Japan Occupied: Survival of Academic Freedom 9811985812, 9789811985812

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
About the Author
1 Introduction
2 Religion and Education in Pre-war Japan: Building a New Identity and Suppressing “Dangerous Thoughts”
2.1 Survey of Pre-Modern Japan
2.1.1 Modernization of Japan
2.2 Establishment of the National School System
2.3 Conservative Backlash and the Kokutai Ideology
2.4 Struggle for University Autonomy and Academic Freedom
2.5 Imperial University Administration
2.6 The Influence of Marxism on Intellectuals
2.7 Suppression of “Dangerous Thoughts”
2.7.1 The Birth of the Japanese Communist Party
2.8 The War and Thought Control
2.8.1 Education During the War
Appendix: Imperial Rescript on Education
References
3 The GHQ’s Initial Reforms: The Dismantling of Japan
3.1 The US Education Reform Policy
3.1.1 Bonner F. Fellers: “An Amateur Psychologist”
3.1.2 The US Plan: “Reorientation of the Japanese”
3.1.3 Education Minister Maeda Begins His Reforms
3.1.4 Maeda as a Liberal
3.2 The US Launches the Spiritual Disarmament of the Japanese
3.2.1 The New Constitution
3.3 Initial US Reforms Favored Japanese Communists
Appendix: Imperial Rescript, January 1, 1946
References
4 General Headquarters (GHQ) Versus Japanese Communist Party
4.1 US State Department Policy on Japanese Communists
4.2 GHQ’s Attitude Toward the Japanese Communist Party
4.3 The Cold War and US Occupation Policies
References
5 University Reform
5.1 Japanese Initiatives for Education Reform
5.2 Eells’ Plan for University Overhaul
5.2.1 Eells Versus Nanbara
References
6 Communism in Universities
6.1 Eells’ Shifting Position
6.1.1 Shift to the Right
6.1.2 The Dodge Line: Retrenchment
6.2 Anti-communist Movement in Universities
6.3 The Eells Speech
6.4 Anti-communism and Academic Freedom in the US
References
7 Covert Red Purge in Education
7.1 Restricting Political Activities of Civil Servants in Education
7.2 Red Purge in the Name of Budgetary Cutbacks
7.3 Eells Faced Students and Professors
7.4 Anti-communists Revealed
References
8 Japanese Communists’ Propaganda Against the United States
8.1 The Eells Incidents and Japanese Reactions
References
9 Japanese Government Launches the Red Purge
9.1 The US State Department Moves Against Communists
9.2 The Korean War: A Violent Catalyst for the Red Purge
9.2.1 Second US Education Mission to Japan: Cheerleader from the US
9.2.2 Student Radicals Protest the Red Purge
9.3 The CIE’s Response to the Red Purge
9.3.1 The Rehabilitation and the Red Purge
9.4 Eells’ Passion for the Red Purge
References
10 War of Ideas
10.1 The US Post-occupation Policy Toward Japan
10.2 NGO-Initiated Cultural Propaganda Activities in Japan
References
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

Ruriko Kumano

Japan Occupied Survival of Academic Freedom

Japan Occupied

Ruriko Kumano

Japan Occupied Survival of Academic Freedom

Ruriko Kumano Faculty of Global Studies Reitaku University Kashiwa, Chiba, Japan

ISBN 978-981-19-8581-2 ISBN 978-981-19-8582-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To my parents

Preface

My quest for unearthing Japan’s past began when I was a 19-year-old exchange student. While studying in California, an American family hosted me where I learned about the US system of government. Fascinated by American democracy, I wondered why Japanese democracy remained in a state of dysfunction. When my host family asked about Japanese history and culture, I could not provide too many answers. Embarrassed, I became eager to learn about my country. I read several books. Kakuzo Okakura’s The Book of Tea (1906) and Dr. Inazo Nitobe’s Bushido: The Soul of Japan (1900) captivated me. These books introduced readers to Japanese spiritual and aesthetic traditions, which the Japanese considered the core of their identity and pride until the end of World War II. I was reassured to find that Japan once had a sophisticated culture and a great sense of honor. Questions arose for me. What changed the Japanese philosophy, tradition, and identity? When I studied the history of Japan, I found that the postwar reforms under the US occupation were the root of Japan’s current political malfunction and psyche, which compulsory school education and the media have been disseminating. I was fascinated by the process of dramatic change in the Japanese political structure and people’s identity from the imperial system to democracy. Pre-war Imperial Japan was labeled as ultra-nationalistic and militant, which the USA transformed into a peace-loving, democratic nation. However, why are we taught so little about pre-war ideology? What was wrong with the pre-war regime? The study of pre-war Japan, its school education, and its reforms during the US occupation seemed to hold the answers. For the completion of this book, my indebtedness to individuals and institutions is substantial. I wish to express my profound gratitude to Dr. Eileen H. Tamura for her unwavering encouragement during my graduate studies at the University of Hawaii. For their valuable advice and generous assistance, I would like to thank the following archivists: Mr. James W. Zobel of the MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library Mr. James F. Cartwright of the University Archives of Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa

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Ms. Colleen McFarland of the Whitman College and Northwest Archives of Penrose Library Dr. Hideaki Nagata of Tohoku University Archives I am also grateful for a generous research grant from the Hiroike Institute’s Academic Promotion Fund, which enabled me to study at the archives in Japan and the USA. This book is dedicated to my parents who have given me the freedom to pursue my dreams. Kashiwa, Japan

Ruriko Kumano

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

Religion and Education in Pre-war Japan: Building a New Identity and Suppressing “Dangerous Thoughts” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Survey of Pre-Modern Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Modernization of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Establishment of the National School System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Conservative Backlash and the Kokutai Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Struggle for University Autonomy and Academic Freedom . . . . . 2.5 Imperial University Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 The Influence of Marxism on Intellectuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Suppression of “Dangerous Thoughts” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.1 The Birth of the Japanese Communist Party . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 The War and Thought Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8.1 Education During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix: Imperial Rescript on Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 5 8 9 12 16 17 19 24 26 31 34 34 35

The GHQ’s Initial Reforms: The Dismantling of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The US Education Reform Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Bonner F. Fellers: “An Amateur Psychologist” . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 The US Plan: “Reorientation of the Japanese” . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Education Minister Maeda Begins His Reforms . . . . . . . . 3.1.4 Maeda as a Liberal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The US Launches the Spiritual Disarmament of the Japanese . . . 3.2.1 The New Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Initial US Reforms Favored Japanese Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix: Imperial Rescript, January 1, 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37 41 42 47 49 50 55 59 60 61 63

3

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4

Contents

General Headquarters (GHQ) Versus Japanese Communist Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 US State Department Policy on Japanese Communists . . . . . . . . . 4.2 GHQ’s Attitude Toward the Japanese Communist Party . . . . . . . . 4.3 The Cold War and US Occupation Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67 67 71 78 85

5

University Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Japanese Initiatives for Education Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Eells’ Plan for University Overhaul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Eells Versus Nanbara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89 90 93 95 99

6

Communism in Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Eells’ Shifting Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 Shift to the Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 The Dodge Line: Retrenchment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Anti-communist Movement in Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Eells Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Anti-communism and Academic Freedom in the US . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

103 107 108 111 112 114 115 119

7

Covert Red Purge in Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Restricting Political Activities of Civil Servants in Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Red Purge in the Name of Budgetary Cutbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Eells Faced Students and Professors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Anti-communists Revealed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123 127 128 133 134 137

8

Japanese Communists’ Propaganda Against the United States . . . . . 139 8.1 The Eells Incidents and Japanese Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

9

Japanese Government Launches the Red Purge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 The US State Department Moves Against Communists . . . . . . . . 9.2 The Korean War: A Violent Catalyst for the Red Purge . . . . . . . . 9.2.1 Second US Education Mission to Japan: Cheerleader from the US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2 Student Radicals Protest the Red Purge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 The CIE’s Response to the Red Purge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.1 The Rehabilitation and the Red Purge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 Eells’ Passion for the Red Purge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

159 162 164 168 168 170 173 175 177

Contents

10 War of Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 The US Post-occupation Policy Toward Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 NGO-Initiated Cultural Propaganda Activities in Japan . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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181 183 186 192

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

About the Author

Ruriko Kumano received her Ph.D. in education from the University of Hawaii at Manoa in 2007 and is currently an associate professor in the Faculty of Global Studies at Reitaku University, Japan. Through her graduate studies at Seton Hall University in the USA (M.A. in Asian Studies) and Ph.D. research at the University of Hawaii (East-West Center full fellowship grantee), she has focused on studying the lost memory of Japan’s pre-war ideology and the drastic reforms under the US occupation to discover the reasons for the downfall of the pre-war regime and why postwar Japanese people are taught so little about the pre-war ideology. Her publications include Nihon Ky¯oiku Senry¯o (Japanese Education Occupied) (2015) and Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the ‘Red Purge’ in Occupied Japan (in History of Education Quarterly, 50, no. 4, 2010).

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Chapter 1

Introduction

While the world was divided between the colonizers and the colonized, independent Imperial Japan came into being in 1868. School education was an efficient tool to nurture citizens who would maintain the legitimacy of the new nation-state. The emperor, supported by the virtues of loyalty and self-sacrifice of the people, was the core of Imperial Japan. The modern nation required a strong military force to defend itself and expand its empire. In this imperial Japan, communism was a threat that aimed to destroy the imperial system. The infiltration of communism into Japan was never to be tolerated. This nation-building came to an abrupt end with Japan’s defeat in World War II in the summer of 1945. In August 1945, Imperial Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers. From September 1945 to April 1952, the United States (US)—the dominant power among the victorious nations—occupied the defeated country. Douglas MacArthur, US Army General and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), attempted to transform Japan from an authoritarian military regime into a demilitarized democracy. During the initial phase of MacArthur’s reforms, the Japanese identity, associated with the emperor, monopolistic capitalism, and a strong military, was drastically altered. The US reformed Japanese education by replacing Japanese values with American democratic ideals. US officials and experts on Japan believed that the strength of Japan’s militarism sprung from selfless loyalty and love for the country. The US wanted to eliminate this attitude.1 In Japan’s new Constitution, drafted in English within a week by MacArthur’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo, the emperor’s supremacy was replaced by people’s sovereignty. The emperor was declared the “symbol” of the unification of Japanese citizens. The constitution renounced the possession and use of military force as a means of settling international disputes and guaranteed freedom of speech

1

Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan 1945–1952 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_1

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1 Introduction

and academic freedom to every citizen.2 With this revolutionary change, Japan lost the core values that it had developed since the 1868 Meiji Restoration. The GHQ called this Japan’s “spiritual disarmament.”3 Apathy or Marxism filled the “spiritual vacuum”4 in Japan. The defeat ripped the society. What remained was a lack of shared values, except for the common desire for abstract peace with no military conflict. This state of confusion resulted from the classic tactic of “divide and conquer.” When people’s identity is erased, tumultuous confusion ensues, compelling them to fight each other. In the fall of 1945, MacArthur released hardcore Japanese communists from lengthy imprisonment. By releasing all political prisoners, the occupying US forces appeared to be the true liberators of the oppressed. Many intellectuals embraced Marxism as a symbol of new political freedom and some joined the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). In the name of democratization, Japanese communists instigated a revolution. In 1947, as the acute antagonism between the US and the Soviet Union became apparent, the US government launched the policy of communist containment. As the Cold War intensified worldwide, ideological bickering heated up within the GHQ in Tokyo. The GHQ’s military intelligence in Tokyo was aware of communist infiltration of the GHQ and the US federal government, particularly in the State Department. The GHQ openly supported Japanese communists at the beginning of the Occupation. However, growing communist influence in the universities began to alarm the GHQ in Tokyo. Japanese communists, aligning their strategies with the Communist International, Cominform (Communist Information Bureau),5 launched loud and effective propaganda to foment dissatisfaction with the US policy among the Japanese people. Communist activities continued to spread across Japanese universities. MacArthur, a staunch opponent of communism, feared that Japan was falling for another form of authoritarianism. He decided to root out all communist activity in education and the workplace. The “Red Purge” was carried out nationwide from 1949 to 1950. The GHQ ordered the Japanese cabinet to remove communists and their sympathizers from private businesses, government offices, and educational institutions. Stanford University professor, Dr. Walter C. Eells (1886–1962), who served at the GHQ as a higher education adviser, became an influential spokesman for anticommunism and a central figure in the Red Purge of the Japanese education system.6 2

Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 120. US Secretary of State, Byrnes’s announcement about Japan’s surrender in August 1945. Nippon Times, September 5, 1945; Asahi Shimbun, September 4, 1945, 1. 4 MacArthur used this phrase when he invited Christian missionaries to the defeated Japan. 5 This is a reestablished organization of the Communist International (or Third International) established in 1919 in Moscow. The Communist International had been dissolved as a gesture of goodwill by Stalin in December 1943 when the US and the Soviet Union fought against Germany (against fascism) during World War II. However, it was reestablished in September 1947 when the Cold War began. 6 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 258. 3

1 Introduction

3

For Japanese historians, the Red Purge in education remains a serious subject of inquiry. Most studies of the GHQ’s reforms focus on the controversy of Eells and the Red Purge as the first destructive attack on Japan’s efforts to achieve academic freedom in the post-war period. Between July 1949 and May 1950, the GHQ’s Civil Information and Education (CIE) Section sent Eells to 30 tax-funded national universities to demand the immediate dismissal of communist professors. He argued that such dismissal would protect academic freedom. Eells’ speeches reflected the US Cold War policy. They sparked a heated debate among Japanese professors and students on how to cope with the communist influence at their universities while protecting the academic freedom that they had retained during the Cold War. The standard narrative of the Red Purge in education was ideologically constructed by Japanese leftist historians, stating that the GHQ’s dispatch of Eells to universities across Japan threatened universities’ academic freedom and autonomy. The narrative boasts a victory for Japanese universities in which professors and students vigorously opposed the GHQ’s directives and successfully minimized the number of victims of the Red Purge compared with the large number of people fired from governmental and industrial sectors.7 By revealing the heated tensions within the GHQ regarding communist influences within Japanese universities, this study sheds new light on the Red Purge and its impact on Japan’s political climate, a collage that Marxist historians continue to paint. This study focused on relevant education reforms and the Red Purge by using Eells’ paper and the US intelligence reports. By looking into the US perspective through the GHQ and Eells papers, it became apparent that the controversy of the Red Purge in universities was a propaganda battle between the US and the Soviet Union in Japan. The Cold War propaganda war in occupied Japan resulted in a polarized political climate in which the conservative Japanese government continued to rule Japan based on the diktat of the US Cold War policy. This study documents the traumatic transformation of Japan, focusing on the role of the university in the modern nation-state. In addition, this study describes the bitter ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the US in US-occupied Japan. The Japanese ideological polarization during the Occupation and the Cold War, which derailed Japan’s progress toward democracy, was carefully analyzed. Universities remained protected by their autonomy and intellectuals shared their opinions through higher education and the mass media; thus, university education became the last bastion of leftist sanctuaries.

Isao My¯ojin, “Senry¯oka nihon no daigaku to reddo p¯aji: Iwayuru ‘¯Iruzu senp¯u’ ni tsuite (Japanese universities and the Red Purge during the occupation: The so-called ‘Eells Typhoon’),” Hokkaid¯o ky¯oiku daigaku kiy¯o 47, no. 2 (1997): 33–45; Sabur¯o Ienaga, Daigaku no jiy¯u no rekishi (History of university freedom), 2 ed. (Tokyo: Hanawa shob¯o, 1962; reprint, 1965), 111–112; Akio Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi (History of university autonomy) (Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha, 1965; reprint, 1968), 114–117. 7

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The book is organized chronologically and focuses on Japan’s higher education reforms and the Red Purge while providing a relevant sociopolitical context to document Japan’s deterioration caused by spiritual disarmament.

Chapter 2

Religion and Education in Pre-war Japan: Building a New Identity and Suppressing “Dangerous Thoughts”

The US Occupation’s education reforms must be evaluated against the background of Japan’s pre-war system. Officials at the GHQ in Tokyo were aware of the brutal persecution of “dangerous thoughts” in Imperial Japan, a history of thought-control that had started from the 1868 Meiji Restoration and lasted till the utter defeat in 1945. This painful history is a pertinent backdrop to the US and Japanese zeal for drastic reform during the American Occupation (summer of 1945–spring of 1952). Japan’s pre-war education system mirrored the country’s feverish efforts to build a unified modern nation-state, strong enough to defend the country against the military threat posed by the imperialist Western powers. However, Japan’s real fear was of the West’s spiritual and religious encroachment. To understand the role of education in pre-war Japan, this chapter provides an overview of the religious and ideological history of the Tokugawa samurai regime, followed by an analysis of the political situation from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to the unconditional surrender in World War II in 1945.

2.1 Survey of Pre-Modern Japan Until Catholic missionaries introduced Christianity to Japan in the mid-sixteenth century, Japan had a polytheistic spiritual tradition. Unlike monotheistic religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Japan’s indigenous worldview did not emphasize one supreme God. People viewed nature, such as mountains, rivers, rocks, and trees, as a manifestation of the deities. Pursuing harmonious relationships among humans, deities, and nature was the bedrock of this belief system, which was crystallized as Shinto (Shintoism, the way of gods and goddesses) in dynamic interactions with religious and philosophical streams of ingenious and foreign origins.1 1

H. Byron Earhart, Religion in Japan: Unity and Diversity, 5th ed. (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2014), 9–10, 162; Allan G. Grapard, s.v. “Shinto,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 8 (Tokyo; New York: Kodansha, 1983).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_2

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2 Religion and Education in Pre-war Japan: Building a New Identity …

According to the oldest Japanese myth, gods and goddesses created the Japanese archipelago to be ruled by an emperor, a descendant of the Sun Goddess (Amaterasu ¯ Omikami). The emperor was the symbolic head of both Shinto rituals and government, although the emperor seldom governed the nation. The emperor’s role was to perform rituals for the peace and tranquility of the country.2 Japanese did practice dichotomy of choice. To them, both could co-exist in their daily lives. As a result, no single religion or philosophy became dominant. Shintoism emphasizes the purity of thought and action. Buddhism, introduced in Japan in the sixth century CE, promotes the personal pursuit of self-liberation from base desires, such as greed and lust, and encourages compassion toward all life forms. Confucianism, introduced in Japan in the fifth century CE, is a set of ethical and political teachings that encourage loyalty to the family and clan and benevolence to people of lower rank. Daoism, a Chinese religion that developed from the ancient Chinese reverence for nature, came to Japan along with other Chinese religions. However, it did not survive as a religion in Japan. Elements of Daoism, such as “cosmological notion, the almanac, and divination,” which embrace the idea of living in harmony with the natural world, influenced Buddhism and Shinto.3 Depending on preference and situation, individuals may invoke one or more of these ethical ideas. By the mid-sixteenth century, the people of Japan had a worldview that was a combination of complementary religious traditions.4 Portuguese merchants trading with Japan’s ruling warrior regimes brought Catholic missionaries with them. Their teachings differed radically from the flexible Japanese beliefs. Christianity believed in a transcendent, supreme God, regarding the gods of Japan as false. Christianity demanded absolute faith in God to exclude all other religions.5 However, Christianity was tolerated until the beginning of the seventeenth century when the Tokugawa warrior regime (1603–1867) banned it and persecuted its Japanese followers. In 1614, the Tokugawa ordered the missionaries to leave the country. Most missionaries sailed to Manila and Macao, while some managed to hide and continue their work underground. For a few years, there was no concerted suppression of Japanese Christians. The Tokugawa, however, eventually put pressure on the regional warlords (daimy¯o) to eradicate Christianity by any means necessary. They were wary of any possible coalition between the disaffected peasants and the unemployed samurai that may threaten their hegemony and Christians were regarded as potential instigators. The Christian insistence that the conscience of the individual was the ultimate standard of moral behavior was seen as subversive in a society dedicated to absolute obedience to superiors. The Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638) confirmed all fears. An armed uprising took place in the western part of Kyushu where Christian influence was the strongest. They fiercely rebelled against

2

Earhart, Religion in Japan, 16. Earhart, Religion in Japan, 3. 4 Earhart, Religion in Japan, 89–92. 5 Earhart, Religion in Japan, 163–164. 3

2.1 Survey of Pre-Modern Japan

7

the warlord of the Shimabara fiefdom. A total of 37,000 insurgents and their families were massacred, including women and children.6 The following year, to prevent the further intrusion of Christian missionaries, the Tokugawa banned trade with the Portuguese coming to Japan from Macao. This completely severed contact with the West, except for with the Dutch East India Company merchants who were Protestant. Protestant doctrine emphasized individual faith based on the Bible rather than church hierarchy and they had fought Catholics in Europe. In Japan, the Dutch were allowed to trade, however, only on the small man-made, fan-shaped island of Dejima in the port of Nagasaki. Thus, during the Tokugawa period, Christianity was mercilessly persecuted. They required every household to belong to a Buddhist temple where births and deaths were registered.7 However, the Tokugawa rationale for social control was not based on Buddhism, rather on Neo-Confucianism (Shushi-gaku), which provided a suitable ideology for stabilizing the feudal order and a rationale for legitimizing it. During the Sung (Song) Dynasty (960–1279) in China, Confucianism underwent a revival, known as “NeoConfucianism,” which created a comprehensive philosophy, borrowing from Daoism and Buddhism. The morality of Confucianism was a harmonious, seamless union of five human relationships: (1) ruler and subject, (2) parents and children, (3) husband and wife, (4) elder and younger, and (5) friend and friend. In addition, it emphasized the social order supported by the behavior of individuals appropriate to their status.8 The Neo-Confucian philosophy contributed to bushido (literally, “the way of the warrior”), a code of ethics that propagated self-control, aesthetics, absolute loyalty to one’s lord, a strong sense of personal honor, devotion to duty, and courage, if required, to sacrifice one’s life in battle.9 While these moral traditions were developing in the cocoon of Japanese isolation, the Western world was undergoing dramatic change. The British Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century led to state-sponsored capitalism in Europe. The US independence from the British Empire and the French Revolution brought further geopolitical changes. The Western industrialized nations, whose military superiority was based on advanced weapons technology, expanded their colonies and considered it their moral duty to spread their superior civilization and culture globally. Many Japanese intellectuals in Tokugawa were aware of the British exploitation of India and China. They believed that they had to resist the West to avoid the misery of their neighbors.10

6

Earhart, Religion in Japan, 178. Earhart, Religion in Japan, 180. 8 Earhart, Religion in Japan, 181–182. 9 Martin C. Collcut, s.v. “Bushido,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 1. 10 Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 6. 7

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2.1.1 Modernization of Japan In July 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858), special envoy of US President Millard Fillmore, sailed into Edo Bay (now Tokyo Bay) with his imposing naval squadron, the “Black Ships.” Perry demanded at gunpoint that the Tokugawa abandon its rigid isolationism. In addition, flaunting superior cannons, he demanded trade concessions. Intimidated and unable to fight back, the Tokugawa asked Perry to return for a formal reply in a year. Perry returned after six months, in January 1854, and successfully ratified the Treaty of Peace and Amity. Two ports were made accessible to the US merchant and whaling ships for fuel and provisions. England (1854), Russia (1855), and the Netherlands (1854) acquired the same privileges.11 Four years later, Townsend Harris (1804–1878), the first US Consul General, skillfully concluded the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Tokugawa. This treaty introduced “extra-territoriality,” whereby, foreigners in Japan were exempt from Japanese laws. Taking advantage of the Japanese ignorance regarding foreign affairs, all the European nations followed suit and concluded similar treaties.12 The series of concessions to the foreign powers revealed the glaring powerlessness of the Tokugawa, which encouraged the rebellions of the young, low-ranking samurai, who advocated the restoration of the original imperial rule in Japan. The rebels considered the unequal treaties a national disgrace and insisted that only a new imperial regime could redress the insults. However, the emperor had no political power during the Tokugawa regime. While the Tokugawa yielded to the US gunboat diplomacy, the young samurai rebels in the countryside insisted on further isolating Japan, if only to embarrass the faltering regime. When the rebels’ demands were not met, they murdered English officials and American merchants in Yokohama and Nagasaki, highlighting the Tokugawa’s inability to protect foreigners. English gunboats retaliated by bombarding rebel cities. The rebels, forced to recognize that the West was far more powerful, turned their efforts to topple the Tokugawa regime. A ferocious civil war ensued. England played a crucial role in the conflict, supporting the rebel forces. The English motivation for helping the rebels was simple and shrewd—help the rebels win and monopolize the lucrative Japanese trade to sell English industrial technology, such as large steamships, railroads, and weapons. The soon-victorious rebels, who made the emperor their figurehead, declared that they had, at last, restored Japan’s original imperial government by returning the emperor as the “symbolic head of state.”13 The new regime began in 1868 and bore the name Meiji or “Enlightened Reign.”

11

Treaties of Japan in the “Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce,” Wikimedia Foundation, last modified November 2, 2021, at 10:00(UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Jap anese_Treaty_of_Amity_and_Commerce. 12 Peter Duus, Modern Japan, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 66–70. 13 Earhart, Religion in Japan, 196.

2.2 Establishment of the National School System

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The young, ambitious oligarchs of the Meiji government faced three exigent tasks: (1) the legitimization of their rule by making the emperor “sacred and inviolable,”14 (2) the rapid Westernization of weaponry to resist the potential colonization by the West, and (3) the revision of unequal treaties with the Western powers that the Tokugawa regime was forced to sign. The new Japan had to quickly dismantle the feudal social order and unify it as a strong modern nation-state. During the first decade of the Meiji period (1868–1912), Western civilization was of vital importance. The oligarchs coined the famous slogans, “Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Military” (Fukoku Ky¯ohei) and “Civilization and Enlightenment” (Bunmei Kaika). Various fact-finding missions and many bright students were sent abroad to discover the secrets of the West’s success. Those who personally witnessed advanced civilization were eager to import modern technology to catch up with the West and defend the fragile new regime.

2.2 Establishment of the National School System Meiji leaders recognized that Japan required a compulsory school system to build a new, stronger, and unified nation. Under the Tokugawa regime, samurais, who went from warriors to bureaucrats, were highly educated in feudal schools, organized by the local warlords, where they studied Confucian texts to become the samurai elite. Over time, however, children of other social classes, such as sons of wealthy merchants, were allowed to attend these schools and the classical Japanese curriculum was expanded to include Western mathematics, astronomy, and military science. Temple schools (terakoya), private institutions organized by local Buddhist temples, educated the merchant class and peasants in the three Rs—reading, writing, and arithmetic. These schools were incorporated into the new educational system after the Meiji Restoration and the resulting abolition of feudal classes.15 The Meiji government invested large amounts in sending scholars to the US and Europe and employed foreigners to teach in Japan. In particular, “American utilitarianism and teaching methods, German science, and the French unified education system” greatly influenced the developing Japanese system.16 The Ministry of Education was established in 1871. The following year, the government introduced the Education Law, which outlined the new school system to develop national unification through compulsory education. Japan modeled its education system on American primary and secondary schools and universities. Practical and utilitarian goals were promoted with an emphasis on technical education that replaced Confucian moral education. The administrative framework adopted the

14

“Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1889” Article 3 in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2 (Tokyo; New York: Kodansha, 1983), 7. 15 Michiya Shimbori, s.v. “Modern Education,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2. 16 Shimbori, s.v. “Modern Education.” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2.

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centralized French model in which the Education Ministry controlled the schools and everything related to academics.17 After being banned for nearly 200 years, the Westerners were allowed to re-enter Japan and Christianity was reintroduced to the country. Largely due to the demands of foreign diplomats, the Meiji government lifted the Tokugawa ban on Christianity in 1873.18 Since Christianity was associated with the West, the missionary teachers were considered the representatives of a superior military civilization.19 In 1885, the first cabinet was formed in the Diet (the Japanese parliament). Arinori Mori (1847–1889), who had studied in England and the US before the 1868 Meiji Restoration, came home and became Japan’s first education minister. In 1886, Mori issued the School Ordinance, establishing elementary schools, middle schools, imperial universities, and teachers’ colleges. Elementary schools were considered training centers for loyal subjects of the emperor while middle and higher middle schools were designed to prepare students for imperial universities. The imperial universities were intended to produce leaders who would absorb the advanced Western knowledge needed to modernize the nation. The teachers’ colleges instilled nationalistic values in young men and women, such as loyalty to the emperor and devotion to the country. This comprehensive school system aimed to modernize the country and unify the people by creating a new identity for the Japanese people.20 Meiji oligarchs considered universities to be the most important institution where selected bright students were expected to embrace the Western knowledge crucial for modernizing Japan. Indeed, one of the best elite schools in the Tokugawa era, Kaiseijo (a school of foreign studies), developed into a university that became Tokyo University in 1877.21 In 1886, Mori issued the Imperial University Ordinance to establish a tax-funded imperial university (Tokyo University) that would “create capable leaders who would absorb advanced Western learning necessary for the modernization of the nation.”22 A decade later, Kyoto Imperial University was founded (1897), followed by the Imperial Universities of Tohoku (1907), Kyushu (1911), Hokkaido (1918), Osaka (1931), and Nagoya (1939). In 1924, Keij¯o Imperial University was started in colonized Korea and, in 1928, Taihoku Imperial University was opened in colonized Taiwan.23 Of the nine imperial universities, Tokyo Imperial University was the most prestigious. It served as a center of academic research and trained officials to meet the 17

Shimbori, s.v. “Modern Education,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2. Earhart, Religion in Japan, 201. 19 Michael Cooper, s.v. “Christianity,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 1. 20 Michio Nagai, Higher Education in Japan: Its Takeoff and Crash (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1971), 24. 21 Shimbori, s.v. “Modern Education,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2. 22 Shimbori, s.v. “Modern Education,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2. 23 Tetsuya Kobayashi, Society, Schools and Progress in Japan (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1976), 28; Nagai, Higher Education in Japan, 20–22; Herbert Passin, “Japan,” in Education and Political Development, ed. James S. Coleman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 289; Masako Shibata, Japan and Germany under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 23. 18

2.2 Establishment of the National School System

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needs of an expanding Imperial Japan. Since the mission of an imperial university was to research and teach Western thought and technology, students were required to have a good command of foreign languages. Half of the curriculum was taught in foreign languages. To prepare for a rigorous imperial university, students had to attend a three-year preparatory school, also called a higher school. This academic ladder was narrow and steep, creating an elite whose graduates dominated the top positions in the government and leading industries.24 In the wake of the rapid industrialization of the 1890s, the Meiji oligarchs launched state-run trade schools of commerce, engineering, agriculture, and medicine. Concurrently, several prominent individuals founded private higher education institutions, which received no government funding. The government was unwilling to provide financial assistance to private institutions, considering them a “breeding ground for anti-establishment thought.”25 Unlike their counterparts in Western countries, Japanese private schools did not have financial support from religious organizations, philanthropic foundations, or industrial moguls. Student tuition was their sole source of income. With such a weak financial base, schools were restricted to offering short, inexpensive humanities and social sciences courses rather than applied sciences, which required expensive facilities. Thus, they had difficulty securing qualified teachers and students. The state-run schools absorbed teachers who were graduates of imperial universities and foreign schools. As bright students went to well-equipped, state-run professional schools or prestigious imperial universities, the private schools gained a reputation for attracting academically less gifted students. This notoriety of private schools fueled dangerous anti-establishment sentiments. Two exceptions were Kei¯o Gijuku (Kei¯o University), founded in 1890 by Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835–1901), and Waseda University, founded in 1905 by Shigenobu ¯ Okuma (1838–1922). These two private Tokyo institutions challenged the exclusive status of imperial universities and became famous institutions, independent of government control. However, the Education Ministry designated private institutions as “special schools.” Japan’s breakneck speed of industrialization in the 1910s and 1920s was accomplished by the rapid expansion of the higher education system. In 1918, the government, compelled to produce more educated young people, promulgated the University Ordinance. As a result, 10 state-run professional institutions and 20 private institutions became “universities.” By 1945, the number of universities throughout Japan increased to 48.26 24

Ikuo Amano, “Continuity and Change in the Structure of Japanese Higher Education,” in Changes in the Japanese University: Comparative Perspective, ed. William K Cummings, Ikuo Amano, and Kazuyuki Kitamura (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 19. 25 Takashi Tachibana, Tenn¯ o to t¯odai (Emperor and Tokyo Imperial University), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Bungei shunj¯u, 2005), 156. 26 Ben-Ami Shillony, “Universities and Students in Wartime Japan,” Journal of Asian Studies 45, no. 4 (1986): 775; Byron K. Marshall, “Growth and Conflict in Japanese Higher Education, 1905– 1930,” in Conflict in Modern Japanese History: The Neglected Tradition, ed. Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 277–278; Ikuo Amano,

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2.3 Conservative Backlash and the Kokutai Ideology Treatises on liberal political philosophy, such as J.S. Mill’s On Liberty, were translated into Japanese and newspapers and academic journals disseminated these novel theories of democratic governance. The educated Japanese people established political organizations and demanded popular participation in national politics through the establishment of a parliament. The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement began in 1874 under the leadership of Taisuke Itagaki (1837–1919), a prominent politician who resigned from the government in 1873. Itagaki wanted to colonize the Korean peninsula, which served as a buffer between Japan and China, and denounced the oligarch’s hesitation to invade Korea. He demanded radical reforms to end the tyranny of oligarchy and called for the establishment of a representative government based on a written constitution. The reigning oligarchs, once infatuated with the West, began to believe that the domestic populist movement championed Western thoughts excessively and needed to be suppressed. This increasingly jingoistic backlash against Western ideas was fueled by the collective reluctance, if not outright refusal, of Western governments to revise or abrogate existing unequal treaties. The oligarchs branded any advocacy of liberal Western thought as a threat to public peace. The Libel Law and the Press Ordinance were enacted in 1875 to stamp out potential threats to the throne. Articles 2 and 3 of the Libel Law stipulated that slander directed at the throne or any member of the imperial family was a punishable crime. Article 4 protected all government officials from expressions of contempt by the public, making them invulnerable to public criticism. Fearing that Japan was becoming too Westernized, the conservative cliques among the Meiji leaders moved to suppress the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement while promising to create a constitution. To counter liberal ideas, they promoted Japan’s national identity by consolidating traditional Japanese political thought. This state ideology embraced an unbroken imperial line and the concept of the family state, in which the relationship between the emperor and his subjects was like that of a father with his children. Proponents of this worldview held that there were two types of nation-states—one that evolved naturally and one that was man-made. In the natural evolution of the state, the family grew into a clan, the clan grew into a tribe, and the tribe expanded into a state. They claimed that the ideal example of the natural state was Japan where the emperor was a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess, the imperial house was the head family of the nation, and the Japanese people were the emperor’s children. They argued that the foundations of imperial Japan were firmer than the man-made, contract-based Western nations.27

Continuity and Change in the Structure of Japanese Higher Education, 16–25; Tachibana, Tenn¯o to t¯odai, vol. 1, 126–132; Nagai, Higher Education in Japan, 27. 27 Germaine A. Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 28.

2.3 Conservative Backlash and the Kokutai Ideology

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According to Article 1 of the 1889 Meiji Constitution, “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors, unbroken for ages eternal.”28 It solidified the sanctity and inviolability of the emperor. The emperor was, above all, the leader of Shinto, the indigenous spiritual foundation of Japan. A seamless bonding of ancestor worship with the belief in the unbroken imperial line made the Japanese identity solid. These beliefs were consecrated as Kokutai, the Japanese nation’s character, translated into English as “national polity.”29 By placing the emperor at the head of the government, the Meiji government restored the unity of the symbolic spiritual authority and the government. The emperor was the legitimate ruler of Japan. The Tokugawa regime was the emperor’s deputy, having been given the title of Shogun to rule Japan. To mobilize popular support for the emperor as the unquestionable spiritual leader of Japan, the government used the nation’s indigenous religion, Shinto. The new government removed Buddhism from the privileged position that it had enjoyed under the Tokugawa regime and made Shinto the supreme religion.30 However, in drafting the Meiji Constitution (the Constitution of the Empire of Japan), the oligarchs decided against establishing a state religion. The Meiji Constitution was framed under the considerable influence of foreign governments and was drafted “in imitation of those of mid-nineteenth century German states.”31 As a newly founded modern state, keenly interested in cooperation with Western powers, Japan had to incorporate religious freedom, a concept derived from the Western concept of the separation of the church and the state, which was foreign to the Japanese at the time.32 In addition, by including freedom of religion in the constitution, the Meiji oligarchs concealed the government’s theocratic nature. Therefore, the Meiji Constitution of 1889 included Article 28, which guaranteed freedom of religion, however, only “within limits not prejudicial to peace and order and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects.”33 Although Shinto was not a state religion, Shinto priests were considered public officials and attendance at Shinto shrines was a patriotic duty. This public status of Shinto, referred to as “State Shinto,” was bolstered by the government’s declaration that “Shinto is not a religion.”34 The status of Shinto remained ambiguous with an increasing tendency to associate it with patriotism. People participated in Shinto rituals, as national ceremonies, out of a sense of duty rather than 28

“Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1889” Article 1, s.v. “constitution,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2. 29 Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis, 28; s.v. “Kokutai,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 5. 30 H. Byron Earhart, “Religion,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 7; Hiratsuka Masunori, “Religious Education,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 7. 31 Ukai Nobushige, s.v. “Constitution” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2, 1. 32 Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 1868–1988 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 114. 33 “Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1889” Article 28 in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2, 8. 34 Teruhisa Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan: State Authority and Intellectual Freedom, trans. Steven Platzer (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988), 119.

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from personal belief. Later, in times of extreme nationalism, this transformation was directed against Christians and religious cults.35 To counter influential Western ideas, the fragile Meiji government searched for Japanese traditions. The Meiji oligarchs devised a self-serving gimmick that propagated that the Japanese spirit was superior to Western materialism, reflected in the slogan, “Japanese spirit, Western knowledge.”36 They wanted to combine the best of the West, such as modern political, economic, and legal systems and technology, with the best of the East, such as spiritual legacy. Hirobumi It¯o (1841–1909), a rebellious former samurai, who later became Japan’s first Prime Minister, proclaimed in 1909 that bushido, the samurai’s moral code, was Japan’s moral standard, entrenched preciously in the hearts of the educated classes. He said that “it is only since the introduction of modern technical sciences that we have been obliged to pay more attention to specialized technical attainments than to the harmonious development of the whole.”37 This was true of the Meiji leaders who wanted to import modern technical sciences while barring Western religious and philosophical influences. In the late 1880s, elite students at imperial universities and intellectuals embraced the latest political theories and philosophies of Europe, namely progressivism and socialism. These political and economic theories, which called for creating a new society by turning away from traditional culture and history, had a great impact on Japanese intellectuals. In 1887, Emperor Meiji visited the Tokyo Imperial University to see the education of elite students and sensed a radical atmosphere among the students. Students at the imperial universities were expected to learn the latest Western philosophy, science, and technology to advance Japan and protect it from the Western threat. However, the students had no interest in Japan’s history and were ashamed of its past. After this visit, the emperor expressed his concern to Nagazane Motoda (1818–1891), a Confucian scholar and the emperor’s tutor. The universities taught the latest scholarship on science and technology, however, lacked the moral training that should be at the core of education. He observed that many considered Japanese and Chinese studies to be outdated and useless. He doubted that future leaders would be properly educated without an understanding of Japanese history and moral education. Emperor Meiji decided to reintroduce education based on traditional Japanese culture.38 With the emperor’s support, Motoda advanced an education philosophy that expounded the Confucian values of humility, loyalty, and filial piety. Motoda’s ideas were captured in the “1890 Imperial Rescript on Education,” which governed Japanese education until 1945 (see Appendix). The conservative oligarchs of the

35

Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 120. Shimbori, “Modern Education,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2. 37 Wm Theodore de Bary et al., eds., Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2 (1958; reis., New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 165. 38 Michio Ezaki, Comintern no b¯ oryaku to nihon no haisen (Comintern: Conspiracy and Japan’s Defeat) (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2017), 106–108. 36

2.3 Conservative Backlash and the Kokutai Ideology

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Meiji period argued that Western nations provided the moral foundation of Christianity and Japan had no equivalent religion to unite the people.39 It¯o, who would become the author of the Meiji Constitution, believed Buddhism could not unify the Japanese populace. He argued that loyalty to the emperor was analogous to the European devotion to Christianity.40 Thus, Meiji leaders decided to make the emperor the foundation of a new set of national values, called Kokutai. Kokutai became the guiding map of civil values for all Japanese citizens.41 The government hoped that the Confucian emphasis on duty and order would curb the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, which threatened the stability of the fragile oligarchic government.42 The Ministry of Education quickly distributed certified copies of the rescript to every school in Japan to instill Japan’s extraordinary uniqueness in the receptive minds of children. Schools hung the rescript next to the portrait of the emperor and principals were instructed to read it to students at school ceremonies. Throughout Japanese society, the rescript was treated as a sacred object that symbolized the spiritual unification of the Japanese people. Those who did not hold it sacred were stigmatized as treasonous and unpatriotic.43 The rescript requested the Japanese people to respect each other and fulfill their duties with humility, according to their positions in their relationships. In addition, it asked the people to show loyalty and piety to the throne and called upon individuals to willingly sacrifice for the nation. These were the fundamental values that governed the feudal society throughout Japan. This call was acceptable to older Japanese people as it confirmed their long-standing beliefs of immutable truth and virtuous behavior. All moral instructions, known as sh¯ushin, were based on the rescript. In addition, Japanese schools began emphasizing the importance of Japanese history to provide the students with a sense of the imperial household’s continuity. Japanese history textbooks described the imperial family as descendants of the founding goddess of Japan. They defined Japan as a divine nation, stressing that it was the people’s supreme duty and honor to serve the emperor with unquestionable loyalty. Kokutai was vigorously promoted as a nationalist rallying cry to counter Western liberal thoughts. The Meiji government intended to silence any voices and behaviors that challenged its legitimacy and depoliticize the current and future generations of intellectuals. The government wanted loyal support from intellectuals rather than ideological challenges. However, the elite intellectuals despised the rescript because it was intended only for the common people and not for them. They continued to 39

Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan, 68. Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 118. 41 Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 121; Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan, 68. 42 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 156; Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis, 28; s.v. “Imperial Rescript of Education,” Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 4. 43 de Bary et al., eds., Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2, 139; Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 121. 40

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believe that they needed to study progressive political and economic theories to defend Japan.44 By the late nineteenth century, the Meiji government’s efforts to become an industrialized military power were beginning to pay off. In 1895, Japan defeated China’s Qing dynasty and, in 1905, its new status as a formidable military power was confirmed when Japanese troops vanquished Russia. The Western nations began to accept Japan as an equal. In 1894, Britain and other Western countries finally agreed to end the unequal treaties. In addition, the extra-territorial privileges of foreign residents were phased out in 1899 and the treaty powers agreed to restore tariff autonomy to Japan by 1910. Consequently, Japanese confidence, supported by global recognition, began to grow. Japan’s participation on the victorious side in World War I (1914–1918) cemented its position as one of the top-ranking military nations in the world.45

2.4 Struggle for University Autonomy and Academic Freedom46 For the Meiji oligarchs, higher education was meant to promote the progress and prosperity of the empire, not the pursuit of knowledge. The Meiji Constitution contained no guarantee of academic freedom. It¯o explained the government’s motivation in his Commentary on the Constitution (1888). Academic and educational freedoms are indeed clearly spelled out in the constitutions of many countries…. However, if we endorse the same liberties, we will in the future, without fail, be visited by every imaginable sort of disputation [giron], with the result that the Government’s authority will be severely impaired.47

As the Meiji government was afraid of criticism from the intellectuals, it painstakingly formulated legal mechanisms to intimidate all dissidents. While the Meiji Constitution of 1889 guaranteed the freedoms of religious belief, speech, writing, publication, public meetings, and association, it added that these freedoms existed “within the limits of [the] law” to avoid disturbing public peace and tranquility, and students and professors must not remain “antagonistic to their duties as subjects.”48

44

Ezaki, Comintern no b¯oryaku to nihon no haisen, 108–109; Center for East Asian Cultural Studies, Meiji Japan through Contemporary Sources, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Center for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1972), 30–31. 45 Duus, Modern Japan, 2nd ed., 146; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 9–10. 46 Part of this section is reproduced with permission from Japan Studies Review. [“Japanese Professor Resist University Reforms During the U.S. Occupation” by Ruriko Kumano. 2012. Japan Studies Review, Vol. XVI, 53–56, Copyright 2012 Japan Studies Review]. 47 Quoted in Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan, 72. 48 “Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1889” Article 28 in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol.2, 8.

2.5 Imperial University Administration

17

Moreover, the government could restrict the freedoms with directives that did not require the approval of the Diet. The Meiji leaders expected imperial universities to import and disseminate Western knowledge to strengthen Imperial Japan. In fact, Article 1 of the Imperial University Ordinance of 1886 explicitly stated that the mission of an imperial university was to serve the needs of the state. The 1881 ordinance gave professors the same legal status as government officials, making it easier for the government to control university personnel.49 Faculty members at imperial universities had two conflicting obligations: (1) to work for the interests of the state in their role as civil servants and (2) to research and teach as academics in their respective fields. The first obligation demanded loyalty to the state. The second required a high degree of freedom of thought and freedom to question the legitimacy of the existing order.

2.5 Imperial University Administration Education Minister Mori created a university governing system in which the Education Ministry held a monopoly on the power to regulate imperial universities. On behalf of the emperor, the minister appointed university presidents and the University Council, the highest organ of the university administration that was obligated to report all council proceedings to the education minister. In 1888, a group of young professors, newly returned from studying abroad, found the ministry’s rigid control unbearable and advocated the adoption of European-style governance, which would allow faculty members to participate in decision-making. Their brave advocacy was quickly squashed, however, they were not dismissed.50 Despite the reluctance of the Education Ministry to share power, Japanese imperial universities gradually moved toward de facto self-governance. Two events, in particular, triggered this change: (1) the Tomizu Incident of 1905 at Tokyo Imperial University and (2) the Sawayanagi Incident of 1913 at Kyoto Imperial University.51 In 1903, when war between Russia and Japan became imminent, Professor Hirondo Tomizu (1861–1935) and six other professors of Tokyo Imperial University criticized Prime Minister Tar¯o Katsura’s (1848–1913)52 cautious diplomatic maneuvers. Tomizu urged a more aggressive policy toward Russian advances in Asia. The 49 Tachibana, Tenn¯ o to t¯odai, vol. 1, 113–114; Byron K. Marshall, Academic Freedom and the Japanese Imperial University, 1868–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 60. 50 Marshall, Academic Freedom, 283; Nagai, Higher Education in Japan, 57. 51 Marshall, Growth and Conflict, 282–283; Hitoshi Osaki, ¯ Daigaku kaikaku 1945–1999 (University reforms) (Tokyo: Y¯uhikaku, 1999), 146. 52 Taro Katsura was a General in the First Sino-Japanese War and a genr¯ o (principal elder) of the Meiji government who served as Governor-General of Taiwan and Minister of War. He served as Prime Minister from 1901 to 1906, from 1908 to 1911, and from 1912 to 1913. Katsura Taro, Wikimedia Foundation, last modified July 26, 2022, 05:00 (UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Katsura_Tar%C5%8D.

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war broke out. Although Japan won, the terms of the peace treaty, arranged by the US President, Theodore Roosevelt, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, were a great disappointment. Japanese people, who had made great sacrifices in this war, found the terms inadequate concerning territorial gains and financial reparations. Tomizu, once again, publicly expressed his disapproval and stated that the peace treaty should be immediately abrogated to extract greater concessions from Russia.53 The government could no longer ignore such open dissent. The education minister dismissed Tomizu, despite the established procedure, whereby, a university president submitted a recommendation for the dismissal of a professor to the Education Ministry. The government claimed that it had the power to act according to the 1899 Civil Service Limitation Ordinance, which gave them the ability to suspend civil servants, including professors, at the government’s convenience.54 The president of Tokyo Imperial University, Kenjir¯o Yamakawa (1854–1931), supported the government’s decision. However, when a group of law professors publicly denounced the university president for colluding with the ministry, Yamakawa resigned. Most professors did not support Tomizu’s aggressive argument yet understood the imminent threat to their freedom of inquiry. Faculty members demanded that Tomizu and Yamakawa be reinstated. To avoid further alienating professors, the Prime Minister dismissed the education minister and offered to reinstate Tomizu and Yamakawa. While Tomizu returned to teaching, Yamakawa declined the offer. The faculty’s victory in the Tomizu Incident marked the first step in the universities’ independence from the iron grip of government control.55 Several years later, a second incident strengthened university autonomy. When Masatar¯o Sawayanagi (1865–1927), an Education Ministry official known for his affinity for democracy, became president of Kyoto Imperial University, he unexpectedly forced the early retirement of seven professors on grounds of incompetence. The entire faculty revolted, demanding that a scholar’s competence be judged by other scholars in the same field. Sawayanagi refused to listen. Kyoto faculty appealed directly to the education minister and obtained endorsement that only department faculty members had the authority to make decisions about personnel and other internal administrative matters. Humiliated, Sawayanagi resigned. Encouraged by this victory, the professors requested the right to elect a new university president from their ranks, which they were granted. The Kyoto University Council drafted new regulations that reflected this victory for university autonomy. Other imperial universities followed.56

53

Marshall, Academic Freedom, 62. Doo Soo Suh, “The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1952), 427. 55 Suh, “The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945,” 320. 56 Suh, “The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945,” 321–323; Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 37–38; Osaki, Daigaku kaikaku (University reforms), 146–149. 54

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By 1919, departments in imperial universities had real decision-making power over curriculum and personnel matters. The faculty elected two-thirds of the University Council members with the remaining one-third consisting of departmental chairpersons sitting ex officio. Departments elected their deans. Once a department made decisions on an issue, the respective president and the University Council usually acquiesced.57 The Education Ministry allowed universities to regulate their internal affairs. In pre-war imperial universities, therefore, autonomy meant that faculties had the power to hire or fire professors and elect presidents. This practice prevented interference by both the Education Ministry and individual university presidents. Although imperial universities gained limited, but valued, autonomy from the Education Ministry in the early twentieth century, they could not protect themselves from criminal charges by the powerful Justice Ministry and the dreaded Home Ministry. From the earliest days of imperial universities, professors had the privilege of studying even those ideologies that the government considered dangerous. However, as the influence of socialism grew in the universities, the government became increasingly intolerant of such studies.

2.6 The Influence of Marxism on Intellectuals Soon after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), when rapid industrialization began in Japan, critical social problems associated with urbanization came to light. At the same time, Marxist-Socialist ideas came to Japan from Europe. The Japanese who followed the ideological movements in the West were intellectuals, such as journalists, professors, and university students. The influence of Marxism in Japanese universities grew, especially after the Russian Revolution of 1917, and reached its peak in the 1920s when the illegal (and, therefore, clandestine) Japanese Communist Party was formed. Fascinated by the flood of liberal ideas from the West, Japanese intellectuals eagerly engaged with socialism and followed the socialist movement in Europe.58 A synopsis of the ideological turmoil in the European brand of socialism helps illuminate the ensuing developments in Japan. During the Industrial Revolution in Europe, in the early nineteenth century, utopian socialists, Robert Owen (1771–1858) in Great Britain and Henri de SaintSimon (1760–1825) in France, held that a classless society would eliminate the inequalities resulting from monopolistic industries and crude capitalism. This group of European thinkers advocated a fair distribution of wealth and envisioned a new

57

Marshall, Academic Freedom, 54–67; Marshall, “Growth and Conflict,” 283. Lonny Carlile, Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 8.

58

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society made of small communities in which private property was abolished. The term socialism was first used in this context.59 In the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and his friend, Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) developed their concept of socialism, known as Marxism. They held that socialism was the transitional stage between capitalism and communism, characterized by state ownership of the means of production. Marx believed that humanity should strive for communism, which would end the class struggle and bring harmonious equality. Numerous groups have used Marx’s works as the theoretical foundation for their agendas. The “subtle and manifold content”60 of Marx’s actual writings allows diverse interpretations to emerge, purporting to be the true arbiter of Marxian philosophy. Several strains of Marxism were born as a result of these interpretive endeavors.61 One of the destructive rifts among Marxists arose between the reformist social democrats and the revolutionary communists over the methods of transforming the existing capitalist society into a harmonious society. While the communists insisted that overthrowing the capitalist state was the only way to achieve Marx’s intended goal, the social democrats argued that the transition to socialism could be managed within the confines of the parliamentary system. An ideal society could be realized peacefully through the gradual extension of workers’ control. The latter group was opposed to a violent revolution. Since each capitalist nation had different characteristics and conditions, the social democrats preferred a loose international network as opposed to the strictly centralized organization that communists advanced.62 Heated opposition to social democrats arose from Russian communists, where a despotic government ruled and parliamentary democracy had never existed. Communism, in its modern form, is said to have originated with the Russian revolutionary, Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924), and is often called Leninism. Lenin argued that revolution was the only way to realize a socialist society and urged the formation of “a highly centralized party of professional revolutionaries” to achieve a society grounded in fairness.63 The 1917 collapse of the Tsarist regime and the Russian Bolshevik Revolution marked the irreparable split between communists and social democrats. In 1918 the Bolsheviks of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, led by Lenin, changed their name to the Russian Communist Party while retaining the popular title, Bolsheviks.

59

Jonathan Beecher, s.v. “Utopian Socialism,” in Encyclopedia.com, https://www.encyclopedia. com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/utopian-socialism (accessed August 18, 2022). 60 Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 8. 61 Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 8. 62 Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 8–13. 63 Charles Hobday, Communist and Marxist Parties of the World (London: Longman Group Limited, 1986), 12.

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Following this change, communism was exclusively identified with the Leninist interpretation of Marxism.64 The communist parties in the Soviet Union and Europe broke away from the moderate social democrats. As a defensive move against the resurgence of noncommunist leadership amidst the global socialist movement, the Bolsheviks, under Lenin, established a new Communist International Organization, the Communist International, abbreviated as Comintern (or Third International), in Moscow in 1919. The Comintern defined all national and local communist parties “simply as branches of the Comintern.”65 The Bolsheviks in Moscow believed that communist societies worldwide could be realized through armed proletarian revolutions, which required well-trained revolutionaries willing to follow the dictates of the Comintern. In the Comintern’s view, proletarians were uneducated in the communist theory and needed detailed instructions from Moscow. Therefore, Moscow insisted on centralized control where its streamlined chain of command would fulfill the goal of proletarian revolution worldwide.66 Due to this rigid centralized control model, many social democrats refused to join the Comintern. The communists, feeling betrayed, developed animosity toward the social democrats. Although other versions of socialism existed, including an anarchist camp, the split between the two main streams of Marxism entered Japan and the same violent turmoil played out.67 While things fermented politically across European countries in the wake of industrialization, Japan went into a state of upheaval. Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan developed its industry based on capitalism, under the slogan, “Enrich the nation! Strengthen its Arms!” After the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), industrialization and urbanization led to great disparities in wealth and new social tensions frayed the nation’s traditional family fabric. Appalling labor conditions, with low wages, plagued urban workers. There were no government policies to support workers nor remedies to ameliorate labor conditions. Intellectuals, exposed to the latest political and economic theories abroad at imperial universities and private institutions of higher education, advocated the elimination of the novel social problems. Strikes became rampant and the labor movement budded in Japan. In 1897, Fusataro Takano (1869–1904) and Sen Katayama (1859–1933), who had just returned from the US, founded the Trade Unions Federation, a society for the promotion of trade unions, the first of its kind in Japan. Craft unions, such as those for ironworkers and typesetters, were formed for mutual support. The Federation published a journal, Labor World, and by 1899, the Federation’s membership had grown to 5000. In 1900, the government, which viewed the trade union movement as a harbinger of revolution, hastily passed the Peace Police Law, Article 17. It

64

Hobday, Communist and Marxist Parties of the World, 13. Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 31. 66 Westad, The Cold War, 31–32. 67 Takashi Tachibana, Ky¯ osant¯o no kenky¯u (Study of the Japanese Communist Party), vol. 1 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 1983), 45; Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 11. 65

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outlawed labor unions and strikes, declaring them disturbances to public tranquility. The Federation dissolved in 1901.68 By 1906, the government had studied international socialist movements and their impact on domestic socialism. They divided Japan’s socialists into two camps: (1) reformists who advocated societal transformation through parliamentary action and universal manhood suffrage and (2) revolutionaries who called for violent regime change.69 Sh¯usui K¯otoku (1871–1911), a famous journalist who introduced anarchism to Japan by translating the works of European and Russian anarchists, such as Peter Kropotkin, and Toshihiko Sakai (1871–1933), a historian, were considered revolutionaries by the government. The following is a brief history of the nascent movement of the revolutionaries in Japan. In 1903, K¯otoku, Sakai, and others70 founded the Commoner’s Society. They began publishing the weekly Commoners’ News in which they expressed their passionate opposition to Japan’s impending war with Russia. The journal became the voice of the Japanese socialist movement. After K¯otoku and Sakai published Marx and Engels’ entire Communist Manifesto in November 1904, amidst Japan’s desperate war against Russia (the Russo–Japanese War, February 9, 1904–September 5, 1905), the government found the publication too threatening to ignore and immediately prohibited its distribution. In January 1906, the relatively liberal, Kinmochi Saionji (1849–1940)71 Cabinet was formed. In this less repressive atmosphere, Sakai and other socialists, including approximately 200 reformists and revolutionaries, formed the Japan Socialist Party. The party proclaimed its mission— the establishment of a socialist society within the limits of the law. Due to this promise, the government tolerated the party’s existence. Within this idealistic party, however, disputes arose along the old fault line between reformists and revolutionaries. At the party congress in February 1907, K¯otoku called for general strikes to change Japan’s labor policy and his radical friends gathered enough votes to remove the phrase “within the limits of the law” from the party constitution. When this change was announced, the government immediately ordered the party’s dissolution.72 In July 1908, Army General Tar¯o Katsura became Prime Minister (the second term). He was determined to use draconian measures to eradicate all socialist movements in Japan. When 14 of K¯otoku’s followers, including Sakai, staged a demonstration, waving flags with the words “Anarchism” and “Anarchism-Communism,” they were imprisoned. In the summer of 1910, K¯otoku and his followers were charged 68

Kotobank, s.v. “Rodo kumiai kiseikai” in Britanica Kokusai daihyakka jiten, sho komoku jiten, htdtps://kotobank.jp/word/ (accessed August 18, 2022). 69 George M. Beckmann and Toshiaki Okubo, ¯ The Japanese Communist Party 1922–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 3. 70 Other younger men included Sakae Osugi ¯ (1885–1923), Kanson Arahata (1887–1981), and Hitoshi Yamakawa (1880–1958). 71 Kinmochi Saionji (1849–1940) served as prime minister from 1906 to 1908 and from 1911 to 1912. As the last surviving genr¯o, he was the most influential politician from the mid-1920s to the early 1930s. “Saionji Kinmochi”, Wikimedia Foundation, last modified August 6, 2022, 13:28 (UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saionji_Kinmochi. 72 Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 3–8.

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with plotting the assassination of Emperor Meiji, the imperial families, and ministers of state. The conspirators were convicted of lèse-majesté and treason. K¯otoku and 11 of his followers were executed by hanging in January 1911. This event, which became known as the High Treason Incident, had a chilling effect on the burgeoning socialist movement. The government made no distinction between reformists and revolutionaries and propagated the dangers of socialism to Japan nationwide. The rise of the Seiy¯ukai Party to a majority in the Diet ushered in a new era of Japanese party politics. Takashi Hara (1856–1921), the president of the Seiy¯ukai Party, was appointed Prime Minister. Japan’s growing importance in world politics generated a wave of support for liberalism. World War I (1914–1918) greatly benefited Japan. As Western business withdrew from East Asia during the war, Japan moved in. In addition, Great Britain and its allies turned to Japan for munitions and war materials, which triggered an economic boom during the war. With the defeat of Germany, Japan gained several strategic islands in the South Pacific that had previously been German colonies. Increasing employment in the manufacturing industry transformed Japan from an agrarian society into an industrialized one. This process was further driven by the internationalization of the traveling population and mass media, such as newspapers and radio, which dramatically increased the contact of ordinary Japanese people with foreign cultures.73 The Russian Revolution of 1917–1918 and the worldwide call for democracy exerted a significant influence on Japanese politics. Once considered dangerous for the Japanese imperial regime, new currents of thought were propagated through mass media. The Rice Riots of 1918, caused by the severe inflation that accompanied Japan’s rapid industrial expansion during World War I, sparked a mass demand for universal suffrage. Prime Minister Hara, however, was a staunch opponent of universal suffrage. Against government oppression, prominent intellectuals advocated popular political participation. In December 1918, Sakuz¯o Yoshino (1878– 1933), a law professor at Tokyo Imperial University, and Tokuz¯o Fukuda (1874– 1930), an economics professor at the Tokyo Higher School of Commerce (now the prestigious Hitotsubashi University), founded the Dawn Society to “propagate ideas of democracy.” They called on other professors and students to fight against “despotism and militarism.”74 Yoshino, who had converted to Christianity in secondary school, graduated from the Department of Political Science at Tokyo Imperial University in 1904. From 1909 to 1924, he taught political science at his alma mater. From 1910 to 1913, he studied in Germany, England, and the US. Upon his return, he presented his political analysis in Ch¯uo¯ k¯oron, Japan’s prestigious monthly magazine. His article, titled “On the Meaning of Constitutional Government and the Methods to Perfect It,” appeared in January 1916 and created a nationwide controversy. Yoshino argued that democracy, which he translated as “government for the people,” was compatible with the emperor’s sovereignty. Although sovereignty resided in and with the emperor, 73

Henry DeWitt Smith, Japan’s First Student Radicals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), xii. 74 Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 18.

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Yoshino wrote, the government’s primary concerns should be the people’s welfare and needs. To this end, he insisted on universal suffrage and a system of party politics. He believed that if Japan wanted to be respected as a first-tier nation, it needed to follow the world’s trend of democratization. A few of Yoshino’s students formed the New Men Society to build a democratic Japan. Inspired by this society, students at Waseda University, a prominent private university in Tokyo, formed the People’s League to uphold the value of liberalism.75

2.7 Suppression of “Dangerous Thoughts” The 1917 Russian Revolution stimulated interest in radical revolutionary MarxismLeninism among Japanese intellectuals and ordinary laborers. A stream of magazines and newspapers appeared, bearing provocative titles, such as Kaiz¯o (Reform), Kaih¯o (Liberation), Warera (We the People), and Demokurash¯ı (Democracy).76 Marxism flourished openly among university professors and students. In January 1919, Hajime Kawakami (1879–1946), a Kyoto Imperial University professor, began publishing a monthly journal, entitled Research in Social Problems. His 1917 book, Tale of Poverty, a national bestseller, earned him the reputation of a brave, conscientious scholar. Kawakami went on to write several treatises on Marxism. In July 1918, Kyoto Imperial University students formed the Labor-Student Society with Kawakami’s endorsement. In 1920, Kawakami was appointed dean of the Department of Economics at Kyoto Imperial University. Many bright students flocked to the university, hoping to study under his tutelage. The Kyoto campus became a “breeding ground for political activism.”77 When the opposition parties introduced a universal suffrage bill in February 1920, Prime Minister Hara dissolved the Diet and held elections later that month. Students mobilized 75,000 people to participate in a rally held in Tokyo. The Hara Cabinet did not yield to the mounting pressure from Japanese academia. After the renewed victory of Hara’s Seiy¯ukai, prospects of universal suffrage disappeared.78 However, on November 4, 1921, Prime Minister Hara was stabbed to death by a 31-year-old assassin at Tokyo Station. With this assassination, Japanese party politics degenerated into chaotic bickering that eventually devolved into nationalistic militarism. In this political climate, certain restrictions on freedom of thought came from the universities themselves. Ideological conflicts between liberal and conservative professors continued to escalate. In January 1919, Tatsuo Morito (1888–1984), an assistant professor of economics at Tokyo Imperial University, published an article in 75

Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 18. Tatsuo Arima, The Failure of Freedom: A Portrait of Modern Japanese Intellectuals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 53. 77 Gail Lee Bernstein, Japanese Marxist: A Portrait of Kawakami Hajime 1879–1946 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 132. 78 Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 16–19. 76

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the departmental journal, Economics Studies, on the social philosophy of Kropotkin, a famous Russian proponent of anti-statism and anti-authoritarianism.79 Expanding on Kropotkin’s thoughts, Morito presented a position that could be interpreted as antiJapanese government. A right-wing student group known as Association for a New Nation, established to counter the left-wing New Men Society, considered Morito’s article highly offensive and reported it to the Justice Ministry, which launched a vigorous investigation.80 Pursuant to their inquiries, the Justice Ministry informed the Education Ministry that it intended to prosecute Morito. Before the indictments were drawn up, the university’s president, Yamakawa, who had returned to the post several years after the Tomizu Incident, consulted with the Economics Department about dismissing Morito. Yamakawa was willing to fight the Justice Ministry if the economics professors wanted to protect Morito.81 However, the antipathy between Marxist and anti-Marxist factions within the Economics Department had been brewing. A supposedly liberal group led by Eijir¯o Kawai (1891–1944), a vocal critic of Marxism, formed a coalition with the conservative faction led by Seibi Hijikata (1890–1970), who would later work closely with a military clique. This combined force within the department voted six to one against Morito.82 Based on Article 42 of the 1909 Press Law, which dealt with the crime of sedition, the ¯ government brought charges against Morito and Hy¯oe Ouchi (1888–1980), editor of the departmental journal. Once the indictments were issued, the suspension was automatic following the Civil Service Limitation Ordinance.83 ¯ The trial of Morito and Ouchi marked the beginning of the uncompromising government persecution of leftist thinkers.84 Yoshino and other distinguished intellectuals defended them in the heavily covered trial. The New Men Society and other ¯ leftist student groups, too, openly supported Morito and Ouchi. However, in October ¯ 1920, Morito and Ouchi were convicted. Morito was sentenced to three months in ¯ prison and a fine of 70 yen, while Ouchi received a one-year prison sentence, one year of probation, and a fine of 20 yen. The university administration confiscated copies of the journal to remove it from circulation. The university permanently dismissed ¯ Morito, however, later reinstated Ouchi (although he was dismissed again in 1937 after being charged in connection with the Popular Front incident, discussed below).

79

Richard H. Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 40. 80 Akio Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi (History of university autonomy) (Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha, 1965; reprint, 1968), 39–40. 81 Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 40–41. 82 Marshall, Academic Freedom, 175, 178. 83 Suh, “The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945,” 144–145; Arima, The Failure of Freedom: A Portrait of Modern Japanese Intellectuals, 55. 84 Louis Frédéric, s.v. “Morito Tatsuo” in Japan Encyclopedia, trans. Kathe Roth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

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Morito survived World War II and became Minister of Education during the US Occupation of Japan.85 After this symbolic but dramatic defeat, leftist student groups radicalized. A small population of university students, undoubtedly the country’s elite, became important players in political activism and the labor movement. They had studied the latest socialist theories and devoted their time to political activities. They felt obliged to work for the betterment of society. In addition, the slow, steady increase in the number of university students due to the expansion of higher education in the late 1910s and 1920s coincided with the economic depression after the war boom. A university degree no longer guaranteed high-paying employment. These uncertainties generated discontent among students and encouraged them to become politically active. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, Marxism had gained a significant number of converts at Japan’s leading academic institutions and many students joined the illegal Japanese communist movement.86

2.7.1 The Birth of the Japanese Communist Party The High Treason Incident of 1911, which resulted in the execution of K¯otoku and 11 other conspirators, had a chilling effect on the nascent socialist movement. Nevertheless, a few socialists managed to keep their movement alive even in a lethal climate. Sakai, who had been in jail for two years when his friend K¯otoku was executed, was released. In September 1915, he launched a new journal, New Society. Among the first contributors was Motoyuki Takabatake (1886–1928), who was once a Christian and enrolled in D¯oshisha University (a private university founded in 1875 by Christian educator J¯o Niijima who had graduated from Amherst University), however, recanted his faith and left the university. He had published his socialist journal, T¯ohoku Review, which prompted the government to imprison him for two years. He read Marx and Engels’ Capital in English in a prison cell. Once released, Takabatake helped Sakai form a socialist group to advance labor unionism and anarchism. New Society gained a growing audience, particularly among intellectuals. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, this group came to believe that communism, rather than anarchistic unionism, could offer more practical guidelines to achieve the socialist transformation of Japanese society. Energetic and productive, Takabatake introduced Lenin’s theories in the February 1918 issue of New Society. He translated the original Capital into Japanese, making a great contribution to the Japanese understanding of Marxism. In the May 1919 issue of New Society, Sakai and other younger men made 85

Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan, 40–42; Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 39–41; Marshall, Academic Freedom, 175–178; Suh, “The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945,” 144–145; Arima, The Failure of Freedom, 55. 86 Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan, 28–33; Patricia G. Steinhoff, “Tenk¯o: Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1969), 103, 122; Marshall, Academic Freedom, 87–92; Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 19.

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public their conversion to Marxism-Leninism. They praised the Soviet Union and the emerging Comintern. In December 1920, socialist intellectuals, Hitoshi Yamakawa (1880–1958), Sakai, and other Japanese socialists, who had belonged to labor unions and student organizations, formed a unified Japan Socialist League. The government quickly arrested many members and banned the League the next year.87 These Japanese communists obtained the latest information on world communist developments from Sen Katayama and his socialist group in the US. Katayama went to the US in 1884 at the age of 25. He attended Maryville College in Tennessee, followed by Grinnell College in Iowa, Andover Theological Seminary, and Yale Divinity School. He became a Christian and a socialist. In 1896, he returned to Japan and began work based on his belief in Christian socialism. In 1897, he participated in establishing the Trade Unions Federation and edited Labor World, the organ of the federation, until the government dissolved it in 1901. In 1904, he attended the Second International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam and the following year, he participated in a convention of the American Socialist Party in Chicago. Katayama had kept in close touch with his socialist comrades in Japan. After declaring bankruptcy in the rice business in Texas, he returned to Japan in 1907 and rejoined the socialist movement while pursuing a career as a journalist. After being jailed for his participation in the Tokyo Streetcar Strike of 1912, Katayama fled to the US in 1914, where he joined communist circles in New York. Inspired by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, he became an active communist. He organized the communist-oriented League of Japanese Socialists in the US, whose members later became active in Japan. He moved to Moscow in 1921 and became an officer of the Comintern in 1922.88 Before going to Moscow, Katayama sent Eiz¯o Kond¯o (1883–1965), a member of his New York group, to Tokyo in May 1919 to make direct contact with Japanese comrades. Kond¯o made contact with a Comintern representative in Tokyo and received Soviet funds to establish a communist party in Japan. Sakai and Yamakawa, whose Socialist League had just been dissolved by the Japanese government, tried to dissuade Kond¯o from taking such a dangerous path. Kond¯o, who had graduated from Waseda University, continued undeterred, recruiting Waseda alumni and students. On August 20, 1921, these radical intellectuals founded the Enlightened People’s Communist Party and elected Kond¯o as party chairman. As soon as the party published its manifesto in October, the police hastily investigated and found a direct link between Kond¯o and the Comintern. He was arrested and imprisoned. Within a week, 40 of his associates were charged with violating the Publications Law and the Peace Police Law.89 During this time, the US government announced a conference of nine naval powers, excluding Soviet Russia. Known as the Washington Naval Conference, it was held from November 1921 to February 1922 in Washington, DC to discuss disarmament and the Far Eastern question of equal access to unstable China. The Comintern denounced the interference of the US and other powers in the Far East and 87

Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 11–14. Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 11–14. 89 Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 32–35. 88

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called for a Congress of the People of the Far East in January 1922 to repel capitalist encroachments. The Comintern invited all national-revolutionary socialist groups in the Far East to Moscow. In the early fall of 1921, shortly after the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, a Chinese communist sneaked into Japan and urged the Japanese communists to send delegates to a Moscow conference.90 Sakai and Yamakawa sent Ky¯uichi Tokuda (1894–1953) as their representative while Kond¯o’s illegal Enlightened People’s Communist Party elected Kiyoshi Takase (1901–1973). In Moscow, the Comintern leaders instructed Takase and Tokuda to form a communist party in Japan. The Japanese delegates invited Sakai and Yamakawa to orchestrate this formation upon their return. Though they were reluctant, their younger followers—labor union leaders and members of the Enlightened People’s Communist Party who had just been released on bail—were very enthusiastic. Sakai and Yamakawa acquiesced to the demand. On July 15, 1922, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was founded and Sakai was named chairman. The party had fewer than 50 members, mostly students, intellectuals, and laborers. The party adopted a tentative constitution based on the British Communist Party and pledged to act as a branch of the Comintern and a leader of the revolutionary movement in Japan. The JCP received funding and directives from Moscow.91 Sanz¯o Nosaka (1892–1993) was a crucial bridge between the Comintern and its JCP branch. Nosaka was born to a prosperous Japanese merchant in Hagi of Yamaguchi. At nine years old, he was adopted by a family on his mother’s side, the Nosakas. He attended the prestigious private Keio University in Tokyo. Under the influence of his professor, Kiichi Horie (1876–1927), he became interested in the labor movement. He wrote his senior thesis on the moderate labor organization, Friendly Society, founded by Bunji Suzuki (1885–1946), a Christian who was one of the primary organizers of the labor movement in Japan. When he graduated from the university in 1917, Nozaka worked for Friendly Society as a researcher and later as the editor of its union journal, Labor and Industry. Nosaka read an Englishlanguage copy of The Communist Manifesto, which his friend brought to Japan in 1918. He embraced the ideology and converted to Marxism-Leninism. In August 1919, he arrived in London and studied political economy at London University. Here he joined the British Communist Party when it was founded in 1920. Nosaka’s activities in the Communist Party led to his deportation from Britain in 1921. He emigrated to the Soviet Union and became an influential member of the Communist Party with the help of high-ranking friends in Communist Party. He participated in the Congress of the People of the Far East and returned to Japan in 1922. In the same year, he became a founding member of the JCP.92 90

Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 38. Steinhoff, “Tenk¯o,” 19, 82; Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 44–49. 92 Jemes Kirkup, “Obituary: Sanzo Nosaka,” Independent, November 16, 1993. http://www.indepe ndent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-sanzo-nosaka-1504671.html (accessed March 16, 2022); Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 4–5. 91

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However, before revolutionary strategies could be agreed upon, secret party documents were leaked to the police, which brought the fledgling organization to an end. In May 1923, the Waseda University administration announced the establishment of a military affairs research institute on its campus. However, anti-military students disrupted the institute’s auspicious opening ceremony. Among the protesters was noted leftist faculty member, Manabu Sano (1892–1953) of the Department of Politics and Economics. The military research institute was forced to disband, angering the country’s powerful military cliques. The government saw this defeat as a clear manifestation of a dangerous ideology. The Home Ministry was certain that Waseda was a bastion of communism and ordered the police to monitor the activities of suspicious organizations on campus. As a result, the leak occurred. Sano had kept a record of the clandestine meetings of the illegal JCP securely in his Waseda office. The right-leaning students informed a government agent of the leftist professors’ secret. A group of prosecutors and a judge stormed Sano’s office and found documents about the JCP.93 The day after the leak, national newspaper headlines read, “Red Professors Discovered on Waseda Campus” and “Waseda University—Strategic Brain for the Communist Party.”94 Around 50 members of the JCP were arrested on June 5, 1923, 30 of whom were tried under the Peace Police Law. During the trial, the Home Ministry made a public pronouncement that communism was equivalent to terrorism.95 Ironically, the trials of the Waseda professors increased the popularity of socialism and communism due to the prestige and authority of the university professors. Pressured by the Home and Justice Ministries, the Education Ministry ordered the dissolution of all social science study groups throughout the nation’s higher education institutions.96 Alarmed by the resurgence of the Communist Party, Japanese government officials, police, and politicians prepared legislation to halt the spread of dangerous thoughts and counter the intrusion of external subversive elements. The police did not hesitate to use force, if required, brutally. The second biggest earthquake in Japanese history, with a magnitude of 7.9 (second only to the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 2011, which had a magnitude of 9.0), devastated Tokyo on September 1, 1923, killing more than 160,000 people. The ensuing inferno scorched the nation’s capital and neighboring Yoko¯ hama. Military police took advantage of the chaos to club Sakae Osugi (1885–1923), a prominent anarchist writer, his lover Noe It¯o (1895–1923), who was a well-known socialist writer, his six-year-old nephew, who held American citizenship, and 13 other leading radical intellectuals and labor leaders to death. It¯o’s mutilated body was dumped into an old well in the backyard of Tokyo military police headquarters. As the six-year-old boy was an American, the US Embassy in Tokyo expressed outrage, forcing the Japanese government to investigate. These murders became 93 Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 45–47; Suh, “The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945,” 153. 94 Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 48. 95 Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 67–69. 96 Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 48.

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a national scandal. However, the military policeman, Masahiko Amakasu (1891– 1945), who clubbed these individuals to death received perfunctory punishment. He was imprisoned for less than three years. Upon his early release from jail, he went to France with his wife to study, thanks to an Imperial Army scholarship, and moved to Manchuria where he participated in the infamous Manchurian Incident of 1931, a tragic prelude to the Pacific war.97 In this harsh political climate, characterized by relentless and lethal persecution, the remaining members of the JCP voted to dissolve their organization in February 1924. On hearing the news, the Comintern ordered its Japanese members to reorganize. By 1927, 21 former members had rejoined and 118 new members were recruited.98 As the economic and social mood in Japan deteriorated, the government believed that extending suffrage to a larger portion of the male population would be a definite outlet for widespread discontent. In March 1925, a universal manhood suffrage law was passed. The tax requirements for suffrage were abolished, however, the age was set at 25 to disqualify radicalized university students. In addition, the government made participation in labor strikes legal and allowed the formation of unions.99 These laws encouraged moderate left-wing activists to form proletarian parties to send representatives to the Diet. On March 5, 1926, moderate labor groups formed the Labor-Farmer Party, however, radical communists infiltrated and eventually dominated the party.100 Concurrent with the limited suffrage law, the Diet enacted the Peace Preservation Law, which explicitly outlawed political organizations that advocated changes to the spirit of kokutai, the imperial house, or capitalism. The first general election in Japan’s history, based on the 1925 universal manhood suffrage law, was held in February 1928. Labor parties won eight seats in the Diet. While the government interpreted this outcome as a threat to the imperial regime, the labor parties were encouraged to hope for the imminent dawn of a socialist utopia. In this election, the communists, who had infiltrated the legal Labor-Farmer Party, opposed Japan’s invasion of the Asian countries, the capitalist economy, and the imperial system, as ordered by the Comintern in Moscow. From 1927 to 1931, the JCP dutifully followed the Comintern’s directives, calling for the destruction of imperial institutions to promote an eventual proletarian revolution.101 This bold, if not glaringly unrealistic, declaration by the communists invited a swift response. On March 15, 1928, more than 1500 Japanese leftists were arrested, which increased to 3400 by the end of the year. Of those arrested, 40% were university students or graduates.102 Education Minister Rentar¯o Mizuno (1868–1949) ordered university 97

“Masahiko Amakasu,” Wikimedia Foundation, last modified July 17, 2022, 13:33 (UTC), https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masahiko_Amakasu. 98 Steinhoff, “Tenk¯ o,” 87–88. 99 Beckman and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 81. 100 Duus, Modern Japan, 2nd ed., 182–183. 101 Steinhoff, “Tenk¯ o,” 170. 102 Tachibana, Nihon ky¯ osant¯o no kenky, vol. 1, 218; Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 53.

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31

presidents to expel the arrested students and take punitive measures against leftist professors. One conspicuous target was Kawakami of Kyoto Imperial University, who was accused of promoting radical student groups. The president of Kyoto Imperial University, following the university’s internal precedent established after the 1913 Sawayanagi incident, consulted faculty members in Kawakami’s department. Surprisingly, they did not oppose the president’s demand for their colleague’s resignation. Disappointed with his department, Kawakami resigned and joined the JCP in 1932. He was subsequently convicted and served time in prison from 1933 to 1937.103 ¯ Another leftist economics professor, Yoshitar¯o Omori (1898–1940) of Tokyo Imperial University, was forced to resign. The Education Ministry accused him of speaking at a gathering against the military research institute at Waseda University, writing under a pen name for the leftist journal, The Masses, and encouraging the farmers’ revolt at an agricultural school in Niigata prefecture. Assistant law professor, Yoshitar¯o Hirano (1897–1980) of Tokyo Imperial University, who vocally opposed the Peace Preservation Law and Waseda’s military research institute, went to Germany through a university arrangement to escape persecution. After his return in 1930, he was forced to resign from Tokyo Imperial University for his financial contributions to the JCP. Two famous leftist professors at Kyushu Imperial, Itsur¯o Sakisaka (1897–1985) and Hiroo Sassa (1897–1948) were forced to resign, not because they were connected with the JCP, but rather because they were “too left-wing.”104 As the number of arrests and forced resignations increased, the laws became more suppressive. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 was revised in 1928 to include the death penalty for anyone calling for alternatives to kokutai or guilty of insulting the imperial family.

2.8 The War and Thought Control The Manchurian Incident of 1931, in which the Kwantung Army (the largest group in the Imperial Japanese Army) attacked the Chinese garrison at Mukden (now Shenyang) and ignited Sino-Japanese hostilities, further narrowed the spectrum of what could be construed as patriotic in Japan and intensified intolerance of dissent. Militarist influence on Japan’s domestic and foreign policy increased. Young military officers, who considered themselves true guardians of kokutai, planned several coups d’état. Although their attempts failed with regime change, they succeeded in assassinating several prominent political and financial leaders. These coups incited a sense of perpetual crisis among the Japanese authorities, which allowed the militarists to hold the decisive voice in the country’s destiny. The government, now dominated

103

Bernstein, Japanese Marxist, 145–154. Tachibana, Nihon ky¯osant¯o no kenky¯u, vol. 1, 228; Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 54–58; Bernstein, Japanese Marxist, 145; Marshall, Academic Freedom, 133–135, 184. 104

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by military cliques, grew vicious toward dissidents. Ultranationalist military officers and politicians denounced the liberal professors at Tokyo and Kyoto Imperial Universities, which were considered breeding grounds for undesirable students. For instance, Muneki Minoda (1894–1946) of the ultranationalist journal, The Principle of Japan, criticized liberal professors bitterly in the journal and played a key role behind the notorious Takigawa Incident. In October 1932, Kyoto Imperial University law professor Yukitoki Takigawa (1891–1962) delivered a lecture at Ch¯uo¯ University in Tokyo entitled, “Tolstoy’s Concept of Punishment as it Appeared in Resurrection.” He stated that a society should not treat its criminals vengefully but rather investigate the root cause of the crimes as such understanding could reveal remedies more effective than harsh punishment. It was reported to the prosecutor-general that Takigawa’s speech was made to defend Communist Party members and attack the government. The Justice Minister duly informed the Education Minister, Ichir¯o Hatoyama (1883– 1959),105 who promised a further investigation. Hatoyama ordered Kyoto Imperial University President, Shigenao Konishi (1875–1948), to investigate further. Konishi spoke to the dean of the Law Department, who protested the government’s intrusion and assured him that Takigawa’s study was not dangerous. However, when the Diet reconvened, Takigawa’s book, Reader on Criminal Law, was attacked as leftist propaganda due to the pressure from the ultranationalists. This book and his Lecture on Criminal Law were banned. Konishi pleaded with Education Minister Hatoyama to wait for the opinion of competent professors before banning the books. However, in 1933 Hatoyama dismissed Takigawa. In protest, all the law professors at Kyoto Imperial University, and Konishi, submitted their resignations. More than 3000 Kyoto Imperial University students (362 of whom were arrested) demonstrated in support of Takigawa against the ministry’s decision. On September 11, 1933, the second semester at Kyoto Imperial University began without students in the Department of Law. These protests were dramatic, yet did not change the minister’s decision. The Education Ministry accepted the resignations of 21 faculty members. Known as the Takigawa Incident, this was the only case in which the independence of an imperial university was compromised by political power in pre-war Japan.106 Later, when Hatoyama was to become Prime Minister in 1946, MacArthur vetoed the nomination due to Hatoyama’s direct involvement in this affair. During the Occupation of Japan (1945– 1952), Japanese academics fought to preserve their university autonomy against the US attempts to reform university administration. In July 1935, while the Japanese government tightened its thought-control laws and persecuted “dangerous” professors, the Comintern announced its adoption of a new, less antagonistic strategy of cooperating with non-communists to stop the spread of fascism at its 7th congress. It called for a united front with moderate socialists (reformists), liberals, and other political forces that resisted fascism and aggression. This Popular Front policy was a radical departure from the Comintern’s 105

Ichir¯o Hatoyama was the grandfather of former Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama (1947-). Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 60–63; Suh, “The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945,” 171–172; Tachibana, Tenn¯o to t¯odai, vol. 2, 55–56.

106

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earlier opposition to “all bourgeois and capitalist governments.”107 This policy shift gave the Japanese government an additional justification for suppressing moderate labor parties.108 Between December 1937 and February 1938, more than 400 activists of the Labor-Farmer Party were arrested in the so-called Popular Front Incident. They were accused of being involved in a Comintern-inspired conspiracy against Japanese military actions in China. In 1938, over 30 teachers and professors were arrested for ¯ their association with the Labor-Farmer Party. Among those arrested were Ouchi, Hiromi Arisawa (1896–1988), and Yoshitar¯o Wakimura (1900–1997), all from the Economics Department of Tokyo Imperial University. A group of right-leaning ¯ professors at Tokyo Imperial University demanded Ouchi’s immediate dismissal. The prosecutor-general recommended his suspension and the university complied. ¯ Ouchi was indicted and formally suspended from teaching. Even after the court ruled on his innocence in 1944, he was forced to resign.109 Sano of Waseda University joined the JCP in 1922 and rose to the Central Committee the following year. Sadachika Nabeyama (1901–1979) was a laborer who had only secondary education. Like Sano, however, he became involved in the JCP and became a Japanese delegate to the Comintern in 1926. When the two men were arrested for their revolutionary activities in 1929, they tried to use their joint public trial as a forum for the JCP propaganda. They were sentenced to life imprisonment in October 1932. In June 1933, Nabeyama and Sano publicly recanted their communist affiliations. No information is available as to the reason for their recantation.110 A massive wave of the so-called tenk¯o (conversion) followed. By 1940, almost everyone associated with the left-wing movement renounced their communist ties to survive. However, several hundred communists, a fraction of the original party membership, resisted and maintained their opposition to the imperial government.111 During the Asia–Pacific War, some communists sought refuge in the Soviet Union or Communist-controlled areas of China. Those who remained in Japan were captured and either tortured to death or held in solitary confinement until MacArthur released the survivors in October 1945.

107

Harold J. Goldberg, s.v. “Popular Front Policy,” in Encyclopedia.com, https://www.encycl opedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/popular-front-policy (accessed April 3, 2022). 108 Steinhoff, “Tenk¯ o,” 243. 109 Marshall, Academic Freedom, 163–165, 205; Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 7475; Suh, “The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945,” 195. 110 Germaine A. Hoston, “Emperor, Nation, and the Transformation of Marxism to National Socialism in Prewar Japan: The Case of Sano Manabu,” Studies in Comparative Communism 18, no. 1 (1985): 26. 111 Hoston, “Emperor, Nation, and the Transformation of Marxism to National Socialism in Prewar Japan: The Case of Sano Manabu,” 26.

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2.8.1 Education During the War On July 7, 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident near Beijing triggered a large-scale war between China and Imperial Japan (the Second Sino-Japanese War), which created an atmosphere of national crisis in Japan and helped the government further tighten its thought control. Japanese academics realized that any discussion regarding freedom was detrimental to their safety. Silence was accepted, acquiescence was encouraged, and support for kokutai was rewarded. In 1937, the Education Ministry published the Cardinal Principles of the National Polity, which was the government’s effort to clarify any ambiguities about kokutai, the state structure unique to Japan as embodied in the imperial institution. The fundamental message of the text was that Japan prospered because it was blessed with a divine origin, divine leadership, and divine characteristics. The Education Ministry delivered copies of the book to every educational institution, from primary schools to universities. The Tokyo and Kyoto Imperial Universities established a new course named “Kokutai—Japanese Spirit.” In addition, a text published in 1940, Divine Message, portrayed the emperor as the descendant of god.112 After Japan started the war in the Pacific in 1941, compulsory military drills were introduced in schools. Elementary schools were called National People’s Schools and were intended to train subjects for the empire, with graduates required to attend youth schools to acquire vocational skills. When the tide turned in the war against Japan, mobilizing university students and evacuating schoolchildren to the countryside became mandatory. The schools encouraged young students to sacrifice themselves for the emperor’s wishes, teaching them that death for the emperor was the most honorable sacrifice for the Japanese people.113

Appendix: Imperial Rescript on Education Imperial Rescript on Education Know ye, Our subjects: Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; 112

Hoston, “Emperor, Nation, and the Transformation of Marxism to National Socialism in Prewar Japan,” 26; Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi, 90; Yoko H. Thakur, “History Textbook Reform in Allied Occupied Japan, 1945–52,” in Education and Schooling in Japan since 1945, ed. Edward R. Beauchamp (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 23. 113 Shimbori, s.v. “Modern Education” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2.

References

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bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may thus attain to the same virtue. The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meiji [October 30, 1890]114

References Amano, Ikuo. 1979. Continuity and Change in the Structure of Japanese Higher Education. In Changes in the Japanese University: A Comparative Perspective, eds. William K. Cummings, Ikuo Amano, Kazuyuki Kitamura, 107–26. New York: Praeger Publishers. Arima, Tatsuo. 1969. The Failure of Freedom: A Portrait of Modern Japanese Intellectuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ¯ Beckmann, George M., and Toshiaki Okubo. 1969. The Japanese Communist Party 1922–1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bernstein, Gail Lee. 1977. Japanese Marxist: A Portrait of Kawakami Hajime, 1879–1946. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Carlile, Lonny E. 2005. Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Center for East Asian Cultural Studies. 1972. Meiji Japan through Contemporary Sources, vol. 3. Tokyo: The Center for East Asian Cultural Studies. de Bary, Wm. Theodore, Donald Keene, and Ryusaku Tsunoda eds. 1964. Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press. First published 1958. Duus, Peter. 1998. Modern Japan, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Earhart, H. Byron. 2014. Religion in Japan: Unity and Diversity, 5th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning. Ezaki, Michio. 2017. Comintern no b¯oryaku to nihon no haisen (Comintern: Conspiracy and Japan’s defeat). Tokyo: PHP Shinsho. Frédéric, Louis. 2005. Japan Encyclopedia. Translated by Kathe Roth. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Gluck, Carol. 1985. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hardacre, Helen. 1989. Shinto and the State, 1868–1988. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hobday, Charles. 1986. Communist and Marxist Parties of the World. London: Longman Group Limited. Horio, Teruhisa. 1988. Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan: State Authority and Intellectual Freedom. Translated by Steven Platzer. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

114

Japan Ministry of Education, translated by Japan Ministry of Education, “Imperial Rescript on Education (1890),” quoted in de Bary et al., eds., Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2, 139.

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Hoston, Germaine A. 1985. Emperor, Nation, and the Transformation of Marxism to National Socialism in Prewar Japan: The Case of Sano Manabu. Studies in Comparative Communism 18 (1): 25–47. Hoston, Germaine A. 1986. Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ikazaki, Akio. 1965. Daigaku no jichi no rekishi (History of university autonomy). Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha. Reprint, Shin nihon shuppansha, 1969. Kobayashi, Tetsuya. 1976. Society, Schools, and Progress in Japan. Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd. Kumano, Ruriko. 2007. Academic Freedom and Autonomy: Walter C. Eells and the Red Purge in Universities during the Allied Occupation of Japan. PhD diss., University of Hawaii. Kumano, Ruriko. 2012. Japanese Professors Resist University Reforms During the U.S. Occupation. Japan Studies Review XVI: 51–74. Marshall, Byron K. 1982. Growth and Conflict in Japanese Higher Education, 1905–1930. In Conflict in Modern Japanese History: The Neglected Tradition, eds. Tetsuo Najita, and J. Victor Koschmann, 276–294. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Marshall, Byron K. 1992. Academic Freedom and the Japanese Imperial University, 1868–1939. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mitchell, Richard. 1976. Thought Control in Prewar Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Nagai, Michio. 1971. Higher Education in Japan: Its Takeoff and Crash. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Nishi, Toshio. 1982. Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945– 1952. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. ¯ Osaki, Hitoshi. 1999. Daigaku kaikaku 1945–1999 (University reforms). Tokyo: Y¯uhikaku. Scalapino, Robert A. 1967. The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. Berkeley: University of California Press. Shibata, Masako. 2005. Japan and Germany Under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Shillony, Ben-Ami. 1986. Universities and Students in Wartime Japan. The Journal of Asian Studies 45 (4): 769–787. Smith, Henry DeWill. 1972. Japan’s First Student Radicals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Steinhoff, Patricia G. 1969. Tenk¯o: Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. PhD diss., Harvard University. Suh, Doo Soo. 1952. The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities before 1945. PhD diss., Columbia University. Tachibana, Takashi. 1983. Nihon ky¯osant¯o no kenky¯u (Study of the Japanese Communist Party). 3 vols. Tokyo: K¯odansha. Tachibana, Takashi. 2005. Tenn¯o to t¯odai (Emperor and Tokyo Imperial University). 2 vols. Tokyo: Bungei shunj¯u. Thakur, Yoko H. 1998. History Textbook Reform in Allied Occupied Japan, 1945–52. In Education and Schooling in Japan since 1945, ed. Edward R. Beauchamp, 21–38. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. Westad, Odd Arne. 2017. The Cold War: A World History. New York: Basic Books.

Chapter 3

The GHQ’s Initial Reforms: The Dismantling of Japan

Early on the morning of December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Until then, American public opinion had been largely non-interventionist. However, the attack gave the US government a convincing reason to declare war on Japan and its real enemy, Nazi Germany. The US government was confident of its eventual victory over Japan and planned for the occupation of a defeated Japan as early as 1942.1 The US had fought alongside the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. In the Far East, the US needed Soviet military help to defeat Japan. US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945), who was pro-Soviet and had close advisors who were pro-communist, if not outright communist spies,2 worked out post-war arrangements with Soviet premier, Josef Stalin (1878–1953) at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Roosevelt secured a pledge from Stalin that once Germany was defeated, the Soviet Union would declare war against Japan with whom the Soviet Union had maintained a neutrality pact since April 1941. Stalin renounced the pact on April 5, 1945, however, technically, the treaty remained in force until April 1946.2 With the tide of the war turning against Japan, the Japanese government sent out peace feelers in July 1945, before the Potsdam Conference. The Japanese government desperately sought a guarantee from the Allied Powers that the emperor and the 1

Peter Duus, Modern Japan, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 256. These included Harry L. Hopkins (1890–1946), Roosevelt’s chief diplomatic adviser, originally from the Treasury Department, and Alger Hiss (1904–1996), director of the Office of Special Political Affairs in the State Department. [Hamilton Fish, Roosevelt no kaisen sekinin (FDR: The Other Side of the Coin; How We Were Tricked into World War II), trans. Souki Watanabe (Tokyo: S¯oshisha, 2017), 340 and 349.] Both of them were suspected of being informers for the Soviet Union as revealed in the World War II Venona project. [John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: kaidoku sareta soren no ang¯o to supai katsud¯o (Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America), trans. Terumasa Nakanishi (Tokyo: PHP kenky¯usho, 2010), 462.] 2

2

U.S. Department of State, “Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan”: Top Secret “Agreement,” February 11, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1945Malta/d503 (accessed August 19, 2022). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_3

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Japanese imperial house would be retained because he was integral to Japan’s national character and the government feared that if the emperor was removed, Japan would become a communist country. Japanese ambassadors in Europe tried to convince the US that the retention of the emperor was the only way to avoid communism in Japan and the US and Japan shared common interests that opposed the Soviet Union.4 In drafting an ultimatum to Japan, Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson suggested to President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972), who took office upon Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, that a sentence be added, stating that “we [would] not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty”5 to increase the chances of the Japanese surrender. This was the basis for the ultimatum. Under Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew (1880–1965), who had been the US ambassador to Japan when the Pacific War broke out, understood Japanese politics well. Grew strongly recommended including a phrase, stating that “the constitutional monarchy [will] be maintained.”6 However, when the ultimatum was announced worldwide, Grew’s wording was not included.7 On July 26, 1945, the US, Britain, and China (under the Kuomintang) issued the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet Union was not included as it maintained the neutrality pact with Japan. The declaration demanded unconditional surrender, including the following terms: (1) elimination of “the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest,” (2) a complete dismantling of Japan’s war-making powers, and (3) removal of “all obstacles to the revival and strength[en]ing of democratic tendencies among Japanese people.” Freedom of speech, religion, and thought and respect for fundamental human rights shall be established.8 The Allied Powers urged the Japanese government to unconditionally surrender all forces or face “prompt and utter destruction.”9 The Potsdam Declaration did not specify the fate of the emperor. Japan chose to mokusatsu—a deliberately vague but significant word that literally means “kill by silence”—until the Allied Powers guaranteed the emperor’s safety. Between July 30 and August 2, when President Truman departed from Potsdam, the decision was made to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.10 Truman ordered the first atomic bomb to be dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, which killed 140,000 4

Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945– 1952 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 24–28; George H. Nash, ed. Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2011), 560–562. 5 Quoted in Nash. Freedom Betrayed, 561. 6 Nash. Freedom Betrayed, 561–562. 7 Nash. Freedom Betrayed, 561–562. 8 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), vol. 2, 413. 9 Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 413. 10 Nash, Freedom Betrayed, 564.

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people.11 At 11 p.m. on August 8, the Soviet Union handed the declaration of war to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow. The next day, one million Soviet troops crossed the Siberian border into Manchuria and butchered exhausted Japanese soldiers and unarmed civilians. Approximately half a million Japanese soldiers were captured as prisoners of war by the Soviet Union and were used as slave laborers in Siberia.12 On the same day, the Soviet troops invaded southern Karafuto (Sakhalin Island) and the US dropped a second atomic bomb; this time on Nagasaki, killing 74,000 people.13 On August 15, 1945, the Japanese people heard the emperor’s voice for the first time broadcast over the radio. He urged his loyal subjects to surrender. The Great Empire of Japan lost the Greater East Asia War, as Japan called the war with the Allied powers until SCAP banned the use of the term in December 1945. The vanquished nation was to be occupied by the Allied forces until the purposes outlined in the Potsdam Declaration were achieved. President Truman designated US Army General, Douglas MacArthur (1889– 1964) the SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). In addition, General MacArthur was to be responsible for Occupation forces in Okinawa and southern Korea and the US Army Forces in the Philippines and the Western and Mid-Pacific. As SCAP, he oversaw the non-military aspects, too, of the Occupation of Japan. The Occupation forces, composed primarily of troops from the Eighth Army of the US Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC) and the British Commonwealth Forces, performed non-military duties for SCAP, who had a staff of roughly 5500, composed of military and civilian sections. The civil section was divided into specific reform areas, such as the Government Section (GS) and the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE). While the GHQ in Tokyo issued orders to the Japanese government, military government (MG) units, operated by the Eighth Army, were responsible for ensuring that the local municipal government complied with SCAP orders. Taken together, the Occupation forces, including the MG, were called the GHQ or SCAP.14 On September 2, 1945, the Allied Occupation officially began as the Japanese delegates signed the document of surrender on the US battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Although the Allied Powers were to occupy Japan jointly, such cooperation was a façade from the beginning. On September 8, 1945, a week after the Occupation officially began, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to make no contact

11

The estimated death toll in Hiroshima is as of December 1945, according to Hiroshima city. The Japanese government’s official estimate of detained Japanese is 575,000 and the estimated death toll is 55,000. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan, “The Investigation on the Death Toll during the Internment in Siberia,” http://www.mhlw.go.jp/seisaku/2009/11/01.html (accessed August 19, 2022). 13 Cameron Carson, “Karafuto 1945: An Examination of the Japanese under Soviet Rule and Their Subsequent Expulsion” (2015), Honors Thesis, 2557, 7. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_ theses/2557 (accessed August 19, 2022); The estimated death toll in Nagasaki is as of December 1945, according to Nagasaki city. 14 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, “Introduction,” in History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan (1945 through 1951), 8. 12

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with the representatives of foreign governments without permission from the GHQSCAP.15 His directive was meant to sever all contact between the Japanese government and the other Allies, particularly the Soviet Union. Although, in principle, the Allied powers occupied Japan as a group, the US monopolized the Occupation by formulating policies independently. The other Allies resented the high-handedness of the US. The Soviet Union, in particular, demanded Soviet troops be allowed to occupy Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s islands. Great Britain, which had sent over 40,000 troops from the British Commonwealth as part of the Occupation force, demanded an equal share in the administration of the Occupation. However, MacArthur ignored these demands.16 To appease the Allies, the White House agreed in late December 1945 to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. The Far Eastern Commission would meet regularly in Washington to guide MacArthur in matters of basic policy. The Allied Council for Japan, comprising representatives from the US, the Soviet Union, China, and the British Commonwealth, would confer regularly in Tokyo to supervise MacArthur. However, fortunately for MacArthur, the bickering multinational policy-making bodies could not function well, allowing the US government to remain the sole policymaker. Whenever other Allies attempted to interfere with US policy, the US could cast its veto and when “urgent matters” arose in Japan, it could issue emergency “interim directives” without the consent of the Far Eastern Commission.17 In fact, “the US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” made public by President Truman on September 22, 1945, stated, “[I]n the event of any differences of opinion among them [the Allies], the policies of the United States will govern.”18 In essence, the US independently decided on the most critical policies of the Occupation. In effect, MacArthur was granted absolute power over Japan and used the Japanese government to rule the nation. The Japanese government, a mere conduit for SCAP’s reforms, had to comply as all of its actions were under the scrutiny of SCAP. MacArthur appointed the Prime Minister and approved the appointment of the cabinet members. Statements from the Prime Minister and other high officials during Diet sessions were translated into English in advance and had to be approved by the GS. All drafts of the Japanese government’s proposed bills were translated and circulated in the GS. If there were no objections, the GS officials approved the discussion of the bills during the Diet session.19

15

Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 35. Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 35; Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), xxix. 17 “Agreement of Foreign Ministers at Moscow on Establishing Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan,” December 27, 1945, in Political Reorientation of Japan, vol. 2, 421. 18 “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” August 29, 1945, in Political Reorientation of Japan, vol. 2, 423. 19 “Authority of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” in Political Reorientation of Japan, vol. 2, 427. 16

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3.1 The US Education Reform Policy20 The question of re-educating the fiercely militant Japanese population had long been discussed in the US. General MacArthur was well informed about the US government’s Occupation policy. “The US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC 150/4)” was prepared by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), approved by President Truman, and delivered to MacArthur through the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 6, 1945.21 The SWNCC was established in December 1944 to plan the political-military issues in the Occupations of the Axis powers following the end of World War II and achieve full integration of the US foreign policy. “The US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” defined the objectives of the Occupation: (1) to ensure that Japan would never again threaten the national security of neighboring Asian countries and the US and (2) to establish “a peaceful and responsible government” that should conform, as closely as may be possible, to the principles of democratic self-government, adding that “it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers” to impose any form of government upon Japan not supported by “the freely expressed will of the people.”22 The Occupation policy highlighted a reformist zeal aimed at democratization and demilitarization. According to the SWNCC’s mandate, MacArthur carried out, without delay, the primary tasks of demilitarizing and demobilizing the Japanese armed forces. Over six million soldiers and civilians were repatriated from Japan’s overseas colonies and territories. All remnants of the war machine were thoroughly destroyed. SCAP took steps to erase all military influences in Japanese society by suppressing right-wing activities.23 American policymakers believed that for Japan to become a peaceful and responsible member of the world community, it had to be transformed into a democratic nation; a change that required dismantling Japan’s pre-war system and its people’s beliefs. After Japan’s surrender, the SWNCC began the “Reorientation of the Japanese” project and started preparing a policy paper during the initial phase of the Occupation. The final version, Reorientation of the Japanese (SWNCC–162), was issued on January 8, 1946. This policy paper was dispatched to MacArthur on the same day and was established as the guideline for the CIE of the GHQ.24 As such, formal and 20

Part of this section is reproduced with permission from Educational Perspectives. [“The US Occupation and Japan’s New Democracy” by Ruriko Kumano, 2007. Educational Perspectives, Vol. 40, No. 1, 37–39, Copyright 2007 by Educational Perspectives.] 21 Henry Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947 (Westport, CT; Greenwood Press, 2003), 11 and 183 (note 92). 22 “The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Appendix A: 11 in SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 423. 23 Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 12. 24 A.J. McFarland, brigadier general, U.S.A., secretary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subject: Reeducation and Reorientation of the

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detailed policies regarding the re-education of the Japanese were given to MacArthur only after his major reforms had commenced in the so-called punitive phase of the Occupation. Due to the nature of the military occupation of Japan, MacArthur answered directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These policy documents defined only the principles and made no stipulations for specific actions. Therefore, MacArthur’s GHQ developed concrete reforms for Japan.25 MacArthur’s words and actions at the beginning of the Occupation were largely based on the recommendations from his staff. MacArthur’s devoted staff in Tokyo had an understanding of Japanese characteristics and how Japan should be reformed. The following section introduces one possible source of these ideas.

3.1.1 Bonner F. Fellers: “An Amateur Psychologist” Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers (1896–1973), one of MacArthur’s most trusted advisors, was an expert on Japanese psychology. Since 1943, Fellers had been MacArthur’s military secretary and the chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), which led the strategy of encouraging the Japanese armed forces and homeland population to accept surrender. Fellers was awarded an Oak Leaf Cluster instead of a second Distinguished Medal for contributing in a “marked degree to Japan’s surrender.”26 Fellers’ perception of Japanese traits during the war had a great impact on MacArthur and his subordinates who carried out the reforms in Japan.27 Fellers’ staff in the PWB led information, education, and religious reforms in the initial period of the Occupation when formal policies were yet to be finalized in Washington. Therefore, it is worthwhile to analyze Fellers’ understanding of the Japanese people and the role of education in Japan. Fellers first developed an interest in Japanese psychology when he attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas as an army captain in 1934–1935. He studied Japanese behavioral patterns and psychological traits to find ways to weaken the morale of Japanese soldiers and encourage them to Japanese People,” February 9, 1946, SM-4968 in United States, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for the Far East, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East (National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T1204, Roll 4). This final version was a result of many revisions since August 1945; Yuka Tsuchiya, Shinbei nihon no k¯ochiku: Amerika no tainichi j¯oh¯o ky¯oiku seisaku to nihon senry¯o (Constructing a pro-U.S. Japan: U.S. information and education policy and the occupation of Japan) (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2009), 77. 25 Justin Williams, “Completing Japan’s Political Reorientation, 1947–1952: Crucial Phase of the Allied Occupation,” American Historical Review 73, no. 5 (1968): 1455. 26 Standard-Times (New Bedford, MA), July 7–13, 1958, Bonner Frank Fellers Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. 27 John W. Dower called Fellers an “amateur psychologist” in John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), 280–281.

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surrender. Fellers’ studies culminated in the paper, “The Psychology of the Japanese Soldier.” In the summer of 1944, when MacArthur’s command initiated its attempts to persuade the Japanese to surrender, Fellers’ “Answer to Japan,” a revised version of his paper, was established as the necessary preamble to plan psychological warfare and used as an orientation guide for Allied intelligence personnel.28 In “Answer to Japan,” Fellers stated, “The real Japan is understood only by a study of her religious patriotism.” He argued that the Japanese indigenous religion, Shinto, was the most compelling spiritual force in Japan, capable of controlling people. To better understand the Japanese worldview, Fellers traced Japanese history from ancient times to explain the belief that the emperor was a direct descendent of the Sun Goddess. “Under the spell of Shinto,” Fellers wrote, the people became “innocent but devilish” tools of gangster militarists to plot world conquest. Patriotism and Shinto were inseparable, said Fellers. He further highlighted bushido, the samurai moral code. “Samurai teachings became the vehicle for the national faith” and loyalty until death was “the keystone of their code.” This loyalty to the emperor was instilled in the youth attending Japan’s schools through “the national bible,” The Way of the Subjects, issued by the Japanese Ministry of Education in 1941 to explain what was expected of the Japanese as a people, nation, and race. He concluded, “Outwardly modern, psychologically, Japan is medieval. Thus, for forty years Japan frantically developed her industry and intensified the moral training of her youth.”29 Fellers, nonetheless, said, “[T]he mystic hold the Emperor has on his people and the spiritual strength of the Shinto faith properly directed need not be dangerous. The Emperor can be made a force for good and peace provided Japan is totally defeated and the military clique destroyed.”30 Fellers surmised that it was not necessary to kill the emperor for Japan to become a peaceful nation. Kenneth “Ken” R. Dyke (1899–1980), an information and education officer in MacArthur’s wartime headquarters and, later, the first head of the CIE of the GHQ in occupied Japan, praised the “Answer to Japan.” Dyke issued a series of initial drastic reform directives in the name of SCAP. He stated that “Answer to Japan” was “one of the clearest, most graphic and interesting summations of the emotional and religious fervor which activates the Japanese.” Dyke argued that planning tactical operations would be difficult and that a peaceful settlement and a permanent post-war plan would not be possible without an understanding of the “psychological axioms” that Fellers’ analysis offered.31

28

Ken R. Dyke, Information and Education Officer, Headquarters USAFFE to G-1, GHQ, “Check Sheet—Subject on Psychological Warfare” May 28, 1944 Box 3, Bonner Frank Fellers Papers, Box 3, Hoover Institution Archives. 29 Bonner F. FellersFellers, Bonner F., General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area, “Answer to Japan,” July 1, 1944, 1, 3, 7, 11, Bonner Frank Fellers Papers, 1:1, Hoover Institution Archives. 30 Fellers, “Answer to Japan,” 23. 31 Ken R. Dyke, Information and Education Officer, Headquarters USAFFE to G-1, GHQ, “Check Sheet—Subject on Psychological Warfare,” May 28, 1944, Bonner Frank Fellers Papers, Box 3, Hoover Institution Archives.

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Less than a month before Japan’s surrender, Fellers’ PWB published a report on Japan’s education, entitled, “Youth: Pawn of the Militarists.” This report revealed how MacArthur’s staff understood Japan’s pre-war and wartime education system: In Japan…the school system had been geared to serve the military, political and economic ambitions of the military caste, the self-appointed guardians of millions of Shintoworshipping subjects….[I]t had been geared to…weld the people as a whole into a nation of robots, ready to die for the perpetuation of an anachronism – the system of Emperor worship.32

Further, the report quoted Daniel C. Holtom, a prominent expert on Shinto, “[p]sychological disarmament of Japan will be confronted by the fact that in the schools and other agencies of official propaganda there exists a definite Shinto education inimical to the peace of the world.”33 Holtom was the first to give serious attention to State Shinto. Holtom explained that Shinto, originally a cult lacking political significance, had been perverted by militarists and imbued prewar society with chauvinistic patriotism and unswerving loyalty to the emperor. Holtom’s view was highly influential in the Occupation’s understanding of Shinto. The GHQ tried to secure his services, however, his ill health prevented this.34 Based on Fellers’ understanding of Japanese psychology, the report explained that the goal of pre-war Japanese education was “the creation of the samurai mind in the millions of Japanese boys and young men” through the inculcation of the principles of bushido and teaching of military tactics and techniques. In addition, it stated, “The Minister of War leads the nation. The Minister of Education makes a nation that can be led [emphasis in the original].”35 It described the curriculum of morals and history as “the primary school medium for indoctrination” and said that “the myths of Japan, silly and ridiculous as they are, are taught as sober and uncontestable history, and the divinity of the emperor is proclaimed in no uncertain terms.”36 The report recommended the use of the Ministry of Education and its school system to achieve the Allied aims. It emphasized that it would be most convenient to use the school system, as “[i]t guides the principal activity of nearly 16 million

32

United States, Army Forces, Pacific, General Headquarters, Office of the Military Secretary, Psychological Warfare Branch, Collation Section, Inside Japan, “2. Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” Special Report No. 5, July 23, 1945, 1, Bonner Frank Fellers Papers, Box 13:16, Hoover Institution Archives. 33 Daniel C. Holtom, “Shinto in the Postwar World,” in Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, vol. 14, no. 3, February 14, 1945, quoted in Collation Section, Psychological Warfare Branch, OMS, GHQ, AFPAC, Inside Japan, “2. Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” Special Report No. 5, July 23, 1945, 14. 34 Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 1868–1988 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 6, 134–135. Mark Taylor Orr, chief of the Education Division of CIE, cited Holtom’s analysis on Shinto and its direct connection with State and education in his PhD dissertation. See Mark Taylor Orr, “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 1954), 3–4. 35 Inside Japan, “2. Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” 9. 36 Inside Japan, “2. Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” 5, 9, 10, and 13.

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students, some 400,000 teachers and about 190,000 priests, and controls…the principal means of indoctrination, not only of Japan’s intense nationalism, but also of civil obedience.”37 The report further mentioned that the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 was the “Bible” of the national cult whose purpose was to “clarify the moral foundations for the empire itself.”38 It quoted Willis C. Lamott, “In any reconstruction of Japan, following a disastrous defeat, the Rescript will be the first obstacles [sic] to be overcome.”39 As Fellers understood, the Japanese were infused with the samurai martial spirit based on indigenous religious Shinto beliefs and education was the tool used by the imperial government to breed subjects’ blind loyalty to militaristic and ultranationalist leaders. The report concluded that “the continued existence of the samurai attitude can only serve to impede reconstruction.”40 Although his description may have been rather simplistic and stereotypical, the underlying understanding concerning Japanese characteristics was, as discussed below, identical to those of the policymakers in Washington. At MacArthur’s headquarters in the Philippines, Fellers submitted a memorandum, dated August 15, 1945, suggesting the establishment of an Information Dissemination Section. This section was intended to (1) encourage cooperation from the Japanese, (2) assist in the orderly transition from war to peace, and (3) assist in removing the influence of militarism and “Japanese concepts which oppose democratic principles.”41 He recommended that trained personnel from his PWB run this section.42 On August 27, 1945, before leaving for Japan, MacArthur authorized the establishment of the section with Fellers as its chief.43 A New York Times editorial on August 27, 1945, commented on the prospects of the Occupation of Japan and stated that during the Meiji period the Japanese diligently learned and adopted the material civilization of the West, however, “[w]hat was completely overlooked or openly repudiated were all the moral and spiritual values of the West.” The editorial further stated that “[w]hether the Japanese can be taught to appreciate not merely the material but also the moral and spiritual values of the [W]est will depend to a large extent not only their fate, but also the

37

Inside Japan, “2. Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” 13. Inside Japan, “2. Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” 4. 39 Willis C. Lamott, Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan (New York: John Day Company, 1944), 147, quoted in Inside Japan, “2. Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” 15. 40 Inside Japan, “2. Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” 16. 41 Bonner F. FellersFellers, Bonner F., “Dissemination of Information in Japan,” August 15, 1945, Bonner Frank Fellers Papers, Box 13, Hoover Institution Archives. 42 Bonner F. FellersFellers, Bonner F., “Dissemination of Information in Japan,” August 15, 1945, Bonner Frank Fellers Papers, Box 13, Hoover Institution Archives. 43 Marlene J. Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Defeated Japan, 1943–1945,” in The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform, ed. Thomas W. Burkman (Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial, 1982), 8. 38

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ultimate fruits of our victory.”44 On that same day in Japan, a Nippon Times editorial suggested that the Japanese should follow the samurai spirit of bushido to cope with the humiliation of being occupied by a former enemy. The editorial quoted a Japanese master swordsman, Hiromichi Nakayama: In olden times the samurai never mouthed what was finished. He fought for all he was worth against the enemy, but once he owned defeat, the way of a true samurai was to love his enemy with greater love than before the fight….We must greet the Allied Army with just such a spirit.45

However, American troops approached Japan with a grand mission of eliminating bushido from the psyche of the Japanese people. MacArthur, as SCAP, landed in Japan. On September 2, onboard the US battleship Missouri, Japan and the Allied Powers signed the instrument of surrender. MacArthur addressed the American people: We stand in Tokyo today reminiscent of our countryman, Commodore Perry, ninety-two years ago. His purpose was to bring to Japan an era of enlightenment and progress, by lifting the veil of isolation to the friendship, trade, and commerce of the world. But alas the knowledge thereby gained of Western science was forged into an instrument of oppression and human enslavement.46

In addition, the US government stressed the spiritual component of disarming Japan. When Japan surrendered, US Secretary of State, Byrnes announced, “[T]he physical disarmament of Japan is now proceeding… [T]he second phase, spiritual disarmament of the people to make them want peace instead of war was difficult… [W]e shall have to eliminate ultranationalistic and totalitarian teachings in schools.”47 It was in this context that the “reorientation of the Japanese” took place. Despite these clear messages from the US, the Japanese government refused to face the harsh reality of unconditional surrender. On August 15, 1945, Prime Minister, Kantar¯o Suzuki announced that Japan had accepted the surrender under one condition—that the emperor would continue to rule Japan. Accordingly, Education ¯ issued special instructions to prefectural governors and school Minister, K¯oz¯o Ota principals, stating that people should devote their hearts and souls to “guarding the fundamental character of the Japanese Empire” as only such an attitude would show fidelity to the emperor.48 Two days after Japan’s surrender, on August 17, 1945, Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni (1887–1990, uncle of Emperor Hirohito), the first post-war Prime

44

“N.Y. Times Comments on the Future of Japan: Says Appreciation of Moral, Spiritual Values of West will Be Decisive Factor,” Nippon Times, August 31, 1945. 45 “People Urged to Display Great Spirit of Bushido: Must Face Coming of Allied Troops with Dignity and Broadmindedness,” Nippon Times, August 28, 1945. 46 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 276. 47 Nippon Times, September 5, 1945; Asahi Shimbun, September 4, 1945, 1. 48 “Instructions Are Issued by Education Ministry,” Nippon Times, August 18, 1945.

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Minister, formed a cabinet and appointed Tamon Maeda (1884–1962) the first post-war Education Minister.49 Prime Minister Higashikuni declared that his cabinet’s mission was threefold— to maintain national polity (kokutai), comply with the Potsdam Declaration, and observe the Imperial Rescript on Surrender proclaimed by Emperor Hirohito on the radio on August 15, 1945.50 The Imperial Rescript on Surrender stated: Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it….foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the innate glory of the imperial state and keep pace with the progress of the world.51

The Rescript, the emperor’s wish for his subjects, served as the fundamental policy for the post-war Japanese government. Education Minister Maeda, at a press conference on August 18, 1945 said that the “foundation of Japanese education cannot exist without the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education and the 1945 Imperial Rescript on Surrender.” He hoped to solve Japan’s future educational problems by translating these imperial rescripts into concrete policies.52 While the Japanese government attempted to maintain social cohesion by trying to preserve kokutai and the people’s loyalty to the emperor, MacArthur planned to eliminate both.

3.1.2 The US Plan: “Reorientation of the Japanese” The US Occupation policymakers believed that education reform was the key to democratizing Japan. Since the end of August 1945, the SWNCC had been preparing a policy paper on Japanese reorientation. The outcome was the policy paper, “Reorientation of the Japanese,” dated January 8, 1946, and reviewed and approved on February 9, 1946, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.53 According to this policy paper, the following Japanese ideologies required changes: 49 “Mr. Maeda Tamon, as Education Minister” (author’s translation), Asahi Shimbun, August 19, 1945. 50 Prime Minister Higashikuni’s press interview in Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 1945. 51 “Imperial Rescript,” quoted in “His Majesty Issues Rescript to Restore Peace,” Nippon Times, August 30, 1945. 52 Asahi Shimbun, August 19, 1945. 53 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “Reorientation of the Japanese,” January 8, 1946; SWNCC 162/2 Copy No. 7, “Appendix ‘A’—Facts Bearing on the Problem,” 11; A.J. McFarland, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Secretary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum for the State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee, Subject: Re-education and Reorientation of the Japanese People,” February 9, 1946, SM-4968 in United States, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for the Far East, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East (National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T1204, Roll 4).

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(a) The persistence of feudal concepts, including class stratification, the glorification of the military, and a habit of subservience to authority. (b) A belief in the superior qualifications of the Japanese for world leadership is closely connected with the cult of emperor worship fostered in recent years by the military to serve their purposes. (c) Extreme racial consciousness and an anti-foreign complex, which is often combined with great admiration for foreign achievements and learning.54 The process of reorientation included information control and drastic educational and religious reforms. Unlike other aspects of the Occupation, control of information and educational and religious reforms was to be a long-term project. Nevertheless, the groundwork for reorientation had to be laid within the first few months of the Occupation when the Japanese were still reeling from defeat and suffering from a loss of faith in their leaders.55 American policymakers understood that the purpose of Japan’s pre-war education was to foster nationalism, loyalty to the emperor, and subordination of the individual to the state. The US State Department called the Japanese education system “a means of indoctrinating students and teachers with the ideology of aggressive nationalism.”56 Hence, the militaristic and nationalistic educational practices needed to be abolished. The reform had the following objectives: (1) outlawing nationalistic and militaristic ideology, (2) establishing academic freedom, (3) encouraging democratic principles, (4) removal of militaristic and nationalistic teachers and administrators, (5) encouraging democratically-inclined teachers and support for the formation of teachers’ associations, and (6) changes in the hierarchical administration of educational institutions.57 To this end, the CIE, headed by Colonel Dyke, initiated reforms and supervised education, religion, and the media.58 The CIE intended to use every available channel, including radio, newspapers, books, and movies, to reach the minds of the Japanese. School education reform was seen as the primary tool to prevent the youth from harmful pre-war ideologies and promote ideological changes.59 However, US policymakers emphasized the importance of the Japanese initiative in reform. They wanted to supply ideas and incentives alone. The logic was that if the 54

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “Reorientation of the Japanese,” January 8, 1946; SWNCC 162/2 Copy No. 7, “Appendix ‘B’—Discussion,” 14. 55 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “Reorientation of the Japanese,” January 8, 1946; SWNCC 162/2 Copy No. 7, “Appendix ‘B’—Discussion,” 17. 56 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, File 097.3 Z1092 no. 4119S, Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” December 9, 1946, iii, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Post War Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington DC: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc., 1977). 57 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, File 097.3 Z1092 no. 4119S, Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” December 9, 1946, iv. 58 SCAP, CIE, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1948), 58. 59 . State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “Reorientation of the Japanese,” January 8, 1946; SWNCC 162/2 Copy No. 7, “Appendix ‘B’—Discussion,” 15–16.

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US imposed its reforms on the Japanese, the Japanese may adopt superficial forms of alien attitudes and ideologies without any real understanding of the fundamental philosophies. They anticipated that there would be liberal Japanese who had been oppressed by the wartime government and would be willing to accept US reforms and assist in the development of Occupation objectives. Therefore, the first task of reform was to seek out such liberals, ensure that they were placed in key positions, and offer them counsel, guidance, and support.60

3.1.3 Education Minister Maeda Begins His Reforms During the first few months of the Occupation, the GHQ let the Ministry of Education initiate reforms “unless and until this prove[d] to be ineffective or insincere.”61 Maeda recalled: For about a month following my appointment as Minister of Education, we were permitted a comparatively free hand, with a minimum of restraints being employed, due largely to the fact that the Occupation authorities themselves had at this time not yet completely established their own policy.62

Soon after the Occupation began, Fellers, who oversaw education as the Chief of the Information Dissemination Section, requested a meeting with Maeda to understand the reforms that Maeda planned to institute in education. Maeda informed that he wished to establish civics education throughout the compulsory grades and higher grades and added that, unfortunately, there was no exact translation for civics in Japanese. Fellers agreed to this and provided his consent. With that, the meeting ended and Maeda moved to execute his reform policy.63 On September 15, 1945, Maeda issued the “Educational Plan for Building the New Japan,” the first comprehensive policy on Japanese education, which reflected

60

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “Reorientation of the Japanese,” January 8, 1946; SWNCC 162/2 Copy No. 7, “Appendix ‘B’—Discussion,” 14–15; SCAP, CIE, Education in the New Japan, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1948), 136–137; Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, File 097.3 Z1092 no. 4119S, Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, December 9, 1946, 59. 61 Arundel Del Re and M.A. Piacentini to SCAP, GHQ, CIE, “Preliminary Report on Measures Pertaining to the Cultural Re-education of Japan,” October 3, 1945, 1; Box 20, Joseph C. Trainor Papers, Hoover Institution. A CIE report stated that “directives are used only when it is judged that Japanese efforts are out of line with or controvert general Occupational policies,” SCAP, CIE, Education in the New Japan, vol. 1, 136. 62 Tamon Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” Japan Quarterly 3, no. 4 (1956): 415. 63 Tamon Maeda, “Seiji to minshushugi” (Politics and democracy), in Maeda Tamon: sono bun, sono hito (Tamon Maeda’s writings and personality) (Tokyo: Kank¯o sewanin daihy¯o Horikiri Zenjir¯o, 1963), 100–101; Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” 417.

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both the Japanese cabinet’s policy and his ideas for post-war Japan.64 It preceded all SCAP directives on Japanese education reform and the birth of the CIE in the GHQ. The main policies were (1) maintenance of the structure of the Imperial State, (2) compliance with the Imperial Rescript on Surrender, (3) promotion of scientific education, (4) creation of a peaceful state by eliminating all militaristic thoughts, (5) construction of a new ethical Japan through the cultivation of religious sensibilities, and (6) improvement of culture through a comprehensive program of adult education.65 Maeda reemphasized the importance of preserving kokutai, stating that efforts will be made to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State.66 Indeed, on September 9, 1945, he gave a speech, broadcast on the radio, in which he stated, “The real strength of Japan’s national polity was revealed at the end of the war: Once the emperor called for stopping the war, the Japanese followed the emperor’s order despite differences in opinion. Thus, the most important thing we have to keep in mind is to guard our kokutai.”67 He lamented that the “recent moral decay [among the Japanese people] had to be remedied by our sincere obedience to the Rescript of Education”68 as it claimed that a harmonious relationship among the people and their loyalty to the emperor were the most important virtues for happiness and the prosperity of Japan.

3.1.4 Maeda as a Liberal The US State Department officials trusted Maeda as a liberal and expected him to carry out radical reforms in keeping with American objectives. Charles A. Beard (1874–1948), a prominent historian, wrote a letter to President Truman’s White House Secretary on August 19, 1945, in which he mentioned his 1922 meeting with Maeda in Japan and praised Maeda as “a friend of the US,” suggesting that the liaison officer between MacArthur’s staff and the Ministry of Education obtain information about Maeda’s character and history. The White House forwarded the letter to the State Department and the War Department. As it turned out, the GHQ’s first chief education officer, Harold Henderson, was well acquainted with Maeda. Before the war, Maeda had been director of the Japan Institute and the Japanese Cultural Library 64

Japan, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Research and Statistics Division, Minister’s Secretariat, Japan’s Modern Educational System: A History of the First Hundred Years (Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance, 1980), 226; Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” 415. 65 “Big Education Reforms Are Decided by Ministry: Wide Reconstruction Plan Contemplated to Promote Peace and Knowledge,” Nippon Times, September 16, 1945. 66 “Big Education Reforms Are Decided by Ministry: Wide Reconstruction Plan Contemplated to Promote Peace and Knowledge,” Nippon Times, September 16, 1945. 67 Asahi Shimbun, September 10, 1945; Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, 67–74 (author’s translation). 68 Quoted in Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 148.

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in New York, where Henderson, a professor of Japanese at Columbia University, was a frequent visitor. During the war, Henderson had been a propaganda specialist and was a member of Fellers’ leaflet executive committee in the Southwest Pacific campaigns. Fellers assigned Henderson the task of establishing contact with his pre-war Japanese friends.69 Soon after Maeda’s educational policies were publicized on September 15, Henderson, now chief of the GHQ’s Educational Section, informed Maeda that Henderson himself would be a liaison between the Ministry of Education and the GHQ. Referring to the newspaper accounts of Maeda’s plan, Henderson encouraged Maeda to continue his work in the same direction as the GHQ did not intend to issue directives on education, rather wanted to handle everything through personal conferences between the two of them.70 On September 22, 1945, the Information Dissemination Section was reorganized as the CIE. Colonel (soon to be Brigadier General) Dyke was appointed the head of the CIE and put Henderson in-charge of the Division of Education, Religion, and Monuments. Dyke and Henderson preferred to work behind the scenes with Maeda whom Henderson trusted to take the proper initiatives as a liberal. Henderson told Maeda the goals of SCAP and the US government for the schools and asked him to make appropriate decisions. Maeda continued with this leeway until the first directive on education was issued in late October 1945.71 Meanwhile, in the US, the New York Times reported on the re-education of Japan and stated that the effort “to convert this nation… from a totalitarian war machine to a peacefully-inclined democracy is not an overnight step.” The article described various activities that Henderson had implemented, such as removing essays and parables that had indoctrinated Japanese youth “with the bushido spirit” from textbooks.72 In an interview, Henderson stated, “Our job is not to tell the Japanese what to do… We hope that democratic re-education of Japan will be an indigenous growth on a new soil of freedom and liberalism.” In addition, he explained why, in his view, it was difficult for the Japanese to adjust to new democratic concepts: Japan lacks many things that we take for granted. They had no foundation in Greek logic; therefore, they don’t think logically. They have had no Roman law, therefore the contract that would mean one thing to the American means something else entirely to the Japanese. They have never had either Christian philosophy or democratic practice.73

69

Marlene Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Defeated Japan, 1943–1945,” 116, note 79; Tamon Maeda, Sans¯o seishi (Tamon Maeda’s memoir) (Tokyo: Hata shoten, 1947), 216; Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” 415. 70 Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” 415. 71 Orr, “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan,” 82, 200; Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 84–85, 91. 72 “Re-Education of Japan Said Long-Term Project” (from the New York Times), Nippon Times, September 28, 1945. 73 “Re-Education of Japan Said Long-Term Project” (from the New York Times), Nippon Times, September 28, 1945.

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Henderson, while critical of the Japanese people’s lack of understanding of American customs, conveyed hope that “[t]hey are capable of absorbing these things, as witness our own Nisei.”74 Soon the gap between what the GHQ wanted to change in Japan and what the Japanese government hoped to preserve became apparent. Throughout the Occupation, the US definition of “liberal Japanese” was unclear. Immediately after the surrender, a clear majority of Japanese continued to accept the emperor as the head of the nation, except for communists who had been imprisoned for criticizing the emperor system in public. For the imperial Japanese government, communism was the anathema to the emperor system and capitalist economy. Furthermore, it was a virulently infectious ideology of the treacherous Soviet Union. However, an ironic twist of fate assaulted the GHQ—if the US wanted real liberals, MacArthur would have to free the Japanese communists who had fought militarism from prison, which is what eventually happened. On October 4, 1945, SCAP issued the Civil Liberties Directive and ordered the Japanese government to abrogate the laws that restricted “freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.”75 In addition, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to release political prisoners, most of whom were staunch socialists or communists, labeled by the Japanese government as destroyers of kokutai. This directive paralyzed the Higashikuni Cabinet. The next day, the entire cabinet resigned, as it failed to meet the Allied demands.76 The Japanese government needed to find leaders who could work in harmony with SCAP and understand their expectations. Existing Japanese leaders proposed that Kijuro Shidehara, a 73-year-old former foreign minister known to be a pacifist, become the next Prime Minister. MacArthur approved the recommendation that Shidehara forms a cabinet in which Maeda remained the Education Minister as he was considered a political liberal.77 The new cabinet declared that democratic politics be established. This was the Japanese government’s first use of the term “democracy.” Shidehara stated that Japanese politics had respected the people’s will, as evidenced in the first provision of the Charter Oath of 1868, in which Emperor Meiji declared the basic policy of the newly established nation, “Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion.”78 Shidehara added

74

“Re-Education of Japan Said Long-Term Project” (from the New York Times), Nippon Times, September 28, 1945. 75 Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 463–465. 76 Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 16. 77 Department of State, Interim Research & Intelligence, Research and Analysis Branch, File 097.3 Z1092, No. 3274, “Analysis of Shidehara Cabinet,” October 12, 1945, 1, 5, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia; “Baron Shidehara Gets Imperial Command to Organize Cabinet,” Nippon Times, October 7, 1945. 78 “The Charter Oath,” in Wm Theodore de Bary et al., eds., Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2 (1958; reis., New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 137.

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that “based on this spirit of the Charter Oath, the Japanese government aimed to establish democratic politics by respecting people’s basic rights and restoring freedom of speech, assembly, and association.”79 Maeda started to use the word democracy, however, made it clear that “sovereignty resides in His Majesty. We, the loyal subjects, have been allowed to participate in the governing of the empire… This is the special nature of Japanese-style democracy.”80 In Maeda’s Japanese-style democracy, We must respect our indigenous values – loyalty and patriotism. These values will be truly fulfilled with the development and perfection of democracy, which is based on respect for individuality. It seems as if loyalty, patriotism, and democracy are incompatible, but they actually reinforce one another. Democratic education has to be based on Japanese indigenous culture.81

Maeda’s concept of democracy was a desperate attempt to hold on to imperial rule while complying with the Allied demand for popular sovereignty and power. One week after the issue of the Civil Liberty Directive, MacArthur demanded specific reforms from the Shidehara Cabinet. Aiming at education, MacArthur demanded schools to be open to a more liberal education system, allowing people to shape their future progress based on factual knowledge and realize that the government is the people’s servant rather than the master.82 MacArthur’s demand indicated that Maeda’s Japanese-style democracy, in which the emperor was the ruler, was far from the American-style democracy of popular sovereignty. The Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch of the State Department scrutinized Maeda’s reforms in a report dated October 5, 1945. Maeda’s reforms had three areas of focus—(1) preservation of national polity, (2) expansion of scientific education, and (3) elimination of military training and wartime doctrines. Although appealing words, such as science, non-military, and peace were integral to Maeda’s reform policy, the R&A dismissed his gesture as “only the use of other expressions to describe the same situation.”83 In addition, they questioned that if he truly intended to change education, why had he not yet proposed a plan to revise the courses in Japanese ethics and history by eliminating the doctrines that were “the backbone of nationalist education”?84 The R&A concluded that Japanese policymakers would continue to perpetuate the 79 “Prime Minister Shidehara Declared His Administrative Policies,” Asahi Shimbun, October 10, 1945. 80 Maeda’s speech on October 15, 1945, in Sengo nihon ky¯ oiku shiry¯o sh¯usei hensh¯u iinkai, ed., Sengo nihon ky¯oiku shiry¯o sh¯usei (Historical materials on postwar Japan’s education) vol. 1 (Tokyo: Sanichi shob¯o, 1982), 123. 81 Maeda, Sans¯ o seishi, 40. 82 SCAP, “Statement to the Japanese Government Concerning Required Reforms,” October 11, 1945, in Political Reorientation of Japan, vol. 2, 741. 83 United States, Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence, Research and Analysis Branch, File 097.3 Z1092, No. 3266, “Japanese Post-War Education Policies,” October 5, 1945, 3 in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Post War Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. 84 United States, Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence, Research and Analysis Branch, File 097.3 Z1092, No. 3266, “Japanese Post-War Education Policies,” October 5, 1945, 3.

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philosophy of militant nationalism, to the detriment of American policy, and feared that a conservative view would be a formidable obstacle to freedom of education and the elimination of the “religio-nationalist interpretation of Japanese mythology and the glorification of militarism” from educational curricula.85 It recommended the use of external pressures or the force of combined student-faculty demands to facilitate real change.86 Henderson visited Maeda in mid-October and told him, “The other day… we agreed to let everything connected with education be carried out by conferences between us but Washington now says that such a casual arrangement will never do.”87 With apologies, Henderson showed an outline of a directive that was to be issued. On October 22, 1945, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to reinstate teachers and educational officials who had been dismissed for their liberal or anti-militaristic opinions and prohibited discrimination against students, teachers, or educational officials on grounds of “race, nationality, creed, political opinion, or social position.” SCAP encouraged students and teachers to engage in “free and unrestricted discussion of issues involving political, civil, and religious liberties.”88 In compliance, on November 1, 1945, Maeda instructed presidents of universities, colleges, and high schools to reinstate liberal teachers who had been forced to resign before and during World War II for their dangerous thoughts. Yukitoki Takigawa, who had been dismissed from Kyoto Imperial University in 1933, was the first professor to be reinstated.89 On October 30, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to remove all persons “who [were] known to be militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, or antagonistic to the objectives and policies of the Occupation” from the educational system.90

85

United States, Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence, Research and Analysis Branch, File 097.3 Z1092, No. 3266, “Japanese Post-War Education Policies,” October 5, 1945, 3. 86 United States, Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence, Research and Analysis Branch, File 097.3 Z1092, No. 3266, “Japanese Post-War Education Policies,” October 5, 1945, 3–4. 87 Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” 415. 88 GHQ, CIE, AG 350, “Administration of the Educational System of Japan,” October 22, 1945, in SCAP, CIE, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2, 27. 89 GHQ, SCAP, CIE, Education Division, “Digests of the More Important Ministry of Education Orders and Directives Issued Since the End of the War,” May 10, 1946, i; Box 43, Joseph C. Trainor Papers, Hoover Institution Archives. 90 SCAP, CIE, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2, 29–30.

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3.2 The US Launches the Spiritual Disarmament of the Japanese91 In November 1945, MacArthur received The Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper, dated November 3, a secret military directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.92 One section directly referred to the removal of ultranationalistic ideology: The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda in any form will be prohibited and completely suppressed. You will require the Japanese Government to cease financial and other support of National Shinto establishment.93

On December 15, 1945, MacArthur ordered State Shinto to be abolished to separate religion from the state and prevent the misuse of religion for political ends, and prohibited the dissemination of Shinto doctrines and other religions “in any form and by any means” in any educational institution supported by public funds.94 The circulation of “The Cardinal Principles of Kokutai” (Kokutai no Hongi) published by the Ministry of Education in 1937, was prohibited. Brigadier General Dyke, Chief of the CIE, who drafted this Shinto directive, said in a statement to the Japanese press that the Shinto directive liberated the people from compulsory support of an ideology “which has contributed to their war guilt, defeat, suffering, privation, and the present deplorable condition.”95 Accordingly, the Ministry of Education complied with the Shinto directive, with one exception—the prohibition on shrine worship did not explicitly include the Imperial Palace, therefore, pupils and teachers continued to line up and bow in the palace’s direction.96 This deliberate flouting of SCAP’s directives accelerated the severity of the reforms.

91

Part of this section is reproduced with permission from Educational Perspectives. [“The US Occupation and Japan’s New Democracy” by Ruriko Kumano, 2007. Educational Perspectives, Vol. 40, No. 1, 39–40. Copyright 2007 by Educational Perspectives.] 92 MacArthur had received a draft version of this directive in August 1945. See Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 76. 93 Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS 1380/15, 3 November 1945), in Appendix A:13 in SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 432. 94 SCAP Directive, “Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto (Kokka Shinto, Jinja Shinto),” paragraph 1 h, paragraph 2a in SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 467. 95 “Control by State of Shinto Religion Ordered Abolished: Directive Issued by MacArthur Frees Japanese From Compulsory Belief,” Nippon Times, December 17, 1945, 2. 96 “Digest,” December 22, 1945, in “Digests of the More Important Ministry of Education Orders and Directives Issued Since the End of the War,” May 10, 1946, 18; Box 43, Joseph C. Trainor Papers, Hoover Institution; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 171.

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On December 31, 1945, SCAP issued a directive that prohibited sh¯ushin (teaching morals), Japanese history, and geography in school until SCAP permitted their resumption.97 The next big blow came when Emperor Hirohito denied his divinity in his New Year’s address (the Imperial Rescript on January 1, 1946), referred to as the “Human Declaration,” although this rescript contained more. The following passage denied the emperor’s divinity: The ties between me and my people have always been formed by mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends or myths. Nor are they predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese are superior to other races and destined to rule the world.98

After the release of the rescript, MacArthur commented that the emperor’s statement pleased him as the emperor undertook “a leading part in the democratization of his people. He squarely takes his stand for the future along liberal lines.”99 The idea of issuing an “emperor’s statement” denying his divinity came from the US and Maeda wrote the draft statement. Maeda’s account of the drafting illuminates the Japanese motives. On December 23, 1945, Prime Minister Shidehara told Maeda that an influential American urged him to have the emperor issue a statement disavowing his divinity.100 Shidehara passed two or three sheets of Western letter paper to Maeda on which were drafted sentences, handwritten in English. Shidehara said, “If you agree that this is a good idea, as the minister of education, please prepare a draft statement based on this draft.”101 Concurring with the idea, Maeda told Shidehara that after the surrender of Japan, people were confused and did not know what they should do. As such, it was up to the emperor to sweep away the mystery surrounding him, declare that he was with the people, and indicate the path Japan should take. Maeda prepared a draft in secret.102 97

Japan, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Research and Statistics Division, Minister’s Secretariat, Japan’s Modern Educational System: A History of the First Hundred Years (Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance, 1980), 229–230. 98 “Official Translation of Imperial Rescript, January 1, 1946” in Foreign Relations of the united states 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII, 134–135. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/fru s1946v08/d138 (accessed August 19, 2022). 99 “General MacArthur’s Comment on Imperial Rescript of January 1, 1946,”in SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 471. 100 R.H. Blyth, a professor at the Gakushuin (the Peers School) and a tutor of the crown prince, acted as the informal liaison between the Imperial Household and the CIE of the GHQ. Harold G. Henderson, “The Secret History of the Japanese Emperor’s Renunciation of ‘Divinity’ 1946,” in William P. Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952 and Japanese Religions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), 259, 317–319; Takemae, Inside GHQ, 237. 101 Tamon Maeda, “Ningen sengen no uchi soto” (Inside and Outside the Human Declaration), in Maeda, Maeda Tamon sono bun so no hito (Tamon Maeda’s writings and personality), 76 (author’s translation). 102 The main source here is Tamon Maeda, “Ningen sengen no uchi soto” (Inside and Outside the Human Declaration), in Maeda, Maeda Tamon sono bun so no hito (Tamon Maeda’s writings and personality), 75–87; Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 265.

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Two days later, Maeda handed the draft to Shidehara who wrote a final draft on December 25. The next day, Shidehara became ill and was hospitalized, leaving the rescript in Maeda’s hands.103 Maeda requested an audience with Emperor Hirohito to show him the rescript. After reading it, according to Maeda, Emperor Hirohito told the story of Emperor Gomizunoo (reigned 1611–1629) who abdicated his throne to receive a moxa treatment to cure chickenpox. Even the court physician had not been allowed to touch the emperor’s body, therefore, it had been unthinkable to burn moxa on the divine body. Emperor Hirohito said, “There were some inconveniences to being treated as a living divinity.”104 According to Maeda, Emperor Hirohito, who was in the audience, said that as Emperor Meiji proclaimed, the idea of respecting the will of the people already existed in Japan, as evidenced by the Charter Oath of 1868. Emperor Hirohito suggested adding some sentences to the rescript to make that point clear. Maeda added the five provisions of the Charter Oath of 1868 as the first part of the rescript. He showed the revised rescript to Emperor Hirohito who approved it.105 The cabinet approved the rescript on the morning of December 30 and, in the afternoon, an English translation of the rescript was carried to the GHQ for SCAP approval. There was no objection from MacArthur (see Appendix).106 On January 4, 1946, Education Minister Maeda sent a message to the prefectural governors and heads of schools reassuring them that the emperor’s “human declaration” did not change the relationship between the emperor and his subjects. The unique relationship between the Sovereign and his subjects in our country does not consist in imaginary myths and legends, not in a monomaniac sense of superiority of our people. I cannot help being filled with trepidation when I think that the Emperor graciously teaches us that by cleansing ourselves from this mistaken idea we may realize the close relationship between the Sovereign and his subjects; that is, the Sovereign and his subjects belong to one family. I am deeply impressed by the magnanimity of His Majesty’s will and our desire to serve him devotedly cannot but be augmented ever more.107

On the same day, SCAP ordered the trials of wartime leaders and the purging of political, business, and intellectual elites who supported the war. More specifically, SCAP directed the dissolution of “militaristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations” and the removal of all elements undesirable for the growth of democracy from government and other public offices.108 This directive was the “biggest bombshell since the surrender” and hit the Shidehara Cabinet particularly hard, as some of its members, including Maeda, fell under the categories mentioned in the directive.109 As the 103

Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 266. Maeda, Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, 81–82. 105 Maeda, Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, 83. 106 Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 267. 107 SCAP, CIE, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2, 157–158. 108 “SCAP Orders Removal, Exclusion from Public Offices of Those War Responsible; Existence, New Formation are Banned of Ultra-Nationalistic Bodies, Affiliate,” Nippon Times, January 5, 1946, 1. 109 “Nippon Bureaucrats Suffer Mortal Blow: ‘Housecleaning’ Directives Sweeping and Strict— Cabinet Seen as Tottering,” Nippon Times, January 5, 1946; “Shidehara Lineup Is Badly Shaken by SCAP’s Orders,” Nippon Times, January 6, 1946, 1. 104

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governor of Niigata prefecture during the war, Maeda held the post of branch chief of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, now categorized as a “militaristic nationalism and aggressive influential terroristic or secret patriotic society.”110 Although some US officials in the State Department were critical of the decision, Maeda had to be removed.111 Given his consistent adherence to the status quo, he was not popular among the Occupation authorities. For instance, Brigadier General Elliot R. Thorpe (1897–1989), the former chief of counter-intelligence for MacArthur, stated in his memoir, “We made the mistake of initially using a reactionary named Maeda as education minister.”112 His comment is not surprising as Thorpe was considered progressive and was soon to return to the US due to his suspicious sympathy toward Japanese communists. Maeda, after recommending Yoshishige Abe as his successor, resigned on January 13, 1946. He was forbidden from holding public office for five years.113 By May 1948, after the screening of the undesirables had been completed, over 210,000 high-ranking military officers, national and local politicians, key business leaders, and other professionals were forced to resign.114 In the field of education, the purging of undesirable elements took time. It was after May 7, 1946, that the Education Ministry finally set up screening committees that removed militaristic educational personnel from schools. By September 25, 1946, the screening committees had dismissed approximately 800 teachers. Fifty-five educators who had been dismissed before and during the war due to their political or religious opinions were reinstated. By May 1947, when this purge was completed, 120,000 teachers and educational officials had been removed from their posts, though most of them resigned before they were purged.115

110

“SCAP Orders Removal, Exclusion From Public Offices of Those War Responsible; Existence, New Formation are Banned of Ultra-Nationalistic Bodies, Affiliate,” Nippon Times, January 5, 1946, 1. 111 Mayo stated that Gordon T. Bowles, the author of the US educational reform plan, had “confidence in Maeda’s essential liberalism and was critical of the later decision to purge him” in Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 116. 112 Elliott R. Thorpe, East Wind, Rain: The Intimate Account of an Intelligence Officer in the Pacific 1939–49 (Boston: Gambit, 1969), 194. 113 Mieko Kamiya to Hidefumi Kurosawa, September 15, 1974, letter in Hidefumi Kurosawa, Sengo ky¯oiku no genry¯u o motomete: Maeda Tamon no ky¯oiku rinen (Searching for the origin of education in postwar Japan: Tamon Maeda’s education philosophy) (Tokyo: Naigai shuppan, 1982), 228. 114 Isao My¯ ojin, Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji: GHQ no shiji to iu “Shinwa” o kensh¯o suru (A blot on the Japanese postwar history, Red Purge: refuting the “myth” of Red Purge under the direction ¯ of GHQ) (Tokyo: Otsuki shoten, 2013), 46–47; Mayumi Itoh, The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 80; John K. Emmerson, The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: Holt, 0Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 255. 115 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, File 097.3 Z1092 no. 4119S, Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” December 9, 1946, 33, 42–43; Robert W. Aspinall, Teachers’ Unions and the Politics of Education in Japan (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 31.

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The number of teachers removed was relatively small, especially at the university level. Typically, one-third of a university screening committee was composed of professors and assistant professors from that university. Furthermore, at Tokyo Imperial University, to respect the hard-won tradition of department autonomy, faculty members of each department examined each other. As a result, most professors passed the screening. Subsequently, the Education Ministry realized those objectionable professors were still in the university and promptly dismissed them. A dramatic turnover occurred in Tokyo Imperial University’s economics department, which was ¯ known for the ideological infight among its faculty members. Ouchi, Arisawa, and other Marxists, who had been suspended or dismissed during the war, were reinstated, while eight wartime faculty members were dismissed. Overall, due to intracampus investigations, most professors who had not conspicuously cooperated with the military regime remained on the job.116

3.2.1 The New Constitution Observing Japanese politicians’ and bureaucrats’ tenacious adherence to the kokutai, MacArthur realized that the “natural growth” of democracy in Japan would be virtually impossible without a drastic overhaul of the 1890 Meiji Imperial Constitution.117 With the Far Eastern Commission’s first meeting scheduled for late February 1946, he decided to move quickly on the drafting of a new constitution to escape the scrutiny of the other Allied Powers, particularly the Soviet Union. On February 3, 1946, MacArthur directed the GS officials to draft a constitution, which they did in one week. On February 13, 1946, the GS staff handed the draft to the Shidehara Cabinet with the warning that Japan’s failure to adopt its basic principles would make it difficult for SCAP to protect the emperor from the trial as a war criminal. This threat worked and the Japanese government adopted the American draft. After a few minor changes, the Diet passed it in May 1946 and the new constitution became effective on May 3, 1947.118 The new constitution of Japan laid the foundation for a democratic Japan where sovereign powers rested not with the emperor but with the people. The constitution embraced America’s Bill of Rights, establishing suffrage for all people, including 116

Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, File 097.3 Z1092 no. 4119S, Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” December 9, 1946, 38, 43; Takashi Tachibana, Tenn¯o to t¯odai (Emperor and Tokyo Imperial University) (Tokyo: Bungei shunj¯u, 2005), vol. 2, 440; Byron K. Marshall, Academic Freedom and the Japanese Imperial University, 1868–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 183–184; Masako Shibata, Japan and Germany under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 87–88. 117 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 111. 118 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 275–280; Dower, Embracing Defeat, 360–373; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 111–134.

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women, from the age of 20, the equality of all family members under the law, and an independent judiciary system with the power of judicial review to safeguard these rights. In addition, it added a provision, Article 23, which stated, “Academic freedom is guaranteed.” This simple phrase was interpreted as safeguarding “university autonomy and the rights of academic professionals to academic investigation and expression,” offering legal protection from undue control by the state.119 Most famously, with Article 9, Japan renounced the possession and use of military force as a means of settling international disputes, even for self-defense. It was a perfectly utopian concept—no defense is the best defense.

3.3 Initial US Reforms Favored Japanese Communists The initial phase of the GHQ-initiated reforms seemed to benefit Japanese communists. MacArthur was surprised. He said that the Japanese, having lost their spiritual core, were ready to accept Christianity, which he saw as the source of American superiority in science and morality. His Occupation of Japan was clearly colored by his evangelistic fervor. The Occupation was, according to MacArthur, “the opportunity” for the Japanese, “a race, long stunted by ancient concepts of mythological teaching,” to be uplifted by “practical demonstrations of Christian ideals.”120 To MacArthur, the US Occupation was based on Christian love “without vengeance.” In the fall of 1945, MacArthur addressed the Protestant leaders visiting Japan and said, “Japan is a spiritual vacuum. If you do not fill it with Christianity, it will be filled with Communism. Send me 1000 missionaries.”121 However, the “spiritual vacuum” created by the destruction of faith in the emperor and the Japanese national identity began to be filled with another belief, indeed, the long-forbidden dangerous ideology of communism. In October 1945, MacArthur released communists from prison against the will of the Japanese government, which was a demonstration of the principle of “freedom of thought.” On release, the hardcore communists began a loud public campaign as the now-legally-recognized JCP under the leadership of Tokuda (chairman 1945–1953) and Yoshio Shiga (1901–1989). While most of their comrades disavowed their ideology during the pre-war Japanese government’s systematic tenk¯o program of physical torture, Tokuda and Shiga were among the few JCP members who survived brutal imprisonment and 119

Lawrence Ward Beer, Freedom of Expression in Japan: A Study in Comparative Law, Politics, and Society (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984), 253. 120 Douglas MacArthur, “Second Anniversary of Surrender,” September 2, 1947, SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 775; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 42. 121 Quoted in Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 243; Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 135; Masafumi Okazaki, Nihon senry¯o to sh¯uky¯o kaikaku (Religious reform during the occupation of Japan) (Tokyo: Gakujutsu shuppankai, 2012), 30–31, 290–291.

Appendix: Imperial Rescript, January 1, 1946

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never recanted their belief in communism. Due to their tenacity, Tokuda, Shiga, and a few others were highly respected and qualified as the new JCP leaders.122 The communists pledged to abolish the emperor system, establish “a people’s democracy,” eliminate militarism, distribute landowners’ farmland free to the peasants, allow labor unions to be freely formed, and grant universal suffrage to all Japanese over the age of 18. Among the 39 newly established post-war political parties, as of December 1945, only the JCP advocated the sovereignty of the people.123 The number of new parties increased to 363 by the time the first postwar general election was held in April 1946. The major political parties were the Liberal Party (Jiy¯ut¯o), the Progressive Party (Shinpot¯o), and the Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakait¯o). In this new ideological spectrum, the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party were labeled conservative, while other left-wing groups were considered progressive.124 The goals of the GHQ’s reforms eerily resembled those of the JCP, which naturally made the GHQ one of their few friends. However, when antagonism arose between the US and the Soviet Union, MacArthur came to view communists as more dangerous than the conservative Japanese. Now seen as real “friends of the US,” conservative Japanese, even those who had been purged as ultranationalists, were allowed to return to their former posts while MacArthur purged radical liberal elements, that is, the communists.

Appendix: Imperial Rescript, January 1, 1946 Official Translation of Imperial Rescript, January 1, 1946 Today we greet the New Year. My thought goes back to the beginning of the Meiji Era when Emperor Meiji proclaimed the Five Clauses of the Charter-Oath as the basis of our national policy. It reads: 1. Deliberative assemblies on a wide scope shall be convened and all matters of government decided by public opinion. 2. Both the high and low shall, with a unity of purpose, vigorously engage in the conduct of public affairs. 3. All the common people, no less than the servants of the state, civil and military, shall be enabled to fulfill their just aspirations, lest discontent should infect their minds. 4. All the evil practices of the past shall be eliminated and the nation shall abide by the universal rules of justice and equity. 5. Wisdom and knowledge shall be sought throughout the world to promote the prosperity of the Empire. 122

Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 48. 123 Nihon Ky¯ osant¯ono Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai, Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 65-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 65 Years), vol. 1 (Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo Iinkai Shuppankyoku, 1988), 102. 124 Itoh, The Hatoyama Dynasty, 79.

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What more need be added to these open and lofty precepts? By reaffirming the Oath, I desire to direct the future course of our national fortunes: It is my wish that on the lines so indicated, old abuses shall be discarded, full play be allowed to popular will, all of officials and people be whole-heartedly given to the pursuit of peace, and enriched culture and learning be attained, and the standards of living of the people be elevated. Thus shall a new Japan be constructed. Devastations wrought by the war upon our cities and towns, the miseries of its victims, the stagnation of industries, the shortages of food, and the great and growing numbers of the unemployed are sorely heart-rending. But as long as the nation faces indomitably the present ordeal, remains firm in its determination to seek civilization consistently in peace, and preserves the perfect accord to the end, there is no doubt but that a glorious prospect will be revealed not only for our country but for the whole humanity. Love of the family and love of the country are particularly strong in our land. With no less devotion should we extend this spirit, and dedicate ourselves to the love of mankind. The protracted war having ended in defeat, our people are liable to become restive or to fall into utter despondency. The extremist tendencies appear to be gradually spreading, and the sense of morality is markedly losing its hold on the people. In effect, there are signs of confusion of thoughts, and the existing situation causes me deep concern. I stand by my people. I am ever ready to share in their joys and sorrows. The ties between me and my people have always been formed by mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends or myths. Nor are they predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese are superior to other races and destined to rule the world. My government will leave no stone unturned to alleviate the trials and tribulations of the people. At the same time, I trust that my people will rise to the occasion, and strive courageously for the development of industry and culture as well as for the solution of their more immediate problems. If in their civic life my people maintain solidarity, practice mutual aid and assistance and foster the spirit of broad tolerance, they will prove themselves worthy of their best traditions. In this manner, our nation will undoubtedly render a signal contribution toward the welfare and advancement of mankind. The planning for the year is made at its commencement. I confidently hope that my beloved people will unite with me in my present resolve, and that they will dauntlessly and unflinchingly march onward for the accomplishment of the great undertaking which now confronts the nation.125

125

“Official Translation of Imperial Rescript, January 1, 1946” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII, 134–135. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1946v08/d138 (accessed August 19, 2022).

References

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References Aspinal, Robert W. 2001. Teachers’ Unions and the Politics of Education in Japan. New York: State University of New York Press. Bary, Wm. Theodore de, Donald Keene, and Ryusaku Tsunoda (eds.). 1964. Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press. First published 1958. Beer, Lawrence Ward. 1984. Freedom of Expression in Japan: A Study in Comparative Law, Politics, and Society. Tokyo: Kodansha International. Carson, Cameron. 2015. Karafuto 1945: An Examination of the Japanese under Soviet Rule and Their Subsequent Expansion. 2015. Honors Thesis. 2557. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hon ors_theses/2557. Accessed 19 August 2022. Dower, John W. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Duus, Peter. 1998. Modern Japan, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Emmerson, John K. 1978. The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Hardacre, Helen. 1989. Shinto and the State, 1868–1988. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Kehr. 2010. Venona: kaidoku sareta soren no ang¯o to supai katsud¯o (Venona Decoding Soviet Espionage in America). Translated and edited by Terumasa Nakanishi. Tokyo: PHP kenky¯usho. Itoh, Mayumi. 2003. The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Japan, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. 1980. Japan’s Modern Educational System: A History of the First Hundred Years. Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance. Kumano, Ruriko. 2007. The US Occupation and Japan’s New Democracy. Educational Perspectives 40 (1): 36–43. Kumano, Ruriko. 2011. United States Education Reform Policy for Postwar Japan: Reorientation of the Japanese. Journal of the College of International Relations 32: 9–20. Kurosawa, Hidefumi. 1982. Sengo ky¯oku no genry¯u o motomete: Maeda Tamon no ky¯oiku rinen (Searching for the origin of education in postwar Japan: Tamon Maeda’s education philosophy). Tokyo: Nagai shuppan. MacArthur, Douglas. 1964. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill. Maeda, Tamon. 1956. The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan. Japan Quarterly 3 (4): 414–425. Maeda, Tamon. 1963. Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito (Tamon Maeda’s writings and personality). Tokyo: Kank¯o sewanin daihy¯o Horikiri Zenrij¯o. Marshall, Byron K. 1992. Academic Freedom and the Japanese Imperial University, 1868–1939. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mayo, Marlene J. 1982. Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Defeated Japan, 1943–1945. In The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform, the Proceedings of a Symposium held on 16–18 October 1980, ed. Thomas W. Burkman, 21–127. Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial. My¯ojin, Isao. 2013. Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji: GHQ no shiji to iu “Shinwa” o kensh¯o suru (A blot on the Japanese postwar history, Red Purge: refuting the “myth” of Red Purge under the ¯ direction of GHQ). Tokyo: Otsuki shoten. Nash, Goerge H., ed. 2011. Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japanese Communist Party Central Committee). 1988. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 65-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 65 years), vol. 1. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo Iinkai Shuppankyoku. Nishi, Toshio. 1982. Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945– 1952. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Oinas-Kukkonen, Henry. 2003. Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

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Okazaki, Masafumi. 2012. Nihon senry¯o to sh¯uky¯o kaikaku (Religious reform during the occupation of Japan). Tokyo: Gakujutsu shuppankai. Orr, Mark Taylor. 1954. Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan. PhD diss.: University of North Carolina. Scalapino, Robert A. 1967. The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sengo nihon ky¯oiku shiry¯o sh¯usei hensh¯u iinkai (ed.). 1982. Sengo nihon ky¯oiku shiry¯o sh¯usei (Completion of sources of postwar Japanese education), vol. 1. Tokyo: Sanichi shob¯o. Shibata, Masako. 2005. Japan and Germany Under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Tachibana, Takashi. 2005. Tenn¯o to t¯odai (Emperor and Tokyo Imperial University), 2 vols. Tokyo: Bungei shunj¯u. Takemae, Eiji. 2002. Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy. Translated by Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann. New York: Continuum. Thorpe, Elliot R. 1969. East Wind, Rain: The Intimate Account of an Intelligence Officer in the Pacific, 1939–1949. Boston: Gambit. Tsuchiya, Yuka. 2009. Shinbei nihon no k¯ochiku: Amerika no tainichi j¯oh¯o・ky¯oiku seisaku to nihon senry¯o (Constructing a pro-U.S. Japan: U.S. information and education policy and the occupation of Japan). Tokyo: Akashi shoten. Williams, Justin. 1968. Completing Japan’s Political Reorientation, 1947–1952: Crucial Phase of the Allied Occupation. The American Historical Review 73 (5): 1454–1469. Woodard, William P. 1972. The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952 and Japanese Religions. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Government Documents Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 1941–1951. History of Non-Military Aspects of the Occupation of Japan. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government Section. 1949. Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, 2 vols. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section. 1948. Education in the New Japan. 2 vols. Tokyo: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945M alta/d503. Accessed 19 August 2022. United States, Department of States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d138. Accessed 19 August 2022. United States, Department of States. 1977. O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc. United States, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for the Far East, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East (National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T1204, Roll 4).

References

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Manuscript Collections Boner Frank Fellers Papers, 1904–1997. Hoover Institution Library and Archives (Stanford, California). Joseph C. Trainor Papers, 1933–1980. Hoover Institution Library and Archives (Stanford, California).

Chapter 4

General Headquarters (GHQ) Versus Japanese Communist Party

The GHQ released hardcore Japanese communists from brutal imprisonment and legalized the JCP at the beginning of the Occupation. By freeing all political prisoners, the US presented itself as the true liberator of the oppressed. With General MacArthur’s public blessings, the GS rapidly implemented dramatic reforms that appeared to encourage the communists. Nevertheless, neither the US government nor MacArthur had ever trusted the JCP. This poses a puzzling question. Why did MacArthur release the Japanese communists from prisons in which they had been detained for more than ten cruel years?

4.1 US State Department Policy on Japanese Communists In conjunction with the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, the US State Department began to develop concrete plans for the Occupation of Japan as early as March 1944. The committee meeting, held on March 22, 1944, discussed the abolition of intolerable laws once the Occupation started. They recommended that laws “unduly restricting freedom of expression, with particular reference to prohibitions against ‘dangerous thoughts,’ should be [met with] suspension and rescission.”1 “Dangerous thoughts” in Imperial Japan meant communism or other liberal progressive thoughts denying the emperor system or capitalism.

1

“Memorandum prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East,” PWC-114, CAC-123, “Japan: Nullification of Obnoxious Laws” [Washington], March 22, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V, Lot 122, Box 53. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v05/ d1195 (accessed August 19, 2022). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_4

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4 General Headquarters (GHQ) Versus Japanese Communist Party

The State-Navy-War-Coordinating-Committee (SNWCC) decided to abolish the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, thereby, releasing all political prisoners incarcerated due to their ideologies.2 The US policy on Japanese communists was based on intelligence gathered on their activities in China by an American diplomat, John K. Emmerson (1908–1984), who was the second secretary of the US Embassy in China and a covert member of the detached US military unit known as the US Army Observer Group (USAOG, aka, the Dixie Mission). In late 1943 and early 1944, when forces, mainly comprised of Americans, were spearheading the war against Japan in China, the US created the Dixie Mission in Yenan, Shensi Province, China, the base of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to explore a means of closely coordinating with the Chinese communists. However, the focus shifted to intelligence gathering once such cooperation became politically incorrect. Having served at the US Embassy in Tokyo from 1936 to 1941, Emmerson was an expert on Japan and spoke fluent Japanese. He arrived in Yenan in November 1944 where he conducted interviews with Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) and communists.3 Emmerson met Japanese communist leader, Sanz¯o Nosaka (then using the alias Susumu Okano), who was an original member of the JCP. Like many communists in Japan, he was apprehended during a mass arrest of communists and socialists, known as the March 15th Incident, in 1928. Nosaka was imprisoned for two years. He was eventually released on grounds of an ocular illness in 1931. It is still a mystery how Nosaka managed to escape with his wife, Ry¯u, from Japan and reached Moscow in March 1931 “as the JCP representative to the executive committee of the Comintern, the Soviet organization in charge of the international activities of the Communist Party.”4 He later visited the US twice in the 1930s and was deeply involved in intelligence work against Japan.5 He worked at the Comintern headquarters until March 1940, when the Comintern ordered him to travel to Yenan to work for Mao Zedong. Nosaka became an advisor to the General Political Department of the CCP and worked with Chinese communists who had studied in Japan. His group grew in size, leading to the establishment of the Japanese Anti-War Alliance in May 1940. In 1944, he formed the Japanese People’s Emancipation League, which consisted of approximately 500 Japanese POWs. The league

2

Eiji Takemae, “Early Postwar Reformist Parties,” in Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation, ed. Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 347. 3 Carolle J. Carter, Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists, 1944–1947 (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 1, 13; Henry Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003), 2. 4 S.V. “Nosaka Sanz¯ o,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nos aka-Sanzo (accessed August 19, 2022). 5 “Spy Against Japan: Letters shed new light on Nosaka’s espionage acts,” The Japan Times, October 22, 2000. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2000/10/22/national/letters-shed-new-lighton-nosakas-espionage-acts/ (accessed March 16, 2022).

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conducted propaganda activities against the Japanese army and re-educated Japanese POWs.6 Emmerson asked Nosaka his prediction for post-war Japan. Nosaka replied that it would take a long time to achieve a democratic revolution and he would not see it within his lifetime. He elaborated that the Japanese people were eternally loyal to the throne and would hold on to the emperor at any cost. He advised against the JCP campaigning to overthrow the emperor, at least for the time being.7 Emmerson, after interviewing Nosaka and many Japanese POWs, wrote a proposal to utilize Japanese communists for psychological warfare against Japan. Although his proposal was not fully implemented, the practicality of using communists to defeat and democratize the Japanese nation was elaborated. This may explain the logic behind the aforementioned release of Japanese communists from prison. The full proposal was as follows: EXHIBIT NO. 435-B PROPOSED PROJECTS AGAINST JAPAN My short study of the activities of Susumu Okano and the Japanese People’s Emancipation League in Communist China convinces me that we can utilize the experience and achievements of this group to advantage in the prosecution of the war against Japan. Without going into the details of methods and materials, all of which are being carefully investigated here, we can suggest the following proposals: (1) Effect the organization of an international “free Japan” movement The Japanese People’s Emancipation League (Nihon Jinmin Kaiho Renmei) has an estimated membership of 450 Japanese prisoners in north and central China. Its declared principles are democratic. It is not identified with the Communist Party. Upon completion of a course of indoctrination, the more able members voluntarily prepare propaganda leaflets and engage in propaganda activities on the frontlines. There is no doubt that most of them are sincere converts to the anti-war principles of the league. Intelligence shows that the league is well known to the Japanese Army and its influence is respected and feared. Organization of chapters of this association, or a similar one, among Japanese (prisoners, internees, and others) in the United States, India, Australia, and other countries, should be carried out. The result would be widespread dissemination of democratic ideas, the creation of a powerful Japanese propaganda organ (it is indisputable that propaganda from a Japanese source and written by Japanese is more effective than that from enemy sources), and the stimulation of a force useful at the time of invasion and in postwar Japan.

6

The United States, Department of State, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), OIR Report NO. 4909.5, “The Potentials of World Communism: Far East Part I: Japan,” August 1, 1949, 20, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1977); John K. Emmerson, The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 180; Kenr¯o Nagoshi, Kuremurin himitsu bunsho wa kataru (Kremlin top-secret documents reveal) (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ k¯oronsha, 1994), 98; Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 17. 7 Takemae, “Early Postwar Reformist Party,” 343–344.

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4 General Headquarters (GHQ) Versus Japanese Communist Party (2) Encourage the organization of cells within Japan to spread defeatism and thereby reduce resistance at the time of invasion Preparations are now being made to send agents directly to Japan from this (Yenan) area. Simultaneous organization needs to be undertaken of underground cells within Japan on the same principles as the free-Japan group on the outside. Such activities would necessarily be on a small scale, but ample evidence exists that there are such elements which can be useful to us. Careful preparation is obviously essential. (3) Set up a radio transmitter in a Communist base area such as Shantung Province for broadcasts to Japan, Korea, and Manchuria A transmitter on the Shantung promontory would be 400 miles nearer Japan proper than Saipan and 600 miles nearer than the northern tip of Luzon. The Japanese People’s Emancipation League has a strong unit in Shantung Province and is now establishing a school there. Consequently, trustworthy Japanese personnel is already on the spot to operate such a station. Additional trained personnel could be recruited from the school in Yenan and sent to any designated spot. Identification of the station with a “Free Japan” group would insure [sic] broadcasts of immeasurably greater effect than those of stated American (enemy) origin. (4) Train units of Japanese for activity with American pacification operations and with military government officials during occupation Eighth Route Army experience has clearly proved not only that Japanese prisoners can be converted, but that they can be satisfactorily and extremely effectively used in propaganda operations on the frontlines. Approximately 350 are now training and engaging in such activities on the north and central China fronts. Such Japanese personnel, with invaluable knowledge of particular areas and of the language, could be extremely useful in assisting American Army officers in reestablishing order among the Japanese population. Recruitment of these persons can be made from the personnel of Japanese Emancipation League chapters in China, already trained, and from prison camps under American, Australian, or British jurisdiction. A course of training would be necessary. Issei and nisei in the United States could serve as instructors. Materials and the experience of the Eighth Route Army would be of inestimable assistance in setting up such a project. JOHN K. EMMERSON YENAN, CHINA, November 7, 1944.8

8

United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary (1956). Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 84th Congress, second session (85th Congress, first session), Parts 50–54 (pp. 3502–3503). https://archive.org/stream/scopeofsovietact5054unit#page/3502/mode/2up (accessed August 19, 2022). This document was presented at the hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary in United States Senate in 1956. Following the war, some of those who dealt with Chinese communists were accused of being soft on communism during the McCarthy era and lost their credibility as professional diplomats. By the time China was “lost” to the Communist Party (culminating in the establishment of People’s Republic of China under the Chinese Communists in October 1949), the US government had been investigating the cause of the loss of China.

4.2 GHQ’s Attitude Toward the Japanese Communist Party

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Emmerson believed that Nosaka-led Japanese communists could form the basis of a democratic Japanese government, which could become a US ally. The US government and communists both desired to eliminate militarism and fascism to establish a new democratic Japan. Officials from US agencies, particularly those from the State Department, such as Emmerson, believed that Japanese communists could become a potential force for democratizing Japan. Although Emmerson’s original plan for cooperating with the communists was not accepted by the SWNCC’s investigation of American policy toward Japan in July 1945, high-level foreign policy officials in the State Department, many of whom had served in China, supported Emmerson’s plan. The prevailing idea in the State Department was that “all individuals and groups should take part in advancing freedom and its responsibilities and rights.”9 This notion was bolstered by the opinion that, even if the communists were legally allowed to campaign in Japan, they would hold limited influence in the post-war nation due to strong anti-communist and Soviet sentiments among the Japanese. Observing the increasing power of Soviet and Chinese communists in Europe and Asia, the US presented itself as a liberator that genuinely respected freedom for all. This image greatly enhanced the US influence in Asia.10

4.2 GHQ’s Attitude Toward the Japanese Communist Party MacArthur remained well informed about the US government policy toward Japan. However, his decisions were largely based on advice from his devoted staff and selfconvictions about a new Japan. A conflict eventually emerged between Washington and MacArthur, who habitually ignored the directives pouring in from across the Pacific. The GHQ officials in Tokyo disagreed among themselves on how to handle the communists. Mark Julius Gayn (1909–1981), a noted American journalist who, according to a recently declassified FBI file, was a spy for the Soviet Union,11 said that there were “two warring camps” in Tokyo.12 One was composed of “reformminded” officers of the GS, which was led by Brigadier General Courtney Whitney (1897–1969)13 and the other was G-2 (military intelligence) headed by Major General Charles A. Willoughby (1892–1972). Whitney believed that Japan should be drastically restructured and viewed communists as promoters of democracy. He claimed that only communists had consistently opposed Japan’s militarism and overseas expansionism for which they had gravely suffered. In fact, many communists, once 9

Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 7. Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 4–10. 11 John Simkin, “Mark Gayn,” in Spartacus Educational, https://spartacus-educational.com/JFK gayn.htm (accessed August 19, 2022). 12 Mark Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), 42. 13 Gayn, Japan Diary, 42. 10

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released from prison, enthusiastically supported SCAP reforms while most Japanese defended the pre-war system.14 However, Willoughby opposed drastic changes as he believed that a conservative Japan was the best US ally in the upcoming struggle against the Soviet Union. He argued that Japan needed only “a light face-lifting.”15 Willoughby graduated from Gettysburg College in 1914 and was assigned as General MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, Intelligence, in 1941. He viewed all communists as insidious agents of Stalin and strongly opposed their release.16 SCAP contained three intelligence divisions—(1) G-2, (2) the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), and (3) the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC). Brigadier General Elliot R. Thorpe (1897–1989) headed the latter two. Thorpe’s CIS was tasked with liberating political prisoners. Although the GHQ found both pros and cons to releasing communist prisoners, the ultimate decision was made following the policies formulated in Washington.17 SCAP issued the Civil Liberties Directive on October 4, 1945, ordering the Japanese government to abrogate the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, under which thousands of socialists and communists had been maltreated, and all other laws and ordinances restricting freedom of thought and expression. The directive further stipulated the abolition of “all secret police organs,” including the Special Higher Police (i.e., Tokk¯o, the most feared thought-police organization).18 SCAP ordered the Japanese government to release everyone who had been detained and imprisoned under these restrictive laws within one week. The JCP became a lawful political organization for the first time in Japanese history. However, these developments were not unique to Japan as the release of political prisoners and legalization of the Communist Party had been previously accomplished in post-Nazi Germany.19 Prime Minister Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni (1887–1990) instructed his government to release all political prisoners and, humiliated, resigned the following day. Under the newly formed Kij¯uro Shidehara (1872–1951) Cabinet, the Japanese government begrudgingly released approximately 2500 political prisoners on October 10, 1945.

14

Gayn, Japan Diary, 42; Emmerson, The Japanese Thread, 261–262; Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 23. 15 Gayn, Japan Diary, 42. 16 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 161; Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 16; Papers of MGEN Charles Willoughby, Box #1 Folder #1, General Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library (Micro Labs Virginia Beach, A) Roll #001 (National Diet Library, Tokyo Japan). 17 Harry Emerson Wilds, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), 54; Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 14–16. 18 SCAPIN 93 “Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties,” October 4, 1945, in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 463–465. 19 Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 13.

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Jubilant communists and sympathizers gathered in front of MacArthur’s headquarters and hailed the general by shouting banzai (literally, ten thousand years long life) three times, wishing him eternal life. This was an intoxicating day for the communists. Although conflicting views toward the communists persisted within the GHQ, there was a clear consensus that they should be tolerated as long as they remained useful for occupational objectives.20 Conversely, the Japanese communists were using American-dominated GHQ to their benefit. Hardcore communist leader, Tokuda had written a draft of “Appeal to the People” one week before his release. Shiga, another noted communist prisoner, suggested to Tokuda that the phrase “the Allied Forces is a liberation army” be deleted from his draft as he foresaw that MacArthur would eventually turn on them. Tokuda countered that the Soviet Union would soon become involved in the Occupation and this flattering phrase would serve as a restraint on the Americans who may otherwise behave egoistically. In addition, other communists protested, stating that the Occupation force was overwhelmingly comprised of American soldiers, thus, resulting in an imperialistic army rather than a liberation army for Japan. Tokuda, still in prison, said he fully understood their views, yet, insisted that American forces were needed for their objectives.21 Such strategic acrobatics were apparent in Tokuda’s proclamation in the first post-war issue of party newspaper Akahata (Red Flag), dated October 20, 1945: We express our deepest gratitude that the occupation of Japan by the Allied forces, dedicated to liberating the world from fascism and militarism, has opened the way for the democratic revolution. We positively support the peace policies of the United States, Great Britain, and the Allied Powers.22

While still in exile in China in September 1945, Nosaka sent a message to an American general in Korea requesting US’s help to return to Japan. Nosaka established the credibility of his request by providing information connecting him to a US military observer group in Yenan. In addition, he wrote that he knew and had been in close contact with Emmerson. The GHQ in Tokyo assessed Nosaka as “intellectually more able than the two main communist leaders” in Japan and approved his request, anticipating that he would temper radicalized JCP leadership under Tokuda and Shiga.23 A lingering rumor indicates that Nosaka, who served as JCP chairman from 1958 to 1982 (until he was 90 years old), was a double agent working for a US intelligence organization and the Soviet Communist Party. Soviet documents released after the 20

John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War Two (New York; W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), 81; Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 16; Takemae, “Early Postwar Reformist Parties,” 355; Lonny E. Carlile, Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 63. 21 Shiga danwa (Shiga’s talk) 177–178, quoted in Junnosuke Masumi, Sengo seiji, 1945–1955 (Postwar politics), vol. 1 (Tokyo: T¯oky¯o daigaku shuppankai, 1983), 156–157. 22 Quoted in Emmerson, The Japanese Thread, 261. 23 Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 17–18.

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Soviet Union collapse confirmed that Nosaka was one of their paid spies. More specifically, Kenr¯o Nagoshi investigated declassified Soviet documents after the sudden fall. His research revealed that Nosaka, before returning to Japan, visited Moscow in October 1945 and held a secret meeting with a Comintern officer to discuss the blueprints for a communist revolution in post-war Japan. The two men agreed that Nosaka would present a moderate strategy for this process with the slogans, “United Front with the Socialist Party” and “Beloved JCP.”24 The same Soviet documents revealed that Nosaka held several detailed discussions about post-war JCP strategies with a representative from the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye, Main Intelligence Directorate), which was the foreign military intelligence agency of the Soviet Army General Staff. The detailed minutes of this meeting show that Nosaka wished to reestablish a tight alliance with the Soviet Union and, most importantly, asked for Soviet financial and material assistance. Nosaka requested a total of 15 items, including (1) financial assistance amounting to $500,000 in gold bullion, (2) civilian clothes for 50–60 people, (3) a reliable communication network with Moscow, (4) a legal permit for his wife to leave Moscow, (5) the establishment of a Japan-Soviet Society, and (6) intensification of the Soviet propaganda broadcast in Japan. The document further shows that Nosaka’s interlocutor recommended to Stalin that Nosaka’s request for financial assistance be granted.25 The Soviet Communist Party decided that Moscow’s clandestine relationship with Nosaka would no longer be maintained through the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, but rather through agents of the GRU or NKVD (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs), which were two of the most feared secret police agencies during the Stalin era.26 Additional declassified documents revealed that Nosaka betrayed some of his Japanese comrades, including Kenzo Yamamoto, by denouncing them to the NKVD, which arrested them in 1937. Nosaka and his wife had been granted asylum in the Soviet Union in 1931. Subsequently, he became a Comintern’s mole and traveled to the US where he worked as a spy from 1934 to 1938.27 During his stay in the US, Nosaka wrote a secret letter to the KGB in Moscow, claiming that fellow Communist Committee member, Kenzo Yamamoto (1895–1939) and his wife, Matsu, were suspected of actively spying in the Soviet Union under the direction of the Japanese police. With this, Nosaka may have avenged his vendetta against Yamamoto as it was common knowledge that Yamamoto was carrying on a love affair with Nosaka’s wife. Based on these alleged spy activities, Yamamoto was brutally tortured and executed

24

Kenr¯o Nagoshi, Kuremurin himitsu bunsho wa kataru (Kremlin top-secret documents revealed) (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ koronsha, 1994), 97–109. 25 Nagoshi, Kuremurin himitsu bunsho wa kataru, 97–109. 26 Nagoshi, Kuremurin himitsu bunsho wa kataru, 110–111. 27 “Spy Against Japan: Letters shed new light on Nosaka’s espionage acts,” The Japan Times, October 22, 2000. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2000/10/22/national/letters-shed-new-lighton-nosakas-espionage-acts/ (accessed March 16, 2022).

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in March 1939. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, two Japanese journalists, Shun-ichi Kobayashi and Akira Kat¯o obtained copies of secret KGB documents from the Stalin era and discovered the abovementioned confidential letter from Nosaka. They published shocking evidence of Nosaka’s involvement in Yamamoto’s execution in the September 27, 1992 issue of the popular weekly magazine Sh¯ukan Bunshun. Journalists from the JCP newspaper Akahata confirmed the authenticity of this document during their visit to Moscow.28 The JCP questioned Nosaka, who had been temporarily hospitalized at Yoyogi Hospital in Tokyo. He confirmed that the letter was his but declined to discuss it further. The JCP unanimously expelled him from the party at an annual meeting on December 27, 1992. The JCP officials said that Nosaka had never reported on writing the letter when they were investigating Yamamoto’s execution. Furthermore, Nosaka’s autobiography stated that he had tried to save Yamamoto’s life. Nosaka, being the chairman of the JCP, had continually lied during post-war Japan.29 He died in his home less than one year later, on November 14, 1993. He was 101 years old. Although there are rumors, it remains unclear how many more comrades he had betrayed and sent to execution. Unaware of Nosaka’s true intentions, the GHQ in Tokyo granted his request for returning to Japan. Nosaka’s triumphant return on January 10, 1946, seemed to meet the GHQ expectations. He and the JCP Central Committee soon issued the following statement: Although the emperor system, as a state institution, would eventually have to be abolished, the imperial family could continue to exist; but once a democratic country was established in a new Japan, the will of the people should decide the fate of the imperial family as a state institution.30

Nosaka advocated a peaceful revolution for democracy and eventually a socialist society, which he said was attainable under the occupying US military force. Party members adopted a strategy of peaceful revolution by forming a united front with the Socialist Party at the 5th JCP Congress in February 1946. This signaled the beginning of a new “Beloved JCP”(aisareru ky¯osant¯o) era. Despite this overture, the Socialist Party adamantly refused to cooperate with the JCP. Enraged, the JCP members publicly denounced the socialists. The longstanding animosity between the two parties would not easily dissipate.31

28

Jemes Kirkup, “Obituary: Sanzo Nosaka,” The Independent, November 16, 1993. http://www. independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-sanzo-nosaka-1504671.html (accessed August 19, 2022). 29 Nihon Ky¯ osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japanese Communist Party Central Committee), Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 70 nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 70 years), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha, 1994), 159–161. 30 Emmerson, The Japanese Thread, 264. 31 Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 71–72.

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The JCP reiterated that Allied forces formed a liberation army, however, began insisting on “a joint occupation,” meaning the Soviet Union’s participation in Occupied Japan to restrain US domination. Despite this hidden agenda, the JCP believed that a democratic revolution could rapidly advance under the American aegis.32 Although signs of discord began to emerge between the US and the Soviet Union, wartime camaraderie had not yet dissipated. Even Mao’s Chinese Communist Party accepted American mediation for the growing tensions with Chiang Kai-shake’s Nationalists. In Japan, initial drastic reforms appeared to greatly encourage left-wing elements. In fact, the GHQ civil sections, such as the GS, Economic Science Section (ESS), and the CIE, were staffed with leftists or the so-called “New Dealers,” who supported the socialist ideology underlying President Roosevelt’s New Deal policy, with wellhidden connections to leftist foreign correspondents and were collaborating with Japanese socialists and communists to advance progressive reforms.33 Leftists in the GS and the ESS pushed hard for their agenda. They successfully instituted the Trade Union Law in December 1945, which gave laborers the right to organize unions, collectively bargain, and strike without fear of losing their jobs.34 However, Japan’s economy had already been devastated by the war and was unable to shoulder any union-inspired strikes. Furthermore, the Japanese imperial government bailed out the nation’s large industrial firms and provided compensation for war damages, which caused uncontrollable inflation. Labor leaders responded to a severe food shortage by mobilizing communists, socialists, Koreans, women’s groups, and the urban poor to demand jobs and food in front of the Prime Minister’s residence in early April 1946. While trying to suppress this demonstration, the police incurred several injuries.35 On May Day of 1946, 500,000 laborers and housewives held a demonstration in the streets of Tokyo. Two weeks later, a large number of Tokyo’s Setagaya Ward residents made an unprecedented march toward the Emperor’s palace to protest a delay in rice rations. Within days, an additional 250,000 Tokyo residents gathered in front of the palace to demand the release of grain stores from the palace storage. Some sneaked into the palace kitchen, where they discovered that grains had been exhausted. This was a staggering discovery. The emperor was living the same frugal lifestyle as other Japanese people. Meanwhile, the JCP, confident of its popular power, spread rumors that the GHQ enthusiastically supported the communists during a series of mass demonstrations.36 32

Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 54–55; Germaine A. Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 266. 33 GHQ Far East Command Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff and C in C, Subject; Leftist Infiltration into SCAP” APO 500 24 April 1947, RG-23, Box 18, Folder 2, Charles A. Willoughby Papers, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia. 34 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 255; Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 66. 35 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 315. 36 Nihon Ky¯ osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japanese Communist Party Central Committee), Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 65-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 65 years), vol. 1 (Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Iinkai shuppankyoku, 1988),

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MacArthur’s political adviser, George Atcheson, Jr. (1896–1947), publicly responded to these demonstrations on May 15, 1946, by saying that while the Communist Party was free to develop, the US did not favor communism in Japan. Atcheson reported to the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes (1882–1972), that it was difficult for the Japanese to differentiate between the “active support of communistic principles” and “the general rule of democracy,” which permitted all varieties of political parties.37 MacArthur warned that the mass demonstrations, which often involved physical intimidation, were a menace to the basic purposes and security of the Occupation, however, he did not identify communists as the culprits.38 The JCP continued to pretend to believe that the GHQ was on its side. However, this facade of mutual tolerance did not last long. Alarmed by the May 1946 mass demonstrations, MacArthur sent an urgent request for the US government to send food to alleviate Japan’s crisis. The supplies, shipped from the US, did not even begin to ease the severity of the crisis. Instead, labor strikes intensified as inflation continued and working wages failed to keep pace with the ever-rising prices of basic necessities.39 Two labor federations were formed in August 1946—the All Japan General Federation of Trade Unions, which was anti-communist, and the communist-dominated Congress of Industrial Unions of Japan (CIU). In the autumn of 1946, the communist union displayed its radical strategy by directing a series of strikes for higher wages within the national railway system and all major electric power companies. These disruptions crippled the already ailing economy. The new Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida (1878–1967), who was also the president of the Liberal Party, barely concealed his anger at the unions. Tensions intensified when his conservative government threatened to dismiss public employees, including large numbers of national railway workers. In January 1947, Yoshida publicly denounced the striking workers and rejected all National Public Employees Union demands for higher wages.40 Growing hostility toward Yoshida’s economic stance led to a wide-ranging coalition of labor unions, including those with anti-communist, communist, and neutral affiliations. These new partners formed a joint struggle committee in which the communists took the lead in mobilizing labor unions (membership totaled three million). This newly empowered group announced a general strike for February 1, 1947. The intention was to shut down the whole economy except for the operation of the Occupation forces and food deliveries to the Japanese people. Although the coalition unions feared that SCAP may intervene in the planned strike, the JCP 108; The Political Advisor in Japan George Atcheson, Jr. to the Secretary of State, Confidential No. 607, 18 September 1946 (Received October 7) Tokyo, 315–316 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, vol. VIII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946). 37 The Political Advisor in Japan George Atcheson, Jr. to the Secretary of State, Confidential No. 607, 18 September 1946 (Received October 7) Tokyo, 315; Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai, Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 70-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 70 years), vol. 1, 174. 38 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 316. 39 Masumi, Sengo seiji, 1945–1955, vol. 1, 193–194; Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 77. 40 OIR, “The Potentials of World Communism: Far East Part I: Japan,” August 1, 1949, 11.

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leaders were confident that such action would be unlikely as SCAP’s oppressive policies would receive the same publicized criticism that had occurred following the US suppression of labor movements in US-occupied South Korea.41 Negotiations between union leaders and Yoshida broke down a day before the strike. MacArthur immediately declared that he would not permit a general strike as it would worsen an already weak economy. At the same time, he ordered the Diet to be dissolved, forcing a general election to be held under the new constitution.42 The defeated but angry communists said that the US was “a duplicitous opponent of any genuine ‘people’s democracy’” and began to openly disparage the GHQ policies.43 In turn, the GHQ issued an official statement during the election campaign that the Japanese people should not vote for the JCP as it was a “destroyer of democracy.”44 This statement erased the prevailing misconception that MacArthur supported the communists.

4.3 The Cold War and US Occupation Policies An open rift between the GHQ and the JCP mirrored the antagonism simmering between the US and the Soviet Union, which became glaringly obvious in March 1947 when foreign ministers from the four Allied forces (the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France) met in Moscow. Soon after the Moscow meeting, on March 12, 1947, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine before a joint US Congress session and called for the containment of communism. Truman emphasized the urgent need to protect the US and Europe from encroaching communism and urged Congress to send military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall called for a massive economic aid plan to rebuild Western Europe, termed the Marshall Plan, in June 1947. Fanned by the fear of communist expansion, Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act in March 1948 and approved funding, which eventually amounted to USD 12 billion.45 This bold gesture triggered an aggressive response from the Soviet Union, which escalated into the Cold War. The US government’s Cold War policies were formulated through direct and indirect help from a powerful group of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) based in New York. Founded in 1921, the CFR published the preeminent journal Foreign Affairs. It played an influential role in developing American foreign policies. Many 41

Dower, Embracing Defeat, 268–269. OIR, “The Potentials of World Communism: Far East Part I: Japan,” August 1, 1949, 12; Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 65-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 65 years), vol. 1, 115. 43 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 269–271. 44 Nihon Ky¯ osant¯o no 65-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 65 years), vol. 1, 115. 45 “Marshall Plan, 1948,” in Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. https://history. state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan (accessed August 19, 2022); “The Truman Doctrine, 1947,” in Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. https://history.state.gov/milestones/ 1945-1952/truman-doctrine (accessed August 19, 2022); Katherine A. S. Sibley, The Cold War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 8, 139. 42

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council members joined the White House during the post-war and Cold War eras and helped mold US policy. Its original members (i.e., before the CFR was officially formed in 1921) directly influenced major US foreign policy decisions at the end of World War I. Leaders of the CFR’s War and Peace Studies Project were incorporated into the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy during World War II.46 In May 1947, the State Department established the Policy Planning Staff to formulate a long-term Cold War strategy. The CFR member, George F. Kennan (1904– 2005), who had first advocated for the communist containment policy in Foreign Affairs, became the chief architect of this strategy. Truman established the National Security Council (NSC) on September 18, 1947. This Council consolidated the agencies that had been separately waging the Cold War. Until then, Washington officials had not intervened in MacArthur’s rule over Japan due to his significant prestige there and their preoccupation with European affairs. Meanwhile, MacArthur was competing for the Republican presidential nomination for the upcoming 1948 election. However, MacArthur’s public statements became problematic as the Cold War increasingly dictated both domestic and foreign policy issues in Washington.47 Upon hearing about the Truman Doctrine, MacArthur told reporters that Allied Powers should expedite the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. Washington officials were shocked by his assertion. However, MacArthur was merely reiterating the US policy of accepting a disarmed Japan into the world community, an idea to which all Allied Powers had agreed in the summer of 1945. However, such US policy was based on the expectation that the nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek would rule China and become a pivotal ally in Asia. When the Pacific War ended, the US and the Soviet Union recognized Chiang’s nationalist regime, giving it a seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council.48 The moment the Pacific War ended, a large-scale and brutal civil war broke out on Asia’s mainland between Chiang’s nationalists and Mao Tse-tung’s communists. Alarmed by Mao’s growing influence in China, the US provided massive military assistance to Chiang, which temporarily worked. The nationalists captured communist headquarters in Yenan in March 1947 and were close to total victory. However, rampant corruption within Chiang’s circle, combined with uncontrollable inflation, undermined Chiang’s control. By late 1947, he lost both the battle and the support of 46

Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and Unites States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 17, 29; Glenn Davis and John G. Roberts, An Occupation without Troops: Wall Street’s Half-Century Domination of Japanese Politics (Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1996), 147, 150; The current organization (as of 2022) claims that the CFR is “an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher…” in About CFR, https://www.cfr.org/about (accessed August 19, 2022). 47 Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 8; Yoneyuki Sugita, Pitfall or Panacea: The Irony of U.S. Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952 (New York: Routledge, 2003), 36; Sibley, The Cold War, 132; Yonosuke Nagai, “The Roots of Cold War Doctrine: The Esoteric and the Exoteric,” in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), 27. 48 Sugita, Pitfall or Panacea, 35.

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the people. Mao began to gain the upper hand in China. Without consulting Washington, MacArthur announced in September 1947 that Occupation forces would be reduced to no more than 200,000 within six months unless unforeseen factors arose. The following day, the Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson (1893–1971)49 complained to President Truman and discredited MacArthur’s announcement at a press conference. In March 1948, Truman declared that the US would oppose any form of government controlled by the communists in China.50 The Korean peninsula had expediently been divided into the US and the Soviet zones after World War II. This divide became the frontline of the Cold War. Officials in Washington and Moscow had agreed to the Occupation zones when the Soviet Union attacked Japan before the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel, with the Soviets controlling North Korea and the Americans South Korea.51 The US-Soviet Joint Commission in Korea reached a deadlock in February 1948 and fell apart when the UN Assembly approved the US proposal for a national election in US-occupied South Korea. The UN ignored Soviet opposition to the division of Korea. Dr. Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) formed the Republic of Korea (ROK) in Seoul under American auspices in August 1948. Kim Il-sung (1912–1994) founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) one month later under Soviet guidance. Kim Il-sung was one of the small numbers of Koreans who joined the CCP underground in neighboring Manchuria. As a member of the CCP, he fought against the Japanese before slipping across the border to reach the Soviet Union in 1940. Kim joined the Red Army when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, he returned to Korea as a Soviet officer. The Soviets placed Kim Il-sung, who was in his 30s, as head of the new regime in the North Korea zone, expecting his loyal subservience to Soviet diktat. Both the Soviet and the US troops soon withdrew from the Korean peninsula.52 The stage was set for a violent showdown between North and South Korea. The US government realized the urgent need to reassess its Asian foreign policy and began to pay attention to Occupied Japan. In March 1948, the State Department sent Kennan to Japan to coordinate a better working relationship between MacArthur and Washington.53 By then, it was well known that MacArthur and his top staff in

49

According to K.M. Heaton, Dean Acheson and his assistant for Far East policy, Owen Lattimore, were part of the “China Lobby” that intentionally allowed China to fall under communist control. Indeed, Lattimore was later “identified by the Senate Committee on Internal Affairs as ‘a conscious, articulate agent of the Communist Party.’” K. M. Heaton, The Impossible Dream (Bellingham, WA: Hart Publications, 1990), 1–20. 50 Yoshikazu Sakamoto, “The International Context of the Occupation of Japan,” in Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation, ed. Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 57–58. 51 Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 163. 52 Westad, The Cold War, 162–165. 53 Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989), 179.

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Tokyo had a “violent prejudice” against the State Department.54 Former diplomat, Richard B. Finn served at the Political Adviser’s Office (POLAD) as the State Department representative to the GHQ in Tokyo from 1947 to 1954. He reminisced that MacArthur had accepted the State Department’s office on the sole condition that it becomes a section of SCAP military headquarters under his control. It was called the Diplomatic Section, whose staff were not allowed to transmit or receive telegraphic messages from the State Department in Washington. MacArthur’s staff, famously loyal to him, were suspicious of the State Department. They looked upon the Diplomatic Section as the enemy. In fact, Major General Willoughby of the G-2 had informed MacArthur about possible leftist and communist infiltrations of the State Department. Finn said that Willoughby was “in many ways a brilliant man… A reactionary man politically, but he foresaw the Cold War before many people foresaw it.”55 The meetings between Kennan and MacArthur revealed the large difference in their assessments of the communist threat in Japan. MacArthur said that he had successfully democratized Japan and that the Japanese would never willingly accept communist encroachment. Thus, he did not see the communists in Japan as a menace. He argued for an early peace treaty, even without Soviet participation. On the other hand, Kennan believed that Japan was weak, unstable, and vulnerable to communist propaganda. He insisted that economic recovery should be SCAP’s main objective as a healthy economy would stabilize the current government, making the nation strong enough to fend off communism. He insisted that the US should not press for a treaty. Although MacArthur did not agree with Kennan’s assessment of the communist threat in Japan, he consented to focus on economic recovery.56 Fueled by the fear of a communist revolution in Asia, the US government determined that Japan would become an American bulwark against communist encroachment in East Asia. The National Security Council adopted a policy report, “Recommendations with Respect to US Policy toward Japan” (NSC13/2), in early October 1948 to achieve political stability in Japan.57 This altered the occupational policy from “demilitarization and democratization” to economic recovery.58 Each GHQ section’s power waxed and waned as the original focus of its mission shifted to economic recovery. Until early 1947, the GS had radically reformed Japan’s 54

Takemae, Inside GHQ, 149. Richard Finn, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project: Richard B. Finn, initial interview date: April 8, 1991 (Copyright 1998 ADST), 5–6. http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Finn,%20Richard%20B.toc.pdf (accessed August 19, 2022). 56 Sugita, Pitfall or Panacea, 38–39. 57 “Note by the NSC Executive Secretary (Souers) to President Truman,” NSC 13/2, [Washington,] October 7, 1948, [Annex] NSC 13/2, “Report by the NSC on Recommendations with Respect to the United States Policy toward Japan” [Washington, October7, 1948] in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI, 857–858. https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1948v06/d588 (accessed August 19, 2022). 58 Takeshi Igarashi, Tainici k¯ owa to reisen (Peace treaty and the Cold War) (Tokyo: T¯oky¯o daigaku shuppankai, 1986), 52; Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 136. 55

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political and legal systems. While Washington was still maintaining the façade of an alliance with the Soviet Union, Willoughby’s G-2 was fighting the Cold War behind the scenes. Head of both the CIS and the CIC, Brigadier General Thorpe left Japan at his request in February 1946.59 Willoughby became the head of all SCAP intelligence activities. In fact, the CIC took total control of anti-communist intelligence. Willoughby recruited communist hunters from Japan’s former military intelligence officers, the military police, and the feared Special Higher Police. Among these recruits were two infamous leaders from the Japanese Army, vice chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff, Torashir¯o Kawabe (1890–1960), and Lieutenant General, Seiz¯o Arisue (1895–1992), both of whom Willoughby had met in Manila during the Japanese surrender mission in August 1945.60 Kawabe was a leading member of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff in 1931, a military attaché in Moscow from 1932 to 1934, and chief of intelligence for the Kwantung Army, the largest and most prestigious command in the Imperial Japanese Army stationed in southern Manchuria. He had led Japan’s secret military agency against communist encroachment in Asia. In addition, he interrogated the JCP members and Korean nationalists in Japan. He made his career as an expert communist hunter. Arisue served as head of the dreadfully feared intelligence department (G-2) of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff in 1945 where years-long solitary confinement and horrific torture were routinely used to break the communists. After the 1945 surrender, he served as Chief Liaison Officer between the Japanese Army and the GHQ. Arisue offered vast intelligence documents, collected before the end of the war, as a bargaining chip with the GHQ. He was considered by the GHQ as a possible war criminal, however, he was spared due to the vital information he could supply and his willingness to support Willoughby’s efforts against communism.61 Under the auspices of working on a Japanese history of the war, Willoughby established a clandestine G-2 section in 1948 to monitor communists in Korea, Manchuria, and the Soviet Union. He chose Kawabe as its chief. Kawabe’s section was a military secret service agency called the “Kawabe Kikan.”62 His subordinates included former high-ranking Red hunters from the Japanese army and navy. Many former officers of the Special Higher Police, which was abolished by SCAP in September 1945, were assigned to the CIC as invaluable assistants. All those recruited were exempt

59

Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 184, note 124. Charles A. WilloughbyWilloughby, Charles A., GHQ shirarezaru ch¯oh¯o-sen—shinpan; Willoughby kaikoroku (Charles A. Willoughby’s memoirs), trans. and eds. Yan Yon and Masao Hiratuka (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan-sha, 2011), 72–73, 216–217. 61 Kunihiko Hata, ed. Nihon riku kai gun s¯ og¯o jiten (Japanese army and navy dictionary). 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2005); Hideki Fukukawa, ed. Nihon rikugun sh¯okan jiten (Japanese army generals dictionary) (Tokyo: Fuy¯o shob¯o shuppan, 2001). 62 The GHQ’s support to the Kawabe Kikan ended in 1952. Subsequently, it became a think tank called Sekai Seikei Ch¯osakai (World Politics and Economics Research Section) within the Cabinet Research Section. 60

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from the purge of military and police personnel and were placed on the Occupation payroll with special privileges.63 Willoughby swiftly used his capable Japanese and American staff to identify the leftists. Willoughby detested these people and believed they were active Soviet sympathizers, if not outright spies, who had been conspiring to make Japan a communist country. After the US government announced its anti-communist policy in March 1947, Willoughby conducted a secret internal investigation to detect leftist infiltration of SCAP. He ousted all the members who were suspected communists or sympathizers and who had worked for progressive policies to drastically democratize Japanese society.64 Those working in the GHQ for progressive policies resigned or were forced to leave. The first chief of the CIE, Dyke, who helped free communist political prisoners, abolish the Special Higher Police, draft the Emperor’s New Year’s message renouncing his divinity, and purge ultranationalists from schools and the media, was labeled by Willoughby and other conservatives as “that damned pink.”65 Dyke resigned in May 1946 and returned to the US in June where he regained his position as Vice President of the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). Dyke was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Nugent (1903–1983), “a dyed-in-thewool conservative,” who had joined the marines and underwent training in Japanese and psychological warfare during the War.66 Willoughby’s G-2 eventually succeeded in ousting Lieutenant Colonel Charles Louis Kades (1906–1996), a Harvard-educated lawyer who had served in the New Deal policy during the FDR administration and was a powerful acting chief in the GS in Tokyo. Kades was blocked from returning to Japan when he arrived in Washington to negotiate the Occupation policy in December 1948. He resigned on May 3, 1949. Willoughby successfully eliminated all known “New Dealers” from the GHQ by getting rid of Kades.67 Willoughby testified in his memoirs that MacArthur had loyally implemented policies in line with the GS advice up until 1948. However, the G-2 gained more influence within the GHQ soon after 1948 when it covertly supported conservative Japanese politicians who would willingly cooperate with the GHQ in exchange for leniency in punitive reforms.68

63

Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 52–53. GHQ Far East Command Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff and C in C, Subject; Leftist Infiltration into SCAP” APO 500 24 April 1947, RG-23, Box 18, Folder 2, Charles A. Willoughby Papers, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia; Willoughby, GHQ shirarezaru ch¯oh¯o-sen—shinpan; Willoughby kaikoroku (Charles A. Willoughby’s memoirs), 175, 216–218. 65 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 181. 66 Bonner F. FellersFellers, Bonner F. to Norman Thomas, May 21, 1946, Box 5, Folder 1, Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers Papers, MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA, USA. 67 Willoughby, GHQ shirarezaru ch¯ oh¯o-sen—shinpan; Willoughby kaikoroku (Charles A. Willoughby’s memoirs), 217. 68 Willoughby, GHQ shirarezaru ch¯ oh¯o-sen—shinpan; Willoughby kaikoroku, 175. 64

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The quiet but dramatic shift in the Occupation policy was manifested in areas of labor and economics. For instance, SCAP told the Japanese government to issue an order that would deny civil servants the right to strike or collectively bargain on July 31, 1948. The plan to disband the powerful financial conglomerate (the Zaibatsu), the 1947 Occupation policy paper (FEC 230),69 was modified. Thus, the number of large corporations designated for dissolution suddenly dropped from hundreds to only nine.70 American financial and economic interests directly contributed to the sudden “reverse course”71 toward Occupied Japan. By taking advantage of the intensifying Cold War, a group of powerful individuals informally called the Japan Lobby, pressured the US government to alter its Occupation policy from democratization and demilitarization to economic recovery and remilitarization. This group, officially known as the American Council on Japan (ACJ), was established in June 1948 at the request of the State Department. The ACJ’s advisors included prominent Americans, such as William R. Castle and Joseph C. Grew, both of whom were former US ambassadors to Japan and held important US government positions.72 The council constitution listed its main objective as “keep[ing] before the American public the vital interest of the US in a peaceful, prosperous and friendly Japan in accordance with the historical role the US has played and can continue to play in the Far East.”73 As the ACJ had powerful allies in the federal government, the Zaibatsu dissolution plan was shelved.74 The Soviet Union responded to the US declaration of the Cold War and the highly effective Marshall Plan for rebuilding Western Europe by tightening its grip on Eastern Europe. The Comintern had been dissolved as a gesture of goodwill by Stalin in December 1943, however, it was re-established in September 1947 under the new name, Cominform (Communist Information Bureau). Its new mission was to combat the Marshall Plan and US “imperialism.”75 69

“State Department economists drew up an amazingly detailed document known as FEC-230. It was submitted to the Far Eastern Commission on May 12 [1947] and communicated to General MacArthur’s headquarters. It was classified as confidential and its contents, thus, kept from the American public.” A report by James Lee Kauffman, prominent New York lawyer, “Foreign Affairs,” Newsweek, December 1, 1947. 70 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 82, 271; Carlile, Divisions of Labor, 146–148. 71 The term “reverse course” (gyaku k¯ osu) refers to the phenomenon in which a series of changes in the GHQ’s policy occurred “at some point between 1947 and 1949,” which substantially changed the Occupation authorities’ attitudes with respect to radical left-wing political parties and labor unions. Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamoto ed., Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation, xiii. 72 Yukika Soma, “Man of Principle” in Ozaki Yukio Kinen Zaidan (Yukio Ozaki Memorial Foundation), “About Ozaki and us.” https://ozakiyukio.jp/en.html (accessed August 19, 2022). 73 “Council on Japan Organized Here,” The New York Times, Monday, July 19, 1948. https:// www.nytimes.com/1948/07/19/archives/council-on-japan-is-organized-here.html (accessed March 16, 2022). 74 Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 134–160. 75 Westad, The Cold War, 97; Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), 898–899.

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The JCP, originally established as a branch of the Comintern in 1922, quickly aligned with the new Cominform and its leaders began to openly denounce the US. The JCP adopted the Democratic Japanese Race Frontline in February 1948, declaring that only communism could save Japan from imminent American destruction.76 Emphasizing the incomplete nature of Japan’s democratic revolution, the JCP said that the US was a driving force for new fascism in Japan and the mendacious US was operating “under a cover of democracy.”77 The JCP incited Japanese nationalism by stressing how the US had sabotaged Japan’s independence and promised that it would build a popular front “with maximum opposition to the Occupation and the [Japanese] government”78 by appealing to “intellectuals, workers, and other groups.”79 Thereafter, the JCP began infiltrating schools and universities to influence future generations. Their overt challenge to the US and the GHQ triggered the Red Purge, which began in 1949.

References Carlile, Lonny E. 2005. Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Carter, Carolle J. 1997. Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists 1944– 1947. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. Davis, Glenn, and John G. Roberts. 1996. An Occupation without Troops: Wall Street’s Half-century Domination of Japanese Politics. Tokyo: Yenbooks. Dower, John W. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Emmerson, John K. 1978. The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Finn, Richard B. Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project: Richard B. Finn, Initial interview date: April 8, 1991 (Copyright 1998 ADST). http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Finn,%20Richard%20B.toc. pdf. Accessed 19 August 2022. Fukukawa, Hideki (ed.). 2001. Nihon rikugun sh¯okan jiten (Japanese army generals dictionary). Tokyo: Fuy¯o shob¯o shuppan. Gayn, Mark. 1948. Japan Diary. New York: William Sloane Associates Inc. Hata, Kunihiko (ed.). 2005. Nihon riku kai gun s¯og¯o jiten (Japanese army and navy dictionary), 2nd ed. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. Heaton, K. Maureen. 1990. The Impossible Dream. Bellingham, WA: Hart Publications. Hoston, Germaine A. 1986. Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Igarashi, Takeshi. 1986. Tainici k¯owa to reisen (Peace treaty and the Cold War). Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai.

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Nihon Ky¯osanto Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japan Communist Party central committee), Nihon Kyosanto no 65-nen (Japan Communist Party’s 65 years), vol. 1, 108. 77 OIR, “The Potentials of World Communism: Far East Part I: Japan,” August 1, 1949, 9. 78 OIR, “The Potentials of World Communism: Far East Part I: Japan,” August 1, 1949, 9. 79 OIR, “The Potentials of World Communism: Far East Part I: Japan,” August 1, 1949, 13.

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Kumano, Ruriko. 2007. Academic Freedom and Autonomy: Walter C. Eells and the Red Purge in Universities during the Allied Occupation of Japan. PhD diss: University of Hawaii. Kumano, Ruriko. 2010. The Japanese Communist Party and MacArthur’s General Headquarters. Studies in International Relations 30 (2): 57–74. Masumi, Junnosuke. 1983. Sengo seiji 1945–1955 (Postwar politics). Vol. 1. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. Nagai, Yonosuke. 1977. The Roots of Cold War Doctrine: The Esoteric and the Exoteric. In The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, 15–42. New York: Columbia University Press. Nagoshi, Kenr¯o. 1994. Kuremurin himitsu bunsho wa kataru (Kremlin top-secret documents revealed). Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ k¯oronsha. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japanese Communist Party Central Committee). 1988. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 65-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 65 years), vol. 1. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo Iinkai Shuppankyoku. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japanese Communist Party Central Committee). 1994. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 70-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 70 years), vol. 1. Tokyo: Shin nippon shuppannsha. Oinas-Kukkonen, Henry. 2003. Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Quigley, Carroll. 1966. Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time. New York: The MacMillan Company. Sakamoto, Yoshikazu. 1987. The International Context of the Occupation of Japan. In Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation, ed. Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, 42–75. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Scalapino, Robert A. 1967. The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. Berkeley: University of California Press. Schaller, Michael. 1997. Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation. New York: Oxford University Press. Schonberger, Howard B. 1989. Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945– 1952. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press. Sibley, Katherine A.S. 1998. The Cold War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Shoup, Laurence H., and William Minter. 1977. Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy. New York: Monthly Review Press. Sugita, Yoneyuki. 2003. Pitfall or Panacea: The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952. New York: Routledge. Takemae, Eiji. 1987. Early Postwar Reformist Parties. In Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation, ed. Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamato, 339–365. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Takemae, Eiji. 2002. Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy. Translated by Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann. New York: Continuum. Ward, Robert E., and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, eds. 1987. Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Westad, Odd Arne. 2017. The Cold War: A World History. New York: Basic Books. Wildes, Harry Emerson. 1954. Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath. New York: The Macmillan Company. Willoughby, Charles A. 2011. GHQ shirarezaru ch¯oh¯o-sen—shinpan; Willoughby kaikoroku (GHQ’s unknown espionage battles: a new edition・Charles A. Willoughby’s memoirs). Translated and edited by Yan Yon and Masao Hiratuka. Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan-sha.

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Government Documents Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government Section. 1949. Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948. 2 vols. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. The United States, Department of States. 1977. O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc. United States, Department of States, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V. https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1944v05/d1195. Accessed 19 August 2022. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945M alta/d503. Accessed 19 August 2022. United States, Department of States. 1946. Foreign Relations of the United States 1946. The Far East, vol. VIII. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. United States, Department of States. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI, 857–858. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus19 48v06/d588. accessed 19 August 2022. United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. (1956). Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 84th Congress, second session (85th Congress, first session), Parts 50–54 (pp. 3502– 3503). https://archive.org/stream/scopeofsovietact5054unit#page/3502/mode/2up. Accessed 19 August 2022.

Manuscript Collections Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby,1947–1973. MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library (Norfolk, Virginia).

Chapter 5

University Reform

In early March 1946, MacArthur invited 27 prominent education specialists from the US to Tokyo. Headed by Dr. George D. Stoddard, they formed the US Education Mission, which was tasked with investigating Japan’s education system and presenting recommendations for reforms. To facilitate the work, MacArthur ordered the Education Ministry to establish the Japanese Education Committee. This committee consisted of 29 educators, most of whom were well-known professors at national or private universities. The ministry appointed 56-year-old Dr. Shigeru Nanbara (1889–1974), president of Tokyo Imperial University, as the committee chairman. The Japanese Education Committee provided information about Japan’s pre-war and wartime education to the US Education Mission. The American educators, in turn, suggested ways to encourage elementary and secondary education to teach democracy. Regarding higher education, both the American and the Japanese agreed that academic freedom should be guaranteed and that universities needed to participate more actively in society. According to Nanbara, American educators praised the administrative system within Japanese imperial universities as democratic as faculty members’ votes determined the outcome of personnel and policy decisions.1 At the end of its three-week tour, the US Education Mission presented its report to MacArthur. The Mission made detailed recommendations for primary and middle schools, however, it did not say much about higher education except regarding

Part of this chapter is reproduced with permission from Japan Studies Review. [“Japanese Professor Resist University Reforms During the U.S. Occupation” by Ruriko Kumano, 2012. Japan Studies Review, Vol. XVI, 57–68, Copyright 2012 by Japan Studies Review]. 1

“Japanese Educational Reform Committee,” September 17, 1946, 1; Box 33, Joseph C. Trainor Papers, 1933–1980, Hoover Institution Archives; Shigeru Nanbara, “Shin daigakusei no mondai” (Problems in the new university system) (Remarks at conference of the university administrators, February 14, 1949), in Masao Terasaki, ed., Nanbara Shigeru ky¯oiku kaikaku: Daigaku kaikaku ronsh¯u (Shigeru Nanbara’s essays on university reforms) (Tokyo: Nihon tosho sent¯a, 2001), 353.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_5

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academic freedom. The American educators did, however, say that higher education must not be “the privilege of a few,” as was the norm in Japan.2 These American specialists emphasized that administration needed to be decentralized to restore and fortify academic freedom and university autonomy as democratization implied that the administration was supposed to be as responsive to the ordinary people as possible. They insisted that the Education Ministry’s control be limited to “examining the qualifications of a proposed institution of higher education.”3 They recommended that faculty members administer academic affairs and establish “national associations of teachers, professors, and of universities.”4 In response, the Japanese Association of University Professors (JAUP), modeled after the Association of American University Professors (AAUP), was established on December 1, 1946, and chaired by Nanbara. Moreover, Article 23 of the new constitution guaranteed academic freedom. In January 1949, the Science Council of Japan was established to reinforce freedom of thought and inquiry.5

5.1 Japanese Initiatives for Education Reform The US Education Mission’s recommendation for decentralized power served as a blueprint for post-war reform. Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Nugent, then acting chief of the CIE, assured that the Japanese would take the initiative of adopting the reforms proposed by the American Mission and that the CIE will act merely in an advisory capacity. To that end, Nugent requested that the Japanese Committee, which had worked with the US Education Mission, be elevated to an authoritative position that would be autonomous and independent of the Education Ministry. The CIE established a fundamental policy to reduce the Education Ministry’s power.6

2

United States, Department of State, “Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan: Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” in Far Eastern Series 11 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 61. 3 The United States, Department of State, “Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan: Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” in Far Eastern Series 11 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 61–62. 4 The United States, Department of State, “Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan: Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” in Far Eastern Series 11 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 50. 5 Tokiomi Kaigo and Masao Terasaki, Daigaku ky¯ oiku (Higher education) (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1969), 24–27. 6 Department of State, Office of Research and Intelligence, Division of Far East Intelligence, “Situation Report—Japan, Comments on Current Intelligence,” May 24, 1946, 5, File 097.3 Z1092 No 3479.10. in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington DC: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc.,1977); “Japanese Educational Reform Committee,” September 17, 1946, 2; Box 33, Joseph C. Trainor Papers; Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, Education in the New Japan (Tokyo: SCAP, CIE Section, 1948) 1: 144–145.

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Nugent became the chief of the CIE in May 1946 when the first chief, Brigadier General Ken R. Dyke, returned to the US. In contrast to Dyke, who had limited knowledge of Japan, Nugent knew Japanese education very well. He attended Stanford University, receiving a BA with distinction in 1923 and an MA in history in 1931. He did additional graduate work in the field of Japanese history. He was a member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1933 to 1937. After teaching at Menlo Junior College in California, Nugent came to Japan in 1936 and served as a lecturer at the Wakayama College of Commerce and the Osaka College of Commerce. In June 1941, he was called to active duty with the US Marine Corps. He served in the campaigns at Pearl Harbor, the Marshalls, the Marianas, and Iwo Jima and received the Pacific-Asiatic Theater Ribbon with four battle stars. In September 1945 he landed at Kyushu (Sasebo) with the Fifth Amphibious Corps. Due to his qualifications for highly specialized work in education and religion, he served with the CIE, starting in November 1945.7 He was the key person who retained the policy of respecting Japanese initiatives in education reform. In August 1946, the Japanese Education Reform Committee (JERC) was established as a cabinet-level groupthat would operate autonomously and would be free from the control of SCAP and the Education Ministry.8 At the first JERC meeting, Nugent said, “We give you complete freedom. Since this educational problem is yours alone, feel free to discuss matters openly and arrive at your decisions. We will never interfere with you.”9 Although he made sure that the JERC took the US Education Mission’s recommendations into account, especially concerning the decentralization of educational administration, Nugent wanted the JERC to be in charge. In practice, the CIE presented only basic outlines of its aims and the JERC made proposals to the Education Ministry, which, in turn, sought approval from the CIE. To expedite the reforms, Nugent met regularly with the Education Minister, while Lieutenant Colonel Mark T. Orr (1914–2010), who was chief of the Education Division and could speak Japanese, met weekly with the Vice Education Minister. Whenever delicate policy issues emerged, representatives of the JERC, the Education Ministry, and the CIE held joint meetings. In addition, the Three-Men Committee, made up of the top leaders of the three organizations, met whenever serious conflicts surfaced. Nanbara, president of Tokyo University, and Vice Chairman and later Chairman of the JERC, had considerable influence in fostering consensus among the three men.10 7

GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information and Education Section, “Press Release,” 1330, June 4, 1946, RG-100, Box 1, Donald R. Nugent Papers, MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library (Norfolk, Virginia). 8 SCAP, CIE, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, 1: 145; Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” December 9, 1946, 097.3 Z1092 no. 4119S, 47 in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Post War Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington DC: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc.,1977). 9 Terasaki, ed., Nanbara Shigeru ky¯ oiku kaikaku: Daigaku kaikaku ronsh¯u (Nanbara Shigeru’s essays on university reforms), 187–188 (author’s translation). 10 Nanbara succeeded Abe as chairman in November 1947. “Japanese Educational Reform Committee,” September 17, 1946, 4, Box 33, Joseph C. Trainor Papers; Education in the New

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In March 1947, the Fundamental Law of Education, which provided a legal basis for equal opportunity in education, was enacted. Based on this egalitarian principle, in the same month, the School Education Law replaced the old discriminatory educational ladder in the dual-track (the brightest vs. the not so bright) system with a single-track system of six years of primary education, three years of middle school, three years of high school, and four years of university.11 In theory, universities were transformed from elitist institutions into egalitarian ones to serve the needs of all the people. This shift to a new system required drastic changes in the existing institutions of higher education. During this restructuring, conflicts emerged between the JERC and the CIE regarding the administrative system in national universities. The newly appointed adviser of higher education, Dr. Walter C. Eells (1886–1962), a Stanford professor who held an MA degree in Mathematics from the University of Chicago and a PhD in Education from Stanford, ignited the biggest academic turmoil in Japanese education. It is important to understand why was Eells handpicked for this position. When the first US Education Mission arrived in Japan in March 1946, it recommended that the CIE hire prominent civilianadvisers.12 Dr. George Stoddard, chairman of the education mission, recommended Eells by describing him as “a capable person who would strongly contribute to a job associated with Japanese higher education.”13 The CIE hired Eells, then 61 years old, in March 1947, when the new education laws were passed.14 Some CIE members voiced concerns as to whether a person of his age could handle the war-torn environment of Tokyo. Dr. Stoddard and other members of the education mission, however, wrote letters to the CIE in support of Eells’ appointment.15 Indeed, Eells seemed to be a good fit for the position. After obtaining a PhD in Education from Stanford University, Eells taught at Whitworth College, the US Naval Academy, Whitman College, and his alma mater. At Stanford, he earned a national reputation as a scholar in the field of junior college education. In 1938, he became the first full-time executive secretary at the American Association of Junior Colleges in Washington, DC. In 1945, he assumed a government position Japan, 1: 145; Joseph C. Trainor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor’s Memoir (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1983), 222–223; Mark Taylor Orr, “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan,” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 1954), 33, 220. 11 “Fundamental Law of Education,” in Education in the New Japan, 2: 109; SCAP, CIE, “Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields,” October 1, 1949 (Tokyo: Civil Information and Education Section, 1949), 11; Hideo Takemura, “The Role of the National Government in Japanese Higher Education, 1868–1980” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1982), 148–149. 12 United States, Department of State, “Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan: Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” 2. 13 Mark T. OrrOrr, Mark T., Senry¯ oka nihon no ky¯oiku kaikaku seisaku (Educational reform policies in occupied Japan), trans. Gary G. Tsuchimochi (Machida-shi: Tamagawa gakuen shuppanbu, 1993), 14. 14 Walter C. Eells, “Preface,” May 15, 1954, Walter C. Eells Papers, Whitman College Manuscript Collection, Penrose Library, Whitman College (Walla Walla, Washington) (hereafter, Eells Papers). 15 Orr, Senryoka nihon no kyoiku kaikaku seisaku (Educational reform policies in occupied Japan), 36.

5.2 Eells’ Plan for University Overhaul

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as chief of the Foreign Education Division of the Veterans Administration.16 Two of his colleagues described him as a “tireless worker” who possessed “a keen mind” and “courage.” They noted that he could “press for his point of view in the face of stiff opposition because it was unthinkable to him to accept a second best.”17 Eells would go on to demonstrate this persistence in Tokyo.18

5.2 Eells’ Plan for University Overhaul Most, if not all, studies on educational reform during the US Occupation accuse Eells of being the instigator of the Red Purge in universities.19 His association with the anticommunist movement eclipses his other important actions, such as his conspicuous role in the controversy over the introduction of a board of trustees as a system of governance for Japan’s national universities. The CIE and the Japanese education leaders agreed on one thing—the power of the Education Ministry should be diminished and, if possible, eliminated. However, there was little consensus about where the powers of the ministry should be redistributed. The CIE’s insistence on decentralizing governance originated from its conviction that the central power should be transferred to local boards of education. Decentralizing the elementary and middle school levels of the education system was not difficult. In December 1947, the JERC prepared the Board of Education Bill, whereby, an education committee would be established in each prefecture and manned by locally elected people.20 However, it had a different idea for universities. Most of the JERC members were university professors who wholeheartedly agreed with the CIE that the universities should be independent of the Education Ministry. This consensus resulted in the School Education Law of March 1947. Article 59 of the law reads, “The university shall have a faculty meeting to discuss and deliberate over important matters.”21 16

Who Was Who in America with World Notables, vol. 4, 1961–1968 (Chicago: Marquis-Who’s Who, 1968), s.v. “Eells, Walter Crosby.”. 17 Curtis Bishop, “Walter C. Eells,” Junior College Journal, 33, no. 6 (1963): 3; Ernest V. Hollis, “Walter Crosby Eells, 1886–1962,” School and Society 91 (1963): 242. 18 Ruriko Kumano, “Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the ‘Red Purge’ in Occupied Japan,” History of Education Quarterly, 50, no.4 (2012): 517–518. 19 Takemura, “The Role of the National Government in Japanese Higher Education, 1868–1980,” 162; T. John Pempel, Patterns of Japanese Policymaking: Experiences from Higher Education (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 51; Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 258; Sabur¯o Ienaga, Daigaku no jiy¯u no rekishi (History of university freedom), 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Hanawa shob¯o, 1962; reprint, 1965), 111–112; Akio Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi (History of university autonomy) (Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha, 1965; reprint, 1968), 114–117. 20 Trainor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan, 238; Masako Shibata, Japan and Germany under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 85. 21 SCAP, CIE, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, 2, 122.

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This law did not specify the role of the Education Ministry in the administration of national universities. The JERC believed that publicly-funded universities should be free of government control, except in cases where funds had to be allocated.22 Since the departure of the US Education Mission, the Education Ministry had been making desperate attempts to retain its power. In November 1946, the ministry established a less public, yet just as powerful, special committee to deliberate on the standards for the new university system. However, the CIE instructed that this new committee be disassociated from the ministry. In July 1947, this new group evolved to become the University Accrediting Association (UAA). The UAA was independent of both the Education Ministry and the JERC.23 Members of the CIE’s Higher Education Division, especially Eells, were pleased with this development. Although Eells’ superior, Education Division Chief, Mark T. Orr, like Nugent, respected Japanese autonomy and urged for less instruction from the GHQ, Orr’s staff were alarmed that their suggestions were always completely ignored. They expected the UAA to follow their advice. To ensure that the Japanese people would value American advice, Eells and the other discontented staff members attended every session of the UAA, which was pressured to operate under the direct supervision of the American advisers.24 Eells stated at one meeting that the UAA should review the CIE’s new plan for establishing local boards of education for public universities. To Eells’ disappointment, the UAA members vigorously opposed the plan, arguing that (1) Japanese public universities had been established for national, and not local, needs; (2) local boards of education would not have the ability to understand the mission of the universities, thereby, lowering the quality of the universities; (3) the plan would expose the universities to political and economic manipulation, that is, interference in faculty autonomy; and (4) local governments did not have sufficient funds to support universities. The JERC, too, opposed the plan, citing similar reasons.25 Eells rejected these arguments as he wanted the Education Ministry’s power to be thoroughly decentralized. In fact, SCAP tried to give each prefecture more power in the same way as the federal system operated in the US. Eells believed that each prefecture should have its public university and Japan’s public universities should be like America’s state universities. In reality, Japan is geographically smaller in size than California and its prefectures are similar in size to California counties.

22

Ienaga, Daigaku no jiy¯u no rekishi, 104. Trainor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan, 229; Takemura, “The Role of the National Government in Japanese Higher Education, 1868–1980,” 140. 24 Hitoshi Osaki, ¯ Daigaku kaikaku, 1945–1999 (University reforms) (Tokyo: Y¯uhikaku, 1999), 67, 71–72; Takashi Hata, Sengo daigaku kaikaku (University reform in postwar Japan) (Machida-shi: Tamagawa daigaku shuppanbu, 1999), 82. 25 Pempel, Patterns of Japanese Policymaking, 49; Hata, Sengo daigaku kaikaku, 76–78; Shibata, Japan and Germany under the U.S. Occupation, 89–90; Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku ky¯oiku, 587. 23

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Nevertheless, Eells remained convinced that giving autonomy to local people was the true beginning of democratization.26 In early January 1948, Eells handed Orr a document, entitled “Suggested Plan for Publicly Controlled Universities in Japan Higher Education Unit,” which proposed that each publicly-funded university should have its local board of trustees. Eells prescribed that “some intermediary administrative advisory organ between the ministry and the faculty councils” was necessary to supervise the overall administration of the university.27 In public universities in the US, the trustees’ most important function is to appoint a president or chancellor. Although faculty members have independent jurisdiction over the curriculum within their departments, their power over budgetary and personnel matters is limited to offering recommendations.28 Eells believed that this American system would be a perfect model for Japan as it would restrict the control exercised by the Education Ministry and make each university accountable to the taxpayers. However, elitist Japanese professors found it difficult to understand the rationale underlying Eells’ proposal. Structural changes in Japan’s school system did not correspondingly alter the mentality of the Japanese educators whose uniform conviction about the mission of the university was set in the pre-war era—universities were for a select few who would become leaders of industries, science, commerce, and politics and the professors could make decisions concerning academic standards, the course content, and personnel selection. Leaders in the Japanese education system had no trust in lay people who were less educated and who, until recently, had followed the military government’s orders. The academic elite regarded governance by lay people as the equivalent of mob rule. Eells, at the March 1948 meeting of the UAA, informally solicited members’ opinions regarding introducing a board of trustees as the system of governance. Their reaction was “most emphatically negative.”29 When the JERC learned about Eells’ proposal, they, too, vehemently opposed it.

5.2.1 Eells Versus Nanbara The Education Ministry lost its control over public elementary and secondary schools with the Board of Education Bill that was passed on July 15, 1948. The ministry, 26

Harry Wray, “Senry¯o-ki ni okeru ky¯oiku kaikaku” (Trilateral relationship: SCAP, the Ministry of Education, and the Japan Education Reform Committee), in Ray A. Moore ed. Tenn¯o ga baiburu o yonda hi (The day the Emperor read the Bible) (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 1982), 67. 27 Hata, Sengo daigaku kaikaku, 79–80; Osaki, ¯ Daigaku kaikaku, 139–140; Pempel, Patterns of Japanese Policymaking, 48. 28 Burton R. Clark, “United States,” in Academic Power: Pattern of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education, ed. John H. Van de Graaff (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 111–112. 29 Trainor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan, 238.

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however, did retain control over publicly-funded universities. Despite strong opposition from Japanese academics, Eells continued to advocate the establishment of boards of trustees in national universities. His proposal was a more comprehensive reform package called “The Eells Plan”.30 According to his recommendation, each prefecture would have one national university, which would consist of liberal arts and education departments to offer both cultural and vocational education. These universities would be governed by boards of trustees. Eells argued that because universities should meet the needs of society, private citizens representing the public should decide policies, personnel, and curricula. From his perspective, the absence of such representation was undemocratic.31 When Eells proposed to Orr that the CIE recommend his new plan to the JERC, other CIE officers opposed the move, arguing that the proposal went against the CIE’s policy of encouraging Japanese initiatives. Thus, tension arose within the CIE between those who were encouraging the Japanese to make their decisions and those, like Eells, who wanted to create changes in Japanese higher education. Eells believed that unless the Occupation authorities exerted more pressure, the Japanese would not change anything.32 Eells’ plan was eventually approved by CIE Chief Nugent and the plan was presented to the Education Ministry as the official policy of the CIE.33 The Education Ministry divulged The Eells Plan to certain JERC members, including President Nanbara of Tokyo University. Representing the other six presidents of Japan’s former imperial universities, Nanbara expressed his objections in a letter to Orr, dated July 15, 1948. Nanbara argued that a university was supposed to be “a special, social organization” whose mission was to search for the truth and provide a liberal education and specialized training to nurture professionals.34 Under The Eells Plan, Nanbara wrote, vocational training would become the major objective of university education, thereby, reducing the value of pure research and scholarship and lowering academic standards. Moreover, he continued, academic independence would be gravely compromised by the intrusion of a board of trustees who would have their

30

Trainor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan, 238. Department of State, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), File 097.3A1092. No. 5003C. “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 3 in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1977); Shigeru Nanbara, “Storm over the University Law: Reasons Given Opposing Education ¯ Ministry Plan,” Nippon Times, July 20, 1949; Genichi Oyama, “‘No More Eells’ t¯os¯oki (‘No More ¯ Eells’ struggle document),” Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron, November special issue (1968); Osaki, Daigaku kaikaku (University reforms), 152. 32 Hata, Sengo daigaku kaikaku, 81. 33 Trainor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan, 238. 34 Shigeru Nanbara and the other six presidents of national universities to Orr, Education Division, the CIE, “On the Proposal to Establish Boards of Trustees in National Universities,” July 15, 1948, 1 (original in English); Box 29, Joseph C. Trainor Papers, Hoover Institution Archives. 31

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non-academic agenda. Nanbara insisted that a university must be an organization that was protected from political interference.35 By referring to the pre-war political interference of the Tomizu Incident and the Sawayanagi Incident, Nanbara explained how university autonomy had developed “as a result of long years of effort by university elders and professors and lived to this day as a priceless heritage.” He emphasized that, unlike the US, Japan was still an unstable democracy and the backlash of reactionary forces would arise again at any moment and try to destroy the progress that the American and Japanese people jointly accomplished. He posed a rhetorical question, “What would happen if universities loosened their guard and allowed people who do not understand the sacred mission of universities to manage them?” He repeated his belief that “university people themselves—more than anyone else—must guard… the mission of the university.” Eells’ plan, in which only four of 13 board members would be selected from among university personnel, was meant to disempower faculty members. Nanbara stated that even in the US, the board-of-trustees system had its critics. If the system were introduced in Japan, he continued, “it would stultify the tradition and strong points of Japanese universities cultivated by years of indefatigable efforts… and would… give rise to fresh dangers and evils.”36 Orr forwarded Nanbara’s letter to Eells, who immediately responded in a memorandum to Orr. “Such a narrow and restricted concept of a university,” Eells wrote, was unacceptable, and Japanese universities tended to remain “highly monopolistic and bureaucratic” and, therefore, “quite unresponsive to broad social needs.” He believed that Nanbara’s view limited a university to an ivory tower for the elite. He stressed that national universities, supported by public funds, belonged to the people and were supposed to be accountable to the public, therefore, should not be exclusive.37 Eells did concur that universities had to be protected against unwarranted interference and reassured Nanbara that academic freedom and tenure, as set out by the American Association of University Professors, would be put into practice. In addition, he admitted that the board of trustees system was “not foolproof” yet believed that it would “minimize the dangers” that Nanbara foresaw.38 In his letter to Orr, Nanbara included an alternative called “The Nanbara Plan,” in which a National Education Committee in Tokyo, comprising educators, experts in 35

Shigeru Nanbara and the other six presidents of national universities to Orr, Education Division, the CIE, “On the Proposal to Establish Boards of Trustees in National Universities,” July 15, 1948, 1. 36 Shigeru Nanbara and the other six presidents of national universities to Orr, Education Division, the CIE, “On the Proposal to Establish Boards of Trustees in National Universities,” July 15, 1948, 1; Nanbara, “Storm over the University Law: Reasons Given Opposing Education Ministry Plan,” Nippon Times, July 20, 1949. 37 Adviser on Higher Education to Chief, Education Division, “Comments on Statement by Seven University Presidents regarding Boards of Trustees for National Universities,” July 24, 1948, 1; Box 29, Joseph C. Trainor Papers. 38 Adviser on Higher Education to Chief, Education Division, “Comments on Statement by Seven University Presidents regarding Boards of Trustees for National Universities,” July 24, 1948, 1–2.

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education, and Diet members, would replace the Education Ministry. Nanbara wrote that this committee would approve the presidents and deans selected from among faculty members at each national university and oversee the budgets and governance of the universities. The Nanbara Plan exposed the unspoken fact that he favored a centralized, top-down administration. Nevertheless, he demonstrated his respect for lay people by suggesting that each university should form an “advisory committee” composed of an equal number of university professors and lay members.39 Eells argued that Nanbara’s plan had “the probability of being more bureaucratic and dictatorial” than the Education Ministry and would ignore public interests. In addition, he argued that financial matters and the selection of personnel should be assigned to the local board of trustees for each university instead of a centralized national council in Tokyo. He concluded that many of Nanbara’s objections to The Eells Plan were “not necessarily valid” and it quite adequately addressed Nanbara’s concerns.40 The Education Ministry had, in fact, received Eells’ plan from the CIE in July 1948, however, had kept it under wraps for three months as it knew that Nanbara and other Japanese education leaders strongly opposed it. In mid-October 1948, the ministry publicized The Eells Plan as its own, entitling it “The Outline of the Proposed Law Governing Japanese Universities,” commonly known as the University Law. University professors and students rejected it vehemently. Nanbara publicly expressed his objections to The Eells Plan and presented his alternative as JERC’s plan. Debates over the University Law were publicized in major newspapers. Other Japanese academic associations drew up their proposals, most of which gave no decision-making power to outsiders.41 Japanese academics were determined to thwart the University Law proposed by Eells, while Eells relentlessly attempted to push it through. In Plans for Higher Education in 1949, a CIE document, Eells stated that no project is more important for 1949 than the proposed University Law because “it involves one of the basic purposes of the Occupation… namely the decentralization of control of all education.”42 While Eells worked hard to implement his version of decentralization, the JERC developed its scheme to gain greater autonomy from the Education Ministry. The Special Law on Public Servants in Education in January 1949 was a major victory for the professors of national universities as (1) the Education Ministry lost its veto power, meaning that the ministry had to issue appointments solely based on the recommendation of the university president and (2) the faculty meeting had 39

Shigeru NanbaraNanbara, Shigeru and the other six presidents of national universities to Orr, Education Division, the CIE, “On the Proposal to Establish Boards of Trustees in National Universities,” July 15, 1948, 5–6. 40 Adviser on Higher Education to Chief, Education Division, “Comments on Statement by Seven University Presidents Regarding Boards of Trustees for National Universities,” July 24, 1948, 3. 41 Hata, Sengo daigaku kaikaku, 117; Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku ky¯ ¯ oiku, 593; Osaki, Daigaku kaikaku, 141; Takemura, “The Role of the National Government,” 68, 149; Pempel, Patterns of Japanese Policymaking, 54. 42 Walter C. Eells, “Plans for Higher Education in 1949,” n.d., 18–19, in “Preface and CIE Documents,” Eells Papers.

References

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the power to appoint and dismiss professors and administrators. This law affirmed the traditional practice of university autonomy that had originated in the pre-war imperial universities.43 However, this victory was temporary, as the upcoming controversial University Law was expected to specify the governing system of national universities in greater detail. Nevertheless, encouraged by their recent victory, Japanese academics and students opposed the University Law. At this critical juncture, the Red Purge spread through university campuses, threatening to strip away the precious few privileges of autonomy that academia had fought hard to acquire. In July 1949, Eells spoke at Niigata University’s opening ceremony and argued that to protect academic freedom, universities had to oust communist professors who, he said, were slaves to the Communist Party.44 The CIE was concerned that universities were dealing ineffectively with the ever-mounting leftist student activism and the potential threat of communist professors. The CIE, and particularly Eells, believed that although the Japanese people were strongly anti-communists, the universities did not reflect this public sentiment due to the university’s autonomy. Eells continued to insist on the implementation of the board of trustees to remedy this flaw. Although the CIE inundated Japanese education leaders with suggestions, it left the details of the reforms to the universities. The CIE’s attitude allowed Japanese leaders to reject Eells’ recommendation and maintain the status quo. Amid the heated debate over Eells’ anti-communist statement, the Education Ministry shelved the proposed University Law in August 1949 and formed the Draft Committee to discuss a new National University Administration Bill.45 With the rejection of the proposed University Law, Japanese professors continued to enjoy their traditional autonomy throughout the Red Purge.

References Bishop, Curtis. 1963. Walter C. Eells. Junior College Journal 33 (6): 3. Clark, Burton R. 1978. United States. In Academic Power: Pattern of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education, edited by John H. Van de Graaff, 104–123. New York: Praeger Publishers. Hata, Takashi. 1999. Sengo daigaku kaikaku (University reform in postwar Japan). Machida-shi: Tamagawa daigaku shuppanbu. Hollis, Ernest V. 1963. Walter Crosby Eells, 1886–1962. School and Society 91: 242. Ienaga, Sabur¯o. 1965. Daigaku no jiy¯u no rekishi (History of university freedom), 2nd ed. Tokyo: Hanawa shob¯o, 1962. Reprint. 43

Shinichi Yamamoto, “National Universities before and after Incorporation,” Daigaku Kenky¯u 35 (2007): 21; Ienaga, Daigaku no jiy¯u no rekishi, 105. 44 Walter Crosby Eells, Adviser on Higher Education, “Convocation Address: Opening of Niigata University,” July 19, 1949, in “Niigata University,” Eells Papers. 45 “Daigaku Kanrih¯ o o Kis¯o” (Drawing up a draft university governing law), Asahi Shimbun, August 6, 1949.

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Ikazaki, Akio. 1965. Daigaku no jichi no rekishi (History of university autonomy). Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha. Reprint, Shin nihon shuppansha, 1969. Kaigo, Tokiomi, and Masao Terasaki. 1969. Daigaku ky¯oiku (Higher education). Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. Kumano, Ruriko. 2007. Academic Freedom and Autonomy: Walter C. Eells and the Red Purge in Universities During the Allied Occupation of Japan. PhD diss. University of Hawaii. Kumano, Ruriko. 2012. Japanese Professors Resist University Reforms During the U.S. Occupation. Japan Studies Review XVI: 51–74. Nishi, Toshio. 1982. Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945– 1952. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Orr, Mark Taylor. 1954. Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan. PhD diss., University of North Carolina. Orr, Mark Taylor. Senry¯oka nihon no ky¯oiku kaikaku seisaku (Educational reform policies in occupied Japan). Translated by Gary H. Tsuchimochi. Machida-shi: Tamagawa gakuen shuppanbu, 1993. ¯ Osaki, Hitoshi. 1999. Daigaku kaikaku 1945–1999 (University reforms). Tokyo: Y¯uhikaku. ¯ Oyama, Genichi. 1968. ‘No More Eells’ t¯os¯oki (‘No More Eells’ struggle document). Ch¯uo k¯oron, November special issue, 174–181. Pempel, T. John. 1978. Patterns of Japanese Policymaking: Experiences from Higher Education. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. Shibata, Masako. 2005. Japan and Germany Under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Takemura, Hideo. 1982. The Role of the National Government in Japanese Higher Education, 1868–1980. PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh. Terasaki, Masao. (ed.). 2001. Nanbara Shigeru ky¯oiku kaikaku: Daigaku kaikaku ronsh¯u (Nanbara Shigeru’s essays on university reforms). Tokyo: Nihon tosho sent¯a. Trainor, Joseph C. 1983. Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor’s Memoir. Tokyo: Meisei University Press. Wray, Harry. 1982. “Senry¯o-ki ni okeru ky¯oiku kaikaku” (Trilateral relationship: SCAP, the Ministry of Education, and the Japan Education Reform Committee). In Tenn¯o ga baiburu o yonda hi (The day the Emperor read the Bible), ed. Ray A. Moore. Tokyo: K¯odansha. Yamamoto, Shinichi. 2007. National Universities before and after Incorporation. Daigaku Kenky¯u 35: 17–26.

Government Documents Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section. 1948. Education in the New Japan, 2 vols. Tokyo: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section. United States, Department of State. 1946. Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan: Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In Far Eastern Series 11. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. United States, Department of States. 1977. O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc.

References

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Manuscript Collections Joseph C. Trainor Papers, 1933–1980. Hoover Institution Library and Archives. Stanford, California. Papers of Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Nugent. MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library. Norfolk, Virginia. Walter Crosby Eells Papers, 1890–1962. WC Manuscript Collection 3. Whitman College Manuscript Collection. Whitman College and Northwest Archives, Penrose Library, Whitman College. Walla Wall, Washington. Notes: Eells authored and co-authored 40 books and monographs and organized his numerous publications into 36 hardcover volumes. (Walter Crosby Eells, “Introduction,” Walter Crosby Eells: Author (1961), 2, Walter Crosby Eells Papers, vol. 13.). This collection is housed as the “Walter Crosby Eells Papers, 1890–1962” in the Whitman College and Northwest Archives of Penrose Library. Among the 36 volumes, vol. 20, Communism in Education in Japan, contains invaluable sources for this study on Eells’ experiences in Japan. This study refers to vol. 20, Communism in Education in Japan, as the Walter C. Eells Papers (Eells Papers), unless otherwise specified.

Chapter 6

Communism in Universities

At the start of the Occupation, the GHQ reinstated Marxists and leftist professors, who were anti-war, and encouraged them to participate in political activities. The demise of the militarist regime and the birth of democratic reforms proved to most academics that they had been correct and were overjoyed with hope and confidence. At the same time, they felt shame at having failed to resist pre-war and wartime repression. Masao Maruyama (1914–1996), an emerging liberal political scientist in post-war Japan, described Japan’s intellectual circles in the early days of the Occupation as “confessional communities” in which regret and shame were openly shared.1 ¯ Marxists who had been dismissed from imperial universities, such as Ouchi and Arisawa, were now considered victims of a militaristic regime and were honored for never having compromised their ideals. Japan’s universities welcomed them as fearless freedom fighters and national heroes. Former supporters of the imperial regime were purged or, if permitted to stay, publicly humiliated. Marxism became the ideology of a new hero, owing to the noteworthy struggle of its followers against fascism and militarism. Students revered Marxist professors as “progressive and democratic” and derided non-Marxists as “unprogressive and reactionary.”2 Many students studied the Marxist economic policies promoted by Kawakami, an

1 Masaru Tamamoto, “Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectual Thought in American Occupied Japan, 1948–1952” (PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1988), 74.

Part of this chapter is reproduced with permission from History of Education Quarterly. [“Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the “Red Purge” in Occupied Japan” by Ruriko Kumano, 2010. History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 50 No.4, 518–527, Copyright 2017 by Cambridge University Press.]. 2

Henry Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003), 134. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_6

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economics professor dismissed from Kyoto Imperial University in 1928 for his Marxist writings.3 As Marxism grew in prestige, the GHQ intelligence section and the CIE began researching Marxist influence on Japanese education. In late 1946, the CIE investigated whether the anthropology, history, philosophy, and economics curricula reflected a Marxist bias. The answer was no. At the same time, the CounterIntelligence Corps (CIC) conducted opinion polls in various schools. The results showed that few students supported the JCP, a finding that corresponded with the rise of anti-communism.4 The first post-war general election in April 1946 illustrated that despite the JCP’s “beloved” and “peaceful revolution” tactics, it gained only five seats (2,140,000 votes or 3.85% of all voters),5 indicating that the hostility toward the communists and the Soviet Union persisted. The Japanese held profound enmity toward the Soviet Union as it had broken its neutrality pact at the end of the war, killed nearly one million fleeing Japanese soldiers and civilians in Manchuria, and invaded and occupied the Japanese-controlled southern half of Sakhalin Island (“Karafuto” as it was known to the Japanese) and the adjacent islands, which were Japanese territory.6 Although the JCP denied its connection with the Soviet Union, the Japanese suspected that the JCP said so “to curry favor with the Americans.”7 The majority of Japanese people were particularly horrified by the JCP’s call for the abolition of the emperor system. In the spring of 1947, the GHQ intelligence agents interviewed two prominent economics professors from Kyoto Imperial University and Kyushu Imperial University. The professors stated that a majority of economics professors were indeed Marxists and estimated the percentage of Marxists within the economic departments of universities as 50% at Tohoku Imperial University, 67% at Tokyo Imperial University and Kyoto Imperial University, and 90% at Kyushu Imperial University. They claimed that the GHQ’s directive, which had reinstated them in their teaching positions, created the impression that Marxists were now the America-sanctioned forces for establishing democracy. Based on this interview and other investigations, the GHQ found that the communists’ efforts to infiltrate universities were, to some degree, successful, particularly in the field of economics. Studying Marxism became 3

John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 233–234; J. Victor Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics,” in Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 397. 4 Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion and Hostility, 130–139. 5 Isao My¯ ojin, Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji: GHQ no shiji to iu “Shinwa” o kensh¯o suru (A blot on the Japanese postwar history, Red Purge: refuting the “myth” of Red Purge under the direction of ¯ the GHQ) (Tokyo: Otsuki shoten, 2013), 72. 6 This was done in accord with a secret agreement among Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill at the Yalta Conference on February 11, 1945. “Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan,” February 11, 1945, L/T Files, (Released to the press by the Department of State on February 11, 1946) in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Malta/d503 (accessed August 23, 2019). 7 John K. EmmersonEmmerson, John K., The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 271.

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popular among students, however, only a small number of JCP members or sympathizers created cells on campus to carry out communist activities. They concluded that the effect of communist propaganda on youth was negligible.8 This trend among students reflected the political climate at the time. After MacArthur prohibited the general strike in February 1947, the socialists began to resent their domineering comrades, the communists. In the April 1947 general election, held soon after the aborted strike, the Socialist Party gained nearly a third of the seats in the Lower House while the JCP lost one seat from the previous election and held only four seats. MacArthur and the GS strongly endorsed the socialists and middle-of-the-road Democrats, hoping that they would prove to be the most powerful parties in a democratized Japan. Tetsu Katayama (1887–1978), a moderate Christian socialist at the head of the Socialist Party, was appointed by MacArthur as the Prime Minister in May 1947. He formed a coalition cabinet, supported by centrist conservative groups, including the Democratic Party and the People’s Cooperative Party. The supporters of this cabinet dreamed of a new socialist Japan, however, Katayama’s policies, which included an attempt to nationalize heavy industries, failed. Furthermore, his cabinet could not ameliorate the ever-deepening economic crisis and was just as ineffective as the previous cabinet. The mounting criticism inside and outside the Socialist Party forced Katayama to resign in early 1948. However, the coalition government continued under Hitoshi Ashida (1887–1959), head of the centrist conservative Democratic Party.9 As Japan’s war-torn economy continued to worsen, communist influence spread across the nation’s universities. In April 1948, the Japanese government announced that it would triple tuition fees at national universities to cover operational costs. Students from 78 universities staged a series of vocal protests. In September 1948, student associations nationwide formed the All Japan Federation of Student SelfGoverning Associations, or Zengakuren, to promote democratic education.10 The Zengakuren secretariat at Tokyo University consisted of 14 members, including four members of the JCP and ten sympathizers. Zengakuren was supposed to be apolitical, however, communist students skillfully led the nationwide campaign against the

8

Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 131–134. Department of State, Division of Research for the Far East, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), “The Potentials of World Communism: Far East Part I: Japan,” August 1, 1949, 12–13, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1977); Junnosuke Masumi, Sengo seiji 1945–1955 (Postwar politics), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1983), 233; Takeshi Igarashi, “Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 326; Lonny E. Carlile, Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 84–85, 145. 10 Tamamoto, “Unwanted Peace,” 149. 9

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tuition increase. As a result, many students saw communism as the cure to society’s ills and joined the movement.11 In response, in early October 1948, the Education Ministry banned student political activities in schools.12 Communist cells on campus were declared illegal, however, the correction measures were left up to each university. Nevertheless, more intense student activism arose when the Education Ministry announced its Outline of the Proposed Law Governing Japanese Universities (hereafter, the proposed University Law) in mid-October 1948. It was well known that the CIE had been pressurizing the Education Ministry to adopt the board-of-trustees plan advocated by Eells, therefore, it was apparent that the proposed University Law was a Japanese version of The Eells Plan (see Chap. 4 for more on this subject). Communists used the University Law controversy to elicit support from intellectuals for their antiOccupation strategy. Zengakuren, the Japan Teachers’ Union, and the Democratic Scientists Association, all of which were under the influence of the JCP, vehemently opposed the law, claiming that the CIE, by imposing its plan on the Japanese, was attempting to colonize Japanese education.13 The CIE was aware of the communist influence in schools and universities through reports from the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), such as “Communist Penetration of Japanese Schools and Universities,” dated August 11, 1948.14 Eells obtained firsthand information about communist influence in universities from Frank Kawamoto, a Japanese-American spy who pretended to be a law student and attended a student rally at Tokyo University. In an intelligence report, dated October 1, 1948, Kawamoto reported that only 160 out of 3000 law students attended the rally and 90 of the participants were communist cell members. These communists determined the agenda as if they represented the entire student body. They were astute in handling meetings, taking charge of decision-making procedures, and restricting opposing voices with skillful use of language, including “double negatives and roundabout ways.” Kawamoto believed that if the CIE encouraged non-communist students, who were indifferent to politics, they could counteract the communist students. He recommended instructing students about their rights and responsibilities, clarifying permissible political movements, and training university authorities to handle students’

11

Department of State, Division of Research for the Far East, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), File 097.3A1092, No. 5003C, “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 4. 12 Hatsugaku No. 458, “Students’ Political Activities,” October 8, 1948, English translation by Education Research, Education Division, the CIE, in Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa (Honolulu, Hawaii). The ministry invoked the Fundamental Law of Education Article 8 Political Education clause that prohibited support for a particular political ideology in schools. 13 OIR, File 097.3A1092, No. 5003C, “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 4; OIR, File 097.3 OIR 5087, “The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan,” November 14, 1949, 4. 14 My¯ ojin, Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji, 117.

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political activities. “Action [emphasis original] must be taken now,”he urged at the end of the report.15 Until 1948, the CIE had been passive in obtaining intelligence on communist activities, however, it proactively requested a joint meeting with G-2 to discuss the JCP’s activities, strategies, and communist penetration in Japanese education. On February 4, 1949, the CIE chief, Nugent instructed each section to formulate an action plan for the year 1949, emphasizing counter-measures against communist influence. Moreover, the CIE set up the Committee to Study Methods to Combat Communism, which held meetings twice per week in February and March 1949.16

6.1 Eells’ Shifting Position In his “Plans for Higher Education in 1949,” Eells outlined methods to combat communist influence in Japanese universities. His plan encouraged tolerance and was circulated among the Education Division of the CIE. A few members of the CIE advocated more aggressive measures to deal with communists, however, Eells opposed such measures. Open suppression, he said, would be “little different from the hated wartime ‘thought control’ a few years [earlier] in Japan.” “As long as freedom of opinion is provided for in the Constitution,” he stated, “it is quite inconsistent to deny similar freedom of belief and freedom of expression to mature, thinking students and professors at the university level… Interest in Communism and a study of its principles may be looked upon as a normal and healthy attitude in a university community searching for truth.”17 He further proposed that the CIE explain the characteristics of democracy and compare them with the theory and the practice of communism. For instance, as communist students had recently called the board of trustees’ plan “undemocratic” and asserted that it was “evidence of colonization by America,” he gave a talk to several hundred students, denying the veracity of their claims. The students’ responses to his speech were “very favorable.” Seeing the effectiveness of his explanation, Military Government (MG) officers asked him to give similar explanations to other groups of students. Eells followed up with a proposal that the CIE give similar talks to representative student groups in important national universities. In addition, he stated: Perhaps the most effective method of all for propagating democracy as a substitute for Communism is by living it and practicing it, rather than by teaching it or preaching it only. This leads to an almost impossible situation since an Occupation, particularly a Military Occupation, cannot always be democratic either in its internal administration nor in its dealing with the inhabitants of the occupied country.18 15

Frank Kawamoto to Advisor on Higher Education, “Law Student Rally at Tokyo University,” October 1, 1948, 3, in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 16 My¯ ojin, Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji, 119–120. 17 Walter C. Eells, Chairman, “Plans for Higher Education in 1949,” [no pagination], Eells Papers. 18 Eells, “Plans for Higher Education in 1949,” [no pagination].

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Eells shared an idea about suppressing communism from a personal friend who was an MG education officer in Korea. His friend advised that Occupation officers “remain in the background” and refrain from referring to American ways as such references may incite violent nationalistic responses.19 However, when student activism grew radical and violent in the spring of 1949, Eells’ tolerance of the communists dramatically changed. Japanese students’ reactions to his subsequent behavior demonstrated the wisdom of his friend’s warning from South Korea.

6.1.1 Shift to the Right The socialist and democrat coalition government under Prime Minister, Hitoshi Ashida, collapsed in October 1948 when it was revealed that certain cabinet members had received large bribes from Sh¯owa Denk¯o, a chemical fertilizer company. Despite the GS’s interference, Shigeru Yoshida, then president of the conservative Democratic Liberal Party (Minshu Jiy¯u-t¯o), a new party established after the Liberal Party was dissolved in March 1948, returned to the post of Prime Minister on October 15, 1948, and formed the second Yoshida cabinet. Although the Democratic Liberal Party had the largest number of seats (153 out of 466 seats) in the House of Representatives, this figure represented only one-third of the total seats. The opposition—Socialists, Democrats, and other small parties—held 235 seats. Yoshida wanted to achieve an absolute majority while his popularity was high. After two months of abrasive bargaining with his political opposition and SCAP, Yoshida dissolved the Diet and called for a new election on January 23, 1949. Yoshida’s Democratic Liberal Party won 264 seats, an absolute majority, thus, shifting power to the right. The Socialist Party suffered devastating defeat, falling from 143 to 48 seats. However, the JCP’s seats increased from four to 35.20 Indeed, JCP membership had grown from 1180 in December 1945 to 108,693 in April 1950.21 According to a US intelligence report, the influence of the JCP expanded mostly among intellectuals, students, organized workers, and Korean residents in Japan.22 Alarmed by the popularity of the communists, MacArthur expressed his delight that a strong conservative party would be in power for four years. He commented that the increased number of communists holding seats in the Diet did not constitute a threat and that communists had reached 19

A friend of Eells to Eells, “Letter on Communism,” January 12, 1949, letter attached to “Plans for Higher Education in 1949.” 20 Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 210–216; Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japanese Communist Party Central Committee), Nihon Ky¯osnt¯o no 70-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 70 years), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shin nippon shuppannsha, 1994), 197; Takeshi Igarashi, Tainici k¯owa to reisen (Peace treaty and the Cold War) (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1986), 61. 21 Taken from the official Communist Party membership figures cited in Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 67. 22 OIR, Report No. 4909.5, “The Potentials of World Communism: Far East Part I: Japan,” August 1, 1949, 5.

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“their peak in Japan.” He added that he would watch them vigilantly and “if they broke the law they would pay for it.”23 As the number of communists increased, so did criticism of them from moderate labor unions and the general public. Magazines from the right and the moderate left charged the JCP with using “treacherous and dishonest tactics” to achieve its objectives. For instance, Mitsusuke Yonekubo (1881–1951), labor minister in the former socialist Katayama cabinet, criticized the communists for their “pseudo-democratic attitude.” He accused the JCP of advocating “sabotage, agitation, and impediment of production” and demanding “blind obedience from its members.” He said, “[T]he Communist Party does not support genuine democracy but stands in the way of Japan’s democratization.” He analyzed the JCP’s gain in the January 1949 election as follows—the dire economic conditions and the unstable social environment in Japan provided the Communist Party with “a favorable opportunity to increase its numerical strength if it disregards the quality of its membership.” According to him, youth, dissatisfied with political and economic conditions, and intellectuals, who converted to communist doctrines and theories, were the newest members of the Party.24 The communist influence among students was visible in Zengakuren, however, the influence among professors remained obscure until Tokyo University professor, Takashi Ide (1892–1980) publicly announced his conversion. Professor Ide, dean of the Philosophy Department of Tokyo University, caused a sensation across Japan by publicizing his joining the JCP in spring 1948. The publicly-funded Tokyo University was (and still is) one of the most respected institutions in Japanese society. Therefore, Ide’s embrace of communism was valuable propaganda for the JCP whose members now preached that their doctrines and cause were good enough for a prestigious Tokyo University professor to believe in them.25 Ide’s account of why he joined the JCP was published in 1949: In April 1948, a Communist Party member residing in my neighborhood called upon me and suggested that I join the Party. Without hesitation, I consented….I joined the Communist Party because it seemed to me that only this organization could eliminate inconsistent, half-way ideologies and opportunism. Moreover, in my judgment, of all philosophies the Communist Party’s Marxism-Leninism most closely approximates absolute truth. Materialism is not something which one understands by examining it intellectually within the quiet atmosphere of the study. It is rather a weapon, the strength of which the Party member gradually comes to understand while fighting with his class for victory.26 23

Quoted in Finn, Winners in Peace, 216. GHQ, SCAP, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Publications Analysis No. 242, February 8, 1949, “Communist and Anti-Communist Attitudes and Arguments,” 7–8, Box 18, Joseph C. Trainor Papers. 25 GHQ, SCAP, the CIE, Analysis and Research Division, Media Analysis Branch, “Publication Analysis,” No. 197, August 17, 1948, 6, Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers. 26 Translated and quoted in Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action 1919–1951 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1952), 195. Ide’s account was originally in R¯on¯o Ky¯uenkai, Jiy¯u no hata no moto ni—Watakushi wa naze ky¯osant¯oin ni nattaka (Under the flag of freedom: why I became a Communist Party member) (Tokyo: Sanichi shobo, 1949), 8–40. 24

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¯ Some academics openly criticized Ide. Hy¯oe Ouch, a Marxist economist, former professor at Tokyo Imperial University, and president of H¯osei University (a large private university in Tokyo) said of Ide: “[V]iewed objectively he cuts a ridiculous figure because he has lowered himself to becoming a lay member of a political party. He has joined a partisan political group advocating dictatorship under the façade of democracy.”27 Ide’s membership in the JCP, and his statement, refueled the GHQ’s concern about communist professors. The first Occupation officer who publicly pointed out the danger of such teachers was Captain Paul T. Dupell, the civil education officer of the MG in Tokyo. The MG units, operated by the Eighth Army of the US, were responsible for making sure that municipal governments complied with SCAP orders. On February 3, 1949, Dupell gave an anti-communist speech at the Nihon University Engineering School, a private university whose students had recently imprisoned their president in his office “because their Communist-inspired demands” were rejected.28 Dupell said, “Teachers are especially desirable conquests for Communists. Once converted to the cause, two or three teachers banded together in one school can create enough dissension to cause out-and-out riots.” He said that a communist professor “who quietly and unobtrusively spreads the doctrines of Communism in his classroom” should be dismissed “for incompetence and undesirability.”29 The New York Times, which reported Dupell’s speech, pointed out that up until this speech, the Occupation authorities had purged only those who had attacked the communists in the pre-war period as their actions suppressed “democracy and academic freedom.” However, this speech indicated that “the Occupation’s thinking on Communists [had] veered around to the view the Japanese held 22 years earlier.”30 Dupell’s high-handedness became infamous among the Japanese and in the GHQ. He was dismissed from the Eighth Army on June 10, 1949.31 Although Dupell’s proclamation was not the GHQ’s official policy, it heralded the anti-communist hysteria. In fact, a month after Dupell’s speech, in a commencement address at St. Paul’s University (Rikky¯o University) in Tokyo, William J. Sebald (1901–1980), the chief political adviser to SCAP and a US delegate to the Allied Council for Japan, declared that the US would not allow Japan to fall victim to the “insidious concealed aggression and infiltration” of communism.32 Sebald’s address served as a US declaration of war against communism in Japan. On February 26, 1949, the third Yoshida cabinet was formed. Yoshida, a conservative, was proudly anti-communist and had never liked the progressive and revolutionary reforms of the GHQ. However, once the GHQ announced its anti-communist stance, Yoshida willingly became a protégé of MacArthur. With the support of the 27

Quoted in GHQ, SCAP, the CIE, Analysis and Research Division, Media Analysis Branch, “Publication Analysis,” No. 197, August 17, 1948, 6, Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers. 28 Burton Crane, “Japan Told to Oust Red School Cells,” New York Times, February 5, 1949, 5. 29 PIO-GHQ-FEC, “News Release,” February 4, 1949, 1–2, Box 18, Joseph C. Trainor Papers. 30 Crane, “Japan Told to Oust Red School Cells,” 5. 31 My¯ ojin, Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji, 120–121. 32 “Japan Gets U.S. Pledge,” New York Times, March 19, 1949.

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GHQ, Yoshida launched his anti-communism crusade by (1) rewriting the existing Ordinance 101 (a ban on the organization of political and other associations) to add clear wordings to ban all anti-democratic associations and rename it the Ordinance for Controlling Associations and Others, (2) proposing to establish an Un-Japanese Activities Committee imitating the US House Committee on Un-American Activities, and (3) establishing a public agency that aimed to expose the actual undemocratic activities of the communists. The Un-Japanese Activities Committee never materialized. However, in March 1949, the Lower House of the Diet established a special committee to investigate and publicize the anti-Japanese activities of the communists.33

6.1.2 The Dodge Line: Retrenchment Back in Washington, during the summer of 1948, the National Security Council formulated a Cold War policy (NSC 13/2) for Occupied Japan, which President Truman approved in October that year. The new objective for Japan was economic recovery. Immediately after Yoshida formed a cabinet in February 1949, the US government sent Detroit banker, Joseph M. Dodge (1890–1964) to Tokyo as a special ambassador and financial adviser to MacArthur. Dodge’s mission was to bolster the Japanese economy to prevent Japan from falling into communism. Dodge implemented a deflationary program to balance the budget, which included substantial cutbacks in civil service personnel. To comply with Dodge’s directive, Prime Minister Yoshida proposed dismissing 100,000 national railways workers. As if driven by instinct, the JCP mobilized worker demonstrations. In response, in April 1949, at the behest of MacArthur, Yoshida issued the Ordinance for Controlling Associations and Others to “facilitate [the] healthy development of pacifism and democracy.” The ordinance prohibited “secret, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, violent, and antidemocratic” groups. In addition, it required each political organization to register its name, purpose, and activities and the names and addresses of its members with the Attorney General’s Office.34 The JCP reported more than 100,000 members.35 These new requirements made it easier for the government to identify communists. In addition, Dodge’s cutback program had a harsh impact on education. In the spring of 1949, the Diet sharply reduced educational budgets, first, by consolidating existing higher educational institutions into fewer universities (which led to many university employees losing their jobs) and second, by establishing new standards

33

Finn, Winners in Peace, 216, 235; My¯ojin, Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji, 131–132. Ordinance for Controlling Association and Others (Ordinance No. 64, 1949); OIR, “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 6. 35 Nihon Ky¯ osanto Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japan Communist Party central committee), Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 65-nen (Japan Communist Party’s 65 years), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Nihon Kyosanto Chuo Iinkai Shuppankyoku, 1988), 128. 34

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for hiring teachers, which excluded those who “organized or belonged to a political party or association” that schemed to overthrow the government.36 The Japan Teachers Union, dominated by the JCP, adamantly opposed these government moves, as did Zengakuren. Together they planned a series of nationwide strikes. Eells expressed deep concern about the increasing number of student strikes. In a memorandum to the Education Division chief, he reported that 75,000 students from 105 schools had been on strike. He believed that Zengakuren was instigating these strikes and “other agencies [that were] not interested in the development of democracy in Japan” were agitating the students. He concluded that the hidden goal of the student strikes was to embarrass the Japanese government and the Occupation forces and urged the CIE to advise the Education Ministry to reprimand students participating in the strikes.37 Eells’ apprehension about the Zengakuren students intensified when he learned about the direct connection between Zengakuren and the JCP. Japanese-American undercover agent, Frank Kawamoto reported to Eells that, at the Zengakuren national conference held at the Tokyo University of Commerce, a Zengakuren leader relayed a stirring message from the JCP chairman, Tokuda, who wished the conference a great success. A JCP member of the Diet and two representatives of communist-dominated labor federations attended the conference and encouraged students to cooperate with the workers in bringing down the Yoshida cabinet and its capitalist supporters. Kawamoto wrote that Zengakuren was “clearly” a branch of the JCP “with aims to confuse, distort, and agitate.”38 His report convinced Eells and other CIE members that the communist infiltration in universities had reached alarming levels. This hardened Eells’ attitude toward the communists in universities.

6.2 Anti-communist Movement in Universities University authorities realized the seriousness of student activism. Even Tokyo University president, Nanbara, who was well known for his support of “sound growth of political activities among students,”39 suspended 20 students who were considered responsible for the strikes and disorder on campus. At Kyoto University, there was a shocking event involving Zengakuren. When a group attempted to hold a 36

Article V in Law for Certification of Educational Personnel (Law No. 147, May 31, 1949), in SCAP, the CIE, Education Division, Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, vol. 2, 270; OIR, “The Campaign Against Communist Teachers in Japan,” November 14, 1949, 5; OIR, “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 1–2. 37 Walter C. Eells to the Chief, Education Division, Memorandum, “Student Strikes in Higher Educational Institutions,” May 21, 1949, in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 38 Frank Kawamoto to Walter C. Eells, “Report on the Second National Conference of the Federation of All Japan Student Self Governments (Zengakuren),” June 6, 1949, in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 39 OIR, “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 9.

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rally at the university in support of several nurses who were denied employment at the university’s hospital “on political grounds,” the president refused to let them use school facilities for the gathering and rejected an interview with Zengakuren delegates. Angry students confined the president to his office where he called the police. The police arrested a few students. In protest, on June 3, 1949, the Central Committee of Zengakuren called for a nationwide indefinite student strike that would begin on June 20. Alarmed by Zengakuren’s dictatorial control over students nationwide, Tokyo University students, who opposed the radical tactics of the communist students, organized the Student Democratization Committee to oppose the strikes.40 The GHQ gladly publicized the news. University students were developing [an] active anti-Communist movement…[The] Student Democratization Committee of Tokyo University distributed ten thousand copies of a leaflet denouncing Zengakuren at more than six hundred colleges, universities and technical schools nationwide.41

In its leaflet, the anti-communist student group argued that students should take back the students’ organization from Zengakuren, which, they said, had been under the exclusive control of the communists and had been furnishing students with information only favoring the communist side. At Kyoto University, the student council withdrew from Zengakuren and reorganized itself to oppose communist activism on campus. Anti-communist student groups called on students nationwide to reject Zengakuren’s “unilateral dictatorship.”42 As a result, only devoted Zengakuren members participated in the strikes, which were small-scale and sporadic. The general public disapproved of the strikes and even the leftist Japan Teacher’s Union did not support the students’ actions.43 Meanwhile, the Yoshida cabinet dismissed workers from government and public corporations. The first to be dismissed were the communists and labor activists. As a result, labor unrest escalated to terrorist activity levels. In early July 1949, the president of Japan National Railways (JNR) was found dead on a railway line outside Tokyo. Soon after, an unmanned train plowed into a crowded railway station in western Tokyo, killing and injuring numerous bystanders. In August, a train was sabotaged and wrecked, killing the driver and crew. Prime Minister Yoshida announced that the communist labor unions had committed these terrorist acts. Several railway union members, mostly communists, were arrested and tried for the latter two crimes. The murder of the JNR president remains unsolved. On July 16, 1949, Yoshida pleaded with the Japanese people to “remain calm in the face of… Communist attempts to fan discontent, stir up hate, and incite the rabble to violence over the 40

OIR, “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 7–8. Students Resist Communist Attempts to Dominate Japanese Universities,” CI&E Bulletin, August 3, 1949, Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers. 42 OIR, “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 10. 43 OIR, “Political Activities in Japanese Universities and Colleges,” September 21, 1949, 9; “Students Resist Communist Attempts to Dominate Japanese Universities,” CI&E Bulletin, August 3, 1949. 41

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government’s [cutback] program.”44 His plea paraphrased MacArthur’s Fourth of July statement, suggesting outlawing the JCP. It was amid this tense political atmosphere that Nugent asked Eells to talk about academic freedom versus communism and advocate the purge of communist professors nationwide. In a memorandum to the Education Division staff, Nugent wrote that “in all future proposed addresses” at the inauguration of new universities, the CIE officials should carry “a stirring message on academic freedom” in which they should contrast Western democracies with “what goes on behind the Iron Curtain— the purges of ‘bourgeoisie’ scholars in Russia… [and] the re-writing of history along ‘national’ or Marxist lines.”45 When Eells was invited to the opening ceremony of Niigata University in northern Japan, he wrote an 11-page speech, which Nugent called “an excellent address” and suggested that “Dr. Eells take a couple of copies with him for the local press.”46

6.3 The Eells Speech At Niigata University on July 19, 1949, Eells declared, “Communism is a dangerous and destructive doctrine since it advocates the overthrow of established democratic governments by force.” He posed a rhetorical question—“Must those who may believe in this dangerous doctrine be allowed in the name of academic freedom to teach such doctrines to the youth of the country?” He argued that communist professors surrendered their newly-acquired freedom of expression when they joined the Communist Party and blindly followed Party orders, hence, they could not remain objective in the classroom. To safeguard academic objectivity, he reasoned, Japanese universities had to dismiss communist professors as soon as possible.47 Eells’ Niigata speech demonstrated a more combative stance than his earlier position, which was gaining support within the GHQ. Joseph C. Trainor, another education expert in the CIE, confirmed that Eells’ address contained “the essential points of the [Education] Division position.”48 In fact, Eells was paraphrasing what the US educational leaders were proposing in the US at the time. Referring to the US Educational Policies Commission report, issued in the US a few weeks earlier, Eells said that the communists controlled by Moscow needed to be dismissed from every level of American schools.49

44

Lindesay Parrotts, “Yoshida Appeals to Public on Reds,” New York Times, July 17, 1949. Nugent to the Education Division, note, April 23, 1949, in “Niigata University,” Eells Papers. 46 CIE, “Intra Section Routing Slip,” July 8, 1949, in “Niigata University,” Eells Papers. 47 Walter Crosby Eells, Adviser on Higher Education, “Convocation Address: Opening of Niigata University,” July 19, 1949, 6, in “Niigata University,” Eells Papers. 48 Joseph C. Trainor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor’s Memoir (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1983), 345–356. 49 Eells, “Convocation Address: Opening of Niigata University,” July 19, 1949, 5. 45

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Eells explained that the commission was very influential in the US and that President Truman and the US Commissioner of Education endorsed the report.50 He explained the report’s main point: Do the recommendations of this document violate the long and jealously guarded academic freedom of the university? By no means. Their basic reason for advising exclusion of Communist professors is that they are not free [emphasis original]. Their thoughts, their beliefs, their teachings are controlled from outside. Communists are told from headquarters what to think and what to teach [emphasis original]. In the very name of academic freedom, therefore, the most important right and duty of a university, we dare not have known Communists as university professors because they are then no longer really free [emphasis original] to teach or carry on research.51

Eells continued, “The University not only has the right, it has the duty in order to preserve true [emphasis original] academic freedom, to refuse to allow members of the Communist Party on its faculty.”52 He contended that the students had gone on strike, as they were instructed to do so by “the executive committee of Zengakuren in Tokyo, commonly known to be a Communist-controlled group.” He urged that such students be dismissed so that their places at school, which they had spurned by their actions, could be given to students who were eager for educational opportunities.53 The next day, most major Tokyo newspapers reported Eells’ speech. Universities throughout Japan referred to Eells’ address as The Eells Statement. Eells later wrote that he believed in what he advocated but it was not his doctrine, rather it was what the majority of people in the US believed.54 To place the Red Purge in Japan in a broader context, the next section presents an overview of the anti-communist sentiment in the US.

6.4 Anti-communism and Academic Freedom in the US55 The Regents of the University of Washington (UW-Seattle) dismissed two communist professors in January 1949. The UW case, considered “the first important academic freedom case of the Cold War,” sparked a national debate over communist professors’

50

Bess Furman, “Truman Says Reds Should Not Teach,” New York Times, June 10, 1949, 11; Eells, “Convocation Address: Opening of Niigata University,” July 19, 1949, 5. 51 Eells, “Convocation Address: Opening of Niigata University,” July 19, 1949, 5. 52 Eells, “Convocation Address: Opening of Niigata University,” July 19, 1949, 6. 53 Eells, “Convocation Address: Opening of Niigata University,” July 19, 1949, 8–10. 54 Walter C. Eells, “Academic Freedom and Communism,” n.d., speech manuscript prepared in 1951, [no pagination], Box 4, Ronald Stone Anderson Papers. 55 This section is reproduced with permission from History of Education Quarterly. [“Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the “Red Purge” in Occupied Japan” by Ruriko Kumano, 2010. History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 50 No.4, 523–527, Copyright 2017 by Cambridge University Press.]

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fitness to teach the American youth.56 The UW president, Raymond B. Allen became the national spokesman for the summary dismissal of communists from universities. According to Allen, purging communist professors would not infringe on academic freedom, instead, protect it. He believed that communists surrendered their ability to think for themselves and, hence, were unfit to be in a university where freedom of thought was central to learning.57 His argument was not new. Since the late 1930s, the same view was expressed by anti-communist intellectuals.58 One of the most famous was Sidney Hook (1902– 1989), a prominent philosopher, an exponent of classical American pragmatism, and the head of New York University’s Philosophy Department from 1948 to 1969.59 Hook embraced Marxism in the 1920s and was one of the first to introduce Karl Marx to the American philosophical world. Indeed, as Danny Postel has pointed out, he was “the first professor to teach a course on Marxism in the United States.” However, Hook grew increasingly disillusioned with Stalin’s Great Purge. He saw Soviet communism as “a threat to Western democracies” and “a negation of Marxist thought.”60 Hook was a Marxist and, as defined by Christopher Phelps, a communist with a small “c”; one of “those who saw themselves as revolutionaries seeking to overthrow capitalism and establish a classless society but who were not necessarily associated with the Communist Party—who were in fact often opposed to it.”61 A Marxism expert, Hook exposed the inner workings of the Communist Party in the US and painted a picture of the Communist Party as evil. As early as 1939, Hook had warned that the academic world needed to “cleanse itself of Communists,” or otherwise, outsiders would “wipe out all liberal dissent.”62 In the Association of American University Professors Bulletin, he presented an influential argument that Communist Party membership was incompatible with academic integrity and freedom. He stated that the Communist Party was not a regular political party, rather a dangerous monolithic organization conspiring to overthrow the American government. Hook claimed that members of the Party, who were intellectual slaves forced to follow the Party line, operated in secret and often attacked their opponents in abusive language, thus, ignoring common ethics. He emphasized that communist teachers were detrimental to American education as they were ordered 56

Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 104. 57 Raymond B. Allen’s comments quoted in “Academic Freedom and Communists,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 11, 1949. 58 Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 105. 59 Paul Kurtz, Sidney Hook: Philosopher of Democracy and Humanism (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1983), vii. 60 Danny Postel, “Sidney Hook: An Intellectual Street Fighter Reconsidered,” November 8, 2002, in Chronicle of Higher Education, Section: Research & Publishing 49(11), A18. https://www.chr onicle.com/article/sidney-hook-an-intellectual-street-fighter-reconsidered/ (accessed August 23, 2022). 61 Christopher Phelps, Young Sidney Hook: Marxist and Pragmatist (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 14. 62 Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 105.

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to indoctrinate students by abusing their responsibility to encourage free thought.63 In his New York Times Magazine article of February 1949, Hook illustrated his point by quoting directives from the Communist Party: Marxist-Leninist analysis must be injected into every class. Communist teachers…must take advantage of their positions, without exposing themselves, to give their students, to the best of their ability working-class education…the Party must take careful steps to see that all teacher comrades are given [a] thorough education in the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Only when teachers have really mastered Marxism-Leninism will they be able skillfully to inject it into their teaching at the least risk of exposure and…conduct struggles around the schools in a truly Bolshevik manner.64

Hook’s accusations were presented without concrete evidence. No actual cases of classroom indoctrination had ever been found. In fact, most of the evidence used to prove the dangers posed by communists was, as historian Ellen Schrecker put it, “theoretical or out-of-date.”65 However, the Cold War had made anti-communism an urgent national priority and it did not matter whether the alleged scheme of the Communist Party corresponded to reality.66 Allen’s view mirrored Hook’s argument. In fact, it was the mainstream rationale for anti-communism in American education. The National Education Association (NEA), the most influential school organization, and the American Association of School Administrators together established the Educational Policy Commission in 1935 to “develop long-term policies for American educators.”67 The Commission was composed of 21 leading educators, such as President James B. Conant of Harvard University and President Dwight D. Eisenhower of Columbia University.68 Keenly aware of the intense debate over the legitimacy of dismissing communist teachers versus academic freedom, on June 8, 1949, the Educational Policy Commission, after six months of study, issued its report, “American Education and

63 Sidney Hook, “Academic Freedom and ‘The Trojan Horse’ in American Education,” Association of American University Professors Bulletin 25, no. 5 (December 1939); Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 74, 373, note 22. 64 Sidney Hook, “Should Communists Be Permitted to Teach?” New York Times Magazine, February 27, 1949, 24, quoted in Lionel S. Lewis, Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 16. 65 Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 106. 66 Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 73–74. 67 Benjamin Fine, “N.E.A. Adopts Red-Teachers Ban; 3,000 Delegates Shout Approval,” New York Times, July 7, 1949, 1; Murray Illson, “Educators Warn On Loyalty Oaths,” New York Times, October 9, 1949, 1. 68 Other members included Professor John K. Norton of Columbia University’s Teachers College, Dr. Mabel Studebaker, president of the NEA, Dr. William Jansen, superintendent of schools in New York City, Dr. John L. Bracken, president of the American Association of School Administrators, and Dean T. R. McConnell of the University of Minnesota. Benjamin Fine, “Education in Review,” New York Times, June 12, 1949, E7.

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International Tension.”69 As “the main lines of strategy for American education,” the Commission recommended that: Members of the Communist Party of the United States should not be employed as teachers. Such membership, in the opinion of the Educational Policies Commission, involves adherence to doctrines and discipline completely inconsistent with the principles of freedom on which American education depends. Such membership, and the accompanying surrender of intellectual integrity, render an individual unfit to discharge the duties of a teacher in this country….The whole spirit of free American education will be subverted unless teachers are free to think for themselves. It is because members of the Communist Party are required to surrender this right, as a consequence of becoming part of a movement characterized by conspiracy and calculated deceit, that they should be excluded from employment as teachers.70

The day after the report was made public, President Truman endorsed it. He stated that he did not believe that “anyone who favored destruction of our form of government ought to teach in the nation’s schools.” Dr. Earl J. McGrath, the US commissioner of education, recommended the report as “a manual for teachers.”71 The report served to mobilize “the overwhelming consensus” in the academic community regarding how to respond to the communist teachers. In addition, it convinced the public that educational leaders were well aware of the dangers of communism and capable of handling the issue.72 Mass media, too, supported the report. For instance, the Chicago Daily Tribune wrote that “for the first time an organized educational group has adopted a position generally held by the public” and chided the Commission’s slowness to realize that “no issue of academic freedom is involved in the prohibition it recommends against Communists as teachers.” The Tribune added sarcastically that “the public in general reached this ground long before professional educators were disposed to seek it out.”73 The Christian Science Monitor wrote that “the commission took the common-sense position that Communist party members should not be employed as teachers in American schools.”74 The New York Times stated in its editorial, “Surely we can rid our schools of the Communist and the indubitably subversive without paying in that process the far too costly price of losing our most cherished heritage, freedom of thought and expression.”75 Similarly, the Los 69

“The Role of Education,” New York Times, June 9, 1949, 30. Educational Policies Commission, American Education and International Tensions (Washington, DC: National Education Association of the United States and American Association of School Administrators, 1949), 37–40. 71 Bess Furman, “Truman Says Reds Should Not Teach,” New York Times, June 11, 1949, 11. 72 Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 112. 73 “Academic Freedom and Communists,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 11, 1949. 74 “Sanity Versus Jitters,” Christian Science Monitor, October 11, 1949, 18. 75 “The Role of Education,” New York Times, June 9, 1949. 70

References

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Angeles Times cited Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s opinion that “while no university in its senses would knowingly hire a Communist, if such a man were hired he shouldn’t be fired for his beliefs alone, but only if it were demonstrable that having him around was a real danger.” Schlesinger, a renowned history professor at Harvard, indicated that “there are, or could be, harmless Communists.” In response, Hook countered, “There are no ‘sleepers’ or passive members in the Communist Party.” The Los Angeles Times, concurring with Hook’s position, stated, “Keep the Communists out of the schools. They can be driven out without violating the principle of academic freedom.”76 American educational leaders viewed communism as “the enemy of traditional American freedom” and urged the removal of communist teachers from all levels of education.77 As such, in Japan, Eells soon became the spokesman supporting the American stance of protecting “academic freedom” against communist encroachment.

References Carlile, Lonny E. 2005. Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Dower, John W. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Emmerson, John K. 1978. The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Finn, Richard B. 1992. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hook, Sidney. 1939. Academic Freedom and ‘the Trojan Horse’ in American Education. Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors 25 (5): 550–555. Igarashi, Takeshi. 1985. Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic ForeignPolicy System in Postwar Japan. Journal of Japanese Studies 11 (2): 323–356. Igarashi, Takeshi. 1986. Tainici k¯owa to reisen (Peace treaty and the Cold War). Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. Koschmann, J. Victor. 1993. Intellectuals and Politics. In Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew Gordon, 395–423. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kumano, Ruriko. 2007. Academic Freedom and Autonomy: Walter C. Eells and the Red Purge in Universities during the Allied Occupation of Japan. PhD diss., University of Hawaii. Kumano, Ruriko. 2010. Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the ‘Red Purge’ in Occupied Japan. History of Education Quarterly 50 (4): 513–537.

76

Sidney Hook, quoted in “It’s the Teachers, Not the Books,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1949, A4. 77 Lewis, Cold War on Campus, 19.

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Kurtz, Paul. 1983. Sidney Hook: Philosopher of Democracy and Humanism. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Lewis, Lionel S. 1988. Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. Masumi, Junnosuke. 1983. Sengo seiji 1945–1955 (Postwar politics), vol. 1. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. My¯ojin, Isao. 2013. Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji: GHQ no shiji to iu “Shinwa” o kensh¯o suru (A blot on the Japanese postwar history, Red Purge: refuting the “myth” of Red Purge under the ¯ direction of the GHQ). Tokyo: Otsuki shoten. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japanese Communist Party Central Committee). 1988. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 65-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 65 years), vol. 1. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo Iinkai Shuppankyoku. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o Ch¯uo¯ Iinkai (Japanese Communist Party Central Committee). 1994. Nihon Ky¯osant¯o no 70-nen (Japanese Communist Party’s 70 years), vol. 1. Tokyo: Shin nippon shuppannsha. Oinas-Kukkonen, Henry. 2003. Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Phelps, Christopher. 1997. Young Sidney Hook: Marxist and Pragmatist. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Postel, Danny. 2022. Sidney Hook: An Intellectual Street Fighter Reconsidered. in Chronicle of Higher Education, vol. 49, Issue 11, A18. Section: Research & Publishing. https://www.chr onicle.com/article/sidney-hook-an-intellectual-street-fighter-reconsidered/. Accessed 23 August 2022 Scalapino, Robert A. 1967. The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. Berkeley: University of California Press. Schrecker, Ellen W. 1986. No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities. New York: Oxford University Press. Swearingen, Rodger, and Paul Langer. 1952. Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action 1919–1951. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Tamamoto, Masaru. 1988. Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectual Thought in American Occupied Japan, 1948–1952. PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University. Trainor, Joseph C. 1983. Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor’s Memoir. Tokyo: Meisei University Press.

Government Documents Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 1953. Civil Information and Education Section, Education Division. Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, 2 vols. Tokyo. United States, Department of States. 1977. O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc.

References

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Manuscript Collections Joseph C. Trainor Papers, 1933–1980. Hoover Institution Library and Archives (Stanford, California). Ronald Stone Anderson Papers. Hamilton Library, University of Hawai‘i at M¯anoa (Honolulu, Hawaii). Walter Crosby Eells Papers. 1890–1962. WC Manuscript Collection 3. Whitman College Manuscript Collection. Whitman College and Northwest Archives, Penrose Library, Whitman College (Walla Wall, Washington).

Chapter 7

Covert Red Purge in Education

Eells’ speech at Niigata University became a nationwide sensation and was quoted in every major newspaper in Japan. Academics in Japan grew tense and nervous as they were unsure whether the speech was one man’s opinion or the policy stance of the GHQ authorities. Only a few days after Eells’ controversial speech, the presidents of 69 national universities converged for a meeting at the Education Ministry in Tokyo. The top ministry officials were asked whether they were expected to follow Eells’ proposal and dismiss suspected communist professors. Although the officials responded that it was only a speech and not a formal American policy, university presidents knew better than to ignore an Occupation official’s long speech. Hence, they established a committee to further study Eells’ proposal.1 Apprehensive about the future, a group of leftist professors visited Eells in early August 1949. They were representatives of the National Council on Countermeasures to the Proposed National University Law, which was formed in May 1949 and was dominated by the communist student group, Zengakuren (the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations).2 Tsunenobu Terasawa (1919–1998), a professor of philosophy at Tokyo Metropolitan University, who studied Hegel and Marxist philosophy, interviewed Eells. The minutes of the meeting reveal some points of contention.

1 “Akai ky¯ oju no jogai” (Elimination of Red professors), Asahi Shimbun, July 24, 1949; “Shis¯oteki tsuih¯o okonawazu” (No purge on thought), Tokyo daigaku gakusei shimbun (Tokyo University student newspaper), July 17–28, 1949 (combined issue), 1.

Part of this chapter is reproduced with permission from History of Education Quarterly. [“Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the “Red Purge” in Occupied Japan” by Ruriko Kumano, 2010. History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 50 No.4, 527–533, Copyright 2017 by Cambridge University Press.] 2

Shingo Fukushima, “Shakai kagaku to shiteno seiji kenky¯u—1947–54” (Political study as social science, 1947–54), Sensh¯u Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenky¯usho Gepp¯o no. 486 (2003): 21. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_7

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Terasawa: [M]ay we understand that your chief point is to dismiss communist professors from universities because they are not free to think, and that such action is necessary to protect the academic freedom? Eells: Yes. Terasawa: That professors joining the Communist Party have no freedom to think is doubtful to me. They remain in the Party because they think that communism is the best. But if they think that they were mistaken, then they have the freedom to withdraw from the Party. We can’t say that they don’t have the freedom to think. Eells: It is not so according to my study. Even twenty authorities on university affairs in the US concluded so after gaining access to plenty of evidence. The Communist Party is the same, whether they are in America, Japan, or Russia. Terasawa: Whether or not professors of the Japanese Communist Party have the freedom to think is a matter, I think, for the Japanese to investigate, study, and discuss. Eells: The Japanese should decide, but what I am opposed to is the teaching of communism by professors who believe in it. Terasawa: How do you intend to carry out your plan [of firing communist professors]? Eells: Under the present law the Monbusho [Education Ministry] has the final decision, but eventually, I would like to see the Board of Trustees in each university (if such Boards are permitted) decide [on] such matters. Terasawa: If such decisions are left to the Board of Trustees, it would mean that there will be great variation in the decisions. Eells: It can’t be helped if there are variations, but I do hope all universities follow my advice.3

Eells reiterated his belief that communist professors were unfit to teach as they could not think independently. At the end of their tense meeting, Eells said, “I do hope that this problem I put forth to you will be eagerly discussed by the Japanese. And even if, as a result, you do not agree with me, I would be perfectly satisfied.” This, seemingly, accommodating comment, gave the leftist professors the impression that Eells had no intention of enforcing the extreme proposals in his speech.4 However, Eells was not being entirely truthful. From his perspective, universities were dealing ineffectively with radicalized students and communist professors. Eells continually advocated the adoption of a board-of-trustees system to remedy this flaw. However, in the face of strong opposition from Japanese professors, the Education Ministry withdrew its university reform proposal from the Diet deliberation in August 1949. Therefore, while the explosive issue of dismissing communist professors continued festering with no remedy in sight, professors in national universities kept their traditional university autonomy, that is, faculty-centered university administration, which was codified in the School Education Law of 1947 and the Special Law on Public Servants in Education of 1949. Faculty members had the power to make decisions regarding the dismissal of communist professors. 3

“Report of Conference Held with Mr. Eells from Educational Information Daily,” August 18, 1949 (English translation of Nikkan Ky¯oiku J¯oh¯o [Daily educational information] by CIE staff), in “Niigata University,” Eells Papers. 4 “Report of Conference Held with Mr. Eells from Educational Information Daily,” August 18, 1949.

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Eells, disappointed to see that the Japanese rejected the University Law, realized that unless his new proposal was elevated to an official GHQ policy, Japanese leaders in education would continue rejecting his suggestion. In the memorandum to Nugent on September 2, 1949, Eells reported that the Niigata speech had prompted heated discussion among the Japanese and he had received favorable comments. For instance, he received a letter from Sukeo Kitasawa (1887–?),5 a professor at Tokyo Women’s College, expressing full support for his statement from “all right minded teachers all over the country.”6 Nevertheless, there were negative reactions as well. The radical communist student-led Zengakuren put up a vigorous defense against Eells’ charges as his statement represented an example of “capitalistic control” and “non-democratic interference with the sacred rights of universities.”7 Some students and professors visited Eells and voiced their doubts and objections.8 Japanese misgivings were understandable, given that the JCP was a legally recognized party, which MacArthur had approved at the beginning of the Occupation. Moreover, the new constitution, which MacArthur and his close subordinates had drafted in six days, explicitly guaranteed freedom of thought and expression, including academic freedom, and the GHQ had reinstated leftist (if not communist) professors dismissed before the war, welcoming them back as national heroes. This GHQ gesture greatly enhanced the image of America as a true champion of democracy and human rights. However, the GHQ adviser on higher education began favoring the dismissal of the professors who were once again labeled as undesirable professors. Thus, Japanese educators reminded Eells in their letter that “in a true democratic society, freedom of thought, belief, and learning should not be limited [for] any reason.”9 Eells reported that many Japanese students and professors continued to question whether his statement was, in fact, the GHQ policy. Despite Nugent’s approval of his speech, Eells did not feel comfortable stating that it represented the formal GHQ policy. Thus, Eells requested that his Niigata speech be formally approved as representative of the GHQ policy, explaining that no university could take decisive measures without the Education Ministry’s approval and the ministry itself would not grant such approval “without more formal assurance and backing” from the GHQ. Eells asked Nugent to authorize the Education Ministry to support those universities that follow Eells’ recommendations.10 However, Nugent refused to publicize any 5

This date is unknown. Sukeo Kitasawa to Walter C. Eells, July 20, 1949, letter (original in English), in “Niigata University,” Eells Papers. 7 Walter C. Eells and Donald M. Typer to Chief, Education Division, Memorandum “Program for Activities in Universities,” September 2, 1949, in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 8 Walter C. Eells, “Communism and Education: Dr. Eells Clarifies His Niigata Speech,” Nippon Times, November 4, 1949. 9 Educational Reconstruction Council Preparatory Committee, Representatives, Mr. Kumao Terada and Mr. Toshio Tanaka to Walter C. Eells, letter, November 11, 1949, in “Tokushima University,” Eells Papers (translation by the GHQ staff). 10 Walter C. Eells and Donald M. Typer to Chief, Education Division, Memorandum “Program for Activities in Universities,” September 2, 1949. 6

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formal GHQ policy about communists and reminded Eells that it was Japan’s responsibility, and not the GHQ’s, to end the controversy about communists in Japanese universities. Nugent insisted that the Japanese should deal with communists on their campuses. However, he suggested that to add authority to his address, Eells should say that the CIE chief wholeheartedly agreed with his anti-communist policy. Nugent told Eells, “For this, I personally will take the responsibility.”11 Nugent lamented that the universities, which were talking about jealously guarding their university autonomy, still depended on the Education Ministry, which leaned on the CIE. Nugent’s irritation showed when he said, “if the Ministry cannot deduce SCAP’s attitude from approved addresses given by members of the Education Division… the Ministry is either very obtuse or… it wants something definite in writing in order to be relieved of all responsibilities. The Ministry cannot (and should not be allowed to) shirk this responsibility. Neither should individual universities.” He continued to advise that the CIE encourage the ministry to formulate its policy and if the proposed policy had “any guts”, the CIE could give a “no objection,” which would be interpreted as “enthusiastic approval.”12 It was a wholehearted endorsement for the Red Purge. Nugent’s reluctance to impose the GHQ’s view on the Japanese was the CIE’s policy and marked a new phase of the Occupation. In late July 1949, 10 days after Eells’ Niigata speech, MacArthur announced that he would reduce the number of personnel in the Occupation’s MG, which had overseen “almost every phase of Japanese life.”13 He granted the Japanese an increased autonomy that the Japanese government had been demanding. As a result, the GHQ gave the Japanese more initiative to govern. The GHQ, however, frequently offered its “instruction,” “advice,” or “recommendation,” which carried the unmistakable connotation of an “order.”14 Although the CIE encouraged the Japanese to make their decisions, they had to carefully consider the implications of a recommendation by the GHQ. Despite this behind-the-scenes support for Eells, Nugent withheld public endorsement of Eells’ Niigata speech until November 1949. Hence, Japanese confusion and apprehension further deepened.

11

Chief, CIE (Nugent) to Chief, Education Division, Memorandum “Program for Activities in Universities,” September 7, 1949, in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 12 Chief, CIE (Nugent) to Chief, Education Division, Memorandum “Program for Activities in Universities,” September 7, 1949. 13 “U.S. Virtually Ends Civil Affairs Role throughout Japan,” New York Times, July 29, 1949. 14 Tetsuo Hirata, Reddo p¯ aji no shiteki ky¯umei (Historical analysis of the Red Purge) (Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha, 2002), 81.

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7.1 Restricting Political Activities of Civil Servants in Education Eells’ speech set off a national debate regarding whether it was “just” to employ communist teachers in publicly-funded schools and whether their political rights should be restricted. The Special Law on Public Servants in Education of January 1949 defined national school teachers as national public servants and all other teachers in publicly-supported schools as local public servants. During the US Occupation, 92% of teachers, from kindergarten through university, worked for national or public schools. The political activity of Japanese teachers was subject to the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education. Article 8 reads, “The schools…shall refrain from political education or other political activities for or against any specific political party.”15 An additional law, the Law for Certification of Educational Personnel, was enacted in May 1949. It stated that people who “organize or join political and other associations which advocate the overthrow of the government by force” would be denied teaching certificates.16 In October 1948, the Education Ministry broadened the scope of prohibition by reinterpreting Article 8 and banning all political activities at schools. This action was taken after students demonstrated against a tuition increase and after some teachers were caught soliciting votes for the Communist Party for the January 1949 election by visiting students’ homes. In June 1949, the ministry prohibited teachers from participating even in off-campus activities that may influence students. A few months later, on September 19, a National Personnel Authority defined the political activities that public servants should not engage in—supporting or opposing candidates for public office, any particular political party, and “virtually all means of exerting political influence on others, either in public or private capacity, whether during or after office hours.”17 This ruling raised the question of whether professors of national universities were forever barred from expressing their political views, in speech or writing.18 Academics waited for Tokyo University president, Nanbara, the most influential of all university presidents, to respond to the new restrictions. Nanbara chose to ask the deans of Tokyo University departments to study the relationship between the 15

Article 8 of Fundamental Law of Education, in SCAP, the CIE, Post-War Development in Japanese Education, vol. 2, 128. 16 Department of State, Division of Research for the Far East, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), 097.3 #OIR 5087, “The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan,” November 14, 1949, 1–3 and 6, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1977). 17 OIR, 097.3 Z1092 #OIR 5168, “Political Rights in the Japanese National Public Service,” February 6, 1950, 3. 18 OIR, “The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan,” November 14, 1949, ii; “Is Criticism on Political Affairs a Political Act or Not? University Professors are Active in Journalism,” Mainichi Shimbun, September 27, 1949 (English translation by H. Okada [GHQ staff?]), Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers.

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guarantee of academic freedom in Japan’s Constitution and the National Personnel Authority regulations. Meanwhile, he met with Kiyoshi Asai (1895–1979), president of the National Personnel Authority. On October 17, Nanbara issued a public statement that an exception must be made for university professors as it was their inherent duty to address current political and social issues, including communism and Marxism, and share their research results with their students and the public.19 Five days later, the Japanese government reversed its position on Article 8 and allowed teachers and professors to make political contributions, join political parties, sign and circulate petitions, and participate in political campaigns. Government officials added, “Activities of university professors, such as expressing their opinions on campus or engaging in the enlightenment of the masses, are thought to be an integral part of the performance of their duties as professors.”20 President Nanbara’s prestige rose even more. While the Fundamental Law of Education and other public servant regulations restricted political activities and provided a legal basis for dismissing professors who breached the political neutrality rule, the Special Law on Public Servants in Education of 1949 provided special legal protection to all national university professors. Articles 5 and 6 stipulated that if a professor’s position was changed (i.e., demotion, dismissal, or disciplinary action against his or her will), the university administration was required to investigate the case before the disciplinary actions could be imposed. The law guaranteed the right of the defendant to request an open hearing and appoint a defense counsel.21 This law became the bulwark against the Red Purge.

7.2 Red Purge in the Name of Budgetary Cutbacks In early September 1949, each prefectural board of education and municipal assembly established personnel quotas to lay off public employees. Communists and their sympathizers were at the top of the list. By early October, 1000 teachers had been dismissed, more than half of whom were JCP members.22 One major daily newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, asserted that Article 8 of the Fundamental Law of Education was the legal basis for dismissal. Elementary and middle 19

“Akai ky¯oju to kaku daigaku no ugoki” (Red professors and movement at each university), Asahi Shimbun, October 9, 1949; “University Head Clarifies Stand on Red Teachers,” Nippon Times, October 22, 1949, in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers; “Akai ky¯oju tsuih¯o to t¯odai no taido” (Ousting Red professors and Tokyo University’s attitude), Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 1949. 20 Mainichi Shimbun, October 23, 1949, quoted in OIR, “Political Rights in the Japanese National Public Service,” February 6, 1950, 5. 21 The Special Law on Public Servants in Education of 1949 (January 12, 1949) (Ky¯ oiku k¯omuin tokureih¯o). https://www.town.shibata.miyagi.jp/reiki_int/reiki_honbun/3702500004140925h.html (accessed August 24, 2022). 22 OIR, “The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan,” November 14, 1949, 8; “‘Akai ky¯oin’ seiri susumu” (Ousting “Red teachers” is in progress), Asahi Shimbun, October 4, 1949; “Leftists in Japan Lose School Jobs,” New York Times, October 14, 1949.

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schools launched the Red Purge in the name of budgetary cutbacks. However, the Education Ministry, while denying direct involvement, stated that teachers were being dismissed to meet new personnel quotas. The ministry reasoned that since there were not enough voluntary retirements, it had no choice but to force retirement.23 Communism was never mentioned. Around the same time, the media reported several instances of universities advising alleged communist professors to resign. The JCP newspaper, Akahata (Red Flag), was the first to report, on September 18, 1949, that Toyama, Yamanashi, and Kanagawa Suisan universities had pressured communist professors to resign.24 The US State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) reported that between mid-September and the beginning of October 1949, 20–30 professors at national universities had been urged to resign. The Education Ministry stated that each university had acted on its own.25 When these discharges were reported in the media, Nanbara criticized Eells’ Niigata address, “[C]onditions in the United States differ from [those] in Japan. Educators in Japan… have fought bitterly with great sacrifices for the freedom of learning, even under the military government during the war years.”26 He stated that no outside authority, not even the GHQ, should meddle in a university’s internal matters. He maintained that only when a professor violated political neutrality did a university have the right to deal with it through an established procedure.27 His view was formally expressed in the Japanese Association of University Professors’ “Resolution Regarding Academic Freedom and Position of Professors” (issued on October 22, 1949), which read in part: We believe that dismissing a professor merely because of his membership in a political party, which is legally recognized in society, is unacceptable in light of academic freedom guaranteed in the constitution. On the other hand,...professors should not violate their academic freedom by betraying, in their utterances, writings, or guidance of students, partisanship in favor of some particular party or group. Only if a professor violated the rule, would it be justifiable to dismiss such a professor.28 23

“‘Akai ky¯oin’ seiri susumu” (Ousting “Red teachers” is in progress), Asahi Shimbun, October 4, 1949. 24 “An Extract from ‘Akahata’ Dated September 19, 1949” (English translation by Oka [GHQ staff?]); “Communist Professors are Purged Based on False Propaganda at Toyama University,” Akahata, September 18, 1949 (English translation by GHQ staff); “Discharge of Professors who are Members of Democratic Scientists’ League Contemplated in Kobe,” Akahata, September 25, 1949 (English translation), Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers; “Gakumon no jiy¯u o mamore” (Protect academic freedom), Tokyo daigaku gakusei shimbun (Tokyo University student newspaper), September 26, 1949. (The Tokyo University student newspaper, if not communist-dominated, at least leaned toward the left.) 25 OIR, “The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan,” November 14, 1949, 8; “‘Akai ky¯oin’ seiri susumu” (Ousting Red teachers is in progress), Asahi Shimbun, October 4, 1949. 26 “Freedom of Education,” Nippon Times, n.d. in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 27 “Tokyo Educator Opposes Purge of Red Teachers,” New York Herald Tribune, October 18, 1949; “University Head Clarifies Stand on Red Teachers,” Nippon Times, October 22, 1949, both sources are in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 28 Japanese Association of University Professors (JAUP) (Zenkoku daigaku ky¯ oju reng¯o), “Gakumon no jiy¯u to daigaku ky¯oju no chii ni kansuru ken” (Resolution on academic freedom

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The Science Council of Japan and the Teachers’ Union issued statements that concurred with the JAUP.29 Kiyoshi Asai, president of the National Personnel Authority, voiced his support for Nanbara: It would be difficult to base the current dismissals [of national university professors] on the [the National Personnel] Authority’s recent political activities regulation alone, because evidence of specific violations must be established and the regulation is not retroactive in force.30

Education Minister S¯otar¯o Takase (1892–1966) concurred by saying that no professors should be dismissed from their jobs merely due to membership in a particular political party. Eells responded to these objections in his speech at H¯osei University, a large private university in Tokyo, in late October 1949. This particular speech was carefully prepared and reinforced with the GHQ’s endorsement. A few days before Eells spoke, Col. F. C. Dahlquist, a high-ranking official of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) in G-2 who had read the draft manuscript, commented that it was “very good stuff with plenty of punch” but requested the following revisions. Eells had written that “the university has the right to fire Communists” and followed with “it has the duty.” Dahlquist did not object to “right,” however, felt that using “duty” sounded as though Eells was ordering universities to dismiss communists, therefore, he suggested that the speech “be toned down a bit.” Referring to Eells’ phrase “the real danger from Communism in the Universities is far greater in Japan than in the United States,” Dahlquist pointed out that the statement was counter to General MacArthur’s recent announcement that communism was not a problem in Japan. He suggested rephrasing it so as not to contradict MacArthur’s position.31 The fact that Eells’ speech manuscript was read and approved by a high-ranking official of the PWB indicated that the speech went further than the CIE’s recommendation; it became a part of the GHQ-endorsed psychological warfare against Japanese communists. In fact, Education Division Chief, Orr wrote in his memoir that Eells’ speeches were approved through a channel directly connected to MacArthur.32 Psychological warfare, a tactic involving the use of propaganda or similar methods to demoralize the enemy in an attempt to ensure victory,33 had been employed in and position of professors), October 22, 1949, in Zenkoku Daigaku Ky¯oju Reng¯o, Kaih¯o 5: 68–69 (author’s translation). 29 “Statement by Science Council of Japan on Respect of Academic Freedom and Freedom of Thought,” October 6, 1949, in Shiry¯o nihon gendai ky¯oiku shi (Historical materials on Japanese modern education), vol. 1, ed. Miyahara (Tokyo: Sanseid¯o, 1974), 528; Teachers’ Union’s statement, October 6, 1949, in Shiry¯o nihon gendai ky¯oiku shi, vol. 1, ed. Miyahara, 169. The Teachers’ Union (Nikky¯oso) was established in June 1947. 30 OIR, “The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan,” November 14, 1949, 9. 31 Loomis to Eells, memo, October 26, 1949, in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 32 Mark T. Orr, Senry¯ oka nihon no ky¯oiku kaikaku seisaku (Educational reform policies in occupied Japan), trans. Gary H. Tsuchimochi (Machida-shi: Tamagawa gakuen shuppanbu, 1993), 32. 33 New World Encyclopedia contributors, “Psychological warfare,” New World Encyclopedia, https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Psychological_warfare&oldid= 1071924 (accessed August 24, 2022).

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the Far East during World War II, however, when Japan was defeated, psychological warfare activities were suspended. In 1947, with the advent of the Cold War, General MacArthur reactivated a small planning group, the PWB in the G-2 section, the GHQ, Far East Command. Willoughby, head of G-2, appointed a civilian and retired army colonel, J. Woodall Greene, as the chief. Greene had served in psychological warfare for MacArthur in the Pacific during World War II and, after the war, assisted with the war crime trials as a civilian in Tokyo. Colonel F. C. Dahlquist had directed one of the Sino-American peace teams under General Marshall and was appointed to the newly activated PWB in the number-two position—executive. This PWB would be fully active on the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War (June 1950–July 1953).34 On October 29, 1949, Eells delivered a speech, which had been thoroughly read and approved by the PWB, at Hosei University. In his speech, he commented on the main objections of the Japanese. To the argument that forbidding a member of the Communist Party to become a professor was a violation of his constitutional rights, Eells explained that there should be a distinction between the “political rights of all citizens” and the “privilege” of being a professor, which was “won by a long period of preparatory study and demonstrated ability, intellectual honesty and integrity in thinking.” Communists were committed to an ideology of destruction and, hence, no longer had the freedom of thought and did not deserve the privilege of being a professor.35 The Japanese argued that conditions in Japan and the US were different, therefore, the definition of academic freedom that Eells claimed was not acceptable in Japan. Eells countered that Japan’s dire economic condition was a fertile and dangerous ground for communist infiltration, therefore, his definition of academic freedom had to be applied more strictly to Japanese universities.36 To bolster his argument, he quoted a 1937 Communist Party directive, which was often cited by Sidney Hook, a leading advocate of anti-communist policy in the US, as evidence that communist teachers injected their beliefs into their teaching—“Communist teachers must take advantage of their positions without exposing themselves. Only when teachers have really mastered Marxism-Leninism will they be able skillfully to inject it into their teaching at the least risk of exposure and at the same time conduct struggles around the schools in a truly Bolshevik manner.” “I do not see,” 34

SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.), “General MacArthur’s PSYOP Organization” in The American PSYOP Organization during the Korean War, http://www.psywarrior.com/KoreaPSYOPHist.html (accessed August 24, 2022); “Details, The J. Woodall Greene papers, 1942–1945,” in ARCHIVEGRID, http://beta.worldcat.org/archivegrid/collection/data/47033334 (accessed August 24, 2022); J. Woodall Greene to Bonner F. Fellers, October 23, 1948, and February 26, 1949, Box 2, folder 12; Charles Willoughby to Bonner F. Fellers, October 1, 1950, Box 5, folder 14, RG-44a Papers of Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, USA, Military Secretary to MacArthur, SWPA, SCAP, 1913–1972, MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA; “GHQ Offices Directory,” Papers of MGEN Charles Willoughby Company (General Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library), Box 1, folder 6: Dai Nippon Printing (Microfilm Roll #001, Japanese National Diet Library). 35 Walter C. Eells, “Communism and Education: Dr. Eells Clarifies His Niigata Speech,” Nippon Times, November 4, 1949. 36 Eells, “Communism and Education: Dr. Eells Clarifies His Niigata Speech”.

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Eells commented, “how any professor bound by such instructions…can do an honest job of teaching or research—can have true academic freedom.”37 To the Japanese argument that membership in the Communist Party should not be sufficient to disqualify professorship, Eells emphasized that “a true Communist cannot remain harmless but must follow the Party line, even secretly and cunningly.” To make his point, he offered an analogy: Suppose there is a mad dog running loose in the vicinity of this university. There may be two theories for dealing with him. One theory says he is a very beautiful dog; he has never done any harm to anybody – yet; he has certain constitutional dog rights; he should have full dog freedom. The other theory says that we already know the nature of mad dogs – that it is their nature to bite children or students – or even professors! – or possibly even a university president! The poison of their bite is likely to kill their victims. Therefore, let us restrain or remove this mad dog now, rather than waiting until he really bites someone. I confess I believe in the second theory as a safeguard for our young people who are in danger of being bitten by the mad dog of Communism.

He did not stop there. We know enough about Communism….It is worse, far worse, than any mad dog or any epidemic of smallpox. It is worse than murder or poison. A murder kills only one or two persons. Communism plans to murder democratic government as a whole. Poison affects only a few of us. Communist government plans to make slaves of all of us.38

He concluded, “Communism is more than a political party. It is a movement which would take over and regulate, accordingly a despotic ideology, every phase of a citizen’s life… [I]t assign[s] a special job to teachers who join the movement— the duty to destroy the loyalty of the children and youth and to indoctrinate them with Communist ideology… Should there be freedom to destroy our freedom—and freedom to use the schools and universities as an important means of doing it?”.39 This was the speech that high-ranking GHQ officials approved. Even his colleagues in the Education Division criticized Eells’ harsh words and suggested he tone down his rhetoric, however, he did not listen. According to his colleagues, Eells seemed to enjoy being a notorious communism fighter.40 Eells’ sharp words infuriated Japanese communists who intensified their scathing criticism of Eells and the GHQ, including MacArthur. Eells failed to persuade skeptical Japanese academics. In his reminiscences, Eells admitted that his argument faced “some elements of difficulty” in countering Japanese objections.41 Japanese academics came to believe that the persecution of the communists by their government was a deplorable criminal act as it reminded them of prewar “thought control” policies that had included the death penalty. While they agreed 37

Eells, “Communism and Education: Dr. Eells Clarifies His Niigata Speech”. Eells, “Communism and Education: Dr. Eells Clarifies His Niigata Speech”. 39 Eells, “Communism and Education: Dr. Eells Clarifies His Niigata Speech”. 40 Orr, Senry¯ oka nihon no ky¯oiku kaikaku seisaku (Educational reform policies in occupied Japan), 33. 41 Walter C. Eells, Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far Pacific (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1954), 29. 38

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with Eells that a university had to preserve political neutrality, they disagreed that Communist Party membership alone should be a sufficient reason for dismissal. Many Japanese academics, already upset with Eells’ plan for a board of trustees, considered Eells’ anti-communist declaration another nasty imposition of the American version of academic freedom. President Nanbara confessed similar fears in a letter to Mark T. Orr, a former Education Division chief who had left Japan in February 1949. “You have probably already heard about Dr. Eells’ speech at Niigata University. Of course, we Japanese… try to understand his good intentions. However, we have a bitter experience of ‘thought control’ during the war. We do not want to repeat the same mistake…”42 Indeed, in November 1949, the US State Department’s OIR wrote in its confidential report, “The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan,” that “the legal basis for the Red Purge” was “far from clear… the Japanese officials themselves [were] not confident that the current campaign [had] a well-founded legal basis.” The OIR added that the purge may revive “the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty that increasingly directed pre-surrender Japanese scholarship into safe and sterile channels.”43 Amid the heated debates, in early November 1949, Nugent spoke to the press for the first time about Eells’ Niigata address. Nugent said that Eells’ speech “was not designed to start a witch hunt” and denied the widely circulated rumor that the GHQ had ordered Japanese educational authorities to dismiss communists. He stated that he fully agreed with Eells’ recommendation, however, such decisions would remain in the hands of the Japanese.44

7.3 Eells Faced Students and Professors Eells proposed that the only way to persuade skeptical academics and students was to address them “directly and in person.” Otherwise, the people would read only the portions of his speeches that the newspapers published. He insisted that speaking at as many universities as possible was the solution. One of his goals was to persuade universities to oust communist professors. The other was to advise students on how to combat encroaching on communism. Eells explained that some university students began forming non-communist organizations, one of which had vowed to fight the

42

Nanbara to Orr, letter, August 15, 1949, quoted in Orr, Senry¯oka nihon no ky¯oiku kaikaku seisaku (Educational reform policies in occupied Japan), 34. 43 OIR, “The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan,” November 14, 1949, i-ii, 9. 44 Peter Kalischer, United Press staff correspondent, “Denies ‘Witch Hunt’ in Education Circles,” no source or date, Eells Papers; “Ky¯oju tsuih¯o shirei wa sezu” (No order to oust professors), Asahi Shimbun, November 9, 1949.

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control of the communist-led Zengakuren. Eells believed that these fledgling anticommunist groups needed “encouragement and friendly guidance.”45 To help anticommunist student groups, Donald M. Typer, the CIE’s officer for youth organizations and student activities, would accompany Eells. Typer received his MA from the University of Chicago in 1935 and completed the residence for his doctorate in Chicago in 1936. He came to Japan in 1947.46 In addition, William Neufeld, the CIE’s officer for health and physical education, would accompany them. The CIE considered physical education an important counter-communism program that would work by “encouraging counter interests and outlets.”47 Eells proposed that the conferences at the universities include teaching and administrative tools to defeat communism, therefore, two days were allocated at each conference. Between November 1949 and May 1950, the CIE sent Eells on a nationwide speaking tour to warn the Japanese public about the evils of communism. At 30 university conferences, Eells delivered his famous anti-communist lectures in English and Japanese interpreters translated every word. More than 20,000 professors and students from 138 universities attended these conferences.48 At a December 1949 conference at Osaka University, skeptical professors asked questions to fathom Eells’ true intentions. Osaka University’s president asked Eells whether his statement was his opinion or that of the GHQ. Eells answered, “The higher officials of the GHQ agreed on the draft of the speech, so please consider it a GHQ recommendation.”49 When a professor at the same conference reiterated the Education Minister’s opinion that a university professor should not be dismissed simply because he belonged to the JCP, Eells replied that such a viewpoint directly contradicted the GHQ’s position. Subsequently, the Japanese Education Ministry was urged to change its position.

7.4 Anti-communists Revealed Although Japanese professors’ and students’ opposition to Eells’ anti-communist speeches seemed to be unanimous and pervasive, this was not the case. A large number of academics and students supported his efforts. Before Eells’ anticommunist campaign began, strong anti-Soviet and anti-communist sentiments had already been simmering in Japan due to the festering issue of repatriation. While almost more than 1.7 million Japanese who had been stationed throughout China, 45

Walter C. Eells and Donald M. Typer to Chief, Education Division, Memorandum “Program for Activities in Universities,” September 2, 1949. 46 Biography of “Donald M. Typer,” in “Aftermath of Niigata Address,” Eells Papers. 47 William Neufeld, “Health and Physical Education Program in the Universities,” in “Plans for Higher Education in 1949,” n.d., 56–57, Eells Papers. 48 Eells, Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far Pacific, 30. 49 “Rit¯ o ky¯oju wa nokosu” (Professors who leave the JCP could stay), Asahi Shimbun, December 3, 1949; “The Statement is GHQ Recommended—Dr. Eells, Questions and Answers about Red Professors,” Asahi Shimbun, December 3, 1949, Eells Papers.

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Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific had returned home alive by the fall of 1947, about half a million Japanese remained prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. In May 1949, the Japanese government estimated that 469,041 of them were supposed to be repatriated, however, Moscow announced that only 95,000 Japanese soldiers were to return home.50 The Soviet Union was using the Japanese prisoners as forced labor in Siberia where they worked under terrible conditions and underwent communist indoctrination. Having received thousands of petitions from Japanese families to investigate the prisoners’ prospects for coming home, MacArthur pressed the Soviet delegate in Tokyo to explain why so many prisoners were still being held. In December 1949, William J. Sebald, the US delegate to the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo, stated publicly that the US estimated that 370,000 out of 376,929 Japanese who had not yet returned had already perished while in Soviet custody.51 Given the level of hostility toward the Soviet Union in Japan, it is not surprising that many Japanese supported Eells’ anti-communist message. In the Walter C. Eells Papers, Eells kept a total of 14 personal letters from Japanese professors, students, and others, including three letters written immediately after the Niigata speech and 11 personal letters during his visit to various universities (excluding official thank-you letters). In addition, two letters came via General MacArthur. Although these letters may not be the only feedback that Eells happened to receive or keep, this correspondence gives us a glimpse of the anti-communist sentiments among Japanese academics and students. A professor at Nihon University in Tokyo sent MacArthur a postcard in late November 1949 in which he thanked Eells for his lecture against communism and requested that “General MacArthur take steps to have Dr. Eells give the same lecture to every one of the nation’s universities, because it contains a message of special significance to all of the nation’s college students and professors.”52 The digest of letters, together with the original postcard, was routed to Eells.53 This correspondence to Eells included information about what was happening in universities. Immediately after Eells’ speech at Niigata University in July 1949, an anonymous letter to Eells read, “Please save us, pro-Americans, from the suppression by Communist teachers.” The letter urged the dismissal of all members of the faculty who teach communism “with your authority.” The author explained that 50 Charles A. Willoughby, GHQ shirarezaru ch¯ oh¯o-sen—shinpan; Willoughby kaikoroku (GHQ’s unknown espionage battles: a new edition; Charles A. Willoughby’s memoirs), trans. and ed. Yan Yon and Masao Hiratuka (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan-sha, 2011), 94–95. 51 F. W. Warner, “Repatriate Organizations in Japan,” Pacific Affairs, 22, no. 3 (September 1949): 273; “37-man shib¯o to suitei” (Number of deaths estimated to be 370,000), Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 1949; Department of State, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, File 097.3 Z1092 5068/50(PV), “The Reemergence of the Extreme Right in Japan on the Basis of Anti-Communism,” April 14, 1950, 17, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports VIII Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia and the Far East Generally: 1950–1961 Supplement (Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1979). 52 SCAP, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Digest of Letter (no name or address) to General MacArthur, November 24, 1949, in “Nihon University,” Eells Papers. 53 Orr, Senry¯ oka nihon no ky¯oiku kaikaku seisaku (Educational reform policies in occupied Japan), 33.

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communist professors dominated Kyoto University’s Economics Department and were forcing students to convert to communism.54 Another anonymous writer wrote that as there were “too many” communist professors in Wakayama University’s Economics Department, there was no freedom of thought. “Please save our school. It is hard to get a job, it is hard to do a free thinking [sic], as we have too many communists. You are a pure ampire [sic] of academic freedom,”the letter read.55 A professor at Kobe University wrote that he “entirely” agreed with Eells and hoped that his recommendations would be put into practice. The Kobe writer continued that he “firmly resolved to fight” against fellow teachers who were communists, as otherwise, his non-action would “allow communists to sway their influence in the university.”56 These letters revealed what the media reports did not, that is, the volatile atmosphere at the universities. Eells’ speech allowed non-communist students and professors to vent their pent-up resentment. Until Eells’ speech in July 1949, they had been afraid to speak out against communist professors. If they publicly denounced a communist colleague, they would be labeled “reactionary” or “anti-democratic.” Speaking against leftist professors was seen as reminiscent of pre-war militarism and ultranationalism. However, the same Occupation authorities who had released the communists from prison and reinstated leftists in their teaching positions were now turning against them and some Japanese academics and students felt safe expressing their anti-communist sentiments to Eells. These letters confirmed that there were active communists on university campuses, fueling Eells to speak with even more fervor. The stage was set for a confrontation pitting Eells against the Japanese professors and students who were determined to sabotage his mission.

54

All student applicants for the University of Kyoto’s Economic Department to Walter C. Eells, postcard, July 25, 1949, “Niigata University,” Eells Papers (translation by Frank Kawamoto, GHQ staff). Note on translation: in the Eells Papers, English translations are attached to all original Japanese letters or documents for Eells who could not read Japanese. 55 A student at Wakayama University to Eells, a letter, n.d. (original in English), in “Wakayama University,” Eells Papers. 56 Yoshihide Ueki, Professor of Hyogo Normal School of Kobe University, to Dr. Walter C. Eells, personal letter, n.d. (translation by GHQ staff), “Kobe University,” Eells Papers.

References

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References Eells, Water C. 1954. Communism in Education in Asia, Africa and the Far Pacific. Washington D.C.: American Council on Education. Fukushima, Shingo. 2003. Shakai kagaku to shiteno seiji kenky¯u—1947–54 (Political study as social science, 1947–54). Sensh¯u Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenky¯usho Gepp¯o 486: 1–23. Hirata, Tetsuo. 2002. Reddo p¯aji no shiteki ky¯umei (Historical analysis of the Red Purge). Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha. Hirata, Tetsuo. (ed.). 1993. Daigaku jichi no kiki—K¯obe daigaku reddo p¯aji jiken no kaimei (Threats to university autonomy: An analysis of the Red Purge at K¯obe University). Tokyo: Shiraishi shoten. Kumano, Ruriko. 2007. Academic Freedom and Autonomy: Walter C. Eells and the Red Purge in Universities during the Allied Occupation of Japan. PhD diss., University of Hawaii. Kumano, Ruriko. 2010. Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the ‘Red Purge’ in Occupied Japan. History of Education Quarterly 50 (4): 513–537. Miyahara, Seiichi. (ed.). 1974. Shiry¯o nihon gendai ky¯oiku shi (Historical materials on Japanese modern education), 2 vols. Tokyo: Sanseid¯o. Orr, Mark Taylor. 1993. Senry¯oka nihon no ky¯oiku kaikaku seisaku (Educational reform policies in occupied Japan). Translated by Gary H. Tsuchimochi. Machida-shi: Tamagawa gakuen shuppanbu. Warner, F.W. 1949. Repatriate Organizations in Japan. Pacific Affairs 22 (3): 272–276. Willoughby, Charles A. 2011. GHQ shirarezaru ch¯oh¯o-sen—shinpan; Willoughby kaikoroku (GHQ’s unknown espionage battles: a new edition; Charles A. Willoughby’s memoirs). Translated and edited by Yan Yon and Masao Hiratuka. Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan-sha. Zenkoku Daigaku Ky¯oju Reng¯o (The Association of University Professors). Kaih¯o (Organization Report) 4 & 5 (1949 & 1950).

Government Documents Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, Education Division. 1952. Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, 2 vols. Tokyo. United States, Department of States. 1977. O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc. United States, Department of States. 1979. O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, VIII Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia and the Far East Generally: 1950–1961 Supplement. Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc.

Manuscript Collections Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, 1947–1973. MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library (Norfolk, Virginia). Ronald Stone Anderson Papers. Hamilton Library, University of Hawai‘i at M¯anoa (Honolulu, Hawaii). Selected Papers of Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, USA Chief, Psychological Warfare Section, SWPA. MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library (Norfolk, Virginia). Tokyo daigaku gakusei shimbun (Tokyo University Student newspaper). Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan (Japan National Diet Library) (Tokyo).

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Walter Crosby Eells Papers, 1890–1962. WC Manuscript Collection 3. Whitman College Manuscript Collection. Whitman College and Northwest Archives, Penrose Library, Whitman College (Walla Wall, Washington).

Chapter 8

Japanese Communists’ Propaganda Against the United States

When Eells visited universities nationwide, he experienced the pervasive influence of communism. Each university’s communist cell confronted him with loud demonstrations, protest flyers, and billboards. When Eells and Typer visited Kyoto University in late November 1949, the university’s communist cell distributed a handbill that read, “It was Communists who fought to the last for the freedom of learning and thought which fascists tried to snatch away [in] the dark age of Japan when the militarist clique was swaying their tyranny.”1 The JCP’s attacks on Eells intensified after the Cominform in Moscow bitterly criticized the JCP’s strategy of “peaceful revolutions” in early January 1950, six months before the breakout of the Korean War (June 25, 1950). The Cominform accused Sanz¯o Nosaka of misleading the Japanese people and helping “the foreign imperialists to turn Japan into a colonial appendage of foreign imperialism.”2 JCP chairman, Tokuda, while recognizing “certain inadequacies” in Nosaka’s strategy, supported him and rejected the Cominform’s criticism.3 The ensuing internal conflict split the JCP. Yoshio Shiga and Kenji Miyamoto (1908–2007) refused to follow the “lukewarm” attitude of Nosaka and Tokuda. They

1 “Mimeographed Handbill, Kyoto University,” November 28, 1949 (translation by GHQ staff), in “Kyoto University,” Eells Papers. Eells collected many, if not all, of the handbills produced by the communist cells at each university and had them translated into English. 2 Quoted in United States, Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), File 097.3 Z1092 5257/50, “The Japanese Communist Party in the Wake of the Cominform Attack,” May 12, 1950, 3–4, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports VIII Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia and the Far East Generally: 1950–1961 Supplement (Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1979). 3 Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 60; Lonny E. Carlile, Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 151.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_8

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formed their faction—the “internationalist” faction—and demanded that the JCP accept the Cominform’s criticism.4 After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supported the Cominform’s criticism in its official organ, Jen-min jih-pao (People’s Daily), Nosaka and Tokuda conceded.5 At the 18th Central Committee meeting, held on January 18 and 19, 1950, Nosaka admitted his error and promised to adjust the strategy of the JCP. The Central Committee resolved that the JCP acknowledged an error in Nosaka’s strategy and that they would rectify following the Cominform criticism and strengthen their alliance with international proletariat organizations. Nevertheless, they kept denying its direct relation with the Cominform, saying that they accepted the Cominform’s criticism of their free will because they thought that the criticism was valid.6 The JCP’s alliance with the Cominform was, however, apparent from its change of stance regarding the peace treaty. As early as September 1949, the US initiated negotiations with Britain and France to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. Whether the Soviet Union would participate in this peace treaty was a potential diplomatic powder keg. The JCP stressed its desire for a “comprehensive peace treaty,” which meant a treaty with each of the former adversaries, including the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, which had been established in October 1949 under the Chinese Communist Party. However, the Yoshida cabinet was considering the possibility of a “separate peace treaty” that would exclude the Soviet Union and Communist China.7 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibited Japan from having a military or engaging in war, therefore, security (how to defend Japan without a military force) was central to the debate of a possible peace treaty. Prime Minister Yoshida, in his January 1950 Diet speech, stated that although the government preferred a comprehensive treaty, it would be willing to consider separate treaties, as they would be better than no treaty at all. Yoshida’s speech partially implied that to solve Japan’s security problem, the Japanese government may accept the presence of US military bases in Japan. The JCP severely criticized Yoshida for this stance, claiming that his real intention was to revive the Japanese military. This viewpoint marked a 180° turn from the JCP’s original stance—before the Cominform’s criticism, it had publicly opposed Article 9, arguing that Japan should have the right to defend itself with its military force. 4 Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 62–63; Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action 1919–1951 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 222. 5 OIR, “The Japanese Communist Party in the Wake of the Cominform Attack,” May 12, 1950, 6–7. 6 “Ky¯ osant¯o ‘hihan’ ni zenmen sh¯ofuku” (Full-scale consent to Cominform criticism), Asahi Shimbun, January 21, 1950; “Nosaka hihan o y¯onin: Ky¯osant¯o ch¯uo¯ i de ketsugi,” (Accepting the Cominform’s accusation of Nosaka: the JCP Central Committee decided), Yomiuri Shimbun, January 21, 1950. 7 Takeshi Igarashi, “Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic ForeignPolicy System in Postwar Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 327; Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 263.

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The JCP declared that the GHQ policies revealed Washington’s hidden agenda—to colonize Japan.8 The JCP’s about-turn suggested that the party was now entirely subservient to Moscow and Yoshida and the GHQ anticipated violence from the JCP following Cominform’s strategy. In response to this political development, at the national university administrators’ meeting in late January 1950, the Education Minister declared that each university should, “without hesitation,” get rid of communist professors who “disturb education on account of political activities.”9 However, once again, it was up to each university whether to carry out this policy. Even after the Cominform criticism, in public, the JCP appeared unified. However, in reality, the Shiga-Miyamoto faction, resenting that the JCP’s Central Committee made minimal policy changes, began acting independently and resorted to radical tactics. Zengakuren (the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations), which now acted independent of the JCP, aligned with the Shiga-Miyamoto splinter group and adopted the slogan, “Pro-Comprehensive Peace Treaty and Preserve Peace.”10 It demanded an immediate cessation of the US Occupation and a peace treaty that included the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.11

8.1 The Eells Incidents and Japanese Reactions12 Eells became the perfect target for the combative communist faction. Eells toured the nation energetically, earning the ever-lasting sobriquet, “Eells Typhoon.”13 Protests followed him wherever he went; students interrupted his speeches with booing, catcalling, and name-calling, including choicest terms, such as liar, an enemy of the democracy, and warmonger. Scathing criticism of his political stance appeared on circulars and handbills at every campus that he visited.14 When Eells visited 8

OIR, File 097.3 Z1092 #OIR-5136A, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Peace Treaty Problems,” February 28, 1950, 4–7. 9 “Expulsion of Red Professors Who Disturb Education,” Jiji Shimbun, January 27, 1950 (English translation); Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 10 OIR, File 097.3 Z1092 #5423/50, “Student Communist Activities in the Japanese Universities, September–October 1950,” December 27, 1950, 1. 11 OIR, “The Japanese Communist Party in the Wake of the Cominform Attack,” May 12, 1950, 7–9; Akira Yamanaka, Sengo gakusei und¯o shi (History of student movement in postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Gun shuppan, 1981), 98–99. 12 Part of this section is reproduced from with permission from History of Education Quarterly. [“Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the “Red Purge” in Occupied Japan” by Ruriko Kumano, 2010. History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 50 No. 4, 534–535, Copyright 2017 by Cambridge University Press.] 13 Walter C. Eells, “Academic Freedom and Communism,” speech manuscript, n.d., Box 4, no pagination, Ronald Stone Anderson Papers, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 14 Walter C. Eells, Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far Pacific (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1954), 30.

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Yamanashi University in March 1950, the JCP K¯ofu (Prefectural Capital) Committee distributed handbills that urged students to take action against Eells by reminding them of their country’s pre-war practice of ousting leftist professors. The connection was obvious—Eells’ Red Purge would lead to the same suppression of freedom. At the conference, the chairman of the Student Council of Yamanashi University, on behalf of the communist students, questioned Eells’ right to discuss the danger of communism on two grounds—(1) It violated SCAP’s directive of October 22, 1945, which prohibited discrimination against any creed and (2) Article 8 of the Fundamental Law of Education that prohibited political education. Communist cells at other universities used the same argument to challenge Eells.15 To the first allegation, Eells responded that he was a representative of SCAP and his speech “had the careful consideration and the formal approval” of the chief of the CIE, which was the same authority that had issued the 1945 directive. To the second allegation, Eells answered that he was an American citizen and, therefore, not subject to Japanese law. At the same time, to ease the tension, he said that he was not opposed to communism, per se, however, was against political infiltration in universities, which violated the basic principles of academic freedom. He asked the students to imagine what would happen if a huge financial conglomerate tried to influence the university for its interests and ordered professors to support it. Eells argued that for academic freedom, he would advocate eliminating such pressure and infiltration.16 Despite Eells’ mollifying remarks, the communists did not stop criticizing him, since their public criticism of him was an effective way to gain support from Japan’s intelligentsia. When Eells visited Kyushu University (formally an Imperial University) in April 1950, the university’s chapter of Zengakuren distributed a handbill stating that the US government intended to remain in Okinawa and Eells and Typer were American executors paving the way for the colonization of Japan. This allegation stemmed from the US government’s announcement that it would station troops in Okinawa indefinitely and keep American Occupation forces in Japan even after the Occupation ended.17 Claiming to be defenders of peace, the students at Kyushu University went on a strike to demand that the university oppose the expulsion of progressive professors. They added other demands to their list, including (1) the immediate conclusion of a fair and comprehensive peace treaty, (2) the immediate withdrawal of Occupation forces, and (3) absolute opposition to US military bases in Japan.18 15

Kofu Area Committee of the Japan Communist Party, “We Appeal to Students of Yamanashi University before the Speeches of Messrs. Eells and Typer,”; Eells, Typer, and Neufeld to Chief, the CIE, “Report of Field Trip to Yamanashi, Ibaraki, Fukushima and Utsunomiya Universities,” April 3, 1950, 4, both in “Yamanashi University,” Eells Papers. 16 Walter C. Eells to Chief, the CIE, “Discussion of Communism at Yamanashi University,” March 20, 1950, in “Yamanashi University,” Eells Papers. 17 Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Student Government Organization, “To the Entire Students [sic] upon Meeting Dr. Eells,” April 10, 1950 (announcement on bulletin board of Kyushu University) (English translation by GHQ staff), in “Kyushu University,” Eells Papers. 18 Clerical Bureau of Kyushu District Federation of Student Government Organizations, “About Kyushu Universities’ Struggle against War and Imperialism,” April 19, 1950 (printed bulletin from

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Alarmed by the increasing number of demonstrations by communist students on his campus, President Nanbara of Tokyo University banned the communist cell in late March 1950. (The Education Ministry had already banned communist cells in universities in October 1948, however, it was up to the university authorities to decide). Other universities followed suit.19 Major businesses and industrial employers declared that they would not employ communist students or their sympathizers. In late March 1950, Asahi Shimbun reported that two communist professors, Professor Wada of Saga University and avowed JCP member Setsur¯o Komatsu (1908–1975) of Kobe Keizai University, had been dismissed.20 Convinced that some universities were following Eells’ recommendation, communist students intensified their anti-Eells campaign. Their hostile responses culminated in what was called the “Eells incidents” at Tohoku and Hokkaido universities in May 1950, when communist students physically disrupted conferences. Tohoku University’s Fifty-Year History (Tohoku daigaku goj¯u-nen-shi), published in 1960 (when anti-American sentiments peaked among Japanese intellectuals opposed to the revision of the US-Japan security treaty), described the Eells incident at Tohoku University as follows: President Satomi Takahashi made an introductory address and as soon as Dr. Eells ascended the platform to speak about “academic freedom,” the students in the audience shouted, “In what capacity have you come here? Official or private?” and the meeting was thrown into chaos. Eells answered, “My opinion can be taken as the GHQ’s,” and continued his lecture, however, nobody could hear it because of the students’ riotous interruptions. After an hour and a half, Eells gave up and the lecture was called off.

The author of the book provided his interpretation of the incident: Despite being pressured to obey the Occupation authority’s orders and advice, Tohoku University did not fire the Red professors and students rejected Eells. The significance of the Eells incident was that the university openly resisted the Occupation authority.21

This interpretation implies that Tohoku University rose as a united front against the GHQ and that the students were heroic fighters who silenced Eells. In 2007, to mark its centennial, Tohoku University published Tohoku University’s One-Hundred-Year History (Tohoku daigaku hyakunen-shi). It presents the Eells incident in detail and is a fair description of what happened on that day. Nevertheless, the overall interpretation of the incident remains the same. It states that the purpose of the US Cold War policy changes was to make Japan a bulwark against communism. When the Red Purge Kyushu University, circulated at Kumamoto University, April 19, 1950) (English translation by GHQ staff with author’s editing), in “Kumamoto University,” Eells Papers. 19 “Ky¯ osant¯o saib¯o o kinshi” (Banning communist cells), Asahi Shimbun, March 21, 1950. 20 Tetsuo Hirata, ed., Daigaku jichi no kiki—K¯ obe daigaku reddo p¯aji jiken no kaimei (Threats to university autonomy: An analysis of the Red Purge at K¯obe University) (Tokyo: Shiraishi shoten, 1993), 360–361; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 262; Joseph C. Trainor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor’s Memoir (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1983), 349. 21 Tohoku Daigaku, Tohoku daigaku goj¯ u-nen shi (Tohoku University’s fifty-year history), vol. 1, 505–508 (author’s translation).

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reached Tohoku University, students rose to protect academic freedom and university autonomy. The centennial history claimed that the Eells incident was one of the few events during the Occupation where Japanese citizens confronted the mighty GHQ and boast that the incident was significant in the history of the university and the history of international relations.22 Disrupting an Occupation official’s speech may seem like a healthy democratic action to present-day citizens of democratic countries like the US, however, at that time, in Occupied Japan, even the slightest disobedience to the mighty GHQ was regarded as criminal, therefore, the event was significant. The incident has been described sympathetically in Japanese history books with the students’ actions glorified as bravery against US Occupation at that time. Soon after the Tohoku Eells incident, the president of the university organized the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee. Its May 1950 report provided an account of what took place during Eells’ lecture. The reconstruction of the event that follows here is based on the report, newspaper articles, the Tohoku University newspaper, and Eells’ account, which had not been used in Tohoku University’s One-Hundred-Year History. On May 2, 1950, Eells, Typer, and Neufeld, along with two Japanese interpreters, visited Tohoku University. Once they arrived at the campus, they saw handbills reading, “Let’s Boycott Dr. Eells’ Speech,” “Drive Out Foreign Powers,” “Silence Eells,” “All-out Opposition to the Eells Statement,” “Mr. Eells, No, Thank You,” and “No More Hiroshima, No More Eells.”23 Some of these boldly displayed the signature of the communist cell of Tohoku University. The visitors’ first stop was Lecture Room No. 1 at 9 a.m. Eells’ account states: About 750 students and teachers crowded into a lecture room with seats for about 500 to 550. We were told that admission had been selective by invitation to certain students….I think the system of checking invitations of entrance broke down completely at the downstairs entrance so far as we could judge. Indiscriminate groups of students came in without checking.24

Eells’ observation was correct. The Tohoku University administration had invited about 600 people for the morning lecture. However, before the lecture began, a quarrel broke out at the entrance of the lecture room between administrators and students. The administrators refused to admit the uninvited students. When the students forcibly entered the room, seats, floor, and stage were fully occupied.25 A communist cell 22

Tohoku Daigaku hyakunen-shi hensh¯u iinkai, Tohoku daigaku hyakunen-shi 1 ts¯u-shi 1 (Tohoku University’s one-hundred-year history) (Sendai, Japan: Tohoku daigaku kenky¯u ky¯oiku sink¯o zaidan, 2007), 618. 23 Rinji Ch¯ osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report) (Tohoku University Eells Incident, May 1950), Report No. 2, May 26, 1950, 23, Tohoku University Archives (author’s translation). 24 “Stenographic Transcript of Report of Dr. Eells to Col. Ayotte, CO Tohoku Region,” May 2, 1950, 1, in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 25 Newspaper press translation, May 4, 1950 – Tohoku gakusei shimbun (Tohoku student newspaper), extra, in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers (translation by GHQ staff with author’s editing).

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member shouted, “This lecture should be forced to be open to the public. Please come in freely.”26 Another student stood up and spoke to the audience, “We have not figured out the nature of Eells’ lecture—whether it is official or private. We cannot listen to the lecture if this is not clarified. Let’s demand the university administration’s explanation right now.”27 Despite the disruption, President Satomi Takahashi (1886–1964) took the platform to greet the speakers. However, there were several loud interruptions during his speech. According to Eells, “a half-dozen students were standing on their seats demanding” that the president say whether Eells’ visit was official.28 The protesting students focused their verbal attacks on President Takahashi. A war of words had been raging between the communist students and the university administration about the nature of the conference. A week before the conference, the communist students, hearing about Eells’ visit, had complained that the president was limiting the audience to 50 students selected by Gakuy¯ukai (a faculty-supervised student organization), excluding communist students. Moreover, the communist students insisted that the university must clarify whether Eells was coming with official GHQ approval. In addition, they wanted to know if the university would dismiss its communist professors. The president replied that the students should ask Eells directly when they had the opportunity.29 Dissatisfied with his evasion, the students decided to denounce the president at the conference. President Takahashi said that regardless of whether Eells’ statement was official or private, Tohoku University wanted to welcome him. He believed that the GHQ’s advice concerning Japanese education was offered out of goodwill, therefore, all those in attendance needed to show respect and gratitude toward the GHQ. The president assured them that there was no pressure on the university to follow Eells’ recommendations. It was up to each university to accept or reject Eells’ advice. The president said, “First, let Dr. Eells say whatever he has to say. Then let us have the freedom to criticize his ideas, take whatever we must, and discard whatever we should.”30 Eells later commented that the president’s words were the finest introductory statement he had heard in the 24 universities that he had visited.31 When Eells and his interpreter appeared on stage, several students shouted, “A question for the president!” and “In what capacity is Dr. Eells lecturing, official or private? Why haven’t the university authorities held this lecture openly?”32 26 Rinji Ch¯ osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report), 36–37 (author’s translation). 27 Rinji Ch¯ osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report), 19 (author’s translation). 28 “Stenographic Transcript of Report of Dr. Eells to Col. Ayotte, CO Tohoku Region,” May 2, 1950, 1–2, in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 29 Rinji Ch¯ osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report), 18–19. 30 Rinji Ch¯ osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report), 37–38 (author’s translation). 31 “Stenographic Transcript of Report of Dr. Eells to Col. Ayotte, CO Tohoku Region,” May 2, 1950, 1–2, in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 32 Rinji Ch¯ osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report), 38.

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The shouting continued for 30 minutes. Eells, uncertain when to start his speech, repeatedly sat down and stood up.33 A student asked Eells’ interpreter to tell Eells to wait while he and the other students negotiated with the president. Eells told the students, through his interpreter, that if the audience allowed him to speak, he would explain the purpose of the meeting and whether it was private or official. However, students kept shouting at the president and demanding answers.34 The president once again stepped up and said that he would answer the questions after the lecture. However, students continued to protest. Once again, Eells offered to explain; this time the students relented. Eells clarified that he had come in an official capacity, as the adviser on higher education for the CIE, at the invitation of the Education Ministry and Tohoku University. The content of his lecture had been approved and supported by high-ranking GHQ officials, therefore, his statement could be considered an official statement from the CIE, however, it was his personal opinion as well. He explained that he was an adviser, not a dictator, and had no intention to force his opinion on the university. In addition, he said that he would be happy to meet the students to answer their questions after the lecture.35 He tried to start his lecture, at which point the students started to curse, “Get down, Eells!” and “Nonsense!” Irritated, some students and professors countered by saying, “Let us halt criticism and listen to the lecture.”36 On Eells’ next attempt, a student holding a megaphone jumped onto a desk in the front row and blasted the president for not answering their questions. Eells continued his lecture; however, no one could hear it. Other students joined in, asking the audience to leave so that the students could hold an assembly on the spot. A vote was taken as to whether Eells should be allowed to speak. Although about a third of the audience voted in favor of permitting the lecture, pandemonium ensued. The president asked Eells to continue. Eells read four or five paragraphs of his speech, however, “no one, even in the front seats, could hear a word,” Eells recalled.37 He finally gave up and sat down. President Takahashi adjourned the meeting at a little past 11 a.m. Eells, Typer, Neufeld, and Takahashi left the room as some students exclaimed, “We drove out Eells!”.38 The following morning, the Sendai Municipal Police arrested two communist students of Tohoku University and pursued three others. The arrests were made based on Imperial Ordinance No. 311, providing for penalties against acts inimical to the objectives of the Occupation. After a thorough investigation, the University 33

Newspaper Press Translation, May 4, 1950, T¯ohoku gakusei shimbun (Tohoku Student Newspaper), extra, in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 34 “Stenographic transcript of report of Dr. Eells to Col. Ayotte, CO Tohoku Region,” May 2, 1950, 2; Rinji Ch¯osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report), 38. 35 “Stenographic transcript of report of Dr. Eells to Col. Ayotte, CO Tohoku Region,” May 2, 1950, 3. 36 Rinji Ch¯ osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report), 39–40. 37 “Stenographic Transcript of Report of Dr. Eells to Col. Ayotte, CO Tohoku Region,” May 2, 1950, 3. 38 Rinji Ch¯ osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc investigation committee report), 43.

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Council expelled three students, suspended seven, and reprimanded five. In addition, the university accepted the resignation of Professor Ryujyo Yamada, head of Student Affairs, and reprimanded Mr. Sekino, director of the University Office.39 On May 3, 1950, the day after the student protest at Tohoku University, MacArthur released a statement celebrating the third anniversary of Japan’s new constitution. In it, he branded the communists “abusers of freedom” and said that the problem Japan was facing was how to deal with “this anti-social force” without impairing “the legitimate exercise of personal liberty.”40 The following day, encouraged by MacArthur’s open criticism of the communists, Prime Minister Yoshida ordered an investigation into the Eells incident and said that the educational authorities should expel the communist cells from all university campuses.41 On May 4, when Eells visited Hirosaki University, he told his audience that the incident at Tohoku University reflected “the attempt of a minority group to subject the majority to its power,” just like “the Soviet pattern of violence, subjecting the bulk of the nation to the power of a minority comprising three percent of the people.”42 The media reported the Eells incident widely in Japan and the US.43 Eells collected numerous Japanese newspaper articles about the incident to analyze the public’s reactions. These articles disapproved of students’ actions and took the position that the communist cells had exploited Eells’ lecture to launch their anti-Occupation campaign, which was directed by the JCP. Major newspapers charged the communist students with denying Eells the right to speak and the audience the right to listen. Media consensus was that such actions threatened the foundation of freedom and democracy, which communist students claimed to defend.44 It should be acknowledged here that all editorials were under strict American censorship, prohibiting any criticism of SCAP and its personnel. It is safe to assume, however, that the general 39

“Two Reds Who Shouted Down Eells Nabbed; 3 Others Flee,” Nippon Times, May 4, 1950; English translation of (communist magazine) Shins¯o (Truth), July 1950, in “Hokkaido University,” Eells Papers; Ministry of Education, “Punishment of the Students in Connection with the Incident at Tohoku University,” June 10, 1950, in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers; “3 gakusei o taigaku” (Three students expelled), Asahi Shimbun, June 6, 1950. 40 General Douglas MacArthur, “Illegalize the Japanese Party: The Pawn of an Alien Power” (Allied Commander of the Occupation Forces statement on the third anniversary of the Japanese constitution), Tokyo, Japan, May 2, 1950, in Vital Speeches of the Day 16, no. 15 (May 15, 1950): 460. 41 “Gov’t Staring at Tohoku Univ. Case Seriously,” Kahoku Shinp¯ o, May 5, 1950 (by Newspaper Press Translation); “Gov’t Takes Serious View of Eells Case,” Nihon Y¯ukan, May 6, 1950 (English translation); Nippon Times, May 5, 1950, all in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 42 “Oust Red Professors, Dr. Eells Reiterates,” Nippon Times, May 14, 1950. 43 Eells kept three U.S. local newspaper articles on the Tohoku Incident: “Japanese Shout Down Yank Attacking Reds,” Los Angeles Daily News, May 2, 1950; “Japanese Boo Down Washington Educator,” Washington Daily News, May 2, 1950; “Jap Student Reds Heckle Mac Aide,” Chicago Daily News, May 2, 1950. 44 Editorial, Mainichi Shimbun, May 6, 1950; “Editorial Comment,” Asahi Shimbun, May 6, 1950; “Students’ Disturbance of Dr. Eells’ Speech Criticized,” Tokyo Shimbun, May 4, 1950 (English translation); “Editorial: New Education Minister and Students Cell,” Y¯ukan Ch¯ugai, May 7, 1950 (translation by GHQ staff), in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers.

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public sentiment was against the radical students. Only the JCP organs welcomed the incident, describing it as a heroic action. The weekly Miyagi Minp¯o (the organ of the Miyagi Prefectural Chapter of the JCP) published a special issue on the incident. One author claimed, “[T]here is a smell of war in Mr. Eells’ lectures” and exhorted “students, professors and progressive intelligentsia in all Japan to stand en bloc against his statement.”45 When 600 Tohoku University students—10% of those enrolled—attended a communist-led student meeting on May 4, reporters only from the JCP’s newspapers, Akahata and Miyagi Minp¯o, were admitted, while all other local and national reporters were shut out.46 The communist students led the proceedings in the name of the Student Self-Government Body and 14 communist students were elected to form an executive committee of the Peace-Protection Organization. According to Akahata, the goal of this Peace-Protection Organization was to prevent war and the colonization of Japan’s education.47 Those in attendance decided on a slogan, “Nation’s Independence.”48 The speakers at the meeting expressed distrust in the university authorities, demanded a retraction of Eells’ statement, and insisted on further efforts to acquit the arrested students, prevent communist professors and students from being expelled, and preserve the communist cell on campus. They submitted a resolution of no confidence against the president, the dean, and other administrators.49 The meeting was a communist show. Nearly 200 students, disgusted with the tyrannical conduct of the cell’s leaders, left the auditorium.50 One anonymous participant wrote a public statement, accusing communist students of monopolizing the meeting and hissing at all those expressing opposing opinions or drowning them out by shouting the word “reactionary.” According to this author, “[T]he Communist Party is not entitled to assert or demand the freedom of study and thought.”51 45

“Special Issue of the Weekly Miyagi Mimpo” (English translation by GHQ staff) in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 46 “Special Issue of the Weekly Miyagi Mimpo” (English translation by GHQ staff); CI section report, “Students Meeting on 4th of May at Tohoku University”; “Students, Faculty Meet in Closed Sessions Re Eells Incident,” Kyodo (Evening), May 4, 1950; “Tohoku Students Hold Mass Rally,” Nippon Times, May 5, 1950, all in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 47 “Dr. Eells Forced to Suspend Lecture,” Akahata, May 4, 1950 (English translation by Yokoyama [GHQ staff]), “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 48 “Creation of Peace-Protection Organization,” Mainichi Shimbun, May 4, 1950 (English translation by Hino [GHQ staff]) in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 49 “Students Hold Demonstration in Protest against Eells Case,” Jiji Press, May 4, 1950, “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 50 “All Students’ Grand Meeting,” Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 1950 (by Newspaper Press Translation); “Editorial Comment,” Asahi Shimbun, May 6, 1950, in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers; “Zengaku taikai de sawagu” (Commotion at the All-Student Meeting), Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 1950. 51 Interpreter in CI Section to Mr. Haworth, “Students Meeting on 4th of May at Tohoku University”; “Statement on Bulletin Board, May 5th” (English translation by GHQ staff), in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers.

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Zengakuren, which supported the Tohoku students’ action, mailed the Education Ministry a resolution, demanding the discontinuation of Eells’ and Typer’s lectures as they were against the constitution and the Fundamental Law of Education.52 However, the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee of the JCP did not support Zengakuren. It dissolved the communist cells at Tokyo University and Waseda University as these cells sided with the radical internationalist faction led by Shiga and Miyamoto and were rebelling against the JCP headquarters, dominated by the Tokuda-Nosaka faction. This intra-party power struggle revealed that the faction controlling the JCP did not support the rebellious students.53 Shortly thereafter, on May 16, a similar incident erupted at Hokkaido University, where the students, some leftist professors, and the University Employees’ Union attempted to silence Eells. Zengakuren students from Tohoku and Tokyo universities traveled to the university to instruct the students on how to confront Eells. According to a former Hokkaido University student leader, the protesters did not intend to disrupt the conference, rather refute Eells’ doctrine of academic freedom during the discussion sessions.54 Similar to Tohoku University, trouble began with how admission to the conference had been handled. The scheduled lecture and the roundtable conferences were open only to faculty, administrators, and selected students, therefore, the Student Council, the Hokkaido University Employees’ Union, and the Hokkaido University Branch of the Democratic Scientific Society (a leftist scientists’ society whose leaders had strong ties with the JCP) formed the University Mass Group. This group demanded that Eells’ speech be open to the entire university.55 When their demand was denied, the executive committee members physically blocked the entrance to the auditorium to prevent invited faculty and students from entering. Early, on the morning of May 15, President Seiya It¯o (1883–1962) of Hokkaido University, Professor Hajime Matsuura (1900-?),56 the chair for the Eells conference, and Mr. Niblo, the GHQ’s regional education officer, came to the train station to welcome Eells, Typer, Neufeld, and their interpreters. The president stated that he feared that the communist students may cause trouble and proposed holding a strategic meeting at his office before the conference. At the meeting, the president explained that the students had demanded to attend all the sessions, including those 52 “Eells Hit by Student Body,” Nippon Times, May 5, 1950; “Statement of All Japan Student Union,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 5, 1950 (by Newspaper Press Translation), in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers. 53 “Students’ Movement Said Standing at Cross-Roads,” (English translation by Kobayashi/cs, GHQ staff) Kyodo, May 9, 1950, in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers; OIR, File 097.3 Z1092 #5423/50, “Student Communist Activities in the Japanese Universities, September–October 1950,” 5. 54 Isao My¯ ojin, “Hokudai ¯Iruzu jiken no sh¯ogen: Takaoka Kenjir¯o-shi ni kiku” (Testimony of the Eells case at Hokkaido University through Kenjir¯o Takaoka as a witness), Kushiro ronsh¯u 15 (1983): 96–97; “¯Iruzu Jiken ch¯osa h¯okokusho zenbun” (Eells Incident investigation report), Hokkaid¯o daigaku shimbun (Hokkaido University Newspaper), July 5, 1950, 2. 55 “¯Iruzu Jiken ch¯ osa h¯okokusho zenbun” (Eells Incident investigation report), Hokkaid¯o daigaku shimbun (Hokkaido University newspaper), July 5, 1950, 1–2. 56 This date is unknown.

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planned only for the faculty members, and recommended that all scheduled sessions of the conference be open to the public.57 According to “The Eells Incident Investigation Report,” which was submitted by the University’s Investigation Committee in June 1950, Eells agreed, saying that it was just what he wanted.58 However, according to Eells’ account, he objected to the proposal and suggested that he held a separate meeting for the students to which the president said that such an arrangement would not satisfy the students. Therefore, after discussing the matter with Typer and Neufeld, Eells agreed to go along with the president’s plan “to prevent possible trouble, particularly since it appeared the [p]resident had already half-promised the students such a course of action.”59 Twenty minutes delayed for the first lecture, the American visitors proceeded to the auditorium where they found “several hundred students milling about the entrance, which had been barricaded by the communist group with a ladder and other obstructions.”60 Despite the blockade, the guest speakers were permitted to enter unharassed. The president declared that all the sessions would be open to the public. Satisfied with the concession, the students removed the barricade, and the auditorium and the corridors were quickly packed, making an audience of about 1500, the largest for any of Eells’ appearances.61 The first morning lecture session was “surprisingly orderly in view of the initial disorder,” recalled Eells. Eells gave his speech, entitled “Academic Freedom and Communism.” Within the first ten minutes, a student disrupted the lecture twice by shouting, “That’s a lie!” in Japanese, however, a hundred or more students promptly hissed him down. No other interruptions occurred. Eells was relieved to see that “all danger of any explosive development had passed.”62 Although his afternoon session was a roundtable event regarding university education for selected faculty members, 400–500 professors and students entered the designated room. Due to a lack of seats, they moved to a larger room. After Eells’ introductory comment, the meeting was opened for questions. “Evidently by prearrangement,” according to Eells, a professor stood up, took the microphone, and began to criticize Eells’ morning lecture, which he described as “shallow, superficial,” and without credible evidence. This professor, Mikao Moriya (1906–1982), was a Catholic. He asked whether all Catholic teachers should be dismissed along with the communists and further questioned whether Eells knew the tragic history of 57

Walter C. Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 1, in “Hokkaido University,” Eells Papers; “¯Iruzu Jiken ch¯osa h¯okokusho zenbun” (Eells Incident investigation report), Hokkaid¯o daigaku shimbun (Hokkaido University Newspaper), July 5, 1950, 2. 58 “¯Iruzu Jiken ch¯ osa h¯okokusho zenbun” (Eells Incident investigation report), Hokkaid¯o daigaku shimbun (Hokkaid¯o University Newspaper), July 5, 1950, 1–2. 59 Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 1. 60 Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 1. 61 “¯Iruzu Jiken ch¯ osa h¯okokusho zenbun (Eells Incident investigation report),” Hokkaid¯o daigaku shimbun (Hokkaido University Newspaper), July 5, 1950, 2. 62 Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 1–2; “Student Reds Fail to Stop Eells Talk,” Nippon Times, May 16, 1950; Eells, Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far Pacific, 31.

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Marxist professors during the war. He proposed that Eells expel the conniving professors who were betraying their colleagues by labeling them communists.63 Moriya received a thunderous ovation from the audience. Eells retorted, “I don’t know for sure whether my lecture is pertinent or not. But I see this university is highly colored with communism. Therefore, my speech was not wasted. I lectured here so that you will not suffer from the smallpox of communism, but I see some of you are already suffering from it. If the Japanese university has such a history as has been told by Professor Moriya, it was very unfortunate. What I say does not apply to pink professors; nor Communist professors will be imprisoned without a trial (applause by a small number of people and laughter).”64 Another professor, Sh¯ohei Miyahara (1914–1983), stood up, with audience encouragement. The JCP’s Akahata and the magazine, Shins¯o (Truth) proudly reported what followed. Below are excerpts from Miyahara’s comments: Please prove, with facts, where and how Japanese communist university professors were wrong. (Great applause.) I know of an opposite example. We have a very important skeleton of Desmostylus, an extinct genus of herbivorous mammal, which is the only one existing in the world. Because we could not preserve it, a plan was made to move it to the Tokyo Science Museum when a professor of geology there was fired because he was a member of the Communist Party, but he is still working for the museum without remuneration….If you say that is a directive issued by the Communist Party, then what’s wrong with it? (Great applause.)

Eells responded: I am talking about a general principle. It is very commendable for this university to have the skeleton of Desmostylus, but I am more interested in the bones of living men rather than in the old bones of dead animals. I am against the centralization of universities. If possible, I would send that skeleton to the farthest end, say, Obihiro, Hokkaido. (Shouts of opposition)65

Professor Miyahara’s statement was “a typical Communist harangue,” Eells later mentioned in his report.66 President It¯o told Eells that a communist professor’s dismissal needed to be based on grounds of professional competence, instead of legal grounds. Eells concurred. To conclude the session, the conference’s chair, Professor Matsuura, said, “Dr. Eells faltered in answering the questions today. We shall ask him to have a good [night’s] sleep tonight and we will make clear tomorrow what he could not do so today.”67 63

“Question and Answer Session between Dr. Eells and Moriya and Miyahara, Professors of Hokkaido University,” Akahata, May 24, 1950 (English translation), in “Hokkaido University,” Eells Papers. 64 “Question and Answer Session between Dr. Eells and Moriya and Miyahara, Professors of Hokkaido University,” Akahata, May 24, 1950 (translation by GHQ staff with author’s editing). 65 These comments were taken from “Question and Answer Session between Dr. Eells and Moriya and Miyahara, Professors of Hokkaido University,” Akahata, May 24, 1950 (translation by the GHQ staff with author’s editing), and Shins¯o, no. 43, July 1950 (communist magazine) (translation by the GHQ staff with author’s editing), both in “Hokkaido University,” Eells Papers. 66 Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 3. 67 “Question and Answer Session between Dr. Eells and Moriya and Miyahara, Professors of Hokkaido University,” Akahata, May 24, 1950 (translation by the GHQ staff).

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Matsuura’s remark, translated into English for Eells by his interpreter, angered Eells. Eells’ interpreter told him that it implied that his answers were wandering and irrational as if he were tipsy. Eells decided that Matsuura was on the side of the communists. Matsuura was a member of the Democratic Scientific Society, which was, according to Eells, a communist front organization. Due to this negative impression, Eells retaliated by blocking Matsuura from receiving a passport, thus, preventing him from attending an international meeting of botanists in Stockholm, Sweden.68 The next day, trouble occurred during the afternoon roundtable session. On the previous day, students had persistently demanded that Chairman Matsuura allow students to ask Eells questions during the roundtable sessions. At the beginning of the session, Professor Matsuura explained that the roundtable conference was intended for teaching personnel for the improvement of university instruction, therefore, questions would be taken from professors alone. He promised that students would get an opportunity to ask questions after the roundtable at the final session. Several members of the University Mass Group, including the head of the ¯ Hokkaido University Employees’ Union, Lecturer Kashio Ota (1915–1994), demanded that the arrangements be changed to allow students to ask questions. Matsuura repeated the same announcement and requested Eells to begin his lecture. Eells reassured the students that they would have an opportunity to ask questions at the later session. However, Eells’ announcement did not appease the students. The president said, “Be quiet! Do not get excited!” Other students and faculty members’ pleas, such as “Listen quietly” and “Leave everything to the chairman,” were drowned ¯ asked the profesout by students’ shouts for the right to ask questions. Lecturer Ota sors and administrators to give time to students’ questions. He was ignored. Chairman Matsuura insisted that the meeting was not to be dominated by the students. In addition, Eells refused to change his original schedule. Matsuura warned the audience that if he had to ask for decorum once again, he would adjourn the meeting.69 (In his account, Eells stated that Matsuura’s threat “was playing into the hands of the communist elements who would be happy to have the meeting wrecked”).70 Many people applauded in support of the chairman’s decision. At the beginning of his lecture, Eells reiterated that he would answer questions only from the faculty. He suggested that students translate their questions into English to save time in the final session. However, no one moved. A while later, someone hung a banner from the second floor of the auditorium, as close as possible to the stage, which read, “The university authorities promised to allow us to debate freely. Those who do not keep this promise are the enemies of democracy.” About 10–12 students ¯ sitting in the front row, stood up and noisily left the room.71 and Lecturer Ota, Despite the distractions, Eells continued his lecture, however, when he was a third of the way through the scheduled talk, the students and the lecturer returned. 68

Eells, “Disorders At Hokkaido University,” 7. “¯Iruzu Jiken ch¯osa h¯okokusho zenbun” (Eells Incident investigation report), 2. 70 Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 4. 71 Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 5; “¯Iruzu Jiken ch¯ osa h¯okokusho zenbun” (Eells Incident investigation report), 2. 69

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At this point, someone hung a banner on the opposite side of the room, which read, “Let us discontinue the roundtable conference. But do not leave the room. Let us pursue those responsible for this fiasco.”72 The same students who had left and reentered the room walked up to the stage. Chairman Matsuura, deciding that students’ conduct undermined the safety of the guests, declared that the lecture would be discontinued. In Eells’ account, the same students jumped on the stage, “seized the microphone, displaced the chairman, and took over the meeting.” Eells later stated that “the chairman made no effort to restore order.”73 President It¯o asked Eells and his interpreter to go to another building and continue the session with professors alone. However, that session, too, was canceled because students prevented the president from entering the room. American military police escorted Eells to a car and sped to his hotel. Despite this incident, Eells went to Iwate University, as planned, and completed, without any disturbances, all the conferences nationwide. Later, four students were expelled from Hokkaido University and five others were suspended. The university administration dissolved the university’s communist cell.74 The day after the Hokkaido University incident, in Tokyo, Zengakuren mobilized 3000 university students to demonstrate to “gag” Eells’ anti-communist statement by waving red flags and anti-American placards, such as “No More Hiroshima,” “Never Make Japan a Powder Dump of Imperialists,” and “Fight International Imperialism for the Sake of Racial Liberation.”75 Indeed, a fierce propaganda battle was waged between the communists and the GHQ internationally. The Chinese Communist paper, Jen-min jih-pao (People’s Daily), triumphantly described the debate, pitting professors Moriya and Miyahara against Eells at the Hokkaido University conference and the Soviet Union presented the incident to the world via radio as a communist victory over US imperialism.76 The International Student Federation, an international leftist students’ association to which Zengakuren belonged, sent a telegram to the Hokkaido chapter of Zengakuren and congratulated its members on the heroic action against Eells’ “fascist” statement.77 The Japanese media, except for the JCP’s publication, reported the incident negatively and provided their analyses of the incidents at both Tohoku and Hokkaido “¯Iruzu Jiken ch¯osa h¯okokusho zenbun” (Eells Incident investigation report), 2. Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 5. 74 Eells, “Disorders at Hokkaido University,” 5; Masakata Yanada, ed., Hokudai no Iruzu ¯ t¯os¯o— Sono shinjitsu o akiraka ni suru tameni (Eells struggle at Hokkaido University: for the purpose of revealing the truth) (Tokyo: K¯oy¯o shuppansha, 2006), 114–115. 75 “Anti-Eells Rally Held by Students,” Nippon Times, May 17, 1950. Other slogans on placards included “Kill the Eells Statement,” “Absolute Freedom of Study,” “Prohibit All Atomic Weapons,” and “We Demand the Immediate Halt of the Fortification of Japan”. 76 Isao My¯ ojin, “Senry¯oka nihon no daigaku to reddo p¯aji: Hokudai ¯Iruzu jiken no jissh¯oteki kenky¯u” (The Red Purge during the occupation of Japan: analysis of Eells Incident at Hokkaido University), Hokkaid¯o ky¯oiku daigaku kiy¯o 45, no. 1 (1994): 25. 77 “Kokusai gakuren kara gekireibun” (Words of cheer from an international leftist students’ association), Hokkaid¯o daigaku shimbun, May 30, 1950. 72 73

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universities. The national newspaper, Sangy¯o Keizai Shimbun claimed that the two incidents were instigated by a few communist students who had been manipulated by directives from outside or abroad. The English-language, Nippon Times editorial stated that the students’ disruptive actions validated Eells’ views on the communists—that they relied upon “force and violence to work their will upon those who disagree with them.”78 The Jiji Shinp¯o declared that while the students’ protests were ostensibly for academic freedom, they were part of an anti-American movement. The Mainichi Shimbun concurred and added that the incidents brought the hostilities between the US and the Soviet blocs into universities.79 These Japanese media reports may have been a part of an anti-communist campaign as self-censorship was vigorously enforced during the Occupation.80 However, they reflected the public mood of the time in which anti-communist sentiments were rapidly intensifying. Although a few letters written by Japanese to Eells cannot constitute historical proof of how the society, at large, felt about students’ misbehavior, some words deserve to be quoted as a glimpse of Japanese sentiments about the incidents, including anger toward disruptive communist students and sympathy for Eells and the GHQ. Professor Kikuo Tanaka (1893–1975) of Yamagata University wrote that the communist students who spoke out were “senseless and ungrateful” and that “[a]ll Japan is indignant with those Red-led groups.”81 Professor K¯oki Noguchi (1893-?)82 of Akita University wrote to Eells, “I feel extremely sad and ashamed that the worst incident of this kind has happened. We admire the courage and faith with which you have expressed your opinion bravely without any change, from beginning to end, despite such unpleasant incidents.”83 K. Suzuki wrote, “To think of the outrageous misdemeanor even by one of our countrymen toward our benefactors makes me almost die in shame. From the bottom of our heart, we must tender our profound apologies to you all, who are toiling day and night for our welfare and interests.”84 Another comforting letter came from Mitsue Doi, “an old-fashioned mother and grandmother.”

78

“Professional Agitators or Students?” Nippon Times, May 18, 1950. Editorial “Get Student Movement Back on Right Track,” Sangy¯o Keizai Shimbun, May 19, 1950 (translation by GHQ staff), in “Hokkaido University,” Eells Papers; Cited in “Japan’s Students Fight Occupation,” New York Times, May 28, 1950; “Gakusei und¯o no hansei o nozomu” (Hope students repent), editorial, Mainichi Shimbun, May 10, 1950. 80 Isao My¯ ojin, “Senry¯oka nihon no daigaku to reddo p¯aji: Hokudai ¯Iruzu jiken no jissh¯oteki kenky¯u” (Red purge during the occupation of Japan: analysis of the Eells Incident at Hokkaido University), Hokkaid¯o ky¯oiku daigaku kiy¯o 45, no. 1 (1994): 24. 81 Kikuo Tanaka, Professor of English, Yamagata University, to Eells, letter, May 9, 1950, in “Yamagata University,” Eells Papers (original in English). 82 This date is unknown. 83 K. Noguchi, Dean of Liberal Art Faculty, Akita University to Dr. Eells, letter, May 23, 1950, in “Akita University,” Eells Papers (translation by the GHQ staff with author’s editing). 84 K. Suzuki to Dr. Eells, letter, May 22, 1950, in “Hokkaido University,” Eells Papers (original in English). 79

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I thank all of you with all my heart for coming from your distant country and working for us….Communists are extending their influence, under the protection of the Americans, their livelihood, and human rights….[W]e [Christians] were greatly relieved when General MacArthur and other people started to work on the anti-Communist policy….Please continue your work for the sake of the Japanese people who have just awakened to the truth.85

Eells was so touched by the woman’s letter that he replied: It was very kind of you indeed, to write so fully and so frankly, and I want you to know how much I appreciate it. Such letters as yours are very helpful when such controversy comes up. It is gratifying to know that we have the support of the greater majority of the Japanese people.86

The Eells incidents exposed the severely harmful influence of the communists on university campuses and elicited anti-communist sentiment and sympathy for the GHQ among ordinary Japanese people. They helped the GHQ and the Japanese government to step up anti-communist measures. Prime Minister Yoshida appealed to the nation, with strong anti-communist rhetoric, during the upper house general election on June 4, 1950, and Yoshida’s Liberal Party won 30% of the votes, becoming the dominant party in the upper house.87

References Carlile, Lonny E. 2005. Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Eells, Water C. 1954. Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far Pacific. Washington D.C.: American Council on Education. Hirata, Tetsuo. (ed.). 1993. Daigaku jichi no kiki—K¯obe daigaku reddo p¯aji jiken no kaimei (Threats to university autonomy: An analysis of the Red Purge at K¯obe University). Tokyo: Shiraishi shoten. Igarashi, Takeshi. 1985. Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic ForeignPolicy System in Postwar Japan. Journal of Japanese Studies 11 (2): 323–356.

85

Mitsue Doi to Dr. Eells, letter, no date, in “Tohoku University” and “Hokkaido University,” Eells Papers (translation by GHQ staff with author’s editing). This letter was circulated among the staff in the Education Division. 86 Dr. Eells to Mrs. Mitsue Doi, letter, July 7, 1950, in “Hokkaido University,” Eells Papers. 87 Out of 250 seats, the Liberal Party gained 76 seats, the Japan Socialist Party 61, Ryokufukai 50, the National Democratic Party 29, and the JCP 4 (same as in 1947): “1950 Japanese House of Councilors election,” Wikimedia Foundation, last modified April 5, 2022, 15:28 (UTC), https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950_Japanese_House_of_Councillors_election; “Gov’t Staring at Tohoku Univ. Case Seriously,” Kahoku Shinp¯o, May 5, 1950 (by Newspaper Press Translation), in “Tohoku University,” Eells Papers; “Yoron no d¯ok¯o to senkyo no ky¯okun” (The trend of public opinion and lessons from the general election), Yomiuri Shimbun, June 11, 1950.

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Kumano, Ruriko. 2007. Academic Freedom and Autonomy: Walter C. Eells and the Red Purge in Universities during the Allied Occupation of Japan. PhD diss: University of Hawaii. Kumano, Ruriko. 2010. Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the ‘Red Purge’ in Occupied Japan. History of Education Quarterly 50 (4): 513–537. ¯ Kashio ni kiku (Testimony My¯oin, Isao. 1982. Hokudai ¯Iruzu jiken no sh¯ogen: Matsuura Hajime, Ota ¯ as witnesses). of the Eells case at Hokkaido University through Hajime Matsuura and Kashio Ota Kushiro Ronsh¯u 14: 117–146. My¯ojin, Isao. 1994. Senry¯oka nihon no daigaku to reddo p¯aji: Hokudai ¯Iruzu jiken no jissh¯oteki kenky¯u (The Red purge in Universities during the occupation of Japan: Analysis of Eells Incident at Hokkaido University). Hokkai¯o Ky¯oiku Daigaku Kiy¯o 45 (1): 15–27. Nishi, Toshio. 1982. Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945– 1952. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Scalapino, Robert A. 1967. The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. Berkeley: University of California Press. Swearingen, Rodger, and Paul Langer. 1952. Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action 1919–1951. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Tohoku Daigaku. 1960. Tohoku daigku goj¯u-nen shi (Tohoku University’s fifty-year history), 2 vols, vol. 1. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku daigaku. Tohoku Daigaku hyakunen-shi hensh¯u iinkai. 2007. Tohoku daigaku hyakunen-shi 1 ts¯u-shi 1 (Tohoku University’s one-hundred-year history) Sendai, Japan: Tohoku daigaku kenky¯u ky¯oiku sink¯o zaidan. Trainor, Joseph C. 1983. Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor’s Memoir. Tokyo: Meisei University Press. Yamanaka, Akira. 1981. Sengo gakusei und¯o shi (History of student movement in postwar Japan). Tokyo: Gun shuppan. ¯ Yanada, Masakata. (ed.). 2006. Hokudai no Iruzu t¯os¯o—Sono shinjitsu o akiraka ni suru tameni (Eells struggle at Hokkaido University: for the purpose of revealing the truth). Tokyo: K¯oy¯o shuppansha.

Government Documents General Douglas MacArthur. 1950. Illegalize the Japanese Party: The Pawn of an Alien Power (Allied Commander of the Occupation Forces statement on the third anniversary of the Japanese constitution), Tokyo, Japan, May 2, 1950. In Vital Speeches of the Day 16 (15): 460 United States, Department of States. 1979. O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, VIII Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia and the Far East Generally: 1950–1961 Supplement. Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc.

Manuscript Collections Hokkaido daigaku shimbun (Hokkaido University newspaper). Hokkaido Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan (Hokkaido University Library) (Sapporo, Japan). Ronald Stone Anderson Papers. Hamilton Library, University of Hawai‘i at M¯anoa (Honolulu, Hawaii). Tohoku Daigaku (Tohoku University). Rinji Ch¯osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc Investigation committee report: Tohoku University Eells incident, May 1950), Report No. 2, 26 May 1950. Tohoku University Archives (Sendai-shi, Japan).

References

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Walter Crosby Eells Papers, 1890–1962. WC Manuscript Collection 3. Whitman College Manuscript Collection. Whitman College and Northwest Archives, Penrose Library, Whitman College (Walla Wall, Washington).

Chapter 9

Japanese Government Launches the Red Purge

On May 6, 1950, right after the Eells incident at Tohoku University, Prime Minister Yoshida appointed Teiy¯u Amano (1884–1980), a philosopher and an educator, as the Education Minister. Amano was considered a liberal and a victim of militarism during the war, as militarist and right-wing groups had denounced him for the antiwar theme of his 1937 book, The Sense of the Right (D¯ori no kankaku).1 A week after appointment, Amano visited Courtney Whitney, the powerful chief of the GS, for advice, as protocol dictated for all newly appointed ministers. Whitney explained that Amano’s main duty was to prevent the students from getting involved in politics and stabilize the current terrible state of affairs. Whitney added that he believed communism was not a great threat in Japan, however, it was undeniable that the JCP was exploiting the immaturity of the students for its cause and that student organizations were the “nurturing beds” for radical movements. Whitney requested Amano to take a strict approach to remedy the situation. Amano assured him that he would ensure that students’ political activities did not disturb the peace and order of the universities.2 Three days after this meeting, however, Amano lost face when students disrupted Eells’ conference at Hokkaido University on May 16. The following day, Amano visited the CIE Chief, Nugent and apologized for “the unfortunate incidents” at Tohoku University and Hokkaido University. Nugent consoled him, saying it was not his fault, however, expressed his annoyance by denouncing the protesting students as “gangsters.” He requested that the Education Ministry obtain detailed reports from 1 William D. Hoover, “Amano Teiy¯ u,” in Historical Dictionary of Postwar Japan, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 22. 2 Japan, Education Ministry, “Amano Daijin, Whitney Kyoku-ch¯ o sonota to kaidan no ken” (Conference between Minister Amano and Chief [of GS] Whitney), May 13, 1950, in Sengo ky¯oiku shiry¯o (Historical materials on postwar education), section 1, item 40, Kokuritsu Ky¯oiku Seisaku Kenky¯ujo (National Institute for Educational Policy Research, Tokyo [Nishi’s translation from the original Japanese into English in Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 264].

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_9

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the two universities about the measures they planned to take. Nugent felt sorry for those students who foolishly believed in communism and observed that while the students claimed to be fighting for freedom of speech, they denied that freedom to others. He insisted that universities needed to decide how to respond to disruptive student demonstrations. If universities needed the government’s intervention, Allied Nations would believe that Japanese universities could not handle their affairs. One of the great advances made by post-war Japanese education, Nugent mentioned, was university freedom and autonomy, which needed to come with the responsibility towards the public that supported them and the public made no secret of its opposition to the communists’ gangster tactics. Amano thoroughly agreed with Nugent.3 Nugent requested Amano not to take his words as an order. This reflected the ever-tenuous relationship between the Japanese government and the Occupation authorities. Although SCAP had announced that it was scaling back its role, from decision-maker to mentor, it still had the final say. Japanese discontent and suspicion toward the US government and SCAP had been mounting due to the protracted Occupation and unpopular SCAP-directed economic policies. Moreover, SCAP’s repeated interventions in Japanese political decision-making alienated the Japanese politicians. Two controversial issues during the spring 1950 Diet sessions were a SCAPdirected economic stabilization program based on Joseph M. Dodge’s fiscal policies, known as the “Dodge Line,” and the local tax revision bill that was “taken almost directly from the recommendations” of the US Shoup Tax Mission. This tax mission, headed by Carl Sumner Shoup (1902–2000) and seven prominent economists, was invited to Tokyo by MacArthur and stayed from May 10, 1949, for about three months. The Shoup Mission recommended detailed tax revisions (400 pages long) to promote decentralization and local governance that SCAP had been trying to implement from the beginning of the Occupation.4 The Dodge economic policies were so unpopular that, for the first time since the surrender, there was widespread resistance to American control, from the communists and “responsible organizations,” such as moderate labor, farmers, and business interest groups that the GHQ had supported.5 Nevertheless, the GHQ insisted that the budget, based on the Dodge Line, and the tax revision bills be enacted, deepening public discontent toward the Occupation authorities. For the first time, SCAP’s relationship with the Japanese government became the central issue in a Diet session. SCAP’s GS chief insisted that the local tax revision bill be enacted without amendment. In the lower house, Prime Minister Yoshida’s Liberal Party (established in 3

“Amano Daijin, Nugent Kyoku-ch¯o kaidan” (Conference between Minister Amano and Chief Nugent), May 17, 1950, Sengo ky¯oiku shiry¯o (Historical materials on postwar education), section 1, item 40. 4 United States, Department of State, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), File 097.3 Z1092 5247/50, “Japanese Political Trends Affecting U.S. Position in Japan,” May 23, 1950, 1, 6–7, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports VIII Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia and the Far East Generally: 1950–1961 Supplement (Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1979). 5 OIR, “Japanese Political Trends Affecting U.S. Position in Japan,” May 23, 1950, 1–6.

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March 1950 as a merger of the Democratic Liberal Party, led by Yoshida and 22 members from the alliance faction of the Democratic Party) had the majority (287 seats out of 466 seats), therefore, under pressure from SCAP, the Yoshida cabinet passed the bill in the lower house, despite a walkout by all opposition party members, protesting the GHQ’s intervention. In the upper house, however, the government could claim only 60 of the 250 seats, therefore, the budget was blocked until the end of April 1950.6 The Yoshida cabinet’s secretary-general charged the opposition parties with “dancing to the tune of the Communists” by defying an Occupation policy. According to him, such actions were “calculated to destroy pro-American sentiments among the Japanese” and were diminishing Japan’s prospects for an early peace treaty. The chairman of the Democratic Party, which was the most conservative element of the opposition, charged the Yoshida government with “borrowing the prestige of GHQ in suppressing the Japanese people.”7 Furthermore, the opposition parties petitioned General MacArthur to honor the “independence of the Diet.” The author of the intelligence report of the OIR stated that this Japanese resistance was a reflection of “the maturing of Japanese political institutions” and warned that if SCAP continued to resort to de facto directives in the name of advice and guidance, US prestige and influence would diminish in the long run.8 Observing the growing disenchantment among Japanese politicians toward GHQ, Nugent became even more careful when he wanted to advise the education minister. Behind the façade of Yoshida’s faithful obedience to GHQ’s guidance, there was self-imposed pressure to regain Japan’s independence as soon as possible. Disagreement regarding the peace treaty increased tensions between the conservative government and the opposition parties. After analyzing editorials and media reports, US intelligence concluded that the majority of Japan’s public opinion leaders were in favor of a “comprehensive peace treaty,” which would include all of Japan’s former enemies. The US analysis suggested that the Japanese were worried that if their country concluded a peace treaty that did not include the neighboring communist countries, Japan would have to live in constant fear of a new war. In addition, losing good relations with China meant that Japan would sacrifice a large market that was necessary for its economic recovery.9 Even so, the Yoshida government pushed for a peace treaty with only the US bloc, a stance against which the JCP spearheaded a vehement verbal attack. Japanese intellectuals, particularly liberals and Marxists, were in favor of a neutral Japan forged from the comprehensive treaty and sided with

6

OIR, “Japanese Political Trends Affecting U.S. Position in Japan,” May 23, 1950, 7, 9–10; the number of seats that the government claimed (60) included those of the coalition party. At the upper house general election in June 1950, Yoshida’s Liberal Party increased its seats from 38 to 76, making it the dominant party. 7 Quoted in OIR, “Japanese Political Trends Affecting U.S. Position in Japan,” May 23, 1950, 10. 8 OIR, “Japanese Political Trends Affecting U.S. Position in Japan,” May 23, 1950, 11–12. 9 OIR, File 097.3 Z1092 OIR-5136 “Japanese Attitudes Toward Peace Treaty Problems,” February 28, 1950, 4–5.

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the JCP. On the other hand, conservatives and “old liberals,” such as Amano Teiy¯u, the Yoshida cabinet education minister, wanted a separate treaty.10 To Yoshida’s annoyance, a very influential liberal opinion leader, Tokyo University’s President Nanbara, advocated a comprehensive peace treaty and criticized Prime Minister Yoshida’s anti-communist policy. While peace treaty negotiations were taking place between the US and Japan, Nanbara attended the December 1949 Conference on Education in Occupied Countries, held in Washington, DC. There he spoke to an audience on reform in Japanese education and the importance of neutrality for post-Occupation Japan. In other words, he supported a comprehensive peace treaty. He also said that the extreme nationalist elements in the Japanese government were a danger to Japan’s revival.11 When the Eells incident occurred at Tohoku University in May 1950, Yoshida uttered a scathing criticism of Nanbara during a closed meeting with Liberal Party Diet members, blaming the incident on Nanbara’s liberal stance. Yoshida’s comments were leaked to the press, which reported him to have said that “President Nanbara… cried for overall [comprehensive] peace in the United States. Such a stand is that of a prostitute of useless learning and a time-server, who knows nothing about international questions. It is no more than mere academic hallucination.”12 A few days later, Nanbara fired back that Yoshida was resorting to “the tactics of the militarists in ‘suppressing scholars’… This is nothing more than a blasphemy of scholarship and the authoritarian suppression of scholars.”13 Japanese academics criticized Yoshida, and the peace treaty issue further deteriorated the relationship between the Yoshida government and academics, which had already been soured by the Red Purge.

9.1 The US State Department Moves Against Communists Observing active communists’ attack against Eells and the US government, W.J. Sebald, the acting US political adviser in Japan, reported to the director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs of the State Department that every day, the JCP’s newspaper Akahata carried an article that attacked the US. It violated the press code, which prohibited any criticism of SCAP/GHQ and its personnel and Allied countries.14 According to Sebald, it was obvious that “the propaganda lines and activities 10

Masaru Tamamoto, “Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectual Thought in American Occupied Japan, 1948–1952” (PhD diss., The John Hopkins University, 1988). 11 Shigeru Nanbara, Nihon to Amerika (Japan and the United States) (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1950), 42–43; “K¯owa no sokushin o y¯ob¯o” (Requesting hastening peace treaty), Asahi Shimbun, December 11, 1949. 12 “Yoshida’s Stand Ires Educators,” Nippon Times, May 6, 1950; “Shush¯ o no dan ni t¯odai k¯oka” (Protesting Prime Minister Yoshida’s comments), Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 1950. 13 “Nambara Raps Yoshida in Severe Counterblast,” Nippon Times, May 7, 1950; “Nanbara S¯ och¯o, Shush¯o e hanron” (President Nanbara counter-attacks prime minister), Asahi Shimbun, May 7, 1950. 14 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 88–89.

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of the Japan Communist Party” were made to conform “perfectly with the overall Soviet objective in the Far East of undermining the position of the United States…” Sebald was sure that these bold attitudes of communists were in response to Cominform criticism toward JCP in January 1950 and declared that “the Japan Communist Party is not a bona fide Japanese organization which should be accorded the status of a Japanese political party, but is an agency for implementing Soviet policy.”15 This secret correspondence indicates that the State Department was well aware of the pernicious nature of communist propaganda and felt an urgent need to counteract it, saying “something should be done, and done soon, to counteract the highly effective communist propaganda line… the communists are being so successful in crystallizing Japanese public opinion against base rights and against a ‘separate’ peace, that unless something is done to counteract this propaganda, we may be faced with a hard, hostile public opinion in Japan when these matters are eventually raised at the time of the peace conference…”16 Sebald, in this same report, suggested a crackdown on communists: While I appreciate that a widespread crackdown by the Occupation might not be an unmixed blessing, I am nevertheless convinced that the Occupation should not fear criticism resulting from countermeasures, especially against the upper communist hierarchy, in particularly flagrant cases. Any hardening of the Occupation attitude would, of course, necessarily have to filter down from General MacArthur, who, in my limited discussions on the subject with him, has usually brushed off the communists as gadflies and nothing more. We are, therefore, faced with a basic decision, namely, should an attempt be made to hold the communists strictly in line, either through the Japanese Government or directly by the Occupation, or should we allow matters to drift and hope that the Japanese people themselves will solve the communist problem? I, personally, favor the former course, but would appreciate your views on this most important subject.17

A series of unplanned events finally brought the peace treaty debate to an end, and MacArthur acted just as Sebald desired. On May 30, 1950, the JCP held an anti-American rally on the outer grounds of the Imperial Palace. Demonstrators threw stones at four American soldiers, all of whom suffered minor injuries. It was “the first Communist violence aimed at U.S. troops,” the press reported.18 Six Japanese demonstrators were arrested and tried by a military court. The general public was convinced that the incident marked the beginning of

15

“The Acting United States Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)” Tokyo, March 24, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, 611.941/8–2450, 1155. http://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d698 (accessed August 24, 2022). 16 “The Acting United States Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)” Tokyo, March 24, 1950. 17 “The Acting United States Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)” Tokyo, March 24, 1950. 18 “Reds Stone CI’s at Japan Rally,” Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1950; “Amerika sh¯ ok¯o-ra ni ranb¯o” (Injured U.S. military officers), Asahi Shimbun, May 31, 1950.

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the violent strategy long-anticipated since Cominform’s criticisms at the beginning of the year.19 MacArthur received an open letter in the name of a communist group, criticizing the arrests and trials and demanding the immediate release of the prisoners, a comprehensive peace treaty, and the withdrawal of Occupation forces. MacArthur promptly ordered the Japanese police to raid all JCP offices and the communist cell at Waseda University, where the police seized copies of the letter. The JCP Central Committee blamed the Zengakuren (the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations) leaders for MacArthur’s wrath. In June and early July 1950, the JCP expelled a total of 42 Zengakuren leaders from its membership.20 Despite the JCP’s claim that only a fraction of its members had rebelled against GHQ, MacArthur did not believe it. A week after the May 30 rally, MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida ordering the removal from public service of all 24 members of the JCP’s central committee. MacArthur explained that the SCAP’s January 4, 1946, directive purging militarists and ultranationalists from public office gave him the authority to do this. He stated that the communists’ “coercive methods” resembled the methods used by past militaristic leaders to mislead the Japanese people, and “their aims, if achieved, would surely lead Japan to an even worse disaster.”21 The following day, MacArthur ordered Yoshida to purge the 17 top editors of Akahata and most of the communist leadership, including Tokuda and Nosaka, who immediately went underground.22

9.2 The Korean War: A Violent Catalyst for the Red Purge23 The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. This war determined Japan’s future international relations in the Cold War in Asia. For the Yoshida government, the war brought with it two opportunities. First, US involvement in the war and its demand 19

OIR, File 097/3 Z1092 No. 5423/50, “Student Communist Activities in the Japanese Universities, September–October 1950,” December 27, 1950, 5; OIR, File 097.3 Z10923 No. 5321 “Internal Problems of the Japanese Communist Party since the Outbreak of Hostilities in Korea,” February 12, 1951, 1–2. 20 OIR, “Student Communist Activities in the Japanese Universities, September–October 1950,” December 27, 1950, 5; “University Raided in Tokyo Round-up,” New York Times, June 12, 1950. 21 Quoted in Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 234. 22 “MacArthur Gensui yori Yoshida S¯ ori Daijin ate no shokan” (Memorandum from General MacArthur to Prime Minister Yoshida), June 6, 1950, Sengo ky¯oiku shiry¯o (Historical materials on postwar education), section 4–1, 41, Kokuritsu Ky¯oiku Seisaku Kenky¯u-jo (National Institute for Educational Policy Research, Tokyo. 23 Part of this section is reproduced with permission from History of Education Quarterly. [“Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the “Red Purge” in Occupied Japan” by Ruriko Kumano, 2010. History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 50 No.4, 535–536, Copyright 2017 by Cambridge University Press.]

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for munitions from Japanese industries dramatically vitalized the Japanese economy. Second, Japan became strategically indispensable to the US against the Soviet bloc, giving Japan more negotiating power with the US regarding an ongoing peace treaty. This war made Washington decide to sign a peace treaty with Japan as soon as possible so that the US could keep a permanent foothold in Japan. In turn, Japan was pressured to assume some of the responsibility for its defense.24 On July 8, 1950, the transport of American troops from Japan to the Korean Peninsula coincided with MacArthur’s order to Yoshida to form a 75,000-member national police reserve and add 8000 men to the maritime police. To justify this about-face, MacArthur had to announce that the Japanese Constitution did not forbid maintaining military forces for selfdefense.25 With the start of the Korean War, the US began pressuring the Japanese government to rearm: the same country that had imposed the pacifist Article 9 on Japan was now trying to discard it. Japan’s new ideology of pacifism, which had now deeply pervaded the Japanese psyche, was so strong that this sudden policy shift by MacArthur bewildered the Japanese people, and their skepticism toward American policy changed into anti-American sentiment, especially among intellectuals and academia.26 The war also gave MacArthur more justification for supporting Yoshida in his anti-communist policies. In fact, once the Korean War began, MacArthur ordered Yoshida to suspend Akahata for 30 days, as, in his view, it distorted the truth about the war. However, its suspension was extended indefinitely.27 MacArthur’s orders were warmly welcomed by Prime Minister Yoshida, who had been eager to outlaw the JCP. Shortly after the communist attack on American soldiers, Yoshida publicly stated that it was high time to outlaw the JCP. Willoughby at G-2 had already recommended a similar action to MacArthur; however, the supreme commander and the GS opposed such an extreme response. When Yoshida pushed for deliberation of a bill to outlaw the JCP in the Diet, the legal section of the GHQ vetoed it as a violation of civil rights.28 Nonetheless, as then-attorney general Takeo ¯ Ohashi (1904–1981) later testified, the GS did suggest that the Japanese government oust communists from government employment.29

24

Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 138. Tamamoto, “Unwanted Peace,” 137; Takeshi Igarashi, “Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan.” Journal of Japanese Studies 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 329. 26 Toshihiro Menju, “The Development of Grassroots International Exchange in Japan and the Impact of American Philanthropy,” in Philanthropy and Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar U.S.Japan Relations, ed. Tadashi Yamamoto, Akira Iriye, and Makoto Iokibe (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2006), 255. 27 “Akahata mukigen teikan” (Akahata suspended indefinitely), Asahi Shimbun, July 19, 1950; “30-nichikan no hakk¯o teishi” (Thirty-day suspension for Akahata), Asahi Shimbun, June 27, 1950. 28 OIR, “Internal Problems of the Japanese Communist Party since the Outbreak of Hostilities in Korea,” February 12, 1951, 2; Finn, Winners in Peace, 234. 29 Isao My¯ ojin, “Dai niji ky¯oshokuin red p¯aji keikaku to zasetsu no keii” (The second Red Purge and the process of its failure), Ky¯oiku shi gakkai kiy¯o 31 (1988): 58. 25

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On August 31, 1950, the Yoshida cabinet announced the removal of communists from public service to protect the nation. These dismissals were different from the previous year’s covert Red Purge, which had been implemented in the name of the retrenchment program; this time, the dismissals were publicly referred to as the Red Purge. The following day, after consulting with GHQ, the Yoshida government announced the legal basis of its actions: Article 78, Clause 3 of the National Public Service Law, which referred to “persons lacking in qualifications necessary for given positions,” would be applied to expel communists among the national public servants, and Article 5 of supplementary provisions to the Local Autonomy Law would be used to dismiss suspected communists among local public servants. The Education Ministry would need to find a different legal basis for dismissing teachers as regulations for teachers were set in the Special Law on Public Servants in Education of 1949.30 However, some ministers of Yoshida’s cabinet expressed strong reservations because the JCP was still a legally recognized party. How could public servants’ membership in the JCP be equated with their “lacking qualifications” if the party was still legal? According to Asahi Shimbun, the government’s true intention was to remove communists first and then concoct a legal basis for this move later. To take these criticisms into account, Yoshida announced that he was using MacArthur’s statements about communism and his order to purge members of the JCP’s Central Committee as an expedient reason for ousting communists.31 Although many Japanese academics opposed Eells, they were becoming concerned about the threat of communism. An increasing number of national universities began dismissing communist professors. An August 1950 Attorney General’s Office report stated, “There were approximately 180 communists or communist sympathizers among professors, ten of whom have already been fired, eighteen are still under investigation… The reasons for this congestion of the process are: (1) each university administration cannot find appropriate reasons for discharge; and (2) the Special Law on Public Servants in Education requires university administrations to give 30-day advance notice to defendants and to conduct investigations if requested. These time-consuming procedures hindered discharging [communist] professors.”32 It has not been possible to quantify the actual number of dismissals, as there were few media reports on the mass dismissals, and they were often inaccurate. However, 30

“Gov’t to Clarify Red Purge Steps,” Nippon Times, September 1, 1950; “Ma shokan o saiy¯o” (Applying MacArthur’s statement for ousting Reds), Asahi Shimbun, September 5, 1950; “K¯omuin no ‘aka’ tsuih¯o” (Ousting “Red” public servants), Asahi Shimbun, September 1, 1950. 31 “Aka tsuih¯ o no h¯oteki konkyo” (Legal basis for ousting Reds), Asahi Shimbun, August 22, 1950; “Ma shokan o saiy¯o” (Applying MacArthur’s statement for ousting Reds), Asahi Shimbun, September 5, 1950. 32 H¯ omufu Tokubetsu Shinsakyoku (Attorney General’s Office, Special Investigation Bureau), “Showa 25-nen 8-gatsu iwayuru Tokushu Kanch¯o Gur¯upu ni kansuru h¯okoku” (August 1950 report on special government office groups), cited by Tetsuo Hirata, “¯Iruzu mondai to daigaku ky¯oin reddo p¯aji no shiteki ky¯umei” (Historical analysis of the Eells issue and the Red Purge), in Daigaku jichi no kiki—Kobe daigaku reddo p¯aji jiken no kaimei (Threats to university autonomy: An analysis of the Red Purge at Kobe University), ed. Tetsuo Hirata (Tokyo: Shiraishi shoten, 1993), 359.

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one historian has been able to confirm 11 dismissals at eight national universities, and another has estimated that 30–40 professors were dismissed.33 Eells himself learned of at least three dismissals. When Eells visited Utsunomiya University in March 1950, the university president said that he had dismissed three communist professors when the college was reorganized into a new university. The university president confided in Eells that he had done so because he wholeheartedly agreed with Eells’ anti-communist Niigata speech of July 1949.34 When the Education Division chief of the CIE asked the vice education minister whether professors had, in fact, been dismissed solely due to their JCP membership, he replied that there had not been a blanket dismissal but that certain professors had been dismissed for “improper behavior” as public servants.35 Without a solid legal foundation, the Education Ministry had no choice but to use the political neutrality rule applied to all public servants. Few appealed to the National Personnel Authority due to the sensitive issues involved. Those dismissed chose not to speak out, and most cases were buried without documentation.36 With GHQ’s approval, the Education Ministry wanted to carry out a blanket dismissal of communist professors throughout the nation. Therefore, the Education Ministry was looking for a way to identify communist teachers at every educational institution. After consulting with the Attorney General, Minister Amano decided to use Potsdam Ordinance No. 62, Article 3 of May 1947, which ordered the dismissal of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic personnel as well as persons who opposed or became obstacles to the Occupation’s purpose. The Potsdam Ordinances were SCAP directives issued at the early stage of the Occupation. After the new constitution went into effect on May 3, 1947, SCAP orders issued before that date were renamed “cabinet orders” but were often called Potsdam Ordinances, making them supraconstitutional Occupation laws that overrode existing laws and applied to all citizens. That special law was the most efficient way to screen teachers at all levels. Amano announced this decision on September 6, 1950.37

Hirata, “¯Iruzu mondai to daigaku ky¯oin reddo p¯aji no shiteki ky¯umei” (Historical analysis of the Eells issue and the Red Purge), 360–362; My¯ojin, “Dai niji kyoshokuin reddo paji keikaku to zasetsu no keii” (The second Red Purge and the process of its failure), 72, note 34. 34 Eells, Typer, and Neufeld to Chief, the CIE, “Report of Field Trip to Yamanashi, Ibaraki, Fukushima and Utsunomiya Universities,” April 3, 1950, 6, in “Yamanashi University,” Eells Papers. These Utsunomiya University dismissal cases were not listed as confirmed in Tetsuo Hirata, ed., Daigaku jichi no kiki (Threats to university autonomy). 35 “Monbu Jikan Loomis kaidan y¯ oshi” (Minutes of the meeting between the vice minister and Loomis), August 22, 1950, Sengo ky¯oiku shiry¯o (Historical materials on postwar education) 6, Kokuritsu Ky¯oiku Seisaku Kenky¯u-jo (National Institute for Educational Policy Research, Tokyo). 36 Nevertheless, some cases were documented, and Hirata discussed them. See Hirata, “¯Iruzu mondai to daigaku ky¯oin reddo p¯aji no shiteki ky¯umei” (Controversy over Eells and historical analysis on the Red Purge in university), 363–408. 37 “Ky¯ oin no aka tsuih¯o seirei 62-g¯o de” (Ousting Red teachers with Ordinance No. 62), Asahi Shimbun, September 6, 1950; “Seirei 62-g¯o o tekiy¯o” (Applying Ordinance No. 62), Hokkaido daigaku shimbun (Hokkaido University Newspaper), September 24, 1950; Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann 33

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9.2.1 Second US Education Mission to Japan: Cheerleader from the US During this escalating stage of the Red Purge, the Second US Education Mission came to Tokyo and stayed from August 27 to September 22, 1950, to determine whether the Japanese had followed the 1946 recommendations of the First Education Mission, and, given the intensifying Cold War, whether further suggestions were needed. Upon the mission’s arrival, Nanbara, who was the chairman of the Japan Education Reform Committee, gave a welcome speech with critical overtones. He said that Japan wanted to learn and embrace “the ideals and methods” of the US, but wondered whether Japan may lose its own “valuable national culture and good characteristics” in the process of transforming its institutions. Nanbara was referring to the pressure put on universities by the CIE to establish boards of trustees and purge communist professors. He stated that the two immediate and most serious dangers confronting Japan were communism and “the revival of fascistic forces,” namely anti-communism.38 Nanbara was warning against the resurgence of extreme conservatives in the Japanese government and voicing his implicit criticism of the GHQ’s anti-communist policy. The US Education Mission indirectly responded to Nanbara’s criticism in its report of September 22, 1950. While the American visitors found that the suggested reforms had been followed and were working successfully, they were dissatisfied with the current system of university governance, which was controlled “largely by their faculties and to a considerable degree by their students.” It recommended that each university have “a policy-making board.” In other words, they supported what Nanbara opposed: Eells’ board-of-trustees plan. The mission endorsed the Japanese government’s anti-communist policy by stating, “One of the greatest weapons against communism in the Far East is an enlightened electorate in Japan.”39

9.2.2 Student Radicals Protest the Red Purge A rumor circulated that the Special Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General’s Office had compiled a list of 32 communist professors who had to be dismissed.40 (New York: Continuum, 2002), 114; My¯ojin, “Dai niji ky¯oshokuin red p¯aji keikaku to zasetsu no keii” (The second Red Purge and the process of its failure), 59–62. 38 Shigeru Nanbara, “Welcoming Speech on the Occasion of Arrival of the Second American Education Mission,” August 3, 1950, 44–49, Box 72, Joseph C. Trainor Papers, Hoover Institution Archives (original translation with author’s editing). 39 U.S. Education Mission to Japan, “Report of the Second United States Education Mission to Japan, Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Tokyo, September 22, 1950,” 1 and 10, 12. 40 “Sekishoku tsuih¯ o lisuto o sakusei” (Making a list of Reds to be ousted), Hokkaid¯o daigaku shimbun, September 24, 1950.

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In fact, the Education Division of the CIE had only obtained a copy of a “List of Professors to Be Purged” from the Seinen Shimbun (Youth newspaper) on September 26, 1950. Tokyo University professor Takashi Ide, who was publicly known as a JCP member, topped the list.41 According to the Hokkaido University newspaper dated September 24, 1950, Zengakuren representatives visited the Education Ministry in late August and early September 1950 to learn more about its Red Purge plans. A ministry official answered that the government would dismiss communists on legal grounds but that this time, national university professors’ right to request a public investigation would not be granted. Zengakuren leaders then visited the CIE, requesting a cancellation of the Red Purge. However, Arthur K. Loomis, the chief of the Education Division, flatly denied the CIE’s involvement in the Red Purge plan.42 In late September 1950, Zengakuren students protested at H¯osei University in Tokyo, boycotting their examinations with the slogans “Opposition to Red Purge” and calling for a general strike on October 5. The movement spread to other universities in Tokyo.43 On September 29, Zengakuren students marched against the Red Purge at Tokyo University. They read a message from Professor Ide of Tokyo University that encouraged students to fight the Purge. Ide wrote that “under the new situation of the Korean war, you are going to rise in protest against the Red purge threatening the educational field… You will have to fight in union against the revival of the notorious ‘Peace Preservation Law’ and war preparations.”44 Four days after the demonstration, Nanbara denied the existence of such a list and assured the students that only professors engaged in political activities contrary to their duties would be subject to an investigation for possible dismissal. The following day, Education Minister Amano announced that the ministry would screen teachers of all levels but said that only communists who violated the rule of political neutrality could be dismissed. He emphasized that in the case of university professors, university autonomy would be respected, and the screening process was intended to check excessive actions by professors “to protect academic freedom and social order.”45 Despite these assurances, the following day, approximately 200 students from 11 universities gathered at Tokyo University to hold a rally against the Red Purge. It ended with a clash with the police. The next rally involved 400 students at 41 “List of Professors to be Purged,” Seinen Shimbun, September 26, 1950 (English translation by GHQ staff), Box 18, Joseph C. Trainor Papers. 42 “K¯ okai shinsa wa okonawazu” (Open investigation will not be held), Hokkaido daigaku shimbun (Hokkaido University Newspaper), September 24, 1950. 43 “H¯ odai de juken kyohi” (Examination boycott at H¯osei University), Asahi Shimbun, September 26, 1950; editorial, Asahi Shimbun, October 5, 1950. 44 Translation of the message of Professor Ide of Tokyo University to the students, attached to Walter C. Eells to Chief, Education Division, “Translations of Documents,” October 12, 1950, Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers. 45 “A Statement Issued by Minister Amano,” October 4, 1950 (English translation); Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers. Amano said that screening would be carried out first by the university, then by a committee set up by the Education Ministry, and would be finalized by the ministry itself. “Notification of Tokyo University to Its Students,” October 3, 1950 (English translation), Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers.

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Waseda University on October 17. More than twice as many policemen were assigned to control the gathering, and they arrested 143 students. The Police Department announced that student leaders of radical movements were considered to be members of the Communist Party and that they had expediently mobilized many noncommunist students to support the party’s anti-US struggle. The police requested that university authorities and the Education Ministry act decisively to stop these student protests. In response, Tokyo University expelled three Zengakuren Central Executive Committee members, and other major universities prohibited students from holding meetings on campus. As a result, Zengakuren canceled a student strike scheduled for October 20. Although Amano expressed his wish to dissolve Zengakuren, Attorney ¯ General Ohashi said that he would leave the matter to university authorities and stay vigilant. Amano announced that the screening of teachers would start in November and that the student protests would have no effect on the ministry’s plans.46

9.3 The CIE’s Response to the Red Purge As the Education Ministry prepared for the Red Purge, the CIE’s Education Division assessed the actual influence of communists in universities. In a document entitled “Communist Influence among Students,” dated October 3, 1950, the authors (who are not named) referred to the report from the Special Investigation Bureau of the Japanese Attorney General’s Office, which estimated that as of July 1950, there were 120 communist cells in Japanese universities. Student membership in these cells was 1043 out of 397,894, or 0.26% of the university student population. Faculty members suspected of being communists totaled 103 out of 39,182, also 0.26%, making the communist presence at universities “infinitesimal,” while the influence was substantial.47

46

OIR, File 097.3 Z1092 #5423/50, “Student Communist Activities in the Japanese Universities, September–October 1950,” December 27, 1950, 7–8; “Kaisan kankoku o mushi” (Ignoring a disbanding order), Asahi Shimbun, October 6, 1950; “Report on Student Riots,” Sunday Mainichi, October 22, 1950 (Tokyo News, October 27, 1950), 1 in Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers; “Rant¯o no soudai gakusei taikai” (Students’ rally clashes with police at Waseda University), Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 1950; “Students, Police Clash at Waseda,” Nippon Times, October 19, 1950; “Student Rioters Face Indictment,” Nippon Times, October 20, 1950; “Hanbei t¯os¯o ga mokuhy¯o” (The aim was anti-U.S. struggle), Asahi Shimbun, October 6, 1950; “T¯odai de Takei Iinch¯o ra o shobun” (Tokyo University disciplined Takei, leader of Zengakuren), Asahi Shimbun, October 20, 1950; “Kaku daigaku de gakusei taikai” (Student rally at each university), Asahi Shimbun, October 20, 1950; “Police Chief Here Demands Breakup of Students’ Group,” Nippon Times, October 19, 1950; “Shinsa wa 11-gatsu kara” (Screening starts in November), Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 1950; “Shobun o genj¯u ni” (Give strict discipline), Asahi Shimbun, October 20, 1950. 47 The numbers did not include sympathizers and fellow travelers. “Communist Influence among Students,” October 3, 1950, 3, Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers. This document was written in the form of a report to Nugent, chief of the CIE; Eells and Typer, who were in charge of higher education and student guidance, were most likely the authors.

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The authors discussed how so few communists could mobilize so many noncommunist students to their cause. Japan’s defeat in World War II, they speculated, had created a “spiritual vacuum” that the communists were ready to fill with the promise of a better life. The communists reminded the students who had been disillusioned and angry with the horrific war that the JCP was the only political party that had opposed the war. To independent-minded students, the communists spoke of US efforts to colonize Japan. The communists also instigated strong criticism of the Occupation authorities by fanning opposition to the board-of-trustees plan, Eells’ anti-communist address, and “the current proposals of the Japanese government to ‘purge’ Communists from university faculties.” The authors stated that non-communists were “too timid” to stand up against “the Communist politicians, the few Communist faculty members, or even against the Communist students.” The vast majority of non-communist students were afraid of being branded “reactionary,” so they followed communist-led demonstrations “like sheep.” Not being well versed in political rhetoric, they did not know how to counter their articulate communist peers. As a result, most students took no action. By contrast, the communist students had a “sense of mission” and were supported by communist faculty members as well as national and international communist organizations. The authors concluded that the communist influence at universities was minimal and recommended that in place of repressive programs, more attention should be given to student welfare and the development of non-political student organizations.48 Typer, who was the officer on youth organizations and student activities of the Education Division, wrote his opinion of the Red Purge program in his memorandum of October 4, 1950, to the chief of the Education Division: What assurance, if any, do we have that the purge will not repeat the mistakes of ten years ago when liberal and progressive professors were liquidated?.... We must meet Communism with every means at our disposal but we must not permit that effort to take our sights and our energies away from the basic problems of which Communism is a symptom rather than a cause.49

Typer added that Eells and Neufeld agreed with his assessment. The very Americans who had recommended dismissing communist professors at university conferences nationwide now warned against the Red Purge. What caused this shift? Perhaps the CIE realized that the Red Purge orchestrated by the Japanese government violated its basic policy of decentralizing educational administration. After all, the CIE expected each university to decide on how to deal with communists. Public university presidents were technically independent of the Education Ministry and were expected to make all final decisions; however, they still wanted clear instructions from the ministry. Such a subservient attitude was the invisible but potent legacy of long-term centralized governance. The CIE wanted to change this 48

“Communist Influence Among Students,” October 3, 1950, 2–6, Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers. 49 Donald M. TyperTyper, Donald M. to Chief, Education Division, memorandum, “Reexamination of University Teachers,” October 4, 1950, no pagination, Box 47, Joseph C. Trainor Papers.

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culture and even wanted to abolish the ministry itself, but at the same time recognized that using it was the most efficient way to implement reforms. The CIE’s expedient but contradictory actions reinforced the virtual power monopoly of the ministry and perpetuated Japanese universities’ dependency. The ministry instructed all presidents of national universities to oust communists, and some acted on it. More importantly, the Education Ministry’s use of the Potsdam Ordinance to justify its action gravely worried the CIE. Although Amano had already announced the plan publicly, the ministry had submitted its plan to Nugent only in mid-October. Nugent was apprehensive—if the ordinance were to be used, loud criticism from various quarters in Japan against the Red Purge would be directed at Nugent himself, further aggravating already intense anti-US sentiments among communists and their sympathizers.50 Nugent did not hide his displeasure with the ministry’s use of the Potsdam Ordinance when he met with Amano in late October 1950. Nugent told Amano that to purge these teachers using Potsdam Ordinance 62 was not a “wise policy,” as it would become invalid once the Occupation ended, and then the Japanese would have no legal basis to purge communists. Moreover, relying on a Potsdam Ordinance would make it appear that the screening was not to identify communists but rather to punish people who objected to the Occupation, thus throwing the blame on GHQ. Nugent insisted that the Japanese government take responsibility for dismissing communist teachers and advised that the ministry consider an amendment to the Public Servant Law. Amano pointed out that the law applied only to public school teachers. He was also concerned that the ministry had already publicized that the ordinance justified its actions; if he changed his course of action, the people would see this as capitulating to the student protests.51 Nugent asked whether the same screening procedures would be applied to all teachers at all levels—elementary, secondary, and university. Amano explained that university teachers would have special treatment due to the guarantee of academic freedom. Nugent countered by saying that academic freedom was guaranteed in the constitution and should therefore apply to all teachers. Amano retorted that “elementary and secondary teachers should receive very strict screening because they are dealing with small children in the formative years while university students are mature and critical and will not be influenced by their professors,” to which Nugent replied that recent strikes and demonstrations indicated that university students were not analytical and responsible and could, in fact, be easily influenced by professors and outside agitators. Amano could not give a satisfactory counterargument to this. Nugent commented later that Amano was “either afraid to tackle the problem at the 50

My¯ojin, “Dai niji ky¯oshokuin reddo p¯aji keikaku to zasetsu no keii” (The second Red Purge and the process of its failure), 61–64; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 265. 51 Top-secret memorandum, vice-minister to Minister Amano, “Ky¯ oin no tekikaku shinsa no ken” (Regarding investigation of teachers’ qualifications), October 24, 1950, Sengo ky¯oiku shiry¯o (Historical materials on postwar education), section 4, item 28, Kokuritsu Ky¯oiku Seisaku Kenky¯ujo (National Institute for Educational Policy Research, Tokyo); Nugent to Dr. Loomis, “Memo for the Record,” October 26, 1950, 1–2, Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers.

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university level or the old school tie prevails—he having been a university professor himself.”52 Nugent concurred that communist professors deserved to be dismissed if they “disturbed the university’s autonomy by agitating and encouraging students to have a strike.”53 Again, he added that this was the CIE’s opinion, not an order. Nugent supported the ministry’s effort to screen communist teachers; however, he left the legal basis pending. While the CIE had been encouraging the Japanese to oust communists from schools, it did not allow the ministry to use the most effective way—a supra-constitutional SCAP directive—to accomplish that purpose.

9.3.1 The Rehabilitation and the Red Purge Taking advantage of the national mood supporting anti-communist policy, Prime Minister Yoshida appealed to MacArthur in June 1950 to release the Japanese who had been expelled from their jobs for their ultra-nationalistic and militaristic connections. Some officers in GHQ thought that the purge had gone too far and that the Japanese government should have more freedom to run things their way.54 SCAP gave its approval for as many as 10,000 individuals—including formerly undesirable top-level political, business, press, cultural, and academic leaders—to return to public life on October 12, 1950. The government announced that those who were not freed, such as former top military officers, would have a chance at rehabilitation once Japan signed a peace treaty. This rehabilitation further vitalized Yoshida’s Liberal Party: many anti-communist conservatives retuned to local and central politics. Top government leaders were ecstatic. Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda (1899–1965) said that this rehabilitation would help “accelerate Japan’s economic recovery.”55 Once the government had secured replacements for the suspected communist staff who were to be sacked, the Agriculture-Forestry Ministry dismissed two communist employees on October 16, and other government agencies followed suit.56 The Education Ministry was planning to follow suit, despite the CIE’s objections regarding the shaky legal basis of such actions. 52

Nugent to Dr. Loomis, “Memo for the Record,” October 26, 1950, 3. Top-secret memorandum, vice-minister to Minister Amano, “Ky¯oin no tekikaku shinsa no ken” (Regarding investigation of teachers’ qualifications), October 24, 1950, Sengo ky¯oiku shiry¯o, section 4, item 28 (Nishi’s translation in Unconditional Democracy, 265). 54 Richard Finn, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project: Richard B. Finn, initial interview date: April 8, 1991 (Copyright 1998 ADST), 19. http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Finn,%20Richard%20B. toc.pdf (accessed August 19, 2022). 55 “10,090 Japanese Freed of Purge, Gov’t Announces,” and “Depurge Action Widely Greeted,” Nippon Times, October 14, 1950; “Hanky¯o jiban o ky¯oka” (Strengthen anti-communist foundations), Asahi Shimbun, October 13, 1950; “Ichi-man naigai o tsuih¯o kaijo” (Releasing 10,000 purgees), Asahi Shimbun, October 13, 1950. 56 “Red Purge of Public Servants Initiated by Forestry Agency,” Nippon Times, October 20, 1950. 53

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In the private sector, between June and December 1950, with obvious government approval, key private industries dismissed communists and their sympathizers, resulting in more than 12,000 dismissals.57 While other government agencies had dismissed 1177 communists as well as sympathizers by the end of November 1950, the educational field was deadlocked.58 By early November 1950, the Education Ministry had already started the first stage of screening teachers. However, the CIE and the GS had disapproved of the ministry’s use of Potsdam Ordinance 62. On December 2, 1950, a GS (GHQ) officer gave an official ultimatum disapproving the use of the Potsdam Ordinance. The ministry had to halt the screening.59 At the Diet session in mid-December 1950, Amano declared the postponement of screening of teachers, adding that it did not mean giving up.60 Amano explained that although the ministry was ready to screen, it needed to negotiate the criteria with the related agencies (the CIE and the GS). The ministry could not find any other legal basis to screen all teachers other than Ordinance 62. Meanwhile, to expedite the elimination of communists from national universities, the ministry wanted to remove Article 5 of the Special Law on Public Servants in Education, which provided special protection for professors from undue discharge or demotion. The ministry sent an amendment bill to the tenth Diet session (December 10, 1950–June 5, 1951), which passed on June 2, 1951.61 By then, however, the Red Purge was over. On May 1, 1951, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway (1895–1993), who had replaced MacArthur as the new SCAP, took the significant step of returning full autonomy to Japan. A month earlier, MacArthur’s defiance of President Truman’s orders concerning the strategy for the Korean War had enraged the president, who dismissed MacArthur on April 11, 1951 (Tokyo time). Ridgway issued a statement on the fourth anniversary of the signing of Japan’s constitution announcing that he had authorized the Japanese government to review the existing Potsdam Ordinances that had implemented Occupation directives.62 The Japanese government immediately reviewed the status of those who had been banned from public office by SCAP directives. As of April 1951, more than 193,000 persons remained in the category of political purgees–former militarist

57

OIR, “Internal Problems of the Japanese Communist Party since the Outbreak of Hostilities in Korea,” February 12, 1951, 2; “Minkan kigy¯o nimo kitai” (Expecting the private sector to oust Reds), Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 1950; My¯ojin, Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji: GHQ no shiji to iu “Shinwa” o kensh¯o suru (A blot on Japanese postwar history, the Red Purge: refuting the “myth” ¯ of the Red Purge under the direction of GHQ)(Tokyo: Otsuki shoten, 2013), 52–53. 58 My¯ ojin, “Dai niji ky¯oshokuin reddo p¯aji keikaku to zasetsu no keii,” 58. 59 My¯ ojin, “Dai niji ky¯oshokuin reddo p¯aji keikaku to zasetsu no keii,” 65–66. 60 “Ky¯ oin tsuih¯o isoganu” (Ousting of Red teachers postponed), Asahi Shimbun, December 15, 1950. 61 My¯ ojin, “Dai niji ky¯oshokuin reddo p¯aji keikaku to zasetsu no keii,” 66–67. 62 “Significant Step Taken by SCAP for Reversion of Autonomy to Nippon,” Nippon Times, May 2, 1951; “Nihon senry¯o no h¯osaku o kanwa” (Loosening grip on the occupation’s governance policy on Japan), Asahi Shimbun, May 2, 1951.

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people from political parties as well as employees of major financial, commercial, media, and industrial enterprises. In addition, some 5500 former educators and education officials who had been barred from educational posts were pardoned.63 When questioned at the June 1951 Education Committee at the House of Representatives regarding the progress in purging communists, Amano stated that the ministry would soon be unable to use Potsdam Ordinance 62; therefore, he would have no legal basis for the planned screening, meaning he would finally abandon the Red Purge.64

9.4 Eells’ Passion for the Red Purge CIE’s disapproval of the ministry’s use of the Potsdam Ordinance hindered the ministry’s planned Red Purge. This did not mean that the CIE opposed the Red Purge itself, only that it opposed how it was carried out. The CIE’s resolute stance on ousting communist professors was obvious in its new recommendation report. Before Eells retired from the CIE and left Tokyo on March 14, 1951, he wrote a report containing 32 recommendations for improving higher education in Japan.65 The CIE adopted it as an official policy in June 1951 and, in July, distributed it to the Education Ministry and universities. In the report, Eells did not neglect to add that recommendations were not “a directive to Japanese educational authorities” and that they “may accept or reject as they see fit.” Nevertheless, as Japanese educational leaders had rejected the proposals he made during his tenure, Eells encouraged universities to adopt a board of trustees composed of “both lay and professional groups” to maximize “local control of Higher Education.” He also suggested that universities remove “staffs and student bodies of communistic and other totalitarian influence by all methods consistent with generally accepted concepts of university freedom and autonomy.” As he wrote, Eells had come to understand very well that for his recommendations to be implemented, “both reeducation of the present educational leaders and the development of new ones” were necessary.66 His unwavering faith in his expertise and his uncompromising attitude made a strong impression on many Japanese, but such a strong character also produced adversaries. The historical study and interpretation of the Red Purge have been skewed by ideological bias. The leftist intellectuals who were influenced by communist propaganda against Eells and the US Occupation perpetuated an image of Eells as a notorious Red Purge instigator and violator of university autonomy. Post-war Japanese 63

OIR, File 097.3 Z1092 no. 5566, “Japanese Reconsideration of Occupation-Sponsored Measures,” October 1, 1951, 6; “Gov’t Action to Ease Purge Ruling Seen Possible,” Nippon Times, May 2, 1951. 64 My¯ ojin, “Dai niji ky¯oshokuin reddo p¯aji keikaku to zasetsu no keii,” 68. 65 “CIE komon ¯Iruzu hakase kikoku” (Dr. Eells leaves Japan), Shigaku Jih¯ o, March 15, 1951, Box 4, Ronald S. Anderson Papers. 66 Walter C. Eells, “Improvement of Higher Education in Japan,” Higher Education, 8, no. 11 (1951): 127–129.

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historians contend that by sending Eells to universities across Japan, GHQ undermined the academic freedom and autonomy of the universities.67 This commonly accepted narrative is understandable, as the Japanese were not aware of the complicated dynamics within GHQ and the real propaganda battle between the Soviet Union and the US. Japanese academics and students made sense of the situation based on their political beliefs and the meager information available to them, which were censored media reports. When reliable information was scarce, the JCP offered a seemingly satisfying explanation of the current problems and solutions for them. The JCP’s argument about the US imperialism and colonization of Japan resonated with many faculty and students, and some accepted the JCP’s verdict that the US occupied Japan for its own Cold War security interests. They also sensed that Eells’ speech was an undeniable manifestation of US Cold War policy and that GHQ was blatantly compromising earlier, more tolerant US policies for its ideological interests. Eells’ openly hostile attitude toward communists reminded Japanese academics of the former military regime’s brutal persecution. For them, Eells was dragging Japan back to the dark ages of only a few years earlier. However, the faculty’s stance was complex. The current prevailing scholarship neglects ideological differences among Japanese academics and reduces them to a monolithic group. Such narratives depict academics as though they all united to oppose the oppressive GHQ. The reality, however, was far more complicated. Although most academics opposed Eells’ call to oust professors who were members of the JCP, they agreed with him about keeping ideological bias out of university education. Some even endorsed Eells’ argument. In this sense, Japanese universities governed by faculty were not passive victims of the Red Purge. A recent study of the Eells incidents at Tohoku and Hokkaido universities by ¯ o reflects the same tone as the previous narrative. He Japanese historian Osamu Ot¯ wrote, “Eells was refuted by professors and ridiculed by the audience at Hokkaido University. Not accomplishing what he intended because of counterattacks from students and professors, Eells left Japan with a sinking heart. He stigmatized himself and compromised his integrity by engaging in US anti-communist propaganda against his conscience.”68 Eells hardly seems to have violated his conscience, given his later activities. Immediately upon relinquishing his position in Tokyo, Eells visited 63 countries abroad, observing communist influence on education. He then published a book based on his observations, entitled Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far Pacific.69 In December 1951, Eells was awarded the Commendation for Meritorious Civilian Service by the Department of the Army for his work in SCAP 67

Sabur¯o Ienaga, Daigaku no jiy¯u no rekishi (History of university freedom), 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Hanawa shob¯o, 1962; reprint, 1965), 111–112; Akio Ikazaki, Daigaku no jichi no rekishi (History of university autonomy) (Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha, 1965; reprint, 1968), 114–117. 68 Osamu Ot¯ ¯ o, Kensh¯o Iruzu ¯ jiken: Senry¯o ka no gakumon no jiy¯u to daigaku jichi (Review of Eells Incident: academic freedom and autonomy under the occupation) (Osaka: Seibund¯o shuppan, 2010), 221–225 (author’s translation). 69 Walter Eells, Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far Pacific (Washington, DC: American Council of Education, 1954).

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in Tokyo from 1947 to 1951.70 Eells had a sense of mission and conviction of the dangers of communism from his own experience in Japan and served as an expert on communist influence in education. He returned to Washington, DC, in 1953 and engaged in private research and consulting work on special projects for the American Council on Education, William Benton’s Encyclopedia Britannica, and the US Office of Education. On December 15, 1962, he passed away in Washington, DC, at the age of 76.71 Although Japanese historians’ narrative of the Red Purge in education may be ideologically skewed, the fundamental point was made: GHQ’s anti-communist policy stirred up memories of thought control that were still fresh and painful and planted new fears that freedom was precarious even in Japan’s so-called democracy.

References Eells, Water C. 1951. Improvement of Higher Education in Japan. Higher Education 8 (11): 127– 130. Eells, Walter C. 1952. Contributors to This Issue. The Educational Record 33 (1): 4. Eells, Water C. 1954. Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far Pacific. Washington D.C.: American Council on Education. Finn, Richard B. 1991. Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project: Richard B. Finn. Initial interview date: April 8, 1991 (Copyright 1998 ADST). http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Finn,%20Richard%20B.toc. pdf. Accessed 19 August 2022. Finn, Richard B. 1992. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hirata, Tetsuo. 1993. “¯Iruzu mondai to daigaku ky¯oin reddo p¯aji no shiteki ky¯umei” (Historical analysis of the Eells issue and the Red Purge). In Daigaku jichi no kiki—Kobe daigaku reddo p¯aji jiken no kaimei (Threats to university autonomy: An analysis of the Red Purge at Kobe University), ed. Tetsuo Hirata, 327–418. Tokyo: Shiraishi shoten. Hollis, Ernest V. 1963. Walter Crosby Eells, 1886–1962. School and Society 91: 242. Hoover, William D. 2019. Historical Dictionary of Postwar Japan, 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ienaga, Sabur¯o. 1962. Daigaku no jiy¯u no rekishi (History of university freedom), 2nd ed. Tokyo: Hanawa shob¯o. Reprint, 1965. Ikazaki, Akio. 1965. Daigaku no jichi no rekishi (History of university autonomy). Tokyo: Shin nihon shuppansha. Reprint, Shin nihon shuppansha, 1969. Igarashi, Takeshi. 1985. Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic ForeignPolicy System in Postwar Japan. Journal of Japanese Studies 11 (2): 323–356. Kumano, Ruriko. 2007. Academic Freedom and Autonomy: Walter C. Eells and the Red Purge in Universities during the Allied Occupation of Japan. PhD diss., University of Hawaii. Kumano, Ruriko. 2010. Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the ‘Red Purge’ in Occupied Japan. History of Education Quarterly 50 (4): 513–537.

70 71

Walter C. Eells, “Contributors to This Issue,” Educational Record 33, no. 1 (January 1952): 4. Ernest V. Hollis, “Walter Crosby Eells, 1886–1962,” School and Society 91 (1963): 242.

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Menju, Toshihiro. 2006. The Development of Grassroots International Exchange in Japan and the Impact of American Philanthropy. In Philanthropy and Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar U.S.Japan Relations, edited by Tadashi Yamamoto, Akira Iriye, and Makoto Iokibe, 247–274. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange. My¯ojin, Isao. 1988. Dai niji ky¯oshokuin reddo p¯aji keikaku to zasetsu no keii (The second Red Purge and the process of its failure). Ky¯oiku Shi Gakkai Kiy¯o 31: 56–72. My¯ojin, Isao. 2013. Sengo-shi no oten Red p¯aji: GHQ no shiji to iu “Shinwa” o kensh¯o suru (A blot on the Japanese postwar history, Red Purge: refuting the “myth” of Red Purge under the ¯ direction of GHQ). Tokyo: Otsuki shoten. Nanbara, Shigeru. 1950. Nihon to Amerika (Japan and the United States). Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha. Nishi, Toshio. 1982. Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945– 1952. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. ¯ o, Osamu. 2010. Kensh¯o Iruzu ¯ Ot¯ jiken: Senry¯o ka no gakumon no jiy¯u to daigaku jichi (Review of Eells incident: academic freedom and autonomy under the occupation). Osaka: Seibund¯o shuppan. Takemae, Eiji. 2002. Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy. Translated by Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann. New York: Continuum. Tamamoto, Masaru. 1988. Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectual Thought in American Occupied Japan, 1948–1952. PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University. Westad, Odd Arne. 2017. The Cold War: A World History. New York: Basic Books.

Government Documents United States, Education Mission to Japan. “Report of the Second United States Education Mission to Japan, Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Tokyo, September 22, 1950.” United States, Department of States. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d698. Accessed 24 August 2022. United States, Department of States. 1979. O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, VIII Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia and the Far East Generally: 1950–1961 Supplement. Washington D.C.: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc.

Manuscript Collections Hokkaido daigaku shimbun (Hokkaido University newspaper). Hokkaido Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan (Hokkaido University Library) (Sapporo, Japan). Joseph C. Trainor Papers, 1933–1980. Hoover Institution Library and Archives (Stanford, California). Ronald Stone Anderson Papers. Hamilton Library, University of Hawai‘i at M¯anoa (Honolulu, Hawaii). Sengo ky¯oiku shiry¯o (Historical materials on postwar education). Kokuritsu Ky¯oiku Seisaku Kenky¯ujo (National Institute for Educational Policy Research) (Tokyo). Tohoku Daigaku (Tohoku University). Rinji Ch¯osa Iinkai h¯okokusho (Ad hoc Investigation committee report: Tohoku University Eells incident, May 1950), Report No. 2, 26 May 1950. Tohoku University Archives (Sendai-shi, Japan).

References

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Walter Crosby Eells Papers, 1890–1962. WC Manuscript Collection 3. Whitman College Manuscript Collection. Whitman College and Northwest Archives, Penrose Library, Whitman College (Walla Wall, Washington).

Chapter 10

War of Ideas

As communist propaganda smeared US policy as imperialist, the US government recognized the urgency of informing the rest of the world of its democratic policy stance. The US government’s desperate need prompted Congress to endorse various propaganda programs. However, as the word “propaganda” has distinctly negative connotations of being a manipulative and deceitful practice, it could not be used publicly. Hence, the US government employed numerous euphemisms, such as information.1 Public Law 80–402, the US Information and Educational Exchange Act (the Smith-Mundt Act) of 1948, aimed to promote “a better understanding of the United States in other countries.”2 It provided the Truman administration with the legal and financial grounds for establishing an information service and an educational exchange division on a global scale during peacetime.3 Multiple US information and cultural strategies were developed to counter Soviet propaganda. The State Department created the Office of International Information and the Office of Educational Exchange.2 In April 1950, Truman launched the Campaign of Truth to negate the appeal of Soviet Union propaganda. He told the American Society of Newspaper Editors: 1 Kenneth A. Osgood, “Propaganda,” in Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Encyclopedia.com. https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transc ripts-and-maps/propaganda (accessed August 24, 2022). 2 “US Information and Educational Exchange Act (the Smith-Mundt Act) of 1948,” Sec. 2., in U.S. Agency For Global Media. https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/oversight/legislation/smith-mundt/ (access August 24, 2022). 3 Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 32–33.

Part of this chapter is reproduced with permission from Reitaku Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies. [“U.S. Cultural Diplomacy for Japan in the 1950s” by Ruriko Kumano, 2019. Reitaku Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 27, 55–81.] 2

Chizuru Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan: Promoting Democracy 1946–1960 (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 26–27. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9_10

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This is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the Communists have in this struggle. They systematically use deceit, distortions, and lies as a matter of deliberate policy. This propaganda can be overcome by truth—presented by newspapers, radio, and other sources that people trust.… Unless we get the real story across to people in other countries, we will lose the battle for men’s minds by default.5

The Cold War quickly became a “war of ideas,” a “battle for hearts and minds,” or “ideological warfare.”6 When the Cold War led to actual armed conflict with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Truman switched the peacetime label of “information” to a wartime moniker, the “psychological warfare effort.” He issued a presidential directive on April 4, 1951, to establish the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). The PSB conducted planning for American cultural and information campaigns through mass media, publications, films, libraries, and educational exchanges in strategically important countries, such as Austria, West Germany, and Japan.7 In January 1951, Truman sent John Foster Dulles (1888–1959), the chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation and the chief foreign policy adviser for the Republican Party, to Japan on a peace mission known as the Dulles Mission to lay the groundwork for a peace treaty. Dulles invited his benefactor, philanthropist John D. Rockefeller III (1906–1978), to join the mission as a cultural affairs consultant. Rockefeller was in charge of advising Dulles on how to strengthen the US-Japan relationship through intellectual and cultural exchange. Before World War II, the Rockefeller Foundation supported the conferences held by the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). Hence, Rockefeller was viewed favorably in Japan, especially among financiers and intellectuals. In fact, the IPR was the most significant channel for Japanese-American intellectual exchange before the war.8 After researching the situation in Japan, Rockefeller submitted his recommendations to Dulles on April 16, 1951. His research was substantially supplemented by the assistance of scholars and diplomats who had in-depth knowledge of Japan, such as Edwin Reischauer, Hugh Borton, and Sir George Samson.9 The report suggested two strategies to persuade the Japanese to follow the American democratic model through cultural exchange programs: (1) the US should develop contacts with Japanese intellectual leaders through “selective and direct channels” and (2) the US should 5

Quoted in Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 27. Osgood, “Propaganda.” 7 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 28. 8 Makoto Iokibe, “U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange: The Relationship between Government and Private Foundation,” in Philanthropy and Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, ed. Tadashi Yamamoto, Akira Iriye, and Makoto Iokibe (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2006), 69; Glenn Davis and John G. Roberts, An Occupation without Troops: Wall Street’s Half-Century Domination of Japanese Politics (Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1996), 35, 40; Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 115–116; Fumiko Fujita, “Nichibei chiteki k¯ory¯u keikaku to 1950 nendai nichibei kankei” (The U.S.-Japan intellectual interchange program and U.S.-Japan relations in the 1950s), University of Tokyo Journal of American Studies 5 (2000): 70. 9 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 116. 6

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approach the Japanese people as a whole through mass media. The report emphasized that the cultural programs should be “private in nature” and maintain complete separation from official government offices. These recommendations became the guidelines for the US government strategy in Japan.10

10.1 The US Post-occupation Policy Toward Japan On September 8, 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed without the participation of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. On the same day, the US-Japan Security Treaty was signed, which allowed the US to retain military bases in Japan. The treaty became effective on April 28, 1952, when the Occupation officially ended. However, the islands of Okinawa remained under the authority of the US government (the US military held de facto control over the island). As the Cold War intensified, the US regarded Okinawa’s geographic position as strategically important and had a fixed policy of maintaining long-term rule over the islands. Sovereignty over Okinawa reverted to Japan on May 15, 1972. However, US military bases on Okinawa islands remained: 70.3% of US military bases on Japanese territory are located in Okinawa.11 Therefore, the US military has retained significant control over the islands. In the early 1950s, anti-American sentiment among the Japanese grew due to the prolonged Occupation, miserable economic conditions, and the US pressure on the Japanese government to rearm. Communists and their sympathizers fanned this sentiment through anti-US propaganda. In particular, Japanese intellectuals criticized the blatant inconsistency of US policy during the Occupation, noting that it had shifted from demanding the complete disarmament of Japan to the pursuit of rearmament to turn Japan into an American fortress in East Asia.12 Japanese academia was dominated by the so-called progressives, who described the history of the US Occupation of Japan as a failure and coined the term “the reverse course” to describe these dramatic changes in the US policy toward Japan. The US embassy in Japan conducted research on the prevailing Japanese view of the US in February 1952, two months before the end of the Occupation. According to its report, “Psychological Factors in Japan,” dated February 28, 1952, Japanese public opinion showed “Japan’s ignorance of the real nature of the Soviet Union and Soviet foreign policy.” In this view, Japanese leftists, easily fooled by communist propaganda, wrongly assumed that the Soviet Union was a socialist state aspiring to create a global utopia under the leadership of the labor class. These naïve, gullible

10

Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 117. Kengo Kikuyama, “Okinawa under heavy US base burden, 50 years after the return,” NHK WORLD-JAPAN, June 1, 2022. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/2005/ (accessed August 24, 2022). 12 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 42–43. 11

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Japanese leftists encouraged “the concept of neutrality, continued disarmament, and resistance to the alliance with the United States.”13 To correct these illusions regarding the Soviet Union and counter anti-American propaganda in Japan, the US government expended significant effort to instill a true understanding of American democracy through censorship and anti-communist measures during the Occupation, as well as through cultural exchange programs following the Occupation. Through such programs, the US endeavored to correct Japanese perceptions of the US that were tainted by communist propaganda. The US cultural exchange programs in post-Occupation Japan were a form of information diplomacy and were one of the key strategies of the US government during the Cold War. Notably, information diplomacy was implemented through nongovernmental organizations. According to Emily Rosenberg, lobbying organizations, think tanks, and private American organizations have significantly shaped US foreign policy following World War II.14 American policies toward Japan were no exception. In January 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) was inaugurated as president of the US. A former army general and expert on psychological warfare, Eisenhower considered effective psychological strategy imperative to winning the Cold War. The advent of the atomic bomb age meant that future confrontation with the enemy was far less likely to happen on a traditional battlefield with traditional weapons. Thus, Eisenhower explored cultural exchange programs as an effective method for containing communism. In January 1953, Eisenhower established the Jackson Committee, which discussed the role of psychological warfare in the conduct of foreign policy. After investigating the Soviet Union’s systematic, yet crude, propaganda campaign, the Jackson Committee called for the use of ordinary American citizens, private groups, and non-governmental organizations as vehicles for transmitting information to avoid such programs appearing propagandistic. Eisenhower favored promoting positive views of the US through informal contacts. Subsequently, he launched the People to People Program, in which the government encouraged ordinary Americans to develop friendly contacts with foreigners to convince them of the beauty of American democracy and the greatness of American culture.15 To implement this new policy, Eisenhower announced the creation of the US Information Agency (USIA) in June 1953. It incorporated all outbound government information programs and bore all responsibility for overseas information activities targeted at foreigners. The US Information Service (USIS) represented the overseas offices of the USIA, which had more than 190 posts in 141 countries. This reorganization was meant to concentrate the authority over psychological warfare in the hands of the executive branch. The USIA was an independent foreign affairs agency 13

Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 46. Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading American Dreams: Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890– 1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 12. 15 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 46–53; Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 31; Fumiko Fujita, Amerika bunka gaik¯o to nihon: Reisen ki no bunka to hito no k¯ory¯u (U.S. cultural diplomacy and Japan in the Cold War era) (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2015), 12–13. 14

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within the executive branch: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower had the authority to direct the group’s policy.16 At the end of the US Occupation of Japan in April 1952, the State Department took over the information and education program that had been run by the CIE section of the SCAP. After the creation of the USIA in Washington in 1953, USIS Japan assumed this responsibility. USIS Japan was headquartered in the American embassy in Tokyo. It established 16 regional public affairs offices and 14 information centers, popularly known as American Cultural Centers, in major cities in the early 1950s. The US ambassador was the chief American officer in Japan on all matters of cultural policy; therefore, the embassy worked with the assistant directors of the USIS to prepare an initial statement of USIS objectives in Japan. The Psychological Office of the Far Eastern Command in Japan was also involved in planning the cultural propaganda programs. These plans were routed to the USIA in Washington, as well as to the State Department and other executive agencies.17 According to the USIS Country Plan-Japan Part 1, dated June 24, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared “the objectives of American cultural campaign against communism in Japan”18 : 1. To promote orderly political, economic, and social progress based upon free, democratic institutions. 2. To convince the Japanese of the threat of Soviet and Chinese communism to the realization of Japan’s legitimate aspirations; of the fallacy of neutralist or “Third force” concepts as solutions; and of the necessity for taking appropriate measures for national security. 3. To encourage cooperation with the United States and other Free World nations for world peace, progress, and security.19 Concerning national security, Dulles urged the USIS to inform the Japanese of the threat of Soviet and Chinese communism to increase the likelihood that the Japanese would accept US military bases in Japan and approve of the security treaty with the US. Dulles also expected the USIS to promote awareness among the Japanese of the two countries’ mutual interests and encourage popular support of Japanese rearmament for self-defense.20 Dulles’s focus on Japanese rearmament corresponded with a parallel movement in Japan. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, MacArthur authorized the formation of a Japanese force of 75,000 men to compensate for the 16

Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 30. For a detailed study on the USIA, see Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 17 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 42–44. 18 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 44. 19 Department of State, “USIS Country Plan-Japan Part 1,” June 24, 1953, Confidential File 511.94/4–2753, National Archives College Park (NACP), MD. Quoted in Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 44. 20 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 45.

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American forces that left Japan for Korea. Due to the constitutional prohibition on maintaining a military force in Japan, this force was called the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu yobi tai). Later, the US-Japan security treaty, signed in September 1951 on the same day as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, approved the expansion of the National Police Reserve to 110,000 men; it was renamed the National Security Force (Hoan tai) in mid-1952. On July 1, 1954, the Self-Defense Forces Act enabled the establishment of the Defense Agency and the National Security Force was reorganized as the Japan Self-Defense Forces, comprising the Ground Self-Defense Force (army), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (navy), and the Air Self-Defense Force (air force). Prime Minister Yoshida rejected the US government’s frequent demands to dramatically increase Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, citing Article 9. He explained that for Japan to increase the size of its defense forces, the public first had to consent to the drafting of a new constitution. With such a shrewdly reasoned opposition to its overall aims in Japan, the US felt that it had no choice but to alter popular opinion in Japan.

10.2 NGO-Initiated Cultural Propaganda Activities in Japan Let us review a case study of an actual propaganda field operation. In Natalia Tsvetkova’s comparative study on international education by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, she argued that the Soviet government targeted youths from social groups of lower status, believing them “to be more likely to become a foundation for establishing a pro-Soviet elite in a long-term perspective,” while the US government targeted “existing dominant groups” when it implemented programs designed to inculcate capitalist and liberal democratic attitudes and dispositions.” She concluded that the American approach was more effective in the long term.21 Indeed, the main objectives of the US government’s cultural exchange program were to foster pro-American sentiment among Japan’s elite class and educate future leaders to become pro-Americans who would keep Japan in the free world. Moreover, the US programs were targeted at “existing dominant groups” consisting of affluent educated elites, such as pro-American conservatives in business, industry, and politics, as well as pro-American liberal academics and journalists. This target group was ideologically antagonistic toward progressive (Marxist) intellectuals, the very individuals whom the US hoped to bring around to their point of view. To exert such influence, the US implemented a program of cultural exchange. These programs often relied on private organizations to spearhead their efforts.

21

Natalia Tsvetkova, “International Education during the Cold War: Soviet Social Transformation and American Social Reproduction,” Comparative Education Review 52, no. 2 (May 2008): 213– 214.

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Following the end of the Occupation in 1952, the US government launched a massive cultural propaganda against communism in Japan through USIS programs, including the USIS’s pamphlet distribution and propaganda film exhibitions organized through American Cultural Centers. However, the State Department favored activity by non-governmental institutions (NGOs) in the field of cultural relations. Even so, despite their ostensible independence, the private cultural exchange programs were tightly coordinated with the USIS. The whole effort was geared toward enhancing a mutual understanding between the US and Japan.22 The first government-backed private philanthropist in charge of a cultural exchange program was J. D. Rockefeller III of the Rockefeller Foundation. After submitting his recommendations on a US cultural exchange program to the Dulles Mission in January 1951, Rockefeller returned to Tokyo as a private citizen in October 1951, intending to implement his strategy of developing contacts with key Japanese intellectual leaders with the full backing of the US government. In fact, the strategy of emphasizing the “private nature” of his efforts was also suggested by Saxton E. Bradford, a public relations officer at the US embassy in Tokyo, who wrote to Rockefeller in a memorandum dated November 7, 1951. Bradford said that a segment of Japanese intellectuals was anti-American and opposed any peace treaty finalized only with the US bloc and excluding the Soviet Union and mainland China. He said that a private, NGO-initiated exchange program would be the most significant and plausible way to change the perceptions of the anti-American intellectuals in Japan.23 If cooperation was secured from the Japanese, Rockefeller was ready to support the project with funds from his foundation. In Tokyo, Rockefeller soon found the right people to help implement his plan. Before the war, Rockefeller was acquainted with Aisuke Kabayama, who was the founder of Japan’s Kyodo News Agency and an early leader of the America-Japan Society (Nichi-Bei Ky¯okai), Tamon Maeda, who was the first post-war education minister, Yasaka Takagi, who was the former leader of the Japanese Institute of Pacific Relations, and Shigeharu Matsumoto, who was the former chief of the editorial bureau of the Domei News Agency. Rockefeller met them at the 1929 Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) conference in Kyoto. After the long interval imposed by the war, they met again in 1951. Among these prominent Japanese, Rockefeller found Matsumoto to be the most active leader and observed that he was deeply committed to the promotion of the US-Japan cultural exchange. Rockefeller’s pre-war connections constituted a direct channel for developing contacts with Japanese intellectuals.24 This Japanese elite team led by Rockefeller and Matsumoto launched an academic exchange program between Japan and the US in the early 1950s with financial assistance from both the Rockefeller Foundation and J. D. Rockefeller III as an individual. 22

Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 108. Fumiko Fujita, “Nichibei chiteki k¯ory¯u keikaku to 1950 nendai nichibei kankei” (The U.S.-Japan intellectual interchange program and U.S.-Japan relations in the 1950s), University of Tokyo Journal of American Studies 5 (2000): 72. 24 Takeshi Matsuda, Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent Dependency (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 2007), 127; Iokibe, “U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange,” 69–73. 23

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First, the team worked together to create a base for intellectual exchange in Japan in 1955 by establishing the International House of Japan (known as the I-House) in Roppongi, Tokyo. This handsome building, with its beautiful Japanese garden, became a gateway for non-governmental cultural exchange and cooperation between the people of Japan and those of other countries. The project was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and prominent Japanese politicians and business leaders. For instance, incumbent Prime Minister Yoshida, Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda, and then-Secretary of Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa secured a site and raised funds for the I-House.25 This cross-cultural association between the Japanese team, led by Shigeharu Matsumoto and Yasaka Takagi, and the US team, comprising prominent Japan scholars, such as Hugh Borton and Edwin O. Reischauer, proceeded with actual operations. However, conflicts of interest immediately sprang up between the Japanese and the Americans. From the American perspective, the program’s main purpose was to interact with individuals embodying various ideological shades of the Japanese intelligentsia, especially those who leaned left, to help them gain a better understanding of American democracy. However, the Japanese side did not want to include a broad swath of leftist intellectuals in their efforts. Instead, Matsumoto’s group wanted only those in Matsumoto and Takagi’s cliquish circle, those individuals who had the same ideological inclinations—liberal, capitalist, 100% pro-Americans—and excluded progressive intellectuals.26 Makoto Iokibe, in his study of US-Japan intellectual exchange, argued that “Matsumoto and the I-House group were supported and highly respected by those in Japan’s ‘establishment’ [i.e., conservative, anticommunist political leaders and business and industrial leaders], but they did not represent the pacifist-leftist coalition that dominated the academic and intellectual currents at the time.”27 In the 1950s, the political and intellectual worlds were dangerously polarized, reflecting the Cold War divide. The Japanese intellectual community bitterly regretted the war waged by Imperial Japan and fervently wished for peace and the healthy development of democracy. Following the end of the war, leftists, especially communists who claimed they had justly opposed the war and had, therefore, been oppressed by the militaristic government, gained more prominence in post-war Japanese politics. These groups, called progressive forces, proclaimed themselves the guardians of “peace and democracy.” When the US Occupation changed its policy to address the Cold War in Japan in its so-called “reverse course,” these leftists—socialists and communists alike—fanned anti-American sentiment. These leftist factions could barely tolerate Japan’s conservative government, which appeared to meekly kowtow to US dictates. 25

Iokibe, “U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange,” 73–74 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 117; “About I-House” https://www.i-house.or.jp/eng/about/index.html (accessed March 26, 2022). 26 Fujita, “Nichibei chiteki k¯ ory¯u keikaku to 1950 nendai nichibei kankei” (The U.S.-Japan intellectual interchange program and U.S.-Japan relations in the 1950s), 73. 27 Iokibe, “U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange,” 76.

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While the Japanese intellectual circle was leaning toward the left, being viewed as pro-American was professionally risky for professors. Nevertheless, intellectuals such as Matsumoto, Takagi, and others who were involved in the founding of the I-House were openly pro-American and supported Japan’s political establishment.28 In such a polarized climate, it was natural for Matsumoto to choose his friends or students to be Japanese delegates to the US. However, for the Americans, this selection was deeply problematic, as it meant that the program simply reinforced the existing pro-American elite strata of Japanese society, rather than converting the anti-American leftist intellectuals. Until 1959, when this program was discontinued, the same conflicts and tensions over the selection of participants remained between the partnered groups.29 In the early 1950s, Japanese conservative politics was also split. One faction, led by Prime Minister Yoshida, prioritized rebuilding the economy and was wary of rearmament. Yoshida established the Self-Defense Forces under pressure—and with financial support—from the US government in 1954; he then left office.30 The other faction, led by Yoshida’s rival Ichir¯o Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi, advocated revising the constitution and rearming.31 In 1955, these two factions were combined into the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP). Hatoyama and Kishi (grandfather of former Prime Minister Shinz¯o Abe) each became prime ministers and pushed for constitutional revisions and rearmament. Meanwhile, following the Korean War truce in 1953, another lethal accident, the Lucky Dragon Incident, aggravated Japanese unease regarding the US. In 1954, a Japanese tuna boat named Lucky Dragon was contaminated with deadly radioactive ash from a US hydrogen bomb test on Bikini Island. This incident ignited nationwide anger and antiwar, anti-nuclear weapon, and anti-US sentiments and strengthened Japan’s commitment to pacifism. International power struggles and domestic factions made the Japanese public increasingly uneasy and allowed progressive intellectuals to spread their ideas widely through journals and newspaper articles. In fact, progressive (Marxist-oriented) Japanese people at large national universities advocated the idea that the Soviet Union and mainland China were peace-loving, whereas the capitalist countries, such as the US, were aggressive imperialists. They also warned that Japan’s alliance with the US not only endangered its security but also undermined Japan’s independence. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s (and perhaps also to the present day), these progressive intellectuals remained influential in shaping Japanese public opinion through their skillful use of the mass media.32

28

Iokibe, “U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange,” 76. Fujita, “Nichibei chiteki k¯ory¯u keikaku to 1950 nendai nichibei kankei” (The U.S.-Japan intellectual interchange program and U.S.-Japan relations in the 1950s), 80. 30 Tomohito Shinoda, Nichibei d¯ omei toiu riarizumu (Emerging realism of the Japan-U.S. alliance) (Tokyo: Chikura shob¯o, 2007), 68–71. 31 Iokibe, “U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange,” 79–80. 32 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 53. 29

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This polarization of pro-American establishment supporters and anti-American intellectuals had long been known to the US government. In 1955, the USIS set out to investigate the opinions of Japanese intellectuals. Although the term intellectual was never defined, the term broadly referred to every Japanese “who has been to or is attending a university.” In particular, the USIA considered professors, political commentators, and journalists to be the most important intellectuals. A report entitled “Japanese Intellectuals,” dated December 1, 1955, argued that intellectuals in Japan opposed US foreign policy, particularly abhorring the US pressure on Japan to rearm. Moreover, nearly all intellectuals favored Japan’s establishment of political relations with mainland China.33 In this political climate, in 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a Joint Declaration restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries. In return, the Soviet Union supported Japan’s application for UN membership, allowing Japan to join the UN in 1956. In 1957, the Soviet success in launching a satellite, Sputnik, before the US could do so bolstered the leftist intellectuals’ view that Japan should not side exclusively with the US and that if Japan could not remain neutral, it should side with the Soviet Union. As the Cold War antagonism in Asia and Europe affected Japan’s security, Japan’s pacifist-leftist intellectuals grew increasingly anti-American: they supported peace and opposed rearmament. These movements were entangled with widespread opposition to the Kishi cabinet’s proposed revision of the US-Japan security treaty. Intellectuals’ skepticism toward the US and the progressives’ influence over the public were revealed in the form of an unprecedented massive protest by the Japanese people against the revision. In May and June 1960, huge demonstrations against the treaty filled the streets of Tokyo and all other major cities, forcing the cancellation of a planned visit by President Eisenhower to Japan.34 The US government was shocked by the Japanese public’s violent reaction. It had engaged in outreach for decades, working toward a pro-American Japan, yet its efforts had failed. Edwin O. Reischauer, who was then a professor of Japanese history at Harvard University, a former special assistant in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State, and one of the American committee members in the US-Japan intellectual interchange program, explained the state of US-Japan relations in his article, aptly titled “The Broken Dialogue with Japan” and published in the October 1960 issue of Foreign Affairs. In the article, Reischauer stated that the US government failed to retain the favor of ordinary Japanese. He maintained that the 1960 security treaty controversy was “a consequence of the conservative versus progressive” polarization caused by the lack of a unifying core of ideals stemming from dramatic social and ideological change during the Occupation. He pointed out that moderate democrats, such as supporters

33

Operations Coordinating Board, “Japanese Intellectuals,” December 1, 1955, Psychological warfare file, MR91-106 #1 Eisenhower Library, Kansas. Cited in Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 49. 34 Iokibe, “U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange,” 81.

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of the Socialist Party and the newly formed Democratic Socialists, including intellectuals and journalists, opposed the Liberal Democrats and their policy of alliance with the US. Reischauer described these people as mostly “sincere believers in democracy” who were “devoted to the ideal of international peace.” He criticized them as well, saying that “few intellectuals seem to have given serious thought to the question [of] whether Japan can maintain true neutrality and independence without first rearming… Japanese intellectuals have not realistically faced the logical conclusions of the course they advocate.” However, Reischauer admitted faults in the US strategy, pointing out that the US had failed to make a concerted effort to understand the mindset and thoughts of Japanese intellectuals and engaged in limited direct contact with them. In his view, the US embassy had instead been inclined to engage in more contact with “Englishspeaking businessmen and with conservative political leaders” who already shared more of the American point of view on world problems. He pointed out the importance of the US government’s realization of the great gap in thinking separating those in power, the intellectuals, and other leaders of the opposition. He highlighted the need to devote more attention to the intellectuals who were responsible for shaping popular opinion on national issues, and he recommended that the US open a dialogue with not only the pro-American Japanese in power but also the skeptical anti-American Japanese intellectuals.35 Since the early 1950s, the US government had been trying to engage with the people of Japan through both privately initiated cultural exchanges and governmentsponsored programs, such as the Fulbright Program. However, its efforts appeared in vain. The US cultural exchange program was—whether intentionally or unintentionally—exclusive, admitting only Japanese people from existing dominant groups. Those who could understand English well enough to pass the competitive selection process to become exchange students to the US were from affluent, longestablished families of a high social class—precisely the demographic that was already primarily pro-American. Candidates who were academically gifted but were communist sympathizers or followed another shunned ideology were excluded from the programs. Neither governmental nor private cultural exchange programs were immune to this bias. An inherent flaw may have been that this kind of privately initiated program, especially one funded by a philanthropic giant, had significant social status attached to it–significant enough that only a select few from the establishment were selected. Thus, owing to the exclusion of unsympathetic candidates, the enormous gap in perception regarding the United States and the global outlook among the conservative Japanese elites, left-leaning Japanese intellectuals, and ordinary people remained unchanged, if not further widened. The gap in perception between the conservative government and ordinary citizens about security issues is still deep and wide. Moreover, pacifist tenets are entrenched in the Japanese psyche. The Fundamental Law of Education and the revised version, 35

Edwin O. Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” Foreign Affairs 36 (October 1969). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1960-10-01/broken-dialogue-japan (accessed March 26, 2022).

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Basic Act on Education of 2006, that control compulsory education state that education aims to cultivate people “with the qualities that are necessary in the people who make up a peaceful and democratic nation and society.”36 Through grade-school instruction concerning the pacifist Article 9, psychological disarmament had an extremely potent, long-lasting effect on Japanese minds. All Japanese children learn that the constitution of Japan is the first in human history that explicitly prohibits the use of military force in the interest of world peace. They learn that this idealistic constitution was the result of the deep regret of the Japanese regarding their aggression during World War II. For the Japanese, peace and democracy are one holistic concept. In practice, however, democracy and peace are separate matters. The US, the very nation that demanded that this constitution be enforced, is the most potent military power in the world. In fact, the US has used the banner of democracy to wage war, both before and after World War II, proving that peace and democracy are not two sides of the same coin, as the Japanese have been taught. Due to Japan’s pacifist constitution, along with a post-war education that emphasizes peace, the Japanese have been loath to accept any policies with any positive views of the military. Since the country’s wartime defeat, anything indicative of patriotism has had a negative connotation, as it could be construed as endorsing Japan’s previous militaristic ideology. Most importantly, ever since the Japanese lost the war, the country’s values and history, which all Japanese were taught to protect and preserve with their lives during the war, were also lost: these were replaced with abstract ideas such as peace and democracy. There has been no in-depth discussion of the meaning of peace for Japan. Peace, as the absence of military combat, is a precious ideal held dear by the Japanese; however, the world has seen an unending series of wars and conflicts since World War II. With these historical memories and hope for a peaceful future inextricably embedded in the Japanese mind, even when the US wanted Japan to fight against communism or, more recently, against terrorism, Japan has remained reluctant to engage. Now, seven decades after its defeat, Japan has become economically successful and has gained political freedom and ideological diversity. However, the country continues to carry on aimlessly without a vision for its role in the global community.

References Belmonte, Laura A. 2008. Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

36

Japan, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, “Basic Act on Education” (Act NO 120 of December 22, 2006). https://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/lawandplan/tit le01/detail01/1373798.htm (accessed August 24, 2022). The Original 1947 enactment, Ky¯oiku kihon h¯o (the Fundamental Law of Education) was revised and implemented on December 22, 2006. It now contains 18 Articles.

References

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Cull, Nicholas J. 2008. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989. New York: Cambridge University Press. Davis, Glenn, and John G. Roberts. 1996. An Occupation without Troops: Wall Street’s Half-century Domination of Japanese Politics. Tokyo: Yenbooks. Fujita, Fumiko. 2000. Nichibei chiteki k¯ory¯u keikaku to 1950 nendai nichibei kankei. (The U.SJapan intellectual interchange program and U.S.-Japan relations in the 1950s). University of Tokyo Journal of American Studies, 5: 69–85. Fujita, Fumiko. 2015. Amerika bunka gaik¯o to nihon: Reisenki no bunka to hito no k¯ory¯u (U.S. cultural diplomacy and Japan in the Cold War era). Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. Iokibe, Makoto. 2006. U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange: The Relationship between Government and Private Foundations. In Philanthropy and Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, ed. Tadashi Yamamoto, Akira Iriye and Mokoto Iokibe, 61–98. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange. Japan, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. “Basic Act on Education” (Act NO 120 of December 22, 2006). https://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/lawandplan/ title01/detail01/1373798.htm. Accessed 24 August 2022. Kikuyama, Kengo. 2022. Okinawa under heavy US base burden, 50 years after the return. NHK WORLD-JAPAN, June 1, 2022. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/2005/. Accessed 24 August 2022. Kumano, Ruriko. 2019. U.S. Cultural Diplomacy for Japan in the 1950s. Reitaku Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 27: 55–81. Matsuda, Takeshi. 2007. Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent Dependency. Washington D.C.: Woodrow, Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press. Osgood, Kenneth. 2006. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad. Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas. Osgood, Kenneth A. Propaganda. In Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Encyclopedia.com. https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcriptsand-maps/propaganda. Accessed 24 August 2022. Reischauer, Edwin O. 1969. The Broken Dialogue with Japan. Foreign Affairs 36. https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1960-10-01/broken-dialogue-japan. Accessed 26 March 2022. Rosenberg, Emily S. 1982. Spreading American Dreams: Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890– 1945. New York: Hill and Wang. Saeki, Chizuru. 2008. U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan: Promoting Democracy 1948– 1960. New York: Edwin Mellen Press. Shinoda, Tomohito. 2007. Nichibei d¯omei toiu riarizumu (Emerging realism of the Japan–U.S. alliance). Tokyo: Chikura shob¯o. Tsvetkova, Natalia. 2008. International Education during the Cold War: Soviet Social Transformation and American Social Reproducation. Comparative Education Review 52 (2): 199–217.

Conclusion

In the early nineteenth century, the Japanese archipelago, which had been selfisolated for 250 years, was suddenly confronted by the aggressive advance of the massive Western battleships, demanding at canon-point that Japan be opened for trade. The Japanese samurai regime, which had not fought any battle for nearly 300 years, did not have reliable weapons to fight back. Japan had no choice but to acquiesce. As a result, a dozen seaports were successively opened for Western countries. A large group of young, low-ranking samurai, who did not have much money or many rifles, began assassinating foreign diplomats, merchants, and sailors to embarrass their regime. As expected, a civil war erupted. The rebels, materially helped by Great Britain, won the war. Japan had to “modernize” fast. The national slogan was, “Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Military,” just like Great Britain. The rebels who ended the samurai regime wanted to build an empire of Japan with an emperor’s sovereignty. The new reign was named Meiji (enlightened reign). Meiji Imperial Japan fought the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, winning both. The young rebels, now the nation’s senior leaders, reaffirmed that their policies were correct. The imperial regime asked for absolute loyalty and obedience from the Japanese people. They achieved such loyalty through education, from elementary school to university. In addition, the ritual of worshipping the emperor as a god in a human form was practiced daily and any discernable show of disobedience was harshly reprimanded. Any open expression of disloyalty met a deadly charge of lèse-majesté. Freedom of speech and academic freedom, though meager, had to be practiced with great care so as not to endanger one’s life. Soon after the 1917 Russian Revolution, communism was introduced to Japan and fascinated university students and professors. Long oppressed intellectuals found communism liberating and exhilarating. However, the Japanese government found communism lethally infectious and moved to successfully destroy it without mercy.

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Conclusion

Imperial Japan lost in World War II. Douglas MacArthur arrived to change Japan into a peace-loving, democratic nation. Japan needed, he said, “spiritual transformation.” To achieve such a formidable task, MacArthur used the well-organized and efficient Japanese education system, which was managed by the Ministry of Education. He purged many undesirable, nationalistic staff from the government, industries, and universities. After the Allied victory, the United States and the Soviet Union no longer needed each other and descended into the Cold War. MacArthur needed all the nationalistic communism-hating Japanese whom he had purged a few years earlier. The Korean War broke out. He determined that Japan’s infatuation with eternal peace, which Japanese schools assiduously inculcated under the American tutorage, had to be stopped and the new education, based on fearing a communist encroachment, was launched immediately. However, Japanese people who had tasted the freedom of speech refused to relive the nightmare of authoritarianism. MacArthur and his Japanese politicians tried hard to transform this “peace-loving democratic Japan” back to “a communist-hating strong Japan.” Since the early post-war years, Japan has been the closest American ally in Asia–Pacific. It somersaulted a few dizzying times to find its place as if manhandled by history that appeared to repeat itself.

Index

A Acadmic freedom, 2, 16, 48, 60, 89, 90, 99, 115, 125, 131, 142, 144, 169, 176, 195 Acheson, Dean, 80 Akahata, 73, 75, 129, 148, 151, 162, 164, 165 suspension of, 165 Allied Council for Japan, 40 Amano, Teiyu, 159, 162 American Association of University Professors, 97 Anti-American, 143, 153, 154, 163, 165, 183, 187, 188, 190, 191 Atcheson, George, 77 Atomic bomb, 38, 184 Autonomy, see university’s autonomy, 3

B Basic Act on Education (Japan), 192 Boards of education, 93 Borton, Hugh, 182, 188 Bradford, Saxton E., 187 Buddhism, 6 Byrnes, James F., 77

C Censorship, 147, 154, 184 Charter Oath, 52, 57 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 68, 140 Christianity, 5 Civil Information and Education Section (CIE), 39 and Red Purge, 170, 175

Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), 72, 106 Cominform, 2, 84, 139, 163 Comintern, 21, 27, 32, 68, 74, 84 Confucianism, 6 Constitution Meiji Imperial, 1889, 13 New Japan, 1946, 1, 59 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 78 Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), 72, 82, 104 D Daoism, 6 Dodge, Joseph M, 111, 160 Dulles, John Foster, 182 Dulles Mission, 182 Dupell, Paul T, 110 Dyke, Ken R., 43, 91 E Education Law, 9, 92 School Education Law (1947), 93 Eells, Walter C. biography, 92, 176 Eells incidents, 143 Eells statement, 115 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 117, 184 Emmerson, John K., 68 Emperor, 13 Hirohito (Showa), 47, 56 Meiji, 14, 23, 52 F Far Eastern Commission, 40, 59

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. Kumano, Japan Occupied, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8582-9

197

198 Fellers, Bonner F., 42 Finn, Richard B., 81 Foreign Affairs (journal), 78, 79, 190 Fukuzawa, Yukichi, 11 Kei¯o Gijuku (Kei¯o University), 11 Fundamental Law of Education, 92, 127, 191

G Gayn, Mark Julius, 71 Government Section (GS), 39 and constitution, 59 Grew, Joseph C., 38, 84

H Hara, Takashi, 23 Harris, Townsend, 8 Hatoyama, Ichir¯o, 32, 189 Higashikuni, Naruhiko, 46, 72 High Treason Incident (Daigyaku jiken), 23, 26 Hokkaido University, 149, 176 Hook, Sidney, 116, 131

I Ide, Takashi, 109, 169 I-House, 188 Ikeda, Hayato, 173 Imperial house, 12, 30, 38 Imperial Rescript on Education, 14, 34, 45 Imperial University Ordinance, 10, 17 Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), 91, 182, 187 It¯o, Hirobumi, 14

J Japanese Association of University Professors (JAUP), 90, 129 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) foundation of, 28 Japanese Education Reform Committee (JERC), 91 Japan Teachers’ Union, 106, 112, 113

K Kabayama, Aisuke, 187 Kades, Charles Louis, 83 Katayama, Sen (political activist and journalist), 21

Index and Comintern, 27 Katayama, Tetsu (politician), 105 Katsura, Tar¯o, 17, 22 Kawakami, Hajime, 24, 103 Kennan, George F., 79 Kishi, Nobusuke, 189 Kokutai (national polity), 13 Kond¯o, Eiz¯o, 27 Korean War, 131, 164, 182, 185, 196 K¯otoku, Sh¯usui, 22 Kyoto Imperial University, 10, 54

L Lenin, Vladimir, 20 Libel Law, 12 Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), 189 Loomis, Arthur K., 169

M MacArthur, Douglas and Christianity, 60 and constitution, 59 SCAP, 39 Maeda, Tamon, 47, 187 Educational Plan for Building the New Japan, 49 Marshall Plan, 78, 84 Marx, Karl, 20 Matsumoto, Shigeharu, 187 Meiji Restoratio, 8 Miyamoto, Kenji, 139 Moral education, 9, 14 Mori, Arinori, 10 Motoda, Nagazane, 14

N Nanbara, Shigeru, 89, 96, 162, 168 National Security Council (NSC), USA, 79, 81, 111 Nazi Germany, 37, 80 Neufeld, William, 134 Niigata University, 99, 114 Niijima, J¯o, 26 Non-Governmental Institutions (NGOs), 187 Nosaka, Sanz¯o and Cominform, 140 biography of, 28, 68, 75 Nugent, Donald R., 83, 90

Index O Okinawa US military base, 183 ¯ Okuma, Shigenobu, 11 Waseda University, 11 Orr, Mark T., 91, 94 ¯ Ouchi, Hy¯oe, 25

P Peace Preservation Law (Chian iji h¯o), 30, 31, 68, 72 People’s Republic of China, 70, 140, 183 Perry, Matthew C., 8 Popular Front Incident, 25, 33 Potsdam conference, 37 declration, 38, 47 Press code (US occupation), 162 Propaganda communist, 81, 105, 163, 175, 181, 183 US, 176, 181 Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), 182

R Red Purge 1949, 2, 85 1950, 2, 164, 168, 169 Reischauer, Edwin O., 188, 190 Ridgway, Matthew B., 174 Rockefeller, John D. III, 182 Rockefeller Foundation, 187 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 37 and New Deal, 76 Roosevelt, Theodore, 18 Russian Revolution, 20

S Sakai, Toshihiko, 22 Samson, George, 182 San Francisco Peace Treaty, 183 Sano, Manabu, 29 Sawayanagi, Masatar¯o Sawayanagi Incident, 18 Sebald, William J., 110, 135, 162 Self-Defense Forces, 186, 189 Shidehara, Kij¯ur¯o, 72 Shiga, Yoshio, 60, 73, 139 Shinto, 44 and origin of, 5 Shoup, Carl Sumner, 160 Sh¯ushin (morals), 15

199 Socialist Party (Shakait¯o ), 22 Socialist Party (Nihon Shakait¯o ) post-war, 61, 74, 75, 191 Stalin, Josef, 37 State Department Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), 129 Political Adviser’s Office (POLAD), 81 Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch, 53 State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), 71 formation of, 41 Stimson, Henry L., 38 Stoddard, George D., 89, 92 Suzuki, Bunji, 28 T Takabatake, Motoyuki, 26 Takagi, Yasaka, 187 Takano, Fusataro, 21 Takase, Kiyoshi, 28 Takase, S¯otar¯o, 130 Takigawa, Yukitoki Takigawa Incident, 32, 54 Thorpe, Elliot R., 58, 72, 82 Thought Control, 31, 132 Tohoku University, 143 Tokuda, Ky¯uichi, 28, 73 Tokugawa (warrior regime), 6 Tokyo Imperial University, 10 Tomizu, Hirondo Tomizu Incident, 18 Trainor, Joseph C., 96, 97, 114 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 8 Truman, Harry S., 38 Typer, Donald M., 134 U United Nations (UN), 79 University’s autonomy, 60, 99, 173, 176 development of, 99 University’s autonomy, 99 US Army Observer Group (aka, Dixie Mission), 68 US cultural exchange program, 184, 187, 191 US Education Mission the first, 92 the second, 168 US Information Agency (USIA), 184 US Information Service (USIS), 184

200 US Information and Educational Exchange Act (the Smith-Mundt Act), 181 US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, 40, 41

W War Department, 50 Way of the Subjects, 43 Whitney, Courtney, 71, 159 Willoughby, Charles A., 71, 82 World War I, 23

Index Y Yalta Conference, 37 Yamakawa, Hitoshi (socialist), 27 Yamakawa, Kenjir¯o, 18 Yamamoto, Kenzo, 74 Yoshida, Shigeru, 77, 108 Yoshino, Sakuz¯o, 23

Z Zaibatsu, 84 Zengakuren, 105