Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Restoration, 1868-2000 [1st ed.] 978-0-312-23914-5;978-1-349-63240-4

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Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Restoration, 1868-2000 [1st ed.]
 978-0-312-23914-5;978-1-349-63240-4

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxiv
The Meiji Renovation (Richard Sims)....Pages 1-39
The Consolidation of the Meiji State and the Growth of Political Opposition, 1878–90 (Richard Sims)....Pages 40-68
The Constitutional Experiment and the Beginning of Compromise Politics, 1890–1905 (Richard Sims)....Pages 69-92
Political Party Consolidation, Oligarchic Reaction and the Emergence of New Forces, 1905–18 (Richard Sims)....Pages 93-122
Party Cabinets, Radical Movements and the Collapse of Taisho Democracy, 1918–32 (Richard Sims)....Pages 123-178
The Pursuit of Greater National Unity and the War State, 1932–45 (Richard Sims)....Pages 179-237
The Post-War Reshaping of Japanese Politics, 1945–52 (Richard Sims)....Pages 238-265
The ‘1955 System’ and the Era of L. D. P. Dominance, 1952–93 (Richard Sims)....Pages 266-343
The Shake-Up of Japanese Politics, 1993–2000 (Richard Sims)....Pages 344-365
Back Matter ....Pages 366-395

Citation preview

]APANESE POLITICAL HISTORY SINCE THE MEI]I RENOVATION

RICHARD SIMS

Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation 1868-2000

palgrave

*

JAPANESE POLITICAL HISTORY SINCETHE MEIJI RENOVATION 1868-2000 Copyright © Riehard Sims 2001

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reprodueed in any manner whatsoever without written per mission exeept in the ease ofbrief quotations embodied in eritieal articles or reviews. For information address PALGRAVE, 175 Fifth Avenue, NewYork, N.Y 10010 First published by PALGRAVE, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE is the new global imprint of St. Martin's Press LLC Seholarly and Referenee Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd. (formerly Maemillan Press Ltd.)

ISBN 978-0-312-23915-2 ISBN 978-1-349-63240-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-63240-4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sims, R.L. (Riehard L.) Japanese politieal history sinee the Meiji renovation, 1868-2000 / Riehard Sims. p.em. Includes bibliographieal referenees and index. I.Japan--Polities and government·-- 1868- I.Tide. DS881.9L S5665 2001 952.03'3--de21 00-051474 Transferred to digital printing 2007

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I must first acknowledge my gratitude to my publishers in London for inviting me to update and extend the earlier version of this book, which appeared in 1991 under the imprint of the Vikas Publishing House in New Delhi. Because that version was part of aseries which was intended to include aseparate volume on recent Japanese politics, it was not appropriate for me to cover the post-1952 period in detail. I am therefore pleased to have had the chance to make the work more complete (although I am all too well aware that it is impossible to cover every aspect of modern Japanese political his tory in one volume). In addition to the historians whose works are listed in the bibliography, this book owes a great deal, directly or indirectly, to a considerable number of scholars who have personally helped to shape my understanding of Japanese history over the past four decades. First among these is Bill Beasley, who guided me initially as a research supervisor and later as a colleague and fellow teacher and to whom I owe an incalculable debt. Among the various Japanese historians who have aided and encouraged me, particular mention must be made of Oka Y oshitake and Mitani Taichiro, both of whom went out of their way, despite their many other commitments, to make my periods of research at Tokyo University rewarding, and of Sakai Yukichi, who provided me with an invaluable introduction to local political history, notably during a trip to collect politicians' records in Akita in 1972. It is a pleasure to express gratitude also to Uchikawa Yoshimi, Miyachi Masato, Miyake Masaki, Banno Junji, Emura Eiichi, Matsuo Takayoshi and Taguchi Shoichiro, with all of whom I have had informative discussions. N eedless to say, they bear no responsibility for the ways in which I have incorporated their ideas in this book. In some places, indeed, several of them would almost certainly strike a different balance or emphasise other factors. It is natural, however, v

VI

Acknowledgements

that some aspects of Japanese history should be seen through a different perspective from outside Japan. Apart from colleagues and other scholars I must also acknowledge the contribution of my students at the School of Oriental and African Studies in the University ofLondon. They have provided a testing-ground for the interpretations which appear in the following pages, and have not infrequently forced me to refine or qualify my arguments or to seek further support for them. I hope that their successors will derive some benefit from their critical efforts. Last but not least, I wish to thank my wife Denise who has laboured long and, on the whole, uncomplainingly in typing not only the present book but also two earlier versions. London, August 2000

R.S.

CONTENTS Acknowledgements

page

Priface

Xl

Glossar)'

XVll

A Note on Japanese Names The Changing Value

v

of the

XX1l1

Yen

XXIV

Chapters 1.

The Meiji Renovation Japan in the mid-nineteenth century The causes of the Meiji Ishin The establishment and consolidation of the Meiji government Obstacles to centralising riform The abolition offeudal domains The acceleration of modernisation Political division and the 1873 governmental crisis The ascendancy of Okubo The disestablishment of the samurai and the Satsuma rebellion The character of the Meiji government

2.

The Consolidation of the Meiji State and the Growth ofPolitical Opposition, 1878-90 The consolidation of the Meiji state The People's Rights movement The 1881 political crisis The first national political parties The People's Rights movement in the 1880s The Meiji government's response to the People's Rights movement VB

1 2 5 12 20 25 30 33 35 36 38 40 41 44 51 56 58

61

Vlll

3.

4.

Contents The Constitutional Experiment and the Beginning of Compromise Politics, 1890-1905

69

The first Diet sessions The Ito cabinet and the Jiyuto The 1898 impasse and the Kenseito cabinet The Yamagata cabinet and the Kenseito The formation cf the Seiyukai PoZitics under the first Katsura cabinet The Ribiya Park riots The declining role cf the eider statesmen

70 74 78 82 85 86 89 91

Political Party Consolidation, Oligarchie Reaction and the Emergence ofN ew Forces, 1905-18

93

The political strategy cf Rara Takashi The second Katsura cabinet and the Seiyukai The second Saion)i cabinet and the death cf the Emperor The Taisho political crisis The social and ideological background cf the Taisho political cnSIS The aftermath of the Taisho political crisis The Okuma cabinet and the rise of the Doshikai The Terauchi cabinet and the resurgence cf the Seiyukai The rice riots and the Hara cabinet 5.

Party Cabinets, Radical Movements and the Collapse ofTaisho Democracy, 1918-32 The post-war ferment The policies cf the Rara cabinet Seiyukai disunity and non-party cabinets Reform and reaction under the Kato cabinet The Wakatsuki cabinet and its difficulties Formation cf the Minseito and the 1928 election The repressive policies and political difficulties of the Tanaka cabinet Financial retrenchment and the Naval Limitations controversy The Depression and fa i/u res cf the Minseito cabinet Military subversion and the Mukden Incident The collapse of the second Wakatsuki cabinet The Inukai cabinet and the May 15th Incident The weaknesses of poUtical parties

94 97 100 104 107 114 115 118 120 123 123 128 133 137 142 144 146 149 153 154 158 159 162

Contents

6.

7.

8.

lX

'Taisho Demoeraey' and the new social movements Ltift-wing politieal parties

168 173

The Pursuit ofGreater National Unity and the War State, 1932-45 The upsurge offundamentalist nationalism The divisions within japanese ultranationalism The Saito cabinet The Okada eabinet and the Minobe affair Factional struggle in the army The February 26th Incident The inerease in military injluenee on governement The partial party revival and the Hayashi eabinet The first Konoe eabinet and the China Incident The Hiranuma and Abe eabinets The Yonai eabinet and the new party movement Konoe and the new politieal structure The emasculation of the new structure Polities and foreign poliey in 1941 Tojo, the 1942 election and war-time polities The growth of opposition to Tojo The Koiso and Suzuki eabinets and the peaee party The decision to surrender

179 179 182 186 189 192 195 197 202 205 210 214 217 220 223 226 229 232 236

The Post-War Reshaping ofJapanese Politics, 1945-52 Conservative expectations and initial Oeeupation poliey Constitutional riform The revival of politieal parties The 1946 election and the purge of Hatoyama The first Yoshida eabinet and the challenge of the Left Soeialist-led coalition government The change in Ameriean polie}' and thereturn to conservative control The end of the Oeeupation The '1955 System' and the Era ofLDP Dominance, 1952-93 The persistenee of American injluenee Conservative division and Yoshida's ousting Socialist merger and the formation of the Liberal Demoeratie Party

238 238 242 246 249 251 255 258 263 266 268 270 274

Contents

x

Ihe Hatoyama cabinet and the reaction against the Occupation Kishi's rise to power Kishi and Security Treaty revision Political conciliation and economic growth under Ikeda Ihe Sato cabinet and political change in the 1960s Ihe retrocession oJ Okinawa Relations with China and the end oJ the Sato cabinet Ihe Tanaka cabinet's aims and setbacks Ihe Miki cabinet and the obstacles to political reform Ihe Lockheed scandal and the Fukuda cabinet LDP factional conflict and the Ohira cabinet's loss oJ a Diet majority Ihe conservative revival Ihe Suzuki cabinet and administrative reform Nakasone's new approach Ihe Liberal Democratic Party's 1986 election success Introduction oJ the consumption tax Ihe Recruit scandal and the collapse of the Takeshita and Uno cabinets Ihe collapse oJ the 'bubble economy' and the impact oJ the Culf Crisis Ihe Sagawa scandal and the Liberal Democratic Party's fall from power Ihe reasons for the LD P' s long dominance

9. The Shake-up ofJapanese Politics, 1993-2000 Ihe Hosokawa coalition and its reform measures Ihe Conservative-Social Democratic coalition, 1994-6 Ihe New Frontier Party and the 1996 election Ihe Hashimoto cabind and the LDP setback in 1998 Ihe Obuchi cabinet and the LDP-Liberal Party-Komeito coalition Ihe Japanese political situation at the beginning oJ the twenty-jirst century Bibliograph)' Index

276 279 281 287 291 296 298 301 305 308 311 313 315 319 324 326 328 331 334 337 344 344 348 350 354 356 360 366 381

ILLUSTRATIONS

between pages 36 and 37 Some key figures in the Meiji Renovation Iwakura Tomomi, the most important court noble in the Meiji Renovation Okubo Toshimichi and Kido Takayoshi, the principal samurai leaders during the Meiji Renovation Yamagata Aritomo and Ito Hirobumi, influentialleaders from the early 1880s

between pages 120 and 121 Two political cartoons, 1906 and 1912 Cartoon of the rice riots, 1918 A rice granary burned in the rice riots

between pages 134 and 135 Prime minister Hara Takashi, 1918 Leaders of the Seiyukai party, 1918 Universal suffrage demonstration, February 1920 Demonstration against the Peace Preservation Law, 1925 Three of the founders of Japan's first proletarian literary magazine Inukai Tsuyoshi, Kato Takaaki and Takahashi Korekiyo,January 1924 Saionji Kimmochi with Inukai Tsuyoshi The 'cabinet of national unity' under Admiral Saito, May 1932

between pages 234 and 235 Cartoon satirising the 1930s campaign for clean elections Three leaders of Shakai Taishuto celebrating their success in the 1937 general election Xl

Xli

Illustrations

Konoe Fumimaro, three times prime minister in 1937-41 Key cabinet members 19 July 1940 Saito Takao's controversial Diet speech, February 1940 Listeners to the Emperor's surrender broadcast, 15 August 1945 General MacArthur's headquarters

between pages 274 and 275 May Day rally, 1946 Ii Yashiro, after announcing the cancellation of the general strike, February 1947 Some of the 39 women with seats in the House of Representatives after universal suffrage, 1946 The Emperor and Empress attending a ceremony, 1946 Leaders of the coalition cabinet, 1948 with Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru Founding ceremony of the Liberal Democratic Party, 15 November 1955 Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro with Marshai Bulganin, 1956 Tanaka Kakuei with Zhou Enlai, 1972 Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke with President Eisenhower, 1960 Prime Minister Sato Eisaku with President Nixon Ohira Masayoshi, Prime Minister 1978-80 Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko with President Reagan First meeting of the second Nakasone cabinet, 1984 Prime Minister Nakasone after his election victory 1986 Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru and his successor Foreign Minister Uno Sosuke, 1988 Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, 1989 Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, speaking on the controversial Peacekeeping Operations bill, 1991 Miyazawa Kiichi presented with proposals for Japan to playa more active international roIe, 1993

PREFACE For much ofthe last forty years the foreign image ofJapan has been overwhelrningly dominated by a mixture of admiration for, envy of, and apprehension about that country's extraordinary economic growth, and at least until the 1990s businessmen and economists alike sought to leam from Japan's success. In stark contrast the Japanese political system and its evolution have impinged only slighdy on outside perceptions. Many foreigners are unaware that Japan is a constitutional democracy, and, even among the better informed, few, if any, would advocate the adoption of Japanese political practices or hold Japanese politicians up as models to be emulated. No Japanese politicalleader has ever attracted anything approaching the fascination aroused by Mao Tse-tung or the admiration felt for Jawaharlal Nehru. Nor does this surprise the Japanese themselves, for even withinJapan there is litde inclination to boast about the conduct ofJapanese politics. Stilliess is any pride taken in Japan's modern political heritage. Indeed, many Japanese would maintain that between 1868 and 1945 Japan's development was distorted by the ruling elite's propagation of an authoritarian 'Emperor-system', while some would go so far as to claim that the introduction of unequivocally democratic institutions after the Second W orld War was, and has remained, largely a nominal change which had only a limited effect on basic attitudes and practices.! It would be impossible to deny the validity of much of the criticism of Japan's modern political record. Before 1945, certainly, repression and govemment indoctrination always existed to a greater or lesser extent, together with a reluctance on the part of the ruling elite to concede full political rights even to the male 1 One important eontemporary politieian who has expressed sueh view is Ozawa Iehiro. In an article published in Oetober 1993, he deseribed Japan's parliamentary demoeraey as a peeuliarly J apanese style of polities and not the real thing. Ozawa Iehiro and Fukuda Kazuya, 'Turing Japan into a Self-Reliant Nation', Japan Echo, vol 20, no. 4 (winter 1993), p. 22.

X111

XlV

Priface

population. It is also the case that the political system which evolved in the early twentieth century out of the earlier oligarchie style of government proved ineffective in terms of providing rational, coordinated decision-making, especially in foreign policy, and clearly contributed to Japan's blundering into disastrous international conflict in the 1930s and early '40s. Moreover, both before and after the Pacific War the management ofJapanese politics was tainted by corruption and the use of financial inducements (the latter on ascale rarely matched elsewhere), with general principles and issues playing a relatively minor role in elections. However justified such criticism is, a political history of modern Japan which sought only to emphasise and condemn failure would be unacceptably one-sided. The fact that Japan has proved able to combine a high degree of political stability with virtually unlimited freedom of political and intellectual expression over the last halfcentury suggests that its pre-war political experience may not have been entirely unconstructive. Nor is modern Japanese political tradition wholly authoritarian. It also contains a significant antiEstablishment strand which emerged alongside the oligarchie construction of a modern state in the 1870s and was more broadly based than is often supposed. Similarly, although modern Japan has become increasingly centralised, localism has remained strong. Even now, for instance, it would be extremely difD.cult for a politician to be elected to represent an area in which he was an outsider; and if he did not attend to local interests in general and constituents' requests in particular, his chances of re-election would be negligible. Furthermore, although nationalism was an extremely potent force between the mid-nineteenth and midtwentieth centuries, it did not completely prevent the developme nt of liberal attitudes; and neither education nor religion nor the law were wholly subjected to the purposes of the state, even when calls for national unity reached a peak in the decade and half preceding 1945. In an overview of Japan's modern political re cord one further aspect merits attention. Although conflict has not been uncommon in Japanese politics, and has sometimes taken a violent form, it is generally agreed that among elite groups (including political parties) a propensity to compromise has been far more pronounced than the tendency to stand absolutely firm on principles or policies or to push differences to an extreme. This tendency, which may

Priface

xv

weH owe much to the exceptional racial homogeneity of the Japanese and (despite considerable religious diversity) the absence of bitter sectarianism, has customarily been regarded by idealistic Japanese historians in an essentially negative light - as an obstacle to the achievement of democratic government by political parties through the mobilisation of popular forces and the threat of force. It is, however, not unlikely that a more confrontational style of politics would have led to a strengthening of authoritarianism rather than constitutionalism; and if it is acknowledged that political modernisation presents formidable problems, the development of a 'politics of compromise' may be seen as less deserving of condernnation. A willingness to accommodate different interests and to exercise restraint in the pursuit of power may have played a key role in the evolution of a viable political system which, for an its faults, aHowed an increasing measure of popular participation while remaining basically stable. In this respect, at least, Japanese politics may offer a usefullesson.

GLOSSARY Asahi Shimbun Bakufu

Bungei Shunju buraku burakumin

bushido

Choshu Daido Danketsu daimyo

Dajokan

A majorJapanese newspaper. The administrative organisation (originally a military headquarters) of a Shogun before 1868. Though responsible for national affairs, it mIed direcdy over less than a half ofJapan. A major Japanese monthly periodical. A hamlet, after 1888 part of an administrative village (mura). Inhabitants of ghetto-like communities, who continued to suffer discrimination after they were given legal equality in 1871. Also known as eta ('fuH of filth'), they were traditionally associated with professions which involved the taking oflife. The 'way of the warrior', the idealised ethical code ofthe samurai (bushlJ dass offeudalJapan. It emphasised total dedication by a warrior to his lord. A feudal domain which played a major role in the Meiji Ishin. The anti-government alliance which brought together the different wings of the political opposition in the late 1880s. The mler of a feudal domain in Tokugawa Japan. Many daimyo left decision-making to retainers, however, and were litde more than figureheads in 1868. U ntil 1862 they spent every other year at the Tokugawa capital, Edo. The Council of Government in Japan between 1869 and 1885, when it was replaced by a modern cabinet system. XVll

XVlll

genro

Genro-in gun haihan chiken han

hanbatsu hanseki hokal1 harakiri

jibal1

jushin

Glossary

The select group of Meiji leaders who were recognised as elder statesmen from the 1890s and continued to advise the Emperor on important political matters, usually determining the prime ministerial succession. Until his death in 1922 Yamagata Aritomo was the leading genro. The last (and from 1924 the only) genro was Saionji Kimmochi. A high-level advisory body on legislation, 187590. A traditional administrative district which from 1878 to 1923 functioned as a sub-prefectural unit with an officially appointed head. The abolition of feudal domains and their replacement by a centralised prefectural system (29 August 1871). Autonomous or semi-autonomous feudal domains, of which there were about 270 in 1868, ranging in size from small fiefs which produced only 10,000 koku of rice a year to a few very large ones, like Kaga, Satsuma and Choshu, which produced dose to 1,000,000 koku. They were subjected to occasional levies by the Bakufu, but not regular taxation. Cliques based on particular han. The return of han registers to the Emperor in 1869, an important step towards the ending of feudal autonomy. The ritual cutting open of the belly, a form of suicide chosen (originally by samurai) to avoid disgrace or make a public protest or gesture. Also known as seppuku. The political base of established support, usually depending on lower-level assembly members and yuryokusha, on which politicians depended to secure most of their votes. They were, and to some extent still are, based mainly on a particular geographical area within a constituency. The elder statesmen, mostly ex-Prime Ministers, who were sometimes consulted between 1934

Glo5sat}'

Kanto kazoku kokka

Keidanren Kizoku-in kobun Kochi kocho Kodoha koenkai koku Kokugaku

kokutai

Meiji

XIX

and 1945 on the choice of a new Prime Minister and other important matters. The region of eastern Japan which includes Tokyo. 'Family State', a late-Meiji ideological concept intended to denote the special relationship between Emperor and people and the unique character ofthe kokutai. Federation ofEconomic Organisations, the major big business association. The House of Peers, the upper chamber in the Japanese Diet, 1890-1947. Literally 'child role', the protege, henchman or disciple of an influential personage, boss or teacher (oyabun or oyakata). The name of the prefecture which replaced the han ofTosa (and also its main city). The mayor of a village or group of villages, 187189. The 'Imperial Way faction', a group of army officers in the 1930s associated in particular with Generals Araki and Mazaki. The support organisation of a politician. Unit of measurement for rice, approximately 4.96 bushels (roughly 300 lbs). 'National Learning', a school of thought in late TokugawaJapan which emphasised the nation's indigenous (non-Chinese) tradition and the supposed divine descent of the reigning imperial dynasty. 'National polity (or structure)', a word which implied that the J apanese state possessed a unique (almost tribalistic) character based on the special position of the Emperor and an unbroken imperialline. The name given (from 1868) to the reign of Mutsuhito, the Emperor who succeeded to the throne in 1867 and died in 1912. The Emperor hirns elf is usually referred to by his reign-period name, the use of his personal name being con-

xx

Nohonshugi

Rengo Sa-in Sangi sangyo kumiai

Sat-Cho Satsuma Sei-in

Shinto

shishi

shizoku

Glossa1'}!

sidered disrespectful. The ideological tradition which stressed the essential importance of agriculture as the foundation of society and encouraged village cooperation and self-help. It was sometimes linked with hostility towards capitalism, industrialisation and urbanisation. The major labour union federation after its formation in the late 1980s. The 'Left Board', the legislative advisory body in the Dajokan. It was replaced by the Genro-in in 1875. State Councillor in the Dajokan system of government, 1869-85. Producers' cooperatives, govemment-encouraged mutual assistance groups which spread rapidly throughJapanese viHages in the early decades of the twentieth century. Abbreviation ofSatsuma and Choshu. A feudal domain which played a major role in the Meiji Ishin. After the abolition of the han in 1871 it became Kagoshima prefecture. From 1871 until its abolition in 1877 the highest decision-making body in the Meiji government. Its members, mainly Sangi, also laid down general policy guidelines. The indigenous religion ofJapan which, as weH as its popular side involving fertility and purity rites and reverence for exceptional natural phenomena, also embraced the officially-sponsored belief in the divine origins oftheJapanese imperial family and the Japanese islands. Patriotic activists (literally 'spirited samurai') who engaged in anti-Bakufu or anti-foreign activities in the 1860s. Sometimes referred to as 'men of high purpose' . 'Gentry families' , the general name applied to all samurai after hanseki hokan in 1869. It de-emphasised the many differences of status within the samurai dass.

Glossar)'

Shogun Showa Shugi-in

Sodomei Soka Gakkai Sohyo Taisho Tokugawa Tosa U-in

yen

yuryokusha zaibatsu

XX!

The tide, meaning 'general', given to military miers who controlled Japan in the name of the Emperor. The name given to the reign period ofHirohito, Emperorfrom 1926 to 1989. The tide of the elected Lower House of the Diet under both the Meiji constitution and the 1946 constitution, and of the assembIy of samurai representatives of han which met occasionally between 1869 and 1871. The main labour union federation in Japan in the inter-war and early post-war periods. The largest and, through the Komeito party, most politically involved ofJapan's 'new religions'. The largest labour union federation from the 1950s to the late '80s. The name given to the reign period 1912-26. The family which held the shogunal power from 1603 t01868. A feudal domain which played an important part in the Meiji Ishin. The 'Right Board', which from 1871 until its abolition in 1875 comprised the ministers and vice-ministers of government departments and discussed problems of administration. From 1873 it was not convoked regularly. The main unit of currency inJapan after the Meiji government took full control of, and unified, the nation's finances in 1872. For the changes in its value in relation to the dollar, see the appended table. Local men with political influence. The relatively small number of very large financial and industrial combines, each originally under the .con~rol of a single family, which in the course 'of Japan's economic modernisation, and often with the aid of special government subsidies or other favours, came to dominate Japanese banking and industry. Some, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, owned or control1ed many

XXII

zaikai

zoku

zokugiin

Glossaljl

companies and were important in almost every sector. They were partly broken up in the early stages ofthe post-1945 Occupation. A term referring to big business and especially the main big business organisations, Keidanren and Nikkeiren. Literally 'tribe' , but in the political context referring to those Diet members (mainly, but not exclusively, from the Liberal Democratic Party) who were recognised as possessing specialised knowledge of an area of govemment and influence over the ministry adrninistering it. A Diet member belonging to a zoku.

A NOTE ON JAPANESE NAMES AllJapanese personal names are written with the family name preceding the given name, as is customary in Japan. In a few cases an alternative reading of a given name is given in brackets when a person is first mentioned. This is because the Chinese ideographs used in Japanese are normally susceptible to being read in more than one way in Japan, and the alternative renderings of some J apanese given names are almost equally common. Hara Takashi, for instance, is very often known as Hara Kei. It should also be noted thatJapanese does not normally distinguish between singular and plural. Whether words such as daimya or genra denote one person or more than one, therefore, depends on the context. Readers may be puzzled by the fact thatJapanese political parties are at times referred to by their (sometimes abbreviated) Japanese tide and at others by their English translation. For the period before 1952 I have been consistent in using the Japanese tide, both because most other books do so and because the translations of some of the very numerous parties would be the same in English, though different in J apanese. Kaishinto and Shimpoto, for instance, would both be rendered as Progressive Party. The post1952 situation is rather different. Most Western writers te nd to use an abbreviated form of the translated tide, especially in the case of the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) , which in Japanese is normally referred to as the Jiminto, although its full name is Jiyuminshuto. In certain cases, however, where the conventional English rendering is either not literal (as in the case of KomeitolClean Government Party) or unfarniliar (as with Sakigakel Harbinger Party), the Japanese tide is usually employed. In order to minimise confusion I have used whichever tide is most commonly found in English-language books. XXlll

THE CHANGING VALUE OF THE YEN US dollars per 100 Yen 1874 1877 1879 1882 1884 1886 1888 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1900 1910 1920

US dollars per 100 Yen

101.6 96.1 88.7 91.3 88.9 78.9 74.2 82.1 78.0 69.8 62.1 50.8 49.4 49.5 49.8

1921 1923 1924 1925 1926 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1938 1939 1940

48.2 48.9 42.1 40.9 46.1 46.1 49.4 48.8 28.1 25.2 29.5 28.5 25.9 23.4

After the Pacific War, Japan experienced hyper-inflation. When the yendollar rate was stabilised in 1949, 100 yen were worth approximately 28 cents and this remained the case until 1971. Thereafter the exchange rate varied as follows:

Yen per dollar 1972 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1982 1985 1986

Yen per dollar

302 280 300 293 240 195 240 227 * 249 * 239* 160

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

122 126 143 135 125 125 112 100 103 116 130

* Indicates average for year (the other postwar figures refer to the end of the year). XXIV

1

THE MEI]I RENOVATION The year 1868 marks a turning-point in Japanese history comparable with 1789 in France or 1917 in Russia. On 3 January 1868 a handful of ambitious samurai from han (feudal domains) in southwest Japan carried out a bold coup d'etat by seizing control of the Imperial Palace in the ancient capital of Kyoto. With the backing of some sympathetic court nobles and samurai from a few other han, they ousted the Bakufu (the regime headed by a Shogun from the Tokugawa family which had held sway over the country for over two and a half centuries) and prodaimed the restoration of power to the imperial dynasty which had reigned over Japan for weIl over a thousand years but had for more than five centuries been exduded from any role in government, save that of conferring legitimacy on whichever feudal leader achieved supremacy. This was to be far more than a dynastie restoration, however. In contrast with most contemporary expectations the change of regime was to lead directly to the epoch-making transforn,ation known in Japanese as the Meiji Ishin.! Within four years han autonomy was to give way to a centralised system of prefectures, and the four-dass system of samurai, peasant, artisan and merchant - in which the samurai, the Japanese hereditary military elite, enjoyed special status - was jettisoned. These momentous changes were foIlowed by the ending of the traditional samurai monopoly of military service in 1873, the abolition oftheir time-honoured right 1 Meiji Ishin is traditionally translated as Meiji Restoration, a term which lays stress on the fornlal return of power to the Emperor (at this time the fifteen-yearold Mutsuhito), whose dose advisers were, towards the end of1868, to introduce a new year-period with the name Meiji Cenlightened government'). This translation, however, reflects the bias of pre-1945 official historiography, and is both less accurate and less appropriate than Meiji Renovation. It should be noted that in contrast with previous practice, whereby a new year-period name was adopted whenever it was considered appropriate (often after no more than three or four years), the name since 1868 has remained the same for the wh oIe of an Emperor's relgn.

2

The Meiji Renovation

to wear swords in 1876, and finally, in the same year, the conversion oftheir annual stipends into government bonds. Together with these major political and social changes came a policy of'civilisation and enlightenment' which encouraged the study of the West and involved the introduction of Western-style institutions and systems, notably a modern elementary education system in 1872. Two years before this a Ministry of Public W orks was established to promote Western technology and in the same year a loan was floated in Britain for the building of Japan's first railway - from Yokohama to Tokyo. Such changes and innovations were just the most obvious features of the initial stages ofJapan's dramatic transformation into a modern nation-state dedicated to the cause of catching up with the leading Western powers.

Japan in the mid-nineteenth century The rapidity ofthe change which occurred inJapan from the 1860s was remarkable by any standards; it appears even more striking when set against the static character of Japanese institutional life during the preceding two centuries. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of Japan's resistance to change was its conscious self-isolation from the West. Following an initial period of intense interest in European culture and military technology (developed in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, principally through contacts with Portuguese missionaries and merchant-adventurers) the early Tokugawa rulers had gradually restricted intercourse with Westemers in order to eliminate the danger of political and ideological disruption. Mter 1640 the only European foothold in Japan was on the artificial islet of Deshima in Nagasaki harbour, where a handful of Dutch traders, tolerated because of their lack of connection with missionary activities and because they provided a channel for books and information, were kept under dose supervision. In 1854 the Arnerican Commodore Perry did seeure a very limited relaxation of restrietions on visits by Western ships, and in 1858, in the face of a threatening British expedition headed by Lord Eigin, fresh from triumph over the Chinese in the Arrow War, the Tokugawa Bakufu broke more significantly with its traditional policy of sedusion by allowing trade in Y okohama and a few other ports; but ten years later xenophobie attitudes remained strong and foreigners still needed to be wary of attack by fanatical samurai. Christianity, which had been rigorously

Japan in the mid-nineteenth century

3

proscribed after gaining over half a million adherents out of a population of about 18 million in the early seventeenth century, continued to be strictly forbidden to theJapanese; even after 1868, several thousand Japanese Christians whose farnilies had secretly preserved their religious identity until 1865 were subjected to severe punishment for several years. As part of its policy of suppression of Christianity the Bakufu had compelled all Japanese to register with Buddhist temples. However this form of otficial patronage did little, if anything, to restore the dedining intellectual vitality of the various Buddhist sects in Japan. Nor did it allow them to play any sort of political role. From the eighth to the sixteenth century Buddhist temples had been major landholders and had exercised considerable influence, while the newer Arnidhist sects, which sprang up in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries prornising salvation in the Pure Land, had attracted such wide support that they became a force to be reckoned with in the endemie civil warfare which wrackedJapan in the sixteenth century. But both temples and sects had seen their power savagely emasculated by Oda N obunaga, the first of the three feudal chieftains who brought unity to Japan between 1560 and 1615; and in a society so tightly controlled by its feudal mlers as that established by Ieyasu, the first Tokugawa Shogun, there was no room for political activity by religious institutions. Even if they had nurtured such ambitions, they no longer commanded the same resources as before. Moreover, religion had ceased to exercise the same influence on the minds of the samurai dass. The consolidation of Tokugawa hegemony over riyal feudal lords had been accompanied by the otficial encouragement of Confucian leaming, which was seen as a valuable supplement to the traditional bases of feudalloyalty, and in the more stable era which followed the ending of feudal warfare the rational secular approach of Chinese Neo-Confucianism held a much greater appeal than Buddhism to samurai scholars. Under the patronage of Bakufu and daimyo (domain lords) Confucian values were intensively propagated in the acadernies which a growing number of samurai attended. Confucianism was undoubtedly an important ingredient of the political stability which characterised TokugawaJapan. At the same time, however, the debates between different scholars and different schools were an indication that intellectual life was by no means stagnant. Moreover, from the late eighteenth century the domi-

4

The Meij'i Renovation

nance of Confucian learning began to be cha1lenged from two quite different directions - on the one hand by the gradual acquisition of Western knowledge, known as 'Dutch Learning' (Rangaku), the superiority of which in science, especially medicine, and military matters was appreciated by a small but growing number of openminded samurai, and on the other hand by 'National Learning' (Kokugaku), which represented a nativist re action in favour ofJapan's pre-Confucian traditions and attracted particular interest among Shinto Oapan's indigenous religion) priests and wealthy peasants. Even in the field of religion the situation was not entirely static. During the nineteenth century new sects with roots in popular religious beliefs such as shamanism were spreading in rural areas. At the same time education was becoming more widespread. By 1850 there were about 10,000 schools (often one-teacher village schools) in Japan, and nearly half of all Japanese males (and about one in seven females) were literate. Such intellectual and social developments did not pose any immediate threat to the political system. But feudal government, with its heavy dependence on agricultural taxes, found it diilicult to adjust to the growth of a vigorous commercial economy. Ironically, one of the main stimuli of urban commercialism was the policy offeudal control known as sankin-kotai (alternate attendance), whereby the Shogun compelled daimyo to spend every other year in Edo. The large establishments which the near 300 daimyo were obliged to maintain in the capital helped to make it probably the largest city in the world by 1700 with at least 1 million inhabitants; while Osaka, the port from which produce from the most economically advanced region of Japan was supplied to Edo by sea, grew to almost half the latter's size. Towns which lay on the routes to Edo taken by daimyo retinues also flourished, as indeed did many other towns, for like the Shogun most daimyo in the early seventeenth century sought to reduce the danger of rebellion (hitherto not uncommon) by compelling vassals to give up their independent local bases and move to the han castle-town, where they would receive a stipend from the daimyo's warehouse. One effect of seventeenth-century urbanisation was to undermine the samurai ethic of frugality, for in the towns and cities there were opportunities for consumption which had not existed in the countryside. These not only included different foods and styles of dress but also new forms of entertainment, such as the (kabukt) theatre, sumo wrestling, teahouses,

The causes of the Me!ji Ishin

5

geisha (skilled female entertainers), books (induding cheap novels), and woodblock prints. Since the Tokugawa era was also one of unprecedented peace, it was inevitable that martial qualities would be less emphasised and less tested in practice. Because of these changes it gradually became more difficult for rulers to maintain a tight control over the peasantry, and even though crop yields rose as a result of the dissemination of improved seed-strains, techniques and tools, it proved impossible to meet the expanded needs of the urban-based ruling dass by increasing the land tax. Similar difficulties arose when domain governments attempted to establish monopolistic controls over the new forms of commercial production, such as paper-making or soya sauce brewing, which wealthy peasants, especially in the nineteenth century, were developing. All too often the outcome was organised peasant protest, which increasingly tended to end in concession or retreat by the feudal authorities. Beneath the surface, therefore, Japanese society had changed significantly by the mid-nineteenth century. Even so, the overall appearance of stability was remarkable, and in one important respect in particular that stability was genuine. After aperiod of rapid increase during the seventeenth century, Japan's population rose only from about 31 million in 1720 to roughly 33 million in 1850. Such a slow growth rate contrasts strikingly with the experience of other countries during the same period. How and why such population control was achieved is still a matter of debate, although it is dear that it owed nothing to official policy and much to conscious family choice. The absence of population pressure, however, may have been a crucial factor in the long duration of the Tokugawa system of government.

The causes 01 the Meiji Ishin Since the Meiji Ishin marked the real beginning of modern Japanese political history, it is essential to consider its nature and try to identify the forces which produced it, though this is by no means an easy task. One fundamental problem results from the unusually decentralised political structure ofJapan before 1868. The fact that the T okugawa Bakufu held directly less than a third of the national territory, and that many of the daimyo still retained some measure of independence in their own domains, meant that significant political activity took place not just in the Tokugawa capital of Edo

6

The Meiji Renovation

but in the various castle-towns where conservatives, reformers and moderates manoeuvred for influence. Moreover, the continued existence of the imperial dynasty and court in Kyoto provided another focus for political machination and agitation in 1858, when the Bakufu's authority was undermined by its inability to resist the Western powers' demands for the opening ofJapan and an unstable situation developed in which Bakufu, reformist daimyo and radical xenophobie samurai all competed for the support of the Emperor and the court. Another problem of interpretation sterns from the fact that the Meiji Ishin had both internal and external causes. For many years it was the Western impact which was stressed - on the one hand the disruptive challenge to the traditional policy ofisolation (which had come to be regarded as sacrosanct), on the other the attraction of the Western model. Eventually approaches which treated major historical developments as the result of internal economic and social changes gained a hold and from the 1920s there was a tendency to regard external factors more as a catalyst than as a main cause. Non-Japanese historians have rarely been willing, however, to play down the latter to such an extent, and in Japan too historians have become more indined to see similarities with nationalist revolutions against imperialistic pressure or colonialism in other nonWestern societies. N evertheless, wide variations in the evaluation of the relative importance of domestic issues and outside influence still remain. Nor is any consensus to be found with regard to the nature of internal causes. All historians accept that behind the fa