Jihadi Thought and Ideology [1 ed.] 9783832595708, 9783832537050

Citation preview

Jihadism and Terrorism Edited by Rudiger ¨ Lohlker

Volume 1

R¨udiger Lohlker, Tamara Abu-Hamdeh (eds.)

Jihadi Thought and Ideology

λογος

Jihadism and Terrorism

Volume 1

Jihadism and Terrorism Volume 1

Edited by Rudiger ¨ Lohlker

The volumes of this series are peer reviewed.

Editorial Board: Farhad Khosrokhavar (Paris), Hans Kippenberg (Bremen), Alex Schmid (Vienna), Roberto Tottoli (Naples)

R¨udiger Lohlker/Tamara Abu-Hamdeh (eds.)

Jihadi Thought and Ideology

Logos Verlag Berlin

λογος

Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de.

c Copyright Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH 2013

All rights reserved.

ISBN 978-3-8325-3705-0 ISSN 2199-1820

Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH Comeniushof, Gubener Str. 47, 10243 Berlin Tel.: +49 (0)30 / 42 85 10 90 Fax: +49 (0)30 / 42 85 10 92 http://www.logos-verlag.de

Contents

Rüdiger Lohlker Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 4 

Rüdiger Lohlker Al-Qaeda Airlines: Jihadi Self-Assessment and the Ideology of Engineers ........................................ 5 

Joas Wagemaker Between Purity and Pragmatism? Abu Basir al-Tartusi’s Nuanced Radicalism ................................ 16 

Robert Wesley Back to Fundamentals: Approaching the Study of the Ideology of Islamist Organizations .............. 38 

Manfred Sing From Maoism to Jihadism: Some Fatah militants’ trajectory from the mid 1970’s to the mid 1980’s .................................................................................................................................... 55 

Nico Prucha Celebrities of the Afterlife: Death Cult, Stars, and Fandom of Jihadist Propaganda ......................... 83 

Rüdiger Lohlker Jihadi Masculinities: Another Masculinity in Crisis ........................................................................ 138 

Contributors ..................................................................................................................................... 165 

Index................................................................................................................................................. 166 

3

Rüdiger Lohlker

Introduction

A short survey of the literature on jhadism will immediately demonstrate that the study of jihadi ideas is still at an early stage. The current volume contributes to this ongoing process of understanding jihadi ideas and the development of these ideas. In his first contribution Rüdiger Lohlker discusses an analysis of jihadi attacks by one of the lesser known jihadi authors, Dhu l-bijadayn, and the way this author frames his technical thoughts in a jihadi framing. It is one of the few approaches to discuss rhe role of the technical experts of jihad and their way of conceptualizing ideas of jihadism. Joas Wagemakers chapter analyses – as usual well informed and very precise – the interesting case of Abu Basir al-Tartusi and the development of his „nuanced radicalism“. Robert Weseley presents a conceptualization for the analysis of ideology offering a language and basic framework for analysts. Manfred Sing studies the trajectory of Palestinian maoists to jihadism offering a case study of a fairly under- or un-researched topic in the field of Jihadism studies. The embodiment of jihadi ideology/theology in the various aspects of visual online propaganda is discussed by Nico Prucha. He demonstrates the ways jihadi 'martyrs' are created online as a role model any aspiring jihadist has to follow. In his second contribution Rüdiger Lohlker discusses jihadi masculinities to show the intimate relation between a specific – violent – way of creating forms of masculinity and jihadi practice, ideas, and visual imaginary that form a subtext of expressions of jihadi ideology/theology. The contributions of this volume show in detailed analysis aspects of jihadi ideology and theology of jihadism shedding new light on this field of research. The research was funded by the Austrian Research Fund (FWF): P22706-G17.

4

Rüdiger Lohlker

Al-Qaeda Airlines: Jihadi Self-Assessment and the Ideology of Engineers In the case of jihadism religious thought matters1, but the practical and military discourses have been less researched. Religion matters, but there are other aspects to be looked at. One of the most prolific writers calls himself Dhu l-bijadayn2 referring to one of less prominent companions of the prophet. This companion was called „the man with two striped garments“ (bijad)3 due to his appearance when he first met the prophet Muhammad. His tribesmen had prevented him from conversion to Islam, but at last he succeeded and he was left with one sheet of cloth he had to tear apart to cover himself.4 He died on the battlefield and was put down in his grave by the prophet himself aided by Abu Bakr and 'Umar al-Khattab. He is well known today as a role model for self-sacrifice.5 Who could be a better role model for an aspiring jihadi? The pseudonym is popular with other fighters too.6 Dhu l-bijadayn reached a certain fame in non specialist circles when announcing on jihadi fora that the US ambassador J. Christopher Stevens – who died in an attack in Benghazi – was killed by a lethal injection after plans to kidnap him went bad.7 1

2

3 4

5

6

7

E. g., Rüdiger Lohlker, “The Forgotten Swamp revisited“, in id. (ed.), New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism: Online and Offline (Göttingen: Vienna University Press 2012a), 125-139; Orhan Elmaz, “Jihadi Salafi Creed: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Imperatives of Faith“, in Rüdiger Lohlker (ed.), New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism: Online and Offline (Göttingen: Vienna University Press 2012), 15-36; Stephen Ulph, Towards a Curriculum for the Teaching of Jihadist Ideology, Part 1-3 (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation 2010) (via http://www.jamestown.org/); Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Theology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 2012). I will use here the more classical pronunciation, not the modern one using a lenghtened ē for the dual (e. g., alSahabi al-jalil Dhu l-bijadayn li-l-shaykh al-Maghamisi (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rSe6rKXRjE4) (accessed July 5, 2013). Another version of his name with a typo in Rüdiger Lohlker (2012b), “Religions, Weapons, and Jihadism. Emblematic Discourses“, in Rüdiger Lohlker (ed.), Jihadism: Online Discourses and Representations (Göttingen: Vienna University Press 2012b), 65-87, here 86f. We will not use the current version of his name circulated in the media: Dhu-al-bajadin. Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, Vol 1 (Beirut: Librairie du Liban 1968), 52. E. g., Silsilat al-sahaba ghayr al-mashhurin: al-Sahabi al-jalil Dhu l-bijadayn (http://forums.fatakat.com/thread4141801) (accessed 2013/07/05) or Ila jannat al-khuld: Dhu l-bijadayn (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ltMYuhW-E8) (accessed July 5, 2013). E. g., Dhi l-bijadayn ma'na min ajmal ma'ani al-tadhiyya (http://www.twbh.com/index.php/site/article/read494/) (accessed July 5, 2013), Qissat al-batal Dhu l-bijadayn 18 (http://www.alraidiah.com/vb/showthread.php?t=143602) (accessed July 5, 2013), and Hal qissa dafn Dhi lbijadayn fi ghazwat Tabuk thabita? (http://www.saaid.net/Doat/Zugail/28.htm) (accessed July 5, 2013). https://www.facebook.com/people/%D8%B0%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86/100003506648157(accessed July 5, 2013). E. g., http://counterjihadreport.com/tag/dhu-al-bajadin/ (accessed July 5, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/4/al-qaeda-weapons-expert-us-ambassador-libya-killed/?page=all

5

Less fam mous is a statement he h is creditted with on n the attack on the Booston maratthon, calledd “marathon of death” in i his statem ment, praisinng the “two o daring you ungsters” wh who caused terror t in thee eyes of thhe Americanns etc. usin ng cheap deevices – a hint to his videos andd online manuals (seee below).8 H He is framingg the “War on Terror” aas a “War on o Islam” th hus reproduccing the circcle of panicc essential foor the proceess of preparring potentiial mujahidss for the accceptance off jihadi theollogy.9 Dhu l- bbijadayn waas described d in the meddia as the all-Qa'ida weapons expeert or as its “explosives “ s guru”10. Thhe most fam mous of pub blications hee is credited d with may be the “Enccyclopedia”” (mawsu'a)) on weaponns and expplosives.11 We W find inn the “Encyclopedia of o Dhu l-B Bijadayn” chapters c onn Molotov coocktails, Haawn mortarss, on Berettaas, construccting hand grenades, g ussing AK-47, M 16, andd G 3, silenccers etc.12 The othher main conntribution to o the field oof jihadi millitary studiees by Dhu l--Bijadayn iss his speciall course for beginners as a mujahidss combiningg text and videos. v Its focus f is on explosives and toxins.. The Islamiic credibilityy of this co ourse is hintted at with a depiction of what is perceived as a the blackk banner of tthe prophett Muhammaad with the first part of o the Islam mic creed annd the so caalled seal off the propheet. This bannner is perceived as onee of the mosst importantt markers off the jihadi subculture.. Other religgious formuulas are inteerspersed innto the textts, e. g., “W We rely upoon the ever--living whoo does not diie”13

This couurse gives basic b inform mation on prrimary mateerials necesssary for buiilding explo osives. Withh detailed phhotographicc illustration ns, the begginner jihad di is led steep by step to build an n explosivee device. Cruucial questiions are disccussed, e. gg., the way to t procure the t necessar ary supplies easily. Thee best placees to buy the t materiaal for the explosives are discusssed, wheree to avoid questions,, identificatiion etc. The begginner is asssured that even a smalll experiencee – being ab ble only to oobtain a sm mall quantityy – will be uuseful in thhe future. The T use of ppotassium chlorate c is discussed, building an n electronicc

8 9 10 11 12 13

(accessedd 07/05/2013)), and http://w www.elaph.com m/Web/news/2 2013/6/816560.html (accesssed July 5, 20 013). http://ww ww.ye1.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=7230077 (accessed July J 8, 2013); the posting by an US official in thiss thread seeems not to haave had any efffect. Cf. the cchapter on jihaadi masculinities in this voluume. http://homeland.housee.gov/news/ny y-daily-news-aal-qaeda-bomb b-making-exp pert-publishes--magazine-deetailing-howmake-exxplosives (acceessed July 8, 2013). 2 has been postted on several fora hinting at Since puublication the encyclopedia e a its popularitty. E. g., htttp://sheshan.ahhlamontada.co om/t96-topic ((the links do not n work anym more). Referringg to Sura 25, al-furqan, a 28, taken up in thhe Hadith literrature.

6

detonator aand other thhings like ethanol, e vasseline, glyceerin, soap, acetone etcc.14 The matterials usedd are basic sstocks availlable in eveery househoold. E.g., a digital theermometer uused to dettermine thee exact tempperature of the t mixture prepared:

The beginnner is againn and again reminded too control what w he is do oing to avoiid damage for f himself.. In a similarr vein, anotther text abo out explosivves tells the student: Expplosives aree dangerouss substancees and are different d fro om other suubstances because youu will not be abble to contro ol or predicct the resullts of its ex xplosion or interaction with otherr subbstances [… …] that is neecessary to ensure you ur health and d the healthh of the peo ople aroundd youu.15 There are oother dangeers, too. In th he first sesssion Dhu l-b bijadayn tellls the studennt: Maay be duringg the trainin ng you mayy think you are another person – w when you fin nd that youu are able to buiild a bomb or a poisonnous substance easily you y may feeel a sort off pride. Youu andd some of your y friendss may walk together an nd since yo ou are proudd of yourseelf you mayy starrt to talk to them. You might say tto them thatt you are ab ble to build a bomb eassily and killl eveeryone you want w [...]”166 14 15 16

One verssion at http://aalplatformmed dia.com/vb/sho howthread.php p?t=8765 (acceessed July 23,, 2013). Linkss don't work. E. g., htttp://alqimmah.info/showthread.php?p=64421 (accessed July 31, 2013 3). Daura khhassa li l-mujahid al-mubta adi': al-dars aal-awwal.

7

So “your brother 'Abdallah Dhu l-bijadayn” is training the future bomb and poison experts of the jihadi subculture with a minimal religious framing. Even calling himself “your brother” is to be read as part of this framing. This study aims at the analysis of an online publication by the Kata'ib al-firdaws al-a'la, the “Brigades of the highest garden of paradise”, a “jihadi technical magazine” called Al-Qaeda Airlines. In fact, it is not a magazine. It is just a set of PowerPoint slides exported to pdf. This format is quite in line with the less sophisticated jihadi publications on weapons and other technical aspects of jihadi operations – with the notable exception of Mu'askar al-battar. The online magazines in the tradition of Sawt al-jihad17 and its last incarnation as Inspire use a much more elaborate form of desktop publishing. Other issues of this magazine deal with chloroform18 or ricin and nicotine19. The second issue, the issue we are discussing, is an analysis of the positive and negative aspects – form a jihadi point of view – of several jihadi operations. The first issue created a stir in US media, due mainly to the successful public relation by SITE Institute – and the smart use of the airplane motif by the author(s). Understanding terror as a form communication20, this act of communication can be seen as quite successful. The first issue describes the production of chloroform and its use, illustrating the process with accurate photographs enabling the reader/viewer to produce chloroform. The religious framing is reduced to a verse of Sura 8, al-anfal, advocating the preparation for war21, the self-designation as “brother”, speaking of mujahidin, and listing imprisoned jihadis, most of them in US jails. The third issue deals with ricin, but also with nicotine, and with a mobile phone gun or a “killing pen”. The religious framing is the same as before in the first issue. The Quranic verse is exactly the same.22 This framing lends itself to a specific layout for Al Qaeda Airlines. At the end of the third issue Dhu l-bijadayn announces “Operation Hemorrhage” or the “Strategy of Thousand Cuts” (istratijiyyat al-alf jurh), ending the slide with the quotation well known from the English-language magazine Inspire published by Al-Qa'ida in the Arab Peninsula23 This strategy of attacking the enemy with smaller, but more frequent operations is what some may refer to as the strategy of a thousand cuts. The aim is to bleed the enemy to 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

A detailed analysis in Nico Prucha, Die Stimme des Dschihad (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac 2010). Maddat al-kluruform al-mukhaddara, no. 1. al-Jur'a al-qatila, no. 3. Peter Waldmann, Terrorismus: Provokation der Macht (Hamburg: Murmann 20052). With a modernizing translation. There are other slides copied and pasted from issue no. 1. Courtesy of the editorial of Inspire 3 (2010).

8

deaath.24 Using this quote Dhuu l-bijadayn n documentts the intercconnectedness of the jjihadi disco ourses. Thee claim of Innspire that the t total cost of the opperation using bombs in i parcels too down UP PS flights inn 2010. Thiss strategy caan be seen as a a jihadi aadaptation of o the “princciple of adddition” Daviid Kilcullenn wrote abouut.25

h combbination off technical illustration, i copy and paste from m The style Dhu l-bijaddayn is a hybrid media sourrces, a fasccination with some gotthic elemen nts (see the skull abovee) and kitscch. We willl now focus on the secoond issue off Al Qaeda A Airlies, called Hallmarrks of Al Qaaeda.

24 25

Inspire 3 (2010), 3. David K Kilcullen, Acccidental Gueriilla: Fightingg Small Wars in the Midth h of a Big O One (Oxford et e al.: Oxfordd Universiity Press 20099), 3.

9

Al-Qaeda A Airlines 2 The secondd issue startts the comm mon two sliddes of the magazine: m a. “Brigades oof the higheest Paradisee Garden” aand the subtitle “a jihaadi militaryy magazine” and b. Al A Qaeda Ai Airlines in English E andd Arabic. Booth slides arre combined d with pictuures showing g airplanes calling up 99/11. Quite logical in a jihadi fram me, a well knnown quote from Usam ma bin Ladin n follows: If oour messagges had beeen able too reach you u through words, wee wouldn't have beenn 26 deliivering them m through planes. p

This quotee situates 9//11 evidentlly in a relaation that is a specific expression of the circcle of panicc dominatingg the jihadii mindset sttressing thee need to reeact in a vio olent way ssince the en nemy is nott behaving aas he shouldd do. The maain purposee of Dhu l-b bijadayn's ppresentation n is to disccuss the poositive aspects and thee mistakes of jihadi attaacks; critical remarks annd recommendations are formulatted. The first caase is the caase of the “sshoe bombeer” of the sh hoe bomberr, the Britishh citizen Ricchard Reid,, who in Deecember 20001 tried in vain v to expplode a bom mb – that waas concealeed in his sho oes – on ann airplane. T The reason iss clearly staated: The expplosive appparently did d not detonaate due to the one-daay delay in the take-offf of Reid'ss flight. He had worn his h shoes fo or more thaan one day,, and the raainy weatheer, perhaps along withh Reid's accuumulated fooot perspirattion, causedd the fuse to o be too dam mp to ignite..27

Other probblems menntioned are, e. g., thee appearancce (hair etcc.) of Reidd causing th he securityy 26 27

Al Qaedaa Airlines, 3. Id.,8.

10

personnel at the airport to stop him from boarding until the next day. Another point is that Reid did continue to try to detonate the explosive device instead of putting his shoe on, get off the plane and try another attack. Dhu l-bijadayn reminds his fellow mujahidin: “As we mentioned before: Small mistakes may cause the failure of the entire operation.”28 Dhu l-bijadayn then muses about the idea to blow up a plane by using a small amount of explosives to cause a leakage of pressure. He is talking about the 9/11 attacks and how the increased security measures after these attacks lead the planners of the shoe bomb attack to their modus of operation with an added idea to organize a second wave of attacks on airplanes.29 We see the process of assessing the possibilities and trying to device new plots under new circumstances. Other operations discussed are the first Bali bombings in 2002. The main critique is: May be the only negative aspect mentioned is the use of mobile phones to communicate among the brothers leading in turn to the capture of some of the members of the cell executing the attack.30 The next operation is the attack on the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004. The discussion is very short. The main point may be that in the statement of the Jemaah Islamiyya Australia is categorised as “one of the worst enemies of God and Islam.”31 Following a kind of chronology the next case is the case of the Madrid bombings 2004. Dhu lbijadayn is very outspoken in his assessment: We have to look at the reasons that lead to this result as well as to really understand that this has happened just because of the will of God. But it is also incumbent on us to explain what happened during this attack (ghazwa) and to mention the positive aspects of this blessed attack, too; so that every future jihadi operation will be more professional and precise.32 A rare insight into the theological underpinnings even in a technical text written in an engineer’s perspective who things about ways to make things work. There is some critique, Dhu l-bijadayn says. The first negative point includes buying the material for the explosives in a way that makes it possible to trace the attackers. Another main fault was

28 29 30 31 32

Id.,20. Id.,12. Id.,30. Id.,40. Id.,55.

11

buying the mobile phones in shops that were known to the security forces, another one using the phones as a timing control for the detonation. The second negative point was leaving the cars that were used to reach the railway stations before these stations – even taken into account that the cars were stolen. The third point was taking the mobile with bare hands thus leaving fingerprints. Following are some pictures of destruction and the claim that Spain withdraws its troops from Iraq due to this attack.33 The London bombings on July 7th 2005 are the next case discussed by Dhu l-bijadayn. He includes detailed description of the actions of the bombers and boasts that, despite all the efforts of the British security apparatus, four mujahidin were able to organize such an operation. He gives short description of each of the four operations adding quotes of the bombers like Your democratically elected governments continually perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world. Your support makes you directly responsible. We are at war, and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.34 By these quotes, he tries to project a connection between military operations of the British armed forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other “attacks” on the Muslim community in other regions. This connection is leading to the necessity to organize a Muslim army, i. e., a jihadi underground. Then he turns to the construction of the bomb with a remark that is laughable that buying aspirin is more difficult than buying hydrogen peroxide used for the bombs.35 For one of the bombers, his calmness is stressed although he was only minutes before the bomb exploded36, evidently a role model in the eyes of the author. The apartment of the bombers with the remains of another bomb is shown.37 And this part is closing with a cynical remark where to search for the reasons of the bombing again laying the blame on the British foreign policy.38 The next operation discussed is the attempt to take down airplanes using disguised liquid explosives. Dhu l-bijadayn claims that the foolishness of the “crusaders” has helped the jihadis thus encouraging other jihadis. Dhu l-bijadayn stresses the resulting controls of passengers especially when carrying liquids turning a failed attack into a successful. What went wrong according to Dhu l-bijadayn?

33 34 35 36 37 38

Id.,62. Id.,101. Id.,105. Id.,108. Id.,112. Id.,114.

12

The sizee of the celll executing the operatioon was too big, i. e., to o many perssons particip pated. Eachh one knew aabout the deetails of thee operation. Somebody y argued that the numbeer of person ns was evenn higher durring 9/11. Dhu D l-bijad dayn retorts that only a small gro oup knew aall details of o the 9/11 attacks. Thhe second problem p waas the time of preparattion allowin ng the Britissh security services too know abouut the prepaarations: “T The period oof discussio on and the delay of thhe operation n was moree than six moonths and inn addition, the t meetinggs and talks were numerous.”39 But Dhu l--bijadayn is optimistic. He writes: Thoough it is noow difficultt to use it [tthe liquid explosive] to o blast airpllanes, there are dozenss of ttargets wheere the secu urity measuures used at a airports are a not obseerved. Therrefore, it iss posssible to usee this idea to t weaken tthe enemiess of God (your imaginaation is you ur border, o 39

Id.,122.

13

brother mujahid).40 Dhu l-bijadayn inserts some reflection on the role of media of media and the need to conceal some information. Then he turns to the attacker on the now Saudi minister of the interior, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef in 2009. He gives only a quite usual biographical entry referring the reader to a publication of the al-Malahim media outlet for further details.41 The next operation is the failed attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab. Dhu l-bijadayn frames this attack with the quotation from Usama bin Ladin he used in the introduction of the presentation, followed by a statement of the AlQa'ida in the Arab Peninsula about this attack. Dhu l-bijadayn describes the operation and tells about the targets using the usual circle of panic narrative: The martyrdom seeking brother was advised to blast up the plane over an American city so as to the plane when falling down drops onto of the Americans shooting their rockets at our houses and kill our women and children.42 The last discussed are the parcel bombs placed in cargo planes in October 2010. Dhu l-bijadayn introduces his discussion of this case with a slide titled inter alia “the years of fear to terror to come.”43 Then he turns to his favourite topic: producing explosives. He gives a step by step instruction on concocting PETN using material easily to be found on the web; additionally he is talking about acetone peroxide. He discusses other possible ways to cause damage to the enemy. The final threat reads: We will continue with similar operations, and we do not mind at all in this stage if they are intercepted. It is such a good bargain for us to spread fear amongst the enemy and keep him on his toes in exchange of a few months of work and a few thousand bucks.44 So finally Dhu l-bijadayn is back to the communication aspect of terrorism. His presentation may be read as a way to spread terror among the enemies of jihadis demonstrating how effective jihadis are able to operate.

40 41 42 43 44

Id.,123. Id.,132. He is referring to Qism al-tafrigh wa l-nashr (2010), Nukhbat al-i'lam al-jihadi: Fuztu wa-rabb al-Ka'ba, no. 2, (n.p.: Mu'assasat al-Malahim li-intaj al-i'lami). Id.,139; adopting a classical topic of patriarchal masculinity narratives: the defender of women and children. Id.,152. Id.,205.

14

Conclusion Dhu l-bijadayn is firmly embedded in the jihadi framing, using short remarks as markers to demonstrate his jihadi identity and reliability. At the same time he is using his technical skills as a service for the jihadi subculture. He is inserting himself into the position of a “scholar” cum engineer performing a service for his community. A more collective continuation of Dhu l-bijadayns efforts are the columns on “Open Source Jihad” and others of the magazine Inspire trying to instruct mujahidin to execute operations with simple means.

15

Joas Wagemakers

Between Purity and Pragmatism? Abu Basir al-Tartusi’s Nuanced Radicalism Introduction Over the past few years, the alleged revisionism of jihadi movements and scholars has become an increasingly important theme in the study of radical Islam. First and foremost among these is the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, which has substantially revised its radical ideas since the late 1990s1 and has also adjusted its policies accordingly.2 A similarly drastic move away from the use of violence has taken place among members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, but it is unclear whether they have also revised their radical ideology.3 Similar doubts can be expressed about the alleged revisions of certain jihadi scholars. Although some authors clearly describe the recent writings of these ideologues as “revisionism”4 and the critical work of major radical scholars such as Sayyid Imam5 and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi6 have indeed received a lot of attention, including from the Western press7, it is highly doubtful whether either 1

2 3 4

5

6

7

Daniel Lav, “Jihadists and Jurisprudents: The ‘Revisions’ Literature of Sayyid Imam and Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya”, in Joseph Morrison Skelly (ed.), Political Islam from Muhammad to Ahmadinejad: Defenders, Detractors, and Definitions (Santa Barbara, Cal.: Praeger Security International 2010), 110-1, 125-8; Roel Meijer, “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London and New York: Hurst and Co./Columbia University Press 2005), 207-17. Omar Ashour, “Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group”, Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (2007), 596-625. Id., “Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements”, Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 3 (2011), 377-97. Amel Lamnaouer and Romain Caillet, “De l’usage de jihad: la fin d’une ère en Égypte? Les revisions idéologiques de Sayyid Imâm”, in Hadjar Aouardji and Hélène Legeay (eds.), L’Égypte dan l’année 2007 (Cairo: CEDEJ 2008), 85-115; Marwan Shehadeh, “Weakening al-Qaeda: Literature Review Challenges its Authority”, Arab Insight 2, no. 6 (2009), 25-36. Kamal Habib, “Another Wave of Jihadist Adjustment: Internal Debates of the Movement”, Arab Insight 2, no. 6 (2009), 37-50; Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 232-38; Daniel Lav, “An In-Depth Summary of Sayyid Imam’s New Polemic against Al-Qaeda, ‘Exposing the Exoneration’”, February 23, 2009, www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3111.htm (accessed March 15, 2012); id., “Jihadists”, 111-15, 121-25. Lahoud, Jihadis’, 239-45; id., “In Search of Philosopher-Jihadis: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Jihadi Philosophy”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10, no. 2 (2009), 205-20; Joas Wagemakers, “Reclaiming Scholarly Authority: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Critique of Jihadi Practices”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 7 (2011), 523-39. Caryle Murphy, “Jihadi Dispute Points to Deeper Radicalism among Youths”, Christian Science Monitor, March 27, 2009, www.csmonitor.com/2009/0327/p04s02-wome.htm (accessed April 2, 2009); Robert F. Worth, “Credentials

16

Imam8 or al-Maqdisi9 has actually changed his beliefs. A major radical Muslim scholar who is not the subject of any publication on revisionism is the Syrian-British ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi. He himself has not remained quiet in the debates on changing radical views, however. He has criticized al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya for their ideological moderation,10 has scolded Sayyid Imam for his criticism of the jihadi movement,11 and has also weighed in on the accusations of revisionism leveled against al-Maqdisi,12 who he has defended on several occasions.13 Abu Basir himself has also made remarks that might suggest he is no longer the radical scholar he once was. The most famous of these is perhaps his strong condemnation of the bombings in London in July 2005 for both practical and ideological reasons.14 Although he later stated that the British government and its policies were ultimately responsible for the bombings,15 he stood by his condemnation after having been accused of revisionism, an accusation he denied, albeit in very general terms.16 More important than the condemnation of a single attack – from the point of view of ideology, at least – are the indications of Abu Basir’s recent conciliatory advice to activists involved in the revolutions against Arab regimes (the Arab Spring)17 and his apparent acceptance of participation in electoral politics. Considering Abu Basir’s strict ideas on Islam in general, his strongly negative views of the regimes in the Arab world, and his earlier adamant refusal to accept democracy, this is somewhat strange. It is therefore not surprising that Abu Basir

8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17

Challenged, Radical Quotes West Point”, New York Times, April 30, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/world/middleeast/30jihad.html?_r=1 (accessed May 6, 2009); Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda Mastermind Questions Terrorism”, The New Yorker, June 2, 2008, www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?printable=true (accessed June 5, 2008). Lav, “Jihadists”, 128-38. Wagemakers, “Reclaiming”, 526-29. Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Mubadarat al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya al-Misriyya: I‘tiraf bi-l-Khat’ am Inhiyar wa-Suqut (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=dezrni62, 2003) (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Kalima hawla Muraja‘at al-Shaykh Sayyid Imam (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=cde5tgas, 2007) (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Al-Tafriq bayna l-Tanasuh wa-l-Taraju‘ (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=hkjazx32, 2008) (accessed January 13, 2010). Id., Dhabban ‘an ‘Ird Akhina l-Shaykh Abi Muhammad al-Maqdisi (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation/read/f48.doc, 2002) (accessed February 24, 2012); id., Al-Hukm bi-l-Sijn Khamsa Sanawat ‘ala Abi Muhammad al-Maqdisi: Limadha?! (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=09011201, 2012) (accessed February 24, 2012); id., Daftar al-Thawra wa-l-Thuwwar: Kalimat Kutibat li-l-Thawrat al-‘Arabiyya wa-bi-Khassa minha l-Thawra al-Suriyya (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/books/read/b%2040.doc, 2011/2012), 381-82 (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Bayan hawla l-Tafjirat allati Hasalat fi Madinat Lundun (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/hadath/Read/hadath17.doc, 2005) (accessed March 15, 2012). Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Al-Wajh al-Akhar al-Mas’ul ‘an Tafjirat Lundun (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/hadath/Read/hadath18.doc, 2005) (accessed March 15, 2012). Id., Hubb al-Tashaffi.. am al-Hukm al-Shar‘i (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/articles/read/a88.doc, 2005), 1-2 (accessed March 15, 2012). Joas Wagemakers, “Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: Syria”, November 19, 2011, www.jihadica.com/al-qaida-advises-the-arab-spring-syria/ (accessed March 15, 2012); id., “Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: Libya”, January 9, 2012, www.jihadica.com/al-qaida-advises-the-arab-spring-libya/ (accessed March 15, 2012).

17

was criticized for some of this by a fellow radical scholar.18 Abu Basir’s recent comments on the Arab Spring and elections suggest that he may be a purist with regard to his beliefs in a situation when dictators rule through harsh repression and real change is unlikely to happen, but that when actual opportunities arise he proves to be a lot more pragmatic. This article focuses on whether Abu Basir is indeed simply a radical scholar wavering between purity and pragmatism or a consistent ideologue whose recent comments are rooted in longer-held beliefs. Although Abu Basir is one of the most important radical Muslim scholars today, little is known about him. His website (www.abubaseer.bizland.com) states that Abu Basir ‘Abd al-Mun‘im b. Mustafa Halima was born in Tartus, hence his adopted name “al-Tartusi” (the man from Tartus), in Syria on October 3, 1959. It also states that he is married to an originally Palestinian wife, has three daughters and one son and left Syria “on the path of God” (fi sabil Allah) in 1980 and remains in migration.19 He has lived in Great Britain for some years but it is not certain for how long exactly. Neither is it clear whether he has a degree in religious studies or not. This is typical of the lack of information we have about Abu Basir, who long seems to have wanted to remain out of the limelight, despite being a prolific writer of books, articles and fatwas for his website. Recently, however, Abu Basir has become more active in public, giving lectures available on YouTube20 and writing on Facebook,21 which is probably related to his concerns about events in the Middle East since the Arab Spring, particularly in his native Syria. Despite his large number of publications, his more active recent public profile and his stature as a major radical Muslim scholar, little has been published about Abu Basir’s ideology,22 particularly with regard to his alleged revisionism, which is what this article concentrates on. More specifically, this article asks whether Abu Basir has compromised or revised his earlier radical and “pure” beliefs in favor of a more pragmatic approach now that the Arab Spring offers opportunities for real change or has stuck to the same ideas he has always held, albeit with a different emphasis. To this end, I start by giving an overview of Abu Basir’s general ideology, followed by his views on democracy. I then focus on his more recent work that was inspired by the Arab Spring. This article is mostly based on the Arabic writings of Abu Basir himself, downloaded from his own website as well as from Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s homepage (www.tawhed.ws). Its goal is twofold: firstly, it gives 18

19 20 21 22

D. Hazan, “Salafi-Jihadi Cleric Abu Basir al-Tartusi Presents His Position on Democracy: The Principle of the Rule of the People is Heresy – But Some Mechanisms of Democracy can be Adopted”, January 19, 2012, www.memri.org/report/en/print6007.htm (accessed January 26, 2012). See www.abubaseer.bizland.com/hadath/Read/Hawya.doc (accessed March 15, 2012). See for instance www.youtube.com/watch?v=f60BQZy97tM&feature=related (accessed March 15, 2012). See www.facebook.com/moaradaislamiya (accessed March 15, 2012). An exception is Joas Wagemakers, “An Inquiry into Ignorance: A Jihadi-Salafi Debate on Jahl as an Obstacle to Takfir”, in Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh and Joas Wagemakers (eds.), The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki (Leiden: Brill 2011), 314-24.

18

the first broad yet detailed overview of Abu Basir’s ideology available, based on a representative selection of his writings; secondly, this article seeks to provide a contribution to the literature on revisionism by showing that seemingly contradictory but actually highly nuanced radical views may co-exist, without being expressions of ideological backtracking. Abu Basir’s General Ideology Abu Basir, like so many of today’s radical Muslim scholars, adheres to Salafism, a trend within Sunni Islam whose adherents claim to emulate the supposedly pure example of the Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of Islam (al-salaf al-salih) as closely and in as many spheres of life as possible.23 Salafism, however, is not a homogeneous trend and Abu Basir may best be grouped among the Jihadi-Salafis, who share the basic ideology with quietist or politically active Salafis, but emphasize the importance of jihad as a means to solve problems between Muslim countries and non-Muslim ones as well as those within the lands of Islam itself. This is often expressed in the belief that the regimes in the Muslim world today are actually unbelievers (kuffar) who may be overthrown by means of jihad.24 Hugely important to all Salafis, including those of a jihadi flavor like Abu Basir, is the unity of God (tawhid). As others have pointed out,25 the concept of tawhid does not just refer to the belief in the one true God, which may be labeled monotheism, but is divided by Salafis into several parts: tawhid al-rububiyya (the unity of Lordship), tawhid al-asma’ wa-l-sifat (the unity of names and attributes, meaning that God is absolutely unique in all his characteristics), and tawhid al-uluhiyya (the unity of divinity, implying that only God may be worshipped). Abu Basir is no exception,26 pointing out that tawhid encompasses more than just monotheism. He focuses on the shahada (Islamic confession of faith) and states that its first half (“there is no god but God”) consists of two parts: a rejection of polytheism (la ilaha (“there is no god”)) and an affirmation that only God is worthy of worship (illa llah (“but God”)).27 This latter point is an important one, since it introduces Abu Basir’s argument that tawhid is more than just the belief in one Lord and Creator (tawhid alrububiyya): 23

24 25 26 27

For more on Salafism, see Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London/New York: Hurst and Co./Columbia University Press 2009); Bernard Rougier (ed.), Qu’est-ce que le salafisme? (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2008). Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press 2012), 7-10. Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London/New York: Hurst and Co./Columbia University Press 2009), 39. Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Shurut La Ilaha illa llah (www.tawhed.ws/r?=imzt2mwe, 2000), 20 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Shurut, 17-18.

19

This meaning is what [even] the polytheists (al-mushrikun) decided on before [the advent of Islam]. They did not differ with the prophets [of Judaism, Christianity and Islam preaching tawhid] on this point. They disagreed with them (i.e. the prophets) on the god worthy of worship (al-ilah al-mustahiqq li-l-‘ibada).28 To illustrate that a clean break with polytheism (shirk) is necessary to achieve full tawhid, he mentions the (pre-Islamic) prophet Ibrahim as an example of a believer who disavowed the idols of his father, citing verses such as Q. 26: 75-77: “‘And have you considered what you have been serving, you and your fathers, the elders? They are an enemy to me, except the Lord of all Being’”.29 Basic Concepts A clean break with polytheism in favor of the belief in tawhid naturally leads to the question of faith (iman) and its opposite, unbelief (kufr). Abu Basir states that the former is constituted by conviction in the heart (i‘tiqad bi-l-qalb), speech (qawl bi-l-lisan) and acts (‘amal bi-l-jawarih). Although this is the “orthodox” Sunni position, there are strong disagreements about this issue between Jihadi-Salafis and their quietist counterparts.30 Abu Basir has also weighed in on the debates about this and is obviously a staunch defender of the Jihadi-Salafi position.31 Since iman is strongly connected with tawhid, Abu Basir states that “there is no iman, except after the disbelief (al-kufr) in the idol (bi-l-taghut), outwardly and inwardly (zahiran wa-batinan)”, citing Q. 2: 256 as proof: “So whoever disbelieves in idols and believes in God, has laid hold of the most firm handle, unbreaking”. This “most firm handle, unbreaking” (al-‘urwa al-wuthqa) is the tawhid of God as expressed in the shahada, according to Abu Basir.32 The meaning of taghut (pl. tawaghit), on the other hand, is broader than just a concrete idol and, Abu Basir states, includes “everything worshipped besides God”.33 Instead of worshipping tawaghit, he states, they should be rejected with

28 29 30

31

32 33

Id., Shurut, 19. Id., Shurut, 18. All Qur’anic quotations taken from A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York: Touchstone 1996 [1955]). See Joas Wagemakers, “‘Seceders’ and ‘Postponers’? An Analysis of the ‘Khawarij’ and ‘Murji’a’ Labels in Polemical Debates between Quietist and Jihadi-Salafis”, in Jeevan Deol and Zaheer Kazmi (eds.), Contextualising Jihadi Thought (London: Hurst and Co. 2012), 143-65. Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Mulahazat wa-Rudud ‘ala Risala ‘Mujmal Masa’il al-Iman al-‘Ilmiyya fi Usul al-‘Aqida alSalafiyya’ (www.tawhed.ws/a?a=0ybqpkdw, 2001), 1-6, 27-28 (accessed September 3, 2009); id., Qawa‘id fi lTakfir (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/books/read/b16.doc, 1994), 55-60 (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Shurut, 34. Id., Shurut, 38.

20

“enmity (al-‘adawa), hatred (al-baghda’), and loathing (karh) in the heart”.34 If iman should be embraced (partly through the disbelief in idols), kufr should be avoided at all times. Abu Basir gives an extensive description of kufr and related concepts such as fisq (sinfulness) and nifaq (hypocrisy)35 and divides them into “major” and “minor” (or “greater” and “lesser”) versions, in which the former type is so grave that it immediately expels the culprit from Islam. The minor version of these concepts (minor unbelief, minor sinfulness, minor hypocrisy, etcetera) is also sinful, but not so much that it turns the person guilty of it into a non-Muslim or “infidel” (kafir).36 Although this is a rather theoretical description of kufr, it is clear from his work where Abu Basir is going with this. One of the major issues he considers kufr is “ruling on something other than what God has revealed”.37 Abu Basir points to various verses from the Qur’an to show that ruling on the basis of non-Islamic laws violates God’s tawhid, since his absolute unity and uniqueness demands that he is the sole sovereign in every sphere of life, including legislation.38 This is particularly the case when “un-Islamic” rulings occur not just incidentally but structurally and are based on a secular or otherwise non-Islamic constitution that has replaced Islamic law (shari‘a). Such an exchange (tabdil) of legislative systems justifies labeling it a case of major unbelief (kufr akbar) because its gravity and structural character betrays the unbelieving heart of the person responsible for it.39 Just as with tawaghit, kufr is something Muslims would do well to stay away from, according to Abu Basir. This does not just mean refraining from sinning, but also refers to staying away from non-Muslims altogether in order not to be affected by their differing religious beliefs. Such efforts to promote a strong intra-Islamic solidarity on the one hand and, especially in this case, encourage separation from non-Muslims have their roots in the concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty towards Muslims and disavowal of everything else). Throughout Islamic history, this concept has taken various forms and has been used in different ways.40 Abu Basir has used it to reject the idea of

34 35 36 37 38 39

40

Id., Shurut, 41. For more on this, see Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur’an (Montreal etc.: McGill-Queens University Press 2002 [1959]), 119-83. Al-Tartusi, Qawa‘id, 14-55. Id., Shurut, 82. Id., Ma‘na Tawhid al-Hakimiyya (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=k8ompyjr, n.d.), 1 (accessed February 24, 2012); id., Qawa‘id, 153. Id., Mulahazat, 16-17. For more on this, see Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: AlWala’ wa-l-Bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London/New York: Hurst and Co./Columbia University Press 2009), 95-101;id., Quietist, 63-66. See also al-Tartusi, Qawa‘id, 251-57. See Joas Wagemakers, “The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Wala’ wa-l-Bara’”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 44, no. 1 (2012), 93-110; id., “Framing the ‘Threat to Islam’: Al-Wala’ wa-l-Bara’ in Salafi Discourse”, Arab Studies Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2008), 1-22; id., Quietist, 147-88; id., “Transformation”, 81-95.

21

interreligious dialogue41 but has mostly used it in the context of emigration (hijra), a concept rooted in the journey by the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622. Abu Basir defines this concept as “moving out (al-khuruj) on the path of God from the abode of unbelief (dar al-kufr) to the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) and from the abode in which fitna (strife, temptation) is fierce (shadid) to the abode where this is less so”.42 The abodes of unbelief and Islam are defined, respectively, by Abu Basir as those areas in which the rule of Islam is not applied and those areas where it is, irrespective of the number of Muslim inhabitants.43 He mentions four reasons why people may make use of hijra: to be able to worship God peacefully, to escape repression, to strengthen Muslims and weaken polytheists, and to do missionary work (da‘wa) for Islam.44 All of this can also happen within the dar al-kufr, for example by moving from “the abode of injustice (zulm) and sin (fisq) to an abode where this is less present”.45 It is tempting to assume that Abu Basir’s own position as an immigrant in Great Britain – which is easily justified by the many reasons he gives for legitimate and illegitimate emigration to (other parts of) the dar al-kufr46 – has led him to write an entire book on hijra. Perhaps this is true. The concept of hijra is, however, an important expression of bara’ and Abu Basir is by no means the only Jihadi-Salafi to have written on the subject within the context of al-wala’ wa-bara’.47 An even more important and certainly more common expression of the disavowal of tawaghit and kufr, however, is excommunication (takfir). Although this term has a bad reputation as the prerogative of radical Muslims who appear to use it in such an “un-Islamic” way as to be labeled “Leninist takfiris” by some,48 the actual use of the concept by Jihadi-Salafis is much less reckless than is often assumed49 and Abu Basir’s writings illustrate this. He warns against the immediate use of takfir by pointing to several objections to its application to Muslims seemingly guilty of kufr. Such Muslims may simply have misinterpreted a text, may not have been aware of a certain ruling, or may unintentionally have made a mistake.50 As has been discussed elsewhere, Abu Basir has even dedicated an entire book51 to the question of ignorance (jahl) and to what extent this excuses a

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Hiwar al-Adyan Kayfa Naqra’uhu wa-Kayfa Nufassiruhu (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=1502091e, 2008), 3 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Al-Hijra.. Masa’il wa-Ahkam (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=6pydf0u2, 2001), 11 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Al-Hijra, 38-43. Id., Al-Hijra, 15-26. Id., Al-Hijra, 43-44. Id., Al-Hijra, 26-35, 46-51, 56-58, 62-77. See, for instance, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Salih al-Jarbu‘, Al-I‘lam bi-Wujub al-Hijra min Dar al-Kufr ila Dar al-Islam (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=nmz4ek2y, 2001) (accessed March 16, 2012). See, for instance, www.takfiris.com/takfir/ (accessed March 16, 2012). Wagemakers, “Inquiry”, id., “‘Seceders’” Al-Tartusi, Qawa‘id, 79-109, 162-71. Id., Al-‘Udhr bi-l-Jahl wa-Qiyam al-Hujja (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=j458ddox, 2001 [1991]) (accessed February 24, 2012).

22

person from committing an act of kufr.52 Such carefulness in the application of takfir stems from the belief that one cannot know what goes on inside a person’s heart, meaning that even general rulings of takfir in response to questions about certain sins must often still be investigated individually, because these may show that excommunication in a particular case is not justified.53 Despite a certain carefulness Abu Basir displays regarding takfir, it must be said that he is nevertheless quite radical in the concept’s application. Not only does he justify the use of excommunication against the people who he considers guilty of kufr akbar, but he also states that, precisely because we cannot know what goes on in people’s hearts, we must judge them by their words and acts.54 Abu Basir justifies this by pointing to “practical evidence” (qara’in ‘amaliyya), by which he means “outward acts (a‘mal al-jawarih al-zahira) that prove the inward truth (haqiqat albatin)”. Such acts are often enough to show what goes on in a person’s heart, Abu Basir claims, and do not require an explicit confirmation of unbelief by the person guilty of it.55 He goes on to list examples of acts that justify labeling the person guilty of them a kafir. Some of these acts are general, such as mocking Islam or engaging in kufr when one is not forced to.56 Others, however, are rather political and include “appealing (al-tahakum) to the taghut and the laws (shara’i‘) of the taghut”, “opposing the appeal to the law of God (shar‘ Allah)”, and “not ruling on what God has revealed”.57 That excommunication is not strictly a theoretical issue to Abu Basir is shown in his application of takfir to the well-known Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In an article dedicated to this issue, Abu Basir excommunicates al-Qaradawi for several reasons, including the latter’s efforts to establish a religious dialogue with non-Muslims and, more importantly, his support for democracy, partly because this system allows the people to legislate instead of God.58 Although these are not the only issues raised by Abu Basir as reasons for applying takfir to al-Qaradawi,59 it is noteworthy that politics is a recurring theme in his writings. It is therefore not surprising that he justifies revolting against Muslim rulers for their acts of kufr 60 and calls on Muslims to wage jihad against the rulers of the Muslim world because of their repression, torture and “un-Islamic” legislation.61 Before we 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

Wagemakers, “Inquiry”, 314-25. Al-Tartusi, Qawa‘id, 71-79. Id., Qawa‘id, 172. Id., Qawa‘id, 140. Id., Qawa‘id, 140-42. Id., Qawa‘id, 145-49, 153-54. Id., Limadha Kafartu Yusuf al-Qaradawi..? (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/articles/read/a%20118.doc, 2008), 1416 (accessed February 29, 2012). See also id., Hukm, 209-93. “Syrian Jihadist Scholar Abu Basir al-Tartusi: Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi is an Apostate”, December 24, 2008, www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3018.htm (accessed June 2, 2009). Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Munaqashat Qawl al-Shaykh Hamid al-‘Ali fi Mas’alat al-Khuruj ‘ala Anzimat al-Kufr wal-Ridda (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation/read/f%2086.doc, 2007), 2-3 (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Al-Hijra, 58-62. Cf. id., Al-Hijra, 63.

23

look at how such views are applied to the changed situation in the Arab world since 2011, we must first look in greater detail at what Abu Basir has to say about democracy.

Purity: Abu Basir’s Views on Democracy Theoretical objections In his treatment of democracy, Abu Basir starts by going back to the most basic meaning of the word “democracy”: rule of the people. He describes the system of democracy as one in which the people themselves have the highest authority and, consequently, have the right to decide on their own affairs.62 This immediately leads to Abu Basir’s main objection to democracy, namely that the people are the source of power and legislation, not God.63 This has several far-reaching implications. One of them is that it gives people power over things they do not own since they are not the owner of the world and everything in it, but God is.64 In effect, by giving people the power that belongs to the Creator of the world, democracy switches the roles of God and his creation by acting as if God himself is not the Creator but his creation is.65 A similar implication can be discerned regarding making the people – not God – the source of legislation. Since legislation is an area in which God should be absolutely sovereign according to Abu Basir, allowing human beings to interfere with this through democracy is not only a blatant violation of tawhid, as we saw above, but it also elevates the people to the status of God. Abu Basir cites several Qur’anic verses to show why he believes this is the case, including the well-known Q. 9: 31, which states: “They [Jews and Christians] have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God”. This verse, as well as its Prophetic explanation, allegedly shows that following other people in legislation equals taking them “as lords” (arbaban) and thus as “gods”.66 It is therefore not surprising that Abu Basir refers to “appealing” (tahakum) to others besides God as “worship”, and to democracy, being a system that not only allows but even facilitates “others besides God” (i.e. the people) to be “worshipped”, as a taghut.67 A second major reason Abu Basir is against democracy is the number of freedoms that are 62 63 64 65 66 67

Id., Hukm al-Islam fi l-Dimuqratiyya wa-l-Ta‘addudiyya al-Hizbiyya (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=q47of42zo, 1999 [1990]), 18-19 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Hadhihi Hiya l-Dimuqratiyya fa-Hal Antum Muntahawna (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=0goum2jh, 1999), 1 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Hadhihi, 7; Hukm, 61-62. Id., Al-Dimuqratiyya al-Qadhira (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=peaeae2s, 2006), 1 (accessed February 24, 2012); id., AlHuriyya bayna l-Islam wa-l-Dimuqratiyya (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=ptdks0fc, 2002), 4 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Hukm, 29-30, 104-5. See also Lav, “Jihadists”, 118-9; Wagemakers, “Inquiry”, 317-22. Al-Tartusi, Hukm, 69, 103-4.

24

seemingly inherent to it. The first of these is freedom of religion, which means that “one can believe what one wants . . . even if one wants to abandon faith (yartaddu min al-iman) for unbelief (al-kufr) and apostasy (al-ilhad)”.68 Abu Basir contrasts this with Islamic rulings on this issue, citing the Prophet’s saying that “whoever changes his religion (dinahu), kill him (fa-qtuluhu)” and Qur’anic verses such as Q. 8: 39, which states: “Fight them (qatiluhum), till there is no persecution (fitna) and the religion (al-din) is God’s entirely”.69 Democracy’s freedom for all to believe whatever they want further suggests equality of all faiths, which Abu Basir rejects, quoting Q. 32: 18: “Is he who has been a believer like unto him who has been ungodly? They are not equal.”70 Strongly related to freedom of religion is obviously the question of freedom of expression. Not surprisingly, Abu Basir also rejects the latter because it may easily lead to insulting God and Islam, which is forbidden,71 since “one cannot find anything in democracy that is sacred (muqaddas) [or something] that is forbidden to be discussed”.72 A third aspect of democracy that Abu Basir objects to is the idea of majority-rule. Democracy, Abu Basir states is based on the principle (mabda’) of recognizing the point of view of the majority, [which is] based on what the majority has agreed upon, even if they have agreed upon falsehood (albatil), deviance (al-dalal), and clear unbelief (al-kufr al-bawah). The truth (al-haqq) – according to democracy, which does not allow correction to or comment on it – is what the majority decides and agrees upon, nothing else.73 Relying on the majority is wrong, Abu Basir claims, because the Qur’an states about this (among other verses) in Q. 12: 106 that “the most part of them believe not in God, but they associate other gods with Him (hum mushrikin)”, adding that according to Prophetic sayings, even a single man can represent the truth amidst many who claim otherwise.74 Instead of relying on the majority opinion, which may very well be wrong, Abu Basir therefore states that people should rely on the will of God, which is always right.75 Abu Basir’s rejection of democracy does not mean a rejection of the Islamic concept of shura 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

Id., Hadhihi, 2. Id., Hahdihi, 2; id., Hukm, 32-33. Id., Hadhihi, 4; id., Hukm, 60-61. Al-Tartusi, Al-Dimuqratiyya al-Qadhira, 2; id., Hadhihi, 2; id., Hukm, 37-43. Id., Hukm, 37. Id., Hukm, 52-53. See also id., Hadhihi, 5-6. Id., Hukm, 53, 298-99. Al-Tartusi, Hukm, 101.

25

(counsel, consultation), which is somewhat similar to democracy because it also involves discussing issues, deciding on them, and ruling on the basis of the outcome. The two are entirely different, however, according to Abu Basir. Whereas democracy allows all people to decide, the concept of shura is meant to let knowledgeable Muslims referred to as the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd (the people who loosen and bind) decide.76 He further distinguishes shura from democracy by stating that the former is Qur’anic77 while the latter is not. He also contends that a shura reflects the rulings and sovereignty of God, not the people. Moreover, Abu Basir claims, shura pertains only to questions of ijtihad (independent interpretation of the sources) for which no clear scriptural answer can be found.78 Democracy, on the other hand, covers everything, including issues on which the Qur’an and the Sunna are very clear. Furthermore, Abu Basir claims that shura involves the voluntary finding of the Islamic truth, not what the majority compels one to do on the basis of “un-Islamic” legislation.79 In line with this rejection of any parallel between shura and democracy, Abu Basir also rejects Islamic arguments that working for non-Muslim rulers, such as in the case of the prophet Yusuf working for the “infidel” Pharaoh, is sometimes allowed by stating that the circumstances, the people involved, and their intentions in Yusuf’s time differed from what they are now.80 Practical Objections Apart from theoretical arguments against the concept of democracy, Abu Basir also presents more practical objections that are not necessarily related to democracy as such, but will often come up once such a system is put into practice. One of these is that democracy is strongly associated with the West. Referring to parliaments and democratic elections, Abu Basir states that these are “a Western way designed by the Jews and Christians and it is not allowed by the shari‘a to look like them (la yajuzu shar‘an al-tashabbuh bi-him)”.81 He is particularly keen to point out that democratization in the Muslim world only serves American interests because it would benefit Israel and create divisions and because the rejection of democracy by a Muslim country would give the

76 77 78

79 80 81

Al-Tartusi, Hukm, 69, 78-79. See Q. 2: 233 (“But if the couple desire by mutual consent and consultation to wean, then it is no fault in them.”) and Q. 42: 38 (“their affair being counsel between them”). Sura 42 is also called “al-Shura”. This use of ijtihad is a very Salafi one. Ideally, clear-cut texts, when available, result in unanimous answers among scholars while differing but mutually acceptable views occur when they are not. This use of ijtihad differs somewhat from its “normal” use. See Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 2003), 76-108. Al-Tartusi, Hukm, 78-80. Id., Hukm, 365-416. Id., Hukm, 72.

26

United States an excuse to invade that state, resulting in thousands of casualties.82 Similarly, writing about the elections in Egypt in 2005, Abu Basir comments that the relatively large number of seats won by the Muslim Brotherhood indicates that America has pushed the regime in Cairo to give the Islamists some more freedom in order to make its own claims that it favors democratization sound less hollow. At the same time, the United States has not urged Egypt to organize completely free and fair elections, Abu Basir maintains, because that would risk bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power, which America does not want.83 Other practical objections include the separation between religion and state (fasl al-din ‘an aldawla), which Abu Basir claims is one of the principles democracy is based on. He rejects this notion since, according to him, Islam is “the religion of [both] state and politics”.84 Another issue that Abu Basir associates with democracy is the formation of political parties. He rejects this because the freedom to form political parties also means the freedom to form “un-Islamic” parties, which he considers to be wrong.85 Moreover, the establishment of parties will lead to a divided Muslim community86 as well as an increase in loyalty to the party and, subsequently, a weakened loyalty to Islam.87 Finally, Abu Basir states that democracy is based on the principle of choice and voting (mabda’ al-ikhtiyar wa-l-taswit), “even if the issue voted on is the shari‘a of God”.88 The shari‘a, however, “is not allowed to be subjected to the process of choosing and voting”, since it deals with “the permissible (al-halal) and the forbidden (al-haram), truth (al-haqq) and falsehood (al-batil)”, which are clear in themselves.89 Voting on issues contained in the shari‘a could lead to people openly refuting the ruling of God and would, in general, show “disdain (al-istikhfaf) and make a mockery (al-tahakkum) of the shari‘a of God and his religion”.90 Practical objections such as those mentioned above would become particularly clear once candidates actually enter parliament. From that moment on, they would have to show loyalty to the “un-Islamic” constitution, acknowledge the fact that legislators have the right to come up with new laws, and accept that these will come into existence through majority-rule, even if they are contrary to Islam. Moreover, whatever Islamic members of parliament do, they will always be part of a system that is fundamentally wrong, which includes having to show loyalty to an “infidel” ruler and 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

Id., Al-Dimuqratiyya kama Turiduha wa-Tumarisuha Amrika (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=m2ro2mm0, 2003), 1-2 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Al-Intikhabat al-Misriyya: Risala min Amrika wa-ila Amrika (www.tawhed.ws/pr?i=5617, 2005), 1-3 (accessed February 28, 2012). Id., Hukm, 43. Id., Hukm, 47-49, 119-32, 295-97. Id., Hukm, 52. Id., Hukm, 151. Id., Hadhihi, 6. Id., Hukm, 57. Id., Hukm, 59-60.

27

engaging in votes on issues that are contrary to Islam.91 Abu Basir holds up the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as an example of this, claiming that their greater political involvement in the Egyptian parliament has forced them to show their commitment to the peace agreement with Israel as well as to equality between Muslims and Christians, the constitution, peaceful methods and democracy itself.92 Because Abu Basir rejects all these things, he plainly states that “Muslims will not be able to reach their goals through democracy (‘an tariq al-dimuqratiyya)”93 and even goes so far as to claim that “parliamentary work” (al-‘amal al-niyabi) is “clear unbelief” (kufr bawah).94 Such views seem to leave little room for compromise. How Abu Basir reconciles this with his later, allegedly more moderate ideas, is what we will turn to now.

Pragmatism or Applied Nuanced Radicalism? Radical views such as the ones expressed above on both the regimes in the Muslim world as well as democracy obviously beg the question of why Abu Basir argues in favor of a conciliatory approach towards the remnants of these regimes and how he can possibly accept electoral participation. We will look at these two themes respectively and will see that this is less contradictory than it may seem, actually showing that Abu Basir’s views – though extreme – sometimes express a rather nuanced radicalism. Commenting on the Arab Spring In his comments on the Arab Spring, Abu Basir has mostly concentrated on his native Syria and, to a far lesser extent, Libya. Being an adherent to Salafism, whose followers have very negative views on Shiites for their supposed religious deviance, Abu Basir cannot avoid commenting on the Syrian ‘Alawite regime, which was still in power at the time of writing. Not only does Abu Basir hold this “sectarian Syrian regime” to be responsible for “disgusting criminal acts (a‘mal ijramiyya wahshiyya) that it has committed during a period of more than 40 years”, but he also considers the ‘Alawites to be people who deviate from Islam’s most basic tenets, such as in their alleged belief that Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law ‘Ali b. Abi Talib is God.95 The ‘Alawite regime in Damascus, Abu Basir claims, is not just a deviant exception in the Muslim world but is actually part 91 92 93 94 95

Id., Hukm, 310-28. Id., Al-Intikhabat, 3-4. Id., Hukm, 417. Id., Hadhihi, 8; id., Hukm, 352. Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Ma La Ya‘rifu l-Nas ‘an al-Nizam al-Suri al-Ta’ifi (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=30091109, 2011), 1 (accessed February 24, 2012).

28

of a “sectarian Qarmatian esoteric coalition (tahaluf Qarmati batini ta’ifi)”96 between Syria, Iran, and the Shiite Lebanese Hizbullah organization.97 This coalition entails the active involvement of both Iran and Hizbullah in Syrian affairs, which Abu Basir rejects as a blatant interference, to the detriment of the Syrian people.98 Despite the fact that Abu Basir often indicates his opposition to the sectarian nature of the Syrian regime and “the influence of the Shiite esoteric Qarmati crescent in the region”99, his greatest objection to the regime is its behavior towards Syrian citizens. He accuses the regime of “bloodbaths and murders (majazir wa-jara’im al-qatl) . . . against the Syrian people” and compares the French colonial period favorably with the regime of President Bashar al-Asad, asking: “What crimes against Syria and its people has French colonialism committed that the sectarian Nusayri Ba‘thi100 regime has not committed many times as much?”101 Abu Basir accuses the regime of not caring about Syria or its people at all and states that it “treats the Syrian homeland (al-watan alSuri) the way pastures with dairy cows (al-mazari‘ ma‘a baqarat halib) are treated, with their value (qimatuha) [depending] on the amount of milk they produce for [the regime] (‘ala qadr ma tadurru ‘alayhi min halib)”. He summarizes his views by stating that “in over 40 years of dominance and rule, [the regime] has not offered anything to the homeland or the citizen worth mentioning”. Instead, Abu Basir states, it has brought nothing but “destruction (al-damar), ruin (al-kharab), backwardness (al-takhalluf), poverty (faqr) and humiliation (idhlal)”. The reason for all this, he claims, is that “it is a regime that does not have the least bit of loyalty or [sense of] belonging (adna wala’ aw intima’) to the Syrian homeland”. It is probably for this reason that Abu Basir divides Syrian ‘Alawites into two layers: “a Pharaonic tyrannical rich layer (tabaqa ghaniyya taghiya mutafar‘ana)” (which obviously includes the ‘Alawites in the regime) and “a deprived poor (faqira mahruma) layer”, who form the majority of Syrian ‘Alawites.102 Abu Basir, remarkably considering his objection to their religious views, addresses the latter group directly by stating that they have also been abused by the al-Asad regime, just like the rest of the Syrian people, and he therefore calls 96

97 98 99 100 101 102

The Qarmatians were an Isma‘ili branch of Shiite Islam who revolted against the Fatimid imamate in 899. See Wilferd Madelung, “Karmati”, in E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat and C. E. Bosworth (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1997), 4: 660-65. The word “esoteric”, for lack of a better word, refers here to the belief among Isma‘ili Shiites that the Qur’anic text, apart from its outer, literal meaning, also had an inner meaning behind the actual words. Remnants of this belief are said to have survived among the ‘Alawites. See Marshal G. S. Hodgson, “Batiniyya”, in H. A. R. Gibb, J. H. Kramers, E. Lévi-Procençal, J. Schacht, B. Lewis and Ch. Pella (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1986), 1: 1098-1100. Al-Tartusi, Daftar, 12. Id., Daftar, 44, 91, 171. Id., Daftar, 30. The word Abu Basir uses for “Shiite” here is actually rafidi, a derogatory term for Shiites. “Nusayri” is another term for ‘Alawite, frequently used by their opponents. “Ba‘thi” refers to the political affiliation of the Syrian regime, which sprang from the Ba‘th Party. Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Al-Isti‘mar al-Qarmati al-Batini li-Suriya wa-Shar‘iyyat al-Difa‘ ‘an al-Nafs (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=30081101, 2011), 1-2 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Ma La Ya‘rifu, 2-3.

29

on them to join the rest of their countrymen in demonstrating against the regime.103 Abu Basir’s willingness to distinguish “ordinary” ‘Alawites from the regime shows that he does not treat the entire sect as lackeys of President al-Asad but is actually more nuanced. More importantly perhaps, it also shows that his overriding concern is not stirring up anti-‘Alawite feelings in general – although he obviously makes use of this tactic to smear the regime – but the downfall of al-Asad. He therefore spends a lot of time advising Syrian protesters and demonstrators. When protests against the regime in Damascus had only just begun, Abu Basir basically limited his advice to warning about ‘Alawites, as we saw above, and focused on keeping demonstrations “pure” by stressing that protesters should have the right intention (niyya) that overthrowing “the tyrant and his regime is done on the path of God”, not for other reasons.104 As time went on, however, his advice became more concrete and also more radical. While Abu Basir did express his wish for the revolution to remain peaceful, he also stated that if “peaceful choices (al-khiyarat alsilmiyya) [are met with] the killing of dozens and [even] hundreds of youngsters from among the people of Syria”, it is going to lead to all means being used “to confront this aggression”.105 As the regime’s crackdown continued, Abu Basir began to stress the value of (military) self-defense more and more, encouraging Syrians to obtain guns and to set up self-defense committees as well as calling on “the remnants of good (baqaya l-khayr) from the Syrian army to fear God” and defend the Syrian people instead of the regime.106 Later on, he supported a call for jihad against the regime107 and described the opposition’s Free Syrian Army (Al-Jaysh al-Suri al-Hurr) as fighting a “jihad in the path of God for legitimate purposes: defense of the religion, honor, the land, possessions and the rest of the inviolable things (baqiyyat al-hurumat)”.108 He therefore encouraged Syrians wanting to wage jihad against the regime to co-ordinate their efforts with the Free Syrian Army as much as possible.109 Abu Basir spends far less time writing about Libya than about the revolution in Syria. This is probably because Syria is closer to his heart but also because the revolution in Libya, unlike in his country of birth, has already overthrown the dictatorial regime, about which Abu Basir is elated. He 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

Id., Kalimat Akhassu bi-ha l-Ta’ifa al-Nusayriyya al-Musammat bi-l-“‘Alawiyya” (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation/read/F%20102.doc, 2011), 1 (accessed July 23, 2011). Id., Tawsiyat wa-Tawjihat Hamma li-l-Mutazahirin (www.tawhed.ws/a?a=0ybqpkdw, 2011), 1-2 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Al-Isti‘mar, 2. Id., Al-Isti‘mar, 3-4 (the quotation is on 4); id., Jumla min al-Tawsiyat wa-l-Iqtirahat Akhassu bi-ha l- Thawra alSuriyya (www.tawhed.ws/r?i= 3008110, 2011), 2-4 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Bayan Nusra wa-Ta’yid li-I‘lan Shurafa’ wa-Abtal ‘Ashar’ir Dir al-Zur (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/hadath/Read/hadath%2084.doc, 2011), 1 (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Su’al wa-Jawab hawla Mujahidi l-Jaysh al-Suri al-Hurr (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation/read/F%20107.doc, 2012), 3 (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Al-Ajwiba al-Tartusiyya ‘an al-As’ila al-Himsiyya (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation/read/F%20104.doc, 2011), 1 (accessed February 29, 2012).

30

celebrated the violent death of the Libyan ruler Mu‘ammar al-Qadhdhafi by stating “God is great, God is great and praise be to God. Today the taghut al-Qadhdhafi was killed”.110 Although the ruling Libyan regime was ousted with the help of NATO – a fact that is presumably not to Abu Basir’s liking111– he warns against letting this alliance interfere in Libya’s internal affairs at the expense of your religion (‘ala hisab dinikum), decision-making, the freedom of the Libyan people, and its choices. The moment something like this happens, you will have gone from imperialism to imperialism (min isti‘mar ila isti‘mar), from the imperialism of the cursed tyrant and his gang (al-taghiya al-la‘in wa-‘isabatihi) to the imperialism of the Crusaders (al-Salibiyyin), even if indirectly.112 Instead, Abu Basir calls for the establishment of an Islamic state because “the people of Libya . . . are a Muslim people . . . who have a right to be governed by the shari‘a of Islam”.113 He pays most attention, however, to warning the Libyans who overthrew al-Qadhdhafi about their next steps. Although the Libyan people make mistakes, Abu Basir writes, they are “a noble Muslim people”, who should not be turned into an enemy by dividing them in supporters and detractors. Libyans have lived “under the rule of a taghut that was characterized by the utmost unbelief (qimmat alkufr)” for more than 40 years, he writes, and the problems that will surely arise as a result of this should be treated “with kindness (al-rifq), wisdom (al-hikma) and good religious counsel (almaw‘iza al-hasana)”. Interestingly, just like Abu Basir adopted a more conciliatory tone towards “ordinary” ‘Alawites in Syria, he also encourages Libyans to treat the remnants of the regime (baqaya l-nizam) in a shar‘i way that is characterized by justice (al-‘adl), forgiveness (al-safh), and amnesty (al-‘afw) . . . Most of them were in a situation between ignorance (al-jahl), poverty (al-faqr), and compulsion [to join the regime] (al-ikrah) and you are bigger than to treat those over whom you have been victorious with the mindset and the law of the taghut.114

110 111

112 113 114

Id., Daftar, 289. The help from NATO invokes the concept of al-isti‘ana bi-l-kuffar (asking “infidels” for help, particularly in a case of war against other Muslims), which many Salafis (including Abu Basir) consider forbidden. See id., Qawa‘id, 154-55. See also Wagemakers, “Enduring”, 93-110; id., Quietist, 147-64, 179-83. Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Kalima Akhassu bi-ha Ahlana l-Abtal fi Libiya ma ba‘d al-Thawra wa-Suqut al- Taghiya (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=30081107, 2011), 4 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Kalima Akhassu bi-ha Ahlana l-Abtal fi Libiya, 3. Id., Kalima Akhassu bi-ha Ahlana l-Abtal fi Libiya, 1-2.

31

This conciliatory attitude Abu Basir adopts also includes ceasing the fighting when combat is over and solving problems with words, not weapons.115 That Abu Basir’s message to Libyan revolutionaries is indeed something special becomes clear when it is compared to the advice given by certain other radical Muslim scholars, who urge Libyan fighters to keep up their jihad until an Islamic state has been established.116 This willingness to adjust to a post-revolutionary reality becomes even clearer in Abu Basir’s treatment of elections, to which we must now turn. Arguing for Electoral Participation In his call to Libyan revolutionaries to apply the shari‘a, Abu Basir mentions that Islamic law is “based on the truth (al-haqq), justice (al-‘adl), equality (al-musawat) and respect for the rights of people (ihtiram huquq al-nas)”. Although other radical scholars may not deny that the shari‘a is based on these concepts, Abu Basir’s stress on such mostly universal values indicates his realization that this is what people are calling for and that he must adjust his message to their demands. A stronger indication that he has done this is his response to the temporary Libyan constitution drawn up after the fall of al-Qadhdhafi’s regime, to which he merely suggested corrections without rejecting it as a whole, which seems to clash with his rejection of substituting the shari‘a with something else.117 Moreover, he endorsed the candidacy of the Salafi leader Hazim Salah Abu Isma‘il in the Egyptian presidential elections118, which seemingly clashes with several of Abu Basir’s theoretical objections to democracy (rule by the people and majority rule), not to mention some of his practical objections. Given these alleged contradictions, the Mauritanian radical scholar Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti published a fatwa in which he states that Abu Basir has changed his views on participation in elections.119 A closer look at Abu Basir’s recent writings, however, reveals that he has not really changed at all. In advice given primarily to revolutionaries in Tunisia and Egypt but secondarily also directly at activists in other Arab countries, Abu Basir states that “Muslim youngsters” (al-shabab al-Muslim) must “form their independent group (jama‘atahum al-mustaqilla) based on the method of the Qur’an and the Sunna (manhaj al-kitab wa-l-Sunna) according to the understanding of the pious 115 116 117 118 119

Id., Kalima Akhassu bi-ha Ahlana l-Abtal fi Libiya, 2-3. See Wagemakers, “Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: Libya”. Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Malhuzat ‘ala l-Dustur al-Libi al-Mu’aqqat (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation/read/F%20103.doc, 2011), 1-16 (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Daftar, 343-4; id., Al-Mawqif min Tarashshuh al-Ustadh “Hazim Salah Abu Isma‘il li-Ri’asat Misr (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/hadath/Read/hadath%2089.doc, 2011) (accessed February 29, 2012). Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, “Ma Ta‘liqukum ‘ala Kalam al-Shaykh Abi Basir hawla Tarashshuh al-Shaykh Hazim Abu Isma‘il li-Ri’asat al-Jumhuriyya fi Misr?”, December 5, 2011, www.tawhed.ws/FAQ/pr?qid=5624 (accessed February 29, 2012).

32

forefathers (‘ala fahm al-salaf al-salih)”.120 Any decision to participate in politics, the economy, or society should always be based on the shari‘a of God, Abu Basir writes.121He takes a similar approach regarding the temporary Libyan constitution, of which he writes that it should not refer to the country as a democratic state but as an Islamic one. “The people,” Abu Basir states, should only be “the source of executive powers (al-sultat al-tanfidhiyya) in the sense that the people are the ones who decide about who rules them and represents them in all ruling facilities (marafiq al-hukm) and state institutes (mu’assasat al-dawla)”. This emphasis on “executive” should be added, he writes, so it is clear that “the legislative power (sultat al-tashri‘) with or instead of God” does not rest with the people. The shari‘a, he maintains, should be the source of legislation in Libya and any proposed laws that do not conform to its norms should be rejected.122 This shows that Abu Basir does not contradict his views on exchanging the shari‘a for a constitution since he only objected to that if it concerned a secular or “un-Islamic” constitution, as we saw above. Since he clearly argues in favor of a fully Islamic constitution that essentially makes the shari‘a the law of the land, there is no reason for him to object this Libyan constitution as such. Moreover, his point that the people are not the source of legislative power, which rests with God, means he confirms his earlier rejection of the core of democracy. That his own endorsement for president of Egypt can only come about by a majority vote is not inconsistent either since Abu Basir’s rejection of adhering to what the majority wants was never based on the idea of a majority as such, but merely on the idea that preferring it to the rule of God was wrong, even if the latter was only espoused by a single person. Despite Abu Basir’s insistence on his theoretical rejections of democracy, including his continued refusal to accept its allegedly inherent freedoms123, he reinterprets some of his former practical objections to democracy, although he remains consistent with his earlier views. This reinterpretation is based on the distinction Abu Basir makes between, on the one hand, democracy as “a creed (ʿaqida), a religion (din), and a philosophy (falsafa)” based on all the tenets he rejects mentioned above and, on the other, democracy as something connected to “its means of ruling (wasa’iliha fi l-hukm) such as elections and voting”. It is democracy as a creed, not democracy as a collection of legitimate instruments, that the West wants to enforce upon Muslims, he states. Although these instruments have been used wrongly by democrats, Abu Basir maintains, using them wisely means one is not a kafir, nor can one be called a democrat in such a case.124 Abu Basir even 120 121 122 123 124

Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Kalimat fi l-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya Akhassu bi-ha Ahlana fi Tunis wa-Misr (www.tawhed.ws/r?i=30081106, 2011), 1 (accessed February 24, 2012). Id., Kalimat fi l-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya Akhassu bi-ha Ahlana fi Tunis wa-Misr, 4. Id., Malhuzat, 2-3, 8. The quotation is on 2. See also id., Hatta Yakuna l-Tamthil ‘Adilan wa-Shamilan (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/articles/read/a%20153.doc, 2011), 8 (accessed February 29, 2012). Id., Hatta, 19-20; id., Malhuzat, 4-5, 7. Id., Hatta, 10-11.

33

claims that elections and voting as such (i.e., within the limits of the shari‘a) is quite Islamic. Because there is no actual text in scripture legitimizing or rejecting this practice, Abu Basir considers elections and voting to lie in the sphere of ijtihad and argues that the early Islamic shura responsible for choosing ‘Uthman as the third caliph of Islam shows that elections and voting have long been part of that religion. He cites a hadith stating that the best of your leaders (khayr a’immatikum) are those you love and who love you (tuhibbunahum wa-yuhibbunakum) . . . and the worst of your leaders (shirar a’immatikum) are those you hate and who hate you, [whom] you curse and who curse you (tubghidunahum wa-yubghidunakum wa-tal‘anunahum wa-yal‘anunakum).125 In line with this hadith, Abu Basir argues that it is actually very Islamic to demand public approval of leadership and the freedom to criticize them in order to prevent repression. He cites the duty to “command right and forbid wrong (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar)” as mentioned in, for instance, Q. 9: 71126, as well as a hadith stating that “the best jihad is a word of justice to an oppressive leader” as examples of early-Islamic public oversight of rulers.127 For the same reason, he argues in favor of term limits for present-day rulers (not caliphs) and practical and legal means agreed upon by Muslim scholars to depose such leaders peacefully if need be in order to avoid armed clashes and bloodshed.128 Because Abu Basir detaches some parts of democracy from that concept’s objectionable tenets and reinterprets the former in the context of a full adherence to the shari‘a, he can look at them in a more neutral way and actually finds support for them in Islamic history without contradicting his earlier views. This is particularly clear regarding his ideas on working for a secular government. As far back as 1990, he argued that democracy is wrong but that working in “governmental departments (al-dawa’ir al-hukumiyya)” is allowed as long as it does not lead to “open violations of the shari‘a (mukhalafat shar‘iyya zahira)”, does not in any way “strengthen falsehood or its people (al-batil wa-ahlihi)”, does not require “loyalty to the idols” (muwalat li-l-tawaghit), and does not clash with any scripture forbidding it.129 In the same period, he also legitimized “organized collective action”, provided it happens on the basis and in the context of Islam.130 Abu Basir 125 126 127 128 129 130

Id., Hatta, 13. For more on this concept, see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 2001). Al-Tartusi, Hatta, 13-14. Id., Hatta, 17-18. Id., Hukm, 359-61. Id., Hukm, 179-209.

34

apparently believes that Abu Isma‘il the Egyptian candidate for the presidency he supports, is a good man who is able to govern on these conditions.131 Although it is important to note that Abu Basir endorsed Abu Isma‘il for the position of president (i.e., an executive job, not a legislative one), he also leaves room for political parties contesting parliamentary (i.e. legislative) elections, provided they do not oppose Islam132 or place greater value in the interests of the party than those of society and the Muslims.133 Since these are his only objections to forming parties (hizbiyya), such new ideas are, in fact, in perfect harmony with his earlier views. This even applies to Abu Basir’s takfir of parliamentary work that we saw above. Although he has condemned this as kufr, he has qualified this claim by stating that members of parliament should not be excommunicated collectively but should be looked at on an individual basis.134 Moreover, he states that even such individual takfir should be expressed with care, considering the many obstacles to and conditions of excommunication, and he acknowledges that some people run for parliament without knowing anything about democracy135 or even want to do so within the limits of Islam, thereby changing their verdict completely. Takfir, in other words, should only be applied outright to those members of parliament who actually adhere to democracy in all its aspects – including, most prominently, “unIslamic” legislation – not to those who only make use of democratic means without accepting the system’s underlying tenets.136 While Abu Basir cannot be accused of revising his ideology for pragmatic reasons that sprang from the Arab revolutions in 2011, it is clear that it was the Arab Spring that caused him to take another look at those parts of his ideology that could be reinterpreted in light of new events. One of the reasons he urges people to vote for Abu Isma‘il, for example, is to serve their own interests after the revolution, particularly considering that the alternative candidates could be a lot worse.137 Abu Basir also states that if one can achieve “worldly and religious rights and interests (al-huquq wa-lmasalih al-diniyya wa-l-dunyawiyya) through words (al-kalima), dialogue (al-hiwar) and kindness (al-rifq), then one must not work to obtain them through fighting (‘an tariq al-qital), violence (al‘unf) and force (al-shidda)”.138 This willingness to take the new situation in the Arab world into account has not, however, led Abu Basir to backtrack on ideas expressed earlier, as he himself also

131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138

Id., Hatta, 5; id., Al-Mawqif. Id., Hatta, 9; Malhuzat, 3-4. Id., Kalimat fi l-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya Akhassu bi-ha Ahlana fi Tunis wa-Misr, 1. Id., Hadhihi, 8. Id., Hukm, 354. Id., Taswibatuna li-Risala Hadhihi ‘Aqidatina li-Akhina Abi Muhammad al-Maqdisi (www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation/read/F15.doc, 2000), 3-4 (accessed October 20, 2009). Id., Hatta, 5-6. Id., Hatta, 3; see also id., Kalimat fi l-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya Akhassu bi-ha Ahlana fi Tunis wa-Misr, 2.

35

maintains139, but has, rather, led to a new chapter in his long-held nuanced radicalism.

Conclusion Abu Basir al-Tartusi is one of the best-known and most authoritative radical Muslim scholars alive. His Salafi ideology emphasizes the unity of God (tawhid) in every sphere of life, including legislation, and he equates the acceptance of “un-Islamic” laws or constitutions next to or instead of Islamic law (shari‘a) with worship of other gods (tawaghit). Such unbelief (kufr) should be disavowed and its adherents should be excommunicated (takfir), he states. Since he believes that the regimes in the Muslim world rule at least partly on the basis of non-Islamic laws, he also applies takfir to Muslim rulers. The same applies to democracy, a system that is based on the idea of making the people – not God – the source of power and legislation and which includes “un-Islamic” freedoms and the mistaken idea that the majority should decide. The revolutions in the Arab world in 2011 (the Arab Spring) have shown a different side of Abu Basir’s radical views, however. While continuing his staunch criticism of the regimes in Libya and particularly Syria, he has struck a relatively conciliatory tone towards the “deviant” ‘Alawites in the latter country, to which President al-Asad’s family also belongs, and has urged Libyan revolutionaries to show understanding for the remnants of al-Qadhdhafi’s regime. Similarly, he has endorsed a Salafi candidate in the presidential elections in Egypt and has responded with detailed corrections – not outright rejection – to the new temporary Libyan constitution, despite his earlier rejection of such ideas, suggesting that he has revised his earlier, supposedly more radical views. A detailed look at Abu Basir’s entire oeuvre shows that he does not waver between purism and pragmatism but actually continues to adhere to his long-held nuanced radicalism. Abu Basir’s relatively conciliatory tone towards “ordinary” ‘Alawites and the remnants of al-Qadhdhafi’s regime can be explained, firstly, by pointing to the fact that his overriding concern is overthrowing the Syrian and Libyan regimes and he seems genuinely willing to accept that not everybody agrees with him, as long as the regimes are toppled and, secondly, are turned into Islamic states. On democracy, Abu Basir has retained his theoretical objections to that system of governance but has reinterpreted his practical misgivings in light of the new circumstances. This does not constitute revisionism, however, since his practical objections were always based on the context of dictatorship in the Arab world. Once this changed as a result of the Arab Spring, it was only natural for him to see if these practical objections still applied. The fact that Abu Basir revisited these practical problems of democracy as a direct result of the Arab Spring does not alter that fact. 139

Id., Hatta, 9.

36

Whether Abu Basir’s nuanced radicalism will be enough to bring about the Islamic states he so desires, however, is highly doubtful.

37

Robert Wesley1

Back to Fundamentals: Approaching the Study of the Ideology of Islamist Organizations2 Introduction Ideology is a term or, perhaps more frequently, a concept that is employed by analysts, scholars, commentators and others when describing an important influence on the actions of Islamist organizations. It is common to hear of the ‘Islamist Ideology’ or the ‘Jihadist Ideology’ as though they were easily discernible entities, or that they represent static codes that are collectively accepted and adhered. Organizations that can be categorized, for example, as Sunni ‘Islamist’ or ‘jihadist’ due indeed espouse many similar attitudes, beliefs and practices, to make such a categorization useful when comparing such organizations against outsiders. However, when comparing these Islamist organizations with each other, significant differences in their attitudes, beliefs, practices and identities can be highlighted. An understanding of the variances in these organizational beliefs and practices may have important applications, perhaps most prominently in the influence of such distinctions on external actors. The use of organized violence, for example, is rejected by some organizations, but is central to the identity structure of others. While such logic concerning variance in beliefs and potential impact may seem axiomatic, there are significant challenges to the study of organizational ideological variance and the operational implications in respect to, inter alia, decision-making. One such immediate challenge is the lack of a commonly understood definition of the term ideology. Those who use the term ideology tend to either preface with a simple definition or brief operationalization of the term, or just assume the audience shares a common connotation with the author. These actions are not innately detractive, but they may overly simplify a complex concept to the detriment of an applicable outcome. This is especially true when approaching the challenging task of understanding the influence of ideology on decisions of violence and vice-a-versa. A second and closely related difficulty concerns the identification or articulation of an 1 2

This Chapter represents the views of the Author, and not necessarily those of any organizations affiliated with the Author. This chapter is a partial adaptation of the theoretical framework of the Author’s doctoral dissertation entitled Ideology and Decisions of Violence in the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islmaiyya (est. completion 2013).

38

organization’s ideology. In this respect, the term ideology has historically carried negative connotations, thus hindering the term’s selection in the rhetoric of organizational members. As Terry Eagleton pithily quips, “…nobody would claim that their own thinking was ideological, just as nobody would habitually refer to themselves as fatso. Ideology, like halitosis, is in this sense what the other person has.”3 Studying ideology can be cumbersome when faced with a vague or nonanalytically instructive definition and the infrequency of its use in self-identifying circumstances. A third hindrance in the study of ideology and its interplay with decisions of violence is that there are no apparent analytical frameworks that can be directly borrowed or easily adapted to provide structure to such study. While this chapter does not proffer an analytical framework for the study of ideological development and decisions of violence, it is intended to contribute a language that can be used in the study of ideology of Islamist organizations that can be applied to a variety of analytical studies.4 It is the hope of the Author that this chapter will at the very least provide motivation to scholars studying related organizations and their ideologies to take a more structured approach that will aid practical applications of their analysis. Why study ‘ideology’, and is it even a useful concept of focus? Before embarking on a study that focuses or utilizes the concept of ideology, one must first consider whether the term is in fact useful. Confronting this concern, Kathleen Knight simply asserts, “what makes the term ideology so useful in political science is that it can communicate a broad, abstract concept efficiently.”5 While this may be true, in spite of being widely used, and when used seemingly widely understood, ideology lacks a commonly accepted definition. In fact, epistemological debate on the term can be surprisingly heated for those who still consider such expenditures of time useful. So what exactly is the concept that the term, according to Knight, so effectively communicates? There are perhaps dozens of definitions of ideology that have been proffered overtime, including those that seek to emphasize negative motivational descriptors such as illusion, power, dominance and falsehoods.6 Whether focusing on manipulation or social function, most definitions have some relationship to the interactions of ideas and beliefs. If, as Knight contends, the term ideology is 3 4 5 6

Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso 1991), 2. An analytical framework for the study of ideology and decisions of violence can be found in the Author’s doctoral dissertation Ideology and Decisions of Violence in the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islmaiyya (est. completion 2013). Kathleen Knight, “Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century”, American Political Science Review (2006), 623. For some examples see: John Gerring, “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis”, Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (1997), 957-994.

39

useful for its conveyance of a broad and abstract concept, then it follows that it could be more important to describe the concept than to haggle over a precise definition. In the context of understanding ideologies’ interactions with espousing organizations, it becomes valuable to disaggregate the formative elements, or constituent parts, of ideology for their applicability in understanding the impact of these ideas and beliefs on the evolution of such organizations. There are numerous potential elements that can enter into a deconstruction of ideology. While this chapter will not attempt to enumerate a comprehensive list of all potential ideological elements, it provides a basic construct of select elements for the operationalization of ideology for use in an analytical framework. The specific elements outlined below were selected for their applicability to Islamist organizations. The concepts selected could be generally categorized as ‘functional’ attributes of the ideology, which guide the actions and processes of ideological adherents. The focus on function is intentional, as it allows for the study of ideology to be applied to other analytical interests, such as decision-making and organizational dynamics. Since ideology is difficult to identify and describe in its totality, these component parts, are meant as signposts, or ‘indicators’ for the analyst when describing an ideology. Inasmuch as the analyst can identify these concepts in the study of an organization, they can be utilized when elaborating what exactly the ideology is, and in turn what it does (its function). The set of signposts outlined below are meant, in part, to form a glossary of terms for which the analyst can utilize when describing and analyzing the emergence and progression of specific operational ideologies of Islamist organizations. These concepts will not be described here in detail, but are enumerated below as a general introduction. The language of ideology

Centrality A common question when addressing the identification of ideologies is whether each and every political or social action is ‘ideological’, or based on a vague ideology. Ernest Gellner answers that, “whilst ideologies are systems of ideas, not all systems of ideas are ideologies.”7 To clarify, Eagleton proposes “the force of the term ideology lives in its capacity to discriminate between those power struggles which are somehow central to a whole form of social life and those that are not.”8 This concept of centrality is important to any operationalization of ideology for use in analytical 7 8

Ernest Gellner, “Notes Towards a Theory of Ideology”, L'Homme, T. 18, no. 3/4 (1978), 69-82. Eagleton, Ideology: an Introduction, 8.

40

studies as it helps to discriminate between organizations that may share common ideas or beliefs, but for which these ideas and beliefs carry varying weights of importance or ‘centrality’.

Identification The concept of identification9 is a central concept that can be applied to the discussion of ideological formation and the practical, or functional, aspects of the ideology under study. The concept of identification, for the purposes of this study, will primarily be invoked in relation to the extent to which adherents embrace the ideology as a principle source of individual and group identification.10

Promotion, Legitimization and Rationalization The concepts of promotion, legitimization and rationalization are central to the understanding of how ideology and its expressions are utilized by espousing movements. Ideology, in respect to these terms contains elements of the “promotion and legitimization of interests…in the face of opposing interests.”11 Or as Eagleton elaborates, ideology “can be seen as a discursive field in which self-promoting social powers conflict and collide over questions central to the reproduction of social power as a whole.”12 The legitimization and rationalizations components of ideology are highly relevant to both existing or dominant ideologies, and those emerging in opposition. These concepts are especially important to Islamist organizations that have developed specific operational ideologies that guide both individual and collective decisions. In respect to decision-making and choices of violence, legitimization and rationalization through ideology is a seemingly unavoidable process - thus emphasizing the importance of understanding ideology when viewing decision-making.

9

10

11 12

For additional discussion of identity, ideology and group dynamics, see for example: David John Manning, T. J. Robinson, The Place of Ideology in Political Life (Croom Helm 1985); and Edward Shils, “The Concept and Function of Ideology”, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, 66-76. The orientation of identity with ideology can also be explored from a psychoanalytical perspective where the ‘self’ is equated with the ‘ideal’ (R.D. Hinshelwood, “Ideology and Identity: A Psychoanalytic Investigation of a Social Phenomenon”, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society 14, no. 2, 131-148). Eagleton, Ideology: an Introduction, 29. Id.

41

Unifying Ideologies have certain effects on their audiences. Whether by design or by consequence, ideologies have a unifying effect. Ideology may be difficult to fully articulate, even by adherents, but the more commonly understood the ideology becomes to adherents, the more unifying the effect. In fact, it could be argued that the birth and maturation of specific ideologically differentiated organizations or movements is a consequence of the development of a common understanding of the espoused ideology. In this sense, it is the understanding of the ideology that binds or unifies the organization or movement members and passive adherents.

Positivity While it may seem an obvious component of ideology, it is worth mentioning the role positivity13 plays in this dynamic. More specifically, ideology encompasses “a set of beliefs which cohums and inspires a specific group or class in the pursuit of political interests judged to be desirable.”14 In other words, ideology is seen as a positive motivational agent in social or political activism.

Bridging The concept of bridging is fundamental in the understanding of the importance of ideology for oppositional movements. According to John Wilson, ideology is: the vital bridge between attitude and action, between thinking and doing. Ideology is however, only a set of ideas, symbolically expressed in writings, speeches, and other modes of transmission, to which the discontented must be exposed before they can be mobilized to action. A simple but necessary additional part of the process of mobilization is contact. Contact can be made in a number of ways, depending on structural conditions, on the way the ideology is spread, and on the leadership of the movement. If it is the ideas that raise consciousness, it is the carrier of those ideas that effects the mobilization to action.15

13

14 15

The meaning of ‘positivity’, as used in this study, is not intended as an adaptation of Comte’s ‘positivism’ (as described in his work Cours de Philosophie Positive). For a brief description of the progression of positivism, see for example: George Lichtheim, “The Concept of Ideology”, History and Theory 4, no. 2 (1965), 164-195. Eagleton, Ideology: an Introduction, 44. John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (Basic Books 1973), 131.

42

In this sense, ideology is not only unifying, it provides the key to activating adherents to act upon beliefs. It accomplishes this through developing a more uniform set of beliefs that can be channeled into activism. Movements or organizations elaborating and espousing the ideology act as the physical bridge to activism.

Threat and Promise Threat and promise are two conjoined concepts that are vital to an understanding of how an ideology attracts and sustains adherents, especially in Islamist organizations. Ernest Gellner explained the interdependence of these concepts when he stated that: Ideologies contain hypotheses, but they are not simply hypotheses…they are hypotheses full of both menace and ‘sex-appeal’. They threaten and they promise; they demand assent with menaces; they reclassify the moral identity of the believer and the skeptic; and they generate a somewhat new world. The world is different according to whether one looks at it within or without a given ideology…an essential characteristic of ideologies that this offencegenerating property is inherent in them, that it is implied in their very intellectual content…ideologies contain contentions which are inherently fear- and hope-inspiring…The strain generated by offensiveness has at least two functions: it is diacritical, serving to separate believers from unbelievers, and it helps enforce discipline and ranking within the community of the faithful…All ideologies need both a trap and a bait: an entry-inducing and an exit-hampering mechanism…16 Islamist organizations are apt to exploit both threat and promise in the conversion and retaining of adherents. Imbued beliefs may at times be tasseled to warnings of eternal damnation or reward, sometimes both.

Total Belief Although the concept of total belief may apply to all ideologies, it is more clearly demonstrable in organizations or movements whose purpose transcends both the individual and collective. As Wilson explains, “an ideology provides the means for integrating social events and group goals in an all-embracing explanatory scheme…the distinctive mark of the ideologist remains; for him, 16

Gellner, Notes Towards a Theory of Ideology.

43

conversion is potentially far more total and extensive than for someone who merely supports a piecemeal program.”17 The Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, to take an example of an Islamist organization, sought to provide an ideological construct that encouraged total belief; one that discouraged partial adherence and encouraged disassociation of alternative interpretive schema.18

Consistency The concept of consistency is important in its understanding of ideology, yet its application by the analyst of ideology requires nuance and qualification. For example, Wilson described, in part, the concept in the following: The more radical the ideology, the more it seeks ‘to impose a unified, internally consistent scheme of interpretation upon a world of heterogeneous meanings…’19 The ideologist is concerned more than anything else with purity. He is above all interested in a meaningful rather than a logical expression of order…The appeal of ideology therefore lies not in its rational validity but in the conviction with which the heterogeneous events of the social world are integrated. Once an ideology has been fully absorbed there is no such thing as counter-evidence. Ideology has much of the appeal of dogma, then, in providing certitude in an uncertain world. And yet ideology cannot maintain its credibility on apparent consistency alone. To achieve lasting support, the ideology must be seen to work. It must provide practical solutions to the problems of everyday life.20 While it may be true that the ideologist21 may be concerned with consistency of interpretation and application by adherents, it is questionable as to the extent to which consistency, or purity, is necessary to maintain cohesion, recruitment or total commitment. The provision of ‘practical solutions to everyday life’ also does not necessarily have to occur for total belief. Nevertheless, the extent to which the ideology is consistently applied to everyday life is a factor that influences organizational stability and increases the unifying effect of the ideology.

17 18 19 20 21

Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements, 94. Tawfik Hamid provides examples of the importance of total belief and dissuasion of alternative constructs in his book Inside Jihad: Understanding and Confronting Radical Islam (Abdelhamid 2008), 201. Egon Bittner, “Radicalism and Organization of Radical Movements”, American Sociological Review 28, no.6 (1963), 928-940. Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements, 94-95. An ‘ideologist’ is used here as a generic term to refer to those who play an active role in the formulation of ideology.

44

Development of oppositional ideologies and specific operational ideologies of organizations The previous section introduced a set of key concepts relating to the functional role of ideology that can provide a basis for approaching the emergence and development of general or specific operational ideologies. The following section outlines a framework of key tasks and developmental elements applicable to the emergence of Islamist organizations and their specific operational ideologies. Each of these is briefly introduced with a view to exposing the reader to a basic understanding of the core concepts. Collective and individual perception of existing habitat Essential to understanding the emergence of general oppositional ideologies and the specific operational ideologies adopted by Islamist organizations, are the individual and collective perceptions of the existing conditions that often are the impetus for opposition. These existing conditions are referred to here as the ‘habitat’, and simply refer to the perceived social, personal, political, and economic ‘life’ that the individual or subsections of a society find themselves. An analysis, however brief, of these perceptions is essential for the analysis of an oppositional ideology as it is precisely these pre-existing, or latent, perceptions that the ideologist will seek to utilize in order to construct a desirable alternative. Determining these pre-existing perceptions is a challenging commission. For example, it would be an impossible task to attempt to ascertain a complete understanding of the positive and negative perceptions of an individual or collective about their own lives thirty years in the past. However, the ideologist may nullify the need to undertake this task though the articulation of specific ‘negative perceptions’22 in ideologically-relevant communications. In this way, analysts of ideological development can narrow the focus of their analyses to those issues highlighted by the ideologist or other contemporary analysts. While other negative perceptions may have existed but were not referenced by the ideologist, these ‘extra-ideological’ issues may be of less significance23 for 22

23

‘Negative perceptions’ is used here instead of ‘grievances’ or ‘injustices’ (terms often used in social movement research) as grievances are generally associated with a specific culpable agent, while ‘negative perceptions’ do not necessitate a specific agent but can rather be general conditions. As will be mentioned later in this Chapter, the ideologist may attribute a culpable agent to negative perceptions, whereby they can be referred to as grievances. For more on grievances and injustices in the context of framing, see for example: David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”, American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986), 464-481. While ‘extra-ideological’ negative perceptions may impact the development of an oppositional ideology, it would be difficult to correlate changes to these perceptions with ideological development due to data limitations.

45

understanding the development of the ideology. Negative perceptions are also sometimes relatively easy to identify because they are frequently the impetuses for opposition. Society and individuals are, when provided the opportunity, quite apt to articulate their perceptions of negative influences on their personal and collective habitat. It is not always easy to ascertain or measure the level of existing relative opportunity for expressing these negative perceptions, but a significant degree of restriction has existed in many habitats where oppositional Islamist organizations emerge.24 While individual public expression may have been limited, Islamist organizations have provided platforms for channeling or identifying such expressions. In order to most efficiently analyze the development of an oppositional ideology’s identified negative perceptions of habitat, it may be useful to group the perceptions into categories for specific types of ideological movements. While there are no set categories for such a general analytical framework, they may include the following broad categories: economic opportunity, political influence, social status, social freedoms, religious freedoms, historical injustices, grievance resolution (i.e. ability to seek and achieve ‘justice’) and personalized issues.25 The problem with these categories in the context of the development of Islamist ideology in general, and the more specific operational ideologies of Islamist organization, is that they are relevant in much more limited contexts. The negative perceptions that some Islamist organizations have focused on through the articulation of their ideology are specific interpretations of Islamic theology that they find lacking or not yet fully realized in their habitats. Issues such as economic opportunity or political influence are not generally harnessed by Islamist ideologues for motivational purposes, as these are peripheral issues to the core ideology. Some organizations for example have sought to replace the existing political structure not for reasons such as the lack of opportunities for political influence, but rather principally because the existing political structure did not conform with its interpretations of proscribed religious teachings and interfered with the ability to implement social reforms consistent with Islamist ideology. It could be argued that these organizations have only been interested in politics or political structures 24 25

For example in Egypt and Tunisia. Some social movement scholars might refer to these categories as falling under the general theories of relative deprivation or opportunity structures. While relative deprivation theory is certainly essential for the understanding of many cases of collective action, it is not explicitly mentioned here as the theory implies comparative judgments about entitlements, which is not necessarily applicable to al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. Entitlement for al-Jama’a alIslamiyya was much more related to idealistic constructs than to contemporary exemplars. Opportunity structures will be discussed later in the Chapter in relation to decisions of violence. For more on relative deprivation theory see, for example, Iain Walker and Heather Jean Smith (eds.), Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration, (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002), 379.

46

in as much as they prohibited or provided for a revised social system based upon their interpretation of Islamic proscriptions. Development of a diagnostic lens One of the central roles of the ideologist is to identify, interpret, or ‘diagnose’, the ailments of the existing habitat from which the collective finds itself. While ideologists may simply illuminate each of the ailments that suit their needs, it is far more beneficial for the long-term adherence to the ideology to develop a shared means from which targeted audiences can view and interpret society. This chapter will use the term lens to refer to the shared means or shared approach to interpretation that the ideologist is attempting to construct for use by movement adherents (i.e. a common eyepiece for viewing the world). It is beneficial for the ideologist to develop a lens to aid the diagnosis of society’s negative conditions, referred to in this study as the diagnostic lens26. It should be remembered that the development of an oppositional ideology does not occur in isolation, but rather in contrast to existing ideologies, most notably the dominant ideology. In most societies, the established political structure will seek to maintain or cultivate its own diagnostic lens from which society can view negative aspects. Beliefs, values and attitudes may already be established and customized to provide a lens from which to view collective negative perceptions. This may be formed by ruling elites or through existing social processes. The oppositional ideology’s diagnostic lens will generally be in direct conflict with the dominant ideology’s interpretive lens. Individual factors, such as physiological disposition, are important to recognize in the analysis of ideological development as they are always present for both the ideologist and the potential movement adherent. Both roles may be influenced by factors such as public voices, family, peers, participant institutions (not active influence), cultural background and immersed culture. In this sense, the resonance and utility of an ideologist’s diagnosis may be influenced by a number of factors independent of the actions of the dominant or oppositional ideologies. In terms of the resonance of diagnostic frames to potential adherents, these individual factors are closely related to the concept of experiential commensurability.27 In this sense, diagnostic frames will resonate more, and thus the diagnostic lens will be more easily assimilated, when it matches with the personal experiences of the target audiences. Perceived experiential commensurability of 26 27

The diagnostic lens can be conceptualized as an aggregation of diagnostic frames proffered by the ideologist. For more on experiential commensurability and framing resonance, see for example: David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization”, in Bert Landermas et. al. (eds.), International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1 (1988), 197-217.

47

adherents can also have an effect on the ideologist and may cause framing realignments or frame transformation.28 Both diagnostic and prognostic frames may be transformed or redefined in response to lapses in or the desire for more experiential commensurability. Ideas may thus be reframed to permeate elements of life that they were previously absent from. Individual factors are difficult to identify, and thus may not factor prominently in the analysis of lens development. Nevertheless, their presence is important to note in the analysis of lens development and should be referenced when identified. The oppositional ideology not only develops in conflict with a dominant ideology, but it is also competing with other alternative ideological constructs from which it is also one. The ideologist must wrestle with competing ideological constructs in the development of both the diagnostic and prognostic lenses. While it may be difficult to discern the effects of alternative constructs on ideological lens development, one of the more recognizable manifestations of this interference comes in the form of frame disputes. As Robert Benford states, “frame disputes are a ubiquitous feature of the internal and external politics of movements.”29 These frame disputes may occur when opposing actors, including alternative oppositional ideological movements, challenge the narrative or frames of the movement in question. These actions can cause the ideologist to reframe or counter-frame in response to such challenges. It is also possible that the ideologist may also attempt to avoid these encounters altogether, but such decisions would be difficult to ascertain. In any respect, the analyst must be cognizant of competing ideological constructs and their potential impacts on ideological lens development. Essential to the analysis of the development of the oppositional ideology in general, and to the lenses in particular, are communication modalities. The diagnostic lens is not a tangible object, nor is it even spoken about in these terms by the organization under study. It is rather a term that describes an understanding that adherents have, or that the ideologist is striving to achieve. The conveyance of an ideology is rarely undertaken in the form of a single communiqué. It is an evolving process that includes the use of various communicative mediums. The process of developing a diagnostic lens involves communicating to various audiences using differing means. It can include interpersonal communications, such as one-on-one conversations 28

29

For additional commentary on ‘frame transformation’ or ‘keying’ (as Goffman referred), see for example: Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Harvard Univ. Press 1974), 45.; and David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”, American Sociological Review 51, no. 4. (1986), 464-481. Robert D. Benford, “An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective”, Sociological Inquiry 67, no. 4 (1997), 417.

48

with potential ideological adherents. It may also involve speeches, interviews or other verbal communications to larger audiences. Frequently, the development of the lens involves written communications that can range from academic publications to manifestos. As the lens itself is an abstract concept that is not always even fully articulated or completely understood by the involved parties, the analyst of the development of the diagnostic lens must investigate all possible communicative methods to gain a more accurate understanding of this process. The Diagnosis One of the objectives of the ideologist is to develop an interpretive lens for all adherents to view the ills of society. For all the various methods of persuasion employed by the ideologist, the end result of its labor should be a common understanding, or diagnosis, of ‘what is wrong’ with the current habitat. This common understanding provides one of the unifying pillars of the ideological movement and is usually a significant part, along with the prognosis, of what sets the oppositional ideology apart from competing ideologies. There are two key elements of this diagnosis: the articulation and localization of discontent, and the attribution of culpability. The ideologist generally does not need to invent or discover new discontents, but rather is engaged with re-interpreting them “such that a new angle of vision, interpretation, or understanding is provided,”30 or articulating certain discontents that will be the focus of the organization’s future activities. This often involves the simplification of the complexities of the existing habitat and the localization of the causes of it negative aspects. Through the process of diagnostic lens development, the ideologist strives to convince potential adherents of certain truisms. For example, someone might ‘feel’ that there is something wrong with society, but cannot articulate what exactly is wrong, or why. Through the diagnostic lens, that someone is able to understand more specifically what is wrong and why. A simplified example of the articulation and localization of discontent may be the following: There is strife in a locality. The strife exists because traditional notions of right and wrong are no longer understood or accepted by the youth of that locality. These notions are no longer understood or accepted because exogenous ideas such as romantic pre-marital encounters with the opposite sex are being propagated through the exposure of the youth to morally repugnant foreign films and television programming. Through the development of the diagnostic lens, the ideologist will 30

David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements”, Mobilization 12, Issue 1, 130.

49

cultivate an understanding of how to identify moral repugnance, and thus make the task of identifying it easier for adherents. In this example, the discontent is specifically identified and a cause is proffered. The ideologist will seek to provide such simplified explanations as they better resonate with a larger audience than complex and nuanced rationalizations. The ideologist will also often, but not always, attribute a complicit or culpable agent31 during the process of diagnosis. In the simplified example above, exposure to immoral lifestyles through the mediums of foreign films and television might be articulated as the localized cause of the strife, but the ideologist might take one step further and identify the government as responsible for this undesired situation as it did not properly censure the programming based upon its immorality. In this example, the government can become the responsible agent and, in turn, the focus of the movement’s future actions. At this stage, the ideologist has articulated the discontent and has identified a culpable agent. The next process that the ideologist undertakes is to provide a lens from which adherents can view how to remedy their undesired situation. The development of the prognostic lens It is not enough for an ideologist to articulate the problems of society to gain support. In order to mobilize participation in the ideological movement, the ideologist must articulate both a vision for an improved future and the means from which the movement will rectify articulated problems and realize its future vision. As with the development of the diagnostic lens, individual factors, such as psychological disposition, are always present for both the ideologist and the potential movement adherent. Both roles may be influenced by factors such as public voices, family, peers, participant institutions (not active influence), cultural background and immersed culture. In this sense, the resonance of an ideologist’s prognosis may be influenced by a number of factors independent of the actions of the dominant or other oppositional ideologies. The prognostic phase is the truly distinguishing phase of ideological development for an oppositional ideology. To be considered a distinct oppositional ideological movement, or at least a sufficiently diverging oppositional movement – there is a need to proscribe a path to achieving a

31

For more on attribution of culpability, see for example, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 616. William Gramson refers to the ‘culpable agents’ as ‘targets’, see William A. Gamson, “Constructing Social Protest”, in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (eds.), Social Movements and Culture (Routledge 1995), 91.

50

new future that contrasts with fundamental principles of competing oppositional ideologies. The articulation of specific interim goals and objectives and the means to which to achieve them is essential to this process of differentiation.32 In order to construct these, the ideologist must first define a vision for the future (or potential futures), and the path and means to rectify identified discontents in order to achieve this vision of the future. This is not simply a process of definition, but also a process of rationalization and provision of tangible justifications. A distinct vision of a better future is most likely not the first task of an ideologist.33 The development of opposition to the status quo or the identification of undesired aspects of society are likely to begin prior to the articulation of a future status of society. Indeed, oppositional movements may not develop with a specific end in mind. Rather, they may develop a diagnosis of society’s undesired traits and proscribe means to rectify its deformations. However, if an oppositional organization or movement truly desires to differentiate itself from competing actors and establish a more specific ideology for which it will propagate, a more specific vision of a future state should be articulated. In reality, few ideological movements actually achieve a high degree of detail, and Islamist organizations are no exception. As with the other components of ideological development, this articulation of a future state of society is not a mechanistic process that follows a strict set of guidelines or procedures. Instead, an ideologist may make judgments as to the necessity, utility and completeness of articulation. In this sense, the ideologist will generally leave portions of this future vision unarticulated or vague, with many practical questions left unanswered. For example, the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s ideological leadership never fully articulated its vision for the future. Its vision of the future was the establishment of an Islamic State, in which Egyptians would abide by its selection of Islamic legal principles for governance and civil society. Aside from brief elaborations as to what the principles of an Islamic State should be, it provided little additional detail specific to the practical functions of that future society. However detailed or vague an ideological movement’s vision for the future may be, the concept and process of developing a vision of the future is an important element in the study of the progression of that ideology and associated adhering organizations. Indeed, it could be argued that 32

33

Differentiation through prognosis can be key to understanding the actions of ideologists in that they need to sufficiently distinguish their specific operational ideology from competing ideologies in order to, for example, effectively recruit and mobilize adherents. Divergence or conflict in prognostic development, in terms of framing, can be accentuated in ‘frame disputes’ and ‘counter-framing’. For more on aspects of differentiation, see for example: Robert D. Benford, “An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective”, Sociological Inquiry 67, no. 4 (1997), 409-430; and for an case study, Herbert Haines HH, Against Capital Punishment: The AntiDeath Penalty Movement in America, 1972-1994 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996), 117-147. Some may refer to this a ‘utopian vision’ but it does not necessarily have to be utopian, but could be more ‘practical’. For a utopian reference see for example: John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (Basic Books 1973), 110.

51

the development of a vision for the future is essential for driving recruitment and maintaining the support of adherents. And as John Wilson states, “the fulcrum between the past and the future is the movement itself.”34 Path and means of rectification The construction of the prognosis is an essential task for the ideologist in order to differentiate between competing ideologies and to recruit and mobilize adherents. While the level of detail of the prognosis may vary, the task is fundamental. The proposed means to rectify identified undesired circumstances must be distinguishable from competing organizations in order for the organization to be considered to have a distinct operational ideology. Competing ideological organizations may have a similar diagnosis, and even similar visions of the future, but the means to achieve that future vision may be significantly different. It is the ideologist’s role to develop a lens from which movement adherents can employ on the path to realizing their ultimate objective. The path and means are highly relational to the localization of discontent and the associated attribution of culpability. For example, if culpability is judged to lie with the current political structure, then it is this political structure that must be changed. If the fault lies with the established legal system, then it is that legal system that must be changed. The ideologist must identify what must be changed and what must take its place. The ideologist, through a process of rationalization, must put forth a set of objectives for the movement to achieve in order to rectify the undesired and achieve its future vision. Initially, these objectives may be general or vague and non-instructive, such as the need to change a political system. Over time, interim objectives may be established as the organization or movement develops a more discernible path for achieving its vision of the future. For example, if the change of a political system is an objective, then an interim objective may be influencing the loss of legitimacy or credibility of the existing political regime. The establishment of a path of goals and objectives provides a guiding framework for the movement to develop an implementation strategy. Rational and sources of justification The ideologist must convince to and defend the articulation of its vision of the future and the path and means for achieving that vision. Making claims and proffering solutions will not 34

Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements, 110.

52

necessarily mobilize target audiences to act. To enable these claims and solutions to resonate with targeted audiences, the ideologist must develop a rational that appeals to the personal and social disposition of these audiences. While this chapter will not elaborate the specific rhetorical devices employed by ideologists, it is important to keep in mind the necessity of predicating argumentation upon the established or latent belief systems of the target audiences. In terms of the framing tasks that may be undertaken in respect to rational and justification, the ideologist may be attuned to issues such as narrative fidelity, empirical credibility and experiential commensurability. Walter Fisher describes narrative fidelity as “whether the stories they experience ring true to the stories they know to be true in their lives.”35 Empirical credibility simply refers the extent to which diagnostic and prognostic claims can be ‘tested’ through real world events.36 As already mentioned, experiential commensurability refers to the extent to which frames are accepted based upon their relevance to the actual current or previous experiences of the target audiences.37 The interpretation of history’s events and lessons, both recent and ancient, is commonly adopted by ideologists in justifying their own interpretations of society and the means for rectifying undesired attributes.38 Closely associated with historical interpretation is the utilization of religious beliefs in ideological rational. An ideologist may tend to focus on that which will resonate due to the centrality of the issue to the targeted audience.39 In highly religious audiences, religious justification is essential. It seems that for most Islamist organizations, religious justification has been perceived, at least by adherents, as required for articulated means and objectives. Goals and objectives, and a strategy or method for achieving vision of the future The end result in the development of a prognostic lens is the delineation of objectives, which provides an outline of sorts for adherents to aspire to achieve. Through the delineation of objectives and the initiation of strategy development, the oppositional ideology is more or less established. As a distinct role40, the ideologist is not concerned with providing the intricacies of strategy, but rather providing for the rational for the implementation of strategy. The ideologist accomplishes this, in part, through defining overall objectives that guide implementation. 35 36 37 38 39 40

Walter Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument”, Communication Monographs 51, Issue 1 (Routledge 1984), 8. See for example, Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization”, 208. Id. Wilson states this self-justifying task simply as “placing the movement in historical context – where does it fit into historical patterns.” See, Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements, 125. See for example, Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization”, 205-206. The individual(s) assuming the role of ideologist may of course assume other roles within the ideological movement.

53

The ideologist’s role is not yet complete after the delineation of basic objectives. During the process of achieving objectives and the specific strategies and tactics employed to achieve objectives, the ideologist will once again be needed in order to provide rational or justifications for the tactics and strategy chosen. Such strategy and tactics must be assessed for their conformity to the ideological foundations of the movement. This process of ideological justification is especially relevant for Islamist organizations engaged in decisions of violence.

Conclusion This chapter introduced a number of key terms relevant to the conceptualization of ideology. The complexity of this conceptualization may seem daunting, if not unapproachable for those desiring to study ideology. However, this chapter does not argue that the analyst wishing to approach the ideology of Islamist organizations should elaborate each of the enumerated concepts for their given analysis. Rather, it is meant to provide a language and basic framework from which the analyst can utilize to economize efforts while maintaining a consistent and structured approach. Having a common language and framework can enable a more focused approach and enable the term ideology to be applied in a more analytically useful way. If ideology is essential for understanding issues such as decision-making and organization dynamics, then it follows that a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of ideology can enable a greater depth of analysis. In any respect, it is hoped that this chapter serves as a catalyst for more critical thought on the signification of terminology used by those studying the ideology of Islamist organizations.

54

Manfred Sing

From Maoism to Jihadism: Some Fatah militants’ trajectory from the mid 1970’s to the mid 1980’s1 On 14th February 1988, after fifteen years of military action, the Palestinians Muḥammad alBaḥayṣ (nom de guerre: “Abū Ḥasan”) and Bāsim Sulṭān at-Tamīmī (“Ḥamadī”) and their fellow Lebanese combatant Marwān al-Kayyālī died as their car exploded in Limassol, Cyprus.2 The explosive device had supposedly been planted by Mossad agents,3 who considered the three men top-terrorists and leaders of the Islamic Jihad Brigades (Sarāyā al-Ǧihād al-Islāmī). Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī had started their career as Maoist activists inside the Fatah (Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Ḥarakat at-Taḥrīr al-Waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī), the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Like them, some other Fatah Maoists moved to the “grounds of Islam”4 in the period between 1979 and 1984. After ten years of dissent with the political line of Fatah, they finally broke away from Fatah to form the Islamic Jihad Brigades. The Brigades were one of the first armed Islamist groups of Palestine and can be seen as the branch of the emerging Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (Ḥarakat al-Ǧihād al-Islāmī fī Filasṭīn) on Lebanese soil.5 The adoption of Jihadism among Palestinian fighters happened simultaneously by the Lebanon-Fatahline and the Egypt-Gaza-line, represented by its main figures Fatḥī Šiqāqī and ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz alʿAwda. In Lebanon, it was mostly Fatah officers, often of Maoist or Marxist background,6 who reintroduced the idea of ǧihād to the political and military scene. The Islamic Jihad Brigades were considered “the most significant military movement in the mid1980s”7, responsible for several attacks inside Israel in 1986 and 1987.8 A prominent assault was the ‘Gate of Moor Operation’ of October 15, 1986, which the assailants named the Burāq-Operation 1 2

3 4 5

6

7 8

This article is a revised version of “Brothers in Arms: How Palestinian Maoists Turned Jihadists”, Die Welt des Islams 51, no. 1 (2011), 1-44. Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1994), 111. Munīr Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra. Abū Ḥasan wa-Ḥamadī waiḫwānuhumā (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Wafāʾ1994), 32 and 124. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 32 and 124. Id., 3, 46, 89, 131-138. This meets also the self-conception of the Islamic Jihad Movement. See the current General Secretary’s, Ramaḍān Šallaḥ, statements in Ġassān Šarbal, Fi ʿayn al-ʿāṣifa. Ḥiwār maʿa l-amīn al-ʿāmm li-Ḥarakat al-Ǧihād al-Islāmī fī Filasṭīn ad-duktūr Ramaḍān ʿAbdallāh Šallaḥ, aǧrāhu Ġassān Šarbal, al-Ḥayāt (Beirut: Bīsān 2003), 65. Members of other Marxist groups (PFLP and PFLP-GC) also joined or formed ǧihād groups. See Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 93 and 129 f.; Denis Engelleder, Die islamische Bewegung in Jordanien und Palästina 1945-1989 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2002), 70. Jean-Francois Legrain, “HAMAS: Legitimate Heir of Palestinian Nationalism”, in John L. Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1997), 159-178, here: 162. Id., 161.

55

(ʿamalīyat al-Burāq),9 when Jihadists threw three hand grenades at Israeli troops during a graduation ceremony near the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. The attack resulted in the wounding of seventy soldiers and the death of one of the conscript’s fathers.10 In the immediate aftermath of the attack the Jihadists issued their first public declaration using the name Islamic Jihad Brigades, propelling the movement into the view of the public.11 This particular cell also claims to have attempted the first suicide attack in Palestine. In August 1987, ʿItāf ʿUlyān (nom de guerre: “Umm Ḥamadī”)12 was discovered and imprisoned before she could head for her last journey to Jerusalem in a car packed with two hundred kilos of explosives. This unsuccessful attempt became also part of the foundation myth of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine and was of great significance because it not only took place nearly eight years before the first successful suicide attack in Palestine, but also because the potential perpetrator was a woman.13 In a treatise named As’ila ḥawla l-islām wa-l-mārkisīya min warāʾ al-quḍbān (“Questions about Islam and Marxism from behind the bars”) Muḥammad al-Baḥayṣ and Bāsim Sulṭān at-Tamīmī explained why they had moved from Marxism to “the grounds of Islam”.14 According to the preface, the text was written in 1984 in response to questions sent to them by their comrades in Israeli prisons.15 This frame points at the fact that much of the Jihad movement’s recruiting took place in Israeli prisons16 and many of the new Jihadists were former nationalists and secularists17 who shared a common experience of military and prison life. The treatise was posthumously published as a booklet in Beirut in 1990, two years after the two authors were killed in Cyprus. The two martyr-converts are presented as men of praxis, not of theory who knew long before the 9 10 11 12

13

14 15 16 17

Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 31, 124. The operation is named after the heavenly creature that, according to Islamic tradition, carried Muhammad from Mecca to Jerusalem on his Night Journey. See Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 96 and Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 32 and 124. Šafīq does not mention that the “successful and great” operation caused the death of a civilian. Id., 124. According to her account, she secretly went to Lebanon in 1980 to join a Fatah training camp at the age of 17 where she obviously met Munīr Šafīq, Abū Ḥasan and Ḥamadī. Since 1984, she pleaded for suicide attacks in Israel according to the model of attacks in Lebanon. She was convicted to fifteen years in prison, released after ten years, but again imprisoned and released for several times. See her account under the title “ʿItāf ʿUlyān: Rāʾidat alʿamalīyāt al-istišhādīya fī Filasṭīn”, (on the Aqsaa-Website, http://www.aqsaa.com/vb/showthread.php?t=11344) (accessed December 17, 2009), and more information about her on the Website of the Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners (Nisāʾ li-aǧl al-Asīrāt as-Siyāsīyāt, http://www.wofpp.org/english/etafi.html) (accessed December 17, 2009). Many websites hail her as a brave fighter and female role model and include her in the ranks of prominent female suicide bombers like Wafāʾ Idrīs, the first female ‘martyr’ in Palestine in 2002. See Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wamasīra, 123-125, 131f. and also Ramaḍān Šallaḥ’s statements in Šarbal, Fi ʿayn al-ʿāṣifa, 65, 67. Since the mid 1980s, the Jihadist movement has claimed responsibility for many militant attacks in Israel. It is said to have carried out thirty suicide attacks with one hundred sixty victims since 1995. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Palestinian_Islamic_Jihad_suicide_attacks) (accessed December 17, 2009). Muḥammad Muḥammad al-Baḥayṣ, Muḥammad Bāsim Sulṭān at-Tamīmī, Ḥawla l-islām wa-l-mārkisīya min warāʾ al-quḍbān (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Islāmī 1990). Id., 7. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 95; Engelleder, Die islamische Bewegung, 72. Among them is Ramaḍān Šallaḥ, the current leader of the Islamic Jihad Movement.

56

downfall of the Soviet Union that Marxism had practically and theoretically failed.18 In 1994, the Islamist intellectual Munīr Šafīq republished the entire treatise as an appendix to his hagiography “Martyrs and March: Abū Ḥasan, Ḥamadī, and their Brothers”.19 Šafīq was not only a close observer of the Islamic Jihad Brigades, but also the spiritus rector of the group20 who actively took part in the group’s discussions and decision making.21 In addition, Šafīq founded the political wing of the Islamic Jihad Brigades—the Fighting Islamic Tendency (alIttiǧāh al-Islāmī al-Mujāhid)—which was instrumental in forming the liaison to Fatḥī Šiqāqī’s Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine.22 In his account of the Maoists’ transformation, he often does not mention names, dates and places; neither does he claim to have written an objective report,23 but his book gives some insight into the discussions and decision-making process of the group. Šafīq— an offspring of a Palestinian Christian family—had been a member of the Communist Party in Jordan until 1965 and had spent two years in prison due to his political convictions. In 1968, he joined Fatah and became a high-ranking member of the PLO.24 He turned to Islam at about 1979, and the publication of al-Islām fī maʿrakat al-ḥaḍāra (Islam in the Battle of Civilization) in 1981 can be considered his Islamic coming-out.25 The importance of this book in the context of the Jihadist movement is obvious, as Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī referenced it in their treatise several times and one of the chapters even bears the title of Šafīq’s book.26 The re-introduction of ǧihād to Palestine and Lebanon The re-introduction of the term ǧihād into the political and military scene during the 1970s was

18 19 20

21 22

23 24

25 26

See the preface in Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī, Ḥawla l-islām, 10. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra. Abū Ḥasan wa-Ḥamadī wa-iḫwānuhumā. See his statement in the interview with Waḥīd Taǧā, “Munīr Šafīq”, in Waḥīd Taǧā (ed.), al-Ḫitāb al- islāmī almuʿāṣir: Muḥāwarāt fikrīya, (Aleppo: Fuṣṣilat li-l-Dirāsāt wa-t-Tarǧama wa-n-Našr 2000); also compare Bašīr Mūsā Nāfiʿ, “Al-Islāmīyūn al-filastīnīyūn wa-l-qaḍiya al-filasṭīnīya” (http://www.samanews.com/index.php?act=%20Show&id=23063) (accessed September 10, 2009). Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 4 and 127. Šafīq himself does not mention his or the group’s connection to Šiqāqī’s group, but underlines the group’s pioneering role for Hamas, see Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 125. Legrain’s assumption that Šafīq got associated with Hamas after 1988 may go too far, see Legrain, “HAMAS“, 162. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 4. For biographical details see Islamonline 2001, “al-Kātib fī ṣuṭūr: Munīr Šafīq” (http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/contemporary/Tech/2001/article9-cv.shtml) (accessed February 28, 2008). Born in 1936, Šafīq engaged in politics starting in 1951. By joining Fatah, he became responsible for foreign relations (1968-1972) and was a member (1972-1978) and the director (1978-1992) of the PLO Planning Centre. After that, he is said to have withdrawn from official duties to devote his energy to studies and writing. He is now active as “general coordinator of the Arab Nationalist Club (al-Muntadā al-Qawmī al-ʿArabī)”, an alliance of Islamist and nationalist groups, see Munīr Šafīq, “al-Muqāwama mā baʿd intihāʾ al-ḥarb al-bārida”, in Muʾtamar al-Dāʾim li-lMuqāwama, Qiyam al-muqāwama. Ḫayār aš-šahāda wa-l-ḥayāt (Beirut: Dār al-Hādī 2008), 255-263, here: 255. Munīr Šafīq, al-Islām fī maʿrakat al-ḥadāra (Beirut: Dār al-Kalima li-n-našr 1981; Dār al-Fikr al-Islāmī 19902). Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, Ḥawla l-islām, 23, 46.

57

not forced by traditionally religious circles. Individuals and groups began to propagate the reinvigoration of popular armed struggle against Israel using the concept of ǧihād.27 The concept of ǧihād was certainly not new in the context of Palestinian resistance.28 It was accompanied by two major ideological shifts that affected the Middle East as a whole and especially Palestine between 1967 and 1979. After the Arab defeat of 1967, many Arab nationalists embraced Marxism.29 Their disillusionment about Arab nationalism reached its peak when Anwar al-Sadat, the heir of Nasserism, started the peace process with Israel whereas Israel occupied the so-called security zone in South Lebanon (1978-2000). The second shift occurred under the auspices of the Iranian Revolution in 1978/79. The revolution inspired many Arab activists to embrace political Islam, among them leftist and Christian intellectuals, who started to sympathize with Islamism as a mass movement for revolution and ǧihād.30 While Gaza born Fatḥī Šiqāqī’s ideological trajectory led from Arab nationalism to Islamism and then to Jihadism, most Arab nationalists of the LebanonFatah-line came to Jihadism by way of Maoism. In both the Palestinian and the Lebanese context, a number of Arab nationalists of the 1960s became Jihadists by the 1980s, either by way of “moderate” Islamism or Maoism. The Palestinian Jihad movement practically and ideologically aimed at broadening the mass basis for armed struggle. It seems to have been supported logistically and financially by PLO factions and might even have entirely relied on PLO support, “before it diversified its sources of support to include Iran and Islamic groups in some Arab countries.”31 In the Lebanese arena, the Fatah Maoists’ adoption of ǧihād occurred against a multi-faceted background. In Lebanon, the popular armed struggle by Palestinians had started on 1 January 1965 when the heretofore unknown al-ʿĀṣifa (the Storm) forces, the military wing of Fatah, released a

27 28

29

30

31

Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 90-95. The first advocates of ǧihād go back to the early 1970s. As early as 1929, ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Qassām had propagated ǧihād “until victory or martyrdom.” Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 98ff.; Engelleder, Die islamische Bewegung, 70. In 1978, Yassir Arafat on his ḥaǧǧ-pilgrimage to Mecca also used the term ǧihād in arguing that the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle was a duty to God; Engelleder, Die islamische Bewegung, 70f. The Movement of the Arab Nationalists (Ḥarakat al-Qawmīyīn al-ʿArab), centred in Beirut, crumbled in the aftermath of the Six Day War and gave birth to Palestinian and Lebanese groups (PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, and OCAL) all of which identified with Marxism-Leninism. Some of Khomeini’s bloodthirsty references to the meaning of ǧihād are: “Islam is a religion of blood for the infidels but a religion of guidance for other people. […] We do not fear giving martyrs. Whatever we give for Islam is not enough and is too little. […] [To kill the infidels] is a surgical operation commanded by Allah. […] War is a blessing for the world and for every nation.” See Murawiec, The Mind of Jihad, 43f. For the impact of Shiite elements on Sunni ǧihād fighters like Fatḥī Šiqāqī see Emmanuel Sivan “Islamic Radicalism: Sunni and Shiʿite”, in Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East (Amherst: State University of New York Press 1990), 39-76. For leftist sympathizers see Emmanuel Sivan, “Assessment by the Left”, in id. (ed.), Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, enlarged Edition (New Haven/London: Yale University Press 1990), 153-180. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 111. Ǧūrǧ Ḥabaš (PFLP) endorsed the Islamic Jihad Movement openly, but also a prominent Fatah figure like Ḫalīl al-Wazīr (“Abū Ǧihād”) is supposed to have been on good terms with Jihadists, see id., 114, and Engelleder, Die islamische Bewegung, 71. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 59, downplays Abū Ǧihād’s role.

58

communiqué in Beirut that announced a first successful guerrilla raid into Israel.32 For the fighters, this event marked the beginning of the Palestinian “revolution” (al-thawra); more guerrilla groups sprung up after the Six-Days-War in June 1967, using Lebanon and its refugee camps as their save haven, especially after the guerrillas were driven from Jordan in “Black September” 1970. But soon, the guerrillas found themselves trapped in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990. Fatah had not only to face the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, but also Syrian containment policy and internal fighting. In 1976, Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war, sending troops to prevent a victory of the PLO’s allies, the Lebanese National Movement.33 The end of the Israeli siege of West-Beirut in August 1982 mandated the evacuation of approximately ten thousand PLO guerrilla fighters under the eyes of multinational forces. Only when in September of 1982, communist and nationalist groups set up the Lebanese National Resistance Front (Ǧabhat al-Muqāwama alWaṭanīya al-Lubnānīya) to fight the Israeli troops in Lebanon, some Palestinian fighters were able to re-group, participate in various guerrilla attacks and affect Israel’s gradual retreat from Lebanon, except for the southern security zone. During these events, an anonymous telephone caller used, for the first time in Lebanon, the name of ‘Islamic Jihad,’ taking responsibility for a series of suicide bombings aimed at Western targets, as well as kidnappings of Western diplomats and journalists.34 The Development of Fatah Maoism Between 1972 and 1974, the Maoists succeeded to build up a tayyār (tendency) inside Fatah, made up of “Palestinians, Lebanese, Arabs and Non-Arabs.”35 This tayyār had no central committee and general secretary because the Maoists were against the “splitting” of the resistance movement, which after all would weaken the Fatah. In this sense, they were also committed to “the mass line” (ḫaṭṭ al-ǧamāhīr).36 This term was borrowed from Mao Zedong’s method to learn from the masses and to immerse the political leadership in the concerns and conditions of the masses. Thus, the 32 33 34

35

36

Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival. The PLO in Lebanon (London: Westview Press 1990), 1. According to Brynen, the group never reached the frontier, let alone their intended target, an Israeli water-pumping station. An alliance of Lebanese leftist, nationalist and Muslim groups, headed by Kamāl Junblāṭ (Joumblatt). The unknown telephone caller is said to have been a member of one of the groups that separated from the Shiite Amal movement and later originated Ḥizballāh (the Party of God). The bombing of the US embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983 and the attacks on the barracks of the US and French peacekeeping troops on October 23, 1983 are attributed to these groups. Ḥizballāh emerged between 1984 and 1985. See August Richard Norten, Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 1999); Hala Jaber, Hezbollah. Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press 1997); Walid Charara, Frédéric Domont, Le Hezbollah. Un mouvement islamo-nationaliste (Paris: Fayard 2004). Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 2. “Non-Arabs” seems to refer to Iranians. For the emergence of the tendency see also Fatḥī al-Biss, Inṯiyāl aḏ-ḏākira. Hāḏā mā ḥaṣala (Amman: Dār aš-Šurūq 2008), 141-145. For the leftist Fatah wing see Helga Baumgarten, Palästina: Befreiung in den Staat. Die palästinensische Nationalbewegung seit 1948 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1991), 227-234. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 36f.

59

Maoists’ main goal was to unite the “masses” according to the Chinese and Vietnamese model of a people’s liberation war irrespective of the possible losses of human lives.37 The reference to Maoism was not by accident, since China stood for „unreserved support“38 in the eyes of the Maoist militants whereas Soviet support was regarded “half-hearted”39. This judgment goes back to the fact that between the mid 1960s and mid 1970s China was “the most consistent big power supporter of the Palestinian guerrilla organisations, arming them, criticizing them, seeking to unify them and, despite fluctuations in the relationship, providing moral and material support.”40 Since the first trip of a Fatah delegation to China in 1964, Palestinian leaders like Yāsir ʿArafāt (Yasser ʿArafat) and Ǧūrǧ Ḥabaš (George Habash) regarded China as a close friend and ally. In 1965, Mao Zedong explained the common interest with the words: “Imperialism is afraid of China and of the Arabs. Israel and Formosa are bases of imperialism in Asia. You are the gate of the great continent and we are the rear. They created Israel for you, and Formosa for us. Their goal is the same.”41 China supported the guerrillas not only with arms (guns, mortars, antitank rockets), but provided also military training units in China and the Arab states.42 China initially favoured Fatah over the Marxist organisations PFLP and (P)DFLP and consistently pleaded for the “unification under the most powerful fedayyen confederation”.43 Chinese politicians told Palestinians visitors more than once that “unity is the key to victory for the Palestinians.”44 China was also the only great power which declared in 1973 that the “Palestinian people’s rights cannot be restored through UN resolutions”45 and expressed scepticism about a political settlement on Palestine. It was therefore seen as a Maoist influence when the Palestinian National Charter was revised in 1969 stating that “the armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine; it is, therefore, a strategy and not a tactic”.46 37

38 39

40 41 42

43 44 45 46

In a mass public rally on the Palestine Solidarity Day in 1965, Mao told the PLO delegates “that peoples must not be afraid if their numbers are reduced in liberation wars, for they shall have peaceful times during which they may multiply. China lost twenty million people in the struggle for liberation.” Cited by John K. Cooley, “China and the Palestinians”, Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 2 (1972), 19-34, here: 25. See Biss, Inṯiyāl aḏ-ḏākira, 144f. Lillian Craig Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO”, Journal of Palestine Studies 7, no. 1 (1977), 123-154, here: 124. An account of 25 PLO delegations to China versus nine to the USSR between 1964 and 1975 is given by Hashim S.H. Behbehani, China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975. Three Case Studies (London/Boston 1981), 132. It was not until 1970 that the Soviet Union gave any recognition to the validity of Palestinian guerrilla movement action, see Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: University Press 1984), 155. Harris, “China’s Relations”, 123f. Id., 127. Cooley, “China and the Palestinians”, 26f. He nevertheless points out that it is impossible to estimate the exact amount of Chinese military and economic support. ʿArafat said in 1970: “I would be revealing no secrets, if I tell you that China was the first outside power to give real help to Fateh.” As cited ibid., 26. Harris, “China’s Relations”, 124. Id., 131 and 141. Id., 127. Id., 129.

60

After the guerrillas’ aim to create an Arab Hanoi47 had failed in Jordan in 1970, one of the Marxist leaders, Nāyif Ḥawātima (Hawatmeh, (P)DFLP), reconsidered the concept of a “People’s war of long duration” and moved towards the Soviet stance that advocated the Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories (UN resolution 242), the foundation of a Palestinian state, and mutual recognition. Hawatmeh, a close to ʿArafat at that time, started propagating the so-called “programme of stages” of liberation (barnāmiǧ al-marāḥil) which became the basis for the Palestinian National Council’s “Ten-Point-Programme” in 1974.48 It indicated the PLO’s contentment with a partial liberation of Palestine, i.e. either a Two-State-Solution or a step-by-step liberation.49 The Maoists vigorously criticized this policy change.50 They believed that the Soviets’ imperialistic strategy (“neither peace nor war”)51 aimed at reaching a political stalemate in the region and offered no real solution for the Palestinians. They also viewed the new amendments of the PLO Charta as solely serving the interests of the United States, Egypt and the Arab League that attempted to rid itself of the responsibility for Palestine.52 Therefore, the Maoists questioned whether Fatah wanted to maintain as its goal the liberation of Palestine as a whole or give up the “revolutionary struggle” and “fundamental rights.”53 However, the Maoists did not join the Rejectionist Front54 which emerged under the leadership of the prominent Marxist, George Habash (PFLP). Despite their conflict with Fatah leaders, they decided to stay within the organization, as long as their independence and criticism were respected.55 When the Palestinians entered the Lebanese civil war alongside the Lebanese Nationalist Movement in 1975, Maoists—estimated to be in the “hundreds”—joined under various Fatah commanders, since they were not united by a formal organization.56 They formed the so-called Student Squad (as-Sarīya aṭ-Ṭullābīya or al-Katība aṭ-Ṭullābīya) which became the organizational 47 48

49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56

Baumgarten, Palästina, 224, 226 See id., 245f. The “Ten-Point-Programme” was decided on at the 12th meeting of the Palestinian National Council, 1st-8th July 1974, Cairo. It was followed by the decision of the Arab League that the PLO was the only and legitimate representation of the Palestinian nation (28th-30th October 1974) and by Arafat’s speech in the General Assembly of the United Nations (13th of November 1974). The 2nd Point reads: “The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated.” The 8th Point reads: “Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.” Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 17. Id., 20. Id., 18, 28. Id., 21f. Several militant groups left the PLO or left their membership pending because of the Ten-Point-Programme, like PFLP, PFLP-GC, the Abū-Niḍāl-Group, Syrian backed as-Sāʾiqa and the Iraq backed Arab Liberation Front. Šafīq Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 51, 58 and 69. Biss speaks of “hundreds, if not thousands”. See Biss, Inṯiyāl, 230.

61

kernel of the fighters who were mainly active in various sectors of West-Beirut.57 Since 1977, Maoists were also known as the Jarmaq Squad (Katībat al-Ǧarmaq)58 in southern Lebanon, which fought as a part of al-ʿĀṣifa against the South Lebanon Army (Ǧayš Lubnān al-Ǧanūbī).59 According to Anīs an-Naqqāš,60 one of the squad’s co-founders, the squad counted “more than a hundred and twenty fighters in the South while the [Lebanese] National Movement only had some dozens.”61 It fortified the Beaufort Castle (Qalʿat Šaqīf), a crusader fortress situated on a hill near Nabatiye and the Litani river, from where the fighters fired rockets against the Israeli forces which retaliated with permanent shellfire. The squad attracted not only Palestinians and Lebanese from different confessional62 backgrounds, but also Iraqi Communists, Maoists, and Islamists63 who had found refuge in Lebanon, as well as Iranians who came for military training to the Fatah camps.64 The Iranian trainees came from the Marxist group Fidāʾīyīn-e Ḫalq (the People’s Fedayeen) as well as from the Islamo-Marxist counterpart Muǧāhidīn-e Ḫalq (the People’s Muǧāhidūn).65 The squad decided to support all of these groups despite their ideological differences. According to Šafīq, the squad lost forty “martyrs”66 during the various campaigns from 1976 to 1978. Its final chapter began with the Israeli invasion of Beirut (Operation “Peace for Galilee”). On the night of June 6, 1982, Israeli forces took the Beaufort Castle in one of the first clashes of the invasion. Nonetheless, the Jarmaq Squad reaped fame from the “Battle of the Beaufort Castle”

57 58 59 60

61 62 63

64

65

66

Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 83, 114f. Compare Biss, Inṯiyāl, 277. Biss, Inṯiyāl, 277. Named after Mount Jarmaq (Mt. Meron), the highest mountain in Palestine/Northern Israel. It was set up by Saʿd Ḥaddād in 1976 and allied with Israel, especially when Israeli troops invaded Southern Lebanon (Litani Operation) in 1978 to set up the security zone. He was the partner of Venezuelan terrorist Carlos (Ilich Ramírez Sánchez) in the attack on the OPEC conference in Vienna 1975. See the interview Ġassān Šarbal, “Anīs an-Naqqāš” in Ġassān Šarbal (ed.), Asrār aṣ-ṣundūq al-aswad. Wadīʿ Ḥaddād – Carlos – Anīs an-Naqqāš – Ǧūrǧ Ḥabaš, (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books 2008), 253-341, and Manhāl al-Amīn, “Anīs an-Naqqāš: al-Munāḍil al-qawmī ʿalā ṭ-ṭarīq al-islāmī“, al-Aḫbār, April 9, 2009, http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/128691 (accessed November 25 2009) See Šarbal, “Anīs an-Naqqāš”, 330. Christians, Muslims, and Druzes all joined the Jarmaq Squad. Seven-hundred members of the Shiite Daʿwa-Party from Iraq trained in PLO camps. See Waddāḥ Šarāra, Dawlat Ḥizballāh. Lubnān muǧtamaʿan islāmīyan (Beirut: Dār an-Nahār 2006), 109; compare also Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad. The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon (Harvard University Press 2007), 28. According to Anīs an-Naqqāš in Šarbal, “Anīs an-Naqqāš”, 326, and Saʿūd al-Mawlā in Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran, en regardant vers Jérusalem: la singulière conversion à l’islamisme des «Maos du Fatah»”, Cahiers de L’Institut Religioscope, Numéro 2 (2008), http: www.religioscope.org/cahiers/02.pdf (accessed December 01, 2009), 1-39, here: 33. The relations between Fatah and Iran were good, Arafat himself visited Khomeini twice in the latter’s exile in Najaf. It is also known that two of Khomeini’s sons participated in the Fatah military training. See Šarāra, Dawlat Ḥizballāh, 109. See Šarbal, “Anīs an-Naqqāš”, 326; Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran”, 33. Among the prominent trainees were supporters of Khomeini like Muḥammad Muntaẓarī, the son of the Āyatullāh Muntaẓarī (d. 2009), and Ǧalāl ad-Dīn al-Fārisī who could not run for the Iranian presidency in 1986 on the grounds that his father was born an Afghan; on Fārisī see Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1994), 176. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 119. According to Saʿūd al-Mawlā, fourteen or fifteen died trying to prevent the Israeli intrusion 1978, see his statement in Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran”, 33. Biss mentions a memorial place erected in Bint Jbayl for twenty-eight squad members, see Biss, Inṯiyāl, 307.

62

(Maʿrakat Šaqīf), because its fighters managed to inflict “substantial loss”67 onto the Israeli army. Yet as the invasion advanced and many fighters were killed, the squad’s members were scattered, retreating either to Beirut or to the Beqaa-Valley.68 In this context, Šafīq states that “the experience of the Lebanese wing” inside the squad came to end, because only a few Lebanese remained in the squad after 1982, whereas most of them looked for a “new position.”69 These remarks suggest that either many Lebanese abandoned the group because they were unwilling to accept the turn to Islam or they were of Shiite background and most probably turned to groups that later formed Ḥizballāh.70 Šafīq further indicates that “the squad was forced to retreat to Tripoli and enter a struggle that it only wanted to leave”.71 The squad’s engagement in Tripoli is remarkable because the first example of a collective shift from Maoism to Islamism occurred in Tripoli prior to the Israeli invasion to Lebanon; Maoists were instrumental in forming the Sunni Islamic Unification Movement (Ḥarakat at-Tawḥīd al-Islāmī) which was ideologically influenced und directly supported by Iran.72 One of the squad’s leaders, ʿIṣmat Murād, and one of its supporters, Ḫalīl ʿAkkāwī, who was of Palestinian descent,73 joined the Tawḥīd Movement and brought with them their organizations, Murād’s Movement of the Arabic Lebanon (Ḥarakat Lubnān al-ʿArabī) and ʿAkkāwī’s Popular Resistance (al-Muqāwama ašŠaʿbīya). From 1982 to 1985, the Tawḥīd Movement reigned over the greater part of ‘liberated’ Tripoli and established—except for the ʿAlawī quarter Jabal Mohsen—a mixed Sunnī-Šīʿī Islamic social system, wherein seven emirs exercised control in the town quarters.74 In this context and with 67

68

69 70

71 72

73

74

Šafīq only mentions two martyrs; see Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 120. According to Israeli sources, six Israelis, among them the commander of the unit, and at least three Palestinians were killed; see Zeev Schiff, Ehud Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon & Schuster 1984), 124-131. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 122f. Saʿūd al-Mawlā said in an interview: “Avec l’invasion israélienne et l’occupation, la Brigade n’existe plus, elle est détruite militairement et politiquement. Donc tout ce monde s’est dispersé.” See Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran”, 35. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 88-90. Like ʿImād al-Muġnīya, Ṭarād Ḥamāda and temporarily Saʿūd al-Mawlā (until 1988). The latter even maintains that the squad was split along confessional lines after 1979: “A partir de 1979, nous avons fait face à cette division sunnite chiites. Ce qui s’est passé en réalité, c’est que les chiites qui étaient dans la Brigade l’ont quittée de fait en 1979. Plusieurs ont rejoint les groupes islamistes chiites qui ont créé plus tard le Hezbollah.” See Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran”, 35. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 93. The activists just returned from a visit to Teheran when they heard about the Israeli invasion. In the summer of 1982, thousands gathered in the mainly Sunnī town to take an oath on Sheikh Saʿīd Šaʿbān as the new Grand Emir of Tripoli; Šaʿbān was a charismatic Sunnī figure with a strong pro-Iranian tendency and good relations to Lebanese Shiite clerics. See Saab, Ranstorp, Securing Lebanon, 830f; Muḥammad Abī Samrā,“Min ‘Munaẓẓamat al-Ġaḍab’ wa-‘Dawlat al-Maṭlūbīn’ ilā ‘al-Muqāwama aš-Šaʿbīya’ wa-‘Liǧān al-Masāǧid’”, An-Nahar, March 2, 2008, http://www.beirutletter.com/editorial/e520.html (accessed November 01, 2009); id., Ṭarābulus: Sāḥat allāh wamīnāʾ al-ḥadāṯa (Beirut: Dār as-Sāqī 2011).Munīr Šafīq only briefly mentions the Maoist involvement, see his Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 89f. On him see Michel Seurat, “Le quartier de Bâb Tebbâné à Tripoli (Liban). Étude d’une ‘asabiyya urbaine”, in id., L’État de barbarie (Pairs: Èditions du Seuil 1989), 110-170. ʿAkkāwī is said to have taken part in battles in southern Lebanon for some time, see Šarbal, “Anīs an-Naqqāš”, 330. ʿAbd ar-Raʾūf Sinnū, Ḥarb Lubnān 1975-1990. Tafakkuk ad-dawla wa-taṣadduʿ al-muǧtamaʿ (Beirut: Arab

63

the partial retreat of Syrian troops, ʿArafat staged his Lebanese comeback in September 1983. His fighters took position in the Badawi refugee camp near Tripoli and later also in Nahr al-Bared. ʿArafat supported the Tawḥīd Movement financially and militarily to consolidate its power in the city75 against the resistance of pro-Syrian leftist groups. The Tawḥīd Movement rejected political parties as a heritage of colonialism and wanted to “purify” the city in order to re-establish “the honour of Tripoli” (karāmat Ṭarābulus) and “the honour of man.”76 In mid-October 1983, the movement executed twenty-eight communists, with the justification that spilling the unbelievers’ blood was “licit” (ḥalāl) according to the Šarīʿa.77 At about the same time an intense PalestinianPalestinian conflict erupted, when the Syrian-backed Fatah dissidents attacked ʿArafat’s five thousand fighters, forcing them to once again leave Lebanon in December 1983.78 The Tripoli episode illustrates that the Maoists not only sided with a pro-Iranian Islamist movement, but also remained loyal to ʿArafat’s Fatah, while their Marxist-Leninist counterparts cooperated with Syria. The Maoists’ loyalty to ʿArafat79 was opposed to the Syrian containment policy against the Fatah not only in Tripoli but also in “the war of camps” during which the Shiite Amal militia, backed by Syria, tried to gain control over the Palestinian camps in Beirut and in Southern Lebanon.80 The Discourse of Conversion There was no clear-cut way from Maoism to Jihadism and not all Maoists subscribed to Islam or militant Jihadism. There is an illustrious club of today’s intellectuals who fought in the Student Squad, but withdrew from the battlefields to spread their pro-Palestinian message through books

75 76

77

78

79 80

Scientific Publishers 2008), Vol. I, 418. See Sinnū, Ḥarb Lubnān, Vol. I, 418; Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 9. Seurat, “Le quartier de Bâb Tebbâné”, 160f. Sheikh Šaʿbān stated: “Nous ne sommes ni un parti ni une religion nouvelle. Nous sommes musulman, notre religion est l’islam, notre partie les musulmans.” Also compare Abī Samrā, “Min ‘Munaẓẓamat al-Ġaḍab’”. Seurat, “Le quartier de Bâb Tebbâné”, 159. In an open letter, the Lebanese Communists (LCP) accused their warally, the PLO, of not having prevented the massacre, see the section “Waṯāʾiq” in the party journal aṭ-Ṭarīq 4 (1983), 215-229, under the title “Ḥaul al-azma fī Munaẓẓamat at-Taḥrīr al-Filasṭīnī wa-aḥdāṯ Ṭarābulus wa-š-šamāl, wa-lʿalāqa bayn qiyādat ‘Fataḥ’ fī š-šamāl wa-l-Ḥizb aš-Šuyūʿī al-Lubnānī”, including the offical PLO statement answering the allegation and a riposte by the Polit Bureau of the LCP. ʿArafats opponents were Fataḥ al-Intifāḍa, PFLP, DFLP, and PFLP-GC. Saʿīd (“Abū Mūsā”) al-Murāġa’s group, Fataḥ al-Intifāḍa, called upon all Fatah groups to disobey the leadership’s orders, see Brynen, Sanctuary, 184-187. For the background see Sinnū, Ḥarb Lubnān, Vol. I, 417-421. Arafat’s presence in Tripoli was not acceptable for Syria, since ʿArafat and Syrian president Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad had failed to agree upon a common political strategy in spring. ʿArafat’s fighters managed to escape with French help on Greek ships, in spite of resistance from Syria and Israel. See Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 88f. and 93. For the background see Sinnū, Ḥarb Lubnān, Vol. I, 408-412.

64

and films, such as the playwright Roger ʿAssāf,81 the novelist Ilyās Ḫūrī,82 the philosopher Ṭarād Ḥamāda,83 the sociologist Saʿūd al-Mawlā,84 and the filmmaker Muḥammad Suwayd.85 Fatḥī al-Biss, a Palestinian refugee from Jordan and one of the early members of the Student Squad, recounts a dispute with Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī about their conversion to Islam. In his controversial memoirs,86 Biss describes how he returned to Jordan in 1977 after ten years of political and military engagement in Lebanon, being torn between his conviction to armed struggle and his wish to return to his family to help as a pharmacist in the refugee camp.87 Some of his comrades assured him that “the revolution has enough fighters.”88 Yet in about 1982, Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī suddenly showed up in his office to discuss their newly acquired Islamic convictions. The two argued that Maoism did not lend itself to the continuation of their struggle and “that Maoists [like Biss] who opposed the transformation have left the [mass] line and the squad whereas the vast majority has adopted the new position.”89 Biss replied that an Islamization was not necessary because the squad never opposed Islam and the restriction to “a pretentious ideology” (aydiyūlūǧī faḍfāḍ)90 was contrary to the squad’s former aim of “broadening the front of friends and diminishing the front of foes.”91 In general, the Maoists’ ideological crisis of orientation seems to have lasted from 1976 to 1982. The beginning of an increasing detachment from Maoism was not only marked by Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 and the downfall of the “Gang of Four,”92 but also by China’s new foreign policy 81

82 83 84 85

86

87 88 89 90 91 92

ʿAssāf, who converted to Islam after the Iranian Revolution, visited the Islamic Republic in 1985 and returned disenchanted. After observing the Iranian regime firsthand, he found it too Marxist: “Et curieusement, pas seulement par la pratique politique, mais en art, l’art, la forme artistique, sont décalqués en Iran presque sur ces régimes marxistes, les mêmes images, le sang, la violence, le nationalisme, la gloire des leaders, c’était la répétition de ce que nous avions déjà vu. Je leur ait dit, aux amis iraniens, ils ont été choqués.” See Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran”, 16. Ilyās Ḫūrī wrote ‘the’ Lebanese-Palestinian novel Bāb aš-Šams (Beirut: Dār al-Ādāb 1998). He represented Ḥizballāh as labour minister in the Lebanese cabinet of 2006/07. He is professor at the Lebanese University, was member of Ḥizballāh from the early 1980s to 1988, and is wellknown for his engagement in the Christian-Muslim dialogue after the civil war. In his film ʿInda-mā yaʾtī l-masāʾ (Nightfall) Suwayd recorded the stories of his surviving former comrades in “documentary fiction”. See Laura U. Marks, “Mohamed Soueid’s Cinema of Immanence” (http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc49.2007/lauraMarks/index.html) (accessed November 20, 2009). Inṯiyāl aḏ-ḏākira was published in Beirut and Amman in 2008. The Jordanian authorities, at first, prohibited the distribution of the book. According to the bill, no less than twenty passages were classified as defamatory because the author blamed the Jordanian army for having maltreated Palestinians and bombed refugee camps and held that the security services tortured prisoners. The authorities accused the author of inspiring “confessional chauvinism (an-naʿarāt aṭ-ṭāʾifīya) and discord (fitna) between individuals of the Jordanian people”. After a public outrage, particularly on behalf of the Jordanian Writers’ Union, the court dropped the charges against the author in Mai 2009. See Dār aš-Šurūq, “Maḥkamat al-istiʾnāf tunhī qaḍīyat Inṯiyāl aḏ-ḏākira” (http://www.shorok.com/activities_details.php?event_id=107) (accessed November 11, 2009). Biss, Inṯiyāl, 285. He also opened a publishing house (Dār aš-Šurūq). Id., 286. Id., 309. Id., 310. Id., Biss does not convey their response. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 34. This disappointment was a global phenomenon and caused most Maoists in Europe

65

after its admission to the United Nations (1971) and the Soviets’ expulsion from Egypt (1973). China gradually improved its relations to the Arab states, especially to Egypt, and did not openly condemn the Camp David negotiations (1977/78). In turn, its relations to Fatah cooled down.93 In the foreword to al-Islām fī maʿrakat al-ḥaḍāra (1981), Munīr Šafīq mentions that his book was the fruit of two years of discussions with friends and foes.94 After nearly a decade of disputes with the main Fatah line, Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī also turned to the “grounds of Islam” at about the same time.95 It took another two or three years for the ǧihād group to form. Šafīq mentions that at the end of 1984, Fatah leadership in the West Bank decided to no longer support Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī. However, this decision did not affect Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī’s activities, as they continued to cooperate with former comrades.96 Neither Šafīq nor Baḥayṣ/Tamīmī mention an overwhelming ‘Damascus incident’ preceding their turn to Islamism and Jihadism. This lacuna hints at the fact that they took this step after due deliberation. Only Anīs an-Naqqāš―coming from a Lebanese Sunnite family―once singled out a religious motive for his conversion when he referred to a Friday prayer in Tehran as being decisive for his move to Islamism.97 Since he tried to assassinate the Shah’s last Prime Minister (Shapour Bakhtiyar) in Paris in 1980, the political impact of the Iranian Revolution on him seems more obvious. The same can be said about his Lebanese-Shiite friend ʿImād Muġnīya who became the military mastermind of Ḥizballāh.98 Munīr Šafīq describes his own conversion as a long “historical process” arising from a long standing “critical attitude towards the ideas of Marx” when he was still a member of the Communist Party.99 He asserts that his “conversion was no individualistic process,” and that he “did not turn to

93

94 95 96 97

98

99

to abjure their convictions, since the Gang of Four was not only blamed for excesses during the Cultural Revolution, but was also declared guilty for anti-party activities in a show trial in 1981. See Behbehani, China’s Foreign Policy, 102-133 (chapter “Turning point in Sino-Palestinian relations”); Harris, “China’s Relations”, 123-154; and Sāmī Musallam, aṣ-Ṣīn wa-l-qaḍīya al-filasṭīnīya 1976-1981 (Beirut: Muʾassasat ad-Dirāsāt al-Filasṭīnīya 1982), 8-15. Šafīq, al-Islām, 10. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 3, 46, 89, 131-138. Also compare Sayigh, Armed Struggle, 630. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 59. In an interview, he described how his friend Ǧalāl al-Fārisī cited a Koranic verse on patience and endurance during a prayer in Tehran: “Ça été une véritable revelation, un moment fort dans ma vie. Depuis, je suis devenu un fidèle pratiquant.” See Charara, Domont, Le Hezbollah, 93. On him see Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran”, 5, and Naqqāš’s remarks in “Ṣadīq li-ʿImād Muġnīya yakšifu tafāṣīl ḥayātihi l-yawmīya”, Dunyā al-Waṭan, February 21, 2008, http://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/content-123683.html (accessed May 14, 2010). Muġnīya is believed to be responsible for the 1983 bombing of the US Marines barracks in Beirut, the kidnapping and killing of CIA’s Beirut station chief, William Buckley, and the 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. He was killed by a car bomb in Damascus on February 12, 2008. See “The Fox is Hunted Down”, Newsweek, February 25, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/112771 (accessed November 01, 2009). See the interview on al-Jazeera with Munīr Šafīq, “Bidāyāt an-niḍāl as-siyāsī wa-ḫiyār al-muqāwama” (23.5.2009), http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/pages/63f0f92c-21df-4541-a4a4-13e4762a1731, (accessed September 9, 2012).

66

Islam because of special circumstances or personal convictions,” but because he “was part of a wider tendency.”100 However, he admits that the last step of the collective conversion was an individual one, since the group members had to fight “a new battle within themselves.”101 Some of them embraced Islam wholeheartedly and more quickly than others. After Mao Zedong’s death, the Arab Maoists grasped that the Cultural Revolution had failed.102 They had their day of reckoning with Marxism-Leninism debunking the myth that it owned supreme social, historical, ideological, and methodological knowledge.103 Instead, they came to attribute the failure of the Cultural Revolution in China to the “European (sic!) mentality,” namely the “European idea” of a “total break with the past.”104 This is certainly a critique by hindsight, but it illustrates how the Maoists perceived the Chinese failure, when in 1980 Khomeini reclaimed the very idea of a total break with the (Westernized) past in revolutionary Iran and postulated an “Islamic Cultural Revolution.”105 The group from very early on had been critical of “Western” Marxism because of cultural differences. For example, it was part of their independent (“Arab”) interpretation of Marxism that they used the salutations aḫ (brother) and uḫt (sister) instead of rafīq/rafīqa (comrade).106 Already in 1976, Šafīq invoked “the spirit of ǧihād” in a poem mourning his brother’s, “Abū Ḫālid” Ǧūrǧ Šafīq ʿAsl, death on the battlefields.107 However, the Maoists were heavily struck by the masses streaming into the streets of Tehran in 1978 shouting “God is great” and “There is no God but God.”108 From then on, they started a discussion on the “particularity” (ḫuṣūṣīya) of every revolution and on the question of how to win over the masses.109 At this point, most Maoists had already drawn the conclusion that while Marxism could not be put into practice,110 Islam could be the instrument for a revolution of the Palestinian and Arab masses. Yet, they doubted whether a deeper understanding of Islam was necessary to mobilize the Muslim masses for revolution, since even in their own rows resistance against a turn to Islam prevailed.111 The reasons for this resistance, according to Munīr Šafīq, was that many group members had studied Marxism at Western universities and some were non-Muslims or even atheists, so that they had to overcome

100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111

Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 107. Id., 111. Id., 34. Id., 32. Id., 34. See for example Murawiec, The Mind of Jihad, 289f. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 35. See Biss, Inṯiyāl, 274. Compare also Šafīq’s remark in the 2009 interview that “Marxists don’t have a language to deal with death”; see Šafīq, “Bidāyāt an-niḍāl as-siyāsī.” Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 35. Id., 34. Id., 98. Id.

67

“intellectual and psychological barriers” to embrace Islam.112 After intense discussions, the group members concluded that its “pivotal axis”—mass mobilisation through Islam—was without any value or even unreliable, if they had no deeper understanding of “the tenet” of Islam (al-ʿaqīda)— belief in God, the creation, the Prophet Muhammad and the Koran.113 The idea that there was no revolution without belief definitely forced them to reverse and abjure their former materialistic convictions. For years we have searched for the mass line, while it directly lay before our eyes, but we did not see it. Do you not see that Islam is the line of the masses in our countries? So, by which logic do we look for characteristics of the revolution by saying that they are national democratic […] or socialist while they are Islamic here, if we like it or not? From here, the revolution will be born in our countries.114 The group came to realize that it had been the prisoner of a foreign and wrong “theory of the revolution,” but with their incremental rejection of Marxist theory, they had approached the masses’ pulse more and more.115 After all Mao had been right to demand that an effective theory of the revolution has to be discovered in the practice of the masses, because only such a theory could in return inspire the masses, since revolutions could not be made by ready-made prescriptions from Moscow or Beijing.116 If one were to apply Marx’s saying, that the avant-garde has to be the midwife of the revolution, to the Arab conditions then the revolution must be a Muslim child, “because in the Arab countries the revolution will not be born with blonde hair and blue eyes or with a yellow face and slitted eyes, and whoever bears in his mind the Marxist option, has to go to Sweden, China or Vietnam.”117 A harbinger of the group’s final turn to Islam was a heated discussion on “the woman’s question” which kept the group busy from 1975 to 1977 and to which Munīr Šafīq contributed a controversial paper named Mawḍūʿāt ḥawl al-marʾa (“Topics on Women”).118 Šafīq argued that historically women had participated in all the nation’s and umma’s struggles and therefore should also be involved in the current battles. He asserted that the disregard for women had no basis in the Arab112 113 114

115 116 117 118

Id., 138. Id. Id., 136; compare also Rūǧīh (Roger) Nabʿa, “Wa… li-māḏā ar-rumūz fī zaman al-miḥan”, al-Aḫbār, September 6, 2006, http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/3715 (accessed November 11, 2009). Nabʿa, a co-founder of the Student Squad and now a teacher at the International College at the American University in Beirut, holds that “the mass basis” (al-qāʿida aš-šaʿbīya) is the most important factor that determined whether Arab nationalism, Palestinian liberation, and Islamic revolution failed or succeeded. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 136. Id., 135. Id., 137. Id., 126-129, and also Biss, Inṯiyāl, 284

68

Islamic tradition, but was the result of the decline of the Arab world and of colonial exploitation. However, he further argued that women should only dedicate their efforts to the liberation of the nation, and not pursue a separate cause such as “absolute equality with men” or “women’s liberation.” Such demands were inappropriate to Arab history, “against the majority of the people”, and represented a bourgeois or individualistic attitude. Šafīq alerted that to reach the masses, the revolutionaries had to understand that the people cannot be forced into a direction they would not accept: “Women’s liberation” was off the agenda. Šafīq admits that some members could not accept these arguments due to their social background (class, religion, university study). He even concedes that after the group’s turn to Islam fewer women participated, although they had played a prominent role earlier. However, he reduces this development to the fact that many female fighters had reached the age of thirty119 and retreated to Beirut during the war. According to Fatḥī al-Biss, Šafīq’s paper already displayed “a stronger Islamic portion than usual” and let “some of us ask the question: are we really Marxists?”120 An aspect that figures prominently in Šafīq’s narrative about the Maoists’ conversion is the image of the morally upright, unshakable fighter who differs from self-interested tacticians. In spite of the active participation of the Maoists in the civil war, Šafīq only blames Arafat and the PLO for contributing to battles among Arabs, instead of “pointing with every gun at the Zionist enemy”121 and seeking support from all sides, regardless of political or confessional affiliations.122 This error brought the Palestinians into opposition to the Maronite forces and to Syria, which “was not the enemy.”123 Šafīq also blames the PLO for its deteriorating relations to the Amal militia and the Shiite population in the South of Lebanon.124 He holds that the Jarmaq Squad was on good terms with Amal members125 and played an important mediating role, preventing Amal and PLO (until the mid 1980s) from fighting each other and thereby protecting the population.126 The members of the

119 120 121 122 123 124

125 126

Maybe this argument means that it should be considered natural for women to marry and have children by that age and retreat from political work. Biss, Inṯiyāl, 284. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 23 and 81. Id., 84f. Id., 73-77. Id., 83. This remark may refer to the critical position of Amal leader Mūsā aṣ-Ṣadr who proclaimed as early as 1973 that he did not consider launching rockets and grenades as “revolutionary”. Amal also tried to prevent guerrilla actions in the South between 1980 and 1982 because the people were tired of the permanent skirmish between the PLO and Israeli troops. When the Israeli army invaded Lebanon in 1982, they were at first welcomed by the population. For the deterioration of PLO-Amal relations after 1979 see Rami Siklawi, “The Dynamics of the Amal Movement in Lebanon 1975-90”, Arab Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2012), 4-26, here: 12f. and 16-20. Compare also Biss, Inṯiyāl, 240f., who maintains that the Student Squad provided weapons and a military training when Amal started to form its own militia in 1974. Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 84; also Biss, Inṯiyāl, 278.

69

Jarmaq Squad were respectful of religious traditions and fasted during the month of Ramadan.127 The Shiite population in turn called them Ḥusaynīyūn128 already prior to their conversion to Islam because of their braveness and their will to self-sacrifice.129 Another nickname the Maoists were proud of was Ǧamāʿat at-Taḍāmun al-ʿArabī (Society of Arab Solidarity), because of their repudiation of fights among Arabs.130 According to Šafīq, the Maoists also protested—as the “conscience of Fatah”—against the harsh treatment, torture or killing of prisoners and civilians by Palestinian forces.131 In 1978 and 1979, some of their troops even managed to infiltrate Israel and launch two attacks in Hebron and Nablus.132 Šafīq concludes that the Maoists’ will to wage the war against “the Zionist enemy” was in line with the Fatah principles, whereas the inner-Arab fighting—the PLO was involved in—was not.133 In reference to the intra-Palestinian and intra-Arab battles, Munīr Šafīq quotes in length from a book published in 1978 and co-authored by two Squad members, one of them his brother killed in 1976.134 The authors mainly deal with the moral principles required of the revolutionary, such as selflessness and brotherliness.135 Although from a Marxist background, they define ethical and moral principles as concurring “with what Islam says,”136 according to Šafīq. He concludes that “religious ethics” and “strong moral values” were among the main reasons that caused the group to renounce Marxism and “opportunism” and turn to Islam.137 Revolutionaries should not aspire fame, wealth, or influence, but only have to be the “unknown soldiers” on God’s way and play the role of the “catalyst” (ʿāmil musāʿid) for mass revolution.138 Ṣādiq al-ʿAẓm’s Critique of “the Maoism of Fatah” and Šafīq’s replies After his turn to Islam, Munīr Šafīq was convinced that the muǧāhid―the one who fights the ǧihād—should be even more resolute than the fidāʾī—the one who sacrifices himself—which was the term used by the PLO guerrillas. Because of his uncompromising view, Šafīq had been ousted as an editor of the PLO newspaper Filasṭīn aṯ-Ṯawra after he had criticized the PLO “Ten-Point-

127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138

Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 116. After Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī, Muhammad’s grandson, who was killed and beheaded at the battle of Karbala (680 AD). Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 94. Id., 74. Id., 113f. Id., 122. Id. Saʿd Ǧarādāt, Ǧūrǧ Šafīq ʿAsl, Afkār ṯawrīya fī mumārasat al-qitāl (Beirut: Dār aṭ-Ṭalīʿa 1978). Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 103-110. Id., 110. Id. Id., 132.

70

Programme” of 1974.139 In an article written in 1972, he had already dismissed any proposal for conflict resolution other than armed struggle until total liberation.140 In later works, he drew a straight line from the “Ten-Point-Programme” to the Oslo Accords (1993) to illustrate the worsening situation in Palestine.141 In contrast to the Maoists, Arab Marxist and Communist intellectuals were highly critical of the Palestinian guerrillas’ ideas and behaviour.142 In 1973, Marxist philosopher Ṣādiq Ǧalāl al-ʿAẓm attacked Munīr Šafīq and other Fatah Maoists because he held their military strategy not only for one-sided and unrealistic but also for responsible for the expulsion of the PLO guerrillas from Jordan in “Black September” 1970. Although ʿAẓm supported the guerrillas in general, his book was meant to be a critical inquiry into the Palestinian military struggle which he believed had to be improved on all levels.143 Because of this critique, ʿAẓm lost his “job with the PLO’s Research Center on direct orders from Arafat himself”144 and had to go underground for a while because of personal threats. Ironically, he shared the fate of being ousted with Šafīq whom he had mainly criticized. ʿAẓm argued that “Black September” was a continuation of the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967.145 He admitted that the Palestinian leaders had correctly criticized the Arab states’ inability to face Israel, but had nonetheless inherited the social, political, and military problems from the Arab regimes.146 Although it was quite common to refer to the guerrilla attacks as the “Palestinian revolution,”147 ʿAẓm questioned this term. He considered military struggle only as “resistance” (muqāwama) and not as a full-fledged “revolution”148 and wrote that according to Mao Zedong “armed struggle is neither the only, nor the sufficient precondition to achieve a revolution.”149 ʿAẓm

139 140

141 142

143 144 145

146 147 148 149

See Sayigh, Armed Struggle, 352. Munīr Šafīq, “Li-māḏā yarfuḍu l-filasṭīnīyūn mašrūʿ ad-dawla al-filasṭīnīya fī ḍ-Ḍiffa al-Ġarbīya wa- Qiṭāʿ Ġazza”, Šuʾūn Filasṭīnīya 1972, no. 7, 65-73. More verbose: Šafīq, Bayn istrātīǧīyat at-taḥrīr al-kāmil wa-istrātīǧīyat al-ḥall as-siyāsī (Beirut: Dār aṭ-Ṭalīʿa 1973). Šafīq Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 11 and also Šafīq, Min ittifāq Ūslū ilā “ad-dawla ṯunāʾīyat al-qawmīya”. Rudūd ʿalā Idwārd Saʿīd wa-ʿAzmī Bišāra wa-āḫarīn (Amman: Dār aš-Šurūq 1999). For critical works about the Palestinian guerrillas see the Syrian Marxists Ilyās Murquṣ, ʿAfwīyat an-naẓarīya fī lʿamal al-fidāʾī. Naqd al-fikr al-muqāwim (Beirut: Dār al-Ḥaqīqa 1970) and Yāsīn al-Ḥāfiz, at-Taǧriba at-tārīḫīya al-vietnamīya. Taqyīm naqdī muqāran maʿa t-taǧriba at-tārīḫīya al-ʿarabīya (Beirut: Dār aṭ-Ṭalīʿa 1976). For a critical view on the Arab new left by a communist see Karīm Muruwwa, al-Yasār al-ḥaqīqī wa-l-yasār al-muġāmir. Iʿādat al-iʿtibār ilā l-ḥaqīqīya fī l-ḫilāf maʿa ǧamāʿat “al-Ḥurrīya” (Beirut: Dār al-Fārābī 1970). Ṣādiq Ǧalāl al-ʿAẓm, Dirāsa naqdīya li-fikr al-muqāwama al-filasṭīnīya (Beirut: Dār al-ʿAwda 1973), 8. Ghada Talhami, “An Interview with Sadik al-Azm”, Arab Studies Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1997), 113-126, here: 122. Dirāsa naqdīya li-fikr al-muqāwama al-filasṭīnīya published in 1972 was a kind of supplement to his other critical works after 1967, an-Naqd aḏ-ḏātī baʿd al-hazīma (Beirut: Dār aṭ-Ṭalīʿa 1968) and Naqd al-fikr ad-dīnī (Beirut: Dār aṭ-Ṭalīʿa 1969). ʿAẓm, Dirāsa naqdīya, 17-21. See for example Munīr Šafīq, Ḥawl at-tanāquḍ wa-l-mumārasa fī ṯ-ṯawra al-filasṭīnīya (Beirut: Dār aṭ-Ṭalīʿa 1971), idem., aṯ-Ṯawra al-filasṭīnīya bayn al-naqd wa-t-taḥṭīm (Beirut: Dār aṭ-Ṭalīʿa 1973). ʿAẓm, Dirāsa naqdīya, 11, 18, 25 passim. Id., 214.

71

deplored that Fatah did not even want to become a social movement150 and added: The simple thing that Munīr Šafīq ignores―whereby he reflects the general Fatah direction―can be reduced to the point that the emotional attachment of the masses to armed struggle as well as the spontaneous and natural support for the revolution does not necessarily form a significant and important political change in the consciousness of the masses.151 Moreover, ʿAẓm criticized the concept of a people’s war152 and accused Munīr Šafīq among others to apply it in an arbitrary manner:

From here arises a very contrived phenomenon one can call ‘the Maoism of Fatah’ (māwīyat al-Fataḥ), which is a Maoism void of any serious content and of all the foundational pillars on which authentic Maoism is build; its only aim is to justify the political line of Fatah and its decisions and tactics which do not originally come from sources that have any connection with Maoism or any revolutionary experience that bears any resemblance with the Chinese experience.153 ʿAẓm did not only disapprove of the PLO habit to describe Israeli soldiers as mere cowards relying on their weaponry, but also deplored Šafīq’s simple belief that “he who really believes in the masses and their ability will always win because the masses make history and they will make it also in our countries in the presence, not in the future […].”154 ʿAẓm admitted that the masses make history, “but there are many conditions that have to be fulfilled and achieved, something which Fatah does not acknowledge and Munīr Šafīq put aside.”155 Finally, he criticized that the Maoists’ warfare was suffering from a surplus of bravery and a lack of political consciousness: It is no wonder that the fedayeen are more often driven by their wish to die for their cause instead of fighting well and live—if possible—to see their cause win. The resistance movement does not differentiate clearly (in the consciousness and behaviour of the fedayeen) between human sacrifice, that is useless or a sacrifice for itself or not more than just martyrdom, and the price that the movement has to pay in order to realize progress so 150 151 152 153 154 155

Id., 221. Id., 42. Id., 78-206. Id., 119. Id., 206. Compare a similar quote id., 42. Id., 43.

72

that it comes closer to achieve its liberating aims.156 This criticism was farsighted insofar as the useless suicidal behaviour it condemned was replaced only ten years later by a logic that regarded martyrdom as the kernel of the matter. In his immediate response, Šafīq cited different examples and definitions to justify calling the Palestinian struggle a revolution.157 He wrote that the participation of “tens of thousands of the revolutionary masses” and the loss of “tens of thousands of martyrs, wounded, and political prisoners” made the guerrilla movement a revolution.158 Defending the concept of “a People’s war of long duration”159 and his belief in the masses,160 he stated that no Marxist-Leninist had the right to criticize the thousands of martyrs and wounded in the “holy war” (ḥarb muqaddasa) against Zionism, Imperialism, and the anti-revolutionary forces.161 He put the doubting “‘intellectual’” (muṯaqqaf) in quotation marks and compared ʿAẓm to the imprisoned Fāṭima al-Barnāwī,162 concluding that the latter had to be preferred to the first, whose attitude leads to nothing but “surrender.”163 In al-Islām fī maʿrakat al-ḥaḍāra, Šafīq indirectly took up the debate once again by re-defining mass mobilisation and the People’s war in Islamic terms. The entire text is an attack on Western cultural imperialism and it praises PLO representative Edward Said for his book Orientalism.164 Šafīq was convinced “that imperialistic exploitation knew consciously or unconsciously” that military, economical and political power was not enough and therefore “strove to make the dependency comprehensive (šāmil); especially in the countries of the Arabs and Muslims it concentrated on the cultural-civilizational attack.”165 For this purpose, the West invented the standards of rationality and irrationality, progress and backwardness, morality and immorality just to impose its lifestyle, materialistic belief, and consumer mentality on other peoples.166 Šafīq’s critique of the capitalist “global greed” included Marxist thought and socialist countries, because their power as well was based on the exploitation of other peoples. To illustrate this point, Šafīq created a fictional discussion between an Arab and a French Marxist after the assumed victory of

156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164

165 166

Id., 234. Šafīq, aṯ-Ṯawra al-filasṭīnīya, 13-16, 65-67. Id., 12. Compare also Sayigh, Armed Struggle, 199. Šafīq, aṯ-Ṯawra al-filasṭīnīya, 44-49. Id., 98-107. Id., 20. The PLO fighter who tried to install a bomb in an Israeli cinema in 1967 was imprisoned for ten years. Šafīq, aṯ-Ṯawra al-filasṭīnīya, 28. Šafīq, al-Islām, 8, writes on the second page of the book in the first footnote: “In this context, Edward Said’s book ‘Orientalism’ constitutes a very important work, because he proves this truth with hundreds of evidences and testimonies.” Id., 196. Id., 19-27, 84-92, 109-114, 176-206.

73

socialist revolutions in both their countries.167 The Arab Marxist asks his French comrade whether they would sell a Peugeot now for half the price or buy Arab oil for double the price. The answer is that this sort of global justice can only be put in practice after world revolution, and that after all the French proletariat has the right to an appropriate standard of living. Šafīq concluded that capitalist and socialist economies share the same greed and the same mode of exploitation of non-Western countries.168 After these observations, Šafīq argues that Muslims are morally and spiritually different and should base their lifestyle on “the revolution of Islam” and on “the totality of Islam.”169 Necessary would be a total renunciation of the West, “because the total war (al-ḥarb aš-šāmila) that was waged against us can only be answered with total war.”170 This war requires “unity” (tawḥīd)—a pivotal term in this Islamist discourse171—and aims at the liberation of Palestine, which forms the focal point for the mobilisation against imperialism.172 The ǧihād against imperialistic powers will further strengthen “the process of unification” (ʿamalīyat at-tawḥīd) among Muslims,173 “because Palestine has become the title of unity (tawḥīd).”174 Šafīq urged that: We have to stand on the ground on which the masses stand―without ambiguity, unshakeably and without hesitation. […] There is no development without the people. […] We are no contemporaries as long as we are alien to the spirit and the pulse of the umma and do not stand on the fundament of heritage on which the masses stand.175

As the “mass line” can only be with Islam, secular Marxists contradict themselves when they plead for the emancipation of the masses.176 Theoretical reasoning—because of the problems, sacrifices, and obstacles of military struggle—has not led to any alternative to the “ǧihād for the liberation of 167 168

169 170 171

172 173 174 175 176

Id., 84-87. This argumentation was not new but already used by Mirza Sultan-Galiev, a Tartar Bolshevik and representative of a ‘Muslim Communism’ in the USSR. He wrote in 1923: “If a revolution succeeds in England, the proletariat will continue oppressing the colonies and pursuing the policy of existing bourgeois governments. […] In order to prevent the oppression of the toiler of the East, we must unite the Muslim masses in a communist movement that will be our own and autonomous.” Cited by Murawiec, The Mind of Jihad, 230. Šafīq, al-Islām, 97. He bemoaned that Muslims faced with Westernization mainly followed two unsuccessful routes: the call for Modernization or the call for harmonization between modernity and heritage, see id., 121-129. Id., 200. The whole chapter (id., 195-200) that ends with the sentence quoted above bears the title: “About the necessity to wage total war against total war.” Former Maoist Roger Nabʿa lately explained the whole history of the Middle East since the abolishment of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1923 as a search for “unity“ (tawḥīd) and “opposition” (mumānaʿa) to its loss, see Nabʿa, “Wa… li-māḏā.” Šafīq, al-Islām, 44, 150-155. Id., 44. Id., 150. Id. See his interview with Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran”, 30.

74

Palestine.”177 Although a critic could hold that the revolution “has not yet resulted in the annihilation of the Zionist entity and the liberation of Palestine,”178 it would be wrong to pose the question whether armed struggle as such has failed. Instead, any “questioner should go to the battlefields so that the Palestinian revolution could account for a huge amount of fighting masses (ǧaḥāfil muǧāhida) who wage the venture of war until victory.”179 Selective and Accumulative Conversion Baḥayṣ’s and Tamīmī’s treatise As’ila ḥawla l-islām wa-l-mārkisīya min warāʾ al-quḍbān can be understood as a popularized version of Šafīq’s al-Islām fī maʿrakat al-ḥaḍāra. In question-andanswer-form, the authors explain their reasons for abandoning Marxism. As their adoption of Islam was not only a religious conversion, but also an ideological reorientation, it was selective and bore heretical features and can be categorized as “accumulative conversion,” according to a typology developed in the research project of the Enquete Commission of the German Parliament on so called sects and psychosocial groups.180 An accumulative and selective conversion can be set apart from two other forms of conversion: from the convert who chooses a mono-cultural, singular, closed religious system (mono-conversion) as well as from the convert who intensifies the religious orientation that is predominant in his family or social milieu (intensification). For the accumulative heretic, the family or original social milieu does not influence his choice, and he is aware of other possibilities. The actor does not look for a closed system of religious belief, but instead selects particular elements from an assortment of principles. He prefers religiously open milieus and upholds a great deal of flexibility for his ideas and behaviour. He combines a sort of openmindedness and creeds from different backgrounds with the fundamentalist core of his new belief system. He does not pay much attention to cognitive, theological or dogmatic contradictions, but constructs an ontological frame that can tie together contradictory elements. (1) Selectivity Right from the beginning, Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī underline the selectivity of their Islamic belief 177 178 179 180

Šafīq, al-Islām, 150f. Id., 154 Id. See German Report on Cults (Enquete-Kommission des Deutschen Bundestags „Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen“): “Anhang zum Forschungsprojekt ‘Aussteiger, Konvertierte und Überzeugte – kontrastive biographische Analysen zu Einmündung, Karriere, Verbleib und Ausstieg in bzw. aus religiös-weltanschaulichen Milieus oder Gruppen’”, 1998 (http://www.cesnur.org/testi/endber/ANHANG.HTM) (accessed September 27, 2008). The typology can be applied as a heuristic model indicating that conversion processes produce different versions of a multi-layered habitus and discourse that cannot be solely explained by religious motives or motivations.

75

when answering their co-fighters’ question from where a political theory derives its legitimacy: from its consonance with the contemporary stage and the needs of reality (as would be the case with Marxism) or from its historical birth certificate (i.e. Islam)?181 In their response, they reject the assumption that they converted to Islam only because the religion is part of the Arab legacy. Instead, they agree, that the whole legacy is not automatically correct and appropriate: Not everything that is part of the legacy is scientific and correct so that we have to follow it. Not everything that is part of the legacy can be rejected because it is gone by. There is always something that is dogmatically, methodically and theoretically correct while it is at the same time a legacy that the ancestors and the descendants bear.182

They also reject their brothers’ assumption that they converted to Islam to win the Muslim masses over more easily.183 Instead they state that mass mobilization under the umbrella of Islam is difficult or even unpopular because it resembles “swimming against the current”184 since ǧihād demands more sacrifices.185 The move towards the “grounds of Islam” is to be only the first, correct and necessary step into the right direction.186 This is because first and foremost, Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī believe in Islam and in God, and second, that Islam helps to discover the right “theory of revolution.”187 Finally, the authors are convinced that if there will be a revolution, it can only be an Islamic one: Lā ṯawra fī bilādinā illā ṯawra islāmīya.188 (2) Open-mindedness The Palestinian converts combine open-mindedness with regard to their understanding of Islam with an uncompromising understanding of ǧihād. The two authors implicitly contradict the Muslim Brotherhood’s slogan “Islam is the solution” (for every time and place) when they write: “Islam has no preconceived answers to contemporary challenges,” because “the understanding of contemporary people for Islam and the problems of their time” is decisive.189 Islam presents “general principles,” but it “does not interfere in the details” which are left open for iǧtihād (independent interpretation of the legal sources) in line with transformations and material progress; 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189

Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, As’ila, 12. Id., 13f. Id., 15-16. Id., 16; Šafīq, Šuhadāʾ wa-masīra, 131. Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, As’ila, 16. Id., 16, 38. Id., 16. Id., 27. Id., 16.

76

this also refers to concepts like šūrā (consultation), milkīya (possession), and takāful (solidarity).190 Although Islam has the answers to contemporary challenges, this does not mean that “those, who are entitled to issue juridical opinion and independent interpretation (man fī yadihim amr al-fatwā wa-l-iǧtihād),” possess “a magic key” when they turn to Islam to find solutions.191 Resolving contemporary challenges is intricate: “Do not forget,” the authors urge their brothers, “that what can be suggested is only an attempt to apply the method of Islam by human beings, and they are erroneous. […] There is no infallibility for leaders and muǧtahidūn.”192 Therefore, after embracing Islam as a revolutionary idea “further research, work, study and attempts are necessary—but in any case the probability of success through Islam is certain in the end, while other ways are doomed to failure from the beginning to the end.”193 As the Islamic Jihad groups were well-known for the tendency to work together with different PLO factions in spite of ideological differences, the two authors write that the struggle against Israel has to be continued “in the spirit of brotherhood, unity, cooperation and trust” and continue: We should not be afraid of differences, but of stagnation […], we should not fear the pluralism of opinions but the censorship of opinions. […] We have to build unity within pluralism, difference, and struggle. […] It cannot be tolerated that unity curbs thought or that freedom of thought curbs unity.194 (3) Debunking Marxism Baḥayṣ’s and Tamīmī’s booklet is an attempt to defeat Marxism with the weapons of historical criticism. The authors present Marxism as theory culturally grounded in Europe that is not apt for the Third World and has failed: “Instead of mass support in the battle for freedom and independence it has turned into a tyrannical, bureaucratic state, isolated—together with the avant-garde party— from the people” and curbs all freedoms, whenever policy and secret services want to.195 Marxists are convinced that they possess the “magic wand,” but no Marxist book has ever been valid for more than five years.196 Therefore, it is time to end “the intellectual terror” (al-irhāb al-fikrī), that Marxism is “objective and scientific and knows the secrets of truth.”197 The crucial argument of the authors lies in their reference to Marx’s well-known description of 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197

Id., 37. Id., 38. Id. Id., 39. Id. Id., 19f. Id., 21. Id., 21f.

77

the “devastating effects” of British colonialism on the traditional society in India.198 Marx’s view was that British “capital” or “industry” would fundamentally transform European as well as nonEuropean societies; accordingly, it was a trick of history that the force of capitalism and the “stupid” British rule, which mercilessly destroyed the social web of the repressive “village culture” in India, would cause a revolution in Asia.199 Twice Baḥayṣ and Tamīmī quote Marx’s statement that the “dual historical mission” of the British was to destroy the old Asiatic order by “sowing the seeds of European civilization.”200 Certainly, the authors knew the critique of this Marxian passage by Munīr Šafīq and Edward Said.201 The authors understood Marx’s analysis as a justification of European colonialism and underlined their argument that contemporary “civilization” was a “destructive one.” Capitalist as well as communist states had created dependent Westernised societies in the Third World that would never be able to acquire “real independence.”202 A remedy could only be found in the Islamic civilization (ḥaḍāra), which had liberated the peoples from corruption and destruction—beginning with the Islamic futūḥāt (conquests) which differed fundamentally from any imperialist aggression.203 As soon as the Islamic model of justice and solidarity would be revived, the “real struggle” for independence against Imperialism and Zionism could begin.204 The authors argue that communism failed due to a disparity between its promises and the situation of the masses. “The avant-garde elite” (an-nuḫba aṭ-ṭalīʿīya) in communism finds itself in isolation and in opposition to “traditional” society.205 Governing communists were unable to harmonize their views with their society’s traditions.206 Yet, true development and independence can only be accomplished by the masses and not by “secular, Westernized programs,” which stand in contrast to what the masses believe. Because of the central position of Islam in “our civilization”

198

199

200 201

202 203 204 205 206

The sources are not mentioned in the treatise, but the authors certainly refer to: Karl Marx, “British Rule in India“, New-York Daily Tribune, no. 3804, June 25, 1853 (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm) (accessed October 27, 2009), and id., “The Future Results of British Rule in India”, New-York Daily Tribune, August 8, 1853 (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/07/22.html) (accessed October 27, 2009). In “British Rule”, Marx writes: “England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.” Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, As’ila, 25, 43; compare the excerpt translated into French in Charara, Domont, Le Hezbollah, 9193. See Šafīq, al-Islām, 180 and Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books 1978), 153. For the broader context see Manfred Sing, Miriam Younes, “The Specters of Marx in Edward Said’s Orientalism,” in: Die Welt des Islams 53, no. 2 (2013), 149-191. Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, As’ila, 25. Id., 44. Compare the chapter about “Violence and the difference between the Islamic futuḥāt and the colonial assaults” (al-ʿUnf wa-l-farq bayn al-futūḥāt al-islāmīya wa-l-ġazawāt al-istiʿmārīya), in Šafīq, al-Islām, 129-132. Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, As’ila, 46. Id., 49. Id.

78

freedom and development can only be achieved with the help of Islam.207 The intention is to implement a successful development for the umma in all spheres, including inflicting “a lasting defeat on the Zionist enemy.”208 Just like Catholicism—as liberation theology—plays a major part in the revolutions of Latin America,209 Islam has to take over the same role in Africa and Asia. Like other peoples, the Islamic umma possesses the right to protect its identity from being crunched by Western civilization and has to reject Westernization in order to achieve independence, freedom and development.210 (4) Ontological re-framing Baḥayṣ’s and Tamīmī’s ontological starting point is the term fiṭra, “the human nature” that God created and humans can not change.211 Fiṭra means a “never ending struggle” between “the contradictory constants” of human nature, such as between personal whims and higher moral values.212 Thus, the authors shift the ‘main contradiction’ from social relations to human nature: “Islam is interested in the human being and makes him the yardstick to measure progress or delay.”213 They argue that Islam is a “comprehensive method” for all aspects of human life, whereas Marxist materialistic understanding of human nature is one-sided.214 Islam erects equilibrium between the spiritual, material, and natural needs, while Marxism focuses on material needs, justifies mass slaughter as progress, and considers man a servant to production forces and to greed.215 Marxism describes history as an egoistic competition for dominance, and fails to fulfil its promise of equality between men, due to its belief that equality can be achieved by nationalization.216 Islam does not accept any form of oppression and injustice, and therefore fighting the oppressor is integral to the belief in God.217 The masters in feudalist, capitalist, and socialist countries legitimize their power through the creation of laws that stipulate that every attack on them becomes an illegal act.218 Laws are created to accommodate the various needs of those in power; in addition, people in the West justify every need (such as homosexuality or norms in 207 208 209

210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218

Id., 49f. Id., 50f . The Latin American Episcopal Conference in Medellin 1968 officially supported the Neo-Marxist influenced liberation theology. Liberation theologians also supported the Nicaraguan revolution 1979. The same year, the Latin American Episcopal Conference pledged itself to the “preferential option for the poor” in spite of opposition from conservative bishops. Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, As’ila, 52. The discussion of the term fiṭra takes up about ten pages. Id., 31-41. Id., 36. Id., 33. Id., 39. Id., 32. Compare Šafīq, al-Islām, 48, 97, 105, 110, 113. Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, As’ila, 33f. Id., 40. Id.

79

regards to heterosexual relations) by relying on public interest and humanity. Socialists, communists, and secularists start fighting for their convictions, but their values soon evaporate, because they neither struggle with their personal aspirations and whims nor question their own selfserving behaviour.219 (5) Contradictions: Indirect Confirmation of Marxism and Modernity The idea to find a way out of modernity and its contradictions is itself a typical modern idea, in particular when this idea is connected with the view that one can surpass modernity by a better alternative. The Islamic alternative put forward by the former Maoists overtly or tacitly reflects this paradox. First, Šafīq and Baḥayṣ/Tamīmī argue for the comprehensiveness of Islam opposed to the limitations of Western thought as well as for the moral nature of Islam compared to Western immorality and consumerism. However, Baḥayṣ/Tamīmī maintain that Muslims desire and deserve more material progress, justice, and political power. This corresponds to Šafīq, who said: “Pour moi, il y a aujourd’hui des islamistes qui sont bien plus politiques et matérialistes, en un sens, que nombre de marxistes.”220 The converts propagate not only Islam, but they also behave like better Marxists—in line with the masses and with its materialistic needs. Secondly, Baḥayṣ/Tamīmī try to defuse the notion that their move to “the grounds of Islam” was motivated by personal interest or political pragmatism, since such self-serving motivations would contradict their critique of opportunism and their self-image of being selflessly committed to higher aims. Yet, one can deduce from Šafīq’s writings that the Maoists hoped that by adopting Islam they would gain more power, support, and legitimacy. Thirdly, Baḥayṣ/Tamīmī claim that their Islamic ideals differentiate their political struggle from other political projects. They reject the communist logic that “barbarism has to be eliminated by barbaric means.”221 But they neither provide any definition that distinguishes non-barbaric from barbaric forms of violence, nor a proof that their delineation conforms to Islamic ideals. In the opposite, Šafīq’s plea for a “total war against total war” matches the idea to pay evil back in its own coin.222 Fourthly, the former Maoists identify with a non-Western “traditional world” exploited and 219 220 221 222

Id., 40f. See his interview with Dot-Pouillard, “De Pékin à Téhéran”, 30. Baḥayṣ, Tamīmī, As’ila, 32; they falsely attribute Lenin’s sentence to Engels. For another example compare ʿAbbās Mūsawī, founder of Islamic Amal and later a leading figure in Ḥizballāh, who said in October 1983: “It is the duty of each Muslim whom Israel, America, France and all those other evil forces have oppressed or killed or helped to kill, or destroyed his home or occupied his land—it is the duty of every Muslim to counter evil with evil.” See Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation. Lebanon at War (Oxford: University Press 2001), 521.

80

threatened by “Western modernity” and want to surpass modernity with what they see as ‘real’ development. They refute Marx’s analysis that the modernizing-devastating effect of global capitalism sweeps away all traditions; instead they want it to sweep away only obsolete traditions, in addition to Zionists and Imperialists. They also oppose the idea that the trick of history223 causes social revolutions; instead they plead for armed struggle to preserve tradition and identity. Thus, they aspire progress without any of its destructive effects, as well as development and justice without obstacles and compromise. They look for an exit strategy from the devastating side of modernization, but through their plea for permanent military action they embody the destructive force of modernity to which they feel unjustly subjugated.

Conclusion The ideological transformation from Maoism to Jihadism happened simultaneously to a series of political events. The set-backs for the Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan (1970) and Lebanon (1978/1982) as well as the disastrous entanglement of the PLO into the Lebanese civil war caused disenchantment about the tactics, force, and aims of the PLO. It also caused the PLO to split into two opposing camps: one inclined towards a political “settlement” of the conflict with Israel according to international law and the second one eager to continue the armed struggle until the “liberation” of Palestine. The re-introduction of the concept of ǧihād happened in response to the PLO strategy that—beginning in 1974—showed some inclination to accept a two-state-solution. The Maoists’ conversion to Islam made them appear more radical, in their self-understanding as well as in relation to Fatah, although they did not substantially alter their insistence on the priority of armed struggle, whereas the bulk of Fatah members moved towards political “settlement” with Israel. The Maoists’ shift resulted in a selective, accumulative, and contradictory belief system that marked a triple distinction from the Arab Left, Fatah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, while at the same time representing a triple blending—or sublation—of anti-imperialism, liberation struggle, and Arab-Islamic identity.224 The Jihadists advocated an Iran-like revolution that would supersede the Russian and Chinese models and implicitly revived the idea of progress, namely, the idea that Islam summed up and surpassed the previous experiences. They vested their ideas in an ‘authentic’ Islamic style and marketed martyrdom and military struggle for the liberation of Palestine as new 223 224

See Šafīq, al-Islām, 41, where he refutes the Marxian notion of “the trick of history”. Former Maoist Roger Nabʿa explained that the Middle East knew only four charismatic figures in the 20th century. After Nasser, Arafat and Khomeini, Ḥizballāh’s General Secretary Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallāh is a symbol that unites the previous three experiences, see Nabʿa, “Wa… li-māḏā”.

81

Islamic ideals. Both as Maoists and Jihadists, they allied with the most committed pro-Palestinian power and its ideology, first with Maoist China, then with Islamic Iran. Their fondness of mass mobilisation, unanimity, armed struggle, and martyrdom does not seem particularly religious; it virtually remained untouched by their shift, but turned into intransigence couched in Islamic terms. The conversion to Islam and Jihadism caused troubles inside the Maoist group which underwent a state of instability and finally broke up. Baḥayṣ’s and Tamīmī’s attempt to explain their shift was convincing for some “brothers”, but “pretentious” for others. Although for some it formed a new beginning, for others it marked the end of their militant phase. The group members were divided over the question whether every single activist had to become a practising Muslim and what the appropriate role for female fighters was. This point illustrates that the conversion was ideological and religious and produced the difficulty to harmonize a radical political conviction with a conservative belief system. The Maoists’ shift can be seen as part of the de-secularization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which different actors legitimate their rejection of international rulings and their advocacy for political violence by referring to a religious language.225 The Maoist militants opened the “immanent frame” (Charles Taylor) for the legitimatization of political violence step by step to also include religious arguments. Hence, internationalism was accompanied by particularity, criticism by belief, and historical necessity by God’s will. With their Islamized “theory of the revolution”, they believed in the masses’ capacity to make history regardless of the circumstances, as long as they stand united. Even if the enemy seems to have the upper hand, history will prove that the muǧāhidūn will succeed in the end. This prophesy of final victory, which may be delayed until the distant future, leaves behind all concrete questions―about the ‘right’ moment, the ‘ripe’ circumstances, the ‘adequate’ means and the ‘immediate result’ of actions―by which Marxists were theoretically agonized and practically threatened with failure. Thus, the Jihadists’ violent acts become immune to critique or failure insofar as they are situated inside a different frame. The actors have turned into tools of providence, but their personal destination is only to be a “catalyst” for victory; they do not have to “live to see their cause win” (al-ʿAẓm).

225

For this process in the Israeli, Palestinian, and US context see Hans G. Kippenberg, “Die Entsäkularisierung des Nahostkonflikts. Von einem Konflikt zwischen Staaten zu einem Konflikt zwischen Religionsgemeinschaften“, in Hans Joas, Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), Säkularisierung und die Weltreligionen (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 2007), 465507.

82

Nico Prucha

Celebrities of the Afterlife: Death Cult, Stars, and Fandom of Jihadist Propaganda “Doubts of all things earthly, and intuitions of some things heavenly; this combination makes neither believer nor infidel, but makes a man who regards them both with equal eye.” Herman Melville, Moby Dick The article intends to describe and decipher selected sources of a vast and daily growing body of jihadist propaganda materials, freely disseminated via the Internet. The described propaganda materials in this article are part of the global jihad as defined and adhered by al-Qa’ida (AQ) and its affiliates. The marketing of ‘martyrs’ (shahid, pl. shuhada’) is one of the main narratives of the vast ideological resources propagated on the Internet, which originate from various conflict areas worldwide where jihadists are engaged in, and had historically played a role in.1 By frequently publishing professionally made videos and corresponding writings, AQ uses common media elements to portray individual combatants as well as “martyrdom operatives” (or suicide bombers)2 who are famed, propagated, and presented as ultimate role models to the audience. These “martyred” individuals, who are deemed as having attained the shahada3 “on the path of God” (fi sabil l-llah), are resurrected in the religious connotation as stars online, who have proven themselves as ‘true’ Muslims according to the worldview and the interpretations of jihadist groups in general. The biographies of martyrs are a powerful tool to inspire and recruit young men worldwide and are a major motivational element in the extremist literature since the 1980s and the 1990s.4 Videos and in general 1

2

3 4

Jihadi media activists and professional media groups have been very industrious in the past ten years to digitalize as much content as possible from previous conflicts, mainly Afghanistan of the 1980s and Bosnia and Chechnya of the 1990s. Thus, the newer materials mainly published on the Internet for the global audience are coherent and cohesive on an ideological-theological basis as the history of the jihadist mainframe is referenced, built-in, and repeated in its individual environment. Istishhadi is the Arabic reference used by jihadists to refer to “martyrdom” bombers as well to those, who attained the shahada, having professed the Islamic creed by the ultimate and outmost sacrifice possible in this world. The mainstream Arabic language media usually refers to this phenomenon by the reference of “suicide” (intihar) instead of “martyrdom”. The shahada refers to the confession of the Islamic creed, to bear witness that there is no God but God and Muhammad is His messenger. By standards of jihadist framing ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam from his office in Peshawar was a key writer of such tales from mainly young Arab men who had been killed fighting the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan, as outlined in his famous “’Ashaq al-hur” martyr biography collection, http://tawhed.ws/dl?i=pwtico4g (accessed August 29, 2013). This tradition was continued in

83

the televising of fighters and individuals who become such martyrs has become part of this cult or culture. While in the past decades the main narration was carried by the textual layer, the martyr biographies are nowadays mainly generated by professional audiovisual productions freely available online, while the pertaining literature is merely a bonus element of this genre. The jihadist endeavors online are part of a global culture dependent on modern technology to broadcast themselves and, of course, their messages to the world. This modern agitprop is not restricted to jihadists, but with different content and messages militants and hate groups of all colors and backgrounds use the Internet as a communication facility to lure consumers into their specific interpretation or world perception, trying to gain sympathy through modern, pop-cultural elements. Jihadists employ nasheed [“praiseful hymns”5] and huda [“encouraging battle songs”6] in combination with appealing training, combat, or everyday aspects of the Mujahideen and use a powerful yet comprehensible rhetoric. The rhetoric is inseparable from the (audio-) visual content and enforces key elements such as grievances and the need to respond, usually framed as a “call” to arms (nafir).7 The nature of communication has changed in the past decade with the Internet nowadays being an omnipresent entity. The reference to “jihad” in this article is limited to the militant manifestation in the mindset and ideology of AQ according to the written and audiovisual corpus sanctioning violence in general. As Philipp Holtmann explains, “jihad” and its related ideology “Jihadism” refer to “a fighting struggle” (jahada) in the sense of terrorism (irhab) and armed operations with a killing intention (jihad bi-l-saif, qital). Further elements are spiritual purification (jihad al-nafs), financial support (jihad bi-lmal) and propaganda (da’wah (cmp. al-Salim 2003); jihad bi-l-qalam (cmp. al-Suri 2004)). The phenomenon of global jihad is often identified with “al-Qaeda“ (AQ), which signifies both a central organization, a decentralized movement as well as physical and virtual

5

6 7

the 1990s with the influx of Arab foreign fighters in Bosnia, see for example: Majid al-Madani / Hamd al-Qatari (2002), Min qissas al-shuhada al-Arab fi l-Busna wa-l Hirsik, www.saaid.net. For example a training video by the Liwa’ al-Islam Brigade (Syria) entitled “mashru’ takhrij dawrat al-maham alkhassa”, published April 14, 2013 on YouTube shows the powerful functioning of the nashid, and in a later part of the video the huda’, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6wm6ErJhHE. The powerful role of song craft, an essential part of the jihadi culture, is further detailed in this article in the chapter The Martyrdom of the munshid of the al-Shumukh Forum. Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Jihadi Twitter Activism Part 2: Jabhat al-Nusra on the Twittersphere”, Jihadica, May 13, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/jihadi-twitter-activism-part-2-jabhat-al-nusra-on-the-twittersphere/

84

networks, in which actors of global jihad team up.8 We engage in online discourses on a daily basis via our classical computers and laptops, but increasingly so by the use of small portable computers, such as smartphones and tablets. This highly engaging and engulfing media interaction allows a never-before possible interaction between those who produce media content and the consumers. As almost all forms of online media allow, enable, and empower users to generate their own content and interact by posting comments, questions, or responses, a new culture of media consumption and production has come to exist, whereas the jihadist sub-culture on the Internet are part of. The martyr videos are posted on YouTube and elsewhere, while the links to YouTube have the dual strength of a rich media environment and the potential to draw the viewer into a densely interconnected cluster of mutually reinforcing video content. In some cases the users must be aware of current jihadi developments and trends to fully comprehend pictures that may appear odd to an uninitiated viewer. However, other videos are a clear and obvious part of the jihadi visual culture of martyrdom and advocate ideological harmony. Pictures of individual martyrs for example, are framed as part of the overall jihadi culture and are popular on Twitter (and Facebook) where they are commemorated and propagated as role models.9 Online media platforms facilitate a blend of audio-visual media interspersed with writings that further sanctions and explains specific ideological dimensions of jihadi activity.10 As the range of online platforms has expanded, so jihadist groups have increasingly used sites such as Twitter,11 Facebook, and YouTube,12 with their use of tumblr also gathering pace13. The role of the ‘media mujahid’ has been approved14, sanctioned15 and encouraged with the release of suggested strategies16, although not all 8 9 10

11

12

13 14

Philipp Holtmann, Virtual Leadership: How Jihadis Guide Each Other in Their “Internetworks.” A Study of Communicative Guidance Patterns in Online-Jihad. Manuscript, dissertation, University of Vienna, 2. Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Jihadi Twitter Activism Part 2: Jabhat al-Nusra on the Twittersphere”, Jihadica, May 13, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/jihadi-twitter-activism-part-2-jabhat-al-nusra-on-the-twittersphere/. The persistent as well as ideological cohesive online presence of jihadist propaganda, framed as authoritative rulings and determinations, has become an open sub-culture. The jihadist narrative, enforced by audio- and visual elements strengthens in-group cohesion and affects mainstream Muslim culture, the main targeted audience. For an introduction to the jihadist presence on Twitter as well as the social-media strategy deployed since the outbreak of violence in Syria: Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Jihadi Twitter Activism – Introduction”, Jihadica, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/jihadi-twitter-activism-introduction/. Cori E. Dauber, “YouTube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone and Photoshop on Every Computer”, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College ,2009, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=951. Rüdiger Lohlker, “Tumbling Along the Straight Path – Jihadis on tumblr.com”, Research Notes, University of Vienna, 2012, http://www.univie.ac.at/jihadism/?p=391. Al-Manhajiyya fi tahsil al-khibra al-i’lamiyya, Mu’assasat al-Furqan & Markaz al-Yaqin, part 1, May 2011.

85

have seen the move away from the traditional forum based interaction as positive.17 The jihadist culture online embraces the visual output, generating professionally made videos on a daily basis. Most of the ‘official’ productions by jihadi media departments are published via the jihadi forums and at the same time uploaded to YouTube with links being advertised for on Twitter and Facebook, where sympathizers contribute in disseminating the links or upload the videos to other channels to further decentralize the data. Especially with the violence in Syria on a viral scale with hundreds of jihadi brigades fighting the regime, the video output of the overall jihadist genre on YouTube has risen and is thus ultimate part of the unstoppable emergence of audiovisual content on the net. The figures and forecasts are downright impressive: video downloads reached 20m[illion] terabytes in 2012, which means an increase of over 50% in relation to 2010. It is estimated that, by 2016, 1.2m minutes of video will cross the net every second of the year. Also improvements in connectivity on mobile phones already highlight the fact that on-line video will be the fastest growing application at a rate of 75% between 2012 and 2017. Further to this, the availability of free editing software, constant bandwidth increases and access to on-line repositories have enriched audiovisual contributions on the net, adding to the phenomenon key social, cultural and political dimensions.18 The classical jihadi discussion forums remain the vital hub for authoritative, cohesive, and coherent

15

16

17

18

The sanctioning of jihadi activity is related to the existing core fatwas, authoritative rulings, ideological decrees and so on. Thus, any local jihadi AQ-affiliated action is therefore placed under the virtual umbrella, increasing the appeal. Prem Mahadevan, “The Glocalisation of al-Qaedaism”, Center for Security Studies (CSS), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?lng=en&id=161729&tabid=1454211886&contextid774=161729&contextid775=161659. Discussed in: http://www.jihadica.com/jihadi-twitter-activism-introduction/ http://www.univie.ac.at/jihadism/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Prucha-Online-Territories.pdf Members of the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum and Shumukh al-Islam have posted advice encouraging fellow users to develop social media profiles to disseminate their message to a wider group of users; for example: “The Twitter Guide // the Most Important Jihadi Users and Support Accounts for Jihad and the Mujahideen on Twitter”, https://shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=192509. “Selected Tweets from Twitter”, https://shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=192509. The jihadi success of Twitter has had its impact on leading Jihadi writers such as Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili to highlighted the shift of “major [jihadi] writers and analysts”, lamenting the general decline in participation in jihadi online forums.17 Furthermore, al-‘Amili issued a “Call (nida’) to the Soldiers of the Jihad Media” demanding that they “return to their frontiers (thughur)” elevating their status. Al-‘Amili himself is one of the high-profile clerics but is also quite active on twitter (@al3aamili). For further details, Cole Bunzel, “Are the Jihadi Forums Flagging? An Ideologue’s Lament”, Jihadica, March 20, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/are-the-jihadi-forums-flagging-an-ideologue%E2%80%99s-lament/ According to the “Call for Papers: Videoactivism, culture and participation. Theory and practice of social change in the age of the networks”, issued by Dr. Francisco Sierra and Dr. David Montero, E-Mail correspondence, September 2, 2013.

86

propaganda disseminated via all channels of the Internet.19 However, with an increasing pace, jihadi media groups and activists have turned to the social media and are fully committed on Twitter where selected parts and most popular aspects of this cohesive ideology are disseminated in a crowed-out style.20 The importance and renewed focus on Twitter by jihadist groups, for example, is highlighted in the recently published 11th issue of the English Jihadi magazine Inspire,21 where in a fandom styled fashion Twitter is appraised as another important tool for to propagate Islam by jihadist definition. Within the complex network of interconnecting sites, Twitter has become the main hub for the active dissemination of links guiding users to digital content hosted on a range of websites, social media platforms, and discussion forum, as well as a new platform to market and advertise the multi-faceted role model of the “martyr”.

19

20

21

The coherent and cohesive ideology, that in past years filled many gaps and open questions by responding to questions and criticism online, is difficult to counter, as no ‘single-narrative’ of al-Qa’ida is evident. Rather, on a multilayered basis, emotional, theological, moral, and other elements are triggered by its massive professional propaganda output combining the textual layer with the audio/-visual one. Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Tweeting for the Caliphate: Twitter as the New Frontier for Jihadist Propaganda”, CTC Sentinel, June 2013, West Point. For an visualization on how effective selected parts of the ideology, in writing and audio-visual format, have an outreach on Twitter by the example of the Syrian “Jabhat al-Nusra”: Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Jihadi Twitter Activism Part 2: Jabhat al-Nusra on the Twittersphere”, Jihadica, May 13, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/jihaditwitter-activism-part-2-jabhat-al-nusra-on-the-twittersphere/ Inspire, al-Malahem Media, Special Issue (11), Spring 2013, p. 17. The cover story and a colorful picture commemorating Tamerlan Tsarnaev elaborate the “AQTweets” section. In the picture, the Boston bomber is depicted as sending an SMS from paradise to the his mother: “My dear mom, I will lay down my life for Islam. I’m gonna die for Islam Inshaa Allah.” Reactions taken from Twitter include for example the user “Abu Shamel”,stating: “Allahu Akbar, I feel so happy, only 2 soldiers of Allah defeated America, it’s army & #intel America can never stop the decree of Allah.” The magazine takes credit for having successfully inspired not only the Boston bombers, but also the Woolwich assailants, in a reasoning phrased as an “eye for an eye”, revenge for the occupation of Islamic countries and the deployment of unmanned drones.

87

Twitter andd Facebookk allow to in nteract and iintersect beetween the ono and offlline worlds, where reall-life and death aare mediateed from the battlefieldss to the livin ng rooms. The T above sshown screeen grab is taaken from Twittter by the haandle @ntfo ooosh (al-Siimbatik)22 and a shows th he marrtyr Abu Yaahya al-Libii23 – may Good receive him: h A ccouple of days d ago, hee told me tthe stories of the kara amat of Godd for the Mujahideen M and todday I am forttunate to assk for the kaaramat for the t shahid. c the sm miling shahid d expressing his happinness for leaaving this world w Karamat, tthe “miraclees”, in this case and enterinng the afterrlife, are po opular not oonly in the classical jih hadi literatuure but also o in the moddern context onn Twitter. Thhe picture with w the staatement waas retweeted d over 4,0000 times witth close to 500 ‘likes’ in a short time. mation is reaally just peoople in disg guise”24 andd the Aftter all, as Jaason Lanier puts it, “diigital inform Internet is an intersecttion whereaas content frrom the reall world, ourr daily lives , enter a glo obal platform m in textual, vissual, and auudio-/visuall form. As much as an ny of the virtual v conteent, jihadism m with its vast media matterial from the real-w world has ccreated spheeres of its own whichh attract vaarious types of audience aand who in turn are alsso able to pparticipate in i the “onliine jihad” bby creating and publishhing their own versions of fan-culturre. Instead of followin ng the mainstream paarts of glob bal and/or local l 22 23 24

@ntfooossh, https://twittter.com/ntfoo oosh/status/37726937663414 410816/photo//1, August 28,, 2013. The clearr name of the martyr m is not revealed r and nnot to be conffused with Abu u Yahya al-Libbi, Hasan Qa’id, AQ Q’s second-in--command, ass outlined in thhe following chapter. c Jason Lannier, Who Ow wns the Future? (Penguin Boooks Ltd.: Lon ndon 2013), 52. 5 EBook ediition.

88

Muhammad M

culture, individuals hence are able to subscribe to a specific and nevertheless global lifestyle that is the essential and integral foundation of a worldwide active terror group, according by their own standards.25 The jihadi culture on the Internet is fed by authorized media material, which in the past years has more and more been re-disseminated based on increased fan activities. The fans and followers subscribe to AQ’s monopoly of absolute truth and their work in turn is valued as part of the overall jihad. Thus, engaging and drawing in their audiences by the new media in general is part of the jihadists’ motivation and tactic on the Internet as versatile, the converging medium, as wide is the range of different fan activities we find online. Beyond the “one-click fandom” on Facebook, the diversity of these practices necessitates the further qualification of how they cluster among different fan groups. Two definitions are thus required here: Firstly, the emphasis on fans’ productivity in online spaces warrants further attention to the different types of productivity in “participatory culture”26. John Fiske (1992) distinguishes between three types of productivity among fans: semiotic productivity – the act of reading/watching/listening and thereby meaning construction on behalf of fans in encounters with the object of fandom and texts surrounding an object of fandom; enunciative productivity – which describes the interactions between fans surrounding their fan object such as fan talk, gossip, banter and speculations; and textual productivity – found in fans’ creation of new texts such as fan fiction, music remixes, or fanzines.27 The role of the ‘public relationship departments’ of AQ, via the online forums, the electronic magazines where individuals can be drawn into and even participate by writing articles, has resulted of a ‘new martyr’, who had been engaged online and then managed to join jihadi detachments in the real-world to die fighting “on the path of God.” Such stories are on the rise with individuals being portrayed having had their first point of contact on the Internet and then moving on to the battlefields. The jihadist strives and struggles by all means, foremost by violent actions, to implement their orthodox and selective interpretation (ta’wil) of Islamic divine scripture. Paradox and ironic is the jihadists’ usage of the Internet to achieve an efficient output of this massive propaganda, disseminated 25

26 27

As outlined in the jihadist media in general and summarized by AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a speech eulogizing Abu Yahya al-Libi in September 2012, “we do not tie our jihad to any organization, to any [specific] leader or leadership, not to any group, and not to any name or territory not even to the Holy Land. For the land does not hold anyone sacred but sanctifies one for one’s deeds. Therefore, we support this form of divine service while we engage the enemies of God, fighting them wherever [God] enables us to, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, Algeria, Syria, and Libya.” “Asad al-‘ilm wa-l-jihad Abu Yahya al-Libi”, as-Sahab Media, September 2012. Jenkins, H. Fans, Bloggers and Gamers (New York: New York University Press 2006). Cornel Sandvoss, “Fans Online – Affective Media Consumption and Production in the Age of Convergence”, in Miyase Christensen, André Jansson et.al.: Online Territories – Globalization, Mediated Practice and Social Space (Peter Lang Publishing: New York 2011), 50.

89

online on all channels, and in an increasing number of languages.28 Nevertheless, the crafting and disseminating of propaganda, in the jihadists’ intention is declared as ‘missionary work’ (da’wa) or as “propagating Islam”, has proven highly effective in past conflicts and is a main element of operational groups and movements. Especially biographical stories of the martyrs (shuhada’), killed Mujahidin in action as well as “martyrdom operatives”, or suicide-bombers, have been at the center of jihadist propaganda and are highly effective in terms of incitement, radicalization, and recruitment since the armed struggle in Afghanistan against the Soviet Red Army in the 1980s. The propaganda of the jihadists, with the ideology merging due to the influence of Arab foreign fighters joining local conflicts, has since massively improved.29 Own media departments were developed in the 1980s and deployed in the early 90s in Bosnia, the Caucasus and other war zones around the world with foreign fighters joining for the defense of local Muslims while preaching and instilling a specific interpretation of Islam that has in wide parts contradicted local traditions and belief sets.30 Videos were made, edited and distributed world wide with ideological writings, jihadist magazines had been printed and individual Mujahideen and ideologues became popular heroes among the population of their countries of origin. The media departments prior to the 9/11 attacks in Washington, D.C. and New York have been further developed and expanded with the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq . With the innovative capacity of online forums, social media and in general ‘new media’ platforms, the jihadist ideology is effectively competing for the ‘hearts and minds’ of young Muslims with other mainstream and legitimate schools and interpretations. The professional and consequent use of the all-available media platforms empowers the extremists in general terms.

28 29

30

According to Rüdiger Lohlker in an interview with the Wiener Zeitung, 10./11. September 2011. http://www.univie.ac.at/jihadism/. With embedded “media battalions” as well as “media cells”, Arabic language films of various kinds are frequently published. In the 1980s VHS tapes from Afghanistan were used for active recruitment world wide, showing Arab Mujahidin and their lives in the Jihad against the Russians. Arabs fought alongside local Afghans who in some cases became foreign fighters themselves when the jihad in Afghanistan ended. In a book entitled “Of the Stories of the Arab Martyrs in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, accounts of mainly Arab foreign fighters are biographically detailed, framing in particular the death as well as literally outlining ‘proof’ for attaining martyrdom in the jihadists’ worldview. Bodies emanating musk, smiling combatants killed an action, bodies of deceased not decaying, and in general ‘miracle’ tales (karamat) of the martyrs are vividly narrated. Most accounts are of Arabs, mostly veterans of the Afghan war, but accounts also include Afghans who joined the international cause besides Turks, Eritreans, Tajiks and Chechens. Against all local customs and traditions, a ‘pure’ and only valid interpretation (ta’wil) of Islam is enforced by the foreign fighters, who as Arabs claim authority and teaching functions to non Arab Muslims in the zones of conflicts. Anything deemed as innovative (bida’) or forbidden (haram) is reformatted and reclaimed by the jihadist understanding of divine texts. A prominent example is the relative new phenomenon of Islamists and jihadist fighters in central Africa in 2012 where the al-Qa’ida affiliated Ansar al-Din, the “Supporters of the Religion” occupied towns in northern Mali, deliberately targeting and destroying Sufi graves and holy places. The movement only has an Arab minority among them, but adheres to the global jihadi ideology and agenda. The destruction of holy graves and sites is in contradiction to the principles of tawhid and therefore a sin and branded as ‘polytheist’ (shirk).

90

As such, and in particular after the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the role of individual sympathizers as well as organized media workers has been further acknowledged and equalized with the role of “martyrdom operatives” or ‘regular’ Mujahideen who actively fight in the field and who are framed, portrayed and made famous within the online circles and spheres of global jihadism. Individual operatives, for example the 9/11 hijackers, had filmed their testimony (wasiyya) at an early stage of the planned attacks. The jihadist media therefore had for many years new materials to broadcast celebrating the September 11 attacks, with the individual hijacker speaking in his own words and terms, providing the audience direct access to the personal mindset and individual justification of the attacks embedded in a greater narrative and story telling of post-colonial occupation31 and oppression32; of a global “conspiracy against Islam” and the “crusader-Zionist” intentions of annihilating the proper religious worship for God. Naturally, such policies or authoritative rulings (hukm) and interpretations (ta’wil) affect the treatment of non-Muslims as well and strictly excommunicate (takfir) anyone normally considered a Muslim by harsh values. Next to the vast corpus of written propaganda and ideological tracts are the filmed productions of jihadist movements, which have increased likewise. The jihad videos are in most cases perhaps more important and dangerous than the texts. The videos clearly depict and portray ideological torrents in a grand and most potent narrative whereas role models are addressing the virtual umma, the Islamic nation, with the ambition of being re-enacted by the consumers. These role models are the one who are fulfilling, living out, re-enacting the presumed acts and deeds of early Muslims, thus transforming themselves by their own acts – and most importantly their own words documented by the digital lens – as the only ‘true’ believers and real men, becoming the stars of in the online forums where fans can contribute their photoshopped pictures and meshed up videos33 to endorse these stars. The videos depict and portray ideological torrents in a grand and most potent narrative whereas role models are addressing the virtual umma, the Islamic nation, with the ambition of being re-enacted by the consumers. These role models are the ones who are fulfilling, living out, re-enacting the presumed acts and deeds of early Muslims, thus transforming themselves by their own acts – and most 31

32

33

The propaganda is coherent, however dependent on local history and circumstances. The post-colonial struggle of Algeria, where AQ maintains a North Africa branch, finds its expression of European, mostly French, influence and military personnel depicted as sent to combat the jihadists along “apostate” Algerian soldiers. A rhetoric justifying the execution and open war against governmental soldiers and police who, as Sunni Muslims, are termed as apostates (murtaddin) of Islam, loyal to man-made laws instead of divine legislation and therefore declared as legal military opponents. Oppression by tyrants, termed in the jihadist mind set as idols (taghut), are another evident manifestation of the contradiction of the monotheistic principle of tawhid the jihadists fight for – the service and worship to the one and only God, who shall not be associated with partners of any kind. Thus, the jihadists define themselves as muwahhidin, exercising the tawhid principle in contradiction to the mushrikin, who neglect the monotheistic belief set and are rather loyal servants of dictatorial, secular or monarchist governments where individual leaders are hailed and praised in a similar fashion as God. As outlined in the case of Abu Qasura al-Libi in this article.

91

importantlyy their ownn words doccumented byy the digital lens – as the t only ‘truue’ believerrs and real men, m manifesting as stars in i the onlin ne forums an and the sociial media where w fans eendorse and d appraise these t stars, whosse actions arre to be re-eenacted in rreal-life.

On Jihadii Media Acttivists and New Martyyr Role Mo odels Thee jihadist media m departtment is as ddecentralizeed as the In nternet itselff, with med dia activists,, by the extrremists’ reaasoning term med as “me dia mujahid d” (al-muja ahid al-i’lam mi). This ro ole model iss backed by the call to take t the fight on a greaater level on n all channeels online ass issued by al-Fajr34 inn their response of the killing k of bin n Laden: Thee Internet iss a battlefield for jihadd, a place for missionarry work, a fi field of conffronting thee eneemies of God. G It is upon any individual to consideer himself as a media-mujahid,, deddicating him mself, his weealth and hiis time for God. G 35 The ‘media mujahid’ needs not to t physicallly join the real-life miilitant groupps to participate in thee divine obliigations of combat c (qittal) and da’’wa, but can n work in a function wh where he is far f from thee battlefield.. This divine obligation n in jihadistt terming co onsists of in ncitement, innspiring (ta ahrid) 36 thee targeted auudience to follow f the actions a of thhe Mujahid deen. AQ’s senior s leadeership has emphasized e d 34 35

36

Bayan m min markaz al--Fajr li-l i’lam m, “ta’ziyya w wa-tahani’a li-ummat al-Isllam bi-munassiba istishhad al-shaykh al-asad Osam ma bin Ladenn”, 1432 a.H. Nico Prucha, “Online Territories off Terror – Utillizing the Inteernet for Jihad dist Endeavorss,” ORIENT IV (2011): 43.. The article is availablee online at htttp://www.univvie.ac.at/jihad dism/blog/wp-content/uploaads/2011/11/Prrucha-Online-Territoriees.pdf. Qur’an 44:84 is usuallyy referenced and a serves as the basis to ju ustify any meedia related w work. The Eng glish-languagee jihadi maagazine “Inspiire”, for examp ple, is such a direct reference.

92

this in receent publicattions and citted in neweer videos. Th he Libyan ideologue i ‘A Attiyatullah h al-Libi (d.. 2012) had been quoteed in a videeo entitled ““You are on nly accounttable for yoourself”, a direct d quotee from the Q Qur’an (4:84), equating g the urge to join the Mujahideen with the propagandaa work thatt will inspiree individualls to engagee in misssionary callls to each and a every M Muslim for jihad; j to joiin the caravvan of jihad (qafilat al-jihaad) under any a circum mstances. Thhis means without w preeconditions or limitatiions on thee bassis of the caall to arms (nafīr) towaards this orr that front – and the inncitement to jihad is a shaari’a-law obbligation. God, G exaltedd is He, say ys: “Prophett, urge the bbelievers to o fight...”37, andd: “Urge thee believers on. o God may ay well curb b the power of the disbeelievers.”38

plied to ‘A Attiyatullah al-Libi afteer he was kkilled in a U.S. dronee Thee same paraameters app strike in P Pakistan in August A 201 12 to framee him as a martyr, m hav ving enteredd paradise (janna) ( andd ascribing tto the divine order of being b alive and taken care c of by God, G as outtlined in Qu ur’an 3:1699 and detaileed in the subbsequent ch hapter of thiss article. Incitement to jihad j is weell establishhed within the t online dominions, d where med dia activism m can be achhieved from any place, in- or outsiide of confliict zones. With W a ring oof decentrallized mediaa workers suupporting thhose who arre ‘embeddded’ with fig ghting elem ments, the jiihadi mediaa has in thee past years greatly im mproved in providing professionaal made videos and w writings fro om real-lifee combat zonnes for com mputer-, tabllet-, smartphhone-, and television-sscreens throoughout the world. Thee 37 38

First part of 8:65. Part of 4:84. La tukallaafu ila nafsakaa, as-Sahab M Media Productiion, June 2011 1.

93

‘media mujahid’ as a role model promotes those ‘embedded’ front-line cameramen in particular, without whom the quality and quantity of jihad groups worldwide would not have a lasting impact or relevance. In the jihadists’ self perception, the media [worker] has become a martyrdom operative without an explosives belt, for they are entitled to these merits [of jihad]. Furthermore, haven’t you seen how the cameramen handle the camera instead of carrying Kalashnikovs, running in front of the soldiers during attacks, defying death by exposing their chests to the hails of bullets!?39 Rather, the media worker in the field has turned into a role model of adoration just like any hardcore fighter or martyrdom operative, and is portrayed by the jihadi media likewise and is accredited as an istishhadi, as someone who actively has sought out and attained the shahada. The wish to become a martyr, having a “clear intention” (al-niyyat al-saliha) as proof of their piety and their loyalty to God, being ‘true’ practitioners of Islam expecting compensation in the afterlife. This powerful new role model is backed by the accreditation of the value of the quantitative and qualitative online propaganda: Haven’t you seen the cells responsible for expanding the electronic media files (isdarat), how they enter the most dangerous and most fortified areas and how they disseminate the isdarat of the Mujahideen in the heartlands of the hypocrites (munafiqin)!?40 Media workers, on the other hand who are not directly embedded with fighting units, are not of lesser importance. For they ensure the process, editing, the layout, translating and subsequent publication. The jihadist is a practitioner of verses of the Qur’an, by his belief and standards, directly exercising the divine command by God’s words.41 Being alive in our contemporary times is a punishment, with the wishful dream to fight alongside the prophet. This dream, this imagined world, is shared within the jihadist and especially the salafist spectrum42 that seek to re-enact the 39 40 41

42

Al-Manhajjiyya fi tahsil al-khibra al-i’lamiyya, first part, 18. This ideological handbook is part of a lengthy series sanctioning the media work in general, published by the media groups Markaz al-Yaqin and al-Furqan in May 2011. Ibid. As the German jihadist Abu Adam states in the video “Boden der Ehre, part 1” (Waziristan, March 2010), the Mujahideen are “practitioners of the verses” of the Qur’an, unlike most Muslims. Therefore, most Muslims dwell in the unchanged status of sin, particularly the diaspora in western countries while the Mujahideen have by their contribution to jihad and by undertaking the emigration (hijra) ‘cleansed’ themselves of such sin and neglect. For example Abu Abdullah, “Wahre Männer”, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXoEJE2I8e8 (accessed July 5, 2012). In his sermon Abu Abdullah asks, “why

94

lives and deeds of the early Muslims. As such, the historical texts of the Qur’an and Sunna, the recorded acts and deed of prophet Muhammad, are the ultimate playbooks and guidance.

Various Martyr Types as Role Models Particularly within the online spheres the martyr, the martyrdom seeker (or ‘suicide-bomber’; istishhadi) are role models incorporated in all forms of the jihadists’ propaganda. While ‘suicidebombers’ regularly appear within jihadist videos, these operatives must be distinguished, both on a military as well as on an ideological level, from ‘regular’ Mujahideen who are killed on the battlefield, during enemy aerial bombings or as a result of wounds suffered in battle. The Arabic clearly distinguishes between the ‘suicide-bomber’ and the Mujahid who died in battle. The verb ‘istashhada’, however, is also used in jihadist statements and declarations when leaders or highranking members are killed, thus receiving the status of a shahid, bearing witness to jihadist-Islamic principles;

but

unlike

those

who

conduct

an

‘amaliyyat

al-istishhadiyya

(suicide

bombing/martyrdom operation) the shahada was attained passively. Both terms (isthishhadi and shahid) must be further analyzed for a proper and correct understanding of the jihadist mindset and the jihadist language43 within the boundaries of the legal declarations of the legitimacy of the ‘alistishhadiyya operations’. The Mujahid as well as the Mujahid who decides to undertake such an operation, henceforth termed the isthishhadi, are both wandering on the “path of God” (fi sabili lllah) in hope of attaining the shahada by good deeds. The shahada is the Islamic creed, the confession “there is no God but God and Muhammad is His messenger.” Thus, to attain the shahada in jihadist speak has a greater meaning of one’s readiness to sacrifice all possible worldly goods for God – including one’s own life and to pass on to the afterlife (the shahid is not dead, only in this world). Hence the statements are often introduced by Qur’an 3:169: Think not of those, who are slain in the path of God, as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, they are bestowed with provision.44

43

44

are we not bestowed by God with the honor of living together with the prophet” as his companions had? “To spread the message, to fight with the prophet, to protect Islam, real men are needed (…). They are the most truthful men to have ever lived, the companions of the prophet, who gave their life for God.” Western media outlets are always quick to simply use the term “martyr” for both, the fallen Mujahid as well as the ‘suicide-bomber’. Arabic jihadist sources, however, provide a multitude of writings, emphasizing each term by historical and religious accounts. Simply translating both Arabic terms as “martyr” neglects the comprehensive meaning of these terms and does not acknowledge the deeply rooted ideological concepts that are fundamental to understand the motivation and determination of both the shahid as well as the istishhadi. All following verses of the Quran are quotations of: Muhammad A. S. Abdel-Haleem, The Qurʾan (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004).

95

This mindset is further sanctioned by citing Qur’an 2:154, to back up the above statement: Do not say that those who are killed in God’s cause are dead; they are alive, though you do not realize it.45 The stories of martyrs enable the narrator to present the individual as a ‘true’ Muslim who indeed lived, fought, and sacrificed for implantation of the divine definition as set in Qur’an, 3:146 to widen the conviction of “being alive with God” in the afterlife: Many prophets have fought, with large bands of godly men alongside them who, in the face of their suffering for God’s cause, did not lose heart or weaken or surrender: God loves those who are steadfast.46 The jihadi, in his self-perception, is part of “bands of godly men” and as such have remained steadfast, reluctant of their own safety or lives. Furthermore, the jihadist sources emphasize that individual believers are expected to have “spent” their lives and their wealth “on the path of God”. Qur’an 9:111 is cited to provide an alleged theological and judicial framework: God has purchased the persons and possessions of the believers in return for the Garden – they fight in God’s way: they kill and are killed – this is a true promise given by Him in the Torah, the Gospel, and the Qur’an. Who could be more faithful to his promise than God? So be happy with the bargain you have made: that is the supreme triumph.47

The New Martyrs of the Internet – the Death of AQ’s Second-in-Command, Abu Yahya alLibi, Eulogized by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The majority of the martyr biographies or tales in general are about ‘regular’ Mujahideen, martyrdom operatives, recently also about media activists, and describe leaders or more high ranking individuals of all types. The biographical elements have commonalities as outlined but the 45 46 47

See for example Mu’awiyya al-Qahtani, “The Biography of the Hero Abu Talha al-Ansari”, Mu’assasat al-Mas’ada al-I’lamiyya, 2012. Ibid. For a contextual reading, Nico Prucha, “Abdallah ‘Azzam's outlook for Jihad in 1988 – “Al-Jihad between Kabul and Jerusalem””, Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010, http://www.rieas.gr/images/nicos2.pdf.

96

emphasis iis more preecise when the central or main leaadership eu ulogizes higgh-ranking individuals. i . When leadders eulogizze fellow leaders, the ddepth of thee ideology expressed e w weighs heav vier, for thee slain leadeer remains a role model and a leadder by his leegacy. Perhaps the mosst active rolle model off such a slain leader is to t date Abu u Mus’ab all-Zarqawi, the t Jordaniaan leader off the first geeneration off al-Qa’ida iin Iraq. He has – long after his de ath – reemeerged in thee Syrian civi vil war wherre he servess as a role model to the AQ-linked jihaddi battalion ns who re-stage and re-enact al-Zarqawi’ss a ideological paradiggm to sancttion attackss in generall. Martyred d leaders onn operational patterns and the Interneet remain allive for theeir speechess, statementts, writings, and actionns in generral are usedd over and oover again too frame theem as ultimaate role models. As seeen in the piccture below w, publishedd in July 2013, al-Zarqaawi’s modu us operandii from Iraq as well as his legacy ffor the Iraq qi al-Qa’idaa departmentt, known ass the “Islam mic State of Iraq” is refflected today y in Syria. T The picturee, posted onn Twitter by @omarz7, enforces th he meaning of al-Zarqaawi, which is strengtheened after th he “Islamicc State of Iraaq” declareed its extenssion into Syyria, hence being renam med to the “Islamic State of Iraqq AQ publish and Syria””. Shortly before this declaration, d hed pictures of the “shhaykh al-M Mujahid Abuu Mus’ab al--Zarqawi – may m God reeceive him – training camp.”48

with less so o religious authoritativve qualities while Abuu Al-Zarqqawi had beeen a militaary leader w Yahya al-L Libi was a fully f comm mitted religioous ideolog gue, the autthor of a wi wide range of o extremistt books and regularly appeared a in n as-Sahab videos as a preacher. In a messaage broadcaast by AQ’ss notorious aas-Sahab media m foundaation in Sepptember 2012, Ayman al-Zawahirri eulogized d the killingg of his com mrade and second-in-ccommand A Abu Yahyaa al-Libi.

49 9

Al-Libi, w whose real name wass

confirmed after his death d by Ay yman al-Zaawahiri as Hasan H Muh hammad Qaa’id, killed in a dronee strike in Pakistan in June J 2012.50 The deathh of al-Libi is a great loss l for he had been a productivee writer and somewhat of one of th he remaininng faces of as-Sahab. a His H comprisiing writingss are hostedd 48

49 50

Ibn al-raafidayn (@om marz7), #al-d dawlat_al-Islam miyya_fi_Iraq q_wa-l Sham #al-sham m mu’askar Abu u Mus’ab al-Zarqawi – taqaballahu l-llah, https://tw witter.com/omaarz7/status/3575672593397792385/photo//1 (accessed Ju uly 17, 2013).. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Asad al-‘illm wa-l-jihaad Abu Yah hya al-Libi”, as-Sahab M Media, Septeember 2012,, http://archhive.org/detaiils/Nosr.A (acccessed Septem mber 2, 2013).. Bill Roggio, “Abu Yaahya al-Libi killed in lat atest drone sttrike, US offficials say”, The Long War Journal,, http://ww ww.longwarjouurnal.org/archives/2012/06//abu_yahya_al_libi_ru.php (accessed Junne 5, 2012).

97

on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s website tawheed.ws next to the prominence of jihadist scholars such as Osama Bin Laden, ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, Sayyid Qutb, and many others.51 Thus, al-Zawahiri elaborates on the role of al-Libi as a missionary worker for Islam (da’i) who was committed to “incite the umma” (tahrid) even more so after his episode of torture in the U.S. military prison in Baghram, Afghanistan.52 Abu Yahya al-Libi’s importance to the AQ leadership and al-Zawahiri in particular, is perhaps further evident as al-Zawahiri wrote an apprising introduction (taqdim) for al-Libi’s mainframe on dealing with Muslim spies, the “Guidance regarding the Ruling on Muslim Spies.”53 Abu Yahya alLibi’s mainframe to operationalize shari’a Law for jihadist groups was widely read and implemented by groups such as the Somali based Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen who sanction the execution of alleged spies in propaganda videos54 and ideologues in AQ’s Yemeni department such as Harith bin Ghazi al-Nazzari, warning imprisoned Muslims to interact with their captors and thus be ‘turned’ into spying on their brothers.55 Al-Libi’s Guidance, or tutorial to use a modern translation of “teacher”, mu’allim, has the intention to be a pragmatic handbook for jihadi groups worldwide. The central question revolves around the shari’a law permissibility to execute spies. As spies pose the greatest threat, the modernday spy craft consists of submitting credible and vital military graded intelligence to the main combatant, the United States of America. In most cases such information results in the death of jihadists as well as theologians and ideologues as a result of an aerial bombardment of meeting places, safe houses, or while travelling. In other cases, the intelligence submitted by spies among the Mujahideen enables Special Forces to arrest high-value-targets with the ambition to gain further information. Prior to his eulogy of al-Libi, al-Zawahiri emphasized the ideological as well as the operational value in general and his handbook in particular. Grading this work as “judicial knowledge” (al-i’lmiyya al-fiqhiyya) and by equating his 149 page long writing as a fatwa, a legal 51 52

53 54

55

“The folder of Abu Yahya al-Libi”, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, http://tawhed.ws/a?a=hv5znv47, (accessed June 14, 2013). Al-Libi had managed to escape with three comrades and talked extensively about the escape and the torture in asSahab videos. Parts of the videos are re-used for al-Zawahiri’s eulogy, “Asad al-‘ilm wa-l-jihad Abu Yahya al-Libi”, as-Sahab Media, September 2012. Abu Yahya al-Libi, “Al-Mu’allim fi hukm al-jasus al-muslim”, Markaz al-Fajr li-l i’lam, 2009, http://www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=y34deswq, February 2012. The Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen in late 2008 published a video entitled “Iqama hukm allah ‘ala jasusayn”, the “implementation of the rule of God on two spies” whereas in the video al-Libi’s book is shown, quoted and the ultimate framework to execute two alleged Muslim spies who are shot. His alleged real name is offered as Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Murshidi as stated in: Harith bin Ghazi alNazzari, al-Wajiz fi ahkam al-asir al-Muslim, al-Malahem, 2012. His first name is misspelled as al-Harith. In an audio speech by al-Nazzari showing filmed sequences to commemorate ‘Adal al-‘Abab, a high level AQAP ideologue, who was killed in Yemen issues his name properly. Fi ritha’ al-shaykh ‘Adal ‘Abab, al-Malahem media, March 6, 2013, http://as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?p=501318. The subchapter “Warning of ridda: The danger of becoming a kafir in prison” in al-Nazzari’s writing in this context is of particular interest.

98

decree valid for all Muslims, al-Zawahiri further praises al-Libi who had migrated (hajir), embedding himself spiritually and physically-military (rabit), conducting the jihad since the communist rule over Afghanistan [in the 1980s]. Since that time his commitment for jihad and the Mujahideen has never been revoked. Not even during his time in capture in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the prisons of the crusaders and their henchmen; he was – by the kindness (munna)56 of God – rescued from imprisonment57 despite his aforementioned captors and then rejoined the fields of jihad and military preparation (ali’dad). He then became the companion of the commander [Abu] al-Layth, the martyr – as we reckon him to be – Abu’ l-Layth al-Libi – may God have mercy on him – who was assassinated by an American missile [fired by an unmanned drone] based on the treason of spies and the deception of the hypocrites (al-munafiqeen). Shaykh Abu Yahya in this time did not eat and was tirelessly seeking knowledge,58 studying and lecturing, and sought further knowledge by travelling to Mauretania to master lingual and juridical topics being instructed by the best of the masters59 in the field.60 The death of al-Libi in 2012 and the eulogy by al-Zawahiri published in September of the same year provide an interesting insight into the overall concept of “martyrdom” by AQ’s leader. For alZawahiri’s perception of the martyrdom of al-Libi is focused on the latters work and contribution to the media field, the tutoring and lecturing of Muslims worldwide while having been a field commander as well. Thus, one may argue, al-Libi had been a ‘hybrid’ whose martyr story comprises both elements and is as such of great value to the jihadi propaganda online as al-Libi is a role model having professed his faith online and in the real world. His legacy online, consisting of various writings and videos, remains.

56 57 58

59 60

Interestingly, Ayman al-Zawahiri uses the term munna (grace, kindness) that in the context of the overall theme of prisoners is often used in relation to the Qur’an. A reference to the U.S. military prison Baghram, Afghanistan. Talab al-‘ilm is a reference with historical and traditional connotation to those who seek to gain knowledge and understanding in religious practice and manners. It is a honorary and obligatory determination to actively seek knowledge on the proper orthopraxis and conduct of religious parameters for worldly circumstances. Al-Zawahiri uses the term fursan, referring to “knights” or, as loosely translated in this context, “masters”. Fursan has an implicit connation referring to the brave, fearless men who sacrifice everything for their creed. Introduction by Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Abu Yahya al-Libi, al-Mu’lim fi hukm al-jasus al-Muslim (Markaz al-Fajr li-l i’lam 2009), 4-5.

99

For, accordding to Abuu Yahya al-L Libi who apppears in his own eulogy y describingg martyrdom m, the acccounts of thee Islamic crreed (shahadda) and the martyrs (sh huhada’) is an narration about lifee andd being alivee (a’hiyya),,61 not about ut leading a bad b and unh happy life.622 For the Mu Mujahid is frramed as an n individuall loyal to God G in this and the nexxt life whereas in thiss world he thhus is part of o the group p the most pious and rightly r guided believerrs, being som meone whoo pursues deeath to be alive. For thee reward of ones God will w compen nsate for deeeds in this world w in thee next as outtlined in selective readiing of versees of the Qu ur’an by extrremist’ interrpretation, for people desiire life, fearrful of deathh, while the shahid pursues death ddemanding life.63 d in his euloogy for Abu u Yahya al-L Libi, his As Ayman al-Zawahirri elaborated attaained martyyrdom will raise r the atttention of th he people to his writinngs and his missionaryy worrk to propaagate Islam,, God willinng. For thee shahada professes p thhe words off life as thee twoo martyrs – as we deem them to be – Sayyiid Qutb and d ‘Abdallahh ‘Azzam – may Godd havve mercy wiith them botth – [have pproven]. Thiis is exactlyy what Ameerica cannott cope with,, who definee the Mujahhideen and AQ A as theirr prim mary enem my; for they are ignoraant of the reality r that AQ is mere rely a message for thee Muuslim ummaa to strive, struggle, reesist, and to o fight the foreign f Cruusader-Zioniist injusticee

61

62 63

Followingg a typical jihhadist rhetoricc, sentiments and key word ds of the Qur’’an are emplooyed to boos their t frame off referencee. “Being alivee” is a referen nce to Qur’ann 3:169 conno oting that the martyrs are ““alive with theeir Lord, theyy are bestow wed with provvision.” Abu Yahyya al-Libi in his own word ds; Ayman al--Zawahiri, “A Asad al-‘ilm wa-l-jihad w Abuu Yahya al-Lib bi”, as-Sahabb Media, Seeptember 2012. Ayman all-Zawahiri, “A Asad al-‘ilm wa-l-jihad w Abuu Yahya al-Lib bi”, as-Sahab Media, Septeember 2012.

100

and the corruption (fasad64) inside [our countries]; for the attained martyrdom of the Mujahideen of AQ and the leadership only emphasizes the sincerity and promotes the message of AQ, for whenever our blood is shed for the sake of our articles of faith (‘aqida), our words become alive among our umma. Whenever the martyrs fall, the da’wa .

(propagation of Islam) of jihad is filled with life.65 The message or the comprising narration by AQ is mainly alive on the Internet where the martyrs and their stories remain present. Even if the use of the Internet was in the beginning of the early days of jihadism online a unique phenomenon with limited actors, it is nowadays unthinkable that most individuals who subscribed to AQ’s worldview would not have profiles online or would be ignorant of the Internet and the jihadist forums and social media channels. As al-Zawahiri further outlines, the Internet is the safest zone for AQ’s message, independent of the slain leaders, activists, or fighters in general. For by these lies the Americans are deceived [by their own leadership] that the war against terror would be won against AQ by killing this or that person. It eludes their perception of reality and of their defeat in Iraq, and the coming defeat in Afghanistan. They have lost in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and they miss the point that AQ has indeed divided its real tasks into various parts, consisting of the incitement of the umma (tahrid). This is an omen of the defeat of America, God willing.66 For the extrajudicial execution of AQ personnel in general by drones and by other means, has no effect or impact on preventing the jihadist incitement of mainly Arab Muslims especially in the wake of the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Al-Zawahiri re-emphasizes the hybrid role of martyrs, who first of all have fulfilled their part either way in this world and are mediatized on the Internet for their postume fame, that our martyrs will enhance the message of jihad by greatest means possible, spreading and presenting this message as firm as a wall, for we are killed for our da’wa to be alive.67

64

65 66 67

The term fasad is taken from the Qur’an but used by jihadists in the modern meaning for “corruption”. By exploiting this as a main slogan, jihadists seek to further position themselves as righteous people who, just like any average Arab, are victims of the “interior corruption”, referring to the widespread nepotism of Arab dictators. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Asad al-‘ilm wa-l-jihad Abu Yahya al-Libi”, as-Sahab Media, September 2012. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Asad al-‘ilm wa-l-jihad Abu Yahya al-Libi”, as-Sahab Media, September 2012. ibid.

101

Elements of the Tales of the Martyrs The biographical literal stories often have a hagiographic character including divine miracle tales (karamat) that are very popular and regularly visualized in the visual productions with all technical means at hand. Elements such as the karamat are used to engulf and encapsulate the audience by telling the tales of “gracious wonders”, “miracles” or “thaumaturgic” occasions. Such karamat, whereas a Mujahid experienced a miracle by God while fighting on His path, are summarize how a Muslim can further draw a line of demarcation to ‘passive’ believers by joining the jihad. Such ‘acts of God that emanate at the hand of creation’ are of course reserved only for the Mujahideen in the literature genre of jihad while one may argue that God shows signs of approvals, expressed by miracles, to confirm the righteousness of those wandering on His path, fulfilling their promise to Him (as frequently stated). The visual cult suggests that anyone can be special and receive such karamat with the guarantee of being made famous. Ironically, as the jihadist despises Sufism, karamat are essential in the sufists’ spiritual notion. As jihad is a method and a place of veneration, those who die as a shahid – for example – are subjected to unnatural conditions as their bodies smell like musk68 and do not decompose. As ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam wrote extensively about killed Mujahideen in Afghanistan, he easily recalls several examples in his last known sermon in 1988 held in Seattle, U.S.A,69 to underline the karamat for the killed before he refers to karamat experienced by fighters who under normal and logical circumstances would have been killed, however, wondrously survived unharmed! Their clothes are burned, but their bodies remain untouched, unharmed, non-violated and thus pious and pure. Furthermore, the karamat continue in the sermon as ‘Azzam asks how many of the youth have entered battles and their clothes had been burned, and not one of them had been injured. The heroic epics, ongoing primarily in the online jihad propaganda of AQ today, had already been popular and fascinating in the modern sense of the jihad in Afghanistan. One, his name was Ahmad Banna from the leadership circle of Ahmad Shah Mas’ud, 68

69

See also Eli Alsheech (2008) who states that the texts of Hamas” commonly state that the martyrs’ corpses, gravesites, and personal belonging emit the scent of musk, a fragrance that the Qur’ān associates with Paradise and that the Islamic tradition (hadith) considers a proof that a martyr was accepted by God.” Die Welt des Islams 48, 3536. In reference the hadith was related: “No-one is wounded in the Path of God, and God knows best who is wounded in His Path, except that he will come on the Day of Resurrection with his wounds spurting blood. Its colour will be like the color of blood and its smell will be that of musk” (al-Bukhari, Book 7, No. 441). ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, “al-Jihad bayna Kabul wa-Bayt al-Maqdis”, video, Seattle, U.S.A., 1988.

102

approximated that about 30 of the youth destroyed about 500 tanks in eight years. Najeeb70 – the president of the state – send him [a note]: “O Banna, reduce your attacks and we will give you what you want. You know that we have your brother imprisoned, we will kill him if you continue to attack our tanks.” This Ahmad Banna read a hadith “in the name of God” (who says at the time of the morning “in the name of God,” who does not lead anything on earth or in heaven by His name astray, for He is the all-hearing and all-knowing). Banna as a matter of fact believed that no bullet can injure him, as long as he recited this hadith three times.71 He took autobuses and public transports [i.e. minibuses and shared taxis] on the Highway where the Russians had set up checkpoints and unarmed watch points. Banna’s picture was distributed among the Russians who named him General Banna. As one of the Russian soldiers spotted him and said “Banna!”, fear overcame him. An Arab youth told me: “By God, the weapons slipped out of the hand of the Russians who were at the checkpoint while Ahmad fended them off unarmed, jumping out of the car, and coming under machinegun fire. Only his clothes were burned. He was not wounded, not even a scratch. The attention is focused on the karamat that could be understood as a reward by God in this world, just as ‘Azzam continues with two, perhaps at best termed paranormal, stories from the battlefields of Afghanistan, where he attributes karamat to individual Mujahideen during battle or when under fire. Following a classical-historical line of classical Arabic texts, ‘Azzam re-enacts the hadith by copying its rhetorical style: I said to Abu Hafz al-Urduni before he was ‘martyred’ and returned from the Russian border, I said to him: “Tell me about the karamat, that you have seen.” He said: “O shaykh ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam you are relating [stories] of the karamat, but you surely won’t believe this karamat I will now tell you.” I said: “Tell me.” He said: “We had been at battle and a RPG72 was fired at the Afghan Mujahids. Such a RPG is capable to destroy a tank of 46 tons and just burned his clothes. He wasn’t wounded by the RPG that can destroy a tank like a rocket, perforating up to 17 cm of steel, wasn’t able to penetrate one cm of his flesh.” I said to the leader in Qandahar: “ya fulan73” he and his aide had been shaykh Siyyaf, who was 70 71

72 73

Muhammad Najeebullah In some regards, Voodoo witchcraft in Africa is being used to make soldiers “bulletproof”. Rituals are replaced by the mere fact of reciting a hadith or just participating in jihad. It may be, that the firm belief in God’s aid and guidance leads to high-risk actions that are, if survived, particularly unharmed, defined and termed as “miracles” for the individual Mujahid. Rocket Propelled Grenade – primarily a shoulder fired anti-tank weapon. Ya fulan, “o someone”, a stranger who is being addressed. This is quite common for the hadith where strangers and

103

sitting with him, said to him: “ya fulan, tell me about the karamat you have seen.” He said: “One guy, I think his name was Yar Muhammad, one of the Mujahideen, once had an airplane flying over him. Therefore, he threw himself onto the ground and placed his weapon underneath his stomach. The aircraft fired a missile at him but only hit him on his back. His weapon underneath his stomach was broken while his back was not harmed. Individual Mujahideen, from all over the world, are at least postum by written and audiovisual biographical descriptions made famous by their clear name, their actions and operations. In all of the available materials, ranging from digitalized content from the 1980s Jihad against the Red Army in Afghanistan, to the 1990s Balkan Wars, and in particular the peak of digital primary content from 2003 onward from Iraq and as of writing (2013) Syria, a similar reasoning, iconography and rhetoric is used on a coherent basis while new videos and writings from Somalia, Chechnya, Turkistan (West China), Palestine, Egypt, and many other zones of conflict with jihadist actors stir ‘the big picture’.74 The shahada is at the center of jihadist motivation, for every single deed is undertaken only for God and the religion of “Islam”, with the black banner representing mainly the Islamic creed in the militants’ mindset. The black banner is sometimes complemented75 by allahu akbar and ihda l-husnayyin, a reference to Qur’an 9:52, Say, ‘Do you expect something other than one of the two best things (ihda l-husnayyin) to happen to us?’ This is a popular slogan for jihadist groups, who refer to “one of the two glorious things” as either being victorious or attaining the shahada. Therefore, the Mujahid only anticipates in this world to be victorious, to remain alive and establish an Islamic state and the Caliphate in the long term, or to

74

75

unknown (mostly) men addressed Muhammad with questions. This sentiment was further elaborated in a speech by Ayman al-Zawahiri, September 2012, claiming the rise of alQa’ida as a movement is unstoppable as the umma has awakened worldwide; Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Asad al-‘ilm wal-jihad Abu Yahya al-Libi”, as-Sahab Media, September 2012. This also highlights the authority of Arabic for jihadist groups on a global scale, as the Qur’an was revealed in Arabic, the “speech of God” (kalimat allah) can truly only be repeated by the Arabic speaking believers. For an implementation of the above described complemented black banner, see the documentary “Terror in Moscow”, 12 May 2003, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0383669/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1. A troop of Chechen Mujahideen had taken several hundred theater visitors hostage what become known as the “Nord Ost Theater Siege”. The documentary collected the speechs and demands made by the Chechen Mujahideen showing the black banner with the reference to the Qur’an; this is an element that has since gained a momentum within the jihadist main frame. Oftentimes non-Arabs jihadi ideologues seek the use of Arabic to boost their standing and gain respect, as detailed in, Nico Prucha, “Die Vermittlung arabischer Jihadisten-Ideologie: Zur Rolle deutscher Aktivisten,” in Guido Steinberg (ed.), Jihadismus und Internet: Eine deutsche Perspektive, SWP, October 2012, 45-56, http://www.swpberlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-studien-de/swp-studien-detail/article/jihadismus_und_internet.html.

104

be killed “on the path of God.” Death is thus the most fundamental part of the shahada, to attest the outmost possible for God and for Islam, being rewarded by entry to paradise in the perception by the jihadists.76 This is also referenced by the Qur’anic word al-husaynayn (“one of the two most beautiful deeds”), namely dying on the battlefield as a shahid, thus entering paradise (al-janna), or remaining in this world victorious (nasr), implementing and enforcing shari’a-law principles. The powerful message is conveyed by the dead, the mostly martyred men, who draw on a culture of fandom and whose biographies keep them alive on the Internet for – it seems – eternity. The in parts comprising biographical stories are a literal genre of the greater corpus of the jihadist literature and are essential for the video-culture of jihadist films and audiovisual productions. This jihadi literature genre, however, has become inseparable from the audiovisual tracks that populate and roam the Internet, where a jihadi subculture of fandom and admiration deem it a divine command to be not only be passive consumers, but rather also active publishers of ‘user-generated-content’ or simple re-disseminators.77 The multi-lingual pop-cultural jihadi agitprop media departments and pro-active sympathizers complement one another. While ‘official’ media departments issue written tales of individual martyrs and also publish professional made videos, the media activists can choose the most appealing elements and retell or re-disseminate such stories, in either written or visual narrated form. The pop-cultural aspects expressed on the Internet are not confined or exclusive to traditional symbols or icons, but are in fact in parts a mirror of our global pop-culture in general. Jihadists sometimes use Hollywood movie posters or well-known popular icons from the movie culture in their own context to promote their slogans and frame of reference.

76 77

For a precise analysis of this slogan in the context of the Saudi Arabian al-Qa’ida branch, see Nico Prucha, Die Stimme des Dschihad “Sawt al-gihad”: al-Qa’idas erstes Online-Magazin (Hamburg: Verlag Dr.Kovač 2010), 39. The work of such media activists who either reproduce or mash up jihadist propaganda online has been sanctioned and approved especially since Osama bin Laden’s death in 2011. As outlined in the text of Abu Yahya al-Libi, “Risala ila l-ikhwa fi thaghr al-i’lam al-jihadiyyi”, Nukhbat al-I’lam al-Jihadiyyi, August 11, 2013, http://justpaste.it/3djs; or the paper by Abu Sa’d al-‘Amili, “nida’ ila junud al-i’lami al-jihadi – ilzamu amakanukum wa-‘udu ila thughurikum”, Fursan al-Balagh al-I’lam, March 2013, retrievable at http://www.jihadica.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/stay.pdf. For an introduction to the jihadist presence on Twitter as well as the social-media strategy deployed since the outbreak of violence in Syria: Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Jihadi Twitter Activism – Introduction”, Jihadica, April 27, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/jihadi-twitter-activism-introduction/.

105

G by Abu Talha al-Almani published on the Shuumukh al-Islam78 Germ man In a naasheed in German section in S September 2013. 2 This pop-cultura p al ‘override’’ of Hollywo ood-producctions is quite visible ass the decaying bbody in the picture p in th he jihadist m mindset represents a Muslim M who sold the heereafter (akhhira) for this woorld (dunyaa) thus rottting in helll like a Ho ollywood Zo ombie. Thee “Zombie”” in the piccture advertisingg the nasheeed is stolen from the suuccessful AMC’s A “Thee Walking D Dead” seriess79 that is baased on the origginal comicc series created by Roobert Kirkm man.80 Abu Talha al-Allmani is prresumed havving joined a jihhadist groupp in Syria, who, w accordding to jihad dist sympath hizers on Tw witter wass one of thee most famo ous rap singger in Germ many, know wn as Deso D Dogg. He embraced e Isslam andd his name became Ab bu Malik wiith his nick kname “Abu u Talha al-A Almani”. He left Germ many for today he iss [among] th he rows of th the Mujahid deen in Syriaa.81

heological making m of tthe “media a shahid” Intersectioons – the th AQ hass establishedd a worldviiew and a fframe of reeference, pro oviding com mfort and order o to thee chaos of llife, which is aggressiively and oopenly adveertised on all levels oof the Interrnet. In thee meantime, the jihadistts themselv ves term thiss as an “opeen source jiihad.” This “open source jihad” iss conducted by media workers either e embeedded with actual reaal-life Mujaahidin in th he field orr supportingg sympathizees, who ediit, layout annd make new w materials available oonline in a professional p l 78 79 80 81

Abu Dujaana al-Maqdissi. “GIMF: Du unya Nasheedd Abu Talha all-Almani”, Sh habakat Shumuukh al-Islam, September 2,, 2013, httpps://shamikh11.info/vb/show wthread.php?t= =210773. The homeepage of the AMC A TV Statiion advertisinng “The Walkiing Dead”, http://www.amct ctv.com/showss/the-walking-dead. “The Wallking Dead” on o ComicVine, http://www.ccomicvine.com m/the-walking g-dead/4050-118166/. Nico Pruccha. “Who Leet the Dog out? A note on thhe German sid de of “jihadism m””, Jihadica,, August 27, 2013, 2 http://ww ww.jihadica.coom/who-let-thee-dog-out-a-nnote-on-the-geerman-side-of--%E2%80%9C Cjihadism%E E2%80%9D/.

106

manner are nevertheless the extension of the Kalashnikov of the ‘classical’ Mujahid, fighting on “the path of God.” “Open source jihad”, however, calls not only to become a part of AQ on a media level, but to conduct ‘lone wolf’ or ‘single cell’ attacks by all means, attempting to reach in particular disgruntled Muslims living in the west. As the Yemeni English language magazine “Inspire” defines “Open Source Jihad [as] (…) a resource manual for those who loathe the tyrants; includes bomb making techniques, security measures, guerrilla tactics, weapons training and all other jihād related activities. o Informal: A disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations: The open source jihād is America’s worst nightmare. o It allows Muslims to train at home instead of risking a dangerous travel abroad: Look no further, the open source jihād is now at hands reach.82 By establishing and maintaining a coherent presence on the Internet, AQ and affiliate groups and branches have achieved and proven being resilient, even if the situation of the actual group may be dire or stretched thin due to the constant threat of unmanned drones or counter-terrorist operations. The intersection of offline acts and online visualization of these purported legitimate defensive and moral justified actions construe and fertilize the jihadists’ frame of reference and the motivations that have consequently led to both individual and as well as collective actions. While the question, however, is always about how ‘Weltanschauung’ and ‘ideologies’ translate into individual perception and interpretation, and how the acts of individuals are affected,83 the jihadist media groups and battalions are in place to enforce guidance and to reproduce not only high-ranking ideologues but rather portray common fighters or suicide-bombers as much as renown jihadist figures. The written and filmed statements of jihadist groups are given credibility by their social context (…) [and] the power of performative speech – vows and christenings – is rooted in social reality and is given currency by the laws and

82

83

This page has so far appeared in all six editions of the magazine, except the third, special, edition (November 1431 / 2010), marking the special section open source jihad. Edition 1, p. 32; edition 2, p. 52; edition 4, p. 23; edition 5, p. 23; edition 6, p. 36. Sönke Neitzel, Harald Welzer, Soldaten – Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben (S. Fischer Verlag: Frankfurt am Main 2011), 17.

107

customs that stand behind it.84 With its massive and immense online presence, consisting of both videos and comprising writings, jihadist materials seek to incite and inspire (tahrid) violence by its assumed religious-authoritative role, whereas the only “true believer” is the one fighting for ones creed (iman) and religion (din) based on the jihadist methodology of faith (manhaj).85 This methodology of faith has its slogans that are easy to comprehend and repeat while providing the clear cut framing of individual as well as collective actions. As Arabic is the most important language for Muslims, and deployed as well by non-Arab Muslim scholars in general, specific terms expressing the methodology of faith are stated in Arabic and are oftentimes a reference to the Qur’an. By using singular words or short phrases like the Islamic creed, “there is no God but God and Muhammad is His messenger”, the jihadists seek to hijack Islam exclusively for their cause and interpretation, with the ambition of drawing the consumer into their virtual ‘network of knowledge’ to further the understanding of this ideology that in the past years has covered more and more niches. In combination with the assumed position of AQ ideologues and the pertaining countless pseudo-scholarly writings, ideologues as well as ‘regular’ fighters or “martyrdom operatives” in the propaganda serve as guides for the consumers, leading them further into this online milieu of jihadism. By citing renowned jihadist figures or scholars the individual actor of jihadist videos relays the ideology in their corresponding dialect, language or emphasis, enabling the audience to read and expand their knowledge within the virtual worlds where countless religious writings and essays by historical as well as contemporary jihadi scholars can be easily accessed. These religious authoritative writings serve as the backbone and as the intellectual motivation that find its expression by mostly male actors86 in the audiovisual propaganda – who openly address the audience with details of their motivation to conduct, for example, “martyrdom operations” or who had filmed their testimony (wasiyya) in case of being killed in ‘regular’ combat. The videos are the intersection of online and offline worlds. These main ideological writings and especially the movies of jihad are offered sometimes on a daily basis within the dwellings of the jihadi virtual by various groups worldwide – including regular 84

85

86

Juergensmeyer references Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Harvard University Press: Cambridge 1991); Mark Juergensmeyer, “Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence”, Comparative Studies in Religion and Society (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles 2000), 127. Jihadists are fighting in a cosmological war between “truth” (haqq) and “falsehood” (batil), where the latter is a violation of fundamental principles such as the “unity/oneness of God” (tawhid). Nico Prucha, “Notes on the Jihadists’ motivation for suicide-operations”, http://www.univie.ac.at/jihadism/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/Prucha_1.pdf, 60-62. Most portrayed Jihadists by videos and biographical stories are men or young males in general. Female martyr and correspondingly biographies exist, for example: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, “Min qisas al-batula wa-l-fida’, alistishhadiyyat ‘arafna al-dukhula ila l-hayyat”, http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/feda/2004/isteshhadeat.htm (accessed March 8, 2006).

108

publications that are dominantly Arabic- and Urdu-language movies, ranging from Afghanistan to Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq but also filmed statements and clips from the Caucasus and elsewhere. As a recent phenomenon, pro-jihadist but apparently non-militant groups, usually termed by western media as “salafists”, openly demonstrate in western cities using the same iconography and slang of militant jihadists movements, with local language jihad propaganda at hand and crafting new files to the overall corpus. Arabic core files, writings, and the authoritative use of specific symbols are thus in a localized context and a local language used in a repetitive manner. This creates a coherent identity and group cohesion, whereas individuals receive guidance and can strengthen their notion of belonging within this community. According to Anthony Cohen, people construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity.87 Subsequently, a specific religious habitus is propagated as a audio-visual frame of reference that includes vital cornerstones of an ideology put into action with the perception of fighting for both justice and defense. The intersection of real-life and online, virtual worlds – accessible for anyone unlike the real-life scenarios, lead to questioning the effects of the accessibility to the jihadist propaganda for consumers sometimes thousands of miles away. But in close emotional, spiritual and politicized proximity with the fear, anger and cognition of being ‘persecuted’ because of ones faith and one’s identity as “Muslim.” Thus, it would be deceptive to perceive the intention as well as the desired effects of radicalizing and inspiring the audience as a singular process. By studying and monitoring the written and filmed jihadist online propaganda, one must also find an understanding of online practices and spaces not as distinct and isolated pursuits, but as closely linked with the everyday and offline milieu.88 The jihadist online territories on the Internet are public spaces, which on a first glimpse may seem to be a pure online feature, a fantasy. However, these online territories are a variety of intersections between the online and the offline. This includes virtual spaces that

87 88

Anthony Cohen. The Symbolic Construction of Community (London: Tavistock 1985), 118. Miyase Christensen, André Jansson et.al.: Online Territories – Globalization, Mediated Practice and Social Space (Peter Lang Publishing: New York 2011), 2.

109

are anchored offline, o or extensions e oof online en ntities, as well w as thosee social terrritories thatt mayy emerge when w onlinee activities aare “lived out” o or re-enacted in oother parts of o everydayy lifee.89 Militancy is openly propagated p as an indiividual obliigation (farrd ‘ayn) inn times of occupation o and exploitatioon of Islamiic territoriess by non-M Muslim enem mies. The jiihadist com mmunity, ph hysical and also virtually, eexercised inndividually or o in small groups, is a collectivee united by the absolutte convictioon of being the vvictims of a global conspiracy agaainst Islam and a in need of stars andd heroes fraamed as the sole and legitim mate defendders. The sellf-perceptioon of the jihadi is essen ntially aboutt the firm co onviction being part of thee “soldiers of o God” (ju und allah), w who in theiir death pro ove their loyyalty to Go od. The linees of demarcatioon are clearlly drawn, an ny Mujahidd, any fighteer striving on o the “pathh of God” (ffi sabil l-llahh) is portrayed aand propagaated as a real believer adhering to o the “truth”” (haqq) unnlike those who w have faallen into a statte apostasyy by their ignorance or open lo oyalty to anything deefined by the t jihadistss as “falsehoodd” (batil). Thhis enables AQ as welll as other Jiihadist mov vements that at are ideolo ogically in close c proximity to AQ andd its massive amount of religiou usly authorritative writtings to deefend, sancttion, explain andd justify in short any military m operration. The meedia activistt, who carries mainly the cameraa and not a rifle, is inn particular popular inn the Syrian connflict wheree AQ affiliaates such ass Jabhat al--Nusra prop pagate this rrole model in their viddeos along ‘classsical’ martyyrs.

Media M Mujahideenn such as Ab bu al-Wafa aal-Ansari, whose w clear name is staated as Ahm mad Muhamm mad Baydar, aree eulogizedd as having fulfilled thee jihad bi l--lisan, “by the t tongue””, in the refference to being on the grouund and em mbedded cam meramen annd documen ntary-makers of the opperations off their brothhers. Jabhat al-N Nusra is always keen to promotee its Twitterr handle and d elevates aany media worker of their t

89

Ibid.

110

troop to the status of the ‘regular’ Mujahideen.90

Online Martyrs and Fandom Death Cult The contemporary foundation of using the Internet by jihadist media activists was perhaps crafted by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s “Message to the British and European Peoples and Governments regarding the Explosions in London”, July 2005, where he outlined the Internet as the most important medium to propagate and spread the jihadists demands and frame of reference in general. He referred to “the jihadi elite” residing in Europe to partake in this venture.91 Perhaps the current state of “online jihad” is best described by al-Suri’s vision, with groups such as the Nukhbat al-I’lam al-Jihadi being a direct manifestation of al-Suri’s definition of da’wa and tahrid by all means; most and foremost in Arabic but for a global audience in all languages and sizes. Media groups and battalions of real-life jihadi detachments and groups have fully utilized the Internet as the main capacity of delivering their message to their target audiences, increasingly via the interactive social media.92 Naturally, the Internet functions only due to the human factor, who use intermediary devices such as smartphones, laptops, tablets, and classical stationary computers to feed new content and input in general into the jihadi cloud computing networks. To understand the new landscape of martyred role modes advertised on the Internet, the depth as well as the value of the jihadist media activists must be embedded accordingly. While in some cases these activists are ‘hybrids’, meaning mainly young men engaged in combat and operations with the Mujahideen while conveying the messages from the front lines, others are only active from ‘safe areas’ or zones, sometimes located in far away places but as active – and important – as ‘embedded’ media activists. Especially in the context of the Syrian conflict has the martyred media activists gained a momentum and is celebrated as any regular Mujahid or suicide bomber by his brigade or 90

91 92

In the video, the “raid of Abu ‘l-Wafa al-Ansari”, the attack on the North-Syrian village Khan al-‘Asal is shown where al-Ansara was killed in the wake of filming. In the film an unknown Mujahid eulogizes al-Ansari and tells the story of the successful conquest of the village, underlined by combat-footage and sequences of taking many prisoners of the regular Syrian Army. Al-Manarat al-Bayda’, “raid of Abu ‘l-Wafa al-Ansari”, August 28, 2013, https://shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=210395. Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “66 Important Jihadist Twitter Accounts (Part 2)”, Jihadica, September 4, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/66-important-jihadist-twitter-accounts-part-2/. Nico Prucha and Ali Fisher. “Tweeting for the Caliphate – Twitter as the New Frontier for Jihadist Propaganda”, CTC Sentinel (Westpoint), June 2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tweeting-for-the-caliphate-twitter-as-the-newfrontier-for-jihadist-propaganda.

111

battalion.93 The individual media activists responsible for the daily output of media files are increasingly highlighted and valued as any shahid, for their work has been fully equated and is valued. One case of a ‘hybrid’ is outlined by the martyrdom biography of Mu’awiyya ‘Abd alQahhar Belhajj, who was eulogized by Salah Abu Muhammad, the head of AQIM’s media department al-Andalus in August 2011. Having been a fulltime Mujahid, Belhajj had also been an integral part of AQ’s North African department’s media department and thus serves as a double role model.

The Martyrdom of the Media Mujahid Mu’awiyya ‘Abd al-Qahhar Belhajj Belhajj was killed together with his brother at a checkpoint of the Algerian Army. Salah Abu Muhammad elevated his attainment of martyrdom in his eulogy of Belhajj and his companion. By referencing their death as istishhad, Salah Abu Muhammad seeks to equate their deaths to those who undertake, and thus chose death, in a martyrdom operation styled attack. As the individual Mujahid nevertheless awaits martyrdom on the “path of God”, his life in this world is exclusively based on the expectation to work to elevate the religion of God. For, this world is a corridor not an abode (fa-l-dunya dar mamarr wa-laysat dar maqarr).94 Any individual subscribed to AQ’s worldview strives to venture to the afterlife, seeking reward and re-compensation for his struggle. Thus, the reference istishhad is more commonly used to describe martyrdom in general, independent on the modus operandi of death. [Mu’awiyya] ‘Abd al-Qahhar and his brother Abu Nusayba – may God have mercy with them both – had been killed after being stopped at a security checkpoint. A group of Algerian soldiers and intelligence officers converged on them in an attempt to capture and humiliate them. But by their own free choice, they did not allow this to happen, not wanting to satisfy those of this world in their [misled] religion, not granting any joy to the enemies, they ignited their two explosives vests, thus killing and injuring 15 of the Pharaoh’s soldiers; the two were submitted to the mercy of their Lord, unsoiled, being pure returnees [from the 93

94

See for example this clip from Syria, published on August 20, 2013 on YouTube showing the remains of “the martyr – God willing – of the free media, the hero Muhammad Musallima Abu Halab, martyr for the free media”, August 20, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUqgZF8gpW0. The deceased is seen in what appears to be an improvised morgue while a voice from the off recites Qur’an 3:169. Alshech, E., “Egoistic Martyrdom and Hamas Success in the 2005 Municipal Elections: A Study of Hamas Martyrs’ Ethical Wills, Biographies and Eulogies”, Die Welt des Islams 48 (2008), 23-49. Alshech references, http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/Hamas/shuhda/abokwak/waseyah.htm - where the wasiya (testimony) can be accessed, October 12, 2010.

112

dunnya].95 The martyrr story is of particularr interest, foor Mu’awiy yya ‘Abd al-Qahhar waas a key fig gure for thee electronic m media depaartment, al-A Andalus, forr AQIM, wh hile having been a perhhaps ‘regulaar’ Mujahidd otherwise. In the videeo, he is po ortrayed andd eulogized d as such a ‘regular’ M Mujahid in the t rows off AQIM, acccrediting him the status of a warriior trained and a equippeed with the Kalashniko ov and seenn with his fellow fighterrs. His special role is, hhowever, ou utlined in th he eulogy (riitha’) as the al-Andaluss Media Deepartment loost one of its i memberss, who are eenergetic in n producingg ahdihim), th heir sacrificee to incite (tahrid) ( thee their share, paarticipating with their ppains (bi ja umm ma shakingg it awake; to t break thee spell of feear that has kept the um mma in iron ns; to revoltt agaainst injusticce and the tyrants. t Forr the eye breeaks a a teaar, while thee heart sadd dens, for wee are now apart with w you o ‘Abd al-Qaahhar and grrievous.96 The death of the technical-fluentt propaganddist seems more m severee than the looss of a Mu ujahid, whoo turned intoo a “martyrddom seekerr” by his chhoosing, evaading captiv vity thus keeeping his ‘honor’ ‘ andd ‘purity’ in jjihadist undderstanding.

For only real men aree ‘true’ beliievers maniifesting themselves as such, who are able an nd capable,, physically and mentallly to fulfill the covenaant to God as a based on an often-ciited verse of the Qurann y enhance thhe young martyr: (33:23), whhich is usedd to visually Theere are menn among thee believers who honou ured their plledge to Good: some off them havee fulffilled it by death, d and some s are sti ll waiting. They T have not n changedd in the least.

95 96

Salah Abbu Muhammad, “Ritha’ qadwa q al-shaabab, Mu’awiyya ‘Abd al-Qahhar a Bellhajj”, al-And dalus Media,, http://archhive.org/detaiils/osod_ggh78. Ibid.

113

In the picture on the right, the martyr Belhajj is accredited with this divinity and eulogized by Salah Abu Muhammad, on the left, who is reading the eulogy from an illuminating computer screen reflecting in his glasses.

The Founders, pioneers and Actors of the early electronic Media Frontier – Abu A’id alFilastini The digital world had been a venue of interest since the days of ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam inspired by computer visionaries among his followers. One of ‘Azzam’s companions in the 1980s was a Mujahid named “Abu A’id al-Filastini”, who was killed in the events following the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001. He is highlighted as a pioneer in the 1980s who foresaw the value of promoting the propagation of Islam by electronic means by digitalizing the writings of renowned scholars such as his mentor and guide ‘Azzam. In the modern context of the vast amount of online jihadi endeavors, the digital files established by actors such as Abu A’id are a most essential a central part and set the first foundation in the electronic media frontier.97 He gained prominence by his clear name Khalil bin Sa’id al-Dik, usually referred to as Khalil (al-) Deek in western media and writings. He was a Palestinian from Jordan who had studied computer science in Los Angeles. He later traveled from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Bosnia and was a Bosnian passport holder.98 Deek is also sought responsible for recruiting the convert Adam Yahiya Gadahn (Adam Pearlman)99 who turned into the media advisor and spokesman of al-Qaida in Pakistan alias ‘Azzam al-Amriki. It is assumed that he worked as computer engineer and Charity Without Borders staffer, where it is now believed that Adam Yahiye Gadahn worked around that same time in 1997. The Charity was discovered to be an Al-Qaida organization used to funnel money overseas and wasn't shut down until after September 11, 2001. Hisham Diab was running this organization at the time and it was confirmed by his ex-wife Saraah Olson that Hisham and Khalil Said al-Deek

97

98 99

The first AQ generation in Saudi Arabia digitalized a great deal of the 1980s military handbooks and files in general, having thus further set the foundation for the contemporary massive data of this kind. For details: Nico Prucha, Die Stimme des Dschihad “Sawt al-gihad”: al-Qa’idas erstes Online-Magazin (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač 2010), 7377. John R. Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad (Zenith Press: St. Paul 2007), 270. Ben Fox. Father of suspected al-Qaeda operative is baffled by accusation, http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/nation/terror/20040528-0715-terrorthreat-gadahn.html. (accessed August 29, 2013).

114

recruited Adam Yahiye Gadahn and transformed him into an American-hating fanatic.100 He is the alleged co-conspirator of the “Millennium Plot” that intended a spade of attacks in the U.S. and the Middle East. On December 31, 1999, an Algerian/Jordanian terrorist cell with cooperation from Al-Qaeda planned to execute two thwarted terrorist attacks. One an attack on Los Angeles International Airport, and the other on biblical sites in the Middle East and a hotel in Amman Jordan. In late 1998 two Palestinians, Raed Hijazi and Abu Hoshar settled on a plan to attack multiple targets throughout the middle east. They would first attack four targets: the SAS Radisson Hotel in downtown Amman, the border crossings from Jordan into Israel, and two Christian holy sites, at a time when all these locations were likely to be thronged with American and other tourists. Next, they would target a local airport and other religious and cultural sites. Hijazi and Abu Hoshar cased the intended targets and sent reports to Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Osama Bin-Ladin, who approved their plan.101 His martyr biography was published as part of a 350-page long collection edited by Abu ‘Ubayda al-Maqdisi featuring individuals from mainly the Arab countries perished after the events of September 11, 2001. The book entitled “shuhada’ fi zaman al-ghurba” (“The Martyrs in the Earthly [Stage] of Emigration”) hosts 121 martyr tales, with the majority showing a picture of the deceased. The pictures are mostly screen grabs of jihad-videos, mainly taken from the Afghanistan-based Labayyka productions. According to the foreword by al-Maqdisi, this compilation of martyr stories with an introduction by Khalid bin Fathi al-Agha (Abu ‘l-Walid al-Ansari)102 was completed in Afghanistan in May 2005 and published in 2008.103 In total 121 martyr biographies are hosted in this comprising compilation,

100 101 102

103

Khalil al-Deek, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalil_al-Deek. (accessed August 29, 2013). The Millennium Plot, Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/millenium-plot.htm, (accessed August 29, 2013). The introduction is dated to 2007. According to a footnote detailing al-Ansari, he was born in 1966 in Gaza and moved with his parents to Saudi Arabia where he went to school “until he heard the call to jihad, (…) to support his brothers, the Afghan Mujahideen in 1986.” The use of ideological keywords such as the “mounted mujahid” and the concept of the murabiteen, the one tied to the front fighting for their beliefs set is a reoccurring phenomenon repeated throughout the individual martyr stories. Abu ‘Ubayda al-Maqdisi and ‘Abdallah bin Khalid al-‘Adam. Shuhada fi zaman al-ghurba. The document was published as aPDF- and WORD format in the main jihadist forums, for example, http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?322767-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%28%28%C2%B0-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-

115

with the m majority haviing been fro om Arab couuntries, mainly Saudi Arabia A (24),, Egypt (11)), Syria (7).. Neighborinng countriees and reg gions also are repressented often n, includinng Waziristtan104 (10),, Uzbekistann (9), Turkiistan105 (6). Based onn the data of o these bio ographies, ttable 1.1 in ndicates thee martyrs byy origin:

b Origin Table 1.11: Martyrs by Onee martyr froom France, Mukhtar all-Karibi, haad been prominently feeatured in an a as-Sahabb video “Cruushing the C Crusader”106 where he speaks in French F with h Arabic subbtitles to hiis audience.. In the bookk by al-Maqqdisi, he al-Karibi is chherished as the “first martyr m celebrrated by thee Caribbeann Islands” w where he wass born.107 Among the four Paalestinians listed in Abbu ‘Ubaydaa al-Maqdissi’s compilaation, the sttory of Abuu A’id is onee of the mosst interestin ng ones, andd perhaps th he most pro olific. Accorrding to his biography,, he had beeen responsiible in a wide w range oof da’wa reelated taskss, from digiitalizing the notoriouss military “E Encyclopediia of Jihad”” to transcribbing sermon ns (khutba) by ‘Abdalllah ‘Azzam.. Accordiing to the 9/11 9 Comission Reporrt, Abu A’id d a.ka. Khalil Deek, pllayed a vitaal role as a facilitator w while in Caalifornia and d highlights his role as an ‘adminisstor’ of jihaadist materiaal. In early 19999, [Raed] Hijazi andd [Khadr] Abu A Hoshaar108 contaccted Khalill Deek, ann merican citizzen and an associate oof Abu Zubaaydah who lived in Peeshawar, Paakistan, andd Am who, with Afg fghanistan-b based extrem mists, had created an electronic version off a terroristt mannual, the Encyclopedia E a of Jihad. They obtaained a CD--ROM of thhis encyclo opedia from m

104 105 106 107

108

%D9%811%D9%8A-% %D8%B2%D9%85%D9%866-%D8%A7% %D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B B1%D8%A8% %D8%A9%C2%B00%29%29. A tribal bborder area bettween Afghan nistan-Pakistann. West Chinese provincee with a Musliim majority poopulation. Part of thhe Harb al-muustada’ifin serries, 1426. Inn the wake of the Syrian co onflict a symppathizer of Jab bhat al-Nusraa re-uploadded the video on o YouTube, http://www.yo h outube.com/w watch?v=BZI6YgjbVS4, Sepptember 11, 2012. Accordinng to this marttyr story, al-K Karibi was raissed in France and converted d to Islam. Ass a convert hee is applaudedd as both ann internationaal fighter and as a an outstandding individuaal who heeded the call to Isllam and jihad. Al-Maqddisi. Shuhada’ fi f Zaman al-G Ghurba, 283-2285. Both had been accompplices of “Abu u Zubaydah, a longtime ally y of Bin Laden n”, 9/11 Comm mission Reporrt, 175

116

Deek.109 He was perhaps one of the main actors on the new frontier for jihadist propaganda before and during the early days of the Internet. As the nature of the corpus of contemporary jihadist materials is seldom shy to overstate the roles individuals played, such descriptions must be read with caution. This is because in parts hagiographic elements are accredited to the martyrs while the impact and role of these individuals are elevated because of their impact and their contribution to further or establish a global jihadist network. In this case, however, the role of the martyr is rather downplayed and neither his role in the United States nor his involvement in the “Millennium Plot” is mentioned at all. His pioneer media work for the global jihadist agenda is at the center and can perhaps be understood as yet another trend set in death by this martyr. As it is not new but a modern trend to highlight individual contribution to the jihadi media of fighters who then set out to join the real-life battlefields, as outlined in the case of Abu Qasura al-Libi, for example. Already in the 1980s, during the war against the Red Army in Afghanistan, however, fighters are portrayed who also used their various expertise to conduct da’wa by the means of either crafting or disseminating propaganda or by finding new means for jihadist propaganda to manifest itself. This unique aspect is accredited to Abu A’id al-Filastini, “the lion of Palestine, who disembarked” life and became a shahid in the course of his deeds for Islam. Supposedly, he was an engineer who studied civil aviation without a degree and subsequently used his computer skills and expertise to be a pioneer of digitalizing jihadist materials of the 1980s he would later publish on the Internet. By reasons only known to God, he abandoned his [civil aviation] studies and turned to gaining advanced computer knowledge.110 His real name was Khalil Sa’id al-Dik who, like many others of the sons of Palestine, lived in Jordan.111 When he met one of the sons of the Islamic Movement (al-harakat al-Islamiyya),

109

The 9/11 Commission Report, 175. Shuhada fi zaman al-ghurba,157. 111 Ibid. For a highly interesting overview of the impact of Palestinians from Jordan for Global Jihad: Hazim al- Amin, alSalafi al-yatim – al-wajha al-filastini li-“jihad al-alimi” wa-“l qa’ida”, (Dar al-Saqi: Beirut, London 2011). 110

117

he immediately joined their Islamic center.112 Due to his endeavors and his skills he became well known among the scholars of this center, including ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, whom he later accompanied to the “Mosques in America inciting and missionizing” (muharridan wa-da’iyyan) the salafist-jihadist creed. In the late 1980s ‘Azzam went to the United States to preach and tell stories of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.113 Abu A’id moved to Peshawar, Pakistan, which had been ‘Azzam’s chosen residence and the most important base for many Arab foreign fighters bound for Afghanistan to team up and meet. The text alters his name after stating his move to Peshawar to Abu A’id al-Muhajir al-Gharib, thus accrediting him with a special status only a migrant (muhajir), or as a stranger (gharib) in this world in the rite of passage can be approved of. For Jihadists are “strangers”, who are merely passing through this world114 hence Abu A’id is named al-Gharib, the stranger – further elevating his status in both this world (al-dunya) as well as in the afterlife (al-akhira) where the jihadists’ creed propagates the reward for deeds in the service of God in this world. In the jihadist notion and spiritual essentials (Geisteshaltung), the constant fleeing of the physical, celestial surrounding is of grave essence. As most martyr stories indicate, the Mujahid, or the martyrdom operative, has a strong desire for the shahada, confessing the outmost possible by ones deeds for God. Until the status of actually attaining the shahada is reached, with the awards of the afterlife, where the believers are safe from any sin while enjoying the heavenly rewards (ajr). Thus, the Mujahid dwells in a state of mental transition into the celestial while disengaging this world, retreating into the belief set of being a soldier of God (jund allah), migrating from his life into a stage of jihad. As such, the individual Mujahid considers himself as being in the direct service for God. This may fulfill a human urge in the self-perception of terrorist actors in general, to be an avantgardist and therefore of greatest importance.115 112

Ibid. This may be a reference to ‘Azzam’s last filmed khutba in 1988 in Seattle, Washington, U.S.A., as described in this chapter. 114 Philipp Holtmann, “Leadership without Leaders – How Jihadists Guide Each Other in Cyberspace”, in Rüdiger Lohlker (ed.), Studying Jihadism (Vienna University Press: Göttingen 2012). 115 As the terrorists is a political being who fights not only for him- or herself, but claims to be engaged for “liberty” or “justice”, international active groups such as the German Red Army Faction had a similar reasoning in their writings and a similar self-awareness. Al-Qa’ida perceives itself as a platform for “enlightened” individuals who comprehend the ‘truth’ and thus target designated main enemies to free ‘peoples’ from oppression. Parts of this notion is outlined in the following article: Henner Hess, „Die neue Herausforderung. Von der RAF zu AL-Qaida“, in Kraushaar, Wolfgang (ed.), Die RAF und 113

118

Abu A’id received military education and preparation in designated training camps while coming and going to fight in various battles in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Years later, at the time the conflict in Bosnia unraveled in the early 1990s, Abu A’id was deeply moved and travelled to Bosnia. He felt compelled to support the Muslims in Bosnia as the fires of jihad didn’t just engulf Khurasan (Afghanistan) but where also lit on the wide plains of Bosnia-Hercegovina, while the voices of the muwahhidin116 to oblige the support for the sons of the Muslims in this region had been raised.117 Support (nusra) includes foremost military aid by foreign fighters, who moved to Bosnia to participate in training and combat missions and also of missionary work (da’wa) of the salafistjihadist interpretation for the Bosnian Muslims.118 Following the usual rhetoric of this literal genre, the Muslims in Bosnia are termed as those “who are raided by the Serbian Crusader-legion.”119 The events, a reminder of the atheist communist Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, lit the light of jihad in Bosnia and likewise ignited the heart of our shahid.120 Abu A’id wanted to hurry into this land of the oppressed (mustada’ifin) where its people have to protect their innocent honor (‘ird) by their sword and are terrorized by the by the infidel Serbs.121 Somewhere between his episode in Bosnia and 9/11, he returned to Afghanistan to join the shahid, the leader Abu Mu’adh al-Khosti with whom he started a new round of killing and combat in the places where the angels transcend spreading their mercy in dark nights. This lion of the lions of the sons of tawhid of the emigrants (al-muhajireen), participated in their

der linke Terrorismus, Vol. 1 (Hamburger Edition: Hamburg 2006), 116. A reference to those, who truly practice the worship of God, professing the monotheistic framework in the mindset by jihadist interpretation. The term muwahhid is further a denotation for any ‘true’ Muslim. 117 Shuhada fi zaman al-ghurba,158. 118 The “Gitmo-Files”, illegally attained and published by WikiLeaks provides valuable insight on how Arab prisoners in the controversial US-facility Guantanamo are alleged of being supporters for the “Global Jihad Support Network” consisting of da’wa and combat stationed in Bosnia during and after the Balkan-war in the early to mid-90s. These files are available on the WikiLeaks website: http://wikileaks.org/gitmo/. 119 Shuhada fi zaman al-ghurba,158. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 116

119

jihaad, being tieed into theirr fronts (ribbat), everyw where among g the green hills.122 Abu A’id hhowever, waas betrrayed by thhe hands of the rejectioonist Shiitess and Abu Mu’adh M al-K Khusti journ neyed to hiss Lorrd. [Abu A’id] was not able to stayy after the leader l was killed k and im mmediately y packed upp 1233 his bags and was set to return to the Kingdo om of Sataan, whose ““hump is America” A

[refferring to thhe Kingdom m of Jordan] .124 bu A’id resiided in Pesh hawar wherre he marrieed a Syrian with whom m Instead of returning too Jordan, Ab he had twoo sons, as seeen in the piicture of thiis martyr.125

He settled in Pakistan P and d made use of his comp puter skills to develop and dissem minate jihadii h invaluabble contribu ution and the t – at thhe time – start s of thee materials eelectronicallly. With his evolution aand the selff-conception n of the jihhadi electronic media that t would become a mainstream m m element off everyday-jjihadism neearly a decaade later, Ab bu A’id beg gan to workk on digitalizing jihadii materials uused for da’’wa and inciitement (tahhrid). The returnee (al-aa’id) began n anew to uuse his tech hnical skillss and his ccomputer ex xpertise forr hed militaryy know-how w tutorials via v the Interrnet and hee completedd da’wa and tahrid and publish 122

Ibid. As opposeed to the “hum mp of Islam”, based b on a sayying of Proph het Muhammad. According tto Holtmann (2012, ( 114), “this exprression goes back b to an alleegedly sound Prophetic had dith (oral transmission of thhe sayings and d deeds of thee Prophet M Muhammad annd his companions), in whhich Muhamm mad compares the duties of IIslam to the different d bodyy parts of a camel, whichh was an extreemely valuablee animal in Arrab tribal cultu ure of the 7th century.” In the jihadist’ meaning this refers to o Muslims whho traded their belief in God and work foor Islam for worldly w issues,, such as tuurning one’s looyalty to God d over for the lloyalty to hosttile governments. 124 Shuhada ffi zaman al-ghhurba,158. 125 The pictture on the left was originally publlished by th he Californian n Orange Coounty News, June 2006.. http://ww ww.ocweekly.ccom/2006-06-15/news/wherre-is-oc-s-misssing-terrorist// (accessed Auugust 29, 201 13). A captionn reads, “D Deek with his eldest e children n in Anaheim,, mid-1990s. Photo P courtesy y Tawfiq Deekk.” 123

120

highly important tasks, t such as: a ‐

Producing electronic versions off the Afghan ni Military Encyclopeddia and pub blishing thee files on thee World Wide Web;

‐

With greatt efforts he saved the hheritage of the imam, the shahid ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam byy transcribinng his record ded khutba’’s and publishing the ellectronic doocuments.1266

WORD doocuments, foor example of ‘Abddalllah ‘Azzam m’s writingss, obtained oonline someetimes bearr the signatuure of the author. a Perh haps part off Abu A’id’ss legacy is best highligghted when n looking att some of ‘A Azzam’s wrritings on Abu A Muham mmad al-M Maqdisi’s on nline jihadi repository tawhed.ws.. Some of ‘‘Azzam’s writings, w up ploaded or created ass early as 1997, bearr the signature in thee document pproperties of o “Abu A’id d”, perhaps Abu A’id al-Filastini, a as a shown inn the picturee.127

His ordeal started wheen he was arrrested in P Pakistan, duee to his zeaal and his co onnection too the sons of tawhid. [These sonss] swore to never stopp fighhting until they drink the blood oof the sons of the Cross and theirr henchmen n who havee crafted a realitty in Peshaw war consistting of aposstasy of Islaam (ridda) and hypocrrisy (nifaq).. He was arrestted in Pesh hawar and eextradited to t the King gdom of Ev Evilness, Jorrdan, to bee throown into thhe dungeons of the sa hiyusalibiyyya (the Zio onist-Crusadder-Alliancee). In smalll cellls that seem med like sm mall corridoors, he cou uld by no means m remaain under th he whip off hum miliation annd he went on o a hungerr strike. 128 He was waanted in connnection witth the thwarrted “Millen nnium Plot””,

126

Ibid. ‘Abdallahh ‘Azzam. “Jiihad sha’b Muslim”, seconnd edition (Peeshawar: Mark kaz al-shahidd ‘Abdallah ‘A Azzam 1997);; http://taw whed.ws/dl?i=hhr6mikyq. 128 Shuhada ffi zaman al-ghhurba,158. 127

121

after the arrests of Abu Hoshar and 15 others, the Jordanians tracked Deek to Peshawar, persuaded Pakistan to extradite him, and added him to their catch. Searches in Amman found the rented house and, among other things, 71 drums of acids, several forged Saudi passports, detonators, and Deek’s Encyclopedia.129 Abu A’id (Deek), had been arrested and extradited on December 16, 1999 but was released in May 2001, being 44 years old at that time.130 According to the Turkish Hürreyet Daily News, Deek went on a hunger strike May 3 to highlight his plight in detention without being formally charged. Two weeks later, Deek was hospitalized for low blood pressure, physical weakness and fatigue, according to Adel Deek.131 According to his martyr biography he had nowhere to go after his release as he was banned from entering several countries, including Lebanon. He returned to Peshawar, where he was regularly checked on by the Pakistani intelligence, demanding that he would get to the U.S. embassy for questioning.132 Abu A’id was getting ready to show his approval regarding what was demanded of him, when he dreamt of that despicable crusader woman at the [American] embassy who had pressured him previously, saying: “Flee, flee no more.” Abu A’id awoke by her voice to pack his bags to depart right for his religion with the intention of returning to the frontiers of the Murabiteen here in Kabul.133 He continued his da’wa related work and witnessed the U.S. bombing raids on Kabul and later in Qandahar. He had managed to flee back into Pakistan where he sought to continue his work for da’wa, tahrid, and military preparation. An agent of the “Pakistani intelligence agencies” gained his trust, and after several months, this treacherous agent was in the service of our martyr. On a memorable day, a festive public holiday, 129

The 9/11 Commission Report, 175. Release of Deek angers Americans, Hürriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/release-of-deekangers-americans.aspx?pageID=438&n=release-of-deek-angers-americans-2001-05-24 (accessed September 1, 2013). 131 Ibid. 132 Shuhada fi zaman al-ghurba,159. 133 Ibid. 130

122

this traitor had lunch with our martyr. In a surprise move, this coward gained hold of the weapon of Abu A’id and emptied in his treacherous hatred all the bullets into the body of his guest. Verily, God bestowed the sons of tawhid with the honor to cut the head of this traitor-criminal off under the very same roof where the knight of Palestine departed and disembarked after bringing about his messages in this life.134

Abu ‘Umar – the new Role Model of the “Media Martyr” The martyr story of “Abu ‘Umar” is perhaps the most precise outline of an exemplary case to underline the jihadists’ importance of the Internet and of the physical actors behind this ongoing online jihad. He is presented as the ultimate new role model to the audience and termed as an istishhadi al-i’lam al-jihadi, a “jihadi media martyr.” For his contribution to the media enabled him to participate in jihad, being in charge of the media and engaged in interviewing and meeting frontline leaders. He had been an absolute online-media-activist and as thus is bestowed with the same reward any killed Mujahid may claim “on the path of God” – the difference, however, is that stories such as this provide a different role model to be re-enacted: using individual technical and communication skills for the greater aspects of contemporary jihad, as missionizing (da’wa) is essential for any form of qital. Abu ‘Umar is cherished as having actively attained the shahada, as his work is fully acknowledged and redeemed. By determining his status as an istishhadi, he is fully equated to any martyrdom seeker who rams his explosives-laden vehicle into a checkpoint or any bomber who carries the explosives on one’s body. He had been a co-worker for the “Global Islamic Media Front” (GIMF) and founder of the “al-Qadisiyya Media Department”, focusing on publishing material in “Asian languages”. Both media departments issued a statement, commemorating his work and pledging to continue his legacy. The first statement, published by GIMF via the forums is a classical eulogy. It describes the martyrs life and death, praising his work and dedication. The emphasis is set on the important role he played for the development of GIMF and the various language departments. The second statement by al-Qadisiyya is a collection of various accounts by his colleagues and comrades, who shed very personal light on Abu ‘Umar, allowing the reader a personal connection to this outstanding man and his ethos, granting him ‘holy’ attributes, usually restricted only for the real-deal fighters. Based on the account of “Abu Khalid”, he once “saw the true image of Abu ‘Umar in this verse of the Qur’an: 134

Ibid.

123

Muhammad is the Messenger of God. Those who follow him are firm against the disbelievers and tender towards each other. 135 The GIMF statement was published on December 13, 2011 on the forums and on YouTube,136 in Arabic, English, and Urdu. The statement by al-Qadisiyya was published in Arabic (January 26, 2012) and Urdu (February, 23). The death of Abu ‘Umar is celebrated in unison with the one year anniversary of this media foundation he established. The statement starts with a typical rhetoric by announcing to the Islamic umma in general but to the Mujahideen in particular the martyrdom of one of the leaders of the Global Islamic Media Front, a knight of knights of the jihadi media and the [online] forums, namely the brother ‘Abd al-Mu’ayyad bin ‘Abd al-Salam, “Abu ‘Umar” – may God accept him. This occurred in a martyrdom operation during the firefight with the soldiers of apostasy of the Pakistani military intelligence – the agents of the Jews and the Christians – who attempted to storm his safe house in the region “Gulestan-e-Jauhar” of the city Karachi.137 His key-role and prominence is correlated by the mainstream media claiming the death of an outstanding individual engaged in the work for GIMF on the Internet.138 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed a operation, killing three Pakistani “Ranger” soldiers as vengeance and revenge for the brother, the Mujahid ‘Abd al-Mu’ayyad bin ‘Abd al-Salām “Abu Umar” who was martyred in this same area after a raid by those apostate soldiers on his apartment. 139 As confirmed by CNN-Arabic, “Abu ‘Umar” was a U.S. citizen, verifying his clear name as indicated by the GIMF statement. The statement gives the birthdate of the hero as July 17, 1974. He was raised and brought up in a wealthy family. He studied at the best schools and universities and worked as a teacher and a translator for 135

Part of 48:29. Abu ‘Umar – istishhadi al-i’lam al-jihadi, al-Qadisiyya, January 26, 2012 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4YcNzNVamrM 137 GIMF, General Command, “bayyan bi khussus istishhad ahad qadatiha wa-faris min fursaniha al-akh Abu ‘Umar”. 138 “Pakistani Police: Key Leader of TTP Arrested”, CNN-Arabic, January 6, 2012, http://arabic.cnn.com/2012/world/1/6/Pakistan.Taliban/ (accessed May 28, 2013). 139 http://hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=267382 (accessed December 16, 2011). 136

124

international companies in Yemen the U.S. at the senior levels. He and his father received U.S.-citizenship, our hero, the martyr – God willing – lived a life of comfort, without any further intention for his worldly satisfaction. Three main events shaped the live and led to the ultimate radicalization of Abu ‘Umar. Having sympathies and apparently knowledge of jihadist ideology, methodology and interpretations, he applauded the 1998 declaration by bin Laden and later the 9/11 attack. Our brother only subscribed to the jihadist methodology shortly before the foundation of the “Global Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders in 1998”, announcing the unification of the Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Jihad al-Islamiyya with Qaedat al-Jihad.140 And in 2001, shortly after the knights of Qaedat al-Jihad carried out the raids on Manhattan in the land of disbelief America where our hero lived at the time with his family, he heard the news of the blessed operation, maximizing his craving for jihad and to fight on the path of God, and to live happily among the Mujahideen. The third event that “changed his life entirely” was the “Crusader assault on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” about one month after the September 11 attacks. Here his actual story begins. He moved on from theorizing and minor commitment to Jihad and became fully engaged to support Jihad and the Mujahideen. In a vital step, Abu ‘Umar entered a phase of segregation – fully subscribing to the jihadist ideology and drawing lines of demarcation to the ‘other’, or the ‘enemy’ by secluding himself as much as possible to retain his newly boundaries of purity. This is a human element in radicalization processes after an individual commits himself to action and, naturally, after having fully accepted a particular worldview, vision, or ideology. As Gudrun Ensslin, German co-founder of the Red Army Faction wrote in 1971 from prison, any individual truly committed must “draw the line of demarcation every minute.”141 This could even be a more psychological-emotional vector for radicalized Muslims living in 140

141

Sayeed Rahman, “A Note on Usama bin Ladin’s 1998 Declaration of War: al-Kisa’i vs. al-Kasani”, Jihadica, February 24, 2011, http://www.jihadica.com/a-note-on-usama-bin-ladin%E2%80%99s-1998-declaration-of-war-alkisai-vs-al-kasani/. Gudrun Ensslin, Zieht den Trennungsstrich, jede Minute. Briefe an ihre Schwester Christiane und ihren Bruder Gottfried aus dem Gefängnis 1972-1973, Christiane u. Gottfried Ensslin (eds.), (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag 2005).

125

the U.S. in particular, in a non-majority Islamic society perceived as the main enemy. He drew this line of demarcation by translating his mental or inner segregation or withdrawal by physically abandoning all of his worldly comforts and his job to support Jihad, to deter tyranny and enmities against the Islamic umma. Therefore, he migrated from America with his parents to Land of the Two Holy Sites142 and started his Jihad venture from there. He moved from between a number of countries, offering his various material and media services to support the Mujahideen and married a Pakistani in this time. He worked as a facilitator and “moved to Pakistan to join the fight with his brothers”. However, at first he seemed to have disapproved the decision by the leadership to be chosen based on his experience and profession in media related tasks. He was a translator for numerous languages and chosen to resist the vicious [western] media assault on the Mujahideen especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan. [He was tasked] with providing material and media support to assist the Mujahideen, to promote their voices from deep inside the battlefield to the Muslims in general. He joined the GIMF for many years and worked as an English translator. He had become the chief of the translation department, then he founded with some of his brothers the alQadisiyya Media Department to facilitate translations into Asian languages. The statement emphasizes Abu ‘Umar’s wish to interact as a media facilitator in a journalistic function to promote the voices of the Mujahideen in general but in particular the Mujahideen of the TTP and of AQ in as many languages as possible. Therefore, he set up local media groups and jihadist websites and forums online in Urdu, English, Benghali, and Pashto to defend the honor of the Mujahideen and to refute criticism and lies [promoted by the mainstream media]. Furthermore, to broadcast the true image of jihad and to correct the image, publishing the news and media data of the Mujahideen to incite and inspire Muslims to join and gather support [was his core motivation].

142

In jihadist speak a reference to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

126

His techniccal fluency,, his passion n for his w work is likew wise expresssed by the hhabit to rarrely has leftt his compuuter. This roole model element, e thee tireless ‘o office work ker’ for the benefit of conductingg da’wa, resulting in neew attacks against thee enemies iss backed by y repeatedly ly citing thee martyr ass “twenty four hours forr media jihaad is way tooo little”. The GIMF F statement concludes, c m of this lead der will nott quell the workflow w off the jihadi m media. Thiss is what wee the martyrdom are saying to thhe nations of o disbelieff (kufr), and the crusadeer armies ass well as thee legions off h we w are a naation that will w not die without a ffight. The death d of ourr apoostasy and hypocrisy; leadders and brrothers will only strenggthen our paatience and resolve, thheir blood iss lighteningg ourr path.

aramat thatt had been sso vividly described byy Fandom arrt online acccredit Abu ‘Umar with the same ka ‘Azzam foor the 19800s fighters,, relating hhis smile and a his bod dily status “three day ys after hiss istishhad” as “karamaat for the mo ost high-rannking shuha ada.”143

The Martyyrdom of th he munshid d of the al-S Shumukh Forum F Onee such outsttanding exaample is the story of Kh halad al-Farrisi, a membber of the Shumukh al-Islam Foruum who was commemo orated by thhe forum’s administrattion after hiis death and d praised ass the “munshhid al-shum mukh”, the praiseful hym mn singer fo or the forum m.

143

Abu Khabbab al-Muhajir, https://sham mikh1.info/vb//showthread.p php?t=159657&page=4, Jannuary 28, 2012 2.

127

Thee announcinng of the atttained marttyrdom by the adminisstrators of oone of theirr prominentt members iis significaant, as the legacy off al-Farisi is i a vital part p of thee massive quantity q off propaganda material promoted by the foorums in general. g Th he vital auddio-element of jihadii propaganda, the nashid, is even more so hiighlighted by b the commemorationn of one off the voicess who acted as a direct intersection n between oon- and offfline by his commitmennt within both worlds,, further proomoting the active role and his mem mbership of the forum. The adminnistrators ad ddress the ma of al-taw whid in gen neral and thee members of the Shum mukh al-Islaam forum in n particular.. umm Wee announce the t attained d martyrdom m of the muj ujahid, the knight k (al-faaris), the lion144 Abu’ l-Barra’ Muhamm mad bin Saalim al-Suddani, a reno own [forum m] member by his [on nline] namee “Khhalad al-Faarisi”, may God G receivee him in [th he rows am mong the] shhuhada’ and d grant him m resiidence in thhe highest leevel of Paraadise.145 The elevation of the martyr, m askin ng God for his acceptaance and hiss placementt in the high hest level off Paradise, aal-firdaws, is further underlining u the importtance of this individuaal. By his contribution c n online in pparallel to his real-liffe commitm ment, he has the right to receive the outmo ost possiblee reward (ajrr) by God. As mostly, but not alw ways, his cleear name is revealed too the comm munity post-mortem. h the hijra a to Yemenn and the wiisdom to fig ght with hiss brothers of o the Ansarr God granted him who lost reliigion to exccel the rotteenness of th his world inn al-sshari’a agaiinst the tyraant, those w the battle of Laawdar in Ap pril 2012.1466 As the “prolific Internnet shaykh””147 and proominent ideo ologue Abu u Sa’d al-‘A Amili would d emphasizee in a strateggic writing in April 2013,148 the administraation of the Shumukh forum emb braces theirr 144

lit.: the lioon (al-hummaam), the lion (aal-asad), the liion (daraghim ma) Bushra sara: istishhhad munshid d al-shumakkh al-akh Khalad K al- Farisi (acceessed April 18, 2012),, http://shaamikh1.info/vbb/showthread..php?p=10590006469, 146 Ibid. 147 As coinned by Brynar B Lia, “Jihadis D Debate Egy ypy, part 3”, 3 Jihadicaa, February y 7, 2011,, http://ww ww.jihadica.coom/jihadis-deb bate-egypt-3/. 148 Abu Sa’d al-‘Amili, “N Nida’ ila junud d al-i’lami al-jiihadi”, Fursan n al-balagh li l-i’lami, Marc rch 2013. 145

128

members to re-enact this promoted role model, thus elevating their status likewise: For death for the enemies of God means devastation and anguish; for they bury their heads in the ground [escaping reality]. Therefore, [we] the jihadi forums wage our war against them day and night (…). Calling (nafir) on our members, our knights to join the battlefields of jihad. Thus, quench the thirst for blood.149 The jihadi media in general and in particular the forums as well as social media are vital “frontiers” (thughur) and as essential as physical front lines in battle. The forum administration determining anyone of the Mujahideen, the virtual media activists as much as the real-deal fighters as murabitun, tied to the front in the historical-theological connotation as “frontier-guards”.150 Hence, the members are addressed as o you murabitun on the frontier of the media” – the role model of the martyr is instilled – “these are you brothers preceding you to the battle fields of glory and pride, where the neigh of the horse is heard, the teeth fletching, dispersing flesh and blood in support for the religion (din), defending the honor (‘ird).151 The official part of the posting is concluded by download links of the nashid “The Journey of the Beloved”, “rahl al-habib by the voice of the brother, the shahid – may God accept him.” The nashid is a eulogy and a story of two friends – one having attained the shahada, while the other must remain in the dunya: “The beloved has journeyed, for tears in my eyes burst out / while the heart is torn up over the loss / the one has journeyed who lived under His [God] sovereignty / who advanced in a quick pace to the highest level / the beloved one who abandoned his brothers crying over his loss/ with agony in [their] heart you embarked on your journey / tears flowing on the cheeks, mixing with my tear / tears running like fire we are accustomed with / 149

Bushra sara: istishhad munshid al-shumakh al-akh Khalad al- Farisi For a thorough analysis of the concept of ribat and its implication, Nico Prucha, “Jihadists‘ Use of Quran’s ribat concept”, Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, August 2009. 151 Bushra sara: istishhad munshid al-shumakh al-akh Khalad al- Farisi. 150

129

had we been together we would beg to meet our Lord / death is a small river in the cracks [of my] heart [ staying behind in this world] / for how long have I craved a friend like him / […]

Abu Qasura al-Libi One of the first foreign fighters killed in Syria fighting on the side of the al-Qaeda linked Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) was 19-year old Libyan Muhammad al-Zulaytani. A member of the JN-forum, “the support forum for the Front of Victory”, by the name “muraqib 2”152 posted a eulogy one day after al-Zulaytani’s death, posting a fan-made picture to commemorate the mujahid. Al- Zulaytani’s nom de guerre had been Abu Qasura al-Gharib.153 The chosen kunya, the wider meaning and implementation of the term gharib, implies the greater theological dimension this individual subscribed to, understanding this world as a mere passage way where he considered himself a “stranger” (al-gharib).154 He attained the shahada as we reckon it to be on January 4, 2012.155 May God have mercy with you Abu Qasura and may you dwell as an inhabitant of His Paradise. The posting is concluded by a fan-made picture:

152

“Muraqib 2” is a new member of the JN forum, who joined in January and had 45 contributions as of January 5th, 2012. 153 Muraqib 2, “Special / a picture of the shahid of Jabhat al-Nusra – as we reckon him to be – Abu Qasura al-Gharib”, January 4, 2012, muntadiyyat al-nusra li jabhat al-nusra, http://jalnosra.com/vb/showthread.php?t=313 (accessed March 20, 2013). 154 See also Nico Prucha, “Die Vermittlung arabischer Jihadisten-Ideologie: Zur Rolle deutscher Aktivisten”, in Guido Steinberg (ed.), Jihadismus und Internet: Eine deutsche Perspektive, SWP, October 2012, 45-56, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-studien-de/swp-studien-detail/article/jihadismus_und_internet.html 155 The date and the identity is confirmed by a website loyal to the Syrian Army, http://syrianow.sy/index.php?d=26&id=69126 (accessed May 31, 2013).

130

Thee brother Muhammad M al-Zulaytanni was born n in 1994 in n Benghazii, Libya. He heard thee calll (nafir) to support ou ur brothers iin Syria. He H was killeed [in a fireefight] by th he criminall Asssad regime on January 4, 2013.156 The flag shhown in this picture on n the left is the new an nd revised fllag of JN. T The handcraafted flag inn another piccture publisshed in a po osting of thee Shumukh al-Islam forrum by his comrade “aal-Assad al-Muhajir” sshows that Abu A Qasuraa had been a member of o JN since the early daays of its fo ormation. A similar butt slightly different d nottion as of th the “munshiid al-shumu ukh” thus bbears the story of Abuu Qasura in tthis postingg entitled “eu ulogy for thhe beloved Abu A Qasuraa al-Gharib””, narrated his h comradee and brother in arms.157 The story is furtherr outlined and photoggraphs of Abu Qasūrra, showingg him arm med with a Pullemyot Kalashnikova, a heavy innfantry weapon, and sitting in ffront of thee handcraftt Jabhat al-N Nusra flag clearly c align n him to thiss elite band of Mujahid deen that is ggreatly adm mired by thee followers and subscrribers of th he al-Qaedaa ideology. His comrrade denotees him in a classicall descriptionn for the maartyrs as a coming g from thee heart; Ab bu Qasura drove him mself to exh haustion too these words are disttinguish him mself by thee troop whoo deem them mselves as th hose sinceree with God.

156

The link iin the picture is defunct. JN N has, howeveer, opened a new n Facebook k group with tthe title “gazaaanow”. It hass over 20,0000 “likes” as of May 22, 20 013, https://w www.facebook.com/gazaano ow. 157 Publishedd and accessedd March 4, 2013, https://shaamikh1.info/vb b/showthread.php?t=1938334,

131

While havving been a fighter, an nd thus a fuully subscriibed individ dual to the ideology of o al-Qaedaa expressed bby his clearr membersh hip of Jabhaat al-Nusra in i its early phase, p he coontributed to t the jihadii forums as a member. His status is thus furtther elevateed by his routine onlinee. Howeverr, the jihadii sub-culturee on the Internet was where w he haad been draw wn into the vision of A AQ in the firrst place, ass al-Muhajirr states addrressing the readers r likew wise: Donn’t you rem member the day when yyou cried ou ut of pain while w you wh where watchiing the firstt Fridday sermonn distributed d [online] byy Jabhat al-N Nusra158 incciting to Jihhad?! 1599 Donn’t you recaall the day when w we saat in the lod dge of our beloved b Abuu Mariyya al-Tunisi, a

mayy God accept him?! 158

The scenee describes maay remind the wary online cconsumer of Jabhat J al-Nusrra videos of thhe video entittled “da’wa too Jihad forr Syria”. The about a 30-minu ute long clip shhows a sermo on by a masked preacher whho openly callls to arms andd raises a K Kalashnikov from fr the pulpiit over his heaad inciting thee male crowd to respond. T The video was published onn April 12, 2012, http://w www.youtube..com/watch?vv=ahakEgAig--8 (accessed May M 31, 2013)). 159 This is m most likely a reference to o a Tunisian fighter, killed d February 26 2 in Aleppo,, Syria. A Faacebook pagee commem morating him m has abou ut 90,000 ‘likes’. “Réévolution Tu unisienne 2””, February 26, 2012,, https://ww ww.facebook.com/revolutio on.tn.2/posts/1106831816169 9836 (accesseed May 27, 20013). A video ppublished by the t al-Bayariq q Media Founndation, part of o Ansar al-Sh hari’a in Tunissia and Egyptt, on Februaryy 25, 2013 commemorattes the fighterr and details hhis life. His clear c name waas Ayman al-H Hukayri, 30 years old from m Matuer, T Tunisia and he h had been a member off Jabhat al-Nu usra. He was jailed under Ben Ali’s ru ule based “onn terrorism m charges”, http://ww ww.youtube.coom/watch?v=2 24lSGT9T5E44 (accessed May M 27, 2013).

132

Don’t you remember how you ran out with him shouting “allahu akbar” when the preacher raised his weapon over his head on the pulpit?! As a role model, Abu Qasura serves as an identity marker, for he had been a ‘normal’, everyday user of the Internet. The general outline of his online radicalization, in combination with his combat actions in Libya and his exposure to fighters perhaps at least sympathetic to AQ’s worldview turn him into a role model who can be re-enacted even just by following jihadist sermons distributed online. Perhaps before joining JN the online inspired Mujahid was further guided in the field by religious teachings and instructions. Ideologues like Palestinian Abu l’-Walid al-Maqdisi160 had played a vital role in the religious teaching, who nevertheless was a prominent offline preacher based in Gaza and a vivid online activists likewise. The Israeli Air Force killed him in a targeted mission in October 2012.161 The impact of online active and Internet-fluent ideologues such as Abu ‘l-Walid al-Maqdisi, who had been the leader of various jihadist groups in Gaza and a veteran from Iraq was also acknowledged by Ayman al-Zawahiri in a eulogy.162 Remaining active within the virtual landscape, Abu Qasura translated his newly acquired knowledge about religious affairs into comprehensible contributions online for the like-minded youth, perhaps picturing himself in the footsteps of his role models such as al-Maqdisi. Whenever you had completed your work, being instructed or on guard duty, you went straight to your iPad and you finished your reading. O, how you loved Abu ‘l-Walid alMaqdisi – may God accept him – even though you had never met him! This is the muwahhid163 – the true professor of monotheism – I poetize!! For he is a juvenile, a lion, a memorizer of the Book of God, Muhammad al-Zulaytani, may God receive him. He is one of the lions of JN in the glorious Idlib. The story resembles the classical elements of the shahid genre and is at the same time a milestone regarding the dissemination strategy by AQ groups such as JN as of. It shows how classical forums 160 161

162 163

His writings, rulings, decrees, and articles can be accessed on the website dedicated to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (‘Isam al-Barqawi) Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, http://tawhed.ws/a?a=abuwalid (accessed May 27, 2013). David Barnett, Bill Roggio, “Israeli Air Force kills leader of the Tawhid and Jihad Group in Gaza airstrike”, The Long War Journal, October 13, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/israeli_air_force_ki.php#ixzz2UuZROkjB, (accessed May 31, 2013). Ritha’ al-shaykh Hisham al-Sa’idani (Abu ‘l-Walid al-Maqdisi), as-Sahab Media, November 2012, http://www.jarchive.net/details.php?item_id=7808 (accessed May 27, 2013). Nico Prucha, Die Stimme des Dschihad “Sawt al-Gihad”: al-Qaidas erstes Online-Magazin (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac 2010), 65.

133

are still used as the primary channel to disseminate information among the members without seeking the need to publish further details, in particular videos. The ‘classical’ jihadi forums serve as a normative and authoritative basis – for any content published here is credible and authentic. The content, however, is by far not limited to the forum. Rather, independent distribution via YouTube and Twitter boost role models such as Abu Qasura on all layers online. Photo-sharing social media sites such as flickr164 and naturally Twitter, where high-profile (and prolific) AQactivists are advertising the martyr as another true role model165 have contributed to the appeal of the shahid who is also eulogized in a special video on YouTube.166 The death of Abu Qasura was also confirmed by an online forum belonging to the “Free Syrian Army” in a posting entitled “the martyr al-Zulaytani of the Libyan martyrs who attained martyrdom in Syria in 2013.”167 The posting is introduced by Qur’an 3:169 and a picture shows Abu Qasura holding a commando version of the A.K. 47 assault rifle sitting at a beach. Beneath the picture a famous hadith complements the posting, emphasizing the divine obligation to fight in alSham (Syria): Narrated by Zayyid bin Thabit al-Ansari – may God be satisfied with him –, said: The messenger of God, peace and blessing be upon him, was heard saying: “My blessings for Sham! My blessings for Sham! My blessings for Sham!” They said: “O messenger of God, what is the meaning of this?” He said: “These angels of God have spread their wings over Sham.”168

A new generation of shuhada’ – Pathways and Intersections of the On- and Offline Worlds The massive jihadist content online has inspired and incited a new generation of passive sympathizers and active recruits resulting in a new generation of martyrs. For those who joined jihadist outlets or succeeded in undertaking ‘lone wolf’ attacks and have been martyred fighting or perished as martyrdom operatives and who nevertheless had a virtual footprint, by being forum members, contributors in general via Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube, re-enter the very same jihadist segments of the Internet after their death. These individual martyr stories, sometimes published as 164

http://www.flickr.com/photos/93647787@N07/8518363744/in/photostream/ As promoted, for example, by the Twitter user @7AZ1M, https://twitter.com/7AZ1M/status/305800644848152577 166 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RelWqgxf9H0, published January 7, 2013 (accessed May 20, 2013). 167 http://syrianarmyfree.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37269, March 4, 2013 (accessed May 31, 2013). 168 Ibid. For the reference of the hadith: Musnad Ahmad (21096). 165

134

PDF- or WORD-documents, but also as threads on forums and the social media in general serve as intersecting or parsing the virtual online with the real-life offline world. Prominent stories are those, whereas the martyr had a role in both elements. The commemoration of the munshid, the nashid singer of the al-Shumukh al-Islam forum by the administration in April of 2012, or the eulogy of Abu Qasura, a young Libyan who was killed in 2012 in Syria fighting with Jabhat al-Nusra underline the successful impact and the passion of jihadist missionizing within both worlds and the mobilization. Whether via ‘retweets’ on Twitter, posting comments on YouTube videos, or ‘likes’ on Facebook, by embracing the emergent behavior and ‘social search’ which sites such as Twitter and Facebook facilitate, anyone can connect with and disseminate propaganda content outside of the ‘classical forums’. This has crafted a new generation of jihadists, who had been active within these virtual dominions of al-Qaeda, where the exposure to the media has had an impact on their personal lives and understanding of religious conduct. When individuals of that new generation become martyrs, they ultimately re-enter this jihadi sphere of role models and ideology online, being advocated and promoted as role models themselves. Such personal biographies further strengthen the overarching ‘narrative’ placed on the channels of the ‘new’ and ‘social media’ dominating the Internet. Twitter and Facebook are the natural choice for the jihadist strategic communication and specifically their crowd-out strategies, turning these new-generation martyrs into pop-stars with access to their Facebook profiles, YouTube commemoration videos, photo-sharing sites such as flickr, or the Facebook groups promoted within jihadist forums.

135

The high-llevel ideologgue and miilitary leadeer Abu ‘l-Layth al-Libi, killed in a U.S. dron ne strike inn 2008 is loooking at thee jihadi med dia activityy on the pho oto-sharing site “flickrr” from hea aven in thiss fan-photosshopped picture

Faccilitating thhe Internet as the prrime and most m effective (as w well as cosst-effective)) communication facilitty to lure co onsumers innto their specific interprretation or w world perceeption is nott restricted tto the jihaddi web. Millitant and hhate groups of all colo ors employ similar means to gainn sympathy tthrough moodern and pop-cultural elements. However, H th he quantity as well as quality, nott to neglect the multi-liingual capaccity, of jihaadi media deepartments is unmatche hed and unprecedented.. Employingg nashid (“ppraiseful hy ymns”) andd huda’ (“en ncouraging battle songgs”) as pow werful audioo elements I like to term m as ‘nashid dworms’ as they functio on and trigg ger elementts commonly known ass j forum ms to social media – ‘earwormss’169 are a popular eleement and passed on from the jihadi boosting profiles withhin the onlin ne communnities. Like most m elements of jihaddi media, this powerfull emotional and romantticizing son ng craft is pplaced in combination with w visual elements of o appealingg training, coombat, or everyday e asspects of thhe Mujahideeen and usee a powerfuul, yet comp prehensiblee rhetoric ennhancing the overall ap ppeal. The rhetoric is inseparablee from the ((audio-) vissual contentt and enforcces key elem ments whilee reaching oout to the au udience to get g active, eempower th he umma byy individual response. Soccial media, such as Faacebook, onn the other hand, h also pose p a poteential threatt to jihadistt groups annd their phhysical netw works. As the nature of social media connsists of an a constantt informationn flow, grooups such as the in S Syria activee Kata’ib al-Muhajirin a n bi Ard all-Sham feltt 169

For a typpology of thee classical eaarworm, Ira H Hyman, Naom mi Burland, Hollyman H Duuskin et al, “Going “ Gaga:: Investigaating, Creatingg, and Manipu ulating the Soong Stuck in My M Head”, Ap pplied Cognittive Psycholog gy 27 (2013),, 204–215..

136

inclined to publish pictures and names of every martyr on their Facebook group, linking to YouTube. This crowd-out strategy, however, backfired and the Facebook page went silent. On May 5, 2013, the administrator posted an explanation of the group’s media outage: Peace be upon you, the mercy of God and His blessing, we apologize to every member of [our] honorable page for our absence recently, not publishing news and other things (…). [We] had been busy with internal issues and when we had uploaded a couple of pictures [on our Facebook page] of those who we deem being martyrs, the local security forces responded in their respective countries, raiding their houses. We therefore stopped this to protect the families [of the martyrs]. We are very sorry and ask you for forgiveness for our failure to protect them.170

170

Facebook page of the Kata’ib al-Muhajirin bi Ard al-Sham, published and accessed May 5, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=473426306061452&id=443758765694873

137

Rüdiger Lohlker

Jihadi Masculinities: Another Masculinity in Crisis Living in her street I find very nice I would rather be there than in paradise. Hafiz (just another idea of paradise, R.L.) Jihadis adopt a specific framing of the Islamic master frame aiming at a legitimation of violent action.1 A sub frame of the jihadi frame is the masculinity frame. This frame has not been analyzed up to now, although there are some discussions starting from the idea terrorism is a result of “angry young men”, the youth bulge2 etc.3 To understand the general mindset of jihadi agitators, it is helpful to look at a description of right-wing agitators in the U.S. in the 1940s. The similarities are striking: The modern individual's sense of isolation, his so-called spiritual homelessness, his bewilderment in the face of the seemingly impersonal forces of which he feels himself a helpless victim, his weakening sense of values – all these motifs often recur in modern sociological writings. This malaise reflects the stresses imposed on the individual by the profound transformations taking place in our economic and social structure. [...] On the plane of immediate awareness, the malaise seems to originate in the individual's own depths and is experienced by him as an apparently isolated and purely psychic or spiritual crisis. It enhances his sense of antagonism to the rest of the world. Although malaise actually reflects social reality, it also veils and distorts it. Malaise is 1

2

3

For a discussion of this (re-)framing cf. Rüdiger Lohlker, “Religion, Weapons, and Jihadism: Emblematic Discourses”, in Rüdiger Lohlker (ed.), Jihadism: Online Discourses and Representations (Göttingen: Vienna University Press 2012b), 65-87. This one dimensional approach to societal problems has been delegitimized by the development of the Arab revolutions of 2010/11 onwards (e. g., Andrey V. Korotayev/Julia V. Zinkina, “Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis”, Entelequia. Revista interdisciplinar 13 (2011), 139-169 (http://cliodynamics.ru/download/Korotayev_Zinkina_Egyptian_Revolution_Entelequia_New.pdf) (accessed April 21, 2013) and even earlier studies, e. g., Henrik Urdal/Kristian Hoelscher, Urban Youth Bulges and Social Disorder: An Empirical Study of Asian and Sub-Saharan Cities (http://http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1503804) (accessed August 21, 2013)). The German author published in 2006 a pamphlet on the men of terror or the radical losers applying the usual stereotypes about arabo-islamic cultures (Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Schreckens Männer: Versuch über die radikalen Verlierer, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2006).

138

neither an illusion of the audience nor a mere imposition by the agitator; it is a psychological symptom of an oppressive situation. The agitator does not try to diagnose the relationship of this symptom to the underlying social situation. [...] Those afflicted by the malaise ascribe social evil not to an unjust or obsolete form of society or to a poor organization of an adequate society, but rather to activities of individuals or groups motivated by innate impulses. For the agitator these impulses are biological in nature they function beyond and above history: Jews, for instance, are evil—a "fact" which the agitator simply takes for granted as an inherent condition that requires no explanation or development. Abstract intellectual theories do not seem to the masses as immediately "real" as their own emotional reactions. It is for this reason that the emotions expressed in agitation appear to function as an independent force, which exists prior to the articulation of any particular issue, is expressed by this articulation, and continues to exist after it. [...] Malaise can be compared to a skin disease. The patient who suffers from such a disease has an instinctive urge to scratch his skin. If he follows the orders of a competent doctor, he will refrain from scratching and seek a cure for the cause of his itch. But if he succumbs to his unreflective reaction, he will scratch all the more vigorously. This irrational exercise of selfviolence will give him a certain kind of relief, but it will at the same time increase his need to scratch and will in no way cure his disease. The agitator says: keep scratching.4 To look at jihadi agitators simply as an Islamic version of right-wing agitators is misleading. Jihadism as a transnational subculture is born out of the experience of the Afghanistan wars, the situation in the home countries of the Arab Afghans, and the situation in several Asian countries. This core structure of Jihadism has spread over the world including other Muslims suffering from particular forms of malaise and uniting them by common enemies. The similarities we may not go back to the fact that Jihadism is a modern phenomenon like other phenomena. The specifics of jihadist identities are derived from a shared religious heritage5, a shared worldview, especially well identified enemies (the 'West' in general), and an individual identity born out of the experience of modern malaise and vulnerability of the self forcing the individual jihadi to build a strong identity with fixed boundaries. This may be interpreted as an expression of masculine identity in crisis, a common trait of the 20th and 21st century. Jihadis use the urge to act violently as a substitute for the scratching mentioned above. Because the scratching will not cure the disease, death as the final 4 5

Leo Lowenthal/Norbert Guterman, Prophets of Deceit. A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator (New York: Harper & Brothers 1949), 15-16. We will not discuss here the relation between Islam and Jihadism. Jihadism is understood as a transnational subculture using and reframing Islamic master frames to fit into a subculture centering on the use of violence.

139

solution of all tensions – and scratching – is so attractive for jihadis. We may interpret jihadi masculinities as a specific variegation of general masculinity in crisis. The Turkish sociologist Pinar Selek states that as long as “being a man” is on trial there is the danger to lose it again. See-sawing between being in power and powerlessness transforms men into schizophrenic beings, very fragile, trying to conceal this fragility by building walls, wearing powers, and performing rituals of power.6 The most effective rituals are using violence against all enemies securing the fragile body of jihadis and the walls built to protect it. This fragile existence, this feeling of malaise, the need to scratch is put into action by a minority of Muslims the majority does not interpret jihad as an obligation to act violently. Gabriele Marranci argues – starting from Damasio's theory of emotions and self and Milton's understanding of emotions as ecological mechanisms – that this difference goes back to their primary emotional commitments. In other words, it is what I feel I am that determines my identity for me, regardless of how others, engaged in countless public discourses around the use of cultural markers, might perceive me. Now, an increasing number of Western Muslims are becoming trapped in what Bhabha [...] has defined as the ‘circle of panic’. A ‘circle of panic’, according to Bhabha, develops when within a community an undefined and atestable rumour is spread. In this case, the rumour spreading among Muslims says that an imagined monolithic ‘West’ wishes to wipe out Islam, and consequently, Muslim identities. I shall suggest that a ‘circle of panic’ is what Bateson has defined as schismogenesis: the tendency for individuals to move apart through a systematic and divergent interaction produced by negative feedback. Schismogenetic processes may affect the emotions of certain Muslims to the degree that they feel an act of identity to be required in order to maintain a stable experience of their self. Because of the ‘circle of panic’, a certain rhetoric of jihad could easily become the preferred ‘act of identity’.7 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi8 has several texts to illustrate – not intentional for sure – the circle of panic. To quote just one example focusing on feeling of the jihadis of being threatened: The conspiracy against our brothers, against their banner and against their jihad arises from

6 7 8

Selek Pinar, Zum Mann gehätschelt, zum Mann gedrillt. Männliche Identitäten (Berlin: Orlanda 2010), 230-231. Gabriele Marranci, Jihad beyond Islam (Oxford/New York: Berg 2006), 10-11. For this leading jihadi thinker cf. Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Theology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 2012) and Muhammad Al Subaie, L'idéologie de l'islamisme radical. La nouvelle génération des intellectuels islamistes (Paris: L'Harmattan 2012).

140

all countries around them and the world in general […].9 Since the circle of panic produces a need for an “act of identity” to maintain stability, the following reflections are based on the assumption that one of the most important frames of this emotion is a specific jihadi masculinity frame enabling jihadis to build a – fragile – identity. The problematic situation of masculinities has been noted by scholars working on radicalization into violence, e.g., Tahir Abbas wrote: Young Muslim men, invariably of South Asian origin, are experiencing a sense of dislocation because of the presence of aspirational and committed women in society, as well as Muslim women within the South Asian community. In educational terms at least, women are outperforming men, although their representation in further and higher education is sometimes left wanting. There is a crisis of masculinity in society, with Muslim men particularly affected. Economic decline and psychological and cultural features impact on young Muslims in harsh terms. Furthermore, it is especially important to highlight the question of cultural patriarchy. British-born South Asian Muslim men often wish to integrate into society far more than earlier generations. However, certain inter-generational tensions can emerge, dislocating the second generation from the first. Parents have a particular set of expectations and children another. Tensions and rifts emerge, and within the context of patriarchy, which is especially acute for Pakistanis, young Muslim men, protected by their mothers (who can reproduce their own marginalisation through this), are unable to channel effectively their energies in a more productive way. The cleft between generations is not always bridged, with young men unable to find a way out and parents either unaware or prepared to turn a blind eye. A particular problem is the theology of inter-generational conflict. Younger Muslims want a stricter and more literal interpretation of the Quran, Sunna and Hadith because it gives people a sense of identity in an evermore fractured world. Given the freedoms provided to Muslims in Britain to take on challenges, individuals concerning themselves with struggles in other parts of the Muslim world are encouraged. But the theology of first- and secondgeneration South Asian Islam, particularly in relation to Pakistanis, is generally inflexible and unable to accommodate the interests and anxieties of current generations. As a consequence, younger Muslims turn to ‘radicalised’ sets of messages that stem from outside 9

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi al-Wasaya al-ghaliyya li-ansar al-shari'a al-'aliyya s. l. 2013 (via http://www.tawhed.ws) (accessed April 22, 2013).

141

the community and which position them in reaction to their parents and to wider dominant society.10 So there are complex configurations of tensions inside the Muslim community, too. The intergenerational conflicts between first and second generation, and even third-generation Muslim men. But the central problem remains the crisis of masculinity, that is expected to be solved by jihadi practice. This seems to be true for converts, too. Since the publication of Masculinities by Robert W. Connell, it is a truism that masculinity is a socially constructed category, not an essential, biologically based characteristic of male bodies.11 The vision of the male body requests a muscular, well trained body capable to do anything through his power and skills best symbolized in sports. To strengthen the boundaries living in a controlled manner is indispensable. The qualities of a mujahid are described by the godfather of transnational jihadism, 'Abdallah 'Azzam, as follows: …and I saw that most of the martyrs that I lived with possessed the following characteristics: • Holding the tongue from the Muslims • Keeping a clean heart towards the Muslims • Going about in silence, and avoiding too much talk • Obedience to the leaders – if he is commanded to be at the rear, he goes to the rear • Not arguing in regards to what they are ordered to do • Shyness, lofty character, and extreme respect for the scholars, elders, and those in authority • Firmness and keenness in remaining where they were, and running away from the environment of relaxation, free time, and ease • Their tongues would not move except in mentioning the good qualities of the Muslims…May Allah have Mercy upon a man who knows his own limits.12 This well trained state of mind is accompanied by physical training enabling the Mujahid to “run away”.

10 11 12

Tahir Abbas, “Introduction: Islamic Political Radicalism in Western Europe”, in id. (ed.), Islamic Political Radicalism: An European Perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2007), 3-14, here 10-11. Robert W. Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press 20052). 'Abdullāh 'Azzām, The Scales of Allāh, 22 (http://islamfuture.wordpress.com/2009/08/22/the-scales-of-allah-swt/) (accessed March 28, 2010).

142

Training It is not surprising to read that military and physical training is regarded as one the foremost duty of the Mujahidin even if spiritual preparation has – theoretically – a certain pre-eminence: Generally the military training ought to be acquired by every healthy Muslim. Even the disabled Muslim could perform various military duties, due to the modern method of warfare. Specifically, each and every member of the Jihad Movements and organisations must obtain the highest standard of military training and ought to acquire first-hand experience of actual combat. After this necessary training they ought to serve whichever section they are assigned.13 Brynjar Lia commented on the centrality of training: “Training is perhaps the primary vehicle with which jihadi groups are able to translate their radical ideologies into violent action.”14 Stressing physical and military fitness is common to any other historical instances in Muslim history when the discourse the obligation of military jihad is intensified in cases of external and internal threat. The famous 12th century historian and Hadith scholar Ibn 'Asakir introduced his collection of forty hadiths on jihad intended to stir up “the valiant jihad fighters, the ones with strong determination and mighty arms, with sharp swords and piercing spears”.15 Modern day jihadis are referring to a tradition16. It is, however, a tradition17 that is reconfigured and reframed to support the modern – fragile – construction of identity we have been talking about. A course in one of the famous training camps in Afghanistan may have taken eight months18 other courses have been shorter.19 To give an impression of training in 2008 in North Africa20:

13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20

Mufti Khubaib Sahib, Mujahideen & Training (http://www.2600.com/news/mirrors/harkatmujahideen/ www.harkatulmujahideen.org/jihad/m-train.htm) (accessed August 22, 2012). Lia Brynjar, “Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training”, Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (2008), 518-542, 1. Sulaiman A. Mourad/James E. Lindsay, The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period. Ibn ʿAsākir of Damascus (1105-1176) and His Age, with an Edition and Translation of Ibn ʿAsākir's. The Forty Hadiths for Inciting Jihad (Leiden/Boston: Brill 2013), 65. This tradition can be traced back to the prophet Muhammad; but there are other traditions on jihad this narrative ignores. For a contextualization cf. Mourad/Lindsay, The Intensification. al-Shahid Abu Ishaq al-Afghani. Najm ada'a fi sama' al-Jaza'ir, s. l. 1427h (http://tawhed.ws/pr?i=5922) (accessed November 30, 2011). For virtual training camps cf. Anne Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?”, Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (2008), 215-233. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xrx4wl_iiiii-iiiiiii-iiiii-iiiiii-iiiiiiii-iiii-iii-iiiii-iiiiii_shortfilms#.UY5mjCqtb-9 (accessed May 11, 2013).

143

One of thee most impoortant methods of trainning is “edu ucation by momentous m s events”.21 One of thee prominent writers on these t issuess, Abu Bakrr al-Naji, connsiders this method th he most efffective one. Naji belieeves that ‘tterrible eveents’ whichh cappture the minnds of the people, p whicch the jihad di movemen nt is a part oof, have a much m greaterr learrning effectt than ‘a hu undred yearss of peacefu ul education n.’ This is eespecially so [...] sincee succh ‘momenttous events’ produce hheroes on both b sides. They give ample opp portunity too 2 dem monstrate ‘ssteadfastnesss in the facee of the horrrors resultin ng from theese events.’22

Naji states, citing anotther author, the cure for all a of this is enteringg the battleefields23 [… …] the mosst importan nt field forr eduucation is thhe battlefield [...] the puurification of the soulss and the edducation of sincerity inn praactice takes necessarily y place [… …] on the battlefields b of jihad ass had taken n place thee eduucation of the t first Mu uslims... [… …] The mosst importan nt point we have to clarify is thee effeect of practiical jihad on n the educaation of the [jihadi] gro oup and the souls of itss individuall mem mbers... Thhe communiity confrontting hardshiips, fighting g adversitiees, and who ose sons aree exeercising connstant effortss and permaanent jihad,, this is the communityy that is entitled to live,, andd it is written for it thatt it will perssist and trium mph [...] Th his method oof education n with all itt 21 22 23

Lia, Docttrines, 35. Id. Klaus Thheweleit, Mäännerphantasien 1+2 (Müünchen/Zürich h: Piper 2000 0), Vol. 2, 1176 ff., discusses similarr phenomenna for Germaan right-wing authors. The similarity of extreme ethno ocentric nationnalism in the German casee and jihaddi worldview ws has been noticed by Werner Boh hleber, “Kolleektive Phantaasmen, Destrruktivität undd Terrorism mus”, in Thoomas Auchterr et al. (edss.), Der 11. September. Psychoanalyttische, psych hosoziale undd psychohisstorische Analysen von Terrror und Traum ma (Gießen: Psychosozial-V P Verlag 2003), 164-183, too.

144

includes of hardship and horror is the only powerful way to erect a firm basis.24 Creating a firm basis is indispensable for the jihadi project, recalling what we have already said about male jihadi identity. Jihadi men are fighting against the desires they have themselves. They are not able to reach the aim they are proclaiming, the global Islamic caliphate, so they reach out for what they are able to do: destroying the enemies. Being trained to shed blood efficiently enables the mujahid to stop the attack on his boundaries, he imagines as boundaries of the global umma, and to dissolute the tensions he is feeling in the act of shedding his own blood25 – and still stay alive in the memories of the virtual and real jihadi subculture and in paradise. As a shahid the fighter attains unification with the other, i. e., the enemy, destroying him and guaranteeing his own purity since he is not tarnished by worldly desires, hardened against it through the suffering and pain of his training and actions. Proclaiming the primacy of shedding blood to be a true human (i. e., man) is not a genuine Islamic or Muslim concept. We read similar ideas in right-wing, monarchist, revolutionary conservative texts in Europe. For instance, count Joseph de Maistre (1754-1821) praises the executioner, putting him on the same level as soldiers as a professional killer silencing the earth crying out for blood. War is for de Maistre simply divine, the natural state of mankind. Shedding blood is necessary for the salvation of mankind/men.26 The other side of this construction of man/kind is the body, i. e., women as the embodiment of uncontrolled flesh and of blood, to be controlled because they represent nature, potentially out of control and as such a threat to masculinity as a power of control.27 We will come back to this aspect later.

Masculine bodies The masculine body formed in the imaginary (and reality) of jihadis may be illustrated by this wallpaper in a jihadi tumblr-blog28 showing a ninja-style fighter and the black jihadi banner29 : 24 25

26

27 28

Abu Bakr Naji, Idarat al-tawahhush, akhtar al-marhala sa-tamurru biha al-umma (http://ia600402.us.archive.org/10/items/ozoooK/48.pdf) (accessed May 08, 2013), 58. The act of shedding ones own blood is often stressed, e. g., “the brothers Mujahidin whose blood is shed on this earth” (al-Malahim li'l-intaj al-i'lami, Mu'assasat, Nukhbat al-i'lam al-jihadi. Qism al-tafrigh wa'l-nashr, tafrigh liisdar al-mar'i al-mumayyiz: Fuztu wa-rabb al-Ka'ba 2, s.l. 2010 (via http://www.tawhed.ws) (accessed May 8, 2013), 7). All references as in Nikolaus Sombart, Die deutschen Männer und ihre Feinde. Carl Schmitt: Ein deutsches Schicksal zwischen Männerbund und Patriarchatsmythos (München/Wien: Carl Hanser 1991), 67f.; for a similar approach cf. Theweleit, Männerphantasien. Id., 80f. http://jundullah.tumblr.com/ (accessed October 10, 2012); the title of this blog is referring to Australia. The

145

The imaginned super-nnatural strength is welll illustrated d by this graphic file, winner off the designn contest30 att Ansar al-M Mujahidin forum f in 20009:

29 30

backgrouund image is taken t from a site s offering laayouts, codes, generators, an nd graphics too enhance the appearance of Web 22.0 sites: http://content.pimp p-my-profile.ccom/i50/5/3/1 13/f_6f6db16aab7d7.jpg. Cf. Philippp Holtmann,, “The Symbo ols of Online JJihad”, in Rüd diger Lohlker (ed.), ( Jihadism m: Online Disscourses and Represenntations (Götttingen: Viennaa University P Press 2012), 9--63 on jihadi aesthetics. a Jihadi foora are followiing the commo on media conccept of attractting users by using u games, a jihadi varietty of gamificaation of onlinee behavior.

146

This designn reminds us u of the vissual impactt of some on nline gamess, but for ouur discussio on the mainn point is thee fine illustrration of jih hadi feelingg of grandiosity viewing g others as inferior, ev ven in termss of physicall appearance. The imag gined battleffield is wheere jihadis are a honed. A As Lia puts it: i sincce jihad is such s a pain nful and bruutal process, the preparratory proceess must acccustom thee recrruit to this reality: r they y must learnn determinaation, patien nce, and selff-sacrifice; they t shouldd learrn to enduree the brutaliity of war, bbut also to employ e its savagery s aggainst Islam m’s enemies.. Leaarning by doing is a po oint raised bby all theorrists: particiipation in aactive war-ffighting andd arm med confronntations is th he best way to learn jih had.31 howing anotther masculline ideal, an athlete poosing as thee archetypall Less pop ccultural is thhe post32 sh male primaate.33 This time t it is th he well trainned body of Mike Tyson also knoown under his Muslim m name as M Malik Abdul Aziz34:

The messaage is cleaar: A Musslim fighterr posing as a a role model for mujahidin n and theirr sympathizeers. Sometiimes this kind k of poosing is no ot well interpreted, w we might say: s utterlyy

31 32 33 34

Lia, Docctrines, 519. http://junndullah.tumblrr.com/ (accesssed Janaury 066, 2013). http://junndullah.tumblrr.com/ (accesssed August 277, 2012). The retirred professionnal boxer conv verted to Islam m in prison, at first to the Naation of Islam m than Sunni Isslam.

147

ridiculous335:

The perfecctly styled jihadi bod dy is imagiined as beiing pure. This T purityy is a prereequisite forr stabilizing the well coonstructed boundaries b oof this body y. The boun ndaries are tto be defended againstt enemies off every kindd. Especially Muslims – nominally Muslims for jihadis – are dangeerous. Non-violent Muuslims are perceived p ass traitors. Shhia Muslim ms are a welll known foee for most of o the salafii Muslims but jihadiis stress especially the coaliition of Zionism Z (= =Israel), imperialism i m (=USA/Cruusaders), annd Shiism (= =Iran) and aall their allies imaginab ble: [...]] the peoplee has to be awakened tto know of the zionist--crusader-shhi'i36 projecct organizedd agaainst them too gain hegem mony aboutt the region n and its Mu uslim inhabiitants.37 There are other elem ments conspiiring againsst the unity y necessary to stabilizee jihadi ideentities, andd these are fooes from wiithin:

35 36 37

The pictuure is taken duuring pro-Syriian oppositionn manifestatio on, but posted on a jihadi bloog on tumblr.ccom. So we may readd it as part of the t jihadi imaaginary. The wordd used in Arabbic is rafidi, a derogative nooun applied to o Shi'i Muslim ms. Abu Ahm mad ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Misri, Tahta zilal al-suyuff: al-Jihad bayyna al-ta'ifa w wa'l-umma fi zill al-harb 'ala al-m muqaddasat waa-'umum fardiiyyat al-jihad (http://www.aas-ansar.com/v vb/showthreadd.php?t=1752 25) (accessed April 5, 22010), 23.

148

Be aware that, behind eveery secessioon (fitna)38, are people exploiting e it and distrib buting whatt d them39 is America, itts secret serrvices and ttheir follow wers amongg theyy get out of it. Behind 4 the Arabs [...].40

The purityy of jihad iss a special concern, c i. e., the puriity of the jihadis, is peermanently threatened.. Mikael101, a jihadi tumblr-blog t gger posts a picture with w the bo ottom line ““Do Not Tarnish T Thee Of Jihad”41: Sublimity O

Women an nd purity As we ssaid, womenn are to be controlled ssince they are a endangeering the coontrol and purity p of thee body armooured througgh rigorous training, suubordinatio on and obed dience (see bbelow), hin ndering him m to follow tthe way off jihad. Therre is one reepresentatio on of femin nine beings acceptable for jihadiss without reservations: the maiden ns of paradiise, the fam mous huris. The differeence of reaal women – here: the mother – and the id dealized maaidens of paradise p are well expplained in this poem,, anonymously as in maany cases42: “The maide dens of paradise (hur all-'ayn) are ccalling me 38 39 40 41 42

One of thhe most difficcult concepts to translate. Fiitna means seccession, tumullt, upheaval, eeven some kin nd of tribulatioon. The text has an obviouus typo. Ahmad 'A Ashshush, Barra'at al-tayyar al-jihadi miin za'ighinat al-ashrar a s. l.: s. d. (via httpp://as-ansar.co om) (accessedd April 20, 2013), 6. http://miikael101.tumbblr.com/page/2 2 (accessed Feebruary 10, 20 012). Anonym mous, al-hur s.d.; a very com mmon poem annd song; in a forum we read d about a Abuu Marwan as author, a but this attribbution is not sure. s For a voccal version off this poem cf. http://www.y youtube.com/w watch?v=qdEp ponpJKls (accessedd April 22, 20013).

149

The maidens of paradise are calling me./Let me, o mother, let me. Do not shed tears, my mother./You will not lead me astray. Mother, my way is clear,/the heart is filled with joy. War and jihad are on their way./Blood is spilled for glory.” We notice a first alienation: Giving up the mother for the maidens of paradise, a real woman for imaginary women. A file on killed mujahidin gives some other examples. We read about a mujahid, who said every time when he thought about returning to his family: “I am here to die and to go directly into the garden of paradise (janna).”43 About another fighter we read, “he preferred the next world to this world and its decorations […] and to his wife and her European44 coquetry […] paradise and the maidens of paradise”.45 There is another case. A Saudi mujahid returned to his mother after a longer stay in Afghanistan – where his brother had died. His mother objected to his intention to join the fighters in Bosnia. He was engaged, and the date of his wedding was fixed. He continued his studies at the university until his mother died. Then we read, “but god declined to marry to anybody else than the maidens of paradise.” The mujahid went to Bosnia and was killed there.46 We learn about another Saudi mujahid fought in Afghanistan. Returning to Saudi Arabia his family and especially his mother was happy, arranging everything for marriage. The house was prepared for the couple. “But God wanted for him that one of the maidens of paradise should be his wife”.47 Another fighter – this one from Turkey fighting in Chechnya – was very interested in the maidens of paradise. Again and again he was asking […]: What about the maidens of paradise? […] What about the paradise garden (janna)? A year passed, and he returned to Turkey […] then he contacted one of his fellow mujahidin, crying: What made me leave Chechnya? […] By God! Live after jihad is not bearable […] And he returned to Chechnya.48

43

44 45 46 47 48

Hamad al-Qatari/M. al-Madani, Min qisas al-shuhada' al-'arab, s. l. 2004 (http://www.saaid.net/doat/hamad) (accessed April 26, 2013), 38. The older biographical stories are much more instructive than younger ones, because newer biographies are more conventional, using well established narrative structures. Cf. Rüdiger Lohlker, Dschihadismus: Materialien (Wien: facultas/wuv 2009a). Just a code for what was perceived as an unislamic behaviour by jihadis. Qatari/Madani, Min qisas, 88. Id., 27 and 38. Id., 64. Id., 78.

150

The way too jihad is im magined as endangeredd by the vices of this world. w We reead about on ne Mujahidd traveling too Bosnia: Theey were waaiting that a way mayy open up either e in Crroatia or Sllovakia. Bo oth of thesee couuntries are full fu of sins, wine, w womeen, and tribu ulations, no obody can sttand it.49 uet woman, endangeringg the will of the jihadi,, So we are lleft with thrree types off real womeen: the coqu the motherr, the persoon who may y stand in tthe way of the jihadi, the wife orr the bride, potentiallyy dangerous since she iss enticing th he aspiring jihadi into the bonds of o marital liife or the sw wamp of ann o be accceptable if sh he turns to jihad. j average liffe. The wifee/bride will only The jihadi imaginary is i producing g illustratioons of this faantasy:

r “The type of Mu uslimah we should all sseek.”50 A kind k of jokee The headliine of this illlustration reads: by an armcchair mujahhid, not a reaal activist. T The hipster reading of “anything ggoes” affectts the jihadii online presence. Therre seems to o be a straange attractiiveness of a niqabi w woman with h a AK 47,, vely using a weapon, th he jihadi version of thee caring motther turningg controlled by niqab annd aggressiv mp when herr husband iss returning. The situatio on in Syria produced p a new pheno omenon: thee into a vam real niqabi fighter, turrning this illlustration innto reality. The impperfect reall woman caan be adapteed to a jihaadi lifestyle if she is abble to perfo orm what iss regarded as pious actiions in supp port of the j ihadi fighteers. Then th hey will be aable to supeersede evenn heir wide eyyes. We reaad a Fatwa,, a juridicall opinion, issued i by a the maidenns of paraddise with th

49 50

Id., 32. http://trutthseeker92.tum mblr.com/ (accessed Augusst 27, 2012).

151

member of the Fatwa committee of the Minbar al-tawhid wa'l-jihad site51. The question was asked by Abu Qatada52 al-Hulandi (Abu Qatada, the Dutchman)53: I heard from a brother that the witness (shahid) in the paradise garden is overwhelmed by the beauty of the maidens of paradise. But when he looks at his spouse he forgets the maidens since his wife is much more beautiful than the maidens of paradise. Is this a correct view? Don't forget to inform me since I want to join the mujahidin. A fundamental truism of the jihadi subculture seems to be threatened: the promised maidens of paradise. Another question arises: What about the real woman a jihadi may have married? The answer will calm down the worried mujahid to be: The believing women – when they enter the paradise garden – are more virtuous than the maidens of paradise. This is because of the pious deeds they did in this world.54 This is certainly a highly original and innovative solution to a problem worrying traditional Islamic scholars for centuries: the relation of believing women and maidens of paradise.55 But what about a woman who is not willing to act the way a mujahid, a jihadi fighter, expects them to do? We may assume she will be counted as one of the dangerous women threatening the integrity of the boundaries of the bodies of jihadis, causing his fragmentation and closing the door to the eternal solution of the tensions tearing his body apart. A jihadi who chooses to create intense bonds with females will not be able to reach true autonomy. The obsessive idea of autonomy so important for men and for jihadis and the attached idea of dominance and absolute control is an illusion endangered especially by the existence or appearance of women. The (male) subject is dependent on something else – women, the “west” etc. – at this stage and will remain dependent in the future. The paradox of dependence and striving for autonomy cannot be solved than by use of violence. This may be seen as a general problem of male identity but in the case of jihadis the solution for this paradox is transformed into a global conflict 51

52 53 54 55

For a preliminary analysis of this central site cf. Rüdiger Lohlker, “Eine „Bibliothek des Dschihad“: Minbar attauḥīd wa'l-ǧihād”, in Johanna Pink/Mathias Brückner (eds.), Von Chatforen bis Cyberjihad. Muslimische Internetnutzung in lokaler und globaler Perspektive (Würzburg: Ergon 2009b), 155-167. Referring – among others – to the famous jihadi ideologue Abu Qatada al-Filastini. http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=1961&text=‫العين‬+‫( الحور‬accessed April 15, 2013). I am leaving out the detailed discussion pertaining to this question. For a detailed discussion of the traditional and modern views cf. Jane Idleman Smith/Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press 2002), 157 ff.

152

between religions and cultures, a conflict aiming at the salvation of humanity on a global level.56 The source of sexual lust and fulfillment is just because it exists the source of aversion, fear, and defense.57 The female body is attractive but at the same time appears “as an anxiety-inducing location of threat or disgust” as Loren says58. This contradiction is to be solved by violence to achieve control of the sources of this threatening attraction and restore autonomy or re-erect the boundaries of the body. The most important mechanism to secure these boundaries is physical training as mentioned before.

Death and laughter The best way to dissolve the tensions the mujahidin experience trying to live this way is death. Soothing all these problems into an eternal dissolution is the only way available for mujahidin. In the biography of Sayf al-Umma al-Ghamidi, we are told this mujahid was never overwhelmed by a “lot of laughter” much more showing a kind of smile.59 There is one exception: Mujahidin are prescient of their death in action, i. e., they are laughing in expectation of their death. Abu Ishaq alJaza'iri is said to laugh when told about a dream of one of his companions that the leader of the group was wounded in the operation to come and said: “My explanation is that I will be killed as a blood witness in the way of god.”60 This part of the Fursan al-shahada series61 shows a mujahid preparing for a suicide attack:

56 57

58

59 60 61

Faisal Devji first wrote about this aspect (Faisal Devji, The Terrorist in Search of Humanity: Militant Islam and Global Politics, New York: Columbia University Press 2009). Rolf Pohl, “'(...) vom Liebhaber zum Lustmörder'. Die Legierung von Sexualität und Aggression in der männlichen Geschlechtsidentität”, in Sylvia von Arx et al. (eds.), Koordinaten der Männlichkeit. Orientierungsversuche (Tübingen: edition diskord 2003), 15-47, here 43-44. Loren, Scott, “Mutating Masculinity: Re-Visions of Gender and Violence in the Cinema of DavidCronenberg”, in Martina Läubli/Sabrina Sahli (eds.), Männlichkeiten denken. Aktuelle Perspektiven der kulturwissenschaftlichen Masculinity Studies (Bielefeld: transcript 2011), 151-170, here 157. http://tawhed.ws/pr?i=6991 (accessed November 30, 2011). al-Shahid Abu Ishaq al-Afghani. Najm ada'a fi sama' al-Jaza'ir (http://tawhed.ws/pr?i=5922) (accessed November 30, 2011). Fursan al-shahada 9 #2 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZU9vOFrgrY) (accessed May 11, 2013).

153

A smile or at least shoowing teeth is the usuall image prod duced of killled mujahiidin:

One of thee most impportant lead ders of the internation nal mujahidin in Chechhnya, al-Kh hattab, wass eulogized iin a very iddyllic picturre, evoking,, e. g., the birds b of paraadise but allso a feeling g of Pacificc islands62:

62

http://ww ww.facebook.ccom/pages//‫مجاھدوون‬4636354423678366?freef=ts (accessed April 19, 20013).

154

If this stagge is reachedd, the mujahidin as wittnesses of their t version n of Islam w will experieence eternall bliss, calm mness and looss of his in nternal tensiions. Still it is stressed that being kkilled in miilitary jihadd is a prerequuisite for reeaching this state. As M Mikael101 teells us63:

63

http://miikael101.tumbblr.com/post/11735940130/iin-the-name-o of-whom-muh hammads-soull-is-in-his (acccessed Novembber 21, 2012).

155

64 So fightingg, sheddingg blood is the prerequuisite for crrossing the bridge, thhe straight bridge b , too

paradise. O Once this bridge b is cro ossed, the pparadise is awaiting th he killed muujahidin. Th he paradisee understoodd this way is i the refugee of a torn masculine identity i lon nging for a pplace to liv ve where noo danger for his bodily identity i arisses, longingg for an idyllic scene lik ke this65:

This imagiinary is perttaining to th he paradigm ms of the geeneral Islam mic master fframe: the bridge b to bee crossed is well know wn to all Muslims; thee idyllic imaginary of paradise iss also very common.666 Jihadis aree thus apprropriating th his commoonly shared imaginary framing itt in a jihad di frame byy setting thee necessity to fight vio olently as aan indispen nsable condition to entter into parradise. Thiss

64 65

66

Referringg to the comm mon Islamic master m frame w with this idea from f the first Quranic Q Sura.. http://truuthseeker92.tuumblr.com/pag ge/3 (accessedd April 20, 20 012); the pictu ure is borrow wed without an ny hint to thee original file from httpp://www.flick kr.com/photos//cgrubbs/7012 2576033/sizess/l/in/photostreeam/ (don't expect e correctt applicatiion of citationn rules used by b jihadis), ddemonstrating g once again that t the jihaddi subculture is part of thee general iinternet culturre. There are different parradigms of paaradise in an Isslamic context (cf. Rüdiger Lohlker/Andr drea Nowak, “D Das islamischhe Paradies alls Zeichen: Zw wischen Märtyyrerkult und Garten”, G Wieneer Zeitschrift ffür die Kundee des Morgenllandes 99 (20009), 199-225).

156

necessity is put againsst the majorrity of Musllims, but alsso against arrmchair muj ujahidin67:

The focus of the life of o a mujahid d - to avoidd the disperssion of the suit of armoor he tried so s busily too build for his body – iss the amir, the leader off the group..68 To be obedient is inddispensablee: Obeedience to the t Ameer is i not only nnecessary fo or the Mujaahid, but it iis also the guarantee g off his success. Diisobediencee of the Am meer is a pitlless blackho ole of destruuction and a defeat forr O fallen into this bllackhole of disobedience it wouldd be extremeely difficultt the Mujahid. Once to gget out of itt. A Mujahid [...] is bleessed by Allah, and heavenly helpp is upon hiim while hee obeeys the Ameeer. By his obedience o too the Ameerr, Allah bestows upon hhim, an ascent to thosee leveels which is beyond one’s imaggination. Bu ut as soon as his obeedience to the Ameerr beccomes weakk, the dow wnfall of thhe Mujahid d commencce instantlyy, which is not onlyy desstructive to himself, h butt to the whoole Ummah and the wo orld at large..69

67 68 69

http://truuthseeker92.tuumblr.com/ (acccessed Februuary 15, 2013)). Rüdiger L Lohlker, “Cybberjihad – das Internet als F Feld der Agitattion”, Orient 43 4 (2002), 5077-536, here 52 20. Obediencce to the ameeer (http://ww ww.2600.com m/news/mirrorss/harkatmujahhideen/www.h harkatulmujahiideen.org/jihaad/obdence.htm m) (accessed August 222, 2012).

157

We read about the fear of the jihadis to lose control, to experience the dissolution of their boundaries without any other to reach. Even whole tracts written by jihadis remind us of the necessity to avoid any split – equating it to a sin and as such using religious framing – and to achieve a perfect unity, e. g., “Awakening the sleeper because of the sins of division and the importance of unification in the Islamic state”.70 Obedience to God and his prophet is equated with obedience to the amir.71 Implicitly the infallibility of the amir is suggested, causing the Mujahidin to follow him without questioning anything. This obedience manifests itself in the oath of allegiance (bay'a), a very old concept going back to the time of the prophet Muhammad. During all of Muslim history, the oath of allegiance was sworn to rulers.72 On a spiritual level, the oath of allegiance was sworn to Sufi shaykhs by their followers throughout Islamic history.73 These traditions were reframed into a specific jihadi frame helping the constantly endangered jihadi individual to hold his potentially fragmented identity together. So the functional organization of non-modern communities headed by a commander, leader etc. is transformed into a tool to construct a form of identity necessary to survive the malaise of modern societies. The amir and the jihadi group are the societal or organizational ego enclosing the individual ego of the jihadi. These “machines of totality” (Theweleit) are indispensable for the existence of the individual jihadi – at least in a virtual form. The family as a total institution is another machine producing unity and stability of the jihadi by using the spouse as a disanimated being, securing the borders of the jihadi ego against the evils of untamed sexuality. As spouse the legitimate woman is part of the body armor of jihadis. Another machine producing and upholding the borders of the jihadi ego74 is the weaponry (see below). All these machines are aiming at the stabilization of the potentially fragmental jihadi identity.75 The pressing need to construct the organizational ego is evident when we study the online activities of jihadis permeated by references to the bay'a.76 Offline activists stress this obligation, too. Juhayman al-'Utaybi, the leader of the occupiers of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, writes: [...] if the Muslims pledge allegiance to one imam, the person, who breaks up with the

70 71 72 73 74 75 76

Abu Sa'd al-'Amili, Tanbih al-anam li-ma fi'l-tafriqa min al-atham wa-ahamiyyat al-tawahhud fi daulat al-islam, s. l.: 2013 (via http://as-ansar.com/vb/) (accessed April 20, 2013). Sahib, Mujahideen. For an example for a still living tradition cf. Bettina Dennerlein, “Legitimate Bounds and Bound Legitimacy. The Act of Allegiance to the Ruler (bay`a) in 19th-century Morocco”, Die Welt des Islams 43 (2001), 287-310. William C. Chittick, Sufism (Oxford: Oneworld 2005), 28. Not only jihadi egos we may add, the affinity of men to technical devices may be interpreted as a softened version of this relation. Cf. Theweleit, Männerphantasien, 222-223. Philipp Holtmann will deal with this phenonemon in a book to be published 2013.

158

com mmunity, wiill die the death of an uunbeliever.77

The most pprominent example e of male m erectnness may be found in a statement bby the core of o al-Qa'idaa on the deatth of Usamaa bin Ladin,, the archetyypal image of a jihadi amir: a He was neither weak befo ore them, nnor did he capitulate. However, H hee challenged d them facee to fface, like a towering bu uilding whiich no one can surmou unt. He keptt fighting a battle withh whiich he was familiar, f an nd from whi ch he did no ot desist.”788

Fighter ass a role mod del m of maasculinity iss easily to be b found spporting the weapons w ass The fighhter as the dominant model the machinne symbolizzing virility and the waay to dissolv ve the tensio ons dominaating the jih hadi identityy constructioon. An exam mple from th he journal D Dharwat al-sanam79:

Another exxample from m the blog of o a supporteer of the Sy yrian jihadi group Jabhhat al-nusra80:

77 78

79 80

Juhaymann al-'Utaybi, Risala R al-imarra wa'l-bay'a w wa'l-ta'a wa-h hukm talbis all-hukkam 'ala talabat al-'ilm m wa'l-'ammaa (http://newarabia.org/vvb/showthread d.php?t=8167)) (accessed July 19, 2008). In the nam me of God The al-Qaeda Organisation O – General Lead dership “You have lived in gglory and died as a martyr” A statement abbout the digniity and martyrrdom of Sheikh h Osama bin Laden, L may A llah have merrcy on him (http://icssr.info/news/attachments/13 304701772AQ Q. Pdf) (accesssed July 5, 2011). Dharwat al-sanam, no. 3, 4 (several files availablle online). http://insppiredmuslimaah.tumblr.com//post/374689338768/la-ilahaa-illalah-muhaammadun-ra-ssoulullah (accessed Decembeer 30, 2012).

159

Sometimess even the shhadow of a body may bbe sufficien nt to evoke this t part of tthe jihadi im maginary:81 Weapons aas an essenttial part of jihadi j identtity are welll illustrated d by this trib ibute to the Stockholm m bomber Taaimour Abduulwahab al--Abdaly: “Grab myy Gun and my m Ammo Strap S my kaamarband on nto my chesst Get dresssed up in my m camo Martyrdom m is what I wanted w bestt Hit them w with my rock ket launcherr Grab myy Gun and my m Ammo Strap S my kaamarband on nto my chesst Get dresssed up in my m camo Martyrdom m is what I wanted w bestt The T Hoor all Ayn are waaiting for me m Grab myy Gun and my m Ammo Grab myy Gun and my m Ammo Strap S my kaamarband on nto my chesst Get dresssed up in my m camo 81

E. g., a piicture showingg the alleged shadow s of thee jihadi expertt on explosives, Dhu '-bijada dayn (http://ww ww.snamalislaam.com/vb/sh howthread.phpp?t=17270) (aaccessed Aprill 19, 2013). FFor Dhu l-bijadayn cf. myy chapter on Al-Qaeda Airlines A in this volume.

160

Martyrdom m is what I wanted w bestt Am mber's bluee eyes and her h blonde hair h Grab myy Gun and my m Ammo Strap S my kaamarband on nto my chesst Get dresssed up in my m camo Martyrdom m is what I wanted w bestt My M words arre bullets co oming at yo ou Grab myy Gun and my m Ammo Strap S my kaamarband on nto my chesst Get dresssed up in my m camo Martyrdom M is what I wanted best”82 We see thee intimate reelation of ussing weaponns as tools or o machiness for the trannsgression of o the fixedd boundariess of the jihaadi self by trransformingg it into thee “martyrdom” identityy in paradisee where thee maidens off paradise arre awaiting the fighter.. The fighterr is directly connected to paradise. Here, aan example from the context c of tthe Iraqi ciity of Fallu uja.83 The ffighter can be directlyy situated in a religious framing. Here showingg the posturre for a pray yer84:

he dominannt victoriouss masculinitty may be thhe header of o an articlee One of thee best illustrrations of th in the onlinne journal Dharwat D al--islam85:

82 83 84 85

http://ww ww.ansar1.infoo/showthread.p php?t=29569 (accessed Maay 12, 2013). Dharwat al-sanam no. 3, 12 (several files availab le online). Dharwat al-sanam no. 3, 29 (several files availab le online). Dharwat al-sanam no. 3, 23 (several files availab le online).

161

The title reeads “Discuussion betweeen a jihadii and a defeaated”, the victorious v jihhadi on the right in thee most prom minent positiion, the defeeated on thee left, left in n despair. The discussioon ends witth the jihadii saying thatt the easy way w of the defeated d is a rebellion against god d and a subm mission und der the rolee of the Jewss, combininng masculiniity with antti-Semitism,, a classical combinatioon. Anotherr example from f a femaale supporteer adding an nother impo ortant part oof jihadi sem miotics, thee black bannner86:

A proper jiihadi shaykkh or intellectual leaderr is often deepicted weaaring a whitte robe as a symbol forr purity, boookshelves inn the background, and looking in a sober, eaarnest way. A symbol of o scholarlyy purity embbodying thee purity of true jihad. Here Abu Muhammad d al-Maqdissi87, the leaading jihadii scholar:

86 87

http://insspiredmuslimaah.tumblr.com m/post/356995551244/jihaad (accessed December 30, 20012). http://insspiredmuslimaah.tumblr.com m/post/351761 69455/whilst--standing-in-the-courtroom m-with-two-oth her (accessed Decembeer 30, 2012).

162

The inabiliity to live a life that we w called 'nnormal' is evident e in several bioggraphical acccounts. Wee have givenn some exam mples. Abou ut another m mujahid wee read that after a fightinng in Burmaa and beingg active in B Bangla Deshh he “return ned to his hhouse as a visitor. v It did not take more than nine days”” that he tookk off for Affghanistan.88

Psychologgy of Jihadii Framing – Theoreticcal Conclussions Readingg jihadi textts, we noticce a selectivve approach h89 to Islamic traditionss (re-)organ nizing thesee 90 traditions iin support of violent Jihad. J Theese reorgan nized and reeframed eleements of trradition aree 91 often usedd emblemaatically as a marker of jihadi identity. i These T elem ments are not n part off

transhistorical, essentiially Islamicc discourse . Religion does d matter in the case of jihadi su ubcultures – as part of tthe identitarrian producction of thesse subculturres. To enab ble this kindd of reframiing specificc psychologiical processses can be identified, i bbased on a distorted fo orm of mascculinity emb bodied in a diverse sett of visual material. m Wee may finishh by James W. W Jones' in nsights: Thee examples of Muslim m jihadists and terrorissts in otherr traditions as well sh how us thatt reliigions give rise to terrrorist actionns when theey emphasiize shame aand humiliaation, whenn theyy dichotom mize the world into waarring camp ps of the alll-good agaiinst the all-evil, whenn 88 89

90 91

http://taw whed.ws/pr?i= =605, 4 (accesssed Novembeer 30, 2011). Islamic ttraditions havee been selectiv vely reworkedd in former tim mes to the neeeds of the histoorical situation n. For the concept oof Jihad see, e. e g., the case of Syria in thee crusader perriod (Mourad//Lindsay, The Intensificatio on). For jihadism m this means a reframing in the t context off modernity an nd a modern subculture. E. g., Elm maz, Jihadi-Sa Salafist Creed. Lohlker, Religion, Weaapons.

163

they demonize those with whom they disagree and foment crusades against them, when they advocate violence and blood sacrifice as the primary means of purification, when their devotees seek to placate or to be unified with a punitive and humiliating or idealized figure or institution, when they offer theological justifications for violent acts, and when they promote prejudice and authoritarian behavior. These are some of the means by which religion makes people violent. For a clinical psychologist of religion, then, the question is, what psychological processes are involved when religions leads to violence? My answer is that universal religious themes such as purification or the search for reunion with the source of life or the longing for personal meaning and transformation – the classic instigators of spiritual search and religious conversion – become subsumed into destructive psychological motivations such as the Manichean dichotomizing of the world into all-good all-evil camps, or the drive to connect with and appease a humiliating or persecuting idealized patriarchal Other. The result is the psychological preconditions for religiously sponsored terrorists and violence. There are thus some general factors that might serve as warning signs that a religious group has a high potential for violence: (1) profound experiences of shame and humiliation either generated by social conditions outside the group and potentiated by it or generated from within the group, (2) splitting humanity into all-good and all-evil camps and the demonizing of the other, (3) a wrathful, punitive idealized deity or leader, (4) a conviction that purification requires the shedding of blood and often (5) a fascination with violence.92 Jihadism as understood here may be the perfect illustration of Jones' finding. A solution proposed by him may read as follows: A non-violent theology is one of the necessary means to find a way out of this world of “religiously sponsored terrorists and violence” (Jones).

92

James W. Jones, Blood that Cries out from the Earth: The Psychology of Religious Terrorism (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press 2008), 69-70.

164

Contributors

Tamara Abu-Hamdeh

Assistant, Islamic Studies, Oriental Institute, University of Vienna (Austria)

Rüdiger Lohlker

Professor, Islamic Studies, Oriental Institute, University of Vienna (Austria). Recent publications: Islamisches Recht (Islamic Law) (2012); (ed.), Jihadism: Online Discourses and Representations (2012)

Nico Prucha

Researcher, PhD student, University of Vienna; Recent publication: Die Stimme des Jihad (The Voice of Jihad) (2010)

Manfred Sing

Researcher, Leibniz Institute for European History, Mainz (Germany).

Recent

publication:

(ed.),

Rethining

Totalitarianism and its Arab Readings (2012) Joas Wagemakers

Assistant

Professor,

Radboud

University

Nijmegen

(Netherlands). Recent publications: A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (2012); (co-ed.), The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki (2011) Robert Wesley

Researcher, (Co-)Director Terrorism Research Initiative, Founding Editor Perspectives of Terrorism

165

Index Eagleton, Terry........................... 39, 40, 41, 42 Ensslin, Gudrun ......................................... 125 Farisi, Khalad al- ............................... 127, 128 Filastini, Abu A’id al-.114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123 Fisher, Walter ............................................... 53 Fiske, John ................................................... 89 Gadahn, Adam Yahiya ....................... 114, 115 Gellner, Ernest ....................................... 40, 43 Ghamidi, Sayf al-Umma al- ....................... 153 Gharib, Abu Qasura al- ...................... 130, 131 Habash, George................................ 58, 60, 62 Hafiz .......................................................... 138 Hamada, Tarad ....................................... 63, 65 Hamadi ............................................. 55, 56, 57 Hawatima, Nayif .......................................... 61 Hijazi,Raed ........................................ 115, 116 Holtmann, Philipp .. 84, 85, 118, 120, 146, 158 Huri, Iliyas ................................................... 65 Ibn Asakir................................................... 143 Imam, Sayyid ......................................... 16, 17 Jaza'iri, Abu Ishaq al-................................. 153 Jones, James W. ................................. 163, 164 Karibi, Mukhtar al- .................................... 116 Kayyali, Marwan al- .................................... 55 Khattab, Umar al- .................................. 5, 154 Khomeini ................................... 58, 62, 67, 81 Khosti, Abu Mu’adh al- ......... 44, 59, 104, 144 Kilcullen, David............................................. 9 Kirkman, Robert ........................................ 106 Knight, Kathleen .......................................... 39 Lanier, Jason ................................................ 88 Libi, Abu al-Layth al- .......................... 99, 136 Libi, Abu Qasura al- .................... 91, 117, 130 Libi, Abu Yahya al- ....... 88, 89, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 105 Libi, Attiyatullah al-..................................... 93 Loren, Scott................................................ 153 Maistre, Joseph de ..................................... 145 Mao Zedong ......................... 59, 60, 65, 67, 71 Maqdisi, Abu Ubayda al- ................... 115, 116 Maqdisi, Abu l-Walid al- ........................... 133 Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad al- ..... 5, 16, 18, 19, 21, 98, 121, 133, 140, 141, 162, 165 Marranci, Gabriele ..................................... 140 Marx, Karl............................ 66, 68, 77, 78, 81 Mas’ud, Ahmad Shah................................. 102 Mawla, Saʿud al-.............................. 62, 63, 65

Abbas, Tahir .......................................141, 142 Abdaly, Taimour Abdulwahab al- ..............160 Abdul Aziz, Malik ......................................147 Abdulmuttalab, Umar Farouk ......................14 Abu Bakr ........................................................5 Abu Hasan ........................................55, 56, 57 Abu Hoshar ................................ 115, 116, 122 Abu Isma‘il, Hazim Salah ......................32, 35 Abu Khalid .................................................123 Abu Malik ..................................................106 Abu Muhammad, Salah ............. 112, 113, 114 Abu Nusayba .............................................. 112 Abu Umar ...................123, 124, 125, 126, 127 Abu Zubaydah .................................... 115, 116 Agha, Khalid bin Fathi al-.......................... 115 Almani, Abu Talha al- ................................106 Amili, Abu Sa’d al- ......................86, 105, 128 Amriki, Azzam al- ...................................... 114 Ansari, Abu al-Wafa al- ............................. 110 Ansari, Zayyid bin Thabit al- .....................134 Arafat, Yasser ...................................60, 61, 64 Asad, Bashar al- ...........................................29 Assāf, Roger .................................................65 Awda, Abd al-Aziz al- ..................................55 Azm, Sadiq al-..............................................70 Azzam, Abdallah .....83, 96, 98, 100, 102, 103, 114, 116, 118, 121, 127, 142 Bahays, Muhammad al- .........................55, 56 Bakhtiyar, Shapour .......................................66 Banna, Ahmad ....................................102, 103 Barnawi, Fatima al- ......................................73 Bateson .......................................................140 Baydar, Ahmad Muhammad ...................... 110 Belhajj, Muawiyya Abd al-Qahhar ... 112, 113, 114 Benford, Robert..............45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53 Bhabha .......................................................140 Bin Ladin, Usama ..................10, 14, 125, 159 Bin Nayef, Muhammad ................................14 Biss, Fathi al- .....59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 67, 68, 69 Brynjar, Lia ................................................143 Cohen, Anthony .........................................109 Connell, Robert W. .....................................142 Damasio .....................................................140 Dhu l-bijadayn. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 160 Diab, Hisham ............................................. 114 Dik, Khalil Sa’id al- ................................... 117 166

Shiqaqi, Fathi ................................... 55, 57, 58 Siyyaf ......................................................... 103 Stevens, J. Christopher .................................. 5 Sudani, Abu l-Bara’ Muhammad bin Salim al............................................................... 128 Sur, Abu Mus’ab al- ................................... 111 Suwayd, Muhammad ................................... 65 Tamimi, Basim Sultan al- ...................... 55, 56 Tartusi, Abu Basir al- .. 3, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36 Taylor, Charles ............................................. 82 Tunisi, Abu Mariyya al- ............................. 132 Tyson, Mike ............................................... 147 Ulyan, Itaf .................................................... 56 Urduni, Abu Hafz al- ................................. 103 Utaybi, Juhayman al- ......................... 158, 159 Uthman ........................................................ 34 Wilson, John .................. 42, 43, 44, 51, 52, 53 Yusuf ............................................................ 26 Zarqawi, Abu Mus’ab al- ............................. 97 Zawahiri, Ayman al- . 89, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 104, 133 Zulaytani, Muhammad al- . 130, 131, 133, 134

Melville, Herman .........................................83 Milton .........................................................140 Mugniya, Imad .............................................66 Muhajir, al-Assad al- ..................................131 Muhammad ..........................5, 6, 95, 143, 158 Muhammad, Yar .........................................104 Murad, Ismat ................................................63 Najeeb ........................................................103 Naji, Abu Bakr al- ..............................144, 145 Naqqash, Anis al- .............................62, 63, 66 Nazzari, Harith bin Ghazi al- .......................98 Olson, Saraah ............................................. 114 Qa’id, Hasan Muhammad ............................97 Qadhdhafi, Mu‘ammar al-............................31 Qaradawi, Yusuf al- ..............................23, 108 Qutb, Sayyid ........................................98, 100 Reid, Richard ......................................... 10, 11 Said, Edward ..........................................73, 78 Salam, Abd al-Mu’ayyad bin Abd al- ........124 Selek, Pinar ................................................140 Shafiq Asl, George .................................67, 70 Shafiq, Munir ....55, 56, 57, 63, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 78 Shinqiti, Abu l-Mundhir al-..........................32

167

The study of Jihadi ideology is still in an early stage. The contributions of this volume contribute to this field: Ideologues of Jihad, Maoists turned Jihadists, a theory of framing of Jihadi ideas, the analysis of Jihadi masculinities and of Jihadi role models presented in obline videos will further our understanding of Jihadi ideas and ideologies by exploring underresearched aspects of Jihadi ideology and theology. Dschihadistische Ideologien sind noch nicht ausreichend untersucht. Die Beitr¨age in diesem Band tragen zu einem vertieften Verst¨andnis bei. Mit dschihadistischen Ideologen, zu Dschihadisten gewordene Maoisten, einem theoretischen Ansatz zur Analyse dschihadistischen Denkens, eine Untersuchung dschihadistischer M¨annlichkeitsvorstellungen und dschihadistische role models in Onlinevideos erm¨oglichen Einblicke in sonst wenig bekannte Ph¨anomene.

Logos Verlag Berlin

ISBN 978-3-8325-3705-0

ISSN 2199-1820