John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima 3030944328, 9783030944322

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Tabula Contentorum
Tabula Quaestionum
Table of Contents
List of Questions
List of Contributors
Utrum subiectum proprium in scientia libri De anima sit anima vel ille terminus anima vel corpus animatum vel quoddam aliud aut nihil.
Is the proper subject of the science discussed in De Anima the soul, the term 'soul', the living body, something else, or nothing?
Utrum omnis notitia sit de numero bonorum, id est utrum omnis notitia sit bona.
Is all cognition counted among good things, that is to say, is all cognition good?
Utrum omnis scientia sit de numero honorabilium.
Is all knowledge honorable?
Utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficillimorum.
Is the science of the soul one of the most difficultsciences?
Utrum universale nihil est aut posterius est.
Is a universal nothing or posterior?
Utrum accidentia magnam partem conferant ad cognoscendum quod quid est.
Do accidents contribute a great deal towards cognizing what something is?
Circa secundum librum de anima quaeritur primo utrum omnis anima sit actus substantialis.
Concerning the second book of De Anima we ask first: Is every soul a substantial act?
Utrum omnis anima sit actus primus corporis organici.
Is every soul the first act of an organic body?
Utrum definitio animae sit bona qua dicitur anima est actus primus substantialis corporis physici organici habentis vitam in potentia.
Is the definition of the soul which says that the soul is the first substantial act of an organic physical body that has life in potency a good definition?
Utrum in eodem animali sit eadem anima vegetativa et sensitiva.
Are the vegetative and sensitive souls the samein an animal?
Utrum potentiae animae sint distinctae ab ipsa anima.
Are the powers of the soul distinct from the soul itself?
Utrum potentiae animae debeant distingui per actus autobiecta.
Should the powers of the soul be distinguished by their acts or objects?
Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis animati.
Is the whole soul in every part of the animate body?
Utrum naturalissimum operum in viventibus sit generare sibi simile.
Is it the most natural operation of living things to generate their like?
Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva.
Is sense a passive power?
Utrum necesse est ad sentiendum esse sensum agentem.
Is an agent sense necessary in order to sense?
Utrum sensus possit decipi circa sensibile proprium sibi.
Can sense be deceived about a sensible proper to it?
Utrum sensibilia communia sint per se sensibilia.
Are common sensibles per se sensible?
Utrum numerus, magnitudo, figura, motus, et quies sint sensibilia communia et per se.
Are number, magnitude, shape, motion and rest common, per se sensibles?
Utrum color sit proprium obiectum visus.
Is color the proper object of sight?
Utrum ad videndum colores lumen requiratur propter colorem vel propter medium.
Do we need illumination to see color because of the color or because of the medium?
Utrum sit idem sonus quando ego loquor quem quilibet vestrum audit.
When I speak, do each of you hear the same sound?
Utrum odor multiplicatur realiter per medium vel spiritualiter seu intentionaliter.
Is odor is propagated through a medium in its real being, or in its spiritual or intentional being?
Utrum species qualitatum proprie et per se sensibilium habeant in medio vel in organo instantaneam generationem et multiplicationem.
Do the species of proper and per se sensible qualities have instantaneous generation and propagation in the medium, or in the organ of sense?
Utrum tactus sit unus sensus vel plures.
Is touch one sense or several?
Utrum sint tantum quinque sensus exteriores.
Are there only five external senses?
Utrum sensibile positum supra sensum faciat sensationem, id est, sentiatur.
Does a sensible object placed on a sense produce sensation? That is, is it sensed?
Utrum praeter sensus exteriores oportet ponere unum sensum communem.
Is it necessary to postulate a single common sense?
Utrum oporteat praeter sensum communem ponere alios sensus interiores.
Is it necessary to posit other internal senses in addition to the common sense?
Utrum organum sensus communis sit in corde vel in cerebro seu in capite; nullus enim alibi ponitur illudorganum.
Is the organ of common sense in the heart or in the brain or in the head (for it is not taken to be anywhere else)?
Utrum in organis exterioribus sensuum subiective fiat actualis sensatio vel solum receptio specierum sensibilium et non sensatio nisi in corde.
Does actual sensation take place in the external senses as in a subject, or only the reception of sensible species, with sensation taking place only in the heart?
Circa tertium librum De anima quaeritur primo utrum intellectus humanus sit virtus passiva ab intelligibili.
Concerning Book III of De Anima we ask first: Is the human intellect a passive power as regards an intelligible object?
Utrum oporteat intellectum esse denudatum ab eo quod ipse intelligit.
Must the intellect be devoid of what it understands?
Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma substantialis corporis humani.
Is the human intellect the substantial form of the humanbody?
Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma inhaerens corpori humano.
Is the human intellect a form inhering in the humanbody?
Utrum sit unicus intellectus quo omnes homines intelligentes intelligant.
Is there a unique intellect by which all humans understand when they are thinking?
Utrum intellectus humanus sit perpetuus.
Is the human intellect everlasting?
Utrum intellectus possibilis sit pura potentia sic quod non sit aliquis actus, sicut nec materia prima.
Is the possible intellect pure potency in the sense that it is not any kind of actuality, just like prime matter?
Utrum intellectus prius intelligat universale quam singulare, vel e converso.
Does the intellect understand the universal before the singular, or vice versa?
Utrum intellectus humanus possit se intelligere.
Can the human intellect understand itself?
Utrum necesse sit ad hoc quod homo intelligat concurrere active intellectum agentem, praeter intellectum possibilem.
Is the active contribution of an agent intellect, apart from the possible intellect, necessary for a human being's act of understanding?
Utrum actus vel etiam habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva vel sit res sibi addita.
Is the intellectual act or even its habit the same as the intellective soul, or a thing added to it?
Utrum omnis intellectio simplex sit vera.
Is every simple act of thinking true?
Utrum non ens possit intelligi.
Can a non-being be understood?
Utrum punctum monstretur vel intellegatur ut privatio.
Is a point represented or understood as a privation?
Utrum intellectus sit reservativus specierum intelligibilium, cessante actuali intellectione.
Does the intellect preserve intelligible species once the actual act of thinking has ceased?
Utrum intellectus humanus possit intelligere plura simul.
Can the human intellect understand more than one thing at once?
Utrum in homine sit anima intellectiva alia ab animasensitiva.
Does the intellective soul in a human being differ from the sensitive soul?
Utrum in homine est appetitus appetitui contrarius.
Is one appetite contrary to another in a human being?
Utrum natura faciat aliquid frustra vel etiam deficiat aliquando in necessariis.
Does nature do anything in vain, or is it even sometimes deficient in what is necessary?
Utrum potentia motiva secundum locum sit vegetativa vel sensitiva vel intellectiva vel appetitiva vel aliqua alia potentia animae praeter istas.
Is the locomotive power the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, appetitive, or some other power of the soul besides these?
Index of Names
Index of References in the Footnotes to the Translation
Index of Terms in the Footnotes to the Translation
Index Fontium

Citation preview

Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9

Gyula Klima Peter G. Sobol Peter Hartman Jack Zupko

John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima

Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action Volume 9

Editor-in-Chief Gyula Klima, Fordham University, New York, USA Series Editors Russell Wilcox, University of Navarra, Pamplona, Spain Hendrik Lagerlund, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden Jonathan Jacobs, CUNY, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, USA Dan Bonevac, University of Texas, Austin, USA Sarah Borden, Wheaton College, Wheaton, USA Edward Feser, Pasadena College, Pasadena, USA Jorge Garcia, University of Buffalo, New York, USA William Jaworski, Fordham University, New York, USA Joseph E. Davis, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA Stephan Meier-Oeser, Academy of Sciences of G¨ottingen, G¨ottingen, Germany Jose Ignacio Murillo, University of Navarra, Pamplona, Spain Calvin Normore, UCLA, Los Angeles, USA Penelope Rush, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia Jack Zupko, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada

Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action provides a forum for integrative, multidisciplinary, analytic studies in the areas of philosophy of nature, philosophical anthropology, and the philosophy of mind and action in their social setting. Tackling these subject areas from both a historical and contemporary systematic perspective, this approach allows for various “paradigm-straddlers” to come together under a common umbrella. Digging down to the conceptualhistorical roots of contemporary problems, one will inevitably find common strands which have since branched out into isolated disciplines. This series seeks to fill the void for studies that reach beyond their own strictly defined boundaries not only synchronically (reaching out to contemporary disciplines), but also diachronically, by investigating the unquestioned contemporary presumptions of their own discipline by taking a look at the historical development of those presumptions and the key concepts they involve. This series, providing a common forum for this sort of research in a wide range of disciplines, is designed to work against the well-known phenomenon of disciplinary isolation by seeking answers to our fundamental questions of the human condition: What is there? – What can we know about it? – What should we do about it? – indicated by the three key-words in the series title: Nature, Mind and Action. This series will publish monographs, edited volumes, and commented translations.

Gyula Klima • Peter G. Sobol • Peter Hartman • Jack Zupko

John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima

Gyula Klima Department of Philosophy Fordham University New York, NY, USA

Peter G. Sobol McFarland WI, USA

Peter Hartman Department of Philosophy Loyola University Chicago Chicago, IL, USA

Jack Zupko Department of Philosophy University of Alberta Edmonton, AB, Canada

This work was supported by National Endowment for the Humanities ISSN 2509-4793 ISSN 2509-4807 (electronic) Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action ISBN 978-3-030-94432-2 ISBN 978-3-030-94433-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments We have benefited greatly from the assistance of others since embarking on this project over a decade ago. To organize the project and coordinate our efforts during the initial phase, the editors and translators held meetings at the Radboud University Nijmegen, the University of Western Ontario, Universit´e du Qu´ebec a` Montr´eal, the University of Wisconsin (Madison), the University of Winnipeg, and Fordham University. We are grateful to those institutions for hosting us, and in particular to Hans Thijssen, Paul Bakker, Henrik Lagerlund, and Claude Panaccio, for inviting us and providing welcome surroundings in which to work. Sharon Alford spent many hours on the microfilm reader at Emory University library preparing digital copies of our manuscripts from microfilms for all of us to use. Peter King offered technical advice on editing medieval texts and assistance to the project in its early stages. We were able to rely on outside readers to spot errors and infelicities in the draft text of our Latin edition, and in this capacity, we are happy to acknowledge the expert eyes of Robert Andrews, Jo¨el Biard, and Claude Panaccio. We have not adopted their thoughtful suggestions in all cases, however, and we are of course responsible for any errors that remain. Portions of the translation were tested in a number of venues, such as Gyula Klima’s graduate seminar at Fordham University, Jack Zupko’s philosophical Latin reading group at the University of Alberta, and the students in Peter Hartman’s philosophy graduate seminar at Loyola University Chicago. Again, with the translation, Claude Panaccio’s keen understanding of fourteenth-century philosophical discourse helped us in many places where the manuscripts did not.

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Finally, we thank the National Endowment of the Humanities, whose financial support in the form of a Grant for Editions and Translations (RZ-50988-09) made the edition and translation possible, as well as a grant for a supporting conference co-sponsored by Fordham University in 2012 (RZ-51468-12), which yielded a volume of accompanying interpretive essays edited by Gyula Klima, Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others: A Companion to John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind (Springer 2017).

Introduction Life and Works John Buridan was born around 1300, probably in the diocese of Arras, Picardy. He attended the Coll`ege Lemoine in Paris on a scholarship and then the University of Paris, where he was a member of the Picard Nation. He was formally licensed as a teaching master in the Faculty of Arts by the mid-1320s. His earliest works were polemical in nature — short treatises criticizing contemporary views on the nature of relations, points, and universals — but he soon became known for his lectures on logic, which were eventually revised as his logical masterwork, the Summulae de dialectica. This work, ostensibly written as a commentary on a popular logic text by Peter of Spain, moved far beyond Peter’s work in scope, method, and philosophical insight, to become one of the most widely used logic texts in the later Middle Ages. Buridan also lectured extensively on the works of Aristotle that formed the basis of the arts curriculum in Paris, writing commentaries on virtually the entire Aristotelian corpus, including De anima or On the Soul, the work edited here; indeed, the textual tradition indicates that he lectured on particular Aristotelian texts more than once, presumably polishing and further elaborating his ideas in the process. He is a careful and for the most part sympathetic expositor of Aristotle, but never afraid to reject the philosopher’s views when there is good reason to do so. Like the Summulae de dialectica itself, his Aristotle commentaries were copied and widely circulated at universities in Central and Eastern Europe, where they served as textbooks and reference sources for scholars and students of Aristotle well into the VII

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sixteenth century.1 Buridan continued lecturing, writing, and being active in the scholarly community in Paris until the late 1350s. We do not know his exact death date, but it is likely to have been before 1361, when there is a record of one of his sources of scholarly support being awarded to another person.2

Versions of the Text The text we edit here is the third and final version of Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima (Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima). It is clearly identified as Buridan’s third or final set of lectures (“tertia sive ultima lectura”) on De anima in the catalogue tradition as well as in several of the manuscripts.3 From this we can infer that Buridan lectured on De anima on two previous occasions, although we have yet to find manuscripts we can definitively identify as originating from his first or second lectures. Buridan’s third and final set of lectures on De anima is also a compiled [compilatus] text, meaning that it was probably revised by Buridan himself from original classroom notes taken down by a student or secretary.4 The text we present here shows every sign of having been 1 See,

for example, the extensive analysis provided by Andrews 2016 of the “supercommentary” on De anima — i.e., a commentary on Buridan’s commentary on Aristotle’s De anima — by Bero Magni de Ludosia, a Swedish master active at the University of Vienna between 1429 and 1465. Indeed, Buridan’s commentaries were evidently so useful that they sometimes replaced the texts of Aristotle in the classroom; as Fl¨ueler 2008 writes in connection with Buridan’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, “In fact, I am able to verify that the masters of the Faculty of Arts in Vienna did not read Aristotle at all! Aristotle was not the subject of the lectures; instead, the masters read Buridan’s questions on the Aristotelian Ethics” (265). 2 For Buridan’s career and comprehensive discussion of his philosophy, see Zupko 2003 and Klima 2008, as well as Zupko’s 2018 entry on Buridan in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 3 For example, the explicits of manuscripts S and U below both refer to their texts as the “tertia lectura” of Buridan’s Quaestiones on Aristotle’s De anima. 4 This is attested to in the colophons of four manuscripts (AOR and V below). Two of these manuscripts (O and R) even go so far as to describe the questions as “edited [editae]” by Buridan. For the significance of compilation in manuscript copies of Buridan’s commentaries, see Fl¨ueler 1999, 513–15.

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well established in Buridan’s lifetime, despite occasional and minor differences in wording among the three main families or groups of manuscripts (labeled α , β , and γ ) described below. Buridan’s commentary provides a comprehensive philosophical treatment of Aristotle’s De anima, both in terms of the number (51) and length of the questions raised as well as the complexity of their argumentative structure. The text of the tertia sive ultima lectura survives in some 24 manuscripts in varying conditions and states of completeness. Again, because no manuscript has been identified as containing one of the earlier versions, we cannot tell how Buridan’s psychology might have evolved between the prima and ultima lectura. We know that such a manuscript once existed because there is a medieval record of a bequest to the library of Heidelberg University of a volume containing “certain questions by Buridan on the book, De anima, but not from the final set of lectures [quedam questiones circa librum De anima a Biridano, sed non de ultima lectura].”5 Unfortunately, this volume has been lost. We do have 15 manuscripts of a somewhat abbreviated text with fewer questions,6 which may be the remains of one or both earlier lectures, or later abridgements by Arts Masters who used Buridan’s commentary as the basis for their own lectures on De anima at one of the newly founded universities in Eastern Europe,7 or both. In 1991 Benoˆıt Patar produced an edition of a commentary or commentaries on De anima based on three anonymous manuscripts, which he claimed to be Buridan’s prima lectura, or a hitherto unidentified first set of lectures on the text.8 But doubts have been raised about the validity of Patar’s claim,9 and a more recent study of these same manuscripts by Paul Bakker and Sander de 5 Michael

1985, 705. of each manuscript along with titles of individual questions are provided in Michael 1985, 684–89. 7 For these abridgements, which Markowski 1984 terms “r´ edactions pragoise,” see Markowski 1971, 1984, and 1988. 8 Patar 1991. 9 See the reviews of Patar’s edition by Sten Ebbesen (1994, 758–62), Z´ enon Kaluza (1995, 136–39), and Christoph Fl¨ueler (1995, 218–24). It should be pointed out that the authorship of the text found in the main manuscript (Bruges 477) from which Patar constructed his edition has been a matter of dispute for some time, and that no scholarly consensus has formed around the question. 6 Descriptions

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Boer concludes that, despite some surface similarities, there is no conclusive reason to attribute the text to Buridan because the contents also exhibit similarities to the De anima commentary of Buridan’s younger contemporary, Nicole Oresme.10 Accordingly, Bakker and de Boer conclude that the manuscripts should be catalogued as anonymous commentaries produced around the same time and in the same context as those of Buridan and Oresme.11 There is also an early printed edition of a set of Quaestiones on De anima edited by George Lokert (Paris 1516) and attributed to Buridan,12 but the text corresponds to none of the surviving manuscripts. For a time it was thought that Lokert might have abridged the text of the edition from a lost manuscript of one of the earlier redactions.13 But a recent article concludes that Buridan is unlikely to have been the sole source of this text.14 It is possible that further study of these 15 manuscripts will reveal that they contain earlier versions of Buridan’s De anima commentary. Until that happens, no picture can be given of the development of Buridan’s teachings in psychology. Thankfully, that task can be set aside for now because the text edited here, the tertia sive ultima lectura, is an independent work and clearly intended as such by its author. In it, Buridan refers numerous times to his commentaries on other works of Aristotle, but never to his earlier lectures on De anima; nor does he ever suggest that an argument or conclusion expressed in the final version represents a change from, or an elaboration of, a position taken previously.15 This makes it more likely that the relation between earlier and later versions of a commentary was in Buridan’s 10 For example, the work contained in the Bruges 477 manuscript makes extensive

use of the perspectivist tradition in its discussion of the propagation and reception of sensible species, which is something we find in Oresme’s psychology but not Buridan’s. 11 Bakker and de Boer 2012. 12 Georgius Lokert Scotus 1516. The volume contains a collection of texts, including editions of Buridan’s Quaestiones on Aristotle’s De anima as well as on the books of the Parva Naturalia. 13 See Michael 1985, 716–17. 14 de Boer 2014. 15 Elsewhere, Buridan does not hesitate to tell us when he changes his mind about something, as in his treatment of self-referential paradoxes in the Sophismata (Summulae de dialectica IX, Chapter 8, Seventh Sophism: “Every proposition is false”; tr. Klima 2001, 967–68).

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mind one of supersession rather than continuous development and refinement; in other words, Buridan delivered his tertia lectura on De anima with the idea that it would be his “official” treatment of the subject, replacing earlier commentaries.16

Genre Like other texts in the medieval genre of quaestiones, Buridan’s commentary is divided into particular problems or issues (the quaestiones) he takes to be raised by the authoritative text under discussion: in this case the three books of Aristotle’s De anima. He devotes 6 questions to Book I, 25 to Book II, and 20 to Book III. In keeping with the standard form of such commentaries, each question is headed by the Latin verb “quaeritur” (“it is asked”) followed by the interrogative pronoun “utrum” (“whether”) and the question under consideration (e.g., in q. 9 of Book III, “quaeritur utrum intellectus humanus possit se intelligere” [“it is asked whether the human intellect is able to understand itself”]).17 Typically, the topic question is based on a lemma from the Latin version of Aristotle’s text; we have identified where this is so in our edition. But just as often, and not unlike readers of Aristotle in our own time, Buridan is interested in pursuing issues that are tangential to Aristotle’s discussion. For example, in q. 14 of Book III, he uses Aristotle’s De anima III.6 (430b 21) remark about points being understood as privations as an opportunity to present his own divisibilist solution to the problem of analyzing continuous magnitudes — a solution also discussed at length in other works, where the topic seems more germane.18 But this is not surprising. In fact, the medieval genre of quaestiones was more freewheeling than 16 This

characterization also seems borne out by the manuscript tradition. The tertia sive ultima lectura was evidently the version of choice for copying and further propagation, as its surviving copies far outnumber any other Quaestiones on De anima attributed to Buridan. 17 In the translation, we actually rendered these as direct “yes/no” questions (“Is the human intellect able to understand itself?”) to indicate more clearly the disputational character of the discussion. 18 For example, in Book VI, qq. 1–4 of his Quaestiones on Aristotle’s Physics (Paris 1509, 93vb –98va ).

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its origins as a commentary on a prescribed text might suggest, to the point where Arts Masters such as Buridan felt no compunction about reusing materials they had presented on other occasions and in other contexts, much in the way university lecturers do today.19 Although there is no evidence to suggest Arts Masters were required or even expected to treat of certain topics in their commentaries, a loose but identifiable tradition of questions developed around the text of the De anima,20 usually keyed to specific passages, such as Aristotle’s remark in Book II, chapter 5 (418a 13) that no error is possible regarding proper sensibles (discussed by Buridan in q. 11 of Book II of his commentary), or in Book III, chapter 10 (433b 5–6), about the contrariety of appetites (which Buridan treats in q. 18 of Book III). But the genre offered plenty of room for an author to pose his own questions and to explore the implications of Aristotle’s teachings via passages in other texts, in this case the psychological treatises of Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia (qq. 24–25 of Book II), as well as the controversial interpretations of other authorities, such as Averro¨es and Alexander of Aphrodisias (qq. 3–6 of Book III). There were other medieval genres of commentary, such as the expositio, or literal commentary, which, as the name suggests, involved closer explication of the actual wording of an authoritative text, divided lemmatically into sections and arguments.21 Five manuscripts have been identified as containing Buridan’s expositio on Aristotle’s De anima;22 these appear to represent three different redactions of 19 Likewise,

Buridan explicitly connects q. 8 of Book III of his De anima commentary, “Utrum intellectus prius intelligit universale quam singulare, quam e converso” (see III.8, par. 43 below), with q. 7 of Book I of his Physics commentary, “Utrum universalia sunt nobis notiora singularibus”, which covers much of the same material (ed. Streijger and Bakker, 76–77) 20 See the comprehensive study in Christensen 2018. 21 The division of the text of the three books of De anima is due to its commentators, beginning in late antiquity, most likely for purposes of teaching and study. The most influential medieval division was that of Averro¨es (1126–1198), whose Long Commentary on De anima appeared in the West in a Latin translation by Michael Scot around 1225. From then on, medieval commentators on De anima, including both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, were able to read and study Averro¨es’ commentary, or at least excerpts thereof. Buridan sometimes quotes from it verbatim, e.g., in III.2, par. 6 and III.3, par. 7 below. 22 Michael 1985, 677–83.

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the same commentary, which would correspond to the three versions of the question commentary that probably would have accompanied them.23 As indicated above, the expositio and the quaestiones both originated as classroom lectures on a text that students were required to “read” for their bachelor’s degree. We do not know precisely how Buridan gave his lecture courses, but there is some evidence to suggest that his practice was to deliver the expositio or literal commentary on a given passage and then any quaestiones he took to be raised by it in close proximity, perhaps even on the same day.24 If this is correct, the pedagogical benefit would be to bring the philosophical discussion into alignment with the letter of the text. Be that as it may, the practice was usually not followed when the lectures were transcribed and revised for publication and copying because the two works were almost always bound separately. None of the surviving manuscripts of the Quaestiones edited here is bound with its corresponding expositio.

Authenticity John Buridan is clearly the author of our text. In addition to it being ascribed to him by name in many manuscripts,25 there are numerous references in it to other commentaries we know were written by Buridan, i.e., his Questions on Aristotle’s Physics, Meteorology, De caelo, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics, as well as to Buridan’s own logical masterwork, the Summulae de dialectica. As can be seen 23 Michael

1985, 718. On Buridan’s expositiones (or “dicta” in some manuscripts), see Fl¨ueler 1999, 502–506. 24 By studying the watermarks on a copy of Buridan’s expositio and quaestiones on Aristotle’s Metaphysics written during Buridan’s lifetime (Paris BN lat. 16131), Christoph Fl¨ueler discovered that the scribe used sheets of paper from the same ream to write first the literal commentary and then the question(s) corresponding to it, before proceeding to the next passage from Aristotle, showing that “the commentaries were written down in an alternating fashion, but at the same time period, and in two different fascicles” (Fl¨ueler 1999, 509). 25 For example, among the manuscripts used for this edition, Buridan is identified as the author of the work in the explicit to Book I in mss. A and T (see I.6, par. 19 below) and again in the explicit to the entire text at the end of Book III, in mss. A and V (see III.20, par. 19 below).

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from the apparatus fontium of our edition, these references are accurate and almost always relevant to the topic under discussion. Finally, the arguments and doctrines presented in our text are all recognizably Buridanian in the sense that they fit the characteristically nominalist positions he defends in other works, as well as employing the same kind of fine-grained logical and conceptual analysis to defend them.

Dating We do not know precisely when Buridan delivered the lectures on De anima that became the commentary edited here. There is a reference in q. 11 of Book III to certain articles from the 1347 Parisian Condemnation of the views of the theologian, John of Mirecourt, who was Buridan’s contemporary. Since this does not appear to be a later interpolation, it gives us a terminus post quem: our text must have been composed after 1347. As for a terminus ante quem, there are only two clear references to the De anima commentary in Buridan’s other works, suggesting that it was written fairly late in his career. These are in Book X, q. 2 of his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, and in Book I, q. 7 of his commentary on the Meteorology.26 If Bernd Michael is right that the latter commentary dates from 1357/58,27 then the tertia lectura of Buridan’s De anima commentary must have been produced between 1347 and 1358. Buridan’s probable death date gives us a terminus ante quem only slightly later. We know from his being mentioned in a 1358 jurisdictional dispute at the University of Paris that he was still alive in that year,28 but probably not after 1361, when one of his benefices was reassigned, something that 26 Buridan

briefly refers to Book II, q. 10 and Book III, q. 10 of his Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima (the work edited here) in Book X, q. 2 of his Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum (Paris 1513, f. 205rb ; tr. Kilcullen 2001, 516). The reference in Book I, q. 7 of the Quaestiones in libros Meteorologicorum Aristotelis is to Book II, q. 18 of the Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima. For further details, see Michael 1985, 673–74 and 706–8. As Michael demonstrates, the references can only be to the third and final version of Buridan’s commentary. 27 Michael 1985, 659–75. 28 The available evidence is canvassed in Michael 1985, 399–404. Michael believes Buridan’s actual death date to be October 11, 1360.

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would typically be occasioned by the decease of its incumbent. So, our text was probably composed between 1347 and 1358, and almost certainly before 1361. Bernd Michael speculates further that our text might have been written later in the 1350s because the Mirecourt reference in Book III, q. 11 includes a reference to another late work, the final version of Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s Physics. He concludes, “of all the works of Buridan which originated in the 1350s, the tertia lectura of the De anima is evidently one of the last.”29

Manuscripts Twenty-three manuscripts have been identified containing the text of the tertia sive ultima lectura of Buridan’s Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima.30 None of them appears to have been copied during Buridan’s lifetime; the earliest that can be reliably dated (A = Berlin 566) was written in 1382, more than two decades after Buridan’s death. This is not unusual in the case of Buridan. Christoph Fl¨ueler has found that only seven of approximately 250 surviving copies of Buridan’s works were definitively produced during his lifetime.31 Buridan’s reputation meant that his works were copied often, and, as we shall see below, recopied at other places far from Paris, an activity that continued well into the fifteenth century.

29

Michael 1985, 708. descriptions of most of the manuscripts in our list are available in the two most comprehensive manuscript studies to date: the 1985 doctoral dissertation of Bernd Michael, which gives the state of primary text research on Buridan up to about 1978, and the editor’s introduction to Patar 1991. See also footnote 68 below. 31 Fl¨ ueler 1999, 501. Fl¨ueler also contends that the small number of manuscripts dating from Buridan’s lifetime indicates “his fame was established only after his death” (ibid. 501–502). We tend to agree, if by “fame” is meant Buridan’s fame outside Paris. Buridan was famous during his lifetime in Paris, as his career in the University (twice serving as its Rector, in 1328 and 1340) attests. 30 Full

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Based on the pioneering research of Edmond Faral,32 supplemented by more recent studies by Charles Lohr,33 Zdzisław Kuksewicz,34 Jozef de Raedemaeker,35 Ryszard Palacz,36 Peter C. Marshall,37 Bernd Michael, Benoˆıt Patar, Christoph Fl¨ueler, Paul Bakker, and Sander de Boer,38 the following manuscripts have been identified as containing the text of the tertia sive ultima lectura of Buridan’s Quaestions on De anima (preceded by the letter designation used in this edition): 1. [A]: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek 566, ff. 1ra –65ra39 2. [B]: Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. A.5.1365, ff. 228ra–267vb40

Soppr.

3. [C]: Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. C.4.263, ff. 1ra –68rb41

Soppr.

4. [D]: Krakow, Biblioteka Jagiellonska 2083, ff. 70r –117v42 5. [E]: Li`ege, Biblioth`eque de l’Universit´e 346 C, ff. 53r –95r43 32 Faral

1946 and 1949. 1970, 172–74. 34 Kuksewicz 1961. 35 de Raedemaeker 1963. 36 Palacz 1970. 37 Marshall 1983. 38 Bakker and de Boer 2012. 39 Michael 1985, 694; Patar 1991, 40*: northern Italian provenance; dated 1382 by the scribe. 40 Michael 1985, 695; Patar 1991, 46*–47*: incomplete (text ends in the middle of Book III, q. 4); northern Italian provenance; Michael dates to the fifteenth century. 41 Michael 1985, 695; Patar 1991, 38*: northern Italian provenance (Augustinian friary of Padua, according to the explicit); Michael dates to the end of the fourteenth or beginning of the fifteenth century. 42 Michael 1985, 696; Patar 1991, 38*: incomplete (text ends in Book III, q. 4); probably produced in Krakow; Michael dates to the end of the fourteenth or beginning of the fifteenth century. 43 Not listed in Michael 1985; Patar 1991, 38*–39*; the manuscript is described in Streijger, Bakker, and Thijssen 2010, 17; provenance unknown; Patar dates to c. 1370 as the text is bound with a copy of a Quaestiones De longitudine et brevitate vitae with that date. 33 Lohr

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6. [F]: Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana P.120 sup., ff. 74ra –135va44 7. [G]: M¨unchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 742, f. 2r –52vb45 8. [H]: M¨unchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 18794, f. 93r – 195v46 9. [I]: Oxford, Bodleian Library Canon auct. class. lat. 278, f. 2r –36r47 10. [J]: Oxford, Bodleian Library Canon misc. 393, 1ra –75vb48 11. [K]: Perugia, Biblioteca Communale Augusta N.43, ff. 3ra –60ra49 12. [L]: Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 480 (D.7.6), ff. 6ra –75vb50 13. [M]: Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 592 (F.6.4), ff. 113ra–187vb51 14. [N]: Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 593 (F.6.5), ff. 93ra –148ra52 44 Michael

1985, 696; Patar 1991, 39*: provenance unknown; Michael dates to the fifteenth century. 45 Michael 1985, 696; Patar 1991, 41*: provenance unknown, but ms. was purchased from the collection of the Italian humanist Petrus Victorius (1499–1585); dated 1387 in the explicit, 1388 in the tabula quaestionum. 46 Not listed in Michael 1985; Patar 1991, 39*: provenance unknown; dated 1401 in the explicit. 47 Michael 1985, 696–97; Patar 1991, 41*–42*: northern Italian provenance, possibly Padua or Bologna (Michael); dated 1394 in the explicit. 48 Not listed in Michael 1985; Patar 1991, 39*: northern Italian provenance, probably Padua; dated 1401 in the explicit to Book I; author misidentified as Blasius of Parma in the content summary. 49 Michael 1985, 734; Patar 1991, 42*: provenance uncertain; dated 1394 in the explicit. 50 Michael 1985, 697–98; Patar 1991, 39*–40*: northern Italian provenance; scribe identifies himself as a master at Piacenza, on the basis of which Michael suggests the ms. was written c. 1398–1402. 51 Michael 1985, 698; Patar 1991, 45*: northern Italian provenance; date uncertain, but probably fourteenth century (codex also contains a copy of Albert of Saxony’s commentary on De caelo made in Bologna and dated 1368 in the explicit; another part of the codex [but not the one containing Buridan’s Quaestiones on De anima] is dated 1382). 52 Michael 1985, 698–99; Patar 1991, 42*–43*: northern Italian provenance (written by a student in Perugia, according to the explicit); dated 1396 in the explicit.

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15. [O]: Sarnano, Biblioteca Communale E.14, ff. 1va –46vb53 16. [P]: Sarnano, Biblioteca Communale E.143, ff. 1ra –66ra54 17. [Q]: Treviso, Biblioteche Comunali 420 A, ff. 48ra –87vb55 18. [R]: Citt`a del Vaticano, Reg. lat. 1959, ff. 1ra –69vb56 19. [S]: Citt`a del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 2164, ff. 122ra –234rb57 20. [T]: Citt`a del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 11575, ff. 22ra –87rb58 ¨ 21. [U]: Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek cod. 5437, ff. 176ra – vb59 228 53 Michael

1985, 699; Patar 1991, 45* (where the ms. is erroneously listed as ‘E.68’): incomplete (missing Book II, qq. 1 and 15–25, as well as Book III, qq. 1– 2); provenance uncertain; fourteenth or fifteenth century, but precise date uncertain. 54 Michael 1985, 699–700; Patar 1991, 43*: incomplete (missing the last sections of each question in Book I, qq. 1–3 and most of Book II, q. 5); northern Italian provenance, possibly Padua; dated 1302 in the explicit, which is impossible (more likely 1402, with a missing ‘c’ in the scribe’s ‘millesimo ccco secundo’). 55 Michael 1985, 734; Patar 1991, 44*–45*: provenance unknown; dated 1419 in the explicit to Book II. 56 Michael 1985, 701–2; Patar 1991, 45*–46*: provenance unknown; dated 1404 in the explicit. 57 Michael 1985, 589–90, 700–1; Patar 1991, 38*: provenance unknown; precise date unknown, but another ms. in the same codex is dated 1398 in the explicit and appears to have been written around the same time. Michael notes that the codex for the most part contains works on natural philosophy and was written by two scribes: Petrus de Allamania, who wrote the first part between April and June 1398 (ff. 1–120, containing a copy of Buridan’s Quaestiones on Aristotle’s Physics), and Henricus de Westphalia, who wrote the second part (ff. 122–311, beginning with our text, the tertia lectura of Buridan’s Quaestiones on Aristotle’s De anima, on f. 122) probably around the same time. The colophon indicates that the codex was produced in Bologna in 1398–99 under the direction of Master Dinus de Florentia. It is unclear how the codex came to be in the possession of the Vatican Library. 58 Michael 1985, 701; Patar 1991, 46*: probably northern Italian, from Bologna, Padua, or Pavia (Michael notes that the paper on which it is written is from Ferrara); date uncertain, but probably late fourteenth or early fifteenth century. 59 Michael 1985, 702–3; Patar 1991, 43*–44*: central European provenance (Vienna); date uncertain, but codex contains works written between 1390 and 1416. Missing two folios from Book III.

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¨ 22. [V]: Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek cod. 5454, ff. 2ra – 56vb60 ¨ 23. [W]: Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek cod. ra vb61 ff. 35 –91

5374,

This list does not include manuscripts containing either abbreviated summaries or short excerpts of the text, but only manuscripts that contain the full, or nearly the full, authentic text of the tertia lectura. We have examined copies of all 23 manuscripts listed above, fully collating several questions and parts of other questions. Here are fuller descriptions of each of the manuscripts we used (AETVW):62

[A]: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek 566, ff. 1ra–65ra Our oldest datable manuscript (1382) is written on paper and part of a codex containing 12 quires (originally 13), all written in the same hand and in a style suggesting Italian provenance. The scribe identifies himself as “Fredericus de Meyssena,” although the name is not attested elsewhere, as far as we know. Michael believes that the codex probably belonged to the library of the Franciscan custodial school in Barbarano. It was purchased before 1895 by the Berlin library from a dealer in Padua. The text of Buridan’s tertia lectura is clearly written with relatively few grammatical and structural errors. The scribe sometimes offers disjunctive readings (e.g., “restringuitur vel refertur” for “restringuitur” in Book III, q. 1), as if he is unsure about the reading of his source manuscript, or he was copying from more than one manuscript and decided to note different readings. 60 Michael

1985, 703; Patar 1991, 44*: central European provenance (Vienna); dated 1397 in the explicit. 61 New ms. recently discovered by Sander de Boer (and so not listed in Michael or Patar). The text was miscatalogued as an autograph copy of the Quaestiones on De anima of Henry Totting of Oyta (c. 1330–97) in Franz Unterkircher (1969, 79); central European provenance (Vienna); dated 1393 in the explicit. 62 Most of our codicological information here is from Michael 1985.

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[E]: Li`ege, Biblioth`eque de l’Universit´e 346 C, ff. 53r – 95r This codex has both paper and parchment leaves. Streijger et al. 2010 note that it “contains Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones super libros De caelo and several works by John Buridan, such as his Quaestiones on De anima, Meteora, and Parva Naturalia,” as well as an anonymous Quaestiones on De generatione et corruptione, which can be attributed to Buridan.63 The provenance is unknown. As noted above, its copy of Buridan’s Quaestiones De longitudine et brevitate vitae is dated 1370. Patar 1991 describes the hand as “certainly fourteenth century,” concluding that “it is very probable that the Quaestiones on De anima [in E] are from the same era, which would mean that the Li`ege version [of the text] is very close in time to the last lecture given by the Picard master.”64 But in the absence of further evidence, such as some indication that the two texts are in the same hand or written on paper with matching watermarks, this conclusion strikes us as premature. The text of E is also clearly written with relatively few errors. The verso of some folios was difficult to read in our copy because the binding did not open flat when the manuscript was photographed.

[T]: Citt`a del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 11575, ff. 22ra–87rb This manuscript is written on paper, dating from the end of the fourteenth or beginning of the fifteenth century, and contains works on natural and moral philosophy by John Buridan and Ugo Benzi. Michael notes that T contains paper produced in Ferrara, suggesting that T might have been copied at Bologna, or perhaps at another northern Italian university such as Padua or Pavia.65 It is not known when the codex entered the Vatican library, but there is evidence that it was already part of another Vatican collection in the fifteenth century.

63 Streijger,

Bakker, and Thijssen 2010, 17. 1991, 38*–39*. 65 Michael 1985, 701 64 Patar

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T appears to have been written by two scribes, with the second taking over from the first at folio 15r , in the middle of Book II, q. 8. Patar suggests that the scribes might have been working from two different exemplars.66 The manuscript shows signs of water damage beginning at folio 37r (towards the end of Book II, q. 20) becoming progressively worse until the end. This makes the text difficult to read in places.

¨ [V]: Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek cod. ra vb 5454, ff. 2 –56 This manuscript is written on paper and bound in a codex containing works on natural philosophy. As noted above, the explicit indicates that the manuscript was produced in Vienna in 1397. The scribe even records his name, “Nicolaij de farchas hida(?).” As far as we know, he is not attested elsewhere. The manuscript seems from the beginning to have belonged to the Arts Faculty at the University of Vienna — hence the ownership mark, “Liber facultatis arcium,” in the lower margin of f. 1ra .

¨ [W]: Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek cod. ra vb 5374, ff. 35 –91 This manuscript is written on paper and bound in a codex along with the gloss of an unidentified treatise on natural philosophy written in another hand and dated 1438, as well as a single anonymous question, “Utrum appetitus vel fantasiae sunt causae,” also written in another hand. The scribe of our text tells us in the explicit (f. 91rb ) that it was produced in the studium generale in Vienna in 1393; his name is “Henricus Oltinghi de Oytha,” which led to the misidentification of this text in the catalogue of the Austrian National Library as an auto-

66 Patar

1991, 46*.

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graph of Henry Totting of Oyta’s Quaestiones on De anima. Henry (c. 1330–97) was a philosopher and theologian in his own right who would likely have been in Vienna when the manuscript was written. He was active in Prague, Paris, and Vienna, where he died in 1397. In addition to his own set of Quaestiones on Aristotle’s De anima (as yet unedited), he also composed an abbreviation of Adam Wodeham’s commentary on the Sentences. So Henry may very well have been our scribe in the case of W even though the commentary is not his. Whoever he was, our Henry was a talented scribe with a very legible hand. His version of the text is the oldest datable (1393) from the α or central European family (see groupings below). As mentioned above, Sander de Boer recently discovered the true identity of the text contained in this manuscript but his work came to our attention only after we had finished a draft edition based on AETV.

Methodology For our edition we decided to follow a “best-text strategy” of producing the philosophically most reliable and doctrinally most coherent text justifiable on the basis of available manuscript evidence, instead of a “critical edition” in the technical sense, where we would attempt to reproduce the — perhaps merely hypothetical — text at the root of a properly reconstructed stemma. We performed four soundings against the 23 manuscripts listed above: 21 lines from Book I, q. 1; 19 lines from Book II, q. 2; 117 lines from Book III, q. 1; and 29 lines from Book III, q. 13. These soundings allowed us to identify three groups based upon shared omissions, additions, and variations: DHUVW (α ), BGMRT (β ), and the rest (γ ). Most of the members of α (and none of the members of β ) have a central European provenance: UVW were copied in Vienna and D

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in Krakow (although H is unknown).67 However, we were not able to identify any further major groupings from these soundings.68 Having made these initial divisions, we chose the best text(s) from each of these three groups, namely AETVW. We initially selected V as containing the best text in the α family. We eliminated D and U on the grounds that these manuscripts were incomplete.69 V and H both offered good readings. However, based on our soundings there were relatively few variants between them and further checks revealed omissions in other questions in both manuscripts, some unique and others shared.70 In the absence of decisive evidence from soundings, we chose V because two of the editors 67 When our edition was in final copyediting, we became aware of another manuscript containing the tertia lectura of Buridan’s Quaestiones on De anima: Lambach, Benediktinerstift, Col. 175, ff. 163va–203rb. We were unable to obtain a copy of this manuscript before going to press, but with the help of another scholar who had access to a copy we were able to test 53 lines from our edition of Book III, q. 1 against it. Based on this reading, the Lambach seemed not to belong to either our α or β groups, which would place it in γ . One interesting feature is that it appears to have been produced in Prague, which would make it the only β or γ manuscript with a central European provenance. Here is the explicit, on f. 203rb : “Et patet satis per dicta quomodo procedant rationes que fiebant. Et sic est finis questionis et consequenter omnium aliarum. Expliciunt longe questiones De anima magistri Iohannis Byridani reportate Prage per Wernerum de Drisponscede (Drispenscede?) anno Domini millesimo tricentesimo LXXXVto in vigilia Sancti Iohannis Baptiste hora vicesima prima ante cenam.” We are grateful to Paul Bakker for his generous assistance with this manuscript. 68 S seems to be in a class by itself. We had initially included it in our draft apparatus until its unreliability became clear. S frequently gave variant readings found in no other manuscript, going far beyond the task of a copyist and often entering into the realm of speculation. It is almost as if the scribe had enough philosophical training to feel comfortable augmenting and correcting the argument as he went along. Hence, we removed S from our edition. 69 D ends at Book III, q. 4. U is missing an entire folio, from Book III, q. 14, par. 4, “et si quis dicat ...” to Book III, q. 15, par. 17, “. . . maneret in organo corporeo phantasiae’; and another, from Book III, q. 17, par. 25, “post emissionem spermatis ...” to Book III, q. 19, par. 15, “. . . sibi convenientia”. It also contains a blank space in Book III, q. 20, omitting text from par. 9 “Item incontinens movetur secundum ...” to par. 10 “... agunt cum ratione et nihil contra.” 70 For example, H has unique gaps of 12 words at II.15, par. 3, 3 words at III.10, par. 9, 8 words at III.15, par. 17, and 15 words at III.17, par. 19, as well as a 10-word gap shared with UV at III.5, par. 7. HVW share 5-word gaps at II.17, par. 24 and III.6, par. 14, although in the former case the missing text is added in the margin of W.

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knew that it was reliable, having used it before to construct working editions of Books II and III in their dissertations.71 After W was brought to our attention, we added it to our sounding, but were unable to discern any major differences between it and V. Since we had already completed our initial edition, and since W (1393) is older than V (1397), we decided to read the entire text again against W, adding it to the core family of best texts alongside AETV.72 We selected T as containing the best text from the β group (BGMRT). We eliminated B on the grounds that it was incomplete (ends in the middle of Book III, q. 4). T had fewer gaps than GMR. We selected A and E from the γ group (ACEFIJKLNOPQS). We eliminated OP because these were incomplete (O is missing Book II, qq. 1 and 15–25, as well as Book III, qq. 1–2; P omits the last sections of each question in Book I, qq. 1–3 and most of Book II, q. 5). We eliminated S because it was such an outlier, as mentioned above. AE shared similar homoioteleutonic gaps and had the fewest omissions in our soundings.73 However, we were not able to determine if A or E was the better manuscript, so we decided to use both. A, as it turns out, was also the oldest datable copy (1382).

The Edition The Latin text produced here is the work of three different editors: Peter Hartman (Book I), Peter G. Sobol (Book II), and Jack Zupko 71 See

n. 75 below. finishing the edition, we can now safely say that W is superior to V. For instance, there is a 78-word gap in UV that spans paragraphs 14 and 15 of Book II, q. 1, and a 24-word gap in UV in par. 30. However, W is not free of gaps, with a unique gap of 10 words at III.2, par. 20, as well as gaps of 8 words at I.4, par. 8, 6 words at III.8, par. 16, and 12 words at III.13, par. 9, the latter shared with AT (UV have the text). 73 E is also one of only two manuscripts (the other being W) to include a negative argument (though a different one in each case) missing from the beginning of III.16, par. 3, in all other manuscripts — all of which, oddly, include the reply to this argument at III.16, par. 20. The argument supplied by W (written beneath the column on f. 87vb of W) looks more germane to the reply than the argument supplied by E, so we’ve given the reading of W in the main text of the edition, with the text of E in the apparatus. 72 After

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(Book III).74 Although each editor took primary responsibility for establishing and revising Buridan’s text from our source manuscripts according to principles agreed upon at the start of the project, the entire draft text was thoroughly proofread multiple times and rechecked against the source manuscripts by members of the editorial team. Subsequently, the Latin text was reviewed on its own by several external proofreaders. We classicize all spellings (in the main text as well as in the apparatus fontium) according to the Oxford Latin Dictionary, using the evolved spelling (e.g., tamquam/numquam/eamdem over tanquam/nunquam/eandem) and distinguishing “u” and “v.” We do not note variations in word order, and we ignore certain common variants (e.g., eo quod/quia; ergo/igitur; et sic etiam/et tunc; huius/istius; ille/iste; nec/neque; scilicet/videlicet; sive . . . sive/seu . . . seu; vel/aut/seu; etc.). We do not record variants involving sentence particles such as etiam, enim, autem, tamen, etc. unless the meaning is affected, or categorematic terms with equivalent meaning, e.g., sint distinctae/distinguantur. We silently correct obvious errors in the case endings of nouns and adjectives and the number/mood/voice of verbs. We write out all numerals in the text. As far as the structure of each question is concerned, we have supplied the numbered paragraph divisions in the edition/translation, which often align with paragraph markers supplied by the scribes of our main manuscripts (though we have not noted when they do not). We do not record variants in the first word of paragraphs (Item; Deinde; Demum; Primo; Secundo; etc.) or the ordinal numbering of arguments. We have standardized the opening of each question so that it contains a title question beginning with the interrogative pronoun “Utrum” in the Latin edition and so that it poses an actual question in the English translation, ending with a question mark. We do not record other pro forma verbiage connected with the opening or closing of a question (e.g., “Quaer74 Some

years before the present project began, the editors of Books II and III produced preliminary working editions of those Books as part of their doctoral dissertations (see Sobol 1984 and Zupko 1989), both of which circulated informally for years in the absence of a proper critical edition of the ultima lectura of Buridan’s Quaestiones on De anima. The present edition/translation is much improved because it contains the complete text and is based on better manuscripts.

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itur consequenter nono . . . ”) except at the beginning and ending of each Book. Finally, we use double quotation marks in the edition and translation for verbatim quotations, but italics in the edition and single quotes in the translation when a word or phrase is mentioned. The apparatus is in two tiers. First, the apparatus fontium gives the source(s) of all identifiable references in the body of the text. We provide the Latin wording for all direct quotations but also for some paraphrases too, such as when it seemed to us that the wording of the source contributed to the way Buridan frames and/or discusses the question. We also give internal references: on the Latin side when the reference is to another Book or question of the work (BURIDANUS, QQ. De an.); on the English side if the reference is elsewhere in the same question. Needless to say, for a work that is a commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Buridan quotes often from the letter of the philosopher’s text, as well as from other relevant authorities, both ancient and medieval. At other times, he loosely paraphrases what Aristotle says, or else broadly alludes to an Aristotelian teaching in a certain work. We do not know which source(s) Buridan had at his elbow as he wrote, but in all cases, we have endeavored to provide a modern reference for the source or text in question, with Bekker numbers where appropriate. In the case of literal quotations, we provide an apparatus fontium reference to the Aristoteles Latinus, along with the wording of the passage from that edition.75 In the vast majority of these cases, Buridan’s De anima quotations follow William of Moerbeke’s thirteenth-century Latin — or so-called “nova [new]” — translation of the De anima almost verbatim, though there are occasions where a quotation appears to have come from a florilegium or compilation of authorities such as the Auctoritates Aristotelis, in which case we have supplied a reference to the late thirteenth-century florilegium with that title edited by Jacqueline Hamesse. We record manuscript variants for quoted passages only where we could not find any witnesses with verbatim text of either the Aristoteles Latinus or the Auctoritates 75

In keeping with our policy of classicizing all spellings according to the Oxford Latin Dictionary, we have changed the medieval spellings in quotations from the Aristoteles Latinus to their classical equivalents.

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Aristotelis,76 and we judged that the misquotation affected the way Buridan understood the passage in his subsequent remarks. The second tier, the apparatus criticus, provides the variant readings we have recorded from AETVW. Our apparatus uses the following abbreviations: add. addidit corr. correxit del. delevit exp. expunxit hom. homoioteleuton inf. infra inv. invertit lin. lineam marg. margine om. omisit praem. praemisit ras. rasura rep. repetivit sup. supra

The Translation As with the Latin edition, our English translation is the work of three different translators: Peter Hartman (Book I), Gyula Klima (Book II), and Jack Zupko (Book III). This might seem a recipe for inconsistency given natural differences in the way English speakers express themselves, to say nothing of differing stylistic preferences in translating medieval philosophical texts. But in practice we found that even 76 Our

manuscripts exhibited interesting variations in the precise wording of their Aristotle quotations, despite their having originated from the same source text(s), with A (= Berlin 566) usually offering the reading closest to the modern edited versions found in the Aristoteles Latinus and Auctoritates Aristotelis.

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our initial drafts read well together, and were harmonious where it really mattered, which is to say, on points of doctrine. Stylistic niceties were discussed at length by the editors/translators in person at meetings during the first three years of the project, resulting in a basic equivalence lexicon of stock phrases and technical terms for use in revision. As the project moved along, particular translation issues were discussed and resolved by the translators via email. The translation of each Book was then carefully proofread by the other translators, as well as tested in other venues such as our graduate seminars and Latin reading groups. On the handful of occasions where we could not agree about how to render a particular passage, the final decision was always left to the translator of the Book in question, just as its editor had final say over how the Latin text should read.

Tabula Contentorum Agnitio

V

Introductio

VII

Liber Primus I. 1 Utrum subiectum proprium in scientia libri De anima sit anima vel ille terminus anima vel corpus animatum vel quoddam aliud aut nihil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 2 Utrum omnis notitia sit de numero bonorum, id est utrum omnis notitia sit bona. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 3 Utrum omnis scientia sit de numero honorabilium. . . . . I. 4 Utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficillimorum. . I. 5 Utrum universale nihil est aut posterius est. . . . . . . . . I. 6 Utrum accidentia magnam partem conferant ad cognoscendum quod quid est. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Liber Secundus II. 1 Circa secundum librum de anima quaeritur primo utrum omnis anima sit actus substantialis. . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 2 Utrum omnis anima sit actus primus corporis organici. . . II. 3 Utrum definitio animae sit bona qua dicitur anima est actus primus substantialis corporis physici organici habentis vitam in potentia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 4 Utrum in eodem animali sit eadem anima vegetativa et sensitiva. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 5 Utrum potentiae animae sint distinctae ab ipsa anima. . .

XXX

2

. . . . . .

4

. . . .

16 30 42 52

. .

68 84

. . 86 . . 104

. . 124 . . 136 . . 156

Table of Contents Acknowledgements

V

Introduction

VII

Book I I. 1 Is the proper subject of the science discussed in De Anima the soul, the term ’soul’, the living body, something else, or nothing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 2 Is all cognition counted among good things, that is to say, is all cognition good? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 3 Is all knowledge honorable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 4 Is the science of the soul one of the most difficult sciences? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 5 Is a universal nothing or posterior? . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 6 Do accidents contribute a great deal towards cognizing what something is? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Book II II. 1 Concerning the second book of De Anima we ask first: Is every soul a substantial act? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 2 Is every soul the first act of an organic body? . . . . . . . II. 3 Is the definition of the soul which says that the soul is the first substantial act of an organic physical body that has life in potency a good definition? . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 4 Are the vegetative and sensitive souls the same in an animal? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 5 Are the powers of the soul distinct from the soul itself? .

XXXI

3

. .

5

. . . .

17 31

. . . .

43 53

. .

69 85

. . 87 . . 105

. . 125 . . 137 . . 157

TABULA C ONTENTORUM II. 6 II. 7 II. 8 II. 9 II.10 II.11 II.12 II.13 II.14 II.15 II.16 II.17 II.18

II.19 II.20 II.21 II.22 II.23 II.24

II.25

Utrum potentiae animae debeant distingui per actus aut obiecta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis animati. . Utrum naturalissimum operum in viventibus sit generare sibi simile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum necesse est ad sentiendum esse sensum agentem. . Utrum sensus possit decipi circa sensibile proprium sibi. . Utrum sensibilia communia sint per se sensibilia. . . . . . Utrum numerus, magnitudo, figura, motus, et quies sint sensibilia communia et per se. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum color sit proprium obiectum visus. . . . . . . . . . Utrum ad videndum colores lumen requiratur propter colorem vel propter medium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum sit idem sonus quando ego loquor quem quilibet vestrum audit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum odor multiplicatur realiter per medium vel spiritualiter seu intentionaliter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum species qualitatum proprie et per se sensibilium habeant in medio vel in organo instantaneam generationem et multiplicationem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum tactus sit unus sensus vel plures. . . . . . . . . . . Utrum sint tantum quinque sensus exteriores. . . . . . . . Utrum sensibile positum supra sensum faciat sensationem, id est, sentiatur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum praeter sensus exteriores oportet ponere unum sensum communem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum oporteat praeter sensum communem ponere alios sensus interiores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum organum sensus communis sit in corde vel in cerebro seu in capite; nullus enim alibi ponitur illud organum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum in organis exterioribus sensuum subiective fiat actualis sensatio vel solum receptio specierum sensibilium et non sensatio nisi in corde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

XXXII

. . 174 . . 188 . . . . .

. . . . .

218 238 266 286 306

. . 320 . . 346 . . 356 . . 368 . . 382

. . 402 . . 490 . . 504 . . 530 . . 548 . . 560

. . 584

. . 610

XXXIII II. 6 II. 7 II. 8 II. 9 II.10 II.11 II.12 II.13 II.14 II.15 II.16 II.17 II.18

II.19 II.20 II.21 II.22 II.23 II.24 II.25

TABLE

OF

C ONTENTS

Should the powers of the soul be distinguished by their acts or objects? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is the whole soul in every part of the animate body? . . . Is it the most natural operation of living things to generate their like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is sense a passive power? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is an agent sense necessary in order to sense? . . . . . . . Can sense be deceived about a sensible proper to it? . . . Are common sensibles per se sensible? . . . . . . . . . . Are number, magnitude, shape, motion and rest common, per se sensibles? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is color the proper object of sight? . . . . . . . . . . . . Do we need illumination to see color because of the color or because of the medium? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . When I speak, do each of you hear the same sound? . . . Is odor is propagated through a medium in its real being, or in its spiritual or intentional being? . . . . . . . . . . . Do the species of proper and per se sensible qualities have instantaneous generation and propagation in the medium, or in the organ of sense? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is touch one sense or several? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Are there only five external senses? . . . . . . . . . . . . Does a sensible object placed on a sense produce sensation? That is, is it sensed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is it necessary to postulate a single common sense? . . . . Is it necessary to posit other internal senses in addition to the common sense? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is the organ of common sense in the heart or in the brain or in the head (for it is not taken to be anywhere else)? . . Does actual sensation take place in the external senses as in a subject, or only the reception of sensible species, with sensation taking place only in the heart? . . . . . . . . .

. . 175 . . 189 . . . . .

. . . . .

219 239 267 287 307

. . 321 . . 347 . . 357 . . 369 . . 383

. . 403 . . 491 . . 505 . . 531 . . 549 . . 561 . . 585

. . 611

TABULA C ONTENTORUM

XXXIV

Liber Tertius III. 1 Circa tertium librum De anima quaeritur primo utrum intellectus humanus sit virtus passiva ab intelligibili. . . . . III. 2 Utrum oporteat intellectum esse denudatum ab eo quod ipse intelligit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 3 Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma substantialis corporis humani. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 4 Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma inhaerens corpori humano. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 5 Utrum sit unicus intellectus quo omnes homines intelligentes intelligant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 6 Utrum intellectus humanus sit perpetuus. . . . . . . . . . . III. 7 Utrum intellectus possibilis sit pura potentia sic quod non sit aliquis actus, sicut nec materia prima. . . . . . . . . . . III. 8 Utrum intellectus prius intelligat universale quam singulare, vel e converso. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 9 Utrum intellectus humanus possit se intelligere. . . . . . . III.10 Utrum necesse sit ad hoc quod homo intelligat concurrere active intellectum agentem, praeter intellectum possibilem. III.11 Utrum actus vel etiam habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva vel sit res sibi addita. . . . . . . . . . . . III.12 Utrum omnis intellectio simplex sit vera. . . . . . . . . . . III.13 Utrum non ens possit intelligi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.14 Utrum punctum monstretur vel intellegatur ut privatio. . . . III.15 Utrum intellectus sit reservativus specierum intelligibilium, cessante actuali intellectione. . . . . . . . . III.16 Utrum intellectus humanus possit intelligere plura simul. . III.17 Utrum in homine sit anima intellectiva alia ab anima sensitiva. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.18 Utrum in homine est appetitus appetitui contrarius. . . . . . III.19 Utrum natura faciat aliquid frustra vel etiam deficiat aliquando in necessariis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

630 . 632 . 646 . 658 . 674 . 690 . 702 . 718 . 728 . 764 . 782 . . . .

800 822 838 854

. 866 . 890 . 908 . 922 . 934

XXXV

TABLE

OF

C ONTENTS

Book III III. 1 Concerning Book III of De Anima we ask first: Is the human intellect a passive power as regards an intelligible object? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 2 Must the intellect be devoid of what it understands? . . . III. 3 Is the human intellect the substantial form of the human body? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 4 Is the human intellect a form inhering in the human body? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 5 Is there a unique intellect by which all humans understand when they are thinking? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 6 Is the human intellect everlasting? . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 7 Is the possible intellect pure potency in the sense that it is not any kind of actuality, just like prime matter? . . . . . III. 8 Does the intellect understand the universal before the singular, or vice versa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 9 Can the human intellect understand itself? . . . . . . . . III.10 Is the active contribution of an agent intellect, apart from the possible intellect, necessary for a human being’s act of understanding? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.11 Is the intellectual act or even its habit the same as the intellective soul, or a thing added to it? . . . . . . . . . . III.12 Is every simple act of thinking true? . . . . . . . . . . . . III.13 Can a non-being be understood? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.14 Is a point represented or understood as a privation? . . . . III.15 Does the intellect preserve intelligible species once the actual act of thinking has ceased? . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.16 Can the human intellect understand more than one thing at once? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.17 Does the intellective soul in a human being differ from the sensitive soul? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.18 Is one appetite contrary to another in a human being? . . III.19 Does nature do anything in vain, or is it even sometimes deficient in what is necessary? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

631

. . 633 . . 647 . . 659 . . 675 . . 691 . . 703 . . 719 . . 729 . . 765

. . 783 . . . .

. . . .

801 823 839 855

. . 867 . . 891 . . 909 . . 923 . . 935

TABULA C ONTENTORUM III.20

XXXVI

Utrum potentia motiva secundum locum sit vegetativa vel sensitiva vel intellectiva vel appetitiva vel aliqua alia potentia animae praeter istas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944

Index Fontium

985

XXXVII III.20

TABLE

OF

C ONTENTS

Is the locomotive power the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, appetitive, or some other power of the soul besides these? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945

Works Cited

959

Index of Names

973

Index of References in the Footnotes to the Translation

975

Index of Terms in the Footnotes to the Translation

979

List of Contributors Peter Hartman, Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA Gyula Klima, Department of Philosophy, Fordham University, New York, NY, USA Research Center for the History of Ideas, Institute of Hungarian Research, Budapest, Hungary Peter G. Sobol, McFarland, WI, USA Jack Zupko, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada

XXXIX

Liber Primus

2

Book I

3

L IBER I Q UAESTIO 1

4

Utrum subiectum proprium in scientia libri De anima sit anima vel ille terminus anima vel corpus animatum vel quoddam aliud aut nihil.

5

10

15

1. Et arguitur primo quod sit corpus animatum, quia operationes et passiones hic consideratae sunt compositi ex corpore et anima et non animae sine corpore nec corporis sine anima. Unde etsi intelligentiae, quae aliquando vocantur animae corporum caelestium, et Deus, qui etiam aliquando vocatur anima mundi, intelligant sine ministerio corporis, tamen de huiusmodi intellectione non consideratur in hoc libro. Similiter etiam si anima humana post mortem separata a corpore intelligat, tamen de hoc non consideratur hic. Sed subiectum huius scientiae debet poni proprium et adaequatum sic quod per se et principaliter in hac scientia considerata ad ipsum attribuantur; ergo etc. 2. Item per idem arguitur quia subiectum proprium alicuius scientiae debet habere passiones consideratas in illa scientia; anima autem non habet tales, sed sunt communes sibi et corpori; ergo etc. 3. Et hoc confirmatur quia haec scientia est naturalis. Modo in secundo Physicorum dicitur quod considerans formam naturali

1 proprium ] et adaequatum add. W || in scientia ] om. AE || anima ] vel in scientia huius libri quem communiter solemus vocare librum de anima add. W 5 compositi ] compositae T corporis animati scilicet compositi ex materia et forma seu W 7 aliquando ] solum W 8 aliquando ] om. AE 9 intellectione ] consideratione AE 11 subiectum ] proprium add. AET 12–13 proprium . . . attribuantur ] cuius proprie sunt primae et principales passiones in hac scientia consideratae AET 16 passiones ] proprias add. T || consideratas ] constitutas T || scientia ] dicitur subiectum add. in marg. E in qua dicitur subiectum add. T © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 1

5

B OOK I Q UESTION 1

Is the proper subject of the science discussed in De Anima the soul, the term ‘soul’, the living body, something else, or nothing?

1. First, it is argued that its proper subject is the living body. The activities and attributes considered here belong to the composite of soul and body, not to the soul without the body, nor to the body without the soul. It is for this reason that even though the intelligences1 (which are sometimes called the souls of the heavenly bodies) and God (sometimes called the soul of the world) engage in thought without the aid of a body, nevertheless this kind of thinking is not studied in this book. Likewise, even if the human soul existing apart from the body after death does engage in thought, this is not studied here. However, we should postulate the subject of this science to be proper and adequate in such a way that the things studied in this science are primarily and per se attributed to the subject;2 therefore, etc.3 2. Again, by the same token, the proper subject of a science ought to have the attributes studied in that science. Yet the soul does not have these attributes, for they are common to it and the body; therefore, etc. 3. This is confirmed as follows. This is a natural science. However, in Physics II Aristotle declares that someone who studies a form 1

The intelligences are immaterial intellective beings (usually identified as angels), some of whom carry out cosmological tasks such as rotating the heavenly spheres. 2 For Buridan’s discussion of the subject of a science, see Summulae de dialectica 8.3.5. According to that discussion, the adequate subject of a science is the genus to which whatever is considered in the science is attributed per se (on its own account) and primarily (not on account of something else). 3 Usually, when the conclusion to be drawn is obvious, medieval authors and scribes indicate it with this phrase (“therefore, etc.” or just “therefore”) rather than spelling it out. The translation will preserve this feature of the text.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 1

L IBER I Q UAESTIO 1 20

25

30

35

6

consideratione oportet quod consideret “materiam usque ad quid” et sic compositum. 4. Et iterum de corpore vivente hic consideratur non tamquam de passione nec tamquam de parte nec tamquam de principio nec tamquam de causa subiecti huius scientiae; ergo tamquam de subiecto. 5. Item haec scientia est una pars per se et principalis scientiae naturalis; ideo subiectum eius debet esse aliqua pars per se subiectiva subiecti totalis scientiae naturalis, scilicet entis mobilis; anima autem non est per se ens mobile sed corpus animatum; ergo etc. 6. Item quaelibet scientia debet supponere de subiecto suo proprio quid est et quia est, ut habetur primo Posteriorum; et hoc non supponitur hic de anima sed investigatur quid est anima secundo huius; ergo etc. 7. Item nec illa anima est subiectum proprium huius scientiae, nec ista, et sic de aliis; ergo nulla. 8. Oppositum arguitur per communem huius scientiae denominationem, Aristoteles enim et omnes alii vocant eam scientiam de anima et non scientiam de corpore animato. Unde Aristoteles in principio libri De sensu et sensato, continuans scientiam parvorum librorum naturalium ad scientiam huius libri, dicit “in libro isto determinatum

20 materiam usque ad quid ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.2 194a22–23 (Ar. lat. VII.1 52.7): “Eiusdem autem scientiae est cognoscere speciem et materiam usque ad hoc.” Auc. Ar. 2.59 (ed. Hamesse, 145): “Materia et forma sunt eiusdem considerationis.” 30 primo Posteriorum ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.1 71a 11–12. 31 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1–2 412a 1–413a10. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.1–3. 39–42 in libro . . . habentibus ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu 1 436a1– 3 (Ar. lat. XIII.2 3.1–3): “Quoniam autem de anima secundum ipsam determinatum est et de virtute qualibet ex parte ipsius, consequens est facere considerationem de animalibus et vitam habentibus omnibus, quae sunt proprie et quae communes operationes eorum.” 22 consideratur ] constituitur T 23 parte ] subiecti add. in marg. W 24 causa ] esse W || huius scientiae ] om. W 27 subiecti ] om. W 29 suo ] om. W || proprio ] primo A om. TW 33 proprium ] om. W 34 aliis ] singulis A singulis aliis E

7

B OOK I Q UESTION 1

as a natural philosopher must also study “its matter up to a point,” and so the composite.4 4. Again, the living body is studied here, but it is not studied as an attribute, part, principle, or cause of the subject of this science. Therefore, it is studied as its subject. 5. Again, this science is a per se principal part of natural science, and so its subject ought to be some per se subjective part of the whole subject of natural science, namely, a being capable of motion. However, the soul is not per se a being capable of motion, whereas the living body is; therefore, etc.5 6. Again, each science should assume what its proper subject is and that it exists, as Posterior Analytics I maintains. However, this is not assumed here about the soul, but rather what the soul is is investigated in De Anima II; therefore, etc.6 7. Again, neither this soul nor that soul, etc., is the proper subject of this science; therefore no soul is the subject of this science. 8. The opposite is argued for by appeal to what this science is usually called, for Aristotle and everyone else calls it the science of the soul, not the science of the living body. Accordingly, at the beginning of On Sense and What is Sensed Aristotle connects the science discussed in the Brief Essays on Natural Philosophy7 to the science 4 According to Aristotle, material forms are supposed to be defined with reference to

the kind of matter they inform. His classic example is the definition of ‘snubness’, which ought to be defined as the ‘concavity of a nose’. 5 A subjective part is a part of a universal whole. More precisely, it is a specific or less generic term that can be put as the subject-term for a more generic predicateterm (the universal whole) in a per se universal predication. For instance, ‘human’ is a subjective part of ‘animal’, for the universal predication “Every human is an animal” is per se, that is, essentially true. Likewise, ‘living body’ is a subjective part of ‘a being capable of motion’, for “Every living body is a being capable of motion” is a true, per se, universal predication. By contrast, ‘soul’ is not a subjective part of the term ‘a being capable of motion’, because “Every soul is a being capable of motion” is not a true, per se, universal predication, for the soul, being a form, is moved only per accidens, on account of the motion of the body it informs. For more on the notion of a subjective part in medieval philosophy, see Arlig 2015. 6 See II.1–3 for Buridan’s discussion of what the soul is. 7 The Brief Essays on Natural Philosophy (Parva naturalia) is the collection of natural works discussing issues related to the soul and the body, e.g., On Sense and What is Sensed, On Memory, etc.

L IBER I Q UAESTIO 1 40

45

50

55

60

65

8

esse de anima secundum se ipsam et de virtute qualibet ex parte ipsius et consequenter determinandum esse de animalibus et vitam habentibus.” 9. In ista quaestione dimitto opinionem modernorum multorum non volentium in una totali scientia aggregata ex pluribus diversis conclusionibus et demonstrationibus assignare aliquod subiectum unum proprium, sed tot subiecta quot sunt conclusiones demonstratae in ea ex diversis terminis constitutae, verbi gratia in totali geometria et in totali metaphysica etc. Hanc enim opinionem alibi satis improbavi; et pertinet eius improbatio magis proprie ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, nam in illo libro debet videri quod oportet talem scientiam habere unitatem ex unitate alicuius unius considerati principaliter in illa scientia ad quod omnia alia prout in illa scientia considerantur habent attributionem. Et hoc vocamus in proposito subiectum proprium et adaequatum huius scientiae. Et non vocamus illud proprium subiectum et adaequatum illius scientiae quia acceptum sit in qualibet conclusione demonstrata vel demonstrabili per illam scientiam vel in illa scientia, nec etiam quia illa scientia illi subiecto inhaereat, sed quia nihil in illa scientia consideratur nisi ea ratione qua attribuitur ad ipsum, vel quia est pars eius vel passio vel principium vel privatio vel contrarium partis aut passionis, scilicet secundum attributionem propinquam vel remotam. 10. Hiis ergo suppositis notanda est in proposito differentia huius scientiae ad scientiam parvorum librorum naturalium, scilicet quia in hac scientia non consideratur nisi de anima secundum se et de eius potentiis et operationibus ea ratione qua se tenent ex parte animae et de

43 opinionem modernorum multorum ] E.g., O CKHAM, Expositio in libros Physicorum Prologus; Summa logicae I.30. 48 alibi ] B URIDANUS, QQ. An. post. I.23. Cf. QQ. Porph. Isa. 3. 45 aliquod ] om. T || unum ] sibi add. W 46 subiecta ] om. AET 47 constitutae ] dicunt fore assignanda add. W 48 metaphysica ] mathematica TW || etc. ] plura subiecta esse asserunt secundum pluralitatem consequentiam(!) in eis assignatorum et demonstratorum W || alibi ] ego Buridanus add. A 50 talem ] totalem W 54–55 Et . . . scientiae ] hom. T 58 scientia ] om. W || vel ] ut AET 60 partis aut ] alicuius AET || passionis ] contrarium add. T

9

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discussed in this work, saying that “matters about the soul in itself and with regard to each of its powers have been settled in De Anima, and next [namely, in the Brief Essays on Natural Philosophy] matters about animals and things having life should be settled.” 9. In this question, I set aside the opinion of several modern authors8 who do not want to assign some single proper subject to a whole science aggregated from many different conclusions and demonstrations. Rather, on their view, there are as many subjects as there are conclusions, made up of different terms, demonstrated in the science in question, for instance, in the whole of geometry or the whole of metaphysics, and so on. Now, I sufficiently disproved this opinion elsewhere, and the disproof pertains more strictly to the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics, for in [our Questions on] that work one should see that such a science must have its unity in virtue of the unity of the single thing principally studied in it, to which everything else, insofar as it is studied in that science, is attributed. This is what we call the proper and adequate subject of this science in the question at hand. We do not call it the proper and adequate subject of this science because it was taken as the subject in any conclusion that is demonstrated or demonstrable through or in this science, nor even because this science inheres in it, but rather because nothing in this science is studied except insofar as it is attributed to this subject as its part, attribute, principle or as the privation or contrary of one of its parts or attributes — that is to say, because it is attributed to the subject either directly or indirectly.9 10. Assuming these results, we should note here the difference between this science and the science discussed in the Brief Essays on Natural Philosophy, namely that in this science all that is studied is the soul in itself, and its powers and activities insofar as they stand in 8 Buridan

likely has Ockham in mind. See Ockham, Summa logicae I.30 and Expositio in libros Physicorum, Prologus. 9 See Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I.23, where he argues that any science, as a whole body of knowledge consisting of several demonstrated conclusions and their demonstrations, owes its unity to that one (kind of) thing in respect of which everything else considered in that science is investigated, precisely insofar as it related to that one (kind of) thing. See also Summulae de dialectica 8.3.6 and Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge 3.

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obiectis prout agunt in ipsam animam. Unde si aliquid hic dicatur de complexionibus corporum animatorum, hoc est incidentaliter solum. Sed in parvis libris naturalibus determinatur de passionibus et operationibus communibus animatorum ex parte totius compositi ex anima et corpore et de eis quae ex parte corporis requiruntur ad huiusmodi passiones et operationes. 11. Et tunc manifeste dicendum est ad quaestionem quod anima, id est iste terminus anima, est ponendus subiectum proprium in hac scientia, quia hic est primo et principaliter in hac scientia consideratus, nec aliquid dicitur de consideratione huius scientiae nisi secundum attributionem ad ipsum. Unde etiam haec scientia dicitur una propter illius termini unitatem et attributionem aliorum terminorum ad ipsum, sicut exercitus dicitur unus propter unitatem principis et ordinem aliorum ad ipsum. Et etiam propter distinctionem illius termini ab aliis terminis primo consideratis in aliis scientiis, haec scientia dicitur esse scientia ab aliis distincta, nec potest aliter distingui haec scientia a scientia parvorum librorum naturalium quam sicut dictum est; ergo etc. 12. Et propter solutiones rationum notandum est sicut bene dicit Aristoteles in prooemio huius libri quod licet non possit esse sphaera vel planum sine materia sive corpore materiali et sine virtutibus naturalibus, tamen hoc non obstante possumus considerare de sphaera et plano secundum se sine aliqua consideratione quae vel qualis sit natura rei quae est sphaerica vel plana aut quae sunt potentiae vel virtutes naturales ipsius, verbi gratia si consideramus quod sphaera tangit planum secundum punctum. Et ita similiter intendit Aristoteles quod quamvis anima esset inseparabilis a corpore nec posset suas operationes exercere sine corpore, tamen possibile est considerare de 85 in prooemio huius libri ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 403a12–15. Cf. B URIDAN US , QQ. De an. III.14. 66 hic ] ibi T 67 complexionibus ] corporis animati vel add. W || solum ] et non de principali intentione add. W 69 communibus ] om. A || totius ] corporis W 73 proprium ] et adaequatum add. W 74 hic ] hoc ET iste terminus anima W 76 ipsum ] ipsam animam seu ad hunc terminum anima W 77 terminorum ] om. AET 78–79 et ordinem ] in ordine W 79 termini ] anima add. W 81 scientia ] una AEV 86 planum ] in puncto add. in marg. E 89 rei ] om. A 90 si ] sicut A sic E 91 intendit ] innuit A 92 anima ] om. E

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relation to the soul, and also their objects insofar as they act upon the soul. Thus anything said here about the composition of living bodies is purely incidental. By contrast, the Brief Essays on Natural Philosophy takes up attributes and activities common to living bodies in relation to the entire composite of soul and body, as well as features of the body that are required for these activities and attributes. 11. We should then clearly reply to the question at hand that the soul, that is, the term ‘soul’, should be put forward as the proper subject of this science. For this term is studied first and principally in this science, and everything said in the study of this science is attributed to this term. This science is accordingly also said to be one science due to the unity of this term and the attribution of other terms to it, just as an army is said to be one due to the unity of its commander and the subordination of others to them.10 As well, owing to the distinctness of this term from other terms primarily studied in the other sciences, this science is said to be a science distinct from the others. Nor can this science be distinguished from the science discussed in Brief Essays on Natural Philosophy in any other way than the one just described; therefore, etc. 12. In order to give an answer to the opening arguments, let us note, as Aristotle rightly says in the prologue to De Anima, that even though there cannot be a sphere or plane without matter or a material body and without natural faculties, this still does not prevent us from being able to study the sphere or the plane in itself without taking into consideration the nature (or the sort of nature) that the sphere or plane has, or what its capacities or natural faculties are, for instance when we consider that a sphere touches a plane at a point.11 Aristotle holds similarly that even if the soul were inseparable from the body and could not carry out its activities without the body, it is still possible to

10 According to

Buridan, a science is not only about a term (or about a demonstrated proposition in which this term is the subject), but also about the things falling under the term. See also Summulae de dialectica, Sophismata, Part 3, 13th Sophism (tr. Klima, 898). 11 See below III.14 for a dedicated discussion of this passage.

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anima secundum se ipsam considerando passiones et praedicata sibi convenientia secundum se et non toti corpori. Multa enim sunt talia, ut quod anima sit actus corporis, hoc enim non convenit corpori neque composito ex anima et corpore; quod etiam anima sit principium corporis secundum agens, secundum formam, et secundum finem; quod etiam anima dividatur in plures potentias propter diversas operationes vitales; et sic de aliis. 13. Et per hoc solvuntur rationes quae fiebant ante oppositum. 14. Ad primam enim conceditur quod operationes animae de quibus hic consideratur non exercentur sine corpore, tamen non considerantur hic quantum ad ea quae requiruntur ex parte corporis — immo sic in parvis libris naturalibus — sed considerantur hic solum secundum attributionem ipsarum ad animam. 15. Et per idem respondetur ad aliam, sunt enim passiones et praedicata quae appropriate attribuuntur animae, licet forte non sine habitudine ad corpus, ut esse actum primum secundum quem vivimus et esse principium corporis secundum formam, finem, et agens. Etsi operationes animae sint communes corpori et animae, tamen dictum est quod non consideratur hic de eis secundum illam rationem. 16. Ad aliam consimiliter conceditur quod hic non consideratur secundum simplicem rationem quidditativam ipsius (quia esset metaphysicalis consideratio) sed in ordine ad corpus et ad suas operatio-

96 anima . . . corporis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a22, 27. 97–98 anima . . . finem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415b9–12. 109 esse . . . vivimus ] A RI STOTELES , De an. II.1 412a 27. 110 esse . . . agens ] A RISTOTELES , De an. II.4 415b 9–12. 94–95 passiones . . . secundum se ] praedicata sibi convenientia et passiones secundum se ipsi convenientes W 100 vitales ] om. A exercendas add. TW 101 Et . . . oppositum ] ad rationes T || ante oppositum ] om. AE 112 de eis ] om. T 113 consimiliter ] rationem principalem consimiliter T dicitur et add. W || consideratur ] de anima add. T determinatur de anima W 114 quia ] ut sic add. W || esset ] oportet T 115 ordine ] habitudine AET

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study the soul in itself by studying the attributes and predicates that are suited to the soul in itself, not to the entire body. There are in fact many such attributes and predicates, for example: the soul is the act of the body (this does not apply to the body nor to the composite of soul and body); the soul is the principle of the body as agent, form, and end; the soul is divided into many powers according to its different vital activities; and so on. 13. Based on this, we answer the arguments which were raised above for the opposing view as follows. 14. To the first argument,12 we grant that the activities of the soul studied here are not carried out without the body. However, they are not studied here in connection with what is required on the side of the body (which is what is studied in the Brief Essays on Natural Philosophy). Rather, they are studied here only insofar as they are attributed to the soul. 15. To the second argument,13 we reply with the same line of reasoning. There are attributes and predicates that are properly attributed to the soul, even though, perhaps, not without a relation to the body, such as being the first act by which we live, or being the principle of the body as form, end, and agent. Indeed, even if the activities of the soul are common to it and the body, they are nevertheless not studied in that regard here, as mentioned above. 16. To the third argument,14 we likewise grant that the soul is not studied here with regard to its simple quidditative nature, which would be a metaphysical study, but in relation to the body and its activities. 12 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above. 14 See par. 3 above. 13 See

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nes. Sed tamen consideratur quantum ad praedicata sibi attributa et non corpori neque composito. 17. Ad aliam dico quod quidquid hic consideratur de corpore vivente, hoc non est nisi secundum attributionem ad animam. Unde nec hic considerantur termini supponentes pro corpore nisi incidentaliter vel in obliquo, ut quia anima est actus corporis etc. Nec est scientia de corpore vivente completa in hoc libro, sed complebitur per alios libros sequentes qui considerabunt de eis quae ex parte corporis requiruntur ad operationes vitales. 18. Ad aliam dico quod sufficit ad hoc quod ista scientia est naturalis quod consideretur in ea de aliqua parte integrali entis per se mobilis in ordine ad operationes naturales. 19. Ad aliam potest dici quod in hac scientia supponitur de anima quid nominis, nec forte hic investigatur definitio animae nisi per habitum superiorem, scilicet per metaphysicam. Illae enim distinctiones entis in decem praedicamenta et cuiuslibet praedicamenti per actum et potentiam, quae in secundo huius praemittuntur definitioni animae, etiam sunt metaphysicae cuius est stabilire principia aliarum scientiarum. 20. Ad aliam conceditur quod non anima sed iste terminus anima est subiectum proprium huius scientiae qui appropriate supponit pro animabus. Et si quaeris ubi est ille terminus anima, dico quod in mente mea quantum ad scientiam meam et in mente tua quantum ad scientiam tuam.

132 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1–2 412a 1–413a10. 116 consideratur ] hic de anima add. W 126 integrali ] vel essentiali add. AE 127 ordine ] corpore T 129 forte hic ] potest dici quod in hac scientia W 130– 132 metaphysicam . . . potentiam ] om. T 130 distinctiones ] divisiones AE definitiones et praem. W 131 in decem praedicamenta et ] om. AE 132 praemittuntur ] om. T ad investigandum add. in marg. W || definitioni ] definitiones W 135 non ] ista add. W || anima1 ] nec ista add. W 136 proprium ] et adaequatum add. W 138 mente ] om. T 139 tuam ] Et hoc de prima quaestione primi libri De anima secundum Iohannem Buridanum add. T

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Nonetheless, the soul is studied here with regard to the predicates attributed to it and not to the body or the composite. 17. To the fourth argument,15 I state that whatever is studied here concerning the living body is studied only with regard to its attribution to the soul itself. It is for this reason that terms suppositing16 for the body are not studied here except incidentally and obliquely, as in stating the fact that the soul is the act of the body, and so on. Nor is the science of the living body completed in this work, but it will be finished in the other books that follow De Anima, which will deal with what is required on the side of the body for its vital activities. 18. To the fifth argument,17 I state that in order for this science to be a natural science, it suffices for it to study some integral part of a being per se capable of movement in relation to its natural activities. 19. To the sixth argument,18 we can reply that in this science the nominal definition19 of the soul is assumed. It may be that the definition of the soul is investigated here but only by means of a higher branch of learning, namely metaphysics. Indeed, the division of being into ten categories and each of them by act and potency, which is preliminary to the definition of the soul given in De Anima II, also belongs to metaphysics, whose job it is to underwrite the principles of the other sciences. 20. To the last argument,20 we grant that not the soul but rather the term ‘soul’, which properly supposits for souls, is the proper subject of this science. If you were to ask where this term ‘soul’ might be, I say that it is in my mind with regard to my knowledge, and in your mind with regard to your knowledge.21 15 See

par. 4 above. term ‘supposits for’ is the standard phrase in the secondary literature on medieval logic in English to render the Latin phrase ‘supponere pro’, expressing the idea of a term’s standing for something in a proposition. For more details, see Read 2019. 17 See par. 5 above. 18 See par. 6 above. 19 A nominal definition is a definition specifying the meaning of a term, as opposed to a quidditative definition which describes the nature of the thing referred to by the term defined. See Summulae de dialectica 8.2. 20 See par. 7 above. 21 While we have translated the term ‘scientia’ as ‘science’ above, here it is translated as ‘knowledge’ — an individual, inherent quality of a human mind. 16 The

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Utrum omnis notitia sit de numero bonorum, id est utrum omnis notitia sit bona.

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1. Arguitur primo quod non, quia dicitur in tertio Metaphysicae quod in mathematica non est bonum neque finis. 2. Item dicitur quinto Ethicorum quod “leges iubent vivere secundum omnem virtutem et prohibent omnem malitiam.” Ergo non prohibent nisi malum et tamen prohibent plures scientias vel artes, puta nigromanticas et daemonum invocativas; ergo etc. 3. Item sicut illud est bonum quod appositum bono reddit ipsum melius, ut habetur tertio Topicorum, ita illud est malum quod appositum malo reddit ipsum peius. Sed scientiae et artes appositae malis hominibus reddunt ipsos deteriores, iuxta illud primo Politicae: “Saevissima est iniustitia habens arma.” Homini autem perverso scientiae et artes arma sunt maxime ad iniustificandum; ergo etc. 4. Item sexto Metaphysicae: “Non sunt verum et falsum in rebus, ut quod quidem bonum verum quod autem malum falsum, sed in mente.” Cum ergo scientiae sint non in rebus sed in mente, ipsae sunt verae vel falsae et non bonae vel malae; ergo etc. 3 tertio Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. III.2 996a21-b 1. 5–6 leges . . . malitiam ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. V.5 1130b24–25 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 457.8): “Secundum unamquamque enim virtutem praecipit vivere, et secundum unamquamque malitiam prohibet lex.” 10 tertio Topicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Top. III.2 117a 16–17. 12–13 Saevissima . . . arma ] A RISTOTELES, Pol. I.2 1253a33 (Ar. lat. XXIX.2 10.9): “Saevissima enim iniustitia habens arma.” Auc. Ar. 15.10 (ed. Hamesse, 252): “Saevissima iniustitia est habens arma, scilicet sciendi.” 15–17 Non . . . mente ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VI.4 1027b25–26 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 131.170): “Non enim est falsum et verum in rebus, ut quod quidem bonum verum quod autem malum falsum, sed in mente.” Auc. Ar. 1.153 (ed. Hamesse, 128): “Bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum in anima.” 4 mathematica ] metaphysica AET || finis ] boni add. A 8 invocativas ] invocationes AE 14 iniustificandum ] interimendum A iniuriandum E 18 et non ] om.(!) T © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 2

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Is all cognition counted among good things, that is to say, is all cognition good?

1. We argue first that it is not, since Metaphysics III says that there is neither good nor ends in mathematics. 2. Again, Nicomachean Ethics V says that “laws command us to live in accord with all the virtues and they disallow all evil,” and so they disallow nothing but what is bad. However, they disallow many kinds of scientific and practical knowledge, such as black magic and how to summon demons; therefore, etc. 3. Again, as Topics III states, just as that is good which, when added to some other good, makes it better, so too that is bad which, when added to some other bad, makes it worse. However, scientific and practical knowledge added to bad people make them worse, according to this remark in Politics I: “armed injustice is most cruel.” Yet for corrupt people scientific and practical knowledge are the best weapons for carrying out injustice; therefore, etc. 4. Again, Metaphysics VI says that “truth and falsity are not in things, as if what is good is true and what is bad is false, but rather in the mind.” Therefore, since scientific knowledge is not in things but in the mind, it is true or false, not good or bad; therefore, etc.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 2

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5. Item notitia erronea saltem est mala, quia dicitur sexto Ethicorum quod “intellectus speculativi verum est bonum et falsum malum.” 6. Oppositum videtur ponere Aristoteles in principio huius libri; et primo Ethicorum quod “bonum dicitur aequaliter enti;” et omnis notitia est ens; ergo bona. Et item primo Ethicorum: “Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.” Et in prooemio Metaphysicae: “Omnes homines natura scire desiderant.” 7. Notandum quod bonum dicitur uno modo simpliciter et alio modo bonum habenti et secundum quid, ut aqua est simpliciter bona, sed non bona igni cum corrumpat ipsum; et mare quod est simpliciter bonum non est bonum ei qui cadit et submergitur in ipso; et vinum est simpliciter bonum, et non est bonum febricitanti. 8. Et ergo ponitur conclusio prima quod omne ens est bonum loquendo simpliciter, quia omne ens est volitum a Deo, ergo bonum. Consequentia patet, quia voluntas libera est in obiectum bonum vel apparens bonum. Si autem sit apparens bonum et non bonum, hoc est propter errorem iudicii. In Deo autem non potest incidere error. Ergo omne volitum a Deo est bonum simpliciter. Sed antecedens patet, quia omne quod est aliud a Deo est ab ipso Deo dependens et factum et conservatum. Et tamen quidquid Deus facit vel conservat, hoc facit

20 intellectus . . . malum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. VI.2 1139a27–28 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 479.19): “Speculativae autem mentis et non practicae bene et male verum est et falsum.” Auc. Ar. 12.107 (ed. Hamesse, 240): “Verum bonum est intellectus.” 21–22 principio huius libri ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402a1. 22 bonum . . . enti ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.6 1096a24 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 379.32): “Amplius autem quia bonum equaliter dicitur enti.” 23–24 Bonum . . . appetunt ] A RISTO TELES , Eth. ad Nic. I.1 1094a 1–2 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 375.5): “Ideo bene enuntiaverunt bonum quod omnia appetunt.” Auc. Ar. 12.1 (ed. Hamesse, 232): “Omnia bonum appetunt.” 24–25 Omnes . . . desiderant ] A RISTOTELES, Met. I.1 980a22 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 11.3): “Omnes homines natura scire desiderant.” Auc. Ar. 1.1 (ed. Hamesse, 115): “Omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant.” 19 notitia ] cognitio T 24 appetunt ] et omnis notitia est eius igitur bona add. W 26 Notandum ] pro quaestione primo notanda W 27 et secundum quid ] om. AETW 31 ergo ] isto notabili stante add. W 33 voluntas . . . obiectum ] voluntatis universaliter est obiectum AE voluntas dei universaliter est quod T 36 simpliciter ] consequentia bona add. T

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5. Again, erroneous cognition, at least, is bad, since Nicomachean Ethics VI says, “Truth is the good of the speculative intellect and falsehood the bad.” 6. Aristotle seems to claim the opposite at the beginning of this book. As well in Nicomachean Ethics I he says that “‘good’ is said coextensively with ‘being’.” But any instance of cognition is a being. Hence, it is good. Furthermore, in Nicomachean Ethics I Aristotle says, “The good is what all desire,” and in the prologue to the Metaphysics, he says, “All human beings by their nature desire to know.” 7. Note that something is said to be good in one way without qualification and in another way with the qualification that it is good for the one who has it. For instance, water is good without qualification, but it is not good for the fire it puts out; the sea is said to be good without qualification, but it is not good for the person who falls into it and drowns; and wine is good without qualification, but it is not good for someone who has a fever. 8. Thus we put forward our first conclusion. If we are talking about what is good without qualification, then everything that exists is good, since everything that exists is something that God wanted to exist, and therefore good. The consequence is clear, since free will has as its object either what is in fact good or what seems good. If its object merely seems good and is not what is in fact good, this is due to an error in judgment. Yet in God no such error can occur. Therefore, everything that God wanted to exist is good without qual-

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per intellectum et voluntatem. Haec debet fieri manifesta duodecimo Metaphysicae; ergo etc. 9. Sed tunc restat dubitatio utrum omnis notitia sit bona habenti eam. Et primo dubitatur de notitia falsa, circa quod est notandum quod si notitiam falsam vocares propositionem falsam in mente formatam, non oportet quod illa sit mala habenti eam. Possibile enim est quantumcumque bonum hominem et perfectum formare in mente sua propositiones contradictorias, sed assentiret verae et dissentiret falsae, et hoc non est sibi malum sed bonum et conveniens. 10. Si vero per notitiam falsam velis intelligere assensum propositionis falsae, sicut dicit Aristoteles sexto Ethicorum quod “verum est bonum intellectus et falsum malum intellectus,” intellectus enim naturaliter inclinatur ad veritatem, ideo si per apparentiam deceptivam assentit falso et adhaerat, hoc est dispositio disconveniens. Tamen non propter hoc oportet dicere quod omnis talis notitia falsa sit peccatum culpabile, quia tunc nullus deberet studere in philosophia. Omnes enim in ea studentes, et quantumcumque profecti, habent multas opiniones falsas, immo plures quam una vetula quae circa pauca considerat. Sed quia non est in potestate nostra invenire demonstrationes ad oppositam vel solvere rationes facientes nos illis falsis assentire,

39–40 duodecimo Metaphysicae ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. XII.6–7. 49–50 verum . . . malum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. VI.2 1139a28–29 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 479.19): “Speculativae autem mentis et non practicae bene et male verum est et falsum.” Auc. Ar. 12.107 (ed. Hamesse, 240): “Verum bonum est intellectus.” 39 Haec ] singula add. W || fieri ] videri add. sup. lin. W 50 intellectus1 ] om. AETV 51 si ] aliquis add. W || apparentiam deceptivam ] apparentem deceptionem vel apparentiam AE 52 assentit ] consentit TV om. W || est ] sibi add. ETW || dispositio ] malum seu W 55 profecti ] provecti AT perfecti W

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ification. The antecedent is clear, since everything other than God depends upon God, was made by God, and continues to exist because of God. However, God makes something or conserves it in existence through God’s intellect and will, as should be clear in [my Questions on Aristotle’s] Metaphysics XII; therefore, etc. 9. However, the problem still remains: Is every cognition good for the one who has it? This problem will be discussed first in connection with false cognition. Let us note that if you were to call any false proposition formulated in the mind ‘false cognition’, then there is no need to claim that such false cognition is bad for the one who has it. For it is possible that someone, no matter how good or perfect they might be, might formulate in their mind two propositions that contradict each other but affirm the true one and deny the false one; and this is not bad for them but instead good and appropriate. 10. However, if you were to hold that false cognition is assent to a false proposition, then, following Aristotle’s statement in Nicomachean Ethics VI that “what is true is good for the intellect whereas what is false is bad for the intellect,” because the intellect has a natural inclination towards the truth, the intellect would be ill-disposed if, through a deceptive appearance, it assents to what is false and adheres to it. That said, just for this reason we do not have to say that all false cognition is a blameworthy fault, since then nobody ought to study philosophy, for all students of philosophy, no matter how advanced, hold quite a few false opinions, indeed, many more than a market-woman who has studied very few things.22 But when we can-

22 Buridan

often uses the stock character of the little old woman (vetula, here translated as ‘market-woman’) as an example of an uneducated Everyman, although he will sometimes appeal to rustics (rustici) and the vulgar or uneducated (vulgares).

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22

ideo inde non culpamur. “Ignorantia namque invincibilis excusat a peccato,” ut habetur tertio Ethicorum. 11. Sed tunc restat maior dubitatio utrum omnis notitia vera et adhaesiva vero sit bona habenti. Hoc enim habet difficultatem et hoc quantum ad bonos homines et quantum ad malos. Et primo videamus de malis utrum omnis vera notitia quam habet malus sit ei bona. 12. Videtur quod non, quia ea fit deterior et magis nocivus bonis hominibus ut si sit magnus decretista vel legista, et hoc est malum sibi per quod efficitur peior. Et tales mali suas scientias convertunt in malos usus, et tamen cuius usus malus est ipsum quoque malum est. 13. Sed oppositum arguitur quia omnis virtus perficit animam intellectivam; et unicuique habenti naturales potentias bonum est quod habeat eas perfectas et specialiter principaliores; ideo bonum est eis omne per quod perficiuntur. 14. Credo et pono istam conclusionem quod omnis vera notitia est habenti bona, quia quantum est de se est directiva eius ad bonum et retractiva a malo; nec per eam aliquis male operatur nisi per accidens. Sed male operatur per notitiam erroneam et falsam admixtam illi notitiae, propter quod bene dicitur tertio Ethicorum quod omnis malus et male agens ignorat, quia cum illa notitia erronea stat privatio notitiae verae illi oppositae. Haec quidem privatio vocatur ignorantia, quia verbi gratia malus forte sic syllogizabit: omne mihi bonum est faciendum; furari est mihi bonum ut habeatur pecunia; ergo furandum

59–60 Ignorantia . . . peccato ] Auc. Ar. 12.47 (ed. Hamesse, 236): “Ignorantia excusat peccatum.” Cf. A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. III.1 1110b31–1111a2. 77 tertio Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. III.1 1110b28. 62 vero ] om. AE 67 peior ] seu magis parvus add. W 68 malos usus ] malitias T 72 perficiuntur ] tale efficitur ut credo AE 73 Credo ] om. AE 74 se ] esse T 75 retractiva ] retractat A restrictiva seu praem. W 76 male ] nihil T || erroneam ] malam add. AE 76–77 notitiae ] vero W 78 agens ] operans T 80 quia ] quaedam W || malus ] homo add. AET

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not discover demonstrations for the opposite or give an answer to the arguments that compel us to affirm these false things, we are thereby not blamed. “Indeed, invincible ignorance absolves us of fault,” as Nicomachean Ethics III maintains. 11. However, the larger problem still remains: Is all true cognition, which adheres to the truth, good for the one who has it? This problem concerns both good and bad people. Let us look into it with regard to bad people first: Is every true cognition that a bad person has good for them? 12. It seems that it is not, since it makes them even worse and more capable of harming good people, for instance if they were a powerful canon lawyer or attorney. This is bad for them because it makes them worse. Also, such bad people put their knowledge to bad use, and that whose use is bad is also itself bad. 13. The opposite is argued for as follows. Every virtue perfects the intellective soul; it is good for anything that has natural powers to have these powers perfected (especially the more principal ones); therefore, anything through which they are perfected is good for them.23 14. I believe and endorse this conclusion: all true cognition is good for the one who has it, since of itself it can guide them to what is good and draw them back from what is bad. Nor do they act badly through it, except incidentally. However, they do act badly through erroneous and false cognition that is mixed in with it. It is for this reason that it is well said in Nicomachean Ethics III that every bad person who acts badly is ignorant, since along with the erroneous cognition there is also the lack of the true cognition opposed to it. This lack is called ignorance. For instance, a bad person might reason as follows. Any23 Hence,

to complete the argument, knowledge, which is an intellectual virtue perfecting the intellect, is good for the intellect, and so it is good for things that have intellects.

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85

90

95

24

est. Et sic furtum committit. Prima propositio non est causa peccati. Immo per se esset principium dirigendi et bene faciendi. Sed secunda propositio, quae est falsa, est causa peccati. 15. Sed iterum etiam dubitatur de bonis hominibus utrum ars sutoria esset bona regi. 16. Videtur quod non per locum a causa finali ad suum effectum. Nam ars sutoria est causa finalis eius quod est addiscere illam et eius quod est suere propter addiscere eam. Et iterum causa finalis sutoriae artis est usus eius, scilicet facere sotulares. Ergo arguitur sic: “cuius finis bonus est ipsum quoque bonum est.” Hoc est una maxima. Sed non esset bonum regi suere ad addiscendum illam artem. Ergo nec ista ars esset sibi bona. Vel arguitur sic: cuius usus malus ipsum quoque malum est; sed usus artis sutoriae, scilicet suere sotulares, non esset bonus regi sed malus et inhonestus et inutilis; ergo etc. 17. Oppositum arguitur quia omnis virtus est bona habenti, cum descriptio virtutis sit quod ipsam habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit; et omnis ars est una de virtutibus intellectualibus; ergo etc.

90–91 cuius . . . bonum est ] BOETHIUS, De topicis differentiis II (ed. Nikitas, 35): “Cuius finis bonus est ipsum quoque bonum est.” A RISTOTELES, Top. III.1 116b 27 (Ar. lat. V.1 52.17): “Cuius finis melior et ipsum melius.” Auc. Ar. 36.45 (ed. Hamesse, 324): “Cuius finis est melior ipsum quoque melius.” 97–98 quod . . . reddit ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.6 1106a15–17. 83 esset ] tenet W || dirigendi ] dirigenti V ad bonum add. T 88–89 et eius quod ] et hoc V 90 arguitur ] illo stante add. W 91 maxima ] in morali add. W 95 regi ] nec honestum add. T 97 quod ipsam ] quae W || habentem ] semper add. E se add. W

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thing good for me ought to be done; stealing to have money is good for me; therefore, I ought to steal — and so they steal something. Now the first premise is not the cause of their sin. In fact, in itself it would be a guiding principle and a principle for doing good. The second premise, however, is false and the cause of their sin. 15. But the problem arises once again with regard to good people: Is knowing how to make shoes good for the King? 16. It seems that it is not, by the topic “from the final cause to its effect.”24 The craft of shoemaking is the final cause of both (a) learning that craft and (b) making shoes for the sake of learning that craft. Furthermore, the final cause of the craft of shoemaking itself is its use, that is, making shoes. Hence, one might argue as follows. “An item whose end is good is itself also good.” This is a maxim. However, it would not be good for the king to make shoes for the sake of learning the craft of shoemaking. Therefore, the craft of shoemaking would not be good for the King. Alternatively, one might argue as follows. Anything whose use is bad is itself bad; but the use of the craft of shoemaking, namely the making of shoes, would not be good for the King, but instead bad, disgraceful, and useless; therefore, etc. 17. The opposite is argued for as follows. Any given virtue is good for the one who has it, because the characterization of a virtue is that it is something which perfects the one who has it and makes their work good; any craft is an intellectual virtue; therefore, etc. 24

A topic, also called a dialectical locus, is the subject matter of Aristotle’s Topics. It is an “inferential license,” which validates a necessary or probable non-syllogistic inference. For Buridan’s discussion of dialectical loci in general, see Summulae de dialectica 6.2. For his discussion of the topic from the final cause, see Summulae de dialectica 6.4.13.

L IBER I Q UAESTIO 2 100

105

110

115

120

26

18. Item si rex sciret omnes artes, ipse melius sciret iudicare de omnibus controversiis inter scientes, et hoc esset bonum sibi et bonum toti communitati. 19. Hoc faciliter solvitur dicendo quod nec esset regi bonum addiscere illam artem, nec esset bonum sibi uti ea si haberet eam, quia impediretur per hoc a melioribus operationibus et sibi et populo utilioribus. Sed si posset habere illam artem vel aliam quamcumque sine occupatione et sine impedimento ab aliis melioribus, illa esset sibi bona quamvis non uteretur ea quia perficeret aliqualiter animam eius. 20. Tunc ad rationes ante oppositum. 21. Ad primam dicit Aristoteles tertio Metaphysicae quod certe mathematicus considerat de multis bonis, sed non considerat de eis secundum illas rationes secundum quas dicuntur bona. Ideo non utitur illis terminis: bonum vel malum, finis vel ordinatum ad finem. Et iterum quamvis mathematica non considerat de dictis terminis, tamen ipsa est bona quia perficiens animam. 22. Ad aliam dicitur quod leges non prohibent scientias ea ratione qua sunt scientiae, sed prohibent quosdam libros quos aliqui ediderunt propter falsitatem et errores in eis contentos, per quos aliqui moverentur ad male operandum et male faciendum. Vel etiam potest dici quod si leges prohibeant auditiones aliquarum scientiarum, hoc est quia mali possunt valde nocere aliis, non per illas scientias sed per errores quos admiscent illis scientiis.

110 tertio Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. III.2 996a 21-b1. 101 scientes ] cives W || bonum2 ] om. AETW 102 communitati ] universitati E universalitate A 103 Hoc ] haec dubitatio W || dicendo ] distinguendo AE 105–106 utilioribus ] om. AE utilibus W 109 ante oppositum ] om. ETV principales add. A 110 Ad primam ] respondendo dicatur W 118 falsitatem et errores ] fallentes errores AE 119 faciendum ] credendum AET 120 auditiones ] audientem AE

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18. Again, if the King were to know all the crafts, he would know better how to adjudicate all the controversies among their practitioners, and this would be good for him and good for the whole community. 19. This problem is easily solved by declaring that it would neither be good for the king to learn this craft nor good for him to use it, if he were to know it, since it would get in the way of his doing things that are better and more useful both for him and for the people. However, if he could know this craft, or any other craft, without his being preoccupied or prevented from doing better things, then it would be good for him to have it, even if he might not use it, since it would perfect his soul somehow. 20. To the arguments for the opposite view. 21. To the first argument,25 Aristotle says in Metaphysics III that the mathematician certainly studies many things that are good but they do not study them with regard to those characteristics according to which they are said to be good. Hence the mathematician does not use the terms ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘end’, or ‘means to an end’. Nevertheless, even though mathematics does not involve the consideration of these terms, it is nonetheless good since it perfects the soul. 22. To the second argument,26 we reply that the law does not disallow scientific knowledge qua scientific knowledge, but it disallows certain books which some people published due to the falsehood and errors contained in them, by which some people would be motivated to act badly and to do bad things. Alternatively, we can say that if the laws were to disallow people from hearing lectures about some item of scientific knowledge, this is because bad people can thereby seri25 See 26 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above.

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28

23. Ad aliam dicitur quod scientiae non reddunt malos peiores quantum est ex se, sed errores quos illi admiscent cum scientiis suis. 24. Ad auctoritatem Aristotelis sexto Metaphysicae dicitur quod non est intentio Aristotelis quod omne bonum sit extra animam, sed quod non omne bonum vel malum est in anima, et omne verum vel falsum est in anima. 25. De notitia erronea dictum est satis in positione.

125 sexto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VI.4 1027b25–26 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 131.170): “Non enim est falsum et verum in rebus, ut quod quidem bonum verum quod autem malum falsum, sed in mente.” Auc. Ar. 1.153 (ed. Hamesse, 128): “Bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum in anima.”

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ously harm others — not by their scientific knowledge but rather by the errors they would mix in with their scientific knowledge. 23. To the third argument,27 we say that scientific knowledge in itself does not make bad people worse. Rather, it is the errors that they mix in with such scientific knowledge. 24. As to the authoritative passage from Aristotle’s Metaphysics VI,28 we say that Aristotle did not mean that everything good exists outside the soul, but rather that not everything that is good or bad exists in the soul, although everything true or false exists in the soul. 25. As for erroneous cognition,29 enough has been said in the main response.

27 See

par. 3 above. par. 4 above. 29 See par. 5 above. 28 See

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30

Utrum omnis scientia sit de numero honorabilium.

5

10

15

20

1. Arguitur quod non, quia tunc sequeretur quod omnes scientes deberent honorari. Consequens est falsum. Et hoc probo multipliciter. Primo quia honorandi sunt boni et non nisi boni, ut habetur quarto Ethicorum; multi autem scientias multas habentes sunt pravi et iniusti; ergo etc. Secundo quia sequeretur quod omnes homines essent honorabiles, quod est falsum; et patet consequentia quia omnes aliqua sciunt; ergo etc. Tertio quia sapientissimos non videmus honorari nisi sint divites; ergo etc. 2. Item multae sunt artes viles et despectae et earum professores abhorrentur in communione hominum, ut suspensores hominum et mundatores latrinarum; ergo tales artes non sunt honorabiles. 3. Item secundo Ethicorum dicitur quod bonum honorabile sive honestum distinguitur contra bonum delectabile et contra bonum utile; sed multae vel omnes scientiae sunt utiles et delectabiles; ergo non sunt honorabiles; ergo etc. 4. Item quaestio per utrum quaerit inter opposita, ut habetur decimo Metaphysicae; sed Aristoteles primo Ethicorum quaerit utrum felicitas sit laudabilium vel honorabilium; ergo laudabile et honorabile opponuntur; ideo idem non est laudabile et honorabile. Sed omnes

4–5 quarto Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. IV.3 1124a24–25. 13 secundo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.3 1104b30–31. 17–18 decimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. X.5 1055b33. 18 primo Ethicorum ] A RI STOTELES , Eth. ad Nic. I.12 1101b 10–11. 1 numero ] bonorum add. AW 5–6 et iniusti ] om. A 6 quia ] si quaestio esset vera W 8 videmus ] debemus T 10 despectae ] degeneres A degentes ET 11 in communione hominum ] om. T 12 ergo . . . honorabiles ] om. AET 17–18 decimo ] octavo(!) AETVW © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 3

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Is all knowledge honorable?

1. It is argued that it is not, since then it would follow that everyone who knows something ought to be honored. The consequent is false, which I will prove in several different ways. First of all, good people (and only good people) ought to be honored, as Nicomachean Ethics IV says; but many people who know many things are base and unjust; therefore, etc. Second, it would then follow that all people would be honorable, which is false; the consequence is clear since everyone does know at least a few things; therefore, etc. Third, we see the wisest people honored only if they are rich; therefore, etc. 2. Again, there are many crafts that are vile and despised, and their practitioners are detested by the community, such as hangmen and sewer workers; therefore, knowledge of such crafts is not honorable. 3. Again, Nicomachean Ethics II distinguishes the honorable or worthwhile good from the pleasurable good and the useful good. But much, if not all, knowledge is useful and pleasurable. Hence, not all knowledge is honorable; therefore, etc. 4. Again, a question introduced by ‘whether’ is concerned with opposites, as Metaphysics VIII holds. But in Nicomachean Ethics I, Aristotle asks whether happiness is praiseworthy or honorable. Hence, praiseworthy and honorable are opposites, and so something

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 3

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25

30

35

40

32

scientiae sunt laudabiles, cum sint virtutes, et Aristoteles primo Ethicorum dicit quod virtutis est laus et quod virtutem laudamus propter opera et actus. 5. Item possumus reducere ad quaestionem praecedentem, quia omne honorabile vel honestum est bonum et omne turpe est malum; sed non omnis scientia est bona prout in alia quaestione arguebatur; ergo non omnis scientia est honorabilis. 6. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles. Et arguitur ratione quia omnis scientia est virtus intellectualis, ut habetur sexto Ethicorum; et omnis virtus est honorabilis; ergo etc. Minor ex hoc patet quia omne illud est honorabile cuius honor est signum et praemium. Sed secundum Aristotelem, et Tullium, “Honor est praemium virtutis.” Et honor etiam describitur quod “est exhibitio reverentiae in signum virtutis;” ergo etc. 7. Notandum est quod in secundo Ethicorum Aristoteles dividit bonum in bonum honestum et bonum delectabile et bonum utile. Sed non est intelligendum quod membra illius divisionis, scilicet illa nomina utile, delectabile, et honestum, distinguantur contra invicem quantum ad res pro quibus supponunt, ita scilicet quod nulla res sit honesta, delectabilis, et utilis simul nec e converso. Immo sic, scilicet quantum ad res pro quibus illi termini supponunt membra illa coincidunt. Eadem enim res est delectabilis, utilis, et honesta, ut humana felicitas in hac vita est nobis valde utilis ad beatitudinem in alia vita, et 21–22 primo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.12 1101b14–15. 24 quaestionem praecedentem ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. I.2. 26 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. I.2. 28 Oppositum dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTE LES , De an. I.1 402a 1. 29 sexto Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES , Eth. ad Nic. VI.3 1139b15–19. 32 Honor est praemium virtutis ] C ICERO, Brutus 281 (ed. Loeb, 242): “Cum honos sit praemium virtutis. . . ” A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. IV.3 1123b35 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 440.15): “Virtutis enim praemium honor.” Auc. Ar. 12.68 (ed. Hamesse, 237): “Honor est praemium virtutis.” 33 est exhibitio . . . virtutis ] A LBERTUS M AGNUS, Super Eth. I.4, n. 24 (ed. Cologne, 21): “. . . exhibitio reverentiae in testimonium virtutis.” Cf. A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.5 1095b26; VIII.8 1159a22; B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. I.3. 35 secundo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.3 1104b30–31. 25 et omne turpe est malum ] om. AET in marg. V 31 praemium ] virtutis add. TV 31–32 Sed . . . virtutis ] om. T 32 virtutis ] quarto Ethicorum add. VW || Et ] cum AE 38 nomina ] membra A 41 illi termini ] om. A || membra ] om. E 43 in alia vita ] om. AE

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is not both praiseworthy and honorable. All knowledge is praiseworthy, though, since it is a virtue, and Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics I that praise is appropriate for virtue and that we praise a virtue owing to its works and actions. 5. Again, we can draw from the previous question. Everything that is honorable and worthwhile is good and everything shameful is bad; but not all knowledge is good, as we argued in the previous question; therefore, not all knowledge is honorable. 6. Aristotle states the opposite, which we argue for by reason as follows. Every kind of knowledge is an intellectual virtue, as Nicomachean Ethics VI maintains; and every virtue is honorable; therefore, etc. The minor premise is clear because everything is honorable for which honor is its sign and reward. But according to Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics IV, and Cicero, “Honor is the reward for virtue.” Honor is also characterized as “the display of respect as a sign of virtue;” therefore, etc. 7. Let us note that in Nicomachean Ethics II Aristotle divides the good into the worthwhile, the pleasurable, and the useful. But we should not think that the members of this division, namely the names ‘useful’, ‘pleasurable’, and ‘worthwhile’, are distinguished from one another with regard to the things for which they supposit — that is, so that no thing is worthwhile, pleasurable or useful at once, or vice versa. On the contrary, the members of the division overlap with regard to the things for which the terms supposit, for the very same thing is pleasurable, useful, and worthwhile. For instance, human happiness

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45

50

55

60

65

34

tamen etiam inter bona humana nobis in hac vita contingentia illa felicitas est nobis honestissima et delectabilissima prout apparet primo et decimo Ethicorum. Oportet ergo intelligere quod illa tria nomina contra invicem distinguuntur secundum rationes a quibus imponuntur ad significandum easdem res. Omne enim honestum est delectabile et utile et e converso, sicut declarat Seneca. Sed debet hoc videri et declarari in secundo Ethicorum. Tamen idem secundum aliam rationem dicitur honestum et secundum aliam delectabile et secundum aliam utile. Cum enim bonum sit obiectum appetitus, ut dicebatur in alia quaestione, et non loquitur de appetitu qui est divina voluntas, quia sic bonum aequaliter diceretur enti, sed loquitur de appetitu humano, et tunc nos dicemus quod aliquid est nobis appetibile secundum triplicem rationem et secundum quamlibet earum dicitur bonum. Primo modo aliquid dicitur nobis appetibile, quia recta ratio dictat ipsum appetendum esse, et illud ut sic vocatur bonum honestum. Secundo modo aliquid dicitur appetibile quia apprehenditur tamquam conveniens appetitui et appetenti, et hoc modo vocatur delectabile. Sed utroque modorum horum potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quod illud sit appetibile secundum se, scilicet circumscripta apprehensione quod ipsum ordinetur in aliud appetibile obtinendum, et sic non dicitur nisi honestum vel delectabile. Secundo modo dicitur appetibile ex eo quod apprehenditur ordinari ad aliud appetibile obtinendum, et secundum hanc rationem vocatur utile.

45–46 primo et decimo Ethicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. I.20; X.4–5. 49 sicut declarat Seneca ] S ENECA, Ep. mor. ad Luc. 71.4–5. 50 secundo Ethicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. II.11. 52–53 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. I.2. 44–45 illa felicitas ] ista V om. T 45 nobis ] om. AET 48–49 et utile ] om. T 49–50 declarari ] demonstrari T 53–54 qui . . . appetitu ] hom. T 55–56 secundum triplicem rationem ] om. V 59 apprehenditur ] appetitur AET 61 intelligi ] contingere VW 61–62 Uno modo quod illud ] ita V primo modo ita W 62 apprehensione ] appetitione AET 63–65 et sic . . . obtinendum ] hom. T 63–64 non dicitur nisi ] enim A

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in this life is extremely useful to us for blessedness in the next life; yet even among the human goods that happen to us in this life, happiness is also the most worthwhile and the most pleasurable for us, as is clear in [our Questions on Aristotle’s] Nicomachean Ethics I and X. We should therefore understand that these three names are distinguished from one another in accordance with the concepts from which they were imposed to signify the very same things,30 for everything worthwhile is also pleasurable and useful (and vice versa), as Seneca states. This point should be looked into and clarified in [our Questions on Aristotle’s] Nicomachean Ethics II. Even so, the very same thing is said to be worthwhile in accordance with one concept, pleasurable in accordance with another, and useful in accordance with yet another. Since the good is the object of desire, as mentioned in the previous question, and since we are not speaking here about desire which is the divine will (for in that case the good is said to be coextensive with what exists) but rather about human desire, we shall say that something is desirable for us in accordance with these three concepts and good according to any of them. First, something is said to be desirable for us because right reason dictates that it ought to be desired, and as such it is called a worthwhile good. Second, something is said to be desirable because it is grasped as something that is suitable to the desire and to the one who has the desire; this is called a pleasurable good. Now each of these two can be taken in two ways. On the one hand, if something is desirable in itself, that is, setting aside any consideration of its relation to obtaining some further desirable item, then it is only called worthwhile or pleasurable. On the other hand, if something is desirable in that it is considered in relation to obtaining some further desirable item, then it is called useful in accordance with this concept.

30 In

accordance with Buridan’s semantic doctrine, conventionally significative spoken and written words signify things by virtue of being subordinated to naturally significative concepts of the human mind. What establishes the relation of subordination between a word and a concept is an act of imposition. For more on Buridan’s semantics of terms and concepts, see the Introduction to Summulae de dialectica and Klima 2008, 27–120.

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70

75

80

85

36

8. Tunc ponuntur conclusiones. Prima est quod omnis scientia est bonum honestum sive bonum honorabile, quia recta ratio dictat esse eam appetibilem et bonam ut intellectus ea perfectibilis perficiatur. Immo omnis habens scientiam vel artem aliquam, etiam licet mechanicam, iudicaret illam esse diligendam tamquam bonam et homini convenientem, quia perficeret intellectum eius et nulli bono obtento vel appetendo obesset. Rex enim non esset peior vel vilior si haberet omnes artes mechanicas — immo esset perfectior multis — quamvis non esset sibi secundum rectam rationem appetibile agere secundum eas exteriori operatione. 9. Secunda conclusio est quod omnis scientia est bonum delectabile, quia omnis scientia est conveniens intellectui, ut dictum est; ergo et appetitui, scilicet voluntati, quia eadem res est intellectus et voluntas, ut supponitur ad praesens. 10. Tertia conclusio est quod omnis scientia est utilis, quia si sit practica est ordinabilis et utilis ad opus, et si sit speculativa adhuc est utilis ad speculari quod est melius quam esse sine speculatione caeteris paribus. Et si in rege vel papa habente artem sutoriam illa ars non esset utilis ad faciendum vel suendum sotulares, tamen in casu esset utilis ad posse melius iudicare de controversiis huiusmodi artificium inter eos vel ad alios, scilicet in casu quo oporteret controversiam devolvi ad superiores. Immo universaliter omnis perfectio est nobis utilis ad ordinationem nostram in Deum. Quanto enim magis

67 Tunc ] faciliter add. V statim add. W || conclusiones ] faciliter add. W 71 diligendam ] eligendam AE appetendam et praem. W 72 nulli ] non alteri AE alteri add. T alibi add. V 73 appetendo ] obtinendo AET || obesset ] abesset AET || esset ] est inde V inde add. AEW || vel vilior ] om. AET 74 artes ] virtutes W || immo ] inde add. V ipse add. W || perfectior ] perfectio V || multis ] multum W 80 supponitur ] sumitur A 81–82 quia si . . . utilis ] hom. A 83 melius ] et utilius add. V 84 Et ] quia VW 87 eos ] omnes A 88 devolvi ad ] dissolvi V || universaliter ] naturaliter W

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8. Next I put forward some conclusions. The first conclusion is that in every case knowledge is a worthwhile or honorable good, since right reason dictates that it is desirable and good, so that the intellect, which can be perfected by it, is perfected by it. Indeed, anyone who has knowledge of a science or a craft, even one of the mechanical arts, would judge rather that one ought to esteem it as a good suitable to a human being, since it would perfect their intellect and it would not conflict with any other good that has been obtained or ought to be desired. The King, for instance, would not be worse off or more base if he were to have all the mechanical arts — quite the contrary, he would be more perfect than many people — even though it might not be desirable for him, according to right reason, to engage in the outward activities associated with the mechanical arts. 9. The second conclusion is that all knowledge is a pleasurable good, since all knowledge is suitable to the intellect, as mentioned. Therefore, it is suitable to desire, that is, to the will, since the intellect and the will are the very same thing, as we assume for the time being.31 10. The third conclusion is that all knowledge is useful. If it is practical it can be directed at, and is useful towards, its product; if it is speculative, it is still useful for contemplation, which, other things being equal, is better than not engaging in contemplation. If the craft of shoemaking were not useful for making or fashioning shoes in the case of a King or Pope who knew the craft, even so sometimes it would be useful for facilitating better judgments about controversies of the sort that involve shoemakers, either among themselves or in relation to others, namely in cases in which the controversy should be brought

31 Buridan

will eventually tell us that he defends the identification of intellect and will below in III.1, par. 4, although he never dedicates a complete discussion to the topic here. See as well Questions on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics X.1.

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singulis perfectionibus perfecti sumus, tanto magis assimilamur Deo, gratia cuius sumus, quod summe debemus appetere. 11. Tunc ergo ad rationes. 12. Ad primam conceditur quod omnes scientes deberent digne honorari si aliud non obstaret. Sed obstare possunt errores et pravitates admixtae cum scientiis multis. Non enim omne habens aliquem gradum albedinis dicitur album. Ideo nec omnis homo habens aliquod honorabile dicitur honorabilis vel est dignus quod honoretur sed aliquando vituperandus est propter nequitias annexas. Et eodem modo patet quod non sequitur: omnes aliqua sciunt; ergo omnes sunt digni quod honorentur. De hoc autem quod sapientissimi etiam sine pravitatibus admixtis non honorantur, dicendum est quod licet non honorentur a malis honorantur tamen a bonis et sapientibus si sciant eos esse tales. Nec est cura si mali non honorant eos, quia non debet reputari honor vel reverentia a pravis impensus vel impensa. 13. Ad aliam dicitur quod illae artes non sunt despectae nec viles per se, sed reputantur viles propter opus exterius quod est immundum corporali immunditia. Sed si operatio sit licita et expediens, tunc nulla est inde immunditia animae, nec per consequens debet simpliciter dici immunditia, iuxta illud Senecae: “Non credo turpitudine corporis foedari animam sed pulchritudine animae corpus ornari.”

109–110 Non credo . . . ornari ] S ENECA, Ep. mor. ad Luc. 66.4 (ed. Loeb, 4): “Claranus mihi videtur in exemplar editus, ut scire possemus non deformitate corporis foedari animum, sed pulchritudine animi corpus ornari.” 90 singulis ] similis EV similibus W || assimilamur ] et melius add. T 92 ergo ] per hoc W 98 nequitias ] malitias AET || eodem modo ] eadem opinio V ex hoc T 99 non sequitur: ] om.(!) T || sciunt ] scientes AETV 101 admixtis ] annexis AET 101–102 licet . . . tamen ] om. VW 102 a bonis ] ab omnibus V immo ab omnibus W 103 tales ] ut est ergo etc. add. T debent honorari add. W || cura ] via V || mali ] alii VW || quia ] si mali honorarent eos ille bonus add. T || debet ] habet T 104 a pravis ] om. AET || impensus vel ] om. AETV || impensa ] nisi a bonis et sapientibus add. AET 105 despectae ] deiectae A directivae VW 107 expediens ] fuit W 108 est ] debet dici T || inde ] om. ATW 108–109 animae . . . immunditia ] hom. A

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to one’s superiors. Indeed, in general every perfection is useful to us with regard to our orientation to God, for the more we are perfected by each perfection, the more we are like God, by whose grace we exist, which we should desire above all. 11. To the arguments. 12. To the first argument,32 we admit that everyone who knows something ought to be worth honoring, provided nothing stands in the way. But the errors and base things mixed in with quite a few cases of knowledge can stand in the way. Not everything that has some degree of whiteness is called white; hence not every person who has something honorable is called honorable or worth honoring — indeed sometimes one ought to scorn them instead, owing to their accompanying villainies. In the same way, this clearly does not follow: Everyone knows some things; therefore, everyone is worth honoring. As for the point that the wisest people, even with no wickedness mixed in, are not honored [unless they are also rich], we reply that although they would not be honored by bad people, they nevertheless are honored by good and wise people, if such people know them as such. Nor should we care that bad people do not honor them, since the “honor” and “respect” given by base people should not be counted. 13. To the second argument,33 we reply that these crafts are neither despised nor vile in themselves, but they are counted as vile owing to the fact that the outward work performed through them is tainted with bodily filth. However, if the activity is allowed and appropriate, then the soul does not become filthy because of them, nor, as a consequence, should one without qualification call them filthy. As Seneca

32 See 33 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above.

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14. De illa divisione boni quomodo debeat intelligi dictum est in positione. 15. De felicitate autem dicendum est quod ipsa etiam est valde laudabilis et valde honorabilis. Sed cum laudabile quemadmodum et utile dicatur ea ratione qua est conveniens ad aliud bonum obtinendum, et honorabile propriissime vocatur quia recta ratio iudicat esse bonum per se ipsum, Aristoteles per illas diversas rationes quaerit utrum felicitas sit laudabilium vel honorabilium, id est utrum dicatur felicitas ea ratione qua dicitur laudabilis et ad aliud valens, vel ea ratione qua dicitur honorabilis et bona secundum se ipsam. Et esset quaestio per utrum sufficienter inter opposita si suppleatur, scilicet supposito quod felicitas dicitur felicitas per aliquam boni rationem, utrum hoc sit per rationem honorabilis tantum vel laudibilis tantum vel utilis tantum vel delectabilis tantum vel horum omnium vel plurium simul. 16. Ultima ratio reducta est ad priorem quaestionem.

125 priorem quaestionem ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. I.2. 115 est ] bonum et add. VW 116 propriissime ] om. AET 121 suppleatur ] supponeretur VW || supposito ] om. AT 123 vel laudibilis tantum ] om. W

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puts it, “I do not believe that the soul is marred by the ugliness of the body, but rather the body is decorated by the beauty of the soul.” 14. As for how the division of the good ought to be understood,34 an answer was given in the main reply. 15. With respect to happiness,35 it ought to be said that happiness is both extremely praiseworthy and extremely honorable. However, since something is called ‘praiseworthy’, like ‘useful’, in the sense that it is suitable for obtaining some other good, whereas it is most strictly called ‘honorable’ because right reason judges that it is good in itself, Aristotle asked whether in these different senses happiness is praiseworthy or honorable, that is, whether happiness is so-called because it is praiseworthy and helps us obtain something else, or because it is honorable and good in itself. This would be a question properly introduced with ‘whether’ which does concern items that are mutually exclusive, if one were to supplement it, namely — assuming that happiness is said to be happiness due to its being good — whether this is because it is honorable alone, praiseworthy alone, useful alone, pleasurable alone, all of the above, or some of the above. 16. The last argument36 is drawn from the previous question.

34 See

par. 3 above. par. 4 above. 36 See par. 5 above. 35 See

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42

Utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficillimorum.

5

10

15

1. Et arguitur primo quod non, quia “illud quod per superabundantiam dicitur uni soli convenit,” ut dicit Aristoteles in Topicorum; ergo non sunt plura difficillima; ergo nihil est de numero eorum. 2. Secundo sic: faciliora sunt certiora et difficiliora sunt minus certa et magis dubitamus circa ea; sed scientia de anima praecedit alias scientias naturales per certitudinem, ut dicit Aristoteles; ergo ipsa est aliis facilior et non difficillima. 3. Item a facilioribus incipienda est doctrina, ut dicitur quinto Metaphysicae; et haec scientia inter naturales solet primo addisci; ergo ipsa est facilior aliis. 4. Item ex operationibus venimus in notitiam substantiae. Ideo de illa substantia est facilior doctrina cuius operationes sunt faciliores nobis ad addiscendum; sed sic est de operationibus animae quia illas experimur in nobis; ergo etc. 5. Item si esset de numero difficillimorum, hoc esset ratione animae intellectivae, ut communiter conceditur. Sed hoc non debet esse. Probatio: quia cum intelligibile fuerit sufficienter praesentatum intellectui, debet fieri intellectio. Modo intellectus est intelligibilis et est

2–3 illud . . . convenit ] A RISTOTELES, Top. V.5 134b 24 (Ar. lat. V.1 102.2): “Nam secundum superabundantiam uni soli inerit.” Auc. Ar. 36.78 (ed. Hamesse, 327): “Quod per superabundantiam dicitur uni soli convenit.” 7 ut dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402a 2. 9–10 quinto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.1 1013a1–4. 5 difficiliora ] difficillima AET 7 naturales ] philosophiae add. VW 9 incipienda ] inchoanda AET 10 inter ] caeteras add. AE omnes alias scientias add. T 12 substantiae ] scientiae V 13 substantia ] scientia AV 14 ad addiscendum ] ad cognoscendum AET 16–17 animae ] om. V 17 conceditur ] dicitur W 18 praesentatum ] approximatum T 19–20 est semper ] om. A © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 4

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Is the science of the soul one of the most difficult sciences?

1. It is argued, first, that it is not. “What is said using a superlative applies to just one thing,” as Aristotle says in Topics. Therefore, there are not many things that are most difficult. Hence, nothing is one of the most difficult things. 2. Second, it is argued as follows. What is easier is more certain whereas what is more difficult is less certain and more dubious; but the science of the soul is ahead of the other natural sciences in its certainty, as Aristotle says; therefore, it is easier than the others, not the most difficult. 3. Again, a lesson should start from what is easier, as Metaphysics V says; the science of the soul is usually taught first in the natural sciences; therefore, it is easier than the others. 4. Again, we come to know a substance through its activities. Hence, it is easier to learn about that substance whose activities are easier for us to learn about. But this is the case with the activities of the soul, because we experience them in ourselves; therefore, etc. 5. Again, if the science of the soul were one of the most difficult sciences, this would be owing to the intellective soul, as is generally conceded. But this should not be the case. Proof: When an intelligible thing is sufficiently presented to the intellect, then knowing it

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 4

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semper sibi maxime praesens. Ergo semper debet se intelligere. Ideo hoc non debet sibi esse difficile. 6. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles. 7. Tota difficultas huius quaestionis videtur in hoc consistere: quomodo potest simul stare quod scientia de anima sit aliis scientiis certior, ut ponit Aristoteles, et cum hoc difficilior, cum difficultas sit causa incertitudinis seu gravitatis quae se concomitantur. Ad hoc respondetur multipliciter. 8. Uno modo per distinctionem quam ponit Aristoteles secundo Metaphysicae, scilicet quod in cognoscendo res provenit dupliciter difficultas. Uno modo ex parte rei cognoscendae, scilicet quia ipsa est parvae et debilis entitatis. Et sic materia prima est difficulter cognoscibilis, Deus autem et intelligentiae sic summe sunt cognoscibiles. Alio modo ex parte rei cognoscentis, quia propter eius debilitatem et gradum inferiorem non potest magna et alta cognoscibilia apprehendere immediate et sine difficultate. Et sic Deus et intelligentiae sunt nobis difficilis cognitionis, quia intellectus noster propter eius debilem potentiam indiget ministerio sensus, ideo non potest insensibilia comprehendere sine processu et deductione ex notitia sensibilium. Et tunc ponuntur duae conclusiones. 9. Prima est quod scientia de anima est nobis difficillima et per consequens incertissima quantum est ex parte cognoscentis — dico inter caetera naturalia, scilicet circumscripto Deo et intelligentiis — quia intellectus noster est insensibilis et tamen ex parte nostra et ex debilitate nostri intellectus est quod non possumus comprehendere ni-

22 Oppositum dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402a12–13. 25 ut ponit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402a 2. 28–29 secundo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. II.1 993b9–10. 20 maxime ] simplex et T || se ] esse AT || intelligere ] intelligibile T 21 debet sibi esse ] est T 22 Oppositum dicit Aristoteles ] in prooemio primi huius ubi nota quod add. W 24 stare ] sistere E || scientiis ] naturalibus V naturalibus add. W 25 ut ponit Aristoteles ] om. AET 31 prima ] om. T 32 Deus . . . cognoscibiles ] hom. W || sic summe sunt ] sunt facillime bene AET 35 immediate et ] nec AE 37 ministerio ] instrumento T 38 comprehendere ] cognoscere AET apprehendere W 41 dico ] om. AET 43 tamen ] cum W 44–45 nisi sensibilia vel ] non sensibilia nisi per sensata nisi A

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should take place. Now the intellect is an intelligible thing, and it is always most present to itself. Hence, it always ought to know itself. Therefore, this should not be difficult for it. 6. Aristotle claims the opposite. 7. All the difficulty of this question seems to boil down to this: How can these two stand together, namely, (1) that the science of the soul is more certain than other sciences, as Aristotle claims, and (2) that it is also more difficult, since difficulty is the cause of uncertainty or of hardship going along with it? There are several ways to answer this. 8. One answer appeals to a distinction that Aristotle draws in Metaphysics II, namely that there are two ways in which it can be difficult to know something. In one way the difficulty is on the side of the thing to be known, namely because it has weak and feeble being. In this manner prime matter is difficult to know whereas God and the intelligences are easiest. In another way the difficulty is on the side of what does the knowing, because due to its weakness and lower rank it cannot grasp great and lofty intelligible things directly and without difficulty. In this manner God and the intelligences are difficult for us to know, since our intellect, owing to its weak power, needs the help of the senses; hence it is unable to comprehend items that cannot be sensed without a process of deduction from the cognition of sensible things. Now we put forward two conclusions.37 9. The first conclusion is that coming to know the soul — among natural beings, that is, setting aside God and the intelligences — is the most difficult for us, and consequently the most uncertain, as regards what does the knowing. This is because our intellect cannot be sensed, and, owing to the weakness of our intellect, we can comprehend only 37 Namely,

in connection with the first answer.

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si sensibilia vel per deductionem ex sensibilibus, ut dictum est; ergo etc. 10. Secunda conclusio est quod quantum est ex parte rei intelligendae scientia de anima est certissima et facillima, quia inter caetera naturalia anima est altioris entitatis et maioris cognoscibilitatis. 11. Sed statim contra ista dicta occurrit dubitatio duplex. 12. Prima est quia quantum ad scientiam nostram de anima idem est cognoscibile et cognoscens, scilicet anima nostra intellectiva. Ideo si est difficultas ex parte rei cognoscentis, etiam est difficultas ex parte cognoscibilis, et si est facilitas et certitudo ex parte cognoscibilis, et etiam ex parte cognoscentis, cum idem sit hoc et illud. 13. Secunda dubitatio est quia si anima sit facilioris et certioris notitiae quam aliud ex parte rei cognoscendae, ego quaero: cui cognoscenti est ipsa facilioris notitiae? 14. Ad primam dubitationem respondetur quod licet sit idem cognoscens et cognitum, tamen secundum aliam rationem dicitur cognoscens et secundum aliam rationem dicitur cognitum vel cognoscibile. Dico ergo quod ea ratione qua ipsa anima est maioris entitatis aliis naturalibus ipsa est magis cognoscibilis et ea ratione qua ipsa non potest cognoscere nisi mediante sensu ipsa difficilius potest se apprehendere. 15. Ad secundam dubitationem dicitur uno modo quod Deus est cui anima sic est cognita et certa ad talem sensum: non quia in Deo sit aliqua cognitio remissa vel incerta, sed quia cognoscit animam esse magis ens, scilicet perfectius, et prius, scilicet via dignitatis. Vel dicitur alio modo quod res meliores et nobiliores sunt causae aliorum finales, iuxta illud dictum septimo Politicae quod “semper deterius,” id est minus bonum, “est gratia melioris.” Ideo anima est causa finalis

70–71 semper . . . melioris ] A RISTOTELES, Pol. VII.14 1333a21–22 (Ar. lat. XXIX.2 306.1): “Semper enim quod deterius melioris gratia est.” 47 est quod ] om. AE scendae add. AET 49 parte2 ] rei add. W 54 rei add. W 55 parte ] 61 rationem ] om. W T aliarum A

|| quantum est ] om. T 47–48 intelligendae ] et cognoet ] per consequens add. W 51 nostram ] om. VW 53 si est ] sic T || ex parte cognoscibilis ] om. A || parte ] rei add. W 56 anima ] om. E 57 quam aliud ] om. T 66 sic est ] est magis AET 69 aliorum ] aliarum rerum

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sensible things or items deduced from sensible things, as mentioned; therefore, etc. 10. The second conclusion is that the science of the soul is the most certain and easiest as regards the thing to be known, since the soul has the highest sort of being among natural beings and is more knowable. 11. However, two problems come up at once against these claims. 12. The first is this. In our knowledge of the soul, the thing to be known and what does the knowing are the same, namely our intellective soul. Hence if there is a difficulty on the side of what does the knowing, then there is also a difficulty on the side of the thing to be known; and if it is easy and certain on the side of the thing to be known, then so too on the side of what does the knowing, since they are one and the same item. 13. The second problem is this. If on the side of the thing to be known the soul is easier to know and more certain than anything else, then I ask: For which knower is the soul easier to know? 14. To the first problem we reply that even though what does the knowing and what is known are the very same thing, still, this thing is said to be the one doing the knowing on one account, and it is the thing known or the thing to be known on another account. Therefore, I say that insofar as the soul has more being than other natural items it is more knowable, and insofar as it can know something only by means of the senses it is more difficult for it to be able to grasp itself. 15. One answer to the second problem is that God is the one for whom the soul is easier to know and to be certain about in this sense: not because in God there is any weak or uncertain act of knowing, but rather because God knows that the soul is more of a being, that is to say, more perfect, and it is prior, that is, more noble. Another answer is that better and more noble things are the final causes of other things, in line with the dictum from Politics VII: “what is worse” (that is, less

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75

80

85

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aliorum. Propter quod etiam dicitur secundo Physicorum quod “nos sumus finis omnium quae fiunt et utimur eis propter nos.” Modo in processu quantum ad notitiam propter quid, causae, quantum est ex ordine rerum cognoscendarum, sunt nobis notiores et certiores causatis. Et hoc debet videri in prooemio Physicorum, scilicet quomodo causae simpliciter sunt etiam secundum naturam notiores et certiores causatis. 16. Secundo modo respondetur facilius quod quantum ad aliqua scientia de anima est nobis facilior quam scientia de aliis formis naturalibus et certior, scilicet quantum ad ea quae experimur in nobis de operationibus et potentiis animae, et quantum ad ea quae faciliter sunt deducibilia ex illis. Sed ipsa est difficilior et incertior specialiter quantum ad animam intellectivam — quomodo ista se habeat ad corpus et ad materiam? — propter hoc quod inextensa est et non educta de potentia materiae sed modo supernaturali adveniens et inhaerens corpori. 17. Tertio modo etiam respondetur quod quantum ad plurimas quaestiones unaquaeque earum est nobis facilius et certius cognoscibilis et demonstrabilis propter experientiam operationum quam sint quaestiones de multis aliis formis quarum non sic possumus proprias operationes experiri. Sed tamen scientia de anima potest dici difficilior quam scientia de aliis formis naturalibus quantum est ex parte maioris multitudinis quaestionum dubitabilium propter hoc quod ultra alias formas anima requirit in corpore valde diversas organizationes

72–73 nos sumus . . . propter nos ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.2 194a 34–35 (Ar. lat. VII.1 53.6): “Et utimur tamquam propter nos omnibus quae sunt. Sumus enim quodammodo et nos finis.” Auc. Ar. 2.63–64 (ed. Hamesse, 145): “Nos sumus quodammodo finis omnium. Nos utimur omnibus quae sunt tamquam propter nos.” 76 in prooemio Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.6. 72 aliorum ] aliarum rerum T 73 fiunt ] per nos add. AET || et utimur eis propter nos ] hom. T 74 ex ] parte vel add. AE 75 ordine ] parte T 77 simpliciter sunt etiam ] simplices T 82 operationibus ] operabilibus V || potentiis ] possibilibus V passionibus W 83 specialiter ] simpliciter VW 85 inextensa ] extensa(!) T || educta ] deducta A 89–90 cognoscibilis ] scibilis AET 91 formis ] naturalibus add. T 95 diversas ] operationes et add. W

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good) “is always for the sake of what is better.” Hence, the soul is the final cause of other things. This is why Aristotle also says in Physics II, “We are the end for all things that come into being, and we use them for our own sake.” However in the process of coming to know why something is the case, causes are better known and more certain to us than effects, in the order of intelligible things. And on this point — the way in which causes are better known and more certain by nature without qualification than effects — see the prologue of [my Questions on Aristotle’s] Physics.38 16. A second (easier) answer39 is that with respect to some things the science of the soul is easier for us than the science of other natural forms, and more certain, namely with respect to what we experience in ourselves regarding the activities and powers of the soul, as well as with respect to what is easily deducible from them. However, the science of the soul is more difficult and uncertain especially with respect to the intellective soul. How is the intellective soul related to the body and to matter? For it has no extension and is not drawn forth from the potency of matter; rather, it comes to and inheres in the body in a supernatural way.40 17. A third answer is that many questions are easier for us, and able to be answered with more certainty and demonstrated, because of our experience of the activities involved, relative to questions about many other forms whose proper activities we cannot experience in this way. But the science of the soul can still be said to be more difficult than the science of other natural forms insofar as there are many more debatable questions connected with it, for the soul requires an extremely complex structure in the body, beyond what other forms

38 See

Questions on Aristotle’s Physics I.6. Buridan here refers to the Aristotelian distinction between two types of knowledge resulting from the corresponding two types of demonstration: (1) knowing that something is the case (quia est), and (2) knowing why something is the case (propter quid est). For Buridan’s own detailed account of the distinction, see Summulae de dialectica 8.8 and 8.9. 39 Namely, to the original question: How can it be that the science of the soul is both more certain and also more difficult? 40 On the immateriality of the soul and the notion of being drawn forth from the potency of matter, see below III.3.

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et habet valde multiplices et diversas potentias et operationes; et difficilius est valde multa scire quam pauca. Et forte stat quod hoc intendebat Aristoteles, qui declarando huius scientiae difficultatem enumeravit quaestionum de anima abundantem multitudinem. 18. Et istae solutiones omnes non repugnant ad invicem sed sunt simul tenendae. Unde et sic etiam in prooemio Metaphysicae dixit Aristoteles metaphysicam esse simul et certissimam et difficillimam, prout hoc illic debet videri. 19. Tunc ergo ad rationes. 20. Ad primam dicitur quod unica est scientia aliarum difficillima simpliciter, scilicet metaphysica. Sed hoc non obstante scientia de anima potest esse in suo genere difficillima, scilicet inter scientias naturales. 21. De secunda ratione satis dictum est in positione. 22. Ad aliam potest dici quod ista scientia non esset primo addiscenda inter naturales secundum viam doctrinae incipientem a facilioribus et communioribus, sed liber Physicorum qui ob hoc dicitur primus librorum naturalium. Sed tamen haec scientia, scilicet de anima, primo solet addisci propter eius magnam utilitatem et nobilitatem. 23. Ad aliam concessum est quod ipsa quodammodo et quantum ad aliqua est facilior. 24. Ad ultimam dicitur quod intellectus noster non est sufficienter actuatus ad formandum intellectionem, sed indiget prius actuari a speciebus sensibilibus ex sensu receptis, prout magis debet videri in libro tertio.

101 prooemio Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. I.2 982a 25–29. 103 illic ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. I.3. 119–120 in libro tertio ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.11; III.15. 97 stat ] om. AETV 99 enumeravit ] narravit T 102 simul et ] om. AET 104 Tunc ] respondetur A hiis visis respondetur faciliter T || rationes ] respondeo add. W 105 aliarum ] aliis W 106 simpliciter ] principaliter E 111 naturales ] scientias add. T 111–113 secundum . . . naturalium ] hom. T 111 incipientem ] incipiendo AE 111–112 facilioribus et ] om. AE 114 solet ] potest T 118 intellectionem ] intentionem AT

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require, and it has quite a few different powers and activities; and it is more difficult to know more things than fewer. Perhaps this is what Aristotle had in mind when he proclaimed the difficulty of this science and listed a massive number of questions about the soul. 18. All these answers are not incompatible with one another. Indeed, they should be held together. Aristotle also on these grounds said in his prologue to the Metaphysics that metaphysics is at once the most certain and the most difficult. The point should be investigated there.41 19. To the arguments. 20. To the first argument,42 we reply that there is but one science among all the others that is the most difficult without qualification, namely metaphysics. But this point notwithstanding the science of the soul can be the most difficult of its kind, namely among the natural sciences. 21. A satisfactory answer to the second argument43 was given in the main body of the question. 22. To the third argument,44 we can reply that this science should not be taught first among the natural sciences, if we follow the path of instruction that starts from what is easier and more common, but rather the Physics, which for this reason is called the first among the books of the natural sciences. Be that as it may, the science of the soul is usually taught first owing to its great usefulness and nobility. 23. To the fourth argument,45 we conceded that it is easier somehow and in respect of some things. 24. To the last argument,46 we say that our intellect on its own is not sufficiently actuated to formulate an act of knowing, for it needs to be actuated first by the sensible species it acquires from the senses, as ought to be seen in the discussion in Book III.47 41 Namely,

in Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics I.3. See par. 1 above. 43 See par. 2 above. 44 See par. 3 above. 45 See par. 4 above. 46 See par. 5 above. 47 Buridan’s full discussion on sensible species begins at II.9 below, whereas he treats on intelligible species in III.11 and 15. 42

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Utrum universale nihil est aut posterius est.

5

10

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1. Arguitur primo quod universale sit prius singularibus, et magis universale minus universalibus per Porphyrium qui hoc saepe dicit. 2. Item “prius est a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia,” ut dicitur in Praedicamentis et in quinto Metaphysicae; sed ab universali ad singulare non convertitur. Sequitur enim, Socrates est; ergo homo est; et non sequitur e converso. 3. Item partes definitionis debent esse priores definito, ut dicitur septimo Metaphysicae; sed illae sunt universaliores; ergo etc. 4. Item perpetuum est prius corruptibili; universale autem est perpetuum, ut dicitur primo Posteriorum, et singulare corruptibile; ergo etc. 5. Item secundo Metaphysicae: eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi. Ideo quae sunt priora in cognoscendo sunt priora etiam

3 per Porphyrium ] P ORPHYRY, Isag. passim. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Porph. Isa. 4 (ed. Tatarzy´nski, 140). 5 prius . . . consequentia ] A RISTOTELES, Cat. 12 14a 34– 35 (Ar. lat. I.1 37.14): “Prius autem videtur esse illud a quo non convertitur subsistentiae consequentia.” Met. V.11 1019a3–4. 10 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RI STOTELES , Met. VII.10 1035b 14–20. 12 primo Posteriorum ] A RISTOTELES , An. post. I.8 75b 23. 14 secundo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. II.1 993b30–31. 1 nihil est ] aut prius add. T || est ] singularibus add. T 6 Praedicamentis ] Postpraedicamentis A 7 convertitur ] consequentia subsistendi add. T 8 sequitur ] om. EW est consequentia T 12 ut dicitur primo Posteriorum ] om. AET || corruptibile ] ut patet ibidem add. W

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 5

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Is a universal nothing or posterior?48

1. First, we argue that the universal is prior to singulars, and also that what is more universal is prior to what is less universal, by an appeal to Porphyry, who often says this. 2. Again, “one item is prior to another when the consequence from the existence of the latter to the existence of the former holds, but not the converse,” as is said in the Categories and in Metaphysics V. However, the consequence from the universal to the singular does not hold but the converse does, for although this follows: “Socrates exists; therefore, a human being exists,” the converse does not.49 3. Again, the parts of a definition ought to be prior to what is defined, as Metaphysics VII says; but the parts of a definition are more universal [than what is defined]; therefore, etc.50 4. Again, what is everlasting is prior to what can be corrupted. However, universals are everlasting, as Posterior Analytics I says, whereas a singular can be corrupted; therefore, etc. 5. Again, according to Metaphysics II the principles of being and knowing are the same. Hence, items that are prior in knowing are also

48 Namely,

to the singular. See also Buridan’s discussion on this topic in Questions on Aristotle’s Physics 1.7; Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VII.15; and below III.8. 49 That is, A is prior to B when ‘B exists’ entails ‘A exists’ but ‘A exists’ does not entail ‘B exists’. 50 This is because the parts of a (quidditative) definition (of a species) are its (proximate) genus and (specific) difference, each of which is broader than the species defined. For more details of Buridan’s theory of definitions, see Summulae de dialectica 8.2. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 5

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in essendo. Sed universalia sunt priora in cognoscendo et notiora propter quod dicitur in prooemio Physicorum quod “oportet ex universalibus in singularia procedere;” ergo etc. 6. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles, scilicet “universale aut nihil est aut posterius est.” Et arguitur ratione quia singularia bene sunt substantiae, ut Socrates et Plato, et universalia non sunt substantiae, ut Aristoteles probat septimo Metaphysicae, sed sunt termini significativi in anima aut in voce. Modo substantiae sunt priores accidentibus, ut habetur septimo Metaphysicae; ergo etc. 7. Ista quaestio est facilis quantum spectat ad propositum, distinguendo de singularibus et universalibus. 8. Uno modo dicitur universale secundum causalitatem, scilicet quia est causa multorum. Sic enim Deus et intelligentiae et corpora caelestia vocantur universalia et causae universales quia sunt causae omnium istorum inferiorum. Unde de illis universalibus, scilicet de Deo et intelligentiis, intendebat Aristoteles in prooemio Metaphysicae, ubi dixit quod “maxime universalia sunt difficillima ad cognoscendum quia sunt a sensu remotissima.” Singularia autem correspondentia huiusmodi universalibus vocantur ista inferiora, quae sunt ultima causata, et quae, si sint causae, sunt causae paucorum. 17–18 oportet . . . procedere ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.1 184a 24–25 (Ar. lat. VII.1 8.1): “Unde ex universalibus in singularia oportet provenire.” 19–20 universale . . . est ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402b7–8 (Ar. lat. XII.2 3.2.11–12): “Animal autem universale aut nihil est aut posterius.” 22 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.13–15. 24 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.1 1028a32– 33 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 133.24): “Sed substantia omnium primum, ratione et notitia et tempore.” Auc. Ar. 1.159 (ed. Hamesse, 128): “Substantia prior est accidente natura, tempore et definitione.” 32–33 maxime . . . remotissima ] A RISTOTELES, Met. I.2 982a 23–25 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 15.103): “Fere autem et difficillima sunt ea hominibus ad cognoscendum quae maxime sunt universalia; nam a sensibus sunt remotissima.” Auc. Ar. 1.15 (ed. Hamesse, 116): “Quae maxima sunt universalia difficillima sunt ad cognoscendum hominibus, quia a sensu sunt remotissima.” 20 est ] singularibus add. T 21 ut Socrates et Plato et ] om. T || sunt substantiae ] om. T 22 Metaphysicae ] sed quod singularia sint substantiae patet ut Socrates et Plato add. T 22–24 sed sunt . . . Metaphysicae ] hom. AET 28 multorum ] simul add. W 29 vocantur ] sunt T 30 omnium istorum ] aliorum VW 30–31 scilicet . . . intelligentiis ] om. T 35 sunt ] tantum add. AE

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prior in being. But universals are prior in knowing and better known, which is why the prologue to Physics says that “one must procede from universals to singulars;” therefore, etc. 6. Aristotle says the opposite, namely that a “universal is either nothing or it is posterior.” It is argued by reason as follows. Singulars, such as Socrates and Plato, are surely substances, whereas universals are not substances, as Aristotle proves in Metaphysics VII. Rather, universals are significative terms existing in the soul or in speech. Yet substances are prior to accidents, as Metaphysics VII maintains; therefore, etc. 7. This question is easy insofar as it concerns the matter at hand if we draw a distinction with regard to singulars and universals. 8. In one way an item is spoken of as universal with regard to causation, namely because it is the cause of many things. God and the intelligences and also the heavenly bodies are spoken of as universals and universal causes in this way, since they are the causes of everything below them. These universals, that is, God and the intelligences, are what Aristotle had in mind in the prologue of his Metaphysics when he said, “Universals are the most difficult things to know since they are most distant from the senses.” However, what is below them, that is, their ultimate effects, are spoken of as the singulars cor-

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9. Et sic maxime ponitur haec conclusio quod universalia sunt naturaliter priora singularibus. Universalia namque sic accepta sunt causae singularium, et causae sunt priores naturaliter suis causatis. Immo sic universalissimum est primum omnium, quod est ipse Deus. 10. Secundo modo dicitur universale secundum praedicationem vel significationem, scilicet terminus praedicabilis de pluribus et significans plura indifferenter, ut iste terminus homo vel animal. Et quanto aliquid est magis de pluribus praedicabile et plura significat, tanto est universalior. Singulare autem sibi correspondens est terminus praedicabilis de uno solo et supponens pro uno solo, ut iste terminus Socrates vel Plato vel hic homo vel hoc veniens, ut dicit Porphyrius. Sic enim ipse determinat de universalibus et singularibus. Et huiusmodi universalia et singularia sunt in anima vel in voce vel in scriptura. Primo quidem in anima sunt conceptus quibus determinate concipimus Socratem vel Platonem, et isti vocantur conceptus singulares; alii sunt conceptus quibus indifferenter concipimus omnes homines et omnia animalia ad quos designandos imponuntur illa nomina homo et animal, et isti vocantur conceptus universales. Et tales conceptus universales et singulares sunt termini ex quibus formantur in anima propositiones mentales. Postea illis terminis mentalibus correspondent termini vocales quos, mediantibus illis conceptibus, imponimus ad significandum res conceptas, ut isti termini homo, animal, Socrates, et Plato. Et consequenter etiam in scriptura sunt termini universales et singulares correspondentes vocalibus, ut habetur in primo libro Perihermeneias. Termini autem vocales et scripti debent ordinari secundum exigentiam mentalium, quia non formantur nisi ad repraesentandum mentales. 46 ut dicit Porphyrius ] P ORPHYRY, Isag. 2.15. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Porph. Isa. 4 (ed. Tatarzy´nski, 139–140); QQ. Porph. Isa. 9 (ed. Tatarzy´nski, 158–159). 59–60 primo libro Perihermeneias ] A RISTOTELES, De int. 1 16a 4. 36–38 naturaliter . . . causae sunt ] hom. E 36–37 naturaliter ] simpliciter V 39 primum ] principium add. W 43 de pluribus ] om. T 46 vel . . . veniens ] om. AET 51 alii ] et isti T 52 designandos ] distinguendo T 54 anima ] mente AE 55–56 correspondent ] vel subordinantur potius add. AET 59 correspondentes ] om. A subordinati terminis ET || vocalibus ] om. A 60 Termini autem ] ex hiis habetur et apparet quod termini T || debent ] dicuntur AT 61 formantur ] inferunt A

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responding to universals of this sort; and even if these singulars are causes, they are nevertheless causes of few things.51 9. It is especially in this first sense that we put forward our first conclusion that universals are naturally prior to singulars, for universals taken this way are the causes of singulars, and causes are naturally prior to their effects — indeed, the most universal in this way is the first [cause] of all things, namely God. 10. The second way an item is said to be universal is in terms of predication or signification, namely a term able to be predicated of many items and signifying many items indifferently, such as the term ‘human’ or ‘animal’. The more something is predicable of many things and significative of many things, the more universal it is. A singular corresponding to such a universal is a term able to be predicated of just one thing and suppositing for just one thing, such as the term ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato’, or ‘this human’ or ‘this one approaching’, as Porphyry says, who discussed universals and singulars along these lines. Universals and singulars in this sense are (a) in the soul, (b) in speech, or (c) in writing. As regards (a) there are some concepts in the soul by which we conceive Socrates or Plato determinately, and these are called singular concepts; there are other concepts by which we conceive all human beings or all animals indifferently, for the designation of which we imposed these terms ‘human’ and ‘animal’, and these are called universal concepts. Such universal and singular concepts are the terms with which we formulate mental propositions in the soul. As regards (b) to these mental terms there correspond spoken terms, which we imposed to signify by means of these concepts the things we conceive, such as the terms ‘human’, ‘animal’, ‘Socrates’, and ‘Plato’. As regards (c) there are universal and singular terms in writing as well, which correspond to spoken terms, as De Interpretatione maintains. But spoken and written terms ought to be ordered

51 On

universals in this sense, see also Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge 4 and Summulae de dialectica 2.1.2.

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11. Et tunc est dubitatio utrum apud animam termini universales mentales sint priores terminis mentalibus singularibus. Hoc enim est dubitare utrum prius concipimus res universaliter quam singulariter vel e converso, et utrum prius magis universaliter quam minus universaliter. Et hoc determinare non pertinet ad illum locum sed ad tertium huius et ad prooemium Physicorum. Ideo solum de hoc ponam conclusiones quarum probationes videbuntur in locis suis. 12. Ergo secunda conclusio in hac quaestione est ista: quod conceptus singulares sunt priores conceptibus universalibus, propter hoc quod necesse est nos prius sentire quam intelligere et apud sensum non sunt nisi conceptus singulares, quia sensus non cognoscit universaliter. 13. Tertia conclusio est quod conceptus magis universales sunt notiores apud animam quam conceptus minus universales. Et hoc declarari debet in prooemio Physicorum; sic enim dicitur ibi quod universalia sunt notiora singularibus, quod debet exponi, id est magis universalia minus universalibus. Ideo etiam dicitur quod in scientiis “oportet ex universalibus in singularia procedere,” quod oportet exponere, id est ex magis universalibus in minus universalia, quia scientiae non descendunt ad singularia simpliciter. 14. Sed restat dubitatio tractanda in tertio huius: utrum apud intellectum conceptus simpliciter singulares praecedant conceptus universales. Et ego pono quartam conclusionem quod sic. Et illa probabitur in tertio libro.

67–68 tertium huius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.8. 68 prooemium Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.7. 77 prooemio Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.7. || dicitur ibi ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.5 189a 5–6. 79–80 in scientiis . . . procedere ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.1 184a23–24 (Ar. lat. VII.1 8.1): “Unde ex universalibus in singularia oportet provenire.” 83 in tertio huius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.8. 86 in tertio libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.8. 67 pertinet ] spectat A 72 nos ] om. AE 75–76 notiores ] priores VW scientiis ] naturalibus add. W 83–84 intellectum ] intentionem A

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according to the exigencies of the mental terms, since they are formed only in order to represent mental terms. 11. Then the question arises whether in the soul universal mental terms are prior to singular mental terms. This is the same as the question whether we conceive things in a universal way before we conceive them in a singular way (or the other way around), and whether in a more universal way before a less universal way. Discussion of these matters is not appropriate here; it belongs in [our Questions on Aristotle’s] De anima III and the prologue of [our Questions on Aristotle’s] Physics. And so I shall only put forward some conclusions; proofs for them will have to be looked up in their proper places. 12. Therefore, my second conclusion in this question is that singular concepts are prior to universal concepts, because it is necessary for us to sense before we understand, and in the senses there are only singular concepts, since sense does not cognize in a universal way. 13. The third conclusion is that in the soul more universal concepts are better known than less universal concepts, which should be clear in the prologue of [our Questions on Aristotle’s] Physics, because Aristotle says in the prologue of his Physics that universals are better known than singulars. This remark ought to be expounded as follows: the more universal is better known than the less universal. This is why he also says that in the sciences “one must move from universals to singulars,” which one should expound in this way: one must move from the more universal to the less universal, because the sciences do not descend to singulars without qualification. 14. There still remains an issue which ought to be treated in [our Questions on Aristotle’s] De anima III: Do concepts in the intellect that are unqualifiedly singular precede universal concepts? I put forward as my fourth conclusion that they do, and this will be proved in Book III.

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15. Sed adhuc ad propositum Aristotelis determinans de hoc quod universale aut nihil est aut posterius est, oportet notare quod Plato aliter ponit universalia et singularia, scilicet extra animam correspondentia conceptibus universalibus et singularibus. Dixit enim quod huic nomini homo et conceptui communi sibi correspondenti correspondet extra animam quaedam natura humana communis omnibus hominibus singularibus quam dicebat esse quidditatem formalem istorum omnium singularium, et quandoque vocabat ideam, et quam dicebat primo significari per illum terminum communem homo et primo concipi per illum conceptum communem a quo sumitur hoc nomen homo. Et ita etiam dicebat esse ideam equorum et ideam asinorum. Ponebat enim res singulariter existentes praeter animam quas vocabat singularia, ut Socrates, Plato, Brunellus, et alias res universaliter existentes etiam praeter animam quas vocabat ideas et quidditates singularium. 16. Et Aristoteles illam opinionem destruxit septimo Metaphysicae et declaravit quod omnis res est singulariter existens. Immo conceptus communis a quo sumitur hoc nomen homo ita singulariter existit in anima tua sicut haec albedo in hoc pariete, et ista vox homo ita singulariter existit in aere sicut haec vox Socrates. Et ideo sic intelligit Aristoteles quod universale nihil est. Sic ergo apparet quomodo debeat exponi propositio Aristotelis quod universale aut nihil est aut posterius est. Nam illud universale ideale quod ponebat Plato nihil 88 universale . . . posterius est ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402b7–8 (Ar. lat. XII.2 3.2.11–12): “Animal autem universale aut nihil est aut posterius.” 101 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.3 1029a28–29; Met. VII.8 1033b20–29. 107–108 universale . . . posterius est ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402b7–8 (Ar. lat. XII.2 3.2.11–12): “Animal autem universale aut nihil est aut posterius.” 87 determinans ] declarando AET determinando W 88 est2 ] singularibus add. T || oportet notare ] sciendum est AET 89 aliter ] om. AE 91 nomini ] termino T 94 omnium ] hominum AE hominum add. T || quandoque ] quam AET 96 conceptum ] terminum T || communem ] homo conceptum etiam add. T || nomen ] commune add. W 97 ideam2 ] om. T || asinorum ] et sic de aliis add. AET 98 singulariter ] simpliciter A 102 singulariter ] simpliciter A || existens ] extra anima add. T 103 a quo sumitur ] om. T || hoc nomen homo ita ] ens vel universale AET || singulariter ] simpliciter A 105 singulariter ] simpliciter A 105–106 intelligit ] innuit A intendit T 106 est ] aut posterius est add. AET 106–108 Sic . . . posterius est ] hom. AET 107 Aristotelis ] quam ponit in libro De anima scilicet illa add. W 108 illud universale ideale ] universale scilicet illud ideale T

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15. Even so, we should note with regard to Aristotle’s claim that the universal is either nothing or posterior that Plato postulates universals and singulars differently than Aristotle does. For Plato there are items outside the soul corresponding to universal and singular concepts. He said that to the name ‘human’ and the common concept corresponding to it there corresponds outside the soul a human nature common to all singular human beings which he claimed to be the formal quiddity of all these singulars, and which he sometimes called an Idea, and which he said is primarily signified by the common term ‘human’ and primarily conceived by the common concept from which the name ‘human’ is derived. And so he said that there is an Idea for horses and an Idea for donkeys. He postulated that there are things existing in a singular way outside the soul, which he called singulars, such as Socrates, Plato, and Brownie; and there are other things existing in a universal way also outside the soul which he called Ideas and the quiddities of singulars. 16. Aristotle thoroughly refuted Plato’s view in Metaphysics VII and he made it clear that every thing exists as a singular. Indeed, the common concept from which the name ‘human’ is derived exists as a singular in your soul just as much as this whiteness does in this wall, and the utterance ‘human’ exists as a singular in the air just as much as the utterance ‘Socrates’ does. This is the way in which Aristotle understood the claim that the universal is nothing. Therefore, it is obvious how one ought to explain Aristotle’s claim that the universal

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est; universale autem, capiendo pro conceptu, posterius est rebus extra animam singulariter existentibus, vel etiam quia conceptus universalis posterius est conceptu singulari, sicut dictum est. 17. Ergo respondendum est ad rationes. 18. Primo de auctoritate Porphyrii in tertio libro videbitur. Diversi enim sunt termini singulares, sicut Porphyrius notat; quidam sunt ut Socrates, Plato, Brunellus; alii ut hic homo, hoc animal, hoc veniens. Modo conceptus singulares correspondentes istis terminis hic homo, hoc animal sunt bene priores apud animam quam conceptus universales, quia immediate habent ortum ex sensu. Sed conceptus universales sunt prius apud animam conceptibus correspondentibus istis nominibus Socrates, Plato, difficile est enim res apprehendere secundum illos conceptus prout experimur, sicut si quis videat Socratem venientem a longe, statim enim percipiet sensu ipsum esse hoc corpus, et statim consequenter intellectus formabit conceptum singularem. Et deinde ex isto poterit faciliter abstrahere conceptum communem corporis, licet adhuc ignorat utrum illud sit animal aut corpus aliud. Sed cum appropinquabit et videbit ipsum moveri ex se iudicabit sensu quod hoc est animal, et immediate poterit etiam intellectus ab hoc conceptu singulari abstrahere conceptum universalem animalis, et remanebit adhuc dubium utrum est homo vel bestia. Tandem magis appropinquans iudicabit quod est hic homo, et nesciet adhuc quod sit Socrates. Ultimo autem cum erit ei propinquius, cognoscit eum esse Socratem vel Platonem. Et sic universale bene est prius tali singulari.

113 in tertio libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.8. 114 Porphyrius notat ] P OR PHYRY , Isag. 2.15. Cf. B URIDANUS , QQ. Porph. Isa. 4 (ed. Tatarzy´ nski, 139–140); QQ. Porph. Isa. 9 (ed. Tatarzy´nski, 158–159). 109 capiendo ] om. AET 114 notat ] nominat T 115 Brunellus ] om. AE || ut ] hic Brunellus add. AE || hic homo ] om. W 116 correspondentes ] quibus subordinantur AE quibus correspondent sive subordinantur et mente T || istis terminis ] isti termini AET 117 hoc animal ] om. V 119 conceptibus ] singularibus add. AE 123 singularem ] consimilem singularem EW consimilem secundum rem V 124 abstrahere ] extrahere A habere T 125 corpus ] aliquid W 128 abstrahere ] extrahere A a sensu habere T || conceptum ] rem add. E || universalem ] communem W

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is nothing or posterior: the ideal universal, which Plato postulated, is nothing, whereas the universal taken as a concept is posterior to the things outside the soul which exist as singulars, or also because the universal concept is posterior to the singular concept, as mentioned. 17. We should now respond to the initial arguments. 18. First,52 we shall see about the authority of Porphyry in Book III, for there are many different singular terms, as Porphyry noticed. Some are like ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, and ‘Brownie’ and others like ‘this human’, ‘this animal’, and ‘the one approaching’. Now singular concepts corresponding to the terms ‘this human’ and ‘this animal’ are in fact prior in the soul to universal concepts, since they arise immediately out of sensation. However, universal concepts are prior in the soul to the concepts corresponding to the names ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’, because it is difficult to grasp things according to these concepts, as we experience. For example, suppose someone were to see Socrates approaching from afar. They will at once perceive through the senses that he is this body, and then their intellect will formulate a singular concept right away. Next, their intellect will be able to abstract from this a common concept for body easily, even though they still do not know whether he is an animal or some other body. Now, when Socrates gets a little closer and they see that he moves on his own, they will then immediately judge through their senses that this is an animal, and their intellect will be able to abstract the universal concept of animal from this singular concept immediately. Yet there is still the question whether he is a human being or a beast. Eventually, after Socrates has come even closer, they will judge that he is this human being. However, they still do not know whether he is Socrates.

52 See

par. 1 above.

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19. Sed etiam quando dicitur quod “illud est prius naturaliter a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia,” ego dico quod proprie loquendo hoc est verum sub tali sensu quod si duo termini supponunt pro duabus diversis rebus, et sint illi termini A et B, si autem ad A esse sequitur B esse et non e converso, tunc res pro qua supponit B est prior. Cum enim A non possit esse sine B et B potest esse sine A, sequitur quod A dependet ex B et non e converso. Ideo B est causa ipsius A. Sed ubi termini supponant pro eadem re non oportet regulam tenere, ut si sequitur: homo est; ergo animal est et non e converso, non oportet concludere quod animal sit prius homine, quia illa convertibilitas consequentiae non provenit ex prioritate animalis ad hominem sed ex eo quod ille terminus animal plura significat quam ille terminus homo. Sed si tu argueres sic. Sequitur quod si conceptus singularis est, quod conceptus universalis est, et non sequitur e converso; ergo conceptus universalis est prior conceptu singulari. Tu faceres bonam consequentiam, sed antecedens esset falsum. Cum enim potes habere conceptum singularem, licet non habeas vel habueris conceptum universalem; sed e converso non est possibile; ideo conceptus singularis est prior. 20. Ad aliam bene concessum est quod conceptus universaliores sunt priores conceptibus minus universalibus, scilicet genus specie. 21. Ad aliam dico quod conceptus universalis non est perpetuus. Immo de novo formatur in mente tua, sicut conceptus singularis. Sed ad illum sensum universale dicitur perpetuum, et non singulare, quia semper terminus universalis pro aliquo supponeret quandocumque po-

133–134 illud . . . consequentia ] A RISTOTELES, Cat. 12 14a 34–35 (Ar. lat. I.1 37.14): “Prius autem videtur esse illud a quo non convertitur subsistentiae consequentia.” Met. V.11 1019a3–4. 133 Sed etiam quando ] ad secundam rationem cum AET 140 regulam ] in isto W 143 consequentiae ] sequelae W || ad hominem ] om. AE 144 quam . . . homo ] om. AETV 149 habeas vel ] om. W 150 prior ] conceptu universali add. TW

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Finally, when he is next to them, they recognize him to be Socrates or Plato. And in this way, a universal is in fact prior to such a singular. 19. But when it is said that “one item is naturally prior to another when the consequence from the existence of the latter to the existence of the former holds, but not the converse,”53 I reply that strictly speaking this is true in the sense that if two terms — let them be A and B — supposit for two different things and the existence of A entails the existence of B, but not conversely, then the thing for which B supposits is prior, for, since A cannot exist without B and B can exist without A, it follows that A depends upon B and not conversely. Hence B is the cause of A. However, if the terms supposit for the same thing, the rule need not hold. For instance, suppose this follows: “A human exists; therefore an animal exists,” and not conversely. One need not conclude that an animal is prior to a human, because whether the consequence is convertible or not does not stem from the priority of animals to human beings but rather from the fact that the term ‘animal’ signifies more things than the term ‘human’ does. Now suppose you were to make the following argument. If the singular concept exists, the universal concept exists, but not conversely; therefore, it follows that the universal concept is prior to the singular concept. In that case, your consequence would be valid, but the antecedent would be false, for you can have the singular concept even though you might not have or have had the universal concept, but the converse is not possible. Hence the singular concept is prior. 20. To the third argument,54 we in fact allowed that more universal concepts are prior to less universal concepts, that is, genus to species. 21. To the fourth argument,55 I reply that a universal concept is not everlasting. On the contrary, it is formulated in your mind as something new, just as a singular concept is. But a universal (and not a singular) is said to be everlasting in this sense: a universal term would

53 See

par. 2 above. par. 3 above. 55 See par. 4 above. 54 See

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neretur in propositione propter perpetuitatem in successiva generatione singularium. Sic autem non esset de termino singulari. 22. Ad ultimam dictum est quod res prius cognoscitur singulariter quam universaliter simpliciter, licet prius cognoscatur magis universaliter quam minus universaliter.

160 simpliciter ] om. AET

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always supposit for something whenever it is in a proposition, owing to the fact that the successive generation of singulars is everlasting. But this would not be so with a singular term. 22. To the last argument,56 we have said that a thing is cognized in a singular way prior to being cognized in a universal way, without qualification, although it is cognized more universally prior to being cognized less universally.

56 See

par. 5 above.

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Utrum accidentia magnam partem conferant ad cognoscendum quod quid est.

5

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1. Et arguitur primo quod non, quia sequeretur quod esset circulatio in demonstrationibus, quod est contra Aristotelem primo Posteriorum dicentem “circulo quoque demonstrare est impossibile.” Se queretur etiam quod esset petitio principii, quod est inconveniens. Consequentia manifesta est, quia quod quid est, id est definitio, est principium demonstrationis, est enim medium in demonstratione potissima, ut patet secundo Posteriorum. Et sic cum accidentia sciantur per demonstrationem qua de suis subiectis demonstrantur, apparet quod accidentia sciantur per quod quid est. Ergo patet quod si e converso quod quid est sciretur per accidentia, esset circulatio. Et item: ex quo per quod quid est demonstrantur accidentia, oportet quod quid est esse notius eis, aliter esset petitio principii. Ergo si e converso per accidentia vellemus notificare quod quid est, nos procederemus a minus notis ad notius, et hoc esset petere principium. Arguitur etiam sic: ista quae sunt minus nota non valent ad notificandum illud quod est magis notum. Sed accidentia sunt minus nota, quia dicitur septimo Metaphysicae quod “substantia est prior accidente notitia, tempore et ratione.” 5 circulo . . . impossibile ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.3 72b 25–27 (Ar. lat. IV.4 288.19): “Circulo autem quod impossibile sit demonstrare simpliciter manifestum est.” 9 secundo Posteriorum ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. II.11 94a 34–35. 19–20 substantia . . . ratione ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.1 1028a32–33 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 133.24): “Sed substantia omnium primum, ratione et notitia et tempore.” Auc. Ar. 1.159 (ed. Hamesse, 128): “Substantia prior est accidente natura, tempore et definitione.” 4 in demonstrationibus ] om. T 6 principii ] in demonstrationibus add. AET 7 quod ] propter A 12 circulatio ] et petitio principii add. T || item ] arguitur de petitione principii quia add. AE 13 demonstrantur ] sciuntur et praem. AT || accidentia ] om. A 18 nota ] ergo etc. Minor patet add. T

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 6

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Do accidents contribute a great deal towards cognizing what something is?

1. It is argued, first, that they do not. For then it would follow that there would be circularity in demonstrations, which is contrary to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I where he says, “Circular demonstration is not possible.” It would also follow that the question would be begged, which is unacceptable. The consequence is obvious since what something is, that is, the definition, is a principle of demonstration, for it is the middle term in the most powerful kind of demonstration,57 as is clear in Posterior Analytics II. Since accidents are known through a demonstration where they are demonstrated of their subjects, it is thus clear that accidents are known through what something is. Therefore, it is obvious that if, conversely, what something is were known through its accidents, there would be circularity. Again, since accidents are demonstrated through what something is, what something is must be better known than its accidents, for otherwise the question would be begged. Therefore, if, conversely, we wish to make known what something is through its accidents, we would be proceeding from what is less known to what is better known, and this would beg the question. The point is also argued as follows. What

57

The most ‘powerful’ kind of demonstration is demonstration making us know not only that something is the case (quia est), but also the reason why something is the case (propter quid est). See Summulae de dialectica 8.6.2 (tr. Klima, 726). In this kind of demonstration the syllogistic middle term is the definition of the subject of which a proper accident (attribute) stemming from the quiddity of the thing is demonstrated in the conclusion. For Buridan’s thorough discussion of the issue, see Summulae de dialectica 8.8 and Questions on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II.7. For medieval theories of demonstration in general, see Longeway 2009. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 6

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2. Item secundo Metaphysicae: eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi; sed accidentia non sunt principia essendi ipsius substantiae et quod quid est; ergo nec cognoscendi. 3. Item nihil agit ultra speciem suam, scilicet nobilius et perfectius se; sed notitia substantiae est nobilior et perfectior quam notitia accidentium; ergo notitia accidentium non est innata facere notitiam substantiae et quod quid est. 4. Item per accidens non cognoscitur substantia directa repraesentatione, quia accidens et substantia sunt valde diversa; nec per discursum. Probatio: quia non potest esse evidens consequentia de esse unius ad esse alterius, quia non potest reduci ad primum principium, quod fundatur in contradictione; numquam enim potest esse contradictio hoc esse et illud non esse, cum contradictio debeat esse affirmatio et negatio eiusdem de eodem. Et item hoc confirmatur, scilicet quod non possit demonstrari per unum esse aliud esse, quia hoc esset per syllogismum affirmativum et syllogismi affirmativi tenent per unionem extremorum in medio, per illam regulam: “Quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, ista inter se sunt eadem.” Modo diversa non possunt esse uni et eidem eadem; ergo etc. 5. Item si accidens duceret in notitiam substantiae, vel hoc esset ratione convenientiae vel ratione oppositionis. Sed neutro modo est

21 secundo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. II.1 993b 30–31. 37–38 Quaecumque . . . eadem ] Soph. el. 6 168b30 (Ar. lat. VI.3 83.22): “Quae uni et eidem sunt eadem sibi invicem probamus esse eadem.” AQUINAS, In Phys. I.3, n. 22: “Quae autem uni et eidem sunt eadem sibi invicem sunt eadem.” Auc. Ar. 1.11 (ed. Hamesse, 140): “Quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem inter se sunt eadem.” Cf. A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.2 185b2–3; B URIDANUS, Tractatus de consequentiis 3.1.4. 21 essendi ] et repraesentandi add. E 24–25 et perfectius ] om. VW 27 quod quid est ] quidditatis VW 37 extremorum ] immediate add. W || regulam ] famosam (quae habetur primo Posteriorum in marg.) add. W 39 et eidem ] om. AE 40 duceret ] nos add. T || notitiam ] cognitionem AET 41–42 est possibile ] potest dici AET

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is less known doesn’t help in making known what is better known; but accidents are less known, for Metaphysics VII says, “Substance is prior to accidents with regard to knowledge, time, and definition.” 2. Again, according to Metaphysics II the principles of being and knowing are the same. But accidents are not the principles of the being of the substance itself and of what it is. Therefore, they are not the principles of knowing it either. 3. Again, nothing acts beyond its species, that is, produces something nobler and more perfect than itself. But knowledge of substance is nobler and more perfect than knowledge of accidents. Therefore, knowledge of accidents is not naturally suited to produce knowledge of substance and what something is. 4. Again, a substance is not known through an accident by means of direct representation since an accident and a substance are quite different; nor does this happen by means of discursive reasoning. Proof: There can be no evident consequence from the being of the one to the being of the other, since the consequence cannot be reduced to a first principle which is based on contradiction, for it can never be a contradiction that the one exists and the other does not, since a contradiction should be the affirmation and negation of the same thing about the same thing. This point, namely that the being of the one could not be demonstrated through the being of the other, is once again confirmed, because this would be through an affirmative syllogism, and affirmative syllogisms hold through the union of the extreme terms in a middle term according to the rule, “Whatever things are identical to one and the same thing are identical to each other;” but different things cannot be identical to one and the same thing; therefore, etc.58 5. Again, if an accident were to lead to knowledge of a substance, then this would be either by reason of their agreement or by reason of 58 This

argument is similar to one found in Nicholas of Autrecourt. See Correspondence n. 11 (ed. De Rijk, 64).

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possibile. Non enim sunt opposita, cum unum insit alteri. Nec sunt convenientia, quia primo diversa sunt; ergo etc. 6. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles in isto prooemio: “Accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est.” Et in tertio Physicorum: “Necesse est ignorato motu ignorare naturam.” Et in primo huius prius oportet determinare de operationibus animae quam de eius partibus vel potentiis. Et octavo Physicorum et duodecimo Metaphysicae per motus perpetuos inquiruntur substantiae separatae, et “omnis transmutatio facit scire materiam,” ut apparet primo Physicorum. Propter quod saepe differentiae accidentales ponuntur in descriptionibus substantiae ad circumloquendum differentias essentiales. 7. Omnes concedunt quod notitiae accidentium multum faciunt ad habendam notitiam substantiarum. Et omnes hoc experimur, nam per colores, sapores, et figuras tu scis hoc esse pomum et illud pirum. Similiter per pelles et figuras tu cognoscis hoc esse muttonem et illud lupum, hoc esse bovem et illud equum. Sed modus per quem hoc fiat est bene dubitabilis. 8. Aliqui enim ponunt talem modum. Supponunt primo quod intellectus ad intelligendum indiget moveri a phantasmate, et phantasia

44–45 Accidentia . . . quid est ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402b 21–22 (Ar. lat. XII.2 3.2.26–27): “Sed e converso accidentia conferunt magnam partem ad cognoscendum quod quid est.” Auc. Ar. 6.7 (ed. Hamesse, 174): “Accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est id est subiectum sive definitio subiecti.” 46 Necesse . . . naturam ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. III.1 200b 14–15 (Ar. lat. VII.1 96.3): “Necessarium enim est ignorato ipso ignorari et naturam.” Auc. Ar. 2.95 (ed. Hamesse, 148): “Ignorato motu necesse est ignorare naturam.” 47 primo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402b9–15. 48 octavo Physicorum ] A RISTOTE LES , Phys. VIII.6 258b 10–12. 48–49 duodecimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES , Met. XII.6 1071b3–22. 50 omnis . . . materiam ] Auc. Ar. 1.216 (ed. Hamesse, 133): “Sicut transmutatio facit scire materiam sic operatio formam.” Cf. AVER ROES , Comm. Met. VIII.6 (VIII 220 G); AVERROES , De subst. orbis 2 (IX 7 H-I); Auc. Ar. 10.22 (ed. Hamesse, 231). 50–51 primo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.9 192a25–34. 51–53 Propter quod . . . essentiales ] Cf. AQUINAS, Summa theol. I.77.1 ad 7. 43 primo ] principaliter T praedicamenta W 51 saepe ] dicit Aristoteles add. VW 52 substantiae ] om. VW 57 cognoscis ] scis AE 58 lupum ] om. V || hoc esse bovem ] om. W 61 phantasmate ] phantasmatibus seu a phantasmate W

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their opposition. But neither way is possible. They are not opposed, since one is inherent in the other. Nor are they in agreement, because they are primarily diverse; therefore, etc. 6. Aristotle states the opposite in his prologue to De Anima: “Accidents contribute a great deal towards knowing what something is.” Also, in Physics III, he says, “When the change is unknown the nature must likewise be unknown.” Also, in De Anima I he says that it is necessary to specify the activities of the soul before specifying its parts and powers. As well, in Physics VIII and Metaphysics XII he says that separate substances are investigated through their everlasting motions. As well, “Every change gives us knowledge of matter,” as is obvious from Physics I. For this reason, accidental differences are often put into the description of a substance as a way of characterizing essential differences. 7. Everyone concedes that knowledge of accidents contributes a great deal towards having knowledge of substance. We all experience this fact, for you know that this is an apple and that is a pear by their colors, tastes, and shapes. Likewise, you know that this is a sheep and that is a wolf, this a bull and that a horse, by their shapes and their coats. However, the way that this comes about is quite open to doubt.59 8. Some say that it happens in the following way. First, they assume that in order to think, the intellect needs to be moved by a phan-

59 For a

detailed analysis of Buridan’s doctrine, including his subsequent discussion of the different possible accounts of the matter, see Klima 2004a and Klima 2008, 89–103.

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a sensu, et sensus ab obiecto exteriori. Et suppositio vera est. Secundo supponunt quod sensus et phantasia non sunt nisi accidentium. Unde Commentator secundo huius dicit quod sensus non apprehendit quidditates rerum. Tertio supponunt, sicut ponit Avicenna, quod virtus imaginativa seu aestimativa elicit a speciebus et intentionibus sensatis intentionem non sensatam, ut ovis ex figura, colore, et motu lupi sensatis elicit intentionem inimicitiae et fugit ab eo. Et ita intellectus, cum sit virtus superior, potest iterum ex intentionibus imaginatis elicere intentionem non imaginatam. Ideo sic ex intentionibus accidentium sub imaginatione cadentium potest intellectus elicere intentionem substantiae. Et hoc videtur Aristoteles intendere in isto prooemio dicens: “Cum enim habeamus tradere secundum phantasiam de accidentibus, aut omnibus aut pluribus, tunc et de substantia habebimus aliquid dicere optime.” 9. Sed mihi videtur quod secunda suppositio istorum sit falsa, scilicet quod sensus et phantasia non apprehendunt substantias. Unde Commentator dicit secundo huius, sive dicat verum sive falsum, quod aestimativa sive cogitativa apprehendit intentiones decem praedica-

64 secundo huius ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.63 (ed. Crawford, 225.41–42). Cf. AQUINAS, Summa theol. I.57.1 ad 2. 65 ponit Avicenna ] AVICENNA, Lib. de an. IV.1 (ed. Van Riet, 6.79–7.88). 73–75 Cum . . . optime ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402b22–25 (Ar. lat. XII.2 3.2.29–33): “Cum enim habeamus tradere secundum phantasiam de accidentibus, aut omnibus aut pluribus, tunc et de substantia habebimus aliquid dicere optime.” 78 secundo huius ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.63 (ed. Crawford, 225.44–50). 62 sensus ] ulterius add. W 66 aestimativa ] elicitiva AE 68 intentionem ] sensationem T 78 falsum ] non curo add. W 79 aestimativa ] imaginativa AE || cogitativa ] virtus add. T

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tasm, the imagination by the senses, and the senses by an external object.60 This assumption is true. Second, they assume that the senses and the imagination deal only with accidents. This is why the Commentator says, apropos of De Anima II, that the senses do not grasp the quiddities of things. Third, they assume that, as Avicenna maintains, the imaginative or estimative power elicits an intention61 that has not been sensed from both species and intentions that have been sensed. For instance, a sheep elicits the intention of hostility from the shape, color, and motion it senses of the wolf, and so it flees from the wolf. Since the intellect is a higher faculty, it can further elicit a nonimagined intention from imagined intentions, and this is the way in which the intellect is able to elicit the intention of substance from the intentions of accidents which fall under the imagination. This seems to be what Aristotle had in mind in his prologue to De Anima where he says, “For when we are in a position to deal with the accidents through imagination, whether all of them or many of them, then we will be in the best position to say something about substance.” 9. It seems to me, however, that their second assumption is false, namely that the senses and the imagination do not grasp substances. Accordingly, the Commentator says with regard to De Anima II — whether truly or falsely — that the estimative or cogitative power 60 According to

common scholastic Aristotelian doctrine, universal intellectual concepts required for thought are produced in the intellect from the singular representations of sensed singulars, the so-called phantasms, stored in the internal sense called imagination (imaginatio or phantasia). 61 Intentions, in general (in contrast to the active intentions of the will, which we would strictly call intentions in the English vernacular), are representations, whether sensory or intellectual or even non-cognitive (as are intentions of sensible objects in the medium between sensible object and a cognitive subject capable of receiving them) that are apt to present some object or objects to a cognitive subject, directing its attention to that object or objects as such. According to Avicenna’s doctrine Buridan presents here, the intention of hostility or dangerousness must be instinctively elicited in the sheep by its so-called estimative power (vis aestimativa), since being hostile or dangerous is not in and of itself a sensible quality of the wolf sensed by the sheep, but it is something supervening on its sensible qualities, such as shape, color, movement, etc. The opinion Buridan is dealing with here, taking its cue from Avicenna, then analogously claims that our substantial concepts are likewise elicited by some intellectual faculty, since substances as such are not sensed either, only their sensible qualities, which are accidents.

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mentorum. Et Aristoteles concedit substantias esse sensibiles per accidens. Immo ego credo quod sensus percipit album et dulce potius quam albedinem aut dulcedinem. Unde canis percipit vocantem eum per auditum, et eumdem percipit per visum, iudicat enim vocantem esse quem videt. Ideo per visum vadit ad vocantem. Et non iudicat canis quod vox est color sed quod ille vocans est ille coloratus, nec vadit ad vocem sed etiam voce cessante vadit ad ipsum qui vocavit. Et credo quod cum accidens et subiectum sint unita, facilius est confuse simul cognoscere accidens et subiectum quam accidens distincte a subiecto vel e converso. Semper enim difficilius est distincte quam confuse apprehendere. Unde non credo canem iudicare de albedine abstracta a substantia sed de albo, album enim est substantia quae est alba. Cum hoc concedendum est, sicut illi bene dicunt, quod intellectus a speciebus et intentionibus imaginatis potest multas elicere intentiones non imaginatas, et sic multa potest intelligere quae non possunt cadere sub imaginatione.

80 Aristoteles concedit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.6 418a8–9, 20–21. 87 subiectum ] substantia T 88 subiectum ] substantiam T 88–89 subiecto ] substantia T 89 distincte ] distinguere AET 90 apprehendere ] cognoscere W || canem ] sensum AE 91 substantia1 ] subiecto W 93 et intentionibus ] om. T et intellectionibus add. W 94 intelligere ] elicere et praem. W

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grasps intentions belonging to all the ten categories. Likewise, Aristotle concedes that substances are sensible per accidens.62 For my part, I believe that sense perceives what is white and sweet rather than whiteness and sweetness. So it is that a dog perceives the one calling them through their hearing, and they perceive the very same person through their vision. For they judge that the one calling them is the one they see, and so it is through vision that they go to the person calling them. The dog does not judge that the sound is a color, but that the one calling them is the one who has color.63 Nor does the dog go to the sound, but even once the sound has stopped they go to the person who had called them. I believe that since an accident and a subject are united, it is easier to know an accident and a subject at once con-fusedly than it is to know an accident and a subject distinctly. It is always more difficult to grasp things distinctly than to grasp them con-fusedly. This is why I do not believe that the dog makes a judgment about whiteness abstracted from substance, but rather they make a judgment about a white thing, for the white thing is a substance that is white. We should admit as well, as they rightly claim, the intellect can elicit many non-imagined intentions from imagined intentions and species, and so the intellect can think about many things that cannot fall under imagination. 62 See

Buridan’s discussion in II.12 on the difference between being perceived per se and per accidens. 63 This ‘judgment’ is not an intellectual judgment, i.e., a complex of intellectual concepts corresponding to the words of the sentence “The one calling is the one seen”, since the dog, lacking intellect, obviously lacks these; rather, this is the simple identification of the same source of the different sensory modalities perceived by the different external senses (sound by hearing, color by sight), performed by the internal sense called the common sense (sensus communis), whose function is to integrate the information streaming in through the external senses into phantasms, the singular representations of singular sensory objects as such. For more discussion, see Lagerlund 2017 and Sobol 2017. On sound in particular, see Hartman 2017. For Buridan’s own discussion, see II.22.

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10. Alius modus dicendi est quod sensus, sicut est dictum, apprehendit confuse et simul substantiam et accidens, intellectus autem habet naturam et potentiam abstrahendi ex ista confusione conceptus proprios et distinctos, quorum uno concipit substantiam sine accidente et alio accidens sine substantia. 11. Tertius modus dicendi est quod res cognoscitur et repraesentatur per suam similitudinem. Effectus autem gerit in se quamdam causae similitudinem. Immo est quaedam participata similitudo suae causae. Ideo effectus potest repraesentare causam, et causa effectum, propter quod innatum est utrumque cognosci per reliquum, hoc quia est, illud propter quid est. Substantia autem et accidens se habent ad invicem sicut causa et effectus. Sic ergo per accidentia cognoscuntur substantiae et per inferiora substantiae separatae et tandem Deus et e converso. 12. Quartus modus dicendi est quod sicut materia prima non potest recipere formas substantiales nisi praedisposita et praeparata per accidentia, ita nec intellectus notitias substantiarum quae sunt principaliores nisi praedispositus per notitias accidentium, et sicut ex materia praedisposita extrahitur forma ad actum virtute agentis, ita ex potentia intellectus praedispositi extrahitur ad actum notitia substantiae in virtute intellectus agentis. 13. Et est sciendum quod isti quattuor modi non repugnant ad invicem. Immo ex eis simul concurrentibus constituitur modus perfectus secundum quem accidentium notitia confert ad notitiam substantiae.

97 confuse ] om. W 102 quamdam ] quodammodo AT 103 causae ] suae add. AE || participata ] om. T || suae ] om. VW 104 causa ] om. T 115 extrahitur ] abstrahitur V cum notitiis accidentium add. AE 118 constituitur ] totalis add. TVW

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10. Another way of talking about this is that sense, as mentioned, grasps a substance and an accident at once con-fusedly, whereas the intellect has the nature and power to abstract proper and distinct concepts from this con-fusion,64 by one of which it conceives a substance without an accident, and by the other it conceives an accident without a substance. 11. A third way of talking about this is that the thing is known and represented through its likeness. Now an effect carries in itself a certain likeness of its cause; indeed, it is a certain shared likeness of its cause. Therefore, an effect can represent its cause and a cause can represent its effect, because each is naturally suited to be known through the other — the one in demonstrating that it is, the other in demonstrating the reason why it is.65 A substance and an accident are, however, related to each other as cause and effect. Therefore, this is how substances are known through accidents and separate substances (and eventually God) are known through things lower than them, and conversely. 12. A fourth way of talking about this is that just as prime matter cannot receive substantial forms unless it has been predisposed and prepared by accidents, the intellect likewise cannot receive knowledge of substances (which are more principal) unless it has been predisposed by knowledge of accidents. And just as a form is drawn forth into act from predisposed matter by the power of the agent, so too the knowledge of substance is drawn forth into act from the potency of the predisposed intellect by the power of the agent intellect. 13. Note that these four ways are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the complete way in which knowledge of accidents contributes to knowledge of substance is made up from all four of them taken together.

64 The Latin

here is confusio, constructed from the adverbial form Buridan had been using above: con-fusedly (confuse) as opposed to distinctly (distincte). The idea is that the substance and the accident are grasped as (con-)fused together (or confusedly) as opposed to being grasped as distinct (or distinctly). 65 See footnote 57 above.

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14. Ideo non restat nisi solvere rationes. 15. Ad primam rationem dictum est quod non est circulatio inconveniens sed necessaria. Nec est petitio principii, quia uterque processus est ex nobis notioribus, hic quantum ad quia est, et illuc quantum ad propter quid est. Et sic potest dici ad auctoritatem allegatam septimo Metaphysicae. Sed dicendum est quod cum Aristoteles dixit substantiam esse priorem accidente secundum notitiam, intentio sua erat solum quod notitia substantiae esset prior perfectione quam notitia accidentium, quia, sicut dicebat ibidem Aristoteles, perfectius credimus scire rem si sciamus quid ipsa est quam si sciamus qualis ipsa est aut quanta aut ubi. 16. Ad aliam conceditur quod quantum ad processum propter quid eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi, sed non oportet ita esse in processu et demonstratione quia est. 17. Ad aliam dicitur quod agens non producit aliquid nobilius se nisi hoc sit in virtute agentis nobilioris concurrentis et principalius agentis. Sed sic potest, ut calor ignem. Si ergo notitia accidentis facit ad notitiam substantiae, aliud agens principalius concurrit, scilicet intellectus agens. 18. Ad aliam potest dici quod directa repraesentatione substantiae cum accidentibus confuse repraesentant se sensui, et sensu mediante intellectui, qui iam potest abstrahere etc. Dico etiam quod discursive possumus scire ex uno aliud. Et ideo ratio ista supponit falsum, scili-

124–125 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.1 1028a32–33 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 133.24): “Sed substantia omnium primum, ratione et notitia et tempore.” Auc. Ar. 1.159 (ed. Hamesse, 128): “Substantia prior est accidente natura, tempore et definitione.” 128 ibidem ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.1 1028a33–b 1. 120 restat ] aliud dicendum add. W 122 sed ] potius intelligendum add. W 123– 124 quantum ad ] om. AE 124 Et sic potest dici ] om. AET 127 substantiae ] om. T || perfectione ] via perfectionis AET 128 credimus ] est W 131 conceditur ] dico quod verum est T 133 processu et ] om. T 135 nobilioris ] superioris et praem. W 136 Sed sic potest ut ] scilicet sicut T 137 substantiae ] productione potest add. A ibi add. W 140 et sensu mediante ] om. T || mediante ] ulterius add. W 141 etc. ] modo dicto AET 142 falsum ] om. T

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14. Thus, all that remains is to respond to the objections. 15. To the first argument,66 we said that the circularity is not absurd, but necessary. Nor is the question begged, since both processes of reasoning start from something better known to us: the one insofar as it proceeds to the fact that something is, the other insofar as it proceeds to the reason why something is. This is how to reply to the authoritative passage cited from Metaphysics VII. But we should note that when Aristotle said that substance is prior to accident with regard to knowledge, what he meant was only that the knowledge of substance is prior to the knowledge of accidents in its perfection, since, as Aristotle says in the same place, we believe that we know a thing more perfectly if we know what it is than if we know how it is, or how much it is, or where it is. 16. To the second argument,67 we grant that the principles of being and knowing are the same as regards the process of reasoning about the reason why something is, but this does not have to hold for the process of reasoning and demonstration that it is. 17. To the third argument,68 we reply that an agent does not produce anything nobler than itself except by virtue of the assistance of a nobler and more principal agent. But this can happen, as is the case with heat producing fire.69 Therefore, if knowledge of accidents produces knowledge of substance, some other, more principal agent is lending its assistance, namely the agent intellect. 18. To the fourth argument,70 we can reply that substances with their accidents con-fusedly represent themselves to the senses by means of a direct representation, and through the senses to the intellect, which then can abstract, etc. I also state that we can know the

66 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above. 68 See par. 3 above. 69 In this case, heat, an accident, produces fire, a substance, even though the latter is nobler than the former. However, it can do so only because it is acting in virtue of a higher agent, namely, as the heat of another fire that lights this fire, its effect. 70 See par. 4 above. 67 See

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cet quod nihil sit evidens nisi declaretur vel probetur per primum principium. Immo sunt tot principia indemonstrabilia quot sunt conclusiones demonstrabiles, prout debet videri primo Posteriorum. Quod etiam dicitur de syllogismo affirmativo, ratio etiam supponit falsum, scilicet quod non sit procedendum nisi per demonstrationes ex praemissis categoricis. Immo de alio ad aliud hypothetice potest argui: Si A est, B est; sed A est; ergo B est. Et haec debent videri in logica. 19. Ad ultimam dicitur quod magna est convenientia accidentium ad substantias, caliditas enim est multum conveniens et naturalis igni. Quando autem dicitur quod substantia et accidens sunt primo diversa, hoc dicitur quantum ad modos praedicandi secundum quos distinguuntur praedicamenta. Et etiam si multum distant secundum gradus entium et perfectionum, tamen diversa accidentia bene generant similitudines et repraesentationes diversarum substantiarum inquantum sunt naturales dispositiones earum. Sic etiam ratio nihil arguit contra illum modum qui secundo positus fuit. Si enim plurimum differunt, tanto magis videtur intellectus posse confusionem distinguere.

145 primo Posteriorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. An. post. I.31. Cf. A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 72a 33–37; B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. II.1; Summ. de dial. 8.5.2; AQUINAS, Summa theol. I.94.2. 149 in logica ] B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 8.7.2. 144 tot ] vel proprie add. AE 146 etiam2 ] simpliciter W 147–148 praemissis ] vel principiis add. A 148 de alio ad aliud hypothetice ] om. AE || hypothetice ] om. T 152 primo ] praedicamenta W 155–156 similitudines ] perfectiones TV 156 diversarum ] disparatarum V 157 Sic etiam ] et haec enim ET et etiam ista A 159 distinguere ] Et sic finitur quaestio sexta et ultima primi libri De anima Aristotelis et est secundum Buridanum add. A Et sic est finis quaestionum primi libri De anima secundum magistrum Iohannem Buridanum de tertio opere add. T

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one on the basis of the other by discursive reasoning. And so the fourth argument makes a false assumption, namely that nothing is evident unless it is asserted or proved by means of a first principle. On the contrary, there are as many indemonstrable principles as there are demonstrable conclusions, as is made clear in [my Questions on Aristotle’s] Posterior Analytics I. The argument about affirmative syllogisms also makes a false assumption, namely that one should proceed only by demonstrations with categorical premisses. However, on the contrary, we can argue hypothetically from one to the other: “If A is, B is; but A is; therefore, B is.” But these issues should be discussed in logic.71 19. To the final argument,72 we say that there is considerable agreement between accidents and substances, for heat is very agreeable and natural to fire. But when the argument says that a substance and an accident are primarily diverse, this is in connection with the modes of predication according to which the categories are distinguished. Furthermore, even if they are quite different in terms of degrees of being and perfection, diverse accidents nonetheless do produce likenesses or representations of diverse substances to the extent that they are natural dispositions of them. Hence, this argument has nothing to say against the second way of answering the question, for if substance and accident differ in so many different ways, then so much the more the intellect seems to be able to sort them out from their con-fusion.

71 See 72 See

Zupko 2003, 183–202. par. 5 above.

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Circa secundum librum de anima quaeritur primo utrum omnis anima sit actus substantialis.

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1. Arguitur primo quod non sit actus, quia potentia animae est anima, ut dicetur post. Sed potentia non est actus, quia dicit Aristoteles in prooemio huius quod actus et potentia differunt non parum. Et Commentator similiter dicit quod sunt differentiae oppositae. 2. Item in libro De substantia orbis dicit Commentator quod actui repugnat recipere. Et iuxta hoc dicit Aristoteles primo De generatione quod formae est agere et quod pati sive recipere est alterius potentiae. Sed constat quod anima recipit species sensibiles et intelligibiles; ergo etc. 3. Item compositum substantiale ex actu et potentia non est actus sed in actu, ut equus aut lapis; sed anima nostra intellectiva est sic composita, scilicet ex intellectu agente et intellectu possibili; ergo etc. 4. Deinde si concedatur quod sit actus, tamen arguitur quod non sit actus substantialis, quia omnis actus substantialis est substantia; sed anima non est substantia; ergo etc. Probatur minor multipliciter. Primo quia commune est omni substantiae in subiecto non esse, ut habetur in Praedicamentis, et anima est in subiecto, ut dicitur in secundo huius; ergo etc.

4 dicetur post ] BURIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.5 5 huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.1 402a25. 6 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. I.6 (ed. Crawford, 10.20–21). 7 De substantia orbis ] AVERROES, De subst. orbis 1 (IX 3 L): “Quod enim est in actu non recipit aliquod, quod sit in actu, secundum quod sit in actu.” 8 De generatione ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. II.9 335b30–32. 19 Praedicamentis ] A RISTOTELES, Cat. 5 3a 7. 20 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a19. 4 potentia ] animae add. T 5 parum ] parvum V 9 formae ] formare T recipere ] resistere A 15 actus ] substantialis add. E © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 7

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Concerning the second book of De Anima we ask first: Is every soul a substantial act?

1. We argue first that the soul is not an act, because a potency 1 of the soul is the soul, as will be clarified later. But potency is not act, since Aristotle says in his preface to De Anima that act and potency differ a great deal. The Commentator likewise remarks that they differ as opposites. 2. Again, in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, the Commentator says that an act cannot be receptive. In line with this, Aristotle declares in On Generation and Corruption I that it is a mark of form to be active, whereas to be passive or receptive is a mark of some other potency. But clearly the soul receives sensible and intelligible species; therefore etc. 3. Again, something that is a substantial composite of act and potency is not an act but is rather in act, for instance a horse or a stone. But our intellective soul is this sort of composite of the agent and possible intellects; therefore etc. 4. Next, even should we concede that the soul is act, it is still argued that it is not a substantial act. For every substantial act is a substance, but the soul is not a substance; therefore etc. The minor premise is proved in several ways. First, it is common to every substance not to be in a subject, as held in the Categories, and the soul is in a subject, as Aristotle says in De Anima II; therefore etc.

1 In his argument, Buridan uses the Latin potentia to convey both potency and power.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 7

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5. Secundo quia sibi convenit definitio accidentis; ipsa enim inest primae materiae tamquam subiecto suo, et adest et abest sibi praeter eius corruptionem; ergo ipsa est accidens et non substantia. 6. Item Commentator in isto secundo ponit differentiam inter formas substantiales et accidentales per hoc quod forma accidentalis habet subiectum in actu et substantialis non. Et tamen dicitur quinto Metaphysicae quod anima est substantia in subiecto in actu, et e contra de formis simplicium, scilicet elementorum. Et hoc etiam habetur in octavo Physicorum, ubi dicitur quod grave inanimatum non movetur ex se sicut animal, quia non est divisibile in partem per se moventem et partem per se motam. Animal autem sic est divisibile, scilicet in animam, quae est per se movens, et corpus, quod est per se motum. Ergo illud corpus est subiectum in actu, quia dicitur tertio Physicorum quod ens in potentia non movetur per se sed ens in actu; ergo anima est forma accidentalis. 7. Item ex septimo Metaphysicae habetur quod substantiae non definiuntur per additamenta; sed anima definitur per additamentum, scilicet per corpus, quod non est de eius essentia; ergo etc. 8. Item generatio animae non est generatio substantialis; ergo anima non est substantia. Antecedens probatur quia generatio substantia-

24 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.14 (ed. Crawford, 133.28– 134.44). 26–27 quinto Metaphysicae ] AVERROES, Comm. Met. V.8 (VIII 118 E); A RISTOTELES, Met. V.18 1022a31. 29 octavo Physicorum ] AVERROES, Comm. Phys. VIII.2.2 (IV 365 F–G); A RISTOTELES, Phys. VIII.4 255a6–10. 33 tertio Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. III.1 201a 10 et cfr. A RISTOTELES, Phys. V.1 224a 27–28; VIII.5 257a27–31. 36 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.5 1031a1. 23 ipsa . . . substantia ] om. AE 25–26 accidentalis habet ] accidentales habent VW 26 substantialis ] substantiales V 31 et . . . motam ] om. T 32 animam quae est ] partem T 34 per ] ex se vel per A ex E 34–36 se . . . ex ] om. E 37 additamenta ] additamentum ET

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5. Second, because the definition of accident applies to it, for the soul inheres in prime matter as its subject, and is present in it and absent from it without its corruption.2 Therefore, the soul is an accident and not a substance. 6. Again, the Commentator here distinguishes substantial from accidental forms on the grounds that an accidental form has a subject in act, whereas a substantial form does not. However, Metaphysics V declares that the soul is a substance in a subject in act, as opposed to the forms of simple bodies, namely the elements. We have the same claim in Physics VIII, which says that a heavy inanimate body does not move on its own like an animal does, since it cannot be divided into a part that moves per se and a part that is moved per se. An animal, however, is divisible in that way, namely into the soul (which moves per se) and the body (which is moved per se). Therefore, that body is a subject in act, since a being in potency is not moved per se, but only a being in act is, as is stated in Physics III. Therefore, the soul is an accidental form. 7. Again, from Metaphysics VII we have it that substances are not defined by something added to them. But the soul is defined by something added to it, namely the body, which is outside its essence; therefore etc. 8. Again, the generation of the soul is not a substantial generation; the soul is therefore not a substance. Proof of the antecedent: A 2 Buridan

alludes to Porphyry’s definition of ‘accident’ as “what may be present or absent without corruption of its subject” in his Isagoge. Cf. Spade 1994, 11.

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lis debet esse “transmutatio totius in totum, nullo sensibili remanente.” Et non est ita in generatione animae sed praeexistunt in materia dispositiones, ut calor et humiditas et organisatio, quae non corrumpuntur sed potius perficiuntur; ergo etc. 9. Oppositum determinat Aristoteles. 10. Et ponuntur ergo aliquae conclusiones. Prima est quod anima est substantia. Hanc probat Commentator sic, quia “anima est omni accidenti” quod in animato invenitur “nobilior,” prout “dat nobis cognitio naturalis,” ut dicit; ergo ipsa non est accidens sed substantia. 11. Item ipsa est pars ex qua, cum corpore, constituta est substantia per se subsistens, scilicet animal aut planta. Et omnis pars substantiae est substantia; ergo etc. 12. Item si de supposito per se subsistente quaeritur simpliciter, “Quid est hoc?” non quaeritur nisi de substantia. Accidentia enim quaeruntur per “Quale est hoc?” aut “Quantum?” aut “Ubi?” Ergo illud est substantia per cuius adventum vel recessum mutatur responsio ad “Quid est hoc?” Sic enim voluit Aristoteles distinguere transmutationes et formas substantiales ab accidentibus. Sed per adventum vel recessum animae, mutatur huiusmodi responsio; apud enim generationem animae equi vel asini, dicimus quod hoc est asinus vel equus, et ante non; et in recessu animae non amplius respondemus quod hoc est equus vel asinus sed hoc est cadaver. 13. Item operationes principales substantiales non debent reduci in aliquod accidens tamquam in principale principium ipsarum sed in substantiam; sed operationes principales animatorum, ut nutrire, sen-

41 transmutatio . . . remanente ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.4 319b 14 (Ar. lat. IX.1 24.4). 45 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a21. 47–49 anima . . . naturalis ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.1 (ed. Crawford, 130.16–17): “Ponere enim animam accidens est inopinabile secundum quod dat nobis prima cognitio naturalis.” 41 debet ] dicitur V 43 quae ] in adventu animae add. AE 51 subsistens ] existens T 53 supposito ] subiecto T 56 adventum ] eventum A || recessum ] decessum V 57 voluit ] novit AE || distinguere ] distingui T 58 Sed ] quia W 63 substantiales ] substantiarum TVW 64 principium ] activum add. E 65 substantiam ] anima A

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substantial generation has to be “the transmutation of a whole into a whole,3 without anything sensible persisting.” Yet this is not the case with the generation of the soul. Instead, dispositions pre-existing in matter (such as warmth, dampness,and its organization) are not destroyed but rather perfected ; therefore etc. 9. Aristotle maintains the opposite. 10. We therefore put forward some conclusions. The first is that the soul is a substance. The Commentator proves this as follows: “The soul,” as he says, “is nobler than any accident found in an animated being, as natural cognition tells us.” Therefore, the soul is not an accident but rather a substance. 11. Again, the soul is a part which, together with the body, constitutes a substance subsisting per se, such as an animal or a plant, and every part of a substance is a substance; therefore etc. 12. Again, if one asks “What is this?” about a concrete object subsisting per se, then the question is directed precisely at substance. For we ask about accidents with questions such as “What is this like?” or “How much is this?” or “Where is it?” Therefore, a substance is something whose arrival or departure changes the answer to the question “What is this?” This is how Aristotle wanted to distinguish substantial transmutations and forms from accidents. But the arrival or departure of the soul does change the answer to this sort of question. For we say that this is a horse or a donkey upon the generation of the soul of a horse or of a donkey, but not before. And when the soul departs, we no longer say that this is a horse or a donkey, but that this is a carcass. 13. Again, the main substantial functions ought not to be reduced to some accident as their main source, but rather to a substance. But the main functions of animate beings, such as nutrition, sensation, and so

3 In

substantial change, something wholly new is generated out of what existed before, which ceases to be upon the generation of the new thing.

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tire, etc. reducuntur in animam tamquam in principale principium earum; ergo etc. Et confirmatur secundum Aristotelem quia operationes vitales non reducuntur sufficienter in accidentia, quia non in gravitatem et levitatem, quia tunc in animali omnia ossa fierent deorsum et consequenter nervi et tota caro supra. Nec reducuntur sufficienter in qualitates quattuor primas, scilicet in calidum et frigidum etc., quia hoc maxime esset in calidum, quod non potest dici quia calidum ex se non habet naturam figurandi aliter et aliter membra diversa, nec habet naturam ex se terminandi augmentum, quia ignis in infinitum augmentaretur si apponeretur combustibile, ut dicit Aristoteles. Ergo oportet dispositiones naturales animatorum reducere principaliter in aliud principium substantiale, et hoc est anima; ergo etc. 14. Secunda conclusio est quod anima est actus sive forma, quia hoc est actus quo adveniente materiae vel subiecto praesupposito aliquid dicitur esse hoc aliquid in actu quod non erat ante nisi in potentia. Hoc est notum ex quid nominis. Sed per animam equi vel asini advenientem materiae, equus dicitur actualiter equus cum ante non esset equus nisi in potentia. Et sic de asino: non dicebamus quod erat asinus sed quod poterat esse asinus; ergo etc. 15. Item cum animatum sit substantia per se subsistens et hoc aliquid, materia autem non est hoc aliquid nec per se subsistens, ut dicit

67 secundum Aristotelem ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 416a5–9. 75 dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 416a16. 86–87 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a 6–7. 66 etc ] et intelligere VW 69 fierent ] forent T 71 calidum ] caliditatem A || frigidum ] frigiditatem A 72 calidum ] calido A 73 figurandi ] frigorandi TV 77 aliud ] aliquod W 81–82 advenientem ] adveniente AETV 82 actualiter ] actus T actu W 86 nec ] om. V || subsistens ] existens T

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on are reduced to the soul as their main source; therefore etc. Aristotle confirms this point, because it is not enough to reduce life-functions to accidents. It is not enough to reduce them to heaviness and lightness, because then all the bones of an animal would be in its lower part, and so all its flesh and sinews would be in its upper part. Nor is it enough to reduce them to the four primary qualities, namely warmth, coldness, and so on, for then the best candidate for this reduction would be warmth — which we cannot maintain, because warmth does not have of itself the nature of differently shaping the various bodily limbs, or of terminating growth, since, given fuel, fire would grow indefinitely, as Aristotle says. Therefore, the natural dispositions of animate beings must be reduced to a different substantial principle as their main source, and that is the soul; therefore etc. 14. The second conclusion is that the soul is an act or form, because an act is that on account of whose coming into matter or into a preexisting subject something is said to be a this something4 in act what it was before only in potency. This is clear from the meaning of the term . Now it is on account of the soul’s coming into matter that a horse is said to be actually a horse, when, before, it was a horse only in potency. The same goes for a donkey: We did not say that it was a donkey, but that it was able to be a donkey. Therefore etc. 15. Again, an animated being is a substance that subsists per se and is this something. Matter, however, is not this something, nor does

4 This translates the Scholastic technical phrase ‘hoc aliquid’ corresponding to Aris-

totle’s Greek phrase (tode ti) to indicate an individual substance of an unspecified nature, where ‘this’ does the job of referring to an individual that can be pointed out as ‘this’, and ‘something’ stands in for the name of any natural kind, such as horse, dog, donkey, and so on.

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Aristoteles, sequitur quod animatum non est simplex materia. Ergo animatum est substantialiter compositum ex materia et forma tamquam ex potentia et actu, et ista est compositio ex anima et corpore. Ideo oportet vel quod corpus sit forma et actus animae, quod nullus potest dici, vel quod anima sit actus et forma corporis, quod est propositum. 16. Et sic sequitur tertia conclusio, quod anima est actus substantialis. Omnis enim actus vel est actus substantialis vel accidentalis; sed ipsa non est actus accidentalis cum non sit accidens; ergo etc. 17. Item per actum substantialem, substantia, per se subsistens est actu illud quod est, et per actum accidentalem est actu tale vel tantum vel ubi; modo per animam animatum est actu illud quod est, ut homo vel equus; ergo etc. 18. Sed tunc est notandum quod actus et potentia correlative et correspondenter differunt ad invicem et multipliciter, prout debet videri nono Metaphysicae. 19. Uno modo actus significat idem quod existere rem et non solum posse esse, et potentia significat ipsam esse posse. Et sic omne ens est actus. Unde sic prima materia est actus et in actu et non solum potentia vel in potentia. Ipsa enim non solum potest esse sed de facto est. Sed sic Antichristus est solum potentia vel in potentia. Et in proposito non loquimur sic de actu et potentia. 20. Secundo modo forma inhaerens materiae vel subiecto vocatur actus respectu illius subiecti, quia subiectum illa forma est actu tale vel tantum vel taliter se habens. Vel etiam, si sit forma substantialis,

102 nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.6 1048a32. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. IX.2 (ed. Parisiis 1588, ff. 56vb –57rb ). 88 substantialiter ] substantia V 81–89 Hoc est notum . . . actu ] hom. V 94 accidentalis ] sufficienti divisione W 95 etc ] substantialis T 98 animatum ] animal A 105 actus ] et actu add. A || et in actu ] om. VW 110 subiectum ] solum V

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it subsist per se, as Aristotle says. It follows that an animated being is not simple matter. Therefore, an animated being is substantially composed of matter and form as from potency and act; this is its composition from soul and body. Hence, either the body has to be the form and actuality of the soul, which cannot be maintained, or the soul has to be the actuality and form of the body, which was the claim to be proved. 16. Thus, there follows the third conclusion: the soul is a substantial act. For every act is either a substantial or an accidental act. But the soul is not an accidental act, since it is not an accident; therefore etc. 17. Again, on account of a substantial act, a substance that subsists per se is actually what it is, whereas on account of an accidental act, it is such-and-such or so much or somewhere. Now, on account of the soul, an animated being is actually what it is, for instance, a man or a horse; therefore etc. 18. But then we should note that ‘act’ and ‘potency’ differ from each other in several correlated and corresponding ways, as should be seen in Metaphysics IX. 19. In the first way, ‘act’ signifies a thing that is and not merely can be, whereas ‘potency’ signifies that it can be. In this way every being is an act. Accordingly, in this sense, even prime matter is an act and actual, not merely a potency or potential. For it not only can be, but in fact it is. But in this sense the Antichrist5 is only a potency or potential. In the case at hand we do not speak of act and potency in this way. 20. In the second way, a form inhering in matter or in a subject is called an act with regard to that subject, because it is on account of the form that the subject is actually such-and-such or so much or so 5

The Antichrist is the standard medieval example of an individual that will contingently exist in the future, a fact we know now from revelation.

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ista vocatur actus quia secundum istam compositum vocatur actu illud quod est, et materia vel subiectum cui inhaeret vocatur, respectu illius formae, potentia subiectiva. Et isto modo in omnibus animatis corporibus corpus dicitur potentia respectu animae et anima dicitur respectu ipsius actus. 21. Tertio modo actus vocatur motus vel operatio respectu operantis, sive active sive passive. Et illud operans, sive active sive passive, vocatur potentia activa vel passiva respectu istius operationis. Sic enim dicitur tertio Physicorum quod motus est actus mobilis et motivi secundum quod mobile est motum, et isto modo non oportet animam esse actum; immo sic omnis anima est potentia respectu operationum vitalium. 22. Quarto modo, agens et movens dicitur actus respectu passi et moti. Passum autem vel motum vocatur potentia respectu illius propter hoc quod agens continet in actu formali vel virtuali similitudinem eius ad quod recipiendum passum est in potentia. Et sic etiam omnis anima est actus corporis, nam sicut dicit Aristoteles in secundo huius, anima non est solum causa corporis sicut forma et substantia sed etiam sicut efficiens et finis. 23. Et est ultra sciendum quod si intelligentiae dicantur animae caelorum, anima ibi non est, secundum Aristotelem, actus corporis sicut forma inhaerens, sed solum quarto modo, scilicet sicut agens passi et movens moti, quemadmodum notavit Aristoteles in secundo huius

120 tertio Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. III.3 202a 13. les ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415b11–27.

128 dicit Aristote-

110–112 est . . . ista ] om. T 112 vocatur ] est VW || actu ] om. T 114–115 corporibus ] corruptibilibus AT 115–116 respectu ipsius actus ] actus respectu corporis T 118 active sive passive ] activi sive passivi AT 119 passiva ] dum patitur add. W 121 est ] et AE || oportet ] apparet A 129 sicut . . . substantia ] et substantia sicut forma T 130 efficiens et finis ] finis et agens ATVW

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disposed. Indeed, if the form in question is a substantial form, it is called an act because the composite is called what it actually is on account of this form, and the matter or subject in which it inheres is called ‘subjective potency’6 with regard to that form. In this way, the body is said to be potency with regard to the soul in all animate bodies, and the soul is said to be an act with regard to it. 21. In the third way, some motion or activity is called an act with regard to the functioning thing, whether actively or passively. The functioning thing, whether actively or passively, is said to be an active or passive potency with respect to its activity. This is how Physics III says that motion is the act of the moveable thing and of the thing that moves it, insofar as the moveable thing is moved. The soul does not have to be an act in this way. Instead, in this way every soul is a potency with regard to vital activities. 22. In the fourth way, the agent and mover is said to be an act with regard to the patient and what is moved. But the patient or the moved thing is called a potency with regard to the agent, because the agent contains in formal or virtual act the likeness of that for the reception of which the patient is in potency.7 And so as well, every soul is the act of the body, for the soul is not only the formal and substantial cause of the body, but also the efficient and final cause, as Aristotle remarks in De Anima II. 23. Note further that if the intelligences are to be called the souls of the heavens, the soul in this case is not an act of a body as an inherent form, according to Aristotle, but only in the fourth sense, namely as the agent is the act of the patient and the mover is the act of what is 6A

‘subjective potency’ or as it is more often called a ‘passive potency’ is simply a subject capable of receiving a form that actualizes it or its capability to receive or have this form (Buridan does not admit a real distinction between the subject and its capability). In this sense, for instance, a celestial body is not (or does not have) a subjective potency of any quality it does not actually have, because it is incapable of any qualitative change. 7 A causal agent has “in formal act” that which it engenders in its patient when it has the actual form the patient acquires, for instance, when a burning log causes another to catch fire. The causal agent has something “in virtual act” when it does not have the actual form it engenders, but is able nevertheless to engender that form in a patient. Medieval examples of virtual act commonly invoke the sun’s role in terrestrial generation and corruption.

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cum dixit “sicut nauta navis,” etc. Et ita etiam credidit Commentator quod intellectus est actus hominis, ideo ponit in homine aliam animam, scilicet sensitivam corruptibilem informantem materiam. Sed de hoc quaeretur in tertio libro. 24. Ad rationes. 25. Ad primam dictum est quod anima bene dicitur potentia respectu operationis et actus respectu corporis. 26. Ad secundam conceditur quod actui substantiali repugnat recipere actum substantialem sed non actui substantiali repugnat recipere actus accidentales. Materia autem sola est quae recipit formas substantiales. 27. Ad tertiam dicitur quod anima humana intellectiva est simplex forma. Et in tertio dicetur de intellectu possibili et agente. 28. De alia ratione debet videri in Praedicamentis. Aliqui exponunt quod ista proprietas debet intelligi de substantiis totalibus, vocando substantiam totalem quae non est pars alterius substantiae; sed substantia partialis, ut forma materialis, bene est in subiecto. Aliter exponitur proprietas quod per substantiam non intelligimus nisi terminos de praedicamento substantiae, et per esse in subiecto intendebat praedicationes denominativas. Et sic intendebat quod nullus terminus substantialis est praedicabilis denominative de alio quod se habeat re-

135 sicut nauta navis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 413a 9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 74.2.15): “Amplius autem inmanifestum si sic corporis actus anima, sicut nauta navis.” || credidit Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 401.424– 404.512). 138 tertio libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.5. 148 Praedicamentis ] A RISTOTELES, Cat. 5 3a 7. 151–152 Aliter exponitur ] B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 3.1.5 154 denominativas ] B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 3.2.3. 137 sensitivam ] sensibilem et W || informantem materiam ] om. T 143 non ] omni add. T 144 accidentales ] accidentalis (vel substantialis add. in marg. ) A 149 intelligi ] exponi E 150 substantiam ] primam esse add. T || totalem ] substantiam add. A 151 materialis ] om. VW 152 intelligimus ] aliud intelligat T intendebat V intendebat aliud W 153 intendebat ] Aristoteles add. E intelligebat T 154 intendebat ] intelligebat T

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moved, as Aristotle noted in De Anima II, when he said “like the pilot of a ship” etc. The Commentator believed that the intellect is the act of man in the same sense, and so he postulated there to be in man another soul, a sensitive, corruptible one that informs matter — but we will inquire into this in Book III. 24. To the objections. 25. To the first argument,8 we have said that the soul may well be said to be a potency with regard to its activity, and to be an act with regard to the body. 26. To the second argument,9 we grant that a substantial act cannot receive a substantial act, but a substantial act may receive accidental acts. Only matter can receive substantial forms. 27. To the third argument,10 we reply that the human intellective soul is a simple form. We shall discuss the agent and possible intellect in Book III. 28. Concerning the next argument,11 one should check the Categories. Some explain it that this distinctive feature of substance should be understood to concern total substances, calling a ‘total substance’ one that is not a part of another substance, whereas a partial substance, such as a material form, may well be in a subject. This feature is explained in another way in saying that by ‘substance’ we understand merely terms in the category of substance, and by ‘being in a subject’ Aristotle meant denominative predications. Thus he meant

8 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above. 10 See par. 3 above. 11 See par. 4 above. 9 See

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spectu ipsius per modum subiecti; immo iste est modus praedicandi accidentium. 29. Ad aliam rationem constat quod de definitione accidentis debet videri in Porphyrio. Ista enim definitio dabatur de terminis praedicabilibus accidentaliter. Et per adesse et abesse debet intelligi praedicatio affirmativa vel negativa et non vera inhaerentia, sicut forma inhaeret. Modo ista ratio non est ad propositum. Ergo videbis de hoc in Porphyrio. 30. Ad aliam dicitur quod ista differentia Commentatoris debet sic intelligi, quod accidens habet subiectum in actu, id est circumscripto omni accidente, adhuc residuum dicitur in actu hoc aliquid. Sed forma substantiali circumscripta, residuum non dicitur hoc aliquid actu, sed bene diceretur actu tale vel tantum, et hoc est quia sicut dicit Aristoteles forma ipsa substantialis est secundum quam dicitur hoc aliquid. Et materia secundum se non est hoc aliquid, nec secundum accidens dicitur hoc aliquid, sed tale vel tantum. Similiter, auctoritas Aristotelis quinto Metaphysicae et octavo Physicorum debet exponi non quod corpus subiectum animae, anima circumscripta, sit hoc aliquid in actu, sed quia adhuc esset in actu motivo et resistivo per virtutes elementorum quae remanserunt ex mixtione. Sed de simplici elemento, circumscripta forma substantiali et suis propriis virtutibus, residuum non esset in aliquo actu motivo et resistivo. Ideo est quod non movetur ex se, quia oportet resistentiam esse mobilis ad motorem, quae non est in elemento simplici nisi ab extrinseco. Sed in animali est bene ex intrinseco. Et hoc debet amplius videri in octavo Physicorum.

162–163 in Porphyrio ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Porph. Isa. 13; Summ. de dial. 2.6.1. 180 amplius videri ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. VIII.4 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 92va ). 160 accidentaliter ] accidentium W 160–161 praedicatio . . . negativa ] praedicationes affirmativae et negativae A 161 vera ] om. A || inhaeret ] materiae add. TVW 164 ista differentia ] definitio illa W 166 omni ] om. TVW 167–169 actu . . . aliquid ] hom. ETV 170 est ] dicitur A || accidens ] eam A aliquid add. T 173 corpus ] sit add. A om. T 174 resistivo ] transitivo T 175 Sed de simplici ] et singulari T 178 motorem ] motionem motoris A 179 extrinseco ] intrinsico V 179–180 bene ex intrinseco ] tantum ab extrinseco W

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that no substantial term is predicable denominatively of another as its subject; rather, this is the mode of predicating accidents. 29. To the next argument:12 clearly, one should see Porphyry as regards the definition of ‘accident’, which was given about accidentally predicable terms; by ‘presence’ and ‘absence’ one should understand affirmative and negative predication, not genuine inherence as form inheres — and now the argument is irrelevant to the case at hand. See my comments on Porphyry about this issue. 30. To the next argument,13 we reply that the Commentator’s distinction has to be understood so that the subject of the accident is in act. That is, even if we exclude every accident, the remainder is still said to be a this something in act. If we exclude the substantial form, however, the remainder is not said to be this something in act, but it is correctly said to be such-and-such or so much in act, and this is because the substantial form itself is what accounts for it being called a this something, as Aristotle says. Matter of itself is not this something. Neither is it called something on account of an accident; rather, on account of an accident it is called such-and-such or so much. Likewise, one should explain Aristotle’s remarks in Metaphysics V and Physics VIII not as saying that the body subject to the soul is this something in act if we exclude the soul, but rather as saying that it would still be able in act to move and resist on account of the powers of the elements which have remained from the mixture. But in the case of a simple element, if the substantial form and its proper powers are excluded, the remainder would not be able in act to move or resist. It is for this reason that it does not move on its own, for resistance has to be that of the mobile thing against the mover, which is not present in a simple element except from something extrinsic. But in an animal it

12 See 13 See

par. 5 above. par. 6 above.

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31. Ad aliam dico quod intentio Aristotelis erat in septimo Metaphysicae quod substantiae, id est termini de praedicamento substantiae, si debeant definiri pure quidditative, non debent definiri per additamenta, sed solum per praedicata essentialia, quia nihil connotant alienum ab eo pro quo supponunt. Terminis autem accidentalibus et connotativis non conveniunt tales definitiones. Sed ulterius est intentio Aristotelis quod naturalis debeat illos terminos substantiales definire per additamenta et non pure quidditative, quia non considerat eos simpliciter quidditative, sicut metaphysicus, sed in ordine ad motum. Immo oportet quod definiat per motum et materiam aptam ad motum, ut notatur in secundo Physicorum et sexto Metaphysicae et in prooemio huius. 32. Ad aliam dicitur quod in generatione substantiali, remanent bene dispositiones accidentales sensibiles eaedem in generato et corrupto. Sed non manet subiectum idem, capiendo subiectum pro supposito per se subsistenti, quod dicitur hoc aliquid. Et non dixit Aristoteles in descriptione generationis quod simpliciter nullum sensibile remaneret idem, sed dixit cum additione: “nullo sensibili remanente ut subiecto eodem,” intelligendo per subiectum sicut iam dictum fuit.

181–182 in septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.5 1031a1. 185 supponunt ] B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 8.2.4. 191 secundo Physicorum ] A RI STOTELES , Phys. II.1 192b 16. || sexto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES , Met. VI.1 1025b19. 191–192 in prooemio huius ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. I.3. 196 dixit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.4 319b 14–17. 184 quia ] quae ET qui W 185–186 et connotativis ] om. W 186 ulterius ] non ATVW 187 quod ] quin W 187–188 definire ] definiri AV 188 additamenta ] additum A additamentum T additamentis V 189 eos simpliciter ] de eis pure E 194 accidentales ] om. A 195 supposito ] primo vel add. A 198 idem ] om. AE || ut ] in AE

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is clearly from something intrinsic. See more details on this point in Physics VIII.14 31. To the next argument,15 I reply that Aristotle’s intent in Metaphysics VII was that substances, that is, terms in the category of substance, provided they are to be defined purely quidditatively, should not be defined by means of something added to them, but only by means of essential predicates, because they connote nothing extrinsic to what they supposit for. Connotative and accidental terms do not have such definitions. But Aristotle intended further that the natural scientist should define these substantial terms by means of additions and not purely quidditatively, since he does not consider them absolutely quidditatively, as does the metaphysician, but in relation to motion. Indeed, he has to define them by means of motion and matter apt to be moved, as is noted in Physics II and Metaphysics VI, as well as in the preface to De Anima. 32. To the next argument,16 we should respond that in substantial generation the same accidental sensible dispositions may well remain in what is corrupted and generated. But the same subject does not remain, understanding by ‘subject’ the ‘concrete object that subsists per se,’ which is said to be this something. Aristotle did not say in his description of generation that absolutely no single sensible remains the same; he added “nothing sensible remains in the same subject,” understanding ‘subject’ in the way just described.

14 The

idea here is that any term that connotes something extrinsic to the substance can become false of the substance through the change of the connoted thing (as when I cease to be taller than my son because of his growth). Thus, such terms cannot be regarded as essential predicates characterizing the substance itself. See Physics VIII.4. 15 See par. 7 above. 16 See par. 8 above.

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Utrum omnis anima sit actus primus corporis organici.

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20

1. Et arguitur quod non sit actus primus, quia solus Deus est actus primus; omnia enim alia sunt ipso posteriora. Et etiam formae elementorum sunt priores naturaliter formis aliis; ideo formae mixtorum, cuiusmodi sunt animae, non sunt primi actus. Et iterum omnis anima requirit in subiecto, ad hoc quod in eo recipiatur, plures dispositiones primas quae sunt formae quaedam et actus; ideo anima non est actus primus. 2. Item dicit Aristoteles in isto secundo quod “vegetativa anima aliis est prima”; ergo saltem aliae animae non sunt actus primi, sed solum vegetativa. 3. Ad idem valet ista auctoritas quinto Metaphysicae quod anima est substantia in subiecto in actu. 4. Et etiam ista auctoritas Commentatoris in tertio Caeli, quod materia non recipit formas mixtorum nisi mediantibus formis elementorum. 5. Deinde etiam arguitur quod non omnis anima sit actus corporis, auctoritate Aristotelis in isto secundo quod “nihil prohibet” quandam animam separari a corpore, scilicet intellectivam, quia “nullius corporis est actus”. 10 isto secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415a22 (Ar. lat. XII.2 95.1.1): “Quare primum de alimento et generatione dicendum est: vegetativa enim anima et aliis inest prima.” 13 quinto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.8 1017b15. 15 tertio Caeli ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De caelo II.5.1 (V 201 B). 19 isto secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 413a7–8 (Ar. lat. XII.2 74.2.13): “At vero secundum quasdam nihil prohibet, propter id quod nullius corporis sunt actus.” Cf. B URIDAN US , QQ. De an. III.3. 1 actus ] substantialis add. W 5 formis ] omnibus T 7 eo ] eam W 8 primas ] primae materiae V 11 aliis est prima ] est animalibus prima T inest aliis primo VW || aliis ] aliarum E || aliae ] aliquae T 18 arguitur ] concesso A 20 quia ] quae EW © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 8

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Is every soul the first act of an organic body?

1. It is argued that the soul is not the first act, since God alone is the first act; for everything else is posterior to Him. Also, the forms of the elements are naturally prior to other forms; hence the forms of mixed bodies, as are souls, are not first acts. Again, every soul, in order to be received in its subject, requires in it several primary dispositions that are certain forms and acts; therefore the soul is not the first act. 2. Aristotle says, in De Anima II, that the vegetative soul is the first among others; thus at least the other souls are not first acts, but only the vegetative soul is. 3. The authority of Metaphysics V supports the same point, namely, that the soul is a substance in a subject in act. 4. And so does the Commentator’s remark in On the Heavens III that matter receives the forms of mixed bodies only through the mediation of the forms of the elements. 5. Furthermore, one can also argue that not every soul is the act of a body, in line with Aristotle’s remark in De Anima II that nothing prevents a certain soul (namely the intellective soul) from being separated from the body, for it is not the act of any body.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 8

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6. Deinde etiam concesso quod omnis anima sit actus corporis, tamen arguitur quod non omnis anima est actus corporis organici. Primo quia corpora caelestia, quorum intelligentiae dicuntur animae, non sunt organica, cum non habeant membra deputata ad diversas operationes. 7. Item cum anima sit simplex forma, ipsa debet habere simplex subiectum; corpus autem organicum non est simplex sed difforme, compositum ex diversis membris. 8. Item in corpore equi est accipere aliquam partem homogeniam inter alias partes quae iam non est composita ex partibus quantitativis diversarum rationum, ut aliquam modicam carnem; et sic ista modica caro non est corpus organicum. Et tunc cum anima equi sit extensa toti corpori ipsius equi, oportet esse aliquam partem animae quae adaequate informet istam modicam carnem, et est adaequate actus eius; et ista pars animae est anima. Sicut enim quaelibet pars albedinis est albedo, ita quaelibet pars animae est anima, et non alia forma. Vocetur igitur ista partialis anima B. Ego dicam quod B est anima et non est actus corporis organici; ergo non omnis anima est actus corporis organici. 9. Oppositum determinat Aristoteles. 10. Quantum ad hoc quod anima sit actus primus, oportet dicere quid nominis, et apparebit intentum. Si autem loquamur de actu simpliciter, primo manifestum est quod solus Deus est actus primus; omnia enim alia, sive sint actus sive potentiae, sunt eo posteriora.

41 determinat Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 413b 27. 22 corporis ] om. E 25 organica ] organizata T || membra ] partes T 25–26 operationes ] rationes T 28 organicum ] organizatum T 29 membris ] subiectis V 31 quantitativis ] om. T 33 organicum ] organizatum T 38 anima ] forma VW || anima ] forma W 39–40 ergo . . . organici ] om. VW 43 nominis ] actus primi add. W

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6. Furthermore, even granting that every soul is the act of a body, one may still argue that not every soul is the act of an organic body. First, because celestial bodies, whose intelligences are said to be souls, are not organic, because they do not have parts given over to diverse activities. 7. Again, since the soul is a simple form, it ought to have a simple subject; however, an organic body is not simple but heterogeneous, composed of diverse parts. 8. Again, in the body of a horse one may designate a homogeneous part among the other parts, which is not already composed of quantitative parts of different sorts, such as a tiny piece of flesh; hence this tiny piece of flesh is not an organic body. But then, since the horse’s soul is extended throughout the horse’s whole body, there has to be a part of its soul that fully informs this tiny piece of flesh and which is fully its act; and this part of its soul is a soul. For just as each part of a whiteness is a whiteness, so too, any part of a soul is a soul and not some other form. Let this partial soul be called B. Then I say that B is a soul and it is not the act of an organic body; therefore, not every soul is the act of an organic body.17 9. Aristotle maintains the opposite. 10. As for the soul being the first act, one only need state the nominal definition and the point will be clear. If we talk about ‘act’ absolutely speaking, then it is obvious in the first place that God alone is the first act; for all other things, whether they are acts or potencies, are posterior to Him. 17 In

English, it may sound odd to say that every part of a soul is a soul or every part of a whiteness is a whiteness. Indeed, it sounds odd in Latin, too, although not as odd as in English, given Latin’s lack of articles. Yet, this is precisely what Buridan’s argument requires. The point of the argument is that a form that is extended along the extension of a body has distinct parts informing distinct parts of the body, and those partial forms are of the same kind as the whole form informing the whole body; therefore, if the whole form can be named ‘an F’, its parts should also be named ‘an F’. But then, each soul-part informing a body-part is a soul. However, some such partial soul informs a homogeneous and hence non-organic body-part, which is also a body itself; therefore, we have a soul (namely, a soul-part) that informs a non-organic body (namely, a homogeneous body-part). Thus, not every soul is the form of an organic body.

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11. Sed secundo modo potest intelligi quod anima sit actus primus inter omnes istos actus qui sunt actus istius corporis cuius ista anima est actus. Verbi gratia cum corporis humani vel corporis asini sint plures actus et formae, scilicet qualitates et quantitates, dicetur quod anima est illorum actuum primus. 12. Nota quod est bene dubitabile utrum ita sit. Si enim in eodem corpore ponantur plures formae substantiales, ut formae elementorum cum forma mixti et cum anima, oporteret dicere quod formae elementorum sunt naturaliter priores et etiam tempore; et sic anima non esset actus primus. Si etiam ponantur in eodem plures animae, ut vegetativa, sensitiva, et caetera, omnes ponerent quod anima vegetativa esset aliis naturaliter prior, et sic iterum non esset omnis anima actus primus. 13. Sed si in omni uno supposito sit unica forma substantialis, tunc non restat comparatio nisi ad eius formas accidentales cum ea existentes in isto subiecto: an ista forma substantialis sit prior naturaliter istis formis accidentalibus vel quod aliquae istarum sint priores in isto subiecto quam anima. 14. Ad hoc est una opinio quod sic omnis anima, immo et omnis forma substantialis, est actus primus. Dicunt enim quod licet in materia multae dispositiones accidentales primae requirantur ad hoc quod fiat et recipiatur in ista materia forma aliqua substantialis, tamen in adventu istius formae substantialis, omnes istae dispositiones accidentales primae corrumpuntur. Et consequenter, ad introductionem formae substantialis, aliae formae accidentales, consimiles prioribus, introducuntur. Ut si, ex aqua fiat ignis, oportet materiam praedispo-

64 una opinio ] THOMAS DE S UTTON, De pluralitate formarum pars 5 (ed. Busa). 52–55 ponantur . . . eodem ] possunt esse VW 59 omni uno supposito ] omnibus suppositis VW 60 comparatio ] operatio eius AE 61 subiecto ] supposito W || naturaliter ] om. TV

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11. But the claim can be understood in another way, namely that the soul is the first act among all the acts that are acts of the body of which this soul is an act. For example, although the body of a man or a donkey has several acts and forms, namely qualities and quantities, the soul will be said to be the first among all these acts. 12. Note, however, that it may well be doubted whether this is the case. If we postulate several substantial forms in the same body, such as the forms of the elements along with the form of the mixed body and the soul, we would have to say that the forms of the elements are naturally prior, and prior even in time; thus the soul would not be the first act. Indeed, if we postulate several souls, such as the vegetative, sensitive, and so on, then everybody would hold that the vegetative soul would be naturally prior to the others, and thus, again, not every soul would be the first act. 13. If, however, there were a unique substantial form in every concrete individual, then the only comparison is to its accidental forms existing along with it in the same subject. Is this substantial form naturally prior to these accidental forms, or are some of them in this subject prior to the soul? 14. On this score, there is the view that in this way every soul, indeed, every substantial form, is a first act. For those who hold this view maintain that although many primary accidental dispositions are required in matter for a substantial form to come to be and be received in this matter, nevertheless upon the arrival of this substantial form, all these primary accidental dispositions are destroyed. Following upon the introduction of the substantial form, other accidental forms, similar to the prior ones, are introduced. For example, when water turns

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ni per caliditatem et siccitatem. Sed in adventu formae substantialis ignis, corrumpitur huiusmodi caliditas. Et consequenter, post formam ignis generatur alia caliditas consimilis sed alia numero. 15. Et ad hoc ponendum illi moventur auctoritatibus. 16. Una est Aristotelis primo De generatione quod generatio, scilicet substantialis, est transmutatio totius in hoc totum, nullo sensibile remanente. 17. Secunda est Aristotelis secundo Physicorum: materia cum forma est causa omnium accidentium quae fiunt in ea. 18. Tertia est Aristotelis septimo Metaphysicae quod substantia est prior accidente. 19. Quarta est quod non est quaerenda causa quare ex anima et corpore fit unum. Et non intendit quin bene sit quaerenda causa efficiens producens istam formam in materia; sed videtur intendere quod non sit quaerenda causa intermedia inter materiam et formam, sed quod ista forma substantialis recipitur immediate in istam materiam. 20. Et hoc videtur posse confirmari ratione, quia ex materia et forma substantiali fit unum per se; sic autem non fit aliquod per se unum ex materia et accidente; et tamen videtur quod magis deberet fieri per se unum ex materia et accidente quam ex materia et forma sub-

76 primo De generatione ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.4 319b15. 77–78 transmutatio . . . remanente ] Cf. Auc. Ar. 4.3 (ed. Hamesse, 167): “Generatio est quando totum, scilicet compositum ex materia et forma, transmutatur in totum, nullo subiecto sensibiliter remanente in eodem.” 79 secundo Physicorum ] Cf. A RISTO TELES , Phys. I.9 192a 13–14. 81 septimo Metaphysicae ] Cf. A RISTOTELES , Met. VII passim. 83–84 non . . . unum ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412b6. 73 huiusmodi ] huius forma accidentalis scilicet qualitas et A ista W || post ] ad A ad introductionem T || formam ] substantialem add. AW 74 consimilis ] sibi in specie add. W 77 sensibile ] consimile T 84 unum ] homo V || efficiens ] sufficiens V quaedam add. W 86–87 sed quod ista ] scilicet quia T 86 sed ] vel A 90 magis ] alia add. A

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into fire, its matter needs to be predisposed by warmth and dryness. But upon the arrival of the substantial form of fire, this warmth is destroyed. Following upon the form of fire, another warmth is generated, similar to the first but numerically different from it. 15. They are moved to take this position by the authorities. 16. One is Aristotle, who says in On Generation and Corruption I that substantial generation is the change of a whole into this whole, where nothing sensible remains. 17. The second is Aristotle’s dictum in Physics II: matter along with form is the cause of all the accidents that are produced in it. 18. The third is Aristotle’s remark in Metaphysics VII that substance is prior to accident. 19. The fourth is his claim that one should not look for the reason why a body and a soul make up a single thing. He does not mean that one should not look for the efficient cause that produces this form in matter. Rather, he seems to mean that one should not look for a cause in between matter and form; the substantial form is received immediately in its matter.18 20. This seems able to be confirmed by an argument: something one per se comes to be from matter and substantial form, but something one per se does not come to be in this way from matter and an accident; however it seems that matter and some accident should 18 If

we want to know what holds together the parts of a model airplane, then the answer is that it is the glue between the parts. However, this just goes to show that the model airplane is a conglomerate of its parts, rather than a genuine unit. By contrast, an as yet uncut cake is not a conglomerate of its slices, even if it can be cut into several slices in various ways. But as long as it is not physically cut up, we need not ask what holds its slices together. It is only a cake that has been put together again from the slices it was previously cut into that would need something to hold those slices together. Likewise, if a piece of wax is rolled up into a ball, it would be silly to ask what holds its spherical shape together with the wax itself, even if the wax is conceptually distinguishable from the spherical piece of wax. The spherical shape is simply that on account of which the wax is so-shaped: for the shape to be is nothing but for the wax to be so-shaped. Therefore, the shape is not a pre-existing item to be ”glued together” with the wax to constitute the wax ball in the way the parts of the model airplane were pre-existing items to be glued together to constitute the model airplane.

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stantiali, si accidens immediatius reciperetur in materia quam forma substantialis. 21. Et ad idem videtur innuere auctoritas Commentatoris in isto secundo, dicentis quod forma accidentalis habet subiectum in actu quod est compositum ex materia et forma substantiali, et forma substantialis habet subiectum in potentia iuxta illud quod dicitur primo De generatione, quod hyle, id est materia prima, est maxime proprium subiectum generationis substantialis, et per consequens formae substantialis, quia primo Physicorum debet ostendi quod generatio formae substantialis est ipsa forma substantialis. 22. Et iterum communiter dicitur quod impossibile est accidens transire de subiecto in subiectum; ideo necesse est accidentia corrumpi ad corruptiones suorum subiectorum. Subiectum autem accidentis est substantia per se subsistens, ut aqua est subiectum caliditatis vel frigiditatis, vel alterationis et motus localis. Immo ipsa est quae est calida vel frigida, quae vere alteratur vel movetur. Sed apud corruptionem formae substantialis, corrumpitur substantia per se subsistens, ut aqua vel equus; ergo tunc corrumpuntur omnia eius accidentia. 23. Sed non obstantibus istis ego credo oppositum, quod demonstrare pertinet ad librum De generatione. Ideo de hoc brevissime transeo, tangendo solum duo media. 24. Primum est, si equus interficiatur et ad corruptionem animae eius corrumpitur tota eius caliditas, adhuc ipso mortuo invenitur per

94 auctoritas Commentatoris ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.4 (ed. Crawford, 133.33–134.35). 97–98 primo De generatione ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.4, 320a1. 98–99 hyle . . . substantialis ] Auc. Ar. 4.9 (ed. Hamesse, 168): “Hyle, id est materia prima, maxime et proprie est subiectum generationis et corruptionis susceptibile . . . .” 100 primo Physicorum ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.17 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 171.27–172.7): “Utrum generatio substantialis est forma substantialis vel materia vel compositum vel aliquod accidens eis additum.” 102–103 impossibile . . . subiectum ] E.g. AQUINAS, QQ. Disp. de potentia dei q. 3 a. 7. 111 De generatione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De gen. et corr. I.8 (ed. Streijger, 80–89). 98 id . . . prima ] om. AE 99 generationis ] formae add. A 105 est ] per se add. A 107 movetur ] localiter et sic de aliis add. W 108 subsistens ] existens T 114 caliditas ] qualitas A || invenitur ] reperitur VW

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become something one per se more than matter and substantial form do, if an accident were received more immediately in matter than a substantial form is. 21. The Commentator’s remark on Book II seems to suggest the same point, when he says that an accidental form has a subject in act, which is composed of matter and substantial form, whereas a substantial form has a subject in potency, in accordance with what is said in On Generation and Corruption I, namely that hyle (prime matter) is most properly the subject of substantial generation — and, consequently, of substantial form, because my Questions on Aristotle’s Physics should show that the generation of a substantial form is the substantial form itself. 22. Again, it is commonly held that it is impossible for an accident to migrate from one subject to another; hence, accidents must be destroyed when their subjects are destroyed. However, the subject of an accident is a substance that subsists per se. For example, water is the subject of warmth or coldness, or alteration, or locomotion. More exactly, it is water itself that is truly cold or warm, and that is truly altered or moved. But when the substantial form is destroyed, the substance that subsists per se, such as water or a horse, is destroyed. Therefore, all its accidents are then destroyed. 23. These arguments notwithstanding, I believe the opposite, the demonstration of which is the business of my Questions on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption. Therefore, I’ll go through it rather quickly, touching only on two main arguments. 24. The first is that if a horse is killed and all its warmth destroyed upon the destruction of its soul, even after it has been dead for a while

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aliquod tempus magna caliditas in pectore suo. Quid ergo generaret istam caliditatem novam? Non interficiens, quia non habet naturam generandi caliditatem plus quam frigiditatem. Nec ista caliditas generatur per modum sequelae ad formam cadaveris, quia ista potius determinaret sibi frigiditatem quam talem caliditatem. 25. Secundo si ex aqua fiat ignis, aqua calefit. Constat quod licet ista caliditas educatur naturaliter de potentia materiae quae naturaliter inclinatur ad formam ignis ad quam ista caliditas disponit, tamen non educitur ex forma substantiali aquae, quoniam ista est innaturalis et disconveniens formae substantiali aquae. Et potius forma substantialis aquae resisteret generationi caliditatis quam conferret ad eius generationem. Ideo nullo modo oportet, si forma substantialis aquae corrumpitur, quod ista caliditas corrumpatur ex quo materia manet, de cuius potentia educebatur. 26. Hae rationes et aliae debent supponi et poni in libro De generatione. 27. Nec valent persuasiones illius opinionis. 28. De hoc enim quod generatio est totius in totum transmutatio, dictum est iam in praecedenti quaestione. 29. Conceditur quod omnium accidentium substantiae compositae convenientium et eius formae, ista forma est causa. Si non subiectiva

129–130 in libro De generatione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De gen. et corr. I.10 (ed. Streijger, 95–99). 133 in praecedenti quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.1 par. 32. 115 aliquod ] magnum T

127 quo ] om. V

|| manet ] manente V

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it is still very warm inside its chest. What, then, could generate this new warmth?19 The killer does not have the nature to generate warmth any more than to generate cold. Nor is the warmth generated in the manner of something that follows upon the form of the carcass, because it would produce coldness rather than such warmth. 25. Second, when water turns into fire, the water gets warm. It is clear that although this warmth is naturally brought forth from the potency of matter, which naturally inclines toward the form of fire, for which this warmth prepares it, nevertheless, this warmth is not brought forth from the substantial form of water, since it is unnatural to and inconsistent with the substantial form of water.20 Indeed, the substantial form of water would resist the generation of warmth rather than contribute to it. Therefore, if the substantial form of water is destroyed, this warmth still need not be destroyed at all, because the matter, from whose potency it was brought forth, remains. 26. These arguments and others are to be assumed and are presented in my Questions on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption. 27. Nor are the arguments for that view persuasive.21 28. We already dealt with the claim that generation is the change of a whole into this whole22 in the previous question. 29. We grant that the cause of all the accidents pertaining to a composite substance and to its form is the form itself23 . And even if the

19 The

warmth of the dead horse must be new, because with the death of the horse, the subject of the warmth of the living horse is destroyed, and a new subject comes to be, namely, the carcass of the horse (to which the old warmth cannot migrate from the old subject, which was the living horse). Therefore, the warmth of the carcass must be a numerically distinct warmth from the warmth that was the warmth of the living horse. The point of Buridan’s argument is that there is no plausible candidate that could account for the generation of this new warmth in the carcass. 20 According to Aristotle, water is cold by its nature. 21 See par. 21 above. The view expressed here is the view of Thomists and all those who follow Avicenna against Averroes, claiming that the substantial form precedes all other forms in matter; that is to say, no accident directly inheres in matter, but rather only in the substantial form/matter composite. Buridan rejects this view in several places, for example, Questions on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption, II.7. 22 See par. 16 above. 23 See par. 17 above.

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vel effectiva, est tamen causa finalis. Forma enim est finis dispositionum materiae praedisponentium eam ad receptionem istius formae. 30. De auctoritate septimo Metaphysicae dictum fuit in prooemio in sexta quaestione. 31. Illa auctoritas, quod non est quaerenda causa media quare ex materia et forma fit unum, ponitur ab Aristotele in octavo Metaphysicae de formis accidentalibus et subiectis suis, sicut de formis substantialibus. Hoc enim dicit Aristoteles ad removendum quorundam opinionem dicentium quod omnis forma unitur materiae vel subiecto per unionem additam, quam aliqui vocabant compositionem, aliqui participationem vel inhaerentiam vel coexistentiam, sicut apparet in octavo Metaphysicae. 32. Ad aliam apparet quod ita bene Aristoteles in isto secundo, septimo et octavo Metaphysicae dicit fieri per se unum, sine causa media quaerenda, ex cera et figura, et omnino ex subiecto et accidente, sicut ex materia et forma substantiali. Sed solum ex materia et forma substantiali fit una substantia quae est unum et hoc aliquid; ex materia autem et accidente fit unum compositum accidentale.

138 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.4 1028a31. 141–142 octavo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VIII.3 1045b20–23. 148 in isto secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412b 6. 148–149 septimo et octavo ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.3 1029a2–5; VIII.1 1024a24–30. 136–137 dispositionum ] dispositivum W 137 praedisponentium ] dispositivum alias disponentium A 140 media ] materiae V 143 quorundam ] quandam VW 146 coexistentiam ] existentiam AW 152 una substantia quae ] unum compositum quod W 153 fit ] per se add. AETV

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form is not their cause either as a subject or as their effective cause, nevertheless it is their final cause, for the form is the goal of the dispositions of matter which predispose the matter to the reception of the form. 30. We discussed the passage from Metaphysics VII24 in Book I q. 6.25 31. Aristotle says that one should not look for an intermediate cause why matter and form make up a single thing in Metaphysics VIII, in conection with accidental forms and their subjects as well as substantial forms26 . Aristotle said this in order to refute the opinion of those who claimed that every form is united to matter or to a subject by means of some added union, which is variously called “composition,” “participation,” “inherence,” or “coexistence,” as is clear in Metaphysics VIII. 32. In response to the other confirmation, it is clear that Aristotle correctly says in De Anima II as well as in Metaphysics VII and VIII that a piece of wax and its shape and generally any subject and its accident become something one per se in which there is no need for an intermediate cause joining them, just as matter and substantial form. But only from matter and substantial form does there come to be a single substance 24 See

par. 18 above. question at issue there is: “Do accidents contribute a great deal towards knowing what something is?” 26 See par. 19 above. 25 The

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33. De auctoritate Commentatoris dictum est in alia quaestione. De auctoritate Aristotelis dicitur quod, licet in materia praeexistant dispositiones ad formam generandam, tamen forma ista non recipitur in istis dispositionibus sed in materia sic disposita et de potentia materiae educitur. 34. Ad ultimam rationem dicitur quod, propter ignorationem materiae et notitiam substantiae compositae, omnia accidentia secundum communem locutionem attribuuntur substantiae compositae et non materiae, tamen non educuntur nisi de potentia materiae, saltem ista quae similia inveniuntur in compositis diversarum specierum. 35. Tunc ergo quidam volunt exponere quod omnis forma substantialis, inter omnes alias formas subiecto suo inhaerentes, est

154 in alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.1 par. 30. 164 quidam ] Cf. P ETRUS DE T RABIBUS, Comm. Sent. (ed. Huning, 169). 155 praeexistant ] existant E 165 omnes ] om. A subiectis suis inhaerentibus V

|| subiecto suo inhaerentes ]

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that is one and a this something, whereas from matter and accident there comes to be a single accidental composite.27 33. We discussed the passage from the Commentator in the previous question.28 Concerning the passage from Aristotle, we say that although dispositions for generating the form preexist in matter, the form is still not received in these dispositions but rather in the matter so disposed, and it is brought forth from the potency of matter. 34. To the last argument29 we reply that due to our ignorance of matter and our familiarity with composite substance, in ordinary speech we attribute all accidents to the composite substance and not to matter, despite the fact that they are brought forth only from the potency of matter, at least those found to be similar among composite substances belonging to diverse species.30 35. Therefore, at this point some people want to expound the claim that every substantial form, among all the forms inhering 27 Something

certainly needs to be clarified about this passage. The first sentence says that from wax and its shape there comes to be something that is per se one, which seems to go directly against what Aristotle says about per se units as opposed to per accidens ones, the latter of which are composites consisting of two distinct forms inhering in the same subject, just as the substantial form of the wax and its shape would be. To be sure, the second sentence clarifies the point, namely, that the composite resulting from wax and shape is only an accidental composite, but that seems to go against the claim of the previous sentence that they become a per se unit. The point of the first sentence, however, is clearly that one should not look for an intermediary between a form, whether accidental or substantial, and its subject. But this still does not make a piece of wax and its shape a per se unit, properly speaking. So Buridan here apparenlty reinterprets ‘per se one’ as referring to a composite whose components are not unified by an intermediary, and so he can consistently talk about something that is per se one, in the sense that it does not need an intermediary between its components, despite its being only an accidental composite, insofar as it is composed of an accidental form and its subject informed by a distinct substantial form. 28 See par. 21 above. 29 See par. 8 above. 30 Buridan here seems to try to provide a criterion to distinguish accidents that inhere in prime matter from those that inhere in the composite of prime matter and substantial form: those accidents that belong to something not on account of its species, but rather on account of its genus would be ”brought forth only from the potency of matter”, as for instance the three dimensions belonging to all bodies. For a contrasting view, see Aquinas’ discussion of the same issue in the last chapter of De esse et essentia.

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prima et actus primus, via dignitatis et perfectionis. Et hoc est verum, sed non apparet esse ad propositum Aristotelis, quia etiam ipse ponit quod scientia est actus primus. Et ideo dicendum est quod, ipso modo in proposito, vocatur actus primus et secundus comparando formam vel habitum ad operationem ex eo procedentem, ita quod omnis forma vel habitus, a qua vel a quo nata est procedere operatio, dicatur actus primus, scilicet in ordine ad huiusmodi operationem, et ista operatio dicatur actus secundus respectu ipsius formae vel habitus. Sic enim semper ponit Aristoteles scientiam esse actum primum, et considerare secundum. Et sic universaliter omnis anima est actus primus respectu operationum vitalium quae innatae sunt procedere ab ea, et hoc est facile. 36. Deinde quomodo anima est actus corporis dicendum est in alia quaestione. 37. Sed de hoc quod quaeritur, utrum anima sit actus primus corporis organici, potest dici quod sic. Et hoc non est dubium de animabus totalibus corporum corruptibilium, scilicet animalium et plantarum. Apparent enim in illis corporibus partes multum dissimiles et diversis operationibus deservientes. 38. Sed de anima partiali illius modicae carnis, potest dici quod adhuc ista caro dicitur corpus organicum instrumentale, non quod sit compositum ex partibus dissimilibus nec dissimilibus instrumentis, sed quia caro secundum se est unum organum seu instrumentum distinctum instrumentaliter contra os et contra nervum, et ad aliud officium animae deserviens. 39. De caelo etiam potest dici probabiliter quod, quamvis sit similis figurae et regularis, tamen motui quo movet intelligentia aliter deserviunt poli et aliter aliae partes. Et Aristoteles in secundo Caeli ponit in 168 scientia . . . primus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a27. 178–179 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.3. 193 secundo Caeli ] A RISTOTELES, De caelo II.2 284b 6. 167 propositum ] intentionem A 168 quod ] de V 168–169 ipso ] alio VW 170 ex ] ea vel add. A || eo ] vel ab ea add. E || procedentem ] et econtra add. T 174 semper ] saepe om. VW 181 animabus ] animalibus E 182 totalibus ] rationalibus E || corruptibilium ] totalium W 183 illis ] corruptibilibus add. T || corporibus ] corruptionibus V 184 deservientes ] exercentes T 192 intelligentia ] intelligentias T

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in its subject, is first, and is the first act with respect to nobility and perfection. Well, this is true, but it does not seem relevant to Aristotle’s point, since he also held that knowledge is a first act. Hence we should say that in the sense relevant to this interpretation an act is called “first” or “second” by comparing the form or habit to the operation stemming from it, so that a form or habit from which an operation is apt to stem is called its first act with respect to an operation of this sort; and the operation is called the second act with respect to the form or habit in question. Thus Aristotle always holds that knowledge is a first act and the exercise of knowledge a second act.31 And so generally, every soul is a first act with respect to the operations pertaining to life that are naturally suited to arise from it. This is easy. 36. How the soul is the act of the body is discussed in the next question. 37. Now in response to the question, then, whether the soul is the first act of an organic body, we say that it is. This is not in doubt concerning the whole souls of corruptible bodies, namely animals and plants, for in the case of these bodies there clearly are very different parts which carry out different operations. 38. However, about the partial soul of that tiny piece of flesh32 we can say that this piece of flesh is still said to be an instrumental organic body, not because it is composed of dissimilar parts or instruments, but because flesh in itself is an organ or instrument,33 distinct from bone and sinew as instruments, which carries out another function of the soul. 39. We can plausibly say about a celestial sphere34 that although it has a uniform and regular shape, nevertheless, its poles function in the motion with which the intelligence moves the heavens in one way 31 That

is to say, insofar as we have the habit of knowledge, such as the knowledge of a foreign language, it is a first act, as opposed to the actual exercise of it, as when we actually speak that foreign language, which is a second act. 32 See par. 8 above. 33 The word ‘instrumentum’ is just the Latin translation of the Greek word ‘organon’, both meaning an instrument. 34 See par. 6 above.

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caelo dextrum et sinistrum. Et stellae etiam ad aliud deserviunt quam orbis deferens eas. 40. Ad rationes. Manifestum est quod omnes quae arguebant de corpore organico et actu primo solutae sunt ex dictis. 41. Sed de hoc quod dicit Aristoteles aliquam animam nullius corporis esse actum, potest dici quod intendebat de actu educto de potentia corporis et materiae, quia sic anima intellectiva non est corporis actus. Vel etiam intendebat de actu inhaerente corpori, quia sic animae caelorum, scilicet intelligentiae, non sunt actus corporum, tamen bene sunt actus eorum, sicut dictum fuit in alia quaestione.

203 in alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.1 par. 22. 198 aliquam ] quamdam T

199 ] om. AETVW 203 actus ] aptus T

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and its other parts do so in another. Furthermore, Aristotle in On the Heavens II posits a left and right side in the heavens. Also, the stars carry out a different function than the spheres that bear them. 40. In response to the objections, it is clear that all the arguments dealing with organic bodies and first acts are resolved by what has been said. 41. However, in response to the objection referring to Aristotle’s remark that some soul is the act of no body35 , one may say that he did not mean that it is an act brought forth from the potency of body and matter, for in this sense the intellective soul is not an act of a body. Alternatively, he may have meant an act inherent in a body, for in this sense the souls of the heavens (the Intelligences) are not acts of bodies, although they are their acts, as was stated in the previous question.36

35 See

par. 5 above. point of this somewhat densely formulated sentence is that the intelligences are the acts of the celestial bodies, however, not as their forms, but as their movers.

36 The

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Utrum definitio animae sit bona qua dicitur anima est actus primus substantialis corporis physici organici habentis vitam in potentia.

5

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15

1. Arguitur primo quod non, quia absolutum non definitur per relativum, eo quod terminus absolutus non includit in sua ratione aliquem respectivum; et tamen anima est quid absolutum et iste terminus anima est terminus absolutus, isti vero termini actus et potentia sunt termini relativi ad invicem, ut patet nono Metaphysicae 2. Item prima pars bonae definitionis debet esse genus definiti, ut patet sexto Topicorum; sed illi termini actus et potentia non sunt genera, cum sint transcendentia in pluribus vel in omnibus praedicamentis reperibilia; ergo etc. 3. Item si anima est actus corporis, quaeritur cuius corporis. Non enim corporis de genere quantitatis, puta quod est dimensio, quia hoc est accidens et anima non informat accidens. Nec corporis de genere substantiae, quia hoc nomen corpus, prout est de genere substantiae, supponit pro substantia composita per se subsistente; aliter non praedicaretur quidditative de homine, animali, asino, et lapide. Modo

1–3 anima . . . potentia ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a26–27 (Ar. lat. XII.2 67.2.12) “Unde anima est primus actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis;” Auc. Ar. 6.41 (ed. Hamesse, 177): “Anima est actus corporis organici physici vitam habentis in potentia, scilicet opera vitae.” 8 nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.7 1048b5–9. 10 sexto Topicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Top. VI.5 142b29. 5 relativum ] respectivum AEW || terminus absolutus ] absolutum W || includit ] claudit AET 5–6 aliquem respectivum ] aliquod relativum V connotativum W 6 anima . . . et ] om. W 8 relativi ] respectivi AEW 14 genere ] praedicamenta W || quod est dimensio ] dimensionis W 17 composita ] om. W || aliter non ] alias V © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 9

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Is the definition of the soul which says that the soul is the first substantial act of an organic physical body that has life in potency a good definition?

1. We first argue that it is not, because something absolute is not defined by something relative, since an absolute term does not include a relative one in its account; however, the soul is something absolute whereas the term ‘soul’ is an absolute term. But the terms ‘act’ and ‘potency’ are relative to each other, as is clear in Metaphysics IX. 2. Again, the first part of a good definition is supposed to be the genus of the thing defined, as is clear from Topics VI; but the terms ‘act’ and ‘potency’ are not genera, as they are transcendentals which can be found in many or all categories; therefore etc. 3. Again, if the soul is the act of a body, the question is raised: Of what sort of body? For it is not body in the genus of quantity, namely, the size ,37 since this is an accident and the soul does not inform an accident. Nor is it body in the genus of substance; for the name ‘body’ insofar as it is in the genus of substance, supposits38 for a composite substance that subsists on its own; 37 In

medieval Aristotelianism, the three dimensions considered in themselves were taken to constitute the so-called corpus mathematicum, a mathematical body, abstracted from natural bodies, called corpus physicum, which is in the genus of substance. 38 The medieval theory of supposition is the medieval semantic theory of contextdependent reference as part of the broader theory of the properties of terms. See Read 2015.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 9

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anima non est actus compositi quia non informat ipsum sed materiam solum sibi subiectam; ergo etc. 4. Item frustra ponitur physici quia omne corpus est physicum, licet etiam sit artificiale, ut statua est corpus physicum quia est ens. Et sic per physicum nihil contrahit corpus; ideo frustra ponitur — quia, si bene poneretur, hoc esset ad differentiam corporis artificialis et corporis mathematici; et hoc non esset bene dictum, quia nec corpus artificiale nec corpus mathematicum different a corpore naturali, prout videndum est in secundo Physicorum. 5. Item male dicitur habentis vitam in potentia, quia omne habens animam habet vitam in actu, non solum in potentia. Unde licet in somno anima nullam operationem exerceat, dum tamen anima remaneret, animal non diceretur mortuum sed vivum. 6. Item actus non debet definiri per potentiam sed e converso, ut patet nono Metaphysicae. Iterum dicitur secundo huius quod prius est determinandum de operationibus quam de potentiis, quia actus et operationes sunt priores potentiis secundum rationem, id est secundum definitionem, ut dicit Aristoteles. Cum ergo anima sit actus, ipsa non bene definitur per potentiam. Ideo male ponitur ista ultima clausula. 7. Item vivere idem est quod viventibus esse; ideo vita idem est quod anima, et idem non debet definiri per se ipsam; ergo anima non debet definiri per vitam.

27 secundo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.2 193b32; B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. II.2 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 254.23–25): “Aristoteles non intendebat ponere differentiam rerum artificialium a rebus naturalibus, quia res artificiales sunt res naturales et non differunt ab eis.” 33 nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.8 1049b12. || secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415a 19–20. 36 ut dicit Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a 19–b6. 19 sed ] secundum V 23 per physicum ] ad A om. E || corpus ] ly physicum add. A om. T 25 mathematici ] mechanici W 26 mathematicum ] mechanicum VW 32 e converso ] e contra AV 33 quod ] quomodo A 35 id est secundum ] et A 37 male ] frustra T 40 vitam ] vivere T

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otherwise it would not be quidditatively predicated of human being, animal, donkey, or stone;39 however, the soul is not the act of a composite, for it does not inform it but rather informs only the matter which is its subject; therefore etc. 4. Again, the occurrence of ‘physical’ in the definition of soul is superfluous, for every body is physical, even if it is artificial, as for instance a statue is a physical body, since it is a being. Thus, ‘physical’ does not narrow down ‘body’; therefore, it is superfluous to put it in. (For if it were correct to put it in, then it would be to differentiate them from artificial and mathematical bodies; but that would not be correct, because neither an artificial nor a mathematical body differs from a natural body, as one should see in my Questions on Aristotle’s Physics II.) 5. Again, it is incorrect to say ‘that has life in potency’, for everything that has a soul has life in act, not merely in potency. Hence, even if the soul would not exercise any of its operations during sleep, still, as long as the soul remains , the animal would not be said to be dead, but alive. 6. Again, an act is not supposed to be defined by potency but the other way around, as is clear in Metaphysics IX. Furthermore, De Anima II says that we should settle matters about operations before potencies, since acts and operations are prior to potencies in their account, that is, their definition, as Aristotle says. Since, therefore, the soul is an act, it is not correctly defined in terms of potency. Hence, this last phrase is incorrectly put into the definition.40 7. Again, living is the same as being in the case of living things; hence life is the same as soul, and nothing should be defined through itself; therefore, the soul should not be defined through life. 39 The

term ‘body’ in the sense in which it refers to natural bodies is a quidditative, i.e., essential predicate of natural bodies, whether living or non-living, because it properly responds to the question ‘what is this?’, while pointing to any of these bodies. But something counts as a body of this sort only if it is something informed by a substantial form on account of which its matter is extended in three dimensions. However, according to the objection, this sort of body cannot be the subject of the soul, because the soul, being a substantial form, directly informs prime matter, and not something that already consists of prime matter and another substantial form. 40 Namely, the phrase “that has life in potency” in the preceding paragraph.

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8. Item forma seminis vel ovi vel frumenti non est anima, et tamen sibi convenit ista definitio. Ergo non est bona, cum conveniat aliis a definito. Et ego declaro quod haec definitio convenit formae substantiali ovi et sic de aliis, quia ovum habet vitam in potentia licet non in actu, et est corpus physicum et organicum, compositum ex partibus dissimilibus et ad diversa officia deputatis, ut ex albumine et vitello. Et tamen ista forma ovi est actus primus substantialis ipsius; ergo etc. 9. Oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem, qui dat istam definitionem tamquam bonam. 10. Nota quod naturalis non considerat substantias secundum rationes earum simpliciter quidditativas, sed solum metaphysicus. Immo physicus non considerat substantias nisi in ordine ad motum et operationes earum. Et quia formae materiales ad operationes suas requirunt certam materiam et appropriatam per dispositiones qualitativas vel quantitativas, ideo oportet quod naturalis definiat formas per suas proprias materias. Ideo bene oportet animam definiri per corpus physicum organicum definitione naturali. 11. Dicam ergo quod ista est valde bona definitio naturalis ipsius animae quia explicite et convertibiliter indicat quid est anima modo naturali. Dico explicite quia dictum fuit quod anima est actus, et quod est substantia, et actus primus; et hoc totum explicat ista definitio. Et quia actus dicitur alicuius actus, ideo explicite ponitur cuius ipsa sit actus, quia corporis physici organici. Et explicatur etiam secundum quam potentiam sit actus, quia secundum potentiam ad vivere; ideo dicitur habentis vitam in potentia. 12. Item quaedam est definitio dicens quid nominis; alia pure quidditativa; alia causalis, explicans non solum quid res est sed etiam prop-

43–44 substantiali ] om. A 47 forma ] sustantialis add. T || ipsius ] ovi AE 50 naturalis ] aristoteles A 51 simpliciter ] pure T 52 et ] mutationes et add. T 53 materiales ] naturales A 61 et ] quod substantia est add. T || explicat ] exemplificat E explicite dicit T 62 quia ] om. AEV || dicitur ] est A debet esse ET

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8. Again, the form of a seed, an egg, or a grain of wheat is not a soul, and yet this definition applies to it. Therefore, the definition is not good, since it may apply to things other than the thing defined. And I show that this definition applies to the substantial form of an egg and to the others as well, because an egg has life in potency, though not in act, and it is a physical organic body composed of dissimilar parts, such as the white and the yolk, which are assigned different functions. Yet the form of an egg is its first substantial act; therefore etc. 9. The opposite is argued by appeal to Aristotle, who offers it as a good definition. 10. Note that the natural philosopher does not consider substances simply with regard to their quidditative accounts, but only the metaphysician does. For the natural scientist considers substances only in relation to their motion and operations. Because material forms require for their operations some matter made appropriate through qualitative or quantitative dispositions, it is necessary for the natural philosopher to define forms by means of the matter that is proper to them. Therefore, the soul certainly has to be defined as a physical organic body in a definition provided by natural philosophy. 11. Therefore, let me declare that this is quite a good definition of the soul in natural philosophy, since it explicitly and convertibly41 indicates what the soul is in the way required by natural science.42 And I say ‘explicitly’, because it has been said that the soul is an act, a substance, a first act; and all this is explicit in this definition. Because an act is said to be the act of something, the definition therefore explicitly states what the soul is an act of, namely that it is the act of a physical organic body. It is also explicit which potency it is an act of, namely the potency to live; that is why it states: ‘that has life in potency’. 12. Again, some definitions are nominal definitions; others are purely quidditative; yet others are causal, making explicit not only

41 A

definition is supposed to be ‘convertible’ with what it defines (the definiendum) in the sense that necessarily, whatever the definiendum applies to the definition should also apply to and vice versa. 42 For Buridan’s distinction between metaphysical and scientific definitions, see Summulae de dialectica 8.2 (tr. Klima, 631–664, especially, 638–659).

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ter quid est — et talis est magis perfecta. Et huiusmodi est illa definitio. Cum enim anima sit forma, non oportet quod habeat causam formalem nisi prout improprie vocamus praedicatum quidditativum formam subiecti, sicut dicit Aristoteles secundo Physicorum quod partes definitionis sunt formae, scilicet quod genus est forma communis et differentia est forma propria, ut dicit Commentator ibidem. Ad exprimendum ergo talem formam animae, dicitur quod anima est actus primus substantialis. Et ad exprimendum causam eius materialem et subiectivam, dicitur corporis physici organici. Et ad exprimendum eius causam finalem, dicitur habentis vitam in potentia — si per vitam intelligamus hic operationem vitalem, operatio enim est quoddamodo finis operantis, ut felicitas hominis. 13. Item haec definitio bene est convertibilis cum isto termino anima, quia convenit omni et soli. Dico omni quia declaratum est prius quod omnis anima est “actus primus substantialis corporis physici organici.” Et est etiam actus habentis vitam in potentia secundum duplicem bonam expositionem. Prima est quod ipsa est actus habentis vitam, et fiet ibi punctus, et per hoc differt anima a forma ovi vel seminis; deinde in potentia supple ad operationes vitales, id est potentis, per huiusmodi vitam et animam, exercere operationes vitales. 14. Alia expositio est actus habentis vitam in potentia, id est actus quo corpus dicitur actu vivens quia, ipsa circumscripta, non esset vivens nisi in potentia. Et sic adhuc per istam clausulam differt anima a forma substantiali ovi vel seminis. 15. Deinde haec definitio convenit animae solum quia per hoc quod dico actus, differt anima a materia prima et a composito; et per hoc quod dico primus, differt ab actibus secundis qui sunt operationes vi-

71 secundo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.3 194b 26–30; Cf. A RISTOTE LES , Met. VII.11 1036a 26. 73 dicit Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. Phys. II.3.1 (IV 59 L). 81 declaratum est prius ] BURIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.2. 69 oportet ] apparet E 74 animae ] scilicet communem add. A 75 materialem ] materiam V 76 exprimendum ] quoddamodo add. TV 82 quod ] quodamodo EV quomodo W || corporis ] om. E

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what the thing is but also for what reason it is — and these are more complete. This definition is of the latter sort. Since the soul is a form, it does not need a formal cause, except insofar as we improperly call a quidditative predicate the form of its subject. For example, Aristotle says in Physics II that the parts of a definition are forms, namely (as the Commentator says regarding this passage) the genus is a common form, and the difference is the proper form. Thus to express this sort of form in the case of the soul, the definition states that the soul is the first substantial act. To express its material and subjective cause it has ‘of a physical organic body’. And to express its final cause it has ‘that has life in potency’ — provided by ‘life’ here we understand vital operations, for an operation is in a way the end of the thing acting, as happiness is in the case of human beings. 13. Again, this definition is correctly convertible with the term ‘soul’, as it applies to all souls and only to souls. I say ‘to all’ since it was explained earlier that every soul is the first substantial act of a physical organic body. It is also an act of something that has life in potency, in accordance with two correct interpretations. The first is that it is ‘the act of something that has life,’ full stop, and this is what distinguishes the soul from the form of an egg or a seed; next, add ‘to vital operations’ to the phrase ‘in potency,’ that is, the act of something capable of exercising vital operations through this sort of life or soul. 14. The second interpretation of ‘the act of something that has life in potency’ is that the soul is the act through which the body is said to be actually alive, because, without the soul, the body would be only potentially alive. By this phrase, the soul still differs from the substantial form of an egg or a seed. 15. What is more, this definition applies only to the soul, because ‘act’ distinguishes the soul from prime matter and the composite; ‘first’ from secondary acts, which are the vital operations; ‘substan-

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tales; et per hoc quod dico substantialis differt a scientia et huiusmodi habitibus qui sunt accidentia. Et cum dico corporis non contraho particulas praecedentes, sed explico causam materialem animae. Et cum etiam dico physici non contraho sed designo quod anima non dicatur actus corporis ea ratione qua dicitur artificiale sed ea ratione qua est a natura. Vel etiam potest dici quod haec nomina naturale et natura non significant substantiam absolute, sed in ordine ad motum vel operationem, prout debet videri secundo Physicorum. Idem autem significat physis Graece et natura Latine, et similiter physicum et naturale. Ideo ponitur physici ad denominandum habitudinem ad motus vel operationes naturales, quia naturalis terminos suos definire debet per motum et habitudinem ad motum, ut dicitur secundo Physicorum et sexto Metaphysicae. Sed per hoc quod dicitur organici differt anima a formis substantialibus corporum simplicium vel homogeneorum, ut quatuor elementorum et mineralium. Et per habentis vitam in potentia differt anima a formis ovorum vel seminum secundum expositiones prius datas. 16. Ad rationes. Ad primam dicitur quod animae et aliae formae substantiales non definiuntur a naturali secundum conceptus quidditativos et absolutos, sed respective ad materiam et ad motus et ad operationes naturales. 17. Ad secundam dicitur quod definitio pure quidditativa debet dari per verum genus et differentias essentiales. Sed bonae descriptiones et definitiones causales sumunt bene terminos aliquos communiores loco generis et proprietates et etiam nomina causalia loco differentiarum. Saepe enim in bonis descriptionibus sumuntur multi termini qui 102 secundo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.1 192b 22; B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. II.1 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 251.11–21). 106 secundo Physicorum ] A RI STOTELES , Phys. II.1 192b 22. 106–107 sexto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VI.1 1025b16. 96 non ] om. T 99 est ] dicitur VW 100 naturale et natura ] materiale vel artificiale naturale A naturalis naturaliter(?) T || et natura ] materiale E 103 naturale ] materiale A 104 denominandum ] demonstrandum A notandum E notificandum V 105 suos ] nos V || debet ] debemus V 109 mineralium ] numerativum T 117 verum ] unum T 118 bene ] alios add. AW || aliquos ] om. A om. W 119 generis ] generum A || et ] ponunt add. A || proprietates ] proprietatis TV 120 bonis ] suis A || descriptionibus ] definitionibus A || multi ] om. E

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tial’ from knowledge and similar dispositions, which are accidents. When I say ‘body,’ I am not narrowing down the preceding parts of the definition. Instead, I am making explicit the material cause of the soul. Also when I say ‘physical’ I am not narrowing down the definition, but rather indicating that the soul is said to be the act of a body, not insofar as that body is artificial, but insofar as it is natural. Alternatively, we can even say that ‘natural’ and ‘nature’ signify substance not absolutely but in relation to motion and activity, as one should see in my Questions on Aristotle’s Physics II. For ‘physis’ means the same in Greek as natura in Latin, and the same goes for ‘physical’ and ‘natural’. Hence ‘physical’ is put into the definition to designate the relation to motions or natural operations, because the natural philosopher must define his terms by means of motion and the relation to motion, as stated in Physics II and Metaphysics VI. Now ‘organic’ distinguishes the soul from the substantial forms of simple or homogenous bodies, such as those of the four elements and minerals. And ‘that has life in potency’ distinguishes the soul from the forms of eggs or seeds, in accordance with the interpretations provided earlier. 16. Replies to the initial arguments: to the first43 , we say that souls and other substantial forms are not defined by the natural philosopher by means of quidditative and absolute concepts, but relative to matter, motion, and natural operations. 17. To the second,44 we reply that a purely quidditative definition is supposed to be provided in terms of a true genus and essential differences. But good descriptions and causal definitions are correctly based on (a) some more common terms in place of genus, (b) properties, and even (c) causal names in the place of differences. For

43 See 44 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above.

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non vere et proprie sunt genera et differentiae, ad circumloquendum genera et differentias. 18. Ad tertiam dicitur quod anima est actus corporis, id est materiae corporeae tamquam cui inhaeret, et etiam substantiae corporeae per se subsistentis tamquam pars formalis eius. 19. Ad quartam apparet ex dictis quomodo non frustra ponitur physici. 20. Ad quintam solvitur per expositiones prius datas de habentis vitam in potentia. 21. Ad sextam dicit Commentator quod, quia actus et potentia sunt relativa, ideo non est inconveniens quod per invicem definiantur. Et Porphyrius idem dicit de genere et specie. Et Aristoteles in Praedicamentis: qui definite novit unum relativorum, definite novit reliquum, tamquam definiantur utrumque per reliquum vel saltem per eius fundamentum. 22. Ad septimam dicitur quod licet sit idem homo et animal, tamen iste terminus homo non est iste terminus animal sed definitur per ipsum; et ita potest dici de vita et anima. 23. De forma seminis dictum est in positione.

130 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. Met. IX.2.1 (VIII 236 G). 132 Porphyrius ] P ORPHYRY, Isag. 2.9 (Ar. lat. 2.8.22 Busse: p. 4). 132–133 Praedicamentis ] A RISTOTELES, Cat. 7 8b 35 (Ar. lat. I.2 7.62): “Quapropter palam est quia necessarium est quod noverit quis relativorum definite, et illud ad quod dicitur definite nosse;” Auc. Ar. 31.28 (ed. Hamesse, 303): “Quicumque definitive noverit unum correlativum definitive nosciturus est et reliquum.” 121 ad ] cuius add. A || circumloquendum ] scribendum A 124 tamquam ] om. AEW 131 per invicem definiantur ] primum definitur T 133–134 reliquum tamquam ] quamvis E 134 definiantur utrumque ] si unum definiatur T

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good descriptions are often based on several terms that are not truly and properly genera and differences to characterize genera and differences. 18. To the third,45 we reply that the soul is the act of the body, that is, an act of the corporeal matter as of something in which it inheres, and also an act of the corporeal substance subsisting on its own as its formal part. 19. The answer to the fourth46 is clear from what has been said: how it is not superfluous to add ‘physical.’ 20. The fifth47 is solved by the interpretations of ‘that has life in potency’ provided earlier.48 21. To the sixth,49 the Commentator says that because act and potency are correlatives, it is not unacceptable that they be defined through each other. Porphyry says the same thing about genus and species. And Aristotle says in the Categories that someone who definitely knows one of the correlatives definitely knows the other, as each is defined through the other, or at least through its foundation. 22. To the seventh,50 we say that although a human being and an animal are the same, the term ‘human being’ nevertheless is not the term ‘animal’ but is defined by it; and so we reply in the same way regarding life and the soul. 23. The form of the seed51 was covered in the main discussion.

45 See

par. 3 above. par. 4 above. 47 See par. 5 above. 48 See pars. 14–15 above. 49 See par. 6 above. 50 See par. 7 above. 51 See par. 8 above. 46 See

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Utrum in eodem animali sit eadem anima vegetativa et sensitiva.

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1. Et arguitur quod non, sed quod sint formae et animae diversae, quia non possumus arguere diversitatem formarum substantialium nisi per diversitatem operationum, cum non ducamur in notitias substantiarum nisi per accidentia et proprietates earum. Sed constat quod sentire, quod est opus sensitivae, et nutrire, quod est opus vegetativae, sunt valde diversae operationes secundum speciem, immo et secundum genus, quia nutrire est agere et sentire est pati secundum Aristotelem. 2. Item operationes magis differentes debent provenire a formis et principiis magis differentibus. Sed constat quod videre et nutrire in isto equo sunt operationes magis differentes quam videre in equo et asino, quod apparet quia et organa et obiecta habent magis differentiam. Ergo si videre in equo et videre in asino proveniunt ab animabus diversis secundum speciem, sequitur quod magis in equo videre et nutrire proveniunt ab animabus specie differentibus. 3. Item inesse alicui secundum se est inesse sibi per suam naturam vel essentiam; ideo inesse animali secundum quod animal est inesse sibi per naturam per quam est animal; et sic etiam inesse viventi secundum quod vivens est inesse sibi per naturam per quam est vivens.

9 nutrire est agere ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 416a18 (Ar. lat. XII.2 102.1.1): “Quoniam autem eadem potentia animae vegetativa et generativa, de alimento necessarium est determinare primum: separatur enim ab aliis potentiis opere hoc.” || sentire est pati ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 416b 33–34 (Ar. lat. XII.2 107.1.3): “Sensus autem in moveri aliquid et pati accidit, sicut dictum est: videtur enim quaedam alteratio esse.” 7 opus ] operatio E || opus ] nutritivae sive add. T 7–8 vegetativae ] nutritivae V 8 secundum speciem ] om. A 12 principiis ] potentiis T 14 magis ] maiorem AE © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 10

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Are the vegetative and sensitive souls the same in an animal?

1. It is argued that they are not, but rather they are diverse forms and diverse souls. For we can argue for the diversity of substantial forms only from the diversity of operations, because we come to know substances only through their accidents and properties. But it is clear that sensing, which is the task of the sensitive soul, and nourishing, which is the task of the vegetative soul, are quite diverse operations which differ in species; indeed, they also differ in genus, since according to Aristotle nourishing is action whereas sensing is passion. 2. Again, operations that are more different ought to stem from forms and principles that are more different. But it is clear that seeing and nourishing in this horse are operations that are more different than seeing in a horse and seeing in a donkey, which is obvious from the fact that their respective organs and objects are more different. Therefore, if seeing in a horse and seeing in a donkey stem from souls different in species, it follows all the more that seeing and nourishing in a horse stem from souls that are different in species. 3. Again, being present in something of itself is being present in it through its nature or essence; hence being present in an animal qua animal is being present in it through the nature by which it is an animal; so too being present in a living thing qua living thing is

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 10

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Sed Brunello inest esse sensitivum secundum quod animal et non secundum quod vivens, et esse vegetativum inest sibi secundum quod vivens et non secundum quod animal. Igitur esse sensitivum inest sibi per naturam per quam est animal et non per naturam per quam est vivens, et esse vegetativum e converso. Ergo in Brunello est alia natura secundum quam est animal et alia secundum quam est vivens, et illae sunt anima vegetativa et sensitiva; ergo etc. 4. Item primo Caeli dicitur quod unius corporis simplicis debet esse unus solus motus simplex per naturam; ideo etiam unius simplicis animae debet esse una sola simplex operatio. Anima autem vegetativa est una simplex forma cuius operatio est nutrire; ergo sentire non est eius operatio sed alterius animae. 5. Item potentia animae non est distincta ab anima, ut dicetur post; sed in equo vegetativum et sensitivum sunt potentiae distinctae; ergo etiam istae sunt animae distinctae. 6. Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Commentatoris in De substantia orbis dicentis: “Unum subiectum habere plures formas substantiales est impossibile.” 7. Item sequitur quod equus esset plura animata quia quaelibet anima dat esse animatum, et hoc videtur inconveniens. 8. Item ex pluribus in actu non fit unum per se, prout habetur septimo Metaphysicae; et quaelibet anima dat esse in actu; ergo animal, si sic haberet plures animas, non esset aliquod unum per se, quod est falsum. 9. Item Aristoteles primo Physicorum — et ubicumque loquitur de isto proposito — reprehendit antiquos de hoc quod ponebant pri-

29 primo Caeli ] A RISTOTELES, De caelo I.2 268b 30 (Ar. lat. VIII.2): “simplex motus simplicis corporis”. 34–35 ut dicetur post ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.5. 38–39 Unum. . . impossibile ] AVERROES, De subst. orbis 1 (IX 3 K–L): “Unum enim subiectum habere plusquam unam primam est impossibile.” 42–43 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.13 1039a4 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 159.752): “Duo namque sic actu numquam sunt unum actu...” 46 primo Physicorum ] A RI STOTELES , Phys. I.4 passim. 26 natura ] anima AW 33 animae ] potentiae W 38–39 Unum. . . substantiales ] nisi unam formam T || plures formas substantiales ] nisi unam formam V 47 proposito ] composito V

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being present in it through the nature by which it is a living thing. But being sensitive is present in Browny qua animal and not qua living thing, whereas being vegetative is present in him qua living thing and not qua animal. Therefore, being sensitive is present in him through the nature by which he is an animal and not through the nature by which he is a living thing, and the converse is the case for his being vegetative. Therefore, in Browny there is one nature whereby he is an animal and another nature whereby he is alive, and these natures are the vegetative and sensitive souls; therefore etc. 4. Again, On the Heavens I declares that a single simple body should have a single simple motion by nature; hence a single simple soul should also have a single simple operation. However, the vegetative soul is a simple form that has nourishing as its operation; therefore, sensing is not its operation but that of another soul. 5. Again, a power of the soul is not distinct from the soul, as will be said later; but in a horse the vegetative and sensitive powers are distinct; therefore, they are distinct souls as well. 6. The opposite is argued by appeal to the Commentator’s remark in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere: “It is impossible for one subject to have several substantial forms.” 7. Again, it follows that a horse would be several animate things, for each soul makes something animate; and this seems unacceptable. 8. Again, something one per se does not result from many things that are in act,52 as Metaphysics VII states; however, any given soul makes something to be in act; therefore, an animal, were it to have several souls in this way, would not be something one per se, which is false. 9. Again, Aristotle in Physics I (and wherever he speaks about this matter) criticizes his predecessors for assigning the first subject

52 Several

actual things make only an aggregate; they are not fused into something genuinely one, in which they would lose their actuality and distinctness.

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mum subiectum transmutationum naturalium esse substantiam in actu, ut a¨erem vel aquam vel ignem vel aliquod medium ipsorum, quia intentio Aristotelis est quod non esset amplius generatio simpliciter, sed solum alteratio. Non enim est generatio simpliciter sed alteratio, ubi remanet idem subiectum in actu substantiali; nec est forma substantialis quae acquiritur, sed forma accidentalis. Hoc igitur supposito, manifestum est quod anima sensitiva in equo non esset forma substantialis, nec eius generatio esset generatio substantialis, sed alteratio, quia haberet subiectum in actu substantiali per animam vegetativam. Et haec sunt inconvenientia; ergo etc. 10. Ista quaestio bene est difficilis quia difficile est demonstrare aliquam partem. 11. Tenentes enim plures animas et formas substantiales in eodem supposito fundant suam opinionem quod secundum gradum et ordinem praedicatorum quidditativorum, scilicet generum et specierum subordinatorum sibi invicem, sunt in eodem plures formae substantiales subordinatae, ut in Socrate est forma prima qua est substantia, alia qua est corpus, alia qua est vivens, alia qua est animal, et alia specifica qua est homo. Et sicut materia prima est naturaliter in potentia ad primam istarum, scilicet generalissimam, et ista est primus actus istius materiae propter quod ex eis fit unum per se, ita secunda forma se habet ad compositum ex materia et prima forma, scilicet quod compositum illud est per se potentia respectu secundae formae, et ista est actus formalis ipsius compositi; ideo fit ex eis unum per se, sicut fiebat ex materia et forma prima. Et sic consequenter, pari ratione, ex tertia forma et composito ex materia et duabus formis prioribus fit unum per se, et sic usque ad formam finalem et specialissimam quae iam non est in potentia ad ulteriorem formam substantialem; ideo omnis dispositio ei ultra adveniens esset forma accidentalis; et transmutatio, ipsa ma-

48 substantiam in ] om. AE || substantiam ] subiectum W 51 simpliciter ] simplex A 61 supposito ] subiecto A 62 quidditativorum ] essentialium add. AE 63 sibi invicem ] om. AET 67 et ] quod add. AETVW 71 formalis ] substantialis W 73 materia et duabus ] secunda forma cum W 76 ei ] rei V

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of natural changes to be some substance in act, such as air, water, fire, or some intermediary among these. Aristotle’s point is that then there would no longer be generation in the absolute sense, but rather alteration.53 For when the same subject remains in substantial act, then there is no generation in the absolute sense but merely alteration. Neither is the form that the subject acquires a substantial form; instead, it is an accidental form. Assuming this point, then, it is obvious that the sensitive soul in a horse would not be a substantial form. Nor would its generation be a substantial generation, but rather an alteration, for it would have a subject that is in substantial act by its vegetative soul. These results are unacceptable; therefore etc. 10. This question is rather difficult, for it is difficult to prove either position.54 11. Philosophers who hold that there are several souls and several substantial forms in the same concrete object take the basis for their view to be that, corresponding to the order and degree of quidditative predicates (namely genera and species subordinate to one another), there are several subordinate substantial forms in the same individual. For instance, in Socrates there is an initial form on account of which he is a substance, another form by which he is alive, another by which he is an animal, and another specific form by which he is a human being. Just as prime matter is naturally in potency to the first (most generic) of these forms, and this form is the first act of that matter, on account of which something one per se results from them, then so too is the second form related to the composite of matter and the first form, namely so that this composite is per se in potency in respect of the second form and this latter form is the formal act of this composite, and so something one per se results from them, as it did from matter and the first form. And so on, in the same way, something one per se results from the third form and the composite of matter and the two

53 Alteration

is a mere qualitative change of a substance that already exists in act and which persists throughout such a change; therefore, such a change is a mere accidental change, a change with qualification, namely, a substance’s coming to be somehow. But this is not a generation of a substance absolutely speaking, i. e., it is not a substance’s coming to be. 54 For a detailed historical survey of the problem, see Callus 1967–1979.

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nente, esset alteratio et non generatio substantialis. Et imaginantur isti quod, quantum ad animam sensitivam, omnia animalia sunt eiusdem rationis substantialis, a qua sumitur hoc genus animal, et secundum formas ulteriores specificas sunt homines, equi, et canes diversarum rationum substantialium specificarum. 12. Et tunc isti solvunt rationes et auctoritates quae fiebant in oppositum. 13. De Commentatore dicunt quod ipse intendebat unum subiectum non habere nisi unam formam substantialem finalem, scilicet a qua sumitur species specialissima in praedicamento substantiae, sed bene habet plures formas substantiales priores generales. 14. Ad secundam dicunt quod non est inconveniens unum animatum esse plura animata, quia totum animatum est suae partes quantitativae quarum quaelibet est animata. Et licet sint plures, tamen totum compositum est unum animatum, quia fit ex illis unum per se modo praedicto. 15. Ad tertiam concedunt quod ex pluribus in actu substantiali specifico et finali non fit unum per se, sed ex formis subordinatis, quarum una est potentia respectu alterius, fit unum per se, sicut dicebatur. 16. Ad quartam dicunt quod Aristoteles istos reprehendebat quia ponebant istud subiectum esse in actu substantiali secundum formam specificam et finalem ad quod sequitur quod, isto manente, non esset generatio substantialis sed solum alteratio. 17. Non obstantibus istis ego credo oppositum, scilicet quod in equo unica sit anima et quod non sit in eo anima vegetativa distincta a sensitiva nec sensitiva distincta a vegetativa. Et verum est quod gene-

85 finalem ] om. AE 87 substantiales priores ] om. T || generales ] om. AE

|| substantiales ] om. V

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previous forms, and so on, right up to the last (most specific) form — which is not then in potency to a further substantial form, and so any disposition arriving on top of it would be an accidental form, and a change, while this specific form stays in place, would be a case of alteration rather than substantial generation. These philosophers imagine that, with regard to the sensitive soul, all animals have the same substantial nature, from which we get the genus of animals, and it is due to further specific forms that there are human beings, horses, and dogs with their diverse specific substantial natures. 12. These philosophers then resolve the arguments and citations given for the opposite side. 13. As for the Commentator’s remark,55 they claim that he meant that one subject can have only one last substantial form, namely the one from which we get the most specific species in the category of substance. But it certainly has several prior generic substantial forms. 14. To the second argument,56 they reply that it is not unacceptable for one animate thing to be several animate things, for the whole animate thing is its quantitative parts, any of which is animate. Although they are several, the composite whole is still one animate thing, since something one per se results from them, in the way described above. 15. To the third,57 they grant that something one per se does not result from several things which are in their last specific substantial act; but something one per se does result from subordinate forms where one is in potency with respect to the other, as described above. 16. To the fourth,58 they reply that Aristotle criticized them because they maintained that the subject in question is in substantial act due to its last specific form, from which it follows that as long as the subject remains in place there is no substantial generation but merely alteration. 17. These arguments notwithstanding, I believe the opposite, namely that in a horse there is a unique soul, and that the vegetative soul in it is not distinct from the sensitive soul nor is the sensitive

55 See

par. par. 57 See par. 58 See par. 56 See

6 above. 7 above. 8 above. 9 above.

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raliter improbare istam multiplicationem formarum secundum multiplicationem praedicatorum quidditativorum pertinet ad septem Metaphysicae. Ideo, hoc supponendo, nihil dicam hic nisi quod specialiter pertinet ad animas et animata. 18. Pono igitur rationes probabiles ad probandum quod non sunt sic in equo animae diversae sensitiva et vegetativa. 19. Prima ratio est si in equo ab anima sensitiva circumscribatur anima vegetativa vel e converso: Deus enim sic eas posset auferre ab invicem, si essent diversae animae; remota igitur sensitiva, remanente vegetativa, quod remaneret esset planta — omne enim animatum habens animam vegetativam sine anima sensitiva est planta. E converso autem, remota vegetativa et remanente sensitiva, quod remaneret esset animal. Et ex utrisque est nunc equus compositus; ergo ipse est compositus ex animali et planta, quod est absurdum. 20. Item sequitur quod vegetativa in equo esset nobilior quam sensitiva, etiam in isto equo, quod videtur absurdum. Consequentia patet quia opus eius esset nobilius, quia opus vegetativae esset agere secundum substantiam per nutritionem et generationem, et opus sensitivae non esset nisi recipere species et agere sensationem quae non est nisi quoddam accidens. Modo agere est nobilius quam pati, et agere nobiliorem effectum est nobilius quam agere minus nobilem, si ista sunt diversa agentia. 21. Item difficilius arguitur quia isti ponunt quod, secundum animam sensitivam, equus et canis sunt eiusdem rationis substantialis et quod tamen differunt secundum rationes substantiales specificas, hoc

104–105 septem Metaphysicae ] QQ. Met. VII.12 (ed. Parisiis 1588, ff. 44ra – 50rb ); A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.13 1033a30–1033b1. 104 quidditativorum ] essentialiter subordinatorum AE || quidditativorum ] essentialiter subordinatorum AE 110 e converso ] vegetativa a sensitiva scilicet per potentiam divinam AE 119–120 secundum ] om. AET 120 generationem et ] om. AE 121 sensationem ] formam substantialem V

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soul in it distinct from the vegetative soul. In fact, it is the business of my Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VII to show generally that the multiplicity of forms doesn’t follow the multiplicity of quidditative predicates. So, assuming that result, I shall here speak only about what pertains in particular to souls and animate beings. 18. Thus, I present some plausible arguments to prove that in a horse there are not sensitive and vegetative souls distinct in this way. 19. The first argument, supposing that the vegetative soul in a horse is separated from the sensitive soul, or conversely, is that, if they were diverse souls, God could remove them from one another. For with the sensitive soul removed and the vegetative soul remaining, what would remain would be a plant — for every animate being having a vegetative soul without a sensitive soul is a plant. Conversely, with the vegetative soul removed and the sensitive soul remaining, what would remain would be an animal. The horse is now composed of both; therefore, it is composed of an animal and a plant, which is absurd. 20. Again, it follows that the vegetative soul in a horse, indeed, in this very horse, would be more noble than its sensitive soul, which seems absurd. The inference is clear, since its work would be more noble. For the task of the vegetative soul would be to act with respect to substance by means of nutrition and generation, whereas the task of the sensitive soul would only be to receive species and to act with respect to sensation, which is merely an accident.59 However, acting is more noble than being acted upon, and acting with respect to a nobler effect is more noble than acting with respect to a less noble one, if the agents are different. 21. Again, there is a more difficult argument.60 These philosophers claim that with regard to the sensitive soul, a horse and a dog have the same substantial nature, yet they differ with regard to their specific 59 In

the context of the Aristotelian theory of sense perception, the term ‘species’ expresses a different idea from what it expresses in the Aristotelian theory of categories. In the latter context, it expresses a taxonomical concept, namely, a concept of narrower extension subordinated to a concept of broader extension, as species to genus. In the context of the theory of sense perception, however, a species is a likeness (similitudo) of a sensible quality transmitted through a medium and received in a sense organ. 60 See end of par. 11 above.

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est, per diversas formas substantiales specificas additas animae sensitivae vel animabus sensitivis. Quaero ergo utrum ista forma substantialis specifica quae est in equo ultra animam sensitivam et vegetativam sit anima quaedam vel alia forma. Et utrumque erit inconveniens. Primum quidem erit inconveniens quod ista forma non sit anima, quia tunc erit minus nobilis quam anima. Et hoc est inconveniens, quia forma specifica se habet, secundum istos, ad formam generalem sicut actus et perfectio substantialis ad potentiam, et sicut forma generalis ad materiam. Perfectio autem substantialis debet esse nobilior quam sit potentia perfectibilis, sicut forma generalis ponitur nobilior ipsa materia. Secundum, quod ista esset minus nobilis quam anima, apparet quia inter omnes formas naturales, animae ab omnibus reputantur nobiliores. Et iterum sive ista forma specifica esset anima sive non, vel ipsa esset cognoscitiva vel non cognoscitiva. Si non sit cognoscitiva, tunc erit ignobilior quam anima sensitiva. Omnis enim forma cognoscitiva videtur esse nobilior forma non cognoscitiva. Et hoc est inconveniens, sicut dictum fuit, scilicet quod forma specifica secundum istam opinionem esset ignobilior forma generali. Si ista forma sit cognoscitiva, tunc erit sensitiva vel intellectiva, quia omnis cognitio est sensatio vel intellectio. Et non esset intellectiva in equo, ergo esset sensitiva et non distincta a sensitiva. Et consimiliter quaeritur, cum pirus et pomus non differant secundum rationem substantialem per animam vegetativam sed per alias formas suas specificas, utrum illae formae specificae essent animae vel non, et sequitur inconveniens, ut prius. 22. Item isti ponunt animam vegetativam esse eiusdem rationis in homine, equo, pisce et verme, et hoc est valde inconveniens, quia tunc consimiliter deberet facere nutritionem et consimilem carnem facere et consimilia membra formare, quod est manifeste falsum. Et consequentia patet, quia si ponantur aliae animae a vegetativa, tamen inter eas nulla operatur ad nutritionem, augmentationem, et similiter ge-

138–139 apparet ] esset T 139 naturales ] et materiales add. AW materiales V || reputantur ] repraesentatur AV reputatur W 140 ista ] alia T 145 istam opinionem ] operationes V || istam opinionem ] operationes V 155 consimiliter ] consimilem AEW

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substantial accounts — that is, they differ by the diverse specific substantial forms added to the sensitive soul(s). Therefore, I ask whether the specific substantial form that is in the horse beyond its sensitive and vegetative soul is a soul or some other form. Each answer will be unacceptable. First, it is unacceptable that this form is not a soul, for then it will be less noble than a soul. This is unacceptable, for according to these philosophers, the specific form is related to the generic form as a substantial act and perfection are related to potency, and as the generic form is related to matter; but a substantial perfection has to be more noble than a perfectible potency, just as the generic form is claimed to be more noble than matter itself. Second, that this would be less noble than the soul is clear, because everyone holds that the soul is more noble than any other natural form. Again, whether this specific form is a soul or not, it is either capable of cognition or not. If the specific form were not capable of cognition, then it will be less noble than the sensitive soul. Indeed, any form that is capable of cognition seems to be more noble than a form that is not. Yet, as we said, it is unacceptable that the specific form, on this view, would be less noble than the generic form. If the specific form were capable of cognition, then it will be either sensitive or intellective, since every cognition is either an act of sensing or thinking. It would not be intellective in a horse; therefore, it would be sensitive, and not distinct from the sensitive soul. Likewise, since a pear tree and an apple tree do not differ in their substantial accounts by their vegetative soul but rather by their other specific forms, the question arises whether these specific forms would be souls or not, and just as before, an unacceptable result follows. 22. Again, these philosophers hold that the vegetative soul has the same account in human beings, horses, fish, and worms. This is highly implausible, because then it would have to nourish them in similar ways and produce similar flesh and shape similar bodily members, which is clearly false. The inference is clear, for if we postulate souls other than the vegetative soul, still, none of them would function for

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nerationem, et per consequens ad generandum carnem vel ossa et ad formandum membra, nisi anima vegetativa per suas potentias. Et tamen ipsa esset eiusdem rationis et consimilis naturae in omnibus istis; etiam deberet habere in eis et consimiles potentias et consimiles operationes. Si autem aliquis vellet dicere quod non esset eiusdem rationis nec consimilis naturae anima vegetativa in praedictis, tunc ista praedicta per animas suas vegetativas differrent specie ab invicem secundum rationes substantiales, et non solum ab inanimatis. Et sic, propter differentias specificas animalium et plantarum, non oportet esse in aliquo ipsorum aliam formam substantialem ab anima vegetativa. 23. Item non poneretur in equo anima sensitiva distincta ab anima vegetativa, nisi propter diversitatem operationum. Sed hoc non arguit in eodem supposito diversitatem formarum substantialium, quia eadem anima intellectiva habet multum diversas operationes, ut intelligere et velle, similiter apprehendere, componere et dividere, immo et movere corpus et potentias corporales. Et nulla est anima vegetativa — etiam in planta quantumcumque imperfecta — quae non habeat dissimiles operationes, ut attrahere alimentum per radices, digerere alimentum, nutrire, augmentare, emittere folia et forte fructus, aut sibi simile generare. Immo etiam forma elementi, ut aquae, per gravitatem movet se deorsum, per frigiditatem frigefacit, per humiditatem humefacit, et si esset calefacta, remoto calefaciente, refrigeraret se. 24. Tunc ergo potest responderi ad rationes. Ad primam quando dicitur quod non possumus arguere diversitates specificas formarum substantialium in istis materialibus nisi ex diversitate operationum, hoc conceditur, sed tamen non quaecumque diversitas specifica operationum arguit diversitatem formarum substantialium. Hoc enim non arguit in uno supposito propter hoc quod forma superioris gradus et nobilioris actualitatis potest in plures et nobiliores operationes, et

161 istis ] aliis T 172 supposito ] subiecto AW 174 similiter ] scilicet T || dividere ] discurrere add. TV 180 se deorsum ] localiter AE 181 calefaciente ] calore A 184 in istis ] inferioribus T 188 nobilioris ] maioris VW

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nourishment, growth, and likewise generation, and as a result for the generation of flesh and bones and shaping bodily members. Only the vegetative soul would so function through its own powers. But the vegetative soul is supposed to be of the same nature and of a similar nature in all these animals; it should also have to have similar powers and similar operations in them. However, if someone were to maintain that the vegetative soul is not of the same sort and of a similar nature in the animals mentioned above, then these animals would differ from each other in species with regard to their substantial accounts by their vegetative souls, and not merely from inanimate things. Thus in order to account for the specific differences of animals or plants, no other substantial form would be needed apart from the vegetative soul. 23. Again, one would postulate a sensitive soul in a horse distinct from its vegetative soul only because of the diversity of its operations. However, this is not an argument for the diversity of substantial forms in the same concrete object, since the same intellective soul has quite diverse operations, such as thinking and willing, as well as apprehending, affirming and denying, indeed, even moving the body and bodily powers. Also, every vegetative soul — even in a plant, no matter how imperfect — has a variety of operations, such as taking up nutrients through its roots, distributing them, nourishing, growing, sprouting leaves and perhaps fruits, or generating something like itself. Even the form of an element, such as water, moves itself downwards by heaviness, cools by coldness, and moistens by wetness, and if it were heated up, then after the removal of the heat source, it would cool itself down. 24. We can now respond to the opening arguments. To the first,61 when it is said that we can argue for the specific diversity of substantial forms in the case of material substances only from the diversity of their operations, we grant this, but not just any specific diversity of operations is an argument for the diversity of substantial forms. For this is no argument for the diversity of substantial forms in the same concrete object, because a form of higher rank and more

61 See

par. 1 above.

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continet potentialiter formas inferiores, sicut mixtum continet et retinet de elementis aliquas virtutes et operationes operationibus eorum consimiles, iuxta illud quod mixtum movetur secundum naturam elementi dominantis, licet non remaneant formae substantiales elementorum, ut suppono. Et sic intendit Aristoteles in secundo huius quod est de animabus sicut de figuris. Semper enim in eo quod posterius est, potentia quod prius, ut in tetragono trigonum et in sensitivo vegetativum. Sed si in diversis suppositis perfectis et non orbatis secundum suas naturas sic se habent quod unum sit naturaliter, non ex acquisitione, innatum ad aliquam operationem ad quam vel ad similem alterum non est innatum, ista supposita iudicantur habere formas substantiales specifice diversas. Et hoc maxime iudicatur in viventibus ex diversis figurationibus corporum et membrorum, ut si equus habet pedes naturaliter ad ambulandum et non piscis. Hoc etiam arguitur multum ex generationibus, ut quod semen equi vel frumenti numquam generabit canem vel ordeum. Propter hoc ergo apparet quod prima et secunda rationes non de necessitate concludunt. 25. Ad tertiam dicitur quod Brunellus, per eamdem eius essentiam et naturam, est Brunellus et asinus et animal et vivens et secundum se ipsum (quia per suam naturam). Et cum dicitur quod Brunello inest esse sensitivum secundum quod animal et non secundum quod vivens,

193 suppono ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De gen. et corr. I.22 (ed. Streijger et Bakker) 166.9–11). || secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.3 414b 30. 189–190 et retinet ] om. AE 192 dominantis ] producantis W 204 canem ] carnem VW 208 Brunello ] per suam naturam add. A

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noble actuality is capable of more (and more noble) operations, and contains the lower forms potentially — just as a mixed body contains and retains some powers and operations pertaining to the elements, and similar to theirs, and in accordance with this the mixed body moves according to the nature of the element dominant in it, even though (as I assume) the substantial forms of the elements do not remain in it.62 This is what Aristotle means in De Anima II when he says that it is the case regarding souls as it is regarding figures. For the potency that was prior always exists in what is posterior, as the triangle does in the rectangle, and the vegetative soul in the sensitive soul. However, if two different, complete and non-defective concrete objects are such that one of them is naturally (not through acquisition) capable of some operation of which (or a similar one) the other is not capable, then these concrete objects are judged to have specifically diverse substantial forms. This judgment is made in the case of living things most of all from the different configuration of their bodies and bodily members, as for example a horse naturally has legs for walking and a fish does not. This conclusion is drawn all the more from reproduction: the seed of a horse or wheat never generates a dog or barley, for instance. Thus it is clear that the first and second63 objections do not prove their conclusion of necessity. 25. To the third objection64 we reply that Browny, through his selfsame essence and nature, is Browny and a donkey and an animal and alive; and all this is by himself, because it is through his nature.65 When the claim is made that being sensitive is present in Browny qua 62 Mixed bodies in

which, say, the heavy element of earth is predominant, such as in rocks, fall downwards, whereas those in which the light element of fire is predominant, such as in hot vapors or smoke, would naturally rise upwards, despite the fact that these mixed bodies contain these elements only “virtually” in that they have qualities that result from the combinations of the powers (virtutes) of the elements from which they came to be. For further discussion, see note 69 below. 63 See par. 2 above. 64 See par. 3 above. 65 Buridan, true to his nominalism, identifies individuals with their individual natures or essences. See Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VII, 16. So, by his lights, it would be true to say that Browny is an essence or Browny is his equinity, etc.; therefore, for him, it is the same to say that Browny is sensitive through his animality, and to say that Browny is sensitive by himself.

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nos per hoc intelligimus quod haec est vera per se et primo: “Animal est sensitivum,” et non haec: “Vivens est sensitivum.” Ita quod per “inesse secundum quod ipsum” intelligitur praedicatio convertibilis terminorum, vel prima aut immediata aut huiusmodi, prout reduplicatio exponitur. Ita quod ista locutio non erat de reali inhaerentia. 26. Ad quartam potest dici quod formae elementorum sunt primae et infimae inter formas substantiales et non includentes aliquo modo virtualiter qualitates et potentias priorum corporum. Ideo rationabile est quod non habeant diversitates operationum, saltem in eodem genere motus. Sic autem non est rationabile de formis perfectioribus superiorum graduum, et de hac ratione plenius considerandum in primo Caeli.

217 priorum corporum ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De gen. et corr. I.22 (ed. Streijger et Bakker) 163–171 220–221 in primo Caeli ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De caelo I.6 (ed. Moody 1942, 27–35). 213–214 reduplicatio ] multiplicatio V multipliciter add. W 215–216 primae et ] om. AE 217 priorum ] primorum A

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animal but not qua living, we understand by it that “An animal is sensitive” is true per se and primarily,66 but “A living thing is sensitive” is not. Thus, by ‘being present in X ’ we understand a predication of the terms that is convertible, primary or immediate or the like, depending on how reduplicative phrases are explained,67 so that this phrase did not indicate real inherence. 26. To the fourth objection68 we can reply that the forms of the elements are the first and the lowest among substantial forms, and they do not include somehow virtually the qualities and powers of prior bodies.69 Therefore, it is reasonable that they do not have a diversity of operations, at least in the same genus of motion. But this is not reasonable with regard to more perfect forms of higher ranks. We should consider this argument in more detail in connection with my Questions on Aristotle’s On the Heavens I. 66

The qualifiers ‘per se’ and ‘primarily’ indicate certain further specific conditions for a predication to be true. The qualifier ‘per se’ indicates that the predication is essential, as in ‘A man is an animal’, as opposed to ‘per accidens’, which indicates that the predication is accidental, as in ‘A man is white’, while the qualifier ‘primarily’ (‘primo’), indicates that the predication is convertible, as in ‘Color is visible’. See Summulae de dialectica 4.3.2 (tr. Klima, 258). 67 Generally speaking, a reduplicative phrase is taken to be one that specifies the aspect on account of which the predicate applies to the subject. For example, while it is true that in 2015 Barack Obama, qua president (or on account of then being the president or insofar as he was then the president), had presidential powers, it is not true that Barack Obama, qua Michelle Obama’s husband had presidential powers. However, in typical nominalist fashion, Buridan reinterprets the phrase, and takes it merely to indicate the requirement of essential and convertible predication, as described in the previous note. Thus, while the point of the objection was that the predicates ‘alive’ and ‘sensitive’ must apply to the same animal on account of different aspects, namely, distinct souls in the same animal, Buridan’s reply simply consists in reinterpreting the truth conditions of the predications ‘a living thing qua living thing is alive’ and ‘an animal qua animal is sensitive’. For Buridan, these predications are true simply because the predicate essentially and convertibly applies to the subject, as required by the reduplication (which is why the predication ‘a living thing qua living thing is sensitive’ would not be true), and not because they apply to the subject on account of its really distinct aspects, namely, different natures constituted by distinct souls in the same subject. For further discussion, see Summulae de dialectica 8.6.1–4 (tr. Klima, 724–736). 68 See par. 4 above. 69 According to the Aristotelian doctrine of the mixture of the four elements (earth, water, air, fire), when these elements are mixed to constitute a complex body, they

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27. Ad quintam et ultimam dicitur quod potentia sensitiva est anima sensitiva et potentia vegetativa est anima vegetativa. Ita dico quod in equo eadem anima est sensitiva et vegetativa, sed istis diversis nominibus nominatur quibus intelligitur esse principium diversarum operationum, sicut postea magis dicetur.

226 postea magis dicetur ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.5. 224 equo ] eodem V eodem animali W 225–226 operationum ] casuum V

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27. To the fifth and last objection70 we reply that the sensitive power is the sensitive soul and the vegetative power is the vegetative soul. Thus, I say that in a horse the same soul is sensitive and vegetative, but it is named by these different names through which it is understood to be the principle of these different operations, as will be explained in more detail later.

do not remain in the new composite substance in actuality, yet their proportions in the mixture will determine the resulting qualities of the composite. Thus, although they are not present in the composite body in actuality, they are present in it through their powers (virtutes), i.e., by virtually determining its resulting qualities. For a detailed yet succinct account available in English, see Aquinas 2007, 168–170. For Buridan’s own discussion of the same doctrine, see his On Generation and Corruption I, q. 22 where he had this to say: “Note that a mixture is called a mixture because it is generated out of several components having contrariety among themselves, and because it retains some of their powers (virtutes), and also because it has qualities and powers (virtutes) that result from the actions and passions of these components. But it is not said to be a mixture of these components because their substantial forms would remain.” Translated by Gyula Klima from John Buridan, QQ. De gen. et corr. (ed. Streijger and Bakker, 168). 70 See par. 5 above.

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Utrum potentiae animae sint distinctae ab ipsa anima.

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1. Et arguitur quod sic, quia aliter non essent distinctae ab invicem. Sed ego probo quod sint distinctae ab invicem etiam in eodem supposito, ubi tamen dictum est quod non est nisi unica anima. Et hoc probo multipliciter. 2. Primo quia habent diversos actus, et potentiae distinguuntur per actus. 3. Secundo etiam quia habent diversa organa et diversa obiecta, ut apparet de visu et auditu, similiter de vegetativa et sensitiva, quia huius obiectum est sensibile et illius alimentum. 4. Tertio quia ubi una non est, ibi altera est, ut in oculo est visiva et non in pede nec in aure. Si enim visiva esset in pede vel in aure, ipsa ibi esset frustra, quia non posset exercere suam operationem, et natura nihil facit frustra. 5. Quarto quia aliam potentiam habet cor, aliam cerebrum, aliam hepar, quae ordinatae sunt ad diversas operationes. 6. Quinto Aristoteles distinguit inter istas potentias etiam in eodem supposito, quia dicit quibusdam insunt omnes, aliis plures, aliis una sola. Et dicit unam includi potentialiter in aliam, ut in sensitiva vegetativam.

4 dictum est ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4. 17–19 Aristoteles . . . sola ] A RI STOTELES , De an. II.3 414a 29 (Ar. lat. XII.2 87.1.1): “Potentiarum autem animae quae dictae sunt, aliis quidem insunt omnes, aliis vero quaedam harum, quibusdam vero una sola.” 19–20 unam . . . vegetativum ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.3 414a31 (Ar. lat. XII.2 87.1.7): “Inest autem plantis vegetativum solum, alteris autem hoc et sensitivum.” 4 supposito ] subiecto A 5 multipliciter ] scilicet quod sint ab invicem distinctae add. AVW 9–10 quia huius obiectum ] cuiusmodi V 16 quae ] quia A 17–18 eodem ] subiecto sive add. W © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 11

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Are the powers71 of the soul distinct from the soul itself?

1. We argue that they are, for otherwise they would not be distinct from each other. But I prove that they are distinct from each other, even in the same individual thing, where, as we said, there is nevertheless but one soul. I prove this in several ways. 2. First, because the powers of the soul have diverse acts, and powers are distinguished by their acts. 3. Second, because they also have diverse organs and diverse objects. This is clear in the case of sight and hearing, and likewise with the vegetative and sensitive powers, since the object of the latter is something sensible, and the object of the former is nourishment. 4. Third, because where one is not, the other is. For example, the power of sight is in the eye and not in the foot or the ear. For if the power of sight were in the foot or ear, it would be there pointlessly, since it would not be able to carry out its operation: and nature does nothing in vain. 5. Fourth, because the heart, the brain, and the liver have different powers, which are set up for different operations. 6. Fifth, Aristotle distinguishes these powers even in the same concrete object, for he says that some have them all, others most, and still others only one. He also says that one is potentially included in the other, as the vegetative power is included in the sensitive power.

71 The

Latin word ‘potentia’ may refer to a thing’s state of being in potency or to its power to do something, whence it will be translated accordingly either as ‘potency’ or as ‘power’, as the context requires. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 11

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7. Sexto quia idem non adversatur sibi ipsi. Sed dicitur primo Ethicorum quod sensus adversatur et obviat rationi. 8. Septimo quia intellectus non est virtus organica nec extensa, aliae sunt organicae et extensae, et quia intellectus separatur ab aliis sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. 9. Octavo quia quaedam sunt potentiae cognoscitivae, ut sensitiva et intellectiva, et aliae non. Quaedam sunt reservativae specierum, ut phantasia, et aliae non. 10. Item, ad principale: sicut se habet potentia materiae ad materiam, ita se habet potentia animae ad animam. Sed potentia materiae non est de essentia materiae, ut dicit Commentator primo Physicorum. Ad quod probandum adducit triplex medium, scilicet quod materia est substantia et potentia est ad aliquid, et idem potest dici de anima et potentia animae. Secundo quia eiusdem materiae sunt plures potentiae, et idem dicetur de anima. Tertio quia potentia, ut dicit, corrumpitur in adventu formae, materia manente; ergo etc. 11. Item anima exercet diversas operationes mediantibus diversis potentiis, et medium non est idem cum aliquo extremorum; ergo etc. 12. Item idem non denominat se, ut quod est album non est albedo; sed anima est potens, scilicet exercere suas operationes; ergo ista non est potentia. 13. Item in secundo Ethicorum dicit Aristoteles tria esse in anima, scilicet passiones, potentias, et habitus; et idem non est in se; ergo illae potentiae sunt distinctae ab anima.

21–22 primo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.13 1102b13. 31 dicit Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. Phys. I.4.3 (IV 41 E–F). 42 secundo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.4 1105b19. 28 phantasia ] phantasiae AE 33–34 et potentia animae ] om. AV

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7. Sixth, the same thing is not set against itself. Yet Nicomachean Ethics I says that the senses are set against reason and hinder it. 8. Seventh, the intellect is neither an organic power nor extended, whereas the other powers of the soul are organic and extended; and the intellect is separated from the others as something perpetual from something corruptible. 9. Eighth, some powers are cognitive, such as the sensitive and intellective powers, whereas others are not; some are capable of preserving species, such as the imagination, whereas others are not. 10. Again, for the main thesis: just as the potency of matter is related to matter so is the potency of the soul related to the soul. But the potency of matter is not of the essence of matter, as the Commentator remarks in Physics I. To prove this, he offers three arguments, namely, that matter is a substance and its potency is a relation to something,72 and the same can be said about the soul and its potency ; second, that the same matter has several potencies and the same will be said about the soul; third, as the Commentator says, upon the arrival of form, the potency is destroyed, while matter remains; therefore, etc. 11. Again, the soul carries out different operations by means of different powers, and the mean is not the same as any of the extremes; therefore, etc. 12. Again, the same thing does not denominate itself, as something white is not a whiteness; but the soul is a power in the sense that it has the power to carry out its operations; therefore it is not of itself a power.73 13. Again, in Nicomachean Ethics II, Aristotle says that there are three things in the soul, namely passions, powers, and habits; and the same thing is not in itself; therefore, these powers are distinct from the soul. 72 The

Latin phrase ‘ad aliquid’ simply means ‘to something’, but in Scholastic Latin it was also used as the name of the highest genus or category of Relation. The point of the argument, then, is that the soul is a substance and its power is a relation, whence, being in distinct categories, they must be distinct entities. 73 The point of this argument is the distinction between the denominated thing and that from which it is denominated. So, just as a white thing, which is denominated white from its whiteness is distinct from its whiteness, so the powerful (potens) thing is distinct from the power (potentia) on the basis of which it is denominated.

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14. Oppositum arguitur quia sicut potentia materiae se habet ad materiam, ita potentia animae ad animam; sed Aristoteles in principio istius secundi dicit materiam esse potentiam; ergo etc. 15. Item si potentia esset accidens animae, anima esset in potentia ad eam, quia subiectum est in potentia ad omnia sua accidentia. Ergo vel se ipsa esset in potentia ad illam potentiam et tunc, pari ratione, possemus ita dicere a principio, vel est in potentia ad ipsam potentiam per aliam potentiam, et sic procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. 16. Item Aristoteles animam describit quod anima est qua vivimus, sentimus, et intelligimus; sed potentia vegetativa, sensitiva, et intellectiva est qua vivimus, sentimus, et intelligimus; ergo etc. 17. Item tertio huius dicit Aristoteles quod non est alterum appetitivum et fugitivum, nec ab invicem nec a sensitivo. 18. Dicendum est breviter ergo quod omnis anima est potentia, quia omne principium activum vel passivum alicuius motus vel operationis est potentia activa vel passiva, scilicet activa si sit principium activum huius operationis et passiva si passivum; sed omnis anima est principium suae operationis vel activum vel passivum, ut omnes concedunt; ergo etc. Maior manifesta est per definitiones potentiae activae et passivae nono Metaphysicae. Ibi enim potentia activa vel passiva definitur quod potentia activa est principium transmutandi alterum, et potentia passiva est principium transmutandi ab altero. Inde

46–47 in . . . secundi ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a9. 54–55 anima . . . intelligimus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.7 431a12. 57 tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.7 431a12. 65 nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.12 1019a15, IX.1 1046a11. 66–67 potentia . . . altero ] Auc. Ar. 1.219–220 (ed. Hamesse 133): “Potentia activa est principium transmutandi aliud in quantum aliud.” 50 potentiam ] materiam AV 55–56 et intellectiva ] om. A 57–58 appetitivum ] appetitum AV 62 passivum ] operationis et passionum add. V operationis add. W 67 potentia passiva est ] principium passivum E

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14. The opposite is argued because just as the potency of matter is related to matter, so is the potency of the soul related to the soul; but in the beginning of Book II of De anima Aristotle says that matter is potency; therefore etc. 15. Again, if a potency were an accident of the soul, then the soul would be in potency toward it, since a subject is in potency toward all its accidents. Therefore, the soul is either in potency toward such a potency on its own, and then, by the same token, we could have said this from the beginning, or it is in potency toward such a potency by means of another power, and thus we would have to go to infinity, which is unacceptable.74 16. Again, Aristotle describes the soul as that by which we live, sense and think; but the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective powers are those by which we live and sense and think; therefore etc. 17. Again, in De anima III Aristotle claims that appetite and avoidance are not distinct from each other, or from the sensitive soul. 18. Let us briefly say, therefore, that every soul is a power, since every active or passive principle of any motion or operation is an active or passive power, that is, an active power if it is an active principle of this operation and a passive power if it is a passive principle; but every soul is a principle (whether it is an active or passive principle) of its operation as everybody concedes; therefore etc. The major premise is clear by the definitions of active and passive powers in Metaphysics IX. For there an active power is defined as the principle of changing something else, and a passive power as the principle of 74 The

gist of this somewhat condensed argument seems to be that if the soul were distinct from its powers, then those would be its accidents, and the soul, as their subject, would have to be in potency to receive them. But the soul is either (1) receptive of its accidents on its own, without the mediation of any distinct power giving it the potency to be receptive of its activities, in which case it does not have to have distinct powers to exhibit its activities we observe, or (2) it can be receptive of its accidents only through the mediation of a distinct power; but then, this distinct power, being an accident, can be received by the soul only through the mediation of another distinct power, which in turn would demand another distinct power making the soul receptive of it, and so on to infinity, which is unacceptable. So, (1) remains as the only viable alternative, namely, that the soul is receptive of its accidents without the mediation of any distinct powers; therefore, the soul is not distinct from its own powers.

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enim est quod Deus est prima potentia activa, et materia prima potentia passiva, saltem in transmutationibus substantialibus. 19. Item omne agens vel activum est potentia activa, quia sibi convenit definitio potentiae activae. Sed omnis anima est agens vel activa quia, sicut Aristoteles declarat in secundo huius, omnis anima, saltem in corruptibilibus, est causa corporis non solum secundum formam et finem sed etiam secundum agens. 20. Manifestum est ergo quod in omni viventi corruptibili anima est potentia vegetativa quia est principium activum nutritionis; in omni animali anima est potentia sensitiva quia est principium sensationis aut activum aut passivum; et in omni homine anima est potentia intellectiva quia est principium intellectionis vel activum vel passivum vel utrumque. Et si non sit in uno supposito nisi unica anima, tunc in homine illa anima est potentia intellectiva, potentia sensitiva, et potentia vegetativa, potentia secundum locum motiva, et potentia appetitiva, secundum praedicta. Est enim principium activum et passivum nutritionis, intellectionis et sensationis. 21. Et tunc est dubitatio utrum sit bene dictum quod in homine sunt plures potentiae animae. 22. Et ego credo quod non, loquendo de potentiis principalibus secundum quod postea distinguemus de potentiis, et etiam loquendo de virtute sermonis; non enim oportet quod si aliquis sit pater multorum quod sit patres; et si est aliquid diversum a multis non propter hoc ipsum est multae diversitates. Sed secundum sensum improprium concedimus in homine esse multas potentias animae, ad istum sensum quod anima est potens exercere multas diversas operationes et, secundum rationes diversas et respectivas ad illas operationes, imponuntur sibi nomina diversa quae dicimus secundum rationem differre. Sic dicimus intellectum, sensitivum et vegetativum differre secundum ra-

72 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415b9. 68 materia ] prima add. VW || prima ] om. A 73 corruptibilibus ] corporalibus V 75 omni ] animato V 78 anima ] intellectiva add. A 80 utrumque ] utroque V || supposito ] subiecto A 88 etiam ] tunc AET 89 virtute ] proprietate VW 90–91 propter hoc ] oportet quod W 94 respectivas ] relativas A respecte(?) E || operationes ] rationes AE || operationes ] rationes AE 95 dicimus ] discimus A

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being changed by something else. This is the reason why God is the first active power and matter is the first passive power, at least as far as substantial changes are concerned. 19. Again, every agent or active thing is an active power, since the definition of active power applies to it. But every soul is an agent or is active, because, as Aristotle declares in De anima II, every soul, at least in corruptible things, is the cause of the body, not only as its form and end but also as an agent. 20. It is clear, therefore, that in every living, corruptible thing, the soul is the vegetative power, since it is the active principle of nutrition; in every animal, the soul is the sensitive power, because it is the active or passive principle of sensation; and in every human being the soul is the intellective power, because it is the principle of thinking (whether it is active or passive or both). And if in a single concrete object there is only a unique soul, then in a human being this soul is the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative power, and the locomotive and the appetitive power, in keeping with what was said above. For it is the active and passive principle of nutrition, thinking, and sensation. 21. The question then arises whether it is correct to say that in a human being there are several powers of the soul. 22. And I believe it is not, speaking about the principal powers, in accordance with a distinction among powers to be introduced shortly;75 and also in accordance with the proper sense of the phrase — for if someone is a father of several children, he does not have to be several fathers; and if something is diverse from several things, it does not, on that account, have to be several diversities; although in an improper sense we do grant that in a human being there are several powers of the soul, in the sense that the soul is capable of carrying out several diverse operations, and we impose on it different names, which we say differ with regard to the different concepts respective to

75 See

par. 24 below.

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tionem, quia haec nomina significant rem eamdem secundum diversas rationes. 23. Non obstantibus praedictis, quae vera sunt, ego pono aliam conclusionem, scilicet quod potentiae animae sunt distinctae ab anima et a se invicem, quia suppono ex definitionibus potentiarum activarum et passivarum quod omne activum est potentia activa et omne passivum est potentia passiva, et capiunt denominationes proprias ab operationibus, ita quod omne activum nutritionis est potentia nutritiva, et omne activum caliditatis est potentia calefactiva. Et ita si videre esset agere, omnis potentia activa visionis esset potentia visiva. 24. Modo ultra, licet anima sit principale activum nutritionis, tamen calor naturalis et plures dispositiones animae vel corporis coagunt ad nutritionem tamquam agentia instrumentalia quibus anima utitur ad agendum nutritionem, sicut faber igne et malleo. Et sic anima sensitiva ad sentiendum utitur specie sensibili et certis dispositionibus organi. Et ita de motiva secundum locum. Et intellectus etiam utitur specie intelligibili ad formandum intellectionem. Istae ergo dispositiones, quibus anima instrumentaliter utitur ad nutriendum, sunt potentiae nutritivae instrumentales et differunt ab anima nutritiva. Et sic dispositiones ad sentiendum sunt potentiae sensitivae instrumentales et differunt ab anima sensitiva. Et cum sint dispositiones aliae ad nutriendum aliae ad sentiendum — aliae etiam ad videndum et aliae ad audiendum — manifestum est quod, loquendo de potentiis instrumen-

97 nomina ] omnia E 98 rationes ] operationes E 106 activa ] om. V || visiva ] passiva V 108–109 coagunt ] quomodo agunt A 109 ad nutritionem ] om. V 115 instrumentales ] istius V 116 sentiendum ] aliae ad videndum et aliae ad audiendum add. A

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these different operations. Thus we say that the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative soul differ conceptually,76 because these names signify the same thing according to different concepts. 23. The last remarks, which are true, notwithstanding, I also put forward another conclusion, namely that 77 powers of the soul are distinct from the soul and from each other. I assume from the definitions of active and passive powers that everything that is active is an active power and everything that is passive is a passive power, and they receive their proper denominations from their activities, so that everything that is active with regard to nutrition is a nutritive power, and everything that is active with regard to heat is a heating power. And in the same way, if seeing were acting, then every active power with regard to seeing would be a power of sight. 24. Furthermore, although the soul is the principal agent of nutrition, nevertheless, natural heat and several dispositions of the soul or the body cooperate in nutrition as instrumental agents that the soul uses for effecting nutrition, as the blacksmith uses fire and a hammer. And it is also in this way that the sensitive soul uses sensible species and certain dispositions of the sense organ for sensing.78 The same goes for the locomotive power. Indeed, even the intellect uses intelligible species to formulate thoughts. Therefore, these dispositions, which the soul uses as instruments for nourishing, are instrumental nutritive powers, and they differ from the nutritive soul. And in the same way the dispositions for sensing are instrumental sensitive powers, and they differ from the sensitive soul. And since the dispositions for nourishing are other than the dispositions for sensing — indeed, 76 A

mere conceptual distinction is a distinction between two ways of conceiving of the same thing; to use Gottlob Frege’s classic example, the distinction between the Morning Star and the Evening Star is a mere conceptual distinction, because it is the same thing, the planet Venus, that is conceived in two different ways, in terms of two different concepts. By contrast, a real distinction is the distinction between two distinct objects, such as the distinction between Venus and Mars. 77 The equivalent of ’some’ is not in the Latin text. However, Buridan is going to draw a distinction between the soul’s principal and instrumental powers, and will hold that it is only the latter that are really distinct from the soul itself. 78 Sensible species are forms that carry information about the sensible qualities of sensible objects, whether in the medium or in the senses that are receptive of them, as the reflected light (lumen) of a colored object carries information about its color.

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talibus quae vocantur potentiae animae quia sunt instrumenta animae, illae differunt ab anima et ab invicem. 25. Et sic manifestum est quod ista conclusio et prima non repugnant, sunt enim subcontrariae et simul ambae verae. Sed prima conclusio intelligitur de potentiis animae principalibus, scilicet quae sunt principia principalia quibus exercentur operationes vitales; haec autem conclusio secunda intelligitur de potentiis instrumentalibus quibus anima utitur et indiget ad exercendum suas operationes. Totum ergo solvitur distinguendo inter potentiam principalem et instrumentalem sive dispositivam. 26. Et tunc respondendum est ad rationes. Ad primam et secundam, dico quod eadem anima habet bene diversa obiecta et diversos actus quos exercet per diversa organa, et imponuntur sibi diversa nomina correspondentia nominibus actuum. Et de hoc dicetur plus in alia quaestione. 27. Ad tertiam quando dicitur quod vegetativa vel tactiva est ubi non est visiva in homine vel in equo, ego concedo de potentiis instrumentalibus, sed non principalibus. Sed tu rationabiliter quaeris utrum anima in pede equi sit visiva. Et dico quod sic, loquendo de potentia principali et remota, quia secundum se innata est videre, et videret in pede si Deus et natura formarent sibi oculum in pede. Tamen ipsa non est in pede potentia propinqua ad videndum, quia per potentiam propinquam debemus intelligere vel dispositiones requisitas cum principali agente vel ipsammet principalem potentiam habentem suas dispositiones requisitas ad operandum; et cum est sine illis vocatur potentia remota. Nec est ista potentia frustra in pede, quia ibi exercet alias operationes. 28. Ad quartam conceditur quod cor et cerebrum habent potentias animae instrumentales multum diversas, et in equo etiam habent par-

134 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.6. 125 principalia ] principaliora AE 132 per ] et E 140 formarent ] ordinassent W

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there are others for seeing and others for hearing — then, speaking of the instrumental powers that are called powers of the soul because they are the instruments of the soul, it is obvious that these powers differ from the soul and from each other. 25. And thus it is clear that the first thesis and this one are not in conflict. For they are subcontraries and they are true together. But the first thesis is understood to concern the principal powers of the soul, namely the principal principles by which vital operations are carried out. The second thesis, however, is understood to concern the instrumental powers that the soul uses and needs for carrying out its operations. The whole question, therefore, is solved in terms of the distinction between principal and instrumental or dispositive powers. 26. Thus, we need to respond to the objections. To the first and second,79 I reply that the same soul has many diverse objects and diverse acts, which it carries out through diverse organs, and it is named by diverse names corresponding to the names of these acts. And this will be discussed in more detail in another question. 27. To the third,80 which says that the vegetative or the tactile power is somewhere where there is no power of sight in a human being or a horse, I concede this claim concerning the instrumental powers, but not concerning the principal ones. But you reasonably raise the question whether the soul in the foot of a horse has the power to see. And I say that it does, speaking of the principal and remote power, for in itself it is capable of sight, and it would see in the foot if God and nature were to form an eye for it in the foot. But it does not have, in the foot, the proximate power to see, since by a proximate power we are supposed to understand either the dispositions required together with the principal agent or the principal power itself having the dispositions it requires for its operation. And when it is without these dispositions, then it is called a remote power. And this power is not in vain in the foot, for there it carries out other operations. 28. To the fourth81 we concede that the heart and the brain have very different instrumental powers of the soul, and in a horse they even 79 See

par. 1 above. par. 4 above. 81 See par. 5 above. 80 See

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tes quantitativas animae diversas sed tamen similis naturae et similis speciei, quae sunt partes unius simplicis animae totalis. 29. Ad quintam dico quod intentio Aristotelis est distinguere inter nomina et rationes quibus eadem res nominatur in ordine ad diversas operationes. 30. Ad sextam certum est quod saepe iudicium sensus est erroneum, donec ratio correxerit, ut quia visui sol iudicatur esse bipedalis, et ratione scitur esse maior tota terra; sed non stat simul quod anima iudicet et assentiat utrumque. Et etiam sensus aliquando iudicat delectabile esse prosequendum quod ratio iudicat propter inhonestatem esse fugiendum; sed numquam homo simul iudicat et assentit quod sit prosequendum et fugiendum, quod tamen posset facere nisi esset eadem anima sensitiva et intellectiva. Sed non potest, quia non possunt simul esse in eodem iudicia contraria. Immo si iudicat secundum unam apparentiam, iudicium cadit secundum aliam. Dico ergo quod in multis iudicium secundum rationem et iudicium quod esset secundum sensum si non superveniret ratiocinatio sibi, rebellant, quia non possunt simul stare. Et ita etiam appetitus, sequens illud iudicium sensus, aliquando sic est fortis quod inclinat ad non ratiocinandum de contrario et ad non consentiendum ei cui ratio, si superveniret, dictaret esse consentiendum. Sed ista non arguunt quod sensus et intellectus sunt diversae res, sed potius sunt eadem res circa quam vel in qua possunt esse iudicia contraria et inclinationes successive, non tamen simul. Et de hoc debet videri septimo Ethicorum.

172 septimo Ethicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. VII.6 (ed. Parisiis 1513, ff. 97va –98va ). 150 quae ] quia VW || partes ] simplices add. AT || simplicis ] partes unius add. A || animae ] partis E 156 stat simul ] conveniens est A 163 secundum ] vel super add. A super V 164 iudicium quod esset ] om. A 165 sibi ] om. AE sic T || rebellant ] rebellans AEVW 166 illud ] idem E || iudicium ] cum add. A secundum add. E 170 in ] a A

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have different quantitative parts of the soul, but of a similar nature and similar species, which are the parts of one simple whole soul. 29. To the fifth82 I reply that Aristotle’s intention is to distinguish between the names and concepts which name the very same thing with regard to its diverse operations. 30. To the sixth,83 certainly, the judgment of the senses is often mistaken, until reason has corrected it, as when the sun is judged by vision to be two feet across, whereas by reason we know that it is bigger than the whole earth. But the soul cannot judge both and assent to both judgments at the same time. And also the senses sometimes judge something delightful should be pursued, which reason judges should be avoided, because of its shamefulness. But a human being never judges and assents to the judgment at the same time that it is both to be pursued and avoided, which, however, could happen, if the sensitive and intellective souls were not the same. But it cannot happen, because in the same subject there cannot be contrary judgments at the same time. Rather, when one judges in accordance with one appearance, then the judgment according to the other is dropped. I say, therefore, that in many cases, the judgment according to reason, and the judgment that would be made according to the senses if reason did not prevail, fight with one another, because they cannot stand together. And thus, even the appetite, following that judgment of the senses, is sometimes so strong that it inclines a person not to reason about the contrary, and not to consent to what reason would dictate one should consent to, if it could prevail. But these points do not establish that sense and intellect are distinct things; rather, they are the same thing, with regard to which or in which there can occur contrary judgments 82 See 83 See

par. 6 above. par. 7 above.

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31. Ad septimam dico quod in homine virtutes animae instrumentales bene sunt extensae et diversae, sed nulla virtus principalis animae in eo est extensa, scilicet nec virtus principalis sensitiva nec virtus principalis vegetativa. Dico etiam quod virtus principalis sensitiva et vegetativa ita est perpetua et separabilis a corpore sicut potentia intellectiva. Sed possibile est eam separatam intelligere, sed non est possibile eam separatam nutrire naturaliter vel sentire organice, propter defectum potentiarum instrumentalium. In aliis autem quam in hominibus, potentiae sensitivae et vegetativae sunt corruptibiles et inseparabiles. 32. Ad octavam similiter dicitur quod in homine quaedam sunt potentiae instrumentales cognoscitivae et quaedam non, et quaedam reservativae et quaedam non. Sed omnis potentia principalis animae in homine est cognoscitiva et visiva et auditiva et reservativa, sed non per quodlibet organorum suorum potest videre vel audire vel reservare. 33. Ad nonam dicitur quod similiter principalis potentia materiae, scilicet qua principaliter patitur, est ipsa materia. Sed bene sunt aliae dispositiones diversae ad recipiendum diversas formas. Et de argumentis Commentatoris videatur primo Physicorum. 34. Ad decimam dicitur quod potentia principalis non est media sed bene potentia instrumentalis. 35. Ad undecimam dicitur quod non res significatae sed termini significantes sunt denominantes, et in multis concretum praedicatur de suo abstracto, ut quod unitas est una, entitas est ens, deitas est Deus, privatio est privata, potentia est potens. Sed non in omnibus ita est,

191 primo Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.22 (ed. Streijger and Bakker, 223.13–224.4). 174 bene sunt extensae et ] extra invicem sunt bene AE 176 et ] virtus principalis add. A 179 naturaliter ] om. A 195 denominantes ] denominationes W

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and inclinations one after the other, but not at the same time. And this needs to be seen in Book VII of my Questions on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 31. To the seventh84 I reply that in a human being the instrumental powers of the soul are, indeed, extended and diverse, but no principal power of the soul in a human being is extended, namely, neither the principal sensitive power, nor the principal vegetative power. In addition, I say that the principal sensitive and vegetative powers are just as everlasting and separable from the body as is the intellective power. But it is possible for it to think when separated, although it is not possible for it to nourish itself naturally or to sense organically when separated, because of the lack of instrumental powers. In living things other than a human being, however, the sensitive and vegetative powers are corruptible, and inseparable. 32. To the eighth85 it is replied in a similar fashion that in a human being certain instrumental powers are cognitive and others are not, and some are preservative and others are not. But every principal power of the soul in a human being is cognitive, and is able to see, and hear, and preserve, although it is not through just any of its organs whatsoever that it can see, hear or preserve. 33. To the ninth86 it is replied that, in a similar manner, the principal potency of matter, namely, that whereby it is principally receptive, is matter itself. But there certainly are several diverse dispositions in it for receiving diverse forms. And concerning the arguments of the Commentator, consult Book I of my Questions on Aristotle’s Physics. 34. To the tenth87 we reply that a principal power is not a mean, but an instrumental power certainly is. 35. To the eleventh88 we reply that not the things signified, but the terms signifying them are denominative, and in many cases the concrete term is predicated of its abstract counterpart, as when we say that a unity is a thing that is one, or beingness is a being, or god-

84 See

par. par. 86 See par. 87 See par. 88 See par. 85 See

8 above. 9 above. 10 above. 11 above. 12 above.

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scilicet ubi abstractum supponit pro dispositione addita ei pro quo concretum supponit. 36. Ad ultimam dicitur quod Aristoteles in secundo Ethicorum intendebat de potentiis instrumentalibus quibus organa animae diversimode disponuntur sic quod anima, secundum huiusmodi dispositiones, est in diversis hominibus inclinata ad diversas operationes et passiones et ad diversos habitus.

201 organa ] om. E

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head is God, privation is a deprived thing, power is a powerful thing. But this is not so in every case, namely, when the abstract term refers to a disposition added to the thing to which its concrete counterpart refers.89 36. To the last objection90 we respond that Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics II meant to talk about the instrumental powers by which the organs of the soul are disposed in various ways, so that in different humans, the soul, on account of these various dispositions, is inclined toward different operations and passions, and toward different habits.

89

This is why it is not true that a whiteness is white, for the abstract term ‘whiteness’ refers to the color of white things (distinct from the white things themselves, according to Buridan), which are referred to by the concrete term ‘white’. 90 See par. 13 above.

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Utrum potentiae animae debeant distingui per actus aut obiecta.

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1. Et arguitur quod non per actus, quia potentiae sunt principia activa, scilicet principium activum vel passivum. Ideo sunt naturaliter priores actibus, et priora non habent distinctionem ex posterioribus. 2. Item diversarum potentiarum in genere contrariarum, scilicet activae et passivae, est idem actus, ut patet tertio Physicorum. 3. Item cum hominem generet homo et sol secundum Aristotelem, immo etiam et Deus, apparet quod potentiarum Dei, solis, et hominis, quae sunt valde diversae, est idem actus, scilicet generatio hominis. Et diversorum et plurium unam navem trahentium est idem actus, scilicet motus quo navis movetur. Ergo sic diversarum potentiarum est idem actus. 4. Item manifestum est quod eiusdem potentiae sunt valde diversi actus. Omnia entia alia a Deo quantumcumque diversa sunt actus et operationes Dei, qui est unus et simpliciter simplex. Et potentia rationalis est eadem contrariorum, ut habetur nono Metaphysicae. Et eadem etiam caliditas calefacit, rarefacit, et levifacit. Et potentia vegetativa, sensitiva, et intellectiva in homine sunt eaedem, licet actus sint valde diversi, scilicet intelligere, sentire, et nutrire. 5. Similiter arguitur quod non distinguuntur potentiae per obiecta, quia idem visus videt colores contrarios, immo colorem, magnitudi7 tertio Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. III.1 201a30. 17 nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.2 1046b16. 1 animae ] om. AE 5 posterioribus ] sicut nec unitatem nec entitatem add. TVW 6 in genere ] et A etiam E || contrariarum ] om. TVW 8 secundum Aristotelem ] ut patet secundo physicorum A om. T 14 eiusdem ] unius T 18 rarefacit ] albificat A || levifacit ] levificat AEVW vivifacit T

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 12

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Should the powers of the soul be distinguished by their acts or objects?

1. And it is argued that they should not be distinguished by their acts, because powers are principles (either active or passive) and so they are naturally prior to their acts, and things that are prior do not have their distinctness from things that are posterior. 2. Again, different powers that are contraries in their genus (namely, active and passive) have the same act, as is clear from Physics III. 3. Again, since according to Aristotle a human being is generated by a human being and by the Sun, indeed, also by God, it seems that the very different powers belonging to God, the Sun, and a human being have the same act, namely the generation of a human being. And a number of different people hauling the same ship have the same act, namely the movement of the ship. Therefore several powers have the same act. 4. Again, it is clear that the same power can have several, very different acts. All beings other than God — no matter how different — are different acts and operations belonging to God, who is one and absolutely simple. And the same rational power concerns contraries, as it is held in Metaphysics IX. And the same heat heats, rarifies, and makes things light. And the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective powers in a human being are the same, although their acts are very different, namely thinking, sensation, and nutrition. 5. Likewise, it is argued that powers are not distinguished by their objects, for the same sight sees contrary colors — indeed, color, size,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 12

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nem, et figuram; et idem intellectus intelligit omnia entia quantumcumque diversa; et idem etiam color videtur a visu hominis et a visu equi, immo etiam et intelligitur ab intellectu; et idem alimentum est obiectum potentiae nutritivae, augmentativae, et generativae. 6. Item aliquando obiectum non est potentia existente aut etiam operante, ut si modo nullae sunt rosae, tamen nihilominus possumus intelligere rosas. Quomodo ergo per huiusmodi obiecta quae non sunt, distinguerentur potentiae quae sunt? Et non bene apparet quod hoc sit possibile. 7. Oppositum dicitur communiter, et videtur esse de intentione Aristotelis in isto secundo et in secundo Ethicorum et in nono Metaphysicae. Nec tu potes alio modo scire quod in homine sunt potentiae sensitiva, intellectiva, et vegetativa diversae nisi quia apparent in nobis illi diversi actus qui sunt intelligere, sentire, et nutrire. 8. Si exponamus terminos, cito poterit videri veritas in hac quaestione. Potentia enim est quod potest esse, vel movere vel moveri, vel facere vel fieri, vel cognoscere vel cognosci, et sic de aliis praedicabilibus. Actus autem dicitur illud ad quod est potentia, scilicet illud quo illud quod potest esse est, et quo illud quod potest cognoscere vel cognosci, cognoscit vel cognoscitur, et sic de mutare et mutari, de agere et pati, et sic de aliis. Et ideo actus dicitur activi, passio passivi, motus mobilis et motivi, cognitio cognoscitivi et cognoscibilis.

33 in isto secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415a 20. || secundo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.5 1105b25. 33–34 nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTO TELES , Met. IX.7 1048b 36. 25 intellectu ] sive intuitur ab intuitu add. A 27 existente ] existentis T || aut etiam ] actu et W || aut ] at A actu V 28 operante ] operantis T 29 huiusmodi ] haec W || non ] om. V 30 quae ] non add. V 31 possibile ] probabile V 35 sensitiva . . . vegetativa ] nutritiva sensitiva et vegetativa diversae V diversae add. W || apparent ] essent T 39–40 sic . . . praedicabilibus ] om. AT 40 est ] fit E 42 mutare et mutari ] movere vel moveri T 43 actus ] actio TW

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and shape; and the same intellect thinks of all beings, no matter how different; and the same color is seen by the sight of a human being and the sight of a horse, and is also thought of by the intellect; and the same food is the object of the nutritive power, and the augmentative power, and the generative power. 6. Again, sometimes the object of an actually existing and even operating power does not exist, as when there are no roses, and yet we can nevertheless think of roses. How, then, would such objects that do not exist distinguish powers that do? And it is not clear that this is possible. 7. The opposite is commonly held and seems to be what Aristotle intended in this second book, and in Nicomachean Ethics II and in Metaphysics IX; in no other way would you be able to know that in a human being there are the sensitive, intellective, and vegetative powers, except on account of the obvious fact that we have these diverse acts, which are thinking, sensing, and nourishing. 8. If we explain the terms, the truth can quickly be seen in this question. A potency is something that can be, or can move or be moved, or can make or be made, or can cognize or be cognized, and so on for other predicables. An act, however, is that for which there is a potency , namely that by which what can be is, and that by which what can cognize or be cognized cognizes or is cognized, and the same goes for changing and being changed and acting and being affected, and so on for the rest. Thus, the act is said

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9. De obiectis autem dicendum est quod passivum vocamus obiectum activi et e converso, motivum mobilis et e converso, cognoscitivum cognoscibilis et e converso, et sic de aliis. 10. Deinde etiam est notandum quod quaestio potest esse vel de distinctione nominum significantium res per modum potentiarum et actuum, vel de distinctione rerum significatarum per ista nomina. 11. Et istis notatis ponuntur conclusiones. 12. Prima est quod quaecumque sunt ab invicem distincta, ista sunt se ipsis distincta essentialiter et intrinsece, quia posito per possibile vel impossibile quod omnia alia ab eis quae nunc sunt ab invicem distincta essent circumscripta et annihilata, ipsis tamen existentibus, adhuc ipsa essent ab invicem distincta; ergo se ipsis. Item omne ens est ens se ipso essentialiter et non alio sibi addito, et sic etiam se ipso est unum et idem sibi, prout debet videri quarto Metaphysicae; ita etiam omnia entia se ipsis sunt entia et multa ab invicem diversa prout hoc totum debet videri in quarto Metaphysicae. 13. Secunda conclusio est quod, hoc non obstante, multa sunt ab invicem distincta per aliqua alia sibi etiam extrinseca, quia per quod aliquid est, per illud ipsum est ens et unum et idem sibi. Sed effectus, quamvis se ipso essentialiter et intrinsece est, tamen cum hoc bene efficienter est per aliquod extrinsecum, licet etiam finaliter propter aliquod extrinsecum, ut quod omne ens est per ipsum Deum et propter

58 quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.2 1003b32; B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. IV.7 (ed. Parisiis 1588, ff. 17vb –18va ). 60 Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.2 1003b23; B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. IV.7–8 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 17vb –19rb ). 45 passivum ] passum V 46 motivum ] motuum T || et e converso ] om. T 54 eis ] puta omnia alia ab a et b add. TV puta ab a et a b add. W || nunc ] om. A non T 57 se ipso ] om. TV || essentialiter ] om. T || sibi ] modo T om. V 63 sibi ] om. V 65 efficienter ] efficiens(?) T || finaliter ] om. AE 66 ut quod ] licet AE || ens ] sit intrinsece propter se ipsum ut quia omne ens est propter se ipsum add. AE || est . . . Deum ] om. AE

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to belong to what is active and affection belongs to what is passive, and motion belongs to the mobile thing and the mover, and cognition belongs to the cognitive thing and the cognizable thing. 9. Concerning the objects, however, we should say that what is passive we call the object of what is active and conversely, the motive power the object of the mobile thing and conversely, the cognitive power the object of the cognizable thing and conversely, and so forth. 10. Next, we should also note that the question may concern either the distinction of names signifying things as acts and powers or the distinction of the things signified by these names. 11. Having noted these points, we put forward some conclusions. 12. The first is that things that are distinct from each other are distinct of themselves, essentially and intrinsically. For assuming, whether as possible or impossible, that all things other than these, which now are distinct from each other, were laid aside and annihilated, while these still existed, these would still be distinct from each other; therefore, they are distinct of themselves. Again, every being is a being of itself and essentially, not by something else added to it, and also of itself it is one and the same as itself, as one should see in Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV. Likewise, all beings are beings and several beings distinct from each other of themselves, and for all of this one should see in Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV. 13. The former conclusion notwithstanding, the second conclusion is that there are several things that are distinct from each other by other things, which are also extrinsic to them, because that by which something exists is that by which it is a being and one and the same as itself. But an effect, although of itself it exists essentially and intrinsically, nevertheless at the same time it certainly exists as an effect by some-

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Deum; ergo, etc. Et simili modo ea quae sunt se ipsis sunt intrinsece, tamen bene sunt efficienter et finaliter per alia et propter alia, per quae etiam efficienter et finaliter sunt multa et distincta. 14. Tertia conclusio est quod multae sunt potentiae quae non sunt distinctae per actus. Ut posito quod nunc intellectus Socratis et intellectus Platonis fuerint creati et nondum habeant aliquos actus, illi sunt distincti et non per actus suos, et omnes potentiae quae sunt principia activa aut passiva actuum suorum et etiam praevenientia istos actus; ideo nec esse nec distinctionem habent ab eis sed potius illi actus accipiunt esse et distinctionem ab illis potentiis. Et simili modo apparet quod multae sunt potentiae quae non sunt distinctae per obiecta sua, sicut intelligentiae, quae secundum Aristotelem sunt diversae potentiae motivae non sunt distinctae per corpora caelestia sed potius e converso, quoniam corpora caelestia non sunt causae earum sed e converso. 15. Quarta conclusio est quod ex diversitate actuum et obiectorum aliquarum potentiarum et habitudine istorum ad istas potentias, possumus bene arguere istas potentias esse ab invicem diversas. Nam si potentia A est et potentia B est et actus C proveniat a potentia A et non a potentia B, sequitur quod A et B sunt potentiae distinctae. Et ultra, si caeteris paribus actus C sit natus provenire ab A et nec ipse nec sibi similis in specie sit natus provenire a B, sequitur quod A et B sunt potentiae distinctae secundum rationem et speciem. Et simili modo de obiectis, si enim potentia A agit in C et non potentia B, sequitur istas esse distinctas. Et si caeteris paribus A agit in C et B non potest agere in C nec in aliud simile secundum speciem ipsi C, sequitur quod A et B distinguuntur secundum rationem et speciem; quaecumque enim

78 secundum Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433a 10. 68 per ] et T 71 posito ] supposito A 74 etiam praevenientia ] et praecedunt W 75 distinctionem ] definitionem T 76 ab illis potentiis ] per istas potentias TVW 79 motivae ] intellectivae A 82–83 et . . . potentiarum ] om. AE 87 nec ] alter add. W

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thing extrinsic to it; and as something existing for an end, it exists for the sake of something extrinsic to it, just as every being exists by God and for the sake of God; therefore etc. Likewise, those things that are exist of themselves intrinsically, nevertheless they certainly exist by other things as their effects, and for the sake of other things, which are their ends; they are also several and distinct through those other things, which are their efficient and final causes. 14. The third conclusion is that there are several powers that are not distinct by acts; for example, assuming that the intellect of Socrates and the intellect of Plato have just been created and have not yet had any acts, these intellects would be distinct, but not by their acts, just as are all powers that are the active or passive principles of their acts and also come before these acts. Therefore, these powers do not have their being and distinctness from these acts, but rather the acts receive their being and distinctness from these powers. And likewise it is also clear that there are several powers that are not distinct through their objects, as are the intelligences, which according to Aristotle are diverse motive powers that are not distinct through the celestial bodies they move, but rather the other way around, since the celestial bodies are not their causes, but rather the other way around. 15. The fourth conclusion is that from the diversity of the acts or objects of some powers, and from their relation to these powers, we may correctly argue that those powers are diverse from each other. For if power A exists and power B exists and act C proceeds from power A and not from power B, it follows that A and B are distinct powers. Furthermore, if, other things being equal, act C is apt to proceed from power A and neither it nor a specifically similar act is apt to proceed from power B, it follows that A and B are distinct in nature and species. And the same goes for objects: for if power A acts with regard to object C and power B does not, it follows that the powers are distinct. And if, other things being equal, A acts with regard to C and B cannot act with regard to C or with regard to something else

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potentiae sunt eiusdem speciei, istae sunt eiusdem rationis, et caeteris paribus possunt in consimiles effectus secundum speciem. 16. Quinta conclusio est quod non oportet omnes potentias proportionaliter esse distinctas distinctionibus suorum actuum vel obiectorum, et hoc probant bene quasi omnes rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis. 17. Sexta conclusio est quod nomina significantia res per modum potentiarum et actuum vel per modum potentiarum et obiectorum suorum oportet proportionaliter distingui. Hoc patet primo per inductionem, ut factivo correspondent factibile et factio, et activo correspondent agibile et actio, motivo mobile et motio, creativo creabile et creatio, visivo visibile et visio, et sic de aliis. Verum est tamen quod non oportet concludere si factivum est quod factibile est, si productivum est quod productibile est; sed bene oportet concludere si aliquid est factivum vel productivum quod etiam aliquid est factibile vel productibile. Haec enim nomina ampliant suppositionem ad possibilia.

100 nomina ] omnia T 103 factivo ] factioni primo V 104–105 creativo . . . creatio ] om. AE 104 creativo ] creator(?) T creationi V 106 factivum ] factum A || productivum ] (?) A producere(?) T adiactum V 107 productibile ] adiactibile V 108 factivum ] activum A 109 suppositionem ] factionem W

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specifically similar to C, it follows that A and B are distinct in nature and species, since any powers that belong to the same species have the same nature, and, other things being equal, they can act with regard to effects that are specifically similar. 16. The fifth conclusion is that it is not necessary for all powers to be distinct in keeping with the distinctions of their acts or objects, and this is correctly proved by nearly all the arguments given at the beginning of the question. 17. The sixth conclusion is that the names signifying things as powers and their acts or as powers and their objects have to be distinguished correspondingly. This is clear first by induction, since to something that can make there corresponds something that can be made, as well as the making, and to something that can act there corresponds something that can be acted on as well as the acting, and to something that can move there correspond something that can be moved and the moving, and to something that can create something that can be created and the creating, and to something that can see there corresponds something that can be seen and the seeing, and so on. Nevertheless, one need not conclude that if there exists something that can make, there exists something that can be made, and if there exists something that can produce, there exists something that can be produced. But one certainly has to conclude that if something is effective or productive, then something is effectible or producible. For these names ampliate supposition to possibilia.91 91 These

terms, involving in their meaning the modal notion of possibility, logically behave in the same way as that modality itself, which, on Buridan’s and many other medieval authors’ account, involves the ampliation of supposition, that is to say, extending the range of reference of the terms with which they are construed to merely possible entities. For example, if in Buridan’s classroom someone had uttered the sentence: ‘artificial diamonds are producible’, then he would have said something true, even if there were no artificial diamonds in existence at the time. For even at that time the subject of his sentence would have referred to something, namely, to those (at the time merely possible) artificial diamonds that came (or just could have come) into existence only after modern technology allowed their production (as well as to those that still can come into existence, now that the technology is in place) Therefore, even then, it would also have been true to say that if something is productive of artificial diamonds, then artificial diamonds are producible, even if there was nothing actually producing artificial diamonds at the time. Cf. Summulae de dialectica 4.6, 9.5 (tr. Klima, 298–302, 914–929); see also chapters 6–7 of Klima 2008.

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18. Iterum etiam verum est quod capiendo passivum proprie, prout recipit in se subiective vel est innatum recipere actionem agentis, non oportet in omni actione correspondere passivum vel passum, agenti vel activo, quia Deus potest aliquid creare sine subiecto praesupposito; immo ipse fecit et creavit primum subiectum. Sed loquendo de factionibus naturalibus necesse est omni activo correspondere passivum, omni motivo mobile, omni factivo factibile subiective, et sic de aliis. 19. Item ex modis significandi grammaticalibus oportet omni verbo activo correspondere verbum passivum, et praedicationem passivi, ut si aliquis creat, aliquid creatur, si aliquis recipit, aliquid recipitur, et sic de aliis. Et inde etiam provenit convenientia prius dicta inter nomina significantia per modum potentiarum et actuum. 20. Et secundum dicta in ultima conclusione et in notabilibus sequentibus, debet intelligi quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus et obiecta, id est proportionaliter eis quantum ad praedicata et rationes earum. 21. Sed aliquis quaereret quare magis solemus dicere quod potentiae animae distinguuntur per actus quam actus distinguuntur per potentias, cum proportionaliter distinguantur. Dico quod hoc est quia, licet potentiae activae et passivae praecedant bene actus suos, et eas bene videmus (licet nullos actus earum percipiamus), tamen non scimus quod istae sint potentiae activae vel passivae donec ex eis percipimus provenire suos actus. Non enim sciremus lumen solis esse calefactivum nisi perciperemus ab eo caliditatem provenire, iuxta illud tertio Ethicorum quod fortissimi non coronantur sed agonizantes,

135 tertio Ethicorum ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.9 1099a3. 110 proprie ] vel passivum add. TVW 111 subiective ] similem A 115 factionibus ] factoribus (?) E actionibus W || omni ] om. W 119 activo ] activi generis TVW || verbum ] om. AV || et praedicationem passivi ] om. T || praedicationem ] verbi add. AE || passivi ] praedicationi V 120 aliquis ] aliquid AE 121 provenit ] proportio sive add. E || convenientia ] convertentia AEV 122 et actuum ] om. TVW 125 id est ] et AW || eis ] om. E || quantum ] quam T || praedicata ] nomina add. VW || rationes ] et nomina add. T 128 animae ] om. TVW 131 nullos ] multos E

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18. Again, it is also true that, taking ‘passive’ in the proper sense — in the sense that something passive is what receives or is apt to receive in itself as subject the action of the agent — something passive or some recipient does not have to correspond to something active or to an agent in every action, for God can create something without a presupposed subject; indeed, he made and created the first subject. But speaking about natural agency, to every active thing there has to correspond as subject something passive, to every thing able to move something able to be moved, and to every thing able to make something able to be made, and so on for the rest. 19. Again, on the basis of grammatical modes of signifying, every active verb has to have a corresponding passive one, and the predication of a passive one, as when someone creates, then something is created, when someone receives, then something is received, and so on. This is also the origin of the above-mentioned agreement among names signifying as powers and acts.92 20. And in accordance with what has been said in the last conclusion and in the subsequent notable points, it should be understood that powers are distinguished by their acts and objects, that is, there is a mutual correspondence between them with regard to their predicates and their concepts.93 21. But one may ask why we usually say that the powers of the soul are distinguished by their acts rather than that their acts are distinguished by their powers, although they are distinguished correspondingly. I reply that this is so because, although the active and passive powers precede their acts and we certainly see them to be there (even if we do not perceive any of their acts), nevertheless, we do not know whether these are active or passive powers until we perceive their acts proceeding from them. For we would not know that the light of the Sun is capable of warming, unless we perceived warmth 92 See

par. 17 above.

93 Buridan’s point here simply is that the distinction of powers on the basis of the dis-

tinction of their acts and objects need not be construed as an ontological claim (after all, he just listed a number of counterexamples to that interpretation of the claim), but as a semantic claim about the correspondence between the names (and their concepts) whereby we name powers and the names (and their concepts) whereby we name the acts and objects of those powers.

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quia non nisi per actus provenientes scimus quae et quanta sit potentia. Sic enim intelligitur quod actus sunt notiores potentiis et priores secundum rationem, ut dicitur secundo huius et nono Metaphysicae, scilicet quod arguitive per distinctiones actuum concludimus distinctiones potentiarum, licet causaliter distinctiones actuum magis proveniant ex distinctione potentiarum. 22. Et apparet manifeste quod secundum praedicta omnes rationes quae fiebant procedunt viis suis.

138 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415a20 || nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.8 1049b4 Auc. Ar. 1.225 (ed Hamesse, 134): “Actus simpliciter praecedit potentiam, in uno autem individuo potentis praecedit actum”. 136 provenientes ] provenientis A 139 actuum ] potentiarum T mus ] per add. T 140 potentiarum ] aptus T

|| concludi-

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to proceed from it, in line with what is said in Nicomachean Ethics III that it is not the strongest who get the crown, but those who fight, for it is only through the acts proceeding from it that we know what and how great the power is. This is how we understand that acts are better known than their powers, and prior to them in their concept, as is stated in the second book of this work and in Metaphysics IX, namely that we conclude by argument that powers are distinct via the distinction of their acts, although in the causal order the distinctness of acts proceeds rather from the distinctness of powers. 22. Given what has been said, it is clear that all the opening arguments proceed in their own way.

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Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis animati.

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1. Arguitur primo quod non quia sequeretur quod pes equi esset animal et etiam pes hominis esset homo, quod est falsum, quia non posset dici rationabiliter quod animal esset pes equi nisi esset equus, nec pes hominis nisi esset homo, et absurdum esset dicere quod pes equi sit unus equus vel pes hominis unus homo. Consequentia patet ex hoc quia pedi equi conveniret definitio animalis, esset enim substantia animata sensibilis, et etiam sensitiva ex quo in isto esset tota anima sensitiva; et pedi hominis conveniret definitio hominis, scilicet substantia animata sensibilis rationalis mortalis, esset enim substantia rationalis ex quo in eo esset tota anima rationalis. 2. Item anima in equo est extensa extensione corporis; ideo aliam partem habet eius in alia parte corporis, et sic non est possibile quod sit tota in qualibet parte corporis. 3. Item sequitur quod aure equi abscisa et corrupta, esset corrupta tota anima ipsius equi; ideo residuum non maneret vivens, quod est falsum. Consequentia principalis patet quia si auris equi abscindetur et corrumpitur oportet corrumpi quidquid erat de forma substantiali in aure; cum formae materiales non transeant de subiecto in subiectum, ideo tota corrumpitur si tota erat in aure.

4 esset homo ] om. AT || falsum ] ut patet per experientiam add. W 10 sensitiva ] subiectiva AE || definitio ] descriptio VW 11 mortalis ] materialis A 13 corporis ] subiecti A 19 corrumpitur ] truncatur V || quidquid ] quid A © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 13

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Is the whole soul in every part of the animate body?

1. It is first argued that it is not, for then it would follow that the foot of a horse is an animal, and even that the foot of a human being is a human being, which is false, because one could not reasonably say that an animal is the foot of a horse, unless it were a horse, nor that it is the foot of a human being, unless it were a human being, and it would be absurd to say that the foot of a horse is one horse or the foot of a human being is one human being. The consequence is clear from the fact that the definition of animal would apply to the foot of a horse, for it would be a sensible animated substance, and also a sensitive one, because there would be in it a whole sensitive soul. Likewise, the definition of human being — namely animate, sensible, rational, mortal substance — would apply to the foot of a human being, for it would be a rational substance, since there would be in it a whole rational soul. 2. Again, in a horse the soul is extended with the extension of the horse’s body; therefore, one of the soul’s parts is in one part of its body and another in another part, and thus it is not possible that it be a whole in every part of the horse’s body. 3. Again, it follows that cutting off and destroying the ear of a horse would destroy the the horse’s whole soul; thus the rest of the horse would not remain alive, which is false. The main consequence is clear because, if the horse’s ear is cut off and destroyed, whatever there was of the substantial form in the ear must be destroyed, since material forms do not migrate from one subject into another; therefore, if the whole soul was in the ear, then the whole soul is destroyed.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 13

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4. Item si tota anima Socratis esset in manu et tota in pede, tunc sequitur quod idem simul movetur et quiescit, quod est impossibile quia ad quiescere sequitur non moveri. Quiescere enim definitur quod est aptum natum moveri et non movetur; impossibile est quod idem simul moveatur et non moveatur. Sed consequentia principalis patet quia possibile est quod simul pes moveatur et manus quiescat: et si pes movetur, illud movetur cum eo quod est secundum se totum in eo; et si etiam manus quiescit, illud quiescit quod secundum se totum est in eo. Ideo cum sit tota in pede ipsa movetur in pede et cum sit tota in manu ipsa quiescit in manu. 5. Eodem modo sequitur quod idem movetur simul contrariis motibus, scilicet sursum et deorsum, et secundum idem sui, quod videtur impossibile. Consequentia patet quia simul tu potes movere manum dextram sursum et manum sinistram deorsum et ad utriusque motum movetur quidquid est in ea. 6. In oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem qui facit istam quaestionem: si anima sit partibilis, utrum partes sint separabiles ab invicem ratione solum aut etiam et loco, scilicet quod una pars sit in capite et alia in corde, sicut quidam dixerunt. Et ipse respondet quod non sunt separabiles loco sed ratione solum, nisi quod sub dubio relinquit de parte intellectiva; ergo ipse intendit de aliis potentiis et animabus quod secundum se totas sint in qualibet parte corporis. 7. Item arguitur de anima intellectiva quia vel ipsa est tota in qualibet parte corporis, vel tota in una parte et nihil eius in alia, vel partim

37 Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.2 413b13. 40 quidam dixerunt ] E.g., AVICENNA, Lib. de an. V.7 (ed. Van Riet, 157.77–82): “Sed quia hae omnes coniunguntur cum homine, scimus in eo esse coniunctas animas a seipsis alias et diversarum essentiarum, quarum unaquaque differt ab alia, et ideo unaquaque habet locum proprium, quia rationalis habet cerebrum et irascibilis animalis habet cor et concupiscibilis habet epar.” Cf. A LBERTUS M AGNUS, Summa de creaturis II (ed. Venice 1498–99, ff. 134vb –141rb). || ipse ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.2 413b27. 31 manu ] pede V 38 partibilis ] partialis T || separabiles ] separatae VW 41 separabiles ] separatae VW

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4. Again, if the whole of Socrates’s soul were in his hand and the whole of his soul were in his foot as well, then it follows that the same item is in motion and at rest at the same time, which is impossible, because being at rest entails not being in motion. For being at rest is defined as being naturally suited to be in motion while not being in motion; it is impossible for the same item to be both in motion and not in motion at the same time. Now the main inference is clear, because it is possible for the foot to be in motion while at the same time the hand is at rest: if the foot is in motion, anything that is as a whole in the foot is in motion along with it; if the hand is at rest, anything that is as a whole in the hand is at rest. Thus, since the whole soul is in the foot it is in motion in the foot, and since the whole soul is in the hand it is at rest in the hand. 5. Likewise, it follows that the same item is in motion with contrary motions — such as upward and downward — at the same time and according to the same item belonging to it, which seems impossible. The consequence is clear, because at the same time you can move your right hand upward and your left hand downward, and whatever is in any of the hands is moved with its motion. 6. Aristotle argues for the opposite position when he raises the following question: If the soul is divisible into parts, are the parts separable from each other only conceptually or also spatially, namely in such a way that one part is in the head and another in the heart, as some people have said? He replies that they are not spatially separable but only conceptually separable, leaving open, however, the question about the intellective part. Therefore, he means that all the other powers and souls are in every part of the body as wholes. 7. We argue the same point in regard to the intellective soul: it is either (1) a whole in every part of the body; (2) a whole in one part,

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in una et partim in alia, vel ipsa in nulla parte est. Quartum membrum tenet Commentator, sed illud est contra fidem et contra philosophiam, sicut videbitur in tertio libro. Nec potest poni tertium membrum, quia supponimus eam indivisibilem et simplicem non habentem partes. Nec secundum membrum quia non possit rationabiliter assignari ista pars corporis in qua esset; et reverteretur quaestio utrum esset tota in qualibet parte istius partis, et esset eadem difficultas sicut prius; et cum hoc aliae partes essent sine anima, ut si esset tota in corde et non alibi, tunc caput, pedes, et manus essent sine anima, quod est absurdum. Igitur relinquitur primum membrum. 8. Item arguitur de anima equi, quia cum ista sit educta de potentia materiae, ipsa est continue coextensa materiae, et quaelibet pars eius est anima quia non potest poni quod sit alia forma. Ergo pars animae existens in pede est anima et est tota quia habet partes. Ergo in pede est tota anima, et pari ratione dicam de qualibet parte corporis equi. Ergo in qualibet parte corporis equi est tota anima. 9. Item vel tota anima est in qualibet parte vel aliquid eius in pede et aliquid in corde et sic de aliis partibus. Si dicatur primo modo, habeo intentum. Si dicatur secundo modo tunc abscisa aure equi aliquid erit destructum de corpore equi et etiam aliquid de anima, et sic illud quod remanebit nec erit idem secundum animam nec erit idem secundum corpus cum eo quod ante erat equus. Et sic non erit idem animal quod ante nec idem equus qui ante erat, et erit unus equus corruptus et alter de novo genitus; et sic multa sequuntur impossibilia.

47 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 401.424– 409.654). 48 tertio libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.5. 46 est ] nec aliquid ipsius add. AETV 47–48 philosophiam ] physicam A 54 manus ] pupilla T 65 destructum ] remotum TVW 67–68 animal quod ] anima quae V 68 nec . . . erat ] hom. V

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and none of it is in any other part; (3) partly in one part of the body and partly in another; or (4) in no part of the body. The Commentator holds (4), but (4) is contrary to faith and to philosophy, as we shall see in the next book. Nor can we accept (3), since we assume that the intellective soul is indivisible and simple, not having any parts. Nor (2), since (a) the part of the body in which the intellectual soul exists cannot reasonably be assigned; (b) the same question could be raised again whether the whole intellective soul would be a whole in every part of that part of the body, and there would be the same difficulty as before; and, on top of this, (c) the other parts of the body would be without a soul, so that if the whole intellective soul were in the heart and nowhere else, then the head, feet, and hands would be without a soul, which is absurd. Therefore, we are left with (1). 8. Again, it is argued concerning the soul of a horse that since the horse’s soul is drawn forth from the potency of matter, it is continuously extended along with matter; and every part of this soul is soul,94 since we cannot hold it to be a different form. Therefore, the part of the soul existing in the foot is soul, and is a whole, because it has parts. Therefore, in the foot, there is the whole soul, and by the same reasoning we say the same about every part of the body of a horse. Therefore, the whole soul is in every part of the body of a horse. 9. Again, either (a) the whole soul is in every part, or (b) part of the soul is in the foot, part of it is in the heart, and so on for the other parts. If we say (a), we have what we wanted to prove. If we say (b), then if a horse’s ear is cut off, part of the horse’s body will be destroyed and also part of its soul, and thus what remains will not be the same as what the horse was before, either with regard to its body or with regard to its soul. Therefore, there will neither be the same animal as before nor the same horse as there was before, but there 94 Alternatively, this phrase could be translated as “and every part of it is soul”,

and, given the lack of articles in Latin, correspondingly, we might replace the definite article in front of every occurrence of the term “soul” in this paragraph with an indefinite article (or no article), which might render the argument perhaps more palatable in English. However, since Buridan had earlier committed himself to the unicity of substantial forms, he is committed to the claim that every soul in the body of a horse is the single substantial form of that horse.

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10. Ista quaestio continet multas difficultates quas rationes tangunt quae ad utramque partem quaestionis adductae sunt. 11. Prima est cum anima plantae vel bruti sit extensa extensione corporis sive materiae et per consequens habet situaliter partem extra partem, quomodo intendit Aristoteles quod partes animae non differant ab invicem secundum locum vel subiectum sed solum ratione? 12. Secunda difficultas est, supposito quod anima intellectiva humana sit indivisibilis et non extensa, utrum ipsa informet totum corpus humanum et quamlibet eius partem. 13. Tertia dubitatio sequitur difficilis: utrum quaelibet pars quantitativa plantae sit una planta et quaelibet pars animalis unum animal et sic tandem utrum pes equi sit unus equus. 14. Quarta difficultas est consimiliter de homine: Utrum pes vel manus hominis sit homo. 15. Quinta dubitatio est utrum — si ab arbore resecetur ramus vel ab equo aut ab homine pes, vel consimiliter si in arbore pullulet ramus novus et in homine vel in equo generetur ex alimento aliqua portio carnis novae — utrum haec arbor quam nunc demonstro tamquam suppositum per se subsistens sit illud idem quod ante erat arbore demonstrata tamquam unum suppositum substantiale per se subsistens, et sic etiam de equo et de homine. 16. Ultima dubitatio est quomodo directe respondebitur ad quaestionem quae in principio proponebatur. 17. Et quaelibet istarum dubitationum posset esse una magna quaestio et difficilis. 18. Sed brevius transeundo dico ad primam quod sine dubio partes quantitativae animae equi sunt ab invicem distinctae et extra invicem secundum situm et subiectum, ita quod pars existens in pede est alia a parte existente in aure, et quod corrumperetur haec si ab-

74 intendit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.5 411b 20. 70–71 tangunt ] protendunt AE tanguntur V 71 adductae ] deductae VW 81 pes ] pars V 82 consimiliter ] simpliciter A scilicet T 82–83 vel manus hominis ] hominis vel pars hominis T 88 suppositum ] subiectum A 89 unum . . . subsistens ] pro uno supposito substantiali et subsistenti W || unum suppositum substantiale ] pro uno supposito substantiali et V || suppositum ] subiectum A

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will be a horse destroyed and another one generated anew — and thus many impossibilities follow. 10. This question contains many difficulties, which the arguments raised on both sides of the question have touched on. 11. The first is that since the soul of a plant or a brute animal is extended with the extension of its body or matter, and as a result it has one part spatially outside another, what does Aristotle mean by saying that the parts of the soul do not differ from one another in their location or subject but only conceptually? 12. The second difficulty: assuming that the intellective human soul is indivisible and is not extended, does it inform the whole human body and every part of it? 13. Then there is the third difficult problem: Is every quantitative part of a plant one plant? Is every part of an animal one animal? And so in the end, is the foot of a horse one horse? 14. The fourth difficulty is analogous with respect to human beings: Is the foot or hand of a human being a human being? 15. The fifth problem is: After cutting off a branch of a tree or the foot of a horse or human being, or likewise after a tree grows a new branch and a human being or horse generates a new portion of flesh from food, is this tree that I am now pointing at, as a concrete substantial object subsisting on its own, the same as the tree that was pointed at before, as a concrete object subsisting on its own? The same goes for the horse and the human being. 16. The last problem is how we shall directly answer the question raised at the beginning. 17. Any of these problems could be a big and difficult question. 18. However, considering them briefly in passing, I respond to the first95 that the quantitative parts of the soul of a horse are without a doubt mutually distinct and outside of each other in location and subject, such that the part existing in the foot differs from the part existing

95 See

par. 11 above.

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scinderetur auris alia manente. Nec de istis intendit Aristoteles quod solum differant ratione, sed Aristoteles intendit hic quod, terminum communem simpliciter acceptum, vocemus totum respectu sui ipsius accepti cum determinatione, sicut istum terminum animal vocamus totum universale ad istos terminos animal rationale et animal irrationale, et per consequens etiam ad istas species homo et brutum. Et sic etiam istum terminum homo vocamus totum in modo ad istos terminos homo albus, homo niger, homo grammaticus, etc. Et sic etiam iste terminus anima equi diceretur totum et isti termini dicerentur partes eius, scilicet anima vegetativa equi et anima sensitiva equi anima appetitiva equi et anima secundum locum motiva equi. Et erat tunc quaestio Aristotelis utrum istae partes, scilicet ista quattuor nomina, supponerent pro eisdem rebus vel non. Hoc est dictu, utrum anima sensitiva equi sit anima vegetativa equi vel non, et si non, tunc est dubitatio utrum una sit in una parte corporis et alia in alia vel quod sint simul utraeque extensae per totum corpus. Deinde iterum si ponatur quod sit eadem anima, ultra est quaestio utrum ista nomina anima sensitiva equi et vegetativa equi sint synonyma nomina vel differant ratione, scilicet ita quod secundum diversas rationes imposita sint ad significandum illam rem eamdem. 19. Et dicitur quod de istis quaestionibus Plato opinabatur quod istae essent diversae animae et in diversis organis seu partibus corporis situatae, scilicet quod sensitiva esset in cerebro, nutritiva in hepate,

119 Plato ] P LATO, Timaeus 69C–71A. 103–104 irrationale ] morale AE 108–109 anima . . . equi ] om. AE 110 Aristotelis ] difficilis AE || quattuor ] duo AE 111 eisdem rebus ] eadem re A 119 Plato opinabatur ] plures opinabantur T

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in the ear, and such that the latter would be destroyed if the ear were cut off while the former remains. Nor did Aristotle mean that these quantitative parts of the soul differ only conceptually. Rather, Aristotle here meant that we call a common term taken absolutely a whole with regard to itself taken with some determination, as when we call the term ‘animal’ a universal whole with regard to the terms ‘rational animal’ and ‘irrational animal’, and consequently also with regard to the species ‘man’ and ‘brute’. We likewise call the term ‘man’ a whole-in-mode with regard to the terms ‘white man’, ‘black man’, ‘literate man’, and so on.96 Likewise the term ‘the horse’s soul’ would be said to be a whole, and these terms would be its parts, namely ‘the horse’s vegetative soul’ and ‘the horse’s sensitive soul,’ ‘the horse’s appetitive soul’ and ‘the horse’s motive soul.’ Aristotle’s question then was whether these parts, i.e. these two names, supposit for97 the same things or not — that is to say, whether the horse’s sensitive soul is the horse’s vegetative soul or not; if not, then there is the problem whether one of them is in one part of the body and another in another, or whether they are extended together throughout the whole body. Then again, if we hold that it is the same soul, there is a further question whether the names ‘the horse’s sensitive soul’ and ‘the horse’s vegetative soul’ are synonymous or differ conceptually, namely, such that they are imposed to signify the same thing according to different concepts. 19. Plato is said to have held the opinion on these issues that they were different souls in different organs or parts of the body, namely the sensitive soul in the brain, the nutritive soul in the liver, the vital

96 A

whole-in-mode is a common term taken without any determination, as in “A man runs”, “A donkey walks”; a part-in-mode is the same common term taken with some determination, as in “white man”, “Socrates’s donkey”, “runs fast”, ”walks gracefully”.” Summulae de dialectica 6.4.6 (tr. Klima, 436). 97 The phrase ‘supposit for’ is the commonly used Anglicized version of the scholastic technical phrase ‘supponit pro’ as part of the medieval logical theories of supposition or reference. A term is said to supposit in a proposition for the thing or things which in that proposition it is taken to stand for. For instance, in the proposition ‘A man runs’ the term supposits for men, whereas in the proposition ‘A man is a noun’ it is taken to stand for itself and all other token-words of the same type. For a brief, easily accessible survey of this and other relevant theories, see Read 2015.

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et vitalis aut appetitiva in corde, et generativa in membris genitalibus. Aristoteles autem contra hoc ponit conclusiones quas etiam ponimus. 20. Prima est quod anima sensitiva et anima vegetativa in equo non sunt distinctae secundum diversas partes corporis, sed per totum corpus animalis extensa est anima vegetativa et sensitiva. Et hoc probat manifeste quantum ad potentias animae inventas in plantis. Est enim potentia in plantis sumendi alimentum quod sumitur per radices et est potentia generandi folia, flores, et fructus quod fit per ramos. Utraque tamen harum potentiarum est in radicibus et in ramis, quod apparet quia si truncetur arbor, adhuc manebit in utrisque partibus vita vegetativa et radices pullulabunt sibi novas stipites et ramos ferentes folia et fructus, quod non facerent nisi in eis esset ista potentia germinandi flores et fructus. Et similiter ex alia parte: si rami abscisi replantentur, resument sibi radices, quod non esset nisi in eis esset similis potentia sicut in radicibus, quantum est ex parte animae, licet sit dissimilis organizatio. 21. Deinde etiam Aristoteles declarat de animalibus quia multa sunt animalia quae, si dividantur, vivunt secundum utramque partem longo tempore et sentiunt et moventur. Hoc experimur faciliter in multis speciebus vermium, et secundum utramque partem etiam habent sensitivam quia apparent dolere si pungantur; ergo non solum in capite vel in parte quae est proportionalis capiti est potentia sensitiva, sed per totum corpus; et similiter appetitiva et secundum locum motiva. Et hoc etiam apparet magis de vegetativa quia animal secundum quamlibet sui partem nutritur et proportionaliter augetur. Et si haec sint concessa de illis animalibus imperfectis, ita debent haec concedi de perfectis, licet non possint vivere divisa quia eorum anima, propter eius maiorem perfectionem, requirit ad sui permanentiam nobiliorem et perfectiorem organizationem, propter quod ablato aliquo principa126 probat ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.4 409a 8. 138 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.4 409a 8 (Ar. lat. XII.2 53.1.16): “Plantae autem et animalium multa divisa vivunt et videntur eamdem habere animam specie.” 122 vitalis aut ] om. T 126 sensitiva ] et appetitativa add. VW 129 generandi ] germinandi V || fructus ] superfluitas A 132 ferentes ] frondes VW 133 germinandi ] generandi AW 138 animalibus ] animabus T 141 vermium ] viventium V 142 sensitivam ] appetitus A appetitum T aimam appetitativam W 148 perfectis ] perfectioribus W

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or appetitive soul in the heart, and the generative soul in the genitals. Against this view Aristotle puts forward theses we also endorse. 20. The first is that the horse’s sensitive soul and vegetative soul are not distinct according to different parts of the body, but rather the sensitive and vegetative soul is extended throughout the whole body of the animal. Aristotle proves this straightforwardly with regard to the powers found in plants. For plants have the power of drawing nutrition through their roots, and they have the power of generating leaves, flowers, and fruits, which happens in their branches. Yet both of these powers are in the roots and in the branches, which is clear because, if a tree is cut down, vegetative life remains in both of these parts, and the roots will grow new boughs and branches bearing leaves and fruits, which they would not do unless they had this power to sprout flowers and fruits. The same goes for the other part: if the severed branches were planted again, they will re-establish roots, which would not happen were there not in them, with respect to the soul, a power similar to the power in the roots, though they have a different structure. 21. Furthermore, Aristotle discusses the case of several animals which, if cut into two, continue living in both halves for a long time, and sense and move. We experience this readily in several species of worms, which have sensitive power in both halves, since they appear to feel pain when pricked; therefore, the sensitive power is not only in the head or the part corresponding to the head but throughout the whole body; and the same goes for the appetitive and locomotive powers. This is even more apparent with regard to the vegetative power, because the animal is nourished through any of its parts and grows accordingly. Well, if we grant these points as regards imperfect animals, we should likewise grant them as regards perfect animals, even though they cannot survive division. Their soul, on account of its greater perfection, requires for its permanence a more noble and per-

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lium organorum moritur cito per totum corpus; sicut etiam in animalibus heterogeniis quae sunt perfectiora plantis partes eorum divisae, citius moriuntur quam partes plantae. Nos enim videmus manifeste quod equus nutritur et sentit et dolet si pungatur secundum pedem et secundum aurem et sic de aliis partibus. Ergo concedenda est ista prima conclusio Aristotelis. Sed hoc iam concesso — scilicet, quod in equo non sit anima sensitiva separata secundum situm ab anima vegetativa — adhuc est dubitatio utrum una est anima sensitiva et alia vegetativa et e converso. Et dictum est quod non in quadam praecedenti quaestione. 22. Secunda conclusio Aristotelis est quod ista nomina sensitivum et vegetativum attributa equo non sunt synonyma sed differunt secundum rationem, quia alia est ratio secundum quam intelligimus animam esse principium sensationis secundum quam dicitur sensitiva, et alia est ratio secundum quam intelligimus animam esse principium nutritionis et secundum quam dicitur nutritiva, et sic de aliis. Et hoc sit dictum de prima dubitatione. 23. Secunda dubitatio et eius circumstantiae pertinent ad tertium librum, propter quod dimitto eam ad praesens. 24. Et quarta dubitatio, quia est de circumstantiis secundae, Aristoteles de ea reliquit sub dubio usque ad tertium librum. 25. Sed dubitatio tertia est bene difficilis, et ego dico primo quod non est bona definitio vel etiam descriptio animalis quod animal est substantia animata sensibilis quia manifeste convenit plantae. Planta enim est substantia animata quia est vivens et etiam ipsa est sensibilis quia potest sentiri et tangi et videri. Immo etiam lapis est sensibilis. 26. Sed tu forte diceres quod ponentes istam definitionem accipiunt sensibile loco sensitivi, et certum est quod ista definitio esset

159–160 in . . . quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4 par. 17. 168–169 ad tertium librum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3–5, III.17. 171 tertium librum ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4, 429a20; B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3–5, III.17. 151 per ] om. E 154 equus nutritur ] intensius V || nutritur ] om. AE 157 situm ] subiectum A 164 sensationis ] nutritionis A || sensitiva ] nutritiva A 164–166 et alia . . . nutritiva ] hom. A

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fect organization, and accordingly if one of the more important organs is destroyed the soul soon dies throughout the whole body. Likewise, in the case of heterogeneous animals, which are more perfect than plants, their severed parts die sooner than do the parts of plants. In fact, we see clearly that in its foot or its ear or any of its other parts a horse is nourished, and feels and suffers pain if pricked. Therefore, we should grant Aristotle’s first conclusion.98 But having allowed that in a horse the sensitive soul is not separate in location from the vegetative soul, there is still the problem whether the sensitive soul is one soul and the vegetative soul is another, and conversely. And we said in an earlier question that they are not . 22. Aristotle’s second conclusion is that the names ‘sensitive’ and ‘vegetative’ as applied to a horse are not synonymous, but differ in their concept, for there is one by which we understand the soul to be the principle of sensation and according to which it is called sensitive, and another concept by which we understand it to be the principle of nutrition and according to which it is called nutritive, and so on for the rest. Let this be the reply to the first problem. 23. The second problem99 and its implications pertain to the third book, so I put it aside for the time being. 24. The fourth problem,100 which is about the implications of the second, was left open by Aristotle until the third book. 25. But the third problem101 is certainly difficult. For my part, I say first that it is not a correct definition or even description102 of an animal that it is a sensible animated substance, because it clearly applies to a plant. For a plant is an animate substance because it is alive, and it is also sensible because it can be sensed, touched, and seen. Indeed, even a stone is sensible. 26. Now perhaps you would say that those proposing this definition use ‘sensible’ in place of ‘sensitive’. This definition of animal

98 See

par. 20 above. par. 12 above. 100 See par. 14 above. 101 See par. 13 above. 102 For the difference between definition and description, see Summulae de dialectica 8.2 (tr. Klima, 631–63). 99 See

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melior vel minus mala de animali, scilicet quod animal est substantia animata sensitiva. Sed tunc ego dicam quod si tu vis hanc definitionem accipere tamquam propriam huic termino animal, sive dicas eam esse quidditativam definitionem vel dicentem quid nominis vel descriptionem, necesse est concedere quod pes equi est animal et quod cauda equi vel auris est animal, et sic de aliis partibus quantitativis equi, quia cuilibet parti tali convenit ista definitio. Quaelibet enim istarum partium est substantia animata sensitiva, cum sit composita ex corpore et anima et non alia quam sensitiva. Et iam dictum est prius ab Aristotele et probatum quod in qualibet parte corporis animalis est anima sensitiva et anima vegetativa; ideo quaelibet pars quantitativa animalis est substantia animata sensitiva. 27. Item non ponimus quod anima sensitiva equi sit composita ex partibus, scilicet ex substantiis diversarum rationum, sed ex partibus eiusdem rationis, sicut esset forma aeris. Sed propter homogeneitatem in talibus homogeniis, partes recipiunt praedicationem totius quantum ad praedicata quidditativa. Sic enim quaelibet pars materiae est materia, quaelibet pars formae est forma, quaelibet pars quantitativa aeris est aer et aquae aqua, et sic de aliis. Sed ultra manifestum est, si animal solum componitur ex materia partium eiusdem rationis et anima etiam partium eiusdem rationis, quod est totum homogenium quantum ad partes eius quantitativas, sicut aer. Ergo si iste terminus animal est praedicatum quidditativum et substantiale de equo vel de homine demonstrato, sequitur quod quaelibet pars quantitativa animalis est animal, et ita etiam quaelibet pars quantitativa equi esset equus si hoc praedicatum equus esset praedicatum quidditativum et substantiale. 28. Si autem dicatur quod corpus animalis est organicum et heterogenium et dissimilium partium quantitativarum — hoc ego concedam, hoc est quantum ad dispositiones accidentales additas substantiae ani-

188 probatum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4 pars. 17–23. 182–183 definitionem . . . descriptionem ] descriptionem vel dicentem quid nominis AE 182 definitionem ] om. T || dicentem ] docentem T 183 concedere ] ponere V 194 praedicationem ] praedicationes V praedicationes ipsius W 198– 199 anima etiam ] forma T 203 quantitativa ] om. TV ipsius W 206 quantitativarum ] quidditativarum T

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would be better, or less bad, namely that an animal is a sensitive animated substance. But then I would say that if you want to accept this as the proper definition of the term ‘animal’ — whether you call it a quidditative or a nominal definition or a description — then it is necessary to grant that the horse’s foot is an animal, and that the horse’s tail or ear is an animal, and so on for the horse’s other quantitative parts, since this definition applies to every such part. For every part is a sensitive animated substance, since it is composed of a body and a soul, which is none other than the sensitive soul. Aristotle said before and showed that in every part of the body of an animal there is a sensitive soul and a vegetative soul; hence every quantitative part of an animal is a sensitive animated substance. 27. Again, we do not hold that the horse’s sensitive soul is composed of parts, namely substances of different natures, but instead that it is composed of parts with the same nature, as the form of air would be. However, because of the homogeneity in such homogeneous things, their parts take on the quidditative predicates of the whole. Thus, every part of matter is matter, every part of form is form, every quantitative part of air is air and every quantitative part of water is water, and so on for the rest. But it is clear, further, that if an animal is composed only of matter having parts of the same nature and a soul also having parts of the same nature, then it is a homogeneous whole as regards its quantitative parts, just as air is. Therefore, if the term ‘animal’ is a quidditative and substantial predicate of this horse or this human being pointed out, it follows that every quantitative part of an animal is an animal, and so also that any quantitative part of a horse would be a horse if ‘horse’ were a quidditative and substantial predicate. 28. Now suppose someone objects that animal bodies are organic, heterogeneous, and have dissimilar quantitative parts. I would grant the point as far as accidental dispositions added to the substance of

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malis, si dicamus quod animal sit praecise constitutum ex materia prima substantialiter et una forma substantiali quae non sit partium substantialiter dissimilium et diversarum rationum, et tunc iste terminus animal, si sit terminus vere substantialis, non significat nec connotat huiusmodi organizationes — ideo adhuc illae non obstant quin quaelibet pars animalis sit animal, cum omnes partes quantitativae animalis sunt ad invicem eiusdem rationis circumscripta diversitate accidentium substantiae additorum. 29. Et hoc iterum confirmatur quia si animal sit constitutum ex materia et una anima partium eiusdem rationis, tunc, posito casu possibili per potentiam divinam quod Deus conservaret istam constitutionem sub universali similitudine accidentium vel etiam sine accidentibus, adhuc illud compositum esset animal si animal sit vere nomen substantiale et non connotativum accidentium; et tunc nihil obstaret quin quaelibet pars eius esset animal, sicut quaelibet pars aeris est aer. 30. Et iterum inevitabiliter oportet concedere quod unum animal est duo vel tria animalia, si hoc nomen animal sit nomen substantiale, quia capio unum animal cuius utraque medietas vivere potest divisa ab alia, et sint istae medietates A et B et totale animal sit C; tunc patet quod C est A et B si totum est suae partes. Sed constat quod A est unum animal et B est unum aliud animal, ita quod A et B sunt duo animalia diversa ab invicem; ergo C quod est unum animal est plura animalia. Nunc igitur declaro assumptum, scilicet quod A est animal et B est animal, quia de omni ente verum est dicere quod quidquid

209–210 substantialiter dissimilium et ] divisibilium(?) T 229 diversa ] divisa add. AE 229–230 unum . . . animalia ] duo animalia est unum animal T

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the animal are concerned, were we to say that an animal is substantially constituted precisely out of prime matter and a single substantial form which does not have substantially dissimilar parts of different natures, and the term ‘animal’, provided it is genuinely a substantial term, neither signifies nor connotes such structures; then they still do not prevent every part of an animal from being animal,103 since all quantitative parts of an animal have the same nature with respect to one another, setting aside the diversity of accidents added to the substance. 29. This point is again confirmed, because if an animal is constituted out of matter and a single soul having parts of the same nature, then, assuming the situation possible by divine power that God preserves this constitution under a general similarity of accidents or even without accidents, the composite would still be animal, if the term ‘animal’ is genuinely a substantial name not connoting accidents; then nothing would prevent every part of it from being animal, just as every part of air is air. 30. Again, one must inevitably grant that a single animal is two or three animals, if the name ‘animal’ be a substantial name, for this reason: I take one animal of which either half can live divided from the other, and let these halves be called A and B, and the total animal C; then it is clear that C is A and B, if the whole is its parts. But it is obvious that A is a single animal and B is another single animal, so that A and B are two mutually diverse animals; therefore C, which is a single animal, is several animals. Now I prove what was assumed, namely that A is an animal and B is an animal. For it is true to say of

103

Clearly, the English text would read more smoothly if we had ‘an animal’, rather than just ‘animal’ here. However, omitting the indefinite article is one way of indicating Buridan’s point, namely that if we use the term as subordinated to a purely absolute, non-connotative concept, then it behaves pretty much like English mass terms denoting some homogeneous stuff (in this case, “animal-substance”), like the terms ‘water’ and ‘gold’, which in this role do not admit either an indefinite article or the plural number in English (we do not talk about ‘a gold’ or ‘golds’). One cannot consistently apply this syntactical trick throughout the translation, as will be clear in the next paragraph, but it is worth keeping in mind, and it will be applied when Buridan’s argument demands and the English context allows its application without too much strain.

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ipsum erit aliquando vel fuit ipsum est illud; et e converso quidquid ipsum est semper erit illud quamdiu erit, et fuit illud quamdiu fuit, licet bene erit tale vel tantum, quale vel quantum ipsum non est. Sed A erit animal et B erit aliud animal, scilicet quando erunt ab invicem divisa; tunc enim utrumque erit unum suppositum per se subsistens et vivens et sentiens; et omne tale est animal. Ergo utrumque est animal concesso quod hoc nomen animal sit pure nomen substantiale; sic enim non committitur in argumento fallacia mutando quid in quale vel in quantum aut in aliud praedicamentum. Si autem concessum est quod A et B sunt animalia et quod utrumque est animal hoc, ex eo concedi debet quod utrumque est compositum ex corpore et anima sensitiva quo concesso, sequitur similiter de qualibet parte quantitativa istius animalis aut etiam equi. 31. Ergo quantum ad istam dubitationem tertiam probata est prima conclusio quod quaelibet pars quantitativa animalis, scilicet composita ex corpore et anima vel parte animae, est animal, et quaelibet pars equi est equus, et ita pes equi est equus, si isti termini animal et equus sint vere termini substantiales non connotativi, et quod omnes partes animae equi sint ad invicem eiusdem speciei et eiusdem rationis substantialis. 32. Secundam conclusionem ego pono quod si haec nomina animal, equus, asinus, etc., non sint nomina vere substantialia sed connotativa, scilicet connotativa totalitatem, tunc non quaelibet pars quantitativa animalis vel equi est animal vel equus nec pes equi est equus. 33. Ista conclusio declaratur faciliter. Intelligo enim per ens totale quod est ens et non pars alterius entis, et per substantiam totalem quae est substantia et non est pars alterius substantiae. Si ergo iste terminus

232 aliquando ] om. T est add. V est W 236 suppositum ] subiectum A 238 pure ] proprie A om. T 241–242 ex . . . quod ] utrumque debet concedi quia T 242 corpore ] materia T 250–251 speciei . . . substantialis ] rationis et eiusdem speciem animalis VW 254 totalitatem ] totalitatis T 257 per ] om. AE

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any being that it is whatever it was or will be at some time; conversely, whatever it is it will always be as long as it will be and it was as long as it was, even if it will have qualititative or quantitative features it does not now have.104 But A will be an animal and B will be another animal when they are divided from each other, for at that time each will be a single concrete object that subsists and lives and senses on its own, and everything of the sort is an animal. Therefore, each is an animal, allowing that the name ‘animal’ is a purely substantial name; thus one does not commit the fallacy of changing substance into quality or quantity or another category in the course of the argument.105 But if we grant that A and B are animals and that each is this animal , one has to concede on this basis that each is composed of body and sensitive soul, and, granting this, the same result follows likewise for every quantitative part of this animal or even this horse. 31. As regards the third problem, then, we have proved as our first thesis that every quantitative part of an animal, namely a part composed of body and soul (or part of soul) is animal, and every part of a horse is horse, and so the foot of a horse is horse, if the terms ‘animal’ and ‘horse’ are genuinely non-connotative substantial terms; and we have proved that all parts of the horse’s soul are of the same type as regards one another and have the same substantial account. 32. I put forward my second conclusion: If ‘animal’, ‘horse’, ‘donkey’, and so on are not genuinely substantial names but rather connotative names, namely connotative of totality, then not every quantitative part of an animal or horse is animal or horse, nor is the foot of a horse horse. 33. This conclusion is easily established. I understand by ‘total being’ what is a being and not part of another being, and by ‘total substance’ what is a substance and is not part of another substance. If, 104 The

point here is the difference between the substantial, non-connotative, quidditative predicates, which belong to the same substance as long as it exists, and the accidental, connotative, quantitative or qualitative predicates, which may become true or false of the same substance with the accidental changes of the substance, while it persists through these changes. 105 For Buridan’s treatment of the fallacy of the figure of speech along these lines, see Summulae de dialectica 7.3.9–10 (tr. Klima, 534–548).

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animal significat substantiam animatam sensitivam et connotat quod ista sit totalis et non est pars alterius substantiae, tunc de exemplo prius posito — quod A et B sint partes animalis C — manifestum est quod A bene est animal quando divisum est ab ipso B sed non est animal quando est unitum ipsi, quia non est totalis substantia sed pars substantiae; deficiente enim connotatione, deficit praedicatio. 34. Et consimili modo tenendum est quod si isti termini aer et aqua connotarent totalitatem modo praedicto, nulla pars aeris vel aquae esset aer vel aqua. Et sic etiam manifestum est quod, si pes equi vocetur A et residuum B, quod B non est equus, sed resecato pede statim B est equus. Nec tamen est aliud quam ante erat, sed aliter se habet ad ipsum pedem. Esse enim totale vel partiale non solum significat esse aliquid sed etiam aliqualiter se habere vel non se habere ad aliud. Ideo iam esset fallacia figurae dictionis arguendo sic: quidquid B est nunc, ipsum ante erat istud; B nunc est animal; ergo ante erat animal. Mutatur enim quid in qualiter se habere ad aliud. 35. Et tunc in superiori dicta definitione animalis oportet dicere quod animal est substantia totalis animata sensitiva. Et videtur quod saepe Aristoteles usus est in suis verbis hac connotatione totalitatis. Ideo saepe dicit partes esse in potentia in toto actu aliquid totale sed potest esse, scilicet si fuerit divisa ab alia parte. Et sic etiam in secundo huius dicit in unaquaque planta esse actu animam unam et potentia plures, quia unica est anima totalis sed possunt per divisionem esse plures totales. Et iste usus etiam est communis inter vulgares: nam si quaereretur de numero lapidum in cumulo existentium, dicerentur esse decem et non plures, quia tantum sunt decem totales, licet infiniti sunt partiales. Et sic tu potes videre quomodo modica equivocatio indistincta decipit homines.

277 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.16 1040b10–16. huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.2, 413a25.

279–280 secundo

263 ipsi ] sibi VW b add. T 276 animata ] substantia add. A animatis T in toto ] ad totum et T 281 unica ] una T

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therefore, the term ‘animal’ signifies a sensitive animated substance and connotes that it is the total substance rather than part of another one, then, assuming the earlier example where A and B are parts of an animal C, it is clear that A is certainly an animal when it is divided from B but it is not an animal when it is united to it, since it is not the total substance but rather part of a substance; for when the connotation fails so does the predication. 34. We should hold in like manner that if the terms ‘air’ or ‘water’ connoted totality in the way described, then no part of air or water would be air or water. And so too it is clear that, if the horse’s foot is called A and the rest called B, then B is not a horse — but once its foot has been cut off, B is straightaway a horse. Yet it is not different from what it was before; rather, it is related to its foot differently. For being total or being partial signifies not only being something but also being somehow related (or not related) to something else. Hence it would then be the fallacy of figure of speech106 to argue as follows: ‘Whatever B is now it was the same thing before; B is now an animal; therefore, it was an animal before’. There is a shift from what a thing is to how it is related to something else. 35. Then, in the definition of ‘animal’ provided earlier,107 one has to say that animal is the total sensitive animated substance. Aristotle seems to have used this connotation of totality often in his writings. Thus, he frequently says that in the whole the parts are in potency and not in act, because neither part is actually something total, but it can be were it divided from the other part. He also says in Book II that in any plant there is a single soul in act but several in potency, because it has a unique total soul but there can be several total souls through division. This is the usual way of speaking in the vernacular; if a question is raised about the number of stones in a heap, we would say that there are ten and not more, because there are only ten total stones although there are infinitely many partial stones. Thus you can see how a slight and unnoticed equivocation fools people.

106 See 107 See

the reference in the previous note. par. 25 above.

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36. Et hoc sit dictum de tertia dubitatione, nisi quod adhuc addi potest rationabiliter causa quare magis consuevimus dicere quod quaelibet pars aeris est aer et quaelibet pars aquae est aqua quam quaelibet pars equi est equus et caprae capra. Videtur enim mihi quod causa in hoc est quia vulgus et multi philosophorum putant membra animalis esse substantialiter diversarum rationum non solum quantum ad accidentia; et quod hoc nomen animal sit appropriate impositum ad supponendum pro composito ex partibus sic dissimilium rationum, sicut esset de domo. Et si ita esset, non quaelibet pars animalis esset animal, sicut nec quaelibet pars domus est domus; sed si hoc non est ita, tunc debet dici sicut ante dictum est. 37. De quinta autem dubitatione tractavi satis in primo Physicorum, ubi dixi Socratem non esse totaliter eumdem nunc quod Socrates erat heri. Sed dixi eumdem secundum denominationem a parte valde principaliori, quoniam locutiones tales utuntur communiter. Propter usum communem concedimus simpliciter et absolute scilicet sine additione esse eumdem, licet iste non sit proprius usus secundum proprietatem sermonis, et licet huiusmodi identitas non sufficit ad medium syllogismi affirmativi. Licet enim omne simum sit nasus et secundum denominationem a parte concedimus hominem esse simum, nullus tamen concedit hominem esse nasum. Et si hodie amputarentur Socrati pedes, non valet talis syllogismus: Socrates heri erat pedes, manus, cor, et caput; et Socrates est idem hodie quod ipse heri erat secundum denominationem a parte principaliori; ergo Socrates est hodie pedes, manus, caput, etc. 38. Et adhuc ibidem dictum fuit quod utimur alio modo identitatis minus proprie qui attenditur ex sola continuatione succedendi diversas partes ad invicem, sicut diceremus Secannam esse eumdem fluvium in

298 Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.10 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 109.22– 110.8). 288 rationabiliter ] ratio naturaliter et A || causa ] rationaliter add. A 291 putant ] ponunt T 292 substantialiter ] om. T 294 composito ex ] om. A 301 tales ] omnes AET 312 identitatis ] identitate T 313 qui ] quia T

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36. Let this be the reply to the third problem, except that we can add the reason why we typically say that every part of air is air and every part of water is water, but not that every part of a horse is a horse and every part of a goat is a goat. It seems to me that the reason is that common people and many philosophers think that the parts of an animal have substantially different natures, not merely with regard to accidents, and that the name ‘animal’ is properly imposed to supposit for the composite of parts with natures that are dissimilar in this way, just as would be the case with a house. If this were so, not every part of an animal would be an animal, just as not every part of a house is a house. But if this is not so, then we should say in reply what we said earlier. 37. I discussed the fifth problem108 sufficiently in my questions on Physics I, where I said that Socrates is not totally the same now as Socrates was yesterday. But I called him the same by denomination from the much more principal part, since phrases of this sort are in common use. Because of common usage, we accept absolutely and without adding any qualification that Socrates is the same, although this is not proper usage strictly speaking, and although identity of this sort is not enough for the middle term of an affirmative syllogism. For although everything that is blond is hair, and by denomination from the part we say that a man is blond, nevertheless, nobody would say that a man is hair.109 And if today Socrates’s feet were amputated, the following would not be a valid syllogism: “Yesterday Socrates was his hands, feet, heart, and head; Socrates is the same today as he was yesterday by denomination from the more principal part; therefore, today Socrates is his hands, feet, heart, and head.” 38. Furthermore, in the same discussion I said that we use another sense of identity less properly, where we attend to only the continuation of successive parts different from one another, as when we say

108 See

par. 15 above. we have changed the example, for in idiomatic English we could not denominate the snub-nosed Socrates from his nose by saying ‘Socrates is something snub’ or ‘Socrates is snub’; we could only say ‘Socrates is snub-nosed’. However, the pattern of argument that Buridan is talking about here works with ‘blond’, because we can call a blond-haired person blond without further ado. 109 Here

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numero a mille annis citra, et sic magis possemus Brunellum dicere eumdem equum in numero a principio suae nativitatis usque ad mortem, et ad praesens non dico plus de istis; recurrat qui voluerit ad istum locum. 39. Nunc ultimo videndum est quomodo directe respondebitur ad quaestionem quae formabatur a principio et quantum ad hoc oportet distinguere de toto. Hoc nomen totum aliquando capitur categorematice, aliquando syncategorematice. 40. Syncategorematice debet exponi tota anima, id est animae quaelibet pars vel tota anima, id est quaelibet pars animae. 41. Et si exponatur secundo modo, tunc est manifeste negandum quod in aliquo animali sit tota anima vel in aliqua domo totus homo, vel quod etiam tu ambulabis per totam unam horam, et tamen conceditur quod tota anima equi esset in toto corpore equi, quia isti termini corpore et equi confunduntur. 42. Sed si exponatur primo modo, tunc in corpore equi est tota anima equi, quia in corpore equi est animae equi quaelibet pars; non

315 sic ] vel add. E nihil add. T 325 manifeste negandum ] manifestum TW 326 quod ] non add. W 327 tamen ] etiam non AE 328 toto ] om. TW

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that the Seine is the same river in number as it was a thousand years ago, and so all the more could we say that Browny is the same horse in number from the beginning of his birth up to his death, and at present I say no more about these issues; let he who so wishes consult that discussion. 39. Now we should finally see how to answer directly the question raised at the beginning, and to this end we need to introduce a distinction regarding wholes. The name ‘whole’ is sometimes taken categorematically and sometimes syncategorematically. 40. Syncategorematically, the phrase ‘whole soul’ should be analyzed as either ‘a soul’s every part’ or ‘every part of a soul.’ 41. Analyzed as ‘every part of a soul,’ then one should clearly deny that in an animal there is a whole soul, or in a house there is a whole human being, or even that you will be walking for a whole hour, although we grant that the horse’s whole soul would be in the horse’s whole body because the terms ‘body’ and ‘horse’s’ are confused.110 42. Analyzed as ‘a soul’s every part,’ however, in a horse’s body there is a whole horse’s soul, because in the horse’s body there is the 110 The

reason is what in modern logic we would describe as a difference in the relative scopes of the quantifiers involved in these phrases. For expounding ‘in an animal there is a whole soul’ in the second syncategorematic sense of ‘a whole soul’, we get ‘in an animal there is every part of a soul’, meaning ‘in an animal there is every part of a soul or another’. That is to say, to make this sentence true, we should be able to find an animal such that it would have in it every part of a soul or another, that is, it would have a part of this soul, and a part of that soul, and part of that soul, and so on, for each and every soul-part of any soul whatsoever, which is clearly absurd. On the other hand, changing the word order changes the relative scopes of the quantifiers, or in the framework of medieval supposition theory, the confusion and distribution of terms. (For a detailed discussion of the relations between quantifierscopes in modern logic and the distribution of terms in medieval logic, see Klima 2008, 180–186.) For then ‘a whole soul of a horse is in a whole body of a horse’ is expounded as ‘every part of a soul of a horse is in a whole body of a horse’, which means that every horse-soul-part is in some whole horse-body or other, which is true. So, while the first word order would demand that all horse-soul-parts should be in one and the same horse-body, which is absurd, the second merely requires that every horse-soul-part is in some horse-body or other, which is precisely how things actually are (there are no disembodied horse-soul-parts floating around in the universe, as far as we can tell).

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tamen quaelibet pars animae equi, nisi in isto equo esset omnis anima equi. Concederetur etiam quod in omni equo esset tota anima equi. Immo etiam quod in qualibet parte quantitativa corporis equi esset tota anima, quia, quamcumque partem corporis volueris signare — sit ista A — in ea est aliqua pars animae totalis equi, quae est anima, licet non totalis sed partialis, et ista vocetur B. Tunc in A est anima B et quaelibet pars eius. Ergo in A est animae quaelibet pars, sed non animae totalis quaelibet pars. Ergo in A est tota anima, licet non tota anima totalis. 43. Et aliquis quaereret quomodo de proprietate sermonis haec locutio tota anima debet exponi. Et videtur mihi quod differat dicere tota anima et anima tota. Dicatur ergo tota anima, id est quaelibet pars animae, et anima tota, id est animae quaelibet pars. 44. Sed secundum neutram expositionem est verum quod in homine sit tota anima, propter hoc quod animae humanae nulla est pars cum sit indivisibilis. 45. Hoc autem nomen totum categorematice sumptum significat idem quod habens partes, et sic in homine adhuc non est tota anima, sed in equo est tota anima. Immo etiam in qualibet parte quantitativa corporis equi est tota anima, ut apparuit. 46. Alio modo utimur hoc nomine totum partim categorematice et partim syncategorematice, ut quod exponamus totum A est B quia A est B et nihil est ipsius A quod non est B. Unde sic bene dicitur totum de indivisibilibus, ut tota essentia divina est Deus et tota anima intellectiva informat corpus humanum, immo et totum corpus humanum. Sed sic non est tota anima equi in qualibet parte corporis equi, sed in qualibet parte corporis equi est tota anima equi, sicut prius diceba-

335 quamcumque ] quantamcumque E 341–342 locutio ] aut proportio add. A 349 idem quod ] quoddam AE 353 quia ] id est A 355 anima ] forma A 356 informat ] totum add. T

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horse’s soul’s every part — though not every part of any horse’s soul (unless all horses’ souls were in this horse). It would even be granted that in all horses there would be a whole horse’s soul, and furthermore that in every quantitative part of the horse’s body there would be a whole soul, since whatever part of the body you care to pick (let it be A) there is in A some part of the horse’s total soul, which is soul, though partial rather than total (let this part be called B). Then in A there is the soul B and every part of it. Therefore, in A there is the soul’s every part, although not a total soul’s every part. Therefore, in A there is the whole soul, though not a whole total soul. 43. Someone might ask how this locution ‘whole soul’ should be analyzed in line with its proper meaning. Well, it seems to me that there is a difference in saying ‘whole soul’ and ‘soul as a whole’, so let ‘whole soul’ be ‘every part of a soul’ and ‘soul as a whole’ be ‘a soul’s every part.’ 44. Now on neither analysis is it true that in a human being there is a whole soul, for the reason that there are no parts belonging to a given human soul, since it is indivisible.111 45. The name ‘whole’ taken categorematically signifies the same thing as ‘something having parts’. Thus in a human being there is still not a whole soul, but in a horse there is. Indeed, in every quantitative part of the horse’s body there is a whole soul, as we made clear.112 46. In another way we use the name ‘whole’ partly categorematically and partly syncategorematically, so that we analyze ‘the whole A is B’ as ‘A is B and nothing belonging to A is not B’. Accordingly, ‘whole’ is correctly said of indivisibles in this way, for instance “The whole divine essence is God” or “The whole intellective soul informs the human body” (or rather “The whole intellective soul informs the whole human body”). But a horse’s whole soul is not in every part of 111 Since

it is not extended, a human soul has no quantitative parts; therefore, the human soul is not a (quantitative) whole, according to Buridan. 112 See par. 41 above.

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tur. Et isto modo capit Aristoteles totum in sexto Physicorum ubi dicit quod si essent puncta indivisibilia in linea et tangerent se, necesse est totum tangere totum. 47. Et adhuc totum aliter sumitur pro totali et distinguitur contra partiale, ut iam dictum est prius de hac significatione. 48. Ex hiis dictis apparet quod omnes rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis procedunt viis suis, exceptis istis quae arguebant de intellectu; sed istae reservantur ad tertium librum.

359 Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VI.1, 231a29. 366 reservantur ad tertium librum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3, III.4.

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the horse’s body in this way; instead, in every part of the horse’s body there is a whole soul of the horse, as described earlier.113 This is how Aristotle takes ‘whole’ in Physics VI, where he says that if there were indivisible points in a line touching each other, then a whole would have to touch a whole. 47. ‘Whole’ is taken in yet another way for ‘total’, and is opposed to ‘partial’, as we stated already regarding this signification earlier.114 48. From these remarks it is clear that all the arguments presented at the beginning go through in their own ways, except those that argued about the intellect; but that issue is reserved for Book III.

113

Namely, in every part of the body of the horse there is a whole horse-soul, i.e., a horse-soul’s every part, although, a whole horse-soul in a part of the horse’s body would be a partial horse-soul and not a total horse-soul. See pars. 34, 35 and 42. 114 See par. 33 above.

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Utrum naturalissimum operum in viventibus sit generare sibi simile.

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1. Et arguitur quod non quia operationes magis propriae viventibus sunt eis magis naturales quam aliae. Sed nutritio est viventi magis propria, quia convenit omni viventi et etiam semper per totam vitam et nulli alteri quam viventi convenit. Hoc est proprie proprium, quia convenit “omni et soli et semper”. Sed nec omni viventi convenit generare sibi simile, ut mulae; nec semper quia non in pueritia nec in senio; nec etiam convenit solis viventibus quia ignis generat ignem; ergo etc. 2. Item illud est naturalius per quod conservatur natura et prolongatur quam per quod breviatur. Sed per nutritionem salvatur et prolongatur, et per similis generationem breviatur. Unde dicitur in libro De longitudine et brevitate vitae quod animalia multi coitus sunt brevioris vitae. Et hoc est quia frequens coitus desiccat et propter spermum emissionem infrigidat. Et haec sunt causae senectutis et mortis. Et huius signum est quod multae plantae desiccantur cum perveniunt ad fructus maturationem et apparet de nutrientibus maioranas qui auferunt semina pullulativa ne desiccentur. 3. Item naturalius est quod naturaliter appetibilius et etiam secundum rectam rationem quia ista non est contra naturam; sed sic est appetibilior nutritio quam sibi similis generatio quia et recta ratio dictat et natura etiam inclinat ad magis diligere se quam alium; ideo

7 convenit . . . semper ] P ORPHYRY, Isag. 4 (Ar. lat. 4 (de proprio) 19.18 Busse: p. 12). 13 dicitur ] A RISTOTELES, De long. et brev. vitae V 466b 8. 14–15 brevioris ] brevis E 15 spermum ] spirituum W randis E 22 quia ] om. AE 23 natura ] naturaliter T

18 maioranas ] maio-

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 14

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Is it the most natural operation of living things to generate their like?

1. It is argued that it is not, because those operations are more natural to living things that are more proper to them than others. But nutrition is more proper to a living thing [than other operations], because it pertains to each living thing, and always, throughout their entire lives, and it pertains to no other thing, but to living things. Therefore, it is properly proper, because it pertains “to all, and only, and always”. 115 But it does not pertain to every living thing to generate its like, as in the case of a mule; nor does it pertain always, because it is not present in children or the elderly; nor, even, does it pertain only to living things, because fire generates fire; therefore, etc. 2. Again, that whereby nature is conserved and prolonged is more natural than that whereby it is shortened. But by nutrition nature is preserved and prolonged, whereas by the generation of the living things like it is shortened. Accordingly, On the Length and Shortness of Life says that those animals that copulate often have shorter lives. The reason for this is that frequent copulation dries them out and the emission of sperm cools them down, which are causes of old age and death; a sign of this is that many plants dry out when they bear fruit, which is clear in the case of those who tend to marjoram, for they remove the sprouting seeds, so that the plants do not dry out. 3. Again, that is more natural which is naturally more desireable and also is according to right reason, for it is not against nature. But in this way nutrition is more desirable than generating one’s like, because right reason dictates and nature also inclines one to care more

115 This

is the formulaic definition of property (proprium) in the strict sense, deriving from Porphyry’s Isagoge (his Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, chapter 4). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 14

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appetibilius est conservare se, quod fit per nutritionem, quam aliud procreare, quod fit per similis generationem. 4. Item naturalius est de quo natura est magis sollicita. Sed hoc est magis de nutritione quam de similis generatione, quod apparet primo quia ipsa magis continuat nutritionem, secundo quia, sicut dicunt medici, natura primo capit de alimento quod sibi est necessarium ad nutritionem, et quod ultra est superfluum — non in quali sed in quanto — mittit ad generationem. Unde manifestum est quod propter hoc pueri non generant, nec senes. Pueri quia non est superfluum alimenti in quanto, bene enim indigent toto ad nutritionem et augmentationem. Senes etiam propter defectum caloris naturalis parum possunt digerere de alimento; ideo etiam non est eis superfluum in quanto. 5. Item operationes nobiliores naturae sunt magis naturales; operatio autem nobilissima viventis non est generare sibi similem sed intelligere et sapere, in quo consistit humana felicitas; ergo etc. Et maior ex hoc patet quia magis intentum a natura est magis naturale; nobilior autem operatio est magis intenta a natura. Probatio quia est finis aliarum operationum. Nam sicut dicitur septimo Politicae, semper “deterius est gratia melioris,” sed constat quod propter finem alia intenduntur. Et sicut dicitur primo Posteriorum, “propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis”; igitur nobilior operatio, cum sit finis, magis intenditur a natura; ergo est naturalius. 6. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles et arguit specialiter quod similis generatio sit opus naturalius quam nutritio quia inter opera naturae

41 septimo Politicae ] A RISTOTELES, Pol. VII.14 1333a21–22 (Ar. lat. XXIX.2 306.1): “Semper enim quod deterius melioris gratia est.” 43 primo Posteriorum ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 72a 29–30 (Ar. lat. IV.4 287.22): “semper enim propter quod est unumquodque, illud magis est, ut propter quod amamus, illud magis amicum.” 46 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415a 26–29. 24 aliud ] ad TV 28 continuat nutritionem ] considerat de nutritione T 34 possunt ] totum add. V 38 intelligere ] sibi nutrire T 44 nobilior operatio ] nobilius TV 45 naturalius ] nobilior E

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for oneself than for another. Therefore, it is more desirable to conserve oneself, which is carried out by nutrition, than to procreate, which happens through the generation of one’s like. 4. Again, that is more natural which nature is more concerned about. But nature is more concerned about nutrition than about the generation of one’s like. This is clear in the first place because nature engages more in nutrition without a pause; in the second place because, as physicians say, nature first takes from nourishment whatever is needed to nourish itself, and it puts what is in excess beyond that need (not in quality but in quantity) toward procreation. It is clear along these lines why neither children nor the elderly procreate: children do not, because they do not have any superfluous amount of nourishment, for they surely need the whole for nutrition and growth; the elderly, because of the lack of natural heat, can barely digest their nourishment, and so they do not have any superfluous amount. 5. Again, the nobler operations of nature are the more natural; but the noblest activity of a living thing is not generating its like, but thinking and being wise, in which human happiness consists; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear because what is more intended by nature is more natural, and a nobler operation is more intended by nature. Proof: it is the end of other operations. For Politics VII declares that “the worse is always for the sake of the better,” but we agree that other things are intended for the sake of the end, and, as Posterior Analytics I says, “that for the sake of which something is such and such is itself more such and such”;116 hence the more noble operation, since it is the end, is more intended by nature; therefore, it is more natural. 6. Aristotle claims the opposite, and he argues in particular that the generation of one’s like is a more natural task than nutrition, for 116

Barnes renders this passage from the Posterior Analytics as: “For a thing always belongs better to that thing because of which it belongs — e. g. that because of which we love is better loved.” (Aristotle 1984, 116) However, Buridan’s point here is that if a natural activity is the intended end of another natural activity, or in other words it is that for the sake of which the other natural activity is performed, then the former is even more natural than the latter. Thus, the universal claim backing this point is that if x is F for the sake of y, then y is even more F, which is what is provided in the translation without the schematic letters.

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illud debet dici naturalius quod est perfectius; sed generare sibi simile est perfectius quam nutrire, quod apparet quia nutrire est prius via generationis, et tale est posterius via perfectionis, prout saepe ponit Aristoteles. 7. Secundo arguitur quia perfectius est opus quod a perfecta natura procedit et nonnisi a perfecta natura quam quod procedit ab imperfecta; sed sibi similis generatio in viventibus non procedit nisi a perfecto in quantitate et qualitate; nutrire autem non solum perfectis sed etiam imperfectis convenit, ut infantibus, pueris, et senibus; ergo etc. 8. Tertio quia tanto generatio est perfectior nutritione quanto animatum totale per se subsistens est perfectius minutis ipsius partibus corporis animati. Nam per generationem efficitur totale vivens per se subsistens, et per nutritionem generantur solum quaedem minutae partes quae corpori viventi praeexistenti apponuntur. 9. Quarto sicut habetur ex quarto Ethicorum dare est nobilior actus liberalitatis quam recipere, ex eo quod dare est ex perfectione et complemento, recipere autem est ex defectu et indigentia. Generare autem est dare et est ex perfectione, nutrire autem est recipere vel propter recipere ex indigentia, scilicet ad restaurationem de perditi. 10. Quinto etiam arguitur quia ex generatione magis assimilamur ipsi Deo. Generare enim nihil connotat diminutionis, propter quod Deo attribuitur, qui largiendo aliis suam bonitatem omnia generat vel facit vel creat. Nutrire autem connotat diminutionem, propter quod non attribuitur Deo. Nobilius autem est per quod magis assimilamur ipsi Deo nobilissimo. 11. Ipsa quaestio apparet mihi valde difficilis undique. Primo quia non potest bene sciri an generare sit perfectius vel convenien-

50–51 saepe ponit Aristoteles ] Phys. VIII.7 261a5; Met. I.8 989a15. Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. IV.1 1120a10–13. 50 tale ] taliter A 60 efficitur ] fit T quia in E quia T in V

64 liberalitatis ] libertatis AV

63 quarto 70 qui ]

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among natural operations, that should be called more natural which is more perfect. But generating one’s like is more perfect than nourishing, which is clear because nourishing is prior in the order of generation, and such is posterior in the order of perfection, as Aristotle often asserts. 7. Second, we argue that the operation that proceeds from a perfect nature, and only from a perfect nature, is more perfect than the one that proceeds from an imperfect nature. But in the case of living things, the generation of one’s like proceeds only from an individual perfect in quantity and quality, whereas nutrition pertains not only to perfect individuals but also to imperfect ones, such as infants, children, and the elderly; therefore etc. 8. Third, generation is more perfect than nutrition to the extent that the total animated being subsisting on its own is more perfect than tiny parts belonging to the animate body. For generation produces the total living being subsisting on its own, whereas nutrition produces only some tiny parts added on to the pre-existent living body. 9. Fourth, as Nicomachean Ethics IV maintains, “giving is a nobler act of generosity than receiving” since giving comes from perfection and completeness, whereas receiving comes from insufficiency and need. But to generate is to give and comes from perfection, whereas nutrition is receiving or is done for the sake of receiving, and comes from need, namely to restore what is lost. 10. Fifth, we also argue that by generation we become more like God Himself. For generation does not connote any sort of diminishing, which is why it is attributed to God, who, by extending his goodness to others, generated or made or created all things. But nutrition connotes diminishing, which is why it is not attributed to God. For that is more noble through which we become more like God himself, who is the most noble. 11. This question appears to me to be very difficult on all sides. First of all, because one cannot know well whether to generate is more

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tius naturae vel magis intentum a natura quam nutrire, et sic de aliis operationibus, vel etiam generatio quam nutritio nisi sciatur prius pro quibus rebus ista nomina supponunt; et hoc scire bene est difficile. Sed de hoc ego recurro quantum ad generare et nutrire et intelligere et sentire ad ea quae ego dixi in primo libro Physicorum, videlicet quod generare est generans, et generari est quod generatur, nutrire est nutriens et nutriri est quod nutritur, et sic de sentire et sentiri et de intelligere et intelligi; similiter de esse album aut dulce, esse enim album est idem quod est album, et sic de aliis. Et hoc ego hic suppono; postea ego dicam de generatione et nutritione. 12. Deinde etiam sicut notat Aristoteles quo aliquid nutritur active, id est, nutriens, est duplex, scilicet principale, quod est anima vegetativa, et instrumentale, quod est calor et spiritus et aliae dispositiones concurrentes active cum anima ad nutriendum. 13. Cum igitur quaeritur utrum generare sit naturalius vel perfectius quam nutrire, hoc est quaerere utrum generans sit naturalius et perfectius quam nutriens. Et potest haec quaestio esse de generante principali et nutriente principali, quod est anima, vel potest esse quaestio quid per generare vel generans intelligamus aggregatum ex anima et omnibus illis quae ex parte corporis animati necesse est concurrere ad similis generationem, et similiter per nutrire aggregatum ex anima et omnibus quae similiter necesse est concurrere ad nutritionem. Et debet haec comparatio fieri in ordine ad idem suppositum animalis vel plantae. Statim enim ego manifeste concederem quod nutrire in animali est perfectius quam generare in planta, et generare etiam in animali quam nutrire in planta, quia anima animalis est nobi-

80 in primo libro Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.18 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 182.9–15.) 86 notat Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 416b 26–28. 77 operationibus ] conditionibus V 79–80 et intelligere et ] om. T 82 quod nutritur ] nutritum AEV 85 generatione ] generare A 93 nutriente ] nutritive A || quod est anima ] om. V 98 ordine ] corpore T || suppositum ] subiectum(?) A 100 animali ] homine T || perfectius ] nobilius T

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perfect or more appropriate to nature or is more intended by nature than to nourish, and likewise for other operations (or even generation rather than nutrition), unless one knows first what things these names supposit for. And this is very difficult to know.117 But concerning this issue I have recourse to what I said about ‘to generate’ and ‘to nourish’ and ‘to understand’ and ‘to sense’ in my questions on Physics I, namely, that to generate is the thing generating and to be generated is the thing being generated, and to nourish is the thing nourishing and to be nourished is the thing being nourished, and the same goes for to sense and to be sensed, and to understand and to be understood, and to be white or sweet, for to be white is the same as the white thing, and so on for the rest. I assume this point here; I will address generation and nutrition below.118 12. Next, as Aristotle remarks, that by which something is actively nourished (namely what does the nourishing) is twofold: principal, which is the vegetative soul, and instrumental, which is heat and spirit and other dispositions actively cooperating with the soul in nourishing. 13. When, therefore, the question is posed whether to generate is more natural or more perfect than to nourish, this is to ask whether what generates is more natural and more perfect than what nourishes. And the question may concern the principal generating thing and the principal nourishing thing (which is the soul), or the question may be raised such that by ‘to generate’ and by ‘generating thing’ we are supposed to understand the aggregate of the soul and everything else that on the part of the animated body is needed to cooperate for the generation of one’s like, and in the same way by ‘to nourish’ we are supposed to understand the aggregate of the soul and all those things that are likewise needed to cooperate for nutrition. This comparison should come about with an eye to the same concrete individual animal 117 On

Buridan’s account, the infinitive forms of verbs, such as ‘to generate’ (generare), supposit for (refer to) the same things as their corresponding (substantivated) participles (i.e., participles functioning as nouns, not as adjectives), such as ‘the thing generating’ (generans). For more on Buridan’s logical doctrine concerning these phrases and its supporting arguments, see Summulae de dialectica 4.2.6. (tr. Klima, 237–251). 118 See pars. 20–21 below.

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lior anima plantae. Et similiter pari ratione tam generare quam nutrire est perfectius in equo quam generare vel nutrire in mure, quia anima equi est nobilior quam anima muris. Etsi sint alii modi intelligendi istam quaestionem, tamen non intendo nunc loqui nisi de praedictis quantum ad generare vel nutrire. 14. Pono igitur conclusiones. 15. Prima est quod in eodem, puta Brunello, generare sibi simile principale non est nobilius vel naturalius quam principale nutrire, vel e converso, quia est idem hoc et illud, scilicet eadem anima. Immo etiam similiter non esset nobilius Socratem intelligere et sapere quam Socratem ambulare et esse album, quando simul intelligeret et ambularet et esset albus, quia idem esset, quamvis tamen intellectio esset nobilior quam ambulatio vel albedo. Debet tamen concedi quod si Socrates modo intelligit non ambulans et prius ambulabat non intelligens, ipse nunc est nobilior et perfectior quam ipse esset ante. Unde sic intelligit Aristoteles felicitatem humanam et supremam hominis bonitatem consistere in opere secundum perfectam sapientiam, non quia ista operatio sit nobilior quam ipsamet anima humana, sed quia anima sic operans est nobilior et melior quam ipsa esset non sic operans. Et ita equum generare sibi simile est nobilius et perfectius et magis participans esse divinum quam esset ipsum non generare caeteris paribus. 16. Secunda conclusio quod in Brunello generare est nobilius et perfectius et appetibilius et per consequens naturalius quam esset nutrire, si per generare intelligimus aggregatum ex omnibus quae in eo

117 intelligit Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. X.7. 108 simile ] et nutriente se add. TV 112 intelligeret ] vel saperet add. T opere ] operatione VW 126 aggregatum ] congregatum AEV

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or plant. For I would at once concede without further ado that to nourish in an animal is more perfect than to generate in a plant, and also that to generate in an animal is more perfect than to nourish in a plant, since the soul of an animal is more noble than the soul of a plant. In the same way, and for the same reason, to generate as well as to nourish are more perfect in a horse than they are in a mouse, for the soul of a horse is more noble than the soul of a mouse. Although there may be other ways of understanding this question, I nevertheless for now mean to talk about only the above-mentioned with regard to generating or nourishing. 14. Therefore, I put forward some conclusions. 15. The first conclusion is that in the same thing, say Browny, to generate its like principally is not more noble or more natural than to nourish principally, or conversely, because the one is the same as the other, namely the selfsame soul. Indeed, in the same manner, for Socrates to think and to be wise would not be more noble than for Socrates to walk and to be white, whenever at the same time he were to think and walk and be white, for they would be the same, although his act of thinking would still be more noble than his walking or whiteness. Yet we should grant that if Socrates thinks now while he is not walking, and earlier was walking while not thinking, then now he is more noble and more perfect than he was before. Accordingly, this is how Aristotle understood human happiness and supreme human goodness to consist in an operation according to perfect wisdom: not because this operation is more noble than the human soul itself, but because a human soul operating in this way is more noble and more perfect than it would be were it not operating like this. So too, a horse generating its like is more noble and more perfect and is participating more in divine being than were it not generating, other things being equal. 16. The second conclusion is that for Browny to generate is more noble and more perfect and more desirable, and consequently more natural, than to nourish, if by ‘to generate’ we understand the aggre-

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necesse est concurrere ad generare sibi simile, et similiter, si per nutrire intelligimus aggregatum ex omnibus quae in eo necesse est concurrere ad nutrire; hoc est dictu quod plures vel maiores perfectiones requiruntur in Brunello ad hoc quod generet sibi simile quam ad hoc quod nutriat se. Et hoc apparet quia requisita ad nutrire requiruntur etiam et praesupponuntur ad generare et aliqua ultra eris quia imperfectae dispositiones in prima aetate sufficiebant ad nutrire quae non sufficiebant ad generare sibi simile. Et credo quod isto modo debet intelligi ista auctoritas famosa quod posteriora via generationis sunt priora via perfectionis, et e converso. Unde licet prior via generationis sit in homine nutritio et augmentatio quam ambulatio, tamen non oportet quod ambulatio sit res nobilior quam nutritio vel augmentatio aut etiam quam anima quae prius fuit generata; sed aggregatum ex requisitis ad ambulationem est perfectius quam congregatum ex requisitis ad nutritionem vel augmentationem. Et etiam videtur mihi quod non erat intentio Aristotelis quod humana felicitas et summa hominis bonitas esset consideratio secundum perfectam sapientiam praecise, sed congregatum ex ista et aliis praesuppositis et requisitis ad huiusmodi considerationem, iuxta illud Boetii quod felicitas est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. 17. Sed tunc dubitatur de intelligere utrum sit nobilius et perfectius hominem intelligere et sapere non generando quam generare non sapiendo. Et ego dico quod sic, quia licet ponamus in homine unicam animam indivisibilem quae est generare, intelligere, sentire, et nutrire, tamen dispositiones requisitae cum illa anima ad generare sunt omnes materiales et eductae de potentia materiae. Intellectio autem et sapientia non sunt eductae de potentia materiae, sed solum de potentia animae intellectivae, et tales sunt nobiliores et magis per-

145 illud Boetii ] B OETHIUS, De consolatione philosophiae III.2 (ed. Loeb, 232.10–12): “Liquet igitur beatitudinem esse statum bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum.” 149 ponamus ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.5. 128 aggregatum ] congregatum AEV 139 generata ] genita TV || aggregatum ] congregatum AETV 143 consideratio ] operatio AE 145 considerationem ] operationem AE 150–151 intelligere . . . nutrire ] nutrire et sapere et sentire et intelligere T 154 nobiliores ] et perfectiores add. T

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gate of everything needed in Browny to cooperate in generating his like, and similarly by ‘to nourish’ we understand the aggregate of everything needed in Browny to cooperate in nourishing; for this means that more or greater perfections are required in Browny to generate his like than to nourish himself. This is clear because whatever is required for nourishing is also required for and presupposed by generating — and there will be further things required, because the imperfect dispositions in childhood were enough for nourishing but not enough for generating one’s like. I believe that this is how we should understand the celebrated dictum that what is posterior in the order of generation is prior in the order of perfection, and conversely.119 Accordingly, although in a human being nutrition and growth are prior to walking in the order of generation, walking still does not have to be a nobler thing than nutrition or growth or even than the soul that was generated earlier. Instead, the aggregate of the requisites for walking is more perfect than the aggregate of requisites for nutrition or growth. It also seems to me that Aristotle did not mean that human happiness and the greatest good for a human being is contemplation in perfect wisdom exclusively, but rather the aggregate of this activity itself along with other things presupposed by and required for this sort of operation, in line with Boethius’s remark that happiness is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods. 17. But then a question arises about thinking: Is it more noble and more perfect for a human being to think and to be wise while not generating, than it is for him to generate while not being wise? For my part I declare that it is, for although we postulate in human beings a unique indivisible soul which generates, thinks, senses, and nourishes, the dispositions required for generation are nonetheless all material and drawn forth from the potency of matter. However, thought and wisdom are not drawn forth from the potency of matter but only from

119 See

par. 6 above.

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ficientes animam et hominem quam quaecumque eductae de potentia materiae. Ideo homo intelligens et sapiens non generans est perfectior homine generante non intelligente nec sapiente; unde ille actus sapiendi propter eius nobilitatem et excellentiam attingit magis obiectum nobilissimum quod est ipse Deus. 18. Cum igitur Aristoteles dixit quod naturalissimum operum viventibus est generare sibi simile, non intendebat istam operationem nisi ad alia opera potentiae vegetativae et non ad opera potentiae sensitivae vel intellectivae. Et non est dicendum quod Aristoteles intenderet quod secundum propriam locutionem generare esset operatio animae, sed est anima operans, ut dictum est. Saepe enim Aristoteles et alii loquuntur praeter proprietatem sermonis ad brevius loquendum, sermones tamen sunt debite intelligendi secundum materiam subiectam, ut dicitur primo Ethicorum. Erat igitur sensus secundum praedicta quod vivens est in statu perfectiori secundum naturam quando est sufficiens ad generandum sibi simile quam quando est sufficiens solum ad nutriendum vel augmentandum. 19. Sed ex istis dictis nondum apparet utrum generatio sibi similis sit operatio vel res perfectior quam nutritio, vel e converso. Ad hoc enim sciendum oportet scire pro quibus rebus supponant. Et hoc est dictum Physicorum quod hoc nomen generatio substantialis supponit pro forma substantiali quae generatur. Nutritio autem est quaedam substantialis generatio, licet non totalis viventis sed partialis, est enim conversio alimenti in substantiam aliti; igitur nutritio est anima viventis, licet non totalis sed partialis. Sed generatio sibi similis ex semine, quae res sit, manifestum est, si videas concurrentia antequam sit illud simile genitum. Primo enim oportet quod vivens generet semen et ultra non agit, sed ultra semen per virtutem quam accepit ex viventi

168 primo Ethicorum ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.3 1094b12–15. 175 Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.16 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 166.20–26). 155 animam et hominem ] hominem ad animam A || et hominem ] om. T 158 excellentiam ] sapientiam AT 165 anima operans ] materia operans anima T 173 operatio ] melior add. A 175 dictum ] dictu AE 177 substantialis ] partialis T

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the potency of the intellective soul, and such things are more noble and more perfective of the soul and of the human being than anything drawn forth from the potency of matter. Hence someone thinking and being wise but not generating is more perfect than one generating but not thinking and being unwise; accordingly, this act of wisdom, due to its nobility and excellence, reaches up closer to the most noble object, which is God Himself. 18. Thus when Aristotle said that the most natural operation in living things is to generate their like, he meant this operation only in comparison to the other activities of the vegetative power, not in comparison to the activities of the sensitive or intellective power. We should not say that Aristotle meant that, properly speaking, generating would be an operation of the soul, but instead it is the soul acting, as stated. For the sake of brevity, Aristotle and other philosophers often speak using expressions beyond their proper sense, but their words should rightly be understood in accordance with their subject matter, as Nicomachean Ethics I says. Hence in line with the foregoing, his meaning was that a living thing is in a more perfect state according to nature when it is capable of generating its like than when it is capable only of nourishing and growing. 19. But it is still not clear from what has been said whether the generation of one’s like is an operation or thing that is more perfect than nutrition, or conversely. To know this we need to know what things they supposit for. I said in my questions on the Physics that the name ‘substantial generation’ supposits for the substantial form that is generated. Now nutrition is a sort of substantial generation, though a partial rather than a total generation of the living thing, for it is the conversion of nourishment into the substance of the thing nourished. Hence nutrition is the soul of the living thing, although a partial rather than the total soul. However, it is clear what thing the generation of one’s like from seed is if you were to look at the things cooperating

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generat simile illi viventi. Et sic est ibi duplex generatio substantialis: una est generatio seminis, et ista est forma substantialis seminis quae non est anima cum non ponamus semen esse animatum; alia est generatio totalis viventis quae iam est anima totalis, vel erit. 20. Et tunc ponuntur breviter duae conclusiones. Prima est quod nutritio est nobilior quam generatio seminis quia omnis anima est nobilior quam forma materialis quae non est anima. Secunda conclusio est quod generatio viventis ex semine est nobilior quam nutritio, quia forma totalis viventis videtur esse nobilior quam forma partialis minutarum partium, sicut est nutritio. Et semper illud quod est nobilius et perfectius in naturalibus ego reputo esse naturalius et magis intentum a natura, cum habeat modum finis respectu aliorum, et intendatur propter se et alia propter ipsum, et “propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis.” 21. Ideo patet ex praedictis quid sit directe respondendum ad quaestionem et ad rationes quae fiebant. Propter quod notandum est quod non sequitur si aliquid est magis necessarium inter naturalia vel operationes et passiones naturales et magis inseparabile, quod illud, propter hoc, debeat dici naturalius, quoniam in secundo Physicorum ostensum est quod forma est magis natura quam materia, et ibidem etiam ostensum est quod materia est magis necessaria. Ipsa enim est simpliciter necessaria et magis impossibilis non esse, et est etiam simpliciter necessaria ad omnes transmutationes et operationes generabilium et corruptibilium. Non sic autem forma, propter quod Aristoteles in secundo Physicorum determinat quod materiae attribuenda est necessitas et fini vel formae ratio et causa necessitatis. Et vocat ibi Aristote-

195–196 propter . . . magis ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 72a 29–30. 201 secundo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.1 193b7. 207 secundo Physicorum ] A RI STOTELES , Phys. II.9 199b 30–200b10. 184 seminis ] om. T 185 quae ] quia V 194–195 intendatur ] magis add. V 200 naturales ] om. T 204 magis ] om. AE 205 generabilium ] transmutabilium V 208 fini ] secundum fieri V || ratio ] ideo V

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before its like has been generated. The living thing first has to generate its seed, and it does no more than that; but beyond that, the seed, by the power it received from the living thing, generates the like of that living thing. And thus there are two substantial generations here: one is the generation of the seed, and this is the substantial form of the seed, which is not a soul, as we do not take the seed to be animate; the other is the generation of the whole living thing, which already is or will be its total soul. 20. Now I briefly put forward two conclusions. The first conclusion: nutrition is more noble than the generation of seed because every soul is more noble than a material form that is not a soul. The second conclusion: the generation of a living thing from seed is more noble than nutrition, because the total form of a living thing appears to be more noble than the partial form of its small parts, like nutrition is. I always hold that which is more noble and more perfect among natural things to be more natural and more intended by nature, since it has the status of end with regard to the others, and it is intended for its own sake while others are intended for its sake, and “that for the sake of which something is such and such is itself more such and such.”120 21. It is clear from the preceding remarks how one should directly respond to the question and to the objections that were raised. For the sake of a direct response, we should note that it does not follow that if something is more necessary and more inseparable among natural things or among natural operations and attributes, that it should for this reason be called more natural, for Physics II showed that form is more nature than matter, and also in the same place that matter is more necessary. For matter is absolutely necessary and is more impossible not to be, and is also absolutely necessary for all change and operations among generable and corruptible things. But this is not the case with form, which is why Aristotle establishes in Physics II that necessity should be attributed to matter with regard to the coming to

120 See

par. 5 above.

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les necessitatem ex materia necessitatem simpliciter, et necessitatem ex forma vel fine vocat necessitatem ex suppositione. Si non ex maiori necessitate dicitur res vel operatio naturalior, tunc oportet quod ex maiori perfectione et nobilitate dicatur aliquid naturalius. Et hoc est rationabile quia naturalius debet dici quod est naturae convenientius et secundum naturam appetibilius vel magis intentum a natura. Tale autem est illud quod est perfectius, quanto enim aliquid est melius et perfectius secundum naturam, tanto est naturae convenientius et tanto etiam est appetibilius. Cum ea ratione res sit appetibilis qua est bona; quia etiam perfectius habet rationem melioris, oportet quod sit tamquam finis aliorum, quia semper deterius est gratia melioris, ut dicitur septimo Politicae. Finis autem intenditur et desideratur propter se, et alia propter ipsum naturali ordine, et propter quod unumquodque tale, etc.. Ideo perfectius et magis desideratur et magis intenditur. Et hoc intendit Aristoteles dicens omnia appetunt esse divinum; et gratia eius agunt quaecumque agunt secundum naturam, ut eo participent secundum assimilationem quantum possunt. Et quia per illud unumquodque naturalium magis assimilatur ipsi Deo quod est nobilius et perfectius; ideo hoc principaliter intendit et appetit natura. Et sine dubio, cum omnis natura posterior habet esse et ordinem ab ipso Deo, qui est tamquam prima forma et prima natura mundi, licet non inhaerens, oportet illud esse naturalius quod principalius intenditur ab ipso Deo, et hoc est illud quod melius et nobilius. 22. Ad rationes. 23. Ad primam dicendum est quod bene viventi magis est necessaria nutritio et magis inseparabilis quam sibi similis generatio. Ideo

220 septimo Politicae ] A RISTOTELES, Pol. VII.14 1333a21–22. 221–222 propter . . . etc ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 79a 29–30. 223 dicens ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415a30–415b1. 211 oportet ] apparet AE 212 nobilitate ] inter naturalia add. V 217 qua ] quae V 218–219 tamquam ] om. A 226 nobilius ] melius EV 228 ordinem ] et omnem eius directionem add. V 229–230 inhaerens ] in homine T 230 oportet ] apparet A || naturalius ] nobilius TVW 231 hoc . . . quod ] isto modo illud V || melius et nobilius ] nobilius et perfectius V

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be of form, which is why Aristotle there calls the necessity stemming from matter absolute necessity, while he calls the necessity stemming from form or the end conditional necessity. If a thing or operation is not called more natural due to its greater necessity, then it must be that something is called more natural due to its greater perfection and nobility. This is reasonable, for that should be called more natural which agrees more with nature and is more desirable according to nature or is more intended by nature. But that which is more perfect is such, for something is better and more perfect according to nature just to the extent it agrees more with nature — and also just to the extent it is the more desirable, since a thing is desirable insofar as it is good; also, because the more perfect has the aspect of what is better, it must be the goal of others, so to speak, since, as Politics VII says, “the worse is always for the sake of the better.” Now the end is intended and desired for its own sake and others for its sake in the natural order, and “that for the sake of which anything is such and such” and so on; hence it is more perfect and more desired and more intended. This is what Aristotle means when he says that all things desire divine being; and they do whatever they do according to nature because of this desire, so that they can participate in it by assimilation as much as they can. Since any natural thing is more similar to God Himself by that which is more noble and perfect, this is what nature principally intends and desires. And since, without a doubt, every posterior nature has its being and order from God Himself, who is, as it were, the First Form and the First Nature of the world, without inhering in it, that must be more natural which is more principally intended by God Himself, and this is what is better and more noble. 22. Replies to the opening arguments. 23. To the first,121 we reply that nutrition is certainly more necessary for and more inseparable from a living being than is the genera-

121 See

par. 1 above.

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hoc praedicatum nutrire est magis proprium huic subiecto vivens secundum praedicationem. Sed dictum est quod non sequitur ex hoc quod debeat dici naturalius. 24. Ad secundam dicitur quod licet propter excessivum coitum debilitetur natura, non tamen ex moderato secundum naturae convenientiam debilitatur. Et etiam sicut huiusmodi individui natura salvatur per nutritionem, sic alterius individui natura producitur per generationem, et ita perpetuatur mundus secundum successionem individuorum, quod natura prima magis intendit quam solum unius individui permanentiam. 25. Ad tertiam dicitur quod appetibilior est nutritio in casu necessitatis et indigentiae. Immo etiam sic calor naturalis vel sanitas esset appetibilior quam sapientia vel opus sapientiae in quo consistit humana felicitas. Sed quod sic est magis appetibile non dicitur simpliciter magis necessaria et magis appetibile quia est appetibile finaliter propter aliud melius. Ideo illud melius simpliciter est appetibilius. 26. Ad quartam simpliciter dicitur quod natura est magis sollicita de nutritione non propter melioritatem sed propter necessitatem, scilicet in quantum quod est finaliter appetibile et principaliter non potest attingi sine isto. 27. Ultima ratio conceditur, scilicet quod intellectio est homini naturalior operatio. 28. Et tu etiam secundum praedicta videas quomodo rationes ad aliam partem procedant.

235 praedicatum ] praedicatio T || nutrire ] om. AET 239–240 naturae convenientiam ] materiae conveniat T || convenientiam ] exigentiam E 243 solum ] subiectum VW 244 permanentiam ] om. VW 246 sanitas ] sanitatis A 247 sapientiae ] scientiae V

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tion of its like. Hence the predicate ‘to nourish’ is more proper to the subject ‘living thing’ by way of predication. But we have said that it does not follow from this that it should be called more natural. 24. To the second,122 we reply that although nature is weakened by excessive copulation, it is nevertheless not weakened by moderate copulation in harmony with the nature. In addition, just as the nature of such an individual is preserved by nutrition, so another individual’s nature is produced by generation, and thus the world is perpetuated by the succession of individuals, which is more intended by the First Nature than the permanence of just one individual. 25. To the third,123 we say that nutrition is more desirable in case of necessity and need. Indeed, even natural warmth or health would thus be more desirable than wisdom or the exercise of wisdom, in which human happiness consists. But what is more desirable in this way is not said to be more necessary and desirable absolutely, because it is desirable for the sake of something better as its end; hence what is better absolutely is more desirable. 26. To the fourth,124 we simply answer that nature is more concerned with nutrition not because it is better but because of necessity, namely insofar as that which is principally desirable as an end cannot be achieved without it. 27. We grant the last objection,125 namely that understanding is the more natural operation for human beings. 28. You may also see how the arguments on the other side go through in line with the foregoing.126

122 See

par. 2 above. par. 3 above. 124 See par. 4 above. 125 See par. 5 above. 126 See pars. 6–10 above. 123 See

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Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva.

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1. Arguitur quod non quia materiae est pati et formae est agere, agit enim agens secundum quod est in actu et patitur passum secundum quod est in potentia, ut patet tertio Physicorum et primo De generatione et ubicumque Aristoteles loquitur de ista materia; sensus autem est forma et non materia; ergo etc. 2. Item Aristoteles ponit in secundo huius quod anima est causa corporis secundum triplex genus causae, scilicet formae, finis, et agentis; sensus autem principalis est ipsa anima; igitur sensus est potentia activa et corpus passiva. Et Commentator dictam auctoritatem exponit dicens quod anima est causa movens corpus secundum omnes modos motuum sive veros sive aestimatos. Et videtur quod intendebat per modos aestimatos sentire et intelligere. Et manifestum est quod Aristoteles, volens declarare quod anima est causa corporis sicut agens, dixit eam esse causam nutritionis et augmentationis et sensationis, quod non esset ad propositum nisi esset virtus activa quantum ad sensationem secundum quam vocatur sensus; ideo debet dici quod sensus est virtus activa.

4 tertio Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. III.3 202a 12. 4–5 primo De generatione ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.9 326b 29. 7 secundo huius ] A RISTOTE LES , De an. II.4 415b 9–12. 10 Commentator ] AVERROES , Comm. De an. II.37 (ed. Crawford, 188.64–68). 13 modos ] motus AET © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 15

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Is sense a passive power?

1. We argue that it is not, because being affected is proper to matter whereas acting is proper to form, since an agent acts insofar as it is in act and the patient is affected insofar as it is in potency, as is clear from Physics III, On Generation and Corruption I, and wherever Aristotle talks about the subject. But sense is form, not matter; therefore etc. 2. Again, Aristotle declares in Book II that the soul is the cause of the body in three kinds of causes, namely as form, end, and agent. But the principal sense is the soul itself; hence sense is an active power and the body is a passive power. The Commentator explains this authoritative passage by saying that the soul is a cause moving the body in all the modes of motion, be they genuine or putative modes. And by ‘putative modes’127 he seems to have meant sensing and understanding. It is clear that Aristotle, who wants to say that the soul is the cause of the body as an agent, said that it is the cause of nutrition, growth, and sensation (sensatio)128 — which would be irrelevant were it not an active power with regard to sensation, according to which the soul is called sense; hence, we should say that sense is an active power. 127 They

are called “putative modes” because they are actualizations of cognitive powers, analogous to genuine change, rather than instances of genuine change, which is a material subject’s acquiring a quality (alteration), quantity (growth or diminution), or place (locomotion). 128 ‘Sensatio’ is a technical term for Buridan, denoting a conscious act of sensory cognition, as opposed to the mere reception of sensible species in a functioning sense organ, which is what we would probably identify as “subliminal perception.”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 15

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3. Item, sentire est agere; igitur virtus sensitiva est virtus activa. Consequentia tenet per locum a coniugatis. Antecedens probatur quia hoc verbum sentire est activi generis, et tales modi significandi grammaticales debent sumi a proprietatibus rerum et consonare eis — aliter essent ficti aut falsi, quod est inconveniens — et non esset consonantia in proposito si sentire esset pati et non agere. Et hoc etiam patet quia omnes communiter ponunt quod sensatio et intellectio sint actiones immanentes. Et si sensatio sit actio, oportet quod sentire sit agere per locum a coniugatis. Nec esset ratio quare magis diceretur actus immanens quam aedificatio nisi maneret in suo agente, et manet in sensu; igitur sensus est agens sensationem; igitur, est virtus activa. 4. Item, in tertio huius dicitur quod moventia animal secundum locum sunt sensus et appetitus, vel intellectus et appetitus; movens autem est virtus activa; ergo, sensus et intellectus et appetitus sunt virtutes activae. 5. Item, si sensus esset potentia passiva et non activa, sequeretur quod potentia vegetativa esset nobilior quam sensitiva, quod est falsum. Consequentia patet quia potentia vegetativa est activa, et agere est nobilius quam pati; et tamen ex nobilitate operationis arguitur nobilitas potentiae.

30 tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433a 9–10; Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.20. 21 verbum ] nomen A || significandi ] figurandi A 25 ponunt ] volunt VW 25–26 et intellectio . . . actio ] est actio A 26 actio ] actus VW 27–28 immanens ] manens T 30 animal ] vel V om. W 33 activae ] animae T 37 operationis ] operis A

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3. Sensing is acting; hence the sensitive power is an active power. The inference holds by the topic “from conjugates.”129 Proof of the antecedent: the verb ‘to sense’ is an active verb, and such grammatical modes of signification should be derived from the properties of things and agree with them — for otherwise these modes would be fictitious or false, which is unacceptable — and there would be no agreement in the case at hand if sensing were being affected and not acting. The antecedent is also clear because everyone generally holds that the acts of sensing and thinking are immanent actions,130 and if the act of sensing is an action, then by the topic “from conjugates” sensing must be acting. Nor would there be any more reason for calling it an immanent action than housebuilding, were it not to remain in its agent, but it does remain in sense; therefore, sense is an agent as regards sensation; hence it is an active power. 4. Book III says that what moves an animal from one place to another are sense and desire, or intellect and desire. But what moves is an active power; therefore, sense and intellect and desire are active powers. 5. If sense were a passive and not an active power, it would follow that the vegetative power is more noble than the sensitive power, which is false. The consequence is clear, because the vegetative power is active, and acting is nobler than being acted upon; yet the nobility of an operation is an argument for the nobility of its power.

129 The

topic “from conjugates”, discussed in Summulae de dialectica 6.6.2 (tr. Klima, 486–488), describes what inferences are acceptable based on the sematic relations between an abstract term and its concrete counterpart. See Aristotle, Topics II.9. Boethius explains the term as follows: “Conjugates are those items derived from the same name, such as ‘just’ and ‘justly’ from ‘justice’” (De topicis differentiis III, ed. Nikitas, 35). A similar argument appears in QQ. De an. III.1 par. 8 below. 130 An immanent action is an action that does not produce anything outside the agent, such as the acts of sensing and thinking, as opposed to a transient action, which produces something in a subject other than the agent, such as heat produced by fire in a piece of wood.

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6. Item, sequeretur quod sensibile esset nobilius sensu, ut color visu, quod est falsum. Et apparet consequentia ut prius quia eius operatio esset nobilior, cum agere sit nobilius quam pati, et sensibile ageret sensationem ad quam sensus non se haberet nisi passive. 7. Item, aliqui arguunt per experientias quod mulier menstruosa visu inficit speculum, et basiliscus visu interficit hominem, quod non esset nisi visus esset potentia activa. 8. Oppositum autem declarat Aristoteles in secundo huius et similiter de intellectu in tertio huius. 9. Bonum est dicere aliqua de nominibus quibus in hac quaestione et in sequentibus utemur. Notandum est igitur quod sensibile significat idem quod possibile est sentiri, et sensitivum idem quod est potens sentire. 10. Et tunc dubitatur primo utrum species coloris facta in aere vel in oculo debeat dici sensibilis. Et dico quod non secundum propriam significationem quia non possit sentiri; tamen secundum locutionem attributivam vocamus eam sensibilem ex eo quod per eam illud cuius est species sentitur, sicut urina dicitur sana non secundum propriam significationem sani sed quia significat animal esse sanum. 11. Secundo dubitatur quid debeamus intelligere per sensitivum, utrum animal vel organum vel corpus subiectum animae vel ipsam animam. Et dico quod Aristoteles in primo huius determinat quod animal proprie est quod sentit vel quod potest sentire; ideo proprie dicitur sensitivum. Dicit enim sic: “Melius autem fortassis non dicere

44 inficit speculum ] De insomniis II 459b24–460a32. || interficit hominem ] G AIUS P LINIUS S ECUNDUS, Nat. Hist. VIII.32–33 (ed. Loeb, 56, 58). 46 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 416b33. 47 tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a14. 62–64 Melius . . . animal ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. I.4 408b 12–14 (Ar. lat. XII.2 47.1.19): “Melius enim fortassis est non dicere animam misereri aut addiscere aut intelligere, sed hominem anima.” 43–45 Item . . . activa ] om. W 50 sentiri ] sentire V 52 coloris facta ] corporis facere A 54 significationem ] locutionem W || non ] puto quod add. V credo quod add. W 55 illud ] aliud W 58 intelligere per ] vocare VW || sensitivum ] sensum V 59 organum ] corpus organicum A 61 potest ] proprie add. E

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6. Again, it would follow that the sensible would be more noble than the sense — say, a color would be more noble than sight — which is false. The consequence is plain as before, for its operation would be more noble, since acting is more noble than being affected, and the sensible would produce sensation, to which the sense would relate only passively. 7. Again, some people argue from experience that a menstruating woman discolors a mirror by her sight, and that a basilisk kills a human being by its sight, which could happen only if sight were an active power. 8. Aristotle, however, declares the opposite in Book II, and likewise in the case of the intellect in Book III. 9. It is useful to say some things about the names which we shall use in this and the subsequent questions. We should note, then, that ‘sensible’ signifies the same as ‘what can be sensed’, while ‘the sensitive’ is the same as ‘what is capable of sensing.’ 10. Then there is an issue, firstly, whether the species of color produced in the air (or in the eye) ought to be called sensible. I reply that in the proper meaning of the phrase it should not, for it cannot be sensed. Yet we do call it sensible attributively speaking, because that of which it is the species is sensed through it — just as urine is called healthy not in the proper meaning of ‘healthy’, but rather because it means that the animal is healthy. 11. The second issue is what we should understand by ‘sensitive’, the animal, the body or organ subject to the soul, or the soul itself. I reply that Aristotle in Book I determines that, properly speaking, it is the animal that senses or can sense; hence it is properly called sensitive. For as he says: “Perhaps, however, it is better not to say that

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animam misereri aut addiscere aut intelligere, sed hominem vel animal”; igitur animal sentit sicut totale sensitivum. Sed non est negandum quin etiam anima sentiat sicut partiale sensitivum et quin etiam corpus seu organum sentiat sicut partiale sensitivum. Ideo etiam saepe Aristoteles vocat organum sensitivum et saepe etiam potentiam animae quae est anima vocat sensitivum. 12. Tertia dubitatio est quid debeat vocari sensus. Dico quod aliquando sensus accipitur pro sensatione, sed proprie sensus dicitur anima sensitiva. Unde non omne sensitivum, id est potens sentire, dicitur sensus, nec enim animal proprie dicitur sensus, nec corpus. Ideo sensum accipimus pro anima quae potest sentire. 13. Quarta dubitatio est quid proprie significet sentire. Et videtur mihi quod sentire non significat adaequate idem quod habere in se speciem ipsius sensibilis, quia tunc aer sentiret, scilicet videret, odoraret, et audiret; nec significat adaequate agere istam speciem, quia tunc color videret et sonus audiret; nec significat adaequate agere sensationem, quia Deus agit eam et omnia alia quae exiguntur, et tamen non sentit, et posset eam agere sine alio agente concurrente et tamen non sentiret sed intelligeret; item nec videtur significare adaequate idem quod recipere sensationem, quia licet forma, quando fit, recipitur in subiecto in quo fit, tamen quando ipsa facta est et est in permanentia, ipsa non amplius fit nec amplius recipitur nec etiam amplius agitur, prout agere idem significat quod producere, et tamen adhuc est sentire. Ideo videtur quod sentire aliquando est quando ipsum nec est agere nec pati, capiendo agere pro producere et pati pro recipere. Sed dum fit sensatio, sentire bene est pati et etiam agere. Et quando ipsa facta est, verum est dicere quod sentire fuit pati et agere. Sentire enim est sentiens et pati est patiens et agere agens. Sensus autem sentiens, 63 vel ] animatum V 75 significat ] proprie et add. VW || in se ] om. W 77 nec . . . speciem ] et E 78 et sonus ] sensus T || sonus ] sensus A 79 exiguntur ] aguntur TV 80 agente ] om. T 82 fit ] sic A 86 quando ] quod TV 90 et . . . patiens ] om. V

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the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that a human being or an animal does”; hence the animal senses as a total sensitive thing. However, we should not deny that the soul also senses as a partial sensitive thing, and that even the body or an organ senses as a partial sensitive thing; thus Aristotle often calls an organ a sensitive thing, and he also often calls a power of the soul (which is the soul itself) a sensitive thing. 12. The third issue is what we should call ‘sense’. I reply that sometimes ‘sense’ is taken for sensation, but properly speaking ‘sense’ refers to the sensitive soul. Accordingly, not everything sensitive (i.e. able to sense) is called ‘sense’, because neither the animal nor the body is properly called ‘sense’. Therefore, we take ‘sense’ to refer to a soul that can sense. 13. The fourth issue is what ‘to sense’ properly means. It seems to me that ‘to sense’ does not mean quite the same thing as ‘to have in itself the species of the sensible thing’, for in that case air would sense, namely it would see, smell, and hear; nor does it quite mean ‘to produce this species’, because then color would see and sound would hear; nor does it mean quite the same as ‘to produce sensation’, for God produces it (and all the other things that are required) and nevertheless God does not sense, and He could produce it even without the concurrence of any other agent and still would understand rather than sense; finally, it does not seem to mean quite the same as ‘to receive sensation’, for although when a form comes to be it is received in the subject in which it comes to be, nevertheless, when it has come to be and remains, it is no longer coming to be, nor is it being received, nor is there any making of it, insofar as ‘to make’ means the same as ‘to produce’ — and yet there is still sensing. Hence it seems that sometimes there is a sensing when the subject neither acts nor is affected (taking ‘acts’ for producing and ‘is affected’ for receiving). But while

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dum sensatio fit, est agens et patiens, et cum ipsa facta est et permanet, sensus est sentiens et fuit agens et patiens. Ideo dicitur finaliter quod sentire significat idem quod habere sensationem sibi inhaerentem. Et ideo si ponamus quod tam animal quam anima et quam organum sive corpus habet sensationem sibi inhaerentem, tunc bene dictum est quod quodlibet istorum sentit. 14. Tunc ponuntur conclusiones. 15. Prima est quod sensus, id est anima sensitiva, est virtus activa et passiva. Dico virtus activa quia ipsa est potentia vegetativa et motiva secundum locum, et etiam quia ipsa agit ad sensationem producendum, ut dicetur post. Dico etiam virtus passiva quia ipsa recipit sensationem, ut dicetur post. 16. Secunda conclusio est quod organum subiectum animae se habet ad speciem sensibilem apud sensationem passive, scilicet in recipiendo ipsam speciem, et obiectum se habet tunc active, scilicet in producendo eam, quia vel anima vel organum se habet passive ad istam; sed non anima, ut dicetur post; igitur organum. Similiter vel obiectum se habet ad istam active vel anima; sed non anima, ut dicetur post; igitur obiectum. Utrum autem sensus seu anima sensitiva se habeat ad sensationem active, et quomodo se habeant ad invicem

101 dicetur post ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.10. 91 dum ] cum AE et T 93 significat ] adaequate add. VW 94 et quam organum ] alii organi A 101–102 Dico . . . post ] hom. V 105 se habet tunc ] om. ETVW 107 organum ] obiectum AT 107–109 Similiter . . . obiectum ] om. T

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sensation comes to be, sensing is indeed a kind of being affected and also a kind of acting. When it is made, though, it is true to say that sensing was a kind of being affected and a kind of acting. For sensing just is the thing sensing, being affected just is the thing affected, and acting just is the thing acting.131 However, the sense sensing, while the act of sensing is coming to be, is both the thing acting and the thing being affected; once it has come to be and remains, then the sense just is the thing sensing, and it was the thing acting and the thing being affected. So in the end we say that ‘to sense’ means the same as ‘to have an inherent sensation’. Then, if we were to hold that the soul and the organ or body have the act of sensing inhering in them, as well as the animal, the claim that each of them senses was indeed correct. 14. Now we propose some conclusions. 15. The first conclusion is that sense, that is, the sensitive soul, is an active and a passive power. I call it an ‘active power’ because it is the vegetative and the locomotive power, and also because it acts to produce the act of sensing, as will be declared later. I also say that it is a ‘passive power’ because it receives the act of sensing, as will be declared later.132 16. The second conclusion is that an organ subject to the soul is passively related to the sensible species involved with the act of sensing, namely in receiving that species, whereas the object is then actively related to it, namely in producing it. For either the soul or the organ is passively related to it; but not the soul, as will be shown later;133 hence the organ. Likewise, either the object or the soul is actively related to it; but not the soul, as will be shown later;134 hence the object. However, whether the sense or sensitive soul is actively related

131 This is just Buridan’s typical nominalism at work; identifying agents with actions

and patients with passions. 132 See par. 23 below. 133 See par. 19 below. 134 See par. 17 below.

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species sensibiles et sensatio, dicetur in alia quaestione. Sed nunc ad videndum quomodo sensus sit virtus passiva et secundum quam dispositionem, videndum est quomodo ipse se habeat ad speciem sensibilem et an se habeat passive ad sensationem. 17. Pono igitur tertiam conclusionem quod anima non agit ad producendam speciem sensibilem in organo sensus exterioris, ut in oculo vel aure. Et haec conclusio sic persuadetur, quia consimiliter videtur fieri lumen vel species coloris in medio vel in organo, scilicet ratione diaphaneitatis; nec plus exigitur hic quam illic. Sed omnes communiter concedunt quod lumen vel etiam species coloris fiunt in medio, scilicet in aere, a lucido et a colorato active et quod aer in hoc se habet solum passive, non quod aer vel forma substantialis eius aliquid coagat. Igitur similiter de lumine, quod est species lucis, et de specie coloris in organo sensitivo. 18. Item, lux et color cum agente principali, quod est Deus, sufficiunt ad producendum active suas species in subiecto diaphano sibi convenienter applicato. Unde hoc facerent quacumque forma substantiali diaphanum fuerit informatum, immo etiam si nulla forma substantiali fuerit informatum sicut est in corpore caelesti. Igitur non oportet quod forma substantialis corporis diaphani sive sit anima si-

111 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.10. 117 videtur ] debet A 120 coloris ] corporum A 121 colorato ] corpore A colore ETW 122 non ] sit add. AETV 125 color ] una add. VW 127 convenienter ] sufficienter E convenienti T || facerent ] faciunt VW || forma ] formali T 128 diaphanum ] illud organum AET

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to the act of sensing, and how sensible species and the act of sensing are related to each other, will be discussed in the next question. But here to see how (and in what disposition) sense is a passive power, we should see how it is related to the sensible species and whether it is passively related to the act of sensing. 17. Thus, I put forward the third conclusion: the soul does not act to produce the sensible species in the organ of an external sense, for instance in the eye or in the ear. This conclusion is made plausible as follows. It appears that illumination135 or the species of color come to be in the medium or in the organ in an analogous way, namely on account of their transparency; and nothing more is required in the one case than in the other. However, everybody generally agrees that illumination, or even the species of color, come to be in the medium (the air) actively from a light-source or from a colored body, and that the air in this process is merely passive, without air or its substantial form co-producing anything. Hence, the same goes for illumination, which is the species of light, and for the species of color, in the sensitive organ. 18. Again, light and color, along with the principal agent (God), are enough to actively produce their species in a transparent subject appropriately present to them. Accordingly, they would do so no matter what sort of substantial form informs the transparent object, indeed, even if it is not informed by any substantial form, as is the case in a celestial body.136 Hence the substantial form of a transparent body, 135 Natural

philosophers in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries distinguished between lux, rendered here as ‘light’, and lumen, rendered here as ’illumination.’ ’Light’ names an inherent quality in a bright object. ’Illumination’ names the species that a bright object sends into any adjacent transparent medium. In the presence of illumination, opaque colored bodies emit species of color and hence become visible. For a detailed discussion of this issue, See Lindberg, 133–135. 136 Buridan, following Aristotle, held that the heavens are ingenerable and incorruptible and therefore cannot consist of the same matter as the generable and corruptible bodies of the sublunary world. However, since for Buridan the sole reason for positing prime matter in the hylomorphic composition of material substances is to identify the substrate of generation and corruption, i.e., substantial change, the substance of the heavens, according to him, does not require this sort of composition. As he puts it in his Questions on Aristotle’s On the Heavens I.11: “We would posit, therefore, in vain and without any compelling reason such matter in the heavens.” (ideo frustra omnino et sine ratione cogente poneremus talem materiam in caelo). See Grant 1983.

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ve sit alia forma aliquid faciat active ad speciem istam sensibilem in organo sensitivo producendam. 19. Quarta conclusio apparet mihi probabilis quod anima nihil operatur passive ad recipiendum speciem sensibilem in organo sensitivo, nec etiam forma substantialis medii, ut aeris verbi gratia, ad recipiendum lumen vel speciem coloris, immo quod ad hoc operatur sola materia passive secundum quod disposita est diaphaneitate vel corpus subiectum diaphaneitati ubi non est materia vel forma substantialis, ut in caelo. 20. Ad probandum istam conclusionem oportet notare quod si in eodem subiecto recipiuntur diversae formae una post aliam et simul remanentes in isto subiecto, non oportet quod prior recipiat posteriorem ita quod sit eius subiectum de cuius potentia egreditur. Ut si calidum nigrefiat aut nigrum calefiat, non oportet propter hoc quod nigredo sit subiectum caliditatis, nec e converso. Si enim caliditas esset subiectum nigredinis oporteret ad corruptionem caliditatis corrumpi nigredinem, quod est falsum. Et patet consequentia, quia accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum. Ita etiam non oportet, si forma substantialis et forma accidentalis simul sint in eadem materia, quod hoc sit illi subiectum, aut e contra. Verbi gratia, frigiditas aquae non est subiectum formae substantialis aquae, scilicet cui ista forma substantialis inhaeret, quia potest corrumpi, forma substantiali manente, et generari caliditas; et postea iterum alia frigiditas potest generari in eadem aqua, quae non erat subiectum formae aquae cum posterius adveniat, et ideo nec prior frigiditas erat subiectum illius. Sed etiam nec forma substantialis aquae est subiectum ipsius frigiditatis de cuius potentia egreditur, quia forte frigiditas prius erat in materia antequam in ea reciperetur forma substantialis aquae. Oportet enim materiam ad recipiendum formam esse praedispositam per humiditatem et frigiditatem. Et non oportet quod istae dispositiones corrumpantur, quia qualitates symbolae bene manent eaedem in generato et corrupto, prout debet videri in secundo De generatione. Si igitur aqua 162 secundo De generatione ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. II.1 331a 24–26; B URIDANUS, QQ. De gen. et corr. II.7 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 224–228). 140 probandum ] persuadendum VW 143 potentia ] ista prior add. AET ista posterior add. W 145 nec e converso ] om. A 148 subiecto ] de cuius potentia egreditur add. VW 150 contra ] converso TVW 151 aquae ] om. A 153 alia ] om. E 154 erat ] erit T || cum ] et T 158 reciperetur ] reperiretur T 161 eaedem ] om. A

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whether it be a soul or some other form, does not have to do anything actively to produce the sensible species in the sensitive organ. 19. The fourth conclusion seems plausible to me, namely that the soul does not do anything passively to receive the sensible species in the sensitive organ, and neither does the substantial form of the medium, as that of the air, for example, to receive illumination or the species of color; instead, this is done passively by the matter in that it is disposed by transparency, or it is done by the body subject to transparency where there is no matter and substantial form, as in the heavens. 20. To establish this conclusion we must note that if the same subject receives diverse forms one after the other and they remain together in the subject, then it is not necessary for the prior to receive the posterior in such a way that it is its subject from whose potency it comes forth. For example, were something hot to become black or something black to become hot, it is not necessary on this score for the blackness to be the subject of hotness — or the other way around, for if hotness were the subject of blackness, then the blackness would have to be destroyed upon the destruction of the hotness, which is false. The consequence is clear, because accidents do not migrate from subject to subject. Likewise, if a substantial form and an accidental form are together in the same matter, it is not necessary for the former to be the subject of the latter (or contrariwise). For example, the coldness of water is not the subject for the substantial form of water, namely the subject in which this substantial form inheres, because it can be destroyed and heat can be generated in its stead while the substantial form remains in place; and afterwards another coldness can be generated in the same water, which is not the subject for the form of water since it arrived later, and hence neither was the earlier coldness its subject. But the substantial form of water too is not the subject for this coldness, from the potency of which it comes forth, because perhaps the coldness was first there in the matter before the substantial form of water would have been received in it. After all, the matter has

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calefiat et iterum frigefiat, non oportet propter hoc quod ista caliditas vel frigiditas recipiatur subiective in forma substantiali aquae sed in materia subiecta illi formae. 21. Item, possumus dicere consimiliter quod si lumen vel species coloris in organo animato recipitur, non oportet propter hoc quod in anima recipiatur subiective sed in materia subiecta animae. Et quod ita sit probatur quia, sicut remanet caliditas eadem symbola si ex aere fiat aqua, propter quod neutra istarum formarum substantialium debet dici subiectum istius caliditatis de cuius potentia egreditur, ita si interficiatur equus et in oculo mortuo remaneat diaphaneitas, in eo remanebit lumen vel species coloris sicut ante, si maneat praesens corpus lucidum aut coloratum. Ideo anima non erat subiectum huius luminis vel speciei coloris, et omnino forma substantialis nihil operari videtur ad recipiendum illas, quia consimiliter esset huiusmodi receptio quantumcumque mutarentur formae substantiales, si remaneret subiectum diaphanum. Immo imaginandum est quod si esset materia quanta et diaphana sine forma substantiali per potentiam divinam, adhuc reciperet lumen et speciem coloris sicut nunc. Anima igitur nec operatur ad speciem sensibilem active nec passive. 22. Quinta conclusio principalis ponitur quod organum subiectum animae sive materia recipit sensationem ita quod sensatio educitur de potentia ipsius materiae quia sensatio est actus seu forma extensa extensione organi et materiae, per hoc enim differunt in homine sensa-

165 subiecta ] subiectiva T 168 subiecta ] subiectiva T 170 aqua ] vel ignis add. A 173 coloris ] et omnino forma substantialis add. T 176 recipiendum ] receptionem E || consimiliter ] consimile T 178 imaginandum ] concedendum VW 180 et ] habens A 183–184 educitur . . . sensatio ] hom. A 184 quia ] et quod ET quod V 184–185 extensione ] ad extensionem AT

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to be predisposed by wetness and coldness for receiving the form of water. These dispositions do not have to be destroyed, since the same elemental qualities137 may well persist in what is generated and corrupted, as one should see in my commentary on On Generation and Corruption II. Hence if water becomes hot and then in turn becomes cold, it is not necessary on this score that the hotness or coldness be received in the substantial form of water as their subject, but rather in the matter which is the subject of the substantial form. 21. Again, we can say in like manner that if illumination or the species of color is received in an animated organ, it does not thereby have to be received in the soul as its subject, but rather in the matter that is the subject of the soul. We prove that this is the case as follows. Just as hotness remains the same elemental quality if water comes to be from air, because neither of these substantial forms should be called the subject of this hotness from whose potency it comes forth, so too if a horse were killed and transparency were to persist in its dead eye, then illumination or the species of color will remain in it just as before as long as the bright or colored object were to remain present. Hence, the soul was not the subject of the illumination or the species of color, and the substantial form seems to have nothing whatsoever to do with their reception, since there would likewise be a reception of this sort no matter how much the substantial forms were to change, as long as the subject remains transparent. In fact, we should imagine that if by divine power there were some amount of transparent matter without a substantial form, it would still receive illumination and the species of color, just as it does now. Hence the soul has nothing to do with the sensible species, whether actively or passively. 22. The fifth main conclusion is that the organ subject to the soul, or its matter, receives sensation in such a way that sensation is drawn forth from the potency of this matter because, the act of sensing is an act or a form extended with the extension of the organ and the matter,

137 This

remark alludes to the Aristotelian theory of how the qualities of mixed bodies composed from the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) derive from the contrary pairs of qualities of the elements (hot, cold, wet, dry). But Buridan’s point here merely is that these qualities can be received directly in prime matter, and thus persist numerically the same through substantial change.

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tio et intellectio; omnis autem forma in organo materiali est materiae coextensa, et rationabile est quod sit educta de potentia materiae et ei inhaerens; ergo etc. Item, cum ponamus solam animam in homine quae est indivisibilis et inextensa, oportet quod sensatio vel sit educta de potentia materiae vel sit solum educta de potentia animae intellectivae indivisibilis existentis. Si primo habeo propositum. Si secundo modo hoc videtur impossibile, scilicet illud quod est eductum de potentia subiecti indivisibilis et inextensi sit divisibile et extensum; sed tamen sensatio est in nobis divisibiliter et extense, sicut dicebatur si debeat differre ab intellectione. 23. Sexta conclusio ponitur probabilis quod ista sensatio non solum habet organum materiale, scilicet ipsam materiam, pro subiecto de cuius potentia educuntur sensationes, sed etiam ipsam animam sensitivam, quia si non esset, ita sequeretur quod materia magis proprie cognosceret et sentiret quam anima, et hoc omnes abhorrent concedere. Consequentia patet quia dicit Aristoteles saepius quod sentire est pati, et ideo dictum est prius quod sentire est habere sensationem sibi inhaerentem. Si igitur anima non pateretur nec reciperet sensationem sed solum ageret eam in materia, et materia illa eam pateretur et reciperet, manifestum est quod anima proprie non sentiret nec cognosceret. 24. Item, subiectum accidentis de cuius potentia educitur ipsum accidens, ita quod non educitur de potentia alterius subiective, debet recipere principaliter aliquam denominationem ab illo accidente. Sed ut diceret adversarius, materia sic recipit sensationem et non anima. Igitur materia debet aliquam denominationem ab ista sensatione prin-

201–202 sentire est pati ] E. g. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 416b32 (Ar. lat. XII.2 107.1.3): “Sensus autem in moveri aliquid et pati accidit, sicut dictum est: videtur enim quaedam alteratio esse.” 186 omnis autem ] quia omnis W || forma ] anima A 187 rationabile ] rationale A 188 cum ponamus ] componamus T || solam ] solum W 192 eductum ] solum add. VW 194 divisibiliter ] divisibilis W divisibili T || extense ] extensa W || si ] sequitur quod T 198 educuntur sensationes ] educitur VW 202 sentire ] sensatio E 209 denominationem ] denominativam T || accidente ] et tu expones hanc propositionem maiorem ad debitum sensum, scilicet nomen a nomine add. V 211 aliquam ] aliam T || ista ] denominatione vel add. A

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since the acts of sensing and thinking differ in this regard in human beings; but every form in a material organ is extended together with matter, and it is reasonable that it be drawn forth from the potency of the matter and inherent in it; therefore, etc. Again, since in human beings we postulate a single soul that is indivisible and unextended, sensation must be drawn forth from either the potency of the matter, or only the potency of the existing indivisible intellective soul. By the first alternative, I have the conclusion. The second, however, seems impossible, namely that what is drawn forth from the potency of an indivisible and unextended subject is divisible and extended; but sensation is nonetheless in us in a divisible and extended way, as has been said, if it is supposed to differ from the act of thinking. 23. The sixth conclusion is put forward as plausible, namely that sensation has not only the material organ (the matter itself) as the subject from whose potency acts of sensing are drawn forth, but also has the sensitive soul itself as subject. For if it did not, it would then follow that matter would more properly sense and cognize than the soul does, and everyone would be loath to concede this. The consequence is clear, because Aristotle often says that to sense is to receive something, and so we have already said that to sense is to have an inherent sensation.138 Thus, if the soul were neither to be affected nor to receive sensation but merely act upon it in matter, while the matter was affected by and received it, then clearly the soul properly speaking would neither sense nor cognize. 24. Again, the subject of an accident from whose potency the accident is drawn forth (such that it is not drawn forth from the potency of anything else as its subject) should be the principal recipient of some denomination from the accident. But, an opponent would say, matter receives sensation in this way and the soul does not; hence matter

138 See

par. 13 above.

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cipaliter recipere, quod non apparet verum nisi dicatur principaliter sentiens, quod omnes abhorrent dicere, vel principaliter sensata, quod est falsum, quia si video colorem ego propter hoc nec video nec sensu cognosco materiam eius. 25. Item, persuasio esset ad idem quia nullus intellectus intelligit nisi per suam essentiam formaliter vel per suam intellectionem sibi inhaerentem; ergo nec aliquis sensus sentit nisi per suam essentiam vel per aliquam sensationem sibi inhaerentem. 26. Verum est certe quod magna est dubitatio si ponamus in homine solam animam. Oportet enim istam esse intellectivam et indivisibilem, non extensam aliqua extensione materiae vel subiecti. Et tunc ista anima inextensa est anima sensitiva et vegetativa. Quomodo igitur, cum sensatio ponatur extensa extensione organi et materiae, poterit ipsa esse in subiecto indivisibili inhaerenter et tamquam educta de potentia istius? Et illud videtur mirabile, cum forma non habeat extensionem nisi extensione sui subiecti. Et quomodo etiam divisibile et extensum poterit inhaerere indivisibili et inextenso? Et certe respondeo quod hoc est mirabile, quia mirabili et supernaturali modo anima humana inhaeret corpori extenso non extensa nec de potentia materiae educta cui inhaeret, et tamen etiam toti corpori inhaeret et cuilibet parti eius. Hoc est bene mirabile et super naturam. 27. Idcirco etiam oportet respondere consequentter ad conclusiones. 28. Dico igitur quod sensatio educitur non solum de potentia materiae nec solum de potentia animae sed simul de potentia compositi et ratione totius compositi et utriusque partis, sive in equo sive in homine. Et ea ratione qua in homine educitur de potentia animae et quod

212 recipere ] accipere ATV 213 sentiens ] verum sensus T || dicere ] concedere E om. T || sensata ] sensitiva VW 214 sensu ] sentio nec VW 215 materiam ] materias A 217 formaliter ] formae A 218 sensus ] om. V 219 per aliquam ] om. VW || per ] om. A 221 intellectivam ] intellectionem T 229 mirabili ] miraculose est AE miraculose fit T 230 extenso ] humano EVW 231 materiae ] subiecti V 232 super naturam ] supernaturale A 233–234 conclusiones ] consequentias AET consequentiam VW 235–236 materiae ] materiali E 238 animae ] materiae T

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should be principally denominated from sensation. Yet this appears to be true only if matter is principally called what senses, which everyone would be loath to say, or what is sensed, which is false, because if I see a color then I do not on this account see or grasp its matter by sense. 25. Again, a persuasive argument for the same point might be that the intellect formally thinks only through its essence or through its act of thinking which inheres in it; therefore, any sense senses only through its essence or through some act of sensing inhering in it.139 26. It is certainly true that there is a serious issue were we to hold that in a human being there is a single soul. For this soul has to be intellective and indivisible, not extended by any extension of matter or subject. This unextended soul is then the sensitive and vegetative soul. Yet since sensation is supposed to be extended with the extension of the organ and matter, how then can it be inherent in an indivisible subject and, as it were, drawn forth from its potency? That seems miraculous, since a form has extension only through the extension of its subject. And how too can something divisible and extended inhere in something indivisible and unextended? Well, I reply that this certainly is miraculous, since it is in a miraculous and supernatural manner that the human soul inheres in an extended body while neither being extended nor drawn forth from the potency of the matter in which it inheres, and nevertheless inheres in the whole body and in every part of it. This is quite miraculous and supernatural.140 27. Accordingly, in what follows, we need to reply to the conclusions. 28. Therefore, I say that sensation is drawn forth not from the potency of matter alone, nor from the potency of the soul alone, but together from the potency of the composite and on account of the whole composite and of each part, whether in a horse or in a human being. 139 Sensatio here (and

elsewhere in similar contexts) is translated as ‘act of sensing’ to preserve the parallel exploited by Buridan with intellectio, rendered as ‘act of thinking’. Likewise, sensatio will be rendered as ‘act of sensing’ when it is important to emphasize that Buridan is talking about a determinate single act rather than about any single act of sensing in general. 140 Buridan discusses the inherence of the human soul in its body in Book III, q. 4 below.

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anima etiam ipsam agit in se, anima cognoscit, et ea ratione qua educitur de potentia materiae ipsa, est extensa extensione materiae. 29. Nec obstat quod ipsa est in subiecto indivisibili, scilicet in anima intellectiva, quia anima intellectiva non est indivisibilis tamquam habens positionem in continuo, sicut imaginaretur de puncto, sed sic quod ipsa est indifferenter in qualibet parte corporis quantumcumque extensi. Sicut igitur non repugnat tali indivisibili esse in toto corpore extenso, ita nec repugnat talem sensationem extensam esse in toto tali subiecto indivisibili. 30. Sed tunc certe merito dubium est utrum materia equi sentiat et utrum materia mea intelligat. Cum enim sensatio equi inhaerat materiae equi et est educta de eius potentia, quid obstaret quin illa materia sentiret ista sensatione, sicut subiectum cui inhaeret albedo est album ista albedine? Et similiter intellectio mea inhaeret animae meae et anima mea inhaeret materiae meae; sequitur quod intellectio inhaeret materiae. Quid igitur obstaret quin materia mea intelligeret ista intellectione? 31. Ad hoc potest responderi quod nos ponimus multa accidentia inhaerere primae materiae immediate, ita quod non mediante forma substantiali, ut caliditatem, frigiditatem, albedinem, nigredinem et huiusmodi. Et tamen denominando vulgus propter ignorantiam materiae non attribuit ista accidentia materiae sed toti composito sibi noto. Non enim dicit materiam aquae esse calidam aut frigidam sed aquam. Et tamen secundum rei veritatem materia est calida vel frigida. Unde si removeretur per potentiam divinam forma substantialis aquae ab aqua aliis conservatis materia vere esset calida vel frigida caliditate aut frigiditate sibi inhaerente. Et non minus esset calida si sibi cum

239 anima ] omnia T 244 parte corporis ] corpore T 246 extenso . . . toto ] om. T || sensationem ] speciem AET 251 sensatione ] per illam sensationem W 252 ista albedine ] om. T || animae ] vel materiae add. A 253 et . . . materiae ] om. A || anima mea inhaeret ] si intellectio inhaereat E 253–254 sequitur . . . materiae ] om. E 254 materiae ] meae add. T 259 tamen ] materiam add. V 261 aquae esse ] om. A aquam T

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Insofar as sensation is drawn forth in a human being from the potency of the soul and the soul produces it in itself, the soul cognizes; insofar as it is drawn forth from the potency of matter, it is extended with the extension of matter. 29. And it does not make any difference that sensation is in an indivisible subject (the intellective soul). For the intellective soul is not indivisible as though it were something having a position in a continuum, as we would imagine about a point. Instead, it is indivisible in such a way that it is indifferently in every part of the body, no matter how extended. Therefore, just as it is not incompatible for something indivisible in this way to be in a whole extended body, so too it is not incompatible for such an extended sensation to be in a whole subject that is indivisible in this way. 30. But then the issue arises (with good reason) whether the matter of a horse senses and whether my matter thinks. Given that the horse’s act of sensing inheres in the horse’s matter and is drawn forth from its potency, what would prevent matter from sensing by this act of sensing, just as the subject in which a whiteness inheres is white by this whiteness? Likewise, my act of thinking inheres in my soul and my soul inheres in my matter; it follows that the act of thinking inheres in matter; what then would prevent my matter from thinking by this act of thinking? 31. To this we may reply that we hold that many accidents inhere in prime matter immediately without the mediation of substantial form — for example, hotness, coldness, whiteness, blackness, and the like. Yet when ordinary people speak denominatively, because of their ignorance of matter, they do not attribute these accidents to matter but instead to the whole composite known to them. They do not say that the matter of water is hot or cold, but rather that water itself is hot or cold. However, the truth is that the matter is hot or cold. Accordingly, if the substantial form of water were removed from water by divine power, with everything else preserved, the matter would truly be hot

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ista caliditate inhaereat forma substantialis, ex quo caliditas ponitur sibi inhaerere. 32. Sed in proposito nonne oportet concedere quod materia est animata cum anima sit forma sibi inhaerens, sicut paries est albus albedine sibi inhaerente, licet ista non sit de essentia parietis sicut nec anima de essentia materiae? Et tamen vulgus non consuevit dicere quod materia prima sit animata sed planta vel animal. 33. Utrumque tamen est animatum sed diversimode. Planta enim est animata anima quae est de eius essentia; materia autem est animata eadem anima sibi inhaerente. Nunc autem de sensatione diceremus quod sensatio non solum inhaeret materiae nec solum educitur de potentia materiae, sed inhaeret composito ex materia et anima et de eius potentia educitur ratione utriusque, et principalius et immediatius ratione animae. Et ideo nec anima nec materia dicitur sentire tamquam totale subiectum sensationis. Et hoc intendebat Aristoteles in primo huius dicens sic: “Dicere autem animam irasci simile est et si aliquis dicat eam texere vel aedificare. Melius autem fortasse est non dicere animam misereri aut addiscere aut intelligere sed hominem.” Tunc non apparet mihi inconveniens dicere quod anima sentit et irascitur tamquam subiectum partiale huiusmodi operationum vel passionum, et quod etiam materia vel corpus subiectum similiter dicatur irasci vel sentire tamquam subiectum partiale, minus tamen proprie quam anima, cum principalius et immediatius anima ponatur subiectum sensationi et intellectioni quam corpus. Sed tamen nec materia sine anima nec anima sine materia sentiret, cum de neutrius potentia sensatio sufficienter educatur, nisi Deus miraculose vellet conservare sensationem sine subiecto de cuius potentia egrediebatur.

281–283 Dicere . . . hominem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. I.4 408b 12–14 (Ar. lat. XII.2 47.1.17–19): “Dicere autem irasci animam, simile est et si aliquis dicat eam texere vel aedificare. Melius enim fortassis est non dicere animam misereri aut addiscere aut intelligere, sed hominem anima.” 268 nonne ] non T non (?) V te (?) W 274 essentia ] et econverso add. T 275 Nunc ] tertio modo T 277 materiae ] primae add. V || ex ] potentia seu add. A 286 subiectum ] animae add. VW 290 sensatio ] sensitiva TVW 292 egrediebatur ] educeretur A

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or cold through the hotness or coldness inhering in it. It would be no less hot if its substantial form were to inhere in it along with this hotness. 32. Well, is it not necessary in the case at hand to grant that matter is animated? For the soul is a form inhering in it, just as a wall is white owing to the whiteness inhering in it even though it does not pertain to the essence of the wall, as the soul does not pertain to the essence of matter. Nevertheless, ordinary people do not typically say that prime matter is animated but rather that an animal or a plant is. 33. Yet each are animated, though in different ways. A plant is animated through the soul which pertains to its essence; matter, however, is animated by the same soul inhering in it. Now we would say as regards sensation that it not only inheres in matter and is not only drawn forth from the potency of matter, but it inheres in the composite of matter and soul, and it is drawn forth from the potency of the composite on account of both, but more principally and immediately on account of the soul. Hence neither the soul nor the matter is said to sense as though it were the total subject of sensation. This is what Aristotle meant in Book I when he said: “Saying that the soul is angry is like saying that it is weaving or building. Perhaps it is better not to say that the soul pities or learns or understands, but to say that the human being does.” Then it does not appear to me to be unacceptable to say that the soul senses or is angry as a partial subject of operations or affections of this sort — or even that matter or the body as subject should likewise be said to be angry or to sense as a partial subject, although less properly so than the soul, for the soul is taken to be more principally and more immediately the subject for acts of sensing and thinking than the body. However, neither the matter without the soul, nor the soul without the matter, would sense, since an act of sensing is not sufficiently drawn forth from the potency of either, unless God

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34. De intelligere autem adhuc in dicta auctoritate ponit Aristoteles quod magis proprie dicimus hominem intelligere quam animam, tamen magis proprie est dicere quod anima intelligit quam quod sentit, et minus proprie est dicere quod corpus intelligit quam quod sentit, propter hoc quod intellectio inhaereat toti composito et utrique parti, tamen solum educitur de potentia animae et non de potentia materiae, sicut nec ipsa anima intellectiva. 35. Tunc igitur manifestum est quod non oportet solvere rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis, quia bene concessum est — et conceditur magis in alia quaestione — quod potentia sensitiva, quae est anima sensitiva et vegetativa, est potentia activa; immo etiam est potentia activa ad sensationem. Et hoc non obstat quin etiam cum haec sit potentia passiva, scilicet receptiva sensationis. Ideo licet rationes quae fiebant vel aliquae earum non sint omnino falsae, tamen nihil concludunt contra dicta quia solum concludunt quod sit potentia activa. 36. Sed iuxta dicta restat adhuc unum dubium, videlicet utrum sit concedendum quod sensus patitur a sensibili, quia manifestum est quod Aristoteles dicit quod sic, sed oppositum videtur ex dictis manifeste. Cum enim sensibile non agat nisi speciem sensibilem et anima non recipiat istam sed organum solum, videtur quod sensibile nihil agat in animam, quae est sensus, et sic sensus nihil patitur a sensibili. Similiter credo quod sensibile nihil agat in sensum loquendo proprie, et sic etiam sensus, id est anima sensitiva, nihil patitur a sensibili. Immo posito quod ab excellenti calido corrumpatur anima et vita, adhuc anima non pateretur sed materia. Subiectum enim est quod vere patitur et proprie in quo forma producitur vel a quo abiicitur. Forma autem quae sic producitur aut abiicitur est ipsa passio vel actio. Unde fieri vel corrumpi subiective bene est pati; sed fieri vel corrumpi terminative non est pati, nisi secundum impropriam locutionem qua tamen saepe utimur. Sed ego pono quod sensibile sit proportionatum

302 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.10. STOTELES , De an. II.12 424a 28. 306 falsae ] verae VW 309 iuxta ] contra AET producitur ] introducitur T

311 dicit quod sic ] A RI -

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wanted to preserve the act of sensing miraculously, without the subject from whose potency it was drawn forth. 34. As for thinking, Aristotle claims in the above-quoted passage that we more properly say that a human being thinks than his soul does, yet it still is more proper to say that the soul thinks than that it senses, and it is less proper to say that the body thinks than that it senses, because an act of thinking inheres in the whole composite and in each part, even though it is drawn forth only from the potency of the soul and not from the potency of matter, just as the intellective soul itself is not drawn forth from the potency of matter. 35. Then it is clear that we need not reply to the objections raised at the beginning of the question, for it has rightly been granted — and will be granted even more in the next question — that the sensitive power, which is the sensitive and vegetative soul, is an active power; indeed, even that it is an active power with regard to sensation. This does not prevent it from also being a passive power, namely one receptive of sensation. Therefore, although the arguments that were made (or some of them) are not entirely unsound, they still do not entail anything against what has been said, since they only entail that it is an active power. 36. But in line with the foregoing remarks, there still remains one problem, namely whether we should concede that sense is affected by the sensible, because it is clear that Aristotle says it is, whereas the opposite is clearly apparent from the foregoing remarks. Since the sensible produces only the sensible species, and the soul does not receive the sensible species, but only the organ does, it seems that the sensible does not act upon the soul (which is the sense), and so the sense is not affected at all by the sensible object. Likewise, I believe that the sensible object does not act upon the sense at all, properly speaking. So too, the sense (the sensitive soul) is not affected by the sensible object at all. Indeed, assuming that excessive heat were to destroy the soul and life, the soul would still not be affected, but rather the matter. For what is truly and properly affected is the subject in which a form is produced or from which a form is expelled; and the form that is thus produced or expelled is the action or affection

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ut fiat in animali species sensibilis et sensatio sine corruptione aliqua. Adhuc anima non patitur proprie a sensibili, sed dicitur pati ab eo secundum impropriam locutionem et attributionem, scilicet ex eo solum quod subiectum in quo est, scilicet organum, patitur a sensibili, sicut exemplificatur quod dolium aliquando dicimus acescere quia vinum existens in eo acescit, vel etiam ea intentione quia species sensibilis quam sensibile agit concurrit de necessitate tamquam dispositio activa vel passiva ad formationem sensationis quae recipitur in anima. 37. Parum vidi quod praedictae dubitationes sic in speciali tractarentur; ideo difficile est mihi bene dicere, sed tamen forte haec erunt principia motiva aliorum ad cogitandum et melius dicendum de praedictis; sic enim “dubitare de singulis non est inutile,” ut dicit Aristoteles.

335 dubitare . . . inutile ] A RISTOTELES, Cat. I.7 8b 21–22 (Ar. lat. I.1 7.23.18): “de singulis non erit inutile.” 328 exemplificatur ] exercat T || dolium ] oleum T

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itself. Therefore, coming to be or ceasing to be as a subject is nothing but to be affected. But coming to be or ceasing to be as a terminus of change is not being affected, except improperly speaking, which, nevertheless, we often do. Now, I maintain that the sensible object is well-suited to produce a sensible species and an act of sensing in the animal without causing any destruction. Yet the soul would not be affected by the sensible object properly speaking, though it is said to be affected, speaking improperly and attributively, solely in virtue of the fact that the subject in which it inheres (the organ) is affected by the object of sense — just like when we say that this barrel is turning sour because the wine in it is turning sour, and we also mean that the sensible species that the sensible object produces cooperates of necessity as an active or passive disposition for the formation of the act of sensing which is received in the soul. 37. I did not quite see that the foregoing problems would be discussed in such detail; hence it is difficult for me to provide the correct answers. Well, perhaps these things will motivate others to think about them and give better answers. Thus “it is not useless to raise difficulties about each,” as Aristotle says.

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Utrum necesse est ad sentiendum esse sensum agentem.

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1. Arguitur quod sic quia sicut se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia, sic etiam sensus ad sensibilia, ut habetur tertio huius; et apparet quod sit conveniens proportio; sed ad intelligendum necesse est concurrere intellectum agentem, ut apparet tertio huius; ergo etc. 2. Oppositum arguitur quia si esset sensus agens, Aristoteles esset valde insufficiens et diminutus quia non tractavit de isto manifeste, quia iste, si esset, esset nobilior sensu passivo seu passibili, sicut Aristoteles ponit intellectum agentem esse nobiliorem intellectu possibili. 3. De ista quaestione fuerunt valde diversae opiniones. Unde multis visum est quod omnino in proposito sit proportionaliter dicendum de sensu et intellectu, quia Aristoteles, ubi inquisivit intellectum agentem, posuit rationem communem sensui et intellectui, dicens universaliter quod in omni natura, scilicet ubi invenitur novus effectus, necesse est esse duo principia, scilicet activum et passivum, et quod semper oportet esse honorabilius agens passo. Et non apparet quod ex illo universali principio debeamus magis concludere intellectum agentem ultra passivum quam sensum agentem ultra passivum.

4 tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a16–17. 6 tertio huius ] A RISTO TELES , De an. III.5 430a 14–15; B URIDANUS , QQ. De an. III.10. 10–11 ponit . . . possibili ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a17–19. 15–18 universaliter . . . passo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 10–18 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.12): “Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente et principium materia.” 8–9 manifeste ] maxime AET 9 passibili ] possibili A et possibili add. W 10–11 possibili ] passibili EV 14 ubi ] ubicumque AT © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 16

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Is an agent sense necessary in order to sense?

1. It is argued that it is, because just as the intellect relates to intelligible objects, so does the sense to sensible objects, as is stated in Book III. And the analogy seems to be suitable. But for understanding, the agent intellect must cooperate, as will be clear in Book III. Therefore, etc. 2. The opposite is argued, because if there were an agent sense, then Aristotle’s treatment of the issue would be rather incomplete and defective, since he did not discuss this thoroughly, although this agent sense, if there were one, would be nobler than the passive or passible sense, just as Aristotle claims that the agent intellect is nobler than the possible intellect. 3. There have been very diverse opinions about this question. To many people141 it appeared concerning this issue that we should talk about sense and intellect in an entirely analogical fashion, because Aristotle, where he investigated the agent intellect, proposed a common way of thinking about sense and intellect, stating in general that in every nature, that is, where a new effect is found, there have to be two principles, namely an active one and a passive one, and that the agent always has to be superior to the patient. And it does not appear that, from this universal principle, we ought to conclude even more that there is an agent intellect besides a passive one than conclude that there has to be an agent sense besides the passive sense.

141 See

Brenet 2010.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 16

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4. Et omnino isti utebantur tali ratione tamquam clara demonstratione. Primo supponebant quod non possit argui nobilitas potentiae vel subiecti nisi ex nobilitate operationis vel modi operandi. 5. Secundo supponebant quod sensatio sit nobilior operatio quam sit vegetatio cum secundum hanc operationem gradus animalium excedat gradum plantarum; ideo concluditur quod sensatio sit opus nobilissimum animae sensitivae quae non est intellectiva. 6. Tertio supponebant quod anima sensitiva est nobilior in bruto, ut in equo aut cane, quam sit aliqua forma vel dispositio rei inanimatae ut lapidis, ferri, aquae, vel aeris. 7. Quarto supponebant quod semper est necesse agens esse honorabilius passo, ut habetur tertio huius, quod apparet verum si sit agens principale (non solum dispositivum vel instrumentale agentis principalis), et etiam quod passum non habeat nobiliorem operationem quam sit passio secundum quam patitur ab illo agente. 8. Hiis enim salvatis non apparet quod debeat esse instantia contra istam regulam Aristotelis, cum non posset argui nobilitas subiecti vel potentiae nisi ex nobilitate operationis, ut dicit prima suppositio. 9. Tunc ex hiis arguunt sic. Vel anima sensitiva agit sensationem vel non sed solum patitur et recipit eam. Si agit eam, tunc ista debet dici sensus agens et habetur propositum, scilicet quod sit dare sensum agentem ad sensationem. Si vero dicitur quod non agit eam sed solum patitur et recipit eam, tunc oportet dicere quod obiectum agit eam tamquam principale agens, et tamen non potest argui maior nobilitas animae sensitivae quam ex sensatione, cum ista sit eius nobilissima operatio, ut dicebat secunda suppositio; et tamen in hoc casu oportet

32 ut habetur tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a16–17. (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.12): “Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente et principium materia.” 21 clara ] certa V 23 vel subiecti ] om. V || subiecti ] instrumentali add. A sciri (?) W 27 intellectiva ] intellectivae AE 37 regulam ] rationem E 42 sensationem ] sentiendum V

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4. And these people used this sort of reasoning as if it were an entirely sound demonstration. For they assumed in the first place that the nobility of a power or a subject could only be argued for from the nobility of its activity or mode of acting. 5. In the second place they assumed that sensation is a nobler activity than vegetating, since it is in this activity that animals surpass plants in degree of perfection. Therefore, it is concluded that sensation is the noblest function of the sensitive soul that is not intellective. 6. Thirdly, they assumed that the sensitive soul is nobler in a brute animal, such as a horse or a dog, than any form or disposition of an inanimate thing, such as a stone, iron, water, or air. 7. In the fourth place they assumed that it is always necessary that the agent is superior to the patient, as is stated in Book III, which seems to be true concerning the principal agent (as opposed to something merely disposed by or instrumental for the principal agent), and they also assume that the patient does not have a nobler activity than the reception of the agent’s action. 8. For these assumptions being in place, it does not seem that there should be any counterinstance to this rule of Aristotle’s, since there is no way to argue for the nobility of the subject or a power, except from the nobility of its activity, as the first assumption stated.142 9. Then, from these assumptions they argue as follows. The sensitive soul either acts to produce sensation, or it does not, but merely passively receives it. If it acts to produce it, then it can be said to be agent sense, and then we have what we wanted to prove, namely that there has to be an agent sense for sensation. But if it is said that the sensitive soul does not produce , but merely passively receives it, then one has to say that the object produces it as a principal agent, and yet one can argue for the greater nobility of the sensitive 142 See

par. 4 above.

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agens esse nobilius passo, ut dicebat quarta suppositio; igitur oportet agens inanimatum, ut lapidem, esse nobilius ipsa anima sensitiva, quod est falsum, ut dicebat tertia suppositio; igitur falsum est dicere quod anima sensitiva non agit. 10. Et confirmatur quia non apparet quod per alium modum arguendi valeret ratio Aristotelis in tertio huius ad concludendum intellectum agentem. 11. Sed quamvis ista ratio sit bene ordinata et apparens, tamen aliqui cavillant contra eam dicentes primo quod in bruto non sit sensatio nobilior quam nutritio vel sibi similis generatio, cum sensatio non sit nisi accidens et nutritio est conversio alimenti in substantiam nutriti, et sic est generatio substantialis quae est substantia, immo quae est anima sensitiva, et ista est nobilior quam aliquid accidens. Immo etiam licet sensatio sit nobis data ad deserviendum intellectui quantum ad intelligere, tamen brutis non videtur esse data nisi ad nutritionem et augmentationem et similis generationem, et omnino ad necessitatem vitae exercendam et procurandam, propter quod plantis non fuit data sensatio quia ex alimento coniuncto planta potest sufficienter nutriri et generare sibi simile sine sensatione; et aliquibus etiam animalibus est datus solus sensus tactus, quia iste sufficit eis ad nutriendum et necessitatem vitae; animalibus autem indigentibus quaerere a longe alimenta dati sunt sensus ad hoc necessarii, propter quod in illis nutritio vel similis generatio videtur esse finis sensationis, et finis est nobilior ordinatis ad finem. Ideo licet diceremus animam sensitivam se habere pure passive ad sensationem et quod obiectum modo nobiliori concurreret ad sensationem quam anima sensitiva, tamen non sequitur quod est nobilius quam anima sensitiva, cum ipsa etiam sit anima vegetativa quae habet nobiliorem operationem quam sit aliqua operatio obiecti sensibilis inanimati. Nec propter hoc etiam sequere-

52 tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5. 48 agens ] obiectum V 54 ordinata ] arguta VW 55 cavillant ] arguebant V 57 substantiam ] subiectum V 61 brutis ] anima bruti AT 66 nutriendum ] nutrimentum AETV 68–69 nutritio ] nutrimento V 71 pure ] proprie add. A

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soul only from sensation, since this is its noblest activity, as the second assumption stated.143 However, in this case the agent has to be nobler than the patient, as the fourth assumption stated.144 Therefore, an inanimate agent, such as a stone, has to be nobler than the sensitive soul, which is false, as the third assumption stated.145 Therefore, it is false to claim that the sensitive soul does not act. 10. This conclusion is confirmed, because it does not seem that Aristotle’s argument in the third book for an agent intellect can work in any other way. 11. However, although this argument is well-constructed and plausible, some people quibble against it, saying first that in brute animals sensation does not seem to be nobler than nutrition or generating their like, since sensation is only an accident and nutrition is the conversion of nourishment into the substance of the nourished, and so it is substantial generation, which is a substance,146 indeed, a substance that is the sensitive soul, and this is nobler than any accident. Indeed, although sensation is given to us to serve the intellect for understanding, to brutes it seems to be given only to serve nutrition and growth and generating their like, to carry out and secure the necessities of life altogether, for which reason sensation was not given to plants, because, being joined to the source of its nutriment, a plant is capable of sufficiently nourishing and reproducing itself without sensation. And even some animals were only given the sense of touch, as it suffices for them to nourish themselves and for the necessities of life. But animals that need to seek out their food from afar were given senses necessary for this purpose, for which reason nutrition or generating their like in their case seems to be the end of sensation, and the end is nobler than a means to the end. And so, even if we said that the sensitive soul is related purely passively to sensation and that the object cooperates in the production of sensation in a nobler way than the sensitive soul does, it still does not follow that it is nobler,

143 See

par. 5 above. par. 7 above. 145 See par. 6 above. 146 For Buridan, generation is the generated thing. See Summulae de dialectica 6.4.14 (tr. Klima, 449–450) and Questions on Aristotle’s De anima II.8 par. 11. 144 See

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tur quod anima equi non haberet nobiliorem operationem quam anima plantae, quia nutritio equi est multum nobilior quam nutritio plantae, sicut equus est nobilior planta. 12. Secunda cavillatio esset dicendo sicut nos dicimus de generatis ex putrefactione, cum enim oportet generans principale esse nobilius generato, vel saltem aeque nobile, quia agens non potest virtute propria dare plus quam habeat, et cum nullum appareat agens corporeum in generatione ranae quod sit nobilius rana, quia omnia corpora approximata illi generationi sunt inanimata. Corpus enim caeleste, si agat hoc, non est nisi per virtutem quam influit in aerem vel aquam continentem materiam generationis ranae, et adhuc ista virtus, cum non sit nisi accidens, non est nobilior substantia ranae, scilicet quam anima sensitiva. Propter quod oportet concludere quod ad generationem ranae concurrit aliud agens principalius incorporeum et nobilius, quod Avicenna vocat datorem formarum qui est ipse Deus benedictus a quo vel solo vel principaliter agente fit in materia disposita omne quod fit. 13. Et tunc posset dici quod sensus et intellectus ab omnibus sensibilibus et intelligibilibus recipiunt species intelligibiles et sensibiles per quas disponuntur ad recipiendum sensationes et intellectiones quas in eis sic dispositis sine alio agente facit ille dator formarum. Et iste est intellectus agens, quem concludit Aristoteles in tertio huius, et quem laudat, dicens: “Et etiam hic intellectus separabilis et impassibilis et immixtus est substantia actu ens, et honorabilior,” scilicet intellectu nostro possibili. Unde etiam statim de ipso ipse dicit, “Idem

79–80 sicut . . . putrefactione ] BURIDANUS, QQ. De gen. et corr. II.12 (ed. Streijger and Bakker, 251.18–19). 90 Avicenna vocat ] AVICENNA, De gen et corr. XIV (ed. van Riet, 139.45–49). 97–98 Et . . . honorabilior ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a17–19 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.11–12): “Et hic intellectus separabilis et impassibilis et immixtus, substantia actu ens. Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente et principium materia.” 99–100 Idem . . . rei ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a19–20 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.3): “Idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei.” 82 appareat agens ] agat AET 85 aquam ] in aliquam T 87 anima ] animata V 89 nobilius ] naturalius A naturalius quam T 92 omnibus ] obiectis VW 93–94 recipiunt . . . sensibiles ] om. A 97–98 separabilis . . . est ] inest A

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for the sensitive soul is also the vegetative soul, which has a nobler activity than any activity of an inanimate sensible object. Nor would it follow from this either that the soul of a horse would not have a nobler activity than the soul of a plant, since the nutrition of a horse is much nobler than the nutrition of a plant, just as a horse is nobler than a plant. 12. The second quibble would arise from speaking just as we speak about animals generated from putrefaction, for the principal generating thing must be nobler than the generated thing, or at least equally noble, since the agent cannot give more by its own power than what it has, and because there appears to be no corporeal thing acting in the generation of a frog that is nobler than the frog, since all bodies near that generation are inanimate. For a celestial body, if it plays a role in this, does so only by the power that it infuses in the air or water that contains the matter of the generation of the frog, and even that power, as it is just an accident, is not nobler than the substance of the frog, namely than its sensitive soul. For this reason one has to conclude that the generation of a frog involves the cooperation of another nobler and more principal immaterial agent, which Avicenna calls the giver of forms, who is the holy God, by whom there comes to be in some appropriately disposed matter everything that comes to be. 13. And then one might say that sense and intellect receive from all sensible and intelligible things the intelligible and sensible species by which they are disposed to receive acts of sensing and thinking that are made in them thus disposed, without any other agent, by that giver of forms. And this is the agent intellect, which Aristotle concludes in Book III, and which he praises by saying “and this intellect, inseparable, impassible, and unmixed, is by its substance a being in activity, and is more honorable,” namely than our possible intellect. Hence he

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enim est secundum actum scientia rei,” iste enim intelligit omnia per suam simplicem essentiam sine intellectione vel scientia addita. Sic igitur est dare necessario intellectum agentem non solum ad formationem nostrae intellectionis sed etiam ad formationem sensationis et universaliter ad omnis alterius rei productionem. Sed non est sic dare sensum agentem, quia ille dator formarum, cum omnia cognoscat per suam simplicem essentiam et sine organo corporeo, non debet dici sensus, sed intellectus et purus intelligendi actus. Haec est opinio quorumdam, quae non est improbabilis. 14. Alii autem aliter posuerunt intellectum agentem tamquam partem vel potentiam animae humanae, non ponentes tamen sensum agentem. Dixerunt enim intellectum agentem requiri ad abstrahendum species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, vel universalia a singularibus, quod non indiget facere sensus, cum sensus non cognoscat universaliter. Sed de hoc videndum erit in tertio huius. 15. Ego autem credo et puto esse demonstrabile quod, ad nostram intellectionem et ad omne aliud quod fit, necessarium est concurrere active, immo principaliter agere, illum primum intellectum agentem qui omnibus quidem dat esse et vivere, “hiis quidem clarius, hiis vero obscurius,” ut dicit Aristoteles in primo Caeli. 16. Sed ultra credo quod anima nostra sit potentia activa ad intellectionem et quod sic debeat dici intellectus agens, et similiter quod anima sensitiva, sive in nobis sive in brutis, agat ad producendum sensationem et quod sic debeat dici sensus agens. 17. Notandum est enim quod, licet agens universale quod est Deus possit unumquodque agere determinate sine alio agente determinato, tamen illa non diceretur actio naturalis sed miraculosa. In actionibus

107–108 opinio quorumdam ] Cf. A EGIDIUS ROMANUS Quodlibeta III. 13 (ed. Bononiae, 53ra –55va ). 109 Alii ] Cf. A LBERTUS M AGNUS, De anima II.3.6 (ed. Stroick) 104.48–50. 114 tertio huius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.10. 119 primo Caeli ] A RISTOTELES, De caelo I.9 279a 29–30 (Ar. lat. VIII.2): “Unde et aliis communicatum est hiis quidem clarius, hiis autem obscurius esse et vivere.” 103 nostrae intellectionis ] nostri intellectum V 105 dator ] creator V 109– 110 partem vel ] praecedat A 117 primum ] purum W 117–118 intellectum agentem ] actum intelligentem E 118 dat ] est AET 120 ultra ] etiam ego opinor et add. W || credo ] opinor V 125 agente ] om. V

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immediately says about it: “For it is identical in act with the knowledge of the thing,” since this intellect understands everything by its simple essence, without some added act of thinking or knowledge. In this way, then, there has to be an agent intellect, not only for the formation of our acts of thinking, but also for the formation of acts of sensing, and universally for the production of every other thing. But there does not have to be an agent sense in this way, for this giver of forms, since it cognizes everything by its own simple essence, and without any bodily organ, should not be called sense, but intellect and a pure act of understanding. This is the opinion of some people, and it is not implausible. 14. Others proposed that the agent intellect was a part or power of the human soul, yet they did not posit an agent sense. For they said that the agent intellect is required for abstracting intelligible species from phantasms, or universals from singulars, which sense does not need to do, since sense does not cognize universally. But this issue will have to be discussed in Book III. 15. But I believe and take it to be demonstrable that the first agent intellect has to cooperate actively, indeed principally act, for our thinking (and everything else that comes to be), giving everything its being and life, “to some brighter, to others dimmer,” as Aristotle says in On the Heavens I. 16. But I also believe that our soul is an active power in our thinking and so it has to be called an agent intellect, and likewise that the sensitive soul, whether in us or in brute animals, acts in producing sensation, and that in this way it has to be called an agent sense. 17. For we should note that although the universal agent that is God can act to produce determinately anything without another determinate agent, that act would not be called a natural action, but miracu-

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autem naturalibus oportet praeter agens universale concurrere agentia particularia determinantia ad hoc quod potius fiat hoc quam illud, ut ignis agens determinat ad hoc ut producatur ignis et non aqua, et semen equi ad hoc ut producatur equus et non capra. 18. Modo constat quod eisdem concurrentibus intellectus noster libere potest formare propositionem affirmativam vel negativam. Sic enim possum formare in mente mea quod hoc est asinus sicut quod hoc non est asinus, et quod homo non est animal sicut quod homo est animal; et ad hoc etiam quod ego formem affirmativam et non negativam, hoc non determinat obiectum vel phantasma; igitur anima nostra ad hoc agit sicut agens particulare et determinans. 19. Sed ultra non solum intellectus immo etiam sensus — etiam in equo et cane — componit et dividit. Iudicat enim quem vidit vel vocantem esse dominum suum et vadit ad eum. Et si viderit viam directam esse malam, iudicat non esse eumdem per illam et quaerit aliam. Et sicut dicet Aristoteles postea sensus communis discernit dulce esse idem quod album vel diversum. Cum igitur ad sic componendum vel dividendum praeter agens universale debeat esse aliud agens particulare determinans, et non sufficiat ad hoc obiectum, oportet concedere quod anima in hoc habeat actionem. 20. Item sicut dicunt Avicenna et alii commentatores et expositores Aristotelis virtus aestimativa etiam in brutis ex intentionibus sensatis per sensus exteriores elicit alias non sensatas, ut ovis ex visu lupi intentionem inimicitiae, et ex visu pastoris intentionem amicitiae, ad quod active eliciendum et formandum non sufficiunt exteriora sensibilia. Igitur anima ad hoc agit.

142 dicet Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.2 426b 17–22. AVICENNA, Lib. de an. IV.3 (ed. van Riet, 38.28–39.38).

147 Avicenna ]

132 propositionem ] conclusionem A 149 sensus ] species V tiones add. A species add. W 152 ad ] ad AET

|| alias ] inten-

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lous. In natural actions, on the other hand, besides the universal agent there have to be cooperating particular determining agents, in order to produce this rather than that, as fire by its action determines that fire is produced and not water, and the seed of a horse by its action determines that a horse is produced and not a goat. 18. Now, it is clear that, while the same things are cooperating, our intellect can freely form an affirmative or a negative proposition. For I can form in my mind the proposition that this is a donkey, just as well as the proposition that this is not a donkey, and that man is not an animal, just as well as that man is an animal. And that I may form an affirmative proposition and not a negative one is not determined by the object or the phantasm. Therefore, it is our soul that acts as a particular, determining agent. 19. But, furthermore, not only the intellect, but sense as well — even in a horse and a dog — affirms and denies. For a dog judges that the person he sees or is calling is his master, and goes to him.147 And if he should see a direct route to be bad, he judges that he must not go that way, and looks for another route. And as Aristotle later on declares, the common sense discerns this sweet thing to be the same as this white thing, or to be distinct from it. Since, therefore, to affirm or deny in this way there has to be another particular determining agent besides the universal agent — and for this the object does not suffice — one has to concede that the soul is active in this process. 20. Again, as Avicenna and other commentators and expositors of Aristotle say, the estimative power even in brute animals elicits from the intentions sensed by the external senses other intentions not sensed, as a sheep elicits the intention of enmity from the sight of a wolf and the intention of amity from the sight of the shepherd, for the active eliciting and formation of which the external sense objects are not sufficient. Therefore, the soul acts in this process. 147 Since

Buridan talks about the dog’s ‘judging’ something, he obviously intends to use the terms ‘componit’ and ‘dividit’ in their technical sense, meaning ‘affirms’ and ‘denies’. However, strictly speaking, these terms describe the intellectual activities of judgment-formation, which a dog, lacking intellect, cannot perform. So, Buridan is clearly using these terms analogously, meaning that the dog’s sensitive soul is capable of putting together and separating sensory representations in a way that resembles the activity of judgment formation, insofar as the content of the dog’s complex sensory representation might adequately be spelled out by us in an intellectual judgment, such as ‘My master is calling’, etc.

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21. Et cum istis rationibus apponuntur aliae quae prius tactae et positae fuerunt tamquam probabiles et persuasivae. Tales enim rationes forte sufficiunt in hac materia; non enim in omnibus est demonstratio expetenda Unde sic ego concedo sensum agentem quem credo formare active sensationem in seipso. 22. Sed tunc est dubitatio quomodo sit possibile quod idem in seipso agat et a seipso patiatur, cum Aristoteles videatur hoc negare in multis locis. Et ego dico quod hoc debet alibi perscrutari. Ideo solummodo dico pro nunc quod non est possibile idem agere in se sic quod non concurrat cum eo aliud, aut active aut passive vel principaliter vel dispositive, ut quod grave vel forma gravis aut ipsa gravitas movet se, sed aliud concurrit active quod non est aliquod illorum, ut generans vel removens prohibens; et aliud etiam passive quod non est aliquod illorum, ut materia vel medium, prout debet videri in octavo Physicorum. 23. Ex dictis autem hic et in praecedenti quaestione potest aliquid dici de ista dubitatione quae relicta fuit in alia quaestione, scilicet praecedente, videlicet quomodo se habeat species sensibilis ad sensationem. Nam si illa quae dicta in hac quaestione et in ista sunt vera, sequitur manifeste quod sensatio differt a specie sensibili quia species sensibilis non educitur de potentia animae sed solum organi vel materiae nec subiective recipitur in anima. Sensatio autem educitur de potentia animae et recipitur in ea subiective, licet non tamquam in subiecto totali, ut dictum est in alia quaestione. 24. Item anima non agit ad productionem speciei sensibilis. Et ipsa agit ad productionem sensationis, ut nunc dictum est; ergo etc. Et etiam potest esse persuasio quod in aliquo organo sive in ipsa anima,

155–156 non . . . expetenda ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. II.3 995a15 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 47.116): “Acribologia vero mathematica non in omnibus est expetenda, sed in non habentibus materiam.” Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.10 par. 21. 159 Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.1 1046a9–15; Phys. VIII.4 254b29–30. 160 alibi perscrutari ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. IX.1 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 56rb – 56vb ). 166–167 octavo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VIII.4 254b 30. 169 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.9 par. 16. 176 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.9 par. 33.

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21. And to these arguments we may add the others touched on and put forward earlier as plausible and persuasive. For such arguments perhaps suffice in this matter, since we cannot demand strict demonstrations in everything. Therefore, I recognize an agent sense, which I believe to form sensation actively in itself. 22. But then there is the question of how it is possible for the same thing to act on itself, and to be acted on by itself, since Aristotle seems to deny this in several places. And I say that this has to be investigated elsewhere. Therefore, I only say for now that it is not possible for the same thing to act on itself without any other thing cooperating with it either actively or passively, or principally or dispositively, e.g., for a heavy body or its form or heaviness to move itself downward without something else actively cooperating which is not one of these, such as the generating thing or the remover of the obstacle.148 And there is some other thing cooperating passively as well that is not one of these, such as matter or the medium, as should be seen in Physics VIII. 23. On the basis of what has been said here and in the preceding question, some answer can be provided to the problem that was left open in the preceding question, namely how the sensible species is related to sensation. For if what has been said in that question and in this one are true, then it clearly follows that sensation differs from the sensible species because the sensible species is not brought forth from the potency of the soul, but only of the organ or matter, nor is it received in the soul as its subject. Sensation, however, is brought forth from the potency of the soul and is received in it as in its subject, although not as in its total subject, as was said in the other question. 24. Again, the soul does not act for the production of the sensible species. And it does act for the production of sensation, as has just been said; therefore, etc. And another persuasive reason can be that

148 These

are supposed to be the movers accounting for the fall of a heavy body, namely the thing that generated it and thus determined it to be heavy, and the remover of the obstacle, such as someone kicking out the support from under the heavy body, thereby allowing it to move naturally to its natural place, namely down.

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ut in organo phantasiae vel memoriae, est species sensibilis reservata, et non est in eo cognitio. Et Aristoteles in secundo huius quaerit cum aliquis non odorans et non videns patiatur ab odore et colore recipiendo species eorum: “Quid est odorare praeter quam pati ab odore?” Et ipse respondet quod odorare est sentire et cognoscere odorem, quasi dicat quod odorare est actus sentiendi adveniens ultra passionem ab odore, videlicet ultra receptionem speciei odoris ab odore in organo. 25. Secundo etiam patet quod species sensibilis se habet ad sensationem tamquam dispositio necessaria praeexigita ad sensationem, quia experitur quod non est sensatio nisi organum receperit a sensibili exteriori repraesentativum ipsius, quod vocamus speciem sensibilem. Et ob hoc est, ut dicit Aristoteles, quod non secundum quamlibet partem corporis sui potest animal videre vel audire, ut secundum pedem, quamvis ibi sit anima. Hoc enim est quia in pede vel in manu non potest obiectum causare speciem suam, scilicet speciem soni vel coloris, quae praeexigitur ad formandum sensationem. 26. Sed tunc est dubitatio utrum ista species requiritur tamquam dispositio passivi ad recipiendum sensationem vel tamquam dispositio activi ad agendum istam sensationem. Et de hoc apparet mihi probabile dicere quod sicut anima utitur calore tamquam instrumento ad agendum nutritionem, ita ipsa etiam utitur ista specie sensibili vel intelligibili ad agendum sensationem vel intellectionem. Unde sicut ignis quamvis secundum se sit calefactivus et combustivus, tamen non est sufficienter in actu ad hoc faciendum sine calore, ita etiam anima licet secundum se sit principale formativum sensationis post Deum, tamen non est sufficienter in actu ad hoc faciendum sine specie sensibili. Sed congregatum ex ea et specie sensibili est iam sufficienter in actu ad hoc faciendum, sicut dicetur in tertio libro de intellectu ad

181 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.12 424b4–5. 183 Quid . . . odore ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.12 424b16–17 (Ar. lat. XII.2 168.2.20): “Quid igitur est odorare, praeter pati aliquid?” 191 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.12 424a 18–24. 207 tertio libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.10. 188 necessaria . . . sensationem ] praeexacta necessario AT praeexacta necessaria E 190 repraesentativum ] repraesentationem AETV 194 suam ] sensitivam VW

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a sensible species is stored in some organ or in the soul itself, as in the organ of imagination or memory, and there is no cognition in it. In Book II, Aristotle asks about the case when someone not smelling and not seeing may be acted on by odor and color by receiving their species: “What is smelling other than being acted on by odor?” And he replies that to smell is to sense and cognize odor, as if he were saying that smelling is the act of sensing coming on top of being acted on by odor, namely on top of receiving the species of odor from odor in an organ. 25. In the second place, it is also clear that the sensible species is related to sensation as a necessary disposition required for sensation, for we experience that there is no sensation unless the organ has received from the external sensible object its representation, which we call the sensible species. And this is why, as Aristotle says, an animal cannot see or hear with just any part of its body, such as the foot, even if the soul is there. This is so because, in the foot or the hand, the object cannot cause its species, namely the species of sound or color, which is a prerequisite for sensation. 26. But then one may raise the question whether this species is required as a disposition of the patient needed for the reception of sensation or as a disposition of the agent needed for producing this sensation. It seems to me plausible to say that just as the soul uses heat as an instrument to produce nourishment, so it uses this sensible or intelligible species for producing sensation or intellection. Therefore, just as fire is of itself capable of heating and burning, but is not sufficiently in actuality for this without heat, so too the soul, although it is the main formative source of sensation after God, nevertheless, is not sufficiently in actuality for producing it without the sensible species. But the aggregate consisting of the soul and the sensible species is already sufficiently in actuality to do so, as will be said in the third book

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intellectionem. Existens enim in actu primo cum suis dispositionibus sibi convenientibus potest facere se in actu secundo si non sit impedimentum. Et hoc videbatur intendere in isto secundo Aristoteles ubi movebat istam quaestionem: Quare non fit sensatio sine obiecto exteriori, cum sensibilia sint coniuncta sensui in organo suo, scilicet caliditati, frigiditati, et huiusmodi a quibus numquam est denudatum organum? Et ipse respondet, dicens quod causa est in hoc quod sensitivum non est in actu sed potentia tantum. Hoc est dictu quod, licet sensus bene sit in potentia ad recipiendum sensationem, tamen non est in actu sufficienti sine specie sensibili ad agendum istam, quam tamen speciem oportet fieri ab obiecto exteriori. 27. Et istis dictis potest responderi ad rationem illam, scilicet, si esset sensus agens Aristoteles esset valde diminutus. Dico ergo quod ipse satis determinat de illo quia ipse dixit animam esse causam secundum triplex genus causae. Et declarando hoc de causa agente dixit eam esse principium motus et quantum ad motum localem et quantum ad nutritionem et augmentationem et etiam quantum ad alterationem, quae est sensus, id est sensatio. Et sic expressit satis quod anima est agens ad sensationem et non solum recipiens. Sed quia non est alia res — sensus agens et sensus patiens — sed est eadem anima et in eodem organo agens sensationem et recipiens, sufficiebat distinguere organa in quibus fiunt sensationes et obiecta a quibus fiunt species sensibiles in illis organis per quas species anima exercet opera sentiendi.

210 isto secundo Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 417a 3–6. 211–214 quare . . . organum ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 417a 2–5 (Ar. lat. XII.2 107.1.8): “Habet autem dubitationem propter quid sensuum ipsorum non fit sensus, et quare sine hiis quae sunt extra non faciunt sensum, inexistente igne et terra et aliis elementis quorum est sensus per se aut secundum accidentia hiis.” 214 ipse respondet ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 417a 6–9. 221 dixit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415b 9–11. 211 sine ] subiecto vel add. A || obiecto ] subiecto T 213 caliditati frigiditati ] species caliditatis frigiditatis V 218 obiecto ] agente VW 223 principium ] unde add. AV 228 agens ] agente E 230 opera ] actum A actu T

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concerning the intellect and intellection. For being in the first stage of actuality, together with its appropriate dispositions it can bring itself into the second stage of actuality, if there is no impediment. And this is what Aristotle seemed to mean in this second book, when he raised this question: why is there no sensation without an external object, since the sensitive power is attached to a sensible object in its organ, namely to heat, cold, wetness and dryness, from which the organ is never denuded? And he responds by saying that the reason for this is that the sensitive power is not in actuality, but only in potentiality. This is to say that, although sense is certainly in potentiality to receive sensation, nevertheless, it is not sufficiently activated without the sensible species to do so, whereas this species has to be produced by an external object. 27. These points having been stated, one may respond to the objection, namely that if there were an agent sense, then Aristotle would be rather diminished.149 I reply, therefore, that he sufficiently discussed it because he said that the soul is a cause in three genera of causes. And, explaining how it is an agent cause, he said that it is a principle of motion with regard to locomotion, and with regard to nutrition and growth, and also with regard to alteration, which is sensing, that is, sensation. And thus he sufficiently expressed that the soul is an agent with regard to sensation and not only a recipient. However, since the agent sense and the patient sense are not distinct things, but the same soul in the same organ, which is the agent and the recipient of sensation, it was sufficient to distinguish the organs in which the sensations come to be, and the objects from which the sensible species come to be in the organs, through which species the soul carries out the activities of sensing.

149 See

par. 2 above.

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28. Quod enim ultra restabat dicendum de sensu, hoc erat proportionale sicut de intellectu agente. Ideo cum Aristoteles in tertio huius determinat de intellectu agente, credidit propter proportionem istam determinationem sufficere ad loquendum de sensu agente cum hiis quae dicta erant de eo in secundo libro. Et secundum veritatem hoc satis sufficiebat, prout apparebit cum de intellectu agente determinatum fuerit in tertio libro.

232 tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5. QQ. De an. III.7.

237 tertio libro ] B URIDANUS,

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28. Whatever further remained to be said about sense was analogous to what will be said about the agent intellect. Therefore, since Aristotle discusses the agent intellect in Book III, he believed that, because of the analogy with that explanation, it would suffice, along with that explanation, to say about the agent sense what he did in Book II. And in fact this was rather sufficient, as will be obvious when we shall have discussed the agent intellect in Book III.

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Utrum sensus possit decipi circa sensibile proprium sibi.

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1. Arguitur quod sic quia intellectus est multo potentioris virtutis et certioris quam sensus, sed ipse potest errare circa obiectum proprium; igitur, magis sensus. Consequentia tenet per locum a minori. Minus enim videtur quod virtus potentior et certior debeat decipi quam potentia vel virtus minus certa. Prima autem propositio manifesta est quia intellectus per rationem corrigit falsa iudicia sensus, ut de magnitudine solis, quod non faceret si non esset virtus excellentior et certior. Secunda etiam propositio apparet quia Deus, intelligentiae, et omnia universalia sunt obiecta propria intellectus, cum nulla alia virtute cognoscantur, et tamen in multis quaestionibus et opinionibus de praedictis deficiunt et errant plurimi sapientum. 2. Item color et lux sunt propria obiecta visus cum nullo alio sensu sentiantur, et tamen circa ea visus decipitur multipliciter, et aliter iudicat de prope et de longe. Immo etiam in eadem distantia et existente eodem colore, apparet album super quod cadit radius luminis et nigrum quod est in umbra. Et aliquando ita intensum lumen cadit super nigrum politum et reflectitur ad oculum quod illud nigrum apparet album. Item in tertio Meteororum habetur quod medii colores iuxta nigrum apparent albiores et iuxta album apparent nigriores. Ideo manifestum est quod hiis modis decipitur visus circa colores.

20 tertio Meteororum ] A RISTOTELES, Meteor. III.4 375a6–13. 8 falsa ] om. V 12 quaestionibus ] et dubitationibus add. VW 13 errant ] etiam intellectus add. VW © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 17

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Can sense be deceived about a sensible proper to it?

1. It is argued that it can because intellect is much more powerful and reliable than sense, but it can be deceived about its proper object; therefore, sense even more so. The consequence is valid by virtue of the topic “from the lesser.”150 For it appears less that a stronger and more reliable power should be deceived than a less reliable one. The first proposition is clear, because intellect corrects by reason the false judgments of sense, such as that about the size of the sun, which it would not do unless it were a more excellent and reliable power. The second proposition is also clear, because God, the angels and all universals are the proper objects of the intellect, since they are not cognized by any other power, and yet in many questions and opinions concerning these objects, many wise people are deficient in their knowledge and err. 2. Again, color and light are the proper objects of sight, since they are not sensed by any other sense, and yet sight is deceived about them in many ways and judges differently from up close and from afar. Indeed, even the same color at the same distance appears white when it is illuminated and black if it is in shadow. And sometimes such an intense illumination falls upon a polished black thing and is reflected into the eye that this black thing appears to be white. Again, in Meteorology III it is stated that intermediate colors next to black appear lighter and next to white appear darker. Thus, it is clear that sight is deceived about colors in these ways. 150 This

dialectical locus (‘topic’) licenses the inference from the lesser appearance to the greater affirmatively. The relevant maxim is the following: if something that appears less to apply to one thing than to another does apply to the first thing, then it applies to that other thing, too. (A plausible example of this type of argument would be: “Even a child can do that; so you can too” told to a grown man with selfconfidence issues.) Thus, the argument proceeds as follows: intellect appears less to be deceivable about its proper object than sense is, but it is deceived; therefore, sense is deceived too. See Summulae de dialectica 6.5.6 (tr. Klima, 472–474). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 17

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3. Item aliter decipitur, quia in ortu solis sol apparet rubeus, et sic iudicatur rubedo, cum tamen nulla sit ibi rubedo quae videatur. Et si duo vitra supra invicem ponuntur, unum blavium sive azurium, et aliud croceum, quod per ea videbitur apparebit totum viride, et sic iudicatur viriditas, cum tamen nulla sit ibi viriditas quae videatur. 4. Et apparet de tactu, quia intrans balneum iudicat aquam nimis calidam et postquam, per spatium fuerit in balneo, iudicat de calidiori non esse calidam. Similiter de gustu, infirmo enim saepe dulcia et bene sapida apparent amara, et qui comedit allia non iudicat de odore alliarum. 5. Item etiam multa iudicamus de nocte lucida quod non posset fieri si non essent lucida, quia non moverent sensum. Et tamen de die, quantumcumque sit medium bene dispositum, iudicamus ea non esse lucida. 6. Et cum apparet nobis iris, iudicamus multos et diversos colores, cum tamen nullus sit color qui videatur, quod apparet quia si ibi esset color, tunc nos euntes magis prope videremus illum, cum nos melius videamus de prope quam de longe. Consequens tamen est falsum quia, si ibi essemus, nullum colorem videremus. 7. Et tenebra apparet nobis totaliter quasi nigredo, et tamen non est color sed solum diaphanum privatum lumine. 8. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles. Describendo enim sensibile proprium, dicit, “Dico autem proprium sensibile quod non contingit altero sensu sentiri, et circa quod non contingit errare.” Et idem dicit

45–46 Dico . . . errare ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.6 418a11–13 (Ar. lat. XII.2 118.1.8): “Dico autem proprium quidem quod non contingit altero sensu sentiri, et circa quod non contingit errare, ut visus coloris et auditus soni et gustus humoris, tactus autem habet plures differentias.” 32 alliarum ] aliorum V 40 videamus ] iudicemus A iudicamus T 40–41 consequens . . . videremus ] et tamen ad locum ubi nobis apparet iris nullum colorem ibi inveniemus VW 42 totaliter ] color VW || quasi ] et T quia apparet VW 44 dicit ] videtur dicere A

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3. Again, it is deceived in another way, for the sun appears red at dawn, and so redness is judged to be there, whereas there is no redness to be seen there. And if two pieces of glass are placed on top of each other, one blue or azure and the other yellow, anything seen through them will appear green, and thus greenness would be judged to be there, although there is no greenness that appears there. 4. And this appears about touch too, for someone just entering the bath judges the water to be very hot and later on, after he has spent time in the bath, he judges even the hotter water not to be that hot. The same goes for taste, for sweet and good-tasting things often appear bitter to a sick person, and someone who eats garlic does not judge that he smells of garlic. 5. Again, there are many things that at night we judge to be bright, which could not happen if they were not bright, since then they would not move the sense. And yet by day (no matter how well-disposed the medium is) we do not judge them to be bright. 6. And when we see a rainbow, we judge that there are many different colors there, but there is no color to be seen, which is obvious because, if there were some color there, then moving closer we would see it, since we see better from up close than from afar. Yet the consequent is false, because we would see no color if we were there. 7. And a shadow appears to us entirely as if it were blackness. However, it is not a color, but only the transparent medium deprived of illumination. 8. The opposite is stated by Aristotle. For describing what a proper sensible is, he says: “I call a proper sensible something that cannot be sensed by another sense and about which there can be no er-

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de phantasia capitulo de phantasia, ponens per hoc differentiam inter sensum et phantasiam. 9. Difficultas est bene quomodo debeat intelligi illa famosa auctoritas, cum ex praedictis rationibus apparet multas esse deceptiones sensuum circa obiecta propria ipsorum. Et Aristotelesmet videtur glossare illam auctoritatem, dicens quod unusquisque sensuum iudicat de hiis, scilicet de sensibilibus propriis, et non decipitur quin color nec quin sonus, sed quid coloratum aut ubi. Sed adhuc ista expositio videtur aliquibus imperfecta, primo quia ista conditio sensibilium propriorum videtur fuisse posita ad differentiam sensibilium communium. Tamen, per eam sic expositam, non differunt sensibilia propria a sensibilibus communibus, iudicamus enim de magnitudine et de motu, et non decipimur quin motus aut quin magnitudo. Verbi gratia, si quis existens in navi mota in fluvio iudicabit forte arborem existentem in ripa moveri, et sic errabit iudicando ubi est motus vel quid movetur. Sed non deficiet iudicando quin motus, quia motus, sed non arboris, sed navis et ipsius videntis. Posset tamen dici ad hanc instantiam quod non fuit haec conditio apposita ad differentiam sensibilium communium sed ad differentiam sensibilium per accidens. 10. Sed adhuc instatur, quia si visus non decipiatur de colore quin color, quantum ad iudicium generale, tamen decipitur quantum ad iudicia specialia, ut quin albedo, nigredo, vel viriditas. Nam sicut prius arguebatur, videntes solem in mane iudicamus rubedinem, et non est rubedo. Et per ista duo vitra iudicamus viriditatem, et non est viriditas. Et etiam, aspicientes in caelum, aere existente purissimo quan-

47–48 differentiam . . . phantasiam ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.7. 51–52 Aristotelesmet videtur glossare ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.6 418a 14–17 (Ar. lat. XII.2 118.1.11): “Sed unusquisque iudicat de hiis et non decipitur quoniam color nec quoniam sonus, sed quid coloratum aut ubi aut quid sonans.” 47 capitulo de phantasia ] om. V 54 ubi ] aut quid sonans aut ubi add. VW 61– 62 ubi . . . movetur ] eam esse mota vel quod movetur E quid est aut ubi est VW 63–64 tamen . . . instantiam ] adhuc adduci instantia T || ad hanc instantiam ] sine data instantia A 64 differentiam ] datam A 67 generale ] ut quin color add. VW

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ror.” And he mentions the same concerning imagination in the chapter on imagination, positing this to be the difference between sense and imagination. 9. The difficulty mainly consists in how we should understand this famous authority, since from the previous arguments it appears that the senses are often deceived about their proper objects. And Aristotle himself seems to gloss his dictum when he says that each sense judges about these things, namely about the proper sensibles, and is not deceived about the fact that there is some color or some sound, but it is deceived about what is colored or where. But this exposition still seems to be imperfect to some people, in the first place because this condition of proper sensibles seemed to be offered as their difference from common sensibles. However, by this exposition, proper sensibles do not differ from common ones, for we judge magnitude and motion, and we are not deceived about the fact that there is some motion or magnitude. For example, if someone in a ship moving on a river were to judge, perhaps, that a tree standing on the river bank is moving, he will thus be mistaken about where the motion is and what is in motion. But he will not err in judging that there is motion, for something does move, although not the tree, but the ship and the person seeing the tree. One may reply to this objection, however, that this additional condition was not provided to distinguish from common sensibles, but from incidental sensibles.151 10. But one may still object that if sight is not deceived about color with regard to a general judgment, nevertheless, it is deceived with regard to specific judgments, such as that there is whiteness, blackness, or greenness. For, as has been argued,152 seeing the sun at dawn, we judge that there is redness, and there is no redness there. And by the two glasses we judge that there is greenness, and there is no green151 An

‘incidental sensible’ (a sensible ‘by coincidence’) is something sensible that coincides with a proper sensible in a sensible thing. For example, in a white, sweet sugar cube, the sweet taste coincides with the white color, which is the proper sensible of sight, and with the cubical shape, which is the common sensible of sight and touch. So, although sight does not perceive the taste, it is still true to say that whoever sees the sugar cube, sees a sweet thing, and so the sweet thing is incidentally sensible by sight (and the white thing is incidentally sensible by taste). 152 See par. 6 above.

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tumcumque potest naturaliter esse purus, iudicamus in caelo colorem pulcherrimum blavium seu azureum, cum tamen nullus sit color talis quem videmus, cum caelum sit incoloratum. Sed manifestum est quod etiam de prope, licet paries sit totus albus, tamen de nocte, quando tu studes, apparet tibi nigredo extra radium candelae, scilicet in umbra. Et sic albedinem iudicas nigredinem. Ideo deciperis vel de albedine quantum albedo vel de nigredine quantum nigredo, quia albedinem iudicas non albedinem et non nigredinem iudicas nigredinem. 11. Et etiam manifeste apparet quod multum decipimur circa sensibilia propria quantum ad gradus intensionis et remissionis, quia clare manifestum est quod color apparet albior in maiori lumine et minus albus in minori. Et intranti balneum apparet caliditas valde intensa, quod forte non potest aquam tam calidam sustinere. Et postea cum fuerit calefactus, apparet sibi remisse calida et petit calidiorem. 12. Et sic ex istis videtur iterum quod per istam proprietatem sic expositam non differunt sensibilia propria a sensibilibus per accidens, quia de sensibilibus per accidens non videmur decipi quantum ad iudicium generale, sed ad specialia, sicut dictum est de sensibilibus propriis. Non enim decipimur videntes iudicando quod coloratum sit aliquid vel alicubi. Sed in speciali decipimur iudicantes quod sit lignum vel lapis et quod in illo loco vel in isto. 13. Immo etiam bene est dubium an decipiamur circa sensibilia propria et quantum ad generalia iudicia, puta de colore quin color et de sono quin sonus, et caeteris. Nam sonus vel odor potest esse sic remissus quod iudicamus non esse sonum sed silentium; non odorem sed inodorabile. Et etiam, apud visionem iridis, iudicamus colorem cum non sit color, sed solum reflectio luminis solis a guttulis pluviae ad visum nostrum. Et tamen nec lux solis est color, nec lumen, nec in guttula pluviae est color. Aqua enim et aer sunt diaphana incolorata, receptiva omnium specierum diversorum colorum, et si forte sit

73 color ] in oculo add. W 74 videmus ] iudicamus A 75 etiam . . . sit ] licet paries de prope et de die est A || licet paries ] paries licet de die T 78 quia ] et sic T 80 multum ] multis A 87 propria ] per se A om. T 98 reflectio ] refractio V seu refractio W || solis ] a sole E 100 guttula ] guttulis AE

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ness. Also, when we look up to the sky, when the air is clear as much as it can naturally be, we judge that there is a beautiful blue or azure color in the sky, while there is no color that we see there, since the sky is colorless. But it is also clear that even from up close, although the entire wall is white, still, at night when you are studying, there appears to be blackness outside the light of your candle, namely in the shadows. And thus you judge whiteness to be blackness. Therefore, you will be deceived about the whiteness, insofar as it is whiteness, and the blackness, insofar as it is blackness, for you judge whiteness to be non-whiteness and you judge non-blackness to be blackness. 11. It is also clear that we are often deceived about proper sensibles with regard to their intensity, for, obviously, a color appears whiter in greater illumination and less white in lesser. And to someone who enters the bath, the water appears so hot that he can barely stand it. But later on, when he has warmed up, it appears not so hot, and he asks for hotter water. 12. On the basis of the foregoing it seems again that, on this exposition, this property does not distinguish proper sensibles from incidental sensibles, for concerning an incidental sensible we do not seem to be deceived with regard to a general judgment, but only with regard to specific judgments, as has been said about proper sensibles. For we are not deceived in judging that a colored object is something or is somewhere when we see it. But we are deceived when we specifically judge that it is a piece of wood or a stone and that it is here or there. 13. Indeed, it is also rather doubtful whether we may not be deceived about proper sensibles with regard to general judgments, such as ‘There is a color’, concerning color, or ‘There is a sound’ concerning sound, and so on. For a sound or a smell can be so faint that we judge that there is no sound but silence, or that there is no odor but something odorless. Also, seeing a rainbow, we judge that there is a color when there is no color, but only the reflection of the illumination of the sun from the droplets of rain into our sight. Yet, neither the light of the sun is a color, nor is its illumination, and neither is there

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in eis color, ille est ita remissus quod non est visui notabilis. Similiter, existens extra domum aspiciens per fenestram in illam domum, si intra sit obscuritas sine multo lumine, et extra, ubi est aspiciens, sit lumen magnum, ipse iudicat esse nigrum in fenestra vel ultra esse nigredinem. Etiam iudicando nigredinem, iudicat quin color, licet ibi et ultra nullus esset color, sed purum diaphanum obscurum sine lumine. Propter quod pictores, volentes in pariete depingere fenestras, depingunt ibi nigrum; iudicatur igitur color, licet non sit color. Ideo per visum decipimur iudicando quin color. 14. Themistius autem dat talem expositionem, quod ex indispositione organi bene decipimur circa sensibile proprium. Habens enim linguam infectam, non bene iudicaret de saporibus. Decipimur etiam propter impuritatem medii. Sic enim, propter fumos nigros elevatos super terram, apparet nobis sol rubeus de mane. Et omnia visa per vitrum rubeum apparent nobis rubea. Decipimur etiam propter nimiam distantiam. Sed non decipimur si sit debita distantia, medium purum, et organum sensus bene dispositum. 15. Sed contra hoc obiicitur primo quia hoc non ponit differentiam inter sensibilia propria et communia, quia sic etiam non decipimur de magnitudine et figura. Et si decipiamur de motu propter tarditatem multam vel modicam velocitatem, iudicantes quiescere quod movetur, ita sine dubio decipimur iudicantes silentium ubi est sonus si sonus sit nimis debilis, et iudicantes non esse odorem si odor sit

111 Themistius ] T HEMISTIUS, Comm. De an. III (ed. Verbeke, 132.38–133.43). 106 iudicando ] videndo A 108 fenestras ] apertas add. V 110 iudicando ] videndo A 111 Themistius ] de istis A vel Themixtius add. W 117 debita ] determinata V 120 quia ] et T

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color in a droplet of rain. For water and air are colorless transparent bodies, receptive of the species of all different colors, and if perhaps they have their own color, it is so faint that it is unnoticeable by sight. Likewise, if someone is outside a house looking into it through the window, and there is dark inside without much illumination and outside where the onlooker is there is bright illumination, then he judges that the window is black or what is beyond to be blackness. And judging that there is blackness, he judges that there is some color, although there and beyond there is no color, but a pure transparent object in the dark, without illumination. For this reason, painters who want to depict windows in a wall paint them black; therefore, color is judged to be there even though there is no color there. Thus, by sight we are deceived in judging that there is a color. 14. Themistius provides the explanation that, on account of the indisposition of the organ, we are certainly deceived concerning a proper sensible. For someone with an infected tongue does not judge correctly about flavors. We are also deceived because of the impurity of the medium. For in this way, because of black fumes rising above the earth, the sun appears red to us at dawn. And everything seen through a red piece of glass appears to us to be red. We are also deceived by great distance. But we are not deceived if there is an appropriate distance, a pure medium, and a well-disposed sense organ. 15. However, one may object first that this exposition does not distinguish between proper and common sensibles, for in this way we are not deceived even about magnitude and shape. And if we are deceived about motion because it is very slow or it has little speed, judging what is in motion to be at rest, then we are without a doubt deceived about sound in the same way, judging that there is silence where the sound

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valde remissus. Et forte quod Themistius concessisset quod per hoc non ponitur differentia inter sensibilia communia et propria. 16. Adhuc arguitur contra Themistium quia, si sic indispositio organi aut impuritas medii removerent a certitudine iudicii, sequitur quod numquam de illis sensibilibus possemus iudicare cum perfecta certitudine, quod est falsum. Et patet consequentia quia numquam organa nostra sunt summe bene disposita, nisi forte in uno momento, propter hoc quod semper mutatur continue nostra complexio, ita ut numquam sit per tempus dare complexionem perfecte temperatam. Et etiam aer, qui est medium videndi et audiendi, numquam est apud nos perfecte purus; semper enim commixti sunt ei aliqui fumi vel vapores ex terrestribus vel aquis elevati. Et credo quod Themistius bene dixisset quod, sine summa puritate medii aut perfecta dispositione organi, nos certe et sine aliquo defectu iudicamus quin hoc album et illud nigrum, hoc dulce et illud amarum. Sed numquam, quantumcumque sit organum bene dispositum et medium purum, possumus discernere punctualiter gradum intensionis et remissionis. Possunt enim duo alba non omnino punctualiter similia esse inter quae non possumus distinguere gradum dissimilitudinis propter infinitatem graduum divisionis et finitatem potentiae visivae. 17. Commentator autem exponit quod sensus non errat circa sensibile proprium “in maiori parte,” sive in gradu magno, licet in parvo gradu posset errare. Et hanc expositionem dicit Aristoteles secundo huius expresse, dicens, “propriorum,” quidem sensus, “est verus aut paucissimum habens falsum.” Et haec expositio est vera, appositis

136 Themistius ] T HEMISTIUS, Comm. De an. III (ed. Verbeke, 132.38–133.43). 145 exponit ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.64 (ed. Crawford, 225.29–30). 147– 148 secundo huius expresse ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.3 428b18–19 (Ar. lat. XII.2 197.1.10): “Hoc autem accidit propter hoc: sensus propriorum quidem est uerus aut quam paucissimum habens falsum.” 126 propria ] sed inter sensibilia per se et per accidens add. AVW 133 perfecte ] dispositam sive add. AE 137 quod ] non add. V || perfecta ] perfectissime V 139 numquam ] non T || quantumcumque ] tantum quantum V 141–142 duo . . . esse ] punctualiter similia A 143 dissimilitudinis ] similitudinis AET 144 visivae ] divisive W 149 vera ] et perfecta add. V

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is very weak, and judging that there is no odor where the odor is very faint. And perhaps Themistius would have conceded that this does not make a difference between common and proper sensibles. 16. One may argue against Themistius further that, if this indisposition of the organ or the impurity of the medium detracted from the certainty of the judgment in this way, then it follows that we could never deliver judgment on sensible things with perfect certainty, which is false. And the consequence is clear, because our organs are never very well disposed, except maybe for a moment, because of the continuous change of our bodily constitution, so that there is never any extended amount of time over which our bodily constitution would be perfectly tempered. And there is never perfectly pure air (which is the medium of sight and hearing) around us either; for it is always mixed with fumes or vapors rising from the earth or water. And I believe that Themistius would have correctly stated that, even without the absolute purity of the medium or the perfect disposition of the organ, we can judge with certainty and without any defect that this is white and that is black, this is sweet and that is bitter. But no matter how welldisposed the organ and how pure the medium is, we can never tell the exact degree of intensity of some sensible quality. For there can be two white things not exactly similar to each other, between which we could not discern the degree of their dissimilarity because of the infinity of degrees of division and the finitude of the power of sight. 17. The Commentator, however, expounds this so that sense does not err about a proper sensible ‘for the most part’, or to a great degree, although to a small degree it may err. And this is the exposition Aristotle clearly provides in the second book of this work, when he said: “of the proper sensibles,” sense “is true or has the least degree of fal-

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cum ea conditionibus quas ponebat Themistius, scilicet quod sit debita distantia et medium et organum convenientia et bene disposita. 18. Et sic cum Aristoteles dixit secundo huius sensibile proprium est “quod non contingit altero sensu sentiri,” per hoc intendit differentiam inter sensibile proprium et communem. Et cum dixit “circa quod non contingit errare,” per hoc intendit differentiam inter sensibile proprium et per accidens, circa quod contingit non solum in pauco sed in toto errare, iudicando mel quod est fel, aut aurum quod est cuprum. 19. Ad rationes. 20. Ad primam dicitur quod circa aliqua, non potest intellectus errare, scilicet circa prima doctrinae principia dissentiendo eis et assentiendo suis oppositis et per rationem possunt multa dubia manifestari et certificari quae sensus non potest certificare. Tamen in multis et de multis, intellectus magis potest decipi quam sensus circa sensibile proprium, propter hoc quod intellectus intelligit ea intelligibilia in absentia eorum per species vel intentiones reservatas, rebus extra mutatis et corruptis, et sensus non sentit sensibilia propria nisi apud praesentiam ipsorum. 21. Ad secundam conceditur quod visus potest decipi in multo propter indebitam distantiam, et de eo quod est in medio umbroso propter indispositionem medii quod non est sufficienter illuminatum. Et si nigrum politum quo multum lumen refrangitur ad oculum appareat album, hoc est propter indispositionem organi quia organum est nimio lumine occupatum, quod quidem lumen repraesentat fortius lucem apparentem albam quam species istius coloris illum colorem.

152 dixit secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.6 418a11–13 (Ar. lat. XII.2 118.1.8): “Dico autem proprium quidem quod non contingit altero sensu sentiri . . . ”. 154–155 circa . . . errare ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.6 418a12–13 (Ar. lat. XII.2 118.1.8): “circa quod non contingit errare, ut visus coloris et auditus soni et gustus humoris, tactus autem habet plures differentias.” 150 ea ] quibusdam expositionibus seu W 150–151 debita ] determinata V 155– 156 proprium ] per se AT 156 pauco ] vel in parte add. V 160–162 circa . . . certificari ] om. AET 160 prima ] om. V 161 rationem ] ratiocinationem V 165 in ] et T 166 sensus ] extra add. W 169 distantiam ] et indispositionem add. V dispositionem W || medio umbroso ] umbra VW 171 politum ] positum E 174 apparentem ] ad parietem T

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sity.” And this exposition is true, adding to it the conditions provided by Themistius, namely that there is an appropriate distance, and the medium and the organ are agreeable and well-disposed. 18. And so, when Aristotle said in the second book of this work that a proper sensible is one “that cannot be sensed by another sense,” by this he meant the difference between a proper and a common sensible. And when he said “about which there can be no error” by this he meant the difference between a proper sensible and an incidental sensible, concerning which one can err, not only a little, but totally, judging what is bile to be honey or what is copper to be gold. 19. Regarding the objections. 20. To the first,153 it is replied that the intellect cannot err concerning some things, namely concerning the first principles of knowledge, I mean, by dissenting from them or assenting to their opposites; and many doubtful issues can be clarified and resolved by reason that sense cannot resolve. However, the intellect may be more deceived on many occasions and concerning many things than sense concerning a proper sensible, because the intellect thinks about these intelligible things in their absence, by stored species or intentions, while the external things may have changed and corrupted, but the senses sense proper sensibles only in their presence. 21. To the second,154 we concede that sight can be deceived in many ways because of inappropriate distance and about something that is in a shadowy medium, because of the indisposition of an insufficiently illuminated medium. And if a polished black thing that reflects much illumination into the eye appears white, that is because of the indisposition of the organ, because the organ is stunned by the excessive illumination, which more strongly represents light that ap-

153 See 154 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above.

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Quod etiam idem apparet iuxta nigrum albius et iuxta alba nigrius, hoc est verum maxime si sit multa distantia. Et hoc non arguit nisi deceptionem in gradu vel in pauco. 22. Ad tertiam dicitur quod sol apparet rubeus in mane propter impuritatem medii in quo sunt fumi nigri elevati. Lucidum autem, quod per medium purum apparet album, si videatur per nigrum vel confuse cum nigro, apparet sub medio colore, scilicet rubeum. Ideo carbo ignitus apparet rubeus qui, extinctus, manifeste est niger. Et sic etiam, quia viride est medium inter croceum et blavium, ideo haec, simul confuse visa, apparent viridia. Et medium coloratum non est conveniens medium ad iudicandum bene de colore extra existente. 23. Sed tunc dicens si vitrum croceum est propinquum oculo et vitrum blavium est ultra, quare non iudicat bene de blavio? Quid obstat? Dico quod organum non est bene dispositum, quia si oculus bene deberet iudicare de colore aliquo, ipse debet esse bene dispositus per speciem istius coloris, et non debet, secundum eumdem situm, sic confuse esse dispositus per speciem alterius coloris. In praedicto autem casu, visus est dispositus confuse et secundum eumdem situm tam speciebus coloris crocei quam specie blavii. Ideo de neutro potest certe iudicare, sed propter confusionem istarum specierum iudicat medium istorum colorum. 24. De hoc autem quod arguit de tactu et gustu, apparet quod hoc est ex alia et alia dispositione organi. 25. Ad quintam dicendum est quod differentia est magna inter lucem et colorem. Lux enim innata est movere diaphanum, scilicet tenebrosum, et ipsum suo lumine illuminare, color autem non sine lumine alio cadente super ipsum. Et ideo medium conveniens ad videndum lucem est medium non apparens lumine illuminatum. Ideo parvae luces non bene videntur de die, sed de nocte. Propter hoc enim non

179 nigri ] magis E 184 visa ] vel unum per alterum add. VW || viridia ] media A || Et ] medio colore colorata enim add. E medio colore colorata add. T 187 blavio ] croceo VW 189 colore aliquo ] corpore A 202 apparens ] maiori A alio V || Ideo ] per aerem add. A

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pears to be white than the species of this color represents this color. Also, that the same thing appears lighter next to something dark and darker next to something light is especially true at a great distance. And this only proves deception in degree and a small one at that. 22. To the third,155 we reply that the sun appears red in the morning because of the impurity of the medium in which there are black fumes rising from the earth. Something bright, however, which through a pure medium appears white, when seen through something black or something tainted with blackness, appears under an intermediate color, namely red. This is why red-hot charcoal appears red, which, when extinguished, is obviously black. And thus also, because green is intermediate between yellow and blue, when they are seen together in confusion, they appear green. And a colored medium is not a good medium for judging about color outside of it. 23. But then you may say that if the yellow glass is close to the eye and the blue one is farther away, why does an observer not judge correctly about the blue one? What prevents him from doing so? I reply that the organ is not well disposed. For if the eye is to judge correctly about any color, it must be well disposed by the species of this color, and must not be, at the same position, confusedly disposed by the species of another color. But in the above-mentioned case, sight is disposed confusedly at the same position by the species of the color yellow as well as the species of blue. Therefore, it cannot judge with certainty about either, but, because of the confusion of these species, it judges that there is their intermediate color. 24. Concerning what is argued about touch and taste,156 it appears that this stems from the changing disposition of the organ. 25. To the fifth,157 it must be replied that there is a big difference between light and color. For light is naturally suited to change a transparent body, namely a dark one, and illuminate it by its own illumination. Color, however, cannot do so without some other illumination falling upon it. Therefore, a medium appropriate for seeing light is a medium that is not lit by some illumination. Thus, faint lights cannot 155 See

par. 3 above. par. 4 above. 157 See par. 5 above. 156 See

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videntur stellae de die, nec exalationes inflamatae, nec alia parva lucem habentia, nisi sub colore suo videantur et non sub luce sua. 26. Ad sextam manifestum est quod determinatio de iride debet reduci ad tertium librum Meteororum. Sed tamen, quoad nunc dicendum est quod lux, licet non proprie dicatur color, tamen communiter accipiendo nomen color, dicitur color albus. Unde sol apparet albus, licet non habeat colorem alium quam lucem. Sic enim albedo lucens diceretur lux, et albedo non lucens dicitur proprie color. Unde aliqui vocant albedinem lucem extinctam, et dicunt differre albedinem a nigredine propter hoc quod albedo plus participat de luce et minus de opacitate, nigredo autem e converso. Et quia colores medii proveniunt ex mixtione extremorum, eo modo quo determinatum est in libro De sensu et sensato, ideo ex mixtione lucis cum opaco vel nigro vel obscuro secundum diversas proportiones apparet nobis diversus color. Et sic similiter, si lumen a lucido proveniens transeat nigrum vel obscurum, aut a nigro vel obscuro fuerit reflexum, iudicabitur alius et alius color propter remissionem luminis et confusionem eius in oculo cum speciebus aliorum visibilium opacitatem aliquam vel obscuritatem participantium, sicut dictum est prius de illis vitris diversis. 27. Ad ultimam potest concedi quod de longe decipimur, et tenebras iudicamus nigredinem. Sed existentes in loco pure tenebroso nihil iudicamus visu, sed virtute interiori iudicamus tenebram. Percipientes nos, oculis apertis, nihil videre visu exteriori, quod concludimus accidere ex defectu luminis. Verum est tamen quod aliquando improprie tenebram vocamus nigredinem vel opacitatem, ea ratione qua tenebra est privatio luminis vel lucis, quae quidem lux apparet al-

207 tertium librum Meteororum ] A RISTOTELES, Meteor. III.4. 211–212 aliqui ] Cf. G ROSSETESTE, De colore (Baur, pp. 78–79). 215–216 in libro De sensu et sensato ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu III 439b20–440a6. 212 extinctam ] extensam A distinctam TV || dicunt differre ] differunt T 213 plus participat ] habet plus A || participat ] recipiat E 217 diversas ] partes sive add. T 222 participantium ] partium V 223–224 et tenebras ] in tenebra AET

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be seen well during the day, but can be seen at night. This is why stars or sparks or other things having a faint light, are not seen by daylight, unless they are seen by their color, but not by their light. 26. To the sixth,158 it is clear that the determination of the issue of the rainbow should be relegated to Meteorology III. Nevertheless, for now we should say that light, although it is not said to be color properly speaking, but taking the name ‘color’ broadly, is said to be white color. Thus, the sun appears to be white, although it does not have a color, other than light. For in this way a shining whiteness would be said to be light and a non-shining whiteness is said to be color properly speaking. Therefore, some people call whiteness ‘extinguished light’ and they say that whiteness differs from blackness in that whiteness participates more in the nature of light and less in the nature of opacity, and blackness the other way around. And because the intermediate colors result from the mixture of the extremes, in the way it was determined in the book On Sense and What is Sensed, thus, from the mixture of light with something opaque or black or dark in different proportions, a different color appears to us. And in the same way, if the illumination coming from a bright thing passes through something black or dark, or if it were reflected from something black or dark, it will be judged to be a different color, because of the weakening of the illumination and its confusion in the eye with the species of other visible things participating in some opacity or darkness, as has been said concerning the different glasses. 27. To the last one,159 we may concede that we are deceived from afar, and we judge shadows to be blackness. But being in a completely dark place, we judge nothing by sight, but by some interior power we judge that there is darkness. For perceiving that we see nothing by external sight with our eyes wide open, we conclude that this happens because of the lack of illumination. Yet it is true that sometimes we improperly call darkness blackness or opacity, because

158 See 159 See

par. 6 above. par. 7 above.

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ba. Ideo tenebram sic dicimus privationem albedinis et semper cum nigredine est albedinis privatio; ideo sic improprie utimur hiis nominibus promiscue, ‘tenebra’ et ‘nigredo’, ‘tenebrosum’ et ‘nigrum’. Et sic apparet quaestio bene determinata.

231 ideo ] non T

232 promiscue ] permissive A permistive V

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darkness is the lack of illumination or light, which light, however, appears white. Therefore, we call darkness the privation of whiteness, and since blackness is always together with the lack of whiteness, we thus use the names ’darkness’ and ‘blackness,’ and ‘dark’ and ‘black,’ improperly and indiscriminately. And in this way the issue seems to be resolved in a satisfactory manner.

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Utrum sensibilia communia sint per se sensibilia.

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1. Arguitur quod non, quia illud non est per se sensibile quod non potest sentiri nisi per aliud vel cum alio quod sibi non determinat, immo cum quo coniungitur per accidens et contingenter. Sic autem est de sensibilibus communibus. Verbi gratia numquam videtur magnitudo sine lumine vel colore, numquam etiam tactu sentiretur magnitudo si non esset cum caliditate vel frigiditate, cum duritie vel mollitie, aut huiusmodi. Immo tu non iudicas tactu quantus aer est vel quomodo est figuratus. 2. Item substantia non sentitur per se, igitur nec magnitudo nec figura. Antecedens conceditur tamquam ab Aristotele positum. Consequentia probatur quia, in hoc quantum ad propositum spectat, conveniunt substantia et magnitudo quod non sentiuntur nisi coniuncta sunt cum qualitatibus sensibilibus. Ideo illud ipsorum debet magis

11 ab Aristotele positum ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.12 424a 20–23. 4 per . . . contingenter ] om. A || per accidens et ] om. T 7 caliditate ] calido ET calore W || frigiditate cum ] om. E || frigiditate ] frigido T || cum . . . mollitie ] om. A 14 sunt cum ] suis A © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 18

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Are common sensibles per se sensible?

1. It is argued that they are not, because that is not per se sensible which cannot be sensed except through another or with another that it does not determine for itself, but rather with which it is connected accidentally and contingently.160 But this is the case with common sensibles. For example, magnitude is never seen without illumination or color, and it would never be sensed by touch unless it were together with warmth or coldness, with hardness or softness, or the like. Indeed, you do not judge by touch how much air there is or how it is shaped. 2. Again, substance is not sensed per se; therefore neither is magnitude or shape. The antecedent is conceded as something stated by Aristotle. The consequence is proved, because as far as the issue at hand is concerned, substance and magnitude agree in that they are not sensed unless they are connected to sensible qualities. Therefore, of 160 In

this passage, the description of that “which cannot be sensed except through another or with another that it does not determine for itself, but rather with which it is connected accidentally and contingently” is the common description of the counterpart of a per se sensible, namely something only accidentally sensible. For instance, if I see a sugar cube, I see something sweet, but of course its sweetness does not affect my eye. I see it only through seeing its white color, which in fact does not determine that this white thing has to be sweet; indeed, for all I can know about it by sight, it might as well be salty or bitter, or may have no taste at all, because its taste is merely coincidental with its color. By contrast, seeing a color necessarily (and not merely coincidentally) involves seeing some shape: discerning some colored object in my visual field is only possible under discerning the spatiotemporal location of its color, and, accordingly, seeing some shape is only possible by seeing some color surrounded in space by some other color(s). (Note that seeing some diffuse color is not seeing a colored object, which is why one would yell in desperation “I can’t see a thing in this fog!”) Thus, in this sense, seeing shape determines for itself seeing some color (now extending the name ‘color’ to cover light or brightness as well, as when we see the sun), and is not merely coincidental with it. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 18

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concedi sensibile per se quod magis sibi determinat istas qualitates sensibiles. Modo unaquaque substantia magis determinat sibi qualitates sensibiles quam magnitudo aut figura. Ideo videtur quod ipsa magis (vel saltem non minus) sit per se sensibilis quam magnitudo vel figura. Igitur per locum a maiori, si ipsa non est per se sensibilis, nec magnitudo. 3. Item mathematicalia abstracta sunt a materia et motu et a qualitatibus sensibilibus, ut habetur secundo Physicorum et sexto Metaphysicae. Igitur non sunt sensibilia per se. Sed magnitudo, numerus et figura sunt entia mathematicalia; ergo etc. 4. Item quaeritur in quo modo dicendi per se, utrum in primo vel in secundo. Et neutrum potest dici, quia in primo praedicatum debet poni in definitione subiecti, et in secundo e converso, ut apparet primo Posteriorum. Et tamen nec sensibile definitur per motum vel quietem, nec e converso. Et si non sunt sensibilia per se in aliquo horum modorum, sequitur quod non sunt per se sensibilia, quia dicit Aristoteles primo Posteriorum quod quaecumque neutro modo insunt, accidentia sunt. 5. Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Aristotelis in capitulo de numero sensuum exteriorum. 6. Magna dubitatio est quid debeamus intelligere per haec nomina per se et per accidens, proprium et commune. Et videtur quibusdam quod ad hoc multum faciat diversitas opinionum de magnitudine, utrum sit res distincta a substantia et qualitate, et de motu locali, utrum sit res distincta a mobili et loco. Quoniam, si magnitudo sit sub22 secundo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.2 193b32–35. 22–23 sexto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VI.1 1026a7–10. 27–28 primo Posteriorum ] An. post.I.4 73a 34–73b2. 31 primo Posteriorum ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.4 73b 5. 31–32 quaecumque . . . sunt ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.4 73b 5 (Ar. lat. IV.4 289.32): “quaecumque vero neutro modo insunt, accidentia sunt.” 33 in capitulo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 425a28–29. 18 quam ] substantia sicut A 21 abstracta sunt ] abstrahunt V abstrahunt se W 23 numerus ] om. A 25 per se ] om. W 26 neutrum ] neutro modo A 26–27 debet poni in ] est de W 31 neutro modo ] neutraliter V 34 exteriorum ] ubi ad hoc probandum ipse ponit talem medium scilicet quod motu sentiuntur add. VW 38 et qualitate ] per qualitatem T 39 loco ] aliter (?) debet responderi add. A aliter et aliter debeat responderi add. ETW

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these, that should rather be considered a per se sensible which is more apt to determine these sensible qualities for itself. But any substance is more apt to determine sensible qualities for itself than some magnitude or shape is. Therefore, it seems that it is more (or at least not less) per se sensible than is magnitude or shape. Therefore, by the topic ‘from the greater’,161 if it is not per se sensible, then neither is magnitude. 3. Again, mathematical objects are abstracted from matter and motion and sensible qualities, as stated in Physics II and Metaphysics VI. Therefore, they are not per se sensible. But magnitude, number and shape are mathematical objects; therefore, etc. 4. Again, it is asked in which way of saying per se the question should be understood, whether in the first or the second. And neither can be accepted, because in the first the predicate is to be placed in the definition of the subject, and in the second the other way around, as is clear in Posterior Analytics I. But neither is some sensible defined by motion or rest, nor the other way around. And if they are not per se sensible in one of these ways, then it follows that they are not per se sensibile, for as Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics I, “those that do not apply in either of these two are accidents.” 5. The opposite is argued on the authority of Aristotle in the chapter on the number of external senses. 6. A major doubt is what we should understand by the phrases ‘per se’ and ‘accidentally’, and ‘proper’ and ‘common’. And to some people it seems that the diversity of opinions about magnitude makes a big difference, namely whether it is a thing distinct from substance and quality, and about local motion, whether it is a thing distinct from

161 The

dialectical topic Buridan applies here states that when a predicate is held to be more likely to belong to one subject than to another, and is then found not to apply at all to the former, we may conclude that it also does not apply to the latter. See Summulae de dialectica 6.5.6 (tr. Klima, 472–474).

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stantia, ista non est sensibilis nisi per accidens, sicut substantia. Si sit caliditas, sentitur tactu et nullo alio sensu. Si est albedo, sentitur visu et non alio sensu, ideo non est sensibile commune. Et similiter si motus solis non est res distincta a sole vel a magnitudine vel a luce, quae moventur, non apparet quare motus debeat dici sensibile distinctum a praedictis vel quare debeat poni aliter esse sensibilis quam praedicta. 7. Sed sine dubio mihi videtur quod harum opinionum diversitas non debeat facere differentiam in proposito. Quoniam et si motus sit res distincta ab eo quod movetur, tamen quies non est res distincta a quiescente, sicut nec privatio a privato, nec figura est distincta a magnitudine. Ideo de quiete et figura revertentur dubitationes quae prius fiebant de motu et magnitudine. Et communiter etiam non ponitur numerus distinctus a rebus numeratis. Ideo si magnitudo non esset distincta a substantia vel qualitate proprie sensibili, nec etiam motus, adhuc esset de eis dicendum sicut diceretur de numero. 8. Et notandum est, secundum quod mihi videtur, quod cum qualitas et subiectum eius, ut albedo et substantia sibi subiecta, sint simul confuse secundum situm, sensus non habet potestatem distinguendi inter eas, nec percipit ipsam albedinem distincte a perceptione illius substantiae, nec illam substantiam distincte a perceptione istius albedinis. Et ideo non percipit albedinem secundum conceptum secundum quem dicitur albedo. Unde et sic sensus communis dicitur ponere differentiam et convenientiam inter sensibilia propria diversorum sensuum, scilicet iudicans album quod videt esse dulce vel non dulce. Et canis iudicat quem videt vocare eum et, per visum, vadit ad eum, vel etiam iudicat vocantem non esse illum quem videt, ideo non vadit ad illum quem videt, sed quaerit alium. Et nihil iudicat canis an vox sit

43 a luce ] loco A solis add. AV 49 est ] res add. AEW 53 substantia vel ] om. T || etiam ] esset A 56 eius ] om. ETW 58 nec ] unde non W 59–60 distincte . . . albedinis ] aliqua perceptione a perceptione distincta illius subiectae et e converso A 61 albedo ] album AT sed percipit album secundum quam dicitur album add. W 66 quaerit ] scit V

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the mobile thing and its place. For if magnitude is substance, then it is sensible only accidentally, as is substance. But if it is warmth, then it is only sensed by touch and by no other sense. If it is whiteness, then it is only sensed by sight, and by no other sense; therefore, it is not a common sensible. And likewise, if the motion of the sun is not a thing distinct from the sun, or from magnitude, or from light, which are in motion, then it is not clear why motion would have to be called a sensible quality distinct from the aforementioned things, or why it should be said to be sensible in a way other than those things. 7. But it appears to me without a doubt that the diversity of these opinions should not make any difference in this question. For even if motion is a thing distinct from the moved thing, nevertheless, rest is not a thing distinct from the thing at rest, as neither is privation from the thing deprived, or is shape distinct from magnitude. Therefore, the same problems that emerged before concerning motion and magnitude would return concerning rest and shape. And, besides, number is not usually taken to be distinct from the things counted. Thus, if magnitude were not distinct from substance or a properly sensible quality, and neither were motion, one would still have to speak about them the same way as about number. 8. And we should note, as it seems to me, that since a quality and its subject, such as whiteness and the substance subjected to it, are fused together in the same place,162 as it were, sense does not have the ability to distinguish them, and neither does it perceive whiteness distinctly from the perception of this substance, nor the substance distinctly from the perception of this whiteness. Therefore, it does not perceive this whiteness according to the concept according to which it is called whiteness. Thus, it is the common sense that is said to posit the agreement and difference between the proper sensibles of diverse senses, namely judging the white thing it sees to be sweet or not sweet. And a dog judges that the person it sees is calling it and, using its sight, goes to him, or it judges the person calling it not to be the

162 Buridan’s

point is that a sensible quality and its subject that is perceived only through perceiving its sensible quality are together and are perceived together in a unity left unbroken, unanalyzed by the senses. Their discernment takes place only in the intellect, according to Buridan. See Klima 2004a.

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eadem albedini vel diversa, nec sensus iudicat utrum albedo sit motus vel quies, sed iudicat hoc album quiescere vel moveri. 9. Et iterum, quomodo iudicaret sensus sic abstracte de convenientiis et differentiis sensibilium, quoniam hoc est intellectui valde difficile? Videlicet si lapis magnus, albus, et rotundus movetur, utrum est idem vel aliud magnitudo, albedo, rotunditas, et motus. Sed sensus statim iudicat idem esse album, magnum, et rotundum, et quod movetur. Si autem dicatur quod Aristoteles saepe in abstracto dicit colores et magnitudines esse sensibilia per se, dicam quod ita saepe dicit hoc de albo et dulci, et omnino ipse, non multum curans de nominibus, quia significant ad placitum, capit saepe abstractum pro concreto et e converso, sicut in libro De generatione, cum semper dicit primas qualitates esse calidum, frigidum, etc. 10. Et tunc augetur dubitatio cum idem sit lapis, album, magnum, rotundum, et motum, quomodo potest vere dici quod lapis sit sensibilis per accidens et non per se, album autem et magnum sunt sensibilia per se? Et quomodo potest dici quod album est sensibile proprium et non commune, magnum autem et rotundum et motum sunt sensibilia communia et non propria? Et etiam, si est idem magnitudo et figura, quomodo ponuntur tamquam sensibilia distincta? Haec omnia videntur impossibilia. 11. Ad horum igitur solutionem, notandum est quod eadem res nominatur multis et diversis nominibus non synonymis sed impositis secundum diversos conceptus quibus illa res concipi potest, ut quod ille lapis est lapis albus et rotundus. Et licet, secundum omnes istos

78 De generatione ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. II.2 330a25–29. 67 albedini ] albedo V 68 sed iudicat ] et A vel E 69–70 convenientiis ] inconvenientiis T 77 quia significant ] significantibus E 87 impossibilia ] incompossibilia AW 89 impositis ] om. AT 90 secundum diversos conceptus ] sub diversis conceptibus A || res ] concipitur add. ATV || concipi potest ] om. V

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person it sees, and so it does not go to the person it sees, but seeks out another. And the dog judges nothing about whether sound is the same as whiteness or diverse from it; nor does sense judge whether whiteness is motion or rest either, but it does judge whether this white thing is at rest or in motion. 9. Again, how would sense judge in this abstract manner about the agreements and differences among sensibles, when it is so difficult even for the intellect? For instance, if a big, white, round stone is rolling, whether its magnitude, whiteness, roundness and motion are distinct or the same? But sense at once judges the same thing to be white, big, round and moving. If, however, one were to say that Aristotle often calls colors and magnitudes in the abstract to be per se sensibles, then I would say that he says this just as often about the white and the sweet thing, and in general, not caring much about words, which signify by convention, he often takes the abstract for the concrete term and vice versa, as in On Generation and Corruption, where he always claims the primary qualities to be hot and cold,163 etc. 10. Then the question becomes even more pressing: since the white, big, round and moving stone is the same thing, how can one truly say that the stone is sensible only accidentally and not per se, but the white thing and the big thing are sensible per se? And how can one say that the white thing is a proper and not a common sensible, whereas the big thing, the round thing and the moving thing are common and not proper sensibles? Also, if magnitude and shape are the same, how can they be claimed to be distinct sensibles? All these seem to be impossible. 11. For the solution of these problems we should note that the same thing is named by several diverse names that are nonsynonymous, but are imposed according to diverse concepts whereby this thing can be conceived, as when we say that

163 That

is, as opposed to heat and coldness.

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conceptus, ego possum de ipso intelligere et de eo iudicare, tamen per sensum hoc non possum, nisi superveniat notitia intellectiva. Ego non possum iudicare quod hoc est lignum, lapis, vel ferrum, vel quod est substantia aut accidens, vel quod est res composita ex materia et forma, vel res simplex. Sed iudico bene quod est album vel nigrum, magnum vel parvum, rotundum vel oblongum, motum vel quiescens. Et hoc sic est manifestum quia si sit talis mutatio secundum quam lapis incipiat esse ferrum, non mutatis accidentibus, non ob hoc variabitur in sensu sensatio, nec illam mutationem percipiet sensus. Sed si sic mutaretur quod desineret esse album et incipiat esse nigrum, sine mutatione facta secundum substantiam vel secundum alia accidentia, variabitur iudicium in visu, et illam mutationem percipiet et iudicabit visus. Et ita etiam si mutetur de magno in parvum vel de rotundo in oblongum, aut si desinat moveri et incipiat quiescere. Et hoc est manifestum. 12. Dico igitur cum dicimus aliud sensibile per se, aliud per accidens, non intendimus divisionem seu alietatem rerum quae sentiuntur, sed intendimus diversitatem seu alietatem nominum vel conceptuum quibus res quae sentiuntur nominantur vel concipiuntur. Eadem enim res quae sentitur dicitur sensibilis per se secundum illud nomen quod impositum est a conceptu secundum quem ipsa sentitur, et dicitur sensibile per accidens secundum illud nomen quod impositum est ei secundum conceptum secundum quem non sentitur, ita quod nomini sumpto a conceptu secundum quem sentitur attribuitur haec praedicatio per se sensibile ad designandum quod, secundum istum conceptum, sentitur. Et nomini sumpto a conceptu secundum quem non sentitur attribuitur illud praedicatum per accidens sensibile ad designandum quod sentitur, sed non secundum ipsum conceptum. Verbi gratia, cum lapis sit albus dicitur quod album sentitur per se, id est,

92 ego . . . iudicare ] esse omnes possem iudicare eum et de eo T || ego . . . et ] possumus A 96 est ] res simplex add. V 97 oblongum ] longum AV obliquum T 100 illam ] sensationem seu add. T || mutationem ] sensationem AE 108 divisionem ] distinctionem ET 109 diversitatem ] divisionem V differentiam W 111 sensibilis ] sensibile AET 114–115 ita . . . haec ] ubi ista A 116 designandum ] signandum TW

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this stone is a white, round, stone. And although by all these concepts I can think about it and deliver a judgment about it, yet I cannot do so by sense, unless intellective cognition supervenes. I cannot judge that this is wood, stone, or iron, or that it is a substance or an accident, or that it is a thing composed of matter and form or a thing that is simple. But I do certainly judge that it is white or black, big or small, round or elongated, moving or at rest. And this is clear from the following: if a stone turned into iron without a change of its accidents, on account of this change the sensation in the senses would not change, nor would sense notice this change. But if it were to change so that it would cease to be white and begin to be black without a change of substance or other accidents, the judgment in sight would change, and this change would be perceived and judged by sight. And the same would be the case if a thing were changed from big to small or from round to elongated or if it ceased to move and began to be at rest. And this is clear. 12. I say, therefore, that when we call one thing sensible per se and another thing sensible accidentally, we do not mean a diversity or otherness of things that are sensed, but we mean a diversity or otherness of the names or concepts whereby the things sensed are named or conceived. For the same thing that is sensed is said to be per se sensible according to the name that was imposed from the concept according to which it is sensed, and it is said to be sensible accidentally according to the name imposed on it according to the concept according to which it is not sensed, so that to the name taken from the concept according to which it is sensed the predication ‘sensible per se’ is attributed to indicate that it is sensed according to that concept, and to the name taken from the concept according to which it is not sensed, the predicate ‘sensible accidentally’ is attributed to indicate that it is sensed, but not according to that concept. For example, when a stone

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album sentitur secundum conceptum secundum quem dicitur album, et lapis sentitur per accidens, id est non sentitur secundum illum conceptum secundum quem dicitur lapis. 13. Et est sciendum quod, secundum haec dicta patet quomodo Aristoteles bene conclusit quod sensibilia communia sunt sensibilia per se ex eo quod motu sentiuntur. Hoc enim erat dictum quod motus vel mutationes rerum, secundum quas oportet mutare nomina sensibilium communium, sensus percipit. Ideo percipit res secundum illos conceptus a quibus imponuntur illa nomina. Ideo istis nominibus debet attribui hoc praedicatum sensibile per se, scilicet istis nominibus magnum, moveri, quiescere, circulare, triangulare, unum, multa, propinqua, remota, ante, retro, et sic de aliis. Unde non est credendum quod, quando Aristoteles enumeravit illa quinque nomina magnitudo, figura et numerus, quies, motus, quod voluerit sufficienter enumerare omnia nomina quibus attribuendum est hoc praedicatum sensibile commune. Sed illa quinque enumerat tamquam exempla. Vel etiam dicta ratio Aristotelis sic explicatur, et revertitur in idem quod ex mutatione secundum quam mutantur nomina sensibilium communium, ut magnum, movere, quiescere, etc., mutantur etiam in sensu sensationes, quia sensus percipit illas res secundum istos conceptus a quibus illa nomina imponuntur; ergo etc. Igitur hoc ita intendit cum dicit illa sentiri motu. Et hoc sit dictum de sensibili per se et per accidens. 14. Simili modo dicendum est de sensibili proprio et communi. Nam illi nomini attribuitur hoc praedicatum sensibile proprium, quod significat res secundum conceptum secundum quem sunt unico sen-

124–125 Aristoteles bene conclusit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 425a 14–20. 133 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.6 418a 17–18. 125–126 per se ] om. AETW 126 ex eo ] seu V || motu ] per se A per motum S 127 rerum ] temporum(?) T 131 magnum ] magnitudinis(?) add. V parvum add. VW || moveri ] om. T movere V 132 remota ] rotunda T 136 enumerat ] nominavit et enumeravit W 138 mutantur ] alia mutantur add. A 139 magnum . . . etc ] moveri E || magnum movere quiescere ] moveri A 140 quia ] et A 141 imponuntur ] summuntur VW || cum dicit illa ] aristoteles AE om. T 145– 147 sunt . . . quem ] hom. V

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is white, we say that the white thing is sensed per se, that is, the white thing is sensed according to the concept according to which it is said to be white, and the stone is sensed accidentally, that is, it is not sensed according to the concept according to which it is said to be a stone. 13. And we should know that in light of what has been said, it is clear how Aristotle correctly concluded that common sensibles are sensible per se, because they are sensed by motion. For it was said that sense perceives the changes or motions of things according to which the names of common sensibles change. Therefore, it perceives things according to those concepts from which these names are imposed. Therefore, to these names one has to attribute the predicate ‘sensible per se’, namely to the names ‘big’, ‘moving,’ ‘resting,’ ‘circular,’ ‘triangular,’ ‘one’, ‘many’, ‘near’, ‘far’, ‘in front’, ‘behind’, and so on for the rest. Accordingly we should not think that, when Aristotle listed the five names, ‘magnitude’, ‘shape’, ‘number’, ‘rest’ and ‘motion,’ he wanted thereby to provide a complete list of all names to which the predicate ‘common sensible’ is to be attributed. He merely lists these five as examples. Alternatively, the abovementioned argument of Aristotle’s can be explained in the following way, and it amounts to the same: by the change according to which the names of common sensibles are changed, such as ‘big’, ‘moving’, ‘resting’, etc., the sensations in the senses also change, because sense perceives these things according to the concepts from which these names are imposed. This is, therefore, what he meant by saying that these are sensed through change. And let this be said about what is sensible per se and accidentally. 14. We should talk in a similar manner about proper and common sensibles. For the predicate ‘proper sensible’ is attributed to that name which signifies things according to a concept in keeping with which

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su perceptibiles. Et illi nomini attribuitur hoc praedicatum sensibile commune quod significat res secundum conceptum secundum quem percipiuntur pluribus sensibus; ita quod si lapis est albus et rotundus et ego dico quod album est sensibile proprium et non commune, ego volo significare quod album sentitur unico sensu, scilicet visu, et non pluribus sensibus, secundum conceptum secundum quem dicitur album. Et cum dico “Rotundum est sensibile commune,” ego dico quod rotundum sentitur vel potest sentiri pluribus sensibus, scilicet visu et tactu, secundum conceptum secundum quem dicitur rotundum. Et apparet quod ille modus dicendi sit manifestius, et omnes alii patiuntur calumnias si non coincidant cum illo. 15. Et apparet etiam quod rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis non procedunt contra istum modum dicendi. Verum est tamen quod illae rationes possunt facere dubitare utrum illae propositiones essent per se verae: “magnitudo est sensibilis,” “numerus est sensibilis,” vel etiam “substantia est sensibilis.” Et ego dico quod sic, quia sunt necessarie, licet forte universales essent falsae. Ideo non sunt verae et per se in primo modo dicendi per se, sed sunt verae in secundo modo dicendi per se, quia hoc praedicatum sensibile praedicatur de illis aliis terminis sicut passio de suo subiecto, non tamen tamquam de subiecto proprio et primo. Ideo non sunt per se et primo, ut dictum est. Et ob hoc etiam non oportet subiectum poni in definitione praedicati. Sed si assignaretur passioni subiectum primum et proprium, tunc in definitione passionis perfecta deberet poni illud subiectum vel genus eius vel aliquis terminus pertinens ad rationem illius subiecti propter hoc quod passio implicat in sua significatione significationem subiecti cum aliqua connotatione. Et hoc debet videri primo Posteriorum. Et sic patet quaestio.

173 primo Posteriorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. An. post. I.4 (ed. Hubien, I.4 12–15). 146 perceptibiles ] sensibiles AE 153 scilicet ] ad minus add. A 155 manifestius ] manifestus AE perfectius VW 164–165 praedicatur ] dicitur AE 166–167 primo ] primae in primo modo dicendi per se VW 167 oportet ] apparet A 170 rationem ] differentiam E divisionem T 171 significatione ] per add. T

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they are perceptible by a single sense. And the predicate ‘common sensible’ is attributed to that name which signifies things according to a concept according to which they are perceived by several senses; so that if a stone is white and round and I say that the white thing is a proper and not common sensible, I want to signify that the white thing is sensed by a single sense, namely sight, and not by several senses, according to the concept according to which it is said to be white. And when I say ‘the round thing is a common sensible’, I am saying that the round thing is or can be sensed by several senses, namely by sight and touch, according to the concept according to which it is called round. It appears that this exposition is clearer, and all others have difficulties, unless they agree with this one. 15. It is also clear that the objections that were raised at the beginning of this question do not go against this exposition.164 To be sure, these objections may make one doubt whether these propositions are per se true: ‘magnitude is sensible’, ‘number is sensible’, or even ‘substance is sensible’. And I say that they are, because they are necessary, even if, perhaps, their universal forms would be false. Thus, they are not true per se in the first sense, but they are in the second sense, for the predicate ‘sensible’ is predicated of the other terms as an attribute of its subject, although not as its primary and proper subject. So these predications are not per se and primary in the first way, as has been said. And for this reason the subject does not even have to be placed in the definition of the predicate. But if one were to assign the primary and proper subject to an attribute, then, in the complete definition of the attribute one would have to provide its subject or the subject’s genus or some other term pertaining to the definition of this subject, because the attribute implies in its signification the signification of the subject, along with some connotation. And this issue should be checked in Posterior Analytics I. And so, the question is clear.

164 See

pars 1–4 above.

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Utrum numerus, magnitudo, figura, motus, et quies sint sensibilia communia et per se.

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1. Arguitur primo de numero quod non, quia dicitur quarto Physicorum quod non potest numerare nisi anima et non quaelibet anima sed intellectiva. Sed non potest numerare non cognoscens numerum secundum rationem secundum quam dicitur numerus. Igitur sensus sic non cognoscit numerum. Ideo secundum praedicta in praecedenti questione, huic nomini numerus non attribuitur illud praedicatum sensibile per se. 2. Item cum numerus non sit res distincta a rebus numeratis, prout vult Aristoteles in praedicto quarto Physicorum, dicens: “Numerus enim aut quod numeratur est aut numerabile.” Si igitur substantiae sunt quae numerantur, ille numerus erit sensibilis per accidens; et si sint sapores vel colores qui numerantur, ille numerus erit sensibile proprium. Et si sint magnitudines quae numerantur, quare, enumerando sensibilia communia, distinguimus numerum contra magnitudinem? Arguitur igitur de magnitudine. Et possit argui sicut de numero si magnitudo ponitur substantia vel albedo, etc. 3. Sed aliter arguitur sic quia nihil sentitur per se si non possit imprimere speciem suam in sensum vel in organum sensus. Sed hoc non potest magnitudo, quia recipiens debet esse denudatum a natura recepti, ita quod, secundum Aristotelem, sensus receptivus speciei coloris 1 quies ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 425b17. 3–4 quarto Physicorum ] A RI STOTELES , Phys. IV.14 223a 25–26. 7–8 secundum . . . quaestione ] B URIDAN US , QQ. De an. II.12 par. 15). 11–12 Numerus . . . numerabile ] A RISTOTELES , Phys. IV.14 223a 25 (Ar. lat. VII.1 188.11): “Numerus enim est aut quod numeratur aut numerabile.” 22 secundum Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418b26. 2 et per se ] om. AVW 5 intellectiva ] intelligibilis AV 8 attribuitur ] debet attribui VW 10 cum numerus ] quamvis T 14 sapores vel colores ] om. V 15 numerantur ] erit sensibile commune ergo add. E tunc nulla est ratio add. W 16 communia ] om. E non add. AV © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 19

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Are number, magnitude, shape, motion and rest common, per se sensibles?

1. First we argue concerning number that it is not, since it is stated in Physics IV that only the soul can count, and not just any soul, but the intellective soul. But what cannot count does not cognize number according to the concept according to which it is called number. Therefore, sense does not cognize number in this way. And so, in accordance with what has been said in the previous question, the predicate ‘sensible per se’ is not attributed to the name ‘number’. 2. Again, since number is not distinct from the things numbered, as Aristotle intended in the abovementioned Physics IV, where he said: “Number is either what is counted or what is countable.” If, therefore, the things counted are substances, then this number is sensible accidentally; and if tastes or colors are counted, then the resulting number is a proper sensible. And if magnitudes are counted, then why do we contradistinguish number against magnitude? Let us argue, therefore, about magnitude. And one might argue about it, just as we did about number, if magnitude is taken to be substance or whiteness, etc. 3. But we may also argue in this way: nothing is sensed per se unless it is capable of imprinting its species on the senses or the organ of sense. However, magnitude cannot do so, because the recipient has to be stripped of the nature of what is received, so that, according to

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 19

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et cognoscens colorem debet esse sine colore, propter quod, ut dicit, tactus, cum non possit esse omnino denudatus a qualitatibus tangibilibus, sed habet eas reductas ad proportionem quamdam mediam, ideo non sentit similiter calidum vel similiter frigidum, sed excellentias, quia denudatus est ab excellentiis. Sensus autem non est denudatus a magnitudine; immo aeque perfecte et aeque in actu habet magnitudinem sicut obiectum. Igitur non potest recipere speciem magnitudinis; igitur sequitur quod magnitudo non sit per se sensibilis. 4. Deinde etiam arguitur de figura, quia ipsa non est distincta a magnitudine. Quare igitur enumerantur magnitudo et figura tamquam sensibilia diversa? 5. Deinde etiam arguitur de motu, quia si per se sentiatur, hoc maxime videtur esse a visu. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia visio fit in instanti, ut dicit Aristoteles decimo Ethicorum. Et motus non potest fieri in instanti, ut patet sexto Physicorum. Immo, sicut arguit Aristoteles quarto Physicorum in capitulo de tempore, motus non est, quia partes eius non sunt, sed una praeterit et non amplius est, et alia futura est et nondum est. Et non est possibile sentire quod non est; ergo etc. 6. Deinde arguitur de quiete, quia nulla privatio est per se sensibilis, sed oportet quod per habitum cognoscatur. Sed quies est privatio motus; ergo etc. 7. Item secundum dicta in alia quaestione, si quies dicatur sensibile per se, oportet rem esse sensibilem secundum rationem secundum quam dicitur quiescere. Sed hoc est falsum, quia conceptus quietis includit in se conceptum motus et, re quiescente, sensus exterior non

26 non sentit similiter ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a 3–4. 36 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. X.3 1174a14–15 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 569.5): “Videtur enim visio quidem secundum quodcumque tempus perfecta esse.” 37 sexto Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VI.2 232b 20 (Ar. lat. VII.1 222.10): “Quoniam autem omnis quidem motus in tempore est et in omni tempore possibili est moveri.” 38 quarto . . . tempore ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. IV.10 217b 29. 44 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.12. 23 debet ] dicitur T 31 est ] videtur esse A 33 diversa ] communia et distincta VW 35 est ] videtur esse VW || impossibile ] insensibile T 36 Ethicorum ] Physicorum AT 40 possibile sentire ] sensibile W 41–42 sensibilis ] cognoscibilis VW 42 oportet ] apparet A

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Aristotle, the sense receptive of the species of color and cognizing color has to be without color, for which reason, he says, touch, as it cannot be entirely stripped of tangible qualities, but has them reduced to a certain average proportion, does not sense what is as warm or cold as itself, but what exceeds , because it is stripped of those exceeding . But sense is not stripped of magnitude; indeed, its magnitude is no less perfect and actual than that of the object; therefore, it cannot receive the species of magnitude; whence it follows that magnitude is not sensible per se. 4. Again, one may also argue about shape, as it is not distinct from magnitude. Why, then, are magnitude and shape listed as different sensibles? 5. Next, we argue about motion, for if it is sensed per se, then this appears to take place especially by sight. But this is impossible, because sight occurs instantaneously, as Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics X, and motion cannot happen instantaneously, as is clear in Physics VI. Indeed, as Aristotle argues in Physics IV in the chapter about time, motion does not exist, since its parts do not exist, but one part has already passed away and no longer exists, while another will exist, and does not yet exist. And what does not exist cannot be sensed; therefore, etc. 6. Next, one may argue about rest, because no privation is per se sensible, but it has to be cognized by its habit. But rest is the privation of motion; therefore, etc. 7. Again, in accordance with what was said in the previous question, if rest is said to be sensible per se, then it has to be sensible according to the concept in keeping with which it is said to be at rest. But this is false, because the concept of rest includes in itself the con-

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habet conceptum motus, cum non sentiat sensibile in eius absentia. Igitur tunc non potest iudicare rem quiescere; sed etiam nec iudicat eam quiescere quando percipit eam moveri, igitur non potest iudicare rem quiescere; igitur quiescere vel quies non debet dici sensibile per se. 8. Item si motus et quies essent sensibilia per se, tunc sensus bene dispositus et medio bene disposito et existente debita distantia non iudicaret sensibile moveri quando quiesceret et quiescere quando movetur. Sed sic iudicat sensus in tali casu quod duo homines sunt in fluvio in duabus navibus satis prope invicem, qui non respiciant nisi seipsos et illas naves, ita quod non respiciant ad ripas quiescentes. Et sint illae naves A et B, tunc illae naves moveantur simul uniformiter et aeque velociter, tunc uterque iudicabit per visum ambas illas naves quiescere. Sed si navis A incipiat quiescere et navis B velociter moveatur, existens in navi B iudicabit navem A moveri velociter. 9. Oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem. 10. Solutio huius quaestionis apparet ex praecedenti. Primo enim manifestum est quod praedicta debent dici sensibilia per se ad sensum datum in alia quaestione, quia sensus iudicat de rebus secundum illos conceptus secundum quos praedicta nomina significant eas. Et si ita mutentur res quod de eis debeant mutari nomina illa, sensus percipiet illam mutationem, ut si res visa existens parva fiat magna, vel e converso. Similiter, si res visa sit rotunda et fiat oblonga vel e converso, circumscriptis aliis mutationibus, sensus hoc percipiet, et in sensu mutabitur iudicium; iudicabit enim magnum vel oblongum quod ante iudicabat parvum vel rotundum. Et si res mota localiter incipiat quiescere vel e converso, ipso sensu manente et non moto localiter, sensus hoc percipiet. Et si lapis continuus dividatur et separantur partes eius

63 Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 425a17 66 alia quaestione ] B UR IDANUS , QQ. De an. II.12. 60 per visum ] om. A 65 praedicta ] per praedictam quaestionem E 68–69 percipiet ] percipit AE 73 vel rotundum ] om. V et e contra sicut si res visa existens rotunda fiat oblonga vel e contra sensus hoc percipiet W 75 continuus ] contiguus V

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cept of motion, and, when a thing is at rest, an external sense does not have the concept of motion, since it would not sense what is sensible in its absence. Therefore, it cannot then judge the thing to be at rest; but neither does it judge the thing to be at rest when it perceives it to move; therefore it cannot judge the thing to be at rest. Therefore, to be at rest or rest should not be called a per se sensible. 8. Again, if motion and rest were sensible per se, then a welldisposed sense, given a well-disposed medium and the requisite distance, would not judge a sensible object to move when it is at rest and to be at rest when it moves. But sense does judge in this way in the following case: there are two men in two boats on a river near enough to each other, who only see each other and these boats, but do not see the river banks at rest. And if these boats are A and B, provided they both move uniformly and with equal velocity, then the two men will both judge by sight that both boats are at rest. But if boat A stops and B swiftly moves on, then the one in boat B will judge boat A to move swiftly . 9. The opposite is argued by Aristotle. 10. The solution of this question is apparent from the previous one. For it is clear in the first place that the aforementioned are to be said to be per se sensibles in the sense provided in the previous question, because the senses judge about things in keeping with the concepts according to which the aforementioned names signify them. And if things were to change such that their names would have to be changed, then sense would notice this change, for example, if a thing seen that is small were to become big, or conversely. In the same way, if a thing seen is round and becomes oblong, or vice versa, without any other change, then sense will notice this, and the judgment will change in the power of sense; for it will judge to be big or oblong what it judged small or round before. And if a thing that is moved locally

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ab invicem, sensus hoc percipiet et iudicabit primo unum, secundo non unum sed multa. Et per sic iudicare multa intendit Aristoteles sentire numerum. Sed notandum est quod licet percipiet praedicta et iudicet sensus, tamen circa ea contingit ipsum decipi saepius secundum diversas et multas circumstantias, ut per aliqua vitra aliqua res multo apparet maior quam est. Per reflectionem a speculo gibboso apparet minor, et a concavo maior. Et si medium vel refrangens sit difformis figurae, apparebit figura rei valde alia quam sit. Sed de motu similiter dicendum est. Nam motus potest esse ita tardus quod sensus non percipiet, sed iudicabit quiescere. Et si oculus moveatur uniformiter et non percipiet, imaginatio vel intellectus oculo iudicabit rem visam quiescere. Et lapides plures et discontinui possunt sic se proxime habere quod sensus non iudicat distinctionem, sed iudicat illos esse unum. Et ex permutatione digitorum, unus lapillus iudicabitur esse duo et per duos oculos unum apparet esse duo in senibus, vel si superelevetur unus oculorum a situ suo. Et sic de multis aliis modis. 11. Secundo etiam manifestum est quod praedicta debent dici sensibilia communia quia non unico sensu exteriori solum, sed pluribus, iudicamus res et percipimus secundum istos conceptus a quibus illa nomina sumuntur. Tactus enim et visus iudicant illos lapides esse magnos vel parvos, rotundos vel angulares, motos vel quiescentes, et ab invicem esse diversos. Et auditus, per plures ictus percussionis, discernit distinctionem baculi ad campanam ita quod possemus eos numerare. Et tonitruum percipimus moveri quia ipsum audimus modo ad dextrum, modo ad sinistrum. Et omnino quilibet sensus percipit mul-

76 sensus ] visus VW 85 moveatur ] maneat(?) T 86 uniformiter ] circulariter V 90 unum . . . senibus ] om. V 94 et percipimus ] om. A 97–99 Et . . . numerare ] om. AET 99 audimus ] percipimus AET 100–101 multitudinem ] multiplicationem A

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begins to be at rest or vice versa, while the sense is staying in the same place and is not moved locally, then sense will perceive this. And if a stone that is continuous is divided and its parts are separated from each other, sense will perceive this and it will judge first that there is one thing, and then that there is not one thing, but many things. And judging that there are many things in this way is what Aristotle meant by sensing number. But we should note that although sense perceives and judges the aforementioned items, nevertheless, it may often be deceived about them in many and different circumstances, as when, for example, through certain glasses, a thing appears much larger than it is. And in a convex mirror it appears smaller, and in a concave one bigger. And if the medium or the refracting body has an irregular shape, the shape of the seen object will appear quite different than it is. But we should say the same about motion. For motion can be so slow that sense does not perceive it, but judges the thing to be at rest. And if the eye is in uniform motion and it does not perceive it, the imagination or the intellect, by means of the eye, will judge the thing seen to be at rest. And several discontinuous stones can be so close to each other that sense does not judge their distinctness, but judges them to be one. And by crossing one’s fingers, one pebble will be judged two, and by two eyes one thing appears to be two to the elderly or if one eye is shifted from its usual position. And the same goes for many other cases. 11. In the second place, it is also clear that the above-mentioned items are to be called common sensibles, because it is not by one external sense alone, but by several, that we judge and perceive things according to the concepts from which these names are taken. For touch and sight both judge these stones to be large or small, round or angular, moving or at rest, and different from one another. And hearing, through many percussive blows, recognizes the distinct quality of a clapper on a bell so that we may count them.165 And we perceive thunder to move, for we hear it now to the right, now to the left.

165 Here Buridan wants to show that hearing, as well as vision and touch, can discern

number. The example of the bell and clapper is unclear but may mean that hearing can count the number of times a bell is rung because it can detect when the bell has been rung a second time even though the sound of the first ringing can still be heard.

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titudinem et distinctionem multorum suorum sensibilium, licet non ita clare multitudinem numeralem sicut visus et tactus et post auditus. Sed est bene dubitatio quare tactu et visu iudicamus magnitudines et figuras, et non aliis sensibus. Unde si quis dicat per auditum nos iudicare de magnitudine vel parvitate campanae, scilicet ex gravi sono iudicando magnitudinem et ex acuto, parvitatem, constat quod hoc iudicium non est ab auditu per se, sed per accidens, scilicet quia concurrebat alias visus. Nam communiter habentia sonos graves vidimus esse maiora, et habentia acutos vidimus minora. Ideo audientes graves sonos iudicamus magnitudinem, sicut Aristoteles dicit in secundo huius, quod unus sensus iudicat per accidens de proprio sensibili alterius sensus, ut visus de dulci ex eo quod, per duos sensus, percipimus in eodem simul concurrere dulcedinem et rubedinem. 12. Remanet igitur dubitatio quare solum tactu et visu iudicamus magnitudines et figuras. Ad hoc potest dici primo de tactu quod tactus non percipit figuras nec magnitudines corporum calidorum vel frigidorum nisi habeant aliquam soliditatem secundum quam permaneant, non cedentia manui vel tactui. Non enim tactus percipit magnitudinem vel figuram aeris, sed ligni vel lapidis, ex eo quod tangendo posses manum movere supra superficiem istius lapidis de cono ad conum et circa lapidem. Sic enim, per longum motum vel brevem, aut per hoc quod lapis occuparet multum vel parvum de manu, tu iudicares lapidem esse magnum vel parvum. Sic etiam tangendo percipies elevationes et depressiones superficiei exterioris lapidis, et sic iudicabis de figura eius. 13. Sed visus, inter caeteros sensus, magis bene iudicat talia, si medium sit uniforme, propter hoc quod species lucis vel coloris multi-

110–111 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 425a30–31. 102 multitudinem ] indivisibilem add. A 103 iudicamus ] videamus sentiamus T 105 gravi ] magno VW 107 sed per accidens ] om. T 108 alias ] om. T || vidimus ] iudicamus AV videmus T 109 vidimus ] vel iudicamus add. A esse add. T 113 dulcedinem et rubedinem ] quod est album et dulce AW 118 tactus percipit ] tactu perciperes VW 123 percipies ] partiales add. A 127 sit ] bene dispositum et add. T

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And altogether any sense perceives the multitude and distinction of its many sensibles, although their numerical multitude not as clearly as sight and touch and, after them, hearing. However, one may certainly doubt why we judge magnitudes and shapes by touch and sight, but not by the other senses. Thus, if someone were to say that we judge the largeness or smallness of a bell by hearing, that is, by judging it to be large because of its deep sound and small by its high-pitched sound, it is obvious that this judgment is coming not from hearing per se but only accidentally, with the aid of sight. For in general things that have a deep sound we see to be bigger and those with a high-pitched sound we see to be smaller. Thus, upon hearing a deep sound we judge the thing to be large, just as Aristotle says in Book II, namely that one sense judges accidentally about the proper sensible of another sense, as does sight about sweetness, because we perceive that sweetness and redness coincide in the same thing at the same time. 12. There remains, therefore, the question why we judge magnitudes and shapes only by touch and sight. To this, one may reply first concerning touch that it does not perceive the shapes or magnitudes of hot or cold bodies unless they have some solidity, by which they stay in place without yielding to the hand or touch. For touch does not perceive the magnitude or shape of air, but you do perceive the magnitude or shape of a piece of wood or a stone, because while touching it you are able to move your hand over the surface of this stone from one end to the other and around it. For it is in this way, through a long or a short motion, or because the stone fills a greater or a smaller part of your hand, that you judge this stone to be large or small. In the same way, by touching, you perceive the elevations and depressions of the external surface of the stone, and so you will judge its shape. 13. However, among all the other senses, sight judges these things much better, if the medium is uniform, because the species of light

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plicentur ad visum a singulis partibus corporis colorati vel lucidi per radios rectos regulariter et ordinate, ita quod a dextra parte corporis visi recipitur species in dextra parte oculi et a sinistra in sinistram et a superiori in superiorem. Et ita species similiter figuratur in oculo sicut color in corpore colorato. Ideo visus bene iudicat de figura. Et ita etiam, propter idem, quanto visibile fuerit maius, scilicet extensius ad dextram et sinistram et superius et inferius, tanto, caeteris paribus, species plus occupat de magnitudine oculi. Et quanto etiam visibile est minus, tanto minus occupat de quantitate oculi. Ideo sic oculus potest iudicare de magnitudine vel parvitate obiecti. Si autem medium fuerit difforme, vel etiam si fiat reflexio speciei ab obstaculo difformi, tunc a diversis partibus visibilis multiplicantur species secundum radios difformiter et irregulariter se habentes. Ideo non poterimus bene iudicare de magnitudine vel figura visibilis, quod in aqua manifeste experimur. Cum enim sit quieta, habens superficiem levem et regularem, aspicientes in eam iudicamus per reflexionem regularem magnitudines et figuras astrorum et solis et nubium. Et si ad hoc directe respiceremus cum aqua moveretur, non possemus hoc facere propter irregularem reflexionem specierum ab irregulari superficie aquae. Sic autem non multiplicantur regulariter species soni ab isto aere in quo fit sonus regularis, quia ille aer, dum sonat, est motus et divisus et fractus et continue difformiter se habens in partibus suis, et quia etiam sunt in aure tortuositates antequam veniant species ad organum auditivum. Ita etiam per tortuositates nasi multiplicantur species odoris antequam perveniant intra organum olfactus. Nec oportet sic per radios rectos multiplicari speciem odoris sicut speciem coloris vel lucis, cuius signum manifestum est quod parvum obstaculum positum in recta via inter nos et sensibile prohibet nos videre ipsum et non prohibet sentire sonum et odorem ipsius. Et forte sunt etiam aliae differentiae in speciebus sonorum et odorum quantum ad generationes et multiplicationes eorum in comparatione ad species colorum de quibus post dicetur, 158 post dicetur ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.18. 129 rectos ] praesentes vel se habentes A 131 superiorem ] inferiorem V 132 visus ] per illam speciem add. VW 135 species ] om. T 139 visibilis ] visibilibus E 143 per reflexionem ] om. W 148 regularis ] realis E 151–152 antequam perveniant ] ad perveniendum TW 152 intra ] infra AETW 155 sensibile ] exterius add. AT 156–157 speciebus ] generationibus et multiplicationibus specierum colorum VW 157–158 quantum . . . colorum ] om. TV

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or color are transmitted to sight along straight paths in a systematic and orderly manner from the individual parts of a bright or colored body, so that from the right side of an observed body the species is received in the right side of the eye and from the left part in the left, and that from the top in the top. And in this way the species is shaped in a similar way in the eye as color is in the colored body. This is why sight judges correctly about shape. And so also, for the same reason, the larger the visible thing is, i.e., the more extended it is to the right, left, top, and bottom, the greater part of the eye the species will fill, other things being equal. And the smaller the visible thing is the smaller part of the eye the species will fill. Therefore, this is how the eye can judge the largeness or smallness of the object. However, if the medium is not uniform, or if the species is reflected by an uneven obstacle, then the species are multiplied from the different parts of the visible thing along rays with uneven and irregular relationships to each other. Therefore we are not going to be able to judge well concerning the magnitude or shape of the visible thing, as we clearly experience by looking into water. For when it is quiet, having a smooth, regular surface, looking into it we judge by regular reflection the magnitudes and shapes of the stars, the sun and the clouds. And if we were to look back at it directly when the water has been stirred, we could not do the same because of the irregular reflection of species from the irregular surface of the water. However, the species of sound are not transmitted in the same regular manner from the air in which regular sound is made, because this body of air, as it sounds, is continuously moved, divided, and fractured, and the relations of its parts to each other distorted, and also because there are twists and turns in the ears before the species arrive at the organ of hearing. And so as well, the species of odor are transmitted through the twists and turns of the nose before they reach the olfactory organ within. And the species of odor does not have to travel along a straight path in the way the species of

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propter quas non est ordinata multiplicatio in speciebus sonorum vel odorum sicut est in speciebus coloris. 14. Sed nunc propter solutiones rationum, dicendum est de modo per quem fiunt sensationes istorum sensibilium communium. Non enim fit sensatio eorum propter recipere alias species a speciebus sensibilium propriorum, sed oportet primo imaginari quod sensus percipit primo inter sensibilia communia situm sensibilis ad sensum, scilicet an talia sint ad dextram vel ad sinistram, superius vel inferius, ante vel retro, quod magis manifeste apparet de visu quam de aliis quia manifestius iudicat visus de illis. Species enim visibiles ad dextram partem oculi existentes in dextra parte oculi recipiuntur et species existentes ad sinistram in sinistra. Ideo percipit oculus hoc esse ad dextram, illud ad sinistram. Ex hoc sequitur quod videns faciem suam per reflexionem a speculo iudicat visu illud quod videt esse in speculo, quia a speculo secundum rectam viam multiplicatur species in oculo. Ideo situm occupat in oculo secundum exigentiam situs speculi ad oculum. Ideo apparet res esse ubi est speculum. Et etiam campana pulsata secundum primam multiplicationem soni iudicatur ubi est, scilicet ad dextram si sit ad dextram. Et secundum reflexionem quae dicitur echon iudicatur esse ad partem oppositam, quia secundum diversos situs recipitur hinc inde species ad auditum.

159 ordinata multiplicatio ] multiplicata ordinatio V 160 speciebus ] lucis vel add. W 163 alias ] illas ATV 167 quia ] et etiam W 174 exigentiam ] existentiam A 174–175 speculi ad oculum ] speciei in oculo A speciei in speculo E specierum in speculo T 176 primam multiplicationem ] multiplicationem primi T || iudicatur ] multiplicatur V auditur sonus W 178 dicitur ] echo vel add. W

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color or light does, which is clearly indicated by the fact that a small obstacle placed in the direct line of sight between us and the sensible thing prevents us from seeing it, whereas it does not prevent us from sensing its sound and odor. And perhaps there are other differences as well in the species of sounds and odors, concerning their generation and propagation compared to the species of color, which will be discussed later, on account of which the propagation of the species of odors and sounds is not as orderly as the propagation of the species of light and color. 14. But now, for the solution of the objections, we should discuss the way in which the sensations of these common sensibles come to be. For their sensation does not occur because of the reception of species other than the species of proper sensibles; rather, one must first imagine that sense first perceives, among the common sensibles, the location of the sensible relative to the sense, namely whether such and such sensible objects are to the right or to the left, above or below, in the front or behind, which is more obvious in the case of sight than in the case of the others because sight judges more clearly about these things. For the species of a visible thing that is to the right side of the eye are received in the right side of the eye, and the species of a thing to the left in the left side. 166 This is why the eye perceives the former to be on the right and the latter on the left. And from this it follows that someone seeing his face in a mirror judges by sight that what he sees is in the mirror, because the species is propagated from the mirror into the eye along a straight path. Therefore, it occupies a place in the eye according to the requirement of the position of the mirror relative to the eye. This is why the thing appears to be where the mirror is. Likewise, a ringing bell is judged to be where it is by the first emission of sound, namely to the right, if it is to the right. But due to reflection, which is called echo, it is judged to be on the opposite

166 As

we now know, the lens produces an inverted image on the retina, but in Buridan’s time the retina had not yet been identified as the precise organ of vision. Nevertheless, the philosophically relevant point is that the spatial properties of visible objects are represented by corresponding (even if not necessarily strictly matching) spatial properties of the species received in our visual apparatus. For the significance of this point, see Klima 2008, 69–83. See also Klima 2018.

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15. Deinde ex perceptione situs partium visibilis iudicatur etiam visu magnitudo et figura illius visibilis, quia cum species dextrae partis obiecti recipiantur in dextra parte oculi et species sinistrae in sinistra, etiam sequitur quod species sit figurata in partibus oculi sicut figuratum est obiectum; et si obiectum est magnum, ita ut in prospectu visus extendat se ad dextram partem oculi et ad sinistram, tunc species illius occupat totam magnitudinem oculi, et iudicatur magnum. Et si sit parvum, species eius non occupat nisi parvam partem in oculo, sive hoc sit ad dextram sive in medio, et visus sic iudicabit de magnitudine et figura, non quia recipiat aliquam speciem magnitudinis distinctam a specie coloris, sed quia recipit species coloris in dextra parte oculi et extenditur illi parti extensione magnitudinis istius partis, sicut nos dicimus omnia accidentia corporea in subiecto corporeo extendi simul una magnitudine qua ipsum subiectum est extensum. 16. Deinde etiam, propter idem iudicamus unitatem et distinctionem visibilium. Cum enim lapides duo sint ab invicem divisi et distincti, tunc species istorum in oculo occupant partes oculi distinctas et non continuantur simul in oculo. Ideo visus iudicat istos esse divisos. Sed si essent contigui taliter quod species eorum essent coniunctae in visu, visus non iudicaret quod essent divisi sed iudicaret unitatem, nisi forte propter dissimilitudinem accidentium iudicaret ut divisionem. Contingit enim saepe visum decipi circa talia. 17. Sed tunc est dubitatio. Si parvus lapis ponitur inter duos digitos, tunc in utroque digito fiet species istius lapidis. Et illi digiti sunt separati et distantes. Et sic fiunt illae species distantes. Igitur tactus deberet iudicare esse duos lapides separatos, quod est falsum,

180 perceptione ] parte potentie V 183 species ] sensus V 185 partem oculi ] oculum V 188 medio ] sive ad sinistro add. W 190 dextra ] determinata AE 191 et extenditur ] quae coextenditur E coextenditur T 192 corporea ] om. VW 195–196 distincti ] distantes VW 196 distinctas ] distantes VW 197 visus ] om. VW 199 divisi ] licet essent divisi add. V diversi licet essent diversi W 200 forte . . . ut ] om. V

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side, because from there the species is received in different places in the sense of hearing. 15. Again, sight judges the size and shape of this visible thing from the perception of the locations of the parts of a visible thing, because, since the species of the right side of an object are received in the right side of the eye, and the species on the left side in the left, it also follows that the species is shaped in the parts of the eye as the object is shaped. If the object is large, so that it extends across the prospect of vision from the right side of the eye to the left, then its species fill the entire extent of the eye, and it is judged to be large. And if it is small, its species occupies only a small part of the eye, whether to the right or in the middle, and sight will judge its magnitude and shape accordingly — not because it receives some species of magnitude distinct from the species of color, but because the species of a color is received in the right side of the eye and is extended in that part with the extension of the magnitude of that part, just as we say that every corporeal accident in a corporeal subject is extended together with that magnitude by which the subject is itself extended. 16. Furthermore, we judge the unity and distinctness of visible things in the same way. For when two stones are divided and distinct from each other, then their species in the eye occupy distinct parts of the eye, and they are discontinuous in the eye. Therefore, sight judges them to be distinct. But if they were contiguous in such a way that their species were conjoined in sight, sight would not judge them to be two but one, unless perhaps it would judge them to be divided on account of the dissimilarity of their accidents. For sight is often deceived in such things. 17. But then a problem arises. If a small pebble is put between your fingers, then there comes to be a species of this pebble in each finger. And these fingers are separate and at a distance from each other. And so these species come to be apart from each other. There-

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nisi hoc contingat ex permutatione digitorum. Et similiter, in duobus oculis recipiuntur divisim et distanter species eiusdem visibilis. Ideo non debemus iudicare illud esse unum tantum sed duo separata et distantia, quod est falsum. 18. Dico quod bene dubium est utrum in organo exteriori fiat iudicium, puta in oculo vel in pede aut in manu, aut quod non, sed quod species recipiantur primo in organo exteriori et statim multiplicentur ad organum sensus communis, et ibi fiat iudicium. Quodcumque tamen horum ponatur, idem in proposito revertitur. Nam duorum digitorum invicem proximorum partes in manu quae in ordine naturali, sunt iuxta invicem, coniunguntur simul in manu. Ideo si lapis sit inter illos duos digitos, species factae in illis digitis secundum istas partes ipsorum, multiplicantur per manum ad organum sensus communis, et apud coniunctionem illorum duorum digitorum in manu, istae species uniuntur et sic unitae veniunt ad locum iudicii. 19. Si dicamus non fieri iudicia nisi in sensu communi, ideo bene debemus iudicare lapidem esse unum et non duos separatos. Sed si digiti transponuntur, tunc iudicamus duos esse lapides separatos et distinctos, quia tunc ipsae partes istorum digitorum secundum quas ille lapis tangitur non coniunguntur in manu, propter quod species receptae in illis partibus multiplicantur ad sensum communem secundum diversos situs et distantes. Ideo oportet iudicare duos esse lapides separatos. 20. Si vero teneamus quod iudicium fiat in organo exteriori, ut in digito, tamen concedendum est quod statim multiplicatur species vel intentio ad sensum communem, et sequitur iudicium etiam in sensu communi. Sed tunc oportet notare quod iudicium virtutis superioris extinguit et corrigit iudicium quod sit in virtute inferiori. Verbi gratia, secundum apparentiam factam in sensu, sequitur iudicium quod

211 manu ] anima VW 215 quae ] quaeque W 216 iuxta ] unite W 217 factae ] recepta A 231–232 sensu communi ] sensationem A 233 extinguit et corrigit ] corrigit et prohibet certe A || corrigit ] prohibet AET || iudicium ] sensum secundum apparentiam add. A || quod sit ] secundum apparentiam quae est E || sit . . . inferiori ] est secundum apparentiam quae est virtitus inferioris T

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fore, touch would have to judge that there are two distinct pebbles, which is false, unless this happens on account of crossing the fingers.167 Likewise, in the two eyes, the species of the same visible thing is received separately and apart from each other. Thus we should not judge that it is only one thing, but two separate and distant things, which is false. 18. I say that it is indeed questionable whether or not a judgment comes to be in the external organ, as in the eye or in the foot or in the hand, but rather, the species are first received in the external organ and are at once transmitted to the organ of common sense, and it is there that the judgment would be formed. But whichever of these alternatives is chosen, the point is the same. For the parts of the two fingers next to each other on the hand, which are ordinarily next to each other, are joined together in the hand. Therefore, if there is a stone between these fingers, the species produced in these fingers, in keeping with their parts, are transmitted through the hand to the organ of common sense, and where these two fingers meet in the hand, these species are united, and so they arrive united at the place of judgment. 19. If we say that judgments are made only in the common sense, then we should certainly judge that there is only one stone, and not two separate ones. But if the fingers are crossed, then we judge that there are two separate and distinct stones, because then the parts of the fingers by which we touch the stone are not joined in the hand, and for this reason the species received in these parts are transmitted to the common sense according to diverse and distant locations. Thus we have to judge that there are two separate stones. 20. However, if we were to hold that a judgment is made in the external organ — in the finger, for example — yet we would have to grant that the species or intention is at once transmitted to the common sense, and that a judgment follows again in the common sense. But then we have to note that the judgment of a superior power overrides and corrects the judgment of an inferior power. For example, the ap-

167 See

par. 10 above.

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sol est bipedalis et non maior, et sic iudicat vetula. Sed in astrologia ablatum est totaliter hoc iudicium, quia intellectus iudicat per rationem ipsum esse maiorem terra. Cum igitur sensus communis sit virtus superior ad sensus exteriores, licet secundum apparentias factas in sensibus exterioribus, si non superveniret iudicium virtutis superioris, nos iudicaremus lapides esse duos. Tamen quia supervenit iudicium sensus communis, nos simpliciter iudicamus lapidem esse unum. 21. Consimiliter dicendum est de duobus oculis propter coniunctionem eorum in quodam nervo interiori, secundum quod sciunt anatomizantes. Et similiter, si superelevetur unus oculus extra naturalem eius situm, alio non sic elevato, una res apparebit manifeste duae, sicut erat de permutatione digitorum. 22. Postea dicendum est etiam quod, quia ex motu locali rei visae mutatur situs speciei in oculo si oculus quiescat, ideo iudicatur res visa moveri, et esse prius ad dextram et consequenter continue fieri ad sinistram. Unde etiam propter idem iudicamus rem visam moveri si ipsa quiescat et oculus moveatur, tamen imaginemur oculum quiescere, ut si homo in navi moveatur, iudicabit arborem in ripa moveri quia illa species arboris mutabit situm in oculo si oculus movetur et arbor quiescit, sicut si e converso. Et sic iudicamus aliquid quiescere quia continue apparet nobis esse in eodem situ ad nos, ex eo quod species eius non mutat situm in visu, propter quod accidit, cum duae naves iuxta invicem moveantur aeque velociter in mari, quilibet existens in una navi iudicabit ad visum navem suam et navem aliam quiescere, quia species earum non mutant situm in oculo. 23. Ex hiis solvuntur omnes rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis. Ad primam ego concedo quod, loquendo proprie, sensus

235 astrologia ] astrolabiis V post corr. astrologo W 237–238 virtus ] communis add. V 239 virtutis ] alicuius A om. ET 241 simpliciter ] semper V 243 sciunt ] perspectivi et add. VW 248 speciei ] specierum T visae add. V 249 moveri ] maior V om. W

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pearance in the external sense gives rise to the judgment that the sun is two feet across, and not bigger; and this is how a market woman judges it. But in astronomy this judgment is totally demolished, because the intellect judges by demonstration that the sun is larger than the earth. Therefore, because common sense is a power that is superior to the external senses, even though we would judge that there are two pebbles based on the appearances produced in the external senses — provided there is no prevailing judgment by a superior power — nevertheless, we judge without qualification that there is only one pebble, because the judgment of common sense prevails. 21. We have to say the same about the two eyes168 because of their connection in an internal nerve, known to anatomists. And likewise, if one eye is shifted from its usual position, while the other is not thus lifted, then one thing will clearly appear to be two things, as happened in the case of crossing the fingers. 22. Next, we should also note that a thing seen is judged to be moved, first to be to the right and then continuously coming to be to the left, because, on account of the local motion of the thing seen, the place of its species in the eye is changed if the eye is at rest. So, by the same movement we judge a thing seen to move, if it is at rest and the eye is in motion, but we imagine the eye to be at rest, as when a man in a moving boat will judge the tree on the river bank to move,169 because the species of the tree changes its location in the eye if the eye is in motion and the tree is at rest, just as it would in the reverse case. And it is in this way that we judge something to be at rest, because it continuously appears to us in the same position, as its species does not change its location in our sight; and this is why it happens that when two boats at sea move next to each other at equal speed, whoever is in one boat will judge by his sight that his boat and the other boat are at rest, since their species do not change their location in his eye. 23. From these points we solve all the objections that were raised at the beginning of the question. In reply to the first 170 I concede 168 See

par. 10 above. par. 8 above. 170 See par. 1 above. 169 See

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non numerat sed solum intellectus. Sed tamen sensus percipit multitudinem et divisionem. Et hoc hic vocat Aristoteles sentire numerum, non capiendo proprie istum terminum numerus, sed communiter loco ipsius termini multitudo. Unde ratio numerum addit super rationem multitudinis mensurationem vel mensurabilitatem. Unde manifestum est quod tu statim percipis multitudinum hominum, et tu tamen ignoras numerum ipsorum, puta quot sint ipsi. Unde tunc numerum cognoscis, sed tu non cognoscis numerum. Quod autem solus intellectus numerat, licet sensus percipiat multitudinem, apparet signo, quia gallina habens decem pullos non numerat eos nec iudicat quot sunt. Ideo si deficiunt duo vel tres non quaerit eos nisi audiat eos clamantes, quia si non audiat clamorem ipsorum ipsa non percipit eos. Sed si audiat eos tunc cum magno impetu et tumultu quaerit eos. Et ita est de sue habente plures porcellos, et sic de aliis brutis, quia non sunt habentia intellectum, non numerant. 24. Ad secundam de hoc quod numerus non est res distincta a rebus numeratis, soluta est satis ex praecedentibus. 25. Ad tertiam dictum est quod non sentitur magnitudo nisi secundum exigentiam et situm rei ad sensum, species sensibilis proprii occupat in sensu certam magnitudinem et certum situm organi.

262–263 multitudinem ] multiplicationem T 268 ipsi ] septem octavum etc add. T 271 decem ] aliquos A || iudicat ] om. V scit cognoscere W 273 eos ] quod aliquid sibi deficit VW 281 sensu ] alio add. E || organi ] oculi T

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that, properly speaking, sense does not count, but only the intellect does. However, sense perceives multitude and division. And this is what Aristotle calls sensing number, not taking the term ‘number’ in the strict sense, but broadly, in place of the term ‘multitude’. For the concept of number adds to the concept of multitude the concept of measuring or measurability.171 Accordingly, it is clear that you at once perceive a multitude of men, and yet you do not know their number, namely how many of them there may be. So in this case it is a number you perceive, but you do not perceive the number .172 An indication of the fact that only intellect counts, although sense perceives multitude, is that a hen having ten chicks does not count them, and does not judge how many of them there are. Therefore, if two or three are missing, she does not look for them unless she hears them making noise, for if she does not hear their clamor, she does not perceive them . But if she hears them, then she starts looking for them with great fuss and commotion. And the same goes for a sow having a number of piglets, and for other animals: for want of intellect, they do not count. 24. The second objection,173 based on the claim that a number is not other than the things numbered, is satisfactorily solved by the foregoing. 25. To the third,174 we have replied that a magnitude is not sensed, except that in accordance with the requirement and location of the thing sensed relative to the sense, the species of the proper sensible occupies a certain area and a certain location in the organ.175 171 The

standard medieval definition of ‘number’ was ‘multitude measured by a unit’. 172 Buridan here clearly uses word order to express the difference in the appellation of the name ‘number’ in or outside the scope of the intentional verb ‘perceive’. For more on this issue, see Klima 2008, 191–202. 173 See par. 2 above. 174 See par. 3 above. 175 See pars. 14–16 above.

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26. Quod etiam arguitur de figura solutum est ex praedeterminatis. Res enim eadem concipitur diversis conceptibus, et licet non sit figura distincta a magnitudine, tamen differt iudicium quod sit tricubita et quod sit triangularis. 27. Sed de motu, quando dicitur quod visio fit in instanti, videbitur postea utrum hoc sit verum. Et si visio vel iudicium concederetur fieri totum simul quod hoc est album vel nigrum tamen non fieret totum simul quod hoc est ad dextram ante et postea ad sinistram, immo successive hoc iudicaretur, secundum quod successive species mutaret situm in oculo. De alia ratione debet videri quarto Physicorum. Totus enim motus est, sed non totus simul, sed una pars prius et alia posterius. Et nulla partium est praeterita vel futura, sed quaelibet praesens est, si totali tempore motus illius utamur tamquam praesenti. 28. Ad sextam dicitur quod non aliter iudicatur de quiescente nisi quia apparet nobis in eodem situ per aliquod totum tempus. Nec obstat si hoc cognoscitur per illud unde dicatur sensibile per se si sensus iudicat de re secundum conceptum secundum quem sic nominatur, prout ante dictum est. 29. Ad septimam quae contra hoc arguit, dicendum est quod forte sensus non iudicat quietem secundum rationem secundum quam dicitur quies sed rem esse per aliquod tempus in eodem loco vel situ, et hoc intendit hic Aristoteles per iudicare quietem. Et forte bene potest dici quod aliqua horum sensibilium communium dicuntur per se sen-

286–287 videbitur postea ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.18. 291 quarto Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. IV.10. 286 motu ] visu A 288 album vel nigrum ] ad dextrum V 290 hoc . . . successive ] hom. V in marg. W || successive ] om. A 292 non ] motus add. W || simul ] om. W 294 praesenti ] presente AET 296 quia ] sensibile add. V 297 unde ] quin AE quando T 298 iudicat de re ] indiget distinguere V || de re ] distinguere W

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26. And what is objected concerning shape has been solved in terms of the foregoing.176 For the same thing is conceived by means of different concepts, and although shape is not distinct from magnitude, nevertheless, the judgment that the thing is three cubits long differs from the judgment that it is triangular. 27. But concerning motion,177 when it is said that vision occurs instantaneously, we shall see later whether this is actually true. And even if we allow that the vision or the judgment that this is white or black were to occur all at once, nevertheless, the judgments that first this is to the right and afterwards to the left do not occur all at once; rather, this would be judged successively, as the species would successively change its location in the eye. Concerning the other point , one should look up Physics IV. For the entire motion exists, but not the whole at once, but one part earlier and another later. And none of the parts is past or future; however, any present part exists, if the whole duration of this motion is used as the present.178 28. To the sixth,179 we reply that a thing is judged to be at rest only because it appears to us to be in the same location over some time. And it does not matter if this is cognized through that on the basis of which it is called sensible per se, if the sense judges the thing in terms of the concept according to which it is so named, as has been said earlier.180 29. In reply to the seventh objection,181 which argues against this solution, we have to reply that perhaps sense does not judge rest in terms of the concept according to which it is said to be rest but because the thing is in the same location or place for some time. And this is what Aristotle meant here by judging rest. And perhaps one 176 See

par. 4 above. par. 5 above. 178 See Questions on Aristotle’s Physics IV.12–16 (ed. Streijger and Bakker) 306– 348, and Summulae de dialectica 9.7 (tr. Klima, 941–951). 179 See par. 6 above. 180 See pars. 10–11 above. 181 See par. 7 above. 177 See

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tiri non quia iudicium eorum perficiatur in sensu exteriori sed in sensu communi cum iuvamine sensus exterioris. Unde sic visu iudicamus tenebram, quia sensus communis iudicat visum non mutari a lumine. 30. Ad aliam dicitur quod saepe contingit sensum decipi circa sensibilia communia, et causa deceptionis fuit dicta prius. Et sic patet quaestio.

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may correctly say that some of these common sensibles are said to be sensed per se not because the judgment of them is completed in the external sense, but rather in the common sense with the help of an external sense. For it is in this way that we judge darkness by sight, because the common sense judges that sight is not affected by illumination. 30. To the other,182 we reply that it often happens that the senses are deceived about common sensibles, and the cause of deception has been described earlier.183 And so the question is clear.

182 See 183 See

par. 8 above. par. 10 above.

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Utrum color sit proprium obiectum visus.

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1. Arguitur quod sic quia Commentator dicit quod color est visibilis sicut homo est risibilis. Et tamen etiam ponitur communiter quod homo est per se et primo risibilis. Item quarto Metaphysicae dicitur quod omnis sensus debet esse unius generis sensibilis, et omnis scientia una unius generis scibilis. Et non apparet quod posset esse genus magis appropriatum visui quam color. 2. Item omnis sensus unus debet esse per se et primo unius contrarietatis. Ideo sensus tactus postea dicitur esse duplex sensus, quia est duarum contrarietatum. Et non apparet alia contrarietas visibilium quam inter colores. Ideo videtur quod visus sit per se et primo colorum. 3. Deinde arguitur quod lux sit per se et primo visibilis, et per consequens primum obiectum visus, quia illud est primum visibile quod est sine alio visibile, et nihil aliud nisi per ipsum vel cum ipso. Sed sic est de luce, quia sine lumine, quod est species lucis, non videtur color. 4. Deinde arguitur quod neutrum sit primum obiectum visus, quia primum obiectum potentiae debet esse adaequatum illi potentiae. Sed nec lux nec color est obiectum adaequatum potentiae visivae cum utrumque sit visibile. Immo nec ambo simul sub disiunctione sunt 1 Utrum . . . visus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418a 26–28 (Ar. lat. XII.2 123.1.1): “Cuius quidem est visus, hoc est visibile, visibile autem est color . . . ” 2 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.67 (ed. Crawford, 233.74–79). 4 quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.2 1003b19–20 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 68.38): “Omnis autem generis et sensus unus unius et scientia.” 9 postea ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.19. 3 risibilis ] animalis W 3–4 Et . . . risibilis ] hom. T 4 et primo ] om. V 5 debet esse ] est V 14 primum ] proprium A prius T 15 quod ] per se add. V || sine alio ] om. V per se W 16 Sed sic ] sicut AETV || luce ] lumine A 21 nec ] omnis vel add. A || sub disiunctione ] subditione vel distinctione A © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 20

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Is color the proper object of sight?

1. We argue that it is because the Commentator says that color is visible, just as man is risible.184 And it is generally accepted that man is per se and primarily risible. Again, in Metaphysics IV it is said that every sense should be of one genus of what can be sensed, and every kind of knowledge concerns one genus of what can be known. And there does not appear to be a genus more appropriate to sight than color. 2. Again, every single sense is supposed to concern per se and primarily one contrariety. Thus, later on,185 the sense of touch is called a double sense, because it concerns two contrarieties. And there does not appear to be another contrariety of visible things besides that between colors. Therefore, it seems that vision is per se and primarily of colors. 3. Next, it is argued that light is per se and primarily visible, and, consequently, the primary object of sight, because that is the first visible thing which is visible without anything else, while nothing else is seen unless by it or with it. But this is the case with light, because without illumination, which is the species of light, color is not seen. 4. Next, it is argued that neither is the primary object of sight, because the primary object of a power has to be adequate to that power. But neither light nor color is an object adequate to the visual power, because each is visible. Moreover, neither are both at once ad-

184 The

term ‘risible’, in the sense of ‘able to laugh’ and not in the sense of ‘ridiculous’, is the classic Porphyrian example of a property (proprium), that is, a universal, non-essential predicable that can be predicated convertibly with a species. Thus, since every man is risible and everything risible is a man, ‘risible’ is a property of man, and since every color is visible and everything per se visible is a color, ‘visible’ is property of color. 185 See Questions on Aristotle’s De anima, II.19. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 20

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adaequata potentiae visivae, quia multa alia sunt visibilia, scilicet lumen, diaphanum, aer, magnitudo, figura, etc. 5. Notandum est quod idem intelligimus per obiectum visus et visibile vel quod videtur. 6. Et tunc statim est dubitandum utrum Antichristus est visibilis, et utrum ipse est obiectum visus. Et ego respondeo quod Antichristus proprie est visibilis, quia idem significat esse visibile et posse videri. Et Antichristus potest videri quia videbitur. Et ego etiam concedo quod Antichristus est obiectum visus exponendo obiectum visus quia potest videri et non exponendo quia videtur vel visui obicitur. 7. Deinde etiam notandum quod quaestio potest intelligi secundum suppositionem materialem vel personalem. Si secundum suppositionem materialem, sensus est utrum ista propositio color est obiectum visus sit vera primo et per se, vel etiam utrum hoc praedicatum obiectum visus praedicetur per se et primo de hoc subiecto color. Et sensus personalis est prout nullus terminus in dicta praedicatione supponit materialiter sed significative.

23 aer ] om. A || magnitudo, figura ] om. AET 24 Notandum ] oppositum vult aristoteles quod non T 25 visibile vel ] om. V 28 proprie ] om. AEW 31 visui ] om. VW 35–36 vel . . . primo ] om. A 37 prout ] quando W || praedicatione ] propositione EW 38 significative ] figurative T

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equate, under disjunction to the visual power, because there are many other visible things, such as illumination, transparent objects, air, size, shape, etc.186 5. We should note that we understand the same by ‘object of sight’ and ‘visible’ or ‘what is seen’. 6. And then it is at once problematic whether Antichrist is visible and whether he is an object of sight. And I respond that Antichrist is properly visible, because ‘to be visible’ signifies the same as ‘to be able to be seen’. And Antichrist can be seen, because he will be seen. And I even concede that Antichrist is an object of sight by expounding ‘object of sight’ as ‘what can be seen’ and not as ‘what is seen’ or ‘what is in sight’. 7. Next, we should note that the question can be understood either in accordance with material or personal supposition.187 If according to material supposition, then its sense is whether the proposition ‘color is the object of vision’ is true per se and primarily, or even whether the predicate ‘object of sight’ is per se and primarily predicated of the subject ‘color’. And the personal sense is that, in this predication, no term supposits materially, but significatively. 186 As

will be clear in Buridan’s discussion, in the argument, ‘adequate’ should be taken as ‘equivalent’ or ‘convertible’ in the sense that X is the adequate object of sight because something is visible if and only if it is X. But on this understanding, neither color alone, nor light alone is adequate, and not even ‘color or light’ is adequate, because shape or size is visible and yet it is neither color nor light. It is puzzling, though, why the argument lists “illumination, transparent objects, air, size, shape” among these other visible objects, given Buridan’s insistence that they are invisible. 187 This passage exploits Buridan’s semantic doctrine concerning the referring function, i.e. supposition, of terms. Terms in personal supposition stand for what they signify (whence Buridan also speaks of terms in personal supposition as being taken significatively). In material supposition, however, they stand for themselves or for the concept to which they are subordinated (or any other token of the same type), but not what they were imposed to signify (which is why, taken in this way, they are taken non-significatively according to Buridan). For instance, in ‘Man is an animal’ the term ‘man’ is taken for humans, the things it was imposed to signify, whereas in ‘Man is a species’, the same term is taken to stand for itself or for the concept by which humans are conceived (or any other token of the same type), but not for human beings, as the proposition is meant to be true. For more on the medieval doctrine in general, see Read 2015. For more on Buirdan’s doctrine in particular, see his Summulae de dialectica 4 (tr. Klima, 221–302).

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8. De sensu ergo materiali dicendum quod nec color nec lux est proprium obiectum visus. Nec ista est per se et primo vera: color est visibilis, nec ista, lux est visibilis, quia in talibus propositionibus denominativis, ad hoc quod sint per se et primo verae, oportet quod praedicatum sit convertibile cum subiecto. Isti autem termini visibile et color non convertuntur, quia aliud a colore, scilicet lux, est visibilis. Et sic nec isti termini lux et visibile convertuntur, quia aliud a luce, scilicet color, est visibile. Et forte quod, si esset nomen commune luci et colori, quod esset A, adhuc isti termini ‘A’ et visibile non converterentur, quia alia videntur, scilicet lucidum et coloratum, postquam lux et color videantur, et cum hiis magnitudo et figura. Sed iterum de proprietate sermonis, licet nihil aliud a colore esset visibile, adhuc non essent termini convertibiles color et visibile, secundum simplices propositiones universales de inesse, quia licet omnis color est visibilis, tamen non omne visibile est color. Antichristus enim est visibilis quia videbitur, et tamen iste non est color. Sic enim homo et risibile non convertuntur, licet enim omnis homo est risibilis, tamen non omne risibile est homo, quia Antichristus est risibilis qui non est homo. Oportet enim convertibilitatem restringere ampliationem, scilicet omnis homo qui est est risibilis et, e converso, omne risibile quod est est homo. Et ita etiam si aliquando utimur hoc nomine color communiter et indifferenter pro colore et colorato, luce et lucido, posset tamen concedi quod haec esset per se et primo vera, color est visibilis, scilicet quod omnis color qui esset, esset visibilis, et omne visibile quod est, est color. Et sic ad talem sensum posset concedi colorem esse primum obiectum visus; et esset simile de hoc quod color est visibilis, et de hoc quod homo est risibilis.

42 denominativis ] denominatis T || oportet ] scire add. W 45 convertuntur ] om. VW 48 lucidum ] lux add. VW 49–51 Sed . . . convertibiles ] om. TV 51 secundum ] sed V 52 est ] esset AET 53 est ] esset AET || Antichristus ] color VW || enim ] non existens add. VW 54–55 risibile non ] visibile V 56 est . . . homo ] qui est vel qui non est homo risibilis VW 61 et primo vera ] om. V 62 esset esset ] est est AEW 63 est est ] esset esset V || sensum ] et intellectum add. A

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8. Therefore, in the material sense, we should say that neither color nor light is the proper object of vision. And this is not per se and primarily true:‘color is visible’ and neither is this: ‘light is visible’, for in the case of such denominative propositions, it is required for their per se and primary truth that their predicate be convertible with their subject. But the terms ‘visible’ and ‘color’ are not convertible, for something other than color, namely light, is visible. And the terms ‘light’ and ‘visible’ are not converted either, for something other than light, namely color, is visible. And even if, perhaps, there were a name that is common to light and color, let it be A, the terms ‘A’ and ‘visible’ would still not be convertible, because other things would be seen — namely a bright thing and a colored thing — after light and color are seen, and along with these, their magnitude and shape. But, again, properly speaking, even if nothing other than color were visible, the terms ‘color’ and ‘visible’ would still not be convertible, in simple, assertoric, universal propositions because, although every color is visible, not everything visible is a color. For Antichrist is visible, because he will be seen, but he is not a color. This is how ‘man’ and ‘risible’ are not converted, for although every man is risible, not everything risible is a man, for Antichrist, who is not a man, is risible. For convertibility has to restrict ampliation,188 so that every man that exists is risible and, conversely, every risible thing that exists is a man. And so even if sometimes we use the term ‘color’ broadly and indifferently for color and for a colored thing, and for light and for a bright object, one may, nevertheless, concede that this would be per se and primarily true: ‘color is visible’, that is to say, every color that would exist would be visible, and every visible object that exists is a color. And so, in this sense one might concede that color is the primary object of sight; and then the cases of ‘color is visible’ and ‘man is risible’ would be similar. 188 For

the medieval doctrine of ampliation in general and for Buridan’s doctrine in particular, see the references of the previous note. The point of the doctrine briefly is that certain phrases that indicate modalities, tenses, or acts of the cognitive soul (in general, anything that may concern things that are not present) generate “ampliative contexts” for the terms with which they are construed, in which the supposition of these terms is “ampliated”, i.e. extended beyond the realm of presently existing things, to past, future, or merely possible things.

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9. Sed pro sensu personali, notandum est quod differunt color et lux et lumen, quia lux et color terminant visum ita quod non sunt transparentia, sic quod per ipsa videamus aliud corpus. Et si non simpliciter terminant visum, hoc est quia est remissus color et remissa lux. Et proprie lux et color videntur, sed lumen non terminat visum nec lumen proprie videtur, sed est species lucis per quam lux videtur, sicut per speciem coloris, quae non videtur, color videtur. Sed differunt lux et color quia lux potest ex se generare speciem suam in diaphano. Color autem non potest nisi lumen cadat super ipsum, sicut post dicetur in alia quaestione. 10. Et breviter ponuntur conclusiones. Prima est quod lux per se videtur, id est solitarie, sine adiutorio alterius. Sed color sic non videtur per se, id est solitarie, quia indiget lumine per quod cum visione coloris videtur lux, sicut dicetur post. 11. Secunda conclusio est quod quotienscumque videntur simul tempore lux et color, lux videtur prius naturaliter quam color, quia dicit Aristoteles in Praedicamentis quod licet aliqua convertuntur secundum quod est in esse consequentiam tamen si unum in hoc est causa alterius, ipsum prius digne naturaliter dicitur. Lux autem, per suum lumen, est causa in videndo colores, cum colores non possunt videri sine lumine, et color non est causa in videndo lucem; ergo etc. 12. Sed de prius tempore, ponitur conclusio tertia quod uno modo nihil est primo visibile, et alio modo omne visibile est primo visibile. Nam si exponamus primo quia, id est nihil ante ipsum, tunc omne

75 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.15. 79 dicetur post ] B URIDAN US , QQ. De an. II.15. 82 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES , Cat. 12 14b 9–12 (Ar. lat. I.2 76.10): “Eorum enim quae convertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiam, quod alterius quomodolibet causa est digne prius natura dicitur.” 68–69 simpliciter ] om. VW 73 ex . . . suam ] speciem suam generare A 77 alterius ] visi add. AE visibilis add. T 82–83 licet . . . tamen ] om. TV 85 videndo ] iudicando W 89 id est nihil ] om. AT

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9. But concerning the personal sense, we should note that there is a difference between color, light, and illumination, because light and color terminate sight in such a manner that they are not transparent, so that we would see another body through them. And if they do not simply terminate sight, that happens because the color is weak and the light is weak. And light and color are properly seen, but illumination does not terminate sight, nor is illumination seen, properly speaking, but it is the species of light by which light is seen, just as the species of color, which itself is not seen, is that by which color is seen. But light and color differ because light can on its own generate its species in a transparent body, whereas color cannot, unless illumination falls upon it, as will be discussed later in another question.189 10. Now we briefly state some conclusions. The first is that light is seen per se on its own, without the help of anything else. But color is not so seen per se, that is, on its own, because it needs illumination by which, along with seeing color, light is seen, as will be discussed later.190 11. The second conclusion is that whenever light and color are seen at the same time, light is seen naturally prior to color, because, as Aristotle says in the Categories, even if some things are convertible with regard to the consequence of the existence of the one from existence of the other , if one is the cause of the other in some respect, then the cause is justly called naturally prior to the other.191 But light, by its illumination, is the cause in respect of seeing colors, because colors cannot be seen without illumination, and color is not the cause of seeing light; therefore, etc. 12. But concerning priority in time, a third conclusion is proposed that, in one way, nothing is the first visible and in another way, every visible is the first visible. For if we expound ‘primary’

189 See

Questions on Aristotle’s De anima, II.15 below. See Questions on Aristotle’s De anima, II.15 below. 191 The point is that even if A and B necessarily coexist, if A is the cause of B, then A is naturally prior to B. For instance, even if fire and its heat necessarily coexist, fire is prior to its heat, because fire is the cause of its heat. 190

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visibile fuit primo visibile, quia nihil fuit prius visibile quam tu, licet prius multa videbantur, nam ab aeterno tu eras visibilis. Hoc enim nomen visibile, cum sit nomen potentiae, ampliat ad supponendum pro futuro et possibilibus. Tu autem ab aeterno eras futurus et possibilis videri. Si autem exponamus primum quia ante omne aliud, tunc nihil est vel fuit visibile primo, quia nihil fuit visibile antequam tu eras visibilis, cum tamen ab aeterno tu eras visibilis. 13. Ex dictis satis apparet quomodo rationes procedunt. Nam color et coloratum, quando communiter sumuntur, se extendunt ad lucem et lucidum, et tunc est genus proprium quod dicitur visus et est visus unius contrarietatis, scilicet albi et nigri, quia lux per se visa quasi apparet alba. Ideo large sic sumendo colorem et album, lux vel lucidum continentur sub illa contrariete. Et patet quaestio.

93 futurus ] visibilis V 98 sumuntur ] accipitur T 99 quod dicitur visus ] om. T 101 large ] largius W || et album ] vel coloratum V 102 illa ] prima add. A

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as ‘nothing earlier than it’, then every visible was first visible, for nothing was earlier visible than you are, although many things were seen earlier, for you have been visible from eternity. For the name ‘visible’, as it is a name of potency, ampliates supposition to future and possible things. However you were, from eternity, going to exist and be possible to be seen. If, on the other hand, we expound ‘primary’ as ‘earlier than everything else’, than nothing is or was primarily visible, for nothing was visible before you were visible, because you were visible from eternity. 13. From what has been said, it is clear enough how the objections proceed. For ‘color’ and ‘colored thing’ taken broadly cover light as well as bright things, and then it is one generic property (proprium), which is called ‘seen’ and ‘seen’ concerns one contrariety, namely that of white and black, because light seen by itself appears as if it were white. Thus, taking ‘color’ or ‘white’ in this broad sense, light and bright things are contained under that contrariety. And the question is clear.

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Utrum ad videndum colores lumen requiratur propter colorem vel propter medium.

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1. Arguitur quod propter colores auctoritate Avempace et eius ratione quia colores generantur secundum aliquam participationem lucis vel luminis, licet extincte et obumbrate per opacum. Et secundum hoc habet naturam et conditionem movendi diaphanum et visum, prout dicebat Avempace. Nam primum et maxime per se potens movere diaphanum secundum quod diaphanum et visum est lux. Ideo nulli debet convenire conditio movendi diaphanum secundum quod diaphanum et visum nisi secundum aliquam participationem lucis; hoc supponebat Avempace. 2. Deinde etiam supponebat quod recipiens debet esse denudatum a natura recepti. Unde sicut dicit Aristoteles susceptivum coloris vel speciei coloris debet esse sine colore, et receptivum soni debet esse sine sono. Inquantum enim subiectum habet plus de colore vel de sapore, tanto minus et minus distincte potest recipere alium colorem vel saporem aut speciem alicuius istorum. Igitur concluditur quod medium, quanto habebit magis de luce et lumine, tanto minus et minus distincte erit susceptivum speciei lucis vel speciei lucem participantis, cuiusmodi est color, ut dictum est. Igitur non requiritur lumen propter medium ut magis bene sit receptivum speciei coloris, sed propter

1–2 Utrum . . . medium ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418a 31–418b4. 3 auctoritate Avempace ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.7 (ed. Crawford, 231.21–38). 13 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 420a9–10. 1 videndum ] ipsos add. W 1–2 colores . . . propter ] colorem luminis requiratur colorem vel V 5 obumbrate ] obumbrative V 10 aliquam ] aliam AET || participationem ] rationem VW 14 esse ] absonum id est add. AET 15 subiectum ] sensus W 16 alium ] alienum ET aliquem W 18 et ] quam T 19 speciei ] om. W || lucis ] alterioris] add. AE || vel ] alterius add. W || speciei ] om. AET || participantis ] participantem T 21 speciei ] om. T © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 21

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Do we need illumination to see color because of the color or because of the medium?

1. It is argued that this is because of colors, on the authority of Avempace and his argument, according to which colors are generated through a sort of participation in light or illumination, although quenched and darkened by the opaque body. And for that reason it has the nature and status to move a transparent medium and the power of sight, as Avempace argued. For what is primarily and maximally capable per se of moving a transparent medium — insofar as it is transparent — and the power of vision is light. Therefore, nothing should have the status of moving a transparent medium, insofar as it is transparent, and the power of sight unless on account of some participation in light; and this is what Avempace assumed. 2. Furthermore, he also assumed that the recipient has to be devoid of the nature of what is received. Therefore, as Aristotle says, what is receptive of color or the species of color has to be without color, and what is receptive of sound has to be without sound. For the more a subject has of color or flavor, the less, and the less distinctly, can it receive another color or flavor or the species of any of these. Therefore, it is concluded that the more the medium has of color and illumination, the less, and the less distinctly, will it be receptive of the species of light or the species of anything participating in light, like color, as has been said. Therefore, illumination is not required

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 21

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colorem ut ipse cum lumine possit movere diaphanum, quod non poterat propter nimis modicum participare de luce et propter lucem vel virtutem lucis esse in colore obumbratam opaco. 3. Tertio hanc opinionem quantum ad quia est probabat Avempace experientiis. Nam si tu sis in lumine et color sit in loco umbroso, tu non videbis ipsum quia color, non adiunctus lumini, non potest agere suam speciem in medio. Sed bene potest si lumen cadat super colorem, et quantumcumque medium versus oculum sit tenebrosum et sine lumine, oculus adhuc bene videbit colorem istum quia color, adiunctus lumini, potest agere suam speciem in medio, et medium quantumcumque sit sine lumine potest recipere illam speciem. 4. Item haec experientia confirmatur quia secundum eamdem dispositionem, scilicet diaphaneitatem, medium et organum sunt receptiva speciei coloris. Sed oculus in loco obscuro existens optime recipit speciem coloris, immo melius quam existens in medio bene luminoso si lumen cadat super colorem, propter quod existens in camera clausa sine lumine videt clare per foramen colorem illuminatum extra existentem et longe. 5. Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Averrois et eius ratione quia, si lumen requireretur propter colorem, sequitur quod color non esset per se motivus medii et organi, sed per lumen sibi adveniens. Sed hoc est falsum, quia non esset per se sensibilis sed per accidens, quod est falsum et contra Aristotelem. Et haec ultima consequentia patet quia in eo quod est motivus medii et organi est sensibilis. Ideo si non esset per se motivus, non esset per se sensibilis.

25 Avempace ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.7 (ed. Crawford, 231.21–38. 40 Averrois ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.7 (ed. Crawford, 232.68–233.86). 44 contra Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418a26–27. 22 diaphanum ] aut medium add. W 23 participare ] proprie V 28 bene potest ] e converso VW 31–32 in medio . . . speciem ] in marg. VW 33 Item haec experientia ] propter hoc V per hoc W 36 medio ] loco AET 38 lumine ] luce VW 42 lumen ] sic accidentaliter add. A || adveniens ] accidentaliter add. T 45 est ] per se add. VW 46 sensibilis ] visibilis T

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because of the medium, so that it will be more receptive of the species of color, but because of color, so that it, along with illumination, will be capable of moving the transparent medium, which it could not do because of too little participation in light, and because of light — or the power of light — as the color is overshadowed by an opacity. 3. Thirdly, this opinion, as far as the fact of the matter is concerned, was proved by Avempace on the basis of experiences. For if you are standing in an illuminated place and a color is in the shadow, you will not see it because the color cannot produce its species in the medium if it is not joined with illumination. But it certainly can if illumination falls upon the color, and no matter how dark and unlit the medium in front of the eyes is, the eye will still see this color well, because once it has joined with illumination, the color is capable of producing its species in the medium, and the medium, no matter how much it is without illumination, can receive that species. 4. And this experience is confirmed because the medium and the organ are receptive of the species of color on account of the same disposition, namely transparency. But when the eye is in a dark place, it is in the best position to receive the species of color, indeed, even better than when it is in a well-illuminated medium, if the color is illuminated, for which reason someone in a closed, unlit room clearly sees through a hole the illuminated colors outside and far away. 5. The opposite is argued on the authority of Averroes and his argument that if illumination is required because of color, it follows that color would not be per se able to change the medium and the organ, but it could do so only by the illumination added to it. However, this is false, for then it would not be per se sensible, but accidentally, which is false and against Aristotle. And this last consequence is clear because it is sensible insofar as it is able to

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6. Item propter illud videtur requiri lumen quod informatur lumine. Colores autem non informantur lumine, sed medium diaphanum; ergo, etc. 7. Primo supponitur per experientiam quod lumen requiritur ad visionem coloris. Et si aliquis contra hoc obiciat quia si in camera clausa sine lumine poneretur aut nix aut plura genera lapidum preciosorum aut squamae piscium videntur, respondetur quod hoc est quia talia habent propriam lucem aliquam quae potest lumen suum multiplicare ad oculum. Unde etiam talia magis tunc apparent lucida quam proprie colorata, quae tamen, alieno lumine, apparent magis colorata quam lucida. 8. Secundo etiam concedendum est quod lumen non sic requiritur ad visionem coloris secundum quod debeat informare colorem vel subiectum coloris, sed quod informet diaphanum tangens colorem tamquam cadens super colorem vel corpus coloratum, quia corpus coloratum debet esse opacum, non diaphanum. Et si aliquod diaphanum est coloratum, hoc non est ratione diaphaneitatis, sed potius ratione qua habet aliquid opacitatis. Lumen autem non est innatum informare opacum ea ratione qua est opacum, sed diaphanum ratione qua diaphanum. Potius enim lumen ab opaco refrangitur vel reflectitur ad partem aliam quam ad ipsam multiplicetur. 9. Tertio videtur mihi quod opinio Avempace sit vera, scilicet quod lumen non requiritur in medio ad hoc quod medium per lumen disponatur ad recipiendum speciem coloris, quia sine eius illumina-

51 aliquis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 419a 5. 52 aut . . . plura ] quercus putrida aut aliqua A 53–54 hoc . . . aliquam ] talia aliqua lucem habent prima T 55 ad oculum ] om. T 58–59 requiritur ] recipitur A 59 secundum ] scilicet A om. T 63 est ] proprie add. VW 64 aliquid opacitatis ] opacitatem A 67 ipsam ] ipsum AET oppositum W

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change the medium and the organ. Therefore, if it were not per se able to change , then would not be per se sensible. 6. Again, illumination seems to be required for that which is informed by it. However, colors are not informed by it, but the transparent medium is; therefore, etc. 7. First it is assumed on the basis of experience that illumination is required for seeing color. And if someone were to object to this by saying that if one places snow or many kinds of precious stones or fish scales in a closed room without illumination, they are seen, I would respond that this is because such things have their own light of some sort that can propagate its illumination to the eye.192 And so under these circumsatnces, such things appear rather to be bright than properly colored; nevertheless, when they are illuminated by another object’s illumination, then they appear to be colored rather than bright. 8. In the second place, we should concede that illumination is not required for seeing color so that it would inform color or the subject of color, but in order that it inform the transparent medium that touches color insofar as it falls upon the color or the colored body, because the colored body needs to be opaque, and not transparent. And if some transparent medium is colored, then this is not because of its transparency but more because of its having something of opacity. For illumination is not suited to inform an opaque body qua opaque, but the transparent body qua transparent. For illumination is rather refracted or reflected by the opaque body in a direction other than that from which it arrived at the body. 9. In the third place, it seems to me that the opinion of Avempace is true,193 namely that illumination is not required in the medium so that the medium becomes disposed by illumination to receive the

192 Buridan refers here to “glow-in-the-dark,” naturally luminous stones and fish (the

latter in some cases owing their light to bioluminescent bacteria). Some manuscripts add the example of a rotting oak, or what is usually referred to as “foxfire” or “fairy fire,” and is the glow of bioluminescent fungi growing on trees. 193 See par. 1 above.

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tione potest eam recipere, sicut arguebant experientia, vel saltem sine eius notabili illuminatione, potest speciem coloris notabiliter recipere et sufficienter ad efficiendum manifestam et certam visionem coloris. 10. Quarto etiam sequitur secundum Avempacem quod lumen requireretur ad visionem coloris propter simul agere cum colore ad eamdem speciem coloris in diaphano receptivo illius speciei. Necesse est enim cum lumen requiritur quod requiratur tamquam recipiens speciem coloris aut disponens receptivum ad recipiendum, quod est falsum secundum praedicta, vel quod requiratur tamquam disponens colorem ad agendum istam speciem aut tamquam agens cum colore, quod relinquitur esse concedendum. Et iam dictum est quod lumen non informat colorem sed extrinsice coniungitur ei. Ideo videtur sequi quod agat cum colore sicut calor naturalis et spiritus, licet non inhaereant animae, agunt cum anima ad digestionem et nutritionem, et non posset hoc anima agere sine illis. 11. Et propter cavillantes ego confirmo experientias propter quas oportet concedere dictas conclusiones Avempace. Aliqui enim volentes sustinere viam Commentatoris fingendo dicunt quod oculus, per medium pure tenebrosum sibi coniunctum, non posset recipere speciem coloris, quantumcumque color et medium iuxta colorem esset bene illuminata. Sed si in casu prius dicto homo existens in camera clausa obscura videat per foramen colorem illuminatum longe existentem extra, hoc est quia illud lumen a corpore colorato refractum multiplicatur, licet multum remisse, ad foramen et per foramen usque in organum oculi. Ideo nec medium nec organum est omnino carens lumine, sed illuminatum licet remisse, propter quod potest recipere species coloris, et sic oculus potest videre istum colorem.

74 secundum Avempacem ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.7 (ed. Crawford, 231.21–38). 71 experientia ] experientiae AET 72 notabili ] nobilissima A nobilissimi W 73 efficiendum ] designandum T || et certam ] om. VW 75–76 eamdem ] causandum E 81 relinquitur ] requiritur A 83 spiritus ] eius add. VW 88 Commentatoris ] contrariam W 89 sibi ] speciei A

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species of color, for it can receive this species even without its illumination, as has been argued on the basis of experience, or at least in the absence of its greatest illumination, it can receive the species of color in a way that is noticeable as well as sufficient for making the vision of color clear and certain. 10. Also, fourthly, according to Avempace, it follows that illumination would be required for seeing color because it acts together with color to produce the same species in the transparent body receptive of this species. For, because illumination is required, it is necessary that it be required as a recipient of the species of color or as something disposing the recipient to receive, which is false according to the foregoing, or as something disposing color to produce this species or as agent acting along with color, which is what remains to be accepted. And we have already said that illumination does not inform color, but it is extrinsically connected to it. Therefore, it appears to follow that it acts along with color, just as natural heat and spirit do, which, although they do not inhere in the soul, act along with the soul in digestion and nutrition, and the soul would not be able to do these things without them. 11. And for the sake of quibblers, I confirm the experiences on the basis of which one has to concede Avempace’s conclusions. For some people, wanting to uphold the view of the Commentator by relying on their imagination, say that the eye, through a completely unlit medium connected to it, could not receive the species of color, no matter how well the color and the medium next to it might be illuminated. But if, in the aforementioned case,194 the man in the closed dark room sees the distant illuminated color through the hole, this is because the illumination reflected from the colored body is transmitted, though much weakened, to the hole, and through it to the organ of the eye. Thus, neither the medium nor the organ is completely bereft of illumination, but is illuminated, though weakly, and so it is able to

194 See

par. 4 above.

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12. Contra istam cavillationem obiicitur primo quia si diaphanum indigeret lumine ad recipiendum speciem coloris, tunc quanto magis esset illuminatum, tanto magis deberet recipere speciem coloris, et quanto minus, tanto minus. Ideo si esset valde remisse illuminatum, deberet valde remisse recipere speciem coloris. Et sic visus non posset nisi valde debiliter percipere colorem. Et hoc totum est falsum in casu praedicto, quia intense et manifeste oculus videt istum colorem per foramen. 13. Item statim est alia experientia manifesta, quia si per illud foramen concedimus lumen refractum ab isto corpore colorato multiplicari in camera, tamen illud non sufficit ad videndum aliquem colorem existentem in ista camera. Et tamen deberet sufficere si non requireretur ad hoc nisi quod medium esset receptivum speciei coloris et quod color esset sufficiens agere ex se istam speciem in medio receptivo istius. Cum enim iste aer in camera ista sic sit remisse illuminatus, quare magis sufficeret ad recipiendum speciem istius coloris extra remoti quam species coloris intra cameram et propinquioris? Et iterum si sit nox obscura et tenebrosa et homo sit in medio inter colorem illuminatum, qui vocatur A, et colorem nigrum ex alia parte, qui vocetur B, et quod sit positum obstaculum inter colorem B et candelam, ita quod rectus radius candelae non veniat ad colorem B sed illuminet colorem A, tunc iste homo de toto spatio intermedio inter A et B et de qualibet parte spatii illius, videbit clare colorem A et non videbit colorem B. Et omnino infinitae sint tales experientiae. Semper enim quantumcumque homo fuerit circumquaque contentus aere consimiliter tenebroso, tamen undique clare et distincte percipiet colores bene illuminatos, et colores non illuminatos vel debiliter non percipiet vel obscure. 14. Et tunc quinto sequitur quod lumen requiritur ad videndum colores propter ipsos colores qui non sufficiunt sine alio lumine eis coniuncto agere species suas in diaphano receptivo earum, sicut ani-

100 deberet recipere ] debebit sufficere T 103 percipere ] recipere speciem colorum seu W 112 remisse ] intense AE 115 tenebrosa ] nubilosa ET 116 nigrum ] muri AE 123 et distincte ] om. W 127 propter ipsos colores ] om. AE || qui ] quia VW

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receive the species of color. And it is in this way that the eye is able to see this color. 12. Against this quibble it is objected first that if the transparent medium were to need illumination for receiving the species of color, then the more it would be illuminated, the more it should receive the species of colors, and the less, the less. Therefore, if it were very weakly illuminated, then it should receive the species of color very weakly, and so sight could receive only very weakly the species of color. And this is totally false in the aforementioned case, for the eye intensely and clearly sees that color through the hole. 13. Again, this is clear at once from another experience, for even if we concede that the illumination reflected from that colored body is transmitted into that room through that hole, nevertheless, it is not sufficient for seeing some color inside the room. And yet it would have to suffice, if it were required for this only, namely that the medium be receptive of the species of color, and that color were sufficient to produce its species by itself in the medium receptive of this species. For if the air in the room is so weakly illuminated, then why is it more receptive of the species of color outside and far away than it is of the species inside the room and much closer? Furthermore, suppose it is a dark, unlit night, and a man is in the middle between an illuminated color (let it be called A) and a black color on the other side (let it be called B), and that there is some obstacle placed between color B and a candle so that a straight ray from the candle does not hit B, but it does illuminate color A; then in the entire space between A and B and in any part of it this man will see color A clearly, but will not see color B. And there are indefinitely many experiences of this sort. For in every case, however much a man is surrounded on all sides by uniformly dark air, he nevertheless perceives well-illuminated colors on all sides clearly and distinctly, and colors not or weakly illuminated he perceives not at all or dimly.195 14. And then, in the fifth place, it follows that illumination is required for seeing colors because of the colors themselves, which, without some other illumination connected to them, cannot produce

195 Of

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ma nutritiva non sufficit sine caliditate et spiritibus nutrire vel movere corpus animalis; sed cum illis, licet non sibi inhaerentibus, agit nutritionem et augmentationem et motum localem, etc, et sicut homo et sol generant hominem, tamen neutrum per se sufficiat. Nec valet ratio Commentatoris, quia secundum prius dicta, quamvis motus, magnitudo, et color indigeant aere ad hoc quod videantur, tamen dicuntur videri per se quia sensus iudicat de rebus significatis per ista nomina secundum conceptus a quibus sumuntur ista nomina. Et cum hoc etiam haec est per se vera, color est sensibilis et visibilis, quia necessarie et non quia solitarie videatur, sicut etiam anima vegetativa est per se nutritiva, licet non nutriat sine calore. Et etiam si color et lumen agunt simul ad generandum speciem coloris, non tamen oportet quod unum inhaereat alteri, sicut spiritus et anima agunt simul ad nutritionem, et homo et sol ad hominis generationem, et non oportet quod alterum alteri inhaereat. Et sic patet quaestio.

131–132 homo . . . hominem ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.2 194b 9 (Ar. lat. VII.1 55.8): “Homo enim et hominem generat ex materia et sol.” 129 caliditate ] calore VW 135 significatis ] sensatis W 136 ista nomina ] om. AE || nomina ] om. T 137 etiam . . . vera ] ista proprio est vera primo et per se A est per se vera T 137–138 necessarie et non quia ] licet non W 139 lumen ] lux T 140 tamen oportet ] apparet T

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their species in the transparent medium receptive of them without some other illumination conjoined to them, just as the nutritive soul does not suffice without natural heat and spirits to nourish and move the body of the animal; but together with them, although they are not inherent in it, the soul produces nutrition, growth, locomotion, etc. And just as man and the sun generate man, yet neither suffices on its own. And the Commentator’s argument does not prove his point,196 for in accordance with what has been said, although motion, magnitude, and color need air in order to be seen, nevertheless, they are said to be seen per se because sense judges the things signified by these names according to the concepts from which these names are taken. And this is also per se true: ‘Color is sensible and visible’, because color is seen necessarily, and not because it is seen all by itself, just as the vegetative soul is per se nutritive, although it does not nourish without natural heat. And even if color and illumination act together to produce the species of color, the one does not have to inhere in the other, just as the spirits and the soul act together for nutrition, and man and the sun act together in the generation of man, and the one does not have to inhere in the other. And so the question is clear.

196 See

par. 5 above.

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Utrum sit idem sonus quando ego loquor quem quilibet vestrum audit.

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1. Arguitur quod non quia, cum Socrates et Plato sint separati secundum locum et situm, non est idem quod pervenit ad aurem Socratis et ad aurem Platonis. Et tamen non audit unusquisque nisi quod pervenit et multiplicatur ad aurem suam. Et confirmatur sicut de lumine. Non enim est idem lumen quod pervenit ad oculum meum et ad oculum tuum. 2. Item si Socrates esset prope corpus sonans et Plato longe, Socrates audiat sonum intensum et Plato remissum, et non est idem intensum et remissum, sicut non est idem lumen prope lucidum et longe, cum sit prope intensum et longe remissum. 3. Item in dicto casu Socrates prius audit sonum quam Plato, et iam est sonus corruptus apud Socratem quando Plato audit. Non enim est credendum quod sonus qui erat apud Socratem moveatur localiter ad Platonem quia sonus est accidens quod non transit de subiecto in subiectum. 4. Item sequitur quod esset idem echon et primus sonus, quod videtur falsum. Et consequentia patet quia non differt echo a sono prius audito de longe nisi secundum multiplicationem rectam vel reflexam, et hoc non facit differentiam quia eadem est festuca si plicetur et si in rectam extendatur.

1–2 Utrum . . . audit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.8. 5 non ] nullus A || unusquisque ] om. A 6 pervenit ] provenit AETV 7 pervenit ] provenit AETV 7–8 meum . . . tuum ] tuum et ad meum proprie T 11 prope ] om. A per se T 13 prius ] magis W 19 prius ] om. E © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 22

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When I speak, do each of you hear the same sound?

1. It is argued that you do not, for were Socrates and Plato separated by location and position, it is not the same sound that reaches the ear of Socrates and the ear of Plato. And yet every single person hears only what reaches and is propagated to his ear. This is confirmed by analogy with illumination. For it is not the same illumination that reaches my eye and yours. 2. Again, if Socrates were close to the sounding body and Plato far away, Socrates would hear a strong sound and Plato a weak one, and what is strong and what is weak are not the same, just as illumination is not the same near a bright body and far away, because nearby it is strong and from afar it is weak. 3. Again, in the above-mentioned case, Socrates hears the sound before Plato, and by the time Plato hears it, the sound that was near Socrates has already died out. For we should not think that the sound that was near Socrates travels locally to Plato, because sound is an accident that does not migrate from subject to subject. 4. Again, it follows that an echo and the initial sound would be the same, which is false. And the consequence is clear, because an echo and the sound initially heard from afar do not differ, except in being transmitted along a straight or a bent path, and this does not make a difference, because a blade of grass is the same whether it is bent or straightened out.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 22

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5. Oppositum arguitur quia proportionale est de colore ad visum et de sono ad auditum. Sed idem est color in illo pariete quem quilibet vestrum videt; ergo etc. 6. Item quilibet vestrum audit vocem quam ego profero quia audit me, et non est nisi unica vox mea. Ergo etiam unicam et eamdem vocem audit quilibet vestrum. 7. Notandum est quod secundum consuetam locutionem, dici solet quod sensibilia habent duplex esse, scilicet reale et spirituale vel intentionale. Visibile autem secundum esse reale est color aut lux existens in corpore colorato aut lucido et hoc proprie dicitur visibile. Sed visibile secundum esse spirituale aut intentionale est species coloris aut lucis multiplicata per medium diaphanum usque ad oculum. Et hoc proprie non est visibile sed est repraesentativum visibilis per quod visibile videtur. Nam sicut dicitur secundo huius sensibile positum supra sensum non sentitur. Species autem coloris vel lucis ponitur in organo sensus sive in sensu. Ideo non sentitur sed obiectum cuius ipsa est repraesentatio. 8. Et dicitur communiter quod sensibile quantum ad esse intentionale quod est praedicta species, non dicitur proprie sensibile. Tu enim non percipis speciem coloris existentem in aere aut in visu tuo sed colorem extra existentem. Ideo si tale esse spirituale dicitur sensibile, hoc est secundum attributivam locutionem, scilicet quia est repraesentativum sensibilis. 9. Similiter etiam dicitur quod lumen non est proprie sensibile, sed lux. Lumen enim est species lucis quae multiplicatur usque ad ocu-

36 secundo huius ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 419a18–19 (Ar. lat. XII.2 131.2.2): “Patiente enim aliquid sensitivo fit ipsum videre; ab ipso igitur qui videtur colore impossibile est; relinquitur autem quod a medio, quare necesse est aliquod esse medium.” 26 vocem ] sonum A 32 colorato aut lucido ] luminato aut colorato A illuminato aut colorato E || lucido ] illuminato V 36 huius ] saepe add. V 37 non sentitur ] nullam facit sensationem W 43 extra existentem ] existentem in colorato W 45 sensibilis ] visibilis W 46 Similiter ] quando V communiter W 47 quae ] quia T || multiplicatur usque ad ] recipitur in VW

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5. The opposite is argued because the case of color and sight is analogous to the case of sound and hearing. But it is the same color in this wall that is seen by any of you; therefore, etc. 6. Again, any of you hears the voice I produce because he hears me; and there is only this one voice of mine. Therefore, it is one and the same voice that any of you hears. 7. We should note that in accordance with the customary way of speaking, it is usually said that sensibles have two kinds of being, namely real and spiritual or intentional. Something visible according to its real being is color or light existing in a colored or bright body; and this is what is properly called visible. But something visible according to its spiritual or intentional being is the species of color or of light transmitted through a transparent medium all the way to the eye. And this is not visible properly speaking, but representative of the visible thing, by means of which the visible thing is seen. For, as stated in De anima II, the sensible placed on the sense is not sensed. But the species of color or light is placed in the organ of sense or in the sense. Therefore, it is not sensed, although the object, of which it is a representation, is sensed. 8. And it is commonly said that a sensible thing in intentional being, which is the above-mentioned species, is not properly called sensible. For you do not perceive the species of color existing in air or in your vision, but the color existing outside. Therefore, if such a spiritual being is said to be sensible, this is in keeping with attributive speech, namely because it represents something sensible. 9. Likewise, it is said that illumination is not properly sensible, but light is. For illumination is the species of light, which is transmitted

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lum sicut species coloris. Ideo non videtur, sicut nec species coloris, sed per ipsum videtur lux, sicut per speciem coloris color. Et de hoc amplius dicam post. 10. Dicam igitur de sono, secundum dictam communem locutionem, quod est dare sonum secundum esse reale quod vere est sonus et est proprie audibile, et est dare sonum secundum esse intentionale quod non est sonus nec proprie audibile sed est species soni multiplicata per medium a corporibus sonantibus usque in auditum per quam auditur sonus sicut per speciem coloris videtur color. 11. Et tu potes videre magnam differentiam inter sonum et speciem soni, quia ad generandum sonum, oportet aerem moveri et frangi velociter et violenter inter percutiens et percussum. Et non potest generari sonus notabilis nisi per talem violentiam et velocem fractionem aeris. Sed species soni non indiget tali velocitate et violentia motus aeris in quo generatur. Ipsa enim generatur ad valde longam distantiam a corporibus sonantibus ubi aer sic notabiliter et violenter non frangitur, sicut etiam plus et aliud requiritur ad generationem novam lucidi quam ad generationem luminis a lucido et ad generationem coloris quam ad generationem speciei coloris a colore. 12. Dico ergo breviter quod eadem est vox mea quam quilibet vestrum audit, nam vocem meam aut sonum meum qui est in aere ve-

53 sonum ] solum V 63 non ] om. AE 64 requiritur ] requirit AE certe non] add. A || aere ] aure vestra A nostrum aurem(?) T

68 qui ]

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right up to the eye, just as the species of color is. Thus, it is not seen, as neither is the species of color, but light is seen by means of it, just as color is seen by means of the species of color. And I will say more about this later.197 10. I should say, therefore, about sound, in keeping with the common way of speaking,198 that there is sound in real being, which is truly sound and is properly audible, and there is sound in intentional being, which is neither sound nor properly audible, but is the species of sound transmitted through the medium from the sounding bodies to hearing, through which sound is heard, just as color is seen through the species of color.199 11. And you may see a big difference between sound and the species of sound, because, for the generation of sound, the air between the striker and what is struck must be moved and fractured swiftly and violently. And one can generate a noticeable sound only with such a violent and swift fracturing of the air. But the species of sound does not need such swiftness and violence of motion of the air in which it is generated. For it is generated at a rather long distance from the sounding bodies, where the air is not so noticeably and violently fractured, just as something more and different is required for the generation of a bright thing than for the generation of illumination by a bright thing, and for the generation of color than for the generation of the species of color by color. 12. I say, therefore, briefly, that it is my same voice that each one of you hears, for you hear my voice or my sound that is in the air 197 See

par. 16 below. See par. 7 above. 199 Thus, for Buridan, real sound, just as color or light, is not in the medium. Sound, color, and light (that is, brightness) in real being are really inherent qualities of the sounding, colored, and bright bodies, respectively, which of course do not get detached from their subject and taken on by the medium with the same real being. What these sensible qualities emit into the medium (and through it into the sense organs) is their species, i.e., some other qualities of the medium and (and eventually of the organs) which are representative of the sensible qualities, but qua representative of these sensible qualities, are not sensible themselves; rather, they are the means by which those sensible qualities are sensed by a sensitive organism, precisely because they carry vital information to the organism about these sensible qualities and the substances having them. 198

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lociter moto et fracto a gutture meo vos auditis et non speciem eius multiplicatam ad aures vestras. 13. Secundo dico quod non est eadem species vocis meae quae recipitur in aure Ruperti per quam audit vocem meam, et in aure Iohannis per quam ipse audit vocem meam. 14. Sed tunc quia arguebatur de echo notandum est quod simile est de echone et de speculo. Cum enim aspicio speculum color faciei meae secundum figuram eius agit speciem suam quae multiplicatur ad speculum et ab eo reflectitur ad oculum meum. Et tunc per istam speciem video colorem meum et faciem meam, quia illud ego video cuius speciem repraesentativam in visu habeo, et constat quod ego habeo speciem faciei meae in visu multiplicatam per reflexionem. Sed tamen visus propter reflexionem decipitur de situ rei visae quia iudicat id quod videt esse in profundo speculi propter hoc quod oculus non iudicans de reflectione iudicat ad istum situm esse rem visam a quo in ipsum oculum multiplicatur species secundum directam lineam et hoc est a speculo. 15. Item similiter sonus campanae multiplicat speciem suam per medium et usque ad obstaculum a quo reflectitur et revertitur ad me. Et sic primo audio istum sonum per speciem eius multiplicatam recte de campana ad me. Ideo iudico sonum ibi esse ubi est illa campana. Et secundo audio eumdem sonum per speciem revertentem ad me ab obstaculo, et iudico illum sonum esse in obstaculo aut versus obstaculum. Sed tamen idem est sonus quem audio primo et secundo. 16. Et ex istis inferuntur plura corollaria extranea. Primum est quod in aurora ante ortum solis super nostrum hemisphaerium, video lucem solis existentem subiective in sole, aut etiam, habens dorsum ad solem et aspiciens ad partem contrariam, ego video istam lucem solis, quia lumen est species lucis quod habeo in oculo meo, licet per multiplicationem reflexam. Et illud video cuius speciem repraesentativam in oculo meo habeo.

72 Ruperti ] Petri A Elizabeth E Sortis T || Iohannis ] Guerini A Ruperti V Hinrici W 73 meam ] eamdem add. T 77 tunc ] ego T 80 per ] secundum V 87 et ] ultra add. VW || usque ad ] me seu usque ad organum mei auditus et ultra usque ad add. A 90 secundo ] ego AT || per speciem ] om. V 91 in obstaculo aut ] om. ET 99 oculo ] visu VW

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swiftly moved and fractured by my throat, and not its species propagated to your ears. 13. In the second place, I say that it is not the same species of my voice that is received in the ear of Peter, by which he hears my voice, and the one in the ear of John, by which he hears my voice. 14. But then, since there was an objection concerning the echo,200 we should note that the case is similar with the echo and the mirror. For when I look into a mirror, the color of my face, in accordance with its shape, produces its species, which is transmitted to the mirror and reflected from it to my eye. And then, through this species, I see my color and my face, for I see that whose representative species I have in my sight. And it is obvious that I have in my sight the species of my face transmitted to my sight by reflection. However, because of the reflection, sight is deceived about the location of the thing seen, for it judges what it sees to be in the depths of the mirror, since the eye, not judging the reflection, judges the thing seen to be at that location from which the species is transmitted into the eye directly and that is from the mirror. 15. Again, in the same way, the sound of a bell propagates its species through the medium all the way to the obstacle from which it is reflected and redirected toward me. In this way I hear the sound first through the species transmitted straight from the bell to me. Thus, I judge the sound to be where the bell is, and then I hear the same sound through the species returning from the obstacle, and I judge that sound to be in the obstacle or in the direction of the obstacle. But it is the same sound that I hear for the first and for the second time. 16. And from these, several further corollaries follow. The first is that at dawn, before the rising of the sun over our hemisphere, I see the light of the sun existing in the sun as its subject. Indeed, I see this light of the sun even when I turn my back to it and look in the opposite direction, for the illumination that I have in my eye is the species of that light, although transmitted there by reflected propagation. And I see that whose representative species I have in my eye.

200 See

par. 4 above.

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17. Unde si lumen solis cadat directe super speculum bene tersum et mundum et fiat reflectio ad oculum tuum, apparebit tibi corpus valde lucidum in speculo, quod non est ibi sed illud est sol et lux eius. 18. Cum autem remissius fuerit lumen reflexum a pariete, iudicamus nos videre non nisi parietem et quod est in pariete et super parietem. Et quia scimus lucem solis non esse ibi, decipiamur et iudicabimus nos non videre lucem solis, sed lumen cadentem super parietem, sicut iudicamus nos videre imaginem in speculo. Nos autem nihil videmus de lumine quod sit in pariete aut iuxta parietem, sed simul videmus colorem parietis et lucem solis ideo quia lux per se visa apparet alba si non sit obumbrata alia opacitate vel visa simul confuse cum opaco. Ideo quanto intensius lumen reflectitur a pariete ad oculum, tanto color parietis apparet albior, quia visa est cum eo simul albedo lucis solis. 19. Verum est quod facilius concedimus et credimus nos videre solem aut lucem solis per reflexionem a speculo quam per reflexionem a pariete, quia per reflexionem a speculo, videmus figuram solis et splendorem eius congregatae, quia radii reflectuntur ordinate ad visum propter regularitatem superficiei speculi. Et non sic a pariete apparet figura solis quia radii disperse et irregulariter reflectuntur a pariete ad visum propter asperitatem et irregularitatem superficiei parietis. 20. Item aliud corollarium infero, scilicet quod sonus auditur quando ipse non est quia species eius multiplicatur temporaliter et non instantanee, sicut lumen. Ideo tu videns a longe lotrices super Secanam

102 in speculo ] om. T 105 lucem ] lumen AE 108 lumine ] vel luce add. VW 110 alia ] aliqua VW || vel ] om. AE || simul ] solis A sit T 112 simul ] confuse add. TVW 113 lucis ] et add. AV 118 regularitatem ] claritatem A 123 Secanam ] danubium V

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17. Therefore, if the illumination of the sun falls straight onto a well polished and clean mirror and is reflected into your eye, then a very bright body will appear to you in the mirror, which is not there, but is the sun and its light. 18. But when a weaker illumination is reflected from a wall, we judge ourselves to see only the wall and what is on the wall, covering the wall. And because we know that the light of the sun is not there, we are deceived and will judge that we do not see the light of the sun, but the illumination falling on the wall, just as we judge ourselves to see an image in the mirror. We do not, however, see any of the illumination that is on the wall or next to it, but we see at once the color of the wall and the light of the sun, because light seen by itself appears white if it is not darkened by some other opacity or if it is seen at the same time fused together with the opaque thing. Therefore, the more intensely illumination is reflected from the wall in the eye, the whiter the color of the wall will appear, for it is seen together with the whiteness of the light of the sun. 19. It is true that we more easily concede and believe that we see the sun or the illumination of the sun by its reflection in a mirror than that we see it by its reflection from a wall, because by its reflection in the mirror, we see the shape of the sun and its brilliance gathered together, because its rays are uniformly reflected to sight due to the regularity of the surface of the mirror. And the shape of the sun does not appear on the wall in this way, because the rays are reflected from the wall to vision in a dispersed and irregular fashion due to the roughness and irregularity of the surface of the wall. 20. Again I infer another corollary, namely that a sound is heard when it no longer exists, for its species is propagated over time, and not instantly, as is illumination.201 Therefore, when you see from afar 201 Buridan

actually denies the instantaneous propagation of light in Question 18, par. 35. He may have chosen to disregard the issue here and instead follow the received opnion that the propagation of illumination is instantaneous.

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percutientes pannos suos, tu prius vides secundum ictum quam audias primum. Ideo prius vides coruscationem quam audias tonitruum. 21. Sonus autem, qui est in aere velociter moto et diviso ab ictu lotricis, vel etiam ille aer, non movetur ad te quia multum distans es, sic enim simul moveretur ad omnem differentiam positionis. Sed species illius soni per eius generationem in aere consequenter multiplicatur ad te et antequam ad te perveniat iam prius aer quietatus est et non sonat. Ideo nec amplius auditur ab existente prope, et tamen dictum est quod ille qui sic est longe non audit illam speciem soni pervenientem ad ipsum, sed illum sonum realem cuius illa species est repraesentatio et qui iam est corruptus. Nec mirum quia etiam quod non est sed est corruptum, ego principaliter intelligo. Et quae ego vidi iterum apparent mihi in somno per species eorum reservatas in phantasia. Unde oportet concedere quod talia verba intelligo, cognosco, sentio, audio et video ampliant terminos ad supponendum pro praeteritis quae forte amplius non sunt. Si enim species lucis aliquo tempore reservatur in oculo post remotionem lucidi, sicut dicunt perspectivi, tunc video lucem cum tamen iam sit corrupta. Et hoc est possibile. 22. Nec obstat quod communiter dicitur, scilicet quod sensus exterior nihil apprehendit in absentia sensibilis exterioris. Hoc enim non est verum simpliciter et de virtute sermonis, sed conceditur ad talem sensum quod sensus exterior non sentit longo tempore post, quia non

140 perspectivi ] E. g. Iohannes Pecham, Perspectiva communis I.1 (ed. Lindberg, 62): “Lucis etiam intense simulacra in oculo remanent post aspectum, et locum minoris luminis faciunt apparere tenebrosum donec ab oculo evacuaverit vestigium maioris lumine.” 124 quam ] tu scis add. A antequam T || audias ] audiens A 126 est ] actualiter(?) add. T realiter add. V 127 vel . . . aer ] om. E || ad te ] om. V || ad ] a T || quia ] qui ET 127–130 Sic . . . te ] om. A 127 sic ] si V 128 positionis ] (?) T 129 eius ] aliquam E aliam T || in ] aliquo add. VW || multiplicatur ] multiplicatum V 130 te ] me VW || iam ] iam T om. VW || prius ] primus W || quietatus est ] iactatus A 134 sed ] sicut A 135 ego ] aliquando add. A 137 audio ] om. AE 138 et video ] om. V || terminos ] hos A 142 sensus ] visus ETV 145 sensus ] visus ET

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the laundresses on the Seine beating their clothes, you will see the second blow before you hear the first. For the same reason, you see lightning before you hear thunder. 21. But the sound that is in the air swiftly moved and divided by the blow of the laundress’ blow — or even the air itself — does not travel to you, because you are very far away, for that way it would move simultaneously with every change of position . But the species of that sound is propagated to you later through its subsequent generation in the air, and, before it would reach you, that air has already settled and does not sound. Therefore, it is heard no longer by someone close by, and yet we have said that he who is far away does not hear the species of sound reaching him, but the real sound, which has already died out and of which this species is a representation.202 Nor is this surprising because I also principally understand what does not exist but has been destroyed. And things that I have seen appear to me again in sleep through their species preserved in my imagination. Therefore, one has to concede that verbs such as ‘I understand’, ‘I cognize’, ‘I sense’, ‘I hear’, and ‘I see’ ampliate terms to supposit for past things that may no longer exist. For if the species of light is preserved for a while in the eye after the removal of the bright body, as the perspectivists say, then I still see the light even if it is already extinguished. And this is possible. 22. And it does not matter what is commonly said, namely that an external sense apprehends nothing in the absence of an external sensible. For this is not true absolutely speaking and in the proper sense of the phrase; but it is conceded in the sense that an external

202 Indeed,

just as the now existing recording of some sound is the representative species of the sound that no longer exists.

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longo tempore conservat speciem sensibilis vel sensationem post eius absentiam, sicut facit phantasia. 23. Tunc ad rationes. Ad primam dicitur quod sonus quem facio non provenit ad aures vestras, sed species eius. Et ista species est alia in aure Socratis et alia in aure Platonis, et etiam species intensa prope locum soni et remissa longe. Ideo idem sonus et aeque intensus prope auditur intense et longe remisse, et prius audit sonum eumdem propinquus quam remotus. 24. Nec echo est sonus, sed species soni reflexa ab obstaculo per quam iterato auditur sonus qui prius auditus erat per speciem recte multiplicatam a loco generationis soni ad auditum. Et sic finitur quaestio.

156 soni ] usque T

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sense does not sense long after, for it does not preserve the sensible species or sensation for a long time after its absence, as imagination does. 23. Then to the objections. To the first,203 it is replied that the sound I make does not reach your ears, but its species does. And this species is different in the ears of Socrates and Plato, as well as intense near the location of the sound and weak far away. Therefore, the same and equally intense sound is heard intensely up close and weakly from afar. And the person nearby hears the same sound before the person far away. 24. And echo is not sound,204 but the species of sound reflected from an obstacle, through which the sound is heard again that was first heard through the species transmitted to the hearer directly from the place of the generation of the sound. And thus the question is finished.

203 See 204 See

par. 1 above. par. 4 above.

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Utrum odor multiplicatur realiter per medium vel spiritualiter seu intentionaliter.

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1. Arguitur quod sit in medio realiter quia ex quo ipse est in medio, oportet quod sit ibi aliqua res, et hoc est esse realiter. 2. Item esse spirituale non movetur nec impeditur a ventis, sicut apparet de lumine et de speciebus colorum. Sed odor et odoris multiplicatio impediuntur a ventis. Ideo valde a longiore sentimus odores sub vento quam supra ventum. 3. Item spirituale debet se multiplicare instanter per subiectum aptum natum suscipere ipsum. Sed odoris multiplicatio per medium non est instantanea; ergo etc. Maior patet per simile de lumine et de speciebus coloris. Et causa in hoc videtur esse quia successio videtur esse propter resistentiam, et esse spirituale non habet resistentiam propter hoc quod non habet contrarium. Hoc ostendo quia si spirituale haberet resistentiam et contrarium, species albedinis et species nigredinis deberent esse contrariae et sibi invicem resistere. Et tamen non sunt contrariae, nec sibi invicem resistunt, quia simul stant perfecte in eodem subiecto, ut in toto aere, et in qualibet parte aeris ipsius domus est perfecte species nigredinis huius parietis et species albedinis istius. Ideo ubicumque homo fuerit, ipse perfecte et distincte videt hanc albedinem et istam nigredinem. Cum igitur ita sit quod formae spirituales non habent contrarietatem nec resistentiam, et non apparet causa quare debeat esse generatio rei vel multiplicatio successiva, agente sufficienter applicato passo, nisi propter contrarietatem

1–2 Utrum . . . intentionaliter ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.9 421a 7–11. 3 sit ] fit A 7 longiore ] longiquiori W 9 per ] medium in add. A 18 ut ] aut A et T || aere ] huius domus add. A 18–19 parte . . . domus ] eius parte A 19 perfecte ] perfecta V 22 formae ] contrariae add. A || spirituales ] substantiales T 23 quare ] quia T © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 23

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Is odor is propagated through a medium in its real being, or in its spiritual or intentional being?

1. It is argued that it is in the medium in real being, because, given that it is in the medium, it has to be some sort of thing, and this is to be in real being. 2. Again, spiritual being is neither moved nor impeded by the wind, as is clear in the case of illumination and the species of colors. But odor and the propagation of odor are impeded by the wind. That is why we smell odors much farther away downwind than upwind. 3. Again, something in spiritual being ought to be propagated instantly through a subject naturally suited to receiving it. But the propagation of odor through a medium is not instantaneous; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear by analogy with illumination and the species of color; and the reason for this appears to be that the successiveness of propagation seems to result from the resistance , whereas something in spiritual being does not have resistance, because it does not have a contrary. I show that this is the case, because if something in spiritual being had resistance and a contrary, then the species of whiteness and the species of blackness would have to be contraries and resist each other. But they are neither contraries, nor do they resist each other, for they can perfectly stand together in the same subject, as in the entire air and in any part of the air in this house there exist perfectly the species of blackness of this wall and the species of whiteness of that wall. That is why wherever a man might be, he would perfectly and distinctly see this whiteness and that

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 23

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vel resistentiam quam ille habet aut secundum se aut secundum suas dispositiones necessario ad eius esse requisitas, manifestum est quod formarum spiritualium generatio et multiplicatio debet esse instantanea. Et hoc erat maior rationis. Et minor autem patet quia propinquior corpori odorifero citius sentit odorem quam remotior, ut si in igne comburantur pili, propinquior igni citius sentit foetorem quam remotior. Et cum etiam aliquis sit satis longe, ipse prius sentit foetorem remissius et per aliquam moram temporis intensius. Et etiam quia si odor multiplicaret instanter speciem suam, tunc aequaliter et aeque intense multiplicaret eam ad omnem differentiam positionis, non obstante vento flante, caeteris paribus, quod est falsum; ergo etc. 4. Item forma spiritualis statim debet cessare ad remotionem suae agentis, sicut lumen ad remotionem lucidi. Sed non statim removetur odor vel foetor ab aere remoto corpore foetido seu odorifero, sed post sentitur odor longo tempore. 5. Item similiter et proportionaliter debemus dicere de sono et odore. Et tamen sonus est realiter in aere, non in corporibus duris percussis. Unde etiam per motum realem aeris generatur et multiplicatur; ergo etc. 6. Oppositum dicit Commentator. Et arguitur quia, si multiplicaretur realiter per medium, ita etiam in organum olfactus multiplicaretur realiter. Et tunc non sentiretur, quia sensibile positum supra

44 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.9 (ed. Crawford, 276.19–277.33). Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.127 (ed. Hamesse, 184): “Odor est in medio non formaliter, sed intentionaliter.” 26 requisitas ] videtur igitur add. W 32 moram ] horam AETW 39 odor ] foetor W 41 realiter ] om. W 46 positum ] realiter add. V

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blackness. Thus, it seems clear that the generation and propagation of spiritual forms should be instantaneous, given that spiritual forms have neither opposition nor resistance, and there seems to be no reason why — with an agent sufficiently applied to a recipient — there the generation or propagation of a thing should be successive, unless there is some opposition or resistance to it either in and of itself or because of some conditions it necessarily requires for its existence. And this was the major premise of the argument. The minor premise is clear, however, because someone closer to some odorous body senses the odor more quickly than someone farther away, as when hair is burnt in fire, he who is closer to the fire detects the stench sooner than the one farther away. Also, when someone is quite far away, he first senses it weakly and after a while more intensely. And also because, if odor propagated its species instantaneously, then it would do so equally and with equal intensity in all directions, regardless of the winds, other things being equal — which is false, etc. 4. Again, a spiritual form should immediately cease to be upon the removal of what produces it, just as illumination ceases to be upon the removal of the light source. But odor or stink is not removed at once from the air upon the removal of a fetid or odoriferous body, but the odor is sensed afterwards for a long time. 5. Again, we should speak similarly and analogously about sound and odor. And yet sound is in the air in real being, not in the hard bodies that are struck. Thus, it is generated and propagated by the real motion of the air; therefore, etc. 6. The Commentator states the opposite. And it is argued that, if odor were propagated through the medium in real being, then it would also be propagated in the organ of smell in real being. And

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sensum non facit sensationem, ut dicitur saepe in secundo huius. Cum igitur sentiatur, oportet quod multiplicetur spiritualiter. 7. In rationibus nunc ad istam quaestionem adductis, iudicio meo, tanguntur dubitationes plures valde difficiles, videlicet an species qualitatum sensibilium, per quas sentiuntur, habeant contrarietatem ad invicem et repugnantiam; an etiam sit aliqua medii resistentia in earum generatione et multiplicatione; an earum multiplicatio ad longam distantiam sit instantanea; an in praedictis sit similiter de omnium qualitatum sensibilium speciebus, vel sit ita in aliquibus et in aliquibus aliter et, si non sit in omnibus similiter, quae sit in eis causa et ratio dissimilitudinis; an illae species sint per ventum mobiles cum subiectis quibus inhaerent, et quid debeamus vocare esse spirituale seu intentionale, et quid esse reale; et an sensibile existens in sensu vel in organo sensus debeat sentiri. Haec enim omnia sunt bene difficilia. 8. Et ego nunc suppono, ut post declarabitur, quod sensibile existens in organo sensitivo vel ei immediatum non sentitur, propter quod non solum visui vel auditui immo etiam tactui assignat Aristoteles medium quod ponit esse necessarium ad sentiendum. Et hoc videtur experientia manifestum, in quolibet enim membro nostro est caliditas quam tamen non sentimus, et intensa caliditas est in corde et istam non sentimus, et frigiditas est in cerebro et istam non sentimus, et lingua est bene saporosa sicut et alia caro et istum saporem non sentimus. 9. Secundo ego suppono quod nos sentimus qualitates existentes extra nos et subiective in corporibus exterioribus, ut colorem in pariete

47 secundo huius ] E. g. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 419a 12–13. 61 post declarabitur ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.21. 63 assignat Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 423b 4–6. 47 facit sensationem ] sentitur AE 51 sentiuntur ] sentimus A 53 earum ] eadem T 56 non sit ] sic esse potest A || omnibus ] eis W 57 species ] partes V 62 sensitivo ] sensus T 70 corporibus ] aliis W

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then it would not be sensed, because a sensible placed upon the sense does not produce sensation, as is often claimed in the second book of this work. Therefore, since it is sensed, it has to be propagated spiritually. 7. In the arguments presently raised in connection with this question, several very difficult issues are touched upon in my view, such as whether the species of sensible qualities, through which they are sensed, may have mutual opposition and incompatibility; whether there is some resistance of the medium in their generation and transmission; whether their transmission over a long distance is instantaneous; whether the situation concerning the above-mentioned issues is similar with regard to the sensible species of all sensible qualities, or it is one way in some and otherwise in others, and, if the situation is not the same for all, then what is the cause and reason for the dissimilarity; whether these species may be movable by means of the wind along with the subjects in which they inhere and what it is that we should call spiritual or intentional being and what real being; and whether a sensible thing that is in the sense or in the sense organ should be sensed. And all these issues are quite difficult. 8. And I now assume, as will be explained later, that the sensible thing existing in the sense organ or immediately next to it is not sensed, for which reason Aristotle assigns a medium which he proposes is necessary for sensing, not only for vision or hearing, but also for touch. And this seems to be clear from experience; for there is heat in any of our members which nevertheless we do not sense, and there is intense heat in the heart and we do not sense it, and there is coldness in the brain and we do not sense it, and the tongue has a taste as do other parts of flesh, and we do not sense this taste. 9. In the second place, I assume that we sense qualities that exist outside of us in external bodies as their subject, such as the color that

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existentem, frigiditatem lapidis, saporem vini. Hoc omnes concedunt, credunt et dicunt. 10. Tertio suppono quod illa qualitas exterior non sentiretur a nobis nisi imprimeret in sensu nostro vel organo sensitivo aliquod repraesentativum ipsius, quia cum nihil obiectum recipiat a sensu, nihil imprimeret sensui, nulla esset ratio quare sentiretur quando praesentatur sensui et non ante. Et hoc etiam omnes concedunt, et ad hoc perspectivi ponunt experientias de visu. 11. Quarto manifestum est quod illae qualitates exteriores non recipiuntur in sensu sive in organo sensus, quia accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum et quia apparent remanere extra in subiectis suis. 12. Quinto etiam illae qualitates exteriores non imprimunt in sensibus nostris aliquas qualitates sibi omnino consimiles et eiusdem speciei specialissimae per quas sentiantur. Illud est manifestum per experientiam, si bene attendimus, quia, si tu intras balneum, tu statim sentis acute caliditatem aquae et iudicas eam bene intensam. Et verum est quod cum per tempus remaneas in isto balneo, caliditas aquae generat intra corpore tuo aliquam aliam caliditatem sibi similem et eiusdem speciei, sicut faceret in alio corpore. Sed tunc tu non amplius sentis istam caliditatem aquae nisi sentias eam multum remisse quam prius sentiebas intense. Igitur caliditas ista generata in te similis caliditati aquae, non facit ad sentiendum caliditatem aquae, sed potius obest et impedit, propter quod bene dicebat Aristoteles quod non sentimus similiter calidum et similiter frigidum.

78 perspectivi ] E. g. , I OHANNES P ECHAM, Perspectiva communis I.1 (ed. Lindberg, 62): “Lucem operari in visum supra se conversum aliquid impressive.” 94 dicebat Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a 3–4. 73 qualitas ] caliditas A 74 imprimeret ] informet A imprimatur T || aliquod ] om. AET 75 obiectum ] subiectum AE 76–77 praesentatur sensui ] repraesentatur subiectum T 84 aliquas ] alias TVW || omnino consimiles ] non similes T 87 caliditatem ] calorem W || bene ] esse A || verum ] notum A 89 corpore tuo ] organum VW || aliquam aliam ] om. T || aliam caliditatem ] qualitatem E

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exists in the wall, the coldness of a stone, or the taste of wine. This is conceded, believed, and asserted by everyone. 10. In the third place, I assume that this external quality would not be sensed by us unless it were to impress on our sense or sensitive organ something that represents it, because, given that the object receives nothing from the sense, if the external quality also impressed nothing on sense, there would be no reason why it is sensed when it is presented to the sense and not before. And this too everyone admits, and perspectivists offer visual phenomena in support.205 11. In the fourth place, it is clear that these external qualities are not received in sense or the organ of sense, because accidents do not migrate from subject to subject, and because they appear to stay outside, in their subjects. 12. Also, in the fifth place, these external qualities do not impress on our senses some qualities that are entirely similar to them and of the same most specific species, through which these external qualities are sensed. This is clear by experience, if we are careful to notice. For if you enter a bath, you immediately and acutely feel the heat of water, and you judge it to be very intense. And it is also true that, if you stay in the bath for a while, the heat of water generates within your body another heat similar to itself and of the same species, as it would in any other body. But then you no longer feel the heat of the water, unless you feel it much more weakly than when you felt it intensely before. Therefore, this heat, which is generated in you and similar to the heat of the water, does not make for sensing the heat of the water, but rather prevents and impedes it, which is why Aristotle correctly claimed that we do not feel what is similarly warm or similarly cold.206 205 On

the Perspectivists, see Lindberg 1976, 62, and, for a different view, Smith 2004. 206 For a “physicalist” interpretation of Buridan’s theory of sensation based on this passage, arguing for the material character of Buridan’s species, see Klima 2017.

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13. Item etiam si socius tuus comederit allia et tu non, tu senties fortiter odorem istorum alliorum quae ipse comedit. Sed si tu etiam comedas de illis satis ita quod fumus odoriferus perveniat ad organum olfactus tui, tu non amplius senties odorem istorum alliorum quae socius tuus comedit, nec istorum quae tu comedisti. Et hoc est quia, iam in organo tuo est odor similis odori exteriori quem sentiebas. Igitur receptio in sensu qualitatis similis isti exteriori non facit ad eius perceptionem, sed potius impedit. 14. Sexto sequitur quod ad sentiendum qualitatem exteriorem necesse est in organo sensus imprimi aliam qualitatem per quam sentiatur et quae sit dissimilis naturae et speciei ab ista exteriori quae sentitur. Hoc enim sequitur ex quarto et quinto praedictis et suppositis. Et ista qualitas sic in organo impressa solet vocari species qualitatis exterioris sensibilis, quia est repraesentativa ipsius per quam anima innata est cognoscere istam. Et solet dici similitudo istius, non quia sit eiusdem rationis cum ista nec eiusdem naturae secundum speciem, sed bene dissimilis est et in essentia et in virtute. Per eam enim fit sensatio, et per aliam qualis est exterior non fieret sed impediretur. 15. Sed septimo videtur mihi quod ista species existens in sensu exteriori non sentitur isto sensu exteriori sicut aliqui opinantur. Et hoc videtur primo esse de intentione Aristotelis dicentis quod sensibile positum supra sensum in organo sensus non sentitur. 16. Item si species coloris existens in visu sentiretur sive videretur, sequeretur quod visus aeque certe et aeque evidenter — immo certius et evidentius — iudicaret de illis speciebus quam de coloribus exterioribus. Consequens est falsum, igitur et antecedens. Consequentiam declaro primo quia dicentes visum percipere istam speciem dicunt ip-

122 dicentes . . . istam ] Cf. P ETRUS I OANNIS O LIVI, QQ. in secundum librum Sent. Q. 58 ad 14 (ed. Jansen, 469). 105 quam ] aliud add. A 106 ista ] alia V 107 praedictis et suppositis ] praesuppositis W 112 bene dissimilis est ] isto modo est ei bene dissimilis sed bene dicitur ei similis A 113 et ] quae ET || aliam qualis ] talem qualitatem quae VW || impediretur ] sensatio add. VW 118 existens in visu ] om. E 120 iudicaret ] videret A || quam ] sicut W 122 istam ] per T

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13. Again, if your friend were to eat garlic and you were not, you will strongly sense the smell of the garlic he is eating. But if you also eat it, enough to allow the odorous fumes to reach your olfactory organ, then you will no longer sense the smell of the garlic your friend is eating, nor those you have eaten. And this is because there is now in your organ a smell similar to the external smell you sensed before. Therefore, the reception of a quality similar to the external one does not make for its perception, but rather impedes it. 14. In the sixth place, it follows that, for sensing an external quality, it is necessary for there to be another quality impressed on the sense organ, through which it is sensed, which is dissimilar in nature and species from the external quality that is sensed. For this follows from the fourth and fifth assumptions stated earlier. And because it is representative of it, this other quality, impressed on the organ in this way, is usually called the species of the external sensible quality, by which the soul is naturally suited to cognize that external quality. And this species is usually called a likeness of the external quality, not because it has the same definition or the same specific nature as that quality, but it is in fact dissimilar to it both in essence and in power. For the species produces sensation, whereas another quality like the external one would not produce sensation but would instead impede it. 15. But in the seventh place, it seems to me that the species existing in the external sense is not sensed by this external sense, as some people believe. And this seems to be the main point of Aristotle’s saying that a sensible placed on the sense organ is not sensed. 16. Again, if the species of color existing in sight were to be sensed or were to be seen, then it would follow that vision would judge about these species with equal certainty and evidentness — indeed, with greater certainty and evidentness — than about external colors. The consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent. I clarify the conse-

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sam percipere per se et primo, scilicet per prius quam illum colorem exteriorem, propter hoc quod ipsa magis et verius et proprius repraesentat seipsam quam illum colorem. Et ideo sensus magis et verius debet istam speciem apprehendere. Modo rationabile est quod sensus certius et evidentius iudicet de eo quod apprehendit proprius et magis per se. Et adhuc probatur ista consequentia ex quo quia tam illa species quam ille color essent innati videri a visu, tamen color non esset innatus videri nisi per speciem, et species videretur per seipsam, non per colorem. Sed de isto debet visus iudicare certius et evidentius quod cognoscit non per alterum sed per seipsum quam de isto quod cognoscit per alterum; ergo etc. Immo oporteret quod ita certitudinaliter iudicaret de illa specie quod non posset decipi de ea, organo sensus existente bene disposito, quia videret istam non per aliquod medium nec per aliquod repraesentativum sed per seipsam. Ideo nulla apparet intervenire causa deceptionis. Sic igitur probata est ista principalis consequentia. 17. Sed tunc probatur falsitas consequentis. Ostendo enim quod colorem exteriorem evidentius et certius videmus et iudicamus quam eius speciem, si utrumque sentimus. Primo quia propter manifestam visionem coloris, vetula scit se videre illum colorem, et ipsa vel nos nescimus nos videre illam speciem. Immo, interrogata, dicet se nihil videre nisi ea quae sunt extra nos ante oculos. 18. Secundo quia si sit debita distantia, et si medium et organum fuerint bene disposita, nos ita manifeste videmus colorem et coloratum quod nos etiam percipimus eius magnitudinem et figuram et ubi est, et per visum recte vadimus ad illum, digito signando in pariete. Sic autem non percipimus visu, nec iudicamus quod sit ista species in visu nostro, nec percipimus eius magnitudinem et figuram. Et omnino mirabile est si istam speciem per seipsam percipimus et immediate

123 percipere . . . primo ] primo percipere et per se ipsam T 124 proprius ] per prius AE 125 Et ] exteriorem A 128 quia ] om. W 130 videretur ] videri W 131 et evidentius ] om. W 141 sentimus ] videamus VW 142 nos ] ego VW 148 vadimus ] incidimus A 151 immediate ] mediate V

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quent first, because those who claim that vision perceives this species say that it perceives the species per se and primarily, prior to perceiving the external color, because it represents itself more, and more truly, and more properly, than it represents this color. And so sense should apprehend this species more, and more truly. Now it is reasonable that sense should judge with more certainty and evidentness about that which it apprehends more properly and more per se. The consequence is further proved from the fact that the species and the color alike would be naturally suited to be seen by the power of sight, but the color would be seen only through the species, whereas the species could be seen by itself, and not through the color. But sight should judge with more certainty and evidentness about that which it cognizes not through something else, but by itself, than about that which it cognizes through something else; therefore, etc. Moreover, it should judge about this species with such certainty that it could not be deceived about it, provided the sense organ is well-disposed, for it would see it not through some medium, nor through something representative if it, but through itself. Therefore, no cause of deception appears to intervene. And thus the main consequence is proved. 17. But then I prove the falsity of the consequent. For I show that we see and judge the external color more evidently and with more certainty than its species, if we sense them both. First, because of clearly seeing that color, a market woman knows that she sees that color, but she and we do not know that we see that species. Indeed, if she were asked, she would say that she sees nothing but what is outside of us, in front of our eyes. 18. In the second place, if it were at an appropriate distance, and if the medium and the organ have been well-disposed, then we see the color and the colored thing so clearly that we also perceive its size and shape and where it is, and guided by our sight we can walk right up to it, pointing it out with our finger on the wall. But we do not perceive in this way by sight, nor do we judge that there is this species in our sight, nor do we perceive its magnitude and shape. And it is

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et primo, quod nec percipiamus ubi ista est nec quanta nec qualiter figurata, et quod latet nos quod eam percipiamus. 19. Item sensus de suis propriis et per se sensibilibus debet iudicare naturales differentias si sint sensibilia diversarum specierum et dissimilium naturarum. Et tamen dictum est quod color et species eius sunt dissimiles specie, natura, et virtute. Et tamen visus meus nullam differentiam iudicat inter colorem et speciem eius; ergo etc. 20. Tunc igitur venio ad dicendum quid intelligimus in proposito per spirituale et reale. Et videtur mihi quod hoc nomen spiritus primo dictum est et proprie de substantiis incorporeis, scilicet indivisibilibus et inextensis cuiusmodi sunt Deus et intelligentiae, angeli, anima humana intellectiva. Et sic substantia, prima sui divisione, divideretur in substantias spirituales et corporeas. Et consequenter omnes formae accidentales huiusmodi substantiis spiritualibus inhaerentes dicuntur spirituales, ut actus intelligendi et habitus intellectuales. Deinde, quia illae substantiae quae primo dicuntur spirituales et spiritus sunt insensibiles, ideo similitudine ampliatum est hoc nomen spiritus ad significandum corpora quae, propter sui subtilitatem, non sunt visibilia vel non terminant visum. Unde ob hoc, ventum vocamus spiritum et aliquando aerem. Unde respirationem dicimus aeris attractionem, et in nobis vocamus spiritus vitales corpora subtilia calida ex cibo digesto resoluta, per quae anima exercet opera vitae. 21. Adhuc remotius ad similitudinem praedictorum, formae accidentales quae in corporibus sensibilibus inveniuntur insensibiles et repraesentativae sensibilium, dicuntur spirituales. Et sic in proposito sumitur esse spirituale. Et quia vulgus non reputat hoc esse in hoc mundo nisi quod potest sentiri, immo simpliciter, nisi esset ex fide

161 proprie ] primo V 163 intellectiva ] et substantia simplex add. A 164 substantias ] separatas a materia add. T || omnes ] om. T 168 ampliatum est ] applicatur W 169–170 vel non terminant ] nec movent A 171 aeris attractionem ] spiritum W || aeris ] inspirationem et add. T 172 ex cibo ] ab obiecto A 174– 175 accidentales ] substantiales V 175 inveniuntur ] invenimus T repraesentur V reperiuntur W

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rather odd, if we perceive this species by itself, both immediately and primarily, that we perceive neither where it is, nor how big it is, nor how it is shaped, and that we do not even notice that we perceive it. 19. Again, sense should judge the natural differences of its per se proper sensibles if they are of diverse species and dissimilar natures. However, we have said that color and its species are dissimilar in species, nature, and power. Nevertheless, my vision judges no difference between color and its species; therefore, etc. 20. Now, therefore, I come to explaining what we understand in this question by ‘spiritual’ and ‘real’. And it seems to me that the name ‘spirit’ primarily and properly applies to incorporeal substances, namely the indivisible and unextended ones, such as God, the intelligences, angels, and the human intellective soul. And so, substance is first divided into spiritual and corporeal substances. Conequently, all accidental forms inhering in such spiritual substances are said to be spiritual, such as the acts of thinking and intellectual habits. Next, because the substances that are primarily said to be spiritual and spirits are insensible, the name ‘spirit’ is extended by analogy to signify bodies which, on account of their subtlety, are not visible or do not terminate sight. For this reason we call the wind ‘spirit’ and sometimes the air, too. Thus we call the drawing in of air ‘respiration’, and in ourselves we call the warm, subtle bodies dissolved from digested food ‘vital spirits’, whereby the soul carries out its vital functions. 21. By an even more distant analogy to the aforementioned things, certain accidental forms that are found in sensible bodies, which are insensible and representative of sensible things, are said to be ‘spiritual’. And this is how ‘spiritual being’ is understood in this question. And because common people do not take anything that cannot

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acquisita per praedicationem vel ex philosophia per studium, vulgus nihil putaret esse nisi quod posset sentiri, ideo vulgus non vocabit res vel realia nisi sensibilia. Et ex hoc ad placitum habuit ortum ista distinctio quod quaedam sunt entia realia, scilicet sensibilia, et alia spiritualia, scilicet insensibilia, ita quod per realia non intelligimus nisi sensibilia secundum istam vulgarem aestimationem. Et tamen hoc non obstante, cum dicamus ista nomina ens et res converti secundum eorum principales significationes, et nos etiam sciamus per philosophiam insensibilia multa esse sensibilibus magis entia et perfectiora. Non debemus negare quin ista sint vere res simpliciter loquendo, licet non secundum vulgarem intentionem. 22. Deinde secundum impropriam et attributivam locutionem, sicut urinam dicimus sanam, nos aliquando species repraesentativas qualitatum sensibilium vocamus nominibus istarum qualitatum sensibilium, ut speciem coloris colorem, speciem soni sonum, lumen lucem. Non enim percipientes bene naturas et conditiones illarum specierum, non possumus bene distinguere inter eas et istas qualitates sensibiles. Et sic essent ponendi secundum aequivocationem colores reales et colores spirituales, soni reales et soni spirituales. 23. Tunc ergo directe ad quaestionem, dicendum est quod bene per aerem et aliquando ad longam distantiam multiplicatur odor realiter, scilicet quia ex corpore odorifero resolvitur quaedam fumalis evaporatio quae commiscetur aeri et movetur per aerem, in qua fumali evaporatione est verus odor realis et sensibilis. Sed tamen ultra talem fumum multiplicatur species odoris in aere sine tali fumo et per istam, quando pervenit ad olfactum, sentitur ille verus odor distans et remotus et non ista species quae in sensu recipitur. Et Commentator

205 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.9 (ed. Crawford, 277.39–43). 179 praedicationem ] probationem V 180 quod ] ipsum aliquo eius sensu add. A || vocabit ] vocavit AETV 185 et res ] om. V 193 lumen ] luminis W 195 sensibiles ] om. W 197 spirituales ] et sic de aliis sensibilibus add. VW 198–199 bene ] aliquando add. A 199 per ] aliquem add. VW 201 qua ] illa W 202 verus ] huiusmodi A 204 verus ] talis A

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be sensed to exist in this world, or indeed, unless were acquired from faith through preaching or from the study of philosophy, they would believe nothing to exist unless it can be sensed, and so the common crowd will not call them ‘things’ or ‘real’ unless they are able to be sensed. And this conventional usage is the source of the distinction that some beings are real, that is, sensible, and others are spiritual, that is, insensible, so that by ‘real’ we understand only sensibles according to this common opinion. Nevertheless, this common opinion notwithstanding, when we say that the names ‘being’ and ‘thing’ are convertible with regard to their primary significations, we also know by philosophy that many insensible beings are more beings and more perfect than sensible beings. And we should not deny either that they are truly things [res], absolutely speaking, although not according to this common meaning . 22. Furthermore, in accordance with improper and attributive locution, as we call urine ‘healthy’, sometimes we call the species representative of sensible qualities by the names of these sensible qualities, as when we call the species of color ‘color’, or the species of sound ‘sound’, or illumination ‘light’. For not perceiving correctly the natures and conditions of those species, we cannot properly distinguish between them and these sensible qualities. And thus, by equivocation, we would have to posit real colors and spiritual colors, real sounds and spiritual sounds. 23. Then, responding directly to the question, we should say that odor is certainly carried in real being through the air, and sometimes over a long distance, namely, when the odorous body lets out some fume-like evaporation that mixes with air and is moved through the air, in which fume-like evaporation there is true, real, and sensible odor. But beyond this fume the species of odor is propagated in the air without this fume, and when it arrives at the organ of smell, the true remote odor is smelled through it, and not the species received in the

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super hoc dat unam persuasionem probabilem, scilicet quod tempore suo fuit bellum in quo valde multi fuerunt occisi, et ad cadavera mortuorum per sensum odoris venerunt tigrides et vultures a quingentis miliaribus venerunt, quod non fuisset nisi species odoris ad istam distantiam multiplicata fuisset sine tali fumo, quoniam si ista cadavera fuissent omnino resoluta in corpus subtilissimum, illud non suffecisset ad permiscendum se cum aliqua notabilitate in tanto aere quantus esset undique secundum tantam distantiam. Ista tamen persuasio non est demonstrativa, quia aer per ventum potest moveri et portare fumum sibi commixtum ad valde longam distantiam. Sed persuasio haberet probabilitatem si aer esset quietus et non moveretur sic longe per ventum. 24. Sed tamen alia persuasio ad hoc valet, quia multa sunt corpora quae, licet sint valde parva, sunt tamen valde odorifera per longum temporem, ut unius anni vel duorum, licet portentur de loco ad locum, in novo aere sentitur odor eorum satis longe et non apparent notabiliter diminui per illud longum temporem. Si igitur non sentiretur odor eorum nisi cum tali fumali evaporatione, oporteret quod continue fumaret per totum annum, ex quo semper sentitur odor eorum notabilis licet ponantur in novo aere. Et si sic continue fumarent, oporteret quod per tantum temporem eorum resolutio et minoratio notabiliter apparent, quod de multis est falsum licet in multis sit verum quae sunt faciliter et multum fumantia. 25. Tunc ergo respondendum est ad rationes. Primo enim bene conceditur quod species odoris sive alterius qualitatis sensibilis, sive

212 notabilitate ] nobilitate T 214 est ] necessaria seu add. W 221 apparent ] apparet A 222 diminui ] consumi W 225 fumarent ] per totum annum add. E 226 tantum ] totum VW || eorum ] fieret add. W || resolutio ] et minoratio add. A 227 licet . . . verum ] om. V in marg. W

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sense. And the Commentator provides a further persuasive argument besides this one, namely that in his time there was a battle in which very many people were killed, and the smell of the cadavers of the dead attracted tigers and vultures from fifty miles away, which would have not happened unless the species of odor had been propagated that distance without the fumes, for even if these cadavers had been completely dissolved into this very subtle substance, that would still not have sufficed to mix itself with air in any noticeable quantity over the huge body of air that would have been everywhere at such a large distance. But this argument is not demonstrative, for the air could be moved by the wind and carry the fumes mixed with it over such a very long distance. However, the argument would have plausibility if the air had been quiet and had not been moved that far by the wind. 24. Yet another plausible argument confirms the same point. For there are many bodies that, despite being exceedingly small, are very odorous for a long time, such as a year or two. Despite being carried from place to place, their odor is still sensed for a rather long time in new bodies of air, and it does not seem to diminish over that long period of time. If, therefore, their smell were to be sensed only through such smoke-like evaporation, then they would have to “smoke” continuously for the whole year, because their striking odor is always sensed, even when they are placed in a new body of air. And if they were to “smoke” continuously in this way, their dispersion and diminution would be quite apparent over such a long period of time — which is false in the case of many such things, although it is true for many others that “smoke” readily and in significant quantities. 25. Now we should reply to the objections. To the first,207 it is easily conceded that the species of odor or any other sensible quality,

207

See par. 1 above.

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in medio sive in organo sensus, est vere res quaedam. Sed secundum consuetam locutionem dicitur non realis sed spiritualis quia non sensibilis sed insensibilis. Et ita etiam dicitur de specie soni multiplicata per aerem. 26. Sed aliae rationes quaerunt de modis generationum et multiplicationum illarum specierum et de proprietatibus earum, de quibus expedit amplius quaerere et determinationem facere specialem, etc.

237 determinationem facere specialem ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.18. 236 proprietatibus ] quibusdam add. TV

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whether in the medium or in a sense organ, is truly something. But in accordance with the usual way of speaking, it is said not to be real, but spiritual, because it is not sensible, but insensible.208 And the same would go for the species of sound propagated through the air. 26. But as for the other arguments,209 they asked about how the species are generated and propagated, and about their properties, which deserve further inquiry and a special determination, etc.

208 That 209 See

is, too small to be sensed. pars. 2–5 above.

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Utrum species qualitatum proprie et per se sensibilium habeant in medio vel in organo instantaneam generationem et multiplicationem.

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1. Et arguitur quod sic, quia sicut videmus de lumine et de speciebus colorum, ita debemus imaginari de speciebus aliarum qualitatum sensibilium, vel oportet assignare causam diversitatis, quod non apparet facile. Sed lumen et species colorum generantur et multiplicantur per medium diaphanum in instanti. Hoc primo probatur auctoritatibus et postea rationibus. 2. Prima auctoritas est Aristoteles in secundo De anima, qui reprehendit Empedoclem de hoc quod dicebat lumen diffundi per medium temporaliter, sed hoc latet nos propter brevitatem temporis. Et contra hoc dicit Aristoteles quod “hoc est extra eam quae in ratione, veritatem, et contra ea quae videntur. In parvo enim spatio forte lateret nos. Ab oriente autem in occidens latere, magna quaedam et inutilis est quaestio.” 3. Secunda auctoritas est Commentatoris sexto Physicorum contra Alexandrum negantem transmutationes indivisibiles. Dicit Commentator quod Alexander in hoc contradicit magno magistro, scilicet Aristoteli, quoniam Aristoteles et omnes peripatetici dicunt illas transmutationes esse indivisibiles quae fiunt in non tempore. Et hoc est, ut dicit, manifestum in illuminationibus. 10 secundo De anima ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418b 21. 13–16 hoc . . . quaestio ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418b 21 (Ar. lat. XII.2 123.2.16): “hoc enim est et extra eam que in ratione veritatem et extra ea quae videntur: in parvo enim spatio lateret nos, ab oriente autem in occidens latere, magna quidem multum quaestio est.” 17 Commentatoris ] AVERROES, Comm. Phys. VI.3.1 (IV 265 M). 13 extra ] contra TV 14 ea ] causa T || forte ] om. VW 15 quaedam ] quidem T 16 quaestio ] quod est absurdum add. T 17 Commentatoris ] Aristoteles VW 20 peripatetici ] hypothetici T qui add. W 22 dicit ] commentator add. A aristoteles add. V © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 24

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Do the species of proper and per se sensible qualities have instantaneous generation and propagation in the medium, or in the organ of sense?

1. And it is argued that they do, because just as we envision the species of light and color, so we ought to imagine the species of other sensible qualities, or the reason for the diversity of their natures would have to be found, which does not seem an easy task. But illumination and the species of colors are generated and propagated through a diaphanous medium in an instant. This is proved first by relying on authorities, and afterward by arguments. 2. The first authority is Aristotle in De Anima II, who refutes Empedocles’s claim that illumination is propagated in time but that we do not notice the time due to its brevity. And, against this, Aristotle says, “This is beyond reason, truth and experience. Over a small distance, perhaps, its transit may be hidden from us. However, whether the transit of light from east to west remains hidden is a big, but futile question.”210 3. The second authority is the Commentator, in Physics VI, where he argues against Alexander’s denial of indivisible changes. The Commentator says that, with this denial, Alexander contradicts the great master, namely Aristotle, since Aristotle and all the Peripatetics say that changes which do not occur in time are indivisible. And this is clear, he says, in the case of illumination.

210 This

is a curious misrepresentation of Aristotle’s rebuttal to Empedocles. Aristotle did not refer to the transit of light in time from east to west as a futile question but as a claim which was not borne out by experience. For Buridan’s response to Aristotle, see par. 38 below. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 24

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4. Tertia auctoritas est Aristotelis septimo et decimo Ethicorum, ubi dicit visionem et delectationem fieri in instanti et non in tempore. Et tamen non magis fit visio aut delectatio in instanti quam illuminatio, ergo, etc. 5. Deinde etiam arguit rationibus quod lumen vel species coloris generantur et multiplicantur per medium instanter, quia non videtur esse successio in motu vel in mutatione nisi propter resistentiam. Ideo ubi non est resistentia, oportet esse mutationem instantaneam. Sed in diaphano receptivo luminis non est resistentia, quia resistentia est ratione contrarietatis, et lumen non habet contrarium. Tenebra namque non est contraria lumini, quia non est nisi diaphanum receptivum luminis carens lumine. Et similiter etiam species coloris non habet contrarium quia non poneretur habere contrarium, nisi species albi poneretur contraria speciei nigri. Et hoc non est ita, sicut arguebatur in principio quaestionis praecedentis 6. Item illud est concedendum generari et corrumpi instantanee quod non habet durationem nisi instantaneam. Sed lumen est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior nota est de se si aliquid sit tale. Minor probatur supponendo quod a sole secundum rectum processum multiplicatur radius per fenestram in aerem illius domus. Tunc manifestum est quod si aer in hac domo moveatur velociter per ventum, in quo aere recipitur ille radius, non propter hoc apparebit mutare situm ad solem, et ad fenestram, et ad alias partes quiescentes. Et tunc ex hoc sequitur quod ille radius non maneat idem per aliquid totum temporem, quia si maneat idem, tunc vel movetur cum aere in quo subiective recipitur, vel non. Si sic, tunc oportet quod mutet situm ad solem et ad fenestram, cuius oppositum dictum est. Et si non movetur cum eo, tunc oportet vel quod remaneat sine subiecto, vel quod transeat de subiec-

23 Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. X.4 1174a13. cedentis ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.17 par. 3.

37 quaestionis prae-

25 fit . . . instanti ] instanter visio vel delectatio V 27 etiam ] Aristoteles add. AE contra T || rationibus ] et auctoritatibus add. E 28 instanter ] instantanee W 29 in ] mobili vel add. A || motu ] mobili E (?) T 30 oportet ] apparet E 33 nisi ] quoddam add. W 36 poneretur ] esset AT est E || sicut ] fortiter add. V 42 per fenestram ] om. AET 44 propter hoc ] tamen A || apparebit ] ille radius add. W 45 et ] illud radium solis nec etiam A 50 de ] uno add. VW

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4. The third authority comes from Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VII and X,where he says that vision and pleasure come to be in an instant and not in time. Yet the coming to be of vision and pleasure is no more instantaneous than that of illumination; therefore, etc. 5. Then he argues from reason that illumination and the species of color are generated and propagated through the medium instantaneously, because succession in motion or in change seems to occur only because of resistance. Thus, where there is no resistance, there should be instantaneous change. But there is no resistance in a transparent medium that is receptive of illumination because resistance arises from a contrary, and illumination does not have a contrary. Darkness is not a contrary of illumination, because darkness is only a transparent medium receptive of illumination that lacks illumination. And neither do species of color have contraries, because a color would not be assumed to have a contrary unless it is assumed that the species of white is contrary to the species of black. And this is not so, as was argued in the beginning of the previous question. 6. Again, it is to be conceded that what has only an instantaneous duration is generated and corrupted in an instant. But illumination is a thing of this kind; therefore, etc. The major premise is self-evident, if there is anything of this sort. The minor is proved by supposing that a ray is propagated in a straight line from the sun through the window and into the air of this house. It is clear that if the air in this house in which the ray is received is moved quickly by the wind, the ray will not on this account appear to change its position in relation to the sun, the window, or other stationary things. And then it follows from this that the ray does not remain the same for any amount of time, because if it were to remain the same, then either it is moved with the air which is its subject, or it is not moved with it. If it were moved with it, then the ray would change its position relative to the

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to in subiectum, quod est contra conditionem et naturam accidentis. Igitur ille radius per nullum totum temporem durat, et hoc est habere durationem non nisi instantaneam. 7. Oppositum tamen arguitur sicut a principio quaestionis arguebatur. Sicut enim videmus de uno sensibilium ita debemus iudicare de aliis, quia non esset facile assignare rationem diversitatis. Sed de speciebus sonorum apparet manifeste multiplicatio et successiva, quia propinquius corporibus sonantibus prius audit sonum quam remotius. Et etiam in principio quaestionis praecedentis arguebatur de odore quod eius multiplicatio esset temporalis et successiva; ergo etc. 8. Item ex eo continue intenditur caliditas in aliquo subiecto, quia continue generatur in eo caliditas pars post partem, prout hoc alibi debet videri; ergo etc. Similiter quaecumque qualitas in aliquo subiecto continue intenditur vel remittitur, illa temporaliter et successive corrumpitur et generatur. Sed constat quod in nostro hemisphaerio, lumen a sole continue intenditur ab aurora usque ad magnam partem diei, et postea etiam in vespere continue remittitur. Igitur lumen habet in aere continuam temporalem successivam et non instantaneam generationem vel corruptionem. 9. Item cum nihil sit instans indivisibile, prout est hoc alibi probatum, necesse est omne quod est, et omne quod fit, et omne quod corrumpitur, esse fieri et corrumpi in tempore divisibili, et per consequens temporaliter et non instantanee. Et propter hoc determinat Aristoteles in sexto Physicorum quod omne quod mutatur, mutatur in

59 in . . . praecedentis ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.17 par. 3. 62–63 alibi debet videri ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. III.4 (ed. Streijger and Bakker, 38–43). 70–71 alibi probatum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. VI.1 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 94va). 74 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VI.3 234a 30; 237b 4–20. 51 subiectum ] alterum VW || et naturam ] om. E 52 totum ] om. T 55 uno ] speciebus unius VW || sensibilium ] sensibilis W 55–56 iudicare ] videre T 57 multiplicatio ] temporalis add. W 64 illa ] ita W 70 nihil ] nullum T 72 divisibili ] om. VW

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sun or to the window, which, as was said, does not occur. And if the ray is not moved with it, then the ray either remains without a subject or it migrates from one subject to another, which is contrary to the disposition and nature of an accident. Thus the ray has no duration for any whole amount of time, which is to say that it only has an instantaneous duration. 7. The opposite position is argued in the same way as it was in the beginning of the question.211 For just as we envision the species of one sensible, so must we judge concerning the others, because it would not be easy to assign the reason for their diversity. But, regarding the species of sound, there clearly appears to be a temporal and successive propagation, because one who is nearer to a sounding body hears the sound before one who is further away. And at the beginning of the preceding question it was argued that the propagation of odor was temporal and successive, therefore, etc. 8. Again, heat is becoming continually more and more intense in a subject, because heat is generated in it part after part, as is to be seen elsewhere; therefore, etc. In a similar way, a quality continuously intensified and diminished in a subject is generated and corrupted temporally and successively. But it is common knowledge that in our hemisphere, illumination from the sun is continuously intensified from dawn for a large part of the day, and then, later on, continually diminished in the evening. Thus, illumination has a continuous, temporal, successive, and non-instantaneous generation or corruption in the air. 9. Again, since nothing is an indivisible instant (which is proved elsewhere), it is necessary that everything that exists, is made, and corrupted, exists, is made, and corrupted in time and, consequently, temporally and not instantaneously. And for this reason Aristotle determined in Physics VI that everything changed is changed in time

211 See

par. 1 above.

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tempore, et quod non contingit aliquid mutari in instanti. Et dicit ex hoc ultra quod omne quod mutatur, mutabatur prius, et omne quod fit, fiebat prius, et omne quod corrumpitur, corumpebatur prius. 10. Ista quaestio non est mihi facilis quia implicat multas difficultates. Prima est utrum species sensibilium contrariorum sint ad invicem contrariae, vel aliquo modo repugnantes, vel quomodo se habeant ad invicem. Secunda est utrum media per quae multiplicantur illae species habeant aliquam resistentiam generationi et multiplicationi illarum specierum, et unde proveniat illa resistentia. Tertia est utrum potest esse successio temporalis in mutatione sine resistentia, posito quod agens sit sufficienter applicatum passo. Quarta est specialiter de lumine, quomodo multiplicetur per medium corpore lucido praesente. Quinta est specialiter de specie soni. Sexta est de specie odoris. Septima de speciebus qualitatum tangibilium, scilicet caliditatis et frigiditatis, etc. Et hae possunt esse septem magnae quaestiones. 11. De prima videtur mihi prima facie quod species summae albedinis et species summae nigredinis non habeant ad invicem contrarietatem quia sicut prius arguebatur illae sunt in eodem aere et secundum quamlibet partem eius simul sunt quaelibet intense et perfecte, cum ego, ubicumque fuerim in hac domo, iudicem hoc albissimum et aliud quod est iuxta ipsum nigrissimum. Tales autem formae, quae simul sunt in eodem subiecto secundum esse perfectum et intensum,

92 prius arguebatur ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.17 par. 3 76–77 et . . . prius ] hom. VW 79 sensibilium ] om. T 79–80 sint . . . vel ] possint aliquo modo convenire et T 90 mihi ] om. AV igitur E enim dubitatione W 91 summae ] supremae V 93 eius ] in quo add. W || quaelibet ] aeque T aeque add. VW 96 esse ] se E

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and that nothing is changed in an instant. And he concludes from this further that everything that is changing was changing before, and everything which is coming to be was coming to be before, and everything that is being corrupted was being corrupted before.212 10. This question is not easy for me to answer because it involves many difficulties. The first is whether the species of sensible contraries are themselves contrary to each other, or whether they have some other kind of mutual resistance, or how they are related to each other. The second difficulty is whether the media through which the species are propagated offer any resistance to the generation and propagation of these species, and what causes that resistance.213 The third difficulty is whether there can be temporal succession in change without resistance, assuming that the agent is sufficiently applied to the recipient.214 The fourth difficulty specifically concerns illumination, namely how it is propagated through the medium in the presence of a bright body.215 The fifth difficulty specifically concerns the species of sound.216 The sixth concerns the species of odor.217 The seventh concerns the species of tangible qualities such as hot and cold, etc.218 These constitute seven big questions. 11. Concerning the first difficulty, it seems obvious to me that the species of the purest white and the species of the purest black do not have a mutual contrariety because, as was argued earlier, they are together in the same part of the air, and in every part of the air, in which they exist together in the same air and in every part of it, and equally intense and perfect in every part of it, because no matter where I am in this house, I judge this thing to be the whitest and this other 212 Aristotle thought of generation and corruption as

divisible and yet not ultimately granular. Hence, no matter how small a portion of the total change you choose to examine, you will find it composed of even smaller portions, leading to the counterintuitive conclusion that there can be no first or last moment of any change. Buridan addressed this issue more fully in his Questions on Aristotle’s Physics VI, esp. qq. 7–9. 213 See par. 27 below. 214 See par. 32 below. 215 See par. 38 below. 216 See par. 50 below. 217 See par. 65 below. 218 See par. 66 below.

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non ad invicem aliquam contrarietatem vel repugnantiam habent. Et iterum illae species simul sunt in visu, quia simul iudicas hoc albissimum et illud nigrissimum. Simul etiam fiunt et reservantur in organo phantasiae et memoriae vel sensus communis. Nec una impedit nec diminuit aliam, quia phantasiamur et memoramur, et memorative vel phantastice iudicamus unum albissimum, aliud nigrissimum. Et immo in intellectu indivisibili existente simul salvantur perfecte. Ideo simul intelligimus et summam albedinem et summam nigredinem, et formamus propositionem mentalem quod summa albedo differt a summa nigredine. 12. Sed tamen contra hoc sunt fortes dubitationes, primo quia sicut contrariorum causae sunt contrariae, ut dicitur secundo De generatione, ita videtur rationabile quod causarum contrariarum debeant esse effectus contrarii. Et cum species albedinis et species nigredinis sunt effectus contrariarum causarum, scilicet albedinis et nigredinis, igitur illae sunt contrariae. 13. Secundo quia sicut in coloribus sunt colores extremi ut album et nigrum, et medii ut viride, croceum et rubeum, ita in speciebus sunt extremae sicut species albi et species nigri, et species mediae, ut species crocei, rubei, et viridis. Sed in decimo Metaphysicae determinat Aristoteles quod “omnia media sunt media oppositorum quorumdam.” Et tandem ibidem determinat quod omnia media sunt media contrariarum. Igitur oportet species colorum extremorum esse contrarias.

108–109 De generatione ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. II.10, 336b9. 116– 117 determinat Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, Met. X.7 1057a30 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 211.399): “At vero omnia media sunt oppositorum quorumdam.” 118 determinat ] A RISTOTELES, Met. X.7 1057b2 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 211.410):“Si vero sunt in eodem genere media, ut ostensum est, et media contrariorum, necesse ipsa componi ex hiis contrariis.” 100 communis ] om. ET 107 fortes ] plures A 109 rationabile ] esse V colorum extremorum ] extremas colorum ATW coloris E extremas coloris V

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thing next to it to be the blackest. Such forms, however, which exist in the same subject at the same time with a perfect and intense being do not have any kind of contrariety or mutual resistance. Moreover, these species are simultaneously in vision, because you judge this thing to be the whitest and that to be the blackest, and do so at the same time. These species even occur and are preserved together in the organ of the imagination and memory or in the common sense. Nor does one preserved species impede or diminish the other, because we imagine and remember, and via imagination or memory we judge one thing to be the whitest and another to be the blackest. Moreover, they are perfectly retained even in the indivisible intellect. Thus, we simultaneously understand both the purest whiteness and purest blackness, and we form a mental proposition that the purest whiteness differs from the purest blackness. 12. But against this claim there are serious doubts, firstly because just as the causes of contraries are contraries, as is said in On Generation and Corruption II, so it seems reasonable that there should be contrary effects of contrary causes. And since the species of whiteness and the species of blackness are the effects of contrary causes, namely of whiteness and blackness, these species are therefore contraries. 13. Secondly, because just as there are extremes of color, such as black and white, and mean colors such as green, yellow, and red, so in species there are extremes, such as the species of white and the species of black, and mean species, such as the species of yellow, red, and green. But in Metaphysics X Aristotle determines that “all means are means between certain opposites.” And finally in the same place he determines that all means are means of contraries. Therefore, the species of extreme colors should be contraries.

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14. Tertio illae formae habent ad invicem contrarietatem et repugnantiam quae sunt innatae fieri successive in eodem subiecto secundum esse perfectum et intensum. Sed non simul possunt fieri perfecte et intense, nisi hoc sit secundum diversas partes illius subiecti et secundum diversos situs. Sed constat quod impossibile est in oculo secundum eumdem situm fieri speciem perfectam albedinis et speciem perfectam nigredinis, licet hoc sit possibile successive. Maior patet quia cum albedo et dulcedo non habeant ad invicem contrarietatem, nec etiam caliditas et siccitas, una non impedit vel remittit aliam si adveniat eidem subiecto, sed stant simul quaelibet sub esse intenso et perfecto. Omnino nulla apparet ratio quare una forma debeat remittere aliam et non permittere eam esse simul cum ea, nisi propter earum contrarietatem vel repugnantiam vel saltem propter contrarietatem et repugnantiam dispositionum ad esse earum requisitarum. Minor vero manifesta est si quis attendat, quia valde bene conceditur quod species albedinis et nigredinis perfectarum formarum extra invicem situaliter existentium species perfecte recipiuntur in oculo secundum diversas partes oculi et diversos situs. Unde etiam verum est quod a speculo refranguntur species perfectae albedinis et species perfectae nigredinis. Sed hoc est a diversis partibus speculi extra invicem situaliter existentibus. Sed posito quod secundum eumdem situm fiant in oculo et secundum eamdem lineam multiplicentur de obiectis per medium ad oculum, constabit quod neutra recipietur in oculo secundum eius esse perfectum et intensum. Immo sic commiscebuntur quod fiet ex eis species media, sicut ex caliditate et frigiditate fit media tepiditas, ita quod per neutram iudicabimus albedinem perfectam aut nigredinem perfectam sed iudicabimus medium colorem. Hoc apparet experimentaliter, nam quod lux per se visa appareat tamquam alba. Et cum fumi elevati ex terra sint nigri et de mane lux solis multiplicat ad oculum speciem suam, scilicet lumen, per illos fumos intermedios, ita quod per eamdem viam et eumdem situm multiplicantur simul ad oculum 124 in oculo ] om. A 125 fieri ] simul add. VW 128 si ] sed W 130 forma ] substantialis add. V 131 permittere eam esse ] remittitur et causa est T || ea ] ipsa secundum eius esse perfecta VW || earum ] om. A eadem E 133 esse earum ] actum eorum A 134 species ] om. ETV 135 formarum ] om. AET 136 existentium ] om. W || in oculo ] om. VW 137 speculo ] ad visum add. VW 140 fiant ] fiat TVW 141 lineam ] partem W 146 perfectam ] om. A

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14. Thirdly, because those forms have mutual contrariety and resistance which by their nature come to be successively in the same subject, in perfect and intense being, but they cannot come to be at the same time perfectly and intensely in that subject, unless this happens in different parts and in different locations of that subject. However, it is clear that it is impossible that the perfect species of white and the perfect species of black come to be in the same part of the eye, although this is possible successively. The major premise is clear because, since whiteness and sweetness do not have a mutual contrariety, as neither do heat and dryness, one does not impede or weaken the other if they come to be in the same subject, but they stand together, at the same time, in perfect and intense being. Indeed, there appears to be no reason why one form should weaken the other and not allow it to exist together with it unless because of the contrariety and mutual resistance, or at least because of a contrariety or mutual resistance of the dispositions required by their existence. The minor premise is clear if one pays attention, because it is very readily conceded that the species of the perfect forms of whiteness and blackness located in different places are perfectly received in different parts and different locations of the eye. Whence it is also true that the species of perfect whiteness and the species of perfect blackness are reflected from a mirror, but this reflection is from distinct parts of the mirror located in different places. However, assuming that the species of white and black come to be in the same place in the eye and are propagated along the same line from the objects through the medium to the eye, it is clear that neither species will be received in the eye in its perfect and intense being. Instead, they will be mixed in such a way that a mean species is made from them, just as a lukewarm mean is made from hot and cold, so that through neither incoming species shall we judge perfect whiteness or perfect blackness, but we shall judge a mean color. This is apparent in experience, for light seen

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species albedinis lucis et species nigredinis fumorum, tunc non iudicamus albedinem nec nigredinem sed rubedinem. Et ita etiam, sicut alias dictum fuit, si simul per vitrum croceum et per vitrum azurium sibi invicem superposita aspicimus, nec iudicamus croceitatem nec azureitatem sed viriditatem, quia viride est medium crocei et azurei sicut esset fuscum albi et nigri. Et ita pictores, super nigrum ponentes album, faciunt quod nec apparet album nec nigrum, sed fuscum, nisi corpus album superpositum fuerit bonae profunditatis. Et ideo secundum dicta, videtur quod illae species habent veras conditiones formarum contrariarum, scilicet quod habent in eodem subiecto repugnantiam quantum ad esse simul per eumdem situm, et quod habent in eodem commixtionem secundum esse remissum, ita quod ex commixtione et remissione, provenit species media et repraesentans medium colorem. 15. Non obstantibus istis, videtur mihi quod non sunt contrariae propter prius dictam rationem, scilicet quia totum per eumdem aerem multiplicantur simul et utraque retinet ibi esse suum completum et intensum. Sed illud quod ultra addebatur de esse simul in organo phantasiae vel sensus communis vel etiam intellectu non facit mihi fidem quantum ad species quae in medio vel in organo sensus exterioris recipiuntur, quia non credo illas species esse eiusdem rationis et speciei cum illis speciebus vel intentionibus quae ad phantasiam, ad sensum communem vel ad intellectum perveniunt. Lumen enim quod est species lucis in oculo recepta et in aere medio requirit diaphaneitatem in subiecto in quo recipitur et multiplicatur. Non enim multiplicatur per corpus non diaphanum, propter quod oportet oculum fieri de materia

153 dictum fuit ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.11 par. 21. 153 per vitrum ] om. T 159 videtur ] videmus A || veras ] naturas et A 162 ex ] huiusmodi add. EVW 163 et ] illius T 167 et ] quia add. W 168 addebatur ] om. A apponebatur ET 168–169 phantasiae ] memoriae add. E 169 vel ] ponebatur memoriae aut add. A 170 in ] organo phantasiae et sensus communis aut add. A 174 et ] vel repraesentatum aut A vel E

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in itself looks white. And because fumes which rise from the earth are black, and the light of the morning sun propagates its species, namely illumination, to the eye through the intervening fumes, so that the species of the whiteness of light and the species of the blackness of the fumes are propagated to the eye together along the same path and to the same place in the eye, we then judge not whiteness nor blackness but redness. And so as well, as was said elsewhere, if we look through a yellow glass and a blue glass superimposed on it at the same time, we judge neither yellowness nor blueness, but greenness, because green is the mean between yellow and blue, just as grey is the mean between black and white. And so painters, covering white paint with black, cause neither white nor black to appear, but grey, unless the white on top is very thick. And thus, according to what has been said, it seems that these species have the true conditions of contrary forms, namely that they have a mutual resistance to being together in the same subject at the same time and in the same place at once and that they are mixed together in the same thing in a weakened way, so that from the mixing and weakening, a mean species representing a mean color results. 15. Nevertheless, these doubts not withstanding, it seems to me that the species are not contraries for the aforementioned reason,219 namely that species are wholly propagated together through the same air, each retaining its complete and intense being there. But what was said in addition about species being together in the organ of imagination or of common sense or even in the intellect, does not convince me concerning the species received in the medium or in the organ of an exterior sense, because I do not believe that those species are of the same nature and type as the species or intentions that arrive in the imagination, the common sense, or the intellect. For illumination, which is the species of light received in the eye and intervening air, requires transparency in the subject in which it is received and prop-

219 See

par. 14 above.

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diaphana. Non autem est talis diaphaneitas in organo phantasiae vel memoriae vel sensus communis vel intellectu. Et ratio ad hoc videtur probabilis, quia per interpositionem obstaculi ante corpus lucidum vel coloratum, abiicitur et cessat lumen et species coloris secundum illud esse quod habent in medio vel in organo post obstaculum, ita quod non possunt illae species permanere, saltem diu, sine praesentia lucidi vel corporis colorati, quae tamen in phantasia vel in sensu communi non indigent ad generationem sui vel permanentem praesentiam lucidi vel colorati vel etiam diaphani. Ideo species colorum in oculo et repraesentatio coloris in phantasia vel intellectu non videntur esse eiusdem vel consimilis naturae, nec eiusdem rationis aut speciei. 16. Sed forte quod haec ratio non est demonstrativa, quia posset dici quod hoc provenit ex diversa dispositione subiecti recipientis, secundum quam diversitatem habet vel non habet potestatem conservandi qualitatem sibi impressam. Unde etiam videtur experimentaliter verum quod species lucis nullo tempore sensibili permanet in aere post lucidi remotionem, sed in organo oculi manent aliquo tempore sensibili licet brevi, quod apparet per experientias perspectivorum et per Aristotelem hoc declarat multipliciter in libro De somno et vigilia, et quia, baculo ignito moto velociter hinc inde vel circulariter, apparet ignis continuus secundum longam lineam rectam vel circularem, prout baculus movetur. 17. Tamen adhuc illae instantiae non demonstrant, quia non est mihi manifestum quod representationes visibilium, manentes post re-

194 per experientias perspectivorum ] Cf. Iohannes Pecham, Perspectiva communis I.1 (ed. Lindberg, 62). 195 Aristotelem ] Cf. ARISTOTELES, De insomniis II 459 b 5–6. 178 ad hoc videtur ] videtur adhuc A 181 vel in ] ab W 184 praesentiam ] om. A praesentis E 186 repraesentatio ] vel species add. A repraesentativum V || intellectu ] etc add. W 192 sensibili ] om. T 194 licet ] et T 196 quia ] similiter A || inde ] recto add. A 197 continuus ] continus vel circularis W || secundum longam lineam ] vel circulariter secundum habeat W || longam ] om. W

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agated. It is not propagated through a nontransparent body, which is why the eye must be made of transparent matter. However, there is no such transparency in the organs of imagination or memory or common sense or in the intellect. And the plausible reason for this seems to be that when an obstacle is placed in front of a bright or colored body, the being that illumination and the species of color have in the medium or in the organ behind the obstacle is given up and lost, so that these species cannot remain there, at least for very long, without the presence of a bright body or of a colored body, not needing the presence of light or a colored body or even transparency for their generation in imagination or common sense. Thus, the species of colors in the eye and the representation of color in imagination or in the intellect do not seem to be of the same or of a similar nature, nor of the same kind or type. 16. But perhaps this argument is not demonstrative, because it could be said that this arises from the different dispositions of the receiving subject, according to which diversity the subject either has or does not have the power to preserve a quality impressed upon it. For it is also apparent even from experience that the species of light do not remain in the air for any perceptible time after the removal of the light source, but they do remain for a perceptible, albeit brief, time in the organ of the eye, which appears in the experiments of the perspectivists and in Aristotle, who says this many times in the book On Sleep and Waking, and because, when a stick with a glowing tip is waved rapidly back and forth or in a circular pattern, the fire at the end of the stick appears as a continuous long line, straight or circular, depending on how the stick is moved. 17. But these counterexamples still do not demonstrate , because it is not clear to me that the rep-

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motionem visibilium, maneant in organo visus, sed in sensu communi vel phantasia, ubi iam positum est quod non sit repraesentativum similis naturae vel eiusdem speciei cum specie recepta in organo sensus exterioris vel in medio. Et apparet quod haec sunt difficilia ideo difficile est aliquid in hoc proposito demonstrare. Sed valeant rationes quae factae sunt quantum valere possunt. 18. Respondeo ad rationes quae arguebant quod species albedinis et nigredinis sunt contrariae. 19. Ad primam dicendum est quod non est universaliter verum quod omnium effectuum contrariorum sunt causae contrariae, nec quod omnium causarum contrariarum sunt effectus contrarii, licet particulares vel indefinitae sunt verae. Nam a corporibus caelestibus in quibus non est contrarietas, ut apparet primo Caeli, proveniunt in istis inferioribus effectus contrarii, ut aliquando caliditas multa, aliquando frigiditas intensa. Et si quis dicat complexiones vel qualitates aliquarum stellarum esse contrarias, tamen causae illarum non sunt contrariae, vel saltem causae illarum causarum, quia non proceditur in infinitum in causis; ideo tandem est devenire ad contraria quorum non sunt ultra causae contrariae. Et etiam si caliditas sit causa generationis ignis, et frigiditas terrae, non propter hoc oportet quod terra et ignis sint contraria. Sed in proposito, licet albedo et nigredo concederentur esse causae specierum contrariarum, quod tamen est falsum, et quod etiam illae species concederentur esse causae sensationum contrariarum, quod etiam est falsum, tamen non oportet ultra concedi quod illae sensationes essent causae intentionum contrariorum, scilicet quibus simpliciter intelliguntur albedo et nigredo, quia omnino

213 Caeli ] A RISTOTELES, De caelo I.3, 270a13. 202 ubi iam ] ideo A 203 eiusdem ] similis AET eius V 204 difficilia ] et add. V || ideo ] et AET 210 omnium ] cuiuslibet V 212 indefinitae ] infinitae AT om. V 216 tamen causae illarum ] om. T 217 causae ] esse A 218 infinitum ] sed est stare add. T || tandem ] semper A || est ] status et add. VW 219– 220 generationis ] generativa V 225 sensationes ] intellectiones V || causae intentionum ] intellectionum V 226–227 omnino illa ] ita non V

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resentations of visible things, which remain after the removal of the visible things, remain in the organ of sight. But they would remain in the common sense or imagination, where it has already been established that the representation is not of a nature similar to or of the same type as the species received in the organ of the exterior sense or in the medium.220 And it appears that these are difficult matters, so it is difficult to demonstrate anything with regard to this issue. But let the arguments that have been made hold as well as they can. 18. I respond to the arguments which argued that the species of whiteness and the species of blackness are contraries. 19. To the first221 it is said that it is not universally true that all contrary effects have contrary causes, nor that all contrary causes have contrary effects, although the corresponding particular or indefinite propositions are true. For contrary effects emerge in the sublunary region from heavenly bodies, in which there is no contrariety, as is apparent in On the Heavens I, so that sometimes the effect is great heat, sometimes intense cold. And if someone says that the internal structures or qualities of any stars are contraries, nevertheless the causes of these are not contraries, or at least the causes of those causes are not contraries, because there is no infinite regress of causes; we should, therefore, finally arrive at contraries whose causes are not contraries. Furthermore, even if heat is a generative cause of fire, and coldness is a generative cause of earth, it should not follow for that reason that earth and fire are contraries. But in the case at hand, even if whiteness and blackness were conceded to be the causes of contrary species, which is false, and these species were also conceded to be causes of contrary sensations, which is also false, yet it need not be further conceded that these sensations would be causes of contrary intentions, namely, 220 See 221

par. 15 above. See par. 12 above.

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illa stant simul in eodem subiecto indivisibili quando ipse format in se istam propositionem mentalem, albedo summa et nigredo summa sunt contrariae. 20. Ad aliam apparet consideranti Aristotelem in septimo et decimo Metaphysicae, quod Aristoteles loquebatur ibi de mediis transmutationum de uno extremo ad alterum extremum. Unde arguit quod omnia media sunt oppositorum quia oportet transmutationem esse ex oppositis. Species autem sensibilium non habent ad invicem transmutationem nec actionem aut passionem. Unde dicendum est quod illae species non sunt proprie extremae nec mediae, sed solum secundum locutionem attributivam, scilicet quia sunt representativae qualitatum contrariarum et mediarum, sicut urina dicitur sana vel aegra quia significat sanitatem vel aegritudinem. 21. Ad aliam videtur mihi quod species albedinis et nigredinis, sicut sunt simul in eodem aere secundum situm et secundum radios intersecantes se et non remittunt se invicem, ita possunt esse simul per radios non intersecantes se. Si enim sit summa albedo in pariete dextro et summa nigredo in pariete sinistro, utraque multiplicat eadem recta via speciem suam usque ad aliam, et non remittunt se invicem. Ita ego credo quod lumen a sole multiplicatum ad visum cum specie nigredinis fumorum non remittit illam speciem nigredinis, sed iuvat ad eius generationem et multiplicationem, cum non possint generari species coloris a colore sine lumine. Verum est tamen quod bene opa-

230 Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, Met. X.7, 1057a30. 227 subiecto ] intellectu VW 230 consideranti ] consimiliter ex T considerandi V 236 sunt ] dicuntur W 238 et mediarum ] om. A 245 recta via ] linea recta T || usque ] om. AET || aliam ] vel oculum add. A 247 fumorum ] supremorum V || remittit ] per add. A

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those by which whiteness and blackness are understood absolutely, because they do stand entirely together in the same indivisible subject when it forms in itself the mental proposition, ‘pure whiteness and pure blackness are contraries.’ 20. To the next222 argument the reply is clear to anyone who considers that Aristotle in Metaphysics VII and X spoke about the intermediates of change from one extreme to another extreme. For he argues that all intermediates are of opposites because change should occur from opposites. The species of sensible things, however, do not change into each other, and are neither acting on nor acted on by each other. Whence it must be said that these species are not properly extremes or intermediates, but are so only attributively, namely because they are representative of contrary and intermediate qualities, just as urine is said to be healthy or sick because it indicates health or sickness. 21. To the other,223 it seems to me that just as the species of whiteness and the species of blackness are together in the same place in the same air along intersecting rays without weakening each other, so they can also simultaneously exist along rays that do not intersect. For if there is pure whiteness in the wall on the right wall and pure blackness in the wall on the left, each propagates its species right up to the other along the same straight line, but they do not weaken each other. Thus, I believe that illumination from the sun propagated to sight along with the species of the blackness of fumes does not weaken the species of blackness, but rather aids 222 223

See par. 13 above. See par. 14 above.

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citas illorum fumorum remittit de lumine, quia lumen intensius multiplicatur per medium quanto est purius et diaphanius. Similiter ego credo quod nigredo superposita albedini in picturis, et multiplicatio suae speciei non impedit nec remittit de generatione vel multiplicatione speciei albedinis, immo species albedinis perfecte multiplicantur cum specie nigredinis. Et sic etiam in oculo sine eius remissione per speciem nigredinis cum ea existente simul secundum eumdem situm. 22. Et tunc non restat dubitatio nisi quare non iudicamus per istam speciem albedinem et quare iudicamus medium colorem, cum non sit ibi species medii coloris, sed solum sunt ibi species colorum extremorum, ex quibus non fit una cum istae non remittantur, sicut non fit una qualitas ex albedine et dulcedine. Et apparet mihi quod propter solutionem huius dubitationis oportet praemittere et supponere aliqua bene notabilia. 23. Primum est quod, licet propositiones quas vocamus contradictorias vel contrarias non sunt proprie contrariae nec repugnantes in essendo, quia possunt esse simul in intellectu tuo existente indivisibili, tamen iudicia quibus assentiremus eis essent vere contraria et non possunt in aliquo intellectu simul existere. Sic enim dat causam Aristoteles in quarto Metaphysicae quare non est possibile mente negare primum principium, scilicet quia oporteret simul in intellectu habere iudicia quibus assentiremus contradictis. Et hoc est impossibile quia opiniones contradictorum sunt contrariae, ideo non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto. Et sicut propter causam dictam intellectus non potest iudicare assentive idem esse et non esse vel etiam idem album

269 in quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.3, 1005b25. 250 fumorum ] supremorum graduum bene V 254 speciei ] om. A || albedinis ] om. T superpositae add. W 255 nigredinis ] in medio add. A || oculo ] recipitur add. TVW 259 sunt ] fiunt A sint V 265 contrariae ] contradictoriae T 268 intellectu ] subiecto T 270 oporteret ] oportet AETV || intellectu ] vel mente add. A 271 iudicia ] contraria W || contradictis ] contradictoriis T 274 potest ] simul add. A || et . . . idem ] om. A

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in its generation and propagation, since the species of a color cannot be generated by a color without illumination. It is true, however, that the opacity of these fumes certainly weakens illumination, because illumination is propagated the more intensely through a medium the purer and the more transparent the medium is. Similarly, I believe that, when blackness is painted over whiteness in paintings, the blackness and the propagation of its species do not impede the propagation or the generation of the species of whiteness, but rather the species of whiteness are perfectly propagated along with the species of blackness. And so as well, the species of whiteness is received in the eye without any weakening from the species of blackness that occupies the same place with it at the same time. 22. And then no doubt remains, except why we do not judge whiteness from this species and why we judge an intermediate color, since the species of an intermediate color is not there, but only the species of extreme colors, from which, since they not weakened, a single species is not produced, just as a single quality is not produced from whiteness and sweetness. And it seems to me that in order to solve this problem, some important points should be assumed from the outset. 23. The first is that, although the propositions we call ‘contradictory’ or ‘contrary’ are not properly contraries nor do they exclude each other in their being (because they can be in your indivisible intellect together at the same time), still, the judgments by which we assent to them are truly contrary and cannot exist in any intellect at the same time. For this is how Aristotle shows, in Metaphysics IV, why it is not possible for the mind to deny the first principle, namely because otherwise we would have to have judgments in our intellect simultaneously by which we would assent to contradictories. But this is impossible because opinions of contradictories are contraries, whence they cannot be in the same subject at the same time. And just as the

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et non album, quamvis simul iudicet hoc album et illud non album, ita sensus non potest assentive iudicare simul hoc esse album et nigrum vel etiam idem esse album et nigrum vel habere albedinem et nigredinem. Haec enim iudicia ita repugnant, sicut repugnat quod idem sit album et nigrum, quamvis species non repugnant sicut nec repugnant propositiones. 24. Secundo est notandum quod visus iudicat de unitate et pluralitate, sicut dictum est in praecedentibus quaestionibus, ita scilicet quod si secundum diversos et diversos situs species recipiuntur in oculo, iudicat visa esse plura et diversa, quamvis sit unicum, quod videtur sicut accidit in superelevatione unius oculi. Et si species ad oculum veniunt secundum eumdem situm, iudicat visus totum unum, licet sint obiecta diversa, et iudicat totum esse in eodem loco vel situ, vel hic vel illic, sicut in ortu solis iudicamus hoc unum esse rubeum et non plura. 25. Tertio notandum est quod sensus semper iudicat assentive et modo demonstrativo, ut hoc esse album, hoc esse nigrum. Non enim iudicat universaliter sed semper per modum existentis in prospectu secundum situm, et maxime visus. Quod autem iudicat assentive, scilicet quia est ita vel saltem quia videtur ita esse, hoc dicit Aristoteles

282 praecedentibus quaestionibus ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.12, II.13. oculi ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.25 par. 2.

285

283 et diversos ] om. W || oculo ] sensus add. W 284 visa ] visus TV || plura ] in oculo add. V || diversa ] divisa EV divisibilia S 285 ad oculum ] om. W 287 vel ] ut AE || hic vel ] om. W 291 semper ] om. VW 292 situm ] visum A

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intellect for this reason cannot judge with assent that the same thing exists and does not exist or even that this thing is white and is not white (although it can judge this thing to be white and that thing not to be white), in the same way, sense cannot judge with assent that this thing is white and black at the same time, or even that the same thing is white and black or that it has whiteness and blackness at the same time. For these judgments are incompatible , just as same thing’s being white is incompatible with its being black, although the species are not incompatible, just as the propositions are not incompatible either.224 24. Secondly, as was said in the preceding questions, it is to be noted that vision makes judgments about unity and plurality, namely, in the following manner: if species are received in different places in the eye, then vision judges the thing seen to be many and diverse, even if what is seen is just one thing, which is what happens when one eye is raised.225 And if species arrive at the same place in the eye, vision judges the thing seen to be one whole, although there may be different objects, and it judges the whole to be in the same location or place, either here or there, just as we judge at sunrise that there is this one redness and not many. 25. Thirdly, it must be noted that sense always judges with assent and by way of pointing something out, for example, that this is white and that is black. For sense, especially vision, does not judge universally, but always in the manner of existing in its prospect with regard to its location. As far as its assent is concerned, Aristotle says in De 224 Buridan’s

point here seems to be that the assertive judgments of the intellect having contrary or contradictory propositions as their asserted contents are incompatible mental acts that cannot inhere in the same subject at the same time, just as any other contrary forms, such as whiteness and blackness, cannot inhere in the same subject at the same time, even if the unasserted contents of these judgments, the propositions considered without assent, are not incompatible, which is clear from the fact that we can consider them at the same time. By analogy, the assertive judgments of the senses involving species that represent contrary sensible qualities are incompatible forms that cannot be present in the same sense at the same time. Still, the species themselves are not incompatible, since they can be present in the same sense at the same time. See Klima 2004b and Klima 2015. 225 Raising one eye produces two images from one visible object. This experience is mentioned in Question 25, par. 2.

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in illo secundo et apparet per experientiam. Cum enim videmus non manifeste, dicimus quod videtur nobis hoc esse. Sed cum tamen clare videmus, dicimus non solum quod videtur hoc nobis esse, sed etiam quod est hoc. 26. Quarto notandum est quod qualitates non contrariae bene sunt effectivae contrariorum, ut frigiditas et lumen solis recipiuntur in eodem aere simul, ideo non sunt contrariae. Et tamen lumen est activum caliditatis et frigiditas frigiditatis, quae sunt contrariae. Sed cum simul veniunt in idem passum, nec lumen potest facere illud intense calidum, nec frigiditas intense frigidum. Ideo faciunt effectum medium, et sic est in proposito. Illae species, albedinis et nigredinis, sunt simul in visu indistincte secundum situm. Ideo sensus iudicat hoc esse unum et non potest iudicare hoc album, et nigrum. Et species albi est effectiva iudicii quod est album et species nigri iudicii quod est nigrum. Et neutra potest perficere ibi suum iudicium quia agunt simul in idem subiectum, quod non potest simul illa iudicia recipere propter contrarietatem. Ideo agunt iudicium medium, scilicet quod est fuscum vel pallidum. Et hoc est dictum de prima dubitatione. 27. De secunda autem dubitatione apparet mihi quod multipliciter potest imaginari resistentia in aliquo motu vel in aliqua mutatione. Uno modo quia non potest esse illa mutatio sine corruptione alicuius alterius, et tunc illud resistit tali mutationi, quia “omne ens,” ut dicit Commentator primo Physicorum “diligit se permanere,” sicut enim unum contrarium resistit generationi alterius contrarii in subiecto suo. 28. Secundo etiam modo satis propinquo, quia si sint duo agentia innata agere effectus contrarios et applicentur eidem passo, unum re-

294 in illo secundo ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 417b19–20. tator ] AVERROES, Comm. Phys. I.4.4 (IV 46 F).

316 Commen-

298 non ] om. V 301 frigiditas ] om. E 303–304 effectum medium ] effectos medios A 304 albedinis et nigredinis ] om. W || et nigredinis ] om. AE istae V 308 ibi suum iudicium ] illud W 310 agunt ] arguit A 318 propinquo ] proprie A 319 agere ] facere W || eidem passo ] ad passum T

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Anima II that sense judges with assent, namely, that this is so or that at least that it appears to be so. And this is obvious from experience. For when we do not see clearly, we say that this appears to us to be the case. When, however, we see clearly, we say not only that this appears to us to be the case, but that it is the case. 26. Fourthly it is to be noted that non-contrary qualities are quite capable of bringing about contrary effects. Coldness and the illumination of the sun, for example, are received in the same air simultaneously thus they are not contraries. And yet illumination generates heat, and coldness generates coldness, which are contraries. But when they arrive in the same recipient simultaneously, neither can illumination make the subject very hot, nor can coldness make it very cold, and so they bring about a mean effect. And so it is in the case at hand. The two species, of whiteness and of blackness, indistinguishable by place, are simultaneously in vision. Thus, vision judges the object to be one and cannot judge it to be white and yet also black. The species of white is effective of the judgment that this is white, and the species of black of the judgment that this is black, And neither can perfect its judgment there because they act simultaneously on the same subject, which cannot receive both judgments at once because of their contrariety. Thus, they bring about a mean judgment, namely the judgment that the object is grey or pale. So much for the first difficulty. 27. Regarding the second difficulty,226 it seems to me that the resistance in any motion or change can be thought of in many ways. In one way, because there cannot be change without the corruption of something else, in which case the the thing being corrupted resists the change, because, as the Commentator remarks in his commentary on Physics I, “each thing desires to remain as it is,” just as one contrary resists the generation of another contrary in its subject. 28. In a second, rather similar way, resistance occurs because if there are agents that are naturally suited to cause contrary effects and

226 See

par. 10 above.

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 18 320

325

330

335

340

345

428

sistit alteri vel actioni eius. Prohibet enim ne alterum agat vel saltem ne ita intense agat sicut ageret si illud esset remotum. Et apparet mihi quod in mediis vel in organis receptivis specierum sensibilium non sunt tales resistentiae generationi vel multiplicationi illarum specierum. 29. Tertio modo est resistentia ex continuitate corporis. Cum enim unum corpus est naturaliter continuum, ipsum naturaliter appetit manere in huiusmodi continuitate, ut inde sit fortioris virtutis et permanentiae. Ideo resistit agenti vel actioni secundum quam oportet ipsum dividi. Et sic medium resistit corpori recte moto. 30. Et quarto modo satis propinque, si non oporteat quod corpus dividatur, sed oportet quod cedat vel moveatur a loco in quo est. Tunc si ibi naturaliter quiescit, ipsum resistit mutationi secundum quam oportet ipsum ab illo loco removeri. Unde sic corpore proiecto contra parietem, obstat et resistit paries. Et apparet etiam mihi quod iste modus resistentiae non habet locum in generatione et multiplicatione specierum sensibilium, quia non oportet subiectum dividi in quo recipiuntur nec ipsum cedere vel moveri a loco in quo est innatum quiescere, nisi forte hoc aliquo modo haberet locum in soni multiplicatione, si diceretur quod ad soni multiplicationem indigeat quodam motu medii in quo generatur. Sed de hoc diceretur prius in speciali. 31. Quinto modo minus proprie imaginatur resistentia ex indispositione subiecti ad recipiendum actionem agentis. Verbi gratia, si subiectum indigeat aliqua dispositione ad receptionem alicuius formae sine qua non possit illam recipere vel non posset illam faciliter aut intense recipere, tunc opposita dispositio diceretur resistere generationi illius formae et impedire ne generaretur vel ne cito aut perfecte gene-

340 in speciali ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.16. 322 vel in organis ] om. V 323 multiplicationi ] mutationi V 326 ipsum naturaliter ] om. W 327–328 fortioris . . . permanentiae ] virtus in permansione T 330 propinque ] prope A proprie V 337 innatum ] mansuetum A 338 soni ] generatione aut add. A 339 ad soni ] sonus ad sui generationem vel A || soni ] sui E || medii ] medio A 344 faciliter ] facere A 345 opposita ] aliqua A

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they are applied to the same recipient, one will resist the other or its action. For one agent prevents the other from acting, or at least from acting as intensely as it would act if the first agent were removed. And it seems to me that in the media or in the organs receptive of sensible species there is no such resistance to the generation and propagation of these species. 29. In a third way resistance is imagined as arising from the continuity of a body. Since a body is naturally continuous, it naturally desires to remain in this sort of continuity, so that on this account it has more power and permanence. This is why a continuous body resists an agent or an action which must divide it. And this is how a medium resists a body moved in a rectilinear path. 30. In a rather similar fourth way, resistance takes place when a body does not have to be divided, but it must yield or be moved from where it is located. Then, if it naturally rests there, it resists the change that would necessitate its removal from that place. Thus, when a body is thrown against a wall, the wall stands in the way and resists. And it seems to me that this sort of resistance does not occur in the generation and propagation of sensible species, because the subject in which species are received does not have to be divided or yield or be moved out of its natural place of rest, unless perhaps this relocation of the medium occurs in some way in the propagation of sound, if one were to say that some motion of the medium in which sound is generated is necessary for the propagation of sound. But this was discussed in a particular question earlier. 31. In the fifth way, resistance is imagined less properly as arising from the subject’s indisposition to receiving the action of an agent. For example, if a subject required some disposition in order to receive a certain form, without which it could not receive that form or it could not easily or intensely receive it, then the opposite disposition would be said to resist the generation of that form and impede its quick or

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 18

350

355

360

365

370

430

raretur. Et sic manifestum est quod media bene resistunt generationibus et multiplicationibus specierum sensibilium, et similiter organa. Cum enim requiratur diaphaneitas ad receptionem luminis vel speciei coloris, manifestum est quod opacitas, si sit multa, prohibet ex toto multiplicationem luminis ulteriorum, et oportet multiplicationem reflecti ad aliam partem. Et si non sit perfecta opacitas, sed subiectum participat de diaphaneitate et opacitate, tunc quanto plus participabit de opacitate, tanto lumen per illud subiectum minus intense multiplicabitur et ad minorem distantiam. Ideo sic aqua diceretur magis resistere lumini quam aer, et aer turbidus magis quam purus. Et ita licet activa soni bene apta debeant esse solida, tamen subiectum receptivum soni vel speciei eiusdem debet esse subtile et facile mobile et divisibile. Ideo oppositae conditiones et participatio eorum resisterunt generationi et multiplicationi soni vel speciei soni. Et sic forte etiam durities et opacitas et densitas resisterent multiplicationi specierum odorum. Et haec sint dicta de secunda dubitatione. 32. Deinde de tertia dubitatione, videtur mihi dicendum quod nec ex omni resistentia provenit successio, nec omnis successio provenit ex resistentia. Igitur ostendo primo quod non ex omni resistentia provenit successio. Et hoc statim esset manifestum si poneremus sicut ponit Aristoteles, scilicet luminis generationem et multiplicationem instantaneam, et similiter visionis et delectationis generationem, quoniam, hoc non obstante, esset bene resistentia generationi luminis et generationi visionis et delectationis, scilicet resistentia quinto modo prius dicto. Ista enim resistentia non operaretur tarditatem multiplicationis vel generationis, sed solum operaretur remissionem vel parvitatem formae vel dispositionis quae generaretur. Ita quod aeque cito illuminaretur ex accessione candelae totus aer domus, si esset fumo-

367 ponit Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418b23–36 Auc. Ar. 6.70 (ed. Hamesse, 180): “Illuminatio non fit successive et in tempore, sed fit in instanti.” 348 sensibilium ] tali modo add. W 351 ulteriorum ] ulteriorem W 353 et opacitate ] om. T 354 minus ] magis V 355 minorem ] bonam T 359 participatio ] participationes V 361 resisterent ] generationi et add. T 372 remissionem vel ] om. V 374–375 fumosus et ] clarus et non A || fumosus ] ruinosus E

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perfect generation. And it is clear that media do indeed resist the generation and propagation of sensible species in this way; and the same may be said for organs. Because transparency is required for the reception of illumination or the species of color, it is clear that opacity, if it is great, completely prevents the propagation of illumination of those behind it, and the propagation is necessarily reflected to another part of the medium. And if the opacity is not complete, but the subject partakes of both transparency and opacity, then the more it partakes of opacity, the less intensely will illumination be propagated through that subject, and for a shorter distance through that subject. Thus water is said to resist the propagation of illumination more than air, and turbid air more resistant than pure air. And so, although a thing capable of producing sound must of course be solid, yet the subject that is receptive of sound or of its species must be subtle and easily moveable and divisible. Thus, the opposite conditions or the subject’s partaking of these opposite conditions resist the generation and propagation of sound or of the species of sound. And so also do, perhaps, hardness and opacity and density resist the propagation of the species of odors. So much for the second difficulty. 32. Next, concerning the third difficulty,227 it seems to me that it should be said that neither does every case of resistance yield some succession in motion, nor does every case of succession arise from some resistance. First, therefore, I show that not every case of resistance yields some succession. This would be immediately obvious were we to follow Aristotle in assuming that the generation and propagation of illumination, as well as the generation of vision and pleasure, are instantaneous, since despite this, there would still be resistance to the generation of illumination, vision, and pleasure, namely, resistance in the fifth way mentioned above.228 For this resistance does not slow down the propagation or generation, but only causes a weakening or a reduction of the form or disposition that is generated. Thus,

227 See 228 See

par. 10 above. par. 31 above.

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 18 375

380

385

390

395

400

432

sus et spissus, sicut si esset purus, sed non ita intense, sicut etiam si duo lapides, pares in gravitate et quantitate, essent detenti superius per aliqua prohibentia, unus in aere, alter in aqua. Et nos poneremus quod motus localis esset res distincta a mobili et loco. Tamen remotis prohibentibus, aeque cito esset motus per aquam sicut motus per aerem, licet aqua magis resistat quam aer. Sed per aerem esset motus intensior et velocior. Et sic minor resistentia aeris bene operaretur ad hoc quod motus esset maior intensive et ad hoc etiam quod prius esset pertransitum spatium aequale, sed non ad hoc quod prius esset motus. 33. Item si istae rationes non concludunt, quia non pono eas nisi disputative, tamen alius casus ponitur quod resistentia superet activitatem sicut columna resistit lapidi ne cadat deorsum, et sicut utrumque brachium staterae resistit alteri ne descendat. Tunc ex huiusmodi resistentia non provenit successio, sed prohibetur omnino, cum non sit successio sine motu. Et ita resistentia prohibet ne sit motus. 34. Sed magis ego ostendo quod non omnis successio proveniat ex resistentia, quia nihil habet resistentiam contra Dei efficacem voluntatem, et tamen Deus posset sine alio movente movere lapidem successive et generare caliditatem successive. Immo omni remoto quod possit imaginari resistere, Deus posset generare caliditatem successive et continue unam partem post aliam. Et iterum verisimile est, sicut alibi debet considerari, quod corpora caelestia in suis motibus non resistunt suis motoribus, scilicet intelligentiis, et tamen successive moventur. Et iterum, si poneretur quod subiectum illuminabile esset pure diaphanum sine aliquo gradu opacitatis, tunc non esset in eo resistentia generationi luminis. Et tamen ex continua approximatio-

396 alibi debet considerari ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De caelo I.22 (ed. Moody, 102). 375 purus ] spissus A 376 quantitate ] aliis TV 380 per ] resistentiam per add. T 384 concludunt ] excludunt T 385 superet ] faceret TV 385–386 activitatem ] actualitatem T 389 ita ] illa ET 394 caliditatem ] lapidem AETW 398 moventur ] moverentur T || poneretur quod subiectum ] poneremus quod V poneremus W

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if the air in a house were smoky and thick, it would be illuminated just as quickly in the presence of a candle as it would be if it were clear, but not so intensely, just as if two stones, equal in heaviness and quantity, were held up by some means, one in air, the other in water. And we would suppose that local motion is distinct from the moving thing and its place. Yet, when the stones are released, the motion through the water would occur just as soon as the motion through the air, although the water resists more than the air. But the motion through the air would be quicker and more intense. And so, the lesser resistance of the air results in a more intense motion and a motion that covers an equal space sooner than motion through water, but not a motion that begins sooner than motion through water. 33. Further, if these points are not conclusive (because I offer them only for the sake of argument), yet another example is proposed for the conclusion that resistance would overcome activity, as when a column resists a stone so that it does not fall down, and when the arms of a balance resist each other so that neither descends. No succession arises from a resistance of this kind; neither succession nor motion arises, but it is completely prevented because there is no succession without motion. And thus a resistance prevents motion. 34. But further, I show that not every succession arises from resistance, because nothing can resist the efficacious will of God, and yet God could, without another mover, move a stone successively and generate heat successively. Moreover, when every imaginable source of resistance is removed, God could generate heat successively and continuously, one degree after another. And again, it is probable (as should be taken up elsewhere) that in their movements celestial bodies do not resist their movers, namely the intelligences, and yet they are successively moved. And again, if we assume an illuminable subject to be purely transparent without any degree of opacity, then there would not be in it any resistance to the generation of illumina-

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 18

405

410

415

420

425

434

ne vel elongatione corporis lucidi, fieret lumen continue et successive intensius vel remissius in illo subiecto, et etiam ad maiorem vel minorem distantiam continue et successive multiplicaretur. Et si etiam lux continue maioraretur et minoraretur, lumen continue maioraretur et minoraretur. 35. Item iocose arguo quod nulla successio provenit a resistentia ea ratione qua est resistentia, quia videamus quae res est successio: constat quod ipsa est motus vel mutatio. Igitur generatio caliditatis successiva est successio, et ista successio non est aliud quam generatio caliditatis, quae etiam non est aliud quam illa caliditas. Et constat quod ista caliditas provenit a calefaciente et non a frigefaciente resistente. Ab illo enim quod secundum se esset corruptivum caliditatis vel impedimentum generationi eius, non provenit caliditas, sed frigiditas. Resistens est huiusmodi; ergo, etc. 36. Item non differt tarditas vel velocitas a successione et motu, quia dicere quod differunt esset nimis multiplicare entia sine necessitate. Et apparet hoc si quis concederet quod velocitati et tarditati conveniret definitio motus. Igitur eiusdem motus non est aliud velocitas et tarditas, eadem enim res est velocitas motus ad motum tardiorem et tarditas ad velociorem. Sed nullus diceret quod a resistentia proveniret velocitas motus vel quod resistentia esset causa velocitatis motus; igitur nec tarditatis nec successionis. 37. Et videtur mihi probabiliter dicendum sicut de terra interposita inter solem et lunam quod ipsa est causa eclipsis. Certum enim est quod si privatio non est nisi res privata, et eclipsis lunae non est nisi privatio luminis a luna, quod eclipsis lunae non est nisi luna. Et ita terra interposita non est causa lunae, nec luna est ab ea. Ideo secundum propriam locutionem, terra sic interposita non est causa eclipsis

404 continue ] et sucessive add. AE 406 iocose ] om. T || a resistentia ] om. V 409 non ] omnino V 410 caliditatis, quae ] causarum T || quae . . . caliditas ] om. V 417 concederet ] consideret AEW 425 res ] aere A || eclipsis ] ut privatio A privatio E 427 ea ] causata add. W

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tion. And yet, because of the continuous approaching or receding of the bright body, illumination would become continuously and successively stronger or weaker in the subject, and would also be continuously and successively propagated over a greater or lesser distance. And if brightness continuously increased and diminished in the bright body, illumination would continuously be increased and diminished in the medium. 35. Again, I jokingly argue that no succession arises from resistance insofar as it is a resistance. For let us see what sort of a thing succession is: clearly, it is motion or change. Therefore the successive generation of heat is a succession, and this succession is nothing other than the generation of heat, which in turn is nothing other than that heat. And it is obvious that this heat arises from a heat source and not from a resisting source of cold. For heat does not come from that which is in itself corruptive of heat and an impediment to its generation. However, cold does. But a resisting power is of this kind; therefore, etc. 36. Again, slowness or quickness do not differ from succession and motion, because saying that they are different would vastly multiply entities without necessity. And this is clear if anyone were to think that the definition of motion applies to quickness and slowness. Therefore, the quickness and slowness of the same motion are not distinct. For the quickness of a motion compared to a slower motion and the slowness of a motion compared to a quicker motion are the same thing. But no one would say that quickness of motion arises from resistance or that resistance is the cause of the quickness of motion; therefore, neither is it the cause of slowness or succession. 37. And it seems to me that we can plausibly talk about this issue in the same way that we do when we say that the earth placed between the sun and the moon is the cause of an eclipse. For it is certain that, if privation is but the thing deprived, and an eclipse of the moon is but the privation of illumination from the moon, an eclipse of the moon is but the moon. And thus the earth interposed is not the cause of

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 18

430

435

440

445

450

436

lunae, nec eclipsis lunae est ab ea. Sed tamen secundum locutionem attributivam et satis remotam a locutione propria, terra sic interposita dicitur causa eclipsis lunae vel privatonis luminis a luna aut lunae a lumine, sicut placet tibi dicere, ex eo solo quod ipsa impedit vel prohibet generationem luminis a sole in luna ad talem sensum quod si terra esset remota, lumen fieret in luna a sole. Si igitur dicatur terra causa eclipsis, non potest dici quod sit causalitas in alio genere causandi quam efficientis. Et tamen nihil facit in luna, sed prohibet ne illud fiat ibi. Et si terra non esset sic opaca quod ex toto prohiberet illuminationem lunae a sole, sed haberet diaphaneitatem cum opacitate ita quod per eam illuminaretur luna a sole, sed tamen multum debiliter et remisse, constat quod terra non ageret illud lumen remissum in luna, sed tamen diceretur causa remissionis vel parvitatis luminis, etiam in genere causae efficientis ad istum sensum improprium, scilicet quia ipsa prohiberet fortiorem illuminationem lunae a sole tali modo quod si ipsa vel eius opacitas esset remota, sol ageret lumen intensius in ipsam lunam. Et apparet mihi quod ad tales sensus vel proportionales debet intelligi quod remissiones vel tarditates vel omnino parvitates effectuum proveniunt a resistentiis in quibus inveniuntur resistentiae et quod huiusmodi diminutiones quae non sunt nisi parvi effectus proveniunt vere et effective ab illis agentibus quibus illae resistentiae resistunt. Et sic est dictum de tertia dubitatione. 38. Sequitur dicere de quarta dubitatione, cuius determinatio non est mihi manifesta. Et non intendo nunc disputare de instanti, utrum sit res divisibilis vel indivisibilis. Sed volo per hoc quod est aliquid instanter generari intelligere quod ipsum generetur simul totum,

430 remotam . . . propria ] remota T 433 luna ] et prohibet add. A et add. T || terra ] ipsa AE om. T 436 illud ] aliquod E aliud TW 437 fiat ibi ] faciat T faciet V 441–442 in . . . efficientis ] causam efficientem T 443 fortiorem ] fortem A formationem T 453–454 aliquid ] om. W

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the moon, nor is the moon caused by the earth. And so according to the proper way of speaking, the earth thus interposed is not the cause of the eclipse of the moon, nor is the eclipse of the moon caused by it. However, according to an attributive way of speaking rather distant from the proper way of speaking, the earth thus interposed is said to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon, or of the privation of illumination from the moon, or of the privation of the moon from illumination, however you want to say it, for the sole reason that it impedes or prevents the generation of illumination by the sun in the moon, in the sense that if the earth were removed, the moon would be illuminated by the sun. If, then, the earth is called the cause of an eclipse of the moon, this can be said to be causality only in the genus of efficient cause. And yet the earth causes nothing to happen in the moon, but rather prevents something from happening. And if the earth were not so opaque that it completely prevented the illumination of the moon by the sun, but had transparency mixed with opacity so that the moon could be illuminated through it though much more weakly, then it is clear that the earth would not cause that weak illumination in the moon, but it would still be called the cause of remission or of the sparsity of the illumination in the genus of efficient cause in this improper sense, namely that it prevents a stronger illumination from the sun in such a way that if it or its opacity were removed, the sun would bring about a more intense illumination in the moon itself. And it seems to me that it is in such or similar senses that one should understand the weakness or slowness or any kind of sparsity arising from the resisting bodies in which these resistances are found, and that diminutions of this kind, which are only small effects, arise truly and effectively from those agents toward which the resisting bodies are resistant. So much for the third doubt. 38. Next follows the fourth difficulty,229 the determination of which is not clear to me. I do not now intend to dispute about whether an instant is a divisible or an indivisible thing. But by ‘something generated in an instant’ I wish to understand that the whole of it is gener-

229 See

par. 10 above.

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 18 455

460

465

470

475

438

ita quod non prius una pars eius quam alia, nec pars quantitativa nec pars gradualis. Et memor me dixisse in quaestionibus sexto Physicorum quod fuit intentio Aristotelis et Commentatoris, prout apparet ex dictis eorum, quod generatio luminis et multiplicatio esset instantanea si fieret instanter per potentiam divinam sufficiens applicatio lucidi ad subiectum illuminabile. Et idem etiam dixi in septimo Ethicorum, sed hoc non demonstravi esse verum, nec apparet mihi hoc quod sit verum, vel fuit demonstratum mihi. Nec scirem hoc demonstrare. Hoc enim quod Aristoteles dicit contra Empedoclem in secundo huius non est demonstratio, scilicet quod statim quando sol oritur, illum videmus. Diceret enim adversarius quod sol prius est elevatus totus super nostrum hemisphaerium antequam incipiamus videre eum, et apparet nobis oriri quando iam est totus ortus, et occidere quando iam est totus sub horizonte, ita quod numquam apparet nobis esse ubi est, sed semper ante, quia numquam apparet nobis esse in ortu nisi quando radii generati a loco ortus proveniunt ad nos, et iam prius elevatus est super ortum, sicut etiam non apparet nobis esse et fieri sonus quando fit et quando est, sed post. Et quod hoc sit possibile potest persuasive ostendi in quodam exemplo de baculo ignito velociter moto. Ignis istius baculi apparebit nobis alibi quam sit, scilicet ubi fuit, quia apparebit nobis esse in una tota linea longa. Et quando erit in ultimo cono illius lineae, adhuc apparebit esse in primo cono.

456–457 sexto Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. VI.5 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 98va –98vb ): “Sed simul ad totam distantiam ad quam tale lucidum potest tale diaphanum illuminare et quamvis talis praesentatio sine motu successivo non sit possibilis per naturam tamen est possibilis simpliciter scilicet per potentiam divinam.” 460 septimo Ethicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. VII.24 (ed. Parisiis 1513, ff. 159va–160va ). 463 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418b 20–25. 455 alia ] altera A 459 si fieret instanter ] om. A || divinam ] et miraculosam instanter add. A 461 demonstravi ] debet demonstrari A declaram T 463 dicit contra Empedoclem ] om. T 463–464 non . . . quod ] determinavit quia T 464 quando ] ante A 465 Diceret enim adversarius ] cum oporteat A || totus super ] supra A || totus ] om. E 467 totus ] om. AE 468 horizonte ] oriente TW || esse ] circa T 469 ante ] sup. lin. W || quia numquam ] quod non E || numquam ] non ATW 471 et fieri ] om. W 476 primo cono ] toto T

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ated simultaneously, not one part after another, neither a quantitative part nor a gradual part. And I remember that I said in my questions on Physics VI that it was the intention of Aristotle and of Averroes, as is apparent in their writings, that the generation and propagation of illumination would be instantaneous if, by divine power, a sufficient application of a light source were made to an illuminable subject. And I said the same thing in my questions on Nicomachean Ethics VII, but I did not demonstrate that it was true, nor does it appear to me that it is true, nor has it been demonstrated to me. Nor would I know how to demonstrate it. For what Aristotle says against Empedocles in De Anima II is not a demonstration, namely that we see the sun as soon as it rises. For an opponent would say that the sun is wholly risen above our hemisphere before we begin to see it, and it appears to us to rise when it has already entirely risen, and to set when it is already entirely beneath the horizon, so that it never appears to us to be where it is, but always ahead . This is so because the sun never appears to us to be rising unless the rays generated from the place where it is rising reach us, but by then the sun has already risen above the place where it first rose, just as sound does not appear to us to exist and to be produced when it exists and is produced, but later. And that this is possible can be shown in a persuasive way in the particular example of the burning stick that is quickly moved. The fire of the stick will appear to us to be elsewhere than it actually is, that is to say, it will appear to be where it was, because it will appear to us to be in a single long line. And when it is at one end of the line, it will still appear to be at the other.

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485

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39. Item illa ratio non videtur demonstrativa quae arguit sic quod luminis generatio est instantanea, quia lumen non habet contrarium resistens. Primo enim secundum prius dicta, licet lumen non habeat contrarium, tamen subiectum illuminabile ex aliqua eius grossitiae habet resistentiam. Unde in secundo istius, ubi loquitur de echo, dicit semper fieri reflexionem soni et luminis, nisi enim ab aere reflecteretur lumen, esset pura tenebra extra rectum radium. Immo sic videtur quod caelum reflectit lumen, quia quando eclipsatur luna, cum in principio deficit sibi radius solis directus, adhuc apparet aliqualiter lumen eius. Et apparet colorata donec profunde cadat in umbram, et tunc non amplius apparet. Et hoc non potest esse nisi quia ibi est quaedam reflexio radiorum luminis quae pertingebat ad lunam in principio et non potest pertingere ad eam quando nimis profundatur in umbram terrae. 40. Et iterum, si ista ratio valeret, tunc etiam in generatione habitus intellectualis non deberet esse successio; immo statim, quando esset conclusio demonstrata et quando esset actualis consideratio circa eam, habitus scientificus deberet esse perfectus, et non amplius deberet intendi et perfici per repetitionem lectionis et per longam et frequentem speculationem circa illam. Et hoc totum experimur esse falsum. Et sic etiam in virtute memorativa, non perficitur statim habitus memorativus per unum actum cognoscendi sed per frequentem meditationem. 41. Item si illa ratio valeret, tunc ita deberet fieri visio in instanti, visibili sufficienter applicato tali modo quod per longam moram visibilis non deberet visio magis intendi et perfici, quod apparet es-

481 secundo istius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.8 419b27–29 (Ar. lat. XII.2 135.2.13): “Videtur autem semper fieri echon, sed non certus, quia accidit in sono sicut et in lumine.” 480 contrarium ] resistentiam T 482 fieri ] propter add. A || ab ] oriente reflectentur vel add. A 483 rectum ] directum V 485 solis directus ] rectus AE || solis ] om. W || directus ] durans V 486 colorata ] illuminata T 490 ratio ] positio T 491 esse ] fieri W 492 quando ] ante T 494 repetitionem ] receptionem T || lectionis ] luminis TVW 496 statim ] om. W 497 cognoscendi ] cogitandi W || meditationem ] cogitationem W

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39. Again, the argument claiming that the generation of illumination is instantaneous because illumination does not have a contrary resisting it does not seem to be demonstrative. For firstly, according to what has been said above,230 despite illumination not having a contrary, the illuminable subject offers resistance due to some coarseness on its part. That is why in De Anima II, where he discusses the echo, Aristotle says that there is always reflection of sound and illumination, for unless illumination were reflected by the air, there would be pure darkness outside the rectilinear ray. Indeed, it seems that the heavens reflect illumination in this way, because when the moon is eclipsed, even though direct solar rays do not reach the moon when the eclipse begins, its illumination still appears somehow. And the moon appears colored until it falls deeply into shadow, when it is no longer visible. and then its illumination no longer appears. And this could not occur unless there was some reflection of the rays of illumination that reached the moon at the beginning of the eclipse and cannot reach it when it is so enveloped by the shadow of the earth. 40. And again, if this argument were valid then there would be no succession in the generation of an intellectual state. Instead, as soon as there is a demonstrated conclusion and we are actually reflecting on it, our knowledge should be in a perfect state, not needing to be intensified and perfected by repeated readings and lengthy and frequent speculation regarding it. And all these things we know by experience to be false. And so as well in memory, the state of remembering is not perfected right away through one act of cognition, but through frequent meditation. 41. Again, if this argument were valid, vision should occur at the very moment the visible thing is close enough, so that its continued presence does not make the act of vision more intense or more perfect

230 See

par. 5 above.

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510

515

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se falsum. Posito enim quod Deus instanter praesentaret ante visum tuum aliquod visibile et iterum statim removeret sine mora nisi brevissima, tu non posses illud apprehendere perfecte. Unde hoc saepe experimur quod ista non possumus iudicare quia nimis cito transeunt vel removentur. 42. Item nec ista ratio videtur esse demonstrativa quae dicit lumen in instanti corrumpi et non habere nisi durationem instantaneam, propter hoc quod oporteret transire de subiecto in subiectum. Primo quidem hoc est omnino impossibile quod aliquid duret per solum instans indivisibile, quia supponimus, alibi declarandum, quod non sint instantia in tempore quae sunt res indivisibilis durationis, sicut nec puncta in linea. Ideo esse et durare per solum instans indivisibile esset numquam esse et numquam durare. 43. Secundo etiam non oportet concedere quod lumen vel species coloris, generata in aliquo subiecto, nullam habeat permanentiam in isto subiecto post remotionem lucidi, quia experimentum videtur esse ad contrarium, sicut declarat Aristoteles in De somno et vigilia. Cum enim diu aspexeris aliquid splendidum, si vertas te ad aspiciendum nigrum, remanebit in oculo tuo per tempus species impressa ab isto lucido, et continue ac temporaliter diminuetur donec ex toto evanescat. Et propter quod, sicut dicit Aristoteles et expertum est, illud ad quod aspicies apparebit tibi primo illius coloris, scilicet lucidi, donec permutetur in puniceum, deinde in purpureum, quousque in nigrum veniat colorem, et evanescat. Hoc autem non fit sic nisi propter remanentiam speciei lucis, quae non videtur esse nisi lumen. Et tunc posset dici probabiliter quod luminis aut aliarum formarum naturae permanentis subiecta receptiva, secundum diversas naturas suas vel complexiones, sunt innata reservare illas formas, unum longo tem510 alibi declarandum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. VI.1 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 93vb – 94va ). 517 De somno et vigilia ] Cf. ARISTOTELES, De insomniis II 459a 26– 28 Auc. Ar. 7.85 (ed. HAMESSE, 202): “Abeuntibus sensibilibus remanent species eorum in organo sentiendi.” 502 statim ] om. W 504 ista ] ita AETV || iudicare quia ] cito apprehendere quae W || quia ] quae ET 505 removentur ] movetur T 506–507 lumen ] lucem E 516 post remotionem lucidi ] om. T 520–521 evanescat. Et ] diminuetur V 521 propter quod ] quia T 524–525 remanentiam ] renovationem T 527 receptiva ] earum add. TVW || vel ] dispositiones vel add. W 528 complexiones ] dispositiones vel conditiones V

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— which seems to be false. For if we assume that God were to present instantaneously some visible thing to your vision, and remove it again right away after only the briefest period of time, you would not be able to apprehend it perfectly. That is why we often experience that we are unable to judge these things quickly, because they have passed by or been removed too quickly. 42. Again, that argument does not seem to be demonstrative which says that illumination lasts for only an instant and is instantaneously corrupted due to the fact that it must migrate from subject to subject. Firstly, it is absolutely impossible that anything endures for only an indivisible instant, because we suppose (as must be clarified elsewhere) that there are no instants in time, which are things of indivisible duration, just as there are no points in a line. So to be and to endure for only an indivisible instant would be never to be and never to endure. 43. Secondly, it should not be conceded that illumination or the species of color generated in any subject have no permanence in the subject after the removal of the light source, because experience seems to dictate the contrary, just as Aristotle declares in On Sleep and Waking. For if, after gazing for a time at a bright body, you turn to observe a black body, the species impressed by that bright body will remain in your eye for a while, and will continually diminish over time until it has completely vanished. And for this reason, as Aristotle says and as we experience, what you are looking at will first appear to you to be of that color, namely, bright, until it changes into crimson, then purple, until it becomes black in color and then vanishes.It would not happen like this unless the species of light remains, which seems only to be the illumination. And then it could plausibly be said that the subjects receptive of illumination and of other forms of a permanent nature possess, in keeping with their different natures or conditions, a

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pore, et alterum brevi, et aliud sic brevissime quod non percipiatur distincte. Verbi gratia, valde longo tempore reservantur formae vel species in organo phantasiae vel memoriae, sed brevi tempore tamen saepe notabiliter reservantur in organo sensus communis vel sensus exterioris, sicut nunc dicebatur. In aere autem ita brevi quod non sentitur distincte. 44. Quando ergo dicitur quod radius luminis, receptus in aere moto, non movetur cum illo, posset dici quod immo per illud tempus per quod iste aer est reservativus illius luminis, sed propter parvitatem temporis hoc non percipimus distincte. Et sic etiam propter valde velocem generationem luminis in aere adveniente, videtur semper quod omnis et solus aer existens in directo ad solem sit illuminatus radio principali tamquam instanter facto a sole, quod non oportet concedere. 45. Item nec illa ratio demonstrat quae dicit quod luminis generatio et multiplicatio non impeditur a ventis, quae tamen impediretur nisi esset instantanea. Diceret enim Empedocles quod, sicut per ventum remittitur et abbreviatur generatio et multiplicatio soni vel speciei soni, ita et generatio luminis. Sed propter velocissimam generationem aut multiplicationem luminis, illa remissio vel abbreviatio non est notabilis. Verbi gratia, si multiplicatio speciei odoris non sit velocior quam motus aeris per ventum, sequitur quod contra ventum non prolongabitur, quia in quanto aer generaretur tanto aer deportaretur cum vento. Sed si multiplicatio soni sit velocior in duplo quam motus aeris per ventum, tunc in subduplo fiet brevior et minor multiplicatio contra ventum. Et quanto soni multiplicatio est velocior tanto, caeteris paribus, ad longiorem distantiam audiretur sonus. Et si soni multiplicatio esset velocior quam odoris, ad longiorem distantiam audiretur sonus

545 Empedocles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418b 21–26. 531 organo ] organis ET 532 organo ] organis AE 533 aere ] tempore E 536 non ] tunc V 541 tamquam ] om. W 544 impediretur ] temporaliter duret T 547 generatio ] multiplicatio W 548 aut multiplicationem ] om. W 551–552 cum vento ] per ventum A 551 cum ] a T 553 per ventum ] om. AE 554 quanto ] ideo quia TV 554–556 tanto . . . velocior ] hom. VW 556 odoris ] ideo add. TVW

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natural ability to preserve these forms, one for a long time, another for a short time, and another for a time so brief that it is not distinctly perceived. For example, forms or species are preserved for a very long time in the organ of imagination or memory, but they are preserved for a brief yet noticeable time in the organ of the common sense or the exterior senses, as I was saying. In the air, however, the species is preserved for a time so brief that it is not distinctly sensed. 44. Therefore, when it is said that a ray of illumination that is received in the moving air is not moved with it, it can be said that the ray is indeed moved for that time during which the air preserves the illumination, but because of the brevity of this time we do not distinctly perceive it. And so as well, because of the very rapid generation of illumination coming into , it always seems that all the air in a direct line with the sun — and only that air — is illuminated by the principal ray, coming as if in an instant from the sun, which, however, should not be conceded. 45. Again, neither is that argument demonstrative which says that the generation and propagation of illumination is not impeded by winds, which nevertheless would be impeded were it not instantaneous. For Empedocles would say that just as the generation or propagation of sound or of the species of sound is weakened and attenuated by the wind, so also is the generation of illumination. But because of the very rapid generation or propagation of illumination, this weakening or attenuation is not noticeable. For example, if the propagation of the species of odor is not more rapid than the motion of air by the wind, it follows that the propagation of odor will not endure for long against the wind, because in whatever quantity of air an odor is generated, that quantity would be carried away with the wind. But if the propagation of sound is twice as fast as the motion of air with the wind, then the propagation of sound will be half as brief

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contra ventum quam sentiretur odor. Si enim ponatur quod luminis multiplicatio sit in centuplo velocior quam motus venti, sequitur quod contra ventum non minorabitur vel abbreviabitur multiplicatio nisi in subcentuplo, et hoc non perciperetur. Et forte quod non solum in centuplo, sed plus quam undecies centuplo est velocior multiplicatio luminis quam motus venti. Ideo hoc omnino non erit notabile. 46. Sed adhuc est una alia ratio fortis de lumine ad probandum quod lumen haberet corruptionem instantaneam si instanter removeretur lucidum, et per consequens, etiam deberet habere generationem instantaneam si instanter fieret lucidum praesens sufficienter. Et est ratio talis quia si lumen in aere remaneret per aliquod tempus quantumcumque parvum remoto lucido, quaereretur a quo postea corrumperetur. Sequitur enim quod numquam corrumperetur, quod est falsum, ut notum est. Consequentia probatur quia sicut nihil generatur sine generante, ita nihil corrumpitur sine corrumpente, maxime cum “omne ens diligat se permanere,” ut dicit Commentator primo Physicorum, et quia, sicut omne quod movetur movetur ab aliquo, ita omne quod mutatur mutatur ab aliquo, et corruptio est quaedam mutatio. Igitur numquam corrumperetur si non posset assignari corrumpens, quia corrumpens non esset lucidum vel removens lucidum, quia iam transeunt et forte sunt annihilata, tamen adhuc lumen illud ponatur manere. Nec illud lumen corrumperet se ipsum, cum dictum est “omne ens naturaliter diliget se permanere”. Potius enim resisteret corrumpenti. Nec aer, subiectus illi lumini, corrumperet illud lumen, quia illud lumen est perfectio quaedam et dispositio conveniens aeri. Subiectum

572 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. Phys. I.4.4 (IV 46 F): “Omne enim ens ut dictum est diliget se permanere.” 559 contra ventum ] om. W 561 quam undecies centuplo ] duplo quam in centuplo T 562 omnino ] motio V 568 parvum ] parvo V 570 notum ] manifestum AVW 571 maxime ] manente vel non T 572 ens ] naturale add. AE om. T || se ] semper E naturaliter V naturaliter add. W 576 vel removens lucidum ] om. T 577 lumen ] lucidum E 577–578 manere ] in aere T 581 quaedam ] diaphani add. AE

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and half as small against it. And, other things being equal, the faster the propagation of the sound, the greater the distance at which it will be heard. And if the propagation of sound were more rapid than that of odor, sound would be heard at a greater distance against the wind than the distance at which odor is sensed. And if it is assumed that the propagation of illumination is a hundredfold faster than the motion of the wind, it follows that it will be weakened or attenuated only to a hundredth , and this would not be perceived. And perhaps it is that the propagation of illumination is not just a hundredfold but eleven hundred times faster than the motion of the wind. So this motion will not be noticeable at all. 46. But there is still another strong argument about illumination to prove that illumination would be instantaneously corrupted if the light source were instantaneously removed, and consequently that illumination would be instantaneously generated if a light source were made instantaneously and sufficiently present. And this is the argument to the effect that if illumination were to remain in the air for some time, however small, when the light source was removed, it could be asked by what it was then corrupted. For it follows that it would never be corrupted, which is false, as is well known. The consequence is proved, because just as nothing is generated without a generating agent, so nothing is corrupted without a corrupting agent, especially since “each thing naturally desires to perpetuate itself,” as the Commentator says in Physics I, and because, just as everything moved is moved by another, so everything changed is changed by another, and corruption is a kind of change. Therefore a thing is never corrupted if a corrupting agent cannot be assigned.231 For neither the light source nor the removal of the light source is the corrupting agent, because when they are gone or perhaps annihilated, the illumination is still assumed to remain. Nor does the illumination corrupt itself,

231

But see par. 50 below. For Aquinas’s view that corruption would follow upon the suspension of God’s creative activity even in the absence of corrupting agent, see AQUINAS, Summa theol. 1.9.23.

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autem non est corruptivum dispositionis convenientis sibi, sed potius conservativum. Unde et si dicatur quod materia habens unam formam quae perficit eam tamen ipsa naturaliter appetit aliam, ad cuius adventum sequitur corruptio praecedentis formae, et sic esset materia causa corruptionis prioris formae quae erat naturalis ei perfectio, dicimus quod hoc non valet ad propositum, quia aer apud corruptionem luminis nullam formam sibi acquirit, quod appeteret, quia tenebra non est forma inhaerens aeri, sed simpliciter est carentia luminis in aere. Et propter appetitum passivum materiae, non corrumpitur forma eius nisi adveniente alio corrumpente. Ideo nec sine alio corrumpente deberet illud lumen corrumpi in illo aere. 47. Sed tamen contra illam rationem instatur primo de illa specie lucis quae, impressa oculo, manet per tempus remoto lucido et continue remittitur donec tota evanescit. Ideo sic posset dici in aere esse, licet citior esset evanescentia. Secundo instatur de speciebus vel intentionibus sensibilium quae, post absentiam eorum, habent longam permanentiam in phantasia vel in memoria et tamen tandem bene diminuuntur et corrumpuntur et fit oblivio, nisi saepe redeant cogitationes circa talia quae conservant et confirmant illas phantasias et memorias. Ideo sic videtur quod formae habentes in subiectis suis naturam permanendi per aliqua tempore, tandem corrumpuntur et evanescunt ex defectu vel absentia conservantis, sine alio corrumpente. 48. Verum est quod istis obiectionibus respondetur quod illae species in oculo vel in phantasia, habentes naturam permanendi post ob-

585 formae ] om. W 587 valet ] vadit A || apud corruptionem ] a principio corruptionis T 588 appeteret ] apparet V patet W || tenebra ] tenebrositas A 590 forma ] materia T 591 alio ] aliquo A 592 in illo aere ] om. T 594 lucis ] luciditatis A 599 fit ] sequitur T 601 formae ] forte T 602 tandem ] eamdem E 604 respondetur ] ostendetur T

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because it was said that “each thing naturally desires to perpetuate itself.” Indeed, it would rather resist the corrupting agent. Nor would the air, the subject of illumination, corrupt the illumination, because it is a kind of perfection and disposition agreeable to the air, and a subject is not corruptive of dispositions agreeable to it, but rather seeks to preserve them. Thus, even if it were said that matter having one form which perfects it, despite this naturally desires another, whence at the arrival of that other form the corruption of the prior form follows, and so matter would be the cause of the corruption of the prior form which was a natural perfection relative to it, we reply that this does not apply to the case at hand, because during the corruption of illumination, the air does not acquire any form for itself. This is clear, because darkness is not a form inhering in the air, but simply the lack of illumination in the air. And because of the passive appetite of matter, its form is not corrupted unless another corrupting agent arrives. So the illumination in the air should not be corrupted without another corrupting agent. 47. However, against this argument there is first a rejoinder concerning the species of light which, when impressed in the eye, remains for a time after the removal of the light source, and continuously weakens until it completely vanishes. Thus, it can be said to be in the air in the same way, although its vanishing takes place there much more rapidly. The second rejoinder concerns the case of the species or intentions of sensible things which, after their removal, remain for a long time in imagination or in memory and yet they are finally diminished and corrupted and are forgotten but for our frequently recurring thoughts about them, which preserve and confirm these fantasies and memories. So it seems that forms which have a nature to remain in their subjects for some time are finally corrupted and vanish due to the weakness or absence of a preserving power, without the action of any corrupting agent. 48. It is true that one can respond to these rejoinders that these species in the eye or in the imagination, having the nature to remain

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615

620

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iecti remotionem, ex eo postea corrumpuntur quia mutantur in oculo spiritus et humores in quibus impressa erat species lucis. Unde tunc est magna commotio spirituum et humorum in oculo quando oculus patitur ab excellenti obiecto scilicet forti lucido, cuius signum est quod oculus inde lacrimatur. Et sic oportet speciem lucis evanescere et mutari cum illorum spirituum et humorum sibi subiectorum mutatione, et hoc non habet locum in aere quiescente. Et ita etiam diceretur de organo phantasiae et memoriae. Continue enim permutantur ex resolutione corporis a calido et ex adventu novi nutrimenti ad restaurandum deperditum. 49. Sed difficilior est instantia de intellectu. Nam ex demonstratione alicuius conclusionis, ut quod omnis triangulus habet tres angulos, generatur in intellectu quidam habitus qui per tempus innatus est manere. Et manet in intellectu cessante actu intelligendi et in absentia obiecti. Et tamen ille habitus etiam per tempus longum deperditur et debilitatur si non frequentatur consideratio circa illam conclusionem vel circa conclusiones ei propinquas. Hoc tamen non est ex tali fluxu vel mutatione spirituum vel humorum, cum nec intellectus nec habitus sint educti de potentia materiae nec sibi determinans organum corporeum. Sic igitur videtur quod illa ratio de lumine non erat demonstrativa, quoniam sicut quaerebatur a quo corrumpitur illud lumen, ita quaeritur a quo corrumpitur ille habitus, qui tamen corrumpitur, cum dicat Aristoteles secundo Ethicorum quod “habitus morales sunt per-

628 secundo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.11 1100b14 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 389.18): “Circa nihil enim sic existit humanorum operum constantia, ut circa operationes quae sunt secundum virtutem; permanentiores enim et disciplinis haec videntur esse; earumdem autem honorabilissime permanentiores propter maxime et maxime continue vivere in ipsis beatos.” 606–607 oculo ] species add. E 614 corporis ] nostri add. A partium intervenienti VW 616 difficilior ] tunc fortior VW 618 qui ] quia V 619 in ] intellectio illa seu intellectio illius habitus in A 620 longum ] longitudinem AEVW longam T || deperditur ] debilitatur AET 621 debilitatur ] deperit AE deperdit T || frequentatur ] frequentaretur T frequenter V || consideratio ] consideratur VW 624 determinans ] determinat AE 624–625 corporeum ] carneum T 627 tamen ] non V

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after the removal of the object, are afterward corrupted by it because the spirits and the humors in the eye, on which the species of light were impressed, are changed. Hence, there is a great commotion of the spirits and the humors in the eye when the eye is exposed to a sensible object of extreme intensity, such as a very bright object, a sign of which is that the eye begins to water. And so the species of light has to vanish and to be changed along with the change of the spirits and humors which are their subject, which does not happen when the air is still. And the same thing may be said for the organ of fantasy imagination and memory, for they are continually changed because of the loss of parts of the body due to heat and the arrival of new nutriments to replace what has been lost. 49. But a more difficult rejoinder concerns the intellect. For from the demonstration of a conclusion, such as that every triangle has three angles , there is generated in the intellect a certain state, which by its nature persists over time. And it remains in the intellect when the act of understanding has ceased and in the absence of the object. And yet even this state, after a longer time, is weakened and lost if the conclusion is not frequently entertained, or conclusions closely related to it. Yet this is not due to the flow or change of spirits or humors, because neither the intellect nor the state is educed from the potency of matter or determines a corporeal organ for itself. So then it seems that this argument about illumination was not demonstrative, since, just as it was asked by what that illumination is corrupted, so it can be asked by what this state is corrupted, which

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manentiores disciplinis,” et non magis poterit assignari corrumpens hic quam illic. Igitur illa ratio solum petit quod sibi solvatur dubitatio communis. 50. Posset igitur dici probabiliter quod quantumcumque entia praeter Deum sint naturae permanentis et naturaliter diligant se permanere, tamen non possunt permanere sine conservante. Unde si Deus ab entibus abstraheret suam generalem influentiam qua conservat et caelum et intelligentias et mundum, omnia annihilarentur. Et quamvis Deus posset conservare omnia sine aliis particularibus conservantibus, tamen ad permanendum modo naturali, multa cum Deo indigent particularibus conservantibus, quibus remotis ipsa continue fluerent in diminutionem et corruptionem. Unde sicut tu diceres quod lumen indigeret lucido conservante quo remoto lumen instanter periret sine aliquo corrumpente, non obstante quod omne ens naturaliter diligat se permanere, ita potest dici quod lumen indigeat lucido conservante quo remoto lumen continue corrumpitur sine alio corrumpente. Unde ex remotione lucidi per motum localem eius, corrumpitur lumen in loco remoto, ad quem tamen locum remotum non attingit actio removentis lucidum. Sic igitur diceretur quod esset bene mutatio, scilicet corruptio in aliquo, et tamen non esset mutans illud nec corrumpens sed fuit mutans aut corrumpens per accidens, scilicet removens conservans, quod tamen nihil agebat in illo in quo est corruptio, sicut Aristoteles in octavo Physicorum in motu gravis deorsum prius detentis sursum assignat extrinsecum movens per accidens, scilicet removens prohibens, quod tamen iam nihil operatur quando illud grave movetur deorsum.

651 in octavo Physicorum ] Auc. Ar. 2.208 (ed. Hamesse, 157): “Gravia et levia per se non moventur a generante, sed moventur a removente prohibens per accidens.” 630 sibi ] ibi TV 631 communis ] consequens ET 636 intelligentias ] influentias E || annihilarentur ] ambularentur(!) T 638 permanendum ] permanentiam V 640 sicut ] si W 641 lumen ] lumine V 642 corrumpente ] corrumpi add. VW 644 continue . . . Unde ] ipsum A 647 lucidum ] lumen A 649 sed . . . corrumpens ] hom. T nisi V 650 corruptio ] corrumpens V

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is in fact corrupted, because Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics II that “moral states are more permanent than states of learning,” and a corrupting agent can no more be assigned here than in the case of intellectual states. So this argument only asks that we solve the common difficulty. 50. One can therefore plausibly say that no matter how much things other than God have a permanent nature and naturally desire to do so, they cannot remain as they are without a conserving agent. For this reason, if God withdrew from beings his general influence, through which the heavens and the intelligences and the sublunary world are preserved, all things would be annihilated. And although God could preserve all things without other particular conserving agents, yet in order for them to be preserved in a natural way, many things require other particular preserving agents along with God, whose removal would result in their sinking steadily into diminution and corruption. Accordingly, just as you would say that illumination needs a conserving light source, upon whose removal it instantly disappears without any other agent corrupting it, even granting that everything naturally desires to preserve itself, so it can also be said that illumination needs a conserving light source, upon whose removal it is continuously corrupted without any other agent corrupting it. Therefore, illumination is corrupted in a distant place by the removal of a light source via its local motion, even though the action of removing the light source does not apply to this distant place. In this way, then, it would be said that there certainly would be change in something, that is to say corruption, and yet there was no agent changing or corrupting it other than what was changing or corrupting it coincidentally, namely by removing the conserving agent, which brought about nothing in the thing in which corruption occurred, just as Aristotle, in Physics VIII, assigns a coincidental extrinsic mover for

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51. Et ista quae hic dixi non intendo determinative sed disputative solum, ut aliis detur occasio studendi et inveniendi demonstrative veritatem. Credo tamen simpliciter quod Deus modo supernaturali posset facere instanter lumen intensum, immo etiam sine potentia lucidi. Sed disputatio erat de modo naturali generationis luminis, posito casu miraculoso quod Deus instanter praesentaret vel removeret lucidum. Sed ego dicerem, sicut alias dixi, quod impossibile est naturaliter et sine miraculo lumen de novo generari vel corrumpi instanter in aliquo subiecto. Immo, dato lumine generato in isto subiecto, necesse est prius in eo lumen fuisse minus, scilicet remissius, et ad minorem distantiam multiplicatum. Et hoc ego credo demonstrasse septimo Ethicorum et in quinta quaestione sextae Physicorum. Ad ista loca recurrit qui voluerit. De quarta dubitatione sit dictum. 52. De quinta dubitatione iam dictum est prius quod sonus generatur per velocem motum et violentam fractionem aeris, et quod species soni postea multiplicatur temporaliter et non instantanee. Sed aliqui ponunt in hoc differentiam inter multiplicationem specierum luminis et soni, quia sicut sonus generatur per motum quemdam aeris, ideo indiget quod species eius multiplicetur per quemdam motum vel cum quodam motu subiecti in quo multiplicatur et recipitur, quod non est ita de lumine. Et ob hoc dicunt illam speciem soni multiplicari temporaliter, quia non potest esse motus nisi in tempore, licet lumen ponatur multiplicari in instanti. Ideo est mihi haec magna dubitatio, scilicet utrum species soni indigeat ad hoc quod fiat in medio, scilicet in aere, quod ille aer recipiens moveatur, scilicet ad omnem distantiam

661 alias dixi ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.10 par. 17. 665 septimo Ethicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. VII.24, ff. 200rb –200vb. 666 sextae Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. VI.5 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 98va –98vb . 668 dictum est prius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.16 par. 11. 671 aliqui ponunt ] E. g. ROGERUS BACONIS, De multiplicatione specierum I.2 (ed. Lindberg, 20, 22). 655 hic ] om. A sic TVW || intendo ] dicere add. VW || determinative ] determinare AET 656 aliis ] melius A || inveniendi ] demonstrative add. VW 656–658 demonstrative . . . lucidi ] om. T 665 demonstrasse ] in vigensimo quarto quaestione add. E in vigesimo quaestione T 673 ideo ] non T 677 mihi ] inde de hoc W

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the downward motion of a previously supported heavy body, namely what removed the support, which no longer does anything once the heavy body is moving downward. 51. And some of the things I have said here are not intended to determine the issue, but only to bring it into discussion, so as to give others occasion to study the matter and find the truth demonstratively. Nevertheless, I do believe that God could, in a supernatural way, make an intense illumination instantly, even without the power of a bright body. But the dispute was about the natural way in which illumination is generated, on the assumption that God miraculously presents or removes a bright body. But I would say, as I have said elsewhere, that it is impossible naturally and without a miracle for illumination to be generated anew or corrupted instantly in any subject. Indeed, given that illumination is generated in this subject, there must have been at an earlier time when a lesser, which is to say weaker, illumination propagated over a lesser distance. And I believe that I have demonstrated this in my commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics VII and Physics VI. Anyone wishing to do so may return to these places. So much for the fourth difficulty. 52. Concerning the fifth difficulty,232 it was said earlier that sound is generated through the rapid motion and violent breaking of the air, and that the species of sound is afterwards propagated in time and not instantaneously. But some people propose a difference between the propagation of the species of illumination and of sound, because sound is generated by a certain motion of the air; so, it is necessary that its species are propagated through a certain motion or with a certain motion of the subject in which it is propagated or received, which is not the case with light. And for this reason they say that the species of sound is propagated in time, because motion can only be in time, whereas illumination is supposed to be propagated in an instant. Thus, it seems to me quite doubtful whether the species 232 See

par. 10 above.

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ad quam species soni multiplicatur. Et statim videtur esse intentio Aristotelis quod sic, dicit enim de echon, “Echo autem fit cum ab aere uno facto propter vas determinans et prohibens diffundi, iterum aer repellitur sicut sphaera.” Vult ergo ex eo quod est species soni reflecti quia aer motus ab obstaculo repellitur. Deinde etiam post modicum dicit, scilicet quod “Hic,” scilicet aer, “est faciens audire cum moveatur continuus et unus.” Et iterum statim post dicit, “Sonativum quidem ergo quod motum unius aeris continuati usque ad auditum. Auditus autem connaturalis est aeri propter illud quod in aere est moto exteriori quod intra est movetur.” 53. Ista tamen sunt mihi valde difficilia et ignota. Hoc enim quod species soni multiplicatur successive et temporaliter non est signum sufficiens quod oporteat eam multiplicari cum motu locali aeris, quoniam species odoris non indiget multiplicari cum tali motu medii, et tamen successive et tardius multiplicatur quam species soni. Ideo etiam plus impeditur a vento, sicut ante dictum fuit. Et etiam manifestum est quod multiplicatio specierum soni non est per hoc quod aer fractus in quo generatur sonus moveatur usque ad omnem locum in quo sonus auditur, vel etiam aer propinquus illi aeri, quia impossibile esset quod ita velocior divideret alium aerem, et quia oportet ipsum orbiculariter moveri motibus undique oppositis, scilicet ante, retro, dextrorsum, sinistrorsum, etc. Et ideo tenentes quod non nisi cum motu aeris multiplicatur species soni imaginantur quod aer frac-

681 dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.8 419b 25 (Ar. lat. XII.2 135.2.10): “Echon autem fit cum ab aere uno facto propter vas determinans et prohibens diffundi, iterum aer repellitur, sicut sphaera.” 684 post modicum dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.8 419b 33 (Ar. lat. XII.2 139.1.3): “Hic autem est faciens audire, cum moveatur continuus et unus.” 686 dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.8, 420a3 (Ar. lat. XII.2 139.1.7): “Sonativum quidem igitur quod motivum unius aeris continuitate usque ad auditum.” 695 ante dictum fuit ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.17 par. 17. 682 facto ] fracto ATW 682–683 repellitur ] reflectitur T 684 motus ] om. W || repellitur ] impellitur T 688 moto ] cantando add. A motu V 689 intra ] infra AVW || est ] motu V 692 eam ] moveri et add. AE 696 specierum ] speciei E 697 in . . . sonus ] solum T || generatur ] generantur TV 699 ita ] illa ET || alium ] illum E illum totum T

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of sound needs the air receiving it to be moved, that is, across every distance over which the species of sound is propagated, in order to be produced in the medium, namely the air. And right away it seems to be the intention of Aristotle that this is the case, for he says of the echo, “An echo is made when air is repelled, like a ball, from other air made into a unit by a vessel that confines it and prevents its diffusion.” He meant by this that the species of sound is reflected because the moved air is repelled by the obstacle. Then, a little further on, he says, “This,” that is, the air, “causes hearing when it is moved as continuous and one.” And again, directly after this, he says, “What is capable of producing sound, therefore, is what is capable of moving one continuous part of the air to the organ of hearing. Hearing is connatural with the air because what is in the moved air outside the ear is moved inside the ear.” 53. To me, these are very difficult and unknown matters. That the species of sound is propagated successively and in time is not a sufficient sign that it must be propagated with the local motion of the air, since the species of odor does not need to be propagated with such a motion of the medium, and yet it is propagated successively and more slowly than the species of sound. For this reason it is even more impeded by the wind than the species of sound, as was said before. And it is also clear that the propagation of the species of sound does not occur because the broken air in which sound itself is generated is moved to wherever the sound is heard, or even that the air near the first air is so moved, because it would be impossible for it to divide the other air so quickly, and because it must be moved spherically with motions on all opposite sides, namely forward, backward, to the

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tus, in quo fit realiter sonus, impellit aerem propinquum et ille cedens impellit consequenter alium, et sic usque ad longam distantiam. Immo oportet quod in infinitum, si aer esset infinitus, nisi interveniret aliqua condensatio. Et ponitur exemplum, sicut si in fluviis vel in stagno magno aliquis proiciat lapidem in medio, videbuntur ex inundatione aquae fieri iuxta casum lapidis parvae circulationes, et consequenter maiores et maiores usque ad ripas, et tunc a ripis repellentibus aquam videbuntur reverti circulationes. Et ita, quanto aer est mobilior et subtilior aqua, tanto fiunt huiusmodi inundationes citius, et ab obstaculo revertuntur. Et sic fit echo. 54. Haec autem imaginatio, licet sit vera quantum ad hoc quod fiunt inundationes in aere sicut in aqua, scilicet quod una pars pulsa pellit aliam et illa aliam usque ad aliquam distantiam, tamen non oportet credere quod hoc fiat ita velociter nec ad ita longam distantiam in aere sicut in aqua. Quod enim non fiat velociter sicut species soni velociter multiplicatur apparet experimento. Quando enim tu sufflas ad extinguendum candelam, tu multo fortius et velocius moves aerem quam quando tu cantas, licet cantando tu magis minute frangas aerem in fistula arteriae subclaudendo eam. Unde si tu ponas manum tuam ante os sufflantis ad distantiam semipedis, tu sentis notabiliter motum aeris, quem non senties extra os cantantis. Ideo extra os deberent fieri velociores inundationes aeris sufflando quam cantando. Et tamen tarde apparent illae inundationes. Verbi gratia, si pluma sit natans in aere distante ab ore sufflantis per octo vel per decem pedes, notabile erit tempus antequam inundationes ad plumam pervenientes tu videas plumam moveri. Et non esset sic notabile tempus ad decuplam distantiam in multiplicatione speciei soni.

709 repellentibus ] impellentibus AET 710 circulationes ] et cito add. W || ita ] cito et add. E cito quod add. V 711 obstaculo ] obstaculis AE 715 usque ] utique T 718 experimento ] om. V 720–721 fistula ] fistulas T 721 Unde ] quam in illa candela sufflando quod patet A 722 sufflantis ] cantatis E 722–723 aeris ] illum A 723 extra os ] ex ore A || extra os ] ex ore T || os ] sufflantis add. V 725 natans ] volans W

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right, to the left, and so on. And so those who hold that the species of sound is only propagated with a motion of the air imagine that the broken air, in which sound is made in real being, propels the air next to it, and then, with this air yielding, propels the air next to it, and so on over a long distance. Moreover it would happen to infinity, if the air were infinite in extent, unless some contraction intervened. For example, if someone throws a stone into the middle of a river or large lake, from the splash where the stone fell small circles will be seen, and then larger and larger circles, until they reach the banks, and then circles will be seen turning back from the banks, repelling the water. And so, inasmuch as the air is more moveable and more subtle than water, waves of this kind will be made that much more quickly in air and returned from an obstacle. That is how an echo is produced. 54. Regarding this fanciful idea, however, although it is true insofar as waves are made in the air just as they are in water, namely that one part, when pushed along, pushes another, and this part pushes the next over some distance, yet it should not be believed that this occurs as quickly or over such a distance in the air as it does in water. That it does not occur as quickly as the species of sound is propagated is apparent by experience. For when you blow to put out a candle, you blow much more strongly and move the air much more quickly than when you sing, although when singing you fracture the air in a lesser way in the larynx, by closing off the trachea. That is why, if you put your hand half a foot in front of the mouth of someone blowing at it, you noticeably sense the motion of the air, which you do not sense beyond the mouth of the singer. And so there ought to be more rapid waves of air outside the mouth when we are blowing than when we are singing. And yet these waves appear to move slowly. For example, if a feather is floating in the air eight or ten feet away from the mouth of someone blowing at it, there will be a noticeable amount of time

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55. Item si sint cantantes in domo alta voce et sint telae ad ostium vel ad fenestras appensae valde tenues et faciliter mobiles, illae non apparebunt moveri. Et tamen notabiliter moverentur si aer intra domum, impulsus a voce cantantium, deberet, mediantibus illis telis, sic velociter impellere aerem extra domum quod impulsio duraret usque ad illum locum valde distantem in quo vox illorum notabiliter auditur. 56. Item si campana pulsatur, verum est quod prope sit fortis impulsio aeris. Sed vix pervenitur ad distantiam centum pedum, vel ita debilis venit quod non apparebit inde moveri lumen candelae vel pluma volans in aere, quae tamen a modica inundatione aeris apparet notabiliter moveri. Si ergo in illo parvo spatio sic notabiliter diminuta est impulsio ut non percipiatur, oportet concedere quod ex toto quieverit ante perventum ad unam leucam, ubi tamen sonus campanae audiretur. 57. Item per organum vel aliud instrumentum, posset per unam totam horam vel diem fieri sonus continuus et regularis qui undique orbiculariter audiretur ad longam distantiam. Igitur oporteret quod undique aer impelleretur etiam continue et regulariter. Et hoc est impossibile. Tunc enim oporteret remanere vacuum iuxta corpus sonans nisi alter aer ab alio latere reverteretur. Et si reverteretur, tunc ex illo latere non audiretur sonus, quod est falsum. 58. Item si locus a et locus b distant per spacium centum pedum, et in utroque loco fiat talis sonus continuus et uniformis per unam horam, et sint illi soni diversorum tonorum ut eorum differentia percipiatur, constat quod in utroque loco uterque sonus audiretur continue. Sed tunc quomodo possent continue fieri inundationes aeris de loco a ad locum b et e converso? Oporteret enim aerem intermedium simul

730 domo ] aut alibi add. A 732 moveri ] immo nec tela aranea apparebit moveri add. VW || intra ] in totam V 733 deberet ] a vocibus cantantium vel add. A motibus cantantium add. E 736 pulsatur ] sonat T || sit ] fit E fit valde T || fortis ] fortiter AV 737 vix ] vel non add. A 738 inde ] idem T 742 ubi ] licet A || campanae ] non add. AE 744 aliud ] om. VW 745 horam ] moram V || diem ] duas A 749 nisi alter ] non enim A 753 diversorum tonorum ] diversarum causarum T || tonorum ] sonorum VW || ut eorum ] vel corporum et horum A || ut ] et E tunc T

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before you see the feather move because of the waves arriving at it. But there would not be so noticeable a time at ten times that distance in the propagation of the species of sound. 55. Again, if there are people singing in a loud voice in a house and there are very thin and easily moveable curtains at the door or at the open windows, these will not appear to be moved. And yet they would be noticeably moved if the air inside the house, pushed by the voices of the singers, must so quickly push the air through these curtains and outside the house that the impulse would endure up to the very distant place at which the voice of the singers is noticeably heard. 56. Again, if a bell rings, it is true that nearby there is a strong impulse of the air. But it hardly reaches to a distance of a hundred feet, or it comes so weakly that it will not appear to move a candle flame or a feather floating in the air, both of which would be noticeably moved by a small wave in the air. If, therefore, the impulse of the bell is so noticeably diminished in this small space that it is not perceived, it should be conceded that over the entire space, it will be still before it reaches a distance of one league, where the sound of the bell will still be heard. 57. Again, a continuous and regular sound can be made for a whole hour or day by means of an organ of the body or another instrument, which can be heard everywhere around it for a great distance. So it ought to be that the air is also propelled in every direction continuously and regularly. And this is impossible. For then a vacuum must remain near the sounding body, unless another body of air from either side returned to fill it. And if it returned, then the sound would not be heard on that side, which is false. 58. Again, if place A and place B are one hundred feet apart and a continuous and uniform sound is produced in both places for one hour, and if these are sounds of different tones so that their difference can be perceived, it is agreed that both sounds will be heard continuously in both places. But then how do the waves continuously get from place A to place B and from B to A? For then the intervening air would

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continue moveri motibus contrariis, quod est impossibile, et omnino inundationes factae ex locis oppositis contra invicem prohiberent se ad invicem. Ideo non esset soni multiplicatio ad longam distantiam, quod apparet falsum, non obstante multa aeris in contrarium perturbatione. 59. Nunc autem videndum est quare sit rationabile inundationes aeris non ita longe moveri nec ita velociter ad longam distantiam sicut videmus ex percussione moveri inundationes aquae. Propter hoc enim oportet videre quod aer est faciliter condensabilis et rarefactibilis, scilicet multo plus quam aqua. Dico quod per compressionem aut dilationem sine frigefactione vel calefactione. Experimentum enim est si sit dolium semiplenum vino et sit optime obstructum et perforetur inferius, exibit bene una quarta vini vel duae. Et sic oportebit aerem inter dolium existentem rarefieri ad quantitatem illius quartae ut non sit vacuum. Si autem dolium fuerit plenum aqua vel vino et sit optime obstructum, non poterit exire semiquarta, quia non est aer intra sic rarefactibilis. 60. Deinde etiam si una camera esset perfectissime clausa et obstructa, tamen stramina possunt ibi inflammari ad notabilem quantitatem et tandem oporteret flamma extingui et non posse plus inflammari. Primo enim erat inflammatio quia aer circumstans patiebatur condensationem tantam quanta erat inflammatio, et tandem, cum non posset amplius condensari, oportebat flamma cessare. Et vidi in una camera profunda non habente suspirale quod a principio accensae portabantur candelae, sed tandem, cum aer non potuit plus condensari, extinguebantur. 61. Et sic multis experimentis manifestum est quod aer cito et faciliter est rarefactabilis sine eius calefactione vel condensabilis sine eius frigefactione. Modo ultra, sicut arguitur quarto Physicorum, si hic ex 785 Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. IV.9, 217a10 ff. 760 apparet ] est AE 762–767 Nunc . . . calefactione ] om. T 764 percussione ] in aqua add. AE 765 quod ] quomodo A || condensabilis ] ad multum add. TVW 766 Dico quod ] om. A 766–767 dilationem ] tribulationem A 767 frigefactione ] frigefaciente A || calefactione ] calefaciente A 768 obstructum ] constructum T 776 oporteret ] om. W 780 suspirale ] suspirationes T || principio ] totie add. A corsie add. E cersie T continue add. W || accensae ] apprehense A om. T 781 plus ] om. W

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have to be continuously moved by contrary motions simultaneously, which is impossible, and all the waves made from both sides would cancel each other out. Therefore the propagation of sound over a great distance would not occur, which appears false, despite the contrary disturbance of much of the air. 59. But now we should see why it is reasonable that the waves of air are not moved over such a great distance, nor as quickly over a great distance as we see waves of water move from an impact. In order to understand this, it must be seen that air is easily condensable and rarefiable to a great degree, much more so than water. I say that this occurs through compression and expansion without heating and cooling. For we experience that if there is a well-sealed barrel half filled with wine, when it is perforated below, one fourth or one half of the wine will run out. And so the air in the container must be rarified to the quantity of that fourth of the wine that ran out so that there is no vacuum. But if the well-sealed barrel is full of water or wine, then not even half a fourth will escape, because there is no rarefiable air inside. 60. Furthermore, even if a chamber were perfectly closed and sealed, straw can still be burned to a noticeable quantity in it, and finally the flame would have to die out and could burn no longer. For there was flame in the first place because the air surrounding the straw underwent a condensation equivalent to the amount of burning, and finally, when the air could be condensed no further, the flame must cease. In a deep chamber without any inlet for air, I once saw candles brought in that were lit at the beginning but finally, since the air in the chamber could no longer be condensed, the candles were extinguished. 61. And so it is clear from many experiences that air is quickly and easily rarefiable without any heating or that it is condensable without any cooling. What is more, just as it is argued in Physics IV, if a rare

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denso fit rarum, ut si stramina inflammantur, oportet aerem circumstantem cedere ne sit penetratio corporum. Et ita etiam illi cedenti, oporteret alterum cedere, et sic tandem caelum, nisi aer compressus condensaretur ad tantam quantitatem quanto rarum generatum plus occupat quam prius occuparet densum. Quanto igitur corpus est magis et facilius condensabile, tanto rationabile est quod impulsio successiva a corpore primo moto citius cesset et ad minorem distantiam procedat. Igitur si ego alte vocifero et parvum aerem de ore emitto, non oportebit impulsionem aeris orbiculariter et ita velociter protendi ad tantam distantiam ad quantam vox mea auditur. Sed ad causandum impulsionem sufficit pauci aeris parva condensatio, quae est facilior et minorem virtutem requirit quam motus orbiculariter tanti aeris. 62. Et iterum ex eo quod lignum longum et grossum non posset faciliter plicari si ex uno cono impellatur, nec partes eius anteriores possent dividi et cedere lateraliter, contingit totius ligni impulsio simul et non minus notabiliter vel minus velox in partibus remotis a primo pellente quam partibus propinquis. Sed cum aqua sit frangibilis et bene divisibilis et quod partes eius possunt bene faciliter cedere, non oportet, si aliquis impellit unam partem aquae in cono magnae aquae, quod impulsio duret usque ad alterum conum, immo nec ad magnam distantiam. Igitur hoc minus oportet in aere quanto aer est frangibilior et divisibilior. 63. Igitur videtur esse concludendum quod species soni multiplicantur in aere et per aerem ipso quiescente. Et huius signum est quia vox vel sonus factus ab aliquo in cono ligni in longitudine puta sexaginta pedum, sicut sunt ligna in ecclesia beatae Mariae, auditur ab eo qui in altero cono ligni habet aurem, et melius auditur ab eo quam ab illo qui solum per spatium quatuor pedem distat a vociferante et

789 tantam ] totam T || quanto ] quantam V 791 rationabile ] rarefactibilius VW 792 minorem ] breviorem T 795 causandum ] tantam W 796 impulsionem ] impulsio non T 799 impellatur ] compellatur T 800 lateraliter ] localiter T 800–801 simul ] om. T fieri V fieri add. W 801 velox ] velociter A 806 magnam ] aliquam E 808 concludendum ] concedendum T 810 longitudine ] longissimi ET

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thing is made here from a dense thing, for example, if straw is burned, the surrounding air must yield, so that there would be no interpenetration of bodies. And so, when that air has yielded, another part of the air must yield, and thus finally the heavens must yield, unless the compressed air is condensed by as much as the generated rare body occupies in excess of what the dense body occupied earlier. Therefore, it is reasonable that the successive impulse from a body first moved would cease more quickly and travel a lesser distance, in proportion to its being more, and more easily, condensable. So, if I utter a loud sound and emit a little air from my mouth, it will not happen that the impulse of the air will reach out as quickly and in every direction around me to the distance at which my voice is heard. But the minimal contraction of a small bit of air suffices for such an impulse, which is easier and requires less power, than the motion of so much air in every direction around me. 62. And again, there is the fact that if a long and broad timber is struck on one end, it cannot be easily split, or divided and peeled laterally; a simultaneous impulse does occur throughout the entire piece of wood, which is no less noticeable or quick in the parts more distant from the initial striking point than in the ones closer to it. But because water is more yielding and much more divisible, and its parts can much more easily yield, it does not follow that if someone struck one part of water at one end of a great body of water, that the impulse would endure to the other end, let alone to a great distance. Accordingly, this should happen even less in air to the extent that air is more yielding and more divisible. 63. So it seems that it must be concluded that the species of sound are multiplied in the air and through the air while it is at rest. And the sign of this is that a voice or a sound made by someone at one end of a timber some sixty feet long, as are the timbers in the church of blessed Mary, is heard by the one who puts his ear at the other end of the timber, and it is heard better by him than by someone else who is

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a ligno. Et non apparet quod aer motus extra lignum ab illa debili voce impellat aerem in ligno existentem, quia nec ille aer potest intrare in illud lignum. Et tamen non impellerit illum aerem interiorem nisi intraret in illud lignum, cum oporteat impellens simul esse cum impulso. 64. Deinde etiam videtur esse concludendum quod species soni sit in aere quiescente generata et habet in eo permanentiam per aliquod tempus, licet non per longum, quia si vox Socratis audiatur per spatium mille pedum, illa vox non agit speciem quae in ultimo pede recipitur quia ante corrupta est illa vox quam agatur ibi species, et quod est corruptum nihil amplius agit. Ideo species illa in ultimo pede agitur a specie quae erat in penultimo pede, igitur nondum est corrupta species in illo penultimo pede quando fit species in ultimo. Et tamen prius erat species nulla in penultimo. Ideo in penultimo facta mansit per aliquod tempus. Et tunc ultra probabile est concludere quod species illa corrumpitur sine proprio et per se corrumpente, cum non appareat tunc aliquid actu movens vel agens nisi illamet species quae ultra agit speciem sibi similem in ultimo pede. Et non est dicendum quod illa corrumpat se ipsam. Unde sicut dicebatur de corruptione habitus intellectualis per oblivionem non videtur inconveniens quod aliquid ex defectu agentis vel conservantis corrumpatur sine aliquo corrumpente speciali tunc actu agente. Haec dicta de quinta dubitatione sufficiant. 65. De sexta dubitatione quaestionis satis dictum est. Manifestum enim est quod, si ex corpore odorifero fiat exhalatio sive fumalis evaporatio, ille fumus habet in se realiter odorem. Sed ultra, sine tali fumo, multiplicatur species illius odoris, quia sicut dictum est prius aliqua sunt multum odorifera quae valde modicum sunt fumabilia vel evaporabilia. Et tamen ille fumus est corpus, et non apparet quomodo

814 ab ] vel T 821 longum ] longiquium vel longum tempus A longius V || quia ] sed A 822 pede ] agitur vel add. A 823 quia ] aliquando add. A || quam ] antequam VW 826–827 in illo . . . in ] om. T 827 nulla ] illa EW || penultimo ] quam esset species in ultimo add. AEW 828 concludere ] concedendum A concedere E 833 inconveniens ] om. V 835 tunc actu ] et A || tunc ] et omne T 837 satis ] faciliter add. A

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only four feet away from the speaker and the timber. And it does not seem that the air moved outside the timber by this weak voice would push air inside the timber, because this outside air cannot enter into the timber. And yet it would not push that inside air unless it entered into the timber, since the pusher must touch the thing pushed. 64. Then it seems that it must be concluded that the species of sound is generated in still air and persists in it for some time, although not for very long. For if the voice of Socrates were heard at a distance of a thousand feet, this voice would not cause the species that is received in the last foot, because the voice is corrupted before the species is brought into act there, and what is corrupted can no longer act. Thus, the species in the last foot is brought about by the species which was in the penultimate foot, so the species in the penultimate foot was not yet corrupted when the species in the last foot was made. And yet prior to this there was no species in the penultimate foot. So the species made in the penultimate foot remained for some time. And then further, there is the probable conclusion that this species is corrupted without a proper and per se corrupting agent, because in such a case there would not appear to be anything actually moving or acting except that very species, beyond this acting on species similar to it in the last foot. And it should not be said that this species corrupts itself. For this reason, just as was said about the corruption of the intellectual state through forgetting,233 it does not seem wrong that something is corrupted, without any special corrupting agent in act, because of a deficiency in the agent or sustainer. So much for the fifth difficulty. 65. Concerning the sixth difficulty of the question,234 enough has been said. For it is clear that if there is an exhalation or an evaporation of fume from an odoriferous body, this fume really has odor in it. But the species of the odor is multiplied beyond the fume because, just as was said earlier, some things are very odoriferous which are barely capable of being turned into smoke or vapor. And yet this

233 See 234 See

par. 47 above. par. 10 above.

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posset undique misceri aeri ita cito sicut sentitur undique odor, quia oporteret corpus fumi dividere corpus aeris undique, et aer ex naturali continuitate habet resistentiam dividenti, propter quod pluma in aere non potest cito cadere. Ideo videtur quod ita parve exhalationi aer resisteret, quod non sic ita cito posset undique ad tantam distantiam pervenire. Et verisimile etiam est quod species odoris facta in medio vel in organo olfactus habet ibi permanentiam remoto corpore odorifero etiam longiorem quam habeat species soni vel lucis vel coloris. Unde cum recipimus speciem fortis odoris, tunc longo tempore non possumus sentire debiles odores, quia manent diu species odoris in organo. Citius autem post receptionem magni soni vel intensae lucis percipimus debiles sonos vel colores quia citius ab organo evanescunt species lucis vel coloris vel soni quam species odoris. Tandem tamen a medio et ab organo evanescit et corrumpitur species odoris, sicut dicebatur de specie soni et forte de specie lucis vel coloris. 66. Ultimo dicendum est de septimo dubitatione et ultima quae est de speciebus qualitatum per se tangibilium, puta caliditatis et frigiditatis, humiditatis et siccitatis. Et primo dico concedendum esse quod illarum qualitatum sunt species representativae earum, quae sunt alterius rationis et naturae ab illis qualitatibus, ita quod species caliditatis non sit caliditas, nec species frigiditatis frigiditas, sicut nec species coloris color, quia aliter tu non sentires caliditatem extra te existentem. Oportet enim ad sentiendum illum calorem quod in organo sensus perveniat aut calor similis per quem senties illum aut species disimilis naturae et rationis. Sed non calor similis rationis et naturae, quia sensibile positum super sensum non facit sensationem, ut saepe dicit Ari868–869 saepe dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7, 419a10; 418a25; II.11 423b 25. 844 fumi ] suum T 846 ita ] isti W || exhalationi ] exhalationes V 846–847 aer resisteret ] aeris resisterent V 851 speciem fortis odoris ] forte odorem T 853 receptionem ] reductionem T 854 ab organo ] om. T 856 a ] in T 859 per se tangibilium ] sensibilium A || per se ] om. T 865 sentiendum ] sciendum T || illum calorem ] illam caliditatem AE || sensus ] sentiens VW 866 aut ] alius T 867 naturae ] nec disimilis add. A 868 sensum ] sensationem V || facit sensationem ] sentitur A

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fume is a body and there does not appear to be any way for it to be mixed with the air in every direction as quickly as an odor is sensed in every direction, because the body of the fume would have to divide the body of the air in every direction, and air, because of its natural continuity, has a resistance to something dividing it, which is why a feather in the air cannot fall quickly. So it seems that the air would slightly resist the exhalation, so that it would not be able to reach so quickly to such a distance in every direction. It is even probable that the species of odor produced in the medium or in the organ of smell persist there when the odorous body is removed for much longer than do the species of sound or light or color. That is why, when we receive the species of a strong odor, then for a long time we cannot sense weak odors because the species of odor remains for a long time in the organ of smell. We can perceive weak sounds and colors more quickly after the reception of a loud sound or an intense light because the species of light and color or sound vanish more quickly from organ than the species of odor. But at last the species of odor is corrupted and vanishes from the medium and from the organ, just as was said about the species of sound and perhaps about the species of light or color. 66. Finally, we should discuss the seventh and last difficulty,235 which concerns the species of per se tangible qualities, such as the species of heat and cold, moist and dry. And first I say that it must be conceded that there are species representative of these qualities which are of a kind and nature different from these qualities, such that the species of heat is not heat, nor is the species of cold, just as the species of color is not color, because otherwise you would not sense heat existing outside yourself. For in order for you to sense that heat which is in the organ of sense, there must arrive either a similar heat by which you would sense it, or else a species of a dissimilar type or nature. But it is not a heat of a similar type and nature, because a sensible placed 235 See

par. 10 above.

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stoteles. Ideo non sentimus similiter calidum et similiter frigidum ut dicit Aristoteles, sed adhuc per quosdam alios effectus apparent istae species. Pono enim casum quod sit bonus ignis ad caminum, et tu in scamno sedeas ad mensam distantem ab igne per spatium quinque vel sex pedum. Constat quod vestes tuae ita intense calefient quod forte disponuntur usque ad combustionem, nisi ante ponatur obstaculum. Et scamnum versus ignem ita calefiet quod non poteris manum tuam tenere ad ipsum. Haec sunt experta quotidie. Deinde etiam apparet in casu praedicto quod aer intermedius non erit ita intense calidus. ideo homines in eo veniunt et stabunt et non sentient ibi intensam caliditatem, nisi stent ibi diu, qui tamen, si tangent te vel scamnum, sentient vehementem caliditatem. Ideo manifestum esse videtur experientia quod scamnum et panni tui calefiunt vehementer ultra gradum caloris aeris intermedii inter te et ignem. Ille enim aer intermedius ex vento vel motu hominum movetur saepe, et exit una pars illius aeris et alia intrat nova. Ideo sic non intense calefit ille aer intermedius, quo non obstante scamnum vel panni tui valde intense calefiunt. 67. Sed horum effectuum non possunt rationales causae assignari, nisi ponendo tales radios caloris, et ponendo eos possunt reddi causae omnium talium. Ideo ponendi sunt tales radii vel species caliditatis. Quod autem non possunt reddi causae talium effectuum sine talibus radiis declaratur, quia ignis per suam caliditatem, nisi aliud agens interveniat, non agit in vestes tuas nisi per hoc quod prius calefacit sibi aerem intermedium, et iste aer calefactus, iterum per suam caliditatem, calefacit te. Calidum autem per suam caliditatem per se non calefacit intensius quam ipsum sit calidum. Immo quantum est ex parte

869–870 ut dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a 2. 869 calidum ] nobis add. AE 870 Aristoteles ] om. ET 872 ab igne ] aliquam V 873 calefient ] calidae fiunt E 874 disponuntur ] devenient T || ante ] om. A forte VW 876 tenere ] ponere AE || Haec sunt experta ] et ita experimur A 878 veniunt ] stantes A venientes E 886 rationales ] rationabiles V 890 agens ] accidens T 892 intermedium ] immediatum et approximatum A immediatum et proximatum E immediatum V 893 per se ] praecise A 894 calidum ] per se non sit intensius calidum quam est add. A

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on a sense does not cause sensation, as Aristotle often says. So we do not sense a similar heat and a similar cold, as Aristotle also says, but these species of tangible qualities appear through certain other effects. I propose the case that there is a good fire in the fireplace, and you are seated on a bench, at a table, five or six feet from the fire. It happens that your clothes are heated so intensely that they may be nearly set ablaze unless some obstacle is placed between you and the fire. And the part of the bench facing the fire is heated so that you cannot hold your hand against it. These things are experienced every day. Furthermore, it also seems, in the case described above, that the intervening air is not so intensely hot. Thus men come into this and stand and do not sense an intense heat there unless they stand for a long time. However, if they touch you or the bench, they sense a strong heat. So it seems clear from experience that the bench and your clothes are strongly heated beyond the degree of the heat in the air between you and the fire. For this intermediate air is often moved by a breeze or by people moving about, and one part of it goes out and another new part comes in. Thus, the intermediate air will not be heated so intensely, despite the fact that the bench and your clothes are intensely heated. 67. But reasonable causes of these effects cannot be assigned unless rays of heat are posited and once they are posited, the causes of all such effects can be given. Thus, such rays or species of heat ought to be posited. It is clear that the causes of such effects cannot be given without such rays because as long as another agent does not intervene, the fire does not act on your clothes with its heat unless it first heats the intervening air, and this heated air, again through its heat, heats you. A hot body, however, through its own heat, does not heat another body more intensely with its own heat per se than it itself is heated.

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caliditatis et frigiditatis, minus calidum iuxta magis calidum remitteret de caliditate illius magis calidi. Igitur numquam aer iste, calefactus ad gradum remissium, calefaciet scamnum et pannos tuos ad gradum ita intensum per suam caliditatem per se. 68. Nec potest dici quod sic intense calefaciat te per suum lumen, quia aliquando ignis est fortis et non multi luminis, ita quod una parva candela faceret lumen maius per quod tu posses legere in libro, quod non posses per lumen illius ignis. Et tamen lumen illius candelae non sic intense calefacit te. Igitur praeter lumen et caliditatem ignis vel aeris oportet aliud agens concurrere ad sic intense calefaciendum te. Quod autem ponendo radios vel species caliditatis distinctas a caliditate, possunt convenienter assignari causae talium effectuum declaratur, quia dicemus quod radii caliditatis, licet non sint formaliter calidi nec caliditas, tamen habent naturam calefaciendi multo plus et fortius quam lumen. Et sicut contingit radios luminis refrangi et fortificari in loco refractionis, ita etiam radios caloris. Quia ergo a scamno vel a pannis tuis refranguntur radii caloris, ideo sic vehementer calefaciunt scamnum sicut etiam facit lumen solis. Et quamvis aer medius mutetur, tamen continue generantur radii a caliditate ignis qui multiplicantur ad scamnum et ab eo refractionem recipiunt. Ideo sic intense calefacient scamnum valde ultra caliditatem aeris contingentis ipsum. 69. Item nos videmus per experientiam quod multa saepe a calido circumstante frigefiunt per antiperistasim, vel etiam e converso, a frigido circumstante calefiunt. Et in hoc non posset dari causa rationalis

895–896 remitteret . . . calidi ] om. A 896 calefactus ] calefactivus T 898 caliditatem ] solam et add. A calorem E || per se ] praecise AEVW 905 ponendo ] per dictos A 908 calefaciendi ] calidi E 910 caloris ] et calorum E aliorum T 911 caloris ] coloris E 912 lumen solis ] sol T 915 contingentis ] continentis AE 918–919 frigido ] frigiditate AE 919 calefiunt ] frigefiunt V || causa ] et modus add. AET || rationalis ] nisi per radios add. AET

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Moreover, as far as the part of heat and cold in a body is concerned, a body that is less hot placed next to a hotter body weakens the heat of the hotter body. Therefore this air, which is heated to a lesser degree, could never heat the bench or your clothes so intensely degree through its own heat per se. 68. Nor can it be said that the fire heats you so intensely by its illumination, because sometimes a fire is intense and yet does not produce very much illumination, so that one small candle makes a greater illumination, by which you can read a book, which you could not do by the illumination of the fire. And yet the illumination of that candle does not heat you very intensely. Therefore, another agent must contribute to your being heated so intensely in addition to the illumination and heat of the fire or air. However, it is clear that, by positing rays or species of heat distinct from the heat itself, the causes of such effects can easily be assigned, because we say that the rays of heat have a nature to heat objects much more intensely than illumination even though these rays are not formally hot nor are heat itself. And just as rays of illumination are reflected and strengthened in the place where they are reflected, so are the rays of heat. It is because rays of heat are reflected from the bench and from your clothes, then, that they heat the bench so fiercely, just like illumination from the sun. And although the intervening air is changed, yet rays are continuously generated from the heat of the fire which are propagated to the bench and are reflected from it. This is why they heat the bench so intensely, beyond the heat of the air touching the bench. 69. Again, we see by experience that often many things are cooled by a surrounding hot body, or conversely, heated by a surrounding cold body, due to antiperistasis.236 There is no rational way to explain 236 The

term ‘antiperistasis’ had two meanings in the Middle Ages. It was used to name a phenomenon supposed to explain projectile motion in a plenum whereby the projectile continues to move after it is no longer in contact with a mover because the medium displaced by its forward motion has nowhere to go but the space vacated by the projectile and in moving to fill that space imparts additional motion to the projectile. Here, however, Buridan uses the other meaning, which was to name the tendency of qualities to be strengthened in the presence of their opposites.

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sine speciebus caliditatis et frigiditatis, quae tamen manifeste datur ponendo huiusmodi radios et species. Igitur haec ponenda sunt. 70. Declaro igitur quod non possunt horum reddi causae sine talibus radiis, quia si caverna profunda in terra sit in hieme repleta aere calido, et per calorem exterius venientem in aestate refrigerabitur, hoc non est quia ille aer prius calidus fugiat a calido exterius fortiori superveniente et congreget se in se ipsum et uniatur, quia ex tali unione non deberet calidum fieri frigidum nec frigidum calidum, sicut videmus scilicet fieri aerem calidum in hieme, frigidum in aestate, et e converso. Immo ex unione deberet magis fieri calidum calidius et frigidum frigidius. Nec potest etiam dici quod aer exterior existens frigidius in hieme descendat in terram vel illam cavernam in aestate, fugiens a calore, quia iam caverna est repleta alio aere. Ideo esset penetratio corporum. Et forte caverna est bene obstructa ut non possit intrare aer exterior. Et tamen non minus frigefieret ille aer interior qui prius erat calidus. Nec potest dici quod frigiditas aeris exterioris descendat in aerem interiorem, quia non transit accidens de subiecto in subiectum. Unde non apparet quod talis caliditas generetur in profundis terrae in hieme et frigiditas in aestate, nisi ponatur actio per radios caliditatis et frigiditatis, sicut dicitur prius. 71. Item sine huiusmodi radiis non appparet quomodo possit bene reddi causa et modus generationis maximarum grandinum in aestate calidissima, quae non fiunt in media regione aeris sed in inferiori existente multum calida, prout debet videri primo Meteorum. Nam si propter fugam a calido circumstante, partes nubis aquosae congregantur in similis, non propter hoc sequitur quod ita debeant fortiter infrigidari cum ante essent calidae, quia videmus in mari, in fluviis, et in

943 Meteorum ] A RISTOTELES, Meteor. I:3 340a24, 340b33; I.11–12 347b 12– 349a 10. 920 sine speciebus ] sive species AET || datur ] declaratur A 921 et species ] om. VW || ponenda ] vel possibilia add. A 923 caverna ] fovea W 931 cavernam ] foveam W 932 caverna ] fovea W 936 accidens ] actus T actus entis V 937 Unde ] quam W || apparet ] oportet A || quod ] unde TVW || talis ] tanta T || caliditas ] frigiditas T 938 frigiditas ] caliditas TV 941 maximarum ] nivis et TVW 942 inferiori ] superiori A 945 non propter ] per T 946 ante ] om. W

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this without using species of heat and cold. The cause is clearly given by proposing rays and species of this kind. Hence these rays should be posited. 70. I declare, therefore, that the causes of these things cannot be given without such rays, because if there is a cavern deep in the earth, filled with hot air in the winter and cooled in the summer by the arrival of heat outside, this is not because the air in the cave which was previously hot recedes from the stronger incoming heat of the outside air, withdrawing into itself and condensing, because from such a condensation hot should not be made cold nor cold hot, just as we see air in the cave becoming warm in the winter and cold in the summer, and vice versa. Rather, by this condensation hot should be made hotter and cold colder. Nor can it even be said that the outside air, colder in winter, descends into the earth or the cavern in the summer, receding from the heat, because the cavern is already full of other air, so in that case there would be interpenetration of bodies. And perhaps the cavern is well sealed so that the outside air cannot get in. Yet that air inside it which was warm before is no less cooled. Nor can it be said that the coldness of the outside air descends into the air inside the cavern, because an accident cannot migrate from one subject to another. Thus it is not obvious how such heat is generated in the depths of the earth in the winter, and such cold in the summer, unless we assume action by means of rays of heat and cold, as was said above. 71. Again, without rays of this kind, there seems to be no way to give the cause and process of the generation of the biggest hailstones in the hottest summer, which does not occur in the middle region, of the air but in the lower region which is quite hot, as should be seen in Meteorology I. For if the parts of a watery cloud gather together with other such parts because they recede from a surrounding hot body, it does not follow from this that they would be cooled as strongly since

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visceribus terrae fieri valde, quasi infinitam, magnam congregationem aquarum in aestate et in hieme, et tamen non videmus ibi aquam congregatam sic fortiter congelari. Oportet igitur aliud concurrere quod sit causa per se infrigidans. Nec est sic imaginandum quod frigiditas circumstans fugata a caliditate intret in illas partes nubis congregatas, quia accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum nec movetur localiter nisi ad motum subiecti sui. Et ideo non debet imaginari quod eiusdem subiecti gradus frigiditatis separentur a gradibus caliditatis et fugiant in alias partes aquae, sed semper oportet eos remanere in subiectis suis nisi simpliciter corrumpantur. Sed etiam si concedamus quod alius aer frigidus descendat de media regione in illam nubem grossam aquosam, tamen ille aer non est tantae frigiditatis quod per eum posset ita cito et ita fortiter congelare illam grossam aquam. 72. Considerandum est enim quomodo oportet citissimam fieri congelationem. Necesse enim est partes nubis prius congregari et condensari et converti in aquam quae sic congeletur, congregatae enim non possunt sic congelari et uniri nisi prius convertantur in aquam. Et cum fuerint istae partes nubis conversae in aquam, statim cadit aqua velociter propter suam gravitatem. Igitur oportet ita citissimam esse et velocem congelationem quod praeveniat casum aquae deorsum. Et ad hoc non sufficeret frigiditas aeris mediae regionis tangentis illam nubem si concederetur descendere in eam, quia ista frigiditas aeris non est ita intensa, quod apparet quia multi in aestate ascendunt saepe in montem Ventosum, qui est ad septem leucas prope Avinionem, et non inveniunt ita intensam frigiditatem quae ita cito congelaret aquam, licet ibi sit magna frigiditas et congelativa. Et tamen altitudo istius

947 terrae ] videmus] add. A || valde ] mirabilem A || quasi ] om. T || magnam ] om. A maiorem ET magnam exp. W 949 congelari ] se congelare ET 950 infrigidans ] refrigerans V 955 alias partes aquae ] ista parte T || alias ] illas AE 957 alius ] omnis T || de ] in V 961 congregari ] condensare V condensari W 961–962 condensari ] congelari VW 962 congregatae ] congelatae TVW 963 congelari ] congregari W || uniri ] uniformiter W || nisi . . . aquam ] om. TVW 964 istae . . . aquam ] om. AE 965 propter ] per W 966 velocem congelationem ] velocitatem congelationis T 969 quod apparet ] om. W || ascendunt ] descendunt V 970 septem ] triginta A 971 ita ] ibi add. A 972 tamen ] cum AEV

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they were hot before, because we see in the sea, in rivers, and in the bowels of the earth, that there are large, seemingly infinite, collections of waters, in summer and in winter as well, and yet we do not see the water gathering there freeze so strongly. Therefore, something else must contribute that is a per se cause of cooling. Nor is it to be imagined that the surrounding cold, when it flees from the heat, enters into the condensed parts of the cloud, because an accident does not migrate from one subject to another, nor is it locally moved except with the movement of its subject. And so it should not be imagined that, in the same subject, degrees of cold are separated from degrees of heat and flee into other parts of the water, but they always remain in their subjects, unless they are simply corrupted. But even if we assume that another body of cold air descends from the middle region into this large watery cloud, yet this air is not so cold that this large body of water could be frozen so quickly and strongly by it. 72. It must be considered in what way the most rapid freezing occurs. For the parts of the cloud first have to be gathered together, condensed, and converted into water which is thereby frozen, because the gathered parts of the cloud cannot be frozen and condensed unless they are first converted to water. And when these cloud parts are converted into water, right away the water quickly falls because of its heaviness. Hence, the freezing must be rapid, indeed, so fast that it can take place before the water falls down. And the coldness of the middle region of the air touching the cloud would not suffice for this, even if it were conceded that the coldness of the middle region descended into the cloud, because that coldness of the air is not so intense, which is evident from the fact that many people in the summer often climb Mount Ventoux,237 which is seven leagues from Avignon, and they

237 In

a letter written in 1350 (see Petrarch 1969 IV I) describing his ascent of Mt. Ventoux in April of 1336, Petrarch led his readers to believe that such an ascent had rarely been attempted. Some historians have seen Petrarch’s ascent as a harbinger of the Renaissance mindset, with its openness to novelty and exploration. But Buridan’s remark here suggests that, had Petrarch waited until summer to set out for the summit, he would have met other hikers, perhaps even Buridan himself.

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montis excedit in multo locum generationis talium magnarum grandinum, unde bene fiunt ibi nives, sed non grandines. Et ego existens in Carpentracho ad duas leucas aut tres prope illum montem, vidi nubem spissam plenam tonitruis et maximis grandinibus, prout postea apparuit quae quidem nubis erat sub monte, inter me et montem, et tamen nos manifeste videbamus, supra nubem, lucere solem in cacumine montis, donec nubis appropinquavit ad nos. Oportet igitur, praeter praedicta, assignare aliam causam ita festine et vehementis congelationis grandinum grossissimarum. 73. Nunc ostendo quomodo per radios sive species caliditatis sive frigiditatis possunt haec omnia et similia salvari, propter quod est notandum quod numquam debet imaginari quod qualitates contrariae fugiant ab invicem sine suis subiectis. Absurdum enim est imaginari quod accidens moveatur localiter sine suo subiecto. Et tamen corpora calida et frigida, cum fuerint subtilia et levia vel omnino faciliter mobilia, bene experiuntur fugere ab invicem. Sed etiam sine fuga corporali, debemus imaginari quod radii caliditatis et frigiditatis non solum habent naturam quod refrangantur a corporibus solidis et densis, immo etiam radii caliditatis refranguntur a frigido, licet sit rarum et subtile, et radii frigiditatis a calido. Radii autem caliditatis non sic refranguntur a calido nisi sit grossum et solidum, sed multiplicantur in ipsum. Unde est quod ignis profundus fortius calefacit propinquos quam ignis tenuis, licet aeque latus, maior enim multiplicatio radiorum provenit ad illos, quia partes ignis remotiores multiplicant radios suos ad illos per partes ignis propinquiores. Cum igitur aer existens infra terram in caverna habeat aliquos gradus caliditatis et aliquos frigiditatis, in hie-

973 excedit ] accedit T || locum ] loca V 975 Carpentracho ] campaneas A carpentras E corpore alto T || aut tres ] om. W 976 maximis ] magnis S 977 erat ] erant AET 978 supra ] illam T 979 nubis ] om. E 980 aliam causam ] alias causas T 982–983 sive ] et A sicut E vel T 983 omnia ] nomina nominata T || salvari ] conservari A 985 imaginari ] opinari AVW 988 experiuntur ] experimur T || fuga ] friga A 991 frigido ] calido T 994 fortius ] vel citius add. A || ignis ] maior add. T magis add. V 995 licet . . . Maior ] om. T || Maior enim multiplicatio ] latitudo vel multiplicatio enim maior A || multiplicatio ] latitudo E 996 partes ] profundus AE || illos ] homines add. A illas T 997 per ] om. T || infra ] intra E iuxta T 998 frigiditatis ] illos add. AEV

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do not find there such intense cold that would so quickly freeze water, although there is there a great coldness and power to freeze. But the altitude of this mountain is much higher than the places where these large hailstones are generated; therefore, plenty of snow falls there, but no hailstones. When I was in Carpentras, two or three leagues from the mountain, I saw a thick cloud, full of thunder and huge hailstones, as it appeared afterward that the cloud was below the summit of the mountain, between me and the mountain, and yet we clearly saw the sun shining on the summit of the mountain, above the cloud, until the cloud came close to us. Therefore, another cause for the freezing of these huge hailstones, so rapid and strong, must be identified, in addition to the ones already mentioned. 73. Now I show how all these phenomena and similar ones can be saved by supposing rays or species of heat and cold, for the sake of which let it be noted that one should never imagine that contrary qualities recede from each other without their subjects. For it is absurd to believe that an accident may be moved from place ti place without its subject. But hot and cold bodies, when they are subtle and light or easily moveable, are clearly seen to flee from each other. But even without the bodily flight, we should imagine that rays of heat and cold not only have a nature to be reflected from solid and dense bodies, but also that rays of heat are reflected from a cold body, even if it is rare and subtle, and rays of cold are reflected from a hot body. However, rays of heat are not reflected from a hot body unless it is thick and solid, but they are propagated into it. Hence it is that a deep fire heats things nearby more strongly than a fire that is more tenuous although of equal breadth. For a greater propagation of rays arrives at those nearby objects from a deeper fire, because the more remote parts of the fire propagate their rays to them via the more proximate parts of

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me multiplicat ad extra radios caliditatis et radios frigiditatis. Sed a frigiditate exteriori radii caliditatis reflectuntur interius, et non sic radii frigiditatis. Ideo sic reflexi, calefaciunt aerem infra terram. Et sic aer calefactus iterum continue multiplicat radios caliditatis qui reflectuntur quando inveniunt exterius frigidum obvians. E converso autem in aestate, si a terra et ab aere qui est infra terram multiplicantur ad extra aliqui radii caliditatis et aliqui frigiditatis, tamen radii caliditatis invenientes extra calidum non reflectuntur ab eo. Sed radii frigiditatis reflectuntur, ideo frigefit aer intra terram et alia contenta in terra. 74. Sed aliquis obiceret dicens quod secundum haec dicta, aer existens in caverna infra terram deberet in aestate frigefieri vehementissime usque ad fortissimam congelationem aquae et in hieme sic vehementer calefieri usque ad ebulitionem. Quoniam si in aestate per reflexionem radiorum frigiditatis aer frigefit, tanto debet fortiores radios frigiditatis iterum producere qui iterum reflexi, fortius infrigidant. Et sic iterum consequenter fortiores radios emittit. Et sic consequenter reciproce debent infrigidari quae sunt in caverna infra usque ad gradum summum frigiditatis sibi possibilem inesse. Et sic similiter deberet calefieri in hieme, quod totum est falsum. 75. Sed dicendum est quod oportet imaginari quodammodo sicut de lumine. Quamvis enim lumen reflectatur quodammodo ab aere, non tamen sit totaliter, quin ultra in directum multiplicetur multum lumen. Et etiam lumen multo plus reflectitur ab aqua, sed adhuc non sit totaliter, quin multum lumen in eam multiplicatur, sicut etiam radii frigiditatis a calido refranguntur, sed non sic totaliter, quin etiam mul-

999 extra ] om. AEVW 1000 interius ] in terram E 1003 quando ] cum ipsi T 1004 in aestate ] om. T 1005 caliditatis ] frigiditatis T 1007 frigefit ] frigescit T calefacit V || alia contenta ] aer contentus T 1008 dicta ] videtur quod add. VW 1011 ebulitionem ] combustionem E 1012 frigefit ] frigescit ET || fortiores ] fortes T 1014 consequenter ] continue AE 1015 reciproce debent ] deberent recipere A deberent E 1020 directum ] duplo tantum T 1020–1022 multum . . . multiplicatur ] hom. V 1021 lumen ] om. W 1022–1023 sicut . . . quin ] in marg. W 1023–1024 multus ] multum T

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the fire. Therefore, because the air in a cavern beneath the earth has some degrees of heat and some of cold, in winter it propagates rays of heat and rays of cold to the outside. But the rays of heat are reflected back inside from the cold outside, and the rays of cold are not. Thus, when these rays are reflected in this way, they heat the air beneath the earth. And so the heated air continuously propagates rays of heat which are reflected when they encounter a cold obstacle outside. On the other hand, in the summer rays of heat and cold are propagated from the earth and from the air beneath the earth, and yet when the rays of heat encounter the heat outside, they are not reflected by it. But the rays of cold are reflected, so the air beneath the earth and other things contained in the earth are cooled. 74. But someone may object saying that according to what has been said, in summer the air in a cavern beneath the earth would have to be cooled most powerfully, right up to the hardest freeze of water, and in the winter it would have to be heated so powerfully that it would boil. This is so because if the air is cooled in the summer through the reflection of rays of cold, it must again produce even stronger rays of cold which would cool the air even more when they are reflected again. And so again, in turn, it emits even stronger rays. Thus again, the things in a cavern beneath the earth must be reciprocally cooled to the very highest degree of coldness that they can possibly have. And the heating of things in the cave would happen in a similar way in the winter, which is completely false. 75. But we have to say that we should think about this case in pretty much the same way as about illumination. For although illumination is reflected by the air in some way, yet it is not so totally reflected that there is no propagation of much illumination beyond it in a straight line. And illumination is much more reflected by water than by air, but still it is not so totally reflected by water that much illumination

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tus radius illius frigiditatis in illud calidum et e converso. Sic etiam est de radiis caliditatis ad frigidum propter quod calidum sic calefacit frigidum, et frigidum frigefacit calidum, etiam ab aliqua distantia. Et ideo si calidum et frigidum fuerint approximata, et radii qui a caliditate multiplicantur in frigidum fuerint fortiores quam radii frigiditatis qui a calido refranguntur in ipsum frigidum, tunc corrumpunt vel debilitant illam frigiditatem. Si autem fit e converso, tunc intenditur illa frigiditas. Et ideo si caverna in aestate non sit multum profunda in terra, non poterit esse multum frigida quia radii caliditatis exterioris multiplicant se in illam et demittunt radios frigiditatis reflexos in se ipsos. Cum autem fuerit valde profunda, radii frigiditatis in se reflexi obtinent, et sic fit caverna valde frigida. 76. Sed tu quaeris ultra quare tunc non fit infrigidatio usque ad fortem congelationem. Respondetur quod aer naturaliter determinat sibi caliditatem, ideo resistit infrigidationi, et cum in eo corrumpta fuerit caliditas inclinatur ad eius regenerationem. Et etiam forte non est naturalis dispositio terrae vel aquae quod sunt frigidae in summo, propter quod haec omnia obstant ut non posset caverna infrigidari ultra certum gradum. Et ita etiam in hieme non potest aer in caverna calefieri ad magnum gradum lapidibus in terra obstantibus, qui determinant sibi naturaliter frigiditatem et resistunt calefactioni, et radios suos frigiditatis permiscent cum reflexione radiorum caliditatis. 77. De magnis autem grandinibus concedendum est quod oportet nubem esse compressam in aere calido in illa inferiore regione. Et oportet dicere quod in nube cum vaporibus aquosis elevata est multitudo siccae exalationis et calidae et inflammabiles. Quando autem magis per multiplicem exhalationem invalescunt et inspissantur tam

1024 frigiditatis ] multipliciter add. W 1025 frigidum ] frigefaciendum AVW 1027–1028 a caliditate ] per caliditatem A 1030 fit ] om. AE 1033 demittunt ] deveniunt E seu diminuunt add. W 1034 autem ] caverna add. A 1035 frigida ] profunda T 1036 fit ] ultra add. W 1038 sibi ] naturaliter add. W 1039 regenerationem ] generationem A 1045 suos ] suae add. A 1047 compressam ] apprehensam T comprehensam VW 1048 cum ] a AT 1049 siccae ] om. T 1050 exhalationem ] evaporationem vel elevationem A evaporationem E elevationem T

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is not also propagated into it, just as rays of cold are reflected from a hot body, but not so completely that many rays of coldness do not propagate into the hot body, and vice versa. So it is with rays of heat coming to a cold body, on account of the fact that a hot body heats the cold body and a cold body cools a hot body, even at a distance. And so, if a hot body and a cold body are brought near one another, so that the rays which propagate from the hot one into the cold one are stronger than the rays of coldness reflected from the hot into the cold one, then the rays of heat corrupt or weaken the coldness in the cold body. If however the opposite occurs,238 then the cold is getting more intense. And so if the cavern is not very deep in the earth, it will not be able to become very cold in the summer because the rays of outside heat propagate themselves into the cave and weaken the rays of cold reflected back on themselves. If, however, the cavern is very deep, the rays of cold continue to be reflected back on themselves, and so the cavern is made very cold. 76. But beyond this you ask, why, then, is there not further cooling to the point of freezing? It may be answered that air determines warmth for itself by nature so it resists cooling, and when heat is corrupted in the air, it tends toward its regeneration. And it is perhaps not the natural disposition of earth or water that they become absolutely cold, because all things prevent the cavern from being cooled beyond a certain degree. And so even in winter the air in the cave cannot be heated to a great degree, because the stones that naturally determine coldness for themselves prevent it, mixing their rays of cold with the reflection of the rays of heat. 77. Concerning large hailstones, however, it should be conceded that the cloud must be compressed in hot air in the lower . And it should be said that along with watery vapors a great quantity of hot, dry, and flammable exhalations is raised into a cloud. However, when the vapors and exhalations are both strength-

238 That

is, if the rays from the cold body into the hot body are stronger.

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illi vapores quam illae exhalationes, tunc propter contrarietatem partes vaporis aquosi et partes siccae exalationis fugiunt ab invicem. Et congregantur simul partes vaporis in magnos globos et ex alia parte partes exhalationis. Et tunc radii frigiditatis ex globis vaporis, multiplicati versus partes exhalationis contrariae, reflectuntur in illum vaporem qui cum sit de natura aquae est bene receptivus eorum et frigiditatis. Et sic ille vapor fortiter infrigidatur et coagulatur. Et sic iterum generat fortiores radios frigiditatis, qui, iterum reflexi in ipsum, congelant ipsum velociter in lapidem grossum et durum. Et e converso, partes exhalationis congregatae multiplicant radios caliditatis ad partes aquosas quae, ab illa aqua, reflectuntur in illam exhalationem, et sic calefit illa exhalatio et tandem inflammatur et apparet coruscatio. Et non dico quin etiam aliae causae concurrant ad infrigidationem vaporis et ignitiones exhalationum, quae oportet considerari in libro Meteorum. 78. Ad generationem autem huiusmodi magnarum grandinum, oportet regionem aeris circumstantem esse calidam multum, ut nubes aquosa, undique fugiens ab illis aeris caliditate, magis congregetur et inspissetur. Unde in vere fiunt grandines, sed non sic grossae quia non sunt tot exhalationes nubi commixtae, nec etiam aer circumstans est sic calidus vehementer quod nubes, fugiens ab eo, multum inspissetur. In hieme autem est vapor aquosus elevatus sine multa exhalatione, et extendetur ille vapor per totum aerem existentem frigidum et humidum, et non repellentem illum vaporem per antiperistasim. Et sic non est causa propter quam partes vaporis fugiant simul in guttas grossas et solidas. Sed in sua raritate et dilatione, multa congelantur et fiunt nives.

1065 Meteorum ] A RISTOTELES, Meteor. I.9–12. 1053 simul ] similes V 1056 est bene ] tamen est T || eorum ] illorum vaporum vel caliditatis A 1057 coagulatur ] congelatur A 1059 velociter ] fortiter VW 1060 radios ] suos add. AE 1061 partes ] grossas add. A 1062 tandem ] statim T || apparet ] fit eorum VW 1063 quin etiam ] quamvis est V 1064 ignitiones ] calefactionem T || quae ] omnia add. T 1068 illis aeris caliditate ] illo aere AE 1070 commixtae ] combustae T 1071 fugiens ] frigidus A 1074 vaporem ] aerem A 1075 causa ] tanta calefactio T || simul ] simili A

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ened and made more dense by multiple exhalations, then the parts of the watery vapor and the parts of the dry exhalation recede from each other due to their contrariety, and the parts of the vapor gather together in large drops, the parts of the exhalation gathering in another place. And then rays of cold from the drops of water, propagated toward the contrary parts of the exhalation, are reflected back into the vapor, which is quite receptive of the rays and of coldness because it has a water nature. And so this vapor is strongly cooled and made denser. And so again it generates stronger rays of coldness, which quickly freeze into a large and hard stone when reflected back into it. And so conversely, the parts of the compacted exhalation propagate rays of heat toward the watery parts, which are reflected by the water back into the exhalation. And so this exhalation is heated until it finally bursts into flames and lightning appears. And I am not saying that there are no other causes also acting to cool the vapor and to ignite the exhalation. These things have to be considered in the Meteorology. 78. For the generation of large hailstones of this kind, the surrounding region of air must be very hot, so that watery clouds, fleeing in every direction from the heat of the surrounding air, are more compacted and thickened. That is why hail is produced in the spring, but the hailstones are not as large, because there are not so many exhalations mixed in with the cloud, nor is the surrounding air so very hot that the cloud is thickened very much when it recoils from the heat. In the winter, however, watery vapor is raised without much exhalation, and this vapor extends as a whole through the existing cold and humid air, and the vapor is not repelled by antiperistasis. And so there is no reason why the parts of the vapor would simultaneously flee into hard and solid drops. But when the vapor is rare and diffuse, its many parts are frozen into snowflakes.

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79. Iterum etiam, propter istam reflexionem radiorum est semper media regio aeris frigida. Quamvis enim aliae causae concurrant, quae dicendae sunt primo Meteorum, tamen causa in hoc magna est, quia etsi modo esset illa regio calida sicut est illa inferior, tamen tandem et cito fieret frigida. Cum enim in ea essent aliqui gradus frigiditatis, ab illis multiplicarentur radii ad superiorem regionem et ad inferiorem, qui a calore superioris regionis propinque igni et a calore inferioris regionis calidae ex reflexione luminis solis reflecterentur in illam mediam regionem et refrigerarent eam. Et sic iterum illa refrigerata multiplicaret radios fortiores frigiditatis. Et sic iterum fieret frigida, sicut nunc est, quantum natura aeris permitteret. Et haec sint dicta de septima dubitatione, et per consequens de tota quaestione quae a principio proponebatur. 80. Apparet enim ex dictis quomodo solvi possunt rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis, propter quas etiam potest addi praedictis quod quamvis etiam omnino nulla esset resistentia agenti, tamen fortioris virtutis esset producere maiorem effectum sive intensive sive extensive, caeteris paribus. Et ita producere citius effectum caeteris paribus esset maioris virtutis. Propter quod etiam est magna absurditas dicentium quod si esset intelligentia quae non esset fortioris virtutis quam musca, ipsa posset movere caelum velocius quam nunc moveatur, quia non resistit. Posset ergo dici probabiliter quod solius Dei, qui simpliciter est infinitae virtutis, est infinitum posse facere effectum vel intensive vel extensive vel instanter, et totum simul facere aliquem effectum quantumcumque magnum. Et esset difficile hoc improbare demonstrative.

1080 Meteorum ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Meteor. I.3. 1078 radiorum ] frigiditatis add. EW regionem frigiditatis V 1080 tamen ] huiusmodi T 1081 illa regio ] in illa regione T || illa inferior ] in alia inferiori T 1084–1085 propinque . . . regionis ] sic T 1087 Et . . . frigida ] om. E 1089 tota ] magna add. A 1091–1092 quae . . . quaestionis ] factae A 1094 fortioris virtutis ] fortiore virtute T 1097 esset ] maioris add. T 1100 est ] esse add. VW || est ] et V 1102 effectum ] om. W || quantumcumque ] parvum vel add. A || magnum ] parvum TVW || esset ] est mihi T 1102–1103 improbare ] probare AE

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79. Again, because of this reflection of rays, there is always a middle region of cold air. For although other causes concur, which should be discussed in Meteorology I, this cause is significant, because even if now this middle region were as hot as the lower region, it would quickly become cold in the end. For because there are some degrees of cold in it, rays from this cold will be propagated to the upper and lower regions — rays which are then reflected from the heat of the upper region near the sphere of fire and the heat of the lower region warmed by the sun’s rays back into the middle region, cooling it. And so again the refrigerated air would propagate stronger rays of coldness. And so again the middle region would be made cold, as it now is, as far as the nature of air would permit. So much for the seventh difficulty, and consequently for the whole question which was proposed at the beginning. 80. For it appears from what has been said how the arguments made at the beginning of the question can be solved, in connection with which it can be added to what has already been said that even if there is also no resistance at all to an agent, it belongs to the stronger power to produce a greater effect, whether intensively or extensively, other things being equal. And so it belongs to the greater power to produce an effect more quickly, other things being equal. For this reason as well, it is a great absurdity to say that if there were an intelligence that did not have as much power as a fly, it could move the heavens more quickly than they are now moved, because they do not resist. Therefore, one can plausibly say that it belongs to God alone, whose power is absolutely infinite, to be able to produce an infinite effect, whether intensively or extensively or instantaneously, and to produce all at once some effect, however large. And it would be difficult to disprove this demonstratively.

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81. Harum autem qualitatum tangibilium species, credo non habere generationem vel multiplicationem instantaneam, immo magis temporalem et minus velocem quam habeant species odoris vel soni. Et illas species generatas credo habere permanentiam per aliquod tempus remoto agente vel conservante proprio. Unde si scintilla ignis cadat supra manum, non statim sentitur quia non statim perveniunt species sensibiles ad nostrum sensitivum. Cum autem incipit sentiri et velociter removitur a manu, non statim cessat sensatio quia non statim cessat species illa. 82. Et haec sint dicta de speciebus sensibilium proprium per modum quandam digressionis. Sed non inutilia, prout videtur mihi. Rationes autem quae fiebant in principio quaestionis solvuntur secundum determinata hic et alibi. Glossentur enim auctoritates secundum exigentiam praedeterminatorum, sicut unusquisque voluerit.

1106 odoris vel soni ] odorum aut sonorum A || soni ] sonorum E formarum T 1108 proprio ] proprie A 1109 manum ] tuam add. AE || sentitur ] senties AE 1110 nostrum ] organum AE nervum VW || incipit sentiri ] incipis sentire AE 1111–1112 quia . . . illa ] om. E 1113 proprium ] propriorum V 1114 digressionis ] disputationis A || Sed . . . mihi ] non tamen inutilis ut mihi videtur AE 1116 determinata ] praedeterminatam V

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81. Concerning the species of tangible qualities, however, I do not believe that they have instantaneous generation and propagation, but are rather propagated in greater time and at less speed that then species of odor or sound. And I believe that these generated species remain for some time after the agent or proper conserving power has been removed. Whence, if a spark falls on the hand, it is not immediately felt because the sensible species do not immediately reach the sensitive nerve. However, when it begins to be sensed and is quickly removed from the hand, the sensation does not stop right away, because the species do not cease to exist right away. 82. Let these things be said about the species of proper sensibles by way of some digression. But they do not seem useless to me. The arguments that were made at the beginning of the question have been answered according to what has been determined here and elsewhere. For the authorities should be glossed according to the requirement of what has been determined above, just as anyone might wish.

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Utrum tactus sit unus sensus vel plures.

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1. Arguitur primo quod sit unicus, scilicet in uno homine, quia ex parte animae non est plurificatus, cum sit una anima et indivisibilis. Et similiter ex parte corporis est unus, cum corpus sit unum continuum licet sit divisibile. 2. Item aliter essent plures sensus exteriores quam quinque, quod est contra Aristotelem. 3. Item visus ponitur unus igitur et tactus debet poni unus. Consequentia apparet quia non apparet quod tactus sit magis multiplicatus quam visus, nec ex parte organi quia duos oculos habemus, nec ex parte obiecti quia visus est lucis caelestis perceptivus per se et proprie et colorum materialium, quae magis videntur differre ab invicem quam quattuor primae qualitates, scilicet calidum, frigidum, humidum, et siccum; ergo etc. 4. Item si tactus poneretur duplex sensus, hoc esset quia esset perceptivus plurium contrarietatum. Sed propter hoc non est illud dicendum quia sicut dicit Aristoteles, auditus qui ponitur esse unus percipit bene in voce plures contrarietates, ut acutum et grave, magnum et parvum, asperum et leve, raucum et clarum. Et cum hoc, si propter percipere plures contrarietates, sensus diceretur plures, tunc tactus non solum esset duplex sensus, sed valde plures, quia percipit calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, grave et leve, immo et plures alias contrarietates. 7 contra Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 424b22. 17 sicut dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 422b 27–32 (Ar. lat. XII.2 159.1.15): “Habet autem solutionem quamdam ad hanc dubitationem, et quod in aliis sensibus sunt contrarietates plures, ut in voce non solum acumen et gravitas, sed etiam magnitudo et parvitas, et levitas et asperitas vocis, et similia alia.” 2 unicus ] unus T || uno ] om. AE || quia ] primo A 11 et ] qualitatum add. AE 20 plures ] multiplex A 21 plures ] multiplex A 22 et frigidum ] om. W || grave ] asperum add. T || leve ] asperum leve durum et molle add. E durum et molle add. T © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 25

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Is touch one sense or several?

1. It is argued first that it is just one, that is to say, in a single human being, for it is not made many on account of the soul, since the soul is one and indivisible. The same goes for the body, which is one since it is one continuous thing, even though it is divisible. 2. Again, otherwise there would be more than five external senses, and this goes against Aristotle. 3. Again, sight is taken to be one, so touch also should be taken to be one. The consequence is clear because it does not appear that touch should be multiplied more than sight, either on account of the organ, since we have two eyes, or on account of their object, since sight is per se and properly perceptive of celestial light and of material colors, which appear to differ from each other more than the four primary qualities, namely hot, cold, wet and dry; therefore, etc. 4. Again, if touch were to be taken to be a double sense, then this would have to be because it is perceptive of several contrarieties. But one should not say so on this account, because, as Aristotle says, hearing, which is taken to be one, does perceive several contrarieties in voice, such as high and low, loud and quiet, harsh and soft, raspy and clear. On top of this, if a sense were to be called multiple on account of its perceiving many contrarieties then touch would have to be not only double, but very many, for it perceives hot and cold, wet and dry, heavy and light, and indeed, many other contrarieties.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 25

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5. Item non oportet multiplicari sensus propter multiplicationem obiectorum, quia idem visus percipit album et nigrum, rubeum et diaphanum. 6. Oppositum videtur esse de intentione Aristotelis, movet enim de sensu tactus istam quaestionem: utrum plures sunt aut unus. Et postea videtur determinare quaestionem dicens, “Omnis enim sensus unius contrarietatis esse videtur, ut visus albi et nigri, auditus gravis et acuti, gustus amari et dulcis. In tangibili autem multae insunt contrarietates: calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum, durum, molle et aliorum quaecumque sunt huiusmodi.” 7. Item omnis sensus debet esse unius generis sensibilis appropriate, sicut omnis scientia una unius generis scibilis, ut dicitur quarto Metaphysicae, verbi gratia visus coloris, auditus soni, olfactus odoris, gustus saporis. Sic autem non est unum genus sensibile appropriatum tactui, quod est quia unius generis non sunt immediate plures contrarietates specierum. Ideo non est unum genus appropriatum calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci. Ideo nec tactus qui est perceptivus istorum est unus sensus. Et hanc rationem videbatur notare Aristoteles in secundo huius, dicens “sed quod sit unum subiectum, sicut auditui sonus, sic tactui non est manifestum.” Et per unum subiectum intendit unum genus sensibile. Ipse enim multotiens genus solet vocare subiectum. 8. Dicendum primo quod omnis tactus, prout hic loquimur de tactu, est unus sensus. Non enim loquimur hic de tactu prout duo la27 de intentione Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 422b20. 29 videtur determinare quaestionem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 422b 23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 22.159.1.9.): “Omnis et enim sensus unius contrarietatis esse videtur, ut visus albi et nigri, auditus gravis et acuti, gustus amari et dulcis; in tangibili autem multae insunt contrarietates, calidum frigidum, humidum siccum, durum molle, et aliorum quaecunque sunt huiusmodi.” 35–36 quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.2 1003b19. 41–42 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 422b32 (Ar. lat. XII.2 159.1.21): “Sed quid sit unum subiectum, sicut auditui sonus, sic tactui, non est manifestum.” 24 oportet ] apparet T 25 idem ] sensus utputa add. A sensus puta add. E 25–26 rubeum et diaphanum ] lucem et figuram T || diaphanum ] et lucem et figuram etc add. A et lucem add. W 29 videtur determinare ] determinat T 31 In tangibili ] tactui A || tangibili ] tali V 34–35 appropriate ] una add. V 38 plures ] duae W 39 specierum ] sensitivorum T || appropriatum ] propinquum AEW 44 multotiens ] unum add. T 45 loquimur ] loquitur aristoteles A loquitur ET

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5. Again, a sense does not have to multiply on account of the multiplicity of its objects, because the same sight perceives white and black, and red and transparent. 6. The opposite seems to be the intent of Aristotle, for he raises this question about the sense of touch: is it one or many? And later on he seems to answer the question when he says: “Each sense seems to be of one contrariety, as sight is of black and white, hearing of low and high, taste of bitter and sweet. But among tangibles there are several contrarieties: hot and cold, wet and dry, hard and soft, and others of this sort.” 7. Again, each sense should properly belong to a single genus of sensibles, just as each science belongs to a genus of knowables, as stated in Metaphysics IV, for example, sight is of color, hearing is of sound, smell is of odor, taste is of taste. But there is not one genus of sensibles proper to touch in this way, and that is because there are not several contrarieties of species immediately belonging to a single genus. Thus, there is not one genus proper to hot and cold, and wet and dry. Therefore, touch, which is perceptive of these, is not one sense either. And it is this argument that Aristotle seemed to indicate in the second book of this work, when he says: “there is not obviously one subject of touch, as sound is a single subject of hearing.” And by “one subject” he means one sensible genus. For he often calls a genus a subject. 8. We should say first that every touch, in the sense in which we are now speaking about touch, is one sense. For we are not talking

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pides tangunt se, sed prout hoc nomen tactus significat appropriate sensum vel sensus perceptivus vel perceptivos calidi, frigidi, humidi, et sicci. Sic ergo capiendo tactum, dicta conclusio de proprietate sermonis apparet, quia omnis sensus est unus sensus, et omnis tactus est sensus, igitur omnis tactus est unus sensus. Maior patet quarto Metaphysicae, idem enim est unus homo et homo, ens homo et homo. Immo etiam omnis populus est unus populus, quamvis non sit aliquid unum, et omnis exercitus est unus exercitus. 9. Etiam hoc tamen non obstante, potest poni conclusio secunda quod tactus est plures sensus, quia totum est suae partes. Sensus tactus in equo est extensus et divisibilis quantitative, scilicet est utraque pars sensus. Ideo sic iste sensus est plures sensus, sicut una aqua est plures aquae. 10. Sed sciendum quod haec non sunt quae intendebat Aristoteles quaerere in formando quaestionem motam. Sed dubitatio erat utrum sit unus et idem sensus quo possumus percipere calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, durum et molle, et alia tangibilia. Et respondetur communiter quod bene est unus sensus materialiter sed non unus formaliter, quia idem est organum secundum materiam et quantitatem, sed secundum aliam dispositionem qualitativam est perceptivus calidi et frigidi, et secundum aliam humidi et sicci. 11. Sed magis dearticulando veritatem pono tertiam conclusionem quod si hoc nomen tactus capiamus prout supponit pro anima vel parte animae, sic eodem sensu bene sentimus calidum et siccum, humidum et frigidum, durum et molle, et alia tangibilia. Immo sic eodem sensu sentimus calidum et frigidum, dulce et amarum, est enim una et eadem anima vel pars animae in lingua sentiens omnia haec.

51–52 quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.2 1003b19. 48 sensus perceptivus ] sensum perceptionis T 49 tactum ] hoc nomen tactus tunc quantum est de virtute semonis A hoc nomen tactus E 52 unus . . . homo ] unus sensus homo et hoc ens T 56 sensus ] sicut una aqua add. E 57 equo ] in quo T || est ] in add. A 58 pars ] parte A 65 materiam ] identitatem T 69 tactus ] sensus TVW || prout supponit ] om. AE

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about touch in the sense in which two stones touch each other, but in the sense in which the word ‘touch’ properly signifies the sense or senses that is or are perceptive of hot, cold, wet, and dry. Taking ‘touch’ in this sense, the aforementioned conclusion is obvious in the strict sense, for every sense is one sense, and every touch is a sense; therefore, every touch is one sense. The major premise is clear on the basis of Metaphysics IV. For one human and a human are the same, as are a human being and a human.239 Indeed, every people is one people, even if not something one, and every army is one army. 9. Nevertheless, this point notwithstanding, one may also posit the second conclusion, namely that touch is several senses, for a whole is its parts. The sense of touch in a horse is extended and quantitatively divisible, so both of its parts are this sense. Therefore, in this way this sense is several senses, just as one body of water is several bodies of water.240 10. We should know, however, that these are not the issues that Aristotle meant to inquire about when he formed the question raised above. Rather, the question was whether it is one and the same sense by which we can perceive hot and cold, wet and dry, hard and soft, and other tangibles. And it is commonly replied that it is certainly one sense materially, although not formally, for it is the same organ in matter and quantity , but it is by means of one qualitative disposition that it is perceptive of hot and cold, and another by which it is perceptive of wet and dry. 11. But to articulate the truth better, I lay down the third conclusion, namely that if we take the name ‘touch’ to supposit for the soul or for a part of the soul, then we certainly sense hot and dry, wet and cold, hard and soft, and other tangibles by the same sense. Indeed, in this way we sense hot and cold and sweet and bitter by the same sense, for it is one and the same soul or part of the soul in the tongue that senses all these. 239 Buridan

is appealing here to the Aristotelian principle of the convertibility of being and unity: whatever is a being is one thing, and whatever is one thing is a being, but it is called ‘being’ on account of its actual existence, whereas it is called ‘one’ on account of its being undivided. 240 Idiomatic English, with its strong syntactic markers for distinguishing mass nouns from count nouns, does not quite allow a more literal translation of the Latin, even if we have documented uses of both ‘one water’ and ‘waters’.

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12. Quarta conclusio est quod si hoc nomen sensus poneretur supponere pro composito substantiali ex anima et corpore, adhuc eodem sensu sentimus praedicta sensibilia, et hoc satis est manifestum. 13. Sed quinta conclusio est quod si sensum capiamus pro aggregato ex huiusmodi composito substantiali et qualitativa dispositione secundum quam organum est receptivum speciei sensibilis et secundum quam huiusmodi compositum substantiale est cognitivum ipsius sensibilis, tunc non eodem sensu cognoscimus dicta sensibilia, sed alio sensu calidum et frigidum, alio humidum et siccum, et alio dulce et amarum. Nam per totum corpus inveniuntur qualitativae dispositiones ad cognoscendum calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, sed aliae sunt dispositiones speciales ad cognoscendum dulce et amarum quae solum inveniuntur in lingua vel prope. Et ideo non dubitatur quin sit alius sensus tactus et gustus. Sed etiam secundum alias dispositiones qualitativas recipiuntur species calidi et frigidi in organo sensus, et secundum alias species humidi et sicci, vel etiam secundum aliam dispositionem qualitativam organi anima iudicat de calido et frigido, et secundum aliam de humido et sicco. Tactus enim, prout vult Aristoteles, cum non possit esse denudatus totaliter a calido et frigido, humido et sicco, debet consistere, quantum ad organum, in media proportione huiusmodi qualitatum, ita quod sit denudatus ab excellentiis earum ut possit percipere huiusmodi excellentias. Oportet enim sensum esse denudatum a sensibili quod debet apprehendere vel cuius debet speciem recipere, secundum determinationem Aristotelis et Commentatoris. 14. Nunc igitur videmus quod sensus tactus seu eius organum non est denudatum ab excellentiis calidi et frigidi ea ratione qua est in media proportione humidi et sicci, sed ea ratione qua est in media proportione calidi et frigidi. Ideo non secundum mediam proportionem humidi et sicci tactus est cognoscitivus calidi et frigidi excedentium, 92 vult Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a6. 97 Aristotelis ] A RI STOTELES , De an. II.7 418b 26. 98 Commentatoris ] AVERROES , Comm. De an. II.7 (ed. Crawford, 238.9–239.33). 79 receptivum ] repraesentativum V 81 cognoscimus ] sentimus AE 83 inveniuntur qualitativae ] om. TV || inveniuntur ] om. W 83–84 dispositiones ] animae sunt add. TVW 89 sensus ] om. W 94 sit ] debet esse A posset esse E || ab ] aliis T 102 mediam ] om. AV 103 frigidi ] sicci A || excedentium ] excellentium aut frigidi A

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12. The fourth conclusion is that if the name ‘sense’ were taken to supposit for the aforementioned composite of soul and body, we would still sense all sensibles by the same sense, as is obvious enough. 13. But the fifth conclusion is that if we take ‘sense’ for the aggregate of this sort of substantial composite and the qualitative disposition on account of which the organ is receptive of sensible species, and on account of which the substantial composite of this kind is cognizant of the sensible thing itself, then it is not by the same sense that we cognize the aforementioned sensibles, but by one sense hot and cold, and by another wet and dry, and by yet another sweet and bitter. For qualitative dispositions for cognizing hot and cold and wet and dry are found throughout the entire body, but there are other, specific dispositions for cognizing sweet and bitter, which are found only in the tongue or nearby. Thus, there is no doubt that touch and taste are different senses. But also, the species of hot and cold are received in the sense organ on account of different qualitative dispositions than the species of wet and dry, indeed, it is on account of one qualitative disposition of the organ that the soul judges about hot and cold and on account of another that it judges about wet and dry. For according to Aristotle, because touch cannot be entirely stripped of hot and cold or wet and dry, it must consist, as far as the organ is concerned, in a mean proportion of these qualities, so that freed from their extremes, it might be able to perceive them. For sense has to lack the sensible that it is supposed to apprehend or whose species it is supposed to receive, according to the determination of Aristotle and the Commentator. 14. Now we see, then, that the sense of touch or its organ does not lack the extremes of hot and cold because it is in the mean proportion of wet and dry, but because it is in the mean proportion of hot and cold. Therefore, it is not because of the mean proportion of wet and dry that touch is cognizant of the extremes of hot and cold and

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110

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nec est perceptivus specierum suarum, sed secundum mediam proportionem calidi et frigidi. Et e converso, pari ratione, non secundum mediam proportionem calidi et frigidi tactus est cognoscitivus humidi et sicci excedentium, sed secundum mediam proportionem humidi et sicci. Sed constat quod alia est dispositio qualitativa quae est proportio media calidi et frigidi, et alia quae est proportio media humidi et sicci, licet contingat eas esse in eodem subiecto simul. Igitur sequitur propositum, scilicet quod secundum aliam et aliam dispositionem qualitativam potentia tactiva est perceptiva calidi et frigidi ex una parte et humidi et sicci ex alia parte. Ideo sic est duplex sensus tactus, capiendo tactum pro aggregato ex composito substantiali et dispositione qualitativa, etc., sicut a principio proponebatur. 15. Sed propter solutiones rationum, notandum est primo quod secundum eamdem dispositionem qualitativam organi nos percipimus calidum quod in caliditate excedit illam dispositionem seu mediam proportionem, et frigidum quod etiam in frigiditate excedit illam mediam proportionem. Ideo propter perceptionem contrariorum, non oportet ponere alios sensus ab invicem, nec secundum aliam formam nec secundum materiam nec secundum dispositionem organi qualitativam aut quantitativam. 16. Notandum est secundo quod ista quae sentiuntur per modum sensibilium communium reducta fuerunt prius ad magnitudinem vel situm. Ideo non requirunt diversitatem qualitativam in organo, sed solum quod organum sit quantum, prout sensibilia secundum diversos situs eorum possint organum sensus movere secundum diversos situs.

125–126 reducta . . . situm ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.13, par. 25. 104 perceptivus ] receptivus TV 104–105 proportionem ] humidi et sicci est cognoscitivus add. V 105 frigidi ] tactus est cognoscitivus calidi et frigidi humidi et sicci add. W 105–106 et econverso . . . frigidi ] om. A 108 quae ] qua V 109 quae ] qua VW || humidi ] calidi V 111 propositum ] proportio T 119–120 mediam ] om. W 121 alios ] aliquos T || sensus ] distinctas add. A percipere add. V || aliam ] om. A animam T || formam ] om. ET 126 diversitatem ] dispositionem W 128 organum sensus ] om. ET

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perceptive of their species, but because of the mean proportion of hot and cold. And conversely, for the same reason, it is not because of the mean proportion of hot and cold that touch is cognizant of the extremes of wet and dry, but according to the mean proportion of wet and dry. However, it is clear that the qualitative disposition that is the mean proportion between hot and cold is different than the mean proportion between wet and dry, although they may occur in the same subject at the same time. Therefore, the thesis follows, namely that it is on account of different qualitative dispositions that the power of touch is perceptive of hot and cold on the one hand and of wet and dry on the other. And so touch is a double sense in this way, taking ‘touch’ to stand for the aggregate of the substantial composite and the qualitative dispositions, etc., as it was proposed at the beginning of the fifth conclusion above. 15. However, in order to resolve the arguments on the other side, we should note first that it is on account of the same qualitative disposition of the organ that we perceive hot that exceeds in hotness this disposition or mean proportion, and cold that also exceeds in coldness this mean proportion. Thus, there is no need to posit senses that differ from one another to explain the perception of contraries, whether other in form or in matter or in the qualitative or quantitative disposition of the organ. 16. We should note in the second place that those things that are sensed in the way of common sensibles have earlier been reduced to magnitude or location. Therefore, they do not require qualitative diversity in the organ, but only that the organ be extended, so that the sensibles in their diverse locations can move the organ of sense in diverse locations.

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17. Tunc igitur solvendae sunt rationes. 18. Prima ratio concessa est, sicut arguit, quia nec alius ex parte animae nec alius ex parte corporis quantum ad eius substantiam. 19. De secunda autem dicetur in quaestione sequenti. 20. Ad tertiam dicendum est quod colores quodammodo participant naturam lucis, licet obumbrate propter opacitatem. Ideo in eodem subiecto secundum eamdem dispositionem qualitativam illius subiecti faciunt suas species, scilicet ratione diaphaneitatis. Ideo non oportet organum visus, secundum aliam et aliam dispositionem qualitativam ipsius, esse receptivum speciei lucis et speciei coloris. Et non est ita de calido et humido et de eorum speciebus. Quod autem dicitur quod habemus duos oculos, apparet quod illi in iudicando de visibilibus sunt eiusdem rationis tali modo, quia de quibus unus oculus iudicat de eis alius iudicat, et secundum similem qualitativam dispositionem, puta diaphaneitatem, quamvis sit secundum quantitatem et situm diversitas. Et ita etiam conceditur quod non est simpliciter unus et idem tactus in pede equi et in aure, sed est in eis diversitas quantitativa partium corporis et animae et qualitatum et quantitatum. De hac enim multitudine non quaeritur, sed de diversitate specifica qualitativarum dispositionum organorum in quibus anima exercet suos actus cognoscendi seu sentiendi. 21. Ad quartam dicitur quod tactus dicitur duplex sensus quia est perceptivus duplicis contrarietatis, quarum una est innata percipi per unam dispositionem qualitativam organi et alia per aliam. Si autem essent perceptibiles secundum eamdem, tunc non sic dicerentur plures sensus. Ideo et auditus non dicetur sic plures sensus quia omnes istas contrarietates sonorum percipit secundum eamdem organi dispositio-

132 quaestione sequenti ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.20. 133–134 participant ] recipiunt T 134 obumbrate ] obumbrative V 135 qualitativam illius ] om. E 139 humido ] frigido VW 144 conceditur ] concederetur V || unus et ] om. W 146 qualitatum et quantitatum ] qualitatibus et quantitatibus A 147 multitudine ] multiplicatione ET 150 duplex sensus ] sensus dupliciter T

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17. Next, therefore, we should respond to the initial arguments. 18. The first objection241 has been conceded as it argued, for is not diversified in its substance either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body, with regard to its substance.242 19. The second243 will be discussed in the next question. 20. To the third,244 we should respond that colors in some way participate in the nature of light, although in an adumbrated fashion, because of their opacity. Therefore, they produce their species in the same subject on account of the same qualitative disposition in that subject, namely on account of its transparency. Therefore, the organ of sight does not have to be receptive of the species of light and color on account of different qualitative dispositions in it. However, the case is not the same with hot and wet and their species. As for what was said about our having two eyes, it is clear that they are of the same nature when they judge about visible things in this way, because whatever the one makes judgment about, the other does too, and on account of the same qualitative disposition, namely transparency, although there is diversity with regard to quantity and location. And in this way it is also conceded that it is not absolutely one and the same sense of touch in the foot and ear of a horse, but there is in them a quantitative diversity of the parts of the body, and of the soul and of quantities and qualities. However, the question does not concern this sort of multiplicity, but the specific diversity of the qualitative dispositions of the organs whereby the soul performs its acts of cognition and sensation. 21. To the fourth245 it is replied that touch is a double sense, for it is perceptive of two contrarieties, one of which is naturally suited to be perceived by a single qualitative disposition in the organ, and the other by another. But if they were perceptible by the same, then touch would not be said to be multiple in this way. And this is why hearing is not said to be several senses in this way, for it perceives all

241 See

par. par. 243 See par. 244 See par. 245 See par. 242 See

1 above. 1 above. 2 above. 3 above. 4 above.

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160

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nem qualitativam. Nec etiam tactus sic dicitur triplex aut quadruplex sensus quia istae contrarietates grave et leve, durum et molle, percipiuntur per modum sensibilium communium et non requirunt alias dispositiones qualitativas in organo ab illis secundum quas sentiuntur calidum, frigidum, humidum, et siccum. 22. Ad ultimam dicendum est eodem modo, scilicet quod non sit multiplicatum praedicto modo sensus propter obiectorum multiplicationem nisi sit talis diversitas obiectorum quae ad perceptionem eorum requirat diversas dispositiones qualitativas organorum. Sic patet illa quaestio.

157 grave et leve ] om. A || leve ] asperum et lene add. W 161 non sit ] om. T || sit ] oportet A om. E 162 multiplicatum ] multiplicari A multiplicationi T

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contrarieties of sound by the same qualitative disposition in the organ. Indeed, the sense of touch is not said to be triple or quadruple in this way, for the contrarieties of heavy and light, and hard and soft are perceived in the way of common sensibles, and they do not require different qualitative dispositions in the organ than those by which hot and cold and wet and dry are perceived. 22. To the last one246 we should reply in the same way, namely that sense is not multiplied in the aforesaid way on account of the multiplication of objects, unless there is such a diversity of objects that requires diverse qualitative dispositions of organs for their perception. And this question is clear in this way.

246 See

par. 5 above.

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Utrum sint tantum quinque sensus exteriores.

5

10

15

20

1. Et arguitur quod sint plures, quia statim dictum est quod duplex est sensus tactus, et praeter illum sunt alii quatuor, scilicet visus, auditus, olfactus, et gustus; igitur sunt sex. 2. Item Aristoteles distinguit de visu tamquam ponens duplicem visum, dicens in capitulo de sensu communi quod “non est unum visu sentire.” 3. Item nec tactus est unicus sensus, nec visus, nec auditus, quia nullus eorum est unici generis vel unicae contrarietatis, sicut arguebatur in alia quaestione. 4. Item vel tu quaeris in diversis suppositis vel in uno. Si in diversis, constat quod sunt valde multi quia quinque in me et quinque alii in te, ideo decem, sic de aliis suppositis. Et si quaeris in uno supposito, tunc vel tu distinguis eos ex parte obiectorum, et tunc valde multi sunt, vel ex parte mediorum, et tunc idem est visus et auditus et saepe olfactus, et in lingua idem est tactus et gustus, vel ex parte organorum, et tunc est duplex visus duplex auditus, quia duae aures et duo oculi, et idem tactus et gustus in lingua. 5. Item si quinque, hoc est aut quinque numero aut specie aut genere aut analogia, quia hanc divisionem ponit Aristoteles quinto Me-

1 Utrum . . . exteriores ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 424b22. 3 tactus ] BUR IDANUS , QQ. De an. II.19. 5 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES , De an. III.2, 425b 20– 21 (Ar. lat. XII.2 172.1.14): “Manifestum igitur quoniam non est unum visu sentire.” 10 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.19. 20–21 quinto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.9, 1018a10. 3 duplex est sensus ] sint plures VW 9 generis ] sensibilis add. A 11 diversis ] quibusdam T

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 26

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Are there only five external senses?

1. And it is argued that there are more, since we have just established that touch is a double sense, and besides touch there are four others, namely sight, hearing, smell, and taste; therefore, there are six. 2. Again, Aristotle distinguishes sight, as if positing two sights, when he says in the chapter about common sense that “one cannot sense by one sight.” 3. Again, neither touch, nor sight, nor hearing is a single sense, for none of them pertains to a single genus or to a single contrariety, as was argued in the previous question. 4. Again, the question concerns either several concrete sensing subjects or only one. If several, then it is clear that there are many more because there are five in me and five others in you, and thus we have ten, and so on for others. And if the question concerns one concrete sensing subject then are distinguished either on account of their objects, and then there are very many of them, or on account of the medium, in which case sight and hearing, and often smell, are the same, and touch and taste are the same in the tongue or they are distinguished on account of the organs, and then there are two sights and two hearings, for there are two ears and two eyes, and touch and taste are the same in the tongue. 5. Again, if there are five external senses, then they are five either in number, or in species, or in genus, or by analogy, for Aristotle

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 26

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taphysicae. Et tamen ibidem dicit quod tot modis dicuntur multa, quot modis dicitur unum. Sed non est dicendum quod solum quinque numero, quia alii mei alii tui; et eiusdem equi duo oculi sunt diversi numero et alia omnia quorum unum est in uno oculo et aliud in alio sunt diversa numero. Nec sunt quinque tantum specie, quia sensus est principaliter ipsa anima quae in homine, in equo, in capra, in asino, et sic de pluribus aliis, est diversae speciei. Ideo sic non solum visus ab auditu est alterius speciei, immo etiam visus in equo et visus in asino. Nec sunt quinque secundum genus vel analogiam, sed omnis unus, quia omnium est genus unum, scilicet hoc nomen sensus. 6. Item arguitur aliquantulum difficile quia membra genitalia per suas proprias naturas et complexiones sentiunt appropriatas qualitates quas alia membra non sentiunt nec alia organa. Igitur in eis est alius sensus et alterius rationis praeter illos qui in aliis membris inveniuntur. Consequentia patet quia aliter tu non posses habere rationem quod esset alius sensus tactus et gustus. Sed antecedens manifestum est quia membra genitalia sentiunt qualitates spermatum secundum quas delectantur, quas non sentirent alia membra, ut manus aut pes, quod patet quia non sic in illis delectantur. 7. Oppositum determinat Aristoteles dicens, “Quod autem non sit sensus alius praeter quinque (Dico auten hos visum, auditum, olfactum, gustum, et tactum) ex hiis crederet aliquis, etc.”

21 ibidem ] A RISTOTELES, Met. X.1, 1052a15–18 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 196.22): “Dicitur quidem igitur unum tot modis: continuum natura et totum et singulare et universale.” 40 Aristoteles dicens ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 424b22 (Ar. lat. XII.2 25.177.1.1): “Quod autem non sit sensus alter praeter quinque (dico autem hos visum, auditum, olfactum, gustum, tactum), ex hiis credet aliquis.” 26 asino ] in bove et hirco add. A in bove add. E 27 diversae ] diversa VW 28 ab ] cum W || et visus ] a visu W 29 sunt ] possunt esse V possent esse W 30 omnium ] omni T 32 appropriatas ] approprietate V 38–39 quod patet ] om. W 39 quia ] alia membra add. A || illis ] talibus VW

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proposed this division in Metaphysics V. And he also says in the same place that things are said to be many in as many ways as they are said to be one.247 But we should not say that they are only five in number, for mine are other than yours; and the two eyes of the same horse are diverse in number, and for all other visible things, of which one is in one eye and another in the other, are diverse in number. And there are not only five senses in species, for sense is principally the soul which, in a human being, horse, goat, donkey, and so as regards many others, belongs to diverse species. Therefore, in this way it is not only sight that differs in species from hearing, but also the sight of a horse and the sight of a donkey differ in species. Nor are there five senses by genus or analogy, but all are one, because there is one genus for all, that is to say, the name ‘sense’. 6. Again, there is another argument posing some difficulty, because the genital organs, on account of their proper nature and constitution, sense qualities proper to them that other members or organs do not sense. Therefore, in the genital organs there is another sense of a different nature than those that that are found in other members. The consequence is clear, because otherwise you could have no reason why touch would be a different sense than taste. But the antecedent is clear, because the genital organs sense the qualities of sperm in which they find pleasure, which other members, such as the hand or foot, obviously do not sense because of the fact that they do not find pleasure in them. 7. The opposite is established by Aristotle, when he says: “That there is no other sense besides these five (and these, I say, are sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch) one may believe on the basis of the following . . . ” 247 Concerning

this distinction, consider Peter Geach’s example of the cheeky schoolboy who, being told by his teacher to list five animals they saw in the zoo, says: “Elephant, giraffe, zebra, and two monkeys.” Clearly, the boy listed five animals different in number, but only four animals different in kind.

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8. Notandum est quod hanc questionem intelligimus ad praesens de sensibus exterioribus solum, quia etiam de illis solum loquebatur Aristoteles in auctoritate immediate allegata. Dicuntur autem illi sensus exteriores non quia sunt in exteriori superficie corporis — visus autem non est in extremitate pupillae, ut dicit Aristoteles in libro De sensu et sensato — sed dicuntur exteriores quia immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus sibi, non mediante alio sensu. 9. Unde dubitaret aliquis quando sentimus dolorem in membris interioribus, ut in colica passione aut in renibus per distensum lapidis de renibus ad vesicam aut in dolore capitis aut huiusmodi, utrum sentiamus talem dolorem sensu exteriori vel interiori. Et ego dico quod hoc est sensu exteriori, prout hic loquimur de sensu exteriori, quia sensibile est extra organum immutatum, licet non extra totaliter corpus nostrum, quia sensibile positum supra sensum non debeat sentiri, sicut dicetur post. Et sic dico quod illud sensibile immutat illud organum non mediante immutatione alterius organi. Sensum autem communem et phantasiam dicimus interiores, quia immutatio eorum est mediante immutatione aliorum organorum sensitivorum, ut per visum, auditum, olfactum, gustum, et tactum. 10. Et notandum est etiam quod non quaerimus de multitudine sensuum secundum distinctionem individualem, quia nullus sciret quot sunt nisi Deus, sunt enim alii et alii in aliis et aliis suppositis animalium. Sed quaerimus de multitudine secundum distinctionem specificam sensuum. Non dico secundum distinctionem specificam aliorum animalium, sed dico secundum distinctionem specierum sub hoc genere sensus exterior contentarum, quam distinctionem attendimus penes diversitatem sensibilium non possibilium sentiri nisi secundum eamdem dispositionem qualitativam organi. Unde sic visum hominis

47 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu II 438b 8. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.21.

57 sicut dicetur post ]

45 immediate ] om. AE 51 colica ] colerica E colenta V || renibus ] dolore renum TVW 52 de renibus ] om. AV || vesicam ] loca seu partes vesicae A 56 quia ] si TVW 57 sic dico ] om. W 65 distinctionem ] substantiam T 67 animalium ] om. T 68 genere ] nomine AE 69 sensibilium ] sensuum T || possibilium ] posse VW || nisi ] om. AEVW

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8. We should note that for now we understand this question as concerning only the external senses, for these are the ones Aristotle was talking about in the text just quoted. These are called ‘external senses’ not because they are on the external surface of the body — for sight is not on the surface of the pupil, as Aristotle claims in On Sense and What is Sensed — but they are called external, because they are affected by sensibles external to them, without the mediation of another sense. 9. Hence, one might question whether we sense pain in our internal organs by an external sense, as in suffering from colic, or in the kidneys caused by a kidney stone passing into the bladder, or a headache, or the like. And I say that we sense these by external senses, in the way we are talking about external senses in this context, because the sensible thing is outside the affected organ, although not entirely outside our body, because a sensible thing placed directly upon a sense is not supposed to be sensed, as will be explained later. And so I say that the sensible in question affects the sense organ in question without the mediation of another organ. For we call the common sense and imagination ‘internal,’ because they are affected through the mediation of the change in other sense organs, namely sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. 10. And we should also note that we are not asking about the multitude of senses with regard to their individual distinction, for in that way only God knows how many there are, since they are different in different individual animals. But we are asking about their multitude with regard to the specific distinction of senses. And I do not mean the specific distinction of various animals, but the distinction of the species contained under the genus ‘external sense’, which we observe with regard to the diversity of sensibles that can only be sensed by a certain qualitative disposition of an organ. This is how we treat the

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et visum equi reputamus tamquam eumdem sensum, et tactum vermis et tactum hominis tamquam eumdem sensum, quia quae sentit tactus vermis eadem potest sentire quae tactus hominis et secundum similem qualitativam dispositionem in specie, licet non in gradu, scilicet secundum mediam proportionem calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci. 11. Unde notandum est sicut dicit Commentator quod, licet sit alius sensus calidi et frigidi et alius humidi et sicci secundum praedicta in praecedenti quaestione, tamen in hac enumeratione sensuum quinque Aristoteles accipit illos duos sensus tangendi tamquam unum, secundum modum loquendi vulgarem. Vulgus enim non distinguit inter eos quia in nullo membro invenitur unus sine alio. Ideo etiam non fuerunt eis diversa nomina imposita. Sed tamen non est intentio Aristotelis quin praedicto modo sint sex secundum rei veritatem, sed est intentio eius quod solum essent quinque si illi duo tactus non essent nisi unus, sicut ponit vulgus. 12. Ponenda est igitur prima conclusio cum Aristotele quod praedicto modo, solum sunt ponendi quinque sensus exteriores si non esset nisi unus tactus, ad talem sensum quod sub hoc genere sensus exterior continentur quinque species supponentes pro omnibus sensibus exterioribus dicto modo acceptis et non coincidentes in supponendo pro aliquo eodem. Nec praeter illas quinque sunt aliae species vel alii termini supponentes pro huiusmodi sensibus qui non coincidant cum aliqua aut aliquibus praedictarum specierum in supponendo pro eodem vel eisdem. Et hae autem species quinque nominantur appropriate et distincte hiis nominibus quinque, scilicet visus, auditus, olfactus, gustus, et tactus. Et ad probandum hanc conclusionem sic expositam, apparet mihi sufficere processus Aristotelis, quod enim sint illi quin-

76 Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.128 (ed. Crawford, 324.27–30). 78 praecedenti quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.19 86 cum Aristotele ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 424b23–425a14. 97 processus Aristotelis ] A RISTO TELES , De an. III.1 424b 22. 71 eumdem ] unum VW 72 quae sentit ] sensus VW 74 specie ] se E 83 sex ] plures sensus A plures E 89 species ] sensus V 90 non ] om. T || supponendo ] significando W 92 non ] om. W 92–93 aliqua . . . specierum ] praedictis TVW 97 processus ] textus VW || Aristotelis ] om. T

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sight of a human and the sight of a horse as if they were the same sense, and the touch of a worm and that of a human as the same sense, because the touch of a worm senses the same things that the touch of a human can sense by means of qualitative dispositions that are similar in species, although not in degree, that is to say, in keeping with the mean proportion of hot and cold, and wet and dry. 11. Whence we should note, just as the Commentator correctly points out, that although there is one sense for hot and cold and another for wet and dry in keeping with what was said in the previous question, nevertheless, in this enumeration of the five senses, Aristotle took those two senses of touch as one, in agreement with the common manner of speaking. This is because common folk do not distinguish between senses in which one never occurs in an organ without the other. Therefore, they have not even had different names imposed on them. However, Aristotle does not mean to say that in reality there are not six senses in the aforementioned way, but only that there are just five if those two kinds of touch were only one, as people commonly assume. 12. One should therefore posit the first conclusion with Aristotle that we should posit only five external senses in the aforementioned way as long as there is only one sense of touch, in the sense that under the genus ‘external sense’ are contained five species, suppositing for all the external senses understood in this way and not coinciding in suppositing for some one of them. And besides those five, there are no other species or terms suppositing for such senses not coinciding with one or any of the species listed above in suppositing for the same sense or senses. And these five species are appropriately and distinctly named by these five names, that is to say, ‘sight’, ‘hearing’, ‘smell’, ‘taste’ and ‘touch’. To prove the conclusion expounded in this way, Aristotle’s method seems to me to suffice, for we experience in our-

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que sensus sic distincti experimur in nobis. Est enim visus coloris per oculos et non per alia membra, quia non est in aliis membris dispositio qualitativa sufficiens ad sensationes colorum et receptiones specierum suarum. Et sic etiam secundo modo est auditus sonorum per aures, et tertio olfactus odorum per nares, et quarto gustus saporum per linguam, et quinto tactus calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci, qui est secundum dispositiones qualitativas alias a praedictis, quia inventas ubi illae de visu, auditu, olfactu, et gustu non inveniuntur, ut in pede vel in manu. 13. Sed quod, praeter istos, non sit alius sensus probatur quia praeter istos quinque non habemus alium vel alios, nam si haberemus alium, ille non lateret nos. Et cum nullus deficit nobis sensus secundum praedictam distinctionem, igitur non est alius ponendus. 14. Quod ergo nullus deficit nobis probat Aristoteles bene ex parte mediorum, obiectorum, et organorum. Primo hoc patet ex parte organorum, quia licet nullum organum debeat esse de elemento simplici, eo quod anima non est innata informare tale corpus simplex, unde organum sensus oportet esse mixtum ex elementis, et dominari aliquod elementorum. Modo organum ex aqua a dominio habemus manifeste, scilicet organum visus. Et similiter organum ex aere a dominio, scilicet auditum. Terra autem, si nimis dominaretur, esset inepta ad sentiendum propter eius nimiam grossitudinem, propter quod etiam ossa et plantae non sentiunt quia nimis sunt terrestria. Si tamen organum debeat esse de terra reducta aliis elementis ad proportionem, adhuc talem organum habemus, scilicet gustus et tactus. Deinde etiam ignis a dominio non valeret, quia propter eius nimiam activitatem destrueret proportionem in qua oportet vitam consistere. Ignis autem, ad proportionem redactus cum aliis elementis, est omnibus organis sensuum communis, quia nullum opus vitale anima potest exercere sine 111 probat Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1. 101 secundo ] suo W 112 obiectorum . . . parte ] et A 114 unde ] quare W 115 mixtum ex ] simplex cum T 117 organum visus ] visum TV 121 terra ] a dominio add. A 123 a ] multo add. TV 125 est ] in T 126 communis ] conveniens TV

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selves that we have those five senses distinguished in this way. For we see color with our eyes and not with other organs, because other organs lack the qualitative disposition sufficient for sensing colors and receiving their species. And so, in the second way, we hear sounds with our ears, in third way, smell senses odors by the nostrils, in the fourth way taste senses flavors by the tongue, and in the fifth way touch senses hot and cold, and wet and dry on account of qualitative dispositions different from those already mentioned, because they can be found where those pertaining to sight, hearing, smell and taste do not occur, as in the foot or the hand. 13. That there are no other senses besides these is proved by the fact that, besides these five, we do not have any other or others, for, if we were to have another, it would not escape us. And since no sense is missing for us in accordance with the foregoing distinction, we should not assume another one. 14. Hence, Aristotle correctly proves that no sense is lacking in us on the part of media, objects and organs. In the first place, this is clear on the part of organs, for given that no organ should consist of a simple element, since a soul is naturally unable to inform such a simple body, it follows that a sense organ has to be a mixture of several elements and be dominated by some one of them. Now the organ we have clearly dominated by water is the organ of vision. And likewise the sense organ dominated by air is hearing. But earth, if too heavily dominant, would render sense ineffective because of its density, for which reason bones and plants do not sense, since they are too earthy. Yet, if the proportion of earth were reduced in relation to the other elements, then we would have such organs as taste and touch. Furthermore, fire, too, would be useless if it were dominant, for it would destroy the proportion necessary for life to exist, because of its strong activity. However, fire, brought into proportion with the other elements, is common to all organs of the senses, since the soul

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calore. Et si oporteret aliquod organum appropriari igni, illud esset organum olfactus, ut dicitur in De sensu et sensato, et illum habemus. Igitur non deficit nobis aliquis sensus ex parte organi. 15. Secundo etiam ostenditur quod non deficit nobis sensus aliquis ex parte mediorum, quia ad sentiendum vel requiritur medium intraneum scilicet quod est de natura et integritate animalis, vel medium extraneum. Si requiritur medium intraneum, constat quod tale habemus, scilicet carnem in sensu gustus et tactus. Et si debeat esse medium extraneum, adhuc apparet quod per talia sentimus, scilicet videmus, audimus, et odoramus, ut per aquam vel aerem. Etiam si debeat esse medium extraneum, illud debet pertingere ad nos, et quaecumque possunt ad aliquod animal pertingere, illa etiam vel similia possunt ad nos pertingere. Igitur manifestum est quod nullus nobis deficit sensus ex parte medii. 16. Tertio ostenditur quod non deficiat nobis sensus ex parte sensibilium communium nec ex parte propriorum. Primo probatur quod non ex parte propriorum, quia apparet quod per sensus nostros percipimus de quolibet genere sensibili omnes species, scilicet extremas et medias, ut visu omnis species coloris: album, nigrum, et medios, ut rubeum, croceum. Etiam et per auditum omnes sonos, ut acutum, gravem et etiam medios. Et sic de odoribus quantum ad olfactum, et de saporibus quantum ad gustum, et etiam de calido et frigido, humido et sicco et mediis ipsorum quantum ad tactum. 17. Sed contra hanc deductionem potest esse triplex cavillatio. Prima est quia falsum est quod tactus noster percipiat calidum et frigidum et omne medium ipsorum, quia dicit Aristoteles quod non percipit similiter calidum et similiter frigidum.

128 De sensu et sensato ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu II 438b 27. teles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a3.

152 dicit Aristo-

137 illud ] non T tunc W 138 pertingere ] attingere T 140 parte ] defectu TVW 141–142 sensibilium ] quia nec ex parte sensibilium add. W 144 omnes ] omnis TV || extremas ] extraneas W 145 omnis ] omnes A || medios ] colores add. W 146 sonos ] extremos add. A 146–147 grave . . . medios ] om. V 152 omne ] etiam T

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can exercise no vital function without heat. But if one were to allocate fire to some organ then it would be the organ of smell, as stated in On Sense and What is Sensed. And we have that sense. Therefore, we do not lack any sense on the part of the organ. 15. In the second place, it is shown that we do not lack any sense on the part of the medium either, because sensing requires either an internal medium, namely one that pertains to the nature and integrity of the animal, or an external medium. If an internal medium is required, it is clear that we have such, namely flesh in the sense of taste and touch. And if the medium is supposed to be external, then it is also clear that we sense, that is to say, we see, hear, and smell, through such media as water and air. Furthermore, if the medium is supposed to be external, then it is supposed to reach us, and whatever can reach an animal, those or similar things can also reach us. Therefore, it is clear that we do not lack any sense on the part of the medium. 16. In the third place it is shown that we do not lack a sense on the part of common sensibles or on the part of proper sensibles. First, on account of the proper sensibles, it is clear that by our senses we perceive all species of any sensible genus, namely both the extremes and their means; for instance, by sight, all species of colors: white, black, and their means, such as red and yellow. Also, by hearing, we perceive all sounds, the high, the low, and the means. And the same goes for odors, as far as smell is concerned, and flavors, as far as taste is concerned, and also hot and cold, wet and dry, and their means, as far as touch is concerned. 17. But one may raise three trivial objections against this deduction. The first is that it is false that our touch perceives hot and cold and all their means, for Aristotle says that it does not sense what is as warm or cold as itself.

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18. Secunda cavillatio est quia olfactus noster non est perceptivus omnium odorum, quia apparet nobis quod canes venatici persequuntur per sensum odoris animalia per vias et vestigia eorum, ubi tamen nullos eorum odores sentimus. 19. Tertia cavillatio est dicere quod quamvis de qualibet genere nobis sensibili sentiamus omnis species, tamen nobis forte occultum est unum totum genus sensibilium propter defectum sensus cui illud genus esset appropriatum. 20. Sed respondetur ad huiusmodi cavillationes. Ad primam dicitur quod si per manum meam non sentio sibi similiter calidum, tamen illud sentire possum per pedem quem habeo frigidiorem, et illud etiam calidum et in eodem gradu senties per manum quando manus erit frigidior. Unde dolens caput habens frontem calidam et manum frigidiorem experitur quod, ponendo manum ad frontem, sentit caliditatem frontis et per frontem frigiditatem manus. 21. Ad secundam cavillationem dicitur quod homo, ut vult Aristoteles, habet olfactum multis animalibus peiorem et organum minus bene dispositum, propter quod non percipit parvos odores et multum remissos possent quos percipere alia animalia, tamen de omni specie odoris potest percipere odores si sint intensi. Et sic bene concederetur quod non habemus sensus perceptivos omnium sensibilium secundum numerum, sed omnium secundum speciem. 22. Sed contra cavillationem tertiam obicitur quia nullus est aut esse potest sensus naturaliter quin debeat convenire alicui speciei animalium. Tamen non nisi animal sit innatum habere sensum. Et tamen

169–170 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.9 421a 11. 155–156 nobis . . . animalia ] om. T || persequuntur ] odores add. W 156 per . . . animalia ] odores per sensum alium V 165 quando ] quia T 166 habens ] habet AET 167 experitur ] hoc experimur A per manum add. T 168 frigiditatem ] om. T 172 alia ] multa E 174 non ] nos T 175 omnium ] non T 177 debeat ] potest T

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18. The second trivial objection is that our smell is not perceptive of all odors, since it is clear that hounds pursue animals by the sense of smell through their paths and tracks, where we sense no odor. 19. The third trivial objection is that although we sense all species in every genus sensible by us, nevertheless, perhaps an entire genus of sensibles is hidden from us, since we lack the sense that would be proper to that genus.248 20. But we respond to these trivial objections. To the first249 we respond that even if I do not feel with my hand the warmth of a thing that is as warm as my hand is, I am still able to sense it with my foot, which is colder, and you also feel that warmth to the same extetnt with your hand when your hand is colder. Thus, a headache sufferer, having a warm forehead and a cold hand, experiences that, by placing his hand on his forehead, he senses the warmth of his forehead and, through his forehead, the coldness of his hand. 21. To the second trivial objection250 it is replied that, as Aristotle says, humans have a sense of smell that is worse than many animals, and an olfactory organ that is not well disposed to odors. For this reason they do not perceive weak and very faint odors that other animals are able to perceive; however, they would be able to smell all species of odors if they are sufficiently intense. And thus it is readily conceded that we have senses that are perceptive not of all sensibles distinct in number, but of all sensibles distinct in species. 22. However, against the third trivial objection251 we reply that there neither is nor can be a sense that would not belong to some species of animals. By nature only an animal can have sense. Yet

248 Of

course Buridan could not have known about the perception of ultra-sound (available to bats) or electrolocation (available to sharks, rays, platypuses, and others), given that the relevant physical phenomena were not well understood at the time. 249 See par. 17 above. 250 See par. 18 above. 251 See par. 19 above.

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nullum invenimus animal quod videamus prosequi convenientia vel fugere nociva nisi propter sensus istorum sensibilium per quae innati sumus sentire. Ideo falsum est et fictum dicere quod sic sit aliud genus sensibilium. 23. Demum etiam probatur quod non deficit sensus nobis ex parte sensibilium communium, quia ad sentiendum ea non oportet esse alium sensum ab hiis quos habemus, ex quo ea sentimus per sensus nostros. Immo nullius sensibilium communium potest esse aliquis sensus proprius quia quod est sensibile proprium alicuius sensus, non sentitur per se alio sensu, et ista sensibilia communia sentiuntur per se a sensibus nostris. Ideo propter ista sensibilia non est ponendus alius sensus. Haec est determinatio Aristotelis et processus eius, sicut apparere potest in libro. 24. Et tunc est facile dicere ad rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis. De prima dictum fuit in tertio notabili. 25. Ad secundam dicitur quod Aristoteles per duplicem visum intendit visum exteriorem, cuius organum est oculus, et sensum communem, qui non est iam de sensibus exterioribus, quem aliquando vocamus visum prout sentit mediante visu exteriori. Et sic etiam possumus ipsum vocare auditum interiorem secundum quod sentit mediante auditu exteriori. Et hoc notat Aristoteles in capitulo de sensu communi. 26. De tertia ratione dictum fuit in fine praecedentis quaestionis et in penultimo paragrapho.

190 determinatio Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 425a14. 191 potest in libro ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. II.12 424b4–6. 199–200 capitulo de sensu communi ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.7 431a17. 201 praecedentis quaestionis ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.19 202 penultimo paragrapho ] BURIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.19, par. 21. 179 nullum ] videmus aut add. A videmus nec add. E vidimus et add. T 185 quo ] omnia add. A 188 ista ] ideo T ita V || communia ] om. W 189 propter ] praeter A 194 duplicem visum ] sensum ET 194–195 intendit ] intelligit V 195 et ] per add. VW 199 auditu ] sensu T 200 communi ] sensum communem add. V

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we find no animal that we see pursuing what is agreeable or fleeing what is harmful, unless because it senses these sensibles that we are naturally capable of sensing. Therefore, it is false and also fictitious to claim that there is another genus of sensibles. 23. Finally, it is also proved that we do not lack a sense on account of common sensibles, because to sense them, there is no need for a sense different from the ones we have, since we sense them by our senses. Therefore, there cannot be a proper sense for any common sensible because no proper sensible for any sense is sensed per se by another sense, yet these common sensibles are sensed per se by our senses. Therefore, one should not posit a separate sense because of these sensibles. This is Aristotle’s discussion and determination of the issue, as is clear from the text. 24. And then we can easily reply to the arguments that were made at the beginning of the question. As for the first,252 , it is answered by what was said in the third notable point above.253 25. To the second,254 we reply that by ‘two sights’ Aristotle meant external sight, whose organ is the eye, and common sense, which is not one of the external senses, and which we sometimes call ‘sight’, insofar as it senses by the mediation of external sight. And in this way we can even call it ‘internal hearing’, insofar as it senses by the mediation of external hearing. And this is what Aristotle notes in the chapter on common sense. 26. As for the third objection,255 we have dealt with that in the penultimate paragraph of the previous question. 252 See

par. par. 254 See par. 255 See par. 253 See

1 above. 11 above. 2 above. 3 above.

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27. Apparet etiam satis quid sit dicendum de quarta ratione per secundum notabile et per dicta in alia quaestione. 28. Et similiter etiam de quinta apparet per illud secundum notabile. 29. Sed ad ultimam dicitur quod ille sensus in membris genitalibus est sensus tactus, quod apparet quia non per medium extraneum sentit in tangendo. Sed tamen sic dicere non solvit dubitationem, quia sic gustus etiam est quidam tactus. Et ideo vel tu non distingues gustum contra tactum, et sic erunt solum quattuor sensus, vel, si distinguis gustum contra tactum, ita tu distinguis etiam istum sensum qui appropriate est in genitalibus contra tactum, et sic erunt sex sensus. Et hoc totum est contra Aristotelem. Et apparet quod etiam simile argumentum fieret de stomacho, per quem percipimus nos esurire et sitire, quod non percipiemus per manum vel per pedem, in quibus est tamen sensus tactus. Et dubitatio magis augetur quia in spermatizando est delectatio etiam intensa et non est delectatio vel tristitia nisi mediante cognitione, non intellectiva in proposito, quia huiusmodi delectatio convenit brutis. Igitur est cognitio sensitiva, et non solum secundum sensum communem vel phantasiam quia sensus communis et phantasia non moventur ad actus suos nisi mediante alio sensu prius facto in actu, scilicet mediante sensu quem vocamus exteriorem. Ideo describit Aristoteles phantasiam quod ipsa “est motus a sensu secundum actum factus.” Igitur sensu alio a sensu communi sentimus sperma in spermatizando. Et non sentimus ipsum per modum sensibilis communis nec per modum sensibilis per accidens solum, quia sic nihil sentimus nisi concomitanter cum sensibili per se et proprie. Numquam

204 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.19. 223–224 describit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.3 428b 13 (Ar. lat. XII.2 197.1.1): “est autem motum fieri ab actu sensus.” 209 in tangendo ] sed intrinsecum V sed per medium intrinsecum W 214 totum est ] apparet esse V 219 non ] om. E 220 convenit ] communicabitur A provenit T 225 factus ] facto TV facere V 226 sensibilis ] sensus T 227 nihil ] non VW

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27. It is also clear enough what one should respond to the fourth objection,256 in view of the second notable point and what has been said in the previous question.257 28. And the fifth258 is clear as well in light of that second notable point. 259 29. To the last,260 however, we respond that the sense in the genitals is the sense of touch, which is clear from the fact that it does not sense by an external medium in touching. Nevertheless, this response does not solve the problem, because taste is also a sort of touch. And so, either you do not distinguish taste from touch, and then there will be only four senses, or, if you do distinguish taste from touch, then you also distinguish from touch this sense that is assigned to the genitals, and then there will be six senses. And all this goes completely against Aristotle. Obviously, a similar objection could be raised about the stomach, by which we feel that we are hungry and thirsty, sensations we do not feel by the hand or by the foot, in which, nevertheless, there is the sense of touch. But the problem is rendered more difficult by the fact that during ejaculation there is also an intense pleasure, and there is no pleasure or pain without cognition, although not intellectual cognition in the case here, because such pleasure is also present in brute animals. Therefore, it is sensitive cognition, and not only by the common sense or imagination, because the common sense and imagination are only activated by the mediation of some other sense activated earlier, namely by means of a sense we call external. Therefore, Aristotle describes imagination in terms of “movement produced in keeping with an activated sense.” Thus, we sense the sperm in ejaculation by a sense other than the common sense. And we do not sense 256 See

par. 4 above. par. 10 above. 258 See par. 5 above. 259 See pars. 5–10 above, respectively. 260 See par. 6 above. 257 See

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enim visu exteriori iudicaremus magnitudinem, motum vel figuram, nisi cum sensatione coloris aut luminis vel lucis, nec auditu nisi cum sensatione soni. 30. Tunc ergo est magna dubitatio quid per modum sensibilis proprii sentimus in emissione spermatis. Si enim respondeatur quod sentimus et iudicamus aut calidum vel frigidum, humidum vel siccum, hoc apparet falsum; quamvis enim sperma sit calidum, tamen non iudicamus ipsum esse calidum ita nec frigidum nec humidum nec siccum, nisi forte cum iam sit extra emissum. Tunc enim ipsum superpositum membris illis, iudicaremus ipsum calidum vel frigidum, sicut manu vel pede iudicaremus talia. Sed de hoc non quaerimus, quoniam illud non est iudicium ad quod sequebatur illa principalis delectatio. Si enim sentimus sperma non ratione calidi aut frigidi, humidi aut sicci, quae sola dicuntur sensibilia propria tactus ut distinguitur a visu et gustu et aliis sensibus, sequitur quod ille sensus in membris genitalibus sit alius a tactu, sicut et gustus. Unde abbreviando praedicta potest sic argui: ille sensus debet poni distinctus a tactu sicut gustum dicimus esse distinctum ab eo qui sentit, non iudicando calidum nec frigidum nec humidum nec siccum. Sic autem est de illo sensu in membris genitalibus; ergo etc. Vel arguitur sic: licet sensus tactus sit expansus per totum corpus, tamen ille sensus debet dici formaliter distinctus a sensu tactus modo prius dicto, qui iudicat in organo de sensibile proprio de quo tactus non iudicaret in alio organo suo optime disposito ad cognoscendum qualitates proprie tangibiles. Sic autem est de illo sensu in membris genitalibus; ergo etc. Maior ex hoc patet quia qui negaret eam ipse non haberet viam ad probandum quod gustus esset sic distinctus a tactu. Et minor patet quia in membris illis, sensus iudicat de qualitate secundum quam est ista delectatio intensa quae est proprium sensibile in illo organo aliud a calido, frigido, humido, et sicco. Tamen de hiis ibi non iudicet et de illo non iudicaret tactus

233 in ] omni sensatione vel add. A 234 et iudicamus ] om. TW || et ] cum T 236 frigidum nec ] om. V 236–237 nec siccum ] om. W 237 extra emissum ] extramissum A 243 sensibus ] sensibilibus V 245 gustum ] distinguimus ab eo seu add. VW 250 organo ] proprio add. A || de sensibile ] om. T 252 qualitates proprie tangibiles ] tales proprietates tangibiles T 255 patet ] apparet TVW 258 et ] cum A quod T || de ] cum E

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it only in the way we sense common sensibles, or in the way we sense accidental sensibles, for in that way we sense only what is concomitant with per se and proper sensibles. For we never judge size, motion, or shape by external sight without the sensation of color, or illumination or light, or by hearing without the sensation of sound. 30. Thus, there is the big problem of what we sense as a proper sensible in the ejaculation of sperm. For if it were replied that we sense or judge hot or cold, wet or dry, this is clearly false; for even if sperm is hot, nevertheless, we do not judge it to be hot or cold, or wet or dry, except, perhaps, after it has been ejaculated. For when it gets on those members, we judge it to be hot or cold, just as we normally judge these qualities with our hand or foot. But we are not asking about this sensation, for this is not the one that is followed by that major pleasure. For if we sense sperm not insofar as it is hot or cold or wet or dry, which are said to be the only proper sensibles of touch as it is distinguished from sight and taste and the other senses, then it follows that this sense in the genitals is a different sense than touch, as is taste. Thus, summing up the foregoing, one may argue as follows: this sense has to be taken to be distinct from touch, just as we say taste is distinct from that which senses hot or cold or wet or dry without judging. But this is also the case with the sense in the genitals; therefore, etc. Or we may argue as follows: although the sense of touch extends throughout the body, nevertheless, a sense ought to be said to be formally distinct from the sense of touch in the way described above, if it judges, in an organ, a proper sensible that touch would not judge in its other organ which is optimally disposed to cognize properly tangible qualities. But this is the case with the sense in the genitals; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear, because whoever would deny it would have no way of proving that taste is thereby distinct from touch. And the minor premise is clear because in those members a sense judges about the quality on account of which that intense pleasure occurs, which is the proper sensible of

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in manu vel in pulpa digiti, quae tamen ponitur organum aptissimum et summe bene dispositum ad discernendum de propriis tangibilibus, scilicet de calido, frigido, humido, et sicco. 31. Forte si aliquis vellet sustinere in illis membris esse sensum formaliter distinctum a sensu tactus, sicut in lingua ponimus gustum distinctum a tactu, difficile esset demonstrare oppositum, quoniam auctoritas Aristotelis sive alterius philosophi non est demonstratio. Et si aliquis quaereret, dicens “assigna ergo mihi istam qualitatem quae est proprium sensibile isto sensu, ex quo ista nec est caliditas nec frigiditas nec humiditas nec siccitas,” ad hoc respondetur quod sibi non est nomen impositum, sed circumlocutive dicitur quod est ista qualitas ad cuius perceptionem sequitur talis intensa delectatio in illis membris, quam qualitatem et sensationem eius natura ingeniavit ut sequeretur ista delectatio, propter quam animal inclinaretur ad exercendum istam operationem ut inde proveniret sibi similis generatio, finaliter intenta a natura. 32. Tamen quia philosophi sic non dixerunt, etiam ego sic non dico, sed dico cum aliis quod non sit ibi sensus praedicto modo distinctus a tactu, et quod non sit ibi talis qualitas quam ista membra sentiant et quam non sentiret manus aut pes, quia ista manifeste sentiretur ex quo ad eius sensationem sequitur delectatio sic intensa. Et mirabile esset si sic manifeste sentiretur et non esset sibi nomen impositum. 33. Tota ergo dubitatio est cum sperma ibi non sentiantur secundum quod calidum et frigidum aut siccum, secundum quid ergo sentitur ad cuius sensationem illa delectatio consequitur? Et quare tanta delectatio consequitur quae tamen non consequitur in manu sentiente? Qui-

260 tangibilibus ] sensibilibus T 267 proprium sensibile ] proprie sensibilis A 269 circumlocutive ] circumloquentiae T 272 ista ] ad causam talis AE ad eam talis S || animal ] anima V 275 dixerunt ] distinxerunt AV 278 ista ] ita AE 281 non ] om. A 281–282 secundum quod ] quia non A 282 secundum quid ] sed qualitas T || ergo ] ibi E 283 tanta ] causatur A 284 consequitur ] om. A || consequitur ] sentitur A consequeretur E 284–285 Quidquid ] quid VW

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that organ, different from hot, cold, wet, and dry. Yet it does not judge there about those qualities, and touch does not judge this in the hand or fingertips, which are, nevertheless, taken to be the organs most apt and most well-disposed to discern the proper tangibles, namely hot, cold, wet, and dry. 31. Perhaps if someone wanted to maintain that there is a sense formally distinct from the sense of touch in these members, just as we hold that taste is distinct from touch in the tongue, the opposite would be difficult to prove, because the authority of Aristotle or some other philosopher is not a demonstration. And if someone were to say “identify for me, then, that quality which is the proper sensible of this sense, since it is neither warmth, nor coldness, nor wetness, nor dryness,” one may respond that this quality has no name given to it, but we can describe it by saying that it is the quality whose perception is followed by intense pleasure in those members, and that this quality and the sensation of it were fashioned by nature so that this pleasure should follow upon them, and for this reason an animal would be inclined to perform that activity so that generation of its like occurs, which is what is ultimately intended by nature. 32. However, since philosophers have not spoken this way, I also do not speak this way, but I say along with others that there is no sense there distinct from touch in the abovementioned way, and that there is no quality there such that these members would sense it and the hand or foot would not, because this clearly would be sensed, given that such intense pleasure follows upon its sensation. And it would be quite amazing if it were so manifestly sensed and had not been given a name. 33. Therefore, the whole question turns on this issue: since sperm are not sensed there in terms of being hot and cold or dry, what is it, then, whose sensation is followed by that pleasure? And why does such great pleasure result, which does not occur when the hand is

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dquid ista membra sentiunt? Ad hoc respondetur quod tactus, sive in manu aut in pede aut in aliis membris, bene percipit aliqua absque hoc quod iudicet de eorum caliditate, frigiditate, humiditate, vel siccitate. Tactu enim ut manu iudicamus durum quia resistit manui non cedens in seipsum, sed potius facit manum cedere in seipsam. Et molle etiam iudicamus quia sentimus ipsum cedere manui in seipsum. Sentimus asperum et leve. Et non oportet iudicando de istis iudicare simul quia calidum vel frigidum, humidum vel siccum, quia secundum Aristotelem non iudicaremus talia si illud quod sentimus esset similiter calidum, frigidum, humidum, vel siccum, sicut manus tangens. Et tamen non minus iudicaremus durum et molle, asperum et leve. Et scilicet muscam sentimus super manum nostram movere, licet non iudicemus an sit calida. Et aerem vel ventum contra nos motum percipimus et sentimus, licet sit nobis similis calidus. Et si quis moveat manum aut pedem nostram, percipimus ipsum vel ipsam moveri. Et cum sentis dolorem in renibus vel in capite, tu nihil iudicas an calidum vel frigidum, etc. Et haec est natura tactus, scilicet sentire tales motus ex eo quod medium est sibi coniunctum vel medio nobis connaturali. 34. Tunc ergo ad propositum diceretur quod in virga virili sentitur commotio spirituum et ventositatum inflammantium et fluxus spermatis et exterius aliae confricationes ad hoc concurrentes. Nec propter hoc oportet dicere quod ibi sit sensus alius nisi tactus. 35. Sed ratio quaerebat ultra: quare ex sensatione huiusmodi motuum in illis membris consequitur delectatio sic intensa et non sequitur ex sensatione talium in aliis membris, ut in manu vel in pede. Et pro solutione huius dubitationis oportet notare quod determinat Ari-

292–293 secundum Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a3 (Ar. lat. XII.2 163.2.18): “Unde similiter calidum et frigidum, aut durum et molle non sentimus, sed excellentias, tanquam sensu velut medietate quadam existente eius quae in sensibilibus contrarietatis.” 285 sentiunt ] sentiant V || respondetur ] respondeo T 288 ut ] cum T || quia ] et T 291 simul ] similiter AET 292 quia ] om. V 302 medium ] motum AE || coniunctum ] unitum T || vel ] est coniunctum add. A in T 303 sentitur ] sentimus A 304 commotio ] motus T 305 confricationes ] sensationes vel fricationes sentimus A

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sensing? Whatever do these members sense? To this it is replied that touch, whether in the hand or in the foot or in other members, does perceive certain things without judging their hotness, coldness, wetness or dryness. For, as with the hand in touch, we judge something to be hard because it resists the hand, not yielding in itself but rather making the hand yield. And we also judge something to be soft, because we sense it yielding to the hand. We also feel something to be rough and smooth. And it is not necessary when judging these qualities to judge at the same time hot or cold, wet or dry, because according to Aristotle, we would not pass judgment about such things if that which we sense were as hot or cold, wet or dry, as the hand touching it. And yet, we would no less judge hard and soft, rough and smooth. And we can feel a fly move on our hand, although we do not judge whether it is warm. And we also perceive and sense the air, or the wind blowing against us, even if it is just as warm as we are. And if someone moves our hand or our foot, we perceive it, or we feel it being moved. And when you feel a pain in your kidneys or in your head, you do not judge whether it is warm or cold, etc. And this is the nature of touch, namely to sense such motions, because it is conjoined with the medium or with a medium connatural to us. 34. Thus, we should respond to the question that what is sensed in the male member is the excitement of spirits, heated distension, the flow of sperm, and other external frictions contributing to all this at the same time. On the above account there is no need to speak of a sense there other than touch. 35. But the argument presses on: why does such intense pleasure follow upon the sensation of such motions in these members, and not from the sensation of such motions in other members, such as the hand or foot? And for the solution of this problem we should note

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stoteles primo Rhetoricae, scilicet quod motus sensibilis in existentem naturam, id est conveniens naturae, est causa delectationis, et apprehensionem eius consequitur naturaliter delectatio. Et sic e converso, motus sensibilis disconveniens naturae est causa tristitiae et eius apprehensionem sequitur naturaliter tristitia. In quo ergo membro et quando motus est conveniens naturae, si sentitur, consurgit delectatio. In quo autem membro vel quando motus qui sentitur non est conveniens naturae, non consurgit ex huiusmodi sensatione delectatio, quod apparet quia si homo famescit et sitit, descensus cibi et potus per os in stomachum est valde delectabilis, quia est conveniens naturae. Sed cum saturati sumus, tunc non est nobis talis motus delectabilis, sed abominabilis, quia non est conveniens naturae. Nunc ergo, cum generare sibi simile sit in viventibus naturalissimum operum, ut dicitur secundo huius, sequitur quod coitus et emissio spermatis et alii motus ad hoc ordinati et in membris in quibus sunt ad hoc ordinati, et quando natura hoc exigit, sunt valde delectabiles. Et non essent tales motus delectabiles in aliis membris non ad hoc per naturam ordinatis. 36. Et apparet mihi quod ex praedictis aliquis diligenter attendens potest omnes dissolvere rationes quae in principio questionis fuerunt adductae, etc.

311 primo Rhetoricae ] A RISTOTELES, Rhet. I.11 1369b33 (Ar. lat. XXXI.2 199.3): “Supponatur autem nobis esse delectationem motum quemdam animae et constitutionem simul totam et sensibilem in existentem naturam, tristitiam autem contrarium.” 324 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.2, 415a27. 311–312 existentem naturam ] existente TV 313–314 e converso ] e contra T 317–318 In . . . consurgit ] om. T 318 sensatione ] apprehensione VW || delectatio ] om. T 322 naturae ] om. T 328 diligenter ] et forte melius debiliter (!) add. A

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what Aristotle established in Rhetoric I, namely that a sensible motion into an existing nature, i.e. a motion that is agreeable to nature, is the cause of pleasure, and pleasure naturally follows upon its apprehension. And thus, conversely, a sensible motion disagreeable to nature is the cause of pain, and pain naturally follows upon its apprehension. Therefore, pleasure arises whenever and in whichever member a motion — if it is sensed — is agreeable to nature. By contrast, if a motion is sensed in a member at a time when it is not agreeable to nature, then pleasure does not arise from such sensation, which is clear from the fact that, if a human is hungry and thirsty, then the descent of food and drink through the mouth into the stomach is very pleasurable, for it is agreeable to nature. But when we are full, such a motion is not pleasurable to us, but repulsive, for it is disagreeable to nature. Now, therefore, since the generation of their like is the most natural activity of living beings, as is said in the second book of the present work, it follows that sexual intercourse and the ejaculation of sperm and other motions ordered to this end, in the members in which they are ordered to this end, and when nature requires them, are very pleasurable. And such motions would not be pleasurable in other members that are not ordered by nature to this end. 36. And it appears to me that, from what has been said above, anyone who has paid attention can answer all the arguments that were raised at the beginning of the question.

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Utrum sensibile positum supra sensum faciat sensationem, id est, sentiatur.

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1. Et arguitur primo quod sic, quia quanto agens naturale est propinquius passo, tanto magis potest in ipsum agere. Ideo sensibile immediate superpositum organo sensus magis debet in eo facere suam speciem et sensationem. 2. Item lumen visu percipitur, licet usque in profundum oculi recipiatur. 3. Item si homo movetur in navi, ad motum navis iudicat aliquando arborem in ripa moveri, et sic percipit motum et non illum qui est in arbore vel in ripa, quia nullus ibi motus est. Ergo non sentit nisi illum motum quo visus eius movetur. 4. Item si scinditur manus aut nervus, hoc intense sentitur. 5. Item aegritudinis per totum corpus expanse sentitur dolor. 6. Item aures saepe apparent nobis sonare, quamvis extra non sit sonus quem audiamus. Ideo apparet quod sonum in aure existentem sentimus. 7. Item si oculus violenter comprimitur, licet sit clausus ipse apparet scintillare, et sic quaedam lux sentitur. Et non alia nisi illa quae est in oculo; ergo etc.

1–2 Utrum . . . sentiatur ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 423b23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 163.2.6): “Sic enim utique accidet quod quidem in aliis: apposita enim super sensitivum non sentiunt, super autem carnem posita sentiunt; quare medium tactui caro.” 5 sensus ] est passo propinquius ergo add. A 11 in ] littore seu add. V || ibi motus ] om. AET 13 scinditur ] secatur A 14 Item ] alicuius] add. A || aegritudinis ] aegritudines TV || expanse ] extense A || sentitur dolor ] sentiuntur V 15 aures ] in auribus A auribus E 16 apparet ] patet AE || sonum ] solum V || aure ] non add. T 19 scintillare ] lux add. T || alia ] om. W © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 27

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Does a sensible object placed on a sense produce sensation? That is, is it sensed?

1. And it is argued in the first place that it is sensed, for the closer a natural agent is to the patient, the more it can act on it. Therefore, a sensible object placed directly on a sense organ should be more likely to produce its species and sensation in it. 2. Again, illumination is perceived by sight,261 although it is received in the depth of the eye. 3. Again, if a man is traveling on a boat, sometimes he judges a tree on the river bank to move because of the motion of the boat, and thus he perceives motion, but not in the tree or the river bank, for there is no motion there. Therefore, he only senses the motion by which his sight is moved. 4. Again, if the hand or a nerve is cut, that is intensely sensed. 5. Again, the pain of sickness is felt throughout the entire body. 6. Again, our ears often appear to us to sound, although we are not hearing any sound outside them. Therefore, it appears that we hear a sound present in the ear. 7. Again, if we firmly press on our eye, although it is closed, it appears to scintillate, and thus some light is seen, and no other, but one that is in the eye; therefore, etc. 261 As

will be clear from Buridan’s reply, it is crucial to keep in mind here the distinction between light or brightness (lux), the inherent visible quality of a bright object (lucidum), and illumination (lumen), the species of light emitted by the bright object and propagated through the medium into the eye.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 27

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8. Oppositum patet per Aristotelem in capitulo de tactu, dicentem, “Ipso autem sensitivo tacto, nec ibi,” scilicet in visu, vel in auditu vel olfactu, “nec hic,” scilicet in tactu, “fiet utique sensus.” Et experimur quod lingua non sentit saporem suum, nec cor nec hepar sentit suam caliditatem, licet sit multum intensa. 9. Notandum quod anima sentit per organum in quo ipsa est subiective. Illud autem organum corporeum, sive exterius sive interius, est sensibile quia calidum vel frigidum, etc. Immo etiam et habens colorem aliquem et saporem et odorem, cum non sit corpus simplex, sed mixtum, et bona digestione digestum. Unde si dividas oculum equi aut bovis, tu quamlibet partem poteris et visu et tactu sentire. 10. Tunc ergo est dubitatio an anima sentiens per aliquid organum sensitivum sentiat illud organum vel etiam qualitates illi organo inhaerentes. Et etiam est dubitatio, cum medium per quod species sensibilis multiplicatur ad organum sensitivum oporteat esse immediatum organo sensitivo, quod Aristoteles vocat esse sensui suprapositum, utrum illud medium sic immediate se habens ad organum sensitivum sentiatur ab anima sensitiva per illud organum. Aut etiam, si ablatum esset illud medium, et sensibile exterius ut lapis aut ferrum superponeretur immediate illi organo sensitivo, utrum sentiretur. 11. Et apparet mihi dicendum cum Aristotele quod sensus non sentit qualitates organi sui, nec qualitates proprias corporis naturaliter immediate organo suo. Et haec conclusio, quantum ad quia est, potest

21 capitulo de tactu ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 423b 23–24 (Ar. lat. XII.2 163.2.3.): “Ipso autem sensitivo tacto nec ibi nec hic fiet utique sensus...” 36 Aristoteles vocat ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 419a11–12 ; II.7 419a28–29; II.11 423b 25. 41 cum Aristotele ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a 7 (Ar. lat. XII.2 163.2.22): “et oportet sicut debens sentire album et nigrum neutrum ipsorum esse actu, potentia vero utrumque, sic autem et in aliis, et in tactu nec calidum nec frigidum” 22 tacto ] tactu ET 23 fiet ] nec add. T 23–24 experimur ] exprimitur A 27 autem ] obiectum quod anima sentit per organum in quo ipsa est subiective illud autem add. T || organum corporeum ] obiectum est carneum T 30 et ] nec A om. T 35–36 immediatum ] mediatum T 36 esse ] om. AE || sensui ] subiectum add. A 38 sensitiva ] sentiente A 42 naturaliter ] naturalis EVW 43 potest ] videri posse T ita videtur posse VW

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8. The opposite is clear by Aristotle, who says in the chapter on touch, “When the sensitive is touched, then neither there,” that is to say, in sight, hearing, or smell, “nor here,” namely in touch, “will a sensation come to be.” And we also experience that the tongue does not taste itself, nor does the liver or heart feel its own heat, although it is rather intense. 9. We should note that the soul itself senses by an organ in which it is as in its subject. However, that corporeal organ, whether internal or external, is sensible, for it is hot or cold, etc. Indeed, it also has some color and taste and odor, for it is not a simple body, but mixed, and finely combined and distributed. Thus, if you cut up the eye of a horse or an ox, you can sense any of the resulting parts by sight and by touch. 10. But then there is a problem, namely whether the soul sensing by means of a sense organ senses the organ or the qualities inherent in it. There is also another issue, given that the the medium through which sensible species are propagated has to be immediately next to the sense organ, which Aristotle expresses by saying that it is placed upon the sense, namely whether the medium, which is thus immediately located next to the sense, is sensed by the sensitive soul by means of that sense organ. Or indeed, if the medium were removed and some external sensible object, such as a stone or a piece of iron were immediately placed upon that sense organ, whether that sensible object would be sensed. 11. And it appears to me that we should say with Aristotle that sense does not sense the qualities of its own organ, nor does it sense the proper qualities of the body immediately and naturally next to

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probari experimentali inductione. Tu enim visu non iudicas colorem oculi tui, immo nec colorem palpebrarum ipsum oculum tangentium. Et si obicias quod immo, quia aliquando senibus et debiles oculos habentibus apparet quod sint ante oculos eorum maculae nigrae quae, licet, licet appareant volare in aere, tamen non sunt nisi in oculo, respondetur quod organum visivum non est in extrema superficie oculi, sed in profundo, ut habetur in De sensu et sensato. 12. Potest ergo dici dupliciter. Uno modo quod fumi grossi et nigri existentes in superficie exteriori oculi vel prope sentiuntur per pupillam interiorem. Sed medium est inter pupillam interiorem et superficiem exteriorem. Potest etiam dici secundo modo quod in superficie oculi senis sunt venae nimis subtiles habentes iam nimis de terrestri opaco prohibentes lumen et species coloris multiplicari perfecte ad interiorem pupillam. Et sic, sicut iudicamus umbram nigram modo privativo quia inde non recipitur lumen in oculo nisi nimis remisse, sic per oculum iudicamus nigrum quod est contra illas venas opacas vel poros opaco repletos, eo quod per illas aut istos non multiplicatur ab obiecto exteriori lumen in profundum oculi nisi magis remisse quam per alias partes oculi magis subtiles. Et sic iudicamus nigrum non modo positivo, scilicet quia videamus nigredinem nec aliquid quod sit in oculo nostro, sed modo privativo, quia non videmus clare obiectum exterius lucidum vel illuminatum. Sic umbrosum iudicamus nigrum.

50 De sensu et sensato ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu II 438b 9. 44 experimentali inductione ] experimentaliter et inductive T 45 palpebrarum ] aut pilorum add. A 47 sint ] in oculos vel add. A 47–48 quae, licet ] quia T 48 licet ] om. T || aere ] ante add. AE 49 extrema ] extranea V 54 exteriorem ] et superiorem add. T 57 iudicamus ] magnam add. A 62 partes ] propter T 63 videamus ] iudicamus AT 65 lucidum . . . umbrosum ] et sic A

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its organ. And this conclusion, being a matter of fact, seems to be provable by means of induction from experience. For you do not judge the color of your eye by sight, nor, indeed, do you judge the color of the eyelids which are touching the eye itself. And if you were to object that, on the contrary, it sometimes appears to old people and those with weak eyesight that they have black spots in front of their eyes, which, although they appear to float in the air, are only in the eye, then the response is that the organ of sight is not on the outer surface of the eye, but in its depths, as stated in On Sense and What is Sensed. 12. So, one can answer in two ways: in one way, by saying that thick black fumes on or near to the external surface of the eye are sensed inside the eye by the pupil, but the medium is between the pupil within and the external surface. One may also reply in the second way that on the surface of the eye of an elderly person there are very delicate blood vessels which already have a lot of opaque earthy material in them prohibiting the perfect propagation of illumination and the species of colors to the pupil within. And so, just as we judge a shadow to be black privatively, because no illumination is received in the eye from there, except very faintly, so we judge by vision that whatever is behind those opaque blood vessels or pores filled with opaque material is black, because through those vessels or spots the illumination reflected from the external object is propagated into the depths of the eye only very weakly in comparison with other, more subtle parts of the eye. And so, we judge that there is something black there not positively, because we see blackness, nor something that is in our eye, but privatively, because we do not see clearly the shining

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13. Demum, sicut dictum est de visu, ita debet esse de olfactu. Si enim socius tuus comederit allia et non tu, tu valde bene sentires odorem istorum aliorum. Sed si tu comederis allia, non sentis odorem illorum propter hoc quod odor iam non solum spiritualiter sed realiter pervenit ad organum tui olfactus. Immo credendum est quod organum tui olfactus non est penitus sine odore cum sit corpus mixtum, et tamen istum odorem non sentis. 14. Similiter idem apparet de gustu, per quem tu non sentis saporem linguae tuae, cum tamen credendum sit quod ipsa sit saporosa, unde vel nervus sensitivus vel saltem caro immediate superposita non est sine sapore, et tamen neutrius sentis saporem. 15. Sed tamen aliquis obiceret quia saepe aeger habens linguam infectam putridis humoribus iudicat de cibo dulci linguae superposito quod sit amarus. Et hoc est quia sentit amaritudinem et non nisi illam quae est realiter in lingua sua. Solutio: dicendum est quod illi humores quos sic sentit amaros sunt exterius super linguam, adherentes linguae propter quod oportet aliquando radere eos a lingua. Sed tu diceres, quare ergo non sentiuntur continue sed solum quando cibus exterior apponitur? Et ego dico quod illi humores sunt viscosi et tenaces. Corpus autem saporosum non multum multiplicat speciem sui saporis nisi dividatur et teratur. Cum ergo aeger masticat cibum assumptum, illi humores cum cibo illo dividuntur et teruntur, et tunc magis multiplicant speciem sui amari saporis in lingua usque ad nervos sensitivos. Ideo tunc magis sentitur illa amaritudo, et signum huius est manifestum, quia si aeger sine cibo exteriori moveat istos humores, vel radendo eos a lingua vel aliter, ipse intense et abominabiliter sentit putredinem et amaritudinem eorum. 16. Demum etiam similiter apparet propositum de tactu, quia sicut dicebatur, cor non sentit suam caliditatem licet sit multum intensa,

66 debet ] apparet V 68 aliorum ] alliarum AE om. TVW 69 solum ] om. W 73 sentis ] sapis VW 75 vel nervus sensitivus ] sensus T 81 linguam ] licet add. W || adherentes ] inhaerentes T 85 multum ] om. W 86 teratur ] concreatur W 90 sine ] cum T || exteriori moveat ] comedat W || moveat ] comoveat T comedat V 91 et abominabiliter ] om. T

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or illuminated external object. This is how we judge a shady object to be black. 13. Finally, what we have said about sight applies to smell as well. For if your friend eats garlic and you do not, you sense its odor very well. But if you eat garlic, you do not sense its odor, because then the odor has reached your organ of smell not only spiritually, but in reality as well. Indeed, one should believe that your organ of smell is not without any odor because it is a mixed body, and yet, you do not sense that odor. 14. The same appears to hold for taste, by which you do not sense the taste of your tongue, although we should believe that it has some flavor, because the sensitive nerve, or at least the flesh located immediately on top of it, is not without flavor, and yet you do not sense the taste of either. 15. However, someone might object that a sick man, whose tongue is affected by putrid humors, often judges a sweet piece of food placed on his tongue to be bitter. And this is because he senses the bitterness, and only the bitterness that is actually in his tongue. Solution: we should say that the humors he senses in this way are outside, on the surface of the tongue and adhering to it, so that sometimes they need to be scraped off of it. But then you would retort: why then aren’t these bitter humor ssensed continuously, but only when some food is placed there from outside? And I respond that those fluids are viscous and sticky. And a flavorful body does not propagate the species of its taste very much until it is cut and ground up. Thus, when a sick man is chewing a mouthful of food, those humors are cut and ground up along with the food, and then they propagate the species of their bitter flavor more readily into the tongue, reaching the sensitive nerves. Therefore, that bitterness then is sensed more readily. A clear sign of this is that if a sick man moves these humors without external food, either by scraping them off his tongue or otherwise, then he intensely feels, with disgust, their rotten and bitter taste. 16. And so then our claim is obvious concerning touch, because as we have said, the heart does not feel its own heat, although it is very

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nec cerebrum suam frigiditatem. Immo sicut alias dicebatur, tactus intense sentit caliditatem aquae quando aliquis intrat balneum. Cum tamen diu fuerit in balneo, et organum tactus interius fuerit realiter calefactum, tunc nec sentit ita caliditatem suam nec caliditatem carnis sibi coniunctae, immo etiam nec caliditatem aquae sicut a principio sentiebat eam, cuius causa dicebatur alias. 17. Sed aliquis obiceret, quia si pedes tui fuerint multum frigidi aut manus tuae aut alia membra tua, tu valde sentis illam frigiditatem et doles. Respondeo quod nervi sensitivi sunt per totum corpus expansi inter partes carnis et inter nervulos et venas. Dico ergo quod per nervos in pede infrigidatos non sentimus illam summam frigiditatem, immo nec frigiditatem carnis sibi immediate, sed per nervos qui magis sunt intra pedem et qui non sunt ita infrigidati et per carnem sibi propinquam non ita infrigidatam, sentimus frigiditatem nervorum et carnis exteriorum magis infrigidatorum. Unde et aliquando homines sic habent pedes interius et exterius infrigidatos quod dicunt se quasi non sentire illos. Et omnino non sentimus caliditatem vel frigiditatem excessivam partium corporis nostri nisi per alias partes non sic infrigidatas aut calefactas. 18. De auditu autem non habemus sic experientiam manifestam. Immo videtur nobis saepe quod audiamus sonum in nostris auribus existentem de quo dicendum est quod aer vel ignis vel corpora subtilia parva quae aliquando inclusa sunt in poris grossorum corporum, commota et agitata, faciunt quaedam sonum debilem. Sic enim quandoque pottus terreus, si quis in ore suo ponat aurem suam, videtur sonare propter agitationem corporum subtilium ex decoctione ab igne in poris remanentium. 19. Ita etiam ex commotione aeris in tortuositatibus aurium existentis, efficitur quidam sonus parvus cuius species multiplicatur ad organum intus, quod quidam organum, licet sit aereum a dominio, ta95 alias dicebatur ] BURIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.17, par. 12. IDANUS , QQ. De an. II.17, par. 12.

100 alias ] B UR -

98 carnis ] aquae T 103–104 expansi ] extensi A om. T 104 carnis ] et partes carnis add. A || nervulos ] nervos A || venas ] post corr. venillas (!) W 110 habent ] manus et add. T || interius et exterius ] om. T 112 excessivam ] extensivam A intensivam T || nostri ] om. AE || alias ] illas W 116 dicendum ] dictum A 119 terreus ] tardius add. V 123–124 parvus . . . organum ] om. T 124 intus ] ita A || quidam organum ] om. A

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intense, nor the brain its coldness. Indeed, as we have said elsewhere, touch feels the heat of water intensely when someone enters the bath; but when he has been in the bath for a while, and the organ of touch within becomes actually hot, then it senses neither its own hotness, nor that of the flesh connected to it, nor even, indeed, the heat it initially sensed in the water, the reason for which has been provided elsewhere. 17. But someone may object that if your feet or hands or other members are very cold, then you really feel that coldness and it hurts. I respond that the sensitive nerves are distributed throughout the entire body between the parts of flesh, tendons, and blood vessels. Thus, I say that we do not feel that extreme cold with the chilled nerves in our foot, nor do we even feel the chilled flesh right next to them, but we feel the coldness of the nerves and the colder external flesh with nerves that are deeper inside the foot and also with the adjacent flesh, which are not so cold. In general, we do not feel the extreme hotness or coldness of parts of our body, except by means of other parts that are not as chilled or as warmed. 18. About hearing, however, we do not have such clear-cut experience. Indeed, it often appears to us as if we hear a sound in our ears, of which we have to say that the commotion and agitation of air or fire or tiny subtle bodies that are sometimes trapped in the pores of larger bodies make a faint sound. So also, if someone takes a recently made terra cotta pot and puts its mouth to his ear, it appears to sound because of the agitation of the subtle bodies remaining in its pores from the fire used in its production. 19. In the same way, the commotion of air in the winding inner tubes of the ears causes some tiny sound whose species is propagated to the organ within, which organ, although dominated by air, is not

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men non est aer, quoniam anima non est innata informare aerem vel aquam aut aliud corpus simplex. Et sic auditur ille sonus. Ille autem aer sic in tortuositatibus aurium existens commovetur seu agitatur a spiritibus et corporibus subtilibus continue a calore interiori exhalantibus per poros ad istum aerem coniunctos. Unde in febribus magis auditur talis sonus, quia propter excessivum calorem, fit pluries resolutio et exhalatio et innaturalis spirituum agitatio. 20. Causa autem finalis propter quam ordinavit natura quod sic sensibilia sentirentur non superposita sensibus sed per suas species spirituales sint sensibilia est quia qualitates proprie sensibiles, secundum suum esse reale, habent ad invicem contrarietatem, ut colores et sapores, caliditas et frigiditas, et habent etiam longam permanentiam in subiectis in quibus recipiuntur. Ideo cum una qualitas sentiretur per realem eius existentiam supra sensum, contraria non posset longo tempore sentiri quia non posset in sensu recipi donec prior esset destructa. Et cum hoc etiam nos indigemus sentire sensibilia exteriora ad prosequendum vel fugiendum, quorum qualitates non possunt ad nos venire secundum suum esse reale, quia accidens non potest transire de subiecto in subiectum. 21. Similiter nec licuit quod sensus sentiret dispositionem sui organi, quia tunc semper esset in actu secundo sentiendi, et sic ita occuparetur per huiusmodi sensationem quod non posset bene exteriora apprehendere et distinguere. Nec prodesset huiusmodi sensatio, quia sensatio data est animalibus ad prosequendum vel fugiendum convenientia vel disconvenientia. Sensus autem non est innatus prosequi vel fugere dispositionem propriam organi sui; ideo non debet eam sentire. 22. Sed restat tertia dubitatio, scilicet si medium per quod multiplicatur species sensibilis in organum sensus esset remotum et sensi128 spiritibus . . . subtilibus ] corporibus subtilibus sive spiritibus AE || continue ] om. V || interiori ] intensiori T 129 febribus ] febricantibus E febricibus V 130–131 talis . . . exhalatio ] om. T || pluries resolutio ] resolutio plurimorum V 131 innaturalis ] calor add. T innaturalibus V || agitatio ] agitat T 132 finalis ] om. T 134 sint sensibilia est ] fit T fuerit haec V fuit haec W 138 existentiam ] essentiam T || contraria ] contrariam AT contrarium VW 140 sentire sensibilia exteriora ] sensibili exteriori T 142 venire ] pervenire V || potest transire ] transit A || transire ] migrare W 145 sic ita ] tunc AET 147 apprehendere ] comprehendere T 150 propriam ] om. T

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air, for the soul is not naturally suited to inform air or water or any simple body. And this is how that sound is heard. But the air in the tubes of the ears is thereby disturbed or agitated by the spirits and subtle bodies continuously evaporating from the inner heat via the pores connected to this air. This is why a feverish person hears this sort of sound more acutely: due to the excessive heat, there is a more dissolution, evaporation, and unnatural agitation of spirits. 20. The final cause for the sake of which nature arranged that sensibles are sensed not when they are placed over the senses, but through their spiritual species is that, insofar as they have real being, properly sensible qualities are contraries to each other, as are colors, flavors, and heat and cold. They also remain in the subject in which they are received for a long time. Therefore, if a quality were to be sensed because of its real existence upon the sense, then its contrary could not be sensed for a long time, for it could not be received in the sense until the first is destroyed. And besides, we need to sense external sensibles for pursuing and avoiding things, and their qualities cannot come to us in their actual being because an accident cannot migrate from one subject into another. 21. Likewise, it could not be permitted that a sense senses the disposition of its own organ, for then it would always be in the second act of sensing, and it would be so occupied by a sensation of this kind that it could not properly apprehend and distinguish external sensibles. Neither would such a sensation be of any use, for sensation has been given to animals for pursuing agreeable things and avoiding disagreeable ones. But sense is not capable of pursuing or avoiding the proper disposition of its own organ; therefore, it should not sense it. 22. But there still remains the third problem,262 namely whether there would be sensation if the medium through which the sensi-

262 See

par. 10 above.

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bile immediate superponeretur organo sensitivo, utrum sentiretur. Et dicunt multi quod non quia hoc videtur dicere Aristoteles et videtur ad hoc esse experientia, quia cum in sensu tactus organum sensitivum sit nervus sub carne existens et medium naturale sit caro superposita nervo, videmus quod aliquando cirurgici abradunt nervo vel osse carnem superpositam quod amplius nervi aut os non sentiunt illud quod superponitur, propter quod aliqui opinati sunt quod nervi non essent sensitivi, sed caro. Cum tamen sit e converso secundum Aristotelem, sed tunc nervus non sentit quia deficit medium requisitum. 23. Mihi tamen videtur quod cum nos ponimus organum oculi per quod fit visio esse pupillam oculi interiorem coopertam pluribus tunicis, prout asserunt anatomizantes, et nos ponimus etiam quod tam huiusmodi pupilla quam tunicae superiores sunt diaphanae ad recipiendum species lucis et coloris, si ergo per potentiam divinam removerentur istae tunicae superiores, salvata pupilla et anima in ea et singulis eius naturalibus dispositionibus, et per eamdem potentiam corpus lucidum immediate coniungeretur illae pupillae, apparet mihi quod nihil obstaret quin ab illo lucido illuminaretur pupilla sicut illuminaretur aliud diaphanum. Et lumen est species lucis, ut alias dictum est, per quam lux aut lucidum est innatum videri. Ideo videtur mihi in casu praedicto quod nihil obstaret quin anima, per istam speciem, causaret lucis visionem. 24. Et ita puto quod si caro quae est medium tangendi esset calidior quam nervus immediate superpositus, nihil prohiberet quin species caliditatis carnis multiplicaretur in nervum etiam spiritualiter antequam ille nervus esset ab illa carne calefactus et factus quasi similis caloris ei. Et sic nihil prohiberet quin per nervum istum sentiremus istam

154 dicunt multi ] E. g. AQUINAS, Comm. De an. II, lect. 15, n. 432. || dicere Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 419a26. 171 alias dictum ] B URIDAN US , QQ. De an. II.14, par. 9. 161 medium ] in modum E 164 asserunt anatomizantes ] anatomizantibus apparet T || asserunt ] sciunt EW faciunt V || anatomizantes ] anatomisate A 166 coloris ] colorum E 168 eius naturalibus ] aliis T 169 illae ] illi AET 171 aliud ] illud W 172 innatum ] manifestum natum V 179 prohiberet ] prohibet AET

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ble species is propagated were removed and the sensible thing were placed immediately upon the sensitive organ. And many people say ‘no’, because this is what Aristotle seems to claim, and it seems to be supported by experience, because even though in the sense of touch the sensitive organ is the nerve underneath the flesh, and the natural medium is the flesh over the nerve, we see that surgeons sometimes rub off the flesh covering the nerve or the bone, so that the nerve or the bone no longer senses what is placed on it — this is why some have thought that the nerves are not sensitive, but rather the flesh. However, according to Aristotle the case is just the reverse, and then the nerve does not sense because the required medium is not present. 23. Nevertheless, it seems to me that, since we take the organ of the eye whereby vision occurs to be the inner pupil covered by several membranes, as anatomists have claimed, and we also take it that both this pupil and the outer membranes are transparent in order to receive the species of light and color, if these outer membranes were removed by divine power while preserving the pupil and the soul in it along with its particular natural dispositions, and a bright body were immediately joined to the pupil by the same power, then it appears to me that nothing would prevent that bright body from illuminating the pupil, just as it would illuminate any other transparent body. And as has been stated elsewhere, illumination is the species of light whereby light or a bright body is naturally suited to be seen. Therefore, it seems to me that in the aforementioned case nothing prevents the soul from causing vision of this light by this species. 24. And so I hold that if flesh, which is the medium of touch, were warmer than the nerve it immediately covers, then nothing would prevent the species of warmth in the flesh from also being propagated to the nerve spiritually before that nerve were warmed up by this flesh and made to be of similar warmth. And thus nothing would prevent

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caliditatem. Et sic ego opinor quod si nervi sensitivi essent per potentiam divinam denudati a carne circumstante, et quod Deus conservaret in eis animam et calorem naturalem et spiritus et omnes dispositiones quas habent per naturam carne circumstante in naturali dispositione, nos per istos nervos sentiremus calida et frigida immediate sibi superposita. Sed Deus et natura circa unumquodque organum sensitivum ordinaverunt corpus immediate superpositum connaturale illi organo, et sic consimiliter quod non esset innatum agere in organum speciem sensibilem per quam sensatio fieret nisi esset ab exteriori motum vel alteratum, ad finem quod non semper continue esset sensatio occupans sensum et prohibens perceptionem exteriorum, ut ante dictum est. Unde sic caro immediata nervo tactivo est connaturalis et similis illi nervo quod non alterat ipsum nisi alterata ab alio. Et sic etiam tunica involvens pupillam oculi est similis ei sine luce aut colore, quod non movet pupillam istam nisi mota ab alio. Et ita de organis aliorum sensuum. Et sic apparet mihi corollarie concludendum quod non solum tactus et gustus habent medium per quod sentiunt connaturale, immo etiam et alii sensus. Et hoc bene notat Aristoteles in De sensu et sensato, dicens, “Non enim in ultimo oculi anima et animae sensitivum. Sed manifestum quoniam interius.” Sed alii sensus magis utuntur, cum suo medio connaturali, medio extraneo et longe extenso quam tactus et gustus. 25. Nunc facile est solvere rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis. Ad primam conceditur enim quod agens approximatum passo agit si sit convenienter dispositum, hoc ad agendum in illud et illud ad patiendum ab eo. Sed agens non debet esse simile ei quod patitur, immo tunc cesset actio. Quare autem nervus denudatus a carne non

197–198 De sensu et sensato ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu II 438b8 (Ar. lat. XIII.2 4.27.1.101): “Non enim in ultimo oculi anima aut anime sensitivum est, sed manifestum quoniam interius.” 181 carne circumstante ] carnis circumstantis W 182 spiritus ] species T 187 organum ] aliam V 192 alio ] illo E 193 quod ] et A 195 corollarie ] esse A 204 hoc ] om. AE || in illud ] om. VW

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us from sensing that warmth by this nerve. Hence, I take it that if, by divine power, our sensitive nerves were stripped of the flesh covering them, and God conserved in them the soul and natural heat and spirits and all the dispositions they naturally possess by the flesh surrounding them in its natural disposition, then by these nerves we would sense the hot and cold things placed right on top of them. But God and nature have ordained the body surrounding each and every sense organ to be connatural to it, and so as well, they have made it so that it would not be apt to produce a sensible species in the organ, whereby sensation would occur, unless it is moved or altered by some external object, in order that there should not always be sensation continuously occupying the senses and preventing the perception of external objects, as has been said.263 Thus, the flesh immediately surrounding a tactile nerve is connatural and similar to that nerve in such a way that it does not alter that nerve, unless it itself is altered by something else. And so as well, the membrane covering the pupil of the eye is similar to it in being without light or color, so that it does not move the pupil unless moved by something else. And the same goes for the organs of the other senses. Therefore, it appears to me to be drawn as a corollary that not only do touch and taste have a connatural medium through which they sense, but so do the other senses. And Aristotle correctly notes this in On Sense and What is Sensed when he says, “For the soul and its sensitive are not on the outside of the eye. But it is obvious that they are inside.” But besides their own connatural medium, other senses more readily use external and far-reaching media than touch and taste do. 25. Now it is easy to answer the objections raised at the beginning of the question. For in response to the first, 264 we concede that an agent close to the patient acts on it, if they are appropriately disposed: the former to act on the latter and the latter to be acted on by the former. But the agent need not be similar to the patient, indeed,

263 See 264 See

par. 22 above. par. 1 above.

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sentit? Hoc est quia exhalat ab eo calor naturalis et spiritus, et destruitur proportio secundum quam anima erat innata facere sensationem. 26. Ad secundam dictum est alias quod lumen non videtur, sed lux vel lucidum. 27. Ad tertiam dictum est etiam alias quod visu non iudicamus motum nisi ex eo quod percipimus visibile fieri in alio et alio situ ad oculum, et hoc ita fit oculo moto et visibili quiescente, sicut e converso. 28. Ad aliam dictum est quod per tactum percipimus motum localem iuxta ipsum factum, et delectamur si sit conveniens et tristamur si sit disconveniens. Ideo nullum delectamur in solutione continui. 29. Ad aliam de aure sonante, dictum est in positione. 30. Ad aliam, de scintillatione oculi, dico quod Aristoteles manifeste determinat istam dubitationem et docuit causam eius operationis in principio libri De sensu et sensato. Et videat ibi qui vult. Et sic patet quaestio.

209 alias ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.14, par. 9. 211 alias ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.13, par. 22. 221 De sensu et sensato ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu II 437a 22–b10. 207 spiritus ] species T 216 factum ] tactum T || delectamur ] delectatur TV || tristamur ] tristatur TV 217 nullum ] multis A multum EW om. T || delectamur ] debemus T doceremus V dolorem sentiremus W || continui ] ut patet add. A scilicet si corpus nostrum continuum divideretur per cutellum vel aliud instrumentum add. in marg. W 220 operationis ] apparitionis ET

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otherwise the action would stop. Why is it, then, that a nerve stripped of flesh does not sense? This is because natural heat and spirits are evaporated from it, and the proportion according to which the soul is naturally suited to produce sensation is destroyed. 26. To the second,265 we have already said elsewhere that illumination is not seen, but light or the bright object is. 27. To the third,266 we have said elsewhere that by sight we do not judge motion, except by perceiving that the visible object shows up in different locations relative to the eye, and this can happen just as much when the eye is moving and the visible object is resting as the other way around. 28. To the next,267 we have said that by touch we perceive local motion that occurs right next to our sense of touch, and we take pleasure in motion that is agreeable, and feel pain if it is disagreeable. Hence, we take no pleasure in cutting some continuous .268 29. To the next,269 about the sound in the ear, we have answered in the body of the question.270 30. To the next,271 about the scintillation of the eye, I reply that Aristotle clearly resolved this doubt and explained the cause of the phenomenon at the beginning of On Sense and What is Sensed. And anyone who wishes to should see the solution there. And thus the question is clear.

265 See

par. 2 above. par. 3 above. 267 See pars. 4–5 above. 268 In order to defend his conclusion, Buridan must claim that the pain of a laceration is due to a disagreeable motion and not to contact between a sharp edge and nerves embedded in the flesh. 269 See par. 6 above. 270 See par. 19 above. 271 See par. 7 above. 266 See

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Utrum praeter sensus exteriores oportet ponere unum sensum communem.

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1. Et arguitur quod non, quia nec ratione sensibilium propriorum nec ratione communium, quia haec omnia sensibus exterioribus cognoscimus. 2. Item ubi esset eius organum? Videtur enim quod deberet esse in cerebro, cum ad ipsum videantur congregari in capite visus, auditus, olfactus, gustus, et tactus. Sed hoc videtur esse impossibile, quia si ponatur talis sensus communis, oportet dicere quod ad ipsum congregentur omnes sensus exteriores, quod non videtur possibile si sit in capite. Quomodo perveniret ad ipsum tactus pedis? 3. Item oporteret organum istius sensus communis esse innatum recipere species omnium exterioribus sensibus sensibilium. Et hoc non esset possibile quia, sive esset in cerebro sive esset in corde, ibi non esset diaphaneitas nec lumen, quae requiruntur ad receptionem specierum coloris, nec esset ibi aer admodum ad recipiendum species sonorum. 4. Item omnis sensus unus debet esse appropriate unius generis sensibilis et unius contrarietatis, ut videtur velle Aristoteles in isto 1–2 Utrum . . . communem ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.2 426b22 (Ar. lat. XII.2 182.1.20): “Quod autem igitur non possibile separatis iudicare separata, palam.” 19–20 isto secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 422b23. 3–4 propriorum ] in marg. W 13 exterioribus sensibus sensibilium ] sensibilium per sensibus exterioribus A sensibilium exteriorum E 16 admodum ] a dominio VW 19 et unius contrarietatis ] om. T

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 28

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Is it necessary to postulate a single common sense?

1. We argue that it is not, neither on account of the proper sensibles nor on account of the common sensibles, since we cognize all these by the external senses. 2. Again, where would its organ be? It seems that it should be in the brain, since sight, hearing, smelling, taste, and touch appear to converge on it in the head. But this seems to be impossible, for if such a common sense were posited, one would have to say that all external senses converge on it, which does not seem to be possible if it is in the head. How would the sense of touch in the foot reach it? 3. Again, the organ of this common sense would have to be naturally suited to receive the species of all sensibles by means of the external senses. This would not be possible, because no matter whether it is in the brain or heart, there would be no transparent medium or illumination there, which are required for the reception of the species of color, nor would there be air at all for receiving the species of sounds. 4. Again, every single sense has to belong properly to one kind of sensible and to one contrariety, as Aristotle appears to claim here

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 28

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secundo et in quarto Metaphysicae. Et non esset possibile assignare quod esset genus illud et quae esset illa contrarietas; ergo etc. 5. Oppositum determinat Aristoteles in illo secundo. 6. Pono primam conclusionem, scilicet quod praeter sensus exteriores oportet ponere virtutem aliam cognoscitivam. Et suppono ex vigesima quaestione quid debeamus intelligere per sensum exteriorem, quo supposito probatur prima conclusio, quia sensus exterior non est perceptivus sui actus. Et tamen quilibet videns vel audiens iudicat de actu videndi vel audiendi si attendat, quia si quaeratur an videat vel audiat, dicet quod sic; igitur est virtus interior per quam ipse hoc iudicat. Maior autem huius rationis conceditur primo auctoritate Aristotelis. Secundo quia communiter ponitur quod sensus, quia est virtus materialis, non reflectitur super se vel suam operationem cognoscendo se vel suam operationem; tertio quia dictum est quod sensibile existens in organo sensus non sentitur, et visio est in organo visus vel in visu; ideo non videtur. Valeat ratio quantum valere potest, quia de reflexione diceretur magis in tertio. 7. Secunda ratio est quia sensus exteriores non reservant, saltem longo tempore, species sensibiles in absentia sensibilium. Ideo nihil iudicant aut cognoscunt nisi apud praesentiam ipsorum, vel saltem non longo tempore post. Nos autem de tenebra et silentio iudicamus in absentia sensibilium, scilicet dum auditus a nullo sono movetur nec visus a luce vel colore. Et est illud iudicium quia sensus interior potest percipere actum exterioris et eius carentiam. 8. Item nec solum iudicamus modo privativo, immo etiam quando volumus, formamus phantasmata et imaginamur montes aureos et

20 quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.2 1004a3. 22 illo secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.2 passim. 24–25 ex vigesima quaestione ] B URIDAN US , QQ. De an. II.20, pars 8–11. 36 in tertio ] B URIDANUS , QQ. De an. III.9. 29 virtus ] materialis non reflectitur supra se add. T 31 quia ] etiam A 34 visio ] om. T 35 non videtur ] om. T 38 in absentia ] nisi in praesentia A 41 dum ] cum AE 42 iudicium ] iudicare AE || quia ] quod TV 43 percipere ] recipere T || actum exterioris ] actus exteriores eorum A actus exteriores E 45 formamus phantasmata ] phantasiamur AE || aureos ] et castra A et castrae E

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in De Anima II and in Metaphysics IV. It would not be possible to determine what that genus and what that contrariety would be ; therefore, etc. 5. Aristotle determines the opposite in De Anima II.272 6. I lay down the first conclusion, namely that one has to postulate another cognitive power beyond the external senses. Now I assume from Question 20 above what we should understand by ‘external sense’. With that assumption I prove the first conclusion: An external sense is not perceptive of its own act; however, people who see or hear judge their own act of seeing or hearing if they pay attention because if they are asked whether they see or hear they will say that they do; hence there is an internal power by which they judge this. The major premise of this argument is established firstly, by Aristotle’s authority; secondly, because it is generally held that sense, being a material power, does not reflect on itself or its activity in cognizing itself or its activity; and thirdly, because as was said, the sensible existing in the organ of sense is not sensed, but vision is in the organ of sight or in sight, and so it is not seen. Let this argument prove as much as it can, since we will say more about reflection in Book III. 7. The second argument is that the external senses do not retain the sensible species in the absence of sensibles, at least not for long. Hence they only judge or cognize things when they are present, or at least not for long afterwards. Yet we do judge that there is dark or silence in the absence of sensibles, namely when our hearing is not affected by any sound, or our sight by light or color. That judgment is made because an inner sense is able to perceive the act of the external sense as well as its absence. 8. Furthermore, we not only form judgments in a privative way; we can also make up phantasms whenever we want, and imagine

272 The

first two chapters of De Anima III in modern editions appeared at the end of De Anima II in medieval texts.

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diversa animalia et alia huiusmodi, licet nihil videamus aut audiamus vel tangamus. 9. Tertia ratio est quia in somno clausis sensibus exterioribus somniando apparent sensibilia esse in prospectu nostro, quod oportet esse per virtutem cognoscitivam interiorem. 10. Quarta ratio est quia ponimus convenientiam et differentiam inter sensibilia diversorum sensuum exteriorum. Iudicamus enim hoc album esse dulce vel hoc rubeum non esse dulce sed amarum. Et canis, audiens dominum suum vocantem eum, iudicat vocantem esse dominum suum et illum quem videt, et per visum vadit ad eum. Vel si videt alium et non dominum suum, iudicat vocantem non esse illum quem videt; ideo non vadit ad eum, sed quaerit alibi vocantem. Sic autem componere et dividere, seu ponere convenientiam et differentiam inter sensibilia propria diversorum sensuum exteriorum, non est per aliquem sensuum exteriorum, quia neuter cognoscit haec ambo. Nec etiam per duos sensus exteriores quorum unus cognoscit unum et alter alterum sine virtute alia una cognoscente ambo, quia quis istorum sensuum formaret copulativam affirmativam vel negativam? Et si dicas quod anima est eadem, tamen in quo organorum exteriorum formaret ipsa illam copulativam? Hoc non potest assignari bene. Unde si Socrates cognoscit lapidem et Plato lignum, et neuter ambo haec, tunc nec aliquis eorum nec ambo scient differentiam assignare inter lapidem et lignum. 11. Secunda conclusio ponitur quod illa virtus interior cognoscitiva est sensus seu virtus sensitiva, quia nos ponimus omnem virtutem cognoscitivam esse sensum vel intellectivum. Talis autem virtus de qua dictum est in praecedenti conclusione invenitur in brutis, quae non habent intellectum. Nam canis, ut dictum est, ponit convenientiam et differentiam inter quem audit et videt. Et constat etiam quod bruta

46 animalia et alia huiusmodi ] alia VW 47 vel tangamus ] om. W 49 sensibilia ] nobis AE nobis add. T 50 cognoscitivam ] cogitativam AT 52 exteriorum ] om. T 55 dominum suum et ] om. AE 60 neuter ] nullus sensus A 61 etiam ] est AE 65 copulativam ] copulam V 66–67 haec tunc ] om. A 73–74 canis . . . videt ] inter talium quem videt et quem audit A

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golden mountains and various animals and other such things, even though we neither see nor hear nor touch anything. 9. The third argument is that in sleep, while we are dreaming and our external senses are blocked, sensible things appear to be in our prospect, which must happen through some internal cognitive power. 10. The fourth argument is that we can tell the agreements and differences between the sensibles of diverse external senses. For we judge this white thing to be sweet or this red thing not to be sweet but bitter. And a dog, hearing his master call him, judges the one calling him to be his master and to be the one he sees, and following his sight goes up to him. Or if he sees someone else who is not his master, he judges the one calling him not to be the one he sees, and so he does not go up to him, but looks for the one calling him elsewhere. Comparing and contrasting in this way, or noting the agreement and disagreement among the proper sensibles of diverse external senses does not take place through any of the external senses, because no external sense cognizes both. And this does not even take place through two external senses, one of which cognizes one sort of sensible and the other another, without some other particular power that cognizes both, for otherwise which one of these senses would form the requisite affirmative or negative copulative judgment? And even if you were to reply that the soul is the same, in which external organ would it form this copulative judgment? It would be hard to tell. For if Socrates cognizes stone and Plato wood, but neither of them both, then neither one of them nor both of them will know how to tell the difference between stone and wood. 11. The second conclusion is that this internal cognitive power is a sense or sensitive power, for we classify any cognitive power either as a sense or an intellective power. However, the kind of power we were talking about in the preceding conclusion is found in brute animals that do not have intellect. For as we have just said, a dog notices the agreement and the difference between the one he hears and the one he

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inveniuntur somniare et in somno aliquando movere membra sua aut vociferare. Cum tamen vox non sit sine imaginatione significandi, ut habetur in isto secundo, et etiam in vigilia bruta formant phantasmata in absentia sensibilium, ideo si recludatur canis in camera, domino suo recedente, clamat et dolet. Igitur illa virtus sic cognoscitiva est sensitiva. 12. Tertia conclusio ponitur quod est dare sensum unum communem praeter sensus exteriores, id est qui non est aliquis sensuum exteriorum, quia ille sensus meretur dici sensus communis qui potest apprehendere sensibilia propria omnium sensuum exteriorum et actus eorum. Hoc autem potest illa virtus sensitiva interior quae per duas conclusiones priores inquisita est, cum ipsius sit ponere differentiam inter omnia huiusmodi sensibilia propria sensuum exteriorum. Notandum est ergo quod ab organis sensuum exteriorum ad organum sensus communis multiplicantur intentiones repraesentativae sensibilium sensibus exterioribus sensatorum, et cum hac repraesentatione ipsarum sensationum, per quas intentiones nos iudicamus talia videre vel audire, vidisse vel audivisse. 13. Et huiusmodi intentiones vocamus saepe species sensibiles quia repraesentant sensibilia exteriora. Tamen ad ponendum differentiam inter eas et species sensibilium quae in sensibus exterioribus recipiuntur, multi philosophorum antiquorum vocaverunt eas intentiones. Est enim inter has et illas magna et notabilis differentia, species enim coloris aut lucis requirit diaphaneitatem in subiecto in quo recipitur, quam non requirit intentio multiplicata ad sensum communem. Et ita species soni et species odoris requirunt certas et diversas dispositiones in illis in quibus recipiuntur, quas non requirunt illae intentiones.

77 isto secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.8 420b 6 96 philosophorum antiquorum ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. II.12 (ed. Crawford, 317.11–322.36 passim). 83 quia ] et W || sensus ] om. AE || qui ] quia EV 85 sensitiva interior ] interior seu virtus sensitiva W 87 omnia ] alia A || propria ] om. A 89 intentiones ] om. V 90–91 sensibus . . . sensationum ] om. E 90 repraesentatione ] repraesentative A 91 talia ] om. E 93 Et huiusmodi ] om. TV 99 requirit ] recipit V

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sees. And it is also well known that brute animals dream and move their limbs and make sounds while asleep. However, such a sound is not without the imagination of signifying something, as stated in this second book, and even while awake, brute animals form phantasms in the absence of sensibles, which is why a dog locked up in a room barks and whines when his master leaves. Therefore, the power that is cognitive in this manner is sensitive. 12. The third conclusion is that there is a single common sense besides the external senses, that is, a sense that is not one of the external senses, because that sense deserves to be called common sense which is capable of apprehending the proper sensibles of all external senses, as well as their acts. And the internal sense that was investigated by means of the previous two conclusions is capable of doing this, for its function is to distinguish among all the proper sensibles of the external senses. We should note, therefore, that the external sense organs propagate to the organ of the common sense the intentions representative of the sensibles sensed by the external senses, and along with this representation those of the sensations themselves; and by these intentions we judge ourselves to see or hear, or to have seen or heard. 13. We often call intentions of this kind ‘sensible species’, because they represent external sensibles. But then, to distinguish these from the species of sensibles that are received in the external senses, many philosophers of yore called them ‘intentions.’ For there is between the former and the latter a major, significant difference; namely, the species of color or light requires transparency in the subject in which it is received, which is not required by the intention propagated to the common sense. And in the same way, the species of sound and the species of odor require various determinate dispositions in those subjects in which they are received, which are not required by these intentions.

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14. Sed iterum illae species non sunt repraesentativae nisi sensibilium exteriorum. Illae autem intentiones repraesentant non solum illa sensibilia, immo et ipsas sensationes eorum. Et fiunt illae species in subiectis suis sine cognitione praevia; illae autem intentiones fiunt ab ipsis sensationibus sicut species ab obiectis exterioribus, et ob hoc est quod repraesentant illas sensationes. 15. Hiis visis respondendum est ad rationes quae fiebant. De prima enim apparet quod ille sensus interior est ponendus et pro sensibilibus propriis et pro sensibilibus communibus, ut ea percipiamus in absentia eorum et propter alias causas praedictas. 16. De secunda ratione determinat Aristoteles in De somno et vigilia et in De partibus animalium, et Averroes in secundo sui Colliget, quod illud organum sensus communis est in corde, de quo etiam videbitur post. 17. De tertia ratione dictum est per differentiam inter species et intentiones. 18. Auctoritates autem super quas fundata est ultima ratio intelligendae sunt de sensibus exterioribus. Et si sensui communi debeat

112–113 De somno et vigilia ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 459a 4. 113 De partibus animalium ] A RISTOTELES, De part. an. II 647a25. || Averroes ] AVERROES, Colliget II.21 (X 32 B). 114–115 videbitur post ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.24. 103 exteriorum ] om. AE 104 ipsas ] proprias A 106 ipsis ] cognitionibus seu add. T 109 sensus ] communis add. A

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14. Again, those species only represent external sensibles. By contrast, these intentions represent not only the sensibles, but also their sensations. And the species come to be in their subjects without any previous cognition, whereas the intentions arise from the sensations themselves, just as the species do from the external objects, and that is why they represent these sensations.273 15. Having seen these points, now we should respond to the foregoing arguments. Concerning the first274 it is clear that this interior sense is to be posited both for proper sensibles and for common sensibles, so that we perceive them in their absence and for the other reasons mentioned above. 16. Aristotle provides the answer to the second objection275 in On Sleep and Waking and in The Parts of Animals, and Averroes in the second book of his Colliget,276 namely that the organ of common sense is in the heart, which we shall see later in greater detail. 17. As for the third objection277 we have already replied by distinguishing species from intentions. 18. The authoritive passages on which the last objection278 is based should be understood as referring to the external senses. And if a 273 Buridan

sharply distinguishes sensible species from sensory intentions. The former are only representations of sensible qualities, requiring determinate physical dispositions of both the medium and of the sense organ to be able to exercise this representational function. The latter, however, are representations of these qualities by being at the same time representative of the acts of sensation (produced as a result of the reception of the species, see QQ. De an. II.9, pars. 9–13), which is why they also account for our awareness of these acts through the common sense. In contemporary jargon we might say, therefore, that the sensory intentions are encodings of the acts of sensation, which in turn carry the information encoded by the species about the external sensible qualities; thus, the intentions also transcode the information encoded by the sensible species about the sensible qualities (which is why they do not need the same physical dispositions as the species) as they are propagated for further processing to the common sense. Therefore, the integration of this information streaming in from the several external senses performed by the common sense (coupled with various degrees of variously directed attention) accounts for most of our sensory awareness (along with several “background processes” of various recognition mechanisms involving sensory memory). See Zupko 2018 and Klima 2017. 274 See par. 1 above. 275 See par. 2 above. 276 See par. 2 above. Ibn Rushd’s major work in medicine, al-Kulliyyat (Generalities), or Colliget, was written between 1153 and 1169. 277 See par. 3 above. 278 See par. 4 above.

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appropriari unum genus illud erit hoc nomen sensibile, sicut intellectui hoc nomen intelligibile et visui visibile, et sic de aliis. Et sic patet quaestio.

120–121 sicut . . . intelligibile ] om. E

121 hoc ] illud A

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single genus needs to be appropriated for the common sense, then it should be the name ‘sensible’, just as ‘intelligible’ is appropriated for the intellect, ‘visible’ for sight, and so on for the rest. And thus the question is clear.

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Utrum oporteat praeter sensum communem ponere alios sensus interiores.

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1. Arguitur quod sic, quia cum Aristoteles determinasset in secundo huius de sensibus exterioribus et de sensu communi, ipse consequenter determinavit de phantasia tamquam de alia virtute. Unde dicit istam esse aliam et ab intellectu et a sensu. Et tamen ponit eam esse cognoscitivam, quia dixit phantasiam unam quamdam esse potentiam secundum quam discernimus verum a falso, aut verum aut falsum dicimus. Et etiam dicit quod phantasia est secundum quam phantasma aliquod in nobis fieri dicimus, et tamen phantasma est actualis cognitio, quod patet quia somnium est actualis cognitio. Et tamen in De somno et vigilia describit Aristoteles somnium quod ipsum est phantasma in somno. Manifestum est ergo quod phantasia secundum Aristotelem est virtus cognoscitiva. Sed tunc, cum omnis virtus cognoscitiva sit sensus vel intellectus, quoniam dicit Aristoteles phantasiam aliam esse a sensu et ab intellectu, videtur ergo quod non intendebat de quocumque sensu sed de isto sensu communi de quo immediate ante determinavit. Et sic patet quod oportet phantasiam ponere esse sensum alium interiorem praeter sensum communem. 5 determinavit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.3 428a5. 6 ponit ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.3 428a1 (Ar. lat. XII.2 29.192.1.6): “Si igitur phantasia est secundum quam phantasma aliquod nobis fieri dicimus, et si non aliquid secundum methaphoram dicimus, una quaedam est potentia harum aut habitus secundum quam discernimus aut verum aut falsum dicimus; huiusmodi autem sunt sensus, opinio, scientia, intellectus.” 12 describit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 456b 25 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 7.2.10). 7 potentiam ] vel habitum add. TVW 8 discernimus ] describitur vel discernitur T || verum a falso ] et EV om. TW 11 quod patet ] om. A || somnium ] somnum AE || cognitio ] cognoscere T 15 quoniam ] quomodo AE quem V

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 29

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Is it necessary to posit other internal senses in addition to the common sense?

1. It is argued that it is, because when Aristotle treated of the external senses and the common sense in Book II, he proceeded next to imagination as a different power. And he says that it is different both from intellect and from sense. Even so, he claimed it to be cognitive, for he said that imagination is a particular power whereby we discern truth from falsity or say that something is true or false. And he also says that imagination is that on account of which we say that some phantasm comes to be in us; however, a phantasm is an actual cognition, which is clear because a dream is an actual cognition. Indeed, in On Sleep and Waking Aristotle describes a dream as a phantasm in sleep. It is clear, therefore, that according to Aristotle imagination is a cognitive power. But then, since every cognitive power is either sense or intellect, and since Aristotle claims that imagination differs from sense and intellect, it would seem that he did not mean just any sense, but the common sense he just discussed earlier.279 And thus it is clear that imagination has to be posited as an internal sense besides common sense.

279 That

is, when Aristotle claims that imagination is other than sense, he was not referring to just any sense, but the common sense, which is internal. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 29

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2. Item praeter sensum communem est dare virtutes memorativam et reminiscitivam de quibus Aristoteles postquam hic determinavit de sensu communi et phantasia fecit librum particularem tamquam de virtutibus aliis ab ipso sensu communi. Et illae virtutes sunt cognoscitivae quia memorando, cognosco et iudico me talia scripsisse, talia vidisse vel audivisse, etc. Immo reminiscitiva secundum Aristotelem est syllogizativa et discursiva, quod non est sine cognitione et iudicio. Et tamen hae virtutes non sunt intellectus, cum bruta inveniantur memorare. Igitur sunt sensus alii a sensu communi. 3. Item praeter omnes praedictas virtutes solet poni imaginativa, aestimativa, et cogitativa. Immo Commentator et Avicenna ponunt aestimativam in brutis et cogitativam in hominibus ultra sensum communem tamquam virtutes superiores et potentiores. 4. Item Aristoteles ponit sensum communem in corde, et tamen auctores ponunt phantasiam sive imaginativam et aestimativam sive cogitativam et memorativam in cerebro, propter quod dicunt in cerebro tres esse cellulas, prout debent scire anatomizantes. Et in anteriori cellula dicunt esse phantasiam, in posteriori memorativam, et in media aestimativam sive cogitativam, cuius signum dicunt esse manifestum quia ex infirmitate in anteriori parte cerebri vel capitis laeditur vel perditur phantasia, et ex infirmitate in parte posteriori laeditur vel cor-

25 secundum Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De mem. II 453a 4. 30 Commentator ] AVERROES, Colliget II.20 (10 30 F). || Avicenna ] AVICENNA, Lib. de an. IV.1 (ed. Van Riet, 6.79–8.2). 33 ponit ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 456a4. 20 communem ] et discursiva quia non est sine cognitione et add. A || virtutes ] om. TV 20–21 memorativam ] memoriam T 21 reminiscitivam ] reminiscentiam T || hic ] om. ATV 22 particularem ] articulariter A partialiter E partialem VW 23 communi ] et a phantasia A et in phantasia add. E 27 tamen ] omni E 29 omnes ] alias T om. AE 30 cogitativa ] cognoscitiva W 35 cogitativam ] cognoscitivam T 36 tres ] om. AE || debent ] dicunt VW 37 in posteriori ] inferiori pro A || memorativam ] memoriam A 38 cogitativam ] cognoscitivam T

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2. Again, besides common sense there are the powers of memory and recollection. After discussing the common sense and imagination in this book, Aristotle wrote a book about them in particular,280 treating them as if they were powers other than the common sense. And these powers are cognitive, because, by remembering, I know and judge myself to have written such and such things or to have seen or heard them, etc. Indeed, according to Aristotle, recollection forms syllogisms and is discursive, which cannot take place without cognition and judgment. However, these powers are not intellect, because even brute animals are known to remember. Therefore, these are senses other than the common sense. 3. Furthermore, in addition to all the aforementioned powers it is customary to posit the imaginative, estimative, and cogitative powers. Indeed, the Commentator and Avicenna posit the estimative power in brute animals and the cogitative in humans over and above the common sense as superior and more potent powers. 4. Again, Aristotle places the common sense in the heart, whereas other authors place imagination or the imaginative power and the estimative or cogitative power and memory in the brain, which is the reason, they contend, that there are three ventricles in the brain, as those who study anatomy should know. And imagination should be in the anterior ventricle, memory in the posterior ventricle, and the estimative or cogitative power in the middle. And the obvious evidence for this, they claim, is the fact that an illness affecting the frontal part 280 i.e.,

On Memory.

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rumpitur memoria. Et si haec sunt vera, oportet concedere quod phantasia, cogitativa et memorativa sunt virtutes diversae a sensu communi et ab invicem. Ergo praeter sensum communem oportet ponere alios sensus interiores. 5. Oppositum arguitur quia omnes modi cognitionum nostrarum possunt salvari per sensus exteriores et per sensum communem et per intellectum, quia sensus communis est virtus superior ad sensus exteriores, sicut intellectus ad omnem sensum. Et virtus cognoscitiva superior est potentior et nobilior inferioribus virtutibus, ita quod quidquid potest inferior, superior etiam potest et ultra. Ideo potest dici quod omne quod cognoscimus ultra sensus exteriores, nos illud cognoscimus per sensum communem, exceptis illis quae per solum intellectum sunt cognoscibilia. Igitur frustra praeter haec poneremus alium sensum, et nihil ponendus est frustra in natura, ut patet tertio huius. 6. Item si poneretur virtus sensitiva interior praeter sensum communem, illa esset superior et nobilior quam sensus communis, prout communiter concedunt ponentes eam aestimativam seu cogitativam. Sed hoc est impossibile quia ista debet poni virtus sensitiva nobilissima et suprema quae est in organo nobilissimo. Et sic est de sensu communi, cum Aristoteles dicit eum esse in corde, quod quidem cor, ut dicit, est nobilissimum membrum animalis. 7. Item ad quid poneretur alia virtus cognoscitiva praeter sensum communem et praeter intellectum? Aut enim poneretur ad componendum vel dividendum vel discurrendum aut eliciendum species non sensatorum ex sensatis — sicut ovis ex colore, figura, et motu lupi elicit speciem inimicitiae et fugit — aut ad iudicandum de praeteritis

54–55 tertio huius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.19; Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.9 432b21–23. 61 dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De part. an. II.1 647a 25 Auc. Ar. 9.120 (ed. Hamesse, 218). 42 cogitativa ] cognoscitiva T 43 invicem ] intellectu T 46 salvari ] solvere V 48–49 cognoscitiva ] cogitativa T 53 cognoscibilia ] scibilia T 58 cogitativam ] cognoscitivam T 65 species ] sensibilium add. AE

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of the brain or head impairs or destroys imagination, whereas an illness affecting the posterior part impairs or destroys memory. And if these claims are true, one has to concede that imagination, the cogitative power, and memory are diverse powers, distinct from the common sense and from each other. Therefore, one has to posit other interior senses in addition to the common sense. 5. The opposite is argued, because all types of cognition we have can be explained with reference to the external senses, common sense and intellect alone, because the common sense is a power superior to the external senses just as the intellect is to all the senses. And a cognitive power is superior, more powerful, and nobler than the inferior powers in such a way that whatever an inferior power can do, the superior can do as well, and more. This is why we can say that whatever we cognize beyond what we cognize by the external senses we cognize by the common sense, except for those things that are cognizable only by the intellect. Therefore, it would be superfluous for us to posit another sense besides these, and nothing should be posited superfluously in nature, as is clear in the third book of this work. 6. Again, if one were to posit an internal sensitive power besides the common sense, then that would be superior to and nobler than the common sense, just as is commonly held among those who posit it to be estimative or cogitative. However, this is impossible, because that has to be taken to be the noblest and supreme sense, which is in the noblest organ. But this is the case with the common sense, since Aristotle says that it is in the heart; but the heart, as he says, is the noblest organ in animals. 7. Again, for what would one posit another cognitive power besides the common sense and the intellect? For it would be posited for forming judgments or for reasoning discursively, or for eliciting the species of things that are not sensed from things that are sensed — as the sheep elicits the species of danger from the color,

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per modum memorationis. Ob hoc enim aliqui ponunt supra sensum communem et esse virtutem aestimativam seu cogitativam. 8. Sed ostendo quod propter nullum illorum oportet ponere talem virtutem ultra sensum communem. Primo enim hoc non oportet ponere propter componere vel dividere quia secundum Aristotelem sensus communis hoc facit, cum ponat convenientiam et differentiam inter sensibilia propria sensuum exteriorum, sicut dictum est in alia quaestione. Et si sic potest componere aut dividere, nulla ratio efficax adduceretur quare in huiusmodi et ex huiusmodi complexionibus non posset discurrere. Sed etiam nec propter elicere ex sensatis species seu intentiones insensatorum oportet ponere virtutem sensitivam ultra sensum communem quia diceremus quod in hoc est superioritas sensus communis ad sensus exteriores. Sed iterum nec propter iudicare per modum memorationis, quia hoc totum reducit Aristoteles ad sensum communem in libro De memoria et reminiscentia. Unde dicit, “Quaecumque tempus sentiunt et quo haec sola animalium memorantur, et in hoc quo sentiunt.” Deinde dicit “magnitudinem autem et motum cognoscere necesse est quo et tempus.” Sed nos cognoscimus magnitudinem et motum per sensum communem; igitur per illum cognoscimus tempus et per illum memoramur.

72 Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.2 426b 13. 74–75 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.22 par. 10. 81 reducit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De mem. I 450a 23. 82–83 Unde dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De mem. I 449b28–30 (Ar. lat. XIV.1 1.103.2.15): “Quare quaecumque tempus sentiunt et quo, haec sola animalium memorantur, et isto quo sentiunt.” 84 Deinde dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De mem. I 450a9 (Ar. lat. XIV.1 107.1.17): “Magnitudinem autem et motum cognoscere necesse est quo et tempus.” 69 esse ] om. AE 74 sensuum ] sensibilium V 75 potest ] possumus W 77–78 ex . . . insensatorum ] species sive intentiones sensatorum ex non sensatis A species seu intentiones non sensatorum ex sensatis E 78 sensitivam ] puta add. TV 83 tempus ] tempore V || animalium ] animalia AETVW 85 est ] om. AEVW || et ] ad AT om. EVW || tempus ] tempore EV

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shape and movement of the wolf, and flees — or to judge about past things by way of remembering them. It is for this reason that some authors posit the existence of an estimative or cogitative power in addition to the common sense. 8. But I show that for the sake of none of these functions should one posit another power in addition to the common sense. For in the first place, one does not have to posit such a power for the sake of forming judgments, because according to Aristotle the common sense does this when it establishes the agreements and differences among the proper sensibles of the external senses, as has been said in the previous question. And if it can form affirmative or negative judgments in this way, there is no good reason why it could not reason about and from judgments of this kind.281 But also, one does not have to posit a sensitive power besides the common sense for eliciting the species or intentions of things that are not sensed from things that are; for we have said that the superiority of the common sense over the external senses consists in this. Nor again does one have to do so to account for judging by way of remembering, because Aristotle explained all this in terms of the common sense in his On Memory, where he says “only animals that sense time remember, and the faculty whereby they sense time is also that whereby they remember.” Next, he says “magnitude and motion have to be cognized by the same faculty whereby time is cognized.” However, we cognize magnitude and motion by 281 See

Questions on Aristotle’s De anima II.10 par. 20 above.

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 23

90

95

100

105

110

568

9. Item semper Aristoteles videtur intendere quod phantasmata sunt immediate deservientia intellectui, dicit enim “intelligentem quodcumque necesse est phantasmata speculari,” non dicit cogitationes vel aestimationes. Ideo apparet quod inter virtutes sensitivas et cognoscitivas illa est suprema cuius est formare phantasmata, id est, actus istos cognoscendi quos vocamus phantasticos. Sed ista virtus est sensus communis ut patet per Aristotelem in libro De memoria et reminiscentia, dicentem “et phantasma communis sensus passio est.” 10. Et ideo etiam cum somnus et somnium sunt passiones sensus communis, ut patet in De somno et vigilia, Aristoteles ibidem dixit quod somnium est phantasma in somno. Igitur non erat intentio Aristotelis quod supra sensum communem esset aliqua alia sensitiva virtus. Et omnino Aristoteles sive in libro De anima sive in Parvis naturalibus, non determinat, quantum spectat ad potentias animae sensitivae, nisi de sensu communi et phantasia, de memoria et reminiscentia, de somno et vigilia, et tamen cognitionem memorativam reduxit ad sensum communem et etiam cognitionem phantasticam et somnium, ut patet per praedicta. Igitur manifestum est quod numquam fuit intentio sua quod esset virtus cognoscitiva sensitiva interior praeter sensum communem. 11. De illa quaestione sunt et fuerunt diversae opiniones, sicut patet apparere ex rationibus hinc inde adductis, in quibus etiam tanguntur plures magnae difficultates. 12. Prima enim difficultas est, quamvis non essent virtutes cognoscitivae praeter sensus exteriores et praeter sensum communem, utrum tamen ponenda esset alia virtus reservativa specierum sensibilium et 88 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8, 432a 3. 89–90 dicit . . . speculari ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a 7 Auc. Ar. 6.167 (ed. Hamesse, 188): “Necesse est quemcumque intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” 94 per Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De mem. I 450a10–11 (Ar. lat. XIV.2.107.1. 18): “Et phantasma communis sensus passio est.” 97 ut patet ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 455a26. || ibidem ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 456a 26. 88 Item ] propter hoc add. A 90 phantasmata ] phantasma W || cogitationes ] cognitiones T 91 sensitivas et ] om. W 93 cognoscendi ] cogitandi E || phantasticos ] phantasmata T 95 phantasma ] phantasmata quos A phantasia E || communis ] om. A || est ] om. W 97 ibidem ] idem A || dixit ] intendit T 100 Et ] cum add. VW || omnino ] ideo T 104 somnium ] somnum AE 111– 112 cognoscitivae ] sensitivae add. AE

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the common sense; therefore, we cognize time and remember by it as well. 9. Again, Aristotle always seems to insist that phantasms are immediately at the disposal of the intellect, for he says, “it is necessary for anyone understanding to reflect on phantasms”; he does not say that one must reflect on thoughts or opinions. Thus, it appears that among sensitive and cognitive powers, that one is the supreme whose function is to form phantasms, that is, those acts of cognition we call ‘fantastical.’ But that power is the common sense, as is clear from Aristotle’s On Memory, where he says, “a phantasm is an affection of the common sense.” 10. Also, because sleeping and dreaming are affections of the common sense, as is clear in On Sleep and Waking, Aristotle said in the same place that a dream is a phantasm in sleep. Therefore, Aristotle did not intend to have another sensitive power besides the common sense. However, wherever he discussed it, whether in De Anima or the Brief Essays on Natural Philosophy, Aristotle discussed only the common sense and imagination, memory, and recollection, sleeping and wakefulness as far as the sensitive powers are concerned. And yet he reduced memory, as well as imagination and dreaming, to the common sense, as is clear from the foregoing.282 Therefore, it is obvious that he never intended to have an internal sensitive cognitive power besides the common sense. 11. On this question, there are and have been diverse opinions, as should be clear from the arguments advanced so far, which also touch on a number of serious difficulties. 12. The first difficulty is whether one would have to posit another power to preserve the species and intentions of sensible things in their absence, when all acts of cognition have stopped, even if there were

282 See

pars. 8–9 above.

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115

120

125

130

135

140

570

intentionum in absentiis sensibilium et omni actu cognoscendi cessante. 13. Et si est aliqua talis ponenda, tunc est secunda dubitatio utrum ponenda est unica aut plures. 14. Et est tertia dubitatio de qua quaerebatur utrum praeter sensus exteriores et sensum communem est ponenda aliqua virtus interior cognoscitiva et sensitiva. 15. Et si non ponatur alia, tunc est quarta dubitatio quare Aristoteles distincte ponit virtutem phantasticam, sensum communem, memorativam, et reminiscitivam, et distincte determinat de eis, cum tamen videatur ponere omnes has virtutes cognoscitivas quia contingit phantasticae cognoscere et memorativae et reminiscitivae. 16. Quinta dubitatio est de organis istarum virtutum, ubi sunt et quotquot ponantur. 17. De prima dubitatione ponenda est haec prima conclusio, quod praeter sensum communem et singulas virtutes cognoscitivas ponenda est aliqua virtus non cognoscitiva, reservativa tamen specierum sensibilium et intentionum. Et non dico quod sit alia ex parte animae, sicut alias dictum est, sed ex parte organi et operationis. Ista conclusio probatur. Primo autem apparet quod species vel intentiones sensibilium reservantur in nobis in absentia sensibilium, quia aliter non possemus memorari de aliquibus visis vel auditis, nec somniare nec etiam formare phantasmata. Secundo etiam apparet quod huiusmodi species vel intentiones reservantur omni actu cognoscendi cessante, quia aliter, post cessationem ab huiusmodi actibus cognoscendi, non possemus somniari aut memorari aut formare imaginationes vel phantasmata, nisi recurrendo ad sensibilia exteriora, cuius contrarium experimur. Sed etiam potest apparere quod huiusmodi species et intentiones, sic cessantibus actibus cognoscendi, non reservantur etiam in virtutibus cognoscitivis, hoc est dictu in organis in quibus anima 114 intentionum ] et sensibilium add. A 114–115 cessante ] om. A 116 est ] om. VW 119 aliqua ] alia TV 124 omnes ] om. AE || has ] alias T 124–125 phantasticae . . . reminiscitivae ] phantasiae cogitare et memorare et reminiscentiae T 126 istarum ] aliarum A 130 aliqua ] alia AE 132 operationis ] operis W 134 sensibilium ] sensibiles AE 137 cognoscendi ] cognoscente] V 140 phantasmata ] aut memorari add. A nec memorari add. E || ad ] retinendum add. A || contrarium ] oppositum E 143 cognoscitivis ] cognoscendis E

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no other cognitive powers besides the external senses and the common sense. 13. And if one must posit some such power, then the next question is whether a single one or several? 14. And the third question is the one already asked, namely whether one has to posit an internal cognitive and sensitive power, besides the external senses and the common sense. 15. And if one does not have to posit such a power, then the fourth question is why Aristotle definitely posited the imaginative power, common sense, memory and recollection, and discussed them separately, although apparently he posited all these only because cognition happens sometimes by way of imagining or remembering or recollecting. 16. The fifth question is about the organs of these powers, namely where they are and how many of them there are. 17. Concerning the first question, one has to lay down the first conclusion283 that, besides the common sense and the individual external senses, one should posit a non-cognitive power that preserves sensible species and intentions. And I do not claim that it is distinct on the part of the soul, as has already been established elsewhere,284 but on the part of the organ and its operation. This conclusion is proved: in the first place, it is obvious that species or intentions of sensible things are preserved in us in the absence of these sensible things, for otherwise we could neither remember things we saw or heard, nor dream, nor even imagine. In the second place it appears that such species or intentions are preserved when all acts of cognition have stopped, for otherwise, after the cessation of these acts, we could not dream or remember or even form imaginations or phantasms, unless by recourse to external sensibles — and we experience the opposite. But it can also appear that, once cognitive activity has ceased, these species and intentions are also not preserved in the cognitive powers,

283 See 284 See

par. 12 above. par. 8 above.

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145

150

155

160

165

572

est innata formare actum cognoscendi, quia tunc non cessaret actus cognoscendi, quoniam nihil apparet deficere requisitum ad formandum actus cognoscendi. Voluntas enim libera non habet in hoc locum tamen, quia non est in brutis. Cum quia in nobis non exit in actum sine actu cognoscendi, igitur necesse est concedere huiusmodi virtutem reservativam et organum in quo fiat huiusmodi reservatio, praeter organa in quibus innata est fieri actualis cognitio. Et si aliquis obiceret quod intellectus, qui est cognoscitivus, est etiam reservativus, quia aliter perirent habitus intellectuales, ego respondeo quod de hoc determinabitur in tertio libro in decimoquinta quaestione. 18. De secunda autem dubitatione, scilicet utrum ponenda sit unica talis virtus aut plures, ego pono secundam conclusionem quod est ponenda unica, quia sensus communis est unus ad quem conveniunt omnes species vel intentiones sensibilium et sensationum sensuum exteriorum. Et si ille est unus sensus, nulla ratio dictaret quare consimiliter non posset sufficere una virtus reservativa omnium pertinentium ad istum unum sensum communem. Ideo si non sit alia virtus sensitiva cognoscitiva ultra sensum communem, nulla etiam debet poni alia reservativa. Sed post dicemus quod non est alia sensitiva cognoscitiva ultra sensum communem, etc. 19. Nunc autem statim de tertia dubitatione ponenda est conclusio tertia, scilicet quod praeter sensum communem nulla est alia virtus sensitiva cognoscitiva interior. Et voco cognoscitivam quia in ea formatur actualis cognitio. Haec conclusio patet manifeste esse de intentione Aristotelis secundum ea quae ad hoc arguta sunt prius. Nam et somnium, memorationem, et phantasiationem reducit Aristoteles

153 in decimoquinta quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.15. Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 455a22.

169 reducit

144 formare ] facere W 144–145 tunc . . . quoniam ] om. A 145 deficere ] de fide T || requisitum ] om. VW 147 tamen ] teneri T || Cum ] tamen AE discurri T || non ] est in actu aut non add. A || in actum ] om. A 151 intellectus ] intellectiva E || cognoscitivus ] cognitivus A 156 conveniunt ] concurrunt A 157 sensationum ] sensationes E 158 quare ] qualiter W 160 communem ] om. W 161 cognoscitiva ] om. T (?) V || nulla etiam ] om. V 162 post ] non A nos E

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that is to say, in the organs in which the soul is naturally suited to form the act of cognition, for then the act of cognition would never stop, because there nothing needed for the formation of the act of cognition appears to be missing. For free will has no role to play here, as it is not present in brute animals. Nevertheless, since it is never actualized in us without an act of cognition, it is therefore necessary to concede that there is such a preservative power and an organ in which this preservation takes place, distinct from the organs in which actual cognition is naturally suited to occur. And if someone were to object that the intellect, which is cognitive, is also preservative, for otherwise intellectual habits would be destroyed, I respond that this issue will be determined in the fifteenth question of the third book. 18. As for the second question,285 namely whether one should posit one such power or several, I put forward the second conclusion that only one such power has to be posited, because there is only one common sense that gathers all species or intentions of sensible things and sensations of external senses. And if that is a single sense, then there is no reason that would tell us why a single power could not likewise suffice to preserve everything that pertains to this single common sense. Therefore, if there is no other cognitive power besides the common sense, one also need not posit another preservative power. But we will state below286 that there is no sensitive cognitive power besides the common sense, etc. 19. Now we should directly reply to the third question with the third conclusion, namely that there is no other internal sensitive cognitive power besides the common sense.287 And I call it ‘cognitive’, because actual cognitions are formed in it. This conclusion clearly agrees with the intention of Aristotle, in accordance with the arguments that were advanced for it earlier.288 For Aristotle reduces all

285 See

par. 13 above. par. 19 below. 287 See par. 14 above. 288 See par 5 above. 286 See

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 23 170

175

180

185

190

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totum ad primum sensitivum, per quod ipse intelligit sensum communem. Secundo etiam quia, licet Aristoteles nihil de hoc dixisset, tamen hoc apparet verum per rationes quae fiebant prius. Nulla enim apparet necessitas ponendi talem virtutem aliam praeter sensum communem, sicut dicebatur. Et hoc est manifestum si solvantur rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis. Ideo statim solvendae sunt per quarum etiam solutionem apparebit illud quod in quarta dubitatione dubitabatur. 20. Ad primam dicendum est quod hoc nomen phantasia dupliciter usitatur et aequivoce, et similiter hoc nomen phantasma. Uno enim modo phantasia accipitur pro virtute reservativa et non cognoscitiva, de qua iam dixi in prima quaestione. Et hoc est organice distincta a sensu communi. Et phantasma, quod est actus eius inhaerens illi organo reservativo, est species seu intentio repraesentativa sensationis prius factae in sensu communi a sensati, quae quidem intentio derelicta est et facta in illo organo ab actu sentiendi sensus communis. Et illum actum vocavit etiam Aristoteles nomine phantasiae. Sic etiam dicebat in secundo huius quod “phantasia est motus a sensu factus secundum actum.” Hoc est dicere phantasia, id est actus phantasiae remanens sensatione cessante, est motus, id est species vel intentio impressa in organo reservativo a sensu factus secundum actum, id est ab actu sentiendi ipsius sensus scilicet communis. 21. Secundo modo phantasia capitur pro sensu communi qui iam secundum diversas rationes nominatur sensus communis et phanta-

186 Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De mem. I 450a10; 450a23. 187 secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.3 429a 1–2 Auc. Ar. 6.111 (ed. Hamesse, 183): “Phantasia est motus factus a sensu secundum actum secundum quem animalia multa agunt et patiuntur.” 170 sensitivum ] sensum TV sensuum W 173 apparet ] est VW 175 Ideo ] nunc add. AT non add. E 177 dubitabatur ] dicebatur W 180 accipitur ] recipitur E || reservativa ] reservata E 181 quaestione ] seu dubtatione add. V conclusione W 183 reservativo ] reservando A et add. V 185 sentiendi ] cognoscendi W 186 vocavit ] aliquando add. AE aliquando nominavit T 188 dicere ] dictum AE dictum quod T 190 organo ] sensitivo add. A 192 capitur ] accipitur T

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dreaming, remembering and imagining to a primary sense, by which he understands the common sense. In the second place, even if Aristotle had said nothing about this issue, nevertheless, this claim appears to be true in view of the arguments presented earlier.289 For there seems to be no need to posit another such power besides the common sense, as has been said.290 And this will be obvious if we reply to the arguments that were raised at the beginning of this question. Thus, they have to be answered in turn, from which the issue raised by the fourth question will become clear as well. 20. To the first objection291 we should reply that the word ‘imagination’ is used in two ways, equivocally, and the same goes for the name ‘phantasm’. For in one way ‘imagination’ is used for the preservative and non-cognitive power that I was talking about in connection with the first question above,292 and this is in a different organ from the common sense. And a phantasm, which is its act, inhering in that preservative organ, is a species or intention that represents a sensation produced earlier in the conmon sense by the thing sensed; but this intention itself is produced and left behind in that organ by the common sense’s act of sensing. And it was this act that Aristotle called by the name ‘imagination’. For it is in this way that he said in De Anima II, “imagination is a movement produced by a sense in act.” In other words, imagination, i.e. the act of imagination left behind when sensation ceases, is a motion, i.e. a species or intention impressed on the preservative organ, and produced by sense in keeping with this act, i.e. by the act of sensation of that sense, that is to say, the common sense. 21. In the second way ‘imagination’ is taken for the common sense, which, however, is named ‘common sense’ and ‘imagination’ on dif-

289 See

par. par. 291 See par. 292 See par. 290 See

5 above. 5 above. 1 above. 17 above.

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195

200

205

210

576

sia. Nominatur enim sensus communis prout ad actum suum sentiendi movetur a sensibus exterioribus actu sentientibus. Et nominatur phantasia ea ratione qua movetur ad actum cognoscendi a speciebus seu intentionibus in organo reservativo reservatis. Et phantasma prout est actus eius sibi inhaerens est actualis cognitio ad quam movetur per huiusmodi intentiones reservatas. Unde sic proprie descripsit Aristoteles somnium quod est phantasma in somno. Verum est quod, quia sensus communis sic dicitur phantasia seu virtus phantastica, ideo aliquando hoc nomen phantasma largius extendimus ad significandum omnem actum cognoscitivum sensus communis. Sic enim large accipitur ubi dicit Aristoteles quod “intelligentem quamcumque necesse est phantasmata speculari.” 22. Sic ergo apparet quod bene dicit Aristoteles phantasiam differre a sensu communi, quia hoc est simpliciter verum de phantasia reservativa. Si autem loquitur de phantasia cognoscitiva, tunc est intentio sua quod ista nomina differunt secundum rationem, licet sit eadem res. Et cum dicit Aristoteles phantasiam esse saepius falsam quam sensum, intendit quod saepius in sensu communi cognitio est falsa quae proprie dicitur phantastica quia fit a speciebus reservatis, sed cognitio quae proprie nomine dicitur sensatio est facta a sensibus exterioribus actu sentientibus. 199–200 descripsit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somnio I 459a19–20 (Ar. lat. XV.2.2 1.9.2): “Somnium vero phantasma quoddam videtur esse (nam quod in somno phantasma somnium dicimus).” 204 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a8–9 Auc. Ar. 6.167 (ed. Hamesse, 188): “Necesse est quemcumque intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” 206 dicit Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.3 428b11 (Ar. lat. XII.2 192.1.21): “Postea hii quidem veri semper, phantasiae autem plures falsae.” 210 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.3 428a12. 195 sensibus ] sensibilibus A || nominatur ] dicitur A 197 in ] ab A 202 aliquando hoc ] illud A 203 cognoscitivum ] cogitativum V 207 communi ] om. AE || simpliciter ] similiter A 207–208 reservativa ] reservata E 208 phantasia ] reservativa add. V 212 phantastica ] phantasia A || sed ] sicut A quam ET || cognitio ] cogitatio A 213 est facta ] quia fit AE || sensibus ] sensibilibus V 214 sentientibus ] sensibilibus E

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ferent accounts. For it is named ‘common sense’ insofar as it is moved to its own act of sensation by the actually sensing external senses. But it is named ‘imagination’ for the reason that it is moved to an act of cognition by the species or intentions preserved in the preservative organ. And the phantasm, insofar as the act of imagination inheres in it, is an actual cognition to which is moved by such preserved intentions. This is why Aristotle correctly described a dream as a phantasm in sleep. It is true, though, that because the common sense in this way is called ‘imagination’ or ‘imaginative power’, we sometimes extend the name ‘phantasm’ even more broadly to all cognitive acts of the common sense. For it is taken in this broad sense when Aristotle says, “it is necessary for anyone understanding to reflect on phantasms.” 22. Thus, therefore, it is clear that Aristotle correctly claims that imagination is different from the common sense, for this is absolutely true about the preservative imagination. But if he is talking about the cognitive imagination, then he means that these names ‘imagination’ and ‘common sense’] differ in their concepts, although they apply to same thing . And when Aristotle says that imagination is more often false than sense is, he means that in the common sense, the kind of cognition that is properly called ‘imaginative’ is more often false, because it is from preserved species, whereas the kind of cognition

L IBER II Q UAESTIO 23 215

220

225

230

235

578

23. Ad aliam rationem quae arguit de memorativa et reminiscitiva, dicendum est primo quod de differentia secundum rationem inter memoriam et reminiscentiam debet videri in libro De memoria et reminiscentia. Eidem enim virtuti secundum diversas operationes imponuntur talia diversa nomina, quod apparet manifeste in simili per Aristotelem in sexto Ethicorum, ubi dicit alias esse particulam animae scientificam qua anima speculatur circa necessaria, et ratiocinantem qua ratiocinatur circa contingentia. 24. Sed tunc de virtute memorativa sive memoria dicendum est sicut de phantasia quod aliquando hoc nomen memoria vel memorativa accipitur pro virtute reservativa et non cognoscitiva, et tunc est idem realiter quod phantasia reservativa. Et aliquando sumitur pro virtute cognoscitiva, et tunc est idem quod sensus communis. Et aliquando hoc nomen memoria sumitur pro actu cognoscitivo et memorativo, et tunc est idem quod actus ipsius sensus communis. 25. Tunc ergo tu quaereres an debeamus ponere differentiam inter phantasiam et memoriam prout dicuntur virtutes animae. Et ego dico quod non quantum est ex parte animae et organi. Sed ponitur differentia secundum rationem ex diversitate operum, nam praedicta virtus reservativa dicitur phantasia prout reservat species et intentiones sensationum et sensatorum. Sed inquantum ipsa cum hoc reservat intentionem temporis certi apprehensi per sensum communem, ipsa vocatur virtus memorativa reservativa. Et sic etiam sensus communis, inquantum iudicat de aliis sensatis sine differentia temporis in

220 sexto Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. VI.1 1139a4–17. 215–216 memorativa et reminiscitiva ] memoria et reminiscentia VW 217 memoriam et reminiscentiam ] reminiscitivam et rememorativam T 218 operationes ] rationes E 219 manifeste ] manifesta V manifestum W 220 particulam ] virtutes W || animae ] ante corr. partiales post corr. particularem add. W 225 non ] om. A 229 idem quod ] om. AETV 233 praedicta ] quaedam A 238 aliis ] illis A

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that is properly called by the name ‘sensation’ is made by the actually sensing external senses. 23. In reply to the other argument;293 we should say in the first place that one should consult On Memory about the conceptual differences between memory and recollection. For these diverse names are imposed on the same power on account of its different functions, which is obvious in the analogous case presented by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VI, where he says that the scientific part of the soul whereby it speculates about necessary objects is different from the calculative one whereby it reasons about contingent objects. 24. But then, concerning the power of remembering or memory, we should say, just as we did concerning imagination, that sometimes the name ‘memory’ or ‘remembrance’ is taken to refer to the non-cognitive preservative power, and then it is the same thing as the preservative imagination. But sometimes it is taken to refer to a cognitive power, and then it is the same as the common sense. And sometimes the name ‘memory’ is taken for the cognitive act of remembering, and then it is the same as the act of the common sense itsel itself. 25. Next, therefore, you would ask whether we should distinguish between imagination and memory insofar as they are said to be powers of the soul. And I say that we should not, as far as the soul and the organ are concerned. But there is a difference in their concepts on account of the diversity of their functions; for the aforementioned preservative power is called ‘imagination’ insofar as it preserves the species and intentions of sensations and things sensed. But insofar as it also preserves the intention of a certain time of something apprehended by the common sense, it is called the ‘preservative power of

293

See par. 2 above.

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240

245

250

255

260

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quo sentiebantur, dicitur phantasia et non memoria. Sed prout iudicat cum differentia temporis praeteriti in quo ista sentiebantur, ipsa vocatur memorativa. 26. Sed iterum tu quaeris quare, post determinationem de phantasia et de sensu communi in illo libro, fecit Aristoteles alium librum partialem, De memoria et reminiscentia. Et ego respondeo quod hoc fecit rationabiliter quia plus requiritur ad actum cognoscendi memorative vel reminiscitive quam ad alios actus cognoscendi phantasticos. Ideo oportebat in illo libro manifestare quid plus ad istos actus requiritur et quomodo illi actus exercentur per sensum communem et per phantasiam absque hoc quod oportet praeter istos ponere alias virtutes organicas, sicut multi posuerunt. Hoc ergo in isto libro determinat Aristoteles. 27. Ad aliam rationem quae arguit de aestimativa et cogitativa auctoritate Avicennae et Commentatoris et multorum aliorum commentatorum, dicendum est quod, si isti crediderunt has virtutes realiter differre a sensu communi, ipsi non crediderunt sicut Aristoteles. Ideo negarem eos. Sed si crediderunt huiusmodi nomina non esse synonyma, ipsi bene distinxerunt, vocando eamdem virtutem sensum communem, phantasiam, et aestimativam, scilicet sensum communem, ea ratione sicut dixi, quod est innatus cognoscere sensibilia omnia et sensationes sensuum exteriorum, et quod movetur ab huiusmodi sensationibus sensuum exteriorum. Et vocatur phantasia prout ad tales actus cognoscendi movetur ab intentionibus reservatis, cessante motu eius a sensibus exterioribus. Et vocatur aestimativa ea ratione qua ultra haec, est innata elicere ex huiusmodi sensationibus et sensatis intentiones et apprehensiones insensatorum, puta amicitiae vel odiis, utilis aut nocivi, convenientis aut disconvenientis, terribilis vel non terribilis, et sic de aliis plurimis apprehensionibus ad quas innati sunt conse241 memorativa ] memoria V 245 plus ] possibiliter E 246 reminiscitive ] reservative V 247 istos ] alius T 248 quomodo ] om. VW 249 oportet ] oportebat A oporteat E oporteret T 250 posuerunt ] putaverunt TVW 254 realiter ] om. W 257 distinxerunt ] dixerunt A || vocando ] quod quando V 260 movetur ] intelligitur AET 262 intentionibus ] intellectionibus A 264 et ] om. AE 265 amicitiae ] animae V inamicitiae add. W || odiis ] odii vel etiam A odii E odorum V 266–267 terribilis . . . terribilis ] om. TVW 267 plurimis ] pluribus T 267–268 consequi ] om. T prosequi VW

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remembering.’ In this way, the common sense too, insofar as it judges about other sensed things without any difference of time at which they were sensed, is called ‘imagination’ and not ‘memory;’ but insofar as it judges with the difference of the past time at which they were sensed, it is called ‘remembrance.’ 26. But then again you ask why Aristotle, after discussing imagination and the common sense in this book, wrote another book specifically on memory and recollection. And I reply that it made some sense for him to do so, because more is required for the act of cognizing via memory or recollection than for other imaginative acts. Therefore, it was necessary in that book to make clear what more is needed for those acts and how those acts are performed by the common sense and imagination, apart from the fact that one needs to posit those other organic powers, as many have posited them. Accordingly, Aristotle discussed this issue in that book. 27. To the other, which argues about the estimative and cogitative powers294 based on the authority of Avicenna, the Commentator, and many other commentators, we should say that, if they believed that these powers were really distinct from the common sense, then they did not believe what Aristotle believed, and so I would just deny their opinions. But if they believed that these names are not synonymous, they correctly drew the distinction when they called the same power common sense, imagination and estimative power, namely because it is called common sense for the reason I mentioned, that it is capable of cognizing all sensible things and the sensations of the external senses, and that it is moved by these sensations of the external senses. And it is called ‘imagination’ insofar as it is moved to such acts of cognition by preserved intentions, once it is no longer in motion via the external senses. And it is called estimative because beyond this, it is naturally suited to elicit from these sensations and sensed things, intentions and apprehensions of things that are not sensed, such as

294 See

par. 3 above.

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qui motus appetitus sensitivi. Commentator autem non distinguit inter cogitativam et aestimativam nisi quia talem virtutem, secundum nunc praedictam operationem, dicit vocari aestimativam prout invenitur in brutis, et cogitativam prout invenitur in hominibus. Ideo dicit cogitativam deservire intellectui et esse nobiliorem quam aestimativam. 28. Ultima ratio tangit magnam difficultatem, scilicet quae sint et ubi situentur organa praedictarum virtutum, scilicet sensus communis et virtutis praedictae reservativae. Ideo fiet de hoc quaestio specialis, scilicet sequens.

268 Commentator ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.11, 434a 6–15; AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.57 (ed. Crawford, 529.16–17): “Et imaginatio existit in aliis animalibus, cogitatio autem in rationabilibus.” 271 dicit ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.20 (ed. Crawford, 454.315–316); Auc. Ar. 6.256 (ed. Hamesse, 194): “Per virtutem cogitativam homo differt ab omnibus animalibus.” 274 situentur ] sint E

275 virtutis ] virtutes E

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whether something is friend or foe, useful or harmful, agreeable or disagreeable, frightful or not frightful, and many other apprehensions that the movements of sensory appetites are naturally suited to follow. The Commentator, however, distinguishes the cogitative and estimative powers only because he says that this power, on account of the function just described, is called ‘estimative’ when it is found in brute animals, and ‘cogitative’ when it is found in humans. And this is why he says that the cogitative serves the intellect, and that it is nobler than the estimative. 28. The last argument295 touches on a serious difficulty, namely what are the organs of the aforementioned powers, namely common sense, and the above-mentioned preservative power, and where are they located? And so we should have a special question for this, which follows.

295 See

par. 4 above.

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Utrum organum sensus communis sit in corde vel in cerebro seu in capite; nullus enim alibi ponitur illud organum.

5

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1. Arguunt medici quod sit in cerebro et non in corde, auctoritate Galeni, Avicennae, Platonis et plurimorum aliorum, qui dicunt quod est in cerebro in eius anteriori concavitate. Et dicunt ad hoc signum esse sufficiens, quia laesa posteriori parte cerebri laeditur memoria, et laesa media laeditur imaginatio, et laesa anteriori parte laeditur sensus communis et tota pars sensitiva, sicut dicitur contingere in phreneticis. 2. Item Aristoteles ponit somnum esse passionem primi sensitivi, per quod intendit sensum communem. Sed somnus est passio cerebri, quod patet quia ad provocandum somnum vel vigiliam, ponunt omnes medici localia remedia circa cerebrum, et ita etiam ad remediandum sensum. 3. Item phantasia seu virtus imaginativa sita est in cerebro secundum Commentatorem et Avicennam. Phantasia autem immediate immutatur et recipit species quas reservat a sensu communi. Movens autem et motum debent esse simul, ut dicitur septimo Physicorum; 5 Galeni ] G ALENUS, De placitis Hippocrates et Platonis, II.3 (ed. K¨uhn, V 219– 226); De usu partium VII.4–5 (ed. K¨uhn, III 625–636). || Avicennae ] AVICEN NA , Lib. de an. I.5 (ed. van Riet) 87.19–22. || Platonis ] Cf. P LATO , Tim. 69e. 10 ponit ] A RISTOTELES, De somno I 454a 20–23 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 2.2.4): “Nec enim si est animal habens sensum, hoc contingit nec dormire nec vigilare: utraque enim passio haec circa sensum primi sensitivi.” 15–16 secundum Commentatorem ] Colliget II.10 (X 30 F). 16 Avicennam ] AVICENNA, Lib. de an. IV.1 (ed. van Riet) 8.2–11.43. 18 septimo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VII.2 243a3 (Ar. lat. VII.3 9.329.1): “Primum autem movens, non sicut cuius causa, sed unde est principium motus, est simul cum eo quod movetur.” 2 nullus enim ] aut A || ponitur ] posset esse A posuit EW 8 media ] memoria E 10 somnum ] somnium AE 11 intendit ] intelligit A 13 localia remedia ] remedia gerenda A || remediandum ] remedicandum TV 16–17 immediate immutatur et ] immutatur et immediate AE 17 quas reservat ] suas reservatas VW © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 30

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Is the organ of common sense in the heart or in the brain or in the head (for it is not taken to be anywhere else)?

1. Physicians argue that it is in the brain and not in the heart, based on the authority of Galen, Avicenna, Plato and many others who say that it is in the anterior ventricle of the brain. And they say that a sufficient indication of this is the fact that memory is damaged when the posterior part of the brain is damaged, imagination is damaged when the middle part is damaged, and the common sense and the whole sensitive part is damaged when the anterior part of the brain is damaged. as is said to be the case with madmen. 2. Again, Aristotle states that sleep is an affection of the primary sensitive power, by which he means the common sense. But sleep is an affection of the brain, which is clear from the fact that, to induce sleep or waking, and also to cure the senses, all physicians administer remedies locally to the brain. 3. Again, imagination or the imaginative power296 is located in the brain, according to the Commentator and Avicenna. But imagination is immediately changed by the common sense and receives from it the species it preserves. And the mover and moved have to be to-

296 We

have chosen to translate Buridan’s fantasia as “imagination,” although he also uses the word imginatio in a few places. Here, he seems to use imaginatio as a synonym for fantasia (phantasia seu imaginatio). In par. 29 below, however, he suggests that phantasia and imaginatio, or at least the results of their operations, may be different (non intelligentes aliud per imaginationes et phantasias). In later centuries, some scholars writing about the internal senses drew an explicit distinction between imaginatio and phantasia, making the former a temporary store for the common sense, and the latter a temporary store for the estimative power. For an example, see Titelmans 1545, X.6. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 30

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igitur organum sensus communis debet in cerebro coniungi organo phantasiae seu imaginationis. 4. Item aliae virtutes interiores, puta imaginativa, cogitativa, et memorativa, ponuntur in capite secundum Commentatorem, Avicennam et Albertum et alios Aristotelis expositores et commentatores. Quare ergo non ita erit dicendum de sensu communi? 5. Item specialiter sensus perceptivus primarum qualitatum debet esse in media proportione earum et esse denudatus ab excellentiis earum, ut dicitur in secundo huius. Cor autem non est sic in media proportione primarum qualitatum, sed est multum calidum ultra huiusmodi proportionem, prout communiter conceditur. Et confirmatur ratio, quia cum caliditas cordis sit multo intensior quam caliditas manus, manifestum est quod manus sentiret in aliquo caliditatem similem in gradu caliditati cordis. Et tamen sensus communis sentit quidquid manus vel pes sentit; igitur, si sensus communis esset in corde, sequitur quod sentiret sibi similiter calidum, quod Aristoteles videtur negare in secundo huius. 6. Item communiter solent poni quattuor membra principalia in animalibus perfectis, scilicet cor, hepar, cerebrum, et testiculi seu membra genitalia. Eis autem non apparet quod debeat attribui principalitas magis quam aliis, nisi ex eo quod in quolibet eorum radicetur una virtutum principalium ipsius animalis. Et hoc non potest poni commode nisi dicendo quod in corde est virtus vitalis, et in hepate naturalis, id est nutritiva, et in cerebro animalis, scilicet sensitiva, et in testiculis generativa, sicut etiam posuerunt qui Aristotelem praecesserunt. 23 Albertum ] De anima III.4.3 (ed. Stroick, 168.65–76). 27 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a 5; Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.13, par. 3. 35 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 424a 5. 43–44 Aristotelem praecesserunt ] e. g. P LATO, Tim. 69d. 20 imaginationis ] imaginae A imaginativae E 21 cogitativa ] cognoscitiva T 23 expositores et commentatores ] et commentatoris expositores A 25 sensus ] communis add. TV 28 primarum qualitatum ] om. W 30 quia ] om. W 31 in aliquo ] manifeste TVW 32 caliditati cordis ] caliditatis V || tamen ] cum TV || communis ] om. T 39 magis ] cordi add. VW 39–40 radicetur ] radicaretur V 40 una ] unica VW 40–41 poni commode ] concedere A 41–42 naturalis ] nutrimentalis AE 42 nutritiva ] naturalia T

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gether, as is stated in Physics VII. Therefore, the organ of the common sense has to be connected in the brain to the organ of imagination (or imagining). 4. Again, other internal powers, such as the imaginative, the cogitative, and memory are located in the head according to the Commentator, Avicenna, Albert, and other expositors of and commentators on Aristotle. Why then should the same not be said about the common sense? 5. Again, especially a sense that is perceptive of the primary qualities has to be a mean between them and stripped of their excessive instances, as stated in the second book of this work. However, the heart does not have a mean proportion of these primary qualities, but is much warmer than a mean of this kind of proportion, as is commonly recognized. And the argument is confirmed by the fact that, because the heart is much warmer than the hand, the hand would clearly sense warmth in something as warm as the heart.297 And yet the common sense senses whatever the hand or the foot senses. Therefore, if the common sense were in the heart, it follows that it would feel something as warm as itself, which Aristotle appears to deny in Book II. 6. Again, in general, four principal organs are usually identified in perfect animals,298 namely the heart, liver, brain, and testicles or the genitals. But it would appear that principality should be attributed to these rather than to others only insofar as one of the principal powers of the animal itself is rooted in any of them. And the only consistent way of assigning these powers to each is by saying that the vital power is in the heart, the natural or nutritive power is in the liver, the animal or sensitive power is in the brain, and the reproductive power is in the testicles, as was claimed even by those who preceded Aristotle.

297 For an example of this phenomenon, see Questions on Aristotle’s De anima III.2,

par. 18 below. 298 In On the Generation of Animals II.4, Aristotle used the term ‘perfect animals’ to refer to internally viviparous animals. Buridan may well have had that meaning of the term in mind here.

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7. Item sensus communis ligatur in somno, propter quod ad eius ligamentum omnes sensus exteriores ligantur. Unde Aristoteles, volens probare quod somnus sit passio sensus communis, dicit quod ipso facto impotente necesse est omnes sensus particulares fieri impotentes, et non e converso. Sed constat quod in corde nihil sit impotens in somno, quia impotentia seu ligamentum est ex frigore seu recessu caloris. In corde autem hoc non contingit, immo fortificatur in eo et circa ipsum calor in somno, propter quod etiam fit magis digestio in somno quam in vigilia. 8. Oppositum determinat Aristoteles in De somno et vigilia expresse, et in tertio De partibus animalium . Et Averroes hoc nititur demonstrare in suo libro Colliget. Et Avicenna in primo Canonis etiam consentit in hoc Aristotele. 9. Notandum est quod per organum sensus communis ego intendo illud membrum vel illud organum in quo subiective formantur cogitationes omnium sensatorum per sensus exteriores et sensationes eorum. Et ego dico cum Aristotele quod illud organum est cor vel in corde in animalibus habentibus cor, aut proportionale cordi in hiis in quibus proprie non est cor. Et hoc ego probo per communem vocem omnium. Omnes enim communiter dicunt se habere cordi negotia ad quae sunt bene intenti, et scire corde tenus ea quae sciunt dicere et proferre sine libro. Et in sacra scriptura habemus, “Dilige dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo,” et non dicit “ex toto cerebro.” Et iterum “Confitebor tibi, Domine, in toto corde meo.” Et amasius dicit cor suum esse apud 47 dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 455b 10 53 quam in vigilia ] A RISTOTE LES , De somno III 457b 1–7; Cf. Auc. Ar. 7.83 (ed. Hamesse, 202): “In somno fit propulsio caloris ad interiora animalis, unde superiora et exteriora membra in somno sunt frigida et interiora sunt calida.” 54–55 expresse ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 456a 5 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 5.2.40) 55 De partibus animalium ] A RISTOTELES, De part. an. II.10 656a28; (Ar. lat. XVII.2.4): “Quia quidem igitur principium sensuum est qui circa cor locus, determinatum est prius in hiis quae de sensu; et quia duo manifeste tendentes ad cor sunt.” || Averroes ] AVERROES, Colliget II.11 (X 24 D). 56 Avicenna ] Canon medicinae (ed. Gr¨uner, 1984) 97.121. 66–67 Dilige . . . tuo ] Deut. 6:5 (Vulgata) 67–68 Confitebor . . . meo ] Ps. 9:2 (Vulgata); Ps. 9:1 (RSV). 46 omnes ] omnis EV || sensus ] species V 50 frigore ] frigiditateW 55–56 demonstrare ] declarare TVW 59 illud ] unum T || subiective ] om. W 61 vel in corde ] om. TV 64 cordi negotia ad ] in corde illa A || cordi ] in corde E 64–65 sunt bene intenti ] sciunt menti A 65 scire ] sciunt A 66 scriptura ] theologia T 67–68 Et . . . meo ] om. T

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7. Again, the common sense is ensconsed in sleep, for which reason, consequent upon its blockage all external senses are blocked. This is why Aristotle, when he wants to prove that sleep is an affection of the common sense, says that when it is incapacitated all particular senses have to become incapacitated, but not conversely. But it is obvious that in the heart nothing is incapacitated in sleep, since incapacitation or blockage stems from cold or the withdrawal of heat, whereas in the heart this does not take place; on the contrary, heat is intensified in it and around it in sleep, for which reason more digestion occurs in sleep than when one is awake. 8. Aristotle expressly determines the opposite in On Sleep and Waking and in The Parts of Animals III. And Averroes also endeavors to show the same in his book, Colliget. And even Avicenna agrees with Aristotle about this in the first book of his Canon. 9. We should note that by ‘the organ of common sense’ I mean that member or that organ in which cogitations of all things sensed by the external senses and of their sensations are formed as in their subject. And I say with Aristotle that the organ in question is the heart, or in the heart in all animals that have a heart, or the corresponding organ in those that strictly speaking do not. And I prove this by everyone’s common way of speaking. For everyone says they put their heart into something they are truly intent on, or that they know by heart something that they can recite and declaim without a book.299 And in sacred scripture we have: “Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart” — it does not say “with all your brain” — and again, “I will

299

It is interesting to note here that the corresponding phrase in Hungarian features the head rather than the heart, so that one would say, e.g., of a memorized poem, “I know it from head.”

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amasiam suam, et sic de aliis. Et hoc ita dicitur apud omnes quasi a natura dictum sit; dicunt enim quamvis sine ratione et tamquam ab ipsa veritate coacti. 10. Item ad hoc videtur esse experientia notabilis, quia si quis acute laeditur aut pungitur sive in pede sive in manu, ut forte propter dolorem praeiacentem ratione apostematis vel alterius, videtur sibi quod sentiat dolorem usque ad cor et non ad cerebrum. Et clamant vulgares se punctos esse ad cor, et fit inde commotio cordis et non cerebri. Et si actus sensuum non perveniret et terminaretur ad cor, nulla esset ratio quare, ex repraesentativo sensu terribilis, cor ita vehementer afficeretur timore et commovetur et non cerebrum. Et immo omnes motus passionum sensus seu appetitus sensitivi manifeste fiunt circa cor vel proveniunt a corde tamquam ab ipso principaliter sentiente. 11. Item alia experientia est quod in formatione embryonis prima pars apparens nobis formata est cor, quod iam ante apparentem formationem aliorum membrorum habet vitam et sensum, nutritur enim et augetur, et si pungatur, commovetur; non igitur derivatur sibi sensus ab alio membro. 12. Item Averroes in secundo sui Colliget nititur hoc probare, quia cum calor et spiritus expandentur ad exteriora, tunc possunt sensus particulares in suam operationem. Et cum revertuntur interius, non possunt. Igitur virtus sensitiva prima est unde veniunt calor et spiritus, et ad quod revertuntur. Et hoc est cor; ergo etc.

87 Averroes ] AVERROES, Colliget II.11 (X 24 E–G). 70 et tamquam ] quare si vel quasi A 71 veritate ] virtute veritatis A 72 notabilis ] naturalis W 73–74 propter dolorem ] ex dolore in manu A 74 praeiacentem ] praementem(?) A praementem E || ratione ] rationem A 76 Et ] item AE 77 sensuum ] sensitivum TV 78 terribilis ] et terribili W || vehementer ] violenter TW 79 omnes ] omnis E 85 si pungatur commovetur ] movetur T 85–86 derivatur . . . ab ] appropriata V 87 sui Colliget ] huius A 88 exteriora ] interiora ET 90 prima ] primo E

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confess to you, Lord, with all my heart”. And the lover says that his heart is with his beloved, and so on. This is how all speak, as if it were told to them by nature, for they speak this way without giving much thought to it, as if compelled by the truth of the matter itself. 10. Again, it seems to be a familiar experience concerning this that if someone is hurt by a sharp object or stabbed in the foot or hand, then, perhaps because he is already in pain due to an abscess or some other lesion, it seems to him that he feels the pain reach right into his heart and not into his brain. And common people cry about being “wounded to the quick,”300 and from this, there results a commotion in the heart but not in the brain. And if an act of the senses did not reach and terminate in the heart, then there would be no reason why the heart, and not the brain, is so upset and so violently afflicted by fear from the sensory representation of something terrible. Indeed, all the movements of the affections of sense and all sensory appetites obviously take place around the heart or proceed from the heart as from that which principally senses. 11. Again, another experience is that, in the formation of an embryo, the first part that appears formed to us is the heart, which, before the evident formation of other members, has life and sense, because it nourishes itself and grows and, if it is pricked, it twitches; therefore, it does not derive its sense from another organ. 12. Again, Averroes in the second book of his Colliget endeavors to prove the same on the grounds that when warmth and spirits are expanding to the external organs, the proper operation of the particular senses is enabled. And when they turn back within, it is disabled. Therefore, the primary sensory power is that from which warmth and spirit proceed and to which they return. And this is the heart; therefore, etc.

300

The Latin here translates literally as “stabbed in the heart,” but Buridan is not invoking here a physical wound but rather the metaphorical sense that emotional wounds are felt in the chest.

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13. Item operatio sensus est ex calore et spiritibus. Ligamentum autem sensuum est ex frigore et defectu spirituum. Cerebrum autem frigidum est et sine spiritibus nisi a corde. Igitur nec operationem sensus habet nisi a corde. 14. Item ex actione cerebri infrigidante et removente actionis cordis fit ligamentum sensuum. Igitur manifestum est quod cerebrum ex propria eius complexione non habet naturam sentiendi nisi a corde tamquam a primo et principali sensitivo. 15. Item Aristoteles in tertio De partibus animalium arguit ad hoc quia sicut est in magno mundo ita proportionaliter debet esse in minori, scilicet in animali. In magno autem mundo non ponimus plura prima principia, sed unicum habens virtutem super omnia alia, aliter non posset esse conveniens ordo in mundo. Igitur in animali ponendum est unum principium et principale membrum a quo omnia alia habent suas virtutes, et non quod unum sit primum principium unius virtutis et alterum alterius, esset enim inordinatio. Cor autem est vitae principium omnibus aliis membris, prout omnes communiter concedunt. Unde primo vivit et ultimo moritur et primo formatur et influit singulis aliis membris calorem vitalem et spiritus. Igitur similiter ipsum est principium sensus, motus, nutritionis, et aliorum operum. 16. Item quia sensus et appetitus movent, necesse est in eodem esse principium motus et principium sensus. In corde autem est primum principium motus, scilicet causa motus pulsus per quam diriguntur ad omnia membra calor et spiritus, quam motuum quibus aliae passiones animae commoventur, sicut dicebatur prius. 17. Item si potentia sensitiva dicatur nobilior quam potentia vegetativa et opus eius, scilicet sentire nobilius quam opere vegetativae, 100 Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De part. an. III.4 665b14–15 (Ar. lat. XVII.2.4): “Principium autem horum necessarium esse unum; ubi autem contingit, unum melius quam plura.” 94 nec ] nullam A 96 removente ] remotione TW 107 est ] primum add. T || vitae ] om. VW 108 omnes ] om. W 109 influit ] influens W 112 movent ] moventur T 114 causa ] tam TV || diriguntur ] derivantur TV || ad ] om. ATV 115 omnia ] alia add. A aliis T || quam ] et est causa A et causa E || motuum ] motus TW || aliae ] prius add. T apud V sup. lin. aliae W 118 opere ] om. AE

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13. Again, the operation of sense stems from heat and spirits; whereas their obstruction comes from cold and the deficiency of spirits. The brain, however, is cold and is without spirits, except those it has from the heart. Therefore, the brain has sensory operation only from the heart. 14. Again, the obstruction of senses comes from the cooling action of the brain suppressing the action of the heart. Therefore, it is clear that the brain, given its proper structure, does not have the nature of sensing, except from the heart, which is the primary and principal sensitive organ. 15. Again, Aristotle in The Parts of Animals III argues for the same conclusion on the grounds that, just as it is in the macrocosm, so it must be, analogically, in the microcosm, that is, in the animal. But in the macrocosm we do not posit several first principles, but only one that has power over all others; otherwise there could not be appropriate order in the world. Therefore, in an animal, we should posit only one principle and one principal organ from which all others have their own powers, and not that one is the principle of one power and another of another, for then there would be disorder. The heart, however, is the principle of life for all other organs, as everyone generally agrees. Therefore, it is the first to live and the last to die, and it is formed first, infusing each and every other member with vital warmth and spirits. Therefore, likewise, it is the principle of sensing, moving, nourishing, and all other operations. 16. Again, since sense and appetite move, it is necessary to have the principle of moving and the principle of sensing in the same . But the heart has the first principle of moving, namely the cause of the movement of the pulse, through which all other organs receive warmth and spirits, as well as the movements by which the other affections of the soul are activated, as was said earlier.301 17. Again, if the sensitive power is said to be nobler than the vegetative power and its functions, namely, if sensing is nobler than veg-

301 See

par. 10 above.

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sequitur quod membrum nobilissimum et principalissimum animalis debet esse principium sensationis. Cor autem est membrum nobilissimum et principalissimum animalis, propter quod est in medio corporis, sicut rex in medio regni; ergo etc. 18. Item Aristoteles adhuc ostendit in tertio De partibus animalium quod cor est principium nervorum et venarum, et per consequens sanguinis et spirituum, tam sensitivorum quam vitalium. Ideo ipsum debet poni primum corporale principium vitae, sensus, motus, et aliorum 19. Hae autem experientiae et rationes collectae sunt ex Aristotelis et aliorum dictis auctorum, quarum aliquae sunt probabiles et aliquae etiam videntur necessariae. Et multae earum, quamvis non manifeste concludant quod sensatio fiat subiective in corde, tamen concludunt necessario quod cor est principium caloris et spirituum ad sentiendum requisitorum. Hoc enim bene concludunt rationes recitatae ab Averrois in suo Colliget et omnes rationes sequentes. Sed omnes aliae rationes et experientiae praecedentes videntur necessario probare non hoc solum, sed etiam quod sensatio secundum sensum communem fit in corde subiective. Et hoc credo esse tenendum, sed tamen nec propter hoc ego credo omnino esse repellendum hoc quod multi alii et tanti doctores dixerunt de capite sive de cerebro, propter quod ego pono istam conclusionem: quod de necessitate cerebrum concurrit aut active aut passive ad hoc quod fiat sensatio in sensu communi. Et probatur primo per illud signum quod laesa anteriori parte cerebri impe-

123 tertio ] A RISTOTELES, De part. an. III.4 666a 34. 126 principium . . . aliorum ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 456a5–6 Auc. Ar. 7.75 (ed. Hamesse, 202): “Cor est principium sensus et motus in animalibus.” 132–133 Averrois ] AVERROES, Colliget II.11 (X 24 D): “Ergo virtus sensibilis primo et principaliter est in corde.” 119 animalis ] om. E 121 quod ] situm add. W 125 sensitivorum ] sensibilium A || vitalium ] vegetativum A 126 primum ] om. AV principale add. T 127– 128 Aristotelis . . . auctorum ] aristotele et aliis auctoribus TV 130 concludant ] concludunt TV || fiat ] sit A 131 est ] primum add. T 133 aliae ] om. T 139 pono ] volo ponere V

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etative functions, then it follows that the noblest and most principal organ of an animal should be the principle of sensation. But the heart is the noblest and most principal organ of an animal, for which reason it is in the middle of the body, just as the king is in the middle of his kingdom; therefore, etc. 18. Again, Aristotle further shows in The Parts of Animals III that the heart is the origin of nerves and blood vessels,302 and consequently of blood and of spirits, both sensitive and vital. Therefore, it should be claimed to be the bodily principle of the life, sense, and movement of the other . 19. These experiences and arguments have been collected from the writings of Aristotle and other authors, some of which are plausible and others apparently even necessary. And many of them, although they do not unquestionably conclude that sensation occurs subjectively in the heart, do conclude that the heart is necessarily the principle of the warmth and spirits that are required for sensing. For this much is correctly concluded by the arguments deployed by Averroes in his Colliget and by all subsequent arguments. But all the other earlier arguments and experiences seem to prove of necessity not only this much, but also that the sensation of common sense takes place in the heart as in its subject. And I believe this is the view to be held. Yet, I do not believe that for this reason we should entirely reject what so many and so influential masters have said about the head or the brain, whence I want to lay down the following conclusion: the brain’s active or passive cooperation is necessary for the formation of sensation

302 Here Aristotle claims that all blood vessels arise from the heart and that the heart,

being the first organ to contain blood, is the first sensitive organ.

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145

150

155

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ditur sensatio per omnem sensum, et ex infirmitate illius partis cerebri fiunt homines phrenetici et amentes. 20. Item ad hoc est signum quod quibus in collo apprehenduntur venae insensibiles fiunt, ut dicit Aristoteles in libro De somno et vigilia. Et non apparet quare pedes et partes inferiores non possunt tunc sentire nisi per huiusmodi apprehensionem impeditur via de cerebro ad cor per quam viam necesse est omnes species sensibiles mediante cerebro multiplicari ad cor, ut aliqui dicunt, vel omnes spiritus sensitivos multiplicari per cerebrum ad sensus exteriores, ut alii dicunt. 21. Item in somno fiunt omnes sensus exteriores impotentes sentire. Sed quare fierent pedes impotentes sentire in somno nisi cerebrum requireretur active aut passive ad sentiendum? Nullus enim posset de hoc reddere rationem sufficientem, nam huiusmodi impotentia fit ex infrigidatione, ut vult Aristoteles, et huiusmodi infrigidatio non provenit ad cor immo tunc in somno “est quidam conventus caloris intrinsecus,” scilicet versus cor, ut dicit Aristoteles. Sed nec huiusmodi infrigidatio provenit ad pedes vel ad partes inferiores inter cor et pedes. Immo dicit Aristoteles quod superiora infrigidantur et exteriora, interiora vero et inferiora vel quae circa pedes calida. Quare ergo non sentirent pedes nisi ex omnibus sensibus exterioribus ad sentiendum requireretur multiplicatio specierum sensibilium ad caput et mediante capite ad cor? Nullus posset reddere causam sufficientem. 145 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 455b7. 149 aliqui dicunt ] e. g. ROGERUS BACONIS De multiplicatione specierum II.2 (ed Lindberg, 1983) 102.110–112. 155 ut vult Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 457b 27. 157 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 457b1 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 8.2.37): “Et superiora quidem infrigidantur et exteriora, interiora vero et inferiora calida, velut quae circa pedes et quae intrinsecus.” 159 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 457b 1 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 8.2.32): “Quare manifestum ex hiis quae dicta sunt quod somnus est quidam conventus caloris intrinsecus et naturalis reciprocatio propter predictam causam.” 142 sensatio ] per sensum communem et add. VW || infirmitate ] infrigiditate A frigiditate VW 146 tunc ] bene A 147 nisi ] quia add. AETV 149 vel ] et per quam necesse est TVW 149–150 spiritus sensitivos ] species sensationis T 154 huiusmodi ] haec A 156–157 intrinsecus ] intensionis E 159 superiora ] quidam add. W 160 vel . . . pedes ] om. ETV || calida ] velut quae circa pedes add. T velut quae circa pedes et quae intrinsecus add. W 162 multiplicatio ] multitudo AET intitulatio V

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in the common sense. And this is proved first with reference to the fact that when the frontal part of the brain is injured, then sensation through all senses is impeded, and, because of illness in the same part, people become crazy and demented. 20. It is also a significant fact that people whose blood vessels in the neck are constricted faint, as Aristotle remarks in On Sleep and Waking. Indeed, it is not clear why the feet and other lower members cannot then feel, unless the passage from the brain to the heart is impeded due to a constriction of this kind, through which passage all sensible species are propagated to the heart by means of the brain, as some say, or all sensitive spirits have to be propagated to the external senses by means of the brain, as others contend. 21. Again, during sleep, all external senses become incapable of sensing. But why would the feet become incapable of sensing in sleep, unless the brain is required, actively or passively, for sensing? Nobody could give a sufficient reason for this, since this sort of incapacitation results from cooling down, as Aristotle claims, and this cooling down does not reach the heart; rather, in sleep there is a certain gathering of heat within, namely around the heart, as Aristotle says. But cooling down of this kind does not reach the feet or the lower parts between the heart and the feet either; rather, Aristotle says, “The upper and external parts are cooled down, but the internal and lower parts, e.g., the parts around the feet and inside the body are hot.” So, why would the feet not sense, unless sensing requires the propagation of sensible species from all external senses to the head, and through the head to

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165

170

175

180

185

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22. Item si esset via specierum sensibilium ad cor non mediante cerebro, et anima in corde per huiusmodi species innata esset formare sensationem, sequitur utique quod ascensus vaporum ex nutrimento ad caput et reversio eorum non impediret sensationem per pedes et per partes inferiores in somno, quae tamen omnia sunt expresse contra determinationem Aristotelis in De somno et vigilia. Videtur ergo mihi quod omnes nervi sensitivi omnium sensuum exteriorum sunt expansi per totum corpus et habent congregationem ad cerebrum in prima parte cerebri, ut dicetur post, et omnes species sensibilium exteriorum per organa sensuum exteriorum multiplicantur et congregantur ad illum locum. Sed tamen nec ibi fit sensatio subiective nec iudicium, sed de illo loco cerebri est iterum via ad cor per quam illae species iterum multiplicantur ad cor, in quo anima per illas species agit sensationes sensibilium quorum illae species sunt repraesentativae. 23. Et ita apparet mihi quod concordarentur omnes opiniones, prout ex probabilibus rationibus haberent efficaciam, quoniam omnia apparentia videntur posse salvari per hanc viam, et non apparet mihi quod per aliam. Cum enim dicamus organum sensus communis in corde esse, dicimus hoc esse verum quia in corde subiective fit sensatio. Cum autem dicunt alii organum sensus communis esse in cerebro, non dicunt proprie loquendo verum, sed ad istum sensum dicunt verum quia in cerebro est organum ad quod omnes species sensibilium per sensus exteriores congregantur et pertranseunt antequam gerantur ad cor, in quo fit subiective sensatio. 24. Et nihil plus probant rationes arguentes quod cerebrum deserviat ad sentiendum. Sic enim rationabile est quod, laesa vel infirma

168–169 determinationem Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 456b 17. 164 sensibilium ] de pedibus add. EVW 165 species ] sensus V 166 ascensus ] ad sensum V 170 sunt ] et EV 179 probabilibus ] pluribus A 179–180 apparentia ] om. A 181 aliam ] viam posset hoc fieri add. A 183 in ] corde dicimus hoc esse verum quia in corde subiective fit sensatio add. T 186 gerantur ] corrumpuntur AE

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the heart? Nobody could provide any other sufficient reason for this phenomenon. 22. Again, if there were a passage for sensible species to the heart not through the brain, and the soul were able to form a sensation by means of these species, then it certainly follows that the ascent to the head of vapors from nourishment and their reversion would not impede sensation in the feet and lower parts during sleep, which is against everything Aristotle expressly determines in On Sleep and Waking. Therefore, it seems to me that all sensitive nerves of all external senses are spread out all over the body and converge on the brain in its frontal part, as will be pointed out later,303 and all species of external sensible things are propagated through the organs of external senses and brought together to that place. Nevertheless, neither sensation nor judgment come to be there as in their subject, but from that place in the head there is yet another passage to the heart, through which those species are propagated again to the heart, where the soul, by means of these species, forms the sensations of sensible things that these species represent. 23. And it appears to me that in this way all opinions would harmonize, insofar as they are based on plausible arguments, for this way seems able to save all the phenomena, and there does not appear to me to be any other way that can do so. For when we say that the organ of the common sense is in the heart, we say this is true because sensation takes place in the heart as its subject. But when others say that the organ of the common sense is in the brain, they do not strictly speaking say something true; nevertheless, they are saying something true in the sense that in the brain there is an organ in which all the species of things that are able to be sensed via the external senses are gathered through the external senses and through which they all pass before they are carried to the heart, in which sensation takes place as in its subject. 24. And the arguments arguing that the brain contributes to sensation prove nothing more. For in this way it makes sense that when the

303 See

pars. 28–29 below.

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195

200

205

210

215

600

prima parte cerebri, impeditur sensatio per sensum communem, vel quia non potest species sensibilis pervenire ad cor vel quia non potest nisi distorte et inordinate transire per illam partem cerebri. Et ita est de rationibus sequentibus. 25. Sed etiam rationes quae a principio quaestionis fiebant nihil plus arguere videntur, sic enim exponatur auctoritas medicorum et aliorum. Sic etiam in somno non potest esse sensatio per organa sensuum exteriorum quia per infrigidationem cerebri impedita est via, vel etiam per vapores grossos et indigestos ascendentes de corde et hepate ad cerebrum et revertentes a capite ad cor, sicut habetur in De somno et vigilia. Et ob hoc etiam ad provocandum somnum vel vigiliam ponuntur localia remedia ad caput, ut per eius ligamentum vel solutionem possint vel non possint sensus exteriores ministrare cordi species sensibiles. 26. Sed tunc sunt aliae rationes quae quaerunt de organis phantasiae, memorativae, et cogitativae. Et ego respondeo quod, propter occultam huiusmodi organorum distinctionem et occultam praedictorum nominum significationem, utimur dictis nominibus aut permissive aut equivoce. Et ego non pono, praeter organa quae dicimus esse sensuum exteriorum, nisi tria organa pertinentia ad sensationem. Unum et principalissimum est ipsum cor, in quo subiective fiunt sensationes mediantibus omnibus sensibus exterioribus, et sic propriissime hoc vocatur organum sensus communis ratione praedicta. Aliud organum est in anteriori parte capitis ad quod et per quod congregantur et multiplicantur omnes species seu intentiones sensibilium sive sensatorum per sensus exteriores ad ipsum cor, et per quod etiam multiplicantur omnes spiritus sensitivi de corde ad omnes sensus exteriores. Et hoc

199 habetur in ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 456a 30. 191 non . . . pervenire ] species sensibiles non pervenirent AT || potest ] ibi in organo add. A 192 distorte et ] om. E || distorte ] indistincte T 195 auctoritas ] antiquorum add. A 197 infrigidationem ] infirmationem T 200–201 vel vigiliam ] om. W 201 localia ] om. T 202 vel non possint ] om. A 205 memorativae ] memoriae E || cogitativae ] et imaginative add. AE 205–206 occultam ] om. W 209 sensationem ] sensus T sensationes V 213 capitis ] cerebri A

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frontal part of the brain is injured or impaired, then sensation by the common sense is impeded, either because the sensible species cannot arrive at the heart, or because it can only pass through that part of the brain in a twisted and disorderly way. And the same goes for the subsequent arguments. 25. But even the arguments deployed at the beginning of this question seem to argue for nothing more.304 For it is in this way that we should interpret the authority of physicians and others. And in this way there also cannot be sensation during sleep through the organs of the external senses, because the passage is blocked as a result of the cooling down of the brain, or even because of the rising of the crude, undigested vapors from the heart and the liver to the brain, and returning from the head to the heart, as we have it in On Sleep and Waking. Also, it is for the same reason that localzed remedies are applied to the head in order to induce sleep or wakefulness, so that by its blocking or releasing, the external senses become capable or incapable to provide sensible species to the heart. 26. But then there are other arguments that inquire about the organs of imagination, memory, and the cogitative power.305 And I respond that because of the obscure distinction among these organs and the obscure meaning of the above-mentioned names, we use these names permissively or equivocally. And, besides the organs that we claim to be those of the external senses, I posit only three organs pertaining to sensation. The first and most principal one is the heart, in which sensations take place as in their subject, by means of all the external senses. And in this way the heart is most properly said to be the organ of the common sense, for the aforementioned reason. Another organ is in the frontal part of the head, to which and through which all species and intentions of sensible or sensed things are collected from the external senses and propagated to the heart, and through which all

304 See 305 See

pars. 1–2 above. pars. 3–4 above.

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220

225

230

235

240

602

organum vocant etiam philosophi multi organum sensus communis, non quia ibi fiat sensatio subiective, sed quia mediante eo fit sensatio in corde omnium sensibilium exteriorum. 27. Et tunc est quaerendum rationabiliter ad quid natura ordinavit illud organum. Nonne suffecisset quod fuisset a corde ad omnes sensus exteriores via sine mediatione cerebri et sine congregatione specierum sensibilium ad cerebrum? Potest responderi quod optimum fuit sic fieri et non aliter propter duas causas. Prima est quod cor, in sentiendo excessiva sensibilia et passionativa, patitur naturaliter et commovetur et aliquando bene gravatur, ut in timore, ira, et tristitia. Idcirco ne nimis excellenter gravaretur, natura ordinavit quod species a sensibus exterioribus non directe multiplicarentur ad cor sed mediante cerebro, ut per hoc aliquantulum prohiberetur impetus passionis. 28. Secunda causa assignari potest quia cum in vigilia continue cor emittat et expandat spiritus sensibiles ad singulos sensus exteriores, per excessivam vigiliam ita depauperatur ab huiusmodi spiritibus quod ipsum moretur nisi quiesceret, non ab opere vegetativae sed ab emissione spirituum sensibilium ad exteriora. Idcirco natura ordinavit quod esset via communis in huiusmodi expansione spirituum quae innata esset claudi simul ut ad nullos sensus exteriores mitterentur spiritus sensitivi. Et locus clausionis aptus est in cerebro, per fumos et vapores ex nutrimento ascendentes ad caput et ex frigiditate cerebri ingrossatos et repercussos ad partes interiores. Tunc enim revertuntur ad cor, et calor et spiritus sensibiles regenerantur plurimum, quos post expergefactionem cor potest per longum tempus mittere ad om-

221 Nonne ] ratione V 225 passionativa ] passionata E compassionativa T 226 gravatur ] generatur AEV 227 tristitia ] caeteris paribus add. A et caeteris passionibus add. E etc add. T || gravaretur ] generetur A generatur V 228 sensibus ] sensibilibus T 229 aliquantulum ] aliqualiter W || prohiberetur ] prohibetur TV impediretur W 232 emittat ] mictat T multiplicat V || expandat ] extendit TVW 234 moretur ] generaretur AE gravaretur T || quiesceret ] requiesceret W 234– 235 ab emissione ] ad dimissione A a missione E 236 expansione ] expulsione T 237 simul ] om. T 241 regenerantur ] generantur A generarentur E 242 expergefactionem ] corporis add. A || cor ] om. W

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sensitive spirits coming from the heart are transmitted to the external senses as well. And many philosophers call this organ the organ of common sense, not because sensation occurs in it as in its subject, but because it is by its mediation that sensation of all external sensible things takes place in the heart. 27. And then one should reasonably ask what the natural function of that organ is. After all, would it not have sufficed that there was a passage from the heart to all external senses without the mediation of the brain and without the aggregation of sensible species in the brain? One may respond that this is the optimal arrangement and not any other, for two reasons. The first is that the heart, in sensing excessive and passion-inducing sensible objects, is naturally excited and moved, and sometimes seriously overloaded, as in fear, anger, or sorrow. Therefore, to avoid its excessive overload, nature has so arranged it that the species from the external senses do not reach the heart directly, but by the mediation of the brain, so that it would somewhat dampen the impetus of passion. 28. The second reason can be given on the grounds that, because the heart continuously sends and extends the sensible spirits to each of the external senses while awake, extreme lack of sleep would so deplete its spirits that it would slow down, unless it rested, not from its vegetative operation, but from sending the sensible spirits to the external senses. Therefore, nature has so arranged it that there is a common pathway for the expansion of such spirits, which is naturally suited to be closed down at once, so that no sensitive spirits would be sent to any of the external senses. And the suitable place for this obstruction is the brain, by means of the fumes and vapors ascending to the head from nourishment, and on account of the coldness of the brain, becoming dense and returning to the internal parts. For then they re-

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245

250

255

260

265

604

nia organa sensitiva. Et hoc apparet esse determinatio Aristotelis in De somno et vigilia. 29. Et aliqui illud organum praedictum in anteriori parte capitis vocant organum imaginativae quia ibi est communis specierum sensibilium congregatio quae ab aliquibus vocantur imaginationes sensibilium quia sunt repraesentativae eorum. Et alii etiam non intelligentes aliud per imaginativam et phantasiam vocant illud organum organum phantasiae sed non bene proprie. 30. Tertium organum est in posteriori parte capitis. Et est via de corde ad illud organum alia quam ad praedictum organum quod erat in priori parte capitis, per quam viam multiplicantur a corde omnes species seu intentiones sensationum factarum in corde. Et ibi reservantur cessante sensatione in corde. Et tunc illae intentiones ibi reservatae sunt innatae remultiplicari ad cor, ut cor apprehendat per eas ea quorum illae sunt repraesentationes. Et ita fiunt nobis apparitiones nobis nihil sentientibus per sensus exteriores. Et illud organum vocatur aliquando phantasia vel memoria, etc., sicut dictum fuit in alia quaestione. Et notandum est quod aliquando utraque via est clausa, scilicet cordis tam ad organum anterioris capitis quam ad organum posterioris, et tunc fit nobis somnus sine somnio. Aliquando clausa est via ad organum anterioris partis capitis, manente aliqualiter aperta illa quae est ad organum posterioris, et tunc fiunt somnia cum nondum valeat fieri sensatio per sensus exteriores.

243 determinatio Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 457b20 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 9.2.9): “Fit enim somnus, quemadmodum dictum est, dum corpulentum sursum fertur a caliditate per venas ad caput: cum vero amplius non possit, sed in multitudine excedit quod elevatum est, iterum repellitur et deorsum fluit.” 259–260 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.23. 247 imaginationes ] imagines V 249 organum ] om. W 252 alia ] aliter W || erat ] causatur T 254 seu intentiones ] om. AE 255 tunc ] iterum TV 256 remultiplicari ] multiplicari VW 257 apparitiones ] manifestationes T operationes V 261–262 posterioris ] posterius AET 263 anterioris partis capitis ] anterius AE anteriori V || manente ] manifeste add. A om. T 264 posterioris ] posterius AEW

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turn to the heart, and heat and sensible spirits are mostly regenerated, which, upon awakening, the heart can send to all sensitive organs for a long time. And this appears to be Aristotle’s determination of the matter in On Sleep and Waking. 29. And some people call the aforementioned organ in the frontal part of the head the organ of the imaginative power, because taking place there is the common gathering of sensible species, which some people call “the imaginations of sensible things” because they are representative of sensible things. And others, not understanding anything different by the imaginative power and by imagination, call that organ the organ of imagination, although not quite properly. 30. The third organ is in the posterior part of the head. And there is a passage from the heart to that organ different from the one leading to the above-mentioned organ in the anterior part of the head, and it is through this passage that all species or intentions produced in the heart are sent out from the heart. This is where they are preserved after sensation stops in the heart. And then the intentions preserved there are naturally suited to be sent back to the heart, so that through them, the heart will recognize those things of which they are the representations. And this is how we have apparitions while we sense nothing by the external senses. This organ is sometimes called imagination or memory, etc., as we have said in another question. And we should note that sometimes both passages are blocked, namely both the one from the heart to the frontal organ of the head and the one to the posterior part as well. And then we are asleep without dreaming. Sometimes the passage to the organ of the frontal part of the head is blocked, while

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270

275

280

285

290

606

31. Quando ergo arguebatur quod sensus perceptivus primarum qualitatum debet esse in media proportione earum et esse denudatus ab excellentiis earum, ego dico quod hoc habet veritatem de sensibus exterioribus qui primo recipiunt species istorum sensibilium. Et aliae etiam dissimiles sunt species seu intentiones quae ultra multiplicantur ad organa virtutum interiorum, nec illae requirunt tales dispositiones ad sui receptionem quales requirebant priores, ut alias dictum est 32. Ad aliam rationem de quatuor membris principalibus, dicit Aristoteles quod solum cor est membrum simpliciter principale, quod est principium et motus et sensus, vitae et sanguinis et venarum, et huiusmodi. Sed sibi adminiculatur hepar ad nutritionem, cerebrum ad sensationem, testiculi ad similis generationem. 33. Ad ultimam rationem dicitur quod in somno non fit cor impotens quantum ad nutritionem nec quantum ad generationem caloris et spirituum, immo fit potentius. Sed fit impotens mittere spiritus sensibiles ad organa sensuum exteriorum propter clausionem viae, et ob hoc etiam fit impotens recipere species seu intentiones sensibilium a sensibus exterioribus. Ideo etiam fit impotens sentire, nisi hoc forte fiat per species in phantasia reservatas somniando. Et ita etiam fiunt omnes sensus exteriores impotentes sentire propter carentiam spirituum sensibilium non potentium venire a corde. Et nota quod istos spiritus vocamus sensibiles non quia istos sentiamus, sed quia per istos instrumentaliter anima exercet opus sentiendi. Unde forte melius vocarentur spiritus sensitivi. Sed sic loqui consuevimus, quia nomina significant ad placitum.

272 alias dictum est ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.22 par. 13. 273–274 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 456a 5–6 Auc. Ar. 7.75 (ed. Hamesse, 202): “Cor est principium sensus et motus in animalibus.”; ibid. 456b1 Auc. Ar. 7.77 (ed. Hamesse, 202): “Cor est principium venarum.” 278 fit ] sit V 280 potentius ] potens A 284 fiat ] fit A sit E 286 istos ] has species vel A 290 significant ] sunt AE sint T

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the one to the organ of the posterior part remains somewhat open, and then we have dreams, when there is still no sensation by the external senses. 31. Thus, when it was argued that a sense that is perceptive of primary qualities has to be in a mean proportion between them,306 and should be stripped of their excessive instances, I say that this is true with regard to external senses, which first receive the species of these sensibles. And there are other dissimilar species or intentions that are propagated further to the organs of the internal powers, and they do not even require such dispositions for their reception as the former, as has been pointed out elsewhere. 32. To the other argument307 about the four principal organs, Aristotle says that only the heart is a principal organ, absolutely speaking, which is the principle of both motion and sensation, of life and blood and the blood vessels, and of things of this kind. But the liver assists it in nutrition, the brain in sensation, and the testicles in the generation of its like. 33. To the last objection308 it is replied that in sleep the heart does not become incapable of nutrition or of the generation of heat and spirits; rather, it becomes more capable. But it becomes incapable of sending the sensible spirits to the organs of the external senses because of the obstruction of the passage, and hence it also becomes incapable of receiving the species or intentions of sensible objects from the external senses. So it becomes incapable of sensing, except, perhaps, when this happens while dreaming, by means of the species preserved in imagination. And this is also how all external senses become incapable of sensing, because of the lack of the spirits of sensibles that cannot emerge from the heart. And note that we call these spirits ‘sensible’ not because we sense them, but because it is by means of them that the soul carries out the task of sensing, using them as its instruments. For this reason, perhaps, it would better be to call them ‘sensitive spirits’. But this is the way we usually speak, because names signify as we please. 306 See

par. 4 above. par. 6 above. 308 See par. 7 above. 307 See

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300

305

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34. Sed ultimo est dubitatio de cerebri cellulis. Quare sunt tres, et ubi debeamus assignare tria organa eis sensationibus deservientia? Et ego respondeo breviter quod illud organum anterius ad quod congregantur omnes intentiones sensuum exteriorum non est in medio primae partis cerebri, sicut aliqui putant, sed est inter primam partem cerebri et secundam. Ibi enim a corde protenditur nervus sensitivus usque ad craneum capitis, et ibi dividitur in plures nerviculos procedentes ad singula organa sensuum exteriorum. Et ita etiam aliud organum quod est reservativum, quod vocamus organum phantasiae vel memoriae, et est inter duas cellulas posteriores cerebri, ad quem locum etiam protenditur via de corde ad cerebrum. Quomodo autem istae tres cellulae ordinantur in capite debet videri per anatomiam. Aliqui enim dividunt eas in priorem, mediam, et posteriorem, et aliqui dicunt priorem magnam et posteriorem minorem, et divisam in partem dextram et partem sinistram. Et hoc certificare pertinet ad alium locum, etc. Et sic patet quaestio.

295 aliqui putant ] AVICENNA, Canon medicinae, (ed Gr¨uner, 1984) 136.178. 292 et ubi ] nisi E || debeamus ] deberemus ei T || organa ] sensibus vel add. A || sensationibus ] sensibus T 293 anterius ] interius TV 295 cerebri ] et secundae add. V || est ] in medio add. E 297 nerviculos ] nervulos A 297–298 procedentes ] particulares A 298 aliud ] ad A illud E 300 vel . . . est ] existens A

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34. But finally there is a question about the ventricles of the brain. Why are there three, and where should we assign three organs delivering sensations to them? And I briefly reply that the frontal organ in which all intentions of the external senses are gathered is not in the middle of the first part of the brain, as some have thought, but between its first and second parts. For it is to this place that a sensitive nerve is extended from the heart as far as the cranium, and here it is divided into a number of smaller nerves proceeding to the individual organs of the external senses. And thus there is also another organ, which is preservative, which we call the organ of imagination or memory, and it is between the two posterior ventricles of the brain, and to this location there is also a nerve-passage extending from the heart to the brain. But how these three ventricles are arranged in the head ought to be seen in anatomy. For some people distinguish them as anterior, middle, and posterior; but others call the anterior one the major and the posterior one the minor ventricle, divided into right and left parts. And a full resolution of these issues pertains to another discussion, etc. And thus the question is clear.

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Utrum in organis exterioribus sensuum subiective fiat actualis sensatio vel solum receptio specierum sensibilium et non sensatio nisi in corde.

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1. Arguitur quod non fiat actualis sensatio nisi in corde subiective quia, sicut dicitur in De sensu et sensato, “delata ante oculis non sentiunt qui vehementer in aliquid attendunt, ut si in aliquo terribile intendunt timentes,” aut in sonos delectabiles. Et multum phantasiantes non percipiunt quid eis dicitur. Et causa non videtur de hoc posse reddi nisi quia cor est occupatum circa illud in quod sic intendunt, ideo de aliis non format sensationes. Cum enim oculus non sit occupatus, quare non sentiret quod ante ipsum defertur, quia species rei visibilis in eo recipitur, cum sit apertus et diaphanus et manet in eo anima et complexio propria et conveniens? Sed non sentimus quia non formatur sensatio in oculo, et cor est occupatum circa aliud. 2. Item experientia est quod lapillus sub duobus digitis permutatis apparet esse duo, et sub eisdem digitis non permutatis non apparet esse nisi unus. Similiter per duos oculos non apparet res nisi una, nisi forte apud elevationem unius oculi extra eius situm naturalem, vel propter infirmitatem vel antiquitatem, vel aliam occasionem, sic enim bene

5 De sensu ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu VII 447a14–16 (Ar. lat. XIII.2 16.88.1.5): “Si autem semper maior motus minorem depellit (propter quod delata sub oculis non sentiunt, si fuerint vehementer in aliquid intendentes, vel timentes, vel audientes multum sonum), hoc itaque supponatur.” 15–17 Item . . . unus ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.6 1011a3–34; De insomniis 460b20 16–17 non . . . unus ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.13, par. 10. 3 in ] a A 5 ante ] ab V sub W 6 qui ] quaecumque W || attendunt ] intendunt ET tamen dicunt V tendunt W || ut ] at A 9–10 intendunt ] intendit A 10 aliis ] illis A 12 apertus ] clarus A 15 permutatis ] secundum iudicia add. VW 18 elevationem ] superelevationem A sublevationem E 19 occasionem ] huiusmodi occupationem impediretur W © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 31

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Does actual sensation take place in the external senses as in a subject, or only the reception of sensible species, with sensation taking place only in the heart?

1. It is argued that there is sensation only in the heart, subjectively, because, as it is stated in On Sense and What is Sensed, “those who are intently attending to something do not see things right in front of their eyes, as fearful people who attend to something terrible,” or as those who attend to pleasant sounds. And those engaged in fantasizing do not perceive what is said to them. And the only reason one can assign for these phenomena is that the heart is engaged with the things they attend to in this way, and that is why they do not form sensations of the others. For when the eye is not busy, and because the species of a visible thing is received in it since it is open and transparent, and both the soul and an appropriate and suitable disposition remains in it, why would the eye not see what is right in front of it? But we do not sense in this situation, since no sensation is formed in the eye, and the heart is busy with something else. 2. Again, we experience that a pebble under two fingers crossed appears to be two, but under the same fingers uncrossed it appears to be only one. Likewise, to two eyes a thing appears only to be one, except for the shifting of one eye out of its natural place, or because of illness or old age or some other circumstance. For in those cases

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 31

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unum apparet esse duo. De hiis enim non videtur causa posse reddi nisi quia nec oculus nec digitus iudicat, quia antequam fiat iudicium, species duae in oculis duobus receptae, vel in duobus digitis, uniuntur interius et unite multiplicantur ad cor seu ad organum sensus communis ubicumque ponamus ipsum. Ideo res non apparet nisi una. Cum autem unus oculorum superelevatur extra situm suum naturalem, illae species ad locum congregationis earum non accipiunt eumdem situm. Ideo in sensu communi repraesentant rem in diversis sitibus et locis. Et ita quia digiti duo consequenter se habentes uniuntur in manu quantum ad latera eorum naturaliter ad invicem proxima, secundum quae latera lapillus sentitur digitis non permutatis. Eorumdem autem digitorum latera naturaliter non proxima ad invicem sic non uniuntur in manu, secundum quae latera lapillus sentitur digitis permutatis propter quod species sensibiles non veniunt ad sensum communem unite. Ideo lapillus iudicatur esse duo, divisa secundum locum et situm. Hoc autem non videtur sic contingere si iudicia fierent in exterioribus digitis vel oculis. Sensus enim communis iudicaret secundum exigentiam iudiciorum exteriorum, scilicet divisim, sicut iudicia exteriora essent semper divisa. 3. Item in somno sive in somnio nihil sentimus propter hoc quod species sensibiles non possunt pervenire ad sensum communem. Sed nos sentiremus si in organis exterioribus innata esset fieri sensatio, quia tunc species non oporteret venire ad sensum communem, sed sufficeret eas esse in organis exterioribus. Et istae species ita bene fiunt in organis exterioribus in somno sicut in vigilia. Verbi gratia, cum oculus et pupilla sint diaphana, nihil prohiberet lumen vel speciem coloris multiplicari in oculum vel pupillam, si palpebra in somno maneret elevata vel elevaretur, aut si oculus esset sine palpebra, sicut in animalibus oculos duros habentibus, ut dicit Aristoteles. Et simili48 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu V 444b 25–28 (Ar. lat. XIII.2 13.71.1.23): “Quemadmodum in oculis: quaedam enim animalium habent palpebras, quibus non revelatis minime possunt videre; quae autem habent duros oculos non habent, quare non egent ullo quod illa revelet, sed vident a facultate existente illis statim.” 21 quia ] immo oportet quod AE immo T 23 interius ] in numero V in nervo W 23–24 seu . . . communis ] om. A 24 ipsum ] praedictum organum A 25 superelevatur ] sublevetur T sublevatur VW || situm ] locum T || naturalem ] om. TVW 29 latera ] altera V 30 digitis non permutatis ] digito nisi mutato T 32 quae ] quam V || digitis permutatis ] digito permutato T 34 lapillus ] lapis AET 35–36 digitis vel oculis ] digiti vel oculi A 37 sicut ] iudicatur secundum add. VW || exteriora ] si add. VW 38 semper ] om. T 46 vel ] et in AE

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one thing may well appear to be two. Now, given that neither the fingers nor the eyes form judgments, one can only account for these cases by saying that the two species received in the two eyes or the two fingers are united internally before the formation of a judgment and are propagated as one to the heart or to the organ of common sense, wherever it is located. This is why the thing appears to be only one. However, when one eyeball is shifted outside its natural place, these species do not take the same position as they arrive at the place of their aggregation. Therefore, in the common sense they represent the thing in different places and positions. Likewise, since two fingers next to each other are naturally united in the hand at their adjacent sides, when the fingers are not crossed, the pebble is sensed by these sides. However, when the same fingers are crossed, then their sides by which the pebble is sensed are not naturally united in the hand in this way, whence the sensible species do not arrive at the common sense united. Therefore, the pebble is judged to be two pebbles, divided by place and position. But this would not be the case if the judgments were formed in the external fingers or eyes. For then the common sense would judge according to the needs of the external judgments, which is to say, separately, just as the external judgments would be always separate. 3. Again, in sleep or while dreaming we sense nothing, because the sensible species cannot arrive at the common sense. But we would sense if sensation naturally occurred in the external organs, for then the species would not have to arrive at the common sense, because it would suffice for them to be in the external organs. And these species certainly do come to be in this way in the external organs during sleep, just as they do while one is awake. For example, because the eye and the pupil are transparent, nothing would prevent the propagation of illumination or of the species of colors into the eye or the pupil, if the eyelids were to remain open or were raised in sleep, or if there were

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ter nihil prohiberet in somno species caloris multiplicari per carnem ad nervos, sicut dictum est alias, scilicet quod illae species primarum qualitatum multiplicantur per aerem vel per aquam, et sic ad earum multiplicationem, non requiritur operatio animae, nec calor nec spiritus. Igitur in somno multiplicantur per carnem ad nervum intus sicut in vigilia. Nec est sufficiens evasio dicere quod in somno non possunt spiritus et calor mitti a corde ad exteriora organa, ideo non potest in eis anima formare sensationem, quia ad hoc indiget naturalibus spiritibus et calore naturali. Contra hoc est quod non possunt a corde mitti calor multus et sanguis ad pedes sine spiritibus, et tamen in somno mittuntur ad pedes calor et sanguis. Dicit enim Aristoteles, et expertum est, quod in somno “superiora quidem infrigidantur et exteriora, et interiora et inferiora fiunt calida, velut quae circa pedes et intrinsecus. Et dicit Aristoteles de sanguine, illa verba licet non continuata, expergiscuntur quaedam animalia cum “discreti fuerint corpulentior sanguis atque purissimus; est autem tenuissimus sanguis quidem purissimus qui in capite densissimus et turpissimus qui in inferioribus partibus” . . . “Quia vero fit maxime sanguis post nutrimenti ablationem indiscretus somnus fit quousque segregatur sanguis hoc quidem purissimus sursum illud vero turbidissimum deorsum. Cum autem 50 dictum est alias ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.15. 59 Dicit enim Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 457b4 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 8.2.37): “Et superiora quidem infrigidantur et exteriora, interiora vero et inferiora calida, velut quae circa pedes et quae intrinsecus.” 63–66 discreti . . . partibus ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 458a 12 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 9.2.35): “Expergiscuntur autem cum digestio facta fuerit et obtinuerit quae inpacta fuerat caliditas in angusto multa ab eo quod circumstabat, et discreti fuerint corpulentior sanguis atque purissimus, est autem tenuissimus quidem sanguis et purissimus qui in capite, densissimus et turbidissimus qui in inferioribus partibus.” 66–69 Quia . . . expergiscuntur ] A RISTOTELES, De somno III 458 a 19 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 10.2.6): “Quia vero fit maxime sanguis post nutrimenti oblationem indiscretus somnus fit, quoad secernatur sanguinis hoc quidem purissimum sursum, illud vero turbidissimum deorsum: cum autem hoc acciderit, expergiscuntur absoluta ex nutrimenti gravitate.” 49 in somno ] om. W || multiplicari ] vel fieri add. A 50 ad ] aut W 51 vel . . . sic ] nec AE 53 intus ] om. AE 55 in ] cum A 56 formare ] facere AE || hoc ] non add. TVW 57 Contra ] nam in E || est ] enim A 59 pedes ] spiritus add. A || Dicit ] dat E 61 fiunt ] sunt AE om. T 61–62 intrinsecus ] de sanguine add. W 62 de sanguine ] om. EW 63 animalia ] cum digestione(?) add. E || discreti ] colerici et distincti T 64–65 est . . . turpissimus ] om. A 64 est autem tenuissimus ] om. A remissius W || est autem ] om. T 65 in capite ] om. A || turpissimus ] turbidissimus T || qui in ] est T 66 vero ] non sic T || nutrimenti ] nutritiva V 66–67 ablationem ] oblationem EW 67 fit ] et A hoc V || segregatur ] subtilior T secernatur VW

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no eyelids, as is the case with animals having hard eyes, as Aristotle says. Likewise, in sleep, nothing would prevent the species of heat from being propagated through the flesh to the nerves, in accordance with what has been said elsewhere, namely that the species of primary qualities are propagated through air and water, and so the neither the activity of the soul, nor heat or spirit, is required for their propagation. Therefore, the species of primary qualities are transmitted through flesh to the inner nerves in sleep just as in wakefulness. Nor can one avoid this conclusion by saying that in sleep the heart cannot send spirits and heat to the external organs, and so the soul cannot produce sensations in them, since for this it needs natural spirits and natural heat. Against this position is the fact that the heart cannot send much heat and blood to the feet without spirits, and yet, as a matter of fact, heat and blood are sent to the feet in sleep. For Aristotle says, and we experience that, in sleep, “the upper and outer parts cool down, while the lower and inner parts warm up, as happens with the feet and internal organs.” Concerning blood, Aristotle remarks (although not in a continuous passage) that certain animals awaken “when the thickest and purest parts of blood are separated; for the thinnest and purest part is in the head, whereas the densest and murkiest part in

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hoc acciderit expergiscuntur.” Haec Aristoteles in De somno et vigilia, ex quibus patet quod in somno et ante expergefactionem mittitur sanguis hic ad caput et iste ad pedes, quod intendebamus declarare. 4. Item Aristoteles dicit in De somno et vigilia tamquam expertum quod in “quibus apprehenduntur venae in collo, insensibiles fiunt.” Et non esset causa rationalis quare, propter hoc, pedes non sentirent si anima esset innata formare sensationem in pedibus, quoniam si formaretur sensatio in pede, aut hoc esset prius quam in sensu communi aut posterius aut simul. Si prius, tunc anima posset formare istam sensationem non obstante quod per istam apprehensionem venarum, esset impedita via, sive ad cerebrum sive ad cor. Si autem dicatur quod posterius, hoc videtur irrationabile quia frustra fieret, quoniam sensatio per sensum communem sufficeret ad omnia, et quia etiam species et intentiones multiplicantur de organis exterioribus ad cor, non est verisimile quod debeant reverti. Si vero dicatur quod simul, hoc iterum videtur irrationabile quia si non possit esse sensatio in pede sine sensatione in corde, non potest de hoc dari causa nisi quia una harum sensationum est causa alterius, et causa est prior naturaliter causato. Ideo illae non fierent simul, saltem naturaliter.

72 dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 455b7 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 4.2.43): “Amplius autem quibus in collo venae apprehenduntur insensibiles fiunt.” 70 expergefactionem ] expergeantur T 72–73 expertum ] est add. A expertus aut T experimentum V 74 esset ] videtur esse A || rationalis ] rationabilis E 75 innata ] apta VW 76 quam ] tamquam V 80 posterius ] fieret add. A || irrationabile ] mirabile satis add. A esse add. E esse mirabile T rationabile V || quoniam ] alia VW 83 quod ] ad cor add. A 84 irrationabile ] mirabile A 85 potest ] possit AE

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the lower parts ” . . . “now, since blood becomes the most indistinct after the consumption of food, the animal falls asleep, and sleeps until the blood’s parts separate so that purest part ascends and the murkiest part descends. Once this separation is completed, the animal awakens.” This is what Aristotle says in On Sleep and Waking, from which it is clear that during sleep and before waking up, part of the blood is sent to the head and another part to the feet, which is what we wanted to declare. 4. Again, Aristotle mentions in On Sleep and Waking, as something commonly experienced, that those whose blood vessels in the neck are constricted become insensible. And there seems to be no reasonable explanation why, because of this , the feet would not sense if the soul were naturally able to form sensations in the feet. For, if a sensation were formed in the foot, then this would happen either before it is formed in the common sense, or after, or at the same time. If before, then the soul could form this sensation regardless of the obstruction of the passage to the brain or heart due to the constriction of the blood vessels. If after, that seems unreasonable, because then it would be in vain, for the sensation of the common sense would suffice for everything, and also because species and intentions are propagated from the external organs to the heart, and it is unlikely that they would need to be sent back. If, however, it is said that they are formed at the same time, then again this seems unreasonable, for if there cannot be sensation in the foot without sensation in the heart, then the only explanation for this would be that

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5. Item phrenetici, propter indispositionem organi interioris in cerebro ad quod congregantur species omnium sensibilium in multiplicatione earum ad cor seu ad sensum communem, iudicant, per speciem festucae receptam in oculo, serpentem fluctuosum, et per speciem parvi soni receptam in aure, iudicant quod sint diaboli ululantes. Sic autem non iudicarent si fieret iudicium in oculo vel in aure. 6. Item per totum librorum De somno et vigilia, De memoria et reminiscentia, Aristoteles vocat sensum communem vel eius organum primum sensitivum. Non esset autem primum sensitivum, sed postremum, si prius sensationes formarentur in organis sensuum exteriorum. 7. Oppositum arguitur sic, si non fieret sensatio in oculis, in auribus, etc., non esset proprie bene dictum quod haberemus quinque sensus exteriores. Non enim proprie dicitur sensus vel organum sensitivum si non sentiat, quamvis speciem rei sensibilis recipiat. 8. Item in libro De sensu et sensato Aristoteles dicit esse manifestum quod non in extremo oculi est anima sensitivum, sed interius in perspicuo vocato pupilla. Modo si non fieret sensatio in pupilla sicut non fit in tunicis exterioribus oculi, non esset bene dictum quod in tunica exteriori non est anima sensitiva, sed in pupilla, quia eadem ratio de utrisque esset, in utrisque enim esset species rei visibilis, et anima et in neutra sensatio. Et similiter de tactu dicit Aristoteles in secundo 95 Aristoteles vocat ] e. g. A RISTOTELES, De somno III 458a26 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 10.2.12): “Quae quidem igitur causa dormiendi, dictum est, quia a corpulento quod sursum fertur per ingenitum calorem reditio subito ad primum sensiterium.” 102 Aristoteles dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De sensu II 438b9 (Ar. lat. XIII.2 4.27.1.10): “Non enim in ultimo oculi anima aut animae sensitivum est, sed manifestum quoniam interius.” 108 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.11 423b26 (Ar. lat. XII.2 11 23.163.2.6): “Sic enim utique accidet quod quidem in aliis: apposita enim super sensitivum non sentiunt, super autem carnem posita sentiunt; quare medium tactivi caro.” 90 earum ] suarum E 90–91 speciem ] similitudinem A 91 oculo ] se videtur add. AT se videre add. E 92 ululantes ] volantes per aerem A 95 vocat ] notat A 97 prius ] om. V 98–99 auribus ] lingua add. A 99 etc ] ligatis add. VW 100–101 sensitivum ] sensus A 101 quamvis ] nisi V nisi sup. lin. W || rei sensibilis ] sensibilem A sensibilis sub lin. W 103 sensitivum ] sensibilis V 104 pupilla ] vel fieri sensatio in pupilla add. T 106 anima sensitiva ] sensitivum A animae sensitivum E 108 neutra ] utroque AE fuerit add. T || sensatio ] sensitivo VW

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one sensation is the cause of the other. But the cause is naturally prior to what it causes; therefore, they would not occur at the same time, at least not naturally. 5. Again, upon the reception of the species of a stick in their eyes, madmen judge that there is a gyrating serpent in front of them, or upon the reception of a slight noise in their ears, that there are devils howling around them, because of the disturbance of the internal organ in the brain in which all species of sensible things converge in the process of their propagation to the heart or the common sense. But they would not judge in this way if the judgment took place in the eye or in the ear. 6. Again, throughout the books On Sleep and Waking and On Memory, Aristotle calls the common sense or its organ ‘the first sensitive ’. But it would not be the first, but rather the last, if sensations were formed in the organs of the external senses earlier than in the common sense. 7. The opposite is argued in the following way. If there were no sensation in the eyes, in the ears, etc., then it would not strictly speaking be correct to say that we have five external senses. For it is not properly said to be a sense or a sensitive organ if it does not sense, even if it receives the species of a sensible thing. 8. Again, in the book On Sense and What is Sensed, Aristotle says it is obvious that the soul is not sensitive on the outer surface of the eye, but inside, in the transparent part called the pupil. However, if sensation did not come to be in the pupil, just as it does not in the external layers of the eye, then it would not be strictly speaking correct to say that the soul is not sensitive in the external layer of the eye, but it is in the pupil, because the same reason should apply to both, for

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huius quod tangibile sensitivum non est caro, sed medium; sensitivum autem nervi sub carne expansi per totum corpus. Et tamen si non fieret sensatio in illis nervis, ipsi non essent magis sensitivi quam caro, quoniam totum, scilicet caro et nervi, non essent nisi medium per quod species multiplicarentur ad verum sensitivum. 9. Item in secundo De anima quaerit Aristoteles “quid est odorare praeter quam pati ab odore?” Et respondet quod odorare est sentire, sic autem et videre pari ratione est sentire, et similiter audire, etc. Et tamen sensus exteriores audiunt et odorant, etc., quod apparet per Aristotelem in De somno et vigilia dicentem quod necesse est “secundum unumquodque sensum esse aliquid proprium,” velut visui videre et auditui audire et sic de aliis secundum eumdem modum; igitur sensus exteriores sentiunt et non sentirent si non essent in eis sensationes. 10. Item dictum fuit in prioribus quaestionibus quod lux et color non sufficiunt ad faciendum suas species nisi in subiecto diaphano, et quod oportet intentiones, valde aliarum rationum ab illis speciebus in oculis factis, multiplicari ulterius ad organum sensus communis per viam non diaphanam nec illuminatam, ad quas intentiones faciendas requiritur actio animae sensitivae prima, immo actualis visio cuius

114 quaerit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.12 424b 16 (Ar. lat. XII.2 24.168.2.20): “Quid igitur est odorare, praeter pati aliquid?” 117–118 per Aristotelem ] A RI STOTELES , De somno II 455a 12 (Ar. lat. XV.2.1 4.2.6): “Quoniam autem existit secundum unumquemque sensum hoc quidem aliquid proprium.” 122 prioribus quaestionibus ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.15; II.24. 111–112 quoniam totum ] om. E 112 totum ] corpus add. EVW || caro ] cor V || nervi ] nervum AV || per ] ad AV 113 verum ] primum A unum E 116 sic ] si T sicut V || est . . . audire ] sed similiter sentire V || est ] et W || similiter ] sentire add. T 117 audiunt et odorant ] vident et odorant A vident audiunt E 119 sensum ] sensitivum V 123 suas species ] cum suis speciebus A 124 aliarum ] illarum V illarum in marg. W 127 cuius ] cuiusmodi V

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the species of the visible thing and the soul would be in both, and sensation would be in neither. And, likewise, Aristotle says about touch in the second book of this work that what is sensitive of tangibles is not the flesh, which is the medium, but what is sensitive are the nerves spread out under the flesh all over the body. However, if there were no sensation in those nerves, then they would be no more sensitive than the flesh, for then the whole body, flesh and nerves together, would be just the medium propagating the species to what is truly sensitive. 9. Again, in De Anima II, Aristotle asks, “What else is smelling but to be affected by odor?” And he responds that to smell is to sense, just as to see is to sense, and by the same token to hear is to sense, etc. And yet the external senses do hear and smell, etc., as is clear from Aristotle, who says in On Sleep and Waking that “with regard to every sense there has to be something proper,” such as for sight to see and for hearing to hear, and so forth in a similar manner for the rest; therefore, external senses sense and they would not sense if there were no sensations in them. 10. Again, it was said in the earlier question that light and color suffice for making their species only in a transparent medium, and that it is necessary for intentions of a very different nature from those species produced in the eye to be propagated further to the organ of common sense by a passage that is neither transparent nor illuminated, and that for the production of these intentions the primary action of the sen-

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illae intentiones sunt repraesentativae. Igitur necesse est huiusmodi primam visionem fieri in oculo et non in sensu communi. 11. Illa quaestio apparet mihi satis difficilis, et videtur esse mihi de intentione Aristotelis quod sensationes fiunt nobis in organis exteriorum sensuum, ut in oculis, manibus, et auribus. Sed non percipimus nos sentire nisi per actum in sensu communi formatum. 12. Et sic possit responderi ad primam rationem quae fiebat in principio quaestionis, quod nos, valde attenti ad aliquas imaginationes, delata sub oculis aut voces iuxta nos alte propositas non sentimus sensu communi propter eius occupationem, tamen illa videmus et audimus, ignorantes quod illa videamus aut audiamus. Ideo si postea quaeratur an talia vidimus vel audivimus, non poterimus scienter dicere quod sic, quia actus transit et nihil in memoria remansit quia phantasia non nisi a sensu communi recipit intentiones vel species quas reservat. Unde quantumcumque esset visio vel auditio intensa et fortis, usque ad laesionem organi, tamen si sensus communis non attenderet ad eas, nos remotis obiectis non possemus scire quid vidimus vel audivimus. 13. Demum etiam ego credo de intentione Aristotelis esse quod, quia in somno via multiplicationis intentionum sensibilium de sensibus exterioribus ad sensum communem est occulta, quamvis tunc sentiremus per sensus exteriores, tamen non perciperemus nos sentire nec expergefacti memoramur quod aliquid sentiremus, sicut est

128 intentiones ] species V 130 et videtur esse ] valde tamen apparet W 131 nobis ] om. TVW 131–132 exteriorum ] exterioribus EV 132 manibus et auribus ] auribus et caetera AE 135–136 imaginationes ] imagines T 136 propositas ] oppositas V 138 quod illa ] tamen ea V 140 transit ] transivit VW 142–143 et fortis ] ut forte W 143 si ] quia A 143–144 attenderet ] intenderet T 144 obiectis ] oculis V 148 occulta ] occupata TVW 150 sicut ] forte add. TVW

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sitive soul is required, namely the actual vision that these intentions represent. Therefore, this sort of primary vision has to occur in the eye and not in the common sense. 11. This question appears to me to be rather difficult, and it seems to me to be the intent of Aristotle that sensations come to be in us in the organs of the external senses, such as eyes, hands, and ears, but we perceive ourselves to sense only by means of an act formed in the common sense. 12. And in this way one can reply to the first argument raised at the beginning of this question309 that when we intently attend to some imaginations, we do not sense by the common sense things that come before our eyes or sounds that are spoken aloud next to us because of its being busy; nevertheless, we see and hear them without knowing that we see and hear them. Therefore, if later on we are asked whether we saw or heard such things, we cannot knowingly say that we did, for the act has passed away and nothing remains in memory, since imagination receives the species or intentions that it retains only from the common sense. Thus, no matter how intense and strong that act of vision or hearing was, even if it damages the organ, if the common sense did not attend to them, then after the removal of their objects we cannot know what we saw or heard. 13. Finally, I believe Aristotle intends that because the passage for the propagation of sensible intentions from the external senses to the common sense is blocked when we are asleep, even though we would sense by the external senses, nevertheless, we would not perceive ourselves to sense, nor would we remember that we had sensed some309 See

par. 1 above.

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de hiis qui dormiendo exercent opera pertinentia ad vigilantes. Verisimile enim est quod sentiunt sensibus exterioribus. Unde quidam dixit mihi quod vidit unum qui valde plurima agebat determinate in dormiendo, et sic eundo et revertendo habebat oculos apertos. Et omnino non videtur possibile quod aliquis sic determinate indueret se et calciaret et aperiret ostia et reverteretur ad lectum, sicut de aliquibus talibus narratur, nisi illi sentirent vestimenta et sotulares et alia aut per visum aut per tactum. Immo nec nos ipsi possemus talia facere in vigilia sine ministerio visus aut tactus. Et tamen dicitur quod tales, licet memorentur de somniis, tamen non memorantur de hiis quae extra egerunt. Et hoc videtur ex altera duarum causarum contingere, quarum una est quia intentiones sensationum exteriorum non perveniunt ad sensum communem nec per consequens ad phantasiam, vel alia causa est, quia tunc illae phantasiae sunt ita fortes et sic fortiter occupantes sensum communem quod si intentiones sensationum exteriorum perveniunt ad sensum communem, tamen sensus communis non attendit vel sic remisse attendit quod non imprimuntur species aut intentiones in phantasia. Alii dicunt quod tales de illis actionibus non memorantur quia non sentiunt eas. Sed hoc non puto esse verum, ut dixi. Nec valet si aliquis diceret quod in somno omnes sensus exteriores fiunt impotentes, quia licet hoc sit verum de perfecto somno, tamen dicit Aristoteles et verum est quod aliquando dormientes participant de vigilia. Unde sicut dixi, aliquibus accidit in somno sentire aliquo modo et sonos et lumen et saporem et tactum, languide et veluti de longe, et ad hoc quidam respondet interroganti.

172 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De somno II 456a 25. 151 pertinentia ] particularia A || ad ] quemadmodum A 153 quod . . . valde ] qui sit A qui sic E || plurima ] plures T plura V 154 et ] quod add. A quid add. E quod T || revertendo ] redeundo VW 156 lectum ] locum suum A locum ETV 161 duarum ] et aliarum V 162–163 perveniunt ] proveniunt AET 167 attendit ] intendit W || imprimuntur ] reprimuntur A 167–168 aut intentiones ] intentionis W 169 memorantur ] memoramur W 172–173 participant ] percipiant aliquid TV 174 lumen ] lucem E || languide ] linguae W

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thing upon waking up — as is the case with those who, while asleep, do things people would do when they are awake . For it is very likely that they do sense by their external senses. In fact, someone told me that he had seen a person who did all sorts of things quite definitely while asleep and had his eyes open coming and going. And it does not seem altogether possible that someone would put his clothes and shoes on without any hesitation and would open the door and then return to bed, as is reported about such persons, unless they sensed their clothes and shoes and other things either by sight or by touch. Indeed, not even we ourselves would be able to do such things while awake without the assistance of sight or touch. However, it is said that these persons, although they do remember their dreams, do not remember what they were doing externally. And this seems to happen for one of two reasons. The first is that because the intentions of external sensations do not reach the common sense, they also consequently do not reach the imagination. The other reason is that, at that time, those fantasies are so strong and they so strongly occupy the common sense that even if the intentions of the external sensations reach the common sense, it does not pay attention to them, or it does so feebly, such that the species of intentions are not imprinted on the imagination. Others say that do not remember their actions because they do not sense them. But I do not think this is true, as I have said.310 And it does not invalidate this point if someone were to say that in sleep all external senses are incapacitated, because although this is true in deep sleep, Aristotle says, and it is true, that sometimes those who are asleep are partly awake. Thus, as I have said, some people, while asleep, sometimes sense sounds and illumination and taste and touch faintly, as if from afar. And, in addition, some of them even reply to questions.

310 See

par. 12 above.

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14. Item videtur mihi esse de intentione Aristotelis, Avicennae, Averoii et aliorum quod, sicut anima non potest exercere opus nutritionis sine spiritibus et calore nutritivis, sic nec potest exercere opus sensationis sine spiritibus sensitivis qui non veniunt ad sensus exteriores nisi missi a corde. Ideo cum in perfecto somno revertuntur ad cor et non possunt diffundi ad sensus exteriores propter impedimentum viae, sensus exteriores non possunt sentire. Immo etiam in vigilia, quia spiritus sensitivi magis abundant in fonte scilicet in corde quam in sensibus exterioribus, ideo sensationes in sensibus exterioribus sunt debiles et imperfectae sed in corde sunt perfectae et discretae. Ideo simpliciter nulli sensationi factae in sensibus exterioribus acquiescimus nisi consonaret iudicium in corde consummatum. 15. Et per hoc solvitur alia ratio quae fiebat in principio quaestionis de duobus oculis et de digitis permutatis. Sensus communis iudicat unum quia intentiones perveniunt unite ad ipsum, et non sint sensationes in sensibus exterioribus factae potentes huic iudicio obviare. 16. Ad tertiam rationem dictum est quod in perfecto somno non fiunt sensationes in sensibus exterioribus propter carentiam sensitivorum spirituum. Ad instantiam autem quae contra hoc fiebat, dicendum est quod alii sunt spiritus nutritivi et alii sensitivi et per alias vias mittuntur a corde ad alia membra. Spiritus enim sensitivi mittuntur per cerebrum ad organa exteriora et existentes subtiles a modico obstacu-

178 spiritibus et calore ] caliditate et spiritibus A || nutritivis ] nutritionis V 183 fonte ] suo add. TV 184 ideo . . . exterioribus ] quia ibi VW 185 sunt ] fiunt T || et ] magis add. W 186 nulli sensationi factae ] nullis sensationibus factis VW 187 consonaret ] cum scimus A consonet ET || consummatum ] conservatum T 189 de ] duobus add. T || permutatis ] ubi A cancellatis ubi E 190 non sint ] sunt AE 191 exterioribus ] om. AE 193 in perfecto somno ] om. W 194 exterioribus ] om. W

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14. Again, it seems to me to be the intent of Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes and others that, just as the soul cannot carry out the task of nutrition without nutritive heat and spirits, so too, it cannot carry out the task of sensation without the sensitive spirits, which do not reach the external senses unless they are sent by the heart. Therefore, when in deep sleep they recede to the heart and cannot be diffused to the external senses because of the obstruction of their passage, the external senses cannot sense. Rather, even while awake, because the sensitive spirits are more abundant in the source, namely in the heart, than in the external senses, sensations in the external senses are weaker and less perfect, whereas in the heart they are perfect and distinct. This is why we do not simply acquiesce with any sensation produced in the external senses, unless it accords with the judgment delivered in the heart. 15. And by this argument we respond to the argument raised at the beginning of the question concerning the two eyes and crossed fingers.311 The common sense judges that there is one thing there because the intentions reach it united, and the sensations in the external senses are not powerful enough to undermine this judgment. 16. To the third objection312 we have replied that in deep sleep there are no sensations in the external senses because of the lack of sensitive spirits. And to the counterinstance made against this point, one should reply that nutritive and sensitive spirits are different and are sent from the heart through different passages to the other organs. For the sensitive spirits are sent through the brain to the external organs,

311 See 312 See

par. 2 above. par. 3 above.

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lo revertuntur ad cor. Spiritus autem nutritivi et vitales mittuntur cum sanguine per venas et maxime per venas pulsatiles, scilicet quae non transeunt per cerebrum ad pedes et manus. 17. Eodem modo dicendum est de quarta ratione, nam per huiusmodi apprehensionem venae in collo impeditur via spirituum sensitivorum. 18. Quod autem arguitur de prioritate, dicendum est quod prius fit sensatio in sensu exteriori quam in sensu communi, sed debilis et imperfecta. Ideo indigemus quod perficiatur in corde. 19. Ad quintam rationem dictum est quod ex toto scimus in iudicio sensus communis, nec fit nobis sensatio exterior nisi ad ministrandum sensui communi intentiones repraesentativas sensationum. 20. Ad ultimam dicendum est quod sensus communis dicitur primum sensitivum non quia in eo formatur primo sensatio, sed quia est primum principiatione, potentia et causalitate.

199–200 cum sanguine ] om. AEW 201 et manus ] et ad caput A || manus ] capite E 205 prius ] primo AE 208 scimus ] scamus E scatur T 209 exterior ] etiam sensu exteriori T || nisi ] om. A 210 sensationum ] sensibilium add. T et sensibilium add. VW 213 principiatione ] principate A principalitate E principalitate et perfectione T perfectione et add. W || causalitate ] causalitarum et in hoc terminantur quaestiones secundi libri de anima W

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and being subtle, they are turned back to the heart by even a minor obstacle. On the other hand, the nutritive and vital spirits are sent with the blood through the blood vessels, especially through the arteries, namely those that do not go through the brain to the feet and the hands. 17. The same should be replied to the fourth objection,313 because by this constriction of the blood vessels in the neck the passage of sensitive spirits is blocked. 18. To the objection about priority314 one should respond that a sensation occurs in the external sense earlier than it does in the common sense, but it is weak and imperfect. Thus, we need for it to be perfected in the heart. 19. To the fifth objection315 we have already replied that, on the whole, we know something through the judgment of the common sense, and we have external sensation only in order to provide the common sense with the intentions that represent sensations. 20. To the last316 we should reply that the common sense is said to be the ‘first sensitive ’ not because sensation is formed in it first, but because it is first in principality, power, and causality.

313 See

par. par. 315 See par. 316 See par. 314 See

4 above. 4 above. 5 above. 6 above.

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Circa tertium librum De anima quaeritur primo utrum intellectus humanus sit virtus passiva ab intelligibili.

5

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1. Arguitur quod non, quia omne quod patitur movetur, licet non e converso, ut habetur primo De generatione. Et “omne quod movetur est divisibile,” ut habetur sexto Physicorum. Et intellectus non est divisibilis; ergo nec movetur nec patitur. 2. Item dicit Aristoteles quod “oportet ipsum esse impassibilem”; ergo non potest pati. 3. Item agens est nobilius passo, ut habetur tertio huius. Intelligibilia autem ut ligna et lapides non sunt nobiliora intellectu; ergo nec agunt in ipsum nec ipse patitur ab eis. 4. Item sequitur quod potentia vegetativa esset nobilior intellectu. Consequens est falsum. Consequentia probatur quia ipsa est activa in suum obiectum, et agere est nobilius quam pati, et potentia debet iudicari nobilior cuius actus est nobilior. 5. Item formae est agere et materiae est pati, secundo De generatione. Intellectus autem est forma hominis; ergo eius est agere et non pati. 1–2 utrum . . . intelligibili ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a14. 3–4 omne . . . e converso ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.6 323a12–22. 4–5 omne . . . divisibile ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VI.4 234b10 (Ar. lat. VII.1 230.2): “Manifestum igitur est quod omne quod mutatur erit divisibile.” 7 oportet . . . impassibilem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a14–15 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.10): “Impassibilem ergo oportet esse. . . ” 9 agens est nobilius passo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 18–19 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.12): “Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente et principium materia.” 16 formae . . . pati ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. II.9 335b 30–32 (Ar. lat. IX.2, liber 2, cap. 9): “Materiae enim pati et moveri, movere autem et facere alterius potentiae.” 1 quaeritur ] quaerenda sunt aliqua dubia et A 4 generatione ] et e converso ut habetur primo de generatione add. V 10 ligna et ] om. T 14 et potentia ] cum illud T cum potentia V

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 32

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Concerning Book III of De Anima we ask first: Is the human intellect a passive power as regards an intelligible object?

1. It is argued that it is not, because everything that is acted on is moved, although not conversely, as On Generation and Corruption I holds.317 In addition, “everything that is moved is divisible,” as Physics I holds, and the intellect is not divisible; therefore, it is neither moved nor acted on. 2. Again, Aristotle says that “it must be impassible”; therefore, it cannot be acted on. 3. Again, the agent is nobler than the patient, as De Anima III maintains. Yet objects of thought such as wood and stones are not nobler than the intellect; therefore, they neither act on the intellect, nor is the intellect acted on by them. 4. Again, it follows that the vegetative power would be nobler than the intellect. The consequent is false. The consequence is proved because the vegetative power is active in relation to its object, acting is nobler than being acted on, and the power whose act is nobler must be judged to be nobler. 5. Again, acting belongs to form whereas being acted on belongs to matter, as On Generation and Corruption II maintains. But the intellect is the form of a human being;318 therefore, it belongs to it to act, and not to be acted on.

317 According

to Aristotle, “moving is wider than acting” (A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.6, 323a20), so things can be moved without being acted on. For instance, some hay might be so appealing that it “moves” a horse to eat it, without the hay pushing the horse or imparting any physical motion to it. 318 Taking the Latin word ‘homo’ (lit. ‘man’) here to refer to humans generically, as the argument intends. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 32

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6. Item agens et passum debent communicare in materia et esse in principio contraria, ut habetur primo De generatione. Sic autem non est de intellectu et intelligibilibus. 7. Item materia prima est intelligibilis, a qua tamen intellectus nihil patitur, cum ipsa sit nullius activitatis. Et conceptu specifico hominis ego omnes homines intelligo, non solum quos video sed etiam qui sunt Romae qui numquam egerunt in sensum meum nec in intellectum meum; ergo non oportet intellectum pati ab intelligibili ad hoc quod intelligat ipsum. 8. Item intelligere non est pati; ergo intellectus non est virtus passiva. Consequentia patet per locum a coniugatis. Antecedens patet quia si intelligere esset pati, tunc e converso intelligi esset agere. Et hoc apparet esse falsum: primo quia materia intelligitur quae nihil agit; secundo quia communiter dicitur quod intelligere est actio immanens; tertio quia intelligere est verbum activum secundum grammaticam et pati non debet significari per verbum activum nec agere per verbum passivum, eo quod grammatica non esset scientia vera si dissonaret naturis rerum. 9. Oppositum determinat Aristoteles in libro tertio. Quamvis ipse dicat intellectum quodammodo esse impassibilem, tamen distinguit duplex pati, et uno istorum modorum concedit intellectum pati ab intelligibili. 10. Item Aristoteles dicit “intellectum se habere ad intelligibilia sicut sensum ad sensibilia,” et in isto secundo dicit “sensum accidere in ipso moveri aliquid et pati”; ergo etc. Dicit etiam Aristoteles intellec19–20 agens . . . contraria ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.7 324a10–14. 37 libro tertio ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 430a 3–9. 41–42 intellectum . . . sensibilia ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a18 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.10): “. . . et similiter se habere, sicut sensitivum ad sensibilia, sic intellectum ad intelligibilia.” 42–43 sensum . . . pati ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 416b32 (Ar. lat. XII.2 ‘nova’ 107.1.3): “Sensus autem in moveri aliquid et pati accidit. . . ”; cf. (Ar. lat. XII.1 ‘vetus’): “Sensus autem in ipso moveri que et pati accidit.” 22 intelligibilis ] intellectualis E 24 omnes ] om. AE 25 Romae . . . egerunt ] pro me qui non convenirent V || egerunt ] venerunt W 28 est ] potest V 26–28 ab intelligibili . . . pati ] hom. AE 28 pati ] om. T 31 materia ] intelligibilium add. E 32 intelligere ] intellectio AE intellectus T 34 et ] ergo A 35 scientia ] una add. A || si ] scilicet si V 38–39 distinguit ] disponit T 39 uno ] modo add. V || modorum ] contingit vel add. A 42 et ] quod V 43 ipso ] seipso A ipsum V

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6. Again, agent and patient must share in matter and be contraries at the beginning , as On Generation and Corruption I holds.319 But this is not the case with intellect and intelligible objects. 7. Again, prime matter is an intelligible object. Yet in no way does prime matter act on the intellect, since it has no activity. Also, I think of all humans by the specific concept human being — not only those I am seeing, but also those in Rome, who have never acted on my senses or my intellect; therefore, an intelligible object need not act on the intellect for the intellect to think about it. 8. Again, thinking is not being acted on;320 therefore, the intellect is not a passive power. The consequence is clear by the topic “from conjugates.”321 The antecedent is clear, because if thinking were being acted on, then conversely, being thought of would be acting, which is evidently false because: (1) matter, which acts on nothing, is thought of; (2) it is usually said that understanding is an immanent action; (3) ‘to think’ is grammatically an active verb, and being acted on should not be signified by an active verb, nor should acting be signified by a passive verb, for grammar would not be a true science if it did not reflect the natures of things. 9. Aristotle determines the opposite in De Anima III. Although he says that the intellect is somehow unable to be acted on, he distinguishes two ways of being acted on, and in one of them he grants that the intellect is acted on by an intelligible object. 10. Again, Aristotle says that “the intellect is related to intelligible objects as sense is related to sensible objects,” and he says in De Anima II, “in itself, sensing consists in something being moved and 319 In

On Generation and Corruption I.7 (324a12), Aristotle describes coming-tobe as “a process into the contrary,” so a cold stone becomes hot when it is placed in a hot fire. 320 Note that it is the entire predicate ‘being-acted-on’ (‘est pati’ in Latin) that is at issue here. The claim is that thinking is not a species of undergoing some action, even if there is a sense in which the intellect is acted on when it thinks. 321 For the topic “from conjugates” see QQ. De an. II.9, par. 3 above, and Summulae de dialectica 6.6.2 (tr. Klima, 486–488). In the present case, the conjugates are the passive infinitive ‘being acted on [pati]’ (the abstract form of verbs and participles was taken to be expressed by the infinitive) and the adjective ‘passive [passiva]’. This licenses an inference from “thinking is not being acted on” to “the intellect is not a passive power.”

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tum “nec unam habere naturam, nisi quod possibilis est vocatus,” id est potentia ad recipiendum et patiendum, et “non est in actu ante intelligere.” Dicit etiam intellectum saltem possibilem “in omnia fieri,” et fieri est pati, et omnino recipere dispositiones sibi inhaerentes est pati aliquo modo. Nos autem dicimus intellectum recipere intellectiones et habitus intellectuales; ergo etc. 11. Ista quaestio faciliter solvitur ex determinatione Aristotelis, pati enim dicitur multipliciter. 12. Uno modo proprie, pati est idem quod corrumpi. Unde sic contraria sunt ad invicem passibilia; frigiditas enim a caliditate patitur, id est corrumpitur, vel e converso. Et tunc est prima conclusio, quod intellectus humanus non est sic passibilis, cum Aristoteles ponat eum esse perpetuum. Unde sic potest intelligi ista auctoritas quod “oportet eum esse impassibilem.” 13. Secundo modo, pati significat communiter idem quod subiectum recipere dispositionem aliquam sibi inhaerentem, sive substantialem sive accidentalem. Unde sic diceremus materiam pati in recipiendo formam substantialem sive accidentalem et parietem in recipiendo albedinem. Tunc est secunda conclusio, quod intellectus sicut etiam sensus est virtus passiva quia etiam recipit intellectiones et habitus intellectuales. 14. Tertio modo iste modus passionis restringuitur ad passiones nocivas aut tristes aut corruptivas, ut apparet quinto Metaphysicae. Et tunc apparet mihi pro tertia conclusione quod intellectus potest pati

44–46 nec habere . . . intelligere ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a 22–23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.17): “Quare neque ipsius esse naturam neque unam, sed aut hanc quod possibilis. Vocatus itaque animae intellectus (dico autem intellectum quo opinatur et intelligit anima) nihil est actu eorum quae sunt ante intelligere.” 46 in omnia fieri ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 14–15 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.2): “. . . et est huiusmodi quidem intellectus in quo omnia fiunt, ille vero quo omnia est facere, sicut habitus quidam, ut lumen.” 55–56 Aristoteles . . . perpetuum ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a22 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.7): “Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est.” 66 quinto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.21 1022b15–21. 45 est ] in add. A || patiendum ] faciendum V 53 passibilia ] passiva AE 54 vel e converso ] om. AE 55 humanus ] om. AE 61 sive accidentalem ] om. AET 65 passionis ] refertur vel add. A 65–66 nocivas ] motivas V

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acted on;” therefore, etc. Aristotle also says that the intellect “has no single nature, except that which is called ‘possible’,” namely the capacity for receiving and being acted on, and “it is not actual before thinking.” He also says that at least the possible intellect “becomes all things,” and becoming something is being acted on; also, in general, receiving the dispositions that inhere in it is being acted on somehow. But we say that the intellect receives acts of thought and intellectual habits; therefore etc. 11. This question is easily resolved based on the determination of Aristotle, for ‘being acted on’ is said in many ways. 12. First, ‘being acted on’ is in the strict sense the same as ‘being corrupted’. Contraries are capable of being acted on by each other in this way, for coldness is acted on, i. e. corrupted, by heat, or conversely. Then the first conclusion is that the human intellect is not capable of being acted on in this way, since Aristotle maintains that it is everlasting. That is how we can understand his authoritative remark that the intellect “must be impassible.”322 13. Second, ‘being acted on’ generally signifies a subject’s receiving some disposition that inheres in it, whether substantial or accidental. Accordingly, we would then say that matter is acted on in receiving a substantial or accidental form, and a wall is acted on in receiving whiteness. Then the second conclusion is that the intellect, just like sense, is a passive power because it receives acts of thinking and intellectual habits. 14. Third, this kind of affection is restricted to harmful or grievous or corruptive affections, as is apparent in Metaphysics V. For the third conclusion, then, it appears to me that the intellect can be affected by

322 See

par. 2 above.

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passionibus tristibus et nocivis quia intellectus est idem quod voluntas, et voluntas tristari potest et valde sibi nocivas volitiones recipere quibus peccamus et animam nostram denigramus et depravamus. 15. Sed de passione corruptiva potest distingui quod dupliciter dicitur: uno modo quia est corruptiva contrariae dispositionis in subiecto in quo recipitur existentis; alio modo quia disponit ad corruptionem subiecti eam recipientis. 16. Primo modo ergo passiones secundum primas qualitates dicuntur omnes corruptivae quia non fit in aliquo subiecto alius gradus caliditatis quin corrumpatur alius gradus frigiditatis, et e converso. Sed ego dico pro quarta conclusione quod intellectus saepius patitur passionibus quae non sunt isto modo corruptivae, quia cum intellectus a principio recipiat conceptus tam simplices quam complexos, aut dispositiones vel habitus intellectuales, nihil oportet in eo corrumpi. Tamen accidat ipsum aliquando pati dicto modo passione corruptiva, ut si contingat te habere aliquam opinionem et propter rationes contrarias fiat tibi opinio contraria, oportet tunc opinionem priorem corrumpi eo quod impossibile est contraria simul esse in eodem subiecto. Unde propter hoc dictum est quarto Metaphysicae quod impossibile est assentire opposito primi principii. 17. Pro quinta autem conclusione dicendum est quod intellectus humanus non est passibilis passione corruptiva secundo modo, scilicet quae disponat ad ipsius corruptionem, eo quod ipse ponitur incorruptibilis. 18. Sed non obstantibus dictis conclusionibus ponitur sexta conclusio, scilicet quod intellectus est virtus activa, quod probatur primo quia idem est intellectus in homine et sensus et virtus vegetativa in

86–87 impossibile est assentire opposito primi principii ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.3 1005b23–25 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 73.167): “Impossibile namque quemcumque idem existimare esse et non esse.” 69 volitiones ] voluptationes T 70 nostram ] totam add. AE totaliter add. T || denigramus et ] om. AET 71–72 duplicitur dicitur ] duplex passio dicitur corruptiva V 76 omnes ] esse A 77 corrumpatur ] in subiecto add. A || et ] nec(!) A 79 corruptivae ] corruptiones A 80 complexos ] contrarios T 80–81 dispositiones ] discursus AET 83 aliquam ] veram A unam T || rationes ] speciem A 84 priorem ] contrariam A

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a grievous and harmful affection, because the intellect is the same as the will, and the will can be aggrieved and receive volitions that are extremely harmful to it, volitions by which we sin, darkening and debasing our souls. 15. But as for corruptive affections, we can distinguish two ways in which an affection is said to be corruptive: by being corruptive of the contrary disposition existing in the subject in which it is received; or by disposing the subject receiving it to corruption. 16. In the first way, then, in the case of primary qualities, affections are all said to be corruptive because no degree of heat is produced in any subject without some degree of cold being corrupted, and vice versa. But I claim as the fourth conclusion that the intellect is more often affected by affections that are not corruptive in this way, because although it receives from the very beginning concepts both simple and complex, or dispositions, or intellectual habits, nothing need be corrupted in it. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that it is affected by an affection that is corruptive in the way stated, e.g., if you happen to have an opinion and due to contrary arguments the contrary opinion is produced in you, the earlier opinion must be corrupted because it is impossible for contraries to be in the same subject at the same time. That is why it is said in Metaphysics IV that it is impossible to assent to the opposite of a first principle.323 17. For the fifth conclusion, however, it must be said that the human intellect is not affected by a corruptive affection in the second way, viz. by one disposing it to corruption, because it is supposed to be incorruptible. 18. But the aforementioned conclusions notwithstanding, a sixth conclusion is advanced, namely that the intellect is an active power. This is proved first because the intellect, sense, and vegetative powers

323 Note

that Buridan here, following Aristotle, endorses a view that infers ontological properties of concepts from semantic ones, i.e., that contrary opinions that are contrary with regard to their semantic content (in the sense that they cannot be true at the same time) are also contrary with regard to their ontological compatibility (in the sense that they cannot inform the same subject at the same time).

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quantum est ex parte animae, ut nunc suppono; et tamen omnes concedunt quod virtus vegetativa est virtus activa; ergo etiam intellectus et sensus. 19. Item postea determinabitur probabiliter quod potentia secundum locum motiva in homine est aliquando intellectus, et tamen omnis potentia motiva est activa. 20. Item necesse est concedere quod intellectus se habeat active in componendo et dividendo et syllogizando et distinguendo. Et quia quaerebatur utrum intellectus sit virtus passiva ab intelligibili, ideo ego pono septimam conclusionem: quod sic, quia quantumcumque patitur, ipse patitur ab aliquo ente; et omne ens est intelligibile; ergo patitur ab intelligibili. 21. Octava conclusio: ponitur quod intellectus noster aliquando multa intelligit a quibus numquam patitur, sicut arguebatur de materia et hominibus Romae existentibus. Ideo infertur corollarie quod si intelligibile vocamus obiectum intellectus tunc non omne obiectum intellectus est activum in intellectum, nec intellectus est passivus ab omni eius obiecto. Ideo intelligibile et intellectum non referuntur ad invicem universaliter sicut activum et passivum sed sicut repraesentabile et cui fit repraesentatio, quod forte Aristoteles voluit dicere quinto Metaphysicae ponendo secundum modum relativorum, mensura et mensurabile. 22. Solvendae igitur sunt rationes. 23. Ad primam dicitur quod motu propriissime dicto non movetur indivisibile. Sed capiendo communiter moveri pro omni eo quod est

98 postea determinabitur ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.20. 115–116 mensura et mensurabile ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.15 1020b26–31 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 112.573): “Ad aliquid dicuntur alia . . . ut mensurabile ad mensuram et scibile ad scientiam et sensibile ad sensum.” 101 se habeat active ] habeat active concurrere V 102 et syllogizando ] om. A 104 quantumcumque ] quando AE 109 Romae ] recte Romae ac Parisius A 110 si ] ens add. T 111 intellectus . . . intellectum ] est activum T 112 et ] obiectum add. V || intellectum ] vel intellectivum(?) add. A 114 fit ] potest fieri E 119 indivisibile ] proprie per se indivisibile A per se indivisibile ET per se divisibile V

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in a human are the same, viewed on the side of the soul, as I am now assuming.324 And yet everyone grants that the vegetative power is an active power; therefore, so are intellect and sense. 19. Again, it will be determined later with plausible arguments that sometimes the power of local motion in a human is the intellect, and every motive power is active. 20. Again, it is necessary to grant that the intellect plays an active role in affirming, denying, syllogizing, and distinguishing. And because it was asked whether the intellect is a passive power as regards an intelligible object, I propose as the seventh conclusion: that it is, because no matter how much it is acted on, it is acted on by some entity, and every entity is an intelligible object; therefore, it is acted on by an intelligible object. 21. As the eighth conclusion it is proposed that our intellect sometimes understands many things that never act on it, as was argued about matter and humans existing in Rome;325 therefore, it is inferred as a corollary that if we call the intelligible object the object of the intellect, then not every object of the intellect is active in relation to the intellect, nor is the intellect passive as regards all of its objects; therefore, intelligible and intellect are not related to each other universally as active and passive, but as representable and that to which a representation can be made. Perhaps Aristotle wanted to say this in Metaphysics V when he posits, as the second mode of relatives, measure and what is measurable. 22. So then, the opposing arguments must be resolved. 23. To the first argument,326 it is said that when we are talking about motion in the strictest sense, no indivisible is moved. But taking ‘be-

324 Buridan

assumes this because he has already demonstrated it, in QQ. De an. II.5, pars. 23–25 above, where he distinguishes between the soul’s principal and instrumental powers. The former are taken by him to be identical with the substance of the soul, which is why he says, “on the side of the soul.” 325 See par. 7 above. 326 See par. 1 above.

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aliter et aliter se habere secundum prius et posterius, sic indivisibile bene movetur. Et de illo modo debet videri in sexto Physicorum. 24. Illa autem auctoritas Aristotelis de impassibilitate ipsius intellectus est pro prima conclusione et quinta. 25. Ad aliam dicimus quod non omne agens est nobilius suo passo. Sed verum est quod ad omnem passionem et actionem oportet concurrere aliquid agens nobilius quam sit passum. Et de hoc dicetur magis quando quaeretur de intellectu agente. 26. Ad aliam dictum est quod intellectus non solum est potentia activa sed etiam passiva. 27. Ad aliam potest dici quod actionibus et passionibus secundum primas qualitates, de quibus in libro De generatione determinabatur, materia patitur et non forma loquendo proprie. Sed de actionibus spiritualibus, forma potest non solum agere sed etiam pati. 28. Ad aliam similiter dicendum est quod Aristoteles loquebatur de actionibus et passionibus secundum primas qualitates. 29. Alia ratio quae est de materia et hominibus Romae existentibus, soluta est in positione. 30. Ad aliam dico quod intelligere est agere et est pati, nam intellectus in formando actum intelligendi agit in seipsum et patitur a seipso. Ideo cum intelligere sit agere, non est mirum si significatur per verbum activum, et ob hoc etiam bene dicitur quod intellectio est actio immanens in suo agente. Sed quando dicitur “oportet quod in-

121 sexto Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VI.10 240b8–241a15. Cf. B UR IDANUS , QQ. Phys. VI.7 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 99vb –100rb ). 126 dicetur ] Vide infra III.10. 120 sic ] om. AET 121 videri ] moveri A 123 et quinta ] om. AE 127 agente ] om. T 129 activa sed etiam passiva ] passiva sed etiam activa AET 137 soluta est in positione ] soluta est in praecedentibus A 142 oportet ] apparet A 142–143 intelligi ] intelligere A

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ing moved’ generally for everything that is differently disposed earlier and later, what is indivisible is certainly moved. And more on this point should be seen in Physics VI. 24. The authoritative claim of Aristotle concerning the impassibility of the intellect in the second argument,327 supports the first and fifth conclusions. 25. To the third argument,328 we say that not every agent is nobler than its patient. But it is true that in every passion and action, some agent nobler than the patient must concur.329 And more will be said about this when we look at the agent intellect. 26. To the fourth argument,330 it was stated that the intellect is not only an active but also a passive power. 27. To the fifth argument,331 it can be said that by the actions and passions of primary qualities, which are treated in On Generation and Corruption, matter is acted on and not form, strictly speaking. But in the case of spiritual actions, form is able not only to act, but also to be acted on. 28. Likewise, to the sixth argument,332 it must be said that Aristotle was speaking of actions and passions in the case of primary qualities. 29. The seventh argument about matter and humans existing in Rome,333 however, was resolved above.334 30. To the eighth argument,335 I say that thinking is acting and also being acted on, for in forming an act of thinking, the intellect acts on itself and is acted on by itself. So, since thinking is acting, it is not surprising that it is signified by an active verb, and for this reason as well it is also correctly said that an act of thought is an action immanent in

327 See

par. 2 above par. 3 above. 329 The point is that if an inferior agent produces a superior effect, it must be by virtue of the concurrence of a superior agent, for which the inferior agent serves as its instrument. 330 See par. 4 above. 331 See par. 5 above. 332 See par. 6 above. 333 See par. 7 above. 334 See par. 21 above. 335 See par. 8 above. 328 See

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telligi esset agere si intelligere esset pati,” ego nego consequentiam, quia licet intelligere sit pati, tamen forte non est pati ab eo quod intelligitur, ut intelligere materiam non est pati a materia; ideo nec oportet quod intelligi sit agere. 31. Sed tu quaeres quare intelligi significatur per verbum passivum secundum grammaticam nisi intelligi sit pati, et ego dico quod nomina et verba significant ad placitum. Ideo ex modico motivo, possumus significare pati sub voce activi generis et agere sub voce passivi vel etiam sub voce activi generis quod nec est agere nec pati, ut cum dicimus Deum intelligere se et amare et Deum intelligi a se et amari. Unde quia forte crediderunt vulgares fieri sensationem extramittendo, scilicet quod sensus ageret in sensibile et sensibile pateretur, ideo sic significaverunt sentire sub voce activi et sentiri sub voce passivi, et sic communiter intelligere et intelligi, propter proportionem actus intelligendi ad actum sentiendi, et sic tandem amari et amare, desiderari et desiderare, etc., quia tales actus sequuntur actus intelligendi vel sentiendi.

143 agere ] pati AETV add. ex W || intelligere ] intellectio V || pati ] agere AET 143–144 ego nego consequentiam, quia licet ] om. V 144–145 ab eo . . . pati ] hom. AE a materia ut intelligere non est pati T 144 quod ] ipse add. V 145 materiam ] om. AETV add. ex D 146 quod ] materiam add. AET || intelligi ] intelligere A 147 intelligi ] intelligere A || passivum ] activum A 148 intelligi ] intelligere A || quod ] omnia add. V 150–151 generis . . . activi ] hom. A 152 se ] om. EV 155 sic ] om. AET 156 communiter ] vel consequenter add. A || intelligi ] intelligendi V 157 sentiendi ] om. V

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its agent. But when it is said, “it is necessary that being thought of is acting if thinking is being acted on,” I deny the consequence, because even though thinking is being acted on, perhaps it is not being acted on by what is thought of, just as thinking of matter is not being acted on by matter; therefore, it is not necessary that being thought of is acting. 31. But you will ask why being thought of is signified grammatically by a passive verb if being thought of is not being acted on, and I say that nouns and verbs signify conventionally; therefore, we can, even for a very slight reason, signify being acted on in the active voice and acting in the passive voice, or even what is neither acting nor being acted on in the active voice, as when we say that God is thinking of and loving himself, and is thought of and loved by himself. Perhaps, because uneducated people believed that the act of sensing occurs by extramission (so that sense acts on what is sensible and the sensible is acted on by it), they signified sensing in the active voice and being sensed in the passive voice. Likewise, in general, thinking and being thought of, because of the analogy between the act of thinking and the act of sensing, and so on for being loved and loving, being desired and desiring, etc., given that such acts follow upon the act of thinking or sensing.

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Utrum oporteat intellectum esse denudatum ab eo quod ipse intelligit.

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1. Arguitur quod non per similem de sensu. Nam organum tactus non est sine calido et frigido, humido et sicco, quorum ipse est perceptivus, nec lingua sine sapore, nec oculus sine colore; ergo, etc. 2. Item intellectus potest quodlibet ens intelligere et non est a quolibet ente denudatus. Unde ipse potest intelligere seipsum et non potest a seipso esse denudatus. 3. Item Deus primo, principaliter et maxime intelligit seipsum, et tamen non sit denudatus a seipso; ergo etc. 4. Item auctor De causis dicit intelligentiam esse plenam de formis, et hoc dicit ut intelligat eas; ergo ad intelligendum aliquam, non oportet intellectum esse denudatum ab illis. 5. Item nulla apparet necessitas quod intellectus sit denudatus ab eo quod intelligit, nisi quia oportet recipiens esse denudatum ab eo quod recipit. Sed intellectus non recipit res quas intelligit, non enim recipit lapidem, licet intelligat lapidem; ideo non apparet necessitas quod sit denudatus ab eo quod intelligit. 6. Oppositum videtur Aristoteles intelligere sub istis verbis: “Necesse est itaque, quoniam omnia intelligit, inmixtum esse,” id est 1–2 utrum . . . intelligit ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 430a 1 (Ar. lat. XII.2 214.2.3): “Oportet autem sic sicut in tabula nihil est actum scriptum, quod quidem accidit in intellectu.” Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.4 (ed. Crawford, 386.92– 93); Auc. Ar. 6.122 (ed. Hamesse, 184): “Omne recipiens debet esse denudatum a natura recepti.” 11–12 intelligentiam esse plenam de formis ] Lib. de caus. IX.92.8 70. Cf. AQUINAS, Super lib. de caus. lect. 8 (= Prop. 177 in P ROCLUS, Elements of Theology (ed. Dodds, 157)). 20 Necesse . . . esse ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a 18–20 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.14): “Necesse est itaque, quoniam omnia intelligit, inmixtum esse.” 3 organum ] sensus add. T 7 intelligere seipsum et non ] denudatus a seipso nec AE 8 denudatus ] et tamen potest intelligere seipsum add. A 14 quod ] quare AE 15–16 ab eo quod recipit ] a natura recepti T 16 intellectus ] intelligens A 18 denudatus ] om. V 20 itaque ] eum add. E © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 33

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Must the intellect be devoid of what it understands?

1. It is argued that it need not, by analogy with sense. For the organ of touch does not lack the hot, cold, moist, and dry, of which it is perceptive; nor does the tongue lack flavor, or the eye color; therefore etc. 2. Again, the intellect can understand any being and it is not devoid of any being. For this reason, it can understand itself and cannot be devoid of itself. 3. Again, God understands himself first, principally, and in the highest degree, and yet God is not devoid of himself; therefore, etc. 4. Again, the author of the Book of Causes says that an intelligence is replete with forms, and by this he means that it understands them; therefore, the intellect need not be devoid of such forms in order to understand something. 5. Again, there appears to be no necessity for the intellect to be devoid of what it understands, unless because the recipient must be devoid of what it receives. But the intellect does not receive the things it understands, for it does not receive a stone, although it understands it; thus, it does not appear necessary that it be devoid of what it understands. 6. Aristotle seems to mean the opposite in these words: “And so since it understands all things, it is necessary that it be unmixed,”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 33

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non mixtum eis intelligibilibus. Cuius rationem assignat dicens “Intus apparens enim prohibebit extraneum et obstruet.” Et super hoc dicit Commentator quod recipiens “necesse est ut sit denudatum a natura recepti.” Ideo cum positum fuerit quod intellectus intelligit omnes formas materiales, sequitur quod ista substantia quae dicitur intellectus non est aliqua de huiusmodi formis, et quod ipse “nec est corpus nec virtus in corpore,” sicut dicit Commentator. 7. Notandum quod quidam est intellectus intelligens formaliter per suam essentiam, scilicet sine repraesentativo alio a se, et sine intellectione alia a se. Et ille intellectus est divinus, et ille semper continue intelligit et maxime et principalissime seipsum, et de hoc debet videri in duodecimo Metaphysicae. 8. Dico igitur pro prima conclusione quod talis intellectus non est denudatus ab eo quod ipse intelligit primo et principaliter, quia non est denudatus a se. 9. Alius est intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui non semper intelligit quia non intelligit formaliter per suam essentiam sed per intellectionem sibi additam et sibi inhaerentem, sicut accidens inhaeret suo subiecto. Et ille non semper habet in se illam intellectionem, quia tunc semper intelligeret. Ideo oportet cum de novo intelligat quod de novo recipiat illam intellectionem. Et tunc de hoc intellectu ponemus conclusiones. 10. Et erit secunda conclusio talis quod necesse est intellectum humanum antequam intelligat esse ab omni intellectione denudatum, quia si antequam intelligat haberet aliquam intellectionem, ipse illa 21–22 Intus . . . obstruet ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a20 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.16): “Intus apparens enim prohibebit extraneum et obstruet.” 23–24 necesse . . . recepti ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.4 (ed. Crawford, 385.67–68): “necesse est ut sit denudatum a natura recepti.” 26–27 nec . . . corpore ] AVER ROES , Comm. De an. III.4 (ed. Crawford, 383.8–9): “. . . nec est corpus nec virtus in corpore.” 32 in duodecimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. XII.9 1074b15ff. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. XII.14 (ed. Parisiis 1588, f. 75va−vb ) 22 apparens ] existens AEV 24 cum positum ] propositum T compositum V 27 virtus ] om. AETV || sicut dicit ] haec V 34 et principaliter ] om. T 40 cum ] quod A quod add. T 43 erit ] est A est igitur E 44 antequam ] ad hoc quod A || denudatum ] probatur add. in marg. A 45–46 quia . . . intellectione ] in marg. A 45 intelligat ] om. AE

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that is, not mixed with those objects of thought. He gives an argument for this, saying, “for what appears inside will hinder and obstruct what is outside.” And on this passage, the Commentator remarks that the recipient “must be devoid of the nature of what is received.” Thus, since it was assumed that the intellect understands all material forms, it follows that substance which is said to be the intellect is not some form of this kind, and that “it is neither a body nor a power in a body,” as the Commentator says. 7. Note that there is a certain intellect which understands formally by means of its essence, namely without any representation other than itself and without any act of thinking other than itself. This is the divine intellect; it always understands itself continually, principally, and in the highest degree, as should be seen in Metaphysics XII. 8. Therefore, I state as the first conclusion that such an intellect is not devoid of what it understands first and principally, because it is not devoid of itself. 9. But there is another intellect, namely the human intellect, which does not always understand because it does not understand formally by means of its essence, but rather by means of an act of thought added to it and inhering in it, as an accident inheres in its subject. And it does not always have this act of thinking in itself, because then it would always think.336 Thus, whenever it understands anew it must receive that act of thought anew. Let us then put forward conclusions pertaining to this intellect. 10. The second conclusion will be as follows: the human intellect must be devoid of every act of thought before it understands, because if it were to have some act of thought before it understands, it would

336 Although

‘think’ and ‘understand’ are both good translations of ‘intelligere’, there is an important distinction between what the intellect does as its characteristic or essential activity, autonomously and without reference to anything else (thinking), and that same activity terminating in its true object or external ground, which we capture in English by means of success terms like ‘understanding’ and ‘knowing’. We try to preserve this distinction in the translation, using context to determine which meaning Buridan intends.

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intellectione intelligeret, ideo intelligeret antequam intelligeret, quod implicat contradictionem. 11. Tertia conclusio quod necesse est eum antequam intelligat esse denudatum a specie intelligibili, quia licet intellectus non sit sufficiens ad intelligendum sine specie intelligibili, tamen cum ea est sufficiens; et cum fuerit sufficiens ad formandum suam primam intellectionem, ipse statim format eam. Ideo sequitur quod intellectus semper a principio suae creationis intelligeret, si ex tunc haberet speciem intelligibilem, et hoc supponimus esse falsum; ergo antequam primo intelligeret erat denudatus ab illa specie. 12. Sed contra illam rationem aliquis forte diceret quod non oportet specie intelligibili existente in intellectu intellectum intelligere, quia potest deferre vel ad aliud se convertere per actum liberum voluntatis, et etiam quia illa species se habet ad intellectionem sicut habitus ad actum, vel sicut actus primus ad secundum. Modo habitus potest esse sine actu, et actus primus sine secundo; ergo illa species potest esse sine actuali intellectione. Sed de hiis ego dimitto ad praesens, quia de hiis dicetur largius et de huiusmodi speciebus et habitibus intellectualibus. 13. Ex hiis sequitur conclusio quarta quod necesse est intellectum humanum antequam aliquid intelligat esse ab omni intellectione et specie intelligibili denudatum, et universaliter ab omni sufficienti repraesentativo intelligibili per quod sine alio superveniente intellectus est potens formare intellectionem. Aliter enim a principio creationis suae haberet illam intellectionem et intelligeret — quod suppositum est falsum. 14. Sed adhuc ex hiis nondum apparet quaestio sicut fiebat soluta, non enim quaerebat quaestio utrum sit denudatus ab omni intellec-

62–63 de hiis dicetur ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.15. 49 intelligibili ] patet add. A || non sit ] esset(!) A 50 ad intelligendum . . . sufficiens ] hom. A 51 primam ] et propriam add. A 53 suae ] om. VW 54 primo ] om. ES 56 illam ] conclusionem et eius add. A 57 specie ] deferre exp. A || in intellectu ] om. AET || intelligere ] intellectiones V 60 ad ] actum add. A 65 Ex hiis sequitur ] om. T 66 aliquid ] om. A || et ] ab omni add. A 71 est ] videtur A 72 ex hiis ] ex dictis AET || nondum apparet ] nondum A non ET 72–73 soluta ] dissoluta E 73 sit ] sicut V || omni ] om. ET

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understand by means of that act of thought and so would understand before it understands, which implies a contradiction. 11. The third conclusion: the intellect must be devoid of intelligible species before it understands because although the intellect is not sufficient for understanding without an intelligible species, it is sufficient with it, and once it is sufficient to formulate its first thought, it immediately does so. Thus, it follows that the intellect would always understand from the first moment of its creation if it were to have an intelligible species from that point on — and this we assume to be false; therefore, it was devoid of that species before it understood for the first time. 12. But perhaps someone might object to this argument that it need not be that the intellect understands with an intelligible species existing in it, because it can defer, or turn itself towards something else by a free act of will, and also because a species is related to an act of thinking just as a habit is related to an act, or a first act is related to a second act. Now, a habit can exist without an act, and a first act without a second; therefore, a species can exist without an actual act of thinking. But I am setting these issues aside for now because there will be a fuller discussion of them below, as well as of such species and intellectual habits. 13. From these considerations, the fourth conclusion follows: before it understands anything, the human intellect must be devoid of every act of thought and intelligible species, and in general, of every sufficient intelligible representation through which, without anything else added to it, it is capable of formulating an act of thought. For otherwise, it would understand and have that act of thought as soon as it was created — which we assume to be false. 14. But even so, it still does not appear from the foregoing that the question as posed has been resolved, for the question did not ask

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tione vel specie intelligibili per quam intelligit, sed utrum ab eo quod ipse intelligit. 15. Et tunc indubitabiliter ponenda est quinta conclusio: quod intellectus potest illud intelligere a quo numquam est denudatus, quia seipsum potest intelligere; ergo etc. 16. Sed sexta conclusio manifesta est, quod ipse a multis quae intelligit est semper necessario denudatus, ut a corporibus caelestibus et lignis et lapidibus. 17. Tamen adhuc ex istis nondum habemus propositum illud quod Aristoteles et Commentator videntur intendere, scilicet quod intellectus non sit forma substantialis materialis nec corporea. Aristoteles enim et Commentator videntur haec velle concludere ex eo quod intellectus intelligit omnes formas materiales et corporeas, unde enim infert Commentator quod intellectus nec est corpus nec in corpore et Aristoteles quod sit inmixtus. Sed licet forte aliunde posset demonstrari etiam eius immaterialitas, tamen illa non sequitur evidenter ex eo quod potest omnes formas materiales cognoscere, quia istae argumentationes non videntur fundari nisi super proportionem intellectus ad intelligibilia sicut sensus ad sensibilia, et super hoc quod sensum seu organum sentiendi colorem oportet esse sine colore vel saltem sine tali gradu coloris, et sentientem sonum sine sono saltem secundum talem gradum, et sentientem caliditatem sine caliditate saltem secundum talem gradum, et sic de aliis sensibilibus. Propter quod dicit Aristoteles secundo huius quod similiter calidum et similiter frigidum non sentimus, et quod etiam susceptivum coloris debet esse sine colore et soni absque sono. Igitur propter hoc proportionaliter videntur Aristoteles et Commentator concludere quod intellectus ex eo quod est cognoscens omnium formarum materialium directe et sine 76–78 intellectus . . . intelligere ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.9. 97 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.7 418b26; cf. II.12 424a2 ff.; cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.13, par. 3; II.15, par. 2. 75 ipse ] intellectus add. A || intelligit ] et hoc fuit quaesitum add. A 76 indubitabiliter ponenda est ] ponitur AT 82 propositum ] probatum AE 83 intendere ] pervenire E 84 substantialis ] essentialis A om. ET 91 proportionem ] sicut se habet add. T 93 colorem ] om. V 93–94 colore . . . coloris ] calore . . . caloris A 94 sonum sine sono ] saporem sine sapore AE 96–98 et sic de aliis sensibilibus . . . non sentimus ] hom. AE 99 et soni absque sono ] om. AE 101 cognoscens ] cognoscitivus A perceptivus ET

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whether the intellect is devoid of every act of thought or intelligible species through which it understands, but whether it is devoid of what it understands. 15. Then, without any doubt, a fifth conclusion should be advanced: the intellect can understand what it has never been devoid of, since it can understand itself; therefore etc. 16. But the sixth conclusion is also clear: the intellect is always and by necessity devoid of many things it understands, such as celestial bodies, pieces of wood, and stones. 17. Even so, from these considerations we have not yet arrived at the proposition Aristotle and the Commentator seem to want, namely that the intellect is neither a material nor a corporeal substantial form. For Aristotle and the Commentator seem to want to conclude this from the fact that the intellect understands all material and corporeal forms, on which grounds the Commentator infers that the intellect is neither a body nor in a body, and Aristotle that it is unmixed. But even though its immateriality could perhaps be demonstrated on other grounds, it does not evidently follow from the fact that it can cognize all material forms, because those lines of argument appear to be grounded only on the analogy that the intellect is to objects of thought as sense is to objects of sense, and on the fact that the sense or organ of sensing color must be without color, or at least without the degree in which it was received; the organ sensing sound must be without sound at least to some degree; the organ sensing heat must be without heat at least to some degree; and so on for the other objects of sense. For this reason, Aristotle says in De Anima II that we do not sense something that is just as hot or cold , and also that what takes in color must be colorless and what takes in sound must be without sound. Therefore, Aristo-

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discursu, non sit aliqua forma materialis complexionalis. Dico autem directe et sine discursu, quia certum est quod non oportet intellectum esse denudatum ab eo quod cognoscit secundum discursum, quia sic cognoscit seipsum, et habitus et actus sibi inhaerentes. Cum igitur intellectus directe et sine discursu cognoscit calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum secundum quemcumque gradum possibilem, non est possibile quod habeat calidum vel frigidum, humidum vel siccum. Et tamen omne organum corporeum et materiale oportet esse tale, scilicet calidum vel frigidum, etc. Videtur etiam consequi quod intellectus non habeat organum corporeum nec materiam de cuius potentia sit eductus et genitus. 18. Videtur autem mihi quod quamvis haec ratio seu deductio sit apparens, tamen non est demonstrativa. Nam licet praedicta sint vera quantum ad sensus exteriores, scilicet sentientes calidum vel frigidum non debet esse calidi vel frigidi secundum talem gradum, nec sentientes colorem colorati, tamen hoc non oportet sic dicere de sensu communi vel de virtute quam vocat Commentator cogitativam. Nam organum sensus communis, sive sit in corde sicut ponit Aristoteles, sive sit in cerebro sicut ponunt alii, non est eiusdem complexionis cum carne vel nervo digiti tui, sed est multo calidius. Unde si occidis porcum et statim aperies dividendo eum, tu senties in corde vel in cerebro caliditatem multo intensiorem quam sit caliditas digitorum tuorum. Igitur per tactum tu non posses sentire caliditatem aequalis gradus cum caliditate organi sensus communis vel phantasiae vel cogitativae. Et tamen quidquid sensit sensus exterior sive tactus sive visus, hoc potest sentire sensus communis vel phantasia vel cogita118 vocat Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.6 (ed. Crawford, 415.49– 51). 119 ponit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De iuv. 3 469a5–7. 120 ponunt alii ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.6 (ed. Crawford, 415.49–51). Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De mem. (ed. Shields, 57.48–51). 102 complexionalis ] communalis Aom. T 105 Cum ] sic A 106 directe et ] om. A 106–107 calidum . . . siccum ] aliquid frigidum aut siccum A 107 possibilem ] om. E 108–110 humidum vel siccum . . . etc ] hom. T 109 corporeum et ] om. AET 115 quantum ] ergo A || scilicet ] si add. E 118 Commentator ] om. ES 121 tui ] om. A 122 aperies dividendo eum ] dividendo tu aperies et capias eius cor aut cerebrum A statim dividendo tu aperies cor vel cerebrum E aperiendo ipsum V 124 non ] om. (!) AET exp. W 126 cogitativae ] memorativae V

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tle and the Commentator seem to conclude by way of this analogy that because the intellect is cognizant of all material forms directly and non-discursively, it is not some complexional material form337 — I say ‘directly and non-discursively’ because it is certain that the intellect need not be devoid of what it cognizes discursively, since it cognizes itself and the dispositions and acts inhering in it in this way. Therefore, since the intellect directly and non-discursively cognizes hot and cold, moist and dry, in any possible degree, it is not possible for it to be hot or cold, wet or dry. Yet every corporeal and material organ must be such, namely hot or cold, etc. It seems to follow, then, that the intellect has no corporeal organ or matter from whose potency it is brought forth and generated. 18. It seems to me, however, that even though this argument or deduction is plausible, it is still not demonstrative. For although what was said above is true as far as the external senses are concerned, that is to say, the senses sensing hot or cold must not be hot or cold to the degree in question, nor must those sensing color be colored, nevertheless we do not have to say the same thing about the common sense or the power the Commentator calls cogitative. For the organ of common sense, whether it is in the heart as Aristotle holds, or in the brain as others hold, does not have the same composition as flesh, or the nerve in your finger. It is much hotter. That is why, if you butcher a pig and immediately cut it open, you will feel in its heart or its brain a heat much more intense than the heat in your fingers. Therefore, you would not be able to sense by touch a heat of a degree equal to the heat of the organ of common sense or imagination or cogitative power. However, the common sense or imagination or

337 The

adjective ‘complexional [complexionalis]’ is an odd word to use here, but the manuscripts offer no variants. Buridan may simply be emphasizing that the form is ‘folded into’ or ‘woven into’ matter in the way in which material forms constitute the material composition of a material substance (‘complexio’ being the term regularly used to describe the way composite material substances are constituted from elements). Buridan does not mean that the material form is something composite.

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tiva. Igitur sensus communis vel cogitativa potest sentire seu apprehendere similiter calidum et similiter frigidum secundum gradum. Et ita si ponatur quod non sit virtus cognoscitiva ultra virtutem quam vocat Commentator cogitativam vel quam vocat Aristoteles sensum communem, ratio quae fiebat non concludit quod intellectus sit sine organo et complexione, sicut non concludit hoc de sensu communi vel de virtute cogitativa. Et de hoc etiam dicetur amplius in sequentibus. 19. Ad rationes. 20. Igitur apparet mihi quod rationes pro prima parte non concludunt contra dicta, nec contra conclusionem demonstrabilem, licet forte aliquae concludunt contra illud quod fide tenendum est. Nec apparet mihi quod auctoritates pro secunda parte sint bene fultae demonstrationibus, licet possent fulciri probabilibus argumentis, de quibus etiam dicetur post.

131 vocat Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.1 425a27–30. 134 sequentibus ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3; III.17. 141 post ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3. 130 cognoscitiva ] cogitativa A 130–131 quam vocat . . . vel ] hom. A 131 Commentator ] om. E 132 sine ] in(!) A 135 Ad rationes ] om. AT 136 prima ] opposite AE 137 contra dicta, nec ] hom. W 138 contra . . . tenendum est ] illud quod fideliter tollendum est AE || Nec ] om. (!) V 139 secunda ] opposita A 141 post ] Consequenter ad maiorem evidentiam quaestionis praecedentis expedit videri quomodo intellectus humanus sit forma seu actus corporis humani etc. add. VW

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cogitative power can sense whatever an exterior sense such as sight or touch senses; therefore, the common sense or the cogitative power is able to sense or apprehend hot and cold of the same degree. And so, if we assume that there is no cognitive power beyond the power the Commentator calls cogitative or Aristotle calls the common sense, the argument made above does not entail that the intellect is without an organ and without composition, just as it does not entail this about the common sense or cogitative power. More will be said about this in what follows. 19. Replies to the opening arguments.338 20. It seems to me that the arguments for the first part do not go against what was said earlier, nor do they go against a demonstrable conclusion, although perhaps some lead to conclusions contrary to what must be held on faith. Nor does it appear to me that the authorities cited on behalf of the second part are well supported with demonstrative arguments, although they could be supported with probable arguments, about which something will be said later.

338 See

pars. 1–6 above.

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Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma substantialis corporis humani.

5

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15

1. Arguitur quod sic, per definitionem animae datam in secundo huius quam Aristotelis dicit esse “communissimam”, et per consequens ipsa convenit animae intellectivae. Ibi enim dicitur quod anima est “actus corporis”, etc. Idem autem est actus et forma; ergo etc. 2. Item intellectus humanus est substantia, et omnis substantia est materia vel forma vel compositum, ut habetur secundo huius et septimo Metaphysicae. Et intellectus non est materia nec compositum; ergo est forma, et non est forma alterius quam corporis humani; ergo etc. 3. Item differentiae specificae specierum de praedicamento substantiae non debent sumi ab accidentibus nec ab extrinsecis sed a substantia rei; et non a materia, cum illa sit eiusdem rationis in omnibus 4 communissimam ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a 5 (Ar. lat. XII.2 67.1.1): “iterum autem tamquam ex principio redeamus temptantes determinare quid est anima et quae utique erit communissima ratio ipsius.” 6 actus corporis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a 20 (Ar. lat. XII.2 67.2.12): “Unde anima est primus actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis.” Auc. Ar. p. 177. 9–10 secundo huius et septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 414a14 (Ar. lat. XII.2 82.2.14): “Tripliciter enim dicta substantia, sicut diximus, quarum hoc quidem species, illud vero materia, aliud autem ex utrisque, horum autem materia quidem potentia, species autem actus, postea ex utrisque animatum, non corpus est actus animae, sed ipsa corporis cuiusdam.” A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.11 1037a5 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 154.616): “Palam autem et quod anima quidem substantia prima, corpus autem materia; homo vero aut animal quod est ex utrisque ut universaliter.” 1–2 corporis humani ] hominis AE 4 communissimam ] scilicet cum dicit eam actum corporis organici physici, etc. add. A 4–5 per consequens ] per Commentatorem(!) E 6 actus ] substantialis add. AT et forma substantialis add. E || corporis ] hominis(!) A || idem . . . forma ] om. E 9 vel ] totum add. AE 10 nec ] totum add. AE 11 est ] differentia vel add. A || alterius ] corporis add. T 14 debent ] dicimus A 15 cum ] si A || omnibus ] om. AET

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 34

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Is the human intellect the substantial form of the human body?

1. It is argued that it is, by the definition of soul given in De Anima II, which Aristotle says is “most general.” Consequently, it applies to the intellective soul, for he says there that the soul is “the act of the body,” etc; but act and form are the same; therefore etc. 2. Again, the human intellect is a substance, and every substance is matter, or form, or a composite of matter and form, as De Anima II and Metaphysics VII hold. The intellect is neither matter nor a composite. Therefore, it is a form, and it is not the form of anything but the human body; therefore etc. 3. Again, the specific differences of species in the category of substance must not be taken from accidents or extrinsic features, but from the substance of a thing. Not from its matter, since matter has

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 34

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generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Igitur a forma substantiali, scilicet ab intellectu, cuius est ratiocinari, sumitur differentia specifica hominis, scilicet rationale; ergo intellectus est forma substantialis hominis. 4. Item si intellectus sit de natura et substantia hominis, cum non sit materia eius, oportet quod sit eius forma substantialis. Sed arguitur quod sit de natura et substantia hominis: primo quia aliter felicitas humana non consisteret in eius operatione, quod tamen declarat Aristoteles in primo et decimo Ethicorum; secundo quia aliter homo non deberet maxime dici ipse intellectus, cuius oppositum vult Aristoteles dicere in primo et nono Ethicorum; tertio quia homo non diceretur intelligere per hoc quod intellectus intelligit, et tamen sic et non aliter dicitur intelligere; quarto quia aliter homo non esset secundum substantiam nisi animal brutum, quia non haberet a substantia sua animam intellectivam sed sensitivam solum, et sic etiam non deberet magis amare intellectum quam sensum, quod est contra Aristotelem nono Ethicorum; et ideo consequentia patet quia videtur quod homo nihil debet magis amare, saltem post Deum, quam seipsum; ergo etc. 5. Oppositum patet per Aristotelem secundo huius, dicentem quod nihil prohibet quamdam partem animae separari quia nullius corporis est actus, et intendit hoc de intellectu; ergo intellectus non est actus seu forma corporis humani. 6. Item sequeretur quod homo esset perpetuus, quod est falsum, cum moriatur. Et patet consequentia quia hoc videtur esse perpetuum

23 primo et decimo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.7 1098a3–17 et X.7 1177b19–22. 25 primo et nono Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. A RISTO TELES , Eth. ad Nic. I.7 1098a 3–17 et IX.4 1166a 17–18. 31 nono Ethicorum ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. IX.8 33 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.2 413b 24–26 (Ar. lat. XII.2 82.1.16): “De intellectu autem et perspectiva potentia, nihil adhuc manifestum est, sed videtur genus alterum animae esse et hoc solum contingere separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.” 16 Igitur ] aut A item V 17 intellectu ] intellectiva A intelligendo T 20 eius ] om. T 22 operatione ] passione V 25 primo et nono ] septimo et nono AET 27– 28 secundum ] suam add. AE 29 solum ] om. T 31 nono ] et decimo add. T 34 animae ] om. E 34–35 nullius corporis est actus ] etc. A 38 cum moriatur ] om. A

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the same account in all generable and corruptible things. Therefore, the specific difference of a human being (rational) is taken from the substantial form (the intellect, whose activity is reasoning); therefore, the intellect is the substantial form of a human being. 4. Again, if intellect belongs to the nature and substance of humans, since it is not their matter, it must be their substantial form. But it is argued that it belongs to the nature and substance of humans: first, because otherwise, human happiness would not consist in its activity — which Aristotle asserts in Nicomachean Ethics I and X; second, because otherwise a human would not be said to be above all an intellect, which is the opposite of what Aristotle holds in Nicomachean Ethics I and IX; third, because a human would not be said to understand because an intellect understands (and yet, this is how humans are said to understand, and not in any other way); fourth, because otherwise, humans would be nothing in their substance but brute animals, since they would not have intellective souls by virtue of their substance, but only sensitive souls — and so humans would not be obliged to love intellect more than sense, which is contrary to Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics IX. And the consequence is clear because it appears that after God, at least, humans are obliged to love nothing more than themselves; therefore etc. 5. Aristotle states the opposite in De Anima II, where he says that nothing prevents some part of the soul from being separated, since it is the act of no body. He is talking here about the intellect. Therefore, the intellect is not the act or form of the human body. 6. Again, it would follow that humans are everlasting, which is false, since they die. The consequence is clear, because that thing

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cuius forma substantialis est perpetua, quae dat esse hoc aliquid in actu. Et tamen Aristoteles ponit intellectum esse perpetuum, separatur enim ab aliis ut dicit “sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.” 7. Item forma corporis humani est inmixta, id est, non est mixta materiae et qualitatum corporalium complexionibus, cum corpus humanum sit complexionale et materiale. Et tamen dicit Aristoteles quod oportet ipsum sic esse “inmixtum” eo quod “omnia intelligit.” Et Commentator sic exponens dicit expresse quod necesse est ipsum “nec esse corpus nec virtus in corpore.” 8. Ista quaestio mota est ad distinguendum opiniones de ipso intellectu ut videatur in quo conveniunt et in quo differunt, et postea inquiratur de differentiis earum. 9. Dico ergo quod tres fuerunt opiniones magis famosae de ipso intellectu. 10. Una fuit Alexandri, quod intellectus humanus esset forma materialis generabilis et corruptibilis et educta de potentia materiae et extensa extensione materiae, sicut anima bovis aut canis, et non manens post mortem. 11. Alia opinio fuit Averrois, quod intellectus humanus est forma immaterialis, ingenita, incorruptibilis, et sic nec educta de potentia materiae, nec extensa, immo nec multiplicata multiplicatione hominum; sed quod est unicus intellectus omnium hominum, scilicet quo ego intelligo, et tu, et sic de aliis. Et ideo non est forma inhaerens corpori. Unde ipse imaginatur quod sicut Deus est toto mundo et cuilibet 41 sicut perpetuum a corruptibili ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.2 413b 25 (Ar. lat. XII.2 82.1.16): “De intellectu autem et perspectiva potentia, nihil adhuc manifestum est, sed videtur genus alterum animae esse et hoc solum contingere separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.” 45 inmixtum . . . intelligit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a18–20 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.14): “Necesse est itaque, quoniam omnia intelligit, inmixtum esse, sicut dicit Anaxagoras, ut imperet, hoc autem est ut cognoscat.” 47 in corpore ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.4 (ed. Crawford, 383.8–9): “. . . neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore.” 53 Alexandri ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.4 (ed. Crawford, 393–98). 57 Averrois ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.4 (ed. Crawford, 399–413). 42 Item ] sicut add. AE || inmixta ] admixta T 42–43 id est . . . materiae et ] et sine AE 47 virtus ] esse A om. ETV 50 inquiratur ] om. AE 51 magis famosae ] om. E 58 nec ] quod non potest esse A 60 unicus ] unus T 61 et tu ] om. T

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appears to be everlasting which has an everlasting substantial form, which makes it be a this something in act. And yet Aristotle holds that the intellect is everlasting, for as he says, it is separated from other things “as what is everlasting from what is corruptible.” 7. Again, the form of the human body is unmixed — that is, it is not mixed with matter or a complex of corporeal qualities — since it is the human body that is complex and material. But Aristotle says that the form of the human body must itself be “unmixed,” because “it understands all things.” When he explains this remark, the Commentator explicitly says that it is necessary that it “be neither a body nor a power in a body.” 8. This question was raised in order to distinguish views about the intellect, in order to see how they agree and how they differ, after which we will inquire into their differences. 9. I say, then, that there have been three well-known views about the intellect. 10. One was Alexander’s: that the human intellect is a generable and corruptible material form, drawn forth from the potency of matter and extended with the extension of matter, just like the soul of a cow or dog, and that it does not remain after death. 11. The other view was that of Averroes: the human intellect is an immaterial, ungenerated, and incorruptible form, and so is not brought forth from the potency of matter, nor extended, nor even multiplied by the number of human beings; rather, there is a unique intellect belonging to all human beings, namely an intellect by which I understand, you understand, and so on for everyone else. Thus, it is not a form

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parti eius praesens et indistans, et tamen nec mundo nec alicui parti eius inhaerens, sic ille intellectus se habet ad homines, scilicet quod nulli inhaeret sed cuilibet indistanter assistit, licet sit indivisibilis. 12. Tertia via est veritas fidei nostrae catholicae, quam firmiter debemus tenere, scilicet quod intellectus humanus est forma substantialis hominis inhaerens corpori humano, sed nec educta de potentia materiae nec extensa eius extensione, et ideo non naturaliter genita nec corruptibilis, sed tamen nec perpetua simpliciter, quia de novo creata. Et sit tamen sempiterna a parte post, sic quod numquam corrumpetur vel annihilabitur, quamvis Deus de potentia eius absoluta potest eam annihilare. 13. Omnes autem haec opiniones in una conclusione de qua quaerebat praesens quaestio concordant, scilicet quod intellectus humanus est forma substantialis corporis humani. Et hoc videntur satis concludere rationes quae in principio quaestionis fiebant. 14. Demum etiam fides et Commentator in una secunda conclusione conveniunt, scilicet quod intellectus humanus non sit forma materialis sic quod sit eductus de potentia materiae nec extensus extensione materiae. 15. Et hanc conclusionem Commentator et Aristoteles videntur velle probare multis rationibus, quarum prima est de qua in praecedenti quaestione dictum est, scilicet quoniam omnia intelligit oportet inmixtum esse. 16. Secunda est quia est perpetuus, et nulla forma educta de potentia materiae est perpetua. 17. Tertia ratio est quia si esset sic materialis, tunc ad exercendam suam operationem propriam indigeret certa complexione qualitatum

83–84 in praecedenti quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.2, par. 4. 66 via ] opinio vere est vera V opinio est via veritas W || fidei nostrae catholicae ] et fides catholica A fide nostrae T 68 hominis ] corporis T 69 naturaliter ] vocatur T 70 nec ] om.(!) T 72 potentia ] potestate T 78 una secunda ] una AT 80 de potentia materiae nec ] vel AE 82–83 velle ] om. AT 84 omnia intelligit ] omnem intellectum A

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inhering in a body. That is why he imagines that just as God is immediately present to the entire world and to each part of it without inhering in the world or any part of it, so too the intellect is related to human beings, namely in such a way that it inheres in none of them but is immediately present to each, despite being indivisible. 12. The third way is the truth of our catholic faith, which we should hold firmly, namely, that the human intellect is the substantial form of a human being inhering in the human body, but not drawn forth from the potency of matter or extended by its extension, and so not naturally generated or corruptible. But neither is it in the strict sense everlasting because it is created in time. Nevertheless, it is sempiternal hereafter in such a way that it will never be corrupted or annihilated, even though God is able, by his absolute power, to annihilate it. 13. All of these views, however, agree in one conclusion in regard to which the present question was asked, namely that the human intellect is the substantial form of the human body.339 This conclusion seems sufficiently established by the arguments that were made at the beginning of the question.340 14. In addition, the faith and the Commentator agree on a second conclusion, namely that the human intellect is not a material form such that it is drawn forth from the potency of matter, or extended by the extension of matter. 15. Aristotle and the Commentator clearly intend to establish this conclusion with many arguments, the first of which pertains to what was stated in the preceding question, namely that the human intellect must be unmixed because it understands all things. 16. The second is that it is everlasting, and no form drawn forth from the potency of matter is everlasting. 17. The third argument is that if it were material in this way, then in order to exercise its proper operation it would need a certain com-

339 Actually,

Averroes holds not that the intellect is the substantial form of the human body, but the intellective soul, or the human soul as joined to the eternal, transcendent intellect in the activity of thinking (see par. 11 above). Because Buridan does not distinguish the intellect and intellective soul, however, he equivocates when he describes Averroes’ position as agreeing with the other two on this question. 340 That is, the four affirmative arguments in pars. 1–4 above.

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tangibilium in materia sibi subiecta, vel in organo per quod exercet eam, et hoc est falsum; ergo etc. 18. Consequentia tenet, quia omnis forma sic materialis est forma simplicis elementi, vel corporis mixti ex elementis. Et si simplicis, constat quod determinat certam complexionem qualitatum, ut ignis calidum et siccum, aqua frigidum et humidum, etc. Et si sit forma corporis mixti, tunc secundum proportionem elementorum in mixtione determinat sibi proportionem qualitatum, propter quod dicitur primo Caeli quod mixtum movetur secundum naturam elementi determinantis. 19. Sed falsitas consequentis probatur ab Aristotele, primo qualis utique esset huiusmodi complexio corporis vel organi sui? An corpus vel organum sibi subiectum esset magis calidum quam frigidum, humidum quam siccum, vel e converso? Hoc non posset convenienter dici, cum ita intelligat calidum sicut frigidum, humidum sicut siccum, et e converso, secundum omnem gradum. 20. Secundo etiam eadem falsitas consequentis probatur quia omnis forma sic sibi determinans qualitatem et complexionem qualitatum tangibilium est etiam passibilis passione corruptiva, et sic etiam Aristoteles intellectum esse impassibilem dicit. 21. Tertio adhuc idem probatur, quia non sic intellectus est passibilis in exercendo opus suum sicut sensus. Sensus namque, propter hoc quod exigit corporeum organum et certam complexionem organi, gravatur ab excellenti sensibili, ita quod post vehementes sonos non possumus bene audire parvos, nec post fortes odores percipere odores debiles. Sic autem intellectus non gravatur, quia non intelligit per 97–98 primo Caeli ] A RISTOTELES, De caelo I.2 269a5 (Ar. lat. VIII.2): “. . . enim si compositi fuerit, secundum predominans erit.” 100 probatur ab Aristotele ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a24–26. 109 intellectum esse impassibilem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a 29 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.2.12): “Quoniam autem non similis sit impassibilitas sensitivi et intellectivi, manifestum est ex organis et sensu.” 115–116 non . . . corporeum ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a 29–b4. 90 tangibilium ] corporalium add. A || materia ] substantiali add. V 92 forma ] substantialis add. A 97 proportionem ] om. V 98–99 determinantis ] praedeterminantis in eo A 100 consequentis ] principalis add. AE 101 complexio ] conmixtio V 102 vel organum ] om. AE 107 qualitatum ] quantum A 110 adhuc idem ] idem AE adhuc V 114 audire ] sentire T || nec post fortes ] et sic propter fortiores A

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position of tangible qualities in the matter subject to it or in the organ through which it would exercise it, and this is false. Therefore etc.341 18. The consequence holds, since every form that is material in this way is the form of a simple element, or of a body mixed from the elements. If it is the form of a simple element, it determines a certain combination of qualities, as fire determines hot and dry, water cold and wet, etc. If it is the form of a mixed body, then it determines a proportion of qualities in itself that is in keeping with the proportion of elements in the mixture, which is why it is said in On the Heavens I that a mixture is moved according to the nature of its predominant element. 19. However, Aristotle proves that the consequent is false. First, what would this sort of composition of the body or its organ be like? Would the body, or the organ subject to the intellect, be more hot than cold, more wet than dry, or the other way around? This could not be adequately answered seeing that the intellect understands hot just as well as cold, wet just as well as dry, and conversely, in any degree. 20. Second, the same falsity of the consequent is also proved because every form determining for itself a quality and a certain composition of tangible qualities in this way can also be affected by a corruptive affection,342 and yet, Aristotle says that the intellect is unaffected in this way. 21. Third, the same point is proved again, since the intellect cannot be affected in performing its operation in the way sense can be. Because sense needs a corporeal organ and a certain structure in that organ, it is overloaded by an object of sense that is excessive, so that after very loud sounds, we cannot hear quiet sounds as well, nor are we able to perceive weak odors after strong ones. However the intel-

341 Note

that the third argument is a modus tollens over this and the next four paragraphs: paragraph 17 states the main consequence, 18 its proof, and 19–21 the proofs of the falsity of its consequent. 342 Tangible qualities are those felt by the external senses: hot, cold, wet, dry, etc. For corruptive affections, see QQ. De an. III.1, pars. 14–15 above.

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organum corporeum. Unde cum intellexit magnum intelligibile, ut Deum vel intelligentias, non minus intelligit infima, sed etiam magis. 22. Quarta ratio ad conclusionem principalem est quia si esset eductus de potentia materiae et extensus, tunc non posset recipere nisi singulariter et individualiter, sicut sensus; ideo nihil posset cognoscere universaliter. 23. Quinta ratio est quia non posset recipere nisi extensa. Ideo non posset cognoscere indivisibilia, ut Deum et intelligentias, quod est falsum. 24. Sexta ratio est quia virtus corporea et extensa non potest reflecti super se nec super suam operationem. Ideo intellectus non posset cognoscere se et suam operationem, sicut nec sensus visus vel auditus cognoscunt suos actus propter non posse reflecti. Et ideo Aristoteles concludit esse ponendum sensum communem ad cognoscendum actus sensuum exteriorum. 25. Notandum est tamen quod quamvis illa conclusio sit firmiter et simpliciter vera et fide tenenda, et quod rationes ad eam adductae sint probabiles, tamen non apparet mihi quod sint demonstrativae ex principiis, circumscripta fide catholica, evidentiam habentibus, nisi Deus de gratia speciali et ultra communem cursum naturae faceret nobis illam evidentiam, sicut ipse posset alicui facere evidentem articulum trinitatis et incarnationis.

128–129 Aristoteles concludit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.2 426b17–23. 116 magnum ] maxime AET 119 eductus ] productus AE individualiter ] simpliciter aut singulariter et individualiter A recipere nisi extensa et A 125 corporea ] organica T 126 auditus ] non(!) add. V 129 cognoscendum ] agendum E T 136–137 articulum ] om. T

120 singulariter et 123 posset ] potest super ] per T 127 134 catholica ] om.

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lect is not overloaded in this way because it does not understand by means of a corporeal organ. That is why, when it has understood some major object of thought, such as God or the intelligences, it does not understand the lowest things any less, but even more. 22. The fourth argument for the main conclusion is that if the intellect were brought forth from the potency of matter and extended, it would be unable to receive anything except singularly and individually, as sense does; therefore, it could not cognize anything universally. 23. The fifth argument is that it could only receive extended things; thus, it could not cognize indivisibles such as God and the intelligences, which is false.343 24. The sixth argument is that a corporeal and extended power cannot reflect on itself or its own activity. Thus, the intellect could not cognize itself and its own activity, just as the senses of sight and hearing do not cognize their own acts because they cannot reflect. For this reason, Aristotle concludes that the common sense must be postulated in order to cognize the acts of the external senses. 25. Nevertheless, it must be noted that although this conclusion is absolutely and indubitably true, ought to be firmly held on faith, and has plausible arguments supporting it, still, it does not seem to me that those arguments are demonstrative from principles that are evident, leaving the catholic faith aside — unless God with a special grace beyond the ordinary course of nature were to make it evident to us, just as he could make the articles of the Trinity and the Incarnation evident to someone.

343 Extended

things occupy space and are therefore divisible. The only indivisible things in space would be indivisible points, if they existed (and Buridan agrees with Aristotle in QQ. De an. III.14 below that they do not), which would have spatial location without extension.

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26. Unde Alexander sic respondisset ad istas rationes ut puto. 27. Ad primam enim dixisset sicut dictum est in praecedenti quaestione. 28. Ad secundam negavisset intellectum humanum esse perpetuum sicut intellectum divinum. 29. Ad tertiam dixisset sicut nos diceremus de sensu communi et de virtute cogitativa, quando enim dicitur qualis utique esset illa complexio, diceret quod esset complexio organi sensus communis et phantasiae vel cogitativae, et diceret intellectum eodem modo esse passibilem sicut sensum communem. Unde etiam dixisset quod sicut laeso organo visus vel auditus, non possumus bene videre vel audire, sic laeso organo sensus communis vel phantasiae, non possumus bene intelligere nec ratiocinari. Quare autem post maxima intelligibilia bene intelligimus infima? Hoc est quia ista intelligimus per ratiocinationem et discursus, scilicet Deum et intelligentias. Quae autem sic cognoscuntur non gravant organa nostra, sicut obiecta exteriora possunt ea gravare. 30. Ad quartam rationem dixisset Alexander quod virtus extensa bene fertur in obiectum suum modo universali, sicut appetitus ipsius equi. Equus enim sitiens appetit aquam, et non determinate illam sic

139–140 in praecedenti quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.2 138 ut puto ] om. T 147 Unde ] universaliter T 149 vel phantasiae ] om. AE 150 nec ratiocinari ] om. A || bene ] om. AE 153 ea ] om. T 157–158 sic quod non ] vel A

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26. For this reason, I think Alexander would have replied to those arguments as follows. 27. To the first,344 he would have said what was said in the previous question. 28. To the second,345 he would have denied that the human intellect is everlasting in the way the divine intellect is. 29. To the third,346 he would have talked about the common sense and cogitative power as we do. And when we ask what sort of structure that would be, he would reply that it would be the structure that the organ of the common sense and imagination or cogitative power has, and he would say that the intellect is capable of being affected in the same way as the common sense. Accordingly, he also would have said that just as we cannot see or hear well when the organ of sight or hearing has been damaged, so too when the organ of common sense or imagination has been damaged, we cannot understand or reason well. But why, then, do we understand the lowest objects of thought perfectly well after we understand the greatest objects of thought? Because we understand those things, namely God and the intelligences, by reasoning and discursive thought. Things that are understood in this way, however, do not overload our organs as exterior objects can overload them. 30. To the fourth argument,347 Alexander would have said that an extended power is indeed brought to its object in a universal way, just like a horse’s appetite. For the thirsty horse desires water, and not

344 See

par. 15 above. par. 16 above. 346 See par. 17 above. 347 See par. 22 above. 345 See

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quod non istam, sed quamlibet indifferenter appetit. Ideo quamcumque invenit bibit eam. 31. Ad quintam diceret quod intellectus intelligit indivisibile modo privativo, sicut notat Aristoteles in isto libro tertio. Et hoc est apponendo negationem huic conceptui divisibili. 32. Ad ultimam diceret quod intellectus vel sensus non proprie reflectitur, sed per discursum intelligit quod multi dicunt intelligere per reflexionem; et etiam reflexio magis proprie conveniret corporibus quam substantiis separatis.

161 isto libro tertio ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430b19–26. 162 huic ] om. AE proprie ] om. ET

164 intelligere ] om. T

165 etiam ] ipsa A ita add. T

||

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determinately this water to the exclusion of that, but indifferently, any water at all. Thus, it drinks whichever it finds first. 31. To the fifth,348 he would say that the intellect understands what is indivisible in a privative fashion, as Aristotle observes in De Anima III. It does this by attaching negation to the concept of the divisible. 32. To the last one,349 he would say that strictly speaking, the intellect or sense does not reflect, but it understands discursively what many say it understands reflexively, and that reflection applies more strictly to bodies than it does to separate substances.

348 See 349 See

par. 23 above. par. 24 above.

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Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma inhaerens corpori humano.

5

10

15

1. Arguitur quod sic, etiam auctoritate Alexandri et fidei catholicae. 2. Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Commentatoris. Opinio Commentatoris fuit quod intellectus non inhaeret corpori, sed assistit ei, sicut Aristoteles ponit quod intelligentiae assistunt orbi vel Deus mundo. Intelligentia enim ponitur praesens esse sine distantia toti orbi et cuilibet parti eius, quamvis sit indivisibilis et non inhaerens, sicut Deus toti mundo et cuilibet parti eius. Et ita ergo dicit Commentator quod intellectus humanus et indivisibilis et unicus existens, est praesens sine distantia cuilibet homini, licet nulli inhaereat. 3. Et sunt ad hoc rationes Commentatoris probabiles. Prima est quod nulla forma inhaeret materiae si non sit de eius potentia. Sed intellectus humanus non est eductus de potentia materiae, ut dicit Commentator; ergo etc. 4. Secunda ratio eius est quod unicus est intellectus omnium hominum, ut dicit. Est enim perpetuus, et perpetua non multiplicantur 5–6 Opinio Commentatoris ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 383.8–9): “. . . nec est corpus nec virtus in corpore.” 7 Aristoteles ponit ] Cf. A RI STOTELES , Met. XII.7 1072b 20–21 et XII.10 1075a 11–16. 10–11 dicit Commentator ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.20 (ed. Crawford, 451.219–220): “. . . dicimus quod intellectus continuatus nobiscum. . . .” Cf. AVERROES, Comm. Met. XII. comm. 18, ff. 303e–305i 15–16 dicit Commentator ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.2 (ed. Crawford, 381.13–14): “. . . non est materiale nec mixtum cum corpore omnino. . . .” 18 dicit ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 399.347): “. . . intellecta speculativa sunt aeterna.” 1 Utrum ] Nunc autem ad perfectionem praedictae quaestionis quaeritur utrum V 2 humano ] om. AE 6 intellectus ] humanus add. ET 7 quod ] intellectus assistit seu add. V || orbi ] corpore E 9–10 quamvis . . . Et ] om. EVW 13 Commentatoris ] contrariae E || probabiles ] plures T 14 eius potentia ] potentia materiae AE 17–18 omnium hominum ] in(!) omnibus hominibus T © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 35

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Is the human intellect a form inhering in the human body?

1. It is argued that it is, on the authority of both Alexander and the catholic faith. 2. The opposite is argued on the authority of the Commentator. The opinion of the Commentator was that the intellect does not inhere in the body but is present to it, just as Aristotle holds that intelligences are present to the celestial sphere, or God is present to the world. For even though it is indivisible and non-inherent, an Intelligence is held to be immediately present to an entire sphere and to each of its parts, just as God is present to the entire world and to each of its parts. In this way, then, the Commentator says that the human intellect, existing both indivisibly and uniquely, is immediately present to each human being without inhering in any particular one. 3. In this connection, we have the Commentator’s plausible arguments. The first is that no form inheres in matter unless it is brought forth from its potency. But the human intellect is not brought forth from the potency of matter, as the Commentator says; therefore etc. 4. His second argument is that there is a unique intellect belonging to all human beings, as he says. For it is everlasting, and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 35

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multiplicatione corruptibilium. Sed quod est unicum et indivisum non inhaeret pluribus secundum locum separatis et distantibus, cuiusmodi sunt corpora humana; ergo etc. 5. Item intellectus ponitur indivisibilis, etiam secundum fidem, quia non est extensus extensione materiae, cum non eductus de eius potentia. Tale autem indivisibile non inhaeret subiecto divisibili, cuiusmodi est corpus humanum; ergo etc. 6. Et ista ratio sic potest deduci: si intellectus indivisibilis existens inhaereat corpori divisibili, oportet vel quod inhaeret cuilibet parti eius corporis, vel alicui parti et non alteri. Si dicatur quod uni et non alteri, hoc videbitur fictitium, quia non posset convenienter assignari cui parte et quantitate. Si autem dicatur quod inhaeret toti composito, scilicet cuilibet parti eius, constat quod hoc erit secundum se totum, cum non sit divisibilis. Etiam ad hoc videntur sequi multa inconvenientia. 7. Primum inconveniens est quod idem secundum se totum moveretur simul et quiesceret, et quiescere est non moveri, ergo simul moveretur et non moveretur, quod implicat contradictionem. Consequentia patet: posito quod pes tuus quiescat et manus tua moveatur. Tunc enim idem secundum se totum quod est in manu tua movetur ad motum manus, aliter non esset continue cum manu et in manu. Et ita etiam quod est continue in pede quiescit cum pede, manet enim continue in eodem loco, scilicet in loco pedis; ergo intellectus tuus,

23 eius ] materiae AT 26–27 existens ] om. AE 27 divisibili ] om. AET uni ] alicui AE 30–31 autem . . . eius ] primum AE 32 ad hoc ] adhuc V contradictionem ] om.(!) TV 37 tuus ] totus AE 41 tuus ] om. AE

28 36

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what is everlasting is not multiplied with the multiplication of corruptible things. But what is unique and undivided does not inhere in many things that are separate and spatially distinct, like human bodies; therefore etc. 5. Again, the intellect is held to be indivisible, even according to the faith, because it is not extended with the extension of matter, since it is not brought forth from the potency of matter. But something indivisible in this way would not inhere in a divisible subject such as the human body; therefore etc. 6. And this argument350 can be spelled out as follows. If an indivisible intellect inheres in a divisible body, it must either inhere in each part of its body, or else in some part and not another. If it is said that it inheres in one part and not in another, this will seem wholly made up since no reason could be given why it is in this part and quantity rather than another. But if it is said that the intellect inheres in the entire composite, namely in each part of it, then it will do so as a whole, since it is not divisible. And many difficulties seem to follow from this. 7. The first difficulty is that the same thing would, as a whole, be moved and at rest at the same time; and since resting is not being moved, it would therefore be moved and not moved at the same time, which implies a contradiction. The consequence is clear: suppose your foot is at rest and your hand is moved. Then the same thing which as a whole is in your hand is moved by the motion of your hand — otherwise, it would not exist continuously with your hand and in your hand. And so as well, what exists continuously with your foot is

350

Buridan is here referring to the previous argument, only sketched out in the previous paragraph. The argument is this: An indivisible thing (not extended with the extension of the body) cannot inhere in the body, but the intellect is indivisible; therefore, the intellect does not inhere in the body. This argument is reinforced by the following considerations. If the intellect, being indivisible, inheres in the divisible body, we have two alternatives: (1) it is in one part only or (2) it is in each part of the body. However, (1) is absurd, since it cannot be determined in which part it is (indeed, if it is in one part only, then the other parts are not living human parts of a whole living human body — see QQ. De an. II.7, par. 7), and (2) is leading to the five difficulties spelled out in the five arguments in pars. 7–11 below, to be answered by pars. 23–27.

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idem indivisibilis existens, moveretur simul et quiesceret quia moveretur in manu et quiesceret in pede. Sed etiam inconveniens augetur, quia sequeretur quod idem secundum se totum moveretur simul contrariis motibus, si unam manum tuam moveas ad dextram, et aliam ad sinistram, vel unam superius et aliam inferius. 8. Secundum inconveniens est quia sequeretur quod idem distaret a se, quod est impossibile. Consequentia tenet, quia manus distat a pede, ideo etiam quod secundum se totum est in manu distat ab eo quod est in pede secundum se totum. 9. Tertio sequeretur quod pes tuus intelligeret, quia sibi inesset intellectus secundum se totum et per consequens etiam intellectio sibi inesset. 10. Etiam quarto sequeretur quod pes tuus esset homo, quia — cum forma substantialis det esse hoc aliquid in actu — oportet esse compositum ex corpore et totali forma substantiali humana esse actu hominem. Et huiusmodi esset pes tuus, cum intellectus sit forma substantialis totalis hominis. 11. Quinto sequeretur quod forma substantialis transiret de subiecto in subiectum, quod videtur inconveniens. Consequentia patet quia per mutationem, aliquae partes corporis defluunt et aliquae adveniunt. Ideo idem intellectus qui prius erat in partibus defluentibus esset posterius in advenientibus. 12. Haec tamen Commentatoris opinio est falsa. 13. Unde ego pono conclusionem oppositam, scilicet quod intellectus tuus quo tu intelligis inhaeret corpori tuo sive materiae tuae. Et primo enim haec conclusio firmiter tenenda est ex fide catholica. Secundo etiam dicta conclusio tenenda esset rationibus naturalibus, fide catholica circumscripta, ita quod philosophus paganus teneret eam.

44 quia sequeretur ] om. ETV 45 dextram ] partem add. T 51 sibi ] si V 52 intellectio ] intellectus vel intellectio A intellectus E 55 det ] dat E esset T debet V 61 corporis ] om. T 64 Commentatoris ] om. AE 65 Unde ] Ut V 69 philosophus ] om. E

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at rest with your foot, for it remains continuously in the same place, namely, where your foot is. Therefore, your intellect, the very same indivisibly existing thing, would be moved and at rest at the same time, because it would be moved in your hand and at rest in your foot. But it gets worse, because it would follow that the same thing would be moved in its entirety by contrary motions simultaneously if you were to move your one hand to the right and your other to the left, or your one hand up and the other down.351 8. A second problem is that it would follow that the same thing would be spatially distinct from itself, which is impossible. The consequence holds, since the hand is spatially distinct from the foot. And so as well, what is in the hand as a whole would be spatially distinct from what is in the foot as a whole. 9. Third, it would follow that your foot would think because the intellect is present in it as a whole, and consequently, so would the act of thinking be present in it as a whole. 10. Fourth, it would also follow that your foot would be a human being, because — since the substantial form should make something actually be a this something — it must be the case that what is composed of a body and an entire human substantial form is actually a human being. Your foot would be this kind of thing, since the intellect is the substantial form of the entire human being. 11. Fifth, it would follow that a substantial form would travel from subject to subject, which seems absurd. The consequence is clear, because through the process of change, some parts of the body leave and others arrive, and so the same intellect that was previously in the parts which have left would later be in those which are arriving. 12. Nevertheless, the Commentator’s opinion is false. 13. Accordingly, I propose the opposite conclusion, namely that your intellect, by which you understand, inheres in your body or your matter. In the first place, this conclusion must be firmly held on the basis of the catholic faith. Second, it should also be held by natural arguments, leaving the catholic faith aside, as a pagan philosopher

351 Again,

this point is discussed in QQ. De an. II.7, par. 4 above.

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Probo quia ego puto quod philosophus paganus teneret opinionem Alexandri, de qua dicetur postea. 14. Sunt autem rationes naturales quod inhaeret corpori humano. 15. Prima est quia aliter illa non esset de essentia hominis, vel homo non esset unum aliquid per se, et utrumque videtur inconveniens. Unde satis in praecedenti quaestione argutum fuit quod intellectus debet esse de substantia hominis intrinsece. 16. Secunda ratio est quia vel poneretur quod esset unicus intellectus omnium hominum, vel quod essent plures secundum pluralitatem hominum. Sed utrumque apparet inconveniens. Primum inconveniens est quod ponatur unicus, sicut post videbitur. Sed etiam declaro quod non debeat poni alius tibi et alius mihi, si non esset inhaerens; quia ponamus quod A sit tuus et B meus. Tunc oportet quod sint eiusdem rationis, et quod non sint mobiles ad motum tui vel mei, cum non inhaerent nobis. Ideo intellectus A non esset tibi proximior vel magis approximatus quam intellectus B esset mihi, nec e converso, scilicet antequam uterque nostrum intelligeret. Ideo ratio naturalis non dictaret quod A esset magis tuus quam meus. 17. Tertia est propinqua praecedenti, scilicet quod intellectus Socratis vel movetur de loco ad locum cum Socrate, vel non. Si dicas quod sic, hoc non videtur naturaliter dictum, cum non inhaereat sibi, non enim posset dari modus per quem hoc fieret, utrum tactu vel pulsu, non enim posset dici qualis esset alligatio intellectus ad corpus Socratis, propter quam moveretur cum corpore Socratis. Hoc non posset dici specialiter antequam Socrates aliquid cognosceret. Si vero

71 dicetur postea ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.6. 75 in praecedenti quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3, pars. 9–13 80 post videbitur ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.5. 70 Probo ] Probatio A Primo V || philosophus ] om. AE 72 quod inhaeret ] om. T 73 Prima est quia aliter illa ] quia si non ipse A quia E || aliter ] om. T 74 inconveniens ] falsum T 76 intrinsece ] integritate eius A integritate E 79 inconveniens ] nisi sit inhaerens add. T 84 A ] humanus V || proximior ] aut etiam mihi add. A 86 intelligeret ] moveret E 92 pulsu ] et melius visu et sic etiam add. A

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would hold it. My proof is that I think a pagan philosopher would hold the opinion of Alexander, about which something will be said later. 14. In any case, there are natural arguments that the intellect inheres in the human body. 15. The first is that otherwise, it would not belong to the essence of a human being, or a human being would not be something one per se. Both seem absurd. Hence, it was sufficiently argued in the preceding question that the intellect must belong to the substance of a human being intrinsically.352 16. The second argument is that one would hold either that there is a unique intellect for all humans, or that there are many, in keeping with the number of human beings. But both seem absurd. The first absurdity is that the intellect is assumed to be unique, as will be addressed later. But I also state that if it is not inherent, it must not be held that there is one for you and another for me, because let us suppose that A is your intellect and B is mine; then they must have the same nature and not be moveable relative to your movement or mine, because they do not inhere in us. Thus, intellect A would not be closer or more proximate to you than intellect B is to me, nor conversely, namely, before either of us understood. Therefore, natural reason would not dictate that A is your intellect any more than mine. 17. The third argument is close to the previous one, namely that Socrates’ intellect is either moved from place to place with Socrates, or not. If you say that it is, this does not seem to be something that would be said from a natural point of view, since it does not inhere in him. For no means could be given by which this would happen, whether by being attached or being pushed, for it could not be said what sort of connection the intellect has to Socrates’ body on the basis

352 Note that Buridan does not so much argue for this in QQ. De an. III.3, pars.

9–13 above as simply remark that the three views he identifies on the metaphysical status of the human intellect — namely those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, and the catholic faith — all agree that it is the substantial form of the human body. But Buridan is not quite correct where Averroes is concerned: see QQ. De an. III.3, par. 13, n. 23 above.

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dicas quod non moveretur de loco ad locum cum Socrate, tunc distaret Socrates ab intellectu suo, ideo non posset intelligere per ipsum, nisi tu diceres quod ille intellectus esset ubique per indistantiam, sicut diceremus de Deo. Et tunc non esset ponendus nisi unus, quia ita esset mihi propinquus sicut tibi, et specialiter antequam uterque nostrum cognosceret. Ideo possem ita intelligere sicut tu, et ita esset fictitium ponere alium mihi et alium tibi. Unde ob hoc credidit Commentator quod esset unicus, quod postea improbabitur. 18. Quarta ratio est quia humana ratio circumscripta fide, autem etiam fide, non dictaret quod intellectus tuus esset antequam tu esses, nisi poneretur perpetuus et unicus, sicut voluit Commentator. Si autem esset factus de novo, aut hoc esset per modum creationis, quod ratio naturalis circumscripta fide non dictaret, aut hoc esset per modum generationis naturalis, et tunc esset eductus de potentia materiae et inhaerens. Omnes enim debent illi conclusioni assentire, quamdiu vivunt in hoc saeculo, sive fideles sive alii. Unde notandum, ut mihi videtur, quod circumscripta fide et supernaturali actione, ratio naturalis dictaret in omni forma haec sex consequi vel earum opposita, scilicet inhaerere materiae, esse eductum de potentia materiae, esse extensum extensione materiae, esse multiplicatum et non unicum in divisis corporibus separatis et distantibus, esse genitum, et esse corruptibilem; ergo Alexander haec omnia de intellectu posuit, et Averroes haec omnia simul negavit. Nos autem fide ponimus haec omnia non necessario se consequi, sed ponimus inhaerentiam et multiplica-

101 credidit Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 380.44–45): “. . . cum intellectus sit communis omnibus, cognitio autem non.” Auc. Ar. 6.201 (ed. Hamesse, 191): “. . . intellectus est omnibus communis, cognitio autem non.” Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 401.424–25): “. . . intellectus materialis est unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum.” 102 postea improbabitur ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.5. 95 de loco ad locum ] om. T 104 esses ] om. A 106 factus ] formatus T perfectus V 110 saeculo ] sive in mundo add. V 111–112 ratio naturalis ] om. T 112 omni ] om. V || sex ] om. V || vel earum opposita ] om. AE 117 fide ] om. AE 118 et ] per T

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of which it is moved with Socrates’ body. This especially could not be said before Socrates cognizes something. But if you were to say that it is not moved from place to place with Socrates, then Socrates would be spatially distinct from his intellect, and so he could not understand through it, unless you say that this intellect is everywhere without an intermediary, as we would say of God. In that case, only one intellect would need to be posited, since it would be just as close to me as it is to you, especially before either one of us was cognizing. Thus, I could understand through it just as you would, and so it would be fictitious to posit one for me and another for you. That is why the Commentator believed it to be unique — a view that will later be disproved. 18. The fourth argument is that human reason, leaving the faith aside or even assuming it, does not dictate that your intellect exists before you do unless it is thought to be everlasting and unique, as the Commentator intended. But if it was made in time, this would be either by creation, which natural reason would not dictate, leaving faith aside, or by natural generation, in which case it would be brought forth from the potency of matter and inherent. For everyone should assent to this conclusion as long as we live in this world, and whether they are believers or not.353 For this reason, it should be noted, or so it seems to me, that, leaving the faith and supernatural action aside, natural reason would dictate that these six features, or their opposites, mutually imply each other concerning every form: namely, inhering in matter, being brought forth from the potency of matter, being materially extended, being many rather than unique in several separate and spatially distinct bodies, being generated, and being corruptible.354 Alexander held all of these in connection with the intellect, and Aver-

353 The

phrase ‘quamdiu homo vivit in hoc saeculo’ is a formulaic reference to our wayfarer existence in this life, as creatures with corruptible bodies that will perish on our way to the afterlife. Cf. AUGUSTINE, Sermon 159A, sect. 4 (ed. Dolbeau, 94): “Sed restat carnis infirmitas, quam unusquisque nostrorum, quamdiu in hoc saeculo vivit, a se non potest alienare [But there remains bodily infirmity, which unavoidably afflicts each one of us, as long as he lives in this world].” 354 The mutual implication here is not a strict logical equivalence, but rather a kind of natural implication between these six characteristics, or an implication that holds assuming the common course of nature without any special intervention by God. Such natural implications may of course be invalidated by divine power.

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tionem, et negamus eductionem de potentia materiae et extensionem. Et ponimus eum factum modo supernaturali, scilicet per modum creationis non per modum naturalis generationis, nec ipsum esse proprie corruptibile, scilicet modo naturali, sed annihilabilem et tamen numquam annihilabitur. 19. Ad rationes autem Commentatoris aliter responderet fides, et aliter Alexander. 20. Ad primam fides negaret maiorem et Alexander minorem. 21. De secunda ratione tam fides quam Alexander negaret quod esset unicus intellectus omnium hominum, et de hoc dicetur post. 22. Ad tertiam rationem, Alexander negaret quod intellectus sit indivisibilis. Ideo inconvenientia quae adducuntur contraponentes eum esse indivisibilem non essent contra ipsum. Sed fides concedit eum esse indivisibilem. 23. Ideo ad primam instantiam, respondetur quod intellectus non simul movetur et quiescit quia sequeretur contradictio, ut prius arguebatur. Sed conceditur quod simul movetur in manu et quiescit in pede, et hoc non est contradictio. Unde non sequitur, quiescit in pede; igitur quiescit, quia etiam non sequitur, non movetur in pede; igitur non movetur. Sed quando dicitur quod moveretur contrariis motibus, potest dici sicut de corpore Christi scilicet in hostia consecrata cum unus presbyter fert corpus Christi ad dextram et alter ad sinistram. Non enim movetur corpus Christi per se, nec motu sibi inhaerente movetur, sicut nec magnitudo hostiae sibi inhaeret. Ita ergo intellectus non movetur per se nec motu sibi inhaerente. Sic autem aliquid denominari moveri

128 dicetur post ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.5. 119 de potentia materiae ] om. AET 120 modo supernaturali ] scilicet supernaturaliter AE 122 scilicet modo naturali ] sed supernaturaliter(!) A 130 quae adducuntur ] om. V 133 instantiam ] om. AE 135 in pede ] ideo simul movetur in manu et non movetur in pede add. AET 136–137 quiescit . . . quiescit ] non quiescit in pede ergo non quiescit T 137 etiam ] similiter T 139 consecrata ] sancta AE sacrata om. T || unus ] aliquando A om. E 139–140 presbyter fert corpus Christi ] om. T 140 alter ] aliquando A alius E 141 per se ] om. V 141–143 sicut . . . inhaerente ] movetur contrariis motibus V 143 moveri ] movens AET

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roes denied all of them. However we maintain on faith that they do not necessarily follow on one another, but we assume the inherence and multiplication and deny the derivation from material potency and the extension. We also hold that the intellect was made in a supernatural way, that is to say, by creation and not by natural generation. Nor is it corruptible strictly speaking, that is to say, by natural means, though it is capable of being annihilated, and yet it will never be annihilated. 19. To the Commentator’s arguments, however, the faith would respond in one way, and Alexander in another. 20. To the first,355 the faith would deny the major and Alexander the minor. 21. As for the second argument,356 the faith and Alexander would both deny that there is a unique intellect belonging to all human beings, and this will be discussed later. 22. To the third argument,357 Alexander would deny that the intellect is indivisible, and so the difficulties raised against its being indivisible would not affect his position. But the faith grants that it is indivisible. 23. And so to the first objection,358 it is replied that the intellect is not moved and at rest at the same time because a contradiction would follow, as was argued above. But it is granted that the intellect is simultaneously moved in the hand and is at rest in the foot, and this is not a contradiction. That is because ‘it is at rest in the foot; therefore, it is at rest’ does not follow, since ‘it is not moved in the foot; therefore, it is not moved’ also does not follow. But when it is said that it is moved by contrary motions, we can speak just as we speak of the body of Christ, namely, in the consecrated host, when one priest carries the body of Christ to the right and another to the left. For the body of Christ is not moved per se, nor is the body of Christ moved

355 See

par. 3 above. par. 4 above. 357 See par. 5 above. 358 See par. 7 above. 356 See

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contrariis motibus non est inconveniens, quia non sequitur inde contraria simul inesse eodem. Sicut enim non est inconveniens aliquid esse in diversis locis et distantibus, ut dicetur in solutione sequentis rationis, sic nec est inconveniens idem simul moveri ad illa loca, cum nec illi motus sibi inhaereant, nec commensurabiliter se habent ad ipsam. 24. Ad secundam instantiam dicitur quod non distat a se, quia non est in pede et in manu commensurative, cum non sit extensus extensione manus vel pedis. Et non est inconveniens idem esse non commensurative in diversis locis ab invicem distantibus etiam secundum se totum, licet hoc sit modo supernaturali, ut corpus Christi simul est in paradiso et super altar. Non enim corpus Christi in hostia super altar commensuratus est magnitudine hostiae, sed est totum in qualibet parte hostiae: licet distarent ab invicem, et non ob hoc distaret a se. Et similiter quodammodo intellectus est in manu et in pede, et in neutro commensurative, cum non sit extensus in aliquo membrorum illorum. 25. Ad tertiam instantiam, non reputaretur inconveniens quod pes tuus intelligeret sicut partiale intelligens, non sicut totale. Sed tu diceres, quid vocas partiale intelligens? Dico quod vocatur partiale intelligens quod est pars alterius intelligentis, et totale intelligens quod

144 non ] om.(!) T 145 inesse ] in V 146 locis ] localibus V 147 rationis ] quaestionis A || loca ] omnia add. A 148–149 ipsam ] invicem A 158 quodammodo intellectus ] quod V sup. lin. W 160–161 pes tuus ] eum T 161 non sicut totale ] om. A 161–162 Sed . . . quod ] om. AET 162 vocas ] om. V

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by a motion inhering in it, just as the magnitude of the host does not inhere in it. And so in the same way, the intellect is moved neither per se nor by a motion inhering in it. But that something would thus be described as being moved in contrary directions is not a problem because it would not follow from this that contraries are in the same thing at the same time. For just as it is not a problem for something to be in different places or in things that are spatially distinct, as will be discussed in the solution to the next argument, so it is also not a problem for the same thing to be moved to those places simultaneously, since these motions do not inhere in it, nor are they commensurably related to it. 24. To the second objection,359 it is said that the intellect is not spatially distinct from itself because it is not in the foot or hand commensurably, since it is not extended by the extension of the hand or the foot. And it is not a problem for the same thing to be noncommensurably in different places spatially distinct from each other even as a whole, although this would be in a supernatural way, as the body of Christ is simultaneously in paradise and on the altar. For the body of Christ in the host on the altar is not commensurate with the magnitude of the host, but wholly in each part of the host. And although the parts are spatially distinct from each other, the body of Christ is not on that account spatially distinct from itself. Thus, in the same way, the intellect is in some fashion in the hand and the foot, and in neither commensurably, since it is not extended in any of those members. 25. To the third objection,360 it would not be considered a problem that your foot thinks as a partial rather than as a whole thinker. But, you ask, what do you call a partial thinker? I say that a ‘partial thinker’ is that which is part of another thinker, and a ‘whole thinker’ is that

359 See 360 See

par. 8 above. par. 9 above.

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cum intelligit, non sit pars alterius intelligentis. Unde nec intellectus nec aliqua pars hominis est totale intelligens, sed ipse homo. 26. Ad quartam instantiam, diceretur quod nihil secundum famosam et communem locutionem dicitur homo vel animal nisi substantia totalis, scilicet sic quod non sit pars alterius substantiae. Nec aliqua substantia dicitur proprie hoc aliquid, sive per formam substantialem sive aliter, et maxime in organicis, nisi sit substantia totalis. Et hoc est alibi considerandum magis. 27. Ad ultimam, diceretur quod non est naturalis sed supernaturalis modus quo intellectus inhaeret corpori humano. Et certum est quod Deus supernaturaliter posset non solum formare non eductam de potentia materiae, immo etiam eductam separare a sua materia, et separatim conservare, et ponere in materiam aliam. Quare ergo hoc non esset possibile de intellectu humano?

171 alibi ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. VIII.3 1043a29–30; B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.7. 165 aliqua pars ] intellectus V 170 nisi sit substantia totalis ] om. TV

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which thinks when it is not part of another thinker. For this reason, neither the intellect nor any part of a human being is a whole thinker, but only the human being itself. 26. To the fourth objection,361 it would be said that nothing is said to be a human or an animal in familiar and ordinary discourse except the whole substance, namely what is not a part of another substance. Nor is any substance strictly speaking said to be a this something, whether on the basis of a substantial form or in another way, except for the whole substance — especially where organic things are concerned. And this should be considered in more detail elsewhere.362 27. To the final objection,363 it would be said that the way in which the intellect inheres in the human body is not natural but supernatural. And it is certain that supernaturally, God could form not only something that is not brought forth from a material potency, but also separate what has been brought forth from its matter, conserve it separately, and put it in another matter. Why, then, would this not be possible as regards the human intellect?

361 See

par. 10 above. QQ. De an. II.7 above. 363 See par. 11 above. 362 See

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Utrum sit unicus intellectus quo omnes homines intelligentes intelligant.

5

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1. Arguitur quod sic per rationes Commentatoris, quarum prima est quia secundum Aristotelem intellectus est perpetuus, et nullum tale multiplicatur ad multiplicationem corruptibilium. 2. Secunda ratio est quia causa multiplicationis individuorum sub una specie non est nisi propter generationem successivam individuorum ut perpetuetur natura sub identitate specifica, cum propter corruptionem non possit salvari sub identitate materiali. Hoc notat Aristoteles secundo huius. Cum ergo intellectus non sit corruptibilis non debet esse multitudo intellectuum in eadem specie. 3. Item in suppositis eiusdem speciei non est multitudo nisi propter divisionem quantitativam, prout tangitur primo Caeli et septimo Metaphysicae. Si igitur intellectus esset immaterialis et inextensus, sequitur quod non sit multitudo intellectuum humanorum. 4. Item si esset multiplicatus materialiter et individuatus, tunc non posset recipere nisi signate et singulariter; ideo non posset apprehendere universaliter sicut nec sensus — quod est falsum. 3 rationes Commentatoris ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 404– 405.514–515): “. . . impossibile est ut intellectum copuletur cum unoquoque hominum et numeretur per numerationem eorum.” Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 23–25. 10 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.4 415b3–7 13–14 primo Caeli et septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, De caelo I.9; A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.13–15; Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 403–404.473– 512). 1 Utrum ] Demum quinto maiorem in determinationem praedictorum quaeritur utrum VW 1–2 intelligentes ] om. T 7–8 individuorum ] om. ET 8 ut ] om. AET || natura ] autem materia A autem natura E naturale W || identitate ] habitudine T 9 materiali ] immateriali TW 13 quantitativam ] materiae add. AE || septimo ] nono V 14 immaterialis ] ennumerabilis T 16 et individuatus ] et individualiter AET || non ] rep. V 17 signate et ] om. AET

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 36

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Is there a unique intellect by which all humans understand when they are thinking?

1. It is argued that there is by the Commentator’s arguments, of which the first is that according to Aristotle, the intellect is everlasting, and no such thing is multiplied according to the number of corruptible things. 2. The second argument is that there is no reason for the multiplication of individuals in a single species except for the sake of the successive generation of individuals. This is so that the nature is perpetuated under a specific identity, since, due to corruption, it could not be preserved under a material identity. Aristotle notes this in De Anima II; therefore, since the intellect is not corruptible, there must not be a multitude of intellects in the same species. 3. Again, among concrete individuals of the same species there is no multitude except by quantitative division, as is touched on in On the Heavens I and Metaphysics VII; therefore, if the intellect is immaterial and unextended, it follows that there is no multitude of human intellects. 4. Again, if it were multiplied materially and individuated, it could only receive something individually and singularly, and so it could not apprehend universally, just as the senses cannot — which is false.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 36

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5. Item sequitur quod, si esset multiplicatus materialiter et individuatus, in infinitum posset abstrahi conceptus universalis a conceptibus singularibus, vel saltem a conceptibus pluribus eiusdem rationis, quod videtur inconveniens. Iam enim non esset status in praedicatis, quod est contra Aristotelem primo Posteriorum. Consequentia principalis patet quia conceptus Socratis in intellectu tuo et conceptus Socratis in meo essent eiusdem rationis et diversi in numero. Si autem ab eis abstrahas universalem conceptum, ita ego potero facere et essent in me et in te illi conceptus universales eiusdem rationis et diversi in numero, propter quod tu poteris ab eis abstrahere alterum conceptum communem eis, et ita etiam ego. Et sic procedetur in infinitum. 6. Item nihil debet poni frustra in natura, et tamen frustra esset multitudo quia totum posset salvari per unicum illo modo quo imaginatur Commentator, scilicet quod natura intellectualis existens sine extensione et magnitudine non determinat sibi locum vel situm, ideo potest adesse potentialiter et indistanter multis loco et situ separatis et distantibus, et potest operari in eis vel cum eis. Sicut enim dicimus intelligentiam esse praesentem cuilibet parti orbis quam movet, et Deum cuilibet parti mundi, similiter ergo intellectus humanus, talis intelligentia, potest appropriatus in omne corpus tale quale est humanum, ubicumque fuerit, operando in ipsum et cum eo. Et cum illo, omnis homo praedispositus sufficienter potuerit per illum intelligere et operari secundum exigentiam dispositionis in eo praexistentis, cum talis natura intellectualis non sit fatigabilis nec passibilis, nisi passione dispositiva ipsius ad agendum vel regendum hominem.

23 primo Posteriorum ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.20 82a 21 (Ar. lat. IV.4 305.38): “Quod quidem igitur non contingit intermedia infinita esse, si in sursum et deorsum stent praedicamenta, manifestum est.” 32 Commentator ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 404–405.513–520). 19 si ] sup. lin. W 19–20 materialiter et individuatus ] om. AET quod add. VW 21 saltem ] om. VW 22 praedicatis ] praedicamentis A 23–24 principalis ] om. A prima ET 24–25 conceptus Socratis ] om. A 25 essent ] idem essent A || diversi ] essent idem(!) A 28 alterum ] aliam AW 31 quo ] haec V 33 ideo ] item AE 36 intelligentiam ] apparentem sine add. A 39 fuerit ] appropriatus add. V 42 intellectualis ] intellectus V || fatigabilis ] factibilis(!) A vegetabilis(!) VW || nisi ] nec E

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5. Again, it follows that if it were multiplied materially and individuated, a universal concept could be abstracted to infinity from singular concepts, or at least from several concepts of the same kind, which seems problematic. For then there would be no stopping point in predicates, which is contrary to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I. The main consequence is clear, because the concept of Socrates in your intellect and the concept of Socrates in my intellect would be of the same kind and numerically diverse. But if you were to abstract a universal concept from it, I will be able to do likewise, and then there would be, in me and in you, universal concepts of the same kind and numerically distinct, on the basis of which you would be able to abstract from them another concept common to them, as could I. And so it would continue to infinity. 6. Again, nothing in nature should be posited in vain, and yet a multitude would be in vain because then everything could be explained by just one, in the way the Commentator imagines: an intellectual nature, which exists without extension and magnitude, does not determine a location or position for itself, and so it can be present virtually and immediately to many things separated and distinct from one another in location and position, and can act on them or with them. For just as we say that an intelligence is present to each part of the celestial sphere it moves, and God is present to each part of the world, so in the same way the human intellect — this particular type of intelligence — can be fitted to any kind of human body, wherever it would be, operating on it and with it. And with that intellect, every sufficiently predisposed human has been able to understand through it and act within the parameters of the disposition pre-existing in that human, since an intellectual nature of this sort is not able to be fatigued

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7. Oppositum arguitur per rationes quas Commentator arguit contra se, quia cum intellectus humanus sit forma substantialis hominis, dans homini esse, sequitur quod essem per esse tui et tu per esse mei, unde sequeretur quod ego essem si tu esses. Immo ego essem idem formaliter quod tu, quod est absurdum. 8. Item ego intelligerem quidquid tu, et e converso, quia omnis intellectio quae esset in intellectu tuo esset in meo. Ideo quaecumque assisteret tibi assisteret mihi. 9. Commentator propter praedictas rationes tenet quod unicus est intellectus quo omnis homo intelligit vel intelligere potest. Et solvit rationes contra eum. 10. Et dicit in te esse animam sensitivam eductam de potentia materiae alterius tamen speciei ab anima equi vel asini et multo nobiliorem, per quam tu es actu homo et animal, et alius homo quam ego, sicut quaelibet pars orbis caelestis est actu illud quod est intrinsece non per intelligentiam, sed per aliam substantiam in qua et cum qua intelligentia nata est operari. Ideo nec una pars orbis est per esse alterius, nec idem quod altera. 11. Nec sequitur quod ego intelligerem quidquid tu intelligeres, quia dicit Commentator quod ego nihil intelligo nisi per hoc quod ille intellectus copulatur mihi seu animae meae sensitivae in recipiendo 44–45 rationes quas Commentator arguit contra se ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 392.166–169): “. . . tu esses per esse mei, et ego per esse tui, et universaliter homo esset ens antequam esset, et sic homo non esset generabilis et corruptibilis in eo quod homo, sed, si fuerit, erit in eo quod animal.” 52 Commentator propter praedictas rationes tenet ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5, (ed. Crawford, 404–405.514–515): “. . . impossibile est ut intellectum copuletur cum unoquoque hominum et numeretur per numerationem eorum.” 55 dicit ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 401–404.424–500). 63 dicit Commentator ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 404.503–506): “Et est etiam manifestum quod materia et forma copulantur ad invicem ita quod congregatum ex eis sit unicum, et maxime intellectus materialis et intentio intellectus in actu.” 46–47 essem . . . unde sequitur quod ] om. V sup. lin. W 47 essem ] fortiter add. A 50 quaecumque ] quicumque VW 51 assisteret . . . assisteret ] existeret . . . existeret T 52 rationes ] tamen oppositum add. E 57 alius ] alterius V 58 caelestis est actu ] est E || intrinsece ] om. T 59 substantiam ] formam T || in qua ] tamen add. A in quantum tamen E per quam tamen T in quantum W || qua ] substantia add. A 62 intelligeres ] om. V 64 copulatur ] applicatur T

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or affected except by an affection disposing it to act on or govern a human being. 7. The opposite is argued by the arguments the Commentator makes against himself: because the human intellect is the substantial form of a human being, giving being to a human, it follows that I would be through your being and you would be through my being, from which it follows that I would exist if you exist; indeed, I would be formally the same as you, which is absurd. 8. Again, I would understand whatever you do, and conversely, since every act of thought that is in your intellect would also be in mine. Thus, whatever occurs to you would occur to me. 9. On account of the aforementioned arguments, the Commentator holds that the intellect by which every human being understands or can understand is one. And he resolves the arguments against himself.364 10. He says that in you there exists a sensitive soul brought forth from the potency of matter, which nevertheless belongs to a different species than the soul of a horse or a donkey and which is much nobler than these. Through this sensitive soul, you are actually human and animal, and a different human than I, just as each part of the celestial sphere is actually what it is intrinsically, not by virtue of an intelligence, but by another substance in which and with which that intelligence is naturally suited to operate. Therefore, no one part of the sphere exists by virtue of the existence of another, nor is it the same as another. 11. Nor does it follow that I would understand whatever you do, because the Commentator says that I understand nothing except through the fact that the intellect is joined to me or to my sensitive soul in

364 What

follows in pars. 10–11 are Averroes’ responses to the objections he has just raised against his own position in pars. 7–8 above.

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ab ea seu ab actu eius cognitivo vel cogitativo speciem intelligibilem. Et forte probabilius esset dicere quod ego nihil intelligo nisi per hoc quod iste intellectus copulatur mihi in agendo in anima mea sensitiva actum intelligendi, cum fuerit ad istum recipiendi dispositiva per actum phantasiandi sive cogitandi. Sic enim reverteretur opinio Alexandri cum ista, quae postea ponat Deum intellectum agentem. 12. Sed tamen teneamus contra Commentatorem hanc conclusionem quod alius est in me intellectus humanus et alius in te, primo quia fides catholica hanc tenet; secundo etiam quia ratio naturalis dictaret tibi, circumscripta fide. 13. Primo quia puto quod circumscripta fide catholica et supernaturali infusione notitiae veritatis in nobis, ratio naturalis nostra dictaret quod intellectus humanus esset eductus de potentia materiae et generabilis et corruptibilis, ex quo deberet concludi multitudo. 14. Secundo idem inferetur per rationem praedicto modo naturalem, ex eo quod probatum fuit quod inhaeret corpori humano. 15. Tertio quia si esset unicus, sequeretur quod opiniones contradictae essent simul in eodem subiecto indivisibili, quod Aristoteles reputat impossibile quarto Metaphysicae, eo quod ipsae sunt invicem contrariae. Patet consequentia, quia opinio mea et opinio tua, quae forte sunt contradictoriarum propositionum, essent in eodem intellectu subiective indivisibili existente. 16. Quarto quia idem intellectus esset simul felix et miser, cum felicitas consistat in operatione intellectus secundum veram speculationem in divinis, et miseria etiam in operatione intellectus secundum

69–70 opinio Alexandri ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.20 (ed. Crawford, 444.13–35). 80 probatum . . . humano ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.4, par. 5–6. 83 quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.6 1011b15–23 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 88.583): “Quoniam autem impossibile est contradictionem esse simul veram de eodem, palam quia nec contraria simul inesse eidem contingit.” 67 mihi ] om. VW 69 actum ] accidentia A || cogitandi ] cognoscendi AET 70 cum . . . agentem ] et ea quae in principio fuit posita T || postea ] om. AE 71 teneamus ] omnino add. AET 74 tibi ] hoc A om. E || fide ] quod potest declarari multipliciter add. AE 75 primo . . . fide ] hom. V 78 et corruptibilis ] om. T 82 indivisibili ] subiective VW 84 contrariae ] contradictoriae V 85 in ] sub V

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receiving an intelligible species from the sensitive soul or from its cognitive or cogitative act. Perhaps it would be more plausible to say that I understand nothing except through the fact that this intellect is joined to me in causing an act of understanding in my sensitive soul, when the sensitive soul has been disposed to receive it by the act of imagining or cognitive activity. For this would return us to the opinion of Alexander, which in addition posits God as agent intellect. 12. But even so, against the Commentator we hold the conclusion that the human intellect is one thing in me and another in you, first because this is what the catholic faith holds, and second because this is what natural reason would dictate to you, leaving the faith aside. 13. In the first place, I think that, leaving aside the catholic faith and the supernatural infusion of true knowledge in us, our natural reason would dictate that the human intellect is brought forth from the potency of matter and that it is generable and corruptible, from which one must conclude a multitude. 14. Second, the same is inferred by natural reason in the sense just mentioned, since it has been proved that it inheres in the human body. 15. Third, this follows because if it were unique, it would follow that contradictory beliefs would be in the same indivisible subject at the same time, which Aristotle takes to be impossible in Metaphysics IV, because they are contraries. The consequence is clear, since your opinion and my opinion, which might concern contradictory propositions, would be in the same indivisible intellect, being in it as in their subject. 16. Fourth, because the same intellect would be happy and unhappy at the same time, since happiness consists in the activity of the intellect in the true contemplation of divine things, and unhappiness in the

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erroneam credulitatem de ipsis, et sic unus homo errat alio existente felice. 17. Quinto, sicut bene arguebat Commentator contra se, quia sequeretur quod ego intelligerem quidquid tu intelligeres. Non enim valet responsio sua de copulatione, quia si dicatur quod ego intelligo ex eo quod intellectus recipit a me speciem intelligibilem, ita oportet dicere quod color videret ex eo quod visus recipit ab eo speciem visibilem. 18. Sed tamen videtur mihi quod ista secunda conclusio potest poni, scilicet quod si fide circumscripta aliquis procederet ratione pure naturali sine supernaturali infusione, illa ratio dictaret istas conditionales esse concedendas: si intellectus est perpetuus, ipse est unicus omnium hominum, et si non est eductus de potentia materiae, ipse est unicus. Sed fides ex speciali et supernaturali infusione negat istas conditionales, ponendo quod est multiplicatus, cum tamen sit perpetuus a parte post, et non sit eductus de potentia materiae. 19. Solvendae igitur sunt rationes Commentatoris, quarum de prima Alexander negaret quod intellectus humanus esset perpetuus, et fides etiam diceret quod non esset perpetuus a parte ante, sed creatus apud hominis generationem. 20. De secunda ratione dicitur quod Deus supernaturaliter potest creare sine aliqua materia aut etiam in materia multas formas vel substantias eiusdem rationis et speciei specialissimae. 21. Et ita etiam solvitur tertia ratio. 22. Ad quartam dictum fuit prius quod appetitus sensitivus, quantumcumque sit multiplicatus et extensus et individuatus, po-

114 dictum fuit prius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3, par. 30. 92 contra se ] om. T 94 sua ] illa V 100 infusione ] etc. add. AE 101 esse ] veras vel add. T 103 unicus ] rep. V || ex ] haec V || speciali et ] om. AT 103–105 negat . . . eductus ] etc. dicit quod isti sunt multiplicati et cum tamen sunt perpetui a parte post et non sunt educti AE 103 negat ] ad add. MSV 111–112 aut . . . substantias ] multiplicatas formas T 112 rationis et ] om. T

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intellect’s activity as well, in holding mistaken beliefs about the divine. And so one man goes wrong while the other continues to live happily. 17. Fifth, as the Commentator correctly argued against himself, it would follow that I would understand whatever you understand. His reply about joining does not work, because if we say that I understand because the intellect receives an intelligible species from me, then in the same way, we must say that color sees because sight receives a visible species from it. 18. But it seems to me that a second conclusion can be proposed, namely that if, leaving the faith aside, someone were to proceed by purely natural reason without a supernatural infusion, this purely natural reason would dictate that these conditionals should be granted: ‘if the intellect is everlasting, it is unique for all human beings’; and ‘if the intellect is not brought forth from the potency of matter, it is unique’. But using a special and supernatural infusion, the faith denies those conditionals, positing that the intellect is multiplied, although it is everlasting hereafter and not brought forth from the potency of matter. 19. Therefore, the Commentator’s arguments must be resolved. In connection with the first,365 Alexander would deny that the human intellect is everlasting, and the faith would add that it is not everlasting heretofore, but created in the generation of a human being. 20. As for the second argument,366 it is said that God can supernaturally create many forms or substances of the same kind and most specific species without any matter as well as in matter. 21. The third argument is also resolved in this way.367 22. To the fourth,368 it was said earlier that however much sensitive appetite is multiplied, individuated, and extended, it is able to desire 365 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above. 367 See par. 3 above. 368 See par. 4 above. 366 See

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125

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test appetere modo universali. Ideo diceretur quod hoc etiam non est impossibile de virtute cognoscitiva. 23. Ad quintam dicitur quod non proceditur in infinitum ascendendo ad conceptus communiores. Immo ego possum formare conceptum communem omni substantiae vel omni qualitati vel actioni, et non formabo conceptum amplius communiorem nisi dicamus quod potest esse conceptus communis omni enti. Ita ego possum formare conceptum communem omni conceptui a quo imponitur hoc nomen conceptus. Et ita concedo quod tu potes similem formare, et utrumque, scilicet meus et tuus, est communis omni conceptui, licet singulariter existat. Nec potest esse conceptus communior qui solum supponat pro conceptibus. 24. Ad ultimam dicitur quod Commentator non convenienter salvaret omnia apparentia ponendo unicum, prout apparet per rationes adductas contra eum. Ideo non concluditur quod frustra ponatur multitudo.

119 communiores ] et priores add. A 120 vel actioni ] om. A vel alicubi E 121 communiorem ] om. T 122 omni enti ] omni conceptui A om. E 125 singulariter ] vel similiter add. A 128 non convenienter ] sufficienter V 130–131 multitudo ] multiplicatio ET

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in a universal way. Accordingly, we would also say that this is not impossible for a cognitive power. 23. To the fifth,369 it is said that there is no infinite regress in ascending to more common concepts. On the contrary, I can form a concept common to every substance or to every quality or action, and I will not form a more common concept unless we say that there can be a concept common to every being. Thus, in the same way, I can form a concept common to every concept on the basis of which the name ‘concept’ is imposed. And so I grant that you are able to form a similar concept, and both of them — that is to say, mine and yours — are common to every concept, although they exist singularly. Nor can there be a more common concept that supposits only for concepts. 24. To the last,370 it is said that the Commentator did not adequately save every appearance by positing a unique intellect, as is apparent from the arguments adduced against him. Therefore, it is not concluded that a multitude would be posited in vain.

369 See 370 See

par. 5 above. par. 6 above.

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Utrum intellectus humanus sit perpetuus.

5

10

15

1. Arguitur quod non, quia sequitur quod homo esset perpetuus, quod est falsum, cum generatur et morietur. Consequentia patet, quia non videtur corrumpi substantia composita nisi per corruptionem formae suae substantialis, et intellectus est forma substantialis hominis. Igitur homo non corrumperetur nisi eius intellectus corrumperetur. Etiam hoc confirmatur maxime si non ponamus in homine nisi unam formam substantialem, scilicet animam intellectivam, tunc enim homo non esset compositus substantialiter nisi ex intellectu et materia prima, quae est perpetua. Ideo omnes partes hominis essent perpetuae; et partes hominis sunt iste homo; ergo homo esset perpetuus. Unde argueretur per syllogismum expositorium sic; quod intellectus hominis sit A et materia eius sit B. Tunc arguitur, hoc A et hoc B semper erunt; sed hoc A et hoc B sunt iste homo, cum partes sunt suum totum; ergo iste homo semper erit. 2. Item sequitur quod intellectus humani essent actu infiniti, quod est inconveniens. Consequentia patet quia secundum Aristotelem ponentem mundum aeternum, infiniti fuerint homines, quorum quilibet habuit proprium suum intellectum, cum dictum fuit prius quod animae

1 Utrum . . . perpetuus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 24 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.7): “Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est.” 17–18 Aristotelem ponentem ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.7; De caelo I.3; Met. III.4. 19 prius ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.5, par. 18. 1 Utrum . . . perpetuus ] Adhuc sexto de natura intellectus humani quaeritur utrum sit perpetuus VW 12 Unde ] Item VW || intellectus ] forma T huius add. AE 14–15 cum partes sunt suum totum ] om. AT 16 essent ] nunc add. A 19 proprium ] om. T © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 37

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Is the human intellect everlasting?

1. It is argued that it is not, because it follows that humans would be everlasting, which is false, since they are generated and will die. The consequence is clear because a composite substance is evidently not corrupted except through the corruption of its substantial form, and the intellect is the substantial form of a human being; therefore, a human would not be corrupted unless its intellect is corrupted. This is especially confirmed if we posit only one substantial form in a human being, namely, the intellective soul, for then a human being would be substantially composed of just intellect and prime matter, which is everlasting. Thus, all the parts of a human being would be everlasting, and the parts of a human are the human; therefore, that human would be everlasting. Thus, one might argue using an expository syllogism as follows: let the intellect of a human be A and its matter B; then it is argued that this A and this B will always be; but this A and this B are this human, since the parts are the whole; therefore, this human will always be. 2. Again, it follows that human intellects would now be actually infinite, which is absurd. The consequence is clear, because in keeping with Aristotle’s assumption that the world is eternal, there have been infinitely many human beings, each of which has had an intel-

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 37

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intellectivae multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem hominum; ergo infiniti fuerunt intellectus humani qui omnes adhuc sunt, ex quo ponuntur perpetui; ergo sunt actu nunc infiniti. 3. Item sequitur quod intellectus post mortem esset otiosus, quod est inconveniens, quia nihil debet poni otiosum in natura. Consequentia patet, quia esset sine operatione, cum “nihil intelligat sine phantasmate,” ut dicit Aristoteles, et post mortem non est phantasma cum requirat organum corporeum. 4. Item dicit Aristoteles in isto tertio quod “intellectus passivus est corruptibilis,” et ille est intellectus humanus, cum intelligere sit pati. 5. Oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem dicentem quod “separatur ab aliis sicut perpetuum a corruptibili,” et quod est “immortalis et perpetuus et impassibilis.” 6. Item si manet post mortem, ideo concludendum est quod sit perpetuus. Sed manet, quia aliter, frustra quaereret Aristoteles quare non reminiscimur post mortem; ergo, etc. 7. Item secundum Aristotelem omne genitum habet materiam de cuius potentia educitur. Intellectus autem non sic habet materiam;

25–26 nihil intelligat sine phantasmate ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.7 431a16 (Ar. lat. XII.2 229.1.14): “. . . nequaquam sine phantasmatae intelligit anima.” 28–29 intellectus passivus est corruptibilis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a24 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.9): “. . . passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis.” 30–31 separatur . . . corruptibili ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.2 413b 24–26 (Ar. lat. XII.2 82.1.16): “De intellectu autem et perspectiva potentia, nihil adhuc manifestum est, sed videtur genus alterum animae esse et hoc solum contingere separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.” 31–32 immortalis . . . impassibilis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 22–23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.7): “Separatus autem est solus hoc quod vere est. Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est. Non reminiscimur autem, quia hoc quidem impassibile.” 34 quaereret Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 23–24 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.7): “Non reminiscimur autem, quia hoc quidem impassibile, passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligit.” 36 secundum Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.3. 20 multiplicantur ] in se add. V 21 omnes ] om. AT 23 mortem ] om. V 31– 32 et perpetuus ] om. ET 34 Sed manet ] post mortem add. AET 36–37 de cuius . . . materiam ] rep. V 37 potentia ] materia V

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lect proper to it, since it was said earlier that intellective souls are multiplied according to the number of human beings; therefore, there have been infinitely many human intellects, all of which still exist, because they are assumed to be everlasting; therefore, there are now actually infinitely many of them. 3. Again, it follows that the intellect would be superfluous after death, which is absurd because nothing superfluous should be assumed in nature. The consequence is clear because it would be without activity, since, as Aristotle says, “it understands nothing without a phantasm,” and there are no phantasms after death, since they require a corporeal organ. 4. Again, Aristotle says in De Anima III that “the passive intellect is corruptible,” and this is the human intellect, since to understand is to be acted on. 5. The opposite is argued by Aristotle, who says that the intellect is “separated from other things, as what is everlasting is separated from what is corruptible,” and that it is “immortal, everlasting, and impassible.” 6. Again, if it remains after death, then it must be concluded that it is everlasting. But it remains, because otherwise, Aristotle would ask in vain why we do not remember after death; therefore, etc. 7. Again, according to Aristotle, everything generated has matter from whose potency it is brought forth. But the intellect does not

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45

50

55

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ergo non est genitus, et omne ingenitum est incorruptibile et per consequens perpetuum, ut patet primo Caeli. 8. Veritas istius quaestionis apparet ex praecedentibus, sed ista quaestio mota est ut omnia recolligantur simul. 9. Et enumero primo conclusiones quas aliquis poneret si sine fide catholica inniteretur solum rationibus per principia ex sensibilibus habentibus evidentiam per naturam sensus et intellectus, sine speciali supernaturali revelatione. Et sunt aliquae talium conclusionum hypotheticae et aliquae categoricae. 10. Prima est quod si intellectus est perpetuus a parte ante, ipse est perpetuus a parte post, et e converso. Hoc enim credidit Aristoteles demonstrare primo Caeli. 11. Secunda est quod si intellectus non est perpetuus a parte ante et a parte post, ipse est genitus et corruptibilis et eductus de potentia materiae et extensus extensione materiae et multiplicatus multiplicatione hominum. Nam si intellectus non sit perpetuus, ipse est factus, et ratio naturalis non dictaret, sine fide vel supernaturali revelatione, quod aliquid esset factum scilicet per modum creationis, sed quod omne factum esset de novo factum per modum naturalis generationis ex subiecto praesupposito, de cuius potentia educitur forma ab agente. Hoc nititur Aristoteles declarare primo Physicorum et septimo Metaphysicae, et ad huiusmodi generationem ratio naturalis dictaret sequi omnia praedicta.

39 primo Caeli ] A RISTOTELES, De caelo I.12 282a1 (Ar. lat. VIII.2): “Itaque si semper ens non contingit quandoque non esse, impossibile et genitum esse.” 40 praecedentibus ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3–5. 49 primo Caeli ] A RISTO TELES , De caelo I.12 282a 1. 58 primo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.9 192a 25–33 58–59 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.7 1032b15ff. 39 ut patet primo Caeli ] om. EV 41 omnia ] om. V || recolligantur ] intelligantur V 42 enumero primo ] pono A || si ] om. A sic add. V 43 inniteretur ] procederetur E uteretur T || rationibus ] naturalibus add. AET 43–45 per principia . . . et sunt ] quarum AE 45 conclusionum ] propositionum om. E propositionum V 50 quod ] conclusio add. AE om. VW || non ] om.(!) V 53 hominum ] individuorum T || factus ] vel finitus add. A 54 ratio ] om. VW || revelatione ] infusione A 55–56 creationis . . . modum ] hom. T 59 huiusmodi ] hanc E

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have matter in this way. Therefore, it is not generated, and anything ungenerated is incorruptible, and consequently everlasting, as is clear in On the Heavens I. 8. The truth of the matter in this question is clear from the preceding, but the question has been raised so that all the relevant issues might be gathered together. 9. I list first the conclusions someone might advance if, without the catholic faith, one were to rely only on arguments based on principles drawn from sensible things made evident by the nature of sense and intellect, without a special and supernatural revelation. Some of these conclusions are hypothetical; others are categorical. 10. The first is that if the intellect is everlasting heretofore, it is everlasting hereafter, and conversely. Aristotle believed he demonstrated this in On the Heavens I. 11. The second is that if the intellect is not everlasting heretofore and hereafter, it is generated, corruptible, brought forth from the potency of matter, extended by the extension of matter, and multiplied according to the number of human beings. For if the intellect is not everlasting, it is made, and natural reason does not dictate, without faith or a supernatural revelation, that anything is made by way of creation, but rather that everything made has been made anew by way of natural generation from a presupposed subject from whose potency a form is brought forth by an agent. Aristotle tries to state this in Physics I and Metaphysics VII, and natural reason dictates that everything spoken of previously follows this kind of generation.

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65

70

75

80

708

12. Tertia conclusio infertur ex secunda procedendo ex opposito consequentis ad oppositum antecedentis, scilicet quod si intellectus non est eductus de potentia materiae, ipse est perpetuus. Et similiter, si non est extensus, ipse est perpetuus, et si non est multiplicatus, ipse est perpetuus. 13. Quarta conclusio, si non est eductus de potentia materiae, ipse non inhaeret materiae, probatur quia si non esset eductus, ipse esset perpetuus ante et post, ut patet per praecedentes conclusiones. Et numquam ratio naturalis dictaret quod forma perpetua inhaeret materiae nisi inhaeret semper eidem, sicut aliqui posuerunt de dimensionibus interminatis. Et hoc numquam ratio naturalis dictaret de intellectu humano, quia si intellectus humanus inhaeret materiae, non est nisi materia hominis quae manet post mortem in cadavere vel in terra, et tunc nullus diceret quod illae materiae scilicet cadaveris vel terrae inhaereat intellectus humanus. 14. Quinta conclusio est quod haec sex se consequuntur mutuo: intellectum esse perpetuum, neque esse generabilem vel corruptibilem, non esse eductum de potentia materiae, non inhaerere materiae, non esse extensum extensione materiae, et non esse multiplicatum. Et similiter sex opposita consequuntur se mutuo: scilicet non esse perpetuum, esse genitum et corruptibilem, esse eductum de potentia materiae, inhaerere materiae, esse extensum, et esse multiplicatum. Haec enim tota conclusio infertur ex praecedentibus.

63–64 et similiter . . . est perpetuus ] hom. ET 64 ipse ] non(!) add. T 67 materiae ] haec conclusio add. A || eductus ] productus V 70 nisi inhaeret ] om.(!) V || semper ] sensus T || posuerunt ] aliquando add. A 77 generabilem ] genitum AT 81–82 esse eductum de potentia materiae ] esse eductum T om. VW || esse eductum de potentiae materiae . . . multiplicatum ] etc. E

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12. The third conclusion is inferred from the second by proceeding from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, namely, if the intellect is not brought forth from the potency of matter, it is everlasting; and likewise, if it is not extended, it is everlasting; and if it is not multiplied, it is everlasting. 13. The fourth conclusion, that if it is not brought forth from the potency of matter, it does not inhere in matter, is proved because if it were not brought forth, it would be everlasting heretofore and hereafter, as is clear from the preceding conclusions. And natural reason would never dictate that an everlasting form inheres in matter unless it always inheres in the same matter, as some have claimed about interminate dimensions.371 Natural reason would never dictate this about the human intellect, because if the human intellect inheres in matter, then that matter is nothing but the matter of a human being that remains after death in the corpse or the earth, and no one would say that the human intellect would inhere in that matter, namely, in the matter of the corpse or the earth. 14. The fifth conclusion is that these six attributes mutually imply one another: the intellect’s being everlasting, not being generable or corruptible, not being brought forth from the potency of matter, not inhering in matter, not being extended by the extension of matter, and not being multiplied. And likewise, the six opposite attributes imply one another: namely, not being everlasting, being generated and corruptible, being brought forth from the potency of matter, inhering in matter, being extended, and being multiplied. This entire conclusion is inferred from the preceding ones. 371 According

to Thomas Aquinas, interminate dimensions are those without “a determined measure or figure,” from which form is individuated and matter designated (AQUINAS, In Boethii De trinitate expositio, q. 4, a. 2). The idea here would be that an everlasting form would always inhere in matter in the same way as dimensive quantity always inheres in matter: matter will always have dimensive quantity, even if its particular dimensions change over time.

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85

90

95

100

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710

15. Sexta conclusio est categorica, quod intellectus humanus inhaeret corpori humano sive materiae. Et haec fuit prius posita et probata. 16. Septima infertur quae erat opinio Alexandri, quod est generabilis et corruptibilis, eductus, extensus, inhaerens, et multiplicatus. 17. Sed tamen firmiter dicendum et tenendum est quod non omnes dictae conclusiones sunt verae, quia sunt contra fidem catholicam. Sed puto quod oppositae conclusiones non sunt demonstrabiles circumscripta fide et speciali supernaturali revelatione. 18. Et ideo nunc narrandae sunt conclusiones vel propositiones quae in hac materia secundum fidem catholicam sunt tenendae, quarum prima est quod intellectus humanus non est perpetuus a parte ante, sed a parte post. 19. Secunda est quod intellectus iste non est proprie genitus generatione naturali, sed creatus, nec est proprie corruptibilis corruptione naturali, sed annihilabilis. Tamen non annihilabitur. 20. Tertia est quod intellectus non est eductus de potentia materiae nec extensus. 21. Quarta est quod est multiplicatus secundum multiplicationem hominum. 22. Quinta est quod est inhaerens corpori humano seu materiae quamdiu homo vivit, et est separabilis a corpore et iterum reviviscibilis. Et reviviscetur.

85 fuit prius posita et probata ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.4, par. 18. 103–104 quamdiu homo vivit ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.4, par. 18. 84 categorica ] sive catholica est ista add. A 85 sive materiae ] om. V 87 eductus extensus ] om. A extensus E 88 dicendum et ] om. AT 90 puto ] credo AT 91 circumscripta fide et ] sine A sed T 92 sunt ] sine probatione add. AET 98 non ] numquam E

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15. The sixth conclusion is categorical: the human intellect inheres in a human body or matter. And this was previously proposed and proved. 16. The seventh conclusion is inferred, which was Alexander’s opinion: the human intellect is generable and corruptible, brought forth, extended, inherent, and multiplied. 17. But even so, it must be firmly stated and upheld that not all of the aforementioned conclusions are true, because they are against the catholic faith. But I think the opposite conclusions are not demonstrable, leaving faith and a special, supernatural revelation aside. 18. And so the conclusions or propositions that must be upheld in this matter according to the catholic faith must now be presented, of which the first is that the human intellect is not everlasting heretofore, but hereafter. 19. The second is that this intellect is not strictly speaking generated by natural generation, but created; nor is it strictly speaking corruptible by natural corruption, though it is annihilable. Nevertheless, it will not be annihilated. 20. The third is that the intellect is not brought forth from a material potency, or extended. 21. The fourth is that it is multiplied according to the number of humans. 22. The fifth is that it is inherent in a human body or matter as long as one is alive,372 and that it is separable from the body and able to live again. And it will live again. 372 For

the sense of this phrase, see the footnote at QQ. De an. III.4, par. 18 above.

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23. Et quaecumque auctoritates hiis conclusionibus oppositae sunt, sunt semper negandae, licet non possumus oppositas earum demonstrare. 24. Nunc finaliter dicendum est quomodo responderetur ad rationes quae in principio quaestionis fiebant, prout videntur laborare contra fidem. 25. Prima ratio esset pro Alexandro, sed nobis est difficilis solutionis. Dicitur ergo quod mors equi esset simpliciter equi corruptio, sed mors hominis non est simpliciter hominis corruptio, sed est solum separatio unius partis eius ab alia. Ideo concedunt aliqui quod iste homo, scilicet Socrates, sic est perpetuus a parte post quia ipse semper erit, sed non semper erit homo aut Socrates, quia haec nomina homo aut Socrates quamvis solum supponant pro anima et corpore, tamen connotant illas partes taliter se habere, scilicet quod haec illi inhaereat. Sed non semper se habebunt sic. Ideo quamvis iste homo semper erit, tamen non semper erit homo. Et ita Socrates semper erit, sed non semper erit Socrates. Et ita diceremus de equo vel lapide, Deus enim posset separare formam equi vel lapidis a sua materia et separatim conservare, et iste equus vel iste lapis adhuc esset, sed non esset equus vel lapis. 26. Alii autem dicunt quod forma substantialis est valde principalior pars substantiae compositae. Ideo nomen substantiae, ut Socrates, homo, animal, equus, imponitur ad significandum compositam substantiam. Sed tamen sit principalior ratione formae quod illud nomen innatum est supponere pro composito ex illa forma et materia pro tempore quo illa forma est illae materiae unita, et pro forma tantum

106 auctoritates ] vel auctoritas add. V 109 finaliter ] sive faciliter add. A principaliter T 110 laborare ] declarare V 112 nobis ] non(!) T 113 equi ] om. V 117 Socrates ] forma T 117–118 quia haec . . . Socrates ] om. V 119 taliter ] totaliter V || haec ] sine altera illarum add. A 120 iste ] om. V 123 a sua materia et ] om. VW 127 pars ] hominis seu add. E 128 animal ] om. E || equus ] om. T etc. add. ET || compositam ] om. E 129 principalior ] aut substantialiter add. A 131 forma ] materia(!) V 131–132 et pro . . . unita ] hom. V

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23. All authorities opposed to these conclusions must always be denied, even though we cannot demonstrate their opposites. 24. Now, finally, we must say how one should reply to the arguments made at the beginning of the question, insofar as they seem to work against the faith. 25. The first argument is on behalf of Alexander,373 but it is difficult for us to resolve it. It is said, then, that the death of a horse would be the corruption of the horse absolutely speaking, but the death of a human being is not the corruption of that human absolutely speaking, but only the separation of one part of him from another. Thus, some grant that this human, namely Socrates, is in this way everlasting hereafter because he will always be, but he will not always be human, or Socrates, because although the names ‘human’ and ‘Socrates’ supposit only for soul and body, they connote those parts to be related in such a way that the former inheres in the latter. But they will not always be related in this way. Thus, even though that human being will always be, he will not always be human. And so Socrates will always be, but he will not always be Socrates. We would say the same thing about a horse or a stone, for God could separate the form of the horse or stone from its matter and conserve it separately, in which case the horse or the stone would still be, but it would not be a horse or a stone.374 26. Others, however, say that the substantial form is the much more principal part of a composite substance. Thus, the name of a substance, e. g. ‘Socrates’, ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘horse’, is imposed for signifying a composite substance. But even so, it would be more principally by virtue of the form that a name is suited to supposit for the composite of matter and form for the time during which that form is

373 See

par. 1 above. appears to run against Buridan’s logical doctrine that substance terms are absolute terms, not connoting anything. See Summulae de dialectica 3.1.8 (tr. Klima, 150–151). 374 This

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quando ista forma non est alicui materiae unita, propter quod dicimus, Sancte Petre, ora pro nobis, licet non sit compositus ex materia et forma. Et ita concederetur quod non solum Socrates vel hic homo erit semper, sed quod etiam semper erit Socrates et iste homo. 27. Adhuc alii dicunt quod quamvis nomen primo imponatur ad significandum substantiam compositam, tamen transfertur ad significandum formam et ad supponendum aliquando pro ea, propter eius magnam principalitatem super materiam. Unde etiam Aristoteles octavo Metaphysicae videtur hoc expresse determinare, movens enim dubitationem talem, “oportet autem non ignorare quod aliquando latet utrum significaret nomen compositam substantiam, aut actum aut formam.” Et respondet dicens, “erit autem utique et in utrisque animal, non ut una ratione dictum.” Tunc igitur prout hoc nomen homo significat compositum, iste homo semper erit, sed ipse non semper erit homo propter connotationem, sicut dicebatur. Sed prout significat formam, et homo semper erit et ipse semper erit homo, et numquam corrumpetur. 28. Et finaliter dicamus quod determinatio huius dubitationis pertinet ad metaphysicam vel ad facultatem theologiae. Unde plures theologi movent illud quodlibetum, utrum Christus in morte triduo erat

141–143 oportet . . . formam ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VIII.3 1043a29–30 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 172.102): “Oportet autem non ignorare quia aliquando latet utrum significet nomen compositam substantiam aut actum et formam.” 143–144 erit . . . dictum ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VIII.3 1043a36 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 172.108): “Erit autem utique et in utrisque animal, non ut una ratione dictum sed quasi ad unum.” 134 Socrates ] om. VW || homo ] non solum add. T 136 primo ] et principaliter add. AT 137 transfertur ] transponitur V 138 aliquando ] om. AT 139–140 octavo ] secunda V 141 autem ] enim AVW || aliquando ] quando V 142 nomen ] rei ETVW 144 prout ] probat V 150 facultatem ] sacrae add. AET 151 in morte ] om. AET quodlibet corpori christi filii dei in marg. A

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united to that matter, and for the form alone when the form is not united to any matter, which is why we say, ‘Saint Peter, pray for us,’ even though he is not composed of matter and form. And so it would be conceded not only that Socrates or this human being will always be, but also that he will always be Socrates and this human. 27. Still others say that although a name is imposed first to signify the composite substance, nevertheless, it is transferred to signify the form and sometimes to supposit for it, due to its great pre-eminence over matter. And indeed, Aristotle seems to determine this explicitly in Metaphysics VIII, for he raises such a concern: “One must not fail to notice, however, that sometimes it is unclear whether the name signifies the composite substance, or the actuality or form.” And he replies, saying, “yet it will be called ‘animal’ anyway and in both cases, but not by a single account.” So then, insofar as the name ‘human being’ signifies the composite, this human being always will be; but he will not always be human due to the connotation, as was said. But insofar as it signifies the form, the human being will always be, and he will always be a human being, and he will never be corrupted. 28. And finally, let us say that the determination of this doubt pertains to metaphysics or to the faculty of theology. Accordingly, several theologians raise the quodlibetal question of whether Christ was hu-

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homo, scilicet cum eius corpus sine anima erat in sepulchro, et anima sine corpore scilicet in inferno. 29. Ad aliam rationem, Alexander negaret perpetuitatem intellectuum, et nos fide negaremus perpetuitatem mundi a parte ante et a parte post, ideo utrobique non sequitur infinitas intellectuum. 30. Ad aliam dicitur quod post mortem intellectus intelligit sine phantasmate, quod potest facere ex Dei potentia voluntate, et ordinatione. 31. Ad ultimam dicitur quod Aristoteles per intellectum passivum intelligit virtutem phantasticam seu cogitativam, quae corrumpitur, non simpliciter, cum ipsa sit idem quod anima intellectiva, sed sic: quia corrumpuntur dispositiones naturales per quas erat innata exercere actum cognoscendi, cogitandi, vel phantasiandi. Ideo non potest amplius vitalem actum exercere sine quo Aristoteles putavit intellectum humanum non intelligere, quod non tenemus. 32. Rationes etiam ad oppositum solvuntur vel negantur secundum exigentiam praedictorum, etc.

165 Aristoteles putavit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a8–9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 235.2.6): “. . . necesse simul phantasma aliquod speculari.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.167 (ed. Hamesse, 188): “. . . necesse est quemcumque intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” 153 inferno ] paradiso(!) E 154 rationem ] Aristotelis add. ET om. W 156 utrobique non ] neutrobique AET 157 intellectus ] humanus add. AE 162 intellectiva ] vegetativa(!) E 163 naturales ] corporales AET 164 cognoscendi ] om. AET 165 vitalem ] in talem ET || exercere ] om. AET 166 non ] posse add. AET 167 ad ] post ante A ante E

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man during the three days of death, when his body was in the grave without a soul, and his soul was among the dead without a body.375 29. To the other argument,376 Alexander would deny that intellects are everlasting, and we would deny by faith that the world is everlasting heretofore and hereafter, and so in neither case does an infinity of intellects follow. 30. To the other,377 it is said that after death, the intellect understands without phantasms, which it can do by God’s power, will, and arrangement. 31. To the last argument,378 it is said that by ‘passive intellect’, Aristotle understands the imaginative or cogitative power, which is not corrupted absolutely speaking, because it is the same as the intellective soul, but it is corrupted in this way, namely, that the natural dispositions by which it was naturally suited to perform an act of thinking, cogitating, or imagining are corrupted. Thus, it can no longer perform the vital act without which Aristotle thought the human intellect does not understand, which we do not hold. 32. And the arguments on the other side are resolved or denied in accordance with what has been said above, etc.

375 The medieval theological discussion of this question begins with

Peter Lombard, who argues that it is proper to call Christ human during the three days of his death (Sent. III, d. 22, c. 2–3), whereas Thomas Aquinas later rejected this (Quodl. II.1.1; Summa theol. III, q. 50, a. 4). 376 See par. 2 above. 377 See par. 3 above. 378 See par. 4 above.

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Utrum intellectus possibilis sit pura potentia sic quod non sit aliquis actus, sicut nec materia prima.

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15

1. Arguitur quod sic, per Aristotelem dicentem quod “nullam habet naturam, nisi quod possibilis est vocatus.” 2. Item ille dicit quod iste “nihil est actu eorum quae sunt ante intelligere.” 3. Item ad actum spectat agere et ad potentiam pati, ut habetur in libro De generatione et tertio Physicorum. Ideo illud quod non potest agere sed solum pati non est aliquis actus sed pura potentia. Sic est de intellectu possibili, quia dicit Aristoteles quod ipse est talis “in omnia fieri,” et intellectus agens “in omnia facere.” Et ita nec intellectus possibilis aliquid agit, nec intellectus agens aliquid patitur. 4. Item omnis actus habet active aliquam operationem et intellectus possibilis nullam habet operationem, quia tunc praeter eum non indigeremus intellectu agente, quod est contra determinationem Aristotelis.

1–2 utrum . . . prima ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a 22–24. 3–4 nullam . . . vocatus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a 22–23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.17): “Quare neque ipsius esse naturam neque unam, sed aut hanc quod possibilis. Vocatus itaque animae intellectus . . . ”. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.1. 5–6 nihil . . . intelligere ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a 24 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.17): “nihil est actu eorum quae sunt ante intelligere.” 8 libro . . . Physicorum ] Cf. A RISTOTE LES , De gen. et corr. I.9, Phys. III.3. 10–11 in . . . facere ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 14–15 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.2): “et est huiusmodi quidem intellectus in quo omnia fiunt, ille vero quo omnia est facere.” 15–16 contra determinationem Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a10–19. 1 Utrum ] Quaestio octava procedit istam septimam in marg. W || sit ] una add. A 8–9 ideo . . . agere ] om. V 10 talis ] possibilis AT 11 agens ] talis add. A 12 aliquid agit ] om. A 14 habet ] active add. AET

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 38

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Is the possible intellect pure potency in the sense that it is not any kind of actuality, just like prime matter?

1. It is argued that it is, on the basis of Aristotle’s remark that “it has no nature, except that which is called ‘possible’.” 2. Again, Aristotle says, “it is actually none of the things that exist before it understands.” 3. Again, acting is related to actuality and being acted on to potency, as is held in On Generation and Corruption and Physics III. Therefore, what cannot act but can only be acted on is not some actuality, but a pure potency. However, this is the case with the possible intellect, since Aristotle says that it is such in “becoming all things,” and the agent intellect is such in “making all things.” And so the possible intellect is not making anything, nor is the agent intellect acted on by anything. 4. Again, every act possesses some operation actively and the possible intellect has no operation, because if it did, we would not need an agent intellect in addition to it, which is contrary to the determination of Aristotle.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 38

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5. Item substantia simplex vel est actus purus vel potentia pura. Intellectus autem possibilis est simplex substantia et non est actus purus, cum sit receptivus specierum intelligibilium, et quia differt ab intellectu agente; ergo, etc. 6. Item Commentator videtur determinate dicere quod anima nostra intellectiva sit composita substantialiter ex intellectu possibili et intellectu agente. Ideo cum intellectus agens sit actus, anima nostra non esset una per se si etiam intellectus possibilis esset actus, propter hoc quod ex pluribus in actu non fit unum per se. 7. Oppositum arguitur, quia intellectus possibilis est anima et omnis anima est actus, ut patet per definitionem animae; ergo, etc. 8. Item si esset pura potentia, non differret a prima materia, propter hoc quod res non per potentiam sed per actum distinguuntur, ut habetur septimo Metaphysicae 9. Item inhaerens alteri et informans ipsum est actus eius. Intellectus autem possibilis inhaeret corpori humano, secundum dicta prius; ergo, etc. 10. Ista quaestio formata est ad exponendum aliquas auctoritates. Et potest faciliter solvi secundum istam distinctionem de actu et potentia quae fuit posita in prima quaestione secundi huius. Aliquid enim esse actus vel in actu dicitur multipliciter. 11. Primo modo significat idem quod ipsum existere, et potentia non existere, cum tamen non repugnet ipsum existere. Et sic ita intel21–23 anima . . . agente ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 406.557– 565): “Et ideo opinandum est, quod iam apparuit nobis ex sermone Aristotelis, quod in anima sunt duae partes intellectus, quarum una est recipiens, cuius esse declaratum est hic, alia autem agens.” 27 per definitionem animae ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.1 412a 20. 30 septimo Metaphysicae ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.13 1039a5–7 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 159.752): “Duo namque sic actu numquam sunt unum actu, sed in potestate duo fuerint, erunt unum, ut que dupla ex duobus dimidiis potestate; actus enim separat.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 1.187 (ed. Hamesse, 130): “Actus separat et distinguit.” 32 prius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.4. 36 prima . . . huius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.1, par. 18–23. 19 intelligibilium ] sensibilium VW || quia ] iam etiam non add. A tunc non add. E non add. T 21 determinate ] om. AET 25 non fit unum ] om. V 26 quia ] si add. V 29 non . . . actum ] est non propter potentiam sed per actum sed potentia V 31 eius ] primus ipsius A 34 formata ] mota E 37 dicitur multipliciter ] om. AE 39 cum ] et A cuius T

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5. Again, a simple substance is either pure act or pure potency. But the possible intellect is a simple substance and not a pure act, since it is receptive of intelligible species, and because it differs from the agent intellect; therefore, etc. 6. Again, the Commentator seems clearly to say that our intellective soul is substantially composed of the possible and agent intellects. Thus, since the agent intellect is act, our soul would not be something one per se if the possible intellect were also act, because several actual things do not make something one per se. 7. The opposite is argued, because the possible intellect is a soul and every soul is an act, as is clear from the definition of the soul; therefore, etc. 8. Again, if it were pure potency, it would not differ from prime matter, due to the fact that things are distinguished from each other not by potency but by act, as is held in Metaphysics VII. 9. Again, what inheres in another and informs it is its act. But in keeping with what was said above, the possible intellect inheres in the human body; therefore, etc. 10. This question has been formulated to explain certain authoritative passages. It can easily be resolved in terms of the distinction between act and potency set out in the first question of Book II of this treatise. For something is said to be actual or to be in act in many ways. 11. In the first way, a thing’s being actual or being in act signifies the same as its existing, and its being potential signifies its not exist-

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lectus possibilis sicut et agens, et materia prima sicut forma, dicuntur actus vel in actu. Intellectus tamen Antichristi non sic est actus vel in actu, sed est potentia vel in potentia. 12. Secundo modo, actus vocatur forma inhaerens, et illud subiectum respectu illius formae vocatur potentia, scilicet subiectiva. Sic autem intellectus possibilis est actus illius corporis et vocatur potentia respectu intellectionum et habituum intellectualium. Et Commentator videtur opinari quod etiam isto modo intellectus agens est actus ipsius intellectus possibilis, scilicet inhaerens ei, et intellectus possibilis est potentia subiectiva respectu agentis. Et ille etiam Commentator opinatur quod isto modo, intellectus possibilis non est actus alicuius, quia nulli subiecto inhaeret, ut credit, ideo dicit quod hoc intendebat Aristoteles cum dicit quod “nullam ipse habet naturam nisi quod possibilis est vocatus.” Sed non est in hiis credendum ei, cum dictum sit prius quod inhaeret corpori, et post hoc etiam dicetur quod anima nostra intellectiva non est sic substantialiter composita ex agente et possibili, sed est simplex forma quae secundum aliam et aliam rationem dicitur intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis. 13. Tertio modo actus vocatur operatio vel motus respectu operantis sive activi sive passivi. Agens autem et passum vocantur potentiae, scilicet potentia activa et potentia passiva respectu huiusmodi motus vel operationis. Et isto modo videtur mihi quod omne illud quod est aliud a Deo est actus eius, quia est eius operatio. Deus enim omne quod est aliud a se agit aut productive aut saltem conservative. Unde sic Deus dicitur summa potentia et non actus. Sed intellectus nullius

47–49 etiam . . . agentis ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 396.269– 270): “unus est subiectum intellectorum, et est intellectus materialis.” 50–51 isto . . . credit ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 404.514–405.516): “impossibile est ut intellectum copuletur cum unoquoque hominum et numeretur per numerationem eorum per partem quae est de eo quasi materia.” 52–53 nullam . . . vocatus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a22–23. 53–54 dictum sit prius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.4. 56–57 est . . . possibilis ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.10. 43 actus ] anima E 44 subiectiva ] substantiva V 46 intellectualium ] intelligibilium A 55 substantialiter ] formaliter T || agente ] intellectu A 62 eius ] propinquius ipsius A 64 non actus ] et omnium potentia activa AET

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ing, although without its existing implying a contradiction. And so in this way, both the possible and agent intellects, and both prime matter and form, are said to be actual or in act. The Antichrist’s intellect is not actual or in act in this way, however, but potential or in potency.379 12. In the second way, an inherent form is called an act and the subject with respect to that form is called a potency, namely a subjective potency. But in this way, the possible intellect is an act of the body and is called a potency with respect to acts of thinking and intellectual dispositions. The Commentator seems to be of the opinion that in this way as well, the agent intellect is an act of the possible intellect — that is, it inheres in it — and the possible intellect is a subjective potency with respect to the agent intellect. The Commentator is also of the opinion that in this way, the possible intellect is not the act of anything, because in his view it inheres in no subject, and so he says that this is what Aristotle intended when he says that the intellect “has no nature, except that it is called ‘possible’.” But he is not to be believed in these matters, since it was said above that the intellect inheres in the body, and it will be said below that our intellective soul is not substantially composed of agent and possible intellects in this way, but that it is a simple form which is called the agent intellect and the possible intellect for different reasons 13. In a third way, an operation or motion is called an act with respect to something performing an activity, whether active or passive.380 However, the agent and patient are said to be potencies, namely active and passive potencies with respect to this kind of motion or operation.381 And in this way, it seems to me that everything other than God is an act of God, because it is his operation. For God acts on everything other than himself either productively or at least 379 As

a potential being whose future existence is guaranteed by revelation, the Antichrist was the standard medieval example of a known future contingent. 380 The act of performing an activity here would include passive recipients performing their activity of reception, e.g., the external senses in their activity of receiving sensory species, which are the agents in the act of sense perception. In Aristotelian psychology, a cognitive power’s reception of form without matter is never a case of pure passivity. 381 As noted at QQ. De an. II.1, par. 1, above, the Latin term ‘potentia’ is ambiguous between ‘potency’ and ‘power’, so both notions are in play here.

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alterius est actus isto modo nisi ipsius Dei, quia non dependet in esse suo ab alio operante nec productive nec conservative, ideo non debet dici alicuius alterius motus seu operatio. Sed dico quod intellectus possibilis hoc modo est bene potentia activa et potentia passiva, habet enim multas operationes quas agit et recipit, ut intellectionem, compositionem et divisionem, discursum, etc. Et etiam ipsius operationes in homine sint, ut sensatio, nutritio, augmentatio, diminutio etc., si dicamus quod non sit in homine alia anima quam intellectiva. 14. Quarto modo agens vel actus vocatur actus respectu passi vel passibili et passum dicitur potentia respectu activi, haec enim dicta fuerunt in prima quaestione huius secundi. Et isto modo intellectus est actus corporis, agit enim in ipsum motum localem, ut dicetur in hoc tertio. Immo etiam agit in corpore nutritionem et sensationem, etc. Et ipse etiam respectu sui ipsius potest sic dici actus et potentia, quia agit in seipsum conceptus et propositiones et discursus. Et ipse etiam sic diceretur potentia respectu phantasmatis vel obiecti, ut dicetur post. 15. Sed ulterius notandum quod potentia dicta secundo modo, scilicet pro subiecto formae inhaerentis sibi, solet aliquando in ordine ad istam formam dici in actu, scilicet quando habet eam, et aliquando in potentia solum, scilicet quando non habet eam, ut paries in actu dicitur per albedinem vel actu albus quando albedo sibi inest, et dicitur in potentia ad albedinem vel albus in potentia quando sibi non inhaeret albedo, sed potest inesse.

71–72 si . . . intellectiva ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.17. 75 prima quaestione huius secundi ] BURIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.1, par. 18–23. 76–77 in hoc tertio ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433a9–21; B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.20. 80 dicetur post ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.10–11. 70 discursum ] om. AT 71 augmentatio, diminutio ] augmentatio E om. AT 74 passibili ] passivi om. T 75 prima . . . huius ] secunda aut in prima et melius quaestione secundo huius A 78 sic ] om. AE 79 propositiones ] et intellectiones add. T 83–84 et aliquando . . . eam ] om. V 85 albus ] albedinis T || quando ] iam add. AES 86 albus ] albedinis T

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conservatively. For this reason, God is said to be the highest potency, and not an act. But no intellect of anything else is an act in this sense, but only God’s intellect is, because it does not depend for its being on the operation of anything else, either productively or conservatively, and so it must not be said to be the motion or operation of anything else. But I say that the possible intellect is truly an active and passive potency in this way, for it has many activities that it performs and receives, such as thinking, affirmation and denial, discursive reasoning, etc. And even if we were to say that there is only an intellective soul in a human being, its operations, such as sensing, nutrition, growth, decay, etc., would be in it. 14. In the fourth way, an agent or act is called an act with respect to a patient or something capable of being acted on, and the patient is said to be a potency with respect to what is active, for this was stated in the first Question of Book II of this treatise. And the intellect is the act of the body in this way, for it causes local motion in it, as will be discussed in De Anima III. Indeed, it even causes nutrition and the act of sensing in the body, etc. It can also be said to be actual or potential with respect to itself in this way, because it brings about concepts, propositions, and discursive thoughts in itself. It would also be said to be a potency with respect to the phantasm or object in this way, as will be discussed later. 15. But it must be further noted that ‘potency’ taken in the second way, namely for the subject of the form inhering in it, is sometimes customarily said to be in act in relation to that form, namely when it has it, and sometimes in potency only, namely when it doesn’t have it. Thus, a wall is said to be in actuality through whiteness, or actually white, when whiteness is in it, and in potency to whiteness, or potentially white, when whiteness does not inhere in it, but can be in it.

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16. Et est ille modus loquendi propinquus primo modo, quia dicebatur secundum existere rem vel non existere. Et isto modo ego credo quod Aristoteles comparans intellectum possibilem ad formas intellectuales sibi possibiles inexistere, dixit quod ipse nihil est actu ante intelligere, enim non est in actu per aliquam formam vel dispositionem sibi inhaerentem. Et sic ipse intellexit quod ipse “nullam naturam habet,” scilicet ante intelligere, “nisi quod possibilis est vocatus,” quia ipse est “sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum.” 17. Et videtur mihi quod per haec dicta apparent solutiones et expositiones rationum quae a principio quaestionis fiebant, sive ad unam partem sive ad aliam. Apparet enim mihi quod illae rationes capiunt falsum quae dicunt intellectum possibilem nihil posse agere sed pati solum. Et auctoritates Aristotelis sunt satis expositae. Nec est credendum Commentatori in quibus contradicit praedictis. Et quamvis intellectus, aut etiam Deus, sit substantia simplex, non est inconveniens quod sit actus uno modo et potentia alio modo, vel etiam respectu diversorum.

93–94 nullam . . . vocatus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a22–23. 95 sicut . . . scriptum ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 430a1 (Ar. lat. XII.2 214.2.3): “Oportet autem sic sicut in tabula nihil est actu scriptum.” 92 formam vel ] om. E 95 tabula ] rasa add. AET pictum ET 97 expositiones ] omnium add. AET

|| scriptum ] pictum A de-

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16. This way of speaking is close to the first way, since it was said according to whether the thing exists or does not exist. I believe that it is in this sense that Aristotle, when comparing the possible intellect to intellectual forms possibly existing in it, said that the intellect is actually nothing before understanding, for it is not in actuality through some form or disposition inhering in it. And this is how he meant that “it has no nature,” namely before understanding, “except that it is called ‘possible’,” and that it is “just like a slate on which nothing has been written.” 17. And it seems to me that in these remarks, the solutions to and explanations of the arguments made at the beginning of the question are clear, whether on the one side or the other.382 For it seems to me that those arguments saying that the possible intellect can do nothing but be acted on have got it wrong. And the authorities from Aristotle have been sufficiently explained. Nor is the Commentator to be believed when he contradicts what was said. Although the intellect, or even God, is a simple substance, it is not a problem that it should be an act in one way and a potency in another, or with respect to diverse things.

382 See

pars. 1–6 and 7–9 above.

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Utrum intellectus prius intelligat universale quam singulare, vel e converso.

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1. Et quia praeter animam nostram, scilicet extra, non est equus universalis distinctus ab equo vel equis singulari vel singularibus, nec lapis universalis praeter lapides singulares, et sic de aliis, prout supponimus ex septimo Metaphysicae, ideo dicta quaestio in propriis verbis formanda est: utrum easdem res vel eandem rem intellectus intelligit prius universaliter, scilicet secundum conceptum communem, quam singulariter, id est, secundum conceptum singularem, vel e converso. Et si in processu quaestionis etiam aliquando utamur verbis primo positis, tamen volumus eis uti ad sensum verborum immediate positorum. 2. Arguitur igitur primo quod prius intelligimus res universaliter quam singulariter, auctoritate Aristotelis in hoc tertio dicentis “aut sicut circumflexa se habet ad seipsam, cum extensa sit, carni es1–2 Utrum . . . converso ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.7 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 59–78); AVERROES, Comm. Phys. I, comm. 2–3. 6 septimo Metaphysicae ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.8, 1033b20; Auc. Ar. 1.174 (ed. Hamesse, 129): “Universalia non sunt separata a singularibus secundum esse, ut voluit Plato, sed sunt in eis secundum esse, quia praedicantur de eis praedicatione essentiali et directa, ut dicendo hoc est homo.” Textus iste non invenitur in Metaphysica Aristotelis (Hamesse refert lectores ad Categorias 5, 2a 19–27), nihilominus aliquo modo fiebat unus de auctoritatibus libri septimi Metaphysicae in libro Auc. Ar. forsan usitato per Buridanum legendo librum tertium Aristotelis De Anima. 15–16 aut . . . discernit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429b16–18 (Ar. lat. XII.2 208.2.3): “Alio autem, aut separato aut sicut circumflexa se habet ad se ipsam, cum extensa sit carni esse discernit.” 1 Utrum ] Quaeritur octavo et difficilis erit utrum V Ista est quaestio octava tertii libri, et quaestio septima immediate sequitur illam in marg. W 4 singulari ] particulari T 7 utrum ] item si E 13 intelligimus ] cognoscimus AE 14 singulariter ] particulariter T

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 39

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Does the intellect understand the universal before the singular, or vice versa?

1. And since, apart from our soul, that is to say, outside it, there is no universal horse distinct from a singular horse or singular horses, nor a universal stone apart from singular stones, and likewise for other things, as we are assuming on the basis of Metaphysics VII, the question under consideration must be properly worded: does the intellect understand the same things, or the same thing, universally, namely according to a common concept, before it understands them, or it, singularly, that is, according to a singular concept, or vice versa? And if in the course of the question we also sometimes use the wording of the title above, we mean those words in the sense just stipulated. 2. It is argued first, then, that we understand a thing universally before we understand it singularly, on the authority of Aristotle in De an. III when he says, “or just as what is bent is related to

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 39

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se discernit.” Et Aristoteles ibidem distinguit inter carnem et carnis esse, et magnitudinem et magnitudinis esse, ipse per carnem et magnitudinem intelligit singularia, sed per magnitudinis esse et carnis esse intelligit universalia. Et sic ipse vult dicere quod carnis esse sive magnitudinis esse, id est universalia, intelligimus directe, intelligit enim directionem per lineam cum fuerit extensa. Sed carnem et magnitudinem, id est singularia, intelligimus circumflexe. Modo constat quod prius intelligimus illud quod directe intelligimus quam illud quod intelligimus per reflexionem; ergo universalia prius intelligimus. 3. Item super praedictam auctoritatem Aristotelis, dicit Commentator quod intellectus cognoscit universale secundum se et singulare mediante sensu, scilicet per reflexionem super sensum, prout plurimi exponunt ipsum. Sed intellectus debet prius intelligere illud quod intelligit per se quam illud quod per aliud sive per reflexionem ad aliud; ergo, etc. 4. Item primo Posteriorum dicit Aristoteles non esse idem simpliciter notius vel nobis notius. Sed nobis esse notiora quae sunt proxima sensui, et ista dicit esse singularia, et simpliciter notiora ea quae sunt esse a sensu remotiora, et illa dicit universalia maxime. Ideo quamvis singularia sunt nobis notiora quia sensu cognoscuntur primitus, cuius cognitio est prima nobis, tamen universalia sunt simpliciter notiora

16–17 inter . . . esse ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429b 10–14 (Ar. lat. XII.2 208.1.8): “Quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo et magnitudini esse, et aqua et aquae esse et sic in multis alteris (non autem in omnibus: in quibusdam enim idem est esse carni et carnem), aut alio ergo aut aliter habente discernit.” 26–27 intellectus . . . sensu ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.9 (ed. Crawford, 422.49–50): “comprehendit enim formam per se, et comprehendit individuum mediante sensu.” 31 primo Posteriorum ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 71b 33 (Ar. lat. IV.4 286.34): “Priora autem et notiora dupliciter sunt; non enim idem prius natura et ad nos prius, neque notius natura et nobis notius.” 34 universalia maxime ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 72a 4 (Ar. lat. IV.4 287.1): “Sunt autem longiora quidem universalia maxime, proxima autem singularia; et opponuntur hec ad invicem.” 17 et magnitudinis esse ] om. V 19 dicere ] om. VW 21 directionem ] extensionem AE || lineam ] vel horam add. A 22 id est singularia ] om. E 23 prius ] potius TV 29 illud ] ipsum VW 33 notiora ] om. V 35–36 cuius . . . nobis ] om. E

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itself when it has been straightened out, so is the being of flesh discerned.” And when Aristotle in the same place distinguishes between flesh and the being of flesh, and magnitude and the being of magnitude, by ‘flesh’ and ‘magnitude’ he understands singulars, and by ‘the being of flesh’ and ‘the being of magnitude’ he understands universals. In this way, he means to say that we understand the being of flesh or the being of magnitude, that is, the universals, directly, for he means directness by ‘the line when it has been straightened out’. But we understand flesh and magnitude, that is, the singulars, indirectly. Now it is clear that we understand what we understand directly before we understand it by reflection; therefore, we understand universals before we understand singulars. 3. Again, in connection with the authority of Aristotle mentioned above, the Commentator – as most people explain him – says that the intellect cognizes the universal in itself and the singular through the mediation of sense, that is to say, by reflection on sense. But the intellect must first understand what it understands per se before it understands what it understands through another or by reflection on another; therefore, etc. 4. Again, in Posterior Analytics I, Aristotle says that what is better known absolutely speaking and what is better known to us are not the same. But better known to us are the things that are closer to the senses, and those, he says, are singulars, while better known absolutely speaking are the things that are further from the senses, and the latter, he says, are what are most universal. Therefore, although sin-

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singularibus. Demum apponamus quod non apparet quid Aristoteles vocet notius simpliciter, nisi quod est notum per intellectum, cum non sit alia notitia quam sensus vel intellectus. Igitur universale est notius secundum intellectum, et prius notum. Et haec ratio sive auctoritas ad inferendum dictam conclusionem confirmatur per Aristotelem primo Physicorum, dicentem quod aliqui posuerunt principia rerum naturalium esse ea quae sunt notiora et priora secundum sensum et haec dicit esse singularia, et alii ea quae sunt posteriora secundum rationem, hoc est secundum intellectum et haec dicit esse universalia. Unde declarando quid sit notius secundum sensum et quid secundum intellectum, dicit “universale quidem secundum rationem notum est, singulare autem secundum sensum,” et addit, “ratio quidem enim universalis est, sensus autem particularis.” Ideo credidit Aristoteles universalia esse notiora secundum intellectum. 5. Item secundum Avicennam, primum obiectum intellectus et proprium est ens in sua tota communitate, cum omne ens sit intelligibile et obiectum primum intellectus debet esse sibi primo notum et nihil prius. Igitur intellectus primo innatus est intelligere ens in sua tota communitate, et haec est universalissimum; ergo, etc. 6. Item expresse in prooemio Physicorum dicit Aristoteles universalia esse nobis notiora, quod cum non posset esse secundum sensum,

45 universalia ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.5 189a3–4 (Ar. lat. VII.1 25.18): “Sic igitur similiter dicunt et aliter, et peius et melius, et hi quidem notiora secundum rationem, sicut dictum est prius, illi autem secundum sensum.” 47–49 universale . . . particularis ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.5 189a 5–6 (Ar. lat. VII.1 25.18): “universale quidem enim secundum rationem notum est, singulare autem secundum sensum; ratio quidem enim universalis est, sensus autem particularis.” 51–52 primum . . . communitate ] AVICENNA, Lib. de philosophia prima I.5 (ed. Van Riet, 31–33). 56 prooemio Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.5 189a5–6 (Ar. lat. VII.1 25.18). 37 apponamus ] opponimus(!) A supponamus VW 38 notius ] om. V in marg. W || cum ] quod V 39 universale ] simpliciter add. A 57 nobis ] om. V

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gulars are better known to us because they are originally cognized by sense, sensory cognition being first for us, universals are better known than singulars absolutely speaking. Finally, let us add that it is not apparent what Aristotle would say is better known absolutely speaking, unless he means what is known by the intellect, since there is no other knowledge besides that of sense or intellect. Therefore, what is universal is better known by the intellect, and it is known first. The reason or authority for drawing this conclusion is confirmed by Aristotle in Physics I, when he says that some have assumed that the principles of natural things are those that are better known and prior with regard to sense, and he says that these are singulars, whereas others took them to be posterior with regard to reason, that is, by the intellect, and he says that these are universals. For this reason, in stating what is better known by sense and by intellect, he says, “the universal is indeed known by reason, but the singular by sense,” and he adds, “for reason is of universals; sense, however, is of particulars.” So Aristotle believed that universals are better known as far as the intellect is concerned. 5. Again, according to Avicenna, the first and proper object of the intellect is being in its entire universality, since every being is intelligible and the first object of the intellect must be known to it primarily, and nothing prior to it. Therefore, the intellect is naturally suited first and foremost to understand being in its entire universality, and this is what is most universal; therefore, etc. 6. Again, Aristotle expressly says in the prologue to the Physics that universals are better known to us, which, since it could not be

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oportet tamen hoc esse ut secundum intellectum. Ideo concludit, dicens “unde ex universalibus in singularia oportet procedere.” 7. Et ipse ad probandum quod universale sit nobis notius adducit triplex medium, quorum primum est per similem de sensu, scilicet quod totum sensibile est notius sensui quam sua pars, igitur similiter totum intelligibile erit notius intellectui quam una pars. “Universale autem,” ut dicit, “est quiddam totum” ad singularia, “multa enim comprehendit ut partes universale.” 8. Secunda ratio fundatur super hoc quod facilius est cognoscere confuse quam distincte, semper enim difficile est distinguere unum. Et propter hoc dicit totum definitum esse notius partibus definitionis. Sed cognoscere confuse est universaliter cognoscere. Cognoscere autem singulariter est cognoscere distincte et determinate. 9. Tertia ratio est quod “pueri appellant primo omnes viros patres et omnes feminas matres.” Et sic Avicenna evidentius ponit efficaciam illius signi, scilicet si Socrates venit et videas eum de longe, tu prius iudicabis illum esse corpus vel animal vel hominem quam posses iudicare quod sit Socrates, etiam per intellectum quantumcumque ratiocinari poteris. Et ita prius concipis eum et iudicas de eo secundum conceptum universalem secundum quam dicitur homo vel ani-

59 unde . . . procedere ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.1 184a24–25 (Ar. lat. VII.1 8.1): “Unde ex universalibus in singularia oportet provenire; totum enim secundum sensum notius est, universale autem totum quiddam est; multa enim comprehendit ut partes universale.” 64–65 multa . . . universale ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.1 184a 25–26 (Ar. lat. VII.1.2 8.3–4): “multa enim comprehendit ut partes universale.” 68 totum . . . definitionis ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.1 184b10–13 (Ar. lat. VII.1.2 8.4–7): “Sustinent autem idem hoc quodammodo et nomina ad rationem; totum enim quiddam et indiffinitum significat, ut circulus, diffinitio autem ipsius dividit in singularia.” 71–72 pueri . . . matres ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.1 184b13–14 (Ar. lat. VII.1.2 8.7–9): “Et pueri primum appellant omnes viros patres et matres feminas, posterius autem determinant horum unumquodque.” 72 ponit ] AVICENNA, Lib. primus naturalium I.1 (ed. Van Riet, 10–17). Cf. ALBERTUS M AGNUS , Phys. 1.1.6 12 A . 59 universalibus in singularia ] singularibus in universalia(!) EVW 61 similem ] de toto sensibili et add. T 63 quam una pars ] om. AE 64 ad ] ipsa add. AE 65 comprehendit ] apprehendit VW 66 Secunda ] Alia VW 67 distinguere ] definire T 70 determinate ] sive definite add. AE 72 et . . . feminas ] om. A etc. E et omnes matres mulieres TV 73 si ] quia V

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true as regards the senses are concerned, must be true as regards the intellect. And so he concludes, saying “thus, we must proceed from universals to singulars.” 7. Aristotle gives us three ways of proving that the universal is better known to us. The first is by analogy with sense, namely that the whole sensible is better known to sense than part of it, and so, in the same way, the whole intelligible will be better known to the intellect than one part of it. “But,” as he says, “the universal is a kind of whole” relative to singulars, “for the universal includes many things as parts.” 8. The second argument is founded on the fact that it is easier to cognize confusedly than distinctly, for it is always difficult to distinguish something as just one thing.383 For this reason, he says that the whole of what is defined is better known than the parts of the definition. But to cognize confusedly is to cognize universally. To cognize singularly, however, is to cognize distinctly and determinately. 9. The third argument is that “children at first call all men ‘father’ and all women ‘mother’.” Avicenna presents more clearly the significance of this fact: if Socrates is approaching and you see him from a distance, you will judge him to be a body or an animal or a human before you are able to judge that he is Socrates, and this is the case no matter how much you are able to reason about it using your intellect. In this way, you conceive of him and make judgments about him on

383 The

sense of the adverb ‘confusedly [confuse]’ here is simply the opposite of ‘distinctly’, i.e., indeterminately or imprecisely, because the cognition contains elements that have been ‘fused together’. No suggestion of puzzlement or bewilderment is intended.

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mal quam secundum conceptum singularem secundum quam dicitur Socrates. Si autem aliquis dicat, sicut solet dici, quod Aristoteles non intendit ibi comparare universale ad singulare simpliciter, sed in respectu, id est magis universale ad minus universale, volens dicere quod magis universalia sunt nobis notiora minus universalibus, tunc ego ex hoc concludam propositum, quia ex positione quod singulare simpliciter sit primo cognitum ab intellectu, sequitur oppositum illius determinationis Aristotelis. Nam propinquius primo cognito debet esse prius et magis cognitum quam remotius. Sed minus universale est propinquius singulari simpliciter quam magis universale, species enim propinquior est suis singularibus quam genus. Ergo si singulare simpliciter est notum primo, sequitur quod minus universale est notius quam magis universale, et hoc est falsum et contra determinationem praedictam Aristotelis. Ergo non est ponendum quod singulare simpliciter sit primo notum. 10. Item videtur multis quod si intellectus, ex sui natura, propter eius immaterialitatem, non est innatus intelligere primitus universaliter, quod non posset dari modus conveniens per quem postea posset intelligere universaliter. Ideo numquam intelligeret universaliter, quod est falsum. 11. Istae sunt rationes et auctoritates quibus multi putaverunt quod intellectus prius cognosceret universaliter quam singulariter. 12. Oppositum tamen arguitur, quia sicut res primo repraesentatur intellectui, sic primo debet eam intelligere. Sed primo reprae-

81 ad minus universale ] om. V 83 singulare ] om. V 84 cognitum ] notum sive add. A 85 propinquius ] om. V 88 singularibus ] individuis W || si ] sequitur V 94 primitus ] intelligere add. V 100–102 repraesentatur . . . repraesentatur ] praesentatur . . . praesentatur E praesentatur . . . repraesentatur AT 101 debet ] habet V

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the basis of the universal concept by which he is said to be a human or an animal before you do so on the basis of the singular concept by which he is said to be Socrates. But if someone were to say — as is usually said — that Aristotle did not intend there to compare the universal to what is singular absolutely speaking, but in some respect, that is to say, the more universal with respect to the less universal, and that he meant to say that greater universals are better known to us than lesser universals, then from this I will conclude what was proposed, because the opposite of this determination of Aristotle’s follows from the assumption that what is singular absolutely speaking is cognized first by the intellect. For what is closer to the thing that is first cognized must be cognized earlier and to a greater degree than what is farther away. But what is less universal is closer to what is singular absolutely speaking than what is more universal, for a species is closer to its singulars than the genus. Therefore, if what is singular absolutely speaking is known first, it follows that what is less universal is better known than what is more universal, which is false and contrary to the aforementioned determination of Aristotle; therefore, it should not be assumed that what is singular absolutely speaking is known first. 10. Again, it seems to many that if the intellect — because of its nature, on account of its immateriality — is not naturally suited to understand universally from the beginning, no appropriate means could be given by which it could understand universally later on. And so it would never understand universally, which is false. 11. These are arguments and authorities on the basis of which many have thought that the intellect cognizes universally before it cognizes singularly. 12. Nevertheless, the opposite is argued, because just as a thing is represented to the intellect, so it must first be understood. But it

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sentatur sibi singulariter, quia per sensum vel phantasiam, quae non recipiunt vel apprehendunt nisi singulariter; ergo, etc. 13. Item in prooemio Metaphysicae dicitur quod “maxime universalia sunt nobis difficillima ad cognoscendum, quia sunt a sensu remotissima.” Igitur per oppositum, quae sunt proxima sensui illa sunt facillima ad cognoscendum, et apud intellectum, qui non intelligit nisi mediante sensu. Sed proxima sensui sunt singularia, ut dicitur primo Posteriorum; ergo etc. 14. Item ex secundo Metaphysicae habemus quod illa quae sunt secundum se sunt maxime intelligibilia et vere notissima, scilicet Deus et intelligentiae, et sunt nobis valde difficillima, difficultate proveniente ex parte nostra, scilicet quia intellectus noster indiget sensu ad intelligendum, et illa non sunt sensibilia. Et per oppositum, sensibilia sunt intellectui magis facilia et prius nota, et illa sunt singularia et non universalia. 15. Item principia universalia et indemonstrabilia, si non sint statim quando proponuntur intellectui evidentia, indigerent fieri evidentia per sensum, memoriam, et experientiam, ut habetur secundo Posteriorum et prooemio Metaphysicae, ita quod intellectus ex experientia in mul104–105 maxime . . . remotissima ] A RISTOTELES, Met. I.2 982a23–25 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 15.103): “difficillima sunt ea hominibus ad cognoscendum que maxime sunt uniuersalia; nam a sensibus sunt remotissima.” 108–109 primo Posteriorum ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 72a 4–5 (Ar. lat. IV.4 287.1): “Sunt autem longiora quidem universalia maxime, proxima autem singularia; et opponuntur hec ad invicem.” 110 secundo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. II.1 993b 26–31 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 44.27): “Quare et verissimum quod posterioribus est causa ut sint vera. Quapropter semper existentium principia semper esse verissima est necesse; non enim quandoque vera nec illis causa aliquid est ut sint, sed illa aliis. Quare unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem.” 119 secundo Posteriorum ] A RI STOTELES , An. post. II.19 100a 4–5 (Ar. lat. IV.4 342.18): “Ex sensu quidem igitur fit memoria, sicut diximus, ex memoria autem multotiens eiusdem facta experimentum.” 120 prooemio Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. I.1 980b30–981a6 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 12.19–20): “Fit autem ex memoria hominibus experimentum; eiusdem namque rei multae memoriae unius experientiae potentiam faciunt . . . Fit autem ars cum ex multis experimentalibus conceptionibus una fit universalis de similibus acceptio.” 102 singulariter ] simpliciter sup. lin. singulariter V 110 Item ] Similiter TVW || ex ] quo add. V 118 evidentia ] nota E om. T 120 ex ] rep. V 120–121 in multis ] om. V

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is first represented to it singularly, because it is represented by sense or imagination, neither of which receives or apprehends except singularly; therefore, etc. 13. Again, in the prologue to the Metaphysics it is said, “the most universal things are the most difficult for us to cognize, because they are the most remote from sense.” Therefore, conversely, those things that are closest to sense are the easiest to cognize, even by the intellect, which does not understand except by the mediation of sense. But the things that are closest to sense are singulars, as is said in Posterior Analytics I; therefore, etc. 14. Again, we have it from Metaphysics II that those things that exist by themselves,384 namely God and the intelligences, are the most intelligible and most truly known, and they are very much more difficult for us to cognize, with the difficulty arising on our part, namely, because our intellect needs sense in order to understand, and those things are not sensible. By contrast, sensibles are much easier for the intellect to cognize and are known earlier, and they are singulars, not universals. 15. Again, if universal and indemonstrable principles are not evident as soon as they are proposed to the intellect, they would need to be made evident by sense, memory, and experience, as is held in Posterior Analytics II and the prologue to the Metaphysics, in such

384 By

‘things that exist by themselves [secundum se]’, Aristotle just means things that exist separately or apart from matter.

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tis inducet universale principium. Intellectus autem non posset sic ex experientiis inducere universale principium nisi prius cognosceret illa quae sub experientia cadunt, et illa sunt singularia; ergo oportet intellectum prius cognoscere singularia, ut patet prooemio Metaphysicae. 16. Item cum res intelligibiles existunt singulariter extra animam et non universaliter, sicut posuit Plato, et cum etiam cognoscuntur a sensu singulariter et per consequens a principio repraesentantur intellectui singulariter, si intellectus tunc non apprehendit singulariter, non apparet modus per quem posset eas postea apprehendere singulariter. Ideo numquam intellectus intelligeret singulariter, quod est falsum. 17. Ista quaestio implicat plures maximas difficultates: scilicet utrum sensus potest sentire universaliter vel solum singulariter; et etiam utrum intellectus potest intelligere singulariter vel solum universaliter; et unde provenit quod intellectus potest intelligere universaliter, cum res non existant nisi singulariter; et quare sensus hoc non potest. Demum etiam posito quod intellectus intelligere possit et singulariter et universaliter, dubitatio est de qua quaerebatur utrum prius intelligat universaliter vel singulariter, vel e converso; et per quem modum intelligat tam universaliter quam singulariter; demum etiam utrum intelligat prius magis universale quam minus universale, vel e converso. 18. De prima igitur dubitatione, visum fuit aliquibus quod sensus, ex eo quod habet extensionem et situm determinatum in organo corporeo, non habet naturam cognoscendi universaliter sed singulari-

126 posuit Plato ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.18 (ed. Crawford, 440.96– 97): “Et omnia dicta ab Aristotele in hoc sunt ita quod universalia nullum habent esse extra animam, quod intendit Plato.” 121 inducet ] indiget AE adducit vel inducit W || universale principium ] om. AE 122 inducere ] cognoscere A 125 cum res ] omnes V || singulariter ] simpliciter E 126 cognoscuntur ] cognoscimur VW 128 singulariter . . . apprehendit ] hom. W || singulariter ] simpliciter EV || si ] sed V || tunc non ] cum V 131 implicat ] continet A || plures ] in se add. A vel multas in se add. E 132 sensus ] sentit (universaliter) exp. vel solum singulariter add. W 132–134 potest sentire universaliter vel solum singulariter; et etiam utrum intellectus potest intelligere singulariter vel solum universaliter ] sup. col. W 134 intellectus ] solum add. V exp. W 138–139 vel singulariter . . . universaliter ] hom. A

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a way that the intellect would induce the universal principle from the experience of many things. But the intellect could not induce a universal principle from experiences in this way unless it first cognized the things that fall under experience, and those are singulars; therefore, the intellect must first cognize singulars, as is clear in the prologue to the Metaphysics. 16. Again, since intelligible things exist singularly outside the soul and not universally, as Plato claimed, and since they are also cognized singularly by sense and consequently are represented to the intellect singularly from the beginning, if the intellect does not apprehend singularly at that point, there appears to be no way it could apprehend them singularly later on. Thus, the intellect would never understand singularly, which is false. 17. This question raises several great difficulties: whether sense can sense universally or only singularly; whether the intellect can understand singularly or only universally;385 how it happens that the intellect is able to cognize universally when things exist only singularly; and why sense cannot do this. Furthermore, on the assumption that the intellect is able to understand both universally and singularly, there is a doubt in connection with which it is asked whether it understands universally before it understands singularly, or conversely; in what way it understands both universally and singularly; and finally, whether it understands what is more universal before what is less universal, or conversely. 18. As for the first doubt, then, it has seemed to some that sense lacks the nature for cognizing universally, although it does have it for cognizing singularly and determinately, because it has extension

385 Oddly, Buridan answers the first two questions below without the “only [solum]”.

But the term is present here in all of the manuscripts.

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ter et signate. E converso autem de intellectu, quia est immaterialis et inextensus, et non determinans sibi situm in organo, habet naturam intelligendi universaliter et non singulariter. Existit enim quasi modo universali, cum secundum Commentatorem sit idem indivisibilis apud omnes homines, vel cum secundum fidem sit unus indivisibilis in qualibet parte corporis etiam secundum se totum. 19. Haec autem opinio apparet defectuosa. Primo enim deficit ponendo quod intellectus non possit intelligere singulariter, primo quia sicut Aristoteles coactus fuit ponere praeter sensus exteriores aliam virtutem unam, scilicet sensum communem, eo quod percipimus convenientiam vel differentiam inter album et dulce quam non possumus percipere per sensus exteriores, quia nullus cognoscit utrumque, et virtus ponens convenientiam vel differentiam inter aliqua oportet quod ambo ea cognoscat, ita etiam cum ponamus differentiam inter universale et singulare, vel inter universaliter et singulariter cognoscere, necesse est in nobis ponere unam virtutem quae ambo vel utroque modo cognoscat. Et si est aliqua una virtus talis, tunc omnes ponerent intellectum esse talem. 20. Item per virtutem cognoscitivam formamus tales propositiones Socrates est homo et Omnis lapis est Socrates et per illam iudicamus quod prima propositio est vera, et secunda falsa. Et oportet virtutem formantem tales propositiones et iudicantem de veritate et falsitate earum cognoscere subiectum et praedicatum et copulam et significata eorum. Igitur oportet unam et eandem virtutem sic iudicantem cognoscere singulariter Socratem, scilicet secundum conceptum a quo sumitur hoc nomen Socrates, et cognoscere universaliter homines et lapides, scilicet secundum conceptum vel concepta a quibus sumuntur

148 secundum Commentatorem ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 406.576): “opinati sumus ex hoc sermone quod intellectus materialis est unicus omnibus hominibus.” 157–158 virtus . . . cognoscat ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.2 426b 17–23. 145 et signate ] om. AET 146 organo ] corporeo add. ET 147 intelligendi ] cognoscendi V || quasi ] quodam T 149 vel . . . indivisibilis ] et totus AE 150 etiam secundum se totum ] om. AE 156 cognoscit ] percipit AE 162 talem ] ut notum est add. A 164 Socrates ] homo T 166 veritate et ] om. V in marg. W

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and a determinate location in a corporeal organ. It is the other way around with the intellect, however, because it is immaterial and unextended, not determining for itself a determinate location in an organ, it does possess the nature for understanding universally and not singularly. For it exists in a kind of universal way, because, according to the Commentator, it is the same indivisible thing in relation to all humans; or according to the faith, it is a single indivisible thing, existing also as a whole in each part of the body. 19. But this opinion seems defective. For it fails first in claiming that the intellect cannot understand singularly, because just as Aristotle was forced to posit one additional power, namely the common sense, in addition to the external senses, due to the fact that we perceive the agreement or disagreement between white and sweet, which we are unable to perceive by exterior senses — since none of them cognizes both, and the power positing an agreement or disagreement between things must be such that it cognizes them both — so also, since we posit a difference between what is universal and what is singular, or between cognizing universally and cognizing singularly, it is necessary to posit a single power in us that cognizes both in both ways. And if there is one such power, everyone would assume that the intellect would be it. 20. Again, we form such propositions as ‘Socrates is human’ and ‘Every stone is Socrates’ through a cognitive power, and judge through it that the first proposition is true and the second false. And it must be that the power that forms such propositions and passes judgment on their truth and falsity cognizes their predicates, subjects, copula, and significates. Therefore, it must be that one and the same power, judging in this way, cognizes Socrates singularly, that is to say, according to the concept from which the name ‘Socrates’ is taken, and also cognizes humans and stones universally, that is to say, according

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haec nomina homo et lapis. Et illa virtus est intellectus; ergo intellectus cognoscit et iudicat universaliter et singulariter. 21. Item prudentia est una de virtutibus intellectualibus, ut apparet sexto Ethicorum, et ibidem determinat Aristoteles quod ipsa non solum est universalium sed etiam singularium; ergo, etc. 22. Secundo dicta opinio non videtur demonstrabilis esse circumscripta fide, inquantum ponit intellectum immaterialem et inextensum, sicut prius dictum fuit. 23. Tertio dicta opinio apparet mihi deficere in assignando tantum quod intellectus cognoscit universaliter et sensus non nisi singulariter, quod hoc est propter immaterialitatem et inextensionem intellectus, et propter materialitatem et extensionem sensus. Nam licet concederetur intellectus inextensus et immaterialis et sensus extensus et materialis, tamen ex hoc non videtur sequi talis diversus modus apprehendendi, scilicet singulariter et universaliter, quod apparet quia Deus super me est immaterialis et inextensus, et non intelligit modo universali, quia talis modus intelligendi est confusus et imperfectus. Deus autem non intelligit res imperfecte nec confuse, sed omnia distincte et determinatissime. 24. Et iterum apparet quod virtus materialis et extensa fertur bene in obiectum suum modo universali, nam appetitus equi secundum famem aut sitim non est singulariter ad hanc avenam vel ad hanc aquam, sed ad quamlibet indifferenter, unde quamcumque primitus inveniret illam caperet. Et intentio naturalis vel appetitus ignis ad calefaciendum non se habet modo singulari ad hoc calefactibile vel illud, sed ad quodlibet indifferenter quod ipse posset calefacere. Ideo quodcumque sibi praesentetur, calefaceret ipsum.

175 sexto Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. VI.5 1140a25–31. 179 prius dictum fuit ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3, par. 25. 182 est ] non(!) sup. lin. A 189 distincte et ] om. AET distinctissime W 189–190 determinatissime ] determinate T et ordinatissime W 193 singulariter ] simpliciter V 197 calefacere ] capere AE 198 praesentetur ] proximaretur A

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to the concept or concepts from which the names ‘human’ and ‘stone’ are taken. And this power is the intellect; therefore, the intellect cognizes and judges universally and singularly. 21. Again, prudence is one of the intellectual virtues, as is apparent in Nicomachean Ethics VI, and Aristotle determines there that it has to do not only with universals but also with singulars. Therefore, etc. 22. Second, the stated opinion does not seem to be demonstrable, leaving the faith aside, insofar as it posits an immaterial and unextended intellect, as was said earlier. 23. Third, the stated opinion seems to me to fail in claiming, with regard to the intellect’s cognizing only universally and sense not cognizing except singularly, that this is because of the intellect’s immateriality and lack of extension on the one hand, and sense’s materiality and extension on the other. For even if one grants that the intellect is unextended and immaterial and sense extended and material, this sort of difference in modes of apprehending, that is to say, between apprehending universally and apprehending singularly, does not seem to follow. This is apparent because God on high is immaterial and unextended, and God does not understand in a universal way because this mode of understanding is confused and imperfect. God does not understand things imperfectly or confusedly, but everything distinctly and most determinately. 24. Furthermore, it is apparent that a material and extended power is properly brought to bear on its object in a universal way, for the appetite of a horse in the form of hunger or thirst is not singularly for this sack of oats or that water, but for any indifferently, which is why it would take whichever it finds first. And the natural intention or appetite of fire for heating is not related to this or that heatable thing in a singular way, but indifferently, to anything it can heat. Thus, it would heat whatever is put to it.

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25. Item conceptus nostri in intellectu nostro ita singulariter et distincte ab invicem et ab aliis existunt sicut colores et sapores in corporibus, quamvis conceptus tales in eo non habeant extensionem nec situm corporeum, immo omnia existunt singulariter. Si igitur volumus assignare causam unam, licet non sufficientem, quare intellectus potest intelligere universaliter, quamvis res intellectae nec universaliter existant nec sint universales, ego dico quod haec est quia res intelliguntur non per hoc quod ipsae sint in intellectu, sed quia species earum, quae sunt similitudines repraesentivae earum, sunt in intellectu. Unde dicitur tertio De anima, “lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis.” 26. Tunc ergo accipiamus quod res extra animam singulariter et diversim existens de eadem specie vel de eodem genere habent ex natura sui similitudinem seu convenientiam essentialem maiorem quam istae quae sunt diversarum specierum vel diversorum generum. Plus enim conveniunt ex natura rei Socrates et Plato quam Socrates et Brunellus, etiam quantum ad suas essentias, et plus etiam Socrates et Brunellus quam Socrates et iste lapis, quod propter hoc patet quia in ipsis inveniuntur accidentia naturaliter convenientia essentiis eorum, magis similia et magis convenientia in hiis quae sunt eiusdem generis vel speciei quam in aliis. Et huiusmodi maior essentialis convenientia provenit ex eo quod ista quae sunt eiusdem speciei vel generis proveniunt ex eisdem causis vel similibus, magis quam alia, propter quod in ordine entium sunt eiusdem gradus, vel propinquorum graduum ad invicem, quam alia. Immo illa quae sunt eiusdem speciei specialissimae tantam habent essentialem convenientiam quod tu non habes viam ad percipiendum eorum distinctionem nisi per extranea. Verbi gratia, sint duo lapides similes in colore et magnitudine et figura et aliis singularis accidentibus, et nunc videas unum et quantum potes considereres ipsum. Demum, te recedente auferatur ille et ponatur alius loco eius. Tu 208–209 lapis . . . lapidis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 431b29 (Ar. lat. XII.2, 235.1.12): “non enim lapis in anima est, sed species.” 199–200 singulariter . . . et ] indistincte T 200–201 corporibus ] coloribus A 205 est ] sit causa AE 212 sui ] rei T 217–218 magis similia et ] om. E 221 causis ] a quibus add. AETV 223 quam alia ] quod cum aliis A 225 percipiendum ] ponendum A || sint ] sicut ETVW sint sup. lin. W

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25. Again, our concepts exist in our intellect as singularly and distinctly from one another and from other things as colors and flavors do in bodies: although such concepts do not have extension or corporeal location in the intellect, they certainly all exist singularly. Therefore, if we want to give a single reason, although not a sufficient reason, why the intellect can understand universally even though the things understood neither exist universally nor are themselves universals, I say this is because things are understood not on account of the fact that they are in the intellect, but because their species, which are representative likenesses of them, are in the intellect. That is why it is said in De Anima III that “a stone is not in the soul, but the species of a stone.” 26. Let us accept, then, that things existing singularly and separately outside the soul belonging to the same species or the same genus have, by virtue of their nature, a likeness or essential agreement greater than things belonging to different species or different genera. For Socrates and Plato agree more in reality than Socrates and Browny, and Socrates and Browny agree even more as far as their essences are concerned than Socrates and this stone. This is clear because the accidents found in them naturally go together with their essences, and in things belonging to the same species or genus, the accidents are more similar and agree more than they do in other things. This kind of essential agreement stems from the fact that things belonging to the same species or genus come from the same or similar causes, more so than other things, on account of the fact that in the order of being, they occupy the same grade, or grades closer to each other than other things. Indeed, things belonging to the same most specific species have so great an essential agreement that the only way you have of perceiving their difference is by their external features. For example, let there be two stones alike in color, size,386 shape, and other singular accidents, and suppose you now see one of

386 Translating

the ‘magnitudo’ of De an. III.4 429b10–14 and par. 2 above more colloquially here as ‘size’.

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rediens iudicabis quod ille qui sit ibi repositus est ille idem quem ante tu videbas, et similiter, quod color quem in eo iudicabis sit iste idem color quae ante videbas, et similiter de magnitudine et figura. Nec tu habebis aliquam viam ad sciendum an ille est idem lapis vel alter. Et sic etiam esset de hominibus, scilicet si videas eos simul, tu iudicabis quod sint alii propter alietatem locorum vel situs. Postea ego iterum suppono quod si sint aliqua sibi invicem similia, quidquid est simile uni eorum, in eo in quo illa sunt sibi invicem similia, ipsum est simile unicuique aliorum. Verbi gratia, si A, B, et C sint similia secundum albedinem quia sunt alba, si D est simile ipsi A, oportet quod sit simile etiam ipsi B et ipsi C. Inde sequitur ex quo repraesentatio fit per similitudinem quod illud quod erat repraesentativum unius erit indifferenter repraesentativum aliorum, nisi aliud concurreret quod obstet, sicut dicetur post. Et ex hoc finaliter infertur quod cum species et similitudo Socratis fuerit apud intellectum et fuerit abstracta a speciebus extraneorum, illa non magis erit repraesentatio Socratis quam Platonis et aliorum hominum, nec intellectus per eam magis intelligeret Socratem quam alios homines. Immo sic per eam indifferenter omnes homines intelliget uno conceptu, scilicet a quo sumitur hoc nomen homo. Et hoc est intelligere universaliter. 27. Sed tunc statim concurrit duplex dubitatio. Prima est quod cum intellectus res extra et primo intelligibiles, ut puta sensibilia, non intelligat nisi per suas species repraesentivas earum, quare non semper intelligit eas universaliter et numquam singulariter? Secunda dubitatio

241–242 dicetur post ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.15–16. 229 rediens ] veniens T || iudicabis ] seu videbis add. T || repositus ] positus AE || ante ] om. VW 230 iudicabis ] videbas E 232 sciendum ] sentiendum A 235 invicem ] recte add. T 236 sibi ] om. V 237 C ] om. AT 238 si ] sicut V || D ] C T 239 et ipsi C ] om. AT C V 242 post ] om. AET 247 uno ] non (!) T 252 et numquam ] et non V

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them and you examine it as much as you can. Then, when you are gone, it is removed and the other one is put in its place. Upon returning, you will judge that the one put there now is the same one you saw earlier; likewise, you will judge that the color in it is the same color you saw before, and the same is true for size and shape. Nor will you have any way of knowing whether it is the same stone or another. The same would be true of humans: if you were to see them together, you will judge that they are different due to a difference in place or location. Next, I make the further assumption that if there are some things similar to each other, then whatever is similar to one of them is also similar to each of the others, in that respect in which they are similar to each other. For example, if A, B, and C are similar in whiteness because they are white, then if D is similar to A, it must also be similar to both B and C. From this it follows — given that representation occurs by means of likeness — that what was representative of one will be indifferently representative of the others unless something happens that blocks it, as will be discussed later. And from this it is finally inferred that once the species and likeness of Socrates has existed in the intellect and has been abstracted from the species of external features, it will no more be a representation of Socrates than of Plato and other humans, nor does the intellect understand Socrates through it more than other humans. On the contrary, the intellect understands all humans indifferently by means of it, in a single concept, namely, the concept from which the name ‘human’ is taken. And this is to understand universally. 27. But then two doubts immediately arise. The first is that since the intellect does not understand things external to it that are the primary intelligibles — namely, sensible things — except through species that are representative of them, why doesn’t it always under-

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est cum sensus etiam cognoscat res per suas similitudines, quare non cognoscit eas universaliter? 28. Ad solvendum istas dubitationes, debemus ex septimo Metaphysicae videre modum percipiendi rem singulariter, scilicet quod oportet eam percipere per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis. Ideo ipse Deus quasi per modum singularem cognoscit omnia distinctissime et determinatissime, scilicet quia habet omnia perfecte in prospectu suo per se. Sensus igitur exterior, quia cognoscit sensibile per modum existentis in prospectu suo secundum certum situm, licet aliquando false iudicaremus de situ propter reflexionem specierum, ideo cognoscit ipsum singulariter vel signate, ut hoc vel illud. Quamvis igitur sensus exterior cognoscat Socratem vel albedinem vel album, tamen hoc non est nisi per speciem confuse et simul repraesentantem cum substantia et albedine et magnitudine et situ secundum quem apparet in prospectu cognoscentis. Et ille sensus non potest distinguere illam confusionem si non potest abstrahere species substantiae et albedinis et magnitudinis et situs ab invicem. Ideo non potest percipere substantiam vel albedinem vel album nisi per modum existentis in prospectu eius. Ideo non potest cognoscere praedicta nisi singulariter. 29. Item etsi sensus communis a sensu exteriori reciperet species cum tali confusione et non possit dissolvere confusionem, ipse de necessitate apprehendit modo singulari. Unde in somniis iudicamus quod apparet nobis esse hoc vel illud, vel esse hic vel ibi. Ita etiam etsi in virtute memorativa species fiat a sensu cum tali confusione situs, cognitio memorativa fiet in nobis per modum singularem, licet cum praeteritione, et iudicabis quod vel erat hoc vel illud, vel hic vel illic. Et ob hoc dico corollarie esse credendum quod tu non potes co255–256 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.15 1040a2–7. 253 similitudines ] singulares sub lin. V 258 quasi ] quia T || singularem ] singulariter VW 259 distinctissime ] perfectissime A || et determinatissime ] om. T et ordinatissime W 260 per se ] om. T 263 ut ] vel consigificet per T scilicet quod V 265 simul ] similiter E om. T 267 potest ] sensu add. V 269 albedinis ] albi AE 270 vel album ] om. T 274 dissolvere ] distinguere T 277 etsi in virtute ] in superiori virtute T || confusione ] cognitione V confusione sup. lin. V 279 erat ] erit ETV 280 credendum ] concedendum A 280–281 cognoscere ] intelligere TVW

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stand them universally, and never singularly? The second doubt is that since sense also cognizes things by their likenesses, why doesn’t it cognize them universally? 28. To resolve these doubts, we should look at how a thing is perceived singularly on the basis of Metaphysics VII: one must perceive it in the manner of something existing in the prospect of the person cognizing it. Thus, God himself cognizes everything most distinctly and determinately, as it were in a singular manner, namely because he has everything per se perfectly in his prospect. Therefore, because exterior sense cognizes what is sensible as something existing in its prospect in a certain place, even if we sometimes judge falsely about the place on account of the reflection of species, it cognizes it singularly or definitely, as this or that. Therefore, although an external sense cognizes Socrates, or whiteness, or a white thing, this is only via a species representing him confusedly and together with substance, whiteness, size, and location, as he appears in the prospect of the person cognizing him. And the power of sense cannot sort out the confusion if it is unable to abstract the species of substance, whiteness, size, and location from each other. And so it can only perceive substance, or whiteness, or a white thing in the manner of something existing in its prospect. Thus, it can cognize the aforementioned objects only singularly. 29. Again, even if the common sense receives species from the external senses with this sort of confusion and cannot resolve the confusion, it necessarily apprehends in a singular manner. That is why we judge in dreams that this or that appears to us to exist, or to be here or there. And so as well, even if a species is produced by sense in the power of memory, confusedly with place, then a memory will be produced in us in a singular manner, though with pastness, and you will judge either that this or that existed, or that it existed right here

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gnoscere Aristotelem per modum simpliciter singularem, quia numquam novisti eum per modum existentis in prospectu tuo. Verum est quod tu bene cognoscis singulariter hanc vocem Aristoteles vel etiam hanc vocem homo quae tibi proponitur, quia audis eam per modum existentis in prospectu auditus tui. Sed rem significatam isto nomine tu non cognoscis per modum simpliciter et proprie singularem, quia tu numquam cognoscis distincte Aristotelem a Platone vel Ruperto, nisi per circumlocutionem tibi factam ab aliquibus, ut quod Aristoteles fuit unus homo natus in Graecia, discipulus Platonis, consultor regis Alexandri magni, qui composuit tales libros, etc. Modo talis circumlocutio non est secundum conceptum simpliciter singularem, quia ponamus, sive sit verum vel falsum, quod unus alter habuit consimiles conditiones, illa circumlocutio conveniret illi sicut isti, nec magis per talem locutionem intelligis unum quam alium. Sed tamen, verum est quod illud nomen Aristoteles sibi fuit impositum ad significandum eum secundum conceptum singularem, quia demonstrantes eum in prospectu suo dixerunt: Iste puer vocetur ‘Aristoteles’. Et istam sententiam expresse intendebat Aristoteles in septimo Metaphysicae, ubi dixit quod non contingit singularia definire, immo nec circumloqui circumlocutione propria. Oportet enim circumlocutionem fieri, ut dicit, per plurima nomina, et illa essent ut communia et aliis convenientia, vel possibilia convenire, ut si alia singularia generarentur similia. Verbi gratia, dicit Aristoteles: “Si quis te definiat animal dicet gressibile aut album aut aliquid aliud quod in alio sit,” etc. 298 septimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.15 1039b27–28 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 182.812): “propter hoc autem et substantiarum sensibilium singularium nec diffinitio nec demonstratio est.” 303–304 Si . . . sit ] A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.15 1040a11–14 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 162.821): “si quis te diffiniat, animal dicet gracile aut album aut aliquid aliud quod in alio sit.” 281 Aristotelem ] Socratem ET || singularem ] existentem sive significantem A 281–282 numquam novisti ] vel cognovisti A non cognovisti E numquam cognovisti T 282 tuo ] om. AVW 285 prospectu ] cuius cognoscentis exp. V 286 proprie ] per modum add. E 288 tibi factam ] ut praedicatam A vel dictum E tibi datam T 289 unus . . . Graecia ] om. AE 290 etc. ] Alexandri(!) V 290–291 Modo talis circumlocutio ] locutio V modo talis locutio W 292 sive . . . falsum ] om. V 295 Aristoteles ] om. A 297 dixerunt ] hic vel add. EVW || vocetur ] nominetur V 299 nec ] ante add. V 303 te ] om. VW 304 aut album ] om. E || alio ] re T

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or over there. And on this basis, I claim as a corollary that you should believe that you cannot cognize Aristotle in a singular manner strictly speaking, because you have never known him as something existing in your prospect. It is true that you do cognize the utterance ‘Aristotle’ singularly, or even the utterance ‘human’, which is put before you, because you hear it as something existing in the ‘prospect’ of your sense of hearing.387 But you do not cognize the thing signified by that name in a strictly singular manner without qualification because you never cognize Aristotle distinctly from Plato or Rupert, except by means of a description made for you by others, e.g., that Aristotle was human, born in Greece, a student of Plato, an advisor to King Alexander the Great, who wrote such and such books, etc. Now, such a description is not in keeping with a singular concept strictly speaking, because let us suppose, whether truly or falsely, that someone else has similar characteristics: that description would fit the one just as much as the other; nor by such a description would you understand the one more than the other. But it is true that the name ‘Aristotle’ was imposed on him in order to signify him according to a singular concept, because those who pointed at him in their prospect said, “Let this boy be called ‘Aristotle’.” This is what Aristotle explicitly had in mind in Metaphysics VII when he said that singulars are not definable, and further, that they cannot be described by a proper description. For, as he says, one must produce a description using several names, and these would be like common names and would agree with other things, or possible things, e.g., if other similar singulars were generated. For example, Aristotle says, “if someone were to define you, he would say

387 The term ‘prospect’ suggests a visual field, but Buridan is

sense here to refer to an organism’s sensory field in general.

using it in an extended

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30. Sed tu quaeres nonne hoc nomen Aristoteles est nomen singulare et individuum? 31. Et ego respondeo quod nomen vocale non debet dici universale vel singulare nisi ex eo quod sibi correspondet conceptus singularis aut universalis. Porphyrius autem tetigit notabiliter tres modos singularium, scilicet Socrates, hoc album et Sophronisci filius. Modo propriissime, iste modus hoc album vel hoc veniens, etc., habet conceptus singulares sibi correspondentes quia illud pronomen demonstrativum hoc non apponitur bene secundum modum significandi nisi sit cognitio rei per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis. Iste autem modus singularium, Socrates, Plato et Aristoteles, fuerunt proprie singulares habentes conceptus simpliciter singulares sibi correspondentes, quia imponebantur ad significandum res conceptas per modum existentium in prospectu imponentium, qui dicebant hoc vel hic puer vocetur nomine proprio Socrates. Sed illa nomina aliis qui non viderunt illos non sunt iam singularia, nec habentes conceptus correspondentes simpliciter singulares. Sed sicut notat Porphyrius, dicuntur singularia illis per circumlocutionem “ex proprietatibus . . . quorum collectio numquam in alio eadem erit,” vel fuit, ut per hoc nomen Aristoteles intelligimus hominem Graecum sapientissimum, discipulum Platonis, et consiliatorem regis Alexandri. Haec enim circumlocutio sic dicitur singularis quia numquam convenit nisi solo homini. Sed non est singularis, quoniam esset innata aliis convenire, non enim fuisset impossibile quod fuisset alius talis. Sed cum dico hic homo, impossibile est quod alius sit hic homo. Alius autem modus singularium, ut Sophronisci filius, non est proprie dictum singulare quia haec oratio Sophronisci filius statim est innata convenire pluribus, scilicet si Sophroniscus generaret alium filium. Sed eo solo hoc dicitur singulare 309 tetigit ] P ORPHYRY, Isag. 7.19–21 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 13.21–23). 322–323 ex . . . erit ] P ORPHYRY, Isag. 7.21–23 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 13.24–14.2): “Individua ergo dicuntur huiusmodi quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum quorum collectio numquam in alio eadem erit.” 305 Aristoteles ] om. E 311 iste modus ] hoc nomen AE || hoc veniens ] om. E || etc. ] om. EVW 313 hoc ] om. T || bene ] alicuius add. A alicui E 314 existentis ] rei add. V 315 modus ] intellectus V modus sup. lin. V || singularium ] in qua add. AE similiter add. T 318 dicebant ] imponebant V 325 et consiliatorem regis Alexandri ] om. E etc. AT 326 singularis . . . est ] in marg. V || homini ] illi add. AE 327 singularis ] sic AE 330–331 non . . . filius ] hom. E 330 non ] om. (!) T || dictum ] nomen A || oratio ] dictum A

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‘animal that is able to walk’, or ‘white’, or something else that would apply to someone other than you,” etc. 30. But you might ask, isn’t the name ‘Aristotle’ a singular and individual name? 31. I reply that a spoken name must not be called universal or singular unless a singular or universal concept corresponds to it. It is worth noting, however, that Porphyry touched on three modes of singulars, namely ‘Socrates’, ‘this white’, and ‘the son of Sophroniscus’. In the strictest sense, the mode ‘this white’ or ‘this thing approaching’ has singular concepts corresponding to it because the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ is not correctly applied according to its mode of signifying unless there is a cognition of the thing as existing in the prospect of the person cognizing it. But the mode of singulars, such as ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, and ‘Aristotle’, were properly singular, having singular concepts corresponding to them absolutely speaking, because they were imposed to signify things conceived as existing in the prospect of those who imposed them, who said that this, or this boy, should be called by the proper name ‘Socrates’. But to others who have not seen them, those names are no longer singular, nor do they have singular concepts corresponding to them absolutely speaking. But as Porphyry indicates, they are said to be singulars to them by means of a description “on the basis of properties the collection of which never was, nor will be, the same in any other thing”; for example, by the name ‘Aristotle’, we understand a Greek man, most wise, a student of Plato, and an advisor to King Alexander. This description is called singular because it fits only one human being, but because it is naturally suited to fit others, it is not singular, for it would not have been impossible for another human to have existed just like him. But when I say ‘this human being’, it is impossible for some other human being to be this human being. However, the other mode of singulars,

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quia de facto, non convenit pluribus. Et manifestum est quod secundum talem impropriam locutionem seu intentionem, isti termini sol et luna dicerentur termini singulares, qui tamen sunt termini specifici. 32. Tunc igitur revertendo ad propositum, dico quod intellectus cum a phantasmate recipit speciem vel intentionem Socratis cum tali confusione magnitudinis et situs, facit rem apparere per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis, intellectus intelligit illum modo singulari. Sed intellectus potest illam confusionem distinguere et abstrahere conceptum substantiae vel albedinis a conceptu situs, ut non amplius res concipiatur per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis, et tunc erit conceptus communis. Unde cum elicitus fuerit conceptus Socratis abstracte ab illis conceptibus situs et albedinis et aliorum accidentium vel extraneorum, ille iam non magis repraesentabit Socratem quam Platonem, et erit conceptus communis a quo sumitur hoc nomen homo. Et quaecumque virtus potest facere huiusmodi abstractionem, sive illa sit sensus sive intellectus, illa potest universaliter cognoscere. Unde etiam Alexander illam virtutem credidit in nobis esse materialem et extensam, quam tamen in homine concessit esse vocandum intellectum, propter excellentiam nobilitatis eius super virtutes cognoscitivas brutorum. 33. Ex istis dictis, apparet manifeste quod sit directe respondendum ad quaestionem. Dicendum enim est quod prius intelligimus singulariter quam universaliter, quia sit prius intellectu repraesentatio confusa

349 credidit ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. 397.298).

Crawford, 393.196–

334 locutionem seu ] om. AE || seu intentionem ] om. T || sol et ] om. A 337 intentionem ] intellectionem T 339 illum ] illo A 342 non ] om. (!) T || concipiatur ] percipiatur TVW 345–346 repraesentabit ] determinat A 353 quod sit directe ] quomodo sit AET 355 confusa ] aut composita add. A

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e.g., ‘son of Sophroniscus’, is not strictly speaking a singular phrase because the expression ‘son of Sophroniscus’ would at once fit more than one thing, namely if Sophroniscus begot another son. But it is called singular only because, as a matter of fact, it does not fit more than one thing. And it is obvious that it is by this kind of imprecision in speech or thought that the terms ‘sun’ and ‘moon’ are called singular terms, although they are species terms. 32. Returning to the topic, then, I say that when the intellect receives the species or intention of Socrates from the phantasm with this sort of confusion of size and location, it makes the thing appear as something existing in the prospect of the person cognizing it, and the intellect understands him in a singular manner. But the intellect is able to sort out this confusion and abstract the concept of substance or whiteness from the concept of place, so that the thing is no longer conceived as something existing in the prospect of the person cognizing it, and then there will be a common concept. For this reason, when the concept of Socrates has been drawn out in abstraction from the concepts of whiteness, place, and other accidents or external features, it will no more represent Socrates than Plato, and it will be the common concept from which the name ‘human’ is taken. And any power that can perform an abstraction of this kind, regardless of whether it belongs to sense or intellect, can cognize universally. For this reason as well, Alexander believed that this power is material and extended in us, which he nevertheless granted should be called ‘intellect’ in a human being, on account of its great pre-eminence over the cognitive powers of brute animals. 33. From what has been said, it seems obvious what should be directly replied to the question: it should be said that we understand singularly before we understand universally, because a representation

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cum magnitudine et situ et aliis quam intellectus potest distinguere et abstrahere illam confusionem. 34. Nunc restat dicere de ultima dubitatione, scilicet utrum intellectus intelligit prius magis universale quam minus universale, vel e converso. Et de hoc ego dixi magis complete in prooemio Physicorum, ubi dixi cum Aristotele quod prius et facilius magis universale intelligimus. Et hoc provenit ex parte sensus, quoniam duplex ponitur singulare sensibile, ut tactum fuit: unum quod solet vagum vocari, ut hic homo vel hic veniens, quod vocari debet singulare simpliciter et proprie solum, tamen ad placitum vocatur vagum quia similis vox convenit pluribus secundum diversas demonstrationes; aliud quod solet vocari determinatum, ut Socrates vel Plato etc., eo quod describitur per collectionem proprietatum tamen determinatam sic ad unum suppositum, quod de facto non recipitur talis in alio supposito, ut bene dixit Porphyrius. 35. Modo igitur considerandum est quod non oportet rem prius cognoscere singulariter quam universaliter quantum ad singularem determinatum, sed quantum ad singularem vagum, immo difficile est cognoscere sic singulariter. Si enim Socrates veniens videtur a longe, prius iudicabo quod est corpus quam quod est animal, et prius quod est animal quam quod est homo, et prius quod est homo quam quod est Socrates, et sic ultimo apprehendam eum secundum conceptum a quo sumitur hoc nomen Socrates. Sed prius per sensum et consequenter per intellectum, iudicabimus hoc animal vel hunc hominem confuse cum situ quam universaliter, animalem vel hominem abstrahendo a repraesentatione situs. Et tunc notandum est quod quodlibet universale

360–361 prooemio Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.7 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 72–76). 356 distinguere ] definire AE 360 magis ] exemplariter A exemplariter add. T 362 intelligimus ] sive confuse add. A || quoniam ] sensibilium communium unde AE 363 unum quod ] unumquodque VW || vagum ] supra V 364 vel hic veniens ] om. A 365 proprie ] Socrates enim et Plato isto modo non vocetur individuum vagum add. A 367 determinatum ] demonstratum AT || vel Plato ] om. V 369 recipitur ] invenitur AE || supposito ] definito T 372–373 determinatum ] demonstratum A 374 veniens ] om. AE

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confused with size, place, and other things is in the intellect before it is able to sort out the confusion and abstract from it.388 34. Now it remains to say something about the final doubt, namely whether the intellect understands what is more universal before what is less universal, or conversely. I have spoken about this more extensively in the prologue to my Physics, where I said with Aristotle that we understand what is more universal first and more easily. And this happens on account of sense, since we posit two sorts of sensible singulars, as was touched on there: one, which is usually called “vague”, such as ‘this human’ or ‘this one approaching’, and this alone should be called singular properly and absolutely speaking, although it is conventionally said to be vague because a similar utterance applies to more than one thing, according to different acts of pointing at something; and another, which is usually called “determined”, such as ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato’, etc., in that it is described by a collection of properties, which is nevertheless determined to a single individual so that, as a matter of fact, such a collection is not received in another determinate individual, as was well said by Porphyry. 35. Now it should be acknowledged that one need not cognize a thing singularly before cognizing it universally as far as a determined singular is concerned, but only as far as a vague singular is concerned; indeed, it is difficult to cognize it singularly in this way. For if Socrates is seen approaching from a distance, I will judge that what I see is a body before I judge that it is an animal, and that it is an animal before I judge that it is human, and that it is human before I judge that it is Socrates, and in this way I will end up apprehending him according to the concept from which the name ‘Socrates’ is taken. But first by sense, and subsequently by intellect, we will judge this animal or this human fused together with a place, rather than universally, by

388 As

noted above, Buridan’s point here is not that a sensory representation ‘confuses’, say, whiteness with a place and a size, mistaking one for the other, but rather that it necessarily represents this whiteness as “fused together” with its size and place here and now, i.e., representing it as being of this size, here and now in the visual field of the perceiver. It is this “confusion” or “being fused together” that the intellect needs to abstract from in forming a universal representation.

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habet suum singulare vagum sibi correspondens, ut corpus/hoc corpus, animal/hoc animal, homo/hic homo. Modo apud sensum, prius est individuum vagum magis universalis quam individuum vagum minus universalis, nam sensus prius iudicat hoc corpus quam hoc animal. Ideo abstrahendo, intellectus prius iudicabit magis universale quam minus universale, ut corpus prius quam animal. 36. Hiis igitur sic dictis, respondendum est faciliter ad rationes. 37. Ad primam dicitur quod Aristoteles per istam circumflexionem non intendebat reflexionem intellectus super sensum, ut aliqui fictitie dicunt, nullus enim posset bene dicere per quem modum fieret huiusmodi reflexio. Sed per circumflexionem intendebat convolutionem et confusionem specierum et conceptuum substantiae, qualitatum, magnitudinis, situs, etc., sicut dictum fuit. Et per extensionem intendebat abstractionem, modo prius dicto. 38. Ad auctoritatem Commentatoris igitur dicitur quod intellectus intelligit universaliter secundum se, quia ex sua natura et perfectione est quod possit abstrahere modo prius dicto, cum tamen prius habuerit conceptum singularem a quo oportet fieri abstractionem. Sed intelligit singulariter mediante sensu, quia oportuit prius sentire singulariter. 39. Ad auctoritatem Aristotelis primo Posteriorum, conceditur quod singularia sunt nobis notiora secundum intellectum. Sed cum dicimus universalia simpliciter esse notiora, possumus dicere quod hoc est verum capiendo singularia pro minus universalibus; vel etiam verum est comparando universalia ad singularia determinata, et non ad vaga; vel potest dici quod ipse loquitur de universalibus in causalitate, quae sunt primae causae, illa enim sunt notiora simpliciter

391 dicunt ] viz. Averroes. 383 animal ] vel V || animal . . . hic homo ] etc. A om. E 386 universale ] universaliter W 386–387 quam minus universale ] om. A 387 universale ] universaliter W 388 sic dictis ] visis T om. V 389 circumflexionem ] reflexionem T circumlocutionem VW 392 circumflexionem ] reflexionem T circumreflexionem V vel circumlocutionem W 394 extensionem ] distinctionem T 405 universalia . . . singularia ] singularia . . . universalia(!) V 407 primae ] et per se add. A

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abstracting animal or human from the representation of place. And then it must be noted that each universal has a vague singular corresponding to it, as in ‘body’/‘this body’, ‘animal’/‘this animal’, and ‘human’/‘this human’. Now in the senses, there is a more universal vague individual before there is a less universal vague individual, for sense judges this body before this animal. Therefore, when it abstracts, the intellect will judge what is more universal before what is less universal, e. g. the body before the animal. 36. Now that these things have been said, it should be easy to reply to the initial arguments. 37. To the first,389 it is said that by ‘bent’, Aristotle did not mean the reflection of intellect on sense, as some have fictitiously said, for no one could rightly say how a reflection of this sort would occur. But by ‘bent’ he meant the convolution and confusion of the species and concepts of substance, quality, size, place, and so on, as was said. And by ‘extension’, he meant abstraction, in the way stated above. 38. Therefore, to the Commentator’s authoritative remark,390 it is said that the intellect understands universally on its own because it is due to its own nature and perfection that it can abstract in the way stated, since it previously had the singular concept from which the abstraction must be produced. But it understands singularly by the mediation of sense because it first had to sense singularly. 39. As for Aristotle’s authoritative remark in Posterior Analytics 391 it is granted that singulars are better known to us as far as the intellect is concerned. But when we say that universals are better known absolutely speaking, we can say that this is true by taking ‘singulars’ for things that are less universal; or it is true by comparing universals to determined rather than vague singulars; or it could be said that Aristotle is speaking of universals in causality, which are first causes, for

389 See

par. 2 above. par. 3 above. 391 See par. 4 above. 390 See

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secundum suam naturam et minus nota nobis, eo modo quo exponi debet in prooemio Physicorum. Et consimiliter potest dici ad aliam auctoritatem Aristotelis in prooemio Physicorum 40. Ad auctoritatem Avicennae, dicendum est quod sic intelligitur: ens in sua tota communitate est primum obiectum intellectus, non quia primo intelligatur, sed quia haec propositio est vera per se et primo, tamquam terminorum convertibilium, ens est intelligibile, sicut ista, homo est risibilis, quia omne ens est intelligibile, et nihil aliud ab ente est intelligibile si istum terminum ens capiamus in sua tota communitate. 41. Ad auctoritatem Aristotelem in prooemio Physicorum, dicitur quod ipse capiebat singulare pro minus universali, et omnia haec magis debent tractari in prooemio Physicorum. Et cum dicitur quod minus universale est propinquius singulari simpliciter quam magis universale, ego hoc negabo de singulari vago, ita enim propinque se habet iste terminus corpus ad istum terminum hoc corpus sicut iste terminus homo ad istum terminum hic homo. 42. De ultima ratione, dictum est in positione quomodo intelligimus universaliter cum prius intelleximus singulariter. 43. De rationibus autem ad aliam partem adductis, potest satis apparere ex dictis hic et in prooemio Physicorum quomodo istae procedant, etc.

409 in prooemio Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.7 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 72–76). 410 in prooemio Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.5 189a 3–6 (Ar. lat. VII.1 25.18). 420 in prooemio Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.7 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 72–76). 428 in prooemio Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.7 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 76–77). 408 secundum suam naturam ] ipsi naturae A 410 Aristotelis ] potest dici add. V 415–416 et nihil . . . intelligibile ] om. V 418 auctoritatem ] om. VW 419 omnia haec ] hoc totum AET 425 ratione ] dubitatione AE || positione ] praecedenti quaestione(!) A || quomodo ] cum V 426 universaliter ] prius add. VW 428 hic ] om. V

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they are better known absolutely speaking in virtue of their nature and lesser known to us, in a way that should be explained in the prologue to my Questions on Aristotle’s Physics. And one can speak to the other authoritative remark of Aristotle in the prologue to the Physics in the same way. 40. As for the authoritative remark of Avicenna,392 it must be said that it is understood as follows: being in its entire universality is the first object of the intellect, not because it is understood first, but because the proposition, ‘being is intelligible’, is true per se and primarily — as in the case of propositions with convertible terms,393 such as ‘A human being is risible’ — because every being is intelligible, and nothing other than being is intelligible if we take the term ‘being’ in its entire universality. 41. To the authoritative remark of Aristotle in the prologue to the Physics 394 it is said that he was taking ‘singular’ for what is less universal. And all this should be treated more thoroughly in the prologue to my Questions on Aristotle’s Physics. When it is said that what is less universal is closer to what is absolutely speaking singular than what is more universal, I will deny this of a vague singular, for the term ‘body’ is as close to the term ‘this body’ as the term ‘human’ is to the term ‘this human’. 42. As for the final argument,395 it was said in the main reply to the question how we understand universally even though we first understood singularly. 43. As for the arguments adduced on the other side,396 however, it can be sufficiently clear from what has been said here and in the prologue to my Questions on Aristotle’s Physics how they should proceed, etc.

392 See

par. 5 above. Summulae de dialectica 1.6 (tr. Klima, 48–55). 394 See par. 6 above. 395 See par. 10 above. 396 See pars. 12–16 above. 393 See

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Utrum intellectus humanus possit se intelligere.

5

10

1. Et arguitur primo quod non, quia sensus non potest se sentire; igitur intellectus non potest se intelligere. Consequentia patet, quia sicut se habet sensus ad sensibilia, sic se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia, ut dicit Aristoteles. Antecedens autem communiter conceditur, unde apparet quod una ratio Aristotelis ad ponendum sensum communem praeter sensus exteriores est quia percipiamus nos videre et audire, et hoc non percipimus per sensus exteriores. Ideo oportet ponere alium sensum communem interiorem per quem hoc percipimus. Ideo Aristoteles in hac ratione supponit quod visus exterior non percipit se videre, nec auditus se audire, et sic de aliis; ideo videtur universaliter verum quod sensus non potest se sentire.

1 intellectus humanus possit se intelligere ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429b 9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 208.1.6): “Et ipse autem se ipsum tunc potest intelligere.” 5 ut dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a17 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.10): “sicut sensitivum ad sensibilia, sic intellectum ad intelligibilia.” 6 ratio Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.2 425b10–17. 1 Utrum ] communiter et nono add. A 2 Et arguitur primo ] om. V 4 sensibilia ] se add. V 5 ut dicit Aristoteles ] om. AET 6 unde ] ut V 7 sensus ] om. V 12 potest ] percipitur A © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 40

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Can the human intellect understand itself?

1. It is argued first that it cannot, because sense cannot sense itself; therefore, the intellect cannot understand itself. The consequence is clear because intellect is related to intelligible things just as sense is related to sensible things, as Aristotle says. But the antecedent is usually granted, which is why it appears that one of Aristotle’s arguments for positing a common sense distinct from the external senses is that we perceive that we see and hear, and we do not perceive this through the external senses. And so another sense, common and internal, must be posited through which we perceive this. Accordingly, Aristotle is assuming in this argument that external vision does not perceive that it sees, nor does hearing perceive that it hears, and so on for the other external senses; thus, it seems universally true that sense cannot sense itself.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 40

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2. Item si intellectus intelligeret se, sequeretur quod ageret in seipsum et pateretur a seipso, eo quod intellectus debet pati ab intelligibili sicut sensus a sensibili. Sed consequens est impossibile, quia cum intellectus sit indivisibilis, oportet dicere quod secundum idem ipse ageret et pateretur. Et quia agens agit secundum quod est in actu, et passum patitur secundum quod est in potentia, sequitur quod idem secundum idem et respectu eiusdem, scilicet respectu sui ipsius, esset in actu et in potentia. Et hoc Aristoteles videtur reputare impossibile in tertio Physicorum, dicit enim quod quamvis eadem sint in actu et in potentia, “non tamen simul, aut non secundum idem.” Et hoc etiam esset contra definitionem potentiae activae et potentiae passivae quod idem secundum idem agat in se et patiatur a se, nam nono Metaphysicae potentia activa describitur sic: “quod est principium transmutationis in alio in quantum aliud,” et potentia passiva est “principium mutationis ab alio in quantum aliud.” 3. Item dicitur in tertio huius “intelligentem quemcumque necesse est phantasmata speculari.” Ideo non est intelligibile quod non est phantasiabile. Et iterum, “cum phantasia sit motus a sensu,” ut dicit Aristoteles, sequitur quod non est phantasiabile aliquid si non sit 21 in tertio Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. III.1 201a 19–20 (Ar. lat. VII.1 99.10): “non simul autem aut non secundum idem.” 24–25 nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.1 1046a10–11 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 180.21–22): “quod est principium transmutationis in alio in quantum aliud est.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 1.219 (ed. Hamesse, 133): “potentia activa est principium transmutandi aliud in quantum aliud.” 25 describitur sic ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.1 1046a12–13 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 180.23–24): “principium mutationis passive ab alio, in quantum aliud est”. Cf. Auc. Ar. 1.220 (ed. Hamesse, 133): “potentia passiva est principium transmutandi ab altero in quantum ab altero.” 28 in tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a8–9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 235.2.6): “necesse simul phantasma aliquod speculari.” Cf. Auc. Ar. (Hamesse 188): “necesse est quemcumque intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” 30–31 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.3 429a1 (Ar. lat. XII.2 197.2.5): “phantasia utique erit motus a sensu secundum actum facto.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.111 (ed. Hamesse, 183): “phantasia est motus factus a sensu secundum actum secundum quem animalia multa agunt et patiuntur.” 13 intellectus ] om. V 17–18 est . . . quod ] hom. A 18–20 sequitur quod . . . potentia ] hom. V 20 reputare impossibile ] repugnare A 22 hoc ] istud A om. VW 24 agat in se et patiatur a se ] agat et patiatur E 25 sic ] om. VW 26–27 et . . . aliud ] hom. T 27 mutationis ] transmutationis ETVW

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2. Again, if the intellect understood itself, it would follow that it would act on itself and be acted on by itself, because the intellect must be acted on by what is intelligible just as sense is acted on by what is sensible. But the consequent is impossible: since the intellect is indivisible, it must be said that it acts and is acted on in the same respect. And because an agent acts insofar as it is actual, and a patient is acted on insofar as it is potential, it follows that the same thing would be actual and potential in one and the same respect, namely, with respect to itself. Aristotle evidently thinks this to be impossible in Physics III, for he says that although the same thing is actual and potential, “yet it is not this way at the same time, or in the same respect.” It is also contrary to the definition of active and passive potencies that the same thing should in the same respect act on itself and be acted upon by itself, for in Metaphysics IX, an active potency is described as “that which is the source of change in another thing qua another,” and a passive potency is “the source of change by another thing qua another.” 3. Again, it is said in De Anima III that “anyone who is understanding must reflect on phantasms.” Thus, what is not imaginable is not intelligible. Further, “since imagination is moved by sense,” as Aristotle says, it follows that a thing is not imaginable if it is not

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sensibile. Intellectus autem noster non est sensibilis; igitur nec phantasiabilis; igitur nec a nobis intelligibilis. 4. Item si posset se intelligere, sequeretur quod semper intelligeret se, quod est falsum. Consequentia probatur quia intelligibile intelligitur per hoc quod ipsum repraesentatur intellectui. Nihil autem potest repraesentare magis ipsum quam ipsemet, et ipse semper est sibi praesens; igitur semper deberet intelligere se si ipse esset intelligibilis a seipso. 5. Item nihil intelligeret se immediate ita quod non per aliud praesens intellectui. Et hoc non conceditur. Immo Aristoteles videtur dicere contrarium, dicit enim quod “cum sic singula sciat cum multa intellexerit, ut sit sciens secundum actum, tunc est in potentia aliter quam ante addiscere, et ipse tunc potest intelligere seipsum.” Si vero dicatur quod ipse non intelligat immediate se, sed mediantibus aliis prius intellectis, tunc est valde difficile dicere quae sint illa prius intellecta per quem ipse potest duci ad intellectionem sui ipsius, et per quem modum fiet huiusmodi deductio. 6. Item vel intelligeret se directe, et tunc intelligit sine alio praeintellectione, quod est falsum, vel intelligeret se mediate per modum reflexionis super seipsum et suam operationem, sicut aliqui dicunt. Et hoc videtur esse impossibile, quia quod reflectitur non videtur esse nisi corpus vel corporeum et extensum, et intellectus non est huiusmodi; igitur, etc.

42 dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429b5–9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 208.1.2): “Cum autem sic singula fiat ut sciens, dicitur qui secundum actum. Hoc autem confestim accidit cum possit operari per se ipsum. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodam modo, non tamen similiter et ante addiscere aut invenire. Et ipse autem se ipsum tunc potest intelligere.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.142 (ed. Hamesse, 186): “Intellectus cum intellexerit alia, potest se ipsum intelligere.” 51 aliqui dicunt ] Cf. AQUINAS, De veritate q.2, a.6; q.10, a.9, ad 10; AQUINAS, Sent. de an. III, lect. 8, n.14. 33 a nobis ] om. E 35 quia ] unum add. A aliquid add. T 40 nihil ] vel(!) VW || immediate ] in instanti A 40–41 praesens intellectui ] prius intelligatur E 41–42 dicere ] concedere AT 46 dicere ] scire A om. T 47 duci ] deduci AE 49–50 praeintellectione ] om. E 50 mediate ] indirecte E 51 super ] supra VW 52 quod ] om. AE

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sensible. But our intellect is not sensible; therefore, we are unable to imagine it, nor are we able to understand it. 4. Again, if it could understand itself, it would follow that it would always understand itself, which is false. The consequence is proved, since what is intelligible is understood by virtue of being represented to the intellect. But nothing can represent it more than it itself, and it is always present to itself; therefore, it would always understand itself if it is intelligible by itself. 5. Again, nothing understands itself immediately, in such a way that it is present to the intellect not through something else. And this is not granted. Indeed, Aristotle seems to say the opposite, for he says, “when it knows singulars in this way, once it has understood many things in the manner of one who actually knows . . . then it is in potency in a different way than before it learned . . . and then it can understand itself.” But if it is said that it does not understand itself immediately, but through the mediation of other things previously understood, then it is very difficult to say what those previously understood things would be through which it can be led to a thought of itself, and how such a process would occur. 6. Again, either it would understand itself directly, and then it understands without any previous act of thought, which is false; or it would understand itself indirectly by means of reflection on itself and its activity, as some say. And this seems impossible, because what is reflected seems to be only a body, or bodily and extended, and the intellect is not like this; therefore, etc.397

397 This

argument takes the Latin terms ‘reflexio [reflection]’ and ‘reflectere [to reflect]’ quite literally, as a body that is folded or bent back on itself, like a flexed arm. But in Latin as well as in English, there is a figurative, analogical, or ‘spiritual’ sense of the term, as when we speak of the reflection of light in a mirror, or (as we will see below) the reflection of an immaterial thinking subject on itself.

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7. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles. Et de eo volumus addiscere vel tradere scientiam, quod non esset nisi crederemus quod possemus ipsum intelligere. 8. Item intellectus noster potest in se formare vel habere conceptus communes a quibus sumantur illi termini ens, unum, substantia, forma, actus, etc., et unoquoque horum conceptum concipiemus ipsum, licet indifferenter cum aliis, eo quod ipse est ens et unum et substantia etc.; igitur multipliciter possumus ipsum intelligere. 9. Omnes de hac quaestione concedunt quod intellectus humanus potest seipsum intelligere, sicut immediate ante argutum est. Sed bene est dubitatio per quem modum hoc fiat; igitur, de hoc ego pono aliquas conclusiones. 10. Prima est quod intellectus humanus non intelligit per suam essentiam, scilicet sine indigentia alterius repraesentativi, quia tunc semper intelligeret, et maxime seipsum sine aliquo discursu, et nihil prius quam seipsum, sicut intellectus divinus. Et hoc experimur esse falsum, et est contra totam determinationem Aristotelis. Concedendum est tamen quod intelligeret se et alia per suam essentiam subiective quando intelligit ea, quia per suam essentiam recipit intellectiones et subicitur eis. Sic enim convenienter dicitur “naturam eius esse . . . quod possibilis est vocatus,” et quod ipse “est potens in omnia fieri.” Concedendum etiam est quod ipse intelligit per suam essentiam active et per suam essentiam agit intellectionem formandum, licet non solitarie, scilicet non intelligit per suam essentiam formaliter, sed per 55 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429b9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 208.1.2). Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.142 (ed. Hamesse, 186). 74–75 naturam . . . vocatus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4, 429a21–23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.17): “Quare neque ipsius esse naturam neque unam, sed aut hanc quod possibilis. Vocatus itaque animae intellectus dico autem intellectum quo opinatur et intelligit anima nihil est actu eorum quae sunt ante intelligere.” 75–76 est . . . fieri ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a14–15 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.1–2): “et est huiusmodi quidem intellectus in quo omnia fiunt.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.149 (ed. Hamesse, 186): “Sicut in omnium rerum natura est aliquod quod potest primo fieri et facere omnia illius generis, sic etiam in anima est necesse haec duo esse, unum secundum quod potest fieri omnia intelligibilia et recipere ea, et hoc est intellectus possibilis. . . ” 55 dicit ] determinat T 58 potest ] percipit AT 61 cum aliis ] om. E || et substantia ] om. T 64 immediate ] om. AT 68 indigentia ] exigentia AT || alterius ] om. V 69 et maxime ] maxime et primo A 72 se et alia ] om. T

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7. Aristotle states the opposite. And we want to acquire and convey knowledge about the intellect, which would not be if we did not believe we could understand it. 8. Again, our intellect can form or possess in itself common concepts from which the terms ‘being’, ‘one’, ‘substance’, ‘act’, ‘form’, etc., are taken, and we will conceive of it by any one of these concepts, although indifferently with other things, because it is a being, one, a substance, etc.; therefore, we can understand it in many ways. 9. Everyone grants concerning this question that the human intellect can understand itself, as was argued just above. But there is certainly doubt about how this occurs; therefore, I propose some conclusions about it. 10. The first conclusion is that the human intellect does not understand through its essence, that is to say, without needing something representative of another, because then it would always understand, and would especially understand itself non-discursively, and nothing prior to itself, just like the divine intellect. And this we know by experience to be false. It is also contrary to the entire determination of Aristotle. Nevertheless, it must be granted that it understands itself and other things through its essence subjectively when it understands them, since it receives acts of thinking through its essence and is subject to them. Thus it is aptly said that “its nature is . . . such that it is called ‘possible’,” and that it “is capable of becoming all things.” It must also be granted that it understands through its essence actively

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intellectionem sibi acquisitam et sibi inhaerentem. Alio autem modo Deus intelligit per suam essentiam quia nec active nec subiective sed formaliter. 11. Secunda conclusio est ita quod intellectus humanus non intelligit se antequam intelligat aliud. Immo indiget prius intelligere aliud quam intelligat se, quia non est sufficiens ad seipsum vel aliquid aliud intelligendum sine ministerio sensus, quia si ad hoc sufficeret, ipse semper seipsum intelligeret et per suam essentiam, sicut Deus, cuius oppositum dictum est. Experimur enim quod ad intelligendum indigeremus actu sentiendi vel secundum sensum exteriorem vel secundum interiorem, propter quod nihil intelligimus quando perfecte sine somniis dormimus. Sic autem sensu indigemus ad repraesentandum sibi intelligibilia per species eorum. Sensus autem non repraesentat primitus sibi nisi sensibilia, et quae sibi primo repraesentantur illa prius intelligit. Ideo prius intelligit aliquod sensibile quam insensibile, et ipse est insensibilis propter eius immaterialitatem et indivisibilitatem; igitur prius intelligit aliud a se quam se. 12. Tertia conclusio est quod vulgares et vetulae ipsum intellectum nostrum faciliter intelligunt quia faciliter possunt formare conceptus communes a quibus sumuntur haec nomina ens, unum, res, aliquid et huiusmodi, et cum hiis et unoquoque eorum omne ens indifferenter intelligitur et per consequens intellectus humanus.

97 intelligunt ] Cf. AQUINAS, Summa theol. I, q. 76 a. 1: “experitur enim unusquisque se ipsum esse qui intelligit.” 84 aliquid ] om. A || aliud ] om. E 86 semper seipsum ] per seipsum E 89 nihil ] intellectus V || sine ] om. E 90 sibi ] om. V 91–92 primitus ] om. E 92 primo ] om. E || prius ] praesens AE 94 insensibilis ] intelligibilis T || indivisibilitatem ] divisibilitatem(!) V 95 quam se ] om. V 97 conceptus ] om. V 98 communes ] rationes A et conceptus rationes add. T || aliquid ] om. V 99 unoquoque ] vel utique add. A || omne ens ] rep. V

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and acts through its essence in forming an act of thought, although it does not do so on its own, that is to say, it does not understand through its essence formally, but through an act of thinking acquired for itself and inhering in it. God, however, understands through his essence in another way, since he understands neither actively nor subjectively, but formally. 11. The second conclusion is that the human intellect does not understand itself before it understands something else. On the contrary, it needs to understand something else before it understands itself, because it is not sufficient for understanding itself or anything else without the assistance of sense, since if it did suffice for this, it would always understand itself and through its essence, just like God, and the opposite of this has been stated. For we experience that in order to understand, we need an act of sensing with respect to either exterior or interior sense, which is why we understand nothing when our sleep is completely dreamless. But in this way, we need sense to represent intelligible things to it by means of their species. But sense represents only sensible things to it at first, and the things that are first represented to it are what it first understands. Thus, it understands what is sensible before it understands what is insensible, but it is itself insensible on account of its immateriality and indivisibility; therefore, it understands what is other than itself before it understands itself. 12. The third conclusion is that rustics and market women easily understand our intellect itself because they can easily form common concepts from which the names ‘being’, ‘one’, ‘thing’, ‘something’, and others like them are taken. And with these concepts—and by any one of them—every being is understood indifferently, and consequently, the human intellect as well.

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13. Item alio modo vetula intelligit intellectum suum quia ipsa experitur et iudicat se scire et credere quod nullus canis est equus et omnis equus quem vidit erat maior cane. Ideo ipsa cognoscit hoc se scientem et credentem. Cum autem ipsa haec universalia scire non posset nisi per intellectum suum, constat quod ipsa hoc sciens et credens non est corpus tantum, sed compositum ex corpore et intellectu. Ideo cognoscendo se hoc scientem et compositum ex corpore et intellectu cognoscit, et corpus et intellectum cognoscit, licet confuse et non distincte. 14. Quarta conclusio est quod intellectus intelligit se intellectione sibi propria. Sic dico propria quod illa supponit pro intellectu et non supponit pro alio ab intellectu. Et hoc faciliter probatur quia possum in me formare conceptum a quo sumitur hoc nomen anima, aliter impositor nisi habuisset talem conceptum non potuisset nomen imposuisse ad significandum. Ita possum formare conceptum a quo sumitur hoc nomen rationale. Et possum ab illis conceptibus complexionem facere per modum determinationis et determinabilis, et sic erit conceptus correspondens huic complexioni anima rationalis. Et ille conceptus pro omni intellectu humano supponit et non supponit pro alio ab intellectu, et per ipsum omnem animam rationalem, et per consequens omnem intellectum humanum, ego indifferenter intelligo. 15. Sed certe maior est dubitatio utrum ego possum formare conceptum simplicem et non complexum pro omni intellectu humano supponentem et pro nullo alio. Et certum est quod vocem simplicem possum imponere ad significandum quae dicto modo pro omni intellectu humano supponit, ut si conveniamus quod haec vox A aequaliter nobis significet sicut hoc complexum intellectus humanus. Sed non sequitur quod propter hoc ita possit esse conceptus simplex, non enim

101 Item ] om. T 105 constat ] cognoscat VW constat in marg. W 107–108 ideo . . . intellectu ] compositum T 107 hoc scientem ] ergo se ipsa existente A || et ] ipsa V 110 se ] om. E 111 illa ] non(!) add. T 113 formare ] om. T 113–116 anima . . . nomen ] hom. T 113 aliter ] om. T 114 talem ] terminus V 117–118 erit conceptus correspondens ] conceptus correspondent T 126 supponit ] om. A || conveniamus ] nos concedamus (!) A convocamus E 127 hoc complexum ] om. E

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13. Again, in another way, a market woman understands her intellect because she experiences and judges herself knowing and believing that no dog is a horse and that every horse she has seen was bigger than a dog. Thus, she cognizes herself knowing and believing this. But since she could know those universals only through her intellect, it is clear that, when she knows and believes this, she is not only a body but a composite of body and intellect. And so in cognizing herself knowing this, she also cognizes the composite of body and intellect, and cognizes both a body and an intellect, although confusedly and not distinctly. 14. The fourth conclusion is that the intellect understands itself by means of a thought proper to it. I say ‘proper’ in this way to indicate that it supposits for the intellect and does not supposit for anything but the intellect. This is easily proved because I can form in myself the concept from which the name ‘soul’ is taken, for someone giving the name could not have imposed such a name for signifying it if he had not had such a concept. In the same way, I can form the concept from which the name ‘rational’ is taken. From these concepts, I can make a complex by means of a determination and a determinable, and thus there will be a concept corresponding to the complex ‘rational soul’. And that concept supposits for every human intellect and does not supposit for anything but the intellect. Through it I understand indifferently every rational soul, and consequently every human intellect. 15. But of course there is a greater doubt whether I can form a simple and non-complex concept suppositing for every human intellect and for nothing else. It is certain that I can impose a simple utterance for signifying it, which, in the way stated, supposits for every human intellect, for example, if we were to agree that the utterance A signified the same for us as the complex, ‘human intellect’. But it does not follow on this account that it could be a simple concept, for a

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omni termino simplici vocali potest correspondere conceptus simplex, ut isto termino vacuum vel isto termino chimaera. 16. Pono igitur quintam conclusionem, quod intellectum humanum tu non potes intelligere conceptu proprio, scilicet qui non supponat pro alio ab intellectu sine discursu, sed per discursum tu potes hoc facere. Quod enim hoc tu possis per discursum patet quia tu experiris te cognoscere universaliter et addiscere conclusiones universales syllogizando, et iudicas hoc non posse fieri sine potentia cognoscitiva. Ideo concludis in homine esse potentiam cognoscitivam universalium et discursivam. Talis autem conceptus a quo sumitur hoc complexum potentia in homine cognoscitiva universalium solum supponit pro intellectu. Sed quod non possit concipi per conceptum proprium sine discursu patet quia dictum est in secunda conclusione quod non potest se primo intelligere, sed oportet quod prius intelligat sensibilia. Et cum ista sensibilia per propriam repraesentationem non faciant ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat se, apparet quod non faciunt hoc nisi per discursum, ut quia experimur in nobis tales operationes quas iudicamus non posse esse nisi ex huiusmodi potentiis. 17. Sed adhuc non apparet an possumus intellectum humanum concipere conceptu proprio simplici, hoc enim est valde difficile, nisi dicatur sicut de conceptibus substantialibus substantiarum sensibilium, quos etiam non habemus sine discursu. Sensus enim non format tales conceptus, sed format quia album vel nigrum, magnum vel parvum, motum aut quiescens. Intellectus autem percipiens hoc mutari de albo in nigrum, de magno in parvum, de situ in situm, infert hoc esse aliud ab huiusmodi dispositionibus. Et cum adhuc talis conceptus sit complexus, intellectus ex natura sua innatus est elicere et formare conceptum simplicem absolutum a conceptibus accidentium extraneorum. Et ille est conceptus substantialis secundum quem imponitur no-

131 quintam ] istam V 132 qui non ] qui (!) A 133–134 hoc facere ] om. EVW 134 quod . . . patet ] om. E 137 concludis ] concludo V || universalium ] universalem V 138 Talis autem ] cum unus talis T 139 universalium ] om. E universaliter V 142 se ] om. T 143 sensibilia ] sciat add. V || non faciant ad ] faciant W 146 potentiis ] fieri add. E 150 habemus ] possumus habere E 151– 152 vel . . . vel . . . aut ] et . . . et . . . et T 153 de albo in nigrum ] om. A 154 talis ] universalis add. V

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simple concept cannot correspond to every simple vocal term, as with the term ‘vacuum’, or the term ‘chimera’.398 16. Therefore, I propose a fifth conclusion: you cannot understand the human intellect non-discursively by means of a proper concept, that is to say, one which does not supposit for anything but the intellect, though you can do this discursively. That you can do so discursively is clear because you experience that you cognize universally and learn universal conclusions by syllogizing, and you judge that this could not occur without a cognitive potency. Thus, you conclude that there is a cognitive and discursive potency for universals in human beings. However, the sort of concept from which the complex ‘cognitive potency for universals in a human being’ is taken only supposits for the intellect. But it is clear that the intellect could not be conceived non-discursively by a proper concept because it was stated in the second conclusion above that it cannot understand itself in the first instance,399 but must first understand sensible things. And since those sensible things do not bring the intellect to understand itself by means of a representation proper to it, it is clear that they only make this happen discursively, as when we experience in ourselves the kinds of activities we judge cannot exist except by potencies of this kind. 17. But it is still not apparent whether we can conceive of the human intellect by means of a proper simple concept, for this is very difficult unless it is said to be like the substantial concepts of sensible substances, which we also do not have non-discursively. For sense does not form such concepts, but it forms what is white or black, large or small, moved or at rest. But the intellect, while perceiving this being changed from white to black, large to small, or place to place, infers that it is different from dispositions of this kind. And since such a concept would still be complex, the intellect is naturally suited to elicit and form an absolute, simple concept from concepts of extrinsic accidents. This concept is a substance concept in keeping with which

398 The

term ‘vacuum’ signifies the same as the complex expression, ‘place not filled with body’; likewise, the term ‘chimera’ signifies the same as the complex expression, ‘animal composed from members from which it is impossible for an animal to be composed’. See Summulae de dialectica 8.2.3 (tr. Klima, 636). 399 See par. 11 above.

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men de praedicamento substantiae. Et secundum quod illa accidentia ex quorum conceptibus elicitur conceptus substantialis sunt pluribus aut paucioribus communia, etiam conceptus substantialis sic elicitus est communior vel specialior, ut si ex sentire eliciatur conceptus generalis animalis et ex ratiocinari hominis. Et videtur multis quod tales conceptus simplices substantiales habere non possumus, quia habens talem non potest alium non habentem ducere ad habendum, nisi per circumlocutionem ex accidentibus illius notis. Sed dicemus quod ex hac circumlocutione intellectus illius per naturam ipsius est innatus elicere consimilem conceptum simplicem substantialem. Quod enim discursive infertur, est conclusio complexa. Idcirco oportet conceptum simplicem habere, aut ex propria et immediata repraesentatione, aut ipsum virtute intellectus elicere ex complexis conclusionibus. 18. Et haec dicta sint probabiliter de ista quaestione, quae saltem possent aliquos expergefacere huiusmodi considerandum et inveniendum veritatem.

159 sunt ] qui add. T 160 communia ] est communis T 161–162 generalis ] communis AT 167 simplicem ] om. AT 161–167 est communior . . . quod enim ] in marg. A 171 probabiliter ] hic probatis A om. E

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a name from the category of substance is imposed. And depending on whether those accidents from whose concepts the substantial concept is elicited are common to more or fewer things, the substance concept thus elicited is more common or more specific, as when from sensing we elicit the general concept of animal and from thinking the general concept of human. And it seems to many that we cannot have such simple substance concepts because no one having such a concept can lead another who does not have it into having it, except through a description based on accidents of things with which that person is acquainted. But we will say that on the basis of this description, the intellect of this other person is naturally suited to elicit a similar simple substance concept. For what is discursively inferred is a complex conclusion. Therefore, one must either have a simple concept on the basis of a proper and immediate representation, or else elicit it by the power of the intellect from complex conclusions.400 18. And let these things be plausibly stated in regard to this question, which might at least be able to awaken some to investigate things of this kind and discover the truth. 400 In

this paragraph and the previous one, Buridan envisions a two-step process through which the intellect forms simple concepts (including simple concepts of itself): (1) it infers, discursively, from its experience of collections of extrinsic accidents, a connotative, complex concept of a substance (“the intellect, while perceiving this being changed from white to black, large to small, or place to place, infers that it is different from dispositions of this kind”); and (2) it elicits, nondiscursively, an absolute, simple concept of the same substance (“And since such a concept [i.e., one arrived at discursively] would still be complex, the intellect is naturally suited to elicit and form an absolute, simple concept from concepts of extrinsic accidents”). The latter, non-discursive, step in concept formation is crucial, because otherwise Buridan would fall prey to the same regress argument he makes in his Questions on Aristotle’s Physics I, q. 4 (ed. Streijger and Bakker, 36.3–9), tacitly against William of Ockham: i.e., a discursive process yields only complex concepts, but the components of these are either simple or complex; if the latter, then we go on to infinity, which is impossible, because conceptual analysis cannot go on to infinity; if the former, then we must acquire simple concepts through a non-discursive process; therefore, etc. For discussion of the regress argument and its implications, see Klima 2008, 94–103.

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19. Rationes autem quae fiebant a principio quaestionis, deducantur ad sensus suos secundum praedeterminata, prout videbitur expedire.

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19. Let the arguments that were made at the beginning of the question be rendered in their proper senses according to what has been determined above, as will be seen to be expedient.401

401 See

pars. 1–8 above.

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Utrum necesse sit ad hoc quod homo intelligat concurrere active intellectum agentem, praeter intellectum possibilem.

5

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15

1. Et arguitur quod non, quia “sicut sensus ad sensibilia,” etc. Sed non est dare sensum agentem praeter sensum possibilem, id est receptivum sensationum, cum Aristoteles eum non posuit; igitur, etc. 2. Secundo sequitur quod anima humana sit substantialiter composita ex partibus diversarum rationum, quod videtur falsum eo quod ipsa est forma et forma debet in indivisibili consistere secundum auctoritatem Sex principiorum. Et consequentia patet, quia ipsa est substantia, ut vult Aristoteles, et intellectus possibilis etiam est substantia, et diversae essent substantiae, quia agens esset honorabilior passibili, ut dicit Aristoteles, ideo diversus ab eo. Et tamen ponentes eos ponunt eos ambo in intellectu nostro seu in anima nostra esse, cum dicat Aristoteles, “necesse est et in anima has esse differentias”; igitur, manifestum est quod anima nostra haberet in se illas partes substantiales diversarum rationum. 1–3 Utrum . . . possibilem ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 14–15. 4 sicut sensus ad sensibilia ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a 18 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.10):“Et similiter se habere, sicut sensitivum ad sensibilia, sic intellectum ad intelligibilia.” 10 Sex principiorum ] Cf. G ILBERTUS, Lib. sex prin. I.1 (Ar. lat. I.1 35.3–4). 13 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a18–19 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.12): “Semper enim honorabilior est agens patiente et principium materia.” 15 necesse . . . differentias ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a13 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.2): “necesse est et in anima esse has differentias.” 1 Utrum ] Quaeritur consequenter et decimo utrum A consequenter quaeritur utrum T || homo ] om. V 4 Et arguitur ] om. V 5 id est ] et E om. T nec VW 6 sensationum ] specierum sensibilium A et specierum add. T || posuit ] posuerit A posuisset VW || igitur, etc. ] om. VW 7 Secundo ] item AET 8–9 quod videtur falsum eo quod ipsa ] antecedens patet quia A 9 in indivisibili consistere ] supernaturaliter(!) existere A 12 passibili ] om. A 14 ambo . . . seu ] esse A ambo esse E

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 41

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Is the active contribution of an agent intellect, apart from the possible intellect, necessary for a human being’s act of understanding?

1. It is argued that it is not necessary, because “as sense is related to the objects of sense,” etc. But one should not admit an agent sense apart from the possible sense, that is to say, a sense that is receptive of sensations, since Aristotle did not posit it; therefore, etc. 2. Second, it follows that the human soul would be substantially composed of parts of different natures, which is evidently false because it is a form, and form must consist in something indivisible, according to an authoritative passage from the Book of Six Principles. The consequence is clear, since it is a substance, as Aristotle intends, and the possible intellect is also a substance, and they would be diverse substances because the agent is superior to the patient, as Aristotle says, and so diverse from it. And yet, those who posit them assume that both are in our intellect or in our soul, since Aristotle says, “there must also be these differences in the soul”; therefore, it is clear that our soul has in it those substantial parts of different natures.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 41

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3. Item agente et passo approximatis ad invicem, debet sequi actio et passio. Sed phantasma est activum et intellectus possibilis passivus, et sunt sufficienter approximata sine distantia. Igitur sine indigentia alterius debet sequi actio in intellectu possibili, et illa videtur esse intellectio. Et confirmatur, quia frustra ponerentur plura si totum potest salvari per pauciora. Sed sine agente ulteriori, possumus dicere quod passio quam recipit intellectus possibilis a phantasmate et sensu est intellectio; igitur non oportet dicere quod ad intelligendum requiratur aliud agens. 4. Item si poneretur ille intellectus agens, tunc ad intellectionem concurrent duo agentia per se diversarum rationum, scilicet phantasma et iste intellectus agens. Et in tali casu agentium subordinatorum, unum debet agere in reliquum. Ideo vel phantasma ageret in intellectum agentem vel e converso, quod non apparet verum, quia non posset bene dici quid esset illa actio. 5. Item iste intellectus agens vel cognosceret vel non cognosceret. Et si non cognosceret, tunc esset ignobilior quam possibilis, quod est contra Aristotelem. Et si cognosceret, tunc vel cognosceret semper et per suam essentiam, vel aliquando et aliquando non, per receptionem speciei intelligibili vel intellectionis. Si secundo modo, tunc non esset differentia eius ad intellectum possibilem. Si primo modo, tunc nos etiam semper per illum intelligeremus, eo quod ipse si poneretur, deberet poni esse anima nostra vel pars eius principalior. Ideo oporteret quod intellectione eius intelligeremus. Modo hoc est falsum, scilicet quod sic semper intelligeremus.

18–19 debet . . . passio ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.6 322b 23–24. 19 et ] in A 29 Et in tali casu ] modo A 31 e converso ] ex sufficienti divisione add. A 36–37 vel aliquando . . . speciei ] om. A 38 intellectum ] istum V 40– 41 oporteret quod ] intelligeremus add. A quaestio esset quod T in add. W

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3. Again, when agent and patient are close to each other, action and passion must follow. But the phantasm is active and the possible intellect passive, and they are sufficiently close to each other without anything setting them apart. Therefore, without needing anything else, action must follow in the possible intellect, and this appears to be the act of thinking. This is confirmed, because it would be pointless to posit more items when the entire phenomenon can be explained by fewer. But we can say, without positing an additional agent, that the affection the possible intellect receives from the phantasm and from sense is the act of thinking; therefore, one must not claim that another agent is required for understanding. 4. Again, if an agent intellect were posited, then two agents with diverse natures per se would contribute to the act of thinking, namely, the phantasm and the agent intellect. In such a case of subordinated agents, one must act on the other. Thus, either the phantasm would act on the agent intellect, or conversely – which does not appear to be true, because one could not rightly say what that action would be. 5. Again, the agent intellect would either cognize, or not cognize. If it does not cognize, then it would be inferior to the possible intellect, which is contrary to Aristotle. And if it cognizes, then it would cognize either always and by its essence, or sometimes and sometimes not, via the reception of an intelligible species or an act of thought. If it cognizes in the second way, there would be no difference between it and the possible intellect. If it cognizes in the first way, we would always understand by means of it, because if it is posited, it would have to be assumed that it is our soul, or the more principal part of it. Thus, it would have to be that we would understand by its act of thought. Now this is false, namely, that we always understand in this way.

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6. Oppositum determinat Aristoteles, et dicit quod iste intellectus agens “est separabilis, et impassibilis, et inmixtus, substantia actu ens,” et honorabilior intellectu possibili, nam ut dicit, “semper honorabilius est agens patiente, et principium materia.” 7. Sicut etiam in nona quaestione huius secundi dixi de nominibus ad potentiam sensitivam pertinentibus, ita nunc dicam proportionaliter de nominibus ad potentiam intellectivam pertinentibus. Dico igitur quod intelligibile significat idem quod posse intelligi. Idcirco omne ens dicitur intelligibile, quia omne ens potest intelligi. Intellectivum autem significat idem quod potens intelligere, et hoc est homo, et natura, et anima, et corpus, eo modo quo in praedicta quaestione dictum fuit. Non autem omne potens intelligere dicitur intellectus, sed oportet quod sit substantia incorporea, scilicet non extensa. Intellectus igitur significat idem quod substantia incorporea potens intelligere. De intelligere autem dicatur etiam proportionaliter sicut de sentire, scilicet quod intelligere aliquando nec est agere nec pati. Sed apud hominem est adaequate idem quod habere intellectionem sibi inhaerentem. Non autem sic est de Deo, quoniam ipse est sua intellectio. Sed de isto nihil ad praesens, quoniam de hoc pertinet ad duodecimum Metaphysicae. 8. Pono igitur aliquas conclusiones. 9. Prima est quod non solum ad hoc quod homo intelligat, immo universaliter ad hoc quod aliquid fiat, necesse est concurrere, immo principaliter agere, intellectum agentem, qui est ipse Deus, prout hoc

43 dicit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a17 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.11): “Et hic intellectus separabilis et impassibilis et inmixtus, substantia actu ens”; De an. III.5 430a 18–19 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.12): “Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente et principium materia.” 47 nona quaestione huius secundi ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.9, par. 9–13. 54 dictum fuit ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.9, par. 11. 57 dicatur etiam proportionaliter ] BURIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.9, par. 13. Cf. QQ. De an. III.1, par. 30–31. 43 Aristoteles ] in tertio huius add. A 47 nona ] una V 48 ita ] infra T || nunc ] om. V 48–49 proportionaliter ] probabiliter(!) VW 53 et natura ] om. AET 58 scilicet ] om. VW 59 idem ] om. V 63 aliquas ] om. E 64 homo ] aliquid T 65 immo ] primo et add. A

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6. Aristotle maintains the opposite. He says that this agent intellect is “separable, impassible, unmixed, a substance existing in actuality,” and superior to the possible intellect, for as he says, “the agent is always superior to the patient, and the principle to the matter.” 7. Just as I spoke in Book II, q. 9 above about names pertaining to the faculty of sense, so I will now speak correspondingly about names pertaining to the faculty of intellect. I say, then, that ‘intelligible’ signifies the same as ‘able to be understood’, which is why every being is said to be intelligible, since every being can be understood. ‘Intellective’, however, signifies the same as ‘able to understand’, and this is the human being, the nature, the soul, and the body, in the way stated in the aforementioned question. Not everything able to understand is said to be an intellect, however, though it must be an incorporeal, which is to say, unextended, substance. ‘Intellect’, therefore, signifies the same as ‘incorporeal substance able to understand’. But what was said about sensing will also be said correspondingly about understanding, namely, that understanding is sometimes a case of neither acting nor being acted on. But in a human being, it is precisely the same as having an act of thought inhering in it. It is not this way for God, however, since God is his own act of thought. But nothing will be said about this for the time being, since it pertains to Metaphysics XII. 8. Therefore, I propose some conclusions. 9. The first is that it is necessary for an agent intellect, which is God himself, to contribute to—indeed, to act principally in—not only a human being’s activity of understanding, but also universally, to any-

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determinatum est in Metaphysica. Sed etiam de hoc ego volo dicere modicum. 10. Nunc videtur igitur mihi quod ex ratione quam tetigit Aristoteles in isto tertio potest concludi iste intellectus agens, qui est Deus benedictus et non alius. Ratio enim secundum principia Aristotelis posset sic fieri. Supponatur primo quod ad omne quod fit naturaliter, necesse est subiectum esse quod patitur et recipit actionem agentis, et esse agens a quo est ista actio. Cum igitur intellectus noster fiat de novo intelligens, necesse est esse subiectum quod recipiat intellectionem, et hoc est intellectus humanus quem vocamus intellectum possibilem. Et necesse est etiam esse agens a quo fit iste intellectus possibilis sic intelligens et a quo fit ista intellectio. 11. Secundo supponimus quod in omni actioni necesse est agens principale esse nobilius passo, immo etiam et totali facto. Voco enim principale agens in aliqua actione a quo active provenit illa actio, absque concursu agentis principalioris atque nobilioris agentis. Igitur agens non principale potest esse minus nobile suo passo aut totali facto. Sed necesse est agens principale esse nobilius, eo quod agens non plus potest dare quam habeat, nisi in virtute agentis concurrentis plus habentis. Ideo impossibile est factum vel passum esse nobilius suo principale agente, et hanc suppositionem notavit Aristoteles cum dixit, “semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, et principium materia.” 12. Tertio ego suppono ex septimo Metaphysicae quod non solum forma fit nec solum materia sive subiectum fit, sed totum compositum

67 Metaphysica ] A RISTOTELES, Met. XII.9 1074b15 ff. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. XII.14 (ed. Parisiis 1588, f. 75va−vb ). 70 isto tertio ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a10–19. 88–89 semper . . . materia ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 18– 19 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.12): “Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente et principium materia.” 91–92 totum . . . fit ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. VII.8 1033b16–19. 69 tetigit ] recitat E 71 benedictus ] et gloriosus add. E 74 noster ] om. A 76 humanus ] om. E 82 atque nobilioris agentis ] nobilioris A om. ET 83 non ] om. (!) V || principale ] est quod add. A

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thing’s happening, as was determined in the Metaphysics. But I also want to say a bit about this. 10. It seems to me that, from the argument Aristotle touched on in De Anima III, we can deduce this agent intellect, which is none other than holy God. For the argument could be constructed as follows, in keeping with Aristotle’s principles. Let us assume first that for everything that occurs naturally, it is necessary that there be a subject which is acted on by, and which is receptive of, the action of an agent, as well as an agent from which that action arises. Therefore, when our intellect is brought to understanding for the first time, it is necessary that there be a subject which receives the act of thought, and this is the human intellect, which we call the possible intellect. It is also necessary that there be an agent by which that possible intellect is thus brought to understanding, and by which that act of thought is produced. 11. Second, we assume that in every action, it is necessary that there be a principal agent nobler than the patient, and also nobler than its total effect.402 For I call the principal agent in any action that from which the action actively proceeds, without the contribution of a more principal and nobler agent. Accordingly, a non-principal agent can be less noble than its patient or than its total effect. But it is necessary that the principal agent be nobler, because an agent cannot give more than it has, except by virtue of a contributing agent having more. Thus, it is impossible for an effect or a patient to be nobler than its principal agent, and Aristotle took note of this assumption when he said, “for always the agent is superior to the patient, and the principle to the matter.” 12. Third, I assume on the basis of Metaphysics VII that neither form alone nor matter alone or a subject comes into existence, but the

402 The

Latin term here, ‘factum’, means literally, ‘what has been made’.

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ex materia et forma. Sic igitur cum fiat intellectus noster intelligens, nec solum fit intellectus noster nec solum fit intellectio, sed fit etiam compositum ex intellectu et intellectione. Hoc enim compositum est, et ante non erat: et fit terminative ratione intellectionis, et fit subiective ratione intellectus. 13. Ex hiis concluditur quod ad hoc quod homo fiat intelligens, necesse est concurrere active aliquid agens nobilius quam sit intellectus noster, qui est in hac factione materia et passivum, et etiam quam sit compositum ex intellectu et intellectione quod est totale factum. Et non potest assignari tale agens nobilius, nisi intellectus divinus. Igitur ad hoc quod homo intelligat, necesse est esse et active concurrere illum intellectum agentem, scilicet Deum. Et videtur ex dictis Aristotelis quod ipse velit illum intellectum divinum concludere, quia assignat ei conditiones quae nulli alteri convenient proprie quam intellectui divino, dicens quod hic intellectus “separabilis est, et impassibilis, et inmixtus, substantia actu ens,” et “honorabilior” scilicet intellectu nostro possibili; et quod “est idem secundum actum scientia rei,” id est quod ille intellectus est intellectus, intellectivum et intellectio, scientia, scitum et sciens; demum quod “ipse solus vere separatus est” et “immortalis et perpetuus.” Haec igitur non bene conveniunt intellectui nostro. Nec oportet contra hoc obicere de hoc quod Aristoteles dicit, “in anima esse has differentias,” quia non dicit in anima nostra. Potest igitur dici quod intellectus possibilis est anima, scilicet humana, et intellectus agens est Deus, scilicet anima mundi. 106 dicens ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 17 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.11): “Et hic intellectus separabilis et impassibilis et inmixtus, substantia actu ens”; De an. III.5 430a 18–19 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.12): “Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente et principium materia.” 108 est . . . rei ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a20 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.3): “Idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei.” 110–111 ipse . . . perpetuus ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a22–23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.7): “Separatus autem est solus hoc quod vere est. Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est.” 113 in . . . differentias ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 13 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.1.2): “in anima esse has differentias.” 92 noster intelligens ] simpliciter sciens A 93 noster nec solum fit ] aut A 98 active ] om. A 99 factione ] actione A 103 Deum ] benedictum add. E 104 divinum ] agentem add. T || concludere ] excludere(!) T 105 conditiones ] proprietates AT 109 intellectus ] intelligens sup. lin. W 110 scitum ] scientiae A om. TV 111 bene ] proprie AT et proprie add. E 113 non ] om. (!) T

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entire composite of matter and form. So when our intellect becomes an act of thinking, neither our intellect alone nor the act of thinking alone comes into existence, but the composite of intellect and act of thinking comes into existence. For this composite exists, and it did not exist before: it comes into existence both terminatively, by reason of the act of thinking, and subjectively, by reason of the intellect.403 13. We conclude from these assumptions that when a human being is understanding, the active contribution is required of some agent that is nobler than both our intellect, which in this productive action is the matter and passive recipient, and the composite of intellect and the act of thinking, which is the total effect. And no such nobler agent can be found, except the divine intellect. Therefore, when a human being understands, this agent intellect, namely God, must be there and make an active contribution to it. And it seems from the remarks of Aristotle that he wants to conclude to this divine intellect, since he attributes characteristics to it which properly agree with nothing other than the divine intellect, when he says that this intellect “is separable, impassible, unmixed, a substance being in actuality,” and “superior,” namely, to our possible intellect; that it is “the same as the actual knowledge of a thing,” that is, that this intellect is understanding subject, what is able to understand, and the act of understanding, and it is knowledge, what is known, and that which knows; and, finally, that “it alone is separate,” and “immortal and everlasting.” These characteristics do not truly agree with our intellect. Nor should it be objected against this that Aristotle says, “these differences exist in the soul,” because

403 The

act of thinking comes into existence ‘terminatively’, i.e., insofar as it is the terminus or end result of the action producing it, whereas the intellect comes to be thinking ‘subjectively’, i.e., insofar as it is the subject of the act of thinking produced in it.

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14. Secunda conclusio est quod necesse est, praeter intellectum divinum, esse intellectum alium agentem sic quod ille active se habeat ad intellectionem formandam a nobis, et quod ille est intellectus noster. Et sic etiam de sensu agente ad sensationem. Haec enim satis declarata fuerunt in decima quaestione secundi huius, quantum ad componere, dividere, et abstrahere, aut etiam ex primis sensationibus et intellectionibus primorum sensibilium vel intelligibilium alias elicere sensationes et intellectiones aliorum sensibilium et intelligibilium. Sed hoc non fuit multum demonstratum de primis sensationibus vel intellectionibus. 15. Ideo remanet magna dubitatio: utrum intellectus noster se habeat active ad primam eius intellectionem, vel solum passive, et sensus ad suam primam sensationem. 16. Et de hoc ego opinor hanc tertiam conclusionem: quod sensus seu anima sensitiva se habet active ad suam primam sensationem, et proportionaliter intellectus ad primam eius intellectionem. Haec non demonstro, sed debiliter persuadeo, primo quia puto quod color ex se non habeat potentiam agendi plus quam speciem suam in subiecto diaphano eiusdem rationis, sive in a¨ere vel in caelo, sive in oculo aut vitro, et sic de aliis diaphanis. Non enim habet virtutem producendi effectum multo nobiliorem se sine agente nobiliore. Et tamen sensatio vel intellectio est effectus valde nobilior quam sit illa species sensibilis vel intelligibilis primae sensationis vel intellectionis. Ideo praeter illam speciem, requiritur ad formandam sensationem vel intellectionem aliud agens nobilius, et illud videtur esse anima sensitiva quantum ad sensationem, et intellectiva quantum ad intellectionem.

120 decima quaestione secundi huius ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.10, par. 16–22. 118 a nobis ] om. AT nostram E 120 declarata ] determinata AT || decima ] secunda A alia et in illa quaestione huius libri tertii T 121 primis ] propriis sensibus aut A 130 suam ] om. VW 132 debiliter ] faciliter A 138 intelligibilis ] primo add. V 139 praeter ] solum add. E 140 videtur esse ] dicitur VW

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he does not say, ‘in our soul’. Therefore, we can say that the possible intellect is the soul, that is to say, the human soul, and the agent intellect is God, that is to say, the world soul. 14. The second conclusion is that in addition to the divine intellect, it is necessary that there be another intellect, acting in such a way that it is actively related to our forming an act of thinking, and this is our intellect. And so it is as well with the agent sense, in relation to sensation. For these things have been sufficiently stated in Book II, q. 10 with respect to affirming, denying, and abstracting, or even eliciting further sensations and thoughts of other things that can be sensed and understood from our initial sensations and thoughts of what is first able to be sensed and understood. But this was not much demonstrated as regards first sensations or thoughts. 15. And so a significant doubt remains: whether our intellect is actively related to its first act of thinking, or only passively, and whether sense is actively related to its first act of sensing. 16. In this connection, I hazard this third conclusion: that sense or the sensitive soul is actively related to its first sensation, and correspondingly, intellect is actively related to its first act of thinking. This I do not demonstrate, but I can weakly argue for it, first because I think color does not have within itself the capacity for bringing about any more than its species in a transparent subject of the same nature, whether that is in the air or in the heavens, in the eye or in glass, and similarly for other transparent things. For it does not have the power of producing an effect much nobler than itself without a nobler agent. And yet, sensation or thinking is an effect much nobler than the sensible or intelligible species of an initial sensation or act of thinking. Therefore, in addition to the species, another, more noble, agent is required for forming a sensation or thought, and this seems to be the sensitive soul as far as sensation is concerned, and the intellective soul as far as thinking is concerned.

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17. Sed tamen adversarius posset evadere dicendo quod illud agens nobilius est ipse Deus, et non oportet ponere aliud agens nobilius facto, sicut diceretur de animali facto ex putrefactione. 18. Et difficile est hanc evasionem destruere demonstrative. Probabile tamen videtur mihi, cum anima sensitiva se habeat active ad illas sequentes sensationes, active se etiam habeat ad omnes, et similiter de intellectu. 19. Iterum doctores communiter dicunt intellectiones et sensationes esse actiones immanentes, et hoc non esset magis dicendum de illis quam de aliis actionibus, nisi quia manent subiective in suis agentibus. Omnis autem intellectio manet subiective in intellectu; ideo videtur quod ad omnem intellectionem iste agat. 20. Item non videtur omnino ad placitum esse quod sub voce activi generis dicimus sensum sentire et intellectum intelligere, sed hoc videtur habere ortum et determinationem ex natura rei. Nam quae pure sunt ad placitum non habent se similiter apud omnes, sed quae a natura sunt. Similiter enim “ignis ardet hic et in Persis,” ut dicit Aristoteles, et non solum apud Latinos, immo apud omnes, sive Hebraeos sive Graecos, vel Arabices, Gallicos, vel Teutonicos. Omnes enim dicunt sub voce et modo significandi activi generis sensum sentire et intellectum intelligere. Videtur igitur quod iste modus significandi et loquendi habeat ortum ex natura rei, quod non apparet esse nisi quia

144 diceretur ] Cf. OVIDUS, Met. XV.375; B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.10, par. 13. 158–159 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. V.7 1134b26 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3, 467.4): “ignis et hic et in Persis ardet.” 146 illas ] alias AE 147 sequentes ] om. V 148 intellectu ] intellectiva A 150 non esset ] om. (!) T 151 de aliis actionibus ] de aliis accidentibus vel actionibus A om. V || in suis agentibus ] om. V 152 in intellectu ] om. V in marg. W 153 intellectionem ] om. AT actionem E 156 determinationem ] vel derivationem(?) add. A 156–157 pure ] om. A 158 ignis ] om. T 159 Latinos ] aliquos A 160 Gallicos, vel Teutonicos ] om. AT Gallicos et sic de aliis E 162 significandi ] dicendi VW

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17. Nevertheless, an adversary could avoid this by saying that the nobler agent is God himself, and that there is no need to posit another agent nobler than the thing made, as would be said about an animal made from putrefaction.404 18. It is difficult to refute this move demonstratively. Even so, it seems likely that, since the sensitive soul is actively related to those subsequent sensations, it is also actively related to all sensations, and that it is likewise for the intellect. 19. Again, theologians commonly say that sensations and thoughts are immanent actions, and this should not be said of them any more than of other actions, unless because they remain subjectively in their agents. But every act of thinking remains subjectively in the intellect; therefore, it seems that the intellect acts with regard to every act of thought.405 20. Again, it does not seem to be utterly by convention that we say that sense senses and intellect understands in the active voice, but this seems to have its origin and determination in the nature of things. For what is purely conventional is not dealt with in the same way by everybody, but what is natural is. For in this way, “fire burns both here and in Persia,” as Aristotle says, and not only among Latin speakers, but for everybody, whether Hebrew or Greek, or among Arabs, French, or Germans. For everybody says that sense senses and intellect understands in the active voice and mode of signifying. It appears, then, that this mode of signifying and speaking has its origin in the nature of 404 For

animals generated from putrefaction, see QQ. De an. II.10, par. 13 above. Even if it is a subordinate agent in producing its first act of thinking, the human intellect produces it by means of an immanent action, since its effect remains subjectively in the agent. But the same effect, relative to the principal agent, i.e., God, is produced by a transient action, because its effect is produced in a subject other than the agent, i.e., in the human intellect. 405

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intellectus et sensus agant ad omnes suas intellectiones vel sensationes. 21. Etsi hanc non demonstrant, tamen apparet mihi quod non sunt ad propositum rationes probabiliores, et sufficiat hoc in proposito, quoniam “acribologia mathematica non est in omnibus expetenda,” ut dicitur secundo Metaphysicae. 22. Nunc igitur videndum est de rationibus in principio quaestionis ad utramque partem adductis, quomodo procedant. 23. De prima dicendum est quod est dare sensum agentem, et de hoc dictum fuit in secundo libro. 24. Ad secundam dicitur quod anima humana est simplex et non composita substantialiter. Et tunc dicitur quod ille intellectus agens, qui est nobilior intellectu nostro possibili, est intellectus divinus. Sed quantum ad animam nostram eadem res est quae vocatur intellectus possibilis ea ratione qua recipit intellectiones, et quae vocatur intellectus agens ea ratione qua agit eas. Et potest dici quod ipse, etiam secundum attributivam locutionem, dicitur nobilior ut agens quam ut patiens, scilicet in quantum cum eo agente agit res nobilissima, scilicet Deus, et cum eo patiente, nihil compatitur nobilius eo. 25. Ad aliam dicitur quod saepe activum est suo passivo approximatum, et non sequitur actio. Martellus enim est activus in ferrum, et tamen positus iuxta ferrum, non agit in ipsum quia deficit agens aliud, scilicet faber, qui, si non agat, martellus non potest agere. Ita nec phantasma ageret in ipsum intellectum nisi ipse intellectus et Deus coagerent, immo principalius agerent quam phantasma. Et visum est quomodo rationes aut necessario aut probabiliter cogunt ponere prae-

169 secundo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. II.3 995a 15 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 47.116): “Acribologia vero mathematica non in omnibus est expetenda, sed in non habentibus materiam.” Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.10, par. 21. 173 secundo libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.10. 167 propositum ] oppositam A 168 acribologia ] om. T 176 intellectus divinus ] et Deus add. E 181 agit ] coagit EW 182 Deus ] gloriosus add. E || eo ] om. V || compatitur ] operatur AT patitur W 184 actio ] om. V || Martellus ] vel malleus add. ET malleus W 186 martellus ] malleus W || potest agere ] agit E 188 coagerent ] agerent VW 189 cogunt ] tangant V

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things, something that would not be the case, it seems, unless because intellect and sense are active in relation to all their acts of thinking or sensations. 21. And even if these arguments are not demonstrative, it still seems to me that there are no more plausible arguments for the other side, and this suffices for what has been proposed here, since “mathematical accuracy is not to be sought in all things,” as Metaphysics II says. 22. Now then, we should see how the arguments adduced on each side at the beginning of the question fare. 23. As for the first argument,406 it should be said that one must admit an agent sense. This was discussed in Book II of this treatise. 24. To the second,407 it is said that the human soul is simple and not substantially composite. And then it is said that the agent intellect, which is nobler than our possible intellect, is the divine intellect. But with respect to our soul, it is the same thing that is called the possible intellect insofar as it receives acts of thinking, and the agent intellect insofar as it brings them about. It can also be said that, even analogically speaking, it is said to be nobler as an agent than as a patient, that is to say, insofar as it is acting along with the most noble thing, namely, God, and when it is being acted on, nothing nobler than it is being acted on with it. 25. To the other,408 it is said that often what is active is close to its patient, and no action follows. For a hammer is active on iron, and yet when placed next to an iron it does not act on it because it lacks another agent, namely, the blacksmith. If he does not act, the hammer cannot act. Thus, no phantasm would act on this intellect unless this intellect and God act together, or rather, unless they were to act more principally than the phantasm. And we have seen how the

406 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above. 408 See par. 3 above. 407 See

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ter phantasma aliud agens, immo alia agentia; ideo nihil frustra posuimus. 26. Ad aliam potest dici quod Deus agit in intellectum nostrum et phantasma et intellectionem, et omne quod fit vel quod est aliud ab eo, sicut dicebatur in septima quaestione huius tertii. Et tamen hoc phantasma agit in intellectum agentem, quia agit in intellectum possibilem, qui est intellectus agens. 27. Ad aliam manifestum est quod intellectus agens qui est Deus semper cognoscit per suam essentiam, et intellectus noster etiam agens cognoscit per sibi additam intellectionem, sicut intellectus possibilis, quia est idem. 28. Auctoritas autem Aristotelis ad aliam partem adducta cum sua ratione concludit illum secundum intellectum agentem qui est Deus benedictus, sicut dicebatur prius, etc.

194 huius tertii ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.7, par. 13. 190–191 posuimus ] ut manifestum est add. A 193 fit ] ab eo fit add. A || vel quod est aliud ] om. T 195 agit . . . quia ] hom. V 197 agens ] proprie add. A 199 sibi ] om. AET 202 secundum ] om. E 203 sicut dicebatur prius ] in saeculo saeculorum E

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arguments either necessarily or probably require one to posit another agent, indeed other agents, in addition to the phantasm; therefore, we have posited nothing in vain. 26. To the other,409 it can be said that God acts on our intellect, the phantasm, the act of thinking, and everything that happens or that is other than God, as was stated in Book III, q. 7. And yet, this phantasm acts on the agent intellect because it acts on the possible intellect, which is the agent intellect. 27. To the other,410 it is obvious that the agent intellect which is God always cognizes by means of its essence, and that even our agent intellect cognizes by means of an act of thinking added to it, just like the possible intellect, because it is the same. 28. But as for the authoritative passage of Aristotle adduced on the other side,411 with its accompanying argument, it concludes to that second agent intellect, who is holy God, as was said above, etc.

409 See

par. 4 above. par. 5 above. 411 See pars. 6–7 above. 410 See

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Utrum actus vel etiam habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva vel sit res sibi addita.

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1. Propter quamdam opinionem antiquissimam et iam in istis temporibus ab aliquibus resumpta, quaeritur undecimo utrum actus vel etiam habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva, vel sit res sibi addita. 2. Arguitur quod sit idem, quia aliter sequeretur quod intellectus esset passibilis et alterabilis etiam alteratione corruptiva, quod negat Aristoteles. Consequentia probatur, quia ita intellectus reciperet dispositiones sibi additas sicut materia, et aliquando contrarias successive et sibi invicem corruptivas, ut opiniones contrarias quae non possunt simul esse in eodem propter contrarietatem, ut habetur quarto Metaphysicae. Ideo una est corruptiva alterius, sicut est de dispositionibus quae in materia recipiuntur. Et si dicas quod alteratio corruptiva quae non convenit intellectui est quae disponit ad corruptionem sui subiecti et non solum ad corruptionem dispositionis contrariae, tunc ego dicerem quod materia non plus esset passibilis passione corruptiva

5–6 vel sit res sibi addita ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a15–16. 8–9 quod negat Aristoteles ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 17. 12–13 ut habetur quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.3 1005b23–25 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 73.182): “contraria vero est opinio opinioni quae contradictionis, palam quod impossibile simul existimare eundem esse et non esse idem; simul enim habebit contrarias opiniones qui de hoc est mentitus.” 3–4 propter quaedam . . . resumpta ] om. AET 3 Propter quamdam ] Utrum V 6 addita ] superaddita VW 7 idem ] quod anima intellectiva add. A 8 alterabilis ] sicut materia prima est passiva alterabilis add. A sicut materia prima add. ET || alteratione ] passione T 10 dispositiones ] et intellectiones add. A || sibi ] om. E 10–11 successive ] om. AE 14 materia ] prima add. T © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 42

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Is the intellectual act or even its habit the same as the intellective soul, or a thing added to it?

1. Due to a certain opinion of great antiquity which some have taken up again now, in these present times,412 we ask, eleventh: Is the intellectual act or even its habit the same as the intellective soul, or a thing added to it? 2. It is argued that it is the same, because otherwise it would follow that the intellect would be alterable and able to be acted on by a corruptive alteration, which Aristotle denies. The consequence is proved because the intellect would receive dispositions added to it just like matter, and sometimes contraries successively and corruptive of each other, e.g., contrary opinions, which cannot be in the same thing at the same time due to their contrariety, as is held in Metaphysics IV. Thus, the one is corruptive of the other, as is the case with dispositions received in matter. And if you say that a corruptive alteration that does not apply to the intellect is one that is disposed to the corruption of its subject and not merely to the corruption of the contrary disposition, I 412 Several

manuscripts add this prefatory comment to the first argument of this

question.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 42

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quam intellectus, quia nulla potest disponere ad corruptionem materiae, cum ipsa sit incorruptibilis. 3. Item Deus sine addito est intelligens et sciens omnia, ex eo quod ipse est similitudo repraesentativa omnium. Et ita possemus dicere quod intellectus est similitudo repraesentativa entium, licet non ita perfecte sicut intellectus divinus. Ideo propter imperfectionem, indiget concursu alterius agentis, ut phantasmatibus, ad hoc quod ipse fiat sufficienter repraesentatio et intellectio entium. Et cum ita possunt salvari, non est ponenda diversitas nec plurificatio intellectionum et habituum in intellectu, cum enim in natura nihil debeat poni frustra. Et tamen poneremus frustra plura ubi omnia possemus salvare per pauciora. 4. Item intellectus et intellectio et scientia non determinant sibi quod differant, ideo si simul invenientur in nobis, non oportet tenere quod differant. Ideo frustra poneremus illam multitudinem, ut dictum est prius. 5. Item sicut nos ponimus quod haec magnitudo est idem quod figura, et est aliquando sphaera, aliquando cubus, aliquando pyramis, ex eo quod aliter et aliter se habet, absque hoc quod sphaericitas vel cubicitas sit res sibi addita, et etiam haec ligna et lapides sic aliquando sunt domus, aliquando non sunt domus, et sic etiam multi ponunt quod hoc mobile, ex eo quod aliter et aliter se habet, est aliquando motus, aliquando quies, aliquando motus sursum, aliquando motus deorsum, absque hoc quod motus sit alia res ab eo, ideo, ut prius, frustra poneretur talis multitudo. 6. Item si habitus intellectualis esset alius ab intellectu tanquam res addita sibi, tunc ille habitus de novo genitus in intellectu, et ideo etiam esset corruptibilis. Sed hoc est impossibile, scilicet quod corrumperetur; igitur, etc. Falsitas consequentis declaratur quia non pos-

23 imperfectionem ] intellectionem V 24 ut ] aut AT || phantasmatibus ] phantasiationis EVW || ipse ] sibi A 25 et intellectio ] om. V 26 intellectionum ] intellectu add. A 34 haec ] om. AE || quod ] haec add. E 35 aliquando ] aut A vel E 36 habet ] magnitudo add. VW 37 sibi ] super add. VW 41 eo ] distincta add. T 43 esset ] apparet E 46 declaratur ] probatur AT

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would say that matter is no more able to be acted on by a corruptive affection than the intellect, because nothing can be disposed to the corruption of matter, since it is incorruptible. 3. Again, God understands and knows all things without addition because God is the representative likeness of all things. And so we could say that the intellect is the representative likeness of beings, although not as perfectly as the divine intellect: due to its imperfection, the human intellect needs another agent, such as the phantasms, to contribute to its becoming an adequate representation and an act of thinking of beings. And since things can be explained in this way, one must not posit a diversity or proliferation of acts and habits of thought in the intellect, since nothing in nature should be posited in vain. And we would be positing more in vain where we could explain everything by fewer. 4. Again, intellect, act of thinking, and knowledge do not by themselves determine that they differ, and so if they are found in us at the same time, one need not hold that they differ. Thus, we would posit this multitude in vain, as was stated above. 5. Again, just as we posit that this magnitude is the same as figure, and that because it is differently disposed, it is sometimes a sphere, sometimes a cube, and sometimes a pyramid, without sphericity or cubicity being a thing added to it; and also that these stones and pieces of wood are sometimes a house and sometimes not a house; and so too, just as many posit that because this moveable thing is differently disposed, it is sometimes motion and sometimes rest, sometimes motion upwards and sometimes in motion downwards, without motion being something other than it, so, as before, a multitude of this sort would be posited in vain. 6. Again, if there were an intellectual habit different from the intellect, like a thing added to it, then this habit would be generated anew in the intellect, and so it would also be corruptible. But this is impossible, namely, that it would be corrupted; therefore, etc. The

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set assignari corrumpens. Non enim corrumperetur ad corruptionem sui subiecti, scilicet intellectus, quia iste ponitur perpetuus. Nec ad desinitionem actus intelligendi, quia ponitur manere longe post actuali intellectione cessante. Nec corrumperetur a contrario, quia forte numquam eveniret contrarius habitus, ut si quis habeat scientiam unius conclusionis mathematice, forte quia dimitteret studium et ibit ad arma et numquam considerabit circa illam materiam, ideo numquam acquiret sibi habitum contrarium. Nec corrumperetur ex cessatione actus sentiendi vel phantasiandi, quia cessant in somno forti sine somnio, et remanent habitus intellectuales. Et non apparet a quo vel per quid aliter corrumperetur, nam si tu dicis quod corrumpatur ab oblivione per non assentire, apparet quod hoc non sufficit quia cessante consideratione manet post longo tempore. Ideo apparet quod non necessario dependet in suo permanere ex consideratione, propter quod nec oportet quod corrumpetur ex cessatione a consideratione. 7. Oppositum arguitur, quia si essent idem, sequeretur quod non indigeremus intellectu agente, quod est contra determinationem Aristotelis. Consequentia patet, quia ad intelligendum vel sciendum nihil oportet fieri, intellectus enim non fit modo si tu modo incipis intelligere vel si tu addiscis; igitur nec aliquid fit quod sit ipse intellectus; igitur nec scientia et ita etiam nec intellectus fieret; igitur nihil fieret, et sic nullum esset faciens vel agens. Ideo non deberet poni intellectus agens.

63–64 determinationem Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a 10–19. 49 desinitionem ] distinctionem T || actus ] intellectus V sup. lin. W intellectus exp. W || manere ] immanere(!) A 51 eveniret ] adveniret AT 52 conclusionis ] manifeste vel add. A || mathematice ] aut in mathematica add. A || dimitteret ] dictaret(!) T 56 habitus ] actus(!) T 57–58 oblivione ] obligatione E 58 per non assentire ] vel ex non cognoscitive(?) A per non consentire E vel non consideratione T 61 consideratione ] quarum propositum add. A 62 arguitur ] per Aristotelem add. AT 66 igitur nec aliquid ] vel A 67 fieret ] scientiam add. W 68 non ] om. (!) V

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falsity of the consequent is clear, because no corrupting agent could be designated for it. For it would not be corrupted because of the corruption of its subject, namely, the intellect, since that is assumed to be everlasting. Nor would it be corrupted because of the cessation of the act of understanding, since it is assumed to remain long after actual thinking has ceased. Nor would it be corrupted by a contrary, because the contrary habit might never occur, as in a case where someone has knowledge of one conclusion mathematically, and, perhaps because he gave up his studies and goes to war, will never consider the matter again, and so will never acquire the contrary habit for himself. Nor would it be corrupted by the cessation of the acts of sensing or imagining, because these cease in a deep and dreamless sleep, and the intellectual habits remain. And there appears to be no other way for it to be corrupted, for if you say that it would be corrupted by being forgotten because it was not assented to, it is apparent that this is not sufficient, because it remains for a long time after it has ceased being actually considered. Thus, it is apparent that it does not necessarily depend for its persistence on being considered, because it does not have to be corrupted by ceasing to be considered. 7. The opposite is argued, because if they were the same, it would follow that we would not need an agent intellect, which is contrary to Aristotle’s position. The consequence is obvious, because nothing needs to be produced for understanding and knowing, for an act of understanding does not come into existence now, if you are now beginning to understand or learn;413 therefore, neither does something come into existence that is the act of understanding; therefore, neither the knowledge nor the act of understanding comes into existence; therefore, nothing would come into existence, and so there would be 413 The

reason an act of understanding does not come into existence is because at that moment you are just beginning to understand, and then, when you are just beginning to understand, the act of understanding is not there (since you are just beginning to understand); therefore, at any later time, when you already understand, an act of understanding did not have to come into existence, since it did not have to come into existence for you to begin to understand either. The reply to this argument at par. 17 below speaks of an act of thinking (intellectio) instead of an act of understanding (intellectus), but the terms are being used interchangeably in this context.

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8. Item sequeretur quod a principio tuae nativitatis, tu habebas omnem scientiam quam nunc habes, quod est falsum, quia tunc frustra venisses ad scholas. Consequentia patet quia tunc tu habebas intellectum qui erat ex tunc quidquid est iam, nam tu habebas quidquid est ille, tuus intellectus. Sed omnem scientiam quam nunc habes est iste, tuus intellectus, ut dicis. Igitur omnem scientiam quam habes tu ex tunc habebas. 9. Item sequeretur quod anima sensitiva esset actus sentiendi, quia proportio est, “sicut sensus ad sensibilia, ita intellectus ad intelligibilia.” Sed consequens falsum est, quia bene est sensus sine sensatione, et cessat sensatio manente sensu, et idem non est sine seipso vel sine eo quod est idem quod ipsum. 10. Item per oblivionem, tu amittis scientiam tuam et non intellectum; vel etiam per sciendum, tu acquiris scientiam et non intellectum; igitur, etc. 11. Item sequeretur quod idem esset actus considerandi per intellectum et habitus intellectualis, quod est falsum, quia ex actibus generantur habitus, et idem ex seipso non generatur, et cessat actus non cessante habitu, et intellectus est causa et principium tam actus quam habitus. 12. Et quasi infinita talia possent adhuc adduci. 13. Opiniones antiquissimae revertantur multotiens tanquam novae, et gaudent multi resumere eas, quia propter earum oblivionem, videntur nova et mirabilia dicere. Et ita a iuvenibus libenter audiuntur

78–79 “sicut sensus ad sensibilia, ita intellectus ad intelligibilia.” ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429a17 (Ar. lat. XII.2 201.1.10): “sicut sensitivum ad sensibilia, sic intellectum ad intelligibilia.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.137 (ed. Hamesse, 185): “sicut se habet sensus ad sensibilia, sic se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia.” 71 omnem ] unam E 72 venisses ] Parisius add. E 73 quidquid ] ipse add. AT || habebas ] intellectum add. T 82 tuam ] om. A 87 habitus ] intellectuales add. VW || actus ] habitudinis add. T 90 Et . . . adduci ] om. T || quasi ] om. AE 91 antiquissimae ] antiquorum A || multotiens ] om. E 93 nova ] intelligibilia add. V

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nothing producing or acting. Thus, there would be no need to posit an agent intellect. 8. Again, it would follow that from the moment of your birth, you had all the knowledge which you now have, which is false, because then you would have gone to school in vain. The consequence is clear, because you had an understanding then which was from that moment whatever it is now, for you had whatever is this, your understanding. But all the knowledge you now have is this, your understanding, as you say. Therefore, all the knowledge you have you had from that moment. 9. Again, it would follow that the sensitive soul would be an act of sensing, because the analogy is, “as sense is to what is sensible, so is intellect to what is intelligible.” But the consequent is false, because certainly the power of sense exists without sensation, and sensation ceases while the power of sense remains, and the same thing is not without itself, or without what is the same as itself. 10. Again, by forgetting, you lose your knowledge and not your understanding; also, by knowing, you acquire knowledge and not your understanding; therefore, etc. 11. Again, it would follow that the intellect’s act of considering something and the intellectual habit would be the same, which is false, because habits are generated from acts, and the same thing is not generated from itself. Also, the act ceases without the habit ceasing, and the intellect is the cause and principle of act and habit alike. 12. An almost infinite number of such arguments could yet be brought up against this view. 13. The most ancient opinions are very often returned to as if they were new, and many delight in taking them up again because, due to their having been forgotten, they seem to say something new and

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quia naturaliter nova et mirabilia delectant, prout determinat Aristoteles primo Rhetoricae. 14. Iam igitur quidam quorumdam antiquorum resumpserunt opinionem, quam credo nostro tempore satis improbatam, ita quod nullus amplius curaret de illa disputare, scilicet quod in nobis intellectus et scientia non different, sed sunt idem intellectus, intellectio, et scientia, et omnino omnis intellectio tua et omnes habitus intellectuales quibus tu intelligis aut consideras aut potes considerare sunt idem quod intellectus tuus. 15. Et rationes difficiliores quas ad hoc adducunt sunt quas a principio quaestionis posuimus. Et maxime fundant se super hoc quod possunt omnia salvare per idem aliter et aliter se habere, sicut dicebatur de motu, de figura, et de domo. Ideo propter tales rationes, aliqui antiquissimi posuerunt accidentia non esse entia, scilicet distincta a subiectis suis, sed sic deberent dici modi substantiarum, quod idem non est solum nunc calidum et post frigidum, aliter et aliter se habens, immo etiam ipsum nunc est caliditas et post frigiditas, aliter et aliter se habens, sicut idem nunc est sphaericitas et post cubicitas. Et hanc opinionem, ut puto, tenuerunt et tenent non quia credant eam esse veram, sed quia difficile est demonstrative eos redarguere.

95 primo Rhetoricae ] A RISTOTELES, Rhet. I.11 1371b11–12 (Ar. lat. XXXI.2 203.1): “omnia enim hec mirabilia. Et quoniam quod secundum naturam delectabile, que vero eiusdem generis secundum naturam invicem sunt, omnia cognata et similia delectabilia ut in pluribus.” 96 quidam ] Cf. JOHANNES DE MIRECURIA, Apologiae (ed. Stegm¨uller, 200–201); NICOLAUS ORESMIUS, Questiones super Physicam (Books I-VII), III.2–7 (ed. Caroti, et al.). 94 mirabilia ] prout add. V || delectant ] sensum add. AT 97 nostro ] in eo W 98–99 intellectus et scientia ] intelligentibus et scientibus A 103 difficiliores ] fortiores A difficiles E formaliores T 105 et aliter ] om. A 106 et de domo ] om. E 107 accidentia ] actus E 109 solum ] est negatur vel add. A 111 cubicitas ] bicubicitas AT cubitas E 112 tenuerunt ] invenerunt AT || non quia ] nam(!) E

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amazing. And so youngsters happily lend an ear to them, because what is new and amazing is naturally delightful, as Aristotle maintains in Rhetoric I. 14. Now then, some people have taken up again from certain of those ancients an opinion I believe has been sufficiently disproved in our day, to the point where no one would care to dispute about it any longer, namely, that intellect and knowledge do not differ in us, but that intellect, the act of thinking, and knowledge are the same, and that absolutely every one of your acts of thinking, and the intellectual habits by which you understand or think or are able to think, are the same as your intellect. 15. And the more challenging arguments they adduce in support of this are the ones we posited at the beginning of the Question. They base their position above all on the fact that they can explain everything by the same thing’s being differently disposed, as was said about motion, figure, and the house. Thus, some of the most ancient philosophers, using arguments like these, assumed that accidents are not entities distinct from their subjects, but that one should speak instead of ‘modes of substances’, such that the same thing, differently disposed, is not only now hot and later cold, but also now heat and later coldness, differently disposed, just as the same thing is now sphericity and later cubicity. And I think they held this opinion, and those others now hold it, not because they believe it to be true, but because it is difficult to refute them demonstratively.

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115

120

125

130

135

810

16. Unde ad rationes prius adductas contra eos, ipsi sic respondent. 17. Ad primam dicunt quod oportet ponere intellectum agentem qui agit intellectionem vel scientiam, non ita quod intellectionem vel scientiam faciat, sed sic quod animam faciat esse intellectionem vel scientiam, quia eam facit aliter se habere quam prius se haberet, sicut diceretur quod domificator non domum facit, nec aliquid facit, sed aliquid vel aliqua facit esse domum. Et sic tu hanc ceram prius cubicam facis esse sphaericam, et tamen nec ceram, nec sphaericam, nec sphaericitatem facis. Non igitur aliquid facis. Sed aliquid facis esse sphaericum vel sphaericitatem, vel sciens vel scientiam, vel intellectum vel intellectionem. 18. Ad aliam diceretur quod a principio nativitatis tuae, tu omnem scientiam vel intellectionem quam habes habebas, et tamen nullam habebas scientiam vel intellectionem in principio, sicut haec cera sphaericitatem quam habet habebat heri, sed non habebat sphaericitatem. 19. Ad aliam diceretur quod etiam anima sensitiva quandocumque sentit est sensatio. Nec sine sensatione potest esse iste sensus, sed tamen potest esse iste sensus sine sensatione. Unde quandocumque iste sensus fuit vel erit, ista sensatio fuit vel erit. Sensus fuit tamen saepe quando non fuit sensatio, et iste sensus, in potentia manente, cessat esse sensatio. Sed ista sensatio non cessat esse. 20. Ad aliam similiter dicitur quod numquam me durante ego scientiam meam amittam, sed bene amitto scientiam sic, scilicet quod am-

119 aliter ] et aliter add. A 121–122 cubicam ] bicubicam T 122–123 nec sphaericitatem ] om. A 123 non . . . facis ] hom. A || aliquid facis esse ] om. A 124 vel sphaericitatem ] om. A 124–125 intellectum ] intelligens AET 127 scientiam ] tuam add. V 128 scientiam ] scientias add. VW || in principio ] om. AET || cera ] substantia E 131 nec . . . sensus ] om. A 132 iste sensus ] om. AET 133 Sensus ] om. AT 134 in potentia ] om. A est tibi T 137–138 amplius ] om. AET

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16. Accordingly, they reply as follows to the arguments previously adduced against them. 17. To the first,414 they say that one must posit an agent intellect that brings about the act of thinking or knowledge, not in such a way that it makes the act of thinking or knowledge, but so that it makes the soul into an act of thinking or knowledge, because it makes the soul differently disposed than it was before, just as one would say that a house-builder neither makes the house, nor makes anything, but makes something or some things into a house. In the same way, you make this previously cubical piece of wax to be spherical, but you do not make the wax, or what is spherical, or the sphericity. Therefore, you do not make some thing. But you do make something to be spherical or sphericity, knowing or knowledge, understanding or actually thinking. 18. To the other,415 it would be said that from the moment of your birth, you had every piece of knowledge or act of thinking which you have, and yet you did not have knowledge or acts of thinking in the beginning, just as this piece of wax has the sphericity it had yesterday, though it did not have sphericity.416 19. To the other,417 it would be said that the sensitive soul is also an act of sensation whenever it senses. Nor without sensation can that sense exist, but that sense can exist without sensation. For this reason, whenever that sense was or will be, that sensation was or will be. And yet there has often been that sense when there was no sensation, and then that sense, remaining in potency, ceases to be an act of sensation. But that act of sensation does not cease to be. 20. To the other,418 it is likewise said that as long as I am alive, I will never lose my knowledge, but certainly I lose knowledge in

414

See par. 7 above. par. 8 above. 416 For discussion of this argument and its implications, see Klima 1999 and 2010b. 417 See par. 9 above. 418 See par. 10 above. 415 See

L IBER III Q UAESTIO 11

140

145

150

155

160

812

plius anima mea non erit talis scientia. Et sic etiam scientiam meam non acquisivi per studium, sed acquisivi sic scientiam quod per studium, intellectus meus qui non erat scientia factus est scientia. 21. Ad aliam dicitur quod ex aliquo aliqualiter se habente fit ipsum idem aliter se habens, ut ex magnitudine sphaerica magnitudo cubica, et ex materia privata materia formata, et est idem materia formata quod erat materia privata. Sicut igitur ex cera quae non erat sphaericitas cera fit sphaerica et sphaericitas, ita ex intellectu ignorante intellectus fit intelligens et sciens et intellectio et scientia; et sic etiam ex intellectu qui saepe fit actus intelligendi, ipse fit scientia. Nec igitur actus fit nec habitus fit nec cessat esse, sed actus fit habitus. Diceretur etiam quod intellectus est causa et principium actus et habitus ad illum sensum quod prius naturaliter est intellectus quam ipse sit actus vel habitus, et quia etiam ratio animae vel intellectus est prior et simplicior ratione actus vel habitus intellectualis, sicut diceretur quod magnitudo esset causa vel principium figurae, et motus temporis, et mobile ipsius motus, licet esset sic idem motus et tempus, vel etiam mobile et motus, prout multi dicunt. 22. Non obstantibus adhuc istis, ego firmiter adhaereo opinioni contrariae, scilicet quod quamdiu ego intelligo et scio, intellectus meus nec est intellectio nec scientia, immo intellectio et scientia sunt dispositiones diversae ab eo et sibi inhaerentes. 23. Primo igitur huic conclusioni adhaereo propter auctoritatem studii Parisiensis et episcopi qui, quondam congregati propter pericu-

138 anima mea ] in anima mea AT 139 non ] om. (!) T 140 factus ] om. V 141 aliqualiter ] equaliter(!) T elicit aliter supra V 144 ex ] haec add. V 144– 145 sphaericitas ] sphaerica AT 148 fit ] nec scientia add. A || nec cessat esse ] similiter nec scientiam add. T || actus fit habitus ] huiusmodi habitus fit actus aut econverso A 151–152 et simplicior ] et superior AT om. E 152 actus vel ] om. E 153 et motus temporis ] om. T || motus ] principium add. A 154–155 ipsius . . . motus ] hom. A 156 firmiter ] credo et add. A 158 immo ] intellectus vel add. A

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the sense that my soul will no longer be such knowledge. And so as well, my knowledge I have not acquired by study, but I have acquired knowledge in such a way that by study, my intellect, which was not knowledge, is made into knowledge. 21. To the other,419 it is said that from something being disposed in some way, the same thing comes to be disposed in some other way, as from a spherical magnitude comes to be a cubical magnitude, and from unformed matter comes to be informed matter, and the informed matter is the same as what was the unformed matter. Therefore, just as spherical wax and sphericity are made from wax which was not spherical, so the intellect is brought to be understanding, knowing, an act of thinking, and knowledge, from an intellect that is not knowing; and so as well, it is brought to be knowledge from an intellect that is often made into an act of understanding. Therefore, neither the act nor the habit comes into being or ceases to be, but the act becomes the habit. One might say further that the intellect is the cause and principle of the act and habit in the sense that the intellect is naturally prior to its being an act or habit, and also because the nature of the soul or intellect is prior to and simpler than the nature of the act or intellectual habit, just as one would say that magnitude is the cause and principle of figure, and motion of time, and the moveable of its own motion, even though motion and time, or moveable and motion, are all the same, as they say. 22. Still, these replies notwithstanding, I firmly adhere to the contrary opinion, namely, that as long as I understand and know, my intellect is neither the act of thinking nor the knowledge; rather, the act of thinking and the knowledge are dispositions distinct from it and inhering in it. 23. In the first place, then, I adhere to this conclusion based on the authority of the school of Paris and the Bishop who at one time, 419 See

par. 11 above.

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165

170

175

180

185

814

lum multarum falsarum opinionum Parisius seminatarum, condemnaverunt eas. Et adrogatum universitatis inhibuit episcopus sub poena excommunicationis, ne amplius ab aliquo tenerentur. Et haec fuit una de illis, scilicet quod intellectus noster esset scientia vel intellectio. 24. Secundo conclusioni dictae meae adhaereo quia opposita potest esse principium alterius magnae haeresis. Nam eodem modo possent illi dicere et de aliis accidentibus et subiectis earum, sicut de habitibus intellectualibus et de intellectu, scilicet quod aqua calida esset idem quod caliditas, et frigida idem quod frigiditas, aliter et aliter se habens. Et hoc est iam contra ea quae tenemus de sacramento altaris, ubi accidentia manent sine subiecto. Igitur substantia panis, quae erat alba, magna, et figurata, non erat albedo, magnitudo, et figura, etc., quae manent in sacramento, quia haec manent et substantia panis non manet. Unde bonus est syllogismus: haec substantia panis non manebit, et haec albedo manebit; igitur haec albedo non est haec substantia panis. 25. Item sic similibus rationibus ipsi possent dicere de formis substantialibus ad materiam, scilicet quod materia uno modo se habens est ignis, et alio modo se habens est aqua, a¨er, vel lapis. Et haec fuit opinio Melissi et Democriti, dicentium omnia esse unum substantialiter. Non enim erant ita fatui quod crederent istum hominem esse idem cum illo, sed de hiis quae apparent ex se invicem generari, ut si ex terra A fiat aqua B, et ex aqua B herba C, et ex herba C equus D, et sic de omnibus speciebus generabilium, tunc equus D est idem quod fuit herba et aqua et terra, eadem enim materia quam dicebant esse totam substantiam prius fuit terra et post aqua et herba et equus, aliter

165 intellectus noster esset scientia vel intellectio ] Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (ed. Denifle & Chatelain) vol. 2, #1147, art. 28. 167 magnae haeresis ] Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (ed. Denifle & Chatelain) vol. 2, #1147, art. 29. 164 tenerentur ] istae opiniones add. E || haec ] ista opinio nunc dicta A 167 alterius ] om. E 169 intellectualibus ] et de intellectualibus AT 173 alba ] om. A 173–174 non erat . . . etc. ] hom. A 180 a¨er, vel lapis ] etc. AT 184 et ex herba C ] om. A 185 speciebus ] om. V 187 substantiam ] nisi add. VW || et herba ] om. A

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having summoned the congregation together because of the danger of numerous false opinions disseminated in Paris, condemned them. The Bishop checked the arrogance of the University under pain of excommunication, so that these opinions would no longer be held by anyone. And this was one of them, namely, that our intellect is the knowledge or the act of thinking. 24. Second, I adhere to my aforementioned conclusion because the opposite can be the beginning of another great heresy. For they could speak about other accidents as well as their subjects in the same way as they do about intellectual habits and the intellect, namely, that hot water is the same as heat, and cold water is the same as coldness, differently disposed. But this is already contrary to what we hold concerning the sacrament of the altar, where the accidents remain without a subject. Therefore, the substance of the bread, which was white, large, and a certain shape, was not the whiteness, largeness, shape, etc., that remain in the sacrament, because those remain, and the substance of the bread does not remain. For this reason, this syllogism is good: ‘The substance of the bread will not remain, and the whiteness will remain; therefore, the whiteness is not the substance of the bread.’ 25. Again, in the same way, they could speak using similar arguments about the relation of substantial forms to matter, namely, that matter disposed in one way is fire, and disposed in another way, is water, air, or stone. This was the opinion of Democritus and Melissus, when they claimed that everything is substantially one. For they were not so foolish as to believe that this human is the same as that one, but they did believe this of things that appear to be generated from one another: for example, if from earth A comes water B, and from water B comes grass C, and from grass C, horse D, and so on for all species of generable things, then horse D is the same as what

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190

195

200

205

816

et aliter se habens. Haec autem dicta sunt valde obscura et periculosa, sic enim asinus fuit lapis, et lapis semper fuit, et numquam equus vel homo fuit genitus, licet materia facta fuit homo vel equus. Haec enim satis sunt reprobata per Aristotelem et per alios, et nullo modo ego vellem eis assentire. 26. Item aliter et aliter se habere significat idem quod alio et alio modo se habere. Si igitur intellectus nunc est una opinio et cras erit opinio contraria, alio et alio modo se habens, iste modus non erit iste modus, ex quo modi ponuntur alii. Si igitur modi sunt plures et alii ab invicem, et intellectus non est nec erit alius sed semper idem, necesse est intellectum esse alium et ab illis modis et ab unoquoque illorum. Et tunc omnes difficultates quae erant de identitate vel alietate illarum opinionum, et maiores, revertuntur de illis modis. Ideo melius est statim stare in alietate illarum opinionum. Verum enim est quod intellectus sit contrarie opinans, alio et alio modo se habens, etsi illi modi sunt illi opiniones, sicut etiam Socrates, prius albus et post niger, alio et alio modo se habet, et illi modi sunt albedo et nigredo. Accidentia enim sunt modi et dispositiones substantiarum secundum quorum variationem substantia subdita aliter et aliter se habet. Et omnino, aliter et aliter se habere requirit aliquam alietatem, et oportet quod illa detur in proposito, et non potest bene dari nisi alietas illorum habituum ad invicem vel ad intellectum.

191 per Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, Met. I.4 985b5–20; VIII.2 1042b9–14. 188 periculosa ] dicere et tenere add. E 189–190 et numquam . . . fuit ] vel T 190 facta ] rep. V 192 vellem ] magis(!) add. V 201 alietate ] admixtione(?) AT 204 et alio ] om. A 206 subdita ] subiecta AV om. W 208 alietas ] om. AETV sup. lin. W

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was the grass, water, and earth, for the same matter, which they said is the entire substance, was first earth and later water, grass, and horse, differently disposed. But these remarks are exceedingly obscure and dangerous, for in the same way, a donkey was a stone, and a stone has always existed, and no horse or human being has ever been generated, although matter has been made into a human being or a horse. These ideas have been sufficiently condemned by Aristotle and others, and in no way would I want to assent to them. 26. Again, ‘being differently disposed’ signifies the same as ‘being disposed in different modes’. If, therefore, the intellect is now one opinion and tomorrow will be the contrary opinion, being disposed in different modes, then the first mode will not be the second, because these modes are assumed to be different. If, therefore, there is more than one mode, and they differ from each other, and the intellect is not and will not be other than it is but always the same, then the intellect must differ both from those modes and from each one of them in turn. And then all of the difficulties that arose in connection with the difference or identity of those opinions, and more, return in connection with those modes. Thus, it is better to take a stand at once on the side of the difference of those opinions . For it is true that the intellect would be opining in contrary ways, being disposed in different modes, even if those modes are those opinions, just as Socrates, first white and later black, is also disposed in different ways, and those modes are whiteness and blackness. For accidents are modes and dispositions of substances according to the variation of which their underlying substance is differently disposed. And in general, being differently disposed requires some difference, and it must be that it is present also in the case we are considering, and it can cor-

L IBER III Q UAESTIO 11 210

215

220

225

230

235

818

27. Sed tu obicies quia ita argueretur de figura quod sit distincta a magnitudine, cuius tamen oppositum ego teneo. 28. Ad hanc obiectionem debet responderi per ea quae dixi super secundum Physicorum in tertia quaestione. 29. Nam res potest uno modo se habere aliter et aliter prius et posterius ad aliquod extrinsecum, sine aliqua sui mutatione, per mutationem illius extrinseci. Sic enim columna prius mihi dextra sit posterius mihi sinistra. 30. Secundo modo res dicitur se habere aliter et aliter per hoc quod partes eius quantitativae mutant situm ad invicem per motum localem earum. Sic enim eadem magnitudo fit aliter et aliter figurata. Et hoc est aliter et aliter se habere ex alietate partium ad invicem et ex motu earum partium per quem fiunt aliter situatae, qui est etiam alius ab illis partibus et a totali magnitudine. 31. Sed si res tertio modo dicatur aliter et aliter se habens prius et posterius, scilicet circumscriptis exterioribus et quod eius partes non mutant situm ad invicem, tunc alietas designata per aliter et aliter se habere non potest salvari nisi per generationem vel corruptionem alicuius dispositionis sibi inhaerentis et distinctae ab ea. Sic enim est de aqua, si prius est calida et postea frigida; et de materia, si sit prius sub forma aquae et posterius sub forma ignis; et de intellectu, si prius fuerit sic opinatus et post habet contrarie. Nam homine dormiente et omni repraesentatione sibi per sensum circumscripta, adhuc aliter haberet se posterius quam haberet se prius, quod non potest salvari nisi per alietatem opinionum illarum ad invicem et ab intellectu. Aliter non posset ostendi quin omnia essent unum modo quo opinabantur Parmenides et Melissus, sicut dixi prius.

212–213 super secundum Physicorum in tertia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. II.3 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 262.4–25). 212 obiectionem ] distinctionem A dubitationem ET 218 et aliter ] om. AT 222 situatae ] figuratae add. A figuratae T 224 et aliter ] om. A 225 circumscriptis ] positionibus add. A || exterioribus ] partibus T 228 distinctae ] codistinctae T 231 homine ] hodie A 233 posterius . . . prius ] prius . . . posterius ET 235 quo ] omnia add. V 236 sicut dixi prius ] om. A

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rectly be assigned only as the difference of those habits in relation to each other or to the intellect. 27. But you will object that one might argue in the same way about shape that it is distinct from magnitude, whereas I maintain the opposite of this. 28. One should reply to this objection in terms of what I have said in my commentary on Physics II, in the third question. 29. For in one way, a thing can be differently disposed earlier and then later in relation to something that is extrinsic to it, without any change in itself, through a change in what is extrinsic to it. Because this is how a column is first on my right and later on my left. 30. In a second way, a thing is said to be differently disposed because its quantitative parts change place relative to each other by their local motion. For this is how the same magnitude becomes differently shaped. And this is to be differently disposed on the basis of the difference of the parts relative to each other and by the motion of their parts, through which they come to be differently situated, which is also different from those parts and from the entire magnitude. 31. But if a thing is said to be differently disposed earlier and later in a third way, leaving aside what is external to it and assuming that its parts do not change position relative to each other, then the difference designated by ‘being differently disposed’ can only be explained by the generation or corruption of some disposition inhering in it and distinct from it. For this is how it is with water, if it is first hot and later cold; with matter, if it were first in the form of water and then later in the form of fire; and with the intellect, if it first believed one thing and then held the contrary. For when a man is sleeping, leaving aside everything represented to him by sense, he would still be disposed later differently than he was earlier, and this can only be explained by the difference of those opinions from each other and from the intellect. Otherwise, it could not be shown that not all things are one in the way that Parmenides and Melissus believed, as I said before.

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240

245

250

255

820

32. Tunc igitur faciliter solvuntur rationes aliorum. 33. Ad primam enim dictum est prius quomodo intellectus est passibilis, et quomodo passione corruptiva. Et adhuc potest addi quod materia sit passibilis passione sic corruptiva quod aqua disponat ad corruptionem substantiae, vel simplicis vel compositae, licet non ipsius materiae. Sed passio qua intellectus patitur ad nullius substantiae corruptionem disponit, sive simplicis sive compositae. 34. Ad secundam, tertiam, et quartam, solutae sunt ex dictis, quia sine multitudine non potest salvari quod intellectus sic aliter se habeat sicut aliter se habet. Sed hoc potest salvari de figura et de domo. Et Deus numquam intrinsece sic aliter se habet. Ideo non sequitur, si non repugnat in eo esse idem intellectum et intellectionem et scientiam, quod hoc non repugnat in nobis. 35. Ad aliam quae quaerit quomodo corrumpatur habitus intellectualis, dico quod haec dubitatio non est nobis propria sed communis nobis et eis. Licet enim non dicant quod scientia nostra fiat vel corrumpitur intellectu permanente, tamen ipsi habent dicere quod intellectu permanente, ipse de novo fit scientia. Et corrumpitur scientia, id est desinit esse scientia propter oblivionem. Ideo dicant a quo vel quomodo cessat scientia esse, et nos diceremus quod ab illo vel illo modo scientia in eo corrumpitur et cessat esse. Et vide quid dixi de hoc in secundo huius, in quaestione septima, de dubitationibus quarta et quinta principalibus.

258–259 in secundo . . . principalibus ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.7, par. 25–38. 238–239 passibilis ] impassibilis(!) A 239 Et adhuc ] exp. E 239–240 potest . . . corruptiva ] hom. E 240 passibilis ] corruptibilis W 245–246 quod . . . salvari ] hom. T 247 intrinsece ] om. T 249 non ] om. (!) E 253 intellectu ] in intellectu T 256 illo vel ] om. A 257 eo ] esse(?) A 258 septima ] sextodecima AT

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32. The arguments of the others, then, are therefore easily resolved. 33. To the first,420 it was said above how the intellect is capable of being acted on, and how it is capable of being acted on by a corruptive affection. It can be added further that matter is capable of being acted on by an affection that is corruptive in such a way that water is disposed to the corruption of a substance, either simple or composite, although not to the corruption of the matter itself. But the affection by which the intellect is acted on is not disposed to the corruption of any substance, whether simple or composite. 34. To the second, third, and fourth:421 they are resolved by what has been said, because without a multitude, it cannot be explained how the intellect would be disposed in one way as it is in another. But this can be explained as regards the figure and the house. God is never intrinsically disposed differently. Thus, if the identity of intellect, act of thinking, and knowledge produces no incompatibility in God, it does not follow that there is no such incompatibility in us. 35. To the other,422 which asks how an intellectual habit would be corrupted, I say that this doubt is not proper to us, but common to us and them. For even though they do not say that our knowledge is produced or corrupted while the intellect persists, nevertheless, they have said that while the intellect persists, it is made into knowledge for the first time. And the knowledge is corrupted, i.e., it ceases to be knowledge because of forgetfulness, and so they speak of the way in which or how it ceases to be knowledge, and we would say that in one way or another, the knowledge in it is corrupted and ceases to exist. See what I have said about this in Book II of this treatise, Question 18, in the fourth and fifth main doubts.

420 See

par. 2 above. pars. 3–5 above. 422 See par. 6 above. 421 See

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822

Utrum omnis intellectio simplex sit vera.

5

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1. Et arguitur quod non, quia si omnis conceptus simplex sit verus, sequeretur quod etiam omnis vox significativa correspondens conceptui simplici esset vera, cum non sit vera vel falsa in voce significativa vel scriptura nisi ratione verae vel falsae in mente. Sed consequens falsum est, quod ego probo primo per Aristotelem primo Perihermeneias dicentem sic, “est autem, quemadmodum intellectus in anima aliquotiens sine vero vel falso, aliquotiens autem cum iam necesse est horum alterum inesse, sic et in voce, circa enim compositionem et divisionem est veritas vel falsitas. Nomina igitur vel verba ipsa consimilia sunt sine compositione vel divisione intellectui, ut homo vel album quando non additur aliquid, nec enim verum vel falsum est adhuc.” 2. Item magis verum videtur esse vera vel falsa oratio deprecativa vel imperativa, ut Petre fac ignem, quam simplex dictio, ut Petre vel 1 omnis intellectio simplex sit vera ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430a26 (Ar. lat. XII.2 224.1.2): “Indivisibilium quidem igitur intelligentia in hiis est circa quae non est falsum.” 6–7 primo Perihermeneias ] A RISTOTELES, De int. 1 16a 10–16 (Ar. lat. II.1 5.11–17): “est autem, quemadmodum in anima aliquotiens quidem intellectus sine vero vel falso, aliquotiens autem cum iam necesse est horum alterum inesse, sic etiam in voce; circa compositionem enim et divisionem est falsitas veritas quae. Nomina igitur ipsa et verba consimilia sunt sine compositione vel divisione intellectui, ut homo vel album, quando non additur aliquid; nec enim adhuc verum aut falsum est.” 14–15 oratio deprecativa vel imperativa ] Cf. PETRUS HISPANUS, Tractatus I.6 (ed. de Rijk, 3): “Orationum perfectarum alia indicativa, ut ‘homo currit’, alia imperativa, ut ‘fac ignem’, alia optativa, ut ‘utinam essem bonus clericus’, alia subiunctiva, ut ‘si veneris ad me, dabo, tibi equum’. Harum autem omnium sola indicativa oratio dicitur propositio.” Cf. B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 1.2.3 (tr. Klima, 20–21). 1 Utrum ] Capitulum de operationibus utrum V Circa capitulum de operationibus quaeritur utrum W 2 Et arguitur ] om. V 4 cum non sit ] et non potest A 8 aliquotiens autem ] om. A 9 circa enim ] esse veram A 11–12 ut . . . album ] om. E ut hoc animal vel hoc album T 14 magis ] videntur add. V 15 Petre vel ] om. AT © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 43

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Is every simple act of thinking true?423

1. It is argued that it is not, because if every simple concept were true, it would also follow that every significative utterance corresponding to a simple concept would be true, since there is no truth or falsity in a significative utterance or inscription except by reason of its truth or falsity in the mind. But the consequent is false. I demonstrate this first on the basis of Aristotle in De Interpretatione 1 when he says, “and just as there are sometimes thoughts in the soul which are neither true nor false, and sometimes it is necessary that one or the other belong to them, so it is with speech; for truth or falsity has to do with affirmation and negation. Therefore, names or verbs themselves are like thoughts without affirmation or negation, for example, ‘man’ or ‘white’ when nothing is added, for it is as yet neither true nor false.” 2. Again, imperative or deprecative speech, as in ‘Peter, make a fire!’, seems to be more true or false than a simple word, such as

423 Several

manuscripts preface the title of q. 12 with the words “quaeritur circa capitulum de operationibus intellectus utrum [it is asked concerning the chapter on the operations of the intellect] ... .” Most medieval commentators took the beginning of Book III, chapter 6 of De anima to mark a shift in Aristotle’s subject matter from the nature of the intellect to its activities or operations. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 43

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Petrus. Et tamen primo Perihermeneias dicit Aristoteles deprecativam orationem esse “nec veram nec falsam.” 3. Item sequeretur quod omnis dicens aut in mente concipiens quod Deus non est diceret verum et haberet conceptum verum, quod opinari videtur iniquum. Et consequentia patet quia haberet conceptum simplicem et diceret vocem simplicem, propter hoc quod qui dicit totum dicit partem; et qui habet totum habet partem; et simplex est pars complexi. 4. Item isti termini vacuum et chimaera non habent convenientem correspondentiam in re. Ideo pro nullo supponunt, et sic non sunt veri sed potius falsi, licet sint simplices et incomplexi. 5. Item conceptus correspondens huic termino rosa est simplex et non est verus, posito quod nulla esset rosa et omnes essent annihilatae, quia tunc iste conceptus non haberet correspondentiam in re. 6. Item conceptus syncategorematici sunt simplices et non sunt veri, immo saepe reddunt propositionem falsam quae esset vera sine eis. Et etiam illi conceptus syncategorematici non habent extra correspondentiam, quia nihil extra repraesentant praeter repraesentationes conceptuum categorematicorum. 7. Item omne verum omni vero consonat, ut dicitur primo Ethicorum. Contraria autem sibi non consonant. Ideo non simul esse vera. Et tamen termini et conceptus simplices sunt bene contrarii, ut termini album/nigrum, albedo/nigredo; igitur non sunt omnes veri. 8. Item quinto Metaphysicae homo dicitur falsus et denarius dicitur falsus. Quare igitur non ita essent conceptus eorum falsi, cum 16 primo Perihermeneias ] A RISTOTELES, De int. 4 17a 4–5 (Ar. lat. II.1 8.9–10): “non autem in omnibus, ut deprecatio oratio quidem est, sed nec vera nec falsa.” 20 consequentia patet ] Cf. B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. IX.8, quinta sophisma (tr. Klima, 961–962) 35–36 primo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.8 1098b10–11 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 385.13): “Vero quidem enim omnia consonant existentia, falso autem cito dissonat verum.” 39 quinto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTE LES , Met. V.29 1025a 2 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 123.876): “Homo autem falsus qui promptus et electivus talium rationum, non propter aliud aliquid sed propter id ipsum, et qui aliis talium factor rationum, sicut res dicimus esse falsas quaecumque falsam faciunt phantasiam.” 18 aut ] Deus V 19 verum ] om. T 20 opinari ] concedere AT om. E || iniquum ] et absurdum add. A 26 licet . . . incomplexi ] om. E 35 omni vero ] non(!) T 36 simul ] om. V

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‘Peter!’ or ‘Peter’. And yet Aristotle says in De Interpretatione 1 that deprecative speech is “neither true nor false.” 3. Again, it would follow that anyone saying or conceiving in his mind that God does not exist would say what is true and would have a true concept, which is believed to be sinful. The consequence is obvious, because he would have a simple concept and make a simple utterance, due to the fact that anyone who says the whole says the part, and anyone who possesses the whole possesses the part, and the simple is part of the complex. 4. Again, the terms ‘vacuum’ and ‘chimera’ do not actually correspond to reality. Thus, they supposit for nothing, and so they are not true but rather false, even though they are simple and incomplex. 5. Again, the concept corresponding to the term ‘rose’ is simple, and it is not true on the assumption that no rose exists and all roses have been annihilated, in which case that concept would not correspond to reality. 6. Again, syncategorematic concepts are simple and are not true. Indeed, they often make false a proposition that would be true without them. Also, these syncategorematic concepts do not correspond to anything outside the mind, since they represent nothing outside the mind in addition to what categorematic concepts represent. 7. Again, all truths harmonize, as is stated in Nicomachean Ethics I. But contraries do not harmonize. Thus, they cannot both be true. And yet, there are certainly contrary terms and simple concepts, such as the terms, ‘white’/‘black’ and ‘whiteness’/‘blackness’; therefore, not all simple concepts are true. 8. Again, in Metaphysics V, a man is said to be false and a denarius is said to be false. Why, then, wouldn’t their concepts be false as well,

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tamen videantur esse simplices et incomplexi? 9. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles in isto tertio, dicit enim sic: “indivisibilium enim quidem intelligentia in hiis est circa quae non est falsum.” Et per indivisibilium intelligentiam intelligit conceptum simplicem, nullatenus complexum. Dicit etiam secundo, “falsum enim in compositione semper est.” 10. Secundum igitur has auctoritates apparet quod nullus est conceptus simplex falsus. Sed etiam quod omnis sit verus apparet per tertiam auctoritatem dicentem, “est autem dictio quidem aliquid de aliquo, sicut affirmatio vera aut falsa omnis. Intellectus autem non omnis, sed qui est ipsius quid est, secundum hoc quod aliquid erat esse, verus est, et non aliquid de aliquo, sed sicut videre proprii est verum, si autem homo albus aut non, non verum semper.” Et apparet quod intelligit conceptum simplicem cum dicat, “qui est ipsius quid est” et “non aliquid de aliquo.” 11. Item secundo Metaphysicae: “unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem,” ex quo videtur sequi quod omne quod est, est verum. Ideo etiam dicitur quinto Metaphysicae: “amplius est et esse significat quia verum; non esse autem quia non verum.” Sed omnis intellectio simplex est vera. Solet dici quod haec est una differentia 42 isto tertio ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430a 26–27 (Ar. lat. XII.2 224.1.2): “Indiuisibilium quidem igitur intelligentia in hiis est circa quae non est falsum.” 45 secundo ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430b 2 (Ar. lat. XII.2 224.1.10): “falsum enim in compositione semper est.” 49 tertiam auctoritatem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430b26–30 (Ar. lat. XII.2 224.2.18): “Est autem dictio quidem aliquid de aliquo, sicut affirmatio, vera aut falsa omnis; intellectus autem non omnis sed qui est ipsius quid est secundum hoc quod aliquid erat esse verus est, et non aliquid de aliquo, sed sicut videre proprii verum est, si autem homo album aut non, non verum semper.” 56 secundo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. II.1 993b 30–31 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 44.33): “unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem.” 58 quinto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.7 1017a31–33 (Ar. lat. XXV.3 103.317– 318): “Amplius esse et est significant quia verum, non esse autem quia non verum sed falsum.” 50 omnis ] om. A 51 quid est ] quidem V 52 verus ] verius V 53 non verum ] om. A 60 vera ] ergo omnis simplex intellectio est vera A

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since they seem to be simple and incomplex? 9. Aristotle states the opposite in De anima III, for he remarks, “thus, the thinking of indivisibles is in those things about which there is no falsity.” And by ‘thinking of indivisibles’, he means the simple concept, definitely not the complex concept. He also says in a subsequent subsequent passage, “for falsity is always in composition.” 10. According to these authoritative passages, then, it appears that there is no false simple concept. But that every one is true is apparent in a third authoritative passage, where he says, “assertion, however, is something of something, as in every true or false affirmation. Not all thought, however, is true or false, but that concerning what a thing is, according to what it was for something to be, is true. And it is not something of something , but rather, in the way seeing a proper is true; whether a man is white or not, however, it would not always be true.” It is apparent that he means the simple concept when he says, “that concerning what a thing is” and “not something of something.” 11. Again, in Metaphysics II: “as each thing is in respect of being, so it is in respect of truth,” from which it seems to follow that everything that is, is true. And so as well, it is stated in Metaphysics V, “moreover, ‘being’ and ‘is’ signify what is true; ‘not being’, however, signifies what is not true.” But every simple thought is true. It is often

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inter scientiam divinam et humanam, quia scientia divina est causa aliarum rerum omnium, et scientia humana est causata ab aliis rebus. Et ita etiam est de velle Dei et hominis. 12. Demum etiam dicitur quod bonum dicitur secundum ordinem ad voluntatem seu appetitum, et e converso, et verum secundum ordinem ad intellectum seu cognitionem, et e converso. Tamen valde differunt apud Deum et apud hominem quia apud Deum unumquodque aliud dicitur bonum ex eo quod est volitum a Deo, et dicitur verum ex eo quod est intellectum apud Deum, et ita quod universaliter: si est intellectum et volitum esse a Deo, ipsum est simpliciter loquendo et bonum et verum. Et si est intellectum et volitum fore, ipsum erit bonum et verum; et sic similiter de praeterito et possibili, si enim Deus intelligit et vult aliquid posse esse, ipsum potest esse et bonum et verum. Et sic valde bene dictum est quod sicut res se habet ad esse, ita et ad veritatem, et quod etiam sic bonum et verum dicuntur aequaliter et convertibiliter ente. Ideo sic concedendum est quod omnis conceptus simplex, cum sit ens, est bonus et verus. 13. Sed apud intellectum humanum et appetitum humanum, nos appetimus ex eo quod nobis videtur bonum et est apud intellectum nostrum veritas ex eo quod res intellectae habeant ad conceptus nostros determinatam consonantiam, eo modo quo dixi in logica et quod magis declarandum est in metaphysica. Unde primo hic hoc est suppo-

81 logica ] B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 9.1, concl. 2–3 (tr. Klima, 832–833). 82 metaphysica ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. VI.6–9 (ed. Parisiis 1588, ff. 37ra –39rb ). 68 aliud ] a Deo add. AT ab eo add. E || a Deo ] ab eo E 68–70 dicitur verum . . . esse a Deo ] infra A 69 apud Deum ] a Deo AET 71 intellectum ] intentum A || fore, ipsum erit ] ipsum est forte AT 72 similiter ] proportionaliter AET 76 convertibiliter ] convenienter vel aequaliter et melius A om. E 76–77 ideo . . . verus ] om. A 78 et appetitum humanum ] om. E 78–79 appetimus ] apponimus E 79 bonum ] verum vel bonum et melius A 81 determinatam ] debitam AET || consonantiam ] correspondentiam A || logica ] nostra add. A

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said that this is one difference between divine and human knowledge, since divine knowledge is the cause of all other things, and human knowledge is caused by other things. It is also this way for divine and human willing. 12. Finally, it is said that something is said to be good with respect to its ordered relationship to volition or appetite, and conversely, and true with respect to its ordered relationship to thought or cognition, and conversely.424 Even so, there is a significant difference between God and humans in this regard, since for God, each and every thing that is other than God is said to be good because it is willed by God, and true because it is thought by God, and likewise for everything else: if it is thought and willed by God to exist, it is, absolutely speaking, both good and true; if it is thought and willed to exist in the future, it will be good and true; and so on analogously for the past and for possible things, for if God thinks and wills that something can be, it can be both good and true. So it has been very well said that just as a thing is with respect to being, so it is with respect to truth, and also that ‘good’ and ‘true’ are said equally and convertibly with ‘being’. In the same way, then, it must be granted that every simple concept, since it has being, is good and true. 13. But in human thought and appetite, we desire on the basis of what appears good to us, and there is truth in our thought to the extent that the things we think of have a determinate agreement with our concepts, as I have said in my logic, and which should be stated even more clearly in my metaphysics. That is why we must assume here in

424 What

this convertibility means is that something is good just in case it is willed and vice versa (it is willed just in case it is good), and it is true just in case it is thought and vice versa (it is thought just in case it is true), at least in the case of divine thought. The situation is somewhat more complicated with human will and thought, as we shall see in the next paragraph.

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nendum quod voci significativae non est attribuenda veritas vel falsitas nisi sicut urinae sanitas, scilicet significative sanitas. Non enim ex alio vox significativa dicitur vera nisi quia conceptus correspondens est verus, et sic de falsitate. 14. Sed aliter etiam exponitur consonantia secundum quam propositio dicitur vera et aliter secundum quam terminus dicitur verus. Nec etiam est eadem expositio in omnibus propositionibus sed diversa in diversis, ut ponamus secundum communem locutionem quod propositio affirmativa de inesse et de praesenti dicatur vera ex eo quia qualitercumque significat esse, ita est, quam locutionem ad praesens nec approbo nec reprobo, sed de hoc videatur alibi perfectior declaratio. Tunc talis affirmativa diceretur falsa ex eo quod non qualitercumque significat esse, ita est. Negativa autem diceretur falsa ex eo quod qualitercumque affirmativa sibi contradictoria significat esse, ita est, et diceretur vera quia non qualitercumque affirmativa sibi contradictoria significat esse, ita est. Eadem enim est causa veritatis propositionis et falsitatis suae contradictoriae, et e converso, ita quod ex consonantia vel non consonantia affirmativarum ad res conceptas et significatas, dicuntur tam affirmativae quam negativae verae vel falsae, licet non e converso. 15. Consonantia igitur secundum quam propositio affirmativa de inesse et de praesenti dicitur vera esset quod qualitercumque significat esse, ita est. Et ex eadem consonantia, negativa contradictoria esset falsa. Et ex defectu huiusmodi consonantiae in affirmativa, ipsa affirmativa esset falsa, et negativa seu sibi contradictoria, esset vera, ita quod negativa iudicanda esset falsa secundum causam veritatis

93 alibi ] B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 9.2, concl. 1–14 (tr. Klima, 849–859). Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis I.1 (ed. Hubien, 17–19). 85 conceptus ] sibi add. A 89 propositionibus ] sequentibus(?) E 92 locutionem ] quantum add. ET 93 reprobo ] quantum est add. A 94 falsa ] vera(!) E 95 ita ] sic V om. T 98 propositionis ] unius add. A 100 non ] om. (!) V || conceptas ] compositas A 101–102 non e converso ] vera esset quae qualitercumque significat esse ita est T 103–104 de inesse ] om. V 105 negativa ] eius add. A 106 in affirmativa ] om. A 107 seu ] om. AE 108 negativa ] om. E || causam ] om. AT

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the first place that truth or falsity should be attributed to a significative utterance only in the way health is attributed to urine, that is to say, it is health significatively. For a significative utterance is said to be true only because the corresponding concept is true, and likewise as regards its falsity. 14. But the agreement is explained differently depending on whether a proposition or a term is said to be true. Nor is the explanation the same for all propositions, but different for different cases, so that we assume, in keeping with conventional discourse, that an affirmative, assertoric, present-tense proposition is said to be true because however it signifies things to be, so they are—a way of speaking of which I neither approve nor disapprove at present, but see the more complete account of this elsewhere.425 Then, such an affirmative proposition would be said to be false because things are not however it signifies them to be. But the negative would be said to be false because however the affirmative contradictory to it signifies them to be, so they are, and it would be said to be true because things are not however the affirmative contradictory to it signifies them to be. For the cause of the truth of a proposition and of the falsity of its contradictory is the same, and conversely, so that the affirmatives as well as the negatives are said to be true or false on the basis of the agreement or lack of agreement between the affirmatives and the things conceived and signified, though not conversely. 15. Therefore, the agreement according to which an affirmative, assertoric, present-tense proposition is said to be true is that however it signifies things to be, so they are. The negative contradictory to it would be false by virtue of the same agreement. From the absence of this kind of agreement in the affirmative, that affirmative would be false and the negative, or what is contradictory to it, would be true,

425 In

addition to the references provided in the Latin text, see chs. 9–10 of Klima 2008 for further discussion of this point.

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affirmativae sibi contradictoriae, et vera secundum causam falsitatis eius. 16. Sed consonantia secundum quam propositio de futuro dicitur affirmativa vera esset quia qualitercumque significat fore, ita erit, de praeterito, quia qualitercumque significat fuisse, ita fuit, et de possibili, quia qualitercumque significat posse esse, ita potest esse. Et ex hiis consonantiis, negativae contradictoriae essent falsae, et ex defectibus consonantiarum dictarum, affirmativae essent falsae, negativae essent verae. 17. De hypotheticis autem nihil dico, quia talis non pertinet ad hanc scientiam specificare. 18. Unde satis ex hiis apparet quod omnis propositio est vera vel falsa, quia ita est vel non ita, quantum ad affirmativam, et si sic, vera est et negativa falsa, et si non, tunc est e converso. Et apparet etiam quod eadem propositio potest esse vera et potest esse falsa ut Socrates est homo, est enim ita quando Socrates est, et non est ita quando non est. Et apparet etiam quod omne tale verum habet falsum sibi contradictum et e converso, si propositiones formentur. 19. Conceptuum autem qui non sunt propositiones, sed termini qui possunt subici vel praedicari in propositionibus, consonantia secundum quam dicuntur veri attenditur penes hoc quod possunt pro aliquo vel aliquibus supponere, et si non possunt tunc dicuntur falsi. Talium autem conceptuum quidam sunt complexi ex determinatione et determinabili et alii incomplexi. Et statim secundum haec dicta apparet quod complexi aliqui sunt veri et aliqui sunt falsi, nam illud complexum equus risibilis pro nullo supponit et illud equus non risibilis pro aliquo supponit; et e converso, illud equus hinnibilis pro aliquo supponit et illud equus non hinnibilis pro nullo supponit. 109 falsitatis ] veritatis(!) E 110 eius ] affirmativae add. T 113 fuisse ] om. V 115 negativae ] sibi add. E 116 dictarum ] in affirmativis add. E || affirmativae ] propositiones add. E 118 nihil dico, quia ] nihil dico ad praesens nobis quia dico quod A 121 ita est . . . non ita ] vel est ita vel non E 126 et e converso ] om. A 127 qui ] aliqui AE || termini ] illeg. add. V 134 risibilis ] ignibilis A || pro nullo ] om. A || non ] om. A 135 aliquo supponit ] nullo A || e converso ] om. A 135–136 equus . . . illud ] hom. A 136 hinnibilis ] ignibilis A

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such that the negative must be judged to be false in keeping with the cause of the truth of the affirmative contradictory to it, and true in keeping with the cause of the affirmative’s falsity. 16. But the agreement according to which an affirmative proposition about the future would be true is that howsoever it signifies things will be, so they will be; about the past, that however it signifies things were, so they were; and about possibles, that however it signifies things can be, so they can be. Based on these agreements, the negative contradictories would be false, and in the absence of these same agreements, the affirmatives would be false and the negatives would be true. 17. I am saying nothing about hypotheticals, however, because it does not pertain to this science to specify things further along these lines.426 18. But it is clear enough from this that every proposition is true or false, because is or is not the case as far as the affirmative is concerned: if it is the case, it is true and the negative is false; if not, then it is the other way around. It is also apparent that the same proposition can be true, and that it can be false, for example, ‘Socrates is a man’. For it is the case when Socrates exists and not the case when he does not exist. It is also apparent that every such truth has a falsehood contradicting it, and conversely, if the propositions are formed. 19. Of concepts that are not propositions, however, but terms that can be the subjects or predicates in propositions, the agreement according to which they are said to be true is seen entirely in their being able to supposit for something or for some things; if they are not able to supposit, they are said to be false. However, some of these concepts are complex, consisting of a determination and determinable; others are incomplex. And in keeping with these remarks, it is immediately clear that some complexes are true and others false, for the complex ‘risible horse’ supposits for nothing and the complex ‘non-risible horse’ supposits for something; conversely, the complex ‘horse capa426 I.e.,

the science of psychology.

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20. De simplici autem conceptu, ego dico quod non potest esse falsus. Immo omnis est verus, quia omnis talis potest pro aliquo supponere quia omnis talis conceptus est alicuius conceptus. Omni enim conceptu, aliquid vel aliqua concipitur vel concipiuntur, et si aliquid concipitur, oportet esse vel fuisse vel fore vel posse esse. Et si illud est, tunc iste conceptus, vel nomen sumptum ab eo, supponit pro illo in propositione de praesenti respectu huius verbi est. Et si illud erit vel fuit, tunc supponit pro illo in propositione de praeterito vel de futuro respectu horum verborum erit vel fuit, et ita si potest esse, respectu huius verbi potest esse. Ideo omnis talis terminus potest pro aliquo supponere. Et hoc etiam potest esse manifestum per inductionem, tu enim nullum terminum incomplexum posses assignare categorematicum quando iste posset dicto modo pro aliquo supponere, dum tamen illi termino non corresponderet complexio in mente, sicut sunt isti termini chimaera, vacuum, prout magis dicetur in quaestione sequente. 21. Sed propter auctoritates in oppositum adductas, notandum est quod ad simplicem conceptum vel ad complexum non per modum enuntiationis, nullus consequitur assensus vel dissensus. Sed ad propositionem formatam potest sequi assensus vel dissensus, et nulla est malitia sive speculative sive practice formare propositionem falsam. Sed assentire vero et dissentire falso est bonum, e converso autem est malum. Unde sic debet intelligi illud quod dicitur sexto Ethicorum, scilicet quod verum est bonum intellectus, et falsum malum. Unde nec repraehenduntur homines si forment propositiones falsas non assentiendo, sed si assentive dicunt eas, quia ita communiter et vulgariter vocamus veritatem vel falsitatem in assentire vel dissentire consistere propter bonitatem vel malitiam, vel propter honorem vel vituperum. 151 quaestione sequente ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.13 158 sexto Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. VI.2 1139a27–28 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 479.19): “Speculative autem mentis et non practice, bene et male verum est et falsum; hoc enim est omnis intellectui opus; practici autem et intellectivi veritas, confesse habens appetitui recto.” 138 quia omnis ] rep. V 138–139 talis . . . supponere ] hom. V 141 vel fore ] om. A 145 verborum erit vel fuit ] om. T 146 verbi ] est vel erit vel add. AT || esse ] om. E 149 supponere ] vel supponeret add. E 151 sequente ] alia AT 154–155 sed . . . dissensus ] hom. E 155 est ] manifesta add. A 157 vero ] om. A 158 illud quod dicitur ] om. V || Ethicorum ] Physicorum V 161 eas ] om. V 162 in ] om. V

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ble of whinnying’ supposits for something and the complex ‘horse not capable of whinnying’ supposits for nothing. 20. As for the simple concept, however, I say that it cannot be false; on the contrary, every one is true because every such concept can supposit for something because every such concept is a concept of something. For something is conceived or some things are conceived by every concept, and if something is conceived, it must exist, or have existed, or exist in the future, or be able to exist. If it exists, then the concept, or the name taken from it, supposits for it in a present-tense proposition with respect to the verb ‘is’. If it will be or was, then it supposits for it in a past-tense or future-tense proposition with respect to the verbs ‘will be’ or ‘was’; and so as well if it can be, with respect to the verb ‘can be’. Thus, every such term can supposit for something. This can also be made evident by induction, for you could designate no incomplex categorematic term when it could supposit for something in the way stated, as long as no complexity in the mind corresponds to that term, as is the case with the terms, ‘chimera’ and ‘vacuum’, as will be more fully discussed in the next question. 21. But in view of the authoritative passages adduced on the other side, it must be noted that no assent or dissent follows upon a simple concept or upon a complex concept which is not complex in the way a proposition is. But assent or dissent can follow a formed proposition, and there is nothing bad, whether speculatively or in practice, about forming a false proposition. But assenting to what is true and dissenting from what is false is good; the converse, however, is bad. For this reason, what is said in Nicomachean Ethics VI must be understood in this way, namely, that truth is the good of the intellect, and falsity the bad. That is why people are not reproached if they form false propositions without assenting, but only if they say them so as to assent to them, because we generally and ordinarily say that truth

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Et alias veritates vel falsitates, quae consistunt in formationibus conceptuum sine iudicio, assensus vel dissensus non vocamus quia nec est ibi bonum commendabile nec malum reprehensibile. Ideo saepe restringimus haec nomina verum et falsum ad iudicia assentiva vel dissentiva, aut ad conceptus ad quos innati sunt consequi assensus vel dissensus, cuiusmodi sunt propositiones mentales. Ideo sic restringendo haec nomina, procedunt auctoritates Aristotelis primo Perihermeneias, scilicet quod in conceptu incomplexo nec est verum nec falsum, scilicet cui sit assentiendi vel dissentiendi. 22. Ex hiis igitur patet quod omnes rationes sunt solutae, usque ad illam quod omne verum omni vero consonat, quod etiam exponi sic debet quod nulli assensus propositioni verae sunt repugnantes quoniam tales possint simul esse in eodem. Sed non est sic de assensu vero vel falso, ideo non possunt esse simul in eodem opiniones contradictorias, ut dicitur quarto Metaphysicae. 23. De hoc autem quod homo vel denarius dicitur falsus, apparet quod hoc non est nisi secundum locutionem attributivam, ut quia homo libenter dicit assentive propositiones falsas, et cum etiam assentimus denarium valere duos obolos et non valet.

170–171 primo Perihermeneias ] De int. 1 16a 16 (Ar. lat. II.1 5.15–17): “Nomina igitur ipsa et verba consimilia sunt sine compositione vel divisione intellectui, ut ‘homo’ vel ‘album’, quando non additur aliquid; nec enim adhuc verum aut falsum est.” 178 quarto Metaphysicae ] Met. IV.3.1005b25–34 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 73.182): “contraria vero est opinio opinioni quae contradictionis, palam quod impossibile simul existimare eundem esse et non esse idem; simul enim habebit contrarias opiniones qui de hoc est mentitus.” 165 nec ] non omne A non E 166 ibi ] in E || commendabile ] laudabile AT 167 verum . . . falsum ] ad verum . . . ad falsum V 170–172 auctoritates . . . dissentiendi ] om. V vel dissentiendi om. T 173 igitur patet ] prius dictis apparet AET 176–177 sed . . . in eodem ] hom. T 176 de ] om. V 177 possunt ] om. V 181 propositiones ] orationes E 182 valet ] et sic finitur quaestio duodecima add. A quando valet et valere quando non valet, etc. sequitur quaestio E et non valere denarium valet, et sic patet quaestio add. V et dicimus non valere quando valet. Postea quia Aristoteles determinat de modo intelligendi punctum et hoc nomen punctum videtur significare indivisibile et nihil est tale prout debet videri sexto Physicorum, ideo quaeritur nunc tertiodecimo add. W

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or falsity consists in assenting or dissenting because of goodness or badness, or praise or blame, in just this way. And we do not call other truths or falsehoods that consist in the formation of concepts without judgment acts of assenting or dissenting, since there is no commendable good or reprehensible evil there. Thus, we often restrict the names ‘true’ and ‘false’ to assenting or dissenting judgments, or to concepts upon which it is natural for assent or dissent to follow. Mental propositions are like this. Thus, by restricting the names in this way, Aristotle’s authoritative remarks in De Interpretatione I follow, namely, that there is neither truth nor falsity in an incomplex concept, that is to say, one that would be an object of assenting or dissenting. 22. From these remarks, then, it is clear that all of the arguments have been resolved,427 up to the argument that all truths harmonize,428 which should be explained as follows: no acts of assenting to a true proposition are incompatible because such acts can be in the same thing at the same time. But it is not like this for true or false assent, and so contradictory opinions cannot be in the same thing at the same time, as is said in Metaphysics IV. 23. But as for the argument that a man or denarius is said to be false,429 it is clear that this occurs only in attributive speech, such as when a man deliberately states false propositions in an assenting manner, and also when we assent to valuing a denarius at two oboles, and it is not worth that.

427 See

pars. 1–6 above. par. 7 above. 429 See par. 8 above 428 See

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1. Quia Aristoteles determinat de modo intelligendi punctum, et hoc nomen punctum videtur significare indivisibile in magnitudine et nihil est tale, prout debet videri sexto Physicorum, ideo quaeritur utrum non ens possit intelligi. 2. Et arguitur quod sic, quia punctum nihil est, suppono enim ex sexto Physicorum quod nihil est indivisibile habens situm in magnitudine, cuiusmodi tamen oporteret esse punctum si esset. Et tamen punctum potest intelligi, quia Aristoteles in isto tertio dat nobis modum intelligendi ipsum, dicens quod “monstratur ut privatio.” 3. Item, primo Physicorum dicitur quod privatio est per se non ens, et tamen intelligitur, cum de ea tradatur scientia in primo Physicorum. 4. Item Aristotelem vel Antichristum possumus intelligere quia de eis saepe loquimur, et tamen ipsi non sunt. Et ita etiam, si habeo scientiam de rosis aut tonitruis, ego non amitterem istam scientiam de

4 sexto Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VI.1. 7 sexto Physicorum ] A RISTO TELES , Phys. VI.1 231a 24–25 (Ar. lat. VII.1 216.3): “impossibile est ex indivisibilibus esse aliquod continuum, ut lineam ex punctis, si vere linea quidem continuum est, punctum autem indivisibile.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 2.166 (ed. Hamesse, 153): “Nullum continuum potest esse ex indivisibilibus, unde linea non potest componi ex punctis.” 9 in isto tertio ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430b 20–21 (Ar. lat. XII.2 224.2.11): “Punctum autem et omne diuisio et sic indiuisibile monstratur sicut priuatio.” Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. IV.14 (ed. Parisiis 1588, ff. 23vb –24ra ). 11 primo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.9 192a4–5 (Ar. lat. VII.1 38.15): “Nos quidem enim materiam et privationem alterum esse dicimus, sed horum hanc quidem non esse secundum accidens, materiam, privationem autem per se esse.” 2 Quia . . . intelligendi ] quaeritur consequenter utrum T || Quia . . . determinat ] consequenter et tertio decimo quaeritur A 4 Quia . . . Physicorum ] om. E || quaeritur ] tertio decimo add. E 6 Et arguitur ] om. V 7–8 magnitudine ] om. V 10 quod ] et V 13 Aristotelem vel ] om. T || Antichristum ] fore fuisse add. A 14 Et ita ] item T 15 rosis ] aliquae rosae A 15–16 de istis ] om. AE © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 44

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Can a non-being be understood?430

1. Since Aristotle discusses the way a point is understood, and the name ‘point’ seems to signify something indivisible in a magnitude, and there is no such thing, as must be seen in Physics VI, it is therefore asked whether a non-being can be understood.431 2. And it is argued that it can: since a point is nothing, for I assume on the basis of Physics VI that there is nothing indivisible having position in a magnitude. But that is what a point would have to be if it existed. Even so, a point can be understood, since Aristotle provides us with a way of understanding it in De Anima III, when he says, “it is represented as a privation.” 3. Again, in Physics I it is said that privation is per se a nonbeing. And yet it is understood, since knowledge about it is conveyed in Physics I. 4. Again, we can understand Aristotle or the Antichrist, since we often speak about them. And yet they do not exist. In this way as well, if I have knowledge of roses or thunder, I would not lose this 430 Since

non-beings such as indivisible points are usually taken to have no nature, this question asks how they can be understood if understanding involves grasping the nature of a thing. 431 Most manuscripts provide this prefatory remark in the title of q. 13, presumably to explain the connection between the topic question and the passage being commented on here, namely, De Anima III.6 430b 20–21.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 44

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istis, si modo cessarent esse rosae et tonitrua. Ideo adhuc possem talia intelligere, quamvis non essent. 5. Item Aristoteles opinatus est quod impossibile aliquid esse vacuum, et tamen credidit ipsum posse intelligi, ex quo de eo tradidit scientiam et definitivam et demonstrativam. Et ita etiam, dicimus chimaeram nihil esse, et tamen eam intelligimus, ex quo saepe loquimur de ea et ex quo imposuimus hoc nomen chimaera ad significandum eam. 6. Item quaecumque possumus imaginari, nos possumus ea intelligere. Et tamen non entia possumus imaginari, ut montem aureum, spatium ultra caelum, et huiusmodi. 7. Item ego intelligo immo scio chimaeram non esse, et tamen chimaeram non esse nihil est. Et etiam equum non esse asinum, et hoc scirem licet nulli essent equi vel asini, sed omnes annihilati, et tamen tunc, nihil esset equum non esse asinum. Et intelligo etiam hominem esse asinum, quod tamen aliqui dicunt nihil esse. 8. Item hoc nomine infinito non ens significatur non ens, et tamen omne quod per nomen significatur potest intelligi; igitur non ens intelligitur. 9. Oppositum arguitur, quia primo Posteriorum dicitur quod non est non contingit scire. Et quarto Metaphysicae, dicitur qui non unum 18 Aristoteles opinatus est ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. IV.8 216a21–26 (Ar. lat. VII.1 166.7): “Quod quidem igitur non sit separatum vacuum, ex hiis manifestum est.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 2.130 (ed. Hamesse, 150): “Non est vacuum in natura.” 35 primo Posteriorum ] Auc. Ar. 35.13 (ed. Hamesse, 312): “Quod non est non contingit scire, ex quo habemus quod de non ente non est scientia.” Cf. A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 71b 25 (Ar. lat. I.2 286.27): “Vera quidem igitur oportet esse, quoniam quod non est non est scire, ut quod dyametros sit symetros.” 36 quarto Metaphysicae ] Auc. Ar. 1.99 (ed. Hamesse, 123): “Qui non unum intelligit, nihil intelligit.” Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.4 1006b9–10 (Ar. lat. XXV.2 67.18): “nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum.” 16 cessarent ] desinarent E 18 aliquid ] om. AET 19 tamen credidit ] non concludit E || ipsum ] esse add. V 20 definitivam ] difficillimam E 26 spatium . . . caelum ] om. AT 27 scio ] habeo V scientiam habeo W 28 asinum ] non esse add. A nihil est add. E et etiam asinum non esse T 30 asinum ] et hominem esse asinum add. A 31 asinum ] album A || quod tamen aliqui ] rep. V 32 hoc nomine infinito non ens significatur non ens ] hoc nomen infinitum non ens significat A 32–33 et tamen . . . significatur ] hom. V 36 est ] ens A || unum ] ens AT

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knowledge of them if roses or thunder now ceased to exist. Thus, I can still understand such things, even when they do not exist. 5. Again, Aristotle thought it impossible for something to be a vacuum, and yet he believed a vacuum could be understood because he conveyed both definitive and demonstrative knowledge about it. And so as well, we say that a chimera is nothing, and yet we understand it because we often speak about it and because we have imposed the name ‘chimera’ for signifying it. 6. Again, whatever we can imagine, we can understand. And yet we can imagine non-beings, such as a golden mountain, a space beyond the heavens, and things of that sort. 7. Again, I understand, indeed, I know that a chimera does not exist, and yet for a chimera not to be is nothing.432 I also know that a horse is not a donkey, and I would know this even if there were no horses or donkeys, but all had been annihilated — in which case nothing would be a horse not being a donkey. I also understand a man being a donkey, which some say is nothing. 8. Again, by the infinite name ‘non-being’ a non-being is signified, but everything signified by a name can be understood; therefore, a non-being is understood. 9. The opposite is argued, because in Posterior Analytics I, it is said that what does not exist cannot be known, and in Metaphysics IV, 432

The sentential nominalization, ‘for a chimera not to be’ — or ‘that-a-chimera-isnot [chimeram non esse]’ — indicates that Buridan is referring in this argument to the theory of the ‘complexly signifiable [complexe significabile]’ as the significate of a proposition, defended at Paris by Gregory of Rimini (c. 1300–1358). For Buridan’s rejection of this theory, see Zupko 1994–97 and ch. 9 of Klima 2008.

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intelligit nihil intelligit. Et ens et unum convertuntur; igitur qui non ens intelligit nihil intelligit, et cum ad nihil intelligere, sequitur non intelligere. Ideo si aliquis intelligeret non ens, ipse non intelligeret, et hoc implicat contradictionem. 10. Item intellectus patitur ab intelligibili et nihil patitur a non ente. Et oportet aliquid esse repraesentativum eius quod intelligitur, et non posset dici quod esset repraesentativum non entis. 11. Item capiendo hoc nomen non ens tamquam infinitum, hoc est affirmativa non ens intelligitur et talis subiectum pro nullo supponit. Et talis propositio affirmativa est falsa, scilicet in qua subiectum pro nullo supponit; igitur haec est falsa, non ens intelligitur, vel ista, non ens potest intelligi. 12. Plures conclusiones logicae ponuntur satis faciles. 13. Prima est quod capiendo hoc nomen non ens infinitum materialiter, haec est concedenda non ens intelligitur. Non enim est mirum si ista vox non ens intelligitur, hoc enim est intelligere ens. 14. Secunda conclusio est quod si subiectum dictae propositionis supponat seu capiatur personaliter et haec dictio non capiatur non in-

37 ens et unum convertuntur ] Auc. Ar. 1.90 (ed. Hamesse, 122): “Ens et unum convertuntur.” Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.2 1003b22–23 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 68.42): “Si igitur ens et unum idem et una natura eo quod se ad inuicem consequuntur sicut principium et causa, sed non ut una ratione ostensa . . . ”. 37–38 Et ens . . . nihil intelligit ] hom. ATW 38 cum ] cuius A || sequitur ] om. V 39 ipse non ] nihil AT 41 Item ] et T 42 intelligitur ] intelligeret V 43 non entis ] alicuius nisi illud sic ergo etc. A 44 tamquam ] om. AET 45 talis ] om. AT 46 Et ] omnis add. AT igitur E || propositio affirmativa ] om. A 49 logicae ] om. T 50 non ] om. (!) V 51–52 Non enim. . . intelligitur ] hom. V 53 propositionis ] conclusionis V 54 supponat seu capiatur ] supponat AT sumatur E || personaliter ] materialiter(!) V || non ] om.(!) V 54–55 infinite ] distinctive E

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it is said that anyone who does not understand one thing understands nothing. But ‘being’ and ‘one’ are convertible; therefore, anyone who understands a non-being understands nothing. However, understanding nothing entails not understanding at all. Thus, if someone were to understand a non-being, that person would not understand at all, and this implies a contradiction. 10. Again, the intellect is acted on by what is intelligible, but nothing is acted on by a non-being. And there must be something representative of what is understood, but we could not say what would be representative of a non-being. 11. Again, by taking the name ‘non-being’ infinitely, this proposition is affirmative: ‘A non-being is understood’, and its subject supposits for nothing. But every affirmative proposition of this kind, that is to say, one in which the subject supposits for nothing, is false; therefore, this is false: ‘A non-being is understood’; or this: ‘A non-being can be understood’. 12. A number of easy conclusions are proposed, pertaining to the logic of the question. 13. The first is that, taking the infinite name ‘non-being’ materially, this must be granted: ‘A non-being is understood’. For it is not surprising that the utterance ‘non-being’ is understood, because this is to understand a being.433 14. The second conclusion is that if the subject of the aforementioned conclusion supposits or is taken personally, and the word ‘non’ 433 Namely,

the utterance.

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finite sed negative, tunc ista est neganda et falsa non ens intelligitur, quia valet istam nullum ens intelligitur, quae contradicit istae verae aliquid ens intelligitur. 15. Tertia conclusio est quod si haec dictio non ponatur esse infinitans, adhuc ista est concedenda non ens intelligitur quia per nomen significatur quod populus intelligitur vel etiam exercitus, et tamen populus est non ens, sed entia. Unde credo istam esse concedendam, non ens est, quia populus est, et non ens est non ens, quia populus est populus. Et est propositio vera cuius subiectum pro nullo ente supponit, sed tamen supponit pro entibus, ut populus est. 16. Quarta conclusio est quod aliquid intelligitur quod nihil est, scilicet quod nec est ens nec entia, sic enim Antichristus nihil est, et tamen Antichristus intelligitur. Sed tamen ista esset neganda, aliquid non est, quod intelligitur, et etiam ista, Antichristus non est, qui intelligitur, quia si Antichristus pro nullo supponit, oportet relativum

55 ens ] om. T 56 nullum ens intelligitur ] non ens intelligitur et nullum ens intelligitur V 56–57 quae . . . intelligitur ] om. A 56 verae ] om. E 58–59 non ponatur esse infinitans ] infinitans non ponatur V 58 non ] ens add. A 59–60 quia . . . intelligitur ] hom. V 59 quia ] et AET 60–61 populus ] vel exercitus add. A 61 ens ] quia populus est et non est ens add. E quia est et non ens add. VW 63 vera ] affirmativa add. AE || cuius ] in qua E 68 quod ] non(!) add. V 69 Antichristus ] antecedens V || oportet ] om. V apparet W

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is taken not infinitely, but negatively, then the proposition, ‘Not a being is understood’,434 is false and must be denied, since it comes to the same as the proposition, ‘No being is understood’, which contradicts the true proposition, ‘Some being is understood’. 15. The third conclusion is that if the word ‘non’ is assumed to be infinitizing, ‘A non-being is understood’ must still be granted because on account of that name, what is signified is that a people is understood or even that an army is understood, and yet a people is not a being, but beings. That is why I believe ‘A non-being exists’ must be granted, because a people exists, as well as ‘A non-being is a nonbeing’, because a people is a people. And there is a true proposition whose subject supposits for no being even though it does supposit for beings, as in ‘A people exists’.435 16. The fourth conclusion is that something is understood which is nothing, that is to say, something which is neither a being nor beings, for in this way the Antichrist is nothing, and yet the Antichrist is understood. But even so ‘Something is not, which is understood’ must be denied, as well as ‘The Antichrist is not, who is understood’, be434 Buridan

distinguishes here the scope of the negative particle ‘non’ in the Latin sentence, ‘non ens intelligitur’. So — marking out the scope of the negation in parentheses — if it is taken to be the propositional negation of the entire sentence following it, ‘Non (ens intelligitur)’, then it is taken negatively and expresses the negative claim that it is not the case that a being is understood. But if it is taken infinitively, i.e., as a term-negation, ‘Non (ens) intelligitur’, then the proposition is affirmative and says that a non-being is understood. In English we typically indicate the distinction by means of word order and hyphenation. 435 Interestingly, in his Summulae de dialectica, Buridan did not consider this argument and the corresponding interpretation when faced with the same problem sentence, which he rejected in his solution (Summulae de dialectica 9.5, Seventh Sophism; tr. Klima, 923–24). Nevertheless, elsewhere in the Summulae de dialectica, he accepts this “collective interpretation” of the supposition of ‘non-being’ in ‘An army is a non-being’ – the converse of which, ‘A non-being is an army’, he must also accept as true (Summulae de dialectica 4.2.6; 6.5.5; tr. Klima, 251; 470). The solution of the Summulae de dialectica, also taking into account this “plural interpretation,” would be perfect, however, for the following sentence with a disjunctive infinitive subject: ‘Non (ens vel entia) intelligitur [A non-(being or beings) is understood]’. But then, this seems to violate the grammatical rule that a noun in the plural requires a verb in the plural – apparently part of the price of refusing to allow an ontology of entities of different types that are beings and units in different senses!

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pro nullo supponere. Modo in ista propositione, Antichristus non est, subiectum pro nullo supponit et est vera propositio. Ideo etiam cum dico qui intelligitur, illud relativum qui pro nullo supponit. Ideo propositio, cum sit affirmativa, est falsa, et sic totalis propositio erit falsa, aequivalet enim istae copulativae, Antichristus non est et ipse intelligitur, et huius copulativae secunda pars est falsa quia subiectum pro nullo supponit. Sed haec erit concedenda, Antichristus intelligitur, qui non est, vel etiam ista, Antichristus intelligitur et ipse non est, eo quod in hac propositione, Antichristus intelligitur, subiectum supponit pro aliquo, licet illud non sit. Iste enim terminus intelligitur ampliat suppositionem subiecti ad futurum, et non poterat ampliare relativum cuius antecedens non est ampliatum. Unde haec consequentia non valet, Antichristus non est et Antichristus intelligitur; igitur Antichristus non est et ipse intelligitur. Demum etiam ego concederem istam, aliquid quod non est intelligitur, et negarem istam, aliquid intelligitur quod non est. Differentiam autem harum propositionum non oportet hic declarare, sed declaravi eam in logicalibus. 17. Quinta conclusio magis principalis est, quod de termino non supponente pro aliquo vel aliquibus, non verificatur affirmative hoc praedicatum intelligitur vel opinatur vel cognoscitur vel significatur et sic de aliis praedicatis. Et haec conclusio videtur mihi debere esse magis principium in logica, quia aliter nullus posset assignare causam quare tales propositiones essent falsae, chimaera est animal, vacuum

81 non est ampliatum ] B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 4.6.2 (tr. Klima, 299–300). 86 in logicalibus ] Loc. non inv. Cf. B URIDANUS, Tractatus de consequentiis I.6 (ed. Hubien, 26–30). Vide etiam B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 4.6.2 (tr. Klima, 299–300); Summ. de dial. 9.5, tertia sophisma, ‘Antichristus est’ (tr. Klima, 917– 19). 70 supponere ] supponit V || est ] intelligitur T 71–72 et est . . . supponit ] in marg. infra A 72 relativum ] idem subiectum T subiectum V 74 est ] ens add. VW 75–77 et huius . . . intelligitur ] hom. E 77–78 et ipse . . . intelligitur ] hom. V 78–79 subiectum . . . intelligitur ] hom. E 82 et Antichristus ] in marg. A 83 et ] qui vel A || etiam ] secundo add. E 88 verificatur ] praedicatur E || affirmative ] et vere add. AE 89 vel significatur ] om. AT 91 magis ] om. AET || causam ] om. AT 92 animal ] om. E

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cause if ‘Antichrist’ supposits for nothing, the relative pronoun must supposit for nothing. Now in the proposition, ‘The Antichrist is not’, the subject supposits for nothing and it is a true proposition. And so as well, when I say, ‘who is understood’, the relative pronoun ‘who’ supposits for nothing. Thus, since the proposition is affirmative, it is false, and so the entire proposition will be false, for it is equivalent to the copulative proposition, ‘The Antichrist is not and he is understood’, the second part of which is false because the subject supposits for nothing. But ‘The Antichrist is understood, who is not’ will have to be granted, or even ‘The Antichrist is understood and he is not’, because in the proposition, ‘The Antichrist is understood’, the subject supposits for something, although it does not exist. For the term ‘is understood’ ampliates the supposition of the subject to the future, and it could not ampliate a relative pronoun whose antecedent has not been ampliated. That is why this consequence does not hold: ‘The Antichrist is not and the Antichrist is understood; therefore, the Antichrist is not and he is understood’. Finally, I would also grant ‘Something which is not is understood’, and deny ‘Something is understood, which is not’.436 But the difference between these propositions need not be explained here. I have explained it in my logical works, however. 17. The fifth conclusion is the most important: the predicate ‘is understood’, or ‘is thought’, or ‘is cognized’, or ‘is signified’, and so on for other predicates, is not verified affirmatively of a term which does not supposit for some thing or some things. And this conclusion, or so it seems to me, should rather be a principle of logic, because otherwise, no one could explain why propositions such as these would be

436 It

isn’t clear why Buridan would deny this proposition, since, in line with the foregoing, it should be equivalent to ‘Something is understood and that is not [Aliquid intelligitur et illud non est]’, in which ‘something [aliquid]’ is ampliated to non-beings, such as the Antichrist. In fact, by existential instantiation, you can get from this to the sentence above, ‘The Antichrist is understood and he is not [Antichristus intelligitur et ipse non est]’, which he concedes. Unfortunately, there are no viable alternative readings in the manuscripts.

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95

100

105

110

115

848

est locus, Antichristus est homo, et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Tales enim non sunt falsae nisi quia subiectae earum non pro aliquo vel pro aliquibus supponunt. Et causa dictae conclusionis deberet assignari ex Metaphysica, scilicet quia idem significat hoc est illud et hoc est idem illi, et non est idem vel diversum nisi ens enti, ut habetur quinto Metaphysicae. 18. Et propter solutiones rationum, notanda est quod intellectus concipiens res primo conceptibus simplicibus potest illos taliter complectere per modum determinationis et determinabilis quod complexum pro nullo supponit, ut si sine negatione complectit terminos impossibiles supponere pro eadem, quamvis quilibet sit natus supponere pro aliquo, ut equus risibilis vel equus aureus, aut si cum negatione complectat terminos necessario supponentes pro eodem, ut homo non risibilis vel equus qui non est animal. Et possibile est quod ad designandum talem conceptum complexum, nos imponimus vocem incomplexam, ut hoc nomen vacuum vel hoc nomen chimaera. Si igitur quaeras quid ego intelligo per illud complexum, homo hinnibilis, ego dico quod nihil intelligo per hoc nec possem intelligere hominem hinnibilem, sed omnem hominem intelligo per conceptum hominis in isto conceptu implicatum et omne etiam hinnibile. Et istos conceptus taliter compono quod complexum pro nullo supponit, nec etiam vox significativa ad illud complexum designandum, sive fuit oratio sive simplex nomen.

97–98 quinto Metaphysicae ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. V.9; X.3. 93 Antichristus . . . aliis ] et AT 94 earum ] om. AT 96 est illud ] om. T 97 nisi ] non AE || quinto ] decimo AT duodecimo E 100 primo ] prius AT || taliter ] om. E 101 determinabilis ] aliter add. E 101–102 complexum ] in quantum complexum add. A 103 pro ] aliquot add. T || quilibet ] utique AT 104 equus aureus ] equus qui est canis T homo hinnibilis E 105 complectat ] compleat E 106 equus ] homo AT 107 designandum ] significandum W || conceptum ] sumptae add. V 108 ut . . . vacuum ] om. T 109 hinnibilis ] ignobilis et per hominem ignobilis A est hinnibilis homo risibilis et per hominem hinnibilem T 110 nihil ] non aliquid A 111 hinnibilem ] ignobilem A 112 hinnibile ] ignobile A 114 significativa ] imposita ad significandum AET || complexum ] incomplexum T || designandum ] om. AET 115 simplex ] complexum V

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false: ‘A chimera is an animal’, ‘A vacuum is a place’, ‘The Antichrist is a man’, and so on for others similar to these. For such propositions are false only because their subjects do not supposit for something or some things. The grounds for this conclusion must be found in the Metaphysics, namely, that ‘the same’ signifies that this one is that one, and that this one is the same as that one, and nothing is the same as or diverse from something except a being in relation to a being, as is held in Metaphysics V. 18. For the sake of resolving the arguments, it should be noted that the intellect, first conceiving of things by means of simple concepts, is able to combine those concepts as a determination and determinable in such a way that the resulting complex concept supposits for nothing: e.g., when the intellect combines terms without negation so that they cannot together supposit for the same things, although each of them is naturally suited to supposit for something, as in ‘horse capable of laughter’, or ‘horse made of gold’; or when the intellect combines terms that necessarily supposit for the same things with a negation, as in ‘man not capable of laughter’ or ‘horse which is not an animal’. It is possible that to designate such a complex concept, we impose a non-complex utterance, such as the name ‘vacuum’, or the name ‘chimera’. If, therefore, you should ask what I understand by means of the complex, ‘man capable of whinnying’,437 I say that I understand nothing by means of it, nor could I understand a man capable of whinnying, but I understand every man by means of the concept of man implied in that concept, and also everything capable of whinnying. And I compose those concepts in such a way that the resulting complex does not supposit for anything. And the significa-

437 That

is, the concept designated by the phrase, ‘man capable of whinnying’.

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120

125

130

135

140

850

19. Et tunc facile est respondere ad rationes. 20. Ad primam dico quod debes mihi dare descriptionem huius nominis punctum, et tunc sciam dicere tibi quid per illud nomen debeam intelligere. Dicas igitur esse talem descriptionem, indivisibile habens positionem in magnitudine, tunc dico quod nec intelligo nec possum intelligere punctum. Sed per hoc nomen punctum, ego omnia indivisibilia indifferenter intelligo, et omnia habentia positionem, et omnes magnitudines et positiones, sic complectendo horum conceptus quod illud complexum pro nullo potest supponere. Cum igitur dicit Aristoteles, “punctum monstratur vel seu intelligitur ut privatio,” debet exponi, id est, conceptus quem designat hoc nomen punctum implicat in se quemdam conceptum privativum. 21. Ad secundam dico quod privatio est ens, quia est ipsa materia privata. Sed de hoc videatur primo Physicorum. 22. Ad aliam dico quod quando Antichristum intelligo, ego quoddam ens intelligo, non tamen ens quod est sed ens quod erit. Dictum enim est in logica quod talia verba intelligo, significo, etc. ampliant terminos cum quibus construuntur ad supponendum pro praeteritis et futuris, immo etiam pro possibilibus quae nec erunt nec fuerunt. Ideo per hoc nomen rosa, ego infinita entia, scilicet infinitas rosas intelligo, licet nulla sit rosa. 23. Ad aliam dico quod detur quid nominis vacui ut locus non repletus corpore. Tunc per hoc nomen vacuum, non intelligo vacuum si impossibile est vacuum esse, sed tamen intelligo omnia loca et omnia repleta et omnia corpora, per diversos conceptus per quos talis fit complexio quod complexum pro nullo supponit. Et sic de chimaera, 124–125 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430b 20–21. 129 primo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.9 192a4–5; B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. I.23 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 225–230). 132 in logica ] B URIDANUS, Summ. de dial. 4.6.2 (tr. Klima, 299–300). 116 et . . . respondere ] om. E 118 punctum ] punctus vel punctum VW || sciam dicere ] etiam debeo dare AT 122 et omnia ] et per omnia V 122–123 et omnes . . . positiones ] in magnitudine et omnes dispositiones et omnes magnitudines A et omnes conceptus magnitudinum E 123 magnitudines et positiones ] dispositiones et omnes magnitudines T || complectendo ] idem add. A 129 privata ] om. AET 133 ad supponendum ] ad significandum AT om. W 135 entia ] si add. V 137 detur ] declaratur A 138 Tunc ] om. V 140 et omnia corpora ] om. A

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tive utterance designating that complex concept also does not supposit for anything, whether it be a phrase or a simple name. 19. And then it is easy to reply to the arguments. 20. To the first,438 I say that you should give me a description of the name ‘point’, and then I would know what to tell you about what I ought to understand by that name. Should you then give this sort of description, ‘indivisible having position in a magnitude’, I say in that case that I do not understand a point, nor can I understand it. But by the name ‘point’, I understand all indivisibles indifferently, and all things having position, and all magnitudes and positions, combining their concepts in such a way that the complex can supposit for nothing. Therefore, when Aristotle says, “a point is represented, or understood, as a privation,” it should be explained as follows: the concept designated by the name ‘point’ implies in itself a certain privative concept. 21. To the second,439 I say that a privation is a being, because it is matter itself, deprived . But for this, one should see Physics I. 22. To the other,440 I say that when I understand the Antichrist, I understand a certain being — not a being that is, however, but a being that will be. For it was said in my logic that verbs such as ‘I understand’, ‘I signify’, etc., ampliate the terms with which they are construed so that they supposit for past and future beings, and indeed, even for possible beings that neither have been nor will be. Thus, by the name ‘rose’, I understand infinitely many beings, that is, I understand infinitely many roses, even though none of these is a rose. 23. To the other,441 I say, let the nominal definition of ‘vacuum’ be ‘place not filled by body’. Then I do not understand a vacuum by the name ‘vacuum’ if it is impossible for a vacuum to exist, but rather, I understand all places, and all things that have been filled, and all bodies, by diverse concepts through which a combination is produced

438 See

par. 2 above. par. 3 above. 440 See par. 4 above. 441 See par. 5 above. 439 See

L IBER III Q UAESTIO 13

145

150

155

160

852

si enim des quid nominis, scilicet animal compositum ex membris ex quibus impossibile est animal componi, tunc per hoc nomen chimaera non significatur vel intelligitur chimaera, sed animal et membri, etiam per conceptum complexum qui pro nullo supponit. 24. Ad aliam dico quod non imaginor montem aureum nec spatium ultra caelum, sed montem et aureum et caelum, per conceptus quos imaginatio sic complectit quod complexum pro nullo supponit. 25. Ad aliam dico quod haec oratio chimaeram non esse, aut equum non esse asinum, potest sumi materialiter pro hac propositione, chimaera non est vel equus non est asinus. Tunc ego concedo quod ego intelligo et scio chimaeram non est et equum non esse asinum. Sed si illa oratio et eius termini sumantur significative, tunc chimaeram non esse nihil est, et equum non esse asinum nihil est, et ideo nec intelligo nec scio chimaeram non esse, nec equum non esse asinum. 26. Ad aliam dico quod de isto termino infinito non ens nec significatur nec intelligitur non ens, sed omne ens intelligitur et significatur per conceptum tam infinitum, qui propter infinitatem pro nullo ente supponit. 27. Rationes in oppositum non arguuntur contra nos, sed tamen nec reputo eas multum valere.

142 nominis scilicet ] in marg. A nominis E 143 animal ] aliquid E aliquid animal T 144 etiam ] etc. AET 146 imaginor ] om. T 147 et ] om. V in marg. W || aureum ] et spatium add. AET 148 quod . . . supponit ] in marg. A 149 haec oratio ] om. T || esse ] est A animal add. VW 151 est ] animal add. VW 152 est ] esse animal VW 153 oratio ] propositio E 154 esse ] esse vel est A est T est animal V 155 esse ] animal add. VW || asinum ] etc. ad aliam dico quod add. A tunc . . . asinum rep. A 156 nec ] om. A 157 non ens ] om. A 160 arguuntur . . . nec ] om. AT 161 eas multum ] multis A multum T || valere ] et ideo dimitto eas etc. add. A

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such that the complex supposits for nothing. And the same goes for ‘chimera’, for if you provide the nominal definition, namely, ‘animal made of bodily parts from which it is impossible for an animal to be made’, then a chimera is not signified or understood by the name ‘chimera’, but an animal, and bodily parts, are signified and understood by a complex concept which supposits for nothing. 24. To the other,442 I say that I do not imagine a golden mountain, or space beyond the heavens, but a mountain, and something golden, and the heavens, by concepts the imagination combines in such a way that the complex supposits for nothing. 25. To the other,443 I say that the phrase, ‘for a chimera not to be’ or ‘for a horse not to be a donkey’, can be taken materially for the proposition, ‘A chimera does not exist’, or ‘A horse is not a donkey’. In that case, I grant that I understand and know that a chimera does not exist and that a horse is not a donkey. But if that phrase and its terms are taken significatively, then ‘for a chimera not to be’ is nothing, and ‘for a horse not to be a donkey’ is nothing, and so I neither understand nor know a chimera not to be or a horse not to be a donkey. 26. To the other,444 I say as regards the infinite term ‘non-being’ that a non-being is neither signified nor understood, but every being is understood and signified by a concept so infinite, which, on account of its infinity, does not supposit for any being. 27. The opposing arguments are not asserted against us.445 But even so, I don’t think they amount to much.

442 See

par. 6 above. par. 7 above. 444 See par. 8 above. 445 See pars. 9–11 above. 443 See

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854

Utrum punctum monstretur vel intellegatur ut privatio.

5

10

1. Et arguitur quod non: vel punctum nihil est vel aliquid est. Si nihil est, tunc non intelligitur secundum dicta in alia quaestione. Et si aliquid est, tunc debet intelligi positive, cum omne ens sit positive, et cum si punctum est aliquid, ipsum est magnitudo, quae positive intelligitur. 2. Item describitur punctum quod est principium lineae vel finis lineae vel terminus lineae vel ad quem copulantur partes lineae. Et haec omnia non sunt privativa, sed positiva; igitur, positive debet intelligi. 3. Oppositum expresse dicit Aristoteles sic: “punctum autem, et omnis divisio, et sic indivisibile, demonstratur ut privatio.” Et describitur quod punctum est cuius pars non est, et haec descriptio est privativa propter illam dictionem non; vel describitur quod punctum 1–2 ut privatio ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430b 20–21 (Ar. lat. XII.2 224.2.11): “Punctum autem et omne divisio et sic indivisibile monstratur sicut privatio.” Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. IV.14 (ed. Parisiis 1588, ff. 23vb –24ra). 4 in alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.13. 11 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430b20–21. 12–13 describitur quod ] E UCLIDES, Elementa I, def. 3 (ed. Busard, 31): “Punctus est cuius pars non est.” Cf. B OETHIUS, (attr.) Ars Geometriae, ‘De mensura’ (ed. Friedlein, 374.1–2): “Punctum est, cuius pars nulla est”; B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. VI.4 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 96va ): “Maior manifesta est per definitionem dicentem quid nominis puncti: punctum est cuius pars non est habens positionem in magnitudine.” 14 describitur quod ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. V.6 1016b25–27 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 102.77): “Facta autem conversione: dualiter quidem divisibile superficies, unice autem linea, nullatenus divisibile secundum quantitatem punctum et unitas; hoc quidem non habens positionem unitas, illud vero habens positionem punctum.” 5 positive ] aliquid add. AET 8 Item describitur ] om. A || punctum ] autem est illud add. A om. ET 8–9 lineae vel terminus lineae vel ] om. A 10 omnia ] nomina T 12 et omnis divisio ] rep. A om. T 13 descriptio ] non(!) add. A 14 illam dictionem ] hanc negationem E || describitur ] definitur AT © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 45

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Is a point represented or understood as a privation?

1. It is argued that it is not: either a point is nothing or it is something. If it is nothing, then according to what was said in the previous question, it is not understood. And if it is something, then it must be understood positively, since every being exists positively, and since if a point is something, it is a magnitude, which is understood positively. 2. Again, a point is described as that which is the beginning of a line, or the end of a line, or the limit of a line, or that at which the parts of a line are joined. And none of these things are privative, but positive; therefore, it must be understood positively. 3. Aristotle expressly states the opposite as follows: “but a point, and every division, and so what is indivisible, is represented as a privation.” Also, a point is described as ‘that which has no part,’ and this description is privative on account of the word ‘no’. Alternatively,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 45

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20

25

30

35

856

est indivisibile habens positionem in magnitudine, et hoc nomen indivisibile est privativum; igitur, etc. 4. Ad videndum qualis conceptus correspondeat huic nomini punctum, oportet videre descriptionem dicentem quid nominis ipsius. Describitur enim uno modo: punctum est indivisibile habens situm in magnitudine; vel sic: punctum est cuius pars non est, habens positionem in magnitudine. Et reputo descriptiones tamquam aequivalentes, quia aequivalet dicere indivisibile et cuius pars non est. Describitur alio modo: punctum est terminus lineae, vel punctum est principium vel finis lineae. Haec etiam descriptiones coincidunt, quia non capimus ibi principium vel finem pro causa, sed pro termino primo aut ultimo. Et si quis dicat quod haec descriptio non est conveniens quia non convenit punctis coterminantibus vel continuantibus, qui sunt inter primum terminum lineae et ultimum, ego dico quod immo, punctum enim continuans (licet non sit terminus lineae totalis, cum est terminus lineae partialis) est principium unius partis lineae totalis et finis alterius, cum quaelibet pars lineae est linea. 5. Notandum igitur quod secundum primum modum describendi punctum, nihil est punctum, nec potest esse, prout debet videri in sexto Physicorum. Ideo nec potest intelligi, nec potest nomine significari, ut in alia quaestione dictum est. Et haec sit prima conclusio. 6. Sed secundum alterum modum describendi, punctum est linea, punctum est superficies, et punctum est corpus, sed non totale corpus, nec totalis superficies, nec totalis linea. Sed hoc nomen punctum sup-

34 sexto Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VI.1. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. VI.1–4 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 93vb –98va ). 35 alia quaestione ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.13, par. 20. 15 positionem ] situm E 18 ipsius ] om. AT 19 punctum ] quod A quod add. E || situm ] positionem AT 20–21 positionem ] situm E 21 reputo ] has add. AET 22 quia . . . non est ] om. T || aequivalet ] idem est A 24 descriptiones ] definitiones AT || coincidunt ] incidunt V 25 ibi ] om. AE hic T 27 punctis ] non(!) add. A om. E cunctis V || coterminantibus vel ] om. AET 28 terminum ] om. V || et ] continuans A 29 continuans ] vel coterminans add. VW exp. W 29–30 cum est terminus ] et finis alterius cum tamen quaelibet pars T 30 est ] enim add. AEVW 33 punctum ] ipsum add. A om. V 37 punctum est superficies, et punctum est corpus ] superficies et corpus A

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a point is described as ‘an indivisible having position in a magnitude,’ and the name ‘indivisible’ is privative; therefore, etc. 4. In order to see what sort of concept would correspond to the name ‘point’, we must look to the description giving its nominal definition. For it is described in one way as follows: ‘A point is something indivisible having position in a magnitude’; or as follows: ‘A point is something of which there is no part, having position in a magnitude’. I take the descriptions as equivalent, since it comes to the same thing to say ‘indivisible’ and ‘something of which there is no part’. In another way, it is described as follows: ‘A point is the limit of a line’, or ‘A point is the beginning or end of a line’. These descriptions also coincide, since we do not take ‘the beginning’ or ‘the end’ there as a cause, but as the first or last limit. And if anyone says that this description is unacceptable because it does not fit coterminating or continuating points, which are those between the first limit of a line and the last, I say that on the contrary, it does fit them, for a continuating point (although it is not the limit of an entire line, since it is the limit of a line segment) is the beginning of one part of an entire line and the end of another, because each part of a line is a line. 5. It must be noted, then, that according to the first way of describing a point, nothing is a point, nor can anything be a point, as must be seen in Physics VI. Thus, it can be neither understood nor signified by a name, as was stated in the previous question. And this is the first conclusion. 6. But according to the other way of describing it, a point is a line, a point is a surface, and a point is a body, but not the entire body, nor the entire surface, nor the entire line. But the name ‘point’ supposits

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40

45

50

55

858

ponit pro linea, corpore, et superficie, et connotat quod sit terminus lineae, scilicet primum aut ultimum lineae. Et cum non sit primum aut ultimum indivisibile, oportet quod illud sit prima aut ultima pars lineae. Quomodo autem lineae sint infinitae primae partes et infinitae ultimae ego declaravi super librum Physicorum, ut prima medietas, prima tertia, prima quarta, et sic in infinitum, et ita etiam de ultimis. Et quaelibet istorum, illa ratione qua prima vel ultima dicitur terminus lineae, et dicitur punctum. Erit igitur secunda conclusio, quod secundum hanc descriptionem huius nominis punctum, punctum potest intelligi intellectu pure positive et significari per terminum pure positivum. Significatur enim per istum terminum ens, et per istos terminos quantitas, magnitudo, vel corpus, qui etiam conceptus eis correspondentes sunt positivi et non privativi. 7. Tertia conclusio: quod secundum utramque descriptionem et significationem huius nominis punctum, conceptus correspondens, scilicet ad quem designandum impositum est hoc nomen punctum, est quodammodo privativum. Probatur quia omnem conceptum voco quodammodo privativum qui in se implicat negationem, propter quod Aristoteles in libro Priorum propositiones negativas vocat privativas. Unde etiam terminus infinitus aliquando dicitur privativus. Unde etiam, licet nomen dictum proprie privativum debeat implicare nomen

43 librum Physicorum ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. VI.4 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 97va -vb ). 57 libro Priorum ] A RISTOTELES, An. pr. I.2 25a5–7 (Ar. lat. III.1 7.25): “Nam universalis quidem privativa universaliter convertitur . . . ”. Cf. Auc. Ar. 34.5 (ed. Hamesse, 308): “universalis negativa et particularis simpliciter convertuntur.” 40 aut ] ad V || lineae ] om. A 42 lineae ] om. E 43 declaravi ] demonstravi AE 44 tertia ] quarta add. V || quarta ] est T 46–51 Erit . . . privativi ] in marg. infra A 47 nominis ] termini T 48 intellectu ] om. AE || significari ] simpliciter AE semper T || pure ] om. AET 50 qui etiam ] et hi AE 51 et non ] vel(!) T 52 Tertia ] Alia A || quod secundum ] scilicet A praeviam V 52–53 descriptionem et significationem ] acceptionem AT 53 conceptus ] sibi add. A 54 designandum ] significandum V || hoc nomen ] iste terminus A hic terminus T 56 propter ] haec est V 58 terminus ] ut add. V 59 implicare ] vel ampliare et melius A ampliare T

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for the line, the body, and the surface, connoting that it is the limit of a line, i.e., the first or last of a line. And since there is no first or last indivisible, it must be that it is the first or last part of a line.446 But I have explained how there are infinitely many first parts and infinitely many last parts of a line in my Questions on Aristotle’s Physics, i.e., how there is a first half, a first third, a first quarter, and so on to infinity, and likewise for the last parts.447 And each one of these is also said to be a point for the same reason that the first or last part is called the limit of a line. Therefore, the second conclusion will be that according to this description of the name ‘point’, a point can be understood by the intellect purely positively, and can be signified by a purely positive term. For it is signified by the term ‘being’, and by the terms ‘quantity’, ‘magnitude’, or ‘body’, and the concepts corresponding to them are positive and not privative. 7. The third conclusion is that according to both descriptions and significations of the name ‘point’, the corresponding concept, namely, the concept which the name ‘point’ was imposed to designate, is in some way privative. This is proved because I call every concept that implies negation privative in some way, because Aristotle calls negative propositions privative in the Prior Analytics. That is why even an infinite term is sometimes called privative. For this reason as well, even though a name that is strictly speaking privative must imply 446 According

to Buridan, (1) a surface is a body without considering its depth; (2) a line is a surface, without considering its width, but only its length; and (3) the beginning and end of a line are the line, without considering its length. Thus, these terms all supposit for the same thing – the same real, individual entity, namely, a body – while connoting some dimension or dimensions abstracted from it. 447 Like Aristotle, Buridan is a divisibilist who denies the existence of such things as indivisible points in a line on the grounds that indivisibles, being unextended and lacking parts that could be in contact with each other, cannot compose anything divisible. But there is still the question of what terms like ‘point’ and ‘instant’ refer to, if not indivisible entities. In his Questions on Aristotle’s Physics VI.4 (Paris 1509, f. 97va ), Buridan argues that such terms refer to the divisible first and last parts of something, such as a line or length of time. Moreover, there are infinitely many such parts because however we designate them, e.g., as the first or last third of a line, there is always another divisible part that is smaller, e.g., the first or last tenth of the line, or hundredth, or thousandth, and so on to infinity. For discussion of this and other divisibilist strategies for dealing with terms putatively referring to indivisibles, see Zupko 1993.

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positivum cum negatione, connotando subiectum de quo illud nomen positivum sit aptum natum dici, ut caecus, non habens visum aptus natus habere; et ignorans, natus scire non sciens, tamen aliquando nomen privativum dicimus largius, scilicet sine connotatione talis aptitudinis, ut scilicet incorruptibile, ingenerabile, indivisibile, quamvis non sit aptum natum esse corruptibile, generabile, vel divisibile. Et hoc expresse notat Aristoteles quinto Metaphysicae, dicens “privatio dicitur uno quidem modo, si non habet aliquid natorum haberi, et si non natum sit habere.” Et idem ipse etiam notat tertio Physicorum de hoc nomine infinitum, et de hoc nomine indivisibile. 8. Hoc supposito, arguitur sic: omnis conceptus implicans quodammodo negationem est privativus, licet forte non proprie. Sed conceptus a quo sumitur hoc nomen punctum, sive quantum ad primam dictarum significationum sive quantum ad secundam, implicat negationem; igitur etc. Maior est supposita. Minor declaratur primo quantum ad primam descriptionem, notum est enim quod indivisibile dicitur quasi non divisibile. Sed etiam de secunda significatione: manifestum est quod ex eo aliquid dicitur principium aut finis lineae aut terminus, quia intelligitur esse prima pars vel ultima. Et non prima pars quia sit omnibus aliis partibus prior, quoniam sic nulla est lineae prima pars, sed sic lineae prima pars quia nulla illius lineae est prior. Sic enim infinitae sunt partes lineae, scilicet prima decima, pri-

66 quinto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.22 1022b22–24 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 117.713): “Privatio dicitur uno quidem modo, si non habet aliquid natorum haberi, et si non ipsum sit aptum natum habere, ut oculis privari dicitur planta.” 68 tertio Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. III.5 204a7–16. 60 positivum . . . connotando ] privitivum tamen negativae connotat A || cum negatione ] connotare E 62 non sciens ] in marg. A tamen adesse indivisibile(?) T 63 nomen privativum ] om. V || nomen ] aliquid add. A om. V || dicimus ] clarius vel add. A 63–64 connotatione talis aptitudinis ] tali connotatione appellationis E 64 indivisibile ] om. T 64–65 quamvis . . . divisibile ] hom. T 65 esse corruptibile, generabile, vel divisibile ] om. V 67 natorum ] intelligi sive add. V 68–69 et idem . . . indivisibile ] om. E 69 infinitum, et de hoc nomine ] hom. A 70 omnis ] om. T 71 forte ] om. AE 74 etc. ] om. VW || Minor declaratur primo ] maior supposita declaratur minor A 76 quasi non ] quod non est E || quasi ] illud quod est A 79 aliis partibus ] om. E 80 sed . . . pars ] om. A 81 lineae ] b add. VW || scilicet ] prima secunda add. AT

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a positive name with negation, connoting the subject of which that positive name is naturally suited to be said,448 as something blind is something not having the sight it is naturally suited to have, or someone ignorant is someone who is naturally suited to know, but does not; nevertheless, we sometimes call a name ‘privative’ more broadly, that is, without the connotation of such an aptitude, e.g., ‘incorruptible’, ‘ungenerable’, or ‘indivisible’, even though is not naturally suited to be corruptible, generable, or divisible. Aristotle expressly notes this in Metaphysics V when he says, “‘privation’ is said in one way if does not have some one that some thing might naturally have, even if the thing itself is not naturally suited to have it.” And he makes the same observation in Physics III about the name ‘infinite’ and the name ‘indivisible’. 8. On these assumptions, then, one argues as follows: every concept that in some way implies negation is privative, although perhaps not strictly so. But the concept from which the name ‘point’ is taken, whether as regards the first of the aforementioned significations or the second, implies negation; therefore, etc. The major is assumed. The minor is explained first in regard to the first description, for it is widely known that ‘indivisible’ is said in the sense of ‘not divisible’. But it also holds as regards the second signification: it is clear that something is called the beginning or end of a line, or a limit, because it is understood to be the first or last part. And it is not the first part because it is prior to all the other parts, since there is no first part of a line in this sense. But it is the first part of a line in the sense that no

448 The

translation here follows the Latin, but the doctrine is not correct; unfortunately, the manuscripts offer no alternative readings that would make better sense. On Buridan’s view, the subject is not connoted but directly signified by a privative name, which in turn connotes the aptitude to have an attribute and the lack of that attribute (i.e., it connotes the attribute negatively). Accordingly, in a proposition, a privative name supposits for the subject, positively appellating its aptitude and negatively appellating the attribute it is apt to have. For example, ‘caecum’ supposits for a blind animal, positively appellating its aptitude to have sight and negatively appellating its sight, so it will supposit only for those things that are animals, have the aptitude to have sight, and yet do not have sight.

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ma centissima, prima millesima, etc. Et apparet manifeste quod haec expositio implicat negationem. 9. Et iuxta hoc, scholares incidentaliter quaesiverunt an sphaera posita super planum tangeret ipsum secundum punctum, ad quod ego respondeo quod quantum ad primam descriptionem, negandum est quod tangit secundum punctum, quia si tangat, hoc est secundum aliquid, et punctum nihil est. Sed quantum ad secundam descriptionem, ego pono hanc conditionalem, quod si tangat, tangit secundum punctum quia secundum eius ultimam partem, scilicet secundum ultimam medietatem, secundam ultimam centissimam, secundum ultimam millesimam, et sic in infinitum. Ideo non solum secundum unum punctum sed secundum infinita puncta tangit, quia secundum infinitas ultimas partes, dividendo sphaeram secundum circulos parallelos ad invicem et ad ipsum planum. 10. Sed tunc tu quaeres categorice utrum tangat. Et ego respondeo aliter et aliter, secundum quod tu dabis mihi aliam et aliam descriptionem huius dictionis tangere, dicentem quid nominis, hoc enim in omni doctrina oportet praesupponere. Cum igitur dicat Aristoteles quinto Physicorum quod duo corpora tangerent se, significat idem quod ultima eorum esse simul. Et non potest exponi simul, id est, in eodem loco, esset enim penetratio corporum, sed simul, id est, proxima. Et iterum, exponitur proxima vel quia nullum est aliud corpus medium, vel quia impossibile est ea amplius approximari sine penetratione vel depressione alicuius eorum. Si igitur dicas hanc secundam expositionem, ego dico quod tangant se sphaera illa et planum. Et si 100 quinto Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. VI.1 231a21–22 (Ar. lat. VII.1 216.3): “Si autem est continuum et quod tangitur et consequenter, sicut definitum est prius, continua quidem quorum ultima unum, que vero tanguntur quorum simul.” 82 prima millesima ] om. AT || etc. ] om. V || haec ] om. V 83 negationem ] om. E 84 scholares ] aliqui add. A 89 tangat ] om. V 90–92 ultimam medietatem . . . milessimam ] eius ultimam A ultimam medietatem vel secundum aliquam(?) T 91 medietatem ] secundum ultimam decimam add. E 96 categorice ] om. AE 97 mihi ] om. E || et aliam ] om. T 98 dictionis ] nominis T 101 Et non . . . simul ] hom. V || simul ] om. E 102 corporum ] om. V || sed simul ] oportet enim exponere quod A || id est ] quia E in eodem loco . . . id est hom. T 103 iterum ] tunc ita E || aliud ] om. V 104 amplius ] plus AT 105 depressione ] compressione T 106–107 expositionem . . . primam ] hom. E 106 se sphaera illa et ] supra illa ad T

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part of that line is prior. For in this way, there are infinitely many parts of a line,449 namely, a first tenth, a first hundredth, a first thousandth, etc. And it is obvious that this exposition implies negation. 9. And in connection with this, students have incidentally asked whether a sphere placed on a plane would touch it at a point. I reply that as far as the first description is concerned, it must be denied that it touches it at a point, because if it touches it, then it touches at something, and a point is nothing. But as far as the second description is concerned, I propose this conditional: if it touches it, then it touches at a point, since it touches at its last part, namely, at the last half, the last hundredth, the last thousandth, and so on to infinity. Thus, it touches not only at a single point, but at infinitely many points, because it touches at infinitely many last parts, by dividing the sphere at circles parallel to each other and the plane itself.450 10. But then you will ask whether it touches the plane categorically. And I reply in different ways, depending on whether you will give me one or the other description of the word ‘touch’, stating its nominal definition, for this must be assumed in every discussion. Therefore, when Aristotle says in Physics V that two bodies touch each other, this signifies that their extremities are together. And ‘together’ cannot be understood as ‘in the same place’, for there would be penetration of bodies. But ‘together’ can be understood as ‘adjacent’. Then again, something is called ‘adjacent’ either because there is no other body between it and the other to which it is adjacent, or because it is impossible for it and the other to be closer without one of them being

449 Three

manuscripts, including our primary manuscripts (V and W), have ‘lineae b [of line b]’, suggesting that a concrete illustration or drawing might have accompanied Buridan’s lecture here. 450 In keeping with his divisibilism, Buridan contends that the sphere would touch the plane at a point only in the sense that it would be in contact with its last part, which would be produced by slicing the sphere along an axis parallel to the plane surface. But there would be infinitely many such points or last parts since however you sliced it, you could always slice it more finely!

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des primam expositionem, ego dico quod non tangunt se, ut si hic in a¨ere ponas ens sphaericum super ens planum, tunc inter illa erit a¨er, et inter quascumque partes eorum, quia a¨er dexter attingeret ad a¨erem sinistrum. Nam si essent puncta indivisibilia sicut aliqui imaginantur, illi a¨eres non distarent nisi per unum punctum indivisibile, quod non faceret distare partes ad ipsum copulatas. Et cum nihil sit indivisibile in sphaera vel in plano, et inter quodcumque divisibile ipsius sphaerae et inter quodcumque divisibile ipsius plani est a¨er medius, sequitur quod non est aliquid unius quod sic tangat aliquid alterius quod non sit aliquid corpus medium, scilicet a¨er. 11. De rationibus in principio quaestionis adductas, apparet quod non sint contra dicta, si debite exponantur auctoritates Aristotelis.

108 ens sphaericum super ens ] et habes sphaericum et habes A ens sphaericum et ens E 110 si ] aliquando add. V 111 unum ] om. ET 113 divisibile ] indivisibile AT 114 divisibile ] indivisibile ATV 118 auctoritates ] dicta V

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compressed or penetrated. If, therefore, you give the second description, I say that the sphere and plane would touch each other; and if you give the first description, I say that they do not touch each other, e.g., if you place an actual sphere above an actual plane here in the air, then there will be air between them and between each and every one of their parts, because the air on the right would touch against the air on the left. For if there were indivisible points as some imagine, those volumes of air would be separated by just a single indivisible point, which would not separate the parts joined to it. And since there is nothing indivisible in the sphere or plane, and there is air between every divisible part of that sphere and that plane, it follows that there is nothing belonging to the one touching anything belonging to the other such that there would not be some body between them, namely, the air.451 11. As for the arguments adduced at the beginning of the Question, it is clear that they are not against what has been said, if the authoritative passages from Aristotle are properly understood.

451 For

analysis of Buridan’s response to the indivisibilist ‘touch-at-a-point’ argument, see Zupko 1993.

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Utrum intellectus sit reservativus specierum intelligibilium, cessante actuali intellectione.

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1. Et arguitur quod non, quia proportionaliter dicendum est de sensu et intellectu. Sed in sensibus, potentia cognoscitiva non reservat species sensibiles, cessante actuali sensatione. Immo ad reservandum ponuntur aliae potentiae cognoscitivae, ut phantasia et virtus memorativa; igitur in intellectu, qui est potentia cognoscitiva, non reservatur species etiam; igitur, etc. 2. Item videtur implicare contradictionem quod remaneat species intelligibilis et non sit actualis intellectio, quia existentibus causis sufficientibus actualis intellectionis et eo modo quo sunt sufficientes, oportet esse intellectionem. Species autem intelligibilis cum intellectu possibili et agente, et Deo, sufficiunt ad esse et fieri intellectionem, quoniam si sensibilia et phantasmata requiruntur, hoc non est nisi ad causandum speciem intelligibilem in intellectu; igitur, etc. 3. Vel formatur ratio sic: eadem potentia non est receptiva speciei sufficienter ad cognoscendum et reservativa eius sine intellectione, quia tunc essent causae illius sufficientes sine effectu, et non indigeremus, praeter sensus exteriores et sensum communem, phantasiam vel memoriam. Sed intellectus recipit speciem sufficientem ad intelligendum et actu cognoscendum; igitur, etc.

3 Et arguitur ] om. V 5 sensibiles ] sensibilium E || sensatione ] cognitione secundum sensationis V cognitione sensationis W 6 cognoscitivae ] non(!) cognoscitivae AE 6–7 memorativa ] vel cogitativa add. A vel cognoscitiva T 8 etiam ] om. AET 10 intelligibilis ] intellectualis V || sit ] remaneat E 13 et Deo ] om. A ideo ET 14 sensibilia ] vel virtus sensitiva add. A 17–18 intellectione ] cognitione AET 18 non ] ideo nos non certe A 19 phantasiam ] phantasticam V phantastica virtute W 20 memoriam ] memorativam VW © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 46

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Does the intellect preserve intelligible species once the actual act of thinking has ceased?

1. It is argued that it does not, because sense and intellect should be treated analogously. But in the senses, the cognoscitive power does not preserve sensible species once actual sensation has ceased; on the contrary, other cognoscitive powers, such as imagination and power of memory, are supposed to preserve them; therefore, in the intellect, which is a cognoscitive power, species are also not preserved; therefore, etc.452 2. Again, it seems to imply a contradiction that an intelligible species would remain without there being an actual act of thinking, because once the causes sufficient for an act of thinking exist, and in the way in which they are sufficient, the act of thinking must exist. But the intelligible species, along with the possible and agent intellects, and God, suffice for the existence and coming to be of an act of thinking, because if sensibles and phantasms are required, this is only for bringing about the intelligible species in the intellect; therefore, etc. 3. Alternatively, the argument is put as follows: the same power is not sufficiently receptive of a species for cognizing and retentive of it without an act of thinking, because then sufficient causes for it would exist without the effect, and we would not need imagination, or memory in addition to the external senses and the common sense. But the intellect receives a species sufficient for understanding and actually cognizing; therefore, etc.

452 The

‘cognoscitive power’ would be whatever power of cognition performs the cognitive act: the external senses plus common sense, imagination, and memory in the sensory part of the soul; the intellect or power of understanding in the intellectual part of the soul. The argument is that whatever does the sensing does not also do the preserving; for that is required another power — and analogously in the case of thinking. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 46

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4. Item non indigeremus phantasmate ad iterationem intelligendi, sicut ad iterationem sentiendi per sensum communem non indigeremus sensibus exterioribus. Et hoc tamen videtur falsum, cum dicat Aristoteles “intelligentem quemcumque necesse est phantasmata speculari.” Et quia non possumus dormientes sine somno intelligere propter hoc quod non sunt phantasmata in actu. 5. Item sicut illa species potest de novo generari, ita potest corrumpi aut per oblivionem aut aliter. Sed dari non posset modus quomodo corrumperetur si natura eius posset manere cessante intellectione, quia non corrumperetur ad corruptionem subiecti, cum ponatur intellectus esse perpetuus; nec corrumperetur a contraria, quia non habet contrariam naturam sicut species albi et species nigri non habent in intellectu contrarietatem, cum possint esse simul in eo; nec corrumperetur ad remotionem conservantis, quia nec actualis intellectio vel actuale phantasma vel actualis sensatio aut sensibile est conservans, ex quo istis remotis vel cessantibus ponitur remanere. Cum igitur alia remaneant, non videtur quomodo illa umquam possint corrumpi. 6. Oppositum arguitur, quia si non maneret illa species intelligibilis in intellectu cessante intellectione, sequeretur quod intellectus remaneret aeque et ita in potentia post sicut ante intelligere, quod est contra Aristotelem et etiam contra rationem, quia si in dormiente nihil remaneret in intellectu sapientis, tunc ipse evigilatus non posset magis

24–25 dicat Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a 8–9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 235.2.6): “necesse simul phantasma aliquod speculari.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.167 (ed. Hamesse, 188): “necesse est quemcumque intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” 42 contra Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.4 429b5–9. 22 intelligendi ] sic add. VW 23 iterationem ] aliquid add. T || sentiendi ] falsa(?) add. V || sensum communem ] sensationem sed VW 24 videtur ] est AT 30 si natura eius ] nulla eius pars T 34 eo ] eodem E 35 intellectio ] sensatio VW 36 vel . . . sensatio ] om. T || sensatio aut sensibile ] intelligibile E 38 umquam ] om. A 40 in intellectu ] om. AE 41 et ita ] om. AT || post ] om. ET 42 rationem ] Aristotelem T 43 sapientis ] om. A

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4. Again, , we would not need a phantasm for understanding a second time, just as we do not need the external senses for sensing a second time via the common sense. And yet this seems to be false, since Aristotle says that “anyone who is understanding must reflect on phantasms,” and because we cannot think while in a dreamless sleep due to the fact that there are no actual phantasms then. 5. Again, just as the species can be generated anew, so it can be corrupted, whether by being forgotten or in some other way. But no means could be given by which it would be corrupted if its nature could remain once the act of thinking has ceased: for it would not be corrupted because of the corruption of the subject, since the intellect is supposed to be everlasting; nor would it be corrupted by a contrary, because it does not have a contrary nature, just as the species of white and the species of black are not contrary in the intellect since they could be in it at the same time; nor would it be corrupted as regards the removal of a conserving agent, since neither the actual act of thinking, nor the actual phantasm, nor the actual sensation or sensible thing is a conserving agent, because the species is assumed to remain after these have been removed or ceased to operate. Since, therefore, other things remain, it is not clear how the species could ever be corrupted. 6. The opposite is argued, because if the intelligible species did not remain in the intellect once thinking has ceased, it would follow that the intellect would remain equally and just as much in potency after the act of thinking as before, which is contrary to Aristotle, and also to reason, because if nothing remained in the intellect of a sleep-

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conclusiones ex multis processibus deducendas deducere quam unus qui de novo inciperet addiscere, quod est falsum. 7. Item certum est quod habitus intellectuales remanent, ut scientiae, artes, et prudentiae. Et non remanent sine repraesentativis rerum intellectarum, quae non videntur esse nisi species intelligibiles, cessantibus intellectionibus; igitur, etc. 8. Item in parte sensuali, species sensibiles reservantur cessantibus sensationibus; igitur etiam in intellectu species intelligibiles. Consequentia patet quia similis est proportio, et quia natura non minus debet esse sollicita de parte intellectuali quam de sensuali sed magis, et quia non minus memoramur de aliis intellectis quam de nuper sensatis, licet illae intellectae sint talia quae sub sensu cadere non possunt, ut Deus et intelligentiae et conclusiones universales. Immo expertus sum quod etiam in somniis saepe mihi talia revertuntur ad apprehensionem. 9. Pono aliquas conclusiones consequenter se habentes. 10. Prima est quod cessante actuali intellectione, aliquid est in intellectu derelictum ex illa intellectione, quia aliter nullos haberemus habitus intellectuales, non enim generantur nisi ex actibus intelligendi et considerandi, et sic essemus aeque in potentia sicut ante intelligere, specialiter de illis quae in phantasia non habent species. Igitur indigeremus discursu longo, sicut indigebamus in addiscendo, quod est manifeste falsum. Et talia quae sic in intellectu derelinquuntur ex actibus intelligendi et considerandi, nos vocamus habitus intellectuales.

44 deducendas deducere ] reducendas reducere E || deducendas ] adducendas T 45 addiscere ] discere AT 47 repraesentativis ] repraesentatione AT 53 sed magis ] om. V 54 memoramur ] dicimus eas memorari A || nuper ] aliis AET 55 illae ] om. VW || talia ] in marg. W alia ATV alia add. W 56 conclusiones ] omnes conclusiones A || expertus ] conceptus T 57 saepe ] om. AT 64 habent species ] sunt E 65 indigebamus ] om. A 66 manifeste ] om. A || derelinquuntur ] ergo relinquuntur A 66–67 ex . . . nos ] om. E

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ing knower, then he could not, upon waking, draw the conclusions that should be drawn from various deductive arguments any better than someone who was beginning to learn for the first time, which is false. 7. Again, it is certain that intellectual habits remain, such as the sciences, the arts, and prudence. And they do not remain without representatives of the things understood, which appear to be only intelligible species once thinking has ceased; therefore, etc. 8. Again, in the sensory part , sensible species are preserved once sensations have ceased; therefore, intelligible species are also preserved in the intellect. The consequence is clear, because the relationship is similar, and because (1) nature must be no less moved in its intellectual part than in its sensory part, but more so; and (2) we remember other things we have thought of no less than things we have recently sensed, even though those things thought of, e.g., God, the intelligences, and universal conclusions, are not the sorts of things that can fall under sense. And yet, I have often experienced that such things also return to my apprehension in dreams. 9. Next, I provide some conclusions related to these arguments. 10. The first is that once actual thinking has ceased, something is left behind in the intellect by that act of thinking, because otherwise we would have no intellectual habits, for they are generated only from acts of thinking and considering, and also because otherwise we would be just as much in potency as before the act of thinking, especially as regards those things which do not have species in the imagination. Therefore, we would need a long chain of reasoning, just as we needed for learning, which is manifestly false. Things of this sort, which are left behind in this way by acts of thinking and considering, we call ‘intellectual habits’.

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11. Secunda conclusio est quod ille habitus non est de natura vel specie intellectionis differens ab ea solum secundum intensum et remissum, ut aliqui dicunt, ita quod cum est intensum est intellectio, et cum est remissum, non amplius dicitur intellectio sed habitus. Ista conclusio probatur, quia non existente actu intelligendi, est habitus remissus in eo qui parum studuit, ideo cito amissibilis nisi perseveret in studio. In eo autem qui longo tempore studuit, est habitus intensus, et difficiliter mobilis seu amissibilis, licet non sit actualis intellectio. 12. Item ponamus secundum adversarium quod intellectio sit forma intensa decem graduum eiusdem rationis, et habitus derelictus sit forma remissa quinque graduum, similiter eiusdem rationis cum illis gradibus qui erant formae intensae. Tunc igitur cessante actuali intellectione, corrumpuntur quinque graduum illi formae intensae, et constat quod cito et faciliter et quasi instanter cessat huiusmodi intellectio. Ideo sic cito et faciliter corrumpuntur illi quinque gradus habitus. Et tamen alii quinque remanentes non corrumpuntur cito, sed sunt longe permanentiae et de difficili mobiles. Huius autem diversitatis inter quinque remanentes et quinque corruptos, nullus posset assignare causam ex qua ponuntur ad invicem eiusdem rationis, et quod intellectus nullum sibi determinat. Ideo fictitia erat et falsa positio adversarii. 13. Tertia conclusio est quod ille habitus sic in intellectu ex actu intelligendi derelictus non est species intelligibilis, nec eiusdem rationis vel speciei cum ea. Voco autem hic speciem intelligibilem quae mediante sensu sit in organo phantasiae vel cogitativae, vel in intellectu,

68 ille habitus ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Cat. 8 8b 26–9a10. 76 adversarium ] Sc., IOHANNES DE M IRECURIA : vide B URIDANUS , QQ. De an. III.11, PAR . 14, 23– 24. 69 specie ] illius sive specie vel A || intellectionis ] intellectus TV intellectarum W sed(!) add. V 70 intensum ] remissum(!) V remissio(!) W 71 remissum ] intensum(!) V intensio(!) W || habitus ] oportet add. V 73 cito ] scito E || amissibilis ] annihilatur vel amissibilis A annihilatur T 74 intensus ] extensus sive intensus A 75 amissibilis ] annihilabilis AT 80 graduum illi formae intensae ] om. E ille gradus T 81 cito ] scito E 82 cito ] scito E 83 habitus ] om. AET || quinque ] om. A || remanentes ] habitus add. AE habitus T permanentes W 91 vel speciei ] om. A || hic ] huiusmodi A

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11. The second conclusion is that this habit is not of the nature or species of the act of thinking, differing from it only by intensification or diminution, as some say, such that when intensified, it is an act of thinking, and when diminished, it is no longer said to be an act of thinking, but a habit. This conclusion is proved because when an act of thinking no longer exists, there is a diminished habit in someone who has studied too little, and so it is quickly lost unless he perseveres in study. In someone who has studied for a long time, however, there is an intense habit, not easily moved or lost, although it is not an actual act of thinking. 12. Again, let us suppose, following an opponent,453 that an act of thinking is a form intensified by ten degrees of the same nature, and the remaining habit is a form diminished by five degrees of the same nature as the degrees that belonged to the intensified form. So then, when the actual act of thinking ceases, the five degrees belonging to the intensified form are corrupted, and it is agreed that such an act of thinking ceases quickly, easily, and almost instantaneously. So in this way, the five degrees belonging to the habit are corrupted quickly and easily. However, the other five that remain are not corrupted quickly, but persist for a long time and are movable only with difficulty. But no one could give a reason for the difference between the five remaining and the five corrupted, given that they were assumed to have the same nature and that the intellect determines no degree for itself. Therefore, the position of the opponent was fictitious and false. 13. The third conclusion is that the habit thus left behind in the intellect by the act of understanding is not the intelligible species, nor is it of the same nature or kind as the intelligible species. However, I am here calling an ‘intelligible species’ that which, through the media-

453 As

indicated in the edition, the opponent in question here is John of Mirecourt, whose views were condemned in 1347 in articles cited by Buridan in QQ. De an. III.11, pars. 23–24. But the idea that acts and habits of thought are of the same nature and differ from each other only in degree was also defended by Buridan’s younger contemporary, Nicole Oresme, in his QQ. De an. III.10 (ed. Patar, l. 48 ff.) and by Ps.-Buridan, in his QQ. De an. III.10 (ed. Patar).

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sine qua intellectus non potest primo intelligere res sensatas vel phantasiatas, sicut sensus exterior non potest sentire sine specie causata ab organo istius sensus. Haec igitur conclusio sic exposita probatur, quia necesse est illam speciem esse praeviam in intellectu, habitus autem non, sed derelinquitur et causatur ab intellectione, et ista species causatur in mente ab actu phantasiae vel cogitativae, vel est illemet actus, habitus autem non, sed sit in intellectu mediante intellectione. Et illa species non est repraesentatio nisi sensuum vel phantasiarum, cum sit causata ab eis, nulla intellectione praevia. Habitus autem isti sunt de hiis quae sub sensu vel phantasia non cadunt, sicut de insensibilibus, puta de Deo et intelligentiis. 14. Sed de hoc tu obicies, quia si de hiis quae sub sensu vel phantasia non cadunt habemus habitus intellectuales, quomodo igitur dicit Aristoteles “intelligentem quemcumque necesse est phantasmata speculari”? 15. Et ego dico quod hoc bene dixit, quia necesse est prius intelligere sensata et phantasmata, et ex illis per ratiocinationem deductivam ad aliarum notitiam pervenire. Ideo videtur mihi esse intentio Aristotelis, et veritas, quod intellectus humanus, quantumcumque singulis artibus et scientiis habituatus, non potest in hac vita naturaliter formare actum intelligendi non existente sensu interiori, scilicet phantasia vel cogitativa in actu suo secundo, scilicet cognoscendi, propter quod sensibus tam interioribus quam exterioribus ligatis per somnum perfectum, scilicet sine somnio aut per aegritudinem, nullus intelligit. Tamquam necesse sit actum cogitandi, vel intellectionem ab eo causa-

106–107 necesse . . . speculari ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a8–9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 235.2.6): “necesse simul phantasma aliquod speculari.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.167 (ed. Hamesse, 188): “necesse est quemcumque intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” 93 sensatas ] nisi T 94 sine ] nisi T 96 praeviam ] propriam T 98 est illemet ] etiam ille AT 101 isti ] ita A 102 de ] om. V 106–107 necesse . . . speculari ] etc. T 108 necesse ] necessario V 109–110 deductivam ] et eductionem A 110 ad ] et E per V 112 artibus ] partibus V 113 interiori ] exteriori(!) ES 114 suo ] om. A 115 tam interioribus quam exterioribus ] exterioribus quam interioribus AE 116 sine ] in V 117 cogitandi ] cognoscendi AET || intellectionem ] actum cogitandi A

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tion of sense, is in the organ of imagination or the cogitative power, or in the intellect, without which the intellect could not think of sensed or imagined things in the first place, just as an external sense could not sense without a species caused by the object in the organ of that sense. Explained in this way, then, the conclusion is proved because it is necessary for the species, though not the habit, to be previously in the intellect. But the habit is left behind and caused by an act of thinking, and the species is caused in the mind by an act of the imagination or cogitative power, or it is the act itself, but not the habit — which exists in the intellect by the mediation of the act of thinking. And the species is the representation only of what has been sensed or imagined, since it is caused by those things, and not by a previous act of thinking. There are, however, the habits of things that do not fall under sense or imagination, e.g., insensibles such as God and the intelligences.454 14. But you will object to this, because if we have intellectual habits of things that do not fall under sense or imagination, how can Aristotle say that “anyone who is understanding must reflect on phantasms”? 15. And I say that Aristotle has spoken well, because it is first necessary to understand sensed and imagined things, and to attain to other knowledge by deductive reasoning from them. And so it seems to me to be the intention of Aristotle, and also the truth, that however much it is habituated to individual arts and sciences, the human intellect cannot in this life naturally form an act of understanding without the existence of internal sense, that is to say, without imagination, or the cogitative power in its second actuality, i.e., in its actually cognizing, because no one understands when the internal and external senses are both ensconced in a deep sleep, i.e., a sleep without dreams, or a

454 The proof here is

based on two contrasts: (1) the species has to be in the intellect prior to the act, whereas the habit must follow the act; (2) the species represents only sensed and imagined objects, prior to any act of thought, whereas the habit can represent insensible objects as well.

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tam in intellectu, coagere cum intellectu ad formationem intellectionis, sicut necesse est speciem ab obiecto sensibili causatam in organo sensus coagere cum sensu ad formationem sensationis, ut dicebatur in secundo libro. Cum autem intellectus actuatus fuerit per primas intellectiones, ipse est potens actu considerare de omnibus quae ex illis primis intellectionibus vel ex similibus aliis deductis fuerint, et quorum habitus in eo remanserunt. Et sic iterum apparet magna differentia inter species intelligibiles et habitus intellectuales. 16. Item in quaerendo aliqualiter de natura et essentia huiusmodi specierum intelligibilium, arguitur ad tertiam praedictam conclusionem sic: illa species intelligibilis, secundum prius positam descriptionem seu interpretationem, vel est ipsamet prima intellectio vel est dispositio alia praevia illi primae intellectioni. Et si dicas quod sit illa intellectio, tunc per secundam conclusionem apparet quod habitus ille non est ista species intelligibilis, nec eiusdem rationis cum ea. Et si dicatur quod sit dispositio praevia, adhuc magis distabit ille habitus ab ea quia ponitur derelinqui et causari ab intellectione. 17. Et iterum, si illa species esset idem quod ille habitus, oporteret illam manere cessante intellectione, habitus enim manet. Sed haec non possunt stare simul, scilicet quod maneat et quod sit idem cum illo habitu. Probo quia: vel maneret in organo corporeo phantasiae vel cogitativae corporaliter et extense, vel remaneret in intellectu solum ita quod non esset educta de potentia materiae, nec extensa extensione organi corporei, sicut nec intellectus. Si maneat primo modo, scilicet corporaliter et extense, tunc differet ab habitu intellectuali et

121 secundo libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.22, par. 13–14. 121 fuerit ] ad exponendum aliquas auctoritates add. AT 122 quae ] est add. V 123 similibus ] sensibus E 129 interpretationem ] intentionem A 130 alia ] prima aut add. A aliqua E || intellectioni ] intentioni A 132 eiusdem ] species vel add. AT 137 stare ] facere V

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sleep caused by illness. It is just as necessary for the cogitative act, or the act of thinking caused by it in the intellect, to act along with the intellect in the formation of an act of thinking, as it is necessary for the species caused by a sensible object in the sense organ to act along with sense in the formation of an act of sensing, as was stated in Book II of this treatise. However, when the intellect has been actualized by these primary acts of thinking, it is capable of actually considering everything deduced from those primary acts of thinking, or from others similar to them, whose habits have remained in it. And so it is clear again that there is a significant difference between intelligible species and intellectual habits. 16. Again, digging a little bit deeper into the question of the nature and essence of this kind of intelligible species, one can argue for the third conclusion mentioned above as follows: according to the description or interpretation proposed earlier, the intelligible species is either the primary act of thinking itself, or else another disposition prior to that primary act of thinking. If you say that it is the act of thinking, then by the second conclusion above it is obvious that the habit is not the intelligible species, nor is it of the same nature as the intelligible species. And if it is said that it is the prior disposition, then the habit, which is assumed to have been left behind and caused by the act of thinking, will be even more distant from it.455 17. And again, if the species were the same as the habit, it would have to remain once the act of thinking has ceased, for the habit remains. But these are incompatible, namely, that the species remains and that it is the same as the habit. I prove this as follows: either the species would remain corporeally and extended in the corporeal organ of imagination or the cogitative power, or it would remain in the intellect alone in such a way that it would not be derived from a material potentiality, nor extended by the extension of a corporeal or-

455 The point of the argument is

that the intelligible species is either a primary act of thought or a prior disposition. If the first, then it is clear that the species is not the habit, because the act is not the habit; if the second, then it is even more obvious that the species is not the habit, for the disposition precedes even the act that precedes the habit. So, the species is in no way the same as the habit, which was the third conclusion posited above.

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immo ab actuali intellectione, quae non sic se habent extense, si debeat intellectio differre a sensatione et habitus intellectualis ab habitu sensibili. Si autem dicatur quod illa species maneat in intellectu nostro secundo modo, scilicet inextense et non tanquam educta de potentia materiae, cessante intellectione, hoc implicat contradictionem. Implicat enim quod cesset intellectio, quia dicitur cessante intellectione, et quod non cesset intellectio. Hoc probatur, scilicet quod sit impossibile illam speciem manere in intellectu sine intellectione, quia nihil aliud ponitur requiri ad formationem intellectionis nisi intellectus noster et universale agens, quod est Deus, et illa species quae est representatio rei vel intelligendae vel intellectae, et aliarum ad esse illius speciei requisitarum. Dicere enim alia requiri ad intelligendum apparet esse ficticium et omnino superfluum. Haec autem omnia manerent si species illa maneret in intellectu, quia non apparet deficere approximatio nec alia circumstantia. Igitur impossibile esse videtur quod maneat in intellectu illa species, et non maneat intellectio. 18. Aliqui tamen volunt dicere quod haec ratio non sit necessaria, quia potentia intellectiva libera est et non oportet quod potentia libera, omnibus requisitis ad causandum actum ad quem libere se habet,

159 Aliqui ] Guillelmus de Ockham(?) (cf. Ordinatio I, d. 1, q. 6; OTh I, 506). Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. III.3 (ed. Parisiis 1513, f. 42va ): “Sed voluntas libere potest acceptare opus illud sine refutatione, vel refutare sine acceptatione, vel etiam nec refutare nec acceptare sed deferre, ut videtur mihi quod quasi quilibet homo experiri potest in se ipso.” 145 sensibili ] sensuali ET 146 secundo modo ] intelligibile TV solum W 148– 149 quia . . . intellectio ] hom. E 151 ponitur ] ad formationem add. V || ad formationem ] rep. V 154 alia ] illa VW 155 omnino ] ideo A 160 potentia ] intellectiva add. VW

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gan, just as the intellect is not. If it remains in the first way, namely, corporeally and extended, then it would differ from the intellectual habit, and indeed, from the actual act of thinking, neither of which is extended in this way — if thinking is to differ from sensation and intellectual habits from sensory habits. But if it is said that once an act of thinking has ceased, the species would remain in our intellect in the second way, namely as something unextended and unlike anything derived from a material potentiality, this implies a contradiction. For it implies the contradiction that the act of thinking ceases, since it is said, ‘once the act of thinking ceases’, and that the act of thinking does not cease. This is proved — that is to say, that it is impossible for the species to remain in the intellect without the act of thinking — because nothing else is assumed to be required for the formation of an act of thinking but our intellect and the universal agent, which is God, and the species, which is the representation of the thing understood or to be understood, and of other things whose presence is required by the existence of the species. For saying that other things are required for thinking appears fictitious and altogether superfluous. But all these remain if that species remains in the intellect, because neither proximity nor any other condition would appear to be lacking. Therefore, it is evidently impossible for the species to remain in the intellect, and the act of thinking not to remain. 18. Nevertheless, some people want to say that this argument is not conclusive, since the intellective power is free, and a free power, when it has everything it needs for causing that act to which it is freely

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producat illum actum. Sed potest illis stantibus producere oppositum, vel deferre, et nec producere istum nec oppositum. 19. Sed de hoc ego dico quod illius libertas non habet locum nisi in actibus voluntariis aut in aliis consequentibus actus voluntarios, prout debet videri in tertio Ethicorum. Sed in illis primis intellectionibus formandis nullus potest concurrere actus voluntarius quia voluntas non fertur incognita in cognitione intellectuali, et nihil erat in intellectum apud formationem primae intellectionis. Ideo non habet ibi locum voluntas, ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. 20. Sed tunc certe remanent dubitationes: quae res sit illa species intelligibilis; et in quo sit tamquam in subiecto de cuius potentia educatur; et a quo fiat active; et ad quid deserviat. 21. Quantum igitur ad hoc quod primo dubitatur, quae res sit illa species, ego dico quod ad respondendum illi dubitationi oportet praecognoscere quid nominis. Et ponamus quod huiusmodi species nec sit habitus intellectualis nec actualis intellectio, sed quod sit actus vel dispositio veniens a sensibili mediante sensu, requisitus vel requisita in mente vel necessaria ad formationem primae intellectionis, scilicet quam aliquis potest formare non praeveniente alia intellectione. Tunc apparet mihi quod illa est actus cognoscendi per phantasiam vel cogitativam vel quocumque alio nomine nominetur, quem Aristoteles vocat phantasma, qui quidem actus sit extensus et eductus de potentia organi corporei, vel est intellectio actualis actu causata in in-

166 tertio Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. III.5. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. III.3 (ed. Parisiis 1513, f. 42va ) 162 actum ] universaliter add. AT 164 libertas ] opinionis add. A oppositionis add. ET 165 actibus ] animalibus E || voluntariis ] voluptatiis T 166 primis ] propriis A 168 incognita ] et add. AE || intellectuali ] intelligibili AT || nihil ] illud T 169 apud ] ad E || ibi ] om. V 171 dubitationes ] magnae add. AET 174 primo ] quaerebatur seu add. E 175 species ] intelligibilis add. A 176 praecognoscere ] cognoscere AET 177 sit ] habitualis vel add. A || intellectualis ] vel intellectio add. A 178 veniens ] proveniens AET 179 in mente ] immediate V || vel ] om. AET 180 alia ] aliqua alia A 182 vel ] a V || nomine ] om. VT 183 phantasma ] sive phantasia add. A || qui ] om. TV || quidem ] dicitur A 184 organi corporei ] materiae E || intellectio ] intentio A || actualis ] a tali A || in ] ab V

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disposed, need not produce it. But it can, with those things in place, produce the opposite, or defer and produce neither the act nor its opposite.456 19. But on this point, I say that the freedom of this has a place only in voluntary acts or in other things that follow voluntary acts, as must be seen in the third book of the Ethics. But no voluntary act can contribute to the formation of those first acts of thinking because the will does not concern things that are uncognized in intellectual cognition, and nothing was in the intellect at the formation of the first act of thinking. Thus, the will has no role to play there, in terms of the characteristic activity on account of which it is called ‘will’. 20. But then, of course, questions remain. What thing is the intelligible species? Where is it as in a subject, from whose potentiality it is derived? What actively produces it? What purpose does it serve? 21. Therefore, as far as the first question is concerned, that is to say, what the species is, I say that to answer this question, one must first consider the meaning of the term. And we assume that a species of this kind is neither the intellectual habit nor the actual act of thinking, but an act or disposition coming from the sensible object by the mediation of sense, required in the mind or necessary for the formation of a primary act of thinking, namely, an act of thinking someone can form without another act of thinking preceding it. Then it is clear to me that it is either the act of cognizing by the imagination or cogitative power (or by whatever other name it is called) that Aristotle calls the ‘phantasm’, which act, of course, would be extended and

456 The

best-known medieval defender of this view is William of Ockham. But Buridan does not here or elsewhere associate this position with anyone in particular; rather, he treats it as a basic fact of human psychology. See e. g. QQ. Eth. ad Nic. III.3 (Paris 1513, f. 42va ).

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tellectu et educta de potentia illius sine extensione. Hanc disiunctivam omnes habent concedere, cum “necesse sit intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” Sed quae pars disiunctivae sit vera? Videtur mihi melius ad praecavendum minus de entium multitudine quod sufficiat illud phantasma, id est, illa actualis cognitio. Cum enim dictum fuit in secundo libro quod actuales sensationes recipiuntur subiective tam in anima quam in corpore, et de utriusque potentia educuntur, videtur mihi quod per illam actualem cognitionem seu apprehensionem, intellectus sit sufficienter in actu, ut ipse cum illa posset actualem sufficienter formare intellectionem in se quae iam non recipiatur in corpore tanquam educta de eius potentia, sed in intellectu solum. Unde sic patet quod illud phantasma, id est illa actualis apprehensio, se habet proportionaliter ad intellectionem sicut species causata ab obiecto in organo sensus se dicebatur habere ad sensationem. Sic igitur intelligo illud dictum Aristotelis quod intellectivae animae, “phantasmata ut sensibilia sunt,” propter quod sine phantasmatae, nequaquam intelligit anima; nam sicut sine specie sensibili causata ab obiecto in organo sensus non potest sensus exterior formare sensationem, ita nec intellectus sine praedicto phantasmate intellectionem. 22. Sic igitur iam patet quid est illa species intelligibilis immediate deserviens intellectum, et in quo subiective recipitur, quia in composito ex anima et organo virtutis cogitativae, quodcumque fuerit illud, de quo visum est in secundo libro, in quo etiam visum est a quo fiat ac-

186–187 “necesse sit intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a8–9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 235.2.6): “necesse simul phantasma aliquod speculari.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.167 (ed. Hamesse, 188): “necesse est quemcumque intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” 190 in secundo libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.9, par. 22–24. 199 dictum Aristotelis ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a 7–8 (Ar. lat. XII.2 235.2.60): “phantasmata autem sicut sensibilia sunt praeter quod sunt sine materia.” 207 in secundo libro ] BURIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.22–23. 185 illius ] materiae add. A vel est . . . illius] hom. E 186–187 phantasmata speculari ] quemcumque etc. A etc. E 188 minus ] materiam T 192 per ] om. TV || cognitionem seu ] cognitionem vel cogitationem A cogitativam E 193 actualem ] active V 196 apprehensio ] intellectio A cognitio E 201 nam ] id est quod V 203 phantasmate ] potest facere add. T

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derived from the potentiality of a corporeal organ, or the actual act of thinking actually caused in the intellect and brought forth from its potentiality without extension. Everyone has to grant that these are the alternatives, since “anyone who is understanding must reflect on phantasms.” But which alternative is true? It seems to me to serve better the precaution about doing with a smaller number of entities to say that the phantasm, i.e., the actual cognition, would suffice.457 For since it was stated in Book II of this treatise that actual sensations are received subjectively in the soul as well as in the body, and that they are brought forth from the potency of both, it seems to me that the intellect is sufficiently active via that actual cognition or apprehension, so that with it, it is sufficiently able to form an actual act of thinking in itself, one that is not already received in the body and brought forth from its potentiality, but in the intellect alone. Thus, it is obvious that the phantasm, i.e., the actual apprehension, is related to the act of thinking in the same way as the species caused by an object in a sense organ was said to be related to the sensation. It is in this way, then, that I understand Aristotle’s remark that to the intellective soul, “phantasms are like sensible objects,” because without phantasms, the soul in no way understands. For just as external sense cannot form a sensation without sensible species caused by an object in the organ of sense, so the intellect cannot form an act of thinking without the aforementioned phantasms. 22. So it is now clear what the intelligible species immediately serving the intellect is, and in what it is subjectively received, for it is in the composite of soul and the organ belonging to the cogitative power (whatever it is, which was discussed in Book II of this treatise,

457 Like

Ockham, Buridan is committed to parsimony. This is just one of numerous versions of the razor to be found in his writings.

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tive. Et apparet etiam ad quid deserviat, quia universaliter ad omnem intellectionem formandam, cessantibus enim huiusmodi phantasmatibus, cessat omnis actualis intellectio. Sicut enim anima nulla opus potentiae vegetativae potest exercere sine calore, ita etiam nullum opus potentiae intellectivae potest exercere sine huiusmodi phantasmate, id est, sine actuali apprehensione cogitativa. 23. Sed ulterius ego dico consequenter ad tertiam conclusionem prius positam quod praedicta species intelligibilis, id est, illa phantastica apprehensio, non manet omni intellectione cessante, licet bene maneant in phantasia vel memoria species et intentiones sensibilium et sensationum, sicut dictum fuit in secundo libro. Haec conclusio probatur, quia si maneant illae phantasticae apprehensiones, omnia manent requisita ad formationem primarum intellectionum; igitur oporteat illas intellectiones manere, quia necesse est, positis causis sufficientibus ad aliquem effectum et eo modo quo sufficiunt, poni istum effectum. Tamen sicut dictum fuit, ad huiusmodi primas intellectiones formandas non concurrat actus voluntarius. 24. Et ut expeditum sit de illa materia, aliquis posset quaerere quomodo consequenter intellectus potest componere et dividere et discurrere. 25. Et ego dico quod intellectus, actuatus per primas et simplices apprehensiones plures, potest iam cum illis phantasmatibus manentibus complectere alios conceptus aut affirmative aut negative. Quo facto, potest iterum plures illarum propositionum congregare et ordinare in syllogismo et inferre conclusiones alias consequenter. Et potest libere se transferre de consideratione una in aliam, et hanc dimittere et illam prosequi, in quibus fuerit praehabituatus, nam in talibus inter-

218 in secundo libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.23. 208 ad ] quod V 210 actualis intellectio ] intellectualis intellectu E 211–212 calore . . . sine ] hom. VW 212 huiusmodi ] om. T 212–213 id est ] et TVW 213 sine ] huiusmodi add. T || apprehensione ] potentiae add. E 217 intentiones ] seu add. A 219 si ] nisi(!) VW 224 non ] om. (!) E 230 alios ] illos AET 232 syllogismo ] subiecto T || consequenter ] sequentes T 233 dimittere ] ante mittere V

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where we also saw how it is actively produced). It is also clear what its function is, because universally, it serves in the formation of every act of thinking, for once phantasms of this sort have ceased, all actual thinking ceases. For just as the soul cannot exercise any function of the vegetative faculty without heat, so also it cannot exercise any function of the intellective faculty without a phantasm of this sort, that is, without an actual cogitative apprehension. 23. But furthermore, consequent to the third conclusion advanced above, I say that the aforementioned intelligible species, i.e., the imagined apprehension, does not remain once every act of thinking has ceased, even though the species and intentions of sensible things and sensations certainly remain in the imagination or memory, as was stated in Book II of this treatise. This conclusion is proved as follows: if the imagined apprehensions remained, then everything needed for the formation of primary acts of thinking remains; therefore, those acts of thinking also should remain, because once the causes sufficient for some effect have been posited, and posited in a way in which they are sufficient, the effect must be posited. However, as was said, a voluntary act does not contribute to the formation of primary acts of thought of this kind.458 24. And to complete the investigation, someone might ask how the intellect can consequently affirm, deny, and reason discursively. 25. I say that the intellect is able, once it has been activated by several primary and simple apprehensions and with those phantasms remaining, to combine other concepts either affirmatively or negatively. Once it has done this, it can again gather several of those propositions, order them in a syllogism, and draw other conclusions that follow from them. And in those things in which it has been thus habituated, it can freely move from the consideration of one thing to that of an-

458 See

par. 19 above.

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mittit se libere voluntas. Et quia, sine praedictis phantasmatibus seu phantasticis apprehensionibus, non potest intellectus aliquos praedictorum actuum exercere, credidit Alexander quod non est in homine potentia animae, vel anima, nisi materialis et extensa, et quod anima nostra in organo quod assignamus virtuti illi cogitativae exerceret omnes illos actus quos intellectui appropriamus. 26. Et istis visis, videndum est de rationibus quae adductis fuerunt in principio quaestionis. 27. Ad primam dicitur quod in organo secundum quod anima exercet actum cogitandi vel cognoscendi non reservatur species sensibilis cessante sensatione. Sed non est remotum dicere quod reservetur habitus, idem enim videtur esse organum sentiendi et appetendi, et tamen remanent habitus in appetitu sensitivo quos plurimi dicunt esse virtutes vel malitias morales. Et ideo haec ratio non est contra praedeterminata. 28. Et omnes etiam aliae rationes ad primam partem adductae magis sunt praedeterminatae, praeter ultimam. Ultima autem ratio licet non concludat contra praedeterminata, posset tamen similiter induci de habitu intellectuali quod non maneret, quia videtur quod non posset assignari quomodo postea corrumpi, nec a quo. Sed de hoc dictum fuit satis in secundo libro. 29. Sed tunc ad rationes quae arguuntur pro secunda parte, dicendum est quod prima arguit bene quod in intellectu relinquuntur et remanent habitus intellectuales.

237 credidit Alexander ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.5 (ed. Crawford, 393– 398). Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.3, par. 29. 255 in secundo libro ] B UR IDANUS , QQ. De an. II.18, par. 44. 235–236 seu phantasticis apprehensionibus ] om. E 244 cogitandi ] om. AET || vel ] om. AET 246 appetendi ] apprehendendi EV 247 plurimi ] philosophi add. T 248 morales ] om. ET 251 praedeterminatae ] praecedentes AT praedictis E || ultimam ] quam contra add. VW 252 similiter induci ] deduci T 255 libro ] quomodo remanent intentiones vel species in phantasia vel in rememorativa add. A om. VW 257 quod in ] de V || relinquuntur ] derelinquuntur AET

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other, dismissing this one and pursuing that, for the will freely inserts itself into such matters. And since the intellect cannot exercise some of the other activities just discussed without the aforesaid phantasms or imagined apprehensions, Alexander believed that in humans there is no power of the soul, or any soul, except something that is material and extended, and that our soul exercises all acts we ascribe to the intellect in the organ we assign to the cogitative power. 26. Now that these things have been seen, we must attend to the arguments adduced at the beginning of the question.459 27. To the first,460 it is replied that in the organ in which the soul exercises the act of cogitation or cognition,461 the sensible species is not preserved once sensation has ceased. But it is not too far off to say that a habit is preserved, for the organ of sensing and desiring appears to be the same, and in sense appetite there remain habits, which many say are moral virtues or vices.462 And so the argument is not contrary to what has been determined above. 28. And all the other arguments adduced in the first part have been to a large extent already determined, except for the last argument.463 But even though this last argument does not have a conclusion that is contrary to what was determined above, it could similarly be brought up regarding the intellectual habit that it does not remain, since it appears that it could not be explained how it could be corrupted afterwards, or by what. But enough was said about this in Book II of this treatise. 29. But then, in connection with the arguments advanced on behalf of the second part,464 it must be said that the first argues correctly that intellectual habits are left behind and remain in the intellect. 459 See

pars. 1–5 above. par. 1 above. 461 That is to say, in the organ of the cogitative power, which according to fourteenth-century physiology is located in the middle ventricle of the brain. 462 In other words, if sensing and desiring operate through the same organ (the cogitative power), and most philosophers accept that there are habits governing our appetites or desires, then there are also habits in the part of the soul that senses. 463 See par. 5 above. 464 See pars. 6–8 above. 460 See

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30. Ad secundam dicitur quod habitus intellectuales remanent sine aliis repraesentativis. Immo ex actibus citharizandi fiunt et remanent in manu habitus inclinantes ad movendum digitos prompte et ordinate. 31. Ad tertiam rationem dictum est in secundo huius quomodo remaneant species vel intentiones in phantasia vel in memoria. Sed illa ratio tangit difficultatem quomodo memoramur de aliis intellectis quae sub phantasia non cadunt. Et apparet mihi quod illa difficultas non tangeret Alexandrum non ponentem intellectum immaterialem sicut nos ponimus, sed virtutem materialem posse in omnes nostras cognitiones, et ita memoriam materialem diceret reservare intentiones omnium nostrarum cognitionum. Nos autem possumus dicere quod intellectus intelligere potest et per modum praeteriti et per modum futuri sicut potest per modum praesentis. Et quocumque modo intelligat componendo cum certo tempore, habitus in eo relinquitur inclinans ad iterum intelligendum et componendum cum isto tempore. Intellectus autem cum phantasmatibus statim est innatus quodlibet rei intelligere prius intellectum et ad quod est habituatus. Cum enim alias percepit se intelligere A in tali die, etiam potest intelligere quantum tempus transiret post illam diem, ipse potest inferre duos annos esse praeteritos postquam primo intellexit A. 32. Quomodo autem post mortem et sine corpore sentiamus, intelligamus, aut memoramur, non spectat determinare ad istam facultatem, etc.

262 in secundo ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.23. 260 citharizandi ] tandem add. A 262–263 huius . . . memoria ] libro T 267– 268 cognitiones ] operationes id est cognitiones T 272 relinquitur ] derelinquitur AET 274 rei ] om. E ens in marg. add. W 279 post mortem ] om. E || corpore ] et sine sensu add. T

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30. To the second, it is replied that intellectual habits remain without any other representations. Indeed, from acts of playing the lyre, habits are formed and remain in the hand, inclining the fingers to move quickly and skillfully. 31. To the third argument, it was stated in Book II of this treatise how species or intentions remain in the imagination or memory. But the argument touches on the difficulty of how we remember other objects of thought which do not fall under the imagination. And it seems to me that this difficulty would not affect Alexander, who did not posit an immaterial intellect, as we do, but claimed that a material power holds sway over all our cognitions. And so he would say that the material memory preserves the intentions of all of our cognitions. However, we can say that the intellect is able to understand something both as past and as future, just as it can understand it as present. And no matter how it understands it by combining it with a certain time, a habit is left behind in the intellect inclining it to understand and combine the object with that time. But the intellect together with the phantasms is immediately and naturally suited to understand whatever it has previously understood of a thing to which it has been habituated. Now, since it previously perceived itself understanding A on a given day, and it can also understand how much time has passed since that day, it can infer that two years have passed since it first understood A. 32. But to determine how we sense, understand, or remember after death and without a body, is not the business of this Faculty, etc.

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Utrum intellectus humanus possit intelligere plura simul.

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1. Arguitur quod non, quia dicitur quarto Metaphysicae, “qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit,” et in Topicis dicitur, “contingit plura scire, unum autem solum intelligere.” 2. Item sicut se habet materia prima ad formas substantiales, sic intellectus ad intellectiones; sicut enim materia perficitur per formam substantialem, sic intellectus per intellectionem. Sed materia non potest habere simul plures formas substantiales; igitur, etc. 3. Item unius virtutis non est nisi unus instrumentum, et unius virtutis et unius instrumenti non est nisi unus usus. Sed intellectus humanus est unica virtus; igitur solum unius est intellectiva et cognitiva; igitur non potest intelligere plura simul. 4. Item intellectus cum sit indivisibilis, ad quodcumque se convertit, ad illud totaliter se convertit. Ideo non est possibile si convertat se ad aliquid intelligendum quod convertat se simul ad intelligendum aliud.

1–2 intellectus humanus possit intelligere plura simul ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430a28–b 5. 3 quarto Metaphysicae ] Auc. Ar. 1.99 (ed. Hamesse, 123): “Qui non unum intelligit, nihil intelligit.” Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.4 1006b9–10 (Ar. lat. XXV.2 67.18): “nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum.” 4 in Topicis ] A RISTOTELES, Top. II.10 114b34–35 (Ar. lat. V.1 46.15–16): “contingit enim plura scire, intelligere autem non.” 4 et ] item E 5 plura ] unum solum(!) E || unum . . . intelligere ] sed bene plura scire(!) E || autem ] quidem A om. TVW 8 intellectionem ] intellectiones A 10–13 Item . . . simul ] sub col. W om. ATV Item in libro De sensu et sensato dicitur quod unius virtutis non est nisi usus sensus ad semel. Intelligere autem vel intellectio est usus ipsius intellectus; igitur, etc. E 14 Item ] Propterea W 14– 15 convertit ] dimittit VW 15 se convertit ] sentit A se dimittit W 16 simul ] om. A © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 47

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Can the human intellect understand more than one thing at once?

1. It is argued that it cannot, since it is said in Metaphysics IV, “a man who does not understand one thing understands nothing,” and in the Topics it is said, “it is possible to know more than one thing, but to be thinking of only one.”465 2. Again, as prime matter is related to substantial forms, so the intellect is related to acts of thinking, for just as matter is perfected by a substantial form, so the intellect is perfected by an act of thinking. But matter cannot have more than one substantial form at the same time; therefore, etc. 3. Again, of a single power there is but a single instrument, and of a single power and single instrument there is but a single use. But the human intellect is a single power; therefore, the intellective and cognitive power is of one thing only; therefore, it cannot understand more than one thing at once.466 4. Again, since the intellect is indivisible, whatever it turns itself to, it turns itself to it completely. Thus, if it turns itself to thinking of something, it is not possible for it to turn itself to thinking of something else at the same time. 465 All

mss. misquote the Latin Aristotle here, which says, “it is possible to know, but not to think of, more than one thing.” 466 This third negative argument is missing from all mss. except W, which inserts it at the bottom of f. 87vb . E provides a different argument based on the authority of Aristotle in De sensu but in the wrong order, listed fourth. Interestingly, all mss. include Buridan’s reply to the argument in the correct place, at par. 20 below. The edition uses the text of W at par. 3 here as it seems the better fit for Buridan’s reply.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 47

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5. Item si non repugnat duabus intellectionibus esse simul in intellectu, pari ratione non repugnat tribus aut centum aut mille. Sic enim arguit Aristoteles quarto Physicorum de penetratione corporum. Ideo concludit quod si possent simul esse duo corpora secundum penetrationem, ita possent esse infinita. Ita totus mundus posset esse in grano milii. Igitur similiter dicemus quod si esset possibile simul esse duas intellectiones, ita esset de centum et de mille, quod apparet falsum. 6. Item cum omnes intellectiones sint eiusdem generis sive qualitatis sive actionis sive passionis vel alterius, ego arguo sic: si plures intellectiones possent esse simul in eodem intellectu, aut illae sunt eiusdem speciei et diversae in numero, aut ipsae sunt diversarum specierum in eodem genere. Sed ostendo quod utrumque sit impossibile. Nam quantum ad primum, dicitur quinto Metaphysicae quod “diversa specie dicuntur quaecumque in eadem substantia entia differentiam habent,” ex quo solet inferri quod non possunt esse simul in eodem subiecto plura accidentia solo in numero differentia. Sed quantum ad secundum, dicitur decimo Metaphysicae, “hoc enim est diversa esse specie: in eodem genere entia contrarietatem habere.” Et omnino apparet ibi esse de intentione Aristotelis quod differentiae quae dividunt genus in suas species debeant esse contrariae, et contraria non possunt in eodem subiecto simul existere. Ideo sequitur quod intellectiones diversae speciei non possunt esse simul in eodem intellectu.

20 quarto Physicorum ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Phys. IV.6 213b 9–11 (Ar. lat. VII.1 155.6): “Si autem hoc contingit, et parvissimum accipiet maximum; multa namque parva magna sunt; quare si magna aequalia contingit in eodem esse, et multa inaequalia.” 30 quinto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. V.10 1018b7–8 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 106.398): “Diversa vero specie dicuntur quaecumque eiusdem generis existentia non sub invicem sunt, et quaecumque in eodem genere existentia differentiam habent, et quaecumque in substantia contrarietatem habent.” 34 decimo Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. X.8 1058a17–18 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 214.465): “Hoc enim est diversis esse specie: in eodem genere entia contrarietatem habere, entia individua.” 22 infinita ] mille A 24 apparet ] est E 26 passionis vel ] om. A 28 eiusdem ] diversae(!) A 30 quantum ad primum ] om. A 35 entia ] essentia(!) A || omnino ] non(!) VW 36 esse ] per(?) V || de intentione ] demonstratione E 37 species ] non add. V || possunt ] simul add. V 38 subiecto ] vel add. AT || Ideo ] in eo V 39 intellectu ] subiecto W ras. V

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5. Again, if there is no inconsistency in two acts of thinking being in the intellect at the same time, by parity of reasoning there is no inconsistency in there being three, or a hundred, or a thousand. Aristotle argues in this way in Physics IV about the penetration of bodies. Thus, he concludes that if there could be two bodies interpenetrating, there could be infinitely many. So the whole world could be in a millet seed. Therefore, we will say analogously that if it is possible for there to be two acts of thinking at the same time, so it is possible for there to be a hundred, and a thousand — which appears false. 6. Again, since all acts of thinking belong to the same genus, whether it be quality or action or passion or some other genus, I argue as follows: if multiple acts of thinking could be in the same intellect at the same time, either they are of the same species but numerically distinct, or else they belong to different species in the same genus. But I show that both are impossible. As for the first, it is said in Metaphysics V that “all things which, being in the same substance, have a differentia, are said to be diverse in species,” from which it is usually inferred that there cannot be several accidents differing only numerically in the same subject at the same time. As for the second, it is said in Metaphysics X, “for this is what it is to be diverse in species: to have contrariety while being in the same genus.” It certainly seems to be Aristotle’s meaning there that the differentiae dividing a genus into its species must be contraries, and that contraries cannot exist in the same subject at the same time. Thus, it follows that acts of

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7. Oppositum arguitur per Commentatorem tertio De anima, dicentem quod intellectus intelligit infinita in propositione universali; igitur plura simul. 8. Item dicit Aristoteles quod in quibus est verum vel falsum, est compositio quaedam intellectuum. Si igitur verum vel falsum est compositio seu complexio intellectuum et intellectionum, oportet illas esse simul in intellectu, nec aliter intellectus posset componere et dividere et ponere convenientiam et differentiam inter plura. 9. Breviter in ista quaestione pono multas conclusiones faciles. 10. Prima est quod contingit uno conceptu plura immo infinita simul intelligere, quia conceptu a quo sumitur hoc nomen lapis, omnes lapides intelligo, non solum praesentes, immo etiam praeteritos et futuros et possibiles, quia non est ratio quare magis istum quam illum, ideo vel nullum, quod est inconveniens, vel omnes. Et ita bene dicit Commentator quod intelligimus infinita in propositione universali, immo etiam per terminum universalem sive communem. 11. Secunda conclusio est quod contingit intelligere plura simul secundum diversos conceptus, non enim aliter possumus formare et sci-

40 tertio De anima ] AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.19 (ed. Crawford, 441.37–38): “iudicamus per ipsum res infinitas in numero in propositione universali.” 43 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 432a 10–11 (Ar. lat. XII.2 235.2.11): “Est autem phantasia alterum a dictione et negatione: complexio enim intellectuum est verum aut falsum.” 51–52 non solum . . . possibiles ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.12, par. 20. 44 compositio ] propositio V || igitur ] om. V 45 seu complexio ] seu connexio A vel divisio W 48 Breviter . . . faciles ] ponendae sunt conclusiones E unde in ista quaestione pono multas conclusiones faciles S breviter in illa quaestione pono plures conclusiones T 49–50 simul ] om. A 52 possibiles ] formare(?) add. E 53 ideo ] in eo V || vel nullum ] intelligo add. T ideo vel nullum add. V 56 contingit ] convenit E

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thinking belonging to diverse species cannot be in the same intellect at the same time.467 7. The opposite is argued on the authority of the Commentator commenting on De Anima III, when he says that the intellect understands infinitely many things in a universal proposition; therefore, it understands more than one thing at once. 8. Again, Aristotle states that where there is truth or falsity, there is a certain composition of thoughts. Therefore, if what is true or false is a composition or combination of thoughts and acts of thinking, they must be in the intellect at the same time, otherwise the intellect could not affirm, deny, and posit agreement and difference between multiple things. 9. Briefly, I offer a number of easy conclusions in connection with this question. 10. The first is that it is possible to understand more than one thing by a single concept, and even to understand infinitely many things at the same time, because by the concept from which the name ‘stone’ is taken, I understand all stones: not only those which are present, but past, future, and possible stones as well. Since there is no reason why one of them is understood more than another, either I understand none of them, which is absurd, or I understand all of them. And so the Commentator correctly states that we understand infinitely many things in a universal proposition; indeed, we also understand infinitely many things by a universal or common term. 11. The second conclusion is that it is possible to understand more than one thing at the same time according to diverse concepts, for oth-

467

Since qualities or acts are individuated by their subjects, there cannot be two merely numerically distinct instances of the same specific quality or act in one and the same subject. Thus, I cannot have two instances of the same specific color or of the same specific action at the same time, although I can be red(-haired) and walking at the same time. But then again, as for the second alternative, I also cannot have two specifically different colors, or perform two specifically different actions, in the same respect (that is, in the same parts of my body) at the same time: my hair cannot be both entirely red and entirely white, and I cannot be both walking and running at the same time. So there can be only generically different actualities in the same subject at the same time, whereas it was assumed that all acts of thinking belong to the same genus.

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re tales propositiones, homo non est asinus et homo et asinus sunt duae res. 12. Tertia conclusio est quod contingit intelligere idem in pluribus intellectionibus simul, aliter enim non possemus formare et scire tales propositiones, homo est animal, homo est risibilis, omne ens est idem sibi. Non enim est complexio et compositio in mente sine simplicibus ex quibus est complexio. 13. Quarta conclusio est quod in intellectu nostro possunt esse simul plures conceptus omnino similes ita quod sunt solo in numero differentes, aliter non possemus formare et scire tales propositiones, homo est homo, vel homo et homo sunt animalia, vel etiam homo et homo et homo sunt tres homines. Et etiam apparet quod in hoc est differentia inter tales conceptus intelligibiles et formas materiales, saltem secundum quas est proprie alteratio, scilicet duae albedines vel duae caliditates, si sint in eodem subiecto et secundum eadem partem eius, fiat una albedo vel una caliditas. Et non oportet in intellectu nostro sic confundi conceptus, scilicet quod duo conceptus, si sint eiusdem rationis, fiat unus conceptus. Etiam hoc, ut puto, sic ordinavit natura ad ratiocinandum, enim non posset formari syllogismus mentalis nisi quilibet terminorum trium sumeretur bis sine confusione. 14. Quinta conclusio est quod in intellectu nostro possunt esse simul plures conceptus complexi disparati, aut contrarii aut etiam contradictorii, aliter enim non possemus formare propositionem hypotheticam ex illis compositam, ex quo sequitur corollarie quod nullae propositiones ad invicem sunt contrariae contrarietate quae sit repu-

63 simplicibus ] et conceptibus complexionibus add. AET complexionibus add. V 68 sunt ] duo add. E 69 in hoc ] nihil(!) E 70 tales ] nostros add. ET || intelligibiles ] intellectuales ET 70–71 saltem secundum ] sed A 71 scilicet ] quia istae A sunt add. VW 72 caliditates ] aut frigiditates add. E 73 fiat ] una qualitas ut add. E || caliditas ] frigiditas, etc. E 74 confundi ] et permisceri add. E 76 ratiocinandum ] aliter add. A 77 quilibet ] om. T || trium ] illorum AV 79 disparati ] dispariliter W 80–81 hypotheticam ] illam A 81 compositam ] constitutam AT || corollarie ] om. AT

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erwise, we could not form and know such propositions as ‘A human being is not an donkey’, and ‘A human being and a donkey are two things’. 12. The third conclusion is that it is possible to understand the same thing in more than one act of thinking at the same time, for otherwise we could not form and know such propositions as ‘A human being is an animal’, ‘A human being is risible’, and ‘Every being is the same as itself’. For there is no combination and composition in the mind without the simples from which the combination is made. 13. The fourth conclusion is that more than one entirely similar concept can be in our intellect at the same time in such a way that they differ in number alone; otherwise, we would not be able to form and know such propositions as ‘A human being is a human being’, or ‘A human being and a human being are animals’, or even ‘A human being and a human being and a human being are three humans’. It is also clear that in this there is a difference between these sorts of intelligible concepts and material forms, at least such material forms with respect to which there is alteration, strictly speaking: e.g., if two whitenesses or two heats are produced in the same part of the same subject, then they become one whiteness or one heat. Concepts need not be fused together in this way in our intellect, such that two concepts of the same type should become a single concept. And this, I suppose, has been ordained by nature for the purpose of reasoning, for a mental syllogism could not be formed unless any of the three terms is taken twice without such a fusion.468 14. The fifth conclusion is that there can be several different complex, or contrary, or even contradictory, concepts in our intellect at the same time, for otherwise I would not be able to form a hypothetical proposition from those concepts. From this it follows as a corollary that no propositions are contrary to each other with the contrariety of

468 This conclusion and

its proof seem to be in an interesting conflict with Buridan’s determination of the issue in q. 7 of his QQ. Porph. Isa. (ed. Tatarzy´nski, 152), which is generally considered to be an early work. For discussion of this text, see Klima 2008, 28–29 and 278n16. Perhaps the Questions on Aristotle’s De anima here gives Buridan’s later, more considered opinion, as appears from what he says below about the need for repeated mental terms in any syllogism.

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gnantia in essendo simul in eodem; immo contrarietas quae attribuitur propositionibus est repugnantia in essendo simul veras. 15. Sexta conclusio est quod impossibile est intellectum assentire et dissentire simul eidem propositioni, vel etiam assentire simul utrique propositioni sibi invicem contradictoriarum, si sit sibi evidens contradictio. Nam assentire est credere quod sit ita ad bonum sensum, et dissentire est credere quod non sit ita. Et illae credulitates sunt contrariae et repugnantes non solum in essendo simul veras, sed etiam in essendo simul in eodem subiecto, aliter enim aliquis posset opinari oppositum primi principii, quod est contra Aristotelem, et contra expertam veritatem. Concedo tamen quod posset aliquis simul assentire duabus contradictoriis vocatibus vel scriptis, quia forte credit quod non sint contradictoriae; verbi gratia, multi possunt credere istam propositionem esse veram, neutrum oculorum tuorum habendo, tu potes videre, quia dextrum non habendo, tu potes videre, et sinistrum non habendo tu potes videre, et cum hoc crederent indubitanter istam esse veram, alterum oculorum tuorum habendo tu potes videre. Ex hiis infertur corollarium quod non sunt idem propositio et assensus ei vel dissensus, quia eadem propositione manente, homo potest mutari de assensu in dissensum. Nec peccat formans in mente sua illam propositionem, Deus non est, sed peccaret graviter si assentiret ei, quia nullae propositiones habent ad invicem repugnantiam in essendo simul in eodem subiecto. Assensus autem et dissensus habent.

92 contra Aristotelem ] A RISTOTELES, An. post. I.2 72b 1. Cf. A RISTOTELES, Phys. I.2 185a 3–4; Met. III.3 1005b9–32. 100–101 non sunt idem propositio et assensus ei vel dissensus ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.6 430b26–29. 83 eodem ] subiecto add. AT || quae ] om. V 84 est repugnantia ] om. V 92 expertam ] declaratam A determinationem T 94 vocatibus ] om. E 95–96 istam . . . veram ] istas esse veras VW 97–98 et sinistrum . . . videre ] hom. A 98 crederent ] crederem V credere W 100–101 dissensus ] eius add. A 102 peccat ] in mente sua add. E 103 graviter ] om. W || ei ] et add. VW 105 dissensus ] bene add. A || habent ] ideo tales contradicunt add. A

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being unable to be in the same thing at the same time; instead, the contrariety attributed to propositions consists in their being unable to be true at the same time. 15. The sixth conclusion is that it is impossible for the intellect to assent to and dissent from the same proposition at the same time, or even to assent to both of a pair of contradictory propositions at the same time, if the contradiction is evident to it. For to assent is to believe that it is so in the proper sense, and to dissent is to believe that it is not so. These beliefs are contrary and incompatible not only in being true at the same time, but also in being in the same subject at the same time, for otherwise, someone could believe the opposite of the first principle, which is contrary to Aristotle and also contrary to what we experience to be true. Even so, I grant that someone could assent at the same time to two spoken or written contradictories, since he might not believe that they are contradictories. For example, many are able to believe that this proposition is true, ‘You are able to see having neither of your eyes’, because you are able to see not having a right eye, and you are able to see not having a left eye, and because they believe this proposition is indubitably true, ‘You are able to see having one or the other of your eyes’.469 From this it is inferred as a corollary that the proposition and the assent to or dissent from it are not the same, because with the same proposition in place, a person can be changed from assent to dissent. Nor does this person sin when forming in his mind the proposition ‘God does not exist’, though he would sin gravely if he assents to it, because no propositions are in-

469 The ‘eye syllogism’ is also found in William of Sherwood, in connection with his

treatment of the syncategorematic word ‘neither [neutrum]’ (William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, tr. Kretzmann, 57). Cf. Buridan’s discussion of the fallacy of figure of words in Summulae de dialectica 7.3.10 (tr. Klima, 544).

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115

120

125

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16. Septima conclusio est quod impossibile est eundem simul habere opiniones contradictoriae si sit ei evidens contradictio, quia opinio est habitus assentivus, omne enim quod opinamur assentimus, si proponitur. Sic bene dicit Aristoteles quod opiniones contradictoriarum sunt contrariae, id est repugnantes non solum quantum ad veritatem, immo etiam quantum ad esse simul in eodem. 17. Octava et ultima conclusio est quod in intellectu possunt esse simul multo plures notitiae habituales quam notitiae actuales. Hoc est dictum multo plures habitus intellectuales quam intellectiones, tu enim de mille conclusionibus habes habitus intellectuales tam in mathematicis quam in logicalibus et naturalibus et aliis. Et tamen quilibet experitur quod facilius et melius attendit in actu ad unum vel ad duos quam ad sextum vel ad decem, et quod non potest simul distincte attendere ad centum vel ad mille. 18. Rationes autem quae fiebant in principio quaestionis solvuntur, nam illa propositio qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit est vera de virtute sermonis, quia ens et unum et aliquid convertuntur, ut debet videri quarto Metaphysicae. Ideo sequitur: non unum intelligit; ergo non ens intelligit et non aliquid intelligit. Et idem valet nihil et non aliquid. Ideo sequitur: non unum intelligit; ergo nihil intelligit. Et si Aristoteles intendebat alium sensum, hoc debet videri quarto Metaphysicae, ubi ponit illam auctoritatem. In Topicis autem dixit Ari-

109 dicit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De int. 14.23b1–32; Met. IV.3 1005b28– 30. 123 quarto Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.2 1003b22–23 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 68.23): “Ita vero et ens multipliciter dicitur quidem, sed omne ad unum principium.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 1.90 (ed. Hamesse, 122): “Ens et unum convertuntur.” 127 In Topicis ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Top. VIII.2 157b1–3 (Ar. lat. V.1 161.4): “Et probare instantias non in eo quod proponitur ferre, nisi unum tantum sit huiusmodi, velut dualitas parium numerus solus primus; oportet enim eum qui instat in altero instantiam ferre, aut dicere quoniam hoc solum tale est.” 107 ei ] om. AT 108 assentivus ] assensus A || omne ] si V 108–109 si proponitur ] sibi proportionaliter A om. T 112 Octava ] om. ET || et ultima ] om. A 113 simul multo ] om. A 114 multo ] multotiens(?) add. A 115 conclusionibus ] propositionibus E 115–116 mathematicis ] metaphysicis(!) E 117 in actu ad unum ] ad unum actum AT 118 quam ] faceret add. EVW 122 virtute ] proprietate T || et unum ] om. A 125 ergo nihil intelligit ] om. T 126 intendebat ] intelligit V

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compatible with each other in being in the same subject at the same time. Assent and dissent, however, do have this incompatibility. 16. The seventh conclusion is that it is impossible for the same person to have contradictory beliefs at the same time if the contradiction is evident to him, since belief is an assenting habit, for we assent to everything we believe, if it is placed in front of us. Thus, Aristotle correctly states that contradictory beliefs are contraries, i.e., incompatible not only as far as the truth is concerned, but also as regards being in the same thing at the same time. 17. The eighth and final conclusion is that there can be much more habitual knowledge than actual knowledge in the intellect at the same time. In other words, there are many more intellectual habits than acts of thinking, for you possess intellectual habits of thousands of conclusions in mathematics, as well as in logic, the natural sciences, and other disciplines. And yet, everyone experiences that they are actually able to attend better and more easily to one or two things than to six or ten, and that they cannot attend distinctly to a hundred or a thousand things at the same time. 18. The arguments which were made at the beginning of the Question are resolved, however, for the proposition,470 “a man who does not understand one thing understands nothing,” is true by virtue of the meaning of its terms because ‘being’, ‘one’, and ‘something’ are convertible, as must be seen in Metaphysics IV. Accordingly, this follows: ‘he does not understand one thing; therefore, he does not understand a being, and he does not understand something’. And ‘nothing’ and ‘not something’ mean the same. Accordingly, this fol-

470

See par. 1 above.

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135

140

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stoteles illam auctoritatem exemplificando solum, et exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut ipse dicit primo Priorum. Et non est probabilitas illius propositionis, nisi in hoc quia multo plura contingit simul scire quam singillatim intelligere, prout dicebat ultima conclusio. 19. Ad aliam dicitur quod si materia non potest habere simul plures formas substantiales, tamen potest habere simul plures accidentales, et intellectiones sunt formae accidentales. 20. Ad aliam dicitur quod unius virtutis et unius instrumenti non est nisi unus usus perfectus ad semel, si unus illorum usuum sit impedimentum alterius. Possunt tamen eius esse plures usus imperfecti vel quorum unus aut plures requiruntur ad usum finalem, verbi gratia, non utimur simul lingua ad perfecte gustandum et perfecte loquendum, sed aliquis potest ea uti imperfecte ad ambos simul. Et etiam respiratione, inspiratione, et exspiratione utimur aliquando simul et ad refrigerium caloris naturalis et ad vociferationem, sed perfectius ad refrigerium sine vociferatione quam cum vociferatione. Pulmone etiam utimur simul ad exspirationem et vociferationem, et non dimittitur vociferatio propter exspirationem, quia exspiratio requiritur et ordinatur ad perfectam vociferationem. Sic ergo quia conceptus simplices requiruntur et ordinantur ad complexionem, ideo cum conceptibus simplicibus stat

129 primo Priorum ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, An. pr. I.41 49b 31–50a4; Auc. Ar. 34.16 (ed. Hamesse, 309): “Exempla ponimus non quod ita sint, sed ut sentiant addiscentes quae addiscunt.” 130 nisi ] nec V || simul ] vel contingit plura scire et unum solum et intelligere etiam solum (?) in marg. add. W 131 scire ] om. TVW || singillatim ] simul actu AET 135 et ] om. V 136 semel ] seipsum A se V per se W 137 imperfecti ] perfecti A 138–139 non utimur ] om. A 140 imperfecte ] perfecte(!) AET || simul ] etc. add. E 141 exspiratione ] om. A 142 vociferationem ] vociferandum VW 143 sine . . . vociferatione ] et ad perfectam vociferationem A 144 et vociferationem ] simul vociferationem V

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lows: ‘he does not understand one thing; therefore, he understands nothing’.471 If Aristotle meant something different, this must be seen in Metaphysics IV, where he makes this authoritative remark. In the Topics however, Aristotle said this only by providing an example, and examples are not required to be true, as he states himself in Prior Analytics I. And there is no plausibility in that proposition unless because it is possible to know many more things simultaneously than we can actually think of, one by one, as the final conclusion stated. 19. To the other,472 it is replied that even if matter cannot have more than one substantial form at the same time, it can still have more than one accidental form at the same time, and acts of thinking are accidental forms. 20. To the other,473 it is said that there is only one perfect use of a single power and a single instrument at a time if one of these uses is an impediment to the other. Nevertheless, there can be more than one imperfect use of it, or several uses of which one or more are required for a final use; for example, we do not use the tongue for tasting perfectly and speaking perfectly at the same time, but someone can use it imperfectly for both at the same time. Also, we sometimes use respiration, inhalation, and exhalation simultaneously for cooling natural heat and for speech, but more perfectly for cooling without speech than with it. We also use our lungs simultaneously for exhalation and speech, and the production of speech is not hampered by exhalation, since exhalation is required and designed for the perfect production of speech. In the same way, then, simple concepts are required and 471 Alternatively,

moving the negation to the object of the verb, this might be rendered, ‘he understands not one thing; therefore, he understands nothing’, since he understands not a being and not something; therefore, he understands nothing (since not something = no thing = nothing). 472 See par. 2 above. 473 See par. 3 above.

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150

155

160

165

170

175

904

perfecte actus complectendi. Sed plures complexiones disparatas non potest intellectus ita perfecte formare nec ad eas attendere sicut posset ad unam. Potest tamen imperfecte duas, et adhuc minus perfecte tres, et tandem posset sic excrescere multitudo quod ultra non posset, sicut dicebatur. 21. Ad aliam potest dici primo quod non est propria locutio dicere quod intellectus convertit se ad illud quod intelligit. Sed si recipiamus illum modum loquendi, tunc erit simile, sicut si diceretur quod quacumque cognitione cognoscamus Deum, ita ipsum totaliter cognoscimus, quia est indivisibilis. Verum enim est quod ipsum totaliter cognoscimus sic, quia secundum se totum cognoscimus ad illum sensum quod nihil est eius quod non cognoscimus. Sed non sic totaliter, quoniam aliter et alia cognitione possumus ipsum cognoscere. Ita igitur intellectus sic totaliter convertit se ad unum intelligendum quia secundum se totum, sed non sic totaliter quando etiam bene adhuc ad aliud. 22. Ad aliam dicitur quod cum homo sit potentiae finitae, non sequitur quod si potest simul levare duas lapides pedales, quod ita posset centum vel mille. Nec est simile de penetratione corporum, quia quod homo potest levare lapidem et intellectus formare intellectionem, hoc est per potentiam activam. Et sic etiam per potentiam magnitudinis resistivam est quod alia magnitudo non potest intrare in ea, nisi sic quod dividendo, potest eam intrare inter partes eius. Sed si in unam magnitudinem posset alia intrare penetrando, hoc esset propter carentiam illius potentiae resistivae. Et si omnis magnitudo careret tali potentia resistiva, omnes aeque possent simul penetrare, sicut duae. Et aliquis dubitabit quae res sit illa potentia, et an ipsa est infinita. Et ego credo quod illa potentia non est nisi natura magnitudinis, licet nomina differant secundum rationem. Et dico etiam quod illa non est poten-

148 complexiones ] perfectiones VW 148–149 non potest ] om. A 151 excrescere ] existere T 155 si ] om. V 156 Deum ] om. AV 158–159 sic . . . sensum quod ] quia ipsum toto est indivisibile ad ipsum sensum(?) in marg. A 159–162 aliter et alia . . . quando ] hom. E 160 aliter ] quare A || cognitione ] om. A 161 sic ] se A om. ET 162 bene adhuc ] om. AT cum hoc E 164 cum ] intellectus add. T 168 activam ] om. VW 168–169 resistivam ] cognoscitivam A 169 nisi ] non ET 173 possent ] se add. ETVW

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made for combination, and so with simple concepts the act of combination fits perfectly. But the intellect cannot form or attend to several disparate combinations as perfectly as it could to one. Nevertheless, it can attend imperfectly to two, and still less perfectly to three, until at last a multitude could arise beyond which one could go no further, as was stated. 21. To the other,474 it can be replied first that it is not a proper way of speaking to say that the intellect turns itself to what it understands. But if we accept this way of speaking, then it would be similar to saying that by whatever cognition we cognize God, we cognize Him totally, because He is indivisible. For it is true that we cognize Him totally in this way, because we cognize the whole of Him in Himself, in the sense that there is nothing of Him we do not cognize. But we do not cognize Him totally, in the sense that we are also able to cognize Him in another manner and by another cognition. In the same way, therefore, the intellect also turns itself totally to understanding one thing because it does so in its entirety, but not in the other sense of ‘completely’, when it is still properly attending to something else. 22. To the other,475 it is replied that since a human being’s powers are finite, it does not follow that if he can simultaneously lift two footlong stones, he could therefore lift a hundred, or a thousand. Nor is it like the penetration of bodies, because it is through an active power that a human being can lift a stone and the intellect can form an act of thinking. But it is through the resistive power of a magnitude that another magnitude cannot enter it, except in such a way that by dividing it, it can enter between its parts. But if one magnitude could enter another by penetrating it, this would be due to the latter’s lacking the power to resist. And if every magnitude lacked this power to resist, then any magnitude could just as easily penetrate any other, as two could. And someone will wonder what this power is, and whether it is infinite. I believe that this power is nothing but the nature of

474 See 475 See

par. 4 above. par. 5 above.

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tia infinita, quia eam superat potentia divina, posset enim magnitudo penetrari ab alia magnitudine per potentiam divinam. Sed tamen est tanta potentia quod nulla potentia naturalis potest eam superare tali modo quod, stante aliqua magnitudine alia extrinseca, intraret in eam sine eius divisione. 23. Ad ultimam dicitur quod ista auctoritas quod “diversa specie dicuntur quaecumque in eadem substantia entia differentiam habent,” est posita secundum impropriam locutionem, quia per substantiam intelligit genus, eo quod ipsum est praedicabile essentialiter de suis speciebus, et intendit loqui de differentiis essentialibus illius generis. Vult igitur dicere quod omnes termini sub eodem genere constituti per differentias essentiales illius generis differant specie in isto genere. Similiter alia auctoritas, quae dicit quod omne genus dividitur in suas species per differentias contrarias seu oppositas, est falsa loquendo de oppositione secundum quam repugnaret unum verificari et affirmari de alio. Nam in continuis, omnis binarius est trinarius, et omnis magnitudo est numerus, et omnis linea est corpus. Sed ad istum sensum improprium est contrarietas, quia repugnat differentiis essentialibus alicuius generis, vel etiam speciebus constitutis per eas, praedicari unum de alia essentialiter. Et sic auctoritates expositae nihil opinantur contra praedicta.

179 potentia ] om. T 183 dicuntur . . . habent ] etc. T 189 quae ] om. V 191 verificari et ] vere AET 192 alio ] reliquo A 195 per eas ] om. V 196 auctoritates ] tales sunt add. T 197 praedicta ] etc. et hoc de ista quaestione proveniunt tantum dictum sit quid demonstratione improbari opiniones multis est mihi, etc., et sic finitur quaestio add. A praedeterminata, et sic est finis quaestionis sequitur alia E etc. add. V

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a magnitude, although the names differ depending on how it is conceived. I also say that it is not an infinite power, since divine power overcomes it, for one magnitude could be penetrated by another magnitude through divine power. But even so, it is so great a power that no natural power can overcome it in such a way that one magnitude could enter another extrinsic to it without dividing it. 23. To the last argument,476 it is replied that the authoritative remark, “all things which, being in the same substance, have a differentia, are said to be diverse in species,” was proposed using an improper way of speaking, because by ‘substance’, Aristotle means ‘genus’, in that it is predicable essentially of its species, and he means to speak of the essential differentiae of that genus. Therefore, he means to say that all terms established under the same genus by the essential differentiae of that genus differ in species within that genus. Likewise, the other authoritative remark, which says that every genus is divided into its species by contrary or opposite differentiae, is false if we are speaking of the opposition in which it is impossible for terms to be verified and affirmed one of another. For in a continuum, everything consisting of two consists of three, and every magnitude is a number, and every line is a body. But there is contrariety in the improper sense that it is incompatible for the essential differentiae of some genus, or even for the species established by them, to be predicated one of another essentially. Explained in this way, the authorities suggest nothing contrary to what was said above.

476 See

par. 6 above.

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Utrum in homine sit anima intellectiva alia ab anima sensitiva.

5

10

15

20

1. Arguitur quod sic, quia sensitiva in omni actu suo indiget organo corporeo, et est extensa et divisibilis et generabilis, quia secundo huius dicit Aristoteles quod “sensitivi prima immutatio est a generante.” Et est corruptibilis, quia dicitur in tertio huius quod “non reminiscimur post mortem,” quia intellectus passivus corrumpitur, id est phantasia, quae pertinet ad animam sensitivam. Animae autem intellectivae conveniunt omnes conditiones oppositae; igitur, ipsae sunt distinctae. 2. Item sensitivae et intellectivae sunt iudicia contraria, ut de magnitudine solis, et appetitus contrarii, et sibi invicem adversantes seu obviantes, prout accipitur ex isto tertio et primo Ethicorum. Hoc autem non esset ita si esset eadem anima. 3. Item sequeretur quod homo non nutriretur, quod est falsum. Consequentia patet, quia nutritio non est sine aliqua partiali generatione substantiali, oportet enim nutrimentum converti in substantiam nutriti. Et tamen nihil in homine generatur substantialiter, quia nec materia, cum sit ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis; nec anima intellectiva generaretur in nutritione nec aliqua pars eius, cum sit indivisibilis; nec alia forma aliqua substantialis, quia non ponentes animam intel1–2 anima intellectiva alia ab anima sensitiva ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.8 431b 24 ff. 4–5 secundo huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. II.5 417b16 (Ar. lat. XII.2 114.1.1): “Sensitivi autem prima quidem mutatio fit a generante.” 6 tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.5 430a22–23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 218.2.7): “Non reminiscimur autem, quia hoc quidem impassibile, passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligit.” 13 isto tertio et primo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433a25–b12; Eth. ad Nic. I.13 1102b13–1103a3. 3–4 organo ] om. T 4 corporeo ] om. V || generabilis ] et corruptibilis add. AT 5 sensitivi ] sensui animal sensitivi et melius A sensuum VW 7 quia ] sed V sed exp. quia W || passivus ] possibilis A 12 solis ] possibilis T || appetitus ] sunt add. A || contrarii . . . adversantes ] sunt contrarii et iudicia adversantiae sibi invicem A 14 anima ] in numero add. AT © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 48

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Does the intellective soul in a human being differ from the sensitive soul?

1. It is argued that it does, because the sensitive soul needs a corporeal organ for all of its acts, and it is extended, divisible, and generable, since Aristotle says in De Anima II, “the first change in a sensitive being comes from the parent.” It is also corruptible, since he says in De Anima III, “we do not remember after death,” because the passive intellect, i.e., the imagination, which pertains to the sensitive soul, is corrupted. But all of the opposite conditions apply to the intellective soul; therefore, they are distinct. 2. Again, the sensitive and intellective souls form contrary judgments, e.g., about the magnitude of the sun, as well as contrary desires, and they are adversaries or hindrances to each other, as we learn from De Anima III and Nicomachean Ethics I. But this would not be the case if it were the same soul. 3. Again, it would follow that a human being would not be nourished, which is false. The consequence is clear, because nutrition does not occur without some partial substantial generation, for the nourishment must be converted into the substance of what is nourished. And yet nothing is substantially generated in a human being: the matter is not generated, since it is ungenerable and incorruptible; nor is the intellective soul or any part of it generated in nutrition, since it is in-

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 48

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30

35

40

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lectivam distingui a sensitiva non ponunt in homine aliam formam substantialem quam ipsam animam intellectivam. 4. Item sequeretur quod non omnis generatio unius sit corruptio alterius et e converso, cuius tamen oppositum habetur primo De generatione. Et consequentia patet, quia in nutritione hominis alimentum substantialiter corrumpitur, et tamen nihil ex eo substantialiter generatur, sicut immediate dicebatur. 5. Item sicut statim dicebatur, qui non ponunt in homine animam intellectivam aliam a sensitiva, ipsi etiam non ponunt aliam formam substantialem in homine quam animam intellectivam. Sed ad hanc positionem multa sequuntur inconvenientia. 6. Primum est quod omnis homo esset perpetuus, quia non essent partes eius nisi materia prima et anima intellectiva, quae sunt perpetuae, et totum, scilicet homo, est suae partes; igitur, totum illud, scilicet homo, esset perpetuus. 7. Secundum inconveniens est quia in morte hominis nihil corrumperetur substantialiter, quia nec materia, nec forma, et per consequens nec compositum quod est materia et forma. Et tamen aliquid generaretur substantialiter, scilicet cadaver, aut quocumque alio nomine nominetur, vel materia remaneret sine forma substantiali, quod non est concedendum. Et tunc sequeretur istud inconveniens, contra Aristotelem primo De generatione, quod non omnis generatio unius esset corruptio alterius.

25–26 primo De generatione ] A RISTOTELES, De gen. et corr. I.3 318a23–25 (Ar. lat. IX.2): “Quocirca propter huius corruptionem alterius esse generationem et huius generationem alterius esse corruptionem indefinientem necesse est transmutationem esse.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 4.7 (ed. Hamesse, 167): “Generatio unius est corruptio alterius; propter hoc generatio et corruptio sunt aeterna.” 43 primo De generatione ] A RI STOTELES , De gen. et corr. I.3 318a 23–25. 26 nutritione ] alitione VW 27 tamen ] in eo add. V 29–32 non ponunt . . . inconvenientia ] in marg. A 29 in homine ] om. E in marg. V 30 intellectivam ] esse add. AE || aliam a ] ab anima E || sensitiva . . . aliam ] hom. V 31 substantialem ] om. A 33 Primum . . . esset ] in marg. A 40 aut ] et sic V || alio ] aliomodo E 41 nominetur ] om. E 42 istud ] aliud VW 43 unius ] om. V

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divisible; nor is some other substantial form generated, because those who do not posit that the intellective soul is distinct from the sensitive soul also do not posit a substantial form in a human being other than the intellective soul itself. 4. Again, it would follow that not every generation of one thing would be the corruption of another, and conversely, the opposite of which is held in On Generation and Corruption I. The consequence is clear, because in human nutrition, the food is substantially corrupted, and yet nothing is substantially generated from it, as was stated just above. 5. Again, as was said above, those who do not posit that the intellective soul in a human being differs from the sensitive soul also do not posit a substantial form in a human being other than the intellective soul. But many difficulties follow from this position.477 6. The first is that every human being would be everlasting, because no human would have parts other than prime matter and intellective soul, both of which are everlasting, and the whole, namely, the human being, is its parts. Therefore, this whole, namely, the human being, would be everlasting. 7. The second difficulty is that nothing would be substantially corrupted in the death of a human being because neither the matter nor the form would be corrupted, and consequently the composite that is the matter and form would not be corrupted either. And yet something would be substantially generated, namely, the corpse, or whatever other name we call it, or else the matter would remain without a substantial form—which must not be granted. And then there would follow the difficulty that not every generation of one thing is the cor-

477 That

is, the view of those just mentioned, who hold that there are no substantial forms in a human being other than the intellective or intellectual soul.

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55

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8. Tertium inconveniens est quia sequeretur quod pater tuus non genuit te nec aliquid de substantia tua, quia non genuit materiam tuam nec animam intellectivam tuam; immo illa creatur a Deo. Et tamen nihil plus est de substantia tua. Et sequitur ulterius quod non esset in homine potentia nutritiva, nec sui similis generativa, quod est falsum quia dicit Aristoteles “homo generat hominem et sol.” 9. Item sequeretur quod asinus haberet nobiliorem operationem in generando asinum quam homo in generando hominem, quod videtur absurdum. Consequentia patet, quia asinus generaret nobiliorem substantiam, scilicet animam sensitivam. Homo autem non generaret nisi accidentia, quia solus Deus creat et generat et dat animam intellectivam. 10. Item posset argui sicut arguebatur in quarta quaestione secundi libri de anima vegetativa et sensitiva in animali. 11. Oppositum etiam arguitur sicut in praedicta quarta quaestione secundi libri De anima arguebatur, scilicet primo auctoritate Commentatoris in De substantia orbis; secundo quia homo esset plura animata; tertio quia homo non esset aliquod unum per se; quarto quia anima intellectiva esset forma accidentalis; quinto quia homo esset compositus ex animali bruto et intellectu; sexto quia anima vegetativa esset nobilior in equo quam intellectiva in homine. Et tu potes ibidem videre omnes istas rationes, et etiam alias ibidem convenientes,

50 Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.2 194b 13 (Ar. lat. VII.1 50.2): “Homo enim et hominem generat ex materia et sol.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 2.65 (ed. Hamesse, 145): “Homo generat hominem et sol.” 57–58 quarta quaestione secundi libri ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 5. 59–60 quarta quaestione secundi libri ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 6–9. 61 De substantia orbis ] Cf. AVERROES, De subst. orbis 1 (IX 3 K–L); Auc. Ar. 10.6 (ed. Hamesse, 229): “Impossibile est unum subjectum plures quam unam formam habere.” Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 6. || secundo ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 7. 62 tertio ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 8. || quarto ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 9. 63 quinto ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 19. 64 sexto ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 20. 47 tuam ] om. E || creatur ] datur T 48 Et ] item E 50 dicit Aristoteles ] secundo libro Physicorum add. A 55 et dat ] om. AET 57–58 quarta quaestione secundi libri ] secundo libro V 59–60 sicut . . . scilicet ] hom. A 64–65 quia . . . equo ] in marg. A 66 et . . . convenientes ] om. T

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ruption of another, which is contrary to Aristotle in On Generation and Corruption.478 8. The third difficulty is that it would follow that your father did not produce you or anything belonging to your substance, since he produced neither your matter nor your intellective soul—which, in fact, is created by God. And yet there is nothing more to your substance than this. It follows further that there would be no nutritive power in a human being, nor a power capable of generating what is similar to it, which is false because Aristotle says, “a human being and the sun generate a human being.” 9. Again, it would follow that a donkey would have a nobler activity in generating a donkey than a human being in generating a human being, which seems unacceptable. The consequence is clear, since a donkey would generate a nobler substance, namely, a sensitive soul. But a human being would only generate accidents, since God alone creates, generates, and bestows the intellective soul. 10. Again, one could argue as was argued in the fourth question of Book II of this treatise, about the vegetative and sensitive soul in an animal. 11. The opposite is argued just as it was argued in the aforementioned fourth question of Book II of this treatise: namely, first, on the authority of the Commentator in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere; second, because a human being would be several animate things; third, because a human being would not be something one per se; fourth, because the intellective soul would be an accidental form; fifth, because a human being would be composed of brute animal and intellect; sixth, because the vegetative soul in a horse would be no-

478 As

in par. 4 above.

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70

75

80

85

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etiam quia frustra ponerentur plures animae si omnes possent salvari per unicam. 12. Et ego pono in ista quaestione conclusionem istam quod non est in homine anima intellectiva alia a sensitiva, sed eadem, quod probatur sicut probatur in secundo libro de anima vegetativa et sensitiva in animali. 13. Et possum addere rationes theologicas quae mihi faciunt magnam fidem, quarum una est quod filius Dei assumpsit sibi totam humanitatem et integram. Ideo cum anima sensitiva sit de integritate hominis, illam assumpsit. Et nihil dimisit quod assumpsit. Ergo illam in morte non dimisit, et sic illa in morte non corrumpebatur. Et tamen dicentes eam esse distinctam substantialiter ab intellectiva dicunt eam corrumpi in morte; igitur, etc.. 14. Item in Psalmo quindecimo dicitur, “non dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem,” id est, Christum, et tamen fuisset passus corruptionem si eius anima sensitiva fuisset corrupta in morte. Igitur ego imaginor quod sicut Deus assistit toti mundo et cuilibet parti eius principaliter sine distantia, sicut quodammodo anima humana assistit toti corpori humano sine distantia. Differunt tamen, quia Deus non est forma inhaerens mundo, anima autem informat corpus humanum inhaerentis. Et illa anima dicitur intellectiva secundum quod est innata intelligere, et sensitiva secundum quod est innata sentire, et vegetativa secundum quod est innata nutrire, et motiva secundum locum se-

71 secundo libro ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 18–23. 15:10 (Vulgata); Ps. 16:10 (NRSV).

80 Psalmo ] Ps.

67 etiam quia ] et etiam alias VW || si ] sed V 69 conclusionem istam ] om. A 72 animali ] bruto add. A 73 theologicas ] catholicas V || mihi ] in hoc adducunt vel add. V 74 una ] prima E 77 non ] amisit seu add. W || et sic illa ] quam assumpsit igitur illa in morte non dimisit quam assumpsit igitur V quam assumpsit igitur illa W 79 in morte; igitur, etc. ] ergo etiam in morte AT 80 in Psalmo ] Psalmista V David propheta add. T || quindecimo dicitur ] om. AEV dicit de Christo Jesu T 81 id est, Christum ] om. AT 84 humana ] intellectiva add. E 86–87 inhaerentis ] inhaeret V 87 dicitur ] anima add. VW

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bler than the intellective soul in a human. You can see all of these arguments there, and also others agreeing with them; furthermore, it would be pointless to posit more than one soul if everything could be explained by just one. 12. I propose in this question this conclusion, that the intellective soul in a human does not differ from the sensitive soul but they are the same. This is proved along the lines of the proof in Book II of this treatise regarding the sensitive and vegetative soul in an animal. 13. I can add theological arguments which produce a great faith in me. One of them is that the son of God assumed a complete and entire humanity. Accordingly, since the sensitive soul belongs to the entirety of a human being, he assumed it. And he gave up nothing that he assumed. Therefore, he did not give it up in death, and so it was not corrupted in death. And yet those who say that the sensitive soul is substantially distinct from the intellective soul claim that it is corrupted in death; therefore, etc. 14. Again, in the fifteenth Psalm it is said, “you will not suffer your Holy One,” that is, Christ, “to see corruption.” And yet, he would have suffered corruption if his sensitive soul had been corrupted in death. Therefore, I imagine that just as God is principally and immediately present to the entire world and to each and every part of it, so in like manner the human soul is immediately present to the entire human body. Nevertheless, they differ because God is not a form inhering in the world, but the soul informs the human body in which it inheres. And this soul is called ‘intellective’ insofar as it is naturally suited to understand, ‘sensitive’ insofar as it is naturally suited to sense, ‘vege-

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95

100

105

110

115

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cundum quod est innata movere corpus secundum locum, sicut alias dictum fuit. 15. Sic igitur potest ad rationes responderi. 16. Ad primam dicitur quod eadem anima quae est sensitiva et intellectiva in omni actu suo sentiendi utitur organo corporeo, sed non in actu suo intelligendi. Et negatur quod anima sensitiva in homine sit extensa. Sed bene informat materiam corpoream et extensam, et habet actum sentiendi coextensum organo corporeo, sicut alias dictum est. Conceditur etiam quod anima sensitiva generatur in homine, id est creatur a Deo, et dispositiones corporis requisitae ad sentiendum generantur naturaliter et educuntur de potentia materiae. Et negatur quod anima sensitiva hominis corrumpatur in morte. Sed bene corrumpuntur corporales dispositiones requisitae ad naturaliter sentiendum. 17. De alia ratione quae arguit de iudiciis vel appetitibus contrariis, dicetur in alia quaestione. 18. Ad aliam quae arguit de nutritione, dicitur quod sicut anima intellectiva aliter generatur in materia quam aliae formae, quia non educitur de potentia materiae sed quodam supernaturali modo infunditur, ita consequenter est in homine alius modus nutritionis quam in aliis viventibus est. Est enim hic et illic convenientia et differentia. Convenientia enim est quia utrobique, forma substantialis alimenti corrumpitur, id est quod ibi in materia alimenti, incipit esse forma substantialis vel pars formae substantialis viventis, quae dicitur nutriri. Et sic utrobique fit aliquid non simpliciter sed loquendo secundum quid, scilicet cum praedicatione de tertio adiacente, quia materia sit formata forma qua non ante erat formata, scilicet anima vel parte animae. Sed bene est differentia, quia in brutis aliquid generatur de forma

90–91 alias dictum fuit ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.4, par. 27. 97 alias dictum est ] Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.9, par. 26. 104 alia quaestione ] B URIDAN US , QQ. De an. III.18. 97 coextensum ] extensum A 98 id est ] om. E et V 101–102 in morte . . . corrumpuntur ] in marg. V 106 in materia ] om. A 107 quodam ] quodammodo AVW 109 Est ] sequitur V 111 id est quod ibi ] et AT et quod E 112 substantialis ] om. A 113 loquendo ] om. A 114 de ] om. VW 115–116 anima . . . animae ] vel eius partes A vel eius parte E 116–117 de forma substantiali ] om. A de forma ET

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tative’ insofar as it is naturally suited to nourish, and ‘locally motive’ insofar as it is naturally suited to move the body from place to place, as was said elsewhere. 15. We can therefore reply to the initial arguments as follows. 16. To the first,479 it is said that the same soul that is sensitive and intellective uses a corporeal organ in all of its acts of sensing, but not in its act of understanding. And it is denied that the sensitive soul is extended in a human being. Instead, it informs corporeal and extended matter and possesses an act of sensing that is coextensive with a corporeal organ, as was said elsewhere. It is also granted that the sensitive soul in a human is generated, i.e., created by God, and the bodily dispositions required for sensing are naturally generated and drawn out from the potency of matter. And it is denied that the sensitive soul of a human would be corrupted in death. Instead, the corporeal dispositions required for naturally sensing are corrupted. 17. As for the other argument,480 about contrary judgments or appetites, it will be treated in another question. 18. To the other,481 which argued about nutrition, it is said that just as the intellective soul is generated differently in matter than other forms, because it is not derived from a material potency but infused in a certain supernatural way, so consequently there is a different mode of nutrition in humans than there is in other living things. There is, to be sure, similarity in one respect, and difference in another. There is similarity, because in both cases the substantial form of the food is corrupted, i.e., there, in the matter of the food, there begins to be the substantial form or part of the substantial form of the living thing, which is said to be nourished. And so in both cases, something comes to be not absolutely speaking, but in a certain respect, namely, in a three-part predication, because the matter is informed by a form by

479 See

par. 1 above. par. 2 above. 481 See par. 3 above. 480 See

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125

130

135

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substantiali sic quod illud non erat ante, sed in homine nihil. Sed forma substantialis, scilicet anima, fit in materia et incipit esse in materia in qua ante non erat. Et hoc sufficit ad nutritionem, quia sic salvantur quantitates corporis, et figurae membrorum et aliae dispositiones convenientes omnibus operationibus animae. 19. Ad aliam dicitur quod non oportet apud omnem generationem unius formae substantialis corrumpi aliam simpliciter. Sed oportet quod omnis materia dimittens unam formam substantialem fiat sub alia, et recipiens unam dimittit aliam, si non sit miraculosa operatio. Sic enim nec materia habet simul plures formas substantiales, nec aliquando est sine forma substantiali. 20. Ad aliam rationem conceditur quod non sunt in homine plures formae substantiales, sed unica. Sed tunc respondetur ad inconvenientia quae contra hoc esse videntur. 21. Ad primum, scilicet quod homo esset perpetuus, dictum est in sexta quaestione huius tertii libri. 22. Ad secundum dictum fuit statim quomodo oportet generationem unius esse corruptionem alterius vel e converso. 23. Ad tertium videtur mihi esse dicendum quod apud generationem substantialem hominis vel equi aut asini, pater non agit loquendo

132 sexta quaestione huius tertii libri ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.6, par. 24–31. 120 corporis ] om. T 121 animae ] om. T 122 non ] nobis A || omnem ] om. ET 123 simpliciter ] om. T 124 sub ] una add. AT substantia V 125 sit ] in ipsam add. A 126 substantiales ] sed solum modo unica add. AT 126–127 nec aliquando . . . substantiali ] om. T 128–129 ad aliam . . . unica ] et sic solvitur illa ratio ab expositionibus consequenter A 133 statim ] om. V 136 vel equi ] om. AT || aut asini ] om. E

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which it was not previously informed, namely, by the soul or by a part of the soul.482 But there is certainly a difference, because in brute animals something of the substantial form is generated which did not exist before; however, nothing is generated in a human being, but the substantial form, namely, the soul, comes to be in that matter and begins to be in that matter in which it was not before. And this suffices for nutrition because in this way, all the bodily quantities are preserved: both the shapes of the limbs and other dispositions suited to every activity of the soul. 19. To the other,483 it is replied that it need not be that in every generation of a single substantial form, another is corrupted absolutely speaking. But every matter giving up one substantial form must come to be under another, and in taking on the one, it gives up the other, if there is no miraculous activity. For in this way, neither does matter have several substantial forms at the same time, nor is there any time at which it is without a substantial form. 20. To the other,484 it is granted that there are not several substantial forms in a human being, but only one. But then we reply to the difficulties which seemed to be against this. 21. To the first,485 namely, that human beings would be everlasting, this was discussed in the sixth question of Book III of this treatise. 22. To the second,486 it was just explained how the generation of one thing must be the corruption of another, or conversely. 23. To the third,487 it seems to me it must be said that in the substantial generation of a human or a horse or a donkey, the father does not 482 The

contrast here is between becoming simpliciter, or absolutely, and becoming something. In the act of nutrition, a living being does not ‘become’ absolutely speaking, i.e., it does not thereby come into being; rather, some matter from the nutrition comes to be informed by the soul (or a new part of the soul, if the soul is extended, as in the case of plants and brute animals). Buridan expresses the point using logical terminology: in nutrition, nothing new comes into existence (which would be a two-piece predication, or predication de secundo adiacente, ‘A is’), but something comes to be something (which would be a three-piece predication, or predication de tertio adiacente, ‘A is B’). 483 See par. 4 above. 484 See par. 5 above. 485 See par. 6 above. 486 See par. 7 above. 487 See par. 8 above.

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140

145

150

155

160

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proprie, quia pono quod post emissionem spermatis statim pater moriatur. Non minus generabitur fetus, et tamen quod est corruptum vel annihilatum non amplius agit, et si viveret pater iste non magis ageret quam si esset mortuus. Ideo ad generationem substantialis animalis, et in tempore in quo substantialiter generetur, pater nihil agit. Ideo non dicitur pater quia substantialiter et proprie agat filium, sed quia egit semen et emisit quod agit et determinat ad generationem filii aut substantialiter aut dispositive. Unde non solum in generatione hominis, sed etiam in generatione equi, nec equus nec sperma equi generat proprie et principaliter equum, non enim equus, quia forte mortuus est; nec sperma equi, quia minoris est entitatis et non potest dare plus quam habet. Sed generans principale est dator formarum, qui est Deus benedictus. Pater autem et sperma sunt tamquam agentia instrumentalia, et instrumentaliter dispositiva materiae ad illas animas recipiendas. Unde ad hanc intentionem et non ad aliam videtur mihi esse quod homo generat hominem et equus equum. 24. Et consimiliter respondetur ad aliam rationem quae dicit quod asinus haberet nobiliorem operationem in generando asinum quam homo in generando hominem. Apparet quod hoc est falsum, quia neutrum est agens principale producens animam, sed utrumque emittens semen de seipso, quod quidem semen cum naturali calore matris, disponit materiam ad recipiendum animam. Disponentes autem ad recipiendum animam humanam sunt multo nobiliores quam disponentes ad recipiendum animam asini. Ideo etiam semen hominis est nobilius et nobilioris actionis quam semen asini.

137 statim pater ] om. AV pater W 139 et ] sed V 140 substantialis ] hominis naturalem aut A hominis vel naturalis T 141 generetur ] animalis om. T 143 et determinat ] om. T || filii ] om. E 145 etiam ] nec(!) A 146 et principaliter ] om. A 148 principale est ] principale, id est V || qui est ] om. VW || Deus ] gloriosus et add. E 149 agentia ] potentia organica add. T 149–150 instrumentalia ] principalia W 150 et instrumentaliter ] om. V || illas ] formas secundum add. T 151 intentionem ] intellectionem A institutionem T || mihi ] om. VW 156 agens ] generans A sicut generans T || animam ] om. T 159 humanam ] intellectivam AET 160 recipiendum ] et producendum add. E 161 asini ] ipsius asini, etc. A

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act, strictly speaking. For suppose that after the emission of the sperm, the father immediately dies. The fetus will be generated nonetheless, even though what has been corrupted or annihilated no longer acts; and if the father were still alive, he would act on it no more than if he were dead. Thus, in the substantial generation of an animal, the father does nothing at the time when the animal is substantially generated. And so he is not called ‘father’ because he substantially and properly produces his offspring, but because he produced the semen and emitted what is active and determinative in the generation of his offspring, whether substantially or dispositionally. For this reason, not only in the generation of a human, but also in the generation of a horse, neither the horse nor the sperm of the horse properly and principally generates the horse—not the horse, since it might be dead; and not the sperm of the horse, since it has a lesser state of being and cannot give more than it has. But the principal generating agent is the giver of forms, who is holy God. However, the father and the sperm are, as it were, instrumental agents, instrumentally disposing the matter to receive those souls. It is in this sense and no other, as it seems to me, that a human generates a human and a horse generates a horse. 24. We reply likewise to the other argument,488 stating that a donkey would have a nobler activity in generating a donkey than a human in generating a human. It is apparent that this is false, because neither one is the principal agent producing the soul, but each is emitting semen from itself—semen which together with the natural heat of the mother disposes matter to receive the soul. However, what disposes the matter to receive the human soul is much nobler than what disposes it to receive the soul of a donkey. Thus, the semen of a human being is also nobler, and has a nobler action, than the semen of a donkey.

488 See

par. 9 above.

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Utrum in homine est appetitus appetitui contrarius.

5

10

15

20

1. Et non capio hic appetitum pro potentia animae appetitiva, sed pro actu appetendi. Nec intendo quaerere utrum sit possibile in eodem homine fieri successive appetitus contrarios, quia hoc non dubitatur. Sed dubitatur utrum sit possibile in eodem homine esse simul appetitus contrarios. 2. Arguitur quod sic, per Aristotelem in isto tertio dicentem, “quoniam autem appetitus fiunt contrarii ad invicem, hoc autem accidit cum ratio et concupiscentia contrariae fuerint.” 3. Item in primo Ethicorum dicitur, “ad contraria enim motus incontinentium,” id est, inclinationes et appetitus. Et ad hoc est ratio quia nisi tam continens quam incontinens haberet appetitus contrarios, sequeretur quod incontinens non differeret ab intemperato, et quod continens non differeret a simpliciter temperato, quod est falsum, prout debet videri septimo Ethicorum. Consequentia patet, quia non ex alio differt continens a simpliciter temperato nisi quia temperatus recederet ab inhonesta voluptate sine aliqua inclinatione ad contrarium, continens autem non sine inclinatione ad contrarium. Et similiter intemperatus non differt ab incontinente nisi quia intemperatus prosequitur turpe sine displicentia, incontinens autem prosequitur, 1 appetitus appetitui contrarius ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433b5–6. 7 isto tertio ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433b5–6 (Ar. lat. XII.2 244.2.4): “Quoniam autem appetitus fiunt contrarii ad invicem, hoc autem accidit cum ratio et concupiscentiae contrarie fuerint . . . ” 10 primo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.13 1102b19 (Ar. lat. XXVI.3 394.12): “ad contraria enim motus incontinentium.” 15 septimo Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. VII.4 1148a13–21. 3 eodem ] om. AET 4 fieri ] future add. A 10 Item ] Et AT 11 ratio ] causa A 13 quod ] omnis add. W || intemperato ] temperato(!) V 14 continens ] incontinens(!) V 16 continens ] contingens V 18 continens . . . contrarium ] hom. V 19 intemperatus ] incontinens W || incontinente ] intemperato W 20 displicentia ] quae sunt appetitus contrarii add. A || autem ] non(!) add. A © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 49

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Is one appetite contrary to another in a human being?

1. I do not take ‘appetite’ here for the appetitive power of the soul, but for the appetitive act. Nor do I intend to ask whether it is possible for contrary appetites to be successively produced in the same human being, since there is no doubt about this. Rather, what is doubted is whether it is possible for contrary appetites to be in the same human being at the same time. 2. It is argued that it is possible, based on what Aristotle says in De Anima III, “since appetites are contrary to one another, this happens when reason and desire have become contraries”. 3. Again, in Nicomachean Ethics I, it is said, “for incontinent people are moved towards contraries,” i.e., contrary inclinations and appetites. And the reason for this is that if the incontinent person did not have contrary appetites just like the continent person, it would follow that the incontinent person would not differ from the intemperate person, and that the continent person would not differ from the absolutely temperate person, which is false, as must be seen in Nicomachean Ethics VII. The consequence is clear, since the continent person differs from the absolutely temperate person for no other reason than that the temperate person backs away from dishonorable pleasure without feeling any inclination to the contrary, whereas the continent person

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 49

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30

35

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sed cum displicentia propter turpitudinem. Et sic incontinens in eodem actu habet complacentiam et displicentiam, quae sunt appetitus contrarii. Et ita est de voluntario mixto, ut patet in tertio Ethicorum, mercator enim tempore tempestatis proicit merces in mare, ne ipse et alii submergantur, et habet in illo actu complacentiam et displicentiam, quae sunt appetitus contrarii. Certum est quod in hoc habet magnam displicentiam et intensam propter damnum, ita forte quod oportet eum flere. Sed etiam, nisi hoc placeret sibi hoc non faceret, cum facere vel non facere sit in sua potestate. 4. Item appetitus animales fiunt in nobis mediante cognitione, in hoc enim differunt ab appetitibus naturalibus. Ideo rationale est, si in homine sunt simul cognitiones contrariae et iudicia contraria, quod etiam possunt in eo fieri appetitus contrarii. Sed constat quod simul fiant in homine cognitiones contrariae, sive complexae sive incomplexae, ut propositiones contrariae et termini contrarii, aliter non possemus formare hypotheticam propositionem ex categoricis contrariis. Immo etiam simul fiant in nobis apparentiae contrariae et iudicia contraria, ut quod secundum visum apparet tibi sol bipedalis quantitatis, quamvis simul secundum rationem, scias ipsum esse maiorem tota terra; et secundum digitos permutatos lapis apparet tibi duo, et secundum visum scias ipsum esse unicum; et ad utramque partem quaestionis tu saepe habes rationes probabiles, quarum tamen quaelibet facit apparentiam donec solutio habeatur.

23 tertio Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. III.1 1110a8–12. 40 lapis apparet tibi duo ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IV.6 1011a33–34; cf. Ps.-Arist. Problemata 11, 958b11–15; B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. II.25, par. 2. 21 turpitudinem ] annexa seu consequenter add. T 23 de ] quolibet add. A 24 ne ] negare V 24–25 ne ipse et ] om. A 25 illo actu ] animo hactenus A 28 flere ] ut patet plures add. A et dolere add. W 29 cum ] non(!) add. A vel add. W || vel ] saltem W || sua potestate ] nostra libera voluntate AT sua libera voluntate vel potestate E sua libera potestate W 30 fiunt ] immediate add. A 32–33 quod etiam ] et E 34–35 sive incomplexae ] om. A 36 propositionem ] compositam A om. ET 38 visum ] visum rep. V 39 tota ] om. T 41 quaestionis ] conditionis AE oppositionis T

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does not do so without feeling an inclination to the contrary. Likewise, the intemperate person differs from the incontinent person only in the fact that the intemperate person pursues what is shameful without feeling any disagreement, whereas the incontinent person pursues it, though disagreeably on account of the shamefulness.489 And so in the same act, the incontinent person feels agreement and disagreement, which are contrary appetites. And so it is as well in the case of mixed volitions, as is clear in Nicomachean Ethics III, for the merchant throws his cargo into the sea during a storm lest he and the others sink, and feels in that act agreement and disagreement, which are contrary appetites. Certainly he feels an enormous, intense disagreement in doing so on account of the loss, so much so, perhaps, that he sheds a tear. But also, he would not do this unless it pleased him, since doing it and not doing it are both in his power. 4. Again, animal appetites are produced in us by the mediation of cognition, for this is how they differ from natural appetites. Thus it is reasonable, if there are contrary cognitions and contrary judgments in human being at the same time, that contrary appetites are also able to be produced in that individual. But it is well known that contrary cognitions—both complex and incomplex, e.g., contrary propositions and contrary terms—are produced in a human being at the same time, for otherwise, we would not be able to form a hypothetical proposition from contrary categorical propositions. Indeed, contrary appearances and contrary judgments are also produced in us at the same time. For example, by sight the sun appears to you to be two feet across, although at the same time by you know by reason that it is greater than the entire earth; and when a stone is touched with fingers crossed, it appears to you to be two, yet by sight you know it to be only one; and

489 The

words, ‘complacentia’/‘displicentia’, translated here as ‘agreement’/ ‘disagreement’, are technical terms in Buridan’s theory of volition denoting the will’s primary receptive act, an involuntary inclination towards its object depending on whether it appears to the will as good (sub ratione boni) or bad (sub ratione mali). This sets up the will’s secondary or “elicited” act of acceptance, rejection, or deferment, which is free, as well as its tertiary or “commanded” act of pursuit or avoidance, which Buridan below calls “efficacious appetite”. For discussion, see Zupko 1995, Pironet 2001, and Pickav´e 2017.

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5. Item de aliquo nobis ostenso in praesenti, possibile esset quod ipsum esset acceptandum et prosequendum, si non proveniret inde futurum damnum, et tamen propter futurum damnum ipsum est refutandum et fugiendum. Cum igitur intellectus consideret de illo futuro et sensus de praesenti, solum rationale est quod homo simul secundum sensum iudicet illud esse prosequendum et secundum intellectum esse fugiendum. Et hoc notat Aristoteles in tertio huius, dicens “intellectus quidem enim propter futurum retrahere iubet, concupiscentia autem propter ipsum iam. Videtur enim quod iam delectabile et simpliciter delectabile et bonum simpliciter.” 6. Oppositum arguitur, quia si essent in homine simul appetitus contrarii vel iudicia contraria, sequeretur quod simul essent contraria in eodem subiecto et secundum idem sui, quod est contra naturam et contra conditionem contrariorum. Et consequentia patet, quia appetitus et illa iudicia essent in anima, quae est unica et indivisibilis secundum praedeterminata. 7. Notandum est quod licet aliquando sumamus apparentiam large, prout communiter se extenderet ad omnem cognitionem, tamen quando proprie accipitur, differentia magna ponenda est inter propositionem, apparentiam, et assensum. Tu enim potes formare propositionem sine apparentia quod ita sit vel quod non ita sit, ut quod astra sunt paria, quia nullam habes rationem ad hanc partem vel ad istam quae magis innata sit causare apparentiam de una parte quam de alia. Demum etiam potest esse apparentia sine assensu, cuilibet enim aspicienti in speculo, apparet imago esse in profundo speculi, licet sciamus non esse ita, unde illae apparentiae non assentimus sed dissentimus. Et tangens lapidem secundum digitos permutatos scit 50 tertio huius ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433b6–8 (Ar. lat. XII.2 244.2.4): “intellectus quidem enim propter futurum retrahere iubet, concupiscentia autem propter ipsum iam; videtur enim quod iam delectabile et simpliciter delectabile et bonum simpliciter.” 59 secundum praedeterminata ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.5, par. 15. 45 si ] sibi T 46–47 refutandum ] abiciendum A 51 concupiscentia ] contingentia AVW 52 quod iam delectabile ] delectabile simpliciter W 52–53 simpliciter delectabile et bonum ] loquitur V 56 subiecto ] om. E 60 aliquando ] om. A 60–61 large ] generaliter V 61 extenderet ] se rep. V 64–65 ita sit vel . . . sunt ] om. V 66 causare ] facere AT 66–67 de una . . . apparentia ] hom. T 67 alia ] ut satis evidens est add. A 68 aspicienti ] inspicienti ET

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you often have probable arguments on both sides of a question, each of which has the appearance of truth until a solution is reached. 5. Again, when something is shown to us in the present, it is possible for it to be accepted and pursued if no future loss would arise from it; and yet, on account of a future loss, it is to be rejected and avoided. Therefore, since the intellect takes the future into consideration and sense the present, it stands to reason that someone would at the same time judge by sense that it is to be pursued and by intellect that it is to be avoided. Aristotle takes note of this in De Anima III when he says, “for although the intellect commands resistance on account of the future, desire by what exists now. For what is pleasant now seems both absolutely pleasant and absolutely good.” 6. The opposite is argued, because if there were contrary appetites or contrary judgments in a human being at the same time, it would follow that there would be contraries in the same subject at the same time and in the same respect, which is against nature and against the condition for contraries. The consequence is clear, since the appetites and those judgments would be in the soul, which is unique and indivisible according to what was determined above.490 7. It should be noted that although we sometimes take ‘appearance’ broadly, as lending itself to all cognition in general, nevertheless when it is taken strictly, a major difference should be posited between proposition, appearance, and assent. For you are able to form a proposition without an appearance that it is so or not so—for example, that the stars are even in number—because you have no reason for one side or the other that is more naturally suited to cause the appearance of one side rather than the other. Furthermore, there can also be appearance without assent, for to anyone looking in a mirror, the image seems to be in the depth of the mirror, though we know that this is not so— which is why we do not assent to but dissent from that appearance.

490 The

argument mentioned here is from Questions on Aristotle’s De anima III.5, par. 15, where it occurs as an objection to the monopsychism of Averroes: if we all shared the same unique, indivisible intellect, we could not explain how one person could believe P and another not-P. But since Buridan rejects Averroes’ view on the intellect and also takes the affirmative side here, in this question, the argument in this paragraph appears to be specious, advanced only to populate the opposing side.

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bene quod secundum tactum fit sibi apparentia quod sint duo lapides, et tamen etiam visu scit quod non sunt duo. Et ita etiam intellectui rationes probabiles ad partes oppositas faciunt simul apparentias contrariarum propositionum, sed non assentimus ambabus. Dictum est autem in quaestione decimo sexta huius tertii quod propositiones non dicuntur contrariae secundum repugnantiam essendi simul in eodem subiecto, sed secundum repugnantiam essendi simul veras. Sed assensus illis propositionibus contrariis essent contrarii non solum secundum repugnantiam essendi simul veras, sed etiam secundum repugnantiam essendi simul in eodem. Ideo homo simul potest habere propositiones contrarias, sed non potest simul habere assensus contrarios, sive secundum diversos conceptus sive secundum sensum et intellectum. Apparentiae autem contrariarum propositionum dicuntur etiam contrariae vel quia sunt contrariarum propositionum vel quia si essent seorsum, essent innatae efficere contrarios assensus. Tamen in eodem non possunt simul facere eos, sicut licet lumen solis receptum in a¨ere sit calefactivum, et influentia alia a caelo recepta sit frigefactiva, tamen non possunt idem simul calefacere et frigefacere. 8. Dicam igitur quod apparentiae non sunt contrariae secundum repugnantiam essendi simul in eodem. Sed dicuntur contrariae sicut propositiones, scilicet secundum repugnantiam essendi simul veras; vel dicuntur contrariae quia sunt activae contrariarum assensuum, sicut dictum est de lumine et de virtute frigefactiva. Ideo nihil prohibet

75 quaestione decimo sexta huius tertii ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.16, par. 14. 72 etiam visu ] ipsi vere sciunt visum A 74 ambabus ] talibus VW 75 quaestione ] in marg. V || decimo ] om. W 76 dicuntur ] sunt A || repugnantiam ] apparentiam T 76–77 essendi . . . repugnantiam ] in marg. E 77 subiecto ] om. A || simul ] om. A 77–79 sed . . . veras ] in marg. E 78 assensus ] assentimus A in add. E 81 simul ] om. E 82 conceptus ] contrarios sensus AT 86 solis ] om. A 86–87 solis . . . et ] in marg. V 87 influentia . . . recepta ] ventus autem in aliqua alia virtus superior sive inferior sint in eodem a¨ere A ventus aliqua in eodem a¨ere ET || sit ] et actio recepta esset T 88 idem ] in marg. E 90–91 in . . . simul ] in marg. E 92 assensuum ] si essent seorsum add. T 93 lumine ] solis add. W

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And so as well, someone touching a stone with crossed fingers knows full well that an appearance that there are two stones is produced in him by touch, and yet he knows by sight that there are not two. And so likewise in the intellect, probable arguments on opposite sides produce appearances of contrary propositions at the same time, but we do not assent to both. But it was stated in question sixteen of Book III of this treatise that propositions are not called contraries because of the incompatibility of being in the same subject at the same time, but because of the incompatibility of being true at the same time. But the acts of assenting to those contrary propositions would be contrary not only because of the incompatibility of being true at the same time, but also because of the incompatibility of being in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, someone can have contrary propositions at the same time, but cannot have contrary acts of assent at the same time, whether on the basis of different concepts or on the basis of sense and intellect. But the appearances of contrary propositions are also called contraries, either because they are of contrary propositions or because if they were separate, they would naturally bring about contrary acts of assent. Still, they cannot produce these acts in the same thing at the same time. Analogously, even though sunlight received in the air is a warming agent and another force received from the heavens is a cooling agent, they cannot be heating and cooling the same thing at the same time. 8. I should say, therefore, that appearances are not contraries because of the incompatibility of being in the same thing at the same time. Rather, they are called contraries just like propositions—that is to say, because of the incompatibility of being true at the same time— or they are called contraries because they tend to activate contrary

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in eodem homine esse simul apparentias contrarias etiam secundum intellectum. Si igitur tu velis hoc nomen iudicium applicare ad apparentias, ego dico quod possibile est simul in eodem esse iudicia contraria. Sed si vis illud nomen restringere ad assensus, ego dicam quod hoc est impossibile. 9. Nunc igitur veniendum est ad appetitus. Et dico quod ad simplicem formationem propositionis non consequitur appetitus, sed sequitur ad apparentiam quod sit bonum vel malum, prosequendum vel fugiendum, et magis adhuc ad assentiendum. Ille autem appetitus qui consequitur ad apparentiam quod sit bonum vocatur amor seu complacentia, et ille qui consequitur ad apparentiam quod sit malum vocatur odium vel displicentia. Et isti appetitus solent dici primi motus ipsius appetitus, et non sunt contrarii secundum repugnantiam essendi simul in eodem, sicut nec apparentiae quas consequuntur. Unde manifestum est quod proiciens merces suas in mari habet in illo actu magnam displicentiam propter apparentiam damni, et tamen placet sibi propter apparentiam salvationis suae et aliorum. Illi tamen actus appetitus secundum complacentiam et displicentiam circa idem subiectum, vocantur contrarii attributive, scilicet quia sequuntur apparentias contrarias, puta quia hoc sit bonum et hoc sit malum, vel etiam quia innatae sunt, si essent seorsum, facere appetitus vere contrarios, sicut dicetur statim. 10. Dico igitur quod ad assensum seu iudicium assentivum consequitur alius actus appetitus qui non habet nomen proprium impositum, sed solet vocari appetitus efficax, quia statim ab eo sequitur actualis prosecutio vel fuga, si non sit prohibens aut defectus instrumenti requisiti ad motum prosecutionis vel fugae. Verbi gratia, si homo determinate assentit quod aliquid est ab eo prosequendum, statim consurgit

95 applicare ] ampliare AVW 97–98 Sed . . . impossibile ] rep. inv. A 99 Nunc igitur veniendum ] rep. V 102 assentiendum ] adhuc sensum add. A 103–104 qui consequitur . . . et ille ] in marg. E || bonum . . . quod sit ] hom. A 107 quas ] ad alias A 108 manifestum ] malum V 111 et displicentiam ] om. A 112 contrarii ] animae vel add. A 116–117 consequitur ] sequitur VW 117 proprium ] bene E 119 defectus ] effectus V 121 aliquid ] A ET || ab eo ] faciendum vel add. AE habes V || prosequendum ] vel fugiendum add. TVW

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acts of assent, as was said about sunlight and a cooling agent. Thus, nothing prevents contrary appearances from being in the same human being at the same time also as far as the intellect is concerned. Therefore, if you want the name ‘judgment’ to apply to appearances, I say that it is possible for contrary judgments to be in the same thing at the same time. But if you want to restrict that name to acts of assent, I will say that this is impossible. 9. So now we come to appetite. I say that appetite does not follow upon the simple formation of a proposition, but it does follow upon the appearance that something is good or bad, worthy of pursuit or avoidance—and even more in this regard does appetite follow the act of assenting. But the appetite following upon the appearance that it is good is called love or agreement, and the one following upon the appearance that it is bad is called hate or disagreement. And those appetites are usually said to be first movements of the appetite itself. They are not contrary due to the incompatibility of being in the same thing at the same time, just as the appearances they follow upon are not. For this reason, it is obvious that someone who throws his goods into the sea feels in that act a great disagreement because of the appearance of loss, and yet it is agreeable to him because of the appearance of his and the others’ being saved. Nevertheless, those appetitive acts of agreement and disagreement as regards the same subject are called contraries attributively, that is to say, because they follow upon contrary appearances, such as the appearances that this is good and this is bad, or because they would, if they were separate, naturally produce truly contrary appetites, as will be stated presently. 10. I say, then, that following upon the act of assent or the assenting judgment is another act of appetite which does not have a name of its own, but which is usually called ‘efficacious appetite’, because actual pursuit or flight immediately follows from it if there is no inhibiting agent or defect in the instrument required for the pursuing or fleeing movement. For example, if someone determinately assents to his

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appetitus efficax a quo sequitur prosecutio. Et illum actum appetitus aliqui vocant acceptationem, nomina enim significant ad placitum. Et similiter, si homo determinate assentiat quod aliquid est ab eo fugiendum, statim consequitur appetitus efficax ad fugiendum, quae aliqui vocant refutationem. 11. Ista tamen dicta sunt moderanda quantum ad voluntatem, quia propter eius libertatem, potest transire in actum talem licet assentive sic iudicat per intellectum quod est bonum et prosequendum vel malum et fugiendum. Sed appetitus non liber statim prorumpet in prosecutione, prout hoc alibi debet determinari. 12. Dicam igitur quod respectu eiusdem obiecti, appetitus efficax acceptans, quantum innata est facere complacentiam cum assensu, et appetitus efficax refutans, quantum innata est facere displicentiam cum dissensu, sunt ad invicem vere contrarii et non possibiles esse simul in homine vel in intellectu. 13. Et apparet quod secundum haec dicta, rationes in principio quaestionis hinc inde adductae procedunt viis suis.

131 alibi debet determinari. ] B URIDANUS, QQ. Met. I.5 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 5vb ). 122 sequitur ] om. V sit W 124 aliquid ] A ET 128 transire ] exire A 130 liber ] est add. V 135 vere ] om. A 136 in ] eodem add. E || vel in intellectu ] om. AT 137 apparet ] apparentiam V

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pursuing something, there immediately arises an efficacious appetite from which the pursuit follows. Some call this act of appetite ‘acceptance’, for names signify conventionally. And likewise, if someone were determinately to assent to her avoiding something, there immediately follows an appetite efficacious for fleeing, which some call ‘rejection’. 11. Nevertheless, these remarks must be altered where volition is concerned, because on account of its freedom, it is able to interfere with an act of this type, even if one judges with assent via the intellect that A is a good thing and worthy of pursuit, or a bad thing and worthy of avoidance.491 But an appetite that is not free would immediately issue in pursuit, as must be determined elsewhere. 12. I will say, therefore, that with respect to the same object, the accepting efficacious appetite, to the extent that it naturally produces agreement with assent, and the rejecting efficacious appetite, to the extent that it naturally produces disagreement with dissent, are truly contraries of each other and cannot possibly exist in a human being or in the intellect at the same time. 13. And it is clear that on the basis of these remarks, the arguments adduced on each side at the beginning of the question succeed in their own ways.

491

That is, given the aforementioned distinction between the will’s primary receptive act of agreement/disagreement, its secondary act of assent/dissent/deferment, and its tertiary act of pursuit/avoidance–the so-called “efficacious appetite”.

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Utrum natura faciat aliquid frustra vel etiam deficiat aliquando in necessariis.

5

10

1. Arguitur quod aliquid faciat frustra, quia facit aliquando sextum digitum in manu, qui frustra est quia nullius utilitatis est. Immo utilius et melius esset quod essent tantum quinque. 2. Item frustra dicitur quod ordinatur ad finem ad quem non attingit. Sic autem natura multa facit quia multotiens facit pedes et oculos qui numquam ambulabunt nec videbunt, et sic de aliis; igitur, etc. 3. Item natura frustra facit vermes et araneas et huiusmodi quia potius talia nocent quam sint alicuius utilitatis, propter quod talia nitimur interficere quantum possumus. 4. Item natura saepe deficit in necessariis, ut quia non facit homini pedes aut tibias, et saepe propter defectum necessariorum, fetus non potest pervenire ad finem, immo moritur in utero.

1–2 natura faciat aliquid frustra vel etiam deficiat aliquando in necessariis ] A RI STOTELES , De an. III.9 432b 21–23 (Ar. lat. XII.2 238.2.13): “Si igitur natura non facit frustra nihil neque deficit in necessariis, nisi in orbatis et imperfectis”. Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.168 (ed. Hamesse, 188): “Natura nihil facit frustra, unde non deficit in necessariis, nec abundat in superfluis.” 3 aliquid faciat frustra ] Cf. AVERROES, Comm. De an. III.45 (ed. Crawford, 513.14–20): “cum Natura nihil facit otiose, id est nullum membrum facit sine iuvamento, neque diminuit in rebus necessariis, id est neque abstulit animali membrum in quo habet iuvamentum necessarium (nisi hoc sit propter occasiones contingentes in minori parte, ut digitus sextus).” 1 Utrum ] Consequenter utrum V 7 multa ] aliquando add. A || facit ] talis add. E 8 et . . . etc. ] sed morientur A sed ante morientur E om. T 9 Item ] etiam E || natura ] similiter add. AE 9–10 quia potius talia ] quae fertius A 11 quantum ] inquantum V 12 natura ] om. AEVW © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 50

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Does nature do anything in vain, or is it even sometimes deficient in what is necessary?

1. It is argued that it does do something in vain, since it sometimes produces a sixth finger on a hand, which is in vain because it is of no use. Indeed, it would be better and more useful if there were just five. 2. Again, what is directed to an end which it does not reach is said to be in vain. But nature does many things like this because it often produces feet that will never walk, eyes that will not see, and so on; therefore, etc. 3. Again, nature produces worms and spiders and things of this sort in vain, since they are more harmful than they are of any use, which is why we try to kill them to the extent that we can. 4. Again, nature is often deficient in what is necessary, such as when it does not produce feet or legs in a human being. And often, because of a deficiency in what is necessary, a fetus cannot come to term, but dies in the womb.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 50

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5. Item Aristoteles in secundo Physicorum concedit in operationibus naturae contingere peccata. Illa autem vel sunt ex superfluitate vel ex defectu. Si igitur ex defectu sunt, deficit in necessariis, vocatur enim hoc necessarium: sine quo res non possunt se bene habere, quia non est quaestio de necessario simpliciter. Si autem sit peccatum ex superfluitate, tunc est frustra ex quo est superfluitas. 6. Item casus est idem quod natura, ut habetur secundo Physicorum, et tamen a casu proveniunt defectus in necessariis et abundantia in superfluis; igitur, etc. 7. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles hic et in primo Caeli, dicit enim quod “Deus et natura nihil faciunt frustra.” 8. Notandum quod dupliciter solemus aliquid dici frustra esse: uno modo, quia nullius bonitatis vel utilitatis aut simpliciter aut nobis; alio modo, quia ordinatur ad finem et non ad istum attingit. 9. Notandum est etiam quod hic non quaerimus de necessario simpliciter, scilicet quod non potest non esse aut quod non potest aliter se habere, et manifestum est quod tale non potest deficere. Sed quaerimus de necessario pro tali utilitate sine qua res non potest bene esse et bene se habere, sicut diceremus quod hominibus sunt pedes necessarii et oculi ut ambulet et videat, quia sine hiis non possunt bene vivere. 10. Et ex hoc statim aliquis inferet quod natura valde deficit in nobis necessariis, quia non dat nobis vestes et calciamenta, et cibos et 15 secundo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.8 199b 1–2 (Ar. lat. VII.1 88.2): “Si igitur sunt quaedam secundum artem in quibus quod recte fit propter aliquid fit, in quibus autem peccatur alicuius quidem gratia esse argumentatur sed fallit, similiter utique et in physicis, et monstra sunt peccata illius quod propter aliquid est.” 21–22 secundo Physicorum ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.6 198a5 (Ar. lat. VII.1 78.2): “Quoniam autem sunt casus et fortuna causae quorum utique aut intellectus fiat causa aut natura, cum secundum accidens causa aliqua fiat horum ipsorum.” Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. II.12 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 332–336). 24 hic et in primo Caeli ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.9 432b21–23. A RISTOTELES, De caelo I.4 271a 33 (Ar. lat. VIII.2): “Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 3.18 (ed. Hamesse, 161): “Deus et natura nihil faciunt frustra.” 15 concedit ] procedit V 20 quo est ] ibi add. E 22 a casu ] om. V 24 hic et ] om. V 26 dupliciter solemus ] dicimus AT || dupliciter ] tripliciter(!) T 27 vel utilitatis ] om. AT 28 alio modo ] aliquo modo V 30–31 aut . . . habere ] om. E 32–33 et bene se habere ] om. AT 34 vivere ] ambulare vel videre T 36–37 cibos et domos ] etc. AT et cibos et denarios VW

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5. Again, Aristotle grants in Physics II that faults are possible in the operations of nature. But these stem from either superfluity or deficiency. If from deficiency, then nature is deficient in what is necessary. For this is what we call ‘necessary’: that without which a thing cannot be properly disposed, since the question does not concern necessity without qualification. But if the fault stems from superfluity, then that on account of which the superfluity occurs is in vain. 6. Again, chance is the same as nature, as is held in Physics II, and yet from chance there arise deficiencies in what is necessary and abundances in what is superfluous; therefore, etc. 7. Aristotle says the opposite here and in On the Heavens I, for he says, “God and nature make nothing in vain.” 8. It should be noted that ordinarily, we say that something is in vain in two ways: in one way, because it is of no use or no good, either without qualification or relative to us; in another way, because it is directed to an end and does not reach it. 9. It should also be noted that we are not asking here about what is necessary without qualification, i.e., about what cannot not be, or cannot be differently disposed. It is obvious that something of that kind cannot fail. But we are asking about what is necessary for the kind of use without which a thing cannot be well and be well disposed, just as we would say that feet and eyes are necessary for human beings to walk and see, because without them, they cannot live well. 10. From this, someone will immediately infer that nature is highly deficient in what is necessary for us, because it does not give us cloth-

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domos, sine quibus tamen non possumus bene vivere. Immo oportet quod nos talia emamus, et tamen ipsa non dat nobis pecuniam ad emendum. 11. Solutio: dicendum quod ipsa dat nobis membra, sensationem, et rationem, et omnes vires per quas nos possumus talia acquirere, nisi sit orbatio. Et hoc debet sufficere, hoc enim non est deficere in necessariis. Sed si nos existentes fortes et integri non vellemus operari ad acquirendum talia, et inde male et defectuose viveremus, ille defectus non esset naturae, sed nobis imputandus. 12. Nunc igitur ponendae sunt conclusiones. 13. Prima est quod nihil est omnino quod simpliciter sit frustra quia nihil est quod non sit bonum, quia volitum a Deo. Nihil est enim quod non agatur et conservetur a Deo. Et Deus per intellectum et voluntatem agit et conservat quidquid agit et conservat. Et omne etiam quod est, est ordinatum in finem, scilicet in Deum qui est causa finalis omnium. Et omnia quodammodo attingunt ad istum finem, quia res naturales attingunt ad istum finem qui est Deus ut sibi assimilentur. Et omne ens quantum habet de esse tantum participat de similitudine ad ipsum Deum, qui maxime et primo est. Sic enim Deus nihil facit frustra quia nihil facit quod non sit bonum, nihil enim facit quod non sit finaliter ad ipsum ordinatum et quod non attingit ipsum secundum assimilationem, modo praedicto. 14. Secunda conclusio est quod multa sunt nobis frustra et superflua quia nobis multa sunt mala et nullius utilitatis ut vitia infirmitates, et huiusmodi, tamen quia illa innata sunt per nos ordinari in debitos fines in quos ea non ordinamus, ut piger vires corporales et avarus pecuniam. Immo etiam industria et ipsamet anima et corpus fierent

40 Solutio ] om. E 41 vires ] virtutes E 45 non . . . nobis ] esset a nobis et non naturae AT 50 et conservat ] quidquid agit AT 52 finem ] om. E 53 finem ] om. E || ut sibi assimilentur ] est ipsas fini assimilari AET est ipsas sibi assimilari V nam ipsas attingere finem scilicet Deum est ipsas sicut assimilari quantum possibile est eis add. W 54 esse ] entitate AT 56 quia . . . enim facit ] hom. A || quia nihil facit ] om. T 57 non ] om.(!) A 59–60 et superflua ] om. A tamen add. V add. in marg. W 60 utilitatis ] bonitatis A bonitatis sed potius nociva T || infirmitates ] om. AT 61 in debitos ] in determinatos E

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ing and shoes and food and shelter, without which we cannot live well. On the contrary, we must buy such things; and yet nature does not give us the money to buy them. 11. Solution: it must be said that nature gives us limbs, sensation, and reason, and all the powers by which we are able to acquire such things for ourselves, unless there is a deprivation. And this must suffice, for this is what it is not to be deficient in what is necessary. But if, while strong and able-bodied, we do not want to work to acquire such things and as a result live badly and defectively, the deficiency would not be on the part of nature but must be imputed to us. 12. Therefore, let us now provide some conclusions. 13. The first is that there is nothing which is utterly and completely in vain because there is nothing that is not good, since God has willed it. For there is nothing that is not made and conserved by God. God makes and conserves whatever he makes and conserves by his intellect and will. Furthermore, everything that exists is directed to an end, namely, to God, who is the final cause of all things. And all things somehow reach for this end, because natural things reach for the end, which is God, in order to assimilate themselves to it. And every entity, with as much being as it has, participates to that extent in the similitude of God himself, who exists first and foremost. In this way, then, God does nothing in vain because he produces nothing that is not good, for he produces nothing that is not finally directed to him and which does not reach him by assimilation, in the way just mentioned. 14. The second conclusion is that many things are in vain and superfluous relative to us because many things are bad for us and of no use to us, such as vices, infirmities, and things of that sort, because we still do not direct them to the ends to which they are naturally suited to be directed by us, as the sluggard with physical strength and the

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nobis frustra si non ordinemus ea ad actus virtutum. Multae etiam operationum nostrarum fiunt saepe nobis frustra eo quod non possumus ad illum finem pervenire ad quem ordinemus eas, ut si vado ad forum propter emere bladum et nihil invenio, illa via seu itio sit mihi frustra. Sic igitur multa facimus frustra quia non sunt nobis bona sed mala, vel quia non venimus ad finem propter quam illa facimus. 15. Tertia conclusio est quod non solum in nobis immo etiam in aliis naturalibus multa inveniuntur frustra et superflua, cum quia sibi non convenientia sed disconvenientia, ut aquae caliditas et frumento nimia pluvia, cum etiam quia non proveniunt ad finem quem natura intendebat, ut si flores ex frigere exstinguantur et non veniunt ad fructum, et similiter formatio fetus in utero, si non veniat ad vitam, vel plura talia. Unde sic bene manifestum est quod natura multa frustra facit, et sibi et habenti eam. 16. Quarta conclusio est quod natura saepe deficit in necessariis ita quod facit multa corpora naturalia quibus deficiunt aliqua membra vel aliquae dispositiones quae essent requisitae vel requisita ad bene esse seu permanentiam istorum convenienter, ut si faciat hominem sine pedibus aut oculis, aut si faceret fetum non potentem propter defectum vivere usque ad nativitatem, sicut prius fuit argutum. 17. Quinta conclusio est quam ut puto intendit Aristoteles: quod nulla natura agens sine cognitione agit aliquid frustra vel superfluum, nec aliquid defectuosum secundum propriam eius speciem, nisi hoc proveniat ex defectu vel ineptitudine suarum instrumentalium dispositionum, vel ex inepta dispositione materiae, aut est ex concursu aliorum agentium vel impedimentorum extrinsecorum. Et causa in huiusmodi est quia in agendo, ipsa dirigitur a Deo infallibiliter cognoscente, prout debet videri in Metaphysica. Et propter has causas 91 Metaphysica ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, Met. I.2 983a8–9 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 17.149): “Deus enim videtur causarum omnibus esse et principium quoddam, et talem aut solus aut maxime Deus habet.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 1.278 (ed. Hamesse, 138): “Etiam bonum universi consistit in primo principio ad quod omnia ordinantur.” Cf. B UR IDANUS , QQ. Met. XII.6 (Parisiis 1518, ff. 67va –69vb ); XII.13 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 75rb –76rb). 65 nostrarum . . . saepe ] facit A fiunt E 67 bladum ] om. A 69 facimus ] ergo, etc. add. AT 71 inveniuntur ] in eis add. ET || et superflua ] om. VW 72 caliditas ] frigiditas(!) E 73 nimia ] om. A 74 frigere ] bruma T || exstinguantur et ] adurantur et temnentur T 75–77 et similiter . . . eam ] etc. T 75 formatio fetus ] formae A formatio E || veniat ] ad fructum vel add. VW 82 faceret ] formaret AE format speciem T 87 ex ] habundantia vel add. A 88 concursu ] mediante add. A 90 infallibiliter ] ideo faciliter V

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miser with money. Indeed, even hard work, and our very souls and bodies, would become pointless for us should we fail to direct them to virtuous acts. In addition, a great many activities become pointless for us because we cannot reach the ends to which we have directed them, e.g., if I stroll over to the market in order to buy wheat and find none, then that journey or walk is for me in vain. In this way, then, we do many things in vain because they are not good for us but bad, or because we fail to arrive at the end for the sake of which we do them. 15. The third conclusion is that many things are found to be in vain and superfluous not only in us but in other natural things as well when they do not agree but disagree with each other, as heat disagrees with water and too much rain is bad for grain; and also when they do not reach the end nature intended, e.g., if flowers are destroyed by cold and do not come to fruition; and similarly, the formation of the fetus in the uterus, if it does not come to life; and several other examples of this sort. For this reason, it is quite obvious that nature does many things pointlessly, both with respect to itself and to what possesses it. 16. The fourth conclusion is that nature is often deficient in what is necessary, such that it produces many natural bodies lacking any limbs or dispositions needed for their well-being or adapted to their continued survival, such as if it were to produce a human being without feet or eyes, or a fetus unable to survive up to the moment of its birth due to a defect, as was argued above.492 17. The fifth conclusion is what I think Aristotle intends: that no natural agent lacking cognition brings about anything pointless or superfluous or defective in its proper species unless this arises from a defect or ineptitude in its instrumental disposition, from an inept material disposition, or from the contribution of other agents or external impediments. The reason in such cases is that in acting, it is directed by an infallibly knowing God, as should be seen in the Metaphysics. But due to the aforementioned

492 See

par. 4 above.

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contingit in operationibus naturae peccatum, et monstruositates et defectus, prout debet videri in secundo Physicorum. Notandum est quod multum differt actio naturae sine cognitione ab actione humana per intellectum et voluntatem, saepe enim agendo peccamus quia erroneae iudicamus. Hoc communiter fit in iudicione secundum malitiam, namque corrumpit iudicium rationis et mentiri facit circa principia practica, sicut habetur sexto Ethicorum. 18. Ad rationes in principio quaestionis, apparet quod non procedunt contra dicta. Et Aristoteles etiam simpliciter non dixit quod natura nihil facit frustra, nec deficit in necessariis, sed apposuit “nisi in orbatis.”

93 secundo Physicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Phys. II.8 199b 1–2; De gen. an. IV.4 770b 16–17. Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Phys. II.12 (ed. Streijger et Bakker, 332–336). 98 sexto Ethicorum ] A RISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. VI.12 1144a35 (Ar. lat. XXVI.2.2 269.13): “Pervertit enim malitia et mentiri facit circa practica principia.” Cf. B URIDANUS, QQ. Eth. ad Nic. VII.7 (ed. Parisiis 1513, f. 144vb). 101 apposuit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.9 432b21–23. 95–96 quia . . . iudicamus ] om. E || quia erroneae ] om. A 96–97 iudicione . . . namque ] vitiosis malita namque 97 iudicium rationis ] om. AET || principia ] praedicta vel add. A 98 practica ] et melius add. A 99 apparet quod ] adductae AET

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causes, mistakes—both monstrosities and defects—occur in the operations of nature, as should be seen in Physics II. It should also be noted that there is a big difference between the action of nature lacking in cognition and human action occurring by intellect and will, for we often make mistakes in acting because we judge erroneously. This commonly happens in judgments made from wickedness, for wickedness corrupts the judgment of reason and leads to deception about practical principles, as is held in Nicomachean Ethics VI. 18. As for the arguments made the beginning of the question, it is clear that they do not go against what has been said. Indeed, Aristotle did not say without qualification that nature does nothing in vain, nor is it deficient in what is necessary, but he added, “unless there is a deprivation.”

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Utrum potentia motiva secundum locum sit vegetativa vel sensitiva vel intellectiva vel appetitiva vel aliqua alia potentia animae praeter istas.

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1. Et arguitur quod non sit vegetativa, quia tunc conveniret plantis, quod est falsum, quia semper manent in eodem loco affixis terrae, nisi per violentiam auferantur. 2. Sed aliqui cavillant, dicentes quod licet plantae habeant animam motivam, tamen non moventur quia deficiunt eis instrumenta requisita ad motum, ut pedes aut alae et huiusmodi. 3. Sed contra hanc cavillationem obicitur quia natura perfecta in sua specie vel in suo genere et non impedita, nec facit aliquid frustra nec deficit in necessariis. Ideo in nullis naturalibus secundum totas species eorum invenitur defectus in necessariis, nec abundantia in superfluis, licet haec in aliquibus suppositis inveniantur. Sed si esset in plantis potentia motiva, illa esset frustra secundum totum genus plantarum, quia non posset in operationem suam ad quam ordinatur finaliter, et esset secundum totum genus plantarum, defectus in necessariis, scilicet in instrumentis requisitis ad opus illius potentiae, scilicet ad motum localem; igitur, etc. 4. Oppositum arguitur quia in animalibus quandoque cessantibus omnibus aliis potentiis animae ab operationibus praeter potentiam

1 potentia motiva ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.9 432a15–20. 8–9 deficiunt eis instrumenta requisita ad motum ] Cf. AQUINAS, Sent. de an. III.9, lect. 14, n. 811. 11–12 frustra nec deficit in necessariis ] B URIDANUS, QQ. De an. III.19. 1 motiva ] animalis add. AET 9 requisita ] om. E 10 cavillationem ] responsionem AT || natura ] om. V 11–12 frustra . . . nullis ] om. V 12 totas ] om. T 13 in ] suis add. V 15 frustra ] non solum secundum speciem sed add. T 19 igitur, etc. ] om. A 20 quandoque ] quantumque A © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 51

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Is the locomotive power the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, appetitive, or some other power of the soul besides these?

1. And it is argued that it is not vegetative, because plants would have it, which is false because they always remain fixed to the same place in the earth unless they are violently uprooted. 2. But some raise a quibble, saying that although plants have a motive soul, they are nevertheless not moved because they lack the instrumental means required for motion, such as feet, or wings, and things of this sort. 3. But to this quibble it is replied that a nature perfect in its species or genus, and unimpeded, does not do anything in vain, nor is it lacking in what is necessary. Thus, neither deficiency in what is necessary nor abundance in what is superfluous is found in any natural things as far as their entire species is concerned, although this is found in some individuals. But if there were a motive power in plants, it would be in vain as far as the entire genus of plants is concerned because it could not perform its activity, to which it is directed as to its end, and there would be a defect in what is necessary as far as the entire genus of plants is concerned, that is to say, a defect in the instrumental means required for the activity of that power, namely, for local motion; therefore, etc. 4. The opposite is argued, because whenever all the other powers of the soul in animals have ceased their activities except the vegeta-

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9 51

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vegetativam, ut in perfecto somno, inveniuntur motus locales membrorum principalium, ut cordis ad pulsum et pulmonis ad respirationem; igitur illi motus sunt per potentiam vegetativam. 5. Deinde arguitur quod illa potentia motiva non sit potentia sensitiva, quia tunc sequeretur quod in omnibus inveniretur animalibus, quod est falsum, quia sunt animalia, ut ostreae et conchae, quae secundum totas suas species sunt immotiva et affixa terrae per radices, sicut plantae. 6. Item continentes moventur contra iudicio sensus consequentes rationem, tanquam motus ille non sit actus potentiae sensitivae. 7. Sed oppositum arguitur quia omnibus et solis animalibus convenit potentia sensitiva, ideo quod est proprium animalibus debet attribui potentiae sensitivae. Sed proprium est animalibus motus localis successive ad partes contrarias et ex se, omnibus enim animalibus hoc convenit, ut ambulare nunc huc nunc illuc. Immo in animalibus minus perfectis et terrae affixis, ut ostreis et conchis, convenit moveri nunc se dilatando et aperiendo, nunc se restringendo et claudendo. Et non convenit hoc aliis quam animalibus.

27 animalia ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.9 432b 19–20 (Ar. lat. XII.2 238.2.13): “Similiter autem neque sensitivum: multa enim sunt animalium quae sensum quidem habent, manentia autem et immobilia sunt per finem.” 30 contra iudicio sensus ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433b7–9 (Ar. lat. XII.2 244.1.25): “intellectus quidem enim propter futurum retrahere iubet, concupiscentia autem propter ipsum iam; videtur enim quod iam delectabile et simpliciter delectabile et bonum simpliciter, propterea quod non videtur quod futurum.” 32–33 omnibus et solis animalibus convenit potentia sensitiva ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.12 434a30 (Ar. lat. XII.2 252.1.14): “Animal autem necesse sensum habere, si nihil frustra facit natura.” Cf. Auc. Ar. 6.174 (ed. Hamesse, 189): “Necesse est omne animal habere sensus.” 23 ut ] motus add. A || ad pulsum ] om. E 24 sunt ] proprie add. A 25 potentia motiva ] om. T 30 continentes ] incontinentes W || moventur ] dimittunt motus A sequentem rationem add. T 31 sit ] per se add. VW 34 est ] omnibus add. T 35 partes ] differentias add. T 36 ambulare ] natare add. E localis volare etc. add. T || nunc huc ] om. A 36–37 minus perfectis ] imperfectis A 38 et aperiendo ] et ampliando T || restringendo ] constringendo T || non ] om. (!) A 39 animalibus ] igitur etc. add. AE

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tive power, as in the case of a dreamless sleep, local motions of its principal members are found to occur, such as the heart beating and the lungs breathing; therefore, these motions occur by means of the vegetative power. 5. Next it is argued that the motive power is not a sensitive power, because then it would follow that it would be found in all animals, which is false, since there are animals such as oysters and mussels, which, as far as their entire species is concerned, are immobile and fixed to the earth by means of roots, just like plants. 6. Again, the continent person, following reason, is moved against what is agreeable to the judgment of sense, as if that motion were not an act of the sensitive power. 7. But the opposite is argued, since the sensitive power is applicable to all and only animals, and so what is the proper attribute of animals must be attributed to the sensitive power. But moving locally in contrary directions successively and autonomously is the proper attribute of animals, for it is applicable to all animals, as when they move first in one direction and then another. Indeed, in less perfect animals fixed to the earth, such as oysters and mussels, the appropriate motion exists in their first dilating and opening themselves and then restricting and closing themselves. This does not happen in anything except animals.493

493 Of

course, the proper identification of this phenomenon in carnivorous plants, such as the Venus Flytrap, did not occur for another five centuries.

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8. Demum arguitur quod non sit intellectiva, quia tunc non conveniret brutis sed solum hominibus, quod est falsum. 9. Item incontinens movetur secundum iudicium sensus, dimittens iudicium rationis et intellectus, tanquam intellectus non sit dominus talis motus. 10. Oppositum arguitur de continentibus, qui contra iudicium sensus moventur et agunt secundum rationem et maxime virtuosi, qui sunt homines nobiliores et excellentiores. Omnia agunt cum ratione et nihil contra. Et a principaliori et nobiliori debet fieri simpliciter denominatio. 11. Demum arguitur quod non sit appetitiva, quia non est aliud appetitiva quam intellectiva, si sit appetitus intellectualis, vel sensitiva, si sit appetitus sensualis. Dicit enim Aristoteles, “non enim alterum, appetitivum et fugitivum, nec ab invicem nec a sensitivo.” Sed argutum est quod ista potentia motiva nec sit sensitiva nec intellectiva; ergo, etc. 12. Oppositum arguitur ex nono Metaphysicae, ubi dicitur, “quod enim desiderabit principaliter, hoc faciet.” 13. Incipiendo aliter quam Aristoteles hic incipiat, dicamus quod animata valde diversis et multis motibus inveniuntur moveri et membra eorum. Primo secundum exigentiam elementi determinantis, animal enim si esset sursum et non detentum, caderet deorsum sicut lapis; secundo modo per violentiam potest trahi et pelli; tertio modo etiam alteratur ab extrinseco, ut si calefiat ab igne. Et manifestum est quod illi motus non attribuntur potentiis animae. Demum moven-

42–43 dimittens iudicium rationis et intellectus ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.9 433a 1–3. 45 continentibus ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De an. III.9 433a 7–8. 52 Dicit enim Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.7 431a 12–14 (Ar. lat. XII.2 229.1.11): “Et non alterum appetitivum et fugitivum neque ab inuicem neque a sensitivo, sed esse aliud est.” 56 nono Metaphysicae ] A RISTOTELES, Met. IX.5 1048a11–12 (Ar. lat. XXV.3.1 184.163): “Quod enim desiderabit principaliter, hoc faciet.” 48 simpliciter ] om. T 51 intellectualis ] naturalis E 51–52 vel . . . Aristoteles ] om. E arguitur . . . Aristoteles om. T 54 nec intellectiva ] in(!) intellectiva A 56 arguitur ] et habetur add. E 57 enim ] non(!) AEVW om. T || hoc faciet ] et facies T 58 aliter ] alterius AE 59 animata ] animalia V 61 non ] nisi E 62 secundo ] tertio(!) V

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8. Furthermore, it is argued that the motive power is not intellective because in that case it would not be applicable to brute animals, but only to humans, which is false. 9. Again, the incontinent person is moved in keeping with the judgment of sense, dismissing the judgment of reason and intellect, as if the intellect were not in charge of such motions. 10. The opposite is argued regarding continent persons, who are moved against the judgment of sense and who act in accordance with reason, but especially regarding the virtuous, who are nobler and more excellent human beings. They do everything in accordance with reason and never act against it. And the denomination without qualification must be made from what is more fundamental and nobler. 11. Furthermore, it is argued that the motive power is not appetitive, since the appetitive power is nothing but the intellective power, if it is the intellectual appetite; or the sensitive power, if it is the sensory appetite. For Aristotle says, “so desire and avoidance are not different, either from each other or from the sensitive faculty.” But it has been argued that the motive power is neither sensitive nor intellective; therefore, etc. 12. The opposite is argued on the basis of Metaphysics IX, where it is said, “whatever [an animal] chiefly desires, it will do.” 13. Beginning in a different way than Aristotle would begin here, let us say that living things, and their limbs, are found to be moved by many, highly diverse motions. First, they are moved in keeping with the exigencies of the determining element, for if an animal is raised up and not supported, it would fall downward like a stone; second, it can be violently pulled and pushed; and third, it is altered by something external to it, e.g., if it is heated by fire. And it is obvious that these

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tur animata motu nutritionis et augmentationis, ad quos multi modi motuum concurrunt, ut sumptio alimenti, decoctio alimenti, attractio alimenti per membra, digestio per alterationem, et conversio in substantiam. Et tales motus attribuuntur animae secundum potentiam vegetativam. In animalibus autem perfectarum specierum, movetur cor motu dilationis et constrictionis ad mittendum spiritus vitales per totum corpus, et provenit idem pulsus per singula membra. Et iste motus attribuitur potentiae vegetativae quia iste sit nobis dormientibus et non cognoscentibus sicut cognoscentibus. 14. Verum est tamen quod iste motus aliquando impeditur aliqualiter, vel retardatur vel velocitatur per sensitivas apprehensiones causantes passiones appetitus sensitivi, ut iram, timorem, delectationem, tristitiam, et huiusmodi. Et quantum ad hoc, ille motus bene attribuitur potentiae sensitivae et potentiae appetitivae concurrente cum operatione vegetativae. 15. Postea in habentibus sanguinem, quaedam partes moventur ad refrigerium cordis, ut branchiae in piscibus et pulmo in respirantibus. Et iste motus attribuitur potentiae vegetativae, quia etiam dormiendo et nihil cognoscendo, sit nobis ille motus. Sed tamen potentia cognoscitiva et appetitiva potest istum motum diversificare, et hoc dedit nobis natura ad vociferandum sicut vellemus, sicut etiam labia et dentes et linguam movemus per sensum et appetitum sensitivum ad comedendum vel loquendum.

66–67 attractio alimenti ] om. E 67 per membra ] ad membra AET 68 substantiam ] nutrimenti add. ET || attribuuntur ] ipsae add. E 73 cognoscentibus ] sicut add. V 76 timorem ] amorem add. E 77 tristitiam ] om. A 80 quaedam partes ] om. AETV 81 ut ] om. V 82 potentiae ] om. A 83 potentia ] om. V 84 istum ] alium T 86 sensitivum ] ut add. A

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motions are not attributed to powers of the soul. Furthermore, living things are moved by the motion of nutrition and growth, in relation to which many kinds of motion occur, e.g., the taking up of food, the ingestion of food, the extraction of nutrients by the limbs, digestion through alteration, and conversion into substance.494 Such motions are attributed to the soul in keeping with the vegetative power. Indeed, in animals belonging to perfect species, the heart is moved by the motions of dilation and constriction to send vital spirits through the entire body, and it produces the same pulse through individual limbs. This motion is attributed to the vegetative power since it is in us when we are sleeping and not conscious, just as it is when we are conscious. 14. Still, it is true that this motion is sometimes impeded in some way, either slowed down or speeded up by sensitive apprehensions which cause passions in the sensitive appetite, such as anger, fear, joy, sadness, and others of this sort. And this motion is correctly attributed to the sensitive power and the appetitive power insofar as it accompanies the activity of the vegetative part of the soul. 15. Next, in those things that have blood, certain parts are moved to cool the heart, such as the gills in fish and the lungs in animals that breathe. And this motion is attributed to the vegetative power, since it occurs in us even when we are asleep and unconscious. But even so, cognitive and appetitive powers can diversify that motion. Nature gave this to us so we can speak as we wish, just as we also move our lips, teeth, and tongue by sense and sensitive appetite in order to eat or speak.

494 The

motions mentioned here — ‘taking up [sumptio]’, ‘ingestion [decoctio]’, ‘extraction [attractio]’, ‘digestion [digestio]’, and ‘conversion [conversio]’ — have been translated so as to suggest an orderly process, although it is unclear whether Buridan thought of them that way.

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16. Item animalia affixa terrae viventia per radices moventur per sensum et appetitum motu dilationis et constrictionis, apud enim apprehensionem convenientem, aperiunt se ad amplectendum, et apud apprehensionem disconvenientem, claudunt se ad repellendum. Alia autem bruta et per sensum et appetitum sensitivum moventur de uno loco ad alium locum distantem. Et etiam tunc illa bruta per sensum et per appetitum sensitivum movent nervos et membra motibus requisitis ad motus illos totales ipsorum animalium de uno loco ad alterum. Unde requiruntur organa corporea diversa ad diversos motus, ut pedes ad ambulandum et alae ad volandum, etc., de quibus determinandum est particulariter in libro De animalibus. 17. Homines autem illos motus exercent aliquando per sensum et appetitum sensitivum, aliquando autem non, sed per intellectum et voluntatem, saepius enim sequuntur iudicium sensus sicut bruta, nihil aut modicum ratiocinantes. Et aliquando ratiocinantes dimittunt iudicium rationis et consequuntur sensum, ut incontinentes; aliquando autem dimittentes iudicium sensus consequuntur rationem, ut continentes et virtuosi. Et sic apparet quod homo talibus motibus movetur nec semper per sensum et appetitum sensitivum, nec semper per intellectum et appetitum intellectivum, sed semper per hunc vel per istum.

98 De animalibus ] Cf. A RISTOTELES, De part. an. IV.12 694a26–b 12. 90 amplectendum ] apprehendum(?) T 92–94 sensitivum moventur . . . movent ] hom. A 92 sensitivum ] om. E sensibus V 93 distantem ] om. AT 94 sensitivum ] sensibus V || membra ] etiam membris add. A 100 non ] om. T 102 ratiocinantes ] rationabiles A 103 sensum ] non convenienter add. A aliter add. V 104 rationem ] convenientes add. A || ut ] et A 105–106 movetur nec semper ] movetur nec AT 106 et ] nec semper per T 106–107 nec semper per intellectum et appetitum intellectivum ] hom. E 106 semper ] om. AT 107 et ] nec semper per T

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16. Again, animals fixed to the earth and living on roots are moved via sense and appetite by the motion of dilation and constriction, for, confronted by an agreeable apprehension, they open to embrace it, and confronted by a disagreeable apprehension, they close to repel it. Other brute animals, however, are moved by both sense and sensitive appetite from one place to another farther away. And so too, those brutes move sinews and limbs by sense and sensitive appetite with the movements required for the entire motion of that animal from place to place. That is why different corporeal organs are needed for different motions, such as feet for walking and wings for flying, etc., the details of which must be determined in The Parts of Animals. 17. Humans, however, sometimes exercise those motions by sense and sensitive appetite, and sometimes not, but rather by intellect and will instead, for more often they follow the judgment of sense, just like brute animals, with little or no reasoning. And sometimes when they are reasoning, they dismiss the judgment of reason and follow sense, as the incontinent man does; and sometimes they dismiss the judgment of sense and follow reason, as the continent and virtuous man does. And so it is clear that humans are moved in such motions neither always by sense and sensitive appetite, nor always by intellect and intellective appetite, but always by one or the other.

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115

120

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18. Et quia Aristoteles in isto tertio intendebat de tali motu locali animalis, scilicet de uno loco ad alium locum remotum, ideo potest concludi quod in omni tali motu animalis secundum locum, potentia motiva est potentia cognoscitiva et potentia appetitiva. Et quia etiam virtus cognoscitiva et virtus appetitiva moventur a cognoscibili et appetibili, ideo tandem concludit Aristoteles quod primum motivum animalis secundum locum est cognoscibile vel appetibile. Deinde etiam quando homo movetur secundum rationem et intellectum, Aristoteles ostendit quae ratio movet et quae non; dicit quod ratio speculativa non movet quia non concludit aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum, prosequendum vel fugiendum. Demum etiam ratio universalis practica non movet, ut si arguo quod semper bene agendum est cum aptitudo iusta fieret; iuste autem agere est bene agere; igitur iuste agendum est. Ego per illam rationem non moveor. Sed ratio practica descendens ad singularia est quae movet, ut si arguo febricitans sitiens debet potare tisanam; sed ego sum febricitans sitiens, et hoc est tisana; statim moveor ad potandum, si non sit impedimentum. Et si aliqua sunt de hoc dicenda amplius, illa videantur septimo Ethicorum.

113 concludit Aristoteles ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.10 433a 13 (Ar. lat. XII.2 244.1.6): “Utraque ergo haec motiva secundum locum, intellectus et appetitus.” 115–116 Aristoteles ostendit ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.9 433a1–3 (Ar. lat. XII.2 238.2.29): “Amplius et precipiente intellectu et dicente intelligentia fugere aliquid aut persequi, non movetur, sed secundum concupiscentiam agit, ut incontinens.” 121–122 ratio practica descendens ad singularia est quae movet ] A RISTOTELES, De an. III.11 434a 17–20 (Ar. lat. XII.2 249.12.2): “Quoniam autem haec quidem uniuersalis existimatio et ratio, alia vero particularis (haec quidem enim dicit quod oportet talem tale agere, haec autem quod hoc quidem tale et ego talis), iam hec movet opinio, non quae uniuersalis; aut utraque, sed haec quidem quiescens magis, haec autem non.” Cf. De motu an. 7 701a32. 125 septimo Ethicorum ] B URIDAN US , QQ. Eth. ad Nic. VII.8 (ed. Parisiis 1513, ff. 144vb –145vb ). 110–111 potentia motiva . . . et ] hom. V 111–112 Et quia . . . appetitiva ] hom. T 114 secundum locum ] ipsum T || cognoscibile vel ] ipsum A 117 faciendum ] om. A 119–120 cum . . . agendum est ] hom. V 119 aptitudo ] appetendi W 123 sed ] om. VW || sitiens ] om. AE

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18. Since Aristotle intended in De Anima III to treat of animal locomotion, that is to say, of motion from one place to another distant place, it can be concluded that in all such animal locomotion, the motive power is a cognitive power and an appetitive power. In addition, since the cognitive and appetitive powers are moved by what can be cognized and desired, Aristotle finally concludes that the first mover of an animal from place to place is what can be cognized or desired. Then, when a man is moved by reason and intellect, Aristotle shows which reason is the mover and which not. He says that speculative reason is not a mover because it does not conclude that something should be done or not done, pursued or avoided. Likewise, universal practical reason is not a mover. Suppose I reason that one must always act well when a just aptitude is produced; but to act justly is to act well; therefore, one must act justly. By this argument I am not moved to act. But practical reason descending to singulars is a mover, such as when I reason that someone who is feverish and thirsty should drink tea; but I am feverish and thirsty, and this is tea; immediately I am moved to drink it, if nothing prevents me. If there are further issues to be discussed here, look for them in Questions on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VII.

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19. Et sic patet satis quomodo secundum praedicta procedunt rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis. Et sic est finis huius ultimae quaestionis, et per consequens totius libri.

128 libri ] Explicit A: Et sic per dei gratiam et auxilium finitae sunt quaestiones peroptime super tribus libris de anima Aristotelis compilatae per excellentissimum doctorem artium magistrum Johannem Buridanum Parisius. Et scriptae per me Fredericum de Meyssenam sub anno domini 1382 indictione quarta quarta die mensis Mai, etc. Explicit T: Expliciunt quaestiones de anima etc. Explicit V: Expliciunt quaestiones libri de anima compilatae per reverendum magistrum Johannem Buridanum per manus Nicolaii de Farchas Hida(?) reportatae Wienne in studio generali sub anno domini 1397, lauda scriptorem donec in veniens meliorem. Explicit W: Et in hoc terminantur quaestiones libri tertii de anima et per consequens totius libri, de cuius finitione benedictum sit nomen domini nostri Jesu Christi omnipotenti dei et almae genetrix domini nostri Mariae semper virginis de quorum gloriosi nominis virtute haec facta sunt et in perpetuum quaecumque fieri credimus perennis deo gratias et omnibus sanctis a me pectore humiliter adaptandas. Terminantur in quo(?) anno domini 1393 currente anno in laudabili studio Wyennsi per me Hinricum Oltingh de Oytha, etc. 127 quae fiebant in principio quaestionis ] ante oppositum VW 127–128 ultimae ] om. E tertii T 128 et per . . . libri ] et finis huius tertii etc. T et sic finit quaestio add. A de anima add. E de quo sit laus deo benedicto add. V

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19. And so it is clear enough how the arguments made at the beginning of the question would proceed based on what has been said above. This is the end of Book III, and so as well of the entire treatise.

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. 2017. “Buridan on Sense Perception and Sensory Awareness.” Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others. Ed. Gyula Klima, 157–68. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, 3. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. . 2018. “Aquinas’ Balancing Act: Balancing the Soul between the Realms of Matter and Pure Spirit.” Bochumer Jahrbuch f¨ur Antike und Mittelalter 21: 29–48. Kuksewicz, Zdzisław. 1961. “Remarque au catalogue des manuscrits des oeuvres de Jean Buridan. Un recueil des questions dans le manuscrit Paris Bibl. Nat. 15888.” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 9: 31–39. Lagerlund, Henrik. 2017. “Awareness and Unity of Conscious Experience: Buridan on the Common Sense.” Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others. Ed. Gyula Klima, 149–156. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, 3. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. Lindberg, David C. 1976. Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lohr, Charles. 1970. “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Jacobus-Johannes Juff.” Traditio 26: 161–183. Longeway, John. 2009. “Medieval Theories of Demonstration.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2009 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2009/entries/demonstration-medieval/ Markowski, Mieczysław. 1971. Buridanisme en Pologne avant Copernic. Studia Copernicana 2. Wrocław: Gdanst. . 1984. “L’Influence de Jean Buridan sur les universit´es d’Europe Centrale.” In Preuve et raisons a` l’universit´e de Paris: logique, ontologie et th´eologie au XIVe si`ecle. Ed. Z´enon Kaluza and Paul Vignaux, 149–63. Paris: Vrin. . 1988. “Der Buridanismus an der Krakauer Universit¨at im Mittelalter.” In Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. Ed. Olaf Pluta, 245–60. Amsterdam: B. R. Gr¨uner. Marshall, Peter C. 1983. “Parisian Psychology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litt´eraire du moyen aˆ ge 50: 101–193.

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Michael, Bernd. 1985. Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zu Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des sp¨aten Mittelalters. Bds. 1–2. Freie Universit¨at Berlin: Inaugural-Dissertation. Palacz, Ryszard. 1970. “Les trait´es de Jean Buridan conserv´es dans les manuscrits de la Biblioth`eque du Chapitre a` Prague.” Medievalia Philosophica Polonorum 14: 53–54. Pironet, Fabienne. 2001. “The Notion of non velle in Buridan’s Ethics.” In The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan. Ed. J. M. M. H. Thijssen and Jack Zupko, 199–219. Leiden-Boston-K¨oln: Brill. de Raedemaeker, Jozef. 1963. “Une e´ bauche de catalogue des commentaires sur le De anima, parus aux XIIIe et XVe si`ecles.” Bulletin de philosophie m´edi´evale 5: 149–83. Read, Stephen. 2019. “Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2019 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2019/entries/medieval-terms/ Smith, A. Mark. 2004. “What Is the History of Medieval Optics Really About?” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 148.2: 180–194. Sobol, Peter G. 2017. “John Buridan on External and Internal Sensation” In Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others. Ed. Gyula Klima, 95–106. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, 3. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. ¨ Unterkircher, Franz. 1969. Die datierten Handschriften der Osterreichischen Nationalbibliothek bis zum Jahre 1400, Katalog der ¨ datierten Handschriften in lateinischer Schrift in Osterreich. Vienna: B¨ohlau. Zupko, Jack. 1993a. “Nominalism Meets Indivisibilism.” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 3: 158–85. . 1994–97. “How It Played in the rue de Fouarre: The Reception of Adam Wodeham’s Theory of the complexe significabile in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century.” Franciscan Studies 54: 211–25.

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. 1995. “Freedom of Choice in Buridan’s Moral Psychology.” Mediaeval Studies 57: 75–99. . 2003. John Buridan: Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master. Publications in Medieval Studies. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. . 2018. “John Buridan.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2018 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato. stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/buridan/

973

I NDEX

OF

NAMES

Index of Names Albertus Magnus: II.7.6; II.24.4 Alexander (of Aphrodisias): II.18.3; III.3.10, 26–32; 4.1, 13, 18–22; 5.11, 19; 6.16, 25, 29; 8.32 Aristotle: I.1.8, 12; I.2.10, 21, 24; I.3.4, 6–7, 15; I.4.1–2, 7–8, 17–18; I.5.6, 8, 15–16; I.6.1, 8–9, 15; II.1.1, 2, 4, 6–8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 21–23, 28, 30–32; II.2.2, 3, 5, 9, 16–19, 21, 30–33, 35, 39, 41; II.3.1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 21; II.4.1, 4, 8, 9, 16, 17, 24; II.5.6, 12, 14, 16, 17–19, 29, 36; II.6.2–4, 7, 12, 14, 21; II.7.6, 11, 18–22, 24, 26, 35, 46; II.8.2, 5, 6, 9, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21; II.9.1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 20, 23, 33, 34, 36, 37; II.10.1–3, 7, 8, 10,

13, 15, 19–28; II.11.2, 8, 9, 17, 18, 26; II.12.2–5, 9, 13; II.13.1, 2, 3, 5, 9–11, 23, 27, 29; II.14.1, 5, 11; II.15.2, 5, 7, 14; II.16.7; II.17.6, 8, 12, 15; II.18.2–4, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 23, 25, 32, 38, 39, 43, 45, 49, 50, 52, 61, 66, 71, 77, 79; II.19.2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13; II.20.2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 33; II.21.8, 10, 11, 22, 24, 30; II.22.4–6, 11, 16; II.23.1, 2, 4, 6–10, 15, 19–23, 26, 27; II.24.2–9, 15, 18, 19–22, 25, 28, 32; II.25.1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14; III.1.1–3, 5–6, 9–12, 21, 24, 28; 2.6, 17–18; 3.1, 4–6, 15, 19–20, 24, 31; 4.2; 5.1–2, 5, 15; 6.2–7,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9

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NAMES

10–11, 27, 31; 7.1–4, 12, 16–17; 8.2–4, 6–9, 19, 21, 29, 34, 37, 39, 41; 9.1–3, 5, 7, 10; 10.1–2, 5–6, 10–11, 28; 11.2, 7, 13, 25; 12.1–2, 9, 21; 13.1–2, 4–5, 20; 14.3, 7, 10–11 Averroes/Commentator: I.6.8–9; II.1.1, 2, 6, 10, 23; II.2.4, 21; II.3.12, 21; II.4.6; II.5.10; II.7.7; II.9.2; II.11.17; II.14.1; II.15.3, 5, 10; II.17.6, 23; II.18.3, 27, 38, 46; II.19.13; II.20.11; II.22.13, 16; II.23.3, 27; II.24.8, 12, 19; II.25.14; III.2.6, 17–18; 3.11, 14–15; 4.2, 12, 17–18; 5.1, 6–12, 17, 19, 24; 7.6, 12, 17; 8.3, 18, 38 Avicenna: I.6.8; II.7.6; II.10.12, 20; II.23.3, 27; II.24.1, 3, 4, 8, 34; II.25.14; III.8.5, 9, 40 Boethius: II.8.16

974 Cicero: I.3.6 Democritus: III.11.25 Galen: II.24.1 John Pecham: II.16.21; II.17.10; II.18.16 Melissus: III.11.25, 31 Parmenides: III.11.31 Paris Bishop of: III.11.23 University of: III.11.23 Peter John Olivi: II.17.16 Plato: I.5.15–16; II.6.14; II.7.19; II.16.1, 2, 3, 23; II.22.10; II.24.1; III.8.16 Porphyry: I.5.1, 10, 18; II.1.29; II.3.21; II.8.1; III.8.31, 34 Seneca: I.3.7, 13 Roger Bacon II.18.52; II.24.20 Themistius II.11.14, 15–17 Thomas of Sutton II.2.14 Tullius: see Cicero

975

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R EFERENCES

IN THE

F OOTNOTES . . .

Index of References in the Footnotes to the Translation Aristotle On Memory and Reminiscence II.23.2 Physics VIII.4; II.1.31 Posterior Analytics I.2: II.8.5 On the Generation of Animals II.4: II.24.6 Topics I.2.16; II.9; II.9.3 Averroes Colliget II.22.16 Boethius De topicis differentiis 1197B: II.9.3 John Buridan Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics

I.3: I.4.18 VII.15: I.5 title VII.16: II.4.25 Questions on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.3 42va : III.15.18 X.1: I.3.9 Questions on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption II.7: II.2.27 Questions on Aristotle’s On the Heavens I.11: II.9.18 Questions on Aristotle’s On the Soul II.1–3: I.1.6 II.1.8: II.9.3 II.8 11: II.10.11 II.9: I.4.24 II.9.9–13: II.23.14 II.10.20: II.23.8

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9

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IN THE

II.12: I.6.9 II.13: I.2.10 II.15: II.14.9, 10 II.17: I.2.10 II.18.35: II.16.20 II.19: II.14.2 II.22: I.6.9 II.25.2: II.18.24 III.1.4: I.3.9 III.2.8: II.24.5 III.3: I.4.16 III.4: II.9.26 III.4.18: III.6.22 III.5.15: III.18.6 III.9: I.2.10 III.11: I.4.24 III.14: I.1.12 III.15: I.4.24 Questions on Aristotle’s Physics I.4: III.9.17 I.6: I.4.16 I.7: I.5 title IV.12–16: II.13.27 VI.4 97va : III.14.6 VI.7–9: II.18.9 Questions on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I.23: I.1.9 II.7: I.6.1 Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge 3: I.1.9 4: I.5.8 7: III.16.13 Summulae de Dialectica Introduction: I.3.7

F OOTNOTES . . .

976

1.6: III.8.40 2.1.2: I.5.8 3.1.8: III.6.25 4: II.14.7 4.2.6: II.8.11; III.13.15 4.3.2: II.4.25 4.6: II.6.17 6.2: I.2.16 6.4.6: II.7.18 6.4.13: I.2.16 6.4.14: II.10.11 6.5.5: III.13.15 6.5.6: II.11.1; II.12.2 6.6.2: II.9.3 7.3.9-10: II.7.30 7.3.10: III.16.15 8.2: I.1.19; I.5.3; II.3.11; II.7.25 8.2.3: III.9.15 8.3.5: I.1.1 8.3.6: I.1.9 8.6.2: I.6.1 8.8: I.4.16; I.6.1 8.9: I.4.16 Sophismata, Part 3, 13th Sophism: I.1.11 Sophismata, Part 5, 7th Sophism: III.13.15 Sophismata, Part 5: II.6.17 Sophismata, Part 7: II.13.27 Nicholas of Autrecourt Correspondence n. 11: I.6.4 Nicole Oresme QQ. De an. III.10: III.15.12

977

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OF

R EFERENCES

Peter Lombard Sententiae III, d. 2, c. 2–3: III.6.28 Porphyry Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories (Isagoge) c. 4: II.8.1 Ps.-Buridan QQ. De an. III.10: III.15.12 Thomas Aquinas In Boethii De trinitate expositio q. 4, a. 2: III.6.13 Quodlibeta II.1.1: III.6.28 Summa Theologiae I.9.23: II.18.46 III.50.4: III.6.28 William of Ockham Expositio in libros Physicorum Prologus: I.1.9 Ordinatio I, d. 1, q. 6: III.15.18 Summa logicae I.30: I.1.9 William of Sherwood Treatise on Syncategorematic Words p. 57: III.16.15 ———————————— Contemporary Authors Arlig, A. 2015: I.1.5

IN THE

F OOTNOTES . . .

Brenet, J.B. 626–629: II.10.3 Callus, D.A. 1024–1027: II.4.10 Grant, E. 1983 157–186: II.9.18 Hartman, P.J. 2017: I.6.9 Klima, G. 1999: III.11.18 2004: I.6.7; II.18.23 2005: II.18.23 2004a: II.12.8 2008: III.9.17; 12.14; 13.7 2009: I.3.7; I.6.7; II.13.14, 23 2010: I.6.18 2010b: III.11.18 2017: II.17.12; II.23.14 2018: II.13.14 Lagerlund, H. 2017: I.6.9 Lindberg, D.C. 1970 133–135: II.9.17 Longeway, J. 2009: I.6.1 Pickav´e, M. 2017: III.18.3 Pironet, F. 2001: III.18.3

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OF

R EFERENCES

Read, S. 2015: II.3.3; II.14.7 2019: I.1.17 Sobol, P.G. 2017: I.6.9 Spade, P.V. 1994 11: II.1.5

IN THE

F OOTNOTES . . . Zupko, J.A. 1993: III.14.6 1994-97: III.13.7 1995: III.18.3 2003: I.6.18 2018: II.23.14

978

979 I NDEX

OF

T ERMS

IN THE

F OOTNOTES

TO THE

T RANSLATION

Index of Terms in the Footnotes to the Translation accident: I.6.1, 7, 8, 10, 17; II.1.5; II.2.27, 34; II.5.15; II.6.12 extrinsic: III.9.17 act: II.2.35, 36; II.4.9; II.9.2; III.15.16 formal vs. virtual: II.1.22 of nutrition: III.17.18 of sense perception: II.9.25; II.22.14; III.7.13 of thinking: III.10.12, 19; III.15.1, 12; III.16.6 of understanding: III.11.7 virtual: see act, formal vs. virtual of will: III.18.4, 11 action: III.16.6 immanent vs. transient: II.9.3; III.10.19 thinking: III.1.8 ampliation: II.6.17; II.14.8

angels: I.1.1 animal: II.4.25; II.7.28, 41; III.17.18 perfect: II.24.6 antiperistasis: II.18.69 body: II.2.34; III.14.6 celestial: II.1.20; II.2.41; II.9.18 composite, mixed: II.4.24, 26 heavy: II.10.22 of horse, how ensouled: II.7.8, 41, 46 human: III.3.13; III.4.6, 15; II.9.26 [?] living: I.1.5 mathematical: II.3.3 organic: II.2.8 change: II.1.30; II.9.2 accidental II.4.9; II.7.30

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9

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no first or last moment of: II.18.9 substantial: II.1.8; II.9.18, 20 chimera: III.13.7 signification of ‘chimera’: III.9.15 cognition: III.15.1 confused vs. distinct: III.8.8 sensory: II.9.2 common sense: I.6.9; II.22.14; II.23.1; III.15.1 imaginatio as store for: II.24.3 complexly signifiable (complexe significabile): III.13.7 concepts: I.3.7; II.5.22; II.6.20 confused vs. distinct: I.6.10 intellectual: 1.6 8 properties of: III.1.16 simple formation of: III.9.17 substantial: I.6.8 confusio translation of: I.6.10 conjugates: II.9.3; III.1.8 connotation of ‘surface’, ‘line’, ‘beginning (or end) of a line’: III.14.6 convertibility: III.12.12 of being and unity: II.19.8 corruption generation and: II.1.22; II.9.18; II.18.9 upon the suspension of God’s creative activity: II.18.46

TO THE

T RANSLATION 980

definition: II.3.11; II.7.25 nominal: I.1.19 quidditative: I.1.19; I.5.3 as syllogistic middle term: I.6.1 demonstration: I.6.1 types of: I.4.15 distinction: II.20.5 conceptual: II.5.22 real: II.1.20; II.5.22 existence: II.19.8 of an act of thinking (intellectio) or understanding (intellectus): III.11.7 terminative vs. subjective: III.10.12 factum translation of: III.10.11 form: II.1.20, 22; III.6.13 cognitive power’s reception of: III.7.13 material: I.1.3; III.2.17 substantial: II.2.27, 32, 34; II.3.3; II.7.8; III.3.13; III.4.15; III.17.5 whole vs. part: II.2.8 generation: II.1.8; II.4.9; II.10.11 corruption and: see corruption, generation and from putrefaction: III.10.17 heart: II.24.18

981 I NDEX

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T ERMS

IN THE

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imagination: I.6.8; II.23.1; II.24.3; III.15.1 imposition: I.3.7 instrument: II.2.38; III.1.25 intellect: I.2.13; I.3.9; I.6.8; II.12.8; III.4.15; III.10.12, 19; III.12; III.15.1, 13 is acted on when it thinks: III.1.8 activity of: III.2.9 assertive judgments of: II.18.23 how it forms a simple concept: III.9.17 how it forms a universal representation: III.8.33 less deceived than sense: II.11.1 problems with its inherence in body: III.4.6 vs. intellective soul: III.3.13 intelligences: I.1.1 are acts of celestial bodies: II.2.41 intentions: I.6.8 sensory: II.22.14 judgment: I.6.9; II.18.23 formation of, in dogs: II.10.19 knowledge is good for the intellect: I.2.13

TO THE

T RANSLATION

habit of vs. exercise of: II.2.35 two types of: I.4.15 light: II.9.17 as brightness (lux) or illumination (lumen): II.9.17; II.16.10; II.21.2 as object of sight: II.14.4 transit in time of: II.16.20; II.18.2 matter: I.1.3; III.6.13; III.8.14 accidents and: II.2.27 being drawn forth from the potency of: I.4.16; II.2.34 celestial: II.9.18 and form: III.2.17 prime: II.3.3; II.9.20 motion as caused in heavy bodies: II.10.22 of a projectile: II.18.69 types of in living things: I.1.5; II.21.28; III.20.13 name privative signification of: III.14.7 negation: III.16.18 propositional vs. term: III.13.14 nominalism: II.4.25; II.9.13 non-being/s (non ens/entia): III.13 title ampliation to: III.13.16

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supposition of: III.13.15 number: II.13.11, 23; II.20.5

TO THE

T RANSLATION 982

reflexio translation of: III.9.6

science: I.1. 9, 11, 20 of the soul / psychology: of body, as location of I.4.16; III.12.17 intellect: II.2.8; II.7.8, subject of a: I.1.1 41, 46; III.4.6 scientia subjective: I.1.5 translation of: I.1.20 part-in-mode: II.7.18 (see also sensation: II.9.2, 25; II.11.9; whole-in-mode) II.12.1; II.12.8; II.16.10 per accidens: I.1.5; II.2.32; acts of: II.22.14 II.4.25 can discern number: II.13.11 per se: I.1.1, 5; II.2.32; II.4.25 hearing: II.13.11 sensible: II.12.1 taste: II.11.9; II.12.1 phantasm: I.6.8, 9 touch: II.21.28 point signification of: supposition of: III.14.6 vision: II.14.4; II.18.24 potency: see power organ of: II.13.14 potentia signification of ‘touch’, ‘contact’: translation of: III.1.1; III.14.9 III.7.13 singulars: I.5 title power: II.1.1; II.4.26; II.5 title soul cogitative: III.15.1, 27 immateriality of: I.4.16 distinction of: II.5.23; II.6.20 sound: I.6.9; II.13.11; II.16.10, distinct from powerful 21 thing: II.5.12 species: I.4.24; II.4.20, 59; divine: III.4.18 II.5.24 of elements: II.4.24 external: II.5.24; II.9.2, 17; estimative: I.6.8; II.24.3 II.13.14; II.16.10, 21; of soul: II.5.10,15 II.18.23; III.7.13 subjective: II.1.20 intelligible: III.15.16 property: II.8.1; II.14.1 and intentions: I.6.8; II.22.14 of concepts: III.1.16 Internal: III.15.13 spatial: II.13.14 species [taxon]: I.5.50; II.2.34; of terms: II.3.3 II.4.59; II.14.1, 7 prospect (prospectus): III.8.29 part

983 I NDEX

OF

T ERMS

IN THE

F OOTNOTES

subject: I.6.1; II.1.20; II.2.24, 35; II.3.3; II.4.25; II.5.15; II.9.3; II.12.2, 8; II.16.10; II.18.23; III.1.16; III.10.12, 19; III.13.15; III.14.7; III.16.6 subject matter of De anima: I.11 of De anima III: III.12 title of a science: I.1.1 substance: I.6.7, 8, 10; II.1.30; II.4.9, 26; II.5.10 ; II.7.30; II.9.18; III.1.18; III.2.17; III.9.17 individual (hoc aliquid): II.1.14 soul is a: II.5.10 terms for: III.6.25; supponere pro translation of: I.1.17 supposition: I.1.17; II.3.3; II.6.17; II.7.18, 41; II.14.7, 8 of ‘beginning (or end) of a line’, ‘instant’, ‘line’, ‘surface’ : III.14.6

TO THE

T RANSLATION

things existing by themselves (secundum se): III.8.14 topic (dialectical locus): I.2.16; II.11.1; II.12.2 touch: see sensation, touch translation of ‘confusio’: I.6.10 ‘factum’: III.10.11 ‘potentia’: III.1.1; III.7.13 ‘reflexio’: III.9.6 ‘scientia’: I.1.20 ‘supponere pro’: I.1.17 ‘vetula’: I.2.10 universals: I.5.8; I.6.8 vacuum signification of ‘vacuum’: III.9.15 virtue intellectual: I.2.13 water: II.2.25; II.19.9 will: I.3.9; I.6.8; III.18.3 whole: II.2.8; II.7.41, 44, 46 universal: I.1.5 whole-in-mode: II.7.18 (see also part-in-mode)

985

I NDEX F ONTIUM

Index Fontium Aegidius Romanus Quodlibeta III.13: II.10.13 Albertus Magnus De anima II.3.6: II.10.14 In libros Physicorum 1.1.6: III.8.9 Summa de creaturis II: II.7.6 Super Ethica I.4.24: I.3.6 Anonymus Liber de causis IX.92.8: III.2.4 Aristoteles Analytica posteriora I.1 71a 11–12: I.1.6 I.2 71b 25: III.13.9 I.2 71b 33: III.8.4 I.2 72a 4: III.8.4 I.2 72a 4–5: III.8.13

I.2 72a 29–30: II.8.5; II.8.20, 21 I.2 72a 33–37: I.6.18 I.3 72b 25–27: I.6.1 I.4 73a 34–73b 2: II.12.4 I.4 73b 5: II.12.4 I.8 75b 23: I.5.4 I.20 82a 21: III.5.5 II.11 94a 34–35: I.6.1 II.19 100a 4–5: III.8.15 Analytica priora I.2 25a 5–7: III.14.7 I.41 49b 31–50a4: III.16.18 De anima I.1 402a 1: I.2.6; I.3.6 I.1 402a 2: I.4.2, 7 I.1 402a 12–13: I.4.6 I.1 402a 25: II.1.1 I.1 402b 7–8: I.5.6, 15–16 I.1 402b 9–15: I.6.6 I.1 402b 21–22: I.6.6 I.1 402b 22–25: I.6.8

Entries in bold are direct quotations or paraphrases © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Klima et al., John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94433-9

I NDEX F ONTIUM I.1 403a 12–15: I.1.12 I.3: II.1.31 I.4 408b 12–14: II.9.11; II.9.33 I.4 409a 8: II.7.20; II.7.21 I.5 411b 20: II.7.11 II.1–2 412a 1–413a 10: I.1.6, 19 II.1 412a5: III.3.1 II.1 412a6–7: II.1.15 II.1 412a9: II.5.14 II.1 412a19: II.1.4 II.1 412a19–b 6: II.3.6 II.1 412a20: III.3.1; III.7.7 II.1 412a21: II.1.9 II.1 412a22: I.1.12 II.1 412a26–27: II.3.1 II.1 412a27: I.1.12, 15; II.2.35 II.1 412b6: II.2.19, 31 II.1 413a7–8: II.2.5 II.1 413a9: II.1.23 II.2, 413a 25: II.7.35 II.2 413b13: II.7.6 II.2 413b 24–26: III.3.5; III.3.6; III.6.5 II.2 413b27: II.7.6 II.2 413b27: II.2.9 II.2 414a14: III.3.2 II.3 414a29: II.5.6 II.3 414a31: II.5.6 II.3 414b30: II.4.24 II.4 415a19–20:II.3.6 II.4 415a20: II.6.7, 21 II.4 415a22: II.2.2 II.4 415a26–29: II.8.6 II.4 415a27: II.20.35

986 II.4 415a 30–415b1: II.8.21 II.4 415b 3–7: III.5.2 II.4 415b 9–11: II.10.27 II.4 415b 9–12: I.1.12, 15; II.9.2 II.4 415b 11–27: II.1.22 II.4 416a 5–9; II.1.13 II.4 416a 16: II.1.13 II.4 416a 18: II.4.1 II.4 416b 26–28: II.8.12 II.5 416b 32: II.9.23; III.1.10 II.5 416b 33: II.9.8 II.5 416b 33–34: II.4.1 II.5 417a 2–5: II.10.26 II.5 417a 3–6: II.10.26 II.5 417a 6–9: II.10.26 II.5 417b 16:III.17.1 II.5 417b 19–20: II.18.25 II.6 418a 8–9, 20–21: I.6.9 II.6 418a 11–13: II.11.8, 18 II.6 418a 14–17: II.11.9 II.6 418a 17–18: II.12.13 II.7 418a 25: II.18.65 II.7 418a 26–27: II.15.5 II.7 418a 26–28: II.14.1 II.7 418a 31–418b4: II.15.1 II.7 418b 20–25: II.18.38 II.7 418b 21: II.18.2 II.7 418b 21–26:II.18.44 II.7 418b 23–36: II.18.31 II.7 418b 26: II.13.3; II.19.13 II.7 418b 26: II.13.3; III.2.17 II.7 419a 5:II.15.7

987

I NDEX F ONTIUM II.7 419a10: II.18.66 II.7 419a11–12: II.21.10 II.7 419a12–13: II.17.6 II.7 419a18–19: II.16.7 II.7 419a26: II.21.23 II.7 419a28–29 II.21.10 II.8 419b25: II.18.52 II.8 419b33: II.18.52 II.8, 420a 3: II.18.52 II.8 420b6: II.22.11 II.8 420a9–10: II.15.2 II.9 421a11: II.20.21 II.11 422b 20: II.19.6 II.11 422b 23: II.19.6; II.22.4 II.11 422b 27–32: II.19.4 II.11 422b 32: II.19.7 II.11 423b 4–6: II.17.8 II.11 423b 23–24: II.21.8 II.11 423b 25: II.18.66; II.21.10 II.11 423b 26: II.25.8 II.11 424a 2: II.18.66 II.11 424a 3: II.20.17; II.20.33 II.11 424a 3–4: II.13.3; II.17.12 II.11 424a 5: II.24.5 II.11 424a 6: II.19.13 II.11 424a 7: II.21.11 II.12 424a 18–24: II.10.25 II.12 424a 20–23: II.12.2 II.12 424a 28: II.9.36 II.12 424b 4–5: II.10.24 II.12 424b4–6: II.20.23 II.12 424b 16: II.25.9 II.12 424b 16–17: II.10.24

III.1: II.20.14 III.1 424b 22: II.19.2; II.20.7, 12 III.1 425a 14: II.20.23 III.1 425a 14–20: II.12.13 III.1 425a 17: II.13.9 III.1 425a 27–30: III.2.18 III.1 425a 28–29: II.12.5 III.1 425a 30–31: II.13.11 III.2 425b 10–17: III.9.1 III.2 425b 20–21: II.20.2 III.2 426b 13: II.23.8 III.2 426b 17–23: II.10.19; III.3.24; III.8.19 III.3 428a 1: II.23.1 III.3 428a 12: II.23.22 III.3 428b 11: II.23.22 III.3 428b 13: II.20.29 III.3 428b 18–19: II.11.17 III.3 429a 1: II.23.20; III.9.3 III.3 429a 5: II.23.1 III.4 429a 14–15: III.1.2, 12, 24 III.4 429a 16–17: II.10.1 III.4 429a 17: III.9.1; 11.9 III.4 429a 18: III.10.1 III.4 429a 18–20: III.2.6; III.3.7 III.4 429a 20: II.7.24 III.4 429a 21–23: III.9.10 III.4 429a 22–23: III.1.10; III.7.1, 12, 16 III.4 429a 24: III.7.2 III.4 429a 24–26: III.3.19 III.4 429a 29: III.3.20 III.4 429a 29–b 4: III.3.21

I NDEX F ONTIUM III.4 429b 5–9: III.9.5; 15.6 III.4 429b 9: III.9.1, 7 III.4 429b 10–14: III.8.2 III.4 429b 16–18: III.8.2 III.4 430a 1: III.7.16 III.4 430a 3–9: III.1.9 III.5 430a 10–19: II.9.8; II.10.1, 2, 3, 7, 13; III.7.4; III.10.10; III.11.7 III.5 430a 13: III.10.2, 13 III.5 430a 14–15: III.1.10; III.7.3; III.9.10 III.5 430a 15–16: III.11.1 III.5 430a 17: III.10.6, 13; III.11.2 III.5 430a 18–19: III.1.3, 25; III.10.2, 6, 11, 13 III.5 430a 20: III.10.13 III.5 430a 22: III.1.12 III.5 430a 22–23: III.6.5–6; III.10.13; 17.1 III.5 430a 23–24: III.6.6 III.5 430a 24: III.6.1, 4 III.6 430a 26: III.12 title III.6 430a 26–27: III.12.9 III.6 430a 28–b 5: III.16 title III.6 430b 2: III.12.9 III.6 430b20–21: III.13.2, III.13.20; III.14 title; III.14.3 III.6 430b 26–30: III.12.10 III.7 431a 12: II.5.16 III.7 431a 12–14: III.20.11 III.7 431a 16: III.6.3 III.7 431a 17: II.20.25

988 III.8 431b 24 ff.: III.17 title III.8 431b 29: III.8.25 III.8, 432a 3: II.23.9 III.8 432a 7–8: III.15.21 III.8 432a 7–9: II.23.9, 21 III.8 432a 8–9: III.9.3; 15.4; 14, 21 III.8 432a 10–11: III.16.8 III.9 432a 15–20: III.20 title III.9 432b 19–20: III.20.5 III.9 432b 21–23: II.23.5; III.19 title, 7, 8 III.9 433a 1–3: III.20.9, 18 III.9 433a 7–8: III.20.10 III.10 433a 9–21: III.7.14 III.10 433a 9–10: II.9.4 III.10 433a 10: II.6.14 III.10 433a 25–b 12: III.17.3 III.10 433b 5–6: III.18.2 III.10 433b 6–8: III.18.5, 20.6 III.10 433a 13: III.20.18 III.11 433b17–20: III.20.18 III.11 434a 6–15: II.23.27 III.12 434a 30: III.20.7 De caelo I.2 268b 30: II.4.4 I.2 269a 5: III.3.18 I.3: III.6.2 I.3 270a 13: II.18.19 I.4 271a 33: III.19.7 I.9 279a 29–30: II.10.15 I.9: III.5.3 I.12 282a 1: III.6.7, 10 II.2 284b 6: II.2.39

989

I NDEX F ONTIUM De generatione animalium IV.4 770b 16–17: III.19.17 De generatione et corruptione I.3: III.6.7 I.3 318a 23–25: III.17.4, 7 I.4 319b 14–17: II.1.8, 32 I.4 319b 15: II.2.16 I.4, 320a 1: II.2.21 I.6 322b 23–24: III.10.3 I.6 323a 20: III.1.1 I.7 324a 10–14: III.1.6, 28 I.9: III.7.3 I.9 326b 29: II.9.1 II.1 331a24–26: II.9.20 II.2 330a25–29: II.12.9 II.9 335b30–32: II.1.2 II.9 335b30–32: III.1.5 II.10 336b 9: II.18.12 De interpretatione / Perihermenias 1 16a 4: I.5.10 1 16a 10–16: III.12.1 1 16a 16: III.12.21 4 17a 4–5: III.12.2 14 23b 1–32: III.16.16 De iuventute et senectute 3 469a 5–7: III.2.18 De longitudine et brevitate vitae 5 466b 8: II.8.2 De memoria et reminiscentia 1 449b 28–30: II.23.8 1 450a9: II.23.8 1 450a 10–11: II.23.9, 20 1 450a 10: III.2.18 1 450a 23: II.23.8, 20

2 453a 4: II.23.2 De motibus animalium 7 701a 32: III.20.18 De partibus animalium II.1 647a 25: II.22.16; II.23.6 II.10 656a : II.24.8 III.4 666a 34: II.24.18 III.4 668a 14–15: II.24.15 IV.12 694a 26–b 12: III.20.16 De sensu et sensato 1 436a 1–3: I.1.8 2 437a 22–b 10: II.21.30 2 438b 8: II.20.8; II.21.24 2 438b 9: II.21.11; II.25.8 2 438b 27: II.20.14 3 439b 20–440a6: II.11.26 5 444b 25–28: II.25.3 7 447a 14–16: II.25.1 7 447b 17–20: III.16.3 De somnio 1 459a 4: II.22.16 1 459a 19–20: II.23.21 2 459a 26–28: II.18.43 2 459b 5–6: II.18.16 2 459b 24–460a32: II.9.7 De somno et vigilia 2 455a 12: II.25.9 2 455a 22: II.23.19 2 455b 7: II.24.20; II.25.4 2 455b 10: II.24.7 2 455a 26: II.23.10 2 456a 4: II.23.4 2 456a 5–6: II.24.8, 18, 32 2 456a 25: II.25.13 3 456a 30: II.24.25

I NDEX F ONTIUM 3 456b 10: II.23.10 3 456b 17: II.24.21 3 456b25: II.23.1 3 457b 1–7: II.24.7, 21 3 457b 4: II.25.3 3 457b 20: II.24.28 3 457b 27: II.24.21 3 458a 12: II.25.3 3 458a 19: II.25.3 3 458a 26: II.25.6 De sophisticis elenchis 6 168b 30: I.6.4 Ethica Nicomachea I.1 1094a 1–2: I.2.6 I.3 1094b 12–15: II.8.18 I.5 1095b 26: I.3.6 I.6 1096a 24: I.2.6 I.7 1098a 3–17: III.3.4 I.8 1098b 10–11: III.12.7 I.9 1099a 3: II.6.21 I.11 1100b 14: II.18.48 I.12 1101b 10–11: I.3.4 I.12 1101b 14–15: I.3.4 I.13 1102b 13: II.5.7 I.13 1102b 13–1103a3: III.17.3 I.13 1102b 19: III.18.3 II.3 1104b30–31: I.3.3, 7 II.4 1105b19: II.5.13 II.5 1105b25: II.6.7 II.6 1106a15–17: I.2.17 III.1 1110a8–12: III.18.3 III.1 1110b28: I.2.14 III.1 1110b 31–1111a2: I.2.10 III.5: III.15.19 IV.1 1120a 10–13: II.8.9

990 IV.3 1123b 35: I.3.6 IV.3 1124a 24–25: I.3.1 V.5 1130b 24–25: I.2.2 V.7 1134b 26: III.10.20 VI.1 1139a 4–17: II.23.23 VI.2 1139a 27–28: I.2.5, 10; III.12.21 VI.3 1139b 15–19: I.3.6 VI.5 1140a 25–33: III.8.21 VI.12 1144a35: III.19.17 VIII.8 1159a 22: I.3.6 IX.8: III.3.4 X.4 1174a13: II.18.4 X.4 1174a14–15: II.13.5 X.7; II.8.15 X.7 1177b19–20: III.3.4 Metaphysica I.1 980a 22: I.2.6 I.1 980b 30–981a6: III.8.15 I.2 982a 23–25: I.5.8; III.8.13 I.2 982a 25–29: I.4.18 I.2 983a 8–9: III.19.17 I.4 985b 5–20: III.11.25 I.8 989a 15: II.8.6 II.1 993b 9–10: I.4.8 II.1 993b 26–31: III.8.14 II.1 993b 30–31: I.5.5; I.6.2; III.12.11 II.3 995a 15: II.10.21 II.3 995a 15: III.10.21 III.2 996a 21-b 1: I.2.1, 21 IV.2 1003b 19: II.19.7, 8 IV.2 1003b 19–20: II.14.1 IV.2 1003b 22–23: III.13.9 IV.2 1003b 23: II.6.12 IV.2 1003b 28–30: III.16.16

991

I NDEX F ONTIUM IV.2 1003b 32: II.6.12 IV.2 1004a 3: II.22.4 IV.3 1005b 23–25: III.1.16; III.11.2 IV.3 1005b 25: II.18.23 IV.3 1005b25–34: III.12.22 IV.4 1006b 9–10: III.13.9, 16.1 IV.6 1011b 15–23: III.5.15 V.1 1013a 1–4: I.4.3 V.6 1016b 25–27: III.14.3 V.7 1017a 31–33: III.12.11 V.8 1017b 15: II.2.3 V.9: III.13.17 V.9 1018a 10: II.20.5 V.10 1087b 7–8: III.16.6 V.11 1019a 3–4: I.5.2, 19 V.12 1019a 15: II.5.18 V.15 1020b 26–31: III.1.21 V.18 1022a 31: II.1.6 V.21 1022b 15–21: III.1.14 V.22 1022b 22–24: III.14.7 V.29 1025a 2: III.12.8 VI.1 1025b 16: II.3.15 VI.1 1025b 19: II.1.31 VI.1 1026a 7–10: II.12.3 VI.4 1027b 25–26: I.2.4, 24 VII.1 1028a 32–33: I.5.6; I.6.1, 15 VII.1 1028a 33-b 1: I.6.15 VII.3 1029a 2–5: II.2.32 VII.3 1029a 28–29: 1.5.16 VII.4 1028a 31: II.2.30 VII.5 1031a 1: II.1.7, 31 VII.8 1033b16–19: III.10.12

VII.8 1033b 20: III.8.1 VII.8 1033b 20–29: I.5.16 VII.10 1035b 14–20: I.5.3 VII.11 1036a 26: II.3.12 VII.11 1037a 5: III.3.2 VII.13–15: I.5.6; III.5.3 VII.13 1033a30–1033b1: II.4.17 VII.13 1039a 4: II.4.8 VII.13 1039a 5–7: III.7.8 VII.15 1039b 27–28: III.8.29 VII.15 1040a 2–7: III.8.28 VII.15 1040a 11–14: III.8.29 VII.16 1040b 10–16: II.7.35 VIII.1 1024a 24–30: II.2.32 VIII.2 1042b 9–14: III.11.25 VIII.3 1043a 29–30: III.4.26; III.6.27 VIII.3 1043a 36: III.6.27 VIII.3 1045b 20–23: II.2.31 IX.1 1046a 9–15: II.10.22 IX.1 1046a 10–11: III.9.2 IX.1 1046a 11: II.5.18 IX.1 1046a 12–13: III.9.2 IX.2 1046b 16: II.6.4 IX.5 1048a 11–12: III.20.12 IX.6 1048a 32: II.1.18 IX.7 1048b 5–9: II.3.1 IX.7 1048b 36: II.6.7 IX.8 1049b 4: II.6.21 IX.8 1049b 12: II.3.6 X.1 1052a15–18: II.20.5

I NDEX F ONTIUM X.3: III.13.17 X.5 1055b 33: I.3.4 X.7 1057a 30: II.18.13, 20 X.7 1057b 2: II.18.13 X.8 1058a 17–18: III.16.6 XII.6 1071b 3–22: I.6.6 XII.7 1072b 20–21: III.4.2 XII.9 1074b15 ff.: III.2.7, III.10.9 XII.10 1075a 11–16: III.4.2 Meteorologica I.2 282a 1: III.6.7 I.3: II.18.79 I.3: III.6.2 I:3 340a 24: II.18.71 I.3 340b 33: II.18.71 I.9–12: II.18.77 I.11–12 347b 12–349a10: II.18.70 III.4: II.11.26 III.4 375a 6–13: II.11.2 Physica I.1 184a 24–25: I.5.5; III.8.6 I.1 184a 25–26: III.8.7 I.1 184b 10–13: III.8.8 I.1 184b 13–14: III.8.9 I.2 185b 2–3: I.6.4 I.2 185a3–4: III.16.15 I.4: II.4.9 I.5 189a 3–4: III.8.4, 39 I.5 189a 5–6: I.5.13; III.8.4, 6, 39 I.7: III.6.2, 8 I.9 192a 4–5: III.13.3, 21 I.9 192a 13–14: II.2.17 I.9 192a 25–33: III.6.11

992 I.9 192a 25–34: I.6.6 II.1 192b 16: II.1.31 II.1 192b 22: II.3.15 II.1 193b 7: II.8.21 II.2 193b 32: II.3.4 II.2 193b 32–35: II.12.3 II.2 194a 22–23: I.1.3 II.2 194a 34–35: I.4.15 II.2 194b 9: II.15.14 II.2 194b 13: III.17.8 II.3 194b 26–30: II.3.12 II.6 198a 5: III.19.6 II.8: 199b 1–2: III.19. 5, 17 II.9 199b 30–200b 10: II.8.21 III.1 200b 14–15: I.6.6 III.1 201a 10: II.1.6 III.1 201a 19–20: III.9.2 III.1 201a 30: II.6.2 III.3: III.7.3 III.3 202a 12: II.9.1 III.3 202a 13: II.1.21 III.5 204a 7–16: III.14.7 IV.6 213b 9–11: 3.16.5 IV.8 216a 21–26: III.13.5 IV.9 217a 10: II.18.61 IV.10: II.13.27 IV.10 217b 29: II.13.5 IV.14 223a 25–26: II.13.1, 2 V.1 224a 27–28: II.1.6 VI.1: III.13.1; III.14.5 VI.1 231a 21–22: III.14.10 VI.1 231a 24–25: III.13.2 VI.1 231a 29: II.7.46 VI.2 232b 20: II.13.5

993 VI.3 234a 3: II.18.9 VI.4 234b 10: III.1.1 VI.10 240b 8–241a15: III.1.23 VII.2 243a 3: II.24.3 VIII.4 254a 29–30: II.10.22 VIII.4 255a 6–10: II.1.6 VIII.5 257a 27–31: II.1.6 VIII.6 258b 10–12: I.6.6 VIII.7 261a 5: II.8.6 Politica I.2 1253a 33: I.2.3 VII.14 1333a 21–22: I.4.15; II.8.4, 21 Praedicamenta / Categoriae 5 3a 7: II.1.4; II.1.28 5 2a 19–27: III.8.1 7 8b 21–22: II.9.37 7 8b 35: II.3.21 12 14b 9–12: II.14.11 12 14a 34–35: I.5.2, 19 Rhetorica I.11 1369b 33: II.20.35 I.11 1371b 11–12: III.11.13 Topica II.10 114b 34–35: III.16.1 III.1 116b 27: I.2.16 III.2 117a 16–17: I.2.3 V.5 134b 24: I.4.1 VI.5 142b 29: II.3.2 VIII.2 157b 1–3: III.16.18 Averroes (Commentator) Colliget II.10 X 30 F: II.24.3 II.11 X 24 D: II.24.8 II.11 X 24 D: II.24.19 II.11 X 24 E-G: II.24.12

I NDEX F ONTIUM II.20 X 30 F: II.23.3 Comm. De anima I.6 10.20–21: II.1.1 II.1 130.16–17: II.1.10 II.4 133.33–134.35: II.2.21 II.7 231.21–38: II.15.1 II.7 238.9–239.33: II.19.13 II.9 276.19–277.33: II.17.6 II.9 277.39–43: II.17.23 II.12 317.11–322.36 passim: II.22.13 II.14 133.28–134.44: II.1.6 II.37 188.64–68: II.9.2 II.63 225.41–42: I.6.8 II.63 225.44–50: I.6.9 II.64 225.29–30: II.11.17 II.67 233.74–79: II.14.1 II.128 324.27–30: II.20.11 III.2 381: III.4.3 III.4 383: III.2.6; 3.7 III.4 385: III.2.6 III.4 399–413: III.3.11 III.5 380: III.4.17 III.5 392: III.5.7 III.5 383: III.4.2 III.5 393: III.8.32 III.5 393–398: III.15.25 III.5 396: III.7.12 III.5 399: III.4.4 III.5 401.424–404.512: II.1.23 III.5 401.424–409.654: II.7.7 III.5 401–404: III.5.10 III.5 404: III.5.11 III.5 404–405: III.5.1, 6, 9; 7.12

I NDEX F ONTIUM III.5 406: III.7.6; 8.18 III.6 415: III.2.18 III.9 422: III.8.3 III.18 440: III.8.16 III.19.441: III.16.10 III.20 444: III.5.11 III.20 454.315–316: II.23.28 III.45 513: .19.1 III.57 529:16–17: II.23.27 Comm. De caelo II.5.1 V 201 B: II.2.4 Comm. Meta. V.8 VIII 118 E: II.1.6 VIII.6 VIII 220 G: I.6.6 IX.2.1 VIII 236 G: II.3.21 Comm. Phys. I.4.3 IV 41 E–F: II.5.10 I.4.4 IV 46 F: II.18.27, 46 II.3.1 IV 59 L: II.3.12 VI.3.1 IV 265 M: II.18.3 VIII.2.2 IV 365 F–G: II.1.6 De substantia orbis 1 IX 3 K–L: II.4.6 1 IX 3 K–L: III.17.11 1 IX 3 L: II.1.2 2 IX 7 H–I: I.6.6 Avicenna Canon medicinae I 97.121: II.24.8 Liber de anima I.5 87.19–22: II.24.1 IV.1 6.79–7.88: I.6.8 IV.1 8.2–11.43: II.24.3 IV.3 38.28–39.38: II.10.20 V.7 157.77–82: II.7.6 Liber de philosophia prima

994 I.1: III.8.9 I.5: III.8.5 Boethius Ars geometriae (attr.) ‘De mensura’: III.14.3 De consolatione philosophiae III.2 232.10–12: II.8.16 De differentiis topicis II: I.2.16 Biblia sacra Deut. 6:5 (Vulgata): II.24.9 Ps. 9:2 (Vulgata): II.24.9 Ps. 15:10 (Vulgata): III.17.14 Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis 1147.28: III.11.23; 15.12 1147.29: III.11.24: 15.12 Cicero Brutus 281: I.3.6 Euclid Elementa I.3: III.14.3 Gaius Plinius Secundus Historia Naturalis VIII.32–33, 36, 38: II.9.7 Galenus De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis II.3: II.24.1 De usu partium VIII.4–5 II 453 ff: II.24.1 Gilbertus Porretanus Liber Sex Principiorum I.1: III.10.2

995 Guillelmus de Ockham Exp. in libros Physicorum Prologus: I.1.9 Ordinatio I, d. 1, q. 6: III.15.18 Iohannes Buridanus QQ. An. Post. I.4: II.12.15 I.23: I.1.9 I.31: I.6.18 QQ. De anima I.2: I.3.5, 7, 16 II.1–3: I.1.6 II.1.18–23: III.7.10, 14 II.1.22: II.2.41 II.1.30: II.2.33 II.1.32: II.2.28 II.3: II.2.36 II.4: II.5.1 II.4.5: III.17.10 II.4.6: III.17.11 II.4.6–9: III.17.11 II.4.8: III.17.11 II.4.9: III.17.11 II.4.17: II.7.21, 26 II.4.19: III.17.11 II.4.20: III.17.11 II.4.27: III.17.14 II.5: II.4.5, 27 II.6: II.5.26 II.7: III.4.26 II.7.25–38: III.11.35 II.9.9–13: III.10.7 II.9.11: III.10.7 II.9.13: III.10.7 II.9.16: II.10.23

I NDEX F ONTIUM II.9.22–24: III.15.21 II.9.26: III.17.16 II.9.33: II.10.23 II.10: II.9.15, 16, 35; III.10.23 II.10.13: III.10.17 II.10.16–22: III.10.14 II.10.17: II.18.51 II.10.21: III.10.21 II.11.21: II.18.14 II.12: II18.24 II.12.15: II.13.1, 7, 10 II.13: II.18.24 II.13.3: II.24.5 II.13.10: II.25.2 II.13.22: II.21.27 II.13.25: II.19.16 II.14.9: II.21.23, 26 II.15: II.14.9, 10; II.25.3, 10 II.16: II.18.30 II.16.11: II.18.52 II.17.3: II.18.5, 7, 11 II.17.12: II.21.16, 17 II.17.17: II.18.53 II.18: II.13.13, 27; II.17.26 II.18.44: III.15.28 II.19: II.14.2; II.20.1, 3, 11, 26 II.19.21: II.20.26 II.20: II.19.19 II.20.8–11: II.22.6 II.21: II.17.8; II.20.9 II.22.10: II.23.8 II.22.13: II.24.31 II.22.13–14: III.15.15 II.22–23: III.15.22

I NDEX F ONTIUM II.23: II.24.30 II.23: III.15.23, 31 II.24: II.25.10 II.25.2: II.18.24 III.1.30–31: III.10.7 III.2: III.3.27 III.2.4: III.3.15 III.3: II.2.5; II.7.48 III.3: III.2.18, 2.20 III.3–5: II.7.23 III.3.9–13: III.4.15 III.3.25: III.8.22 III.3.29: III.15.25 III.3.30: III.5.22 III.4: II.7.48; III.7.9, 12 III.4.5–6: III.5.14 III.4.18: III.6.15, 22 III.5: II.1.23; II.7.7; II.8.17; III.4.16–17, 21 III.5.15: III.18.6 III.5.18: III.6.2 III.6: III.4.13 III.7: II.10.28 III.7.13: III.10.26 III.8: I.5.11, 14, 18 III.9: II.22.6 III.10: II.10.1, 14, 26; III.1.25; 7.12 III.10–11: III.7.14 III.10.21: II.10.21 III.11: I.4.24 III.12.20: III.16.10 III.13: III.12.20; 14.1 III.13.20: III.14.5 III.14: I.1.12 III.15: I.4.24 III.15: II.23.17; III.2.12

996 III.15–16: III.8.26 III.16.14: III.18.7 III.17: II.7.23; III.2.18 III.19: II.23.5; III.20 III.20: II.9.4; III.1.19; 7.14 QQ. De caelo I.6 27–35: II.4.26 I.22 102: II.18.34 QQ. De generatione et corruptione I.8 80–89: II.2.23 1.10 95–99: II.2.26 I.22 166.9–11: II.4.24 I.22 163–171: II.4.26 II.7 224–228: II.9.20 II.12 251.18–19: II.10.12 QQ. Eth. ad Nic. I.3: I.3.6 I.20: I.3.7 II.11: I.3.7 III.3 42va : III.15.18–19 VII.6 179ra –180va : II.5.30 VII.7 144vb : III.19.17 VII.8 144vb –145vb : III.20.18 VII.24 200rb –200vb : II.18.38, 51 X.4–5: I.3.7 QQ. Meta. I.3: I.4.18 I.5 5vb : III.18.11 II.1: I.3.7 IV.7 17vb –18vb : II.6.12 IV.7–8 17vb –19rb : II.6.12 IV.14 23vb –24ra: III.13.2; III.14 title VI.6–9: III.12.13

997

I NDEX F ONTIUM IX.1 56rb –56vb : II.10.22 IX.2 56vb –57rb: II.1.18 XII.6 67va –69vb : III.19.17 XII.6–7: I.2.8 XII.13 75rb –76rb: III.19.17 XII.14 75va−vb : III.10.9 QQ. Phys. I.6: I.4.15 I.7: I.5.11, 13; III.8.34, 39, 41, 43 I.10 109.22–110.8: II.7.37 I.16 166.20–26: II.8.19 I.17 171.27–172.7: II.2.21 I.18 182.9–15: II.8.11 I.22 223.13–224.4: II.5.33 I.23: III.13.21 II.1 251.11–21: II.3.15 II.2 254.23–25: II.3.4 II.3: III.11.28 II.12: III.19.6, 17 III.4 38–43: II.18.8 VI.1 93vb –94va : II.18.42 VI.1 94va : II.18.9 VI.1–4 93vb –98ra : III.14.5 VI.4 96va : III.14.3 VI.4 97va : III.14.6 VI.5 98va –98vb : II.18.38, 51 VI.7: III.1.23 VII.14 44ra –50rb : II.4.17 VIII.4 92va : II.1.30 QQ. Porph. Isa. 3: I.1.9 4: I.5.1, 10, 18 9: I.5.10, 18 13: II.1.29 Summulae de dialectica

1.2.3: III.12.2 2.6.1 : II.1.29 3.1.5: II.1.28 3.2.3: II.1.28 4.6.2: III.13.16, 22 8.2.4: II.1.31 8.5.2: I.6.18 8.7.2: I.6.18 Sophismata 1, concl. 2–3: III.12.13 Sophismata 2, concl. 1–14: III.12.14 Sophismata 5, tertia sophisma: III.13.16 Sophismata 8, quinta sophisma: III.12.3 Tractatus de consequentiis I.1: III.12.14 I.6: III.13.16 III.1.4: I.6.4 Iohannes de Mirecuria Apologiae 200–201: III.11.14; III.15.12 Iohannes Pecham Perspectiva communis I.1 62: II.16.21; II.17.12; II.18.16 Nicolaus Oresme Quaestiones super Physicam III.2–7: III.11.14 Ovid Metamorphoses XV.375: III.10.17 Petrus de Trabibus Comm. Sent

I NDEX F ONTIUM I.3.4: II.2.35 Petrus Hispanus Tractatus I.6: III.12.2 Petrus Iohannis Olivi Comm. Sent Q. 58 ad 14, p. 469: II.17.16 Plato Timaeus 60E: II.24.1 69C–71A: II.7.18 Porphyry Isagoge 2.15: I.5.1, 10, 18 4: II.8.1 7.19–21: III.8.31 7.21–23: III.8.31 Rogerius Bacon De multiplicatione specierum I.2 20, 22: II.18.52 II.2 102.110–112: II.24.20

998 Seneca Ep. mor. ad Luc. 66.4: I.3.13 71.4–5: I.3.7 Themistius De anima III 132.38–133.43: II.11.14, 16 Thomas Aquinas Comm. Phys. I.3.22: I.6.4 De veritate, q.2, a.6; q.10, a.9, ad 10: III.9.6 Summa Theologiae I, q. 57, a. 1: I.6.8 I, q. 76, a. 1: III.9.12 I, q. 77, a. 1: I.6.6 I, q. 94, a. 2: I.6.18 Thomas de Sutton De pluralitate formarum Pars 5: II.2.14