Japan's Strategic Challenges In A Changing Regional Environment 9789814368742, 9789814368735

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JAPAN’S STRATEGIC

CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING REGIONAL

ENVIRONMENT

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JAPAN’S STRATEGIC

CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING REGIONAL

ENVIRONMENT

Editors

Purnendra Jain University of Adelaide, Australia

Lam Peng Er National University of Singapore, Singapore

World Scientific NEW JERSEY

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8281.9789814368735-tp.indd 2

LONDON

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SINGAPORE

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BEIJING

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SHANGHAI

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HONG KONG

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TA I P E I

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CHENNAI

25/6/12 2:34 PM

Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

JAPAN’S STRATEGIC CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT Copyright © 2013 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

ISBN 978-981-4368-73-5 In-house Editor: Sandhya Venkatesh

Typeset by Stallion Press Email: [email protected]

Printed in Singapore.

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CONTENTS

About the Contributors

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Japan’s 21st Century Strategic Challenges: Introduction Purnendra Jain and Lam Peng Er

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Part I:

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Traditional Security

Chapter 1

Japan’s Strategic Options? Katahara Eiichi

Chapter 2

The US–Japan Alliance in the 21st Century: A Chinese Perspective Wang Jian Wei

Chapter 3

China and Japan: Hot Economics, Cold Politics? Li Mingjiang

Chapter 4

Japan’s Strategic Response to North Korea: Activistic Security Policy, Eroding Pacifism Kim Sung Chull

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

A ‘United’ Community in a Divided Region: Southeast Asia, Japan, China, and East Asian Community Pavin Chachavalpongpun India and Japan: Sharing Strategic Interests? Arpita Mathur

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Contents

Chapter 7

Australia and Japan: Toward a Full Security Partnership? David Walton

Part II: Non-Traditional Security Chapter 8

Chapter 9

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175

Japan’s Human Security and Peace-building: Between Aspirations and Limitations Lam Peng Er

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Piracy and Maritime Security: Japan’s Strategic Challenges Sam Bateman

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Chapter 10 Japan and the G8/G20: A Global/Regional Strategy in Financial Governance Joel Rathus

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Chapter 11 The Triple Disaster and Japan’s Energy and Climate Change Policies Purnendra Jain

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Chapter 12 Rethinking Security in Japan: In Search of a Post-‘Postwar’ Narrative Satoh Haruko

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Index

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Sam Bateman is a Professorial Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) at the University of Wollongong, and an adviser to the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Pavin Chachavalpongpun is an Associate Professor at the centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, Japan. Earning his doctorate degree from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, he is the author of Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy (2010) and the editor of ASEAN–US Relations: What Are the Talking Points? (2011). Purnendra Jain is Professor of Japanese Studies in the Centre for Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide in Australia. Author and editor of 12 books and numerous scholarly articles on contemporary politics and foreign policy of Japan, his latest co-edited books are (with Brad Williams) Japan in Decline: Fact or Fiction? (Global Oriental, 2011) and (with Takashi Inoguchi) Japanese Politics Today: From Karaoke to Kabuki Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). He is currently President of the Asian Studies Association of Australia.

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About the Contributors

Katahara Eiichi is Professor and Director, Regional Studies Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of the Japanese Ministry of Defense. His publications include ‘Japan: From Containment to Normalization,’ in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Coercion and Governance (Stanford University Press, 2001); chapter on the USA, East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2010); ‘Japan’s Concept of Comprehensive Security in the Post-Cold War World,’ in Susan Shirk & Christopher P. Twomey (eds.) Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific (Transaction Publishers, 1996) and other articles and book chapters. Kim Sung Chull is Humanities Korea Professor in the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. He is the author of North Korea under Kim Jong Il (2006), and has edited Regional Cooperation and Its Enemies in Northeast Asia (with Edward Friedman, 2006), Engagement with North Korea (with David Kang, 2009) and State Violence in Asia (with N. Ganesan, 2012 forthcoming). Lam Peng Er is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He obtained his Ph.D. from Columbia University. His latest single authored book is Japan’s Peace Building Diplomacy: Seeking A More Active Political Role (New York and London: Routledge, 2009). Arpita Mathur is a former Research Fellow from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She was previously Associate Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Her areas of interest include Japan’s foreign policy, domestic politics and security policy and East Asian politics. Li Mingjiang is an Assistant Professor at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is the author (including editor and co-editor) of 9 books. His recent books are Mao’s China and the Sino–Soviet Split

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(Routledge, 2012) and Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Lexington-Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). Joel Rathus is the East Asia Bureau of Economic Research post-doctoral research fellow at the Crawford School of Economics and Governance at the Australian National University. His most recent book, titled Japan, China and Networked Regionalism, was published by Palgrave in 2011. Satoh Haruko is a research fellow at the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University, where she is currently working on an international research project on rethinking international politics in East Asia. She has previously worked for the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Gaiko Forum. Her research interests are in state theory in East Asia and Japan–China relations. David Walton is a Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities and Communication Arts, University of Western Sydney, Australia. He has been a visiting fellow at four universities in Japan and is currently co-director of a project examining human security policy in Australia, Japan, and China. His most recent publication is Australia, Japan, and Southeast Asia: Early Post-War Initiatives in Regional Diplomacy (New York: Nova Publishers, 2011). Wang Jianwei received his B.A. and M.A in international politics from Fudan University in Shanghai and his Ph. D. in political science from the University of Michigan. Wang is currently professor and head of the Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau. His teaching and research interests focus on East Asia politics and security affairs, Chinese politics and foreign policy, Sino–American relations, Sino–Japanese relations, UN peacekeeping operations, and American politics and foreign policy. He has published extensively in these areas.

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JAPAN’S 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC CHALLENGES: INTRODUCTION Purnendra Jain and Lam Peng Er

In the 21st century, geo-strategic change in the Asia-Pacific region is concomitantly reconfiguring the global strategic landscape. Indeed, power and influence are simultaneously shifting within Asia and from West to East. Although Japan became the second largest economy in the world in 1968, it is now overshadowed by two newly emerging Asian giants that, unlike Japan during its economic rise, are actively seeking a major geo-strategic role in regional and global affairs alongside their economic ascent.1 Today a resurgent China extends its economic and political footprints across the region while India accompanies its economic emergence with expression of strategic interests through its Look East Policy. Across the Pacific, Japan’s principal strategic partner, the United States, is losing its hegemony as the 1

On the power shift in East Asia see, for example, Michael J. Green, ‘Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle with China’ in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (eds.), Asia Responds to its Rising Powers: China and India (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011); Carlyle Thayer, ‘The Rise of China and India: Challenging or reinforcing Southeast Asia’s Autonomy?’ in Tellis, Tanner, and Keough, Asia Responds to its Rising Powers; Purnendra Jain and Brad Williams (eds.), Japan in Decline: Fact or Fiction? (Folkstone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2011); and Lam Peng Er and Lim Tai Wei (eds.), The Rise of China and India: A New Asian Drama (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009). xi

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sole superpower after the Cold War.2 Inside Japan, an economic malaise since 1991 deprives it of financial resources, undermines the nation’s economic clout, saps its confidence and weakens its global appeal, international influence, and prestige. Today Japan must share its regional and global influence with other Asian nations. In international institutions, the declining influence of the G-7/8 where Japan was the only Asian member parallels the rising importance of other international economic forums such as the G-20 with four other Asian countries among its members.3 No longer can Tokyo claim to speak on behalf of Asia, act as a bridge between Asia and the West or be perceived as the only Asian actor with considerable economic clout on the world stage. In non-traditional security areas, too, Japan faces considerable new challenges that can be addressed only through international and multilateral collaboration. Energy security, environmental and climate change issues, human security, pandemics, global terrorism, high-sea piracy, cyber security, and other transnational security issues complicate Japan’s approaches to managing external relations and decisions about the most strategically prudent regional and global roles for Japan at this time.

2

For a prescient analysis that anticipated the relative decline of the US hegemony and its ‘imperial overstretch,’ see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). On the crisis of legitimacy of the US superpower, see Lavina Rajendram Lee, US Hegemony and International Legitimacy (New York and London: Routledge, 2010). For a contrarian view on the relative decline of US power, see Carla Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). To be sure, Japan’s strategic options will be profoundly influenced by whether the US hegemony will decline rapidly or not. 3 The other four Asian members are China, India, South Korea, and Indonesia. See Hugo Dobson, ‘Leadership in Global Governance: Japan and China in the G8 and the UN,’ in Christopher M. Dent (ed.), China, Japan, and Regional Leadership in East Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) and Hugo Dobson, ‘The G8, the G20 and Civil Society,’ in Paolo Savona, John J. Kirton and Chiara Oldani (eds.), Global Financial Crises: National Economic Solutions, Geopolitical Impacts (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011).

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Domestic challenges have made it even more difficult for Tokyo to respond effectively to these changes in the international system. In recent years, political paralysis stemming from the unravelling of the Liberal Democratic Party’s one party dominance and a ‘twisted’ parliament in which the Lower and Upper Houses are controlled by different major political parties compound the lingering economic stagnation that has eroded Japan’s international clout over the past two decades. Rapid turnover of national leaders — six prime ministers in the last five years to early 20124 — has brought to the national helm shifting sets of priorities and understandings about Japan’s strategic positioning. Japan’s security community of politicians, bureaucrats, analysts, and other advisors are therefore confronted by significant change at home and abroad, as Asia and Japan itself are transformed by the power shift in the new millennium. Notwithstanding these considerable domestic and external challenges, Japan desires to become a more ‘normal’ country less prone to passivity in international affairs.5 Clearly, Japan faces unprecedented and to some extent unforeseen challenges in both traditional and non-traditional areas of its national security policy. The Pacific Century thinking that guided Japan’s long-term foreign policy vision two decades back does not reflect the strategic reality confronting Japan and the region early in the 21st century.6 Japan is still an important player on the global stage, in the global economy (the world’s third largest), and particularly within the Asia-Pacific region. It is not only shaped by, but itself is significant in 4

They are, since Koizumi (2001–2006), Abe Shinzo, Fukuda Yasuo, Aso Taro, Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko. 5 Soeya, Yoshihide, Tadokoro, Masayuki, and Welch, David (eds.), Japan as a ‘Normal Country’: A Nation in Search of its Place in the World (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011). 6 In this vision, Japan along with the United States was the leading power in the AsiaPacific. An award-winning documentary series produced by Frank Gibney in 1992 best captures Japan’s unchallenged prominence in the Asia-Pacific. The series is now available on Youtube. . For a general introduction to the topic, see Borthwick, Mark, Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia, Third Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007).

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shaping, the transformation now under way in regional and global power arrangements. Arguably, Japan is in relative decline but it is still a major player in Asia in the power calculus of the US, China, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). That is why this book focuses our viewing lens on Japan’s strategic challenges at this portentous time in the nation’s, the region’s, and the world’s strategic evolution. The rise and relative decline of great powers now under way confronts Japan with vital questions about its strategic future, especially in relation to the moves made by its East Asian neighbours. What role has Japan played in shaping the new geo-strategic environment? How has it leveraged bilateral, regional, and multilateral frameworks to protect and advance its national interest and maintain or even strengthen its regional and global positions? And what of visions for the future, for which it must now prepare? Here we turn our analytical lens to these questions as we consider Japan’s strategic challenges while positioning itself in a new global order. Changing Geo-Economic and Geo-Strategic Environments A gradual but certainly discernible economic power shift with major long-term geo-strategic consequences is under way as the world’s centres of economic gravity inexorably move from West to East. This shift is gaining momentum into the second decade of the 21st century as the collective West led by the United States loses economic power and status on the world stage. The collapse of leading US-based financial institutions and the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 not only triggered a severe recession and high unemployment in America but also a global financial crisis (GFC). The spread of financial contagion to Europe has triggered a debt crisis in European Union countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, which threatens the financial institutions and a common currency of the Eurozone. It has opened political cracks among EU member nations and the possibility that the weakest links (Greece as the prime candidate) may choose or be forced to exit. The sovereign debt crisis in Europe couples with the sluggish US economy that like Japan before it has been effectively hollowed out

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to cheaper labour destinations in Asia. Many commentators from the West agree with World Bank President Robert Zoellick’s warning that ‘the world is in a danger zone’, with the real possibility of a World Depression Mark II as Nouriel Roubini identifies.7 To be sure, the economic gloom in the West has not derailed the economic boom of China and India despite an interconnected world. Both national economies continue to grow although with rates slightly lower than before the GFC. The economic interdependence brought by globalisation leaves China and India not completely immune if the financial situation in the US and Europe deteriorates further. But given that Asian nations are trading with and investing in each other far more than before, the impact of the US and Eurozone crisis may prove to be less fatal than it would have in the past when Asian economies were more dependent on US and European markets. Trade and investment within the region and with other economic growth areas now combine with Asia’s newly acquired financial status (for example, huge foreign currency reserves) to give many Asian nations significant economic insulation, advantage, and bargaining power vis-à-vis the West. Economic strength has enabled these Asian nations to bolster their military strength and defence capability.8 China has been nuclear capable since the mid-1960s and was joined by India and Pakistan in the late 1990s. North Korea, despite its impoverishment, continues with its nuclear and missile programs in the face of direct and indirect opposition through the Six Party Talks, the United Nations, and bilaterally by countries like Japan and South Korea. Military buildup and nuclear competition in Asia produce its own security dilemma with possibility of armed conflict and even nuclear

7

Roubini, Nouriel, ‘How to prevent a depression,’ 19 September 2011, (Accessed: 19 October 2011). 8 Analysts in Japan are also looking at India as a country with enormous military expansion. For example, see Nishihara, Masashi and Horimoto, Takenori (eds.), Gunji Taikokuka Suru Indo [India as a Rising Military Power] (Tokyo: Akishobo, 2010).

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standoff. But consequences also reach to the global level since growing military strength including nuclear capability in Asia helps shift the global balance of military power away from the West. The US remains a military superpower in terms of both its spending and capability and its global military reach through a web of strategic alliances. However the changing military balance also challenges assumptions about US military superiority and forces its security planners to carefully rethink their military strategy in Asia. A consistent picture is evident in international institutions. Asian nations, especially under the auspices of ASEAN, continue to drive many regional institutions in Asia-Pacific and also seek greater say in global institutions such as the UN (Japan and India seek Security Council membership), the IMF, and the World Bank. Some non-Asian nations, including the US, have joined Asian regional organisations such as the East Asian Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, requiring them to accept the norms and principles developed by ASEAN despite initial reluctance. Powerful nations outside Asia have done so recognising Asia’s global importance economically and strategically. Proposals have been made to establish a G-2 (U.S. and China), a G-5 (U.S., Europe, China, India, and Japan), and other multilateral arrangements that reflect the current global power reality rather than that of early post-World War II in mid-20th century, as groupings such as the G-7/8 and the UN Security Council represent. Indeed, the influence, clout, and status of international actors are waning in the West and waxing in Asia. As national economic capacities shift and military capacities begin to follow suit, geoeconomics is reshaping geo-politics. These circumstances put Japan in a difficult bind regionally and globally. Throughout the postWorld War II era, Japan, as an Asian nation allied to the US and a democratic country, identified with the advanced Western democracies. So where does Japan see its position now, and into the future, as new concentrations of economic and military power are formed on the Asian continent? How has Japan envisioned its strategic options and how has it pursued them through bilateral and multilateral arrangements?

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Post-Number One Japan Postwar Japan was Asia’s number one economy between 1968 and 2010 until its eclipse by China. The scale and momentum of China’s economic growth mean that Japan is unlikely to return to its halcyon days as the number one or regain the international influence that this position enabled Japan to exercise in regional and global contexts. When Japan was the number one economy in Asia, many Japanese assumed that their country was naturally a great power. But that is not necessarily so within the next two decades. According to projections by the US National Intelligence Council, Japan will become an ‘upper middle rank power’ by 2025.9 Indeed, some Japanese analysts argue that it is more realistic to view Japan as a ‘middle power’ in the pursuit of its diplomacy.10 India too is surging ahead economically and is expected to overtake Japan as Asia’s second largest economy in the not so distant future barring unforeseen developments.11 Japan as number two is operating in a new strategic context where China is crowned number one in Asia and eventually will be top dog in the global economy. Japan observers cannot but acknowledge the weakening of its economic clout, political influence, and diplomatic sway in the

9

National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington DC: NIC, 2008). 10 Soeya Yoshihide, Nihon no ‘midoru pawaa’ gaikou: sengo nihon no sentaku to kousou [Japan’s ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy: Postwar Japan’s Choices and Conceptions] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005). 11 A 2011 report prepared by PWC predicts that India is likely to be clearly the third largest economy in the world by 2050, well ahead of Japan and not too far behind the US on this MER [market exchange rates] basis. See PWC, The World in 2050: The accelerating shift of global economic power: Challenges and opportunities. . (Accessed: January 2011). In Japan, India’s economic success is being acknowledged in a number of publications and a most recent one is by an influential public intellectual, see Sakakibara, Eiisuke, Indo azu numbaa wan; Nihon keizai no seicho no kagi wa Indo ni ari [India as number one; the key to Japan’s economic growth is India] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Shuppan, Tokyo: 2011).

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international arena although the ‘soft power’ of its culture remains intact.12 Japan is no longer the world’s largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) donor. Financial austerity at home has forced Tokyo to scale back its ODA, which it had used as a powerful diplomatic tool to contribute to both the economic growth of many Asian countries including China, and to its own economic and strategic interest. How is Japan coping with this new global and regional politicosecurity environment while its diplomatic capital is declining? What strategic moves has it taken to best position itself strategically and maximise its global and regional influence? Just as importantly, how is Japan perceived within the region by close postwar Western regional partners, the US and Australia, by friends in Southeast Asia, by the relatively new Asian economic partners that are also strategic competitors, China and India, and by its Korean neighbours? What regional and international roles do these nations expect Japan to play in the international power transition now under way? The chapters that follow in this book explore these questions through the eyes of observers from across the region. Japan’s response through traditional security This book has two parts. The first seven chapters, in Part I, concern Japan’s traditional security arrangements through important bilateral relationships. We begin with the first and foremost aspect of Japan’s strategic responses: the relationship with its top security ally since the end of World War II, the United States. Like other US allies, Japan is concerned about the consequences of declining US influence for its own place in the strategic landscape. Tokyo is in an especially difficult 12

On the allure of Japanese ‘soft power’, see Lam Peng Er, ‘Japan’s ‘soft power’: attraction and limitation,’ East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2007. According to a comparative survey, Japan’s ‘soft power’ is greater than China’s. See Christopher Whitney and David Shambaugh, Asian Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008), p. 3.

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position since Japan is facing a rising competitor, China, with conflicting territorial claims over the East China Sea and the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands, and a belligerent North Korea seeking to build a nuclear arsenal. The large number of US troops that Japan hosts on the small island of Okinawa in Southern Japan has been the source of immense pressure from the people, host cities, and governments of Okinawa prefecture to unburden their home territory from US military facilities. Katahara Eiichi takes up these points in Chapter 1 where he assesses Japan’s strategic options in light of the changing geo-strategic environment. After considering three possibilities, he leans towards the ‘normal state’ option where Japan adopts a more self-reliant security position, responsible for defending its core national interests including its sovereign territory, while maintaining its security alliance with the US as an auxiliary force. In this scenario, Japan must enable itself to conduct both individual and collective self-defence via changing the traditional interpretation of the constitution or by constitutional amendment and play an active role in international peace cooperation activities that may involve Japan’s use of force as both a responsible international stakeholder and a mature US ally. This requires a strong political leadership, a greater military contribution and creative diplomacy from Japan. Japan’s vexed relations with China — in the context of the U.S.–Japan alliance, the bilateral relationship itself and Japan’s relations with the two Koreas — are discussed in some detail by Wang Jianwei, Li Mingjiang, and Kim Sung Chull respectively. In Chapter 2, Wang considers China’s views of the politics of Japan–US security alliance since the end of World War II. He explains how Beijing expected this alliance to weaken in the post-Cold War era as its principal raison d’être had gone with the collapse of the Soviet superpower. Beijing perceives the recent strengthening of this alliance relationship as disadvantageous for China’s own influence in East Asia. Wang concludes that Beijing understands Japan’s closer alliance with the US as Tokyo needs to balance against neighbouring powers such as Russia, North Korea, and China. However, this alliance will remain a sore point in the Japan–China relationship, especially when Beijing perceives the alliance as infringing upon China’s ‘core national interests’ in the region.

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Focusing on the Sino–Japanese bilateral relationship in Chapter 3, Li explains why even with the array of strategic conundrums facing Japan, China remains a central factor. Li acknowledges that Beijing’s assertiveness, although non-confrontational by avoiding the use of force, has unsettled Tokyo to a certain extent. He opines that China has no desire to confront Japan or its US ally since this is not in China’s interests, and argues that with the courage and wisdom of the Chinese and Japanese national leaders, effective crisis management is possible. Kim discusses the situation regarding North Korea in Chapter 4, offering analysis of deepening alliance politics and Japan’s recent strategic nervousness in a vein somewhat different from Li’s analysis in the previous chapter. Kim argues that while Japan is paying greater attention to the rise of China from a broader strategic perspective, behind the evolution of Japan’s ‘activist security’ and military policy is its perception of possible immediate threat from North Korea rather than from China. Kim argues that in the first decade of the 21st century, the North Korea factor has been chiefly responsible for the nationalistic identity politics and transition toward ‘activist security’ and military policy in Japan. He observes that Japan’s coercive North Korea policy has been in line with its vigilance towards an ascendant China. The policy parallel in relation to China and North Korea demonstrates the complicated nature of Japan’s security and military policy in the contemporary period. The China factor also looms large in Pavin Chachavalpongpun’s Chapter 5 on Japan and an incipient East Asian Community (EAC). He argues that for Tokyo, an EAC is ‘beneficial primarily as an instrument employed to offset China’s growing political and economic clout’. He perceptively notes: China has indeed been the main source of Tokyo’s renewed enthusiasm in ASEAN affairs, simply because of their lingering conflicts and competition. Both countries have unveiled the different paths they take as they support ASEAN’s efforts in building an East Asian Community. While China opposed the inclusion of non-Asian members, Japan was in search of more friends in the region to shore up its position to challenge the growing Chinese influence.

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An EAC is indeed a strategic option for Japan. Then Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio proposed to anchor Sino–Japanese relations and mitigate bilateral differences within a broader and overarching EAC.13 However, Tokyo’s enthusiasm for an EAC waned after Hatoyama’s resignation as Prime Minister in 2010. It remains to be seen whether future Japanese leaders will embrace this option again. In view of the new strategic realities, Japan has sought to establish new partnerships and networks for both economic and security purposes. Some are bilateral; some entail closer engagement in regional and other multilateral frameworks. Two countries that stand out here, in their bilateral relationships with Japan and in their work with Japan in multilateral institutions, are India and Australia. In Chapter 6, Arpita Mathur traces Japan’s postwar relationship with India. She argues that the relationship was set on firmer ground through Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India in 2000 when he declared Japan and India ‘global partners’, seeding a remarkable turnaround in the relationship merely two years after Japan was the most vocal and strident critic of India’s nuclear test in 1998. Since Mori’s visit to India, the relationship has been on an upward trajectory through economic and security linkages, with the signing of a security cooperation agreement in 2008 and a two plus two dialogue process since 2010. There is little doubt that these security initiatives have been pursued as the China factor looms large in both nations’ strategic thinking. Mathur notes that multiple factors have contributed to the new-found mutual attraction, but it would seem that without China in this picture, India and Japan are unlikely to have moved so close in security areas. Japan considers India a good hedge against many of its security vulnerabilities. A development similar to that of India is also witnessed in Japan’s relations with Australia, one of Japan’s major economic partners since the two signed a trade agreement in the mid-1950s. Although this relationship was defined largely by commercial interests, the security 13

Hatoyama Yukio, ‘Watashi no seiji tetsugaku’ [My Political Philosophy], Voice, September 2009.

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treaty that each held with the US ensured political underlay and shared strategic interests. Japan has supported Australia’s membership in regional organisations such as the East Asia Summit and the two have signed a joint declaration on security cooperation. In Chapter 7, David Walton traces developments since 2001 when security cooperation was enhanced and a trilateral security dialogue process was put in place. While as Walton concludes, ‘a security treaty and a fully developed security partnership are unlikely for the foreseeable future’, the two nations have clearly moved beyond economic ties to security linkages that include a two plus two security talk process involving foreign and defence ministers of the two nations like the US–Japan security talks. Japan’s response through non-traditional security The five chapters in Part II of this book examine Japan’s responses to non-traditional strategic concerns. The first is human security. Although not well known, in recent years Japan has become actively involved in human security — particularly in response to intra-state conflict and postwar consolidation of peace — in places such as Cambodia, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Aceh, and Mindanao. In Chapter 8, Lam Peng Er argues that Japan can still remain a close ally of the US while placing greater emphasis on human security and peace-building as an objective of its foreign policy. He argues that this ‘liberal’ approach of building regional institutions and working to consolidate peace is more likely to enhance regional stability than a ‘realist’ approach of competing with a rising China and engaging in a vicious arms race. He concludes that consolidating its role in building and institutionalising peace through contributions to human security is likely to be arduous, with no guarantee of success in specific countries suffering from intractable civil wars. But as he explains, this approach is more strategically effective for Japan than engaging in ‘power politics’, arms racing with China which is Japan’s most important trading partner, and raising the military ante region-wide. Another non-traditional security area where Japan has become increasingly involved in recent years is maritime security. Here Japan’s

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expanding international role exemplifies one of its responses to the shifting geo-strategic landscape in which its own economic influence is declining. In Chapter 9, Sam Bateman focuses on Tokyo’s contributions to prevention of piracy where Japanese maritime security efforts are concentrated. By deploying its Self Defense Force (SDF) personnel to secure sea routes from pirates, Japan is gradually reinterpreting its pacifist constitution in practice, to enable its military engagement abroad without formal constitutional amendment. The move yields a range of strategic benefits for Tokyo. By enabling Japan to help address regional and international concerns about the threats of piracy and terrorism to shipping, it signals the country’s valuable contribution to international maritime security. It also enables Japan to establish a strategic presence in key areas where it has a vital interest in ensuring the safety and security of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). But as Bateman argues, even here the actions of Japan, India, and China have been as much about competing for regional power and influence as about countering piracy. In Chapter 10, Joel Rathus examines Japan’s role in regional and global financial institutions. He uses the twin dynamics of China’s rise and US decline as a central point for analysis in explaining Japan’s global and regional strategy in financial governance. He explains how Japan tries to preserve its influence in the face of these twin challenges through examination of Tokyo’s role in such institutions as G-7/8, G-20, the International Monetary Fund, and the Chiang Mai Initiative. On this basis he argues that Japan is not merely a reactive player and should instead be seen as both a quiet leader in ideas and an activist in diplomacy on major reforms in international financial institutions. The 3/11 triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi has posed a difficult and unexpected security dilemma for Japan. Radiation leakage from the crippled nuclear plant in Fukushima has forced Japan to rethink and redesign its energy policy to maximise human security domestically and internationally. Surveying Japan’s energy and climate change policy in Chapter 11, Purnendra Jain discusses what have become essential considerations for this policy in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi

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disaster. He explains the opportunity now before Japan to raise its ante on the nuclear front by harnessing lessons about human security through nuclear disaster prevention that it learned from the 2011 disaster. As Jain explains, Japan is well placed to become a leader in new networks to share its first-hand know-how on civilian nuclear technology and disaster management mechanisms with Asian nations about to take up or build up their nuclear energy production. Minimal access to fuel sources domestically deprives Japan of the chance to become nuclear free in the short to medium term. But Japan can take a strategically rewarding move by demonstrating to its Asian neighbours and others that it has the wherewithal and will to help nations around the region to manage their civil nuclear industry safely while developing new energy sources that help in phasing out nuclear energy without compromising lifestyle and industrial output. Such a move will signal Japan’s national commitment to carbon reduction and to human security region-wide, while generating goodwill towards Japan. In the context of the 3/11 triple disaster, in Chapter 12, Satoh Haruko argues that this disaster demonstrates clearly Japan’s abject failure to both develop a coherent concept of national security and a functional security regime, including a crisis management system. Her broader perspective of national security recognises the need to address threats from both domestic and external sources to protect people and property from a variety of destabilising or life-threatening incursions for which Japan has been unprepared. She exposes the defective structure of Japan’s nuclear energy regime and the structural neglect of public safety measures. But she also notes some positive developments such as deployment of 100,000 SDF personnel and Operation Tomodachi, the US Armed Forces assistance operation to support Japan in disaster relief which Satoh believes made the US–Japan alliance relevant for the first time to a domestic security crisis in Japan. She also recognises a first time in the shift that disaster responses prompted in the Japanese idea of the state — from one that requires the people to defend the state, to one where the state defends its people. However, Satoh concludes, Japan still has a long way to go to develop the broader perspectives that are needed to handle its security policy judiciously.

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We appreciate the need to acknowledge limitations of the discussion in this volume. While the authors here examine key issues concerning Japan’s strategic challenges at this historic moment, not all aspects of Japan’s regional and global strategic landscapes can be discussed adequately in one volume. Issues not discussed here include consideration in Japan about lifting its ban on arms exports, which has implications for Japan’s security allies and partners as well as its adversaries, and is thus potentially a major landmark in its militaryindustry policy. Another concerns the slow change in Japan’s policy stance on ‘nuclear’ including the possibility of a civilian nuclear agreement with India discussed during the Kan administration, which could be a significant development in Japan’s strategic culture. Other issues include outer space policy, cyber security, and Japan’s rising interest in the Arctic region, all of which will gradually shift Japan’s strategic outlook, need, and capacity.14 This book results from a workshop in Singapore in January 2011 hosted by the East Asian Institute (EAI) and funded by the Australian Research Council Asia-Pacific Futures Network and the EAI. Scholars from Japan, China, South Korea, India, Singapore, Thailand, Macau, Australia, and the US presented papers that addressed wide-ranging security issues confronting Japan in the 21st century. Most of the papers presented at the workshop have been included in this volume on the basis of peer screening and external readers’ comments. Each contributor has revised their original paper in light of workshop feedback, external reader comments, and new developments, especially as a result of the 3/11 earthquake, tsunami, and unprecedented nuclear disaster. We thank Zheng Yongnian, Director of the East Asian Institute, for his intellectual support for this project. We also thank colleagues who read individual chapters and offered helpful comments for contributors to consider while revising their papers. We very much appreciate the efforts of this book’s publisher, World Scientific, especially Commissioning 14

Purnendra Jain is grateful to Katahara Eiichi for drawing his attention in a conversation in Tokyo to some of Japan’s important emerging security concerns. Tokyo, 27 September 2011.

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Editor Michael Heng who facilitated the process of reviewing the manuscript, Samantha Yong and Sandhya Venkatesh, the Desk Editors, and other WS staff who helped at various stages of the production process. Bibliography Borthwick, M (2007). Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia, 3rd Ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Dobson, H (2008). Leadership in global governance: Japan and China in the G8 and the UN. In China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, CM Dent (ed.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Dobson, H (2011). The G8, the G20 and civil society. In Global Financial Crises: National Economic Solutions, Geopolitical Impacts, P Savona, JJ Kirton and C Oldani (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate. Lam, PE (2007). Japan’s ‘soft power’: Attraction and limitation. East Asia: An International Quarterly, 24(4), 349–363. Lam, PE and Lim, TM (eds.) (2009). The Rise of China and India: A New Asian Drama. Singapore: World Scientific. Green, MJ (2011). Japan, India, and the strategic triangle with China. In Asia Responds to its Rising Powers: China and India, AJ Tellis, T Tanner and J Keough (eds.). Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research. Hatoyama, Y (2009). Watashi no seiji tetsugaku (My Political Philosophy), Voice, September 2009. Jain, P and B Williams (eds.) (2011). Japan in Decline: Fact or Fiction? Folkstone, Kent: Global Oriental. Kennedy, P (1987). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House. Lee, LR (2010). US Hegemony and International Legitimacy. New York and London: Routledge. National Intelligence Council (2008). Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. Washington DC: NIC. Nishihara, M and T Horimoto (eds.) (2010). Gunji taikokuka suru indo (India as a Rising Military Power). Tokyo: Akishobo. Norrlof, C (2010). America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sakakibara, E (2011). Indo azu numbaa wan: Nihon keizai no seicho no kagi wa Indo ni ari (India as Number One: The Key to Japan’s Economic Growth is India). Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun shuppan.

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Soeya, Y (2005). Nihon no ‘midoru pawaa’ gaikou: sengo Nihon no sentaku to kousou (Japan’s ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy: Postwar Japan’s Choices and Conceptions). Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho. Soeya, Y, M Tadokoro and D Welch (eds.) (2011). Japan as a “Normal Country”: A Nation in Search of its Place in the World. Toronto: University of Toronto. Thayer, C (2011). The rise of China and India: Challenging or reinforcing Southeast Asia’s autonomy? In Asia Responds to its Rising Powers: China and India, AJ Tellis, T Tanner and J Keough (eds.). Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research. Whitney, CB and D Shambaugh (2008). Asian Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion. Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

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JAPAN’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS? Katahara Eiichi

Introduction For the last 60 years or so since the end of World War II, it has been a taboo in Japan to discuss strategic options for Japan; to put it differently, Japan has arguably had no viable options other than one which can be considered strategically realistic and politically affordable, and that is the Japan–US alliance combined with Japan’s limited self-defence capability. Even today, almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, the Japan–US alliance remains the linchpin of Tokyo’s foreign and security strategy. Whenever Japan is confronted by international crises affecting its national security, say North Korea’s testing of a nuclear bomb and ballistic missiles or the 2010 collision between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, many Japanese commentators as well as the mainstream media say, first and foremost, ‘What should we do? Yes, we’ve got to strengthen the Japan–US alliance.’ Japan’s psychological and material dependence on its Big Brother has been deeply etched in the minds of the majority of Japanese people. And Japan’s strategy has worked well in the postwar years, because it has obviated the need for the development of an autonomous military capability, and the need for larger financial cost of the country’s defence requirements. Japan’s alliance-first strategy has also been accepted not only by the United States, which underpinned the 3

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US-centred security order in the region, but also by almost all the countries in the region. Indeed, the history of the Japan–US alliance has been a great success story not just in the modern history of Japan but in the broader international history of the Asia-Pacific region. With the economically strong and politically stable Japan allied with the US, no country felt threatened by Japan, thus allowing East Asian countries to devote their energies to economic and social development, without feeling the need to answer a Japanese defence buildup. One could argue further that the Japan–US alliance that ensures US military presence in the region has decisively contributed to the peace, stability, and economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. The triple disaster that hit Japan in March 2011 would have profound and far-reaching implications for Japan’s strategic policy in the decades ahead. Japan was struck by a massive earthquake and the ensuing tsunami that devastated many cities and villages along the Pacific coast of the Tohoku region. The horrific nuclear crisis that occurred in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, as a result, forced over 200,000 people residing within 20 km of the plant to evacuate, and contaminated a wide-spread area, air, water, soil, and food in an unprecedented way. While the remarkable resilience of the Japanese people in general, and the prompt and effective response of more than 100,000 Self-Defense Force troops for search and rescue missions in collaboration with US troops in particular deserve much credit, the disaster revealed serious weaknesses in leadership and governance of the central government. One of the major lessons that can be drawn from the experience of the 11 March triple disaster would be that Tokyo will require strong political leadership, transparent governance, and comprehensive national strategies for effective crisis management. In this chapter, I argue that the first decade of the 21st Century, Japan finds itself at a major historic turning point. What Japan does or does not over the next few years will likely determine its place in the region and in the world over the next few decades, if not much of the 21st Century. I argue further that given the need for Japan’s recovery from the aftermath of the triple disaster and for its robust rebirth, and perhaps more consequentially, the power shift that has

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been underway in the region with rising China and India, the time has come for Japan to rethink its postwar strategic policy and think through its strategic options for the future. First, I will briefly discuss some of the most critical security challenges confronting Japan, the region and the world at large, thus putting my argument in a proper strategic context. Second, I will offer an overview of Japan’s security policy during the last two decades. Third, I will consider three strategic options for Japan. These are 1) the continuation of the status quo — the policy of keeping the US as the foundation of Japan’s security strategy while taking a low profile defence posture; 2) a global civilian power option with proactive participation in international peace-building and security cooperation especially in areas of non-traditional security issues; and 3) a normal state option — the policy of self-reliant military posture with matured allied relations with the US and security partnerships with major powers in the world. The Strategic Context The evolving strategic environment presents many difficult security challenges, both regional and global. First, a nuclear-armed and dictatorial North Korea with ballistic missiles would pose direct military threats to Japan and the region. It would seriously destabilise the regional balance of power. It would also test the validity of multilateral diplomacy centring on the Six-party Talks, and the credibility of the Japan–US alliance. International efforts in pursuing de-nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula have not shown any positive results. Indeed, the situation seems to be deteriorating since North Korean submarine’s alleged torpedo attack on the ROK’s warship Cheonan on 26 March 2010, claiming 46 lives of Korean sailors and Pyongyang’s shelling of Yeonpyeong island on 23 November 2010. We are confronted with an increasingly belligerent, unpredictable, and inherently unstable Pyongyang that appears to be determined to accelerate its nuclear and ballistic missile program. Multilateral diplomacy of the Six-party Talks perhaps augmented with an effective dissuasion strategy should be pursued before Pyongyang succeeds in

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developing and deploying intermediate or even intercontinental ballistic missiles loaded with nuclear weapons.1 Second, the re-emergence of China as a global actor presents a far-reaching challenge especially for policymakers in the region, given the ongoing power shift driven by China’s growing comprehensive national power and influence not just in the region but in the world at large, including Africa, outer space and cyberspace. China’s increasing military spending, its relentless build-up of air and space power, submarine and aircraft carrier capabilities, ballistic missiles, antisatellite and cyber-warfare capabilities, and nuclear forces have aroused widespread concerns throughout the countries of East Asia. As Andrew Krepinevich argues in his Foreign Affairs article, Chinese efforts at developing and fielding what strategists refer to as ‘antiaccess/area denial’ capabilities would mean that ‘China has the means to put at risk the forward bases from which most US strike aircraft must operate.’ In his words, ‘East Asian waters are slowly but surely becoming a potential no-go zone for US ships, particularly for aircraft carriers,’ thus risking the forward deployment of US military forces becoming ‘wasting assets’.2 Admiral Robert Willard, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted in December 2010 that China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) ‘has achieved initial operational capability (IOC),’ adding that ‘they (the Chinese) have aspirations to eventually become a global military power.’3 Yet China has progressively integrated into a multi-layered system of regional and global institutions, including Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 1

For the concept of dissuasion, see Andrew F. Krepinevich and Robert C. Martinage, ‘Dissuasion Strategy,’ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2008, . 2 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., ‘The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of American Power,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 18–33. 3 Kato Yoichi, ‘US commander says China aims to be a ‘global military’ power,’ Asahi Shimbu,n 27 November 2010, .

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and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, China has been keen to deepen economic and political cooperation with neighbouring countries, and it is clear that China’s approaches to Taiwan have become significantly less belligerent since Ma Yingjeou and his Kuomingtang (KMT) returned to power in 2008. Managing the growing Chinese power and influence and shaping China’s strategic posture and policies would be critical if a new security order in the region is to be open, safe, and stable. Indeed this represents one of the greatest challenges facing Japan and the region at large. The accelerating integration of regional economies into that of China and the fact that China has become a central economic and political player not only in the region but in the global arena present profound strategic and possibly game-changing implications for a new international order in the 21st century world. Third, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan presents a difficult challenge not only for America, and its allies, but for the international community, given the danger of international terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons thus representing a serious threat to the world today. Al Qaeda and its extremist allies are operating actively in an increasingly unstable Pakistan which is armed with ‘the mid-90s to more than 110’ nuclear weapons.4 The US, along with the international community, has so far failed to build good governance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is a regional security problem yet requires a global response. Finally, there are a host of the so-called non-traditional security challenges facing the world today, including cyber-attacks, climate change, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, energy problems, natural disasters, piracy, and problems associated with failed states. Japan’s Evolving Security Strategy Towards East Asia Japan’s security policy has been significantly transformed since the 1990s. Consequently, the country’s security roles and missions 4

David E. Sanger and Eric Schimitt, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy,’ The New York Times, 31 January 2011.

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have been expanded and its defence capabilities enhanced so as to meet emerging threats and diverse contingencies of the 21st century world. Indeed, the last two decades saw the emergence of a national consensus that Japan should play a prominent role in international peace-building and humanitarian relief operations.5 The successes of the Japanese contribution to peace cooperation activities in Cambodia and East Timor helped consolidate public support for Japan’s international endeavours in these fields. The Self Defense Forces’ (SDF) non-combat logistical and reconstruction support for the US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq was also highly appreciated by the US and its allies. The SDF has also been actively participating in multilateral security cooperation activities, including disaster relief and humanitarian operation in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the ongoing peace cooperation activities in Haiti, the ongoing anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, and the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) exercises. However, the question of how far Japan can go in peace-building, particularly with respect to the use of force, remains highly contested. Indeed, Japan’s past record has shown that Japan’s role has been a distinctly civilian one, engaging in administration, construction, logistics, humanitarian relief, and refugee matters. The scope of the SDF’s participation in international peace-building remains limited due to Japan’s restrictive interpretation of the constitution in relation to the use of force and domestic political reasons.6 Yet given the significant changes that have been taking place in Japan’s peace cooperation activities in recent years, and the ongoing review of Japan’s international role, there is a prospect that Japan will progressively become a more proactive player engaged in non-combatant missions. The new National Defence Program Guidelines (2010 NDPG) adopted on 17 December 2010, represents the defence strategy of 5

See Katahara, Eiichi, ‘Japan: From Containment to Normalization,’ in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 69–91. 6 See Lam Peng Er, Japan’s Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a more active political role (New York: Routledge, 2009).

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the Japanese government for the next 10 years, which lays out security objectives and means of Japan’s defence policy and its force structure.7 The fundamentals of Japan’s security policy such as the exclusively defensive defence policy and the three non-nuclear principles remain intact, yet there are six notable features in the new NDPG reflecting Tokyo’s changing perceptions of the strategic environment and new defence requirements. First, the NDPG calls for ‘a body at the Prime Minister’s Office dedicated to security policy coordination among relevant ministers and advisory to the Prime Minister,’ perhaps Japan’s equivalent of US National Security Council (NSC). Second, the time-honoured concept of the ‘Basic Defense Force Concept’ — a concept focused on static existence of defence capability so as to prevent a security vacuum arising — is superseded by ‘Dynamic Defense Force,’ a new concept which aims to enhance the credibility of Japan’s deterrent capability by promoting timely and active ‘operations.’ It should be noted, however, that Dynamic Defense Force cannot be interpreted as involving offensive, counter-force strike capability; the emphasis of Dynamic Defense Force is placed on readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, versatility, and seamless operations of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Third, the new document calls for further strengthening the Japan–US alliance in a wide array of policy areas including a continuous review of common strategic objectives and roles, missions and capabilities, missile defence, strategic dialogue aimed at improving credibility of extended deterrence, maritime security, peace cooperation activities, and cyber space security. Fourth, with regard to force structure there has been a shift in focus to the security of remote southwest islands. This reflects Tokyo’s increasing concern about the prospect of contingencies involving disputes in the so-called ‘gray zones’–confrontations over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests that stop short of war. Hence, the Mid-Term Defense Plan (FY 2011–2015), which was announced along with the NDPG, calls for deployment of new units in island 7

See Japan Ministry of Defense webpage,.

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areas of southwest Japan. Fifth, the NDPG highlights the importance of promoting multi-layered security cooperation, including promotion of security cooperation with several like-minded countries such as the ROK, Australia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and India. Sixth, in light of Japan’s inefficient defence acquisition system and its weakening defence production and technology infrastructure, the NDPG requires the government to formulate strategy to maintain and develop defence production capability and technological base. In this respect, the option of international joint development and production may be pursued with a possible revision of the current policy of banning arms export. Tokyo’s commitment to the Japan–US alliance ensures a robust American military presence in the region, thus contributing to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. What has been taking place in recent years on this front is a gradual transformation of the alliance in the sense that there has been a convergence of strategic objectives and interests between Tokyo and Washington, manifested in a series of policy documents issued through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) in which the two governments worked together to determine how roles, missions and capabilities should be shared between the SDF and the US forces, and how best to facilitate realignment of US forces and military facilities and areas in Japan. Since the inauguration of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, however, Tokyo’s security relations with Washington have been substantially strained primarily due to the Hatoyama government’s mishandling of the Futenma Base issue. The Kan government which appeared to be more strongly and clearly committed to the alliance than the previous Hatoyama government, sought to revitalise the alliance through the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the 21 June 2011 US–Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting, known as the 2+2 meeting. Reflecting on the changing security environment, the 2011 join statement significantly updated the alliance’s common strategic objectives, which were first formulated in the February 2005 2+2 meeting, and revised in 2007. The scope of the alliance has been substantially expanded to include promotion of trilateral security cooperation with both Australia and

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the ROK, promotion of trilateral dialogue among the US, Japan, and India, promotion of ‘effective cooperation through open, multilayered regional networks and rule-making mechanisms, including the ARF, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus), APEC, and the East Asia Summit (EAS),’ maintenance of ‘cooperation with respect to protection of and access to space, and cyberspace,’ and strengthening of ‘international cooperation on disaster prevention and relief.’8 There will be further developments in terms of the roles, missions, and capabilities of the Japan–US alliance so as to make them more effective and relevant to the changing security environment. The scope of the alliance will likely be global and regional, not just the defence of Japan and its surrounding areas. In recent years Japan has been strategically and concretely enhancing its foreign and security policy horizon. With the alliance intact, Japan’s regional security strategy builds on Tokyo’s commitment to consolidate its relations with China and South Korea. However, Japan–China relations deteriorated rapidly after the Senkaku Boat Collision Incident on 7 September 2010, when a Chinese trawler collided with Japanese Coast Guard’s patrol boats near the Senkaku Islands. Yet it can be argued that the two countries remain determined to comprehensively promote a ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,’ exemplified in the Joint Statement issued in May 2008 when President Hu Jintao visited Japan. A positive development that is underway is the significant upgrading of Japan–ROK security cooperation. Currently Tokyo and Seoul have been negotiating for two agreements, one is the Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA) which would enable the two countries to exchange basic military supplies during peacekeeping operations and military exercises, and the other is the General Security of 8 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, ‘Toward a Deeper and Broader US–Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership,’ 21 June 2011, by Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, Takeaki Matsumoto, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Toshimi Kitazawa, Minister of Defense, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf.

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Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) which would facilitate intelligence sharing between Tokyo and Seoul.9 Another notable development in this regard is trilateral cooperation among Japan, China, and the ROK. The trilateral summit meeting and Foreign Ministers meeting are now held on a regular basis and there is momentum to further strengthen tripartite cooperation. Japan–China–ROK tripartite framework can enhance not only economic and technical cooperation but also security cooperation strategically focused on Northeast Asia, especially in areas of non-traditional security issues. Japan’s growing strategic partnerships with Australia and India clearly constitute important elements of its regional security strategy. In March 2007, Japan and Australia launched the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, pledging cooperation in such areas as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, maritime and aviation security, disaster relief, and peace operations. In an effort to implement Japan–Australia security cooperation, the two countries agreed on ‘Major Elements of the Action Plan to implement the J-A Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’ on 9 September 2007. It should also be noted that on 19 May 2010, Tokyo and Canberra signed the ACSA which provides ‘a framework for the reciprocal provision of supplies and services for such activities as exercises and training, UN Peace Keeping Operations, humanitarian relief operations, operations to cope with large scale disasters’ and so on.10 Since Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India in August 2001, Japan has been enhancing cooperation with India in a comprehensive manner, manifested in successive joint policy documents, including the 2006 Joint Statement Towards Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership, the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 9 Chico Harlan, ‘Japan, S. Korea seek to boost military relations,’ Washington Post, 11 January 2011, . 10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan webpage, .

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between Japan and India,11 and the 2010 Joint Statement on Vision for Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade.12 It is expected that Japan and India will continue to expand security and defence cooperation particularly in areas such as maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief through bilateral and multilateral exercises. On global security issues, including maritime security and international terrorism, Tokyo has steadily been enhancing cooperation with EU and NATO countries. A case in point is the SDF’s participation in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, together with European naval force, US-led coalition CTF-151, NATO, Russian, Indian, Malaysian, and Chinese vessels.13 An emerging East Asian community would perhaps constitute an essential ingredient of Japan’s regional security strategy. In my view, the idea of an East Asian community is an idea whose time has not come yet, but the idea should be taken seriously, and is worth pursuing in a serious, cautious, and constructive way. In January 2002 in Singapore, the then Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro proposed the creation of an East Asian Community with ASEAN, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand as its ‘core members’. More recently, the then Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio expressed his aspiration to build an East Asian community as a long-term vision, based on such principles as ‘openness, transparency, and inclusiveness’ and functional cooperation.14 Former Ambassador Tanino Sakutaro suggests that in addition to these principles, ‘anti-hegemony’ should also 11

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan webpage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0810/joint_d.html. 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan webpage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/india/pm1010/joint_st.html. 13 EU Webpage, EU naval operation against piracy, http://www.consilium.europa. eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110104%20Factsheet%20EU%20N AVFOR%20Somalia%20-%20version%2026_EN.pdf. 14 Address by Hatoyama Yukio, Prime Minister of Japan, ‘Japan’s New Commitment to Asia — Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community,’ 15 November 2009; and “Chairman’s Statement of the 12th ASEAN-Japan Summit Cha-am HuaHin, Thailand, 24 October 2009.

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be included as a principle of an East Asian community so that no country should seek hegemony in the region.15 It is worth noting in this regard that the article on hegemony was initially suggested by Henry Kissinger when President Nixon visited China in February 1972, and subsequently was included in the Shanghai Communiqué. It read: Neither [side] should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.16

It should be noted further that the idea of ‘anti-hegemony’ was also included at Beijing’s insistence in the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communiqué. Article 7 of the Communiqué read: The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.17

In the context of East Asian community, the principle of ‘antihegemony’ may be applied to both extra-regional and intra-regional states, and may be welcomed by all the states concerned, including China and the US. Strategic Options for Japan At a time when the centre of gravity of international politics is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region, along with its unforeseen consequences, 15 See Ambassador Tanino’s remarks at the 14th Asia Fellow Program, Asahi Shimbun Asia Network, 9 February 2011, http://www.asahi.com/shimbun/aan/hatsu/ hatsu110209d.html. 16 Cited in Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), p. 270. 17 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, 29 September 1972, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/china/joint72.html.

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and especially given the rise of China and India as great powers, the relative decline of the United States, and a host of global and regional non-traditional security challenges, the traditional US-centred hub and spokes system, or put it another way, the regional security order underwritten by US primacy, may prove to be unsustainable and hence would require through rethinking and reassessment. It would be imperative therefore that the strategic options for Japan must be carefully explored through an examination of evolving strategic circumstances. I would argue that there are three options worthy of consideration. First, Japan can stick with the status quo; second, Japan can seek to become a global civilian power with the Japan–US alliance intact; third, Japan can seek to become a normal state. It is possible to explore other alternatives, like armed neutrality, bandwagoning with China, forging partnerships with regional powers, or the option of doing nothing and letting other powers do the order-building business. I consider these alternatives unlikely in the next few decades if not in the distant future, given Japan’s geostrategic conditions and historical circumstances — Japan is a major economic and technological power and a strong democracy with global interests and it is located in a geo-strategically important Northeast Asia where major powers’ interests intersect, and major powers such as China and Russia are all nuclear-armed and with power-projection capabilities. Japan’s physical vulnerabilities are extremely profound; these are manifested in a geographically small nation with densely populated cities, disaster-prone conditions, and its total dependence on international trade and imported energy sources for survival. Given these geo-strategic conditions, there seems to be no first best, independent defence strategy available to Japan. Only the second best defence strategy is available, and that is a combination of Japan’s limited defence capability and an alliance with a great power, and that great power has been the US for the last 50 or 60 years, the strongest country in the world. Neither the option of armed neutrality as seen in Switzerland nor the option of ‘unarmed neutrality,’ which had long been espoused by the defunct Japan Socialist Party, can be considered strategically viable for Japan. Furthermore, given the nationalistic sentiments and mutual distrust

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rooted in the memories of the wartime past, bandwagoning with China would be a daunting prospect. Some may argue that the ongoing political stagnation in Tokyo, the prevailing sense of drift in the alliance management, Tokyo’s awkward handling of international security problems, the nuclear crisis in the aftermath of the 3.11 disaster, and the prevailing Galapagos syndrome — a condition in which the people and products evolving internally and separately from the rest of the world would mean that the option of doing nothing and becoming strategically irrelevant is a plausible prospect. Yet Japan may be in the midst of transition and has been incrementally yet significantly adjusting and reshaping its institutions and foreign and security policies.18 Simply put, if deemed imperative, Japan would probably do what is required in securing its vital national interests. The first strategic option is to stick with the status quo. This means that Japan would continue to rely on the US as the foundation of its security strategy while making only piecemeal and incremental adjustments in response to changing circumstances. However, there are profound implications of this option for Japan’s security, for the Japan–US alliance, and the security of the region as well. First, despite significant developments that have been taking place in Japan’s security policy and its alliance relations with the US, there is a growing perception that Japan is losing its relevance in the international arena. In 2008, Japan’s official development assistance ranked 5th among foreign aid donors, behind the US, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.19 Prospects for long-term economic growth are clouded by its huge government debt, which currently totals about 196% of GDP (as of 2010),20 and its changing demographics. Japan’s population is not just aging but shrinking fast.

18 See, for example, Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007); Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (Abingdon: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009). 19 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Webpage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/oda/white/2009/html/honbun/b2/s1.html. 20 CIA The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2186rank.html.

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On the international security policy front, Japan’s performance remains far from satisfactory; its defence budget has been declining for nine consecutive years and less than 1% of its GDP. In December 2010, the number of Japanese military personnel contributing to UN operations is only 266, which ranks 47th among UN member states.21 The prevailing perception is that Japan is becoming marginalised, whereas China is increasing its power and influence in the region. Therefore, if Tokyo sticks with the status quo, Japan may end up becoming a self-marginalised middle power. Second, the Japan–US alliance has been strained not only by the Futenma Base issue but also by a growing perception gap between Tokyo and Washington in mutual expectations. Michael Finnegan, former Senior Country Director in the Office of the Secretary of Defence, put it: The alliance is failing to meet the expectations of both the US and Japan in significant ways. For the US, the continuing inability of the alliance to operationalize itself in the core mission of the defense of Japan as well as to be operationally relevant in the region remain the key failings. For Japan, the primary growing concern is the US meeting and sustaining commitments to the defense of Japan, including extended deterrence.… despite public statements about strength, the alliance is actually quite brittle precisely at a time when both allies are perhaps depending on it more than ever. In a crisis the exposure of the alliance’s inability to meet key expectations is likely engender a subsequent significant and deal-breaking breakdown of confidence, leading one or both partners to consider alternatives beyond the current configuration.22

Furthermore, should the US continue to be entangled in the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and given the growing budget

21

United Nations Peacekeeping Website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ contributors/2010/dec10_2.pdf. 22 Michael Finnegan, ‘Managing Unmet Expectations in the US–Japan Alliance,’ The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #17 November 2009, p. 2.

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constraints, US force may not be counted upon in certain situations and contingencies in the region that affect Japan’s national security interests. Third, if China continues to grow economically, politically, and militarily to the point where it can seriously challenge American strategic primacy in East Asia and the Western Pacific, it can be argued that the US has three options: it ‘can withdraw from Asia, share power with China, or compete with it for primacy.’23 Australian strategist Hugh White argues that China’s growth will make the maintenance of US primacy unsustainable, but given the costs and risks of US strategic rivalry against China, the best option for the US would be to relinquish primacy and share power with China.24 Under these changed circumstances, the current Japan–US alliance arrangements would be not only unsustainable but also highly problematic in terms of Japan’s security interests. Put simply, as far as the US maintains primacy in the region, especially in the Western Pacific, the status-quo option may be the most likely, if not the easiest option available to Japan. However, given China’s growing military capability along with its expanding political, economic, and cultural influence in the region and globally, the US alone may not be counted upon as the dominant power capable of tackling all the security challenges in the region. The second option is the strategy of seeking a global civilian power.25 The proponents of this perspective argue that Japan should assume global responsibilities in tackling a host of international security challenges, including international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. They emphasise the continued relevance and significance of Japan’s postwar ideals of peace and democracy embodied in the constitution. And they think it prudent for Japan to maintain the policy of an exclusively defence-oriented security policy and 23

Hugh White, ‘Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing,’ Quarterly Essay, 2010, pp. 36–47. 24 Ibid. 25 Funabashi, Yoichi, ‘Japan and the New World Order,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, 1991/92, pp. 58–74.

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refrain from using offensive military forces for settling international conflicts. It can be argued in this connection that this model of Japan as a global civilian power features key ingredients of what Thomas Berger has labelled as a ‘liberal adaptive state.’ The liberal adaptive state perspective presents a Japan that is driven by ‘an essentially liberal philosophy of international relations, one that stresses building international institutions and deepening economic and social ties between nations, including potential adversaries, as ways of creating an international system that is inherently more cooperative and peaceful than it has been in the past,’ thus making a serious effort ‘to contribute to the creation of a more liberal Asian regional and international order.’26 The liberal adaptive state model assumes that ‘Japan remains relatively restrained in its use of military instruments for pursuing its national interests and is likely to remain so for some time to come,’ yet acknowledges that ‘Japan is increasingly willing to use its forces for a wide variety of noncombat missions, including international peace-keeping, disaster relief, and the provision of logistical support for its allies.’27 The global civilian power or the adaptive state thesis, like the status quo option, is predicated on the continuation of the credible Japan–US alliance underwritten by American strategic primacy in the region. Given the power shift currently underway with China’s ascendancy and America’s relative decline and the prospect of a nuclear North Korea, this option may fail to provide reassurance to the Japanese people on the one hand, and fail to deter Japan’s potential adversaries on the other. Japan’s desire for a global civilian power would also be impeded by its shrinking and ageing population and severe fiscal constraints. The final option for Japan is that of a normal state. The term ‘normal state’ could mean different things to different people. 26

Thomas U. Berger, ‘The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State,’ in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Tsuchiyama,Jitsuo (eds.), Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 259–299. 27 Ibid., p. 260.

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Ozawa Ichiro, former Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and currently an influential member of the DPJ, once defined ‘a normal nation’ as ‘a nation that willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community,’ and ‘cooperate[s] fully with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people.’28 For discussion purposes, I define a ‘normal state’ as a state which takes primary responsibility for the defence of its core national interests, including the defence of its territory. In the Japanese context, a ‘normal’ Japan could mean that Japan would be primarily responsible for the mission of the defence of Japan with the Japan–US alliance as an auxiliary force; a state that has the inherent rights of both individual and collective self-defence and has the political will to execute these rights if deemed necessary, as well as participates in international collective security activities that may involve the use of force as a responsible stakeholder and a matured ally of the US.29 Given the changes in the strategic environment, it can be argued that time is ripe for Japan to take up the challenge of assuming a normal security role. The ‘normal state’ thesis would require in the final analysis that Japan should amend the constitution. Yet political and institutional hurdles may be too high for Tokyo to make a decisive move in that direction. Notwithstanding, as the strategic situation continues changing in a fundamental way, it would not be inconceivable for Japan to explore the possibility of revising the existing interpretations of the constitution relating to the right of collective self-defence and the use of force in international collective security activities. It can be argued further that Japan’s move toward normalcy would make Japan a more proactive and effective security policy player and a more robust and reliable ally of the US, thus positively contributing to the peace and stability of Asia and the Pacific. 28

Ozawa, Ichiro, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994), pp. 94–95. 29 See also Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro, and David A. Welch (eds.), Japan as a ‘Normal ’ Country? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2011).

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Japan’s primacy in the defence of Japan would mean ‘burden-sharing by devolution’ so as to transform the US–Japan alliance of the last 50 or 60 years which has been viewed by many as ‘lopsided’ or ‘unequal’ into a more matured and ‘equal’ alliance thus adjusting to changing strategic conditions. Burden-sharing by devolution would mean not only Japan’s primary role and responsibility in the defence of Japan but also sharing the responsibilities for the maintenance of a stable international order. This would mean a far more self-reliant defence posture and a gradual shift in Japan’s defence capability toward the power-projection end of the force spectrum, and its more proactive involvement in international security affairs, both regional and global. Jim Thomas of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments put it: If US allies become more self-reliant, limit the intra-regional power projection options of potential adversaries and thereby reduce the threats of invasion and conquest, the United States would be able to focus more of its limited resources on reinvigoration those military elements that confer this status as a global superpower: principally its mastery of the skies and command of the high seas. …these domains, along with outer space and cyberspace, will be increasingly contested in the decades ahead.30

However, there are important preconditions for Japan’s leap toward a normal state. Given the lingering discontent and mistrust toward Japan on the part of Japan’s Asian neighbours, it would be imperative for Japan to come to grips with the issue of war responsibility in a sincere and public way so that Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours can be truly reconciled. It would also be important for Japan to find a modus vivendi with China, Korea, and Russia on the intractable issues concerning territories so that Japan’s overall relationships with these countries can be fundamentally stabilised. And perhaps most fundamentally, it would be imperative for Japan to put its own house in order by accelerating the recovery and rebuilding the nation in the aftermath of the 3.11 disaster. 30

Jim Thomas, ‘From Protectorates to Partnerships,’ The American Interest, Vol. 6, No. 5, May/June 2011, p. 42.

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It should be noted in this respect that Japan’s move toward normalcy would not necessarily require Japan to go nuclear. Japan is the only country in the world that suffered the consequence of the nuclear bombing. The Japanese people experienced at first hand the horrors of the nuclear explosion and hence Japan is firmly committed to promote nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It is true that Japan possesses the technical means, including sophisticated rockets for its space program, and nuclear material such as plutonium that would enable Japan to become a nuclear weapons state if it chooses. It is also true that, given the real prospect for a nuclear North Korea and the rapid growth of China’s military power, there have been voices in Japan calling for revision of Japan’s strategic posture vis-à-vis nuclear weapons. Yet the DPJ government is politically determined not to go nuclear. In my view, Japan’s nuclear option cannot be in the interest of Japan because it would create tremendous uncertainty and instability in the region, seriously undermine the non-proliferation regime, and possibly cause a rupture in the Japan–US alliance, which has been the foundation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region for the last 60 years. Whatever option is chosen, it would be critical for Japan and the US, to meet the China challenge jointly, comprehensively, and creatively, while stabilising the US–China relationship. In this endeavour, we would need both engagement and ‘hedging’ strategies. It would be essential for the countries in the region to engage China in strategic dialogue, confidence building measures, joint disaster relief and exercises, and international humanitarian activities energy and maritime security. Yet it would also be prudent for the countries in the region to hedge against a China that might lay down the law to the countries in the region. I would argue further that both engagement and hedging would be insufficient to meet the China challenge. It would be crucial to strategically and proactively co-opt China in regional architecture building. It is widely recognised that community building efforts in the region have been driven by economic integration and with ASEAN in the driver’s seat; yet when it comes to a broader, regionwide architecture building, it can be argued that Tokyo, Washington,

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and Beijing can be expected to play a more prominent role in architecture building in the region. One attractive policy idea in this regard that has been looming large on Tokyo’s policy agenda is the idea of a US–Japan–China trilateral mechanism for comprehensive strategic dialogues and consultations at the official level on wide-ranging security issues encompassing maritime security, international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, international peace-keeping, and a host of ‘human security issues,’ including climate change, pandemics, and natural disasters. A US–Japan–China trilateral mechanism could also involve trilateral measures for cooperation in the fields of defence exchanges, military training, and exercises. In times of international crises, such as incidents in the maritime domain, there would be hot-line channels of communication among the defence establishments of the three countries so that they could coordinate policy measures in timely and effective ways. The time has come for Japan to get its political, economic, and strategic fundamentals right and face up to the strategic challenges of the 21st century world. Japan needs to increase its comprehensive national power and formulate its national security strategy, articulating its national interests, and the means to protect and enhance them. In view of the lessons drawn from the experience of the 3.11 disaster, Japan requires strong political leadership, transparent governance, and comprehensive national strategies for effective crisis management. Given the inevitable power shift driven by the rise of China and emergence of India, it would be vitally important for major powers including the US, Japan, China, and India and middle powers in the region to share the responsibilities in shaping a new security order in the AsiaPacific region. Bibliography Berger, TU (2007). The pragmatic liberalism of an adaptive state. In: Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State, TU Berger, MM Mochizuki and J Tsuchiyama (eds.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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Lam, PE (2009). Japan’s Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role. New York: Routledge. Finnegan, M (2009). Managing unmet expectations in the US–Japan alliance. The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #17. Funabashi, Y (1991). Japan and the new world order. Foreign Affairs, 70(5), 58–74. Hatoyama, Y (2009). Japan’s New Commitment to Asia — Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community, 15 November 2009. Hughes, CW (2009). Japan’s Remilitarisation. Abingdon: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Katahara, E (2001). Japan: From containment to normalization. In: Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, M Alagappa (ed.), Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kissinger, H (2011). On China. New York: The Penguin Press. Krepinevich, AF and RC Martinage (2008). Dissuasion Strategy. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2008. Krepinevich, AF Jr (2009). The pentagon’s wasting assets: The eroding foundations of American power. Foreign Affairs, 88(4), 18–33. Pyle, KB (2007). Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose. New York: The Century Foundation. Soeya, Y, M Tadokoro and DA Welch (eds.) (2011). Japan as a “Normal” Country? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World. Toronto: Toronto University Press. Thomas, J (2011). From protectorates to partnerships. The American Interest, 6(5), 36–44. White, H (2010). Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing. Quarterly Essay.

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THE US–JAPAN ALLIANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE Wang Jian Wei

The Chinese perspective of the US–Japan security alliance has experienced a sea change over the last half a century.1 During the early Cold War era, the alliance was perceived as a serious threat to China’s national security. To counter the US–Japan alliance, China initially forged an alliance with the Soviet Union. By the early 1970s, with the change of China’s threat perception and the rapprochement between China and the US, Beijing’s hostility towards the US–Japan alliance had largely evaporated. Because all three players shared a common strategic interest to check Soviet expansionism, the alliance became harmless or even useful to Beijing in shaping a more favourable security environment in East Asia against Moscow. Immediately after the Cold War ended, the US–Japan alliance did not become a major security issue for China as the alliance had

1

For a review of the evolution of China’s perceptions of the US–Japan alliance in the last century, see Jianwei Wang and Wu Xinbo, ‘Against Us or with Us? The Chinese perspective of America’s alliances with Japan and Korea,’ Asia./Pacific Research Center, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, May 1998. 25

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drifted for a while without a strategic focus. Beijing then believed that with the Cold War’s end, the alliance had run its course. Revitalising the security alliance between Washington and Tokyo after the Taiwan Strait and Korean nuclear crises in the mid 1990s once again put the alliance at odds with Beijing’s vision of the regional security order. The official Chinese line is that the US–Japan security alliance is a relic of the Cold War and therefore should be weakened, if not altogether scrapped, rather than strengthened. It is a bilateral arrangement which should not target third parties.2 Although the Americans and Japanese tried hard to reassure the Chinese that the consolidation of the alliance underpins regional stability, most Chinese were convinced that the alliance is directed once again at China to check China’s rising power and influence in East Asia. Indeed, this is a deep-rooted strategic suspicion held by most Chinese elites. The evolution of China’s perspective of Japan–US, security alliance suggests that it is influenced by the following main factors. First, China’s normative views about the legitimacy of security alliance in general. Ever since the bitter experience of first allying with the Soviet Union and then the US, China has taken a negative view of military-oriented security alliances. In the early 1980s, Beijing declared the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and would not ally with any countries. Generally speaking, Beijing takes the US–Japan alliance as a reflection of a US Cold War mentality even after the Cold War has ended. Second, Chinese evaluation of the alliance is also affected by the well-being of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. When these two pairs of bilateral relations are stable and cordial, Beijing is less concerned about the negative implications of the security alliance and more tolerant of the military ties between Washington and Tokyo.

2

‘Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs talks about the Japan–US alliance, Chinese government’s policy toward Japan,’ Xinhuanet.com, 1 November 2005. .

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On the other hand, if either of the relationships goes sour, Beijing will be more suspicious and uneasy about the relations between Washington and Tokyo. In other words, the change of Beijing’s perception of the security alliance is often a function of the ups and downs of the overall bilateral relations. Third, the Chinese opinion about the security alliance also depends on the assessment of its regional security environment. When Beijing feels more imminent threats from sources other than the US and Japan, it tends to take a more benign view of the US–Japan alliance. When the perceived threat to its vital national interests largely comes from either of the two countries or both, Beijing will become more alarmed by any perceived moves in the alliance. Beijing’s perspective of the alliance in the 21st century has been and will continue to be influenced by these factors. Based on the understanding of these factors that variably affect China’s perspective of the US–Japan alliance, this chapter discusses the evolution of Chinese views of the alliance and related Sino–Japanese interactions in the following time periods: the Bush–Koizumi, post-Koizumi, and DPJ era. It argues that while conceptually Beijing does not like the alliance for both normative and geopolitical reasons, it can live with it as long as it does not threaten the perceived Chinese core national interests. However, Beijing warily discovered that increasingly China’s important interests could be implicated by the existence of the alliance, be it Taiwan, Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands, East China Sea, South China Sea, or Korean Peninsula. From this perspective, the alliance is more perceived as an obstacle to China’s rise in the region. For that reason, Beijing is constantly watching the direction and evolution of the alliance with anxiety and vigilance. In terms of Japan’s role in this alliance, China’s observation is that Japan seems to have made its strategic choice to ally with the existing declining power to contain or hedge against the rising power — China. To the Chinese elites, this Japanese strategy is short sighted, unwise, and unattainable in the long run. In the meantime, they also realise that the combined strength of the US and Japan is still formidable and can put China at disadvantage in the short term.

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Bush–Koizumi Honeymoon to China’s Detriment Entering the 21st century, China’s views of the US–Japan alliance were conditioned by the two new governments in both Washington and Tokyo. The Bush administration initially changed the focus of its East Asia strategy. Enhancing the strategic role of Japan in East Asia became the priority of Bush policy. The two Armitage–Nye reports strongly supported Japan to play pivotal roles in political and security affairs in the region. The first Armitage report in 2000 argued that the American policy towards Asia put too much emphasis on China in the past and it was time to increase the weight of the US–Japan alliance in the American East Asia strategy. Washington should set a goal of turning the US–Japan relations into a ‘mature partnership’ changing its function from ‘burden sharing’ to ‘power sharing.’ Taking the US–British special relationship as an example, Japan should play roles in East Asia as what UK does in Europe.3 The second Armitage–Nye report released in 2007 still considered the US–Japan alliance ‘the core of the United States Asia strategy’ and will ‘continue to shape Asia’s future’ and be ‘a critical factor in the global equation.’ Washington should further encourage Tokyo to play more positive and influential role in the regional as well as global affairs.4 American pundits also talked about how a ‘rising’ and more assertive Japan is good for the US.5 Amidst a changing strategic context, Sino–Japanese relations were haunted by a maverick Japanese politician — Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. His repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (a symbol of Japanese imperialism to the Chinese and Koreans) despite Beijing’s repeated protests and his strongly pro-America foreign policy upset many Chinese. They were convinced that Japan’s grand

3

INSS Special Report, ‘The United States and Japan: advancing toward a mature partnership,’ 11 October 2000. 4 CSIS Report, ‘The US–Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020,’ February 2007, pp. 15, 23. 5 Michael Green, ‘Japan is back: why Tokyo’s new assertiveness is good for Washington,’ Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007.

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strategy was already set — to ally with the US to hedge against China’s rise in East Asia. Many Chinese observers noticed that the US is the most important international driving force behind the push for Japan’s ‘normalcy’ as a regional and global power.6 In this respect, Chinese observers viewed Koizumi’s strong pro-American impulse in his foreign policy as a mistake. According to them, the notion of some Japanese strategists that so long as US–Japan relations were in good shape, other relationships would fall into place automatically7 was a serious and dangerous strategic misjudgement.8 While Koizumi declared in his last visit to Washington that ‘the better the Japan–US relations, my view is that we will be able to have better relations with China and other countries and Asia,’9 Chinese observers pointed out that during Koizumi’s tenure of five years as prime minister, Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours actually sharply deteriorated.10 Related to this, Chinese analysts already noticed the new assertiveness in the Japanese foreign policy. In their eyes, it was Bush’s East Asia strategy of ‘uplifting Japan and downgrading China’ that made the overall Japanese foreign policy more assertive, particularly in military and security affairs including its increasingly proactive role in the security alliance and related stands on Taiwan; its more provocative policy toward the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands and the East China Sea disputes; and, finally, what some perceived as Japan’s increasing intransigence in acknowledging its history of aggression in the region. Some summarised the outstanding problems between 6

Lu Zhongwei, ‘China–Japan Relations: Understanding and Promotion,’ Chinese Diplomacy, No. 1, 2004, p. 20. 7 Feng Zhaokui, ‘Koizumi should reflect on five issues in his China diplomacy’; available online at , accessed 30 May 2005. 8 Wang Cong, ‘Japan has made a strategic misjudgment about China,’ China Youth Daily, 7 August 2005. 9 White House, ‘President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi participate in a joint press availability,’ 29 June 29 2006. 10 Li Xuejiang, ‘Why the US–Japan alliance is getting closer and closer?’ People’s Daily .

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China and Japan as the five ‘Ts’: territory, Taiwan, textbook, theatre missile defence, and trade.11 In balance, Japan appears to have shifted its low-profile approach towards a greater willingness to say ‘no’ to China.12 Beijing noticed with anxiety that during the Bush–Koizumi period, the scope of the US–Japan alliance expanded to some of the most sensitive issues to Beijing. For example, the Taiwan issue increasingly became a concern of the US–Japan alliance. The 1997 US–Japan Defense Guidelines obliged Tokyo to provide logistical support to the US military in a situation taking place in an ‘area surrounding Japan.’ This was perceived by Beijing as implicating Taiwan and helped shape Beijing’s negative views of the alliance. Moreover, the 2005 US–Japan ‘2+2’ meeting for the first time explicitly listed the Taiwan issue as one of the United-States joint strategic objectives. Subsequently with the tension in the Taiwan Strait remaining high, Tokyo and Washington began to draw concrete plans to coordinate their military actions in the event that China invades Taiwan with Japan focusing on rear-area support for US forces.13 The Chinese government strongly opposed this move arguing that the US–Japan military alliance is a bilateral arrangement during the Cold War period and therefore should not go beyond its bilateral nature involving third parties.14 Some Chinese analysts took this as the indication that Japan’s role changed from being behind the scene to the forefront on the Taiwan issue.15 A series of legislation passed in recent years by the Japanese Diet to deal with emergency situations surrounding Japan was perceived by Chinese observers as paving the way for

11

‘Some Recommendations on Improving Sino-Japanese Relations,’ Contemporary International Relations, No. 6, 2004, pp. 3–4. 12 Li Shu, ‘The strategic dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations,’ China Youth Daily, 20 March 2005. 13 Kyodo News, ‘Japan, US mull plan for Taiwan crisis,’ 4 January 2007. 14 ‘China’s policy towards Japan,’ Xinhuanet.com, 28 March 2007. . 15 Bai Ma, ‘the impact of the US–Japan island-takeover exercise on China’s security,’ September 23, 2010 .

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Japan’s joint military intervention with the United States in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Some even wondered if Japan eventually would abandon its nominal ‘One China’ policy.16 Another symptom of Japan’s more assertive foreign policy is its tougher positions on the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands and the East China Sea disputes.17 Chinese observers also considered that the terrorist attacks on US soil on 11 September 2001 and the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan gave Japan the historical opportunity to move beyond the traditional boundary of its security alliance and to expand its regional and global political and military role. Jumping on the American bandwagon of the war against terror, Japan acted very swiftly to fully utilise this opportunity and broke the taboo from one to another passing a series of legislations to enable the Japanese selfdefence force to send its navy, air force, and even ground troops overseas thus fulfilling a historical breakthrough and marking the beginning of the Japanese exercise of the right of collective defence.18 On the other hand, against the background of the global war against terror, the Bush administration was forced to gradually adjust its global strategy. The priority had shifted from East Asia to Middle East and Persian Gulf. As a result, the US modified its East Asia strategy of taking China as a main potential adversary. Instead Washington was eager to secure Beijing’s cooperation on the war againt terror. In addition the 2005 Korean nuclear crisis and China’s imperative role in managing the crisis further highlighted the importance of a good Sino–American relationship. Particularly entering the late years of the Bush administration, seeking stable Sino–US relations became an important policy objective in East Asia and using the US–Japan security alliance to contain China was put on the backburner.

16

Zhao Jieji, ‘The trends in Japan’s Taiwan policy deserves attention,’ China’s Foreign Affairs, No. 3, 2005, p. 49. 17 Duan Tingzhi and Zhou Qingjian ‘Behind Japan’s ‘hitting out in three directions,’ pp. l0–l1. 18 Wang Xianzhi, ‘The harm of new Japanese–American security protection regime to China’s national security and relevant countermeasure,’ Journal of Hunan University of Science & Technology, January 2010, p. 83.

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The Chinese noticed this subtle change. The common document issued by the 2007 US–Japan 2+2 meeting adopted the concept of defining China as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and acknowledged China’s contribution to the regional and world peace and stability. Different from the 2005 2+2 meeting, the document this time removed the Taiwan issue from the list of common strategic objectives. The Chinese analysis attributed this change to the notion that both the US and Japan realised that the regional stability is unattainable without the involvement of China. Some even concluded that the security alliance has entered a transition period and it is not solely directed at China.19 In the post-9.11 circumstances, another indicator for an enhanced security alliance during the Bush–Koizumi era is the increasingly robust cooperation on missile defence often using the tension on the Korean peninsula as a pretext. President Bush pushed very hard for the NMD and TMD schemes, which was opposed by many countries including some of his Western allies. But Japan was quite cooperative with the US on this issue and invested heavily in the project. Missile interception has become one of the important and regular items in US–Japan joint military exercises. Gradually the Japanese missile defence force was highly integrated into the American missile defence force. Starting in 2003, Japan launched several spy satellites to strengthen its intelligence-collection capability for the purpose of missile defence. The US and Japan also accelerated their efforts to jointly develop and exploit TMD systems. This trend continued in the postKoizumi periods. In 2007, Japan began to deploy ‘Patriot — III’ anti-missile systems in Japan. In the Chinese words, ‘missile defence has become the important content of Japan–US joint military exercise, and cooperation on missile defence has been an important driving force for the Japan–US military integration.’20 19

Ma Junwei and Xu Xuequn, ‘Japan–US 2+2 meeting document and the transformation of the Japan–US alliance,’ Contemporary International Relations, No. 6, 2007, pp. 45. 20 Zhang Weiwei and Zhang Guangxin, ‘The enhancement of the Japan–US alliance in the post-Cold War time,’ Dongjiang Journal, No. 2, April 2009, p. 29.

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Balancing the US and China Koizumi’s ‘leaning towards one side’ strategy of strengthening the security alliance at the expense of Sino–Japanese relations ended when he stepped down as prime minister in 2006. By that time the leadership in both countries realised that the political deadlock between the two countries was damaging to their bilateral interests. Even Washington began to worry about the steady deterioration of Sino–Japanese relations and to criticise Tokyo’s intransigence on the war history issue.21 Koizumi’s successor Abe Shinzo decided to address the imbalance of Koizumi’s foreign policy. He moved away from Koizumi’s lopsided pro-US policy by visiting China and South Korea to improve relations with Japan’s Asian neighbours as his first diplomatic priority. Although a political conservative, Abe avoided Yasukuni Shrine visits as Prime Minister for the sake of broader interests between the two counties. President Hu Jintao seized the opportunity by inviting Abe to visit China and both leaders agreed to improve Japan–China relations by building ‘a strategic relationship of mutual benefits.’22 To deal with the conflicting interpretations of the war history, they also unprecedentedly agreed to a joint study of the history by academics from both countries. These positive developments were certainly welcomed by the Chinese. His visit to China and subsequent return visit to Japan by Chinese premier Wen Jiabao were perceived as ‘thoroughly breaking ice’ in the frozen Sino–Japan political relations.23 The Chinese were well aware that as a hawk and strong nationalist, Abe was no less determined than Koizumi to make Japan a ‘normal’ state, to seek Japan’s great power status and to contain China’s growing influence in East Asia. In this regard he used a symbolic

21

Gary Bass, ‘A shrine to Japan’s tainted past,’ New York Times, 5 August 2006. ‘Press conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe following his visit to China,’ 8 October 2006; available online at , accessed 12 October 2006. 23 Shi Yinghong, ‘Putting conflicts on hold for new start with Japan,’ China Daily, 18 April 2007. 22

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compromise on Yasukuni Shrine to pave the way for his ‘great power’ and ‘normal country’ diplomacy. Among other things, he upgraded the Japanese defence agency into a ministry, signed a security pact with Australia, and advocated a quadrangular alliance of the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and his foreign minister Aso Taro initiated the so-called value-oriented diplomacy to strive to form an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ as new bases for Japanese foreign policy.24 All these actually went beyond the traditional framework of the security alliance and in reality advanced the foreign policy platform of the Koizumi era.25 In the meantime, Abe also went further than his predecessor to bolster US–Japan military cooperation in dealing with contingencies such as Taiwan. Koizumi once indicated that Japan did not anticipate providing military assistance to the US in any dispute between China and Taiwan. However, Abe quietly made a decision to go ahead with the joint study of military cooperation in the event of a military conflict involving Taiwan.26 Beijing’s reactions to all these moves by the Abe government were moderate. It seems that his modest goodwill on the symbolic shrine visit won him more leeway in pursuing a more or less similar foreign policy line of Koizumi without much backlash from Beijing. Abe’s practice of shunning Yasukuni was continued by his successor Fukuda Yasuo, a less nationalistic and more friendly Japanese politician towards China in line with his family tradition as it was his father, Fukuda Takeo, who signed the Sino–Japanese treaty of peace and friendship in 1978. Just like most LDP prime ministers, Fukuda chose the US as the destination of his first foreign visit partially to

24

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,’ speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar, 30 November 2006. 25 Chen Xiao and Shi Yinghong, ‘Post-Koizumi China diplomacy of LDP revisited,’ Special issue to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Contemporary International Relations, 2010, p. 72. 26 ‘Japan, US mull plan for Taiwan crisis,’ Kyodo News, 4 January 2007.

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address the problem in the alliance caused by the difference on the North Korean issue. He still stressed the alliance as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. However, that did not prevent him at all from his diplomatic effort to ‘raise Sino–Japanese relations to a new level.’27 Unlike Abe who did not firmly commit himself to the non-visit of Yasukuni explicitly, Fukuda made it very clear that he would not visit the shrine during his tenure as prime minister.28 Instead of harping on ‘value diplomacy’ to isolate China, Fukuda tried to find a common cultural heritage between the two countries. To emphasise the deeprooted cultural affinity between the two countries, Fukuda travelled to visit the hometown and temple of Confucius. This gesture was much appreciated by the Chinese media and public. For the Chinese, it was the manifestation of his admiration of Chinese culture.29 The Chinese leader Hu Jintao returned the favour during his trip to Japan in 2008 by visiting Nara, the ancient capital of Japan modelled after the Chinese ancient capital city Changan. However, Fukuda’s goodwill towards China was not just symbolic. He also took concrete measures to improve Sino–Japanese relations. For example, it was during Fukuda’s tenure that the military exchanges between the two countries realised a breakthrough. Chinese warships visited Japan for the first time since the end of the World War II. The Fukuda government was also ready to tackle thorny issues such as the East China Sea by raising the importance of the talk from the bureau to ministerial level. Under Fukuda’s personal attention, the two countries reached an important agreement in principle on the East China Sea issue. For these reasons, overall the Chinese side gave higher

27

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Forging the future together,’ speech by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, prime minister of Japan at Peking University, Beijing, People’s Republic of China, 28 December 2007. 28 ‘Fukuda came to power: is Sino–Japanese relations heading towards warm spring or cold winter?’ China News Service, 29 September 2007. 29 ‘The present and future direction of Sino–Japanese relations,’ .

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marks to Fukuda government’s China policy. One analysis argued that while Abe was still aimed at hedging against China, Fukuda was more interested in achieving a win–win in the relationship.30 Another article also pointed out that compared to his predecessor, Fukuda was more earnest for Sino–Japan friendship.31 Unfortunately the Fukuda government, just like its predecessor, proved to be short-lived. It was considered by the Chinese ‘a big loss’ to the relationship. Some called the Fukuda era as the ‘golden time’ for Sino–Japanese relations.32 As for his successor Aso Taro, they recalled his provocative remarks to whitewash the Japanese war history. They were also disturbed by his pro-Taiwan remarks by calling it a ‘country’ for several times. On balance, they found that Aso pursued a foreign policy that was more similar to Abe than Fukuda. First, at the global strategic level, Aso clearly considered Sino–Japan relations subordinate to Japan–US relations. He declared that ‘the United States is the only ally of Japan and therefore the relationship with the United States is much more important.’ Secondly, Aso tended to look at Sino–Japan relations from a utility-oriented perspective. He asserted that a friendly Sino–Japan relationship is a means rather than a goal and the goal is to pursue common interest.33 Thirdly, the focus of Aso’s diplomacy is to obtain Japan’s great power status. For that purpose he continued his ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ after he became prime minister.

30

‘Fukuda wants to have environmental cooperation with China,’ World News Journal, 3 January 2008, . 31 Chen Xiao and Shi Yinghong, ‘Post-Koizumi China diplomacy of LDP revisited’ in Special issue to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Contemporary International Relations, 2010, p.73. 32 Qiu Ruan, ‘The impact to Fukuda’s resignation on Sino–Japan relations cannot be underestimated,’ China Review News, 3 September 2009. . 33 ‘How would Sino–Japanese relations evolve after Aso came to power,’ Beijing News, 23 September 2008.

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The nature of this strategy is to offset China’s growing influence and international status.34 These three basic tenets determined that Aso’s China policy tended to be more cautious and conservative than Fukuda. On at least two issues, the Chinese noticed that Aso displayed more ambiguity than his predecessor. On the issue of ‘China threat,’ on the one hand, Aso declared that China’s rise should not be pursued as a threat and should be welcomed; on the other hand, he often talked about the Chinese military, including nuclear threat to Japan. On the more sensitive Yasukuni issue, although Aso refrained from visiting the shrine in person, he did present articles of tribute to the shrine.35 In his brief tenure as Prime Minister, Aso followed Abe’s US-centred foreign policy while maintaining the basic framework of ‘building a mutual beneficial relationship based on common strategic interest’ in dealing with China. New DPJ Government and Sino-Japanese Relations In September 2009, the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a historical victory in the Lower House and formed the new government thereby replacing the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which held power at the national level for 54 years. When Hatoyama Yukio of the DPJ became prime minister in same month, Beijing hoped that he would depart from the policies of his LDP predecessors towards the US and China. Some Chinese observers sanguinely predicted that the Hatoyama Administration would take a pro-China orientation in its foreign policy. They argued that for the first time since World War II, Japan has a historical strategic opportunity to develop its relations with 34

Chen Xiao and Shi Yinghong, ‘Post-Koizumi China diplomacy of LDP revisited,’ Special issue to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Contemporary International Relations, 2010, p. 73. 35 ‘Chinese expressed serious concerns and unhappiness to Japanese prime minister’s presentation of articles of tribute to Yasukuni Shrine,’ Chinesenews.net, 23 April 2009.

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China independently without constraints.36 As anticipated, the Hatoyama Administration made conscious effort to modify the LDP’s pro-American foreign policy by rebalancing its relations with the US (calling for a more equal bilateral ties) on the one hand and better ties with its Asian neighbours (including China) on the other. One Chinese scholar concluded that the DPJ government began to seriously give up its thinking of relying upon the US to deal with China.37 Hatoyama’s call for turning East Asia into a ‘sea of fraternity’ and for building an ‘East Asian community’ were welcomed by both Chinese leaders and scholars as evidence to show ‘the importance Japanese government attaches to and its active stance on East Asia regional cooperation,’38 ‘the importance the Hatoyama cabinet attaches to Asia and China–Japan relations,’ and therefore ‘is conducive to developing Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours and to Japan’s greater role in regional affairs.’39 After Hatoyama put out his EAC platform, Beijing quickly endorsed Hatoyama’s vision without much hesitation. Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi declared that China ‘was among the first countries that initiated and supported such an idea.’40 President Hu Jintao told Hatoyama that ‘China is willing to enhance cooperation with Japan in the process of Asia’s integration with substantial moves.’41 Nevertheless, some Chinese observers were still wondering how far Tokyo could go in this foreign policy reorientation to forge a more 36

“‘The China factor’ in the US–Japan alliance began to change,” Zaobao.com, 22 January 2010. 37 ‘Yan Jiechi’s visit to Japan: China-Japan relations redefined,’ Sohu.com, 21 November 2009. 38 ‘Highlights of Chinese vice president’s interview with Japanese, ROK media,’ Xinhua, 12 December 2009. 39 ‘Tang Jiaxuan’s speech at the reception held by seven Japan–China friendship groups,’ 12 March 2010, Tokyo. < http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/zyjh/ t673828.htm>. 40 ‘Chinese, Japanese FMs meet, highlighting bilateral ties,’ Xinhua, 28 September 2009. 41 ‘Hu Jintao met Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama,’ Xinhua, 13 April 2010.

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‘active’ and ‘equal’ relationship with Washington.42 They noticed that initially Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya indicated that East Asian community should not include the US. Such remarks caused a strong reaction from the American side and were perceived as ‘hurting American people’s feeling.’43 Very soon Hatoyama came out to clarify that the proposed East Asian community does not intend to exclude the US and the key to the community is its openness.44 Indeed he even suggested that the security alliance should be ‘an indispensable prerequisite for creating an East Asian community.’45 Such kind of conflicting signals were not reassuring to the Chinese. Some analysts already made it clear that China does not have the stomach for a US-led East Asian community.46 Indeed some Chinese concluded that Washington is at best halfhearted in its policy of ‘making Japan a great power’ in East Asia on the outset. Conceivably, a great power and autonomous Japan will conflict with US pre-eminence in the region. The Chinese believed that Washington would not support any Asian or East Asian cooperative mechanism that would exclude the US even if it is initiated and led by its ally Japan.47 An example in point is the Tokyo’s abortive initiative of Asian Monetary Fund to address the Asian Financial Crisis and prevent future similar crisis. It was the US that pressured Japan to drop the idea. Some concluded that Washington did not want 42

“‘East Asia Community’ concept not intended to exclude US: Hatoyama”, Japan Today, 17 September 2009. 43 ‘Yang Jiechi’s visit to Japan: China-Japan relations redefined,’ Sohu.com, 21 November 2009. 44 ‘No clear vision for Japan-proposed East Asian community,’ Xinhua, 24 October 2009. 45 ‘Japanese PM says to deepen ties with US. in policy address,’ Xinhua, 29 January 2010. 46 ‘East Asian community should be in no way led by the United States,’ Sohu.com, 11 March 2010. 47 Ma Yanbing, ‘Contention behind the East Asia cooperation,’ World Affairs, No. 5, 2007, p. 35. 48 Mai Chen, ‘The dilemma Japan faces in becoming a political power,’ Zaobao.com, 11 September 2007. .

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Japan to play a leading role in Asia.48 Others even suggested that Washington will only support Japan’s effort to conduct more autonomous policy in East Asia and Southeast Asia to the extent that such diplomacy is conducive to prevailing over the competition and possible confrontation with China.49 It is quite evident that Japan’s security alliance with the US dimed Tokyo’s prospect to play a leadership role in indigenous Southeast and East Asia regional cooperation and integration and limits its freedom of action in Japan’s Asia policy.50 The long time Japanese sluggishness in regional cooperation and integration, in China’s eyes, was largely caused by Japan’s deference to the US.51 For example, before the Hatoyama government came to power in September 2009, Japan’s attitude towards the East Asia community had been lukewarm at the best. Simply because China endorsed it, Japan began to study it and talked about it. But it had said much more than it had done about the East Asia community. One major reason for this hesitation is its concern about the American reaction. The mainstream thinking on this issue in Japan is that such a community should be open to the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and other outside powers and should not do any damage to the Japan–US security alliance. Therefore Chinese scholars came to the conclusion that ‘only when Japan is serious about returning to Asia, could it meaningfully join the process of East Asia integration.’52 49

Yu Xiao, ‘China and Japan’s FTA competition during the development of East Asian free trade,’ Japan Studies, No. 4, 2006, p. 6. 50 As one Chinese scholar sees it, Japan’s security alliance with the United States makes it almost inevitable that Japan will be an obstacle in the community building in East Asia, Bai Ruchun, ‘Japan’s ASEAN policy and China–Japan relations,’ Chinese Foreign Affairs, No. 3, 2007, p. 60. 51 One Chinese scholar pointed out that Japan had very little autonomy in its regional policy because of the Japan–US security alliance. Japan was very cautious even using the world of ‘East Asia.’ Instead Japan preferred to use “Asia-Pacific”. See Lu Jianren, ‘Japan’s policy of regional cooperation,’ Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, No. l, 2006, p. 14. 52 Wang Lihuan, ‘The post-Cold War China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN relations,’ Science of International Politics, No. 3, 2006, pp. 56, 63.

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For China, the friction over the Futenma military base in Okinawa is another test whether the Hatoyama government can really have a more independent foreign policy compared to its predecessors. However, some Chinese analysts pointed out that a series of friction between Tokyo and Washington caused by Futenma does not necessarily indicate the weakening of the strategic basis of the security alliance because the US still provides the nuclear umbrella to protect Japan and is a passport for Japan to play larger role in international affairs. The Futenma episode does not impose a threat to the long term stability of the security alliance. Moreover, even when Japan is able to significantly expand its own military might, its expectation for the security alliance will remain the same. China therefore should not be over optimistic and be more cautious about the future of the security alliance.53 Some concluded that some contradictions between the two countries are not enough to shake the basis of the security alliance. Japan does not have the possibility to fundamentally rid its dependency on the US. Particularly on the issue of responding to China’s rise, Tokyo and Washington have more strategic consensus than divergence.54 Another related question is: if Japan drifts away from the US, can China accept a more independent and ‘normal’ Japan? The Chinese realised that the new Japanese leaders, particularly DPJ Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro have long been leading proponents for a socalled ‘normal’ Japan. In his provocative book, Blueprint for a New Japan, Ozawa for the first time set out the objective of transforming Japan into a ‘normal country’. For that purpose, Japan should, among other things, reform its political system, amend its Constitution, and have a formal military force to play a more active role in international security affairs. While Ozawa’s vision of Japan as a normal country might have some parallels with China’s policy interest and preferences, 53

Zhang Muhui, ‘the adjustment of the Japan–US alliance is not necessary a good thing for China,’ 26 March 2010.. 54 Wang Haiping, ‘An exploration of the direction of Japan–Taiwan relations after DPJ came to power,’ The Forum of World Economics and Politics, No. 2, 1010, p. 122.

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such as reversing the pro-US policy of the previous government, issues such as the overseas role of the Japanese military and Japan’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the Security Council also could test the bottom line of China’s acceptance of Japan as a normal country. Back to the Future? Developments in the Northeast Asia geopolitics in 2010 seem to have diluted the optimistic tone in Chinese perceptions with regard to the future of the US–Japan security alliance. Contrary to the Chinese predication about the weakening of the security alliance, the DPRK’s repeated provocations, the Sino–Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, as well as China’s own actions and responses to these incidents, to Beijing’s dismay, reinforced the American alliance system in the region. The rise of tension on the Korean peninsula resulting from a series of crises triggered by DPRK since 2009, from the nuclear test to Cheonan incident to its artillery barrages, reinforced the US–Japan–Korean military alliance. Chinese observers noted that after the DPRK nuclear test, the American, Japanese, and South Korean military beefed up their contingency plans. After the Cheonan incident, Washington and Tokyo enhanced their support to Seoul and strengthened their policy coordination.55 The Chinese were also impressed by the extraordinary unanimity in dealing with North Korea demonstrated by Tokyo and Washington after the Cheonan incident. Tokyo declared that if the United Nations failed to sanction DPRK, Japan and the United States will form a ‘common alliance’ to sanction North Korea alone. The two countries also held closed-door meeting to discuss the possibility for American troops to enter North Korea to destroy its nuclear arsenal.56 The impact of the crisis is not limited to the US–Japan security alliance, it also provided an 55

Liu Shaili, ‘The security issue on the Korean peninsula and the cooperative between China and the concerned parties,’ Northeast Asian Forum, No. 6, 2010, pp. 43–44. 56 Wu Delie, ‘Examining American East Asia strategy via the Cheonan incident,’ World Affairs, No. 14, 2010, p. 27.

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opportunity for both allies to draw South Korea into a US– Tokyo–Seoul axis. The Chinese noticed with apprehension that the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen advocated the enhancement of the trilateral military cooperation between the three countries with an objective of forming an Asian mini-NATO to contain China. They were particularly dismayed by the perceived Japanese overzealousness in getting involved in the Korean affairs by suggesting sending self-defence force to the Korean peninsula in case of war.57 While the crises on the Korean peninsula did not directly involve China, the unexpected clash between China and Japan on the ship collision incident in the water near the disputed Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands in September 2010 put Sino–Japan and Sino–US relations under direct test with significant implications for the security alliance. From the Chinese perspective, the ship collision incident was not an isolated event just between China and Japan. Rather Chinese analysts saw the America factor behind the incident.58 Some consciously related the incident to the state of Sino-American relations. According to their analysis, Japan’s hard line stand on the incident was a function of the Obama’s getting-tough policy towards China. The deterioration of US–China relations served as the diplomatic basis for Japan’s harsh policy towards China. In order to make Washington happy after the unhappy encounter with the Hatoyama government, Prime Minister Kan was willing to change his original pro-China stand to confront Beijing.59 In the meantime Tokyo did not conceal its uneasiness about the cosy relations between China and the US during the first year of the Obama administration.60

57

World Journal, ‘The United States intends to form the US–Japan–Korean antiChina alliances, but the bottleneck is Korea–Japan relations,’ 18 December 2010. 58 ‘Liu Jiangyong: there is an American shadow behind the Diaoyu incident,’ Chinareviewnews.com, 23 September 2010. 59 Liao Zhuoxian, ‘The ship collision hits Sino–Japanese relations hard,’ Elderly, No. 10, 2010, pp. 14–15. 60 ‘International strategic structure: new changes in great power trilateral relations,’ Chinese Youth Daily, 27 June 2010.

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Some Chinese analysts implied that Washington harbours the intention to exploit the ship collision incident to expedite its ‘return’ to East Asia and justify its military presence in the region. A wellknown PLA analyst argued that the conflict between Beijing and Tokyo is the strongest justification for the US military presence in Asia. If China and Japan get along well, there is no reason for the US to stay.61 From that logic, the Chinese are suspicious about the American overture to mediate the Diaoyu (Senkaku) dispute between Japan and China. During the meeting between Chinese and American foreign ministers in November, the US proposed to hold China–Japan–US trilateral talk to discuss various issues including the Diaoyu (Senkaku) dispute. Beijing was not enthusiastic about the American initiative.62 Some saw the ‘hypocrisy’ in the American offer. On the one hand, the Obama administration chose the side during this dispute by publicly announcing that the US–Japan security treaty applies to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands, which means that the US will come to Japan’s defence in the event of a conflict with China. On the other, the US wants to mediate in the conflict. The Chinese wonder how Washington could be impartial in such an effort. The purpose of the American offer, according to one analyst, is to secure Washington’s leading position in this dispute. Through mediation, Washington could control Japan on one hand, and constrain China on the other so as to manipulate the situation in the Asia-Pacific region.63 The Diaoyu (Shenkaku) dispute was a grave disappointment for Beijing towards the DPJ government. Indeed the Kan Administration turned out to be tougher towards China than Koizumi on the Diaoyu (Senkaku) issue, changing the tactics from ‘arrest and release’ to ‘arrest and detain.’ Some attributed the Japanese toughness to the 61

Jin Yinan, ‘The United States intends to control Japan and constrain China by intervening in the Diaoyu Islands,’ Singtao Daily, 10 November 2010. . 62 ‘“The trilateral dialogue on the Diaoyu Islands is just what the American side has in mind,’ Chinanews.com, 2 November 2010. . 63 Jin, ‘The United States intends to control Japan and constrain China by intervening in the Diaoyu Islands.’

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then Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji known for his hawkish attitudes towards China. It was him, as transportation minister, who ordered the arrest of the Chinese captain and insisted that the captain should be charged under the Japanese domestic law. He was considered the representative figure of Japan’s new rightist and hawkish forces.64 Some Chinese media bluntly called him a ‘trouble maker’ in Sino–Japanese relations.65 Maehara’s remarks — that China’s reaction to the incident was ‘hysterical’ — were described by the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman as ‘appalling.’66 All these forced Chinese analysts to make reassessment of the DPJ’s policy towards China and United States. Some attributed the DPJ’s seemingly sudden change of course to domestic impetus. According to some, Hatoyama’s policy is characterised by a combination of ‘liberalism plus idealism.’ This policy failed to resolve the internal and external difficulties in Japan. Facing the setbacks, the DPJ soon turned to right becoming a new conservative party in Japan. With regard to China, this new conservatism takes China as an economic partner, but a potential military and security threat that needs to be guarded against.67 In a more fundamental sense, many Chinese believe that the Diaoyu (Senkaku) incident in 2010 reflected the anxiety and apprehension on the Japanese side watching China’s power ever growing. With China surpassing Japan in terms GDP to become the second largest economy in the world, Japan increasingly perceives China as a threat.68 In any case, Chinese commentators recognised that the crises on the Korean peninsula, the Diaoyu (Senkaku) dispute, and the controversy 64

‘The Japanese hawkish foreign minister Maehara stepped down regretting that he offended China,’ Www.1n0.net, 9 March 2011. 65 ‘Maehara is a trouble maker in Sino–Japanese relations,’ Wenhui Daily, 30 October 2010. 66 ‘Foreign Ministry: Maehara’s remarks run in the opposite direction to the development and improvement of Sino–Japanese relations,’ Xinhua, 19 October 2010. 67 Ren Jingjing, ‘An inequilateral triangle — detecting changes in China–US–Japan trilateral relations in 2010,’ Chinese Forum of Political Cadres, No. 12, 2010, pp. 49–50. 68 ‘China–US–Japan trilateral relations show some subtle changes,’ Takunpao.com, 27 September 2010.

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over the South China Sea, are beneficial for consolidating the US–Japan alliance. For the DPJ as well as the Japanese public, the territorial dispute between China and Japan underscored the value of the security alliance. The incident strengthened the hands of Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s hands in modifying his previous position to re-emphasise the importance of the alliance and in managing the thorny Futenma issue. If the DJP government were on the defence before the incident, now Kan could easily argue that the American forces in Japan are a necessary deterrent against China.69 Consequently, the alliance has been strengthened rather than weakened. An American media observed: ‘after a period of drift, the US–Japan alliance is ripe for renewal.’70 One manifestation of the strengthened American alliance system in East Asia is the high intensity of military exercises conducted by the US and its two allies, Japan and South Korea, in the region ostensibly as responses to North Korea’s provocations. In reality, these military exercises were also reactions to the perceived increasing navy activities in the region. The alleged Chinese navy passages (ten warships) of the Miyako Strait near Okinawa in April 2010 marked a new stage in China’s navy operations. The deployment was of unprecedented size and scope for the Chinese navy and was the second such operation by the Chinese navy since March when a smaller flotilla was spotted in the same area.71 In December 2010, the US and Japan held the largest joint military exercise in history of their alliance with over 40,000 Japanese and American troops, 40 Japanese and 20 US warships participating.72 Japanese government officials made it clear that the exercise meant to ‘send signals’ to China. Part of the exercise was a scenario to recapture an island after its occupation by a hostile country. Apparently, the exercise was aimed at

69

‘Kan: the US troops in Japan is a deterrence against China,’ Duoweinews.com, 22 June 2010. 70 ‘US–Japan alliance is ripe for renewal,’ Christian Science Monitor, 12 November 2010. 71 ‘Chinese navy’s new strategy in action,’ IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 16, May 2010. 72 ‘US–Japan naval drills start as N Korea tensions rise,’ BBC News, 3 December 2010, .

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a hypothetical occupation of the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands by China. This is the second time since World War II that Japan and the US used China as their imaginary enemy in the field exercise.73 Some Chinese scholars took this exercise as another indicator an upgraded alliance. They took this exercise as a key step to advance the military interoperability between Japan and the US. According to their analysis, the increase of the interoperability in turn will increase the danger of war in East Asia. If Japan were to play a larger role in the security alliance, the American ability to control Japan’s foreign policy will presumably decrease and Japan may drag its patron into an unwanted conflict over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands.74 Conclusion China’s perspective on this security alliance remains ambivalent at best. Initially after the end of the Cold War, China thought that the alliance would become anachronistic as the Soviet Union had collapsed. To Beijing’s unpleasant surprise though, the alliance revived during the 1990s and gradually China became a target of the alliance. Although Beijing did not like it, it tolerated the alliance so long as it does not harm China’s ‘core national interest.’ But increasingly, Beijing saw this alliance encroaching upon China’s perceived legitimate interests such as Taiwan, Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, and East and South China Seas.75 Against the backdrop of China’s rise, Beijing 73

Actually a similar joint amphibious exercise of ‘taking back an island’ was conducted in early 2006. 74 Bai Ma, ‘The impact of the US–Japan island-takeover exercise on China’s security,’ 23 September 2010. . 75 The most recent example is that Japan and United States took common actions on the South China Sea issue. Japan–US Security Consultative Committee (2+2 meeting) for the first time discussed China’s military activities in East and South China Sea in June 2011. The two countries, together with Australia, also conducted live military exercise in an area very close to South China Sea in July 2011. China was very much concerned with such a development. See ‘What did Japan do in the South China Sea dispute?’ 9 August 2011. .

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witnessed the transition of the alliance to possibly contain China. Moreover, the new DPJ government has also turned out to be a disappointment to China. Indeed, Sino–Japanese relations have became strained after the 2010 collision between the Chinese fishing boat and two Japanese coast guard vessels in the disputed waters of the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands. The possibility of containing China by the security alliance makes it difficult for Beijing to endorse the alliance. The Chinese understand that hedging against China is not the only goal of the Japan–US alliance given the uncertainty in the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, the Chinese see the security alliance as an asset as well as a liability for Japan. From the Chinese perspective, for long time, Japan’s US-centred diplomatic strategy often forced Japan to make a difficult choice between its ally and Asia. In other words, Tokyo has to resolve its problem of ‘strategic unclearness’ in its East Asia policy.76 But in the Chinese eyes, this ‘strategic unclearness’ is not easy to go away. Although Japan wants to pursue a more independent East Asia policy, it still needs to rely on the US to check and balance China, Russia, and North Korea. This is particularly true when the power transition between China and Japan has already taken place. Therefore the dilemma is that for Japan to obtain a leadership position in East Asia, it cannot succeed completely in the American shadow, but it cannot succeed without it either. Bibliography Chen, X and Shi YH (2010). Post-Koizumi China diplomacy of LDP revisited. Special issue to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. Contemporary International Relations. Wu, DL (2010). Examining American East Asia strategy via the Cheonan incident. World Affairs, No. 14.

76

He Yingying, “The evolution of Japan’s East Asian regionalism and its influence on the regional strategy of economic cooperation”, Collection of Japanese Studies, June, 2007, p. 6.

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He, Y (2007). The evolution of Japan’s East Asian regionalism and its influence on the regional strategy of economic cooperation. Collection of Japanese Studies. Li, S (2005). The strategic dilemma in Sino–Japanese relations. China Youth Daily, 20 March. Liao, ZX (2010). The ship collision hits Sino–Japanese relations hard. Elderly, No. 10. Liu, SL (2010). The security issue on the Korean peninsula and the cooperative between China and the concerned parties. Northeast Asian Forum, No. 6. Lu, JR (2006). Japan’s policy of regional cooperation. Contemporary AsiaPacific Studies, No. l. Lu, ZW (2004). China–Japan relations: Understanding and promotion. Chinese Diplomacy, No. 1. Ma, JW and Xu, XQ (2007). Japan–US 2+2 meeting document and the transformation of the Japan–US alliance. Contemporary International Relations, No. 6. Ren, JJ (2010). An inequilateral triangle — detecting changes in China–US–Japan trilateral relations in 2010. Chinese Forum of Political Cadres, No. 12. Shi, YH (2007). Putting conflicts on hold for new start with Japan. China Daily, 18 April. Wang, HP (2010). An exploration of the direction of Japan-Taiwan relations after DPJ came to power. The Forum of World Economics and Politics, No. 2. Wang, JW and Wu, XB (1998). Against Us or with Us? The Chinese perspective of America’s alliances with Japan and Korea. Asia/Pacific Research Center, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. Wang, LH (2006). The post-Cold War China-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN relations. Science of International Politics, No. 3. Wang, XZ (2010). The harm of new Japanese-American security protection regime to China’s national security and relevant countermeasure. Journal of Hunan University of Science & Technology. Zhao JJ (2005). The trends in Japan’s Taiwan policy deserves attention. China’s Foreign Affairs No. 3. Zhang, WW and Zhang, GX(2009). The enhancement of the Japan–US alliance in the post-Cold War time. Dongjiang Journal, No. 2.

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CHAPTER 3

CHINA AND JAPAN: HOT ECONOMICS, COLD POLITICS? Li Mingjiang

Introduction Arguably, Sino–Japanese relations can best be characterised as ‘hot economics and cold politics’ since Koizumi Junichiro became Prime Minister in 2001. To be sure, there were problems between Beijing and Tokyo before Koizumi’s tenure as Prime Minister but their bilateral ties did not hit the nadir until Koizumi stubbornly insisted on annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine — the symbol of Japanese militarism to the Chinese and Koreans. Sino–Japanese ties are multifaceted but the paradoxical template of ‘hot economics, cold politics’ seems to capture the essence of this important bilateral relationship critical to the stability and prosperity of East Asia. Despite Koizumi’s departure as Prime Minister in 2006, the avoidance of Yasukuni Shrine visits by subsequent Japanese Prime Ministers, the deepening of economic interdependence, and the historic regime shift from the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the reformist Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, bilateral political ties remain frosty and prickly.1 1

In the post-Koizumi era, bilateral relations were best when Fukuda Yasuo and Hatoyama Yukio were Prime Ministers but the thawing of political relations never lasted. 51

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However, ‘cold politics’ is not akin to ‘deep freeze politics’ or ‘coercive and confrontational politics.’ There were periods of enmity and even hostility between the two societies. But since World War II, bilateral crises have never developed into armed confrontation let alone war between the two countries. Rather, the reduction of highlevel political engagements, mutual acerbic accusations, and some but limited pressure tactics were the typical symptoms of ‘cold politics’ between Beijing and Tokyo. Political leaders in both countries were still willing to and at critical junctures when circumstances permitted did attempt to pull the bilateral political relationship back to a more normal and stable track. Why does the Sino–Japanese relationship show this ‘hot economics and cold politics’ pattern? What are the implications for Japan and China and the region? What are some of strategic changes on the part of China that warrant Japanese reassessment of its policy towards China? This chapter attempts to address these issues. I argue that the ‘hot economics and cold politics’ pattern stems from many factors. I further argue that in the foreseeable future, China is likely to pursue a non-confrontational (in the military sense) yet diplomatically assertive strategy in East Asian security issues and that will be the ‘new normal’ facing Japan. The chapter will also analyse the possible orientations in Sino–Japanese relations based on China’s non-confrontational assertiveness and Japan’s possible reactions to it. The chapter suggests that a preferable strategy for Japan is to work with China to promote regional integration, seek a genuine reconciliation between the two societies, set up effective mechanisms for crisis management, and engage with China in non-traditional security cooperation. China Views Japan in the Post-Cold War Era By and large, the ‘hot economics and cold politics’ relationship between China and Japan reflects the mutual perceptions that the two countries have had towards each other in the post-Cold War era. Historically speaking, it has always been difficult for major powers who are adjacent neighbours to live harmoniously with each other. Numerous military conflicts, nationalistic hatred, and political

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tensions have taken place between major power neighbours. Geopolitics has always been one of the most salient contributing factors to those unfortunate happenings. But the Sino–Japanese mutual perceptions are far more complicated than most other attitudes between two big neighbouring countries. The Chinese and Japanese views towards each other have been compounded by an amalgam of daunting challenges, including historical baggage, unremitting strategic distrust, unmistakable clashes of national interests, and even vaguely defined social stereotypes.2 These negative factors notwithstanding, there are some positive views among the Chinese elite and the public towards Japan. The Chinese quite popularly regard Japan’s modernisation ever since the Meji Restoration and the economic prosperity in the post-World War II era as an amazing success story that China should follow suit. The vast majority of Chinese also believe that the Japanese people are commendable for their good social discipline, a high sense of responsibility in the workplace, and the pursuit of precision and perfection in their manufacturing sector. Although it is difficult to gauge the exact impact of these relatively good views towards Japan on Sino–Japanese relations, intuitively these Chinese affirmative assessments of Japan would at least help mitigate some of the negativities of those factors that drive the two countries apart. However, a far more positive factor that has contributed to the stability of the Sino–Japanese relationship has been the almost consensual view in China that Japan has been and will continue to remain as a useful partner for China’s modernisation (for Sino–Japanese trade figures in the past two decades, see Table 1). The Chinese elite, in particular, have a clear understanding of the importance of Japan for China’s continued economic development in decades to come. Japanese investment, Japanese market, and to some extent Japanese technologies are indispensible for the high rate of economic growth in China. Indeed, the investments by Japanese companies in China, 2

For a discussion of key areas of interaction between China and Japan, refer Paul J. Smith, ‘China–Japan Relations and the Future Geopolitics of East Asia,’ Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2009.

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Sino–Japanese trade from 1990 to 2010 (US$ billion).3

Year

Export

Import

Year

Export

Import

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

6.1 8.6 12 17.4 18.7 21.9 21.8 21.7 20.2 23.5 30.4

12.1 14.2 17 20.7 27.7 35.9 40.4 41.8 37.1 43.1 55.2

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

30.9 40 57.5 73.9 80 92.8 109.1 124.035 109.63 149.099

57.8 61.8 75.6 94.3 108.4 118.4 127.6 142.337 122.545 152.755

Table 2.

Cumulative Japanese investments in China (since 1978) (US$ million).4

1983 N.A.

1984 N.A.

1985 N.A.

1986 N.A.

1987 177

1988 513

1989 686

1990 407

1991 230

1992 526

1993 822

1994 1,789

1995 3,183

1996 2,317

1997 1,862

1998 1,301

1999 360

2000 934

2001 2,158

2002 2,622

2003 3,980

2004 5,863

2005 6,575

2006 6,169

2007 6,218

2008 6,496

2009 6,899

particularly in some of the coastal provinces, have significantly contributed to China’s economic take-off (Table 2). Chinese elite may remember that in the first half of the 1990s when China was diplomatically isolated, Japan was the first major power to reach out to China and continued to participate in the 3

Data was collected from the following sources: Xing Yuqing, ‘Japan’s Unique Economic Relations with China: Economic integration under political uncertainty,’ East Asian Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1, January/March 2009. and Japan External Trade Organization, Japanese Trade and Investment Statistic, 2011: . 4 Japan External Trade Organization, Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics: .

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Japanese official developmental assistance to China.5

Year

Amount

1979–1983 (first batch) 1984–1989 (second batch) 1990–2000 (third & fourth batch) 2001 2002 2003–2007 2007

330.9 billion yen 540.0 billion yen 810 + 970 billion yen 161.366 billion yen 121.214 billion yen NA Japan finally stopped yen loans to China

economic activities in China. Over the decades, Japan has also provided a significant amount of official development aid to China6 (Table 3). It is no exaggeration to say that the economic aspect of the bilateral relationship has helped prevent the ‘cold politics’ between the two countries from deteriorating into ‘freezing politics.’ In China, there has always been the concern that ‘cold politics’ might lead to weakened economic ties between the two countries. This is why whenever circumstances allowed, the Chinese leaders would always attempt to practice some flexibility to improve relations with Japan, for instance, the thawing of cold politics soon after Koizumi stepped down. ‘Cold politics’ between China and Japan are likely to stay because of the existence of a number of fundamental differences. For the vast majority of Chinese people, Japan victimised China for half a century, from the late 19th century to the end of World War II, and Tokyo has been unrepentant. The history issue has always served as the backdrop in Sino–Japan relations.7 It complicates and aggravates many other 5

’The Chinese GDP will be significantly reduced over the Japanese aid to China,’ Chinahourly, 3 March 2011: . 6 For a brief history of Japan’s ODA in China, refer Reinhard Drifte, ‘The Ending of Japan’s ODA Loan Programme to China — All’s Well that Ends Well?,’ Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2006. 7 For further discussion on influence as well as relationship between history and several contemporary issues pertaining to China–Japan relations refer Jin Qiu, ‘The Politics of History and Historical Memory in China–Japan Relations,’ Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2006.

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aspects and issues in the bilateral relationship, for instance, Japanese bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council, maritime disputes in the East China Sea, the security dilemma, and regional leadership rivalry. The common view in China is that since Japan was the victimiser and has not sincerely reflected upon its past wrongdoings it simply does not have the legitimate ground to be regarded as a great power in the world or a regional leader in East Asia. Judging from all evidence, the issue of historical reconciliation between the two countries is unlikely to be solved in the foreseeable future. This is so because of the domestic politics in both countries and the huge gap between them in terms of how the history issue should be handled. There is certainly some truth in the claim that the Chinese patriotic education in the 1990s has contributed to the growth of Chinese nationalism and anti-Japan sentiment in China. Essentially the criticism is that the Chinese ruling party has utilised the history issue and manipulated public opinion towards Japan for the enhancement of the party’s political legitimacy. But one may not want to overexaggerate this factor. In South Korea, for instance, there has been no political indoctrination campaigns similar to what happened in China, but history issue still remains as one of the thorny issues between South Korea and Japan. However, there is no denial that some aspects in the Chinese political and educational programs that highlight the history issue will undoubtedly continue to make it difficult for the two countries to achieve any notable reconciliation.8 Over the years, the two countries have implemented many exchange programs, especially among the younger generation, and many Chinese and Japanese students have studies in the other country,9 but unfortunately such

8

See Shinichi Kitaoka, ‘A Look Back on the Work of the Joint Japanese–Chinese History Research Committee,’ Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, May 2010. 9 As of May 1, 2008, the number of international students studying in Japan reached a record 123,829. Looking at the students’ countries of origin, about 92% are from the neighbouring countries and regions of Asia (of which the top three shares are China at about 58.8%, Korea at about 15.2%, and Taiwan at about 4.1%). For more information, refer Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Student Exchange Programme, 2008: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/people/student/index.html.

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exchanges have not resulted in significantly better understanding between the two societies. Under the shadow of the history issue, China and Japan have a serious security problem that has not been well managed. China has been strenuously pushing for its military modernisation program, with double digit increase in its military expenditure over the past decade and frequently disclosing and displaying its growing military capabilities. Officially, China claims that the military buildup is not targeted at any party (with the exception of the possible contingency of Taiwan independence) but rather part of its century-old national aspiration to transform China into a world power with economic prosperity and a strong military ( fu guo qiang bing). Understandably, Japan has been seriously concerned about the rapid growth of China’s military power. Japan has responded to China’s military rise with measures to further strengthen the Japanese military capability and enhance its security alliance with the United States.10 Tokyo has also been intent to engage with other regional states that harbour the same or similar security concerns towards China. The security problem was further aggravated by the territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and the maritime demarcation in the East China Sea between the two countries. Japan was greatly concerned about Beijing’s heavy-handed approach in handling the crisis situation after a Chinese fishing trawler collided with Japanese coast guard vessels in September 2010, especially China’s reportedly decision to use rare earth export to China as a diplomatic leverage against China. In addition, it is worthwhile to emphasise that it is not just about security differences and disputes, but there exists a typical security dilemma between the two countries. The Chinese maintain that their military buildup efforts are primarily meant for defensive purposes and thus completely legitimate. But in the eyes of the Japanese, China’s military aggrandisement is a palpable threat or perceived threat to their 10

For analysis pertaining to Japan’s military modernisation and various international security concerns that drive this modernisation, refer Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan–China Arms Race and Global Power Projection,’ Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009.

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national security. When Japan takes actions to strengthen its security, for instance, enhancement of Japan–US security alliance and calls for Japan to become a ‘normal state,’ many Chinese believe that those are steps aimed at encircling China or reinvigorating Japanese ‘militarism.’ The Chinese public even believe that foreign finger-pointing or criticism of China’s military modernisation is simply a reflection of their intention and desire to keep China weak and down. The Sino–Japanese security dilemma will remain as one of the most intractable issues in their bilateral relations. The only possible objective is to slightly mitigate and perhaps more importantly to manage the security dilemma between the two countries. Given the fact that China is the rising military power that is increasingly changing the military balance of power in East Asia, Beijing should take more actions and be more active in allaying Japan’s security concerns. Direct military-to-military dialogue and exchanges between the two countries are urgently needed. Effective crisis prevention and management measures are also highly necessary, given the fact that the two countries face the danger of more frequent and more lethal conflicts in the maritime domain in Northeast Asia. Sino–Japanese enmity is not just confined to the bilateral arena, but has profound ramifications in the larger East Asian regional context. Because of the historical and contemporary differences and disputes between the two countries, China and Japan have largely viewed each other as a potential but serious challenger for the leadership position in East Asia, although one has to admit that the two countries have also cooperated extensively bilaterally and multilaterally in regional affairs. It appears that China has taken an active, perhaps even an aggressive, stance towards regional community building. Or perhaps Beijing currently does not have a clear strategic blueprint for the regional order in the coming decades, but the concrete policies coming from Beijing and China’s local provinces have de facto projected an image of China increasingly becoming the dominant power in East Asia, particularly in the economic arena.11 The rivalry for regional leadership between 11

For an overview of views and policies in China towards Asian regionalism, refer Ming Wan, ‘The Great Recession and China’s Policy toward Asian Regionalism,’ Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 3, May/June 2010, pp. 521–530.

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China and Japan has been well documented in their differences with regard to regional architecture. For Japan, it would be very difficult to accept the emergence of a Sino-centric order. For China, the current regional order that largely hinges on Japan–US alliance is not desirable. The relentless competition for regional leadership will probably chill the political relations between Beijing and Tokyo. In this sense, the ‘hot economics, cold politics’ pattern not only frame the bilateral relationship but also impact on the regional level as well. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, there has been a notable growth of Chinese confidence with regard to their economic resilience against large scale external crisis, the merits of their politico–economic system, and relatively advantageous position versus the West. This changed Chinese self-perception is likely to have a negative impact on Sino–Japanese relations. It means that it will be even more difficult (or more improbable) for China to be considerate or make concessions to Japan’s political and security demands. In fact, some Chinese observers increasingly believe that Japan’s economic well-being has to depend on the Chinese market. They believe that the economic interdependence is increasingly becoming asymmetric in China’s favour. Coupled with the growing perception in China that Japan is stuck in a long-term economic stagnation and slowdown, this may lead to the possibility of China using some economic leverages to put pressure on Japan on political and security matters (although we have to stress that it would be very risky and probably not so effective if China would attempt to do so). China’s handling of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute in September 2010 was perhaps an illustration of things moving towards that direction. ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’: How Will These Two Factors Play Out? It is perhaps lamentable that Sino–Japanese ties could not be better. But given the reality of China’s rapid rise, what kind of alternative bilateral relationship could one realistically expect? Historically speaking, the rise of one regional power has often times contributed to the outbreak of major wars with its regional rivalry and notable

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instability in the region. The centuries of warfare in Europe, Japanese expansionism from the late 19th century to 1945, and the contentions between the US and the former Soviet Union in many parts of the world testify to this logic of power politics. In this sense, the ‘hot economics and cold politics’ relationship between China and Japan is really not the worse-case scenario. It is fortunate that the current patter of relations has not evolved into, and in many respects it is unlikely to evolve into, other even worse situations, for instance, ‘cold economics and cold politics,’ ‘cold economics and freezing politics,’ ‘freezing economics and cold politics,’ ‘freezing economics and freezing politics,’ and ‘freezing economics and confrontational politics.’ It is perhaps necessary to explain a little bit what these alternative scenarios would connote. In a situation of ‘cold economics and cold politics,’ both the economic and trade relations and political and security interactions between the two countries would be significantly reduced, and perhaps maintained at a minimal level. Economic, political, and security differences and frictions would frequently surface, but the two countries would still refrain from openly challenging the survival of each other and would not openly declare each other as enemies. This essentially means that the two countries would largely live in mutual isolation. In the case of ‘cold economics and freezing politics,’ the two countries would have very little economic exchanges and at the same time completely conflicting political and security positions on almost all major issues. If a pattern of ‘freezing economics and cold politics’ dominates the bilateral relationship, there would be almost no economic contacts between the two countries and the political and security ties would be acrimonious. But still they are not openly engaged in a hostile relationship. Under a ‘freezing economics and freezing politics’ relationship, China and Japan would have almost no economic ties and no political interaction. In the worst scenario of ‘freezing economics and confrontational politics,’ we would see China and Japan engaged in a relationship with almost zero economic exchange and open hostility, frequent security conflicts, and even major warfare. If we seriously consider these other worse possibilities, we would logically conclude that the current state of Sino–Japanese relationship is not too bad. Given all the negative factors in their bilateral relations

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described above, it would be difficult to completely rule out those possibilities. Then, an interesting question that ought to be asked is why the two countries have been able to maintain this ‘hot economics and cold politics’ relationship for so long? And why does the ‘hot economics and cold politics’ relationship seem to continue? The most significant factor that binds the two countries together has been the economic relationship. It is no exaggeration to say that ‘hot economics’ has saved the Sino–Japanese relations. The mutually intertwined economic relationship provided numerous opportunities for the two societies to communicate and engage with each other (Table 4).12 Intuitively, this has helped contribute to better understanding and diffuse some of the nationalistic feelings between the two countries. Also, the close economic relationship necessitated the bureaucrats in both countries, especially those in charge of economic affairs, to continue to engage with one another even in times of crisis. More importantly, perhaps, economic interdependence has significantly augmented the voice and decision-making power of those economic and financial agencies in both countries. Most importantly, the fact that the two economies are to a large extent already dependent on each other and the tangible benefits that each countries obtain from this economic interdependence have reinforced the belief among the political elite in both countries that the costs of allowing their ‘cold politics’ to deteriorate into ‘freezing politics’ or ‘confrontational politics’ would be unbelievably high. In other words, ‘hot economics’ has quite effectively placed a brake on the downward movement of their political relations. It is then no surprise that the former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo’s attempt to patch up with China by visiting the Temple of Confucius in Shandong Province and highlight a common cultural heritage and civilisational identity with China during his trip to China in 2007.13 Chinese President 12

Claes G. Alvstam, Patrik Ström, and Naoyuki Yoshino, ‘On the economic interdependence between China and Japan: Challenges and possibilities,’ Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 50, No. 2, August 2009. 13 , accessed 20 March 2011.

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Year 2004 First quarter 2005 2009 Aug 2010

Bilateral tourism (select data).14 Number of Japanese tourists to China

Number of Chinese tourists to Japan

3.33 million 287,000 6.80 million 2.50 million (increasing 21% from 2009)

600,000

Hu Jintao reciprocated by visiting Nara, Japan’s ancient capital modelled after the Tang Dynasty’s capital at Changan the next year.15 This is why in the past decade political elites in both countries have been keen to demonstrate self-constraints at times of crisis and to attempt to salvage the political ties as soon as circumstances allowed. In the case of China, for instance, some intellectual elite has openly called for a ‘new thinking’ on China’s Japan policy.16 Although it appears extremely risky for any Chinese political leader to openly endorse the policy proposals recommended in the ‘new thinking,’ some of high-profile visits by Chinese leaders to Japan, for instance, Wen Jiabao’s ‘ice melting’ visit to Japan, clearly reflected some elements of the ‘new thinking.’ Similarly, many actions taken by 14

Data compiled from the following sources: ‘Sino–Japanese tourism exchanges beneficial to both peoples,’ People’s Daily Online, 29 April 2005: , Yoree Koh, ‘Japanese Tourism to China Tapers Off,’ WSJ Blog, 18 October 2010: , Akiko Fujita, ‘Chinese Tourism to Japan on the Rise,’ Voice of America, 8 July 2010: , and Malcolm Moore, ‘China warns tourists not to visit Japan,’ Telegraph, 10 October 2010: . 15 , accessed 20 March 2011. 16 For a summation of various discourses related to the ‘new thinking,’ see Peter Hays Gries, ‘China’s “New Thinking” on Japan,’ The China Quarterly, No. 184, 2005, pp. 831–850.

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Shinzo Abe to readjust Japan’s China policy also demonstrated similar considerations on the part of Japan. In the past few years, the two countries agreed to conduct a joint project on history studies. Beijing and Tokyo decided to continue to carry out various youth exchange programs. More recently, the Democratic Party of Japan, when it came to power, began to place more premiums on China in its foreign policy. Clearly, ‘hot economics’ has contributed enormously to the overall stability in the bilateral relations. It appears that the bouts of political tensions have had some negative but limited impact on economic interactions. But both leaderships need to tread carefully in handling various political and security differences between the two countries. Both Beijing and Tokyo need to understand the importance of not using economic leverages for political and security purposes. Both ruling elites also need to more carefully handle their respective domestic assertive nationalism. The Chinese government’s effort to contain the anti-Japanese demonstrations from spreading throughout China during the September Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis was commendable. China’s goodwill in assisting Japan in the aftermath of the earthquake has also produced some positive effect in the bilateral relations. Given the mutually incompatible perceptions and many differences, cold politics between Beijing and Tokyo are simply inevitable. The relatively more radical or emotional elements in both societies need certain channels to ventilate their anger and grievances, but both government leaders should have the political wisdom and courage to pull the bilateral relations back to the normal track as soon as any crisis runs out of steam. Previous efforts to stop the recycling occurrence of cold politics, for instance the effort to define and fixate the bilateral ties on the notion of strategic mutually beneficial relations, have proven to be futile. The two countries should instead focus on preventing any political fallout from spinning out of control. In this regard, it would be useful if the two countries could work together to set up more effective crisis management mechanisms. The two countries may seriously consider setting up a hotline to deal with abrupt conflicts or skirmishes. It may also be a good idea to establish a ‘two plus two’ regular consultation mechanism among the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries.

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China’s Non-Confrontational Assertiveness: The New Reality Facing Japan The year 2010 was significant for China’s foreign and security policy. It was probably the most complicated and turbulent year for China’s international politics in the past decade. Beijing’s unprecedented strong response to US arms sale to Taiwan and President Obama’s meeting with Dalai Lama, China’s political and security protection of North Korea in the wake of the Cheonan incident and the Yeonpyeong bombing, the reportedly assertive Chinese actions in the South China Sea, China’s heavy-handed approach to US naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, and Beijing’s pressure tactics during the Sino–Japanese crisis over the Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute were believed to be concrete examples of China becoming more assertive in East Asia. It is widely believed that Beijing has jettisoned its erstwhile ‘low profile’ international posture and has instead become more aggressive in pushing for its own narrowly-defined national interests. Some analysts even believe that China is inclined to adopt a confrontational strategy in the region. It is now a crucial moment for the rest of the world, in particular the United States and Japan, to have an accurate assessment of China’s strategic thinking with regard to East Asian security. While acknowledging the fact that China has become more assertive and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future, we also have to be soberminded to note that China is unlikely to pursue any kind of confrontational strategy in its relations with the major powers in the East Asian region. Non-confrontational assertiveness is likely to undergird China’s foreign and security policy in the near future and it is possibly the reality that Japan will have to grapple with in its China policy. What does China’s non-confrontational assertiveness essentially mean? It means that at the strategic level, Beijing is not likely to pursue any conspicuous confrontation with other major powers, including Japan and the United States in East Asia. China will have every reason to avoid a strategic confrontation with the US and Japan as a dyad or even individually with either of them. It also means that China will not easily decide to use force or threaten to use force against any regional states in East Asia. But at the same time, China will be assertive in dealing with issues that are of crucial importance

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to its national interests. There may seem to be some contradictions between the strategic non-confrontation and tactical assertiveness, but it appears that China has been able to balance the two through dexterous diplomacy. In the past decade or more, for instance, China has arguably practiced non-confrontational assertiveness in its external policy with regard to human rights, maritime territorial and demarcation disputes, and even the Taiwan issue. Assertive actions were taken whenever China’s core concerns on these issues were infringed upon. But at the same time, Beijing has always been careful not to escalate any dispute into a major long-term confrontation with any other major power. What is different between today and the past is that Beijing is likely to be willing to employ more assertive means in dealing with major disputed issues in its foreign relations. China’s non-confrontation strategy has been shaped by a number of factors. As long as these factors exist, its non-confrontation approach is likely to be continued. First of all, Beijing’s top priority has been domestic economic growth. For a long time, Chinese political elite has endeavoured to create and maintain a stable and peaceful external environment for the benefit of its domestic economic modernisation. Maintaining stable relations with other major powers and utilising their markets and investments have always been an important consideration for Chinese leaders.17 Today, there is literally very little evidence to show that the Chinese leaders are considering or willing to sacrifice the imperative of economic development by confronting other major powers. Secondly, Chinese decision-makers clearly understand that China’s overall strategic position in East Asia does not provide any effective leverage for China to afford to be confrontational with any other major power. After two decades of laborious efforts in consolidating its strategic foothold in the region, China is, by and large, still a strategically isolated big power in East Asia. This is the strategic quandary that Beijing will have to live within the long run. Any major confrontational 17

For an overview of role of FDI and trade in Sino–Japanese relations, refer Claes G. Alvstam, Patrik Ström, and Naoyuki Yoshino, ‘On the economic interdependence between China and Japan: Challenges and possibilities,’ Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 50, No. 2, August 2009, pp. 201–204.

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move by China will only exacerbate its strategic status. Thirdly, the regional political and security order is still one in which the US enjoys preponderant dominance. Beijing is perhaps not disingenuous when it says that it neither has the capability nor the intention to challenge American supremacy in East Asia. Chinese decision makers may have learned a big lesson in the second half of 2010 when its outdated and in many respects egregious policy over the North Korea issue only resulted in the further consolidation of the US alliances with Japan and South Korea and the closer security relations between Japan and South Korea. Fourthly, it has become crystal clear to Chinese analysts that Japan, although a self-confined strategic player and widely perceived a stagnant if not declining power, has other strategic options to deal with a confrontational China. There is, arguably, much room for Japan to further strengthen its strategic security ties with India, Australia, and even Vietnam.18 The last major factor that will make China’s strategic non-confrontation possible and feasible has to do with the fact that none of the other major powers currently is keen to strategically confront China that would result in some sort of a new Cold War in East Asia. The extensive economic interdependence among the major countries has made it essentially impossible and even unfeasible. Loose strategic groupings or realignments among other major powers against China have always been in the offing and may further intensify in the future, but as long as these powers, either individually or collectively, do not adopt an unambiguous all-round strategic containment of China, China is likely to think that there is still strategic manoeuvring space for a non-confrontational policy. One can find many other factors to argue that a rational China would not be poised as confrontational, but the above-mentioned realities and possibilities are perhaps sufficient to make the case. Strategic non-confrontation notwithstanding, China is becoming more assertive in regional security affairs. And there are a couple reasons. First of all, it has to do with the fact that China’s power has grown to the extent 18

On Japan’s regional as well as international engagement, refer Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan’s response to China’s rise: Regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision,’ International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2009, pp. 837–856.

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that it can afford to be more assertive. Its military modernisation efforts have generated quite impressive results. China has become the number two economy in the world and it has become a crucial growth engine for many regional states. China’s maritime law enforcement capability has been significantly augmented in recent years and appears to grow further in the coming years. In an anarchic world, the growth of one country’s capability always comes hand in hand with the greater temptation to use pressure tactics and brinkmanship. Secondly, partially because of the increased power capability, China’s self-confidence has also notably grown, especially in the wake of the financial crisis. Chinese elite were excited to see that China weathered the financial crisis better than any other country. The bullish mindset was further boosted by their observation that the West was stagnating or even, relatively speaking, declining. China’s self-confidence and rising nationalism interacted to produce a more assertive China. Thirdly, the increased capability and enhanced confidence, together with unabated nationalism, has contributed to the elevation of China’s concerns about its core national interests. Although the Chinese usage of the term ‘core interests’ is still subject to different interpretations, some senior Chinese officials have stated that they may include the ruling position of the party, territorial sovereignty and integrity, and economic and social development. China has sought to codify its concerns about ‘core interests’ in its foreign relations, for instance during Obama’s visit to China in 2009, and has clearly demonstrated its resolve to defend its ‘core interests’ in actions in recent years.19 One ‘core interests’ becomes a prominent concern

19

For more information on ‘core interests,’ refer Orville Schell, ‘China: Defending its Core Interest in the World — Part I,’ Yale Global, 5 April 2010: , Guobin Yang, ‘China: Defending its Core Interest in the World — Part II,’ Yale Global, 7 April 2010: , ‘US urged to respect China’s core interests,’ China Daily, 7 March 2011): , and Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior — Part One: On ‘Core Interests’,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 34, Winter 2011.

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for the top political elite, different bureaucratic agencies in the Chinese political system find it possible and very rewarding to behave assertively. As a result, bureaucratic politics chime in and further complicate China’s relations with its neighbouring countries. What does China’s non-confrontational assertive policy posture imply for Japan? Essentially, it means that in the coming years Japan will have to deal with a China that is more prepared to use pressure tactics on contentious issues between the two countries. Beijing is less likely to make concessions on issues that Japan is most concerned, for instance, the joint development scheme in the East China Sea. As China starts to be more active in protecting what it perceives as its own national interests over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, disputes and skirmishes are highly possible. Japanese assertive actions with regard to the maritime disputes are likely to beget equally assertive Chinese counter measures. This vicious circle of events will have a significantly negative impact on Sino–Japanese cooperation in many other areas, i.e., non-traditional security cooperation and regional economic integration and East Asian community building. China may even pursue an even more restrictive policy on Japan’s bid for greater international influence, i.e., the UN Security Council permanent membership. At the same time, strategists in Japan may find it useful to note that China has little intention to see any major confrontation with Japan. China is likely to practice self-constraint so as to avoid a major confrontation with Japan. Beijing is also likely to reciprocate any Japanese goodwill to prevent any crisis from escalating into a confrontation. All these essentially mean that there is a good window of opportunity for the two countries to maintain and manage the current ‘hot economics and cold politics’ pattern in their relationship. It would be useful if the two countries could attempt to set up more effective mechanisms for crisis prevention and crisis management. The two countries could also do a better job in explaining their strategic intentions to each other. Needless to say, such explanations will not completely clear the strategic apprehensions between the two countries, but they might help in mitigating their strategic distrust. In this sense, it is important to maintain regular high-level communications between the two countries.

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What Japan could further do is probably to continue to work on regional institutions and norms.20 The pace of regional institutional building has been slow in recent years, but it is better than nothing. Regional institutions have always provided a suitable conduit for the leaders of the two countries when the relations turn out to be tense. The experience of the recent fallout over the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is a good example. At time high tensions, the leaders of the two countries managed to communicate during ASEM, East Asian Summit, the G20 meeting in South Korea, and the APEC meeting in Japan. One may not also downplay the socialisation effect of interactions in various regional institutions. Efforts to further develop norms in regulating regional international relations should continue and Japan should take an active stance. Strengthening bilateral cooperation on various non-traditional security issues may also be helpful in mitigating the negative impact of ‘cold politics’ between the two countries. Conclusion Sino–Japanese relations have entered a period of turbulence. The bilateral relations are hamstrung by a number of structural differences between them: historical enmity, negative perceptions, strategic rivalry, and the security dilemma. The Sino–Japanese relationship thus can be characterised as ‘hot economics and cold politics.’ Although the economic ties continue to be strong and bind the two countries together, the political and security differences between them have made the bilateral relationship vulnerable to the disturbance of even a minor incident. Over the years, the two countries have made some efforts to curb the downward trend in bilateral ties, for instance, continuous youth exchange programs, joint history studies, regular high-level meetings, and cooperation in some non-traditional security areas. Given the intractable differences and existential disputes between China and Japan, it would be wishing thinking to expect 20

For an overview of recent initiatives by Japan towards regionalism, refer Yul Sohn, ‘Japan’s New Regionalism: China Shock, Values, and the East Asian Community,’ Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 3, May/June 2010, pp. 497–519.

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dramatic improvement in the bilateral ties. ‘Hot economics and cold politics,’ as this chapter has argued, may be the only outcome that one may realistically expect. It has not been an easy job for the two countries to prevent their relations from degenerating into ‘freezing politics’ or worse ‘confrontational politics.’ Of course, there is no reason to be complacent. The extreme vulnerability in the bilateral relationship means that there is always the possibility that tensions and disputes could escalate into something far more destructive and explosive. If the two countries intent to keep their relations on an even keel, they must tread gingerly and not to ignore the core interests of the other party. A new challenge in Sino–Japanese relations is emerging; that is the trend of China becoming slightly more assertive in handling regional security issues. Growing Chinese assertiveness could bring more uncertainties to the bilateral relations. Various signs show that Tokyo has felt the pressure of Chinese assertiveness and has begun to take precautionary actions in response. But at the same time, it is equally important for Tokyo to understand that China, in the foreseeable future, has no strategic intention to confront Japan or its ally the United States. China’s non-confrontational assertiveness is likely to be the new reality for Japan’s China policy making. Depending on how Japan responds to this new Chinese security posture, Sino–Japanese relations may experience far more troubles in the near future. But at the same time, the chapter has argued that there is still a window of opportunity for the two countries to cooperate for their common good. To fulfil this, the political leaders must have the vision, wisdom, courage, and fortitude not to cave in to domestic political pressure and nationalism to get tough with its neighbour, make compromises when circumstances warrant, and develop more effective means for crisis management. Bibliography Alvstam, CG, P Ström and N Yoshino (2009). On the economic interdependence between China and Japan: Challenges and possibilities. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 50(2).

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Drifte, R (2006). The ending of Japan’s ODA loan programme to China — All’s well that ends well? Asia-Pacific Review, 13(1). Gries, PH (2005). China’s “New Thinking” on Japan. The China Quarterly, 184. Hughes, CW (2009). Japan’s military modernisation: A quiet Japan–China arms race and global power projection. Asia-Pacific Review, 16(1). Japan External Trade Organization (2011). Japanese Trade and Investment Statistic. Jin, Q (2006). The politics of history and historical memory in China–Japan relations. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 11(1). Kitaoka, S (2010). A look back on the work of the joint Japanese–Chinese history research committee. Asia-Pacific Review, 17(1). Schell, O (2010). China: Defending its core interest in the world — Part I. Yale Global, 5. Smith, PJ (2009). China–Japan relations and the future geopolitics of East Asia. Asian Affairs: An American Review, 35(4). Sohn, Y (2010). Japan’s new regionalism: China shock, values, and the East Asian community. Asian Survey, 50(3). Swaine, MD (2011). China’s assertive behavior — Part I: On “Core Interests”. China Leadership Monitor, 34. Wan, M (2010). The Great Recession and China’s policy toward Asian regionalism. Asian Survey, 50(3). Xing, Y (2009). “Japan’s unique economic relations with China: Economic integration under political uncertainty. East Asian Policy, 1(1).

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JAPAN’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA: ACTIVISTIC SECURITY POLICY, ERODING PACIFISM Kim Sung Chull

Introduction Historically, Japan has considered the Korean peninsula either a strategic point for linking itself to the Asian continent or a buffer zone for maintaining its own security and stability. As Japan under the Bakufu rule after the invasion of Korea in 1592 and 1597 became politically stable, it considered the peninsula, along with the Ryukyu Islands, a channel of collecting information about the situation in mainland China.1 As Imperial Japan became ambitious enough to expand its territories, it used the peninsula as a pathway to dominating the Manchurian area. In the wartime period, the Japanese militarist regime extracted both human and material resources from the Korean peninsula. During the Cold War, Japan considered a peaceful and divided Korea its realist objective, for which the policy was called the ‘two Koreas policy.’

1

Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp. 110–167. 73

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With some variance, this fundamental element of Japan’s Korea policy has continued in the post-Cold War era as well. From the beginning of the 1990s, Japan made modest efforts to hold normalisation talks with North Korea with little success. The failure was attributed not only to the fall of the LDP bigwig Kanemaru Shin, who made an adventurous visit to Pyongyang and met Kim Il Sung in September 1990, but also to the virtual collapse of the Japan Socialist Party along with the end of the Cold War. The failure may also be attributed to the opposition of the United States which was mostly concerned about the North’s nuclear weapons development.2 More important, the Japanese government has been neither enthusiastic nor optimistic about the normalisation talks with the North since the abduction issue became politicised in the Japanese society in 2002. This chapter addresses the question: What does North Korea mean to Japan? Specifically the chapter delves into how North Korea has been factored into Japanese security and military policy. North Korea is the only neighbouring country with which Japan has not normalised relations. And Japan perceives North Korea as an immediate threat to its security and to regional and international security as well. Since the abduction issue erupted in 2002 and North Korea conducted missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, the Japanese government has imposed more sanctions on North Korea. On the other hand, Japan has been incrementally adopting an activistic security and military policy, as opposed to the previous policy commitment to basic defence. Prime illustrations of the change include the US–Japan joint development of the missile defence (MD) system, the new space law allowing military use, and the introduction of the ‘dynamic defence force’ concept in the 2010 National Defence Program Guideline. My central argument is that while Japan is paying greater attention to the rise of China from a broader perspective, the evolution of

2

For the details about the US opposition to the normalisation talks after Kanemaru’s visit, see Nonaka Hiromu, Rohei wa shinasu: Zenkaikoroku [Old Soldier Does Not Die: Autobiography] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunshu, 2005), pp. 297–307.

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Japan’s activistic security and military policy has been fostered by the immediate threat perception of North Korea rather than that of China. The North Korean admission of its abducting Japanese citizens and the revealing of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) developments contributed to not only Japanese invocation of a sanctions regime over North Korea but also the Diet’s expediting of legal provisions for the unprecedentedly activistic policy. In the linkage of Japan’s strategic response to North Korea’s destabilising behaviour, there exist a host of issues related to identity politics. Creating a nationalistic political atmosphere, hawkish politicians have driven North Korea-bashing and have taken an advantage of it in security and military affairs. All these changes have irreversibly eroded the pacifist principles embedded in the non-nuclear policy, the arms export ban, and Article 9 of the Constitution. This chapter consists of four sections. The first section examines changes in the security and military policy, changes which occurred in the past decade particularly in response to the North Korean threat. For instance, the US–Japan joint MD development already reached the stage that these allies started deliberating the exports of the product, thus watering down Japan’s self-proclaimed arms export ban. The second and the third sections uncover causal sources of the changes in Japan’s security and military policy. In detail, the second section deals with the abduction issue, which has been the most sensitive, emotionally-charged issue in Japan–North Korea relations. It shows ways in which the abduction issue not only hijacked Japan’s entire North Korea policy but also contributed to the emergence of an unprecedented hard-line policy in Japan. The third section examines domestic discourses through which the perceived threat of North Korea turned into nationalistic drive and justified gearing up the activistic security and military policy. It delves into how hawkish politicians, particularly in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led administrations, have been riding the trend of the worsened perception of North Korea and have found their rationale for challenging the pacifist principles embedded in the non-nuclear policy and Article 9 of the Constitution. The conclusion, based on these analyses, identifies some issues with policy implications.

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Transition Toward Activistic Security and Military Policy In the past decade, Japanese security and military policy has been moving in an unprecedented activistic direction. This change was already evident in Japan’s concern about the Chinese missile firings in the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s; it is noteworthy, however, that the change has been accelerated by Japan’s North Korea-bashing and its increased threat perception of North Korea in the 2000s. Notably the change is neither temporary nor reversible. The change is a clear departure from the pacifist principles, which have been embedded in the arms export ban and Article 9 of the Constitution in particular. Expediting MD development Japan’s collaboration with the United States on the missile defence system has developed within a broader frame of the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance. North Korea’s nuclear programs and its development of ballistic missiles, particularly Taepodong missile, must have rendered Japanese participation in the US-led MD system necessary. And the Japanese policy choice pertaining to the MD must have originated from the perceived threat of Chinese provocative behaviour in the Taiwan Strait and of the expanding military buildup in the 1990s.3 The MD cooperation began with the start of joint research between the two countries. The cooperation further developed as the Japanese government in 2003 decided to procure the MD system from the United States and to join the US-led development of advanced MD technology. At that time, the Japanese government, through a statement made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo in December, declared that Japan would not use the MD system to defend its allies but to only shield the Japanese territory.4 The Japanese government’s joining the MD system was accompanied by 3

Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,’ International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 49–80. 4 Japan Times, 21 November 2006.

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the launching of an intelligence satellite, which was an apparent breach of Japan’s self-proclaimed policy of no space use for military purposes.5 Right after North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, the United States and Japan accelerated the process of joint development of the MD system. At the Bush–Abe summit held in Hanoi on the sideline of the APEC summit in November, the two leaders agreed on gearing up the missile defence cooperation. Inasmuch as the ramification of the North Korea’s nuclear test was great, the Japanese side became more proactive with regard to the use of the MD system. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki Yasuhisa reversed his predecessor Fukuda’s 2003 statement; Shiozaki revealed that the government was now studying ‘whether the Self Defence Force (SDF) might shoot down a missile flying over the territory even if the destination is unknown and is only suspected to be the United States.’6 If such interception became governmental policy, it would contradict the existent interpretation of the Constitution that prohibits collective self-defence. Anyway, Japan’s deliberation on such possibility demonstrated how much the North Korean factor strengthened Abe’s hardline policy. The Abe administration’s adherence to the MD and closer US–Japan alliance became more pronounced in 2007. With the February Agreement, the Six-Party Talks in 2007 envisioned progress on the halted negotiation of the denuclearisation of North Korea. Amid this situation, however, the Abe administration was active in promoting defence cooperation with the Bush Administration, particularly in MD development. At the 2 + 2 security conference in May (talks held between US state and defence secretaries and Japanese foreign and defence ministers), the ministers and secretaries agreed to conclude the General Security of Military Information Agreement, which would allow exchange of top military secrets. The Agreement, which was finally concluded, covered operational intelligence, training 5 Kenneth Pyle, ‘Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Change of Course,’ NBR Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 2006, pp. 20–21. 6 Japan Times, 21 November 2006.

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information, and technical data. In line with this agreement, the Air Self-Defence Force began in April providing the US forces with the intelligence on early warning radar networks. The radar networks, the so-called Base Air Defence Ground Environment, are an integrated linkage of 28 radar sites in Japan. Japan’s information service was intended to permanently link the networks to the US 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base. In response, Japan was able to get access to the intelligence on North Korean ballistic missiles, which the US reconnaissance satellites and air patrols collected. It is said that the US–Japan information cooperation was aimed at surveillance of not only North Korea’s activities related to ballistic missiles but also Chinese aerial military activities as well.7 As the security cooperation between the two allies developed, Washington requested Tokyo’s broader and deeper commitment to an extended security role, which in turn was deemed to be at odds with the Japanese constitution. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates urged his Japanese counterpart Kyuma Fumio to use the MD system to intercept the North Korean missile to shield not only Japan but also the US territory.8 The US–Japan MD cooperation reached its culmination in December 2007, when the Maritime Self-Defence Force succeeded in a missile interception test. The Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) destroyer Kongo shot down a ballistic missile by using the Aegis tool of detecting and tracking. The test used the Standard Missle-3 (SM-3) interceptor, and the cost of the test was known to be $55 million. It is noteworthy that Japan became the first US ally that launched a test based on MD cooperation and that the MSDF test proved the MD’s operational ability to supplement the short-range ground based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles.9 Despite the successful test, however, it is not sure whether Japan realised the possession of the capability to counter not only low altitude missiles but also high altitude ones, even in a theoretical sense. This is so because 7

Japan Times, 13 May 2007. Japan Times, 17 May 2007. 9 New York Times, 18 December 2007. 8

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the SM-3 is known to counter low altitude missiles with a range of 1,500–2,000 km, whereas Taepodong 2, a North Korean three-stage ballistic missile, may fly 4,000–6,000 km.10 On the other hand, Japan’s space-use policy has paralleled the evolution of the activistic security policy; the space policy has aimed to counter North Korea’s ballistic missiles and China’s assertiveness in the military use of space.11 Japan launched three military satellites since 2003, but these launchings were conducted prior to legal provisions. With the passage of a revised version of the Basic Law on Space in the Diet in May 2008, Japan’s legal-restraint on the use of space for defence purposes was eliminated.12 As seen in both the expedited MD development and the military policy of space usage, the Japanese government has made major efforts to achieve a certain military capability to counter the immediate North Korean threat and China’s military rise within a broader perspective. With this backdrop, the LDP policy circle argued that the SDF should possess the capability of a ‘pre-emptive strike’ on enemy bases, obviously targeting the North Korean missile launching site. Right after North Korea launched a rocket in April 2009, seemingly a ballistic missile test, Yamamoto Ichita, a LDP Diet member and a former vice foreign minister, asked the Policy Research Council to discuss a feasibility of carrying out a pre-emptive strike in case of an imminent attack.13 In a response to the LDP policy circle’s discussions, Prime Minister Aso Taro stated in May that the pre-emptive strike on enemy bases is legally possible.14 In an interview with Asahi Shimbun, Ishiba Sigeru, a security expert in the LDP, and a former defence minister, reiterated his previous position that the pre-emptive

10

Hankook Ilbo, 18 June 2006. China demonstrated its assertiveness of the military use of space by destroying an orbiting old satellite. Now China became the third country in succeeding such test, after the United States and the former Soviet Union. New York Times, 20 January 2007. 12 Japan Times, 21 May 2008. 13 Japan Times, 10 April 2009. 14 Asahi Shimbun, 27 May 2009. 11

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strike is not illegal.15 The discussions centred on the pre-emptive strike exactly reflects how well North Korea’s provocative acts resonate with regard to the activistic security policy. Along with the call for public discussion about a nuclear armament option, the preemptive strike must be a prime example of the irreversible trends on which Japan is now riding. Japan’s activism in security affairs appears also in its attempts for enhancing Japan–South Korea cooperation, particularly after North Korean artillery attacks on the South Korean territory, Yonpyong Island, in November 2010. At the Japan–South Korea defence-minister meeting held in January 2011, Kitazawa Toshimi and Kim Kwan-jin agreed to continue bilateral talks for increasing military cooperation, particularly pursuing the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and the General Security of Military Information Agreement.16 If the two agreements are realised, the US–Japan–South Korea security triangle will not simply be anchored by Washington but will be tightened by direct Tokyo-Seoul cooperation. Departing from the pacifist principles Whereas the MD system represents a specific move that the Japanese government is adopting, the National Defence Program Guideline and the annually published Defence White Paper demonstrate basic outlooks of the security environment and provide policy outlines. The National Defence Program Guideline (Boei keikau no taiko), approved by the Kan administration in December 2010, is the culmination of Japan’s activistic security and military policy. The

15

The origin of the discussions of the pre-emptive strike on enemy’s bases can be traced back to Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro’s February 1956 statement at the House of Representatives that it would not be against the Constitution to strike enemy’s base, if no other alternatives, in the event of missile attack from outside. Amid the so-called second nuclear crisis, Director of Defence Agency Ishiba Shigeru stated in March 2003 that it was worthy to evaluate the possession of the pre-emptive strike capability. See Asahi Shimbun, 11 July 2009. 16 Asahi Shimbun, 11 January 2011.

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Guideline depicts China and North Korea as Japan’s chief security concerns. The Guideline was first drafted in 1976, and its revised versions appeared in 1995, 2004, and 2010. If examined carefully, there is a certain difference between the 2004 and 2010 versions in describing North Korea and China and analysing the existent international environment, on which principles of defence policy are based. As to North Korea, the 2004 guideline noted that the country ‘constitutes a major destabilising factor to regional and international security,’ whereas the 2010 version describes the nuclear and missile issues as ‘immediate and grave destabilising factors to the regional security.’ As to China, the 2004 guideline noted that Japan had to remain ‘attentive to its future actions (modernising nuclear and missile capabilities and naval and air forces),’ whereas the 2010 version states that Chinese military modernisation and insufficient transparency are of ‘concern for the regional and global community.’17 In other words, Japan now perceives more seriously the issues related to the two countries than before. And Japan considers the North’s behaviour an immediately destabilising factor and a present threat, while it vigilantly watches the Chinese military buildup and activities in the long run. Ref lecting the perceived North Korean threat, and the increasing concern over China, the 2010 guideline introduces a new concept of defence, ‘dynamic defence force,’ which supersedes the previous ‘basic defence force.’ The dynamic defence force capability stresses rapid response, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, multiple functions of the SDF to cope with a rapidly changing security environment. Defence Minister Kitazawa Toshimi proudly called it ‘innovative.’18 In overall terms, the 2010 guideline is a clear indicator of departure from the basic defence posture during the Cold War. More important, publicising the new guideline demonstrates that regardless of the 17

See National Defence Program Guideline, FY 2011- (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 17 December 2010), and National Defence Program Guideline, FY 2005- (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 10 December 2004). 18 Japan Times, 18 December 2010.

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power shift from the LDP to the DPJ, the activistic security and military policy seems to be irreversible. That is, evolution of the policy is not a mere vestige of the LDP-led administration. In a similar vein, the Defence of Japan 2010, the so-called White Paper, depicts the North Korean nuclear and missile programs as an ‘extremely destabilising factor’ and ‘grave dangers.’ It also points out the ‘lack of transparency’ in the Chinese military buildup. To cope with such challenges, the document maintains that the US deterrence, provided by the presence of American marines in Okinawa in particular, is indispensable to Japan.19 Considering that the document is the DPJ’s first defence-related publication, it is apparent that the present administration’s perception of the security environment and the corresponding security policy inherits from those of the LDP-led administrations. Paralleling the changed concept of defence, the Japanese government has been mulling over relaxing the self-proclaimed arms export ban.20 There are external and internal pressures on this restriction. First of all, the US–Japan joint development of the MD system has pressed Japan to undo the arms export ban. The Obama administration proposed Japan to export the ship-based missile interceptor to third countries: for instance, export of SM-3 Block 2A missile, an advanced version of the SM-3, to European countries to deter the Iranian missile threat.21 As noted before, the SM-3 interceptor was already tested by the MSDF in the Pacific Ocean in 2007. Just as the US proposal reflected its dilemma incurred by the joint development, 19

Mainichi Daily News [In English], 13 September 2010. The Three Principles of Exports were adopted by the Sato administration, in response to the JSP’s mounting criticism on Japan’s logistic support for the US forces fighting in the Vietnam War. The principles prohibited Japan’s arms export to communist countries, the countries subject to arms export embargo under the UNSC resolutions, and the countries engaged in international conflicts. The principles were further strengthened by the Miki administration: total ban to all regions in the world. See Yukari Kubota, ‘Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter: Revising the Three Principles on Arms Exporters,’ RIPS Policy Research Perspectives No. 7, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, November 2008, pp. 1–11 21 Japan Times, 25 July 2010. 20

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so Japan has been in a similar dilemma owing to its participation in it. At Kitazawa–Gates meeting in Tokyo on 13 January 2011, the Japanese side implied a possibility of allowing the United States to sell the SM-3 interceptors in some future.22 Eventually in May the Kan administration decided to allow the US export to third countries, acknowledging that it would be difficult to reject the request from the ally.23 Second, the Japanese defence ministry calls for discussions about relaxing the arms export ban, expanding joint technological development, and participating in the race of defence contracts. The ministry’s call reflects the outcry of the defence industry.24 Indeed, the defence industry underwent an unprecedented slump because of the decline of the government’s arms procurement. Japan is potentially competitive in some areas of dual-use technology, related particularly to minesweeper, radar, sound navigation, infrared imaging sensors, and periscopes for antisubmarine operations.25 Therefore, exports of not only the advanced missile interceptors but also other dual-use equipment seem likely to be realised sometime in the future, and the age of banning arms exports will likely end as well. From Abduction Issue to Sanctions Arguably, the abduction issue has hijacked Japan’s foreign policy. As political scientist Fujiwara Kiichi notes, public opinion centred on the abduction issue has significantly altered the course of foreign policy in general and North Korea policy in particular.26 The abduction issue may be traced back to the early 1990s when information leaks about North Korean infiltrators’ kidnapping of Japanese nationals in the

22

Japan Times, 14 January 2011. Japan Times, 25 May 2011. 24 Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Japan: Sidestepping the Arms Export Ban?’ RSIS Commentaries, No. 151, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 19 November 2010. 25 Kubota, ‘Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter.’ 26 Japan Times, 19 November 2007. 23

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1970s and the 1980s rendered the Japan–North Korea normalisation talks complicated. With Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s Pyongyang visit in 2002, the abduction issue, contrary to his original intention, brought about unprecedentedly worsened perception of North Korea. Furthermore, the emotionally-charged issue provided hardliners with opportunities for fostering a sense of crisis and accelerating the activistic security and military policy discussed in the previous section. Politicisation of the abduction issue At the historic Koizumi Junichiro-Kim Jong Il summit in September 2002, Kim surprisingly admitted the North Korean agents’ abduction and expressed apology for that act.27 Owing to the admission and apology, the summit resulted in a joint statement, the Pyongyang Declaration, in which both leaders pledged cooperation in diplomatic, economic, and security affairs. Certainly Koizumi’s determination to visit Pyongyang was intended to bring the abductees back to their homes in Japan. Tanaka Hitoshi, a high-ranking foreign ministry official who prepared it, recalled that probably the Pyongyang Declaration would not exist if there was no North Korean commitment to send the Japanese abductees home.28 Koizumi’s visit, however, marked a turning point in Japan’s North Korea policy. At first, the Japanese pubic seemed to support Koizumi’s summit with North Korean leader Kim. According to an opinion poll conducted right after the summit, Koizumi’s popularity rose dramatically from 43% in August to 67%.29 But the news that only five abductees were alive and that there was a dearth of information about the deceased abductees raised harsh public criticism against North Korea and the Japanese government as well.

27

For a fuller elaboration of the backdrop of Koizumi’s Pyongyang visit, see Tanaka Hitoshi, Gaiko no chikara [The Power of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Shuppansha, 2009), pp. 99–139. See also Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korea Nuclear Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 1–30. 28 Tanaka, Gaiko no chikara, pp. 117–118. 29 Mainichi Shimbun, 23 September 2002.

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North Korea finally sent the five surviving abductees to Japan on 15 October, but the act was unable to abate the fury of the Japanese public. This was a development neither Pyongyang nor Tokyo anticipated. In this worsening public mood, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo, a hawkish politician with regard to North Korea, came to be in charge of the abduction issue. Only a month after the summit, Koizumi declared that his administration would stop discussing about aid to North Korea because of the lack of progress in both the abduction and nuclear issues.30 Koizumi’s sudden second visit to Pyongyang in May 2004 did not alleviate the public frustration and fury. Whereas Koizumi returned home with several agreements including the promise of return of abductees’ children, he failed to obtain North Korean promise to reinvestigate the so-called deceased abductees. To this, the parents of the youngest abductee Yokota Megumi told reporters that they felt ‘betrayed’ by the government.31 Other families of the abductees, in the same vein, expressed strong discontent in regards to the prime minister’s decision to pledge massive aid to the North before obtaining convincing information about the so-called deceased abductees. Invoking a sanctions regime The abduction issue provided the Japanese government with a setting for its invocation of a sanctions regime. As North Korea admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in October 2002, the Koizumi administration came to join the hard-line Bush administration’s tougher stance over the North Korean nuclear issue.32 The Diet passed the War-Contingency Laws in May 2003, for which the LDP-New Komeito ruling coalition and the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) collaborated. The laws were 30

Japan Times, 27 October 2002. Japan Times, 23 May 2004. 32 See the joint press conference of the Bush–Koizumi summit held at Crawford, Texas on 23 May 2003. (accessed on 4 October 2011). 31

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intended to facilitate cooperation between SDF and US forces and to permit Japan’s execution of certain domestic measures in case of emergency. The laws were prepared long before the abduction issue became an important political issue; however, in view of the timing of the legislation, the deteriorating atmosphere centring on the abduction issue and the North Korea’s HEU program were not irrelevant to the legislation. There followed Japan’s preparation of several legal provisions to directly sanction both North Korea and Chongryon, the pro-North Korean residents organisation in Japan. For example, on 9 February 2004, the Diet passed a revision of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, revision which allowed the government independently to impose trade sanctions on Pyongyang and to ban Chongryon’s remittance to Pyongyang.33 With North Korea’s Taepodong-2 missile firing in July 2006 and the underground nuclear test in October, Japan used every means of coercion: suspension of all North Korean ship’s port calls, end of all North Korean imports, and an expanded ban on all North Korean visitors. As the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1718, Japan immediately placed an embargo on exports of Japanese luxury products, such as cigarettes and liquor, and on exports of electrical appliances.34 In January 2007, the government proposed a revision of Customs Law to the Diet in order to curb illegal trade with North Korea.35 In view of a minor share of North Korea in Japan’s overall trade, the effect of sanctions on trade was not decisive.36 But the disconnection of financial flow from the 33

Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett–Avery, and Helene Marchart, ‘North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002–December 2004’ CRS Report for Congress, 24 January 2005, 7; Hong Nack Kim, ‘Japanese–North Korean Relations under the Koizumi Government,’ in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (eds.), North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 170. 34 Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 October 2006. 35 Japan Times, 21 January 2007. 36 For instance, the total import volume from North Korea from January to July in 2006 reached only US$55.8 million. For North Korea, the decrease in the bilateral trade was offset by a sharp increase in trade with China and South Korea. See Lee Suk, Foreign Dependence of the North Korean Economy and the Influence of the South Korean Economy [In Korean] (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006).

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pro-North Korean Chongryon must have aggravated the problem of foreign-currency shortage in Pyongyang. To Japan, the sanctions against North Korea could not be compromised. Particularly hardliners such as Abe Shinzo and Aso Taro advocated sanctions as the only useful instrument to deal with the North. Even when the North Korean nuclear issue showed progress in February, 2007 at the Six-Party Talks, they opposed joining the four other countries to provide heavy fuel oil to the North. Aso Taro, the then foreign minister in the Abe administration, rejected oil aid, saying that it would become a kind of indirect assistance.37 The sanctions-oriented coercive policy, basically attributed to the abduction issue, led to rigidity in diplomacy. The other participating countries in the Six-Party Talks criticised the Japanese stance at the negotiation table. And there was a flurry of warnings from outside over the efficacy of the coercive policy. For instance, a prominent Japan specialist Gerald Curtis warned that with the sanctions the Japanese government ‘put itself into a corner’ and did ‘not have much leverage of its own to deal with North Korea.’38 In fact, the policy revealed Japan’s dilemma as the United States started deliberating the removal of North Korea from the list of terror sponsoring states in September 2007. Eventually President Bush declared the removal on 26 June 2008, aiming to induce continued North Korean cooperation in the nuclear negotiation at the Six-Party Talks. For North Korea, it meant elimination of the longstanding stigma particularly during the ‘war on terrorism’ in the world. But for Japan, the removal signified a loss of moral ground for sanctions on North Korea; it would mean a significant loss of leverage as well. Amid the changed trilateral dynamics between the US, North Korea, and Japan, the Fukuda administration began to demonstrate some flexibility in dealing with North Korea. In April 2008, Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko stated that Japan would take ‘action for action’ in its North Korea policy, suggesting a possibility of policy shift from

37 38

Japan Times, 12 February 2007. Japan Times, 24 November 2006.

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coercion to staged engagement.39 But the Fukuda administration’s policy also could not overcome the limit of the complicated linkage between the abduction issue and the sanctions. The US removal of North Korea from the terror list was a test of trust between Washington and Tokyo, as Michael Green and James Przystup note. This was because the Bush administration in 2003 had declared that the removal would require some progress on the abduction issue.40 The Bush administration risked its credibility; the Japanese government was unable to survive severe domestic criticism. Iizuka Shigeo, the chairman of Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea, bitterly charged the government’s ‘lack of enthusiasm’ on resolution of that issue.41 In the same vein, Yokota Shigeru, father of the youngest victim Yokota Megumi, expressed disgruntlement to the Fukuda administration’s reliance on dialogue, comparing with the Abe administration’s sanctions.42 After North Korea conducted the second nuclear test in May 2009, the Japanese government announced the strengthening of sanctions. Because of the already imposed sanctions, the announcement was simply resonating domestic politics without any more punitive effect. Given this situation, when former President Bill Clinton brought the two journalists detained in North Korea in August 2009, Japanese remained envious on the one hand and helpless on the other. Nationalistic Discourse in Identity Politics Throughout the 2000s, leading politicians attempted to drive a nationalistic agenda, and indeed they were successful to some extent. Such identity politics in Japan has its roots in broader background than the North Korean provocation; however, the latter has provided 39

Japan Times, 11 June 2008. Michael Green and James Przystup, ‘The Abductee Issue is a Test of America’s Strategic Credibility,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, PacNet 47, 15 November 2007. 41 Japan Times, 30 June 2008. 42 Japan Times, 3 July 2008. 40

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hawkish politicians with a chance for expanding and deepening their nationalistic agenda. Consequently, the pacifist principles seem to be in danger by the discussions about the constitutional amendment issue and the nuclear armament option. Equally notable, nationalism is gradually peeling off the war memories on which the pacifist principles stand. Prime Minister Koizumi became the precursor of inciting a nationalistic agenda, particularly by his controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine annually from 2001 until his retirement in 2006. Both Koizumi and his cabinet members justified the Yasukuni visits as remembering war dead.43 Domestic critics — not to mention Chinese and South Korean governments — denounced his action to be harming diplomatic relations with Japan’s neighbour countries. Surprisingly, however, Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit on 15 August 2006 received 51.5% support, according to a Kyodo News survey conducted right after the visit.44 A notable implication of this support was that to pay respects to war dead including the 14 Class-A war criminals was no longer a political taboo. Abe Shinzo was a key proponent of identity politics. He tried to water down Japan’s history of aggression, particularly in history text books and media. For example, it is known that on 29 January 2001, he as the deputy cabinet secretary put pressure on a NHK producer, in the name of requesting ‘fair broadcasting,’ to change the content of a TV program on the comfort women issue. Indeed the producer who had met Abe returned to his office and instructed his producing team to delete three scenes, including interviews with former comfort women, immediately before the broadcasting.45 As the first prime minister of the postwar generation and the youngest

43

For instance, Chief Secretary of Cabinet Abe Shinzo defended Koiumi’s Yasukuni visit by saying that the war criminals are same as war dead. Japan Times, 17 November 2005. 44 ‘Yasukuni sampai,’ Kyodo News, 16 August 2006. 45 See the public letter send to Abe Shinzo by a NGO, Violence Against Women in War-Network Japan. (accessed on 4 October 2011).

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prime minister in the postwar Japan, Abe told at a news conference in September 2006 that ‘Japan must be a country that shows leadership and that is respected and loved by the countries of the world.’ To the domestic audience, he apparently intended to project that national pride.46 Abe’s nationalistic appeal appeared in his insistence on the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, which in particular renounces war and the use of force and refuses the maintenance of military forces and other war potential. He became more committed to this insistence right after North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test. Citing the test as an obvious threat to the security of Japan, he stressed the need for constitutional revision to protect the country.47 At his first New Year press conference in January 2007, he mentioned the constitutional revision and the North Korean threat as top political issues. And he expressed his desire for the legalisation of the national referendum law, which detailed procedures of the referendum on the Diet-passed draft of an amended constitution.48 At his statement commemorating the Sixtieth Constitution Day in April, Abe pointed out that the Constitution was ‘outmoded’ in the 21st century when Japan must cope with many difficulties including the WMD and terrorism.49 He meant the constitutional revision to transform the SDF into a military and to possess the right of collective self-defence. Kenneth Pyle is right to state that Abe rode a trend, not acted as the agent, of such changes as transition in the international environment and the rise of a younger generation wishing to honour Japanese pride and identity in international politics.50 But Abe’s insistence on the constitutional revision and his upholding of national pride resonated well with the domestic audience owing to North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test. Given this, on 13 April 2007, the national referendum law, as the first step for the long way of constitutional 46

New York Times, 27 September 2006. Japan Times, 1 November 2006. 48 Japan Times, 5 January 2007. 49 Japan Times, 26 April 2007. 50 Kenneth Pyle, ‘Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Change,’ p. 9. 47

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amendment, was approved at the House of Representatives.51 Owing to the atmosphere of insecurity after the North Korean nuclear test, the ruling LDP’s pressure for hurried passage of the law prevailed over the opposition party members’ demand for further careful deliberation. A major problem of the law is that all forms of movements in the media, either for or against the Diet-passed amendment draft, are prohibited; therefore, it is probable that the national referendum, one of the most important citizens’ choice, may take place under the atmosphere of public apathy or in the situation that the right of freedom of speech is prohibited.52 Abe’s nationalistic appeal did not limit itself to the constitutional revision issue alone. He changed the Fundamental Law of Education. In the postwar Japan, not only the Constitution but also the education law reformed the militarist war-torn society; the education law has fostered individuality and freedom, as opposed to the wartime patriotism and emperor-centred state ideology. One month after the first North Korean nuclear test, the revised education law passed at the House of Representatives in November 2006 and became effective in the following month. Article 2 of the revised education law states, as a required goal of education, the development of the attitude of ‘participating in creating the society based on public spirit’ and ‘loving our country and hometown.’53 Again this revision was not based on any extensive and intensive debate in the society. Along with the publication of controversial revisionist history textbooks supported by rightwing politicians and opinion leaders, it seems that the new education law is likely to strengthen nationalism, even if not wartime-style militarism, in the hearts of younger generations in the long run. Consequently, the passage of the national referendum law

51

Japan Times, 14 April 2007. For the problems of the national referendum law, see Kawakami Akihiro, Kenpo kaisei tetsuduki mondai no kisoteki kento (A Study on the Problem of the Constitutional Amendment), Monthly Review of Local Government, Vol. 347, September 2007, pp. 1–13. 53 For the Kyoikukihonho, see (accessed on 4 October 2011). 52

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and the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education were marked as the limelight of Abe’s nationalistic achievement. With North Korea’s two nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009, the identity politics in Japan revolved around the possibility of Japan’s nuclear statehood as well. Breaking the longstanding taboo, hawkish politicians such as Nakagawa Shoichi and Aso Taro argued that the possibility of nuclear armament should be discussed in the public sphere. After North Korea’s first test in 2006, Chairman of the Policy Research Council in the LDP Nakagawa Shoichi stated that Japan should open public debate on the nuclear option.54 His statement resonated with the former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s argument that Japan had no other way but to arm with nuclear weapons in view of the worsened security environment.55 The domestic discourse centred on the nuclear armament was extinguished by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s statement that the United States would continue to provide Japan with full range of security and deterrent commitments. Furthermore, the nuclear option did not receive public support amid the mounting criticism within the LDP as well as by opposition party leaders. Despite this public mood, Prime Minister Abe supported Nakagawa’s viewpoint by saying that Japan would not take the nuclear path but discussions about that issue should be opened.56 After North Korea’s ballistic missile launch in April 2009 and its second nuclear test a month after, Nakagawa repeated, with a firmer and much-trumpeted tone, the need for public discussion about Japan’s path to nuclear statehood.57 Although the controversy over the nuclear option is not likely to receive public consensus in the short run, especially after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, it is no longer taboo to discuss it in political circles and with the support of right-leaning academics.58 54

Japan Times, 29 October 2006; 30 October 2006; and 3 November 2006. For Nakasone’s statement, see Japan Times, 6 September 2006. 56 Japan Times, 9 November 2006. 57 Japan Times, 20 April 2009; 29 October 2009. 58 Emma Chanlett–Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,’ NAPSNET Special Report, 29 July 2008. 55

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Conclusion This chapter is not a survey of the entire trajectory of Japanese security policy. It examined the ways in which the North Korean factor, both its WMD threat and conversely Japan’s bashing of the country, has been incorporated into the evolving activistic security and military policy. The North Korea factor has become a centrepiece of fostering the new activistic mode of security and military policy. The politicised abduction issue and the North’s WMD development became the impetus for Japan’s invoking a sanctions regime and for Japanese security policy’s turn to an activistic mode disregarding the basic defence policy. Behind this transition, there lies Japan’s increasing concern about China’s rise on the security front. There are some policy-related implications of the increasingly activistic Japanese policy for East Asian and global affairs. First, there has been a certain parallel between Japan’s China policy and its North Korea policy. In the 1970s, Japan’s China fever was followed by the adventurous approach to North Korea in economic and cultural exchanges, despite South Korean resistance and American warnings. In the 2000s, the North Korea factor has been chief ly responsible for the nationalistic identity politics and the transition toward the activistic security and military policy in Japan. It is also true, however, that Japan’s coercive North Korea policy has been in line with its vigilance to China’s rise. The policy parallel in regards to China and North Korea demonstrates the complicatedness of Japan’s security and military policy. Second, the evolution of the activistic security and military policy of Japan seems to have reached an unprecedented level in the postwar era. For example, Japan’s cooperation with the United States for the MD system arrived at the stage of its mulling over the export of it to third countries. The MD system has utilities not only for expanding Japan’s defence parameter but also for restoration of the already stagnated defence-industry business. But sales of the advanced products to third countries will seriously erode Japan’s longstanding pacifist principles. What should be noted is that the irreversible policy trend receives little resistance. The recent emphasis on the SDF’s mobility

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and flexibility in the defence-related documents has not faced organised opposition in political circles; the only exception is criticism from the socialists. Finally and more importantly, the Japanese government, in a broader perspective, should enhance multiplicity of its external policy to foster regional security cooperation and resolve the North Korea issue.59 Japan’s existing security and military policy may render the country’s future policy entrapped in confrontational international relations. Japan’s lopsided reliance on the US–Japan alliance is exemplified by the fact that Japan’s SDF is further integrated to the US forces in Japan than ever before. Japan’s search for security cooperation with South Korea became apparent after the North’s artillery attack on the Yonpyong Island in November 2010. A consequential US–Japan–South Korea triangular security and military cooperation seems to be emerging. This situation will further deepen the faultline divide between the US–Japan–South Korea triangle and China– Russia–North Korea alignment; this divide will not necessarily improve Japan’s security environment, but will most likely complicate its North Korea policy particularly. Japan needs to seek its own role for fostering coordination between relevant countries in dealing with the North. Obviously the coordination role can be found in diplomacy, not in the activistic security and military policy, particularly the coercive North Korea policy that has been adopted thus far. Acknowledgement The writing of this article was supported by National Research Foundation of Korea. Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-361-A00017).

59

In the same vein, Victor Cha calls such multi-layered relations “complex patchworks.” See “Complex Patchworks: US Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” Asia Policy, Vol. 11, January 2011, pp. 27–50.

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Bibliography Bitzinger, RA (2010). Japan: Sidestepping the arms export ban? RSIS Commentaries, No. 151, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Cha, V (2011). Complex patchworks: US alliances as part of Asia’s regional architecture. Asia Policy, 11. Chanlett-Avery, E and MB Nikitin (2008). Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests. NAPSNET Special Report. Christensen, TJ (1999). China, the US–Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia. International Organization, 23(4). Funabashi, Y (2007). The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korea Nuclear Crisis. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Green, M and J Przystup (2007). The Abductee Issue is a Test of America’s Strategic Credibility. PacNet 47, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kawakami, A (2007). Kenpo kaisei tetsuduki mondai no kisoteki kento (A study on the problem of the constitutional amendment). Monthly Review of Local Government, 347. Kihl, YW and HN Kim (eds.), (2006). North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Kubota, Y (2008). Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter: Revising the Three Principles on Arms Exporters. RIPS Policy Research Perspectives, No. 7, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo. Lee, S (2006). Foreign Dependence of the North Korean Economy and the Influence of the South Korean Economy. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification. Manyin, ME, E Chanlett-Avery and H Marchart (2005). North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002–December 2004. CRS Report for Congress. Nonaka, H (2005). Rohei wa shinazu: Zenkaikoroku (Old Soldier Does Not Die: Autobiography). Tokyo: Bungei Shunshu. Pyle, K (2006). Abe Shinzo and Japan’s change of course. NBR Analysis, 17(4). Tanaka, H (2009). Gaiko no chikara. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Shuppansha. Toby, RP (1984). State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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CHAPTER 5

A ‘UNITED’ COMMUNITY IN A DIVIDED REGION: SOUTHEAST ASIA, JAPAN, CHINA, AND EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Regionalism has long been a complex concept in East and Southeast Asia. During the Cold War, regional cooperation emerged as an effective, yet manipulative, instrument that was designed to identify friends and allies, and more importantly, enemies and national threats. With the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, countries in this region have since grown to become more familiarised with the idea of regional integration. For the realists, regional cooperation is one way of strengthening the state’s power and safeguarding national security, based on the perception of the world being an insecure place. Countries, thus, participate in regional cooperation primarily to boost their national interests. From this perspective, it allows one to understand why states build regional institutions to promote peace, but also keep them weak and subservient to their own interests at the same time.1 For the idealists, regionalism makes countries less inward-looking and 1

Sorpong Peou, Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Theory and Practice (Santa Barbara, Denver and Oxford: Praeger, 2010), p. 290. 97

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more willing to strive for the communal benefits of the region. It is the different interpretations of regionalism that have driven countries in East and Southeast Asia to cooperate with each other. In other words, while the objectives behind regional cooperation are clear, the motives of each member can at times be ambiguous. Countries possess their own rationale in partaking in regional organisations. Some of these reasons are conflicting and can impact the direction of regional cooperation. This chapter on the East Asia Community (EAC) derives from such an intricate context. Setting the Stage The proposal for an East Asian Community (EAC) was first made public in 2002 during the visit to Singapore of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. But the Japanese initiative was not the first endeavour to integrate East and Southeast Asia. In 1990, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suggested the establishment of the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG), later renamed as East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), which was to include ASEAN member states, China, Japan, and South Korea. Baogang He argued that Mahathir’s proposal was the boldest and most assertive attempt to build exclusive Asian regionalism. It provided an ‘Asian-only’ alternative to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), favouring a return to the notion of a distinctive ‘Asian Community’.2 The EAEC was however never seen through officially. Undoubtedly, EAEC’s Asian exclusivity was responsible for its failure. Not until 1997 did ASEAN express its serious interest in developing a more concrete structure that would incorporate East Asian neighbours. Several factors, such as the Asian financial crisis and expanding regional integration in Europe and the Americas, compelled ASEAN to redefine the concept of regionalism and strengthen its position on the global stage. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, for example, ASEAN countries established the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ to manage 2

Baogang He, ‘East Asian Idea of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, p. 112.

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regional short-term liquidity problems and to facilitate the work of other international financial arrangements and organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This initiative brought Southeast Asia into direct contact with Northeast Asia. Eventually, ASEAN decided to launch the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum as a coordinator of cooperation between ASEAN and the three East Asian nations of China, Japan, and South Korea. The first APT leaders’ meeting was held in 1997 and has since served as a lynchpin institution in the formation of the larger EAC.3 Japan has enjoyed amicable relations with ASEAN since it was granted a Dialogue Partner status in 1977. Yet, this relationship had been taken for granted, particularly on the Japanese part. Japan invested its diplomatic energy overwhelmingly in its alliance with the United States, a foreign policy choice deemed imperative from Japan’s strategic perspective. Japan lives side-by-side with its historical enemies — China and South Korea. Its relationship with the two neighbours is today shaped in part by embittered historical memories, with Japan still perceived as the military aggressor in their past wars. Meanwhile, China’s close ties with North Korea have produced an effect on the region’s security outlook and at times worried both Japan and South Korea. Indeed, the security concerns on the Korean peninsula, to a great degree, dictated Japan’s strategic considerations and thus legitimised its intimate relationship with the United States.4 Such conditions have discouraged Japan from taking any new diplomatic initiatives vis-à-vis ASEAN. Japan could argue that the country’s relations with ASEAN were already solid and that there were no outstanding disputes between the two sides, be it political or economic. But the smooth relationship has fallen into a state of inertia. Even though successive Japanese governments offered generous financial aid and technical assistance to a number of ASEAN countries as well 3

Takashi Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan-China Power Struggles,’ Japanese Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, May 2006, p. 5. 4 For further discussion, see, Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the US–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,’ International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring, 1999, pp. 49–80.

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as supporting Japanese conglomerates investing in ASEAN’s markets, there was clearly a lack of a strategic partnership. For Japan, ASEAN was an important partner, but not a strategic one. In retrospect, Japan’s diplomatic activism towards Southeast Asia was evident in 1977 following the announcement of the Fukuda Doctrine. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, while paying an official visit to Manila, made a famous speech in which he articulated his country’s new foreign policy. The speech indicated that for the first time in the post-World War II era, Japan was willing to play an active role in both economic and political affairs in Southeast Asia without depending on military imperatives and in such a way as to make military considerations less prominent. The doctrine consisted of three key points: rejection of the role of a military power; promotion of the relationship of mutual confidence and trust, or ‘heart-to-heart’ diplomacy; and equal partnership with ASEAN for building peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia.5 But while the Fukuda Doctrine continued to serve as the bedrock of Japan’s diplomacy towards Southeast Asia, it was not brought up to date according to the changing regional environment (at least not until 2008 when Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda upgraded his father’s doctrine through the declaration of the ‘Inland Sea’ vision.6) In other words, the Fukuda Doctrine failed to prepare Japan to cope with new developments in the region. One major development has been the rise of China. In the past decade, China has emerged as a major power in this part of the world 5

Keiko Hirata, ‘Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analysing Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Indochina,’ in Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration, edited by Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 85. 6 In his speech entitled ‘When the Pacific Ocean Becomes and Inland Sea,’ Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda pledged that Japan would (1) Resolutely support the integration and development of ASEAN, (2) Reinforce its alliance with the United States; Discharge its responsibilities as a peace-fostering nation, (3) Develop infrastructure for intellectual and youth exchanges in Asia to underpin the future of the region, and (4) Address through a universal effort the challenge of achieving economic growth while simultaneously protecting the environment and fighting climate change. In Takashi Shiraishi, ‘Renewing Fukuda Doctrine,’ Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 July 2008.

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at a time when American hegemony was in the decline. It is becoming more assertive and influential in Southeast Asia; thus prompting Japan to urgently search for a new way to counterbalance rising China while protecting its interests in Southeast Asia. The proposal of an EAC by Prime Minister Koizumi, therefore, represented Japan’s drive for regionalism as a way to consolidate its power position in the region. This chapter seeks to make a number of arguments and highlight certain misperceptions about Japan’s vision of regionalism, particularly in the context of the EAC. First, it argues that China, not ASEAN, has been a determinant factor behind Japan’s renewed enthusiasm in Asian regionalism. Japan’s proactive role in the EAC symbolises a foreign policy reaction to the rise of China in Southeast Asia. Second, Japan’s approach toward an EAC is greatly different from that of China. These differences must not be construed as Japan and China adopting different views regarding regionalism. Instead, they expose the extent to which the two countries have exploited regionalism differently to fulfil their national interests. For example, while China prefers closed regionalism as it allows Beijing to better manoeuvre its relations with member countries, Japan promotes open regionalism in order to dilute the Chinese influence in the region. Third, the obvious rivalry between Japan and China has generated both positive and negative repercussions on the region, and specifically on the pace of regionalism. Positively, such rivalry has stimulated other regional players to step up their game, for example ASEAN and South Korea. Moreover, it encourages ASEAN to reinforce its own organisation, in the face of Sino–Japanese competition, by taking a leading role where different opinions persist. Negatively, unending rivalry could derail regional cooperation efforts. Member countries may put too much emphasis on defending their national interests rather than those of the region. The three arguments, in turn, uncover a misperception behind the proposal of the EAC. As alluded to earlier, the objectives of regionalism are normally indisputable. But the motives of the members can be highly obscure. Japan’s motives behind the promotion of the EAC concept will disappoint the idealists. For Tokyo, an EAC is beneficial primarily as an instrument employed to offset China’s growing political and economic clout.

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A Community of Power Struggles China’s economic rise is the answer to why an EAC is a compelling concept. Since 1997, both China and Japan, together with South Korea, have worked closely with ASEAN through the APT framework. They recognised ASEAN’s status as a driving force behind Asian regionalisation. But the troubled relationship between China and Japan has produced an inevitable spillover effect on the ongoing EAC-building process. For example, the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS), an important forum set up to materialise the EAC concept, was dishevelled with power politics being played out between Japan and China. They have competed fiercely for increased influence and leadership in the region, and successfully transformed the evolving EAS into a battlefield of power struggles. Although Prime Minister Kiozumi did not attack China directly in his 2002 speech, he clearly supported the idea of involving other powers in the region, including the United States, to create an open regionalism, possibly to minimise the Chinese influence. He said: Our goal should be the creation of a community that acts together and advances together. And we should achieve this through expanding East Asia cooperation founded upon the Japan–ASEAN relationship… Through this cooperation, I expect that the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand will be core members of such a community… The community I am proposing should be by no means an exclusive entity. Indeed, practical cooperation in the region would be founded on close partnership with those outside the region. In particular, the role to be played by the United States is indispensable because of its contribution to regional security and the scale of its economic interdependence with the region.7

7

Speech by Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, on ‘Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership,’ 14 January 2002, Singapore. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

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Overcoming the Chinese influence in Southeast Asia has proven to be an uphill task for the Japanese leadership. As emphasised earlier, although Japan maintained a friendly relationship with ASEAN, their ties were unenthusiastic and lacked a sense of strategic importance. Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Southeast Asia has been in decline in recent years and this will negatively cause an impact on its influence in the region. Statistically, from 2000 to 2007, the share of Japan’s ODA in total ODA commitments to four main ASEAN recipients — Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand — significantly decreased from 78.1% to 38.1%.8 On the contrary, China has been more aggressive in its approach to forge a strong relationship with ASEAN. In the words of Singapore’s Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, ‘It has become the norm in Southeast Asia for China to take the lead and Japan to tag along. Since Japan is unable to recover its economy, it has no choice but to allow China to take the initiative.’9 China–ASEAN official relations commenced only in the mid-1990s. China was accorded full Dialogue Partner status at the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1996 in Jakarta, 19 years after Japan acquired the same status. However, China was the first Dialogue Partner to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia at the 7th ASEAN–China Summit in October 2003 in Bali, one year before Japan decided to sign the same document. Table 1 illustrates how Japan’s diplomacy vis-à-vis ASEAN has lagged behind that of China. Unlike Japan, China has long regarded Southeast Asia as its sphere of influence, both in the historical context and in the contemporary period, and has attempted to maintain that level of influence through developing closer links with the region. But China’s inroads 8

Séverine Blaise, Japanese Aid as a Prerequisite for FDI: The Case of Southeast Asian Countries, Asia-Pacific Economic Papers, Australia–Japan Research Centre, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific Crawford School of Economics and Government, No. 385, 2009, p. 6. 9 Asahi Shimbun, 28 October 2003, Cited in Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan–China Power Struggles,’ p. 6.

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Who leads, who follows: Japan’s and China’s activities with ASEAN.10

Source: The ASEAN Secretariat.

Full Dialogue Partner Status

1977

October 2003

The signing of Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN–Japan Partnership in the New Millennium, together with the ‘ASEAN–Japan Plan of Action’ The signing of the TAC

December 2003

Joint Declaration for Cooperation on the Fight against International Terrorism

2004

2003 (First Dialogue Partner to do so) 2004

December 2008

Appointment of ASEAN ambassador: Katori Yoshinori

2004

October 2008 (Continued)

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1996 2001

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Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues Appointment of ASEAN ambassador: Xue Hanqin

Japan

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Political Cooperation with ASEAN

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China

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Table 1.

Political Cooperation with ASEAN

(Continued)

China

Economic Cooperation with ASEAN The signing of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP)

Japan

2008

2009 (The ACFTA was realised on 1 January 2010)

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ASEAN trade with the Plus Three countries remained robust. Trade with these countries reached US$413.8 billion in 2009, declining by only 15.5% compared to US$489.5 billion reported in 2008, registering a 27% share of total ASEAN trade last year. The 2009 value of total trade between ASEAN and its Plus Three Dialogue Partners was still higher than its pre-crisis level of USS 405.4 billion in 2007. Source: The ASEAN Secretariat, 22 February 2011, .

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2002

Political Cooperation with ASEAN

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Economic Cooperation with ASEAN11 The signing of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation to establish the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) • The signing of the Agreement on Trade in Goods & Dispute Settlement Mechanism • The signing of the Agreement on Trade in Services The Plan of Action to implement the Beijing Declaration on ASEAN–China ICT Cooperative Partnership for Common Development (2007–2012) ASEAN–China Investment Agreement

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Japan shared 10.5% of total ASEAN trade in 2009

2010

2004 2005 2008

Socio–Cultural Cooperation with ASEAN Japan–East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths

2007

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China emerged as Two-way Trade ASEAN’s largest trading partner accounting for 11.6% of ASEAN’s total trade in 2009 2009 ASEAN–Japan Centre

Japan

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Beijing Declaration on ASEAN–China Cooperation on Youth MOU on Cultural Cooperation The signing of ASEAN–China MOU on Information and Media Cooperation

Political Cooperation with ASEAN

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The MOU on Establishing the ASEAN–China Centre MOU on Cooperation on Intellectual Property and the MOU on Strengthening Cooperation in the Field of Standards, Technical Regulations, and Conformity Assessment The Launch of ASEAN–China Free trade Area (FTA) Business Portal (BIZ Portal) Socio–Cultural Cooperation with ASEAN

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Two-way Trade

China

P. Chachavalpongpun

Political Cooperation with ASEAN

(Continued)

106

Table 1.

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into Southeast Asia have not always been smooth. During the Cold War, the non-communist states in Southeast Asia were suspicious of China because it supported communist insurgency in the region. Today, some Southeast Asian countries still regard Beijing as a potential threat. As China has risen economically, it has modernised its army in tandem. The modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the remaining territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands has revived Southeast Asia’s fear of China’s growing military threat. Chinese diplomats working in Southeast Asia take every opportunity in stressing their country’s peaceful co-existence principle and its keenness to become a part of ASEAN’s regionalisation process.12 To demonstrate this, China initiated its FTA negotiation with ASEAN in 2002. In the same year, they also signed a Declaration on Code of Conduct in the South China Sea at the end of the sixth China–ASEAN Summit with an aim of maintaining peace and stability in the South China region, as a way to alleviate the region’s threat perception of China. In parallel, China has firmed up its ties with individual members of ASEAN on a bilateral basis. Thailand became the first country in ASEAN to have concluded a bilateral FTA with China which came into effect in 2003. China has also begun conducting annual military exercises with Thailand, to emulate the Cobra Gold, the largest military exercise in Asia, which is between Thailand and the United States.13 It is evident that the level of Sino–Japanese competition has over the years heightened. After the first APT summit in 1997, there had been efforts from all key countries in the region to construct a new platform that would help consolidate an East Asian regionalism. In 2000, ASEAN commenced a feasibility study on the establishment of the EAS. The EAS was to perform as a key forum for materialising an EAC. The EAS, with its first meeting in 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, consists of the APT members, plus India, Australia, and New Zealand. 12

In a private discussion with Chinese Ambassador to Singapore, Wei Wei, on 11 October 2010, Singapore. 13 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 196, 197.

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The five-year gap between the EAS’s initial idea and its first summit offered an opportunity for Japan to develop its version of an EAC and claim its ownership, as unveiled in Koizumi’s speech in 2002. Sohn Yul argued that Japan’s renewed interest in ASEAN was without doubt a reaction to China’s aggressive approach to the grouping, in particular to the China–ASEAN FTA.14 Asahi Shimbun pointed out, ‘This time, Japan’s counterpart is not ASEAN but China.’15 Japan realised that it had to raise its diplomatic game in order to contain the rising power of China in ASEAN. To quickly follow its initiative on an EAC, the Japanese government recommended a commemorative summit with all ASEAN members; it became the first summit between ten ASEAN countries and Japan outside the Southeast Asian region. The commemorative summit was eventually organised in December 2003 in Tokyo despite initial disagreements from some ASEAN members about the rationale behind the event. They thought that another meeting in Tokyo would be redundant since ASEAN and Japanese leaders had held a similar meeting a few months earlier in Indonesia. In order not to spoil the mood of cooperation and Japan’s goodwill, ASEAN went along with Tokyo’s idea. The success of the commemorative summit increased Japan’s strategic leverage against China and further deepened the existing rivalry between the two East Asian nations. China refused to stand idly in the face of Japan’s increasingly assertive diplomacy vis-à-vis ASEAN. China was on the mission to irritate its Japanese neighbour by offering to host the first EAS on Chinese soil as a symbol of its genuine commitment to the East Asian regionalisation process. But the offer was declined, not only by Japan but also by some ASEAN members who insisted on ASEAN maintaining its centrality in the EAS. Instead, Malaysia played host to the first EAS in 2005, followed by the Philippines in 2006, Singapore in 14

Sohn Yul, Japan’s New Regionalism: China Shock, Universal Values and East Asian Community, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study (WIAS) Discussion Paper No. 2009-005, 2 March 2010, p. 17. 15 Asahi Shimbun, 15 January 2002. Cited in Yul, Japan’s New Regionalism: China Shock, Universal Values and East Asian Community, p. 17.

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2007, Thailand in 2009, and Vietnam in 2010.16 As China’s offer was stalled, Japan came up with a new proposition to co-host the EAS with Malaysia. Simultaneously, Japan produced its Concept Paper on the EAC in 2004 to elaborate on its vision of Asian regionalism. China immediately rebuffed Japan’s proposition and insisted on allowing a single host of the EAS. Beijing also distributed the Modality Paper in 2005, a Chinese view of an EAC, to counter Japan’s Concept Paper. The endless diplomatic settling of scores between Japan and China put a great deal of pressure on ASEAN. While both Japan and China competed indefatigably to win hearts and minds of ASEAN members, and even when their action seemed to recognise ASEAN as the chief driver of the regional integration, the real spotlight seemed to be on the Sino–Japan power struggles and their objectives which might have had little to do with promoting an EAC. Divergence of Approaches The Sino–Japanese competition has compelled the two nations to endorse different approaches toward East Asian regionalism, mostly in a conflicting manner. Yoshihide Soeya explained such differences in terms of their regional outlook. He argued: One would also realise the fundamental differences between Japan’s and China’s perspectives on evolving regionalism in East Asia, including the concept of an East Asian Community. China’s regional outlook and its policies are still conditioned, at the deepest level, by its preoccupation with the modern elements of diplomacy and international politics, including strong nationalism, a sense of rivalry with the United States, an unprecedented pace and scale of military modernisation, and preoccupation with territorial integrity. Japan’s perspective on East Asian regionalism and its interests therein, in contrast, are essentially post-industrial, including 16

Thailand was initially to host the EAS in 2008 but was forced to postpone it to 2009 due to its domestic crisis.

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commitment to non-traditional security issues such as human security, problems common to rapidly evolving civil societies, and issues associated with aging societies. Of course, there are still modern elements in Japanese society and politics, which particularly tend to surface in an emotional vicious cycle over historical and territorial issues between Japan and China. The main story in the evolution of Japanese diplomacy and thinking toward East Asian regionalism, however, has been largely, if not exclusively, a post-modern and post-industrial one.17

As a consequence, each country created its own modality of an EAC while undermining that of its rival. The contentious points boiled down to the issue of membership of EAS. The discourse of an open versus closed regionalism reflects a sense of anxiety on the part of some APT members; this was the anxiety over China’s attempt to control the APT process which had become the central motivator for Japan and others to draw in extra-regional actors into the EAS. It led to what Deepak Nair called a ‘frustrated regionalism.’18 Indeed, the frustration began with the question of eligibility of EAS’s members. Japan called for the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and India in the EAS — a move supported by Singapore and Indonesia. Japan’s intention was obvious: it comprehended that a concerted effort was needed, especially from extra-regional powers, in order to counter China’s growing influence in the region. Bilaterally, Japan had worked intimately with the United States to dilute the Chinese presence in Southeast Asia through a balancing strategy. On top of this, Japan made use of a multilateral forum, in this case the EAS, to keep China at arm’s length. India and Australia, and to a certain extent New Zealand, were supportive of Japan’s open regionalism approach. These extra-regional powers possessed their own 17

Yoshihide Soeya, ‘An East Asian Community and Japan–China Relations,’ East Asia Forum, 17 May 2010 . 18 Deepak Nair, ‘Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 31, No. 1, April 2009, p. 120.

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stakes in the region, and thus hoped to exploit the EAS to preserve their interests. Separately, these countries observed the rise of China through suspicious eyes. India has long been known to endorse an ambivalent attitude toward China. In recent years, bilateral conflicts between India and China have been kept at bay, such as their border disputes; yet, mutual distrust has lingered. India has become actively engaged in ASEAN activities following its Look East policy that was implemented in the early 1990s. Delhi was eager to keep Beijing out of its way as it had strengthened its relations with ASEAN. For diplomatic reasons however, India was content to downplay simmering tensions with China. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated while visiting Malaysia in 2010, ‘Are India and China in competition? I sincerely believe that there are enormous possibilities for our two countries to work together. I look upon the world as a large enough place to accommodate the growth and ambitions of both India and China and it is in that sense that we approach India–China relations.’19 Likewise, Australia embraced a similar view of a looming Chinese threat in Asia. During the Kevin Rudd administration, Sino–Australian relations were smooth, at least on the surface. Every time Rudd visited China, he often showed off his linguistic skill to impress his Chinese neighbours. Rudd is known to be a fluent Mandarin speaker. Behind the scene, the prime minister’s love of Chinese culture did not translate into mutual trust or real friendship. A series of leaked US Embassy cables indicated that the then Australia prime minister warned the US government to be prepared to deploy force against China if moves to assimilate the latter into the international community backfired20 — a statement that irked the Chinese leadership. From this angle, the Sino–Japanese rivalry was successful in further dividing the region, even when the two countries vowed to cooperate together towards a united community. The Chinese government, as opposed to the Japanese approach, was adamant in its position to keep the region ‘free of foreign powers.’ 19

‘Malaysia–India FTA to Double Trade by 2015,’ Straits Times, 28 October 2010. Bonnie Malkin and Malcolm Moore, ‘WikiLeaks: Kevin Rudd Warned of Need to be Ready to Use Force against China,’ The Telegraph, 6 December 2010.

20

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China gained firm support from Malaysia, a country with its own anti-foreign powers history. Both argued that the entry of extraregional actors would dilute the putative identity and purpose of the APT.21 China’s campaign was however under extreme pressure from the majority of ASEAN members who preferred to engage more actors outside the East Asian region in order to better handle the pace of regional integration. For example, ASEAN acknowledged the benefits of involving Australia as a way to suppress the latter’s ambition to lead the East Asian regionalisation process. At the launch of APEC in 1989 by Australian premier Bob Hawke, ASEAN immediately felt threatened by the new regional forum and subsequently led Malaysia to invent the EAEC in response. Recently, Australia managed to upset ASEAN once again; this time, it came from Rudd’s idea of an Asia-Pacific Community (APC) which could potentially eclipse the role of ASEAN as the main driver in Asian regionalism. The APC was meant to connect East Asia and the Pacific, in particular the United States (note that the United States was excluded from the original EAS). But Rudd’s concept was seen as a threat to ASEAN, since the APC would possibly invite selective ASEAN members — not all members — to partake in the forum. Purportedly, only the current ASEAN chair, the future chair and Indonesia (as the largest and presumably most important member of ASEAN) were to be invited to the APC. Such modality displeased other member states, such as Singapore, which have long championed the centrality of ASEAN as a way to elevate their own diplomatic profile. ASEAN, as an organisation, has been overly protective of its own regional turf even when it has clearly shown on numerous occasions that it lacks the capability and resources to drive the regional engine or to seek solutions to regional crises.22 Thus, the involvement of Australia in the EAS was quintessential if ASEAN wanted to keep hold of its leading role in the region. 21

‘Nair, Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism’, p. 119. For further discussion, see, Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former Secretary-General (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 375.

22

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China’s exclusive regionalism was also opposed by the United States. In 2005, the United States expressed its concern over the supposedly inward-looking nature of the EAS.23 The United States then nominated Japan as its ‘regional agent,’ first not to support the EAEC and second to push for a greater openness of the EAS process.24 Other key allies of the United States in ASEAN offered their support for Washington’s position. Singapore was surely keen to see a bigger role for the United States in the region. The Philippines, engaging in territorial disputes with China over the Spratly Islands, shared a similar view on an open regionalism endorsed by the United States. However, Thailand, a major non-NATO ally of the United States, was cautious not to attack Beijing and criticised its modality of the EAS.25 The Thaksin Shinawatra government, known to have enjoyed cosy relations with the Chinese leadership, maintained its ambivalent attitude and preferred other ASEAN members to lead the debate on the EAS.26 The diplomatic tussles between Beijing and Tokyo forced ASEAN to find a way to solve the inclusion dilemma. ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to set three qualifications for the admission to EAS: participant states had to be Dialogue Partners with ASEAN; had engaged economically in the region; and they had to be signatories to the TAC. Although feeling uncomfortable with the TAC, which 23

‘US Concerned Over Exclusive Nature of EAS,’ Agence France Presse, 25 February 2005. Cited in Bruce Vaughn, ‘East Asia Summit: Issues for Congress,’ CRS Report for Congress, 9 December 2005 . 24 Presentation of Takashi Terada on the topic ‘Japan, the United States, and China and Integration of East Asia: Conceptual Issues and Policy Priorities,’ in the conference on ‘The United States and East Asian Regionalism: Inclusion–Exclusion Logic and the Role of Japan,’ Waseda University, Japan, 3 June 2010. 25 For further discussion, see, Donald K. Emmerson, Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation, RSIS Working Paper, No. 193, 19 March 2010. 26 See Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘(10+3)+(1+2)+(?+?)=Asian Identity?’ paper presented at the Fourth High-Level Conference on ‘Asian Economic Integration: Toward an Asian Economic Community,’ organised by India’s Research and Information System for Developing Country and Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, New Delhi, India, 18, 19 November 2005.

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includes the principle of non-interference into other domestic affairs, Australia came to sign the treaty. Eventually, the Japan-led expansionist camp won the debate, as Australia, New Zealand, and India were admitted to EAS.27 From this perspective, the Sino–Japanese competition accelerated the momentum towards the finding of the EAS. Certainly, such momentum persisted until the year 2010 when the EAS agreed to admit two new extra-regional powers — the United States and Russia. From 2011, they would participate in the EAS for the first time in their official capacity. But the membership of EAS was not the only contentious issue that created a rift between China and Japan. The process of regionalism presented another headache for ASEAN as it was reinterpreted differently by China and Japan, ostensibly to complement their own power position in the region. The first EAS Summit ended without any tangible results, apparently because of the continued political divide between China and Japan. Worse, the summit seemed to only stir up further debates on whether any future East Asia Community would arise from the EAS or the APT. The opinions on the issue were divided into two camps as predicted: one led by China which preferred the APT to take a lead, and the other led by Japan, and presumably India, which campaigned for the EAS to champion the EAC.28 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao once commented, ‘The EAS should respect the desires of the East Asian countries and should be led by East Asian countries.’29 But Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer challenged the Chinese leader’s statement by 27

See, Kitti Prasirtsuk, ‘Japan’s Vision of an East Asian Community: A Perspective from Thailand,’ Japanese Studies, Vol. 26, Issue 2, September 2006, pp. 221, 232. 28 China finds itself more comfortable in dealing with its counterparts on a bilateral basis or a small-scale regional cooperation. This explained why China strongly supported ASEAN–China FTA, rather than East Asia FTA. See, Carlyle A. Thayer, China–ASEAN Relations: ASEAN Plus Three: An Evolving East Asian Community? unpublished paper, p. 7. . 29 DS Rajan and Raakhee Suryaprakash, ‘East Asia Summit: An Appraisal,’ ISAS Insight, No. 10 (30 December 2005).

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saying, ‘I think there are a whole series of different drivers of regional integration.’30 Kitti Prasirtsuk averred that China had won that round as it was able to put the APT at the centre of the process towards an EAC. He argued that with the slogan, ‘One Vision, One Identity, One Community’, the first EAS revealed the exclusivist preference on East Asia first, as demonstrated in the words ‘One Identity.’ He also added that Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi brought up the issue of ‘identity’ and thus questioned the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and India, partly due to geographical reasons.31 Meanwhile, former ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong played down the heated debates when he stated that he regarded the EAS as little more than a ‘brainstorming forum.’32 Furthermore, while the ultimate objective is to steer the East Asian region into becoming a genuine community, the summit is often overtaken by ‘critical agendas’ of the day. Impact on the Region The current tug-of-war between China and Japan has generated numerous strategic implications for the EAC process, both positively and negatively. In the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), both China and Japan have evidently stepped up their diplomatic game in cultivating their influence in this relatively least developed region. For ASEAN, this regionalisation process has to continue even when the Sino–Japanese competition refuses to subside. The major tasks for the organisation, as part of preserving its centrality in Asian regionalism, are to take advantage from such competition and to minimise its unconstructive impact.

30

‘Timor Parliament to Consider Oil Deal,’ Australian Associated Press, 27 July 2006 . 31 Kitti, ‘Japan’s Vision of an East Asian Community: A Perspective from Thailand,’ pp. 221–232. 32 ‘Timor Parliament to Consider Oil Deal,’ 9 News, 27 June 2006. .

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Building a healthy community There are at least three benefits stemming from the Sino–Japanese rivalry which can enhance the community-building process. First, the competition between the two countries for leadership has set a new precedent for other countries in the neighbourhood to revise their strategic position and to take a leading role in regional cooperation for the sake of their own national interests as well as those of the region. One has to admit that not all countries in the East Asian region are excited about regional integration, absolutely not if they have to surrender a certain degree of their sovereign rights. New initiatives from China and Japan designed to influence the shape and form of an EAC allowed ASEAN to find the most appropriate modality for a future cooperative framework. For example, ASEAN had a chance to compare Japan’s Concept Paper on the EAC with China’s Modality Paper, and picked what it thought was best for the region. This could serve as a good example for smaller countries, such as South Korea or New Zealand, to stand up and claim their share of regional prosperity through their vision, initiatives, and recommendations regarding an EAC. Taking South Korea as an example, it has begun to step up its game by increasing its involvement and familiarisation with ASEAN, as well as with individual members. Currently, Korea is the fifth largest trading partner with ASEAN and had total two-way trade amounting to $US74.7 billion in 2009, trailing only China, Japan, the US, and the European Union.33 It enthusiastically takes part in the ARF and the APT framework. In fact, the idea and concept of the EAS were originally from the reports of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and the East Asia Study Group (EASG) that were spearheaded by the initiative of Korea. Additionally, the Korea–ASEAN FTA was concluded in 2007. The commitment on the part of Japan and China, demonstrated through their relentless 33

Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 17 January 2011 (Also see, Lee Chi-dong, ‘South Korea, ASEAN, Agree to Upgrade Ties to Strategic Partnership,’ Yonhap, 29 October 2010. .

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competition, has to a certain level fortified South Korea’s incentive to pursue the same role, in using an EAC concept to enlarge its regional role and deepen its regional presence. Second, Beijing–Tokyo power struggles presented a golden opportunity for ASEAN to cement its central role in an EAC effort. ASEAN has insisted on remaining at the centre of all regional cooperative frameworks and has claimed that no other organisations or individual countries in the region could do a better job because ASEAN is neutral and trusted by all regional powers.34 The rivalry between Japan and China has moulded certain bonds in their relationship with ASEAN. In an attempt to expand their influence in the region, both China and Japan have been willing to support ASEAN’s centrality in regional integration and avoid upsetting the grouping. In other words, they are content to accommodate and appease ASEAN even when they realise that ASEAN may not be capable of tackling certain issues. The intense rivalry has so far led to a sharp division among members of the EAS — those who lend their support to Japan tend to disagree with China’s view on regionalism, and vice-versa. Some of these views are fiercely in conflict with each other. Here, ASEAN has stepped in and tried to close that division, performing as a bridge between the two Asian powers, and thus bolstering its status as the key driver of regional cooperation. The existence of different opinions also permits ASEAN to exercise its leadership and authority to make decisions where agreements between China and Japan cannot be reached, particularly on the modality and future direction of an EAC. Besides, ASEAN can strengthen its leadership in APEC, with support from both China and Japan — all of which (except Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) are members of this trans-Pacific organisation. Some ASEAN members are also taking part in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) which is a multilateral free trade agreement designed to integrate the economies of the Asia-Pacific region. Members of the TPP from ASEAN include

34

Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ‘ASEAN Summit: Superstructure Versus Infrastructure,’ Bangkok Post, 20 October 2009.

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Brunei, Singapore (two original members), and Malaysia and Vietnam (currently in negotiation to join the TPP).35 Healthy competition between China and Japan will certainly contribute to the progress of many free trade area cooperation frameworks in the region, such as the TPP, and as a result, to the region’s overall economic growth. Third, in the context of ASEAN–Japan relations, the rise of China has in many ways brought them together, even closer than before. ASEAN needs China for its own economic growth. But ASEAN is also wary of China’s growing influence in the region. ASEAN has thus shared with Japan a certain apprehension about the immense influence of China in Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, working with Japan could help alleviate the level of apprehension, since both parties understand the reality in which any unilateral attempt to restrain the Chinese influence would be difficult, if not impossible. As Japan and ASEAN have found a common interest in the face of China’s rising power, their relationship has progressed further. It is evident that the mission to balance China’s power has reinvigorated Japan’s diplomacy toward ASEAN. And strategically speaking, both Japan and ASEAN are not alone in this game of balancing regional power. The United States has had solid relations with Japan and maintained its firm ties with key ASEAN members. The American factor is imperative for Japan and ASEAN in withstanding the unstoppable ascend of China’s power. The success of the EAS in admitting the United States (and Russia) in 2010 was perceived as a triumph for the Japan camp. For example, the EAS could provide another important venue for the United States, Japan, and India to consolidate their alliance to counter China’s rise. In 2011, the three countries launched a trilateral strategic dialogue on security and economic issues, including 35

The original agreement on the TPP among the countries of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore was signed on 3 June 2005, and entered into force on 28 May 2006. Five additional countries, including Australia, Malaysia, Peru, United States, and Vietnam, are currently negotiating to join the group. In 2010, leaders of the nine current negotiating countries endorsed the proposal advanced by US President Obama that set a target for settlement of negotiations by the next APEC Summit in 2011.

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measures to deal with China’s expansion of its naval power.36 For the sake of the region’s community development, the Sino–Japan competition and the American involvement has made the regional process more transparent, accountable and democratic. Or is this an imagined community? It is too soon to celebrate the success of the EAC just because the unending rivalry between Japan and China may have produced some benefits for the region. If the tension between China and Japan escalates, then it may well destabilise the region. After all, too much emphasis on the rivalry would only highlight the importance of national interests on the part of Japan and China over the ultimate goal of achieving genuine regional integration. Japan’s renewed interest in ASEAN takes us back to its original agenda: to ward off China’s influence in Southeast Asia. Likewise, China’s cooperation with ASEAN may be interpreted as a contributing factor toward the overall goal of building as EAC, but Beijing has surely seen it as part of remapping its sphere of influence in the region. Moreover, Sino–Japan competition may sway the ASEAN agenda at the EAS. Since the concentration is to win over the opponent, both China and Japan have been trying to influence the EAS agenda so as to satisfy their own national interests. Ironically, while the wrangling between China and Japan may encourage ASEAN to act as a united organisation that could bridge the differences, it could also break up its own unity. As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report summarises, there are a range of perspectives within ASEAN on the EAS and China’s evolving role in a potential EAC. Singapore has taken a leading role in articulating the benefits of an open regional framework for Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has stated ‘ASEAN does not want to be exclusively dependent on China, and does not want to be forced to choose sides between China and the

36

‘Japan, India, US to Team up to Counter China’s Naval Power,’ People’s Daily Online, 6 January 2011 .

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United States or China and Japan.’ He also reportedly stated, ‘If the world is split up into closed blocs or exclusive spheres of influence, rivalry, antagonism, and conflict are inevitable.’ Singapore has supported India’s inclusion in the EAS and sought continued US engagement in the region. Burma and Laos are viewed as already significantly under China’s sphere of influence in Southeast Asia.37 The polarisation within ASEAN could be deepened if the competition between China and Japan prolongs. Finally, if history is any indication, ASEAN must realise that too much outside interference could harm regional integration efforts. In the past 60 years, almost all attempts to create regional blocs here have failed miserably. At the end of the Bandung Conference in 1955, China revealed its intention to establish some sort of regional grouping in order to reinstall its sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) also came up with a similar idea of reuniting communist states in this region. To contain both China and USSR, the United States launched its own regional initiative through the setting up of a Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). All of these regional concepts either failed to take off or did not live up to their original purposes. But the idea of regionalism became more tangible when ASEAN was founded in 1967. Arguably, unbridled Sino– Japanese competition poses serious threat to ASEAN’s role as the driver of East Asian regionalism, including the EAC, since the agenda will be set or influenced by the interests of China and Japan. The Tsunami of Compassion The magnitude-9.0 offshore earthquake that struck Northeast Japan triggered devastating tsunami waves of up to 37.9 metres that crashed in land. In mid-2011, 12,157 were reported dead and almost 15,500 others were listed as missing.38 Tens of thousands of buildings were destroyed, with the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant being one of 37

Vaughn, ‘East Asia Summit: Issues for Congress,’ p. 5. ‘In Japan, Quake and Tsunami Death Toll Reaches 12,157,’ Moscow Times, 4 April 2011. 38

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the worst hit. It has been reported that, as a result of the significant damages of the nuclear power plant, radioactive iodine was detected in the tap water in Fukushima and nearby cities, such as Toshigi, Gunma, Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, and Niigata. Food products were also found contaminated by radioactive matter in several places in Japan. The image of a ‘country in ruin’ has gripped the heart of the people of the world, including Southeast Asia. Indonesia, the current chair of ASEAN, immediately released a statement indicating the group’s intention to send relief aid to Japan. It said, ‘ASEAN Member States stand ready to render its support in the efforts to help bring about a swift recovery in whatever way it can, recognising that some ASEAN Member States have already pledged assistance. ASEAN Member States are confident that the Government and People of Japan will fully recover and rise from these unfortunate disasters with strong spirit and resilience.’39 ASEAN’s assistance has been offered in various forms, including cash, medical assistance, food, and rescue efforts. Cambodia contributed US$100,000 for the relief of the victims. Indonesia’s National Agency for Disaster Management deployed a 64-member trained Quick Response Team, equipped with medical supplies. The team included the Indonesian Armed Forces, search and rescue team, and medical team. Laos provided US$100,000 in emergency relief and agreed to set up a national committee to raise more funds and to be ready to dispatch personnel. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines deployed search and rescue contingent. The Singapore Civil Defence Force Operation Lion Heart contingent was activated. The contingent consists of five search specialists and five search dogs. As for Thailand, the world’s largest rice exporter, it promised 15,000 tonnes of rice and over US$6.5 million assistance. Vietnam, meanwhile, provided Japan with US$200,000 and would send a medical team upon request.40 ASEAN’s speedy response to the natural disaster 39

Statement by the Chair of ASEAN on the Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan, Jakarta, 12 March 2011 . 40 ‘ASEAN Countries Extend Relief Aids to Tsunami-Hit Japan,’ Xinhua, 16 March 2011 .

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in Japan has now become a part of a community-building process. ASEAN’s ‘tsunami of compassion’ for badly-hit Japan is one way of building a sense of regional belonging and togetherness. What was the role of China? The Chinese government sent a 15-member rescue team and pledged US$150,000 in aid to Japan for recovery. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said, ‘China is also a country prone to earthquake disasters and we fully empathise with how they (the Japanese) feel now. We will provide more as Japan needs it and we want to continue to help as necessary.’41 When China suffered an earthquake in Sichuan province killing nearly 90,000 people in 2008, a small Japanese search-and-rescue crew made international headlines by participating in recovery efforts. Kathleen McLaughlin argues that while China’s offer of assistance to Japan may not necessarily mean a long-term shift in the two countries’ contentious relationship, there are signs that their ties could be ‘warmed up’ in the wake of the disaster. Chu Xiaobo of Peking University stressed that helping each other in time of crisis has a positive impact on relations between countries. ‘Humans have become more dependent on one another and bilateral relations are not just about politics and economics anymore. It is about connections on many deeper levels,’ Chu said.42 Conclusion The relationship among the three key actors — ASEAN, China, Japan — has been complicated and even more so since they have embarked on the EAC building process. Their rivalry will not vanish anytime soon: this has become the character of power politics in East Asia. It can be argued that Japan is shifting its stance from pacifism after several encounters with China, such as their maritime feud stirred by a collision incident off Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2010. Japan has evidently stepped up activities to curb China’s expanding clout and picked up the pace to find friends to achieve that goal, 41

‘Disaster Brings China and Japan Together,’ Sizly.com, 18 March 2011 . 42 Cited in Ibid.

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indeed through the process of EAC building. Strategies were developed, mainly to achieve Japan’s interests which reflect its realist thinking. China, in the meantime, has adopted similar strategies, employing its intimate ties with certain ASEAN members to further strengthen its position in the region, and often taking a lead in regional initiatives while Japan has followed in China’s footsteps. This chapter has sought to explain the current stage of the EAC through a series of arguments. But one point must be made here in this final page; that is, intra-regional conflicts and legitimacy crises are also responsible for delays in ASEAN community building, such as the current territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, the continued political violence in Thailand and the uncertainties in Myanmar’s democratization process. Therefore, problems for a ‘united’ community do not merely derive from the ongoing Sino–Japanese rivalry. As it has shown through the text, China has indeed been the main source of Tokyo’s renewed enthusiasm in ASEAN affairs, simply because of their lingering conflicts and competition. Both countries have unveiled the different paths they take as they support ASEAN’s efforts in building an EAC. While China opposed the inclusion of non-Asian members, Japan was in search of more friends in the region to shore up its position to challenge the growing Chinese influence. In this process, the rivalry has been perceived as a boon, as much as a bane, for ASEAN. Positively, it has provoked ASEAN and other states to sharpen their diplomatic skills in multilateralism, as shown in the case of China and Japan, and to grasp any advantages that arrive with an EAC. For ASEAN in particular, the competition has assigned the grouping a special responsibility: to act as a mediator in the conflict between the two nations and reiterating its importance as the engine in the region’s community building process. Bibliography Blaise, S (2009). Japanese Aid as a Prerequisite for FDI: The Case of Southeast Asian Countries. Asia-Pacific Economic Papers, Australia–Japan Research Centre, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific Crawford School of Economics and Government, No. 385.

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Chachavalpongpun, P (2010). Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Chachavalpongpun, P (2009). ASEAN summit: Superstructure versus infrastructure. Bangkok Post, 20 October. Chi-dong, L (2010). South Korea, ASEAN, agree to upgrade ties to strategic partnership. Yonhap, 29 October. Chongkittavorn, K (2005). (10+3)+(1+2)+(?+?)=Asian Identity? In Fourth High-Level Conference on Asian Economic Integration: Toward an Asian Economic Community. India’s Research and Information System for Developing Country and Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, New Delhi, India, 18–19 November. Christensen, TJ (1999). China, the US–Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia. International Security, 23(4). Emmerson, DK (2010). Asian regionalism and US policy: The case for creative adaptation. RSIS Working Paper, No. 193. He, B (2004). East Asian idea of regionalism: A normative critique. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58(1). Hirata, K (2001). Cautious proactivism and reluctant reactivism: Analysing Japan’s foreign policy toward Indochina. In: Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration, A Miyashita and Y Sato (eds.). New York: Palgrave. Malkin, B and M Moore (2010). WikiLeaks: Kevin Rudd warned of need to be ready to use force against China. The Telegraph. Nair, D (2009). Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific/East Asia: A frustrated regionalism. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(1). Peou, S (2010). Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Theory and Practice. Santa Barbara, Denver and Oxford: Praeger. Prasirtsuk, K (2006). Japan’s vision of an East Asian community: A perspective from Thailand. Japanese Studies, 26(2). Rajan, DS and R Suryaprakash (2005). East Asia summit: An appraisal. ISAS Insight, No. 10. Severino, RC (2006). Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former Secretary-General. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Shiraichi, T (2008). Renewing Fukuda doctrine. Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 July. Soeya, Y (2010). An East Asian community and Japan–China relations. East Asia Forum, 17 May. Terada, T (2006). Forming an East Asian community: A site for Japan–China power struggles. Japanese Studies, 26(1).

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Thayer, CA. ASEAN Plus three: An evolving East Asian community? To appear in China–ASEAN Relations. . Vaughn, B (2005). East Asia Summit: Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress. Yul, S (2010). Japan’s new regionalism: China shock, universal values, and East Asian community. Waseda Institute for Advanced Study (WIAS) Discussion Paper, No. 2009–2005.

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INDIA AND JAPAN: SHARING STRATEGIC INTERESTS?* Arpita Mathur

Introduction India is a significant variable in addressing Japan’s strategic challenges of a rising China at its doorsteps, a decline in its alliance partner US hegemony and in the context of overall Asian security. It must be stated, however, that the imperatives of such closer ties are not just limited to the immediate expediency against the backdrop of a rising China. A number of other variables including cultural commonalities, democracy, and historical linkages interlock with augmented trade and economic interactions to make the relationship robust. Japan increasingly recognises India’s emergence as an economic powerhouse and with the implementation in August 2011 of the bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, a solid bedrock for a sound superstructure of ties has been laid. In keeping with the aforementioned argument, this chapter will begin by identifying the drivers and factors behind the India–Japan strategic relationship, moving on to assessing both positive trends and weak links in bilateral ties. *For a more detailed version of this chapter, see upcoming monograph by the author entitled ‘India-Japan Relations: Drivers, Trends and Prospects’ published by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 2012. 127

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A unique paradox has defined India–Japan ties through the passage of history.1 On the one hand is the absence of any major dispute, on the other; richness in relations had not been fully exploited for many years. Looking back in time, the post-World War II period saw both countries share intellectual discussion, feeling, and common vision of Pan Asianism. Japan also held a special place in being a prominent support base for members of the Indian revolutionary freedom struggle. Thereafter, the saga of India–Japan relations has been that of benign neglect for much of the Cold War period. The distance between India and Japan grew wider in this era. India, despite its declared policy of non-alignment, tilted towards the former Soviet Union. Japan, on the other hand became an ally of the US, placing both sides in opposite camps. Besides, India chose to follow the import substitution economic model unlike the developmental model followed by most of East and Southeast Asian countries. Different economic systems and beliefs therefore became a barrier in relations. The third reason which chilled ties, according to Japanese diplomat Yamada Takio, was the Indian nuclear test of 1974 — ‘a huge shock for Japan’ — which was trying to work towards a nonproliferation regime.2 Japan which had become a close ally and a junior partner of the US after the war also kept India at an arms length. In sum, South Asia was largely a ‘distant region’ for Japan till the late 1990s and did not fall within its definition of the Asia-Pacific or Asia. The Japanese expression that the region ‘Beyond the Arakan Yoma’ (in Myanmar) is the ‘outer world’ — clearly reflected this outlook.3 Intermittent interactions between Tokyo and New Delhi

1 For an overview of India–Japan relations see Purnendra Jain, From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan’s Changing View of India (1998–2007), ISAS Working Paper No. 41, 10 March 2008. 2 Takio Yamada, Japan–India Relations: A Time for Sea Change? In K. Kesavapany, A. Mani, and P. Ramaswamy, Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), p. 148. 3 Takako Hirose, ‘Japanese Emerging Nationalism and Its New Asia Policy’ in V.R. Raghavan (ed.), Asian Security Dynamic: US, Japan and, the Rising Powers (New Delhi: Promilla & Co. Publishers, 2008), pp. 65–66.

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did occur, but what they achieved was at most minimal level of interaction. Bilateral ties hit a nadir after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests but relations gradually recovered thereafter. A number of factors were behind this warming up of relations. Of these, perhaps the most noteworthy one was the ‘rise of China’ beginning from the 1990s and Asia and the world as a whole facing the question of how to deal with new regional power centres in China and India, which too had become a nuclear power. Besides, there was also a visible warming up of Washington’s relations with New Delhi. With the Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro’s visit to India in 2000, envisaging a ‘global partnership,’ India–Japan relations set foot on a firmer ground. The Drivers of Bilateral Ties A number of changes in the international arena as well as at the domestic front in both India and Japan became drivers bringing India and Japan closer. The most prominent amongst these factors was the rise of China and the effort of all countries in Asia to accommodate as well as formulate their posturing as a response to Beijing’s unprecedented ascent. However, it is to be noted that apart from the rise of China, there were a number of other variables which have bolstered the bilateral relationship — of which the historical and cultural bonhomie, economic complementarities, and positive public opinion can be mentioned. Coping with China’s Rise Much of the literature on India–Japan relations cites China as the primary driving force bringing the two sides together. The question which remains to be addressed is whether this is solely due to the stimulus arising out of the rise of China. While there is little doubt that the power shift in Asia arising out of the rise of China is a primary driver finding resonance in almost every aspect of India–Japan relations, it is not the only factor. However, considering that this has

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been a critical driver, a detailed analysis of the China factor would be helpful. The situation in the region and attempts to decode India–Japan relations in Asia could best be done through the lens of the power transition theory enunciated by A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler who have discussed the impact of the alteration of the existing status quo in the international system — given a situation whereby a dominant and satisfied state is threatened by a dissatisfied challenger. Such a ‘challenger’ to the system aspires to alter the status quo of the dominant country. The status quo stands for ‘rules that determine the way goods are distributed in the international order.’4 The dominant state is bound to resist such an alteration and challenge to its supremacy. Besides, the power transition theory also professes that: • • •

The measure of the power of a country, according to the theory lies in its internal growth. Power parity between the dominant and challenger state combined with dissatisfaction is likely to become a cause for war. A calculus of dissatisfaction of the challenger is the content of its alliance portfolio which represents varying views of status quo than that of the dominant state. Another measure of a challenger’s discontent is its unprecedented military buildup aimed to be on par with that of the dominant state.5

China and India are rising in Asia as robust economic powers gaining considerable political clout as well. Both are nuclear powers. At the same time, Japan has a presence as the world’s third largest economy

4

Kugler, Jacek, and A.F.K. Organski, ‘The Power Transition: A retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,’ p. 173 in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), The Handbook of War Studies (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman) as cited in Douglas Lemke, ‘The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War,’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1, February 1997, p. 24. 5 For these and more details on the theory, see Douglas Lemke, pp. 23–25.

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combined with a pacifist strategic culture.6 Japan’s foreign and security policy is, however, undergoing profound change as Tokyo attempts to readjust its strategic options. In a scenario where the world watches the rise of India and China, there are growing concerns over what Beijing’s military modernisation and economic buoyancy would translate into. With its robust GDP estimated to stand at nearly US$10.09 trillion as per 2010 estimates,7 China’s internal growth is unquestionable, even though its sustainability maybe arguable. China’s GDP is predicted to surpass that of the US by 2027.8 The strong perception of China surfacing as a fairly dissatisfied ‘challenger’ to the US-led or dominated world order can be felt at two levels. This dissatisfaction can be deciphered from its cosy ties with countries like Pakistan, Myanmar, and North Korea as against preponderant Washington’s close relations with Tokyo and rapidly developing close ties with countries such as India in China’s periphery. A recent example of this has been China’s recent decision to export two nuclear reactors to Pakistan. Chinese officials stated that the export to Islamabad was acceptable in view of developments like the US–India nuclear deal and the waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group for India in 2008.9 Beijing has also indirectly challenged Washington by setting up organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Robert Kagan perceives of the SCO as an ‘authoritarian camp’ and a Chinese vehicle to expand their influence in Asia.10 Besides, Beijing has been feverishly building up as well as modernising its military. What also makes China’s so-called 6

A prominent group of strategic thinkers like Peter Katzenstein have termed Japan as a pacifist country. 7 Data from CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ch.html. 8 For more details see Michael J. Green, ‘Asia in the Debate on American Grand Strategy’ in Naval War College Review, Issue Winter 2009, p. 16. . 9 Mark Hibbs, Pakistan Deal Signals China’s Growing Nuclear Assertiveness, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Energy Brief, 27 April 2010 from http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40685. 10 Michael J. Green, Naval War College Review, Issue Winter 2009, pp. 23–24.

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dissatisfaction a bit more difficult is the fact that it is a non-democratic state with similar allies, even as it does not share belief in the existing neoliberal international order. Such a pre-condition is considered to make the dyad have an increased proclivity towards war according to the power transition theory. The vision of the US, on the contrary is that of an Asia under the American influence. The presence of alliances and forward deployed troops in the region are the tools employed for the purpose. India’s rise does not seem to be as worrisome for most countries in the world as for China. Sumit Ganguly attributes this to three reasons — one, because New Delhi does not seek to form a global coalition that wishes to challenge the existing international order. India has, in fact, been forming issue-based ties even with countries like China. The climate change issue at Copenhagen became one such example. Two, India seems to have accepted the existing neoliberal global order. Third, by virtue of India being a democracy the threat and possibility of going to war scales down drastically.11 Besides, India also has to catch up with China in many ways — especially economically apart from managing several internal challenges it faces. India is, however, conscious of China’s rising strategic significance and would consequently also welcome closer ties with both Tokyo and Washington. Is the situation in Asia then ‘ripe for rivalry’ or war as it would be in case the power transition theory is applied? The answer is at once impossible and risky to arrive at. There have been and could be instances in the future where Beijing chooses to respond aggressively, as in the case of the Taiwan Straits problem or a disturbance on the Korean peninsula. Beijing’s reaction of firing missiles into waters near Taiwan in March 1996 was only a reflection of its aggressive posturing on the issue. There have also been instances in the past when China has chosen to react when faced with a difficult situation. The EP3 incident of 2001 involving an American plane being forced to 11

Sumit Ganguly, ‘The Rise of India in Asia,’ in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (eds.), International Relations of Asia (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), p. 164.

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land in Hainan after accidentally colliding with a Chinese aircraft was one such case in point. More recently, in March 2009, Chinese boats moved closely and aggressively in the South China Sea in front of a US Navy Surveillance ship forcing it to take emergency action. China accused the US navy ship of spying. President Obama responded by ordering the dispatch of heavily armed destroyers to escort the ship in the area.12 China has also been locking horns with Washington over revaluation of its currency, yuan and convertibility to the US dollar, as well as over the censorship of the US based company, Google. Nonetheless, there could be two reasons why this might not translate into war. One of course is the fact that despite making rapid strides and having very open and an obvious ambition to attain a great power status at the global level, Beijing still has miles to go. At the same time, there is no doubt on its claims for regional level leadership role. Two, because countries like the US, India, and Japan have been in the process of ‘hedging’ through creating a network of not necessarily alliances but close enmeshment of relationships to ensure that in case China’s rise becomes unmanageable and dangerous, they have a leverage over Beijing. It has to be noted here that China is not the singular base on which the superstructure of India–Japan relations is being built. A healthy and dense bilateral relationship will however surely cushion China’s weight and impact on the region. After all, nobody can wish away the reality that China is geographically contiguous with both countries — making it effortlessly one of the most critical common denominator in Indian and Japanese foreign policies. An anomaly underscores India and Japan’s position in the region viz-à-viz China. On one hand, there is a certain caution and wariness shrouding their views on China and on the other is the rich economic opportunity as well as deep ties of interdependence which binds them with Beijing. 12

For more details, see ‘US Warships head for South China Sea after Standoff’ Times Online, 14 March 2009, from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ us_and_americas/article5898650.ece?print=.

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Hot Economics Cold Politics: Issues in Ties with China As one notices a growth in India–Japan ties, both countries have to deal with the reality of thriving China–Japan economic relations, although accompanied by cold political and security relations. Between Beijing and Tokyo there have been frequent eruptions of tensions over a number of issues including the Yasukuni Shrine issue, textbook row over interpretation of history and alleged Chinese incursions into Japanese waters. At the same time, Japanese engagement is clearly visible in its lukewarm reaction to the Chinese nuclear tests (despite the fact that the test greatly worried Tokyo) as well as its leniency towards Beijing following the Tiananmen Square incident.13 Similarly, India too has keen interest in having good neighbourly relations with China which is a promising market. In fact, bilateral relations have been termed as ‘Strategic Cooperation and Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’. There exist, however, the reality of disputed boundaries, the problem over the Chinese nexus with Pakistan and North Korea all of which threatens to make relations somewhat uneasy. Stephen Cohen notes, ‘...Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power...To counter these contingencies, China has long pursued a classic balance of power by supporting Pakistan.’14 Cohen goes on to add that ‘Beijing has supported India’s separatist and autonomist groups within India, while remaining an authoritarian state. Indians understand that China is scornful of its ‘soft’ democracy and has acquired a substantial lead over New Delhi in economic capacity and weaponry.’15 Besides, India and China are both trying to make inroads into Africa. At closer quarters, Chinese influence in neighbouring Myanmar as well as the looming Tibetan problem has embittered relations with India. A number of Indian strategists have also warned

13

For details see K.V. Kesavan, ‘Japan’s Response to the Tiananmen Square Incident,’ Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 7, July 1990, pp. 669–681. 14 Stephen Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 259. 15 Stephen Cohen, p. 56.

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about what is termed as the Chinese ‘string of pearls’ strategy meant to acquire a chain of naval nodes enroute the sea-lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean.16 This would include countries like Myanmar, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Pakistan, and now Sri Lanka. India and Japan Respond Cautiously India and Japan have been ‘hedging’ and coming closer at two both bilateral and regional levels. Bilaterally, ties have seen an upswing and a gradual, staggered and pyramidical buildup of relations from that of benign neglect till the end of the 20th century to a ‘Strategic and Global Partnership’ today. Japanese leaders like former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo have been upbeat about the significance of the relationship with New Delhi. Abe even proposed what came to be termed as a ‘strategic quadrilateral’ comprising India, Japan, US, and Australia. He even wrote about India eloquently and enthusiastically in his book Utsukushii kuni e: jishin to hokori no moteru Nihon e (Towards a Beautiful Country: A Confident and Proud Japan).17 Now there is a bilateral security arrangement in place in the form of a ‘Joint Declaration on Security Coorperation between India and Japan’ signed in October 2005, even as political ties have been vibrant. At the same time, India is one of the topmost recipients of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA). At the regional and multilateral level, India and Japan have been actively and openly supporting each other. The most recent example was Japan’s support to India’s membership of the East Asia Summit (EAS) much to the Chinese chagrin. Tokyo, along with other ASEAN+3 countries lobbied hard to ensure that India, Australia, and New Zealand are included as members of the EAS. The underlying implication, of course, was the fact that by bringing in 16

For more details on ‘string of pearls’ see Gurpreet Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2008. 17 For this and more, see Purnendra Jain, New Roadmap for Japan-India Ties, The AsiaPacific Journal: Japan Focus, 4 September 2007 from http://www.old.japanfocus. org/_Purnendra_Jain-New_Roadmap_for_Japan_India_ties.

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these countries the influence of Beijing would be neutralised to a certain extent. Japan is also an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). At the multilateral level, both countries have vociferously supported each others claim to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Also emerging are the areas of non-traditional or functional cooperation like energy, environment, and disaster relief which are fast becoming critical factors in bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In the midst of all this careful and meticulous hedging against the rise of China, both the actors have ensured that China is not antagonised and remains actively engaged and involved in the region. The Armitage–Nye Report made this quite explicit with regard to New Delhi in stating that, ‘Washington and Tokyo have both qualitatively improved their respective relationships with India. However, both should move forward based on the assumption that India will not act as either Japan’s or the US’s counterweight against Beijing, mindful that India has its own synergies with China. New Delhi is cautious with respect to Beijing and is not interested in raising tensions with China.’18 Another analyst opines, ‘...the growth in China’s power is going to loom large in India’s imagination. But its response is not likely to go down a path of frontal confrontation, or even an attempt to match Chinese power. It will try and incrementally improve its deterrent capabilities, but not engage China in an Asia wide competition. Its policies will be more a combination of wariness and accommodation.’19 It is this caution which came into play when despite a preliminary meeting of the proposed ‘strategic quadrilateral’ comprising India, Japan, Australia, and the US in Manila in 2007, the proposal did not finally see the light of the day. Former Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro’s value-based proposal of the ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ was also not followed up with enthusiasm. Similarly, both India and Japan 18

Richard L. Armitage and Joseph Nye, The US–Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020, CSIS, February 2007, from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/ pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf, p. 6. 19 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘Still Under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India’, India Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, July–September 2009, p. 231.

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are comfortable with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) taking the driver’s seat in regional mechanisms as they are perceived as ‘neutral players.’ India would not like to be drawn into an anti-China coalition. India and Japan: Foreign Policy Perspectives India’s foreign policy has unarguably moved on far beyond romanticism and moral and value-based rhetoric to a more realpolitik-based outlook. The most critical factor conditioning Indian foreign policy today is the fact that in order to pursue its growth and economic development, it requires a stable international and regional environment. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has stated that foreign policy ‘must change from time to time’ to meet the emerging challenges such as access to markets, sources of energy and investment, and advanced technology.’20 The key notion of economic development in foreign policy is apparent and can be found to be present in what is known as the Manmohan Singh Doctrine.21 There are, of course different shades of opinion on the nature of, and extent to which Indian foreign policy become realist in nature. Regardless of the debate over where Indian foreign policy could be positioned on the theoretical continuum, it has certainly become pragmatic. Perhaps the key indicator to this change in India’s shying away from ‘hard power’ came with its nuclearisation in 1998. India’s nuclear tests did not really take place as a fallout of a nationalistic 20 B.M Jain, Global Power: India’s Foreign Policy 1947–2006 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 38. 21 The key features of the doctrine are as follows: Changing weight of India’s economy as a factor shaping weight in world affairs, improvement of relations with all major powers on the basis of economic growth, positive impact of India’s economic globalisation on regional integration in the region and bilateral ties with neighbors. Recognition that with an open society and economy, bridges can be built with the world with value based credentials like secularism, democracy, and liberalism. For more on this, see Sanjaya Baru, India and the World — Economics and Politics of the Manmohan Singh Doctrine in Foreign Policy, ISAS Working Paper No. 53, 14 November 2008, p. 1.

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government or as an expression of status. It was a step India considered necessary in the light of American extension of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and attempts at conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The nuclear status was also regarded as a critical cushion against China’s nuclear power status.22 Another foreign policy orientation bolstered an extension of the geographical ambit of India’s foreign policy. This was the notion of attention towards an ‘extended neighbourhood’ — a term which started being increasingly used by the government from the mid 1990s — a way of breaking away from the ‘claustrophobic confines of South Asia.’23 The intended region encompassed an area stretching from the ‘Suez Canal to the South China Sea and includes within it the West Asia, the Gulf, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and the Indian Ocean Region.’24 For Japan, the post-Cold War Asian balance of power structure is opaque and a challenge especially with the ascendancy of China. Japan’s unique strategic culture also naturally translates into a distinctive foreign policy tool. That is, the use of military component takes a back seat, while foreign policy and national interests are taken care of through economic means — aid, trade, and foreign direct investment, even as there is an increasing attention being paid towards the ‘noodle bowl’ of regional institutions. The rise of China in the post Cold war era stood out in an even more magnified and exaggerated way because of Japan’s own economic problems. There was a dramatic shift in Japan’s economic engagement with China. From being one of the largest recipients of 22

David Shambaugh (ed.), pp. 154–155. For more on the concept and usage of the term, see David Scott, “India’s ‘Extended Neighborhood’ Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power,” India Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, April–June 2009, pp. 107–143. 24 Yashwant Sinha, ‘12th SAARC Summit and Beyond,’ 3 February 2004 from as cited in Scott, p. 108. 23

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ODA, China has become Japan’s largest trading partner and one of its major investment destinations. Tokyo announced in 2005 that Beijing would not receive yen loans from 2008–09. Besides, domestic political changes were tipping the normal one-party dominant system with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) beginning to decline in clout. Matters came to a head in 2009 when the LDP was routed to make way for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to form government. The significance of India in Japanese foreign policy in view of China’s rise was articulated by former Deputy Chief of Mission Nishigahiro Wataru at the Japanese Embassy in India, ‘the relationship with India is important, partly because of the factor of emerging China. We are not confronting against China, but we have to manage the relationship with China carefully. And in that process, our relationship with India becomes more meaningful.’25 The US Factor The US is closely involved in Asia — both in its own right and through its so-called ‘hub and spokes’ system allies like Japan and South Korea. Washington has been engaging New Delhi consistently in the period from late 1990s. The 2002 National Security Strategy formulated by the US called for closer ties with India which could in turn help Washington to create a ‘strategically stable Asia’.26 Another article on the growth of India–US relations noted: ‘China is a central element in our effort to encourage India’s emergence as a world power...But we don’t need to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India rises’.27 The two sides also signed the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in 2004. The bonhomie continued even after the 11 September attacks and perhaps saw a peak 25

Takako Hirose in V. R. Raghavan (ed.), Asian Security Dynamic: US, Japan, and the Rising Powers (New Delhi: Promilla & Co. Publishers, 2008), p. 59. 26 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 (Washington DC, The White House) from http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/ USnss2002.pdf. 27 Daniel Twining, ‘America’s Grand Design in Asia,’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2007, p. 83.

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with the signing of the Indo–US nuclear deal in 2008. The deal allows India (not a member of the NPT) to receive international civilian nuclear cooperation, on the condition that New Delhi makes certain commitments including a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The US factor cuts both ways when it comes to India–Japan relations. On one hand, Washington finds it advantageous to use its allies in the region to balance China and encourage countries like Japan and India to come closer as an effective soft countervailing hedge to Beijing’s rise. This was clearly reflected in the Joint Statement of the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting in 2011 which stated an alliance common strategic objective that both sides ‘welcome India as a strong and enduring Asia-Pacific partner and encourage India’s growing engagement with the region and participation in regional architectures. The idea is to promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, Japan, and India’.28 In sum, the US would not want a principal regional power, more so Chinese hegemony, and would promote cooperation between its ally Japan and India. On the other hand, despite its alliance with Washington, Tokyo is also well aware of occasional oscillations and deviations with regard to US policy towards China. This brings in even more urgency amongst sections of the Japanese decision-making circles to identify other partners as allies. The alliance has indeed not been without frictions. Apart from the ongoing scuffle over location of US bases in Okinawa, the ‘Nixon Shocks’ of 1971 and later Clinton’s so-called ‘bypassing of Japan’ made Tokyo scurry to reinvigorate the alliance structure. It also realised the benefit of joining hands with countries like India, which seem to be emerging as some kind of balancers against China. The fear of being abandoned has surfaced from time to time amongst the Japanese. As opined by prominent Indian strategic commentator C. Raja Mohan, “The United States, Japan and a number of other key regional actors have begun to view India ‘as a net security provider’

28

Joint statement of the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington DC, 21 June 2011 from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166597.htm.

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in the Western Pacific...drawing India into a strategic partnership, Japan believes it has a better chance of coping with the unfolding redistribution of power in the region. India, in turn sees huge strategic complementarities with Japan”.29 Other Drivers of Bilateral Ties Apart from the larger drivers pushing India and Japan closer are other issues bringing the two sides together. There is a certain realisation amongst both sides that they share a number of areas of common concern. There is, therefore a resultant cooperation in areas including safety and security of sea lanes of communication, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Two, there are economic complementarities between both countries with India’s human resource capital and manpower complementing Japanese ‘money power’ and technical prowess. Japan’s aging society is a severe problem today and the country lacks young and active workforce. India’s abundant cheap and skilled workforce can make up for this gap. This aspect, however, has proved to be a weak link in the relationship. Third is the oft mentioned value based connectivity — democracy, freedom, and human rights which combine with rich cultural and historical links. The legacy of history has perhaps become the most important variable which continues to eat away and corrode Japan’s ties with most of Asian neighbours. Tokyo has had problems with Asian neighbours like China and South Korea over the history issue with offshoots in the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the textbooks issue, and differing positions over the Nanjing ‘massacre’ and wartime history. The fact that there is no such historical irritant with India makes it easier for the two sides to work towards building the relationship further. A positive public opinion has only bolstered bilateral relations between India and Japan. This holds true at two levels — amongst 29

For further details see C. Raja Mohan, Is India an East Asian Power? Explaining New Delhi’s Security Politics in the Western Pacific, ISAS Working Paper No. 81, 11 August 2009.

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the leaders and policy makers as well as public opinion. Japanese Prime Ministers like Mori, Koizumi, and Abe have contributed to furthering bilateral relations to a great extent. Abe even went to the extent of noting in his book, Towards a Beautiful Country, that it will not be surprising if in another ten years time, Japan–India relations overtake Japan–US and Japan–China relations. Even though such a projection might sound and look implausible considering the relative geographical, political, economic, and strategic vitality of Beijing in Japan’s foreign policy, even if a part of it comes true, India–Japan ties are in for a drastic improvement. According to a public opinion poll on Japan conducted in India, as many as 76% Indians believe that relations with Japan are excellent or good, while as many as 58% rate Japan as a reliable friend of India. There is also a positive image of Japan as a ‘technologically advanced and economically strong country’ amongst Indians.30 Although India–Japan relations have much to achieve, a walk down history of ties amply demonstrates that the roots of relations run deep. The cultural historical links arising out of anti-colonialism and the ideas of Pan-Asianism developed and propounded by intellectuals on both sides were not only mutually admired but also encouraged. The trajectory of bilateral relations has not been without lows. In fact, India–Japan relations actually picked up only after touching a nadir in 1998 following India’s nuclear tests. The post-Cold War period has accorded many reasons and arenas for Tokyo and New Delhi to join hands. The recent change on Japan’s political centre stage with the coming of the DPJ government initially seemed to have taken the focus away from India. Apprehensions were laid to rest with Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to India in December 2009. Assessing Positive Trends and Weak Links The political and strategic aspect has perhaps been the highlight of the way bilateral relations have evolved between India and Japan after 30

Public Opinion Poll on Japan in India May 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan website from http://www.mofa.go.jp/ICSFiles/afieldfile/2009/05/08/E.pdf.

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2000–2001. Not only has there been a regularisation of high-level political visits, but also a distinct realisation of overlapping consequential areas of common concerns and interests. A gradual, regular, and incremental augmentation of ties to a ‘strategic and global partnership’ exhibits this realisation, as also drawing up of action plans to achieve the same. The India–Japan Security Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation along with a well-laid out and formulated action plan to achieve it is perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of this pattern of engagement by both sides. The action plan envisages foreign-minister level strategic dialogue, regular consultations between the National Security Advisor of India and his Japanese counterpart, an annual 2+2 subcabinet senior official’s dialogue, and annual comprehensive security dialogue apart from robust defence cooperation. Reciprocal high-level visits between the heads of state have been regularised. The India–Japan security agreement is indeed a momentous milestone in bilateral relations between the two Asian giants, being only the second of its kind similar to what Tokyo has signed with Australia. There are clearly some prominent areas of common concern and action in the security arena — maritime security, the threat of terrorism and spread of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as well on the political front like the common quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Both sides have stakes in regional institutional platforms like ASEAN-led mechanisms, SAARC and more recently the EAS. Japan is also sensitive to and aware of India’s pre-eminence in the South Asia region and has been closely in touch with New Delhi on matters pertaining to the neighbourhood. Economic enmeshment between India and Japan has clearly failed to keep pace with strategic aspects of bilateral relations. Not only has it been a game of low volume and low interest, but also an asymmetric relationship. The trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) volume has been low, while focus has been on official development assistance. As per official Japanese statistics, bilateral trade during fiscal 2008–2009 reached US$12.18 billion. In 2010, trade grew,

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reaching US$8.3 billion in the first 7 months, according to Japanese Government statistics. Japan’s exports to India during this period increased 47.8% over the corresponding period last year to US$4.996 billion, while Japan’s imports from India rose 59.7% to US$3.306 billion.31 The future of this bilateral relationship is promising. There are two primary indicators of this trend. One is the fact that the two sides have recently concluded and implemented a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), but Japan is also closing in on the Indian economy through actively participating in the development of the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor project (DMIC). These two developments have to be perceived within their natural complementarities both sides share in terms of India possessing abundant, skilled young workforce, and Japan the technological edge and capital advantage. Besides, there is a window of opportunity and indicators pointing towards the fact that the Japanese are increasingly looking towards what has been termed as a ‘China-plus-One’ strategy.32 In simpler terms, many Japanese multinational firms could think of risk diversification in terms of geographical location rather than concentrating their production activities in China. Regardless of the advantages that most investors and companies draw from China like good infrastructure and cheap labour, there is perhaps a simultaneous realisation that significant problems also pervade the system there. Issues like uncertainty arising out of the revaluation of the Chinese currency (renminbi), frequent anti-Japan protests arising out of the legacy of history and Yasukuni Shrine problem as well as the undemocratic political system of China inject problems into operations there. Given such a scenario, good alternatives have been seen in ASEAN countries (especially Vietnam) and even India. Nevertheless that India has to 31

From . 32 Masahita Fujita and Nobuaki Hamaguchi, The Coming Age of China-plus-One: The Japanese Perspective on East Asian Production Networks, Second Draft for the World Bank-IPS Research project on the Rise of China and India, 18 February 2006.

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surmount considerable problems itself to become an attractive trade and investment destination for Japan, but keeping in view its relative advantage in some sectors like information technology as well as the growing market Japanese businesses will be compelled to take a relook at destination India. There is an increasing awareness and acknowledgement of the criticality of the Indian option. A survey report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese manufacturing companies brought out by the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) carried out in November 2008 reveals that although China holds the top position amongst promising countries for investment, other countries including India are fast catching up. The number of companies that perceive India as promising is now on par with China. India is thus becoming a destination for ‘new’ investments. For these companies, the major reasons for such a perception stem from the future growth potential of the local market, inexpensive labour and skilled human resources. India also figures at the second rank as a promising country for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the medium term, even as it tops the list in long-term prospects (over the next 10 years). The Japan External Trade Relations Organization (JETRO) expects more FDI in automobiles, infrastructure (US$150 billion estimated in 10 years), raw materials, and food processing and service sector. A survey carried out by the JETRO in 2006 revealed that Japanese firms were getting more interested in expanding their business in India due to economic growth and expanding markets. Japanese firms which showed interest in expanding production in India were those dealing with cars/car parts, transportation machinery, iron and steel/non-ferrous metal and metal.33 India seems to be catching up, but there is a lot to be accomplished in order to be a viable and alternative attractive option for Japanese investors. Japanese investors are known to be cautious and risk averse and it is of salience to 33

JETRO FY2006 Survey of Japanese Firms’ International Operations, March 2007, Japan External Trade Organization from http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/ 20070228845-news/Survey1.pdf.

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undertake some introspection in India on several aspects of the domestic economic construct. Japanese ODA to India has perhaps been a high-point in economic linkages between both sides. The first aid from Japan came to India in 1958 as its first yen loan disbursement. The saga of ODA to India has been regular except for the period of 1998 when India conducted its nuclear tests. Figures for 2008 reveal that Asia remained the largest beneficiary of Japanese aid which stood at US$7507.68 million. India is the largest recipient of Japan’s ODA loans for developing infrastructure including transport and power as well as eradication of poverty. India received a total of US$599.81 million in 2008 in the form of grant aid and yen loans. Perhaps the most noteworthy ongoing project as of 2008 has been the Delhi Mass Rapid Transport system now in Phase 2. The Japanese commitment of ODA loan in the year 2010–2011 stood at 203 billion yen making India the largest recipient of Japanese ODA loan for several years from fiscal year 2003.34 The priority areas for ODA disbursal to India include promotion of economic growth, development of infrastructure, poverty reduction, and environmental protection The Challenges There remain challenges to India–Japan relations. The first challenge is that on the nuclear issue, whereby there remain significant gaps between the two sides. Japan has been pressing India to sign the NPT, which India is clearly not inclined to do. There is a resultant gap in terms of cooperation on the civil nuclear front. A second challenge emerges from the slow pace of economic development, even though there seems to be some positive development on that front. 34

Japan approved 11 ODA Loan projects for India including those signed in an Exchange of Notes in June 2011 in response to India’s proposals presented in FY2010. More information available in Outline of Japan’s ODA to India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan website from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/ sw_asia/india_o.pdf.

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The third challenge would be to ensure that there is an effective implementation mechanism for the agreed aims, goals, and roadmap drawn out by the two sides to build on the bilateral relationship. Areas like water security, environment, nuclear energy, and biotechnology are probable areas of convergence worth exploring in the future. Finally, as aptly noted, ‘Scholarship by Japan’s multitude of observers interested in Japan-Asia relations generally registers only passing attention to relations with India or fails to acknowledge them at all.’35 Notwithstanding all these challenges, it can be gleaned from an analysis of India–Japan bilateral relations that both sides have intertwined, overlapping, and shared strategic interests. A number of factors like economic complementarities and political interests and shared values like democracy bring the two sides closer together. It seems highly unlikely that this current trend will reverse in the years to come. The imperatives of changing power equations will only tend to make this smoother. India’s offer of help and assistance to Japan as well as its relief and rehabilitation team which has been working in Miyagi36 in the aftermath of the devastating tsunami which hit the country is the evidence of the growing intimacy between the two Asian countries. Bibliography Armitage RL and J Nye (2007). The US–Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020, CSIS. Baru, S (2008). India and the World — Economics and Politics of the Manmohan Singh Doctrine in Foreign Policy. ISAS Working Paper No. 53. Cohen, SP (2001). India: Emerging Power. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. 35

For an interesting analysis of India–Japan relations, see Purnendra Jain, Japan–India Relations: Peaks and Troughs, The Roundtable, Vol. 99, No. 409, August 2010, pp. 403–412. For this, see p. 410. 36 P.S. Suryanarayana, ‘India offers more aid to Japan,’ The Hindu, 9 April 2011 from .

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Green, MJ (2009). Asia in the Debate on American Grand Strategy. Naval War College Review, Issue Winter. Hibbs, M (2010). Pakistan Deal Signals China’s Growing Nuclear Assertiveness. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Energy Brief, 27 April 2010. Jain, BM (2008). Global Power: India’s Foreign Policy 1947–2006. Lanham: Lexington Books. Jain, P (2010). Japan–India relations: Peaks and Troughs. The Roundtable, 99(409). Jain, P (2008). From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan’s Changing view of India (1998–2007). ISAS Working Paper No. 41. Joint Statement of the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington DC, 2011. Kesavan, KV (1990). Japan’s Response to the Tiananmen square incident. Asian Survey, 30(7). Kesavapany, K, A Mani and P Ramaswamy (2008). Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia. Singapore: ISEAS. Khurana, G (2008). China’s ‘string of pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and its security implications. Strategic Analysis, 32(1). Lemke, D (1997). The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the end of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research, 34(1). Mehta, PB (2009). Still Under Nehru’s shadow? The Absence of foreign policy frameworks in India. India Review, 8(3). Fujita M and N Hamaguchi (2006). The Coming Age of China-plus-One: The Japanese Perspective on East Asian Production Networks. Second Draft for the World Bank-IPS Research project on the Rise of China and India. Mohan, CR (2009). Is India an East Asian power? Explaining New Delhi’s security politics in the Western Pacific. ISAS Working Paper No. 81. Raghavan, VR (ed.) (2008). Asian Security Dynamic: US, Japan and the Rising Powers. New Delhi: Promilla & Co. Publishers. Scott, D (2009). India’s “extended neighborhood” concept: Power projection for a rising power. India Review, 8(2). Shambaugh D and M Yahuda (eds.) (2008). International Relations of Asia. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Twining, D (2007). America’s Grand Design in Asia. The Washington Quarterly, 30(3).

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AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN: TOWARD A FULL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP?* David Walton

Introduction There has been extraordinary momentum towards a stronger Australia–Japan relationship in the post-Cold War era. The upgraded security ties since 2001 and, in particular, Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) involving the United States and the Joint Declaration on Security Co-operation (JDSC) signed in March 2007, has taken the security relationship into uncharted territory. Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was consistent in his desire to further strengthen the relationship with Australia (and India) as was demonstrated in several speeches to the Diet and in his book Utsukushii kuni e (Towards a beautiful country, 2006). Successive prime ministers in both countries have indicated that they would continue to support the upgraded relationship. Accordingly there is continuing momentum based on the JDSC. In 2010, for example, momentum included the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in May (only second ACSA agreement signed by Japan). The agreement provided a framework for

* This Chapter is a revised and updated version of the author’s earlier article “Australia and Japan: Towards a New Security Partnership?” Volume 28, Number 1, Japanese Studies, May 2008. 149

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reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the JSDF and the ADF on exercises and training, UN Peace keeping Operations and overseas disaster relief operations.1 In December 2010, Japan’s Defence Policy Guidelines reflected the new dimension in security ties with Australia stating ‘Japan will enhance security with countries such as South Korea, Australia, ASEAN, and India.’2 This chapter assesses the development and future prospects of the JDSC. The main argument put forward is that despite current momentum there are limitations on the future development of the JDSC based on Japan’s constitutional constraints, the rise of China, and leadership changes in both Tokyo and Canberra. Accordingly the paper will outline the responses to the JDSC and then assess the agreement and consider if there is scope towards a full security partnership. Finally the constraints on the JDSC will be outlined and implications analysed. Responses to the JDSC There was much fanfare at the governmental level and considerable commentary about the JDSC in both countries in 2007. In Australia, Greg Sheridan and Paul Kelly wrote solid journalistic pieces on the strategic and political implications of the declaration.3 Richard Tanter noted that the declaration ‘codified and publicly acknowledged for the first time the wide-ranging security cooperation between Japan and Australia.’4 Malcolm Cook and Rory Medcalf speculated that the signing of the JDSC had addressed fundamental weaknesses in the security area and would strengthen possibilities for an Free Trade Area (FTA) and also enhance Australia’s leadership position in the 1

DoD media release, ‘Successful 2+2 Australia — Japan Meeting of Defence and Foreign Ministers,’ 19 May 2010. . 2 Japan’s Defence Guidelines, 22 December 2010. . 3 See Greg Sheridan, ‘Security treaty rejected by Tokyo,’ The Australian, 12 March 2007 and Paul Kelly, ‘Security accord flags new Japan,’ The Australian, 14 March 2007, p. 12. 4 Richard Tanter, ‘The New American-led Security Architecture in the Asia Pacific: Binding Japan and Australia, containing China,’ in Japan Focus, 16 March 2007. .

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region.5 Paul Dibb argued that the JDSC had signalled two important factors: that Australia has accepted a regional security leadership role and Japan was asserting a new sense of strategic independence beyond its traditional ties with the United States.6 Aurelia George Mulgan wrote a detailed account on the changes in security ties and speculated that Australia has risked relinquishing a potential role as an ‘honest broker’ in Sino–Japanese relations by signing the Australia– Japan security declaration.7 Brendan Taylor commented on limitations on the military capacity of Australia and the implications of the declaration on relations with China.8 The Economist and the ABC online also carried articles on Chinese concerns about the JDSC.9 For Japan it is the first diplomatic arrangement on permanent security cooperation with a country other than the United States since World War II. The historic significance of the declaration is profound as is that fact that Australia was chosen by Japan. Writing in the Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies (Commentary AJISS), Yamamoto concurred with Paul Dibb’s analysis on Japan’s role. He argued that the declaration has allowed Japan to be more proactive in international security and promote the ideals of democracy and open regionalism.10 The then Prime Minister Abe Shinzo articulated the relatively recent shift in Japanese thinking at the

5 Malcolm Cook, ‘Howard brings home the goods from Japan trip,’ Australian Financial Review, 16 March, Australian Financial Review, 16 March 2007. 6 Paul Dibb, ‘Security deal a significant step for two aspiring nations,’ Australian Financial Review, 16 March 2007. 7 Aurelia George-Mulgan, ‘Australia — Japan Relations: New Directions,’ ASPI Strategic Insights, No. 36, July 2007, p. 9. 8 Brendon Taylor, ‘Limits to Australia–Japan Security Co-operation,’ The Japan Times, 22 March 2007. 9 The Economist, ‘Reaching out over the Pacific,’ 16 March 2007. and Stephen McDonell, ‘Chinese Government expresses some concern about Japan–Australia Pact’ 13 March 2007 . 10 Yamamoto, Yoshinobu, ‘Strengthening Security Cooperation with Australia: A new security means for Japan,’ AJISS Commentary, 9 October 2007. .

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government level about Australia in a statement to the House of Councillors in March 2007. As he said: Did [Japan in the past] recognize Australia as a diplomatic partner, a partner from the viewpoint of security? I think the answer was no… We didn’t understand the merits of security cooperation with Australia until recently.11

Japanese newspapers focused on the symbolic importance of the signing. The Daily Yomiuri, for example, referred to the declaration ‘as an important foundation for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the international community.’12 The Japan Times carried a similar theme, though offering more analysis on the trilateral implication (relations with the US) and also a section that covered concern in China about the motives and agenda of the declaration.13 The Sankei Shimbun, a right-wing paper, wrote a glowing editorial piece suggesting that Abe and Howard were creating a zone of peace in the Asia Pacific by signing the security declaration.14 The Security Relationship: Out of the Shadows The comments raised above need to be placed in context. The importance of the JDSC is best understood through an awareness that the political and security dimensions of the relationship have lagged well behind commercial considerations. Indeed commercial/economic links have been (and still remain) at the very core of the bilateral relationship. Since the 1957 Commerce Agreement senior officials in

11

Yoshida, Reiji, ‘Japan signs landmark security pact with Australia,’ The Japan Times, 14 March 2007. . 12 ‘Japan–Australia Accord: Key to East Asia Stability,’ Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 March 2007. 13 Yoshida, ‘Japan signs a landmark security pact with Australia.’ 14 See ‘Go to anpo kyodo sengen Abe Shusho chiiki heiwa ni mo koken’ [Australia and the security cooperation declaration; Prime Minister Abe and his contribution to a region of peace] Sankei Shimbun, 14 September 2007.

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Tokyo and Canberra have explored strategies to broaden the base to enhance the political and cultural dimension. In essence the desire for a broader base has been part of a strategy to ensure the long-term success of trade relations and as ‘ballast’ in relations. Economic factors, moreover, have driven bilateral imperatives and have ensured the maintenance of long-term mutual interests. As has been well-documented, economic complementarities, which included Australia as a secure supplier of raw resources and food stuffs, were an important factor in the economic takeoff of Japan in the 1960s and in the economic development and restructuring of the Australian economy in the 1970s and 1980s.15 The economic partnership, which continues as a major flow of trade, has been critical in the establishment of linkages and associations/ lobby groups at the governmental and sub-national level. In this context the two countries since the 1970s have worked very closely on commercial interests and on developing regional economic architecture. One direct outcome was the formation of the Asia Pacific Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989. Nonetheless, there were bilateral meetings between Australian and Japanese officials on political/security issues from the 1950s and, in particular, detailed discussions on developments in the Southeast Asia region. By the mid 1960s this included sharing confidential political papers on a wide range of issues in the Asian region (particularly on China and Indonesia), close consultation on United Nations matters and a shared belief in the paramount importance of maintaining a strong United States presence in the region.16 Both countries were and remain close allies of the United States and, as such, were part of the US led ‘hub and spokes’ Cold War framework for the Asian region. In this sense, there was dialogue on security and political issues during the Cold War, but the emphasis in bilateral relations was on economic and commercial ties while enjoying the protection 15

See the extensive range of publications in the Asia-Pacific Economic series produced by the Australia–Japan Research Centre, Australian National University. 16 David Walton, ‘Australia–Japan and the region, 1952–1965: The beginnings of security policy networks’ in Brad Williams and Andrew Newman, (eds.), Japan, Australia, and Asia Pacific Security (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 9–29.

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of a US nuclear umbrella. The considerable constraints on the development of the political/security relationship, such as the legacy of the Pacific War on regional diplomacy and the famous Article 9 of the Japanese constitution for Japan and fear of electoral backlash in Australia, were prohibitive factors. In any event, for both countries the financial/commercial imperatives were a prime motive for closer ties. The focus on economic issues made the bilateral relationship more palatable for domestic audiences in both countries. Since the late 1980s Australia and Japan have worked on developing closer cooperation on regional matters. Cooperation has included leading roles in the formation of APEC, peacekeeping in Cambodia (1992–1993), East Timor (2002–2004), and joint efforts to assist countries affected severely by the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. To supplement this, annual bilateral dialogue on security matters was implemented in 1996 and a military attaché system put in place in Tokyo and Canberra.17 Despite these incremental changes and a shared view that Indonesia and Southeast Asia more generally is an area of national importance, consultation was mainly conducted at a multilateral level using existing regional architecture. Both countries have, for pragmatic reasons of alliance diplomacy, placed greater emphasis on relations with Washington than on the bilateral relationship. The Impact of ‘9/11’ on Security Networks The terrorist attack in the United States on 11 September 2001 and its aftermath resulted in nation-states with close ties to the US administration forging new security ties with fellow allies, in order to strengthen the resolve of like minded nations. The foundations for a close security relationship between Australia and Japan were already in place. After decades of close collaboration the three governments were able to expand the scope and style of security networks as part of a requirement to meet new international challenges. In 2001 a range of initiatives took place to bolster overall Australia–Japan 17

Rix, The Australia–Japan Political Alignment, 1952 to the present (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 169.

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relations (as well as security ties) including the first in a series of government sponsored Australia–Japan conferences. A Memorandum of Understanding on Combating International Terrorism between Australia and Japan and the Trilateral Security Dialogue at the vice ministerial level took place in 2003.18 In many respects the initiatives undertaken by both the Australian and Japanese Governments in the wake of ‘9/11’ were not surprising. What was surprising was the accelerated commitment by both countries to substantially upgrade security ties. Past concerns about the legacy of the Pacific War and anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia for example, have evaporated and been replaced by the desire for closer and more expansive security networks. In this context, the positive response within the Australian community, bureaucracy and security/military circles is profoundly important. It highlights the transition in Australian strategic thinking that has been evolving over the past decade. In particular, the Australian desire to enhance security ties with Japan has been driven by shared views on the importance of the role of the United States at the global and regional level. In Japan, the ‘9/11’ attacks gave the Koizumi Government the opportunity to amend the International Peace Cooperation Law to allow Self Defence Forces’ (SDF’s) greater scope in UN peace keeping missions. Shortly afterwards Koizumi announced that Japan would send SDF engineers to East Timor under UN auspices. The decision to send troops to Iraq in 2003, which required another amendment, was noteworthy as it was the first time since World War II that Japanese forces had been in a war zone.19 On 9 January 2007 18

David Walton, ‘Australia–Japan, opportunities and challenges’ in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds.), Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs, 2001–2005 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 72–88. For an excellent and detailed analysis of emerging security issues and an exploration of trilateralism see Tow et al. (eds.), Asian Pacific Security US, Australia, and Japan in the new Security Triangle (Abington: Routledge: 2007). 19 The amendment allowed the SDF in Iraq to have a non-combatant role for reconstruction and humanitarian activities. For a detailed analysis of the decision making process to send SDF to Iraq, see Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy (Seattle and Washington: University of Washington Press, 2007).

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the Japanese Defence Agency was upgraded to full ministerial status. The new ministry has the SDF and a full range of security planning as part of its portfolio. Notably these changes were taking place with close cooperation and support from US and Australian officials. The arrival of hundreds of Australian soldiers to protect Japanese SDF personnel in Al-Muthanna Province, Iraq in February 2005 for example, served to highlight the linkages between Australia’s commitment to Iraq (and thereby to the US alliance) and support for Japan’s efforts to contribute to international issues.20 The Iraq example has also been used by both Australian and Japanese officials and politicians as a powerful symbol and illustration of the new security relationship. The intent to enhance the bilateral security relationship at the governmental level was demonstrated by the joint ministerial announcement ‘Building a Comprehensive Strategic Relationship’ by Foreign Ministers Alexander Downer and Aso Taro on 18 March 2006. In many respects the importance of the declaration was lost in the ensuing media attention on the inaugural TSD meeting at ministerial level (held in Sydney the previous day) and the visit to Australia (the following day) by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. Nonetheless the joint declaration was a significant milestone in the bilateral relationship. It indicated the desire of both governments to further develop the political/security base as well as the economic relationship and also offered a framework to coordinate joint activity in the Asian region. The goals of the declaration were clear and precise: a number of multilateral initiatives (work together to strengthen APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit (EAS), and a shared reform agenda for the United Nations), a desire to deepen the economic relationship as part of the strategic relationship, and guidelines on how to strengthen bilateral security ties (annual meeting of Foreign Ministers, policy dialogue at Secretary/Vice Ministerial level, and dialogue at senior officials level).21 20

Walton, ‘Australia and Japan,’ p. 76. Joint ministerial statement, ‘Building a Comprehensive Strategic Relationship,’ 18 March 2006, .

21

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A Security Declaration is Signed In the period 2006 and 2007 there was already considerable momentum in bilateral discussions including a series of government led conferences. The then Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer visited Japan in August 2006 and announced that a security agreement would be signed between Australia and Japan in 2007. It was a well planned visit as Koizumi Junichiro was in the process of stepping down as Prime Minister. Downer’s meeting with his likely successor and then Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Abe Shinzo was reported as a great success with Abe speaking warmly about strengthening and broadening the relationship with Australia. Downer, buoyant after the meetings had confirmed support for a security agreement, declared that this was his best visit to Japan in 11 years.22 Upon becoming Prime Minister on 26 September 2006, Abe began upgrading the bilateral relationship with Australia expressing the intention of a closer alignment with fellow democracies Australia, the United States, and India in his first speech to the Diet as Prime Minister. He also signalled support for collective defence and indicated changes in Japanese strategic thinking. In a speech to the Diet on 26 January 2006, entitled ‘Alliance Democracies Security Architecture for the Asia-Pacific region’, Abe expanded on this theme and his vision for Japanese foreign policy. In particular he spoke about the need for pro-active diplomacy. As well as affirming the United States as the cornerstone of foreign policy, Abe stressed the importance of strengthening partnerships with countries that share fundamental values such as democracy, rule of law, and basic human rights. Notably Abe specifically mentioned India and Australia as countries with which Japan shares fundamental values and the desire to promote exchanges at the top level and strengthen economic partnerships.23

22

Alford, ‘Bowing to no one,’ The Australian, 1 September 2006, p. 15. Abe, Shinzō, ‘Speech to the 166th session of the Diet,’ 26 January 2007, . 23

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Momentum continued into 2007 as it was announced that the security declaration would be signed during then Prime Minister Howard’s visit to Tokyo in March. Notably Australian officials had proposed a treaty, but this had been changed to a Joint Declaration on Security due to the difficulties of ratifying a treaty through the Diet and the distraction of a forthcoming Upper House election. Howard commented that it ‘won’t be a full treaty but it might ultimately lead to that.’24 Japanese and Australian negotiators were quoted as stating that ‘the joint declaration is a stepping stone to a formal security treaty sometime in the future’25 suggesting that there existed strong interest in both Tokyo and Canberra in fully developing the new security relationship. The security declaration signed on 13 March 2007 is brief and reaffirms shared values and develops key themes articulated in the March 2006 declaration. In particular, the declaration affirms the importance of trilateral security dialogue with the United States and discusses the need for a peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea (nuclear and humanitarian issues). Emphasis in the document is on non-military measures and the wording is non-threatening. It is not a treaty or an old-style defence pact. There is no provision for example, for mutual defence or other aspects of traditional military style treaties. As such the declaration does not have provisions for dealing with crises such as armed conflict between China and Taiwan, other than consultation. The purpose of the declaration is to deal with common security interests such as border security, counter-terrorism, peace cooperation, exchange of information and personnel and joint exercises, and coordinated activities. For the first time there is an action plan with specific measures (referred to as implementation) including the beginning of regular Foreign Affairs and Defence meetings at the ministerial level known as ‘two plus two talks’.26 The inaugural ministerial talks were held in Tokyo in June 2007. Again this was the first of its 24

Kelly, ‘Security accord flags new Japan,’ p. 12. Sheridan, ‘Security treaty rejected by Tokyo.’ 26 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation DFAT, 13 March 2007. . 25

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kind for Japan (except with the US) and was based on the US–Japan dialogue model. Media attention was intense during the meeting and observers noted that the ‘two plus two’ talks received more media attention in Japan than Howard’s Prime Ministerial visit in March to sign the historic joint declaration.27 In essence the JDSC has established a clear framework for security links and how they will possibly continue to develop. As such the declaration although not as far reaching or substantial as a full defence treaty, is strong on symbolism and is a turning point in Australia–Japan regional diplomacy. Notably, the defence communities in both countries are ‘on side’ and it is anticipated that the commitment to joint exercises and training in the declaration will allow Japanese troops to train on Australian soil in the near future. It also means that after a period of drift in the late 1990s and a pre-occupation with China, Japan has bureaucratic attention once more in Canberra. Towards a Security Partnership? The discussion at the governmental level of a security partnership suggests a radical transformation in the bilateral relationship. The comprehensive strategic partnership framework, as articulated in March 2006, is designed to combine enhanced political security and economic links (through an FTA) of the relationship also suggests that the bilateral relationship will undergo considerable change in the foreseeable future. Indeed such a partnership would have considerable political trade and commercial advantages for both countries. At this stage however, the notion of a security partnership commensurate with the economic relationship is an unrealistic goal. There remains a lack of clarity on how a security partnership would develop and what would be the focal points. In some respects the comprehensive strategic partnership concept, like the JDSC, is codifying what is already taking place in the

27

Interview with Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Official (DFAT) official, Tokyo, 14 June 2007.

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bilateral relationship. The process reflects a new found level of confidence at the governmental level. In this context, the announcement of both joint declarations signifies the formal end of Australian government reticence to fully engage politically as well as economically with Japan. At this stage however, it is too early to describe the accelerated security ties as a security partnership. The level of security cooperation is still relatively new and Japanese soldiers are yet to train on Australian soil. Indeed, Australian and Japanese security upgrades have been largely shaped by the relationship with the United States. One important outcome of the security declaration is the prospect for close consultation and joint action between Australia and Japan outside the US-led security framework. The role of the United States is central in both Australian and Japanese postwar foreign and security policy considerations. Indeed the security treaty arrangements both countries have with the United States have limited the scope for increased bilateral security dialogue. Desmond Ball writing in 2006, for example, argued that ‘US strategic policies and defence decisions will determine the directions, pace, and dimension of Australia–Japan security relations.’28 In the post ‘9/11’ environment it certainly has been the United States new foreign and strategic policies, rather than regional issues, that have been the catalyst for closer defence ties between Australia and Japan. Indeed Australia’s close ties to the United States and access to policy-makers and intelligence material in Washington, which to a large extent was a result of the Howard–Bush relationship, arguably gave Australia new-found credibility with Japanese policymakers and the Japanese Government. The role of the United States as both an agent and an inhibiting factor in the growth of bilateral ties therefore, has presented analysts and commentators with a conundrum. Both Australia and Japan view their relationship with the United States as a cornerstone of foreign policy. Indeed neither country would wish to relinquish this policy position in the

28

Desmond Ball, ‘Security cooperation between Japan and Australia: Current elements and future prospects’ in Brad Williams and Andrew Newman, (eds.), Japan, Australia and Asia Pacific Security (Abington: Routledge: 2006), p. 180.

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foreseeable future. Japanese current concern about a hot war on the Korean peninsula and tensions in Sino–Japanese tensions in late 2010 over the Senkaku Islands are symbolic of the enduring importance of the US alliance. The shared belief in Australia and Japan about maintaining a strong United States military presence in the Asia-Pacific moreover, was a focal point in the development of security policy networks during the Cold War and security ties since 1989. As such the focus on Washington in both Tokyo and Canberra has limited the scope of the security relationship. The United States moreover, has welcomed and encouraged the enhanced security ties between Tokyo and Canberra as it fits within their alliance framework. The security declaration however, offers opportunities for a greater emphasis on regional issues. One area where Canberra and Tokyo can work closely and effectively without direct US involvement is peace keeping operations. Collaboration on peace keeping initiatives, including the possibility of establishing a peace keeping training centre and jointly leading a multinational stand-by arrangement for peace keeping in the Asia-Pacific region, would fit comfortably within the framework of the security declaration.29 Such a plan would allow Australia to play a credible role in regional issues under UN auspices. As such the enhanced bilateral role would allow Australia to offer experience and logistics in peacekeeping and Japan the opportunity to directly involve itself in regional issues in a non-threatening manner. Importantly also there is no explicit US involvement in the proposal. The proposal moreover, falls within the framework of the security declaration. A final point is that the resource constraints on the small Australian armed forces would not be as problematic as traditional security arrangements such as a large scale military action. For Japan the emphasis on peace keeping fits with overarching postwar principles and established policies since the Peace Keeping Operations Law was passed in 1992.

29

Ishizuka, Katsumi, ‘Perspectives on UN peacekeeping collaboration between Japan and Australia’ in Brad Williams and Andrew Newman (eds.), Japan, Australia, and Asia Pacific Security (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 144–163.

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Constraints on the JDSC The Japanese constitution has been the major barrier to enacting a full security partnership.30 Incremental changes to Japan’s defence and foreign policy and the changes to the International Peace Cooperation Law since 1992 has allowed for a more pro-active approach in Tokyo. Nonetheless, Japan is limited in terms of military involvement (does not have the right of collective self defence) and contributions due to Article Nine. In this context it is impossible for Japan to sign a full security treaty. Despite this as already discussed, the JDSC has allowed opportunities for enhanced military ties and close coordination between the defence establishments in both countries. There are constraints on the future of the JDSC that will slow the momentum in the security area for the foreseeable future: the emergence of China as a global economic power and regional leader and leadership changes in Tokyo and Canberra. The emergence of China as a global economic power and a regional leader A central factor limiting the security partnership is Japan’s regional leadership role and strategic competition with China. For Japan, China is a vexed policy area as the growth in direct foreign investment in China and economic and commercial ties have been a major fillip to the previously flagging Japanese economy. The easing of tensions with the departure of Koizumi as Prime Minister (2006) and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s positive visit to Japan in April 2007 have dissipated. The dispute over the Senkaku Islands in late 2010 highlighted that there are economic and security issues that continue to create tension, competition, and regional rivalry.31 Based on a long range

30

See Mito Tamichi, ‘Japan’s Constitutional Revision Debate under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and the Implications for Japan’s Foreign Relations,’ Japanese Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, May 2008, pp. 59–71. 31 See for example Ito Masami, “Tension escalation with Beijing”, The Japan Times, 17 September 2010.

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economic forecast presented by the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) the size of the Chinese economy is anticipated to surpass that of the United States during the 2020–2040 period and be almost seven times that of the Japanese economy by 2050.32 In the area of security, key concerns in Tokyo have included the substantial increases in the Chinese defence budget and interest in gaining access to deep-sea resources in the disputed East China Sea. There has also been considerable diplomatic and summit rivalry with each country competing for the attention of Pacific Island nations and African states. As part of a response to the rise of China, Japan has committed to facilitating economic partnerships and a regional vision — ASEAN plus six which enhances security ties with Australia were part of an expansive and more assertive foreign/security policy development in Tokyo to balance China as a rival regional leader and economic world power. Under Abe in particular, there was also a clear desire to contain China as part of United States driven quadrilateral talks involving Japan, United States, Australia, and India. Japanese policy for the past three decades has been to ensure security partnerships with key countries in the broadest sense. Hosono Shinichi for example, argued that such a partnership would include resource and food security as well as more traditional military and political cooperation and alignment on regional security architecture.33 For Japan there is no doubt that resource security is an important issue and that a key agenda is to secure a stable supply of uranium. FTA negotiations, existing strong commercial ties, and huge demand for resources from China will ensure that resources will be a core area for discussion for the foreseeable future in Japan’s diplomatic dealings with Australia. From an Australian perspective, the emergence of adversarial camps in Asia based on rising tensions between Japan and China has the potential to polarise the region and disrupt trade flows. So far diplomats in Canberra have demonstrated considerable sophistication in not 32

Shiraishi, Takashi, “What the economic rise of China, India means for Japan”, The Daily Yomiuri 17 June 2007. 33 Hosonō, Shinichi, ‘Towards a comprehensive strategic partnership between Australia and Japan,’ AJIA, Vol. 60, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 590–598.

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entangling themselves in Sino–Japanese tensions. Australian policy has involved forging strong commercial ties (including negotiations towards an FTA) and working towards a closer political relationship with China. Australian strategy under both Howard and Rudd/Gillard governments has been to encourage China to play a leadership role within the existing framework and to argue that a strong Chinese economy is good for the global economy. The establishment of Australia–China strategic dialogue in the same year as the JDSC (6 September 2007) can be viewed as part of the diplomatic balancing act by the Australian Government to substantially enhance relations with China while also maintaining close security ties with the United States and Japan.34 The timing of the new security dialogue with China was designed to reduce concerns in Beijing that Australia and China were creating an anti-China bloc. There is also potential for Australia to ensure greater prospects for overall regional security by encouraging transparency in security dialogue and thereby reducing tension and potential hostilities.35 So far Australian initiatives have been successful. China’s comments about the JDSC have not been overly critical. The Peoples Daily news service, for example, factually reported on the declaration and added as a final comment ‘During an exclusive interview with Australian journalists in his official residence on Monday, Abe stressed that the declaration between Japan and Australia will not be aimed at China.’36

34 DFAT media release, ‘Establishment of Australia — China security dialogue,’ 6 September 2007. . 35 Released material through Wikileaks suggests that Australian policy might not be so even handed however. Rudd is reported to have warned US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to be prepared to use force against China ‘if everything goes wrong.’ Mr Rudd also allegedly told Mrs Clinton during a meeting in Washington on 24 March 2009 that China was ‘paranoid’ about Taiwan and Tibet and that his ambitious plan for an Asia-Pacific community was intended to blunt Chinese influence. Daniel Flitton, ‘Rudd the butt of expose,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 December 2010. . 36 People’s Daily, ‘Japan, Australia sign joint declaration on strategic security cooperation’ 13 March 2007. .

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The Role of Direct Prime Ministerial Involvement and Leadership Change A key factor behind the rapid changes has been direct Prime Ministerial involvement in both countries to upgrade bilateral relations and enhance alignment with the United States. In particular the Howard–Abe alignment led to tremendous activity in the bilateral relationship. Howard visited Japan seven times as Prime Minister (four times between 2001–2007) while three Japanese Prime Ministers have visited Australia in the same period (Hashimoto 1997, Koizumi 2002, and Abe 2007). Howard made more official visits to Japan than any other Australian Prime Minister (Hawke and Fraser visited Japan four times) and played a central role in upgrading relations with Japan as part of a commitment towards TSD and also to enhance the bilateral relationship and in particular commercial ties. After a rather ambivalent start on relations with Japan, Howard was credited with providing political leadership and strong bureaucratic support within Australia for a series of meaningful government sponsored conferences and declarations that have given the bilateral relationship impetus. Towards the end of his tenure Howard maintained a clear commitment to sign off on an FTA and a security declaration as part of an overall upgrading of relations. Much of the motivation behind Howard’s desire to strengthen bilateral ties was due to an alignment in conservative thinking with Bush and Koizumi/Abe in the post ‘9/11’ environment and a desire to maximise the commercial gains of an FTA. The Rudd/Gillard Labor Government and Transition in Bilateral Ties with Japan The election of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister in December 2007 witnessed a change in foreign policy direction. Under Howard Australia had a global role as a loyal ally of the United States in the ‘war on terror.’ In effect, this meant committing Australian forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Rudd agenda also has a global agenda but the new government reduced emphasis on bilateral relationships and

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placed more attention on multilateral organisations and Australia’s role as a middle power activist. Moreover, Rudd’s well-known skills as a Sinologist sparked concern that he would be too China-focused in his regional diplomatic initiatives. As such, there was concern in the Australian and Japanese media about where Japan would be positioned. There were several early indicators that alarmed Japan watchers and those with vested commercial interests in Australia. In particular, a more strident policy on whaling and the perceived snubbing of Japan on Rudd’s first major overseas trip as Prime Minister were viewed as a change in direction. Since June 2008, however, there has been a consolidated effort in Canberra to reassure Japan of Australia’s desire to develop a strategic partnership. Indeed, the tumultuous election victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in August 2009, has led to considerable common ground between the two countries on global issues such as disarmament and climate change. ‘Snubbing Japan’ and new areas of engagement Rudd’s decision not to include Japan in his first world trip as Prime Minister in March/April 2008 created controversy. The United States, Europe, and China were on the itinerary. Since 2007 China has been Australia’s largest overall trading partner, a position held by Japan for the previous 36 years. In 2009/10 moreover, China replaced Japan as Australia’s largest export market.37 Japan is extremely sensitive about the rise of Chinese power. Critics accused Rudd of needlessly snubbing Japan, even after the Japanese government had officially stated it was at ease about the matter and that Rudd would visit at least twice later in the year (2008). At the core of concern was that Rudd had downgraded the bilateral relationship. Since June 2008 there have been concerted efforts in Canberra to refute these perceptions. Rudd has demonstrated keen interest in engagement with Japan on global and regional issues with the view to enhancing and broadening bilateral interests. During his speech at Kyoto University in June 2008, Rudd 37

DFAT, Media release: ‘China tops trade in goods and services,’ 22 December 2010. .

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spoke passionately about nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, climate change, energy security, and regional architecture, which were well received by his audience and the Japanese media and government circles. These are critical areas of concern in Japan and demonstrate a major development in the direction of bilateral ties and offer substance to the argument that the bilateral relationship is now a strategic partnership. Clearly a factor in Rudd’s calculations was that the Japanese political system was in political gridlock after the LDP lost control of the House of Councillors in 2007. The DPJ, moreover, was in ascendancy in domestic politics and formed a government with minor coalition partners after the August 2009 national election. The DPJ led coalition had a raft of foreign policy issues including engaging with China, changing the alliance with the United States into a global partnership, redefining multilateralism, and focusing on key critical issues such as the potential for Afghanistan to be a failed state. In many respects these initiatives had symmetry with Rudd-led objectives. Disarmament, in particular, has been a major new area of cooperation between Canberra and Tokyo. Australian and Japanese governments have led discussions on disarmament in the United Nations and former Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Kawaguchi Yoriko co-chair the International Commission on Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament at the United Nations and issued the first report in December 2009.38 Whaling as an issue in security ties While not a security issue, whaling has been a long and protracted dispute and has affected bilateral relations. Contained during the Howard years, the issue came to the fore during the 2007 Australian national election campaign and in December 2007 the first Rudd-led 38

For more information see DFAT, ‘Commission Report Launched in Tokyo: Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World,’ December 2009. .

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cabinet meeting decided to support a case against the Japanese hunt in Australian Antarctic waters. Rudd indicated that he was willing to use a range of assets to take Japan to an international court.39 In January 2008 for example, the Australian Federal High Court handed down a landmark decision ordering Japanese government-backed company Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha out of the Australian Whale Sanctuary.40 Both governments have since attempted to defuse whaling as an issue, but it has remained a source of tension each whaling season (November–January). A key factor in tension has been the Australian Government’s declaration to stop Japan’s cull of whales for scientific research and heated exchanges at the annual International Whaling Commission (IWC) conferences.41 Another source of tension between Australia and Japan has been the Australian refusal to bar Sea Shepherd Conservation Society access to Australian port facilities. The activities of Sea Shepherd activists have included the use of obstructionist methods to stop Japan reaching its whale cull quota. In a series of heated exchanges in January 2010 Sea Shepherd vessels and Japanese whalers twice collided. One protest vessel, the Ady Gil sank. The captain of the ship Peter Bethune subsequently boarded the Japanese vessel Shonan Maru No. 2 on 15 February and attempted to carry out a citizen’s arrest on the captain. In a charged atmosphere he was taken into custody and was arrested upon arrival in Tokyo on 11 March and although eventually released, faced the prospect of a three-year prison sentence.42 39

Andrew Darby and Michelle Grattan, ‘Rudd plans draft to spy on whalers.’ 13 December 2007. . 40 ‘Enforcing whale bans will be difficult,’ World News Australia, 15 January 2008. . 41 Rudd was unable to garner sufficient votes to effectively stop Japan’s whaling policy. New Zealand’s recent revised position which supports a limited cull of commercial whaling has further complicated matters moreover. 42 ‘Sea Shepherd arrested,’ Japan Times, 13 February 2010. .

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In what was viewed as a calculated strategy, Rudd stated on the eve of the then Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya’s first official visit to Australia in February 2010 that he would take Japan to the International Court of Justice in November should Japan proceed with another whale harvest.43 This approach, which was no doubt for public consumption in Australia in an election year, fuelled considerable discontent in Tokyo and threatened to usurp other agenda issues such as cooperation on disarmament and peacekeeping. According to close observers in Japan, Okada was intending to re-define the bilateral relationship with a greater focus on global disarmament.44 Japanese and Australian media attention however, focused on whaling and overlooked other agenda items. In this context whaling is a serious issue that has directly affected development of what otherwise is a relatively trouble free bilateral relationship. The Japanese Government decision to end the Whaling season early in 2011 and the less strident position by the Gillard Labor Government suggests that bilateral tension over whaling might now dissipate. Triple Disaster and Gillard Visit The triple disasters that struck the Tohoku region of Japan on 11 March 2011 (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant crisis) have highlighted the depth in bilateral relations and will ensure that any residual tension over whaling will be on the back burner for some time. As well as sincere sympathy and genuine grief within the Australian community, many of whom have links with Japan, there have been numerous fund raising initiatives throughout Australia to assist Japanese victims. The Federal Government provided $10 million through the Red Cross and Pacific Disaster appeal moreover and immediately offered rescue teams and sniffer dogs. As well a C17 aircraft provided transportation assistance in Japan and water cranes 43

Marina Kamenev, ‘Australia to Japan: Stop Whaling,’ Time, 24 February 2010. . 44 Takashi Terada, ‘Okada’s lost opportunity for a new Australia–Japan partnership,’ 4 March 2010. .

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were sent to the nuclear power plants in Fukushima to assist in fighting fires and cooling spent rods.45 Julia Gillard visited from 20 to 23 April 2011 as the first stop on a tour of Japan, South Korea, and China. She was only the third Western leader (after French President Sarkozy and US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton) to visit Japan since the disaster and the first to visit the earthquake affected areas. Her itinerary included a visit to an evacuation centre at Minami Sanriku and a meeting with the Japanese Emperor as well as the then Prime Minister Kan and Japanese business leaders. As such, Gillard was in a unique position to forge new ties with Japanese leaders based on her visit at such an emotional time as well as decades of bilateral consultation. Indeed commentators in Australia have suggested that the visit offered an ideal opportunity to review the bilateral relationship and to create a new vision to re-define bilateral engagement.46 In particular, the meetings in Japan were important in terms of discussions of energy supplies (liquefied natural gas as an alternative energy supply will be an important dimension) and to reinforce Australia’s commitment as a long-term reliable partner and supplier of energy resources. Notably Gillard also reflected on the importance of the United States and trilateralism (US, Japan, and Australia) in terms of stability in the Asia-Pacific and in dealing with the natural and nuclear disasters. Moreover, the Australian Prime Minister discussed the JDSC as a mechanism for increased cooperation in disaster situations in the region. Gillard and Kan also agreed to enhance defence and security ties and to work towards what was called a ‘new vision’ in defence cooperation. The enhanced cooperation is in the areas of disaster preparedness for the region including delivery of aid for the Pacific Islands.47

45

See Prime Ministers home page ‘Australian Government support for Japanese earthquake and Tsunami victims.’ 21 March 2011. . 46 See Jenny Corbett, ‘Japan crisis and Australia,’ East Asia Forum, 3 March 2011. . 47 Sabra Lane, ‘Gillard delivers keynote address,’ ABC online, 22 April 2011. .

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Concluding Comments The upgrading in security ties and, in particular, the JDSC has helped to re-define bilateral relations. There are now guidelines on how the political/security relationship will develop and a commitment to regional security. It is unlikely, despite the historical significance and strong symbolism of the security declaration that a full security partnership with Japan will emerge in the next decade. As well, constitutional constraints in Japan, Australia’s relations with China, and leadership transition in both countries will remain key factors placing limits on how far security ties will develop. The transition of leadership in both countries (Japan three times and Australia in July 2010) has diluted momentum somewhat. In Japan there has been a succession of leaders holding office for one year or less. Kan Naoto replaced Hatoyama Yukio in June 2010 and he was in turn replaced by Noda Yoshiko in August 2011. Despite the changes in leadership within the DPJ government, there has been continuity in foreign policy. Similarly, Rudd as Foreign Minister in the Gillard Government has maintained continuity in Australian foreign policy. Gillard has also indicated her commitment to enhancing the bilateral partnership in concert with the United States. In Tokyo Prime Minister Kan and his successor Noda have continued to express support for a strategic partnership with Australia. As such structural mechanisms are in place to ensure that the JDSC agreements will be met. Nonetheless it is unlikely that either leader has the opportunity or disposition to maintain the rapid development in security ties as witnessed during the 2006 period under Howard and Abe. Both countries, but particularly Japan, face a range of dire domestic political issues that will result in less attention on bilateral relations. An emphasis on multilateralism in both foreign policy agenda, moreover, will dilute the emphasis on bilateralism in any event. Another critical factor for both countries is developing appropriate policies to deal with China’s emergence as a regional leader and global economic power. The decision in Canberra to begin annual security talks at the ministerial level with China is a significant development in the triangular relationship between Canberra, Beijing, and Tokyo. It is

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possible that the new security arrangements between Australia and China signify the end of serious efforts towards a full security partnership with Japan. The Australian strategy of balancing Japan and China creates both new opportunities at a regional level and difficulties in maintaining current momentum in bilateral relations with Japan. It is clear that Tokyo cannot expect Australia to be ‘on side’ in all regional forums. As China has replaced Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner, it is unlikely that an Australian Government will be willing to reduce diplomatic leverage by siding too closely with Japan. The balancing of these two triads will have important implications for Australia–Japan security ties and the bilateral relationship in general. The momentum that created the JDSC has dissipated and it is unlikely that either Gillard or Kan and now his successor Noda will pursue the agenda with the same gusto as their predecessors. The most likely outcome will be that some momentum in security upgrades will continue as a flow-on effect of the JDSC, but a security treaty and a fully developed security partnership are unlikely for the foreseeable future.

Bibliography Alford, P (2006). Bowing to no one. The Australian, 1 September. Ball, D (2006). Security cooperation between Japan and Australia: Current elements and future prospects. In: Japan, Australia and Asia Pacific Security, B Williams and A Newman (eds.). Abington: Routledge. Cook, M (2007). Howard brings home the goods from Japan trip. Australian Financial Review, 16 March. Hosono, S (2006). Towards a comprehensive strategic partnership between Australia and Japan: Japan’s perspective. AJIA, 60(4). Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, DFAT, 2007. Kelly, P (2007). Security accord flags new Japan. The Australian, 14 March. Mulgan, AG (2007). Australia–Japan relations: New directions. ASPI Strategic Insights, No. 36. Nishihara, M (2007). Heading for a strategic uncertainty? Perspectives on Asian security, 2007. RIPS Policy Perspectives. Rix, A (1999). The Australia–Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present. London: Routledge.

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Sankei S (2007). Go to anpo kyodo sengen Abe Shusho chiiki heiwa ni mo koken (Australia and the security cooperation declaration; Prime Minister Abe and his contribution to a region of peace). Sheridan, G (2007). Security treaty rejected by Tokyo. The Australian, 12 March. Tanter, R (2007). The new American-led security architecture in the Asia Pacific: Binding Japan and Australia, containing China. Japan Focus. Tow, W, M Thomson, Y Yamamoto and S Limaye (eds.) (2007). Asia Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan in the new Security Triangle. Abington: Routledge. Walton, D (2006). Australia–Japan and the region’ 1952–1965: The beginnings of security policy networks. In: Japan, Australia and Asia Pacific Security, B Williams and A Newman (eds.). Abingdon: Routledge. Walton, D (2007). Australia–Japan: Opportunities and challenges. In: Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs, 2001–2005, J Cotton and J Ravenhill (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press. Yomiuri S (2007). Editorial, Japan–Australia Accord: Key to East Asia Stability.

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CHAPTER 8

JAPAN’S HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACE-BUILDING: BETWEEN ASPIRATIONS AND LIMITATIONS Lam Peng Er

Arguably, Japan is at the crossroads of its international relations and domestic politics. It is in danger of entering into its third ‘lost decade’ after the bursting of its ‘bubble’ economy in 1991. By the end of 2010, China has eclipsed Japan as the second largest economy in the world. Moreover, the nation is confronted by its worst crisis since the end of World War II — the unprecedented triple disasters of the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown at Fukushima. A Japan mired in economic stagnation is also confronted by its important export markets in the US and European Union reeling from a financial and economic crisis triggered by the collapse of various financial institutions in the West. Amidst the danger of financial defaults and contagion by Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy in 2011, the burgeoning markets of China and India will be increasingly important to the Japanese economy in the years ahead. At issue is an appropriate international role for Japan commensurate with its reduced economic capability and national identity as a pacifist country. Conceivably, there are at least three strategic

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options for Japan: a perpetual ally subordinated to the US superpower in relative decline (competing with a rising China for hegemony), a neutral Japan (with or without nuclear weapons); or a country acting autonomously in building an insipient East Asian Community (EAC), and pursuing human security and peace-building. Japan’s choices above are not necessarily mutually exclusive and all that stark. Indeed, it can still remain an ally of the US while placing greater emphasis on human security and peace-building in its international relations. This ‘liberal’ approach of building regional institutions and consolidating peace is likely to enhance regional stability rather than a ‘realist’ approach of competing with a rising China and engaging in a vicious arms race. This chapter will examine the Japanese understanding and practice of the allied concepts of human security and peace-building.1 Following that is an analysis of Japan’s contributions and limitations in its pursuit of human security and peace-building. The chapter concludes that the consolidation of peace in Tokyo’s international relations is likely to be arduous with no guarantee of success in specific countries suffering from intractable civil wars. But this approach is preferable to engaging in ‘power politics’ and arms racing with China — Japan’s most important trading partner.

1

On Japan’s peace-building concept, see Lam Peng Er, Japan’s Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a more active political role (New York: Routledge, 2009). On Tokyo’s human security approach, see Bert Edstrom, Japan and Human Security: the Derailing of a Foreign Policy Vision, Institute for Security & Development Policy, Asia Paper, March 2011, Bert Edstrom, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security: The Founding of a New Policy 1995–2003, Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2008, Nobumasa Akiyama, ‘Human Security at the Crossroad: Human Security in the Japanese Foreign Policy Context,’ IPSHU English Research Report Series No. 19, Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of Peace-building (Hiroshima: Hiroshima University, 2004); Elana Atanassova-Cornelis, ‘Japan and the ‘Human Security’ Debate: History, Norms and Pro-active Foreign Policy,’ Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2005; and Lam Peng Er, ‘Japan’s Human Security Role in Southeast Asia,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia (Singapore) Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2006.

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Genesis: Japan’s Human Security Concept Amidst the Asian Financial Crisis in December 1998, the then Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo declared in Hanoi that Japan will adopt a human security perspective in its international relations.2 Henceforth, Tokyo’s broader definition of security is not merely the protection of state sovereignty but also security for individuals and communities. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter, and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have incorporated this concept as an institutional norm. The Japanese national media, most politicians of the major parties, intellectuals, and NGOs are also comfortable with the human security concept. In short, a consensus has emerged in Japan that ‘human security’ is a desirable and practicable approach for Japan’s international relations in the post-Cold War era. More specifically, JICA President Ogata Sadako declared in Manila after visiting the camp of the insurgent Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao in 2006 that Japan’s peace-building is guided by the concept of human security.3 She was also the Government of Japan’s 2

Obuchi said: “The second area where our efforts are needed is ‘placing emphasis on human security’. ‘Human security’ is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to their socially vulnerable — the poor, women, and children, and the elderly — threatening their survival and dignity. We need urgently to implement measures for the socially vulnerable who are affected by the Asian economic crisis”. See Obuchi Keizo, ‘Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia,’ Lecture program hosted by the Institute for International Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam, 16 December 1998. . 3 JICA notes: “The highlight of her visit is a keynote speech Wednesday to a day-long seminar called ‘Peace, Development, and Human Security in Mindanao’ sponsored by the Japanese Embassy and JICA to highlight the anniversary of the half-century of normalized diplomatic relations between the two countries following World War II. The concept of ‘human security’ is being incorporated into mainstream JICA projects, particularly in such regions as Mindanao which are slowly emerging from years or decades of turmoil or war and are now trying to plan for post-conflict sustainable development”. See JICA, ‘President Ogata’s Trip to the Philippines: Traveling to Mindanao Province,’ 19 September 2006. .

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Special Representative of Peace-building in Afghanistan. Ogata was previously UN High Commissioner for Refugees and she envisaged human security as encompassing the well being of refugees in conflict situation. It would be useful to quote Ogata’s understanding of human security at length: The concept was first presented in the United Nations Development Program’s 1994 Human Development Report. A lot of discussion on human security came up after that in view of large numbers of civilian casualties because of the proliferation of internal conflicts.….That’s why I began to think about human security. In December 1998, the then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi delivered a policy speech in Hanoi titled ‘Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia’ in which he said, “I believe the 21st century for Asia should be ‘a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity.’” That marked the start of Japan’s taking the initiative in human security....In March 1999 the Trust Fund for Human Security was set up in the United Nations funded by the Japanese government. At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, the then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori suggested thinking about human security, and in response to this, the Commission on Human Security was established in 2001. In 2003 the commission presented its final report. After that, both Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter and its Medium-Term Policy on ODA incorporated the perspective of human security.4

Besides internalising ‘human security’ in the outlook of its domestic institutions, Japan has also sought to externalise human security and peace-building as norms and institutions in the United Nations for global governance. Tokyo has helped to establish and finance the Commission for Human Security (2004) and also the Peacebuilding Commission (2005) in the UN. These new UN 4

‘Roundtable: How to safeguard people’s freedom’ in Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Thinking About Human Security, 2004, p. 4.

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institutions have taken an interest in addressing intra-state conflict in Africa and Asia. Human Security and Peace-building: Concepts and Norms The 1991 First Gulf War was a turning point in Japanese foreign policy when the country was severely criticised internationally and humiliated for not making any manpower contribution despite offering US$13 billion to the allied war effort. Tokyo subsequently resolved to play a more active role in international affairs. In actuality, the impulse to play a larger role commensurate to its economic weight (rather than to punch below its weight) had not been absent. The then Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo articulated his doctrine to play an active political role for peace and stability in Southeast Asia three years after the 1974 violent riots in Bangkok and Jakarta against the then Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visits. One of the Southeast Asian complaints then was that the Northeast Asian giant was an exploitative economic animal. Even before the First Gulf War, Japan was actively seeking to play a political role to deal with the civil war in Cambodia. Prime Minister Obuchi’s articulation of the human security concept did not emerge from a vacuum but a long-standing desire that Japan should play a larger security role given its status as a great economic power. During his tenure, Obuchi also supported a ban on landmines and a maritime security role especially antipiracy for Japan. Besides the desire to play a larger security role beyond economics, the human security concept gained traction because it was acceptable to the political mainstream and public opinion. After all, ensuring the security of communities and individuals seems like a good thing and therefore uncontroversial insofar as the Self Defence Force (SDF) is kept out of harm’s way. That Japan found the human security idea attractive was also due to its sensitivity to international ideational trends and norms in the 1990s. In that decade after the Cold War, the world and the UN

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were confronted by deadly intra-state conflict. Ideas defining human security as either ‘freedom from fear’ or ‘freedom from want’ became more popular and were incorporated in various UN documents to address conflicts which are within rather than between states.5 In the case of peace-building, the concept was first introduced by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutro–Ghali in his policy paper titled ‘An Agenda for Peace’ submitted to the UNSC and the General Assembly in 1992. This paper proposed a four step seamless approach by the UN to address effectively issues related to peace and security, namely, preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping, and postconflict peace-building. Japan eventually embraced the new international norm of peace-building as desirable. In 1991, Japan dispatched its troops for UNPKO, the first time its military has gone abroad for a mission since the end of World War II, to Cambodia. Despite vociferous resistance from the Japan Socialist Party (the number one opposition party then), liberal newspapers, and a pacifistic public, the idea of Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping gradually won public acceptance, in part, because no SDF member was killed in Cambodia. By the time the SDF was dispatched to East Timor for UNPKO, the public had accepted the idea of SDF’s participation in UNPKO as their country’s contribution to regional peace and stability. Tokyo also dispatched the SDF to other places within the UN framework to the Golan Heights, Mozambique, Zaire (to assist refugees from Rwanda), Nepal, and Haiti. The SDF was also deployed to Aceh for natural disaster relief and Iraq for ‘humanitarian assistance,’ and the Indian Ocean for refuelling assistance in a special measure law to assist the US against terrorism in Afghanistan. Presently, there is no permissible legislative framework for the SDF to be dispatched abroad beyond UNPKO, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and special measures legislations as in the cases of Iraq 5

On the concept of human security and its development, see Wolfgang Benedek, Matthias C. Kttemann, and Markus Mostl (eds), Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management: Policies, Problems, Potential (New York: Routledge, 2011).

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and Afghanistan. Peace-monitoring by the SDF beyond the UN framework like the militaries of other countries is unprecedented for Japan. Peace-building: Japanese Style Initially, Japan defined peace-building as post-conflict consolidation of peace. However, its practitioners like Akashi Yasushi soon found out that ground reality is much messier. In the case of Sri Lanka, the ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers was often punctuated by conflict but Japan and the international community cannot wait until a formal peace agreement is signed before swinging into action. Japan tried to provide economic incentives for peace even before the conclusion of peace accords in the internal conflict in Sri Lanka, Aceh, and Mindanao. Subsequently, Japan adopted a broader definition of peace-building ranging the gamut from peace-making, peacekeeping, ODA as economic incentives for peace, the post-conflict reconstruction including demilitarisation, demobilisation, and job creation for former combatants to reintegrate them into society.6 In this conception, Japan can also offer human security such as humanitarian relief and practical facilities like health clinics and schools in conflict areas to sweeten the ground for a peace accord. Although the concepts ‘human security’ and ‘peace-building’ can appear fuzzy and ambiguous lacking in intellectual rigor (because the disparate aims of peacekeeping, good governance, infrastructural development, and post-conflict justice and reconciliation can be conflated together), Japanese practitioners have found it useful to adopt the broader concept of peace-building. Moreover, the SDF’s peacekeeping operations have also come under broader rubrics like peacebuilding and international peace cooperation. Since the advent of Japanese peace-building with the dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia, Japan has dispatched the SDF for UNPKO 6

See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Efforts at Peacebuilding: Towards Consolidation of Peace and Nation-building (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

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and humanitarian disaster relief abroad. There are at least two hallmarks of Japanese human security and peace-building. First is an aversion by Japan to take risks in peacekeeping operations and peacemonitoring in conflict areas. Constitutional restrictions, domestic politics, and a postwar pacifist political culture mean that the political leadership and the SDF are not willing to precipitate a domestic political crisis if SDF members were to die abroad in the line of duty. If the SDF were to be dispatched, they are usually kept out of harm’s way by being sent to the safest areas as in the case of its stints in Cambodia, East Timor, and Iraq. This may well be very good for Japan but unfair to other countries which expose their peacekeepers and peace-monitors to higher risks. A corollary to the handcuffing of the SDF from behaving according to international norms of peacekeeping is the so-called Five Principles.7 These restrictions can be interpreted as terribly legalistic and cumbersome if not bizarre. For example, the SDF in UNPKO can only use their light weapons in minimalist self-defence but is not allowed to assist UN peacekeepers from other countries in close proximity (engaged in a separate mission) attacked by hostile forces. Second, Japanese peace-building emphasises the non-use of force, human security, and ODA incentives. In January 2002 in

7

‘Thus the law as it now stands is quite restrictive in scope, and it stipulates five conditions that must be satisfied before a Japanese contingent may be dispatched. The five conditions are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

a cease-fire must be in place; the parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operation; the activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner; participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the “above conditions ceases to be satisfied; and use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the personnel’.

See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Current issues surrounding UN Peacekeeping Operations and Japanese Perspective,’ January 1997. http://www.mofa. go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html.

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Singapore, the then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro declared that Japan will help to prevent conflict in Aceh, Mindanao, and East Timor.8 In May the same year, Koizumi proposed that peacebuilding will become a new pillar in Japanese foreign policy.9 Subsequently, Japan hosted international conferences in Tokyo to mobilise global support and resources as economic peace incentives to resolve conflicts in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Aceh. Japan seemed ever ready to organise international conferences in Tokyo for peace-building because such an approach is non-controversial, safe, and publicity-generating. Despite its so-called ‘lost decades’ following the bursting of its ‘bubble economy,’ Japan is still a rich country and is willing to offer generous financial contributions to peace-building. But what is most lacking in Japanese peace-building are ideas to conflict resolution, leadership in peacemaking, and offering sufficient manpower beyond tokenism in peacekeeping and peace-monitoring.10

8

Prime Minister of Japan and his cabinet, ‘Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership,’ 14 January 2002. . 9 Koizumi declared at a speech in Sydney: ‘Since the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts arising from religious and ethnic causes have been rampant the world over. The international society has been engaged in peacekeeping operations designed to consolidate peace and build basic foundations in countries suffering from such conflicts. The Government of Japan will consider how to increase our international role by providing an added pillar for the consolidation of peace and nation building.’ See Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, ‘Japan and Australia: Towards a Creative Partnership,’ 1 May 2002. . 10 While Japan has participated actively in UNPKO, it has not participated in peacemonitoring activities even in Sri Lanka, Mindanao, and Aceh where it sought to play a peace-building role for at least two reasons. First, the peace-monitoring activities conducted by third parties in these regions were not conducted under UN auspices and Japan does not have the legislative framework to dispatch its troops abroad for non-UN peace-monitoring. Second, Tokyo is extremely reluctant to commit its troops to conflict regions even under the UN framework if there is the danger where the SDF is imperiled and domestic political controversy would arise.

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Human Security and Peace-building: Contributions and Limitations Though paved with good intentions, the outcome of Japan’s peacebuilding and human security endeavour thus far is rather modest if not paltry. The exception is its contributions to Cambodia when Japan ran the whole gamut of peace-making, peacekeeping, and postconflict consolidation of peace. Japan was a key financier to the UNPKO to Cambodia while Akashi Yasushi, a senior UN bureaucrat and Japanese national, was the UN special representative in charge of the UNPKO in Cambodia. The UNPKO mission ended after the conclusion of a national election leading to the formation of a new Khmer government. Even that election was problematic because Hun Sen, the electoral loser, refused to yield power to Prince Rannaridh, the winner but the international community was willing to accept an unworkable compromise for Cambodia to have a coalition government with two competing co-Prime Ministers. Things came to a head in 1997 when the co-Prime Ministers and their factions were on the verge of a civil war. Japan intervened and brokered a political compromise between the two Khmer factions which paved the way to another election leading to the consolidation of Hun Sen’s power and the marginalisation of Rannaridh. Tokyo’s role was critical in this conflict. If civil war had erupted again, then the hard work of the UN and the international community to run the first post-Cold War peacekeeping operation and restore peace in Cambodia would have unravelled. This was a rare case where Japan and its top leadership in the Cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a creative and decisive role to defuse a regional conflict. But subsequent Japanese peace-building in Sri Lanka and Aceh was disappointing. The Koizumi Administration appointed Akashi as Japan’s Special Representative for Peace-Building in Sri Lanka. Akashi cooperated with Norway, which earlier succeeded in brokering a tenuous ceasefire between the government of Sri Lanka (dominated by Sinhalese) and the separatist Tamil Tigers in 2002. Japan was already the largest ODA donor to Sri Lanka when it committed itself

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to peace-building there. It was in charge of economic reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Sri Lanka while Norway concentrated on political mediation. Nevertheless, Akashi did not confine himself to only aid and human security projects but also made at least 16 trips to Sri Lanka to talk to the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers to facilitate peace. The complicated and tragic story of Sri Lanka and Japan’s role has been told elsewhere.11 This chapter will just highlight two points about the Japanese approach to peace-building in Sri Lanka. First, Japan was only prepared to use ODA as a carrot but not a stick to dissuade the Sri Lankan government headed by President Rajapaksa from seeking a military ‘solution’ to the ethnic conflict there. The ODA Charter states that non-militarisation is a principle which a recipient state must abide by before the disbursement of aid. However, Tokyo ignored its own pre-condition and did not significantly reduce or terminate its ODA to Sri Lanka as a calibrated response to the latter’s state violence against Tamil civilians caught in the crossfire. In the Sri Lankan case, Japanese ODA and human security projects failed to facilitate peace there. Although Akashi was busy shuttling between the government of Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers, Japan lacked ideas to secure a peace settlement. The main problem in Sri Lanka is not economic deprivation or the lack of economic development but political confrontation and violence. A fundamental political cleavage is between the Sinhalese majority (which insists on its political and cultural dominance) and the Tamil minority (which is against discrimination by the Sinhalese and wanted its own cultural identity preserved). Any durable peace deal must deal with this fundamental political issue. Second, although Japan was committed to the Sri Lankan peace process, it did not consider sending a small contingent of the SDF for peace-monitoring after the ceasefire like the Nordic countries of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland. The Scandinavian countries are among the most peace-loving in the world and their 11

See ‘Japan in Sri Lanka: From ceasefire to a civil war resumed’ in Lam, Japan’s Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia, pp. 88–103.

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democratic governments and societies do value the lives of their troops too. The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission comprising unarmed Nordic troops sought to build confidence and to report on ceasefire violations. But Sri Lanka was considered too risky for the SDF and Tokyo did not bolster the Scandinavian countries in peacemonitoring there. A dispatch of the SDF even for unarmed peacemonitoring to Sri Lanka would require a special legislation leading to disquiet among the Japanese public. Aceh in Indonesia was another case in which Tokyo was interested to build peace but failed at the final hurdle. Although Japan hosted an international conference in Tokyo for reconstruction in Aceh as an incentive for a ceasefire, the Japanese government did not appoint a Special Representative for Peace-building in Aceh. However, the ceasefire was on the verge of collapse in 2003. Japan in a last ditch effort to save to peace process pressured the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the separatist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) to meet in Tokyo. But the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs played only a passive role by providing a venue but no top Japanese politician or bureaucrat was involved as a third party mediator to pressure the protagonists to give peace a chance. To be sure, few top Japanese politicians or bureaucrats would have the knowledge, interest, energy, and experience to mediate in a seemingly intractable conflict in Aceh. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami devastated Aceh and a new Indonesian President and GAM were prepared to negotiate again. Finland succeeded as the third party mediator and a peace accord was signed in Helsinki. Japan was not an official participant in the negotiations there. The Finns cannot claim to have better knowledge and experience of Indonesia and Aceh than the Japanese. But what they had was the tenacity and boldness of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to nudge both sides to an agreement. Japan simply lacks a top politician of that calibre and drive. Moreover, that peace negotiation had the support of Finland and the European Union. Not surprising, Ahtisaari won the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize. After the conclusion of a peace accord, the EU and Switzerland, and five Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries

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sent their troops for peace-monitoring but Japan did not. The peace-monitors were unarmed and were there for confidence-building. Again, Japan was not prepared to participate in this international peace-monitoring mission. In the post-conflict consolidation of peace phase in Aceh, Japan basically pursued human security measures like DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) of former combatants, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructural development. But Japan was extremely weak as a mediator and fearful to be a peace-monitor. One wonders whether ODA in the guise of ‘human security’ is a clutch or an alibi for Japanese peacebuilding while not dealing with the critical issues of peacemaking and peace-monitoring. At the time of writing, Tokyo still has a golden opportunity to pursue peace-building in Mindanao, the Southern Philippines. This ethnic conflict between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had already cost around 120,000 lives.12 The then Prime Minister Koizumi committed Japan to play a larger role to prevent conflict in Mindanao. When it appeared that a ceasefire between Manila and the MILF would hold, Japan decided to join the International Monitoring Team (IMT) comprising Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) countries of Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya for peacemonitoring. Malaysia and Brunei committed unarmed troops while Libya dispatched civilians. Tokyo seconded a JICA developmental expert to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) who then joined the IMT. In theory, the JICA developmental expert in the IMT is backed up by a Mindanao Task Force based in Manila but he is an isolated figure in the field compared to the contingents dispatched by the OIC countries. This Japanese developmental expert is supposed to come up with a developmental blueprint for Mindanao as an incentive for peace. The Japanese embassy in Manila and JICA supported a dozen ‘high impact’ human security projects for the civilians in Muslim 12

See Lam Peng Er, ‘Japan’s Peace-building in Mindanao: Partnering the Philippines, Malaysia and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,’ Japanese Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, May 2008.

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Mindanao as an incentive for peace but made no impact on the peace talks. The peace negotiations led by Malaysia were almost clinched in 2008 when a compromise was made between the two protagonists: the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would accept that the MILF would be granted an ‘ancestral domain’ and that villages and areas with a Muslim majority have a right to a later referendum to decide whether they will join this political entity with considerable autonomy; and the MILF would abandon separatism. However, the Supreme Court of the Philippines struck down the deal as unconstitutional and political violence erupted again. This setback poignantly shows that the fundamental problem in Mindanao is political — the politicisation of ethnic cleavages and the Moros feeling that their political rights and cultural identity are ignored by the Filipino state and the mainstream Catholic society. While Japanese ODA framed as human security can be helpful to civilians, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to clinch a peace accord. Simply put, a political problem requires a political solution. With the advent of the new Aquino Administration, there are hopes that a fresh start to the peacekeeping process will resume. Just one month after the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) captured power from the LDP after winning the August 2009 Lower House Elections, the then Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya announced that his country is committed to peace-building in Mindanao. Not only will Japan remain in the IMT but will join a new mechanism, the International Contact Group, alongside Turkey and the UK, and the Muhammadiyah (the largest NGO in Indonesia) to advice the peace process. The approach by the new DPJ government to peace-building in Mindanao remains the same: dispatching a staff to the IMT who concentrates on developmental and human security projects. One of the latest Japanese contributions to Mindanao is the digital mapping of the huge island so that accurate information can be obtained about the appropriate places for assistance. If the long running conflict in Mindanao were to be eventually solved through a political compromise without input from Japan, then the latter’s role will basically be post-conflict DDR and ODA couched in the language of ‘human security.’

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Thus far, the DPJ government has neither appointed a Special Representative of the Japanese Government for Peace-building in Mindanao nor publicly offered any ideas to facilitate the peace process politically. Interviews with the DPJ’s parliamentary secretary for defence (the political number three man in the Ministry of Defence), the Director of Planning for International Peace Cooperation, Ministry of Defence, and senior officers of the SDF (colonel level) reveal a keen interest in the SDF’s contribution to international peace cooperation including peace monitoring in conflict areas including Mindanao.13 They are cognisant of the political sensitivities within Japan. As mentioned earlier, the SDF is ready but the top politicians (regardless of parties) are not. Notwithstanding Japan’s tentative peace-building in Mindanao, the Aquino Administration still sought the Northeast Asian country’s assistance to organise an unprecedented peace talks between President Aquino and Murad, the top MILF leader at a neutral forum at Narita, Japan in August 2011. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: ‘On the evening of August 4 (Thursday), an informal meeting was held between H.E. Mr. Benigno S. Aquino III, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Mr. Al Haj Murad, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the suburbs of Tokyo for the solution of the issue of the peace in Mindanao. Japan heartily welcomes that this meeting became a meaningful opportunity for smoothly proceeding with the Mindanao Peace Process. This was the first time that the President of the Republic of the Philippines and the Chair of MILF held a meeting. The Government of Japan supported the holding of the meeting as

13

Masuda Kazuo, Director, International Operations Division, Bureau of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence, Interview, March 2010 and Nagashima Akihisa, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defence, Member of the House of Representatives, Democratic Party of Japan, Interview, February 2010. Nagashima became the special advisor on international affairs for Prime Minister Noda in 2011. I had the opportunity to discuss the issue of peace-building including peace monitoring by the SDF with a class of SDF colonels who were studying at the National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS), where I was a NIDS Fellow then.

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requested by the Government of the Philippines to hold it in Japan. There was an expression of gratitude to Japan in the statement of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, and Japan is pleased to have been able to contribute to the realisation of the meeting.’14 Epilogue ‘Human security’ and ‘peace-building’ are allied concepts to address the issues of (civil) war and peace which impact not only on state sovereignty but also the survival and well-being of societies, communities, and individuals. Indeed, the twin pillars of human security and peace-building are consonant to postwar Japan’s pacifist culture and their underpinning of the country’s foreign policy is acceptable domestically and abroad. However, there are also the limitation and complacency engendered by this self-satisfying approach that Japan is actively contributing to international peace through ODA and UNPKO.15 14

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also noted: ‘Japan strongly expects that both parties will continue sincere talks based on the result of the meeting and reach the final peace agreement at an early stage. Japan is also committed to actively continuing its reconstruction and development assistance in the Mindanao region through the dispatch of development experts to the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and intensive implementation of Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects in the conflict-affected areas (J-BIRD projects) and support to the peace process as a member of the International Contact Group (ICG).’ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Meeting between President Aquino of the Philippines and MILF Chairman Murad on the Mindanao Peace Process in the Philippines,’ 5 August 2011. . Ozawa Hitoshi, Political Minister at the Japanese embassy in the Philippines intimated: ‘[I]was in Tokyo (Narita) for a whole week to arrange and oversee the top meeting between the President Aquino and the Chairman Murad. Although we actually acted upon their request, it was one of the most memorable occasions in my career.’ E-mail communication, 8 August 2011. 15 Japan’s ODA will further decline due to its fiscal austerity with negative implications for the country’s foreign policy to cultivate goodwill in the international system.

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But in reality, Japan avoids genuine risks for peace by not dispatching adequate manpower including the SDF for UNPKO in regional hotspots such as Sudan, or as peace monitors in Mindanao, Aceh, and Sri Lanka like other ‘normal’ states. Ironically, JICA staff, MOFA diplomats, and citizen volunteers may go to conflict areas abroad where the SDF fear to tread because of potential political landmines at home. Moreover, domestic political instability since the collapse of LDP one-party dominance, the short-lived tenure of Japanese Prime Ministers since Koizumi Junichiro, and the March 2011 triple disasters (Japan Great Eastern Earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant) have resulted in a country which appears to be more inward looking than eager for a peace-building role abroad. Take for example the case of Sudan. After the 2005 ceasefire agreement to terminate a conflict which had resulted in two million deaths, the UN facilitated a referendum in January 2011. Based on the referendum’s results, Sudan separated into two states in July 2011. Earlier, Japan sent only two staff officers to join the UN mission HQ in Khartoum, Sudan. In the same year, there were 10, 200 UN peacekeepers and more are needed to hold the peace after the referendum. Initially, Japan is adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach since it is uncertain whether armed conflict in Sudan will erupt again after the referendum.16 By September 2011, the SDF had withdrawn from 11 March disaster-hit regions except for Fukushima and became more flexible and open in the deployment of its personnel to Sudan. In September the same year, government sources revealed that Tokyo plans to send an engineering unit of the Ground SDF comprising about 300 members as part of a UN peacekeeping mission 16 The Asahi Shimbun notes: ‘The United Nations requested that Japan dispatch SelfDefence Forces to South Sudan for a peacekeeping operation in the newly-established African country, sources said. The Foreign Ministry is leaning toward sending the troops, while the Defense Ministry is taking a cautious approach, leaving the Naoto Kan government in limbo.’ See ‘U.N. asks Japan to send SDF to South Sudan,’ Asahi Shimbun, 15 July 2011.

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to repair roads and bridges. The SDF dispatch to Sudan is the second time for Japan to participate in UNPKO under a DPJ-led administration following the earlier mission to earthquake-struck Haiti in 2010.17 Indeed, Japan is probably one of the most risk adverse and timid countries to participation in UNPKO which is necessary for human security. Coming up with a ‘New Thinking’ about security is fine but there is a huge gap between theory and praxis in Japanese foreign policy towards human security and peacebuilding. For Japan to walk the talk, it is necessary to commit manpower including the SDF not only for UNPKO but also peace-monitoring in places like Mindanao even if such activism is outside the framework of the UN. Many conflict resolutions in the world are outside the framework of the UN. Arguably, the UN is suffering from overstretch and cannot possibly be involved in every regional conflicts. Often, regional groupings and individual country may take the lead in an attempt to address an intra-state conflict. For example, in the cases of Sri Lanka, Mindanao, and Aceh (places where Japan was involved in peace-building), their internal conflicts were not addressed by the UN but the leading countries of Norway, Malaysia, and Finland respectively. The proposal to send the SDF for peace-monitoring alongside other peace-fostering countries even if outside the UN framework is likely to be controversial in Japan given the Cabinet Legislation Bureau’s narrow interpretation of Article 9, the famous no-war clause of the Constitution. The ruling parties of Japan (the LDP [1955–2009] and subsequently the DPJ) have accepted the Bureau’s narrow definition of Article 9 as permitting the country to be engaged only in ‘defensive’ defence. Domestically, there is the fear that SDF members would either be imperilled if they were caught in an entangling conflict abroad or the

17

‘Government plans to send GSDF to South Sudan: engineers to repair roads, bridges,’ Daily Yomiuri Online, 18 September 2011.

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nation would slide down the slippery slope to militarism again. Nevertheless, for Japan to be a ‘normal’ country, it should at least do what the peace-loving Scandinavian countries like Norway and Finland have done — to send their troops for peace-monitoring even in risky places and be enthusiastically involved in peace-making. Even if Japan cannot be involved in peace-enforcement in conflict areas because of its strategic culture and constitutional constraints, it should participate in peace-monitoring in places where the prospects for a peace settlement and the post-conflict consolidation of peace are fair. An argument can be made that given its unique constitutional and political constraints, Japan can still participate in peace-monitoring by dispatching civilians or the police rather than the SDF to conflict areas once a ceasefire is in place. But the SDF has some of the best equipped and well-trained personnel in the world. Its primary mission is no longer merely a deterrent against an improbable invasion by an imaginary enemy or a provider of logistical support to the US ally in a regional crisis in areas around Japan (interpreted as Korean peninsula and Taiwan) but also international peace cooperation. The SDF already has operational readiness for UNPKO, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peace-monitoring. For example, the SDF dispatched a thousand troops to Aceh for humanitarian assistance shortly after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The SDF mounted large scale operations at home after the March 2011 Earthquake, tsunami, and radioactivity in Fukushima. But lacking are political vision, conviction, and courage of the top political leadership to deploy the SDF like other ‘normal’ peacecountries for peacekeeping and peace-monitoring. These activities are fundamentally different from war-fighting and resolving interstate conflict by force. The puzzle is: why does Japan, a country with considerable human resources, wealth, and aspirations to play a larger role in human security and peace-building, tread so gingerly abroad? Apparently, the new DPJ government is bereft of ideas about

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international relations including peace-building.18 There are a number of plausible reasons. First is the mediocrity of Japan’s top politicians. Many of them cut their teeth in local politics concerned about pork barrel politics and resource distribution to supporters, interest groups, and voters to win electoral support. But most Japanese politicians have little time, interest, and ideas for international affairs let alone knowledge about ethnic conflict in places like Mindanao, Southern Thailand, and Sudan. A few politicians like former DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio may have romantic visions (including an EAC) but no prominent politician has expressed a personal interest and commitment to peacebuilding. There are also no fresh ideas from ministers and MPs about going beyond the limitations of a human security approach in Japan’s international relations which may provide palliative assistance to people suffering from internal conflict but does not address the political root causes of such conflict. Two prominent faces of Japanese human security and peace-building — Ogata and Akashi — are already old and not necessarily household names in Japan let alone abroad. Moreover, there are no Japanese statesmen who can personify peacebuilding like former President Jimmy Carter, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Secondly, is the unstable domestic politics of Japan which is not conducive for ‘New Thinking’ in human security and peace-building. The Japanese political leadership has been lurching from one domestic crisis to another amidst a regime shift from the LDP’s 54 years of perennial rule at the national level. The preoccupation of leaders in the DPJ is to stay in power and to ensure that legislation is passed (despite the control of the Upper House by the opposition parties). On the foreign policy front, the new DPJ government has also been lurching from crisis to crisis over the US marine base in Futenma, 18

See Lam Peng Er, “Has Japan adopted a ‘New Thinking’ in its Diplomacy?” in Lam Peng Er and Colin Durkop (eds.), Rethinking Diplomacy: New Approaches and Domestic Challenges in East Asia and the European Union (Seoul: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011).

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Okinawa (which led to the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama in 2010 over his failure to deliver on an electoral promise to relocate the base outside Okinawa), a collision between a Chinese fishing boat and two Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the vicinity of the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands, and a surprise visit by President Dmitry Medvedev to the disputed Southern Kuriles (Northern Islands) in the same year. Nuclear proliferation by North Korea is another worry. Apparently, there is little time for the top Japanese leadership and bureaucrats to rethink the country’s approach to human security and peace-building. They appear to be simply muddling through in international relations. The weakness of Japanese peace-building is more profound than merely political mediocrity among its politicians. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has failed to publicise its efforts at peacebuilding abroad to win greater support and understanding from the media and general public. The intellectual class comprising academics and opinion shapers and talking heads in the media also lack knowledge and imagination about peace-building in concrete areas. They tend to be opinionated about the legalistic implications of Article 9 of the constitution for Japan’s international relations and supportive of peace-building and international peace cooperation in general but usually have no concrete strategies to offer in specific areas suffering from internal conflict. There is, however, green shoots sprouting in Japan which may support the endeavour of peace-building in the long run. By 2011, many peace-building programs have been established in a number of leading Japanese universities and centres attracting academics and students into this new field where virtually none existed a decade ago. Increasingly, some of these students are guided by altruism to become volunteers in peace-building abroad. Graduate students and young scholars of peace-building in Japan may also help generate ‘New Thinking’ in human security and peacebuilding. They may also be reinforced by Japanese practitioners in UNPKO, UN Commission of Human Security, and UN Peace Building Commission who will share their wealth of knowledge with others.

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Japan has also supported the establishment of peace-building centres not only in Hiroshima but also in Africa to train peace-builders.19 Conceivably, a new generation of politicians, bureaucrats, scholars, journalists, students, and civil society activists will emerge as the dynamos in a new era of peace-building who can think creatively about political problems and solutions rather than to cling on to the chimera of ODA as material incentives for conflict resolution. Peace-building and a human security approach in Tokyo’s foreign policy are likely to be a long and arduous journey with no guaranteed results. Nevertheless, Japan’s peace-building based on a human security concept has the prospect of enhancing a more peaceful world. An alternative approach based on rearmament and geo-strategic competition with a rising China is likely to result in a more turbulent East Asia. Bibliography Akiyama, N (2004). Human security at the crossroad: Human security in the Japanese foreign policy context. IPSHU English Research Report Series No.19, Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of Peace-building. Hiroshima: Hiroshima University. Atanassova-Cornelis, E (2005). Japan and the ‘human security’ debate: History, norms and pro-active foreign policy. Graduate Journal of AsiaPacific Studies, 3(2). Benedek, W, MC Kttemann and M Mostl (eds.) (2011). Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management: Policies, Problems, Potential. New York: Routledge. Edstrom, B (2011). Japan and Human Security: the Derailing of a Foreign Policy Vision. Institute for Security & Development Policy, Asia Paper. Edstrom, B (2008). Japan and the Challenge of Human Security: The Founding of a New Policy 1995–2003. Institute for Security & Development Policy. Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (2011). The Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding. Hiroshima: HPC. 19 See Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, The Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding [Commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Fiscal Year 2010] (Hiroshima: HPC, 2011).

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JICA (2006). President Ogata’s Trip to the Philippines: Traveling to Mindanao Province. Koizumi, J (2002). Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership. Koizumi, J (2002). Japan and Australia: Towards a Creative Partnership. Lam, PE (2009). Japan’s Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role. New York and London: Routledge. Lam, PE (2008). Japan’s peace-building in Mindanao: Partnering the Philippines, Malaysia and the Moro Islamic liberation front. Japanese Studies, 28(1). Lam, PE (2006). Japan’s human security role in Southeast Asia. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28(1). Lam, PE (2011). Has Japan adopted a ‘new thinking’ in its diplomacy? In Rethinking Diplomacy: New Approaches and Domestic Challenges in East Asia and the European Union, Lam PE and C Durkop (eds.). Seoul: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007). Japan’s Efforts at Peacebuilding: Towards Consolidation of Peace and Nation-Building. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, (2011). Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Meeting between President Aquino of the Philippines and MILF Chairman Murad on the Mindanao Peace Process in the Philippines. Obuchi, K (1998). Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia. Lecture program hosted by the Institute for International Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam.

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CHAPTER 9

PIRACY AND MARITIME SECURITY: JAPAN’S STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Sam Bateman

This chapter first reviews the global situation with piracy with a focus on two current ‘hot spots’ — off the Horn of Africa and in Southeast Asian waters — before considering the implications for Japan. It discusses Japan’s stake in international shipping and the challenges posed to Japan by the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism. With its large dependence on shipping and seaborne trade, Japan is greatly concerned about these threats and has taken a lead with measures to promote maritime security and to counter piracy in Southeast Asia, while actively participating in anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy has served the strategic interests of Japan as well. It has allowed Japan to establish a strategic presence in key maritime strategic areas of the world, and has provided justification for widening the scope of the Japanese Constitution to permit regular overseas deployments by the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF). Piracy: A Threat from a Non-State Actor Sea piracy is a major maritime security problem for Asia, especially for countries, including Japan, that are heavily dependent upon seaborne trade for their ongoing national prosperity and security. Attacks by 201

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Somalia-based pirates off the Horn of Africa,1 in the Gulf of Aden and far out into the Arabian Sea attract most attention. However, acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships continue to occur in South and Southeast Asia, particularly in the southern part of the South China Sea, where there has been a worrying increase in the number of attacks over the past two years.2 The Joint War Committee of Lloyds of London lists extensive areas of the Indo–Pacific as war risk areas due to the risk of pirate attack, including Djibouti, Somalia and adjacent areas of the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Yemen, the ports of Balikpapan and Jakarta in Indonesia, the Sulu archipelago, and northeast coast of Sumatra.3 The war risk areas in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean were increased in December 2010 as Somali pirates widened their area of operations.4 The threat of piracy is of great concern to Japan along with the possible threat of a terrorist attack on shipping. Japan is highly dependent upon imports of energy and other critical minerals. In 2007, Japan imported 99.6% of its oil, 100% of its coal and 96.4% of its natural gas from overseas.5 Japan’s primary interest in the Indian Ocean has long been the safe passage of its energy supplies from the Middle East.6

1 The Horn of Africa is the northeastern corner of Africa, including Somalia and surrounding territories. 2 Jermyn Chow, ‘Sea Piracy hits five-year high in waters near Singapore — Worst affected vessels are tankers and large container ships,’ Straits Times, 21 September 2009. 3 The war risk areas as of 16 December 2010 may be found at: . 4 Jonathan Saul, ‘Ship underwriters widen Somali piracy threat zone,’ Reuters, 21 December 2010, . 5 Tetsuo Kotani, ‘Japan’s Maritime Challenges and Priorities’ in Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (eds.), Maritime Challenges and Priorities in Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming 2011). 6 Purnendra Jain, ‘Japan’s Interest in Indian Ocean,’ Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, April 2003.

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The July 2010 attack on the Japanese tanker M. Star, while it was approaching the Strait of Hormuz, possibly carried out by Islamist terrorists served to highlight the vulnerability of Japanese shipping to a terrorist attack in those waters.7 Ensuring the security of critical energy and mineral imports is a major strategic challenge for Japan. Much of these supplies are carried in ships passing through waters at risk of pirate attack, particularly the Arabian Sea and in Southeast Asia. As a consequence, Japan has been at the forefront of moves to counter piracy in these areas. As discussed later in this paper, Japan has initiated key measures to ensure ship safety, security, and marine environmental protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and deployed warships on counter-piracy operations off Somalia. These activities, however, have brought some strategic benefits to Japan by supporting a Japanese presence in key maritime strategic areas of the world — the ‘choke points’ for shipping in Southeast Asia and off the Horn of Africa, as well as in the wider Indian Ocean. Table 1 shows trends with the incidence of piracy and armed robbery against ships (actual and attempted) worldwide between 2004 and 2010. The large jump in the number of attacks globally between 2008 and 2009 was due to increased attacks off the Horn of Africa by Somali pirates. By far the greatest concentration of piracy incidents globally since 2008 has been off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy in Somalia has become ‘big business’ earning the pirates an estimated US$55million in 2008 and perhaps nearly twice that in 2009.8 Factors that have facilitated this situation include the breakdown in governance onshore in Somalia, the pirates’ improved operational expertise, and some initial delays in the international community ‘getting its act together’ to deal with the situation. The problem may have been misunderstood initially with international 7

William Maclean and Jonathan Saul, ‘Analysis: Militant raid on tanker shows Gulf security gap,’ Reuters, 22 November 2010, . 8 Robert Rotberg, ‘Combating maritime piracy: A policy brief with recommendations for action,’ Policy brief #11, World Peace Foundation, 26 January 2010.

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Global piracy — actual and attempted attacks (2004–2010).

Location

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

South-East Asia South Pacific Indian Subcontinent Americas Horn of Africa Nigeria Other Africa Rest of World Total

170 1 32 45 10 28 35 8 329

118

87

65

68

113

36 25 45 16 19 17 276

53 29 20 12 29 9 239

78 2 30 21 44 42 34 12 263

23 14 111 40 38 2 293

30 37 218 29 25 3 410

28 40 219 19 17 3 439

Source: IMB Annual Reports.

authorities not fully appreciating the necessity of dealing with political dimensions of the problem.9 Japan’s Shipping Interests The security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has long been a major strategic challenge for Japan.10 As a consequence, Japan has been greatly concerned about increased threats of piracy and armed robbery against ships, as well as about the possibility of a terrorist threat to shipping. This is not surprising. Japan is both a major shipping and shipper nation. It is the fourth-largest trading nation (4.53% of world trade) (measured in US dollars, imports plus exports), and the country has an even more important share in the global shipping fleet with 15.73% of the fleet controlled by Japan, although only a minor proportion of its controlled fleet flies the national flag.11

9

Martin Murphy, ‘Somali Piracy: Not just a naval problem,’ Backgrounder (Washington: Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments), 16 April 2009, p. 2. 10 Euan Graham, Japan’s Sea Lane Security 1940–2004: A matter of life and death? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport 2010, UN Publication UNCTAD/RMT/2010, p. 69.

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The Japanese controlled merchant fleet is the second largest in the world (after Greece) with a total fleet of 3,751 ships over 1,000 gross tons (GT), and a total deadweight tonnage (dwt) of over 183 million tons as at 1 January 2010.12 About 720 of these vessels are under the Japanese flag and 3,031 under a foreign flag. Japan has a total of 6,221 ships under the Japanese flag if vessels of 100 GT and above are considered.13 Thus most Japanese-flagged vessels are small (i.e., between 100 GT and 1,000 GT) and employed mainly within the Japanese islands. Japanese controlled vessels trading overseas are mainly under foreign flags. The average size of these vessels under international or open registry flags is about 58,000 dwt.14 They are mainly large oil tankers and bulk carriers. Japan makes extensive use of Panama as a foreign flag with 8,100 Japanese controlled vessels over 100 GT and above under the Panamanian flag as at 1 January 2010.15 Panama is the largest flag of ship registration with 22.6% of the global shipping fleet by dwt, or 7.93% of the fleet by number of ships of 100 GT or above, under the flag of Panama. This disparity in percentages reflects the fact that ships on the Panama registry are mainly large. Japanese-controlled vessels constitute 52.8% of the ships under the Panamanian flag. Japan makes much less use of the other major flags of convenience with only 111 ships under the Liberian flag, 89 under the Bahamas flag, and 32 ships under the Marshall Islands’ flag.16 Many Japanese-controlled ships have been attacked by pirates over the years, including some hijacked off Somalia. 17 No Japanese-flag ships were attacked by pirates in 2009 and 2010, but

12

UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, Table 2.6, p. 41. UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, Table 2.7, p. 43. 14 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, Table 2.9, p. 49. 15 Data in this paragraph comes from: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, Table 2.7, p. 43. 16 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, Table 2.9, pp. 46–47. 17 Michael Penn, ‘Somali Pirates and Political Winds Drive Japan to the Gate of Tears,’ Japan Focus: The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 4-2-09, 20 January 2009, . 13

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Japanese-controlled ships under foreign flags tell a different story with 16 attacks in both 2008 and 2009 and 23 attacks in 2010.18 The chemical tanker Golden Nori, hijacked off the coast of Somalia in October 2007 was the first Japanese-controlled vessels taken by Somali pirates with a further five vessels hijacked in 2008. These events became one of the ‘top foreign policy issues in Tokyo’ and ‘a potential turning point for Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution.’19 Panama is the flag that had most ships hijacked in 2009 and 2010 with 12 ships hijacked in 2010 (of a total of 53 hijackings that year) and 6 in 2009 (of a total of 49 hijackings during the year).20 Thus 12.2% of the ships hijacked in 2009 were Panamanian registered, and in 2010, the figure was 22.6%. Or in other terms, while about onetwelfth of the world shipping fleet is flagged in Panama, nearly onequarter of the ships hijacked in 2010 were Panamanian-registered. Some of these were Japanese-controlled vessels. The hijacking or kidnapping of Japanese nationals by pirates is a community concern in Japan that often leads to some reaction from the Japanese Government. This was the case when the small Japaneseflag tug Idaten was boarded by heavily armed pirates in March 2005 in the Malacca Strait.21 Three crew members, including the Japanese Master and Chief Engineer, were taken hostage but later released after a ransom was paid.22 This incident led to increased efforts by Japan to counter piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, including the Cooperative Mechanism between littoral and user states discussed in the next section.

18

IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships — Annual Report for the Period 1 January-31 December 2010, January 2011, Table 13, p. 17. 19 Penn, ‘Somali Pirates and Political Winds.’ 20 IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships — Annual Report for the Period 1 January-31 December 2010, January 2011, Narration of Attacks, pp. 57–65. 21 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships — Annual Report for the Period 1 January-31 December 2005, January 2006, p. 33. 22 ‘Violence resumes in Malacca Straits,’ ICC Commercial Crime Services, 15 March 2005, .

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The Japanese Contribution to Countering Piracy Even before piracy became the focus of increased international attention, first in the Malacca Strait in 2005 and then off Somalia from 2008 onwards, Japan was active in promoting cooperation to improve the safety and security of shipping. In 2000, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) took the lead in establishing the annual North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF), which now includes as members, the coast guards (or equivalent forces) of Canada, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.23 The NPCGF produces practical outcomes, such as joint operational guidelines, and combined training for counter-smuggling, search and rescue, and fisheries enforcement. Japan has been heavily involved in global efforts to counter sea piracy. Japan has been using the JCG extensively as a ‘foot in the water’ in Southeast Asian waters since 2000 to combat piracy.24 The use of the JMSDF would be unacceptable for this activity both for Japan constitutionally and to regional countries with some even opposing the JCG presence at least initially.25 However, Japan persisted and JCG vessels and aircraft now regularly visit Southeast Asia for exercises with their regional counterparts and other capacitybuilding activities. The Indian and Japanese Coast Guards have been conducting joint exercises every year since the year 2000 alternately in each other’s waters.26 The JCG was instrumental in establishing AMARSECTIVE 2004, which was adopted at the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies (HACGA) meeting in Tokyo in 2004 setting in motion a list of measures that have been drawn up to address maritime security concerns,

23

Kotani, ‘Maritime Challenges and Priorities of Japan,’ p. 8. Nayan Chanda, ‘Foot in the Water,’ Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 March 2000, pp. 28–29. Mark Valencia, ‘Joining Up With Japan to Patrol Asian Waters,’ International Herald Tribune, 28 April 2000. 25 ‘Malaysia rejects Japan’s offer for anti-piracy patrols,’ The Times of India online, 15 November 2000. 26 ‘DG Coast Guard’s Visit to Japan,’ Indian Frontier, 1 June 2007, . 24

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including piracy and terrorism.27 Among other things, it sets out the commitments and responsibilities of coastguard agencies, and areas of regional and technical assistance and information sharing. The HACGA meetings, initially led by Japan but now carrying on with their own momentum, have proven to be a very useful, but perhaps under-appreciated, forum for regional maritime security cooperation and confidence-building. The last HACGA meeting was held in Shanghai in October 2010 and in a significant relaxation of the freeze on high level military exchanges between India and China, was attended by the chief of the Indian Coast Guard.28 The JCG undertakes capacity-building activities to enhance maritime security across Southeast and South Asia. It conducts training for foreign personnel in Japan; is assisting Southeast Asian countries in conjunction with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in developing national coast guards, including providing patrol boats; and has hosted Port Security Seminars in Southeast Asian countries to assist implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.29 In March 2005, Japan held the second ‘ASEAN–Japan Seminar on Maritime Security and Combating Piracy’ in Tokyo to review the progress of the ASEAN countries on implementation of ISPS Code. In June 2006, Japan donated three patrol boats to Indonesia to help fight terrorism and piracy, after earlier donating a training vessel to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). In another diplomatic initiative, the JCG sponsored the Indian Ocean (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) Maritime Safety Practitioners’ Conference in Tokyo in November 2001.30

27

Sam Bateman, ‘International Solutions to Problems of Maritime Security — Think Globally, Act Regionally!,’ Maritime Studies 139, November–December 2004, p. 15. 28 Manu Pubby, ‘Govt gives nod for Coast Guard chief’s visit to China,’ Indian Express, 29 September, 2010. . 29 For a comprehensive description of Japanese maritime security initiatives in Southeast Asia see John F. Bradford, ‘Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the Coastal State Responses,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26, No. 3, 2004, pp. 480–505. 30 Japan Coast Guard, Annual Report 2002, Tokyo, 2002, p. 88.

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The JCG established a special office in 2007 to boost cooperation with its overseas counterparts to combat piracy at sea, especially in the Malacca Strait and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.31 The use of the JCG for these activities circumvents the constitutional limitations on the expansion of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and allows the growth of maritime capabilities outside of the defence budget.32 ReCAAP is a particularly important Japanese initiative that was developed through successive HACGA meetings and AMARSECTIVE 2004, Most ASEAN countries, Japan, China, Korea, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are working under ReCAAP to maintain an information network and a cooperation regime to prevent piracy and armed robbery against ships in regional waters. ReCAAP is a most significant achievement for the region that provides the basis for regional cooperation to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships. Unfortunately two key countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, have not so far joined the agreement although they do cooperate to some extent with the ReCAAP ISC in Singapore. Malacca and Singapore straits Japan has been actively involved in measures to ensure the safety of navigation and prevention of marine pollution in the Malacca and Singapore Straits since the late 1960s through the Malacca Strait Council (MSC).33 With funding from Japan, the MSC has overseen 31 ‘Coast Guard to Expand Antipiracy Cooperation,’ The Japan Times, 6 January 2007, . 32 Richard J. Samuels, “‘New Fighting Power!’ Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/08, pp. 84–112. 33 The MSC was established in 1969 for the purpose of route maintenance along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Since then, the MSC has been continuing its efforts to improve safe navigation and preservation of marine environment in the Straits. The work of the MSC is supported by the Japanese Government and maritime community through organisations such as the Nippon Foundation, The Japan Maritime Foundation, The Japanese Shipowners’ Association, Petroleum Association of Japan, The General Insurance Association of Japan, and The Shipbuilders’ Association of Japan.

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hydrographic surveys, oil spill countermeasures, and the provision of navigational aids in the Malacca Strait.34 For many years, Japan was apparently happy to be the only outside state to contribute to the costs of maintaining these services, but as the costs increased, along with increased use of the straits by other Northeast Asian countries, Japan sought to involve other countries in cost contributions. In doing so, however, it has wanted to maintain its pre-eminent position as the ‘lender of first resort.’ Largely as a consequence of Japanese lobbying, a series of meetings sponsored by the IMO: in Jakarta in 2005, Kuala Lumpur in 2006, and Singapore in 2007 led to establishment of the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.35 While the mechanism does not specifically cover security, it was a most significant step forward in regime building for these straits. It was a major breakthrough in reconciling the interests of different stakeholders in security and safety in the straits. The mechanism encourages user States and other stakeholders to voluntarily cooperate with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to enhance safety, security, and environmental protection in the Straits.36 The Cooperative Mechanism comprises three elements: a Cooperation Forum, an Aids to Navigation Fund, and specific projects managed by a Project Coordination Committee.37 The Forum brings together the littoral States, user States, and other interested 34

Kotani, ‘Maritime Challenges and Priorities of Japan.’ For an overview of the Cooperative Mechanism, see Robert Beckman, ‘Maritime security and the cooperative mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ in Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (eds.), In: Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power — Between Rising Naval Power (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 114–128. 36 Yohei Sasakawa, ‘Towards a New World Maritime Community: Cooperative Framework for the Future of the Malacca and Singapore Straits,’ RSIS Commentary 17/2007, Singapore: RSIS, 21 March 2007. 37 Hiroshi Terashima, ‘Transit Passage and Users’ Contributions to the Safety of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ in Myron. H. Nordquist, Tommy B. Koh and John N. Moore (eds.), Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights, and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention in (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), pp. 357–368. 35

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stakeholders. The Fund is intended to enable user States and other stakeholders to make voluntary contributions to enhance navigational safety and environmental protection by maintaining and replacing aids to navigation such as lighthouses and buoys. Several countries, including Australia, China, and the United States, have offered to fund or contribute to the funding of these projects. Japan has been remarkably successful in leading efforts to promote maritime cooperation in the key strategic waterways of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. As one analyst has described Japan’s contributions: Building upon its civilian cooperation with the three littoral states of the Malacca Strait for maritime safety and diplomatic cooperation, Japan has practiced cautious, nuanced, and indirect leadership to improve maritime security in the Malacca Strait. Japan’s intellectual contributions to the development of maritime security cooperation concepts in particular form the backbone of its leadership.38

JMSDF deployments to Somalia Piracy off Somalia has become a critical turning point for the Japanese Constitution with regard to overseas deployments of the Japanese self defence forces.39 After increasing attacks on Japanese ships, Japan decided in January 2009 to deploy JMSDF ships to protect Japanese commercial vessels off the coast of Somalia.40 Two destroyers subsequently left for Somalia in March 2009 to join the multinational naval

38

Yoichiro Sato, Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, September 2007). . 39 Penn, ‘Somali Pirates and Political Winds,’ p. 1. 40 Normitsu Onishi and Mark McDonald, ‘Japan Says It Will Send Anti-Piracy Force to Somalia’s Coast,’ New York Times, 28 January 2009. .

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forces.41 Two JMSDF P3 long range maritime patrol aircraft were also deployed to an air base in Djibouti. In a more recent development, Japan plans to open its first overseas military base during 2011 in Djibouti where there will be an airfield for maritime patrol aircraft and a permanent port facility for JMSDF warships.42 The JMSDF ships and aircrafts are engaged on national tasking and while they work closely with the organised naval combined task forces in the region, such as the European Union’s Operation ATALANTA and the US led multinational task forces CTF 151 established in January specifically for counter-piracy operations, they are not part of those forces.43 The deployment of Japanese warships to Somalia required a new law to authorise the mission and circumvent any residual constitutional limitations. The Law on the Penalization of Acts of Piracy and Measures against Acts of Piracy was enacted by the Japanese parliament in June 2009.44 Initially the JMSDF ships were only able to guard Japanese vessels, but the new law allows Japan’s military to take more effective and appropriate measures against piracy in cooperation with other countries and to escort foreign vessels as well. However, weapons may still only be used in self-defence.45

41 ‘Japanese warships join fight against pirates in Somalia,’ AsiaNews.it, 14 March 2009, . 42 ‘New Djibouti Base: A Cautious Outreach Abroad,’ Middle East & Africa Monitor, May 2010, . 43 John F. Bradford, ‘United States Maritime Strategy — Implications for Indo–Pacific Sealanes,’ Paper presented at the 16th International SLOC Group Conference, 31 January–1 February 2011, New Delhi. 44 Taisaku Ikeshima, The High Seas: Freedoms, Obligations and Jurisdiction, Powerpoint Presentation to ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Manila, 8–9 March 2011, Slide 14. 45 Shino Yasua, ‘Japan passes anti-piracy law,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 2009. .

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The JMSDF mission to Somalia is quite distinct from the JMSDF’s earlier deployments to the Middle East in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan. These ended in 2007 after the Japanese Government failed to win opposition backing to renew the deployment.46 Since 2001, Japan fleet replenishment tankers had provided about 126 million gallons of fuel to US, British, and other vessels operating in the Indian Ocean. As well as the JMSDF deployments to Somalia, Japan has also sought to strengthen its relations and build capacity for maritime security in the region. Japan has provided patrol boats and other vessels to Yemen and facilitated regional meetings on combating piracy.47 Deploying warships to counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa also serves the purpose of governments wishing to establish strategic presence and influence in a region that is politically unstable but vitally important as a source of energy. The JMSDF deployments may be a possible example of this consideration. While the deployments were ostensibly to protect Japanese merchant ships, Japan was also concerned about its prestige and image in the region, particularly after China had decided to deploy warships to anti-piracy operations off Somalia.48 The deployment also accorded with Japan’s desire to attain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and helped the JMSDF to justify its substantial budget. Conclusion The situation with piratical attacks off the Horn of Africa remains serious, but it still should be kept in perspective. Only a very small proportion of the ships passing through the area are successfully hijacked and they are often ships that have not followed best practice in protecting themselves against hijacking. The direct economic losses to

46

Justin McCurry, ‘Japan pulls out of Afghanistan coalition,’ Guardian, 1 November 2007. . 47 Penn, ‘Somali Pirates and Political Winds,’ p. 9. 48 Penn, ‘Somali Pirates and Political Winds,’ p. 8.

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the shipping industry are relatively low, although insurance premiums for ships passing through this area have been increased. Much depends on the quality of a ship and her crew. A valuable ship with a valuable cargo is more likely to be operated by a well trained and motivated crew who will take all precautions against being hijacked. While the shipping industry regularly calls for more action from governments to counter piracy,49 the industry itself could be doing more to ensure that ships are not successfully attacked.50 The Japanese Government and the Japanese ship-owners in particular with their large stake in international shipping, are well placed to take the lead in promoting greater moves to ensure that ships comply with BMP guidelines and that sub-standard vessels are not employed in high risk piracy areas. Japan is greatly concerned about the threats of piracy and terrorism to shipping, but apart from the direct threat posed by pirates off the Horn of Africa and in Southeast Asia, there is also a broader strategic context. Piracy has allowed Japan to establish a strategic presence in key areas where Japan has a vital interest in ensuring the safety and security of SLOCs. It has also provided the catalyst for widening the scope of the Japanese Constitution to permit overseas deployments by the JMSDF. Piracy has served the broader strategic interests of all three rising powers of Asia — China, India, and Japan. All three have sought to play a role in anti-piracy operations both off Somalia and in Southeast Asia, but with an element of strategic competition in this regard. They have all deployed warships to Somalia on anti-piracy operations and have provided capacity building assistance to local security forces both in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia. These actions have been as much about competing for regional power and influence as about countering piracy. 49

For example, Asian Shipowners’ Forum (ASF), ‘The ASF calls for a stop to piracy attacks on merchant ships,’ Press Release, The Japanese Shipowners’ Association, 25 May 2010. . 50 Nick Davis, ‘Take responsibility for stopping piracy,’ Lloyd’s List, 6 October 2010, .

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The way in which the situation with piracy and armed robbery against ships has been improved in other parts of the world provides grounds for believing that the Somali pirates will also be defeated eventually. Measures, such as improved governance onshore, better enforcement by local security forces, international support for capacity building assistance to these forces, enhanced cooperation between the foreign navies engaged on counter-piracy operations in the area, and greater vigilance by the crews of merchant ships passing through the area, all provide support for this optimistic assessment. Improved governance onshore is the vital factor but it is also the most difficult to achieve. Warships alone will not deter piracy off the coast of Somalia. It remains to be seen whether Japan and the international community can assist in the governability of anarchical Somalia to treat the source rather than the symptom of piracy. Bibliography Beckman, R (2010). Maritime security and the cooperative mechanism for the straits of Malacca and Singapore. In: Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power — Between Rising Naval Power, S Bateman and J Ho (eds.). Abingdon: Routledge. Bradford, JF (2004). Japanese anti-piracy initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy formulation and the coastal state responses. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(3). Chow, J (2009). Sea piracy hits five-year high in waters near Singapore — worst affected vessels are tankers and large container ships. Straits Times, 21 September. Graham, E (2006). Japan’s Sea Lane Security 1940–2004: A matter of life and death? Abingdon: Routledge. International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships — Annual Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2010, January 2011. Kotani, T (2011). Japan’s maritime challenges and priorities. In: Maritime Challenges and Priorities in Asia, S Bateman and J Ho (eds.). Abingdon: Routledge. Murphy, M (2009). Somali piracy: Not just a naval problem. Backgrounder. Washington: Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

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Penn, M (2009). Somali pirates and political winds drive Japan to the gate of tears. The Asia-Pacific Journal — Japan Focus, 4. Rotberg, R (2010). Combating maritime piracy: A policy brief with recommendations for action. Policy brief #11, World Peace Foundation. Samuels, RJ (2007). New Fighting Power!: Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security. International Security, 32(3). Sato, Y (2007). Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Terashima, H (2009). Transit passage and users’ contributions to the safety of the straits of Malacca and Singapore. In Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, MH Nordquist, TB Koh and JN Moore (eds.). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport 2010, UN Publication UNCTAD/ RMT/2010.

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JAPAN AND THE G8/G20: A GLOBAL/REGIONAL STRATEGY IN FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE Joel Rathus

Introduction In 1933, as the world struggled to recover from the Great Depression, an extraordinary meeting was held in London. This meeting, the London Monetary and Economic Conference, represented the first time that leaders of the world had gathered in a summit to address a global economic problem. Although membership was narrower than the current G20, and wealth was concentrated in merely the US, the UK, and France, but agreement could not be reached due to domestic political constraints, especially on the part of the US which stakeholders hoped would provide leadership.1 The inability to manage the economic crisis ultimately resulted in World War II, a tragedy which affected the established orders both in Europe and in East Asia. Successfully managing economic crises, especially those of global magnitude, is a key part of preserving peace and stability. This aspect

1

Rodney Morrison, ‘The London Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933: A Public Goods Analysis,’ American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 52, No. 3, 1993. 217

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of economic management is often considered an international public good which ought to be carried out by the leading state in the global system. Since the Second World War this role has been carried out by the US via the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But there has been growing dissatisfaction, especially in East Asia, with the service being provided mainly by the US. The absence, or even unwillingness of the US to lead and contribute during the Asian Financial Crisis marks the turning point after which East Asia, in large part led by Japan, started to develop the Chiang Mai Initiatives (CMI) as a part of its own regional mechanisms for coping with financial crises. Japan’s agenda since the Asian Financial Crisis and currently, during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), is to position itself more advantageously in the institutional architecture of international financial governance. To do so Japan has sought to leverage its position in the G8 and the IMF, and to establish new groups such as the G20 Summit and the recently expanded Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilateralization (CMIM). Taken together, these institutions represent the dominant means of international coordination in financial governance issues available to states today, and Japan’s major role in their development remains a significant if under-appreciated fact. As the G20 has taken over from the G8 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation, it is simply not adequate to explain the G20’s emergence as due to desires of George Bush, Gordon Brown, and Nicolas Sarkozy without reference to Japan’s real, if quiet, role as has become generally accepted.2 The expanding role of the G20, including the organisation of a G20 nuclear regulators meeting in the aftermath of the Great Tohoku earthquake which devastated Japan in early 2011, suggests that the G20 is now a fixture and will play an increasingly significant, if not wholly welcomed, role in shaping Japan’s foreign policy. 2

Rebecca Nelson, ‘The G20 and International Economic Cooperation,’ (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2009), pp. 6–7.

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Analytical Framework This chapter advances the argument that Japan has sought to expand its influence in international economic fora by using its position in global bodies to promote and control the development of regional institutions and by using these still developing regional institutions to force change at the global level. This is a sort of two-level game,3 one game at the regional level and one game at the global level. The games themselves are not carried out independently of each other, and Japan is playing its cards at one level with an eye to the other, and thus these games are intimately linked by Japanese interests and influences. The extant literature on this strategy, which I call in this paper a ‘global-regional interface,’ is most closely linked with liberal international relations theorists. In particular, this chapter follows the work of Oran Young. Young posits that there are fundamentally two different sources of institutions: those formed by/for the hegemon and those which are arrived at by negotiation amongst more or less formally equal powers.4 The G8 and IMF are of the former ‘hegemonic’ type while the G20 and the CMIM can be considered members of the latter ‘negotiated’ type. While these two types of institutions do not necessarily exist in competition with each other, the comparative decline of the US as the world’s leading power makes the salience of the G20 and CMIM is greater. For Japan, which is a major regional (although not hegemonic) player, the shift towards a re-negotiation of the world’s institutional

3

Two level game theory in international relations was first developed by Robert Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,’ International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1988. Since then his basic insight has been used in a variety of other studies, including works on global and regional institution building such as the EU’s multi-level games developed by Alasdair Young, ‘What Game? By Which Rules?’ in The European Union in International Affairs (Canberra: Australian National University, 2002). 4 Oran Young, ‘Review: International Regimes: Towards a New Theory of Institutions,’ World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1986.

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order brings challenges and opportunities. Japan is interested in protecting (and furthering where possible) its international influence. This is especially true in East Asia where the rise of China is placing Japanese interests in jeopardy, such as regional financial leadership. The essential strategy for Japan lies in using its position in global institutions to push regional institutions towards protecting the ‘status quo’ while at the same time using regional institutions to push for a global recognition of the role of Asia in general and Japan in particular at key international bodies, such as the G8 and IMF. Young explains how Japan can pursue this dual strategy by arguing that changes to (and creation of) international institutions, whether regionally or globally, require leadership across three areas: material, entrepreneurial, and intellectual.5 Japan’s diplomatic pushes into institution building in spite of its declining (relative) material power suggest that it is playing a leading role via the entrepreneurial and intellectual channels — notwithstanding that even after many years of stagnation Japan is still able to bring some financial weight to the bargaining table. At the same time, the observation that Japan is pursuing its interests consistently across multiple forums is hardly surprising. Even given Japan’s reputation for pursuing a fragmented foreign economic policy,6 the nature of international financial coordination as a highly technocratic exercise of little relevance to the domestic political success of ministers means that consistency in pursuing interests is comparatively easier to achieve. This chapter seeks to contribute by identifying the deliberate strategy of Japanese policymakers towards leveraging activities in one institution to achieve interests in another while also shedding light of the underlying factors which are driving this ‘global-regional interface’ strategy in Japan’s policy towards international financial institutions.

5

Oran Young, ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society’ in Lisa Martin (ed.), International Institutions: An International Organisation Reader (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001). 6 Purnendra Jain and Joel Rathus, ‘Japan’s Policy Fragmentation: The Japan–Australia FTA’ (paper presented at the Crises and Opportunities: Proceedings of the 18th Biennial Conference of the ASAA 2010, Adelaide, 2010).

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I argue that Japan has adopted a ‘two level’ strategy in response to three basic material forces: its own economic stagnation, the declining hegemonic power of the US in East Asia, and the rise of China. Grimes in his seminal work on East Asian financial regionalism focuses explicitly on the role of the China–Japan–US strategic triangle as an explanatory factor,7 while Rathus’ book traces exactly how Japan is responding to a changing balance of power by pursuing a form of networked regionalism with regard to projects such as the CMI.8 Examining the intellectual and entrepreneurial approaches Japan has made in its attempts to secure its interests elucidates this process. Following work by Wesley on organisational change, I discuss three significant sites of change in these international financial institutions: membership decision making processes and authority.9 This also follows on from work by He on institutional balancing as a strategy for coping with China in East Asia.10 The most important of these is institutional membership, which refers to the countries or entities accepted to participate in the institution. Even global institutions do not have universal membership; the IMF was forced to expel Taiwan for the usual political reasons in 1980. Nor is membership necessarily ‘equal,’ with both the IMF and the CMIM having voting power distributed unequally, which leads to the second issue — that of decision making power. The third site of change, authority, will in this paper focus on the function of surveillance. An international institution is also able to provide quality surveillance of the member economies only if it possesses sufficient authority, which is again determined by domestic political realities in the major players.

7

William Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial Regionalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009). 8 Joel Rathus, Japan, China and Networked Regionalism in East Asia (London: Palgrave, 2011). 9 Michael Wesley (ed.), The Regional Organizations of the Asia-Pacific (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 10 Kai He, ‘Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power in Southeast Asia,’ European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2008.

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Membership in Global/Regional Financial Governance: Japan’s Role and the China Factor Japan has a long history with the G8, but Japanese membership was hardly assured at the outset. In fact, the G8 Leaders Summit has evolved from the G7, which was initially setup as a meeting of Finance Ministers. Japan’s participation in the G7 is not accidental, having deliberately inserted itself into the international financial coordination after joining the Group of Ten in 1962. And yet Japan was initially excluded from the core decision making Group of Four which was setup by the US in 1973. US Treasury Secretary Schulz also wanted limited European influence, inviting only his counterparts in France, Germany, and the UK (rather than the whole G10) to the White House Library for an ad hoc and ostensibly one-off meeting to discuss, informally, US policy towards the dollar; pointedly Japan was also excluded. But this situation did not last long as in the following year the then Japanese Finance Minister Aichi Kiichi, having gotten wind of the library meeting, demanded Japan be included in the process and sought to annualise the meetings. Japan therefore established itself as a member of the G5 Finance Ministers.11 But while the G5 would focus on technical matters of international finance, France’s President Valéry Marie René Georges Giscard d’Estaing (who had taken part in the G5 process as Finance Minister previously) proposed that a Leaders Summit be held among a similar set of countries.12 The G6 Leaders Summit was therefore held in 1975 at the Château de Rambouillet with Italy participating, and the following year Canada joined to form the G7 Leaders Summit — although the G5 Finance Ministers group continued to meet in secret until the Plaza Accord of 1985, after which Italy and Canada were included and the existence of the meeting made a matter of public record.13 The G6/7 was also initially pitched as a one-off meeting, although Japan’s interest in its 11

Andrew Baker, The Group of Seven (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 23–24. Hugo Dobson, The Group of 7/8 (Oxon: Taylor and Francis, 2007), p. 59. 13 Baker, The Group of Seven, pp. 23–24. 12

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success was strong. As Dobson notes, ‘the fact that the Japanese Prime Minister was invited to the very first Summit ... was regarded in Japan as recognition of its position in the global political economy.’14 Indeed, Japan’s acceptance into the G5 Finance Ministers’ Meeting all but guaranteed that Japan should be invited to the Leaders Summit — although Japan’s exclusion from the ‘core’ group meeting at Gaudeloupe Summit in 1979 reveals that Japan’s membership was still liminal. This liminality, however, only raised the significance of the G7, and although Japan was a major contributor to the United Nations by this time, it was still also excluded from a permanent seat at the Security Council. Thus, the G7 Leaders Summit has held a special place in Japanese foreign policy as a symbol of acceptance at the ‘top table’ of international relations. Japan, China, and Outreach G7 Yet Japan has from the outset been interested in bringing other voices to the G7 table. As far back as 1975 Miki Takeo had made clear his desire to act as a ‘bridge between East and West’ and ‘felt strongly about speaking for Asia’ at the Summit.15 In particular, Japan has sought to use the G7 to engage with China, which stands in contrast to Japanese opposition to including Russia.16 Japan’s strategy is to use the G7 process to help socialise China into a liberal global order. The G7, which despite growing from an economic body and ostensibly focussed on ‘exchange of views on the world’s economic situation,’ is also committed to ‘government of an open, democratic society.’17

14

Dobson, The Group of 7/8, p. 51. Ibid. 16 Japan’s opposition to Russia is based on the outstanding territorial disputes in the Northern Kurile Islands. Japan opposed to calling the 1997 Denver conference a G8 and opposed Russia hosting in 2000. 17 Article 1 & 2 of the Rambouillet Declaration, ‘Declaration of Rambouillet (1975),’ . 15

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In 2000, Japan’s PM Obuchi made a major diplomatic effort to include China as a part of the outreach observer program at Okinawa — although that effort ultimately failed. China dismissed the offer to be part of the ‘rich countries club,’ on the basis of developing country status, but was interested in being included in an ‘observer only’ capacity. Moreover, given China’s concern over US military bases in Okinawa attendance was, politically, especially difficult for the Chinese.18 In 2003, France’s President Chirac was successful in inviting Hu Jintao to participate as an ‘expanded dialogue partner’ and China has participated since in this limited capacity. This is due in part to growing political tensions in the bilateral relationship with Japan during the Koizumi era as much as Chinese reticence about the Group. Indeed, during the 2004–2006 peroid, the leaders of Japan and China did not hold bilateral talks at the G7/8 as part of the outreach program, Japan becoming noticeably cool on these talks despite the initial interest in deeper Chinese participation.19 Post-Koizumi has seen a warming in relations, although China’s membership in the G7/8 remains as a part of the Outreach-5 (including Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa) program and the Heiligendamn dialogue process which was formalised by Japan in the 2008 Toyako Summit. But although Japan has been interested in seeing Chinese participation, Japan remains unconvinced about the benefits of supporting formal membership for China in the G7/8.20 The emergence of the G20 summit has helped take some of the momentum away from China gaining a seat on the G8. 18

Hugo Dobson, Japan and the G7/8 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 126. One Japanese author notes that China could have interpreted the choice of Ryukyus as re-welcoming of China as this area was the gateway between Japan and China in antiquity. See Yuichi Morii, ‘The G8 Summit in Global and Local Perspectives: Process, Meeting, and Japanese Domestic Politics’ in John Kirton (ed.), New Directions in Global Political Governance (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). 19 Laura Sunderland, ‘Bilateral Meetings at the G8 Summit,’ G8 information center, . Assessed 10 November 2011. 20 Hugo Dobson, ‘Japan and the Changing Global Balance of Power: The View from the Summit,’ Politics, No. 30, 2010, p. 36.

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From G8 to G20: Engaging China, Engaging the World The creation of the G20 is often interpreted as reflective of the rise of East Asia. The inclusion of China, South Korea, Indonesia, Australia, and India — all members of Japan’s preferred grouping, the East Asia Summit — being cited as evidence of this claim.21 Additionally, much like the G5 Finance Ministers Meeting (the precursor to the G7 Summit) was a response to a crisis brought on by the dollar’s break with the gold standard, the creation of the G20 Finance Ministers Meeting in 1999 is traceable to the Asian Financial Crisis. The creation of the G20 has also suited Japan’s basic interests in managing China. This is because it gives China an equal seat at what is officially the ‘top table’ for international economic coordination, while preserving the existence of the G7/8 as political entity capable of guiding the G20’s work. The G20 was handpicked by the G7 Finance Ministers in September 1999, which first tried other combinations of countries such as the G22 and G33 in 1998–1999.22 Moreover, unlike the G7 Finance Ministers, the G20 is a non-decision making body which focused on domestic reform rather than the G7/8 which is more focussed on international aspects.23 This is why ‘contrary to appearances, the G20 meetings are essentially run by proposals by G8 members’ and why Japan remains happy with the process.24 The view is further supported by former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio noting after the Pittsburgh Summit that, ‘the G8

21

Iftekhar Chowdhury, ‘The Global Governance Group (‘3G’) and Singaporean Leadership,’ in ISAS Work Paper No. 108 (Singapore: Institute for South Asian Studies, 2010), p. 4. He also notes that Europe was more or less opposed to the creation of G20 Finance Ministers. 22 Peter Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 151–152. Removing Malaysia with its interest in capital controls was key for the major powers which preferred a ‘liberal’ international finance order. 23 Injoo Sohn, ‘East Asia’s Counter Weight Strategy: Asian Financial Cooperation and Evolving International Monetary Order,’ in G-24 Discussion Paper Series no. 44 (United Nations Conference of Trade and Development, 2007), pp. 2–3. 24 MOFA official in Dobson, ‘Japan and the Changing Global Balance of Power: The View from the Summit,’ p. 39.

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Japan’s G20 bilaterals. Bilaterals with…

EU, Turkey US, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, China, Korea, Russia (G8), UK, Germany, and Canada Indonesia, India, Germany UN SecGen Ban Ki Mun, China, UK, Italy, Indonesia, Korea Brazil, Indonesia, UK

Source: MOFA website

should not be discarded ... the G20 involves 20 or 25 people gathering and discussing. It is extremely difficult to reach conclusion in such setting.’25 Thus, while the G20 has been able to achieve some remarkable successes during the GFC, Japan continues to see it as a second tier organisation. Unsurprisingly, Japan has sought to use the G20 as an opportunity to meet bilaterally with key countries, especially China (Table 1). Although the most recent opportunity for a bilateral meeting with China, at the G20 Summit in Seoul November 2011, was dashed by re-emerging tensions in the East China Sea. Japan had called strenuously for bilateral talks at the G20 but China was seemingly unwilling to meet with Kan Naoto. China preferred to meet later in the month in Japan at the APEC Summit (even then emphasising that Japan requested the meeting).26 At the previous summits in Toronto 2010 and London 2009, the leaders of Japan and China met to talk about the East China Sea dispute as well as North Korea. Thus the G20 as a forum for the leaders of Japan and China to meet bilaterally has been dealt a blow — while the G20 was designed for coordination of 25

Ibid. ‘Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Talks About President Hu Jintao’s Participation in G20 Summit and Apec Economic Leaders’ Meeting,’ held on 14 November 2010. . (Accessed: 4 October 2011). 26

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financial matters, Japan’s interest in broader engagement with the region, and China in particular, is proving problematic. The G20 is not becoming like the G8 in this regard, and is unable to address a major strategic issue amongst its membership — with implications for its functioning in the future. Japan is also concerned about the perceived lack of legitimacy of the G20 due to its narrow membership base. To these ends Japan has supported the Singapore organised ‘Global Governance Group’ (3G) which is an outreach program of the G20. This saw Singapore being invited to the Summit in Seoul 2010 to discuss the view of nonrepresented countries.27 Viewed cynically, Japan’s interest in expanding the number of voices heard at the G20 through the 3G could be interpreted as an attempt to weaken the institution vis-à-vis the G8. At the Seoul Summit Japan opposed the creation of dedicated G20 Secretariat, which implies a negative interest in the G20 becoming more institutionalised. This is all the more remarkable because China came out in support for the proposition.28 Despite the success of the G20 as a body, Japan has its leadership aspirations at the G20 frustrated several times, and even though it has offered to host both the second and third G20 summits Japan has yet to play anything more than a guest role (this is true even at the Financial Minister’s Meetings which began in 1999. Moreover Obama may have stolen Japan’s hosting at the 2nd US hosted Pittsburgh summit. Korea has also done better institutionally getting co-chair at Toronto and of course host).29 Another example of how Japan has been able to manage its global-regional strategy in international finance is in the Japan championed creation of the CMI. The CMI’s goals run parallel to the IMF

27

Chowdhury, ‘The Global Governance Group (‘3G’) and Singaporean Leadership.’ ‘Who Would Host a G20 Secretariat?,’ Chosun Ilbo, 15 November 2010. 29 John Kirton, ‘A Committed Contributor: Japan in G8 and G20 Governance,’ paper presented at Japan (Still) Matters: What Role in the World (Sheffield University: 2009). Officially, this was due to timetabling issues although the recent G20 in Seoul just days before the APEC conference in Yokohama indicates that Japan is failing to grab a big role in the group. 28

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and the G20 being a forum for the management of financial crises but at the regional rather than global level. The naming of the body as an ‘Initiative’ accurately captures Japan’s initial aims, which was not necessarily the creation of a new institution. The CMI is now viewed as the resurrection of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) concept championed by Japan during the Asian Financial Crisis. However there are important differences. Japan was hesitant to include the entirety of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) membership into the Initiative — preferring instead a functional approach which cherry picked the countries of economic importance to Japan without much regard to international politics. The initial network of Bilateral Swap Agreements included only half of ASEAN and Japan–China bilateral swap agreement came into effect only lately and even then in a halfhearted manner.30 Japan eventually agreed to expand membership to the entirety of ASEAN and to deepen significantly the Japan–Korea link to US$20 billion equivalent although Japan–China remained only at the initial 3 billion mark. While the reasons for this expansion have more to do with regional politics than actual functional utility, an examination of the major economies Japan targeted in the CMI and G20 membership reveals remarkable similarities (Fig. 1). Decision-Making Power: The G20 and the IMF — Managing the Quota Question A crucial part of the question of membership in global and regional institutions is the relative status of those members. It is often the case that a country opposes the inclusion of new members if they would be slotted in a ‘higher’ place in the pecking order. In international financial governance, the key metric of status — although not without limitations — is the voting weight at the IMF. As Rapkin and

30

The Japan–China BSA was finalised only after the initial round in 2,000 two years later in 2002 and was denominated in local currency — not USD — which is a lower commitment although no doubt also useful after a fashion. .

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Fig. 1.

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Membership of the G20 and CMI compared.

Strand note, the quota share of Japan, China, and Korea in the IMF during the 2000s was roughly 13%, despite the fact that between them they share roughly 24% of global GDP.31 It is clear therefore that any adjustment in the IMF voting weight championed by the G20 would be towards the emerging economies, and especially towards East Asia. Japan’s position on this has been largely positive. At the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 Summit, the world leaders supported a package of reforms for the IMF. First, they agreed to a shift of 5% of the voting weight to under-represented countries. Second, they agreed to antedate the revision of voting weight. Thirdly, they agreed to open up the competition for Managing Director to non-Europeans, paving the way for an East Asian (or other regional) head of the IMF.32 Finally, the G20 firmly committed itself to the Singapore reform 31

Sohn, ‘East Asia’s Counter Weight Strategy: Asian Financial Cooperation and Evolving International Monetary Order,’ p. 2. 32 Intriguingly some have voiced support for moving the IMF from Washington to Beijing as the IMF headquarters are to be based in the largest stock holder’s country.

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agenda (which had been discussed at the previous London summit without conclusion). This Singapore package of reforms had previously been endorsed by the IMF Board of Governors in April 2008 but in fact was first discussed in the 2006 Singapore AGM–IMF. The delay of nearly four years before the package was endorsed was due to the ‘difficult and time consuming’ negotiations about (especially China’s) under-representation — even the agreed deadline of 2011 may be ambitious.33 Japan has already reluctantly accepted a major role for China as a stake holder in the CMI, and has positioned itself to support China holding a greater share in the IMF. The actual reforms themselves occurred at two levels. Firstly there was a trebling of the basic votes from 250 to 750 — but this is, by itself, not going to trigger any major redistribution. The reforms will see basic votes expand from the current 2.1% to 5.5% — still far below their highest level of nearly 16%.34 The more significant part of the reform in terms of actual effect is a subtle rule change in the calculation of quota. Specifically the change of definition of GDP to be weighted 40% PPP/60% exchange, where previously it was calculated only by current market exchange rate. The actual agreement reached at the G20 actually goes against some of the principles established in Singapore. While the US has decided (together with Italy and Germany) to forgo an increase in its voting share, and Japan has also decided to forgo a part of their increase, the major country expanding its voting weight is China. If the IMF’s reform goes ahead as planned then China’s weight will be lifted from 2.98% to 6.39% while Japan would move from 6.23% to 6.46%, putting them at near parity.35

33

Includes change to 40% weighting of GDP–PPP to make change. Lukas Menkhoff and Reeno Meyer, ‘The G20 Proposal on IMF Governance: Has Any Progress Been Made?,’ Intereconomics, No. 3, 2010, pp. 2–3. 34 Lukas Menkhoff and Reeno Meyer, ‘The G20 Proposal on IMF Governance: Is There Progress?,’ in Discussion Paper No. 439, 2010. 35 Andrew Tweedie, IMF Quota and Governance Reform (Washington: IMF, 2010). Report accessible at .

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Even though Japan and China have significantly contributed to the General Arrangement to Borrow (GAB) and the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) — Japan committing $1 trillion to the schemes in 2009 — these contributions do not affect the quota calculation, only SDR’s do. NAB was the first stop on CMI’s road link of the $750 billion pledged by the G20 under the Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth pledge on 15 November 2008 Washington, but by 2009 only $195 billion had been delivered. This is because the $250 billion to the NAB is a commitment rather than paid-in fund.36 This seems to reflect Japan’s desire to not pay more to the IMF but to have China step up to the plate instead. The Question of Voting Weight in the CMI The CMI was, indeed still is, set-up as a support for the global level institution of the IMF. The link between the CMI as a regional body and the IMF is made obvious when one examines the rules for disbursement of funds. Without an IMF standby agreement, or other program, only a fraction of the funds are able to be released in the event of crisis.37 Japan’s fear that it may become pre-committed to bailing out its smaller neighbours in East Asia explains why Japan has been so interested in surveillance, or at least policy review, at the CMI. But questions remain over who will contribute how much, even to this IMF supplementary fund. In the CMI Japan and China have jostled for the position of top contributor, precisely in order to secure voting weight. Japan’s interest in leading here was sign-posted by having proposed that the yen

36

Hersh, Adam, ‘Monitoring Commitments and Compliance of the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balance Growth,’ New Rules for Global Finance (Washington, 2010). (accessed 10 November 2011). 37 Initially 10% able to be released increased to 20% under the 2005 Hyderabad agreement. This link to the IMF is in fact a peculiar feature to the CMI, neither its parallels in the Americas or Europe contain such a rule. C Randall Henning, East Asian Financial Co-Operation, Vol. 68 (Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2002), p. 62.

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count for half in the AMF. Japan was keen to be the single largest contributor to the CMI, with China in second place. Unsurprisingly, China insisted on equality with Japan.38 This rivalry between Japan and China deadlocked progress in the CMI from 2000 until the GFC broke out and forced change. It was only in 2008 after ASEAN agreed to take 20% of the total in May, and Korea accepted 16% of the total in April, that Japan and China faced enough pressure to reach the agreement to split the remaining 64% between the two of them equally.39 Even here China’s share included Hong Kong, which was abruptly added to membership of the CMI in order to allow China to claim equality with Japan while simultaneously allowing Japan to claim the largest individual contribution and hence equal voting weight (Hong Kong, although displayed separately, actually does not have a separate vote from PR China — see Table 2).40 This co-equality in the CMI is a notable first, and is not reflected in the IMF or other agencies like the ADB or the WB where Japan has more voting weight than China. The significance of this is that it reveals Japan’s influence in the creation of regional institutions for financial cooperation is slipping fast, and this in turn compels Japan to look to the global level. Surveillance and Enforcement in Global/Regional Financial Governance: Japan and China Surveillance is the sharp end of international financial governance institutions. Surveillance can come in at a variety of levels, from ‘Policy Dialogue’ at one end of the spectrum (which is the East Asian preferred model) to the more rigorous IMF surveillance. Yet the goal is still the same: to acquire information about the financial and 38

Saori Katada and Mireya Solis, ‘Under Pressure: Japan’s Institutional Response to Regional Uncertainty’ in Ramgopal Agarwala (ed.), Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration (Berlin: Springer, 2009), p. 140. 39 Put simply, China wanted to be equal to Japan, while Korea wanted to be equal to China. Author’s Interview with former MOF Official in Tokyo, November 2008. 40 ‘Asean, China, Japan, South Korea finalise Crisis Pact,’ AFP, 3 May 2009.

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Fig. 2.

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Voting weight in CMI.

monetary situation in the reviewed economy and to mutually ensure that beggar thy neighbour or similarly destabilising practices are not occurring, especially on the issue on the RMB’s value. However, China has been very cautious about revealing much on its own economy and especially about the condition of its domestic financial sector. Many of China’s largest banks are tied to government either formally or informally, and information about their loans profile is often tightly guarded for political reasons. China’s central bank is also more influenced by political concerns than its counterparts in the US, Europe, or Japan and has been accused of destabilising currency manipulation on a massive scale. Yet even the most ‘rigorous’ international surveillance of China conducted by the IMF has had poor and unsatisfactory results. Part of the reason for the IMF’s inability to conduct its mandated ‘firm surveillance’ of China is due to China’s stock-piling of foreign exchange reserves. While China is stockpiling FX for more than one reason, the

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effect is to virtually preclude China from ever having to go to the IMF to borrow FX in a crisis. This means that the IMF cannot coerce China in the same way as smaller players and is forced to rely on peer pressure alone.41 China’s record at the IMF is so poor that Michael Mussa, the former Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department at the IMF, argues that there has been a ‘catastrophic failure of Fund surveillance in the critical case of China.’ Thus there has been a re-emerging demand for firm surveillance by industrialised countries being driven by China and the debate on its exchange rate policy.42 Japan in particular is interested in pushing surveillance for China. China is still Japan’s largest destination of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow and with FDI stock of roughly $55 billion according to Japan External Trade Relations Organization (JETRO). With the IMF delivering unsatisfactory results, Japan has attempted to engage China bilaterally on the issue at high level strategic economic talks. Yet Japan has been unable to achieve any successful or meaningful surveillance due to Chinese resistance. An event in 2007 where China unilaterally changed the agreed text of talks to remove any discussion about the RMB did much to damage trust at the highest level.43 With the bilateral channel thwarted thus far, Japan has attempted to get surveillance on the agenda at the G20 and the CMI. G8/G20 and the FSB: Surveillance Agenda Japan’s interest in surveillance at the regional level was first voiced at the APT–FMM in May 2001. Japan co-chaired the study group and prepared the final report. However, policy review and surveillance was curtailed by Chinese opposition, and remained an informal process. A year later and Japan’s quest for greater surveillance yielded the 41

Domenico Lombardi and Ngaire Woods, ‘The Politics of Influence: An Analysis of IMF Surveillance,’ Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 15, No. 5, 2008. 42 Ibid., p. 712. 43 ‘Agreement with China modified without Japanese approval, RMB appreciation related,’ Chūnichi Shinbun, 10 December 2007.

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Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD), which was formed at the APT Deputy Finance Ministers’ Meeting. Yet Japan has become disillusioned quickly with making any real progress at the ERPD, which still lacks formalised and specified rules of disclosure like the IMF.44 Indeed, much of the surveillance undertaken is therefore a rehash of IMF materials, unless and until a credible institution is created.45 In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the G7 countries, with Japan playing a large role, set up the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to prevent similar occurrences.46 The FSF, which started work in 1999, initially had a membership drawn from the G7 countries’ finance ministries and central banks plus representatives from the IMF, WB, BIS, and ECB. The FSF was swiftly expanded, again with the Japanese playing a major role, to include Australia and Singapore. After 2009 London G20 Summit the Forum was complemented with the creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) which includes the entire G20 membership. But the FSF was not able to perform its expected role in surveillance and certainly failed spectacularly in preventing the GFC. Its major contribution was setting up 12 benchmark financial standards which the IMF/WB picked up for the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Yet the FSAP surveillance has struggled even at the IMF. China, together with other developing countries insisted that FSAP processes be voluntary and the governments be permitted to block the publication of FSAP evaluations. The process became a dead letter after Bush stopped the US participating and in any case China has thus far refused to take part — being especially concerned

44

Tetsuji Murase, ‘Economic Surveillance in East Asia and Prospective Issues,’ Kyoto Economics Review, Vol. 76, No. 1, 2007, p. 74. 45 CMI used IMF staff papers initially, which compares poorly with the OECD where each government confronts peer analysis. See, Peter Kenen and Ellen Meade, Regional Monetary Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 157. 46 P. Kupiec, ‘The IMF World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program: A View from the Inside’ in Douglas Evanoff (ed.), Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvency (Singapore: World Scientific, 2005), p. 77.

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about the bank stress testing (China, with its high saving rate would easily meet the Basel Core principle requirements) — although another factor is simply the massive cost in personal, time, and money.47 At the global level Japan, together with the other G7(8) countries, has (unsuccessfully) attempted to link FSAP to access to the IMF’s funds in a crisis.48 At a regional level, too, Japan has encouraged countries like Korea and the Philippines to use the FSAP as a means of surveillance for the CMI.49 Conclusion The world has not yet recovered from the GFC. More significantly, it has become clear that, even after recovery, the world cannot simply reset to the old pattern of Western industrialised countries leading in International Financial Institutions. This shifting balance of influence in key institutions, at both global and regional levels, and especially the twin dynamic of the rise of China and the decline of the US, poses major challenges for Japan. It is not accurate to characterise Japan as a merely reactive player in the significant changes that are occurring in the global financial institutional architecture; and Japan can be seen as a leader in ideas and an activist, if quiet one, in diplomacy on major reforms to the IFIs. This chapter has sought to elucidate Japan’s strategy for preserving its influence in the face of these challenges. It has argued that Japan has embraced a strategy which interfaces between regional and global level institutions as a means to have its interests furthered. In particular, Japan has used its position in the G7/8 and the IMF to lead and influence the output of the G20. From the outset Japan’s interests 47

FSAP cost $1billion before crisis. Davies and Green in Eric Helleiner, ‘What Role for the New Financial Stability Board?: The Politics of International Standards after the Crisis,’ Global Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2010. 48 Ibid., p. 283. 49 Jennifer Amyx, ‘What Motivates Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia Today?,’ Analysis from the East-West Center, No. 76, 2005.

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were in engaging with China in these institutions. Japan has attempted to link regional financial institutions like the CMI to the IMF in order to achieve its interests in surveillance, especially with regard to China and in order to further the development of the CMI. In the opposite direction, Japan has also used regional diplomacy such as the CMI to push key items on the IMF reform agenda, including the readjustment of voting weight. The emergence of the surveillance agenda item across these multiple levels of international financial governance, and Japan’s emerging interest and influence in this issue, reveals how this interfacing strategy can work to deliver concrete results. It should be noted however the global-regional strategy discussed herein is being conducted by ministry officials rather than the political leadership of Japan. With politics too fragmented, long term commitment of political capital to manage international organisations more strategically is impossible, making the global-regional strategy fundamentally reflexive and defensive. Moreover, Japan’s influence at the regional level institution of the CMI is already starting to weaken in the face of China’s rise and so it will become increasingly important that Japan works out ways to interface skilfully with global institutions such the IMF. Yet, as it becomes apparent that China will eventually take over the mantle of the world’s largest economy from the US, Japan’s strategy of interfacing with global institutions is further challenged. China’s rise to global number one will by necessity see a renegotiation of global institutions. The symbolic shift will occur when the IMF headquarters moves from Washington to Beijing as is mandated in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Ideationally, the shift will occur only if some kind of Beijing consensus emerges over the rules of international finance. At this time, it is far from apparent that Beijing shares many of Tokyo’s interests in this field, with major differences over protections for investors and liberalisation of the capital account. Even though the environment is getting tougher for Japan to realise its interests in financial institutional design, Japan is increasingly relying on this interfacing strategy to cope with change — although it remains an open question how successful this will be in the long run.

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Bibliography Amyx, J (2005). What motivates regional financial cooperation in East Asia Today? Analysis from the East-West Center, No. 76. Baker, A (2006). The Group of Seven. New York: Routledge. Chowdhury, I (2010). The global governance group (‘3G’) and Singaporean leadership. In: ISAS Work Paper No. 108. Singapore: Institute for South Asian Studies. Dobson, H (2007). The Group of 7/8. Oxon: Taylor and Francis. Dobson, H (2010). Japan and the changing global balance of power: The view from the summit. Politics, No. 30. Dobson, H (2004). Japan and the G7/8. London: RoutledgeCurzon. Grimes, W (2009). Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial Regionalism. New York: Cornell University Press. Hajnal, P (2007). The G8 System and the G20. Aldershot: Ashgate. He, K (2008). Institutional balancing and international relations theory: Economic interdependence and balance of power in Southeast Asia. European Journal of International Relations, 14(3). Helleiner, E (2010). What role for the new financial stability board? The politics of international standards after the crisis. Global Policy, 1(3). Henning, CR (2002). East Asian Financial Co-Operation, Vol. 68. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Hersh, A (2010). Monitoring commitments and compliance of the G20 framework for strong, sustainable and balance growth. In New Rules for Global Finance. Washington. Jain, P and J Rathus (2010). Japan’s policy fragmentation: The Japan–Australia FTA. Paper presented at the Crises and Opportunities: Proceedings of the 18th Biennial Conference of the ASAA 2010, Adelaide. Katada, S and M Solis (2009). Under pressure: Japan’s institutional response to regional uncertainty. In, Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration, R Agarwala (ed.). Berlin: Springer. Kenen, P and E Meade (2008). Regional Monetary Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kirton, J (2009). A committed contributor: Japan in G8 and G20 governance. In Japan (Still) Matters: What Role in the World. Sheffield: Sheffield University. Kupiec, P (2005). The IMF world bank financial sector assessment program: A view from the inside. In Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvency, D Evanoff (ed.). Singapore: World Scientific.

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Lombardi, D and N Woods (2008). The politics of influence: An analysis of IMF surveillance. Review of International Political Economy, 15(5). Menkhoff, L and R Meyer (2010). The G20 proposal on IMF governance: Has any progress been made? Intereconomics, No. 3. Menkhoff, L and R Meyer (2010). The G20 proposal on IMF governance: Is there progress? Discussion Paper No. 439. Morii, Y (2002). The G8 Summit in global and local perspectives: Process, meeting, and Japanese domestic politics. In New Directions in Global Political Governance, J Kirton (ed.). Aldershot: Ashgate. Morrison, R (1993). The London monetary and economic conference of 1933: A public goods analysis. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 52(3). Murase, T (2007). Economic surveillance in East Asia and prospective issues. Kyoto Economics Review, 76(1). Nelson, R (2009). The G20 and International Economic Cooperation. Washington: Congressional Research Service. Park, YC (2004). Beyond the Chiang Mai Initiative: Prospects for Regional Financial and Monetary Integration in East Asia. Seoul: Korea University. Putnam, Robert (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of twolevel games. International Organization, 42(3). Rathus, J (2011). Japan, China and network regionalism. In Critical Issues in East Asia, M Beeson (ed.). London: Palgrave. Sohn, I (2007). East Asia’s Counter Weight Strategy: Asian Financial Cooperation and Evolving International Monetary Order. G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 44: United Nations Conference of Trade and Development. Tweedie, A (2010). IMF Quota and Governance Reform. Washington: IMF. Wesley, M (ed.) (2003). The Regional Organizations of the Asia-Pacific. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Young, A (2002). What game? By which rules? In The European Union in International Affairs. Canberra: Australian National University. Young, O (2001). Political leadership and regime formation: On the development of institutions in international society. In International Institutions: An International Organisation Reader, L Martin (ed.). Massachusetts: MIT Press. Young, O (1986). Review: International regimes: Towards a new theory of institutions. World Politics, 39(1).

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CHAPTER 11

THE TRIPLE DISASTER AND JAPAN’S ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES1 Purnendra Jain

Introduction Addressing human-induced climate change while reconciling energy needs is one of the most important and pressing issues of our time, presenting national governments globally with major dilemmas. The former requires minimising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that production of energy from fossil fuels — one of the most cost effective energy sources — entails. Here the policy cornerstones are most appropriate energy mix — which fuels from among renewable, non-renewable, and nuclear sources — and most effective energy usage — how to minimise energy consumption without impeding industrial capacity or human need and comfort. For some nations decisions are reached and policies implemented on deeply contested political turf where power generation costs compete with

1

The author acknowledges and appreciates financial support for this research through a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. This paper is part of a larger study of Japan’s foreign policy in a changing strategic environment. I thank Joel Rathus, Ming Hwa Ting, and Maureen Todhunter for their research support. 241

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environmental risks as national governments try to simultaneously pursue energy security and reduce national GHG emissions. The powerful forces on this turf reach beyond industry and environmentalists, pro- and anti-nuclear camps, climate change sceptics, and accepters. This struggle is not just about economic costs and benefits for nations and for those with pecuniary or ethical interests. It also entails strategic, diplomatic, and political wins and losses. While governments, bureaucracies, and industry are generally the key political players, ultimately every nation and every person on earth is a stakeholder. Global climate change does not recognise national borders. For Japan, the March 2011 triple disaster brought the energy/ climate change conundrum to a head, making moves to reconcile ambitious climate change policies with national economic recovery a strategic dilemma. Devastation from the unprecedented tsunami triggered by a massive earthquake that wiped out coastal areas of northeast Honshu and beyond has done much more than stalling the economy. It is known to have crippled the cooling systems at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Daiichi nuclear plant in Fukushima, leading to hydrogen explosions and reactor meltdowns that forced the government to evacuate those living within a 20 kilometre radius of the plant.2 The extent and nature of the deadly radiation spread, and how to deal with it, are uncertain more than a year after the triple disaster. As the Fukushima crisis continues to unfold, it has forced a dramatic new understanding of nuclear risk into national and international debates on energy and climate change

2

There are two nuclear plants in Fukushima; Number 1, commissioned in the 1970s, has six nuclear reactors, while Number 2, commissioned in the 1980s, has four reactors. In June 2011 Japan’s Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters acknowledged that three reactors at the Number 1 plant experienced full meltdowns. TEPCO announced the accident has probably released more radioactive material into the environment than Chernobyl, with continuing leakage of radiation into the air, soil, and sea. Viktor Kotsev, “Costs Rise in ‘Worst Industrial Disaster’,” Asia Times Online, 25 June 2011.

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responses. In Japan it has changed cost/benefit analyses on both policy fronts irrevocably.3 The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government elected to office in mid-2009 had already tried to alter the equilibrium between energy and climate policies established by its predecessor Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government. Days after taking office it declared a major rise in Japan’s carbon emission reduction plan, a rise dependent on a much higher share of nuclear in the nation’s fuel mix. After the triple disaster, Japanese policymakers and the nation at large face inescapable questions: How can — indeed can — nuclear continue to be part of this picture? And what are the consequences for the nation’s position on GHG emissions — and for the national economy; the former in particular needs swift answers. News of radiation leakage that authorities gradually leak through the mainstream media, and perhaps the paucity of news about nuclear fallout,4 have made ‘nuclear’ a fraught issue in a nation that is energy-poor and around Fukushima increasingly radiation-rich. Fukushima Daiichi has brought Japan to a nuclear crossroads, rupturing Japan’s ‘nuclear village’ of nuclear supporting institutions on which its energy and climate change polices have stood and shifting public mood away from nuclear as the saviour of this energy vulnerable nation. Responding to climate change post-Fukushima is therefore taking the nation to pivotal questions about how it sees its future and its place in the world. Energy security and environmental security appear to be colliding and different approaches are in conflict. One approach gives higher priority to maximising industrial production without much regard for GHG emissions; another with favours to minimising energy

3

Economic costs of the Fukushima nuclear disaster include relocating residents from the region around the plant, compensating people for the loss of their homes and belongings, and a fall in international sales of goods and food products from Japan from fears of radioactive contamination. 4 Ann Landman, ‘What Happened to Media Coverage of Fukushima,’ PR Watch, 23 November 2011. .

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consumption (particularly fossil fuels) and GHG emissions more than the first approach concedes. The two approaches conceive Japan’s national security through contrasting lenses that give different weight to the nation’s economic and diplomatic strength and to the service of domestic and international interests and responsibilities. This chapter considers the political terrain in which Japan’s difficult choices about energy and climate change are made. PostFukushima, Japan confronts unforeseen strategic challenges in attempting to reconcile these two policies, each for pivotal national goals, in the wake of Japan’s own domestic disaster and multiple climate disasters internationally. Both policies are in flux during the present transition towards a different policy equilibrium. Despite strong post-Fukushima pushes to step up alternative energies and by some to move away from nuclear power, alternative energies can as yet nowhere near compensate for the quantitative output of nuclear or fossil fuels. It appears Japan will back-seat climate change policy for greater uptake of non-renewables as well as renewables, and will retain existing nuclear operations, all more highly regulated, at least for the short-term triple-disaster recovery period while renewables technology is advanced and cost/benefit are calculated.5 This political terrain is still a tussle between political parties, government ministries, industry, politicians, sub-national governments, and concerned citizens and their civic leaders. Yet old divides on this field are being reconfigured as players reassess their interests, after the consequences of the new DPJ government and then the triple disaster redistribute cost/benefit opportunities while playing out nationally and internationally. These will influence the weight the government gives to all options while aiming to develop a new equilibrium between energy and climate change policies and a new consensus between players to 5

Some ask why Japan does not follow the German path and stop relying on nuclear power. Japan does not have the options that Germany enjoys, for example, drawing power through grids from other suppliers of energy from EU nations including from countries that have nuclear reactors such as France and the Czech Republic. Germany’s renewable stock is also robust compared to Japan’s poor stock.

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sustain it. Whichever path Japan takes, the push to increase renewables in the energy mix, reduce energy consumption and maximise energy efficiency even further will be vital for helping to address both policy needs simultaneously and will drive R&D in these directions. It seems likely that Japan will pursue its networking approach in the international community to build support abroad for its position as safe nuclear advocate while putting more emphasis on alternative energy sources. With Japan’s leadership role declining regionally and globally,6 this crisis presents Japan with an opportunity to rethink policy options and decisions and to demonstrate its ability to contribute globally through example and global networks in these crucial policy areas. Energy and Climate Change: Policy Imperatives Energy Energy has been a huge issue for postwar Japan. Industrial growth doubled the nation’s energy consumption every five years into the 1990s. During 12 years of accelerated economic growth 1960–1972, increases in energy consumption raced ahead of GNP, doubling Japan’s consumption of global energy. By 1976, with only 3% of the world’s population, Japan was consuming 6% of global energy supplies.7 With almost no coal reserves, no oil and no natural gas, the need for vast quantities of fuel to sustain the economy created three particular policy imperatives: minimise fuel cost, maximise energy efficiency, and ensure continuous fuel supply, mostly through diversifying external suppliers and fuel types. Huge volume, especially because largely imported, underscores the pursuit of minimising fuel cost and maximising energy efficiency. These two imperatives have made the means of energy production and extent of energy consumption vital concerns in energy policy. 6

Purnendra Jain and Brad Williams (eds.), Japan in Decline: Fact or Fiction? (Kent: Global Oriental, 2011). 7 Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden (eds.), Japan: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).

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The third imperative to ensure more continuous supply has heightened understanding of energy security. Pursuing the path of industrial trading giant while poor in domestic energy resources made Japan’s economy dependent on external sources for supply and price.8 This raised the real cost of fuel supplies to Japan since it added in the strategic cost of national vulnerability and drew energy policy onto the foreign policy agenda. In 2010 Japan’s self-sufficiency in primary energy stood at 18%, including nuclear, which compares with an average 70% across OECD countries.9 Fuel dependence has made the reliability of overseas supplies intrinsic to national security, and has made diverse sources — by country of origin and by fuel type — vital for sustaining the national energy mix. The so-called Oil Shocks of the 1970s first oriented Japan in this direction. Until then, the need for uninterrupted supply of fuel had inclined postwar Japan to extremely high reliance on oil from the Middle East. The first oil crisis of 1973, however, forced Japan to recognise its consequent vulnerability to both soaring world oil prices and suppliers’ failure to make oil available from a politically unstable part of the world (Fig. 1), conditions that apply in the Middle East even today almost four decades later. Valuable strategic lessons from the two Middle East Oil Shocks in the 1970s have continued to shape Japan’s energy policy. Graphs in Fig. 2 on energy resources for generating electricity highlight results of moves to manage demand through reduced oil consumption and advanced energy efficiency nationwide and to diversify energy sources including greater reliance on nuclear. Japan’s energy demand being price responsive, the nation returned to oil when world oil prices fell in the 1980s–1990s, with oil imports peaking in 1995 (Fig. 3). However solid global demand, particularly from newly industrialised 8

Purnendra Jain, ‘Japan’s Energy Security in an Era of Emerging Competition in the Asia Pacific’ in Michael Wesley (ed.), Energy Security in Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 9 Brendan Barrett, ‘Can Nuclear Power Save Japan from Peak Oil?’ Our World, 2 February 2011. .

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Japan’s oil imports 1985–2008 (by region).

Source: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/nenkan/backdata/zuhyou/y1013000.xls

Asian giants China and India, has pushed up oil prices considerably in recent years, pressuring Japan to again reduce its dependence on imported oil in favour of alternatives. Nuclear and natural gas have been the primary alternatives. By 2009 nuclear accounted for close to one third of the nation’s electricity fuel mix, followed by natural gas that accounted for a quarter (Fig. 2). Energy security remains crucial. With diversification of energy fuels a strategic security measure from the 1970s, today the energy mix includes renewable sources (primarily hydro) as well as nuclear and non-renewables. Nevertheless, oil still accounts for a significant share of Japan’s total fuel requirement and most is still imported from the Middle East. Strategic considerations about fuel supply

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Fig. 2.

Energy resources used to generate electricity in Japan.

Source: ‘From square one: Energy policy overhaul faces many hurdles’, Daily Yomiuri Online, 31 May 2011. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110530004430.htm.

Fig. 3.

Japan’s oil imports 1985–2008 (in thousand litres).

Source: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/nenkan/backdata/zuhyou/y1013000.xls

still include national vulnerability from heavy external reliance and are now joined by other concerns about energy security. One is national sovereignty over offshore supplies, evident in disputes with China over seabed deposits of minerals and oil. Another is safe reliable passage; recent years have witnessed a new threat to Japan’s

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energy supplies with piracy disrupting shipping along the sea route from the Middle East.10 Japan depends largely upon US defence forces to provide sea lane security for passage of oil from the Middle East. However in recent years Japan has also diversified its security arrangements. It has established new security networks with countries like Australia and India in non-traditional security areas such as combating piracy and sea lane security,11 which well serve the maritime passage of Japan’s vital fuel supplies. We see from this brief overview the imperatives set in place by both Japan’s relentless hunger for energy fuels and the poverty of its own fuel endowment. Magnified particularly by exigencies of the world oil market, these imperatives set the nation on a path towards low energy consumption on a per capita basis relative to other nations through technological innovation, other energy efficiency measures and diversification of energy fuels.12 Some two decades before the imperative of global climate change reached the national or international policy agendas. Such an approach to managing national energy needs, with the understandings of scarcity and structures for efficiency that it fed, helped to generate the consensus Japan needed to address climate change as the new global strategic imperative rearing its head on energy policy. At least this seemed to be so, until the Fukushima Daiichi disaster highlighted an issue down played by the nuclear village: the relative safety of the chosen energy source. The disaster proved nuclear infallibility as a myth, rupturing not only the natural landscape but also the energy policy landscape foreshadowing 50% nuclear in its future energy mix.13 10

For details, see Euan Graham, Japan’s Sea Lane Security 1940–2004: A Matter of Life and Death (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 11 These are discussed in Purnendra Jain, ‘Japan’s Expanding Security Networks: India and Australia,’ Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1/2, 2009. 12 Isao Miyaoka, ‘Japan’s Conciliation with the United States in Climate Change Negotiations,’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004. 13 METI had planned to increase the nuclear component to 41% by 2017 and to 50% by 2030. Apparently the increasing reliance on nuclear energy made Japanese leaders like Hatoyama to commit larger reductions of GHGs.

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Climate change Scientists and others have expressed serious apprehension about global warming and have struggled to be taken seriously for roughly two decades. Yet only in the last few years has the increasing frequency of weather-related natural disasters pulled the issue of human-induced climate change to the centre of public concern internationally. Present concern is rooted in strong scientific evidence, led most notably by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), that global warming caused by human activity is changing climate/weather worldwide, with destructive impact already evident in many parts of the world.14 Addressing climate change requires rapidly and significantly reducing GHG emissions that intensify global warming. Effective responses to climate change therefore touch on almost all policies — especially energy policy — by all national governments that take their national and international responsibilities seriously. Japan has taken its commitments relatively seriously at both international and national levels. Internationally Japan has been an active player, recognising strategic benefit as well as responsibility. With the world’s second largest economy for roughly 30 years until 2010 flourishing through industrial production and consumption, Japan was one of the highest GHG emitters in the world. This inspired expectation that Japan will play a leading role in combating climate change and expectation that dovetailed well with Japan’s own aspirations since Japan is seriously interested in playing a leadership role in global non-military issues while upholding a pacifist constitution. Japan thus pursued a symbolic and practical landmark in hosting for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the COP3 in Kyoto in December 1997.15 The Kyoto 14

Anthony Giddens, ‘The Politics of Climate Change: National Responses to the Challenge of Global Warming,’ in Policy Network Paper: Policy Network (London; September 2008). 15 COP or the Conference of the Parties meets annually to work on the UNFCCC and Kyoto was the 3rd meeting. The UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty produced at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro to stabilise GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level low enough to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘United Nations Climate Change Conference October 2011.’ .

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Protocol of the COP3 has been regarded as the most significant international agreement on regulating emissions by setting legally binding numerical targets on its signatory nations. The EU and 37 other industrialised nations signed on to reduce greenhouse emissions by at least 5.2% between 2008 and 2012 when the agreement expires. Japan agreed to a cut of 6% from 1990 emission levels but reports on its performance conflict. Domestically, Japan was already moving towards energy efficiency and minimising fuel consumption for other reasons. However entry of the climate change imperative to reduce carbon emissions introduced another concern into the energy policy arena: changing the fuel mix to seriously reduce the share of carbon-producing fossil fuels. Until the triple disaster nuclear was the front runner alternative, outstripping renewable, and other alternative energy sources. But by highlighting nuclear fallibility, the Fukushima Daiichi disaster upset the public acceptance that underpinned nuclear energy and has pushed energy and climate change policies out of alignment and into flux. Now the nation’s challenge is to create a new political and public consensus between government, industry and society, by reconciling reduced carbon emissions with safe energy usage, and economic strength with sustainability. This requires government to address the regulatory failings over nuclear energy production that Fukushima Daiichi has exposed, a move that will influence — and be influenced by — power relations between the ‘power’ players. Policy Players and Policymaking Before the triple disaster The Japanese government has always pursued an interventionist strategy postwar to keep energy supply and demand in line with public policy goals, which from around the mid-1990s have included the need to reduce GHG emissions to address climate change imperatives. Given the central importance of energy to the nation on this issue, governments have maintained tight relations with bureaucrats and industry, the so-called triangle of Japan Inc. for which Japan’s economic policy is renowned.

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The DPJ took office from the LDP in 2009 armed with different policy priorities arising from its stronger commitment to climate change and intentions for bureaucratic reform. But these faded quickly. Its inital push for green economic growth through higher GHG emissions reduction targets drew industry resistance and its moves to reduce bureaucratic influence in energy drew bureaucratic resistance. Thus the DPJ government policy–making continues the style of indicative planning characteristic of postwar industrial policy that sets out quantitative targets as the basis for negotiating policy instruments with bureaucrats and industry. Much of the negotiation between government, industry, and other interests continues to be conducted in deliberative councils within ministries and agencies.16 The three principal ministries involved pursue their own interests narrowly.17 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is responsible for Japan’s energy and industrial policy, and generally leans towards supporting the interests of big business. METI has actively pursued its preference for energy efficiency and stabilising GHG emissions rather than setting targets for emission reductions, and maintains close relations with the nuclear lobby that represents big business and that it is supposed to regulate in the public interest. The Ministry of Environment (MOE) advocates environmental protection and favours setting achievable targets for reducing GHG emissions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) advocates good international citizenship and is keen to pursue the strategic and diplomatic benefits for Japan of global leadership in reducing GHG emissions to address climate change. It has been the main supporter of a multilateral approach to climate change, and campaigned strongly to hold the COP3 meeting in Kyoto in 1997. Even before the DPJ came

16

Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Climate Change and Japan’s Post-Copenhagen Challenge,’ Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, No. 34, 2009. . 17 Under administrative reorganisation in 2001, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was changed to METI and the Environment Agency (EA) was upgraded to the Ministry of Environment.

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to power, these differences in bureaucratic priorities made reaching and maintaining a policy consensus difficult, and at times the Prime Minister’s office has intervened to move the agenda forward.18 Business groups have been key players, vehemently opposing numerical targets for carbon reductions, which they claim further erode the competitiveness of Japan’s industry and businesses that are already struggling in the world market. Through Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) and other representative bodies they have secured voluntary reductions rather than legally enforceable numerical targets.19 Some commentators believe Japan’s voluntary targets are not a soft goal but are a solid commitment and therefore a valid policy response.20 Others argue that a simple ‘voluntary’ response results from the business–government–bureaucracy nexus favouring commercial interests, which is unethical,21 and has serious environmental costs.22 In these policy matters, ‘industry’ is not just the producers of electricity-consuming manufactured products; it is also the producers of the electricity on which the nation depends. Japan’s ten regional power companies (TEPCO is the largest, all privately owned) monopolise electricity generation and transmission, and heavily favour nuclear fuel for electricity production. They have enormous clout. The nexus between the nuclear industry, METI and government — known as Nuclear Inc., or ‘the nuclear village’ — has

18

Yasuko Kawashima, ‘Japan’s Decision-Making About Climate Change Problems: Comparative Study of Decisions in 1990 and in 1997,’ Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2000; Yasuko Kameyama, ‘The ‘Beyond 2012’ Debate in Japan’ in Yasuko Kameyama, et al. (eds.), Climate Change in Asia: Perspectives on the Future Climate Regime (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008), pp. 123–124. 19 Kawashima, Y ‘Japan’s Decision-Making About Climate Change Problems.’ Comparative Study of Decisions in 1990 and in 1997. 20 Anthony Hobley and Dominic Adams, ‘Big in Japan,’ 4 October 2010. 21 Midori Kagawa-Fox, ‘The Ethics of Japan’s Global Environmental Policy’ (The University of Adelaide, 2010). 22 Jun Morikawa, Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996); Jun Morikawa, Whaling in Japan: Power, Politics and Diplomacy (London: Hurst, 2009).

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powerfully shaped not only energy policy but also the nation’s environmental protection movement, to sustain its position.23 Highranking LDP politician Kono Taro has claimed the relationships between the power companies that run the electricity industry and the Japanese government and bureaucracy are ‘essentially corrupt’.24 Regulation has therefore been merely a side issue on this policy landscape, with the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) under the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), but both NISA and ANRE are under the administrative wing of METI, the ministry that promotes and regulates nuclear energy.25 Over the years METI has continued to work with the nuclear power industry to keep reactors operating within safety standards, but has done so by relaxing those standards or simply not enforcing them. Local governments have been involved in local climate change policy making from the mid-1990s. The national government’s Global Warming Law (1998) and the Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan (2005) both include expectations that the 47 prefectural and all municipal governments (approximately 1,800) will formulate and implement comprehensive, plan-based programs to address GHG emissions. The most advanced local governments, such as Tokyo and Kyoto, have used local ordinances to claim competences in energy, traffic, and other policy areas to reduce their localities’ GHG emissions.26 The Tokyo Metropolitan Government is furthest ahead, introducing an emissions trading scheme (ETS) within its jurisdiction from April 2010, after starting its ‘Ten-Year Project for a Carbon Minus Tokyo’ plan in 2007. Its cap-and-trade system is the world’s third, and the first to specifically target the commercial sector. 23

Furukawa Takuya, “How Japan’s Low Carbon Society and Nuclear Power Generation Came Hand in Hand: The ‘Egoism’ Of Tepco ‘Ecoism’”, The Asia Pacific Journal 9, No. 23 (2011). 24 ABC Local, ‘Japanese MP Taro Kono’, 24 March 2011. . 25 NucNet, ‘Japan Releases 750-Page into Fukushima-Daiichi Accident,’ 7 June 2011. . 26 Noriko Sugiyama and Tsuneo Takeuchi, ‘Local Policies for Climate Change in Japan,’ The Journal of Environment Development, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2008.

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Tokyo was also the first Asian government body to participate in the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) in May 2009 and is taking a leading role in promoting interregional cooperation within Japan.27 Even before the triple disaster, the advent of the DPJ government with its pledge to reform governance structures had thrown a spanner in the works of the Japan Inc., energy consensus. The DPJ brought to government a commitment not just to make Japan an international climate change leader — elevating foreign policy concerns among the many struggling to shape energy policy — but also to transform the nation’s decision making institutions by decreasing the role of ministries, agencies and lobby groups, and increasing transparency. But the dramatic back peddling in Japan’s international position on GHG reductions after the DPJ’s first year in office makes clear that the DPJ’s will for reform had weakened, and the political muscle of those who had brought about the existing consensus had not. Nuclear Inc., was alive and well. At the UN Summit on Climate Change in New York in September 2009, the freshly elected DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama proudly announced a major increase in Japan’s carbon reduction targets — from its 1990 level to 25% by 2020 and to 80% by 2050.28 Yet just 15 months later at the COP16 Conference in Cancun, the DPJ’s Chief Cabinet Secretary declared firmly that Japan will not be bound by any targets beyond 2012 when the Kyoto Pact ends and labelled the Pact as ‘unfair and ineffective.’29 After initial glory at the 2009 UN Summit, subsequent action and inaction reveal the DPJ government has backed away from its ambitious proposals. It appears the DPJ failed to recognise the political strength of Nuclear Inc., which has weakened the DPJ’s commitment to intervene in energy and other markets in response to climate change and left the energy 27

Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Tokyo Climate Change Strategy: Progress Report and Future Vision (Tokyo: 2010). 28 United Nations Environment Program, ‘Emissions Reductions Pledges: Japan,’ 23 November 2010. . 29 ‘Japan Stands Firm on Kyoto in Cancun,’ UPI, 2 December 2010.

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policy landscape marked by divided politics, uneven policy, and a confusing national stance on climate change. The earlier semblance of policy equilibrium, general consensus, and international leadership on climate change had been rattled. Some distinctive features were evident. First, although the Global Warming Law (1998) and the Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan (2005) were in place, there was no legal framework for systematically implementing carbon reductions.30 In March 2010 the DPJ government submitted a bill to the parliament to reduce carbon emissions to the levels Hatoyama had pledged six months earlier at the UN Summit, to introduce a carbon tax, cap-and-trade schemes and a feed-in-tariff on all renewable energy, and additional measures to achieve energy efficiency. More than a year later, parliament had not passed the bill. The business community remained stridently opposed, recognising that a legal requirement for emissions cuts larger than in other nations would disadvantage it unfairly, especially when the global community is not committed to an international framework binding most countries to set targets.31 Second was a voluntary scheme in lieu of a legal framework, another sign of corporate muscle on this policy front. The Japanese Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (JVETS) introduced in September 2005 involves a voluntary cap-and-trade system, which corporate proponents claim has produced many of the desired effects for emissions reduction.32 In October 2008, a trial Voluntary Carbon

30

Despite commitment to the Kyoto Pact, Japan’s carbon emissions have increased: from 1,261million tons CO2 equivalent in 1991 to 1,374 million tons in 2007. Ministry of the Environment, Annual Report on the Environment: The Sound Material-Cycle Society and the Biodiversity in Japan 2009 (Tokyo: 2009). 31 “Emissions-Trading Plan Shelved until After ‘13,” Kyodo News, 29 December 2010. 32 Some argue that Japan’s approach to voluntary targets is different from the Western approach since Japanese companies try seriously to uphold commitments to reducing emissions, rather than treating it as a soft goal that is part of a marketing strategy. See Hobley and Adams, ‘Big in Japan.’

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Credit Trading Scheme (VCCTS) incorporating JVETS was introduced as a voluntary cap-and-trade system. It has operated alongside tax incentives and subsidies to offset research costs for environmental technologies and encourage use of more energy-efficient products.33 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) schemes were also launched, encouraging major companies to help small and medium-sized companies reduce their carbon emissions and in turn acquire reduced emission rights.34 As a result of the voluntary schemes, emissions for sectors representing 83% of total industry fell almost 14% per unit of output between 1990 and 2008, against a 4% increase in total production.35 Third was the National Energy Strategy (NES) mandated since 2003, requiring government to prepare a comprehensive plan for energy production and consumption to be reviewed every three to four years responding to changing circumstances. The most recent version, the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan, was approved by Cabinet in June 2010 and identifies three aims: stable supply, environmental protection, and promoting competition among utility operators through liberalisation. Its pillar is a drastic enlargement of the nation’s reliance on nuclear power, increasing the number of nuclear reactors from 54 by at least 14 by 2030 and raising the share of nuclear power used in total electricity generation from 26% to at least 50%. This was to strengthen security of the country’s energy supply, with the intention to raise the share of self-sufficient energy from under 40% to 70%. The plan also aims to increase use of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power to 20% by 2030; end the nation’s heavy reliance on thermal (fossil fuel) power from more than 60% of total

33

Hughes writes: ‘Recent research using patent data to measure innovation shows that Japanese firms are world leaders across a range of environmental technologies.’ Hughes, ‘Climate Change and Japan’s Post-Copenhagen Challenge,’ 2009. 34 CDM is one of the three mechanisms under the Kyoto protocol (the other two being the joint implementation and international trading schemes). Firms can receive carbon credit by undertaking emissions reduction investments both internationally and domestically. 35 Hughes, ‘Climate Change and Japan’s Post-Copenhagen Challenge.’

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electricity output; reduce the share of oil to 40% of Japan’s primary energy supply, and improve energy efficiency by 30%.36 In practice, the choice of instruments for the new policy equilibrium the DPJ sought between energy security and climate change is based on the so-called ER3D approach: subsidising research, development, demonstration, and deployment into energy efficient technologies, while promoting nuclear and renewable energies.37 However the nature and extent of the shifts proposed initially meant that on this policy front the DPJ was struggling to manage distributive battles right from the start; its initial ambitions to reform energy policy-making and position Japan for international pre-eminence on climate change had threatened to unravel the general consensus with industry on which these policies were based under LDP government. When the triple disaster hit, political opposition and resistance from corporations had already forced the DPJ government to recalibrate rather than abolish proposed subsidies and reorganise proposed taxes for public investment in ER3D, and it was struggling to establish a new regulatory framework. However the triple disaster has portentously ‘changed market circumstances’ for Japan’s energy production and consumption in ways that the 2010 Strategic Energy Plan had not foreseen. The Fukushima Daiichi reactor disaster made nuclear risk into a nuclear reality, changing much more than the ‘conditions of the market.’ After the triple disaster The nuclear reactor disaster at Fukushima immediately cast further doubt on the government’s ambitious climate change policy and pushed energy security ahead in national priorities. Ongoing radiation leakage from the damaged reactor has forced acknowledgement of the real costs of nuclear fuel. This is a major disruption for nation and policy when nuclear is the Strategic Energy Plan’s central pillar and is

36 37

‘Kan to Unveil New Energy Plan at G-8,’ Yomiuri Shimbun, 31 May 2011. Hughes, ‘Climate Change and Japan’s Post-Copenhagen Challenge.’

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therefore a lynchpin of the political consensus underpinning the Plan. By igniting debate about the safety of nuclear power generation, the reactor disaster has put paid not only to some of the core public understandings intrinsic to this policy consensus, but also, importantly, to the cost/benefit analysis for policy, particularly in relation to the energy fuel mix. It has expanded the meaning of the concept of energy security — not just security of fuel supply and passage, but also of the regions and people where reactors are located, from radiation leakage. It has shifted how some of the nation’s people appraise nuclear on the spectrum between only hope for national prosperity, and existential threat; nuclear is now demonstrating both qualities. It has also shifted where key players identify cost/benefit for themselves, disrupting relations between some of them. Overall it has served to undermine the legitimacy of nuclear at home and abroad, planting fear and opposition in the ground on which the nation’s Nuclear Inc. players do their politics, build their reactors and promote use of nuclear energy. Industry Industry is divided. All are forced to pay more for electricity production through the added cost of safety measures. And almost all must comply with setsuden (conserving electricity) requirements to minimise electricity consumption. Some see opportunities and are pursuing market, environmental, and other benefits of going green. Softbank president Son Masayoshi, perhaps Japan’s wealthiest man, has moved ahead of entrenched utilities and government to shift Japan’s economy from dependence on ‘nuclear reactors located on dangerous fault lines.’ Softbank will shoulder most of the 80 billion yen (US$980 million) to build 10 huge solar plants.38 Many want Japan to regain its status from the 1980s as a world leader in solar

38 Christopher Johnson, ‘Japan’s Private Sector Split on Nuclear Switch,’ Asia Times, 28 May 2011. See also Masayoshi Son, ‘Tsunami Clears Way for Solar-Powered Japan,’ Asia Times, 23 September 2011.

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power production, with various proposals including one to turn uninhabitable land around the Fukushima reactor into a huge solar power farm.39 Some corporations are taking initiatives to create new energy technologies, with more than half of Japan’s aging reactors switched off and opponents hoping they will stay off. Generally the private sector, already well drilled in energy efficiency, is taking its own initiatives in a ‘green’ market that is fertile domestically and internationally, without waiting for what it recognises as long, unnecessary delays in government action. However the ‘industry’ situation is made more complex by a distinctive characteristic: Japan has long been the centre of the nuclear reactor industry worldwide. Companies involved in reactor production do not easily opt for nuclear alternatives such as renewables and insist that the Fukushima disaster changes nothing.40 Toshiba president Sasaki Norio claims with resignation his company will now probably need a few more years to win over buyers for the 39 reactors it hoped to sell globally by 2015, with the apologia that Toshiba cannot pursue its sales strategy if people worldwide oppose nuclear energy. Nuclear plants are part of Toshiba’s ‘social infrastructure business’ through which it aims to make ‘environmentally friendly cities’ that will include memory chips, its top money maker. But even Toshiba is taking precautions with green alternatives, buying into a South Korean wind turbine maker and buying out a Swiss maker of electricity meters for smart grids, while Mitsubishi Heavy Industries plans to boost its supply of wind turbines and storage batteries. Toshiba plans a new computer with an eco button to cut

39

Whereas LDP governments at that time had provided policy incentives to bolster solar energy, they began to withdraw and in 2005 eliminated the solar incentives as a consensus was built around bolstering nuclear in the nation’s energy mix. Andrew De Wit and Iida Tetsunari, “The ‘Power Elite’ And Environment-Energy Policy in Japan,” The Asia Pacific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4 ,2011, p. 6. 40 Nick Carey, Margarita Antidze, and John Ruwitch, ‘Special Report: After Japan, Where’s the Next Nuclear Weak Link?’ (Reuters Strategies for Sustainable Growth, 9 June 2011). http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/us-nuclear-poweremerging-idUSTRE75828N20110609.

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power consumption and Hitachi is developing technology to capture almost all the carbon emitted by thermal (fossil fuel) power generators.41 In the short term at least, market forces are favouring low energy consumption, alternative fuels, and green products. As in markets everywhere, Japanese industry will respond while demand is there. Public The public is also divided. Nuclear energy has always had critics in Japan, where anti-nuclear protests and opposition to the siting of nuclear power plants have a long history.42 Local referendums have opposed nuclear power plants,43 even small nuclear accidents and leaks have alarmed residents living around the plants, and antinuclear debates catch momentum nationally.44 Many in Japan have a distinctive too-close-to-home aversion to development of nuclear technology after the national experience of death and suffering from long-term radiation effects through the nuclear bombings of Japan in World War II. Japan is still the only nation to be nuclear

41

Johnson, ‘Japan’s Private Sector Split on Nuclear Switch.’ S. Hayden Lesbriel, Nimby Politics in Japan: Siting and the Management of Environmental Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Daniel P. Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008). Aldridge found that while technical criteria were considered, the principal factor in site selection for Japan’s nuclear plants was the local community’s ability to resist them. 43 For example, in 1996, more than 60% of residents in Maki Town in Niigata Prefecture voted against siting of a nuclear power plant. Following strong opposition, the Tohoku Electric Power Company finally abandoned its plan to build a nuclear facility in Maki. Asahi Shimbun, 24 January 2000. 44 Japan has experienced several small nuclear accidents and leaks. In 1995 liquid sodium escaped from the Monju nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture creating the possibility of an explosion; in 1999 there was a nuclear accident in the Tokaimura nuclear plant in Ibaraki Prefecture; in 2004 there was steam leak in the Mihama nuclear power plant; and in 2007 an earthquake forced closure of all the Kashiwazaki–Kariwa nuclear power plants for safety reasons. 42

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bombed — twice. The March 2011 nuclear catastrophe has shifted public attitudes away from nuclear, while the practical and conceptual issues it raises — the consequent setsuden and the ongoing question marks surrounding the radiation leakage — have in some ways politicised daily life. The heightened consciousness feeds into a public attitude that already generally supported policies to address climate change. Roughly a month after the triple disaster, the Japan Research Centre and Gallup released poll data indicating a major fall in Japanese support for nuclear energy from 62% before the earthquake — one of the highest support levels internationally — to 39% in the disaster’s aftermath. Opposition increased from 28% to 47%. An Asahi Shimbun survey in mid-2011 found nearly three-quarters of Japanese voters favoured an immediate or gradual phase-out of nuclear power.45 The shift in public mood is evident in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Public protests were held at 130 places nationwide to mark the Fukushima disaster’s three month anniversary. A reported 20,000 people demonstrated in central Tokyo, where the Fukushima-inspired protests against nuclear have generally been some of the largest since the Ampo era.46 A few media organizations appear to be outside the bulk that supports Nuclear Inc. by denying or downplaying health threats from radiation. A serial column by Ikezawa Natsuki in the Asahi Shimbun in June 2011 labelled nuclear energy ‘a ticking time bomb to human health,’ its legitimacy based ‘on a pack of lies.’ His column bespeaks an anti-nuclear tone of that newspaper, which joined the Mainichi in editorialising against atomic energy.47

45

APJ Editors, “74% of Japanese Favor Nuclear Phase-Out,” 16 June 2011. 46 In 1960, thousands of ordinary citizens joined students and other protestors to oppose revision of AMPO, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan that protesters felt went against the notion of Japan being a nation of peace. 47 Asahi.com, “Vox Populi: Nuclear Energy Ticking Time Bomb to Human Health,” 15 June 2011.

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Government The government now has less reason to be divided on the energy/ climate change issue. In the short term it has little choice. The nuclear disaster may have strengthened the DPJ’s political hand by souring nuclear and elevating support for alternative energies at home and abroad, but it also laid bare the consequences of Nuclear Inc. clout and the successive governments’ acquiescence to it: dependence on nuclear as a vital component of the nation’s energy mix in the short term. A quick converter to renewables after supporting an increase in nuclear capacity, Prime Minister Kan resigned from his position in September 2011, replaced by Noda Yoshihiko, whose mission is to keep the nuclear industry alive. In the short term, political will, public opposition, and technology cannot enable Japan to fully substitute with alternatives since nuclear was already fuelling some 30% of the country’s electricity.48 With the triple disaster reducing nuclear energy production — Fukushima Daiichi out and many other reactors taken off line for safety checks — it appears fossil fuels will be needed to top up national fuel supplies in the short term recovery period while renewables technology is advanced.49 For the government’s cost/benefit assessment of the energy mix post Fukushima Daiichi, the disaster has changed the perceived value of power generation costs, environmental risks, and energy security, with consequences for both energy and climate change. Kan declared that nuclear policy would be reviewed from scratch, the plan for 14 new plants would be cancelled, and renewables would be 48

Japan has the third most number of nuclear reactors behind the United States and France. Any policy to move away from nuclear power will require a very long lead time. See Daniel P. Aldrich, “Future Fission: Why Japan Won’t Abandon Nuclear Power”, Global Asia, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2011. 49 Japan’s two power grids systems – 50 Hz in the north from Shizuoka to Hokkaido including Tokyo, and 60 Hz from Nagoya to Kyushu in the south – are not compatible. This means that TEPCO, which lost 40 percent of output after the March 11 disasters, cannot easily borrow power from many of Japan’s nine other private utilities. See Johnson, “Japan’s Private Sector Split on Nuclear Switch.”

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expanded to become the key pillar of energy policy.50 A government panel on a new national growth strategy was established, chaired by the Prime Minister’s Office rather than METI, and the DPJ set up an internal working team on renewables. At the May 2011 G8 meeting in France, Kan announced the Sunrise Plan to maximise solar energy.51 Other possibilities for alternative energy sources and efficiency improvements include an energy storage system and the next-generation ‘smart grid’ power transmission network to manage energy efficiency.52 Government is also addressing two major related concerns that the disaster highlighted: nuclear safety and regulation to ensure it. Both put the government on a collision course with the nuclear industry, which seeks to avoid the costs and losses of extra safety measures.53 Since its creation the nuclear industry had enjoyed the relative freedom hitherto allowed by a regulator tied to the institutional arrangements that promote nuclear consumption. The triple disaster has highlighted to the government that both of these issues are important to many Japanese voters. Promoting renewables appears to be consistent with the preferences of sub-national governments. About two thirds of prefectural governments have joined Son Masayoshi’s solar project to wean Japan off nuclear power, using the nation’s many abandoned farmlands to build vast solar power farms, and they are institutionalising arrangements through the National Governors’ Association.54 They also have Emily Gertz, ‘Japan (Officially) Sours on Nuclear Power,’ 11 May 2011. . 51 To show the G8 meeting Japan’s determination to become an international leader in promoting renewable energy while reducing dependence on nuclear power, Kan revealed that the Sunrise Plan will promote technological development to cut panel installation and other costs while working towards installing solar panels on all houses and buildings. See ‘Kan to Unveil New Energy Plan at G-8.’ 52 Ibid. 53 For example, Kan asked the Chubu Electric Power Co to temporarily shut down its Hamaoka plant located on a tectonic fault line southwest of Tokyo to make it more resistant to earthquakes and tsunamis. 54 “35 prefectures to join Softbank’s ‘natural energy council’” 25 June 2011. . 50

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compelling reason to support greater safety measures and better enforced regulation of nuclear plants since local governments are on the ground and closer to both the consequences of nuclear disaster and the people aggrieved by it. International Context Over the years Japan has been an active player and in some areas a leader in global environmental and climate change policy, particularly through international organisations. Japan has been active in the UNFCCC treaty since it was established in 1992 and in the UNFCCC’s COP meetings that provide updates (called ‘protocols’) for setting mandatory emission limits.55 The principal update, the 1997 COP3’s Kyoto Protocol, established legally binding obligations for developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions and has become much better known than the UNFCCC itself. Japan’s role in the UNFCCC, the COP meetings, and the Kyoto Protocol that effectively projected Japan’s international leadership in climate change, has been well recorded.56 Japan has played an important role in international institutionbuilding, mediating between a more active EU and a reluctant United States, Japan’s key ally and partner. At many turns it has tried to bring and keep the US on board with multilateral initiatives, from 1990 when Japan joined with Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the EU to try to bring in the US to the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva. The Kyoto Protocol is a particularly significant example. Although the US signed the Protocol during the Clinton administration, the Bush administration withdrew from the Protocol in 2001, refusing to be bound to any regulations such as emission targets. The US withdrawal particularly disappointed Japan, which pleaded with 55

The UNFCCC is augmented through the parallel efforts of the IPCC, and it aims to gain consensus through meetings and discussion of various strategies. 56 Kawashima, ‘Japan’s Decision-Making About Climate Change Problems; Hiroshi Ohta, ‘Japanese Environmental Foreign Policy,’ in T. Inoguchi and P. Jain (eds.), in Japanese Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

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Washington until the last minute that a global mechanism on climate change without the US would be largely ineffective.57 The US withdrawal inflicted two costs in particular. One was borne by Japan’s international reputation since its inability to sway its own most important security and strategic partner made Japan look like a weak player on the global stage. The other was borne by the Protocol’s supporters since withdrawal of the US as a hugely influential international player gave the appearance of invalidating the Protocol’s process. The US withdrawal also had significant consequences for Japan’s domestic policy front since it gave METI and corporate Japan a valuable precedent for bargaining in energy policy: US refusal to sign up to any emissions target bolstered METI’s bargaining position, at a time when METI’s ‘no targets’ camp had been losing ground in the energy/climate change policy nexus to rivals MOFA and MOE.58 How others regard Japan’s international actions and domestic performance on climate change matters to Japan. It has strived to be seen as both a lead player and a model performer for other nations to follow and copy in this field. In 2007 Japan was ranked six on the table of carbon emitters in absolute terms, following the US, China, EU, India, and Russia. But on a per capita basis that picture changes significantly: the US becomes 11th, Japan 35th, China 80th, and India 145th.59 Japan ranks much higher than China and India but well below most industrialised nations, making Japan a relatively ‘low’ carbon emitter. Other nations are learning from Japan’s experience of the nuclear alternative through the Fukushima Daiichi disaster. Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Israel, and other critical players have

57 Miyaoka, ‘Japan’s Conciliation with the United States in Climate Change Negotiations,’ p. 87. 58 Ibid. 59 China and India, although heavy polluters on the planet in absolute terms, seek special dispensation as developing nations and claim they are low emitters on a per capita basis.

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joined Japan in announcing they will not build new reactors. Some will start shutting the ones they have. Switzerland’s cabinet has voted to phase out atomic energy by 2034, and Germany will close all its nuclear power plants by 2022. Reciprocally, Japan may take lessons from these nations as they move away from nuclear energy and its risks. German policies promoting science and research, technological development, and entrepreneurship towards new business models for a sustainable economy have given Germany alternatives for generating electricity through natural sources including sun, wind, and water. In May 2011 G8 leaders also took lessons from the Fukushima reactor to seek more stringent international rules on nuclear safety. Japan’s nuclear disaster registered as a wakeup call by indicating the importance of a national regulatory body’s independence from both government and the corporate sector. While Japan was enthusiastically in ‘Kyoto’ mode till about a year before the triple disaster, some in Japan had strongly urged forming links with other nations sharing Japan’s disposition towards climate change mitigation. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s statement at the 2009 UN Climate Change Summit in New York reflected this view. Yet as explained in this chapter, government soon shifted the national disposition away from commitment to the Kyoto spirit towards the US position resisting targets and therefore any binding international regime. The message from Japan through its new ‘no more targets post-Kyoto’ declaration at the December 2010 Cancun Summit signals to the international community that Japan has for now left behind its will to lead the climate change movement through international institutions, and that the dominant corporate interests opposing emissions targets in other countries have gained the upper hand in Japan’s policy landscape as well.

Global Civilian Nuclear Network Forming international linkages with partners abroad that share interests, concerns, or positions is an approach to managing international

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relations discernible in Japan’s foreign policy for some years.60 It could be argued that Japan has learned from its experience of the triple disaster about preventing nuclear accidents through new technology and robust safety standards enforced by an independent regulator. Japan is a leading nation in civilian nuclear technology, it is home to the world’s third largest number of nuclear power plants,61 it has no ambition to become a nuclear weapons state, and it is willing to pass on the lessons that have come at such great loss and destruction. This unique status positions Japan well to form a network with appropriate nations to promote safer and better nuclear energy facilities, especially when nations across Asia plan to expand their nuclear energy capacity. As a leading Japanese public thinker states that since Japan is a civilian nuclear state, it ‘must lead the world where nuclear safety is concerned, including sharing the lessons it has learned the hard way from the Fukushima disaster. Should Japan be found to be lacking in the technological base and the expertise needed to keep nuclear energy safely harnessed, Japan’s voice will cease to be heard in the rest of the world.’62 China and India in particular have ambitious plans to expand their nuclear facilities to meet burgeoning energy demands; ASEAN member countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam also find the nuclear option attractive to meet the growing power demands accompanying their economic growth. Nuclear knowledge sharing will help to foster goodwill between these nations and Japan, and there are indications such cooperation is likely. At their fourth trilateral summit in May 2011, the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea agreed to cooperate on disaster management nuclear safety, and in relationship

60

In a book-length study I am currently exploring Japan’s networking strategy to manage international relationships in the face of two rising Asian giants, China and India. This project is funded by the Australian Research Council. 61 The two other world leaders are the Unites States and France, but both are nuclear states and by virtue of this status are members of P5 in the United Nations. 62 “Point of View/Jitsuro Terashima: ‘Either-or’ Argument Won’t Help Energy Policy,” Asahi Shimbun, 20 July 2011.

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among nuclear regulators. Only time will tell the real meaning of this ‘disaster diplomacy’.63 Conclusion The story of energy and climate change policies in Japan features continuous struggles. When energy policy was opened to climate change imperatives in the mid-1990s, it had for years been struggling, successfully, to meet the imperatives of energy affordability, availability, and efficiency, to meet the demands of Asia’s energypoor new industrial giant. The struggles continued, particularly between the powerful vested interests at work within Japan Inc. to protect their turf. Entry of climate change into energy policy space introduced the concept of emissions targets that if legally binding would deny the industrial lobby some of its freedom to produce and consume energy, and therefore some of its clout in policy making. The new ‘climate’ concern also meant a struggle between service of domestic and international interests: the nation’s economic and diplomatic strength. Here it was to win Japan followers and respect, for leadership in a ‘diplomatically safe’ international policy space. But it would also inspire another struggle: to mediate between the EU and the US, its most important but on this issue ultimately intractable security partner. Even so, the entry of climate change imperatives was useful to the industrial lobby for pushing nuclear fuels and thus Nuclear Inc. was born. We see its political strength in the back pedalling of the new DPJ government that came to power with popular mandate to go green but quickly fell in with the nuclear camp. Such was national dependence on nuclear in practice and politics that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and its complex consequences will not close the nation’s nuclear chapter. The March 2011 triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear explosion presents Japan with new opportunities for a 63

Amy King, ‘The Trilateral Summit: A New Era in China-Japan Relations?’, East Asia Forum, 2 June 2011, .

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sustainable, low-carbon economy. National policies, politics, and players that until then moved separately and in conflict have been forced into a situation with new ways of viewing and valuing the world — including its energy resources and its natural environment. This may serve as a catalyst to enable the post-crisis policy shift towards renewables, which Prime Minister Kan pushed, to move beyond policy vision and wishful thinking into an actual greener future for Japan. The capacity of Nuclear Inc. to hold its ground despite a greener tilted government is likely to endure through the early post-disaster period when nuclear opposition may be at its peak. Even though nuclear is falling from favour in parts of Europe, some Asian nations appear set to take up the nuclear chalice. It seems, then, that Japan’s place at the core of the international civilian nuclear industry will bolster the current strength of Nuclear Inc. as will Japan’s networking approach to civilian nuclear consumer nations, however informal and non-binding its relations with them. Bibliography Aldrich, DP (2011). Future fission: Why Japan won’t abandon nuclear power. Global Asia, 6(2). Aldrich, DP (2008). Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. APJ Editors (2011). 74% of Japanese Favor Nuclear Phase-Out. Japan Focus. 2011. Carey, N, M Antidze and J Ruwitch (2011). Special Report: After Japan, Where’s the Next Nuclear Weak Link? Reuters Strategies for Sustainable Growth, 9 June. De Wit, A and I Tetsunari (2011). The ‘power elite’ and environmentalenergy policy in Japan. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 9(4). Dolan, RE and RL Worden (eds.), (1994). Japan: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Giddens, A (2008). The politics of climate change: National responses to the challenge of global warming. In Policy Network Paper. London: Policy

Network. Graham, E (2005). Japan’s Sea Lane Security 1940–2004: A Matter of Life and Death. London and New York: Routledge.

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Hughes, L (2009). Climate change and Japan’s post-Copenhagen challenge, Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, No. 34. Jain, P (2007). Japan’s energy security in an era of emerging competition in the Asia Pacific. In Energy Security in Asia, M Wesley (ed.). London and New York: Routledge. Jain, P (2011). Japan’s expanding security networks: India and Australia. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 22(1/2). Jain, P and B Williams (eds.), (2011). Japan in Decline: Fact or Fiction? Folkstone, Kent: Global Oriental. Japanese MP Taro Kono (24 March 2011). ABC Local, 24 March. Johnson, C (2011). Japan’s private sector split on nuclear switch. Asia Times Online, 28 May. Kagawa-Fox, M (2010). The ethics of Japan’s global environmental policy. Ph.D. thesis, University of Adelaide. Kameyama, Y (2008). The ‘beyond 2012’ debate in Japan. In Climate Change in Asia: Perspectives on the Future Climate Regime, Y Kameyama, AP Sari, MH Soejachmoen and N Kanie (eds.). Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Kawashima, Y (2000). Japan’s decision-making about climate change problems: Comparative study of decisions in 1990 and in 1997. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 3(1). King, A (2011). The trilateral summit: A new era in China–Japan relations? East Asia Forum, 2 June. Kotsev, V (2011). Costs rise in “worst industrial disaster.” Asia Times Online, 25 June. Landman, A (2011). What happened to media coverage of Fukushima? PR Watch, 23 November. Lesbriel, SH (1998). Nimby Politics in Japan: Siting and the Management of Environmental Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Ministry of the Environment, Annual Report on the Environment: The Sound Material-Cycle Society and the Biodiversity in Japan 2009. Miyaoka, I (2004). Japan’s conciliation with the United States in climate change negotiations. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 4(1). Morikawa, J (1996). Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Morikawa, J (2009). Whaling in Japan: Power, Politics and Diplomacy. London: Hurst. Ohta, H (2000). Japanese environmental foreign policy. In Japanese Foreign Policy, T Inoguchi and P Jain (eds.). New York: Palgrave.

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Son, M (2011). Tsunami clears way for solar-powered Japan. Asia Times, 23 September. Sugiyama, N and T Takeuchi (2008). Local policies for climate change in Japan. The Journal of Environment Development, 17(4). Takuya, F (2011). How Japan’s low carbon society and nuclear power generation came hand in hand: The ‘egoism’ of Tepco ‘ecoism’. The Asia Pacific Journal, 9(23). Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Tokyo Climate Change Strategy: Progress Report and Future Vision, Tokyo, 2010. United Nations Environment Program. Emissions Reductions Pledges: Japan. 23 November 2010. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations Climate Change Conference. October 2011.

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CHAPTER 12

RETHINKING SECURITY IN JAPAN: IN SEARCH OF A POST-‘POSTWAR’ NARRATIVE Satoh Haruko

Introduction On 11 March 2011, the worst catastrophe since defeat and devastation in World War II engulfed Japan: a massive earthquake (M. 8.9) and tsunami, both of historical scale, struck Japan’s Pacific northeast and it also triggered a nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The combination of two natural disasters (earthquake and tsunami) and the nuclear disaster makes 3.11 a complex disaster that arguably has no precedent in modern history, anywhere. Each of the three disasters, by itself, is a serious national security challenge for any state to cope with. However, the nuclear crisis in particular suggests another compounding element that appears peculiar to Japan, which is the low security consciousness to a national emergency. There was no crisis management system to speak of in the government, let alone an effective accident control mechanism to combat the accident, even though domestic and international implications were of the most serious kind. The dismal state of national politics in the aftermath of the change of power in 2009 is evidently an additional problem, for the two major parties — the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and former ruling Liberal 273

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Democratic Party (LDP) — that presently occupy the highest governing organ of Japan cannot even work together, let alone assure the people by suspending their preoccupation of late: the seikyoku1 game of political survival. There is hardly a sense of national crisis in Nagata-cho, the location of the Japanese Diet. Yet, such state of affairs after 3.11 is not surprising, for Japan’s unguarded security posture, defective nuclear energy regime, and political paralysis are all legacies of the postwar political economy focused only on rapid economic development and growth. Once a model of international success but now a model of stagnation, political and strategic inertia, this postwar state has left an especially difficult legacy, which is the failure to develop a coherent concept of national security and a security regime (anzen hosho taisei), including a crisis management system. By security regime, I do not mean what is often understood in Japanese discourse as the security system of the Japan–US security alliance (nichi-bei anpo taisei); it is what should exist at the higher realm of national politics responsible for carrying out the state’s primary (or one might even say the most primitive) function, that is to protect its people, property, and territory from a variety of destabilising or life-threatening threats.2 This chapter argues that 3.11 revealed as ever that Japan’s major security challenge still lies in this realm of domestic political discourse that has not transcended the old left-right divide between those identifying strongly with the ‘pacifist’ constitution’s war renunciation clause, Article 9, and those who argue that Japan should become a ‘normal state’ with a normal army by revising the constitution. Japan needs to forge a consensus over the postwar constitution, without which a legitimate security regime that works regardless of who is in power or what is its cause — be it a natural disaster, a nuclear accident, or as right-wing nationalists might suggest, military attack — would not be possible. 1

Seikyoku is a Japanese word for political situation but it also means power struggle within a narrow inter- or intra-party situation. 2 From Operation Tomodachi to the speedy offer of assistance to control the nuclear fallout, the US demonstrated its readiness and generosity to help its oldest Asian ally.

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Impact of the Change of Power on Japanese Security Until 3.11, Japan’s recent security preoccupations were of the conventional kind: how to secure itself among unfriendly or difficult neighbours, such as China, Russia, and North Korea, making provocative moves militarily and politically. These are post-Cold War challenges that arose, in part, because Japan’s relations between these northeast Asian states are still burdened by the legacy of World War II. In facing these new challenges from former adversaries as well as adjusting to the post-Cold War world of diversifying security challenges both traditional and non-traditional, however, Japan has also been challenged by its own postwar security framework (the primacy of the Japan–US security alliance and the exclusively defence-oriented [senshu boei] military capability) and the ‘passive pacifist’ posture supporting it (the so-called Yoshida doctrine of lying low in international politics while focusing on economic development). These have not evolved greatly since 1952, that is, when Japan entered into a security alliance with the United States at the end of occupation without adjusting the strongly pacifist constitution — a postwar legacy of US occupation — that, in principle, does not recognise the legitimacy of armed forces, let alone a military alliance. The Self-Defence Forces (SDF), Japan’s military force, exists as a legal entity but its constitutional standing is still disputable. Over the course of the 1990s, such constitutional dispute over the SDF was beginning to fade into the background. The Gulf War of 1991 was a significant turning point, as Japan was criticised for not participating in the multinational forces. Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping since 1992 has made the SDF more socially acceptable at home. The challenge of a rising China and North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programmes further challenged the SDF’s exclusively defence-oriented posture, and with the dispatch of the SDF to noncombat missions in Iraq and the Indian Ocean without a UN mandate in the post-9.11 America’s war on terror the last remaining constitutional restriction on the SDF before its becoming a ‘normal army’ became the right to collective defence.

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The last ‘attack’ on Article 9 came from Abe Shinzo, a right-wing nationalist, who campaigned to cast away the remainders of this ‘postwar regime’ as LDP prime minister (2006–2007). He upgraded the status of the self-defence agency to a full-fledged ministry of defence and tried to set the process of constitutional revision in motion. Yet, it was also during his one year in office that the LDP suffered irreparable damage to its credibility as Japan’s long dominant party. The news of the disastrous mismanagement of the national pension scheme broke out in early 2007, where more than 50 million pension records were reported to be in disarray. This severely undermined public confidence in the government, and Abe’s LDP lost the upper house elections to the DPJ in July 2007. The electorate was getting fed up with ‘a political class grown fat on a broken system’3 and wanted nothing less than something akin to a regime change. From this point onward, the LDP was on the road to be defeated by the DPJ in the lower house elections of August 2009. Popular mandate that the DPJ received after the change of power in 2009, the first significant one since Japan became a democracy in 1945, was to change the style of policymaking as much as change the rationale and purpose of actual policies. The direction of change suggested that the bases of political legitimacy had shifted from those of a developmental state of national purpose to one befitting an affluent and increasingly pluralistic society. The hitherto acquiescent Japanese public has begun to demand a political process that is dynamic, transparent, and accountable — qualities neglected in Japanese politics during the heydays of the 1955-regime of single-party rule by the LDP, and that is why Hatoyama characterised the party’s landslide victory on 30 August as, ‘change from the old ways of profit driven politics in the service of vested interests and change from bureaucratic rule to popular sovereignty [italics added].’4 3

‘Japan,’ The Economist, 23 February 2008, p. 13. Hatoyama delivered this message at the post-DPJ victory press conference in the early hours of 1 September 2009. 4

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Yet, the DPJ inherited from the 1955-regime a government machinery in desperate need of both immediate repairs as well as a long-term, overhaul plan guided by new sets of principles and logic. The job was like restoring order and efficiency to an old mansion running on infrastructure of a by-gone era and managed by household staff (the bureaucracy) in place of an absentee landlord (political leadership). This included, also, the unresolved historical baggage, which is more than overdue political consensus on the constitution and issues that still require acrobatic interpretations of Article 9, a job Abe failed, for better or worse, to finish. For, one of the main characteristics of the 1955-regime was the ideological tug-of-war over the constitution between its two main parties, the LDP and the Socialist Party. Remaining in the state of permanent tension, the 1955-regime kept the postwar 1947 constitution and the US–Japan security treaty to coexist and compete for authority as a pragmatic measure to secure Japan without disturbing domestic political stability. The LDP preferred to revise the constitution to regain the full state sovereignty, and rearming by revising Article 9 was crucial to this end. The Socialist Party, on the other hand, made itself ideologically incapable of recognising the legitimacy of the SDF, let alone the security alliance, by taking the polar opposite position that appealed to popular anti-war, anti-military sentiment. The warfatigued Japanese public had become averse to the conservative’s idea of constitutional revision because it was construed as going back to the bad old days of a war-mongering state, and the Socialist Party seized on this public sentiment to build its support base. In this historical context, the change of power resulted in more confusion than clarity of purpose and direction in Japan’s security posture. A series of diplomatic missteps quickly deflated public enthusiasm and expectation for the new ruling party. The DPJ’s attempt to renegotiate the relocation of a US Marines airbase in Futenma, Okinawa, in particular, hit a sour note with both the Japanese public as well as the Obama administration, as the then Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio appeared to be challenging the bedrock of Japanese security, the alliance with the US.

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The Futenma Debacle Although the bilateral relationship has had its ups and downs in the past, the plunge under Hatoyama was spectacular. He chose the Futenma issue as a showcase to demonstrate to Japanese voters and to Washington, D.C. that the DPJ does not intend to follow the LDP ways, even in managing the alliance. The choice of Futenma was, however, poor mainly for two reasons. First, Futenma was a political quagmire left behind by the previous LDP governments and the DPJ could have sidestepped it in the early days of its rule. For example, the original agreement reached in 1996 to relocate the airbase from Futenma did include a concrete plan for a new site and it took another 10 years before a roadmap to construct a new airbase in Henoko (another location inside Okinawa) was agreed upon in 2006. Proposing to relocate it outside of Okinawa, as Hatoyama pledged at the elections, was as irresponsible as the original 1996 Clinton–Hashimoto joint statement. In this joint agreement, the governments of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and President Bill Clinton agreed to relocate the Futenma airbase. However, at that time no decision had been made about a possible location for the new base. Second, Futenma became a complicated affair because the DPJ chose the Social Democratic Party (SDP), ideological heir to the anti-alliance Socialist Party, as its coalition partner to secure its support in the July 2010 upper house elections to consolidate majority. The Hatoyama cabinet became vulnerable to internal dissent over Futenma as the whole affair got sucked into postwar Japan’s security identity dilemma caused by the constant juggling of the real world politics of the US–Japan security treaty (represented by the LDP) and the ideal world of the pacifist constitution’ (represented by the former Socialist Party and public sentiment). Fukushima Mizuho, SDP leader and cabinet minister for social issues, expressed party-line views that echoed Okinawan anti-US bases sentiment. Even though the SDP’s parliamentary influence was negligible, the tail wagged the dog as the party’s pacifist identity raised its head to make a stand.

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For a party that has been in opposition for more than a decade, especially with more determination to replace the LDP than the Socialist Party ever had, DPJ’s inability to articulate a coherent position on foreign policy has been damaging to Japan’s national interest.5 The party’s rise as the LDP’s opposition decidedly shifted the line of disagreement over the use of force (in other words, the use of the SDF) to that of conditions rather than on the idea itself. Unlike the Socialist Party, it supported the idea of revising the constitution, and helped the LDP set up the Research Commission for the Constitution (RCC; kenpo chosakai) in 2000. While in opposition, the DPJ has sometimes stood on the sidelines but also took active part in supporting the LDP government’s efforts to enhance Japan’s international role, especially during the period of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro’s rendezvous with neo-con America. So, why the Futenma mess? The partial answer lies in what Hatoyama inadvertently forced the Japanese to confront through the Futenma ordeal: the legacy of the postwar settlement as perceived in the ‘unequal’ relationship with the United States. For, while Hatoyama made a mess out of the Futenma issue, it should be noted that the majority of the Japanese voters were behind Hatoyama’s overall intention to make US–Japan alliance more ‘equal’ and to lessen Okinawa’s burden. He appealed to the public’s ambivalence toward the alliance: While recognising the necessity of the alliance for security, there are also reservations about it because of large US military presence on Japanese soil (especially in Okinawa), fear of being entangled in America’s wars, and the conventional wisdom that it is an ‘unequal’ alliance. But the public turned against Hatoyama for the way he handled it. That said, his Japanese and American critics have arguably blown out of proportion the significance of what is really a fraction of what

5 As Sheila Smith of the Council of Foreign Affairs pointed out in the early days of DPJ victory: ‘[The] question of what DPJ’s foreign policy stance will be, including its views on defence issues, now tops the list of concerns in the US and elsewhere.’ Sheila Smith, ‘A Sea Change in Japanese Politics,’ Honolulu Advertiser op-ed (6 September 2009) reprinted in Council of Foreign Relations website. .

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constitutes the US–Japan alliance — one military airbase in Okinawa. A European analysis of Futenma offers an alternative take from the Japanese and US critics, which I quote at length: If one agrees that the DPJ’s landslide victory in the general elections on 31 August 2009 could at least partly be explained by Hatoyama’s promise to revisit the apparent and consistent asymmetries of the Japan–US alliance, attempts by the DPJ-led government to do just that in September onwards must be interpreted as a democraticallyelected government seeking to implement the policies that it was elected to implement by its electorate. Consequently, Gates’ ‘decision’ in November 2009 that a newly-elected Japanese government does not have the right to review a bilateral agreement negotiated and adopted by a predecessor government could even be interpreted as US ‘interference’ in Japan’s political decision-making process and its democratic practices… Leaving aside that the European Union or individual European states do not have security relations with Japan in any way comparable with the US, it is still hardly conceivable that a European Foreign Minister, Minister of Defence, Prime Minister or President would travel to Tokyo… to tell a new democratic-elected government that an agreement the new government wishes to review is ‘non-negotiable,’ as US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates did during his visit to Tokyo in November 2009.6

Karel van Wolferen picks up the same point but the criticism is directed also at the LDP: ‘Hatoyama’s critics who blame him for mishandling diplomacy vis-à-vis Washington overlook the fact that normal diplomacy is not possible in this case, because the United States does not truly recognise Japanese sovereignty — an indispensable condition for diplomacy. It has been taken as a matter of course that Japan would in the end always do what the United States wanted. 6

Axel Berkofsky and Linus Hagström, ‘Futenma and the Mobilisation of Bias: An Alternative Perspective on the Japan–US Alliance,’ ISPI Working Paper, No. 38, December 2010, p. 8.

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The Hatoyama government must deal with the unfinished post-World War II business that its Jiminto [LDP] predecessors have never looked straight in the eye.’7 The Futenma debacle was a reminder that the contested nature of the framework of Japanese security, its ideological security lexicon, continue to be a political challenge with security policy implications. Richard Samuels pointed out that, ‘[whether] the valence is militarist or neutral, debate over the legality and efficacy of use of force has been a ubiquitous part of the Japanese discourse for more than half a century.’8 The DPJ had internalised this old left-right debate as a amalgamation of former LDP and Socialist Party members, as DPJ’s Sengoku Yoshito’s ‘Freudian slip’ demonstrates. He was caught calling the SDF as an ‘instrument of violence [boryoku sochi]’ as cabinet secretary, revealing his ideological roots as protestor in the antiestablishment (alliance) student riots in 1970 — the last of the violent demonstrations — and as former member of the Socialist Party. However, no sooner than the dust began to settle over Futenma with Hatoyama’s resignation and his successor, Kan Naoto’s effort to reassure the US that the alliance remains the pillar of Japanese security, 3.11 struck. 3.11 highlighted as ever the lack of a robust security regime (anzen hosho taisei) that replaces this postwar framework in which discussions and debates about Japan’s security policy have tended focus on issues of national defence, defence cooperation with the US, and international security contributions. The conceptual gap in Japan’s security policy thus far reflected the inadequate recognition among Japan’s ruling elites that security challenges in today’s globalising conditions are complex and increasingly unconventional; military threats are only one kind of security challenge to the state. With 3.11, especially with Fukushima, the state machinery turned out to be a security challenge to its people. 7 Karel van Wolferen, ‘Japan’s Stumbling Revolution,’ an article originally published in Chuo Koron March 2010 issue, the English version which was posted on (accessed 25 May 2010). 8 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 111.

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3.11 and the sotei-gai Syndrome The destructive power of the tsunami far exceeded the imagination of any Japanese, even for an earthquake prone Japan. The entire communities in coastal areas were swept away by the phenomenal force of tidal waves over 10 meters high.9 However, the news of dangers of nuclear meltdown in Fukushima Dai-ichi (No. 1) nuclear power station was equally, if not more, shocking because the first words that came from Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), owner and operator of the plants, were: ‘The level of the tsunami was beyond our design expectation [sotei-gai].’ The tsunami destroyed the emergency electricity generator to operate the reactor’s cooling system. Yet, what would preparing for ‘worst-case scenarios’ entail? What Safety Regime? A serious problem that emerged with Fukushima was the defective structure of Japan’s nuclear energy regime itself. Above all, it does not have an overriding authority comparable to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). For example, the basic function of the government’s Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) is to discuss and recommend — as in the case of many cabinet commissions — on issues concerning nuclear safety; but it has no enforcement power.10 Moreover, the NSC’s responsibility is to ‘[assure] safety of nuclear research, development and utilisation activities.’ The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), part of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), regulates operators. The emergency 9

A tsunami of such a height has been recorded in the past, but it has not hit Japan in modern times (that is after the Meiji restoration of 1868). 10 The Nuclear Safety Commission was set up in the Cabinet Office in 1978 as a separate body from Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), set up in 1955. The JAEC’s mission statement is revealing of the NSC’s role: ‘The Atomic Energy Commission is set up in the Cabinet Office together with the Nuclear Safety Commission, which is responsible for assuring safety of nuclear research, development and utilization activities,’ (accessed 5 April 2011).

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system to monitor radioactive emission,11 on the other hand, is controlled by the Ministry of Education and Science.12 Information regarding radioactive emissions was, thus, confusing as there were multiple sources in the first few weeks. In Japan, the government, the NISA, TEPCO, and the NSC (each complaining the lack of information sharing); and, from abroad the NRC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The structural neglect of public safety measures — including an accident management system — is rooted in the political economy of the postwar, developmental economy state. The primary purpose of this postwar state was to pursue economic gains at all costs. In the effort to catch up and overtake the industrially advanced West, state and society operated like one massive corporation, ‘Japan, Inc.,’ and its political system, the 1955-regime of single-party rule by the LDP, allowed complacency to reign over prudence in promoting nuclear energy, only as part of the country’s economic and industrial policies, which, in turn, only served the interest of large businesses. As in the following comment from one angry Internet blogger, “Japan’s ‘elites’ in politics, bureaucracy, and the business world had been ignoring warnings and only stressing the safety of nuclear power plants to build them left and right. They propagated the view that Japanese nuclear power plants are trouble-free because they are built to very high safety standards.’13 TEPCO’s corporate culture of obfuscation, hubris, and questionable operational ethics as a public utility company grew in this corruptive political economy that began to unravel in the 1990s. Its monopoly on electricity generation and distribution has gone unchallenged, resulting in internal corruption: The habitual falsification of 11

System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) is managed by the Ministry of Education and Science’s nuclear safety division as part of its nuclear disaster prevention network. . 12 ‘Niju gyosei no heigai arawa [the problem of dual administrative structure exposed],’ Nikkei Shimbun, 30 April 2011. 13 From ‘Bloggers Today,’ 31 March 2011 in Asahi Shimbun-WebRonza. (accessed 1 April 2011).

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operational data and cover-up system of malfunctions of their nuclear power plants for decades, the full extent of which was only revealed in 2002.14 As William Overholt descrbes: ‘Notwithstanding heroic engineers, Tokyo Electric Power Company, the heart of the nuclear crisis, exemplifies the politically coddled corporations cause Japan’s malaise. No other nuclear company in the industrialised democracies has been allowed such a history of bungling, cover-ups, and systematic disregard of security recommendations.’15 TEPCO also did not have an accident-management procedure and were even unwilling to share information with the US or even accept assistance in the critical first three hours of the accident, which is said to have exacerbated the situation, possibly causing the meltdown in three reactors (reactors no. 1, 2, and 3).16

14

In 2002, TEPCO was found to have covered up a system trouble in one of its nuclear power plants. In 2007, TEPCO reported the results of the internal investigation on its past cover-ups and falsifying data to NISA. It was revealed in the report that TEPCO had been repeatedly falsifying data since 1979. Hoshi Yoshitaka, ‘Juncho na gyoseki ni mizu wo sasu deta kaizan [data falsification that spoils good business],’ Nikkei Business Online, 18 January 2007. (accessed 2 April 2011). 15 William H. Overholt, ‘Japan: Don’t Waste the Crisis,’ PacNet Newsletter No. 18A (CSIS-Pacific Forum, 26 March 2011). 16 Although the true facts of the first three hours are not yet fully known, television interviews of the director of Fukushima Dai-ichi, past and present members of the cabinet’s nuclear safety commission, and other specialists all suggest that TEPCO clearly had no functioning command structure to respond swiftly to the situation. Even the engineers from Toshiba, the one of the builders of Fukushima’s six reactors, were shut out of TEPCO emergency meeting the initial hours even though they had rushed to TEPCO headquarters. See Nikkei, ‘Kensho: sono toki [what happened then?]’ 30 April 2011. According to Tachibana Takashi, a well-respected investigative journalist, the Japanese side initially rejected US assistance, presuming that the US objective was to gather technological information on Japan’s nucelar plants because it had not built a nuclear power plants in 30 years. Evidently, the Japanese side did not know the likelihood that America’s unmanned surveillance aircraft Global Hawk had already detected a meltdown in Fukushima Dai-ichi at the earliest stage. Interview with Tase Yasuhiro, a Nikkei columnist, in ‘Shukan News Shinsho’ (TV Tokyo, broadcast 21 May 2011).

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The sotei-gai damage to Fukushima happened not for the lack of imagination but systemic neglect of human safety and environmental concerns in setting safety standards and operating the power plants. While TEPCO admitted that the height of the tsunami was soteigai, the nature of the on-going crisis was determined more by collective and wilful neglect of safety regulations and lessons since the first reactor was built 40 years ago.17 The entire nuclear power regime — not just TEPCO but also state regulators — had been ignoring past warnings of the vulnerability of the existing power plants to a large-scale tsunami.18 One need not stress that management of nuclear power comes with the attendant domestic and international responsibility, first and foremost to safeguard human security for those working in the plant, living around the plant and countries that might be affected by radioactive material released into the air and sea. 80,000 people were affected by the Fukushima accident, and there is as yet no knowing when those evacuees will be able to return to their homes and communities. Japan’s export industries, agriculture, and fishery were also 17

Only a few years ago in 2007, TEPCO had to shut down the Kashiwazaki–Kariya nuclear power station (the largest nuclear power station in the world) after the facility was damaged by the Chuetsu offshore earthquake (M. 6.6). In the aftermath of this accident, there were revelations that TEPCO had ignored expert warnings that the site was above an active fault. 18 The tsunami reached the height of 14-meters while the facility was built to withstand a tsunami of 5-meters high. According to a Reuters report TEPCO’s nuclear specialist team was aware by 2007 of the vulnerability of the nuclear facilities to tsunami that exceeds the height for which the plants were designed to withstand, and had even used Fukushima as its case study. ‘Tokubetsu ripoto: chi ni ochita anzen shinwa–fukushima genpatsu kiki wa naze okitaka [special report: fallen safety myth — why did the fukushima nuclear crisis happen?]’ (accessed 1 April 2011). At the 2006 Diet’s budget subcommittee, Communist Party member Yoshii Hidekatsu questioned the then Minister of METI Nikai Toshihiro of the dangers of the failure of the backup electricity supply to cool down the reactors in the event of a massive earthquake. Nikai responded: ‘METI promises to work seriously to address the situation.’ (accessed 2 April 2011).

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heavily affected as many countries imposed bans on imports from Japan for fear of radioactive contamination. The number of tourists to Japan also dropped sharply. All of these because of the march of sotei-gai symbolised by the Fukushima accident. Nonetheless, the burden of social responsibility, economic, and security costs are clearly beyond the scope of one commercial operator, such as TEPCO, to undertake. Missing is the state as the highest authority in the nuclear energy regime and guarantor of public safety. The Mutated Security Discourse Domestic discourse Japan chose to re-rise in the international community by economic means while leaving security concerns to the US, its postwar guardian and benefactor. The formula worked miraculously during the Cold War when security was primarily the responsibility of the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. In this strategically stable condition, the postwar state developed its other identity as a model of economic development and success as Japan, Inc. Yet, the unintended effect of this choice was that as a legacy of defeat, occupation and the Cold War that, combined with popular anti-war sentiment and anti-state ideology that prevailed among Japan’s intellectuals, the postwar state also gave rise to a peculiar body politic incapable of recognising security as a legitimate (and arguably central) concern of any state. Such a body politic obvious cannot engage in a ‘normal’ security discourse, let alone conceive one. The problem again was the absence of a national consensus on the postwar constitution and the idea of the state, something that the 1955-regime did not seek to obtain and instead left it in a state of abstract, ideological tension. Even though Japan had effectively rearmed as part of US Cold War strategy to utilise Japan as a forward base in its Asian theatre, the LDP refused to drop the idea of revision because, as a conservative party, it wished to restore the nation-state (kokumin kokka) with the Emperor as sovereign that was dismantled after World War II. The Socialist Party, on the other hand, dug its heels

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to the ground and posed as staunch defenders of the constitution, refusing to discuss constitutional revision even as a hypothetical proposition; the state (kokka) did not exist in the lexicon of the public discourse dominated by progressive, anti-state ideology. Constitutional revision became a taboo subject in public discourse and the state vanished from public consciousness, with its extortive powers present in the form of a myriad of regulations, the tax system, and the police (SDF was not even recognised in this perception of the state). In this ideological polarisation, the country became a peculiar place where it was hard to be patriot without being suspected as a right-wing nationalist, and a pacifist without being dismissed as a naïve idealist. It was safest to be apolitical — a non-pori — in this Japan. Such an ideological fixation at the political level and sensitivity at the social level towards state issues had unintended side effects. First, it narrowed the scope of discussions and debates on national security to issues of defence (kokubo) or traditional, hard security issues. They tend to be focused to this day on areas of the security alliance or, if not that, military preparedness to external threats. Any number of books in Japanese that carries in the title the word, ‘security [anzen hosho],’ will amply demonstrate this point. Moreover, there has been no conscious effort to conceptually differentiate anzen hosho from kokubo, and therefore, anzen hosho tends to have a narrower meaning in Japanese discourse than its English equivalent, security, which of course has a broader meaning than just defence. For example, the foreign ministry’s national security policy division (anzen hosho seisaku ka) established in 1993 under the policy planning bureau also reflects this trait. The division’s categories of national security issues are: the Japan–US alliance, regional security issues (such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Korean Peninsula), and international security issues (such as fight against terrorism, peace-building, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).19 Another bizarre example is the name of the cabinet office’s section in charge of national security: it is called anzen-hosho/kiki kanri shitsu, a literal translation of 19

The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (accessed 5 April 2011).

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which is security and crisis management room. The distinction between security issues and issues or incidents requiring crisis management, if it exists, is unclear. The two examples reflect the ambiguous concept of national security even in the government. The alliance discourse The management of the alliance with the US has also suffered from the ideologically charged political landscape. As a ruling party the LDP tended to deal with security issues and alliance politics outside the realm of public discourse, if not shelve many issues and challenges that concern the alliance and leave them unresolved (such as Futenma, to say the least). One reason for this undemocratic approach to security issues has been the public’s strong anti-military, anti-war sentiment that had often turned to expressions of disapproval toward political leaders who discuss security concerns and policy responses that hinted remilitarisation (however hypothetically) in the open forum. While this allergic reaction to security issues has eased in the last two decades, its residual influence can still be felt in how Japan approaches nuclear issues. While enthusiastic to promote nuclear disarmament, Japan has rarely expressed interests in (or even recognised the need to) being part of the nuclear strategy debate, as if doing so would automatically open the path for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. There still prevails the parochial view that the alliance brings security cheaply to Japan (the alliance as necessary evil), a view that is not entirely wrong but is a view rooted in the public’s anti-war, antimilitary sentiment, concerned only with the military dimension of the alliance. In addition, there is a cultivated preference to believe (almost religiously) in the ‘power’ of Article 9 of the postwar constitution as the guarantor of peace over the alliance with the US. The postwar politics of managing the alliance against the backdrop of ideological tug of war over the postwar constitution during the Cold War contributed to sustaining this idealistic — if not naïve — view of international politics. Moreover, there has been little understanding even among Japan’s elites — not just politicians, journalists, or intellectuals but also those in the business community — that there are basically four

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components that make up the US–Japan alliance, each addressing different issues and areas that require different approaches, but none that the alliance could do without: (1) The economic relationship; (2) US bases in Japan; (3) security cooperation between the SDF and US forces; and, finally, (4) America’s extended deterrence (including nuclear). Each, as I said, needs different approaches because each represents different types of problem-solving for both countries, and the balancing of these four components are the substance of the political management of the alliance. While (2), (3), and (4) are what the Japanese imagine the alliance to be, there is scant recognition that the economic relationship is also an important element of the US alliance. Missing so far in the much-used rhetoric such as ‘deepening’ or ‘strengthening’ the alliance in Japan is a comprehensive and strategic articulation of the purpose of the alliance by those in the political establishment (politicians as well as bureaucrats) as well intellectuals and journalists in mass media whose observations and views, in particular, very much shape public opinion towards the alliance. The gap between public perception of the alliance and the regional strategic imperatives that drive the alliance to become more dynamic is something that needs to be narrowed in the coming years if the alliance is, indeed, to deepen. Mapping out the future outlay of US bases in Japan, including the downsizing US force presence in Okinawa, is an important political exercise in this context, but such exercise should no longer be (seen as) the case of Japan merely rubber stamping US decisions. Here it is useful to quote from a recent US report that touches upon the impact of the Futenma debacle on the modus operandi of the security alliance: ‘A handful of civil servants in Tokyo plus a few politicians from the long dominant Liberal Democratic Party once served as the primary Japanese interlocutors for the alliance. The advent of the DPJ government shattered this fraternal arrangement.’20 It recommends that, ‘[the] United States and Japan should

20

Patrick Cronin, Daniel M. Kilman, & Abraham M. Denmark, Renewal: Revitalizing the US–Japan Alliance (Center for a New American Security CNAS, October 2010), p. 23.

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update the institutions for managing their alliance to reflect new political and strategic realities… Future institutions for the alliance should be more inclusive, encompassing members of all the major political parties in Japan’s parliamentary system as well as representative from more than just the Defence and State Departments and their Japanese equivalents.’ Importantly, it also recognises that, ‘Washington and Tokyo must do more to reinforce the Japanese public’s support for the alliance… Further engagement is needed with Japanese communities hosting US bases where considerable frustrations have accumulated. Tokyo should engage these communities in a dialogue and work to alleviate their concerns.’21 Incremental Changes Back in 1995, the Kobe–Awaji earthquake and the sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo (a religious cult group) on Tokyo’s underground system exposed a variety of weaknesses — institutional and conceptual — with Japan, Inc.’s security regime. With Kobe–Awaji, Japan had no crisis management system, let alone an articulate need for a functioning state; demonstratively, the dispatch the Japan’s military, the SDF, for rescue and relief operations was neither automatic nor immediate.22 The system to receive overseas rescue teams was also dysfunctional — one may even say non-existent. With the sarin attack, the problem was conceptual: there was scant recognition then in public discourse that it was an act of terrorism, even though outside of Japan it was registered as terrorism committed by a terrorist group. With 3.11, we witnessed a Japan in transition from the old, postwar state to something else. The government’s responses were a mixture of effects of incremental changes in Japan’s security posture and the legacy of the old, Japan. Inc. The dispersed structure of Japan’s 21

Ibid., p. 7. Popular pacifist sentiment was then still accompanied by strong anti-military sentiment. Kobe, the capital of Hyogo prefecture and a traditional Socialist Party stronghold, was particularly anti-SDF. The governor of Hyogo, whose formal request to the central government is needed for SDF dispatch for disaster relief, initially resisted the idea.

22

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nuclear authorities, particularly the ‘village mentality’ of sectionalism that prevails among them was, in essence, a scaled-down version of the logic of the postwar developmental state that systematically neglected security risk calculations and wilfully abandoned the responsibility for human safety. Karel van Wolferen aptly described this problem of an absent state more than two decades ago: ‘Power in Japan is thus diffused over a number of semi-self-contained, semimutually dependent bodies which are neither responsible to an electorate nor, ultimately, subservient to one another… But the Japanese state vanishes once one considers the question of accountability.’ For Wolferen, the state of Japan, Inc. was not a state but a System.23 In this vanishing state, the sotei-gai syndrome prevails ‘like a mental condition’ — in words of one academic — throughout the state’s administrative structure.24 Just as Japan did not associate the sarin gas attack with terrorism, there is as yet little sense in Japan that this nuclear crisis is being defined and dealt as serious national security challenge let alone a grave international security concern. The response to the quake and tsunami, however, was a far cry from Kobe–Awaji. Prime Minister Kan Naoto immediately ordered the dispatch of 100,000 SDF men and within two days the USS Ronald Reagan (aircraft carrier) arrived outside of Sendai port to begin relief operations and US forces based in Japan launched Operation Tomodachi (tomodachi means friends in Japanese). The marked improvement in the government’s readiness to mobilise the SDF for disaster relief is a positive reflection of incremental changes in Japan’s security posture in the last two decades. Japan has gradually shed the minimalist approach to national defence and the strong popular anti-military sentiment that factored greatly in adopting such an approach has waned. Significantly, the SDF has become socially acceptable since it began participating in UN peacekeeping operations in 1992, effectively legitimising the role 23

Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 42. 24 Nakanishi Terumasa, “Nihon no shukua: ‘soteigai to sengo taisei ga maneku kokka no kiki [Japan’s malaise: lack of preparation and the post-war regime invite the crisis of the state],” Seiron, June 2011, pp. 50–61.

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of the military in the eyes of the public (as positive contributions to international peace), even though its use of force remains restricted by the pacifist constitution’s Article 9.25 Operation Tomodachi, on the other hand, demonstrated vividly to the Japanese people for the first time in the alliance’s 50 years history the value of the security alliance with the US. It was the first time that the SDF worked with US forces in a large scale operation. While there has been growing recognition among policymakers in both Tokyo and Washington of the need to revitalise the 50-year old US–Japan alliance, public support in Japan for the alliance — especially US military presence on Japanese soil — has been tested over Futenma. Moreover, the way that security policy has been discussed and formulated in the old, ‘fraternal arrangement’ has impaired the Japanese public’s understanding (and, therefore, support) of the alliance’s importance in the broader context of ensuring peace and prosperity in Asia-Pacific region. However, while public reservations about the alliance cannot be uprooted easily, Operation Tomodachi undoubtedly opened a positive new chapter for the alliance’s future foundation. Recovering the State Japan has been facing challenges that were different from those of reconstruction and recovery from the ashes of defeat in World War II to become the world’s second largest economy. With economic stagnation combined with the global spread of capitalism and the loss of strategic stability after the dissolution of the bipolar world order, the certainties of the Cold War era that allowed Japan to retain the political

25

For example, 2003 study on the issue of revising Article 9 examines extensively popular attitude and perceptions toward the SDF in recent years and the analysis reveals that more people recognise certain roles for the SDF. In the most recent Yomiuri Shimbun survey on effective organisations in responding to 3.11 conducted on the occasion of 6 months after the disaster, the SDF gained the highest approval at 82%, followed by volunteer groups, the fire brigade, local governments and the police force while the central government and the National Diet were at the bottom at 6% and 3% respectively. Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 September 2011, p.1.

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economy of ‘Japan, Inc.’ while shielded by the United States from the harsher realities of international politics and security crumbled. These irreversible changes began to unravel the conservative political order, the 1955-regime. And, while the overtly ideological contestation over the use of force has faded into the background of national politics the security narrative in Japan remains underdeveloped. A domestic consensus on core security policy issues needs to be forged by overcoming this constitutional impasse and to lay down a legitimate foundation that would broaden Japan’s security discussions as well as policy options to meet a variety of traditional as well as nontraditional security challenges, and not just those posed by the rise of China or by that relative decline of US hegemony in East Asia — the two most recent Japanese concerns until 3.11. Otherwise, the more recent, post-Cold War discussions and debates about how to strengthen Japan’s role in the alliance with the US or how Japan could contribute more to international security, such as in UN peacekeeping, are, in this context, rather like talking about the icing on the cake that is still half-baked. We must note that one of the reasons that the LDP fell from power in 2009 is that with the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new powers, especially China and India, and the global expansion of capitalism presented new challenges that its political order devoted exclusively to economic growth was not equipped to meet. Another reason is that, in trying to meet the new challenges, the LDP failed to see that in the longer narrative of postwar Japan’s political development, it had the wrong ideas from a by-gone era. The re-ignited movement to revise the postwar constitution, the emergence of the idea to become a ‘normal state,’ the antagonism with China over the interpretation of war history, the reactionary nationalism that stressed patriotism, and restoration of ‘Japanese tradition’ of the pre-war nation-state have collectively indicated that LDP’s brand of conservatism had become besieged by right-wing, nationalist thoughts since the Cold War ended. The security narrative woven as a peace-loving nation in the Cold War context also turned out to be quite superficial, as it isolated Japan from the region politically instead of facilitating relations based on trust.

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On the other hand, the DPJ is proving that it is also not the alternative, either. It is also a product of the 1955-regime, however much it tries to do things differently from the LDP. However, it nonetheless remains the task of the DPJ for the time being to try to change the paradigm of domestic politics. It is a historical challenge since the postwar settlement and the security relationship with the US shaped the course of Japan’s postwar development and a significant step in Japan’s democratic evolution. A breakthrough in this area which might be possible in the reconstruction and recovery process from 3.11 would actually be an important — if not crucial — part of fundamental political reform that the change of power initiated. Conclusion Very few postwar Japanese leaders have become unpopular over their handling of foreign and security policy issues until recently. Foreign policy issues have not figured highly in the public agenda, especially during elections, and rarely did they compete for political attention with other day-to-day economic and social issues in the by-gone era of stable 1955-regime. Yet, the DPJ’s two former Prime Ministers, Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto, were punished in opinion polls mainly for their mishandling of Japan’s foreign affairs. But if we go back half a century around the time of the advent of the LDP, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke also became extremely unpopular and paid a heavy political price through resignation in 1960 over the revision and extension of the US–Japan security treaty. This laid down, however, the foundation for long LDP rule with the underlay of the security treaty and buttressed by ‘Japan, Inc.’ The 1955-regime succeeded in restoring Japan’s international status that Japan had lost after defeat in World War II. Hatoyama’s and Kan’s resignations are perhaps similar costs for reinventing Japan. Political renovation to this end has only begun, and the process has so far only revealed the scope and depth of change required of the old, postwar system. Maruyama Masao, one of the influential postwar intellectuals, wished for democratic patriotism to grow with the new constitution in the early postwar years. Inoki Masamichi, former dean of Japan’s

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Defence Academy, likewise argued during the Cold War that healthy patriotism in postwar Japan can only come by with the proper recognition of the two pillars of today’s democracy, popular sovereignty and basic human rights, as values worth defending: ‘If the Japanese nation really tries to respect human rights, it would be impossible for them to trample upon the human rights of their neighbours in the Korean Peninsula or China. The respect of human rights is the most important principle in a democracy, and by upholding human rights one is able to control the expansionist type of patriotism from growing.’26 Their words have never sounded more appropriate, for what is changing in the longer narrative of Japan’s political modernisation is the Japanese idea of the state from one that required the people to defend the state to one of the state defending its people. Bibliography Berkofsky, A and L Hagström (2010). Futenma and the mobilisation of bias: An alternative perspective on the Japan–US alliance. ISPI Working Paper, No. 38. Bloggers today (31 March 2011). Asahi Shimbun-Web Ronza. Cronin, P, DM Kilman and AM Denmark (2010). Renewal: Revitalizing the US–Japan Alliance. Center for a New American Security CNAS. Hoshi, Y (2007). Juncho na gyoseki ni mizu wo sasu deta kaizan (data falsification that spoils good business). Nikkei Business Online, 18 January. Inoki, M (1972). Kuni wo mamoru (Defending the Country). Tokyo: Jitsugyo no nihonsha. Japan (23 February 2008). The Economist. Nakanishi, T (2011). Nihon no shukua: ‘Soteigai to sengo taisei ga maneku kokka no kiki (Japan’s malaise: Lack of preparation and the post-war regime invite the crisis of the state). Seiron, June. Nikkei Shimbun. Niju gyosei no heigai arawa [the problem of dual administrative structure exposed], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 30 April 2011. Overhalt, WH (2011). Japan: Don’t Waste the Crisis. PacNet Newsletter No. 18A. CSIS-Pacific Forum. 26

Inoki Masamichi, Kuni wo mamoru [defending the country] (Tokyo: Jitsugyo no nihonsha, 1972), pp. 155–156.

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Smith, S (2009). A sea change in Japanese politics. Honolulu Advertiser op-ed. 6 September. Wolferen, KV (1989). The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation. London: Macmillan. Wolferen, KV (2010). “Japan’s Stumbling Revolution,” an article originally published in Chuo Koron, March 2010 issue.

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3.11 (March 11)

273, 283, 284

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 98 Aso, Taro 34, 36, 79, 87, 92, 156 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 6, 10, 11, 13, 22, 97–123 Australia 10, 12, 13, 18

abduction issue 74, 75, 83–88, 93 Abe, Shinzo 33, 63, 77, 85, 87, 89, 90, 149, 151, 157, 162 Aceh 182, 183, 185, 186, 188, 189, 193–195 Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA) 11, 12 Afghanistan 7, 8, 17 Akashi Yasushi 183, 186 Anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) 6 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus 11 ASEAN Plus Three 99, 114 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) xvi, 6, 11 Asia military buildup xv Asia Pacific Community 112 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 6, 11 Asian regionalism 98, 101, 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 120

Cambodia 181–184, 186 challenges 127, 132, 137, 146, 147 change of power 273, 275–277, 294 Cheonan 5 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) xxiii China 3, 5–7, 11–18, 21–23 China factor 130 Chongryon 86, 87 Climate change 241–245, 249–258, 262, 263, 265–267, 269 Chiang Mai Initiatives (CMI) 218, 221, 227–237

297

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Defence White Paper 80 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 10, 20, 22, 51, 63, 85 Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands 27, 29, 31, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 57, 68 Downer, Alexander 156, 157 DPJ 27, 37, 38, 41, 44–46, 48, 273, 276–281, 289, 294 drivers 127, 129, 141 Dynamic Defense Force 9 East Asia 217, 218, 220, 221, 225, 229, 231, 232, 235, 236 East Asia Economic Caucus 98 East Asia Economic Group 98 East Asia Summit (EAS) xvi, 11, 102, 113, 114, 120 East Asian Community (EAC) xx, xxi, 13, 14, 40, 98, 114 East China Sea 3, 56, 57, 68 East Timor 8, 182, 184, 185 economic interdependence 51, 59, 61, 65, 66 economic relations 134 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 254, 256 energy 241–252, 254–264, 266–270, 255 European Union (EU) xiv, 13 fossil fuels 241, 244, 251, 263 Fukuda, Yasuo 34, 51, 61 Fukushima 242–244, 249, 251, 254, 258, 260, 262, 263, 266–269, 273, 278, 281, 282, 284–286

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant 4 Fundamental Law of Education 91, 92 G-2 xvi G20 217–219, 224–231, 234–236 G8 217–220, 222–227, 234 Gates, Robert 78 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 12 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 188 GFC, Global Financial Crisis 218, 226, 232, 235, 236 Global financial crisis (GFC) xiv, xv Global Warming Law 254, 256 Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 241–244, 249–252, 254, 255, 265 Gulf of Aden 8, 13 Hatoyama, Yukio 13, 37 hedging 133, 135, 136 history issue 55–57 Howard, John Hu, Jintao 33, 35, 38, 62 human security 177–184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 194–198 IMF, International Monetary Fund 218–221, 227–237 India- Japan relations 127–130, 133, 140, 142, 146, 147 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 9

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International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) 255 International Monitoring Team 189, 192 international shipping 201, 214 Iraq 8, 17 Ishiba, Shigeru 80 Japan Coast Guard (JCG) 207–209 Japan-China Joint Communiqué 14 Japanese Coast Guard 3, 11 Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) 201, 207, 211–214 Japanese militarism 51 Japan-North Korea relations: normalization talks 75 Japan-South Korea: military cooperation 80 Japan–US security alliance 274, 275 JICA 179, 189, 193 Joint Declaration on Security Co-operation (JDSC) 149–152, 159, 162, 164, 170–172 Kan Naoto Koizumi, Junichiro 28, 51, 157, 185, 193 Koizumi-Kim summit 84, 85 Kono Taro 254 Kuomingtang (KMT) 7 Kyoto Protocol/Pact 254, 256, 257, 265

299

LDP 34, 36–38, 274, 276–281, 283, 286, 288, 293, 294 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 20, 51 Local referendums 261 Ma, Ying-jeou 7 Malacca and Singapore Straits 203, 206, 209–211 maritime security 201, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213 Martti Ahtisaari 188, 196 Meji Restoration 53 Mid-Term Defense Plan 9 Mindanao 179, 183, 185, 189–194, 196 Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry (METI) 249, 252–254, 264, 266 Ministry of Environment (MOE) 252, 266 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 252, 266 Moro Islamic Liberation Front 179, 189, 191 national defence [kokubo] 281, 287, 291 National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) 8–10 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 13 Noda Yoshihiko 263 North Korea 3, 5, 19, 22 North Korea-bashing 75, 76 Nuclear 241, 242

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Obuchi Keizo 179 ODA 179, 180, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 198 official development aid 55 Ogata Sadako 179 oil shocks 246 Okada Katsuya 190 Operation Tomodachi 274, 291, 292 Organization of Islamic Conference 189 Ozawa, Ichiro 20 Pakistan 7 peace-building 177–198 piracy 201–204, 206–209, 211–215, 249 postwar constitution 274, 286, 288, 293 power transition 130, 132 Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) 8 Pyongyang Declaration 84 rare earth export 57 regional cooperation Republic of Korea (ROK) 10–12 Rudd, Kevin 165

5,

sanctions 74, 75, 83, 85–88, 93 seaborne trade 201 security 149–165, 167, 170–172, 242–244, 246–249, 257–259, 262, 263, 266, 269

security [anzen hosho] 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294 security discourse 286 security regime 274, 281, 290 Self-Defence Force (SDF) 8, 10, 13, 181–185, 187, 188, 191, 193–195 Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands 3, 11 Shanghai Communiqué 14 Sino-Japanese rivalry 111, 116, 123 Six-party Talks 5 Somalia 202, 203, 205–207, 211–215 Son Masayoshi 259, 264 Southeast Asia 201–203, 207–211, 214 Sovereign debt crisis xiv Sri Lanka 183, 185–188, 193, 194 Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission 188 Strategic and Political Interests strategic relationship of mutual benefits 33 Sudan 193, 194, 196 Tanino, Sakutaro 13 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) 242, 253, 263, 282–286 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 103 Trilateral Security Dialogue 149, 155, 158

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triple disaster 169, 241–244, 251, 255, 258, 262–264, 267–269 UN Peace Keeping Operations 12 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 250, 265 United States 149, 151, 153–155, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163–167, 170, 171 UNPKO 182–186, 192–195, 197 US-Japan security alliance 25, 26, 31, 42

301

US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting (2+2 meeting) 10 view on North Korea

81

Wen, Jiabao 62 Whaling 166–169 World Trade Organization (WTO) 7 Yasukuni Shrine 28, 33, 34, 51 Yeonpyeong island 5