Islamic Law and Governance in Contemporary Iran : Transcending Islam for Social, Economic, and Political Order 9781498507578, 9781498507561

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Islamic Law and Governance in Contemporary Iran

Islamic Law and Governance in Contemporary Iran Transcending Islam for Social, Economic, and Political Order Mehran Tamadonfar

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2015 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tamadonfar, Mehran, author. Islamic law and governance in contemporary Iran : transcending Islam for social, economic, and political order / Mehran Tamadonfar. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4985-0756-1 (cloth : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-1-4985-0757-8 (electronic) 1. Law--Iran--Islamic influences. 2. Constitutional law--Iran. 3. Constitutional law--Religious aspects--Islam. 4. Iran--Politics and government--1979-1997. 5. Iran--Politics and government--1997I. Title. KMH469.T36 2015 349.55--dc23 2015010732 TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

To: Emily Taraneh Tamadonfar and Kevin Omeed Tamadonfar for their intellect, accomplishments, and affection

Contents

List of Acronyms

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction

xiii

I: The Islamic Worldview 1 Islam, Politics, and the Law

1 3

II: The Legal Framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran 2 Constitutionalism 3 Islamization of the Law

17 19 31

III: The Polity in the Islamic Republic of Iran 4 Civil Society in Iranian Political Life 5 Vali-e Faqih or Rahbar (Supreme Leader) 6 The Governmental System: Power Imbalances and Extraordinary Checks 7 Nuclear and Missile Programs, Policies, and the Sanctions Regime

125 127 179

Conclusion

309

Appendix: Charts

315

Glossary

319

Bibliography

327

Index

345 vii

189 287

viii

About the Author

Contents

363

List of Acronyms

AEOI

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

CISADA

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act

ECJ

European Court of Justice

EU

European Union

FMI

Freedom Movement of Iran

ICCPR

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IRGC

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

IRI

Islamic Republic of Iran

IRIB

Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting

IRINN

Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television

IRNA

Islamic Republic News Agency

IRP

Islamic Republican Party

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

MPRP

Muslim People’s Republican Party

NF

National Front

NDF

National Democratic Front

NPT

Non-Proliferation Treaty

OFAC

Office of Foreign Assets Control ix

x

List of Acronyms

PDKI

Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan

SEMA

Special Economic Measures Act

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UN

United Nations

UNSCR

United Nations Security Council Resolution

WWII

World War II

Acknowledgments

The original ideas about this project developed out of numerous discussions about the judicalization of post-revolutionary Iranian politics with my former classmates and friends at the College of Law and Political Science at Tehran University. I am grateful for their thoughtful observations and guidance. Of course, they shall remain nameless here for their safety and security. My views about Iranian politics and law are influenced by my late parents, Ghodratollah Tamadonfar and Robab Liaghat who as educators, journalists, and political activists taught me my early lessons about Iranian politics. I am also inspired by generations of Iranians from all walks of life for their struggles for social justice; political rights; and an inclusive society devoid of ethnic prejudices, religious intolerance, and gender discrimination. Professionally, I owe a great deal to Professors William Safran and Ted G. Jelen for their contributions to my intellectual growth and scholarly work. Bill’s own work and innovative thinking has always served as an example worthy of emulation. Through our collaborative research, I have learned a great deal from Ted. Our brainstorming sessions and his humorous references have made me a more informed student of religion and politics. My late friends and colleagues, Professors Willard Rollins and Nasser Daneshvari, helped me understand the complexities and nuances of traditional societies. Willard’s writings on Native American culture and Nasser’s commonsense pride as a “downtrodden Iranian” have broadened my views. I am in great debt to several people for their assistance in the preparation of this book. Foremost among them are my editors at Lexington Press, Ms. Alissa Parra, Ms. Genevieve Ali, Ms. Carissa Marcelle, and Ms. Meaghan White. They are impressive professionals whose keen interest and guidance facilitated this project. I am truly hopeful that this book meets their standards. The anonymous reviewer’s insightful comments and suggestions xi

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helped improve the manuscript. For the better part of the past decade, all my research assistants at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, contributed to this work. In particular, Ms. Autoosa Kojoori-Saatchi and Mr. Roman Lewis gave of their time and expertise. My children, Emily and Kevin, took time off from their medical studies to brainstorm with me and to help with the cover designs. As always, I am appreciative of their tireless support. Last but certainly not least, my heartfelt gratitude goes to my former administrative assistants, Ms. Susie Lafrentz and Ms. Melissa Rodriguez, for enabling me to take time off from administrative tasks to work on this project. Their professional commitment has meant a lot to me. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for the errors in facts and logic in this book. Mehran Tamadonfar February 2015 Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.

Introduction

This book briefly studies the origins, historical evolution, and scope of classical Islamic law; comparatively analyzes the sectarian and scholastic intricacies of legal traditions in Islam; offers an assessment of the nuances and limitations of the application of Islamic law and jurisprudence to contemporary Muslim societies; and, through a case study of the Islamic Republic of Iran, argues for transcending the traditional views of Islamic law to provide a proper and effective legal framework for the management of modern Muslim societies. Why should we focus on Islamic law in the study of the political dynamics of Muslim societies? What contributions would the study of Islamization and its complexities make to our understanding of contemporary Muslim politics? What lessons can the study of Islamic law and its constraints offer for a meaningful understanding of broader social, economic, and political issues in the Muslim world? How would these understandings put the challenges of the contemporary world politics in perspective? What, if any, are the chances that Islamic law can be adapted and made applicable to contemporary needs and dynamics of Muslim societies? Some of these questions are raised and addressed directly in this book. Answers to other questions are implied by our study of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the evolution of its political system and policies. The central thesis of this book is that, regardless of its scholastic and sectarian nuances, Islamic law has been and continues to remain relevant for the management of Muslim societies and the public’s daily lives. Secularism, which calls for the separation of religion from politics and law, is simply inconceivable in the Islamic worldview. Generally speaking, Muslims’ experiments with secular forms of authority and law have failed to offer legitimate and effective solutions to the ongoing problems in their societies. Naturally, these failures have reignited the old debates about and efforts to reesxiii

xiv

Introduction

tablish the rule of Islamic law. However, given its historical origins and the evolution of Muslim societies over the centuries, this law is limited in both quantity and quality as an effective framework for the management of modern complex societies. These limitations, inevitably, require transparent and meaningful efforts to go beyond traditional Islamic law to ensure its continued appeal and relevance. As illustrated in this book, this task is quite possible through a genuine commitment to a dynamic view of Islamic law that marginalizes archaic precepts and modifies existing understandings and practices through a systematic process of interpretation and reinterpretation. Of course, as evident in the case of Iran, this process could easily become an instrument for autocratic control. The pivotal question is how this process can be pursued in the interest of the public and spirit of effective management of Muslim societies rather than sectarian and factional interests of the rulers or those who challenge their authority. The story of the Islamic Republic of Iran sheds some disquieting lights on the misconceived politicization of the Islamization process and self-serving legal modifications in the interest of the regime and neglect of the populace. The emergence and recent rise of Islamist movements throughout the Muslim world, and Islamists’ well-articulated demands for eradication of secular regimes and their policies and establishment of Islamic states, necessitate a fresh examination of what constitutes an Islamic state. Simply put, the establishment of an Islamic state means a return to Islamic values and practices in all facets of the society, including social, economic, and political realms. Of course, this trend is contrary to the requirements and expectations of the developmentalist perspective that underscores the need for secularism in the democratic-pluralist model of development. From this perspective, religion would ultimately be relegated to the spiritual realm and decline as a political force. Obviously, this view that even downplays the role of the Christian right in the United States and liberation theology in Latin America, for instance, seems increasingly far-fetched and empirically suspect. To one extent or another, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam continue to play a political role in many countries dominated by these monotheistic religions. The Iranian revolution of the late twentieth century and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the spread of Islamist movements throughout the Muslim world and their challenge to secular regimes and the global order, and recent sectarian infightings prompted by conservative Sunni Arab regimes that attempt to undermine the Shi’a Crescent and its Arab advocates by supporting Sunni militant Islamists like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—which is also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—exemplify the growing role of Islam in today’s politics. For nearly four decades, the political role of Islam has been the subject of increasingly intense and contentious debates and discussions within and outside the Muslim world. By pointing at the events of September 11, 2001

Introduction

xv

and the subsequent rise in global terrorism and violence, those who oppose political Islam, particularly in the West, question the merits of an expansive reintroduction of Islam into the politics of Muslim societies. They contend that Islam is indeed an impediment to the development of these societies, since it hampers their chances for a democratic-pluralist path to development, exacerbates sectarian and factional schisms, and undermines the existing global order. To Islamists as the proponents of Islam as a political force, the reaffirmation of Islamic politics is the major, if not the only, mechanism for the development of Muslim societies whose recent pasts have been dominated by devastating foreign colonial intrusions, corrupt and autocratic secular political authorities who have primarily served the interests of their foreign overseers to the detriment of their own people, and misplaced reliance on alien ideologies and policies that have caused economic woes and social misdirections and challenges. Islamists believe that the Islamic worldview offers sound and practical solutions for their societies’ ills. Thus, they favor the establishment of Islamic states that are committed to the implementation of Islamic values and laws, ensure citizens’ rights within the Islamic communalistic view, and advance the goals of global justice and equality. To challenge the existing systems and establish Islamic states, they have pursued an array of strategies with mixed results. In the cases of Turkey and Jordan, for instance, they took advantage of democratic opportunities and institutions to gain political prominence and access to political authority. In Turkey, Islamists’ survival, in the face of challenges by secular-nationalist elements, is largely due to their cautious and gradualist approach to change that, so far, has been neither transformative nor has it been openly hostile to oppositional forces. In recent years, a greater push for domestic Islamization and Ottomanization of foreign policy has intensified the tensions and challenges against the current government. In Jordan, Islamists’ inability to manage the government and meet the public’s needs was the primary explanation for their short-lived political gains and eventual electoral defeat. In much of North Africa, Islamists’ electoral gains did not translate into political authority, as they faced violent challenges by authoritarian military establishments. In some instances, Islamists have resorted to violence to dislodge secular autocratic regimes and to challenge the global system. Popular uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain underscore the public’s frustration with their secular regimes and Islamists’ potentials for transforming the region. In many of these countries, the absence of vibrant civil societies opened the doors for the rise of Islamist forces that could only be counterbalanced by authoritarian military establishments. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, came to power in Egypt because years of autocratic rule had decimated earlier institutions and had hampered the growth of a meaningful civil society. Its rule was, however, short as it challenged the secular and military

xvi

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establishments by expeditiously pursuing radical Islamist policies. In the post-Qaddafi era, Islamist rule in Libya has produced a failed state. In that country, it is not the challenge by an established military that jeopardizes the Islamist agenda; it is rather primordial loyalties to regions, clans, and families that undermine the viability of an Islamic state. There is very little doubt that the common denominator among Islamist movements is their desire to establish Islamic states. While it is generally agreed that a state is Islamic when it is founded upon and committed to Islamic law and its implementation, there is no consensus as to what constitutes the state’s legal parameters, its institutional and functional dynamics, its policy orientations, and its resources to cope with the requirements of modern-day life. These differences are shaped by sectarianism and factional schisms, scholastic disputes, and domestic and global political challenges that hamper Muslims’ ability to build a consensus on these central questions and establish effective Islamic states. Within the sectarian constraints of its specific case study, this book attempts to offer some explanations about the legal, institutional, functional, and policy features of an Islamic state by examining the legal framework, institutional and process dynamics, and policy orientations of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Admittedly, while our brief historical and comparative analysis of the classical Islamic laws and practices offer a window to the opportunities, necessities, and challenges for all Muslims regardless of their sectarian proclivities, our focus on a Shi’a dominated theocratic-authoritarian system limits our ability to generalize from this case study. We will try to ameliorate this limitation by tracing the roots of these issues in the classical Islamic law and by focusing on contemporary mainstream Muslim views on law, society, and politics. Furthermore, an examination of the challenges that forced the Islamic Republic of Iran to transcend dogmatic interpretations of Islamic law and to commit to a more pragmatic approach to Islam and its precepts offers us some explanations about the complexities of Islamic states in the modern age. Indeed, the Iranian experience highlights the quantitative and qualitative limitations of Islamic law and its applications to contemporary societies, and offers opportunities for pragmatic modifications if one is to establish a practical Islamic state regardless of its sectarian propensities. Organizationally, the book consists of three parts: part I is a brief introduction to Islam as a worldview; part II is a comprehensive textual analysis of Islamic legal frameworks, especially the legal framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and part III examines the Iranian polity and its institutional, process, and policy dynamics to demonstrate the complexities and necessities of transcendence beyond traditional views of Islamic laws. Chapter 1 offers a brief analysis of the scope of the Islamic worldview and its role in managing all facets of its followers’ lives. Along with Muslims’ historical practices, this worldview underscores the universality and

Introduction

xvii

centrality of Islamic law and rejects any notion of secularism. Not only the Quranic injunctions but also Muhammad’s traditions explicate the role of Islamic law as an indispensable instrument of managing both the temporal and spiritual authority. In this chapter, we will trace the origins of Islamic law, discuss its early developments and gradual institutionalization, and examine its scope and limitations as an instrument of governance. As indicated by the “fusion theory,” in its historical evolution, the divinely ordained Islamic law has indeed been directly and indirectly influenced by earlier monotheistic religions as well other religious and cultural traditions over the centuries. Initially, the pre-Islamic Arab cultural norms and practices formed elements of Islamic legal practice. Later, Judaic, Christian, and even Persian Sassanid religious and legal norms and practices helped the development of Islamic law. In fact, in many cases, these non-Islamic contributions became so integral to the Islamic worldview that they were no longer distinguishable from the original Islamic precepts. With the institutionalization of the temporal authority during the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties and the growth of scholastic traditions in Islam, intense disputes emerged as to the nature and scope of the law. From then on, with the exception of the Quran, there has been no consensus on the sources of the law, for instance. Scholastic and sectarian traditions vary a great deal on the legitimacy of the Prophet’s hadith and sunnah as well as the applicability of such legal instruments as ijma and qiyas. The Shi’is, in line with their legitimist perspective, have even relied on their Imams’ traditions as a major source of the law. Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to a textual analysis of the legal framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As indicated earlier, the purpose is to study the classical Islamic, Shi’a, as well as political and pragmatic foundations of the Islamic system in Iran, in an attempt to highlight the practical limitations of the law and political considerations in the Islamization process. Chapter 2 studies the Iranian constitution from its foundation through its later revisions. This constitution and its revisions are simply reflections of, and responses to, divergent goals of Iranian revolutionaries who subscribed to a wide array of ideologies and sought a range of contradictory goals for the future of the country, as well as practical difficulties in managing the society by reliance upon dogmatic interpretations of Islamic laws and practices. Largely in response to diverse forces in the Iranian revolutionary process, the original constitution and its revision accounted for a paradoxical political authority that embraces both democratic and authoritarian dimensions. By definition, all monotheistic belief systems reject the notion of popular sovereignty and limit human’s ability to manage their affairs. At the same time, they also acknowledge discretionary rights of the followers within limits. The Iranian constitution spells out extensive rights for the citizens and accounts for limitations set by Islamic divine ordinances, requirements of the

xviii

Introduction

community, and interests of the state. In all constitutional systems, citizens’ rights are spelled out and limitations are imposed. In democratic systems, outside interpretive complexities and gradual modifications due to changing times, these rights and responsibilities are generally well defined and agreed upon. In the Islamic Republic, and by necessity in all Islamic states, constitutionally acknowledged rights and obligations are at least subject to the requirements of Islam and communal interests. This issue is confounded in the Islamic Republic since, in addition to Islamic requirements and communal interests, rights and responsibilities are primarily, excessively, and ambiguously measured by political interests of the regime. Furthermore, as clerics became the constitutionally mandated arbiters of these rights, democratic dimensions of the constitution were sidestepped for the “good of the public” and the regime. Chapter 3 relies on extensive translations and analysis of legal documents, rules, regulations, religious fatwas, judicial decisions, and clerical and lay interpretations of laws to study the details, nuances, and complexities of Islamization of the law in the Islamic Republic. Since it is generally agreed that an Islamic state is obligated to enforce Islamic law, Iranian clerics undertook an extensive effort at Islamization. Faced with qualitative and quantitative limitations of Islamic legal principles and bent on ensuring their uncontested right to authority, they resorted to the doctrine of maslahat/zarurat that allowed them to adopt any laws and regulations they considered beneficial to the community and political authority; and marginalized or abandoned many well-established laws, rules, and practices that no longer served the regime’s interests. The current Iranian penal code, family law, press law, human rights laws, and economics and finance laws are the products of an arduous Islamization process that transparently transcends Islam to ensure social, economic, and political order. In some detail, the book examines the regime’s challenges with and solutions for adopting, modifying, and enforcing these codes. As expected, to some extent, this pragmatic trend in the Islamization process has enabled the regime to meet some of the modern-day needs of the society and, at the same time, ensure its own legitimacy and survival. For instance, Iranian family law that significantly differs from the classical Islamic precepts and acknowledges extensive, but not equal, rights for women, typifies the legal trends in the Islamic Republic. However, in a broader sense, this Islamization of the law did, to some extent, marginalize the Islamic principle of the universality of law, as the regime ushered in legal territorialism and codification. Over time, Islamization also caused political frictions, due to divergent interpretations of the law and questions about the regime’s opportunistic use of the doctrine of maslahat, and institutional paralysis. In part III, the book focuses on governmental and non-governmental institutions, political processes, and policies of the Islamic Republic. In addition

Introduction

xix

to shedding light on the legal and historical evolutions of this system, the hope is to offer a view of potentials and challenges facing any Islamic state. Chapter 4 surveys the historical patterns of the role of civil society in modern Iranian polities and analyzes the contemporary dynamics of these institutions in the Islamic Republic that, on one hand, account for pluralistic politics and, on the other hand, exhibit intolerance for democracy and reinforce autocratic and exclusionary tendencies in the system. Movements, parties, factions, interest groups, charitable institutions, student organizations, and intellectuals have occasionally played prominent roles in all facets of Iranian life. Rare governmental tolerance and inclusiveness has historically ushered in civil society vibrancy and activism. In contrast, widespread civil society stagnation has traditionally been marked by autocratic tendencies of the regimes. Ironically, in both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran even autocratic regimes have been cognizant of the political utility of civil society and have relied upon such institutions in advancing their own agenda. Thus, political activism in Iran has always been both oppositionist as well as pro-systemic. Even during the Mossadegh era, when Iranian civil society institutions exhibited an impressive level of activism and resilience due to governmental support, these institutions pursued pro-systemic, anti-systemic, and pro- and anti-foreign agendas and strategies. Similar to the post-constitutional revolution of the early twentieth century, the Iranian revolution of the late 1970s marked the rise of civil society institutions in the Islamic Republic. As we discuss in detail in chapter 4, these institutions lack any coherent and consistent ideological commitments and policy preferences, are largely driven by political convenience and opportunism, and are limited in organizational strength and rely upon political personalities whose loyalties, political fortunes, and policy preferences shift significantly and often. The regime’s gradual inclination toward authoritarianism has, once more, constricted the role of civil society institutions. In today’s Iran, there is no genuine and legally sanctioned and politically permissible oppositional politics. All opposition is pro-systemic and revolves around the disputes over dynamic (puya) versus traditional (sunnati) interpretations of fiqh. The difference between the two should not be discounted, however. There are, indeed, major process and policy differences between these two perspectives that can have transformative implications for the system and its policies. Chapter 5 discusses the legal status, functions, and evolution of the role of the Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic. The constitutional understanding that the Leader is the final arbiter in all affairs of the state and society removes any legal (but not necessarily practical) limitations on this role in the system. In practice, as extensively discussed in this book, the influence of this office is subject to the Leader’s personal qualities, his religious legitimacy and political popularity, and political sophistication to effectively weave through the complex web of Iranian factional politics. This requires foresight

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to stay above the fray when possible, and to effectively engage in mundane politics and the affairs of the government when necessary. These requirements easily explain the evolution of the office in the post-Khomeini era. In comparison to Khomeini, Khamene’i’s lack of charisma and standing as a marja’e taqlid and close association with conservative political circles have adversely impacted the role of the rahbar. Chapter 6 discusses the institutional framework, process functions, and policy decisions of the governmental system in the Islamic Republic since its inception. Constitutionally, the governmental system consists of an extensive network of elected and appointed institutions and roles. Theoretically, the Iranian government is based on a doctrine of separation of powers and a system of checks. In practice, it is an intertwined organizational network that functions in an atmosphere of extraordinary checks and power imbalances. As the final authority, the Supreme Leader exercises immense influence in this system, even though he does not possess any official governmental role. The executive branch, the Majles, the court system, and other institutions of power are designated constitutionally mandated roles in the system. Their relative influence and effectiveness, however, largely depends upon the dynamics of factional politics and the intensity of challenges to the dominant faction by their opponents inside and outside the body. For instance, conservative, especially clerical, obstructionism has historically paralyzed the parliament and the executive branch whenever they are controlled by radical or pragmatic factions. Conservative clerical domination of the judiciary throughout the history of the republic has also kept other governmental entities in check, since Judicalization of politics allows for both legal and extra-legal mechanisms of control by the clerical establishment. Furthermore, authoritarian trends have empowered nonelected institutions and officials at the cost of democratic representatives and institutions. Clearly, opposition to parliamentary decisions by the Guardian Council, restrictive choices by the Council of Experts, and the intrusive role of the military-security establishment highlight the fragility and vulnerability of democratic institutions. Our study of the struggles of the parliament to enact legislation, in concert with its constitutional mandate, illustrates the structural impediments to an effective legislative body. Similarly, policy paralysis caused by a dual executive, eventual revision of the constitution to streamline the executive branch by removing the office of the prime minister and by empowering the president, and constant factional challenges have rendered the executive branch a body with a great deal of legal power and little independence. Even during the Ahmadinejad administration, when all governmental entities were controlled by the conservative establishment, factional disputes among conservatives undermined the president’s agenda. At times, it appears that the executive and, to a much lesser extent, the legislative branches are in a free fall. Reminiscent of many patrimonial systems,

Introduction

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this condition empowers the Supreme Leader to assert his influence and to keep in check any challenges to the system and his authority. This chapter discusses the organization, functions, and factional politics in the legislative branch. It also offers an extensive analysis of the legal framework of the executive branch and its institutional evolution; and studies the presidents, their backgrounds, ideological proclivities, policy preferences, and challenges since the establishment of Bazargan’s provisional government. This chapter will also trace the impacts of both domestic and external determinants on the adoption, modification, and marginalization of each administration’s economic, social, and foreign policies. This study demonstrates the limits of ideology, preponderance of factional schisms, relative absence of political will and principle on the part of the presidents, and a collective mind-set and commitment to preserve the system even at the cost of marginalizing Islamic precepts along with popular will. Chapter 7 highlights Iran’s nuclear and missile policies not only because it is a timely topic, but also for its overarching impact on every aspect of Iranian polity. These policies are prompted by fear of regime change, in light of external and internal challenges to the political establishment. As Khomeini and his clerical cohorts became aware of the regime’s vulnerabilities during the Iran-Iraq war, they abandoned their stated opposition to nuclear weapons on Islamic grounds. While the leadership continues to reject the allegations that Iran intends to push for nuclear weaponization, the regime’s nuclear and missile policies demonstrate the leadership’s desire to push forward with these policies. This chapter examines the history of Iran’s nuclear policy that dates back to the ancien regime, and analyzes current policies and programs that have prompted harsh reactions by both regional and global powers. These reactions are explained by the scope of Iran’s policies, suspicious secrecy, and relatively aggressive regional and global foreign policies. Gradual but increasingly intolerable sanctions, covert operations, and threats of force by major powers as well as Israel and conservative Arab states may have forced Iran’s strategic reassessment of these policies. There is very little indication, however, that the regime is abandoning these policies. Many suspect that the Rouhani administration’s pursuit of negotiations is simply a change of strategy rather than a policy reversal.

I

The Islamic Worldview

Chapter One

Islam, Politics, and the Law

ISLAMIC UNIVERSALISM AND CENTRALITY Throughout their history, Muslims have always accepted the universality and centrality of the Islamic belief system. Islam is universal because it covers all aspects of human life. In Muslims’ view, as a highly integrated set of values, norms, and practices, Islam provides a comprehensive set of instructions for followers’ daily lives. In that sense, thus, Islam is not simply a religion, it is rather a way of life. It not only teaches the followers about the Creator (Allah) and His expectations of the believers in this and the afterlife, but also guides them in their daily lives by identifying their rights and responsibilities toward Him and toward each other. The Quran and other Islamic sources often specifically spell out these obligations and rights. In view of the fact that Islam rejects the notion of mediation between Man and God, it is ultimately Man’s responsibility to understand and follow His Will in all aspects of human endeavor including marriage, divorce, eating, praying, education, human relations, death, inheritance, and so forth. Islam is central in the sense that it constitutes the essential basis and focus of identity of the follower and his/her loyalty to the Muslim community (ummah). While Muslims maintain ethnic, national, regional, linguistic, and even sectarian identities, generally their Islamic identity should supersede these considerations. From an Islamic point of view, membership in the ummah not only gives the believer a sense of identity with a religio-political community that expands beyond ethno-national boundaries but also instills in him a feeling of selfhood. 1 The Islamic concept of Oneness of God (tawhid), or monotheism, further underscores the idea of the centrality and universality of the Islamic belief system. Although this concept is directly and explicitly a reference to the unity of God and His ultimate sovereignty, it is indeed the 3

4

Chapter 1

foundation of all human activities. As Ali Shari’ati (1933–1977), the Shi’a scholar and political activist, observed, tawhid integrates and unifies the followers’ spirits and ultimately leads them toward a common direction. 2 ORTHODOXY In the developmentalist literature, particularly in the works of Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., 3 political development is understood to partly be a reflection of the degree of secularization of political culture. Cultural secularism, in their viewpoint, involves a particular cultural orientation that is specific rather than diffused, universalistic rather than parochial, and pragmatic. In political terms, secularism is a movement toward separation of church and state whereby religion does not interfere with nor is it integrated into the public affairs of a society. Rooted in the Age of Enlightenment in Europe and a central feature of modern Western political systems, especially in the United States and France, secularism attempts to reduce ties between the government and religion and to replace laws based on religion with civil laws that are the products of consent. Similar secularist principles have existed in non-Western cultures. Ancient Indian traditions supported the separation of the priest and the king, and the current Indian political system is founded on this secular perspective. There is, however, no meaningful secular tradition in Islam. Generally, support for separation of Islam and politics and advocacy for limiting the scope of Islam to religiosity and spirituality have been rare and unsuccessful in Muslim societies. In fact, for Muslims religion is “intimately and organically related to politics, law, and society,” and consequently they believe that all facets of their lives are governed by God, who is the supreme authority. 4 Therefore, secularism, as manifested in the separation of religious realm from political realm, is neither theoretically nor practically accepted. In fact, religion and politics continue to be “the two sides of a single coin in Islam.” 5 As Bernard Lewis has astutely observed: Islam was associated with power from the very beginning, from the first formative years of the prophet and his immediate successors. This association between religion and power, community and polity, can already be seen in the Qur’an itself and the other early religious texts on which Muslims base their beliefs. 6

Generally, Muslim jurisprudents and political activists overwhelmingly support the unity of religion and politics. The Shi’i traditionalist and political activist, Ruhullah Khomeini (1902–1989), explicitly rejected secularism. Islam, he argued, is the religion of politics and as such everything in Islam is political. 7 Probably more than any other Muslim thinker, Khomeini gave

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5

primacy to the political dimension of Islam by suggesting that “the issues of Islam are political issues, and thus the politics of Islam gains primacy over other issues.” 8 However, in his view, Islamic rules are not limited to politics. They also encompass the material and spiritual aspects of the followers’ lives from the time of birth to death, and even after death throughout one’s spiritual existence. 9 As a political activist, Khomeini attached a unique importance to political life and contended that, since Islam regulates this life, “political activity is a religious responsibility” 10 of all segments of the society. From this perspective, politics is a vehicle by which the follower accepts God and follows His Will. In this sense, Khomeini concludes, “Islam is a religion whose divine [spiritual] rulings are also political.” 11 To understand Khomeini’s perspective on the role of politics in Islam, it is imperative to clarify his conception of politics. To him, in the broadest sense, politics is the leadership of the community. He explicitly suggested that “politics means running the state.” 12 He argued that running the state involves “a relationship between the governor and the people, between governments and masses, and between the governors and other governments; and the prevention of corruption.” 13 On the basis of this functional definition, Khomeini presented a typology of politics consisting of Islamic and satanic politics. Satanic politics, in his view, is founded on injustice, lies, and corrupt leadership. Islamic politics, in contrast, guides the society toward all individual and societal needs. 14 It is the leader who identifies these needs and guides the community to achieve them. Ali Shari’ati, whose views on politics and clericalism diverge significantly from Khomeini’s, also suggested that the goal of politics is not so much to attain individual rights and needs as it is to identify these rights and needs and to educate the people to accept them. 15 These views of Islam and politics are not limited to the Shi’a scholarship. They do have widespread support among Sunni political activists and thinkers as well. As a reformist and somewhat of an individualist Muslim, the former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddaffi (1942–2011) believed that religion and politics cannot be separated because there is no contradiction between religious consciousness and political decisions. 16 Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917–1996), an influential Sunni scholar, contended that Islamic monotheism results in the unity of religion and politics. He rejected secularism as heresy (bida’ah) and favored the application of Islamic teachings to the spiritual and socio-political realms. 17 Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut (1893–1963), Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903–1979)—the influential revivalist—and his disciple the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) and a host of other classical and contemporary, both reformist and traditionalist, Sunni scholars have emphasized the universality of the Islamic belief system. Mawdudi believed that shari’ah justifies the universality of Islam because this code does not distinguish between religion and other aspects of life, particularly between religion and politics. 18 He insisted that there is no area of Man’s activity and concern

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for which the shari’ah does not provide specific divine guidance. Like many other Muslims, he rejected secularism by equating it with religiouslessness (la din). He claimed that secularism is shunned in Islam because it could conceivably exclude all morality, ethics, and human decency from the controlling mechanisms of society. Morality of any kind is simply inconceivable without religion and the sanction of eternal punishment to support it, Mawdudi argued. According to him, “when religion is relegated to the personal realm, men inevitably give way to their bestial impulses and perpetrate evil upon one another. In fact, it is precisely because they wish to escape the restraints of morality and the divine guidance that men espouse secularism.” 19 In this sense, the universality of the Islamic message is the source of salvation in this and the afterlife. In advocating for the universalism of Islam, Sayyid Qutb, like Khomeini, spoke of two diametrically different cultures: an Islamic culture and an ignorant (jaheli) culture. Islamic culture, according to Qutb, is based on the fundamentals of the Islamic worldview while the jaheli culture “manifests itself in a variety of systems, all of which can be explained by one principle . . . that of elevating human thought [to the status] of a God not necessitating recourse to God’s guidance.” 20 In this view, the jaheli culture ignores God’s guidance and relies on human vision, values, concepts, and traditions that do not provide solutions to human problems. 21 He then concluded that secularism should be eradicated in order to establish a dynamic and integrated Islamic system. 22 Not many have offered explicit support for secularism in Islam. Those who reject the fusion of religion and politics in Islam rely on juridical/ theoretical and historical explanations. These explanations, however, are generally based upon narrow and often misleading interpretations of Quranic rulings and the history of Islam. Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966) and Chiragh Ali (1844–1895) contended that politics is Man’s rational task and unrelated to religion. Al-Raziq was of the view that Islam and religion are separate because the Quran did not lay out specific political rules. Additionally, he claimed that Muhammad’s tradition (sunnah) indicates that he was a spiritual leader, not a temporal ruler. The early schism in the community over succession to Muhammad and the subsequent emergence of the institutions of the khalifah (the Sunni doctrine and practice of leadership) and imamah (the Shi’a doctrine and practice of leadership) were purely political in nature and had nothing to do with religion. Al-Raziq noted that the khalifah system “has nothing in common with religious functions, no more than the judiciary and the other essential functions and machinery of power and state.” 23 Politics, he observed, is simply left to the believers who will have recourse to rational judgment and base their decisions on experience and rules of politics. Mixing religion and politics in the name of Islam, according to al-Raziq, was a crime committed by selfish leaders in pursuit of their own interests.

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It has been suggested that these secularist contentions in Islam are essentially rooted in influence by Western history, modernity, and industrialization. According to this “diffusion theory,” Muslim societies, like other societies, are not insulated and have historically been impacted by external values and cultures. Secular notions, then, were gradually incorporated into Islam through such cultural diffusion. These secularist pronouncements do not reflect the spirit of the Quran and historical experiences of Muslim societies. The Quran’s lack of specificity on political principles was largely intended to make the Islamic Holy Book universal and applicable to all people at all times, thus ensuring the viability and adaptability of this monotheistic religion. Moreover, the Quran and other Islamic sources explicitly affirm the universality and totality of this belief system. Thus, there is no reason to believe that it was intended to exclude politics and law from this expansive realm and to embrace secularism. In fact, the Quran and other Islamic sources do establish some general guidelines for the political life of the community including the doctrines of consultation (shura), consensus (ijma), and oath of allegiance (bay’ah) with far reaching social and political significance. However, these guidelines are not as extensive and as precise as expected in the practical realm of politics. Historically, Muhammad did rule the ummah and his right to temporal authority has been recognized by all Muslims, even by the Twelver Shi’is (Ithna’ Ashari) who question the legitimacy (haqqaniyyah) of the khalifah system and any authority after their Hidden Imam. The prophet of Islam carried out a number of functions in Medina including leading the prayers and sermons, leading the Muslim forces in wars, arbitrating disputes, holding courts, rendering judgments and issuing sentences, overseeing the enforcement of these judicial decisions, ensuring tax collection, and entering into foreign treaties. He, in fact, served as the leader of a religious and political community. 24 Muhammad’s early successors also exercised their right to temporal authority. It is true, however, that throughout their long history Muslim societies have often been ruled by secular regimes. The current oppositionist Islamist movements, to a large extent, reject these secular and nationalist regimes and their policies that have dominated Muslim societies since the early twentieth century. FOUNDATIONS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF ISLAMIC LAW In Islam, like in other monotheistic religions, the sole Creator is the ultimate ruler, legislator, and judge. All laws, thus, must originate with God and human legislators are solely the mediators of the divine law to humankind. 25 However, similar to other religious systems, in its development Islamic law

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borrowed from other sources. Initially some of the existing customary local (Arab) practices were incorporated into the Islamic divine ordinances. Gradually and to different degrees, this growing body of law was also influenced by foreign laws including Roman Byzantine law, the canon law of Eastern churches, Talmudic law, and the Persian Sassanid law. 26 Over time, however, these laws as well as foreign political and ritual practices were so thoroughly assimilated into the Islamic customs and practices that they could not be easily distinguished. 27 It is generally accepted that early developments of Islamic law began during the second century of Islam. At the early stages, Arabs prominently influenced the development of this law. These early influences are traced back to Iraq of about 100 A.H. According to Joseph Schacht, development of Islamic law in Medina was secondary to and dependent upon the legal traditions and practices in Iraq. 28 In his view, the early lawyers of Islam at the beginning of the second century of Muhammad’s migration (hijra, at about 800 AD) to Medina gradually developed Islamic law by adopting, modifying, and rejecting the popular and administrative practices of their time. It has been suggested that the Iraqi legal traditions of the time were, in turn, influenced by both Roman and Talmudic practices and norms. Some contend that the resemblance of Byzantine-Roman law to Islamic law illustrates direct borrowing by Islam. This might explain the presence of Roman and Talmudic concepts and maxims in early Islamic law. Some have doubted any direct borrowing from Roman law of the West because Islamic and Roman laws are by nature irreconcilable. Islamic law is the law of God with no independent human legislation. Roman law, in contrast, is largely the product of human reason and independent legislation. Even from this perspective, there is the possibility of indirect influence by the Byzantine courts and lawyers in the development of customary law in Islam. 29 For instance, it is likely that the doctrine of consensus (ijma), as a legal instrument, may have originated from Roman legal traditions. 30 The Eastern church and Judaic law also influenced the early developments of Islamic law. As the oldest monotheistic religion, Judaism embodies legal principles and practices that were recognized and embraced by Christianity. The first Christians viewed themselves as “heralds of an eschatological fulfillment of the hopes of Israel and could not regard divine law as other than the Law of Moses.” 31 The New Testament also asserts the legacy of Judaic traditions in Christianity. In fact, in parts of the New Testament Jesus is presented as the one who fulfills the Mosaic Law, not the one who repeals it. Islam, as the last of the monotheistic religions, however, presents itself as the “possessor of a law unique to itself and distinct from Israel’s law.” 32 The origins and development of Christianity are different from those of Islam and Judaism. Christianity emerged and grew within the preexisting monotheistic Judaic worldview. In contrast, both Judaism and Islam emerged

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in the context of polytheistic communities, thus their messages are considered original and distinct. Islam emerged in a pure paganistic (jaheliyyah) setting and the first Muslims, unlike Christians, were converts from paganism. Early Muslim leaders, especially Muhammad, are often praised for destroying the pagan idols and their efforts to usher in a new worldview that replaced all outmoded polities and laws. Of course, Muslims never perceived either Judaism or Christianity as anything but legitimate divine religions that preceded Islam. They simply embraced the Islamic worldview as the last and most comprehensive message of the Creator. Like Judaism, Islam developed its own new and autonomous body of laws. This was possible because, like Judaism, Islamic law developed in the context of its own unique polity. 33 Muhammad, like Moses, was both a spiritual and a temporal leader. It was Muhammad’s rule in Mecca and Medina that shaped the core of Islamic politics and law. In fact, Muhammad’s sayings (hadith) and traditions (sunnah) comprise the two pivotal sources of Islamic law along with the Quran. In practice, Muhammad ruled Muslim lands by interpreting and enforcing the divine law, acting as the judge, and commanding the military in defense of the community. While Muhammad’s tradition and declarations shaped the foundation of Islamic law and polity, it was the succeeding generations of Muslims, especially the Islamic dynasties of the Umayyads (661–750 BC) and the Abbasids (750 to about 950 BC), who advanced Islamic civilization, law, and polity to a glorious age. 34 It is true, however, that in its developmental process Islamic law was exposed to and impacted by the pre-Islamic monotheistic as well as non-religious legal traditions. However, this exposure and infusions of non-Muslim laws and traditions did not detract from the unique identity of Islamic law. It is in fact accurate to suggest that “just as Israel law would be seen to be distinct from all other law, no matter what the influences from other legal traditions the modern historian may be able to detect, so Islam’s law would be seen to be distinct, again, no matter what the borrowings.” 35 There is very little doubt that Judaic law directly influenced development of Islamic law from the outset. 36 Both legal systems rest on the concept of divine law revealed in the Torah for Jews and in the Quran for Muslims. Jewish rabbinical law developed during the first five centuries AD, and preceded the development of Islamic law that developed during the seventh through the ninth centuries. 37 There seems to be strong circumstantial evidence that Islamic law borrowed from Talmudic concepts. 38 Some even trace the “five Pillars of Islam” 39 to Jewish biblical and Talmudic sources. There are even efforts to trace the roots of some of the pivotal Islamic concepts in the Jewish traditions. For instance, according to Judith Wegner, the word “Islam” that means “wholehearted submission to God” is derived “from a related Hebrew word used in the scriptural and ritual exhortations to serve God ‘wholeheartedly.’” 40 The dominant schools of law in Islam generally

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recognize a combination of four roots of jurisprudence (ususl al-fiqh) and a number of legal methods. They include: the Quran, sunnah, hadith, consensus of the community at large or of the clerics (ijma), and analogy as a method of legal deduction (qiyas). Each one of these roots has its conceptual and linguistic counterparts in Jewish law. 41 The Quran corresponds with miqra (Torah), sunnah with misnah (the basic source-text of Jewish oral law), ijma with ha-kol (juristic consensus found in Jewish oral law), and qiyas, in its broader definition, with Talmudic heqqes (reasoning by analogy). 42 Although very little is known about the Persian Sassanid law, it is possible that the codification of Islamic law was influenced by the Sassanid administrative traditions. 43 Interestingly enough, since the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the regime has been engaged in extensive and unprecedented legal codification efforts which, as discussed earlier, undermine the universality of Islamic law by underscoring legal territoriality. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAMIC LAW With the onset of the khalifah system, Islamic law gradually began to be institutionalized. The Umayyads established a centralized bureaucratic system of legal administration. In this system, judges (qadis) were appointed by and represented the authority of the caliph or provincial governors. In that capacity, these judges worked at the direction of the caliph to implement the Islamic worldview. This explains why these qadis’ legitimacy did not initially derive from their understanding of and ability to apply Islamic law but rather from their role as the representative of the caliph. In the absence of a comprehensive and coherent body of Islamic laws, qadis relied on their own judicial discretion and Muslim sense of equity in rendering their decisions. In this manner, they laid the foundation for the subsequent development of new Islamic legal methods and laws. 44 Toward the end of the Umayyad dynasty, these qadis had accumulated an extensive body of legal precedence that is referred to as the Umayyad Judicial Practice. 45 Later, Islamic legal scholars relied on qadi precedence and gradually played a key role in the formulation and development of a systematic Islamic law. Unlike the qadis, these scholars sought to establish an ideal law of God rather than what is practical. In the ensuing division between the official Caliphal law and scholarly Islamic law, legal authority was gradually separated from official position and became increasingly reliant on the scholars’ personal piety and religious knowledge. This dichotomy has continued to date in Islamic legal practices, whereby there continues to be a tension between the official legal authority and role of the legal scholars. These scholars, throughout Muslim history, have successfully and independently played

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a crucial role in the development of Islamic law. The role of the jurists became so prominent that Joseph Schacht refers to Islamic law as “an extreme case of a ‘jurists’ law.’” 46 During the Abbasid period, political and legal institutions and functions were gradually separated. The political authority became the executor of the law, thus leaving judicial interpretation to independent scholars who transformed Islamic law into a codified set of norms attributed to God and His messenger. SCOPE, NATURE, AND SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW In archaic Arabic, the term shari’ah means “path to waterhole.” Given the significance of water in the Middle East desert environment, one may understand and appreciate the Islamic meaning of the term as it relates to a whole productive way of life ordained by God. In this sense, shari’ah is not simply the Islamic legal code; rather it encompasses the totality of Islamic legal, moral, and spiritual norms. Shari’ah categorizes human acts into: 1. Obligatory (waajib): acts which are required of all Muslims including prayers and alms giving. Normally, omission of such acts is punishable by law. 2. Recommended (mustahab): acts that are expected of Muslims such as pursuit of good deeds. 3. Indifferent (mubah): acts which are neutral and left to Muslims’ discretion and choice. 4. Disapproved (makruh): acts which are discouraged. 5. Forbidden (haraam): prohibited acts which, if committed, subject Muslims to punishment including murder, apostasy, drinking alcohol, and adultery. Although shari’ah covers all of these acts, only the obligatory and forbidden acts fall within the realm of the law. 47 These shari’ah stipulations are rooted in the Quran, hadith, sunnah, ravayah (the sayings and deeds of the Shi’a Imams, in the Shi’a jurisprudence), and a series of other legal instruments that began with Muhammad’s prophecy and developed over the centuries by various schools of law and scholastic traditions. The Quran is considered the primary source of shari’ah. Since the text was subject to extensive editorial changes during Muhammad’s life and after his death, it is a general Muslim belief that the entire Quran was never collected and the current text is incomplete. 48 The apparent occasional contradictions between the Quran and prophet’s traditions have exacerbated the ambiguities and controversies. This problem and the limited scope of the

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Quranic legal rulings have made it imperative for Muslims to increasingly rely upon other sources, especially hadith and sunnah. Hadith and sunnah are collectively known as the Muslim or Muhammad’s Traditions. 49 Hadith is a reference to the sayings of the Prophet while sunnah denotes to the exemplary way in which Muhammad lived. In this way, “hadith is the external, sunna the internal side of tradition; hadith is the form, sunna the matter.” 50 The importance of these traditions is that they are the “storehouse” 51 of Muslim worldview covering nearly all Muslim topics ranging from eating and drinking to social interactions and resurrection. Even though there are significant disagreements about the origins and development of these traditions, it is accurate to suggest that these traditions were shaped not only by Muhammad’s and his companions’ practices and declarations but also by Christianity, Judaism, and Hellenism and its religious expressions in Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism. Muslims supported these traditions because they had an impact on their formation and development over time. In the field of law, the prophet’s sunnah developed out of the core of the scholastic traditions of the ancient schools of law as advocated by the common doctrines of their specialists. 52 In fact, some of these schools elevated some of the books of tradition to the level of the Quran. As expected, due to the apparent fabrication of Muhammad’s sayings within various legal schools, there emerged a growing concern about the authenticity of hadith. Some of these schools acknowledge this fabrication and began efforts to ensure authenticity of hadith by requiring that an authentic hadith must be accompanied by trustworthy and relevant documentation (isnad). 53 Therefore, in the ninth and tenth centuries, specialists began compiling written and documented hadith narratives that resulted in hadith books, which are considered an authoritative source of Islamic law and incorporated into various legal schools. While Shi’a legal scholarship embraced Muhammad’s hadith as a major source of law, it also relied on the sayings and traditions of their Imams. Muhammad’s deeds, especially his practices as the temporal leader of the community and his personal conduct as a believer, a husband, and a father also became guides in determining the principles of shari’ah. While these sources established the essential or primary roots (usul) of Islamic law, Muslim scholars had to employ legal methods such as ijma and qiyas to identify specific legal rulings. In the Sunni legal traditions, ijma refers to the unanimous opinion of the community in any generation on any religious matter. In their view, this opinion should be followed by future generations. The questions surrounding ijma revolve around the sources and scope of this method. Legal schools and scholars have significant disagreements over the authority of ijma. George Hourani, following some of the modernist contentions, suggests that any sound authority of a cumulative and infallible consensus should be based on the Quran. In the absence of a Quran-

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ic foundation, he concludes, there is no sound basis for the doctrine of ijma in the Islamic legal traditions. 54 In practice, however, Muslims have relied on consensus and have mainly justified it on the basis of Muhammad’s famous hadith that affirms: “My Community does not agree on an error.” Others have criticized the authority of this hadith by contending that the assumption of the infallibility of the Muslim community is neither realistic nor is it in accord with Muhammad’s humility and keen awareness of human limitations. 55 Many Muslim scholars also indicate that the Quran does not specifically assert the infallibility of the community. For these reasons, some conclude that “there is no sound basis for the traditional doctrine of consensus in Islam.” 56 From this perspective, communal consensus is neither infallible nor is it irrevocable. The practice of consensus, however, has deeper roots in the Pre-Islamic Arab society where the force of public approval generally backed reliance on communal traditions. Qiyas became such a significant legal method in Sunnism that the four Sunni schools of law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali) consider it a source of law per se. The Shi’a jurisprudence rejects qiyas as the source of law and replaces it with intellect (aql). It is, however, important to note that analogy is only a legal method rather than a source of law. 57 Over time, the interpretive writings of Muslim scholars based on consensus and analogy gained a prominent status in Islamic law. These writings and the gradual codification of the law shaped the scope and orientation of Islamic norms and law and opened the door for the independence of the law and legal establishment from the political authority. In the absence of clear and specific legal rulings, the community felt the need for legal methods shortly after Muhammad’s death. Some of the early jurists asserted that the Quran is the only source of the law and considered juristic disagreements contrary to Islam. Those who favored freedom in legal speculation paved the way for the development of Islamic schools of law, resulting in the rise of a great number of major and minor schools as early as the second and third centuries of Islam. These schools did not differ sharply at the beginning. Some of the schools did not gain great followings and did not survive long. In the fourth century of Islam, there were four schools of law that were recognized as Sunni orthodox schools: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. Initially, jurists could subscribe to more than one school, but gradually doctrinal loyalty 58 forced the authoritative dominance of single schools. These dominant schools were named after their respective founders who became the axis of authority construction and forged the school’s methodology upon which its legal principles were constructed. 59 With the dominance of the first three schools, the door of independent judgment (ijtihad) was closed and followers of these schools were expected to emulate (taqlid) the canons of their respective schools. Any efforts at deviating from these canons were denounced as innovation (bida’ah). 60

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The Shafi’i school accepted the Quran as the basic repository of knowledge in Islamic law. 61 Al-Shafi’i’s significant contribution was his classification of the Quranic statements into general (amm) and particular (khass). This classification, which was adopted by future jurists, contributed to greater understanding of the Book and Islamic law. The Hanbalis rejected ijtihad and all forms of qiyas. They even downgraded ijma and focused on hadith as the dominant source of the law. This rigidity gradually undermined the Hanbali influence until its revival and adoption by the Wahhabi movement in the Arab peninsula later in the thirteenth century of Islam. In the non-Arab Muslim lands, the Hanafi and Shafi’i schools became dominant, and the Maliki School spread throughout North Africa and Spain (before Spain was returned to the Christian rule). The Shi’a jurisprudence embraces the doctrine of imamah, which asserts the legitimate rights of Ali and his successors to the leadership of the community after Muhammad. In line with this legitimist doctrine, they subscribe to the sayings (ravayat) and traditions of the Imams as sources of the law in addition to the Quran, hadith, and sunnah. Shi’is, however, varied in their views on the nature of the Imam and the lines of succession to Ali. These disputes resulted in factionalism within Shi’ism and the division of the community into: Fivers, Seveners, and Twlevers. To some, the Shi’a conception of law is more authoritarian than the one advocated by Sunnis, because of the Shi’a belief in the infallibility of the Imams and their Imams’ possession of an esoteric knowledge of the true meaning of the law. 62 This belief makes the Shi’a scholar an agent of the Imam, incapable of independent judgment. Similar limitation exists for ijma since, according to the Shi’a legal thinking, neither the community nor scholars have the final authority to interpret the law. Even the use of qiyas is limited in Shi’ism and accepted as long as such analogy is supported by tradition or precedent of an Imam. In this chapter, we examined the universal and central nature of the Islamic worldview that dispels any meaningful notion of secularism and makes Islam the centerpiece of law and politics in Muslim societies. In its developmental process, Islamic law borrowed, directly and indirectly, from local cultures and other religious traditions and practices. Over time, some of these non-Islamic traditions and practices have become integral to the Islamic worldview and legal principles and practices. Of course, scholastic and sectarian schisms undermined any consensus about the sources and nature of law in Islam. In part II of this book, we will extensively discuss the application of these legal traditions and their modifications in the Islamization process in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the study of constitutional framing of the Islamic Republic and an assessment of legal limitations and paradoxes inherent in a system that attempts to account for constitutional rights within Islamic restrictions.

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NOTES 1. Muhammad Iqbal, “Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal,” in Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, ed. Syed Abdul Vahid (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1964), 50. 2. Ali Sharia’ti, Islam Shinasi (Mashhad: 1347 A.H.), 75–76. 3. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966), 50–72. 4. John L. Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics,” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 4–5. 5. Godfrey H. Jansen, Militant Islam (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 17. 6. Bernard Lewis, “The Return of Islam,” in Religion and Politics in the Middle East, ed. Michael Curtis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 12. 7. Ruhullah Khomeini, Balagh, Farmayeshat-e Mowzui-e Hazrat-e Imam Khomeini, Rahbar-e Kabir-e Inqilab va Bonyangozar-e Jomhoori-e Islami, 1358 A.H., 1 (Tehran: Tehran Publishing House, 1361 A.H.), 105, 110. 8. Ruhullah Khomeini, Payamha va Sokhanraniha-ye Imam Khomeini, dar sheh mahe-ye dowwom-e sal-e 1359, 2 (Tehran: Noor Publications), 98. 9. Ruhullah Khomeini, Payamha va Sokhanraniha-ye Imam Khomeini az Shahrivar-e 1320 ta Hejrat be Paris, 5 (Tehran: Noor Publications, 1361 A.H.), 204–205. 10. Ruhullah Khomeini, Balagh, Sokhanan-e Mowzui-e Imam Khomeini (Tehran: Sepehr Publishing House, 1362 A.H.), 27. 11. Ibid., 29. 12. Ibid., 28. 13. Khomeini, Payamha va Sokhanraniha-ye Imam Khomeini, 5, 210. 14. Khomeini, Payamha va Sokhanraniha-ye Imam Khomeini, 2, 192–193. 15. Ali Shari’ati, Ummat va Imamat, Ja al-Haq, [The collection of speeches] (Tehran: Husayniyyah-e Ershad, 1351 A.H.), 64. 16. Press conference in Cairo in April 1972, cited in Jansen, Militant Islam, 12. 17. Erwin J. Rosenthal, “Some Reflections on the Separation of Religion and Politics in Modern Islam,” Islamic Studies 3 (September 1964): 275, 277–278. 18. Abul A’la Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution, trans. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967), 165. 19. Cited in Charles Adams, “Mawdudi and the Islamic State,” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 113–114. 20. Quoted in Yvonne Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 86. 21. Sayyid Qutb, Hadha al-Din (Cairo: Dar al-Qalam, 1962), 34. 22. Sayyid Qutb, Maalim fi al-Tariq (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1964), 64. 23. Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, “The Caliphate and the Basis of Power,’ in Islam in Transition, Muslim Perspectives, ed. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press,1982), 30–37. 24. Heinz Halm, Shi’a Islam, From Religion to Revolution, trans. Allison Brown (Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1997), 89. 25. Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1998), 1. 26. Joseph Schacht, “Foreign Elements in Ancient Islamic Law,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 32 (1950): 10. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., 13. 29. S. V. Fitzgerald, “The Alleged Debt of Islamic to Roman Law,” The Law Quarterly Review, 67 (1951): 85. 30. Schacht, “Foreign,” 14. 31. Ibid., 1. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., 3. 34. Ibid., 4.

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35. Ibid. 36. For an extensive discussion of these influence see: Judith Romney Wegner, “Islamic and Talmudic Jurisprudence: The Four Roots of Islamic Law and their Talmudic Counterparts,” The American Journal of Legal History, 26.1(1982): 25–71. 37. Prophet Mohammad began his mission about the year 610 AD, but Islamic Jurisprudence did not begin to evolve until the eighth century, according to N. J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), 5. 38. Wegner, “Islamic and Talmudic,” 26. 39. These pillars include: the affirmation of Muhammad’s prophecy, prayers, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage. 40. Wegner, “Islamic and Talmudic” 27. 41. Ibid., 30. 42. For a detailed discussion of these similarities see: Judith Wegner, “Islamic and Talmudic,” 31–49. 43. Joseph Schacht, “Foreign Elements in Ancient Islamic Law,” in Islamic Law and Legal Theory, The International Library of Essays in Law &Legal Theory, Legal Cultures, 7, ed. Ian Edge (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 11. 44. Ibid., 6. 45. Joseph Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 23–26. 46. Ibid., 209. 47. Weiss, The Spirit, 19. 48. John Burton, “The Collection of the Qur’an,” Glasgow University Oriental Society, 23 (1969): 42. 49. A.J. Wensinck, “The Importance of Tradition for the Study of Islam,” The Muslim World, 11 (1921): 239. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., 240. 52. Joseph Schacht, “A Reevaluation of Islamic Traditions,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 81.3–4 (1949): 153. 53. Weiss, The Spirit, 13. 54. George F. Hourani, “The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam,” Studia Islamica, 21 (1964): 59. 55. Ibid., 58. 56. Ibid., 59. 57. Weiss, The Spirit, 23. 58. Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 157. 59. Ibid. 60. Majid Khadduri “Nature and Sources of Islamic law,” The George Washington Law Review 22:19. 61. Ahmad Hasan, “Al Sahfi’i’s Role in the Development of Islamic Jurisprudence,” Islamic Studies, 5 (1966): 240. 62. Ibid., 22.

II

The Legal Framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Chapter Two

Constitutionalism

Long-standing opposition to the monarchy in general, and to the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1978) in particular, brought many revolutionary groups with diverse ideological propensities and policy preferences together during Iran’s revolutionary process throughout the latter part of the 1970s. Nationalists who basically advocated for civil society and a liberal democratic form of government rejected the regime’s oppressive measures and hoped for a return to some of the democratic measures implemented by the Mossadegh government in the early 1950s. 1 Remnants of the old Tudeh party, though very limited in number and popular support, still advanced the idea of a socialist regime patterned after the failed experiments in Azerbaijan in the 1940s. Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or self-described Islamic Marxists, continued following the ideas of their late ideologue Ali Shari’ati. 2 As an Islamist, Shari’ati had called for what he referred to as an “Islamic Order,” which would be based on the revolutionary and dynamic Islamic values advocated by the first Shi’a Imam, Ali ibn-abi-Taleb. Shari’ati vehemently rejected the dogmatic and reactionary elements in the clerical establishment for their inability to bring about the necessary changes for Muslim masses. In his famous work, Tashayyo-e-Alavi va Tashayyo-e Safavi (Alid Shi’ism and Safavid Shi’ism), 3 he distinguished between enlightened intellectuals (rowshanfikran) and reactionary clerics. In his view, the Islamic Order should be based on rule by clerical or non-clerical rowshanfikran. He blamed the emergence and growth of regressive Safavid Shi’ism on the monarchy and reactionary clerics. Shari’ati also rejected democracy as an ineffective form of authority for developing societies. Highly critical of both democracy and Marxism, 4 he argued that developing societies are in dire need of change while democracy is a conservative form of authority that underscores status quo and impedes the

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necessary changes in these societies. 5 Similarly, he criticized Marxism for its disregard for spiritualism and for its preoccupation with materialism. 6 FORMATION AND EARLY REVISIONS From the outset, founders of the Islamic Republic were keenly familiar with the sharp divisions within the revolutionary forces. While Khomeini had explicitly advocated for the establishment of an Islamic theocracy ruled by clerics as early as the 1960s, he recognized that an open support for an Islamic Republic would jeopardize clerical dominance in the revolutionary process. Thus, on numerous occasions, he proclaimed that he was simply a servant of God who hoped to return to teaching at the Qom religious seminaries after the revolution. Although many secular revolutionaries were skeptical of Khomeini’s intentions, there was a naïve assumption that the religious forces could be marginalized in postrevolutionary Iran, as had happened after the Constitutional Revolution in the early years of the twentieth century. As soon as he returned to Iran from his exile, Khomeini called for a referendum to determine the future of authority in Iran, but he insisted on only allowing a vote for or against the establishment of an Islamic Republic, thus limiting the public’s options and marginalizing the secular revolutionary forces, especially nationalists. Only the National Democratic Front, the Fedaeyan, and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan boycotted this referendum. Others participated in the referendum, since they hoped and believed that the new system would account for democratic principles. The referendum was claimed to have passed by a 98 percent of the popular vote. 7 A newly appointed committee tasked with drafting the constitution did indeed put forth a draft which was democratic and fairly similar to the constitution of 1906–1907, but without its monarchic elements. More important, this draft did not account for any more extensive powers for clerics than their role in the constitutional commission, which was called for in the 1906–1907 constitution. Initially, Khomeini supported this draft but later gave in to pressures from all sides for further debates and discussions. Clerics dominated these debates and strengthened the undemocratic elements of the final draft, which gave them unprecedented powers. The final draft was considered by a seventy-three-member elected Assembly of Experts, whose membership was dominated by clerics and their supporters. The outcome was a constitutional proposal that was clearly more authoritarian, particularly in its support for more extensive powers for the faqih (Article 4) than the earlier proposal. With the passage of time, effective mobilization of the masses by clerics, past failures of other revolutionary forces and their limited popular support, internal schisms among some of the natural political allies in the Iranian political life, and political sophistication of Khomeini and his supporters

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resulted in the rise of clerics to power. Much to the surprise of both domestic and foreign observers, Khomeini and his cohorts committed themselves to the establishment of a legal and institutional framework for their rule and effectively built such foundations for their Islamic Republic. Through such mechanisms, they were able to consolidate their power and marginalize other revolutionary forces. On November 15, 1979, with minimal meaningful debate and under highly charged political circumstances, the constitution of the Islamic Republic was adopted. This original constitution contained 175 articles. It became evident during the first decade of its existence that this constitution suffered from major limitations in light of the growing schisms, factionalism, and inefficiency due to the decentralization of power. Increasingly aware of the ambiguities and limitations of the constitution, and fearful of the detrimental effects of factionalism among clerics and its impacts on governmental institutions and public policies, Khomeini ordered the establishment of the Assembly for the Reappraisal of the Constitution shortly before his death in 1989. 8 He asked the assembly to examine the institutional parameters of the system, in particular the executive branch of the government, and to account for effective mechanisms in a revised constitution that could bring about discipline, administrative order, and accountability to the system. As indicated by Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, the secretary of the Council of Experts, the aim of these revisions was “further centralization and order in the regime.” 9 The assembly focused on four main areas for revision: the leadership, the executive branch, the judiciary, and the legislative-executive relations. On June 4, 1989, forty-six amended articles, which had been prepared by the Appraisal Assembly, in addition to two new ones, were approved in a referendum. The amendments intended to transform the role of the Supreme Leader (vali-e-faqih) from a predominantly religious to a political one by removing the requirement of the “source of emulation” (marja-e taqlid) for this position after Khomeini (Article 109). Article 110 enumerates the Leader’s rights and responsibilities, but specifically leaves out his religious role as the source of emulation. It also requires the Supreme Leader to consult the Expediency Council in arriving at major decisions. Evidently, Khomeini himself favored this revision 10 since he believed that, in the absence of his charismatic qualities and religious credentials, there would be a need for institutionalizing the role of the Leader and emphasizing his political rather than religious role. Furthermore, the amendments intended to centralize governmental powers by eliminating the office of the prime minister and increasing the powers of the president, who was mainly a ceremonial figure in the original constitution. By eliminating the office of the prime minister, which exercised the executive powers under the original constitution, and by centralizing power in the hands of the president as the highest executive officer, the amended constitution removed the institutional framework of

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factionalism in the executive branch. The reforms in the Judiciary were explained by the need for greater independence and efficiency. In reality, however, the constitutional amendments in respect to the judiciary also intended to create greater cohesion and integration of the governmental institutions. 11 Furthermore, the amendments created a new governing body called the Expediency Council (Majles-e Tashkhist-e Maslahat-e Nezaam) to discern “the interests” in matters when conflicts emerge between the parliament and the Council of Guardians. These amendments also removed the Leadership Council and gave the Assembly of Experts the authority to appoint a single Leader. The original constitution had provided for election of a leader either by the people, as in the case of Khomeini, or by the Assembly of Experts. The amendments removed the option of popular election of the Supreme Leader. There were no amendment provisions in the original constitution. Article 177 accounts for a formal process of constitutional revisions. On one hand, these amendments along with a series of rulings by Khomeini assigned greater legal powers to the regime. On the other hand, the amendments appeared to strengthen the regime’s republican institutions that were designed to enhance its populist dimensions and, thus, ensure its survival after Khomeini. However, since its adoption, parts of this revised constitution have been reinterpreted or ignored to strengthen the unrepresentative and autocratic elements of the system at the cost of its republican dimensions. From the beginning, the original and revised constitutions have suffered from serious limitations and paradoxes. The primary reason for such limitations is its authors’ attempt to incorporate into these documents divergent, and often contradictory, principles advocated by a wide array of revolutionary forces. These paradoxes are nowhere more evident than in the constitution’s attempt to embrace secular and Western conceptions of right, justice, and equality while acknowledging the supremacy of the restrictive Islamic views and regime’s interests. In fact, the constitution goes even beyond mainstream Islamic limitations when it accounts for the undisputed rights of the clergy to rule and gives primacy to the interests of the regime above all else. PARADOXES AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS Throughout the constitution, there are significant explicit and implicit contradictions. According to Asghar Schirazi, these contradictions reflect the “extraordinary range of political forces involved in the Iranian revolution and in the process of adopting the constitution.” 12 In his view, this document contains democratic, anti-democratic, Islamic legalist, and secular principles. 13 It is evident that the Islamic legalist views dominate the constitutional principles, however. As the most dominant force, Islamic legalists generally be-

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lieved that shari’ah should be the basis of the state, even though they varied on the extent to which they emphasized Islam and accepted the validity of the doctrine of vilayat-e faqih. According to this perspective, the revolution; the state; and all aspects of social, economic, and political life should reflect Iran’s Islamic character. This means that state institutions should be designed in such a way to ensure the pursuit of Islamic goals and policies. This view confines legislation to shari’ah, as defined and understood by Twelver Shi’ism. This approach not only marginalizes secular ideas but also non-Shi’a and even non-Twelver Shi’a principles. Given the fact that shari’ah is understood to be divinely ordained any legislative initiative should be limited to what is consistent with Islamic legal code. Furthermore, legislation should be limited to areas that are not explicitly covered by shari’ah and other Islamic sources. For instance, there is no legislative jurisdiction for the Consultative Council in regard to hadd punishments, since shari’ah explicitly stipulates these punishments and there can be no deviation from them. Clearly, this legalist perspective influenced the way that the judicial branch was established. Chapter XI (Articles 156–174) of the constitution deals with the judicial branch of the government. When enumerating the tasks of the judiciary, Article 156 stresses that the judiciary is responsible for “enacting the penalties and provisions of the Islamic legal code.” This role is to be performed by courts of justice, which are “to be formed in accordance with the criteria of Islam” (Article 61). The law should establish the criteria for the choice of judges, according to Article 163, “in accordance with religious criteria.” Similar references to Islamic criteria and Shi’a principles are made in various articles dealing with the judiciary. LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS The constitution embraces republican values in numerous instances. It is, however, difficult to reconcile the dominant Islamic limitations of the constitution with such democratic principles. Liberal democratic thought is theoretically founded upon the notion of popular sovereignty whereby citizens are the sole and final source of authority. In contrast to democratic thought, Islam explicitly rejects the notion of popular sovereignty and affirms Allah’s uncontested divine authority. Most Muslim advocates of liberal democracy have had to struggle with the idea of popular sovereignty. A host of Muslim scholars including Ali Shari’ati, who acknowledge citizens’ rights, distinguish between the ultimate sovereignty of God and Man’s immediate sovereignty. From this perspective, while God establishes certain restrictions and provides for certain rights for individuals, He leaves an extensive range of issues open to the citizens’ independent judgment and choice. In Islamic law, for instance, discretionary issues (ta’azirat) cover the broadest category of

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subjects compared to the issues that are either prohibited (haraam) or required (vajib). These discretionary powers allow Muslims to account for individual rights within the confines of Islam. Article 56 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran explicitly recognizes God’s sovereignty by stipulating that: “Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is He who has placed man in charge of his social destiny. No one can deprive man of this God-given right, or subordinate it to the interests of a given individual or group.” 14 The logical implication of this article is that while God is the ultimate sovereign, immediate sovereignty belongs to man, who governs his life on God’s behalf. Article 1 of the constitution attempts to address the issue of ultimate and immediate sovereignty. While this article explicitly refers to the “sovereignty of truth and Islamic justice,” it implicitly acknowledges the public’s role as a source of legitimacy of the constitution by referring to the overwhelming majority vote in support of the referendum of 29th and 30th of March 1979. Despite this implicit assertion of authority of the public, from the outset the Islamic regime has affirmed that God’s sovereignty on earth is exercised by His deputies, Shi’a clerics, rather than His followers at large. This viewpoint is the basis of the doctrine of vilayat-e faqih in the constitution of the Islamic Republic. According to this doctrine, in any Islamic state shari’ah is the essential legal framework of the state. Therefore, clerics who are the most knowledgeable in Islamic law and possess the necessary personal piety and character should be the ones who govern the Islamic state. Despite important disagreements over the nature and scope of the role of clerics, they play a dominant role in governing Iran under this constitutional interpretation. This constitutionally mandated monopoly of power that clerics possess restricts individual rights because clerics are the sole interpreters of these rights. They are not only charged with determining whether these rights are consistent with Islam but, as importantly, they are tasked to determine the consistently of these rights with public good and interests of the regime. Throughout the constitution, a wide range of rights are recognized for Iranians. Section (g) of Article 3 of the constitution asserts that one of the goals of the Islamic government is “to secure political and social freedoms within the limits of the law.” To achieve this goal, section (i) of the same article favors “the abolition of all forms of impermissible discrimination and the provision of just opportunities for all in both material and non-material matters.” The necessary equality is achieved, according to section (n) of Article 3, by securing “comprehensive rights of all citizens, both women and men, and establishment of judicial security for all, as well as equality of all before the law.” As a concession to the secular liberal forces, Articles 19–42 spell out the fundamental rights of citizens. Much of these rights and their corresponding procedures and institutions have their origins in secular, not shari’ah, sources. 15

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These fundamental rights include: freedoms of speech, religion, media, and assembly; and rights to private property and choice of occupation, education, social security, and a speedy and fair trial. However, both in theory and in practice, individual rights are restricted by clergy’s understanding of religiously permissible rights, communal necessities, and elites’ interests. In this system, no rights, policies, or laws should contradict shari’ah. Article 4 of the constitution asserts that; “All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the constitution as well as to all laws and regulations, and the fuqaha on the Council of Guardians have the duty of supervising its implementation.” Of course, given the inadequacy of shari’ah rulings and the lack of specificity on majority of issues, the regime had to establish an extensive institutional mechanism to find and implement Islamic principles and to ensure compliance with them, as understood and approved by clerics. Freedoms of Speech and Assembly The constitution acknowledges that freedoms of speech and assembly are essential for the preservation of human rights. Article 23 affirms that people may not be interrogated concerning their opinions, and no one may be abused or taken to task simply for holding certain opinions. To ensure free speech, Article 25 prohibits inspection of and failure to deliver mail, recording and disclosure of telephone conversations, and disclosure of telegraphic and telex communications or willful failure to transmit such communication. This article also prohibits wiretapping and all forms of covert investigation, except such activities that are provided for in law. Freedom of assembly and association is expressly stipulated in Article 26. Formation of political, religious, and professional parties, associations, and societies, regardless of whether they are Islamic or pertain to one of the recognized religious minorities, is freely permitted on the condition that they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, criteria of Islam, or basis of the Islamic Republic. No one may be prevented from participating in the aforementioned groups, or be compelled to participate in them. Article 27 allows public gatherings and marches to be held freely on the condition that the participants are not armed and such gatherings are not detrimental to the fundamentals of Islam. Similar restrictions are spelled out in Article 40, where the constitution states that no one can make exercise of these rights a pretext for harming others or encroaching on public interest. These articles explicitly and comprehensively account for major limitations of the rights and freedoms called for in this constitution. Simply put, any exercise of rights that, in the opinion of the regime and its clerical elites, violates Islamic values, independence of the country or national unity is

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outside the parameters of constitutionally mandated rights. Although there are restrictions on legally mandated rights in liberal democracies, legal and political mechanisms and guarantees protect these rights. For instance, in the United States, the system of checks and balances empowers the courts or the Congress to curb excesses of the executive branch. The Iranian constitution accounts for certain checks on governmental powers, but such assurances are ineffective in light of clerics’ monopoly of power and dominance, especially in the judicial branch. It is ultimately clerics’ call as to whether or not there has been a violation of such rights. In practice, the regime has made a concerted effort, including adoption of numerous pieces of legislation, to limit rights under these articles, largely on the grounds of Islam and interests of the regime. 16 Freedom of the Press The constitution also explicitly guarantees freedom of the press. In both Articles 24 and 175 it expressly calls for freedom of expression and dissemination of thought. In Article 24, it asserts that publications and news media shall enjoy freedom of expression provided what they publish does not violate Islamic principles or the Iranian civil code. The outlines of these freedoms shall be detailed, according to this article, in future legislation. To implement this requirement, the regime passed the Press Law in March of 1986 and clarified press freedoms in its executive bylaws that were adopted in January 1987. These laws will be examined when we discuss the process of Islamization of the law in the next chapter. Article 175 stipulates that freedom of expression in radio and television media depends upon their ability to keep up with the Islamic criteria and best interest of the country. To facilitate the regime’s control of such media, the vali-e-faqih is charged with appointing and dismissing the head of radio and television organization. Furthermore, this organization is supervised by a council consisting of two representatives from each of the three branches of the government: the president, the head of the judiciary, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 17 Religious Freedom Despite the regime’s rigid stance on the supremacy of Twelver Shi’ism, the constitution does account for certain rights for recognized religious groupings. Article 12 establishes the “eternally immutable” principle that Islam, specifically the Twelver Ja’afari School, is the official religion of the country. However, it commands that other Islamic schools of thought, including the Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi, be accorded full respect and legal status. According to this article, followers of these schools are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious

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devotions. The constitution grants major Sunni schools of law an official status for the purposes of religious education and adjudication on matters pertaining to personal status including marriage, divorce, inheritance, and bequest. It even goes further by accepting the supremacy of such schools in those regions of the country where the majority of citizens follow these schools of law. In such regions, local regulations, within the bounds of local councils’ jurisdiction, are to be in accordance with respective schools of thought, without infringing upon the rights of followers of other schools. Rights of non-Muslim religious minorities are spelled out in Article 13 of the constitution. Only Iranian Jews, Zoroastrians, and Christians are recognized as non-Muslim minorities with the right to freely perform their religious duties within the limits of law, and to act according to their own customs in matters of personal status and religious education. In Article 14, the constitution also stipulates that non-Muslims who are not hostile to Islam and have not engaged in conspiracy against the Islamic Republic should be treated in an ethical fashion and in accordance with Islamic justice and equity. The constitution justifies recognition of such rights for non-Muslims on the basis of the Quranic verse: “God does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with those who have not fought against you because of your religion and who have not expelled you from your homes.” 18 Equal Treatment Preservation of “permissible” communal and individual rights and equal treatment of Muslims is the core of the Islamic conception of justice. The constitution establishes that all Iranians regardless of their color, race, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, gender, and language are equal. Article 19 specifically rejects any privileges bestowed on these grounds. Article 20 reaffirms gender equality before the law and in political, economic, social, cultural, and human endeavors as long as such equality is in conformity with Islam. Women’s rights are also asserted in Article 21 whereby the government is instructed to adopt a number of legal and economic measures to ensure the rights of women and families. The government is tasked with creating a favorable environment for the growth of women’s personality and restoration of their tangible and intangible rights. Furthermore, the government is expected to protect rights of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and child rearing, and children who lack guardianship. Additionally, there are provisions for special insurance for widowed, aged, and destitute women. The constitution also calls for the establishment of a competent court to protect and preserve families and grant guardianship of children to their mothers, in the absence of a legal guardian, whenever suitable in order to protect children’s interests.

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In order to achieve legal justice and equality before the law, the constitution establishes general guidelines for due process of law and citizens’ access to courts. In article 32, the constitution prohibits arrests without a legal order. The detainee is entitled to an immediate written notification of charges and supporting evidence. Charges should be filed with competent legal authorities within twenty-four hours in order to expedite the judicial process. According to Article 39, “all affronts to the dignity and repute of persons arrested, detained, imprisoned, or banished in accordance with the law, whatever form they may take, are forbidden and liable to punishment.” In criminal cases, there is a presumption of innocence. One’s guilt is only established by a competent court of law (Article 37). Article 38 forbids all forms of torture for the purpose of extracting confession or acquiring information. “Compulsion of individuals to testify, confess, or take an oath is not permissible; and any testimony, confession, or oath obtained under duress is devoid of value and credence.” Article 33 also prohibits banishment of citizens from their preferred residence and compulsion to reside in a locality not of their choosing, except when required by law. The laws, according to the constitution, will establish punishments for violations of these principles. All citizens are entitled to have access to competent courts and to speedy trials. According to Article 34, no one can be barred from access to courts when their right to recourse is established. Parties to a court case are entitled to legal representation of their choice and, if they are unable to select an attorney, arrangements must be made to provide them with legal counsel (Article 35). These legal rights are guaranteed as long as they do not conflict with public interest. Article 40 of the constitution specifically rejects exercise of one’s rights “in a way injurious to others or detrimental to public interests.” This principle of the supremacy of public good is frequently reaffirmed in Iranian Laws. For instance, while the penal code recognizes citizens’ right to self-defense in cases of crimes against persons and property, there is no self-defense against the government when it acts in public interest. Citizens are entitled to self-defense in any form (as long as the defense is consistent with the attack) if there is a reasonable fear of life, dignity (namoos) of the family, and property, and there is no access to law enforcement (penal code, Articles 626, 627). Conversely, resistance against law enforcement and judicial officers is illegal when they are acting in their professional capacity. However, resistance is permissible if such officials go beyond the scope of their professional duties and there is a reasonable fear for life, physical wellbeing, or endangerment of property on the part of the victim (penal code, Article 628). Economic Rights and Social Security The constitution extensively deals with both economic rights and social security. Consistent with Islamic principles, Article 47 underscores the sanctity

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of private property. Recognizing limits on wealth accumulation, it asserts that private ownership should be respected as long as the property is legitimately acquired. Property and occupational rights of individuals are inviolable, except in cases sanctioned by the law, according to Article 22. Article 31 of the constitution specifically recognizes rights of all individuals and families to housing arrangements commensurate with their needs. According to this article, the government must make land available for the implementation of this requirement, according priority to those whose needs are greatest, in particular the rural population and workers. To establish a set of general guidelines for legitimate occupation and property accumulation, Article 49 entitles and obligates the government to confiscate wealth accumulated through such illegitimate means as usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of government contracts and transactions, sale of uncultivated lands and other sources subject to public ownership, operation of centers of corruption, and other illicit means and sources. The government is obligated to restore illegitimately acquired wealth to their legitimate owners and, if no such owner can be identified, to entrust them to public treasury. The constitution affirms citizens’ right to work and government’s obligation to create employment opportunities. Within Islamic limits, Article 28 allows all Iranians to seek and hold their desired occupations as long as such occupations do not violate public interest and the rights of others. While the government is obligated to create necessary conditions for equal opportunity to work, its decisions and policies should be guided primarily by the society’s needs for certain types of employment. Citizens are also entitled to benefits from social security with respect to retirement, unemployment, old age, disability, and destitution benefits. Additionally, as spelled out in Article 29, citizens are entitled to universal right to health services, medicine, medical care, and other emergency services. Public financing and individual contributions should pay for these services. Educational Opportunities The constitution accounts for universal free education up to the end of middle school. Article 30 also charges the government with the responsibility of expanding higher educational opportunities to the extent that is necessary for the country’s self-sufficiency. This chapter explained how the presence of divergent forces in the revolutionary process led to a dualism in the constitution that, on one hand, advances Western democratic principles of rights and equality and, on the other hand, underscores the primacy of Islamic values and restrictions. This paradox is exacerbated by the system’s obsessive preoccupation with selfpreservation and protection of the uncontested rights of clergy. Thus, while

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the constitution spells out a number of rights that are quite commensurate with Western liberal values, it effectively undermines these rights by emphasizing the primacy of Islamic principles as well as communal and regime interests. In chapter 3, we will discuss the extensive process of Islamization of the law in the Islamic Republic and the efforts to account for and institutionalize a legal system capable of transcending the restrictive Islamic worldview. NOTES 1. For a discussion of the democratic measures adopted by the Mossadegh governments see: Homa Katouzian, Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran (London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1990), 113–125. 2. For a discussion of the ideological propensities and policy preferences of the left see: Valentine Moghaddam, “The Left and Revolution in Iran: A Critical Analysis,” in Post-Revolutionary Iran, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manouchehr Parvin, Hooshang Amirahmadi (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 23–40. 3. See: Ali Shari’ati, Tashayyo-e Alavi va Tahayyo-e Safavi [Alid Shi’ism and Safavid Shi’ism] (Tehran: Student Library of the College of Literature and Humanities, 1352 A.H.) 4. For a detailed discussion of his criticisms of both Marxism and Democracy, see: Ali Shari’ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, An Islamic Critique, trans. R. Campbell (Berkeley: Mizan Press.1980). 5. Shari’ati, Ummat va Imamat, 162, 182. 6. Shari’ati, Marxism, 49–96. 7. Nikki, R. Keddie, Modern Iran, Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), 247. 8. Ettela’at, April 26, 1989. 9. Keyhan, June 12, 1989. 10. Ayatollah Ali Meshkini and Rafsanji both indicated that Khomeini favored the removal of the source of emulation as a requirement for the leader. See: Keyhan, June 10, 1989. 11. Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 81. 12. Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and State in the Islamic Republic. trans. John O’Kane (London and New York: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 1997), 1. 13. Ibid. 14. Hamid Algar, trans. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Berkley, California: Mizan Press, 1980), 49. 15. Schirazi, The Constitution, 19. 16. Schirazi, The Constitution, 125. 17. Article 175 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 18. Quran, 60:8.

Chapter Three

Islamization of the Law

LEGAL UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALISM: ISLAMIZATION AND CODIFICATION Islam is a highly integrated belief system that covers a broad range of issues that govern its followers’ lives. The Islamic doctrine of monotheism (tawhid) is the theological underpinning of the belief in the homogeneity of the ummah that makes Islamic principles universal in the sense that all Muslims regardless of their distinct regional, national, ethnic, racial, sectarian, and gender identities are expected to be subject to the same Islamic principles. Given this universality and the desire for making Islamic rules relevant to all people and at all times, there is an inherent rejection of legal territoriality. Thus, codification of laws in specific countries; the inevitability of incorporating sectarian, ethnic, or national preferences into these codified laws; and the application of these laws to those who live under a particular state jurisdiction is inconsistent with Islamic universalism and undermines communal unity. Although the Quran is the primary source of law, Quranic legal and political stipulations are limited both in quality and quantity. This holy book deals primarily with the ethical and moral obligations of Muslims. Consequently, Islamic law is permeated by religious and ethical considerations. Each institution, transaction, or obligation is measured by standards of religious and moral principles. For instance, the prohibition of interest (riba) underscores Islam’s moral commitment to social justice and equality. 1 Of the six hundred verses in the Quran, the majority deal with religious duties and ritual practices of prayers, fasting, and pilgrimage. No more than eighty verses address legal topics in the strict sense of the term. 2 Obviously, the Quran does not attempt to cover, even in a rudimentary form, all of the basic 31

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elements of a given legal relationship. 3 Even topics that are covered are piecemeal and incomprehensive. It can be suggested that such limitations of Islamic law are the direct consequence of the gradual compilation of the Quran over the years. 4 In the absence of comprehensive Quranic legal injunctions, Muslim jurists relied on their scholastic preferences and communities’ customary practices in identifying the authoritative statements of the Islamic law. However, many of these laws were largely focused on the area of private law and had very little to say about public law and the affairs of the state. The private laws that they adopted traditionally formulated rules that could resolve questions of religious rituals and worship, personal status, contracts, sales, property, tort, and the like. In the interest of social order and justice, they also developed some criminal jurisprudence in connection with a small number of criminal injunctions in the Quran and the hadith. However, by no stretch of the imagination could these rules adequately address the growing needs of developing Muslim societies in such areas as government, administration, and finance. With the passage of time, many governments adopted and incorporated mainly Western legal principles and procedures into their legal systems. Basically, the personal status laws were adequately treated in the shari’ah and generally remained intact. Having been treated comprehensively in the Quran and other sources, these laws had in fact gained a divine revelation status. 5 Consequently, it was nearly impossible for the governments to significantly alter such personal status laws covering marriage, divorce, inheritance and wills. However, while often a major and difficult task, governments could modify criminal, administrative, and economic laws since many of these laws were largely rooted in denominational traditions and were not divinely ordained. These modifications and adoptions that oftentimes contradicted the shari’ah caused a great deal of tension between the clerical establishment, which considered itself to be the protector of the divine law, and the mostly secular regimes that were charged with the administration of the state. Under pressure by clerics and in response to popular expectations, even the secular regimes have had to acknowledge the universality and centrality of Islam and try to find and adopt the necessary public laws and institutions that comply with the Islamic worldview. The need for Islamic law and jurisprudence is so evident that they have often taken precedence over theology in Muslim communities. As William Montgomery Watt has observed, Islam is more concerned with orthopraxy than it is with orthodoxy. 6 Therefore, it is not surprising that today’s Islamists are demanding a thorough and comprehensive Islamization of law in Muslim societies. These demands are in part a reaction to the secular regimes’ desire to introduce non-Islamic, and predominantly Western, legal principles and institutions to Islamic societies. Many modern elites are critical of the Islamization process since they believe that

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such a trend would impede their modernization initiatives. In their view, modernization efforts will only succeed if Western legal codes and institutions are incorporated into the shari’ah-based legal systems of Muslim societies. Islamization of the law means a return to the shari’ah and fiqh, and rejection of the borrowed Western laws and institutions. Proponents of Islamization claim that the current laws, especially criminal codes, are too secular, 7 and push for a return to a shari’ah-based Islamic code. Theoretically, at least, this Islamization process is expected to produce legal systems that are rooted in Islamic theology. In practice, however, the outcome might not be as expected. Islamization of the law in contemporary societies requires codification of the law. In the case of Iran under the theocratic system, codification has undermined the universality of Islamic law and has resulted in legal territorialism. Contrary to Islamic universalism, Iran’s legal territorialism has subjected Islamic law to certain political and sectarian interests and, consequently, has undermined the universality of the law and its religious roots. Here, Islamization of the law has become an instrument of power and state domination. Even beyond Iran, under the current political circumstances, efforts at Islamization tend to downgrade the shari’ah into an ideological framework employed by the Islamists in their quest for political power and control. 8 As a result, many newly codified Islamic laws in Muslim countries embody sectarian and scholastic variations. This form of territorialism and exclusivity undermines the legitimacy of these laws in the eyes of those who do not subscribe to these sectarian and scholastic positions. In fact, to them, such laws are non-Islamic, at best, and anti-Islamic, at worst. As Elizabeth Mayer concludes, these efforts introduce the “territoriality of law” into Islam, which explicitly contradicts the universalistic and supranational character of Islam. 9 Furthermore, many governments that undertake Islamization process do not have a comprehensive approach to Islamization. They are often selective in the choice of the shari’ah principles and in the manner they interpret those principles to serve their political interests. This politically motivated selectivity and exclusivity is so pervasive in the case of Iran that the government has explicitly taken the position that only the laws that it enacts in codified or statutory forms constitute binding statements of the principles of Islamic law in its territory. In justifying the doctrine of expediency (maslahat) in the Islamization process, Khomeini even went as far as contending that the codified laws that violate the shari’ah are binding as long as they serve the interests of the regime. It is increasingly apparent that in the era of Islamization, “the Shari’a requirements are becoming redefined according to what is politically expedient, intelligible and appealing to mass audience. In the course of this ideologization and the politicization of the Shari’a, the connections to the Islamic sources are growing more tenuous.” 10

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This form of politicization of the shari’ah has in fact intensified the controversies over its nature, scope, and proper role in the public life of contemporary Muslim societies. Even without politicization, the Islamization process is a difficult if not a nearly impossible task largely due to the lack of consensus among contemporary Muslims as to what constitutes Islamic law and its origins. Sectarian and scholastic preferences largely underline the growing differences in the codified bodies of Islamic law. In general, many of these laws are not accepted by Muslims as the authoritative shari’ah laws. More importantly, the Islamic regimes have failed to produce a coherent and solid theory that explains why these laws should be treated as authoritative statements of Islamic law. 11 SHI’A CLERICS AND ISLAMIZATION Shi’a clerics have had a long-standing role, which has often been progressive and at times reactionary, in the political history of Iran. In their efforts to preserve their exclusive role as the “guardians of Islam,” they have consistently asserted their right to legislation and have on occasions confronted the governments that challenged this right. During the Constitutional Revolution of the early years of the twentieth century in Persia, clerics made sure that the new constitution recognized their dominant legislative role by stipulating that all laws should conform to the shari’ah. Article 1 of the supplements to the constitution adopted on October 7, 1907, established Shi’a Islam as the official religion of Iran. At no time, should any laws adopted by the Consultative Assembly be in conflict with the Twelver Shi’a principles, according to Article 2. This constitution made clergy the sole judge of what is and is not compatible with the divine law by declaring that: . . . it is for the learned doctors of theology (the ulama)—may God prolong the blessing of their existence!—to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to the principles of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a committee composed of no less than five mujtahids or other devout theologians, cognizant of the requirements of the age, . . . so they may carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the assembly, and reject and repudiate , wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such matters the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and obeyed, and this Article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age. 12

Even when clerics pursued a quietist approach in their dealings with the government, largely as a strategy of self-preservation, they made sure that the government paid attention to their demands and expectations. Cognizant of the clerical power, the governments generally reserved an extensive if not an

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exclusive role for clerics in personal status matters. As exemplified in the clerics’ harsh and violent reaction to the Family Protection Act of 1975 (modified in 1976), which among other reforms accounted for new and more expanded rights for women in divorce and custody matters, clerics challenged any meaningful legislative reform in personal matters. They were even given an important voice in the area of public law and administration whenever the government needed their support to legitimize these legislative initiatives. However, the clerical role in personal matters was gradually diminished over time as some governments co-opted some clerics and marginalized others. The Pahlavi kings (1925–1978) undertook extensive legislative initiatives designed to reform the Iranian legal system. Inspired by Kamal Ataturk’s secularization programs in Turkey and as an attempt to consolidate his rule, Reza shah (1878–1944), the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, pursued a series of legislative reforms designed to secularize the legal system and undermine clerical domination. His son, Muhammad Reza shah (1919–1980), who succeeded him after Reza’s ouster during WWII, continued with the secularization policy even though his approach to clerics was relatively more cooperative than confrontational. These secularist policies ultimately resulted in the establishment of a predominantly secular court system at the expense of the religious courts and clerics. Through repressive measures these reforms and courts did succeed in curtailing the power of clerics, especially by downgrading the shari’ah family law and moving family cases to a secular court system controlled by the Ministry of Justice. 13 Consequently, in effect, much of the power and revenue of clerics (ulama) as judges, legal experts, notary publics, and registrars of deeds were gradually brought under governmental control and put in the hands of modern secular judges, lawyers, and civil servants. These reforms were embraced by a very small segment of the Iranian population, especially since they were imposed without much public input and with governmental heavy-handedness. As the regime faced greater opposition to its authoritarian rule and underwent a legitimacy crisis, these reforms were more relentlessly challenged by clerics and their allies. As explained earlier in this book, given the scope and nature of opposition to the Pahlavis, clerics initially did not publicly advocate for Islamization of the laws. In fact, they astutely called for a system based on popular support and the rule of law. As clerics dominated the revolutionary process and benefited from massive popular support, especially among the disinherited, they began reaffirming their commitment to the rule of the shari’ah and called for a return to Islamic jurisprudence. Similar to the Constitutional Revolution, they began asserting their role as the guardians of Islam. This role is clearly accounted for in the constitution of the Islamic Republic. The new constitution, as previously discussed, explicitly, frequently, and directly requires that all laws and policies be in conformity with the shari’ah and

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other Islamic rulings. Of course, in view of the regime’s commitment to Twelver Shi’ism and self-preservation, Islamization of the law is largely shaped by the elite’s sectarian and scholastic affiliations and their pragmatic interests and considerations. In conformity with Islamic traditions, however, the constitution accounts for a limited degree of tolerance for other schools of law and for the laws of certain non-Muslim minorities. This tolerance ends when the interests of the Twelver Shi’a Islam and the Islamic community are in jeopardy. In contemporary Iran, communal interests are defined by the regime largely in terms of its ability to maintain control over all aspect of Iran’s social, economic, and political life. Faced with the realities of modern governance and public pressure, the regime has had to move away from the traditional shari’ah and the Shi’a worldviews and rely on revisionist doctrines to enact laws as it sees fit, no matter what the connection with the shari’ah. This trend is evident in all areas of the law including personal status, administrative, economic, and penal codes. DOCTRINE OF MASLAHAT/ZARURAT AND INSTITUTIONALIZED LEGAL PRAGMATISM The leaders of the Islamic Republic have resorted to the doctrine of maslahat or zarurat to justify their decisions and laws that either do not directly correspond to Islam or are even contradictory to the letters or the spirit of the shari’ah. The term maslahat or maslaha (masaaleh, l) means interest and welfare. Zarurat (zaruraat, l), which is commonly used in Farsi as an equivalent to maslahat, essentially means necessity. Basically, there is no clear legal distinction between the two concepts in the Shi’a and Iranian legal traditions. In Islam, in general, some distinctions are made between the two concepts. As a legal method, determination of interest (istislah) consists of a mechanism employed by jurists in finding Man’s best interest and promoting that interest by applying it to the case at hand. 14 In theory, this method can only be an instrument of interpretation of the revealed law, not a substantive source of the law per se. In that sense, istislah is an extension of analogy (qiyas), which is a predominantly accepted legal method of deduction, but its scope is broader than that of qiyas. Legally, in qiyas there has to be a determination of illa, the attribute of the object analogous to the revealed ruling. In istislah, the standard for determination of the law is the primacy of human welfare. 15 This doctrine basically assumes that the shari’ah is designed to promote tangible human interest known by God and recognized by Man. The authority of this doctrine is rooted in the Quran, hadith, and ijma. The Quran clearly establishes that the purpose of the shari’ah is human welfare. 16 It is, however, important to note that while these Quranic injunctions do acknowledge God’s concern about human welfare, they do not establish Man’s right

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and ability to recognize where his welfare lies. “To establish the mere existence of human welfare motives behind the revealed law does not suggest that man can apply them through his own judgment; in fact, in one sense it implies the opposite, that man should follow God’s Will as spelled out in the Quran, sunna, and qiyas. This way, man is assured his welfare.” 17 There seems to be some disagreements among Islamic scholars about the scope of the doctrine of maslahat. According to Muhammad al-Ghazali, it consists of considerations that secure a benefit and prevent harm but, in the meantime, are harmonious with the objectives (maqasid) of the shari’ah. In his view, these objectives consist of protecting five essential values, namely: religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. Any measure that secures these values falls within the scope of maslahat, as long as the shari’ah does not reject these measures and they do not seem contradictory to it. 18 From this point of view, Muslims must follow explicit and implicit Islamic rulings, and maslahat does not apply in these circumstances. Furthermore, the doctrine of maslahat is only valid when the necessity is certain not probable; it benefits the public at large, not a certain segment of the population; it is rational and acceptable to people of sound intellect; and it removes or prevents hardship from the people. 19 In a more expansive view of this doctrine, others suggest that this doctrine allows Muslims to waive even the primary rulings of Islam in emergencies or conditions of “overriding necessity.” Khomeini, for instance, contends that Islamic rulings can be waived if the very existence of the state is threatened or when inaction by the government would result in “wickedness or corruption.” 20 In 1988, Khamene’i, then the president of Iran and currently the Supreme Leader, and Khomeini vehemently disagreed on the scope of maslahat. Khamene’i limited maslahat to the secondary or peripheral laws. He basically argued that in Islam there are two types of laws: the central or public and the secondary or peripheral. The central or public laws, like drinking laws, are definitive and unchangeable and, therefore, not subject to change by governmental actions. In contrast, the secondary laws, like personal devotional matters and labor laws, are imprecise and, consequently, subject to interpretation and open to the doctrine of necessity. Committed to an expansive role for clerics and intent on downplaying any shari’ah injunctions that might limit their role, Khomeini noted that there is no central injunction in Islam. By asserting that all laws are subject to governmental actions, he insisted that: “The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any shari’ah agreements which it has concluded with the people when these agreements are contrary to the interest of the country or Islam.” He even added that the “government can also prevent any devotional (ibadi) or non-devotional affair if it is opposed to the interest of Islam and or so long as it is so. The government can prevent pilgrimage (hajj), which is one of the most divine obligations, on a temporary basis, if that practice is contrary to the interest of the Islamic country.” 21 Khomeini’s contention, in short, is that

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the Iranian clerical regime may adopt any laws which serve its interests, because such laws naturally coincide with Islam. Far from the mainstream Islamic or even Shi’a viewpoint, this perspective is quite consistent with Khomeini’s insistence on equating the Islamic state with the rule by clerics. 22 Some other scholars distinguish between maslahat, as an outgrowth of qiyas that is not referred to in the text but does not challenge the textual rulings (munasabah or suitability), and zarurat. In this distinction, the doctrine of necessity applies only to exceptional cases and allows usual requirements of Islamic law to be set aside. The term zarurat does not appear in the Quran, but there are references to this doctrine as the Quran stipulates exceptions to the rules in extraordinary circumstances. For instance, the Quran permits the eating of forbidden food in circumstances of extreme hunger. 23 It also reaffirms this doctrine by underscoring that: “He hath chosen you and hath not laid upon you in religion hardship.” 24 However, even some reformist Muslim scholars who had traditionally supported change and had opted for more liberal interpretations of Islamic law became disenchanted with the utilitarianism of this doctrine and called for a return to the Quran and sunnah. 25 A cursory glance at the legislative and political history of the Islamic Republic makes it clear that the interests of the regime have superseded all other considerations in the most fundamental decisions at all levels and all phases. Clearly, the regime has been intent on giving primacy to the interests of those persons, groups, and camps who have participated in power. 26 They have stretched the doctrine of maslahat so far as to even the choice of the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Azari Qomi, a Khomeini supporter, even went so far as declaring that the existence of the state had such an overriding importance that even if out of some necessity a depraved infidel came to preside over it, it was the duty of the believers to obey him. 27 This extreme view is, in fact, compatible with the classical doctrine of total obedience to the leader in the Islamic worldview. However, this view is challenged by many who reject absolutism in this classical perspective and call for limitations on the authority of the leaders. In a relevant decree on January 7, 1988, Khomeini announced that governmental rules are derived from the absolute dominion of the prophet of God. This, in his view, was the most important of God’s ordinances (ahkam-e-elahi) and stood above all ordinances that were derived from or directly commanded by Allah. If a measure was in the interest of the state and Islam, it could annul all other Islamic ordinances, even prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca. 28 Following this line of argument, the regime has enacted a vast number of laws, statutory instruments, and resolutions that have no demonstrable relationship to the shari’ah. They have accomplished this by resorting to maslahat as well as a legal method called Binding Secondary Contractual Obligations (shart-e-zaman-e-aqd). Under limited conditions, Islamic law recog-

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nizes the validity of contracts even if they are irreconcilable with the forms of contracts generally accepted in the shari’ah. The method of Binding Secondary Contractual Obligations ensures that such contractual obligations are enforced as valid. The Islamic Republic has effectively applied this method to a series of legislative agenda, including family and labor laws, by treating them as labor and marriage contracts. 29 In Islam, while marriage is a ritualistic act (ibadi) in spirit, in form it is a civil legal contract (muamalat) patterned after the normal contract of sale. 30 In legal terms, it is a contract of exchange with well-defined conditions and uniform legal effects. 31 In this sense, any contractual terms are acceptable as long as such terms are not inherently contradictory to the essence of marriage. Largely based on the Twelver Shi’a (Ithna ‘Ashari) jurisprudence, the Iranian Civil Code specifies the rights and obligations created by the marriage contract, even though it does not attempt to define marriage. These rights and obligations fall into three categories: reciprocal, exclusive rights of the wife and husband’s obligations, and exclusive husband’s rights and wife’s obligations. In some instances, these rights and obligations are contrary to the Islamic and Shi’a principles, particularly in regard to rules pertaining to divorce. In practice, the rules of divorce are modified and judges attempt to seek compromises between the parties regardless of the shari’ah rulings. 32 A similar trend is present in custody rules, whereby the mother can retain the custody of her children in case of remarriage after her husband’s death, thus diminishing the paternal grandparents’ rights in the chain of custody. These pragmatic reforms have led some to conclude that, “Paradoxically, it is in Iran, where the Shari’a is now enforced, that women enjoy better status, both in law and in marriage.” 33 Similar measures were undertaken in economic legislation, particularly foreign trade nationalization, labor and industrial codes, and agrarian reform. The Guardian Council (Shuray-e Negahban), a body tasked with ensuring the compatibility of laws and policy decisions with Islam, consistently challenged the legitimacy of these pragmatic legislations and policy decisions. These challenges undermined the government’s ability to function properly and resulted in an institutional crisis in 1988. Frustrated over the ongoing conflict and fearful of the potential damage to the clerical rule in Iran, Khomeini decreed that the parliament may pass any laws not subject to scrutiny by the council if it invokes the doctrine of maslahat by a 2/3rds majority. The parliament relied on this doctrine to pass the controversial Temporary Cultivation Law, a piece of legislation that the council had strenuously objected to on the grounds that it inappropriately transferred properties to occupying farmers. In the opinion of the council, this law was incompatible with Islam since it sanctioned the confiscation of property. Ironically, in the 1960s, clerics had violently opposed the land reform policies of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi on the grounds that it undermined Islam’s advocacy for the right to

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private property. Now, some in the regime were suggesting that it was in the interest of the state and Islam and a matter of social justice to violate the shari’ah property rights. There is very little doubt that in adopting this law the regime was motivated by its obligation to its base of support among the disinherited. 34 A similar strategy was employed in the passage of major anticivil rights laws. The continued dispute over the role of the Guardian Council, concerns over the inefficiency of the legislative process, and commitment to the preservation of the interests of clerics and their regime finally forced Khomeini to support the institutionalization of maslahat in 1988. In a clear departure from the constitutional reliance on the Guardian Council, he agreed to the establishment of the Expediency Council (Majma-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam) consisting of a selected number of clerics and government officials who were initially chosen by Khomeini himself. The revised Constitution in 1989 accounted for this body (Article 112 of the amended constitution), and it became a major player in the legislative process tasked with mediating disputes between the government and the Guardian Council. In practice, as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader, this council has become one of the most powerful governing bodies in Iran. It has even been given the authority to frame and initiate legislation on its own and to make final decisions on matters of dispute between the Guardian Council and the parliament. 35 The government has employed this council to pass a great deal of legislation referred to as State Ordinances (ahkam-e hukumati) which have suspended, undermined, or violated Islamic ordinances. This institution also stretched the scope of maslahat far beyond simple legislation. The doctrine of maslahat was even applied to the choice of the Supreme Leader. As indicated earlier, some clerics even began advocating for the doctrine of absolute obedience to any leader, even a depraved infidel, in the interest of the regime. Khomeini himself argued for this form of absolutism. In the regime’s worldview, the state’s absolute power lies in the absoluteness of God’s sovereignty and extends to every level of state authority. Not surprisingly, this council has sided, for the most part, with the Guardian Council in its disputes with the parliament when the parliament asserts its popular mandate. 36 In addition to these institutions, the clerical regime has continued its tradition of institution-building that had begun during the revolution in order to ensure pragmatism and control. They created the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution in 1980, which was engaged in making laws outside the normal legislative process. In 1987, Khomeini conferred on this council the right to formulate guidelines and rules (zavabet va qava’ed) independent of the parliament. Further legislative powers were granted to the Supreme Council for Supporting the War and the Supreme Council for Reconstruction. These two institutions were short-lived.

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CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS Like much of the world, many Muslim societies are facing serious challenges to their social, economic, and political order due to increases in crimes. The frequency and severity of these crimes are partly attributed to the realities of modern-day life and partly to the social, economic, and political shortcomings of these societies. Increased poverty, growing gaps among classes, generational gap and out-of-control youth frustration, ongoing sectarian and ethnic schisms, and political discontent and violence have contributed to heightened crimes in many Muslim societies. There is a growing concern that the adoption and incorporation of modern Western penal codes into the Islamic criminal justice systems have failed to curb these crimes and establish a reasonable level of social and political order under the secular regimes. Consequently, Islamists in many Muslim societies are advocating for the adoption of shari’ah-based criminal justice systems in order to curb crimes and reestablish social order. This demand is rooted both in respect for and commitment to Islam and the commonly held view that the reinstatement of harsh punishments would deter criminal conduct. While the shari’ah specifies a number of crimes and their appropriate punishments, it is indeed inadequate in identifying crimes and accounting for their proper punishments. However, many of the specified punishments are in fact very harsh and have empirically proven to be effective deterrents to crime. Generally, the shari’ah covers three main categories of crimes and related punishments: determined (hadd), retributory (qesas), and discretionary (ta’azir). Hudud Crimes and Punishments in Islam In Arabic, literally the term hadd means stopping and preventing. In its legal context, it is a reference to a clear and concise punishment for certain crimes. Generally speaking, hudud (pl.) punishments in Islam are those fixed penalties that are specifically identified in the Quran. In the Quran, hadd is a punishment for four types of crimes: robbery, 37 engaging in war (maharebeh), 38 adultery (zena), 39 and accusation of sexual crimes (qadaf). 40 In the hadith, two other categories of crimes are covered by hudud punishments: drinking (maskar); and sexual crimes including homosexuality (lavat), lesbianism (mosahegeh), and pimping and pandering (qawadi). These punishments are integral to the Islamic penal code and are considered important in deterring crimes that are detrimental to the peace, security, and stability of the community. The effectiveness of these punishments, it is suggested, is due to their severe nature, which causes great physical pain administered to the criminal by flogging, amputation, or death. 41 However, while Muslim scholars agree that these punishments are effective in combating crimes, they differ in their views as to the types of crimes and punish-

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ments that are covered by this category of penalties. Generally, the areas that fall within the scope of hudud and their punishments include: • Apostasy: This is basically the crime of rejecting or denying Islam by word, deed, or omission. Death is normally the hadd punishment for these crimes. • Transgression: This is a crime of violent revolt against the leader and, under certain circumstances, is subject to a range of Hudud punishments. • Theft: A crime which, if proven, subjects the criminal to the hadd penalty of the amputation of a hand. • Harba: These are a range of crimes including highway robbery and war against the prophet and God. The penalties for these crimes vary depending on the circumstances. • Fornication: The penalty for this crime depends on the gender of the criminal and his or her marital status. • Drinking of alcohol: which subjects the offender to the punishment of whipping. 42 Some scholars also include the unproven accusations of fornication as a hadd violation. 43 Others exempt fornication and drinking from hudud injunctions. 44 These disagreements are amplified by scholastic and sectarian disputes and they are bound to continue and intensify as Islamist regimes undertake codification and Islamization of the laws. Furthermore, these problems will not be limited to the nature of the crime and the scope of the hudud punishments. Under Islamic law, certain requirements have to be met before hudud punishments are applied. These requirements include the use of “proper procedure” and the determination of the “circumstances” of the case. The proper procedure requires reliance on just judges and fair and trustworthy witnesses in the case. The circumstances of a crime may exempt a typically hadd crime from such punishments. For instance, while robbery is a hadd crime punishable by the amputation of a hand, there is no penalty of amputation if robbery was committed due to “need.” 45 Contrary to their piecemeal approach to economic and personal status laws, the ruling clerics in Iran have Islamized the penal code comprehensively. Having inherited a penal code from the Pahlavi era that had incorporated principles of Western criminal justice systems into the Islamic rulings, the regime had to identify five categories of existing laws in the Islamization process: 1. Laws that were already based on the shari’ah. These laws underwent very little change in the Islamization process. 2. Laws that contradicted the shari’ah. These laws were either partially modified or completely changed.

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3. Laws that were considered or declared to be anti-Islamic before the revolution but, due to political and pragmatic considerations, were tolerated or approved by the regime. 4. Laws that merely appeared Islamized or their Islamization faced significant difficulties and, subsequently, were abandoned. 5. Laws that have no relationship with the shari’ah but have been accepted out of interest (maslahat) or necessity (zarurat). 46 The original Islamic Penal Code was adopted in 1982 and has been revised in part on several occasions. The latest revisions were passed in January 2012. This extensive and growing body of laws is designed to establish social and political order in the country and to ensure regime stability. As discussed earlier, in laying down the foundational principles of the Islamic Republic, Article 2 of the constitution specifically refers to divine revelation as the fundamental source of the laws in the Islamic Republic. According to Article 4 of the constitution, “All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all Articles of the Constitution as well as to other laws and regulations, and the wise persons of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter.” The criminal code is indeed substantially rooted in the shari’ah and the Shi’a fiqh. In its general provisions, this code 47 states: “any action or inaction for which a punishment is established is a crime” (Article 2). The original penal code also asserted legal territoriality in criminal matters by indicating that: “No action is considered a crime unless the law has established a punishment or protective or educational/corrective measures for that action.” However, the most recent revisions to Article 2 of the code do not explicitly assert legal territoriality. 48 These stipulations are in line with constitutional protections that presume innocence unless the guilt is established in a proper court of law (Article 37 of the constitution), and the need for establishing guilt by a court of law in accordance with the established laws (Articles 37 and 166 of the constitution). It is not only Iranians who are subject to this criminal code. In fact, Article 5 of this code accounts for legal extra-territoriality when it subjects foreigners to the Iranian criminal justice system when they commit certain crimes even outside Iran. These crimes include: any actions against the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the county; forgery or misuse of the writings of high level governmental officials; forgery and the use of the Leader’s seal, signature, decree, and writings; and forgery of the Iranian currency and banking and treasury documents, checks, and guarantees. The criminal code accounts for five types of crimes and punishments: hudud, qesas, compensation (diyat), ta’azir, and preventative punishments (mojazatha-ye bazdarandeh) (Article 12).

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Hudud in the Iranian Criminal Law According to Article 13 of the penal code, a hadd is a punishment whose scope, nature, type, and severity are specified by the shari’ah. Book 2 of the penal code extensively discusses the hudud crimes and codifies their punishments. Hudud crimes include: Sexual offenses like adultery (zena), sodomy (lavat), lesbianism (mosahegheh), and pimping and pandering (qawadi); accusation of adultery and homosexuality to a person (qazaf); consumption of alcohol (maskar); war, armed revolt, and corruption on earth (harba); and robbery. Basically, four types of punishments are established for hudud crimes: 1. Execution in the cases of murder, revolt, and certain sexual offenses. 2. Physical harm and punishment such as amputation in the case of robbery. 3. Physical punishment such as beating in the case of drunkenness; and 4. Incarceration in such cases as the third conviction for robbery. Some of the Iranian legal scholars consider sexual offenses like adultery, homosexuality, and lesbianism victimless crimes. 49 In their view, victims of sexual crimes only exist in the cases of forced and non-consensual sex. The punishments accounted for these crimes in the penal code clearly reflect and reinforce this view of sexual crimes. Sexual offenses in the Iranian penal code include: Zena (adultery) Article 63 (chapter 1 of book 2) of the penal code defines zena as intercourse between a man and a woman when they are prohibited (haraam) from engaging in such an act, unless the deed is done by mistake. Under this law, while the man is the primary offender of the criminal act in this case, both parties bear legal responsibility. To be subject to a hadd punishment, the man or the woman should be an adult, of sound mind, independent, and aware of the act of zena and its legal prohibition (Article 64). The proof of zena is established by confession, legal means in the case of pregnancy of an unmarried woman, or the testimony of witnesses. Articles 68, 69, and 72 refer to the conditions, restrictions, and circumstances of confessions. As stipulated in Article 38 of the constitution, forced confessions are unacceptable in courts of law and those who secure such confessions by administering torture are subject to criminal penalties. Article 69 of the criminal code affirms that confession is acceptable if the confessor is an adult and mature person with clear intent and ability to make such a decision. If the confession is made in the presence of a judge four times, the confessor is subject to a hadd punishment. In the case of confessions less

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than four times, the punishment is a discretionary punishment (ta’azir). A similar discretionary power is accounted for the judge in case of a confessed person who expresses regret (tawbeh). The judge may sentence him/her to a hadd penalty or seek his/her pardon from the Leader (Article 72). As a general rule in all criminal cases, normally confession prior to conviction removes the hadd penalty. Furthermore, if the person shows remorse before the witnesses have testified, the hadd punishment is not applied and lesser punishments are imposed. However, confessions and remorse after testimony of the witnesses do not stop the imposition of a hadd penalty. An unmarried woman who gets pregnant is not subject to hadd punishment for zena unless, through legal means, it is proven that she has committed zena (Article 73). Hadd zena may also be established by the testimony of four male witnesses or three male and two female witnesses (Article 74). The types of hudud punishments for zena depend upon the gender, marital status, relationship of the parties, religious affiliations, and physical conditions of those convicted of such offenses. According to Article 82, a male person who commits zena (zani) is subject to capital punishment regardless of his age and marital status if he has committed adultery with a paternal or maternal relative prohibited to him (haraam), with a stepmother, or adultery that has been with force or assault. A non-Muslim zani who has committed adultery with a Muslim woman is also subject to capital punishment. Normally, a female person who commits zena and denies committing such an act is not subject to execution. Under some circumstances, the punishment of adultery is stoning (rajam). Article 83 identifies two conditions where the punishment is stoning: zena by a married man (mohsen) who has a permanent wife and could return to his wife, and adultery by a married woman (mohseneh), who can return to her husband, with another adult. In 2002, under pressure from the Europeans and public condemnations, the head of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi-Shahroodi, ordered that execution by stoning to be stopped. 50 However, the revisions in 2012 still account for this punishment in Article 83 of the penal code. If the parties to adultery are unmarried, the punishment is reduced to one hundred lashes (Article 88). However, repeat offenders of the zena rules will be subject to the punishment of execution after their fourth offense (Article 90). The code normally designates capital punishment for the fourth hadd offenses, except for drunkenness, which results in execution after only three infractions and sentences. Under certain circumstances, hudud punishments are either postponed for a period of time or reduced. For instance, during pregnancy or in the absence of a caregiver for the child, the punishments of execution and stoning of a woman are not enforced unless a custodian is found for the child (Article 91). Similarly, lashing is not enforced if the mother is pregnant or breast-feeding and lashing endangers the child. Contrarily, an ill person can be executed or stoned, but cannot be subjected to lashing until he/she recovers from his/her

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illness (Article 93). Insanity and conversion away from Islam do not protect the adulterer from being subject to hudud punishments (Article 95). In a number of articles, the code specifies the conditions and guidelines for the enforcement of these punishments. For instance, Article 97 states that hudud punishments cannot be enforced in the non-Muslim lands (dar alharb). The code indicates that lashing should only be carried out in moderate weather that is neither too hot nor too cold (Article 96). A male adulterer should be lashed standing and a female adulterer should be lashed sitting and covered (Article 100). The presence of the judge and witnesses is required in the cases of stoning. In the case of stoning, a male adulterer should be buried up to his waist and a woman should be buried up to her chest (Article 102). In stoning, the stones should neither be so big to kill the person after one or two strikes nor so small that they cannot be called stones (Article 104). If the person who is being stoned escapes during the act of stoning, he should be returned for stoning if he was convicted on the accounts of witnesses. However, the person may not be returned if the conviction was the result of confession (Article 103). Lavat (sodomy) The code subjects both parties to a male homosexual act to hudud punishments (Article 109). If certain conditions are met, some homosexual acts are subject to capital punishment. To impose such a penalty, both parties must be adult, mature, and legally responsible/have the ability to make decisions (mukhtar) (Article 111). The parties’ marital status has no impact on whether or not the death penalty is imposed. If an adult male engages in a homosexual act with a minor, the adult is subject to death penalty and the minor is subject to 74 lashes as a ta’azir punishment (Article 112). In an addendum to Article 121, the code also makes distinctions as to the role and religious affiliations of the parties in sodomy. If a non-Muslim commits the act on a Muslim, he is subject to death penalty. When death penalty is imposed, the judge may have some, but not unlimited, discretion as to how this penalty is enforced. The penalty could be carried out by sword, burning, stoning, destroying a wall on top of the offenders or throwing them from a cliff while their hands are tied. Some of these punishments, like death by sword and burning, may be carried out consecutively. 51 The same rules of confession and punishment for repeat offenders are applied in the case of lavat as they are in zena. The code also addresses conducts that are not normally considered intercourse but are socially undesirable and might imply homosexual acts, tendencies, and gestures. These crimes are usually subject to the lesser punishment of lashing. For instance, Article 123 criminalizes and subjects the parties to ninety-nine lashes if two nude men who are unrelated are under cover

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with no reason or necessity. Also, a person is subject to sixty lashes if he/she kisses another person with a sexual desire (Article 124). Mosahegheh (lesbianism) The code criminalizes homosexual acts between two or more women. The same rules of punishment applicable in the case of sodomy are in effect in lesbianism. The punishment for a single lesbian act is one hundred lashes (Article 129), and there is no distinction in penalties based on the sexual roles of the offenders and their religious affiliations (addendum to Article 130). Similar to other hudud punishments, the fourth repeat offense results in death penalty (Article 131). Furthermore, two unrelated nude women under cover with no reason or necessity are subject to less than one hundred lashes. For the third of such an offense, they will be subject to one hundred lashes (Article 134). Qawadi (pimping or pandering) Pimping is defined as a sexual offense subject to hudud punishments. Article 138 distinguishes between male and female offenders in this case. A male offender is punished by seventy-five lashes and sent into exile between three months to a year. A female offender of pimping is subject to seventy-five lashes. Non-sexual hudud offenses range from false accusations of sexual offenses to revolt. Under the Iranian penal code, they include: Qazaf (accusation of adultery and homosexuality) This is primarily a hadd offense under the Iranian penal code, but under certain circumstances it could be considered either a qesas or a ta’azir offense. This offense is treated as a significant crime because of the social implications of such accusations for the victim. In a culture where sexual conduct is private and any allegations of sexual misconduct have far-reaching implications for the person who is being accused, the law not only criminalizes unfounded allegations but, more importantly, accounts for serious punishments for the offender and remedies for the victim. In Article 142 of the penal code, the scope of the qazaf offenses is defined broadly and is not limited to accusation related to sexual offenses. For instance, according to this article, when a parent denies being the parent of a child or when a child denies being the offspring of his/her parents, the person who makes such denials is committing a qazaf hadd. This broad application enables the criminal code to protect individuals’ social standing. The hadd punishment for qazaf is typically lashes, which are not to strike the head or face or the uncovered parts of the body (Article 156). In the case

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of accusation of sexual misconduct, the accuser is given the penalty of eighty lashes (Article 140). If the accusation is about lesbianism or other prohibited acts, the penalty is seventy-four lashes (Article 140, addendum 2). Repeat offenses of qazaf will result in capital punishment after the fourth hadd punishment (Article 157). As a discretionary penalty, the punishment for minors who commit qazaf is determined by the judge (Article 147). The qesas element of this crime is reflected in Article 140 (addendum 1), whereby the law asserts that the implementation of such penalties depends upon the request of the victim. Furthermore, such a right is transferable to the victim’s inheritors after his/her death, if the penalty is not executed and the victim had not forgiven the offender (Article 163). Interestingly enough, this right is not transferable to the victim’s husband or wife. Furthermore, each inheritor may request the implementation even if others might have forgiven the offender (Article 164). Maskar (consumption of alcohol) Legally, it is the consumption of alcohol that subjects the individual to the hadd punishment regardless of the amount of consumption, what has been consumed, and whether or not the use of alcohol has resulted in erratic behavior (Article 165). In the Shi’a jurisprudence, drinking of beer is prohibited, but not all Sunni schools of law find drinking beer a hadd offense. Consistent with the Shi’a position, Article 165 (addendum 1) of the Iranian penal code prohibits the drinking of beer. Drinking of grape juice that has been boiled is also prohibited but it does not subject the offender to a hadd punishment (Article 165, addendum 2).The maskar hadd only applies to those adults who are sane (aqel), of sound judgment (mukhtar) , and aware of the prohibition of alcohol and its ability to make one drunk. In emergency cases, the medical use of alcohol, specifically wine, for the necessary amount does not subject a person to a hadd punishment (Article 167). The hadd punishment for the crime of drinking is eighty lashes for both men and women (Article 174). Non-Muslims are subject to eighty lashes only if they publicly consume intoxicants (addendum to Article 174). Evidently, the mere consumption for non-Muslims is not considered a crime. The crime of drunkenness may be established either by the testimony of witnesses or by confession. Article 170 states that the testimony of only two males is necessary for proof. The requirements of confession are similar to other hudud offenses, except that in addition to being a sane adult who possesses the ability to make decisions, the confessor must also have the intent (qasd) (Article 169). The code also deals with more severe crimes related to alcohol. According to Article 175, making, preparing, selling, buying, offering, and transporting alcoholic drinks is subject to between six months to two years of imprisonment. Anyone involved, due to deception or inducement, in these acts is

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considered an accessory and subject to seventy-four lashes. 52 The same guidelines that govern sexual offenses regarding the requirements of lashing (Article 176 and its addendum), repeat offenses (Article 179), the inception of insanity or conversion (Article 180), and confession and expression of remorse are also applied in the drunkenness crime. As a general rule, hadd ceases with confession and expression of remorse prior to witness testimony, but not with witness testimony (Article 182). The judge can punish the offender or seek his/her clemency from the leader. Moharebeh (violence) and Mafsad fil-arz (corruption on earth) In the Iranian penal code, the terms mohareb (a person who engages in violence and war) and mufased (a person who engages in corruptive acts) are used interchangeably (Article 183). In the shari’ah, muharebeh is considered war against God and His prophet and a hadd offense. In the Iranian penal code, muharebeh means the acts of threatening, fighting, and frightening others in order to use weapons to harm others. 53 However, resorting to arms has to be public. 54 In defining the crime of “Corruption on Earth,” the penal code extends this category to any armed violence that intends to create fear and jeopardize public security and liberty (Article 183). Therefore, a number of acts including resorting to armed violence, highway robbery and armed robbery (Article 185), securing and distributing illegal drugs, and forgery of Iranian currency and banknotes are covered under this definition (Articles 185–188). The code refers to the legitimate rights and freedoms of the public, not one or two people. 55 Therefore, violent acts against one or two people or acts of violence due to personal vendetta that do not aim at or could not cause public fear and instability are not considered muharebeh (addendums 1 and 2 to Article 183). However, the use of any weapons that normally cause fear and insecurity can subject the offender to hadd punishment under muharebeh (addendum 3 to Article 183). Some even suggest that any physical ability that causes fear could be considered a weapon. The acts of flooding peoples’ homes, spraying poisons and pollutants, arson, and similar crimes could also be muharebeh crimes. 56 Individuals and groups who use weapons to fight the mohareb or to eliminate corruption on earth are not considered mohareb and are not subject to hudud punishments (Article 184). Involvement by any group or organized association in armed struggle, upheaval, or resistance against the regime is considered a muharebeh crime. In this case, the group members and their supporters who are aware of the goals of the group and have worked toward the advancement of the group’s goals are subject to hudud punishments, even if they have not participated in the military wing of the organization (Article 186). Furthermore, Articles 187 and 188 designate any individual who intentionally and knowingly assists with any efforts to topple the regime or participate in any coup a muhareb or mufasid and

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subject them to hudud punishments. Similar offenses are covered by The Criminal Code of the Military Personnel that governs criminal offenses by military personnel. Article 11 of this code spells out a range of offenses including organized rebellion. Many of these offenses are ta’azirat offenses except in the case that organized rebellion is carried out with “knowledge” that subjects the offender to a hadd punishment. 57 These offenses may be proven either by the confession of a mature adult with intent or by the testimony of two male witnesses (Article 189). Those impacted by these offenses are not eligible to witness such crimes (addendum to Article 189). There are four types of punishments for harb or fasad: execution, hanging, amputation of the right hand and then left foot, and exile (Article 190). Under the Iranian penal code, the judge has the discretionary power of choosing any of these penalties (Article 191). There are, however, sentencing guidelines for such offenses. For instance, a sentence of exile may not be shorter than a year, even if the offender has repented. The offender is kept in exile until he/she repents (Article 194). Furthermore, an exiled person is to remain under surveillance and prohibited from any contacts with others (Article 193). The penalty of hanging is also subject to significant restrictions. Death should not be caused by the manner the offender is restrained, he/she should not be hanging for more than three days, and if death does not occur within three days the offender should not be executed ( Article 195). Robbery In Islam, robbery is essentially a hadd offense. However, there are two elements in this crime: Man’s right (haqq al-nass) and God’s right (haqq alAllah). These two elements determine the scope and nature of the crime of robbery and its punishments. As a matter of principle, it is “God’s right” that subjects this crime to a hadd punishment. Article 197 of the Iranian penal code defines robbery as the act of taking another person’s property without his/her knowledge. This religious definition has serious legal limitations. For instance, there are acts which are done with the owner’s knowledge but are still considered acts of robbery. Not all acts of robbery are considered hadd offenses. For instance, a father who steals from his children and one who steals in times of economic scarcity are not subject to hadd punishments (Article 198). According to many clerics, robbery in times of economic scarcity is not a hadd offense. Generally, robbery is a hadd offense only if all the phases of robbery have been accomplished and the property is under the control of the robber. Such a crime is proven by the testimony of two just men, twice confession by the adult and mature robber with intent, and the personal knowledge of the judge (Article 199). One confession alone to the judge does not subject the robber to the hadd punishment (addendum to Article 199). Similar to other hudud crimes, repentance and the return of the

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property or rectification of the crime removes the hadd penalty. Cognizant of the two elements of the robbery crime, the Iranian penal code enumerates the necessary conditions for the enforcement of hadd punishment in the case of robbery. Most of these conditions reflect the haqq al-nass aspects of this crime. For instance, the owner is obligated to complain to the judge, but before the complaint he should not have given the property to the offender, and should not have forgiven the offender. Furthermore, before the establishment of guilt, the property should not have been sold to the robber (Article 200). The haqq al-Allah aspect of this crime gives supremacy to God’s right over Man’s. The implication, as spelled out in the addendum to Article 200, is that the penalty of hadd is neither removed after the finding of guilt due to remorse nor is the robber entitled to clemency. The punishments for robbery hadd vary depending on the frequency of the offense. Article 201 of the penal code establishes the amputation of the four fingers of the right hand, in a manner that only the thumb and the palm of the hand remain, for the first offense. For the second offense, the punishment is the amputation of the left foot with only the heel remaining. The third offense subjects the offender to life imprisonment, and the fourth offense carries death penalty, even if the offense is committed in prison. Prior non-hadd robbery offenses are considered one in the determination of punishment (addendum to Article 201) Qesas Crimes and Punishments in the Iranian Criminal Law Lex Talionis, or retribution, was a legal form of punishment developed in early Babylonian law and was present in both the Biblical and early Roman laws. According to this legal principle, criminals should receive as punishment precisely those injuries and damages they had inflicted upon their victims. In ancient Palestine, the victim could forgo this retributory punishment for financial compensation. Later, the Palestinian sages enacted a law that banned retributory punishment and replaced it with compensation. By the fifth century BC in Rome, fines known as edicts had begun to replace retribution in many instances. However, this concept reemerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Germany. Until the eighteenth century, this principle provided the rationale for such corporal punishments as flogging, branding, mutilation, the stock, and the pillory. 58 This type of punishment exists in Islamic law in the form of qesas. The word qesas in Arabic means “equality” or “equivalence.” In Farsi, it commonly means retribution against a person who has committed an undesirable act. In the general Islamic and Iranian legal terminology it basically implies that a person who has committed an offense will be punished in the same way and by the same means that he/she used to harm another person. 59 In qesas, there is also an assumption of equality of the offender and the victim. For this reason, when the offender and victim are not considered equal be-

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cause of their differences in terms of gender, religious affiliation, or mental health the offender is not normally subject to qesas punishments. In many of these cases, the offender is usually subject to discretionary punishments (ta’azirat) rendered by the judge rather than qesas. In Islam, there are five types of qesas crimes: homicide, voluntary homicide (similar to voluntary manslaughter or killing), involuntary homicide, intentional physical harm or maiming, and unintentional physical harm or maiming. The penalties for these crimes fall into two main categories: retribution and compensation (diyat). The Quran also accounts for exile and prohibition from inheritance and the right to dispose of one’s property by testamentary disposition. 60 The Iranian penal code relies heavily on the Shi’a fiqh in covering the qesas offenses. The code identifies and discusses two categories of qesas crimes: murder (qesas-e nafs) and bodily harm (qesas-e ozv). 61 It also asserts that the penalties should be commensurate with the crime and spells out the conditions under which qesas is applied in criminal cases. As a general rule, in all qesas cases, there is the need for a complainant. A complainant is called vali-e dam, 62 who is the legal inheritor of the victim including his/her children, parents, and aunts and uncles and their offspring. In this sense, qesas is simply the right of relatives. In the Iranian law, a spouse is not a valie dam and his/her complaint does not establish the right to qesas (Article 261). In the absence of a complainant or when the complainant has given up his right to qesas, the offender can be subject to a ta’azir punishment of between three to ten years of imprisonment if the act of homicide, for instance, results in social disorder and fear. 63 The consent of all the legitimate claimants is necessary for qesas. In case some of the claimants seek qesas and others seek financial compensation (diyat), those who seek qesas are obligated to pay those who seek compensation. If some claimants forgive the offender, others who seek qesas must pay to the inheritors of the offender who is subject to qesas (Article 264). Under certain circumstances, the offender of a typical qesas offense may not be subject to qesas punishments. This particularly applies to offending pregnant women. Article 262 specifically prohibits subjecting a pregnant woman to qesas before childbirth or after birth as long as there is threat of death to the child. This prohibition applies not only to the qesas of murder but also to the qesas of limbs. The law accounts for legal responsibility of the judge who ignores the defendant’s claim of pregnancy and his imposition of the qesas harms the fetus or the child. In this case, the judge is legally responsible for the payment of compensation. Furthermore, exercise of qesas with a dull or ineffective tool that causes unwarranted discomfort is considered a crime and unacceptable (Article 263). There are explicitly discriminatory practices on the basis of gender and age in the application of qesas. Article 209 of the penal code establishes

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qesas penalty for the male killer of a Muslim woman. However, before enforcing the qesas penalty, the woman’s guardian (vali) is obligated to pay half of the offender’s financial compensation. Of course, there is no compensation payment if both the offender and the victim are male. According to some Muslim scholars, if the woman’s guardians cannot afford to pay the required compensation they cannot request qesas, they rather can only seek financial compensation. 64 Similar rules apply to the murder of non-Muslims, especially Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian women. Homicide Murder may be divided into either two or three categories. Article 204 of the Iranian penal code relies on the Shi’a fiqh when it categorizes murder into: voluntary (amdi), semi-voluntary (shebh-e amdi), and mistake (khata). Some legal scholars have discussed only two categories of voluntary and involuntary murder. The Quran specifically categorizes voluntary homicide as a qesas crime. 65 Articles 205 and 206 of the Iranian penal code specifically identify voluntary murder as a qesas crime if any of the following conditions are present: the offender had intended to kill someone and his actions have resulted in death, the offender’s actions which are normally conducive to death had resulted in death even if there was no intent, and if the offender had no intention to kill someone and his/her actions are not normally conducive to death but death occurred due to the victim’s illness or old age and the offender was aware of these conditions. There is no distinction between murder with and without pre-meditation. In both cases, the offender is subject to qesas. Under the Iranian penal code, neither suicide nor assisting in suicide are considered punishable crimes. However, mercy killing is a voluntary homicide and subject to qesas punishment. Under the law, the requirement for voluntary homicide is a live being. There are some disputes as to whether or not abortion is a type of voluntary homicide, depending on whether one considers the unborn a live being. While some suggest that abortion is not covered by the rules pertaining to voluntary homicide and thus not covered by qesas, other legal scholars do argue to the contrary. 66 Generally, some of the ulama are of the view that if the fetus possesses spirit (ruh) abortion is a form of voluntary homicide and subject to qesas. Others essentially deny the criminality of abortion due to the fact that the fetus is not a live being and only the killing of a live baby is voluntary homicide. 67 There also seems to be significant disputes among the fuqaha and other Muslim scholars as to the application of qesas when the victim or the offender is a non-Muslim. Some tend to contend that religious and sectarian affiliations have no impact on the application of qesas to the cases of voluntary homicide. Others argue that qesas punishment only applies to the killers of

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Muslims, whether they are Sunni or Shi’i. If the victim is a non-Muslim, the Muslim offender is not subject to qesas, except for repeat offenders who make a habit out of the killing of non-Muslims. In this case, the Muslim offender is subject to qesas punishment. If both the victim and the offender are non-Muslims, the offender is subject to qesas. Article 207 of the penal code establishes that the killer of a Muslim is subject to qesas, and an accessory to such an act is subject to 3–15 years of imprisonment. Fathers and grandfathers (not mothers and maternal relatives), even if they are non-Muslims, are not subject to qesas punishments for the murder of their child (even if the child is a Muslim), and will be forced to pay financial compensation instead (Article 220). This openly discriminatory practice is normally justified on the grounds that fathers and grandfathers want the best even for a disobedient child, and paternal attachment and love are so intense that they prevent murder of a child out of desire. 68 Failure to establish similar exceptions for mothers and grandmothers is not only indicative of the discriminatory practices in the qesas punishments but also inconsistent with other rules that assume love and affection on the part of mothers and grandmothers for their children as well. Article 222 also discriminates against people with mental disabilities, since the law does not equate sane and insane victims. According to this article, the killer of an insane person is only subject to the payment of financial compensation, not to qesas. If the offense causes fear and social disorder, the offender is also subject to the discretionary punishment of 3–10 years of incarceration. In contrast, since adults and minors are not considered unequal in the penal code because both are complete human beings, the murder of a minor by an adult subjects the offender to the qesas punishment (Article 223). To apply qesas in the cases of voluntary homicide, the assumption is generally the intent of the offender to murder. There is, as a general rule, no qesas if the intent is not legally established. For this reason, Article 225 of the penal code asserts that an unconscious or asleep offender is not subject to qesas. Fairly similar to the proof for other offenses, the case of murder may be established in court by the offender’s confession (eghrar), repeated oaths (qasameh), testimony of witnesses, and personal knowledge of the judge. Article 223 of the penal code accepts even a single confession to voluntary murder as a sufficient proof. The testimony of two just (adel) witnesses could establish the proof of murder as well (Article 237). Section (b) of the same article also accepts the testimony of two just men or one just man and two just women, or one just man and the oath of the claimant, as sufficient proof. Muslim scholars reject the criticism that these rules of proof pertaining to witnesses systematically discriminate against women. Ayatollah Muhammad Khamene’i, the current Supreme Leader, emphatically rejects this criticism by contending that witnessing is not a right, rather it is an obligation. Thus,

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he claims that women are not deprived of any rights in this area. In fact, he claims that there are circumstances that a woman’s testimony is acceptable and man’s is not. Ironically, he reaffirms the discriminatory nature of such a practice by adding that the limitation of women’s testimony is due to their emotional nature, and he claims that experience shows that the testimonies of sentimental and emotional people lack accuracy and conciseness. 69 Qasameh is a reference to swearing or taking of oath as a way of proving or rejecting the accusation of a crime. 70 Oath is only acceptable if it is taken by a person with no malicious intent. Furthermore, a non-Muslim’s oath cannot be used to convict a Muslim in a criminal case. Normally, there is a need for multiple oaths to establish guilt in the case of qesas. Article 252 of the penal code requires the claimant against a person to swear fifty times to his claim. If there is more than one claimant, there could be fewer oaths by each. Qesas of the Limbs In the penal code, causing injury to or severing one’s limbs subjects the offender to qesas punishment. According to Article 269, the victim of this offense may, under certain circumstances and with the permission of the Leader (vali-e amr), seek qesas. In the absence of a complaint or if the victim forgives the offender, the offender may still be subject to a ta’azir punishment of three months to two years of incarceration, if the offense has resulted in fear or social disorder (addendum to Article 269). Like in the case of homicide, the code identifies three types of offenses in this category: intentional, semi-intentional, and mistake. For semi-intentional and mistaken severing of limbs, there is no qesas offense and the offender is subject to monetary penalties (Article 270). It is only the intentional offense here that subjects the offender to qesas punishment that may be carried out with a clear consideration for the equity of the offense and the punishment. Article 272 lists five criteria of equity in the exercise of the qesas punishment for severing or injuring of limbs. These criteria include: equity in the level of the health of the limbs, equity in the essentiality of the limbs, similarity in the location of the limbs, equity in the severity of the crime and punishment, and avoidance of the offender’s death due to punishment. There is no gender distinction in the qesas of the limbs (Article 273). A severed limb due to qesas punishment is the property of the offender who can reattach the limb. In this case, a reattached limb is not subject to another qesas punishment (Article 287).

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Diyat (Financial Compensation/Penalties) in the Iranian Criminal Law Islamic law categorizes punishments into only hudud, qesas, and ta’azirat. While it does allow the imposition of monetary punishments, it does not specifically account for a separate category of crimes punishable by financial penalties. The Iranian penal code does establish a separate category of financial punishments for crimes when the circumstances discourage or disallow the imposition of qesas punishments. According to Article 294 of this code, diyat is a certain amount of money or other valuables paid to the victim or his/her inheritors by the offender for crimes of life and limbs. Like in other forms of punishments, there are distinctions made according to the age, gender, religious affiliation, and mental health of the victims and the offender. Generally, any offense due to mistake rather than intent subjects the offender to financial penalties. Article 295 of the criminal code specifically stipulates that when homicide or injury to limbs is the result of mistake or error, even if there is the appearance of intent, diyat is to be paid as the punishment. Even if the person intended to shoot another person, animal, or object but mistakenly harmed an innocent bystander, the act is considered pure error (khata-ye mahz) and not subject to qesas (Article 296). Furthermore, monetary compensation replaces qesas when qesas is impermissible. Minors and the mentally ill are subject to financial penalties rather than qesas for intentional and semi-intentional crimes. In 1994, the Islamic Consultative Council passed a legislation designed to curb criminal and civil liabilities of the armed forces in cases of death and injury. The Law of the Use of Weapons in Necessary Circumstances by the Armed Forces provides extensive legal protections for the armed forces in the use of weapons to quell violence, illegal demonstrations, riots, and so forth (Articles 1, 4-6). Article 12 of this law removes officers’ criminal and civil liabilities if they act in accordance with the laws and regulations. However, consistent with the rules of diyat, the responsible government agency is obligated to pay financial compensation for damages to innocent people resulting from the actions of their agents (Article 13). The penal code establishes guidelines for the amount of the diyat depending on the nature and severity of the crime, and the characteristics of the offender and victim. The code’s specific monetary designations are not intended to be applicable to all cases and at all times, however. In fact, many of these penalties are impractical and untimely. Article 496 of the penal code acknowledges these limitations when it states that in the cases that camel or dinar are specified as diyat, the intent is not specifically camel or dinar, rather the indication of the relative value of the diyat. It is generally the consent of the parties that determines the value of the diyat for specific crimes (addendum to Article 297). Article 297 establishes that the diyat of a Muslim man can range from one hundred healthy (not skinny) camels to

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thousands of silver or gold coins with certain values. Muslim woman’s diyat is half of this amount. Like in the Sunni jurisprudence, diyat for the death of a Muslim woman is half of the amount for man regardless of whether the act was intentional or not (Article 300). Diyat for non-Muslims is different, even though some suggest that the amount should be equal. This is particularly argued for the “Owners of the Book,” who should be treated equally with Muslims. 71 In the crimes of limb, when the shari’ah has not established specific financial penalties, the offender is required to pay blood (arsh) (Article 367). Evidently, blood money is sought when the law does not account for diyat. The penal code extensively deals with specific financial penalties and blood money for crimes against limbs including damages to various parts of the body, hair, eyes, eyebrows, and so forth (Articles 375–497). Crimes that result in mental defect are also subject to diyat or blood money rather than qesas (Articles 444 and 445). In the crimes against limbs, diyat is not only for the destruction of the limb but also for the erosion of the limb’s function. For instance, in the case of damage to the nose resulting in the victim’s inability to smell, there is one penalty for the destruction of the nose and one for the loss of the sense of smell. Similar distinctions are made in the loss of eye and eyesight, ears and hearing, and so forth. When considered a crime, abortion is covered by qesas as well as diyat rules. With some exceptions dealing with the protection of the life of the mother, any intentional act that results in the loss of the fetus is considered a crime punishable by qesas and financial penalties and compensation. The clerics’ views on the nature of abortion crimes and their appropriate punishments vary depending on the stage of pregnancy and fetal development. Normally, the more advanced the pregnancy the more severe the punishment. Clearly, damage to or murder of a born infant results in qesas in addition to financial penalties and compensation. Similarly, any intentional physical attack or emotional insult on a pregnant woman that causes the loss of the unborn subjects the offender to qesas, incarceration, and diyat (Article 622). With the exception of the cases that abortion is intended to protect the life of the mother, consulting a woman for the purpose of abortion, assisting in abortion by giving a pregnant woman a drug or other physical stimuli, or engaging in any related activities result in financial penalties and incarceration (Article 623). Article 624 of the code specifically prohibits physicians, midwives, and pharmacists from engaging in such acts. In abortion crimes, financial penalties and compensations vary depending on the gender of the fetus and the stage of pregnancy. Prior to the emergence of spirit (ruh), the penalty is the same for male and female fetuses (Article 487). In the case of homicide of a pregnant woman, both the mother and the fetus are entitled to financial compensation (Article 489). When the physical and spiritual formation is complete, full diyat is imposed in the case of abortion of a male fetus and half for a female fetus (Article 487, section 6).

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When a woman gets an abortion, she is obligated to pay diyat regardless of the stage of pregnancy. If multiple fetuses are aborted, there is a separate diyat for each fetus. In these cases, the woman is not entitled to any shares of the diyat (Articles 489 and 490). In diyat crimes, the offender is responsible for the payment of the penalties in intentional or semi-intentional homicide (Article 304). In case the offender is a minor or mentally ill, the penalty is to be paid by the legally responsible adult (agheleh) (addendum to Article 305). According to the penal code, a minor is a person who has not reached the religious age of adulthood, and “insane” is one who lacks wisdom and control. Even intentional crimes by such offenders are considered “mistake” and their penalties should be paid by the agheleh, who is the offender’s legal inheritor. The agheleh include male paternal and maternal relatives who inherit from the offender, thus they are equally responsible for his/her financial responsibilities (Article 307). The public treasury is responsible for the payment of the compensation if the offender has no agheleh or if the agheleh is unable to pay the penalty within four years (Article 312). Ta’azir Crimes and Punishments in the Iranian Criminal Law Unlike hudud and qesas, ta’azir crimes in Islamic law are those crimes whose punishments are left to the discretion of the judge who has a great deal of latitude in determining whether or not a crime has been committed and what, if any, is the appropriate punishment. Iranian law, however, limits the judges’ discretion by specifying these crimes and establishing their respective punishments. A series of statutes adopted since the Islamic revolution cover a broad range of issues under the ta’azir punishments including political and security crimes, insult against the leadership, fraud and forgery, crimes against public morality and sexual dignity, social crimes against women and children, gambling, and drinking. Political and Security Crimes There is an extensive body of legislation that covers an array of security and political crimes in the Islamic Republic. Generally, certain collective, and some individual, acts that are designed to undermine the security of the country and the safety of the regime’s leadership are considered harba hudud and punishable by death. Other illegal political acts with or without the intent of subversion are generally covered by ta’azir and subject the offender to incarceration and fines. The penal code, the Law of the Establishment of the Public and Revolutionary Courts, Mass Media Law of 2000–2001, the Law of the Punishment of the Crimes of the Military Personnel, and the Law of Countering the Terroristic Acts of the U.S. Government extensively deal with crimes that are defined as political or security crimes. The penal code

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enumerates and criminalizes those activities that undermine the security of the country but fall outside the parameters of harb and, thus, subject the offender to ta’azir. Articles 498 and 499 call for the penalty of incarceration for those individuals who participate in the activities of societies or associations that intend to jeopardize the security of the country, regardless of the ideological orientation of the group or whether the illegal acts are committed inside or outside the country. If it is proven that the member was unaware of the goals of the association, he/she will not be subject to criminal penalties. The Law of the Punishment of Crimes of the Armed Forces deals more severely with crimes of espionage and sabotage by categorizing them as Hudud rather than ta’azir crimes. Dealing with espionage and sabotage, Articles 8 and 9 of this law assert that any military personnel who engages in any action (collectively or individually) that intends to destroy the Islamic Republic and jeopardize the territorial integrity and independence of Iran is considered a muhareb, and is subject to death penalty. Most legal scholars contend that these articles are applicable to both military and civilian personnel in the armed forces. 72 The penal code extends the scope of security crimes by including acts that range from propaganda to insult against the regime’s leadership and foreign dignitaries to actual acts of espionage and sabotage. Article 500 of the code specifically states that whoever engages in propaganda activities against the Islamic Republican system or in favor of opposition groups and organizations is subject to a period of three months to one year imprisonment. Propaganda, in this article, may include such acts as writing articles, giving interviews, preparing posters, making films, using performing and fine arts, etc. The judge has the discretion to determine what constitutes an act of propaganda against the system. 73 Defamation and insult are criminal acts under the penal code. The use of profanity and improper language subjects the offender to both lashing and fine, if the specific act is not covered by hadd punishment (Article 608). Clearly, insults against the prophet of Islam subjects the offender to hadd punishment (Article 513). However, similar insults against the religious authorities and other leaders are covered by ta’azir. A number of articles in the penal code account for a range of penalties for such acts. Article 609 states that whoever insults the Leader; ministers; members of the Majles, Majles-e Khebregan, and the Guardian Council; employees of the ministries or courts; and other governmental and municipal employees is subject to incarceration, lashes, and fines. In numerous articles of the code (e.g., Article 513), criminal penalties are reaffirmed for those who insult the Islamic establishment and the Leader. Additionally, Article 26 of the Revised Mass Media Law of 2000–2001 asserts that such insults by the media are subject to ta’azir punishment. None of these laws provide for specific penalties for insults against non-Muslim religious leaders. Specifically, the code subjects a person who

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insults Khomeini to a period of six months to two years of imprisonment (Article 514). Furthermore, Article 27 of the Revised Mass Media Law states that when a publication insults Khomeini or other religious leaders, the publication’s license is revoked and the managing editor and the author will be subject to criminal penalties. A person who intends to cause or causes bodily harm to the Leader or other leaders of the regime is subject to criminal penalties ranging from incarceration to death. Intentional resistance to and attack on officials who function in their public capacity is defined as tamarrud, and punishable by incarceration depending on the severity of the act (Article 607). Similar penalties are accounted for those who insult and or target foreign leaders and envoys in Iran (Articles 515, 516, 517), if reciprocal laws exist in the victims’ countries. In the absence of reciprocity, lighter punishments are imposed for such crimes. The offender in these cases may additionally be subject to qesas and diyat punishments consistent with the existing laws (addendum to Article 516). In a series of articles, the penal code deals with specific categories of espionage and treason, but does not clearly distinguish between the two. These cases may be covered either by harba (a hadd punishment) or by ta’azir. Any act of espionage in favor of or against any foreign government in Iran that undermines Iran’s national security is punishable by one to five years of imprisonment (Article 502). Discouraging the military personnel from carrying out their functions in defense of the country or encouraging revolt by them is considered muharebeh, and subjects the offender to the death penalty. If acts of treason are successful, the offender is subject to between two to ten years of imprisonment, otherwise the penalty is six months to three years of incarceration (Article 504). Intentional and informed collection and dissemination of documents, maps, and other classified information that deal with domestic and foreign policies of the country is considered espionage and subject to criminal penalties. Depending on the scope and nature of the crime, the penalty may include one to ten years of incarceration (Articles 501 and 505). The nature of crime and severity of penalties may differ depending on the role of the defendant in these security and political crimes. In an attempt to prevent these crimes and to ensure public cooperation, Article 507 provides for immunity from prosecution of those who lack a pivotal or leadership role in acts against the security of the country and collaborate with the regime by providing information about these acts and the individuals involved before the acts have taken place, and by cooperating with the law enforcement in prosecuting those involved. Collaboration with hostile countries is considered a crime under Article 508. While some legal scholars have concluded that the reference to “hostile foreign government” in this article is broadly applied to non-neutral states, others suggest that this article is only referring to those countries that are at war with Iran. 74 During

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war, any crime against the domestic and foreign security of the country subjects the offender to the most severe form of punishment for that crime (Article 509). Assistance with and participation in acts of espionage, threats against public facilities with the intent of creating public disturbance and endangering national security, and agitations and encouragement of others to engage in war and public massacre subject the offenders to a range of penalties of imprisonment (Articles 510–512). As a reaction to the United States’ policies, the regime adopted a singlearticle law called the Law of Countering the Terroristic Acts of the U.S. Government. This law charges the Iranian president with the responsibility of enforcing judicial decisions by arresting and punishing Americans and their functionaries who are found guilty in Iranian courts. The law, further, covers all other countries that directly or indirectly cooperate with the United States to kidnap or conspire against the lives of Iranian citizens (addendum 1 to the article). The U.S. citizens and their functionaries, according to addendum 2, are subject to Islamic legal principles and courts when engaged in the kidnapping and conspiracy against the lives of Iranians and the interests of the Islamic regime. This law is in effect as long as the “U.S. president continues his inhumane actions against the lives and interests of the Iranian citizens” (addendum 3). Forgery and Fraud Chapter 4, Article 518 of the penal code discusses fraudulent acts including illegal/unauthorized minting and distribution of domestic and foreign currencies. These are ta’azir crimes with penalties of between one to ten years of imprisonment. The Law of the Punishment of Currency Forgers and Importers, Distributors, and Users of Forged Currencies, 75 in its single article subjects those who engage in such acts to death penalty if the offense is committed by a member of a group with the intent of subverting the regime. According to this article, if the act was not a part of a group effort to undermine the regime and is proven that the offender is simply misled, he/she is only subject to ta’azir punishment. The penal code also accounts for ta’azir punishments for robbery and destruction of governmental seals, stamps, documents and other establishments (Article 543). Crimes against Pubic Morality and Sexual Dignity The regime relies on the penal code to establish a legal framework for its social policies and to implement the clerics’ view of proper social conduct including dress code, sexual conduct, and social relationships. By referring to undesirable acts as religiously prohibited (haraam) conduct, the code enumerates and prohibits such behaviors as appearing in public in the nude or outfits that are revealing, eating in public during the fasting hours in the

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month of Ramadan, and engaging in sexually questionable conducts. From the outset, the regime insisted on enforcing the long-held clerical preference for proper appearance in public. Article 683 of the penal code describes noncompliance with the Islamic dress code as a crime. For men, that means prohibition of short-sleeved shirts and shorts. 76 Women are required to wear a religious head cover (hejab-e shar’i). The purpose of hejab is to cover a woman’s body, except the face and hands, but the instrument of covering the body is of no relevance. 77 Women who appear in public without a religious head cover are subject to the penalties of incarceration and fines (addendum to Article 638). These criminal penalties are applicable to all who are present in Iran, even those who are on transit, regardless of their nationality, religious affiliation, or permanency or temporary nature of their residency. This law and the regime’s early and periodic emphasis on enforcing the dress code have resulted in violence against women. Early after the revolution, some militant Muslims took it upon themselves to attack women who did not follow the hejab rules, and in some instances began spilling acid on women’s faces to deter them from violating these rules. Under a great deal of pressure from the public, especially women, the regime passed a new law called the Law Regarding the Penalty for Spilling Acid. 78 In a single article, this law establishes severe criminal penalties for this type of violence against women. The penalties vary depending on the implication of the intentional act, resulting in execution for death of the victim and incarceration for the loss of organs, senses, and any other damages. Disorderly conduct in public including undermining public calm and interfering with the public’s business transactions is prohibited, and violators are subject to incarceration and lashing (Article 618). Also, men and women are prohibited from engaging in acts (adultery is not covered under this article and, as discussed earlier in this book, is treated as a hadd punishment) that are inconsistent with the shari’ah and human dignity (Article 637). Even if the act does not warrant criminal penalties, as long as it undermines public dignity, it is still subject to criminal penalties of incarceration and lashing (Article 638). Establishing a place of prostitution, engaging in acts of prostitution, and any sexually corrupt act (fesad) is prohibited. The law orders the closure of such establishments and accounts for criminal penalty of incarceration for such offenses (Article 639). Furthermore, anyone who possesses, collects, distributes, publicizes, exhibits, imports, exports, and encourages the use of any materials that violate public ethics is in violation of the criminal code, and subject to fines and lashing. These materials may include writings, drawings, pictures, publications, announcements, posters, movie tapes, films, or any other such materials (Article 640).

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Social Crimes The penal code criminalizes improper and violent acts against women and children and man’s failure to meet his financial obligations toward them. Whoever uses language inconsistent with the dignity of women and children, and improperly interferes with and violates them in public, is subject to incarceration and lashing (Article 619). A man who is financially capable but refuses to pay maintenance to his destitute wife is also subject to criminal penalty of imprisonment (Article 642). The civil code extensively discusses man’s financial obligations toward his family. The criminal code also deals with various types of conducts that undermine the dignity of the family and the rights of individuals to a proper and dignified family life. While the Iranian law does not prohibit polygamy on the part of men, the penal code specifically accounts for criminal penalties for those involved in arranging for and participating in polygamous relationship on the part of women. Article 643 of the penal code accounts for incarceration, lashing, financial penalties, and permanent revocation of professional license for conducting marriage (when applicable) for those who wed a married woman to a different man. As a major departure from the past, when many marriages were not formally registered, in the interest of “family integrity,” the code requires the formal registration of all marriages, divorces, and returns (rojooe, the religious act of returning to one’s spouse after a divorce). Article 645 establishes criminal penalty of incarceration for failure to register such events. Public Safety and Interest Crimes As discussed earlier, any intentional acts of resistance to the regime and any acts that cause public and security disorder are considered harb and covered by the hadd punishment of death (addendum to Article 675). Any other acts of violence against the public and private interests are ta’azir crimes. Anyone who sets fire to a building, ship, airplane, factory, storage facility, residential area, forest, agricultural farms, gardens, and products is subject to incarceration (Article 675). Even the initiation of such acts is considered a crime and subject to lighter incarceration penalties (addendum 2, Article 675). Furthermore, there is criminal penalty of incarceration for anyone who destroys, burns, or jeopardizes the functions of public or private institutions or installations involved in such public services as water, sewer, electricity, gas, oil, postal and telegraph, radio and television and related facilities, and traffic lights and other instruments of public safety. These penalties apply regardless of whether these services are publicly or privately owned, as long as they are in the service of the public (Article 687).

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Display of Drunkenness, Gambling, and Vagrancy Drinking alcohol is primarily covered by hadd punishment in Iranian law. However, the current Iranian penal code subjects the offender to an additional ta’azir punishment of 2–6 months of incarceration for the public display of drunkenness. Anyone who contributes to and is involved in private and business functions related to drunkenness is also subject to criminal penalties. Production, importation, and sale of alcoholic drinks are prohibited and subject the offender to incarceration and/or financial penalties (Article 703). Also, purchase, transportation, and storing of alcoholic beverages subject the offender to incarceration or lashing penalties (Article 702). Anyone who establishes a place for drinking alcohol or invites others to such a place for the purpose of drinking is subject to the maximum financial penalty and lashing under the law (Article 704). Islamic law prohibits all forms of gambling largely for its destructive impacts on individuals and families. The penal code in Iran prohibits gambling and subjects gamblers to incarceration and financial penalties. In the case of public display of gambling both penalties are imposed (Article 705). Those individuals who build, import, sell, buy, transport, store, or make instruments of gambling available to others are subject to incarceration and financial penalties (Articles 706 and 707). Additionally, there are incarceration and financial penalties for establishing gambling halls and inviting others to such establishments (Article 708). Those who work in gambling establishments or assist with the establishment or management of these entities are considered accessories (mubasher) to these crimes, but may, with the court’s finding, be subject to lighter penalties (Article 710). The law entitles the government to confiscate and destroy equipment and cash related to gambling as a part of the penalty for the offenders (Article 709). The penal code, further, accounts for criminal liabilities for the relevant authorities who are made aware of drinking and gambling establishments but fail to properly report or act on such information. In this case, those authorities are subject to incarceration and lashes, if the law has not established more severe penalties (Article 711). FAMILY LAW As discussed earlier, there are significant limitations in the scope of the Islamic criminal law and its contemporary applications. These limitations have resulted in the adoption or incorporation of Western penal codes in Muslim societies. Contrarily, much of the Islamic civil law has rarely been challenged. In particular, Muslim societies have rarely abandoned or substantially downgraded the laws pertaining to personal matters. With the insistence of clerics and public support for family law, this body of Islamic law

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continues to dominate Muslim societies despite its contemporary limitations. Even the modernizing Muslim societies continue to rely on the basic premises and principles of Islamic family law in regard to such issues as marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, and maintenance. Many aspects of the Islamic family law, like other Islamic legal codes, have been criticized for their failure to treat women equitably. 79 The rules that deny or limit women’s right to divorce, minimize their custodial and inheritance rights, and deprive them from certain procedural rights clearly do not put women on par with men in the Islamic family law. In response to such criticisms and strict interpretations of the laws, some of the proponents of family law have adopted a progressive view of this law and have indicated that the Islamic family law is not rooted in authentic religious law rather it is based on common consensus (quol-al-mashhoor). As such, this law is subject to independent judgment and could be revised to accommodate the contemporary needs of Muslim societies. 80 According to Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Bojnourd, a progressive cleric and theology professor at Tehran University, Islam advocates for gender equality and certain unequal stipulations in Islamic law should not be considered discriminatory as long as these stipulations are reflective of the inherent conditions related to the distinct roles of men and women. For instance, differences in the inheritance shares among women and men are due to the fact that financial and economic responsibilities of women in the family are less than those of men. 81 For this reason, men’s greater financial entitlements in the law should not be interpreted as an indication of their superiority over women. 82 In fact, he suggests that there are areas of the law where women are granted privileges unavailable to men. For instance, Bojnourd contends, men are treated more severely than women in the Islamic penal code. Similarly, this distinction in treatment, he argues, should not be construed as superiority of women over men. In his view, many of the existing discriminatory practices such as unequal role of women as witnesses, unequal inheritance in the Shi’a fiqh, and gender differences in the rules of retribution and diyat are not unalterable and can be easily interpreted and revised by openminded clerics and legal experts. Even the conservative Khamene’i has tried to downplay the discriminatory nature of hejab rules by suggesting that both genders should observe hejab in their own domain. 83 It can be convincingly argued that a significant number of stipulations in the Islamic family law tend to treat men and women differently, and often women are denied opportunities available to men. However, the Islamic family law was progressive at the outset and raised the status of women and families by establishing the rights of the family members. This was in fact a sharp departure from the pre-Islamic Arab tribal traditions that granted women very few rights. In the Arab traditions, marriage was basically a contract of sale through which a woman became the property of her husband. 84 Cus-

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tomarily, she was little more than a piece of property and, as a wife, was totally subject to her husband and his relatives and dependent on them for her maintenance and support. A woman had no voice in marriage or divorce and possessed no inheritance rights, especially when inheritance meant transfer of money from one tribe to another. 85 It was in this atmosphere that Quranic injunctions and Muhammad’s sunnah attempted a radical departure from these customary practices and raised women’s rights and accounted for a degree of gender equity. Later, in its early developments, classical Islamic family law incorporated the customary practices into these Quranic reforms, resulting in a family law that oftentimes embraces discriminatory practices against women while asserting the need for gender equality. Marriage in Islam In Islam, marriage (nikah) is a highly sacred covenant between a man and a woman that reflects the practicality of Islam and combines both the spiritual ibadat (ritual) and muamalat (exchange and interaction) dimensions of a follower’s life. Ultimately, the purposes of marriage are procreation, creating a solid and comfortable familial atmosphere, and social cohesion and order. Both the Quran and hadith attest to these objectives. Referring to God, the Quran says: “One of His signs is that He created spouses of your own species, so that you might find comfort with them. And He put mutual love and affection in your hearts. Surely in this there are lessons for thinking people.” 86 In underscoring the task of procreation, the Quran says: “He is the Creator of the heavens and the earth. He has given you partners from among yourselves and, similarly, made the cattle also males and females. That is how he multiplies you. Nothing can be compared to Him. He is the Allhearing, the All-seeing.” 87 In both the Shi’a and Sunni schools of law, marriage is largely seen as a religious obligation and is imbued with a host of ethical injunctions. Since celibacy is strongly discouraged and sexual relations outside marriage are prohibited as zena and subject the offender to hudud punishments, marriage is a practical means of preserving morals and chastity through satisfaction of sexual needs within the limits set by God. 88 Spiritually, marriage is a religious ritual that removes the sexual taboo and renders sexual relations between a man and a woman licit (halal). Legally, marriage in Islam is a contract, but the boundaries between the ethico-religious and contractual bases of marriage are blurred both in law and in practice. Formally, marriage is patterned after the contract of sale, which typifies contracts in Islam. 89 However, there is a distinction between marriage contracts and contracts of sale. Unlike normal contracts of sale, marriage contract entitles the man to the right of access to the woman’s sexual and reproductive faculties but not the right to the person of the bride. 90 This aspect of the marital rights and

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obligations explains man’s right to divorce his spouse in case she fails to make herself available to her husband for the purpose of sexual pleasure. While some have criticized the contractual nature of marriage in Islam as demeaning to women and downgrading them as objects of sale, 91 compared to the pre-Islamic institution of marriage, the Islamic marriage contract did in fact raise women’s status by making them a party to a binding exchange that recognizes both parties’ rights and responsibilities. 92 Rights and obligations established by a marriage contract are both moral and legal in nature, but the boundaries between the two are blurred and often the legal dimensions overwhelm the moral ones. Of course, while a marriage contract has defined terms and uniform legal effect, it does not necessarily account for equal rights for both parties. However, as a legally binding contract between two consenting parties, certain conditions may be stipulated in the contract of marriage to enhance women’s rights and establish a degree of equality, provided that such stipulations are not contrary to the nature of marriage, as defined by legal scholars. For instance, the marriage contract may give the woman the right to divorce her husband beyond the circumstances allowed in Islamic law, but it may not remove the husband’s right to divorce his wife, since this is a predominantly accepted right in Islamic family law. The marriage contract consists mainly of three components: the offer (ijab), made by the woman or her guardian; the acceptance (qabul) by the man; and the payment of dower (mahr or sadaq) by the husband. A distinguishing feature of Islamic family law is the dominant role of the fathers and grandfathers in contracting a valid marriage, and the absence of such a role for mothers and grandmothers. In fact, women, in general, lack the legal competence in contracting a marriage. A number of conditions, principles, and procedures have to be observed for a contract of marriage to be valid. In the absence of such conditions, a marriage is void (batil), and no rights are recognized for the parties. In this case, there is no inheritance, no maintenance, and the children are considered illegitimate. As an example, the marriage of a woman to several men at the same time (polygamy) is void and lacks any legal effect. If the foundation of a marital contract is sound but it is lacking in certain aspects that can be corrected, such as the lack of witnesses or ineligibility of the man to get married since he is already married to four women, the marital contract is corrupt (fasid). In this type of marital contract, limited rights are recognized for the parties if the marriage is already consummated. For instance, the wife is entitled to dower but not to maintenance. The children of this marriage are considered legitimate and entitled to a share of the inheritance. A valid or sound marriage (salih) is based on a contract that meets all of the legal requirements and, consequently, the parties are entitled to all of the rights and subject to all of the obligations stipulated in the contract. These requirements, according to John Esposito, are centered around five issues: number of spouses, religious affiliation of the parties,

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familial ties, waiting requirements (iddah), and man’s equal or superior status. Islamic family law recognizes man’s right to be married to up to four wives at the same time, but women are prohibited from polygamous relationships. Although this accommodation is inequitable, practically it did limit men’s right to polygamous relationships that were unlimited in the pre-Islamic Arab practices. Given this limitation, it has been suggested that Islamic polygamy raised the status of women who were historically subjected to unlimited polygamy. 93 Preservation of the family, man’s dominant role, and social order are the primary justifications for polygamy in Islam. The loss of men in wars and subsequent problems with orphans and the growing concerns about individual and social morality and chastity encouraged the need for polygamy. In response to the battle of Uhud and the loss of many Muslim men, the Quran encouraged polygamy as long as such relationships do not undermine the commitment to equal treatment. This principle is affirmed in the Quran when it suggests: “If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry women of your choice, two or three or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly [with them] then only one.” 94 Women are prohibited from engaging in polygamous relationships largely because of the patrilineal Arab and Islamic social structures that attach children to the male’s family. Thus, a Muslim woman is allowed to marry only one man at a time so that her children’s paternity could be established. For this reason, a second marriage is legally prohibited and the children are considered illegitimate and may not be legitimized by any later acknowledgments, and are denied inheritance. The religious requirement also aims at ensuring the Muslim partner’s dominance of the family. Since the dominant role of men in the family is generally accepted in Islam, Muslim women are not entitled to marry nonMuslim men to avoid being subjugated to non-Muslims. Furthermore, under the Hanbali law, a Muslim man’s marriage to a non-Muslim is limited to those women who are followers of religions of the Book (kitabiyyah), that is the heavenly and revealed religions that rely on a revealed book. The doctrine of kafaah also attempts to preserve man’s status in the family by underscoring that a marriage is suitable if the man is, at least, of equal social status to the woman he is marrying. The woman’s social status is of no concern, since the marriage raises her status to that of her husband. 95 Islam prohibits marriage to certain members of the family. This prohibition is asserted in the Quran and other Islamic legal sources. According to the Quran, individuals with certain blood relationships or consanguinity are prohibited from marrying each other. 96 For instance, a man cannot marry his or his wife’s ascendants or descendants. Similar restrictions apply to those with fosterage relationships. In Islamic law in general, and in Hanafi law in particular, a woman has to observe a specified waiting period (iddah) after a divorce or the death

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of her husband before getting remarried. By waiting, the child’s lineage will be established and his/her rights are preserved. The marriage contract establishes rights and obligations for both parties. Today, in the reformed Islamic law, it is common to deviate from the customary practices and account for additional rights and responsibilities for parties. The parties can stipulate certain rights and obligations, as long as these stipulations do not violate the nature and purpose of marriage. These stipulations can range from denying the husband the right to polygamy to giving the wife the right to divorce and broader freedoms. Generally, the wife’s obligations include obedience to the husband, maintenance of home, and caring for children. The husband’s obligations include providing for the family and ensuring the security of the wife and children in case of divorce. Both parties maintain property rights. Although they do inherit from each other, marriage contract does not establish spousal interest in property. As a departure from the traditional Arab practices, the Quran allows the woman to keep her property even after her marriage is dissolved. 97 A significant component of an Islamic marriage contract is the dower or mahr right. In some schools, like the Maliki School, dower is such a pivotal component of marriage that its absence voids the marriage. In the Shi’a practice, however, the absence of a specific mahr does not void the contract of marriage but, for her security, entitles the bride to a special type of mahr called mahr al-mithal (exemplary dower). Dower is generally a financial opportunity granted to the woman at the time of marriage to safeguard her economic well-being in case the marriage is dissolved. In practice, dower may also be a deterrent to the husband’s desire to divorce his wife, since it is payable in full at the time of divorce. Legally, it is in fact payable at the time of marriage, but not commonly requested until divorce. In the pre-Islamic Arab traditions, dower was payable to the bride’s father not to the bride, since the bride herself was not a party to the marriage contract. Islamic reform changed this practice and made dower payable to the bride herself as a party to, rather than an object of, the marriage contract. 98 In addition to dower, the husband is obligated to provide for his family regardless of the wife’s economic means. In this obligation, the wife has priority over the children and can take legal action against the husband for his failure to provide for her. The husband has maintenance obligations only for his legitimate children who are the product of a sound marriage and their legitimacy is acknowledged by him. Legitimate children are also entitled to inheritance. Islamic Divorce Islam views marriage as a permanent institution and divorce, while allowed, is discouraged as contrary to the interests of the family and the community.

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However, if the continuation of the marriage undermines peace and harmony, it is no longer serving the purpose of marriage and can be dissolved through divorce (talaq). Talaq in Arabic means “repudiation” and is rooted in the term tallaqah, which means releasing a person from his/her obligations. In Islamic family law, it means the release of a spouse from the marriage bond, either by repudiation or by legal process. Even in progressive Islamic societies, men and women are not entitled to the same rights in divorce. However, Islam radically improved women’s rights to divorce compared to preIslamic Arab practices. In the pre-Islamic Arab traditions, men’s right to divorce was unlimited and women’s right to divorce was non-existent. Islam put some limits on men’s right to divorce and granted women the ability to divorce their husbands under certain conditions. In modern reformed Islamic family law these rights have been expanded, thus providing women with greater flexibility and accessibility to divorce. Married couples may be divorced for numerous reasons and through different processes. In a proper or comprehensive divorce (talaq), the husband exercises his absolute and exclusive right to divorce, a right granted to him by the Quran, by making a pronouncement that the marriage is dissolved. 99 The husband is neither required to offer any justification for this decision nor does he need the consent of his wife. The Quran explicitly underscores the undesirability of such divorces and warns those who exceed the limits set by Allah. 100 The prophet also condemned divorce by referring to it as a lawful (halal) act which is most hateful to God. 101 However, this Quranic assertion has not been effectively incorporated into any legal injunctions to restrict men’s rights and guard against abuses by them. 102 Divorce may be a delegated (talaq al-tafwid) one, whereby the right to divorce is delegated to the wife by her husband through such expressions as “choose” or “divorce yourself.” In a consensual divorce (khul and mubarah), both parties are consenting to the divorce. In khul, the consent is mutual but the desire for divorce is expressed by the wife and the husband may consent to divorce in return for some compensation (i.e., part or all of her dower). Divorce may be the outcome of a judicial process (lian and faskh). In lian, the husband accuses his wife of adultery and the wife denies such allegations and legally seeks retraction. If both swear to the legitimacy of their claims and the husband refuses to divorce his wife, the court can issue a divorce decree. The court may also annul or abrogate (faskh) a marriage contract at the request of the wife on very restricted grounds. Various schools of law differ greatly in terms of the grounds upon which they give the women the right to divorce under faskh. Normally, the grounds available to women are very limited and hard to prove. In some schools, particularly in the Hanafi tradition, a marriage is dissolved, regardless of whether it is consummated or not, if a party to a marriage contract denounces Islam. Thus, in addition to criminal penal-

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ties, apostasy is grounds for the dissolution of marital contract in Hanafi Islam. The rights and obligations of the husband and wife do not end with divorce. The wife is obligated to observe a period of waiting (iddah) to protect the rights of the children in case she is pregnant. Immediately after divorce, she is entitled to the total sum of her dower, if the marriage is consummated and half of that amount if it is not. The husband is obligated to pay maintenance for the wife and children, especially if the wife is nursing a young child. Islamic family law extensively deals with family inheritance as a religious obligation and sharply deviates from the pre-Islamic Arab inheritance traditions. Generally, the pre-Islamic Arab practices were designed to keep the property within the individual tribe in order to preserve its strength and power. Only mature male (agnate) relatives who could fight and protect the possessions could inherit. 103 Minors, widows, and daughters were barred from inheritance. In an attempt to establish a just system and enhance social and familial harmony, Islam changed these practices by diminishing the role of the tribe and clan and by underscoring the significance of family in inheritance. This way, wives, children, and a number of close relatives were granted inheritance rights. The Quran specifies the primary inheritors 104 and others are identified by juristic traditions. There are striking differences between the Sunni and Shi’a laws of inheritance. The Shi’a inheritance law is comparatively simpler and refuses to afford any special privileges to agnate relationships; the Sunni law, however, acknowledges the rights of these relatives. 105 Generally, in Islamic law not all heirs are treated the same. Normally, female heirs are awarded a share equivalent to half of their male counterparts. This unequal treatment is explained by men’s maintenance responsibilities that the Quran specifically imposes on them. Spouses may inherit from each other in cases of death and revocable divorce. Normally, irrevocable divorce terminates spousal inheritance rights. The wife inherits one-eighth of her husband’s estate if there are children and one-fourth if there are no children. However, spousal inheritance is collective in the sense that all the wives collectively share in the one-eighth or one-fourth of the inheritance, whichever is applicable. A controversial issue in Islamic divorce is the limitations of mothers’ custodial rights. Islam generally acknowledges the tender age rule and grants custody to mothers for a male child until the age of seven and for a female child until puberty that is normally set at the age of nine. In the event that the mother is unwilling or morally unfit to provide proper care for children, the father or paternal grandparents gain the custody of the child. If no qualified custodian exists, the court could appoint guardians for them. In the Hanafi law, similar to most schools, during the maternal custody, the father is legally considered to be the natural guardian and maintainer of the children. After

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that period, he and the paternal relatives automatically receive the custody of the children. It is suggested that this preference for paternal custodial rights largely reflects the dynamics of a traditional patriarchal, patrifocal family. 106 This form of paternalism reflects the broader communal tendencies that exclusively assign men the right to control family and communal matters. In these societies, the family emphasizes the paternal line of ancestry and assumes that this line of custody provides for greater stability for children. The Evolution of Family Law in Iran The history of family law in Iran is largely shaped by an ongoing struggle between clerics who have insisted on the monopoly of the Shi’a fiqh in personal matters and the state that has oftentimes tried to modernize family law by diminishing the role of the shari’ah, incorporating modern Western conceptions of rights and responsibilities into Iranian law, and replacing the religious courts and legal establishments with modern secular legal institutions. Consequently, Iranian family law is essentially a hybrid law which is neither the shari’ah nor Western. 107 Until the early decades of the twentieth century, the judiciary was the monopoly of the clergy and family matters were adjudicated by the shari’ah courts that were headed by clerics trained in the Twelver family law. With the fall of the Qajar dynasty (1794–1925) and the accession of Reza shah to power (1925), the regime undertook an extensive effort at legal reform aimed at establishing a secular modern judicial system. The new family law was codified between 1928 and 1935 as a part of the modern Iranian Civil Code. While the European modern codes clearly influenced the civil code in many respects, matters of personal status continued to be predominantly shaped by a simplification of the classical Twelver law. 108 This code, however, departed substantially from the shari’ah by establishing a legal age of marriage, prohibiting girls’ marriage before the age of thirteen, and requiring court permission for all marriages under the age of fifteen. 109 Gradually, more reforms were enacted by the adoption of the Marriage Law (Qanoon-e Ezdevaj) in 1931. This law marginalized the shari’ah courts by requiring the registration of all marriages and divorces in civil bureaus. Additionally, the law expanded women’s rights to initiate divorce proceedings in civil courts rather than religious courts. The most notable reforms in family law in Iran were introduced and enacted in 1967 as a part of the Family Protection Law (Qanoon-e Hemayate Khanevadeh). Considered a radical departure from the shari’ah and the most revolutionary in the Muslim world, this law enacted substantial changes to the rights and obligations of the parties in marriage and divorce and established the Family Protection Courts. In the succeeding years (specifically in 1975), further modifications were made to the law as a part of the continuing family law reform. This law repealed previous family laws and

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accounted for criminal penalties for violation of these laws and failure to use the civil court system to resolve family disputes. The courts were granted discretionary powers to adjudicate family matters including divorce and custody, even in disregard of the Shi’a provisions. Article 1 of the law rejected the religious courts’ jurisdiction and referred all the family disputes and matters related to custody and maintenance of children to provincial (shahrestan) or divisional (bakhsh) courts, where no provincial courts were available. Furthermore, the law subjected all of these cases to the normal requirements of the civil procedure. 110 The civil procedure for family disputes, according to this law, was to rely on arbitration (Articles 3 and 5) to facilitate reconciliation between the parties (Article 6). If arbitration failed, the court could make a decision according to the laws. The law increased the age of marriage from fifteen to eighteen for women and from eighteen to twenty for men (Article 23). The courts may permit the marriage of a woman of fifteen years of age if she was physically and emotionally ready for marriage. The law established criminal penalties for failure to comply with the age requirements. Polygamy was discouraged and, under certain circumstances, banned by the law. A man was obligated to inform the woman at the time of marriage of another existing wife. Failure to inform a woman was considered a fraudulent act and subjected the man to criminal penalties (Article 6). Under this law (Article 16), a married man could not take a second wife except under the following conditions: consent of his existing wife, the first wife’s inability to discharge her spousal duties, wife’s disobedience to her husband, insanity of the wife or her infliction with an irrecoverable disease, the wife’s criminal conviction (as specified in Article 8, section 8) and addiction (as specified in Article 8, section 9), the wife’s abandonment of the marital arrangement, the wife’s inability to have children, and the wife’s disappearance (as specified in Article 8, section 14). The law accounted for the rights and obligations of the parties. The husband and wife were obligated to treat each other well (Article 8). Consistent with the shari’ah, the law established the wife’s right to maintenance and defined maintenance as appropriate housing, clothing, food, and other household necessities (addendum to Article 9). The wife could rely on civil or religious courts to enforce the payment of maintenance by her husband (Article 10). The law also accounted for custodial rights and obligations of the parties. Article 14 of the law called for fines for those who violate legal custodial arrangements. For instance, parents who fail to produce their children for visitation may be fined between 100 to 10,000 rials, with maximum penalties for repeat offenders. Additionally, the court, according to this article, could change the custody of the child due to these infractions. The court may terminate the father’s custodial rights due to his inability to discharge his parental responsibilities and grant custody to the paternal father or mother and, in the case of their incompetence, to a third party. The mother’s custodi-

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al rights were terminated with remarriage, but the court may give custody to the mother or a third party in the absence of a competent father or paternal grandparents (Article 15). In the interest of the family, the law further prohibited the spouses from engaging in any profession or activities that were inconsistent with the family interest. Article 18 of the law allowed the court to prohibit the husband from engaging in a profession, at the wife’s request, that jeopardized the family as long as this prohibition did not undermine the family’s financial well-being. By removing the religious courts’ jurisdictions in divorce, the law practically abolished traditional Shi’a divorce practices. All divorces were decided by secular courts which issued divorce registration permits known as the Certification of Impossibility of Reconciliation (Article 8). These certificates were issued on the basis of the mutual consent of the parties or upon the establishment of certain conditions. 111 As a sharp departure from the Shi’a jurisprudence, similar grounds for divorce were made available to both parties. The husband’s failure to provide for maintenance, taking an additional wife without his existing wife’s consent, and his failure to treat co-wives equally gave the wife additional grounds for divorce. To provide a religious cover for such radical measures, the law required such stipulations to be incorporated into marriage contracts. As expected, these measures encountered serious challenges by clerics. In 1967, Khomeini denounced the provisions of the Family Protection Act for being contrary to Islam and declared divorces issued by these courts void. 112 In fatwa 2836, he said: “The Law designated ‘The Family Law,’ which has as its purpose the destruction of the Muslim family unit, is contrary to the ordinances of Islam. Those who have imposed this [law] and those who voted [for it] are criminals from the standpoint of the Shari’a and the law.” In a later fatwa (2837), he suggested that: “It is the duty of the ulama (may God Almighty support them) to protest forcefully against laws such as this that are void from the standpoint of both Islam and the law; they should not seek to gain the favor of the true criminals by pretending that lower-ranking officials are responsible for executing the order of the opponents of Islam.” 113 Marriage and Family Rights and Obligations in the Islamic Republic Shortly after the revolution, clerical elites announced their desire to return to the Ithna’Ashari Shi’a provisions in family matters and began incorporating these provisions into the Iranian Civil Code which was under revision. However, until September 1979 (nearly seven months after the revolution), the Family Protection Courts continued their operation and rendered judgments according to the Family Protection Act. Soon thereafter, the regime passed

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the Special Civil Court Act and removed all family matters from the ordinary civil courts. This piece of legislation is relatively short (consisting of only nineteen articles) and deals mainly with procedural matters, but it has had a tremendous impact by undoing the pre-revolutionary legal reforms in the Iranian family law. Most importantly, by calling for a “Special Civil Court,” the legislation not only removes family matters from the ordinary civil courts but, more importantly, exempts them from the rules of evidence and procedure contained in the Civil Procedure Code. Article 1 of this code requires the court to be presided over by a religious judge qualified to exercise ijtihad (mujtahid jami ‘al-sharayt) or his appointee. Clearly, the Shi’a jurisprudence underlies the current Iranian family law 114 which is incorporated into the Iranian Civil Code. By relying on some of the moral aspects of Islamic marriage, the law spells out the jurisdictions of the courts, rules of marriage and divorce, and rights and obligations of the parties. However, it does not attempt to define marriage, since it cannot cover temporary marriages 115 under a comprehensive definition because these marriages neither entail living together nor procreation. Some jurists have, however, defined marriage in Iranian law as a “legal relationship established by contract (aqd) between a man and a woman entitling them to sexual enjoyment.” 116 Article 6 of the civil code applies the laws pertaining to personal matters including marriage, divorce, citizenship, legal standing, and inheritance to Iranian citizens regardless of their residency (inside or outside the country) status. In recognition of the significance of religion in personal matters, the law exempts non-Shi’a Muslims and non-Muslims (Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians) from provisions related to marriage and divorce. Individuals are not exempt from this law if their religions do not have specific and established rules, and if such rules undermine public order. Following the Shi’a jurisprudence, where non-believing (kufr) is a prohibitive cause, the code specifically bans the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man and the marriage of any Muslim to a person who subscribes to any religion other than the religions of the book (Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity). Contrary to non-Twelver practices, the code also acknowledges temporary marriages (siqa) in Iran. To justify these marriages, it is suggested that “The Quran has recognized temporary marriage under limited conditions and in consideration of unavoidable social necessities.” 117 These marriages, which are quite controversial and rejected by many Iranians, are expected to be for a specified period of time and this specificity should be known to both parties. If the duration of marriage is not specified, the marriage becomes permanent. Islam basically accepts the age of puberty as the age of marriage. However, the age of puberty could range based on geographical considerations and the physical condition of the individual. Ayatollah Yousef Sane’i, a progressive cleric, rejects the age of nine as the

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age of marriage and favors the age when the conditions of puberty are present. 118 The current Iranian law allows the marriage of girls at the age of thirteen. As a condition of marriage, the Iranian law accounts for mahr that should be profitable, transferable, and possessable by a Muslim. 119 Mahr may only consist of religiously sanctioned materials. Therefore, it may not consist of things such as wine and gambling equipment that cannot be owned by Muslims. Legally, mahr is payable at the time of the marriage, and the wife may refuse to discharge her duties until she receives her mahr (Article 1085). Furthermore, she is free to use the mahr in any manner she wishes. If the wife is divorced before the consummation of the marriage, she is still entitled to half of the mahr. She must return the rest, if she has already been paid more than half (Article 1092). Chapter 8 of the civil code enumerates the rights and responsibilities of the parties in marriage. Basically, these rights and responsibilities fall into three categories: reciprocal rights and obligations, exclusive rights of the husband and obligations of the wife, and exclusive rights of the wife and obligations of the husband. Largely focused on family and its interests, foremost among reciprocal rights and obligations are good and equitable spousal treatment (Article 1103) and cooperation in building and reinforcing the foundation of family and child rearing (Article 1104). To these ends, the law ensures a leading role for the husband (Article 1114) by empowering him to determine the location of marital residence (unless contractually stipulated otherwise), controlling the family finances, seeking his wife’s obedience (Article 1108), and preventing her from undertaking professions that he considers inconsistent with the interests of the family (Article 1117). The law relies on customary practices in the determination of compensated woman’s work at home. It is necessary and required by law for women to work at home to facilitate good family relationships. Relative to customary practices, woman’s family condition, time, place and other considerations, this type of work is uncompensated but entitles the wife to maintenance. Some tasks, including agricultural work, animal husbandry and the like, may be compensated under certain circumstances, especially after the death of the husband. 120 Under the shari’ah patrifocal system, custodial rights are normally granted to the father and paternal grandparents. Mothers’ and maternal grandparents’ custodial rights are basically limited to the period of tender age and may be removed due to the mother’s remarriage. Disregarding the shari’ah principles, the Family Protection Act had enabled the courts to grant either parent custody in the interest of the child. Under this law, the courts normally granted the custody of the child to the mother after the father’s death. After the revolution, the shar’iah formally governs custodial rules, but in practice judges modify these rules and seek compromises on custodial issues from parents. Article 1181 of the civil code grants fathers the primary custodial rights, and puts

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paternal grandparents on par with fathers, even when fathers are alive. These provisions of grandparental rights were modified by a July 1985 law. This law also allows widows to maintain custody of their children even in case of remarriage, thus diminishing the supervisory role of paternal grandparents, and grants the mother the right to receive her deceased husband’s pension. The wife is entitled to her dower at the time of marriage (Article 1085), maintenance by her husband (Article 1106), and control of her own personal wealth (Article 1118). According to Article 1106 of the code, the husband is responsible for the payment of maintenance (nafaghe) to his wife. Article 1197 of the code establishes need as the basis of maintenance. A person is required to pay maintenance if he is capable of paying it without that adversely interfering with his living (Article 1198). In determining the ability to pay, a person’s overall obligations and living conditions should be considered. Maintenance may include shelter, clothes, food, and other household necessities consistent with the wife’s condition. The wife is entitled to the services of a housekeeper if she is used to such services or if she needs a housekeeper due to illness or disabilities (Article 1107). The wife’s refusal to carry out her duties does not automatically remove her right to maintenance (Article 1085). However, Article 1108 specifically stipulates that a woman who refuses to carry out her responsibilities without a legitimate reason is not entitled to maintenance. Following a patrilineal system, a father is also responsible for the payment of child support, and in case of his death paternal grandparents are responsible for the payment. In their absence, the mother is obligated to maintain her children and in her absence maternal grandparents have the obligation (Article 1199). In return, and consistent with the family focus of the law, children and grandchildren are obligated to maintain their parents (Article 1200). Also, other needy relatives are entitled to maintenance that may include shelter, clothes, food, and household goods (Article 1204). To underscore marital obligations and reject spousal abandonment, the code extensively deals with the requirement of residency at the marital home. The husband’s disappearance and refusal to maintain his family are grounds for divorce and criminal penalties. Also, the wife is obligated to reside at the place chosen by her husband, unless the right to choose the marital residence is granted to the wife under the contract of marriage (Article 1114). The wife may also refuse to live in such a residence if she is fearful for her physical, financial, and emotional well-being. In this case, the wife may choose a separate residence and, if her fears are proven, the court may not force her to return to the marital residence and she may not lose her right to maintenance (Article 1115). Similarly, the wife may refuse a sexual relationship with her husband without losing her maintenance right, if the husband is infected with sexual diseases after the marriage (Article 1127).

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As evident in this brief discussion, husband and wife have separate and unequal rights and obligations under Iranian law. This law does not account for common property rights, as exemplified by the wife’s sole control of her own wealth. While the husband is obligated to pay maintenance for his family, he does indeed maintain exclusive control over any wealth accumulated during the marriage. It is only under very limited circumstances, and usually after the husband’s death, that the wife may gain control over some of this wealth. Normally, these disparities in rights and obligations are explained by the “differing but complementary biological and psychological dispositions of men and women.” 121 Proponents of this perspective contend that the law in fact grants the wife a superior status by relieving her of any responsibility to contribute to the family finances, entitling her to maintenance and dower, and granting her autonomy and control over her own wealth. Divorce in Today’s Iranian Law Islam in general and the Shi’a fiqh in particular do not establish equal rights in divorce. However, the current reforms in the Iranian civil code, most of which are the remnants of the Family Protection Act, tend to provide greater opportunities for women in divorce. As discussed earlier, Islam does not encourage divorce but provides for four mechanisms for the dissolution of marriage: repudiation of the wife by her husband (talaq), termination of the marriage on the basis of mutual consent as initiated by the wife (khul or mubarat), separation by court decree (tatliq) and annulment of the marriage contract (faskh). While these mechanisms are commonly referred to as divorce, they have different legal implications. Although the Islamic regime in Iran dismantled the Family Protection Act within months, it did in fact retain some of the progressive elements of that law in regard to divorce. For instance, in a clear departure from the traditional Shi’a jurisprudence that allows the husband to divorce his wife at any time without any grounds, the new law allows divorce only when the man has his wife’s consent. In the absence of consent, the husband must seek the court’s permission to register a divorce by going through arbitration. To reconcile this limitation with Islamic principles, the regime has relied on the Quran which encourages arbitration. Here, while the process is still unilateral and favors men, the husband can obtain divorce if he follows the required legal procedure of arbitration. In establishing the legal procedures and conditions for divorce, the Iranian parliament passed the Executive Regulations Pertaining to the Single Article on Divorce in 1991. This law specifically requires the appointment of arbitrators in divorce cases. The parties may choose any arbitrators including relatives or third parties as long as they are Muslim, married, trustworthy,

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free from corruption, and familiar with the issues of the family (Article 4). 122 These arbitrators must meet, at least in two sessions, to investigate the conflicts between the parties, resolve the issues in order to achieve reconciliation, and report their findings to the court (Article 7). In the amendment to this law (passed in 1992), the Special Civil Court is required to issue a certificate of irreconcilliation to certify the divorce, and the marriage recorder’s office is prohibited from recording any divorces without such a certificate (single Article). This procedure is reaffirmed in the Iranian civil code. While the code gives the husband the right to repudiate his wife at will without providing any grounds for his decision (Article 1133), he is required to follow the procedures set up by the code under the Regular Forms of Talaq (Articles 1134 and 1142). These procedures limit the husband’s arbitrary exercise of his right to divorce. The law essentially accounts for two types of repudiation divorces: revocable (raj’i) and irrevocable (al-ba’in). The revocable divorce is a suspended form of divorce in which the matrimonial bonds are not completely severed until the wife completes three menstrual cycles after the pronouncement of divorce by the husband. During this period, the wife could not remarry and the husband maintains the right to return to the marriage. The wife is entitled to maintenance and, in the case of death of a party, the other’s right to inheritance remains intact. In the irrevocable divorce, the dissolution of marriage is final at the time of pronouncement of divorce. In this case, the wife still has to observe the same period of waiting and is entitled to maintenance if she is pregnant. Normally, a divorce is irrevocable if the marriage has not been consummated, or the woman is past her menopause, or the wife has not reached the age of menstruation, or if it is the third successive repudiation by the husband. Of course, the three successive divorces may not occur on one occasion, contrary to the common perception. 123 To deter the husband from exercising his right to repudiation three successive times, there is a need for an intervening marriage if the parties desire to remarry. Iranian law also accounts for divorce by mutual consent. Articles 1146 and 1147 of the Iranian civil code distinguish between khul and mubarat, and identify them as irrevocable divorces unless the wife claims back the compensation that she had paid in return for her husband’s consent (Article 1145, section 3). The Ithna ‘Ashari Shi’a recognizes judicial dissolution (tatliq) of marriage only on the grounds of the husband’s impotence. Here, upon the wife’s application, the judge either forces the husband to divorce his wife or declares divorce on his behalf. Given the significance of annulment (faskh), the code devotes an entire section to this subject (Articles 1121 to 1132). The marriage may be annulled if the marriage contract is faulty and/or if certain conditions are present or absent in either of the parties, including mental or physical incapacities.

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The law relies on the Secondary Binding Obligation principle in the Shi’a jurisprudence to justify some of the more pragmatic and progressive components of the divorce law in the civil code. This principle allows Muslims to incorporate agreements in contracts as long as such agreements do not undermine the core elements of certain contractual relationships. In marriage contracts, as discussed earlier, husband and wife may agree on certain rights such as the wife’s right to divorce and the choice of the marital residence, but they cannot agree on removing the husband’s right to divorce. Today, in Iran all of these stipulations are printed in a formal marriage contract that is valid only if it is signed by the husband for each stipulation. Since the shari’ah mandates that men are free to repudiate, to delegate, or to refrain from delegating their right to divorce, the husband may indeed refuse to agree to any stipulation that he deems unacceptable. The code specifically requires that all marriage contracts after 1982 contain two sets of stipulations that are binding on the marriage contract signatories. First, even more progressive than the Family Protection Act, these contracts currently establish a matrimonial system by requiring the husband to pay his wife half of the wealth accumulated during their marriage upon divorce, provided that the divorce is not initiated or caused by any fault of the wife. The court decides whether or not the fault of divorce lies with the wife. 124 Second, the contracts include stipulations that delegate the right of divorce to the wife under certain conditions. The wife may seek divorce by recourse to the court on the basis of the conditions inserted in her marital contract. These conditions, which the husband may or may not agree to, generally include: • Husband’s failure to support his wife and to fulfill other mandatory duties for at least six months. • Husband’s mistreatment of his wife to the extent that she no longer can tolerate the marriage. • Husband’s affliction with any incurable disease that may endanger her health. • Husband’s insanity in cases that the shari’ah does not normally allow the annulment of the marriage. • Husband’s failure to comply with a court order to abstain from an occupation that is repugnant to the wife and her position. • Husband’s sentence to a prison term of five or more years, or failure to pay a fine which results in his imprisonment for a period of five or more years. • Husband’s addiction to anything harmful which, in the court’s judgment, is detrimental to family life and renders the continuation of marital life difficult for the wife.

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• Husband’s desertion of marital life without just cause for more than six months. The court decides on the question of desertion and the acceptability of his excuse. • Husband’s conviction for any offense or sentence including hadd and ta’azir that is repugnant to the family and position of the wife. • Husband’s failure to father a child after five years of marriage. • Husband’s disappearance and failure to find him within six months of the wife’s application to the court. • Husband’s second marriage without the consent of the first wife or his failure to treat co-wives equally. Some of the reformist clerics tend to favor women’s right to divorce not only based on their contractual rights but also their husbands’ conduct. Ayatollah Sane’i, a progressive cleric, supports woman’s right to end an unwanted marriage by annulling the marriage deed. In his view, man’s sin that causes haraj (arbitrarily creating difficulty for one’s spouse) enables his wife to divorce him even without the judge’s verdict. In his view, annulling the marriage does not, in this case, deprive the wife of her benefits and dues as long as the marriage is consummated. 125 Despite the restrictive Shi’a jurisprudence in family law and the progressive legal measures undertaken in Iran since the Family Protection Act, the practice of marriage and divorce in Iran is largely shaped by social and cultural norms and values of the society. In Iran, marriage is encouraged and divorce is a social taboo. Most individual interactions are measured and managed within this social environment and outside the legal system. A large majority of divorces and custodial disputes are resolved outside the legal process and based on the couple’s mutual consent. Therefore, courts are mainly the instruments of negotiation in contested cases and formalization of what parties have already consented to. In the case of divorce, which has been subject to greater legal modification, courts attempt to bridge the gap between the legal framework of divorce and social practice, 126 and provide a mechanism for a degree of standardization. Interestingly enough, despite the theocratic nature of the Iranian system and social practices that still tend to be patriarchal, these legal modifications have made Iranian family law more egalitarian than the ones practiced in most Muslim societies. The legal protections for women in marriage, the nearly equal access by women to divorce, and women’s expanded custodial rights that are contrary to the shari’ah are indicative of this trend in Iranian law. These legal steps have enabled women to escape unwanted marriages, but social realities still dominate broader issues related to gender relations. As Ziba Mir-Hosseini observes, the case of family law in Iran “suggests that neither secularization nor a return to a shari’a-based society in themselves ameliorate or worsen women’s lot. Paradoxically, it is in Iran, where the

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shari’a is now enforced, women enjoy better status, both in law and in marriage.” 127 In today’s Iran, women are generally free to contract marriage, seek divorce, and successfully gain the custody of their children. As long as clerics, as the guardians of the shari’ah, find this trend in their social and political interest, they will continue with this pragmatic interpretation of the law that impacts the daily lives of a sizable portion of the Iranian population. PRESS LAW Proponents of democracy in Iran have always considered freedom of the press a pivotal instrument of democratic change. Within limits, Iranian constitutions have legally accounted for press freedoms. Formally, the interests of the community and compliance with Islamic principles have been the main limitations of freedoms in Iran’s constitutional history. In practice, however, freedom of the press, like other freedoms, has been largely measured in term of the interests and wishes of the political authorities. The Supplemental Fundamental Laws of October 7, 1907, specifically recognized press freedom. In Article 20 of this constitutional law, it is stated that: “All publications, except heretical books and matters hurtful to the perspicuous religion [of Islam] are free, and are exempt from the censorship. If, however, anything should be discovered in them contrary to the press law, the publisher or writer is liable to punishment according to that law.” 128 Similarly, the constitution of the Islamic Republic recognizes the significance of the press and its freedoms. Article 24 of the constitution asserts that “Publications and the press have freedom of expression except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.” In concert with this constitutional mandate, the Islamic Consultative Assembly adopted a press law in 1986 (which was approved by the Guardian Council, and its executive bylaws were adopted in 1987). 129 This law spelled out the rights of the press, their limitations, and accounted for extensive institutional mechanisms of press control. After defining the “press” as any regularly published materials under a permanent name and serial number that covers a widerange of subject matters (Article 1), the law enumerates the mission of the press beyond the dissemination of information to the public (Article 2). Under this law, the objectives of the press include: enlightening the public and raising their awareness on a wide range of issues, advancing the objectives of the constitution, refraining from disseminating false and divisive information, campaigning against the manifestations of imperialistic culture, propagating and promoting genuine Islamic and ethical principles, and preserving and strengthening the policy of “Neither the East nor the West.” Article 3 of the law deals with the rights and protection of the press. “The press have the right to publish opinions, constructive criticisms, suggestions

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and explanations of individuals and government officials for public information while duly observing the Islamic teachings and the best interest of the community” (Article 3). The law, however, defines constructive criticism as any criticism that is based on logic and reason and void of insult, humiliation, and detrimental effect. Article 4 prohibits censorship and control of the press and any coercive measures by governmental and non-governmental officials to force the publication of an article or essay. The press, according to Article 5, is legally entitled to acquire and disseminate domestic and foreign news to enhance public awareness. However, in doing so, they should take into consideration the best interests of the community and observe the provisions of the law. In Article 9 of the executive bylaws of the law, the press are permitted to quote from aberrant or anti-Islamic domestic and foreign publications, groupings, and parties for research, criticism, and rejection of their viewpoints provided that this would not be tantamount to publicity for them. The law outlines specific restrictions on the press (Article 4). Basically, any form of dissemination of information that, in the view of the regime, undermines public good, Islamic principles, and the laws is prohibited. These prohibitions include: publication of any atheistic materials prejudicial to Islam and damaging to the Islamic Republic, propagation of obscene and religiously prohibited materials, insulting Islam and religious sanctities including the Supreme Leader and other religious authorities, and committing plagiarism or quoting deviant press or groups and parties in such a manner to propagate ideas detrimental to Islam. In addition to these limitations based on the Islamic and regime considerations, the law prohibits the propagation of luxury and extravagance, causing any social and political discord, instigating and encouraging acts that undermine the security and dignity of the state (including publication of classified documents, maps, and confidential proceedings of authorities), and libelous publications (even by means of caricatures and pictures) against individuals and authorities (Article 6). To ensure press control, the law established extensive licensing and publication requirements. There cannot be any publication without license or with suspended or cancelled license (Article 7). The majority of the materials published by a specific press should be congruent with the subjects authorized by its license, and the responsible license-holder should be specifically identified by the press. The law prohibits publishers and printing houses and distributors from publishing and distributing materials that the Press Supervisory Board deems in violation of the law (Article 7). Of course, the regime controls the press primarily by relying on its licensing procedure and requirements. The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is charged with licensing the press. Article 9 of the press law lists the applicant’s (real or legal person) qualifications. In addition to standard age (twenty-five years old), citizenship of Iran, and educational requirement (at least a bachelor’s degree or completion of the basic seminary education, as verified by Article 10 of

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the bylaws of the Press Supervisory Board), the law requires the applicants to be free from incapacity or loss of social rights due to criminal conviction, fraud, bankruptcy or moral corruption (Article 9). The license-holder is responsible for the general policies of the paper, and the managing director is responsible for any articles and any other related affairs (Article 9, note 4). This law prohibits any publications by those affiliated with the former regime or those who have publicly spoken in favor of the former regime through news media, radio, or television (Article 9, note 5). This law establishes the Press Supervisory Board as the media regulatory and oversight agency and spells out its composition, responsibilities, and general guidelines and procedures. Members of the Board are expected to be devout Muslims who possess required scientific and moral competence and are committed to the Islamic Revolution. The statutory members consist of a judge from the State Supreme Court as elected by the Supreme Judiciary Council, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance or his authorized representative, a Majles deputy as elected by the body, a university professor appointed by the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and one of the press managing editors elected by the press (Article 10). The board examines license applications, determines the competence of the applicants and managing editors, and recommends acceptance or denial to the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Articles 11 and 13). The law also establishes guidelines for publication timelines, circulation, and financial record keeping (Articles 16 and 20), and regulates entry into and exit from the country of publications in compliance with religious values and constitutional laws (Article 22). In conjunction with the penal code, the law establishes administrative and criminal penalties for violations of the press limitations. Article 23 obligates the press to publish responses to false and libelous articles and news items. Failure to publish the responses in a timely manner and in accordance with the set guidelines may result in legal action and temporary suspension of the publication (Article 23). Criminal and civil penalties are accounted for slander and derogatory allegations (Articles 30 and 31). The law also accounts for criminal prosecution of those who publish confidential documents and proceedings (Articles 24 and 29), instigate and encourage criminal conduct that undermines domestic security and foreign policies of the state (Article 25), and insult Islam and the leaders of the regime (Articles 26 and 27). Competent courts in the presence of a jury have jurisdiction over crimes attributed to the press (Article 34). In 1987, the executive bylaws (consisting of four chapters and thirty articles) of the press law was adopted and detailed a host of issues related to the definitions and specifications of the press, license and permit insurance, and obligations of managing editors. The press law is, by any standard, very restrictive and empowers the regime and clerical elites to exert a great deal of control over the media. In

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today’s Iran, the free press continues to be a critical tool in the hands of reformers in their struggles with conservatives who dominate the political process. 130 In this political atmosphere, the media remain vulnerable to conservatives’ autocratic proclivities and reporters, journalists, and editors are subject to extensive waves of repression including arrests, imprisonment, and torture. Conservatives have unleashed thugs on the independent media and have resorted to legislative and judicial measures to tighten their control on the free press. They have, in fact, openly supported media censorship in the name of Islam and communal interest. For instance, Muhammad Javad Larijani, now the Speaker of the parliament and a member of the Supreme National Security Council, defended the move to ban satellite dishes by arguing that uncensored and unpolished satellite broadcasts have many corrupting influences which are far more dangerous than the pollution of the living environment. He essentially concluded that satellites are good as long as they can be controlled and their programs can be monitored by the proper authorities. 131 Reformist President Khatami and his Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Ali Mahajerani, tried to limit attacks on the media and restored licenses to a number of banned publications that expressed ideological viewpoints contrary to the conservative stance, especially those in the judiciary. Supporting the judiciary in this dispute and disregarding the objections of the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Majles passed more restrictive measures in April 1998. Interestingly, this legislation focused on the exploitation of women, and made it a crime to create division between women and men by defending women’s rights outside the legal and shari’ah frameworks. 132 Furthermore, the Majles amended the press law on July 7, 1999. Proponents of these amendments argued that such amendments enhance press freedom by preventing foreign penetration into the press and providing for press facilities. Reformist opponents of the bill, including President Khatami, criticized the ambiguities in the bill, apparent discrepancies, and its attempt to put tight restrictions on the media. 133 These amendments did in fact put significant restrictions on the press. They changed, for instance, the composition of the Press Supervisory Board and the three-person selection board of the press jury by adding representatives from the Islamic Propagation Organization and the Friday Congregational Prayer leader, thus ensuring greater clerical control over the press. Article 5 of this amendment banned anti-revolutionary groups from the media. 134 Furthermore, the amendments authorized the feared Revolutionary Courts (Article 12) to hear certain cases of press violation. These courts could prosecute writers and journalists who overstep the bounds of permitted criticism, force news reporters to reveal their sources, bar those involved in “anti-establishment” activities from holding any positions in press institutions, and hold the press responsible for any articles that incite or encourage acts of violence against national security or the “interest of the Islamic establishment” (Article 25). 135 Of course, these

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Revolutionary Courts do not meet international standards for independent and impartial tribunals, and do not provide for a fair and public hearing as required in Article 14(1) of the ICCRP. To silence the dissenting clerics, Special Courts for the Clergy are also used to prosecute clerics who promote independent ideas in the press. As a result of this legislation, many journalists were banned from writing and many were arrested. The reformist Majles during the Khatami administration tried to soften these restrictions by offering amendments that gave the press some flexibility to change their publication cycles or circulations. Another amendment attempted to ease the definition of insult and defamation in press offenses. However, the Guardian Council and religious authorities overruled such legislative efforts. 136 These types of reforms are simply too piecemeal and limited to ensure press freedom, even if they are incorporated into the law. The ambiguous language that prohibits publication of materials detrimental to Islam in Article 24 of the constitution and similar assertions in press laws fundamentally restrict press freedom in Iran. In practice, the courts, the executive branch, and the Majles continue to constrain press freedom by closing newspapers, putting independent reporters and writers on trial in revolutionary courts, and adopting laws that limit press freedom further. HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND VIOLATIONS Generally, human rights laws cover a broad range of issues including political rights to free speech, assembly, and vote; non-discrimination; protective rights for women, children, and minorities; economic rights to work and fair compensation; and due process rights. Proponents of the Islamic regime in Iran contend that the Iranian constitution and laws guarantee human rights and do not violate universal human rights conventions. 137 Dismissing the criticisms of Iran’s human rights violations, Hussein Mehrpur argues that the Islamic and communal interest restrictions on human rights in Iranian laws reflect the Islamic nature of the system and intend to protect its values against internal and external threats. He insists, however, that the constitution and laws do guarantee human rights within Islamic bounds and communal interests. The critics suggest that such limitations in Iranian laws substantially limit human rights. In their view, Islamic law is not necessarily consistent with human rights and the Iranian regime’s interpretations of rights according to Islamic law and communal and regime interests further violate human rights. Ann Elizabeth Mayer believes that, while Iran acknowledges human rights (huquq-e ensani), the regime undermines such rights by giving supremacy to Islamic law and by opening up the scope of a wide array of rights to interpretation by the regime and its clerical elites. In her view, while international human rights laws accept certain limitations on rights and freedoms,

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they do not impose the types of limitations advocated by Iran’s theocratic regime. In the absence of clear guidelines on how to reconcile Islamic limitations with contemporary human rights, and the lack of consensus and clarity on the Islamic conception of rights, the Iranian regime is free to choose what it considers to be Islamic human rights. 138 To reconcile human rights with Islamic law, some progressive clerics are of the view that Islamic law, as an eternal and infallible God-given law, reflects human nature. Human nature, in turn, establishes the parameters of human rights. Therefore, human rights are reconcilable with Islam, even in those matters where there seem to be contradictions. According to Ayatollah Mohammad Bojnourd, Muslims can rely on independent judgment (ijtihad) to reconcile these areas of contradiction and reinforce human rights aspects of Islamic law. In his view, Islam encourages reliance on thoughtful human reasoning to deal with certain issues. As long as human rights reflect human nature, they are compatible with Islam. 139 This, of course, is neither the dominant view nor does the regime make serious attempts to underscore and reinforce human rights in law and practice in Iran. Political Rights As discussed earlier, the constitution and a host of other Iranian legal codes account for civil and human rights including freedoms of speech, media, assembly, and movement. Article 3 (section 7) of the constitution charges the government with the duty of ensuring political and social freedoms within the framework of the law. In numerous articles, which were discussed earlier, the constitution guarantees freedom of the press within Islamic limitations (Article 24), the public’s right to assemble and participate in the political process (Article 26), and religious freedom. A host of other laws and regulations also establish freedoms of the press and speech. For instance, Article 3 of the Press Law of 1986 entitles the press to publish criticisms and proposals of the public and officials, taking into account the expediencies of the society and Islamic rules and regulations. Basically, many of the rights enumerated appear consistent with the universal human rights. However, these laws allow the regime to disregard such rights when they are understood to be inconsistent with Islam, the interests of the regime, or communal interests. Interestingly, the constitution begins enumerating individual rights by asserting the primacy of communal interests and Islamic principles. This emphasis is nowhere more apparent than in Article 9 of the constitution which stipulates: “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another, and their preservation is the duty of the government and all individual citizens. No individual, group or authority has the right to infringe in the slightest way upon the political, cultural, economic, and military inde-

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pendence or the territorial integrity of Iran under the pretext of exercising freedom.” However, the same article makes it clear that “no authority has the right to abrogate freedoms, not even by exacting laws and regulations for that purpose, under the pretext of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the country.” The laws specifically hold government officials accountable for human rights violations. Article 4 of the press law makes it illegal for the government to censor the press or force them to publish materials. There are criminal and administrative penalties for violations of these rights. Article 48 of the penal code specifically calls for temporary dismissal, and ban on the hiring for government jobs, of those officials who jeopardize citizens’ freedoms. To ensure transparency and accountability both for the press and officials, Article 168 of the constitution and Article 34 of the press law specifically call for jury trials in cases of violations by the press of their freedoms, as spelled out by the laws within an Islamic framework. While these assertions in the constitution and numerous laws intend to prohibit violations of rights and account for punishments for those who violate citizens’ rights, the regime’s sole authority to determine what constitutes rights in accordance with Islam and communal interest undermines the idea of a universal standard of rights, which Iranian laws expressly support. In practice, the regime openly limits citizens’ freedoms and those who advocate for social and political rights in the country. As a matter of practice, defenders of these rights are systematically harassed, arrested, imprisoned, and tortured on dubious charges. During the Ahmadinejad administration (2005–2013), numerous journalists were arrested and sentenced to prison terms, newspapers were closed down, college students and professors were banned from universities, and labor union members and leaders were fired from work or detained simply for demanding that the government respect their political rights. In 2007, the regime even tried to adopt legal measures to restrict the activities of non-governmental (mostly human rights) organizations that allegedly received finances from “problematic internal and external sources aimed at overthrowing the regime.” 140 For instance, they banned the activities of the Center for Defenders of Human Rights (CDHR), run by the Noble Peace Prize Laureate Shirin Ebadi and other leading Iranian human rights attorneys, and agreed to issue new permits for them “if changes were made to the [center’s] mission statement.” 141 The constitution explicitly encourages political participation through elections when it states: “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections” (Article 6). To underscore this right, the constitution relies on the Quranic doctrine of consultation (shura), which entitles members of the ummah to consult among themselves in managing their affairs. Election laws including the Election Law of 1983, the 1984 Law on the Election of the President, and the Referendum Law of 1988 reaffirm this right by stipulating that all eligible citizens, except mentally unfit and mi-

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nors, are entitled to participate in elections freely. However, electoral laws and processes in Iran systematically undermine the public’s right to vote. Clearly, the vetting process by the Guardian Council, which regularly disqualifies candidates from standing for election based on questionable claims, is not consistent with standard electoral practices in democratic systems. According to the 2007 Amnesty International Report, a large number of candidates for that year’s parliamentary elections were disqualified “on the basis of discriminatory selection procedures.” 142 This is indeed a common pattern in recent elections, whereby the conservative-dominated Guardian Council effectively ensures the electoral successes of conservative candidates by disqualifying reformist and moderate candidates from running for office. The result of the presidential election of 2009 that reinstalled Ahmadinejad as a clear winner of a highly contested election shows that electoral irregularities and limitations go beyond the vetting process as exercised by the Guardian Council. The ensuing mass demonstrations in rejection of the rigged election and the lack of respect for political rights, and the regime’s brutal attacks on demonstrators that resulted in deaths and injuries underline the gap between legal political rights accounted for Iranians in the constitution and the laws and repressive practices by the regime that is intent on maintaining its control on an increasingly restive young population that no longer tolerates the regime’s systematic violations of its rights. Non-Discrimination In addition to freedoms, international standards of human rights acknowledge the principle of gender, religious, racial, and ethnic equality. The issue of equal treatment in the Iranian constitution and laws is complex and often confusing, especially in regard to gender and religious equality. Consistent with Islamic law, Article 19 of the constitution calls for equality, but deliberately avoids the issue of whether gender and religion could be grounds for denial of equality. Article 38 of the Labor Law of 1990 143 states that, “for equal works in equal conditions, men and women must be paid equal wages. Discrimination on the basis of sex, age, race, ethnicity, and political or religious creed are not allowed.” Despite calls for equality in the constitution and laws, women are generally treated inequitably in law and practice under the Islamic regime in Iran. 144 Women activists and organizations have repeatedly called for legal reform to ensure equal rights for women. 145 However, the regime continues to limit women’s rights and treats proponents of such rights harshly by detaining demonstrators and imprisoning female activists. The regime’s apologists frequently suggest that the unequal treatment of women in the Islamic Republic does reflect Islamic teachings and Iran’s social circumstances. 146

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Similar arguments are made for discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. Echoing the principle of tolerance of the People of the Book (ahl al-kitab) prescribed by Islamic law, the Iranian constitution acknowledges the rights of such religious minorities as Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews. Article 13 of the constitution grants them the right to observe their own religious laws and duties in personal matters within the limits of Iranian law. However, when Article 14 of the constitution calls for treatment of religious minorities according to the dictates of Islamic justice and equity, and the shari’ah rules generally relegate non-Muslims to an inferior status, it is not certain that the law in actuality calls for equal treatment. This problem is clear in Article 14, which also warns non-Muslims that religious minority rights apply “only to those who do not become involved in conspiracies and activities which are anti-Islamic or are against the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 147 According to the 2007 Amnesty International Report, religious minorities are regularly subjected to discrimination and harassment in Iran. In February 2007, according to this report, the regime cracked down on peaceful demonstrations by the Nematollahi Sufis, who were opposed to the evacuation order of their place of worship in the city of Qom. Many of the demonstrators and their lawyers were detained, injured, flogged, fined, and imprisoned. The regime even went further when Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani issued a religious edict designating Sufism as “null and void.” 148 Zoroastrians, evangelical Christians, and Baha’is have also been subject to discriminatory practices. In March 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief expressed concern about an October 2005 letter instructing government agencies to identify and collect information about Iranian Baha’is. 149 Ethnic minorities including Arabs, Azeris, Kurds, and Baluchis have complained about discriminatory laws and practices as well. Arabs continue to complain of discrimination, particularly in regard to access to resources and forced evictions. The regime detained and tortured scores of Arabs accusing them of involvement in bombings in the south in 2007. Some were executed after they confessed under very limited judicial protection. In fact some of their attorneys who complained about deficiencies of their clients’ trials were charged with “acting against state security.” 150 Public protests by the Azeris in the northwestern towns and cities in 2007 against ethnically offensive cartoons published in the state-run newspaper were harshly confronted by the regime resulting in arrests, injuries, and death of many people. 151 Confrontations between the Kurds and security forces have resulted in many arrests and deaths over the years. The regime has also arrested and imprisoned many Baluchis. In March 2007, in reaction to armed attacks and the killing of twenty-two Iranian officials by an armed Baluchi group, Jondallah, the regime arrested and executed many Baluchis with very little due process. In 2010, the regime arrested and executed the group’s leader, Abdol-

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malek Rigi, without a meaningful due process. The Jondallah reacted to the execution and the regime’s continued repression by several bombings in the south-western part of the country in July of 2010 that resulted in the death of security forces and innocent people. Children’s Rights Iranian laws acknowledge children’s rights, but they are still ambiguous and incomprehensive at best. A major limitation of these rights is the lack of a fixed age of maturity in Iranian law in particular, and in Islamic law in general. While there is no consensus among Muslim legal scholars as to the exact age of maturity, it is often suggested that females reach the age of maturity at the age of nine and males at the age of fifteen. Additionally, there are major disagreements about regional/geographic, physical, and sociopsychological considerations in the determination of the age of maturity. According to Shirin Ebadi, who received the Noble Peace Prize for her legal advocacy efforts in Iran, the most important problem in regard to children’s rights in Iran is the lack of specificity about the exact age when childhood ends and adulthood begins. 152 In Iranian law, a child is a person who has not achieved the age of puberty, 153 which may vary in men and women and from one person to another. In some instances, courts have to establish the age of puberty, especially in determining such rights as the right to marry or engage in commercial transactions. In 1993, Iran joined the 1989 U.N. Child’s Rights Convention with a stipulation that Iran would not be bound by any provisions that conflict with Islamic laws and the Iranian civil code. According to Article 1 of this convention “children are peers below age 18 unless understanding and enforceable regulations set the puberty age below 18.” Thus, the convention recognizes that children’s age is set by domestic regulations and may vary from one country to another. The Iranian civil code establishes the age of puberty as the age of maturity. According to Article 1210 (note 1) of the code, girls achieve puberty after nine lunar years and boys after completing fifteen lunar years. At puberty, all persons are considered adults and are entitled to certain rights and subject to civil and criminal codes and penalties. The implication of this standard is that a ten-year-old girl can be tried and subjected to the same penalties as a forty-year-old man. According to this standard, it is even permissible to issue a death sentence for a female who has reached nine years old lunar age under Iranian law. 154 Before the age of maturity, children’s political, economic, and legal rights are limited. After puberty, the person generally achieves certain rights. For instance, a person who reaches puberty is allowed to marry and engage in a number of legal actions. The law, however, limits political rights even for those who have reached puberty. To vote, for instance, the law prescribes the full age of puberty. In other words, a nine-year-old girl is allowed to marry

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and bear children but cannot vote in elections, even if she has received a puberty age certificate from the courts. Similar restrictions are set in a number of other laws. For instance, the Passport Law (ratified in 1972) requires persons under the age of eighteen to secure permission from their fathers or guardians to secure passports. The labor law sets puberty at the age of full fifteen years. Thus, hiring persons under the age of fifteen is considered child labor and a violation of the law. No one under the age of eighteen may be employed by the government or receive a driver’s license. These exceptions cause a person to be considered an adult in some circumstances and a child in others. Traditionally, children have been a notable component of the workforce in Iran, especially girls in the carpet weaving industry, mainly due to low salaries. This practice has been detrimental to the well-being of the children. Under international pressures and in concert with international labor regulations, Iranian labor laws have historically prohibited child labor with some exceptions. In 1958, the Majles passed a new Labor Law which prohibited child labor under the age of twelve except in family workshops. 155 There were public protests against this law since poor family income made it nearly impossible for children to escape work. People did not comply with this law and child labor continued to be a major human rights concern in Iran for several decades. Largely in response to international pressures and due to improved economic conditions, the government reaffirmed its commitment to combating child labor in 1969, but the problem persisted until the adoption of the 1990 Labor Law. Article 79 of this law specifically raised the labor minimum age to fifteen, and subjected those who violate this limitation to fines. Repeat offenders may be subject to incarceration from 91 to 180 days. There are two exceptions to the age limit in this law. Article 188 exempts businesses that are owned and operated by the children’s immediate relatives. In this case, there is no age limit for working children. However, the minimum age limit is raised to eighteen for those professions whose nature or condition is deemed to be harmful to the physical and emotional health of the children by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Workers between the ages of fifteen and eighteen are considered young adults under this law and should undergo physical examination by the ministry to be certified for work (Article 84). The working hours should not exceed eight hours a day for the maximum of forty four hours per week (Article 51). No night overtime work should be assigned to young adults. Article 53 of the law designated night hours as 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.. The law specifically prohibits assigning difficult or harmful work such as heavy lifting to young adults. Under the penal code and labor law, the government is charged with the responsibility of establishing a rehabilitation center to provide the children with a criminal record vocational training and assist them with finding jobs.

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There is very little doubt that the child labor laws in Iran have remarkably reduced child labor over the recent decades, despite the drop in the per-capita income. 156 Today, the majority of working children are employed in nongovernmental and mainly family farming professions. It is expected that child employment will continue to drop largely due to rising educational opportunities for children and entry of women to the workforce, which would render child labor unnecessary. Equality before the Law Articles 14 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognize that it is an established right of every individual to be treated equally before the law, courts and tribunals, and to be allowed to vindicate his rights. Similarly, in numerous instances, the constitution of the Islamic Republic reaffirms equality before the law and rejects discriminatory treatment of citizens on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, and religious affiliations. For instance, Article 3 (section 14) of the constitution states that one of the duties of the government is “securing multifaceted rights of all citizens, both men and women, and providing legal protection for all, as well as the equality of all before the law.” Articles 19, 20, and 34 acknowledge equality within Islamic limitations. To underscore equality of all, Article 107 of the constitution puts the Leader on par with the average citizen. As a commitment to human rights, the Iranian constitution extensively deals with due process rights ranging from the presumption of innocence, rules of evidence, access to legal representation, and right to open and fair trials. Articles 37 of the constitution and 365 of the Civil Legal Procedure assert the presumption of innocence in criminal and civil matters until guilt and responsibility is established by an authoritative court of law. Consistent with Article 15 of the ICCPR, 157 Articles 169 of the constitution and 11 of the penal code reject retroactive application of the law, which may consider a legal act illegal in future legislation. According to Article 11 of the penal code, “The state laws, rules and regulations, as well as punishments, security, and instructive measures should not be made with retroactive effects. No individual should be punished for committing an act or failing to act on the basis of a law with retroactive effect.” However, if a new law favors the offender of a previously illegal act, changes in penalty should be given consideration when passing the final verdict. The laws, additionally, ban unlawful arrests and detentions. Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that arrests should be made in accordance with legal procedures established in law which require the filing of charges within twenty-four hours with competent authorities. The 1982 penal code accounts for civil and criminal penalties for officials who violate these rights (Articles 53 and 71). According to the law, officials engaged in arrests without warrants and in false imprisonment of people are

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subject to administrative penalties of temporary or permanent dismissal from their positions as well as criminal penalties of incarceration. Iranian law explicitly removes any legal immunity of officials involved in due process violations. The laws also ban any forms of torture and account for legal guarantees to avoid torture in the judicial process. Article 38 of the constitution forbids all forms of torture for extracting information, taking an oath, or forcing confession. In courts, any forced confession, oath, or testimony is devoid of value or credence. The constitution even goes further in Article 39 when it bans “all affronts to the dignity and repute of persons arrested, detained, imprisoned, or banished in accordance with the law.” Article 176 of the By-Laws and Rules and Regulations of the Prisons and Security Measures of March 1993 explicitly states: “Harsh treatments, insults, vulgar speech, or physical punishment of the inmates and the practice of obscene and harsh measures is forbidden in prisons.” The right to legal representation is considered a fundamental right of the parties in court cases. If the parties are unable to afford legal counsel of their choosing, they are provided with legal counsel (Article 35 of the constitution). Article 314 of the penal code entitles criminal defendants to up to three counsels of their choice. According to a 1984 Supreme Court decision, in all death penalty offenses legal counsel must attend the hearings. In the absence of legal representation, the Supreme Court will overturn the verdict and court officials are punished. Similarly, Article 7 of the Bylaws of the Revolutionary Tribunals of 1979 stated: “Every accused person is entitled to have one Iranian legal counsel who is acquainted with Islamic laws and legal procedures.” To ensure fair trials, the constitution and laws establish the right to public and open trials, except when the court considers open trial detrimental to the community and the parties. According to Article 168 of the constitution (that deals with press and legal offenses), trials must be open and members of the public may attend without restrictions unless, “the court determines that an open trial would be detrimental to public morality or discipline, or if in the case of private disputes, both parties request not to hold an open hearing.” Article 9 (section 1) of the Legal Procedures of the Revolutionary Courts of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 327 of the penal code, and Article 136 of the civil code also reaffirm the right to open trials. In addition to the regular court system, the constitution and laws have established a number of institutions charged with ensuring human rights including the Commission of Article 90, the Court of Administrative Justice, and the National General Inspectorate. Article 90 of the constitution requires the parliament to investigate and respond to any public complaints against any of the three branches of the government. To implement this requirement, Article 44 of the Bylaws of the Islamic Consultative Assembly called for the

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establishment of a commission titled the Commission of Article 90. Additionally, Article 173 of the constitution established a court of Administrative Justice under the supervision of the head of the Judiciary, and Article 174 created the National General Inspectorate to investigate and adjudicate complaints against the government and its officials. Recently, the government created two other commissions to deal with human rights issues: The Islamic Consultative Assembly’s Human Rights Commission and the Judiciary’s Human Rights Commission. Human Rights Violations Despite these legal guarantees, it is abundantly clear that human rights in Iran are not properly protected. Islamic restrictions, public interest considerations and, more importantly, political expediencies of the regime do clearly limit freedoms of speech and the press, due process rights, and equal rights. 158 Despite legal guarantees for free speech, the regime systematically restricts the populace from openly expressing their political views. In an attempt to pursue a more pragmatic approach, particularly in social policies, the Khatami government (1997–2005) astutely, but painfully, initiated and carried out limited liberal policies by relaxing harsh measures on dress conformity that began with Khomeini, by protecting free speech and the press, and by relaxing strict Islamic rules regarding gender interactions. A major area of contention during the revolutionary period was the regime’s reliance on stringent criminal penalties and aggressive policies to cow women to submission. Often times, women were fined, beaten, or fired from work for non-compliance with the dress code. 159 Even when these legal measures failed to secure women’s compliance, the regime encouraged—if not sponsored—street thugs to ensure compliance by such violent acts as beating and throwing acid on women who were considered to be improperly dressed. Closely tied to conservative clerics, the Ahmadinejad administration reversed much of the freedoms advanced by the Khatami government by cracking down on free speech and the press, reimposing stricter dress codes, and regulating personal appearance. This administration in fact turned the clock back and engaged in what university students called “a second cultural revolution,” by which the government attempted to systematically curb free speech by purging politically active professors through forced retirements and by expelling active students who openly criticized the regime and its policies. 160 President Ahmadinejad reacted to students’ demonstrations against the regime and his policies by suggesting that student protests show that, under the Islamic system, there is greater freedom of speech in Iran compared to his student days under the shah. Shirin Ebadi rejected this assertion and indicated that “Freedom of speech is being restricted more than before in Iran.” In criticizing the governmental policies on student political

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activism, she complained that “They think students should go to their classes, read their books and then go back home and shouldn’t get involved in the social and political issues around them in the society—that is asking a lot!” 161 Students vociferously rejected the government’s effort to silence the opponents of the government by holding demonstrations, attacking university administrators, and even criticizing the president. The regime tried to contain the student opposition by threatening them with expulsion, expelling active students and even—similar to the shah’s era—organizing pro-government counterdemonstrators who often turn violent against students. At a demonstration against the president in December of 2006 at Amir Kabir Polytechnic University in Tehran, students turned the president’s portraits upside down, held banners referring to him as a “fascist president,” and interrupted his speech by shouting “death to dictator.” 162 Similar demonstrations have been held by other segments of the population. On Labor Day 2007, thousands of workers in Tehran demonstrated against the government’s economic policies and demanded the resignation of the Labor Minister, Muhammad Jahromi. 163 The workers denounced government’s violations of free speech and political activism and criticized antilabor and pro-employer labor laws. The seemingly widespread rejection of Ahmadinejad’s crackdown on civil liberties, his failed economic policies, and his hard-line anti-Western oratory was manifested in the result of the local elections, where voters turned out in droves to vote for his opponents. 164 In April 2007, the government arrested nearly three hundred women accused of not observing Islamic dress. 165 This tough campaign against women in major cities raised fears that the president would reimpose the tough Islamic Revolution era constraints on women’s dress that had loosened during the Khatami administration. While the public was distraught at the possibilities of returning to the early revolutionary restrictions on dress code, the senior hard-line clerics and their conservative supporters applauded the crackdown for its contribution to social stability and the rule of Islamic law. Mustafa Pourmohammadi, the Interior Minister in charge of the campaign, suggested: “People are unhappy with the social and moral status of the society. They expect that the fight against social insecurity be properly implemented.” 166 Reportedly, the Tehran prosecutor suggested that women who violate dress rules should be exiled from the capital to remote areas of the country. In addition to the crackdown on dress, the government took harsh measures against men’s un-Islamic personal appearances by warning barbers not to give men Western hairstyles, not to pluck their eyebrows, and not to use makeup on them. To many people, these campaigns intended to appease the conservatives and to distract the public’s attention from failed economic policies that had diminished productivity, increased the unemployment rate, and thus had resulted in a higher level of poverty. The constitutional restrictions and the terms of the press law provide journalists and editors very little guidance and protections, while they pro-

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vide ample opportunities to the government to censor and restrict the media and to penalize them for their critical stance on governmental policies. The press law accounted for press courts to provide a relatively fair and public forum for press crimes, but both the Islamic Revolutionary Courts and the Special Court for the Clergy have also been involved in press crimes in certain circumstances. These courts offer very few safeguards to the defendants, function in secret, and tend to render very harsh judgments. 167 Furthermore, there seems to be an inconsistency between the press law and the press rights accounted for in Article 168 of the constitution. Legal scholars have argued that proceedings against the press by the Press Board, as an administrative instrument established by the press law, are contrary to the stipulation in Article 168, which requires that all proceedings against the press be dealt with “openly . . . in courts of justice.” 168 The Press Board is simply an instrument of the executive branch which is neither independent nor impartial in its decisions. Its rulings, that often exceed its legal jurisdictions under the law, are administrative and not subject to appeal or judicial review. Due to the legal restrictions on the press and the absence of a meaningful and independent oversight, the Iranian regime falls short of its obligations under Article 2(3.a) of the ICCPR to provide an effective remedy to those whose right to freedom of expression is violated “notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 169 As evident in the legislative initiatives such as the 1999 amendments to the press law, the regime is intent on further restricting the freedom and independence of the press. The thrust of these measures is to undermine the protections of the right to freedom of expression provided by international human rights laws. 170 By most accounts, the Iranian judicial system falls short of meeting any reasonable international standards of due process. Numerous reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the European Union enumerate violations of human rights under the Islamic regime ranging from discrimination on the basis of gender, sex, and religious affiliation to torture, illegal incarceration, executions, amputations, and official advocacy for vigilante justice in today’s Iran. This condition worsened with the electoral success of the conservatives and the inauguration of the Ahmadinejad government. According to Human Rights Watch report, the regime fails to administer justice fairly, individuals are detained illegally by parallel security bodies of the government, and detainees are tortured and subjected to indefinite periods of solitary confinement. 171 While less scathing, the Amnesty International report complained of the “ongoing flagrant violations of Iranian and international law in the human rights arena.” 172 This organization’s report for 2007 enumerated and documented many instances of illegal detentions, torture, flogging, amputations, eye-gouging, and stoning to death. 173 Based on local newspaper reports, the Agence France-Presse had identified 298 execu-

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tions by hanging in 2007, compared to 177 in 2006. 174 There are still legal sanctions for lashing and amputation, and some of these punishments are still enforced but not as frequently as in the early years of the regime. 175 The election of Rouhani to the presidency and the return of moderates and reformers to some positions of prominence have raised the public’s hopes and expectations that some of these harsh measures will be abandoned. To date, however, the regime continues to systematically violate even the most basic due process rights. Individuals are often arrested without proper legal warrants on trumped-up charges. While the civilian court system relies on some due process rights, defendants in the revolutionary and special courts are denied any rights. Persons tried by the revolutionary courts, including those charged with narcotic offenses, enjoy virtually no procedural or substantive safeguards. The accused in these courts are often indicted under very broad and ambiguous criminal offenses such as “moral corruption on earth,” “anti-revolutionary behavior,” “behavior detrimental to national security,” and “siding with global arrogance.” Trials are conducted in secret and commonly very short in duration, largely due to widespread torture that forces defendants to confess before trials begin. 176 In violation of the constitution and the penal code, defendants in revolutionary courts do not have access to lawyers and cannot call witnesses on their own behalf. Political and common criminals are often tortured in prisons, some are kept in prison even after their sentences are finished, and some are even executed after serving their sentences. In response to complaints by the families of Iranian dissidents regarding the use of physical and psychological torture in Iran’s prisons, the EU pressured the regime to improve its human rights record during trade negotiations in 2002. Subsequently, the parliament passed a torture prohibition bill designed to fend off these criticisms. While the constitution and laws explicitly prohibit the use of torture, the new bill aimed at tightening up torture laws by defining unacceptable treatments. Under this bill, “any form of physical or psychological pressure during investigation and trial will be deemed as torture and prohibited.” The bill specifically outlaws isolation; blindfolding; humiliation; deprivations of food, water, and hygiene facilities; nighttime interrogations; and the use of drugs on prisoners. 177 These legislative measures have not improved human rights practices of the current regime in Iran. In fact, the political proclivities of the judiciary and internal frictions have undermined any semblance of due process. The rise in vigilante justice by the Islamic paramilitary forces and the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to rein in such illegal actions exemplify the structural constraints on human rights in today’s Iran. In a recent case of vigilante trials, the Supreme Court acquitted a group of men involved in a gruesome serial killing of a group of people in 2002 because the victims were involved in “un-Islamic activities.” Even though the men had been found

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guilty by lower courts for confessing to the killings by stoning, suffocation, burying alive, burning the victims, and dumping bodies in the desert to be eaten by wild animals, the Supreme Court agreed with their justifications for such crimes. The men argued that their “understanding of the teachings of one Islamic cleric allowed them to kill immoral people if they had ignored two warnings to stop their bad behaviour.” 178 There was no judicial process to determine the guilt of the victims in this case, and the earlier court’s finding of offense of murder was dismissed by the Supreme Court with little explanation. It is abundantly clear that there is a large gap between the legally sanctioned protections for human rights and the systematic violations of these rights in Iran. Despite sporadic efforts on the part of some governments, it does not appear that the Islamic regime intends to follow its own human rights laws let alone the international standards of human rights as long as the clerical elites are intent on maintaining their uncontested right to rule in the face of popular challenges. In a report on the current trends on human rights violations in Iran, the CDHR has indicated that: “Unfortunately, the violation of human rights in Iran has not only been expanded in some fields, it has also found new dimensions.” 179 ECONOMICS AND FINANCE LAWS AND POLICIES Islamic Economics Today, economics and finance precepts and policies are largely rooted in secular principles, even though the nature and scope of such principles have always involved some sort of faith. 180 Historically, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam made consistent and well-documented attempts at business and finance regulations commensurate with their religious values. For many centuries, the Christian churches in Europe sought to enforce canon law in business affairs. They considered commerce a matter of morality and, thus, subject to divine ordinances. Many Christian traditions offered God’s laws to regulate trade and industry. However, there have been strong and effective challenges to the role of Christianity in business affairs for a good part of its history. A number of thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas, Luther, and a host of others wrote extensively either to affirm the role of religion or to underscore the significance of natural law and secular principles in business matters. The emergence and growth of modern large-scale capitalism coincided with the erosion of the church’s dominance in business affairs due to the church’s recognition, during the past three centuries or so, that business is an activity outside its control. Consequently, today secular capitalist principles dominate the Western economic thinking and practices. Judaism also governed pivotal aspects of business, for instance rules pertaining to prohibition of interest in Jewish business transactions. 181 This rule, however, did not govern business

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transactions between the Jews and non-Jews. From the outset, Islam provided detailed, often cumbersome, and at times impractical rules pertaining to business and financial transactions. The Quran and Muhammad’s traditions established the foundations of important and complex Islamic economic precepts. While there have been piecemeal attempts at enforcing economic principles of Islam, Islamic economics has never been comprehensively applied to modern economic systems. Islam advocates for free and fair commercial transactions within the bounds of Islamic law. Generally, Muslims are allowed and encouraged to engage in economic transactions to make a living, support their families, and give charity to the less fortunate. However, economic transactions should only involve free and competitive exchange of permissible goods and services. Monopolies and price-fixing are prohibited. 182 Basically, business transactions in Islam fall into four main categories: sale, rent or hire (ijara), gift, and loan (gratuitous transfer of usufruct property). 183 The principles that govern these transactions cover all other types of business activities, especially partnerships that are common in Muslim societies. In some respects, Islamic economics may be compared to modern Keynesian theory, particularly for its commitment to social justice, equity, and balance. In the Islamic worldview, social justice and equality do not mean that people should be equal in poverty or in riches. It simply means that people should have equal opportunity in having the ability to work and benefit from their work’s rewards. 184 Contrary to modern economic theories, Islam assumes that Man is naturally good and inclined to follow his or her conscience that is shaped by religious values. All aspects of the Islamic worldview follow this central assumption. It is not to assume, however, that Muslims are not inclined to engage in improper or sinful actions. Like other monotheistic religions, Islam does acknowledge its followers’ propensity to err, but this tendency does not detract from the view that Man is naturally good. In discussing Islamic economics, a host of classical and contemporary Islamic thinkers underscore the holistic nature of the Islamic system and the need to understand Islamic economics in relation to broader values in the Islamic worldview. For instance, Sayyid Qutb 185 contends that social justice underlies the Islamic political and economic systems. Similarly, Khurshid Ahmad and a host of others assert that the philosophical foundations of the Islamic economic and political systems overlap 186 and, as Muhammad Arif explains, 187 involve such principles and institutions as tawhid, khilafah, rububiyyah, tazkiyyah, and accountability. Focusing on the economic dimension of the Islamic system, he argues that tawhid establishes God’s ultimate and uncontested ownership of all wealth. According to the Quran, individual ownership is not absolute and God is the ultimate owner of all wealth. 188 Man is only the vicegerent of God and thus a simple trustee of his or her property with the right to use, manage, and dispense of the property. Of

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course, individual right to private property must not undermine communal interest and must not contradict the shari’ah. Khilafah, in economic terms, refers to the rules governing the possession and disposal of property. These rules establish the individual right to private property as long as the property is both licit (halal) and acquired lawfully. A Muslim may not own or trade in illicit (haraam) goods such as liquor, pork, or gambling equipment; and may not acquire wealth by unlawful means including usury, 189 cheating, 190 gambling and other forms of speculation, 191 and theft. 192 These rules have far-reaching implications for the scope and nature of the state, the economic system, and their policies in Muslim societies. In the interest of the community and social justice, the Islamic state may limit individual rights to private property and account for an expanded public sector. Similar to the modern Keynesian measures, the shari’ah clearly advocates for redistribution of wealth for public good. To this end, the state limits the private sector and takes a more active role in economic sphere through planning and reliance on public monopolies. There is ample precedence for state ownership in Islam. In fact, the shari’ah prohibits individual or group ownership of essential resources such as water, grazing lands, food, and fuel since they are considered communal property. 193 There is no dispute among Muslims that the state is entitled to intervene in economics through such means as the establishment of public monopolies, regulations, licensing, and taxation. It is a historical fact that the prophet and his early successors played a significant role in the economic life of the Muslim community by regulating business transactions, collecting taxes, and undertaking redistributive measures. Contrary to the neoclassical economic theory, which assumes that goods are in short supply, the Islamic concept of rububiyyah speaks of God’s arrangement for the nourishment and direction of things toward a perfect state. Here, the assertion is that there is sufficient sustenance for everything and everyone to achieve God’s plan for the Universe. 194 Islamic economic theory also accounts for growth and change. The principle of tazkiyyah, which means growth and purification, accentuates economic change, expansion, and gain leading to social justice and spiritual elevation for the community and property owners. Individuals are expected to work hard to improve their lives materially and spiritually. In a sense, individuals are accountable for their own actions or inactions, both in this world and the next, 195 with regard to their trusteeship of the material things. In view of God’s ultimate ownership of all wealth in Islamic economics, unlike many other economic theories, “people cannot behave irresponsibly with the goods, equipment, land and talents entrusted to them, because they will be held to account for them. Moreover, responsibility is interpreted very widely; one must accept all the duties and liabilities of one’s possessions, as well as the benefits of ownership.” 196

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Committed to social justice, Islamic economics not only requires proper and responsible ownership and use of private property but also accounts for private wealth in the service of the public. The Islamic zakat system of taxation and Islamic rules of inheritance are designed to ensure greater wealth redistribution, similar to the Keynesian concern for wider distribution of spending power throughout the community. The Quran explicitly rejects monopoly of wealth in the hands of a few, since monopoly causes injustice and social imbalance. 197 It is a religious duty of all Muslims to share their wealth with others. Achieving social justice and balance through redistribution is so significant that zakat is put on par with such pillars of the religion as payer, fasting, and pilgrimage. Zakat is an obligatory annual payment levied on all Muslims’ net worth (one-fortieth or 2.5 percent) including their money, investments, agricultural and industrial possessions, animals, and trades. For a particular type of wealth to be subject to this form of taxation, it must be the beneficial and rightful property of the taxpayer, of legitimate nature, economically productive, exceed certain minimum value (hisab), be in excess of the taxpayer’s needs, unencumbered by debt, and held for one lunar year. 198 In addition to taxation, social justice and balance requires charity toward one’s relatives and acquaintances. The Quran establishes this duty (selehe-e rahem) for all Muslims capable of helping the less fortunate. This includes the maintenance of the spouses and children (males until the age of puberty, and females until marriage), needy parents, grandparents, and siblings. 199 This duty is also extended to more distant relatives and needy neighbors. 200 Thus, the Islamic economic system is expected to ensure a fair degree of support for Muslims who fall into difficulties by reliance on Muslims’ religiously sanctioned charitable contributions. For this reason, there is a dislike for insurance and pension funds in Islam, since they might undermine the public duty to aid the poor and the needy. 201 Islamic inheritance laws and policies are also designed to ensure the redistribution of wealth as a means of achieving social justice. These compulsory laws establish specific guidelines for the redistribution of two thirds of the deceased’s possessions, thus the deceased may will only one third of the belongings away from these guidelines even if he/she has legitimate reasons to do otherwise. For the most part, the belongings must be distributed in specified shares among the deceased’s relatives, including all surviving children (a son’s share is twice that of a daughter’s), spouses, and parents. In some circumstances, brothers and sisters, and even more remote relatives, may inherit an appropriate share. Complete prohibition of riba (unlawful advantage by way of excess and deferment) and gharar (uncertainty, risk, or speculation) is a central rule for avoiding repression and social injustice in Islamic economics. These fundamental principles have shaped the theoretical parameters and practices of

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Islamic economics from the outset. Muslims’ constant struggles to search for ways to coexist with secular and contemporary financing practices and banking systems are primarily due to the constraints caused by these rules. Today, the overwhelming majority sees the solution in a profit-sharing system to replace interest. 202 Others find this an unacceptable solution and continue their search for a developmental path committed to the implementation of Islamic economic principles that ensures justice and equity. Linguistically, riba means increase and growth. 203 As mentioned earlier, in economic terms, it means unlawful advantage by way of excess and deferment. This prohibition is not limited to interests on loans. In fact, in Islamic law it refers both to interest on loans (riba al-qarud) as well as usury in trade (riba al-buyu). In the latter, forbidden are both an excess in quantity and a delay in performance. 204 Both secular and religious economic thoughts have always attempted to distinguish between lawful and unlawful interests. The Code of Hammurabi forbade compound interest. 205 As discussed by Nabil Saleh, King Bocchoris of the Egyptian 24th dynasty (c. 730–715 BC) also rejected interest in excess of principal. 206 Many ancient Greeks and Romans charged high interests and, in the case of the default on payment, the debtor could become the creditor’s slave. The Athenian reformer Solon (640–560 BC) cancelled existing debts and securities, as a means of ending civil strife, and for a time limited interest rate to 12 percent. For periods, interest rates were also limited in Rome, especially at the time of Emperor Justinian (483–565 AD). 207 While the Gospel does not prohibit usury, and in fact considers it a commendable practice, 208 Christian churches began prohibiting usury early in the fourth century. 209 Initially, the Christian clergy were prohibited from engaging in usurious transactions, but in the sixth and early seventh centuries this prohibition was extended to the laymen. However, under a great deal of pressure during the seventh century, it was agreed that economic activity should not be constrained by such “obsolete limitations.” 210 The seventh-century residents of Mecca were engaged in extensive business transactions including commerce, giving loans for interest, and speculation. As a businessman, Muhammad himself did encourage trade but condemned usury on moral and religious grounds. 211 Initially, the Quran merely recommended against charging interest on loans but did not ban such a practice. It was after Muhammad’s migration to Medina (hijra) that Islam accepted an outright ban on usury. While this gradual ban has resulted in speculations and disputes over the reasons for this ban in Islam, 212 the rejection of usury is clearly consistent with Islam’s commitment to social justice and protection of the weak against business manipulation and exploitation. Direct references to riba are found in four different verses in the Quran. The time lines of these verses reflect the gradual rejection of riba from initial implicit condemnation, to limited rejection, to total ban. The first verse was

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revealed in Mecca and only condemned usury. The Medina verses established limited and, ultimately, total ban of riba. In totality, these references encourage business transactions, speak of the rewards for fair and equitable business practices, and warn Muslims against the evil of usury and punishments for seeking illicit return on loans and unlawful business practices. The Quran says: “But God hath permitted sale and forbidden usury.” 213 It calls for the protection of the weak and needy, 214 and encourages fairness and honesty in business. 215 It warns the followers: “That they took usury, though they were forbidden; and that they devoured men’s substance wrongfully, we have prepared for those among them who reject faith a grievous punishment.” 216 Also, “O ye who believe! Devour not usury, doubled or multiplied; but fear God; that ye may [really] prosper.” 217 And, “Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom The Evil One by his touch hath driven to madness. That is because they say: ‘Sales is like usury,’ but God hath permitted sale and forbidden usury. Those who after receiving Direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past; their cases is for God [to judge]. But those who repeat [the offence] are Companions of the Fire: they will abide therein [for ever].” 218 “God will deprive usury of all blessing, but will give increase for deeds of charity: for he loveth creatures ungrateful and wicked.” 219 Since the Medina period, Muslims have generally accepted the Quranic prohibition of usury, despite scholastic disputes over the meaning, nature, and scope of such a prohibition. Most schools accepted the prohibition and widened its application. The distinctions were generally over the genus of the material exchanged and the timing of the exchange. By largely relying on the hadith, the Zahiris were the only ones who permitted usury in exchange except for gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates, and salt. 220 Today, some reject interests charged on loans by moneylenders as usury, but consider interests paid by banks acceptable since they believe that no riba is involved when interest is imposed on productive loans. 221 This distinction, however, is not supported by many Muslims. To many Muslims, any addition to the principals in loans is considered usury. Islam also prohibited speculative business transactions (gharar), for their dependence on the game of chance that may be injurious to others. The Quran explicitly prohibits engaging in any games of chance. 222 This prohibition is not limited to gambling; rather it covers any business activities that result in unjustified enrichment through games of pure chance. This prohibition is even extended to some or all types of insurance by some Muslim scholars, since insurance involves an unknown risk. These constraints have put Islamic economic thinking and practice at odds with modern-day capitalism that heavily relies on interest and speculative transactions for the large return they may provide. As a practical matter, some suggest that Muslims need to adjust to the realities of modern capitalism and diminish these Islam-

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ic restrictions in their economic lives. 223 Others criticize this approach as shallow and hypocritical from a religious point of view. The current disputes over the Islamic banking system exemplify the practical limitations caused by the Islamic prohibition of riba, which prohibits the awarding of a predetermined return on deposits. Islamic banks cannot pay interest on funds they receive, cannot lend their money for interest, and cannot invest in any transactions or operations involving riba or speculation. Unlike the traditional banking systems whereby the banks are the intermediaries between savers and borrowers, Islamic interest-free banks are expected to share in the losses and profits, which is permissible in Islam. Non-investment accounts and deposits should be protected by the bank and returned to the depositors undamaged. The bank, however, is not liable for the principals on investment accounts, unless there is negligence, conscious wrongdoing, or breach of contract on the part of the bank. 224 As a contrast to non-Islamic banks, whose operations are purely monetary, Islamic banks are engaged in broader commercial operations including lease contracts and partnerships. Fairness and proper business practices should govern such operations that might involve normal business risks for the parties without any elements of usury and speculation. Economic Laws, Policies, and Plans in Iran The preamble to the constitution of the Islamic Republic contrasts the Iranian economy with secular economic thoughts and practices and identifies the goals and strategies of this Islamic system. Unlike the materialist schools of thought, this preamble asserts, where the goal is accumulation of wealth and maximization of profit, the Iranian economy intends to meet the material needs of the people in the course of their overall growth and development. From the framers’ point of view, the economy in the materialist economic thought and practice is an end in and of itself, and thus “a subversive and corrupting factor in the course of man’s development.” 225 In contrast, they contend that the Iranian Islamic economy is a means of meeting Man’s need to ensure his growth and progress. Chapter IV of the constitution attempts to provide a legal framework for the country’s economy and its financial affairs. 226 The stated objectives of this economy are to ensure self-sufficiency and economic independence of the country, eradicate poverty and deprivation, and fulfill human needs through economic development while preserving human liberty and dignity. Clearly, these objectives and their economic strategies should not undermine public interest or be in conflict with Islamic principles. To pursue and achieve these goals, economic strategies and policies should provide for basic necessities of all citizens; ensure full employment opportunities for everyone with governmental assistance; further quality of life and work that

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allow for intellectual growth of citizens; facilitate access to fair employment free from coercion; prohibit any exploitative and illegitimate measures including hoarding, usury, and monopoly; train and utilize skilled personnel needed for economic development; and prevent foreign economic domination by increased self-sufficiency through improved agricultural and industrial production (Article 43). To achieve these economic and social objectives, the constitution respects private ownership of the property within the limits of the law (Article 47), entitles everyone to freely engage in legitimate business practices (Article 46), and accounts for a large state sector. The economy is divided into three main sectors: state, cooperative, and private (Article 44). The state sector is managed by the government in the interest of the public and includes main industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams, large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, postal services, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, railroads, and roads. Additionally, the government manages “the public wealth” in accordance with public interest. Public wealth may include uncultivated and abandoned lands, minerals, deposits, seas, lakes, rivers and other public waterways, mountains, valleys, forests, marshlands, natural forests, unenclosed pastures, legacies with heirs, property of undetermined ownership, and public property recovered from usurpers (Article 45). In compliance with Islamic rules, the government may also confiscate and manage all wealth accumulated through immoral or illegal means such as usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, gambling, and operation of corruption centers (Article 49). The cooperative sector includes cooperative companies and enterprises concerned with the legitimate production and distribution of goods throughout the country. Cognizant of the limitations of the private sector in the Iranian economy, the framers of the constitution referred to the private sector as a sector that supplements the other two sectors of the economy in agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services (Article 44). In accordance with these constitutional mandates, the Islamic regime has enacted numerous economic laws, policies, and plans since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Currently, business and finance laws are a hybrid of some of the pre-revolutionary laws, which were modified to varying degrees after the revolution, and new Islamic laws that largely reflect the Shi’a views of the Islamic economic system. Collectively, these laws and several economic plans provide for a two-pronged economic strategy. On one hand, they attempt to liberalize the economy in order to facilitate growth and economic prosperity. On the other hand, they assign a dominant role to the government in the economic life of the nation through extensive regulation; adoption of protectionist and redistributive policies; nationalization of certain industries and resources; and direct participation in financial, industrial, and commercial activities. It is the regime’s contention that such a mixed economy with

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an extensive governmental role ensures economic growth while it contributes to justice and fairness by pursuing extensive redistributive policies. To liberalize and stimulate the economy, the regime has occasionally undertaken privatization strategies (largely pursued during the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations), has encouraged private domestic and foreign sector investments, and has provided for investment incentives including tax breaks and guarantees. One of the laws that survived the Islamization process was the 1955 Law Concerning the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment in Iran which was designed to attract and protect foreign investments in the country. 227 The Council of Ministers under the Islamic regime in 1996 decided that foreign investments in Iran will continue to be governed by this law. Underscoring the principle of reciprocity, provisions of this law apply only to firms and individuals of those countries where economic activities and reciprocal facilities for Iranian firms and nationals are made possible (Article VI). Furthermore, foreign investment is possible only through participation of foreign investors in equity capital of existing and new Iranian companies. To ensure Iranian control, the share of foreign investments in joint ventures depends on the merits of the project and may not exceed 49 percent of the total investment. Article I of the law empowers the government of Iran to allow any foreign natural or legal person to import capital, either in cash or in the form of machinery, and so forth, for the purpose of industrial, mining, agricultural, and transportation activities. The investor is entitled to annual transfer of net profits in the currency of the original investment (Article IV), repatriation of the remaining portion of capital in the event of liquidation, and fair compensation from the government in the event of legal expropriation (Article III). Governmental regulations for the implementation of this law specifically prohibit any monopoly rights and require foreign capital to be privately owned without any foreign government participation (Article 1 of the regulations). Any such foreign investments in banking should also comply with banking regulations (note 3 of Article 1). Contrary to the general Islamic rejection of insurance as a speculative economic activity, Iranian law encourages insurance on investments and other economic activities, but limits insurance to the state sector. A foreign investor may insure the capital which he imports into Iran, according to Article 6 of the regulations. To encourage foreign investment, the Council of Ministers in June 1996 approved tax exemptions for a period of six years for all foreign investors, and longer exemptions for foreign investments in deprived areas of the country. 228 Additionally, foreign investors were exempted from some of the banking regulations that govern domestic investments. As a component of the liberalization process, the regime has also adopted laws and policies that encourage trade by offering a wide range of trade incentives. An example of these strategies is the creation of the Trade and Industrial Free Zones in Kish, Gheshm Islands, and Chahbahar. Article 1 of

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the 1993 Law on the Administration of Trade and Industrial Free Zones of the Islamic Republic of Iran 229 specifically identifies the purposes of the industrial free zones as: expediting the pace of infrastructural development and growth, improving the public’s income by encouraging investments, creating employment opportunities, regulating markets for goods and labor, maintenance and growth of involvement in regional and international markets, production and export of industrial goods, and provision of public services. The law obligates the government to finance the zones and to establish independent legal organizations to administer them. To facilitate greater economic freedom for these zones, and thus economic growth, these organizations and their subsidies are exempt from laws and regulations that govern state-run companies and other general laws and regulations of the country. 230 According to Article 8 of the law, within constitutional limitations, these organizations may enter into any partnership agreements for developmental and production projects. The law, furthermore, allows for tax and customs duties exemptions for investors. Articles 13, 15, and 16 of the law exempt natural and legal persons involved in various economic activities in the zones from capital and direct income taxes for a period of fifteen years from the date of production commencement. After this period, they will be subject to a tax law approved by the legislature. Goods produced in the free zones and exported to other parts of the country are also totally or partially exempt from customs duties and commercial tax to the extent of their added value. Similar exemptions are accounted for products made with domestic raw materials. To enhance foreign trade, Article 14 of the law states that commercial transactions of the zones with foreign countries shall not be subject to the country’s import and export regulations and limitations, but commercial exchanges with other parts of Iran are governed by such regulations. The zone administrations may acquire funds from local and foreign sources with prior authorization from the Council of Ministers, and may offer guarantees against losses due to divesting of ownership or nationalization by relying on insurance companies or other financial institutions (Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22). Foreign investors may lease lands in free zones but they may not own land (Article 24). Iran’s customs regulations facilitate trade but prohibit the transfer of certain goods across the Iranian borders. These customs regulations allow any passers, Iranian or foreigner, to take their personal effects and any goods made in Iran, provided that the goods are not of any commercial value. 231 There are limits on foreign-made goods and a total ban on prohibited goods such as arms, narcotic drugs, alcoholic beverages, gambling paraphernalia, transmitters, and antique articles and manuscripts. These regulations also offer limited tax and customs duty exemptions for goods brought in by Iranians and foreigners as long as they are not religiously and/or legally prohibited and are not of commercial interest. Importation and exportation of gold,

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silver, and precious stones are also regulated and limited in size and weight, provided that they are not considered antiques. Importation of foreign currencies in any amount is permissible, except some of the Middle Eastern currencies. There are some limitations on the importation and exportation of Iranian rial as well. 232 Despite attempts at privatization, the Iranian economy relies heavily on the public sector in the form of extensive nationalization as well as redistributive and protectionist policies. Banking and mining are the two major nationalized industries. The Iranian banking system is essentially governed by the Islamic banking precepts, as understood and pragmatically interpreted and enforced by the Islamic regime. Islamization of the banking system began shortly after the revolution and has gone through three major phases. Initially, the regime called for the nationalization and restructuring of the banking system. Later, in 1983, they introduced the Islamic banking principles into the system with a three-year transition period. In the third phase, which began in 1986, the role of banks was redefined and banks became an integral part of the government through comprehensive nationalization of all banks. 233 To comply with the Islamic prohibition of riba, the regime passed the Law for riba-free Banking in 1983. This law, which came into effect in 1984, established new parameters of banking functions in Iran by identifying permissible banking activities ranging from giving interest-free loans to individuals to extensive business activities including participation in a broad range of production and sale of industrial and housing products and commercial services. To avoid riba but encourage financial transactions to stimulate the economy, the regime disallows direct payment of fixed returns on deposits. However, a number of strategies are pursued to allow returns on investments. One strategy is to allow banks to offer variable prizes or bonuses in cash or in kind on deposits from their profits gained through their commercial activities. This solution is fairly consistent with the basic Islamic premise that an investor and an entrepreneur may legitimately share in profits and losses, as long as there is no predetermined amount of return. Also, by legally defining the relationship between depositors and banks as attorney-client relationship, the Iranian banking system allows banks to charge their clients appropriate legal fees for some of their services. 234 Furthermore, by nationalizing banks, the Iranian regime has, in practice, circumvented some of the legal prohibitions of riba in economic transactions involving the government. Riba only exists when the lender and borrower are of separate identity. When nationalized, banks do not have a separate legal identity from the government, thus any payment and receipt of fixed amount in excess of the principal is not, by definition, usury. In the absence of prohibition, then, banks can use their resources to finance any governmental agencies and corporations through traditional methods and charge them interest without violating the prohibi-

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tion of riba. These strategies effectively remove the main impediments to traditional banking transactions caused by the prohibition of usury. As mentioned earlier, the activities of Iranian banks are not limited to the traditional banking services. They are involved in extensive commercial and financial activities including partnerships, lease-purchases, installment sales, and direct investments. The Iranian civil code allows banks to engage in civil and equity partnerships. In equity partnerships, banks participate in production by acquiring stocks and shares in companies. In civil partnerships, assets and ownerships are commingled in joint profit-seeking ventures. 235 Profits from these ventures subsidize traditional banking services. The mining law of 1998 generally defines and describes mines and specifies the rules and regulations governing their exploration and exploitation. Like the banking industry, Iranian mines are all nationalized. Article 2 of the law is based on Articles 44 and 45 of the constitution and delegates the ownerships of all mines to the Ministry of Mines and Metals to be utilized in public interest. The government is tasked with increasing the role of the mining sector in economic and social development while protecting the mining reserves. To these ends, the Ministry of Mines and Metals is responsible for issuing mining permits, supervising mining operations, providing opportunities for mining employment, promoting and achieving value-added mining materials, encouraging the exportation of minerals, and ensuring success for those involved in mining operations by establishing a mining capital investment fund and other incentives. 236 Mineral exploration and exploitation may be performed by any sector of the economy (state, cooperative, and private) under governmental supervision (Articles 5 and 9). In issuing exploitation licenses, however, the government is expected to give priority to the families of martyrs, disabled war veterans and former prisoners of war, cooperative companies, and qualified local individuals in keeping with the existing law (Article 11). Employees of the Ministry of Mines and Metals and its affiliates are prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging in mining transactions for at least one year from the date of their employment termination (Article 33). Any unlicensed exploration and/or exploitation of mines are considered usurpation of public property and subject to criminal penalties (Article 19). The regime’s extensive redistributive and protectionist policies have had both positive and negative impacts on the economic health of the nation. Foreign reactions to Iran’s controversial foreign and nuclear policies in the form of economic sanctions and political pressures have heightened the negative impacts of these policies. Protectionist policies have been enforced within the framework of foreign exchange, subsidies, and commercial policies. These policies have raised the value of non-oil exports, increased foreign obligations, limited access to foreign technology, increased the prices of

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intermediary and capital goods and, consequently, raised the costs of exporting domestically made goods. 237 The Iranian economy relies greatly on governmental subsidies that are paid in a variety of forms with a wide-ranging impact on resource allocation and investments. The Third-year plan document published in 1999 defined subsidy as “any kind of payment made in cash or in kind with an aim of supporting the low income strata of the society, producers of goods and services.” 238 Subsidies are offered directly or indirectly to production and consumption sectors, and fall into three categories: income, value, and indirect. Income subsidy is paid in cash to increase the incomes of low-income families, value subsidy is paid in the form of coupons with certain values for consumption of low-income families, and indirect subsidy is in the form of assessing the prices of certain goods lower than their real value. Indirect subsidy is basically used by the general public. In assessing the trends and inclinations in these subsidies, the Third-year plan criticized some of these subsidies for their contributions to illogical overconsumption and waste. Iranian governments have relied on economic planning to set their economic and social priorities since 1948. Overall, these plans have had mixed results in various sectors of the economy, as they have often suffered from structural limitations such as contradictory goals and strategies, mismanagement, resource miscalculations, and political impediments. In recent decades, it has been nearly impossible to keep all elements of plans in harmony largely because the meaning of planning in Iran has changed into allocation of budgets for five-year plans that allow for competition for resources among various sectors of the economy. Thus, these plans have been subject to intense political pressures, and oftentimes their goals and strategies seem incompatible and their accomplishments limited and sketchy. The Islamist revolutionaries criticized the shah’s economic plans for their secular premises, neglect of the agricultural sector, and dependence on the West. In its first economic plan (1983–1988), the Islamic regime proclaimed that the Islamic economic principles could resolve Iran’s economic and social ills by focusing on agricultural revitalization, self-sufficiency and economic independence, and reduction in dependence on oil exports. 239 Additionally, this plan concentrated on educational expansion, assistance to the disinherited (mostazafan), and economic diversification. The criticisms of this plan, which disregarded the military expenditures (or intentionally understated them for political reasons) and underestimated budgetary needs in a number of other significant areas, resulted in plan revisions including an increase in investment in agriculture (from 15.5 to 16.7 percent of the national budget) and reduction in investments in non-oil industries. In actuality, the military absorbed nearly half of the budget largely because of revenue shortfalls due to the falling prices of oil and gas and the skyrocketing costs of the Iran-Iraq war. 240 Consequently, the regime was forced to deprioritize some

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projects, cut the imports of consumer products in half, and adopt austerity measures that increased unemployment. High inflation rates in the 1980s exacerbated economic woes, but the government consistently underreported the inflation rate which, in the opinion of independent analysts, was nearly 50 percent in 1980. 241 To curb the inflationary trend, the government took a number of steps including price control programs, linking of the rial to the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) of the IMF instead of the United States dollar, and investment in the private sector to seek growth in non-oil industries. Foreign trade liberalization and reductions in impediments to some imports along with currency devaluation helped increase private sector investments, production, and exports in some of the manufacturing sectors, particularly in mining, light industries, and oil and gas. By the end of the plan, the value of non-oil exports was raised from one to 4.8 billion dollars. 242 After the First Plan, the regime adopted a fixed foreign currency rate, which negatively impacted the values of non-oil exports and reduced their value by 25 percent in 1994 compared to 1989. The Second Plan was launched in 1995. The main goal of this plan was to redirect Iran’s economy towards a market economy. Among other things, the failure of this plan was due to the conspicuous contradiction between the target and performance of the plan and disputes among policy-makers and bureaucrats over the merits of planning. In the course of this plan, with the notable exception of 1995, the percentage of target achievements stood at 60 percent annually, with half of the developmental projects falling behind their schedules. 243 It is accurate to suggest that neither the first nor the second plans achieved their main targets. Despite the move toward a market economy, Iran continued its protectionist commercial policies during the first and second plans in the form of nontariff impediments. The exports of goods were time and again banned with the aim of meeting domestic needs and preventing control of their prices on the domestic market. Compared to other market economies, Iran’s custom duties were low and the country was primarily relying on non-tariff impediments. These strategies inflicted heavy losses on exporters and caused the country to lose foreign markets for its goods. Consequently, in the early 1990s, the mix of economic liberalization in import policies and protectionism in exports caused significant trade imbalances. Intent on reversing this trend, the Third Plan (2000–2004) differed from the previous plans for its strong push for market reforms, notably for its commitment to privatization and antitrust legislation. The plan also encouraged investments in domestic industries, attempted to lower the unemployment rate, and opted to replace non-tariff obstacles with tariffs, thus allowing the export of goods in a competitive setting while increasing governmental revenues. Article 114 of the Third Plan document stipulated that in order to boost exports of non-oil commodities, the government is obligated to omit

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non-tariff impediments and take measures to prepare and announce a timetable for improvement of tariff equivalent rates and to determine custom duties. 244 The strategy was to lift some of the bans on imports and exports excluding antiques and cultural heritage commodities, religiously prohibited goods, goods subsidized by the government, and commodities related to the conservation of the environment and genetic reserves. 245 Successive Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations showed a commitment to market economy, despite their important ideological and policy differences. There was a populist opposition to market orientation, however. Both Presidents Rafsanjani and later Khatami were severely criticized by various groups for their close ties to Washington institutions—IMF and the World Bank—and for having followed their advice to implement structural adjustment policies that increased poverty. 246 The Third (and later the Fourth) Plan relied on oil revenue to boost domestic production and expand international trade. 247 The plan, however, failed to attract the necessary domestic investments, even though there was a boost in private Iranian investments offshore. 248 It has been claimed that the Third Plan did in fact reduce the unemployment rate from 15 percent to 11 percent. Some economists, however, rejected this claim and argued that Iran’s unemployment worsened under this plan. 249 Even those who held an optimistic view of the employment situation admitted that, despite improvements, youth unemployment was still too high and rising for young women. 250 It is clear that the Third Plan failed to reach many of its goals, most importantly with respect to privatization and increased competition. The Fourth Plan (2005–2009) focused on reforming the labor market in an attempt to prepare the Iranian economy for integration into the global economy. From the outset, there were some disputes about the plan, which resulted in its revisions. 251 Even though this plan was adopted by a conservative-dominated parliament, it was still pro-market because it aimed at market reform by reducing employer-provided job security with publicly provided income security. 252 The Ahmadinejad administration, which came into the office with the promises of extensive redistributive policies, pushed for redistribution but also relied on market tools in implementing its economic policies. While the start of the plan was quite shaky, it had some limited accomplishments which cannot necessarily be attributed to the plan itself. Of course, the crippling economic sanctions also undermined any chances of the plan’s success. The Fifth Plan (2011–2015) was adopted in the midst of a range of serious economic problems including sharp declines in the currency value, high inflation rates, and declining trade (especially in the oil and gas sector) due to economic mismanagement and foreign sanctions. The Declaration of the General Policies of the Fifth Development Plan, which is endorsed by Khamene’i, has forty-five points and covers cultural, scientific and technical,

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social, economic, political, security, and defense affairs. 253 In the economic realm, the plan hopes to push for greater market orientation by privatizing at least 20 percent of the state-owned enterprises annually, reforming the banking system, and reducing government’s dependency on oil and gas revenues by allocating at least 20 percent of this income to the National Development Fund for industrial and agricultural development programs. Furthermore, it seeks to improve the public’s standard of living by pursuing a sustainable economic growth at an annual rate of at least 8 percent of GDP, help reduce income inequities, and create a competitive market for offering medical insurance services. In the World Bank’s assessment, these efforts at privatization face serious structural challenges. For instance, the IRGC and semi-stateowned enterprises are purchasing the privatizing state-owned enterprises. Meaningful banking reform is also difficult to achieve. 254 Moreover, the public reactions to the Ahmadinejad administration’s decisions to cut into indirect subsidies clearly indicate how dependent the public are on governmental subsidies in the current harsh economic conditions. It seems that there is very little room for the government to further limit its economic role and push for market incentives. Certainly, continuation of the crippling sanctions will also limit the chances for the plan’s success. If history is of any indication, periodic fluctuations in the price of oil determine the levels of success or failure of economic plans in Iran. Some have suggested that Iran’s economic plans have failed to address poverty and unemployment in the country. However, a comparative study of poverty in the third world 255 shows that poverty rates in Iran compare favorably with international norms. As importantly, the poverty rate has been in downward trend in Iran since the end of the war with Iraq. 256 It is noteworthy, however, that the declining trend in poverty rates, due to oil price increases, have not helped income distribution. The rich have gained more than the poor, thus greater inequities in wealth. Additionally, the employment picture in Iran is not as rosy as government statistics have recently indicated. The youth and women’s unemployment continues to be a pressing economic issue. Since the revolution, there has been a schism between those who advocate for a competitive market economy and those who reject the neoliberal economic approach for its contribution to poverty and inequality. Opponents of market economy, both on the right and left of the political spectrum, criticized the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations’ push for market economy and its betrayal of the revolution’s egalitarian principles. With the exception of the agricultural economy, which has somewhat improved the condition of rural areas, market orientation has caused some economic dislocation, trade imbalances, inflation, and rise in unemployment. Questionable and politically motivated economic and social strategies have significantly worsened these economic conditions. Sanctions and foreign pressures in response to radical foreign and nuclear policy decisions along with economic misman-

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agement have caused intolerable economic hardships for some segments of the population. Some Iranian economists in an open letter criticized the Ahmadinejad administration’s economic policies for disregarding basic economic principles. They blamed mismanagement for high inflation, questioned the merit of injecting too much liquidity from oil revenues into other sectors of the economy without creating lasting jobs, and expressed concerns over the adverse impact of inflation on the purchasing power of low-income people. 257 By relying on a textual analysis of the Iranian constitutions and a wide array of laws and regulations that were adopted during the ancien régime and the Islamic Republic, this chapter discussed the historical roots and contemporary legal frameworks of the Iranian system and its policies. Here, we traced the origins and history of these laws and the manners by which the Islamic Republic incorporated them into its preferred Islamic forms. Undoubtedly, this type of Islamization of the law and their codification undermines the universality of Islamic law and makes it susceptible to the regime’s sectarian and scholastic preferences, as demonstrated in our comparative analysis of the traditional Islamic law and Iran’s preference for the ja’afari school of law in Shi’a Islam. The regime relied on the traditional Islamic doctrine of maslahat to justify its decisions to abandon some and marginalize other Islamic legal principles. The discussions of Iran’s criminal codes and procedures, family law, press law, human rights laws, and economics and finance laws highlighted the Islamic Republic’s clear acknowledgment of the limited applicability of traditional Islamic law to contemporary societies. In the interest of pragmatism, the regime has effectively sidestepped these limitations and has pursued relatively pragmatic legal instruments and solutions. In part III, we will study the institutional, process, and policy features of the regime. In great detail, chapter 4 will discuss the history and contemporary characteristics of civil society in Iran. NOTES 1. Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, 200–201. 2. Samir Amin, Islamic Law in the Contemporary World (Glasgow: Royston Ltd., 1985), 9. 3. Erika Fairchild, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993), 40. 4. Noel James, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 1964), 14. 5. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East,” American Journal of Comparative Law 35.1 (1987): 140. 6. William Montgomery Watt, A Short History of Islam (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1966), 87. 7. Mayer, “Law and Religion,” 150. 8. Ibid., 156. 9. Ibid., 155.

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10. Ibid. 11. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “The Shari’a: A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?” in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, ed. N. Heer (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1990), 187. 12. Article 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of Oct. 7, 1907, appendix to: W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia; a Personal Narrative (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 346. 13. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 126. 14. Malcom H. Kerr, Islamic Reform, The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida (Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA.: university of California Press, 1966), 80. 15. Ibid., 81. 16. Quran, 2:29 and 10:58. 17. Kerr, Islamic Reform, 83. 18. Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustafsa min Ilm al-Usul, 1 (Cairo: Al-Mukatabah al-Tihariyyah, 1937), 139–140. 19. Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Malaysia: Pelandul Publications; 1995), 346–348. 20. Shaul Bakhash, “The Politics of Land, Law and Social Justice in Iran,” Middle East Journal 43.2 (1989): 196. 21. Quoted in: Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law, Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi’i International (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 91–93. 22. For a detailed analysis of Khomeini’s view of the role of the clerics see my work: Mehran Tamadonfar, The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership, Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Pragmatism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 106–109. 23. Quran, 2:173 and 119,6:145, and 16:115. 24. Quran, 22:78. 25. Kerr, Islamic Reforms, 207. 26. Schirazi, Constitution of Iran, 237. 27. Resalat, March 30, 1989. 28. Khomeini’s letter to Khamene’i, Kayhan, July 1, 1988. 29. Schirazi, Constitution of Iran, 206. 30. S. Haeri, Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Iran (London: I.B. Tauris; 1989), 23–32. 31. Ziba Mir Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, A Study of Islamic Family Law: Iran and Morocco Compared (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1993), 32. 32. Ibid., 154. 33. Ibid., 197. 34. Shaul Bakhsh, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 201. 35. Schirazi, Constitution of Iran, 64. 36. “Structure of Power in Iran,” accessed January 5, 2007, http://www.iranchamber.com/ governmetn/Articles/structure_of_power. 37. Quran, 5:37. 38. Quran, 5:33. 39. Quran, 24:5. 40. Quran, 24:3. 41. Aly Aly Mansour, “Hudud Crimes.” in The Islamic Criminal Justice System, ed. M.C. Basouni (London: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1982), 195. 42. Ibid., 196–200. 43. An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 108. 44. Carolyn Fluehr-Lovvans, ed., Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings of Muhammad Sa’id al-‘Ashmawy (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1998), 101. 45. Ibid. 46. Schirazi, Constitution of Iran, 165.

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47. See: Reza Sorkhi and Ghader Sirus, Qanoon-e-Mojazat-e-Eslami, Dar Nazm-e Hoghoogh-e-Konooni [The Law of Islamic Punishment in the Current Judicial System], (Tehran: Golban Publication: Bahman 1381 A.H.). 48. “Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran –Book One & Book Two,” The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, accessed September 26, 2013, http://www.iranhrdc.org/ english/human-rights-documents/iranian-codes/3200-islamic-penal-code-of-the-islamicrepublic-of-iran-book-one-and-book-two.html?gclid=CKPQyOPQgLsCFed0QgodAE8Ang#. UpOfl53Tkeh. 49. See Hooshang Shambiati, Hoghoogh-e Keifari Ekhtesari, 2, 5th edition [Crimes Against Persons], (Tehran: Zoobin Publications, 1377 A.H.), 539. 50. “Iran: Stop Execution Slated for June 21,” Human Rights Watch, accessed June 19, 2007, http://www.iranrights.org/english/document-895.php. 51. Muhammad Muhammadi Gilani, Qanoon-e jazai-e Eslmai [Islamic Criminal Law], 1st ed. (Al-Mahdi Publications, 1362 A.H.), 119. 52. For a detailed discussion of the issues surrounding the crime of drunkenness, see: Abbas Zera’at, Sharh-e Qanoon-e Mojazat-e Eslami, ta’azirat [Explanation of the Islamic Criminal Law of Ta’azir], 2 (Kashan: Feiz Publication: 1377 A.H.), 515. 53. Seyyed Muhammad Hasan Mar’ashi, “Maharabah va Fisad fil-Arz,” in Mahnameh-e Dadrasi 2, no. 9 (1377 A.H.): 10. 54. Muhammd Ja’afar Habib Zadeh, Muharebeh dar Hoghoogh-e Keifari-e Iran [Muharabeh in the Iranian Criminal Law], 1 (Tehran: Tarbiat Mudarres University, 1379 A.H.), 35. 55. Ziauddin Peymani, Hoghoogh-e Keifari-e Ekhtesasi, Jara’em alayh-e Amniyyat va Asayesh-e Omoomi [Special Criminal Law, Crimes against public security and safety] (Tehran: Mizan Press, 1374 A.H.), 63. 56. Hossein Mir Muhammad Sadeqi, Hoghoogh-e Keifari-e Ekhtesari 2, Jara’em alayh-e Amniyyat va Asayesh-e Omoomi, [Special Criminal Law 2, Crimes against public security and safety] (Tehran: Mizan Press, 1380 A.H.), 47. 57. Muhammad Ja’afar Habibzadeh, Muhareb dar Hoghoogh-e Keifari-e Iran, [Muhareb in the Iranian Criminal Law], 1 (Tehran: Tarbiat Modarress University Publication, 1379 A.H.), 113. 58. “talion,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, S.V., accessed November 4, 2013, http: www.britanica.com/EBChecked/topic/581485/talion. 59. M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Qesas Crimes,” in The Islamic Criminal Justice System, ed. Cherif Bassiouni (London: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1982), 203. 60. Ibid., 204. 61. “Ghannon-e-hudud va Qesas va Mogharrarat-e-an,” 44814, Rooznameh-e Rasmi, 10972, 1982. 62. Sorkhi, Qanoon-e-Mojazat-e-Eslami, 217. 63. Under the 1370 A.H. Code, the offender would be set free in cases that the complainant had removed the complaint. Under the current code, the offender would be subject to ta’azir penalties and would not be set free. 64. Sheikh Jamal al-din Allameh Heli, Qawaed al-Ahkam [The Rules of Judgments], 1 (Beirut: Institute of Shi’a fiqh Publications, 1410 A.H.), 542. 65. Quran, 2:179 and 183. 66. Hadi Sadeqi, Hooghoogh-e Keifari-e Ekhtesasi, Jara’em alayhe Ashkhas [Special criminal law, crimes against individuals], 3 (Tehran: Mizan Press, 1379), 47–48. 67. Sorkhi, Qanoon-e-Mojazat-e-Eslami, 213. 68. Seyyed Shokrollah Asghari, System-e Keifari-e Islami va Pasokh be Shahadat [Islamic Penal System and response to testimony], 2 (Tehran: Keyhan Publications Organization, 1372 A.H.), 139–149. 69. Seyyed Muhammad Khamene’i, Hoghoogh-e Zan va Moghayeseh-e Hoghoogh-e Bashari va Madani-e Zan dar Islam va Eelamiyyeh-e Hoghoogh-e Bashar [Women’s Rights and a Comparison of Human and Civil Rights of Women in Islam and the Declaration of Human Rights] (Tehran: Tak publications; 1370 A.H.), 104–105.

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70. Vahid Ahmadi, Esbat-e Daavay-e Keifari be Vasileh-e Qasameh, [Proof of a Criminal Case by the means of Swearing] (MA Thesis, College of Law, Azad University, 1372-73 A.H.), 144. 71. Sorkhi, Qanoon-e-Mojazat-e-Eslami, 287–88. 72. See: Ziauddin Peymani, Hoqooghe Jazai-e Ekhtesasi, Jaraem alayhe Amniyyat va refahe Omoomi [Specialized Criminal Law, Crimes Against Public Security and Public Safety], 1 (Tehran: Mizan Press, 1374 A.H.), 17. Also, Hossein Mir Muhammad Sadeghi, Hoghooghe Jazaei-e Ekhtesasi 3, Jaraem alayhe Amniyyat va Rafahe Omoomi [Specialized Criminal Law 3, Crimes Against Security and Public Safety], 1 (Tehran: Mizan Press, 1380 A.H.), 60. 73. Peymani, 22. Also see: Abbas Zara’at, Sharh-e Qanoon-e Mojazat-e Islami, ta’azirat [Explanation of the Ta’azirat Punishment in Islamic Law], Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Kashan: Faiz Publications, 1377 A.H.), 50. 74. Hooshang Shambayati, Hoghoogh-e Keifari-Ekhtesasi, (Special Criminal Law), Vol. 3 (Crimes against Public Interest), 3rd ed. (Tehran: Zhoobin; 1380 A.H.), 129. 75. Adopted in 1368 A.H. by the Expediency Council of the Islamic Republic. 76. http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/canada_coi/iran/IRN103920.E.pdf 77. Bahman Kesharvarz, Majmooeh-e Mahshaye-ta’azirat [The collection of Ta’azirat Rules], Vol. 2 (Tehran: Ganje-e Danesh, 1376), 70. 78. This law was passed in Esfand of 1337 A.H. 79. For a detailed discussion of the Islamic foundations of legal discrimination against women in the Islamic Republic, see: Hossein Mehrpur, Mabahesi az Hoghoogh-e Zan, az Nazar-e Hoghoogh-e dakheli, Mabani-e feqhi va Mawazin-e beinol mellal [Certain Issues on Women’s Rights; From the Point of View of Domestic Law, Islamic Jurisprudence, and International Standards] (Tehran: Ettela’at Publications, 1379 A.H.) 80. An interview with Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Bojnourd in “Fiqh and Women’s Human Rights,” Farzaneh, Journal of Women’s Studies and Research 8 (1997): 42. 81. Ibid., 37. 82. Ibid., 41. 83. Tehran Times, No. 14, 1995. 84. W. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1903), 92. 85. John L. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 15. 86. Quran: 30:21. 87. Quran, 43:11. 88. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 32. 89. For a detailed discussion see: S. Haeri, Law of Desire, 23–32. 90. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 33. 91. It has been suggested that the contractual nature of marriage in Islam does not diminish marriage as a sale. One may even contend that the marriage contract may resemble a contract of sale in form but not in spirit. For a detailed discussion of this argument, see: Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 33. 92. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law, 16. 93. Ibid., 20. 94. Quran, 4:3. 95. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law, 22. 96. Quran, 4:23. 97. Quran, 4:7. 98. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law, 26. 99. J. Schacht, “talk,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, V (1929), 636–40. 100. Quran, 65:1. 101. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 37. 102. Esposito, ibid., 30. 103. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law, 39. 104. Quran, 4:11,12, 176.

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105. Nowel James Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family Law (Cambridge: England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 108. 106. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law, 37. 107. Ziba Mir Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 11. 108. A. Banai, 1961, The Modernization of Iran, 1921–1941, (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1961), 71. 109. Banai, The Modernization of Iran, 81. 110. For the text of these regulations see: Gholam Reza and Hojjati–e Ashrafi, comp. Majmue ye-Kamel-e Ghavanin va Mogharrarat-e Hoghoogi [Complete Collection of the Legal Codes and Regulations] (Tehran: Ketabkhane-e Ganj-e Danesh, 1379 A.H.). 111. Article 8 of the Family Protection Law spelled out a lengthy list of circumstances for which the court would issue the required divorce certificates. They include: man’s inability or unwillingness to pay her maintenance obligations, wife’s disobedience to her husband, mistreatment or misconduct of either parties that make marriage for the other party impossible, terminal illness of a party that makes marriage impossible for the other party, insanity of a party that makes consent to divorce impossible, a party’s involvement in a profession contrary to the dignity and interest of the family (as judged by the court), prison sentences of five or more years or financial penalties that may result in five years of imprisonment or both, any addictions that (in the court’s judgment) has adverse impact on the family and makes marriage impossible, husband’s inability to treat co-wives with justice (equity), abandonment of the family life by either party, any conviction for conduct inconsistent with the dignity of the family or the other party (as judged by the court), the inability of either party to have children despite the desire of the other spouse to have children. 112. Ruhullah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 441. 113. Quoted in: Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 205. 114. See: Muhammad Ja’far Ja’fari Langroodi, Hoghoogh-e Khanevadeh [Family Law], 2nd ed., (Tehran: Genj-e Danesh, 1376 A.H.). 115. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 34. 116. S. H. Imami, Hoghoogh-e Madani [Civil Code] vols. 4 & 5 (Tehran: Islamiyya Press, 1984), 268. 117. Ja’fari Langroodi, Hoghoogh-e Khanevadeh, 119. 118. “A Dialogue with Ayatollah Yousef Sanei on the Rights of Women,” Payam-e Zan [Woman’s Message] 51 (June 1996): 6–12. 119. Ja’fari Langroodi, Hoghoogh-e Khanevadeh, 125. 120. Ibid., 189. 121. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 36. 122. GholamReza Hojjati-e Ashrafi, Mamjmu-e ye-Kamel-e, 830. 123. Ja’fari Langroodi, Hoghoogh-e Khanevadeh, 233. 124. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 57. 125. “A Dialogue with Ayatollah Yousef Sanei on the Rights of Women,” 6–12. 126. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 128–129. 127. Ibid., 197. 128. “Iran’s 1906 Constitution and its Supplement.” Foundation of Iran Studies, accessed November 22, 2013, http://fis-rian-org/en/resurces/legaldoc/iranconstitution. 129. “Press Law,” accessed November 25, 2013, http://www.parstimes.com/law/press_law. html. 130. “As Fragile as a Crystal Glass,” Press Freedom in Iran, A Report by the Human Rights Watch, 1999, accessed October 15, 2000, http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/09/30/fragile-crystalglass-press-freedom-iran 131. Muhammad Javad Larijani, “Satellites and the Islamic System,” Bi-monthly Publications of the Islamic Consultative Assembly’s Center for Research 12 (1994), 8–14. 132. “The Press Under President Khatami,” Human Rights Watch Report, 1999, http:// www.igc.org/hrw/reorts/1999.

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133. Frank R. Lebowitz, “Controversial New Law Limits Press Freedom in Iran.” Digital Freedom Network, accessed January 5, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/iran/Iran99o02.htm. 134. Digital Freedom Network, “Muzzling the Press: Amendments to the Iranian Press Law,” July 7, 1999. 135. R. Frank Lebowitz, “Controversial New Law Limits Press Freedom in Iran.” 136. “Islamic Council Rejects Softer Iranian Press Law,” The Freedom Forum Online, 2000, accessed November 2, 2000, http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp? documentID=3513 137. Hussein Mehrpur, “Legal Guarantees for Observing Human Rights in Iran.” Rahbord, Journal of the Center for Strategic Research, accessed February 4, 2004. www.netiran.com/ Htdocs/Clippings/Social/000000xxSo01.htm. 138. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Islamic Rights or Human Rights: An Iranian Dilemma,” Iranian Studies 29, no. 3-4 (1996): 272–273. 139. “Fiqh and Women’s Human Rights,” Farzaneh: Journal of Women’s Studies and Research, 8 (Winter 1997): 37. 140. “Amnesty International Report 2007. The State of the World’s Human Rights,” accessed October 11, 2007, http://www.rezapahlavi.org//print/?english&id=123. 141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. 143. “Labour Code of 1989,” Rouznameh Rasmi, No. 13387 (17 Feb. 1991): 17. 144. See: Hossein Mehrpur, Mabahesi az Hoghoogh-e Zan, az Nazar-e Hoghoogh-e dakheli, Mabani-e feqhi va Mawzazin-e beinol mellal [Certain Issues on Women’s Rights; From the Point of View of Domestic Law, Islamic Jurisprudence, and International Standards] (Tehran: Etellla’at Publications, 1379 A.H.) parts 2, 3, and 9. 145. “Amnesty International Report 2007.” 146. Mehrpur, “Legal Guarantees.” 147. Mayer, “Islamic Rights and Human Rights,” 275. 148. “Amnesty International Report 2007.” 149. Ibid. 150. Ibid. 151. Ibid. 152. Shirin Ebadi, “Children Rights Convention and Child’s Rights in Iran,” in Azma; Cultural, Social, and Political Magazine, 5 (November 1999): 13. 153. Ibid., 12. 154. Ibid., 13. 155. “Labor Law and Child Rights in Iran,” in Andishe-ye Jame-eh, Social, Cultural Magazine, (Monthly), 7 (Dec. 1999): 3. 156. Abbas Ebadi, “An Analysis of Child Labor in Iran,” in Andishe-ye-Jame’eh, Social, Cultural Magazine (monthly), (Jan 2000): 27. 157. Ibid. 158. “The Iranian Legal Framework and International Law,” Human Rights Report, accessed November 25, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/iran/Iran99o-03.htm. 159. Mayer, “Islamic Rights or Human Rights,” 284. 160. Francis Harrison, “Mass Purges at Iran Universities,” accessed December 21, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6196069.stm. 161. Ibid. 162. “Iran president Facing Revival of Students’ Ire,” accessed December 30, 2006, http:// www.nytimes.com/2006/12/21/world/middleeast/21iran.html?_r=0. 163. BBC News, May 1, 2007. 164. “Iran president Facing Revival of Student Ire.” 165. Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran Cracks Down on Women’s Dress,” accessed April 24, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/23/ AR2007042301175_pf.html. 166. Ibid.

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167. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Agenda item 4, Human Rights Council, UN General Assembly, March 6, 2012. 168. Nasser Katouzian, Iran Farda, 47 (Sept. 1998): 10. 169. “Report of the Special Rapporteur.” 170. Ibid. 171. Jim Muir, “Report Slams Iran rights abuses,” BBC news, accessed June 7, 2004, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3782793.stm. 172. Ibid. 173. “Amnesty International Report 2007.” 174. Nazila Fathi, “Spate of Executions and Amputations in Iran,” New York Times, January 1, 2008. 175. Mehrpur, “Legal Guarantees.” 176. “Iran Human Rights Practices, 1993,” United States Department of State, accessed January 31, 1994. http://aadel.iranhrdc.org/Exe/ZyNET.exe/WRK2000001WP.xml?ZyAction= ZyActionP&-Client=search&Index=IHRDC%20Public%20Documents&Docs=&Query=&Time= &EndTime=&SearchMethod=4&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=HUMAN_ RIGHTS_ISSUE%5EFreedom%20of%20Expression&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=& QFieldDay=&UseQField=HUMAN_RIGHTS_ISSUE&IntQFieldOp=1&ExtQFieldOp=1& Refine=&XmlQuery=&File=C%3A%5CZYIMAGE%20DATA%5CINDEX%20DATA%5CPUBLIC%5CXML%5C2008%5C02%5C00000000%5CWRK2000001WP.xml&User= ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=-f%3ADOC_DATE&ResultOffset=240& MaximumDocuments=20&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r65g4/r65g4/x150y150g16/i360& Display=p%7Cw%7Ch%7Cr%7Cf&DefSeekPage=f&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc= Results%20page&MaximumPages=-1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=f. 177. “Iranian Hard-Liners Ok Anti-torture Law,” accessed March 5, 2004. http://www.rferl.org/ content/article/1052649.html. 178. Frances Harrison, “Group Cleared over Iran Murder,” BBC News, accessed April 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6557679.stm. 179. Fathi, “Spate of Executions and Amputations in Iran.” 180. Trevor Gambling and Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, Business and Accounting Ethics in Islam (London and New York: Mansell Publishing, 1991), 22. 181. Exodus: XXII: 25, and Leviticus XXV: 36 and 37. 182. Meryvn, K. Lewis, and Latifa M. Algaoud, Islamic Banking (North Hampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2001), 27. 183. Ibid. 184. For a discussion of the Islamic notion of social justice, see: M.Umar Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1985), chapters 1–3. 185. Sayyid Qutb, “Islamic Approach to Social Justice,” in Islam, Its Meaning and Message, ed. Khorshid Ahmad (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1975), 117–30. 186. For a thorough discussion of the Islamic economic principles see Khurshid Ahmad, “Islam and the Challenge of Economic Development,” in Islam in Transition, Muslim Perspectives, ed. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); and Muhammad Arif, “Toward the Shari’a Paradigm of Islamic Economics: The Beginning of a Scientific Revolution,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 2 (1985): 79–99. 187. Muhammad Arif, “Toward the Shari’a,” 83. 188. Quran, 6:165 and 57:7. 189. Quran, 2:278 and 2:279. 190. Quran, 9:34. 191. Quran, 5:91 and 5:92. 192. Quran, 5:38. 193. Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Muslim Economic Thinking, A Survey of Contemporary Literature (United Kingdom: The Islamic Foundation, 1981), 7. 194. Gambling and Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, Business and Accounting, p. 33. 195. Ibid. 196. Ibid., 34.

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197. Quran, 59:7. 198. Gambling and Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, Business and Accounting, 52–3. 199. Quran, 4:36. 200. Quran, 17:26. 201. Gambling and Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, Business and Accounting, 53. 202. Siddiqi, Muslim Economic Thinking, 30–31. 203. Sami Hassan Homoud, Islamic Banking, The Adaptation of Banking Practice to Conform with Islamic Law (London: Arabian Information, Ltd., 1985), 47. 204. Lewis and Algaoud, Islamic Banking, 35. 205. L. W. King, trans. The Code of Hammurabi (Article 93), accessed November 10, 2013, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menu/hammenu.asp. 206. Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 8. 207. Saleh, Unlawful Gain, 9. 208. Matthew XXV: 14–30, and Luke XIX: 11–27. 209. Christians opposed to usury justified their opposition by relying on the Christ’s saying: “And if you lend to them of whom you hope to receive, what thank have ye? For sinners also lend to sinners, to receive as much again. But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest; for he is kind to the ungrateful and to the selfish.” (Quoted in Luke VI: 34–35). 210. L. Milliot, Introduction a l’etude du droit musulman (Paris: Sirey, 1971), 647–648. 211. There are hadith and sunnah references to this prohibition. See: Lewis and Algaoud, Islamic Banking, 29. 212. For a discussion of this dispute, see: Nabil Saleh, 10–11. 213. Quran, 1:275. 214. Quran, 2:177 and 4:127. 215. Quran, 17:35, 6:152, and 26:181, 182, 183. 216. Quran, 4:161. 217. Quran, 3:130. 218. Quran, 2:275. 219. Quran, 2:276. 220. Saleh, Unlawful Gain, 15. 221. Lewis and Algaoud, Islamic Banking, 2. 222. Quran, 90–91. 223. Saleh, Unlawful Gain, 87. 224. Ibid., 88. 225. Hamid Algar, trans. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Berkley, CA: Mizan Press, 1980), (preamble). 226. Articles 43–55 of the Constitution. 227. “Foreign Investments in Iran,” Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines, Center for Economic Research and Analysis, 1994, accessed March 20, 2000. http:// www.parstimes.com/law/foreign_investments.html. 228. “Facilities and Tax Exemptions for Foreign Investment.” Manatagh-e Azad: Publications of the Free Trade & Industrial Zones of Iran 65 (October 1996): 12–13, accessed March 20, 2000, http://new.netiran.com/Htdocs/Laws/000000LAGG02html. 229. “A Review of the Law of ‘Trade and Industrial Free Zones,’” Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines Quarterly Magazine, 2.1 (1994): 49–50, accessed March 20, 2000, http: new.netiran.com/Htdocs/Laws/000000LAGG05.html. 230. Article 5 of the Law on the Administration of Trade and Industrial Free Zones, ibid. 231. “Customs Regulations Governing the Goods Carried by Passengers,” Sanat Hal-oNaghl, Scientific, Technical, Economic & Informative 14. 54 (1995), accessed March 20, 2000, http://www.parstimes.com/law/customs_passangers.html. 232. Ibid. 233. Lewis and Algaoud, Islamic Banking, 101. 234. For a discussion of this contractual relationship, see A. Yasseri, “Islamic Banking Contracts as Enforced in Iran (Implications for the Iranian Banking Practices),” in Islamic

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Finance: Challenges and Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century (Fourth International Conference on Islamic Economics and Banking, Loughbrough University, 2000): 505–26. 235. Lewis and Algaoud, Islamic Banking, 102. 236. “Mining Law,” Mines and Metals; Scientific, Technical, News, 63 (1998): 3–10, accessed March 20, 2000, http://new.netiran.com/Htdocs/Laws/000000LAGG08.html. 237. “Protective Policies in Iranian Economy: Past and Future,” Commercial Review; Economic, 147 (January 2000): 24–29; accessed March 20, 2002, http://www.netiran.com/Htdocs/ Clippings/DEconomcy/200123XXDE03.html. 238. Third Five-Year Plan law bill (volume one), Plan and Budget Organization, September 1999. Also, see: Abbas Valadkhani, “An Analysis of Iran’s Third Five-Year Development Plan in the Post-Revolution Era (2000–2005),” Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, 17.2 (2001): 1–21. 239. “Role of the Government,” accessed September 26, 2007, http://countrystudies.us/iran/ 63.htm. 240. Ibid. 241. Ibid. 242. “Protective Policies.” 243. Afsahen Mohsen Nejad. “Planning in Iran, A 50 Year Old Phenomenon,” Tarbaran; Iranian Economic and Transportation Magazine, 10 (2000), http://www.irvl.net/planning_in_iran.htm. 244. For an assessment of the Third Developmental Plan, see: Jahnagir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Third Development Plan: An Appraisal,” Middle East Policy, 12.3 (fall 2005), 46–63. 245. “Protective Policies,” 29. 246. Djavad Saleh-Isfahani, “Iran’s Third Development Plan; A Reappraisal,” Working Papers from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Virginia: (December 2005): 5. 247. Kaveh Rohani, “Unemployment,” The Iran Daily, January 9, 2006. 248. According to Rohani, the only Iranian industry that continues to attract investment is the oil industry. However, the Iranians’ pre-construction investments in Dubai are so substantial that are only surpassed by Britons and other Europeans. 249. Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Third Development Plan,” 46–63. 250. Salehi-Isfahani, “Iran’s Third Development Plan,” 3. 251. William Samii and Fatemeh Aman, “Iran: Analysts Give Economic Planning and Development Mixed Marks,” accessed September 26, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/ 1062437.html. 252. Salehi-Isfahani, “Iran’s Third Development Plan,” 5. 253. “Declaration of the General Policies of the Fifth Development Plan,” accessed October 21, 2013, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataporal/laws/supreme-leadear/khamenei/declarationfifth. 254. “Iran Overview,” accessed October 21, 2013, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ iran/overview. 255. Salehi-Isfahani, “Iran’s Third Development Plan,” 9–12. 256. Ibid., 10. 257. Francis Harrison, “Economists attack Iran Policies,” BBC News, accessed June 12, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6744841.stm.

III

The Polity in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Chapter Four

Civil Society in Iranian Political Life

HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY History of civil society in Iran dates back to the waning years of the Qajar dynasty (1796–1925) and the Constitutional Revolution in the early years of the twentieth century. 1 Oppositional politics helped the rise of liberal-democratic, religious, ethno-national, and nationalist movements and parties that ushered in the era of constitutional monarchy and growing influence of civil society in Iran. During the Constitutional Revolution, a number of parties and groups including Democratic Party (Hezb-e Democrat), Social Balance Party (Hezb-e Ejtemaiyyun-E’etedaliyyun), Consensus and Advancement Party (Hezb-e Ettefagh va Taragh’ghi), and Advancement Seekers Party (Hezb-e Taragh’ghi Khahan) composed the core of civil society in the country. The most important party of the time was the Democratic Party (est. 1288 A.H.) which officially had liberal-democratic leanings and many of its members were progressive and subscribed to social-democratic principles. Although the party advocated for the separation of religion and politics, some of its members had religious tendencies and favored a role for religion in politics. 2 In opposition to the Democratic Party, the Social Balance Party was status-quo orientated and opposed to the progressive policies of the liberals. 3 With the inception of the Pahlavi dynasty and increasing public political awareness, partly due to improved educational opportunities and exposure to Western ideas by Western-educated Iranians during Reza shah’s rule, there was an unprecedented proliferation and subsequent influence of civil society institutions including political parties and groups. Reformists (Eslah Talaban), socialists, and communists were all active during the early years of Reza shah’s rule. Reformist and socialist forces did not survive Reza shah’s dictatorship and were either co-opted or eliminated in a short period of time. 127

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Communists were able to survive for some time largely due to their modern platform and organizational strength, and became the nucleus of the communist movement in the post–WWII era. 4 Despite subscribing to a Bolshevik socialist ideology and their sympathy for the Soviet Union, the pre–WWII communist movement of Iran was incorporated into liberal-democratic-leaning parties and groups because of the country’s lack of necessary social and economic development, absence of a dynamic labor movement, and the communist movement’s inability to build meaningful organizations and a broad base of public support. 5 Reza shah’s ouster in 1941 and events that led to the rise of Mohammad Mossadegh to prime ministership in 1951 opened a new chapter in democratic rights and growth of civil society in the country. During this period, many parties which advocated for and represented various segments of the population by embracing different ideologies and policies emerged on the Iranian political scene. However, at the time that the Allied powers installed Mohammad Reza shah to the throne, most Iranian parties and groups were tied to foreign powers. The notable exception was the Iran Party that called for liberal-democratic values, was committed to a nationalist and independent agenda, and became the anchor of Iran’s civil society of the time. Most others and their supporters in the military and the parliament were connected to, supported by, and worked for foreign interests. For instance, Homeland Party (Hezb-e Vatan) and National Will (Erade-ye Melli) were tied to the British interests, Justice Party (Hezb-e Edalat) and Freedom Party (Hezb-e Azadi) worked for the American interests, Struggle Party (Hezb-e Peykar) was connected to the French, and Iran’s Nationalists’ Party (Hezb-e Melliyyun-e Iran) supported Nazi Germany. In pursuit of their ethnic rights, a number of ethnic parties also emerged in the form of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Democratic Faction of Azerbaijan. These parties and other similar groups pursued a range of goals including economic advantages for their people, educational opportunities, and local autonomy. The communist movement of Iran was formed by a group of foreign-educated Iranians 6 during Reza shah’s rule. The regime could not tolerate their oppositionist views and activities, thus arrested and executed some of the communist leaders. The remainder of the group established the Iran Tudeh Party (Hezb-e Tudeh-e Iran) in 1941. This party, which subscribed to a Marxist-Leninist ideology and advocated for the Soviet interests, gradually developed into one of the strongest and most effective political parties and dominated the labor movement. The party’s success was largely due to its effective public relations campaigns, successful initiatives to build grassroots “labor and toilers societies,” and ability to attract Iranian intellectuals including prominent writers and poets. 7 In the late 1940s, Mohammad Reza shah attempted to constrain and control civil society in Iran by marginalizing progressive movements and parties

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in the name of national cohesion and eradication of ethnic revolts in various parts of the country. As it later became the hallmark of the shah’s approach to civil society in Iranian political life, the regime followed a two-pronged strategy. On one hand, it banned progressive and oppositionist parties and groups, confiscated their publications, and arrested and exiled their leaders and supporters. On the other hand, it promoted a loyalist predominant party system by supporting and strengthening the Democratic Party of Iran, which gained monopoly on power in the Iranian parliament with the support of the regime, the United States, and Great Britain. These efforts brought in a new era of repression and regime’s intolerance of civil society. After the assassination attempt at the shah in 1949, the government declared martial law and subsequently closed down opposition publications, banned the Tudeh Party, and arrested opposition leaders. Despite the ensuing reign of terror, progressive and nationalist forces and personalities continued their opposition to shah’s heavy-handedness and the growing influence of Great Britain and the United States in Iranian politics. Mohammad Mossadegh and his associates along with the leaders of the Peoples’ Party (Hezb-e Mardom) and Unity Party (Hezb-e Vahdat) adopted a political platform that called for open and free elections, freedom of speech and the press, and the end of martial law. 8 Mossadegh and his colleagues in the National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli), which was a constellation of political parties with a wide range of ideologies and policy preferences, succeeded in the parliamentary elections of 1949. The rise of the National Front, growing popular demand for freedom and political participation, and decline and fall of subsequent governments intensified public’s calls for Mossadegh’s leadership. As the leader of the National Front in the parliament, Mossadegh took a confrontational stance against the monarch and called for greater independence in foreign and economic policies. He effectively worked against the British oil concession of 1948 and ultimately the parliament rejected the concession and subsequently nationalized the Iranian oil industry in 1950. Mossadegh’s commitment to liberal-democratic values and his nationalist and anti-imperialist stance gained him a great deal of support within the university community and among the traditional shopkeepers (the bazaaris), small shopkeepers, and ulama. In 1951, due to popular pressure and support, the National Front under Mossadegh’s leadership came to power with the promise of greater democracy and commitment to nationalist principles. During Mossadegh’s premiership until the coup of 1953, Iran witnessed an unprecedented growth in civil society and democratic development. In contrast to his predecessors 9 since the removal of Reza shah from power, Mossadegh was an independent-minded nationalist with strong anti-imperialist views. Throughout his long and tumultuous political career—which spanned from the latter part of the Qajar dynasty through the reigns of Reza shah and the first decade of Mohammad Reza shah including exiles, imprisonments, govern-

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mental positions, membership and leadership of the parliament, and prime ministership—he consistently opposed dictatorship, advocated for a healthy civil society, and rejected foreign intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs. According to Younes Parsa Benab, during Mossadegh’s reign, many political parties and groups appeared on the Iranian political scene that contributed either to the success or failure of his rule. 10 These elements of civil society included the National Front and its affiliates, the Tudeh Party, lesser popular parties outside the government, and independents. The most important parties within the National Front included Iran Party (Hezb-e Iran), Iran Nation’s PanIranist Party (Hezb-e Pan Iranist-e Mellat-e Iran), Islamic Mujahedin Party (Hezb-e Mojahedin-e Islam), and Iran’s Toilers’ Party (Hezb-e Zahmatkeshan-e Iran). The Iran Party did not have any foreign affiliations and was originally created by some members of the Iranian Engineers’ Guild who believed in rule by technocrats and favored political development. Backed by the bazaaris, many leaders of the party called for nationalist and democratic initiatives and supported Mossadegh during his premiership. However, some of its younger and more dynamic members who had socialistic and religious tendencies left the party and created a movement called Movement of the GodWorshipping Socialists (Nehzat-e Khodaparastan-e Socialist). 11 Many of these religiously oriented activists along with some clerics opposed the Tudeh party, preached some form of Islamic socialism, opposed the newly established state of Israel, and supported the Palestinian cause. According to many historians, participation of this movement in the National Front was the beginning of a very important nationalist-religious alliance in the Iranian body politic. 12 These religious elements remained loyal to Mossadegh and his goals until the coup of 1953. Afterward, they changed their name to Iran’s Peoples Party (Hezb-e Mardom-e Iran) and joined the National Resistance Movement. The Pan-Iranist Party subscribed to ultra-nationalist and often racist viewpoints and was active among a number of nationalist and ultra-nationalist groups. Some of these ultra-nationalists supported the National Socialist Movement in Germany and praised Hitler and his racist pronouncements. However, despite important divisions among their constituent groups, PanIranists supported Mossadegh’s nationalistic policies and nationalization of the oil industry. 13 The Islamic Mujahedin Party, which was initially called “The Society of Mujahed Muslims,” was established in 1948 with the support of Ayatollah Abolghassem Kashani (1882–1962) who was in exile in Lebanon at the time. 14 Kashani opposed the British interests, exhibited pro-German sentiments, and worked with the German intelligence. He gained a great deal of popularity among the bazaaris and clerics by supporting Mossadegh and the National Front. His political popularity marginalized the highest-ranking

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cleric of the time, Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Boroojerdi (1875–1961), who supported the monarch and opposed Mossadegh’s nationalistic agenda. Ironically, Kashani and the Islamic Mujahedin Party were primarily interested in opposing the British, and supported Mossadegh as long as he targeted the British interests. As Mossadegh pursued a broader nationalist strategy and intensified his opposition to the regime, military leaders, landed aristocrats, the United States, and major international oil companies, Kashani and the Mujahedin withdrew their support from him. 15 Withdrawal of the Mujahedin from the National Front and Kashani’s support for officers in the Homeland Salvation Committee, which worked with the United States to overthrow Mossadegh’s government, played a crucial role in the success of the 1953 coup. “In fact, by withdrawing [from Mossadegh], Kashani . . . caused a significant damage to the Iranian peoples’ anti-imperialist struggles.” 16 The Toilers’ Party was established in 1951 by some activists and political organizers who had left the Tudeh party a year earlier. This party was a coalition of leftist intellectuals and smaller religious and anti-communist labor unions. At the outset, the party joined the National Front and supported Mossadegh’s efforts to nationalize the oil industry. However, like Kashani and his Mujahedin Party, some members of the Toilers’ Party left the National Front in opposition to Mossadegh’s anti-imperialist agenda. In cooperation with Kashani, some in the military, and the United States intelligence, the party worked for the overthrow of the Mossadegh government during the coup of 1953. In fact, the party was instrumental in organizing riots in Tehran, which was led by Sha’aban Ja’afari (a.k.a., Sha’aban the Brainless) and carried out by his gang of thugs who had close relationship with pro-monarchy bazaaris and clerics. In addition to these major parties and groups, the National Front was supported by minor parties and groups including: Freedom Party (Hezb-e Azadi), Independence Party (Hezb-e Esteghlal), Society of Combatants (Jam’iyyat-e Mobarez), Association of Tehran Businessmen and Shopkeepers (Anjoman-e Bazarganan va Kasabe-ye Tehran), Organization of Nationalist Officers (Sazeman-e Afsaran-e Nationalist), and independents. In the democratic atmosphere of the Mossadegh era, the Tudeh party— which had been banned and many of its leaders were arrested and executed after the assassination attempt at the shah—grew tremendously. As the party leadership grew in strength, it was able to mobilize workers, peasants, military officers, and intellectuals to create extensive organizations that made the party “one of the largest political parties not only in Iran but also in the Middle East.” 17 Mossadegh had an unquestionable commitment to civil liberties and, despite his dislike for communism, believed that the Tudeh party should and could indeed remain active within the Iranian constitutional framework. He was of the opinion that this party could be a positive force in opposition to British imperialism. As a well-organized party with extensive

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backing from various powerful organizations among workers, peasants, women, military personnel, and the youth, the party’s support for Mossadegh’s premiership was indeed critical. However, due to internal frictions, the party did not lend much support to Mossadegh and portrayed his government as a tool of American imperialism. The more experienced, but less influential, members of the party favored support for the government because of its nationalist and anti-British imperialist stance, and believed that cooperation would transform the government into a socialist one. 18 The majority and more influential members, however, were of the view that Mossadegh and his government were not truly anti-British, rather they were a bourgeois government tied to the American imperialist interests. Although the Tudeh party had prior knowledge of the coup of 1953 and possessed the necessary organizational capacity to effectively defend the government, it simply refused to act in support of the government. Fall of the Mossadegh government in 1953, return of the shah to power, and the regime’s new repressive measures enforced by the shah’s secret service (Savak) closed this important and promising chapter in the life of Iranian civil society. In an attempt to consolidate his power, the shah banned any genuine oppositionist parties, groups, and movements in the years that followed. Political activists who continued their opposition to the regime were arrested, imprisoned, killed, exiled, or forced to leave the country. After initial challenges to the regime—especially in the form of student riots—opposition movements, parties, and groups went underground or set up shops in sympathetic foreign countries. In their place, monarchist parties dominated the Iranian political life that undermined Iranian civil society as public’s cynicism and apathy grew. On occasions, in the ensuing years, governmental policies and authority were both peacefully and violently challenged by students, teachers, some clerics, and merchants. The government typically reacted to such challenges with brutal force resulting in arrest, imprisonment, torture, and often execution of the opponents. In the vacuum caused by the absence of an organized and meaningful secular opposition to the regime, and in response to repressive policies and economic and political crises in the late 1950s and early 1960s, for the first time a new and potentially significant religio-clerical oppositionist force appeared on the Iranian political scene. Led by Khomeini, this new religio-clerical opposition challenged the shah’s White Revolution of 1963–1964. 19 As the regime confronted this opposition by attacking the Qom Faiziyyeh religious school and arresting, injuring, and killing some of the religious students, Khomeini compared these brutal acts to the past Mongol invasion and suggested that “support for the Shah means lootery, abandonment of Islam, and attack on the rights of Muslims.” 20 He encouraged religious leaders and students to fight against the dangers of Israel and the regime. Khomeini’s arrest in response to his highly

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personal attacks on the shah resulted in widespread public revolts, which were brutally and effectively quelled within days. For the next fifteen years, until the revolution of 1978, the regime showed no interest in democratic development; rather it focused on establishing an extensive security, military, and bureaucratic infrastructure designed to ensure its stability. During this period, all of the liberal-democratic, leftist, nationalist, and religio-clerical political opposition forces and their leaders either disappeared, went underground, or relocated to foreign countries. In an attempt to preserve a semblance of democracy, the regime only allowed political activism and civil society within the confines of a “loyal opposition to the throne.” Shortly before the coup of 1953, the regime had established the pro-monarchist Nationalist Party (Hezb-e Melliyyoun). A year later, the Peoples Party (Hezb-e Mardom) was established to be the “loyal opposition” and a counterbalance to the Melliyyoun. Despite their overt conflicts, both parties supported the monarch and advocated for the U.S. and Western oil interests. 21 This pattern of party system continued when the regime established the Modern Iran (Iran-e-Novin) party as the dominant party and allowed the Mardom party to play the role of the loyal opposition to the king. At times, the Mardom party was allowed to express minor criticisms of the ruling party and the government but not the monarch. These artificial and limited channels of expressions were closed in 1974 when the king called for the “need for national unity,” created a “single-party” system with the Resurgence (Rastakhiz) Party as the sole instrument of civil society, and banned the Mardom party. Officially, the Rastakhiz party underscored the legitimacy of the constitution and the monarchic system, respect for the principles of the White Revolution, and rejection of pluralism. 22 Of course, none of these regime-inspired, created, and controlled parties gained meaningful popular support that the regime had hoped for. The regime’s intolerance for any type of opposition and challenge, and the consequent unprecedented state of terror, alienated various segments of the population and radicalized many intellectuals, students, and activist clerics. The newly emerging and reorganized older movements, parties, and groups began calling for armed confrontation with the regime. Many actively carried out assassination attempts at top leaders and military targets and engaged in bombings. These groups and parties formed the core of revolutionary forces and played a pivotal role in the success of the revolution in the late 1970s. While the seasoned National Front leaders sat on the sidelines, with the help of some pro-Mossadegh independent activists inside Iran, new National Front–affiliated movements, organizations, and groups were established and became active as early as 1955. They included: Organization of the Students of the National Front of Iran (Sazeman-e Daneshjooyan-e Jebeh-ye Melli-e Iran), Society of the Socialists of the Nationalist Movement of Iran

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(Jame’eh-ye Socialistha-ye Nehzat-e Melli-ye Iran), Iranian Freedom Movement (Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran), Iranian People’s Party (Hezb-e Mardom-e Iran)—which was also known as the God Worshipping Socialists (Nakhshabiyyun)—and Iranian Nation’s Party (Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran). Many of these organizations were brutally repressed by the regime and their leaders were imprisoned or executed. Some of the former National Front activists continued their political activities outside the country within such organizations as the Society of Iranian Socialists in Europe and the Iranian Freedom Movement Abroad. During this period, the Tudeh party was disorganized and insignificant inside the country. Abroad, some of the Tudeh party members and sympathizers became active in the Confederation of Iranian Students in Europe and the United States. Others who had escaped to the Eastern Bloc nations and had initiated new political activities were gradually factionalized over ideological and strategic disputes between the Soviet Union and China. Some moved to the West and created new parties and organizations. The Toofan Marxist-Leninist Organization was created by some of the activists who were expelled or left the party. Some of the younger members of the Tudeh party who considered the leadership backward and ideologically “revisionist” also created the Revolutionary Organization of the Iran Tudeh Party Abroad, which advocated for armed struggle against the regime. The first known groups that called for armed struggle against the regime consisted of a number of communist sympathizers including Arani, Tudeh, Arash, and Peyvand groups, some of whom were engaged in sporadic guerrilla warfare throughout the 1970s. In addition to these radical groups, a number of religio-clerical organizations called for armed struggle after the revolts of 1964 and continued their collaboration with Khomeini throughout the revolutionary process. Among them were Muslim Nations’ Party (Hezb-e Mellal-e Eslami), Islamic Movement of Iranian People (Jonbesh-e Elsmi-e Mardom-e Iran) also known as Jama, and a host of other Islamist groups. The Muslim Nations Party that had gained a great deal of public support during the 1964 revolts called for violent overthrow of the regime and establishment of an Islamic system, and was active during the revolutionary process. After the revolution, many of the party’s leaders joined the Islamic Republican Party and occupied important positions of power in the Islamic Republic. Members of Jama participated in the Bazargan Provisional Government after the revolutionary success. Some of the ethnic groups and parties also joined these calls for armed resistance to the regime including the Kurdish Movement, the Revolutionary Committee of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, and Qashqa’i Turkish tribes in the Fars province. Although varied in their ideological perspectives and policy preferences, many prominent Iranian intellectuals, artists, and athletes such as Foroogh Farrokhzad, Samad Behrangi, and Gholamreza Takhti also called for resistance against repression.

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With the success of the revolution and establishment of the Islamic Republic, pluralism faced serious challenges in the new Iranian polity on both ideological and practical grounds. Like the shah’s regime, the Islamic Republic found it imperative to contain any oppositionist political activism by brutally confronting those who challenge the authority of the state and its Islamic-clerical foundation. Borrowing a chapter from the shah’s era, the Islamic regime accepts popular participation and activism only within strict ideological and political confines designed to protect the system and its elites. This time, however, the intent is not to preserve the monarchy and its dictatorial ways, it is rather to ensure clerical domination and absolutism. CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN Scholarly literature on civil society in post-revolutionary Iran is both limited and confounding. The primary difficulty is to determine what constitutes civil society. In the Islamic Republic, civil society is largely defined and understood in terms of popular political involvement within the confines of Shi’a Islam, parameters of the system and its religio-political proclivities, and elites’ unbending assertion to uncontested and unchallenged political authority. Thus, it has been suggested that in the Islamic Republic the state coexists in harmony with and is an integral part of the civil society. 23 Given this role of the state, and the absence of an extensive civil society free from governmental domination or scrutiny, much of the literature on civil society focuses on the emergence and growth or dismantling of movements, groups, parties, and foundations sanctioned by or tied to the state. There is very little written or known about those civil society institutions that function outside these parameters. Labor unions, women’s organizations, and poor people’s communities have attempted to play a constructive role in ameliorating the socioeconomic conditions facing these segments of the Iranian society. In particular, women’s non-governmental organizations “are challenging gender-specific access and influence over institutional powers, matters that are crucial to the process of democratization,” 24 although they have not pursued or achieved any major structural reforms. Similarly, poor people’s communities in large cities, which are the product of rural-urban migration, 25 resulted in the poor people’s movement that has indeed played a significant political role in Iranian civil society both within and outside the limits set by the state. Ideological Schisms and the Nature of Political Authority To understand the role of civil society in an Islamic polity, one must recognize the seemingly never-ending debates and schisms over the nature and scope of authority. From the outset of the Islamic Republic, intense conflicts

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about the system and its policy orientations derived from divergent views on Islamic monolithicism and pluralism. As clearly witnessed in the contemporary group and factional politics, much of the disputes are over whether the system is embedded in the primacy of Islamic principles or in republican ideals. Subscribing to a monolithic view of religion and society, some continue to reject pluralism on the grounds that tawhid establishes the need for communal unity and restricts the public’s right to pursue its group interests. Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazi, a spiritual advisor to former President Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards, asserts that “The Prophets of God did not believe in pluralism. They believed that only one idea is right.” 26 Conservatives basically argue that Islam is the basis of the system’s legitimacy. According to Hamid Reza Tariqi of the Islamic Coalition Society, “The legitimacy of our Islamic establishment is derived from God. This legitimacy will not wash away even if people stop supporting it.” 27 Khamene’i, Khomeini’s successor, condemns the idea of democratic accountability and pluralism by insisting that the Islamic Republic is not “prepared to allow flawed and non-divine perspectives and ideals that are aimed at enhancing the power of the individual to dictate its social and political lives.” 28 Pluralism and its consequent factional politics, these conservatives insist, undermine the necessary unity proscribed by Islam. In this perspective, any meaningful deviation from the predominant views advanced by the authorities causes discords that undermine the unity and interests of Islam and the community. Many of these anti-pluralists subscribe to the classical Islamic doctrine of “absolute obedience” in order to ensure this unity and Islamic and communal interests. Along this line of thought, Article 11 of the constitution speaks of the political, cultural, and economic unity of all Muslims in order to avoid discord and ensure communal interest. Any collective action that undermines Islam, the regime, or communal interest is deemed unacceptable and illegal. Proponents of the republican principles of the constitution contend that pluralism and growth of a civil society is not only consistent with Islam but also necessary for the democratic transformation of the political system. Abdol Karim Soroush, a Tehran University Professor who had initially supported the authoritarian components of the constitution and favored restrictive Islamic policies, later spoke of the dangers of Islamic monolithicism, as understood by conservatives. Rejecting authoritarianism, he said, “An ideal religious society cannot have anything but a democratic argument.” 29 He maintained that Islam is obligated to ensure individual sovereignty and governmental accountability. If so, he concluded, religious doctrine and pluralism are indeed reconcilable. 30 In his writings, Soroush distinguishes between a “religious state” and a “religious jurisprudent state.” Unlike the former, which is governed by the clerics and is indifferent to popular mandates, the latter is a more ideal religious state that would merely “obligate itself to create an atmosphere that defends believers’ free and conscious faith

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and religious experience.” 31 Similarly, some of the prominent clerics also rebuked the conservative interpretation and clerical domination. Hojjat-olIslam Mohsen Kadivar relied on the dominant Shi’a theological interpretation of authority for rejecting the type of clerical rule advanced by Khomeini. He insisted that, during the greater occultation, no one has a special mission or authority to guide the society. Thus, during this period, the government should be an expression of the majority opinion. 32 Similarly, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, who was bypassed as Khomeini’s successor and marginalized for his democratic beliefs, insisted that Islam and democracy can coexist because Islam supports freedom. He also criticized what the conservative clerics practice as “anti-Islamic.” 33 Khomeini himself was a dogmatic Islamist with a genuine dislike for pluralism. However, as an astute politician with greater interest in clerical rule at all costs than divisive ideological debates, he acknowledged the realities of Iranian politics and embraced a limited form of pluralism by denying that factional politics is due to unhealthy power struggle. He offered that: “A society that does not have differences of opinion is imperfect. If differences of opinion do not exist in the Majles, this Majles [is also] imperfect.” 34 As long as factional politics is guided by Islamic tenets and actions, disagreements over interpretation are inevitable and acceptable. 35 Pluralism and Group Politics Due to these ongoing disputes over the role of political authority and policy preferences, since its inception the Islamic Republic has been largely marred by intense factional politics, a topic that has attracted much scholarly research and some analytical guesswork. These studies tend to focus on the ideological and policy positions of groups and factions, the role of personalities, and factional and group pragmatic/opportunistic reorientations in response to political necessities. An in-depth analysis of group and factional politics in today’s Iran reveals the following characteristics: • Iranian politics is rife with an extensive network of groups and factions that vary in their organizational strength and membership. Generally, their organizations tend to be loose and their members frequently move from one group or faction to another. • Groups and factions embrace an array of ideological orientations. However, legally sanctioned and politically acceptable ideological orientations are confined within the dichotomous interpretations of the traditional (sunnati) fiqh and dynamic (puya) fiqh. 36 These dichotomous perspectives have far-reaching implications for the system including the roles of institutions, political processes, and policy preferences of the regime. This confined ideological continuum ensures that only pro-systemic legitimate

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groups and factions could actively seek effective political role in today’s Iran. Historically speaking, group and factional politics has always been subject to frequent and drastic ideological shifts. These ideological shifts, which are largely due to political opportunism, oftentimes result in significant policy reorientations. In short, it is common for a group or faction to reverse its position on even core issues, if such a reversal is considered necessary at the time. Ideological moderation overtime usually signifies the groups’ or factions’ pragmatic approaches to politics or the acknowledgment of the limitations of dogmatic ideologism, especially on policy issues. There is a prevalence of overlapping ideological and policy preferences that, on occasions, result in political realignments, especially during elections when rival factions may indeed lend support to opposing candidates in order to further their own political and policy objectives or to block policies that seem undesirable to them. Although there have been many attempts at categorizing and classifying groups and factions in Iranian politics on the basis of their ideological tendencies, such efforts are generally not useful. Indeed, such labels as right, left, reformist, centrist, pragmatist, liberal, neo-fundamentalist, and so forth, are relative and oftentimes misleading. As members shift and policies are reoriented or moderated—and even marginalized—ideological labels are rendered meaningless. Therefore, any attempt at categorization and classification must acknowledge these limitations. Factions’ and movements’ political fortunes and misfortunes were closely tied to Khomeini during his reign. As the uncontested leader of the revolution with unbending ideological propensities and policy preferences, he was the final arbiter in factional disputes and often sided with the left and advocated for their policies. Khomeini’s demise transformed the Iranian political landscape, in particular the parameters of factional politics, thus offering marginalized factions new opportunities in the post-Khomeini era. Too often, the success of a movement, group, or faction is erroneously interpreted to signal the demise or decline of other movements, groups, factions, or ideologies. In general, Iranian movements, groups, and factions exhibit a great deal of resilience and tend to survive and rebuild themselves by changing their ideological and policy positions to maintain or regain political legitimacy and relevance. As the dominance of reformers and rise of Khatami did not end the relevance of conservatives, the current reformers’ retreat and conservatives’ hegemony are not indicative of reformists’ demise. The current success of conservatives is largely due to their effective institution-building and alliance with the Islamic Republican Guards, who are increasingly dominating social, economic, and po-

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litical lives in today’s Iran. In the aftermath of massive demonstrations in opposition to the rigged presidential election of 2009 and regime’s brutal crackdown against reformists and the public, the conservative-military alliance may have indeed transformed the Iranian regime from a traditionally clerical into a military-clerical authoritarian system with little interest in pluralism. However, the public anger over flawed elections and failed economic and foreign policies of the Ahmadinejad administration and growing challenges to the regime may reinvigorate reformers and open new opportunities for their return. The election of Rouhani to the presidency (2013–present), though a moderate conservative, with support from reformist politicians underscores the limitations of conservative dominance and continued relevance of the reform movement. The constitution and numerous laws account for pluralism by setting up guidelines for group formation and right to collective action within limits. Recognized religious minority groups including Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are granted freedom to pursue their religious tenets and practices in the constitution (Article 13). In establishing freedom of association, the constitution also provides for the formation of parties and voluntary political and professional associations and societies “provided they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic” (Article 26). Groups and parties are expected to articulate their interests in the political process in an orderly fashion and with due consideration to the regime’s interests. For instance, groups may hold authorized public gatherings and marches, “provided arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam” (Article 27). In 1981, the Guardian Council approved a parliamentary legislation governing the formation, organization, and functions of parties and groups. 37 Article 1 of this law excludes any anti-systemic groups and parties by defining groups and parties as any voluntary “organizations which have articles of association and which have been established by real persons believing in certain essential policies and ideals and whose objectives, behaviors and programs are somehow related to the administration of the state and general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” This law pays special attention to religious groups. According to Article 3 of the law, Islamic associations are voluntary organizations with the goals of Islamic education, dissemination of Islamic values, and propagation of the Islamic revolution. This law reiterates religious minorities’ right to organize and pursue their goals, as established in Article 13 of the constitution (Article 4). It further enumerates groups’ rights, which are limited to the restrictions spelled out in its Article 16. Recognized and registered groups may hold public marches and express their preference in an orderly fashion without undermining the foundations of

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Islam and the system (Articles 6, 7). Former secret service agents, ministers, senators, members of the Majles, members of the former Rastakhiz Party, and those deprived of their social rights by courts’ verdicts are prohibited from establishing or taking leadership roles in parties and groups (Article 7). Groups are expected to refrain from any activities that undermine the country’s independence, territorial integrity, and unity; any harmful contacts with and assistance from foreign sources; any form of violation of freedom of others including the use of slander and false accusation; and any violations of Islamic standards and the basis of the Islamic Republic by engaging in antisystemic propaganda and publication of seditious literature (Article 16). To ensure control over such groups’ activities, the law established a commission referred to as the Article 10 Commission tasked with licensing and overseeing functions of groups and parties (Article 10). In case of the violations stipulated in Article 16, this commission may issue a written reminder or notice, may seize or cancel the offender’s license, and may request the dissolution of the group or party by courts (Article 17). The Council of Ministers adopted the executive regulations of this law in 1982. 38 These regulations established the Article 10 Commission, stipulated its organizational structure, and granted it extensive responsibilities in licensing and monitoring group functions. Groups, according to these regulations, may only be created by real persons who have reached the age of twentyfive, are Iranian citizens, committed to the constitution, and lack adverse records as spelled out in Article 7 of the Parties Law (Article 2). The licensing requirements are indeed very strict and intend to ensure close governmental control and monitoring of these groups and their actions (Articles 3–8 and 23–26). For instance, these regulations entail detailed guidelines for group assemblies and marches. Article 32 requires applicants for such group activities to submit documentations containing information on the goals, timing, place, topics of speeches, slogans, nature of resolutions, and security arrangements. These regulations, however, ban any meaningful political activities by religious minority groups by insisting that “In the doctrine and articles of association for formation of the society, the objectives must be quite specific and comprise the cultural, social and welfare problems peculiar to that minority” (Article 38). This article lists the pertinent cultural, social, and welfare matters and discounts any rights to influence broader public policy issues. These prohibitions, along with stricter licensing requirements, do indeed set greater limitations on religious minority groups compared to their Islamic and professional counterparts. Unlike Islamic and professional groups, religious minority groups are required to identify their religious affiliations, any affiliations with political parties, any relations with any coreligionists abroad, and any relations with foreign coreligionists who reside in Iran (Article 41).

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In accordance with these regulations, many groups and parties have been established. 39 Groups are generally labeled as society, association, organization, or center; and depending on their membership composition or purpose may be categorized into regional/ethnic, professional, Islamic, and women groups. There is a significant overlap of Islamic and professional organizations such as the Islamic Association of Iranian Teachers (est. 1991), Islamic Association of Engineers (est. 1991), Islamic Center for University Academicians (est. 1992), Women Association of Islamic Revolution (est. 1992), and Islamic Association of Dentists (est. 1996). Associations that do not have formal Islamic affiliations are relatively limited in number. They range from educational groups such as the Center for Graduates From Indian Subcontinent (est. 1990) and the Association of Graduates From Europe, America and the Pacific (est. 1992) to professional groups like the Association of Iranian Engineers (est. 1991), the Labor House (est. 1992), and the Society of Advocates of Law& Order (est. 1998). Most outspoken and effective women organizations have Islamic affiliation like the Islamic Society of Women (est. 1998) and Women Islamic League (est. 1998), but some are primarily professional including the Association of Iranian Female Journalists (est. 1999). Largely due to the regime’s sensitivity about ethnic and regional frictions, many regional groups tend to have a professional focus like the League of Golestan Province Academicians (est. 1999). Shortly after the revolution, the regime was challenged by several opposition groups including ethnic groups, royalists, secular intellectuals from across the ideological spectrum, guerrilla organizations, and even some clerical organizations opposed to Khomeini’s vision. Over time, the regime effectively silenced these groups either by cooptation or violent repression. As discussed earlier, ethnic group opposition to the central authority in Iran dates back to the Pahlavi era when these groups’ demands ranged from right to landownership led by the landed aristocrats, economic advantages, and cultural and political autonomy. The Pahlavi monarchs met some of these demands at times and rejected others by force if necessary. The Turkamans, Arabic-speakers in Khuzistan, Kurdish, Baluch, and Qashqai groups found the revolution an opportune time to restate their demands as the Islamic Republic seemed incapable of asserting control throughout the country. In Gorgan, the dispute with the Turkamans was over land rather than Turkaman cultural identity or autonomy. Influenced by leftist movements, some Turkaman peasants were encouraged to seize land from large landowners. The Islamic government violently put down this challenge. 40 The Arabic-speaking Khuzistanis were demanding a larger share of the region’s oil revenues, more job opportunities for local inhabitants, recognition of Arabic as a semiofficial language, and a significant degree of local autonomy. 41 In view of the historical claims by the Iraqi regime over this region as the “Arab Homeland,” the Iranian government considered this movement and their demands

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with great suspicion and violently silenced this opposition by arresting, executing, and exiling their leadership. The Kurdish opposition has historically been more organized and deeply rooted. The ancien régime had effectively dismissed many of the major Kurdish demands and had employed a range of strategies including cooptation, integration, and confrontation to stop oppositionist Kurdish movements. The Kurds had hoped that the revolution would bring them some sort of autonomy they had long desired. To stop the Kurdish violence, initially the Islamic government made limited concessions, but the schisms among various Kurdish groups resulted in the failure of the negotiations. The Kurdish Democratic Party and a radical group led by Ezz-o-Din Hosseini demanded autonomy for all Kurdish speakers beyond the province of Kurdistan, a specified share of the national revenue for expenditure in the province, and complete autonomy in provincial administration. 42 The demands also included recognition of Kurdish as the official language of the autonomous province for local use and for correspondence with the central government, and Kurds were to fill all local government posts and to be in charge of local security forces. The central government was expected to grant similar autonomy to other ethnic groups and remain responsible for national defense, foreign affairs, and the central banking system. The government could not accept these demands. Ultimately, confrontation with radical Kurdish groups like the Committee of the Revolutionary Toilers of Kurdistan (Komala) resulted in open fighting in 1985. Internal frictions within the Kurdish movement and strong military response by the government weakened the Kurds and enabled the central government to silence the armed opposition and regain control of the territories in Kurdistan. The Sunni Baluchis also demanded recognition of their sectarian rights and humane treatment under the Shi’a-dominated Islamic Republican system. Sistan-Baluchistan area has historically been an undeveloped region inhabited by impoverished people who have been neglected by the central government. The Islamic regime also disregarded their demands for resources and cultural and sectarian rights, and violently confronted their organized opposition. In 2003, the Baluch created a militant organization, Soldiers of God (Jundullah), to launch armed struggle against the central government. This organization has been involved in a string of bombings and assassination attempts. In June 2010, the central government finally captured their leader, Abdolmalek Rigi, and executed him. 43 The Islamic government claims that the organization is a tool of imperialism intent on destabilizing the regime, and continues to suppress any oppositionist voice among the Baluch. The recent setbacks have not stopped the organization’s armed struggle, however. In July 2010, in retaliation for the execution of Rigi, the organization bombed mosques in the provincial city of Zahedan that killed a score of the security forces and bystanders. The regime also successfully crushed the Qashqai uprising in the Fars province and publicly hanged its leader, Khosrow Qashqai, in 1982.

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In addition to ethnic group opposition, shortly after the revolution, the regime had to deal with major challenges from some of its allies during the revolutionary process. As Khomeini and his supporters insisted on establishing an Islamic Republic based on Khomeini’s vision of authority, rejected religious and popular challenges to the doctrine of vilayat-e-faqih, and denounced widespread calls for liberal-democratic alternatives an array of opposition groups began challenging the regime. The Hojjatiyyeh was a fundamentalist anti-Bahai religious group that rejected the role assigned to the faqih in the constitution. Members and proponents of this group subscribed to a traditionalist Shi’a view of authority and argued that the Twelfth Imam of Shi’ism, Mahdi, would not return until the world is filled with injustice. Justice and freedom, in their view, will be brought with Mahdi’s return, and that there is no deputy or replacement for him in his absence. They, thus, rejected the doctrine of vilayat-e faqih, and called for rule by a council of clerics. 44 This group was supported by some members of the parliament and competed with the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in establishing influence in the military and bureaucratic organs of the government. 45 Finally, in 1984, Khomeini attacked this group and shortly thereafter the group was dissolved. 46 The most effective challenge to the regime was launched by Mojahedine-Khalq, a guerrilla group which was established in 1965 and subscribed to an ideology that blended a radical view of Shi’a Islam with Marxism. This group, which gained a sizable following among students inside and outside the country in the 1960s and 1970s, called for urban guerrilla warfare against the Pahlavi regime and resorted to bombings and acts of terror against government officials. Ideological schisms within the group resulted in factionalism as early as 1972. Some began underscoring their Marxist proclivities and worked with other Marxist groups inside the country and abroad. Others were more religiously inclined and embraced the dynamic view of political Shi’ism preached by Ali Shari’ati. Before the revolution, the two groups overcame their differences and joined the revolutionary process. While the Mojahedin fought in the revolution, they subscribed to Ali Shari’ati’s vision of an Islamic Order that did not exclusively support the idea of clerical dominance and called for the leadership of enlightened intellectuals (rowshanfikran). Therefore, in the struggle between clerics and Abolhassan Bani Sadr, the first president of the republic, the Mojahedin sided with Bani Sadr and questioned clerical absolutism. In response to the government’s brutal crackdown, this group undertook a very violent armed struggle by resorting to a string of successful assassinations, which paralyzed the government by killing major personalities among clerics, government officials, judges, Majles deputies, and members of revolutionary organizations. With the ouster of Bani Sadr and consolidation of clerical power, this group was effectively marginalized, many of its members were arrested and executed,

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and its leadership had to escape abroad. Although still active outside Iran, this group lacks the necessary resources, organizational capabilities, and broad public support to play an important role in the contemporary politics of Iran. 47 Other smaller guerrilla groups also resorted to armed struggle against the regime including Organization of the Guerrilla Martyrs of the Iranian Masses (Fedaeyan-Khalq-e Iran), Paykar (a Marxist-oriented splinter group of the Mojahedin), and the Union of Communists. The Fedaeyan was a guerrilla group established in 1971 and had successfully expanded its influence domestically and abroad by collaborating with other militant groups. Fascinated and influenced by Latin American guerrilla movements, their leaders, and their ideological and strategic approaches, the Fedaeyan had come to conclude that urban guerrilla warfare is the most effective means to dislodge the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran and end imperialist domination of the country. They openly rejected Marxism-Leninism and Maoist ideas as revisionist and inapplicable to the Iranian case, thus they opposed some of the traditional radical groups and parties including the Tudeh party. The Fedaeyan were involved in a successful series of political assassinations and bombings throughout the 1970s. Later, there were serious frictions within the organization. While successful assassinations had exposed security vulnerabilities of the regime, the government effectively crushed these armed oppositions by the end of 1983 by relying on Pasdaran in counterintelligence activities, widespread arrests, incarcerations, and executions. 48 Movements and Factional Politics In contrast to groups that are official and licensed collectivities of individuals with common objectives, factions in Iran “are made up of individuals who hold various positions within the Iranian polity, groups and organizations promoting similar views.” 49 Given the groups’ and factions’ organizational dynamics, especially shifts in their membership, ideologies, and policy preferences, it is nearly impossible to comprehensively identify these factions and their related groups, accurately specify their ideological makeups, pinpoint their policy preferences, and assess their relative influence in the system. Upon the success of the revolution, the traditional left (particularly, remnants of the Tudeh) was marginalized and liberal Islamic nationalists and Islamists composed the core of governing groups and factions. 50 With the dismissal of President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr (1933– ) in 1981 and the parliamentary defeat and eventual marginalization of liberal Islamic nationalists in 1983, Islamists dominated the political process. As early as September of 1984, some of the leaders of the regime acknowledged the presence of factional divisions between the right and the left among Islamists. 51 These dom-

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inant factions accepted the Islamic foundation of the system but varied in their interpretations of fiqh and, therefore, significantly differed on major policy issues like the nature of the economic system and policies, sociocultural policies, and foreign policy directions of the country. Although there were further ideological frictions, divisions over policy issues, and membership shifts over time, initially the right became known as the conservative or traditional right. Supported by traditional bazaaris, other merchants, and ultra-conservative clerics, the right’s economic stance focused on the sanctity of private property, protection of the private sector (especially, interests of the bazaaris), and limited governmental regulation and taxation. Socially, they favored strict application of the traditional (sunnati) fiqh. They also opposed an active foreign policy, especially those efforts that aimed at exporting the revolution to other countries. There were, however, a group of moderate clerics on the right who were initially guided by Khomeini’s handpicked successor, Ayatollah Husain Ali Montazeri, and often challenged Khomeini’s views and policies, in particular the Islamic basis of his doctrine of vilayat-e-faqih. Later, this group joined Mohammad Khatami and his “liberal” supporters. The left were referred to as Maktabis or Khomeinists for their unwavering support for Khomeini and his doctrine of vilayat-e-faqih, and consisted of both technocrats and clerics. This faction, which held a plurality in the parliament throughout the 1980s and later dominated the Expediency Council, 52 supported a statist economy that included land reform, nationalization of industries, extensive redistributive policies to help the disinherited, regulation of foreign trade, and strict controls over the traditional bazaari sector. They also advocated for a flexible socio-cultural policy based on a dynamic (Puya) view of fiqh, and a more active foreign policy in line with their thirdworld nationalist worldview. Gradually, a somewhat centrist faction 53 labeled as “pragmatists” emerged that selectively embraced some of the policy positions of the right and the left. They supported a mixed economy that would favor nationalization of certain industries—despite their explicit support for a market economy—high taxation, some redistributive policies, and moderate regulative measures. Taking a dynamic stance on fiqh, they also supported the left’s leanings toward flexible socio-cultural policies. During and early after Khomeini, despite these commonalities with the left, these moderates were considered a part of the conservative factions largely due to their support for market-oriented economy and a pragmatic foreign policy. Even after Khomeini, they built an alliance with conservatives that lasted until 1992. Early disputes between the right and the left revolved around the state’s role and the regime’s economic policies. The left dominated the parliament and pushed for legislation aimed at extensive regulation and redistributive policies. The right relied on its members in the parliament to stop such

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legislations and, when failed, used its dominance of the Guardian Council to declare these legislative measures inconsistent with Islam. Khomeini, and later his successor Khamene’i, used factional disputes to their own advantage in order to dominate the political process and pursue their policy objectives. At times, both also preached the benefits of harmony and need for moderation of these schisms. Khomeini consistently supported the left’s policy agenda. Frequently, he kept conservatives at bay by emphasizing communal interests and by downgrading the traditional Islamic interpretations. In the later years, in reaction to the policy paralysis caused by factionalism, he called for greater harmony among factions and the need to settle disputes. He insisted: “We must all be together to support the Majles and the government as it is our religious duty. We must make sure that the foreign press do not remark that there is contention in Iran. If we see that, God forbid, disagreement is going to occur, it is our religious duty to prevent this at all costs, even if it means sacrificing one person or one group for the people.” 54 Often, he tried to project factional disputes as an indication of healthy pluralism in Iran. However, keenly aware of the ongoing policy paralysis, he tried to achieve some efficiency by resorting to the doctrine of maslahat and supporting the establishment of the Expediency Council. This tremendously significant move not only undermined the conservative factions but also redefined the role of the state and the nature of the Islamic Republic. No longer could conservatives rely on their traditional understanding of fiqh to stop the left’s policies. More importantly, by underscoring the primacy of state interests over some of the primary Islamic precepts, Khomeini broke with the longstanding view of authority in the Islamic Republic. 55 Reacting to the unrelenting conservative attack on the left, he later accused conservatives of being pseudo-religionists who are trying to “defeat the revolution.” He referred to them as “narrow-minded’ and “mentally-ossified reactionaries” who improperly label the advocates of the poor and needy as Godless Communists. 56 Khomeini’s death transformed the dynamics of factional politics in Iran. The left could no longer rely on his support and protection in advancing its agenda. With the appointment of conservative Khamene’i as the rahbar and the ascendancy of Rafsanjani to the presidency, conservatives found greater sympathy and support for their positions, despite meaningful frictions on the right. 57 These new realities also had significant impacts on the policy positions of the right and the left on major issues. For instance, during the debates on constitutional revisions, conservatives reversed their long-held opposition to a strong role for the Leader and began calling for a system with strong individual leadership, since it would empower Khamene’i, who happened to be one of their own. Similarly, anticipating Rafsanjani’s presidency, they dropped their adamant support for a market economy with minimal governmental interference, and embraced the idea of a strong and highly centralized

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government. In order to curb Khamene’i’s power, the left in turn abandoned its past support for a strong leader and pushed for limitations on his powers. “In short, factions altered the views they had upheld while Khomeini was alive to fit their immediate interests.” 58 Khomeini’s death, the left’s numerous electoral defeats, and the rise of conservative figures to highest positions of power marginalized the left in the post-Khomeini Iran. No longer in control of the legislature, the left was incapable of setting the legislative agenda. Conservatives found new and unprecedented opportunities, since they controlled most political institutions and significant roles in the system. However, growing schisms over policy positions, which in some instances resulted in overlapping policy preferences among some segments of the right and the left, caused greater factionalism in the post-Khomeini era. In the post-Khomeini era, dominant factions all continue to be Islamist in their ideology. However, they have sharp disagreements on policy issues, which are largely explained by their opposing views on fiqh and its application to the daily lives of Iranians. Within both the conservative and the left factions there is a range of policy positions that are, on occasions, quite contradictory. As indicated earlier, shifts in memberships and ideological/ policy positions undermine any meaningful effort at categorizing these factions. Today, from a policy perspective, factions in Iran fall along an ideological continuum from the right to the left with many factions embracing moderate or liberal positions on major policy issues. On the extreme right, a notable faction is the loosely organized neofundamentalists, who are also known as Hizbollahis. This faction is mainly the product of schisms on the right over socio-cultural policies. As many on the conservative right, especially the moderates, embraced more liberal socio-cultural policies, others rejected such orientations as a conspiracy for “Western cultural onslaught.” To counter this form of imperialism, they called for purification of the Islamic culture. Neo-fundamentalists claim that this onslaught has replaced the original revolutionary values and individual piety with materialistic, immoral, and corruptive cultures. 59 They are critical of the government for its failure to counter this cultural onslaught, and oftentimes rely on extra-legal means such as violence to secure the public’s compliance with what they perceive to be proper Islamic conduct. Neo-fundamentalists’ ability to pursue these strategies with impunity is mainly due to the conservative right’s tacit support, which uses neo-fundamentalists to undermine cooperation between the moderate right and the left. Other than their dogmatic stance on socio-cultural policies, which is blended with xenophobic slogans, neo-fundamentalists lack any coherent and broadly based policy positions. They viciously target both the right and the left and their policies. On the right, for instance, they relentlessly criticized Rafsanjani and his conception of development (towse-‘eh), openness to the West, and inte-

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gration into the global economy. Mehdi Nasiri, an ideologue of this faction, insists that “preserving revolutionary values and principles is vital and should not be sacrificed for the sake of freedom and Towse-‘eh.” 60 He and others in this faction offered harsh criticisms of government technocrats tasked with the implementation of developmental policies during the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations, and portrayed them as an immoral cadre enamored by Western values and devoid of any commitment to Islam and the people. Furthermore, neo-fundamentalists stand in sharp contrast to other factions on gender issues. They openly attacked Rafsanjani and his daughter Faezeh, a member of the parliament who has advocated for women’s rights, by claiming that their liberal policies exceed the rights accounted for women in the Quran and Muslim traditions. The left does not escape the neo-fundamentalist attack either. They often refer to the leftists as Godless Communists 61 who disregard the Islamic socio-cultural values and sanctity of private property. The larger and more influential faction on the extreme right are the traditional conservatives, oftentimes referred to as Conservative Revolutionaries, who underscore monolithicism and downplay pluralism of the constitution. As they follow Khomeini’s doctrine of vali-e-faqih, they also stress the traditional doctrine of absolute obedience. A prominent leader of this faction, Ali Akbar Nateq-e-Nuri, suggests that the Islamic Republic is tasked with the implementation of divine ordinances and, during the occultation period, the vali-e-faqih has the same rights and powers that the prophet and the Imams did. In this respect, his will should be obeyed, “even if his rulings are wrong.” 62 Ayatollah Ahmad Azari-Qomi, another prominent conservative, even contends that the faqih has a personal monopoly on power with no restrictions. 63 Due to their historic alliance with traditional bazaaris, conservative clerics were left with no choice but to reject any form of statism and meaningful regulative and redistributive policies, which had for all practical purposes become the hallmark of the revolution and its stated commitment to the downtrodden. Conservatives argue that the Quran accounts for private property and holds those who engage in commerce in high esteem. 64 They reject redistributive policies since, in their view, these policies remove economic incentives and lead to godless socialism. Furthermore, they consistently insist on a minimalist role for the state in a market economy with little regulation and low taxation. Probably the most significant wedge issue in contemporary factional politics in Iran is stance on socio-cultural policies. The traditional conservative right and, and to a larger extent, neo-fundamentalists, stand alone for their dogmatic support for the preservation of Islamic culture. Cultural Islamization, strictly defined as a total commitment to an Islamic pious lifestyle and rejection of any manifestations of Western culture, is tied to their traditional interpretation of fiqh and central to the Islamic Republic. This stance shapes the conservative right’s positions on a wide

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array of policy areas including gender roles and rights, education, arts, and even public appearance. Tired of governmental and vigilante heavy-handedness in all aspects of life, particularly in socio-cultural policies, Iranian youth and the more educated segments of the population continue to resist such dogmatic social policies advanced by these factions. Conservatives have traditionally upheld a non-revolutionary attitude in foreign policy by rejecting any interventionist policies outside the country. Under the Ahmadinejad administration, with the support of the Revolutionary Guards, some conservative clerics supported the administration’s radical and interventionist foreign and nuclear policies. This position, however, is not shared by all conservatives, some of whom had an open disdain for Ahmadinejad and his abrasive and confrontational stance. Moderate conservatives who generally refer to themselves as Kargozaran (functionaries or servants)—and are also referred to as Islamic modernizers, modern right, and pragmatists—were considered an integral part of the conservative factions for much of the Khomeini era and shortly thereafter. This faction was led by the Association of Combatant Clerics of Tehran (Jamehye Ruhaniyyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran), which was also referred to as Ruhaniyyat. Ruhaniyyat followed Rafsanjani’s liberal economic and socio-cultural policies, asserted their dedication to Khomeini’s ideals, but significantly differed from the conservative right over the nature and direction of Iran’s social, economic, and political systems and policies. In contrast to the conservative right, these moderates speak of political and economic development (towse’eh). To them, political development requires a commitment to pluralism and establishment of effective political institutions. 65 They, therefore, de-emphasize Islamic monolithicism and favor a system of power sharing that would allow for a competitive party system; popular participation in public life; and freedoms of the press, associations, and expression within legal limits. 66 These policy objectives and strategies clearly contrast the conservative right’s belief in the supremacy of Islamic monolithicism and the uncontested power of the rahbar. Economic development, according to moderate conservatives, necessitates a capitalist economy that is industrially based (thus, effectively marginalizing the bazaaris), is integrated into the global economy, and espouses World Bank–inspired structural adjustment policies. To stimulate the private sector, they favor a modern banking system, but they also believe in an expanded role for the state and consequently opt for high taxation, some redistributive policies, and limited regulatory measures. These economic principles were incorporated into Rafsanjani’s first and second Five-Year Plans. Conservative moderates’ views on sociocultural policies are similar to those of the left. To them, modernity and science are not antithetical to Islam. They rather claim that scientific and technological developments do indeed advance Iran’s Islamic culture. These views of culture and development have far-reaching implications for gender

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politics, educational policies, arts, and conduct of the public’s daily life. Moderates underscore the Islamic underpinnings as well as social, political, and economic necessities of gender equity, and rely on the Quran and Khomeini’s pronouncements to reject gender segregation and inequity. Some of the leaders of this faction, especially Mohsen Kadivar, even contend that gender equity “is not a sociopolitical necessity but a fundamental principle [of the Islamic Republic].” 67 These moderates believe in a form of constructive engagement in foreign policy that allows for greater integration into the global market economy. While admiring the past Iranian nationalist movements and criticizing Western imperialism, Rafsanjani himself praised Western democracies for their achievements. Some on the conservative right have often questioned Khomeini’s doctrine of leadership and have supported those Grand Ayatollahs, like Ayatollah Montazeri, who challenged Khomeini’s views and policies. 68 They later joined Khatami and advocated for moderate policies that mainly resembled those of the pragmatists. Known as “liberals” or “reformers,” Khatami and his proponents called for greater flexibility in economic, social, and foreign policy issues. Like the moderate right, liberals supported the Islamization process and clerics’ claim to political power and extensive judicial role. They, however, sought to limit clerical participation in the executive and legislative branches of the government. Liberals opposed the left’s statist economy and favored limited governmental control of the economic life of the country, and joined with pragmatists in their support for integration into global economy and improved relations with the United States, as long as relations are established on an even footing. In 1996, liberals joined pragmatic centrists and formed an umbrella organization called Servants of Reconstruction. The left, or Populist Revolutionaries as they are known, 69 stand in stark contrast to the conservative right on ideological and policy issues. Led by the Association of Combatant Clergy of Tehran (Majma-ye Ruhaniyyoun-e Mobarez-e Tehran), these radicals are commonly referred to as the ruhaniyyoun. By dismissing the traditional interpretations of fiqh and relying on a dynamic view of Islam and its precepts, the left originally supported a statist economy (which was later fundamentally changed with their backing of Khatami and his rise to the presidency), emphatically called for a revolutionary foreign policy including exportation of the revolution to other countries, and consistently stood alongside moderates by advocating for a liberal socio-cultural policy and a tolerant political atmosphere. However, since Khomeini’s demise and largely in a pragmatic response to their electoral woes and changing political realities in Iran, the left has moderated its positions a number of times. For instance, they embraced some of Rafsanjani’s moderate views and policies when he was in power and became even more moderate and pragmatic with the election of Khatami in 1997.

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Although Islamist in their ideology, the left considers republican and revolutionary dimensions of the system equal, if not superior, to its Islamic foundation. While formally accepting Khomeini’s doctrine of vilayat-e-faqih, the left rejects absolutist interpretations of the Leader’s rights, as asserted by some of the conservatives, and emphasizes the republican elements of the constitution that account for God’s ultimate sovereignty and peoples’ right to manage their own affairs. From their point of view, the Islamic Republic is legitimate not only for its commitment to Islamic precepts but also for its recognition of popular sovereignty and commitment to the wellbeing of the public. The left’s dynamic interpretation of fiqh allows them to even bypass religious dimensions of the system’s legitimacy and give primacy to popular wishes and communal necessities and interests. 70 Largely in opposition to the conservative Khamene’i and in an attempt to limit his authority, now the left seems to be even downplaying Khomeini’s doctrine and “arguing that the faqih draws his authority, legitimacy, and thus power from the populace and not from God.” 71 In short, from the left’s point of view, the constitution overshadows fiqh in the Islamic Republic. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the left rejects Islamic monolithicism and embraces pluralism, diversity of ideas, creation of political parties and groups, and freedoms of expression and the press. Commitment to socioeconomic justice is central to the left’s ideological and policy stance. At the outset, by relying on Article 44 of the constitution, which accounts for extensive governmental role in economic sphere, the left showed an unwavering commitment to a statist economic model with extensive redistributive policies to assist the poor. To them, this stance is not only in the interest of the community but also reflective of the true Islamic practices and precepts. Mehdi Karrubi refers to this system as a “pure Mohammadan Islam of the barefooted and not the American brand of Islam of the wealthy.” 72 In some cases, the left’s arguments resembled the radical Marxist and dependency perspectives, which rejected capitalism and imperialism for their contributions to global inequity and rampant poverty in the lesser-developed world. During the first decade of the regime and, especially during the premiership of Mir-Hossein Musavi (1942– )—a reformist candidate who later ran for the presidency in 2009 and called Ahmadinejad’s reelection fraudulent—the left openly espoused extensive redistributive policies, high taxation on the rich, nationalization of major industries, and price-control strategies. Despite this past ideological and policy stance, the left is now more pragmatic and no longer clings to these radical economic positions, especially since Khomeini’s demise. Today, the left tolerates capitalism, as long as it does not dominate the economic life of the country. The public sector, in their view, should have primacy over the private sector when their interests conflict.

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The left has always held a pragmatic stance on socio-cultural policies by embracing tolerance, cultural diversity, and moderation. Their support for Khatami, a moderate reformer, was closely tied to his commitment to similar socio-cultural policies. Like Khatami, the left criticized the regime’s mistreatment of women and gender inequity. In their view, in Islam there is no difference between men and women. 73 In a similar vein, the left advocates for the younger generation’s rights to freedom of speech and thought. They oftentimes criticize conservatives for intruding in college students’ lives and dominating university campuses. Before supporting Khatami, the left’s thirdworld nationalist ideological stance resulted in their rejection of Western (especially American) imperialism and the current world order and advocacy for the exportation of the Iranian revolution. With their support for Khatami, the left moderated its foreign policy stance as well. Party Politics In democratic-pluralist systems political parties are the primary instruments of public mobilization and electoral contestation. Academicians and political practitioners have extensively discussed the relative roles of factions and parties in politics. According to Giovanni Sartori, factions are generally viewed as evil and unnecessary. They are nothing “but the expression of personal conflicts, of ego-regarding and public disregarding behavior.” 74 In contrast, he contends, parties are the necessary instruments of governance in pluralistic systems. The difference between factions and parties is that “parties are instrumental to collective benefits, to an end that is not merely the private benefit of the contestants. Parties link people to a government, while factions do not. Parties enhance a set of system capabilities, while factions do not. In short, parties are functional agencies—they serve purposes and fulfill roles—while factions are not.” 75 Historically speaking, the term party gradually came into use as a replacement for faction with the idea that, unlike factions, parties are not evil and do not disrupt the common weal. 76 In his encyclopedic definition, Voltaire was of the view that “The term party is not, in itself, loathsome; the term faction always is.” 77 Underscoring parties’ commitment to common interest, Edmund Burke defined party as “a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principles in which they are all agreed.” Parties, in his perspective, are the “proper means” for enabling such men “to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the state.” 78 Of course, some of the Founding Fathers of the United States criticized factions/parties for their harmful effects. Madison, Hamilton, and Washington discouraged the “spirit” of party. Washington rejected parties, even though he acknowledged that “parties in free countries are useful checks . . . and serve to keep alive the spirit of

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liberty.” 79 According to Sartori, even Jefferson viewed party as a unifying instrument of governance since in his view party “was to end or, at any rate, undermine the legitimacy of partisanship.” 80 This meant that parties should not be factions and should operate in common interest. Gradually, parties and partisanship became acceptable “with the realization that diversity and dissent are not necessarily incompatible with, or disruptive of, political order.” They are indeed “correlative to, and dependent upon, the Weltanschauung of liberalism.” 81 In short, parties and party systems are the necessary structural requirements for liberal-democratic political systems. The role of political parties in the Islamic Republic has been the subject of much dispute between proponents of pluralism and advocates of Islamic monolithicism. Central to the pluralist discourse is support for political parties. The left has argued that “peoples’ participation is the cornerstone of the Islamic Republic. Toward this aim, free association and establishing political parties are essential parts of any democratic society that creates a pluralism of ideas and a revolutionary cadre.” 82 Karrubi has suggested that “Political Parties guarantee the [survival of the] Islamic system.” 83 To the conservative clerical elites and their allies, however, the establishment of parties undermines clerics’ monopoly on power and is incongruent with the doctrine of vilayat-e faqih. 84 Political parties do exist in the Islamic Republic but their roles in public mobilization and elections are minimal, if not negligible. In the absence of effective parties, groups and factions play a predominant role in political mobilization and elections. The activities and successes of Rouhaniyyat, Rouhaniyyoun, Kargozaran, and other factions and groups in recent presidential and parliamentary elections are testimony to their pivotal role in today’s Iranian civil society and indicative of the marginal role for political parties. As discussed in great detail earlier, political parties emerged in Iran shortly after the Constitutional Revolution. Our brief historical survey of civil society revealed many attempts at party building throughout the twentieth century with periodic successes. While the Pahlavi kings resisted the growth of parties that challenged their authority and questioned their policy positions, there were remarkable periods of political activism facilitated by the Mossadegh government and led by the National Front and the Tudeh party. During its heyday, the Tudeh was one of the most influential and organized political parties in the Middle East. The coup of 1953 and fall of the Mossadegh government, revolt of 1964, and regime’s subsequent intolerance of any opposition ushered in a period of repression that destroyed effective political parties and party activism inside the country. Those parties that survived this repression sought refuge abroad and some joined groups that called for armed struggle against the Pahlavi dynasty. Many joined the revolutionary process in the late 1970s and participated in the initial governments under the Islamic Republican system.

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The Islamic Republic’s constitution and related codes do not distinguish parties from groups. Dealing with both instruments of civil society, Article 26 of the constitution permits the creation of political parties and groups but, like other institutions in the system, they are prohibited from violating principles of independence, freedom, and national unity; criteria of Islam; and the basis of the Islamic Republic. Of course, these very broad and ambiguous restrictions impose a great deal of limitations on the establishment and role of political parties and groups in the country. In an attempt to curb factionalism and party politics, since the leadership considered such divisions destabilizing, the parliament enacted and the Guardian Council approved of the Parties Law in 1981. This law and its executive regulations subject parties and groups to similar political, organizational, and functional restrictions and rights. Party organizations, finances, leaderships, ideologies, and activities are checked by governmental oversight and supervision. 85 These restrictions did not succeed in discouraging party creation and political activism, however. In the political atmosphere of post-revolutionary Iran, many of the old political parties re-emerged and a large number of new ones were created. As a supporter of civil rights and civil society, President Khatami created a “House of Parties” in 2000 to provide a legal framework for party activities. 86 Despite the failure of this and similar efforts to establish a proper and meaningful role commensurate with democracy for parties in the system, party activism did not cease. By some estimates, in 2008 there were as many as 240 political parties in the country. In the chaotic political atmosphere of revolutionary Iran, some of the political parties that had in the past supported the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and had acknowledged Khomeini’s leadership re-emerged on the Iranian political scene. These parties and the newly established parties and groups varied widely in their ideologies, policy positions, and strategies. Upon the success of the revolution, many of these parties were allowed into the government, with the exception of the leftist parties. The Provisional Revolutionary Government (February 4–November 6, 1979) was dominated by the liberal Islamic Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI), since its leader, Mehdi Bazargan, was the prime minister and its members occupied over a third of the ministerial posts. Originally, the Freedom Movement was established in 1960 by Bazargan and some of his clerical and non-clerical allies. During the revolution against the shah, the party played a pivotal role in unifying nationalist and religious parties and personalities. 87 Due to its long struggle against the shah and its past affiliation with Mossadegh, the party enjoyed a great deal of support among modern and traditional elements in the middle class, some of the prominent ulama, university students and faculty, and lawyers. The party advocated for democracy, rejected direct rule by clerics, favored relations with the West, and opposed the left’s socioeconomic agenda. During the provisional government’s short life, the party was able

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to advance some of its policy agenda. However, its increasingly outspoken opposition to repression and clerical absolutism resulted in its eventual marginalization. In contrast to Khomeini and his supporters, nationalists were of the view that the revolution was a vehicle for achieving the nationalist aspirations of the Iranian people. 88 Some remnants of the National Front including the Iran Party were opposed to clerical rule and favored a Western-style secular democratic state. Despite a great deal of pressure by the regime and conservative clerics, nationalists remained quite active in the early years after the revolution. Supported by the professional middle class, nationalists led a third of the ministries in the Provisional Government. However, ideological frictions between younger and more radical members and the party’s moderate leadership resulted in the breakup of the NF and the creation of the National Democratic Front in 1979. The NDF embraced leftist programs and stressed human rights issues. Over time, the NF’s and NDF’s bases of support were significantly reduced, due to the emigration of thousands of middle-class professionals who were the natural supporters of these parties. In the aftermath of Bani Sadr’s removal from power and the ensuing power struggle, nationalist parties and activists were further marginalized. Consequently, by 1983, Bazargan’s Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI) was the only nationalist political group outside the ruling religious hierarchy that still had some freedom of action. Even the FMI was barely tolerated, as their headquarters were attacked and some of its leaders and members were beaten, arrested, and charged. The Tudeh party had enthusiastically supported the revolution and Khomeini’s leadership, but was disallowed in the government. The party took part in the first presidential election in 1979 and the first parliamentary election shortly thereafter. Although religious conservatives through the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) dominated these elections, this was the first opportunity for the Tudeh and the rest of the left to participate in the Iranian political life after a quarter of a century of marginalization. The ouster of Bani Sadr and subsequent opposition to the regime by the Mojahedin caused a dramatic turnaround in the political atmosphere, resulting in political repression, arrests, imprisonments, and executions. While nationalists and many on the left broke with the regime and criticized its undemocratic and reactionary policies, the Tudeh party continued its participation in elections in support of conservatives and, in fact, collaborated with the regime and its security apparatus against the opponents. Naively, the party saw this as an opportunity to “clear the Iranian political arena of other leftist rivals.” 89 As expected, this collaboration and coexistence with the regime was short-lived, since the religious right was intolerant of any competition and was intent on monopolizing power. As early as 1982, after the successful marginalization of nationalists, the Mojahedin, and the Feda’iyan (majority, pro-Tudeh), the

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regime turned its attention to the Tudeh. Iran’s strained relationship with the Soviet Union over the war with Iraq and Soviet presence in Afghanistan had already put the party in jeopardy. The regime began labeling party members as “Soviet agents.” Subsequently, thousands of the Tudeh members and leaders were arrested, charged, and imprisoned. The party leader, Noureddin Kianouri, who confessed to “espionage, deceit, and treason” and collaborated with the regime, was spared but many other leaders of the party’s Central Committee and Political Bureau were executed. 90 As a result, the party organization collapsed and members were forced to leave the country. The party, however, reorganized itself abroad and, in collaboration with the Feda’iyan (majority), called for the overthrow of the Islamic regime in 1985. Inspired by Khomeini, activist clerics, and their allies, a myriad of religious political parties and groups emerged after the revolution. Some of these parties and groups did indeed oppose some of Khomeini’s views on politics and clerical absolutism. Most notable among these parties was the Muslim People’s Republican Party (MPRP). This party was established during the revolution by a group of clerics and non-clerical religious individuals who had liberal tendencies and were influenced and supported by Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari (1905–1986). During the revolution, they advocated for constitutional monarchism and liberal economic policies. After the revolution, they opted for a democratic-pluralist system based on majority rule. The party was opposed to Khomeini’s Islamic state and rejected the regime’s early commitment to a statist economy and policies that undermined the right to private property. 91 In contrast to the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), MPRP also supported cooperation with religio-nationalist, nationalist, and radical parties. While backed by modern and traditional middle classes, this party’s strong base of support was among Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s followers in Azerbaijan and other ethnic groups that favored the decentralization of power and rights of minorities. Most other Islamist political parties generally shared in their support for Khomeini and his doctrine of leadership, although they varied widely on their stances on economic, socio-cultural, and foreign policy matters. The most important Islamist party that dominated politics of the Islamic Republic for nearly a decade was the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). The IRP was established in February of 1979, under Khomeini’s order, by some of his associates and students, 92 and tasked with coordinating the activities of Islamist groups and parties and ensuring consolidation of clerical rule in the republic. 93 Within a span of a year, by relying on prominent clerics, foundations, Friday prayer leaders, revolutionary committees, violent vigilante groups like the Hezbollahis, the Revolutionary Guards, and women’s religious organizations, the party consolidated its support among the bazaaris, factory workers, lower and traditional classes, migrant workers, and university students; gradually dominated governmental and cultural organizations;

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and—by marginalizing or destroying all of its opponents—became the primary instrument of clerical absolutism in the Islamic Republic. 94 The party was effective in drawing broad support among merchants as well as lower classes, despite apparent conflicts of interests among these segments of the population, so long as it effectively portrayed itself as the exclusive defender of the revolution and Khomeini’s ideals. The party was able to mobilize its supporters by controlling mosques and Friday prayer leaders, since nearly all Friday prayer leaders appointed by Khomeini were endorsed by the IRP. Furthermore, the IRP relied on its vigilante functionaries to weaken its opponents by disrupting their demonstrations and attacking their members and leaders. With the exception of a small number of prominent clerics who opposed the clerical regime, throughout the 1980s all Islamist groups were contained within or affiliated with the IRP. However, there was no ideological homogeneity within the party. Initially, there were three major and a number of minor factions 95 within the party that, despite their ideological and policy schisms, collaborated with each other during the Iran-Iraq war and as long as there was opposition to Khomeini and the Islamic system. By the mid-1980s, it was apparent that the internal disputes within the party and the backlash against the Khomeini-era policies made it nearly impossible for the party to maintain its unity and effectiveness. Thus, in 1987, the party was dissolved. The end of the war, dissolution of the party by Khomeini, and finally Khomeini’s death created a political vacuum that intensified factionalism. The current factions like the Rouhanniyyat and Rouhaniyyun are in fact rooted in the early factional trends in the IRP. President Khatami supported the creation of political parties. As his interior ministry authorized political parties, new moderate and centrist parties were established and began contesting seats on local and municipal councils and the parliament. Many of these parties were religious reformist parties, including: the technocratic Executives of Construction Party (ECP), the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Party, and the National Confidence Party. Others embraced a wide array of programs but were limited in organization and popular support, often lacked consistent and comprehensive programs, and many did not last long. They included: Islamic Guidance Party (Hezb-e Hedayat-e Eslami), Islamic Iran Solidarity Party (Hezb-e Hambastegi-e Iran-e Eslami), Islamic Civilization Party (Hezb-e Tamaddon-e Eslami), Islamic Labor Party (Hezb-e Eslami-e Kar), and Islamic Labor Welfare Party (Hezb-e Eslami-e Refahi-e Kargaran). There were also non-Islamist parties with broader programmatic agenda, including: Children of Iran Party (Hezb-e Farzandan-e Iran), Executives of Construction Party of Iran (Hezb-e Kargozaran-e Sazandegi-e Iran), Iran Prosperity Party (Hezb-e Sa’adat-e Iran), and Iran Independence Party (Hezb-e Esteghlal-e Iran).

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In addition to these legally sanctioned parties, there are many Iranian parties (mostly active abroad) that can be categorized as leftist, monarchist, nationalist, liberal-democratic, ethnic, and environmentalist. These parties lack any significant social base and any capacity to influence the Iranian politics of today. The noteworthy leftist parties are the Party of Labor (Toofan), the Social Democratic Party of Iran, the Socialist party of Iran, and the Tudeh Party. The Constitutionalist Party of Iran and Mihan Party (Homeland Party) are pro-monarchy, while branches of the National Front and Melliyyoun advocate for nationalistic agenda. The Iran National Front (U.S. Branch), in its declarations, supports a secular regime in Iran committed to economic, political, and cultural development; and the growth of a civil society, individual liberties, rights of women and minorities, and secularism. 96 Liberal-democratic parties include the Democratic Party of the Iranian People, Republic (Jomhouri), Republicans (Jomhourikhahan), The Glorious Frontiers Party (Marz-e Porgohar), and the Green Party. The Green Party is primarily an environmentalist party with a commitment to democratic development, secular politics, women’s rights, affirmative action, and the rights of minorities. 97 The Glorious Frontiers Party was established in Tehran in 1998 by a group of secular nationalist writers and journalists. Forced to flee the country after harassment by the regime, the party leadership advocates for secular nationalism and democracy in Iran. 98 Some parties represent ethnic groups, including the Ahwazi Renaissance Party (Al-Mohamara), Komala (Kurdish) Party, and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI). 99 The PDKI is one of the oldest ethnic parties, which was originally created in 1945 and successfully established the “Republic of Kurdistan” (also referred to as the Republic of Mahabad, named after its capital city) in 1946. This republic lasted for only eleven months and the party was dismantled after the arrest and execution of its leaders. Within two years, the party rebuilt and continued advocacy for the Kurdish people’s rights during the Mossadegh era. With the fall of Mossadegh and growing repression, the party was dismantled again, but reconstituted itself soon and engaged in an unsuccessful violent armed insurrection against the regime in 1967–68. The PDKI participated in the revolutionary movement against the shah in 1978 with the hope of achieving their objectives for the Kurdish people of Iran. However, after Khomeini’s religious edict, the Islamic regime rejected the Kurdish demands and militarily defeated the PDKI and other Kurdish parties and groups. Active outside Iran, with important ethnic support, the PDKI currently calls for “the attainment of Kurdish national rights within a democratic federal republic of Iran.” The party platform supports the establishment of an independent and non-aligned socialist democratic system in Iran that is committed to secularism, rights of women and workers, and ethnic minorities’ legitimate right to self-determination. 100

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The Electoral System and Campaigns The constitution of the Islamic Republic accounts for appointments, elections, and provisions of direct democracy. Although there are several references to elected officials and elections in the constitution, there is no stipulation as to the role of parties in the electoral process. In discussing the legislative branch, the constitution refers to the “elected representatives of the people” (Article 58). Members of the village, division, municipality, and provincial councils “will be elected by the people of the locality in question” (Article 100), and the choice of Khomeini’s successor is vested with the “experts elected by the people” (Article 107). It is only in dealing with presidential elections that the constitution stipulates more specific guidelines such as direct election of the president, limitation of his term of office to four years, and possibility of a one-time consecutive re-election (Article 114). Article 119 further elaborates on the process by requiring that presidential elections be conducted no later than one month before the end of the term of the outgoing president. In discussing the public’s role in decision-making, Article 59 of the constitution provides for a system of direct democracy through referendum, whereby the public can directly participate in decision making on extremely important economic, political, social, and cultural matters. Any request for direct public participation must be approved by twothirds of the members of the parliament. By all accounts, the most ambiguous and thus controversial stipulation regarding elections in the constitution is the “supervisory” role of the Guardian Council in the electoral process. 101 Article 99 of the constitution reads: “The Guardian Council has the responsibility of supervising the elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the president of the Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to popular opinion and referenda.” In practice, this supervisory role has been interpreted to mean that the council is entitled to vet candidates for public office and to disqualify those who, in the opinion of the council, do not meet the requirements to run. Since the council has resorted to this strategy to disqualify thousands of candidates, particularly those not favored by conservative clerics and their supporters, there have been heated debates about the intent of the constitution in Article 99. When many candidates were disqualified in the parliamentary elections of 1999, this highly politicized process was scrutinized during the parliamentary debates about the election law. Reacting to the disqualifications in 1999, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri questioned the constitutional basis of the council’s role in disqualification of the candidates. He indicated that this interpretation of Article 99 turns the Iranian electoral process into a two-stage process, whereby in the first stage the Guardian Council selects the acceptable candidates and, in the second stage, the public is allowed to choose from among these approved candidates. He insisted that those who

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wrote the initial constitution never intended to create a two-stage electoral system. He further contended that: “The law [constitution] is explicit on the fact that the supervisory role of the Guardian Council pertains to ‘supervision over the elections’ and not ‘supervision over the candidates.’” 102 Many reformists, who were negatively impacted by these disqualifications, also took issue with the council’s role in the electoral process. In a letter to Qom clerics, Ayatollah Mehdi Karrubi wrote: “The general condition—‘practical commitment to Islam and the government of the Islamic Republic’—without specifying its limits is controversial and problematic, and anyone can say that others either have or do not have this qualification according to his views, his likes, or dislikes.” 103 Even the Interior Ministry criticized broad jurisdictions for the Guardian Council in elections. Responsible for conducting elections, the ministry complained that “the Guardian Council is responsible for supervision and the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for administration [of elections]. . . . Any move that damages this separation of responsibilities or puts the supervisor in place of the administrator is contrary to the constitution.” 104 To the opponents of the council’s extensive powers in elections, supervision over elections does not mean the right to disqualify candidates, rather it means to act as a neutral body to ensure elections are held fairly and regularly and the results are ascertained properly. Conservatives and their allies, who relied on the council to deliver electoral victories for them by disqualifying formidable opponents, dismissed these criticisms by arguing that rejection of the council’s disqualification role in elections is tantamount to marginalization of the Islamic basis of the constitution and imposition of a secular republic in the country. 105 In 1988, the cabinet, which was dominated by reformists, circulated a draft proposal to amend and liberalize the election laws. These proposals sought to eliminate the approbatory supervision clause in the constitution and remove the Guardian Council’s power to reject candidates who are approved by provincial executive committees. Another amendment insisted that candidates may not be determined ineligible on any basis other than those considerations that are strictly foreseen in the electoral law. In a sharp departure from past practices, an amendment sought to require that each candidate’s eligibility be accepted or rejected by at least two-thirds members of the Guardian Council. 106 As conservatives dominated the parliament after the 2000 election, these amendments were defeated. They proposed an Article 60 of the law which would authorize the council to “disqualify any candidate for the Majles who commits any type of offense—or any offense which may affect the outcome of election—and declare the election null and void.” This article was dropped from the final legislation in response to the uproar against this potentially unbound power of the council in disqualifying candidates. In collaboration with conservatives, the Guardian Council itself insisted on its power of disqualification. It also objected to the amendment by

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moderate parliamentarians that required the council to provide candidates written explanations for their disqualifications. This requirement, in the moderates’ view, would enable candidates to appeal disqualifications more effectively. This amendment, which intended to limit the council’s broad jurisdiction, was unacceptable to the Guardian Council because “in some cases the explanation could create corruption and destroy an individual’s reputation.” 107 To consolidate its disqualification power further, the council also asserted that being a Muslim is not a sufficient qualification for running in elections. Rather, eligible candidates must show a practical commitment to Islam. Alarmed by the politicization of the election law and potentials for undermining the process, many prominent politicians and journalists harshly criticized the council’s assertion. Even the government-run newspapers suggested that judging a person’s faith and religion “is in the hands of the Almighty God.” 108 Despite these contentious debates, the parliament passed an elections law in February of 2000 that largely reflected the preferences of conservatives and the Guardian Council. 109 Although this law specifically deals with the parliamentary elections including the number of seats in the parliament, religious minority representations, qualifications of the voters and candidates, rules governing campaigns, and the role of the Guardian Council in the parliamentary electoral process, it offers an insight into the legal framework and political dynamics of elections in general in the country. There are age, citizenship, and other eligibility requirements for the voters. Eligible voters should be at least sixteen (full) years old, citizens of the Islamic Republic, and lack any adverse record of mental incapacity or legal conviction depriving them from the right to vote. There are age, citizenship, educational, legal, health, social, and religio-political requirements for candidates for the parliament. The election law sets a minimum of thirty and a maximum of seventyfive years of age for candidates. Candidates should be citizens of the IRI and have “at least the academic degree of Associate Diploma or its equivalent.” In enumerating the reasons for disqualification of candidates, the law explicitly prohibits the candidacy of those who have been convicted in the courts of law for subversive activities against the IRI, apostasy, embezzlement and other financial misappropriations, fraud, and unlawful confiscation of other people’s properties. In addition to the mental health requirement, the law requires candidates to possess “physical health to the extent of being blessed with vision, hearing and speech capabilities.” Individuals of ill repute are also legally barred from running in elections. Religio-political requirements and prohibitions are the most exploited and controversial components of this law. According to Article 28 of the law, all candidates should have “belief in and practical commitment to Islam and the Islamic Republican system” as well as loyalty to the constitution and the doctrine of vilayat-e faqih. As explained earlier, the requirement of “practical allegiance to Islam” is a

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contentious issue. The law exempts recognized religious minorities from such a requirement as long as they are “firm in commitment to their own religion.” However, as applied to Muslim candidates, practical commitment to Islam has been broadly interpreted and relied upon to disqualify candidates on subjective grounds including non-Islamic appearances such as shaving one’s beard or wearing Western accessories. Ali Eshraghi, Khomeini’s grandson, who was initially disqualified from running for the parliament in 2008, complained about the process and indicated that during the vetting process there were questions about “my personal life, including . . . whether I shaved, whether I fast or smoke.” 110 He was later reinstated to run for election. The law also disqualifies candidates affiliated with the parties declared illegal by the Islamic regime; those who had served the past regime including party leaders, elected members of local and national councils, members of the savak, and proponents of the monarchy (Article 30). The election law further disqualifies owners of uncultivated lands and, in concert with article 49 of the constitution, those engaged in any business activities that are deemed un-Islamic and contrary to communal interests. The election law explicitly charges the Guardian Council with an “approbatory and general supervision” of elections. The law reads: “the Guardian Council will have the supervisory task in every stage of the parliamentary elections. This supervision will be expedient and comprehensive in every election related to the Majles.” 111 This entails supervision over all phases of elections, including the final determination of candidates’ eligibility and notification of legal reasons for disqualification. Prospective candidates are required to register with the Ministry of the Interior. A screening committee at the constituency level, under the Guardian Council’s supervision, investigates and determines the eligibility of candidates to run. Those who are found eligible are permitted to prepare for campaigning. By law, others who are determined ineligible are notified within two weeks of the elections and may apply for reconsideration. The final decision on reconsideration is made by the Guardian Council and should be communicated to candidates in writing. The council was vehemently opposed to the notification requirement, but the powerful Expediency Council finally ruled that the council had to provide written explanations for its decisions. The compromise was that written legal notifications will be made with three exceptions. In cases where the reasons are related to indecent public behavior or defamation and could cause embarrassment to the candidate, the reasons should be communicated verbally unless requested in writing by the candidate. When the evidence jeopardizes the honor of the candidate and other individuals, the reasons should be verbally communicated to the candidate. Finally, in cases of national security concerns, the reasons should be communicated in accordance with the decisions made by a commission on which the Chief of the Joint Staff Command of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Information serve.

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As expected, there have been many complaints about the disqualification process. Some candidates have complained that they were notified of their disqualification too late to seek reconsideration. In the 1992 parliamentary elections, Behzad Nabavi, a former minister of heavy industry and a parliamentary candidate, complained to the Guardian Council that he only had twenty-four hours to apply for reconsideration of his disqualification. 112 Some disqualified candidates have charged that the Guardian Council is unresponsive, secretive, and engages in the purging of political opponents. In a threatening response to these complaints in 1992, the spokesman for the Central Committee on Elections and a member of the Guardian Council claimed that: “The criteria for studying the applications in the central committee are based on legal and religious decrees. None of the advice from any of the factions were taken. . . . Some of the candidates whose applications were rejected had loaded files in the courts, which have not yet been investigated for one reason or another. These files will be investigated quite properly in the near future, and I am surprised at the boldness of these individuals for putting themselves up as candidates under these circumstances.” 113 This was indeed a direct legal threat to those who questioned the power of the council and its decision-making process in regard to electoral disqualification. Elections are direct and based on secret ballots. The electoral system is a two-ballot plurality system, which requires a simple majority on the first ballot. If no candidate receives a simple majority on the first ballot, the top two vote-getters will stand for a runoff election, normally within a month. In a runoff election, the candidate with the highest percentage of the votes (plurality) wins the election. In the parliamentary elections, depending on the size of the constituency, districts are either single-member or multimember districts. In the absence of an effective role for parties in elections and formidable independent candidates, this electoral system serves the interests of the dominant bloc in the Iranian body politic. 114 Election dates are not set in Iran. Elections are scheduled by the Ministry of the Interior with prior consent of the Guardian Council. When possible, elections are held on holy days when emotions run high and mosque attendance is at its peak, to ensure higher voter turnout indicative of the support for the Islamic system. According to the 2000 electoral law, ballot boxes are open for ten hours on an election day. If needs be, the time may be extended for another two hours at the discretion of the Minister of the Interior. In some elections, the time has been extended further due to the claim of high voter turnout. In the 2005 presidential elections, voting time was extended for four hours for both the first and the runoff elections. 115 To ensure their rights, candidates may have supervising representatives at the ballot boxes and may report any improprieties to the Election Supervisory Board for investigation and remedies. Law enforcement officers are tasked with ensuring law and

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order and proper conduct of elections. However, they are subject to criminal penalties if they interfere “in the execution and supervision of the election process.” The board is responsible for verifying or nullifying the ballots. According to the election law, the following ballots are null and void: ineligible ballots, ballots acquired through transactions, ballots containing the names of unapproved candidates, blank ballots, ballots cast in boxes that lack election seals, ballots cast by ineligible voters, ballots acquired through fraud and intimidation, multiple ballots cast by an individual, and ballots cast on non-standard election slips. The election law subjects violators of the election law to criminal penalties. These violations include: any form of vote transaction; voting with false documentations; multiple voting; intimidation of voters and election officials; recommendation of voting by individuals present at the ballot box; disruption of the elections; vote rigging; cheating in counting the ballots; and displacement, manipulation, or destruction of election documents. Campaigning in Iran is a mixture of Western-style electioneering and informal local or personal political horse-trading. The election law sets explicit guidelines limiting the duration and scope of campaign activities. Depending on the election, campaigning is limited to one week to ten days. According to the 2000 law, campaigning for the parliament commences eight days before the elections and stops twenty-four hours before voting. In the 2009 presidential election, campaigning was allowed ten days before the elections. These highly regulated campaigns are quite expensive by Iranian standards. Candidates resort to public speeches, mailings, mosque and media appearances, and advertisements. Campaign wall posters are standard and depict only the candidates’ faces, men with beard and no ties and women covered in black veils. Campaigning cannot be conducted through government-sponsored media and organizations. For the first time, during the presidential campaigns in 2009, state television stations sponsored a series of presidential debates. Newspapers that are de facto party and group organs play an important role in campaigns by endorsing candidates and running advertisements. By law, in conducting their campaigns, candidates and their supporters must put forth their own merits and refrain from engaging in negative publicity against their opponents. There are criminal penalties for libel and slander against any candidates. In the 2009 presidential debates, candidates were instructed to refrain from making any negative remarks about other candidates who were not present at the debates. 116 However, there was a stark difference in the strategy and tone of campaigns in the 2009 presidential elections. Candidates and their supporters sponsored huge rallies, including formation of a human chain by supporters of the reformist candidate, Mir Hossein Musavi, which stretched the entire length of the city of Tehran just days before the election. 117 For the first time in the elections in the Islamic Republic, candidates openly criticized each other. Opponents of

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President Ahmadinejad even referred to him as a “liar” and dictator whose misconceived policies and abrasive statements have jeopardized Iran’s economy and foreign standing. Similar to the bare-knuckle American campaigning style, opponents of the incumbent president ridiculed him for being superstitious by claiming that during his UN General Assembly speech he had seen a “light” surrounding him. 118 According to the law, the press and publications are barred from negative campaigning against any candidates. In case of such a violation, the candidate who is attacked may submit a response within eighteen hours that should be immediately printed by the same publication. If the publication fails to print the rebuttal, a similar publication may print the response at the expense of the violator. The key to a successful campaign is access to individuals and institutions that can provide publicity and help mobilize voters for the candidate. They include Friday prayer leaders; officials in the Interior Ministry, provincial governments, and municipalities; or such institutions as mosques, powerful foundations, and publishing houses. 119 Candidates with ties to major groups receive generous support from them. Those without such ties have neither the necessary access to powerful individuals and institutions nor the backing of influential groups. In the absence of a significant role for political parties in voter mobilization, there is an incentive for independents to run for public office. However, these candidates are expected to shoulder a heavy financial burden without organized support by groups or parties. It is particularly difficult for female candidates to run since they need to negotiate campaign financing with their husbands. 120 Despite the constraints imposed on voters by the disqualification of a large number of candidates in every election, the regime encourages voter participation to bolster support for the system and its leaders. Those parties and groups that boycott elections due to their frustrations over large-scale disqualifications of their favorite candidates are harshly criticized by the leadership and oftentimes accused of being un-Islamic, opposed to Khomeini’s ideals, and subversive. In a speech before the 2000 parliamentary elections, Khamene’i said: “elections symbolize the people’s participation and restoration of their rights.” Underscoring that elections are not just one’s right but also one’s obligation, he insisted that “it is important what percentage of people who could vote take part in the elections and vote.” 121 Similar calls for participation in elections are made by both conservative and reformist figures including Khatami and Rafsanjani. During the past three decades, Iranians have learned not to expect radical and drastic changes through the electoral process. They “increasingly see the practice of voting as an established routine for registering their participation and performing their national duty.” 122 To the younger generation of Iranians, who compose the majority of the population, electoral participation is a tedious but the only instrument of change and resistance to clerical absolutism. Voter turnout is impacted by

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popularity and name recognition of individual candidates on the ballot and the types of policies that voters care about, in particular bread and butter issues. Oftentimes, turnout is lower than expected because voters do not see much difference among the candidates and are distrustful of them for their unfulfilled past promises. Massive participation in the presidential and parliamentary elections that were dominated by the reformers resulted in two consecutive elections of Khatami to the presidency by 88 percent and 77 percent in 1997 and 2001 respectively. Similarly, the reformists’ successes in the 1996 parliamentary elections were due to 75 percent voter turnout. Frustration with disqualification and lack of enthusiasm and trust for both reformist and conservative candidates in the 2000 parliamentary elections resulted in a significantly lower turnout of 69.25 percent. While desire for change and support for specific policy issues motivate voters in elections, it is premature to suggest that Iranian voters have a clear and distinct understanding of the issues and candidates’ stance on policies that matter to them. As the vetting process limits voters’ options and offers them only a slate of candidate with minimal differences on major policy issues, due to the candidates’ tendencies toward moderation, candidates’ personal popularity and political affiliations have become the primary considerations in voters’ decisions. Nehads and Bonyads (Foundations) and Bazaar In addition to movements, parties, and groups, the Iranian civil discourse has historically involved secular private, governmental, and religious foundations; the bazaaris; and intellectuals. The Islamic sense of social responsibility and religious obligation to help the downtrodden has always helped the emergence and growth of charitable organizations in Muslim societies. In Iran, individual charitable contributions usually consist of personal contributions in times of difficulty (nazr), and endowment (waqf) which is mainly in the form of contribution to religious establishments including mosques and shrines. During the shah’s era, the regime established the Pahlavi Foundation as a charitable organization which, among other goals, aimed at consolidating the regime’s influence among the downtrodden by providing social benefits to the less privileged segments of the population. The endowments were the primary nonstate charities with extensive influence and impact. For the most part, the government had very little to do with these endowments and, since they were controlled by the clerical establishment, they were the backbone of clerical power and influence. Toward the end of the Pahlavi dynasty, the regime ended clerics’ monopoly over endowments by bringing them under civilian bureaucratic control in an attempt to curb clerical power and influence. Clerics reacted to such measures harshly and underscored the religious basis of endowments, which, in their view, could only be effectively

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and properly run by the clerical establishment in public interest without governmental oversight and interference. From the outset, Khomeini and Islamist leaders of the revolution exhibited a keen interest in religious charities and began establishing numerous foundations even during the revolutionary period. Their aim was not only to reaffirm their commitment to the marginalized segments of the society, but also to gain the downtrodden support for the religious elements in their competition with other revolutionary forces as they challenged the regime. In the Islamic Republic, however, the role of foundations has been fundamentally transformed from charitable organizations to large para-statal institutions with extensive economic, social, and political resources and influence. In line with the constitutional mandate that holds the government responsible for providing for the public by drawing on national revenues and “funds obtained through public contributions,” 123 the regime encourages and funds a variety of these organizations. Today, there is a great deal of controversy over the functions of these organizations that go far beyond charitable activities. Some of these organizations have grown tremendously with ever-expanding economic and political role without any meaningful accountability. As early as 1979, the regime helped in the establishment and funding of a number of foundations including the Foundation of the Disinherited (Bonyad-e Mostazafan), the Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation, Imam Khomeini’s Relief Committee, and the Martyrs’ Foundation. All of these organizations were tasked with providing for the disadvantaged segments of the population. Established in 1979, The Foundation of the Disinherited took over the Pahlavis’ properties with the aim of using their revenues to help the needy, and Imam Khomeini’s Relief Committee assisted in improving the conditions of the rural areas. Similar roles were assigned to the Fifteenth of Khordad and Martyrs’ foundations, especially as vehicles for assisting supporters of the regime and victims of the war with Iraq and violence. Their ultimate goals were to reinforce clerics’ revolutionary credentials and to ensure grassroots support for the regime’s political, economic, and social agenda. In fact, “Through their Islamic and revolutionary credentials, these bodies accelerated the process of indoctrination and the Islamization of society.” 124 By some estimates, Bonyad has been the most powerful and influential revolutionary body in Iran since its inception. Its constitutional document establishes its financial and legal independence and holds the organization accountable only to the Supreme Leader. Although in reality this is a parastatal organization that depends on governmental funding, 125 it rejects any governmental oversight and its leaders have resisted attempts by the parliament and other governmental entities to rein in their activities and ensure their accountability and transparency. Given its political power, many leaders have consistently insisted on its independence and have argued that it is only accountable to the Leader and the Revolutionary Council. 126 As a leftist

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Prime Minister, Mir Hossein Musavi argued that, as a revolutionary body, Bonyad should be free from governmental restrictions. 127 Bonyad’s directors have repeatedly claimed that the organization’s revolutionary role and requirements of market economy justify its freedom from governmental oversight and regulation. Subscribing to a conservative and pro-bazaari line, they have insisted “the Iranian economy should be based on supply and demands where the government is only a supervisor.” 128 They have often claimed that Bonyad’s activities have not only helped the needy but have also resulted in the overall fall in commodity prices in the market. 129 Bonyad has been criticized for the scope of its activities, the absence of a meaningful supervision and oversight over its functions, and its role in factional politics. As early as 1990, the foundation was doing business in service industries, farming, shipping lines, manufacturing of consumer goods, and import-export sectors. As a private enterprise, it even dismissed governmental monopoly over financial and banking sectors and opened up its own financial institutions. Even earlier, these activities were so extensive and so profitable that in 1983 the foundation director officially announced that the foundation owned billions of rials in assets and claimed that Bonyad “is not only the biggest economic enterprise in Iran, but one of the largest in the world.” 130 Bonyad’s economic success is largely due to its preferential treatment by the government in the forms of governmental subsidies; monopoly rights; and extensive exemptions from taxes, custom duties, and export-import restrictions. Ironically, despite its remarkable growth, the foundation spends a very small portion of its resources on the disinherited. For instance, in 1986, the foundation announced that its assets exceeded 53 billion tomans (a toman equals to ten rials), but a year later it only spent 70 million rials on the disinherited. 131 This underscores how limited Bonyad’s charitable role is in today’s Iran. Bonyad, however, clearly plays a critical role in politics by supporting the elites and Revolutionary Guards. Depending on its leadership’s political affiliations, it supports politicians who subscribe to different ideologies and favor alternative policy agenda. In the 1980s when the left dominated the government, Bonyad supported the administration and, thus, was protected by the parliamentarians and the government against any challenges by the left. During Khamene’i’s leadership, the foundation is controlled by conservatives and supports the interests of the bazaaris as well as other conservative foundations and groups. Rampant corruption within the organization and factional disputes over its role ultimately led to parliamentary investigations in 1993. These investigations revealed that the organization was making huge profits by taking improper advantage from the privileges it receives from the government. Even revelations about embezzlement and convictions of some of its operatives at the highest levels did not deter and constrain the organization. The organization continues to argue that its activities are sanc-

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tioned by Islam, and plays a prominent role in the Iranian economy and politics. Three decades into the Islamic Republic, foundations are no longer viewed as charitable organizations; rather, they are the economic and political arm of the regime and its elites in pursuit of their factional and regime interests. Even their limited charitable activities do not fairly and evenly provide for the poor. They are, as Ali Saeidi contends, instruments of “propagating the dominant ideology in a wide range of social and cultural activities.” 132 Additionally, they continue to take stance on even controversial foreign policy topics. For instance, when the government tried to calm down the international uproar over death sentence for Salman Rushdie by reversing stance on Khomeini’s fatwa, in 1996 the head of the Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation rejected governmental efforts and claimed that Khomeini’s fatwa is irreversible, and increased the price on Rushdie’s head. 133 The absence of transparency and accountability, misuse of their resources for political and factional interests, and open opposition to any rational economic and political reform have made these foundations a major obstacle to meaningful reforms in today’s Iran. The bazaar (traditional merchant establishment) is the major contributor to these foundations and has historically been a steady and reliable supporter of the clerical establishment both economically and politically. 134 The bazaaris’ support is rooted in their religiosity and social, economic, and political interests. In addition to their genuine commitment to Islam, outward expressions of devotion in the form of fasting, attending Friday prayers, and sponsoring religious events ensure bazaaris’ social standing and credibility within the bazaar. Therefore, the bazaar has historically been closely tied to conservative clerics and their organizations. As independent entrepreneurs, bazaaris have always supported market economy with little to no regulation and governmental interference. They sided with clerics and their nationalist allies in opposing the shah in the 1950s. Encouraged by clerics, the bazaari-supported enforcers like Sha’aban (a.k.a., the Brainless) played a prominent role in the coup of 1953 and fall of the Mossadegh government. Moreover, despite pressures from the government, in the 1960s, the bazaar supported the cleric-led opposition to the White Revolution and its reform agenda. Although they benefited from privatization and economic growth of the last years of the Pahlavi dynasty, they openly resented the regime’s economic reform strategies, especially the heavy-handed price-control measures that undermined their profits. In the late 1970s, during the revolutionary process, the bazaar supported Khomeini and clerics who relied on bazaar’s economic means to mobilize public support for the revolutionaries. In the Islamic Republic, the bazaar has built effective and strong ties with conservative elites who support market economy and reject any economic reforms and regulations that may undermine the interests of the bazaar. Of course, the failed

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economic policies of the Ahmadinejad’s conservative government that worsened economic conditions, due to increased inflation and unemployment combined with economic boycotts, did indeed undermine the interests of the bazaar and jeopardized their support for his brand of conservatism. Intellectuals There is a rich and lasting tradition of intellectuals’ role in civil discourse in the Iranian polity. Scholars, authors, journalists, poets, artists, and even prominent clerics and athletes have not only defined the parameters of civil discourse but have also assisted in mobilizing the public in support of opposition to regimes and their policies. During the earlier dynasties in pre-modern Persia, some of the thinkers were co-opted into the political establishment and, while holding positions of power, often shaped political debates and influenced the courts’ policies. In modern Iran, increased educational opportunities, especially during Reza shah’s reign, helped popularize intellectuals who often led oppositional politics in the country. These intellectuals subscribed to a wide array of ideologies and policy preferences ranging from the right to the left and advocating for nationalist, liberal-democratic, feminist, socialist, and even Islamist agendas. Many of these intellectuals inspired the emergence and growth of a vibrant civil society in the 1940s and 1950s in the form of political parties and groups who challenged the regime’s dictatorship and called for transformative socioeconomic and political change. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the likes of Ali Shari’ati, Foroogh Farrokhzad, Ahmad Shamloo, and Nima Yooshij made intellectual oppositional politics popular and far reaching. The regime was intolerant of the intellectual opposition and marginalized, exiled, imprisoned, or even executed many intellectuals and their followers over the years. As interpreters of Islam and guides of the Muslim community, religious and clerical intellectuals have also claimed a role in civil discourse. During the Pahlavis, some of the clerics were co-opted by the regime and provided a religious cover for the government and its policies. Others gained prominence in oppositional politics. However, generally speaking, clerics and religious intellectuals were marginal to the ongoing civil discourse for a good part of the Pahlavi regime, especially in the aftermath of the 1953 coup. Given the Islamic nature of today’s Iranian regime, religious intellectuals have a profound impact on public life through their speeches, writings, and religious decrees, particularly since the regime rejects any secular intellectual discourse as anti-Islamic and thus anti-systemic. In light of governmental controls over radio and television, oppositionist intellectual views are normally publicized in newspapers which are targets of government censors who disallow publication of oppositional viewpoints.

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In today’s Iran, according to some, there is a silent intellectual revolution underway 135 consisting of a “fourth generation” of young, dynamic, and diverse intellectuals who have a “strategic role in building a strong civil society.” 136 These intellectuals differ sharply in their views about the nature of authority, role of religion in the public and private life, viability and necessity of religious reform, desirability of modernization and development, and suitability of clerical domination in the Iranian Islamic polity. Their lively debates are unique, vibrant, and could potentially impact the Iranian polity for decades to come. Today, the conservative religious perspective receives a great deal of attention and criticism largely due to conservative domination of the government and its failed policies. Conservative intellectuals reject secularism and its contemporary manifestations and believe that the ultimate sovereignty belongs to God whose worldly authority should be exercised by His representative, the vali. In their view, authority does not derive from social contracts, social norms, or constitutional stipulations and such mechanisms as elections. 137 Therefore, they side-step republican dimensions of the Iranian constitution and suggest that since Khomeini’s doctrine of vilayat-e faqih reflects the Islamic and Shi’a conceptions of authority it must be preserved and safeguarded. Of course, religious conservatives have to address some critical issues: the manner by which the vali comes to power, his qualifications, and the scope of his authority. In line with the Shi’a tradition of appointive (vassayah) authority, religious conservatives reject democratic mechanisms for the choice of the vali and favor a system of “designation” by other fuqaha and the populace at large. Some religious conservatives expect the vali to possess such general qualifications as sufficient knowledge of Islam, integrity, piety, knowledge, and administrative skills. 138 Others speak of additional requirements including being male, possessing mental health, deep conviction to justice, and being of legitimate birth. 139 The major dispute, however, is over whether or not the vali should be a source of emulation (marja-e taqlid), as Khomeini had suggested and as the original constitution required, or such a religious status is not necessary for the primarily political position of the vali. Mesbah Yazi, a former student of Khomeini, advocates for the absolute (mutlaq) authority of the vali 140 as long as he follows the fundamental principles of Islam. From this perspective, the absoluteness of the vali’s authority does not mean an autocracy under the guise of religion. 141 A second group of religious intellectuals, who were mainly radical Islamists during the revolutionary period, 142 advance a reformist view of religion. Historically speaking, Islamic reformism dates back to the time of Muhammad’s death and the subsequent sectarian schisms over succession. With the rise of the institutionalized khalifah system and intensified sectarian disputes, Islamic reformist thought focused on the nature of political authority

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and role of the ummah in managing its affairs. In the Islamic Republic, a fairly diverse religious reformist thought gained momentum with the rise of Khatami to the presidency. These intellectuals try to offer an indigenous model of authority in the Islamic system of Iran by synthesizing and reconciling the Shi’a Islamic and Iranian values and norms with those of democracy and modernity. To religious reformists, democracy is a key component of Islam. A number of these reformers openly question the theological roots of Khomeini’s leadership doctrine by arguing that this doctrine is inconsistent with the democratic nature of Islam. Their conception of democracy is not fundamentally distinct from the Western liberal democratic practices that underscore liberties, rights, and human self-determination. To them, democracy is a method of governance by which people partake in their own destiny and running of their own affairs. 143 Islamic democracy, in their view, is not just a right, it is indeed a religious obligation. 144 Abdolkarim Soroush is a prominent religious reformer in today’s Iran. Although his earlier writings and speeches reflected his conservative religious viewpoints and his rejection of a dynamic view of Islamic jurisprudence, his later thoughts underscore the need for an Islamic democratic system. An ideal democracy is a religious democracy, according to Soroush, where the rights of man and the rights and dictates of God are observed. 145 Islamic civil society, in the religious reform discourse, is central to the success of a democratic system. To former President Khatami, a strong advocate of an Islamic civil society, Islam establishes parameters and standards of activities that are antithetical to any forms of dictatorship and despotism either by individuals or by the majority. While he acknowledges that God is the source of authority, he considers leaders as servants of the public who are obligated to honor and ensure peoples’ equal rights, regardless of their religious beliefs, in managing their own affairs. 146 To justify this view of authority and role of the public, the reformist perspective embraces a dynamic (Puya) view of fiqh, a view that underscores the need to rely on independent judgment (ijtihad) that is rooted in logic in order to achieve the necessary change and progress. From this perspective, Islamic jurisprudence is not a static and unchanging set of rules and guidelines, as religious conservatives contend. It is indeed a body of laws made by Man and, as such, it is not sacred and can be adapted to changing times and circumstances. In rejecting the conservative religious perspective and its commitment to a traditional (sunnati) view of fiqh, reformers assert that the realities of Muhammad’s era are not compatible with modern circumstances and must be set aside. When advanced further, as Mehran Kamrava astutely observes, the reformist perspective questions the legitimacy and necessity of a clerical establishment, if every believer is capable of making independent judgment without the need to emulate clerics. 147 These religious perspectives are challenged by a growing secular-modernist discourse. Although coherent secular-modernist discourse in Iran dates

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back to the twentieth century and is largely rooted in anti-clerical sentiments, 148 the current discourse tends to be predominantly shaped by Western conceptions of modernity and secularism and the inseparability of the two phenomena. 149 These thinkers view modernism in a deterministic fashion and argue that resistance to modernity causes backwardness, marginalization, and isolation in contemporary world. In order for societies to move forward they must embrace modernization strategies compatible with their social, economic, and political realities and circumstances. In line with the traditional developmentalist arguments, 150 these modernists contend that modernization of Iran requires separation of religion from public life and relegation of religion to the private realm. Naturally, secular modernists are committed to democratic development and, like religious reformers, pay a great deal of attention to the role of civil society in the developmental process. However, secular modernists reject religious reformers’ contention that Islam and democracy are compatible. Akbar Ganji, a famous political activist and secularmodernist, believes that the reformist dynamic interpretation of fiqh to justify Islam’s compatibility with democracy and pluralism is inappropriate. In his view, “This is an incorrect perspective. Hermeneutics does not mean interpretive free-for-all. And neither does the ‘structure of text’ lend itself to every interpretation and analysis. The Book and Tradition are absolute, and stand in contradiction with ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘social democracy.’ Such interpretations (synthesizing the two) are incorrect.” 151 In this chapter, we studied the ongoing debates about the nature of authority in the Islamic Republic and their impacts on the role of civil society in the system. Those who support a monolithic form of authority rely on the idea of supremacy of God, highlight centrality of the Islamic worldview, and downplay the role of the public in managing the society. Some even go as far as advocating for the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader, a topic that will be investigated further in chapter 5. A diametrically distinct perspective sees the Islamic worldview compatible with democracy, favors pluralism, and calls for a dynamic view of Islamic law. In their view, parties, groups, movements, foundations, bazaaris, and intellectuals are central to the functioning of the state and its legitimacy in the Islamic Republic. This chapter offers a historical analysis of the role of civil society in Iran during the ancien régime and the Islamic Republic. Interestingly, in their pursuit of autocratic goals, political authorities in both systems developed similar strategies to curb the well-articulated popular demands for political participation that spans over a century and has, on occasions, exhibited periods of civil society vibrancy. Similar to the latter part of the Pahlavi dynasty, in today’s Iran oppositional politics is confined to pro-systemic disagreements over policy issues within the confines of an Islamic perspective. In the next chapter, we will further examine the institutional implications of the monolithic view of authority as manifested in the role of the Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic.

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NOTES 1. It is believed that the first modern Iranian political organization, named Hemmat (commitment), was established in Baku in 1904 by Iranian intellectuals, workers, and businessmen who had migrated to the caucuses for education, work, or commerce. For a detailed historiography of parties and groups in Iran, See: Younes Parsa Benab, Tarike-e sad salehe- Ahzab va Sazemanha-ye Siassi-e Iran (1284–1384) [One Hundred Year History of the Iranian Political Parties and Groups], 1, (Washington, DC: Ravandi Publications, 2004), 27. 2. Benab, Tarike-e sad, 61–62. 3. Ibid., 66. 4. Ibid., 162. 5. Ibid., 172. 6. This group was later referred to as the “group of 53.” 7. For a discussion of the history of the Tudeh party, see: “History of the Tudeh Party of Iran,” accessed October 9, 2007, http://www.iranchamer.com/history/tudeh/tudeh_party02.php. 8. Benab, Tarike-e sad, 350. 9. Prime Ministers Mohammad Ali Forooghi, Ahmad Ghavam, Mohammad Ali Soheili, and Abdol Hossein Hazhir generally supported the U.S. interests and policies. Prime Ministers Mohammad Saed-e Maraghe’i, Morteza Bayat, Ibrahim Hakimi, Ali Mansoor, Ali Razm Ara, and Hossein Ala were tied to the British interests. 10. Benab, Tarike-e sad, 410. 11. Ibid., 413. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 417. 14. Ibid., 423. 15. Ibid., 425. 16. Ibid., 426. 17. Ibid., 446. 18. Ibid., 450. 19. The White Revolution, which was initiated by the shah, carried out a series of policies that gradually expanded and evolved including land reform, women enfranchisement, nationalization of resources, and creation of corps (educational, development, religious, etc.). Among other goals, these policy initiatives intended to centralize the political authority by removing the power bases of the landed aristocracy, ethnic and local chiefs, and clerics. The clerical establishment’s opposition to these policies was also rooted in their view that land confiscation and women enfranchisement are indeed anti-Islamic policies. 20. Quoted in Benab, Tarike-e sad, 526. 21. Ibid., 581. 22. Ibid., 645. 23. Mehran Kamrava, “The Civil Society Discourse in Iran,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 28. 2 (2001): 165. 24. E. R. Povey, “Trade Unions and Women’s NGOs: Diverse Civil Society Organizations in Iran,” Development in Practice 149 (2004): 1–2. 25. A. Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movement in Iran (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 1. 26. Mark Bradley, Iran, Open Hearts in a Closed Land (U.K.: Authentic Media, 2007), 21. Also, BBC Monitoring Service, Oct. 25, 2002. 27. IRNA, June 21, 2001. 28. IRNA, September 2, 2002. 29. Quoted in: Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran (New York: Random House, 2001), 40. 30. Abdol-Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 88–131. 31. Abdol-Karim Soroush, Modara va Modiriat (Tehran: 1997), 350–65. 32. See: Mohsen Kadivar, Nazari-ye-haye dowlat dar figh-e shi’ah (Tehran; 1999), and Moshen Kadivar, Hokumat-e Valiye (Tehran: 2000).

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33. See an interview with Ayatollah Montazeri in: Geneive Abdo, “Rethinking the Islamic Republic: A Conversation with Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri,” Middle East Journal, 55.1 (Winter 2001): 9–24. 34. Ettela’at, May 8, 1988. 35. Keyhan, April 16, 1988. 36. Theologically speaking, those who subscribe to the traditional (sunnati) fiqh rely on the Quran, hadith, and sunnah of the prophet and Shi’a Imams as sufficient means for governing the society. Aspiring to establish an authority patterned after the prophet’s rule in Medina, they argue that the exiting ordinances are sufficient and reject any additional or secondary ordinances created by religious edicts, except in the cases of overriding necessity. The Puya (dynamic) fiqh advocates give primacy to the Shi’a original sources but they believe that fiqh should respond to the changing environment. Thus, they call for the creation of secondary ordinances to meet the evolving societal needs. 37. “Parties Law and Its Relevant Executive Regulations,” in Identity Card of Political Parties and Groups in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Parties Commission Secretariat, Political Department, Ministry of Interior, accessed October 1, 2007, 11–22. http://www.parstimes.com/ law/parties_law.html. 38. Ibid. 39. Khorassan; Social and Political (Daily), No. 14759, July 30, 2000. 40. “Iran after the Victory of 1979 Revolution,” accessed November 25, 2013, http://www. iranchamber.com/history/islamic_revolution/revolution_and_iran_after1979_1.php. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. “Iran hangs Sunni militant leader Abdolmalek Rigi,” accessed July, 21, 2010, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/10359415. 44. Benab, Tarike-e sad, 102. 45. Ibid., 97. 46. Ibid. 47. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the Mojahedin organization and its role in revolutionary and post-revolutionary Iran, see; Parsa Younes Benab, Tarikh-e Sad Salehhe-e Ahzab va Sazemanha-ye Siyasi-e Iran [One Hundred Year History of the Iranian Political Parties and Groups] 2 (Washington, DC: Ravandi Publishing House, 2006), 65–97. 48. Ibid. 49. Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 95. 50. Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran, Roots and Results of the Revolution (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), 276. 51. See statements by Rafsanjani and Khamene’i in Jumhuri-e-Islami, September 18, 19, 22, 24, 1984. 52. Moslem, Factional Politics, 30. 53. Often referred to as “Rafsanjanites.” See Moslem, Factional Politics, 48. 54. Ettela’at, February 3, 1987. 55. Moslem, Factional Politics, 74. 56. Ettela’at, June 20, 1988. 57. In the parliamentary elections of 1992, the Rouhaniyyat (a collection of the conservatives, moderates, and reformist centrists) received a 70 percent majority of votes. Thus, as a major departure from the Khomeini era, they excluded the left from their coalition and, thus, weakened the left politically. See: M. Mozaffari, “Changes in the Iranian Political System after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death,” Political Studies, 41 (1993): 611–617. 58. Moslem, Factional Politics, 84. 59. Sobh, March 6, 1995. 60. Sobh, August 12, 1995. 61. Resalat, July 14, 1996. 62. Sobh, June 20, 1995. 63. Khotut-e Kollie-ye Andisheha-ye Imam Khomein [The Central Themes of Imam Khomeini’s Thoughts] (Tehran: Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), 316.

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64. Resalat, November 10, 1985. 65. Hamshahri, March 5–6, 1996. 66. Hamshahri, February 19, 1996. 67. Quoted in Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics, 133. 68. Shahrokh Akhavi, “Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Middle East Journal, 41.2 (1987): 181–199. 69. Moslem, Factional Politics, 111. 70. In their publication Asr-e-Ma [Our time], the left consistently underscores the revolutionary nature of the system and ties its legitimacy to its populist dimensions. See Asr-e Ma, February 22, 1996, January 19, 1996, and July 24, 1996. 71. Moslem, Factional Politics, 116. 72. Keyhan, July 18, 1990. 73. Ettela’at, October 24, 1996. 74. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis, I (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 25. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid., 3. 77. Ibid. 78. Edmund Burke, The Works of Edmund Burke, I (Boston: Little, Brown, 1839), 425–26. 79. “Washington’s Farewell Address on September 17, 1796,” in Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History 5th ed., vol. I. (Appleton, 1949), 172. 80. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 12. 81. Ibid., 13. 82. Asr-e Ma, October 2, 1994. 83. Ettella’at, December 12, 1995. 84. S. Fairbanks, “Theocracy Versus Democracy; Iran Considers Political Parties,” Middle East Journal, 52.1(1998): 17. 85. Article 4 of the Parties Law. 86. A. W. Samii, “The Changing Landscape of Party Politics in Iran: A Case Study,” Journal of the European Society for Iranian Studies 1.1 (2005): 53–54. 87. Benab, Tarike-e sad, 59. 88. Ibid., 325. 89. “History of the Tudeh Party of Iran,” accessed October 9, 2007, http://www.iranchamer. com/history/tudeh/tudeh_party02.php. 90. Ibid. 91. Benab, Tarike-e sad, 50–51. 92. The founders of the IRP included: Mohammad Hossein Beheshti, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Javad Bahonar, Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardabili, Mohammad Khamene’i, Ali Ghoddoosi, and Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani. 93. Keddie, Modern Iran, 244. 94. Benab, Tarike-e sad, 15-16. 95. The major factions included: Maktabis (radicals), Hojjatiyyah (conservative right), and the centrist clerics. 96. “Iran National Front Organizations,” accessed January 10, 2011, http://www.jebhemelli. net. 97. “Green Party of Iran,” accessed October 11, 2007, http://www.iran-e-sabz.org/program/ program.html . 98. “Marze Por Gohar Party,” accessed October 11, 2007, http://www.marzeporgohar.org/. 99. For a brief history of the PDKI, see: “Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan,” accessed October 11, 2007. “Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan,” accessed October 11, 2007. http:// www.pdki.org/articles1-25-18.htm. 100. Ibid. 101. The Guardian Council is composed of twelve members, half of whom are senior clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader. The other half are jurists who are appointed by the head of the Judiciary with the approval of the parliament. The six jurists have no role in the electoral process. The clerics make all of the decisions regarding the investigation of the applicants,

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receiving and reviewing of the appeals for disqualifications, and the appointment of the provincial supervisory councils. 102. The Guardian, January 13, 2000. 103. Quoted in: Farzin Sarabi, “The Post-Khomeini Era in Iran: The Elections of the Fourth Islamic Majles,” Middle East Journal, 48.1 (1994): 95. 104. Khordad, September 20, 1999. 105. Mehdi Nasiri, “Republican Democrats,” Kayahn, April 14 (1992): 2. 106. New York Times, November 22, 2001. 107. Sobh-e Emrooz, September 21, 1999. 108. Iran, January 5, 2000. 109. “Election Law,” accessed March 20, 2001, http://www.parstimes.com/law/election_law. html. 110. Zahra Hosseinian, “Iran bars grandson of Khomeini from election,” accessed February 6, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/06/us-iran-election-idUSHOS63976420080206. 111. Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, August 12, 1999. 112. Salaam, April 5, (1992): 2. 113. Quoted in: Farzin Sabri, “Post-Khomeini Era,” 98. 114. Farzin Sarabi, “Post-Khomeini Era,” 103. 115. Haleh Esfandiari, “Iran After the June 2005 Presidential Election,” Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Middle East Program, accessed May 15, 2006, http://www.wilsoncenter. org/sites/default/files/mepopsummer051.pdf. 116. Casey L. Addis, “Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 6 (2009): 3. 117. “Anti-Ahmadinejad human chair stretches across Tehran,” accessed June 9, 2009, http:// www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Anti-Ahmadinejad-human-chain-stretches-acrossTeheran. 118. “Ahmadinejad’s ‘halo’ mocked by Iranians,” accessed June 13, 2009, http:// prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2009/06/ahmadinejads-halo-mocked-by-iranians.html. 119. Farzin Sarabi, “Post-Khomeini Era,” 99. 120. Haleh Afshar, 2002, “Competing Interests: Democracy, Islamification and Women Politicians in Iran,” in Women, Politics and Change, ed. Karen Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 112. 121. IRIB, February 15, 2000, Quoted in A.W. Samii, “Changing Landscape,” 8. 122. Bahman Bakhtiari, “The Impact of Elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, XXV. 2 (2002): 52. 123. Article 29. 124. Moslem, Factional Politics, 23. 125. By some estimates governmental contributions to this foundation is a substantial portion of its budget. In 1990, nearly half of its budget was contributed by the government. Over the years, governmental contributions to this foundation have been substantial. Resalat, Oct. 6, 1990. 126. Ettela’at, October 7, 1979. 127. Ettella’at, November 11, 1982. 128. Resalat, November 1, 1990. 129. Ettela’at, December 23, 24, 1990. 130. Ettela’at, November 30, 1983. 131. Moslem, Factional Politics, 44. 132. Ali Saedi, “The Accountability of Para-Governmental Organizations (Bonyads); The Case of Iranian Foundations,” Iranian Studies 37.3 (2004): 486. 133. Salam, February 4, 1996. 134. For an in-depth analysis of the bazaar, see: A. Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 135. Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1. 136. R. Jahanbegloo, “The Role of the Intellectuals,” Journal of Democracy 11.4 (2000): 136.

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137. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokhha [Questions and Answers] (Qom: Mo’assesseh-Amozeshi va Pezhooheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380 A.H.), 13–14. 138. Mesbah Yazdi quoted in: Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, 107. 139. Hossein Montazeri, Mabani-e Feqhi-ye Hukumat-e Eslami [The Jurisprudential Foundations of the Islamic Government] 1, (Qom: Saraee), 141. 140. Mesbah Yazdi, Nazriyyat-e Siyasi-e Eslam: Keshvardari [Political Theory of Islam: Statecraft] (Qom: Mo’asseseh-e Amoozeshi va Pezhooheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380 A.H.), 110. 141. Jaber Amiri, Mabani-ye Andisheh-haye Eslami: Din va Siyasat [Principles of Islamic Thought: Religion and Politics] (Qom: Gorgani, 1380 A.H.), 159. 142. A. Sadri, “The Varieties of Religious Reform: Public Intelligentsia in Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 15. 2 (2001): 271–74. 143. Masoud Razavi, Motefakkeran-e Moaser va Andish-ye Siyasi-e Eslam [Contemporary Thinkers and Islamic Political Thought] (Tehran: Farzan-e Ruz, 1378 A.H.), 138–39. 144. Mostafa Tajzadeh, Siyasat, Kakh va Zendan [Politics, Palace, and Prison] (Tehran: Zekr, 1381A.H.), 106. 145. Abdolkarim Soroush, Farbeh-tar az Ideolozhi [Healthier than Ideology] (Tehran: Sarat, 1373 A.H.), 270. 146. Mohammad Khatami, “Jame’eh-he Madani az Negah-e Eslami” [Civil Society from an Islamic Point of View] in Nesbat-e Din va Jame’eh-he Madani [The Relationship between Religion and Civil Society] ed. Mohsen Armin, et al. (Tehran: Zekr, 1379 A.H.), 181. 147. Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, 150. 148. See Ahmad Kasravi’s (1891–1946) works on history and revolution in Iran. He was the most prolific Iranian modernist in the twentieth century. 149. Essentially, these thinkers believe that for Iran to become modern, it needs to embrace elements of modernity including secularism, rationalism, civil society, development, and globalism. 150. The developmentalist literature covers a wide array of topics dealing with the cultural and institutional requirements of development. Generally, development, from this perspective, requires cultural secularism, structural differentiation, and sub-system autonomy. See Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968). 151. Quoted in: Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, 208.

Chapter Five

Vali-e Faqih or Rahbar (Supreme Leader)

THEOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ROOTS Khomeini envisioned an Islamic state in Iran governed on the basis of Islamic (mainly Twelver Shi’a) precepts and laws by a qualified cleric possessing the status of mar’ja-e taqlid (source of emulation) who would have the final say in all societal affairs in the absence of the Twelfth Imam (Mahdi). In his earlier writings, in particular in his Hukumat-e Eslami (Islamic Government), he developed a theological justification for the role of the Leader based on the Shi’a legitimist doctrine that underscores the legitimacy of rule by the representative of God, vali, until the return of Mahdi. In this Shi’a NeoPlatonic thought, Khomeini’s doctrine of the Leadership of the Jurisprudent (vilayat-e faqih) offers an elitist view of authority whereby the Leader would rule the population based on his personal qualities and understanding of Islam with accountability only to God. 1 Indeed, Khomeini’s supporters in conservative religious circles advanced the notion that the authority of such a vali is absolute (mutlaq) since he represents the Hidden Imam, and his legitimacy is not tied to any popular acceptance. Despite such assertions, even the original constitution acknowledged individual and communal rights and accounted for republican principles in the system, thus empowering the people to partake in running the community. It was no surprise, however, that the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khebregan) incorporated Khomeini’s doctrine into the constitution; appointed him as the vali; and granted him sweeping legislative, judicial, and executive powers. In dealing with the succession issue, the original constitution stipulated that, if no one person is found to be qualified to hold the position after Khomeini, a popularly elected council of three to five clerics will either take over the vali’s functions or will appoint 179

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someone to that position. 2 In 1985, the assembly designated Khomeini’s student and protégé, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, as his successor. He was later stripped of this role due to his relatively liberal oppositionist pronouncements, and passed away on Dec. 20, 2009 as an outspoken opponent of the regime and its authoritarian proclivities. As the marja’a taqlid, Khomeini served as the highest religious and political authority in the system. In 1989, however, the constitution was revised to deal with inefficiencies and factional disputes over policies and institutions, including the vali’s role in the post-Khomeini era. The revised constitution removed the religious requirement of mar’ja for the Leader and modified the mechanism by which this person is appointed to the position. These changes minimized the religious role of the vali and transformed the position into a predominantly political authority in the post-Khomeini era. Article 5 of the revised constitution declares that, in the absence of Mahdi, leadership of the ummah is vested in a “just and pious person who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age, courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability.” Chapter VIII of the revised constitution spells out the qualifications and functions of the Leader after Khomeini and the manner by which he is appointed to the position. The rahbar or Supreme Leader should possess the necessary personal characteristics as well as scholarly and administrative qualifications for the position. Personally, he should be pious, prudent, courageous, and possess right social and political perspicacity. He should exhibit scholarly abilities as a religious leader, administrative capacities, and adequate leadership qualities. In circumstances in which more than one person fulfills these qualifications, the person possessing better jurisprudential and political perspicacity will be given preference in the choice of the Leader. 3 Article 110 of the constitution enumerates the expansive duties of the Leader that include legislative, judicial, executive, and oversight functions. His legislative role includes the delineation of the country’s policies and resolution of disputes over policy issues in consultation with the Expediency Council. In his judicial role, the Leader may confirm, reduce, or pardon convicts’ sentences in accordance with the laws, upon the recommendation of the head of the judiciary. The Leader’s executive roles include direct command and mobilization of the armed forces, resolution of interagency disputes, and declaration of war and peace. The Leader has extensive oversight functions including appointive powers, authorization of referenda, oversight of election results, dismissal of the president for cause, and supervision over the execution of policies. The Leader is granted very broad appointive powers. In his capacity, he may appoint, dismiss, or accept the resignation of clerical members of the Guardian Council, the highest judicial authority in the country, the head of the radio and television network, the chief of the Joint staff of the military, the chief commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

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In the presidential election of 2009, the Leader’s role in the electoral process was amplified by his formal authorization of Ahmadinejad’s re-election, despite accusations of election fraud and the subsequent public uproar. According to the constitution, along with the Guardian Council, the Leader confirms the suitability of first-time candidates for the presidency. The Leader may also dismiss the president in the interest of the country, after the president is found guilty of violating his constitutional duties by the Supreme Court or after a legislative vote affirming the president’s incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the constitution. In practice, the Leader also appoints Friday prayer leaders who play a pivotal role in the mobilization of the public in support of the regime’s policies. He also controls a number of foundations including the Martyrs Foundation and the Foundation of the Disinherited and such agencies as the Land Allocation Committees. As indicated earlier, these influential institutions lack any other oversight but that of the Leader. Article 107 of the revised constitution empowers the Assembly of Experts to appoint the Leader after Khomeini. This popularly elected council is tasked with reviewing the qualifications of all potential candidates who possess the required qualities, and appointing one as the Leader with all the rights and responsibilities accounted for in the constitution. In case the appointed Leader lacks the necessary qualifications or lose some of these qualifications during his leadership, he may be dismissed by the Council of Experts (Article 111). In cases of dismissal, death, or resignation, the council would appoint a successor expeditiously. In the meantime, upon the decision of the Expediency Council, some of the rahbar’s duties will be discharged by a leadership council consisting of the president, head of the judiciary, and a clerical member of the Guardian Council. If any member of the leadership council is unable to fulfill his duties, another person will be appointed to the council by a majority decision of the clerical members of the Expediency Council (Article 111). The constitution limits the jurisdiction of the leadership council and subjects its decision-making process to the consent of threefourth members of the Expediency Council. Upon the approval of the Expediency Council, the leadership council may delineate the general policies of the republic, issue decrees for national referenda, mobilize the armed forces and declare war and peace, and act as the commander of the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards. The leadership council may also be formed and tasked with the responsibilities of the Leader in case of temporary inability of the Leader to perform his duties due to illness or any other incidents (Article 111).

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LEADERSHIP IN PRACTICE Khomeini served as the vali-e faqih until his death in 1989. As the uncontested leader of the revolution and architect of the Islamic Republic, he defined the parameters of vali’s role in the Islamic Republic and was instrumental in the modification of this role for the post-Khomeini era, as reflected in the revised constitution. Although Khomeini was as much a religious guide as he was a political leader, his personality, style of leadership, uncompromising views on some policy issues, and willingness to set aside even some of the central Islamic precepts caused him to be viewed by some as mainly a political leader rather than a devout and dogmatic religious authority. In fact, as he increasingly embraced a more dynamic view of fiqh, especially after 1987, his religious views were increasingly questioned by conservative clerics who subscribed to a traditional view of fiqh. Khomeini’s charisma was instrumental in steering the revolutionary movement in an Islamic direction, guaranteeing clerical leadership of the revolution, combating other revolutionaries’ early efforts to seek alternative forms of authority in the post-revolutionary Iran, and ultimately embracing and institutionalizing pragmatism in the system in response to the limitations and impracticalities of Islamic laws and policies. There is very little doubt that in the Islamic Republic the nature of authority, role of public institutions, directions of public policies, and frequent and explicitly opportunistic institutional and policy modifications were largely shaped by Khomeini’s views and charismatic leadership from the beginning. 4 As the Leader, Khomeini’s foremost interests were survival of the system and clerical dominance. To ensure his and clerics’ uncontested authority, he skillfully marginalized and discredited those who could garner public support and could potentially challenge the system and his autocratic rule. To achieve this, he kept informed of the details of governance by appointing his loyal lieutenants to sensitive positions of power. Moreover, by appointing competing elites to similar positions of authority he effectively counterweighed their influence. 5 As an astute and skilled politician, he did not involve himself in the daily and routine matters of governance and stayed above the fray in the tumultuous and fractious factional schisms among the elites. While on occasion he rejected disharmony and factionalism for being detrimental to the state interests, 6 he took advantage of these disputes to solidify his role and to push his own agenda forward. Also, when necessary, he became impressively pragmatic even at the cost of marginalizing Islamic and Shi’a precepts. To the surprise of many, and dismay of some, he even embraced an exceptionally broad view of the doctrine of maslahat and suggested that even such primary precepts of Islam as prayers may be set aside when necessity requires. In doing so, he abandoned some of the long-held traditional positions by the clerical establishment in Iran and openly opposed conservative clerics.

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On policy matters, Khomeini sided with the radicals’ agenda for the most part and rejected the conservative opposition as reactionary and contrary to the interest of the masses. To the dismay of many conservatives and their bazaari supporters, he advocated for the statist economic policies of the radicals. He rejected the conservatives’ assertions about the sanctity of private property and, in 1988, accused them of practicing an “American brand of Islam.” 7 He also exhibited similar pragmatism on socio-cultural policies when he issued injunctions permitting TV programs that featured unveiled women (as long as they were not viewed by “lustful eyes” 8); and endorsed the game of chess and the use of musical instruments for religiously sanctioned purposes. 9 Khomeini’s acceptance of a cease-fire in the war with Iraq was a complete reversal from his uncompromising opposition to Saddam Hussein and his policies. He, largely in line with the radicals’ foreign policy stance, advocated for an independent third-world-oriented and anti-imperialist foreign policy. Given Khomeini’s stature and dominant leadership role, the succession issue was expected to be controversial, especially in light of the growing factional schisms. Surprisingly, however, the Council of Experts expeditiously abandoned the idea of a leadership council and selected Sayyed Ali Khamene’i as the Leader. In doing so, it was suggested that Khomeini had preferred the choice of a single leader over a council as his successor. 10 Khamene’i’s appointment was made possible because most factions considered him relatively more moderate than and preferable to ultra-conservative ayatollahs, despite the left’s reservations about his conservative stance on policy issues, in particular his anti-statist economic views. As expected, conservatives hailed the choice of Khamene’i and, as some referred to him as a marja’a, called for absolute obedience to his religious and political mandate. Khamene’i was born to a clerical family of humble background. In his biographical sketch, he speaks of his family’s hard life growing in a small and inadequate home having to live on bread and raisins for dinner at times. 11 Inspired by his clerical father, he received his early education in traditional religious schools (makaateb) and continued with religious studies at the seminaries in Mashhad, Qom, and Najaf under well-known clerics including Grand Ayatollahs Fazel Milani, Haeri Yazdi, and Mostafa Boroujerdi, among others. During much of his clerical career, he taught a variety of religious subjects at seminaries. His lectures and published works focused on religious, socio-cultural, and political topics including leadership issues, the role of political parties, significance of return to the principles of the Quran, profundity of prayers and arts, and cultural invasion. He also translated mainly political books from Arabic to Farsi including the works of the radical Egyptian Islamic scholar, Sayyed Qutb, titled: The Future of Islamic Lands, and An Indictment against the Western Civilization. 12

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According to Khamene’i, he was preoccupied with political issues at an early age. Later, influenced by Khomeini and his oppositionist politics of the 1960s, he joined the revolutionary clerics who questioned the Pahlavi regime for its pro-American and anti-Islamic policies. 13 Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s he was actively propagating Khomeini’s ideas and helping with strategies for public mobilization against the regime. As a result, he was arrested and jailed several times and ultimately banned from preaching. However, he continued with his lectures on Islam and politics despite the ban, and consequently was sent into exile in 1976. As the revolutionary fervor heightened in 1978, he returned to Mashhad and joined the revolutionaries. Shortly before the success of the revolution in 1979, he was appointed to the Islamic Revolutionary Council along with other prominent leaders of the revolution. Until his appointment as the rahbar, he served in a number of other important capacities including the founding member of the Islamic Republican Party (1980), Deputy Minister of Defense (1980), Supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (1980), Imam of the Friday Prayers in Tehran (1980), member of the Majles (1980), Khomeini’s representative on the High Council of Defense (1981), president of the republic (1981–1989), chairman of the Revolution’s Cultural Council (1982), president of the Expediency Council (1986) and was reelected to this post for another four-year term, and chairman of the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution (1990). Khamene’i lacks Khomeini’s religious and revolutionary credentials, political skills, and popular support and affection. He was not a high-ranking ayatollah before his appointment to the leadership position. Even after he was elevated to the rank of an ayatollah by the Theological School of Qom in 1989 and nominated to be one of the sources of emulation after the death of Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, in his religious role he has had to compete with a number of well-established and politically active ayatollahs who possess more impressive religious credentials and greater followings. Therefore, Khamene’i’s ability to provide for a strong and effective religious and political leadership has been adversely impacted by those who challenge his decisions, particularly his religious edicts. Cognizant of this limitation, he himself has suggested that he prefers to be “the source of emulation only for the Shi’i community outside Iran.” 14 Although, like Khomeini, he tries to keep distance from daily affairs of the state and generally exerts influence behind the scenes, in the public eye he is closely tied to factional disputes and policy positions of the conservatives. Marred by factional affiliation with the conservatives and frequent direct interference in important policy issues and disputes, he is increasingly unable to stay above the fray. Khamene’i has shown an obvious disdain for democratic values and the republican elements of the constitution throughout his political career. His active role in the ouster of the first president of the republic, Abolhassan

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Bani-Sadr, made him the target of assassination and contempt by the moderate and radical forces who believed that he and the Islamic Republican Party were undermining even the semblance of democracy in the Islamic Republic. On occasions, he has denounced those who have sought greater political freedoms in Iran, has accused them of being agents of foreign powers, and has threatened them by suggesting that the leaders do not have the right to have any pity whatsoever for the mercenaries of the enemy. On numerous occasions, he clashed with the higher ranking oppositionist Ayatollah Montazeri, who rejected the absolutist powers of the rahbar and the regime’s efforts to silence clerical opposition. 15 He sided with the Guardian Council in rejecting liberalization efforts, particularly the parliamentary initiatives to reform the press law and to account for greater press freedoms. In rejecting the reform of the press law, he asserted that the restrictions of the law prevented the enemies of Islam “from taking over the press” and argued that “any reinterpretation of the press law is not in the interest of the country and the system.” 16 He has supported the closure of the print media and arrests and trials of reformist journalists. His support for and approval of President Ahmadinejad’s re-election, despite public demonstrations and ensuing violence, and his outspoken advocacy for crackdowns on the opposition have reinforced the common view that he is autocratic and dismissive of democratic values and principles of the constitution. Khamene’i’s opposition to the radicals’ statist economic policies during Khomeini’s leadership and his unrelenting advocacy for the sanctity of private property and market economy have endeared him to conservatives and their supporters in bazaar. This dogmatic approach, in light of the worsening economic conditions and the growing gap between classes, has reinforced the view that the Supreme Leader lacks compassion for the downtrodden, who were the backbone of the revolution and reliable supporters of clerics. Even some clerics have expressed concerns about the detrimental effects of the growing marginalization of the poor and the youth due to these conservative economic and social policies, which are consistently supported by the Leader. Although historically conservatives favored a non-interventionist foreign policy, Khamene’i supports an active radical foreign policy, particularly in regard to the Middle East and global issues related to the Muslim world. He squarely blames imperialism for the current problems in the Middle East and calls for the eradication of external influences in the region. “No one will allow a bunch of thugs, lechers and outcasts from London, America and Moscow to rule over the Palestinians,” he said on a radio interview. 17 He openly supports the Palestinian struggle for their rights against Israel, and dismisses a negotiated solution as unproductive. “The New Palestinian generation has learned that struggle is the way to victory, not negotiation,” Khamene’i has said, referring to the deadlocked Middle East peace processes. 18 He often refers to Israel as a cancerous implant that must be destroyed,

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and calls for Palestinians, Muslims, Christians, and Jews to choose a government of their own with the exclusion of the immigrant Jews. He explicitly dismisses the claim that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is an internal Israeli matter, and states that this issue involves the whole of the Muslim world who should strive to return that piece of land to Muslim hands. 19 Khamene’i’s open pro-conservative stance on policy issues and intolerance of any meaningful reform has exacerbated the frictions between conservatives and reformers. While his support has assured the conservative domination of the governmental apparatus and implementation of the conservative policy agenda, it has unintentionally facilitated some unity and collaborative attitude among moderates and radicals who are increasingly marginalized from the system. In an unprecedented fashion, these moderates and radicals openly challenged Khamene’i and his decisions within the reformist Green Movement. Despite setbacks after the crackdown on the opposition in response to the popular uprising against the re-election of Ahmadinejad in 2009, if this trend continues it could indeed transform the role of the Leader in the future and open a new chapter in the nature of authority in the Islamic Republic. This chapter analyzed the theological and legal roots of the role of the Leader in the system and, as supported by those who subscribe to a monolithic view of authority, explained the dominance of this role in the Islamic Republic. As indicated earlier, proponents of pluralism in the system question both the theological and legal foundations of this role. Our brief survey in this chapter explained how the role of this position in the system has, so far, been subject to personal and professional qualities of its occupants. Khomeini’s charismatic qualities and political skills enabled him to rise above and manipulate factional disputes and to transcend even central Islamic precepts in discharging his duties. In contract, Khamene’i’s lack of charisma, political skills, and religious qualifications have enabled opponents of the Leader’s authoritarianism to even question the legitimacy of this role in the system. In chapter 6, we will extensively study governmental and nongovernmental institutions, processes, and policies. The dynamics of these institutions and their functions also affirm the ongoing disputes over the nature of authority in contemporary Iran. NOTES 1. For a detailed theoretical discussion of this doctrine, see: Tamadonfar, The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership, 109–112. 2. Article 5 of the original Constitution of the Islamic Republic. 3. Article 109 of the constitution. 4. Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 255. 5. Mehran Kamrava, The Political History of Modern Iran, From Tribalism to Theocracy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), 97.

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6. Ettela’at, February 3, 1987. 7. Ettela’at, April 1, 1988. 8. Ettela’at, December 31, 1987. 9. Ettela’at, August 10, 1988. 10. Ettela’at, June 12, 1989. 11. “A Brief Biography of the Life of His Eminence Ayatollah Khamene’i, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” accessed October 9, 2007, http//www.khamenei.ir/EN/Biography/ index.jsp. 12. Khamene’i has authored a number of books, including: Islamic Thoughts in the Quran, The Profundity of Prayers, A Discourse on Patience, Guardianship, Imam Al-Saadiq, Unity and Political Parties, Arts, Personal Views, Understanding Religion Properly, Struggles of Shi’a Imams, The Essence of God’s Unity, The Necessity of Returning to the Quran, Imam-AlSajjad, Imam Reza and his appointment as Crown Prince, and The Cultural Invasion and other collections of speeches. He also translated Peace Treaty of Imam Hassan (by Raazi al-yasseen), and Muslims in the Liberation Movement of India (by Abdulmunaim Nassri). 13. “A Brief Biography of the Life of His Eminence Ayatollah Khamene’i, the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” accessed October 9, 2007. http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p= bio. 14. Moslem, Factional Politics, 88. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. “Iran leader urges destruction of ‘cancerous’ Israel,” accessed October 9, 2007, http:// edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/12/15/mideast.iran.reut/. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid.

Chapter Six

The Governmental System Power Imbalances and Extraordinary Checks

Iranian political systems have always embodied both formal and informal power structures. Formal power structures are normally manifested in governmental and semi-governmental political roles and institutions. Informal power structures have generally emerged in the form of effective influence patterns exerted by known and well-connected individuals and loosely knit familial, ethnic, intellectual, and political groups that are active in the political system. This pattern of informal politics is reinforced by the presence of informal but frequent social gatherings (dowrehs) that ensure personal loyalties and commitments that extend to ideological affinities and coordinated political activism. The dynamics of governance in today’s Iran can be explained as an interlocking nexus of informal-formal power structures in the Islamic Republic. Both governmental and semi-governmental institutions, which are sanctioned by the constitution and laws, have formal roles in managing the system. However, there is an important network of individuals and institutions that play a significant role in all spheres of the society, even in the absence of officially sanctioned roles in the state. Wilfried Buchta refers to this informal power structure as the four “Rings of Power” that from the most to the least influential elements consist of the patriarchs; state foundations and administrators; regime’s security, revolutionary, and propaganda apparatus; and formerly influential groups and individuals. 1 The constitution sets forth the legal framework of formal power structure in the Islamic Republic. There is a vast gap, however, between this formal power structure that resides in the government and semi-governmental institutions and roles and the actual dynamics of influence exercised by informal centers of power in the country. The constitution explicitly limits govern189

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mental authority and guarantees citizens’ rights against governmental overreach. In practice, however, the government systematically undermines these rights and dominates every aspect of citizens’ lives in order to protect the interests of the ruling elites by claiming advocacy for Islam and communal interests. Ironically, the introduction to the constitution asserts that the government of the Islamic Republic does not reflect the interests of any individuals, groups, or classes, rather it “represents the fulfillment of the political ideals of a people who bear a common faith and common outlook, taking an organized form in order to initiate the process of intellectual and ideological evolution towards the final goal, i.e., movement towards Allah.” 2 To this end, the constitution contends, the government should be run on the basis of the Quran and sunnah by knowledgeable and righteous people who are committed to the establishment of a divine order. In search of this divine order and the attainment of man’s ultimate interest, the constitution asserts, the government must preserve the revolutionary and Islamic nature of the system and its policies both domestically and internationally. The revolutionary task of the government is to promote a single global community free from oppression, discrimination, and injustice. These goals may be attained through popular participation in all stages of decision-making process. As the constitution states, it is only with this form of public participation that the holy government can be realized on earth. 3 The foundational principles of the system, as spelled out in Article 2 of the constitution, officially guide the government and its policies. In general, these principles include the primacy of Islamic precepts; commitment to freedom, justice, and dignity of man; independence of the country and community; and reliance on scientific and artistic advancements in the service of the community. To achieve these objectives, the government must create a virtuous environment free from vice and corruption; enhance public awareness through reliance on mass media; provide for and expand free and accessible educational opportunities at all levels; encourage scientific, technological, cultural, and Islamic studies by establishing and funding research centers; facilitate freedom of expression and public participation in determining the course of the country’s social, economic, political, and cultural destiny; reject all forms of discriminations, despotisms, and foreign imperialistic influences; ensure the security and territorial integrity of the country by establishing universal conscription; attain self-sufficiency in important spheres of the society; and pursue a foreign policy on the basis of Islamic precepts and fraternal commitment to all Muslims and freedom fighters of the world (Article 3). Constitutionally, the governmental system is based upon a doctrine of separate and independent, but unequal, powers and a system of extraordinary checks. The three legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government are formally under the vali’s uncontested supervision. This supervisory role, along with the constitutionally sanctioned oversight by non-elected cler-

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ical institutions—particularly the Guardian Council—facilitate elite control of the government and renders any popular checks on the government and its functions meaningless. For all practical purposes, legally the constitution provides for a governmental system that could maintain despotic control over all facets of policies in the Islamic Republic. The formal independence of representative branches of the government has the potential to open up the political space, especially when they are controlled by opposing factions, and enable them to pursue alternative policies that reflect popular preferences and needs. However, in practice, the independence of the legislative and executive branches of the government is routinely undermined by conservative clerics who have dominated the judicial branch from the outset and rely on courts and other official and non-official law enforcement institutions to silence their opponents and maintain their control of the government. Furthermore, the steady rise of the Revolutionary Guards who have come to dominate the country’s economic, political, and social lives with the backing of conservative clerics has removed any semblance of democracy from the Iranian government. For this reason, it is not inaccurate to suggest that today’s Iran is run by a theocratic-authoritarian government that relies on an alliance between the establishment clerics and military-security apparatus. This trend is transforming the regime into a theocratic-military one that continues to justify itself and its policies on Islamic grounds and communal interests. However, this growing marginalization of Islamic precepts and republican dimensions of the constitution, along with governmental failures to meet the needs of the public, could conceivably undermine the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and strengthen anti-systemic oppositional politics in Iran. THE ISLAMIC CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MAJLES): HISTORY, ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND FACTIONAL POLITICS During the history of modern Iran, the parliament, which is commonly referred to as the Majles, has generally been regarded to be the primary democratic governmental institution, despite concerted and often successful efforts by regimes to undermine its autonomy. In the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution, the constitution established the parliament as a representative body to curb the autocratic tendencies of the monarchs. With the rise of civil society during the Mossadegh era, the parliament was again considered a vehicle for democratic development, which could effectively constrain the monarch’s powers. Similarly, with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, the revolutionaries believed that a strong parliament consisting of elected representatives of people would limit excessive executive powers and would reinforce the republican dimension of the Islamic Republic. For these reasons, the

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constitution and subsequent laws accounted for a strong legislative body with extensive oversight authority over the other branches of the government. Initially, the conservative clerical establishment supported a strong parliament in order to dominate the government through this major center of power and to counter the radical and moderate non-clerical forces who had gained control of the executive branch during the early post-revolutionary years. 4 Although the constitution empowered the parliament by granting it extensive oversight functions, in practice factional schisms have shaped the extent of parliamentary influence in the decision-making process. Generally, the parliament tends to exercise greater power and influence in the system when conservatives dominate the chamber. In the Islamic Republic, the parliament is officially named the Islamic Consultative Council. Chapter VI of the constitution covers the general principles regarding membership, organizational features, procedures, and scope of the jurisdiction of the parliament. The subsequent laws and regulations provided greater details and specificity in these areas. According to the constitution, the parliament is a representative body consisting of deputies elected directly by secret ballots cast by the populace on the basis of a multiseat constituency system for a four-year term (Articles 62, 63). Parliamentary elections may be suspended in times of war and military occupation for a specified period of time if proposed by the president, endorsed by the Guardian Council, and approved by three-fourths of the total members of the parliament. In this case, the existing parliament will continue to function until a new parliament is seated subsequent to elections (Article 68). The number of deputies may increase due to demographic, political, and geographic considerations, but this increase may not exceed 20 percent of the membership for each decade from the date of the initial constitutional referendum (section 1 of Article 64). 5 Representation by religious minorities is based on a quota system that allows one representative each for Jews and Zoroastrians, one each for the Armenian Christians residing in the north and in the south of the country, and one for Assyrian and Chaldean Christians collectively (section 2 of Article 64). Since 1980, parliamentary elections have been held every four years between late March and early May. According to the election law, with the prior consent of the Guardian Council, the Ministry of the Interior sets the exact date of the elections. Candidates for parliamentary elections are required to register with the election board. The board refers the names of the registered candidates to the screening committee, which is set up by the Guardian Council and is tasked with checking the candidates’ credentials and determining their eligibility to run. Those who are approved by the committee can prepare for campaigning. The law requires that the disqualified candidates and the election board be notified of the committee’s disqualification decisions two weeks before the elections to allow for appeals. There have

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been many reports of delays in notifications as well as complaints that the notifications lacked any explanations as to the reasons for disqualifications. Even a number of sitting parliamentarians have been disqualified from running for reelection. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, commissions in each constituency initially investigated the candidates’ eligibility. Supervisory councils, then, examined grievances of the disqualified candidates and endorsed or reversed the decisions of the commissions based on the evidence offered by the grieving disqualified candidates. 6 The final decisions on disqualifications, however, rest with the Guardian Council which, under the law, is obligated to communicate the legal reasons for disqualifications to the candidates in writing. To win a parliamentary seat, a candidate should secure at least 25 percent of the popular votes in the first stage of the elections. If no candidate receives the required votes, there will be a runoff election, which requires the majority of votes to win the seat. After each election, the parliament is considered in session if at least twothirds of its members are accredited and seated (Article 65). 7 The membership may adopt a code of procedure with a two-thirds majority. This code establishes the leadership and organizational structures of the parliament, accounts for committee leaderships and memberships, specifies the jurisdictional issues, and provides guidelines for discussions and decision-making procedures and requirements (Article 66). 8 As shown in chart 6.1 (see appendix), currently the parliament is composed of a leadership structure consisting of a Speaker and a Presiding Board and a committee system with jurisdictions on a wide array of policy issues. The constitution calls for open, well-documented, and publicized parliamentary deliberations and decisions (Article 69). According to the same article, at the request of the president or one of the ministers or ten members of the parliament, the parliament may deliberate and legislate in closed sessions under emergency conditions. Any legislation passed in a closed session requires a positive vote of three-fourths of the present members in the presence of the Guardian Council. The minutes of deliberations and decisions made at the closed sessions must be made public as soon as the emergency conditions have passed. Parliamentary deputies are constitutionally accountable to the entire nation and have the freedom to express their views on all domestic and external affairs of the country (Article 84). To ensure their free speech and their right to cast their votes freely, the constitution accounts for the deputies’ immunities from arrest and prosecution in discharging their duties (Article 86). In the interest of coordination and to facilitate parliamentary oversight, the president, his deputies, and members of the cabinet and their advisors may attend parliamentary sessions. Members of the cabinet may also be summoned before the parliament and their statements may be heard (Article 70).

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Section 2 of chapter VI of the constitution enumerates the legislative, investigative, oversight, and treaty confirmation functions of the parliament. Although in Islam the law is divinely ordained and the parliament in the Islamic Republic is formally a “consultative” body tasked with “finding” the ordained laws, the Iranian parliament is a true legislative body empowered by the regime’s assertion of legal territorialism. Since the constitution and laws basically insist that only codified laws are valid in the Islamic Republic, the parliament is not a mere finder of the laws, rather it is an effective and functioning legislative body. The parliament can enact laws on all matters within its jurisdiction, as specified in the constitution (Article 71). These laws, however, must be examined and endorsed by the Guardian Council to ensure they are consistent with Islam and the constitution (Article 72). As discussed earlier, the policy paralysis caused by the Guardian Council’s dogmatic interpretations and factional proclivities resulted in the creation of the Expediency Council whose main responsibility is to reconcile Islamic precepts with communal and regime interests (Article 112). The parliament may not delegate its legislative powers to an individual or non-parliamentary committees or institutions. Within the limitations of Article 72, parliamentary committees may adopt certain laws that can be implemented tentatively, as specified by the parliament, pending the normal parliamentary approval. The parliament may also delegate its decision-making authority to relevant committees responsible for permanent approval of articles of association of organizations, companies, government institutions, or organizations affiliated with the government. Any such approvals must meet the substantive and procedural requirements spelled out in article 96 of the constitution that accounts for compliance with Islam and the laws of the country (Article 85). The normal legislative process includes bill initiation, committee deliberations and recommendations, and parliamentary debate and voting. Bills may be proposed either by the government with the approval of the cabinet or by parliamentary deputies (must be co-sponsored by at least fifteen members) (Article 74). Appropriation bills that are proposed by deputies may not entail reductions of governmental revenues or increases in governmental expenditures, unless these bills account for remedies for revenue reductions and expenditure increases. The parliament is legally entitled to exercise important checks on the other two branches of the government by examining and investigating all the affairs of the country (Article 76). As a legislative check on the executive branch, the president is obligated to seek confirmation of his Council of Ministers, after its formation and prior to any official conduct of governmental business. Furthermore, the president may seek a parliamentary vote of confidence for the council on important and controversial matters (Article 87). In these cases, the parliament may reject the president’s nominees for the cabinet and may cast votes of no confidence pertaining to specific policy

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issues. In practice, and largely due to factional schisms over personalities and policy issues, the parliament has often rejected proposed cabinet members and has objected to the council’s policy preferences. The constitution spells out the scope of legislative interpellation of the executive officials. One quarter of the members of the parliament may pose questions to the president, or any one member may question any minister on subjects related to their duties. These executive officials are required to appear before the parliament (within a month for the president and ten days for ministers, unless the parliament deems the excuses for delays reasonable) and answer the legislators’ questions (Article 88). Interpellations of the Council of Ministers or an individual minister may be tabled if it is formally requested by ten deputies. Within ten days of the tabling, the ministers must appear before the parliament, answer questions, and seek a vote of confidence. Failure to attend and respond in a timely manner may result in a vote of no confidence against the council. In the absence of a vote of confidence after questioning, the Council of Ministers or the minister subject to interpellation is dismissed. Ministers who are dismissed or who have received a vote of no confidence are prohibited from joining the cabinet formed immediately thereafter (Article 89, section 1). One-third of the deputies may interpellate the president concerning his duties as the chief executive officer of the country. He must appear before the parliament and respond to the questions. If two-thirds of the deputies cast a vote of no confidence for the president after hearing his responses, the issue is communicated to the vali to pursue the dismissal of the president in accordance with section 10 of Article 110 of the constitution (Article 89, section 2). In addition to personnel oversight, legislative checks over the executive branch include: approval of the annual national budget set forth by the executive branch (Article 52); confirmation of foreign treaties, contracts, and agreements (Article 77); approval of governmental decisions to impose restrictions during wars and emergencies (Article 79); 9 approval of changes in the country’s boundaries, when constitutionally permissible, with a fourfifths vote of the total members of the parliament; 10 approval of governmental domestic and foreign loans or grants-in-aid (Article 80); 11 approval of employment of foreign experts when such employment is necessary (Article 82); and approval of transfer of any non-irreplaceable properties of national heritage (Article 83). The parliamentary checks over the judiciary are primarily in the form of legislation that is binding upon the courts in their judgments. Judges are required to adjudicate all cases in accordance with the codified laws and, in the absence of relevant statutes, they are expected to rely on authoritative Islamic sources or authentic fatwa in rendering their judgments (Article 167). Furthermore, it is the parliament that interprets the laws, even though the courts may engage in legal interpretation in the course of adjudication (Arti-

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cle 73). The parliamentary role in personnel matters related to the judiciary is limited to the confirmation and questioning of the Minister of Justice, whose main responsibility is to manage the relationship between the judiciary and the other two branches of the government (Article 160, section 1). Clearly, given the dominant role of the Head of the Judiciary, as the main judicial officer of the state, the role of the Justice Minister is primarily administrative and non-judicial. The legislature may also hear and investigate any petitions of complaints against any governmental entities. Complaints against the parliament may be investigated by the body and responded to within a reasonable time. The parliament must demand timely investigations of and responses to complaints filed against the other two branches. In cases where the subject of the complaint is of public interest, the reply must be made public (Article 90). Earlier in this book, we discussed factionalism in the Islamic Republic. Throughout its existence, the parliament has been the main battleground of factional disputes among radicals, moderates, and conservatives. These schisms have had significant institutional and policy implications for the state and the public. Historically speaking, shifts in the ideological and factional makeups of the parliament have resulted in five parliamentary phases of influence in the Islamic Republic’s governmental system: • In the early post-revolutionary years, radicals dominated the parliament and, despite intense challenges by conservatives and their allies on the Guardian Council, were able to marginalize conservatives and their policy agenda and, with Khomeini’s support, successfully pushed their radical policy agenda forward. • Khomeini’s death and the rise of Khamene’i, an advocate of the conservative establishment, limited radicals’ parliamentary successes, increased the role of the executive power vis-à-vis the parliament, and thus adversely impacted the influence of the parliament in the system. The gradual rise of conservatives in the parliament, largely due to the electoral disqualifications of other viable candidates by the Guardian Council, ultimately marginalized radicals in the chamber. • The subsequent alliance of the rightist factions and their electoral successes in the parliamentary elections resulted in the conservative domination of the parliament, which in turn heightened the influence of the parliament in the system. • The breakup of the rightist coalition caused electoral woes for conservatives in the 1996 parliamentary elections. The emergence of a pragmaticreformist coalition along with the rise of Khatami to the presidency limited the conservative influence in the parliament. As expected, to maintain their influence, conservatives relied on other governmental (particularly

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the judiciary) and semi-governmental institutions to undermine the influence of the parliament. • Recently, the effective marginalization of moderates and reformers through electoral disqualifications, dominance of conservatives in all three branches of the government, and conservatives’ growing ties to the Islamic Republican Guards have reinvigorated the parliament, which continues to effectively push the conservative agenda forward. These ideological and factional schisms have resulted in frequent and heated debates in the parliament over policy issues as well as personnel matters. In particular, since Khomeini’s death in 1989, the parliament has relied on its oversight functions to control the executive branch, especially when it was dominated by reformists, by challenging executive appointments and blocking policy initiatives. For instance, during President Rafsanjani’s second term, the parliament effectively blocked or watered down his economic measures. On numerous occasions, the parliament has forced ministers out by questioning their personal qualities or policies. For instance, in 1984, the parliament impeached Abdollah Nuri, the Minister of the Interior in the Khatami administration. Neither the reformist nor conservative administrations have been immune from the parliamentarians’ efforts to rein in the executive branch. It was Khamene’i’s intervention that blocked the deputies from impeaching Ahmadinejad himself. While the parliament maintains and exercises these checks over the other branches, its own power is marginally controlled when it is dominated by conservatives and supported by the Leader. It is generally understood that Article 63 of the constitution prohibits the dissolution of the parliament since it reads “[parliamentary] Elections for each term must take place before the end of the preceding term, so that the country is never without an Assembly.” Furthermore, misconduct of the members is formally investigated by the body itself and members’ legal immunities normally protect them against legal proceedings, unless their commitment to Islam or support for the Islamic system is questioned. THE PRESIDENCY AND ITS EVOLUTION The first executive authority under the Islamic Republic was a Provisional Government 12 headed by Mehdi Bazargan (1907–1995), who was appointed by Khomeini as the first prime minister in 1979 shortly after the revolution. Bazargan was a religio-political thinker, a political activist, and a capable technocrat with impeccable reputation and credentials dating back to his involvement in the National Front and Mossadegh’s government. He was born to a traditional family with strong Shi’a convictions and ties to the

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progressive clerical establishment. Bazargan rejected the dogmatism of reactionary traditionalist clerics and underscored the need for modernity and the advantages of scientificity. As a trained engineer and professor, he praised and encouraged modern sciences and rejected claims of their incompatibility with the Islamic worldview. Furthermore, he dismissed secularism and believed that Islam does provide meaningful solutions to contemporary social, economic, and political problems of Muslim societies. 13 In line with his Shi’a thinking, his politics embraced the ideals of social justice and rights including workers’ rights, political democracy, and national independence. He was even convinced that the establishment of an egalitarian Islamic system does not require a violent revolutionary transformation and could be accomplished through moderation, tolerance, and active participation of clerics in the social, economic, and political life of the country. Bazargan did indeed underestimate the enormity and complexity of the socioeconomic and political problems of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods in Iran. Despite his impressive political experience during the Mossadegh era and his skillful and unrelenting opposition to the Pahlavi regime, Bazargan naively misread Khomeini’s true intentions about the nature of authority in post-revolutionary Iran, his unwavering dedication to clerical rule above all else, and his distrust of and dislike for a republican form of authority founded upon popular input and support. As it later became abundantly clear, Khomeini’s early democratic pronouncements and support for republican principles were largely a well-calculated strategy to allow clerics to build the necessary institutional and legal framework for their rule and consolidate their power. During his short and tumultuous premiership that lasted for only nine months, Bazargan did succeed in establishing a cabinet, helping with the passage of the original constitution, enacting some liberal policies, and undertaking measures to address some pressing foreign policy problems. However, he soon realized that he could not effectively govern in the face of challenges by clerics and their militant supporters as well as a broad spectrum of other political opponents both on the right and the left. The initial challenges to governmental authority came from local-level revolutionary organizations which were organized and controlled by clerics. In the chaotic revolutionary environment, when the power of the monarchy was waning, zealot religious revolutionaries created a network of neighborhood organizations called the Komiteh. There organizations, which were usually attached to local mosques and controlled by local clerics, began enforcing Islamic laws and tried to ensure order by arresting, trying, and punishing those who challenged their authority. To the dismay of Bazargan and the Provisional Government, these actions were generally sanctioned by the Revolutionary Council, a body formed by Khomeini in 1979 to oversee the transition from monarchy to an Islamic Republic. Supported by the Council, these organizations were reluctant to give up their power and challenged the Provisional Government and

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its efforts to centralize power and solidify its role. In fact, the controversy over the role of these local organizations lasted for some time, as some local clerics insisted on the decentralization of power in post-revolutionary Iran to bolster revolutionary organizations and ensure lasting popular support for the revolution. In addition to these local challenges, the government also faced opposition for its moderate and accommodating approach and policies, in particular for favoring a negotiated solution to the problems with the United States and rapprochement to the West. Initially, Khomeini supported Bazargan and his early attempts at negotiating the removal of the Bakhtiar government, the last prime minister installed by the shah prior to his departure from Iran, and his search for a negotiated solution to disputes with the United State. However, he later withdrew support from the prime minister under clerical pressure and in response to the left’s opposition to any negotiation with the United States and support for anti-imperialist policies. In the midst of these schisms, Khomeini and his close confidants successfully built an institutional framework that gradually took over most governmental functions, ensured clerical domination, and marginalized Bazargan and the secular elements in the Provisional Government. Khomeini’s harsh and uncompromising reaction to the shah’s medical treatment in the United States prompted the hostage situation, whereby students attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took American diplomats as hostages in contravention of international law. The ensuing crisis forced Bazargan’s resignation and provided Khomeini and clerics with an opportunity to consolidate their power further. By most accounts, Bazargan’s failures and the fall of the Provisional Government were essentially due to the clerics’ push for their uncontested authority in the Islamic Republic. Dual Executive and Policy Paralysis The original constitution of the Islamic Republic, which was adopted in 1979, created a dual executive consisting of a popularly elected president as the official, but largely ceremonial, head of the state and an appointed prime minister who was effectively in charge of the government. While the president appointed the prime minister, he was constrained by parliamentary preferences in the choice of the head of the government and ministers. More important, the prime minister acted independently from the president in his decisions and was mainly accountable to the parliament and the vali. Evidently, this decentralized setup was intended to prevent presidential supremacy and any meaningful challenges to the powers of the vali as well as the parliament as the institutional base of clerical power in the Islamic Republic. 14 However, in practice, personal rivalries and intense ideological and policy disputes between the presidents and prime ministers not only fostered factional schisms but also caused policy paralysis. Sustained conflicts be-

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tween President Bani Sadr and his conservative prime minister, Mohammad Ali Raja’i, and President Khamene’i and his left-oriented prime minister, Mir-Hossein Musavi, typified this chaotic and unsettling dynamic within the executive branch. Ultimately, Khomeini had to react to this schism and paralysis by opting for a unitary and centralized organizational arrangement in the executive branch. In calling for the establishment of the Assembly for the Reappraisal of the Constitution, he explicitly questioned the existence of parallel systems and emphasized the need for order and administrative discipline in the executive branch. 15 The Reappraisal Assembly was, therefore, tasked with centralizing the regime in order to achieve a degree of order in the governmental structure. Consequently, among other institutional reforms, the revised constitution did away with the office of the prime minister and established an effective presidency to lead the executive branch of the government. The Legal Framework of a Presidential System Chapter IX of the revised constitution deals with the structures, responsibilities and rights, and general procedures of the three components of the executive power: the presidency (section 1), the bureaucracy (section 2), and the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (section 3). The president is the highest governmental official in the country with the primary responsibility for leading the executive branch and ensuring the implementation of the constitution and laws, except in matters that are the direct responsibility of the Leader (Article 113). These responsibilities generally cover social and economic policies, but presidential powers in foreign and security policies are relatively limited due to the expansive powers of the Supreme Leader in these areas. As mentioned earlier, the constitution details the qualifications of the president, procedures for his election, his functions, and his accountability to state institutions and the public. According to the constitution (Article 115), the president must be elected from “religious and political personalities” of Iranian origin and nationality who lack adverse past record, possess “administrative capacity and resourcefulness,” are trustworthy and pious, believe in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic, and subscribe to the “official madhab [Twelever Shi’ism] of the country.” While some of these requirements, such as Iranian origin and nationality, piety, good past record, and administrative capacity are to be expected, others seem to be exclusionary and controversial. According to this article, for instance, those who subscribe to any other religion or even to Sunni Islam and those who question such principles as the doctrine of vilayat-e-faqih, which has even been challenged by some of the highest-ranking clerics on theological grounds, are ineligible to run for the presidency. Also, women’s candidacy for the presi-

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dency has been consistently rejected on the ground of their inability to meet the rejal requirement of Article 115. While this requirement could be broadly defined as “any person,” the prevailing clerical interpretation is that only “men” meet this requirement and could become the president. This narrow interpretation is shaped by the traditional clerical views of gender roles that limit women’s participation in public life. It is no surprise that the Guardian Council has consistently disqualified female candidates in presidential elections. The president is to be popularly elected for a four-year term, and can run for a successive term once (Article 114). While the constitution calls for the adoption of legislative measures for presidential elections, it signifies the importance of the office by establishing specific electoral guidelines for this office. Candidates for this office must officially declare their candidacy (Article 116). As stipulated in Article 99, the Guardian Council is responsible for the supervision of the election of the president (Article 118). 16 Presidential elections must be held no later than one month before the end of the term of the outgoing president. The outgoing president is expected to perform his presidential duties during the interim period before the swearing in of the new president (Article 119). Presidential elections may be postponed for two weeks, if a qualified candidate dies within ten days before the polling day. There will be a similar postponement if one of the candidates who have secured the greatest number of votes dies in the interim period between the first and second rounds of voting (Article 120). To win the presidency, a candidate must secure an absolute majority in the first round of voting. If no candidate receives the necessary majority on the first ballot, a runoff election is held on the Friday of the following week with the participation of the top two vote-getters on the first ballot. If any of these two candidates withdraws from the contest, the final choice on the second ballot will be between the remaining top two candidates (Article 117). The successful candidate is required to take an oath of office before the parliament in the presence of the head of the judiciary and members of the Guardian Council. In this oath, he is required to attest to his commitment to guarding the official religion of the country, the Islamic Republican system, and the constitution. In asserting the republican nature of the system, the constitution also requires that he acknowledges the people’s role in his choice and to commit himself to the preservation of their rights and the interests of the country (Article 121). In numerous articles, the constitution spells out the president’s legislative and executive functions. In light of the judicial role of the Leader, the president lacks any meaningful judicial responsibilities such as granting of pardons. The president’s legislative responsibilities include signing of the bills approved by the legislature or any referendum approved by the public in accordance with the laws. He must forward such signed legislations to responsible authorities for implementation (Article 123). As the chief execu-

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tive officer of the state, the president is responsible for the implementation of the laws and domestic and foreign policies, and exercises extensive appointive powers. Furthermore, he is responsible for national planning and budget and state employment affairs (Article 126). In practice, he plays an extraordinary role in drafting and implementing the national economic policies. The president also chairs the National Security Council (shuray-e amniyyat-e melli), an influential council consisting of twelve permanent members that coordinates the government’s activities in national security, defense, intelligence, and foreign policy areas. After obtaining the approval of the parliament, the president or his legal representatives have the authority to sign foreign treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements between the Iranian government and other governments or international organizations (Article 125). He also influences cultural and educational policies through his appointive power to the Supreme Council of the Islamic Cultural Revolution (shura-ye ali-e enghelab-e farhangi-e Eslami) and his ability to shape these policies at the implementation level. The president does have extensive appointive powers. In addition to the nomination of ministers for parliamentary approval, the president may appoint presidential deputies to assist him with performing his constitutional duties. The first deputy to the president shall be responsible for administering the Council of Ministers and coordinating the functions of other presidential deputies (Article 124). Additionally, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, the president may appoint special representatives with specific duties. These representatives act on behalf of the president and the Council of Ministers and their decisions are as enforceable as those of the president and the council (Article 127). Upon the recommendations of the foreign minister, the president may appoint Iranian ambassadors to foreign countries and international organizations and receive the credentials presented by foreign ambassadors (Article 128). The ceremonial functions of the president include the awarding of the state decorations (Article 129) and official representation of Iran as the head of the state. In case of resignation, the president must continue performing his duties until his resignation is approved by the Supreme Leader (Article 130). An interim president may be appointed by the Leader in cases of resignation, dismissal, death, long absence, illness, or normal termination of the outgoing president’s term without a successor having been elected for more than two months. Normally, the president’s first deputy may assume the powers and functions of the president in these circumstances. The Leader may appoint another person to this role, if there is no first deputy or the deputy is incapable of performing presidential duties. A council consisting of the Speaker of the parliament, head of the judiciary, and the first deputy to the president are tasked to arrange for a new president to be elected within fifty days of the appointment of an interim president (Article 131). During the interim period, the parliament may not interpellate the ministers nor can it cast a vote of no

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confidence against the executive branch. Additionally, during the interim period, no steps may be undertaken to review the constitution or to hold a national referendum (Article 132). Headed by the president, the bureaucracy consists of a number of departments (referred to as ministries) that are established by law and led by individual ministers nominated by the president and confirmed by and accountable to the parliament. These ministries are primarily responsible for the implementation of the laws and policies dealing with foreign policy issues, service provisions, resource management and conservation, system maintenance and security, and group accommodation (chart 6.2; see appendix). The law determines the number of these ministries and their respective jurisdictions (Article 133). The president supervises the functions of these ministries through his leadership of the Council of Ministers. This council coordinates governmental decisions and ensures compliance with the laws and general directions of the regime’s policies. Additionally, the council’s approval is required for the settlement or arbitration of claims relating to public or state property, which in important cases also requires the approval of the parliament (Article 139). Under the direction of the president, decisions of the council on interagency conflicts and discrepancies are binding as long as such decisions do not call for “an interpretation of or modification in the laws” (Article 134). Ministers are individually responsible for their own decisions as department heads and are collectively accountable to the president and the parliament for the decisions of the Council of Ministers (Article 137). Individual ministers and the council may frame coherent and consistent procedures for the implementation of decisions as long as such procedures do not violate the spirit of the laws (Article 138, section 1). Some of the executive decisions may be entrusted to ministerial commissions authorized to make binding decisions with the approval of the president and in line with the laws (Article 138, section 2). To ensure that executive regulations and decisions of these commissions comply with the laws, they must be brought to the attention of the Speaker of the parliament in case he seeks reconsideration by the Council of Ministers, if he believes that these regulations may be inconsistent with the laws (Article 138, Section 3). The constitution treats the regular military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) as components of the executive branch with distinct lines of authority and varied jurisdictions. As indicated in chart 6.4 (see appendix), however, the Leader has direct control over the armed forces and presidential authority is indirect and secondary. The task of the regular military is to guard “the independence and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the order of the Islamic Republic” (Article 143). As we will discuss later in this book, the IRGC is to be maintained “so that it may continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements.” The laws should determine the scope of the responsibilities of the armed forces, including the

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IRGC and the regular military, and the relationships of the armed forces must reflect “brotherly cooperation and harmony”(Article 150). Members of the armed and security forces are expected to be Iranian citizens 17 committed to and working toward the realization of the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and the regime. As the constitution asserts, the Iranian Army is an Islamic army, meaning that it is committed to Islamic ideology and people (Article 144). The constitution also charges the government with providing military training for citizens and accounting for necessary facilities for a civil defense system, in accordance with Islamic criteria “in such a way that all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Article 151). The constitution justifies this civilian defense strategy on the Quranic grounds designed to ensure the preservation of the religion and community. 18 To these ends, in times of peace, the armed forces may also be used for relief operations, educational and productive goals, and “the Construction Jihad” in line with Islamic criteria (Article 147). The constitution explicitly bans any foreign involvement in the Iranian military and security apparatus and policies not only by banning the recruitment of foreigners into the military but also by forbidding the establishment of any foreign military bases and operations in Iran, even for peaceful purposes (Article 146). To guard against tyranny and corruption, the constitution accounts for checks on the executive power by empowering the Leader, the parliament, and the courts to oversee the functions of the president, the bureaucracy, and the armed forces. According to Article 122, the president, within the limits of the powers and duties granted to him by the constitution and laws, is responsible to the people, the Leader, and the parliament. In order to prevent concentration of power in the hands of a few in the executive branch, the incompatibility clause in the constitution (Article 141) prohibits the executive leaders and government employees from holding more than one position in the government or any other publicly funded (partially or in full) institution, membership in the parliament, practicing as an attorney or legal advisor, and holding posts of managing director or board member of any private company (with the exception of cooperative companies affiliated with government departments or institutions). 19 As evident in the controversy over the 2009 presidential elections, the Leader exercises extensive supervisory role over the president not only in determining the eligibility of the candidates who stand for presidential elections but also the official appointment of the successful candidate, especially in highly contested races and controversial election outcomes. Through his aides and advisors, the Leader oversees the directions of executive decisions that are not under his direct control and authority. Parliamentary oversight generally falls into two categories: personnel confirmation and vote of confidence. All top-level executive officials are formally nominated by the president and must be confirmed by the parlia-

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ment before being sworn into the office. For instance, all ministers and presidential deputies must be approved by the parliament (Article 133). The parliament has frequently and effectively relied on its confirmation power to ensure executive compliance with parliamentary wishes by rejecting presidential nominees or dismissing ministers who have exhibited a degree of independence and have at times undermined the intent of the parliament in law, or have shown disdain for parliamentary oversight, or have ideologically differed from the parliamentary majority. Ministers are not only accountable to the president but also to the parliament individually and collectively for their conduct in the office. Ministers may be dismissed, or given votes of noconfidence, by the parliament as a result of their interpellation (Article 135). The constitution allows the president to appoint a caretaker minister in case of dismissal of a minister for a period of three months (Article 135). If a minister is dismissed by the parliament, the president is required to obtain confirmation for his/her replacement from the parliament. If half of the members of the Council of Ministers are dismissed after votes of no confidence by the parliament, the government must seek a new vote of confidence from the parliament (Article 136). There is no judicial immunity recognized for the president, his deputies, and ministers. The president and ministers may be investigated in common courts of justice with the knowledge of the parliament (Article 140). Additionally, the head of the judiciary is tasked with investigating the assets of the president, his deputies, ministers, and their spouses and offspring before and after their terms of office “in order to ensure they have not increased in a fashion contrary to the law” (Article 142). The Presidents and Their Policies The first presidential election was held in 1980 under the original constitution that accounted for a dual executive consisting of a titular president and an effective prime minister. In this election, Khomeini opposed the candidacy and election of clerics to this position in order to project an image of inclusiveness, to court the support of those who opposed clerical domination of the state apparatus, and to sidestep the possibility of elevating any specific cleric to a position that could potentially challenge his own supreme authority. With Khomeini’s support, Abolhassan Bani Sadr (1933– ) received nearly 76 percent (10.7 out of a little over 14 million votes cast) 20 of the popular vote, despite strong opposition by clerics, especially those affiliated with the IRP. The Bani Sadr Presidency (1980–1981) Like Bazargan, Bani Sadr (1933– )was born to a religious family with strong Islamist convictions. His future political activism and extensive writings

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were rooted in his personal upbringing in a family of clerics and his educational opportunities and endeavors. In Iran, he studied theology and sociology and, like many Iranian students of the 1960s with similar religious backgrounds and proclivities, became convinced that the Iranian regime and its secular and pro-Western policies were misguided. He, thus, joined the student opposition movement and participated in the anti-regime uprising in 1963 that resulted in his arrest and exile. In exile in France, he studied economics and finance while continuing with his oppositionist activities throughout the 1960s and 1970s. There, he became a leader of the student opposition movement abroad and supported Khomeini’s anti-regime activities and calls for the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and establishment of an Islamic system. Bani Sadr’s extensive writings—which in some cases are theoretically incoherent and contradictory and fail to provide practical solutions to the contemporary social, economic, and political problems in Iran— attempt to expose the structural flaws of the Pahlavi regime. By relying on a synthesis of Shi’a and socialist economic interpretations, he tried to build an economic and political theory of authority for post-revolutionary Iran. In line with the classical Islamic argument for God’s ultimate sovereignty, in his book entitled: The Economics of Unity (tawhid), he argues for God’s ultimate ownership of all things, and rejects Man’s ownership for being repressive and undesirable. Desirable economic relationship is between Man and God rather than Man and Man, he argues. He, thus, concludes that capitalism is an undesirable economic system since it inevitably leads to economic and political dependencies and causes global inequity and repression. Furthermore, Bani Sadr rejects “man-made” ideologies including nationalism and Marxism for their failure to rely on spirituality and for their contribution to divisiveness. Divine ideology, in contrast, ensures harmony, a sense of community, and liberty. It is only God that can free Man from Man’s authoritarian and repressive relationships, Bani Sadr concludes. In supporting an Islamic system, he suggests that this system cannot be authoritarian since it is founded upon universal laws and human nature. Similar to Shari’ati and Bazargan, he does not equate Islamic rule with clerical domination. Indeed, he is openly critical of clerical authoritarianism and considers disregard for human rights to be anti-Islamic. Bani Sadr’s association with Khomeini and his support for an Islamic system were instrumental in his early rise to power in post-revolutionary Iran. With the success of the revolution, he was briefly appointed as the deputy economy and finance minister and acting foreign minister in 1979. From 1979 to 1980, he served as the finance minister. When elected to the presidency, he initially enjoyed both popular and Khomeini’s support and, given his role as the head of the armed forces and the Supreme Defense Council, he had a great deal of institutional power to pursue his domestic and international agendas. He was, however, confronted with similar institutional

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and ideological impediments that undermined Bazargan’s Provisional Government. Ironically, Bani Sadr had previously favored institutional decentralization and had opposed Bazargan’s efforts to centralize the power of the Provisional Government. As the president, he supported a strong presidency, as he witnessed the growing powers of the parliament and revolutionary organizations. Clerics had every intention to limit presidential powers, as long as the presidency was controlled by moderate non-clerics, and to seek control of the executive branch. Clerics were already in charge of the judiciary. Moreover, the newly elected parliament was dominated by clerics, since the majority of its members belonged to the IRP and nearly half were clerics themselves. They chose one of the IRP founders, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as the parliamentary Speaker who opposed the president’s agenda. In challenging the president, the parliament rejected Bani Sadr’s initial nominees for the prime and cabinet ministers. Bani Sadr was finally forced to nominate the IRP’s favorite candidate, Mohammad Ali Raja’i, for the post of the prime minister from a pre-approved list prepared by a parliamentary committee. The conservative Raja’i’s close ties to the IRP, his subservience to the wishes of the parliament and his clerical allies, and his relentless opposition to the president’s policies paralyzed the executive branch and enabled the IRP to exert similar influence in this branch of the government, as it did in the other two branches. Bani Sadr’s presidency was short-lived since he was removed from the office by Khomeini in 1981, after clashes between the president and the IRPled clerics and sustained efforts by clerics to outset him. Thus, he failed to accomplish much in domestic and foreign policy arenas. As a Shi’a thinker with socialist proclivities, Bani Sadr was committed to social justice and advocated for a form of Islamic social democracy that entailed extensive governmental regulation and nationalization of industries, policies that endeared him to the left of the political spectrum. However, he antagonized the left and moderates when he failed to support, largely under pressure from conservative clerics, the growing popular demands for political space and openness. In response to intense ideological debates on university campuses and calls for political rights, he agreed to a Cultural Revolution aimed at cleansing universities from “subversive” elements. Naively, he believed that he could control the tide of clerical authoritarianism in the Cultural Revolution, a policy that resulted in the expulsion of students, firing of professors, and closure of campuses. The Cultural Revolution was a major blow to the country’s intellectual and cultural life 21 and resulted in brain drain as many educated and professional Iranians left the country. Bani Sadr also failed in addressing the two major foreign policy issues facing his administration: the U.S. hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war. The hostage crisis had not only caused Iran’s international isolation but also raised the likelihood of U.S. intervention and coup against the regime. Bani

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Sadr worked tirelessly to resolve this dispute through negotiations. He developed a plan, which was supported by the United States, to establish a U.N. commission to investigate the two countries’ disputes over financial matters, hostages, the plight of the shah, and Iran’s right to self-determination and non-intervention by the United States. Pressed by clerics, Khomeini opposed Bani Sadr’s efforts and indicated that the disputes and hostage situation can only be resolved by the new parliament. Led by the IRP, in concert with the Raja’i government, the parliamentarians finally approved a framework for the settlement agreed upon in Algeria, which was favorable to the United States and did not address Iran’s original demands, even though the parliamentary Speaker hailed it as a victory for Iran. Bani Sadr criticized this settlement and the complicity of the Raja’i government in the IRP-orchestrated efforts against his administration’s approach to the hostage crisis. In response, the parliamentary Speaker, Rafsanjani, openly accused the president and the opposition of having ties to the United States and attempting to subvert the Islamic regime. 22 Clerics also mobilized their supporters, including the Hezbollahis, and attacked Bani Sadr’s rallies, closed his newspaper, and called for his arrest and removal from the office. Bani Sadr’s bigger foreign policy challenge was the Iran-Iraq war that ultimately lasted for a decade and took unprecedented human and financial toll on the country’s resources. This war was rooted in personal animosity on the part of Khomeini toward Saddam Hossein, the Iraqi regime’s repressive policies toward the Shi’i majority in Iraq, ideological distrust of and dislike for Islamism on the part of Saddam and for Ba’athism on Khomeini’s part, Iraq’s historical claims over the mostly Arab-inhabited oil-rich province of Khuzistan in the southwestern part of Iran, historical sectarian schisms between the Shi’a Iran and the Sunni regime in Iraq, Iraq’s economic claims, and a series of mutual miscalculations. When sent to exile for his opposition to and personal attacks on the shah, Khomeini ultimately settled in the city of Najaf and, with support from the Iraqi government, continued opposing the Iranian regime. The Saddam government supported the Iranian opposition in Iraq in response to Iran’s advocacy for the Iraqi Kurdish movement seeking autonomy from the Iraqi central government and for the historical disputes over the border status in Arvand rood (Arabs refer to this river as Shatt-alArab), the river separating the two countries. In 1975, after extensive negotiations, the two countries signed the Algiers Agreement that resolved the border dispute in such a manner that enabled the two countries to use the river for navigational purposes. 23 Although Saddam was not satisfied with the Algiers Agreement and continued with his territorial claims, he agreed to withdraw support for, and silence, opponents of the Iranian regime in Iraq. The Iranian government, in turn, terminated its support for the Kurdish movement, a move that allowed Saddam to repress the Kurdish opposition violently and consolidate his power in northern Iraq. Following this rap-

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prochement, Saddam also targeted the Shi’a clerics in Najaf, especially Khomeini and his family, and the Shi’i population in the south. Khomeini opposed these policies, and his criticism of Saddam took a characteristically personal tone. As an Islamist, he also vehemently disagreed with the Ba’athist regime for its secular orientation, nationalistic proclamations, and socialist policies. As the leader of the revolution and later the founder of the Islamic Republic, he continued with his criticisms of the Iraqi regime and of Saddam personally and, along with the revolutionary clerics, called for the exportation of the Islamic revolution to Muslim lands and the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad. Saddam, who had never truly accepted the terms of the Algiers agreement and continued to insist that the province of Khuzistan is an “Arab Homeland,” took advantage of the weakness of the central government in Tehran and, by claiming Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, invaded Iran on September 22, 1980. Both sides made significant miscalculations in their approach to and conduct of the war. Iraqis hopelessly counted on support from the Khuzistani Arabs and underestimated the unifying impact of Iranian nationalism when reinforced by the Shi’a sectarian worldview, a dynamic ideological mix that enabled the Iranian regime to mobilize all segments of the population—even those who opposed clerics and the Islamic regime—against Saddam and the war. The Iranian expectation that the sectarian Shi’a identity would encourage the Shi’i community in Iraq to set aside their Iraqi loyalty and support Iran in the course of the war did not materialize either. The conduct of the war became a major bone of contention between Bani Sadr and the IRP. As the commander of the regular military forces, Bani Sadr supported relying on the regular military to counter the Iraqi aggression. The IRP was fearful that a successful performance by the regular military would strengthen Bani Sadr and his allies and undermine the clerical influence in the postwar era. Thus, they favored the use of “human waves” by relying on young and old volunteer Basijis and Revolutionary Guards rather than the regular military. This strategy that counted on the religious sentiments of the less well-to-do and less educated populace had an enormous human cost resulting in thousands of deaths and injuries. Politically, however, this strategy and the war’s final outcome empowered clerics and their militias, and helped marginalize secular elements in the Iranian political system. Today, these militias and the Revolutionary Guards are the institutional backbone of the regime and ensure the continuity of Iran’s theocratic–authoritarian system. By 1981, the schisms between Bani Sadr, the IRP, and the Raja’i government reached an apex causing violent confrontations over major policy issues including the hostage crisis, conduct of the war, budgetary issues, and human rights violations. The parliament began impeachment proceedings against the

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president, and a number of judges and prosecutors called on Khomeini to remove Bani Sadr for causing disunity, undermining revolutionary organizations, and failing to discharge of his duties. Khomeini withdrew his support from the embattled president, even before the parliament impeached him, 24 after Bani Sadr criticized Khomeini’s leadership and unwillingness to curb the outspoken clerics. Khomeini exercised his constitutional power and dismissed Bani Sadr on June 21, 1981. Bani Sadr went into hiding, joined forces with the Mojahedin-e Khalq, and called for uprising against the regime. Accompanied by the Mojahedin leader, he later escaped to France and, with his blessing, the Mojahedin began a violent wave of bombings and assassinations that killed and injured scores of the top leadership of the regime in 1981. The Raja’i Presidency (July 24–August 30, 1981) As stipulated in the original constitution, Bani Sadr was replaced by a sixmember Provisional Presidential Council responsible for discharging the presidential duties until the next presidential election. Prime Minister Raja’i was appointed to this council and sought the presidency in the upcoming presidential election. Raja’i (1933–1981) was born and raised in the provincial town of Ghazvin and after a brief teaching career attended Tehran’s Teachers Training College (Daneshkadeh-e Tarbiat-e Moallem) and received a degree in education in 1959. He was arrested in 1974 for anti-regime political activism and imprisoned for four years. He supported Khomeini and the clerics in the revolutionary process, and was appointed as the Minister of Education in Bazargan’s Provisional Government, a position which he held until his appointment as the prime minister by Bani Sadr on August 12, 1980. Given Raja’i’s ties to the IRP and his inclination to support the clerical agenda—particularly the Cultural Revolution—Bani Sadr was understandably not keen on Raja’i, but was left with no choice but to appoint him to the position. As the presidential candidate of the IRP, Raja’i received 87.69 percent of the popular vote (12.9 out of 14.7 million votes cast) 25 and was appointed to the office on August 15, 1981. The Raja’i administration did not survive long as the president, his Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar, and some of the top leaders of the government and the IRP were assassinated on August 30, 1981, when the Mojahedin bombed a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council. The regime reacted violently to the armed struggle by the Mojahedin by allowing the Hezbollahis, local militias, and the Revolutionary Guards to undertake a reign of terror that lasted until late 1982. In the name of the Islamic Revolution and interest of the republic, the regime began purging government employees with questionable loyalty to the regime, invading homes and workplaces in search of opponents, and violating peoples’ privacy

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by eavesdropping on phone conversations and by reading private mails. Thousands of people, including the Mojahedin and their supporters, were arrested, tortured, and executed without much due process during this period. 26 Due to the public uproar, this reign of terror officially ended with Khomeini’s eight-point decree in December 1982. The decree forbade any forcible entry of homes and businesses, arrests and detentions without proper judicial orders, property appropriation without court authorization, and any forms of spying on private individuals. The courts were instructed to ensure citizens’ due process rights, as spelled out in the constitution. Special Councils were to be established to investigate all complaints about court violations of individual rights. The direct results of this reign of terror were the transformation of oppositional politics inside Iran and consolidation of the elites’ authoritarian powers. Ever since, the acceptable oppositional politics in the Islamic Republic has been a form of monolithic system-loyal dissent limited to narrow policy and ideological disagreements. In this repressive political atmosphere, people are denied any rights to genuine dissent even within the constitutional framework of the country. However, anti-systemic opposition, although limited in scope and effectiveness, is carried out abroad by Iranians with wide-ranging ideological affinities and policy preferences. Bani Sadr and a growing number of the opponents of the regime continue to criticize Khomeini and the clerical regime for their betrayal of the people’s revolution, incompetence, and authoritarianism. 27 Furthermore, as the reign of terror effectively contained acts of violence, despite sporadic bombings and assassination attempts, the regime’s sense of urgency for its survival subsided and the elites concentrated on consolidating their power by strengthening governmental institutions, containing militias’ excesses, conducting elections, and adopting policies to address the pressing problems. The Khamene’i Presidency (1982–1989) Raja’i was succeeded by Khamene’i, who was initially elected in the presidential election of 1982 with 95.19 percent of the popular vote. 28 He served a second term until his selection as the Supreme Leader when Khomeini died in 1989. As discussed earlier, Khamene’i had served in numerous executive, legislative, and religious capacities since the beginning of the republic and, as a founding member of the IRP, continued to exert a great deal of influence in the conservative elite circles and state institutions. He was indeed a consummate partisan who consistently advocated for clerical domination of the system and adoption of conservative policies favored by conservative clerics and their allies in the bazaar. He vehemently supported the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and favored restrictive social policies. His economic views underscored the sanctity of private property and limited state interven-

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tion in the economic life of the country. He favored an uncompromising radical foreign policy, in particular toward the United States, an orientation that is evident even today in his insistence on the continuation of Iran’s nuclear policy despite tremendous pressures from outside and economic costs of the boycotts. Khamene’i’s divisive presidential tenure was marred by his personal and ideological rivalry with Prime Minister Mir Hossein Musavi, and by his relentless opposition to government’s policies. During his first term, he initially nominated conservative Ali Akbar Velayati as the prime minister. The left-dominated parliament rejected this nomination by questioning Velayati’s competence and his conservative ideological inclinations. 29 Instead, the parliamentary majority favored the appointment of the Islamic leftist Musavi, who was finally appointed by Khamene’i under Khomeini’s pressure. Khamene’i and his IRP allies in the parliament oftentimes criticized and undermined the prime minister and his policy initiatives, and accused the left of using revolutionary rhetoric for political purposes. The conflict between the two was so ferocious that Khamene’i did not want to re-nominate Musavi for the prime ministership after being re-elected to the presidency. 30 He even suggested that the president should not be constrained by parliamentary wishes in the appointment of the prime minister. Furthermore, in an attempt to limit the prime minister’s powers, Khamene’i and his conservative cohorts began calling for a strong presidential system since, in their view, in parliamentary systems the president is ineffective in resolving problems. During the deliberations for constitutional revisions, Khamene’i himself suggested “The interest of the regime calls for a strong director who is surely elected by popular mandate of the people.” 31 Understandably, the moderates and the left, who controlled the parliament, questioned the merit of a strong presidency for its divisiveness and autocratic potentials and favored a parliamentary system of government. Of course, as discussed earlier, these factions reversed their positions on this significant issue as their electoral fortunes changed in the post-Khomeini era. Musavi (1942– ) was one of the ardent supporters of Khomeini and a prominent leader of the left within the IRP. He, along with the Islamic leftist factions, advocated for extensive powers for Khomeini, supported revolutionary organizations in order to keep the revolutionary spirits alive, called for extensive redistributive economic policies in support of the poor, favored tolerant social policies, and pushed for radical foreign policies including the exportation of the revolution. Musavi served as foreign minister and, in 1981, he was appointed as the prime minister by Khamene’i, a position he held until the dissolution of the office under the revised constitution of 1989. Khomeini’s support and the backing of the left-dominated parliament were instrumental in Musavi’s ability to launch extensive economic initiatives. Khamene’i and Musavi sharply disagreed on economic principles and

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strategies. Thus, the prime minister’s statist economic policies were opposed by the president and his conservative allies. Their disputes reflected the ideological gap between conservatives who favored market economy and the interest of the bazaaris and the left that supported a centralized state-dominated economy in the interest of the dispossessed. Like many leftist parliamentarians and even some moderate clerics, Musavi criticized the abusive and immoral conduct of the bazaaris who were making huge profits by hoarding goods and engaging in black marketeering. 32 Throughout Musavi’s prime ministership, the parliament supported government’s statist economic initiatives and passed various pieces of legislation designed to curb the excesses of the market and to facilitate greater economic equity by allowing governmental regulation and supervision, redistribution of resources, and even nationalization of certain industries. In its shift from market incentives and move toward governmental control, the Musavi government controlled domestic prices, set wages, imposed high taxes on the rich, subjected imports to governmental allocations, tightly regulated the establishment and functioning of domestic enterprises, artificially overvalued foreign exchange rates, restricted foreign investments, and subsidized and rationed nearly all foodstuffs. The government even considered private foundations as government’s arm for advancing its redistributive policies. For instance, Musavi supported the independence of the Foundation of the Disinherited and allowed the expansion of its activities in the social and economic life of the country. He even dismissed criticisms of the Foundation of the Disinherited, 33 for being corrupt and inattentive to the plight of the poor, as the ruling elites collectively sat idle while the foundation built an enormous wealth by expanding its activities into major areas of the country’s economy. These initiatives faced major obstacles as the Guardian Council, which has always been the institutional power base of the conservative elites, opposed such legislation on either constitutional or Islamic grounds. For instance, as conservative parliamentarians failed to stop the passage of the land reform law of 1981, the Guardian Council rejected this controversial legislation by arguing that it is anti-Islamic, since it undermines the Quranic assertion of the sanctity of private property by redistributing land among poor landless farmers. 34 The Guardian Council took a similar stance on the parliamentary bill aimed at nationalizing foreign trade. Supported by the left, the parliament passed this bill in 1982 with the intent of centralizing the economy and empowering the state by granting a monopoly power to the commerce ministry over foreign trade. Since the bill would undermine the bazaar, conservatives opposed it. Although the bill was explicitly consistent with Article 44 of the constitution, 35 the Guardian Council opposed it for being unnecessary and un-Islamic. This persistent opposition not only intensified factional schisms among the elites but also exacerbated the institution-

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al frictions between the left-dominated parliament and the conservative Guardian Council, causing a debilitating policy paralysis. As discussed earlier, Khomeini tried to stay above these infightings to ensure his own uncontested authority by prohibiting any faction to gain dominance in the system. In doing so, he alternatively favored factions on various issues. Despite his theocratic support for private property, Khomeini had an affinity toward the downtrodden and clearly understood their role in the revolutionary process and their political power in post-revolutionary Iran. He, thus, supported the Musavi government’s economic policies and rebuked conservatives for their criticisms and obstruction. In support of the government, he even issued unprecedented fatwas underscoring the authority of the state in adopting laws and policies in the interest of the community, even in explicit violation of Islamic principles. 36 In 1987, when President Khamene’i tried to limit government’s authority by suggesting that Khomeini’s decrees still bound the state to “the parameters of holy injunctions,” Khomeini directly criticized the president for misunderstanding his decrees, and argued for greater governmental authority. Khomeini’s stance clearly emboldened the left and the government, but by no means ended the conservative obstruction. Ultimately, Khomeini was left with little choice but to invoke the doctrine of maslahat and help establish the Expediency Council in order to build an institutional mechanism for curbing the Guardian Council’s obstructionist insistence on the enforcement of Islamic principles, and to push forward with the parliamentary legislative initiatives in the economic realm. As expected, the Musavi government’s economic policies did not succeed in light of the strenuous conservative opposition and resistance by the private sector, particularly the bazaaris, fluctuations in the price of oil that limited governmental resources, and the absence of foreign investment. These policies caused economic stagnation, resulted in soaring inflation, and produced intolerable levels of unemployment. These economic problems exposed the government and the left to major criticisms of their economic policies, and renewed the calls for market orientation. The next president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, capitalized on these criticisms and reversed course on the decade-long statist economic policies by opting for market orientation. The Rafsanjani Presidency (1989–1997) Khomeini’s death in 1989 and the prompt selection of Khamene’i as the Supreme Leader made Rafsanjani the obvious choice for the president in the new presidential system. Rafsanjani has undoubtedly been the most enduring and fascinating personality in Iranian politics since the revolution. While his supporters encourage his self-ascribed paternalistic image as the savior of the republic, his detractors view him to be single-minded and idiosyncratic. 37 He is routinely labeled as “pragmatic” or “opportunistic” by friends and foes

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respectively for his lack of ideological conviction and willingness to switch sides on even core principles and policies. His survivalist mind-set and style have allowed him to align with conservatives and advocate for conservative social and radical foreign policies, when necessary, and to dismiss these very positions and embrace moderate social and foreign policies, if required. 38 As evident in his defeats in the parliamentary election of 2000 and his presidential bid in 2005, these unprincipled and transparently opportunistic reorientations along with his unexplainable massive personal wealth 39 have undermined his personal and political credibility among the public, even though he continues to exert an enormous political influence in the system to date as the chairman of the Expediency Council. Born to a farming family in the central city of Rafsanjan in 1943, Rafsanjani studied theology in Qom under Khomeini’s tutelage. However, he has never been distinguished for his religious scholarship and appeal as a theologian. While he has authored a few books, none provides an indication of his theological sophistication. His most important work, Amir Kabir: The Hero of Fight Against Imperialism, is simply a political manifesto praising his favorite nineteenth-century Iranian prime minister, Amir Kabir, and devoid of any meaningful theological value. As a theology student, he became Khomeini’s follower and joined his oppositional activism as early as the 1960s. In the 1970s, he joined the Islamic student movement in opposition to the regime, gained Khomeini’s trust and became his aide, and was imprisoned several times. As a major revolutionary figure, he was appointed to a key position on the Revolutionary Council at the beginning of the republic. In 1980, he was elected to the parliament and served as the Speaker from 1980 to 1989 when he spearheaded the efforts to institutionalize clerical domination of the system and to orchestrate the conservative opposition in the parliament to the government’s leftist agenda. In the last year of the war with Iraq, he was appointed by Khomeini as the commander-in-chief of the Iranian armed forces, an influential position that enabled him to push for the acceptance of the UN resolution which ended the war in 1988. In 1989 he was overwhelmingly elected president (with 94.51 percent of the popular vote) in a virtually uncontested election, and was reelected to the office in 1993 with 62.86 percent of the popular vote. 40 Interestingly, he was the first president of the republic to serve two full terms, despite questions about his leadership style and the viability and merits of his policies. As the president, Rafsanjani was mainly preoccupied with “stabilizing” the regime by pursuing a two-pronged strategy: political institutionalization and economic development through privatization and market orientation. His approach to economic development necessitated moderation in social policies and rapprochement to the rest of the world, in particular to the West. In his view, development (towse-eh) required abandoning revolutionary rhetoric and embracing a rational-formal approach to authority and decision-making.

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He, thus, surrounded himself with technocrats who were committed to building the necessary institutions and processes and undertaking policies that were designed to ensure regime stability. Much of Rafsanjani’s policies were, however, undermined by factional schisms, particularly when he refused to stand steadfast on these policies and principles and abandoned them when pressure intensified. Rafsanjani and his technocrats paid a great deal of attention to economic reform, since they believed in the detrimental effects of poor economic performance. 41 As the leader of the moderate-right or pragmatists, Rafsanjani opposed the Islamic-leftist statist economic policies and favored market orientation and participation in the global economy. Pragmatists, thus, called for the privatization of industries, limited governmental intervention in the market, and foreign investment by allowing partial foreign ownership of industries and by borrowing from international financial institutions, even if it meant agreeing to their restrictive economic guidelines and demands. As Ray Takeyh astutely observes, under Rafsanjani, “The Islamic Republic would no longer seek to challenge the prevailing international norms but would participate in the global economy.” 42 As expected, these economic measures were challenged by both the left and the conservative right on ideological and pragmatic grounds. From the left’s perspective, these measures would abandon the revolutionary objective of creating an inclusive and egalitarian society by abandoning the poor. Privatization, in their view, would only benefit the bazaar and the well-to-do segments of the population, since it would allow “the mercantile bourgeoisie to participate in capital accumulation relatively unfettered by the state.” 43 However, even the bazaar was not satisfied with Rafsanjani’s approach because his policies relied on rational economic principles that underscored the need for building modern industrial infrastructures, reliance on the rule of law, a modern and effective taxation system, integration into the global market, and political transparency and accountability. These goals and strategies were diametrically opposed to the traditional practices in the bazaar and would undermine the interests of traditional merchants. As supporters of the bazaar, conservatives believed in the sanctity of private property which implied “empowering the bazaar and its opaque economic arrangements and not creating a modern economy integrated in global markets.” 44 Thus, they too opposed Rafsanjani’s initiatives. Moreover, conservatives dismissed these policies because they facilitated the “Western Cultural Onslaught” by allowing foreign investment and ownership of domestic industries. In addition to these factional criticisms, the Rafsanjani government’s economic measures suffered from structural and practical limitations. The government needed private investment to denationalize and privatize the industry. An unstable social and political environment did not encourage domestic and foreign investments, however. Additionally, high governmental

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subsidies and unstable fluctuations in the price of oil forced governmental borrowing that resulted in high debt burden, causing inflationary trends that lowered the standard of living of middle-class and poor Iranians. In the final analysis, the Rafsanjani administration did not successfully liberalize Iran’s economy, despite some successes in denationalization, and conversely widened the gap between the rich and the poor 45 and caused huge debt burden. This poor economic performance created backlash by an impatient public against Rafsanjani’s developmental strategy and forced the next administration to reexamine and reassess these policies. Rafsanjani’s social and foreign policies were largely shaped by the imperatives of his developmental strategy. Despite periodic assertions about his commitment to democracy, Rafsanjani was more interested in regime stability than political openness and pluralist development. Like the Islamic left, he supported moderate and non-intrusive social policies. In his government’s view, dogmatic social policies that marginalize the more educated and younger generation of Iranians and result in the continued brain drain would deprive the country from the required skilled human resources and prevent successful economic modernization. Therefore, he called for social and political openness and invited the educated Iranian diaspora to return and partake in the country’s development. Conservatives were suspicious of these efforts and opposed setting aside Islamic cultural values and norms for economic imperatives. The Leader and his conservative cohorts openly attacked Rafsanjani’s moderation on social policies for being anti-Islamic. The ultimate goal of the revolution and the regime, in the conservative right’s view, was to create and maintain a society committed to the rigorous implementation of Islamic principles. There has indeed been a transformation in Rafsanjani’s foreign policy stances since the early days of the republic. In the 1980s, as a dominant figure in the IRP and the clerical establishment and later as the Speaker of the parliament, Rafsanjani was in lockstep with Khomeini and those clerics who supported the exportation of the revolution and such radical foreign policies as confrontation with the United States and Israel. He opposed Bani Sadr’s efforts to resolve the conflict with the United States within a UN-sponsored framework, although he spearheaded the Algiers Agreement, which he claimed to be more beneficial to the interests of Iran. Following Khomeini’s line, he also called for a confrontational stance against Israel. He even wrote a book, titled: Esra’il va Qods-e Aziz (Israel and the Dear Jerusalem), in which he suggested that resistance to Israel and its expansionist policies is a religious obligation for all Muslims. He also opposed Bani Sadr’s Iraq war strategy and his initiatives to end the war, mainly in an effort to consolidate the power of the clerical establishment and to marginalize non-clerical elites. Like other clerics, he also viewed the Iraqi invasion of Iran as an attack on Islam and the Islamic Republic, ruled out any peaceful settlement with Iraq,

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and was convinced of Iran’s ultimate victory because it embodied virtuous Islamic values. He played a pivotal role in shaping the “human wave” strategy which empowered clerics and their militias. However, as the war’s tremendous toll resulted in vociferous popular opposition, the pragmatist Rafsanjani began advocating for the end to military operations in 1988. As the president, Rafsanjani believed that economic development and liberalization requires greater regional engagement and rapprochement with the West, in particular with the United States. Thus, he took advantage of Saddam’s defeat in the first Gulf War and his forced eviction from Kuwait and called for greater regional economic and security cooperation. This was also intended to roll back the United States’ growing political and military presence in the region, which was partly due to the conservative Arab leaders’ fear of Iran’s growing regional influence and search for protection against aggression. To no one’s surprise, conservative Sheikhdoms were not keen on a regional security arrangement led by the Islamic Republic, and Rafsanjani’s initiatives did not stop the United States’ growing influence. Rafsanjani’s efforts to improve relations with the West were also unsuccessful. Iran’s relations with Europe were strained due to the ongoing conflict over the Rushdie affair 46 and state-sponsored assassinations of dozens of Iranian opposition leaders in Europe. In 1997, German authorities indirectly implicated Iranian leaders, including Rafsanjani and Khamene’i, in the assassinations of a prominent leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and his aides in 1992, and cut off diplomatic and trade relations with Iran. 47 Iran was not, however, totally isolated from Europe since other European countries maintained their economic ties to the Rafsanjani government. Efforts at normalizing relations with the United States were also unsuccessful. Rafsanjani’s search for rapprochement with the United States dated back to the hostage crisis in the early 1980s. Unlike the extremists on the right and the left who favored a confrontational stance against the United States, Rafsanjani had often stressed the need for removing Iran from isolation if the country were to take advantage of global markets for its economic development. 48 He was in fact a party to the Iran-Contra Affair, 49 which had nearly caused his political demise. The political atmosphere of Iran in the 1980s did not lend to any meaningful rapprochement with the United States and, as the Iran-Contra Affair was exposed, extremists across the political spectrum called for investigation and punishment of those who had sought relationship with the United States. Khomeini saved the moderates’, in particular Rafsanjani’s, political life by suggesting that schisms are contrary to Islam and by ending the calls for investigation. As the president, Rafsanjani continued making the case for ties to the West, but he was cautious and backtracked on this position when faced with opposition from the conservative right and Khamene’i.

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Despite greater moderation and openness, even today, as Takeyh indicates, the ghost of the Iran-Contra Affair continues to overshadow any meaningful attempts at rapprochement between the two countries. 50 In Iran, Khamene’i’s unbending attitude, the conservative right’s relentless opposition, and the Revolutionary Guards’ confrontational stance make it difficult for moderates to openly seek normalized relations with the United States. The slow pace of recent nuclear negotiations and Iran’s direct but cautious contacts with the United States about regional issues, including the war in Afghanistan and the future of Iraq with the rise of the Sunni extremists and regional dangers posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), underscore the domestic challenges to closer ties with the United States. The Irancontra Affair also made American policy makers suspicious of moderate and pragmatic leaders in Iran to the extent that they showed very little inclination to pursue a meaningful dialogue with President Khatami, a moderate who embraced a “dialogue of civilizations” and sought opportunities to build relations with the West. Rafsanjani was constitutionally barred from running for the presidency after his second term ended in 1997. However, there was a growing suspicion that he and his supporters were trying to gauge the public opinion about the possibility of his return to the presidency for a third term in contravention of the constitution. The overwhelmingly negative public reaction to this possibility, and the establishment’s fear of irreversible damage to the system in case of another constitutional revision, ended the rumors and vacated the presidency for new personalities. Since his departure from the office of the president, Rafsanjani has continued to exercise immense influence as the head of the Expediency Council, but has been unsuccessful in his bids to seek elected office. As indicated earlier, he lost in the parliamentary elections in 2000 and the presidential election in 2005. He was also disqualified from running in the 2013 presidential election by the Guardian Council. During these elections, he was criticized for his failed policies that are considered by the public as self-serving and unprincipled. In the 2005 presidential elections, for instance, he was criticized for his politically motivated support of the war with Iraq that caused massive damage to the country, and for his unwillingness to end the war in 1982 when the opportunity presented itself. His muted and seemingly survivalist reaction to the disputed presidential election of 2009 and crackdowns on the demonstrators have further eroded his political and personal credibility. The Khatami Presidency (1997–2005) and the Reform Movement An informed study of the Khatami presidency requires an analysis of the nature and scope of the Reform Movement, since this movement played a pivotal role in the rise of Khatami to power and the shaping of some of his

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policy decisions. In turn, Khatami was instrumental in the growth and empowerment of this movement and their relatively important, though shortlived, political gains. The story of the Reform Movement is the tale of sound ideals and commitments, remarkable personal and professional sacrifices, strategic blunders, and lost opportunities. It was the enthusiastic support of this movement that facilitated Khatami’s electoral success and helped with his policy accomplishments, although these accomplishments were sporadic and piecemeal. This movement consisted of a demographically diverse but ideologically cohesive group who shared in the overall aims of reform even though they disagreed on the details and strategies. The movement, which flourished and gained momentum during the 1980s and 1990s, mainly consisted of intellectuals (both clerical and secular), students, middle-class professionals, and the print media. Khatami’s outspoken advocacy for political education of the public and freedom of the press and speech especially offered students and the media a new space for political activism. College students in Iran have always played a significant role in the Iranian body politic. Their influence is largely due to their “organic relationship” 51 with, and their self-ascribed role as the “political conscience” of, the broader society. Generally, having been admitted to universities regardless of their economic and social status, many students identify with average Iranians and embrace an anti-elitist and anti-establishment worldview. This attitude is no less present in their opposition to today’s clerical authoritarianism of the Islamic Republic than it was manifest in their struggles against the monarchs’ despotism during the ancien régime. Similarly, even during the harshest periods of political repression, Iranian print media has played a pivotal role in public political education and mobilization. The quantitative and qualitative growth of print media during Khatami’s ministerial role in the 1980s ensured similar, if not unprecedented, opportunities for the media compared to the vibrant days of civil society of the early 1950s. Reformers rejected the patrimonialism and authoritarianism of the system and, as Ali Ansari sums up, opted for a fundamental transformation of the system by underscoring the necessity of legal-rationalism as a pre-requisite for economic, social, and political development; the institutionalization of civil society as a requirement for political and economic development and growth; the empowerment of the Majles as the representative body in the governmental system; encouragement and consolidation of popular input in the political process; marginalization of patrimonial proclivities and depersonalization of power through economic (capitalist) and political institutionalization; decentralization of power by granting greater voice in decisionmaking to the provincial and local governments; embracing a dynamic view (puya) of Islam and Islamic law amenable to democratic development; economic pluralism aimed at greater economic justice through industrialization

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and integration into global economy; and integration into the global community on the basis of equitable and dignified relations with the outside world. 52 The absence of Rafsanjani from the field of presidential candidates in 1997 created a political vacuum on the left and center-right and, at the outset, made the conservative-right’s candidate—the parliamentary Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri—the most likely winner of the presidential election. NateqNuri was a seasoned parliamentarian and a long-time ardent supporter of the traditional elements and the bazaar, thus he was openly despised by both pragmatists and the left. However, he and his conservative allies were so convinced of their eventual victory that they began acting as if they had already won the presidency, and became complacent during the campaign. At the outset of the campaign, Khatami was not considered to be a serious challenger to Nateq-Nuri. 53 In fact, conservatives viewed him as a political lightweight with limited administrative capabilities and experience and lacking in political sophistication and savvy to effectively maneuver through the complex web of the Iranian factional politics. To them, his candidacy was simply an opportunity to draw people to the ballot box and project an image of democracy in the Islamic Republic without jeopardizing the election of their candidate. Soon it became apparent that they had miscalculated. While there were four candidates 54 on the ballot, in Nateq-Nuri and Seyyed Mohammad Khatami the voters were offered two distinct candidates in terms of both style and substance. During the campaign, Nateq-Nuri was preachy in the old reactionary clerical style, behaved as if he was entitled, was devoid of substance and vision, and appeared uncaring for the plight of the downtrodden. In contrast, Khatami had a populist style that underscored his accessibility to the public and his keen understanding of the issues of average citizens. 55 As the New York Times writer Elaine Sciolino observed: “He did not just charm me, he charmed the whole country—and that is why he was elected in 1997 in that stunning victory. . . . He is a man who went on public buses. He’s the kind of baby-kissing politician we’re used to in the United States.” 56 For a cleric, he was noticeably thoughtful and tolerant. He offered explanations and solutions for the global and Iran’s problems in a language that reflected his expansive understanding of both Islamic and Western philosophies, histories, and civilizations. He, in fact, seemed to be a refreshing and reassuring alternative for those who sought change as the only solution to Iran’s socio-political and economic problems. In the final analysis, it was Nateq-Nuri’s shortcomings, Rafsanjani’s support for a dynamic left-center alliance, and the emergence of Khatami as a capable, thoughtful, and dedicated candidate with an impressive ability to connect to and mobilize various segments of the population—particularly women, the youth, and students— that caused Nateq-Nuri’s defeat and the election of Khatami to the presidency. For reformists, Khatami’s election was an enormous accomplishment and

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a monumental but a sparse and relatively short-lived step in their struggle to gain control of the institutions of power in Iran. 57 Khatami was born in 1943 in the provincial city of Ardakan to a respected clerical family with a solid reputation for philanthropy and dedication to Islamic education. While he followed his clerical father’s footsteps by pursuing theological education at the Qom Theological Seminary in the early 1960s, he also received secular education by studying philosophy at Isfahan and Tehran universities, where he respectively received BA and MA degrees in the early 1970s. 58 Afterward, he returned to the Qom seminary and continued his education in Islamic theology and philosophy under a host of prominent ayatollahs including Mohammad Reza Golpayegani and Hossein Ali Montazeri. This exposure to both Western and Islamic thoughts and civilizations has undoubtedly shaped Khatami’s social, economic, and political views that are largely reflective of the ideas of such Western and Islamic thinkers as Hegel, Habermas, Abdol Karim Soroush, and Hojattoleslam Morteza Motahhari, who was one of the most influential theoreticians of the Islamic revolution in Iran. These views are well-articulated in his books and articles that cover a wide range of topics about leadership, politics, development, and religion and include: To Whom Does Velayat Belong?; Traditionalism, Modernism and Development; Fear of the Wave; From the World of the City to the City of the World; and Faith and Thought Trapped by Despotism. At Isfahan University in the early1970s, Khatami joined the Association of Muslim Students, befriended Khomeini’s son Ahmad, and supported the clerical opposition to the regime by organizing religious and political debates. Shortly after the revolution, he was appointed the director of the Islamic Center in Hamburg, Germany. Beginning in 1980, he held a number of political and cultural positions including the first parliamentary representative of Ardakan and Meibod, Khomeini’s representative to the Kayhan publishing group, and Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance in the Musavi government, a position that he held until 1992 in the Rafsanjani administration. Despite opposition from conservatives, under Khomeini’s protection, Khatami advocated for press freedom and supported oppositionist publications including newspapers, journals, and books during his tenure as the culture minister. During the Iran-Iraq war, he served in other capacities including the deputy and head of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces and the Chairman of the War Propaganda Headquarters. After Khomeini’s death, and under pressure from conservatives, he resigned from his ministerial role in the Rafsanjani administration in 1992, but was appointed as the cultural advisor to the president and the head of Iran’s National Library. Khatami was elected president in 1997 by receiving nearly 70 percent of the popular vote in an election with an exceptionally high voter turnout, 59 and was re-elected to the position in 2001 by a greater percentage (almost 78 percent) 60 despite

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decline in voter turnout due to the public’s disappointment with the slow pace of reform. 61 In these elections, Khatami was able to capture support among a broad segment of the population from various regions of the country, including some of the theological centers. 62 Early in Khatami’s presidency it became evident that he was not the revolutionary that some reformers had hoped for, and differed from many reformers on the scope, strategies, and pace of change. Khatami was a cautious gradualist with an unambiguous commitment to moderation, since he rejected any revolutionary transformation of the system and its policies. While he embraced the central premises of the reformist agenda, he was after all a follower of Khomeini and a believer in his doctrine of leadership and political legacy and fearful of the conservative opposition to a meaningful political change. His choice of a moderate cabinet that garnered the support of various parliamentary factions, was an early indication of his cautious approach and his unwillingness to openly confront conservative opposition to the reform agenda. To reaffirm his commitment to the Islamic Republic and counter conservative opposition to his piecemeal reforms, he even suggested that his moderate reform policies intend to return the country to the original aims of the revolution, which many reformers supported, 63 and should be judged as effective instruments for the preservation of the Islamic Republic. Khatami saw an organic link between domestic and foreign policies, as well as within the domestic political, social, and economic realms. Thus, in his view, successful domestic policy initiatives did require a major shift in Iran’s foreign policies aimed at improving the country’s global image and role. Furthermore, meaningful economic development, he contended, necessitated political and social reforms that allow for greater social equity and political pluralism by encouraging civil society and ensuring greater political freedoms. Khatami inherited a troubled economy despite Rafsanjani’s unfounded claims to impressive economic accomplishments. Rafsanjani’s towse’eh policy of privatization, which helped only a small and well-to-do segment of the population, along with the inevitable devaluation of the currency in response to the decline in oil prices and governmental over-expenditure, had exacerbated inequities among the public. As the wealthy elites, their bazaari allies, and the establishment foundations accumulated immense wealth, high inflation and rising unemployment undercut the public’s standard of living. Furthermore, failure to achieve meaningful economic growth and subsequent significant setbacks in various industrial projects, caused by the absence of necessary private domestic and foreign investments mainly due to regulative and political constraints, exacerbated these inequities. Although Khatami was criticized for his failure to pay prompt attention to socioeconomic problems, 64 and even inaccurately for the absence of a coherent and consistent economic agenda, 65 he understood the shortcomings of Rafsanjani’s towse’eh policy.

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However, to the dismay of many reformists and his supporters, the cautious Khatami initially intended to avoid an open confrontation with the former president and his mercantile supporters by not criticizing their policies. Later, in line with the reformist agenda, he enumerated the ills of the economy, moved away from this policy for accentuating disparities, and called for economic restructuring in the interest of economic growth and social justice. Economic restructuring, according to Khatami, could be accomplished through modern market liberalization (in reality, selective privatization) by shifting toward industrial capitalism, domestic and foreign investment growth, diversification, deregulation and bureaucratic decentralization, and formalization/modernization of economic practices. Economic liberalization required limiting governmental regulations as well as rationalization of the private-sector practices. “A free market was therefore defined not simply in relation to the government but also, crucially, in relation to the commercial groups which had come to dominate the economy and influence its practices.” 66 Khatami believed that in addition to limiting regulations, this form of modern economic liberalization required shrinking the public sector, reforming the tax system by relying on income tax and moving away from a rentier state dependent on oil revenues to fund the government, and modernizing/formalizing economic practices which respectively meant challenging the entitlements, bureaucratic controls and a well-entrenched patronage system, and traditional merchants who were accustomed to opaque economic practices. These strategies, in the reformers’ view, were essential for attracting necessary foreign and domestic investments that would help economic growth through job creation which, in turn, would reduce inequities and enhance social justice. 67 In advancing his economic policy, Khatami backed a five-year plan for 2000–2004, which was mainly devoted to promoting selective privatization, rule of law and rationalization of the economy especially reform in the taxation system, expansion of the non-oil exports, deregulation, economic diversification, and attraction of private domestic and foreign investments. Overall, Khatami’s economic policies were not successful and did not adequately address limited growth and inequity concerns. He had some successes in privatization particularly in the banking system, took some steps in reforming the tax system and forcing some of the untaxed to pay their share, made some minor inroads in export diversification, and succeeded in liberalizing exchange rates and brought them in line with international market rates, thus achieving a unified single exchange rate in 2002. 68 Attracting foreign (especially Western) investments in industrial and oil sectors, however, required major foreign policy shifts that were impossible to undertake, largely due to the adverse political climate caused by factional schisms. In a sharp contrast to conservatives, reformers generally agreed that such foreign policy initiatives in order to attract diverse foreign (including U.S.) investors would be in the national interest of the country. 69

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Khatami’s economic failures were due to the structural barriers both at the domestic and international levels. Domestically, the patrimonial system offered unambiguous and unprecedented privileges to the elites and their bazaari supporters who were disinclined to comply with the requirements of a meaningful liberal modernization. Moreover, the economic and social realities in Iran convinced Khatami that only selective privatization is possible in these circumstances. A comprehensive privatization strategy would have adverse impacts on employment, since the state is the largest employer in the Iranian economy. He, thus, refrained from privatizing various public services, retained subsidies on necessities, and raised public employee wages, which in some cases were under the poverty line. 70 At the global level, sharp drops in global oil prices during the first twenty months of Khatami’s presidency, which caused substantial budget shortfalls, forced the administration to make significant cuts in planned investment projects and private-sector credits, thus undercutting growth strategies. This situation was exacerbated by the economy’s inability to diversify and increase foreign currency revenues by expanding non-oil exports. Reformists linked economic liberalization to political pluralism. Social and political reforms, in their view, would enhance the chances of their economic success. Contrarily, the absence of social and political reforms causes public distrust and adds to social and political instability that hinders the opportunities to attract private domestic and foreign investments necessary for diversification and economic growth. Thus, Khatami and reformists embraced major socio-cultural and political reforms. In addition to the economic imperatives, Khatami himself was committed to these reforms because he not only believed in democratic values but was also afraid of adverse impacts of despotism and intolerance on the system. His administration actively pursued social policies designed to minimize governmental interference in the public’s life, including liberalization of dress codes and social relations. Overall, these types of policies underscored the need for political space and pluralism, equal treatment, tolerance, moderation, and respect for public rights within the confines of the Islamic worldview. He clearly identified with public frustration over autocratic proclivities of the system, with their political and cultural resistance to the regime’s insistence on a rigid Islamic cultural identity and monopoly, and with popular rejection of the efforts to dismiss the age-old people’s nationalistic consciousness. He recognized the dangers of these cultural and political tendencies for the system and succeeded in cultivating public’s frustrations by cautiously embracing their openly defiant democratic and nationalistic sentiments. 71 As a student of Iranian political thought and culture, he understood that Iranians’ expressions of pride in their culture and historical heritage are rooted in nationalism. There is very little doubt that, in today’s Iran, much of the anti-systemic opposition is not only a reaction to the policy failures of successive govern-

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ments but also to the regime’s autocratic and dogmatic commitment to an Islamic cultural monopoly and disrespect for and intolerance of the country’s pre-Islamic or non-Islamic cultural heritage. The open expressions of nationalistic sentiments are increasingly evident among average Iranians who are frustrated with the regime and its autocratic style. This is particularly true of the younger generation of Iranians who are unfamiliar with, or possess only a distant memory, of the monarchy and its dictatorial ways which were often symbolically expressed in nationalistic terms. Ironically, this rise in secularnationalism in Iran that is rooted primarily in the Iranian/Persian rather than Islamic/Shi’a identity is oftentimes openly cultivated by the Islamic regime when public support is needed for such controversial policies as the nuclear policy. Of course, nationalistic sentiments, if not properly channeled and contained, could in the long-run pose significant challenges to the system whose legitimacy is rooted in the Islamic worldview that is internationalist in perspective and openly dismissive of nationalistic consciousness. Like Bazargan, Khatami believes that Islam and democracy are indeed compatible and that an Islamic system can and should embrace pluralism and civil liberties. Islamic democratic conceptions, he believes, are originated from the prophet’s practices in Medina and underscore citizens’ rights to self-determination, dignified and equitable treatment, and the accountability of the authority to citizens. 72 Khatami’s commitment to democracy and civil society endeared him to the reform movement and put him at odds with conservatives who dismissed the idea as meaningless sloganeering and alien to the Islamic culture. He and reformers argued that the emergence and growth of a civil society is not only compatible with Islam but also necessary for the country’s democratic-pluralist development. To the reformers, civil society is a constitutionally acknowledged collection of forces and institutions including parties, groups, the media, and intellectuals who shape and convey public’s preferences and expectations to the political authorities. 73 The idea of civil society is also central to Khatami’s views of liberty and democracy, which he largely frames in an Islamic/Quranic context. As he suggested, his notion of civil society differs from the Western conceptions that are rooted in Greek and Roman philosophical thinking and heritage. Khatami believes that an Islamic civil society is expected to reject all forms of despotism and discrimination and advance the Islamic goals of dignified treatment of all in accordance with divine ordinances. This means encouraging collective action and freedom of expression in accordance with the laws. This form of civil society will have to depend upon educated and wellinformed citizens and responsible media tasked with educating the public about their rights and responsibilities. In pursuit of these political objectives, Khatami rejected all forms of violent transformative change and supported a dynamic institutional mechanism in the form of political parties and groups that could facilitate gradual

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change through ballot box and within the framework of the system. Although the constitution had accounted for such instruments of democracy, political circumstances surrounding factional schisms and major policy disputes had restricted the growth of these organizations and had rendered the existing ones ineffective. True and meaningful pluralism, in Khatami’s view, required a shift away from the cult of personalities that had historically hampered party and group politics in Iran to an inclusive system based upon transparency, tolerance, and respect for the rules. This required public political education and a gradual process of institution-building. Thus, the Khatami administration initially approved a series of trade and professional organizations such as the Office for Fostering Unity that were designed to channel their members’ input in a democratic and transparent fashion. In 1998, the Islamic Iran Solidarity Party was established as the first genuine party since the founding of the Islamic Republic. With the support of the president and backing of reformers, the number of these instruments of civil society increased exponentially as reformers established such organizations as the Islamic Iran Participation Front and coalitions like the Second of Khordad (the date of Khatami’s election). Conservatives who had initially opposed these institutions as a challenge to their authority found them to be an effective means of control and began forming and strengthening their own organizations as well. Democratic development also required a meaningful commitment to the freedom of the press and expression. As the culture minister, Khatami had supported the media and intellectuals in the face of conservative opposition by issuing press licenses, resisting the closure of oppositionist papers that were printing materials critical of the conservative elites and establishment, and defending intellectuals’ rights to free expression. At significant personal and professional costs, the Khatami administration maintained its commitment to the free press despite major, and often violent, challenges by conservatives who were framing their opposition to these initiatives in terms of protection of Islam, the state, and women’s dignity. The imperatives that shaped Khatami’s foreign policy did not substantially differ from those in the previous administration, and while the strategies shifted significantly the challenges remained the same. President Rafsanjani pursued a realist approach in favoring Iran’s global integration and détente with the West, particularly with the United States. Such an approach was central to Rafsanjani’s economic policies. As expected, however, the eternally opportunistic Rafsanjani abandoned this approach in the face of harsh opposition from conservatives. Economic imperatives also drove Khatami’s desire for global integration, but he was clearly more capable of offering broader and more philosophical justifications and effective tools for advancing this policy. As evident in his “dialogue of civilizations,” he astutely argued that greater communication, cultural understanding, and mutual re-

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spect are necessary for global integration. Khatami’s numerous interviews with Western media, particularly his famous interview with CNN’s Christian Amanpoor, offer a fascinating window to his overall global vision, strategy, and diplomatic style, especially in his search for rapprochement with the West. In the CNN interview, by pointing out the religious parallels between the foundations of the American culture and that of the Islamic Republic, he not only defended Iran’s theocracy and praised American society but, as importantly, he dismissed the developmentalist/modernization perspective that underscores the need for separation of religion from politics in the democratic developmental process. 74 Here, he spoke of the Puritan foundations of the American civilization and suggested that the significance of American civilization “is in the fact that liberty found religion as a cradle for its growth, religion found protection of liberty as its divine calling. Therefore, liberty and faith never clashed. . . . Therefore, the Anglo-American approach to religion relied on the principle that religion and liberty are consistent and compatible. I believe that if humanity is looking for happiness, it should combine religious spirituality with the virtues of liberty.” 75 These public relations efforts, which many conservatives at home found to be unproductive or counterproductive, gained Khatami a new international stature that could potentially facilitate Iran’s global reintegration on new terms. The United Nations, for instance, adopted his idea of the dialogue of civilizations by designating 2001 as the “Year of Dialogue Between Civilizations”. Of course, Khatami and reformers were well aware that Iran’s global reintegration required normalization of relations with the United States. Historically, the Islamic revolution, establishment of the Islamic Republic and its subsequent policies such as the hostage crisis, the regime’s attempts at the exportation of revolution to the rest of the Muslim world, support for radical Islamist movements especially Hamas in the occupied territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon, hostility toward Israel and the pro-American conservative Arab regimes, and a disquieting nuclear policy had caused a good deal of consternation in the United States foreign policy establishment. Thus, successive American administrations were distrustful of the Iranian regime and disinclined to seek relationship with the country. In turn, many Iranians from both the right and the left of the political spectrum were convinced that normalization of relations with the United States is unwise since it would welcome American hegemonic intentions and would undermine the regime’s efforts to pursue an independent foreign policy. In fact, despite recent gestures by President Rouhani, even today rapprochement with the United States continues to remain a controversial issue and potentially detrimental to the political lives of politicians who do not approach it cautiously. This was clearly evident in the backlash to the “Irangate” incident when the opponents demanded severe punishments for those who had dared to seek a relationship with the United States.

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In recent years, an increasing number of Iranians who had in the past questioned the merits of relations with the United States have become open to reconciliation. This is particularly true of reformers and some of the moderate clerics who find a confrontational stance against the United States injurious to the national interest of the country. During the Khatami administration and in line with his foreign policy stance, they favored a dignified relation on the basis of mutual respect and trust. For instance, Ayatollah Montazeri suggested that Iran’s interest should be the deciding factor in the resumption of relations with the United States. 76 Even some of the former occupiers of the United States embassy, who annually celebrate the occupation of the embassy and hostage taking, began calling for the removal of barriers of mistrust and opening up a dialogue with the American people in line with Khatami’s approach. 77 Khatami believed that emphasizing the ideological and cultural justifications for relations with the outside world could, on one hand, soften internal antagonism and contain factional political opposition, and cultivate external goodwill that could help Iran’s development, on the other hand. In numerous speeches, he spoke of the need for cultural understanding and the necessity of avoiding harsh and dogmatic judgments about others. He explicitly rejected Samuel Huntington’s assertions about an inevitable “clash of civilizations” between Western and Islamic cultures, a view that had gained a significant currency in the West. 78 Mutual distrust and adverse domestic political climates in both Iran and the United State barred any meaningful achievements in the U.S.-Iranian relationships during the Khatami administration. The Clinton administration had been unresponsive to Rafsanjani’s gestures in seeking relations with the United States and, despite finding Khatami’s message refreshing, their response to him was slow, limited, and piecemeal. 79 Khatami also procrastinated since he was facing major domestic turmoil and there were uncertainties surrounding the American presidential elections. The election of George W. Bush, subsequent events of September 11, 2001, and ensuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which could have potentially offered new opportunities for rapprochement, soon removed all the chances for normalization of relations. Under President Bush and neo-conservatives, American foreign policy found a new ideological justification for a confrontational stance against Islamist movements and anti-American regimes in the Middle East. For domestic public consumption, the administration framed its realpolitik approach to the Middle East which was largely shaped by the imperatives of its “war on terror,” the Middle Eastern oil, and Israeli interests as a compassionate Christian commitment to rights and democracy for all people. Ironically, the events of September 11 and the American objectives to remove the Taliban from Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein from Iraq did indeed coincide with the Iranian interests. The Iranian government had been waging a proxy war against the Taliban during the latter part of the 1990s and came close to a

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military confrontation with the Afghan government in 1998 in response to the murder of Iranian diplomats. 80 Not only did the Khatami administration and reformist leaders publicly criticize the attacks of September 11 and express their sympathies for the loss of life in the twin towers, but were also willing to support the Bush administration in dislodging Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and forcing the Taliban out by offering support, especially through their proxies in the Afghan Northern Alliance. Assuming that the Bush Administration could recognize the potential for a constructive Iranian role in the American-led war on terror, the Khatami administration was shocked when the U.S. president included Iran in his “Axis of Evil” and sought a confrontational stance against the Islamic Republic. Naturally, the conservative U.S. administration’s ideological dogmatism empowered conservative opponents of the United States in Iran, and undermined the efforts of reformers, who felt betrayed and disappointed. Now, conservatives, particularly the Supreme Leader, were publicly criticizing Khatami’s initiatives and reinforcing the view that Khatami’s accommodating attitude toward the West had weakened the regime. They began branding proponents of relations with the United States as fifth columnists and traitors. 81 Mutual mistrust between the two countries was compounded by both sides’ accusations and counter accusations about American objectives in Iraq and Iranian support for antiAmerican forces, and by revelations about Iran’s nuclear policies and the regime’s transgressions and lack of transparency. In the post–September 11 world, the United States was unwilling to accept a nuclear Iran, despite earlier understandings. Even the Tehran Agreement that was signed in 2003 between the Iranian government and Europeans, which reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to NPT and a later commitment to sign and ratify additional protocols, 82 did not satisfy the American government. Under this agreement, Iran had retained its long-held claim to peaceful nuclear technology, which even Americans had previously supported, but agreed to a “temporary suspension” of uranium enrichment activities and offered “objective guarantees” for compliance. 83 With the American insistence on a permanent suspension and the Iranian unwavering position, the confrontational stance continued. As a continuation of Rafsanjani’s policies, Khatami pursued regional relations including ties with conservative Arab regimes. This strategy was successful in holding the 1997 meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Tehran, which was even attended by Iraq and the PLO, who were hostile to the Iranian regime. 84 This was followed by improved relations with Saudi Arabia when the two countries signed a formal cooperation agreement in 1998, and the Saudis helped with improving Iran’s relations with some of the Persian Gulf states and Egypt, despite existing disputes. However, tensions with other regional rivals did not subside. Khatami’s unwillingness to take a steadfast stance against the conservative right and his inability to effectively advance reformist policy objectives

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undermined his popularity and heightened popular discontent with reformers. The conservative right has traditionally exerted significant influence in the Islamic Republic disproportionate to its limited numbers and narrow popular support. Their success is largely due to their ability to permeate the top clerical echelons inside and outside the government, law enforcement establishments, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, foundations (in particular, the Foundation of the Disinherited with its unmatched economic and financial resources), traditional merchants, and vigilante organizations that they generally sponsor. By relying on political, administrative, legislative, judicial, and even extra-legal measures they launched a relentless and well-orchestrated opposition to Khatami, reformers, and their policy agenda. These efforts that began with Khatami’s stunning victory over their favorite candidate and continued throughout his presidency are the prime reasons for Khatami’s failures. Even the public resentment and reactions that occasionally turned violent did not deter conservatives’ obstructionist strategies. Whenever their political efforts to undermine the administration’s policies did not achieve the desired results, they undertook legislative initiatives, relied on intimidation tactics, and ensured the arrest and imprisonment of reformers. Conservatives hoped that Khatami’s economic failures would undermine his popular support, and mobilize the public and traditional merchants against the government and in support of the conservative agenda. To undermine the government’s economic policies, for instance, the head of the Foundation of the Disinherited transferred the bulk of the foundation’s hard currency reserves abroad, thus causing devaluation of the rial, which helped those who had access to hard currency and hurt the general public. 85 To silence reformers and their allies in the media, on July 7, 1999, the conservative parliamentary majority forced the passage of a restrictive press law. This law not only restricted press freedoms but, more important, accounted for the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction in press violations involving national security and the “values of the revolution.” This legislation was aimed at limiting the jurisdiction of the press courts and intimidating the press for their support of the reform movement and the president. Almost immediately, the popular reformist paper, Salaam, was closed down and legal proceeding against its publisher was initiated for publishing a confidential letter that alleged the free press endangers the Islamic system. 86 Adverse popular reaction to this legislation and the closure of Salaam was indeed unprecedented since the revolution. Frustrated with the conservative obstruction, university students (who were later joined by other disillusioned Iranians) undertook massive street demonstrations that spread in major cities to which the law enforcement and the Ansar-e Hezbollah reacted harshly by beating, arresting, and killing a number of students in dormitories. 87 Although there were initial indications that the regime would be willing to accommodate some of the students’ reasonable demands such as the account-

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ability of public officials, release of the students, and punishment of those responsible for violence against students including law enforcement personnel and vigilantes, the conservative strategy was to violently repel any opposition by relying on their street vigilantes and courts. As in the past, the Ansar-e Hezbollah, a small but violent group of street enforcers who are organized and maintained by conservatives and their allies to ensure public compliance with the regime’s policies (especially social policies), were unleashed on students and those reformers in the government who expressed sympathy with them. As the confrontations spread and turned increasingly violent and students began challenging the role of the rahbar, the military made explicit threats of coup against the government with Khamene’i’s apparent support. In a letter that was sent to Khatami in early July 1999, and intentionally publicized shortly thereafter, two dozen Revolutionary Guard commanders criticized the government’s failure to deal with those who disrupt security and order and warned that the military could not stand aside if such disruptions continued. While dismissing these threats as a violation of civil supremacy, Khatami and his supporters decided to distance themselves from the opposition, especially students. Khatami even contemplated resigning from the office and calling for a new presidential election. However, some of his close confidants argued against resignation since that would benefit his adversaries in the conservative right. 88 The fear of mass reaction and potential for irreversible damage to the regime due to the president’s resignation forced the two sides to mitigate the tension by forcing conservatives to tone down their intransigence and by requiring Khatami to pledge his loyalty to Khamene’i and give assurances that the government would deal with violence effectively. Khatami and some of the reformers in the government backed away from their earlier support for students and banned demonstrations to stop further damage to the system. While some of the Islamist student organizations honored the ban, others, especially the secular-nationalist groups, continued their demonstrations. To the disappointment of many, Khatami criticized student demonstrators, and called for pro-government rallies to counter their actions. With Khatami’s silence, conservatives and their allies in the judiciary accused the students of being counter revolutionaries and functionaries of foreign interests, a charge that carries severe punishments in Iran and has historically been effective in silencing opponents. The trials and convictions of some of the student leaders to death finally ended student demonstrations against the regime. Conservatives also continued their opposition by choosing to challenge and remove the architects of reforms and those responsible for implementing these policies. Decentralization of power and removal of the old patronage system that granted privileges to the parliamentary deputies and their clerical allies was a central component of the reform agenda. Khatami’s interior minister, Abdollah Nuri, was disliked by conservatives for his advocacy for

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democracy and his zeal to streamline the jurisdictions of provincial governments. 89 Nuri’s decision to replace some of the provincial governors and his efforts to curtail their patronage system by removing their budgetary authority, that typically helped local parliamentary deputies, faced fierce opposition by the parliamentarians. Claiming opposition to his liberalism, they removed him from the office. While Khatami acknowledged the impeachment power of the parliament, he stood by Nuri and appointed him as one of his deputies with similar responsibilities. To the same end, conservatives employed a legal strategy against Gholamhussein Karbaschi, the popular mayor of Tehran and a protégé of the former President Rafsanjani and an ally of Khatami, and a number of city employees. Karbaschi was despised by conservatives and their bazaari allies for his methods to ensure tax collection, his overall goal of breaking up the power of the bazaar, and his willingness to circumvent the law in his efforts to improve the city. His earlier successes and administrative prowess had garnered him widespread support both in the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations and among the public. The judiciary charged him and a number of his employees with corruption. Rafsanjani was unwilling to protect Karbaschi, who had been instrumental in the former president’s political success. Karbaschi’s effective defense against the charges did breathe life into a dispirited reform movement and a public disappointed with the pace of reform. Given his clerical training and familiarity with theological discourse and his skillful theatrics, Karbaschi turned the publicly televised trials, which were watched intently by millions, into a showcase of the conservative right’s ineptness, malfeasance, political recklessness, and absolute disregard for the laws and the Islamic system. His apparent intellect, outspoken and confrontational attitude in the courtroom, and principled support for his employees gained him a massive popular following willing to confront conservatives. Subsequent revelations about the torture of city employees in prison and underhanded efforts to convict Karbaschi further exposed the misuse of the judiciary by conservatives for political purposes, as many began questioning these tactics and calling for accountability and respect for the laws and judicial process. However, Khatami, reformers, and even some of the moderate conservatives who found these tactics improper and counterproductive failed to openly reject these strategies out of fear of being labeled as traitors and counter revolutionaries. The conservative right’s obstructionism continued until their ascendancy to power in the Ahmadinejad administration. Ascendancy of the Principalists 90 and the Ahmadinejad Presidency (2005–2013) The reformist movement managed to achieve significant electoral victories after the election of Khatami to the presidency in 1997. While they scored

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impressive wins in the 1999 municipal council elections, 2000 parliamentary elections, and the 2001 presidential elections, they did not gain control of the major centers of power in the system and could not effectively pursue their policy agenda in the face of relentless opposition by conservatives. 91 The general public gradually became disillusioned with Khatami and reformists for their unwillingness to counter conservatives and for their inability to deliver on their promises. Reformist candidates were decisively defeated in the 2003 municipal council and the 2004 parliamentary elections due to voter apathy and low turnout. In fact, the 2004 parliamentary elections became the turning point in the struggle between conservatives and reformers, as the election results “marked the conclusive end of the campaign for political and social reform” 92 that began with Khatami’s presidency. The Presidential election of 2005 was expected to bring about a major change in the conservative-reformist power struggle and to become a watershed moment for the conservatives’ return to power mostly due to the reformists’ failures, deteriorating economic conditions, unpopularity of the moderate and reform-minded candidates in the field, and the sudden and unexpected rise of the younger radical conservatives. Despite public frustration with the political establishment and fear of public apathy, the pre-election public opinion polls indicated that a majority of Iranians were inclined to participate in the presidential election. 93 The voters were motivated to participate because of their support for the Islamic regime, desire for improving the current political and economic conditions, civic-mindedness, and opposition to the United States. Over one thousand candidates registered to run for the presidency in 2005. The Guardian Council initially disqualified all but six candidates including all female candidates, the leading reformist candidates, and Ibrahim Yazdi, famed leader of the banned Liberation Movement of Iran. In response to public outcry against disqualifications and Khamene’i’s intervention, the Guardian Council reinstated the lesser known reformists Mostafa Moin and Mohsen Mehralizadeh. Reformists failed to field popular and effective candidates because of the growing internal schisms between radical reformists, who had come to believe that the Islamic regime cannot be reformed, and moderate reformers, who still supported a gradualist approach to change within the Iranian body politic. Even known reformers who registered to run were disqualified by the Guardian Council, thus undermining reformers’ chances. The two leading reformist parties, The Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, finally settled on Moin, a little-known former cabinet member. Hojattolislam Mehdi Karrubi, a former parliamentary Speaker, was the choice of the reformist Militant Clerics Association. Radical reformers rejected both candidates and favored either boycott of the election or nomination of a genuinely popular candidate even at the risk of their candidate being declared ineligible by the Guardian Council.

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A diverse slate of old establishment conservatives and young neo-conservatives also offered their candidacy. The pre-election polls indicated that these conservatives would most likely split the conservative vote, thus jeopardizing their chances to win the presidency. 94 The conservative leadership decided to establish a council to choose a candidate in order to force many of these conservative candidates out of the race and avoid a split and electoral defeat. This council eventually agreed on Ali Larijani, 95 but none of the other conservative candidates agreed to drop out. As the seemingly eternal candidate Rafsanjani entered the race, Velayati dropped out in deference to him. The final list of the candidates consisted of reformists Moin, Karrubi, and Mehralizadeh; moderate conservative Rafsanjani; and conservatives Larijani, Mohsen Rezai, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Rezai later dropped out after floundering in pre-election polls. In the IRNA pre-election poll, no candidate had the ability to gain the necessary majority to win the presidency outright, even though reformers and their allies seemed to poll relatively well despite the lack of popular enthusiasm for any candidate. 96 The presidential campaign was unusually contentious and marred by rumors of potential for electoral fraud and illegal interference by the security forces. During the campaign, reformist candidates vowed to continue with the reforms initiated under Khatami, including political liberalization, economic revitalization, and rapprochement with the West. Moin promised an inclusive government that would rely on the services of women and ethnic minorities. 97 Rafsanjani spoke of reform, rights of the press, improvement of economic conditions, and the need to strengthen the parliament. 98 Even the conservatives Rezai, Qalibaf, and Larijani spoke of reform, although ambiguously. Rafsanjani was generally viewed as the man who could bridge the gap between reformers and conservatives. 99 Only the hard-line conservative Ahmadinejad avoided the language of reform and portrayed himself in populist terms as a simple, honest, and devoutly religious man committed to returning to the founding principles of Islam and the regime, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, 100 eradicating political corruption and establishing commitment to bureaucratic accountability, and dismissing any meaningful initiatives to open up to the West. 101 The pre-election polls indicated that Rafsanjani would win a plurality of the votes but not the necessary majority to win the election. Intense campaigning, popular defiance against President Bush, who had criticized Iranian elections as undemocratic, and growing rumors that the security forces were ready to intervene on behalf of conservatives, specifically Qalibaf, added to the unpredictability and contentious nature of the 2005 presidential elections. The voter turnouts were 63 percent and 60 percent respectively on the first and second ballots. 102 Rafsanjani’s win on the first ballot by receiving 21 percent of the popular vote did not surprise many, the biggest surprise was that Ahmadinejad, who was

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polling very poorly during the campaign, came second with 19 percent of the votes and was eligible to run against Rafsanjani in the runoff election. Almost immediately, Rafsanjani and reformers questioned the results and complained about election fraud that had garnered Ahmadinejad the unexpected and inexplicable votes. In particular, Karrubi charged that the security forces had intervened on Ahmadinejad’s behalf by illegally calling for their personnel to back him, intimidating voters at polling places, using false identity cards, and even bribing voters. 103 The recounts of one hundred ballot boxes in Tehran found no evidence of irregularities, however. Fear of an Ahmadinejad victory in the runoff election forced many, including prominent reformers and moderates and their supporters, to back Rafsanjani on the second ballot despite their reservations. During the short runoff campaign, Rafsanjani underscored his reformist proclivities and dismissed allegations that he would undo the reforms accomplished under the Khatami administration. Ahmadinejad’s campaign, however, almost exclusively focused on domestic issues by committing himself to the promotion of social justice, eradication of corruption, and return to the simple Islamic way of life. 104 Ahmadinejad defeated Rafsanjani by 62 percent to 36 percent of the popular vote on the second ballot. With the election of Ahmadinejad, conservatives gained control of all organs of the state in the Islamic Republic. Defeat of the little-known reformist candidates and even Rafsanjani’s loss was not a big surprise. The rise of conservatives was also expected, despite polarization of the electorate during this campaign that generally indicated support for the reformist agenda. 105 What stunned many observers were Ahmadinejad’s unexpected victory and the rise of younger neo-conservatives. Despite vociferous complaints by their opponents about electoral fraud and, as expected in the Iranian electoral politics there seemed to be some irregularities, no evidence of large-scale electoral fraud in either the first or second ballot elections has yet emerged. 106 Rampant political corruption—which in the public view had been exacerbated under both Rafsanjani and the reformist Khatami—growing inequities due to failed and misguided economic and social policies of reformers, halfhearted reformist attempts at change that turned out to be ineffective in the face of conservative opposition, support by the conservative establishment (particularly support by Khamene’i, who believed a weak conservative president would bolster his own authority), and populist style of campaigning by Ahmadinejad are the main explanations for the electoral outcome. During the hard-fought campaign, reformers did not offer any new strategies and policies. Their attempts to reach the youth and the disinherited seemed opportunistic and disingenuous. In contrast, Ahmadinejad’s populist style and promises attracted a good segment of the lowerand lower-middle-class population. He effectively blamed political corruption and misguided policies of the previous administrations for the average Iranians’ dismal living conditions, criticized the growing gap between the

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rich and the poor, and underscored the need for greater equality. To the less privileged Iranians, his commitment to these issues seemed genuine given his well-calculated and effective populist campaign strategy that portrayed him as a simple public servant with a humble background. He successfully made the case in favor of himself, the son of a blacksmith, against a rich cleric, whose immense wealth has never been explained to a curious and resentful public despite rampant rumors of personal corruption and cronyism. Ahmadinejad’s rejection of some of the reformists’ social policies, including gender mixing and relaxation of women’s dress codes, also corresponded with the conservative views of the less well-to-do segments of the population, who resented reformists’ social liberalism. In the controversial presidential election of 2009, Ahmadinejad was reelected to the presidency despite strong and well-organized popular opposition to his style of governance, failed policies, and challenge by a formidable field of reformist candidates able and willing to question the president and his record. Ahmadinejad’s failures as president had not translated into reformist gains in the 2008 parliamentary elections, however. Actually, conservatives had gained seats in the parliament as the pro-Ahmadinejad slate of candidates received the plurality of the votes. 107 Thus, it was evident from the outset that the presidential election would be a hard-fought contest in the conservative-reformist rivalry. More than 450 Iranians, including 42 women, registered to run for the presidency, and only four were approved by the Guardian Council to run for election. 108 Former prime minister Mir Hossein Musavi and former parliamentary Speaker Mehdi Karrubi were the reformists in the field, while Ahmadinejad was challenged by a former Revolutionary Guards Chief, Mohsen Rezai, on the right. As expected, the campaign was ferocious, quite revealing about the importance of the outcome for the country and disputing parties, indicative of the two sides’ willingness to go far in challenging the other, and entertaining for the voters. The six one-onone television debates, which, by some estimates, were watched by 40 to 50 million viewers, 109 were heated and included personal attacks on the candidates, their families, and associates; allegations of ineptitude, corruption, dishonesty, and fanaticism; and accusations of ties to hostile foreign countries. Ahmadinejad’s verbal attacks on Rafsanjani and Musavi’s wife during the debate and his allegations against other candidates prompted some of the clerics to seek Khamene’i’s help in reining in the president. 110 In a show of popular support, both reformists and conservatives sponsored street demonstrations for their candidates. The reformist human chain 111 was countered by conservative street demonstrations and rallies for the president and his conservative allies. 112 Just before the election, to display Ahmadinejad’s fanatic streak and unrealism, reformists distributed a video of him claiming to be surrounded by a “light” during a General Assembly of the UN speech in 2005. 113 During the campaign, Ahmadinejad defended his record, rejected

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the criticisms of his economic and foreign policies by alleging that such criticisms are “a return to Hitler’s methods” and orchestrated by “Zionist entities,” 114 and continued with the campaign theme that won him the presidency in 2005. His conservative and reformist challengers honed in on his failed economic policies, fiscal ineptness, and counterproductive foreign policy. His leading opponent, Musavi, who was practically tied with the president in the public opinion polls just days before the election, 115 vehemently attacked the administration’s economic policies by accusing the president of falsifying data on inflation (which Ahmadinejad had initially claimed to be around 15 percent but later admitted to be 25 percent), 116 called for establishing better ties between Iran and the rest of the world through constructive engagement, 117 and favored women’s rights and an end to gender discrimination. His conservative opponent Rezai pledged to move away from state economic control and encourage the private sector, address the unemployment problem, and personally deal with any infringements on citizens’ rights. While criticizing Ahmadinejad for his dismissal of the Holocaust, Karrubi of the National Trust Party promised to distribute oil profits to every Iranian adult and enforce human rights laws. 118 According to the official figures, 85 percent of the voters turned out for the election and gave a resounding victory to Ahmadinejad with 62.6 percent of the votes. His closest challenger, Musavi, received only 33.8 percent of the votes. 119 As expected, such lopsided victory on the first ballot and the speed by which the results were announced raised suspicion among an already skeptical public about the possibility of electoral fraud. There were allegations of procedural irregularities, illegal and improper interference by the security forces, shortages of ballots in critical polling places, and vote rigging. If the results in some districts were genuine, it meant that many of the voters who had voted for the reformist candidates in the previous presidential election had switched their votes to Ahmadinejad. 120 The challengers called the results so “deeply flawed” that they could “jeopardize the pillars of the Islamic Republic and will establish tyranny,” 121 and demanded an investigation by the Guardian Council and a new election. After a brief investigation by the Guardian Council that concluded there were no major irregularities in the election, Khamene’i confirmed the election results, demanded public acceptance of the outcome, and warned the opponents not to challenge the government. Almost immediately, the interior ministry issued a ban against any unauthorized public gatherings. 122 However, for days, there were violent and deadly confrontations between demonstrators and the security forces throughout the country. 123 As a sign of growing division within the establishment, some of the prominent clerics also joined the chorus of criticisms against the election. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the most revered Shi’a clerics, issued a fatwa criticizing the government and questioning its decisions for being against Islamic values. 124 The Grand Aya-

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tollah Yousef Saane’i, a marja’e-taqlid who was normally an apolitical cleric, warned of the dangers of the lack of public support for the government. In issuing a statement against the crackdowns, the influential Ayatollah Hossein Musavi Tabrizi of the Qom Seminary said “The least we can say is that this government’s legitimacy is in doubt. A majority of the people don’t believe that Ahmadinejad was their vote. . . . People were peacefully protesting election results and the response to that should not be the bullet.” 125 The government’s response to its leading critics was harsh and uncompromising. A number of reformist and moderate leaders were put under house arrest and later tried on trumped-up charges, members of Rafsanjani’s family were arrested and charged, 126 and Khatami was later banned from traveling abroad. 127 Rafsanjani himself was removed as the head of the Council of Experts in 2011 and stripped his role as the leader of Friday prayers. 128 In 2012, Rafsanjani’s daughter was charged with engaging in “propaganda against the ruling system,” sentenced to six months’ incarceration, and banned from taking part in any political and cultural activities for five years. 129 These actions, along with Ahmadinejad’s controversial policies, disregard for the parliament, and challenges against the Leader even fractured the conservative alliance, making the president’s conservative critics his most potent foes during his second term. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was born Mahmoud Saborjhian on October 28, 1956, in the village of Aradan near the city of Garmasar in north-central Iran. He was the fourth of seven children whose father, Ahmad, was a blacksmith and moved the family to Narmak district of Tehran in search of better economic opportunities when Mahmoud was only a year old. During the 1950s, Iran faced tumultuous events such as the CIA coup of 1953, fall of Mossadegh, return of the shah, and the growing repression by the government. Until his college years, Ahmadinejad did not show any interest in politics and excelled in his education. He graduated with an engineering degree from Iran University of Science and technology in 1979. At the university, he joined the Islamic Association of Students, 130 and was involved in the publication and distribution of an anti-regime magazine called Jigh va daad (Scream and Shout). 131 During the Iran-Iraq war, Ahmadinejad volunteered for war and fought against Iraqis in the Kurdish region in western Iran. While many questions about Ahmadinejad’s military affiliations and activities remain unanswered, 132 it is believed that he was a volunteer for the Basij paramilitary organization that operated in cooperation with the IRGC. As a volunteer, he was believed to have participated in covert operations near the city of Kirkuk against Iraqi forces as well as Iranian Kurdish separatists who were fighting for their autonomy from the central government. While there are some disputes among foreign intelligence agencies about the scope of Ahmadinejad’s role in covert military operations, it has been suggested that he had joined the newly formed elite Qods force of the IRGC and, as a senior commander of

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this force, he was involved in the planning of political assassinations in the Middle East and Europe including the murder of Iranian Kurdish leader Abdolrahman Qasemlou in Vienna in July 1989, and attempts at the life of Salman Rushdie in response to Khomeini’s fatwa. 133 In 1986, Ahmadinejad entered graduate school, and in 1989 he joined the faculty of the Iran University of Science and Technology. Until running for the presidency, Ahmadinejad held a number of appointed government positions including the governor of Maku and Khoy in the West Azerbaijan province, advisor for cultural affairs at the Ministry of Culture and Education, governor-general of the newly established northwest province of Ardebil (a position he held for four years until he was removed from the post by the Khatami administration in their attempt to marginalize conservative elements in the government), and rejoined his faculty position after receiving his doctorate degree in transportation engineering in 1997. Ahmadinejad’s charisma, political skills, and populist approach and appeal became evident in his role as the mayor of Tehran. Having been appointed by the conservative-dominated city council as the capital city’s mayor in 2003, Ahmadinejad missed no opportunity in portraying himself as a common man dedicated to the plight of the downtrodden and conservative causes. At one point, he donned a street sweeper’s uniform to earn the support of city workers, and he shunned limousine transportation in favor of a 1977 Peugeot automobile he had owned for many years. 134 He also undid the reforms undertaken by his moderate and reformist predecessors by imposing cultural restrictions favored by clerics and their conservative allies including the closure of fast food restaurants, banning billboards with Western references, advocating for gender-segregated elevators in municipal buildings, converting many cultural centers into prayer halls during the month of Ramadan, and requiring city employees to wear beards and long sleeves. 135 Ahmadinejad’s ideological dogmatism, heavy-handed leadership style, challenge against other institutions of power in the system, and uncompromising policies made him the most controversial Iranian president. These qualities, approaches, and decisions not only offended public and reformist sensibilities but also bought him powerful opponents in the traditional conservative circles including prominent parliamentarians and Khamene’i, who criticized the president on many occasions. Ahmadinejad’s religio-political views reflect the radical Hojjatiyyeh Shi’a perspective with messianic and apocalyptic overtones that predict a period of universal chaos until the messianic return of Mahdi, the 12th Imam of Twelver Shi’ism, who was occulted in infancy. The Hojjatiyyeh was initially created to counter the Bahai faith in the 1950s, but their growing extremism under the Islamic Republic forced Khomeini to ban this group in 1983, which was revived after Khomeini’s death. As a believer in Hojjatiyyeh Shi’ism, Ahmadinejad follows Ayatollah Mohmmad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, of the Haqqani School in the city of Qom, who is a zealot follower of

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Hojjatiyyeh and holds a number of important positions in the regime as a marja-e taqlid. The Haqqani School advocates for clerical control over the government and society. Mesbah-Yazi, who even surpasses Khamenei’i in his extreme conservative views, rejects any new interpretations of the Quran, advocates for capital punishment and flogging, rebuffs pluralism and democracy as inconsistent with Islam, and calls for the insulation of Iran from Western influences. It is even suggested that as a clerical patron of the military-security faction in the Iranian regime, Mesbah-Yazdi has offered religious sanctions for death squads and suicide bombings. He is quoted as having said that: “when protecting Islam and the Muslim ummah (community of believers) depends on martyrdom operations, it not only is allowed, but even is an obligation (wajib).” 136 Mesbah-Yazdi endorsed Ahmadinejad for the presidency. During the campaigns, Ahmadinejad’s stance on broad policy issues was similar to Mesbah-Yazdi’s views. For instance, he dismissed the principles of pluralism and democracy by saying that Iran “did not have a revolution in order to have democracy, but to have an Islamic government.” 137 Furthermore, he expressed serious ideological and moral opposition to Israel and American secularism. 138 These religio-political beliefs directly shaped Ahmadinejad’s vision of his role, style of leadership, and policies. He, according to some, perceived his personal role as the divine harbinger of Mahdi’s coming and, although he denied it, it is claimed that he ordered his cabinet members to write a pact of loyalty with the Hidden Imam and cast the pact into the well of Qom where the Imam is believed to reside. 139 Regularly, he attributed his political fortune to God’s will and claimed a divine support for his approach and policies that could only be challenged at one’s own peril. As indicated earlier, he even claimed divine protection and approval by suggesting that he was surrounded by a halo during his speech at the UN General Assembly, symbolizing his righteous stance and quite consistent with the protective role that Hojjatiyyeh attributes to the twelfth Imam for his true followers. These types of assertions made Ahmadinejad the target of jokes and ridicule by his opponents during the campaign and violent demonstration after his reelection in 2009. While during the presidential campaign in 2005 Ahmadinejad criticized political corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency and called for an honest and accountable government, his leadership style and record as the president further undermined any chances of political and bureaucratic reform. Any push for bureaucratic accountability and eradication of political corruption is a smart campaign platform, but this has never been a small task in the preand post-revolutionary Iranian political systems, even if Ahmadinejad was a true bureaucratic reformer, which he clearly was not. His professional background in the military made him a believer in a hierarchical and action-oriented governmental structure that relies on personal and professional loyalty, whereby subordinates follow decisions without much debate and challenge. It was this

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approach that ensured him a steady opposition even by his old conservative allies in the political establishment. Throughout, his administration was rife with cronyism, as he relied on familial nepotism and a tight circle of largely unqualified childhood friends; military, governmental, and academic colleagues; and college cohorts in staffing his administration and shaping his policies. 140 Ironically, while the conservative parliament approved Khatami’s initial cabinet with little controversy and challenge, the conservative parliament questioned Ahmadinejad’s appointees, many of whom came from the security-military establishment and some were tainted with prior illegal and unpopular acts such as violent repression and the “chain killings” of opposition leaders and intellectuals at home and abroad. 141 As he faced further questioning by the parliament and challenges to his governmental appointments, especially his gubernatorial choices, somewhat reminiscent of Richard Nixon’s bureaucratic approach that intended to undermine the Congressional checks and facilitate control of the bureaucracy, Ahmadinejad sought to circumvent the parliamentary checks by transferring the locus of power and decision-making to the presidential office and his small circle of loyal advisors, and by appointing his loyalists as directorgenerals in government bureaucracies with greater influence than their superiors. 142 He continued the same administrative strategy after his controversial reelection, drawing the ire of even conservative parliamentarians. As Ahmad Tavakoli, an influential conservative member of the parliament, questioned, “How can someone who has not spent a single day of their lives in intelligence work, whose most important work was as the head of a charitable organization, be suitable for the intelligence ministry?” 143 The president’s men gradually became the lightning rod of conservative factionalism and personal rivalries. A number of Ahmadinejad’s allies were challenged by the parliamentarians, including his economy minister, Shamseddin Hosseini, who was questioned for his links to a major banking scandal but survived the impeachment vote. 144 His deputy foreign minister and close ally, Mohammad Sharif Malekzadeh, was arrested and charged with corruption, as Khamene’i tried to assert his authority against his increasingly defiant president, who was perceived to be undermining the authority of the parliament and the Leader. 145 Parliamentarians even initiated petitions for debating impeachment of the president in 2010 by accusing him of gross violations including illegal withdrawal of millions of dollars from the Central Bank’s foreign reserve fund, illegal import of oil and natural gas, and lack of transparency in budget spending. 146 Parliamentary opponents of Ahmadinejad used the biggest financial scandal in Iran’s history, which included a $2.4 billion bank fraud, to secure seventy-three signatures (just above the required 25 percent threshold) to call for investigation and impeachment of the president. 147 While Khamene’i made serious threats against the president and even implied that the office of the president could be scrapped if political needs required, 148 he forced the parliament to back off from its threats of impeach-

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ment. 149 In preventing a showdown between the president and the parliament, Khamene’i was not only asserting his authority against an increasingly vocal parliament but, as important, was trying to prevent damaging exposes about the inner workings of the system by the president. As expected, the president and his allies did not sit idle in their schism with their conservative foes. When the parliament finally got to question him on his policy issues in March 2012, he dismissed their criticisms of his legislative failures, rising prices, unemployment, and fiscal mismanagement. He even ridiculed the parliamentarians by quibbling that “It was not a very difficult quiz. . . . To me those who designed the questions were from among those who got a master’s degree by just pushing the button. If you had consulted us, better questions would have been drawn up.” He added that he deserved high marks for his performance by saying; “Be fair. Any grade of less than 20 [out of 20] would be rude.” 150 In another confrontation with the parliament, he displayed a video purportedly showing Saeed Mortazavi, the former Tehran prosecutor and the president’s ally, being offered bribes by the parliamentary Speaker’s brother in return for political favor. 151 In that case, a 2010 parliamentary report had blamed Mortazavi for the torture and killing of demonstrators during the 2009 anti-election demonstrations. Even with his loyalists in positions of power, the Ahmadinejad administration saw its own share of internal frictions and ministerial resignations, since the president, as a micromanager who refused to delegate decisions to others, was even reluctant to consult with stakeholders on policy issues. As one of his former advisors and member of parliament indicated, “He is taking strategic decisions on the basis of personal whim. When he decided to launch the Mehr Reza Fund [offering young couples low interest rates] he did not take account of the parliamentary opposition. The fund is using oil money and provoking inflation. After the end of Ramadan, he announced four days off, without even consulting his own government.” 152 He totally disregarded the warnings that these holidays cut the economy’s link with the international economy with harmful effects. 153 In his policies, Ahmadinejad consistently tied himself to the downtrodden and radical conservative elements by relying on populist Islamic symbolism and by advocating for their causes. He often portrayed himself as one of them by using blue-collar colloquialisms that criticized the rich and “global arrogance.” Initially, he wanted to continue living in his own house, and when forced to live in the presidential palace by his security details, he ordered the removal of expensive furnishings from the palace. He even refused a VIP seat on the presidential plane and eventually replaced it with a cargo plane. 154 At his first press conference after his election, Ahmadinejad toned down his harsh policy stance on domestic issues by stating that “moderation will be the policy” of his administration in domestic matters. He also offered his openness to relations with any foreign country which is not hostile to

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Iran, but he saw no need to pay special attention to the relation with the United States. 155 In practice, however, his policies were indeed anything but moderate. He made some small concessions to moderates by speaking about women’s empowerment, liberalizing regulations pertaining to women’s attendance at sports events, planning to provide insurance for housewives, and promising to share Iran’s oil wealth with the poor. 156 Throughout his presidency, Ahmadinejad was consistently criticized for his failed economic and fiscal policies, ill-conceived conservative social policies, and confrontational and dogmatic foreign policy stance. During his 2005 campaign, Ahmadinejad had criticized the earlier administrations’ economic and fiscal policies and some of the country’s economic and financial institutions, including the Tehran Stock Exchange, by downplaying its role as a “gambling” enterprise. These criticisms had an unsettling effect on an already fragile economy. Although in response to some of the reactions and backlash to his rhetoric he toned down his stance and claimed policy moderation, the market fell to its lowest level within six months of his presidency. In contrast to Rafsanjani’s liberalism and Khatami’s moderate market-oriented approach, Ahmadinejad believed in an active role for the government in the economy. In his populist view, only the government could ensure public interest by guiding the performance of the public and private sectors. Neither liberalism nor statist economic policies could ensure social justice, according to Ahmadinejad. Generally, his official economic and fiscal policies included massive increases in governmental expenditure to stimulate the economy and address worsening unemployment problem, preservation and even expansion of subsidies to help the less privileged segments of the population, and eradication of corruption and inefficiency. Some of these strategies were contrary to the recent trends set by the previous administrations’ economic policies, and indeed inconsistent with, and undermined, the strategies and goals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (2005–2009). In many respects, this plan reflected the economic strategies and objectives pursued by the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations by committing to high growth rate, reduction in the size of the government and its role in economic sphere, reduction in and streamlining of subsidies, trade regulation through tariffs, and creation of an institutional and legal context for expanding the private sector. 157 Initially, Ahmadinejad tried to keep his campaign promises by pushing for a national school renovation project, minimum-wage increase, increased subsidies, and lowinterest loans to newlyweds. 158 For some time, the growing governmental expenditure was disconcerting for its inflationary impact, particularly in light of the economic sanctions. Not only had the previous administrations made some efforts to curtail these expenditures, but also the Fourth Plan dictated only a modest increase in expenditure. For the fiscal year 2005–2006, the Khatami budget allocated $14.2 billion in oil revenue to the government. The plan had accounted for an

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increase to $15.4 for the fiscal year 2006–2007. As a sharp departure, the Ahmadinejad administration sought and ultimately received $40 billion instead, despite initial resistance by the parliament. 159 The parliamentarians gave in to the administration’s demand even though it meant raiding the Oil Stabilization Fund, which was designed to offset revenue shortages in times of decline in oil prices and revenues. Many viewed this strategy shortsighted and counterproductive for its inflationary effects 160 and the uncertainties in the global oil market. In a highly publicized letter, fifty prominent Iranian economists criticized the administration’s economic policies and their faulty assumptions. They argued that enormous increases in expenditure and shortsighted interventionist policies on the part of the government would have inflationary effects and would unsettle the market. 161 The administration dismissed these criticisms and characteristically accused its critics of being ideological foes intent on causing economic instability in the country and hurting the poor while enriching the privileged segments of the population. On occasions, the administration also gave in to pressures when steadfastness was politically costly. For instance, the bazaar strike over new taxes forced the administration to swiftly change that policy. 162 Despite their populist appeal, these often contradictory policies failed to curb inflation and improve the unemployment rate, thus widening the gap between the poor and the rich. Contrary to the administration’s claim of inflation rate of mid-teens, by some estimates, the inflation rate was heading close to 30 percent a year. 163 As these policies seemed increasingly unsustainable, the administration opted for slight policy reversals with little success. By pushing for increased imports and a leaner budget, they hoped to curb prices and inflationary trends, but this strategy was unsuccessful. The administration even failed to address rising unemployment despite the vast amount of money appropriated by the parliament for developmental projects. In Iran, the size and scope of government subsidies complicate fiscal and economic woes. By some estimates, the amount spent on these subsidies range between 25 to 28 percent of the government’s total annual budget. 164 The previous administrations had called for measured reductions in and streamlining of subsidies with the hope of continuing assistance to the underprivileged, but containing the waste and unintended benefits to those who did not need them. However, a well-entrenched and corrupt system of cronyism tied to the establishment makes it quite impossible to rein in abusers of the subsidies. For this reason, the establishment, including the parliamentarians, has had no taste for a meaningful reform in the subsidy policies. The issues surrounding gasoline subsidies highlight the economic and political problems associated with government subsidies in the Islamic Republic. While it is nearly impossible to assess the cost of these subsidies—especially with price fluctuations in the oil market, the growing consumption, and the highly profitable smuggling business 165—it has been suggested that the total annual cost

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is 10–15 billion dollars. 166 These subsidies allow for one of the lowest gasoline prices at the pump in the world. For instance, after rejecting the Khatami administration’s attempt to raise these prices by eliminating some of the subsidies, the parliament set the price at $.09 a liter in 2006 which at the time was only higher than the price in Libya. 167 The Ahmadinejad administration was not keen on subsidizing affluent people and the oil-smuggling trade, but was concerned about inflation and its adverse impact on the underprivileged. Thus, the administration, with the consent of the parliament, continued raiding the Oil Stabilization Fund to maintain these subsidies. Later, the inevitable reduction in subsidies, price increases, and rationing caused public uproar including street demonstrations and burning of gas stations. The administration’s unwillingness and inability to address rampant nepotism and corruption, despite campaign promises, were also partly responsible for their economic failures. As indicated earlier, heavy reliance on ascription in the choice of government officials, distrust of technocrats outside the president’s personal and professional circles, and close ties to and reliance upon the military-security establishment did not allow any meaningful efforts at reform. The administration was in fact committed to helping its favorite conservative institutions and the military-security establishments by increasing their budgets and expanding the developmental projects that enriched them. There were large increases in the budgets of the Guardian Council and a number of conservative charity organizations, for instance. Historically, the military’s role in the economy began shortly after the Iran-Iraq war, as the Rafsanjani government feared the potentials for unrest by the returning soldiers who were unable to find employment. At the time, the government was of the view that it could address growing unemployment and poverty by engaging the military in new developmental projects. It was believed that this strategy would not only address some of the economic and social problems but would also remove any chances for a coup against the government. The Khatami administration tried to limit the economic role of the military to help strengthen the private sector. Those efforts were reversed by the Ahmadinejad administration, which was committed to the heightened economic role of the government and the military. For instance, in 2006, in addition to numerous existing projects totaling billions of dollars that were awarded during the previous administrations, the government awarded a $2.09 billion no-bid contract to the engineering arm of the IRGC, commonly known as the Khatam al-Anbia Headquarters or Ghorb Khatam, to develop two phases of the South Pars gas field, which was a long-term project to meet domestic fuel consumption needs. At the time, the Corps had completed over 1,200 projects and had close to 250 others at hand. In the Corps’ own estimate, the total value of the previous projects was $3 to $3.5 billion. This total was nearly doubled with the three new projects that were awarded by the Ahmadinejad administration. 168 The administration’s strategy was to expand

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the benefits of these projects to the lower echelons of the military, particularly the Basij, with whom the president had ties and for whom a great deal of affinity. Thus, his administration sought a 75 percent increase in the development budget designed to help the Basij win contracts for various government projects. 169 These policies, of course, helped the security-military establishment to gain predominance in nearly all aspects of the Iranian economy including import-export enterprises, transportation, oil, minerals, infrastructure development, housing, agriculture, and service industries. This expansive economic role enabled the military-security establishment to gain greater direct role in all facets of the Iranian government and politics. For instance, when the parliament rejected the president’s nominee for the oil minister, an overwhelming majority of the parliamentarians voted to confirm the appointment of the former commander of the Khatam al-Anbia, General Rostam Qasemi, as the oil minister. 170 In response to criticisms of this growing military role, their proponents contend that the constitution does account for the military’s expansive role outside the defense of the country. 171 As asserted by some, the winners of Ahmadinejad’s election were those elements of the military involved in various developmental projects. Some even accused the government of plotting to facilitate the takeover of some private companies by the military, as the government launched claims of corruption in the private sector and vowed to undertake reform. 172 In the absence of a vibrant private sector, prevalence of politically inspired regulatory measures by the government that are largely justified on the grounds of commitment to public interests and counter action against external pressures including boycotts, and political and social necessities of a system incapable of undertaking meaningful measures against political corruption and nepotism, the military-security establishment will continue to play a dominant economic role in the Islamic Republic for the foreseeable future. The tightening of international boycotts in reaction to Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and confrontational stance on nuclear policy compounded the economic problems, forcing many to call for initiatives to prevent further sanctions without jeopardizing the national interest of the country. Many reformists and conservatives came to conclude that the president had unnecessarily heightened the tension with serious economic and political consequences. As we will discuss later in this book, these external pressures, including boycott of Iranian oil in the international market and strict measures by the West— particularly by the United States—to slow if not stop the flow and transportation of Iranian oil, import-export restrictions on Iran on a wide array of commodities and services, and blocking the country’s access to the global financial system did indeed make it impossible for the administration to achieve much in the economic sphere. The sanctions had increasingly detrimental economic and fiscal impacts. In particular, foreign currency shortages and decline in the value of rial undermined domestic and foreign investments

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that hampered any chances of growth and relief in an already painful unemployment condition, exacerbated foreign trade imbalances, adversely impacted government subsidies and developmental projects due to the shortage of foreign currencies, and complicated the everyday life of average citizens. As the boycotts tightened, the condition worsened under the Ahmadinejad administration. In 2012, these tightening boycotts, which will be discussed later in this book, practically made the rial worthless, as the government felt helpless to find solutions. In the pre-revolutionary period of the 1970s, on average, a dollar was traded for 70 rials. In the post-revolutionary period, there were sharp fluctuations in the rial’s value over the years depending on the economic conditions. In 2012, it was trading at 26,500 or even higher to the dollar, which was an all-time low. 173 In one day, the currency’s value fell as much as 18 percent, trading as much as 35,000 rials for a dollar. This meant that the currency had lost 80 percent of its value since 2011. 174 The impact of this trend was felt in every sector of the economy. For instance, the Iranian automobile industry, which had grown during the Islamic Republic and was the thirteenth largest producer of automobile in the world in 2011 to the tune of 1.6 million cars—with extensive export activities in Russia, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Egypt, Algeria, and Bulgaria—witnessed a reported 30 to 50 percent drop in car and component production in the first half of 2012. 175 Similarly, export barriers hit the oil sector hard. According to a prominent parliamentarian, in June and July of 2012, oil exports dipped to around 800,000 barrels per day, a low not seen for more than two decades and less than half of the 2.3 million barrels per day exported in 2011. At the same time, oil workers were demanding back pay and salary increases, which in their view was under the poverty line. 176 Currency issues also impacted the tourism industry. The situation worsened as the boycotts froze Iran out of the global banking system. The government had limited options in dealing with the currency fall and its economic and fiscal impacts. Its decision to supply dollars to importers of certain basic products at a special rate in an attempt to rein in the currency slide had an opposite effect. 177 Public frustration with government’s inability to address these economic problems resulted in street demonstrations, riots, and closure of stores in the bazzar in sympathy with traders and other businessmen who were suffering. Characteristically, the government blamed Iranians’ economic woes on the Western “economic war” on Iran, and took a harsh stance against the demonstrators. 178 A number of demonstrators were arrested and charged with cooperating with foreign enemies to cause currency “disruption” and economic instability. 179 Ahmadinejad’s socio-cultural policies were reflective of the broader ideological and political tendencies of the regime, whose preoccupation with selfpreservation and control leaves very little room for inclusive policies in this realm. From the outset, an extensive network of conservative clerical personalities and organizations, judicial authorities, and security agencies have been

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tasked with ensuring popular compliance with the religious values of the system and prevention of challenge to its political monopoly. Khomeini himself established the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, which, as an independent body, is immune from supervision by other institutions of the government. This body’s decisions that are legally binding determine the outlines of the country’s social and cultural policies. Even the relatively liberal administrations that openly opted to minimize governmental intrusions in the socio-cultural life of the country have been unable to sidestep these structural constraints and guidelines that are imposed upon the system and the public. In the 2005 presidential election, reformers, moderates, and the general public were not as concerned about Ahmadinejad’s proposed economic policies as they were about his inclination to reverse socio-cultural and political reforms undertaken by the Khatami administration. These concerns were largely rooted in Ahmadinejad’s views about the nature of the Iranian political system and the role of religion in politics, his past practices as a regional governor and mayor of Tehran, and his close ties to social conservatives and the military. On occasions, he had spoken against democracy and had underscored the Islamic requirements of the state. As discussed earlier, he follows an extremist school of thought that even leaves little room for inclusiveness within the Shi’a worldview. As Tehran’s mayor, he had taken important steps to enforce Islamic social practices and mores and to eradicate Western cultural influences. In reality, however, Ahmadinejad was simply another willing foot soldier in the ongoing practice of socio-cultural intolerance of the system that on occasions deemed it necessary not to challenge the population’s liberal socio-cultural proclivities in order to forestall popular reactions and challenges. Ahmadinejad pursued targeted socio-cultural policies, however. On one hand, the government was keen on sidestepping any direct confrontation with the general public by simply disregarding people’s violations of dress codes, socially liberal behaviors and appearances, and harmless complaints. On the other hand, the government had to accommodate its socially conservative supporters by targeting politically and socially outspoken individuals and media, rhetorically backing “archaic, even superstitious” religious symbols and practices, and supporting Islamic organizations committed to the regime and its Islamic values. 180 While mostly neglecting the general public and their modernist tendencies, the government undertook repressive measures against individuals and civic society organizations through “cleansing” of the media, closure of papers and internet sites, arrest and imprisonment of opponents, expulsion of “undesirable” university professors, and occasional crackdowns on un-Islamic events and gatherings. The government reversed Khatami’s liberal policies toward the media as the new justice minister called for a “year of assessment” that practically suspended publication of new books and production of new musical creations during the

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first year of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. 181 They closed a number of important journals and newspapers and forced strict self-censorship on those who were still allowed to print. A number of editors and writers were banned and some were even charged with press crimes. Some political activists and intellectuals were also harassed and detained on trumped-up charges. As college students criticized the president’s dictatorship and heckled him during his visit to Amir Kabir University, the government arrested student leaders and forced out professors who were sympathetic to them. Furthermore, the government undermined the role of modern civil society organizations, which were supported by the Khatami administration, by redirecting funds to traditional institutions like mosques and religious organizations that are committed to furthering Islamic values and marginalizing the liberal elements. For instance, while the government allowed the Center for Women’s Participation—an organization committed to the advancement of women’s role in all walks of life—to exist, they renamed it as the Center for Women and Family Affairs and redirected its grants to more family-oriented activities and research. 182 With the Supreme Leader’s critical support, even despite widespread criticisms from important elements of the establishment, the Ahmadinejad administration took a hard-line stance against the massive demonstrations and riots that followed the presidential election of 2009. By banning, arresting, charging, and imprisoning the opponents, the administration opened another chapter in the regime’s efforts to clamp down on freedom of ideas and expression. As the government accused the West of a “soft war” of influence through the Web, it criticized Google as an “instrument of espionage,” banned Gmail, 183 and called for an end to the country’s link with the international Internet. The popularity of Internet and search engines in Iran, 184 even among the parliamentarians, forced the government to express a desire to establish a “national” and “clean” network. The regime established an Internet Oversight Agency to facilitate control over the content and to undertake the necessary steps to establish a homegrown Internet system. Although there were significant doubts about their scientific capabilities, in late 2012, Iran launched a new Web video channel called Mehr that is run by the state broadcasting system (IRIB), with very limited capacity. 185 Despite these bans on Google, Gmail, and the official censorship of YouTube, Iranians have been quite creative in accessing the global Internet. The administration was also relentless about relying on the judiciary in silencing its political opponents, especially after the 2009 presidential election. The targets were not only average citizens who had challenged the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad presidency and his failed policies but also some of the reformist and moderate elites, including former President Khatami, who had developed distaste for the administration. The case of Nasrin Sotoudeh, an attorney who had defended journalists and human rights acti-

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vists, gained international attention as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, expressed extreme concern about Ms. Sotoudeh’s well-being in prison. Ms. Sotoudeh, who went on hunger strike in opposition to a travel ban against her twelve-year-old daughter, was serving a six-year prison sentence for “acting against national security and spreading propaganda” against the regime. 186 She was released from prison shortly after President Rouhani came to the office as a gesture of commitment to human rights on the part of the new administration. 187 The rahbar plays a constitutionally mandated role in the formation and implementation of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policies. Although presidents may vary in their styles and priorities, they follow the main thrust of the Leader’s foreign policy preferences in order to avoid friction and marginalization. Generally, substance of the major foreign policy issues including regional relations, Israel, foreign presence and intervention in the Middle East, and nuclear policies have not drastically changed from one administration to another. Indeed, with minor and temporary exceptions, these policies have remained intact since Khamene’i succeeded Khomeini. For instance, while the Khatami administration temporarily suspended uranium enrichment activities as a confidence-building measure, it had no intention of abandoning the country’s right to enrichment and its nuclear projects. The Ahmadinejad administration’s foreign policies were in line with Khamene’i’s stated policy preferences, despites the two leaders’ spats and occasional disputes over style. In practice, what set Ahmadinejad apart from his predecessors was not the substance of his foreign policies, but rather his confrontational and undiplomatic style that garnered him a following domestically and in much of the third world and massive opposition in the West. Even some influential conservative politicians in Iran took issue with Ahmadinejad’s style for damaging the country’s image outside. 188 Ahmadinejad was particularly criticized for his insensitive comments about Israel. In reality, he followed Khamene’i’s lead when it came to Israel. On occasions, Khamene’i himself has harshly criticized Israel and its policies. In supporting the Palestinian cause, he has referred to Israel as a “cancerous tumor” that should be eradicated from the Middle East, has condemned the foreign “thugs and outcasts” who interfere in the region, has opposed a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian issue, and has favored the continuation of the Palestinian struggle against Israel. 189 Ahmadinejad not only portrayed Israel in similar lights, but also challenged the popular sentiments about the roots and implications of the Holocaust, which caused a great deal of negative reaction domestically and globally. These stylistic problems helped crystalize the external opposition to the mainstay of Iran’s foreign policies. In contrast to both the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations, which exhibited moderation toward the West and even called for some form of rapprochement with the United States, Ahmadinejad’s ideological preoccu-

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pations brought him closer to radical regimes in the third world, including North Korea and several Latin American countries. Ahmadinejad expressed a great deal of affinity toward the anti-imperialist pronouncements of the Latin American Left, and his administration entered into a number of joint ventures and trade agreements with Chávez’s Venezuela and the Nicaraguan government. Similarly, the administration signed a number of agreements with the U.S. nemesis, North Korea, which covered a wide range of issues. In October 2012, for instance, the two countries signed an agreement to set up joint scientific and technological laboratories; exchange scientific teams; and transfer technology in information technology, energy, environment, agriculture, and food. 190 A U.N. panel also claimed that Iran and North Korea were regularly exchanging ballistic missile technology and components in violation of the U.N. sanctions. As revealed in some of the classified documents exposed by WikiLeaks, U.S. intelligence had also concluded that Iran and North Korea had extensive military cooperation including missile technology development and transfer. North Korea, it was claimed, had transferred a cache of R-27 Russian missiles to Iran that enabled the country to effectively target capitals in Western Europe as well as Moscow. Access to these missiles and their technology, it was feared, could speed up Iran’s ability to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. 191 While Iran has developed fairly sophisticated missiles, still the range of these missiles does not normally exceed 1,200 miles, and the maximum range for their Russian R-27 missiles is 1,500 miles. These ranges are, in fact, far shorter than the normal ICBM range of 3,400 miles. Although many experts believe that Iran remains distant from developing missiles that can carry nuclear warheads, the country has obtained North Korean BM-25 missiles that do have such capabilities and could potentially be deployed if Iran does develop nuclear weapons. Iran’s venture into space technology, as it sent its first satellite into space, heightened fears that the country may have indeed developed a more efficient generation of rockets, known as Safir, which could substantially increase their capabilities. 192 Even common interests in Afghanistan including Iran’s ongoing tensions with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda did not facilitate a meaningful cooperation with the United States. While in several instances Iran assisted the West in pursuing Al-Qaeda when it served its interest, it also gave refuge to some of its top leaders and members of Bin Laden’s family 193 in order to maintain some influence among radical Islamist groups and leverage over the regimes they target. Ahmadinejad’s unbending stance on nuclear policy and his outspoken opposition to the United States’ role in the region removed any chances of improved relations with the West. Iran’s foreign minister criticized the United States’ military buildup in the region by indicating that: “The Americans always have a deficit, unfortunately, in rationality and prudence.” He called on the United States to be “more prudent and wise” or risk

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more unrest in the region. 194 The Ahmadinejad administration even challenged the United States military presence in the region by authorizing Iranian jetfighters to fire on a U.S. MQ-1 Predator military drone conducting surveillance in the Persian Gulf in 2012. 195 Shortly thereafter, the Revolutionary Guards downed a ScanEagle American drone, while Iran launched a complaint to the United Nations for “illegal and provocative” violation of its airspace by the United States. 196 As in the previous administrations, trade considerations, 197 territorial claims and counterclaims, Iran’s extensive support for Shi’a movements, particularly Hamas and Hezbollah, commitment to the preservation and strengthening of the Shi’a Crescent, opposition to Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians, and rejection of the ever-expanding conservative Arab military and geo-strategic cooperation with the United States shaped the Ahmadinejad administration’s regional policies. The Arab uprising, however, caused greater urgency on the part of conservative Arab monarchs, particularly in the Persian Gulf states, to counter domestic threats to their existence and Iran’s growing influence. Conservative Arab regimes’ suspicion of the Islamic Republic has not only been rooted in sectarian schisms but also in the ideological underpinnings of the Iranian revolution and regime that during the early post-revolutionary years openly questioned the legitimacy of monarchic systems and their domestic and foreign policies from an Islamic viewpoint, and called for the exportation of the Islamic revolution to all Muslim countries. Khomeini and the first generation of the revolutionaries encouraged an open revolt against these regimes. Cognizant of Iran’s diplomatic constraints and military limitations in the face of the U.S. support for these regimes and the country’s economic and geo-strategic interests, Rafsanjani offered greater regional cooperation and integration if these states minimized foreign presence in the region, a policy that was quickly dismissed by these countries since it was perceived as a prelude to the Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Led by Saudi Arabia, conservative Arab regimes have relied on a range of strategies to ensure their stability and counter Iran’s growing influence. These strategies include building up their military arsenals; financial and military support for their regional allies; economic, diplomatic, and military initiatives to stem the tide of domestic change in the broader Arab world prompted by the increasingly restless “Arab street”; and encouraging confrontation with Iran and undermining its regional alliances. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, contracted with the founder of Blackwater, Eric Prince, to train a mercenary force intended to conduct special operations inside and outside the country. Mr. Prince’s new company, named Reflex Response, secured multimillion-dollar contracts, with the understanding of the United States, to prepare a mercenary force of Colombians and South Africans to train for crowd control, intelligence gathering, urban combat,

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protection of nuclear and radioactive materials, and special operations. 198 This force was also believed to prepare for a stealth maritime and air assault to free the three disputed islands controlled by Iran in the Persian Gulf. 199 Furthermore, the UAE has spent billions of dollars to enhance its security including lucrative consulting contracts and weapons purchases. 200 While the Saudis refrained from an open confrontation with Iran, they used the claim of Iranian regional hegemonic designs to secure military hardware from the United States. As the Saudis and Israelis found a common enemy in Iran, the United States was able to sell advanced F-15 fighter jets and other sophisticated weaponry to the Saudis without fear of Israeli opposition. 201 By all indications, the Saudis also strongly lobbied the United States government to bomb Iran, since they claimed that sanctions are ineffective in stopping Iranians from developing nuclear weapons, and reminded the Americans that stopping Iran is necessary to preserve the “American-backed regional order,” a regional security arrangement in effect since the Carter Doctrine. 202 Although Ahmadinejad officially dismissed the suggestions of conservative Arab conspiracy and hostility, as spelled out in the WikiLeaks-exposed U.S. diplomatic cables, by calling them “psychological warfare against Iran,” 203 the administration was well aware of the Arabs’ initiatives including their active courting of Iranians’ traditional allies in Hamas. Although Iran had been instrumental in the establishment and growing influence of Hamas through political, economic, and military support, 204 conservative Arab states including Jordan, Qatar, and other Persian Gulf states were somewhat successful in wooing Hamas away from Iran with the promise of greater Arab economic aid and support for their struggle against Israel. Iran, in turn, supported the growing domestic Shi’a opposition to these Sunni regimes. The Bahraini government, for instance, openly accused the IRGC of setting up militant cells among the majority Shi’a in Bahrain to carry out attacks and assassinations. 205 As expected, the Shi’a resistance in Bahrain dismissed these allegations as “a convenient distraction” from the slow pace of reform and progress toward equal rights for the country’s restive Shi’a majority. 206 Since the start of the Arab uprising, in particular, the Saudis have been relying on their financial, diplomatic, and military capabilities to fend off, or even reverse, the tide of change prompted by the increasingly alienated and outspoken Arab public. Their extensive financial backing of the Egyptian military establishment, as a countermeasure to the Brotherhood, and the military’s coup that overthrew the democratically elected Brotherhood government; their support of the Sunni Muslims’ uprising against the Syrian regime; and their military operations to ensure the survival of the Sunni government in Bahrain exemplify the counter revolutionary efforts on the part of the “Club of Kings” to stem the tide of change, maintain their authoritarian rule, and reverse Iran’s growing regional influence. 207 To establish a united front against Iran, the Saudis proposed to include Jordan and Morocco in the Gulf Cooperation Council and, as they

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deployed military forces in Bahrain under the auspices of this council, they made it clear that these monarchs will resist any change by whatever means possible. The conservative Arab position on the Syrian crisis has evolved significantly over time. For instance, since the Saudis were fearful of the spread of Arab uprising in the kingdoms and an uncontrollable sectarian schism in the region, they initially offered a lukewarm support for the Syrian regime despite their inherent dislike of this regime and its close ties to Iran. Since then, the Saudis have been sitting on the sideline and officially sympathizing with the Syrian people and their desire for change. In actuality, however, they have pushed for pressure on the Syrian regime within the Arab League, and have encouraged and supported Qatar and the United Arab Emirates and their initiatives to offer massive funding for the rebels who intended to overthrow an authoritarian Alawite-led regime. 208 Even though Iran has officially called for inclusiveness in the Syrian polity, Iran’s enormous strategic interest in preserving the Shi’a Crescent by supporting the Syrian regime supersedes its desire to avoid direct confrontation with regional powers and the West. While the Ahmadinejad administration formally supported diplomatic initiatives to solve the Syrian crisis, 209 it did indeed offer extensive assistance to the Assad regime in the form of military hardware, intelligence, and technical and military support. Despite pressures from the United States, the Shi’a government in Iraq allowed Iran to ship military equipment to Syria through the Iraqi airspace. 210 Iran has also provided the Syrians with training and technology to intercept communication and monitor the internet. Furthermore, the Iranian Qods Force personnel have been training the Alawite paramilitary forces and Iranian drones have been employed in counterinsurgency efforts. 211 Although the United States has criticized Russian support for the Syrian regime and has acknowledged Iran’s extensive assistance to the Syrian government, 212 its involvement in the Syrian conflict has been limited to the bombing of the ISIS strongholds, largely due to concerns about the complexities and uncertainties of the Syrian civil war. The British parliament’s unequivocal rejection of British military participation in action in Syria, and the Obama administration’s inability to garner broad domestic and international support for bombing the country in retaliation for the alleged Syrian government’s involvement in the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians highlight the Western apprehension in getting more deeply involved in a civil war and risking confrontation with Syria’s allies: Russia and Iran. The Rouhani Presidency and Prospects for Moderation and Pragmatism (2013–Present) Ahmadinejad had his share of supporters and detractors throughout his presidency. As economic mismanagement and bites of sanctions undermined the

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quality of average citizens’ daily lives and the president’s style and policies exacerbated the infighting particularly within the conservative establishment, there emerged a general sense of Ahmadinejad fatigue and a desire to move beyond dogmatism and return to pragmatic moderation. The presidential election of 2013 was relatively non-controversial compared to the previous two elections since prominent reformers were unable to run, moderate and Principalist candidates were disqualified, 213 and the remaining reformists withdrew before the election. The final field of the candidates consisted of establishment conservatives and those tied to Iran’s nuclear program. 214 Initially, a total of 686 candidates registered to run including Ahmadinejad’s like-minded protégé and close ally Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, former President Rafsanjani, the reformist former vicepresident and technology minister Mohammad Reza Aref, and a field of mostly conservative candidates. Mashaei and Rafsanjani were the two well-known candidates who were disqualified by the Guardian Council. The Council approved eight mostly conservative candidates including Saeed Jalili, Hassan Rouhani, Ali Akbar Velayati, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Mohsen Rezai, Mohammad Gharazi, Mohammad Reza Aref, and Gholamali Haddad-Adel. As expected, Ahmadinejad questioned the disqualification of Mashaei and threatened to seek Khamene’i’s help in reinstating him. 215 The disqualifications made it clear that Khamene’i wanted to reserve the election for loyalist conservatives by sidelining moderates, reformists, and Principalists. 216 The choice of so many personalities tied to the nuclear program underlined the regime’s sense of urgency in dealing with nuclear and foreign policy issues by relying upon establishment conservatives committed to a pragmatic approach in these areas. It was, of course, understood that the choice of any of the “nuclear candidates” would not necessarily translate into a nuclear policy reversal, given the complexity of this issue in the Iranian body politic. 217 Hassan Rouhani specifically called for a “new tone” in the Iranian nuclear policy and criticized Ahmadinejad for his confrontational stance on nuclear disputes. Gradually, he became the leading candidate as he garnered the support of the conservative establishment, moderates, and reformists for his centrist and pragmatic views. 218 As Aref, the leading reformist candidate in the field, withdrew from the race with Khatami’s encouragement, Khatami and Rafsanjani endorsed Rouhani’s candidacy. 219 Rouhani received the necessary support to avoid a runoff election by gaining votes among a broad segment of the population from small to large cities, secular and religious elements, reformists to conservatives, the middle class, and the youth. His somewhat surprising victory is largely attributed to the ongoing reformists’ resentment and animosity related to what transpired in the 2009 election and its aftermath, and to the general population’s widespread rejection of the Principalists and their policies. 220

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Hassan Rouhani was born Hassan Fereydoun on November 12, 1948, in the town of Sorkheh, near the city of Semnan, into a religious family of modest means. His father, Asadollah Fereydoun, owned a spice shop and served numerous prison sentences for his oppositionist politics during the monarchy. Hassan later changed his official name to Rouhani. His religious studies began in the Semnan Seminary and continued at the Qom Seminary in the early 1960s. In Qom, he was mentored by prominent clerics of the time including Ayatollahs Mohammad Reza Golpayegani and Morteza Haeri Yazdi. 221 He received his BA in law from the College of Law and Political Science at Tehran University in 1972. Later, he pursued his studies at Glasgow Caledonian University and received an MPhil in law in 1995 with a thesis titled “The Islamic Legislative Power with Reference to the Iranian Experience,” and a PhD in constitutional law in 1999 with a thesis titled “The Flexibility of the Shariah with a Reference to the Iranian Experience.” As a research professor at Iran’s Center for Strategic Research, he published numerous books and articles on a wide range of topics including Islamic political thought and law, revolution, national security and nuclear diplomacy, foreign and economic policies, national security and the environment, history of imamah, and religious education and the role of the seminaries. As he explains in his memoirs, Rouhani began his political activities as a teenage clerical follower of Khomeini, and was arrested numerous times and banned from delivering public speeches. 222 He continued with his oppositional politics abroad and returned to Iran after the revolution. His career in the Islamic Republic spans over three decades and includes elected, appointed, and academic roles. He served as a member, deputy Speaker, and chair of the foreign and defense policy committees of the Majles; headed the Supervisory Council of the IRIB; served as a member of the Supreme Defense Council during the Iran-Iraq war; held numerous leadership roles in the military for which he received commendations for service; represented Khamene’i at the Supreme National Security Council and was the secretary of this body for a lengthy period; headed the Political, Defense, and Security Committee of the Expediency Council; served as a member of the Assembly of Experts, where he headed the Social and Political Committee; served as a nuclear negotiator; and in his academic role he headed the Center for Strategic Research and was the managing editor of three academic research quarterlies including Rahbord, Foreign Relations, and the Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs. His roles as a member of the National Security Council and a leading nuclear negotiator propelled him to political prominence that ultimately ensured him the presidency. His calm and moderate mannerism and diplomatic skills won him the label of “diplomat Sheikh.” 223 When he headed the nuclear negotiation team during the Khatami administration, Iran responded to Western allegations by voluntarily agreeing to a temporary suspension of some parts of Iran’s nuclear activities as a confidence-building

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measure. Although the administration’s consent to temporary suspension was later criticized by the Ahmadinejad administration, Iran’s concessions under Rouhani’s leadership, which were blessed by the president and Khamene’i, borrowed Iran time to make significant technological advancements and complete the fuel cycle while insisting on Iran’s right to enrichment without being referred to the UN Security Council or risking confrontation with the West. 224 Obviously, it is still too early to offer an assessment of Rouhani’s policy accomplishments. So far, as a sharp departure from the Ahmadinejad administration, his administration has shown an inclination toward meritocracy, inclusiveness, and pragmatic moderation. 225 His cabinet appointments are indicative of his policy priorities, willingness to compromise, and openness to alternative perspectives. His cabinet nominees consisted of moderate reformists, technocratic moderates associated with the Rafsanjani administration, and moderate conservatives with centrist tendencies. Also, the choice of cabinet members indicates the president’s priorities in dealing with domestic economic issues and foreign policy challenges. Astutely, but to the disappointment of some, he has tried to fend off any conservative backlash by putting them in charge of socio-cultural policies. 226 Rouhani’s choice of his economic team reflects the general direction of his economic policy preferences as spelled out during his campaign. Contrary to his predecessor, he has been quite transparent in speaking of the country’s economic woes, including unemployment and high inflation rates. 227 Furthermore, the administration plans to minimize the economic role of the government and return to a market-oriented long-term developmental strategy in order to stimulate the economy. This strategy, combined with reform in subsidies, control of liquidity, and reduction in imports is hoped to lower the unemployment rate, increase the population’s purchasing power, and decrease the gap between the rich and the poor. Of course, these strategies can only succeed if the administration addresses the structural impediments that hampered both the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations. Even the most optimistic observer should consider this a tall and unrealistic order. It is evident that the Rouhani administration views the removal of sanctions as a major step in addressing the country’s economic woes. That explains why nuclear negotiations have taken priority in the new administration. The nuclear policy, foreign economic sanctions, and the conflict in Syria are the most pressing foreign policy issues facing the new administration. Rouhani’s past experience as the chief nuclear negotiator and his moderation promise change, albeit gradual, in Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue. He has explicitly advocated for moderation in foreign policy and has stated that “there is the political will” to end the nuclear dispute. He could not have taken such a stance without the backing of Khamene’i and the conservative

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establishment. 228 In an interview with the NBC network, he explicitly indicated that Iran will never pursue nuclear weapons and reiterated his interest in pursuing a negotiated solution to the nuclear dispute with the West. 229 In his first speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2013, he spoke of ethical and Islamic religious prohibitions against nuclear weapons and reiterated his government’s readiness to engage “immediately in a time-bound and result-oriented talks to build mutual confidence and removal of mutual uncertainties with full transparency.” 230 Although the Israeli prime minister has dismissed these statements as hypocritical, the Obama administration’s response has been cautiously optimistic. 231 As a “disciplined insider,” 232 however, Rouhani does understand the limitations of change in nuclear policy given its immense popularity among Iranians who consider the nuclearization of Iran a symbol of national pride and protection. 233 Under Rouhani, Iran has continued to boost its nuclear enrichment capabilities by installing larger numbers of more efficient centrifuges, even though the latest IAEA report indicates that there has not been much growth in the production of enriched uranium to 20 percent. 234 Rouhani has pledged, however, to pursue serious talks with the West over nuclear issues and Iran’s desire for an end to the economic boycotts. To these ends, he has shifted the responsibility for nuclear talks from the hardline Supreme National Security Council to Iran’s foreign ministry. This shift would not only offer the president great control over the talks but would open opportunities for greater moderation. 235 Western positive gestures may strengthen Rouhani’s hand as he tries to address the domestic resistance to significant concessions on the nuclear issues. For instance, while the recent decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to unfreeze the assets of seven Iranian banks and businesses, that were frozen under the sanction system, is a blow to the Western efforts to pressure Iran, 236 it may help in confidence-building within the Iranian political establishment as they witness the benefits of moderation. Clearly the positive mood and sincere efforts at a negotiated settlement during the nuclear talks in early November 2013 between Iran and the P5+1 represented both the new realities in the domestic politics of Iran as well as the Western understanding that the new Iranian leadership may be more open to a settlement. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the early November 2013 talks did not culminate in an agreement largely due to the French demands that are simply unacceptable to the Iranians. While the West blamed Iran for the talks’ failure, Iranians insisted that the absence of a consensus among the Western negotiators, especially the French insistence on seeking a “credible agreement,” prevented an agreement. 237 It is evident that Iran will continue to insist on its right to enrichment but will be willing to submit to stricter verification measures, as evident in the interim agreement reached on November 24, 2013. While the agreement rolls back Iran’s nuclear programs, it does tacitly acknowledge her right to enrichment. Rouhani’s ability to push

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for a comprehensive agreement will largely depend upon his success to rein in the domestic opposition to these concessions, particularly by conservatives and the security establishment in Iran. The easing of sanctions and consequent economic improvements in the country may strengthen his hands in dealing with this opposition, as he garners popular support for this policy. Success in this area may also help moderation on other domestic and foreign policy issues. Iran’s reliance on the Shi’a Crescent in advancing its regional interests necessitates continued backing of the Assad regime in Syria. Despite public pronouncements by the Iranian leaders in support of “popular wishes of the Syrian people,” 238 Iran has unabatedly continued with its massive political, economic, and military support for the Syrian regime. Khamene’i explicitly criticized the Obama administration’s call for bombing Syria in response to the alleged use of chemical weapons, and has warned of the disastrous human costs and potentials for regional instability. 239 The Rouhani administration does understand how the Syrian situation complicates their economic and foreign policy initiatives. Clearly, the new administration tries to distance itself from the previous administration’s regional policies by supporting new ties to Saudi Arabia and avoiding vocal opposition to Israel. Rouhani has spoken of his role in the initiatives to develop a regional security arrangement with the Saudis during the Khatami administration. His foreign minister, Javad Zarif, also sent a tweet congratulating the Iranian Jewish community for the Jewish holiday of Rosh Hashanah. As a clear departure from the Ahmadinejad administration and its controversial views on the Holocaust, he has pointed out that “we have condemned the killing of Jews by Nazis as we condemn the killing and crackdown on Palestinians by Zionists.” 240 During the campaign, Rouhani called for inclusiveness and openness in socio-cultural policies. He rejected restrictions on Internet access by admitting that “gone are the days when a wall could be built around the country. . . . There are no more walls.” 241 He has advocated for women’s rights, but the parliament rejected his proposal to create a Ministry of Women on the grounds that women are not separate from the community. His choice of conservatives for government posts dealing with socio-cultural issues does not promise meaningful steps for greater social openness and human rights improvements. THE JUDICIARY Public institutions in the Islamic Republic exhibit varying degrees of institutional paralysis due to the regime’s authoritarian proclivities, professional ineptness tied to rampant cronyism and nepotism, ideological schisms, and factionalism. The judiciary is the most dysfunctional institution because of

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the voluminous caseload, ill-prepared and ideologically motivated judges, jurisdictional disputes, proliferation of unconstitutional structures of political control, prevalence of poorly defined and politically motivated charges, absence of procedural clarity and transparency, and pervasiveness of errant judgments. This view is shared not only by a distrusting public who has to cope with an irrational maze of red tape and inefficiency but also by judges who are often incapable of handling the overwhelming number of cases. For instance, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, who headed the judiciary from 1999 to 2009, in his inaugural address, indicated that he was inheriting an institution in ruins and in dire need of reform. Shahroudi’s serious efforts to reform the judiciary were stymied by well-entrenched conservative clerics within the judiciary and their allies in the political establishment. His conservative successor abandoned his reform initiatives and accomplishments including the Citizens’ Bill of Rights which was passed in 2004 to end illtreatment of prisoners. To lower the burden of cases, the judiciary has established new Dispute Settlement Councils with narrow jurisdiction over cases that lack, or are limited, in judicial complexity. These councils, whose jurisdictions are challenged by lawyers on constitutional or religious grounds, are mainly designed to rely on arbitration for resolution of minor civil cases, but their role has not improved the judicial functions. The Court System and Legal Procedures The history of the judiciary in the Islamic Republic dates back to the revolutionary courts created shortly after Khomeini’s triumphant return to Iran. These courts, which were established in Tehran and major provincial cities, almost immediately and summarily charged, tried, convicted, and punished hundreds if not thousands of people associated with the ancien régime including military personnel, police and security officers, parliamentary deputies, cabinet ministers, and civil servants. Led by Sadegh Khalkhali, the infamous “hanging judge,” these courts sent many people to their deaths after summary and secret trials without proper legal representation, much due process, and any chances for appeal. The public outcry and protests by some of the moderate politicians and leading clerics ultimately forced Khomeini to put a temporary halt to these executions and to create a committee that adopted rules of conduct for these courts. These rules did temper the activities of the courts. 242 The constitution of the Islamic Republic in Chapter XI (Articles 156 through 174) accounts for an independent judiciary, frames its main structures and functions, and spells out the general procedural guidelines for adjudication and the qualifications, roles, and responsibilities of judges. The issues of judicial independence and accountability are quite contentious in

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this system. Essentially, the constitution guarantees judicial independence in Articles 156 and 164. As Article 164 reads: [a] judge cannot be removed, whether temporarily or permanently, from the post he occupies except by trial and proof of his guilt, or in consequence of a violation entailing his dismissal. A judge cannot be transferred or reassigned without his consent, except in cases when the interest of society necessitates it, thus too, with the decision of the head of the judiciary branch after consultation with the chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General.

While these stipulations provide for a semblance of the independence of judges, in practice they do very little to ensure judicial independence, simply because of the patterns of recruitment and top down control by the judicial leadership that seeks ideological harmony in the institution. In practice, judicial independence means independence from the public and the other two elected branches of the government. Having been appointed by the clerical leadership, judges are not accountable to the public. With the exception of the parliamentary legislation, which itself is limited in scope and subject to religious litmus tests, there is no meaningful oversight of the judiciary by the legislature or the executive branch. Judges are not immune from judicial discipline, however (Article 171 of the constitution). Technically, they are both criminally and civilly liable for their misconduct, judicial indiscretion, and violation of the laws. Of course, in practice this does not establish an effective mechanism of accountability. In political cases the absence of accountability has been hotly debated. On occasions, when dominated by moderates and liberals, the parliament has tried to investigate the judiciary’s practices, but the judiciary has claimed that it is only responsible to the Supreme Leader and no one else. The judiciary’s responsibilities, according to Article156, are to administer justice and protect the public’s rights by: • investigating and making decisions on grievances, complaints about violations of rights, legal disputes, and probate matters; • promoting justice and ensuring legitimate freedoms; • supervising the proper implementation of the laws; • uncovering crimes and prosecuting and punishing the criminals according to the provisions of the penal code; and • taking proper measures to prevent the occurrence of crimes and to rehabilitate criminals. The highest judicial authority is the Head of the Judiciary. He, according to Article 157 of the constitution, should be an honorable man who is well versed in judicial matters and possess administrative capabilities and prudence. He is appointed to the position by the Supreme Leader for a five-year

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term to oversee all functions of the judiciary. His functions include the establishment of the necessary structures; drafting of judiciary bills; hiring, promotion, transfer, and dismissal of judges in accordance with the law; and discharging with all pertinent administrative duties. The constitution also accounts for a Minister of Justice (Article 160). As a cabinet member, the minister is appointed to the position by the president, subject to parliamentary confirmation, from among individuals nominated by the Head of the Judiciary. The minister is primarily responsible for all matters related to the relationship between the judiciary and the other two branches of the government. However, the Head of the Judiciary may delegate full authority to the minister in financial and administrative matters including personnel hiring (with the exception of judges). Courts of justice are the official bodies that handle grievances and legal disputes. Article 159 of the constitution leaves it up to the parliament to determine the structures and functions of the court system. Parliamentary laws have established a multitier court system based on functional specialization, severity of the case at hand, and level of the court (chart 6.3; see appendix). Functionally, courts are divided into criminal and civil divisions. Their jurisdictions are dependent upon the severity of the crime, the value of the property under dispute, or the level of punitive action involved. Criminal courts fall into two categories: first- and second-level courts. The first-level courts have jurisdiction over prosecution for felony charges, while the second-level courts try cases that involve higher punitive action. Civil courts consist of first-level, second-level, independent, and special civil courts. Special civil courts handle family matters including divorce and custodial disputes. 243 Each family court consists of one male judge and a female consultant. The female consultant may only offer advice to the judge but may not render judgment. All litigants in divorce cases are initially referred to arbitration for reconciliation. If the arbiter determines that the parties cannot reconcile and cohabitate, the judge issues a divorce decree in accordance with the normal rules of civil procedure. The first instance public civil or criminal courts have the original jurisdiction in hearing all cases within their jurisdiction unless the law makes exceptions. The second instance or appellate courts are competent to hear appeals of decisions made by the public and revolutionary courts, but they lack jurisdiction in cases decided by Clerical Tribunals. The Supreme Judicial Council consists of a number of mujtahids and is responsible for framing the country’s overall judicial policies. The council is only responsible to the Supreme Leader. The State Supreme Court is the highest judicial court in the country, according to Article 161 of the constitution. It is formed for the purpose of supervising courts’ conduct and decisions; ensuring uniform application of laws; hearing appeals cases from the public, revolutionary, and military courts; resolving jurisdictional disputes;

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and discharging other legally mandated duties. This court, according to section 10 of Article 110 of the constitution, is also tasked with investigating the president for allegations of legal misconduct. However, technically, it lacks the power of judicial review, since that right is reserved for the Guardian Council. The State Supreme Court is seated in Tehran with branches in Tehran and other cities, as determined by law. The head of the Supreme Court is appointed for a five-year term by the Head of the Judiciary from among honorable men well-versed in judicial matters (Article 162). Each branch is presided over by two judges (a chief judge and an advisor) and deputies who could discharge of the court’s duties in the absence of the judges. 244 Under the instruction of the Chief of the State Supreme Court, who also acts as the chairman of the General Assembly of the Supreme Court, cases are assigned to the court’s branches for investigation and decisions. Each member of the court is required to study the assigned cases and to render judgment after adequate deliberation and consultation. The Chief of the State Supreme Court may request expedited hearings and decisions in emergency cases. Procedurally, the litigants in these courts are not summoned for investigation unless their presence is needed, for which summons are issued. To render its judgment, the court is required to seek the opinion of the State Prosecutor General or his representative. The unjustifiable failure of these persons to appear before the court will not delay the issuance of judgments. In cases of uniformity of the laws and precedence, cases are initially reviewed by the State Prosecutor General Office and its opinion is forwarded to the General Assembly of the Supreme Court. In civil matters, the General Assembly of the Civil Branches consisting of the chief of the Supreme Court and chief of the civil branches will investigate prior judgments. A similar procedure is in effect in criminal matters, as decisions of the lower courts are investigated by the General Assembly of the Criminal Branch. The General Assembly of the Judicial Uniformity that consists of the Chief Judge of the State Supreme Court and chief judges and advisors of both criminal and civil branches make final decisions on matters of precedence that are biding in all courts of law. In discharging of its duties, the State Supreme Court works closely with the State Prosecutor’s Office that consists of the State Prosecutor General, his two deputies, and a number of assistants. In addition to regular courts, a number of specialized courts have been established, some in accordance with constitutional stipulations and others without a constitutional mandate. Judicial procedures in some of these courts lack transparency and respect for due process rights. The Military Court and the Court of Administrative Justice are created on the basis of Articles 172 and 173 of the constitution respectively. The Office of Military Prosecutor and military courts are parts of the judiciary and have jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the army, gendarmerie, police, and the

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Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in connection with their security duties. For common crimes and crimes committed while serving the department of justice in executive capacity, these personnel are subject to common courts and their respective civil and criminal procedures (Article 172). The Court of Administrative Justice is established to hear, investigate, and render judicial decisions about complaints brought up against public entities including government officials, organs, and statutes. This court, which is supervised by the Head of the Judiciary (Article 173), consists of three organs: the branches, the Board of Appeals, and the General Board. Each branch consists of two judges, one serving as the chief judge and the other as the advisor. According to Article 11 of the Law of the Courts of Administrative Justice, both legal and natural persons may file a complaint with the court. Article 18 of this law indicates that the court’s decisions may be appealed to its Board of Appeals. The Board, consisting of four judges and two substitute judges elected from among the chiefs of the branches every six months, hears appeals. In case of contradictory decisions by different branches or violations of Islamic criteria, the General Board of the court will hear the case. The General Board of the Court of Administrative Justice is the highest authority for safeguarding the laws and their proper implementations in the country’s administrative system. According to Article 21 of the Law of the Courts of Administrative Justice, all public entities including governmental organizations and their affiliates and revolutionary foundations are bound by the decisions of this board. Violators of the decisions of this court shall be dismissed from civil service pursuant to the judgment of the court. 245 While these two specialized courts are constitutional and ordinarily present in many judicial systems, Clerical Tribunals, Revolutionary Courts, and Press Courts are neither established on the basis of any explicit or implicit constitutional stipulations nor are they in conformity with the general and due process rights guaranteed in the constitution. By any standards, these courts, their broad and ambiguous charges, their closed hearings, and severe punishments they impose on the defendants are indeed unconstitutional and in violation of international human rights standards. Clerical Tribunals are entrusted with the task of trying and punishing misdeeds by the clergy. The Jurisdictional scope of these tribunals are ill-defined but, in practice, they are generally used to marginalize and punish those clerics who “deviate” from the regime’s view of the Shi’a doctrine and question the religious legitimacy of the system and its policies. These courts, which are somewhat independent from the judiciary, do not follow regular criminal or civil procedures. Their proceedings are not open and their decisions are not necessarily based on codified laws. Their decisions are final and the courts are only responsible to the Supreme Leader. On occasions, the lay have also been tried in these tribunals. The Law of the Establishment of the Public and Revolutionary Courts (adopted in 1373 A.H.) created the Revolutionary Courts that hear

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offenses against the internal and external security of the country, corruption on earth, slander against Khomeini and the Supreme Leader, conspiracy against the regime, espionage, terrorism, narcotic smuggling, and other offenses enumerated in Article 49 of the constitution. 246 According to Article 4 of the Administrative Regulations Governing the Revolutionary Courts and Public Prosecutor’s Office, the broad judicial powers of this court are exercised by a three-judge panel consisting of a religious judge, a civilian judge, and an individual “trusted by the people” who are respectively appointed by the Leader and ministry of justice. In practice, however, these courts are dominated by religious judges. 247 Press Courts were established on the basis of the Press Law, in order to control the media and people’s access to information considered undesirable by the regime, in violation of Article 168 of the constitution which guarantees open and jury trials in press offenses. These courts are used to close down newspapers and magazines and to punish critical journalists. All judges are appointed. They are expected to be honorable Muslims and trained in Islamic jurisprudence. Constitutionally, court proceedings must be open, unless security considerations and parties’ interests necessitate closed hearings. With the exception of decisions by Clerical Tribunals, all cases are subject to appeal within limits. The State Supreme Court, in addition to the appellate courts, may hear appeal cases for heavy punishments. In accordance with the Civil Procedure Law, the absence of summoned parties during the hearings may not prevent the court from rendering a judgment in a case. This “judgment in absentia” may be appealed to the courts for reconsideration. As discussed earlier in this book, all parties, according to the constitution (Article 35), have the right to an attorney in all courts. Any court decision for which either of the litigants was denied legal representation is legally invalid. A Judge who fails to honor the litigants’ due process rights shall be subject to trial in the Judges’ Disciplinary Court, which may remove him from his judicial post. Court decisions may also be quashed due to the judge’s error and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. In these circumstances, the case shall be reinvestigated and revised judgments may be issued. Judicalization of Politics “Politicization” of the judiciary is a reference to the influence of political actors in the judicial realm. In contrast, judicialization of politics refers to the expansion of the judiciary’s political role. 248 In Iran, the experiences of the past three decades or so highlight the gap between the legally mandated judicial functions of the courts and their growing political role in the system. As discussed earlier, constitutionally, the judiciary is primarily responsible for ensuring the proper application of the laws and legal resolution of con-

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flicts. Given the broad scope of the Islamic worldview and the clerical establishment’s self-proclaimed right to guide all aspects of the society and its politics, the judiciary has played an expansive role in the system. Most importantly, since its inception, this branch of the government has been an uncontested stronghold of the conservative clerical establishment to advance their policy agenda and to keep oppositional politics in check. To these ends, the judiciary challenges the other two branches of the government and their policies when they are dominated by moderate and liberal forces whose agenda diverge from those advocated by the conservative establishment. Moreover, the judiciary marginalizes and punishes those citizens who challenge the system and question its authoritarian policies. Of course, this role has undermined the credibility of the judiciary and has exacerbated political tensions. The regime’s Islamization policies that began shortly after the revolution and have continued ever since, at times less intensely than other times, have always been spearheaded by the conservative establishment and their allies in the government, especially in the judiciary. Whenever conservatives fail to control the other two branches of the government, the judiciary remains their outpost for challenging the laws and policies that diverge from their agenda. Courts have not only been persistent in upholding the conservative social agenda including dress codes; discriminatory practices in family law; harsh Islamic punishments including Qesas, flogging, stoning, and organ amputation; and segregation in the educational establishment, they have indeed undermined some of the progressive measures adopted by the moderate or reformist-dominated parliaments and presidents. The case of Gholamhossein Karbaschi exemplifies the judiciary’s challenges to two former presidents: the moderate Rafsanjani and reformist Khatami. As mentioned earlier in this book, Karbschi was an educated, competent, and experienced civil servant with solid religious credentials. He gained a great deal of popularity serving as the mayor of Isfahan and Tehran, where he successfully built new roads, redeveloped parks and historical sites, and improved public services. Karbaschi’s support for the reformist presidential candidate, Khatami, and the reform agenda made him a target of the judiciary. Shortly after the presidential election in 1997, the judiciary invoked the Supreme Leader’s call for the eradication of corruption and arrested a number of Tehran municipal employees for violating the public trust. In April 1998, Karbaschi himself was arrested and charged with corruption and embezzlement. It was no secret that these cases were in retaliation against reformists and an attempt to thwart their policy agenda. Even the public outcry did not stop Karbaschi’s trial. The televised trial, which was watched attentively by the public, illustrated how far the judiciary would go to assert its political role as an advocate of the conservative establishment. Karbaschi’s eloquent and thoughtful defense did not stop his conviction, but ultimately

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the outpouring of public support and harsh criticisms of the judiciary forced Khamene’i to pardon him in 2000. A similar strategy was used in the case of Mashaallah Shamsolvaezin, who was brought before the Press Court numerous times for violating press restrictions. As a reformist, he repeatedly stretched the tolerance of the judiciary by publishing critical pieces and, when the judiciary would close his paper, he would publish his paper under a new name and license. He was ultimately arrested and jailed in 1999. He and other reformist journalists challenged the authority of the Press Court on constitutional grounds. In response to the criticisms of the judiciary for these arrests and accusations of judicial misconduct on behalf of the conservative establishment, the judiciary invoked its independence and asserted its responsibility to ensure the regime’s stability in the face of attack by its opponents. 249 The judiciary has also been criticized for its arbitrary conduct and politically driven insistence on enforcing draconian laws that violate human rights and due process, even when more humane options are available. For instance, in countering public opposition to the presidential election of 2009 on line, a police unit was created in the Prosecutor’s Office to go after “insults and the spreading of lies,” terms widely used by the judiciary to describe actions of the opposition. The judiciary tried and convicted many on the basis of these and similar charges. 250 Similarly, despite the regime’s promises to stop the prosecution of minors in capital cases and moratorium on stoning, the judiciary continues with such practices, which have not been stopped despite domestic outcry and international criticisms. Undoubtedly, judicalization of politics has eroded the image of the judiciary as an impartial arbiter among the public. As the public reactions to the Karbaschi’s conviction and his eventual pardon suggests “the Iranian public has rejected the moral authority of the courts in making judgments and dispensing punishments.” 251 For this reason, not only reformist politicians but also moderate establishment clerics have called for the reform of the judiciary. OTHER INSTITUTIONS OF POWER As discussed earlier, representative institutions in the Islamic Republic are in constant competition with non-representative bodies and roles for power and influence. Non-representative institutions wield extraordinary powers, some of which are constitutionally mandated and others are the outgrowth of the autocratic dimensions of the system and its policies. Most notable among these institutions are the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The elected Council of Experts has a significant constitutional mandate, but its political role is comparatively more tempered in practice.

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The Guardian Council (Shuray-e Negahban) The constitution (Chapter VI, Articles 91–99) established and identified the tasks of the Guardian Council. This body consists of twelve members, six of whom are clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader and the rest are nominated by the judiciary and approved by the parliament. Membership in this body is staggered as half of them are up for reappointment every three years (Article 92). Determination of compatibility of the law with the shari’ah and judicial review are the primary responsibilities of this council (Articles 91). With a three-fourths majority, the council may interpret the constitution (Article 98). All parliamentary laws must be reviewed and judged for compliance within ten days of submission to the council (Article 94). In order to expedite their work, members of the council may attend parliamentary meetings and listen to the debates. Members must attend the meetings when the parliament is discussing urgent bills (Article 97). The council may request a ten-day extension from the parliament to submit a final opinion, if necessary (Article 95). A majority vote by the clerics on the council is required for determining compatibility of the legislation with shari’ah. In practice, this council has taken a rigid stance by striking down many parliamentary and executive decisions on the grounds of their incompatibility with Islam and the constitution. Furthermore, its interpretation of Article 99, which grants the council a “supervisory” role in popular elections including presidential and parliamentary elections and referenda, has been particularly consequential and controversial. As discussed earlier, contrary to the opinion of election authorities who believe that the council’s role is meant to be limited to the administration of elections, the council has emphatically and effectively shaped election outcomes by determining electoral slots through its vetting process. By disqualifying large numbers of candidates, this conservative council practically makes it impossible for viable moderate and reformist candidates to win elections, and ensures electoral success of those favored by the conservative establishment. The council also takes a proactive role in scrutinizing other governmental institutions, particularly the elected ones, under the direction of the Supreme Leader, in disregard of the popular will. 252 These practices made the Guardian Council a super legislative body in constant tension with the parliament and the executive branch and a major source of public tension in the country. Thus, under the revised constitution, its role was reassessed and the Expediency Council was established to rectify the policy paralysis caused by this council’s actions. The Expediency Council (Majma’-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam) The regime faced a number of systemic challenges throughout the 1980s primarily due to the political and policy paralysis caused by the lack of

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discipline in the dual executive and well-defined jurisdictions as well as widespread factionalism and religious dogmatism that undermined governmental functions. In particular, the Guardian Council’s insistence on compliance with shari’ah, in disregard to the contemporary needs and preference of the Iranian society, made it nearly impossible for the parliament and the executive branch to adopt and implement laws in a timely fashion. Thus, among other changes, under Khomeini’s order the revised constitution removed the dualism of the executive leadership by abolishing the office of prime minister, and created the Expediency Council to assess communal interests when those interests conflict with Islamic precepts. Article 112 of the revised constitution creates the Expediency Council with three main responsibilities: • To mediate conflicts between the parliament and the Guardian Council when the council finds a parliamentary bill to be inconsistent with either shari’ah or the constitution, and when the parliament refuses to satisfy the council by amending the bill accordingly and insists on the enactment of the law. • To offer advisory opinions on matters which are referred to the council by the Supreme Leader. • To participate in the selection of the religious membership of the Leadership Council, which is tasked with discharging the responsibilities of the Supreme Leader in his absence, in accordance with Article 111 (section 2) of the constitution. In compliance with section 3 of Article 112, the Council adopted its internal bylaws in 1988, and revised them twice in 1989 and 1997, which spell out its organization and procedures. Articles 2 of these bylaws established a Council Assembly, permanent commissions, special commissions, and a secretariat. The permanent expert commissions consist of the scientific, cultural, and social commissions; political, defense, and security commissions; structural and production commissions; macroeconomics, commerce, and administrative commissions; and legal and judiciary commissions. 253 The Supreme Leader appoints members of this council for a five-year term. Many are reappointed to the position frequently. The council’s membership normally consists of prominent individuals with diverse backgrounds and political affiliations. For instance, in appointing the forty-two-member council in 2007, Khamene’i chose twenty-two clerics and twenty lay individuals. Ideologically, fifteen of these men were conservative, seven were reformists, and five were moderate pragmatists. 254 He even appointed Ahmadinejad to this council for his “worthy efforts” after he left the presidency in 2013, despite their well-publicized disagreements. 255

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The council’s constitutional powers make it an immensely powerful body in today’s Iran. In practice, these powers have been expanded over time, especially since 2005 when the Supreme Leader granted it a “supervisory” role over all branches of the government and delegated to them some of his own authority in accordance with the constitution. 256 The council is, thus, the target of criticism by those who challenge the growing powers of non-elected institutions in the system and call for reform. As Mohammad Reza Khatami, a parliamentary deputy and brother of former president, has suggested: “Reforming the Expediency Council is in line with the peoples’ demand for change, as they have voiced in various elections in the past five years.” 257 The Council of Experts (Majles-e Khebregan) Constitutionally, the task of appointing the Supreme Leader, after Khomeini’s demise, is granted to an elected assembly named the Assembly of Experts (Article 107). The Guardian Council was tasked with adopting the guidelines and rules of procedure for this council (Article 108). This council, which meets once a year, consists of eighty-six “virtuous and learned” clerics elected by the public for eight-year terms. Like in other elections, the Guardian Council has the power to disqualify candidates who seeks seats on this council. This council, which is not normally controversial and does not challenge the leadership and the clerical establishment, selects the Supreme Leader from among their own ranks and periodically confirms him. 258 Khamene’i’s support for conservative candidates and causes, particularly his backing of Ahmadinejad in 2005 and disregard for the public’s uproar after the controversial presidential election in 2009, have prompted speculations that the challenge to the Supreme Leader’s authority may indeed come from the Council of Experts. The election of Rafsanjani to this body in 2007 and his subsequent rise to its speakership was viewed as a blow to the conservative establishment and a sign of popular challenge to the Supreme Leader. 259 In his campaign for the council, Rafsanjani advocated for replacing the Supreme Leader with a council of leadership with term limits. 260 As a sharp departure from his successor, he indicated that for the body to discharge of its duties, it must be able to “interfere” in top-level decisions. This was indeed a signal that the Council would behave differently under his leadership and would challenge conservatives and the Supreme Leader. As the public suspected, with the removal of Rafsanjani from his leadership role, this challenge never materialized. The Military-Security Establishment Organizationally, the military establishment in Iran consists of three major components that are accounted for in the constitution (Chapter IX, Articles

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143–150): The regular military, the IRGC, and the Basij paramilitary force that has been under the IRGC jurisdiction since late 2007. The Supreme Leader supervises the armed forces and, with the exception of a limited judicial authority, other institutions lack any jurisdiction over them. The regular military is constitutionally tasked with ensuring the independence and territorial integrity of the country as well as protection of the Islamic ideology and order (Article 143). Only Iranian citizens dedicated to the system and its objectives may serve in the military (Article 144). In peacetime, military resources may be employed for relief, educational and productive goals, and the Construction Jihad (Article 147). It is implied in the constitution that similar rights, obligations, and requirements are applicable to all components of the armed forces. A single article (Article 150) specifically defines the role of the IRGC as the protector of the revolution and the Islamic system. The Basij militia is constitutionally rooted in the desire to establish a civil defense system that relies on training the population in accordance with Islamic criteria for the defense of the country (Article 151). As stipulated in the constitution, the parliament has adopted a series of laws and regulations governing all armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These laws and regulations spell out the criminal, administrative, and civil rules and procedures that govern their personnel and their rights and responsibilities. Additionally, these laws specify the rights and entitlements of the martyrs, prisoners of wars, and conscripts. 261 The regular armed forces predate the Islamic Republic and, at an estimated 300,000–350,000 personnel, are nearly twice as large as the IRGC in membership. However, they are dwarfed by the IRGC as far as their resources, scope of their activities, and their economic and political influences are concerned. Thus, despite a constitutional requirement that all of these forces work in harmony in the interest of the country (Article 150), the regular military is disillusioned by the IRGC’s privileges in the system. In addition to institutional privileges, the IRGC members and their families receive privileged status at nearly every level including university admissions, access to subsidized resources, and so forth. 262 The IRGC, commonly referred to as the Pasdaran, was created shortly after the revolution to ensure the survival of the regime in line with Khomeini’s ideals, to repel the Iraqi invasion, and to act as a counterweight to the regular military establishment that was distrusted due to their past ties to the ancien régime and its American patrons. However, over the past three decades its roles have been extensively expanded into all facets of Iranian life. It is estimated that the IRGC consists of between 120,000 to 150,000 armed personnel. 263 Organizationally, it consists of four main military branches including ground forces, navy, air force, and intelligence services (chart 6.4; see appendix). However, today the corps also controls or maintains a number of other military-security and civilian organizations and sub-

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sidiaries. Its secretive Qods Force is an elite paramilitary unit (which by some estimates consisted of 10,000–15,000 personnel in 2003) 264 that operates outside the country and is tied to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shi’a militants in Iraq. This force was used to put down the Kurdish uprising in the Iranian Kurdistan; provides weapons, training, and directly participates in the Syrian conflict; and has conducted clandestine operations in numerous Middle Eastern countries. In response to its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States Treasury designated the unit as a terrorist organization in 2007. It is suggested that the activities of this force in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been exaggerated by the United States for political purposes. 265 The Basij, which is now directly controlled by the IRGC, consists of nearly 90,000 volunteer and paid men and women with the capacity to mobilize nearly one million volunteers 266 with ties to clerical institutions. Initially, some of these individuals were members of the Komite system that enforced local mosque clerics’ instructions particularly in regard to Islamic social conduct. With a greater organizational centralization and expansion of their resources, the Basij became an integral component of the regime’s domestic security apparatus. As the organization came under the IRGC jurisdiction, it officially became the primary tool for quelling street demonstrations in order to prevent any chances of a velvet revolution. After the violent repression of demonstrators against the disputed 2009 presidential election, the IRGC and Basij were criticized by the United States and the UN Special Rapporteur for systematic human rights violations. Since the Rafsanjani administration and expansion of the IRGC’s economic and social roles, the IRGC controls a number of subsidiaries with extraordinary influence in the system, including Khatam-al-Anbiya, which controls extensive economic operations in construction, freight services, shipbuilding, telecommunication, automaking, and finance and banking. After the Iran-Iraq war ended, President Rafsanjani, who had adopted a liberal towse-eh policy, pushed for greater participation by the armed forces in developmental projects. This strategy, it was believed, would offer some budgetary relief, undermine the chances of coup by disgruntled returning soldiers, and help employment in the country. 267 The reformist Khatami unsuccessfully tried to limit the growing economic and political influence of the IRGC, but the Ahmadinejad years helped the expansion of these roles to unprecedented levels. The IRGC and its subsidiaries are involved in virtually all sectors of the Iranian economy. By some estimates, the Guards control one-third of the country’s economic activities, 268 even though some estimates suggest a larger role involving thousands of companies with billions of dollars in assets and operations. For instance, in 2007, it was reported that they control more than one hundred companies with an estimated $12 billion in construction and engineering capital alone. 269 Additionally, they manage Iran’s well-fi-

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nanced nuclear and military programs including missile and weapon factories, university labs, medical clinics, oil and gas projects, and Tehran International airport. Most of these projects are non-bid government-funded projects. Furthermore, although vehemently denied, the IRGC is involved in black market activities including smuggling of consumer goods, drugs, and even alcohol with the estimated value of $12 billion annually. 270 The size and scope of these economic activities are so extensive that in November 2010, the Guard Commander, General Massoud Jazayeri, indicated that the force could now “even compete with huge multinational and international companies.” 271 There is very little, if any, transparency and accountability when it comes to the IRGC’s finances. Officially, their revenues are directly transferred to the public treasury, but there is no way to verify that. Opposition leaders, particularly those affiliated with the Green Movement, have been quite critical of the economic and political role of the IRGC. They believe that these roles are corruptive and undermine the Guards’ ability to ensure the country’s security. The reformist opposition along with some conservatives has also questioned the political role of the IRGC by suggesting that even Khomeini explicitly forbade the Guards’ involvement in politics. 272 The Guards have reacted to these criticisms by stating that “Today, no one is impartial. There are two currents: those who defend and support the revolution and those who are trying to topple it.” 273 The expansion of the Guard’s political role is the direct consequence of their ever-growing symbiotic relationship with the Supreme Leader. 274 Reformist challenges—particularly during the Khatami administration—Supreme Leader’s dependency on senior ayatollahs, who often question his religious credentials, 275 and occasional calls for abolishing the office of the Supreme Leader have made the Supreme Leader increasingly reliant on the IRGC and security apparatus. Periodic conflicts between Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, particularly after the controversial 2009 presidential election, made the IRGC and security apparatus even more indispensable to the Supreme Leader. Consequently, a sizable number of top Iranian politicians are former Guardsmen or affiliated with the security apparatus. Although the rank-and-file members of these organizations generally reflect popular sentiments, as some supported Khatami and reformists, the leadership is closely linked to the Supreme Leader and the conservative establishment. It was this leadership that, with Khamene’i’s consent, threatened a coup against the Khatami administration for its reformist policies. Ahmadinejad and the Principalists, who were propelled to the office with the proactive support of the Guards, actively promoted the economic and political roles of the Guards. As a former Guardsman, Ahmadinejad appointed Guards members to sensitive cabinet positions including defense, energy, justice, and interior; and to various bureaucratic roles by replacing reformists, pragmatic conservatives, and technocrats. Their role was,

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of course, expanded after the Guards successfully quelled the massive opposition to the president’s reelection in 2009. The Basij and IRGC’s increasing role in silencing the opposition, direct participation in enforcing conservative domestic social policies, and the economic woes due to international sanctions do undoubtedly impact the IRGC’s interests and future role. Internally, the IRGC is not a monolithic institution and many Guardsmen respect some of the reformist leaders and their revolutionary credentials. They, like most Iranians, have suffered from the economic woes exacerbated by Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement and by international sanctions. While some of these sanctions have been a boon for the IRGC’s black marketeering in the absence of any competitors, they have undermined some of the Guards’ economic interests as well. Iran’s nuclear and missile policies have also raised the potential for a military confrontation with the West and Israel which, if unsuccessful, could drastically jeopardize the Guards’ role. While some in the IRGC question the merits of the new gestures toward the West by President Rouhani, others appreciate the benefits of a negotiated settlement. Regardless, the success of the new administration will largely depend upon its ability to limit the Guards’ influence and pursue moderate social, economic, and foreign policies. While some are convinced that, given the role of the IRGC in the Iranian body politic, today’s Islamic Republic is mainly a military-dominated system, 276 the role and resilience of the conservative clerical establishment should not be discounted. At least for the foreseeable future, the dynamic symbiosis that characterizes the clerical-military nexus will ensure the continuation of the system and clerical domination. In great detail, this chapter analyzed the legal frameworks and the actual functions of governmental institutions, their process dynamics, and policy decisions. This study reveals a system that is formed and functions on the basis of power imbalances and extraordinary checks that are designed to ensure the system’s stability and control by clerics. Our survey of policy decisions by the parliament, specific executive administrations, courts, leadership councils, and the military-security establishment highlights widespread autocratic propensities, tremendous potentials for structural and policy paralysis, and the system’s propensity to transcend Islamic restrictions to ensure its legitimacy and control. In chapter 7, we will expand upon the most pressing and critical policy issue in today’s Islamic Republic: nuclear and missiles policies. It is clear that these policies are the centerpiece of the new moderate administration’s overall efforts to deal with foreign policy crises and persistent economic woes.

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NOTES 1. Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute of Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), 9. 2. Introduction to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. 3. Ibid. 4. Kamrava, Political History, 92. 5. The initial number of membership was set at two hundred and seventy. 6. A. W. Samii, “Changing Landscape,” p. 54. 7. To be seated, the members are required to take and sign an oath of allegiance to Islam, the Islamic Republic and its constitution, the Islamic Revolution, and the interest of the country. In taking an oath, religious minorities are required to swear by their own sacred book (Article 67). 8. Unless the constitution has specified a quorum necessary for certain decisions, the code of procedure may adopt its own quorum requirement. 9. According to this article, the government is prohibited from imposing martial law. The government, however, may impose temporary restrictions in times of war and emergency with the consent of the parliament. If such restrictions last for more than thirty days, new authorization from the legislature is necessary if an extension is needed and sought. 10. Changes in the national boundaries are prohibited unless such changes (if approved by the required majority of the parliament) are not unilateral, are in the interest of the country, and do not encroach on the independence and territorial integrity of the nation (Article 78). 11. The constitution explicitly bans the granting of concessions to foreigners or the formation of foreign companies or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, service, or mineral extraction (Article 81). 12. The provisional government lasted from February to November of 1979. 13. Keddie, Modern Iran, 199. 14. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 22. 15. Moslem, Factional Politics, 78. 16. According to Article 118, the law would establish a supervisory body for elections prior to the establishment of the first Guardian Council. 17. Article 146 of the Iranian constitution bans membership of the foreigners in the Iranian Army and security forces. 18. According to the Quranic verse (8:60), “Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and horses ready for battle, striking fear of God’s enemy and your enemy, and others beyond them unknown to you but known to God.” 19. Holding teaching positions at universities and research institutions are exempt from this rule. 20. Keddie, Modern Iran, 250. 21. Ibid. 22. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran, Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), 26. 23. This agreement was signed on June 13, 1975, between the two countries and established a thalweg system in designating the river border between them. 24. Bani Sadr was impeached on June 21, 1981, by the parliament, and Khomeini signed the impeachment letter. Even before the impeachment decision the militia had seized the presidential building and had arrested the president’s confidants and had closed down his newspaper. 25. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 36. 26. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 221. 27. Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, “I defeated the ideology of the regime,” an interview with Fred Halliday, MERIP Report, 104, 1982): 5–6. 28. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 36. 29. Moslem, Factional Politics, 63. 30. Khamene’i was reelected to the presidency in 1985 by 85.67 percent of the popular vote. Source: Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 36.

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31. Moslem, Factional Politics, 86. 32. Ettela’at, October 10, 1982. 33. Moslem, Factional Politics, 43. 34. It is important to note that the controversy over land reform policies in Iran dates back to the White Revolution of the early 1960s, which among other initiatives enacted land redistribution. Ironically, Khomeini and the conservative clerics had opposed these initiatives for undermining the sanctity of private property in Islam. 35. Section 2 of Article 44 of the constitution specifically designates foreign trade to the state sector of the economy. For greater details, see my discussion of the economic policies and plans in chapter 2. 36. Ansari, Modern Iran, 299. 37. Ibid., 83. 38. He even politically survived his opponents’ challenge to his “Irangate” policy when Khomeini opposed the calls for investigation of the role of the government in dealing with the U.S. 39. Although there is no solid information on the wealth of the regime’s leaders in Iran due to the regime’s sensitivities about public perception, it is commonly believed that Rafsanjani is the richest person in the country; he owns many properties and has much stake in the oil industry and other industries managed by the IRGC. 40. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 36. 41. Takyeh, Hidden Iran, 40. 42. Ibid., 41. 43. Ansari, Modern Iran, 53. 44. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 42. 45. Ansari, Modern Iran, 82. 46. Khomeini had decreed that Salman Rushdie, a British author who had written a book titled The Satanic Verses, had committed blasphemy against Islam and prophet Mohammad, and should be killed. 47. “German Court implicates Iran leaders in ’92 killings,” accessed October 9, 2007, http:// www.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/10/germany.iran. 48. R. K. Ramazani, “Iran and the United States: Islamic Realism?” in The Middle East from Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada, ed. Robert Freeman (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991): 167–83. 49. A secretive deal between the Reagan administration and moderate elements in the Islamic Republic, which became highly controversial in both countries when exposed, was supposed to provide military equipment to Iran in its war with Iraq and procure resources for the U.S. administration’s supporters of the Contras in Nicaragua. 50. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 109–10. 51. Ansari, Modern Iran, 118. 52. Ali M. Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 114–116. 53. Mir Hussein Musavi, the former PM, was the reformers’ favorite to run for the presidency. However, as he refused, the reformers settled for Khatami. 54. Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, Seyyid Mohammad Khatami, Reza Zavare’i, and Mohammad Mohammadi Rayshahri. 55. “Profile: Mohammad Khatami,” accessed October 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/1373476.stm. 56. Ibid. 57. Conservatives maintained their majority in the Fifth Majles, despites the fact that reformers made some gains in the 1996 parliamentary elections. However, conservatives no longer had an absolute majority. The reformers’ ability to organize and mobilize the popular support after Khatami’s victory in the presidential elections enabled them to score their second major victory by gaining parliamentary majority in the Sixth Majles elections of 2000. 58. “Historic Personalities, Seyed Mohammad Khatami,” accessed October 9, 2007, http:// www.iranchamber.com/history/mkhatami/mohammad_khatami.php. 59. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 36.

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60. “Historic Personalities: Seyed Mohammad Khatami.” 61. In the 1997 presidential election, 80.16 percent of the eligible voters cast their votes. See: Buchta, 37. This number declined in the 2001 elections to 72.76 percent. 62. For instance, in the 1997 election, he received 58.7 percent of the votes in the city of Qom compared to Nateq Nuri’s 32.9 percent of the votes. 63. Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, 113. 64. Patrick Clawson, “Do Iran’s Presidential Elections Matter?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #532 (May 4, 2001). 65. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 171. 66. Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, 169. 67. Ibid., 171–72. 68. J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. and Marina V. Rosser, Comparative Economics in a Transforming World. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 506. 69. Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, 175. 70. Keddie, Modern Iran, 274. 71. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 182. 72. Iranian TV, December 9, 1997. 73. Hamshahri quoted in Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, 144–45. 74. See Almond, Gabriel and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966). 75. “Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami,” accessed October 9, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html. 76. Al-Hayat, February 7, 1999, p. 1. 77. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 186. 78. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, 72.3 (1993): 22–49. 79. In 2000, the Clinton Administration slightly softened its stance by announcing the removal of sanctions on Iranian handicrafts and pistachios. 80. Ansari, Modern Iran, 331. 81. BBC News, July 12, 2002. 82. “IAEA and Iran, Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers, 21 October 2003,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://www.iaea.org/nescenter/focus/ iaeairan/statement_iran 21102003.shtmal. 83. Ibid. 84. Keddie, Modern Iran, 271. 85. Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, 121. 86. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 187. 87. Ibid., 188. 88. Ibid., 190. 89. Salaam, March 5, 1998, 1. 90. A number of groups on the conservative right refer to themselves as usulgarayan or the Principalists, who claim to be committed to the principles of Islam and the revolution. Many of these conservatives come from the Revolutionary Guards Crops background and are highly critical of reformists and their agenda. However, they themselves disagree on how to achieve the goals of Islam and the revolution and tend to be factionalized. 91. Mark Gasiorowski, “Op/Ed: The Causes and Consequences of Iran’s June 2005 Presidential Election,” Strategic Insights IV.8 (2005): 2. 92. Mark Gasiorowski, “Iranian Politics After the 2004 Parliamentary Election,” Strategic Insights III. 6 (2004): 2. 93. The IRNA poll indicated that 51.3 percent of respondents planned to vote. See “IRNA Conducts Poll on Iran Presidential elections,” accessed October 1, 2007, http:// www.payvand.com/news/05/mar/1089.html 94. In the IRNA poll, no conservative polled over a single digit. For instance, the eventual winner, Ahmadinejad, polled only 1.7 percent. 95. Ali Larijani, according to the IRNA poll, was garnering the support of 4.4 percent of the respondents. 96. “IRNA Conducts.”

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97. “Iran,” accessed March 11, 2008, http://www.angus-reid.com/tracker/view/5070. 98. Ibid. 99. Simon Tisdal, “Iranians hold their noses as they pick new president,” accessed October 1, 2007, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/may/13/iran.tisdallbriefing. 100. During the campaign, Ahmadinejad promised to strengthen social safety nets, offer subsidized food and housing for the poor, and institute monthly stipends for citizens. 101. Gasiorowski, “The Causes.” 102. “Iranian Presidential Election Anomalies. 2005–2009,” Election Defense Alliance, accessed November 6, 2012, http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=eda-blogs/michael_collins/ 080709/Iranian-election-anomalies. 103. Gasiorowski, “The Causes.” 104. “Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency,” Middle East Briefing 21, International Crisis Group, Tehran/Brussels, 6, February 2007. 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. Associated Press analysis of the preliminary results in “President’s Opponents take a drubbing, Major victory for Ahmadi-Nejad appears to be in the works,” Iran Times International, March 21, 2008. 108. “Iran approves main presidential candidates,” accessed May 21, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/8058884.stm. 109. Casey L. Addis, “Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service (July 6, 2009): 3. 110. Ahmadinejad explicitly criticized some of the candidates and previous leaders of the republic for corruption and dishonesty. In particular, he accused Rafsanjani of stealing billions of dollars of state money and called him a “puppet master” in the campaign against him. See: “NYT: Bid to oust Iran’s Ahmadinejad, Influential Rafsanjani is behind sophisticated antiAhmadinejad campaign,” accessed June 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8058884.stm. In response, Rafsanjani sent an open letter to Khamene’i and complained about Khamene’i’s silence following the “insults, lies, and false allegation” by Ahmadinejad during the campaign debates. See: “Iranian Conservative Media Angry as Rafsanjani Lays into Ahmadinejad,” BBC Monitoring, June 10, 2009. 111. Supporters of the reformist candidate formed a human chain that stretched nearly the entire length of the capital (nearly 12 miles stretching the length of Vali-e Asr avenue) in the biggest display of political might of reformists and their discontent with the president. This event caused so much fear in the establishment that one of the leaders of the Revolutionary Guards warned against any attempts at a “velvet revolution” by the Green Movement and expressed the readiness of the security forces to counter any anti-systemic challenges to the Islamic regime. Esfandiar Safari, “IRGC Preparing for Public Uprising,” accessed March 10, 2009, http://www.roozonline.com/ english/news3/newsitem/archive/2009/march/03/article/irgc-preparing-for-public-uprising.html. 112. “Rival demonstrations fill Tehran streets,” accessed June 17, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/ 2009/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.elections.protests/; also, see: Collin Freeman, “Iran’s Presidential Campaign Reaches Finale,” accessed June 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8094933.stm. 113. Even though Ahmadinejad denied this claim, in the video clip he tells a leading cleric, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, that the crowd stared without blinking during the entire speech. He said: “A member of the [Iranian] delegation told me, ‘I saw the light that surrounded you,’ . . . I sensed it myself too . . . I felt the atmosphere changed. All leaders in the audience did not blink for 27, 28 minutes. I am not exaggerating when I’m saying they did not blink. Everybody had been astonished . . . they had opened their eyes and ears to see what is the message from the Islamic republic.” Quoted in: Associated Press, “Iran race gets bitter as election looms,” June 8, 2009, accessed June 8, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14393406. 114. Freeman, “Iran’s presidential campaign reaches finale.” 115. According to a poll conducted by the Islamic Azad University, and sponsored by Rafsanjani and directed by his son, Musavi was defeating Ahmadinejad with 56 percent to 42 percent of the votes. See: “NYT: Bid.” 116. “Close Iran election race gets bitter,” accessed June 10, 2009, http://www.nbcnews.com/ id/31205290.

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117. The challengers vowed to pursue Iran’s controversial nuclear policy. See: “Iran Reformers face Ahmadinejad,” accessed May 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8041749.stm. 118. “Iran starts television presidential debates,” accessed June 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middle_east/8080999.stm. 119. “Ahmadinejad wins Iran presidential election,” accessed June 13, 2009, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8098305.stm. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid. 122. Addis, Casey L, “Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections,” CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service (July 6, 2009): 6. 123. These anti-Ahmadinejad demonstrations were the most violent in decades, pitting Iranians from all walks of life against the security forces that were intent to quell the opposition by all means. By some estimates, in the initial confrontations between the demonstrators and security forces, at least twenty demonstrators and seven Basiji forces were killed along with over 1,000 arrests and injuries. See: “Clerics’ discontent challenges Iran leader,” accessed July 8, 2009, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31805433/#.UpduqGzTlLM. Also, see: Anna Johnson and Brian Murphy, “Iran Election Results: Ahmadinejad Declared Winner,” accessed November 6, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/13/iran-election-resultsahm_0_n_215169.html. 124. Edward Stourton, “Ahmadinejad’s theological foes,” accessed October 20, 2009, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8314126.stm. 125. “Clerics’ discontent challenges Iran leader.” 126. Addis, “Iran’s 2009,” 8. 127. “Iran ex-president ‘in travel ban,’” accessed April 17, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 8624956.stm. 128. “Iran’s Rafsanjani loses post as chair of state body,” accessed March 8, 2011, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12673821 129. “Iran jails former President Rafsanjani’s daughter,” accessed January 3, 2012, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12673821. 130. It is often suggested that a faction of this association named the Office for Strengthening Unity between Universities and Theological Seminaries, which was initially established by Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti to counter the growing power and influence of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, planned and implemented the hostage-taking at the United States embassy during the 1979 revolution. While some of the former hostages have claimed that Ahmadinejad was involved in the takeover, he and some of his political opponents who were involved have denied such allegations. It is even suggested that Ahmadinejad did not participate in the planning of hostage-taking and, in fact, opposed the attack on the United States embassy. Some have claimed that he supported a simultaneous attack on both the U.S. and Soviet embassies. See: “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, biography synopsis,” accessed November 6, 2012, http://www.biography.com/people/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-38656; and “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” Encyclopedia of World Biography, accessed November 6, 2012, http://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-A-Bu-and-Obituaries/ Ahmadinejad-Mahmoud.html. 131. “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” Encyclopedia of World Biography. 132. There are reports that he joined the Revolutionary Guards in 1986. 133. “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” accessed November 9, 2007, http://www.notablebiographies. com/supp/Supplement-A-Bu-and-Obituaries/Ahmadinejad-Mahmoud.html. 134. “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” Encyclopedia of World Biography. 135. “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, biography synopsis.” 136. “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” accessed November 9, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/iran/ahmadinejad.htm. 137. Ibid. 138. Ibid. 139. Ibid. 140. “Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency.” 141. “Iran: Top Ministers Implicated in Serious Abuses,” Human Rights Watch, 2005, accessed December 15, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/.

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142. “Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous presidency.” 143. Jon Leyne, “Iranian President rewards loyalty,” accessed August 22, 2009, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8212574.stm. 144. “Iranian minister Hosseini survives impeachment vote,” accessed November 4, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15545850 145. “Iran: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ally Malekzadeh ‘arrested,’” accessed June 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13898232 146. James Reynolds, “Why Some Iran Conservatives are Turning Against Ahmadinejad,” accessed November 24, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11824142. 147. Brian Murphy and Nasser Karimi, “Ahmadinejad’s foes flex power in Iran’s parliament,” accessed November 1, 2011, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/ 2011/10/31/ahmadinejads_foes_flex_power_in_irans_parliament/. 148. Ibid. 149. Sebastian Usher, “Iran supreme leader tells MPs not to summon the president,” accessed November 21, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20426775 150. “Iran parliament questions President Ahmadinejad,” accessed March 15, 2012, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17364370 151. “Iran frees jailed ex-prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi,” accessed February 7, 2013, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21352207 152. Crisis Group interview, Tehran, January 22, 2007. Quoted in “Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency.” 153. “Public holiday in Iran’s Capital due to pollution,” accessed November 30, 2010, http:// www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/30/us-iran-pollution-idUSTRE6AT15X20101130 154. Ibid. 155. “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Victory in Iran’s Presidential Runoff Election,” accessed November 6, 2012, http://pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june)5/ahmadinejad_6-27.html. 156. Ibid. 157. For an analysis of Ahmadinejad’s economic philosophy and policies, see: Nader Habibi, “The Economic Legacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” Middle East Brief, The Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, 74 (June 2013): 2–4. 158. “Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency,” 8. 159. A number of the conservative parliamentarians were quite concerned about infusion of massive oil money into the government and hoped to reduce the amount by $10 billion. However, they ultimately gave to the government to avoid being considered uncooperative with the new administration and insensitive to the plight of the poor. 160. The inflation figures in 2012 indicated an annual inflation rate of 24 percent. See “Iran’s rial hits an all-time-low against US dollar,” accessed October 1, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/business-19786662. 161. E’temad Melli, June 15, 2006. 162. Jon Leyne, “Big Test for Iranian democracy,” accessed June 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/middle_east/8083867.stm. 163. Jon Leyne, “Analysis: The rise of Ali Larijani,” accessed May 29, 2008, http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/7424322.stm. 164. “Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency,” 11. 165. Gasoline smuggling in Iran is highly profitable in light of the substantially higher prices in the neighboring countries. By some estimates, the value of smuggled fuel out of Iran totals to $1.5–4.5 billion annually. See; Kargozaaran, June 7, 2006. 166. The director of the National Iranian Oil Derivatives Distribution Company put this number at $15 billion, but the Khatami administration’s assessment projected the amount not to exceed $10 billion in 2006. Kargozaaran, July 15, 2006. 167. Kargozaaran, June 7, 2006. 168. “Iran: Ahmadinejad’s Tumultuous Presidency,” 13. 169. Ibid., 12. 170. Despite the parliament’s hostile relationship with the president, this nomination was approved by a vote of 216–22, largely in reaction to the tightening sanctions and the imposition

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of ban on Commander Qasemi. See: “Iran names Guard Commander Rostam Qasemi oil minister,” accessed August 5, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14393406. 171. Article 147 of the constitution accounts for a broader military role by suggesting: “the government must, in times of peace, utilize the military’s technical personnel and equipment for relief, educational, production and construction crusade work in full observance of the principles of Islamic justice and to the extent that it does not harm the military’s combat readiness.” 172. Sedaye Edalat, July 1, 2006. 173. Ali Arouzi, “Iranians: ‘Our money is becoming more and more worthless every day,’” accessed September 28, 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/28/14137979iranian-our-money-is-becoming-more-and-more-worthless-every-day?lite. 174. “Iran’s rial hits an all-time-low against US dollar.” BBC News, accessed October 1, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19786662. 175. Arouzi, “Iranians: ‘Our money.’” 176. Ibid. 177. “Iran’s rial.” 178. “Iran police clash with protestors over currency crisis,” accessed October 3, 2012, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19812482. 179. “Iran arrests 50 over currency decline,” Associated Press report, accessed October 24, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9631373/Iran-arrests-50-for-creatingcurrency-disruptions.html. 180. “Iran: Ahmadi-Neja’s Tumultuous,”16. 181. Ibid., 15. 182. Ibid., 16. 183. Brian Murphy and Nasser Karimi, “Iran’s Swipe at the Web brings angry reaction . . . from Iranians,” accessed October 1, 2012, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/49232381/. 184. According to Iran’s official statistics, 32 out of 75 million Iranians use Internet, which ranks Iran among the top twenty countries in terms of the sheer number of users. See Brian Murphy and Nasser Karimi, “Iran’s Swipe at the Web . . .” 185. “Iran Launches web video Channel, Mehr,” accessed December 10, 2012, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20663681. 186. “UN fears for Iran hunger striker Nasrin Sotoudeh,” accessed December 4, 2012, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20595041. 187. “Iran’s Rouhani dismisses nuclear weapons fears,” accessed September 19, 2013, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24154483. 188. “Iranian leader: Holocaust a ‘myth’” accessed October 9, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 8301-202_162-1124255.html. 189. “Iran leader urges destruction of ‘cancerous Israel,” access October 9, 2007, http:// www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-1124255.html. 190. Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran, North Korea sign technology agreement,” accessed September 2, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/iran-north-korea-sign-technology-agreement. 191. William Broad, James Ganz, and David Sanger, “Iran Fortifies Its Arsenal With the Aid of North Korea,” accessed November 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/ middleeast/29missiles.html. 192. Ibid. 193. Brian Murphy, “Top al-Qaida ranks keep foothold in Iran,” Associated Press, accessed July 10, 2011, http://lubbockonline.com/world/2011-07-10/top-al-qaida-ranks-keep-footholdsinside-iran#. 194. Lara Jakes, “Iran FM says US buildup near Iraq lacks ‘prudence,’” accessed November 1, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/iran-fm-says-us-buildup-near-iraq-lacks-135230368.html. 195. Courtney Kube, “Iranian jet fires on US military drone, Pentagon says,” accessed November 8, 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/08/15027109-iranian-jets-attack-us-military-drone-pentagon-officials-say. 196. “Iranian TV shows off ‘captured US ScantEagle drone,’” accessed December 4, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20591336.

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197. For instance, Iran is a top trading partner for Dubai, with an annual average trade of imported goods into Iran worth $10 billion. See: Nasser Karimi, “Iran may cut ties with UAE over disputed islands,” accessed November 9, 2012, http://m.apnewscom/ap/db_268743/contendtdetail.htm. 198. Mark Mazzetti and Emily b. Hager, “Secret UAE desert force set up by Blackwater’s founder,” accessed May 15, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn..com/clear. 199. Since 1992, the UAE has claimed sovereignty over the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs, which have been controlled by Iran since the latter part of the 20th century. Iran has rejected these claims and has threatened to severe ties with the UAE and to respond to any aggression. See: Nasser Karimi, “Iran may cut ties with the UAE over disputed islands.” 200. Mazzeti and Hager, “Secret UAE.” 201. Lee Smith, “Our Proxy War in the Middle East,” accessed August 14, 2010, http:// mag.newsweek.com/2010/08/13/the-israeli-saudi-american-alliance-against-iran.html. 202. Ibid. 203. “Iran’s Ahmadinejad dismisses Wikileaks cables release,” accessed November 29, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11860435. 204. It is commonly understood that Iran has provided Hamas and Hezbollah with long-term rockets including Fajr-5 missiles. See Alastair Jamieson, “Iran’s Fingerprints on Hamas Weaponry, but its larger role in Israel-Gaza crisis remains murky,” accessed November 9, 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/19/15282386-irans-fingerprints-on-hamasweaponry-but-its-larger-role-in-israel-gaza-crisis-remains-murky. 205. Frank Gardner, “Iran ‘set up Bahrain militant cell,’” accessed February 21, 2013, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21522074. 206. Ibid. 207. Neil MacFarquhar, “Saudi Arabia scrambles to limit region’s upheaval, Blocking Iran’s influence is another goal of a kind of ‘Club of Kings,’” accessed May 27, 2011, http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/world/middleeast/28saudi.html. 208. Ibid. 209. “Syria conflict: Brahimi seeks Iran help to secure truce,” accessed October 15, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19946958. 210. Michael R. Gordon, “Iran Supplying Syrian Military via Iraqi Airspace,” accessed September 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/world/middleeast/iran-supplying-syrianmilitary-via-iraq-airspace.html. 211. Nick Patton Walsh, “Iranian drones guiding Syrian attacks, rebels say,” accessed November 31, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/31/world/meast/syria-drones/. 212. As the U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta indicated: “Iran is playing a larger role in Syria in many ways. . . . There is now indication that they’re trying to develop, or trying to train, a militia within Syria to fight on behalf of the regime.” Quoted in: Michael Gordon, “Iran Supplying Syrian Military via Iraqi Airspace.” 213. “Rafsanjani and Mashaei barred from Iran presidency poll,” accessed May 22, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22615000. 214. Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Iran’s nuclear ambitions stalk presidential election,” accessed January 28, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21197583. 215. Holly Yan and Talia Kayali, “686 presidential candidates try to succeed Ahmadinejad in Iran,” accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/12/world/meast/iran-presidentialelection/index.html. 216. “Iran’s Ahmadinejad to contest poll bar on ally Mashaei,” accessed May 22, 2013, http:/ /www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22620951. 217. Sharafedin, “Iran’ nuclear ambitions stalk presidential election.” 218. Presidential candidate Rouhani says he will form inclusive administration,” accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/06/04/307130/rohani-to-form-inclusive-administration. 219. Yeganeh Torbati, “Khatami, reformists back Rouhani in Iran presidential vote,” accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/11/us-iran-electionidUSBRE95A09O20130611.

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220. He received 18,613,329 votes of the total 36,704,156 votes cast on election day. See: Jason Rezaian and Joby Warrick, “Moderate Cleric Hassan Rouhani wins Iran’s Presidential Vote,” accessed June 15, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-15/world/39983644_1_iranians-vote-final-results. 221. For a detailed discussion of Hassan Rouhani’s personal and professional background, see: Hassan Rouhani, Khaterat-e Doctor Hassan Rouhani; Enghelab-e Eslami, [Memories of Dr. Hassan Rouhani; Islamic Revolution], 1 (Tehran, Iran: Center for Strategic Research, 2008). 222. Hassan Rouhani, Khaterat-e Doctor, 232. 223. Max Fisher, “5 things to know about Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani,” accessed September 9, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/17/5-things-toknow-about-irans-new-president-hassan-rouhani/. 224. Hassan Rouhani, Amniyyat-e Melli va diplomacy-e Hastei [National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy] (Tehran, Iran: Center for Strategic Research, 2011), 660–667. 225. Alastair Jamieson, “New Iran president expected to tap US-educated advisers, bringing ‘worldly outlook’ to Tehran,” accessed July 24, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/ 2013/07/21/19541056-new-iran-president-expected-to-tap-us-educated-advisers-bringingworldly-outlook-to-tehran. 226. “New Iranian Cabinet Nominees: Building Bridges Between Factions to Yield Reform,” accessed September 9, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jahandad-memarian/new-iraniancabinet-nomin_b_3726826.html. 227. By some estimates, the inflation rate reached to 42 percent in 2013. See “New Iran President expected to tap.” 228. Henry Austin, “Is Iran coming in from the cold? Hints pile up as new president prepares for NYC trip,” accessed September 9, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/ 28/20231166-irans-khamenei-warns-us-intervention-in-syria-would-be-a-disaster-for-middleeast. 229. Tracy Connor, “Iran’s president Rouhani: We will never develop nuclear weapons,” accessed September 18, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/09/18/20561148irans-president-rouhani-we-will-never-develop-nuclear-weapons. 230. “Iran ready for nuclear talks, says President Rouhani,” accessed September 25, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24235932. 231. Julie Page, “US edges closer to high level talks with Iran,” accessed September 23, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/us-edges-closer-high-level-talks-iran-214917026--politics.html. 232. Fisher, “5 things to know.” 233. Sorayya Sarhaddi Nelson, “Polls Close in Iran with No Clear Winner,” accessed October 9, 2007, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0618-03.htm. 234. “Iran has boosted nuclear capabilities, says IAEA,” accessed August 8, 2013, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23867903. 235. “Iran’s Rouhani shifts responsibility for nuclear talks,” accessed September 9, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23972772 236. “Iran nuclear: Firms’ asset freeze annulled by EU Court,” accessed September 9, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23984722. 237. “Iran blames Western Powers for nuclear talk failure,” accessed November 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.ul/new/world-middle-east 238. Connor, “Iran’s president Rouhani.” 239. Ali Arouzi, Paul Goldman and Alastair Jamieson, “Iran’s Khamenei warns US intervention in Syria would be a ‘disaster’ for the Middle East,” accessed August 29, 2013, http:// worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/28/20231166-irans-khamenei-warns-us-interventionin-syria-would-be-a-disaster-for-middle-east 240. “Iran foreign minister Zarif tweets happy Jewish new year,” accessed September 9, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23990717 241. Alastair Jamieson, “New Iran President Expected to Tap US-Educated Advisers, Brining ‘Worldly Outlook’ to Tehran,” accessed July 24, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/ 2013/07/21/19541056-new-iran-president-expected-to-tap-us-educated-advisers-bringing-worldlyoutlook-to-tehran.

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242. Keddie, Modern Iran, 246. 243. “Iran: Constitution, Government & Legislation,” accessed August 26, 2007, http:// jusrist.law.pitt.edu/world/iran.htm. 244. Ehsan Zar Rokh, “Iranian Judicial System (Court’s Structure),” accessed September 10, 2007, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1059481 245. Ibid. 246. “Iran: Islamic Revolutionary Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure,” International Commission of Jurists (December 1980); 20–23, accessed September 26, 2007, http://www.iranhrdc.org/ english/english/human-rights-documents/aadel-collection/14535-iran-islamic-revolutionarytribunals-rules-of-procedure-international-commission-of-jurists-december-1980.html#. UpyMB2zTlLM. 247. Nader Entesar, “Limits of Change: Legal Constraints to Political Reform in Iran,” Journal of Third World Studies, 19. 1(2002): 31. 248. For a conceptual analysis of this distinction and its application to the Iranian judiciary, see: Hootan Shambayati, “A Tale of Two Mayors: Courts and Politics in Iran and Turkey,” International Journal of Middle Easter Studies, 36 (2004): 255. 249. Entesar, “Limits of Change,” 33–34. 250. “Iran cracks down on online opposition,” accessed November 15, 2009, http:// www.nbcnews.com/id/33936886. 251. Hootan Shambayati, “Tale of Two Mayors,” 265. 252. Mallat, Renewal of Islamic Law, 80. 253. “Internal Bylaws of the Expediency Council (The Council for the Expediency of the System),” accessed October 3, 2013, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/laws/institutionsgovernance/expediency-bylaws/. 254. “Meet the Elite: Here is the Establishment of the Islamic Republic,” Iran Times, March 16, 2007: 7. 255. “Ahmadinejad appointed to top Iran Council,” accessed October 3, 2013, http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201385134040912530.html 256. “Iran, Who Holds the Power,” accessed October 3, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ shared/spl/hi/middle _east/03/iran_power/html. 257. “The Structure of Power in Iran,” accessed October 3, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html. 258. Ibid. 259. “Iranian clerics elect Rafsanjani to key role,” accessed October 9, 2007, http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/04/iran. 260. Robert Tait, “Rafsanjani election ups political stakes in Iran,” accessed October 9, 2007, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/05/iran.topstories3. 261. For the texts of these laws and regulations, see: Jahangir Mansour (ed.), Majmooe-ye Ghavanin-va- Mogrrarat-e Niroohay-e Mosallah-e Jomhoori-e Eslami-e Iran [Collection of the Laws and Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran] (Tehran: Didar Publications; 1384 A.H.). 262. Michael Slackman, “NYT: Hard–line force extends grip over Iran,” accessed July 21, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32023387/ns/wrorld_new_York_times/page/2/. 263. Greg Bruno, Jayshree Bajoria, and Jonathan Masters, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” accessed October 3, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324. 264. Ibid. 265. Ibid. 266. “Profile: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” accessed March 14, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middle_east/7064353.stm. 267. Slackman, “NYT: Hard-line force.” 268. Mark Gregory, “Expanding Business Empire of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” accessed July 28, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10743580. 269. Bruno, Bajoria, and Masters, “Iran’s revolutionary Guards.” 270. Slackman, “NYT: Hard-line force.” 271. Thomas Erdbrink, “Elite Iran force’s rise may limit U.S. options,” accessed January 10, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34789801/ns/world_news-washington.

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272. Alireza Nader, “The Revolutionary Guards,” accessed October 3, 2013, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards. 273. Slackman, “NYT: Hard-line force.” 274. Hamza Hendawi, “Revolutionary Guards tighten hold in Iran crisis,” accessed July 26, 2009, http://hoted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/ML_IRAN_REVOLUTIONARY_GUARD. 275. Jon Leyne, “The rise and rise of Iran’s Guards,” accessed March 14, 2008, http:// new.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7296050.stm. 276. Kazem Alamdari, “The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: transition from populism to clientalism and militarization of the government,” Third World Quarterly 26.8 (2005): 1298.

Chapter Seven

Nuclear and Missile Programs, Policies, and the Sanctions Regime

For over two decades, nuclear and missile policies and programs have increasingly impacted all facets of the Iranian polity. Diplomatic pressures and isolation, an increasingly crippling sanctions regime, constant threat of force, cyber-attacks, and covert activities and political assassinations have contributed to internal political schisms, exacerbated economic woes, undermined foreign trade, and challenged the country’s regional and global policies and standing. While the Iranian regime has succeeded in mobilizing its populace in support of these policies by relying on their sense of nationalism and pride, it has failed to gain the necessary global backing for what it views as its inherent right to nuclear technology and self-defense. The United States’ regional policies in the Middle East—particularly the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan—selective but proactive support for regime changes in the region, and calls for an end to the Islamic Republic have convinced Iranians that the survival of the regime and security of the state and its independence could only be ensured by seeking necessary military capabilities including nuclear and missile technologies, and an effective regional security arrangement. These domestic, regional, and global dynamics of Iran’s nuclear and missile politics and policies have so far made it increasingly difficult to find peaceful solutions to the disputes over Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. There was very little chance that the hard-line Ahmadinejad administration would make meaningful concessions on these issues, given its well-articulated skepticism about the global system and the dynamics of regional politics in the Middle East. The election of Rouhani to the presidency and his accommodating style and moderate pragmatic views could potentially offer new 287

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opportunities for some substantive changes in these policies. Potentials for a negotiated settlement on nuclear issues will only be realized when and if the West acknowledges Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology including uranium enrichment. Short of that, even the new administration would find it impossible to resolve the disputes through negotiations in the face of domestic challenges to this approach. History of Iran’s Nuclear Policies Iran’s efforts to master and build an independent full cycle nuclear technology began during the rule of Mohammad Reza shah. In 1959, the country purchased a five-megawatt research reactor from the United States which was installed at Tehran University for research purposes. In response to the international calls for an end to nuclear proliferation, the Iranian government joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1969, and in 1974 the regime agreed to allow full inspection of Iranian nuclear materials by the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA). 1 In the same year, the government established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to oversee the development of Iran’s nuclear capabilities for peaceful uses. 2 At the urging of Westinghouse and other U.S. companies who stood to financially benefit from Iran’s nuclear projects, the Ford administration authorized the sale of a full nuclear fuel cycle that would enable Iran to make significant strides in its nuclear projects. 3 The limited number of nuclear scientists and difficulties in finding an appropriate nuclear site complicated Iran’s nuclear progress during the earlier years. Eventually, the government decided to build two nuclear energy sites in Bushehr and Darkhwin. The German Siemens Company was contracted to build and operationalize the Bushehr project by 1981, while the French Framatome was to begin construction on the Darkhwin facility in 1982. 4 From the outset, Iran intended to gain total control over all stages of the fuel cycle including mining and milling of uranium, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, nuclear reactor, and ultimately spent fuel storage. Yellowcake uranium was initially imported from Zambia and South Africa, and later from China prior to the import bans on uranium, while the government searched for domestic uranium resources. Iran also gained access to enriched uranium by investing in Eurodif, a French company that specialized in enrichment. 5 Furthermore, in order to develop an enrichment technology, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center commissioned an American scientist, Jeffrey Eerkens, to build a set of lasers capable of separating weapons-grade uranium from natural uranium. This technology could also produce plutonium. In 1978, Iran received four lasers for the purpose of enrichment.

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Scope of Nuclear and Missile Programs in the Islamic Republic The Iranian revolution of 1978 and establishment of the Islamic Republic temporarily halted Iran’s nuclear program, since Khomeini considered nuclear power un-Islamic and undesirable. Subsequently, the Bushehr project was abandoned by the Germans. 6 During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqis bombed the Bushehr site but, despite a great deal of structural damage, the project remained viable. 7 The war renewed Iranian interest in nuclear power, despite the Islamic regime’s earlier assertions about the undesirability of nuclear technology and power. They established a new nuclear research laboratory at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center in 1984 and China installed a series of training reactors over the next decade. 8 Throughout the 1990s, the Chinese maintained extensive involvement in Iranian nuclear projects in the form of shipment of natural uranium in 1991, agreements on the construction of four nuclear power plants in 1992, and the construction of a uranium conversion plant. 9 Beginning in 1985, the regime also revived enrichment efforts, and sought the required nuclear technology and materials in the open market. For instance, they worked with the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qader Khan to purchase used and design new centrifuges and to train Iranians in nuclear technology. Recently, Khan has indicated that the Iranian regime was hoping to purchase three nuclear weapons from Pakistan in the 1990s, but the Pakistani government declined and instead agreed to sell only parts and plans. 10 Russians also entered the lucrative Iranian nuclear activities in the early 1990s. Under an $800 million contract, they agreed to rebuild the Bushehr installation and to finish one of the 1,000-megawatt reactors on the site within four years. 11 This project was delayed for years mainly due to political pressures on Iran related to its enrichment activities. In 1996, Iran itself began construction on a heavy-water production plant in Arak, with a byproduct of plutonium that can be used for developing nuclear weapons. 12 Iran’s enrichment activities date back to the late 1990s and early 2000, as the AEOI built a series of enrichment facilities including a plant in Lavizan with extensive enrichment activities, which was razed just before being inspected by the IAEA, and centrifuge enrichment plants at Natanz and Lashkar Abad. Iran also began the production of beryllium at Malek-Ashtar University, which could be used to produce missiles, satellites, nuclear reactors, nuclear weapons, and spacecraft. After a long silence and denials, in 2003, Iran admitted to the IAEA of having an enrichment program and storing uranium at a research laboratory at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. 13 Shortly thereafter, the IAEA urged Iran to suspend its uranium production, which, and in response to Western pressures and the threat of sanctions, forced the Khatami administration to temporarily suspend the program. In turn, Russians agreed to furnish enriched uranium for the Bushehr plant as long as Iran would be willing to return the spent uranium to Russia and not to

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pursue nuclear weapons. The Ahmadinejad administration resumed the enrichment program in 2005 right as the Bushehr plant was completed. Iran continued to develop and improve its enrichment technology and activities despite successive IAEA reports, threats, and sanctions during the Ahmadinejad and first year of the Rouhani administrations. Periodically, and often prior to its nuclear talks, Iran disseminates information about its nuclear and missile activities, which offer a glimpse of the scope of these programs and the pace of Iran’s technological development in these fields. Generally, Iran’s nuclear programs fall into three categories: the declared, publicly known but undeclared, and unknown secret projects. Iran has had some success in identifying domestic sources of uranium and mining yellowcake, an important step in bypassing the sanctions on uranium imports and gaining some self-sufficiency in their nuclear program. For instance, in 2010, they produced yellowcake from the Gachin uranium mine near Bandar Abbas in southern Iran for processing in the Isfahan facility. 14 Iran also announced uranium discoveries in three central sites in Khoshoomi, Charchoolen, and Narigan, and has extensive mining plans for the Saghand site in central Iran with an estimated reserve of more than 1.7 million tons of medium-quality ore. This mine is estimated to have the production capacity of 132,000 tons of uranium annually. 15 As far as enrichment program is concerned, the Fordo plant near the city of Qom has been of a particular concern for the IAEA. In a report in 2012, the IAEA indicated that there were 2,784 centrifuges installed at Fordo and that Iran could double the number of their operating centrifuges in a short period of time, which would enable them to raise their monthly production of 20 percent enriched uranium (medium-enriched) from 15kg to 25 kg. This underground facility which is located in a military base could potentially enrich uranium up to 90 percent in a short period. 16 Some of the existing enriched uranium, which is not weapons-grade, has been used for conversion into fuel for the AEOI’s medical research reactor in Tehran. As a significant engineering achievement, Iran has also produced nuclear fuel rods for its nuclear power plants, which have already been inserted into the core of Tehran’s nuclear research reactor. 17 As a long-term and seemingly farfetched goal, Iranians have also launched a program to develop a nuclear fusion reactor. 18 For many years, scientists around the world have unsuccessfully attempted to develop viable fusion technology, which is a more environmentally friendly and efficient method of power generation than the current methods. Suspicions surrounding these extensive enrichment activities have been intensified with Iran’s growing interest and advancement in space and missile technologies. For the first time, the country successfully launched a domestically built satellite into orbit in 2009 and has had several plans for further launches. The Safir carrier rocket that launched the 2009 satellite

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demonstrated sophistication in multistage separation and propulsion systems. Their new Simorgh rocket is indicative of the country’s further progress in space technology. Ahmadinejad even revealed their plan to send man into space by 2019. 19 This space technology has enhanced the country’s ability to develop and produce an extensive missile system, particularly in collaboration with North Korea. 20 Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is the largest and most diverse in the Middle East, but they are not very accurate. Iran is the only country that has developed a 2,000-km range missile without first having a nuclear weapons capability. 21 These systems that range from short to intermediate missiles include, but not limited to, Shahab 1, 2, and 3; Ghadr-1, which qualifies as a medium-range missile; and Sajjil 1 and 2, which are surface-to-air missiles with range of up to 2,200 km. These missile systems, which are domestically developed, are modeled after the North Korean NoDong, NKSL-1, NKSL-X-2, and Russian SS-2 missiles with similar performances, 22 are capable of targeting much of the Middle East (including Israel and American installations in the region) and some parts of southeastern Europe. 23 Iran, however, has not developed a ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Iran continues to deny that its nuclear, space, and missile programs are a prelude to the development of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has been unable to confirm Iran’s assertions in this respect and suspects that the country has been involved in nuclear weapons research at the Parchin military site, from which Iran was suspected of removing the evidence prior to their inspection. 24 As early as 2011, the IAEA also expressed concerns about undisclosed Iranian nuclear activities, including the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, involving military organizations. 25 However, no one has offered any direct and solid evidence of Iran’s involvement in nuclear weapons development activities. In the absence of such evidence about Iran’s nuclear weapons program, it is also suggested that the country does indeed not intend to build a bomb rather follow the Japanese model by developing a “breakthrough capacity,” which would enable them to build a bomb in a matter of months in the future. 26 This “creates, in effect, a de facto nuclear power with all the parts but just not pieced together.” 27 Of course, major global and regional powers, especially conservative Arab states and Israel, are unwilling accept such a balance-of-power shift in the region under this scenario. Negotiations and the Sanctions Regime With recent setbacks in the Iranian nuclear programs due to effective sanctions, cyber-attacks, and covert activities and assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, it is not clear how close the country is to building a nuclear weapon. While the Israelis continue to draw their redlines 28 and conservative

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Arabs insist that the time is running out and are secretly urging the United States to stop Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, 29 the West is unwilling to go beyond the current diplomatic efforts, covert actions, and sanctions to end Iran’s programs. The United States is not only wary about engaging in another complicated war in the Middle East, but is also uncertain about the effectiveness and implications of a military confrontation with Iran. Since 2003 and revelations about Iran’s secret nuclear activities and potential violations of its treaty obligations, the leadership has officially welcomed negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the disputes. A number of times, they have made formal concessions to constrain their nuclear activities. In practice, however, the regime has repeatedly disregarded those commitments that undermine Iran’s stated rights. Essentially, Iran’s position is that the country is indeed entitled to a peaceful nuclear program under its current international obligations and is unwilling to give up enrichment activities. Formally, the regime has reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT and has allowed IAEA inspections, sometimes with calculated delays and restrictions. In fact, at the IAEA’s request in 2003, Iran signed an additional protocol which would allow more IAEA inspections, more timely reporting by Iran on its nuclear activities, and slowdown in completing the fuel cycle. 30 In response to the European pressures, Iran has also made formal concessions to the EU. For instance, in 2004, they signed an agreement with EU-3 (Germany, France, and Great Britain) that in return for upholding NPT and not pursuing nuclear weapons programs including complete fuel cycle development, Iran would be rewarded with trade agreements. 31 Iranian negotiators even agreed to an IAEA proposal for a fuel swap deal in 2009. According to this proposal, Iran would send most of its enriched uranium to Russia for further enrichment. Despite its drawbacks, this deal would have addressed some of the fears regarding Iran’s efforts to enrich uranium to weapongrade. 32 This and several other inconclusive meetings with the P5+1 (permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) also raised suspicion that Iran was simply pursuing a delaying tactic to make further advances in its nuclear program. In the Istanbul meeting in 2011, the West again offered an updated swap deal to stop enrichment, but Iran again insisted on its right to nuclear technology and its unwillingness to give up the enrichment program. 33 To pressure Iran for concessions, the country has been subjected to an increasingly crippling multilateral and unilateral sanctions regime. The multilateral sanctions include a series of Security Council resolutions (UNSCR 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929) under articles 40 and 41 34 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and several EU measures. Given Russian and Chinese opposition to the use of force against Iran, Article 42 has not been invoked in the UN sanctions regime against Iran. Early Western initiatives to refer Iran to the Security Council and seek economic sanctions were faced with strong opposition by China and Russia. However,

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over time these two countries came to support the sanctions as some of their immediate concerns were addressed. Chinese were reliant on Iranian oil exports, had significant investments in the Iranian oil industry including a $16 billion agreement between Iran and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation to develop the Northern Pars gas field and build liquefied natural gas facilities, and were interested in a geostrategic relation with Iran as a part of their global strategic competition with the United States. 35 As of early 2010, China imported nearly 13 percent of its oil from Iran. Sanctions on Iranian oil exports would jeopardize their economy. With the United State’s mediation, the Saudis guaranteed oil supply to China in return for pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons. 36 Clearly, Russians had their own reservations about a nuclear Iran on their doorsteps. However, they are generally inclined to oppose sanctions, have economic interests in Iran including the Bushehr nuclear energy facility and extensive exports to Iran that had reached $2.08 billion in 2004, and maintain geostrategic interests in relations with Iran in competition with the United States. 37 They also came around to support the sanctions after the United States agreed to scrap its plans for a ballistic missile site in Poland and the Czech Republic, to which they had vehemently objected for undermining their security. The Obama administration replaced the Eastern European site with a ship-borne system. 38 The documents revealed by WikiLeaks do indicate extensive cooperation between Russians and the United States in 2010 to contain Iran. Evidently, Russians exchanged intelligence information about Iran’s capabilities with Washington, and made efforts to interdict Iran’s attempts to purchase and ship restricted technology. By early 2010, the United States had been able to convince both Russians and Chinese to refrain from vetoing Security Council resolutions on Iran that called for effective sanctions. 39 On July 31, 2006, under Article 40 of the Charter, the Security Council passed a no-sanction resolution (UNSCR 1696) 40 requiring Iran to resolve its outstanding issues with the IAEA, demanded suspension of all enrichmentrelated and processing activities—including research and development—and urged the international community to reach a “diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear program is for exclusively peaceful purposes.” 41 As Iran disregarded this resolution and continued with expediting its nuclear and missile programs, on December 23, 2006, the council adopted UNSCR 1737 under Article 41 of the Charter requesting the suspension of uranium enrichment activities. As an important step in the UN sanctions regime, since the five permanent members supported this resolution, it imposed a series of sanctions on Iran including export bans on some nuclear materials and technology (with the exception of the equipment for the light water reactor at the Bushehr facility), and on technology cooperation related to nuclear programs (except where the IAEA deemed such cooperation necessary for humanitarian or medical purposes). Three provisions in this reso-

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lution also targeted Iranian individuals and entities, as designated by the UNSC for their involvement in “proliferation sensitive activity,” imposed bans on their travels in member countries and on their training in subjects that would enhance Iran’s nuclear goals, and froze their assets. 42 To ensure enforcement, the council adopted a series of measures to monitor members’ compliance with these provisions including the establishment of the 1737 committee, which was tasked with collecting and assessing states’ compliance reports. It is important to note that the resolution did not impose sanctions on the Iranian oil and gas industry. Furthermore, major powers also maintained different interpretations of the purpose and scope of these sanctions. Iran reacted to this resolution defiantly by criticizing the United Nation’s inaction in the case of the Israeli nuclear weapons and by asserting Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy. As expected, this resolution and Ahmadinejad’s dismissive reaction caused a good deal of friction within the Iranian political establishment. On March 24, 2007, the Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1747 under Article 41 which repeated and enhanced the previous sanctions and imposed new ones, as Iran failed to comply with the demands. This resolution called on member states to exercise “restraint” in addition to previously stated “vigilance” in enforcing the sanctions, added twenty-eight more names to the list of banned individuals and entities including Bank Sepah (which is the fourth largest bank in Iran and affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), and expanded the list of items banned for export to or import from Iran. Additionally, the new resolution introduced a number of new sanctions including a ban on the sale, supply, or transfer of major military weapon systems; and prohibition of financial, technical, and service assistance in military-related activities. Furthermore, the resolution called on states and international financial institutions “not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans” with the Iranian government unless they are for humanitarian or developmental purposes. 43 The states were required to report to the 1737 committee on the adoption and measures for the implementation of the resolution. This resolution was followed by UNSCR 1803 on March 3, 2008, with all but one member of the council voting in favor. Indonesia abstained from the vote on the grounds that it remained to be convinced of the efficacy of additional sanctions against Iran. This resolution reiterated the previous demands and augmented the scope of some of the previously imposed sanctions. It added additional people and entities to the ban list (including Melli and Saderat banks), required the states “to prevent the entry into and transit through their territories” of designated individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear program, and outlined the sanctions that directly applied to the Iranian state. The resolution called on states to inspect cargo going to or from Iran on aircraft and vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Repub-

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lic of Iran Shipping Line, when they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cargo consists of goods prohibited under UNSCR 1737, 1747, or 1803. 44 The succeeding resolution, UNSCR 1835, was unanimously approved on September 27, 2008. This resolution, however, was not adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter nor does it set out new demands or provisions for sanctions. It simply reaffirms the previous resolutions and the Council’s commitment “to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.” On June 9, 2010, the Council passed its latest resolution (UNSCR 1929), as Turkey and Brazil voted against and Lebanon abstained. This resolution imposed the fifth round of sanctions and demanded a complete halt to Iran’s enrichment programs and any other activities related to nuclear weapon development. This resolution imposed the following sanctions on Iran: • Complete ban from investing in nuclear and missile technology abroad. • Complete arms embargo on Iran including the ban on the sale of “battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircrafts, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.” • Prohibition from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles. • Requiring states to take the necessary steps to prevent technology transfer relevant to missiles to Iran. • Expansion of the list of banned materials for transfer from and to Iran. • Subjecting Iran to a new inspection regime designed to detect and stop Iranian smuggling including search and seizure of cargo ships on the high seas, and the disposition of the seized materials. The states are required to refuse service to Iranian ships that are not in compliance with these sanctions. • Financial sanctions targeting Iran’s ability to finance proliferation activities. States are also called upon, but were not required, 45 to limit their financial interactions with Iranian financial institutions. • Asset freeze on fifteen IRGC-related companies along with forty other Iranian companies. 46 While President Obama referred to this resolution as “the toughest sanctions ever faced by Iran,” Ahmadinejad told the media that they were like a “used handkerchief that should be dumped in a garbage can.” 47 The criticism that the sanctions were indeed targeting the Iranian public was dismissed by Susan Rice, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, by suggesting that the Iranian public were not the targets, as the restrictions did not impose embargo on gas imports to Iran, an idea that was floated by the United States but opposed by China and Russia. 48 The monitoring committee and assessment panel established under this sanction reviewed reports and documents pertaining to member states’ com-

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pliance measures and Iran’s violations. These violations, according to the committee, involved Iran’s smuggling of conventional weapons, especially illicit transfer of weapons to Syria. 49 In September 2012, Bahrain and the UAE confiscated various equipments headed to Iran including carbon fiber, which is crucial for Iran’s nuclear enrichment centrifuges. The UAE has alleged numerous violations of the sanctions regime by Iran over the years. In addition to the successive United Nations sanctions, Iran has also been subject to a series of collective European Unions sanctions, despite reservations by some of their members due to their extensive and vital trade relations with Iran, particularly in oil and gas. Prior to 2010, the EU sanctions included the freezing of assets of targeted entities and embargo on trade or license system involving goods that can be associated with the proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities, or with the development of nuclear weapon systems. In 2010, the EU Sanctions-Regulation 961/2010 confirmed the UN sanctions; extended the list of targeted Iranian entities; prohibited direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer of goods associated with the proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities or with the development of weapon systems; prohibited the supply, sale, or transfer of any key equipment or technology for the Iranian oil industry; made payments in excess of EUR 10,000 to and from Iranian entities (even if not targeted entities) subject to notice to the relevant EU government departments, and subjected all payments in excess of EUR 40,000 to and from Iran to prior approval of the relevant EU governments’ departments. 50 The British played a seminal role in the imposition of these sanctions. The British Treasury department even imposed further sanctions by banning any transactions with Iranian banks. The Iranian parliament responded by voting overwhelmingly to downgrade Iran’s ties with the United Kingdom. 51 As Iranian mobs stormed the British embassy in Tehran, the EU imposed new sanctions on Iranian officials and firms in 2011. These new sanctions were designed to severely impact the Iranian financial system and transport and energy sectors. 52 However, the new sanctions did not impose oil embargo against Iran as some EU countries including Greece were dependent on the Iranian oil. 53 In concert with the existing UN resolutions, in 2012 the EU foreign ministers significantly broadened these sanctions by adopting further restrictions on the Iranian banks, trades, and gas exports. In addition to restrictions on banking transactions, which were already in effect, they banned short-term export credits, guarantees, and insurance. Furthermore, they imposed bans on the imports, purchase, and transport of Iranian oil and natural gas. European companies were barred from providing shipbuilding technology and oil storage capabilities, as well as flagging and classification services to Iranian tankers and cargo vessels. 54 In October 2012, the EU imposed greater sanctions against major Iranian companies including the freezing of the assets of The National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company. By adopting these measures, as indicated by a

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senior EU official, the Union was “now comprehensively capturing all possible elements of this sector and sources of funding for the regime.” 55 Iran reacted to these measures by halting oil sales to British and French companies before these sanctions took effect. Historically, Iran was a major oil supplier to the Europeans, but European companies had lowered their purchases dramatically. 56 Since the United States and Europe were no longer major importers of Iranian oil and gas, the objective of this strategy by the EU and the United States was to curb the sale of Iran’s oil and gas elsewhere. A number of other countries including the United States, Canada, and Japan have also adopted additional unilateral sanctions against Iran. U.S. sanctions date back to the hostage crisis in 1979, and have evolved over time. The U.S.-Iran trade relationship has been limited compared to the Europeans, Russia, and China. Generally, there have been some trade embargo exceptions with the United States including agricultural goods and medical supplies. However, the United States has officially taken a proactive role in undermining Iran’s foreign trade by invoking extra-territorial jurisdiction and by imposing penalties on foreign companies that trade with the country. In 1996, the United States adopted the Iran and Libya Sanction Act (ILSA) that imposed penalties on companies investing in Iran’s and Libya’s energy sector. Even when these sanctions were dropped against Libya in 2011, the United States extended the sanctions against Iran. Given extensive European economic interests with Iran, this strategy was considered quite controversial until the EU itself adopted extensive sanctions. Thus, the act which was designed to punish companies that invest more than $20 billion in a given year to develop Iran’s oil and gas field was not enforced out of fear of angering the American allies for over a decade. The Bush administration’s adoption of the Iran Freedom Support Act in 2006 was viewed as a commitment to regime change in Iran rather than a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. The administration went beyond the existing UN sanctions and imposed prohibitions against American financial institutions and their subsidiaries and American citizens from doing business with Iran. Ironically, the administration did very little to impede trade with Iran. For instance, the administration approved a license for General Electric to export spare parts for jet turbine engines to Iran Air in response to safety concerns. 57 During the Obama administration, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and OFAC (The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control) List of Specially Designated Nationals imposed sanctions on any person (whether a U.S. national or not) who engages in certain types of trades for Iran’s benefit. 58 However, as reported by the New York Times, like the Bush administration, the Obama administration granted special licenses allowing American companies to do business worth billions of dollars with Iran and other countries that were blacklisted for sponsoring terrorism. In the case of Iran, these companies are extensively involved in the

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energy industry. On behest of a wide array of American companies, the OFAC at the Treasury Department has issued thousands of exceptions to the American sanctions. Most of these exceptions have, of course, been issued on the basis of an old law that exempts agricultural and medical humanitarian aid from sanctions. 59 Clearly, these exceptions are deemed to serve the American foreign policy objectives and corporate interests. 60 In 2010, the Treasury Department imposed further sanctions on Iran Air and the Iranian port company Tidewater for providing material support and service to the IRGC, 61 thus disallowing any companies to do business with Iran Air and Tidewater. Additionally, in a major defense bill in 2010, the Obama administration cut off any foreign firm from the U.S. financial system that does business with Iran’s Central Bank. 62 The U.S. Federal Reserve even fined the UK-based bank, Standard Chartered, for violation of the sanctions acts from 2001to 2007 by hiding thousands of transaction with Iran, and demanded future compliance with the American sanctions. 63 In an attempt to further damage the Iranian currency, which was losing its value by the day in early 2013, the U.S. government imposed fresh sanctions including penalties on anyone facilitating significant transactions in rial or holding significant amounts of the currency outside Iran. 64 Canada and Japan also adopted unilateral sanctions against Iran. Beginning in 2010, in concert with the UN sanctions and pursuant to the EU actions, the Canadian government adopted unilateral sanctions against Iran and gradually intensified them. In July 2010, Canada passed the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA). Additional sanctions were imposed in 2011 and 2012 in response to the allegations of the Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States and the reports of Iran’s failure to comply with the IAEA demands. Collectively, these sanctions prohibited any financial transactions with Iranian entities and designated persons; the sale, export, or provision of arms, or any materials used in the petrochemicals; any equipment or machinery designed for the building, maintenance, or refitting of ships; any vessels for the transport or storage of any petrochemical products; any goods used in the mining industry; and any goods for broadcasting, telecommunications, or satellite services to Iran or any other entity acting on Iran’s behalf. The law also banned the imports of Iranian goods and services including petrochemicals, any financial transactions and services (with some exceptions), any insurance transactions, and any shipping or flagging services. 65 In response to the United States’ pressures, in 2012 the Japanese finance minister, Jun Azumi, also announced Japan’s intent to take “concrete steps” to reduce its oil dependency on Iran. As the second biggest consumer of Iranian oil, Japan was indeed pursuing new suppliers among the Arab Persian Gulf states for their increasing demand for oil, due to the nuclear crisis at Fukushima. 66

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The sanctions regime has had an enormous impact on the Iranian economy by halting economic growth, adding to an already intolerable unemployment rate, and causing acute inflation. 67 Iran’s inability to acquire foreign currency, since it was ejected from the SWIFT international electronic banking system in March of 2012, has undermined all sectors of the economy and governmental functions. As a country largely dependent on oil revenues, Iran has had to undercut its prices and engage in bartering transactions in its foreign trade. For instance, it has been importing Turkish gold as payment for billions of dollars of oil exports to Turkey. The Turkish deputy prime minister has called this a “gold-for-oil barter system.” 68 In fact, in 2012, Iran became the largest importer of Turkish gold, which was being physically imported into Iran by carriers. 69 This trend highlights the economic complications caused by the sanctions regime for Iranians. The unprecedented shortages of goods, price increases, and the decline in the peoples’ purchasing powers have caused a good deal of popular dissatisfaction and friction within the political establishment. As discussed earlier, the Ahmadinejad administration downplayed these problems and applauded the citizens’ sacrifices in the face of “global arrogance.” The president dismissed the Health Minister, Marzieyeh Vahid Dastgerdi, the first female minister in the Islamic Republic and the only female in his cabinet, when she complained about pharmaceutical shortages and the inevitability of price increases due to sanctions. 70 New political fracture within the political establishment emerged over the merits of the administration’s nuclear policy toward the end of the Ahmadinejad administration. 71 The election of pragmatic and moderate Rouhani and his assertions about his mandate to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear crisis underline these divisions within the Iranian society and the political establishment. Reportedly, concerned about the adverse economic impacts of the boycotts, the Iranian regime was in secret negotiations with the Obama administration during the latter part of 2013 to seek a negotiated settlement. 72 Rouhani’s election and his decision to empower the foreign ministry to engage in nuclear negotiations improved the chances of a negotiated settlement. During the three rounds of negotiations in November of 2013, Iranians insisted on their rights to enrichment but showed willingness to submit to intrusive inspections. In early November, the high-level negotiations in Geneva raised the specter of an interim settlement, but the unresolved issues on nuclear enrichment and the Arak heavy-water reactor forced a new set of negotiations that began on November 20, 2013. The French, in particular, insisted that Iran should scrap its plans for finishing the Arak reactor since its spent fuel contains plutonium that can be readily used for making nuclear weapons. Additionally, the P5+1 continued to demand suspension of uranium enrichment and limiting Iran’s 20 percent-enriched uranium supplies. In return for these concessions, the West has agreed to “open the spigot” a bit to remove some of the hardship

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caused by the sanctions. 73 Khamene’i backed these negotiations but set his own “red line” by insisting on Iran’s right to enrichment. Before the latest rounds of the negotiations he asserted that Iran would not step back even “one iota” from its right to enrichment. He also criticized the French opposition in the earlier negotiations and accused them of succumbing to the United States and Israel, and called the state of Israel “the rabid dog of the region.” 74 Iran and the six powers hailed the interim agreement reached on November 24, 2013, as a dramatic step. The Obama administration indicated that the agreement will be a major step toward regional peace and global stability. As expected, Iranian officials and the six powers had distinctly divergent views on both the reasons for reaching the agreement as well as Iran’s rights and obligations under the interim agreement. John Kerry, the United States Secretary of State, indicated that Iran had agreed to the deal because of the adverse impact of the sanctions. Contrarily, the Iranian foreign minister Zarif underscored Iran’s desire for confidence-building measures. This interim agreement obligates Iran to “roll back” its nuclear program at its current stage for the period of six months and, in return, the West agreed to ease the current sanctions, to refrain from imposing additional sanctions, and to release about $7 billion dollars in frozen Iranian assets. Iranians insist that the agreement acknowledges their right to uranium enrichment, a point that is questioned by the Americans. Iranians did agree to stop uranium enrichment above the 5 percent threshold and to convert its current stockpile of materials processed to 20 percent into an irreversibly harmless material. Additionally, they will not install any more centrifuges in Natanz and Fordo, nor will their scientists operate any additional centrifuges on these sites. However, they will be able to continue the operations of the 10,190 existing machines on these sites. Iran will allow intrusive monitoring of these operations. As to the Arak heavy-water plant, a point of concern particularly for the French, Iranians agreed not to fuel or commission this plant or install any additional reactor components. They may, however, continue work on this installation that is not specifically prohibited in the agreement. 75 As expected, the initial reactions to this agreement varied throughout the world. While the negotiating parties hailed it as an important accomplishment, Israelis and some of the Republicans in the United States Congress referred to it as an “extremely dangerous” agreement for the free world. 76 As a first step, the interim agreement was hoped to be an effective mechanism for confidence-building if the parties would comply with its terms and expectations. As the Iranian foreign minister indicated, the West’s failure to ease on sanctions or any further sanctions would render the agreement void. Similarly, Iran’s failure to meet its obligations under the interim agreement would make it difficult for the Obama administration to pursue further negotiations. Iran and P5+1 continued their meetings in early 2014. The March meeting

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was hailed as “substantive and useful” by EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton. 77 Shortly thereafter, in compliance with the interim agreement, Iran began cutting its higher-enriched uranium. 78 No final settlement was reached in the final round of the talks in July 2014. However, the parties’ decision to extend the deadline for a final settlement for four months, and Iran’s agreement to convert its stock of 20 percent-enriched uranium into fuel in return for easing of some sanctions, 79 demonstrate both the complexities of negotiations and genuine desires for a final solution. Future negotiations for a comprehensive agreement will be tough in light of the divergent views on Iran’s rights and the seemingly endless opposition by Israel, conservative Arabs in the region, and their allies. Covert Operations and Threats of Force In addition to the sanctions regime, the United States and Israel have been engaged in covert operations including cyber-attacks on Iran’s nuclear installations and assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists. Although neither country has admitted to such operations, there is ample evidence pointing at their culpability in these efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear activities. As early as 2009, in a joint Israel-U.S. operation at the Dimona complex in the Negev desert in Israel, Israelis were testing the effectiveness of the Stuxnet computer worm on systems similar to the ones used in the Iranian nuclear programs. In an effort somewhat resembling a spy thriller, the German Siemens company that had furnished the Iranian equipment was asked to cooperate with a United States national laboratory in Idaho to test the vulnerabilities of the computer controllers Siemens sells to operate industrial machinery around the world. According to Siemens, this program was part of routine efforts to secure its products against cyber-attacks. Evidently, the Idaho National Laboratory, which is a part of the Energy Department and responsible for the United States nuclear arms, was allowed to identify well-hidden holes in the Siemens systems. Based on this finding that was shared with the Israelis and tested on the equipment in Dimona, the Stuxnet worm was developed with the capacity to send the Iranian nuclear centrifuges spinning wildly out of control, and to secretly record the normal plant operations and replay them to the operators to hide the malfunction while the centrifuges were being destroyed. This attack did not completely succeed, but it did destroy a fifth of the centrifuges and delayed Iran’s activities. 80 Expert examinations of the worm did indicate that, given its sophistication and complexity, it must be the work of states familiar with the Siemens equipment and their vulnerabilities. Also, it is well documented that Israel and the United States had indeed acquired and conducted tests on centrifuges similar to the ones that are used in the Iranian nuclear installations, especially in the Natanz enrichment plant. The Americans and Israelis have not denied the attack and, in fact, have

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expressed satisfaction at the delays in Iran’s program. Iranian media later reported additional cyber-attacks by Stuxnet and Flame viruses that targeted Iran’s power plants and oil facilities. 81 These attacks forced Iranians to remove nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant in 2011, due to the damages caused by the worm. 82 In response to these successive attacks and important damage to the Iranian equipment, Iranians took the necessary steps to protect their operations, accused Siemens of conspiracy against Iran, and undertook their own cyber-attacks. An Iranian parliamentarian even accused Siemens of exporting equipment to Iran that was designed to explode when put into operation. The company denied any involvement in the Iranian nuclear activities, including the sale of equipment. 83 In response to the cyberattacks, Iranians created a military unit called “cybercorps” and launched their own attacks on United States banks, and oil facilities and financial institutions in the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, these attacks by a virus known as Shamoon, which can spread through networked computers and ultimately wipe out files by overwriting them, 84 rendered more than 30,000 computers useless at ARMACO. They also impacted Ras Gas in Qatar. 85 The Ahmadinejad administration also accused the United States and Israel of being involved in a systematic assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists. As what turned out to be the beginning of a series of assassination attempts, in 2010 a bomb attack by men on a motorcycle killed one and injured another Iranian nuclear scientist. 86 Currently, Iranians are hiding their nuclear scientists out of fear of assassination. Israel continues to pressure the United States for military actions against Iran and threaten its own unilateral military attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. The Obama administration has been steadfast in refraining from military options even though it does not rule out the use of force in dealing with Iranian nuclear programs. Israel asserts its right to unilateral attack on the Iranian installations based on the perceived Iranian threat to its survival. Of course, there is no consensus in Israel about the viability or even the desirability of such operations. 87 The geographic distance of one thousand miles between the two countries complicates any military operations, especially in a region so hostile to Israel. Furthermore, the potential for regional instability in light of the recent Arab uprisings makes an Israeli unilateral operation untenable. This has not stopped the Netanyahu government from planning for military operations as a last resort. 88 To attack Iran, the Israelis would most certainly need refueling and rescue and save operation bases near Iran. For this purpose, Israelis have been developing extensive ties with the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan, a neighboring country to Iran, through extensive trade in oil-for-military hardware. 89 The possibility of the use of the Azeri facilities does indeed keep the Israeli military option on the table despite its drawbacks. The Iranian regime has dismissed these threats and has vowed to retaliate in case of an attack.

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Iran’s nuclear policies predate the establishment of the Islamic Republic. As discussed in this chapter, as early as the Ford administration, several American corporations were involved in Iran’s nuclear projects during the shah’s regime. The leaders of the Islamic Republic initially rejected nuclear power on religious grounds. By all indications, in response to the exposed security vulnerabilities of the country during the Iran-Iraq war, the regime adopted and pursued extensive nuclear and missile programs by relying on domestic resources, North Koreans, Chinese, Russians, and Pakistanis. Iran’s secrecy about its missile and enrichment programs, however, was alarming to the West as well as to regional powers including neighboring conservative Arab regimes and Israel. Economic boycotts, diplomatic initiatives, threats of force, and covert operations including cyber-attacks against Iranian installations and assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists did not deter the Ahmadinejad administration, which was committed to these policies at all costs. However, Iran’s growing diplomatic isolation, devastating impacts of the boycotts on the Iranian economy, and intensifying internal debates about the merits of these policies helped the rise of the moderates and accession of Rouhani to the presidency. Keenly cognizant of the challenges, Rouhani committed himself to a negotiated settlement and has, so far, withstood domestic opposition to his initiatives. It is increasingly apparent that Iran has made a conscious decision to forgo nuclear weapons and to settle for a “breakthrough” strategy which, like Japan, would enable the country to purse nuclear weapons in the future if needs be. For now, any workable diplomatic resolution requires the recognition of Iran’s rights under the NPT agreements, effective oversight functions, and an end to the boycotts. NOTES 1. Ali Reza Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the coming of Nuclear Crisis (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 130. 2. Gholam Reza Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2009), 347–48. 3. Deborah Campbell, “Iran’s Quiet Revolution,” The Walrus, accessed April 21, 2009, http://walrusmagazine.com/u/register/teaser.php?ref=2006.09-international-affairs-iran-nuclear-technology. 4. Afkhami, Life and Times, 350. 5. Ibid., 355–65. 6. Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 7. 7. Roger Howard, Iran in Crisis? Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response (New York: Zed Books, 2004), 94. 8. Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 131. 9. Ibid., 136. 10. Khan has indicated that the Pakistanis’ willingness to help stem from their religious affinity with Iranians, their hope to thwart foreign pressure from both countries, and Iran’s willingness to pay $10 billion, which could help the Pakistani military tremendously. Iran Times, International, March 19, 2010.

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11. Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 136–137. 12. Ibid., 141. 13. “Head of IAEA Safeguards Welcome Iran Workplan,” International Atomic Energy Association, accessed March 29, 2009, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/ iran_timeline4.shtml. 14. Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran claims nuclear advance day before talk,” accessed December 5, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/05/iran-nuclear-uranium-mine_n_792172.html. 15. Ibid. 16. “Iran ready to double uranium enrichment at Fordo-IAEA,” accessed November 19, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20368030. 17. “Iran makes nuclear fuel breakthrough,” accessed January 1, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2012/01/01/us-iran-missile-idUSTRE80007E20120101. 18. “Iran launched nuclear fusion bid,” accessed July 27, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-10749405. 19. “Iran aims to send man into space by 2019,” accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-10747390. 20. “N Korea and Iran ‘sharing ballistic missile technology,’” accessed May 15, 2011, http:/ /www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13402590. 21. Michael Elleman, “Iran Ballistic Missile Program,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed September 20, 2013, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program. 22. For more details on these missile systems, see: Michael Elleman, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program.” 23. “Iran: Our missiles can reach US bases, Israel,” accessed June 28, 2011, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program. 24. “Iran ready to double uranium enrichment at Fordo-IAEA.” 25. “UN ‘growing concern’ over Iran nuclear weapons plan,” accessed September 2, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14770123 26. Scott Shane, “NYT: Iran nukes claimed compared with Iraq,” accessed September 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/middleeast/30intel.html. 27. It is believed that the head of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, had indeed embraced the Japanese model as early as 2010 during a visit to Japan. See Brian Murphy, “AP analysis: Iran nuclear denial has Japanese ring,” accessed September 1, 2012, http://www.kttc.com/story/ 19435229/ap-analysis-iran-nuclear. 28. On occasions, the Israeli leadership has warned of Iran’s impending ability to build nuclear weapons, and Israel’s unwillingness to accept a nuclear Iran. See: David Sanger, James Glanz, and Joe Becker, “Around the World, Distress Over Iran,” accessed November 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/middleeast/29ir. 29. A series of cables released by WikiLeaks demonstrate widespread conservative Arab leadership’s criticisms of the United States’ policies in the region and secret efforts to thwart Iran’s nuclear programs. For instance, the King of Bahrain asked the Americans to “stop” the Iranian nuclear program. Similarly, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia questioned the Bush administration’s policy for offering Iraq on a platter to Iran and implored Washington to “cut off the head of the snake.” In another cable, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi laments that “Any culture that is patient and focused enough to spend years on a single carpet is capable of waiting years and even decades to achieve greater goals.” His greatest worry, he said, “is not how much we know about Iran, but how much we do not.” To the dismay of the United States, these Arabs were unwilling to openly advocate for an attack on Iran out of fear of negative reactions by their own populace. See David Sanger, et al., “Around the World, Distress Over Iran.” 30. “Communication dated 12 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency,” Islamic Republic of Iran, accessed March 31, 2009, http:// www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf 31. Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, 18. 32. George Jahn, “Diplomats: Iranian negotiators back uranium deal,” accessed October 21, 2009, http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/oldsite/article.asp?ID=11512.

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33. “Foreign powers ‘disappointed’ at Iran nuclear talks,” accessed January 22, 2011, http:// www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/en_us/noticias/internacional/2011/0/3/Foreign-powers-disappointed-Iran-nuclear-talks,c2dac970-25fd-4909-b28a-75d5d7aed95f.html. 34. Articles 40 and 41 are covered under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and allow collective action short of military operations as authorized by the Security Council. Article 41 reads: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. They may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” None of these resolutions are adopted under Article 42, which authorizes military actions to restore international peace and security. 35. Bruce W. Jentleson, “Sanction Against Iran: Key Issues,” A Century Foundation Report (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007), 30. 36. Sanger, et al., “Around the World.” 37. Jentleson, “Sanction Against Iran,” 28. 38. Ibid. 39. Owen Matthews, “The Enemy of My Frenemy . . . ,” accessed November 30, 2010, http://mag.newsweek.com/2010/11/30/what-wikileaks-docs-reveal-about-the-iran-threat.html. 40. This resolution was passed by a fourteen-to-one vote with Qatar opposing the resolution. 41. “United National Security Council Resolutions,” accessed December 18, 2012, http:// www.isisnucleariran.org/documents/unscr/. 42. The annex to this resolution designated twelve inviduals associated with the nuclear program and ten with the missile program. See “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment,” accessed December 18, 2012, http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm. 43. “Security Council, Resolution 1474,” accessed December 18, 2012, http://www. armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-on-Iran. 44. Ibid. 45. “Security Council Oks Iran Sanctions,” accessed June 9, 2010, http://www.msnbc.com/ id/37575561/ns/wold_news_mideastn_africa. 46. For the text of the resolution, see: Security Council SC/9948, accessed December 18, 2012, http://www.un.org/New/Press/docs/2010. 47. “UN votes to slap new sanctions on Iran,” accessed June 9, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/ 2010/WORLD/meast/06/09/un.iran.sanctions.pass/. 48. Ibid. 49. “Fact Sheet on U.N. Resolution 1929, Sanctions Against Iran,” IIP Digital/ U.S. Department of State, accessed December 18, 2012, http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/198010.htm. 50. “Council Regulation (EU), No. 961/2010,” accessed December 10, 2011, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:281:0001:0077:EN:PDF. 51. “Iran parliament votes to downgrade relations with UK,” accessed November 27, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15908525. 52. “EU to slap new sanctions on Iran’s officials and firms,” accessed December 1, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15984216. 53. Don Melvin and Raf Casert, “EU foreign ministers fail to agree on Iran oil ban,” accessed December 1, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/eu-foreign-ministers-fail-agree-iran-oil-ban-132002106 .html. 54. “EU imposes new sanctions on Iran,” accessed October 15, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-19947507. 55. Justina Pawlak, “EU sanctions target Iran oil, gas, tanker companies,” accessed December 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE89F08N20121016. 56. Prior to the sanctions, the Europeans bought nearly 20 percent of Iran’s oil exports. These purchases dropped drastically due to the sanctions. See “Iran ‘halts oil sales to France and Britain’” accessed February 19, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17089953. 57. Jentleson, “Sanction Against Iran,” 11.

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58. For the text of CISADA, see http://www.treasurey.go/resource-cener/sanctions/Doceuemnts/hr2194.pdf. 59. Jo Becker, “U.S. Oks business with terror-supporting nations,” accessed December 24, 2010, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40798089/ns/world_news-the_new_york_times/#.UoZ55fkqiOY. 60. Given the extensive list of exceptions, it is clear that the OFAC has a good deal of latitude in issuing exceptions. At times, political influence has played a determining role in granting these exceptions. 61. “US imposes economic sanctions on IranAir,” accessed June 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.co. uk/news/world-us-canada-13897272. 62. “Obama signs Iran sanctions bill into law,” accessed November 1, 2012, http://www.bbc.co. uk/news/world-us-canada-16376072. 63. “Standard Chartered hit by $300 million in Iran fine,” accessed December 10, 2012, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20669650. 64. “US targets Iranian currency with fresh sanctions,” accessed June 5, 2013, http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/business-22763075. 65. “Baird Expand Sanctions Against Iran,” accessed December 18, 2012, http://www. international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/12/11a.aspx?lang=eng. 66. “Japan ‘to reduce Iran oil imports,’” accessed January 12, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-asia-16523422?print=true. 67. James Kanter and Thomas Erdbrink, “With New Sanctions, European Union Tightens Screws on Iran Over Nuclear Work,” accessed December 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/10/16/world/middleeast/european-union-intensifies-sanctions-on-iran.html?_r=0. 68. Ivan Watson and Gul Tuysuz, “Iran importing gold to evade economic sanctions, Turkish official says,” accessed December 3, 2012, http://cpf.cleanprint.net/cpf/cpf?. 69. Ibid. 70. “Iran sacks sole female minister Dastjerdi from health post,” accessed December 31, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20853142. 71. Keir Simons, “Western intelligence sees ‘small signs of wavering’ on Iran nuclear policy,” accessed October 12, 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/12/14396298-westernintelligence-sees-small-signs-of-wavering-on-iran-nuclear-policy. 72. Bradley Klapper, Julie Pace, and Matthew Lee, “Secret US-Iran talks set stage for nuclear deal,” accessed November 24, 2013, http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_289563/contentdetail.htm. 73. “Iran nuclear talks: Tehran ‘will not step back one iota,’” accessed November 20, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25007901. 74. Ibid. 75. David Blair, “Iran nuclear deal agreed at Geneva talks,” accessed November 24, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/Iran/10470717/Iran-nuclear-deal. 76. Becky Bratu, “‘Extremely dangerous’: Israelis, Republicans criticize Iran nuclear deal,” accessed November 24, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/24/21591860historic-mistake-israelis-republicans-condemn-iran-nuclear-deal?lite. 77. “Iran in fresh nuclear talks with world powers,” accessed April 8, 2014, http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26938351. 78. “Iran has cut higher-enriched uranium stocks ‘by half,’” accessed April 17, 2014, http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27065532. 79. “Iran nuclear talks deadline extended until November,” accessed July 20, 2014, http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-midddle-east-28381608. 80. William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger, “Israel tests on worm called crucial in Iran nuclear delay,” accessed January 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/ 16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 81. “Iran media report new cyberattacks by Stuxnet worm,” accessed December 31, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/25/iran-media-report-new-cyberattack-stuxnet-worm/. 82. “Iran nuclear plans: Bushehr fuel to be unloaded,” accessed February 27, 2011, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12588621.

Nuclear and Missile Programs, Policies, and the Sanctions Regime

307

83. “Germany’s Siemens denies Iranian nuclear sabotage claim,” accessed September 23, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19690774. 84. Lolita Baldor, “US: Hackers in Iran responsible for cyberattacks,” accessed October 12, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-hackers-iran-responsible-cyberattacks. 85. Mike Mount, “U.S. officials believe Iran is behind recent cyberattacks,” accessed October 15, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/15u-s-officials. 86. “Iran nuclear scientist killed in motorbike attack,” accessed November 29, 2010, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11860928. 87. It is believed that the Netanyahu administration has faced significant opposition from senior Israeli security officials about unilateral attack on Iran. See Aron Heller, “TV report: Israel security heads nixed Iran attack,” accessed November 5, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/ article/tv-israel-security-heads-halted-iran-attack-alert. 88. Estrin Daniel, “Israeli defense chief: Iran strike may be needed,” accessed December 1, 2011, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/tv-israel-security-heads-halted-iran-attack-alert. 89. Thomas Grove, “Reuters sources: Azerbaijan explores aiding Israel against Iran,” accessed November 1, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/30/us-iran-israel-azerbaijan-idUSBRE88T05L20120930.

Conclusion

In much of the Muslim world, the general public is quite disillusioned with their societies’ economic woes, social ills, and political problems. To date, many political authorities are still either the by-products of colonialism or continue to subjugate their societies’ interests to outside powers as a requirement for their self-preservation. Greater public awareness due to increased communication is reinforcing public disillusionment and directing their discontent at political authorities. From the northern parts of Africa to the proper Middle East and Asia, frustrated Muslims are vociferously challenging their authoritarian political systems and leaders for their disregard of the public’s sensibilities and rights and for their failures to meet the demands and expectations of their people. The regimes have either repressed these expressions of opposition or have responded with ineffective and piecemeal reforms. There is, however, no consensus among the public about how to proceed with change and what should ultimately be the nature of political authorities and their policy commitments. Many who reject the experiments of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries with an array of political ideologies, forms of authority, and policy decisions for their failures to move their societies forward, see a return to Islam and its solutions to these problems as the only viable choice. These Islamists, who are generally better mobilized and more outspoken, favor the overthrow of the current regimes and establishment of Islamic states committed to the implementation of Islamic laws and precepts. In their view, a true Islamic state will not only reflect societal values and norms but will also be better equipped to address citizens’ needs and expectations. Islamists have and continue to pursue an array of strategies in their search for an Islamic state. In some cases like Jordan and Turkey, they have worked within the existing political parameters to gain political prominence and influence policy decisions. In other cases 309

310

Conclusion

like Iran, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, they have violently challenged the existing political authorities and in some cases have replaced them with Islamic forms of authority. The Iranian revolution ushered in an Islamic Republic that—to the surprise of some and dismay of others—has lasted for decades, the Egyptian uprising brought in a short-lived Brotherhood-led government through a democratic process, the popular uprising against Muammar Qaddafi appears to have resulted in a failed state, and challenges against the Syrian state appears to be stalemated. Secular-nationalist opposition to the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s perceived autocracy, military coup against Muhammad Morsi’s Brotherhood-led government in Egypt, takeover of a large territory by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in parts of Syria and Iraq, heightening violence in Iraq by religious minorities that target the Shi’is and the Shi’a-led post-Saddam government, and the ongoing opposition to clerical autocracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran underline the challenges facing the Islamist models of authority and development. These experiments illustrate the complexities, limitations, and potentials of an Islamic solution to the problems of these societies. First and foremost, despite the socio-cultural and political significance of Islam in the predominantly Muslim societies, it is abundantly clear that not even all Muslims agree on what constitutes an Islamic form of authority. Furthermore, in addition to the sectarian and scholastic schisms that inevitably usher in factionalism, the imposition of Islamic laws and precepts does not sit well with religious and ethnic minorities that legitimately fear exclusionary politics. Coptic opposition to Morsi’s elected government and support for a military coup, Kurds’ emphatic search for autonomy and the Sunnis’ violent reactions to the government of Iraq, secularists’ rejection of Erdogan’s Islamist policies, and minority uprisings against the Islamic Republic of Iran highlight the structural impediments to a sound and inclusive Islamic state even when the Muslim community has a numerical advantage in these countries. Second, recent experiences with change in many Muslim societies reaffirm the challenges and uncertainties in the process of transformative change. The Iranian revolution of the late 1970s brought about changes that do not reflect the hopes and desire of many of the revolutionaries and have not truly met the expectations of an increasingly restive young population that longs for social and political space and economic opportunities. Similarly, remarkable efforts and sacrifices of the Iraqis, Libyans, Tunisians, and Egyptians have not, to one extent or another, resulted in genuine change and have not improved the public’s opportunities in the political, social, and economic realms. Third, transformative change requires necessary institutional mechanisms that not only ensure the success of the process but also enable the new

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authorities to meet the public’s needs. In the absence of other contenders to power, the military effectively stopped systemic transformation in Egypt, despite the Brotherhood’s political legacy and popular support. The success of clerics in overtaking the revolutionary process and establishing an Islamic regime in Iran may be largely attributed to their keen understanding of and commitment to institution-building that effectively channeled and ultimately marginalized oppositional politics, and built a framework for pro-systemic opposition to impede any genuine challenges to the Islamic system. Despite their limitations, these institutions have been quite effective in controlling all facets of the Iranian social, economic, and political lives. Fourth, in the contemporary world, Islam may offer viable systemic and policy alternatives to Muslims if—and only if—a dynamic, open-minded, and pragmatic approach to the Islamic worldview is pursued in the interest of inclusivity and commitment to change. Undoubtedly, many Muslims find a commitment to public rights, equality, and justice central to the Islamic worldview. Although these issues are largely confined within their Islamic constraints, still there is no inherent practical barrier to such demands from a sound Islamic perspective. Theologically speaking, all monotheistic religions assert the ultimate sovereignty of God and reject the notion of popular sovereignty. In Islam, acknowledging the sovereignty of God does not necessarily preclude its followers’ right to take part in managing their societies. In fact, the Quranic doctrine of shura explicitly tasks followers to consult among themselves in communal affairs. As Ali Sharia’ti and a host of other Shi’i and Sunni scholars have contended, it is quite conceivable and indeed appropriate to distinguish between God’s ultimate sovereignty and Man’s immediate sovereignty. This distinction opens up a remarkable opportunity for democratic development within the confines of Islam. In fact, the Sunni political doctrines of shura, ijma, and bay’ah do offer theoretical justifications for democratic procedures and policies. These well-established doctrines account for extensive public input in the management of the society. The classical Shi’a legitimist perspective does not lend itself to democratic practices and the traditional notions of vassayat, as a procedural instrument of the doctrine of imamah, do discount popular role in the choice of the authority. However, as many Shi’a scholars and progressive clerics suggest, the postimamah authority should rely upon a dynamic role for the public in the choice of the authority and its policy decisions. In sum, within limits and regardless of sectarian disagreements about the nature and role of the authority, the Islamic state may be able to embrace a limited form of pluralism and account for democratic institutions and practices that are compatible with the constraints imposed by the Islamic worldview. Fifth, the autocratic proclivities of the clerical system in Iran are neither sanctioned by Islam nor are they inherently inevitable in a sound Islamic state. In today’s Iran, the regime’s autocracy is mainly the outcome of its

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obsessive commitment to the preservation of clerical rule at all costs, even though it is largely rationalized on the grounds of religious values and norms and the interests of the community. To ensure their uncontested rule, Iranian clerics have not only sidelined people’s constitutional rights but have also marginalized even some of the central precepts of Islam. To start with, as a matter of principle, Islam seeks its followers’ direct accountability and rejects an institutional framework for mediation between Man and God. What, then, is the role of a clerical establishment? How can clerics’ monopoly of spiritual and temporal powers be justified on Islamic grounds? Even Islamists like Ali Shari’ati dismiss Khomeini’s Neo-Platonic understanding of authority in Shi’a Islam by underscoring the leadership role of the clerical and non-clerical rowshanfikran (enlightened individuals) in an Islamic Order. Shi’ism is intertwined with Iranian socio-cultural and political values and norms and, regardless of the type of political authority, religious institutions and values will always play a notable role in all facets of the society. However, equating Islam with clericalism, as Khomeini does, and justifying clerical authoritarianism on Islamic grounds is theoretically invalid from both the Shi’a and Sunni perspectives and undesirable and impractical in the contemporary world. Sixth, the establishment of an Islamic state requires a commitment to the implementation of Islamic laws and precepts. Thus, any Islamic state is obligated to pursue Islamization of laws and policies. However, the Iranian regime’s experiences with the Islamization process and its willingness to transcend Islam in law, politics, and policies underscore the limitations and potentials of the Islamic worldview, especially in legal matters in modern times. From the outset, the Islamic Republic acknowledged these limitations, but the institutional imperatives and clerics’ dogmatism made it impossible to dispose of the impractical laws and usher in pragmatic solutions. It was only after a crippling institutional and policy paralysis that Khomeini embraced the doctrine of maslahat and incorporated an institutional framework for pragmatism in the revised Iranian constitution. In practice, this pragmatism in law and policy has not curbed the autocratic tendencies of the regime and has not opened a meaningful space in the social and political lives of Iranians. Contrarily, at times, the regime has justified and reinforced its authoritarian proclivities on pragmatic grounds. Seventh, the effectiveness and stability of all systems ultimately depend upon a matrix of legitimacy that not only accommodates the public’s values and norms but also responds to their needs. Naturally, when all fails, all systems exhibit autocratic tendencies for self-preservation. However, as evident in the pre-revolutionary Iran, Mubarak’s Egypt, Saddam Hossein’s Iraq, and numerous other cases in the Middle East and other parts of the world, political repression is not a lasting legitimizer of authority. In the Islamic Republic, clerics’ monopoly of power has undermined their traditional role

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as the spiritual leaders of the community and protectors of Islam. Thus, even within its Islamist framework, today’s Iranian oppositional politics contains anti-clerical dimensions that adversely impact the broader historical role of the clerical establishment. It is not clear if these anti-clerical sentiments have eroded the level of religiosity among the public. By all indications, there is a growing trend toward the privatization of religion in Iran as many Iranians refrain from attending mosques and other religious establishments. If so, this underscores the public’s continued commitment to the Shi’a religious values but not necessarily to the organized and highly politicized religion of the clerics. Ironically, schisms within the clerical establishment that pit progressive clerics against their conservative counterparts continue to ensure a role for the clerical establishment in the future. As exemplified in the Green Movement, progressive clerics and their proponents have taken a leading oppositional role against the system’s autocracy. Conservative clerics and their dogmatic supporters, who fail to embrace a more dynamic view of Islam and respect popular rights and needs, are opposed by a population that understands and seeks a pragmatic approach to governance, even if it means transcending the traditional Islamic values and practices. In the final analysis, much can be learned from the experiences of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the contemporary Islamic developmental path. A successful Islamic model of development cannot afford to be exclusionary, disregard the public’s hopes and expectations, rely on a traditional view of Islamic precepts, and pursue autocratic strategies and goals. The future of the Islamic Republic of Iran will largely depend upon its willingness and ability to drastically change its current course. Islam may very well offer other Muslims an Islamic developmental alternative, but the path will be controversial, complex, and challenging. Only a genuine willingness to transcend the restrictive traditional understandings of Islam, commitment to tolerance and inclusivity, and respect for people can ensure the success of any Islamic system. Indeed, this is neither impossible nor is it necessarily inconsistent with Islamic teachings.

Appendix

Charts

Chart 6.1. The Majles. Data source: “The Majlis.” Iranian Parliament Website, accessed October 25, 2011, www.majlis.ir.

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316

Charts

Chart 6.2. The Executive Branch. Data source: Wilfried Buchta. Who Rules Iran?: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington: Washington Insitutite for Near East Policy, 2002). “The Structure of Power in Iran.” Public Broadcasting System, accessed October 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html.

Charts

317

Chart 6.3. The Judiciary. Data source: “The Judiciary.” Iran Online, accessed October 25, 2011, http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-11.html.

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Charts

Chart 6.4. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Data source: Andrew Higgins. “Revolutionary Guard Inc.” The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2006.

Glossary

adel

just

aghel

responsible male adult

agheleh

responsible female adult

agnate

mature male adults

ahkam-e-elahi God’s ordinances ahkam-e hukumati

state’s ordinances

ahl al-kitab

people of the Book

al-ba’in

irrevocable

Allah

in Islam, the Creator

aqd

contract

aqel

sane

aql

intellect

amdi

intentional, reference to voluntary homicide

amm

general, public

arsh

blood money

bakhsh

administrative division

batil

void, falsehood

bay’ah

oath of allegiance

bida’ah

heresy; innovation

dar al-harb

non-Muslim lands 319

Glossary

320

dar al-Islam

Muslim lands

diyat

compensation

eghrar

offender’s confession

fasid

corrupt

faskh

annul or abrogate; annulment of the marriage contract

fesad

corrupt act

faqih (fuqaha, Islamic jurisprudent pl.) ghara

uncertainty, risk, or speculative business transactions

ha-kol

juristic consensus found in the Jewish oral law

Hadd (hudud, Determined crime, stopping and preventing; a punishment Pl.) for the types of crimes and punishments that are primarily specified in the Quran hadith

Muhammad’s sayings; reference to the sayings of the Prophet

hajj

pilgrimage

halal

licit; lawful; permissible

haqqaniyyah

legitimacy

Hanafi

one of the four schools of law recognized as a Sunni orthodox school in the fourth century of Islam

Hanbali

one of the four schools of law recognized as a Sunni orthodox school in the fourth century of Islam

haqq al-allah God’s right haqq al-nass

Man’s right

haram

forbidden acts; acts that are prohibited and the believer is subject to punishment for engaging in such acts including murder, apostasy, drinking alcohol, and adultery

haraj

arbitrarily creating difficulty for one’s spouse

harba

a range of crimes including highway robbery and war against the Prophet and God

hejab-e shar’i head cover heqqes

reasoning by analogy

hijra

Muhammad’s migration to Medina

hisab

value

Glossary

321

huquq-e ensni human rights ibadat

ritual

ibadi

devotional; a ritualistic act

iddah

waiting requirements; a period of celibacy immediately after divorce or the death of a husband during which the woman may not remarry. This is normally for three menstrual cycles and its purpose is to determine whether the woman is bearing a child from her previous husband.

ijab

offer

ijara

rent or hire

ijma

consensus of the community or the consensus of the clerics; refers to the unanimous opinion of the community in any generation on any religious matter

ijtihad

independent judgment

illa

the attribute of the object analogous to the revealed ruling

imamah

the Shi’a doctrine and practice of leadership

isnad

documentation; ascribing a hadith back to the one who said it—connecting the chain of narration; and the chain of narrators which reaches back to the text—which is the same as “al-sanad”

istislah

determination of interest; an extension of qiyas (analogy)

Ithna ‘Ashari

the Twelver Shi’a Islam

jaheli

ignorant

jaheliyyah

paganistic

khalifah

the Sunni doctrine and practice of leadership; successor

khass

particular

khata

homicide, murder by mistake

khul

consensual divorce; termination of the marriage on the basis of mutual consent as initiated by the wife

kitabiyyah

the Book

kufr

non-believing

la Din

religiouslessness

lavat

sodomy

lex Talionis

retribution

Glossary

322

lian

a judicial process where the husband accuses his wife of adultery and the wife denies such allegations and legally seeks retraction

mahareb

engaging in war

mahr

dowry in marital contracts

mahr almithal

exemplary dower

mahz

pure error

makruh

disapproved acts; believers are discouraged, but not forbidden, from engaging in such acts

Majles-e Khebregan

Council of Experts

Majles-e Tashkhist-e Maslahat-e Nezaam

The Expediency Council as accounted for in Article 177 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Maliki

one of the four schools of law recognized as a Sunni orthodox school in the fourth century of Islam

maqasid

objectives

maskar

drinking

maslahat (or maslaha)

expediency; interest; welfare

Miqra

Torah

Misnah

the basic source-text of the Jewish oral law

mohareb

a person who engages in violence and war

mohsen

a married man

mohseneh

a married woman

mojazatha-ye preventative punishments bazdarandeh mosahageh

lesbianism

muamalat

a contract; exchange, and interaction

mubah

indifferent acts; acts that are neutral and left to the believer’s discretion and choice

mubaraah

consensual divorce

mufsed

a person who engages in corruptive acts

Glossary

323

muharebeh

war against God and His prophet; In the Iranian Penal Code, means the acts of threatening, fighting, and frightening others by the use weapons to harm people

mujtahid jami’alsharayt

a religious judge qualified to exercise ijtihad

mukhtar

of Sound judgment

mustahab

recommended acts; acts that are expected of the believers such as the pursuit of good deed

nafagheh

payment of maintenance, payable after divorce by a man to a woman if she has child custody.

namoos

dignity

nikah

marriage

qabul

acceptance

qadaf

accusation of sexual crimes (adultery and homosexuality)

qadis

judges

Qanoon-e Ezdevaj

Marriage Law

Qanoon-e Hemayat-e Khanevadeh

Family Protection Law

qasameh

repeated oaths

qasd

intent

qawadi

pimping and pandering

qesas

equality or equivalence; retributory punishment

qesas-e nafs

retribution for homicide

qesas-e ozvy

retribution for severing human organs

qiyas

analogy as a method of legal deduction; corresponds with heqqes; analogical reasoning

quol-almashhoor

common consensus

raj’i

revocable

rajam

stoning

ravayat

sayings of Imams

Glossary

324

riba

the prohibition of interest; unlawful advantage by way of excess and deferment; increase and growth

riba al-qarud interest on loans riba al-buyu

usury in trade

rojooe

the religious act of returning to one’s spouse after a divorce

rowshanfikran the enlightened intellectuals rububiyyah

speaks of God’s arrangement for the nourishment and direction of things towards a perfect state

ruh

spirit

sadaq

payment of dower

salih

valid or sound marriage

seleh-e rahem duty, normally to one’s relatives and acquaintances Shafi’i

one of the four schools of law recognized as a Sunni orthodox school in the fourth century of Islam

shahrestani

provincial

shari’ah

“Path to waterhole” in archaic Arabic; Islamic canonical law, refers to the totality of Islamic rules, encompassing all affairs of the Muslim community.

shart-ezaman-e-aqd

conditions set at the time of the contract; Legal method of binding secondary contractual obligations

shebh-e Amdi semi-voluntary murder shura

consultation

Shuray-e Negahban

Guardian Council

siqa

temporary marriages

sunnah

tradition; Muhammad’s deeds; denotes to the exemplary way in which Muhammad lived; the collected histories of the actions and words that Muhammad spoke outside of revelation, a source of the shari’ah

ta’azir

discretionary issues; cover the broadest category of subjects compared to the issues that are either prohibited (haram) or required (vajib)

talaq

divorce; repudiation of the wife by her husband

talaq altafwid

designated divorce

Glossary

325

tallaqah

releasing a person from his/her obligations

tatliq

judicial dissolution

taqlid

to emulate

tawbeh

repentance

tawhid

oneness of God; Islamic monotheism

tazkiyyah

growth and purification

ulama

learned clerics

ummah

Muslim Community

usul

fundamentals; basic roots

ususl al-fiqh

fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence

vajib

required acts

vilayat-efaqih

leadership of the jurisprudent; Khomeini’s doctrine of leadership

vali-e amr

the Leader

waajib

obligatory acts; acts that are required of all Muslims including prayers and alms giving

zakat

religious taxation normally consisting of 2.5 percent of one’s wealth given annually; one of the five pillars of Islam

zani

a male person who commits zena

zarurat (or zarurah)

commonly used in Farsi as an equivalent to maslahat, primarily means necessity or interest

zavabet va qava’ ed

guidelines and rules

zena

adultery or fornication, sexual intercourse between men and women who are not married to each other.

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Index

Abbasid dynasty, xvii, 9, 11 abortion, 53, 57 accusation of adultery and homosexuality (qazaf), 47–48 administrative laws, 32 adultery (zena), 41, 44–46, 47–48 AEOI. See Atomic Energy Organization of Iran agriculture, 111, 114 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 234; administration, xx, 95, 113, 139, 186, 233; anti-Ahmadinejad demonstrations, 280n123; background of, 237, 239, 243; blue-collar advocacy by, 243–244; budget, 244–246, 281n159; campaign of, 236–237, 241, 244; Cultural Revolution and, 249–250; education of, 239–240; failures of, 237; family of, 239; financial scandal, 243; foreign policy of, 238, 251; inflation and, 238, 243, 244; international boycotts and, 247–248; Islamic Consultative Assembly and, 243, 244–246, 281n170; Israel and, 251; judicial branch and, 250; Khatami and, 250; leadership style of, 240; legitimacy of, 250; as mayor of Tehran, 240, 249; nuclear policy of, 253; policy of, 237, 239, 243, 243–244, 244, 248–249; Rafsanjani and, 279n110; religio-political views of, 240; secularism and, 241; television

debates of, 237; unemployment and, 244; unrealism of, 238, 279n113; U.S., and, 244, 251–253; victory of, 236, 238; video clip of, 279n113; voting and, 238; wealth of, 237 Algiers Agreement, 208, 217 Ali, Chiragh, 6 Allah (creator), 3, 23, 38, 70 ambassador, 202 amm. See general statements amputation, 50, 51, 97, 267 ancien régime, xxi, 115, 143, 173, 219, 272 apostasy, 42 Araki, Ayatollah Mohsen, 184 Ashton, Catherine, 300 Assembly for the Reappraisal of the Constitution, 21, 200 Assembly of Experts, 20, 22, 179, 181 Association of Combatant Clerics of Tehran (Jamehye Ruhaniyyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran), 149, 150 Ataturk, Kamal, 35 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), 288, 289, 290 authority, xvii, 171; democracy and, 19–20; of God, 4, 172, 179; of government, 190, 214; intellectuals and, 171; Islam and, 310, 312; political, 135–137, 136, 143; of Shi’a clerics, 182; of Supreme Leader, 173, 179, 271 Azeris, 90

345

346

Index

Bahai faith, 143, 241 Bahonar, Mohammad Javad, 210 Baluchis, 90, 143 Bani Sadr, Abolhassan, 143, 144, 155, 205, 205–209, 276n24 banking, 105, 107, 109–110, 113, 149, 168 Basij militia, 271, 273, 275 bay’ah, 311 Bazaar, 169, 185, 216, 244 bazaaris. See merchants Bazargan, Mehdi, 154, 197–199 Beheshti, Mohammad, 280n130 bida’ah. See heresy bill initiation, by Islamic Consultative Assembly, 194 Binding Secondary Contractual Obligations (shart-e-zaman-e-aqd), 38–39 Bin Laden, Osama, 252 black market, 274, 275 Board of Appeals, 265 bodily harm (qesas-e ozv), 52, 60 Bonyad, 167–168 Boroojerdi, Mohammad Hossein, 131 branding, 51 British Treasury, 296 budget, 111, 195, 244–246, 281n159 bureaucracy, 203. See also presidency Burke, Edmund, 152 Bush, George W., 229–230, 235 Bushehr project, 289, 293 business transactions, in Islam, 100 Bylaws of the Revolutionary Tribunals, 94 Caliphal law, 10 campaigns, 159–166; of Ahmadinejad, 236–237, 241, 244; of Rafsanjani, 235–236; of Rouhani, 255–257, 258, 260 Canada, 298 candidates: disqualification of, 159–163, 165, 176n101, 192–193, 234–235; slander against, 164–165; support for, 165 Canon Law, 99 capitalism, 99, 104, 151, 224 CDHR. See Center for Defenders of Human Rights censorship, press law and, 82, 84, 87

Center for Defenders of Human Rights (CDHR), 88, 99 Certification of Impossibility of Reconciliation, 74 checks and balances, in U.S., 26 chemical weapons, 260 children, 27, 63, 68, 69, 91–93, 119n112 child support, 77 Christianity, xiv, 8, 122n209 CIA coup (1953), 239 CISADA. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 Citizens’ Bill of Rights, 260 citizenship, 83 civic society organizations, 250 civil courts, 263 civilian defense, 204 civil legal contracts (muamalat), 39 Civil Legal Procedure, 74, 94, 266 civil society: history of, 127; intellectuals and, 170; Khatami and, 226; Mossadegh and, 129; pluralism and, 136; political authority and, 135–137; political parties of, 127–131; in postrevolutionary Iran, 135–173; public cynicism and, 132; Reza shah, Muhammad, and, 128–129 classes, 41 clerical absolutism, 156 Clerical Tribunals, 265, 266 colonialism, xv, 309 commercial transactions, 108 Committee of the Revolutionary Toilers of Kurdistan (Komala), 143 Communism, 127–128, 146, 148 compensation (diyat), 52, 54, 56–58 competition, in economy, 111, 113 complainant (vali-e dam), 52 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), 297 confession (eghrar), 54 consensus (ijma), xvii, 8, 10, 12–13, 311 constitution of Islamic Republic, xvii–xviii; amendments of, 21–22; Chapter IV, 105; Chapter XI, 261–262; checks of power in, 26; civilian defense in, 204; economic rights and social

Index security in, 28–29; economics law in, 105; educational opportunities in, 29–30; equal treatment in, 27–28; Expediency Council and, 271; fiqh and, 151; freedom of press in, 26; freedom of religion in, 26–27; freedom of speech and assembly, 25–26; group politics in, 139–140; human rights and, 94; incompatibility clause in, 204; Islam and, 26–27; judicial branch in, 261–262; liberties and rights in, 23–30; limitations of, 21, 22; original, 21; paradoxes and legal limitations of, 22–23; pluralism and, 139; political parties and, 154; power structures and, 189; preamble of, 105; presidency in, 200, 201; revisions of, 21, 22; Shi’a clerics and, 34; Supreme Leader in, 180; tolerance for other schools in, 36 Construction Jihad, 271 consultation (shura), 88, 311 cooperative economy, 105–106 corporal punishment, 51 corruption, 5, 37, 168, 204, 236, 241, 267, 279n110 corruption on earth (mafsad fil-arz), 49–50 Council of Experts (Majles-e Khebregan), xx, 271 Council of Ministers, 140, 194–195, 202, 203, 205 Court of Administrative Justice, 265 Creator. See Allah crimes and punishments, 6, 23, 41, 51, 56, 267 crimes and punishments, determined (hadd) (hudud), 23; for accusation of adultery and homosexuality, 47–48; for adultery, 41, 44–46; amputation, 50, 51; apostasy, 42; for corruption on earth, 49–50; definition of, 41; for drinking, 42, 48–49; for engaging in war, 41, 49–50; execution, 50; exile, 50; for fornication, 42; hanging, 50; for harba, 42, 44, 50; in Iranian Criminal Law, 44–51; in Islam, 41–43; for kissing, 47; lashings, 45–47; for lesbianism, 41, 47; for pimping or pandering, 41, 47; in Quran, 41; for robbery, 42, 50–51; severity of, 41; for sodomy, 46–47;

347

stoning, 45–46; for theft, 42; for transgression, 42; types of, 43–44 crimes and punishments, discretionary (ta’azir), 41, 52; defamation, 59–60; disorderly conduct, 62; display of drunkenness, gambling, and vagrancy, 64; dress code, 62; espionage, 60; forgery and fraud, 61; insult, 59–60; Iranian Criminal Law, 58; political and security, 58–61; public morality and, 61–62; public safety and interest crimes, 63; robbery, 61; sexual dignity and, 61–62; social crimes, 63; treason, 60 crimes and punishments, retributory (qesas), 41; abortion and, 57; categories of penalties, 52; compensation, 52, 54, 56; complainant, 52; definition of, 51; equality and, 51–52; gender and, 52, 54, 54–55; history of, 51; homicide, 52, 53–55; ineligibility for, 52; intentional physical harm or maiming, 52; of limbs, 55–58; mental disabilities and, 54, 56; murder, 52, 53–55; for non-Muslims, 53–54; oaths and, 55; pregnancy and, 52, 57; types of, 52; unconscious or asleep offenders and, 54; unintentional physical harm or maiming, 52 criminal codes, secularism and, 33 criminal jurisprudence, 32 criminal justice system, 41 criminal laws, 32 cultural diffusion, 7 cultural Islamization, 148 Cultural Revolution, 40, 202, 207, 210, 212, 248–250 currency, 61, 111, 248 custody, 35, 39, 71, 73, 76, 81, 263 customs regulations, 108 cyber-attacks, 301–302 Dastgerdi, Marzieyeh Vahid, 299 death penalty, 46, 47, 51, 61 death squads, 241 debates, 164, 237 debt, 102 Declaration of the General Policies of the Fifth Development Plan, 113 defamation, 59–60, 86, 162

348

Index

democracy, 159; authority and, 19–20; gender and, 135; intolerance for, xix; Islam and, 137, 171–172, 173, 226; Islamic Consultative Assembly and, 191; Khamene’i and, 184–185; Khatami and, 226; press law and, 82 Democratic Faction of Azerbaijan, 128 Democratic Party (Hezb-e Democrat), 127, 129 Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), 20, 128, 143, 159, 218 democratic-pluralist model, xiv, xv determination of interest (istislah), 36 Dimona complex, 301 disapproved (makruh) acts, 11 discrimination, 89–90, 97, 238 disorderly conduct, 62 Dispute Settlement Councils, 260 disqualification, of candidates, 159–163, 165, 176n101, 192–193, 234–235 districts, 163 divine law, 9, 32 divine order, 190 divine ordinances, xvii, 148, 226 divorce (talaq), 63, 263; Allah and, 70; certificates, 78, 119n111; children and, 119n112; comprehensive, 70; consensual, 70, 79; definition of, 69; four mechanisms of, 78; husband and, 69, 78, 80–81; impotence and, 79; in Iranian law, 78–81; Islam and, 69–71; legal aspect of, 70, 81; men and, 70; pregnancy and, 71; in Quran, 70, 78; reasons for, 70; repudiation of, 79; sexuality and, 66; wife and, 79–81, 119n111; women and, 35, 65, 67, 70, 71. See also marriage diyat. See compensation dower (mahr or sadaq), 67, 69, 71, 75–76, 77 dress code, 62, 95, 96 drinking (maskar), 41, 42, 48, 48–49, 64 due process, 97–98, 211 Ebadi, Shirin, 88 economic development (towse’eh), 149, 216, 223–224 economic plans, 111–114, 244 economic reform, 216

economic rights and social security, 28–29 economics laws, 32; in Iran, 105–115; Islam, finance laws and, 99–105 economy, 273; competition in, 111, 113; cooperative, 105–106; diversification of, 111; foreign investments, 107; global, 147, 216, 221; government and, 106, 111, 151, 258; growth of, 113; industrial free zones, 107–108; Iranian revolution and, 114; Khatami and, 221, 223; market, 112–113, 114, 148; military and, 246–247; private, 105–106, 107; sectors of, 105–106; stagnation of, 214; state, 105–106; stimulation of, 107 ECP. See Executives of Construction Party education, 29–30, 141, 170 Eerkens, Jeffrey, 288 eghrar. See confession Egypt, xv, 230, 248, 310 elections: ballot boxes, 163; dates of, 163; districts, 163; Guardian Council and, 88–89, 159–162, 176n101; Islam and, 161–162; Islamic Consultative Assembly, 192–193; Khomeini on, 165; law, 88, 159–162, 164, 192; political rights and, 88–89; presidential, 139, 159, 201, 204, 205, 233–234; religion and, 161; secret ballots of, 163; supervisory board for, 276n18; Supreme Leader and, 22, 181; Tudeh party and, 155; turnout, 165–166; voting and, 161, 163–164, 165 Election Supervisory Board, 163 electoral law, 163 electoral system, 159–166 embassy, U.S., 199, 280n130 employment, 105 endowments, 166–167 engaging in war (maharebeh), 41, 49–50 enlightened individuals. See rowshanfikran enrichment projects, 289–290, 292, 295, 299, 301, 303 equality, 27–28, 31, 51–52, 89, 93–94 equal opportunity, 29, 100 Erade-ye Melli. See National Will Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 310 Eshraghi, Ali, 162 Eslah Talaban. See Reformists

Index espionage, 60 eternal punishment, 6 ethnicity, non-discrimination and, 90 EU. See European Union Europe, Iran’s war with, 218 European Union (EU), 292, 296 execution, 45, 50, 97, 98 executive branch, xx–xxi, 21–22, 191–192, 194–195, 197, 316. See also presidency; Supreme Leader Executives of Construction Party (ECP), 157 exile, 50 Expediency Council (Majles-e Tashkhist-e Maslahat-e Nezaam), 22, 40, 146, 162, 180–181, 214, 269, 269–270 exportation, 108, 111–112, 123n248, 224, 248, 298 factionalism, xix, xxi, 14, 144–152, 157, 196, 199, 216, 310. See also group politics family: disputes, 73; integrity, 63; law, xviii, 34–35, 64–66, 71–78, 102 Family Protection Act, 35, 74, 78, 81, 119n111 Family Protection Courts, 72 fathers, 73, 76, 77 fatwas, xviii Fedaeyan-Khalq-e Iran. See Organization of the Guerrilla Martyrs of the Iranian Masses finance laws. See economics laws fiqh, xix, 33, 52, 65, 144–145, 151, 172–173, 175n36, 182 Fivers, 14 flogging, 51, 267 FMI. See Islamic Freedom Movement of Iran forbidden (haraam) acts, 11, 61 forbidden food, Quran and, 38 foreign currency, 248 foreign investments, 107, 216, 224 foreign investors, 108 foreign loans, 195, 276n11 foreign policy, 110, 114, 169; Ahmadinejad and, 238, 251; Bani Sadr and, 207–208; Islamization of, xv; Khamene’i and, 185, 212; Khatami and,

349

227, 229; Khomeini and, 183; Rafsanjani and, 217; Rouhani and, 258; Supreme Leader and, 251 foreign trade, 108, 213–214 forgery and fraud, 61 fornication, 42 Foundation of the Disinherited, 212, 230 freedom of association, 139 freedom of expression, 26, 250 freedom of ideas, 250 freedom of press, 26, 227 freedom of religion, 26–27 freedom of speech and assembly, 25–26, 95, 193 Friday Congressional Prayer leader, 86, 157 fusion theory, xvii gambling, 64 Ganji, Akbar, 173 gasoline smuggling, 281n165 gender: adultery and, 45–46; compensation and, 56–57; democracy and, 135; discrimination, 238; equality, 27, 65, 89; interactions, 95; Islam and, 65, 89, 152; politics, 149–150; qesas punishments and, 52, 54, 54–55; roles, 201; witnesses and, 54–55 general (amm) statements, 14 gharar, 41, 104 al-Ghazali, Muhammad, 5, 37 global economy, 147, 216, 221 God: authority of, 4, 172, 179; Islam and, 9; Islamic law and, 7–8; man and, 3, 6, 36; sexuality and, 66; sovereignty of, 24, 40, 151, 171, 205, 311; wealth and, 100, 102; See also Allah gold, 299 government: Allah and, 38; authority of, 190, 214; banking and, 168; branches of, 190–191; checks by Islamic Consultative Assembly, 194–196, 197; economy and, 106, 111, 151, 258; goals of, 190; Guardian Council and, 191; martial law, 276n9; pilgrimage and, 37; Quran and, 190; religion and, 4; separation of powers in, xx; shari’ah and, 37; Shi’a clerics and, 35; subsidies from, 111, 113, 245–246, 248; Supreme

350 Leader and, 190. See also Islamic Consultative Assembly Green Movement, 186, 274, 279n111, 313 group politics, 137–144. See also factionalism; movements Guardian Council (Shuray-e Negahban), xx, 25, 39, 43, 59, 154, 234; elections and, 88–89, 159–162, 176n101; Expediency Council and, 269; government and, 191; Islamic Consultative Assembly and, 193, 196, 269; judicial review and, 264, 269; presidency and, 201; role of, 159–162, 176n101, 269; shari’ah and, 269, 269–270; Supreme Leader and, 40, 180–181; women and, 201 guerrilla warfare, 134, 143–144 Gulf Cooperation Council, 255 Gulf War, 218 hadd. See crimes and punishments determined hadith. See sayings Hanafi, 13, 14, 26 Hanbali, 13, 14 hanging, 50, 97 Haqqani School, 241 haraam. See forbidden acts harba, 42, 44, 50 head cover (hejab-e shar’i), 62, 65 Head of Judiciary, 262, 264 health services, 29 hejab-e shar’i. See head cover Hemmat, 174n1 heresy (bida’ah), 5 Hermeneutics, 173 Hezb-e Democrat. See Democratic Party Hezb-e Iran. See Iran Party Hezb-e Mardom. See People’s Party Hezb-e Melliyyoun. See Nationalist Party Hezb-e Mojahedin-e Islam. See Islamic Mujahedin Party Hezb-e Pan Iranist-e Mellat-e Iran. See Pan-Iranist Party Hezb-e Vatan. See Homeland Party Hezb-e Zahmatkeshan-e Iran. See Toilers’ Party (Hezb-e Zahmatkeshan-e Iran) Hezbollah, Ansar-e, 231 Hidden Imam, 179

Index Hitler, Adolf, 130, 238 Hizbollahis, 147 Hojjatiyyeh, 143, 240–241 Homeland Party (Hezb-e Vatan), 128 homicide, 52, 53–55, 56, 58 homosexuality (lavat). See sodomy Hosseini, Shamseddin, 243 hudud. See crimes and punishments determined human nature, religion and, 100 human rights: constitution of Islamic Republic and, 94; discrimination and, 97; institutions and, 94; international standards for, 99; Islamic law and, 86–87, 98; judicial branch and, 268; Khatami and, 95; laws, 86; universal, 87; violations, 86, 95–99 human wave strategy, 218 human welfare, Quran and, 36–37 husband, 69, 73, 76–78, 78, 79–81 Hussein, Saddam, 183, 208–209, 230 IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Organization ibadi. See ritualistic acts ibn-abi-Taleb, Ali, 19 ideologies, 137–138, 144 ignorant culture. See jaheli culture IIPF. See Islamic Iran Participation Front ijma. See consensus ijtihad. See independent judgment ILSA. See Iran and Libya Sanction Act imamah. See Shi’a doctrine and practice of leadership Imams, xvii, 14, 19, 179, 240 imperialism, 132, 147, 150, 152 importation, 108, 112, 283n197, 299 independent judgment (ijtihad), 172 indifferent (mubah) acts, 11 indirect subsidies, 111, 113 individual, 3, 5–6, 36, 87, 136, 311 industrial free zones, 107–108 industrialization, 221 inflation, 111, 114, 214, 223, 238, 243, 244, 258 informal politics, 189 inheritance, 69, 71, 102 institutions, 94, 268–275 insult, 59–60, 86

Index insurance, 107 intellectuals, 57, 170–173 interest (riba), 31, 102–104, 105, 109 International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA), 288, 289–290, 291, 292, 293, 298 international boycotts, 247–248, 299 Internet, 250, 260, 282n183 Internet Oversight Agency, 250 Iran: civil society in post-revolutionary, 135–173; economic laws in, 105–115; Israel and nuclear, 301, 304n28; North Korea and, 251; political history of, 34; Shi’ism and, 34; Syria and, 260; U.S., and, 228–229, 255, 297; war with Europe, 218. See also Islamic Republic of Iran Iran Air Cargo, 294, 298 Iran and Libya Sanction Act (ILSA), 297 Iran-Contra Affair, 218–219, 277n49 Iran-e Novin. See Modern Iran Iranian Civil Code, 39, 63, 72, 74–75, 75 Iranian Criminal Law, 44–51, 58 Iranian penal code, xviii, 28, 52 Iranian revolution, xiv, 19, 20, 34, 310; Bazaar and, 169; changes brought about by, 310; economy and, 114; goals of, xvii; nuclear policy and, 289; political parties and, 134, 153; Shi’a clerics and, 35; Tudeh party and, 155 Iran-Iraq war, xxi, 114, 157, 207–209, 218, 222, 303 Iran National Front, 159 Iran Party (Hezb-e Iran), 128, 130 Iran Solidarity Party, 226 Iraq, 8, 208–209, 310 IRGC. See Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp IRP. See Islamic Republican Party Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, 289, 290 ISIL. See Islamic State of Iraq and Levant ISIS. See Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Islam, 309; authority and, 310, 312; business transactions in, 100; constitution of Islamic Republic and, 26–27; criteria for, 154; definition of word, 9; democracy and, 137, 171–172, 173, 226; democratic-pluralist model

351

and, xv; divorce and, 69–71; economic and finance laws and, 99–105; elections and, 161–162; five pillars of, 9, 16n39, 190; gender and, 65, 89, 152; God and, 9; hudud crimes and punishments in, 41–43; intellectuals and, 170; Islamic Consultative Assembly’s oath of allegiance to, 276n7; legitimacy and, 136; marriage and, 66–69, 118n91; pluralism and, 136, 173; political rights and, 87; politics and, xiv, xviii, 5; politics of Muslim societies and, xv; power and, 4; press and, 83; publications and, 86; religion and, 6; scholastic traditions in, xvii; secularism and, 4; Shi’a clerics as guardians of, 35; universality of, 3, 5–6, 32; wealth and, 100; Western values and, 148 Islamic banking system, 105, 109 Islamic belief system, 3, 5. See also Islamic worldview Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles), xx, 26, 56, 82; Ahmadinejad and, 243, 244–246, 281n170; bill initiation by, 194; checks on other branches of government by, 194–196, 197; democracy and, 191; documentation of decisions made by, 193; elections, 192–193; factionalism and, 196; general principles of, 192; Guardian Council and, 193, 196, 269; impeachment power of, 232; judicial branch and, 195–196, 263; Khatami and, 277n57; laws and, 194; leadership structure of, 193; legal framework of, xxi; legal territorialism and, 194; members of, 192; oath of allegiance to Islam and, 276n7; power of, 192; presidency and, 204–205; press law and, 86; structure of, 315 Islamic Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI), 154, 155 Islamic identity, 3 Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), 157, 226, 234 Islamic law: Caliphal law and, 10; development of, xvii; dogmatic interpretations of, xvi, xvii; foundations and early developments of, 7–10; God

352

Index

and, 7–8; human rights and, 86–87, 98; implementation of, xv, 309, 312; institutionalization of, 10–11; Iraq and, 8; Islamic states and, xvi; khalifah and, 10; lack of consensus about, 34; morality and, 31; Muhammad and, 9; Muslim societies and, xiii; newly codified, 33; origins of, xvii; reestablishing rule of, xiv; roots of, 12; scope, nature, and sources of, 11–14; shari’ah and, 11; sources of, xvii; traditional views of, xiii, xvi; universality of, 33. See also Binding Secondary Contractual Obligations Islamic legal practice, xvii Islamic legal principles, xviii Islamic Marxists (Mujahedin-e-Khalq), 19 Islamic monotheism. See Oneness of God Islamic Movement of Iranian People (Jonbesh-e Elsmi-e Mardom-e Iran), 134 Islamic Mujahedin Party (Hezb-e Mojahedin-e Islam), 130, 130–131 Islamic nationalists, 144 Islamic Order, 19 Islamic penal code, 41, 43 Islamic Propagation Organization, 86 Islamic Republican Guards, 197 Islamic Republican Party (IRP), 143, 155–157, 157, 209, 211 Islamic Republic of Iran: establishment of, xiv; formation and early revisions of, 20–22; future of, 313; Khomeini and, 20, 179; legal framework of, xvii; legitimacy of, 191; policy orientation of, xvi; public participation and, 153; state institutions and, 23; Supreme Leader and, xix; voting referendum for, 20. See also civil society Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), 203, 255, 271–275, 318 Islamic Revolution Party, 157 Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), xiv Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), xiv, 219, 255, 310 Islamic states, xv–xvi, xvi Islamic worldview, xv, xvi–xvii, 6, 10, 100, 198, 311. See also Islamic belief system

Islamist policies, xvi Islamization of law, xviii, 32–33, 42–43, 115 Israel, 217–218, 251, 294, 300, 301–302, 304n28 istislah. See determination of interest Ithna’ Ashari. See Twelver Shi’is jaheli (ignorant) culture, 6 Jahromi, Muhammad, 96 Jamehye Ruhaniyyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran. See Association of Combatant Clerics of Tehran Japan, 298 Jonbesh-e Elsmi-e Mardom-e Iran. See Islamic Movement of Iranian People Jondallah, 90 Jordan, xv journalism, press law and, 86 Judaic law, 8, 9 Judaism, 8, 99 judges (qadis), 10, 195, 262 judicial branch, 260; Ahmadinejad and, 250; case load of, 260; civil courts, 263; in constitution of Islamic Republic, 261–262; court system and legal procedures of, 261–266; dysfunction of, 260; Head of Judiciary, 262, 264; human rights and, 268; independence of, 262; Islamic Consultative Assembly and, 195–196, 263; Khatami and, 267; politics and, 266–268; power monopoly of, 26; public and, 262; responsibilities of, 262; rules for, 261; specialized courts, 264–265; structure of, 317; Supreme Leader and, 262; tasks of, 23 judicial review, Guardian Council and, 264, 269 Jundullah. See Soldiers of God jurisprudence, 10, 13, 14, 32, 35, 39, 75 jurists’ law, 11 Kabir, Amir, 215 Kadiver, Mohsen, 150 Karbaschi, Gholamhussein, 233, 267–268 Karrubi, Mehdi, 160, 235 Kashani, Abolghassem, 130–131 Kerry, John, 300

Index khalifah (Sunni doctrine and practice of leadership), 6, 7, 10, 171 Khalkhali, Sadegh, 261 Khamene’i, Sayyed Ali, 183; arrests of, 184; as assassination target, 185; background of, 183; Cultural Revolution and, 212; democracy and, 184–185; education of, 183; exile of, 184; foreign policy and, 185, 212; groups and organizations, 184; IRP and, 211; Israel and, 251; Khatami and, 231; Khomeini and, xx, 212; merchants and, 168; Musavi and, 212; policy and, 186; politics of, 184; power of, 146; Rouhani and, 258; translations of, 183 Khan, Abdul Qader, 289, 303n10 khass. See particular statements Khatam al-Anbia, 246–247, 273 Khatami, Seyyed Mohammad, 138, 150, 152, 219, 221, 233; Ahmadinejad and, 250; background of, 222; civil society and, 226; democracy and, 226; economic development and, 223–224; economy and, 221, 223; education of, 222; foreign investments and, 224; foreign policy and, 227, 229; freedom of press and, 227; human rights and, 95; Iran-Iraq war, 222; Islamic Consultative Assembly and, 277n57; judicial branch and, 267; Khamene’i and, 231; Khomeini and, 222; modern market liberalization and, 224; nationalism and, 226; 9/11 and, 230; organizations approved by, 226; policy and, 223–224, 250; political activism and, 219; political parties and, 157; privatization and, 224–225; Reform Movement and, 219, 223, 225; social justice and, 224; Supreme Leader and, 230; travel ban of, 239; U.S. and, 228; violence and, 226; women and, 222; writings of, 222 khilafah, 100 Khomeini, Ruhullah, xxi, 20, 132; Bani Sadr and, 205, 206–207, 209; clerical absolutism and, 156; death of, 146–147, 151, 157, 196, 197, 214; on elections, 165; factionalism and, 145–146, 157; fiqh and, 182; foreign policy and, 183; group politics and, 138; IRP and, 157;

353

Islamic Republic of Iran and, 20, 179; Khamene’i and, xx, 212; Khatami and, 222; leadership of, 150, 154, 165, 172, 182, 183, 185; maslahat/zarurat and, 37, 39–40, 182; Musavi and, 212; nationalists and, 155; nuclear policy and, 289; policy and, 183; political authority and, 143; political parties and, 156; politics of, 5, 21; Rafsanjani and, 215; Rouhani and, 257; secularism and, 4 Kianouri, Noureddin, 156 kissing, 47 Komala. See Committee of the Revolutionary Toilers of Kurdistan Komiteh, 198 Komite system, 273 Kurdish movements, 143 Kurds, 90 Kuwait, 218 labor, 91–93 Labor Law (1990), 89, 93 la din. See religiouslessness land reform law, 213 Larijani, Ali, 235, 304n27 Larijani, Muhammad Javad, 84 lashings, 45–47, 47, 48, 63, 97 lavat. See sodomy law: administrative, 32; criminal, 32; divine, 9, 32; divorce, 78–81; elections, 88, 159–162, 164, 192; electoral, 163; equality and, 93–94; family, xviii, 34–35, 64–66, 71–78, 102; foreign, 8, 9; Imams and, 14; Islamic Consultative Assembly and, 194; Islamic schools of, 13; Islamization of, xviii, 32–33, 42–43, 115; Judaic, 8, 9; jurists’, 11; land reform, 213; martial, 276n9; mining, 110; Mosaic, 8; Parties, 140, 154; Persian Sassanid, 8, 10; personal status, 32; presidency and, 202; press, 26, 82–86, 87, 96–97, 185, 230, 266; Quran and, 13, 31–32; Roman Byzantine, 8; shari’ah and, 24, 34, 42, 43; Shi’a clerics and, 37–38; Shi’ism and, 14; Sunni schools of, 13, 27; Talmudic, 8, 9; territoriality of, 33; torture, 98; universality of, xviii;

354

Index

Western, 33. See also economics laws; Islamic law; Islamization of law Law Concerning the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment in Iran, 107 Law of Countering the Terrorists Acts of the U.S. Government, 58, 61 Law of the Punishment of the Crimes of the Military Personnel, 58–59 Law of the Use of Weapons in Necessary Circumstances, 56 Law on the Administration of Trade and Industrial Free Zones, 107 Law Regarding the Penalty for Spilling Acid, 62 Leadership Council, 22, 270 leftist political parties, 159 legal counsel, 28 legal deduction (qiyas), xvii, 10, 13, 14, 36 legal territorialism, 31, 33, 43, 194 legal traditions, of Iraq, 8 legislation, shari’ah and, 23 legislative reform, Shi’a clerics and, 35 legitimacy, 136, 152–153, 312 lesbianism (mosahegeh), 41, 47 Lewis, Bernard, 4 Lex Taliones. See retribution liberal-democratic parties, 159 Liberation Movement of Iran, 234 Liberation Theology, xiv Libya, xvi, 246 loans, 103 mafsad fil-arz. See corruption on earth maharebeh. See engaging in war Mahdi. See Twelfth Imam mahr. See dower Majles. See Islamic Consultative Assembly Majles-e Khebregan. See Council of Experts Majles-e Tashkhist-e Maslahat-e Nezaam. See Expediency Council makruh. See disapproved acts Malekzadeh, Mohammad Sharif, 243 Maliki, 13, 26 man. See individual market economy, 112–113, 114, 148 market reforms, 112

marriage (nikah), 63; age, 72, 73, 75, 91; components of, 67; contract, 66–69, 80, 118n91; corruption of, 67; definition of, 66, 75; dower, 67, 69, 71, 75–76; financial aspect of, 69; Islam and, 66–69, 118n91; men and, 68, 73; obligations in, 69; polygamy and, 67–68; in Quran, 66, 75; reconciliation, 78; registration of, 72; religion and, 66, 68; residency of, 77, 80; responsibilities in, 76; rights and, 39, 65, 66; second, 68; sexual disease and, 77; sexuality and, 66–67; spirit of, 118n91; temporary, 75; validity of, 67; waiting period, 68, 71; women and, 65, 69. See also divorce Marriage Law, 72 martial law, 276n9 Marxism, 20, 143 Mashaei, Esfandiar Rahim, 255 maskar. See drinking maslahat/zarurat, xviii, 36–38, 39–40, 115, 146, 182, 312 Mass Media Law, 58, 59 Mawdudi, Abul A’la, 5–6 Mecca, 38, 103. See also pilgrimage media, 84–86, 164, 250 Mehralizadeh, Mohsen, 234 men, 62, 65, 68, 70, 73. See also fathers; husband mental disabilities, 54, 56 merchants (bazaaris), 145, 148, 156, 168, 169, 214 Mesbah-Yazdi, Taqi, 241 military, 111, 203–204, 246–247, 253, 282n171 Military Court, 264–265 military-security establishment, xx, 271–275 mining law, 110 Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 84, 86 Ministry of Justice, 35, 262 Ministry of the Interior, 160, 162 Ministry of Women, 260 minorities, 90, 156 missile policy, xxi, 287, 289–291, 295. See also nuclear policy missile technology, 251

Index Modern Iran (Iran-e Novin), 133 modernization, 172–173, 178n149 modern market liberalization, 224 Moin, Mostafa, 234–235 Mojahedin e-Khalq, 143, 155, 209–211, 280n130 monolithicism, pluralism and, 153 monopolies, 100, 102 Montazeri, Hossein Ali, 180, 239 morality, 6, 31 Morsi, Muhammad, 310 Mortazavi, Saeed, 243 mosahegeh. See lesbianism Mosaic law, 8 Mossadegh, xix, 19, 128, 129–130, 132, 153, 197 mothers, 27, 39, 57, 71, 76 Movement of the God-Worshipping Socialists (Nehzat-e Khodaparastan-e Socialist), 130 movements, xiv–xvi, 138, 144–152 MPRP. See Muslim People’s Republican Party muamalat. See civil legal contracts mubah. See indifferent acts Muhammad (Prophet), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16n37 Mujahedin-e-Khalq. See Islamic Marxists murder (qesas-e nafs), 52, 53–55. See also homicide Musavi, Mir-Hossein, 151, 164, 212, 237 Muslim Brotherhood, xv Muslim community (ummah), 3, 13, 31, 171, 241 Muslim People’s Republican Party (MPRP), 156 Muslim societies, xiii, xiv, xv, 7 mustahab. See recommended acts mutilation, 51 Nabavi, Behzad, 163 Natanz enrichment plan, 301 Nateq-Nuri, Ali Akbar, 221 national boundaries, 276n10 National Democratic Front, 20, 155 National Front, 129, 130, 133–134, 153, 155, 197 nationalism, 226 Nationalist Party (Hezb-e Melliyyoun), 133

355

nationalists, 19, 20, 144, 155 national security, 60 National Security Council (shuray-e amniyyat-e melli), 202, 258 National Will (Erade-ye Melli), 128 Nehzat-e Khodaparastan-e Socialist. See Movement of the God-Worshipping Socialists Nematollahi Sufis, 90 neo-fundamentalists, 147–148, 148 nikah. See marriage 9/11 (September 11th, 2001), xiv–xv, 229–230 Nixon, Richard, 243 non-discrimination, 89–90 non-Islamic political parties, 157 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 288, 292 Northern Pars gas, 293 North Korea, 251, 291 NPT. See Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear fusion reactor, 290 nuclear policy, xxi, 110, 114, 275, 287, 295, 303; Ahmadinejad and, 253; history of, 288; Iranian revolution and, 289; Khomeini and, 289; Rouhani and, 255, 258–260; scope of, 289–291 nuclear programs, 290–292, 300, 301, 304n28, 304n29 nuclear scientists, 288, 289, 291, 301–302 nuclear weaponization, xxi Nuri, Abdollah, 197, 232 oath (qasameh), 55 Obama, Barack, 260, 293, 297, 299–300 obligatory (waajib) acts, 11 obstructionism, xx, 233 occupations, 29 OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S.), 297–298 Office of Military Prosecutor, 265 oil, 229, 296–297, 298; export, 111, 123n248, 248; industry, 130, 293; prices, 114 Oil Stabilization Fund, 244, 246 Oneness of God (tawhid), 3–4, 31, 100 Organization of the Guerrilla Martyrs of the Iranian Masses (Fedaeyan-Khalq-e Iran), 144, 155–156 orthodoxy, 4–7

356

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orthopraxy, 32 ownership, 102 paganism, 9 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 39 Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1978), 19, 35, 127, 153, 184 Pahlavi Foundation, 166 Palestine, 51 Pan-Iranist Party (Hezb-e Pan Iranist-e Mellat-e Iran), 130 parliament. See Islamic Consultative Assembly particular (khass) statements, 14 Parties Law, 140, 154 paternalism, 71 patrimonialism, Reform Movement and, 220 Paykar, 144 PDKI. See Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan People’s Party (Hezb-e Mardom), 129, 130, 133, 134 Persian Gulf, 253 Persian Sassanid law, 8, 10 personal status laws, 32 pilgrimage (hajj), 37, 38 Pillay, Navi, 250 pimping and pandering (qawadi), 41, 47 pluralism, 133, 135, 136, 149, 186, 311; civil society and, 136; constitution of Islamic Republic and, 139; group politics and, 137–144; healthy, 146; Islam and, 136, 173; monolithicism and, 153; principles of, 241 policy: of Ahmadinejad, 237, 239, 243, 243–244, 244, 248–249; bureaucracy and, 203; factionalism and, 146, 199; Islamic worldview and, 311; Islamization of, 267; Khamene’i and, 186; Khatami and, 223–224, 250; Khomeini and, 183; orientation of Islamic Republic of Iran, xvi; paralysis, dual executive and, 199–200, 269; presidency and, 202, 205–260; Rafsanjani and, 216, 217, 219, 227–228, 230; of Rouhani, 258; voting and, 166. See also foreign policy political activism, 153, 219

political and security crimes, 58–61 political authority, xv, 135–137, 136, 143 political culture, 4 political development, 4 political parties: Burke on, 152; of civil society, 127–131; constitution of Islamic Republic and, 154; electoral systems and campaigns, 159–166; establishing, 153; factionalism and, 152; Iranian revolution and, 134, 153; Khatami and, 157; Khomeini and, 156; leftist political, 159; legitimacy of, 152–153; liberal-democratic, 159; minor, 131; Mossadegh and, 130; nonIslamic, 157; oppositionist, 132; politics and, 152–174; shi’a clerics and, 153 political rights, 56–57, 87 political systems, 189 politics: Bonyad and, 168; gender, 149–150; informal, 189; Islam and, xiv, xviii, 5; judicial branch and, xx, 266–268; of Khamene’i, 184; of Khomeini, 5, 21; of Muslim societies, Islam and, xv; oppositional, xix, 170, 173, 211, 313; pluralism and group, 137–144; political parties and, 152–174; Quran and, 6, 7; religion and, xiv, 4–6, 249; rights and, 5; Satanic, 5; shari’ah and, 33–34 polygamy, 63, 67–68, 73 Polytechnic University, 95–96 poor people, 135 popular sovereignty, xvii, 23 Populist Revolutionaries, 150 poverty, 41, 96, 113, 114 power: decentralization of, 221, 232; institutions of, 268–275; Islam and, 4; of Islamic Consultative Assembly, 192; Islamization of law and, 33; religion and, 4; sharing, 149; structures, 189 pragmatists, 145, 216 pregnancy, 44–45, 52, 57, 71 presidency: armed forces and, 203; Bazargan and, 197–199; checks for, 204–205; in constitution of Islamic Republic, 200, 201; elections for, 139, 159, 201, 204, 205, 233–234; evolution of, 197–205; Guardian Council and,

Index 201; interim period of, 202–203; Islamic Consultative Assembly and, 204–205; laws and, 202; legal framework of, 200–205; oath of office for, 201; policy and, 202, 205–260; prime minister and, 199; resignation from, 202; responsibilities of, 200; Shi’a clerics and, 207; Supreme Leader and, 202; term length of, 201; voting and, 201; women and eligibility for, 200–201; See also specific presidents Press Courts, 265–266, 268 press law, 26, 82–86, 87, 96–97, 185, 230, 266 Press Supervisory Board, 83–84, 86 prime minister, 21, 199, 269 Prince, Eric, 255 Principalists (usulgarayan), 274, 278n90 prisons, 94, 98 privacy rights, 211 private economy, 105–106, 107 private property rights, 28, 40, 145, 148, 213–214, 216, 277n34 privatization, 216, 224–225 professional organizations, 141 prohibited goods, 108 Provisional Revolutionary Government, 154, 155, 197–199 puberty, 91 public: institutions, 260; judicial branch and, 262; morality, ta’azir punishments for crimes against, 61–62; participation, Islamic Republic and, 153; religion and, 173; safety and interest crimes, 63 publications, 82, 83, 84, 86 publishing. See press law punishment. See crimes and punishments qadaf. See sexual crimes Qaddaffi, Muammar, 5 qadis. See judges Al-Qaeda, 230, 252 Qajar dynasty, 72, 127, 129 qasameh. See oath Qasemi, Rostam, 247 Qasemlou, Abdolrahman, 240 Qashqai, Khosrow, 143 Qatar, 255 qawadi. See pimping and pandering

357

qazaf. See accusation of adultery and homosexuality qesas. See crimes and punishments retributory qesas-e nafs. See murder qesas-e ozv. See bodily harm qiyas. See legal deduction Qods, 240, 255, 273 Qomi, Ayatollah Azari, 38 Quran, xvii; chance and, 104; classification of statements in, 14; consensus and, 12–13; divine law in, 9; divorce in, 70, 78; economic laws and, 100; forbidden food and, 38; government and, 190; homicide and, 53; hudud punishment in, 41; human welfare and, 36–37; incompleteness of, 11; interest and loans in, 103–104; law and, 13, 31–32; marriage in, 66, 75; maslahat/zarurat and, 38; monopolies in, 102; Muhammad and, 11; Muslim community and, 13; obligations spelled out in, 3; politics and, 6, 7; polygamy in, 68; power in, 4; private property and, 148; shari’ah and, 11, 36; Torah and, 10; treatment of non-Muslims in, 27 Quranic rulings, 6 Qutb, Sayyid, 5, 6, 183 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 146, 147, 149, 214, 253, 255; Ahmadinejad and, 279n110; background of, 215; Bazaar and, 216; campaign, 235–236; Council of Experts and, 271; developmental strategy of, 216; economic reform and, 216; factionalism and, 216; family of, 215; focus of, 215; foreign policy and, 217; global economy, 216; human wave strategy, 218; Iran-Contra Affair, 218–219, 277n49; Iran-Iraq war and, 218; Israel and, 217–218; Karbaschi and, 233; Khomeini and, 215; personality of, 215; policy and, 216, 217, 219, 227–228, 230; second term of, 197; terms of, 215, 219; United States and, 218–219; wealth of, 215, 277n39 rahbar. See Supreme Leader

358

Index

Raja’i, Mohammad Ali, 207, 210, 211 rajam. See stoning Ramadan, 61 Rastakhiz. See Resurgence Party ravayat. See sayings al-Raziq, Ali ‘Abd, 6 Reagan, Ronald, 277n49 rebellion, 50 recommended (mustahab) acts, 11 Referendum Law (1988), 88 Reformists (Eslah Talaban), 127 Reform Movement, 219–233 religion: economics laws and, 99; elections and, 161; equality and, 89; freedom of, 26–27; government and, 4; human nature and, 100; intellectuals and, 57, 171; Islam and, 6; Islamic values and, 3; marriage and, 66, 68; minority, 90, 139, 140, 276n7, 310; monotheistic, xiv, xvii, 311; morality and, 6; nondiscrimination and, 90; obligation to, 166; political authority and, 136; politics and, xiv, 4–6, 249; power and, 4; privatization of, 313; public life and, 173; Supreme Leader and, 180; in U.S., 228. See also God; Islam religiouslessness (la din), 6 representation, legal right to, 94 Resurgence (Rastakhiz) Party, 133, 140 retribution (Lex Talionis), 51. See also crimes and punishments retributory Revolutionary Council, 167, 198 Revolutionary Courts, 58, 94, 96, 265–266 Revolutionary Guards, 149, 156, 168, 191, 209, 230 Rezai, Mohsen, 237–238 Reza shah, 35, 127–128 Reza shah, Muhammad, 35, 128–129, 288 rial, 248, 298 riba. See interest Rice, Susan, 295 rights: of children, 27, 91–93; in constitution of Islamic Republic, 23–30; due process, 97–98, 211; equal, 172; of husband, 76, 78, 79–80; individual, 87; marriage and, 39, 65, 66; of mothers, 27; politics and, 5; of press, 82; privacy, 211; private property, 28, 40, 145, 148, 213–214, 216, 277n34; to

representation, 94; of wife, 73, 76, 78, 79–80; of women, xviii, 27, 65, 89. See also human rights; political rights Rigi, Abdolmalek, 143 ritualistic acts (ibadi), 39 robbery, 41, 42, 49, 50–51, 61 rockets (Safir), 251 Roman Byzantine law, 8 Rome, 51 Rouhani, Hassan, 139, 255, 299; background of, 257; cabinet appointments, 258; campaign of, 255–257, 258, 260; education of, 257; family of, 257; foreign policy and, 258; Khamene’i and, 258; Khomeini and, 257; nuclear policy and, 255, 258–260; policy and, 258; political career of, 257–258; speech to U.N., 258; U.S., and, 228; women and, 260 Rouhaniyyat, 157, 175n57 rowshanfikran (enlightened individuals), 312 rububiyyah, 102 ruh (spirit), 53, 57 Rushdie, Salman, 169, 218, 240, 277n46 Russia, 292 Saane’i, Yousef, 239 sadaq. See dower Safavid Shi’ism, 19 Safir. See rockets Salaam, 230–231 sanctions, 114, 248, 260, 291–301 Satanic politics, 5 The Satanic Verses (Rushdie), 277n46 Saudi Arabia, 253 savak, 162 sayings (hadith), xvii, 9, 10, 12, 13, 104 sayings (ravayat), 14 SDRs. See Special Drawing Rights secret ballots, 163 sectarianism, xvi secularism, xiii–xiv, 4–7, 33, 172, 178n150, 241 secularization, political development and, 4 secular-nationalism, 226 self-defense, 28

Index SEMA. See Special Economic Measures Act September 11th, 2001. See 9/11 Servants of Reconstruction, 150 Seveners, 14 sexual crimes (qadaf), 41, 44 sexuality, 61, 61–62, 66–67, 77 Sha’aban, 169 Shafi’i, 13–14, 26 Shahroudi, Mahmoud Hashemi, 260 Shaltut, Mahmud, 5 Shamoon, 302 Shamsolvaezin, Mashaallah, 268 shari’ah, 23; categorization of human acts by, 11; crimes and punishments in, 23, 41; definition of, 11; government and, 37; Guardian Council and, 269, 269–270; interpretation of principles, 33; Islamic jurisprudence and, 35; Islamic law and, 11; Islamization of law and, 33; law and, 24, 34, 42, 43; legislation and, 23; man and, 5–6; maslahat/zarurat and, 37; politics and, 33–34; purpose of, 36–37; Quran and, 11, 36; Twelver Shi’ism and, 23; wealth distribution in, 102 Shari’ati, Ali, 19, 23, 143 Shariatmadari, Mohammad Kazem, 156 shart-e-zaman-e-aqd. See Binding Secondary Contractual Obligations Shi’a clerics (ulama), 21, 34–38, 153, 182, 207, 311–312, 313 Shi’a Crescent, xiv, xvi, 260 Shi’a doctrine and practice of leadership (imamah), 6, 14, 311 Shi’a jurisprudence, 13, 14, 75 Shi’a movements, 253 Shi’ism, 14, 19, 34, 115 shura. See consultation shuray-e amniyyat-e melli. See National Security Council Shuray-e Negahba. See Guardian Council Simorgh rocket, 291 social crimes, 63 social injustice, 102 socialism, 130, 148 social justice, 31, 100, 102, 103, 198, 207, 224 social responsibility, 166

359

social security, 29 socioeconomic justice, 151 sodomy (lavat), 41, 46–47, 47–48 Soldiers of God (Jundullah), 143 Soroush, Abdol Karim, 136, 172 Sotoudeh, Nasrin, 250 South Pars gas field, 247 sovereignty: of God, 24, 40, 151, 171, 205, 311; individual, 136, 311; popular, xvii, 23 Soviet Union, 128, 155–156 Speaker of the Parliament, 203 Special Courts, 74, 78, 86, 96, 264–265 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), 111 Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), 298 spirit (ruh), 53, 57 state economy, 105–106 state ownership, 102 State Prosecutor General, 264 State Supreme Court, 263–264, 266 the stock, 51 stoning (rajam), 45–46, 97, 267, 268 students, 95, 231 subsidies, 111, 113, 245–246, 248 suicide bombings, 241 sunnah. See traditions Sunni Arab regime, xiv Sunni doctrine and practice of leadership. See khalifah Sunnism, legal deduction and, 13 Supplemental Fundamental Laws, 82 Supreme Council for Reconstruction, 40 Supreme Council for Supporting War, 40 Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, 40, 202, 248 Supreme Defense Council, 207, 210 Supreme Judiciary Council, 84, 263–264 Supreme Leader (vali-e faqih) (rahbar), xx, 146; accountability to, 167; armed forces and, 203; authority of, 173, 179, 271; choosing, 38; compassion of, 185; in constitution of Islamic Republic, 180; corruption and, 267; Council of Experts and, 271; duties of, 180–181; elections and, 22, 181; foreign policy and, 251; government and, 190; Guardian Council and, 40, 180–181; influence of, xxi; IRGC and, 274;

360

Index

Islamic Republic, xix; judicial branch and, 262; Khatami and, 230; leadership in practice of, 182–186; obedience to, 38, 148; personal qualities of, xix, 180; presidency and, 202; press and, 83; religion and, 180; responsibilities of, 200; rights and responsibilities of, 21; role of, 21, 173, 180, 231; theological and legal roots of, 179–181 Syria, 255, 260, 283n212 ta’azir. See crimes and punishments discretionary Tabrizi, Hossein Musavi, 239 talaq. See divorce Taliban, 230, 252 Talmudic law, 8, 9 tawhid. See Oneness of God taxation, 102, 107, 145, 224 tazkiyyah, 102 Tehran Agreement, 230 Tehran Nuclear Research Center, 288, 289 Tehran Stock Exchange, 244 Temporary Cultivation Law, 39 temporary marriages, 75 territoriality, of law, 33 terrorism, xv theft, 42 Toilers’ Party (Hezb-e Zahmatkeshan-e Iran), 130, 131 Torah, 9, 10 torture, 28, 94, 97, 98 tourism, 248 towse’eh. See economic development Trade and Industrial Free Zones, 107 trade incentives, 107 traditions (sunnah), xvii, 6, 9, 12 transgression, 42 treason, 60 trials, 94 Tudeh party, 19, 128, 129–130, 131, 134, 144, 153, 155 Turkamans, 141 Turkey, xv Twelfth Imam (Mahdi), 179, 240 Twelver family law, 72 Twelver Ja’afari School, 26 Twelver Shi’is (Ithna’ Ashari), 7, 14, 23, 34, 36, 39

tyranny, 204 UAE, 283n199, 296 Uhud (battle), 68 ulama. See Shi’a clerics Umayyad Judicial Practice, 10 Umayyads, 9, 10 ummah. See Muslim community U.N. See United Nations unauthorized public gatherings, 238 unemployment, 96, 111–113, 114, 214, 223, 238, 244, 258, 299 Union of Communists, 144 United Arab Emirates, 255 United Nations (U.N.), 251, 258, 291–301 United Nations Charter, 293–295, 305n34 United States (U.S.), 174n9; Ahmadinejad and, 244, 251–253; checks and balances in, 26; embassy, 199, 280n130; Founding Fathers, 152; Iran and, 228–229, 255, 297; Israel and, 301–302; Khatami and, 228; nuclear programs and, 304n29; OFAC, 297–298; policies, 61; Rafsanjani and, 218–219; religion in, 228; Rouhani and, 228 uranium, 289–290, 292, 299 usulgarayan. See Principalists vagrancy, 64 vali-e dam. See complainant vali-e faqih. See Supreme Leader valiyat-e faqih, 23, 24, 143, 145, 151, 153, 171, 179 values, xiv, xv, 3, 7, 148 Velayati, Ali Akbar, 212, 235 velvet revolution, 279n111 violence, xv, 41, 62, 95, 147, 226, 310. See also engaging in war voting, 91, 161, 163–164, 165–166, 201, 238 waajib. See obligatory acts Wahhabi movement, 14 war on terror, 229 wealth, 100, 102 Western cultural onslaught, 147, 216 Western history, Muslim societies and, 7 Western values, Islam and, 148

Index White Revolution, 132, 133, 174n19, 277n34 wife, 69, 71, 73–74, 76–77, 78, 79–81, 119n111 witnesses, gender and, 54–55 women: attire of, 62, 65; compensation of, 56–57; custody and, 35, 39, 81; divorce and, 35, 65, 67, 70, 71; dress code and, 95, 96; eligibility for presidency and, 200–201; emotions of, 55; family law and, 65; Guardian Council and, 201; Khatami and, 222; marriage and, 65, 69; non-discrimination and, 89;

361 objectification of, 67; organizations for, 141; polygamy and, 63; religious organization of, 156; rights of, xviii, 27, 65, 89; roles of, 65, 250; Rouhani and, 260; social crimes and, 63; social status of, 68; testimony of, 55; violence against, 62, 95. See also mothers; wife

zakat, 102 Zarif, Javad, 260, 300 zarurat. See maslahat/zarurat Zaydi, 26 zena. See adultery

About the Author

Mehran Tamadonfar is associate professor of political science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He is the author of Islamic Polity and Political Leadership: Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Pragmatism; co-editor of Religion and Regimes: Support, Separation, and Opposition; and author of numerous articles and book chapters on the Middle East and North Africa, Islamic law and politics, and Iranian politics.

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