Japan’s "New Deal" for China: Propaganda Aimed at Americans Before Pearl Harbor 0815369301, 9780815369301

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Japan’s “New Deal” for China

In the decade leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, at a time when Japan was expanding its influence in Asia, several Japanese institutions set about trying to convince Amer­icans to support Tokyo’s plans and ambitions for China. This book seeks to analyze the original publications produced by these organizations and explores the methods used by the Japanese to influence Amer­ican attitudes and policy. Four organizations active during the 1930s—the South Manchuria Railway Company, the America–Japan Society, the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, and the Japan Pacific Association—were particularly instrumental in targeting the U.S. This book argues that they routinely used specific terminology to appeal to Amer­icans, such as “New Deal,” “Manifest Destiny,” and “Open Door.” Furthermore, the Japanese claimed that only they could meet the challenge of the growing communist threat, while their development programs would bring peace and prosperity to China. Nevertheless, Amer­ican policy was not significantly altered by Japanese propaganda efforts: documents from the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt reveal that the president continued to prepare the U.S. for war with Japan long before Pearl Harbor. Examining original Japanese English-­language propaganda sources from the 1920s and 1930s, this book will be of huge interest to historians of Japan, China, the U.S., and World War II more broadly. June Grasso is Associate Professor of Social Sciences at Boston University’s College of General Studies, U.S. Her recent publications include the fifth edition of Modernization and Revolution in China (2018).

Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia

131 English-­Language Teaching during Japan’s Post-­war Occupation Politics and Pedagogy Mayumi Ohara and John Buchanan 132 China and Southeast Asia Historical Interactions Edited by Geoff Wade and James K. Chin 133 Southeast Asian Education in Modern History Schools, Manipulation, and Contest Edited by Pia Jolliffe and Thomas Richard Bruce 134 The Colonisation and Settlement of Taiwan, 1684–1945 Land Tenure, Law and Qing and Japanese Policies Ruiping Ye 135 Newspapers and the Journalistic Public in Republican China 1917 as a Significant Year of Journalism Qiliang He 136 The United States and Southeast Asian Regionalism Collective Security and Economic Development, 1945–75 Sue Thompson 137 Japan’s “New Deal” for China Propaganda Aimed at Amer­icans before Pearl Harbor June Grasso 138 Voices of the Korean Minority in Postwar Japan Histories Against the Grain Erik Ropers For a full list of available titles please visit: www.routledge.com/Routledge-­ Studies-in-­the-Modern-­History-of-­Asia/book-­series/MODHISTASIA

Japan’s “New Deal” for China Propaganda Aimed at Amer­icans before Pearl Harbor

June Grasso

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 June Grasso The right of June Grasso to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-8153-6930-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-25272-0 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of figures

1 Introduction: Japanese propaganda and its legacy

vi 1

2 The “New Deal” in Manchuria: the South Manchuria Railway Company’s efforts to win Amer­ican approval

17

3 The America–Japan Society and the Sino-­Japanese conflict

52

4 The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan

71

5 The Japan Pacific Association

95

6 Conclusion: propaganda, anti-­Communism, and the impact of the war on Amer­ican policy

118



133 141

Bibliography Index

Figures

2.1 2.2 2.3 4.1 5.1 5.2

SMRC, “The Carrier of the Light of Civilization” Manzhouguo as a tourist destination SMRC advertisement for its film studios Japanese soldiers and Chinese families in Shanghai, 1937 Japanese soldiers playing baseball in China during war An unlikely friendly encounter between a Japanese soldier and Chinese scholar, Suzhou, 1938 5.3 A Shanghai street weeks after Japan’s victory in the devastating Battle of Shanghai

19 40 43 78 98 99 109

1 Introduction Japanese propaganda and its legacy

One of the most contentious issues shaping Sino-­Japanese relations is the mutual animosity founded on China’s and Japan’s shared histories. Chinese hostility over Japanese conduct and how Tokyo depicted its goals for China before and during World War II, during the Second Sino-­Japanese War, has emerged with renewed intensity in recent decades. As rancor has heightened, it has contributed to the development of an anti-­Japanese patriotism supported, if not encouraged, by China’s Communist Party. Historians Robert Weatherley and Qiang Zhang call the phenomenon “aggressive nationalism,” one of the legacies of Japan’s imperialist past being exploited by Beijing.1 The international community in 2014 witnessed a surprising manifestation of bitterness between the two Asian powers after Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzō (2006–2007, 2012–present) visited Japan’s national war memorial, the Yasukuni Shrine, for the first time in several years. The Chinese response to Abe’s sojourn that brought vitriol to new levels played out in several articles published in London. On January 2, 2014, China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming, wrote an opinion piece for Britain’s Daily Telegraph where he condemned Abe’s trip to the shrine by invoking the image of a popular fictional villain, “The Dark Lord” Voldemort, from the popular British Harry Potter novels, to describe the Japanese. The dust­up came to be known on internet sites by the unfortunate title, “The Sino-­ Japanese Voldemort Wars,”2 after Ambassador Liu wrote:  In the Harry Potter story, the dark wizard Voldemort dies hard because the seven horcruxes, which contain parts of his soul, have been destroyed. If militarism is like the haunting Voldemort of Japan, the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is a kind of horcrux, representing the darkest parts of that nation’s soul.… Deep down, paying this kind of homage reveals whether Japan is trustworthy. It raises serious questions about attitudes in Japan and its record of militarism, aggression and colonial rule.3 Tokyo’s blistering reply came immediately. Japan’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Hayashi Keiichi, wrote in the January 5, 2014, edition of the Daily Telegraph:

2   Introduction There are two paths open to China. One is to seek dialogue, and abide by the rule of law. The other is to play the role of Voldemort in the region by letting loose the evil of an arms race and escalation of tensions.4 The war of words continued when China’s Foreign Ministry Information Department’s deputy director, Hua Chunying, apparently offended by Hayashi’s rebuttal, called the Japanese ambassador’s comments “ignorant, irrational and arrogant.” On January 8, 2014, The Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) online publication, posted on its website her warning that “a war of public opinion between China and Japan” was in “full swing”: “There are no flying cannonballs in the battlefield of public opinion, but it still requires the unity of the entire Chinese society to fight this war.”5 Weeks later, the Chinese government took the provocative step of creating three new national holidays that serve as reminders of Japan’s war with China, officially called the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” by the CCP. In February, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress established September 3 as Victory Day, marking China’s defeat of Japan, and December 13 as National Memorial Day, commemorating the victims of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre where, Chinese authorities claim, 300,000 Chinese died during a six-­week rampage of killing, rape, looting, and destruction by the Jap­ anese army.6 In September 2014, a third holiday, September 30, Martyrs’ Day, was added to honor all heroes who fought and died in the Second Sino-­Japanese War, including Communists, Guomindang (Nationalists), and even foreign allies. As part of the first commemorations of Martyrs’ Day as a national holiday, area museums created exhibits consistent with Beijing’s directives. For example, a display at Beijing’s Museum of the War of the Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression lauded the activities of 80 Amer­ican World War II pilots, the Doolittle Tokyo Raiders, who carried out aerial attacks on Japan in April 1942. The Standing Committee explained that the purpose for the holidays and commemorations was “to remember the havoc caused to the Chinese people, convey China’s stance against aggression, safeguard human dignity and preserve world peace.”7 Japanese criticism was immediate, causing a spokesperson from China’s Ministry of National Defense, Yang Yujun, to comment, “There have always been forces in Japan who want to reverse historical judgements and challenge the post-­war order. China urges Japan to reflect on its actions and face up to history.”8 The Japanese government during Prime Minister Abe’s second term apparently faced up to history and challenged the post-­war order with its own 2014 announcements involving a reinterpretation of key components of Japan’s Constitution, those that deal with the role Japan’s military, specifically its technologically advanced Self-­Defense Forces, can play outside Japan’s borders. Rejecting the pacifist nature inherent in the Constitution, whose Article Nine renounces the use of war as a means to settle international disputes, Abe and his conservative Liberal Democratic Party have expanded the military’s role to engage in “collective self-­defense,” which includes coming to the aid of allies

Introduction   3 under attack. Many analysts view Abe’s moves as not only an attempt to thwart China’s ambitions and aggressive anti-­Japanese posturing, but also as an acknowledgment that Japan can no longer rely on Amer­ican power to protect Tokyo’s interests in the region. More important for this study is that the motivation behind constitutional change is a rejection, at least by some of Japan’s population, of the burden of blame generations of Japanese have shouldered for the many tragedies associated with World War  II in Asia. Japan’s Constitution, written by Amer­ican occupiers, with limitations on its military, serves as a reminder of that past, for which Abe’s government has consistently fallen short of apologizing, according to the Chinese.

Propaganda and the war effort—the “New Deal” for China Historical memory, in this case, of the legacy of World War II, remains significant to both China and Japan, and it is also important to those nations’ ties with the U.S., now as in the past. Their problematic relationships in the years leading up to the war, when both Japan and China sought the U.S. as an ally, are at the core of this study. The specific focus on Japan’s wartime propaganda that justified its actions in China gives insight into Japan’s motivations and aspirations as well as the difficulties Tokyo faced as it confronted opposition from other imperialist powers, especially the U.S., beginning with its first moves onto the Asian mainland in the late nineteenth century. During the war years, all three nations used propaganda, each government enhancing its official policies with distorted depictions of the enemy and its actions. There are many exhaustive studies of Japanese pre-­war and wartime propaganda. For example, Anthony Rhodes devotes a chapter to Japan’s activities in his pictorial compendium of World War II propaganda.9 Historian Peter O’Connor has compiled a vast collection in a multi-­volume publication that focuses on pro-­Japanese propaganda pamphlets published by both Japanese and Western writers.10 O’Connor has used the term “publicity warriors” to describe the players in Japan’s long-­running campaign to manage its image at home and abroad.11 This study focuses on the publicity specifically aimed at the U.S. Japanese propagandists faced an uphill battle when dealing with Amer­ican attitudes, characterized by intense anti-­Asian jingoism based on the decades-­old fear of the “yellow peril” that resulted from Asian immigration to the western U.S. That is perhaps one reason for the growth and variety of Japanese propaganda aimed at Amer­icans as tensions between the two nations intensified. During the years leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo tried to convince the world, or at least its World War I allies, that its goals for its expansion onto the Asian mainland were not only legal but also laudable.12 The Japanese government vigilantly advertised the admirable and positive qualities of its activities in Manchuria and later in areas further south, including China’s capital, Nanjing. The Japanese proclaimed through a variety of publications written in English and other European languages that they were bringing civilization, law, order, and peace to an otherwise uncivilized population; they wanted Westerners,

4   Introduction especially Amer­icans, to appreciate their accomplishments. They also forcefully denied the accusations of terrorism, brutality, and unmitigated violence perpetrated against the Chinese that were reported in Chinese and Western media. Japanese propaganda institutions, such as the four that are the focus for this study—the South Manchuria Railway Company, the America–Japan Society, the Foreign Affairs Association, and the Japan Pacific Association—pushed back against intensifying anti-­Japanese sentiment in the U.S., a phenomenon that began as early as the turn of the twentieth century, in order to gain at least acquiescence, if not approbation, for expansion. The reception accorded to Japanese efforts by Amer­ican audiences was mixed. While there were groups sympathetic to the Japanese that will be described in this study, such as the America–Japan Society, others, including influential members of the U.S. government and press, rejected Japan’s vision, as it was portrayed in its propaganda. John Gripentrog has characterized Amer­ican perceptions of Japan in the 1930s as a “dualistic discourse.” He suggests that within the U.S. government and press there were those who advocated the idea that powerful “liberal statesmen” struggled against the “militarists” in Japan.13 Thus, Amer­icans could potentially influence the struggle and so were worthy targets for propaganda. But, complicating the issue for Jap­ anese propaganda writers was the apparent animosity held by many Amer­icans, particularly those on the U.S. west coast, toward all Asians, tracing back to the nineteenth century when Chinese immigrants were banned from entering the U.S. by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. By the 1910s, anti-­Asian xenophobia expanded, targeting Japanese laborers, while efforts were made to include Japanese immigrants under the Exclusion Act’s regulations. (In 1920, for example, prominent Californian newspaper mogul, Valentine Stuart McClatchy, founded the Japanese Exclusion League of California, which spearheaded the California-­based anti-­Japanese movement.) In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Japanese were ineligible for citizenship. Two years later, Congress passed a bill that banned Japanese immigration to the U.S.14 Japanese publicity writers attempted to overcome the racism associated with the “yellow peril” phenomenon, while also emphasizing the differences between Japan and the rest of East Asia; their propaganda stressed the superiority of Japan’s modernization and continued development, especially during the years leading to World War II. At the height of Japan’s conflict in China, during the 1930s, there were several avenues for Japanese English-­language media to reach Amer­icans. Organizations such as the America–Japan Society, the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, the Japan Pacific Association, and the SMRC all attempted to justify Japanese presence in China, explaining its benefits to Western leaders, businessmen, missionaries, and ordinary citizens. The work of members and supporters of these organizations form the core of this study. For example, the SMRC, whose New York City office was located in the Lincoln Building at 60 East Forty-­Second Street, and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, located at 500 Fifth Avenue, distributed a wide variety of publications to civic and religious organizations, libraries, and private citizens. Numerous English-­language journals included The Japanese Amer­ican, Tokyo Gazette,

Introduction   5 Oriental Economist, America–Japan Society Bulletin, Japan–China Pictorial Primer, and dozens of specialized serials or single editions on topics related to Japan’s presence in China. In addition, a lively film industry was started by the Japanese in Manchuria, making English-­language films part of the program to illuminate the modern, healthy environment provided by the Japanese in that remote, relatively underdeveloped area of the Asian mainland. It also produced the so-­called “friendship films” in several languages that glamorized the theme of Sino-­Japanese amity during Japan’s occupation. Several themes emerged from Japanese English-­language media, which underscored the benefits to the West and the U.S. in particular that resulted from Japan’s policies. Japanese writers and filmmakers emphasized goals for China, such as modernization, industrial development, stability, and peace, that were positive and compelling for Amer­icans at the time. Among the alleged consequences of Japanese presence in China was the facilitation of free trade in formerly closed or underdeveloped locations where plentiful resources could now be tapped by foreign companies. Moreover, the Japanese took credit for ridding China of the scourges of militarism, fascism, and communism, thereby bringing peace and freedom to areas that had previously suffered from violence and backwardness. Japanese writers carefully chose terminology that specifically appealed to Amer­icans by emphasizing familiar concepts such as “new deal,” “open door,” “manifest destiny,” the Monroe Doctrine, and the Good Neighbor policy. Many publications were obvious attempts to reiterate the apparent similarities in Japanese and Amer­ican cultures, historical trends, economic development, and democratic traditions. In addition, by the 1920s, many writers focused on Japan’s effort to halt the infiltration of Soviet-­inspired communism into China, which was evident through the activities of both the CCP and the “imperialist” government of the USSR.

A “new order” for Asia The international context in which writers of Japanese propaganda operated in the years leading to the outbreak of war with the U.S. was complex and constantly changing. By the late 1930s, Tokyo’s goal of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-­Prosperity Sphere (Dai-­tō-a Kyōeiken), which called for economic, political, and cultural unity among Asian peoples under Japanese dominion, had become associated in the West with commercial exploitation and military aggression. But its original vision, formulated by the anti-­militarist Marxist philosopher Miki Kiyoshi, had been distorted. Miki, who worked for the Shōwa Research Association, a government think tank, had supported Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s (1937–1939, 1940–1941) call for an Asia free from Western colonialism and the creation of a “new order” in the Pacific that rejected the existing League-­of-Nations-­centered (European imperialists’) authority. Konoe’s “New Order Movement” (Shintaisei) had grown out of a relatively popular idea among Japanese intellectuals in the 1920s that a cooperative community (kyōdōtai) of Asian peoples would bring peace and prosperity to the area, while

6   Introduction also limiting exploitation by Western nations. The original concept of kyōdōtai assumed voluntary cooperation between Japan and China, but also presumed the Japanese would take the leading role.15 With the beginning of the Second Sino-­ Japanese War in 1937 the new order in Asia had become the Eastern economic bloc controlled by Tokyo; kyōdōtai had given way to government sponsorship of a new type of “totalitarianism” (zentai shugi) over vast portions of the Asian mainland.16 Opposition to Konoe’s “New Order Movement” and the earlier kyōdōtai collaboration came from the West, particularly those powers with possessions in China, and from China itself, first under the leadership of President Yuan Shikai (1913–1916) and after 1927 from Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek’s (Jiang Jieshi, 1928–1975) Guomindang (Nationalist Party) government that ruled the newly re-­established Republic of China. In the years following World War  I, the leaders of Japan’s former wartime allies grew wary of Tokyo’s expansion, growing military strength, and increasing naval power in the Pacific. But each of those governments faced its own challenges at home. In the U.S., isolationist sentiment prevailed during the administrations of three Republican presidents during the 1920s and into the 1930s after Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–1945) was elected. The U.S. Congress had failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and therefore the U.S. was never a member of the League of Nations. The internationalist president, Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921), had offered his “Fourteen Points” to the victors of World War I in order to promote what he considered a “just peace.” Most of the principles outlined in his points, such as support for national self-­determination, a reduction of  trade barriers, and a decrease in the arms race, were rejected by the allies. Wilson’s demand that the U.S. join the League had been rebuffed by Congress. But Wilson’s successor, Warren G. Harding (1921–1923), successfully called for an international conference to discuss naval disarmament and the troubling situation unfolding in Asia: Amer­ican policymakers considered Japan’s formidable naval strength a threat to U.S. interests. Held in Washington, DC from November 1921 to February 1922, the nine-­nation Washington Conference produced several treaties that attempted to limit Japan’s imperial expansion and maintain the status quo in the Pacific. Conditions in China also changed in the years leading to the outbreak of the Second Sino-­Japanese War. The state of virtual disintegration of the Warlord Era ( junfa shidai, 1916–1928) characterized by regional control of military cliques and warlords was somewhat ameliorated in 1928 by the successful military campaigns against several key warlords in central and southeast China carried out by the Guomindang under Chiang Kaishek and other generals. Chiang established a capital in Nanjing, allied with warlords in the north, and worked to secure Western favor while simultaneously asserting his party’s control over Chinese territory. Meanwhile, the Japanese had taken advantage of China’s weakened state and had grabbed additional concessions, giving them a clear advantage in China over Western imperialist powers. For example, the Treaty of 1915 (also known as the Twenty-­one Demands in China and much of

Introduction   7 the West), signed by President Yuan Shikai, had acknowledged the transfer of Germany’s rights in Shandong to Japan and granted economic concessions in northeast China to the Japanese. It was viewed by many Japanese leaders as a step toward heightened and welcomed cooperation. The Chinese, on the other hand, fiercely objected to Japan’s initiatives and President Yuan himself called the day he accepted a watered-­down version of the treaty, May 9, 1915, China’s National Humiliation Day. Yuan, like his successor, Chiang Kaishek, used a ­traditional Chinese strategy of playing one power over another (yi yi zhi yi—“use barbarians to fight barbarians”). They sought assistance from Western powers, like the U.S. and Great Britain, with the expectation that foreign governments with a presence in China would act in their own self-­interests and restrain the Japanese. Beginning in 1927, Chiang Kaishek sought accommodation with Western imperialists as one way to buy time and support as his government consolidated its authority. By the 1930s, China faced a formidable enemy in Japan: its military was no match for Japan’s Imperial Army.17

Tokyo’s propaganda ministry Japan’s attempt to influence public opinion both at home and abroad during this time, by providing favorable interpretations of its plans for the mainland and goals for Asia’s development, began with the work of the Japanese government’s Information Committee, which coordinated publicity on what was happening in China following the “Manchurian Incident” in 1931.18 The history of Japan’s wartime propaganda policies has been outlined by Tokyo in an exhibit of documents relatively recently opened to the public. In 2006 the National Archives of Japan, specifically, the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), added to its publicly available collections most of the 370 issues of the journal Shashin Shūhō (Weekly Photography Journal) that were published beginning in February 1938 to rally support among Japanese for the war in China. JACAR has also sponsored a website in several languages called “A Window into the Early Shōwa Period,” which allows viewers to scroll through the pages of hundreds of editions of Shashin Shūhō where one sees photos similar and sometimes identical to those in booklets published by propaganda societies of the 1930s, such as the Foreign Affairs Association and the Japan Pacific Association. According to the Japanese government’s Cabinet Intelligence Bureau, which was assigned to propaganda work at the time and initiated the concept of the magazine, the purpose of Shashin Shūhō was “providing a clear-­cut explanation of national policy and ingraining a strong awareness of the state of affairs through the extensive use of photographs, a familiar publication medium that can appeal to emotions more easily, in combination with written text.”19 After Tokyo’s publicity policies came under increasingly rigid, more centralized control later in the 1930s, work on Shashin Shūhō also involved a “hidden mission of gathering photographs used in publicity activities aimed at foreign countries.”20 Once the Second Sino-­Japanese War began in 1937, there developed close connections among various government ministries and the Cabinet Intelligence

8   Introduction Bureau. The bureau was reorganized in September 1937 into the Cabinet Intelligence Department (CID) and was given the added tasks of “gathering information not belonging to other government organizations, reporting, and conducting awareness-­raising campaigns and publicity activities.”21 Historian Peter O’Connor has argued that this was when Japan’s Foreign Ministry became “more proactive, increasingly arguing Japan’s case within Japanese terms of reference.”22 The CID created the Information Photography Association, which provided propaganda photographs to both government and private organizations. In 1938, the CID held an Ideological Warfare Exhibition to inform the Japanese people of “the importance of conducting these publicity campaigns both at home and abroad.” Ideological warfare was defined by the CID as “warfare without weapons” and was seen as “increasingly significant” as the war in China continued. The pictorial book that was published for the exhibition made the following introductory statement about the use of ideological warfare in the war: Ideological warfare is a means for conveying where our justice lies to the enemy, highlighting our strength, causing the enemy to lose its will to fight, correcting the perceptions of third parties, and ultimately making the enemy obey us, leading its attitude in a direction that is advantageous to us and brings the war to an end.23 The organizations studied in this book demonstrate the use of such ideological warfare as part of the publicity work accomplished by a variety of Japan’s government-­sponsored and non-­governmental agencies. Correcting the perceptions of Amer­icans and other Westerners was clearly a motivation for all four societies, especially since the Guomindang government of China also had its supporters among Amer­ican politicians, business leaders, journalists, and missionaries. The work of Japan’s propaganda agencies, needless to say, supported Japanese diplomacy in the years leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The intensity with which the Japanese targeted Amer­ican audiences suggested the intractable nature of the underlying conflicts between the two nations. This study will analyze the ways in which Tokyo’s messages were delivered by these organizations as well as how Amer­icans, especially government policymakers, responded. Japanese propaganda evolved during the 1920s through the 1930s to counter persistent anti-­Asian and particularly anti-­Japanese sentiment in the U.S., obvious even before Japan’s moves onto the Asian mainland. When U.S. ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew summarized Japan–America relations in the mid-­1930s, he used the words “hazardous,” “suspicion and uneasiness,” “international friction,” and “irritation.” On the other hand, Ambassador Grew also suggested in the same report that there was “very good reason to feel that the Japanese Government values Amer­ican friendship”24 and will continue to do so. Propaganda served the purpose of continued cultivation of that friendship.

Introduction   9

The continuing conflict The popular JACAR exhibit, Chinese commemorations of anniversaries of wartime milestones, and other media and political events continue to impact Sino-­Japanese relations. In the nearly eight decades since Japan’s defeat, scholarly works and popular media from both countries have continued to flame suspicions, prejudices, and tensions that trace their roots to propaganda sources from the years prior to and during the Second Sino-­Japanese War. One of the earlier indications of the brewing controversy was seen with the 1993 publication of Yamamuro Shin’ichi’s Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, a study that sparked a debate primarily within the academic community about the cultural and social forces behind Japan’s military ventures in China, especially after Chinese scholars questioned the book’s accuracy when describing conditions in northeast China. The 2006 English and Korean translations of Yamamuro’s research fueled more widespread disputes and harsh criticism of Japan’s intentions for China and Korea during the period of Japanese imperialism.25 Outside of academe, the 1997 publication of Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, re-­ignited a storm of controversy, this time in a more public forum. Chang, inspired by her grandparents’ accounts of the Japanese invasion of the Republic of China’s capital city, documented the horror experienced by Chinese in 1937 and 1938. The much-­translated international bestseller was vilified by many in Japan, with some claiming it was fictionalized,26 but its story resonated with Chinese all over the world. Chang used her celebrity to implore the Japanese government to apologize and pay reparations to the Chinese people, demands considered unacceptable by Tokyo’s leaders. The 1990s also saw the emergence of China’s “history activists,”27 academics whose post-­Cold-War research underscored Japanese atrocities. Earlier, similar investigations by Chinese historians and researchers had been forbidden or suppressed by the CCP for their role in “stirring up national hatred and revenge” at a time when the Beijing government sought improved relations with Japan and the West.28 In 2011, the release of The Flowers of War brought the conflict to a wider audience. The Chinese film, with an international cast, produced by renowned director Zhang Yimou, was another interpretation of the tragic events associated with Japan’s occupation of China. Based on a popular novel by Yan Geling, Thirteen Female Martyrs of Nanjing, the film explores the complexities of relationships during the conflict, using as background the conditions in Nanjing in December 1937 during the Japanese invasion. Zhang explained in an interview for the New York Times that he “wanted to be truthful to history,”29 while conforming by necessity to Chinese government rules and political objectives. Despite the obvious political constraints, Zhang succeeded at portraying a complicated situation through the actions of several multi-­dimensional characters, including an Amer­ican charlatan (played by the Amer­ican actor Christian Bale), who poses as a missionary assisting victims of Japanese terrorism; an officer

10   Introduction (played by Zhang himself ) in the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist) army, the Communist Party’s long-­time enemy, who is a patriotic hero; and an officer in the Japanese army who shows his empathetic side when he prevents the looting of a church. In China the film served to reinvigorate anti-­Japanese tensions. As China’s global position improved, the CCP has tolerated, if not encouraged, more diverse interpretations of China’s past relations with Japan. The government of Xi Jinping (2012–present), which initiated controversial challenges to Japan’s sovereignty over disputed islands, has done little to quell the common references to riben guizi (Japanese devils) in popular media. On the contrary, in addition to encouraging Chinese to recall their victimization by Japan during three new holidays, in early 2014 the government began releasing to the public documents written by Japanese army officers chronicling atrocities committed by Japan’s Imperial Army during its invasion of China. Documents held in the provincial archives of Jilin Province (once part of Japan’s colony in northeast China, Manzhouguo) were discovered in 1953 buried underground. The nearly 100,000 files, mostly written in Japanese, are said to contain graphic details of events considered war crimes by the Chinese, such as the Nanjing Massacre, the use of Chinese sex slaves by the Japanese military, human experimentation with biological weapons, and vivisection. Chinese state-­run television, CCTV, has broadcast portions of some of the most horrific cases, with reporters sometimes attempting to find descendants of war victims, and relating to them what happened. Their stories have been made available in dozens of languages, including English, on television news broadcasts and on the internet.30 Additional sources of antagonism for the Chinese included the publication of government-­approved Japanese history textbooks which, according to the CCP, glossed over wartime atrocities by the Japanese in China. Japan’s Ministry of Education approved a “New History” series in 2001 that referred to the Nanjing Massacre as an “incident” and explained the motivation behind Japan’s objectives in China during World War  II as “self-­preservation.” The Chinese have deemed the contents dangerously distorted and insulting to the Chinese people.31 According to one historian who examined the highly charged conflict, “the Nanjing Incident is not only an important episode in Sino-­Japanese relations, but is also emerging as a foundation stone in the construction of the modern Chinese national identity.”32 Chinese-­government-sanctioned history textbooks for students as young as middle-­school age feature Japanese atrocities during the War of Resistance. For example, one textbook adopted by Nanjing area schools refers to the “savage slaughter” of Chinese at the hands of Japanese soldiers and suggests a homework assignment where students interview elderly neighbors on the “kinds of crimes the Japanese intruders did” in 1938.33 As one consequence, the public visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan’s war memorial and symbol of its militaristic past, by Japanese officials, including former prime minister Koizumi Junichirō (2001–2006), sparked widespread and persistent anti-­Japanese demonstrations in China. Such expressions of often violent public outrage, the Japanese sardonically observe, were among the few that Chinese Communist authorities allowed.

Introduction   11 Chinese bitterness about the apparent lack of repentance by the Japanese has also interfered with diplomacy at the highest levels. In 2005, China’s ambassador to the United Nations, Wang Guangya, explained why the Chinese plan to continue to block Japan’s bid for a permanent Security Council seat:  The current five [permanent members of the Security Council] has been selected not because of their economic power but because of the role they played during the Second World War. China played an important role, and also we didn’t occupy other people’s territory.34 In reference to Koizumi’s pilgrimages, Wang commented, “For the last couple of years, the signal from Tokyo is not that positive.” China’s Premier Wen Jiabao (2003–2013) refused to visit Japan when Koizumi was in office. Chinese and Japanese leaders did not participate in official high-­level exchanges from October 2000 to October 2006, when Koizumi’s replacement, Abe Shinzō, ended the diplomatic standoff and traveled to Beijing. Furthermore, Abe broke a long-­standing tradition when he made his first trip abroad as prime minister to Beijing and Seoul, not to Washington. Wen reciprocated by traveling to Tokyo in April 2007 to meet with Abe in the first visit to Japan by a Chinese premier in seven years. He described his trip as “ice-­breaking.” Abe had refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and instead placated Japan’s conservatives with the offering of ceremonial gifts to the shrine during his first term in office as prime minister from 2006 to 2007. But one year following his landslide re-­election in December 2012, Abe caused an immediate storm of controversy and protest in China with his 30-minute visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2013.35 Premier Wen had described China’s intractable position on the issue of paying homage to Japan’s World War II dead at a press conference during his 2007 visit to Japan with his response to the following question by a Japanese reporter: Question: This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident [starting Japan’s attack on Beijing and the Second Sino-­Japanese War]. It is a sensitive year involving historical issues. Should the Yasukuni Shrine and historical issues heat up again, what impact would they cause to China–Japan relations? If Prime Minister Abe visits the Yasukuni Shrine, how would the Chinese Government react to it?

As we all know, in the past few years, the Japanese leader paid many visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where Class A criminals of World War II are enshrined. This was highly offensive to the Chinese people and damaged the relations between the two countries. This should not have happened. We hope that there will be no such visit again. This year is the 35th anniversary of normalization of China–Japan diplomatic relations and the 70th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. China–Japan relations face both opportunities of growth and challenges. Both China and Japan

Wen Jiabao:

12   Introduction should view and handle their relations from a long-­term and strategic perspective. I hope that the Japanese side will stop doing things that are offensive to the Chinese people.36 Another indication of just how seriously the Chinese and Japanese consider interpretations of the past is seen in the creation of a special academic commission whose goal is to resolve historical arguments, including those surrounding what the Chinese insisted on calling its War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.37 Bilateral talks were initiated to resolve a variety of regional economic, security, environmental, and historical problems, but the Chinese insisted that priority be given to the discussion of historical issues. Meanwhile, Japan’s conservative politicians continued to fight to remove from Japanese students’ textbooks what are viewed as “masochistic” descriptions of Japan’s wartime efforts in China. In 2013, a committee of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party outlined a policy that would nullify a decades-­old government edict requiring textbook authors to “show understanding” when writing about historical events involving Japan’s neighbors.38

Four propaganda organizations This study examines Japan’s efforts to gain the West’s support for its expansionist policies onto the Asian mainland by revisiting the period before the U.S.’s entrance into World War II when Japan, a former ally of the U.S., Great Britain, and France, was considered a relative newcomer following the paths of older imperialist nations. The activities of four societies that worked to influence Western impressions of Japan and its activities in China provide the focus. These organizations produced propaganda specifically aimed at promoting U.S.–Japan friendship and were only a tiny part of the gargantuan publicity-­generating enterprise sponsored by the Japanese government beginning in the years following World War I. Propagandists’ overarching goal was to promote Tokyo’s broader policies of economic and industrial planning for war, which called for garnering the population’s wholehearted support. Historian Robert J.C. Butow has argued that steps taken during the 1930s to mold the nation meant “securing enthusiastic and self-­sacrificing devotion to the military cause and to the army’s will,” resulting in an “immediate intensification of existing censorship procedures.”39 One result was that the Jap­ anese government regulated the publications produced by each of these societies; none, including the America–Japan Society, with its many Amer­ican members, was free from Tokyo’s supervision, at least by the 1930s. In 1937, the creation of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Undo) by Prime Minister Konoe instituted further controls over civilian organizations. Information disseminated by any of these groups would have been required to conform to government policy. At this stage Tokyo tried to use “any means possible to silence critical media” and promote its own agenda.40 The book’s chapters have been organized chronologically based on the founding of each organization in an attempt to follow as closely as possible the course

Introduction   13 of the war in China. The oldest institution, the SMRC, was established in 1906 within a year of Japan’s victory over Russia in the Russo-­Japanese War that was fought on Asia’s mainland. The SMRC immediately became a presence in China’s northeastern provinces of Manchuria and soon grew into a huge enterprise engaged in research and development aimed at facilitating Japanese control over northeast China, Japan’s first large mainland target after its earlier expansion into Korea. As early as 1929 the SMRC’s New York office offered a variety of English-­language publications that reported on Japan’s selfless mission in Asia and promoted the SMRC slogan: “the carrier of the light of civilization.” The SMRC’s Publicity Office’s multifaceted approach featured essays, reports, travelogues, advertising, photographs, and films that emphasized the benefits of Japan’s occupation for the Chinese. The America–Japan Society was founded in 1917 and still exists today, with two primary centers in New York and Tokyo. The non-­profit organization’s membership is comprised of both individual and corporate members from both countries. It sponsors a variety of social events, scholarship programs, educational exchanges, horticultural gift-­giving and exhibits, and sports programs. In late 1937, the America–Japan Society published its first volume of the America–Japan Society Bulletin, printed in Tokyo and distributed throughout its many Amer­ican offices. As Japan expanded onto mainland Asia, America–Japan Society members continued to work for continued business ties between the two nations. Society members also focused on sponsored sports exchanges, the highlight of which was the creation of a Japanese collegiate level Amer­ican-­style football league. They also were instrumental in supporting Japan’s bid to be the first Asian nation to host the Olympic Games. The Society continued to meet and work to better relations between the U.S. and Japan even after the Pacific War was underway. The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan was established during the early 1930s by the Japanese government for the purpose of explaining Tokyo’s vision for Manchuria, which officially became the puppet state of Manzhouguo in 1932. As the Second Sino-­Japanese War progressed, the Association stepped up efforts to portray Japan’s goals for all of Asia in a positive light. The Association produced numerous English-­language publications that were made available to the public by subscription or at Japanese friendship associations in the U.S., selected bookstores worldwide, university libraries, and organizations such as the World Peace Foundation in Boston and New York. Association publications emphasized Japan’s role in bringing civilization, prosperity, and peace to a “feudal and lawless” China. In late 1937, another organization with close ties to the Tokyo government, the Japan Pacific Association (JPA), began reporting on the war in China. JPA publications frequently used versions of so-­called eyewitness testimony, letters, statistics, and photographs in order to examine Japan’s war aims and reasons for the expansion onto the Asian mainland. The goal was to demonstrate that the Japanese were working to preserve peace in the Pacific. According to a statement published in 1938 by the JPA, “The realization of Japan’s aims—the stabilization of East Asia and the establishment of permanent peace—will come when

14   Introduction China and Japan work together in harmony.”41 The JPA’s main works in English appeared from 1937 to 1939 when it published five volumes of the Japan–China Pictorial Primer. Filled with charts, graphs, photographs, drawings, and cartoons, each booklet emphasized one theme—Amer­icans should support Japan’s actions in China. Numerous comparisons between Japan and China stressed that Japan was more like the West than China and Japan offered Asia the chance for prosperity and modernization while China could not, unless the Japanese controlled Chinese territory. The four organizations were instrumental in creating and distributing Japan’s positive messages for Westerners during the quest to take over the Asian mainland. The rich collections of literature, photographs, films, and advertisements demonstrate valiant efforts to convince a Western audience, particularly Amer­ icans, of a cover-­up of much darker goals that involved Tokyo’s vision of a new order for Asia, one that required the Chinese to take a subordinate role in their own country. Both Japan and China had supporters among politicians, academics, missionaries, business leaders, sports figures, and the press in the West, but, well before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo’s actions in China convinced Amer­ican policymakers to ignore Japanese publicity and back a weak, fragmented China. Its propaganda was unconvincing to Amer­icans who saw Japan more clearly as a threat than ally. Nevertheless, Japanese English-­language propaganda, like the multifaceted characters of Zhang Yimou’s film about that time in China, reveals a complicated political reality, the memory of which still resonates and influences politics today.

Notes   1 Robert Weatherley and Qiang Zhang, History and Nationalist Legitimacy in Contemporary China (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 87–116.   2 See, for example, Tyler Roney, “The Sino-­Japanese Voldemort Wars: China’s Doomed PR Battle.” The Diplomat, January 9, 2014, 1, thediplomat.com/2014/01/the­sino-japanese-­voldemort-wars-­china-doomed.   3 Liu Xiaoming, “China and Britain Won the War Together.” Telegraph, January 1, 2014, 1; See also, “Xi’s History Lessons.” The Economist, August 15, 2015, 11.   4 Hayashi Keiichi, “China Risks Becoming Asia’s Voldemort.” Telegraph, January 5, 2014, 1.   5 Katie Hunt, “Long-­Time Rivals China and Japan Deploy Harry Potter Villain in Latest Spat.” CNN.com (Hong Kong), March 31, 2014, 1–3.   6 Many authoritative sources estimate the number of lives lost in the Nanjing Massacre as closer to 40,000 to 90,000. June Grasso, Jay P. Corrin, and Michael Kort, Modernization and Revolution in China 5th edn. (London: Routledge, 2018), 81.   7 “China Ratifies National Days to Commemorate War Victory, Massacre Victims,” CNTV.cn, February 27, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/program/asiatoday/20140227/ 105741.shtml.   8 “China Ratifies National Days.”   9 Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1975). 10 Peter O’Connor, Japanese Propaganda: Selected Readings: Series 2, Pamphlets, 1891–1939 (Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental, 2004).

Introduction   15 11 Peter O’Connor, The English-­Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918–1945 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 273. 12 A 1935 plan attributed to the Kwantung [Guandong] Army outlined Japanese propaganda efforts to notify the world of the lawfulness of activities in China. See, Robert J.C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 107. 13 John Gripentrog, “The Transnational Pastime: Baseball and Amer­ican Perceptions of Japan in the 1930s.” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010), 248–249. 14 Helen Kaibara, “In Order to Create a More Perfect Society: The Japanese Association of America’s Response to the West Coast Anti-­Japanese ‘Yellow Peril’ Phenomenon, 1908–1924.” Virginia Review of Asian Studies (2010), 135–136, www.virginiareview ofasianstudies.com/wpm/06/kaibara-­jaa-final.doc. 15 Han Jung-­Sun, “Rationalizing the Orient: The ‘East Asia Cooperative Community’ in Prewar Japan.” Monumenta Nipponica 60, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 481–482. 16 Miles Fletcher, “Intellectuals and Fascism in Early Shōwa Japan,” in Shōwa Japan: 1926–1941, ed. Stephen S. Large (London: Routledge, 1998), 356. 17 Huang Yanzhong, “China, Japan, and the 21 Demands.” The Diplomat, January 24, 2015, 1–3, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china.japan-­and-the-­21-demands; Thomas M. Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 60. 18 The Manchurian (or Mukden) Incident took place in Shenyang, the capital of China’s northeast province of Liaoning, on September 18, 1931 when Japan’s Guandong Army occupied the city. Within a few months, Japanese troops overtook additional Manchurian territory, despite no official authorization from Tokyo. 19 Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan, “A Window into the Early Shōwa Period, about Shashin Shūhō, Intelligence Bureau’s Organization and Function 1941 May,” www.jacar.go.jp/english/shuhou-­english/towa01.html. 20 Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan, “The Reorganization of the Cabinet Information Committee into the Cabinet Intelligence Department and the Publication of Shashin Shūhō,” www.jacar.go.jp/english/about/ materials.html. 21 “The Reorganization of the Cabinet Information Committee into the Cabinet Intelligence Department …,” 1. 22 Peter O’Connor, The English-­Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918–1945, 56. 23 “The Reorganization of the Cabinet Information Committee into the Cabinet Intelligence Department …,” 3. 24 The ambassador to Japan (Grew) to the secretary of state (January 1, 1937), “Undeclared War between Japan and China—Political and Military Developments, Chapter 1: January 1–July 7, 1937.” U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937 III: 1–2. 25 Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.) 26 See, for example, David Askew, “New Research in the Nanjing Incident.” Japan­ Focus.org, October 18, 2005, 3–4. http://japanfocus.org/article.asp?=109. 27 James Reilly, “China’s History Activists and the War of Resistance against Japan: History in the Making.” Asian Survey 44, no. 2 (March-­April 2004), 276–294. 28 Reilly, 278. 29 Larry Rohter, “An Epic Drawn from the Tears of Nanjing.” New York Times, December 16, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/movies/the-­flowers-of-­war. 30 “Japanese Occupation Documents Released to Public,” CCTV.com, April 27, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/27/VIDE1398575283527954.shtml. 31 Jie-­Hyun Lim, “History Education and Nationalist Phenomenology in East Asia.” Global Asia 10, no. 2 (summer, 2015), 102; Jamie Miyazaki, “Textbook Row Stirs Japanese Concern.” BBCNews (Tokyo), April 11, 2007, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk.

16   Introduction 32 Askew, 1. 33 Lucy Hornby, Simon Muncy, and Jonathan Soble, “Pan-­Asian History Textbooks Struggle to Find Common Language.” Financial Times, November 21, 2013, http://ft. com/the-­world/2013/11. 34 Beijing’s demand that the original five permanent members of the UNSC remain as such is seen in many official statements. See, for example, Qiushi Editorial, “Cherishing the Fruits of Victory and Promoting Mutually Beneficial Cooperation.” Qiushi— CPC Journal on China’s Governance and Perspectives 7, no. 4, issue 25 (October–December 2015), 130. 35 See, Henrick Tsjeng Zhizhao, “Japan’s Defence Engagement: Implications of Abe’s Yasukuni Visit.” RSIS Publications, January 8, 2014, [email protected]; Mark Selden, “Japan, the United States and Yasukuni Nationalism: War, Historical Memory and the Future of the Asia Pacific.” JapanFocus.org, http://japanfocus.org/ article.asp?=109. 36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Interview Given by Premier Wen Jiabao to Japanese Press.” April 5, 2007, www.fmprc.gov.ch/eng/ zxxx/t309115.htm 37 China’s Communist Party’s official publications consistently use the term “War of Resistance” interchangeably with “World War II.” For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Modern History publishes the Journal of China’s War of Resistance Against Japan. The term “War of Resistance …” is almost always used in historical articles published in Qiushi, the Communist Party’s Journal on China’s Governance and Perspectives. 38 Hornby, Mundy, and Soble. 39 Robert J.C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 110. 40 O’Connor, The English-­Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-1945, 56. 41 Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Japan’s Problems 4 (Tokyo: Nakado, 1937), 32.

2 The “New Deal” in Manchuria The South Manchuria Railway Company’s efforts to win Amer­ican approval

Amer­icans associate the 1930s with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, the economic policies aimed at bringing the U.S. out of the Great Depression and restoring economic prosperity. Roosevelt’s programs also carried additional burdens of providing relief, helping the poorest in Amer­ican society, eliminating abusive economic practices, and even advocating a sense of economic fairness that had been lacking during the “Roaring Twenties.” It is no ­surprise that, for many, the term “new deal” should suggest welcome transformation. The Japanese government also employed the phrase “new deal” during the 1930s to describe several of its initiatives for Manchuria, its recent colonial acquisition. Japan’s “New Deal” was a large-­scale, multifaceted plan to transform northeast China. The propaganda surrounding Japanese programs was an important part of a campaign to portray Tokyo’s aims in a positive light at a time when most Amer­icans viewed mounting Japanese aggression with anxiety and trepidation. English-­language literature, such as that produced by Japan’s SMRC and distributed by its New York office, played a significant role in the attempts to gain Amer­ican approval for Japanese programs. The SMRC in New York made every effort to convince an Amer­ican audience of the validity of its slogan: “SMR—Carrier of the Light of Civilization into Manchuria.”1 The SMRC was one of three principal Japanese authorities in Manchuria during the 1930s that contributed to Tokyo’s expansion onto the Asian mainland. Established in 1906, following the conclusion of the Russo-­Japanese War in 1905, the SMRC grew into a gargantuan enterprise whose staff researched strategy and implemented policies aimed at spreading and maintaining Japanese control over northeast China. One of a series of progress reports published in English starting in 1929 described the company in this way: The South Manchuria Railway Company is more than a mere railway company; it has been and still is the carrier of the light of civilization into Manchuria. In addition to its extensive railway undertakings which constitute its main business, the Company continues to operate, as accessory enterprises, coal mines, railway workshops, harbors and wharves, warehouses, and hotels; it administers the Railway Zone; it conducts schools, libraries, hospitals, and various hygienic institutions; it controls a number of

18   The South Manchuria Railway Company joint-­stock companies, electric and gas works, shipping and dockyard companies, and several industrial concerns and factories; and it carries on a chemical research laboratory, a geological research institute, an economic research committee, and several agricultural experimental stations and farms. Thus its far-­flung activities and interests are inseparably tied up with the industrial, commercial, social, intellectual, and general life of the country, and the epic story of its growth is to a large extent the story of the phenomenal development and progress of Manchuria during the past twenty-­nine years.2 Scholarly writings in Japanese, English, and other languages have tended to focus on the activities and programs in China directed from the SMRC’s main headquarters in Dalian (Dairen) or on Tokyo’s more general policies.3 Much less has been studied about the resources of SMRC’s New York office, a source for English-­language publications, information, and propaganda focused on Japan’s “mission” in Asia, advertising and defending the programs and policies of Jap­ anese institutions, such as the SMRC, in Manchuria.4 The message delivered by SMRC New York representatives was clear: the Japanese were bringing “civilization” to troubled, chaotic China and, in doing so, were embarking on paths parallel to those of Western imperialism and Amer­ican “manifest destiny,” phenomena that allegedly already had positively impacted less economically developed areas of the world. Moreover, Japan was aiding long-­term Amer­ican goals in East Asia by providing for trade, encouraging an “open door” for exchange of valuable resources, and taking on the obligations of combating warlordism, fascism, and communism on the Asian mainland. A look at the SMRC’s publications distributed from New York City reveals considerable effort to convince Amer­icans that Japanese policies were not only beneficial to China and the cause of modernization but were also morally correct, given the conditions in China at the time, because only the Japanese were able to provide “peace and order”5 to an otherwise violent, backward area. According to the Japanese, their policies were consistent with, even enhanced, the fundamental principles of Amer­ican policy toward China enunciated in the Open Door Policy (1900), which emphasized commercial rights and free trade while preventing China from domination by any one nation. SMRC writers chose ideas and terminology familiar to many Amer­icans and often compared Manchuria’s economic and political development to that of the U.S. For example, one Amer­ican writer chronicled his visit to Manchuria in the late 1930s in the SMRC magazine, Eastern Asia (1940), where he wrote: “It [Manchuria] is at the stage in which western America was about the 1880’s. The country has been pacified, or almost so, and now development can go forward peacefully.” 6 SMRC publications featured travelogues, advertisements, and “human interest stories,” portraying Japanese activities in Manchuria in a favorable light. Contributing authors, both Western and Japanese, emphasized positive aspects of Japanese imperialism by stressing concepts Amer­icans could embrace, such as “new deal,” “open door,” guarantees of freedoms and rights, anti-­fascism, anti-­communism, and anti-­corruption.

The South Manchuria Railway Company   19

Figure 2.1  SMRC, “The Carrier of the Light of Civilization.” Source: SMRC, Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, Summer 1940, back cover.

They lauded the establishment of modern cities, better farms, upgraded commercial sites, disciplined police, schools and colleges, medical and sanitation facilities, tourist attractions, and a lively movie industry, in the attempt to justify and win support for  Japan’s moves onto the Asian mainland. As international tensions increased and the hostilities associated with the beginning of the Second Sino-­Japanese War

20   The South Manchuria Railway Company intensified, the SMRC stepped up its efforts to gain Amer­ican support for Japan. One of its daunting tasks was to examine Japan’s version of “manifest destiny” in order to provide an explanation for Tokyo’s continued policy of imperialism that warranted the takeover of China’s three northeast provinces of Manchuria. The SMRC’s literature on Manchuria was often consistent and sometimes identical with that of like-­minded writers who focused on Tokyo’s goals. For example, one of the most prolific Japanese English-­language writers of the 1930s whose views echoed those of the SMRC on the situation in Manchuria was K.K. Kawakami, Washington correspondent for the Tokyo Hochi Shimbum. Kawakami published several books and numerous articles that endorsed the ideas espoused by SMRC propaganda and attempted to make sense of apparent Amer­ican displeasure with conditions in northeast China. In 1933 he wrote: For the first time in history, a non-­white race has undertaken to carry the white man’s burden, and the white man, long accustomed to think the burden exclusively his own, is reluctant to commit it to the young shoulders of Japan, yellow and an upstart at that. Stripped of all diplomatic verbiage, that is the long and short of the whole story.7 From the beginning of its forays onto the Asian mainland, Tokyo encountered resistance, acquiescence, and occasionally support from the U.S. Amer­ican policymakers, business interests, and political activists were often at odds with respect to U.S. policy toward Japan. Japanese propaganda writers tried to use such inconsistency and domestic discord to Japan’s advantage.

Japan’s claims to Manchuria—selectively citing the rule of law K.K. Kawakami devoted one of his studies published in 1932, Japan Speaks on the Sino-­Japanese Crisis, to an examination of Japan’s treaty rights in Manchuria. In doing so, he not only supported the objectives of the SMRC, the principal institution in Manchuria, but also adamantly blamed the Chinese for causing the conditions leading to the necessity of Japanese intervention.8 By the late 1930s, SMRC writers took the more temperate approach that Japan’s moves benefited China, but the messages were similar: it was the fault of the Chinese that Japan had to take action in the Pacific. In 1929 Ishiwara Kanji (1889–1949), Guandong (Kwantung) Army9 Senior Staff Officer in Manchuria, justified the seizure of Chinese territory with this statement: “Not only was it necessary for Japan, but it would be most welcome for the majority of the Chinese people as well. That is to say, Japan should march forward and take this resolute action as a righteous cause.”10 The subsequent formation two years later of Manzhouguo (The Manchu State) as an area independent from the Republic of China should have been cause for celebration, according to the Japanese:

The South Manchuria Railway Company   21 The emergence of Manchoukuo [Manzhouguo] and the declaration of her independence from China ushered in a new era in Manchuria and the Far East. In the midst of skeptical but scrutinizing international observance, the new State undertook a gigantic task of national reconstruction and its achievement during the first eight years of statehood have been nothing short of a marvel.… The backbone of this marvelous achievement is without doubt the successful execution of political reconstruction, the building of a modern State on the ruins of feudalistic war-­lordism.11 Tokyo explained to Amer­icans its claims to jurisdiction over specific territories in northeast China in terms of internationally recognized treaty agreements, but from the beginning the Japanese ran into opposition from the U.S.12 The SMRC’s booklet Answering Questions on Manchuria (1937) described the early developments that led to Japan’s acquisition of Manchu lands. By the late 1930s, the area remained divided into two main administrative divisions: (1) the independent Manzhouguo and (2) the Leased Territory of Guandong and the SMR Zone, both under Japanese jurisdiction; but Tokyo’s control had expanded since the turn of the century as a consequence of several international conflicts. The SMRC’s lengthy explanation of Japan’s treaty rights noted that both the Guandong Leased Territory and the SMR Zone had been acquired by Japan through agreements with Czar Nicholas II in 1905 following Japan’s victory in the Russo-­Japanese War (1904–1905). The negotiations for the post-­war Treaty of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, had taken place in the U.S. under the guidance of then President Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909). Thus, the Amer­icans had had a hand in giving the Japanese territorial rights on Asia’s mainland. (The Guandong Leased Territory was an area that had been controlled by a Russian 25-year lease with China signed in 1898 that was ceded to Japan after the war. In 1915 the lease was extended to 1997. The SMR Zone was another area formerly controlled by Russia and transferred to Japan in 1905; its lease was later extended to 2007.) But SMRC’s descriptions of Amer­ican approval for Japan’s claims to Chinese lands ignored an ongoing controversy brewing in the U.S. caused by Japan’s “surprising” victory over Russia, which set the tone for future U.S.– Japan relations and encouraged Japanese publicity writers to counter a growing anti-­Japanese hysteria, especially in the western U.S. Several related issues during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency caused a war scare between the U.S. and Japan and fueled anti-­Japanese commentary, especially in right-­wing newspapers, such as those published by the Hearst Press. The first episode that rattled Amer­ican–Japanese relations following the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth occurred on October 11, 1906, when San Francisco’s Board of Education voted to ban Japanese students from public schools and set up racially segregated alternatives, modeled after a common practice at the time in the Amer­ican South where schools segregated by race were legal based on the 1896 Supreme Court ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson. Anti-­ immigration sentiment in California had led to attempts at exclusion, targeted violence, and boycotts of Japanese businesses. Calls were heard for Japanese

22   The South Manchuria Railway Company (and Koreans) to be included in those groups covered by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prohibited immigration of Chinese laborers to the U.S. Both Tokyo and Washington responded to the jingoist sentiment manifested by the crisis by pursuing a diplomatic solution, culminating in the so-­called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907, which placed some restrictions on Japanese immigration. San Francisco’s School Board rescinded the segregation order, but anti-­Japanese rioting in California continued. The press in both countries and in Europe predicted possible war. Roosevelt exacerbated tensions when he announced in July 1907 that the entire U.S. fleet would tour the Pacific. Talk of war eventually subsided with the signing of the Root-­Takahira Agreement of 1908, which acknowledged the territorial integrity of China and continued adherence to the Open Door Policy, which called for unfettered access to Chinese ports for trade. The Japanese were guaranteed their possessions in the Pacific.13 The Root-­Takahira Agreement was one of many attempts at diplomacy whose goal was to mitigate tensions between Japan and the U.S., but diplomatic efforts would not eliminate underlying mutual suspicion. In 1909, President Roosevelt penned a long letter to Senator Philander Chase Knox, appointed secretary of state by the newly elected president, William Howard Taft (1909–1913), where he outlined his concerns over whether there may be a “ripple of trouble” between the U.S. and Japan during Knox’s term as secretary of state caused by incompatible goals and racism. Theodore Roosevelt’s thoughts on Japan reflected views that would outlast his presidency. He wrote: She [Japan] is a most formidable military power. Her people have peculiar fighting capacity. They are very proud, very warlike, very sensitive, and are influenced by two contradictory feelings; namely, a great self-­confidence, both ferocious and conceited, due to their victory over the mighty empire of Russia; and a great touchiness because they would like to be considered as on a full equality with, as one of the brotherhood of, Occidental nations, and have been bitterly humiliated to find that even their allies, the English, and their friends, the Amer­icans, won’t admit them to association and citizenship, as they admit the least advanced or most decadent European peoples. Moreover, Japan’s population is increasing rapidly and demands an outlet; and the Japanese laborers, small farmers, and petty traders would, if permitted, flock by the hundred thousand into the United States, Canada, and Australia. Now for our side. The events of the last three years have forced me to the clear understanding that our people will not permit the Japanese to come in large numbers among them; will not accept them as citizens; will not tolerate their presence as large bodies of permanent settlers. This is just as true in Australia and Columbia as in our Rocky Mountain and Pacific states; but at present the problem is more acute with us because the desire of the Japanese to come here has grown. The opposition to the presence of the Japanese, I

The South Manchuria Railway Company   23 have reluctantly come to feel, is entirely warranted, and not only must be, but ought to be, heeded by the national government in the interest of our people and our civilization; and this in spite of the fact that many of the manifestations of the opposition are unwise and improper to the highest degree. To permit the Japanese to come in large numbers into this country would be to cause a race problem and invite and insure a race contest. It is necessary to keep them out. But it is almost equally necessary that we should both show all possible courtesy and consideration in carrying out this necessarily disagreeable policy of exclusion, and that we should be thoroughly armed, so as to prevent the Japanese from feeling safe in attacking us. Unfortunately, great masses of our people show a foolish indifference to arming, and at the same time a foolish willingness to be offensive to the Japanese.14 Discord was heightened as U.S. policymakers perceived Japan’s mounting control over Chinese territory as a threat to Amer­ican interests and evidence that Japanese expansion would not be curtailed easily. Tokyo challenged the core principles of U.S.–China relations, those outlined in the Open Door Policy, as soon as the establishment of Manzhouguo as a “nation” separate from the Republic of China was announced. SMRC’s literature described Manzhouguo as an “independent” area: Manchoukuo came into being on March 1, 1932. She became officially Manchoutikuo [Manzhou diguo] or the Manchu Empire on March 1, 1934, when Chief Executive Pu Yi was enthroned as Emperor.… Her capital is at Hsinking [Xinjing] and is divided into fourteen Sheng or Provinces.15 The descriptions of Manzhouguo’s political system offered no hint of what was internationally recognized at the time as control or influence from Tokyo. On the contrary, the Japanese emphasized the independence and sovereignty of Manchu rule over Manchu territory: The government is headed by Emperor Kang Teh [Kangde, “tranquility and virtue”] of the Manchou [Manzhou] (Qing) Dynasty which conquered and ruled China for over 260 years. The Emperor represents Manchoukuo; possesses the supreme power to declare war, conclude peace, and sign treaties; commands the army, navy and air forces.16 The Manzhouguo government had come into being, according to Japanese English-­language sources, as a consequence of “an internal revolution”17 and the rule of the Kangde emperor, also known as Puyi, the last emperor of China’s Qing Dynasty, was characterized as obviously superior to previous administrations that ruled the area, especially those of the “corrupt” warlord Zhang Zuolin (1873–1928) and his son Zhang Xueliang (1901–2001). Zhang Zuolin, the powerful military governor (dujun) of Manchuria’s three provinces, was

24   The South Manchuria Railway Company assassinated in 1928 on orders of Colonel Kōmoto Daisaku when a bomb blew up Zhang’s SMR train car. Zhang’s son, Zhang Xueliang, replaced his father as commander of the Manchurian army, and eventually moved his forces south under Japanese pressure. Unlike his father, Zhang Xueliang appeared willing to cooperate with the Republic of China’s new leader, Chiang Kaishek, headquartered in Nanjing at that time. His goal was to ally with other Chinese military leaders in order to regain total control over Manchuria. The events of 1928 in Manchuria focused international attention on the area. The political and legal conditions became more complicated with the untimely death of Zhang Zuolin and the re-­establishment of the Republic of China in Nanjing in that year. As one Western observer, who had lived in Dalian during the late 1920s, wrote in 1928: [T]he “Manchurian Question” is not one but a complex series of questions which are capable of solution neither by courts of arbitration nor interference of disinterested powers. There is a conflict of right versus right in Manchuria, not of right versus wrong.18 The international powers with interests in Manchuria not only included the Republic of China (Manchuria was legally part of China) and Japan, but also Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the U.S., all of which had claims to properties and investments. International access to areas of Manchuria not directly under the control of Japan’s Guandong Army or the SMRC had allegedly been guaranteed by agreements signed at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, where support for the U.S. Open Door Policy for China had been reinforced. But on July 19, 1928, Chiang Kaishek’s government announced that China would unilaterally abrogate a treaty that had been signed with Japan following the First Sino-­Japanese War (1894–1895). The Sino-­Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1896 had given Japan extraterritorial rights in China’s northeastern provinces similar to those Western nations enjoyed throughout China since the Qing Dynasty’s defeat in two Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860). The Tokyo government contested Nanjing’s action, calling it an “outrageous act, disregarding good faith between the nations” and threatening that if similar actions were taken with respect to other treaty obligations, then Japan would take measures to safeguard “their rights and interests assured by the treaties.”19 European and Amer­ican leaders agreed with Japan’s stance and worked to maintain the status quo in Manchuria. That strategy would not be successful for long, as the Japanese took action three years later to further protect their interests in Manchuria and expand control. On September 18, 1931, the Manchurian Incident (or Mukden Incident) occurred when the Guandong Army overtook Shenyang (Mukden), the capital of Liaoning, and used that position as a staging point for further advances into Chinese territory, culminating within six months in the creation of a Manchurian state independent from Nanjing. It had been necessary to wrest control from China to protect Japan’s and other foreign powers’ legitimate commercial

The South Manchuria Railway Company   25 i­nterests from a chaotic, dangerous situation in northeast China. Japanese writers who described the “realities” of Manzhouguo’s creation claimed that the new state began “as a protest against the corruption and maladministration of the former Chang [Zhang] regime.”20 According to the SMRC’s version of conditions leading to Japan’s takeover: For more than ten years the two Changs [Zhangs], father and son, had exploited Manchuria for their selfish ambitions and profit. Their military expenditure had amounted to one hundred million Chinese dollars per annum, representing 85 to 93 per cent of the total expenditure. It put a staggering burden upon the people. Not only had the taxes been high, but the unlimited issuance of inconvertible paper currency had driven farmers and traders to the wall. Not less than 700,000,000 of these bills, printed in Mukden [Shenyang] and New York, had been foisted upon the people. The Changs, through the government banks which were, in reality, their private institutions, compelled the farmers to sell their crops for these worthless notes and resold them in Newchwang [Yingkou] or Dairen [Dalian] for silver or gold. It was a most profitable “racket” unequaled even in the gangdoms of Chicago or New York. Is it any wonder that the Changs earned the enmity of the people and alienated the loyalty of many of their adherents?21 The new Manzhouguo government allegedly addressed injustices and guaranteed certain rights to the people of Manchuria. The emperor’s ruling philosophy was characterized as the “Way of Benevolent Ruler” or “The Kingly Way,” and suggested that the people were guaranteed the freedom and rights of life and property, which guarantee was lacking before the establishment of Manzhouguo. According to the Japanese, they at last had brought a “modern” political system to northeast China: Thus, for the first time in history, Manchuria has a State with its administrative organs in the modern sense of the term. Until the establishment of Manchoukuo in 1932, maladministration and corruption characterized the political life in Manchuria.22 Manzhouguo’s “Kingly Way” and the “Kingly Way Revolution” claimed to liberate the Manchus from centuries of exploitation and create a more ethical form of government that would protect the people’s livelihood. A 1932 proclamation called on Manchuria’s population to work together in unity and rid themselves of the “evil ways” of the past. The Kingly Way Revolution’s goals included the transformation of Manzhouguo into paradise for its inhabitants. As the Kangde emperor, Puyi, proclaimed in a 1935 edict, the people of Manzhouguo shared “one virtue, one heart” (yi de, yi xin). The political reality for Manzhouguo’s emperor bore little resemblance to the idealistic descriptions in SMRC literature. Puyi claimed, at first, to have power equal to that of the emperor of Japan, but nothing could have been further from

26   The South Manchuria Railway Company the truth. Despite the existence of a Ministry of Military Administration, which purported to be under his authority, Puyi did not have any troops over which he had personal control, nor did he have trusted advisors answerable to him. Manzhouguo was ruled by Japanese officials there, with the military backing of the Guandong Army. “The role played by the Kangde Emperor, Puyi, in the Empire of Manchuria and the function assigned it seem to have been filled with symbolism.”23 International reaction to the creation of the puppet state of Manzhouguo and the imposition of Puyi as emperor reflected a growing concern by Western powers that Japanese aggression was more dangerous than previously assumed, but in no way was it overwhelmingly pro-­China. European and, to some extent, Amer­ican politicians had not openly objected to Japanese economic exploitation of China, particularly in the northeast, at a time when they also claimed territorial and economic rights in China.24 Furthermore, a heavy Japanese presence in China’s northeast provinces would serve as a welcome buffer to possible Soviet expansion into that area. But the events associated with the Manchurian Incident and the subsequent tightening of political controls by Tokyo over Manchuria led to an international call for action. In response, in January 1932, U.S. secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, announced a non-­recognition doctrine for territorial changes accomplished by force. On January 7, the U.S. government sent letters to Nanjing and Tokyo explaining the Amer­ican position as a feeble attempt to slow Japan’s march into China at a time when the U.S. was suffering from economic problems associated with the Great Depression and the political impact of isolationism. The Stimson Doctrine of Non-­recognition was soon embraced by Franklin D. Roosevelt, elected president on November 8, 1932. His positive meetings with Stimson on the issue prompted the secretary of state to inform U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, that the Democratic president would adhere to his Republican predecessors’ policy of refusing to recognize Japan’s puppet government in Manchuria. The Japanese, needless to say, voiced their disapproval.25 Meanwhile, the League of Nations created a multinational commission, headed by the Earl of Lytton, that embarked on a fact-­finding tour of China and Manchuria in the spring of 1932 to determine the cause of the Manchurian Incident. But, in September, one month before the report’s findings were announced, Tokyo declared the independence of, granted diplomatic recognition to, and began consolidating its authority over Manzhouguo. The Lytton Report placed blame on both the Chinese and Japanese for the tense situation in Manchuria when it called Japan the aggressor, but also asserted that the Chinese should bear some responsibility because they had inflamed anti-­Japanese violence and prejudices in areas legally controlled by Japan for decades. Despite the report’s acknowledgment of Japan’s long-­standing economic and political interests in the area, the Tokyo government responded to the commission’s findings by announcing its plans to withdraw from the League of Nations. The stress on U.S.–Japan relations caused by Japan’s annexation of Manchuria and subsequent withdrawal from the League in February 1933 appeared to be

The South Manchuria Railway Company   27 temporarily relieved when Franklin Roosevelt met with Viscount (Shishaku) Ishii Kikujirō, former minister of foreign affairs, in June 1933. The cordial encounter was described as “the New Deal in Japanese–Amer­ican relations” by one writer who suggested that an “old friendship is restored and new cooperation is promised.”26 Deeply rooted problems, however, were apparent in the press coverage in both the U.S. and Japan. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi, for example, described Roosevelt’s position on Manchuria as one that needed explanation by the Japanese government because, according to Roosevelt, “Japan’s action is generally considered a violation of treaties.” Ishii’s response was that Tokyo’s policies “in no way violate any pact.”27 Soon the Japanese embarked on an investment program to develop and modernize the region under the leadership of the SMRC. Manzhouguo would become an integral part of the expanding Jap­ anese empire, as Korea (Chōsen) had been since 1910.

Providing the basics for modernization: hygiene and sanitation Japan’s takeover of Manchuria came at a time when the area, like all of China, was suffering from the impact of the worldwide Depression that began in 1929. Manchuria’s economy had begun declining rapidly from 1930 to 1931, as a result of a decrease in foreign trade, but had nearly recovered by 1935, unlike the rest of China. Its industrial sector saw signs of improvement as early as 1933. Japanese investment played a major role.28 A first step toward creating a modern, industrialized Manchuria, the “paradise” written about in SMRC literature, was to tackle deplorable living conditions characteristic of the area. The Tokyo government took credit for improving health conditions and medical facilities in Manchuria beginning even before the formal establishment its colony, Manzhouguo, through the introduction of clean water, sanitation, and up-­to-date medical practices. Japan’s advances were appreciated decades later—with the conclusion of World War II and the occupation of Manchuria by the Soviet Red Army, the impressive Japanese-­built infrastructure became a target for Soviet expropriation. For example, the modern waterworks at Xinjing that supplied the city of approximately three-­hundred-thousand with two-­thirds of its water was dismantled by Red Army soldiers. Pumping machinery and pipes were allegedly brought back to the USSR,29 destroying one of Japan’s most important contributions to the health of the local population and, in an ironic twist, setting back progress in a location where the Russians, themselves, had made the first efforts at development. The Japanese maintained an extensive system of water and sewer works in areas under their control. Descriptions of sanitary conditions in northeast China prior to foreign intervention were particularly critical of the Chinese. The Jap­ anese credited both their innovations as well as those of the Russians carried out before 1905 for improving the lives of the local populace and Japanese sources acknowledged the Russian government as the first to undertake sanitation projects, such as those providing clean water, in Manchuria. (They did not, however,

28   The South Manchuria Railway Company give credit to Zhang Zuolin’s director of the Bureau of Finance, Wang Yongjiang, who sponsored a variety of development projects with the goal of improving conditions in those areas of Manchuria still under Zhang’s control during the 1920s. Wang’s capable and prudent leadership assisted Zhang’s military goals without ignoring domestic programs.30) Louise Young suggests that Japanese colonization literature emphasized Japanese alleged superior standards of personal hygiene as symbolic of racial superiority. Disgust with the “foul odor” of Chinese laborers, their “dirty habits,” and lack of sanitary facilities aimed to reinforce the notion of racial difference.31 Japanese propaganda claimed that they maintained, improved, and expanded a sanitation infrastructure for the benefit of the Chinese. Beginning in 1907, both the Guandong government and the SMRC built “modern waterworks” in their territories. The Guandong government spent 7.65 million yen over several years during the 1930s to complete waterworks in the major cities of Dalian, Lushun (Port Arthur), and Jinzhou and the SMRC allocated an additional 5.9 million yen to provide clean drinking water to 17 smaller cities along the railway line. Modern sewage systems were built in Dalian, Lushun, and in larger cities in SMRC territory. From 1933 to 1935, the Japanese built dams and reservoirs along the I-­tung, Hsiao, and Tai Rivers, providing a reliable water supply to Manchuria’s largest cities. The SMRC’s new Hygienic Institute claimed responsibility for testing water supplies and inspecting wells throughout much of Manchuria. Answering Questions on Manchuria (1937) gives a detailed account of Japan’s efforts to curtail the spread of deadly diseases in northeast China through a variety of programs aimed at bringing modern facilities to the area. The Jap­ anese took credit for ending the spread of plagues then common in northeast China. According to the report, Manchuria had been the site of several devastating plagues since the turn of the century, including pneumonic plagues in 1910–1911, 1920–1921, and 1927, and a cholera epidemic in 1919. In the earliest plague, over 50,000 residents of Manchuria died. The Japanese Hygienic Service in Manchuria established programs to supplement what was portrayed as inadequate efforts by Chinese authorities in the area following the plague of 1910–1911. The Hygienic Institute, for example, was an SMRC unit that carried out hygienic examinations and tests of medical and chemical substances, food, and drink, as well as bacteriological tests with special reference to prevention of epidemic or endemic outbreaks. The institute was also responsible for manufacturing and distributing medicines, vaccines, and disinfectants, which, the SMRC claimed, were distributed to the local population free or at cost.32 The Japanese also acknowledged that the first modern hospitals in Manchuria were built by Russians, and they were critical of the Manchu (Qing) Chinese government (1644–1912) in Beijing and other local leaders, accusing Manchu leaders of ignoring medical services in Manchuria until an International Plague Conference met at Shenyang (Mukden) in the winter of 1911–1912 where it was proposed that China establish plague prevention hospitals at five locations.33 During the following two years, with the assistance of international aid agencies,

The South Manchuria Railway Company   29 Chinese authorities established four new hospitals in Manchuria, while a fifth was built in Shenyang in 1921, but Japanese control reportedly brought improved medical facilities overseen by the Guandong district government, the SMRC, and the Red Cross of Japan. The Guandong government maintained and expanded hospital facilities in addition to appointing district physicians to 13 smaller cities and towns to provide medical care and administer vaccinations. The SMRC administered 35 hospitals within its area, and claimed to oversee a medical staff of 840 in 1934, not including a large number of district physicians and visiting nurses appointed to smaller communities. The Red Cross Society of Japan also maintained a staff of over 1,000 physicians and nurses in Manchuria in 1933 and ran two hospitals in Dalian and Shenyang. The Red Cross was responsible for public education, preventative measures against tuberculosis, and providing free medical service to the poor. Additionally, the SMRC built the South Manchuria Medical College in Shenyang in 1911 with the goal of training physicians from the local population. In 1922, it was renamed Manchuria Medical University. During the 1930s, Manchu medical students reportedly paid a tuition fee of “only” 40 yen because they were subsidized by funding from the SMRC, which allocated over 800,000 yen annually to the university, in addition to providing resources for construction and libraries. Japanese publicity for their achievements in disease control and improving sanitation in areas previously considered among the most backward did not go unnoticed by the international community, especially those who witnessed the changes as foreign trade increased. By the 1930s, the Japanese could boast of their sponsorship of two model cities in Manzhouguo. Dalian, called the “Pearl of the North,” was the site of the largest SMRC hospital, among the best in East Asia. The city’s residents enjoyed various urban amenities unheard of in many parts of Asia, such as paved roads, flush toilets, and central heating. Xinjing (the “new capital,” Shinkyo) (Changchun) benefited from significant Japanese government investment. Manzhouguo’s new capital was to serve as a symbol of modernity with its well-­planned infrastructure, wide well-­lit streets, sewer system, new housing, and public parks. The percentage of Xinjing’s land allocated for parks and recreation was 7.2 percent as compared to 2.8 percent in Tokyo.34 The Japanese also pursued other sorts of advances under the guise of disease-­ prevention research that were not advertised in SMRC publications. Behind the images of beautiful, clean cities and areas under rapid development leaping into modernity, seemingly for the benefit of the local population, were secret projects sponsored by the SMRC and the Guandong Army that appeared to be part of the varied projects to improve the health of the population. In the village Pingfan just outside of Harbin, for example, the Guandong Army set up what is now called the infamous Unit 731, a biological warfare program, where human experiments, including vivisection, were conducted on mostly Chinese from 1934 to 1945. Unit 731, whose official name was the Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Department, at its height had a staff of over 10,000, including some of Japan’s top medical scientists. The army’s biological warfare program

30   The South Manchuria Railway Company and other medical atrocities committed in the name of scientific research were kept well hidden, but were known by the conclusion of World War II. In January 2011, representatives from Harbin announced a six-­year plan to preserve and restore the facilities used by Unit 731 as historic sites. The Chinese government plans to request the area be registered as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, along with Auschwitz and Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial.35

Relief, development, and prosperity—welcoming foreign trade The Japanese avoided any hint of negative publicity surrounding their activities in Manzhouguo in order to attract foreign business to the areas they controlled in China. Japan’s accomplishments in bringing relief and prosperity to Manchuria were acclaimed in portrayals of the multitude of capital investment projects initiated by the Manzhouguo government, the SMRC, and the Guandong district government that brought about rapid development. According to SMRC sources, every endeavor undertaken by the Manzhouguo government or Tokyo was aimed at creating a modern, model state for people who, previously, were subjected to the harsh exploitation of tyrannical, backward leaders, such as Manchuria’s military governor, General Zhang Zuolin. The Japanese reorganization of allegedly archaic and corrupt financial institutions benefited both the local population and, more importantly, the international community interested in trade for Manchuria’s vast resources. SMRC literature showered praise on the Manzhouguo government’s financial reforms, which had successfully balanced the budget in order to increase international confidence in its financial administration. Included among a long list of reforms were: decreases in certain taxes, readjustment of duties and tariffs, lowering the price of salt, and improving the tax collection system. The Japanese monopolized Manchurian opium production, ostensibly for the purpose of eliminating opium use and controlling the smuggling of opium. They claimed that profits from the opium monopoly would be set aside to cover the expenses of control, relief, and education of opium addicts.36 Japanese publications also addressed an issue critical to the international community as a consequence of its long history of investment in northeast China: the foreign loan obligations of the previous administration under General Zhang Zuolin. The SMRC explained, “In conformity with the practice of preserving international good faith, Manchoukuo has bravely announced that she will meet all foreign loan obligations for the former regime.”37 The welcome news was accompanied by descriptions of capital investments in, for example, additional tracks, upgraded terminals, new docking facilities, and other improvements made in Manchurian port cities and along the railway lines to encourage commerce. Shimizu Teruo, staff member of SMRC’s Dalian Information and Publicity Office, described the new Manchuria as “the communications crossroads of the Far East” in an article published in Eastern Asia (1940), “Its railways not only provide transportation and communication facilities within its

The South Manchuria Railway Company   31 own borders, but also serve as indispensable overland links in international railway systems connecting Japan, China and Europe via the Soviet Union.”38 He also noted that “the development of Manchuria’s railways displays a marked resemblance to the development of railways in the northwestern states of the United States.”39 Consequently, the combination of Japanese authority and commercial development in Manchuria caused the SMRC to boast that the growth of Manchurian trade since the Russo-­Japanese War had been rapid and phenomenal.40 The SMRC made bold claims for its achievements in promoting commerce, noting that Japanese efforts far surpassed earlier Russian attempts at development in Manchuria. According to SMRC sources the Russo-­Japanese War had ushered into Manchuria a new economic era. Within a year of the war’s conclusion, Dalian was opened as a “free port” and the SMRC claimed to have invested over 75 million yen in order to make Dalian a “premier port in eastern Asia” by the mid-­1930s. Over the next five years, the Japanese government negotiated a series of agreements with Qing rulers in Beijing to open more northern Manchurian cites, including Harbin, Shenyang, Manzhouli (near the Soviet border), and Aihun, where the SMRC claimed to promote increased international commerce. The establishment of Manzhouguo in 1932 brought renewed emphasis on the area’s commercial development. SMRC sources credited Japanese forces for pacifying the region when Russian forces, there for decades, had been relatively ineffective. In July 1932, the SMRC established the General Directorate of Railways and took over the operations of all railroads, ports, harbors, and river navigation facilities. The Japanese claimed that four factors “revolutionized the prospect for international trade in Manchuria”: (1) the new “efficient” and “honest” administration, (2) a “phenomenal era of construction” that required the importation of construction materials from abroad, (3) expansion of transportation facilities, and (4) financial reforms, such as currency regulation and the opening of “reliable” banks.41 In its analysis of Manchuria’s trade, SMRC literature emphasized a thriving commercial sector and the potential for profit from sought-­after foreign imports. Photographs of bustling piers and the electrified factories of Dalian’s “White Way” attested to a healthy economy. Moreover, the SMRC provided evidence that Manchuria would continue to encourage foreign trade, especially imports. Japanese trade statistics from 1931 to 1936 showed an “adverse balance of trade” beginning in 1933 caused by a decade-­long steady increase in imports whose value exceeded that of Manchuria’s exports. The SMRC credited the establishment of the Manzhouguo government and its development programs for this good news for international business while it predicted continued demand for foreign manufactured products. The primary exports from Manchuria were raw materials and soybean products. SMRC publicity writer Shimizu Teruo described the role Japanese railways played in opening Manchurian markets to the world: Millions of tons of agricultural products, minerals, timber, manufactured goods and a host of other Manchurian resources and products, some destined

32   The South Manchuria Railway Company for far away foreign markets, travel overland on freight carriers seeking internal markets or an outlet to foreign lands. Many production centers were born in the more remote regions through the opening of railway lines, and many were the new commercial products which make their debut because of chances of marketability provided by railways.42

Plentiful resources and opportunities SMRC literature emphasized the vast and varied natural resources waiting to be tapped in Manchuria; Japanese writers referred to the area as the boom land of the Orient. Billions of metric tons of coal, iron, and other minerals were exploited by the SMRC-­owned Shōwa Steel Works headquartered in Anshan as well as several other smaller Japanese-­owned firms. Shōwa Steel Works boasted overseeing the modern facilities, including a cutting-­edge patented method for the utilization of ores with less than 40 percent iron content. According to Jap­ anese sources, whenever Manchurian enterprises came under Tokyo’s patronage, revitalization, modernization, and improvement resulted. For example, the Jap­ anese took credit for developing a large-­scale and environmentally friendly lumber industry to provide wood products for local and international consumption while they also blamed Zhang Zuolin’s previous administration for poor management practices and lack of protection of area resources.43 On March 1, 1933, the Manzhouguo government issued a comprehensive development policy for the area, the “General Outline of Economic Construction Programme of Manchoukuo,” which called for the strong hand of national control over mining, manufacturing, and other industries. Over the next four years, the program was credited with building over 365 new Manchurian industries. More importantly, the policy supposedly addressed several pre-­existing problems. According to SMRC sources, the Manzhouguo government made a concerted effort to highlight the negative aspects of the old, corrupt system it replaced: “Feudal dictatorship and [the] studied ‘squeeze’ system gave way to [a] strictly modern, rational and unified economic system.”44 Additionally, the interests of the international business community were highlighted. For example, “Policy #3” of the “General Outline” emphasized Manzhouguo’s commitment to the principles of the “open door” and “equal opportunity,” a message directly aimed at the U.S. government and Amer­ican business. Increasing U.S.–Manzhouguo trade was an obvious focus of SMRC publications throughout the 1930s, even after World War II started in Europe in September 1939. Roy Hidemichi Akagi, manager of the SMRC’s New York office in the late 1930s and prolific author of works on Japan’s foreign relations and New England history,45 used a variety of English-­language resources to entice Amer­ icans to welcome commercial ties with Manzhougou. Akagi’s articles on Manchuria had two dominant themes: (1) Japan’s actions on the Asian mainland had had a positive impact, and (2) the U.S. economy would benefit significantly as it recovered from the Depression by trading with Manzhouguo. Akagi was a dedicated advocate for closer U.S.–Manzhouguo ties during this tenure as chairperson

The South Manchuria Railway Company   33 of the SMRC’s New York office. He tried many times during his career to forge improved relations. From 1931 to 1934, Akagi was visiting lecturer on Japanese affairs at New York’s Columbia University and earlier had been organizer and general secretary of the Japanese Students’ Christian Association in North America (1924–1929). Author of several works on Manchurian history, he used his academic contacts to feature articles promoting Japan’s goals in Manzhouguo.46 For example, during his stay at Columbia University, he published an article in the Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science (July 1933) entitled “Japan and the Open Door in Manchukuo [Manzhouguo]” in which he outlined the “basic facts” of Manzhouguo’s achievements after only one year in existence. According to Akagi, “Most noteworthy and striking is the growth of trade. During her first year, 1932, in spite of unsettled conditions in Manchuria and the worldwide Depression, the Manchukuo [Manzhouguo] trade increased tremendously.” Akagi implored Amer­icans to seek commercial ties with the new nation he described as “an international reality, as real as the states which emerged in Europe after the World War.”47 “[I]t remains for the United States to provide Manchukuo [Manzhouguo] with materials which she alone can supply such as steel rails, constructions machinery, tractors, agricultural machinery, electrical goods, motor cars, and the like.”48 In June 1940, Akagi wrote another article, “Future of Amer­ican Trade with Manchukuo [Manzhouguo],” reflecting on the favorable developments in U.S.– Manzhouguo trade of the previous eight years and prospects for the future. Complete with charts and graphs, Akagi examined the rise in sales to Manzhouguo by Amer­ican companies and suggested that there was still room for improvement. The SMRC’s Sixth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939, edited by Akagi, also reported on annual increases of U.S. exports to Manzhouguo during the 1930s. While it is not surprising that Amer­ican manufacturers welcomed business with overseas companies seeking Amer­ican-­made industrial products during the Depression, it may appear odd that trade accelerated with an area not accorded diplomatic relations by the U.S. government. In January 1932, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson had specifically reacted to Japan’s takeover of Manchuria with the Doctrine of Non-­recognition; the U.S. government refused to recognize the legality of international territorial changes executed by force. Thus, 23 of the then 80 nations worldwide recognized Manzhouguo as an independent state, but not the U.S. In a rare but subtle criticism of U.S. government policy, the SMRC’s Sixth Report followed a listing of the total yearly increases of Amer­ican imports to Manchuria with the comment: “These figures are most interesting in the face of the Amer­ican attitude of non-­recognition and her complaint against what she calls the ‘closed door’ in Manchuria.”49 In its direct appeal to the Amer­ican business community, the SMRC, like other Japanese institutions, demonstrated a willingness to pursue economic ties, despite heightened political tensions. The Sixth Report concluded:  [T]he Manchurian trade with the United States has shown a most noticeable development in recent years. The Amer­ican trade with Manchuria totaled

34   The South Manchuria Railway Company only 22,758,000 yuan in 1932, but it has jumped to … 104,430,000 yuan in 1938. The remarkable fact about these figures has been the strong favorable balance which the United States has maintained steadily.50  By 1938, the U.S. was Manzhouguo’s third-­largest trading partner, following Japan and China.51 An October 1938 survey conducted by the SMRC and the Manzhouguo Transportation Department concluded that Amer­ican-­made automobiles, for example, dominated the market throughout Manchuria.52 Growing commercial ties between Amer­ican companies and Manzhouguo even after Japan’s full-­scale invasion of China in 1937 presented problems for U.S. government officials and spokespersons for Amer­ican business. The Roosevelt administration’s complaints about Japan’s discrimination against Amer­ican businesses and violations of the Open Door Policy in Manzhouguo were undermined by evidence of a lively trade. The Japanese had imposed significant obstacles to free trade with Manzhouguo for foreign companies in the form of specific laws that favored Japanese companies, such as the Foreign Exchange Control Law (1933), the Oil Monopoly Law (1934), and the Key Industries Control Law (1937), but Amer­ican companies managed to find opportunities. In a 1939 exchange between Republican senator Gerald Nye, a noted isolationist and member of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Nye accused the Roosevelt administration of distorting Tokyo’s trade policies in Manzhouguo by exaggerating restrictions on Amer­ican business. Hull disagreed with Nye’s assessment, citing numerous discriminatory regulations, and added that he was troubled by the fact that Amer­ican exports to Manzhouguo were being used to bolster Japan’s fight against the Chinese.53 Meanwhile, the Japanese, predictably, provided evidence that pointed to the benefits of trade for the U.S. economy as it recovered from the Great Depression.

The new deal in education Japanese literature condemned the backwardness of Chinese public education as a prelude to announcing impressive innovations carried out under Japan’s sponsorship. Whereas the Chinese government had provided no public-­school system for Manchuria before 1900, the Japanese boasted that by 1939 there were 13,886 primary schools, 123 secondary schools (100 boys’ high schools, 23 girls’ high schools), 93 normal schools, 66 vocational schools, 15 colleges and technical schools, one university, and 1,624 private schools. Manzhouguo’s educational program in the 1930s was dubbed the “New Deal” and promised to achieve universal education. SMRC literature was supplemented with photographs of young female students studying and participating in athletic activities, benefiting from the New Deal program and thus challenging traditional Chinese customs for the role of women in education.54 The SMRC and the Guandong government were credited for introducing the Japanese educational system to Manchuria immediately following the Russo-­ Japanese War. They replaced and expanded the first modern educational facilities

The South Manchuria Railway Company   35 in the area that had been established earlier by the Russians. By the late 1930s, the Japanese claimed they were spending about seven million yen annually on education services in South Manchuria. Moreover, SMRC literature credits the Manzhouguo government for the creation of educational centers, holding “popular” lecture series, building public libraries and museums, and establishing language courses and adult education programs. Meanwhile, Japanese authorities publicly welcomed and praised the contributions of various Christian missionary societies to Manchurian education. While characterized as “small in scale” by the Japanese, Christian missionary organizations underwrote three colleges and several secondary schools.55

The harmony of five races An oversized, colorful mural located in the mezzanine of Xinjing’s capital building depicted five young girls, happily skipping hand in hand, each dressed in traditional native attire, one Manchu, one Mongol, one Chinese, one Korean, and one Japanese.56 The pervasive and popular image served as a theme for Japan’s goals in Manchuria—creating a paradise for its inhabitants. By the late 1930s, the Japanese claimed to have achieved the “harmony of five races” throughout their jurisdiction because they had solved the problems associated with immigrants and bandits. But the process had not been smooth. SMRC publications detailed the decades-­long efforts that led to the achievement of “peace and harmony.” The transition began in the years immediately following the Russo-­ Japanese War, when “many a Japanese statesman dreamed of Manchuria as a god-­given land for Japanese immigration.”57 Three major immigrant groups in Manchuria, the Chinese, Koreans, and Jap­ anese, allegedly benefited from the largesse of Japanese programs. The Chinese comprised the largest segment. SMRC writers described migration from areas south of Manchuria during the 1930s as “China’s covered wagons,” a mass migration “quietly moving into Manchuria from various provinces in China” that had resulted in over one million Chinese settling in the northeast each year from 1927 to 1929. Moreover, following the establishment of Manzhouguo, “the new order of things” brought about a renewed influx of immigrants into the more “civilized” northeast. The Manzhouguo government as a result was forced temporarily to limit new Chinese settlement “for political and economic reasons.”58 Despite sporadic legal limitations on Chinese immigration, the Japanese acknowledged that Chinese “coolies” (guli) provided much-­needed labor and helped facilitate expanding markets into Manchuria’s interior. In 1938, for example, Xinjing’s Labor Control Commission decided “to make a positive effort in inviting 1,000,000 Chinese coolies from North China” to relieve a two-­ year shortage of labor for Manzhouguo’s development projects.59 Chinese were employed in a variety of occupations, including agriculture, forestry, and mining, but most worked as factory labor. SMRC writers pointed out that whenever “local disturbances” between Chinese and Japanese in Manzhouguo subsided and “peace and order” were restored, Chinese took advantage of economic

36   The South Manchuria Railway Company opportunities throughout Manzhouguo and “the wave of mass immigration started to rise again.”60 Koreans in Manchuria, on the other hand, had suffered “oppression” and “mistreatment” at the hands of both Chinese authorities and the local Manchu population until the establishment of Manzhouguo and the development of the “radius of peace and order” provided by the Japanese. According to SMRC sources, Koreans had been the “constant victims of marauding hordes of bandits” and had suffered from legal discrimination in their attempts to acquire land. But such difficulties were “wiped away” by the Japanese and after 1931 Koreans enjoyed a “new deal” in Manchuria.61 Koreans in Manchuria numbered about fifty-­three-thousand in 1910. But following Korea’s takeover by Japan in that year, refugees in Manchuria increased, reaching 819,000 in 1936 to nearly one million in 1938. Beginning in the mid-­ 1930s, the Manzhouguo government created segregated “settlement villages” for Koreans, organized by the East Asia Land Development Company, a subsidiary of the SMRC.62 In 1936, the Manchukuo-­Chōsen (Manzhouguo-­Korea) Colonization Company whose branches were located in Xinjing and Seoul, authorized the expenditure of 20 million yen to facilitate the placement of Korean families in settlement villages. By 1937, there were 44 such settlements.63 In 1937, Japanese in Manchuria comprised the smallest of the three major immigrant ethnic groups, numbering just over a half million (376,000 in Guandong Leased Territory, SMRC Zone, and consular districts; 169,000 in Manzhouguo), despite efforts by Tokyo to encourage the settlement of Japanese farmers, in particular, from 1933 to 1937. One major obstacle to Japanese immigration had been “tyrannic land regulations in spite of treaty right” that had kept Japanese farmers from owning land before the establishment of Manzhouguo, but after 1932 “this dismal outlook” for Japanese settlers changed.64 The SMRC’s first experimental plan for immigration focused on fostering self-­ sufficient agricultural enterprises, with initial subsidy by the Japanese government. In 1938, an SMRC progress report concluded, “In all, then, 2,785 farmers representing as many households participated as pioneers in Japan’s new ‘covered wagon’ movement into Manchuria.”65 In 1937, the SMRC announced a bold plan by Tokyo’s Department of Colonial Affairs to settle one million Japanese families (a total of five million immigrants) in Manchuria over the next two decades. This goal would be difficult to meet and would require subsidies, such as “emigration bonuses.” To facilitate the large-­scale resettlement project on the mainland, the Manchuria Colonization Company was created. Marilyn Young describes the complex nexus of Japanese “national, prefectural and local initiatives” used to facilitate and encourage voluntary emigration, particularly of farm households.66 SMRC propaganda emphasized agricultural innovations brought to the mainland by Japanese farming “experts” who were among the targets for emigration campaigns. Photographs showing Japanese farmers using “up-­to-date machinery,” tractors, and plows filled the pages of SMRC publications. Although photographs of Manchurian farmers revealed their more primitive hand tools, they were described as

The South Manchuria Railway Company   37 “hardworking” and “contented” when engaged in Japanese-­sponsored farm projects. Like the Koreans, the Japanese immigrants lived in segregated settlements in both rural and urban areas. For example, the development of “Tokyo Village” near Harbin was sponsored by the Tokyo municipal government.68 One reason for the establishment of segregated settlements, policed by Japanese law enforcement, was the need, according to Japanese sources, to bring peace and security to an otherwise lawless land. The “first wave” of Japanese settlers to rural Manchuria in late 1932 had been subjected to harassment and terror. The group of about 500 “self-­protective” Japanese immigrants who settled near Jiamusi in northern Manchuria allegedly found their situation precarious until Japanese legal institutions appeared. The Japanese blamed the backwardness of China’s legal system: 67

One of the ills of China seems to be the powerlessness of the authorities, both national and local, against the forces of organized banditry. And Manchuria was no exception to that state of affairs and Manchoukuo had inherited the delicate task of bandit subjugation.69 In order to bring peace to Manchuria, Japanese authorities in 1932 undertook the daunting task of eliminating organized opposition to their rule, approximately two-­hundred-thousand strong, they referred to as the five categories of “bandit hordes”: (1) so-­called “political bandits” formerly under command of notorious political leaders, such as Ma Chan-­shan [Guomindang General Ma Zhanshan], Ting Chao, [Guomindang General Ding Chao] and Su Ping-­wen [Guomindang General Su Bingwen]; (2) “professional bandits” who are the traditional outlaws of Manchuria; (3) “civilian bandits” who had been forced to take up banditry on account of economic necessity to get a livelihood; (4) “religious bandits” who ravage the interior districts for religious motives, especially in view of their affiliation with such native religious bodies as the Tataohui [Dadaohui] (Big Sword League) and Hungchianghui [Hongjianghui] (Red Spear League); and (5) minor groups of farmers and workers in abject poverty.70 By 1938, the Japanese reported problems with another category: communist bandits (gongfei).71 SMRC literature described the old Chinese law enforcement system as decentralized and corrupt. The Japanese claimed to replace it with a modern, disciplined, pervasive police administration: After the emergence of Manchoukuo, the new Government, at the same time introducing various organs and facilities for the maintenance of internal peace and order, instituted a determined campaign to uproot banditry by

38   The South Manchuria Railway Company political and economic measures and to liquidate lawless banditry altogether from the country. Relentless punitive warfare was carried on by Manchoukuoan national army and police forces, assisted by Japanese troops. During the past eight short years, thus, the … regions, once the hot-­beds of bandits, were completely cleared of lawless hordes.72 The Manzhouguo government announced a “striking record of success” in its victory over the “bandit hordes” when the pacification program allegedly succeeded in reducing the number of “outlaws” to roughly 5,000 by the end of 1938.73 SMRC’s 1939 progress report concluded its assessment of the campaign with the confident promise “to exterminate the last trace of notorious Manchurian bandits who have made Manchuria both famous and infamous and to accelerate further the realization of a ‘wangtao’ [wangdao, “kingly way”] paradise in East Asia.”74 The pacification program was one part of the “New Deal” in law enforcement that also focused on training local Manchu police and guards to work alongside Japanese. A Central Police Institute in Xinjing was built to oversee training schools under district and local jurisdictions and replace the decentralized, corrupt Chinese system.75 The Japanese complained that the old system of police recruiting had been based on patronage; positions had been “farmed out to the highest bidder as in the old Roman Empire.”76 Tighter security and the establishment of the rule of law were welcome news to Westerners familiar with the problem of banditry and lawlessness throughout China. Newspapers, such as the English-­language North China Herald, published in Shanghai, were filled with horrific tales of outlaws, kidnappings, ransom, bribery, and corruption throughout the 1920s and 1930s.77 Moreover, SMRC propaganda announced that many of these former criminals had surrendered voluntarily and repented “their atrocious activities.” They allegedly became engaged in legitimate professions and supported the new regime. One reason for such claims could be that in many areas local populations were forcibly resettled and required to carry internal passports. Horace M. Masuda, from the SMRC’s “Foreign Section” in Dalian, described the program’s success: Although bandits are now [1939] rare, isolated bands in remote regions are sometimes forced to make desperate attacks on farmers in the interior regions, and to prevent just such an event, the Manchoukuo Government a few years ago adopted the system of concentrated villages in sparsely populated regions.… All outsiders are not permitted to enter freely since a famished outlaw is apt to turn farmer in disguise and later direct his band in an attack. With the increase of concentrated villages, the number of bandits and bandit raids diminished to almost zero.78 In conclusion, the Japanese proclaimed that a revolution in police administration had completely modernized the law enforcement system. Among the reasons to convince foreigners that peace prevailed in Manchuria was to entice visitors to

The South Manchuria Railway Company   39 the region to report on Japanese accomplishments. For example, safety was emphasized in one travelogue where Masuda described an excursion to the Manchurian riverfront village of Mulan: Mulan is a small town of about a thousand clustered houses, decidedly native in style, some built of stone or bricks but the majority of mud.… Passersby stop to lean on the fence and shoot a fascinated look at the “river train.” The town police, all Manchurians, clad in smart uniforms with sabers dangling at their side inspect all incomers and their baggage lest undesirable elements penetrate the peaceful villages. It is surprising that where ever one travels, no matter how deep into the interior, he finds Manchoukuo police officers dressed in the established uniform checking up on new arrivals or performing other routine duties for the preservation of peace and order.79

Manchuria: a tourist destination In 2002, Dalian’s city council designated the popular Dalian Hotel in Xinghai Park one of 100 “Important Buildings Protected by the City of Dalian” in order to fund the preservation of architecturally and historically significant sites. Renamed after World War  II, the Dalian Hotel was once the Yamato Hotel originally built in 1914 in the then-­called Hoshi-­ga-Ura Park. In addition to a plaque at its entrance noting the hotel’s cultural significance, its Japanese heritage today is seen only in the fact that it houses Momiji, one of Dalian’s best Japanese restaurants. Advertising for various hotels appeared throughout SMRC publications during the 1930s. “When you travel in Manchoukuo enjoy the luxury of Yamato Hotels” was one slogan for a chain of a dozen luxury tourist facilities throughout Manchuria and under the management of the SMRC. These included the now-­protected Dalian Yamato Hotel and others in Lushun, Xinjing, Shenyang, and QiQihar. Modern clean buildings, shining automobiles, and beautiful Asian women adorned hotel advertisements. Tourists were enticed to visit modern urban centers as well as outlying areas “whose towns are still hidden under Oriental mystery.”80 Many SMRC articles written for an Amer­ican audience stressed the similarities between the U.S. and Manchuria. The Japanese apparently welcomed Western tourists and tried to sell Manchuria as a vacation spot by emphasizing security and familiarity. Writer Robert Murphy began “Pioneer Aspects in Manchuria,” an article published in the SMRC magazine Eastern Asia (1940) by explaining: When I first crossed the border into Manchoukuo at Antung [Andong], I had the most vivid impression that I was in America. The town itself with the rikishas subtracted and English substituted for the Chinese signs would have passed easily as a town of eastern Colorado. And as the train went on towards Mukden [Shenyang] I was even more conscious of the resemblance between America and Manchoukuo, for the country the train was passing

40   The South Manchuria Railway Company through was tremendously like the country in southern Idaho through which the Union Pacific passes.81 Tourism promotions for Manchuria focused on several themes: the area’s traditional charm coupled with modern facilities, exotic if not unique attractions, luxury living, entertainment, and beaches. One SMRC publication’s centerfold depicted happy Western-­looking men and women (probably Russian) sunbathing on the beaches of Tai Yang Dao (Sun Island, Taiyo-­to Island), outside of Harbin. The photograph, entitled “Bathing Beauties,” showing beachgoers along the shore, was superimposed on an idyllic seascape background.82 Stories of exotic travel targeted wealthy Amer­icans. For example, in the 1940 summer edition of Eastern Asia one writer described an appealing vacation: A ride down the Sungari [Songhua River] from Harbin to Chiamussu [Jiamusi], a young modern city still in the making in northeastern Manchuria, is recommended to travelers who care to see what this great waterway is like. Large comfortable steamboats, strikingly similar to those that operated on the famous Mississippi and other rivers in the southern states of America, are available, sailing daily from Harbin or Chiamussu [Jiamusi].83 Another unique tourist attraction advertised for an Amer­ican audience was the popular Carnival Boat that toured the ports along the Songhua River during

Figure 2.2  Manzhouguo as a tourist destination. Source: SMRC, Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, Summer 1940, 29–30.

The South Manchuria Railway Company   41 summer months. Described as an event “well worth seeing,” an SMRC staff writer concludes: Whether any Manchurian Paul Robeson and others will in later years immortalise the show-­boat of the Sungari [Songhua] remains to be seen, but the glamor of its coming and entertainment will always prove one of the strongest attractions of the North Manchurian year.84 Also playing an important role in the entertainment industry was the SMRC’s Xinjing Film Studio, which produced films for tourists, Chinese, and Westerners, in the form of short films seen in movie theaters during the 1930s and early 1940s. They served as yet another mechanism for the spread of pro-­Japanese propaganda.

The Manzhouguo Film Association In September 2006, National Geographic magazine’s feature article detailed China’s goal for rejuvenating the Manchurian economy for the twenty-­first century. Photos of Beijing’s urban renewal project, the “Manchurian Mandate,” could not hide evidence of Tokyo’s similar efforts some 80 years earlier as Japanese-­style architecture and the legacy of Japanese innovation remain throughout northeast China. Nowhere is the connection more obvious than in one of Changchun’s (Xinjing) most popular tourist attractions today, Movie Wonderland. A theme park modeled after Hollywood’s Universal Studios, Movie Wonderland was built in 2003 by Changchun Film Studios. The Changchun film industry today, dubbed “Chinawood” and Eastern Hollywood by Chinese advertising, is the direct descendant of the Manzhouguo Motion Picture Corporation started by the SMRC in the 1930s. The filmmaking industry originally established in Manzhouguo’s capital city has undergone a metamorphosis from its days as a Japanese propaganda enterprise. Soon after Japan’s defeat in World War II, the CCP, based in northern China, attempted to wrest control of the Japanese studios. On October 1, 1945, the CCP set up its own film production company called the Northeast Film Company in facilities previously controlled by the Japanese. Although its headquarters moved to other areas in Manchuria during the Communists’ war against the Guomindang, the Northeast Film Studio permanently moved to its original location in Changchun in April 1949, six months before the formal establishment of the People’s Republic of China. In February 1955, China’s Ministry of Culture officially named the company the Changchun Film Studio. During the next two decades, the CCP created Maoist propaganda films there. Today the studios, major producers of films and television series and the backers of Movie Wonderland, have become an important part of Manchuria’s tourist industry, much like the Manzhouguo Film Association once was. SMRC publications from the 1930s carried advertisements for films produced by the Manzhouguo Film Association depicting beautiful modern Asian women

42   The South Manchuria Railway Company and appealing to Amer­ican tourists with the theme: “Enjoy the Exotic Orient in Pictures.” The SMRC established the Film Association on August 14, 1937, in collaboration with the Manzhouguo government. Under the leadership of the Japanese Imperial Army Officer, Amakasu Masahiko (also known for his pivotal role in expanding the Japanese army’s role in Manchurian opium production and distribution to China), the Association strove to make films of the highest quality. Amakasu, himself, traveled to Germany during the late 1930s to procure the best in cameras and other technology. The Xinjing studios produced propaganda and entertainment films, although many served both purposes. The Manzhouguo Film Association, sometimes under the name of Beaux Art Productions or Fireside Films, produced silent films and talkies. Several documentary short films were sent to the U.S. and shown in Amer­ican theaters during the late 1930s. For example, Beaux Art Production’s Manchukuo: The Newborn Empire produced in the late 1930s is a black and white, 16 mm film, approximately 13 minutes long, allegedly depicting life in several Manchurian cities. The narrator’s Amer­ican-­accented English and witty, jovial performance effectively present Tokyo’s message that Manchuria was the “paradise” it was claimed to be. The introductory scenes showing bustling cities and ports serve as background to the film’s theme: “A barren and desolate land has been transformed into a great commercial center.” The film examines the SMRC’s version of life in several cities, including Kirin, Dalian, Harbin, Mukden (Shenyang), and Xinjing (Changchun) with an emphasis on obvious manifestations of wealth, modernity, peace, and security. According to the film’s narrator, the Japanese brought “modernized industry and education to an ancient land” beginning in 1906 and now in 1939 the rest of the world should take advantage of Manchuria’s natural mineral resources, rich forests, “up-­to-date equipment,” and superior land and sea transportation systems. While the film’s main focus was Manzhouguo’s impressive economic progress, the producers also depicted the many recent improvements in the daily lives of Manzhouguo’s people, both rural and urban, including the hardworking, yet contented Manchu farmers; studious, yet playful children “in the peak of condition,” as a result of the SMRC’s excellent recreational facilities; and well-­fed, well-­dressed workers. Because of Japanese investment, Manchurian cities had “every facility of modern life” and “the best in European architecture.” In one scene showing the streets of Dalian, the film’s narrator exclaims, “Modern? Just look at these buildings!” The film then shows the activities of Dalian’s active stock market while the narrator comments how Dalian’s business class is also known for setting trends in fashion worldwide.85 Perhaps in an attempt to entertain an Amer­ican audience, the film also shows examples of sports competitions and night life. In a segment introduced with the comment “Now, on the lighter side of the life of Manchuria,” the film shows several minutes of geisha dancing while the narrator explains the training each girl undertakes to become proficient in the complex choreography. Then the footage of the dancing girls speeds up and Amer­ican music is heard in the background. The narrator comments, “Now listen to this ragtime!” while

Figure 2.3  SMRC advertisement for its film studios. Source: SMRC, Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, Summer 1940, 2.

44   The South Manchuria Railway Company the geisha are mocked, their usually deliberate and calm routine set to fast-­ paced foreign music.86 The silent short film Manchukuo (Manchuria) (1938), a 16 mm black and white film, ten minutes and 50 seconds, produced by the Amer­ican company Eastman Classroom Films, uses much of the same footage seen in Manchukuo: The Newborn Empire. During the 1930s, the Eastman Kodak Company distributed silent films for educational purposes in an effort to get schools and theaters to buy its equipment. Eastman Kodak’s cooperation with the SMRC’s Manzhouguo Film Studio is apparent in the production of Manchukuo (Manchuria).87 The film introduces several scenes of parades, dance, and martial arts performances with the title card, “The Japanese celebrate the anniversary of their occupation of the country.” The vast numbers of onlookers appear happy, healthy, and well dressed, often in Western-­style clothing. (It is unlikely that an Amer­ican audience would know whether they were Japanese or Chinese.) Subsequent scenes identify the Japanese-­built modern buildings and other facilities, including trains, such as the SMR’s luxurious Asia Express, ocean liners, new factories, and updated farm equipment. Several themes emerge from the film: Manchurian cities were the sites of harmonious cooperation among Japanese, Chinese, Manchus, Russians, and other foreigners; Manchuria can be characterized as a place of prosperity and abundant resources; even during the Great Depression, the people of Manchuria had a surplus of sumptuous food; and workers and farmers were clean, happy, and remarkably well dressed. One segment introduced with the title card “Dinner is Served” shows a family dining on supersized dumplings and overfilled bowls of meat and vegetables. The film concludes with amusing and inspiring scenes from classrooms in boys’ and girls’ elementary schools where adorable Asian children are reading, reciting, and having fun. The final scenes depict the solemn and serious lives of young Buddhist monks who, like other segments of the Manchurian population shown in the film, apparently spend much of their time eating great food.88 The SMRC also delved into the business of trying to produce film “stars.” The early career of the immensely popular, internationally recognized actress and singer Li Xianglan (Yamaguchi Yoshiko) serves as a poignant example of Japanese attempts to win the hearts and minds of local and international audiences through entertainment industries. The daughter of an SMRC executive, Yamaguchi Fumio, born in Manchuria in 1920, Li, publicized as “a star of matchless beauty born in Manchuria,” came to be affectionately known as the “Manchurian Orchid” during the 1930s and 1940s. With her true ethnicity a well-­guarded state secret, Li was a superstar in a series of “Chinese continental friendship films,” first produced by the Manzhouguo film studios in which she often portrayed young Chinese women who fall in love with strong heroic Jap­ anese men. The storylines usually included the transition linguistically and musically from Chinese to Japanese, thus depicting assimilation in a positive light.89 Although obviously not aimed directly at Western audiences since the films were mostly in Chinese, they played an important role for Japanese propaganda—the commercial success of such films and the hit songs from their movie soundtracks

The South Manchuria Railway Company   45 among nationalistic Chinese audiences appeared to demonstrate the acceptance of pro-­Japanese themes. In 1939, the film studio’s official policy was described: It is best to let the film pose as a Chinese film, with absolutely no surface relation to Japan or Manchukuo [Manzhouguo]; [thus] to transform it into an enterprise of Chinese people. The Chinese who require [domestic products] can thus be hoodwinked and confused, and no matter what the shortcoming of the film in terms of content, it will certainly be accepted by them.90 Li Xianglan, called “The Judy Garland of Japan” by the 1930s in SMRC English-­language publicity, perhaps symbolized best the SMRC’s efforts at transforming Manzhouguo into paradise and convincing the world of the value of its mission; her film characters were content only when they came under the control of Japanese. Several of the songs she made popular are still sources of nostalgia for older Chinese and Japanese as well as hits among young Japanese in karaoke bars, but the Chinese government today remains hostile to the legacy of any SMRC enterprise. The soundtrack to Suzhou Nocturne (Soshu Yakyoku), recently used by a Japanese company to advertise Chinese tea, is banned from China. The song’s original lyrics describe the bonds of love between a Japanese sailor and a female Chinese guerilla fighter.91 In addition to the more popular movies featuring Li Xianglan, the Manzhouguo Motion Picture Corporation produced over 200 “motivational” films during the 1930s and early 1940s, many of which featured Manchuria’s exotic scenery as the backdrop to a fantasy of disciplined, modern life in a land of plenty. For example, during the Depression, the 1935 film Paradise: New Manchuria (Rakudo Shin Manshu) was viewed in many major Western cities, offering audiences a positive, if distorted, vision of conditions in China.92

“The recreation of all recreations”—baseball in Manzhouguo Several scenes of the SMRC’s propaganda film Manzhouguo: The Newborn Empire show lively and competitive baseball games in clean, manicured parks with numerous, well-­dressed fans, most in Western-­style clothing, cheering as players round the bases. The narrator explains:  The Amer­ican national game has taken root solidly. The natural alertness and wiriness of the Chinese and Japanese make them very good players, so much so that they are very often found to be giving our own boys a tough battle. The film invites Amer­icans to visit Manchuria, attend a game, and participate in “the recreation of all recreations.”93 Baseball may be considered “America’s pastime,” but its popularity spread quickly in Japan after the game was introduced by an Amer­ican teacher at

46   The South Manchuria Railway Company Tokyo’s Kaisei School in the early 1870s. A Japanese engineering student who studied in the U.S., Hiraoka Hiroshi, organized the first baseball team, the Shimbashi Athletic Club, with his co-­workers at Japan’s national railways in 1878. Soon other organizations created teams throughout Japan. The SMRC deserves credit for the spread of baseball to Manzhouguo. Railway crews were known to spend their free time playing the game and avid players routinely built diamonds in towns where they had been assigned to construct SMRC rails and stations. Several dozen parks with permanent baseball fields were established by the 1920s. Dalian alone had 19 baseball teams with Japanese players by 190894 and in 1935 a professional all-­Nisei team originating in California called the city its home.95 By the 1930s, Manchuria’s cities hosted several baseball tournaments, including those that welcomed visiting Japanese university teams, several Nisei teams as well as teams from Japan’s two colonies, Korea and Taiwan, and from the Philippines. Teams organized by schools, businesses, and other organizations routinely participated in competitions, including the annual All-­Manchukuo Championship.96 For the Manchus, baseball was a foreign Japanese import, but for Amer­icans reading about and watching the familiar game being played in Manzhouguo, its popularity was further evidence of the apparent similarities between the two cultures. John Gripentrog argues that “Japan’s enthusiastic embrace of baseball had a tangibly positive effect on popular Amer­ican perceptions, explicitly or implicitly reinforcing assumptions of the ‘good’ Japan.”97 The role of Nisei players in Manzhouguo was also significant; their ability to speak English well and their connections to their Amer­ican homes helped improve the region’s image for Amer­icans. Reporting on baseball games and other sports competitions, such as the obviously Western sports of tennis and golf, was yet another way for Jap­ anese writers to attempt to entice foreigners to visit Manzhouguo and, more importantly, convince Amer­icans of the positive qualities of their expansion into Manchuria.

Conclusion The SMRC’s promotion of trade and tourism in Manzhouguo through its English-­language publications and films was just one small part of Japan’s efforts at gaining international recognition and support for its colony, Manzhouguo, and for its subsequent, wider goals of colonizing additional Chinese territory. The creation of a Manchurian “paradise” from a land once characterized by the Japanese and other foreigners as corrupt, impoverished, and uncivilized was to be a preliminary step in the long-­range goal of spreading Japanese influence throughout Asia. The reality of life in Manzhouguo, of course, was quite different from what the propaganda portrayed. The Manchurian economy under Zhang Zuolin and his finance minister, Wang Yongjiang, had benefited from various development projects they had started that were separate from those sponsored by Japanese agencies in areas where they enjoyed the rights of extraterritoriality, but the nearly constant warfare among warlords in north China

The South Manchuria Railway Company   47 c­ ontributed to economic decline in the 1920s, even before the Great Depression impacted the area. The “pacification” achieved by the Japanese targeted and terrorized the population, including local leaders and their supporters, suspected of being anti-­Japanese. The policies of requiring internal passports and setting up segregated communities based on ethnicity undermined the idealism associated with the theme of “five races” living in harmony while the Manzhouguo puppet government did not in reality open the area to Western tourists as advertised. Furthermore, the claim that Japanese authorities attempted to combat the spread of opium use in areas it controlled is considered by most historians to be false. On the contrary, Manzhouguo became the center of drug smuggling and trafficking under Japanese control.98 Additionally, historians now agree that one of the key missions of the SMRC in Manchuria was to gather intelligence for the Jap­ anese government and its war effort. The SMRC’s Research Department, one intelligence-­gathering unit, boasted a staff of 2,345 at its height at the end of the 1930s.99 Yet, the publicity associated with the activities of the SMRC and other Japanese agencies helped create a debate among Amer­ican policymakers, academics, and business and religious leaders during the 1930s, at a time of isolationism and ignorance of Japan’s actual policies, over whether Japan’s imperialist goals in Asia should be supported or at least tolerated. When Roy H. Akagi, as a professor at Columbia University, reviewed several of the SMRC’s reports on progress in Manchuria for the Political Science Quarterly, he summarized the many positive features associated with the SMRC during the early 1930s: Towering over the remarkable achievements of the past quarter of a century in Manchuria, the South Manchuria Railway stands out monumentally, and the fascinating story of its formation, development and present manifold programs forms the central theme of the Report. Here are revealed, in words and figures and photographs, the various activities of that premier railway in the Far East: its historical and legal and financial background; its far-­flung railway enterprises which form the veritable backbone of the transportation system in South Manchuria and an indispensable link in the international traffic in the Far East; its extensive warehousing and harbor and dockyard works; its iron works at Anshan where poor thirty per cent iron ores are miraculously transformed into usable fifty-­five per cent iron ores at profit; its colliery at Fushun which boasts of the largest open-­cut coal mine in the world and its significant shale oil plants; its administration of and public services in the Railway Zone, and the cities and towns with modern facilities it has built therein; its experimental laboratories such as the Central Laboratory at Dairen [Dalian] where extensive research works are carried on to expand the uses of Manchurian products, and agricultural experimental stations and model farms where modern scientific methods are applied to help develop the Manchurian agricultural resources; its far-­reaching educational program, from kindergartens and primary schools to colleges and universities, for both Japanese and Chinese residents, together with numerous libraries; its penetrating hygienic services, radiating from eighteen hospitals

48   The South Manchuria Railway Company and six branches in all leading municipalities in South Manchuria, and health and sanitation projects, including the prevention of plagues; and its affiliated undertakings such as electric plants and gas works, hotel facilities and steamship lines.100 SMRC publicity aimed at Amer­icans, directly from the New York City office or indirectly from its supporters, was overwhelmingly positive; it encouraged a discussion about Amer­ican interests and activities in China while anti-­Japanese propaganda, focused on Japanese militarism and threats to Amer­ican interests, began to spread in the U.S. Soon other Japanese institutions arose that supplemented the kind of propaganda initiated by the SMRC for Manchuria. These organizations focused on what was happening to the south, in China proper, as the Chinese became engaged in full-­scale hostilities and eventually war with Japan.

Notes    1 See, for example, Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Summer 1940) (Tokyo: South Manchuria Railway Company, 1940), back cover.    2 The South Manchuria Railway Company, Fifth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936 (Dalian: South Manchuria Railway Company, 1936), 65.    3 See, for example, Joshua A. Fogel, Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society (London: Routledge, 2001); John Young, The Research Activities of the South Manchuria Railway Company, 1907–1945: A History and Bibliography (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).    4 The SMRC also maintained an overseas office in Paris.    5 “Peace and order” was the ubiquitous phrase used throughout SMRC literature to describe Japan’s aims as it funded development projects in Manchuria. See, for example, South Manchuria Railway Company, Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937 (Tokyo: Herald Press, 1937), 59.    6 Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 56r.    7 K.K. Kawakami, Manchoukuo, Child of Conflict (New York: Macmillan, 1933), vi.    8 K.K. Kawakami, Japan Speaks on the Sino-­Japanese Crisis (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 12.    9 The Guandong (Kwantung) Garrison was created in 1906 to secure the Guandong Leased Territory and areas near the South Manchuria Railway Zone—territories in northeast China won by Japan during the Russo-­Japanese War of 1904–1905. The garrison’s name was changed to Guandong Army following World War I.   10 Quoted in Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 34.   11 The South Manchuria Railway Company, Sixth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939 (Dalian: SMRC, 1939), 1.   12 For example, the Japanese also ignored certain international agreements, most of which were supported by the U.S., such as the Nine-­power Treaty on China, the Four-­Power Treaty concerning the Pacific Region, the Kellogg-­Briand Pact, and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The South Manchuria Railway Company   49   13 Thomas A. Bailey, “The Root–Takahira Agreement of 1908.” Pacific Historical Review 9, no. 1 (March 1940), 19.   14 Letter by Theodore Roosevelt to Senator Knox (1909), Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 120–126. www.mtholyoke.edu/ acad/intrel/trjapan.htm.   15 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 3–4.   16 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 6.   17 Roy H. Akagi, “Japan and the Open Door in Manchukuo.” Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science 168 (July 1933), 54.   18 C. Walter Young, “Sino-­Japanese Interests and Issues in Manchuria.” Pacific Affairs 1, no. 7 (December 1928), 1. Moreover, the Tokyo government had not ordered the assassination of Zhang. There were several members of the Tanaka administration who favored placing Zhang Xueliang in a position to replace his father. See, Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 50–52.   19 “Sino-­Japanese Interests and Issues in Manchuria,” 5.   20 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 5.   21 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 5; K.K. Kawakami, Manchukuo: Child of Conflict (New York: MacMillan, 1933).   22 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 8.   23 Yamamuro, 161.   24 Sandra Wilson, “Containing the Crisis: Japan’s Diplomatic Offensive in the West, 1931–1933.” Modern Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (May, 1995), 360–361. Also included in Wilson’s study are quotations from various Amer­ican officials and diplomats suggesting disagreement at the highest levels in the U.S. government over whether the U.S. should be pro-­Japan or pro-­China at this time.   25 Roger Daniels, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Road to the New Deal, 1882–1939 (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 290.   26 “The New Deal in Japanese–Amer­ican Relations.” The Literary Digest (June 17, 1933), 12.   27 “The New Deal in Japanese–Amer­ican Relations.”   28 Tim Wright, “The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression.” Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 5 (September, 2007), 1078–1079.   29 Norton S. Ginsberg, “Ch’ang-ch’un.” Economic Geography 23, no. 4 (October 1947), 301; See also, Michael Meyer, In Manchuria: A Village Called Wasteland and the Transformation of Rural China (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015).   30 Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 35.   31 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 274.   32 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 81, 83.   33 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 79.   34 Ginsberg, 267–268.   35 Tsuneishi Keiichi, “Unit 731 and the Japanese Imperial Army’s Biological Warfare Program,” trans. John Junkerman. The Asia-­Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (January 2011), www.japan.focus.org; Matthew Penney, “Unit 731 and Preserving the History of Wartime Medical Atrocities.” The Asia- Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (January 18, 2011), www.japan.focus.org; See also, Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1943, and the Amer­ican Cover-­up (London: Routledge, 1994).   36 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937.   37 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937. Loans had been procured by Zhang’s Finance Minister, Wang Yongjiang, during the 1920s for development projects.   38 Shimizu Teruo, Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly (Summer 1940), 7.

50   The South Manchuria Railway Company   39 Shimizu Teruo.   40 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 54.   41 Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 28; Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 54.   42 Shimizu Teruo, 7.   43 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 15–16.   44 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 30.   45 Roy H. Akagi was an able and vocal spokesperson for Japan’s pro-­expansion policies. He was well connected in Amer­ican academic circles having been educated at the Universities of California, Chicago, and Pennsylvania.   46 See, for example, Roy H. Akagi, “Japan and the Open Door in Manchukuo.” Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science 168 (July 1933), 54–63; Roy H. Akagi, “Future of Amer­ican Trade with Manchukuo.” Annals of the Amer­ ican Academy of Political and Social Science 211 (September 1940), 138–143.   47 Akagi, “Japan and the Open Door in Manchukuo,” 55–56. Akagi’s reference to the “international reality” that was Manzhouguo was meant as a criticism of the U.S. policy of non-­recognition of Manzhouguo’s independence.   48 Akagi, “Japan and the Open Door in Manchukuo,” 62.   49 SMRC, Sixth Report, 97.   50 SMRC, Sixth Report, 97   51 SMRC, Sixth Report, 97.   52 Haruo Iguchi, Unfinished Business: Ayukawa Yoshisuke and U.S.–Japan Relations, 1937–1963 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 58.   53 Haruo Iguchi, 58–59.   54 SMRC, Sixth Report, 161.   55 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 75, 78.   56 Ginsberg, 290.   57 SMRC, Sixth Report, 116.   58 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 54.   59 SMRC, Sixth Report, 138.   60 SMRC, Sixth Report, 137.   61 SMRC, Sixth Report, 130.   62 SMRC, Sixth Report.   63 SMRC, Sixth Report, 132.   64 SMRC, Sixth Report, 116.   65 SMRC, Sixth Report, 117.   66 Young, 278.   67 Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 55–57.   68 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 67–68; See also Young, 265.   69 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 59; SMRC, Sixth Report, 20.   70 Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937, 59–60.   71 SMRC, Sixth Report, 20.   72 SMRC, Sixth Report, 20.   73 SMRC, Sixth Report, 20–21.   74 SMRC, Sixth Report, 21.   75 Answering Question on Manchuria, 1937, 62.   76 SMRC, Sixth Report, 18.   77 R.G. Tiedemann, “The Persistence of Banditry: Incidents in Border Districts of the North China Plain.” Modern China 8, no. 4 (October, 1982), 395–433.   78 Horace M. Masuda, Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 32.   79 Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 32.   80 Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, iv.   81 Robert Murphy, “Pioneer Aspects in Manchuria.” Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 54.

The South Manchuria Railway Company   51 Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 29–30. Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 28. Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly, 33. SMRC, Beaux Art Productions, Manchukuo: The Newborn Empire (1939). Prelinger Archive (San Francisco), www.archive.org/details/manchukuo_the_newborn_empire.   86 Manchukuo: The Newborn Empire.   87 Paul Saettler, The Evolution of Amer­ican Education Technology, 2nd edn. (Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 115.   88 Eastman Classroom Films, “Manchukuo (Manchuria)” (1938). Available on the internet from on several sites, including YouTube.   89 Yimen Wang, “Between the National and the Transnational: Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Pan-­Asianism.” IIAS Newsletter, no. 38 (September 2005), 7.   90 Shelley Stephenson, “A Star by Any Other Name: The (After) Lives of Li Xianglan.” Quarterly Review of Film and Video 19, (2002), 1–13.   91 After the war, Li Xianglan (Ri Koran) or Yamaguchi Yoshiko narrowly escaped execution by the Guomindang for treason. After spending nine months in a Shanghai prison camp, Li was spared after she convinced authorities that she was actually not Chinese by producing her birth certificate smuggled into Shanghai by a Chinese family friend. She was deported to Japan at the end of World War II where she continued her acting career there and later in the U.S. under the name Shirley Yamaguchi. Yamaguchi was one of the first native Japanese women to play leading roles in Amer­ican movies. She starred in Japanese War Bride (1952) and other films. She later returned to Japan and became the anchor on a popular political talk show. From 1974 to 1992, she served as a member of parliament. In a 1989 interview for the Chicago Tribune she disclosed that efforts to produce a film about her life have met with resistance by the Chinese government. Yamaguchi died in Tokyo in 2014. (See, Megan McDonough, “Yoshiko ‘Shirley’ Yamaguchi, Actress, Dies at 94.” Washington Post, September 15, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com).   92 See, Hanae Kurihara Kramer, “Film Forays of the South Manchuria Railway Company.” Film History 24, no. 1 (2012), 97–113.   93 Manchukuo: The Newborn Empire.   94 Joseph A. Reaves, Taking in a Game: A History of Baseball in Asia (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 42.   95 Robert Elias, Baseball and the Amer­ican Dream (London: Routledge, 2001), 127.   96 Reaves, 42; John J. Stephan, “Hijacked by Utopia: Amer­ican Nisei in Manchuria.” Amerasia Journal 23, no. 3 (Winter, 1997–1998), pp. 1–42.   97 John Gripentrog, “The Transnational Pastime: Baseball and Amer­ican Perceptions of Japan in the 1930s.” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010), 251.   98 See, for example, John M. Jennings, The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia 1895–1945 (Westwood, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997).   99 Akihiko Maruya, The South Manchuria Railway Company as an Intelligence Organization (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 3. 100 Roy H. Akagi, “Review of Third Report on Progress in Manchuria: 1907–1932.” Political Science Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1933), 285–287.

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3 The America–Japan Society and the Sino-­Japanese conflict

The America–Japan Society’s (Nichi-­Bei Kyōkai) mission is “to promote understanding and enlightened relations between the United States and Japan.”1 Its primary Amer­ican branch located in New York City and its Tokyo counterpart were founded in 1917, but smaller associations promoting friendship between the two nations, in California for example, had been organized even earlier. Today there are dozens of local branches in both Japan and the U.S. under the umbrella of the America–Japan Society’s main headquarters. The Society remains an active private, non-­profit organization whose membership is comprised of both individual and corporate members from both countries. It hosts a variety of programs, such as social events, civic functions, scholarship programs, educational exchanges, horticultural exhibits, and sports programs, with the goal of building and maintaining trust between Amer­icans and Japanese.2 The Society was established during World War I, one week after the U.S. and Japan became official allies as a result of the U.S.’s declaration of war on Germany on April 6, 1917. (Japan declared war on Germany on August 23, 1914.) Yet tensions between the two nations were high, the result of conflicting roles and objectives for China at the time. President Woodrow Wilson had openly denounced Japan’s advances into China at the outset of World War I when Tokyo presented “Twenty-­one Demands” (Treaty of 1915) to the Beijing government of Yuan Shikai. Japan’s attempts to take over segments of China’s economy defied Washington’s “Open Door” policy for China.3 The two allies’ incompatible ambitions in China continued to be a source of growing hostility. Consequently, on April 13, 1917, a group of Japanese intellectuals in Tokyo met with like-­minded Amer­icans living in Japan to form a private organization aimed at preventing a deterioration of bilateral ties. The original founders envisioned an organization that would serve as a “window for diplomacy and business interests”4 for the two nations. The Society became a forum to discuss “differences between the peoples of the two countries,”5 foster trust, and attempt to resolve conflicts in order to encourage close commercial ties. Count Kaneko Kentarō, Japan’s first Harvard graduate, was selected as the Society’s first president. He was a long-­time supporter of close relations with the U.S. In 1900, he had founded the first America Friendship Society (Beiyu Kyōkai). Kaneko consistently spoke against war with the U.S. and continued to serve as honorary president of the America–Japan Society until his death

The America–Japan Society   53 in 1942. Roland Sletor Morris, U.S. ambassador to Japan from 1917 to 1920, was first honorary president. Society members included Japanese royalty, as well as diplomats, politicians, businessmen, religious leaders, and educators from both countries. The membership remained active, continuing the Society’s work, even during World War II. The years leading up to the outbreak of the Pacific War presented the America–Japan Society members with some daunting challenges.

Reporting on the situation in China In late 1937, the America–Japan Society published its first volume of the America– Japan Society Bulletin, printed in Tokyo and distributed in the U.S. through several offices in New York (527 Fifth Avenue), Boston (8 Arlington Street), Chicago (850 Lake Shore Drive), Seattle (Skinner Building), Portland, Oregon (824 W. Fifth Avenue), San Francisco (Fairmont Hotel), Santa Barbara (1741 Prospect Avenue), Los Angeles (800 Central Building), and New Orleans (1326 Whitney-­Central Building). The bulletin served as one of the primary mechanisms for disseminating information to the U.S. as well as to English readers in Japan and other countries. It reported on Society functions and projects, provided information on committee activities, analyzed the state of Japanese college-­level curricula in the U.S., informed readers of the latest English-­ language publications on Japan, listed the various English-­language speeches by members broadcast on overseas radio programs, and critiqued results and scores from various sports competitions. In addition to summarizing the procedures of various meetings and events, several volumes, including the first, provided news, updates, and explanations of Japan’s side in the Sino-­Japanese conflict. The premier edition, whose editors were Amer­icans living in Japan, appeared a few months following the July 7, 1937, Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Battle of Lugou Bridge) near Beijing, the event considered the commencement of the Second Sino-­Japanese War; it is doubtful that the timing of the publication was coincidental. The bulletin’s first volume’s feature article focused on the Panay Incident, an event among the early battles leading to Japan’s capture of China’s coastal urban centers, which further inflamed anti-­Japanese sentiment in the U.S. and may have served as a turning point for Amer­ican policy toward Japan. The Amer­ican gunboat USS Panay, part of the U.S.’s Asian fleet, moored on the Yangzi River outside of China’s capital city, Nanjing, was sunk by Japanese dive-­bombers on December 12, 1937. Two died and 48 were injured as a result of the attack. The Tokyo government claimed its pilots did not see the ship’s Amer­ican flags and immediately apologized and paid the entire amount demanded by Washington, $2,214,007 (about 6,700,000 yen) as restitution.6 The president of the America– Japan Society in 1937, Prince Tokugawa Iyesato, prefaced the Society’s bulletin’s first edition with an expression of regret and a copy of the message of sympathy he cabled to Secretary of State Cordell Hull three days after the Panay’s sinking. Tokugawa’s note was followed by the Amer­ican response penned by U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, a member and honorary

54   The America–Japan Society president of the America–Japan Society. Grew wrote: “We rejoice that the people of America and Japan have expressed in unmistakable manner their desire and determination that nothing shall harm the cause of peaceful relations between our two countries.”7 In addition, the America–Japan Society collected 16,242.56 yen from 7,749 individuals and 218 organizations for a “Condolence Fund for the Sufferers of the ‘Panay’ Incident.” The check for the total contribution was sent to Ambassador Grew on February 12, 1938.8 In May, the Society announced the establishment of a foundation named the Japan–America Trust as more money flowed in for the victims of the Panay. The trust fund, headed by Society president, Tokugawa, Ambassador Grew, and a third person of their choice, was to be used “for the promotion of Japanese–Amer­ican relations.” The third trustee in 1938 was Episcopal bishop Charles Shriver Reifsnider, a missionary and church leader in Japan at the time.9 The America–Japan Society’s account of a seemingly effortless settlement to the Panay issue, in particular, the cordial correspondence between Prince Tokugawa and Ambassador Grew, hid the tension behind earlier moves by the U.S. government to warn Tokyo to stay away from the Panay and the Amer­icans in Nanjing. The incident further damaged already stressed U.S.–Japan relations. On November 30, 1937, Secretary of State Hull sent Ambassador Grew the following telegram, asking for assistance in protecting Amer­icans in China’s capital as Japanese troops approached the city: The Amer­ican Embassy at Nanking [Nanjing] reports that there remain at Nanking about 40 Amer­icans including 5 members of the Embassy staff who are at the Embassy. The USS Panay is also at Nanking. It is understood that a number of Amer­icans together with a number of other nationals are being accommodated on Jardine Matheson and Company’s hulk which lies 4 miles up river from the Nanking Bund. Please bring the above to the attention of the Japanese Foreign Office with the request that the appropriate Japanese military and naval authorities be promptly notified.10 On December 7, the U.S. second secretary of the embassy in China, George Atcheson, reported to Hull that the Amer­ican embassy at Nanjing urged all Amer­icans, including embassy staff, to board the Panay after its captain offered to shelter every remaining Amer­ican in Nanjing as Japanese forces began to close in on the area.11 Atcheson reported two days later that he was warned by China’s Defense Command that conditions had deteriorated to the point where he and his staff should not leave the Panay to return to the embassy, a directive he ignored. Japanese troops were deployed about 17 miles southeast of Nanjing at the time.12 But later that day, December 9, after Atcheson returned to the Panay at 3:00 p.m., he sent an urgent appeal to Washington and several U.S. consular offices in China asking for assistance in communicating the Panay’s

The America–Japan Society   55 position to the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Japanese aircraft continued to bomb Nanjing’s waterfront; several explosions hit within 200 feet of the ship.13 On the evening of December 9, the Panay moved two miles up-­river, away from the bombing sites of that day, but close to three Amer­ican ships owned by Standard Oil. Two days later, Japan’s ambassador communicated to U.S. officials in China that all Amer­icans should evacuate from Nanjing.14 After many attempts to contact the Panay on December 12, word was received on the following day from Admiral Harry E. Yarnell that the ship had been bombed. Eyewitness accounts verified Amer­icans’ claims that the Japanese deliberately targeted the Panay, along with three Standard Oil ships deployed on the Yangzi River. Additionally, the U.S. ambassador in China, Nelson T. Johnson, reported to Secretary of State Hull on December 12 that he had been told that the Japanese had informed the British at Wuhu, about 50 miles southwest of Nanjing on the Yangzi, on that same day, that the Japanese military had orders to fire on all ships on the Yangzi River.15 Meanwhile, the Japanese command in China attempted to refute the allegations. In a conversation between Admiral Yarnell and Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi, commander of Japan’s Third Fleet in China, on December 21, Yarnell reported that he told Admiral Hasegawa that he could not understand how Japanese naval planes flying over Nanjing for months with U.S. gunboats present were unable to recognize the Panay. According to Yarnell, Hasegawa replied that “there was much confusion, his planes acting on army information.”16 The attack on the Panay infuriated those in the Roosevelt administration who began to contemplate punishing Japan by considering imposing an economic blockade, an act many considered tantamount to declaring war on Japan.17 Meanwhile, Congress, still filled with a significant and vocal number of isolationists, proposed the Ludlow Resolution, which called for a national referendum on any declaration of war, unless the U.S. were attacked, before Congress could vote to declare war. While there was fear among certain isolationists that the fate of the Panay would cause the Roosevelt administration to call for war, anti-­Japanese sentiment exploded in Amer­ican media. Furthermore, isolationist sentiment in Congress was denounced by several of Roosevelt’s advisors, including Henry L. Stimson, former secretary of state and future secretary of war, and secretary of the interior, Harold Ickes. Meanwhile, Roosevelt postponed taking action asserting that he needed more definitive information, including films, explaining what had happened. According to Robert Smith Thompson, one effective source of information about the Panay was produced by cinematographer Norman Alley who released a 22-minute newsreel, “Bombing of USS Panay,” in late 1937. As an eyewitness to the attack, he helped silence pro-­Japanese and anti-­war sentiment. The Roosevelt administration began making plans to limit trade with Japan with the aim to eventually establish an economic boycott.18

Promoting business during tense times The members of the America–Japan Society, on the other hand, continued to pursue the daunting challenge of improving U.S.–Japan relations. Having

56   The America–Japan Society announced the resolution of the Panay Incident in the first edition of volume two of the Society’s bulletin, the editors devoted several articles to examining Amer­ ican perceptions of the “North China Affair,” the phrase frequently used in the Society and other Japanese publications to denote the ongoing war in China. Since one of the Society’s primary missions was to promote bilateral trade and investment, the Sino-­Japanese conflict, even before the sinking of the Panay, served as a potential deterrent to stable commercial relations between Japan and the U.S. Society members focused their discussions on a variety of concerns: Amer­ican public opinion, the possibility of boycotts against Japanese products, and apprehension over any deterioration of political or economic ties. Their task was to maintain the appearance, if not the reality, of continued close relations. Members even went so far as to suggest that “elaborate [social] functions should not be undertaken by the Society”19 while the conflict in China continued because of any negative publicity that may impact commercial relations. Business-­as-usual, especially continued commercial ties, was the goal. In April 1937, the Amer­ican Economic Mission, a Japanese trade group, began a successful eight-­month tour of Amer­ican cities to secure trade agreements and ease economic tensions. The excursion reciprocated a 1934 visit to Japan by an Amer­ican business delegation headed by former U.S. ambassador to Japan, William Cameron Forbes. Its accomplishments were lauded at a Society luncheon in November 1937 where U.S. Consul-­General Charles R. Cameron spoke of the “two great manufacturing nations, facing each other on the Pacific, maintaining the trade and economic relations which should characterize good neighbors.”20 But while the trade mission was visiting Amer­ican cities, the Jap­ anese army began its move south into China from Manzhouguo. Although Cameron omitted any reference to China in his address at the luncheon, Society president, Tokugawa, whose speech followed Cameron’s, specifically spoke of “the current China Affair” and reminded the audience of the “fast changing” international situation in Asia. He also added, “Fortunately the relations between the United States and Japan have not been affected to any appreciable degree.”21 His opinions were supported by Economic Mission head, Kadono Chokyūrō, who reported that the “Amer­ican friends” he had met throughout the U.S. were sympathetic to Japan’s actions in China.22 China was also the main topic of discussion at the Society’s annual general meeting on December 1, 1937, presided over by Ken Muto, managing director of a subsidiary of the British Dunlop Rubber Company. Muto referenced the war by acknowledging the gravity of the situation for the Japanese army in China and calling for “prudence and careful study.” At that time, Society members would have heard disturbing reports about the high costs of Japan’s victory over Chinese government forces in what is now called the Battle of Shanghai (August 13, 1937–November 26, 1937; Battle of Songhu, for the Chinese), one of the bloodiest battles of the war. Since their initial attack on the city in August, Jap­ anese ground troops had met fierce resistance. Shanghai was secured for Japan by the Imperial Army in mid-­November, but only after the city was bombarded by Japan’s navy. Troops were then in position to advance toward Nanjing,

The America–Japan Society   57 China’s capital, by December 1. International news agencies, well represented in their territorial concessions in China’s largest coastal city, had reported on the horrors of the fighting. Discussions of the war put Society members in the difficult situation of trying to assess and respond to reports of Japanese atrocities. They were particularly concerned about readers in the U.S., where much of the press coverage appeared to be pro-­China. In response, Kanzaki Kiichi, dean at Kwansai Gakuin, a Christian university, reported his observations from a recent tour of the U.S. Kanzaki noted that “the labor element, women, and religious organizations” in the U.S. were opposed to Japan’s presence in China, but “there were also a large element who understood and sympathized with Japan.”23 (Kanzaki was most likely referring to the attempt by several Amer­ican women’s and religious organizations, which had organized a controversial, highly public boycott of Japanese silk in 1937.)24 Similar sentiments were reported by Dr. Ashida Hitoshi, president of the English-­language Japan Times and member of the House of Representatives (for Kyoto Third District), who spoke at a Society luncheon in March 1938. By that time, reports of the successful capture of Nanjing as well as the circumstances of what would be called the Nanjing Massacre that took place for about six weeks beginning in mid-­December 1937 would have been available, though most likely censored, to Society members. Ashida claimed that in his talks with many “important men” in the U.S. who carefully followed developments in Asia, he learned that, unlike labor groups that held anti-­Japanese demonstrations in Amer­ican cities, these men were convinced of the “sincerity” of Japan’s China policy. The Amer­ican leaders he encountered, mostly business leaders with ties to Japan, said that they believed that the Japanese government had no territorial ambitions in China, and would continue to adhere to the “Open Door” policy supported by the U.S. and respect the economic rights of Third Powers in China.25 Yet another Society bulletin article reported the results of a 1937 survey of editors from 504 large Amer­ican newspapers conducted by the British Sutton News Service. The overwhelming majority of newspaper editors opposed any form of boycott against Japanese products. According to the survey, a majority also answered “yes” to questions asking whether they thought efforts should be made to promote closer ties with Japan.26 In February 1938, Society members celebrated the success of the Japan– America Friendship Mass Meeting, a Tokyo rally with over 4,000 in attendance held “to coalesce the national feeling of gratitude toward the United States for adhering to strict neutrality from the outset of the Sino-­Japanese hostilities.”27 News of the rally was telegrammed to President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, and several members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. But as the war wore on and Japan took control of more Chinese territory, potentially threatening foreign interests, discussions at various Society events went beyond reporting perceived Amer­ican reactions and dealt with the reasons why the Jap­ anese were justified in moving into China. Journalist Takaishi Shingoro, editor-­ in-chief of two major newspapers, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi and the Osaka Mainichi, both of which often featured English-­language sections, explained the

58   The America–Japan Society prevailing Japanese position for Society members following his return from a goodwill tour of the U.S. in early 1938: [W]e in Japan are aspiring to develop the Far East in the same way the Amer­ican people developed their continent in the past century and I think it is up to us to see that we contribute toward the world’s progress and prosperity in the same way the Amer­ican people did by creating the New World civilization.28 Takaishi concluded with an optimistic scenario for the future of U.S.–Japan relations: My four months’ experience in America has taught me that Amer­icans are sympathetic and understanding about our aspiration. Of course the Amer­ ican belief in the maintenance of status quo peace is apt to prevent Amer­ icans from giving us their whole-­hearted approval to our methods used in the process of bringing about change and readjustment in the Far East, but it is my firm belief that if we succeed in making the Far East more stabilized and prosperous, it will not be very long before Amer­icans will be offering their hands of cooperation. I have returned from America feeling that it is our responsibility to bring about as soon as possible conditions in the Far East to invite Amer­ican cooperation. If I have any words to offer you it is this appeal to unite in making the Far East more stabilized and prosperous.29 Takaishi’s message was repeated by Baron Okura Kishichiro, head of Okura Industries and self-­proclaimed admirer of “Amer­icans as industrialists,” at a Society luncheon in March 1938. Okura had recently returned from a trip abroad and reported on an interview he gave to the Los Angeles Times several weeks earlier where he commented: To develop North China is a big undertaking. On my trip across the United States I got to thinking about the remarkable development of the Amer­ican West in so short a space of time. In the development of Northern China for the first thing, of course, is an understanding between the Chinese and the Japanese. Then, Amer­ican objections because of sympathy for the Chinese in the present difficulty would naturally disappear. I think such an accord between the Chinese and Japanese is possible when our intentions are better understood. Japan will stand for an open market in Central China.30 Ambassador to the U.S., Horinouchi Kensuke, appealed for continued “harmonious relations” between the U.S. and Japan in an address before Society members on November 22, 1938. Horinouchi detailed Japan’s plans to bring “peace and order throughout East Asia” by facilitating the “political, economic

The America–Japan Society   59 and cultural cooperation of Japan, Manchoukuo and China” and hoped for the participation of the U.S. in creating a “new era for the ultimate benefit of the entire world.”31 Count Kabayama Aisuke, the Society’s vice-­president and one of its earliest enthusiastic supporters, repeated a similar theme when he asked Amer­ican guests at a Society luncheon honoring Dr. Frederick Robinson, former president of the College of the City of New York, “to observe the new constructive forces now in motion in the Far East,” especially “the amazing results of seven years of progressive nation-­building activities in Manchoukuo” and “the vast reconstruction projects already under way in North China.”32 In December 1938, Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō spoke at the luncheon honoring the return to Japan of Brigadier General and Mrs. Charles Burnett, former military attaché of the Amer­ican embassy in Tokyo and long-­time residents of Japan. The Burnetts were on vacation leave from his post in the Philippines and chose to reconnect with the members of the America–Japan Society, a group with which they had had close ties while residing in Tokyo. In his address, Nomura, like Okura earlier, stressed what he deemed to be the similarities in Japanese and Amer­ican development when he compared Japan’s policies of the 1930s in China to the Monroe Doctrine and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy: But you may recollect conditions in your country, when President Monroe issued that famous declaration. Now Japan is very similarly circumstanced. We aspire to be a stabilizing factor in this corner of the world, and we are afraid that China, allied with foreign powers politically, above all, militarily, may be very dangerous to the very existence of this country and consequently disturb the peace of the Far East. Therefore, Japan wants to live with China on good terms and wishes to be sure that no other power will establish any more naval, military or air bases in China in the future. That is the cardinal point, we most ardently desire. I know that the Monroe Doctrine, Pan-­Amer­icanism of the recently famous good-­neighbor policy will never tolerate any foreign power building such bases in the neighborhood of the United States.33 The recurring theme in Japan’s China policy expressed by Takaishi, Okura, Horinouchi, and Nomura—that Japan was the carrier of peace and civilization to China—was consistent with aims expressed in the publicity of other Japanese propaganda organizations and reflected official government statements during the 1930s. The Society’s publications appeared to comply with views demanded by the CID, established in September 1937. At about the same time, the bulletin’s original Amer­ican editors were replaced with Japanese. Tokyo’s publicly stated goals for China included stability, prosperity, development, and progress, all of which would benefit the rest of the “civilized” world. Japanese members of the America–Japan Society spoke frequently of Japan’s positive ambitions. What is perhaps more surprising is that the organization’s Amer­ican members and supporters echoed similar sentiments in their comments published in the Society’s bulletins.

60   The America–Japan Society In June 1938, Major-­General James G. Harbord, former second in command of U.S. Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War  I and chair of the Radio Corporation of America, spoke at a Society luncheon. He praised Japan’s progress of the previous three decades during which the country “changed from an agricultural peasant nation to one of the most highly industrialized empires of all time.” Then Harbord asserted that Japan was under stress: The old island home remains the same size and for every two million people who die each year, three million Japanese babies are born. There come times in the life of Nations as with individuals when self preservation seems the first law.” He concluded by asking Japan’s “friends” to avoid criticizing Japan’s actions in China.34 In February 1939, Carroll P. Lunt, an Amer­ican writer and the editor of China Digest and Spotlite, both based in Shanghai, spoke at a Society luncheon in Tokyo on the topic, “The China Situation as it affects Japanese–Amer­ican Relations.” Lunt offered a naively optimistic outlook for the future of U.S.–Japan relations even after admitting that the two countries’ interests in China “seem to be at variance.”35 His address focused on the concerns of Amer­ican businessmen and missionaries who worried that their activities in China could be restricted by Japanese authorities there despite efforts from Tokyo to guarantee respect for Third Power interests in China. Lunt pointed out what he considered to be the many positive changes the Japanese army’s “energetic advance in China” should bring about: [T]he Japanese believe that this year in the occupied areas of China trains will run, farmers will plough the good earth and the Chinese will continue to govern themselves in the immemorial way. The Japanese will make a strenuous and on the whole benevolent effort to increase wealth by developing the production of raw materials. If their major wants are satisfied they will not interfere in administration. If this materializes in 1939, as the Japanese believe it will, there does not seem to be any reason why their activities should cause so much concern to Third Power nationals resident in China.36 On the other hand, Lunt also mentioned “movements afoot” by Japanese in China, “while not on too large or important a scale as yet,” that could cause setbacks to Japan’s relationship with the U.S., such as “terrorist activities in Shanghai, the closing of the Yangtse [Yangzi] River, Japanese exchange and raw material control in North China.”37 Yet he suggested that through diplomacy and “fine statesmanship,” conflict between Washington and Tokyo could be averted. There was “room for a reassessment of the Amer­ican position,” he continued, since Amer­ican business interests in China were so much less than with Japan— accounting for a mere 3 percent of the U.S.’s foreign trade. He also implied that

The America–Japan Society   61 the Amer­ican policy of the “Open Door” in China was outdated and that the Roosevelt administration should realize that Japan’s “New Order must prevail in East Asia.… The Japanese believe that a settlement of the China affair that confirms this New Order is imperative, that it is a matter of life or death to them.”38 Most Amer­icans who spoke at America–Japan Society functions during the 1930s did not suggest specific changes to Amer­ican policy, but openly advocated continued friendship between the two nations and optimistically expressed the hope that a break between the two could be avoided. At their various gatherings Society members consistently emphasized one theme: the economic interdependence of the U.S. and Japan. Consequently, they tried to facilitate continued economic cooperation, frequently reiterating trade statistics that illustrated the vibrant trade between the two nations.39 They supported, for example, the amicable, if one-­sided, settlement of “the ticklish Alaskan salmon fishing problem” that had vexed both governments for years. After the Tokyo government agreed to suspend the licensing of Japanese vessels that fished in contested areas, Jap­ anese fishing in Alaskan off-­shore waters was limited. The Society also gave its wholehearted backing to a number of trade missions sent abroad to drum up business with Amer­ican and European companies throughout the 1930s. Many members of the Tokyo-­sponsored business excursions, including Kadono Chokyuro, leader of the 1937 Economic Mission to the U.S. and Europe, and Kashiwagi Hideshige, a banker who had resided in New York City and had been a member of the Japan Society of New York since 1907, participated in Society activities. Upon their return to Tokyo, the Society sponsored a variety of social functions to honor their efforts. The Amer­ican speakers at these get-­togethers lauded Japan’s accomplishments and spoke of continued economic bonds, while for the most part avoiding controversial political commentary. At a Society luncheon on November 15, 1937, in honor of returnees from one of Japan’s trade missions to the U.S., President Tokugawa and U.S. Consul-­General Cameron congratulated the Economic Mission’s head, Kadono Chokyuro, and its members for their success in promoting goodwill and closer ties. Cameron then reported on the state of Japanese–Amer­ican trade. He noted a recent increase in Amer­ican business with Japan, the result of Japanese and Amer­ican manufacturers working to “harmonize their interests” with “private and voluntary agreements.”40 Months later, in March 1938, a Society “welcome home” luncheon was held for recent visitors to the U.S. and attended by U.S. Ambassador Grew. Discussions centered on specific opportunities forthcoming for Amer­ican companies that chose to work with Japanese firms in China’s development. Baron Okura Kishichiro, head of Japan’s “vast Okura industrial and financial empire,” spoke of his corporation’s mission to develop North China with “foreign cooperation and assistance.” He added that he had in the past purchased steel milling equipment from Amer­ican firms and that he anticipated buying considerable amounts of heavy industrial machinery as well as road building and communications equipment from the U.S. for use in China.41

62   The America–Japan Society

Football diplomacy Another of the America–Japan Society’s missions has been to promote good relations through sports exchanges. In the years leading up to World War  II, Society members were active in a variety of initiatives they hoped would lead to greater acceptance of Japan as a leader in the world of sports while also bringing Amer­icans and Japanese closer. Promoting the introduction of Amer­ican football to Japan was one such endeavor and members of the America–Japan Society were at the forefront. Moreover, Japanese interest in football expanded, the number of exhibition games increased, and sports exchanges continued even while the war in China intensified. (Football games were suspended only after the declaration of war by the U.S. against Japan, but resumed soon after the war’s end.) The Society’s first bulletin featured a lengthy article devoted to the history and future of football in Japan. Football had arrived in Japan just three years earlier in 1934 when the manager of the Department of Physical Education at Tokyo’s Rikkyo University (also called St. Paul’s University) and former University of Ohio player, George Marshall, met with interested students from Rikkyo, Waseda, and Meiji Universities. Soon after, the Tokyo Intercollegiate League was set up under the chairship of Paul Rusch, a Rikkyo University professor and long-­time member of the America–Japan Society. Rusch soon earned the moniker “the father of Japanese football.” The first football game was played at the Meiji Shrine Stadium on November 29, 1934, a day chosen for symbolic purposes—Thanksgiving Day in the U.S., the day when many Amer­ican high schools and colleges hold important or season-­ending games. Attendees included members of the Japanese royal family, U.S. Ambassador Grew, and the Amer­ ican embassy staff. One team was comprised of students from Rikkyo, Waseda, and Meiji Universities; the other was a team from the Yokohama Country and Athletic Club. Among the first college coaches in Japan were staff from the Amer­ican embassy, including Lieutenants Alexander George and Merritt Booth as well as Rikkyo University professors George Marshall and Earl Fowler. By 1937, the league expanded to five university teams—Waseda, Meiji, Rikkyo, Keio, and Hosei—that played for a championship title. Additional universities outside of the Tokyo league started their own teams and the Thanksgiving Day Game became an annual event marking the end of the Japanese collegiate football season. Beginning in 1935, the Tokyo Collegiate League organized an all-­star team to tour the U.S. to compete against high school all-­stars and to play Amer­ican college all-­stars in Japan. As attendance at games increased and Japanese high schools began hosting exhibition games, Society members expressed their optimism about football’s future in Japan. Paul Rusch spoke enthusiastically at a Society meeting in March 1938, where he predicted a profitable future for football in Japan. Rusch commented, “The sport is only five years old and it has supported itself. Why, last year all the conference teams had to the good a profit of 400 yen. Not bad, eh?”42

The America–Japan Society   63 America–Japan Society bulletins routinely featured the results of various games and championship contests, but Society members did note that Japanese college football players faced restrictions their Amer­ican counterparts often did not: “In Japan hero worship of the star players is not encouraged to insure the real values of team-­work and less distraction of the student players from their educational pursuits.”43 Some members wondered if such differences would limit participation. Nevertheless, in 1939 the bulletin optimistically reported that “the great game of football is now firmly rooted in Japan.”44 Other sports competitions also served as opportunities for the spread of goodwill and were welcome topics at Society meetings. In the summer of 1938, six Amer­ican free-­style wrestlers toured Japan, taking part in exhibition matches in Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, and Nagoya. Members of the America–Japan Society greeted the wrestlers at a “sukiyaki party” hosted by the Dai-­Nippon Amateur Wrestling Association where they announced their continued support for annual wrestling tournaments. The tournament’s organizers proposed that the Society help promote the Pan-­Pacific Free-­Style Wrestling Championship scheduled for Japan in 1941. Wrestlers from Australia, Canada, China, Hawaii, Japan, Manzhouguo, the Philippines, and the U.S. were scheduled to participate,45 but with World War II underway, the tournament was not held as planned. The war would also have a profound impact on the premier international sports event— the Olympic Games, scheduled to be held in Asia for the first time in 1940.

The 1940 Olympics The Olympic Games are a source of patriotism, pride, honor, and often economic windfall for the host nation and cities; they offer opportunities to showcase modernity, technological advances, as well as culture and tradition. The modern Olympic Games began in 1896 and not until 1940 were Asian cities chosen as sites. The Games were scheduled for Tokyo (Summer) and Sapporo (Winter) after much political wrangling, including a nasty dispute between Axis allies Japan and Italy, both of whose governments had bid for the Games.46 Sandra Collins argues that the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) awarding the Games to Japan served as a way to legitimize Japan as a world power expanding in Asia. Moreover, the 1940 Games would have commemorated the two-­ thousand-six-­hundredth anniversary of the ascension of Japan’s first emperor.47 Tokyo officials used every opportunity to capitalize on the mythology and symbolism to garner domestic and international support. Japan’s success at winning the 1940 Games and participation by Japanese athletes in earlier Olympic competitions were a direct result of the efforts by Kanō Jigorō, internationally known as a judo champion and the IOC’s first Asian member, elected unanimously in 1909. Kanō spared no effort in promoting Jap­ anese athletics in preparation for the Olympic Games. Before 1911 Japanese athletes had had no financial support from the Tokyo government, which prompted Kanō to argue to government officials that athletics in Japan shamefully lagged behind China’s programs because the Shanghai YMCA trained and

64   The America–Japan Society sponsored Chinese Olympic athletes. Japanese officials apparently were sufficiently embarrassed by this information to provide a budget for the new Japan Amateur Athletic Association (Dai-­Nippon Taiiku Kyōkai) established in 1911.48 Kanō headed the first Japanese Olympic team at the Games held in Stockholm in 1912. In February 1931, Tokyo’s City Council decided it would make a formal appeal for the 1940 Games and Kanō’s role included using his fame in the sports world to politick for the Japanese.49 The job took Kanō to various venues where he argued Japan’s position. For example, in Seattle at a meeting of the city’s Japanese-­Amer­ican community in July 1936, Kanō described the spirit of the Olympic Games as one of cooperation, not competition. He hoped that hosting the Games would make other nations more sympathetic toward each other through sports competition. Moreover, he openly confronted his government’s public-­image problems at the time, the result of the constant fighting in North China and the earlier takeover of Manchuria, by proclaiming, “If China understood Japan’s intentions, they would try to cooperate in all matters. China is torn by internal wars. They misunderstand Japan’s real intention.”50 Within two years, however, in July 1938, Japan gave up the Games because of the war in China; the Tokyo government, according to some historians, chose to forfeit the opportunity to host the Games in favor of a policy of expansionism.51 The IOC then awarded the honor to Helsinki, the runner-­up, but because of the outbreak of World War II in Europe in September 1939, the 1940 Helsinki Olympic Games were also cancelled.52 With hindsight Japan’s failed efforts may appear inevitable, but prior to the actual cancellation, members of the America–Japan Society and its president, Prince Tokugawa, who also served as chairman of Japan’s Olympic Organizing Committee, worked diligently to convince the IOC to hold the Games as originally scheduled. Moreover, every effort was made to suggest to ordinary Amer­ icans that Japan still deserved the Games, especially following the storm of controversy that had surrounded and tainted the 1936 Berlin Olympics. During the XI Olympiad, the so-­called Nazi Olympics, German chancellor Adolf Hitler promoted his extreme racial policies by permitting only German “Aryans” to compete for their country, an obvious slight to “non-­Aryans” worldwide. Japan’s supporters openly proclaimed that the 1940 Olympics in Japan would revive the true spirit of international competition as had been exhibited in 1932 at Los Angeles. IOC member Kanō consistently told Amer­ican audiences that the Japanese had no intention of using the Olympics to create “a national spectacle as the Nazis had done.”53 Thus Japan’s failure to host the 1940 Olympics turned into an international embarrassment and domestic tragedy, especially after years of preparation and anticipation, building of new facilities, and Japanese government expenditures of 20,142,427 yen, one-­third covered by the city of Tokyo, on related construction projects.54 The official position of the America–Japan Society on Japan’s bid to hold the 1940 Olympic Games was recorded in the Society’s bulletin in early 1938: The XIIth Olympiad [scheduled for 1940] will offer a splendid opportunity, as did the Xth in Los Angeles, to actively promote a spirit of friendship between these two great nations on opposite sides of the Pacific Ocean.55

The America–Japan Society   65 The bulletin also summarized excerpts from a speech in support of Japan given in 1938 in Chicago by the Amer­ican IOC member Avery Brundage, who later was accused of benefiting materially from his relationships with Japanese businesses and officials.56 The Amer­ican Olympic Committee has constantly held the position that politics has no place in amateur sports, which must always be kept free from distinction of color, creed or class. Athletics should not consider the race, religion, economic or political views of the people who play the host to the Olympics.57 The America–Japan Society’s members focused on the difficulties in which the Japanese found themselves at the 1938 session of the IOC held from March 10–15 in Cairo. One of the first proposals to the IOC at that session was put forward by China’s delegate Dr. C.T. Wang (Wang Zhengting), who demanded a change in venue for the 1940 Games. Dr. Wang was rebuffed, along with a number of similar requests to the IOC received by telegram, when IOC president Henri de Baillet-­Latour would not consider the suggestion, explaining that “the text of the Olympic Charter contains nothing which would permit such a decision.”58 On the other hand, Baillet-­Latour did question Japan’s IOC representative, Kanō Jigorō, about the Tokyo government’s ability to prepare for the Games while engaging in a war with China. He emphasized that “if Japan could not give sufficient guarantee for the organization of these Games then she should inform the International Olympic Committee in time to enable it to select some other site than Tokio.”59 While IOC members at the Cairo conference were unanimous in the view that any decision about the 1940 Games was Tokyo’s alone, they pointed to the “seriousness of the situation” and agreed that:  [I]t was necessary for Japan to examine the question thoroughly before deciding for or against. If between now and then the hostilities in China were not ended, [Baillet-­Latour] advised Japan in her own interests, as in those of the International Olympic Committee, to renounce the celebration of these Games.60  Kanō replied that he saw no reason why Japan should not organize the Games, nor why any nation would refuse to participate. But in response to IOC concerns, Nagai Matsuzō, secretary general of the XIIth Olympiad in Japan, was asked to present evidence that the Tokyo government could continue to pay for the mounting expenses associated with the Games while simultaneously conducting a war in China.61 Optimism among the Japanese diminished further when the governments of several Western nations, led by the British, announced plans to boycott the Olympics because of the war. By that time, Japan had succeeded in capturing Shanghai and Nanjing, controlling territories contiguous to international settlements along China’s coast. (Meanwhile, the British were also attempting to wrest the Games from Tokyo in order to stage them in London, in hopes of providing an economic

66   The America–Japan Society stimulus to that city crippled by the Depression.62) The Tokyo government continued to defend its claim to the Games and garner support at the Cairo IOC meeting where representatives of the British Empire Games Federation joined the Chinese, demanding a change in venue and promising to appeal to allies following the meeting’s conclusion. In response, IOC president Baillet-­Latour explained to committee members that the only decision “compatible with the Olympic Charter” that the IOC could make at the Cairo conference was to remind the Japanese of their obligations to view the realities they faced in staging the Olympics. Baillet-­Latour concluded the meetings with a message to the Japanese people: The International Olympic Committee, honouring its Charter, has not believed itself called upon to examine the proposal as to whether or not the decision reached in Berlin in 1936 should be changed, because it is firmly convinced that Tokio and Sapporo, strong in the unanimous support of the nation and of the Government, desire to celebrate the Games of the XIIth Olympiad in 1940, and in accordance with the Olympic Regulations their Games cannot be taken from them. Both them [sic] towns are convinced that despite the actual difficulties they are in a position to continue their preparations. Nevertheless, as no one can foresee the future, it would not have been right on my part to have failed to warn those bearing the responsibility of the dangers they ran [sic] should the Games have to take place before the conclusion of hostilities.63 Members of the America–Japan Society commented on the proceedings of the IOC’s Cairo meeting by expressing their gratitude to the Amer­ican delegates who forcefully disagreed with the British position and gave the Japanese committee their “spontaneous support.”64 They reported that several statements backing the Japanese were given by Gustavus T. Kirby, treasurer of the Amer­ ican Olympic Association; Avery Brundage, Amer­ican IOC delegate; and Daniel Ferris, secretary of the Amateur Athletic Union of America. Following the Cairo meeting, Ferris cabled the British Empire Games Federation repudiating the suggestion that Amer­icans boycott the Tokyo Games. Ferris commented: “The United States is not considering such a move at all.”65 The America–Japan Society’s Council continued to actively lobby U.S. athletic organizations, requesting them to block support for the proposed boycott. Society members’ reasons were explained in a letter sent to Council member R. L. Durgin by Gustavus T. Kirby where Kirby wrote: There has never been even a discussion within the Olympic ranks as to our not going to Japan. I really believe that at last we have gotten over to the people of the United States that participation in the Olympic Games does not mean voicing or otherwise evidencing our approval or disapproval of the policies, politics or position of the country in which the Games are being held.66

The America–Japan Society   67 But once the Tokyo government itself decided to give up the Olympics to Helsinki in July 1938, the America–Japan Society no longer mentioned the issue in its publications. One of the Society’s final tributes to Japan’s attempts to host the Olympics was in an obituary for Kanō Jigorō who died suddenly of pneumonia on his return voyage to Japan following the IOC’s Cairo meeting.67

Conclusion Members of the America–Japan Society were among those who openly expressed frustration over the lack of progress in reaching a level of mutual understanding between the U.S. and Japanese governments as disagreements intensified over Japan’s conduct in China. Their goal to promote enlightened relations proved elusive. Any effort to portray the relationship between the two countries in a positive way was difficult for the Society’s Amer­ican members, yet they continued to push for improved business and cultural ties. Of course, once the war with China was underway, the America–Japan Society Bulletin came under the control of Japanese editors; it is no surprise that the views expressed in the publications were often at odds with those of the Roosevelt administration, especially after 1937. Amer­ican policymakers had considered Japan’s moves into China as direct threats to U.S. interests in the Pacific as early as World War I, but by 1932, when the puppet state of Manzhouguo was established, serious problems emerged. The U.S. government refused to grant diplomatic recognition to the new state. The beginning of the Second Sino-­Japanese War and the Panay Incident were seen by President Roosevelt as harbingers of significant future conflict. The U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, was one Society member who attempted to interpret, sometimes justify, Japanese policies, giving Washington policymakers alternative explanations for Tokyo’s expansion onto the Asian mainland. Appointed ambassador in 1932 by President Herbert Hoover, Grew, and his wife, Alice Perry Grew, embraced Japanese culture and joined many organizations that promoted goodwill between the two nations during the decade they served in Japan. Grew used the America–Japan Society to encounter like-­minded leaders, but he also warned Roosevelt that Japan’s military strength and political ambitions should not be underestimated. His efforts at influencing Amer­ican policy to be more understanding of Japan’s aims ultimately failed. The America–Japan Society continued to be successful in sponsoring commercial deals, sports exchanges, and cultural events throughout a time of tense relations, while other organizations emerged during the late 1930s, directly sponsored by the Tokyo government, to push harder to get Amer­ican acquiescence, if not approval, for Japan’s takeover of China.

Notes   1 America–Japan Society, “Welcome to the America–Japan Society!”, www.ajstokyo. org/ajs.   2 “Welcome to the America–Japan Society!”

68   The America–Japan Society   3 See, “Wilson to Send a Note to Japan.” New York Times, February 20, 1915; “Wilson Corrects Tokio Hasn’t Approved Japan’s China Demands—Points at Issue Not Minor.” New York Times, March 24, 1915; “Japan Has a Monroe Doctrine: W. Morgan Shuster Discusses Her Attitude Toward Far Eastern Questions.” New York Times, February 28, 1915. www.NYTimes.com/ref./nytarchive.html.   4 “Welcome to the America–Japan Society!”   5 “Welcome to the America–Japan Society!”   6 America–Japan Society, America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 1.   7 America–Japan Society, America–Japan Society Bulletin 1, no. 1 (last quarter 1937), 1.   8 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 2. In addition to donations provided by the America–Japan Society, money for the condolence fund also came from college clubs from both Japanese and Amer­ican universities, women’s and youth groups, and Christian organizations.   9 America–Japan Society, America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 2 (second quarter 1938), 6. 10 Cordell Hull, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew).” November 30, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 384. 11 George Atcheson, “The Second Secretary of the Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State.” December 7, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 390–391. 12 George Atcheson, “The Second Secretary of the Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State.” December 9, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 392–393. 13 George Atcheson, “The Second Secretary of the Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State.” December 9, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 393–394. 14 Clarence E. Gauss, “The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State.” December 11, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 399. 15 Nelson T. Johnson. “The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State.” December 12, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 401. 16 Harry E. Yarnell. “The Commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy).” December 21, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 405. 17 Robert Smith Thompson, A Time for War (New York: Prentice Hall, 1991), 67. 18 Thompson, 66–67; Universal Pictures, Norman Alley’s Bombing of USS Panay (1937), http://archive.org/details/1937/12–12_Bombing_of_USS_Panay. 19 America–Japan Society Bulletin 1, no. 1 (last quarter 1937), 2. 20 America–Japan Society Bulletin 1, no. 1 (last quarter 1937), 10; See also, William Miles Fletcher III, The Japanese Business Community and National Trade Policy, 1920–1942 (Durham, NC: North Carolina University Press, 2012), 113–114. 21 America–Japan Society Bulletin 1, no. 1 (last quarter 1937), 10. 22 America–Japan Society Bulletin 1, no. 1 (last quarter 1937), 10. 23 America–Japan Society Bulletin 1, no. 1 (last quarter 1937), 1. 24 Lawrence B. Glickman, “ ‘Make Lisle the Style’: The Politics of Fashion in the Japanese Silk Boycott, 1937–1940.” Journal of Social History 38, no. 3 (Spring, 2005), 573. 25 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 7. 26 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 4. 27 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 1. 28 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 7. 29 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 7–8. 30 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 6.

The America–Japan Society   69 31 “Address of Ambassador Horinouchi.” Bulletin of the America–Japan Society 3, no. 1 (March 1, 1939), 5. 32 “Address of Ambassador Horinouchi,” 8. 33 “The Society Greets General and Mrs. Burnett.” Bulletin of the America–Japan Society 3, no. 1 (March 1, 1939), 7. 34 America–Japan Society, America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 2 (second quarter 1938), 9. 35 “China Writer Discusses Relations between Japan and the United States.” Bulletin of the America–Japan Society 3, no. 2 (July 1, 1939), 6. 36 “China Writer Discusses Relations between Japan and the United States,” 7. 37 “China Writer Discusses Relations between Japan and the United States.” 38 “China Writer Discusses Relations between Japan and the United States.” 39 “Address of Ambassador Horinouchi,” 5. 40 America–Japan Society Bulletin 1, no. 1 (last quarter 1937), 10. 41 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 7. 42 “Kanto-­Kansai First International Amer­ican Football Game.” America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 9. 43 “Amer­ican Football in Japan.” America–Japan Society Bulletin 1, no. 1 (last quarter 1937), 5. 44 “Intercollegiate Football in Japan.” Bulletin of the America–Japan Society 3, no. 1 (March 1, 1939), 12. 45 “Amer­ican Grapplers Complete Successful Tourney.” America–Japan Society Bulletin 2 no. 3 (third quarter 1938), 9. 46 According to U.S. sources, the Japanese had made a deal with Italy’s Benito Mussolini in February 1935, where he promised to withdraw Italy’s bid in favor of Japan. But Italian delegates attending the IOC meeting in Oslo in March denied any such deal. By October, however, Mussolini sent a personal letter to Japan’s Olympic organizers renewing his promise to withdraw Italy’s bid for the 1940 Games. During the summer of 1935, Japan had threatened to side with the League of Nations and support a trade boycott against Italy as Italy attempted to expand into Africa. As reported in Time magazine, “Japanese goods looked far better [to Mussolini] last week than Olympic Games five years off.” In “1940 Olympics.” Time, October 14, 1935, www. time.com./time/magazine. In another version, the Japanese allegedly promised to stop selling arms to Ethiopia, the target of Italian imperialism during the 1930s, so that the Italians and Germans would support Japan’s bid for the Olympics. See: Joseph R. Svinth, “Fulfilling His Duty as a Member: Jigorō Kanō and the Japanese Bid for the 1940 Olympics.” Journal of Combative Sport (May 2004), 8–9, http://ejmas.com/ jcs/2004. 47 Sandra S. Collins, “Orienting the Olympics: Japan and the Games of 1940.” Diss. Chicago, 2003, 4–5. 48 Svinth,  2–3; Japan Olympic Committee, “The Olympic Movement and Kanō Jigorō.” 1–3, www.joc.or.jp/kano. 49 “The Olympic Movement and Kanō Jigorō,” 7. 50 “The Olympic Movement and Kanō Jigorō,” 9. 51 See, for example, Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics (London: Routledge, 2008); Henri Baillet-­Latour to Ernst Krogius, Letter from Comite International Olympique. July 18, 1938, www.euarchives.org/helsinki. 52 The 1940 Olympic Games, both Summer and Winter, had been scheduled for two Japanese cities, Tokyo and Sapporo, respectively. The XII Olympiad in Tokyo (Summer) had been scheduled for September 4 to October 6, 1940, but after the outbreak of the Second Sino-­Japanese War the IOC awarded the Games to Helsinki and scheduled them for July 20 to August 4, 1940. They were eventually cancelled after World War II began in Europe. The Vth Olympic Winter Games in Sapporo were also cancelled and were held after World War II in St. Moritz, Switzerland, in 1948 after

70   The America–Japan Society the 1944 Games scheduled for London were also cancelled due to the war. Twenty-­ eight nations participated in the 1948 Games. Tokyo hosted the Summer Games in 1964; Sapporo hosted the Winter Games in 1972. 53 Svinth, 11. 54 C. Frank Zarnowski, “A Look at Olympic Costs.” The International Society of Olympic Historians 1, no. 1 (Summer 1992), 16–22. 55 “XIIth Olympiad in Tokyo.” America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 1 (first quarter 1938), 8. 56 Svinth, 10. 57 Svinth, 10. 58 “Session of Tuesday, March 15th, 1938, Morning and Afternoon.” Bulletin Officiel du Comite International Olympique (July 1938), 25. 59 “Session of Tuesday, March 15th, 1938,” 26. 60 “Session of Tuesday, March 15th, 1938.” 61 “Session of Tuesday, March 15th, 1938.” 62 Svinth, 9. 63 “Message from the President of the International Olympic Committee to the People of Japan.” Bulletin Officiel du Comite International Olympique (July 1938), 31. 64 “XIIth Olympiad in Tokyo,” 8. 65 “XIIth Olympiad in Tokyo,” 9. 66 “XIIth Olympiad in Tokyo.” 67 America–Japan Society Bulletin 2, no. 2 (second quarter 1938), 5.

4 The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan was established in the early 1930s by the Japanese government for the purpose of publicizing Tokyo’s version of events unfolding in Manchuria and China. It became one of the primary vehicles used to transmit information from the Japanese government to the English-­ speaking world. In July 1936, in an effort to consolidate Tokyo’s “publicity policies,”1 the Association came under the direct control of the government’s Information Committee, a bureau in the Prime Minister’s Department that oversaw the production and distribution of propaganda, especially that associated with the war in China. The Foreign Affairs Association produced a variety of publications that ostensibly supplied “information concerning the nature of problems being confronted today by the Japanese nation as a whole, and of the governmental steps being taken to solve these problems.”2 As Japan expanded its control over China and the war intensified, the Association shifted more of its coverage to China and stepped up efforts to portray Japan’s goals in a favorable light. In July 1937, for example, the Association published its first volume of the monthly periodical, the Tokyo Gazette, during the month when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Battle of Lugou Bridge) took place. Several of the gazette’s articles each month examined conditions in China, from Japan’s perspective. The Association produced numerous English-­language publications that were made available to the public by subscription or at Japanese friendship associations in the U.S., selected bookstores worldwide, university libraries, and organizations such as Boston’s World Peace Foundation. They included Contemporary Japan: A Quarterly Review of Japanese Affairs where, in magazine format with photographs and other illustrations, the Foreign Affairs Association published articles by Japanese and Western writers on the positive aspects of Japanese policies in China, Japanese fiction, book reviews, and chronicles of the war. The Tokyo Gazette, A Monthly Report of Current Policies, Official Statements and Statistics also focused on the benefits to China of Tokyo’s plans. The Japan Year Book was one of the Association’s first publications; its first volume was released before the Association came under the direction of the Prime Minister’s Department. Each volume contained over 1,000 pages of “facts” about Japan and Manzhouguo. Beginning in 1937, the Association also published a series of specialized booklets and pamphlets related to the “China Affair,” each

72   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan with a focus directly or indirectly on events in China or Manchuria, including: How the North China Affair Arose (1937), The North China Incident (1937), What Happened at Tungchow? [Tongzhou] (1937), Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai (1937), Why the Fighting in Shanghai (1937), Agrarian Problem in Japan (1938), Education in Japan (1938), Japan’s Advance Southward (1938), Japan’s Woman Question (1938), Labor Movement in Japan (1938), Manchoukuo–Soviet Union Border Questions (1938), Our Social Welfare Work (1938), Political Parties in Japan (1938), The Shanghai Incident, 1937 (1938), Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino/Japanese Conflict (1938). Several themes emerged from Association publications focused on China, many of which, not surprisingly, were similar to those seen in the literature produced by the SMRC, such as Japan’s role in bringing civilization, prosperity, and peace to a feudal and lawless China. Like most Japanese wartime publicity, particularly that which came under the auspices of Tokyo’s Bureau of Information during the 1930s, the publications of the Foreign Affairs Association reported on progressive government policies and delved into issues designed to appeal to Westerners, with the goal of portraying Japan as a modern nation, especially when compared to China. In addition to covering the war itself, each volume offered readers a mix of articles that contrasted conditions in Japan and China. As a result, the monthly reports published in the Tokyo Gazette provided evidence that Japan was not only assisting the Chinese people with its wartime programs, but was providing the means for China to become a modern state— once it was part of the Japanese empire. In September 1937, for example, in an article entitled “Overseas Electric Communications—Their Development and the Present Situation,” Tokyo’s Department of Communications detailed the progress made by Japan in the area of international telecommunications. While acknowledging that 87 percent of the world’s submarine cables at the time were controlled by British and Amer­ican companies, the Japanese pointed out that they had begun to lay cable from Japan to the Asian mainland in order to supplement the existing Anglo-­Amer­ican systems. They also showered praise on the West for its accomplishments and bold approach to development: “It is no exaggeration to say that Anglo-­Saxon supremacy in the modern world has been due, in large measure, to this wise and far-­sighted communication policy.”3 They then outlined several Japanese–Amer­ican cooperative efforts in continuing to construct the network of overseas communications and boasted about their recent advances in radio and telephone systems development. As a result, Japan would soon “be placed in direct contact with all other parts of the world.”4 In May 1938, Japan’s Department of Railways published a report in the Tokyo Gazette detailing the government’s accomplishments in the areas of education and welfare. It proclaimed that “Japan is one of the few countries in the civilized world that is enthusiastically and energetically carrying out extensive programmes for diffusion of education and raising of the cultural standard.”5 The report described various measures being taken to provide relief from the hardships caused by the war in China, improve schools, provide affordable access to historical and spiritual sites, and allocate resources to benefit the Japanese people.

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   73 Association publications were also filled with advertising by various government agencies, such as the Board of Tourist Industry and the Japan Hotel Association, whose illustrations depicted peaceful, idyllic scenes in Japan and Japanese-­controlled territories. For example, several end pages of the Tokyo Gazette were adorned with photographs of calm landscapes, beautiful scenery, and modern facilities. One slogan was: “Let your dream to visit Japan come true! The Land of Lovely Scenery, Age-­old Culture and Advanced Modern Industry.”6 Like the SMRC, the Foreign Affairs Association touted the many advantages for foreigners of vacationing in Japan and its territories of Korea, Manchuria, and eastern China. One 1938 edition promoted the 57 hotels that were members of the Japan Hotel Association; it included the five Yamato Hotels in Manzhouguo, two in Korea, and one in Qingdao, in addition to those in Japan proper.7 One report concluded:  Activities along the line of tourist industry such as developing scenic resources and facilitating travels of overseas visitors by issuing special tickets in cooperation with tourist agencies and steamship companies, have contributed in no small measure to the increase in receipts from invisible exports.8 The Foreign Affairs Association, like the Japan–America Society, also profiled the Olympic Games, noting their significance for Japan’s image worldwide:  The Olympic Games to be held in Tokyo and Sapporo in 1940 will afford an unprecedented opportunity of demonstrating what the Imperial Government Railways can do for overseas visitors by letting them gain first-­hand knowledge of the real, present-­day Japan.9  It was these positive images that the Foreign Affairs Association, like other propaganda organizations, continued to deliver to Westerners as the fighting intensified throughout China. One often repeated phrase seen in Association publications was: “The Jap­ anese people are fighting for a better and happier future for both nations—for co-­operation, not for territory.”10 Like SMRC publications, numerous Association reports justified Japanese actions in China on the basis of treaty rights and obligations, concepts that allegedly had credibility among leaders of other powers attempting to maintain a foothold in China. The Japanese also suggested that they alone were effectively meeting the challenges of the unwelcome growth of fascism and communism in China, or what was described negatively in the Tokyo Gazette in 1937 as “the Nationalist–Communist United Front against Japan.” Moreover, until late 1937, Japanese military actions in China were consistently depicted as defensive, in response to Chinese attacks or other violations of international law by Chinese troops. The Japanese claimed that their goals were to protect Japanese and other foreign nationals in China, destroy the scourges of fascism and communism, as well as bring recovery and economic

74   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan prosperity to China. According to Association sources, the primary tasks of the organization during the 1930s were “to give out news as the means of clarifying the real intentions of the Japanese Empire at home and abroad, and further promote education and public relations appropriate to the present emergency [in China].”11 The focus of many Association articles often overlapped with topics also explored by SMRC, America–Japan Society, and other organizations’ writers, but the Foreign Affairs Association was unique in its efforts to place blame on the Chinese for Japan’s actions in China. Today, Association reports on the hostilities that mark the commencement of the Second Sino-­Japanese War remain among the most controversial.

Explaining the beginning of the Second Sino-­Japanese War The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, marked the beginning of Japan’s move south into China from its base in Manchuria and the start of World War II in Asia; its anniversary is still commemorated in China.12 Within weeks of the incident, the Foreign Affairs Association had published several English-­ language commentaries explaining Japan’s side in the conflict, including an 18-page booklet entitled The North China Incident (released July 22, 1937), two articles in the August edition of the Tokyo Gazette, followed by a pamphlet in several formats called Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino-­ Japanese Conflict. The Japanese blamed the Chinese for starting the fighting just outside of China’s former capital, Beijing. One report summarized Tokyo’s version of events: Who began the fighting?  China did. The Chinese troops in Wanping near Peiping [Beiping (Beijing)] were deeply hostile to the Japanese garrison forces carrying on maneuvers around Peiping. They frequently interfered with Japanese troops. On the night of July 7 this year, some of them went to the length of firing at a section of Japanese soldiers on field exercise. Then the trouble started, in spite of repeated efforts on the part of Japan at settling the matter locally.13 More detailed accounts explained what later was called the Marco Polo Bridge Incident or the Battle of Lugou Bridge: On Wednesday night, July 7th, a small unit of Japanese troops was engaged in maneuvers on their usual grounds, near Marco Polo Bridge, southwest of Peiping, and in the vicinity of Lukouchiao [Lugouqiao] and Lungwangmiao—villages which stand on the left bank of the Yungting [Yongding] River.… With the regular summer inspection but a fortnight ahead, all Jap­ anese troops in the area had been drilling day and night for weeks. The Chinese authorities had been notified of these maneuvers, as usual, and nothing untoward had occurred or been anticipated.

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   75 But suddenly, at 11:40 o’clock on this particular night, the Japanese troops were fired upon by Chinese soldiers from the directions of Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao. The Japanese were completely taken by surprise, and were utterly unprepared to return fire, for they were only 150 strong and had a supply of live ammunition amounting only to one ball-­cartridge per person, which was being kept by the commanding officer. All that they could do at this critical moment was to halt their maneuvers, concentrate at a spot some distance from the Chinese, and send for help to their headquarters, situated about two and a half miles away in the former British barracks at Fengtai. Re-­enforcements came quickly, and with the Japanese with real shots to the Chinese fire, the first clash occurred.14 Needless to say, Chinese accounts of the events at Lugou Bridge differ significantly from those of the Japanese, but both sides were firm in their commitment to maintain control of the bridge as an access route to Beijing. As a result, with Chinese and Japanese reinforcements pouring into the area, large-­ scale fighting soon began. At the heart of the dispute before July 7, for both the Chinese and Japanese, were the activities of foreign troops occupying territory in China. China’s government, under the leadership of Guomindang general Chiang Kaishek, sought to rid China of unwelcome foreign forces and renegotiate the terms of the many unequal treaties forced on China since its defeat in the first Opium War in 1842. On the other hand, Japan unswervingly emphasized the legality of its military presence and troop exercises based on treaty rights as well as the similar privileges enjoyed by Western powers throughout China at the time. As a result, the Foreign Affairs Association, like the SMRC earlier, commented on the terms of treaties and other international agreements that guaranteed Japan specific rights on Chinese territory. Japanese troops were legally deployed in north China because of terms agreed to decades earlier under the Boxer Protocol of 1900 (the Xinchou Treaty or Treaty of 1901) signed on September 7 between the Qing government of China and the governments of Austria-­Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United States. The international agreement, described by William R. Manning as an Amer­ican-­ orchestrated deal, was reached following the Boxer Rebellion, the incident where foreign residences in Beijing had been attacked by Chinese nationals in the summer of 1900. Among those killed by the rebels were two consular officials, one German and one Japanese. The protocol permitted those nations, including Japan and the Western powers, eight of the 11 whose governments had sent troops to rescue their citizens under threat, to maintain guard units.15 Citing Article IX of the protocol, Association sources explained: “Foreign troops are free to drill, practice shooting and carry on maneuvers, except that in case they practice with loaded shells, they will give notice thereof in advance.”16 The Jap­ anese consistently pointed out that their soldiers had been the victims of unwarranted Chinese aggression in July 1937 at a time, they claimed, the Japanese were carrying out pre-­scheduled drills:

76   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan [A]s a matter of fact, for the benefit of the local inhabitants, it has been the custom of the Japanese military authorities to serve advance notice on every occasion. The maneuvers in question were only part of a series of similar maneuvers that had been going on for a few preceding days, for which notice had been served as usual, leaving no grounds for complaint on the part of China.17 The Japanese also claimed to have special interests in north China that justified their “defensive” actions because of additional specific treaty agreements, including a two-­year old “arrangement,” the He-­Umezu Accord of 1935, negotiated by Guomindang general He Yingqin, chairman of the Beijing branch of the Military Council of China, and Umezu Yoshijirō, commander of the Guandong Army in Tianjin. The accord guaranteed Japan’s military the right to defend the lives and property of the “large numbers of Japanese” who lived in territories just south of Manchuria. Moreover, the Japanese argued that the proximity of the area to Manzhouguo made it essential for trade and security purposes that they have unfettered access to the area from Beijing eastward to the coast at the port of Tianjin. The He-­Umezu Accord also prohibited Guomindang troops from being stationed near the territory known as the Beijing–Tianjin corridor, thus creating a demilitarized buffer zone between Manzhouguo and Guomindang-­ controlled China further south. Association sources characterized the agreement with General He as “the best practical arrangement that practical statesmanship could ever devise.”18 (General He, who had attended the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in Tokyo, allegedly opposed Chinese military action against the Jap­ anese at the time, but memoirs have pointed out that he did not sign the agreement. He acknowledged the receipt of the memorandum.19) Chinese president Chiang Kaishek subsequently approved the deal, which included replacing the anti-­Japanese governor of Hebei and mayor of Tianjin. Chiang also issued a “good will mandate” (dunma bangjiao ling) that banned all anti-­Japanese activity in the country.20 At that time, Chiang and the Guomindang were focused on destroying the CCP and its followers in their sixth “bandit annihilation” campaign focused on the Xi’an area. Chiang ordered his soldiers not even to speak of fighting the Japanese when the Communists remained the primary enemy. Such sentiments served to demoralize the Chinese military in north China and would cause Amer­ican strategists to question Chiang’s leadership. 21

Japan’s policy of “non-­aggravation” The intensification of hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese in north China throughout July 1937 was blamed on the “menacing attitude” toward the Japanese of Chiang’s Guomindang government. According to the Tokyo Gazette: The Nanking [Nanjing] government manifested its determination to offer armed opposition to Japan on the one hand, and on the other, launched

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   77 s­ ystematic propaganda against Japan, by holding Japan responsible for the outbreak of the original incident which was entirely due to the provocations of Chinese troops, by refusing to recognize Japan’s treaty rights to hold manoeuvres in North China, and by misrepresenting the manoeuvres of the Japanese Garrison troops as being preliminary moves toward the realization of Japanese territorial designs on North China.22 In addition, Association sources detailed dozens of “incidents” of alleged unprovoked attacks on Japanese troops and civilians, “molestations of Japanese women and children,” acts of sabotage and vandalism against foreign property, and illegal entry into Japanese-­controlled areas throughout north China.23 Many articles in the Tokyo Gazette, for example, listed in footnotes the Japanese merchants, police, soldiers, sailors, and others who were murdered by Chinese each day.24 Despite the problems, the Japanese announced in late July that they would follow an official “policy of non-­aggravation,” whereby they would refrain from taking action and maintain “an attitude of watchful waiting”25 in China. They claimed the policy was an attempt to give them time to work out a settlement with the Chinese government in Nanjing, “localize” the problem, bring peace to the area, and ensure the safety of all foreigners living there. But on July 27, 1937, Lieutenant-­General Katsuki Kiyoshi, the new commander of Japan’s China Garrison Army, announced to Guomindang general Song Zheyuan, commander of Chinese forces in north China, that Japanese “patience” had been exhausted and his troops would take action “because Japanese troops could no longer bear the insincerity of the Chinese troops as manifested in their repeated provocative actions.”26 One of the war’s innumerable horrific events took place soon after on July 29–30 in Tongzhou, in this case with the Japanese as targets, and would foreshadow the fierce fighting and heavy casualties among troops and civilians that would characterize the eight-­year war. Japanese troops were outnumbered in Tongzhou, located about 12 miles east of central Beijing, by about 30 to 1. There were also 380 Japanese residents living there, according to Association sources, about 120 of which were rescued by Japanese soldiers when fighting began. The Japanese described the altercation as an organized attack on civilians in Tongzhou instigated by “communistic elements” of the Guomindang’s 29th Army. Association publications claimed that “later investigation revealed that the Chinese had planned a wholesale slaughter of Japanese residents including women and children, and systematically attacked the houses occupied by Japanese.”27 Details of the massacre were described in the Tokyo Gazette: Most of the Japanese women massacred were first kidnapped by Chinese and subjected to unmentionable dishonor for fully 24 hours by them before being butchered. The Chinese pierced wires through the nostrils and lips of some of the women they slaughtered, and, binding the hands and feet of the others, dragged them along to the East Gate of Tungchow [Tongzhou] and threw them into the pond. Some of these women victims were also found

78   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan murdered after they had been subjected to shocking atrocities such as acid smeared over their faces. Space forbids further enumeration of such brutalities.28 Within days of the events at Tongzhou, Chinese and Japanese forces began to concentrate to the south, closer to the Shanghai area where thousands of foreigners resided. Again, the Foreign Affairs Association reported on the defensive nature of Japan’s actions in response to Chinese threats that put all foreign lives, not only Japanese, in danger. On September 29, 1937, the Association released Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai, a booklet that described the history of Shanghai’s International Settlement, explained Japan’s and Western nations’ treaty rights in Shanghai, and focused on the imminent danger posed by the presence of undisciplined Chinese troops in the area. Descriptions of China’s war preparations were accompanied by photographs of the devastation caused by Chinese aerial bombings of densely populated areas. Other photographs showed friendly Japanese soldiers playing with children and interacting peacefully with Chinese civilians.29 The Japanese continued to insist that they had had no intention of engaging Chinese troops, but were “forced to fight … dragged unprepared into hostile combat.”30 The Association’s explanations, needless to say, were consistent with official government versions of events in China, including those directly communicated to U.S. government personnel. On October 30, 1937, Japan’s ambassador to Great Britain, Yoshida Shigeru, met with the Amer­ican ambassador to the United Kingdom, Robert W. Bingham, where he explained that “his Government

Figure 4.1  Japanese soldiers and Chinese families in Shanghai, 1937 Source: Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Why the Fighting in Shanghai, November 1937, inside front cover.

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   79 had felt it necessary to send a punitive expedition to China on account of Chinese hostility and boycott,” but the Japanese army did not intend to remain in Shanghai. The expedition was to be “short and swift” and “not too costly,” but because Chinese resistance was unexpectedly strong, a larger military force was sent to reinforce troops who were not the “best troops.” Yoshida also told Bingham that initially the majority of the Japanese people supported military action in China “as a result of propaganda on the part of the army and navy,” but they had become disenchanted with the views of the military and wanted the war to end. Bingham later conferred with British foreign secretary Anthony Eden and concluded that Yoshida’s interpretation of Japan’s ambitions in China was most likely mistaken, especially since neither embassy in Tokyo nor Washington had heard similar information. Bingham wrote: Eden reminded me of what I know so well from my frequent contacts with educated cosmopolitan Japanese like Yoshida and his predecessor Matsudaira [Tsuneo] and others, that no one can accept a statement from this type of Japanese as really representing the attitude of the Japanese Government. Bingham suggested that the Japanese were attempting to find an opportunity to reduce U.S. hostility to Japan at the time through statements like Yoshida’s.31 Meanwhile, additional propaganda from Western sources backed claims that Japan’s moves into Shanghai were justified. Association sources used testimony from Western eyewitnesses, such as the writers of the British Shanghai monthly magazine, Oriental Affairs. Its editor, H.G.W. Woodward, was quoted in one journal: “The charge that Japan desired or provoked hostilities in Shanghai is absolutely unsubstantiated and is on the face of it extremely improbable.”32 Woodward followed his statement with details of the Chinese government’s activities that violated numerous international agreements associated with the demilitarized zone near Shanghai and his observation that Japanese actions in the Shanghai area were orchestrated to avoid another outbreak of hostilities.33 Other English-­language sources published in China and cited by the Association, such as the North China Daily News, also lauded the Japanese for their apparent restraint while blaming Chiang’s Nanjing government for reckless and dangerous policies that were bound to provoke both the Japanese and other foreign powers in Shanghai.34 The Japanese provided evidence for the one-­sided views with a list of “tragic holocausts” and “well-­planned intrigues” in Shanghai allegedly perpetrated by the Chinese government that targeted the international community, including the bombings of the renowned Palace Hotel, the Sincere Department Store located in the International Settlement, the French Concession’s crowded Avenue Edward VII, and the Amer­ican ship, the President Hoover.35 According to Association sources, such actions signaled for the Jap­ anese the transition from a local and temporary conflict to one on a national scale. Subsequent editions of the Tokyo Gazette described the progress of Japan’s military operations, with numerous maps and charts depicting frequent

80   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan victories, but no longer focused on Chinese provocation. In 1938, another Association booklet candidly explained Japan’s wartime goals: What are the aims of the Japanese, and when can we expect the conflict to end?  Japan is now determined to fight it out to the finish. Peace will return only when China brings herself to realize the error of her ways—particularly of her belief that Japan can be driven out of the Asiatic continent by force.36

Japan takes the Guomindang’s capital By the end of 1937, fighting had spread to Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China and the Guomindang’s power base for nearly a decade. It was there in December that Japanese troops rampaged through the city terrorizing the population, forcing a mass exodus, and killing over 300,000 Chinese, according to estimates by the Chinese government. What has been called by the Chinese the 7-week-­long Nanjing Massacre or Rape of Nanjing, where the Chinese estimate some 20,000 to 80,000 women were raped, received little coverage in Japanese English-­language sources. Considered one of the iconic moments in Chinese history, variations in the depictions of the Nanjing Massacre remain one of the most formidable obstacles for resolving hostilities between Japan and China in the twenty-­first century. As the curator of the Nanjing Massacre museum (Qinhua Rijun Nanjing datusha yunan tongbao Jinlanguan, The Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders), Zhu Chengshan said in 2014 that the massacre is still “a raw scar of history to be kept in mind by all the Chinese people for generations to come.”37 The museum was built in 1985 when Nanjing’s city officials suggested the establishment of a memorial honoring the victims of the massacre. They were responding to the controversy caused when Japanese nationalists promoted the rewriting of history books in Japan, calling the events of December 1937 in Nanjing a minor incident in the war or fictionalized by Chinese after the war. An area in Jingdongmen in south Nanjing called the “pit of ten thousand corpses” (wan ren keng), a burial site used by the Japanese in the winter of 1937–1938, was chosen as the museum’s location. The conflict over the accuracy of historical interpretations concerning the massacre remains highly acrimonious in China and Japan. Daqing Yang, in his study on the historiography of the Nanjing Massacre, has suggested that the “contentious debate about the Japanese atrocities in Nanjing, which first erupted in the 1970s, has become one of the longest-­running historical controversies in East Asia.”38 Yet, details about the massacre had been suppressed by the Communist Party for decades, only to be revisited in nationalist observances of the twenty-­first century.39 Propaganda by organizations, such as the Foreign Affairs Association, serves as one small portion within the larger historical context. Writers for the Foreign Affairs Association did acknowledge a series of “unfortunate” incidents that happened in Nanjing after Amer­icans in the city

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   81 reported indiscriminate violence against foreigners in mid-­December. The Jap­ anese government was quick to apologize to the Amer­icans through U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, long-­time supporter of Japan and member of the America–Japan Society, in two diplomatic notes dated December 24, 1937, and February 12, 1938. What was referred to as the Nanjing Incident by the Japanese at the time was described by Association writers in the March–April 1938 issue of the Tokyo Gazette as a series of misunderstandings caused by overzealous troops who had been carrying out orders to requisition food and other supplies from homes in Nanjing and had mistaken Amer­ican residences for Chinese. The Japanese promised compensation for losses, but they also questioned whether Amer­icans in Nanjing may have mistaken Chinese looters for Japanese soldiers: “[T]he fact should be noted that there were at the time numerous cases of looting and destruction committed by Chinese rabbles, taking advantage of the prevalent confusion.”40 Witnesses to the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers included a small group of Westerners in Nanjing at the time who organized the International Committee for the Nanking [Nanjing] Safety Zone where refugee camps were set up to assist Chinese displaced by the invasion. Later, several Western observers from the committee testified at the post-­war International Military Tribunal for the Far East (May 1946–November 1948) where they were instrumental in helping convict Japanese commanders of war crimes.41 But the question of whether the terror associated with the Nanjing Massacre was perpetrated exclusively or even predominantly by soldiers of Japan’s Imperial Army is still a hotly contested issue. Japanese sources, whose reliability is often questioned, have argued that the atrocities were committed by Chinese soldiers from Chiang’s Guomindang Army, disguised in civilian clothing or Japanese military uniforms.42 As more news of the wartime horror made its way abroad, Tokyo addressed Chinese accusations of Japanese misconduct in several Foreign Affairs Association publications. In many cases, Japanese analysts questioned the validity of the Chinese versions, especially of many of the photographs published depicting Japanese aggression, claiming the Chinese were guilty of forgery: Brutal pictures of Japanese soldiers bayoneting helplessly bound Chinese were circulating in America. Are they actual? Investigations in Tientsin [Tianjin] have revealed the existence of numerous Chinese tradesmen dealing in all kinds of faked photographs. The pictures in question come from such stocks. A Japan naval officer who saw a newspaper reproduction of one of such photographs ascertained that the uniform of the soldiers and the method of handling the rifle were definitely Chinese.43 Initially, Amer­ican government officials had few eyewitness accounts to report from Nanjing; they were isolated from Chinese areas by the Japanese. On

82   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan December 21, 1937, John M. Allison, third secretary of the embassy, arrived in Nanjing to find the “waterfront a shambles and rifle fire heard while small fires were visible at various points in the city.” He was immediately informed by his British counterparts that no foreigners had been allowed to land at Nanjing and that the Japanese military commander had said none would be permitted to land until January 5 because “ ‘mopping up’ operations were still in progress.”44 By mid-­January, Amer­ican Foreign Service officers filed hundreds of pages of reports documenting the “reign of terror that befell the city upon its occupation by the Japanese military forces” witnessed by foreigners and Chinese in Nanjing.45

“Japanese armies of peace and order”46 Blaming the Chinese for duplicity and foreigners for unwittingly questioning Japanese veracity were consistent themes in the Foreign Affairs Association’s and many other Japanese accounts, such as those of the SMRC, during wartime. It was a way to deflect the blame onto the Chinese for the terror associated with the fighting. Another was the characterization of China as lawless, chaotic, and uncivilized. Japanese sources consistently asserted that Japan’s takeover of Chinese territory was advantageous to the Chinese people as well as to foreigners who resided and did business in China. They appealed to treaty rights they shared with France, Great Britain, Italy, the U.S., and other Western nations for the security of their citizens in an apparently lawless country. Japanese writers emphasized that Western powers with interests in China were forced to maintain a military presence throughout China because “China [was] not a safe country to leave their countrymen unprotected by armed forces on the spot.” As one Association writer asserted, “Recall the many cases of bandits and pirates looting foreign property, kidnapping and murdering innocent people.”47 Moreover, Association sources provided testimony from Amer­icans and British who backed Japanese views. For example, among the appendices included in The North China Affair, 1937 were statements alleging atrocities committed by Chinese troops against foreigners a decade earlier in March 1927, during what Westerners in Nanjing referred to at the time as the “Nanjing Outrage,” a series of incidents that occurred during Chiang Kaishek’s Northern Expedition, now called the Nanjing Incident (Nanjing Shijian). The Nanjing Incident took place during the week of March 21 to 27, 1927, immediately following the takeover of the city by troops from the Guomindang’s 6th Army. Rioting and looting by soldiers and civilian Chinese targeted foreigners in the city, killing six and burning residences and businesses. The U.S. and British navies had intervened to rescue the foreigners in Nanjing. Following the incident, a series of protests were lodged against Guomindang leaders. A two-­page proclamation signed by 17 Amer­ican clergymen and educators, initiated by the president of the University of Nanjing, A.J. Bowen, began with these accusations against Chiang’s government:

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   83 In order that the Amer­ican public may know the facts regarding the Nanking [Nanjing] outrage, we, the undersigned Amer­ican citizens and residents of Nanking who were present when the outrages against foreign lives and property were committed in that city on March 24th, desire to make a public statement. Out of our own first-­hand experience and observation we unequivocally affirm that these outrages were committed by armed Nationalist soldiers in uniform who acted with the knowledge and approval of their superior officers. These outrages consisted not only in the looting of foreign homes, consular offices, schools, hospitals and places of business, but also in the burning of foreign homes and schools; in deliberate murder; in twice shooting and seriously wounding a young Amer­ican woman; in shooting and attempting to kill foreign men, women and children; in the attempted rape of Amer­ican women; and in other shocking indignities to foreign women too indecent to be published. To many of such we can bear the sworn testimony of eye-­witnesses; and numerous other cases have been proven beyond the least shadow of doubt. From the statements of many of the Nationalist soldiers made to us and from the testimony of Chinese friends, it is an established fact that they entered Nanking with definite license, if not instructions, to rob and kill foreigners.48 Also included were statements by British who had witnessed an attack on Nanjing’s British Consulate by Guomindang soldiers armed with swords and knives and where several British men were held at knifepoint while their wives were assaulted. The wife of the British consul-­general in Nanjing, Bertram Giles, issued her own account: Three soldiers at once seized me, tore rings off my fingers, inflicting considerable pain, and snatched the brooch on my dress and chain from the neck, also watch and bracelet from the wrist. They took shoes from my feet and felt to see if there was anything in my stocking. They treated me with great brutality.49 On March 30, 1927, Britain’s House of Commons heard from Sir Austin Chamberlain who related additional details from Nanjing with information supplied by the British minister in Beijing whose sources were British, Amer­ican, and Jap­ anese. His statement published in the Association’s The North China Incident, 1937 included: Foreign women, including Mrs. Giles, the wife of His Majesty’s Consul-­ General, were thoroughly searched and rudely stripped of valuables. Many had their clothes torn off them, and two Amer­ican women were saved from attempted violation. These facts can be established by sworn depositions.50 With such reports the Japanese were attempting to exploit the negative press Chiang’s government had already received in the West since the Nanjing Incident,

84   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan despite efforts by Chiang and his family to alter the Guomindang’s image once he assumed total control over the Republic of China later in 1927. Foreigners were frequent targets in China during a time of upheaval. For example, an interview with University of Nanjing’s President Bowen was featured in Time magazine following the brutal murder of the university’s vice-­president, Rev. John E. Williams, in March 1927, as part of the Nanjing Incident. Bowen and Williams had approached several Guomindang soldiers who were burning down a house belonging to a university faculty member. After describing the grim details of Williams’ shooting, Bowen commented: “After finishing robbing us and murdering Dr. Williams, the troops walked off unconcernedly, chatting with each other as though they had shot only a pig or a dog.”51 Association sources persisted in quoting Western accounts that condemned Chinese attacks “on helpless foreign victims”52 as the war intensified. The Jap­ anese cited reports by Western journalists published both in China and abroad that were critical of China’s government and military, especially in their “irrespons­ ible … aerial bombing and killing of helpless civilians,”53 that, according to the Japanese, were virtually daily occurrences in cities where foreigners resided. By mid-­1938, the Japanese controlled much of north and east China. They had pushed out the Guomindang government and its supporters from those areas, forcing them westward. Chiang Kaishek’s armies abandoned Shanghai in November 1937, fled from Nanjing in December, and followed the Yangzi River about 1,000 miles to Chongqing, where, after months of brutal combat and spectacular losses along the way, the Guomindang government officially established its wartime capital a year later in December 1938. As the Chinese armies retreated, the Japanese set up puppet governments whose collaborators had little real authority. In November 1938, Tokyo’s Department of Foreign Affairs announced the creation of the Federal Committee of the Governments of the Republic of China for the dual purposes of laying “the foundation for the establishment of the central regime of China” and, according to Association sources, bringing peace to the Chinese masses.54 By 1939, China’s former capital, Beijing, was the site of the United Council of the Government of the Republic of China, the Japanese-­controlled administration. On January 10, 1939, the council protested to the Amer­ican embassy in Beijing after hearing reports of loan agreements negotiated by the Guomindang with the U.S. and Great Britain. In a statement sent to the secretary of state, the Japanese condemned Western leaders for giving the impression that the Guomindang government was still the government of China. The Japanese explained their position, which was at odds with the policy of the Roosevelt administration because the U.S. consistently maintained ties with Chiang: The termination of hostilities and restoration of peace between China and Japan as well as the campaign for driving out communism and bringing about the downfall of the Chiang Kai Shek regime are the firmly fixed aims of the people of East Asia and at the same time represent the main current of the public opinion in China.

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   85 Great Britain and the United States of America are the two countries which have for long been noted for their knowledge about the situation in China but this time we are unable to understand why these two countries should have failed to take the actual situation in to their consideration. It is beyond our comprehension in that England and America should have concluded loans with the Kuomintang-­Communist faction despite the miserable strait to which it has been driven with the possible consequence of unnecessarily prolonging the hostilities in China.55 The Japanese also refocused their propaganda on accounts of China’s rehabilitation and reconstruction, claiming to bring civilization, peace, and order to the Chinese people as they solidified their hold over Chinese land. In the May 1938 edition of the Tokyo Gazette, the Press Section of Japan’s War Department published a six-­page report whose introduction described “the work of the Japanese soldiers of peace”: What have the Chinese masses experienced after the sweeping victories of the Imperial forces on all fronts? They had doubtless waited for the visitation of tragedy as in the past, preparing for the worst in fatalistic resignation. What they received at the hands of the triumphant Japanese armies, however, was sympathy, kindness and relief—things totally different from what they had expected: medical care for the sick, food for the hungry, shelter for the homeless.56 Tokyo’s War Department then announced that it had created an “Enlightenment and Rehabilitation Corps” to deal with “the immediate spiritual as well as material needs of the Chinese people.”57 The specific tasks of the “soldiers of peace” included setting up refugee camps for the homeless who had escaped the fighting; distributing food and medicine; establishing employment bureaus; publishing newspapers; organizing “harvesting groups” of friendly farmers recognized by their display of Japanese “Sun flags”; repairing railroads, roads, and buildings; re-­opening schools that would teach the Japanese language; and organizing young men’s, boys’, and women’s groups “for the purpose of training and preparation for future leadership,” with the goal of “realizing the ideal of Sino-­Japanese collaboration.”58 The report concluded with “evidence” that a “new China” was emerging, due to the work of the Japanese “soldiers of peace”: Chinese youths who are joyfully playing with Japanese soldiers, and Chinese labourers who are energetically working for construction of hope—these make up the picture of the new China, the real friendly neighbour of Japan. Prior to the outbreak of the present Affair, school children of Tungkwang-­ hsien [Dongguang district, Shaanxi] used to sing: Stand up for our fatherland, sons of China! Wipe away our disgrace, compatriots!

86   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan March forward, every one of you, To annihilate all Japanese; To kill only one of them means little. But such a hymn of hatred is to be heard no longer. Instead, children are singing songs of joy and happiness, some of them in Japanese.59 The pacification program was further enhanced by promises of development projects announced in several subsequent editions of the Tokyo Gazette where detailed descriptions of Japan’s economic plans for China were outlined. In late 1938, the Japanese government created two institutions, the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, for the purpose of coordinating the exploitation of Chinese resources in conquered territory. In the January 1939 edition of the Tokyo Gazette, a ten-­page report by Tokyo’s “Board of Planning” revealed plans to be carried out by the two companies to extract China’s abundant resources in areas already under Jap­ anese control. The companies’ main purpose was to take over and improve many industries that had been established earlier, in some cases by Chinese or by other foreign owners. The Japanese claimed their use of superior technology and organization would increase production and hasten development. They pointed to their accomplishments in Manzhouguo as evidence of their past successes. The report concluded with the statement: “Thus, through well-­ planned, thoroughgoing Japanese aid, the economic life of the new China will fast be revived and developed not only for the prosperity of the Chinese people but also for that of all countries in East Asia.”60

Vilifying Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang Meanwhile, Foreign Affairs Association writers continued to juxtapose Japan’s progressive and beneficial operations with the failures of the Chinese government. They were highly critical of Chiang Kaishek, the Guomindang, his government, and army, particularly the officer corps, referring to them as both fascist and communist while accusing their supporters of brutality, oppression, and corruption. (Western observers of China’s military were often in agreement with the Japanese. The Amer­ican chargé stationed in Zhongqing in 1939 noted that “Chinese officers, especially those in the higher ranks, lack both enterprise and cooperative qualities.”61) Association publications also emphasized the deplorable conditions for the people of China caused by Chiang’s ill-­fated policies. Unfortunately for the Chinese, the activities of poorly trained, underpaid, hungry Guomindang soldiers as well as many of Chiang Kaishek’s wartime strategies served as fodder for Japan’s propaganda goals. For example, in June 1938, during the fierce fighting around the outskirts of Kaifeng, Chiang ordered the bombing of dikes along the Yellow River in a desperate attempt to slow the Japanese advance, which it did for about four months. But the subsequent tragedy was publicized worldwide. As many as 4,000 villages were flooded,

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   87 killing hundreds of thousands. (Estimates range from 400,000 to 800,000 drownings and several million homeless.) Japan’s prime minister, Prince Konoe Fumimaro, summed up international indignation in “An Appeal to the Nation—On the Occasion of the First Anniversary of the China Affair” (July 1938), translated for the August edition of the Tokyo Gazette: As all of you know, the Chiang Regime is such a Government that deliberately drowns thousands of innocent people of its own country by breaching the dikes of the Yellow River. It is against the laws of nature and man that any individual or group that commits such an outrageous act should be allowed to exist. The Chiang Regime, therefore, should have gone out of existence long ago.62 Konoe continued with praise for the new Chinese administrations in Japanese-­ controlled territories, headed by “intelligent and sincere leaders” and “functioning successfully.” He asserted that Japan was assisting them to build an “unshakable foundation for the peace of East Asia.”63 In the attempt to garner additional Western support and characterize Chiang Kaishek and his Guomindang supporters in a negative light, Association writers also condemned China’s government for its support of both fascism and communism. While, on the surface, the accusations appear contradictory, numerous articles in a variety of Association publications attempted to explain such views. Chiang’s overt connection to fascism was manifested in the Guomindang’s creation of the Blue Shirts Society in March 1932. Chiang Kaishek gave his approval to the group, which had originally been a secret organization, also called the Society of the Practice of the Three People’s Principles,64 which was purposely modeled after Italian dictator Benito Mussolini’s Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN or Blackshirts). The Blue Shirts earned notoriety as a paramilitary force, zealously attacking Chiang’s alleged enemies, both domestic and foreign, and assaulting ordinary Chinese for behavior inconsistent with the Guomindang’s goals for China. With Chiang’s support, the Blue Shirts Society infiltrated virtually every aspect of Chinese life during its heyday in the 1930s. Japanese writers described the Blue Shirts as fascist terrorists, carrying out murders of anyone “working toward an improvement in Sino-­Japanese relations.”65 In the August 1937 edition of the Tokyo Gazette, Tokyo’s Department of Foreign Affairs detailed the scores of acts of terrorism, including what it referred to as the First North China Incident when, on May 2 and 3, 1935, two Chinese merchants whose shops sold pro-­Japanese newspapers were killed. This was followed by the “Chahar [Qahar] Incident” days later when a Manchurian official of Japanese parentage was shot. Soon numerous murders and assaults allegedly committed by the Blue Shirts had spread “all over China,” according to Association sources, and were to be regarded as “a disgrace to civilization and to humanity.”66 The Japanese also wrote extensively on Chiang’s ties to the Chinese Communists, the Bolsheviks, and the Communist International (Comintern or Third International, 1919–1943). Appealing to those in the West and Japan influenced

88   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan by the Red Scare of the 1920s, they asserted it was the Japanese government’s moral duty to help rid the world of the scourge of communism. Tokyo’s Department of Foreign Affairs devoted an eight-­page article published in the October 1938 edition of the Tokyo Gazette to the history of the Guomindang’s relationship to the CCP and the “Far Eastern policy of the Moscow Government” because “[i]t has been rightly pointed out by observers that to clarify the tripartite relationship between the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Red Army and the Nationalist [Guomindang] Government with the Communist International as its background is essential in grasping the true significance of the present armed conflict between Japan and China.”67 Association sources claimed that the Soviets had a long-­term plan to “Bolshevize” China dating back to July 25, 1919, when Ambassador Lev M. Karakhan, representative of the Russian Bolshevik government led by V.I. Lenin, handed Chinese authorities a “Declaration to the Chinese Nation and the Governments of Southern and Northern China” (the “Karakhan Manifesto”), which nullified the unequal treaties imposed on China by Russia’s czars during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, promising to return Chinese territories and cancelling indemnities.68 Lenin’s new and hypothetically anti-­imperialist government was anxious to relinquish the economic and legal privileges associated with extraterritoriality as well as give up the remainder of the payments from the Boxer Indemnity because, according to the Japanese:  [H]aving failed in the movement in Europe, the Communists turned attention to the Orient, selecting China as their immediate objective. They saw in China a rising tide of nationalistic and anti-­imperialist movements, a condition which was highly favourable for Communist propaganda.69 For the Japanese, the Soviet government’s success in spreading its influence eastward was first demonstrated when the CCP, or what they called the Chinese branch of the Third International, was founded in 1921. The subsequent formation of an alliance, the First United Front, between the CCP and the Guomindang with financial and military assistance from the Soviet Union in 1923 was proof of collaboration between the two parties, albeit short-­lived, that helped spawn the Chinese Red Army and Soviet areas under CCP authority in southeast China. The Japanese then alleged that within a week of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, Moscow sent a series of instructions “in rapid succession” to Chinese Communist leaders on ways to organize against the Japanese in China. Association writers highlighted the activities of CCP members and supporters during the mid-­1930s because of the claim that the 1935 Congress of the Third International announced new, alarming policies sponsored by Soviet leaders and the Comintern that called for joint preparations for war against Japan. As a result, according to Tokyo, the creation of the Second United Front within a year, again allying the CCP and the Guomindang, marked the “completion” of an “anti-­Japanese alignment” that was the consequence of “the skilful working of the Moscow Government.”70

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   89 The Second United Front in 1936, which joined the Chinese Communists and Guomindang, resulted from the infamous Xi’an Incident, the capture of China’s president and Guomindang head Chiang Kaishek by one of his subordinates, General Zhang Xueliang. General Zhang, whose family originated in Manchuria (and whose father Zhang Zuolin was vilified in SMRC propaganda), deliberately disobeyed Chiang’s orders to attack Chinese Communists, demanding instead that Chiang and the Guomindang Army give his troops the backing needed to fight the Japanese who had murdered his father and occupied his home provinces. Historians have credited Chiang Kaishek’s release, General Zhang’s surrender, and the subsequent creation of the United Front on the skillful negotiations of CCP leader Zhou Enlai with input from Chiang’s wife, Meiling Soong. The Japanese, however, described the resulting alliance as “the surrender of the Chinese Dictator to the Comintern and the Chinese Communists” and the end of the Nanjing government’s “passive policy toward Japan.”71 Chiang’s apparent close ties to Moscow culminated with the signing of the Sino-­Soviet Non-­aggression Agreement on August 21, 1937, which sent Soviet economic and military aid to the Guomindang government to be used in fighting Japan. In numerous accounts of subsequent battles between Japanese and Chinese forces, Association writers were careful to emphasize the instances where the Japanese Imperial Army in China shot down Soviet-­made planes or encountered Soviet-­made weapons. Association writers also examined the alleged cooperation among various high-­ ranking members of both Chinese political parties, including generals, academics, bankers, and lawyers, asserting that these individuals were assisting the Comintern to “utilize Chiang Kai-­shek in carrying on its sinister designs.”72 They detailed the Communists’ strategy for their eventual takeover of China: “The Communists do not intend for their armed strength to be impaired by hard fighting.… They are indulging in guerrilla warfare, which forms their speciality together with propaganda.” They try “to win … soldiers in the armies and the masses over to Communism so that it may outrival the Nationalists [Guomindang] in strength and popularity.” In this way, the Communists, with the Soviets acting as “the real power behind,” would eventually prevail.73 The Japanese concluded that by 1937 the Chinese Communists were “directing all anti-­Japanese forces in China in action against Japan; they are driving China to self-­destruction.”74 Japanese writers stressed the connection among Chiang’s Guomindang, the CCP, and the Soviet Union as a warning to the West, calling it “a grave menace to the welfare of the country” and the rest of the world: What will be the effect of the sovietization of China upon the interests of foreign powers in that country? Every democratic country having anything at all to do with China will suffer greatly. Debts may be cancelled; vested rights and interests nullified; extant safeguards of personal liberty and justice prematurely abolished; trade opportunities circumscribed; and even entry and travel in the country restricted, as is the case in Russia.

90   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan What will be its effect on East Asia and the world in general? A China sovietized is a China completely within the grasp of Moscow revolutionaries. The resultant shift in the balance of power will undermine the peace and stability of the Pacific countries. It may prove the first step toward Red revolution in the entire Far East, toward a new war involving the principal countries of America and Europe.75 The Foreign Affairs Association’s publications also described Japan’s problematic relationship with Moscow during the late 1930s. The tension between the two nations, which historically shared designs on China’s northeastern territories, provided backing for Tokyo’s message that a communist-­controlled China, ostensibly under Soviet influence, would be disastrous for the West, not just for Japan. In a seven-­page report published in the March-­April 1938 edition of the Tokyo Gazette, titled “Facts Concerning Soviet Outrages—Oppressive Acts on Japanese Diplomatic Establishments and Commercial Rights and Interests,” Tokyo’s Department of Foreign Affairs offered examples of what historians now describe as Soviet premier Joseph Stalin’s terror purges of the 1930s. While the article focused on several of Tokyo’s concerns over Soviet policies in Siberia, in territories contiguous to Manzhouguo, such as the termination of Japanese fishing and mining rights in areas claimed by the Moscow government and the ominous presence of Stalin’s GPU secret police in plain clothes scrutinizing Japanese diplomatic facilities, many of the complaints against the Soviets involved accusations of arbitrary arrests and the subsequent “disappearances” of ordinary Russians who worked for Japanese enterprises or associated with Japanese. According to Association sources, various servants, including doorkeepers, charwomen, maids, tradesmen, and store keepers were arrested for “trifling matters”; “their present whereabouts are unknown.”76 The Japanese claimed that the severity of the “oppression” had caused them to close consular offices in many Siberian cities. For example, the situation in the border city of Blagoveshchensk, across the Amur River from Heihe, Manzhouguo, was disturbing: As in other cities, employees of the consulate have been arrested with no good reason and no one can be employed to take their places due to the interference of the GPU [secret police]. As the regular visitors of the consulate are closely watched and explicitly threatened to sever their connections with the Jap­ anese, the physician is frequently afraid to come, the milkman ceased to supply milk, and workmen for repairing the building can be employed only through the diplomatic representative, who is now absent from his post.77 According to the Japanese, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs “flatly turn[ed] down” any consideration of their protests “against such outrages … on grounds that the Government is under no obligation to inform the Japanese Embassy concerning what it had done to Soviet citizens.”78

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   91 In February 1938, Japan’s minister of foreign affairs (and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1928–1932), Hirota Koki, in a speech to the Diet reprinted in English in the Tokyo Gazette, summarized Tokyo’s position on Sino-­Soviet cooperation: Again, the relations between the Soviet Union and China are attracting the special attention of our nation. China concluded in August last a non-­ aggression pact with the Soviet Union, while members of the Communist International have penetrated all classes of the Chinese, destroying the social order of the country and endangering the stability of East Asia. Japan, ever solicitous for the civilization of East Asia and the welfare of its people, cannot but view the situation with the gravest concern.79 Meanwhile, the Japanese were also responding to Soviet military threats as a result of claims to disputed territory on the Manzhouguo border during the summer of 1938. The Japanese claimed that their troops stationed near the Soviet border had already engaged in over 2,400 separate frontier conflicts by 1938. One of the most significant was the Changkufeng Incident, described in a ten-­page report in the September 1938 Tokyo Gazette as well as in a booklet entitled Manchoukuo–Soviet Union Border Questions released by the Association in that same month. The conflict involved a dispute along the Mongolian border that led to a series of attacks that began with repeated bombings of Japanese-­held areas, followed by an invasion by three Soviet battalions “with tanks and mountain-­guns.”80 According to the Japanese, the Soviet assault was repelled, but at a high cost in lives for both sides. Although a truce was brokered in August, the Japanese continued to portray the tensions along the borders with the USSR as a warning that the Soviet government planned to utilize all options to expand its control over areas to the east. Perhaps, more importantly, the Japanese came to the realization that expansion into Soviet Siberian territory from Manzhouguo would not be possible.81 But the problems on Japan’s northern border on the mainland were not over and Japanese propaganda writers were correct in their predictions of future conflicts with the USSR. By the summer of 1939, just weeks before the German invasion of Poland, a fierce five-­month battle between Soviet and Japanese troops led to Japan’s defeat in Mongolian territory as well as a series of devastating military setbacks for the Guandong Army in Manchuria. This was known as the Nomonhan Incident or Battle of Khlakhin Gol, and 75 percent of Japanese ground forces at the battlefront were killed in combat.82 The results demonstrated the obvious superiority of Soviet air and ground forces. Japanese propaganda institutions responded with portrayals of Soviet plans to move into China and the rest of Asia, while both sides increased troops in the area as fighting in Europe became widespread. Akira Iriye has suggested that Tokyo’s anxiety about a lack of military preparedness for a Soviet advance after the defeat at Nomonhan led to some Japanese leaders becoming “particularly solicitous to America’s goodwill.”83 Stepped-­up efforts at producing even more publicity for Japan’s mission in China continued.

92   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan

Notes   1 Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, “On Publicity and Information.” Tokyo Gazette: A Monthly Report of Current Policies, Official Statements and Statistics, no. 4 (October 1937), 7.   2 Tokyo Gazette, “Introduction.” (Each edition of the Gazette featured the same introductory statement.)   3 Department of Communications, “Overseas Electric Communications—Their Development and the Present Situation.” Tokyo Gazette (September, 1937), 4.   4 “Overseas Electric Communications,” 10.   5 Department of Railways, “Adjusting Railway Rates to National Purposes.” Tokyo Gazette (May 1938), 14.   6 Board of Tourist Industry, Japanese Government Railways, “Japan.” Tokyo Gazette (March–April, 1938), end page.   7 “The Japan Hotel Association.” Tokyo Gazette (May, 1938), end page.   8 Department of Railways, 16.   9 Department of Railways. 10 See, for example, Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai (Tokyo, 1937), 38; Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino-­Japanese Conflict (Tokyo, 1938), 5. 11 “On Publicity and Information,” 10. 12 See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Interview Given by Premier Wen Jiabao to Japanese Press.” (April 4, 2007), www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t309115.htm 13 Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino-­Japanese Conflict, 2. 14 Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, The North China Incident, 1937 (Tokyo, 1937), 1. 15 Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands did not send troops to assist the alliance. William R. Manning, “China and the Powers since the Boxer Movement.” The Amer­ican Journal of International Law 4, no. 4 (October 1910), 861. Article IX states that “certain points between Peking (Beijing) and the sea were to be occupied and garrisoned by the powers.” 16 The North China Incident, 1937, 7. 17 The North China Incident, 1937. 18 The North China Incident, 1937, 8. 19 “He-­Umezu Agreement and Qin-­Doihara Agreement.” www.republicanchina.org/war. html. 20 Wang Ke-­wen, “He-­Umezu Agreement” in Science and Football III, Jens Bangsbo, Thomas Reilly, and A. Mark Williams, eds. (London: Routledge, 1997), 39. 21 Hilton L. Root, Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 76. 22 “The Situation in North China.” Tokyo Gazette, no. 2 (August 1937), 27. 23 “The Situation in North China.” 24 In addition to lists of “innocent” Japanese murdered by Chinese included in various articles published in the Tokyo Gazette, the booklet Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai by the Foreign Affairs Association (September 1937) also listed Japanese victims from the Shanghai area murdered from November 1935 to October 1936. See page 49. 25 “The Situation in North China,” 26. 26 “The Situation in North China,” 33. 27 “The Situation in North China.” 28 “The Situation in North China.” 29 Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai. 30 Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai, 33, 37.

The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan   93 31 Robert W. Bingham, “The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State.” October 30, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 126–128. 32 Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai. 33 Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai. 34 Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai, 34. 35 Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai, 36. 36 Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino-­Japanese Conflict, 6. 37 The Official Website of the Museum of Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, www.nj1937.org. 38 Daqing Yang, “The Challenges of the Nanjing Massacre,” in The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 134. See also, Takashi Yoshida, “A Battle over History: The Naning Massacre in Japan” in Fogel, 70–132. 39 Ha Jin, “80 Years Nanjing Massacre, A Book Talk with Ha Jin.” Boston University, March 1, 2018. 40 Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, “Concerning the Nanking Incident,” Tokyo Gazette, nos 9 and 10 (March-­April 1938), 21. 41 Takashi Yoshida, 70–71. 42 See, for example, Kubo Arimasa, “The So-­Called Nanking Massacre Was A Fabrication.” Remnant, www2.biglobe/ne.jp/remnant/nankingm.htlm. This article sets up the contemporary debate among Nanjing Massacre “affirmationists” and “denialists.” 43 Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino-­Japanese Conflict, 5. 44 John M. Allison, “The Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Allison) to the Secretary of State.” December 31, 1937. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: IV, 428. 45 Suping Lu, They Were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by Amer­ican and British Nationals (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 179. 46 Press Section, War Department, “Assisting in Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in China—The Work of the Japanese Soldiers of Peace.” Tokyo Gazette, no. 11 (May 1938), 17. 47 Press Section, War Department, 2. 48 The North China Incident, 1937, 15. 49 The North China Incident, 1937, 14–15 50 The North China Incident, 1937, 14. 51 “Foreign News: Dr. Williams.” Time, April 4, 1927, www.time.com/time/ printout/0,8816,722981,00.html. 52 Tatsuo Kawai, Japanese Foreign Office. Quoted in Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai, 25. 53 From a dispatch by a New York Times Shanghai correspondent, August 27, 1937. Quoted in Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai, 27. 54 Bureau of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, “Development of New Regimes in China.” Tokyo Gazette, no. 17 (November 1938), 18–19. 55 Frank Pruit Lockhart, “The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State.” January 10, 1939. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939: III, 127. 56 Press Section, War Department, 17. 57 Press Section, War Department, 18. 58 Press Section, War Department, 20–21. 59 Press Section, War Department, 21–22. 60 Board of Planning, “The Programme of Economic Development for China, II.” Tokyo Gazette, no. 19 (January, 1939), 24. 61 Graham Peck, “The Chargé in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State.” January 20, 1939. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939: III, 127. (Peck also reported that Western military observers in China found deplorable the absence of organization and

94   The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan coordination even in the air service which had the “most important duties to perform of any branch.”) 62 Konoe Fumimaro, “An Appeal to the Nation—On the Occasion of the First Anniversary of the China Affair.” Tokyo Gazette, no. 14 (August 1938), 5. 63 Konoe Fumimaro, 7. 64 Chiang’s reference to the “Three People’s Principles” was an attempt to claim legitimacy as heir to the beloved Sun Yatsen (Sun Zhongshan) as Guomindang head. Sun’s principles of nationalism, democracy, and socialism were reinterpreted or ignored by Chiang. 65 Bureau of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, “Significance of the North China Problem.” Tokyo Gazette, no. 2 (August 1937), 19. 66 “Significance of the North China Problem,” 20–21. 67 Bureau of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, “Chinese Communists and the China Affair.” Tokyo Gazette, no. 16 (October 1938), 1. 68 For the complete Karakhan Manifesto translated into English, see: “Appendix B: Karakhan Manifesto, July 25, 1919,” in Soviet Policies in China 1917–1924, ed. Allen S. Whiting (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 269–271. 69 “Chinese Communists and the China Affair,” 8. 70 “Chinese Communists and the China Affair,” 1. 71 “Chinese Communists and the China Affair,” 1 and 3. 72 “Chinese Communists and the China Affair,” 3. 73 “Chinese Communists and the China Affair,” 2, 5, and 6. 74 “Chinese Communists and the China Affair,” 8. 75 Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino-­Japanese Conflict, 7–8. 76 Bureau of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, “Facts Concerning Soviet Outrages—Oppressive Acts on Japanese Diplomatic Establishments and Commercial Rights and Interest.” Tokyo Gazette, nos 9 and 10 (March–April 1938), 11. 77 “Facts Concerning Soviet Outrages,” 12–13. 78 “Facts Concerning Soviet Outrages,” 11. 79 “Address of Mr. Koki Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs.” Tokyo Gazette, no. 8 (February 1938), 39–40. 80 Bureau of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, “The Changkufeng Incident.” Tokyo Gazette (September, 1938), 20–29; Foreign Affairs Association, Manchouku– Soviet Union Border Questions (September, 1938). 81 See Martin Blumenson, “The Soviet Power Play at Changkufeng.” World Politics 12, no. 2. (January 1960), 249–263. 82 For a description of the significance of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol for World War II, see Stuart D. Goldman, “The Forgotten Soviet–Japanese War of 1939.” The Diplomat, August 28, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/the-­forgotten-soviet-­japanese-war­of-1939/. 83 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese–Amer­ican War, 1941–1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 8.

5 The Japan Pacific Association

As the Japanese army marched south into the heart of China in late 1937, another organization formed in Tokyo to aid the spread of wartime propaganda—the Japan Pacific Association (JPA). Like several other associations reporting on the Second Sino-­Japanese War, the JPA was closely tied to the Japanese government. It was created in the months following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which is considered the start of war. Its first publication appeared in November, within weeks of the establishment of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Undō), which tried to enforce conformity and a spirit of nationalism in publicity about the war. Moreover, the Tokyo government also reorganized its Cabinet Intelligence Bureau to form the more powerful Cabinet Intelligence Department (CID) in September. The CID took over the task of monitoring publicity and created the Information Photo­ graphy Association to distribute government-­approved images of the war. JPA staff had access to select combat photographs and information about Japan’s military progress in China. Its publications frequently used versions of so-­called eyewitness testimony, letters, statistics, drawings, and images that appeared in publications of other allegedly independent institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, the SMRC, or the Osaka Mainichi and Tokyo Nichi Nichi newspapers, that now were more tightly controlled by the CID. The organization’s task was to portray Japan’s role in China in a positive light by examining Tokyo’s war aims and reasons for expansion onto the Asian mainland. The implied double meaning for its name provided one of the organization’s main themes—its goal was to show the world that Japan would bring peace to the Pacific. According to a statement published in 1938 by the JPA, “The realization of Japan’s aims—the stabilization of East Asia and the establishment of permanent peace—will come when China and Japan work together in harmony.”1 The JPA published propaganda in several Western languages, including English, French, and German. Booklets and pamphlets printed in English were distributed from Tokyo to Japanese friendship associations in the U.S. and other English-­speaking countries, selected university libraries, and bookstores worldwide. Today these resources are available in their original form in the archives of several universities and in private collections. Several volumes also have been copied and are available online as part of university collections.2

96   The Japan Pacific Association The JPA did not outlast World War  II. Its main works in English appeared from 1937 to 1939 when it published five volumes of the Japan–China Pictorial Primer. The termination of its major publications coincided with Tokyo’s decision to abrogate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1911) between the U.S. and Japan on July 26, 1939, an unwelcome event for Tokyo by the State Department, according to Akira Iriye, who also suggested that many in the Tokyo government then became more determined to placate the U.S. in response.3 The booklets had emphasized the theme that Amer­icans should support Japan’s programs for China, especially its economic goals. Numerous comparisons between Japan and China stressed that Japan was more like the West than it was like China and Japan offered the world prosperity while China could not, unless the Japanese controlled Chinese territory. Such assertions were similar to those found in the publications of many of Japan’s wartime propaganda organs, but the JPA differed in that its literature specifically asked for assistance in solving problems the Japanese faced at home, such as overpopulation and inadequate arable land for food production. Such problems, endemic to Japan’s economic situation and quest for growth, were cited as justifications for Japanese imperialism. Moreover, JPA writers consistently compared Japanese twentieth-­century imperialism favorably with that of Western nations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. JPA publications covered the Second Sino-­Japanese War in a way that would target those who may have sympathized with the concerns of the Japanese before the outbreak of war with the U.S., such as the need for food supplies and natural resources for a growing population. Its writers emphasized the striking similarities, from their point of view, of Amer­ican and Japanese progress, pointing out, for example, that Japan’s expansion onto the Asian mainland was contemporaneous and comparable to the increases in Amer­ican acquisitions of overseas territories from 1898 to 1917. In addition, the JPA was unique among Japan’s propaganda organs in that its publications engaged in a discourse with Chinese writers and their supporters, refuting claims of atrocities and maltreatment during the Second Sino-­Japanese War. Many of its writers not only portrayed Japan’s aims in a positive light but also disputed the bad press the Japanese received in the Chinese media by providing images and explanations critical of Chinese versions of events. That role was particularly important by 1937 not only because Japan’s moves south into China had created international sympathy for the plight of the Chinese, but also because in July the Guomindang government redoubled its own propaganda efforts to elicit support. Chiang appointed Amer­ican-­educated Hollington Tong (Dong Xianquang) as head of China’s National Military Council’s external propaganda division and began a “propaganda campaign aimed at the Amer­ican people” in order to garner support for China and seek U.S. sanctions against Japan.4 A JPA goal was to supplement the work of other propaganda organizations and counter China’s intensified efforts. The JPA’s primary publication, the Japan–China Pictorial Primer, was a series of small illustrated booklets released beginning in November 1937,

The Japan Pacific Association   97 f­ ollowing the outbreak of hostilities in China’s capital, Nanjing. The first volume, the 42-page Primer subtitled What’s It All About?, briefly compared Japan’s and China’s histories, economies, and cultures and spelled out Tokyo’s goals for China’s bright future under Japanese dominion. The second volume was published as two editions in December 1937 with two different subtitles, How about Giving Japan a Break? Truth Will Out! or How about Giving Japan Fair Play? Truth Will Out! The 48-page text, the same in both editions, refuted allegations of Japanese atrocities in China found in English-­language sources, including those published in China. Volume three, Do You Know That …? Fifty Questions on Current Topics, answered questions on conditions in both China and Japan in early 1938. It also introduced Japan’s role in developing Manzhouguo and fighting the spread of communism in Asia that had already begun in China’s northern territories. Japan’s Problems was the fourth volume of the Primer series. This booklet analyzed the reasons for Japan’s expansion on the Asian mainland and lauded Tokyo’s accomplishments over the previous few decades. The fifth volume of the series released in 1939 was titled Are You Sure That …? It answered many of the same questions dealt with in volume three and challenged Westerners to discover the “truth” about Japan’s role in China, asking Amer­icans if they were “sure” that Japan was an enemy. An additional publication within its pages not directly attributed to the JPA but which shared similar themes, language, and photographs was the journal entitled Why Is Japan Fighting? published in December 1937. Its larger magazine format repeated several articles from the JPA Primer series and used additional provocative photographs with images often more disturbing than those used in the Primers.5 JPA writers chose illustrations for the Primer series that cleverly portrayed appealing Japanese images. A study of the booklets’ cover designs shows both obvious and subtle attempts to depict the Japanese as more modern, sophisticated, even more Western, than the Chinese. Volume one, for example, had a photograph on its cover of two young professional filmmakers defying Asian social conventions of the time: a man and woman working together, smartly dressed in Western style, using modern photographic equipment, apparently documenting events in China on film.6 This specific photograph was well publicized in other journals. For example, it also appeared as part of a collage in the centerfold of English-­language supplements to the Osaka Mainichi newspaper and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi newspaper in October 1937. The newspapers identified the young female as “Miss Takako Yamagishi, woman war correspondent,” but did not name the male photographer in the photograph.7 Another JPA booklet cover showed clean, well-­dressed Japanese soldiers interacting in a friendly way with Chinese merchants. The Japanese soldiers in the photo were purchasing goods from Chinese in front of a storefront that was adorned with a Chinese-­style lantern and the flag of Japan. Buyers and sellers were laughing.8 Similarly, in a cover photo taken in January 1938 in Suzhou, two men, a Japanese soldier and a Chinese in scholar’s dress, standing with a Chinese pagoda as background, were engaged in what appeared to be polite ­conversation.9 Another cover had universally appealing portraits of adorable,

Figure 5.1  Japanese soldiers playing baseball in China during war. Source: Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer – How about Giving Japan a Break? Truth Will Out! December 1937, back cover.

Figure 5.2 An unlikely friendly encounter between a Japanese soldier and Chinese scholar, Suzhou, 1938. Source: Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer – Do You Know That …? Fifty Questions on Current Topics, January 1938, back cover.

100   The Japan Pacific Association grinning toddlers.10 Yet another showed young men in a field obviously playing the Amer­ican game of baseball. A pitcher was winding up, ready to throw at a batter holding a homemade bat, with a squatting catcher and an umpire behind him. Japanese soldiers standing by third base were gazing across the field of players approvingly.11 The images on the booklets’ covers reinforced the message delivered by text and photos inside, where the Japanese attempted to set the record straight, from their point of view, about the nature of their role in China.

“What’s it all about?”12 The JPA’s 42-page first volume of the Japan–China Pictorial Primer published in November 1937 outlined a side-­by-side comparison of the Japanese and Chinese interpretations of the scene in China during the war. The booklet, subtitled What’s It All About?, attempted to delineate the myriad differences between China and Japan at the time of the hostilities as well as warn of dangerous elements that threatened the peace in East Asia. The inside front-­cover pages showed a map of East Asia over which was superimposed poetic and flowery prose answering the questions “Where is China?” and “Where is Japan?” Here both countries were praised for their ancient cultures and traditions. China was described as “an ancient nation, placid but powerful.” The Japanese were “a spirited and proud people, united in speech and customs, [who] inhabit these isles, frugally living from the scant products of the soil, and going out on the ocean in frail fishing boats.”13 But a closer look at the two-­page map that served as background revealed another message: looming over China’s northern borders in huge letters were the words “Soviet Russia.” The Soviet flag was by far the biggest on the map, several times larger than Japan’s or Manzhouguo’s. East Asia appeared dwarfed by the imposing position of its northern neighbor. Yet, just to the east of Japan was a line drawing of a small nineteenth-­century steamship heading toward Japan with an oversized Western man standing at its helm. The smoke spilling out of the ship’s smokestack spelled out “PERRY,” referring to Commodore Matthew C. Perry, the Amer­ican naval commander who had led a squadron of frigates to Japan in 1853, forcing the Japanese to open trade ties with the West. After anchoring at Edo (Tokyo) Bay, the Amer­icans and Japanese had negotiated a treaty that opened Japan to foreign commercial and diplomatic ties in 1854. Thus, the first image readers saw on the Primer’s inside front cover was a divided East Asia—China under threat from its communist neighbor and Japan influenced and assisted by “friendly” Amer­icans for decades.14 The main purpose of the JPA’s first volume of the Primer was to illustrate the stark differences between a modern Japan and a backward China in order to convince Amer­icans that Japan was the better choice as ally. Although the first few of the booklet’s pages listed the dry facts comparing the two nations’ square miles, number of provinces, populations, dialects, and miles of railroad track, the provocative images accompanying the text, including photographs, charts, drawings, and cartoons, flaunted depictions of Japan’s more economically advanced

The Japan Pacific Association   101 society. The JPA secured the services of one of Japan’s most famous political cartoonists of the early twentieth century, Kitazawa Yasuji (pen name, Rakuten). Rakuten’s political satire had impacted Tokyo’s foreign relations since the Russo-­Japanese War (1904–1905), during which he founded the highly popular Tōkyō pakku (Tokyo Puck),15 which soon became one of the most popular manga magazines of its time. By the time the JPA began publishing, the Tokyo government had already acknowledged the significant role manga played in supporting wartime propaganda. As Peter Duus has suggested, “the political cartoon became a weapon in the battle for public opinion.”16 In 1939 Rakuten, who had been producing pro-­nationalist cartoons, also complained of censorship by government authorities that stifled the creativity of Japanese cartoonists.17 Nevertheless, Rakuten’s drawings were featured by the JPA in the Primer’s first edition where he attempted to convey humorous comparisons between life in underdeveloped China and industrialized Japan. One cartoon mocked a Chinese mode of transport—a wheelbarrow holding two hefty men and their belongings with a thinner man hoisting them along. The text explained that in China, “[t]he quickest means of traveling is by airplane and the slowest is by wheelbarrow.”18 For comparison, the opposite page showed a Japanese railroad terminal. A black and white photograph displayed the tops of dozens of railroad cars in the foreground with more trains and tracks jammed together in the background. The description explained: “Japan has 16,479 miles of railway track and its railroads are noted for safety and for precision of time,” while China’s miles of railroad track were inaccurately described as “few.”19 On the following pages two photographs of urban centers were chosen to exaggerate further the differences between Japan and China. Rather than show the bustling and relatively modern Bund area of Shanghai or commercial centers in other Chinese port cities, an overcrowded market in a slum with mud roads, surrounded by dilapidated shacks depicted China in the 1930s. No automobiles or even bicycles were visible; camels overloaded with straw baskets appeared to be the popular method of transport. On the other hand, a photograph on the opposite page of an unnamed Japanese city featured a wide, gas-­lamp-lit boulevard with electric trolleys traveling down the center. The buildings were modern skyscrapers, typical of those in Western metropolises, except for signs in Japanese.20 JPA writers also emphasized the similarities in forms of government between the U.S. and Japan. The text accompanying a photograph of Tokyo’s Diet ­building said: “Japan has a Diet composed of two branches as in the United States—A House of Representatives and a House of Peers. Japan is governed by a Constitution approved in 1889.”21 On the other hand, China was described as a country that had seen “almost constant civil warfare since 1912” where “local governors and military captains have ruled small territories like medieval barons.”22 Moreover, China’s president and Guomindang head, Chiang Kaishek, was called a dictator who “owes his rise to power to the help of Communist Russia.”23 China’s association with the USSR and the challenges that posed to the West were themes pursued in several volumes of the JPA’s Primers. The JPA

102   The Japan Pacific Association emphasized the Soviet threat to Amer­ican interests in Asia in more detail and with greater urgency than other propaganda organizations, including the Foreign Affairs Association. Profitable commercial ties between Japan and the U.S. provided another topic for the JPA to use to make favorable comparisons. Like the America–Japan Society, the JPA wrote about real and potential trade to appeal to Amer­ican business interests that supported continued access to Japanese markets. In 1936, U.S. exports to Japan (8.9 percent of the U.S. total) were over five times greater than those to China (1.7 percent of the U.S. total), according to Japanese sources.24 Two accompanying Rakutan cartoons exaggerated the lucrative trade between the U.S. and Japan and hammered the point that Japan was the obviously superior trade partner. One cartoon showed an oversized Chinese man dressed in traditional gown, vest, and skull cap holding a small sack on his back. Written on the sack was “$64,164,000”—the “worth of products” China sold to the U.S. in 1935. Next to him was a much smaller Japanese man, dressed in a Western-­ style vested suit, necktie, and hat, who was burdened by the large sack on his back. On his sack “$151,396,000” was written, representing the value of Jap­ anese products sold to the U.S. in 1935.25 In a second cartoon, Rakuten pointed to the favorable balance of trade the U.S. enjoyed with Japan during the 1930s. A tall “Uncle Sam” character stood in the middle, between two shorter men. On the left of “Uncle Sam”, a Chinese man, again dressed in traditional attire, held out a “coin” worth “60” cents to “Uncle Sam” while receiving a “coin” worth “$1”. The Japanese man standing to the right of “Uncle Sam” was accepting a coin that said “$1” while handing a coin worth “1.35” to the U.S. It also should be noted that the caricature of the Japanese man looked so Western in his suit, tie, and hat that Rakuten wrote “Japan” on the hem of the suit jacket. In addition, “Uncle Sam” was clearly smiling at “Japan,” while ignoring and standing with his back to the Chinese figure.26 The JPA also worked to allay any fears that Amer­ican business interests may have had concerning competition with Japan in Chinese territory. By the time the JPA was established in 1937, relations between the U.S. and Japan were strained. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Naval Quarantine Speech” in October, which had called Japan an aggressor nation, was seen as a threat. The U.S. government continued to refuse to recognize the independence of Manzhouguo and often criticized Japanese monopolistic commercial activities on the Asian mainland, in part due to Japan’s failure to adhere to a free trade policy, the “open door” policy in China formulated by the U.S. government at the turn of the twentieth century. The JPA deliberately addressed the issue by posing the question, “Does Japan wish to drive away foreign business from China?” The answer was that “the business interests of the United States and Japan are in no way opposed to each other in China” because “the goods sold by America to China do not compete with those sold by Japan.”27 They then claimed to be working to free China of both civil war and oppressive taxation so that China would become “a better customer of both Amer­ican and Japanese products.”28

The Japan Pacific Association   103 The JPA, like the SMRC, also wrote prolifically about “cultural work” sponsored by the Japanese government throughout China. The Japanese claimed to have followed the lead of the U.S. government in allocating much of the funds procured as the result of the Boxer Protocol following the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 to humanitarian projects for the benefit of the Chinese people.29 In addition, foundations set up by wealthy Japanese, such as the Tōa Dōbun Kwai (East Asia Allied-­Cultures Society) established decades earlier by Prince Konoye Atsumaro, father of Japan’s Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro, oversaw the creation of cultural and educational institutions for the Chinese in both China and Japan. According to JPA sources, Tokyo’s Foreign Office had a special bureau employing over 40 officials whose task was to oversee Sino-­Japanese cultural organizations, including the awarding of scholarships to Chinese students studying in Japan while, by comparison, according to the JPA, “there are no Chinese-­sponsored cultural institutions in Japan.”30 The Primer’s 1938 edition listed the Japanese-­sponsored cultural and educational institutions built by the Japanese government, with accompanying photographs of various sites in selected Chinese cities. Included were several international centers in China as well as Tokyo, such as: Peking [Beijing]: The Dojin Kwai Hospital The Modern Science Library The North China Agricultural Research Institute The Peking Cultural Research Institute and Library Shanghai: The Modern Science Library The Research Institute for Natural Sciences The Tung Wen College [Known for training espionage agents] Hangkow [Hankou]: The Kianghan Middle School The Dojin Hospital Tsinan [Jinan] and Tsingtao [Qingdao]: The Dojin Hospital Tokyo: The Dojin Kwai The Eastern Cultural Institute (with Research Institutes in Tokyo and Kyoto), The Nikka Gakkai (for Chinese students in Japan) The Toa Dobun Kwai The Toa Preparatory School, etc.31

Japan’s and the West’s treaty rights in China The bulk of each volume of the Japan–China Pictorial Primer was dedicated to explaining why Japan was at war with China during the late 1930s. Two themes

104   The Japan Pacific Association emerged: the Japanese were victims of Chinese aggression since China had started the war and Japan, like Western imperialist nations, had a legal right to occupy Chinese territory. Similar to literature published by the America–Japan Society, the SMRC, and the Foreign Affairs Associations, JPA publications detailed the various treaties the Chinese had signed with Japan and other foreign powers dating back to the end of the first Opium War in 1842. The agreements “gave foreign powers the right to send their ships up Chinese rivers to protect foreigners living in the interior.”32 JPA writers argued that Japan was not only trying to protect itself and its legal rights in China but also ensuring the safety of Western nations whose people were in China. The Primer’s third edition included a roughly drawn map of China, entitled “Foreign Interests in China,” delineating the segments of China that were considered under foreign control, including colonies, leases, and concessions. The map was distorted in order to give the reader the impression that most of China was under foreign, primarily European, jurisdiction. For example, most of central China was labeled as areas subject to “Non-­Alienation Promised to Gt. Britain (1898),” while south China was described with the phrase “Non-­ Alienation Prom. to France.” Japan, according to the map, controlled a huge chunk of territory in southeast China north of Amoy, again with a citation from an 1898 “non-­alienation” agreement. The opposite page of the Primer listed the various treaties and described the agreements the Chinese government (Qing) had made with foreigners leading to “promises not to alienate” territory from foreign occupation.33 The JPA then explained that specific treaty rights gave all foreign powers in China the right to administer and protect their Chinese territories without interference from China’s government or laws. Again, a long list of treaties and conventions, beginning in 1842, were cited as proof. Foreign powers had demanded such concessions, according to Japanese, “because they felt the Chinese Government was too disorganized and irresponsible to properly safeguard foreign interests.”34 The areas under direct foreign administration where Chinese law was not applicable were described by the Japanese as havens of peace and order, in comparison to Guomindang-­controlled territories. From 1928, Chiang Kaishek’s government had worked assiduously to retake specific foreign-­controlled territories through negotiations with the international community and had achieved only limited success. For example, the Chinese government had regained jurisdiction over several concessions previously controlled by Austria, Germany, and Russia following defeat during or, in the case of Russia, withdrawal from, World War I. But Chiang Kaishek’s bold attempt in July 1928 to dismantle the Sino-­ Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1896) that legally justified Japan’s presence in northeast China had failed. Furthermore, Western leaders did not support China’s side in the dispute because it challenged their commercial rights in China as well.35 Japanese writers implied that not only foreigners but also the Chinese populations in government-­controlled areas continued to endure intense suffering because of the Guomindang’s weakness and corruption. By the late 1930s, 11

The Japan Pacific Association   105 heavily populated and thriving coastal areas of China remained under foreign jurisdiction, causing JPA writers to comment: “Ironically enough, these areas being more orderly and safe than the territory under native jurisdiction, wealthy Chinese live and keep their fortunes there.”36 The JPA then examined the various sectors of the Chinese government’s administration that remained under foreign control or where a significant number of foreign staff were employed, including the Customs Office, Salt Revenue Administration, and post offices. The examples were used to back the Japanese argument that foreign troops and administrators were needed in China to maintain order, encourage business, and protect foreign nationals. In July 1937, foreign troops in China numbered in the tens of thousands and were deployed in several cities. The Primer printed charts of how many troops from Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the U.S. remained stationed in Chinese cities. Also highlighted were the numbers of reinforcements, totaling nearly 8,000, who were sent in September 1937 in response to increasing hostilities. According to the JPA, “the United States landed 1,435 officers and marines in Sept. 1937; Britain’s reinforcements were the Royal Welch Fusiliers and Ulster Rifles; France sent 700 Colonial troops; Italy dispatched a battalion of 800 Savoy Grenadiers.”37 JPA writers then addressed the question: “Why are these troops not withdrawn?” with the brief response: “Because it is not yet safe to do so.” Graphic descriptions of attacks on foreigners and foreign property by Chinese soldiers and “bandits” during the previous years were accompanied by photographs of anti-­foreign demonstrations, Amer­ican and British troops stationed throughout China, Western warships on China’s rivers, and well-­guarded foreign embassies—all reminders that Japan was not the sole foreign power occupying Chinese territory during the 1930s.38 Additionally, the JPA, like the Foreign Affairs Association, reported on the horror surrounding several alleged attacks by Guomindang troops on foreigners, including the “Nanking [Nanjing] Outrage,” the “Tsinan [Jinan] Massacre,” and the “Tungchow [Tongzhou] Massacre.” For example, one photograph, showing piles of corpses described as those of Japanese civilians killed during the Tongzhou Massacre of July 28, 1937, was accompanied by the text: Two hundred Japanese and Korean men, women, and children were brutally murdered. Many of these bodies, horribly mangled and disfigured, were found in a lotus pond. The wife of a Japanese Consular Police Officer had her two babies killed in her arms. Maids from a Japanese inn were strung together by having a wire forced through their noses and throats and then led out to be shot.39

The war spreads to Nanjing and Shanghai With each subsequent edition of the Primer, Japan’s progress in the war was examined. As the Japanese army marched south during the summer of 1937 it faced fierce Chinese resistance, which the Japanese characterized in several

106   The Japan Pacific Association articles as Chinese aggression targeted at all foreign nations. Meanwhile, Guomindang head, Chiang Kaishek, assisted by his popular, English-­speaking wife, Meiling Soong, her family, and many Chinese who had studied in the U.S., established various institutions that produced propaganda for an Amer­ican audience. The goals were not only to win support but also to elicit sanctions against Japan.40 The JPA’s task was to dispute Chinese accounts of events, to continue what Wei Shuge has described as Japan’s “traditional ‘self-­defense’ argument in the press, insisting that its action aimed to protect Japanese nationals.”41 Like the Foreign Affairs Association, JPA writers responded to negative press the Jap­ anese encountered after their takeover of Shanghai and the capture of China’s capital, Nanjing, asserting that Japan was instead the victim during its war with China. In addition, JPA writers did not ignore Chinese claims of Japanese brutality, but attempted to analyze Tokyo’s legal right to defend its citizens and positions in China. For example, the second edition of the Primer published a portion of a radio address on September 12, 1937, to the Amer­ican people by Meiling Soong, where she said: “Japan has utter disregard for the security of the lives and property of both foreigners and Chinese as seen in Shanghai.”42 The Jap­ anese responded with graphic descriptions accompanied by photographs of horrific destruction caused by aerial attacks on China’s southern commercial centers by the Chinese air force, which were followed by atrocities against civilians and foreigners, allegedly by Chinese soldiers carrying out orders. By mid-­1937, Shanghai and its International Settlement became war zones and the Chinese and Japanese disputed which side was responsible for the carnage that resulted from incessant fighting. Following complaints by Western governments, both the Chinese and Japanese governments allegedly pledged not to target Shanghai’s International Settlement, but such promises went unheeded. On the afternoon of August 23, a 500-pound Chinese bomb exploded over Shanghai’s Nanking Road department stores. The Primer published two photographs showing the same stores before and after the bombing and cited descriptions of the destruction originally published by British reporters in the Shanghai-­based British English-­language journal Oriental Affairs: “Scenes of carnage similar to those of Aug. 14 resulted. Police ambulances and volunteers rushed to the scene to remove the killed and injured. The final count of casualties put the number at 173 killed and 549 wounded.”43 The Primer’s account concluded with the lengthy list of foreigners who had died in the attack.44 In an attempt to corroborate claims of Chinese atrocities for an Amer­ican audience, several of the Primer’s graphic descriptions of casualties and wounded at the hands of the Chinese came from Amer­ican sources, such as Time magazine’s edition on August 23, 1937. A feature story on the war in Asia reported that Chinese bombs in an August 14 attack had landed “smack in the middle of ” thousands of Chinese refugees in Shanghai. The article had also listed the names of foreigners who died as a consequence of the bombings that had hit the nearby Great World Amusement Park located in Shanghai’s French Concession. The excerpt from Time magazine reprinted in the Primer concluded with a quotation

The Japan Pacific Association   107 from a well-­respected Amer­ican eyewitness: “Uninjured by the bombings but a shocked eyewitness was Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. [Eleanor B. Roosevelt]. Quickly she telegraphed a protest to Mme. Chiang Kaishek with whom she had dined earlier in the week.”45 Another of Roosevelt’s accounts of Chinese violence in Shanghai first published in an Amer­ican journal appeared in the Primer in 1937. Quoting from an article in the Saturday Evening Post, JPA writers cited Eleanor B. Roosevelt’s description of the brutality and mayhem caused by the Chinese that characterized life in the International Settlement during the summer of 1937: Suddenly we heard cries, deepening into a sullen roar. Directly below us the entire throng had become an infuriated mob, and giving tongue like hounds, were chasing five Japanese. Four managed to escape by jumping into busses. Oddly enough, the Chinese did not try to pull them out. One tripped and fell. They got him. As he lay in an ever-­widening lake of blood, they kicked him, beat him and stoned him until his ribs were crushed and his face a bloody pulp.46 The JPA also reprinted photographs previously published in Oriental Affairs showing the destruction of Shanghai’s international areas. The British journal’s editors openly blamed Chiang Kaishek’s government for the summer bombings: Between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. that afternoon, two Chinese bombing planes dropped two bombs each, one at the traffic circus, at the junction of Edward VII-­Yuya Ching Road and Boulevard de Montigny, and the other on the Bund end of Nanking Road, over the Cathay and Palace Hotels. The traffic circus was crowded with refugees at the time.… The slaughter was appalling. Lorry-­load after lorry-­load of corpses were removed from the Avenue Edward VII traffic circus, while hundreds of persons still living were taken to various hospitals for treatment.47 The August 30 assault by China’s air force on the USS President Hoover was next featured by the JPA as an obvious example of Chinese aggression that targeted foreigners, in this case, Amer­icans. According to another article cited from the October 1937 edition of Oriental Affairs, the Amer­ican ship, a luxurious state-­of-the-­art cruise liner owned by the Dollar Steamship Line, fell victim to a surprise attack by Chinese aircraft as it approached the port area at the outskirts of Shanghai. It had sailed from Manila on a mission to rescue Amer­ican evacuees who demanded passage to escape the violence. One crew member was killed and several crew and passengers were injured. The Primer’s version of events detailed the damage the ship had suffered and noted that a Japanese destroyer and the British ship, the HMS Cumberland, had come to the Hoover’s aid. A photograph of the ship’s side illustrated the impact of the shelling by Chinese bombs. The JPA also noted the reaction of one of the Hoover’s Amer­ican

108   The Japan Pacific Association passengers, a consular official from Manila, who described the scene as a case of “willful, wanton, merciless, inhuman, savage-­like bombing”48 by the Chinese air force. As fighting continued, Guomindang forces made several desperate attempts to hold on to China’s coastal cities in the face of Japanese advance. The November 1937 edition of the Primer published two maps of Shanghai’s International Settlement showing the deployment of Chinese troops surrounding Japanese and other foreign residences late in the summer of 1937. Their presence was a violation of international law, according to Japanese sources. JPA writers cited a 1932 agreement with Chiang’s government, “witnessed by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy,”49 that had prohibited the positioning of Chinese military personnel in close proximity to foreign-­controlled territories. Instead, a special Chinese security force numbering about 5,000 called the Peace Preservation Corps had been created to patrol those areas. Only those trained police were to protect foreigners. But the Guomindang had violated the law several months earlier when it increased police presence and expanded “secret” military fortifications in the Shanghai area. Furthermore, according to the JPA, in August, Chiang had ordered two army divisions, “on full war footing,” into the city to be stationed “within a stone’s throw of the Shanghai Settlement boundary.”50 It was the Chinese then who were blamed for opening the hostilities that “turned Shanghai into a city of ruin and misery”51 in 1937. The Chinese made no attempt to deny their involvement in the attacks on Shanghai. They needed to defend Chinese territory from Japanese aggression and their actions were aimed at halting the Japanese advance. The bombing of the USS President Hoover, however, proved to be an embarrassment for the Guomindang government. The owner of the Dollar Steamship Line, Robert Dollar, had been a personal friend of President Chiang Kaishek. While witnesses testified that the ship clearly displayed an oversized Amer­ican flag, Chinese pilots claimed to have mistaken it for a Japanese transport ship. Chinese English­language publications blamed pilot error for the attack. For example, The China Journal, a Shanghai-­based English-­language newspaper, printed a front-­page article in its September 1937 edition where it was noted that “the inexperience of Chinese airmen was once more demonstrated on August 30 when bombs were aimed by a Chinese plane at the ‘President Hoover’.”52 The JPA also claimed that China’s leaders flagrantly violated international conventions of warfare in their attacks on foreigners in China while simultaneously trying to blame Japan for such illegal actions. For example, during Japan’s assault on Nanjing and Shanghai, several incidents where the use of the poison gas phosgene were reported by administrators at Nanjing’s Red Cross Hospital. When foreign investigators, including those from the League of Nations Health Organization stationed in China, hesitated to accuse either side of using gas warfare, the Japanese Consulate-­General at Shanghai allegedly “proved” the source of the phosgene to be Chinese trench mortar shells. Their well-­publicized “discovery” was detailed “for the benefit of some 60 rather uncomfortable foreign news representatives” in Shanghai in October 1937, as

Figure 5.3 A Shanghai street weeks after Japan’s victory in the devastating Battle of Shanghai. Source: Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer – Do You Know That? Fifty Questions on Current Topics, January 1938, inside front cover.

110   The Japan Pacific Association well as reported in the JPA’s publications.53 The Chinese were also cited for other violations of international conventions, such as attacking schools, hospitals, and ambulances; targeting civilians, including foreigners; and illegally using foreign flags to protect Chinese property where munitions were stored. JPA journals showed numerous photographs of buildings adorned by British, Amer­ican, or Swedish flags where, the authors claimed, the Chinese government had been amassing supplies, weapons, and troops.54 In contrast, JPA writers praised Japan’s actions in China. After claiming that Japan was not seeking an empire in Asia, the JPA asserted that Japan was proud not to “abandon the lives and property of her people who chose to join those of other nations in living in China.”55 In an effort to promote “an honorable peace” in China, the Japanese proposed that with time and the support of the Chinese and international communities, they would be able to defeat the enemy—“a small group of fanatics” who caused the “turmoil and chaos” in China. According to JPA writers, “these fanatics, falsely called Fascists, are in reality allied to the Chinese and Russian Communists.”56 Like Japan’s other propaganda organs, the JPA took every opportunity to ally China’s government and war effort with the potential spread of communism in Asia. But the JPA went beyond other organizations, including the Foreign Affairs Association, with its articles on China’s historic relations with Russia and the Soviet Union. The JPA, like the Foreign Affairs Association, tried to provide compelling evidence showing that China was doomed to fall to communism if the Guomindang continued to rule. Chiang Kaishek’s connections to the Soviet Union were used as a scare tactic in Japanese propaganda aimed at Amer­icans, especially as border conflicts between the Japanese and the Soviets failed to go Japan’s way.

Communism, the real enemy in China? In 1917 the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia ignited a Red Scare in both the United States and Japan that lasted through the 1930s. Although the Tokyo government established diplomatic ties with Moscow in 1925 while the U.S. held off until 1933, anti-­communist sentiment remained widespread in both nations. JPA literature tried to exploit the fear of what its writers called the “Soviet Menace” in Asia. The third edition of the Primer, Do You Know That…?, explained “[t]hat Japan considers the spread of Communism in Asia as a national peril”57 because the Japanese had seen what communism had done to Russia: Who would agree to live under such a rule where neither workman nor peasant is sure of the next day, where father is betrayed by his son, where children are neglected if their parents do not profess the political and social creed of the day, where liberty and joy of life are non-­existent?58 For the Japanese, communism’s inevitable spread to China and its neighbors was evident in a 1936 treaty of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and

The Japan Pacific Association   111 Outer Mongolia because the agreement was characterized as the culmination of the latest Russian attempts to expand eastward, challenging China’s sovereignty and threatening Japan’s moves westward. According to the JPA, “Tsarist Russia aimed to conquer Outer Mongolia as a step toward her expansion in the Far East. Red Russia coveted it as a base of operations against China and as a link between the Chinese Reds and Moscow” (emphasis in original). Japanese writers warned that Outer Mongolia was already “entirely under the control of Soviet Russia”; several Soviet administrators had been sent to work in the Mongolian government.59 But Japan proclaimed it was ready to take a stand; it was “prepared” and “willing” to be the “bulwark” against the spread of communism to China and beyond.60 The JPA provided evidence of a communist threat by describing the terms of past specific agreements between Moscow and various Chinese organizations, particularly the Guomindang, that had linked Chinese leaders to the Soviet Union and the Communist International (Comintern). In 1923, Guomindang founder and predecessor to Chiang Kaishek, Sun Yatsen (Sun Zhongshan), had negotiated an agreement that created the First United Front, signaling the collaboration among his party, the two-­year old CCP, and the Soviet-­sponsored Comintern, after Sun’s appeals for assistance from the West had been rebuffed. The United Front agreement gave Sun much-­needed financial and military aid, in this case from Moscow, for his plans to reunite China under Guomindang leadership. Soviet assistance was instrumental in the Guomindang’s subsequent military campaign that successfully united several southern Chinese provinces under the party’s control and led to the establishment of Guomindang authority over the Republic of China in 1928 with a new capital at Nanjing. By then, however, Sun had died (in 1925) and Chiang Kaishek had come to dominate Guomindang politics. His goals differed from Sun’s in that he failed to target Western foreign interests, one of Sun’s original ideas, and instead reunified a portion of south China by defeating several warlords, exerting authority over their territories. Having assumed the presidency of the newly re-­invigorated republic, Chiang then tried to dissociate himself and his party from Soviet and Comintern affiliation. He terminated the First United Front, dismissing the party’s Soviet advisors and hiring Germans to replace them. In addition, Chiang ordered the horrific attack on CCP members and their supporters in Shanghai, called the White Terror, which killed thousands of Communists and forced survivors to flee the city. As a result of the Guomindang’s apparent political transformation, by the 1930s, it would be a challenge for Japanese propaganda to portray Guomindang leadership and Chiang’s close associates as pro-­communist or pro-­Soviet. One difficult task for JPA writers was to offset a well-­funded campaign by Chiang Kaishek and his family to portray themselves as friends of the West, particularly Amer­icans. During the same years as the JPA operated, China’s propaganda effort aimed at the Amer­ican people was also in full swing. Tiuchida Akio describes a wide range of institutions started or supported by Chiang’s family members after 1937 that sought to influence Amer­ican public opinion in order to

112   The Japan Pacific Association garner financial support and sanctions against Japan. Among the organizations were the China branch of the International Peace Campaign, an international anti-­war league founded in 1936; the China Defense League, organized by Madame Chiang’s sister, Song Qingling, in Hong Kong; and the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, officially sponsored by H.H. Kung (Kong Xiangxi), Chiang’s brother-­in-law.61 The Guomindang also sponsored the Amer­ican Committee for Non-­Participation in Japanese Aggression, based in New York City and launched in 1938. Among its Amer­ican activists were pro-­China missionaries and scholars. Its activities included publishing booklets that not only portrayed Jap­ anese brutality in China but also examined Amer­ican trade with Japan, blaming certain Amer­ican industrialists for their indirect support for Japan’s aggression and atrocities.62 In addition, the glamorous Chinese first lady served the Guomindang’s cause well. Her connections to wealthy Amer­ican business and political leaders contributed to the Guomindang’s success at maintaining consistent Amer­ican support during and after the war. Her portrayal of the Republic of China as a democratic nation whose leaders were dedicated to eradicating communism gained sufficient credibility in some Western political circles that the JPA and other propaganda organs were forced to “correct” the facts. The Primer’s third edition addressed the issue with the statement: “Popular election certainly is a factor in a democracy. Yet, never in China’s history has there been anything resembling a popular election.”63 More importantly, the JPA continued to draw attention to the Guomindang’s Soviet connections, noting that Chiang continued to be “openly aided by the Communist International.” Tokyo’s goal was to rid Asia of communist influence, an aim that it claimed to share with Washington. Each volume of the Japan– China Pictorial Primer mentioned Japan’s quest to foster the development of capitalism and democracy in China. But it was Chiang Kaishek, himself, who bore responsibility for moving China toward totalitarianism and communism, according to the Japanese, primarily because the Guomindang had not only received direct Soviet aid beginning with the First United Front in 1923, but also had officially allied with the CCP for a second time in 1936. In its version of Guomindang history, the JPA asserted that financial and military assistance from the “Russian Communists” during the 1920s had caused party leaders, especially Chiang Kaishek, to serve Soviet, not Western, goals for China. Chiang, after all, had been a loyal supporter of Sun Yatsen and his collaboration with the Comintern. Moreover, Chiang had received military training in Moscow during the early 1920s and had sent his only son to train there as well. According to the Japanese, Chiang gave his support to the long-­standing Soviet policy against Western and Japanese imperialism. As a result, his policies “tried to drive hate into the hearts of the common people against the so-­called ‘Imperialist Powers,’ America, France, Great Britain, and Japan.”64 Under Chiang’s leadership, the Guomindang staged massive demonstrations and violent boycotts against foreign “oppressors of the Chinese people.” As a result, “Amer­ icans, English, Italians and Japanese were brutally assaulted and killed,”65

The Japan Pacific Association   113 a­ llegedly at the hands of Chiang’s soldiers and supporters. JPA literature supported such claims with illustrations from Chinese publications that depicted violent confrontations between foreigners and Chinese because Chinese patriots were encouraged to fight against foreign exploitation by the government. For example, during the 1930s, the Shanghai Commercial Press published several texts for Chinese public school children where sketches of foreigners beating Chinese civilians were used to illustrate history lessons. A sample text was reprinted in the JPA’s Primer. Accompanying a drawing of foreign soldiers firing on unarmed Chinese bystanders were the statements: “Our People … are being oppressed by the Foreigners” “Our Land … is being invaded by the Foreigners” “Our Riches … are being plundered by the Foreigners.”66 In many JPA reports, the Chinese government’s stand against imperialism was equated with being pro-­communist. Furthermore, the “Soviet Menace” in China loomed larger with the creation of a Second United Front between the Guomindang and the CCP in December 1936, when the two parties officially combined their efforts to fight the Japanese invasion that was heading south from Manzhouguo. The JPA announced the alliance with the statement: “Chiang Kai-­ shek has joined hands with Communism”67 once again. As one consequence of the 1936 Second United Front, Chiang claimed to abandon the Guomindang’s nine-­year-old policy of eliminating members of the CCP and their collaborators before attacking the Japanese. Citing an article from the September 1937 edition of the popular weekly Amer­ican Liberty magazine, the JPA described Chiang’s altered strategy by noting the sudden disappearance from Guomindang-­controlled territories of the formerly ubiquitous placards that had touted the slogan: “First exterminate the Communists; then fight Japan.” According to the Japanese, Chiang’s government followed disturbing, hypocritical policies. While Mme. Chiang continued to speak out as an ardent anti-­ communist, characterizing communism as “a knife in the back” of the Chinese people, she and her husband had apparently “sold out to the Communists”68 when they agreed to join forces with the CCP against Japan with the Second United Front. In October 1937, the alliance between the two Chinese parties was formalized when Communist general and Central Committee member Zhu De met with Chiang. Japanese sources noted that the much-­publicized event where “the bitterest enemies in the country” were photographed shaking hands, served as further “proof ” that the Communist Red Army had become an integral part of Chinese government forces. The JPA supported such suppositions by citing Amer­ican critics of Chiang’s government, especially those who openly challenged the decision made by Time magazine’s editor Henry Luce, a close friend of the Guomindang, to award Chiang and his wife the title of “Man and Woman of the Year” for 1937. New

114   The Japan Pacific Association York Times correspondent Anthony Billingham reacted to the Time magazine honor with an article entitled: “The Man and Woman Whom China Obeys,” from which the JPA excerpted sections to bolster its argument that Chiang Kaishek and his government should not be trusted by Amer­icans: Most Amer­ican conceptions of China and the Chinese people seem based upon imagination, propaganda and incorrect reports written more for their color value than veracity. Amer­icans speak of our ‘great sister Republic’ across the Pacific, meaning China, without realizing that there is not an iota of democracy in all this great land (emphasis in original). Actually China is governed by super-­dictator Chiang Kai-­shek and a number of lesser regional political-­military leaders. Chiang controls the National Government, which includes all the provinces in Central China. Generalissimo Chiang’s own private army is the only one in China which can be termed a national force. What there is of China’s Navy is subject to his orders alone, and Mme. Chiang controls China’s Air Force. For some obscure reason, possibly polite humility, Chiang refuses to admit that he is the dictator of China. He likes to pretend that the National Government runs China’s affairs, but the mere suggestion is ludicrous, for a more closely knit family dictatorship is scarcely imaginable. Chiang Kai-­ shek and Mme. Chiang are the Chinese government … China’s real leaders are all military men, war-­lords of provinces, generals with their own private armies” (emphasis in original).69 Following the conclusion of the above excerpt, the JPA listed the “military chieftains” who, it argued, were among China’s “real leaders.” Included in the list were long-­time CCP members Mao Zedong and Zhu De, described as “commanders of the Chinese Communist forces.”70 JPA writers also focused on the “dreaded” resurgence of Soviet military power under the leadership of Soviet Communist Party general secretary, Joseph Stalin: “Today Japan is also confronted by the fact that Russia, after a decade of military insignificance, has risen again, a menace at her very door and an enigmatic factor in the future of China.”71 Citing public anti-­Japanese statements from 1938 by several Soviet leaders, including General Secretary Stalin, Prime Minister V.I. Molotov, Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, and Defense Minister Kliment Voroshilov, the Japanese argued that the Soviet Communist Party was preparing for an “inevitable war with Japan.” The goal of Soviet leaders was to assure that “the foundation of capitalism will quiver and crumble” in East Asia.72 For the Japanese, the spread of communism in Asia would be a direct threat to their way of life because it would eradicate the ancient foundations of Japanese culture and society, including the sacred role of the emperor. Japan’s emperor was the head of “one great spiritual family.” Soviet-­style communism would destroy the emperor’s position and challenge Japan’s “very existence as a

The Japan Pacific Association   115 s­ piritual, moral and national unit.” “Japan had seen what Communism has done to Russia,” creating a system “where liberty and joy of life are non-­existent.”73 After Japan became one of the Axis powers as a result of joining the Anti-­ Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy in 1936, JPA literature accentuated the connection between the Soviet government and the Communist International, noting that “the same men are the leaders of both.”74 “World Revolution is the aim of the Comintern—where Red Agitation spreads, Red Imperialism follows. All the Communist parties of the world are pledged to help Russia.” As a consequence, the Tokyo government argued that it had been “forced” to sign the Anti-­Comintern Pact in order to put a stop to a communist invasion and takeover of all of Asia. In conclusion, the JPA asked, “If Japan does not stop Red Imperialism, who will do so?”75 Japanese writers persisted in their portrayal of the Soviet Union as the real threat to peace in Asia and, therefore, to Amer­ican interests there, even after World War II began in Europe in 1939.

Notes   1 Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Japan’s Problems, no. 4 (Tokyo: Nakado, 1937), 32.   2 The archives of the National Library of Australia, the University of California, Harvard University, Yale University, Mount Holyoke College, Amer­ican University, Princeton University, Duke University, and the New York Public Library appear to have the most complete collections of JPA publications.   3 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese–Amer­ican War, 1941–1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 8.   4 Tsuchida Akio, “China’s ‘Public Diplomacy’ toward the United States before Pearl Harbor.” The Journal of Amer­ican–East Asian Relations 17, no. 1 (2010), 36.   5 See, Japan Pacific Association, Why Is Japan Fighting? (Tokyo, December 1937).   6 Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? no. 1 (Tokyo: Nakado, 1937), cover pages.   7 See, “The China Emergency.” The Osaka Mainichi, supplement, October 20, 1937, 25.   8 Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? Truth Will Out! no. 2 (Tokyo: Nakado, 1937), front cover.   9 Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That …? Fifty Questions on Current Topics, no. 3 (Tokyo: Nakado, 1938), back cover. 10 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That …? front cover. 11 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? Truth Will Out! back cover. 12 Subtitle for the premier volume of Japan–China Pictorial Primer, no. 1. 13 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 2–3. 14 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 15 Ono Saseo, Japanese Cartoons through the Ages 2, no. 4 (Shanghai: XXth Century Publishing Co., 1942), 290–295, http://evols.library.minoa.hawaii.edu/handle/. Rakuten drew his cartoons in a style similar to that of contemporary Amer­ican cartoonists and satirized Japan’s foreign policy for several decades. His caustic wit is credited for forcing discussions between U.S. and Japanese leaders on the topic of the discriminatory Amer­ican exclusion laws. Some of his cartoons were reprinted in Amer­ican newspapers and journals. During the 1930s, many of his cartoons had a nationalistic, pro-­expansion theme. 293.

116   The Japan Pacific Association 16 Peter Duus, “Presidential Address: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong— The Development of the Japanese Political Cartoon.” The Journal of Asian Studies 60, no. 4 (November 2001), 966. 17 Rei Okamoto Inouye. “Theorizing Manga: Nationalism and Discourse on the Role of Wartime Manga.” Mechademia 4 “War/Time” (2009), 25. 18 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 4. 19 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 4–5. 20 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 6–7. 21 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 14. 22 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 12. 23 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 24 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 10. 25 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 8. 26 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 8–9. 27 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 37. 28 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 29 During the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, a portion of the Boxer Indemnity Funds was allocated to scholarships for Chinese students studying in the U.S. About 1,300 Chinese students attended Amer­ican universities from 1909 to 1929 as a result of the program. 30 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 32. 31 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 32 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 16. 33 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 42. 34 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 41. 35 C. Walter Young, “Sino-­Japanese Interests and Issues in Manchuria.” Pacific Affairs 1, no. 7 (December, 1928), 5. 36 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 42. 37 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 7–8. 38 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 16–19. 39 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 24. 40 Tsuchida Akio, 36. 41 Wei Shuge, Shadowed by the Sun: The Mukden Incident and the Shanghai Incident (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017), 117. 42 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? 14. 43 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? 17. 44 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? 17–18. 45 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? 15. 46 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? 37. 47 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? 16. 48 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? 19. 49 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 30. 50 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 31. 51 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 52 The China Journal 27, no. 3 (September, 1937), 1. 53 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 31. 54 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 36. 55 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 38. 56 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 39. 57 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 63. 58 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 59 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 51. 60 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Japan’s Problems, 25. 61 Akio, 36.

The Japan Pacific Association   117 62 Akio, 44–45. 63 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 36. 64 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 20. 65 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 66 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 67 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Japan’s Problems, 25. 68 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? 29. 69 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 36–37. 70 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 37. 71 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Japan’s Problems, 25. 72 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Japan’s Problems. 73 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 63. 74 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 75 Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That…? 63–64.

6 Conclusion Propaganda, anti-­communism, and the impact of the war on Amer­ican policy

The propaganda work of institutions such as the South Manchuria Railway Company, the America–Japan Society, the Foreign Affairs Association, and the Japan Pacific Association was supported and enhanced by a variety of business, civic, and religious organizations during the years leading up to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and, in some cases, beyond. By the late 1930s, particularly after President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered his “Naval Quarantine Speech” in October 1937, critical of Japan, a flurry of publications appeared targeting Amer­ icans and defending Japanese actions. English-­language newspapers, journals, and specialized serials, published in Japan and the United States by Tokyo’s supporters, produced articles championing ideas and promoting themes similar to those associated with Tokyo government-­affiliated institutions. In many cases, identical information, photographs, and portions of official reports were reprinted or summarized in order to reach a wider audience than, for example, the newly established JPA could. The opinions were often highly critical of Chinese leadership and conditions in China, while heaping praise on the Japanese for assuming responsibility for fixing the problems facing less economically developed Asian nations. In many cases, the views expressed were considerably more blunt in their negative descriptions of the Chinese, the Soviets, and the threat of communism compared to the more carefully written, by comparison, institutional propaganda. Articles came from a wide range of organizations, but those committed to ramping up business with the U.S. were the most numerous, especially since the Tokyo government and the America–Japan Society continued to sponsor trips to Japan, Manzhouguo, and North China to foster business opportunities.1 The Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, for example, tried to spread an optimistic message as it backed Tokyo’s policies, even as anti-­Japanese rhetoric in the U.S. intensified as fighting in China became more widespread and pro-­China groups condemned Amer­ican suppliers of war materiel to Japan.2 In late 1937, the Chamber released a 92-page booklet The Sino-­Japanese Crisis 1937—First Comprehensive, Authentic, Factual Statement, with Official Amer­ican and Japanese Documents, which chronicled a history dating back to 1900 of China’s incessant conflicts with foreign powers, while emphasizing Japan’s positive role in driving commercial development, both at home and on the Asian mainland during the same time period. Its back cover featured a chart,

Conclusion   119 “America’s Oriental Trade,” showing the values of both Japan’s and China’s exports to and imports from the U.S. in 1935 and 1936. Japan’s totals for both were significantly higher.3 The Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, whose office was located at 500 Fifth Avenue, was one of many Chambers of Commerce and Industry that promoted Japanese business interests. Its first Tokyo branch was established in 1878; by the 1930s there were hundreds in cities worldwide. According to the Chamber’s mission statement, the organization should play an “important role in the dissemination of information concerning government policies and programs.”4 Its booklet distributed from the New York City office on the Sino-­ Japanese crisis fulfilled the mission with its detailed version of “China’s Will to War.”5 The text used much of the same historical evidence, including interpretations of treaties and agreements, as well as official statements and anecdotes published earlier by the SMRC, the Foreign Affairs Association, and the JPA. The booklet’s publication was followed by the release of a pamphlet entitled Appeal to Reason, which, in no uncertain terms, blamed the Chinese, especially the Guomindang government, for colluding with the Soviets to cause the turmoil in China. For that reason, Japan was justified in its attack on Guomindang-­ controlled territory. It concludes, “Today Japan is defending China and herself against ‘Red’ domination of Communist Imperialism … while Communist Imperialism sprawls over two continents, controlling half of vast Asia.”6 Japanese Chamber of Commerce publications also featured accounts by Amer­ican business leaders and politicians who expressed their support for Japan’s goals for China and their assertion that the U.S. stood to benefit from Tokyo’s expansion onto the Asian mainland. One such supporter was Col. James E. Edmonds of New Orleans, associate editor of The Cotton Trade Journal and self-­described representative of U.S. southern cotton growers. An unlikely advocate for Japanese imperialism, Edmonds was harsh in his criticism of President Franklin Roosevelt’s characterization of Japan as an “aggressor nation” in his October 1937 speech, which called for an international quarantine of Italy, Germany, and Japan. Edmonds had published a 32-page booklet, What Will a Japanese Victory Mean to Amer­ican Cotton?, following a tour of Japanese cotton production facilities earlier in 1937, where he pleaded with fellow cotton growers to pressure the Roosevelt administration to support Japan’s takeover of China. Illustrated with photos of modern Japanese factories with the latest technology, classrooms, well-­equipped gymnasiums, and “clean, pleasant” dining rooms, Edmonds’ text used arguments similar to those of Japanese propaganda institutions. He repeated much of Tokyo’s version of the history of Japan’s conflict with China and included charts showing improvements the Japanese had made to China’s economy in areas they controlled.7 Appeal to Reason also cited an Amer­ican economist, Alston Garside, of the New York Cotton Exchange, who reiterated the argument that Japan had been and should remain a loyal customer of Amer­ican products. The bottom line for Edmonds and Garside was that the Amer­ican cotton industry, like other U.S. businesses, would benefit from a Japanese empire in Asia and the avoidance of war, but it should also be noted

120   Conclusion that the unofficial visit of representatives of the Amer­ican cotton textile manufacturers to Japan included an additional task, which had some success—to arrange for an informal agreement with Japanese manufacturers to voluntarily limit textile exports to the U.S.8 Not to be outdone, however, China’s rebuttal to pro-­Japanese Amer­ican cotton interests was published several months later by the Amer­ican Committee for the Non-­Participation in Japanese Aggression, based in New York City, The Far Eastern Conflict and Amer­ican Cotton. The booklet reinforced the committee’s views expressed in one of its major publications, America’s Share in Japan’s War Guilt, that continued U.S. trade and business had emboldened Japan’s aggression in China.9 Also in 1937, a group calling themselves “The Business Men of Kyoto” issued a 24-page booklet, The Sino-­Japanese Conflict, written in English and targeted at Amer­icans. The contents juxtaposed the serene beauty and prosperity of Japan’s ancient capital with the dreadful chaos endangering China. The Foreword offered a familiar message: With Soviet Russia stretching her tentacles through Outer Mongolia in an effort to draw the 400 millions of China into an orgy of communism, Japan and the rest of the world cannot remain indifferent.… We ask you, in view of the traditional friendship which has existed between the United States and Japan, to exercise great care and to ponder on the position of this country in her attempt to localize the Far Eastern difficulties and thus to prevent another worldwide calamity.10 Like the Chamber of Commerce, the Kyoto businessmen stressed the need to continue friendly and lucrative trade between the U.S. and Japan, while warning of the disastrous impact to both countries of support for the corrupt Chinese government. In their description of events in southeast China in 1937, when the Guomindang attempted to defend its largest city, Shanghai, from Japanese takeover, the Kyoto businessmen asserted: It is a well-­known fact that the Nanking [Nanjing] government was planning a wanton bombing of not only the Japanese section of Shanghai but also of the entire International Settlement at the time when the alliance with Soviet Russia was completed.… What was done by the Chinese bombing planes, purchased abroad, was enough, however, to show to what extremes the Chinese will go at the instigation of Moscow in its attempt to overthrow capitalism and the economy of the established nations of the world.11 For the Kyoto businessmen, the outlook for the future was “not promising,” because they feared “the red hordes of Moscow will not only step in, but will lead China’s 400 millions in a tidal wave against civilization.”12 Japanese media also publicized the views of Amer­ican business leaders who voiced similar concerns. The “English Section” of the popular bilingual newspaper The Japanese Amer­ican was a reliable source for Tokyo’s versions of

Conclusion   121 events in Asia; it routinely featured lengthy articles by notable Amer­icans who supplemented their personal appeals for support of Japan with “evidence” of Chinese corruption and Soviet aggression. For example, in February 1938, an article entitled “U.S. Should Support Japan Says Amer­ican Business Man,” summarized an address by Daniel B. Trefethen, described in the newspaper as a “prominent Seattle attorney and civic leader.” Trefethen was a founder of a major Seattle law firm and graduate of Harvard Law (class of 1901). He was active in Seattle’s Chamber of Commerce. He argued that Japan was in a fight “for her life against Red Russia.”13 Trefethen questioned why would “Amer­ican public opinion be molded in sympathetic channels toward China,” when “communism, or rather Soviet Russia’s aims and policies, is a real menace to Japan’s very existence.”14 After summarizing the many benefits the Japanese already had brought to the people of Manchuria and North China, he pointed out that Amer­ ican support for China over Japan would not only hurt the U.S.’s economy but cripple Seattle’s. He concluded with a plea to Amer­icans to “use our heads in this crisis” and not be influenced by “the greatest propaganda machine in the world,” the Soviet Union’s Communist Party.15 Similar sentiments were echoed by some of Japan’s religious groups, regardless of whether they represented Shinto, Buddhist, or Christian organizations. Since the takeover of Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese government had provided assistance to several religious-­based settlements that originated in Japan. The experiences of these recent Japanese emigrants were chronicled in many English-­language publications. One repeatedly published story featured a Buddhist (the Ittoen Order whose community lives a “life of no possessions”) farm in Manzhouguo, whose inhabitants struggled to assist the crowds of “Chinese vagrants” who had sought relief in Manzhouguo after suffering from the “turmoil of civil war and the torture of famine” in China. The article estimated that Chinese refugees comprised “two thirds of the whole population in Manchuria” by the late 1930s. The farm’s work was summarized in a publication with the eye-­catching title, Japan and Manchuria on the Cross.16 Japanese writers understood that most Amer­icans would find religious sources focused on Christian teachings more compelling than those written by or about followers of Asian religions, such as Shinto or Buddhism. Many articles and publications supported by Christian organizations in Japan gave wholehearted support to Tokyo’s ambitions in Asia, even though less than 1 percent of Japanese during the 1930s were affiliated with Christian religions. Missionary publications often agreed with views found in other propaganda, but many missionaries and spokespersons from Christian groups in Japan found themselves in the awkward situation of appearing to be advocates of war. By the mid-­1930s, the Tokyo government had passed laws requiring all religious and educational institutions to back Japan’s “national policy.” The establishment of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement in 1937 reinforced Tokyo’s strict controls over publicity. Not to comply would lead potentially to government action against the institution and confiscation of property. (A few years earlier, several pacifist Shinto sects had been disbanded by force and their lands taken under these laws.17)

122   Conclusion One obvious cause applauded by religious groups in Japan that fit well into national policy was the Japanese government’s stand against communism. Religious leaders described Japan’s primary goal in the Sino-­Japanese conflict as the fight against the spread of godless communism. Their speeches and articles highlighted Japan’s “heroic” actions against Soviet-­sponsored imperialism. In 1938, for example, a group of Japanese Catholic leaders toured several Amer­ican cities, speaking on the topic of Japan’s “holy war” in China, the battle “to save Asia from the menace of Communism.”18 Many articles about the activities of Christian organizations in Manchuria were featured in the bulletins of the National Christian Council of Japan and the Japanese Students’ Christian Association in North America (at one time headed by SMRC’s New York City manager, Roy H. Akagi), which reported on the “good works” of Japanese Christians sponsored by Tokyo. According to the National Christian Council bulletin’s July 1941 edition, for example, the many “believers” living in Dalian, Harbin, Jinzhou, and Shenyang were responsible for generous financial assistance to a variety of philanthropies that improved the lives of Manchurians. Also reported was the progress made by the Manzhouguo Model Christian Colony to enlist additional families as well as help non-­Christian neighbors in times of need.19 While missionary publications tended to focus on humanitarian aid projects, often with Tokyo’s financial backing, undertaken by Christian groups in China, they also lent support to Tokyo’s broader goals in Asia. For example, a March 1938 edition of The Japanese Amer­ican newspaper with the headline “No War Wanted” featured a front-­page article entitled “Amer­ican Missionary Asks Fairness to Japan—Says Our Blind Idealism Is Causing Us to Paint China All White and Japan All Black.” The author, Dr. A.D. Berry, dean of Aoyama Gakuin Theological School, reiterated Tokyo’s version of the history of conflict in China, concluding that China was ready for war, with “nearly three million Chinese soldiers in the field.” Berry also noted that while “neither side was guiltless,” Japan was right in pursuing its goals for Asia because its government was determined “to settle permanently the controversy with the Chinese Kuomintang [Guomindang] and Communist parties.”20 Berry also criticized what he perceived as dangerous ignorance of the situation in China in 1938 afflicting many Amer­icans. In a section of his article subtitled “Says Our Blind Idealism Is Causing Us to Paint China All White and Japan All Black,” Berry wrote: Amer­icans always take the side of the under dog. It is an adorable trait in our sentimental make-­up. I remember thirty years ago in the war with Russia Amer­icans all took the side of Japan. In Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia we all took Abyssinia’s side. And as between Japan and China—China is always the under dog. But when we thus take the side of the under dog—we always idealize the dog. It quickly becomes a white wooly lamb. This is strikingly so as to Amer­ican sentiment toward China. Then too—the Chinese are so skillful in

Conclusion   123 propaganda and in the eloquent use of the English language. The Japanese are dumb in both. And they have no such lovely lady as Madame Chiang to plead their case before the whole world and make the other side seem utterly demoniac. And so Japan is all black—and China all white. In all fairness—there is a black side to China.21 The Japanese Amer­ican newspaper and others, including English supplements to more mainstream Japanese newspapers, such as the Tokyo Nichi Nichi and the Osaki Mainichi (whose editor was a frequent attendee of America–Japan Society events), continued to reiterate the theme that the Guomindang represented the greatest threat to peace in Asia while Japan’s actions were reaping positive results for the Chinese people. Frequently, the newspapers published photographs of “new” China, showing prosperity and calm possible only because of the Japanese takeover. In July 1938, for example, at a time when China’s urban centers were crippled by fierce fighting, photos appeared in The Japanese Amer­ican allegedly depicting groups of workers in Shanghai and Tianjin waiting for transportation to jobs. A caption claimed that the cities were “back to normal,” fighting had stopped, and commerce was on the rise.22 By 1937, Japanese organizations that produced English-­language propaganda became more focused on convincing Amer­icans and other Westerners that avoiding war with Japan was a better option than supporting a corrupt Chinese government that was infiltrated by communists; no longer did the Japanese dwell on the concepts of “New Deal” or similar commitments to policies that had been characterized earlier as beneficial examples of imperialism. Instead, the specter of the spread communism to most of Asia and its inevitable threat to capitalism everywhere were dominant themes. It is no coincidence that the new focus for propaganda appeared after President Roosevelt’s October 1937 “Naval Quarantine Speech,” which signaled a troubling change in Amer­ican policy for the Japanese. As tensions between the U.S. and Japan heightened, Japanese propaganda, even that which utilized previously published materials, took on a more desperate tone. For example, a 47-page English supplement to the Osaka Mainichi daily newspaper from October 1937 was entitled “The China Emergency.” Although the oversized magazine reprinted many articles and photographs seen in Foreign Affairs Association and JPA booklets that blamed the Chinese for the worsening conditions in China, its main focus was to convince Amer­icans that their interests were served by allowing Japan to defend itself in this “emergency.”

The Amer­ican audience The desperation apparent in Japanese English-­language propaganda from the late 1930s reflected the realization by Tokyo’s supporters that the outlook in Washington toward Japan was undergoing a rapid transformation. By the time of the controversial “Quarantine” address on October 5, 1937, the Roosevelt administration had anticipated conflicts in Europe and Asia because of the 1936 treaty

124   Conclusion between Hitler’s Germany and Japan, the Anti-­Comintern Pact.23 Italy joined the anti-­communist alliance the following year. On October 27, 1937, in an attempt to clear up “the apparent misunderstanding” about the situation in China and deal with growing tensions with the Roosevelt administration, Japan’s ambassador to the U.S., Saito Hirosi, broadcast a speech on Columbia Broadcast System radio where he described to Amer­icans examples of “anti-­Japanese poison distilled for the past twelve or more years by Communist agitators, selfish war lords and ambitious politicians [in China].”24 Meanwhile, Amer­ican public opinion had become the focus of a well-­targeted campaign by supporters of China’s Guomindang government, especially through the efforts of Chiang Kaishek’s charismatic wife, Meiling Soong. China’s first couple was Time magazine’s “Man and Woman of the Year” for 1937 and was featured in a laudatory article with their photograph adorning the cover of the January 3 edition in 1938. In a “nation-­wide” Gallup Poll of Amer­ican public opinion from early 1940, 75 percent of respondents answered “yes” to the question: “Do you think our government should forbid the sale of arms, airplanes, gasoline and other war materials to Japan?”25 One result was that competition among political, business, and missionary organizations whose interests promoted Japan over China or vice versa became more intense as the war in China continued, at a time when many Amer­icans still supported a policy of isolationism and demanded the U.S. stay out of the increasingly dangerous conditions in both Europe and Asia.26 Amer­ icans during the 1930s tended to have limited knowledge of the actual conditions of the world beyond the U.S. and Western Europe. According to some historians, that may have made them particularly susceptible to propaganda as well as the prejudices and chauvinism that led to isolationism.27 Roosevelt’s speech critical of Japan’s actions in 1937 sounded an alert for pro-­business organizations and other pro-­Japanese groups, but they stepped up efforts to garner support for Tokyo because the president’s commitment to China and animosity toward Japan had not been consistent to that point. Roosevelt earlier had been an open and vocal supporter of Japan, especially during the 1920s when he publicly advocated for Tokyo’s foreign policies. It could be that Roosevelt’s earlier tacit approval or, at least lack of open disapproval, of Japan’s early expansionary moves onto the Asian mainland gave false hope to those who had wanted to convince Amer­icans of Japan’s supposedly praiseworthy goals for Asia. In 1923, as assistant secretary to the navy, Roosevelt had published a provocative five-­page essay in Asia: The Amer­ican Magazine on the Orient entitled “Shall We Trust Japan?” where his answer was a definite “yes.” Roosevelt was convinced that the apparent success of the 1921–1922 Washington Conference had ended the naval arms race among the U.S., Great Britain, and Japan and had made future war with Japan unlikely. The conference, called by the U.S. government, produced several agreements that addressed the rapid buildup of naval power in the Pacific following World War I. The Five-­Power Naval Limitation Treaty of February 6, 1922, signed by France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the U.S., restricted the number and tonnage of capital ships to specific ratios and

Conclusion   125 forced the Amer­ican, British, and Japanese governments to destroy some existing warships and scrap some of those in production. A decade-­long moratorium on capital ship manufacture also had been agreed upon. Roosevelt’s predictions for improved U.S.–Japanese relations expressed in Asia magazine were controversial because they contradicted the views of William Howard Gardiner, vice-­president of the Navy League and prolific writer on issues facing the U.S. navy,28 who had published an article in Current History in 1922 that had received considerable coverage in the press. Gardiner warned that the Five-­Power Treaty would devastate Amer­ican power in the Pacific and allow Tokyo to achieve military supremacy, but Roosevelt held fast to the idea that Japan would be no threat to the U.S. since its government continued to adhere to the Washington Conference protocols. Roosevelt even argued that Amer­ican military technological advances made a Japanese attack on the U.S. impossible.29 By the time Roosevelt was elected president in November 1932, conditions in East Asia had changed. The Japanese takeover of Manchuria posed new challenges for Roosevelt’s public views on U.S.–Japanese relations; Roosevelt soon began to talk with Cabinet members and allies, particularly the British, about the possibility of a war with Japan. Much to the chagrin of some of his advisors in the Democratic Party, Roosevelt announced before his inauguration that he planned to continue the Republican policy of non-­recognition of Manzhouguo that had been enunciated in January 1932 by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson.30 Meanwhile, Japanese leaders interpreted Roosevelt’s election as a positive sign. The November 11, 1932, edition of the English-­language Japan Advertiser, published in Tokyo three days after Roosevelt’s election, cited passages from Roosevelt’s 1923 Asia magazine article, “Shall We Trust Japan?” as evidence. In December 1933, the editors of Asia magazine asked Roosevelt for permission to reprint his decade-­old article. Although Roosevelt gave his approval, a note was added explaining that the conditions under which the article was written had changed.31 Roosevelt had been briefed on Japan’s military readiness and the “potential power” of the Japanese people by U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, in a lengthy letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, dated May 11, 1933, that helped explain an accompanying report from the military attaché of the embassy, indicating “the tremendous military power which Japan is developing.”32 Grew warned Roosevelt that “Japan cannot be considered as a small or weak country.” He wrote: [T]he nation has developed its industries in recent years until it is able to supply itself with all of the necessities of life, and can build all the ships, and make all the airplanes, tanks, guns, ammunition, chemicals, etc., needed to wage a severe war, if it is not too protracted. Furthermore, it has large reserves of war materiel, such as petroleum, nitrates, etc., not produced within the country.… Turning to the armed forces of the country, it is my opinion that Japan probably has the most complete, well-­balanced, coordinated and therefore

126   Conclusion powerful fighting machine in the world today. I do not refer to the army only, but to the combination of sea, land and air forces, backed up as they are by enormous reserves of trained men, by industrial units coordinated with the fighting machine and by large reserves of supplies.… More than the size of the nation or the strength of its fighting machine, however, the thing which makes the Japanese nation actually so powerful and potentially so menacing, is the national morale and esprit de corps—a spirit which perhaps has not been equaled since the days when the Mongol hordes followed Genghis Khan in his conquest of Asia. The force of a nation bound together with great moral determination, fired with national ambition, and peopled by a race with unbounded capacity for courageous self-­sacrifice is not easy to overestimate.33 The sinking of the USS Panay in December 1937 was a major turning point for Roosevelt.34 But his proposal for “peace loving” nations to quarantine “aggressor” states like Japan, which he had mentioned in the speech given the previous October in Chicago, had, unfortunately for Roosevelt, energized the pervasive isolationist sentiment throughout the country in addition to provoking pro-­ Japanese organizations to accelerate their campaigns. As a result, Roosevelt remained silent on the issue of possible military retaliation against Japan for the shelling of the Panay, while simultaneously making preparations to ready the navy for any eventual conflict in the Pacific. The Panay crisis induced Roosevelt to draw up more precise plans for a possible naval blockade as well as work with the British to share responsibility for the security of Western interests in the Pacific. The British, after all, had also been the target of Japanese attacks in China on the same day the Panay was sunk. A British gunboat, HMS Ladybird, and several British merchant ships positioned along the Yangzi in the general area where the Panay had been located were also shelled. The apparent resolution to the Panay Incident was achieved quickly when the U.S. accepted the Japanese government’s official apology and plans for restitution on December 25, 1937. As mentioned earlier, members of the America–Japan Society in Tokyo established a trust fund for Amer­ican victims and their families and U.S. ambassador, Joseph Grew, announced with considerable fanfare a favorable conclusion. But Roosevelt would not ignore the significance of Tokyo’s attack on Amer­ican property in China. Over the next several months, Roosevelt and several trusted advisors worked to get British cooperation for a widespread naval blockade of Japan to protect British and Amer­ican territories in the Pacific and stop Japanese expansion. The plan never materialized as Roosevelt was hindered, to some extent, by continued isolationist fervor in the U.S., as well as a failure to gain the full support of the British government of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, known for his policy of appeasement. Meanwhile, Roosevelt continued to prepare the U.S. military for eventual conflict with Japan and the other Axis powers.35 In July 1939, the Japanese government nullified the long-­standing Treaty of Commerce and Navigation that had defined the close economic ties between the

Conclusion   127 U.S. and Japan since 1911. The treaty was officially terminated as of January 1940, a time when Amer­ican industries were the chief suppliers of war materiel, such as oil, steel, and iron, to the Japanese. In response, the U.S. government began a process of restricting the flow of much-­needed resources to Japan while extending credits to the Chinese government for the procurement of military equipment. In March 1941, Roosevelt signed the Lend-­Lease policy which would eventually send over a billion dollars in aid to Chiang’s government. Japan’s goals for Asia were incompatible with those of the U.S. and Roosevelt had much to fear from increasing Japanese aggression in Asia. The Roosevelt administration threw its support to the Republic of China. Consequently, Jap­ anese propaganda written for Amer­icans and other Westerners would have little impact on the development of World War II in the Pacific.

Conclusion Japanese propaganda aimed at Amer­icans during the 1930s served the varied goals of Tokyo’s foreign policy while Japan expanded onto the Asian mainland. The publications of organizations, such as the SMRC, explained the reasons for Japan’s quest for empire. Its writers employed concepts associated with what was deemed at the time welcome transformation caused by earlier Western imperialism. Their claim was that the Japanese brought “civilization,” modernization, and progress to less developed areas, a process that began in the nineteenth century, while they also adhered to internationally recognized treaties and agreements, including the U.S.’s Open Door Policy, which guaranteed free trade and access to China’s resources. By the 1930s, they adopted the vocabulary of Roosevelt’s New Deal program to describe their efforts and appeal to Amer­icans who had positive images of the changes and the principles behind them. Thus, the SMRC’s initiatives that came under the umbrella of its “New Deal” for Manchuria, Japan’s first Chinese colony, allegedly included guarantees of rights and freedoms, economic opportunity, an end to corruption, as well as the defeat of warlordism, and the destruction of both fascism and communism. Model cities, technological advances, modern medical facilities, improved infrastructure, better security, and expanded access to education were among the specific New Deal projects underwritten by the Japanese. Tokyo’s modernization strategies for “backward” China provided proof that Japan was as advanced as Western powers and deserved cooperation, even support, for its goals for Asia. At first, Japan’s actions in China met with mixed responses from Amer­icans. U.S.–Japanese relations had been severely strained since the early twentieth century as a result of discriminatory laws passed by Congress and Western states that restricted Asian immigration, access to citizenry, and economic activity. Following World War I, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by a return to isolationism; the Republican presidents of the 1920s maintained neutrality toward the conflicts in Asia, while continuing to insist that Tokyo restrict its naval development and adhere to certain principles guaranteeing free trade on the Asian mainland. Meanwhile, organizations such as the America–Japan Society,

128   Conclusion the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, and the Japanese Students’ Christian Association in North America fostered closer business, educational, and cultural ties between the two countries. But after Japan established the puppet state of Manzhouguo, a collision course between Amer­ican and Japanese interests in the Pacific appeared inevitable. During the 1930s, two new organizations, the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan and the JPA, were created to produce English-­language propaganda explaining Tokyo’s “real intentions”: to fight for a “better and happier future”36 for both China and Japan. The writers examined legal and moral justifications for Japan’s presence in China based on treaty agreements and development initiatives dating back to the nineteenth century. Before 1937, they emphasized the defensive nature of Japan’s military actions, which focused on protecting foreign nationals and calming the chaos caused by rapacious warlords, communists, and fascists in China. They consistently blamed the Chinese, whose government allegedly violated international laws or whose troops provoked responses, for the unrest in China. They also diverted attention away from contemporary issues by focusing on alleged Chinese atrocities against Japanese and other foreigners committed years earlier. Japanese complaints about the lack of Chinese acquiescence to demands for concessions, often referred to as their “insincerity” in Japanese publications, signaled the failure of Tokyo’s policies to that point. U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, explained in early 1937 that the Japanese were marking time, their programs for China having been thwarted by significant Chinese resistance. He explained from his vantage point in Tokyo that the Japanese seemed to be somewhat thunderstruck by the sudden and unexpected determination of China to yield no more to Japanese pressure. Furthermore, aggressive tactics on the mainland had prompted Western governments not only to withhold approval but also to censure Japan.37 The U.S., under President Roosevelt, remained distant from the conflict in Asia. Any response was hampered by the passage of a series of Neutrality Acts by Congress beginning in 1935. Roosevelt heard a cautious but positive message from the Tokyo embassy when Grew wrote on January 1, 1937: There is no good reason to believe that these general relations [between the U.S. and Japan] may not maintain their present satisfactory status for some time to come. On the contrary there is very good reason to feel that the Jap­ anese Government values Amer­ican friendship, especially in view of Japan’s increasing difficulties with other nations, and will not purposely alienate the United States unless situations arise where Japan considers her own national interests to be acutely involved. The outlook for 1937, so far as Japanese–Amer­ican relations are concerned, therefore, would not at present appear to justify pessimism.38 Hostility between the U.S. and Japan heightened during 1937, a key year in the relationship between the two countries and for stepped-­up efforts by Japan’s

Conclusion   129 propaganda operations. The commencement of the Second Sino-­Japanese War in July 1937 was followed by the Imperial Army’s rapid advance southward. Fighting in China’s major cities of Shanghai and Nanjing had devastated those areas by the year’s end. In September, Tokyo’s newly formed CID tightened its grip over the production of propaganda, began to provide government-­approved photographs of the war in China to publicity organizations, and embarked on an intensive ideological war to convince both Japanese and Westerners that Japan’s goals, especially fighting communism on the Asian mainland, were laudable. The National Spiritual Mobilization Movement forced Japanese propaganda writers to conform to government positions. Japan’s relationship with the U.S. continued to deteriorate. Roosevelt’s speech in October 1937, which condemned Japanese aggression, followed by the bombing of the Panay in December, set up a troubled truce during which the Japanese tried to focus on the connection between Chiang Kaishek’s government and communism, re-­creating a Red Scare to garner support from the U.S. Amer­ icans, on the other hand, saw in popular journals, such as Time and Life magazines, depictions of China’s First Family as democratic, Westernized, and pro-­Amer­ican. Popular opinion in the U.S. was overwhelmingly pro-­China in the years immediately preceding the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in part also due to a propaganda blitz carried out by the Guomindang and its Amer­ican supporters. Japanese propaganda organizations persisted in vain to convince the Amer­ican government that the plan for a new order in Asia, cooperation between Japan and China, and cultural unity for the Asian peoples were worthy goals when sponsored by Japan. *  *  * Decades later, the conflict between the Japanese and Chinese governments over what happened in China during the Second Sino-­Japanese War continues to play out in their competition and rivalries. The past has not been forgotten among leaders and much of the population of both nations because each government has used historical memory to foster political goals.39 Observers of the situation in Asia at the outset of World War  II could not have easily predicted the reality these two nations are confronted with in the twenty-­first century: Japan’s defeat and subsequent Amer­ican occupation helped forge close strategic and economic bonds between the two democracies while the “dreaded,” from the Japanese standpoint of the 1930s, CCP solidly rules China. Despite the development of close commercial and diplomatic ties since the early 1970s, hostility continues to simmer into the twenty-­first century. The bitterness conveyed by Chinese concerning Japan’s actions during what they still call the “War of Resistance against Japan” continues to fester in China today in ways not seen among Western allies and enemies of World War II. The relatively recent refocusing by Chinese media on the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army in Nanjing in 1937 and elsewhere in China during the war as well as the publicity surrounding recently released documents that were actually discovered decades ago have

130   Conclusion become part of the larger political conflict facing Tokyo and Beijing. Both governments have been guilty of hiding or distorting what happened during the war, for political purposes.40 The government of Xi Jinping, like past CCP leadership, has apparently effectively employed a strategy of drumming up anti-­Japanese nationalism when it serves the party’s goals. The Chinese continue to demand apologies from the Tokyo government while the Japanese strive to demonstrate pride in their past. As explained by Yang Yujun, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, in a response to Japanese protests after the Chinese government created new apparently anti-­Japanese national holidays in 2014: The reason we remember history is not for hatred. World War  II is in the past and history has already made verdict on Japan’s wartime aggression. So why do some people in Japan still want to overturn that historical verdict, and still visit the Yasukuni shrine, offering sacrifices to Class A war criminals? We urge Japan to face up to and reflect on its post-­war responsibility, and to earn the trust of its Asian neighbor and the international community through concrete actions, instead of making irresponsible remarks about normal commemorations in the countries that were victims of war.41 In August 2015, on the eve of the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe gave a nationally televised address where he explained that “Japan has repeatedly expressed feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war.” His speech, however, was characterized as falling short of a real commitment to address the grievances of Japan’s neighbors. China’s Xinhua news agency called the address insincere and filled with “linguistic tricks.”42 Meanwhile, as pointed out by CCP state media in response to one of Abe’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, “a war of public opinion between China and Japan is now in full swing.”43

Notes   1 See, for example, “Editor Studies Manchoukuo, NY Trade Expert to Edit Survey.” The Japanese Amer­ican, September 24, 1938, 1. (Reports on Manzhouguo as a viable market for Amer­ican products.)   2 The Amer­ican Committee for Non-­Participation in Japanese Aggression, Shall America Stop Arming Japan? (New York, 1940).   3 Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, The Sino-­Japanese Crisis 1937—First Comprehensive, Authentic, Factual Statement, with Official Amer­ican and Japanese Documents (New York: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1937), back cover.   4 The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, “Chamber Information Network” (2004), www.jcci.or.jp/home-­e.html.   5 The Sino-­Japanese Crisis, 18–22.   6 Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, Appeal to Reason (New York: Jap­ anese Chamber of Commerce of New York, 1937), 1, 3.   7 James E. Edmonds, What Will a Japanese Victory Mean to Amer­ican Cotton? (New Orleans, Louisiana: The Cotton Trade Journal, 1937).   8 The Ambassador to Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State, “Undeclared War between Japan and China—Political and Military Developments, Chapter 1: January 1–July 7,

Conclusion   131 1937.” January 1, 1937. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: III, 2.   9 Tsuchida Akio, “China’s ‘Public Diplomacy’ toward the United States before Pearl Harbor.” The Journal of Amer­ican–East Asian Relations 17, no. 1 (2010), 45. 10 The Business Men of Kyoto, The Sino-­Japanese Conflict (Kyoto: Osaka Mainichi, 1937), 2. 11 The Sino-­Japanese Conflict, 18. 12 The Sino-­Japanese Conflict, 24. 13 Daniel B. Trefethen, “US Should Support Japan Says Amer­ican Business Man.” The Japanese Amer­ican (Section 2), February 1938, 1; Bailey/Onsager Professional Corporation, “Our Firm, Founder Biographies,” July 25, 2015, www.baileyonsager.com/ our_firm.php. 14 Trefethen. 15 Trefethen, 2. 16 T. Nishida, “ ‘Toeiso’ in Kinchau, Manchuria,” trans. T. Iwahashi, in Japan and Manchuria on the Cross, ed. T. Iwahashi (Osaki, 1937), 1. 17 “Nippon to Elevate Religion to Equal Place with Shinto.” The Japanese Amer­ican, September 10, 1938, 1. 18 “Says Conflict is ‘Holy War’.” The Japanese Amer­ican, August 13, 1938, 5. 19 William Axling, “The Manchurian Model Christian Colony.” The National Christian Council Bulletin, no. 207 (July 1941) (Tokyo: The National Christian Council of Japan, 1941), 5. 20 A.D. Berry, “Amer­ican Missionary Asks Fairness to Japan—Says Our Blind Idealism Is Causing Us to Paint China All White and Japan All Black.” The Japanese Amer­ ican, March 5, 1938, 1–2. 21 Berry. 22 The Japanese Amer­ican (July 30, 1938), 4. 23 See, Cathal J. Nolan, “ ‘Bodyguard of Lies’: Franklin D. Roosevelt and Defensible Deceit in World War II,” in Ethics and Statecraft, ed. Cathal J. Nolan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 35–57. 24 Saito Hirosi, “China, Communism and Misunderstanding.” Vital Speeches of the Day 4, no. 3, November 15, 1937 (New York: City News Publishing Company). 25 Shall America Stop Arming Japan?, 35. 26 See, for example, Amer­ican Committee for Non-­Participation in Japanese Aggression, “Japan’s Partner: The USA! Bombs to Japan, Bandages to China” (New York, 1938); Kubushiro Ochimi, ed. Japan Through Women 1, no. 2 (February 1, 1938), 1–4. 27 See, Robert A. McCaughey, “In the Land of the Blind: Amer­ican International Studies in the 1930s.” Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science 449 (May, 1980), 1–16. 28 See, for example, W.H. Gardiner, “Naval Fleet Ratios.” Review of Reviews, (March 1924), 305–308; “Naval View of the Conference.” Atlantic Monthly (April 1922), 521–530; “Some Amer­ican Naval Views.” Fortnightly Review (March 1, 1923), 353–373; “Why Japan Would be Mistress of the Sea.” World’s Work (December 1921), 212–217. 29 William L. Neumann, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and Japan, 1913–1933.” Pacific Historical Review 22, no. 2 (1953), 146–149. 30 Neumann, 152. 31 Neumann, 152–153. 32 Letter from Joseph C. Grew to Cordell Hull. Tokyo, May 11, 1933. Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1950). 33 Letter from Grew to Hull. 34 See, John McVickar Haight, Jr., “Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan.” Pacific Historical Review 40, no. 2 (May, 1971), 203–226. Haight summarizes

132   Conclusion the debate over whether the Panay Incident forced Roosevelt to decide to attempt to quarantine Japan. 203. 35 Haight, 220–226. 36 Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, “Concerning the Nanking Incident.” Tokyo Gazette, nos 9 and 10 (March–April 1938), 21. 37 Grew (January 1, 1937), 3, 5. 38 Grew (January 1, 1937), 2. 39 The spectacular Victory Day military parade through Beijing, led by President Xi Jinping, on September 3, 2015, commemorating the seventieth anniversary of China’s victory in the Second Sino-­Japanese War has been seen as a show of China’s military might and possible threat to Japan’s security. Also see, Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 40 Yang Daqing, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writing on the Rape of Nanjing.” The Amer­ican Historical Review 104, no. 3 (June, 1999), 842–865; Rana Mitter and Bruno Poncharal, “Le massacre de Nankin: Memoire et oubli en Chine et au Japon.” Vingtieme Siecle Revue d’histoire 94, (April–June, 2007), 11–23. 41 “China Ratified National Days to Commemorate War Victory, Massacre Victims,” CNTV.cn, February 27, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/program/asiatoday/20140227/ 105741.shtml. 42 Jonathan Soble, “Premier’s Remorse for Japan’s Aggression Stops Short of Apology.” New York Times, August 15, 2015, A4. 43 Katie Hunt, “Long-­time Rivals China and Japan Deploy Harry Potter Villain in Latest Spat.” CNN.com, March 31, 2014, 2.

Bibliography

Books Akihiko Maruya, The South Manchuria Railway Company as an Intelligence Organization (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012). Amer­ican Committee for Non-­Participation in Japanese Aggression, Shall America Stop Arming Japan? (New York: Amer­ican Committee for Non-­Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1940). Borg, Dorothy and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese–Amer­ican Relations, 1931–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). Brooks, Barbara J., Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000). Butow, Robert J.C., Tojo and the Coming of the War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961). Collins, Sandra, The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics (London: Routledge, 2008). Daniels, Roger, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Road to the New Deal, 1882–1939 (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 290. Drysdale, Peter and Dong Zhang, Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2000). Edmonds, James E., What Will a Japanese Victory Mean to Amer­ican Cotton? (New Orleans: The Cotton Trade Journal, 1937). Elias, Robert, Baseball and the Amer­ican Dream (London: Routledge, 2001). Fletcher III, William Miles, The Japanese Business Community and National Trade Policy, 1920–1942 (Durham, NC: North Carolina University Press, 2012). Fogel, Joshua A., Life along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989). Harris, Sheldon H., Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1943, and the Amer­ican Cover-­Up (London: Routledge, 1994). Haruo Iguchi, Unfinished Business: Ayukawa Yoshisuke and US–Japan Relations, 1937–1963 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003). Ichihashi Yamato, The Washington Conference and After (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1928). Iriye, Akira, Power and Culture: The Japanese–Amer­ican War, 1941–1945 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009). Jennings, John M., The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia 1895–1945 (Westwood, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997).

134   Bibliography Kane, Thomas M., Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London: Frank Cass, 2002). Kawakami, K.K., Japan Speaks on the Sino-­Japanese Crisis (New York: Macmillan, 1932). Kawakami, K.K., Manchukuo: Child of Conflict (New York: Macmillan, 1933). Lu, Suping, They Were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by Amer­ican and British Nationals (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004). Meyer, Michael, In Manchuria: A Village Called Wasteland and the Transformation of Rural China (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015). Mitter, Rana, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). O’Connor, Peter, The English-­Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918–1945 (Leiden: Brill, 2014). Reaves, Joseph A., Taking in a Game: A History of Baseball in Asia (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). Root, Hilton L. Alliance Curse: How Amer­ican Lost the Third World. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Saettler, Paul, The Evolution of Amer­ican Education Technology 2nd edition (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2004). Thompson, Robert Smith, A Time for War (New York: Prentice Hall, 1991). Tsai, Kellee and Saadia Pekkanen, Japan and China in the World Economy (London: Routledge, 2006). Weatherley, Robert and Qiang Zhang, History and Nationalist Legitimacy in Contemporary China (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Wei Shuge, Shadowed by the Sun: The Mukden Incident and the Shanghai Incident (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017). Whiting, Allen S., Soviet Policies in China 1917–1924 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). Wilson, Sandra, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society (London: Routledge, 2001). Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). Young, John, The Research Activities of the South Manchuria Railway Company, 1907–1945: A History and Bibliography (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

Articles Akagi, Roy H., “Future of Amer­ican Trade with Manchukuo.” Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science 211 (September 1940), 138–143. Akagi, Roy H., “Japan and the Open Door in Manchukuo.” Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science 168 (July 1933), 54–63. Akagi, Roy H., “Review of Third Report on Progress in Manchuria: 1907–1932.” Political Science Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1933), 285–287. Bailey, Thomas A., “The Root–Takahira Agreement of 1908.” Pacific Historical Review 9, no. 1 (March 1940), 19–35. Blumenson, Martin, “The Soviet Power Play at Chungkugeng.” World Politics 12, no. 2 (January 1960), 249–263.

Bibliography   135 Calder, Kent E., “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March–April, 2006), 129–139, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-03-01/. Duus, Peter, “Presidential Address: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong—The Development of the Japanese Political Cartoon.” The Journal of Asian Studies 60, no. 4 (November 2001), 965–997. Fletcher, Miles, “Intellectuals and Fascism in Early Shōwa Japan.” In Shōwa Japan: 1926–1941, ed. Stephen S. Large (London: Routledge, 1998), 345–369. Gardiner, W.H., “Naval Fleet Ratios.” Review of Reviews (March 1924), 305–308. Gardiner, W.H., “Naval View of the Conference.” Atlantic Monthly (April 1922), 521–530. Gardiner, W.H., “Some Amer­ican Naval Views.” Fortnightly Review (March 1, 1923), 353–373. Gardiner, W.H., “Why Japan Would be Mistress of the Sea.” World’s Work (December 1921), 212–217. Ginsberg, Norton S., “Ch’ang-ch’un.” Economic Geography 23, no. 4 (October 1947), 301. Glickman, Lawrence B., “ ‘Make Lisle the Style’: The Politics of Fashion in the Japanese Silk Boycott, 1937–1940.” Journal of Social History 38, no. 3 (Spring, 2005), 573–608. Goldman, Stuart D., “The Forgotten Soviet–Japanese War of 1939.” The Diplomat (August 28, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/the-­forgotten-soviet-­japanese-war­of-1939/. Gripentrog, John, “The Transnational Pastime: Baseball and Amer­ican Perceptions of Japan in the 1930s.” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010), 247–273. Haight, Jr., John McVickar., “Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan.” Pacific Historical Review 40, no. 2 (May, 1971), 203–226. Han Jung-­Sun, “Rationalizing the Orient: The ‘East Asia Cooperative Community’ in Prewar Japan.” Monumenta Nipponica 60, no. 4 (Winter, 2005), 481–482. Inouye, Rei Okamoto, “Theorizing Manga: Nationalism and Discourse on the Role of Wartime Manga.” Mechademia 4 “War/Time” (2009) 20–37. Kaibara, Helen, “In Order to Create a More Perfect Society: The Japanese Association of America’s Response to the West Coast Anti-­Japanese ‘Yellow Peril’ Phenomenon, 1908–1924.” Virginia Review of Asian Studies (2010), 135–148, www.virginiareview ofasianstudies.com/wpm/06/kaibara-­jaa-final.doc, Kramer, Hanse Kurihara, “Film Forays of the South Manchuria Railway Company.” Film History 24, no. 1 (2012), 97–113. Kubo Arimasa, “The So-­Called Nanking Massacre was a Fabrication.” Remnant, www2. biglobe/ne.jp/remnant/nankingm.htm. Kubushiro Ochimi, ed., Japan Through Women 1, no. 2 (February 1, 1938), 1–4. Lim, Jie-­Hyun, “History Education and Nationalist Phenomenology in East Asia.” Global Asia 10, no. 2 (summer, 2015), 102–108. Manning, William R, “China and the Powers since the Boxer Movement.” The Amer­ican Journal of International Law 4, no. 4 (October 1910), 848–902. McCaughey, Robert A., “In the Land of the Blind: Amer­ican International Studies in the 1930s.” Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science 449 (May, 1980), 1–16. “Message from the President of the International Olympic Committee to the People of Japan.” Bulletin Officiel du Comite International Olympique (July 1938), 31. Mitter, Rana and Bruno Poncharal, “Le massacre de Nankin: Memoire et oubli en Chine et au Japon.” Vingtieme Siecle. Revue d’histoire 94 (April–June, 2007), 11–23.

136   Bibliography National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Sino-­Japanese Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, April 2007), 2–6. Neumann, William L., “Franklin D. Roosevelt and Japan, 1913–1933.” Pacific Historical Review 22, no. 2 (1953), 146–149. Nishida, T., “ ‘Toeiso’ in Kinchau, Manchuria,” trans. T. Iwahashi, in Japan and Manchuria on the Cross, ed. T. Iwahash (Osaki, 1937). Nolan, Cathal J., “ ‘Bodyguard of Lies’: Franklin D. Roosevelt and Defensible Deceit in World War  II,” in Ethics and Statecraft, ed. Cathal J. Nolan (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 35–57. Ono Saseo, Japanese Cartoons through the Ages 2, no. 4 (Shanghai: XXth Century Publishing Co., 1942), 290–295, http://evols.library.minoa.hawaii,edu/handle. Penney, Matthew, “Unit 731 and Preserving the History of Wartime Medical Atrocities.” The Asia-­Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (January 18, 2011), www.japan.focus.org. Reilly, James, “China’s History Activists and the War of Resistance against Japan: History in the Making.” Asian Survey 44, no. 2 (March–April 2004), 276–294. Saito Hirosi, “China, Communism and Misunderstanding.” Vital Speeches of the Day 4, no. 3 (November 15, 1937) (New York: City News Publishing Company). “Session of Tuesday, March 15th, 1938, Morning and Afternoon.” Bulletin Officiel du Comite International Olympique (July 1938), 25. “Some Amer­ican Naval Views.” Fortnightly Review (March 1, 1923), 353–373. Stephan, John J., “Hijacked by Utopia: Amer­ican Nisei in Manchuria.” Amerasia Journal 23, no. 3 (Winter, 1997–1998), 1–42. Stephenson, Shelley, “A Star by Any Other Name: The (After) Lives of Li Xianglan.” Quarterly Review of Film and Video 19 (2002), 1–13. Svinth, Joseph R. “Fulfilling His Duty as a Member: Jigorō Kanō and the Japanese Bid for the 1940 Olympics.” Journal of Combative Sport (May 2004), http://ejmas.com/ jcs/2004. Tiedemann, R.G., “The Persistence of Banditry: Incidents in Border Districts of the North China Plain.” Modern China 8, no. 4 (October, 1982), 395–433. “The New Deal in Japanese–Amer­ican Relations.” The Literary Digest (June 17, 1933), 12. Tsuchida Akio, “China’s ‘Public Diplomacy’ toward the United States before Pearl Harbor.” The Journal of Amer­ican–East Asian Relations 17, no. 1 (2010), 35–55. Tsuneishi Keiichi, “Unit 731 and the Japanese Imperial Army’s Biological Warfare Program,” trans. John Junkerman. The Asia-­Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (January 2011), www.japan.focus.org. Wang Ke-­wen, “He-­Umezu Agreement” in Science and Football III, eds Jens Bangsbo, Thomas Reilly, and A. Mark Williams (London: Routledge, 1997). Wang Yimen, “Between the National and the Transnational: Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Pan-­Asianism.” IIAS Newsletter, no. 38 (September 2005), 7. Wilson, Sandra, “Containing the Crisis: Japan’s Diplomatic Offensive in the West, 1931–1933.” Modern Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (May, 1995), 360–361. Wright, Tim, “The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression.” Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 5 (September, 2007), 1078–1079. Yang Daqing, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writing on the Rape of Nanjing.” The Amer­ican Historical Review 104, no. 3 (June, 1999), 842–865 Young, C. Walter, “Sino-­Japanese Interests and Issues in Manchuria.” Pacific Affairs 1, no. 7 (December, 1928), 1–20.

Bibliography   137 Zarnowski, C. Frank, “A Look at Olympic Costs.” The International Society of Olympic Historians 1, no. 1 (Summer 1992), 16–22. Zhizhao, Henrick Tsjeng, “Japan’s Defence Engagement: Implications of Abe’s Yasukuni Visit.” RSIS Publications (January 8, 2014), [email protected].

Collections of primary sources and propaganda America–Japan Society, America–Japan Society Bulletin. Tokyo, 1937–1939. Bulletin Officiel du Comite International Olympique, 1938. Business Men of Kyoto, The Sino-­Japanese Conflict. Kyoto: Osaka Mainichi, 1937 Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Agrarian Problem in Japan. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Contemporary Japan: A Quarterly Review of Jap­ anese Affairs, 1937–1940. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Education in Japan. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, How the North China Affair Arose. Tokyo, 1937. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Japan Year Book. Tokyo, 1932–1952. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Japan’s Advance Southward. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Japan’s Woman Question. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Labor Movement in Japan. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Manchoukuo–Soviet Union Border Questions. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Our Social Welfare Work. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Political Parties in Japan. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, The North China Incident. Tokyo, 1937. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, The Shanghai Incident, 1937. Tokyo, 1938. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Tokyo Gazette, a Monthly Report of Current Policies, Official Statements and Statistics. Tokyo, 1937–1941. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, What Happened at Tungchow? Tokyo, 1937. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai. Tokyo, 1937. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino/Japanese Conflict. Tokyo, 1938. Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan, “A Window into the Early Shōwa Period, About Shashin Shūhō, Intelligence Bureau’s Organization and Function 1941 May,” www.jacar.go.jp/english/shuhou-­english/towa01.html. Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan, “The Reorganization of the Cabinet Information Committee into the Cabinet Intelligence Department and the Publication of Shashin Shūhō,” www.jacar.go.jp/english/shuhou-­english/ towa01.html. Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Are You Sure That …? 5 (Tokyo: Nakado, 1939). Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Do You Know That …? Fifty Questions on Current Topics 3 (Tokyo: Nakado, 1938). Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—How about Giving Japan a Break? Truth Will Out! (Tokyo: Nakado, 1937). Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—Japan’s Problems 4 (Tokyo: Nakado, 1937). Japan Pacific Association, Japan–China Pictorial Primer—What’s It All About? 1. Tokyo: Nakado, 1937. Japan Pacific Association, Why Is Japan Fighting? Tokyo, December 1937.

138   Bibliography Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, Appeal to Reason (New York: Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, 1937). Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, The Sino-­Japanese Crisis 1937—First Comprehensive, Authentic, Factual Statement, with Official Amer­ican and Japanese Documents (New York: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1937). Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/trjapan.htm. Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 volumes (New York: Random House, 1950). Qiushi—CPC Journal of China’s Governance and Perspectives (Beijing: Qiushi Journal Press, 2015). South Manchuria Railway Company, Answering Questions on Manchuria, 1937 (Tokyo: Herald Press, 1937). South Manchuria Railway Company, Beaux Art Productions. Manchukuo: The Newborn Empire (1939). Prelinger Archive (San Francisco), www.archive.org/details/ manchukuo_the_newborn_empire. South Manchuria Railway Company, Contemporary Manchuria, a Bi-­Monthly Magazine (Tokyo: South Manchuria Railway Company, 1937–1940). South Manchuria Railway Company, Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly 1, no. 2, summer 1940 (Tokyo: South Manchuria Railway Company, 1940). South Manchuria Railway Company, Reports on Progress in Manchuria, six volumes (Dalian: South Manchuria Railway Company, 1929–1939). The China Journal 27 (Shanghai) September 1937. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937: III, IV. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939: III.

Newspapers, internet articles, websites, lectures “1940 Olympics.” Time, October 14, 1935, www.time.com./time/magazine. America–Japan Society Website, www.ajstokyo.org. Askew, David. “New Research in the Nanjing Incident,” JapanFocus.org, October 18, 2005, 3–4, http://japanfocus.org/article.asp?=109. Bailey/Onsager Professional Corporation, “Our Firm, Founder Biographies.” July 25, 2015, www.baileyonsager.com/our_firm.php. Baillet-­Latour, Henri to Ernst Krogius, “Letter from Comite International Oympique.” July 18, 1938, www.euarchives.org/helsinki. Berry, A.D., “Amer­ican Missionary Asks Fairness to Japan—Says Our Blind Idealism Is Causing Us to Paint China All White and Japan All Black.” The Japanese Amer­ican, March 5, 1938, 1–2. China Daily, www.chinadaily.com.cn. “China Ratified National Days to Commemorate War Victory, Massacre Victims.” CNTV. cn, February 27, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/program/asiatoday/20140227/105741. shtml. Eastman Classroom Films, “Manchukuo (Manchuria).” 1938. “Editor Studies Manchoukuo, NY Trade Expert to Edit Survey.” The Japanese Amer­ican, September 24, 1938, 1. “Foreign News: Dr. Williams.” Time, April 4, 1927, www.time.com/time/printout/ 0,8816,722981,00.html.

Bibliography   139 Goldman, Stuart D., “The Forgotten Soviet–Japanese War of 1939.” The Diplomat, August 28, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/the-­forgotten-soviet-­japanese-war­of-1939. Ha Jin, “80 Years Nanjing Massacre: A Book Talk with Ha Jin, Author of Nanjing Requiem.” March 1, 2018, Boston University. Hayashi Keiichi, “China Risks Becoming Asia’s Voldemort.” Telegraph, January 5, 2014, 1. “He-­Umezu Agreement and Qin-­Doihara Agreement.” www.republicanchina.org/war. html. Hornby, Lucy, Simon Muncy, and Jonathan Soble, “Pan-­Asian History Textbooks Struggle to Find Common Language.” Financial Times, November 21, 2013, http://ft. com/the-­world/2013/11. Huang Yanzhong, “China, Japan, and the 21 Demands.” The Diplomat, January 24, 2015, 1–3, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china.japan-­and-the-­21-demands. Hunt, Katie, “Long-­Time Rivals China and Japan Deploy Harry Potter Villain in Latest Spat,” CNN.com (Hong Kong), March 31, 2014, 1–3. Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, “Chamber Information Network.” 2004. www.jcci.or.jp/home-­e.html “Japan Has a Monroe Doctrine: W. Morgan Shuster Discusses Her Attitude Toward Far Eastern Questions.” New York Times, February 28, 1915, www.NYTimes.com/ref./ nytarchive.html. Japan Olympic Committee, “The Olympic Movement and Kano Jigoro.” www.joc.or.jp/ kano. “Japanese Occupation Documents Released to Public.” CCTV.com, April 27, 2014, http:// english.cntv.cn/2014/27/VIDE1398575283527954.shtml. Liu Xiaoming, “China and Britain Won the War Together.” Telegraph, January 1, 2014, 1. McDonough, Megan, “Yoshiko ‘Shirley’ Yamaguchi, Actress, Dies at 94.” Washington Post, September 15, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Interview Given by Premier Wen Jiabao to Japanese Press.” April 5, 2007, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/ t309115.htm. Miyazaki, Jamie, “Textbook Row Stirs Japanese Concern.” BBCNews (Tokyo), April 11, 2007, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk. “Nippon to Elevate Religion to Equal Place with Shinto.” The Japanese Amer­ican, September 10, 1938, 1. Official Website of the Museum of Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, www.nj1937.org. Rohter, Larry, “An Epic Drawn from the Tears of Nanjing.” New York Times, December 16, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/movies/the-­flowers-of-­war. Roney, Tyler, “The Sino-­Japanese Voldemort Wars: China’s Doomed PR Battle.” The Diplomat, January 9, 2014, 1, thediplomat.com/2014/01/thesino-­japanese-voldemort-­ wars-china-­doomed. “Says Conflict is ‘Holy War’.” The Japanese Amer­ican, August 13, 1938, 5. Selden, Mark, “Japan, the United States and Yasukuni Nationalism: War, Historical Memory and the Future of the Asia Pacific.” JapanFocus.org, http://japanfocus.org/ article.asp?=109. Soble, Jonathan, “Premier’s Remorse for Japan’s Aggression Stops Short of Apology.” New York Times, August 15, 2015, A4.

140   Bibliography “The China Emergency.” The Osaka Mainichi, supplement, October 20, 1937, 1–48. The Official Website of the Museum of Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, www.nj1937.org. Trefethen, Daniel B., “U.S. Should Support Japan Says Amer­ican Business Man.” The Japanese Amer­ican (Section 2), February 1938, 1. Universal Pictures, Norman Alley’s Bombing of USS Panay (1937), http://archive.org/ details/1937/12-12_Bombing_of_USS_Panay “Wilson Corrects Tokio Hasn’t Approved Japan’s China Demands—Points at Issue Not Minor.” New York Times, March 24, 1915. “Wilson to Send a Note to Japan.” New York Times, February 20, 1915. “Xi’s History Lessons.” The Economist, August 15, 2015, 11.

Index

Page numbers in italics denote figures. Abe Shinzō 1, 3, 11, 130 agriculture in Manchuria 18, 36–7, 47 air raids, Chinese 78, 84, 106–8 Akagi, Roy Hidemichi 32–3, 47–8, 50n45, 50n47, 122 Alaskan salmon fishing problem 61 Alley, Norman (cinematographer) 55 Allison, John M. 82 Amakasu Masahiko 42 Amateur Athletic Union of America 66 America Friendship Society (Beiyu Kyōkai) 52 America–Japan Society 4, 12, 13, 52–3, 67, 118; managing U.S. perceptions of Sino-Japanese War 53, 56–9; and Olympic Games bid 64–7; and Panay Incident 53–4, 68n8, 126; speeches to 57–61; sports exchanges 62–3; and trade with U.S. 56, 61 America–Japan Society Bulletin 5, 13, 53, 56, 67; on American football 63; and Olympic Games bid 64–5 American Committee for NonParticipation in Japanese Aggression 112, 120 American Economic Mission (Japanese trade group) 56 American nationals: and Nanjing Incident (1927) 82–4; and Nanjing Massacre (1937) 80 American West and North China compared 18, 31, 58 America’s Share in Japan’s War Guilt 120 Answering Questions on Manchuria (1937) (SMRC) 21, 28, 48n5 anti-Asian sentiment in U.S. 3, 4, 8, 21–2 Anti-Comintern Pact 115, 124

anti-Japanese sentiment, present day in China 1, 3, 9–11, 129–30 Appeal to Reason 119 Are You Sure That ...? (JPA) 97 Ashida Hitoshi 57 Asia: The American Magazine on the Orient 124, 125 Atcheson, George 54–5 atrocities, Chinese 77–8, 106–8; cited in Japanese publications 81, 82–4, 107–10, 128; see also Nanjing Incident (1927) atrocities, Japanese in China 9–10, 57, 129–30; alleged American support for 112; refutations of 96, 97, 106; see also Nanjing Massacre (1937); Unit 731 bandits 37–8, 82, 105 baseball in Manchuria 45–6, 98, 100 Beijing–Tianjin corridor 76 Berry, Dr. A.D. 122–3 Billingham, Anthony 114 Bingham, Robert W. (U.S. ambassador to Great Britain) 78–9 biological warfare research 10, 29–30 Blue Shirts paramilitary force 87 “Bombing of USS Panay” (newsreel) 55 Bowen, A.J. (University of Nanjing president) 82, 84 Boxer Protocol of 1900 75, 88, 103, 116n29 Brundage, Avery 65 Buddhists 44, 121 Burnett, Brigadier General Charles 59 “Business Men of Kyoto” 120 Cabinet Intelligence Department (CID) of Japanese government 7–8, 95, 129

142   Index California, anti-Japanese acton in 4, 21–2 Cameron, Charles R. (U.S. ConsulGeneral) 56, 61 censorship in Japan 12, 101 Chamberlain, Neville 126 Chamberlain, Sir Austin on Nanjing Incident 83 Chang, Iris 9 Changchun see Xinjing, capital of Manzhouguo Changchun Film Studio 41 Changkufeng Incident 91 Chiang Kaishek 6–7, 75, 94n64; and Battle of Shanghai 107–8; and Blue Shirts Society 87; bombing of Yellow River dikes 86–7; campaign against communists 76; and foreign claims in China 104, 112–13; links to communism 87–9, 101, 110, 111, 112–13, 129; and Manchuria 24; and Nanjing Incident 82–3; New York Times on 114; Time magazine “Man of the Year” 1937 113–14, 124; and U.S. 84, 96, 106, 111–12; and Xi’an Incident 89; see also Soong Meiling (Madame Chiang) China, backwardness of contrasted with modern Japan 100–1 China Affair see Sino-Japanese War, Second Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 2, 76, 80, 88–9, 111, 114; and current relations with Japan 9, 10, 129–30; and films 41; and Guomindang 112–13; and Nanjing Massacre (1937) 80 Chinese Exclusion Act (U.S. 1882) 4, 22 Chinese propaganda aimed at U.S. 111–12 Chinese provocation of Japan 77–9, 82, 128 Christian organizations 33, 35, 121, 122, 128 civilizing mission of Japanese expansionism 3, 13, 35, 58, 59, 100–1, 119; Foreign Affairs Association of Japan publications on 72, 82, 84, 85; JPA and 95; JPA propaganda on 103; and South Manchuria Railway Company (SMRC) 17–18, 19 communism in China 5, 73, 97, 110–15, 118, 120; anti-Japanese activities 124; religious groups against 122; see also Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Communist International (Comintern) 87–9, 111, 112, 115, 124

Contemporary Japan: A Quarterly Review of Japanese Affairs 71 coolies and labor 22, 28, 35 cooperative community (kyōdōtai) 5–6 cotton industry 119–20 “covered wagon” migrations 35, 36 cultural and educational projects, Japanese sponsorship of 67, 72, 103 Cumberland, HMS 107 Dai-Nippon Amateur Wrestling Association 63 Dalian city 28, 29, 31, 39, 42, 46, 47 democracy in China 94n64, 112, 114 Do You Know That ...? Fifty Questions on Current Topics (JPA) 97, 99; on communism and Soviet involvement 110 Dollar Steamship Line 107, 108 Doolittle Tokyo Raiders 2 East Asia Allied-Cultures Society 103 East Asia Land Development Company 36 Eastern Asia, An Illustrated Quarterly (SMRC) 18, 30–1, 39–40 Eastman Kodak Company 44 Eden, Anthony (British Foreign Secretary) 79 Edmonds, Col. James E. 119 education program in Manchuria 34–5, 44, 47, 72, 127 “Enlightenment and Rehabilitation Corps” 85 Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Department see Unit 731 expansionism, Japanese 23, 95, 97; see also imperialism, Japanese extraterritorial rights ceded to Japan 21, 24 Far Eastern Conflict and American Cotton, The 120 fascism 73, 87 Ferris, Daniel 66 film industry 5, 41–4 Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty (1922) 124–5 Flowers of War, The (film) (Zhang) 9–10 football 62–3 Forbes, William Cameron 56 Foreign Affairs Association of Japan 4, 13, 71, 128; on Chinese provocation 76–8, 79, 82; on Chinese threats to foreign nationals 84, 92n24; on communism and Soviet involvement 87–9; on effects of

Index   143 sovietization 89–91, 110; English language publications 71–3; managing perceptions of Sino-Japanese War 73–6, 78, 79–80, 85; on Nanjing Incident 84; on Nanjing Massacre 80–3; North China Incident, The 74, 83; and Olympic Games bid 73; propaganda against Chiang and Guomindang government 86–9 foreign nationals in China 60, 78, 81, 104–5; under threat from Chinese 73, 82–4, 112–13, 128 foreign troops stationed in China 75, 105, 113 free trade: Japanese restriction of 34, 102; and Open Door Policy 18, 127 “Future of American Trade with Manchukuo” (Akagi) 33 Gardiner, William Howard 125 Garside, Alston 119 geisha dancing 42–4 GPU, Soviet secret police 90 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken) 5 Grew, Joseph C. (U.S. ambassador to Japan) 8, 26, 67, 81; and Panay Incident 53–4; on U.S.-Japan relations 128; warning Roosevelt of Japan’s power 125–6 Gripentrog, John 4, 46 Guandong Army 15n12, 15n18, 20, 24, 48n9, 91; see also Unit 731 Guandong government 28, 30; hospital facilities 29; schools and education 34–5 Guandong Leased Territory 21, 36, 48n9 Guomindang (Nationalist Party) 76, 123; and communism 41, 88–9, 113; links with Soviet Union 89–90, 111, 112 Guomindang (Nationalist Party) Army 37, 76, 77, 81, 86, 114; attacks on foreign nationals 104, 105–6, 112; and Battle of Shanghai 108, 120; and Nanjing Incident 82–4 Guomindang (Nationalist Party) government 6, 75, 76–7, 84, 86–7, 104–5; propaganda of 96, 112, 124, 129; and Soviet Union 89, 110, 113, 119; and U.S. 8 Harbord, Major-General James G. 60 Harding, Warren G. (U.S. president 1921–1923) 6

Hasegawa Kiyoshi, Admiral 55 Hayashi Keiichi (Japan’s Ambassador to U.K.) 1–2 He Yingqin, General 76 Helsinki Olympics 64, 67, 69n52 He-Umezu Accord of 1935 76 Hiraoka Hiroshi 46 “history activists” (Chinese academics) 9 history textbooks, partisan revisionist 10, 12 Hitler, Adolph 64 Horinouchi Kensuke (Japan’s Ambassador to U.S.) 58–9 hospitals in Manchuria 28–9 How About Giving Japan a Break? Truth Will Out! (JPA) 97, 98 Hua Chunying 2 Hull, Cordell (U.S. Secretary of State) 34, 54, 125 Hygienic Institute (SMRC) 28 Ideological Warfare Exhibition 1938 8 immigration into Manchuria 35–7; segregation of races 37, 47 imperialism, Japanese 3, 6–7, 84, 112; Chinese resistance 5–7; justifications for 4–5, 13–14, 20, 95–6, 104, 123; “New Order Movement” (Shintaisei) 5–6; parallels with Western 18, 20, 59, 96, 127; threat to U.S. interests 4, 6, 23 industry in Manchuria 18, 27, 32–4, 47, 86 Information Committee of the Japanese government 7, 71 Information Photography Association (Japanese propaganda) 8, 95 International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone 81 International Military Tribunal for the Far East 81 International Olympic Committee (IOC) 63, 65–6 International Peace Campaign 112 international trade 100, 119–20; Japanese promotion of 5, 18, 56, 61, 102; and Manchuria 27, 30–4; U.S. Open Door Policy 18, 22, 23, 24, 61, 127; U.S. restrictions on Japan 55 international treaty agreements and Japanese imperialism 6–7, 21, 24, 48n12, 75–6, 82, 103–4 investment in Manchuria 24, 27, 29, 30–2, 127 Ishii Kikujirō 27 Ishiwara Kanji 20

144   Index Italy: Anti-Comintern Pact 115, 124; bid for 1940 Olympics 63, 69n46; treaties and 82, 124; troops in China 105 Japan Amateur Athletic Association 64 Japan and Manchuria on the Cross 121 “Japan and the Open Door in Manchukuo” (Akagi) 33, 50n47 Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) 7, 9 Japan Hotel Association 73 Japan Pacific Association (JPA) 13–14, 95, 128; on Battle of Shanghai 105–8, 109; on commercial ties with U.S. 102; on cultural institutions 103; on foreign interests in China 104–5; propaganda publications 96–101, 98, 99; on Soviet influence 101–2; on threat of Soviet communism 110–15 Japan Speaks on the Sino-Japanese Crisis (Kawakami) 20 Japan Year Book 71 Japan–America Friendship Mass Meeting (1938) 57 Japan–America Trust 54 Japan–China Pictorial Primer booklets see Pictorial Primers (JPA) Japanese American, The (newspaper) 120–1, 122–3 Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York 4, 118–20 Japanese soldiers and Chinese civilians 78, 85–6, 97–100, 99 Japanese War Bride (film) 51n91 Japan’s Constitution 2–3, 101 Japan’s Problems (JPA) 97 Jiang Jieshi see Chiang Kaishek Johnson, Nelson T. (U.S. ambassador in China) 55 Kabayama Aisuke, Count 59 Kadono Chokyūrō 56, 61 Kanō Jigorō and 1940 Olympics bid 63–4, 65, 67 Kaneko Kentarō, Count 52–3 Kangde emperor see Puyi, emperor of Manzhouguo Kanzaki Kiichi 57 Karakhan Lev M. (Bolshevik Ambassador to China) 88 Katsuki Kiyoshi, Lieutenant-General 77 Kawakami, K.K. 20 “Kingly Way Revolution” in Manchuria 25, 38

Kirby, Gustavus T. 66 Kitazawa Yasuji see Rakuten Knox, Philander Chase (U.S. Secretary of State) 22 Koizumi Junichirō (Japanese Prime Minister 2001–6) 10, 11 Konoe Fumimaro, Prince (Japanese Prime Minister 1937–9, 40–1) 5–6, 12, 87, 95, 103 Konoye Atsumaro, Prince 103 Koreans in Manchuria 35, 36 League of Nations 5, 6, 48n12, 69n46; Lytton Report on Manchurian Incident 26 Lenin, V.I. 88 Li Xianglan (actress and singer) 44, 45, 51n91 Liu Xiaoming on “Voldemort Wars” 1 Lugou Bridge, Battle of see Marco Polo Bridge Incident Lunt, Carroll P. 60 Lushun city 28, 39 Manchoukuo see Manzhouguo (The Manchu State) Manchoukuo–Soviet Union Border Questions 91 Manchukuo (Manchuria) (film) 44 Manchukuo: The Newborn Empire (film) 42–4 Manchuria 13; China blamed for Japanese intervention in 20; foreign claims to 24; infrastructure 27–9; Japanese policies for 17–18; Japan’s claims to 20–2; Soviet Army occupation of 27; see also Manzhouguo (The Manchu State) Manchuria Medical University 29 Manchuria under Japanese Dominion (Yamamuro) 9 Manchurian Incident (1931) 7, 15n18, 24, 26 manga magazines 101 Manzhouguo (The Manchu State) 20–1, 46, 59; action against banditry 37–9; alleged autonomy of 23; Buddhist farm in 121; Christianity in 122; creation of puppet state of 21, 24–5, 26, 67; film industry 41–5; government of 25–6, 32; immigration 35–6; and international trade 30–4; investment in infrastructure 27–9, 127; model cities in 29, 42; “New Deal” education program 34–5; not recognized by the U.S. 26, 33, 50n47,

Index   145 102, 125; Soviet threats towards 90, 91; tourism in 39–41, 40, 46; trade and industry 31–4 Manzhouguo Film Association 41–2 Manzhouguo Motion Picture Corporation 41, 43 Manzhouguo-Korea Colonization Company 36 Mao Zedong 114 Marco Polo Bridge Incident 11, 53, 71; Foreign Affairs Association of Japan on 74–5, 83; Soviet reaction 88 Masuda, Horace M. 38, 39 Miki Kiyoshi 5 military expansion by Abe Shinzō’s government 2–3 military maneuvers, Japanese in China 74–6 Monroe Doctrine 5, 59 Morris, Roland Sletor (U.S. ambassador to Japan) 53 Movie Wonderland, Changchun 41 Mukden Incident see Manchurian Incident (1931) Mulan (Manchurian village) 39 Murphy, Robert 39–40 Mussolini, Benito 69n46, 87 Muto, Ken 56 Nanjing 3, 6, 24; Japanese bombing of 53, 54–5 Nanjing Incident (1927) 82–4 Nanjing Massacre (1937) 2, 9, 10, 14n6, 57, 80–2, 129 national holidays, Chinese anti-Japanese 2, 10, 130 National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Undō) 12, 95, 121, 129 naval power in the Pacific 6, 124–5 “New Order Movement” (Shintaisei) 5–6 Nomonhan Incident 91 Nomura Kichisaburō, Admiral 59 non-aggravation policy, Japanese 76–7, 78 non-alienation agreements and Chinese territories 104 “North China Affair” 56 North China Affair, The 82 North China Daily News 79 North China Incident, The 74–5, 83 Nye, Gerald (U.S. senator) 34 O’Connor, Peter 3, 8 Okura Kishichiro, Baron 58, 59, 61

Olympic Games 1936 64, 1940 63–7, 69n46, 69n52, 73 Open Door Policy (U.S.-China) 18, 23, 24, 61, 102, 127 opium trade 30, 42, 47 Opium Wars 24, 75, 104 Oriental Affairs (British Shanghai magazine) 79, 106, 107 Osaka Mainichi (newspaper) 57, 95, 97, 123 Outer Mongolia 111, 120 Panay Incident 53–6, 67, 126 Paradise: New Manchuria (film) 45 Perry, Commodore Matthew C. 100 photographic propaganda 7–8, 78, 97–100, 98, 99, 109, 110, 123; bombing of Shanghai’s International Settlement 106–7; ‘faked’ Nanjing Massacre pictures 81; and tourism 40 Pictorial Primers (JPA) 14, 96–115, 98, 99 “Pioneer Aspects in Manchuria” (Murphy) 39–40 plagues in Manchuria 28–9, 48 police and security in Manchuria 38–9 political cartoons 101, 102, 115n15 Political Science Quarterly 47–8 population growth in Japan 22, 60, 96 President Hoover, USS 79, 107–8 public services improvements in Manchuria 27–8, 47–8 Puyi, emperor of Manzhouguo 23, 25–6 Qing Dynasty 23, 24, 26, 31, 75 railway infrastructure 30–2, 47, 101 Rakuten 101, 102, 115n15 Rape of Nanking, The (Chang) 9 Red Cross Society of Japan 29 Red scare 88, 110, 129 Reifsnider, Charles Shriver 54 religious groups: bandits 37; in Japan 121–2; in U.S. 57 resources, Japanese exploitation of 26, 30, 32, 86 Rikkyo University, Tokyo 62 Robinson, Dr. Frederick 59 Roosevelt, Eleanor B. on Chinese atrocities 107 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 6, 26; changing attitude towards Japan 124–6, 128; LendLease agreement with Chiang 127; and Manchuria 27, 34; “Naval Quarantine Speech” 102, 118, 119, 123, 124, 129; New Deal 17; and Panay Incident 55, 67

146   Index Roosevelt, Theodore 21, 116n29; letter to Knox on Japan 22–3 Root-Takahira Agreement 1908 22 Rusch, Paul 62 Russian investment in Manchuria 27–8, 31, 35 Russian territories ceded to Japan 21 Russo-Japanese War 13, 17, 21, 31, 48n9 Saito Hirosi 124 San Francisco’s Board of Education racial segregation order 21–2 schools and education 44, 85, 103; antiforeigner material in Chinese textbooks 113; in Manchuria 34–5, 47, 72; sports teams 46, 62 segregation of races in Manchuria 36, 37, 47 Self-Defense Forces (Japan) 2–3 “Shall We Trust Japan?” (Roosevelt, F.D.) 124, 125 Shanghai, Battle of 56, 78–9, 109; bombing of International Settlement 106, 107–8, 120; bombing of USS President Hoover 107, 108; use of poison gas 108 Shashin Shūhō (Weekly Photography Journal) 7 Shōwa Research Association 5 Shōwa Steel Works 32 Shenyang city 25, 28, 29; see also Manchurian Incident (1931) Shimbashi Athletic Club 46 Siberia, Stalinist purges in 90 Sino-Japanese Conflict, The 120 Sino-Japanese Crisis 1937; The 118–19 Sino-Japanese relations in twenty-first century 1–3, 11–12, 129–30 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1896), Chiang’s abrogation of 24, 104 Sino-Japanese War, First 24 Sino-Japanese War, Second 2, 6, 11, 56, 60, 129, 132n39; Battle of Shanghai 56, 78–9, 106–9, 120; China blamed for 119; expulsion of Guomindang forces from north and east China 84; Foreign Affairs Association of Japan publications on 13, 72–6, 79–80; Japan Pacific Association (JPA) publications on 96, 103–8; Japanese goals 80; Marco Polo Bridge Incident 11, 53, 71, 74–5, 83, 88; and Olympic Games bid 64, 65–6, 69n52; Panay Incident 53–6, 67,

126; propaganda and 95; religious groups and 122; and U.S. trade 119–20; see also War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression Sino-Soviet relations 87–90, 91; Nonaggression Agreement 89 Sixth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939 (SMRC) 33–4, 38 SMR Zone 21 “soldiers of peace” 85 Songhua River 40–1 Soong Meiling (Madame Chiang) 89, 106, 112, 113, 114, 123, 124 South Manchuria Railway Company (SMRC) 13; activities of 17–18; Answering Questions on Manchuria 1937 21, 28, 48n5; and baseball 45–6; “carrier of the light of civilization into Manchuria” 17, 19, 27; and creation of Manzhouguo 23, 25–7; Eastern Asia magazine 18, 30–1, 39–40; Englishlanguage literature published by 4–5, 17, 33–5, 41–2; films 5, 41–5; intelligence gathering 47; investment in infrastructure 27–9, 31–2; law and order 37–8; multi-culturalism and immigration 35–6; “new deal” in education 34–5; New York office’s activities 4, 18; propaganda of aimed at U.S. 20–1, 23, 32, 47–8; and tourism 39–41, 40, 46; and trade 30–4; on Zhang regime 25 Soviet Army occupation of Manchuria 27 Soviet Union 31; links with Chiang 111, 112–13; military clashes with Japan 91; promulgation of communism in China 5, 88–91, 110–12, 114–15, 118, 120–1; and Siberia 90; threat from 100, 101–2 sports exchanges with U.S. 62–3 Stalin, Joseph 90, 114 Stimson, Henry L. (U.S. Secretary of State) 26, 33, 55, 125 Sun Yatsen 94n64, 111, 112 Suzhou Nocturne 45 Tai Yang Dao beaches 40 Takaishi Shingoro 57–8, 59 telecommunications, international 72 terrorism 4, 60, 87 Thirteen Female Martyrs of Nanjing (Yan) 9 Tianjin port 76, 81, 123 Time magazine 113–14, 124; on bombing of Shanghai 106–7 Tokugawa Iyesato, Prince 53, 54, 56, 64

Index   147 Tokyo Gazette 71, 72–3, 79–80; blames China for hostilities 74, 76–7; on bringing civilization to China 85; on Changkufeng Incident 91; on economic development 86; on Marco Polo Bridge Incident 74; on Nanjing Massacre 81; on Sino-Soviet cooperation 91; on Soviet influence 88, 90; on terrorism 87, 92n24; on Tongzhou massacre 77–8; on Yellow River floods 87 Tokyo Nichi Nichi (newspaper) 27, 57, 95, 97, 123 Tong, Hollington 96 Tongzhou massacre 77–8, 105 tourism 73; in Manchuria 39–41, 40, 46 trade, promotion of with U.S. 33–4, 55–6, 60–1, 118, 127–8; Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York and 118–21; JPA and 102; SMRC publications and 32–3 trade and investment: effects of communism on 89–90; promotion of bilateral Japan-U.S. 56 transport facilities, improvement in Manchuria 31–2 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 1896 24, 104, 1911 96, 126–7 Treaty of Portsmouth, New Hampshire 21 Treaty of Versailles 6 Trefethen, Daniel B. 121 Twenty-one Demands Treaty 1915 6–7, 52 Umezu Yoshijirō 76 Unit 731, 29–30 United Front (CCP and Guomindang): First 88, 111, 112; Second 88–9, 113 United Nations Security Council 11 United States of America (U.S.) 3; antiJapanese feeling in 3, 4, 8, 21, 55, 124; business interests in Asia 102, 118–21; Christian anti-Chinese propaganda 122–3; cotton industry 119–20; failure of Japanese propaganda in 14, 123–4, 127, 129; giving Japan territorial rights 21; government compared with Japan’s 101; and Guomindang government 84; imperialism of compared to Japan’s 18, 96; isolationism of 6, 47, 55, 124, 126, 127; and Japanese expansionism in China 26, 60–1, 67, 79; and Nanjing Incident 82–3; Nanjing Massacre 80–2; non-recognition of Manzhoughuo 26, 33, 50n47, 102, 125; objections to Japanese immigration into 22–3, 127;

and Olympic Games 1940 66; Open Door Policy toward China 18, 23, 52, 61, 102, 127; Panay Incident 53–5, 126, 129; provocations for war with Japan 1906–1908 21–2; trade with Manzhouguo 32–4 USSR see Soviet Union Wang Guangya (Chinese ambassador to the U.N.) 11 Wang Yongjiang 28, 46, 49n37 Wang Zhengting, Dr. 65 war crimes, Chinese accused of 108–10 War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression 2, 10, 12, 16n37, 129 Warlord Era in China (junfa shidai) 6, 23–4, 46–7, 111 Washington Conference (1921–1922) 6, 24, 124, 125 Wen Jiabao (Chinese Premier 2003–13) 11–12 Western exploitation, Japanese resistance to 5–6 What Will a Japanese Victory Mean to American Cotton? (Edmonds) 119 What’s It All About? (JPA) 97, 100–3 Why Is Japan Fighting? (journal) 97 Why Japan Had to Fight in Shanghai 78, 92n24 Why? Who? How? Questions and Answers on the Sino-Japanese Conflict 74 Williams, Rev. John E., murder of 84 Wilson, Woodrow (U.S. president 1913–21) 6, 52 World War I 6, 52 World War II 2, 10, 11, 16n37, 27, 32, 130; and Olympic Games 63, 69n52; see also War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression wrestling tournaments 63 Xi Jinping 10, 130, 132n39 Xi’an Incident 89 Xinchou Treaty of 1901 75 Xinjing, capital of Manzhouguo 29, 38 Xinjing Film Studio 41 Yamaguchi Yoshiko see Li Xianglan (actress and singer) Yamato Hotel 39, 73 Yang Yujun 2, 130 Yangzi River 60, 84; Panay Incident 53, 55, 126 Yarnell, Admiral Harry E. 55

148   Index Yasukuni Shrine 1, 10, 11, 130 “yellow peril” 3, 4 Yellow River floods 86–7 Yoshida Shigeru (Japan’s ambassador to Great Britain) 78–9 Yuan Shikai (Chinese President 1913–16) 6, 7

zentai shugi (“totalitarianism”) 6 Zhang Xueliang 23–4, 25, 49n18; and Xi’an Incident 89 Zhang Yimou 9, 14 Zhang Zuolin 23–4, 25, 28, 30, 46, 49n18 Zhou Enlai 89 Zhu De 113, 114