Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy: Classical and Modern Interpretations 1138800309, 9781138800304

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Table ofContents
List of figures
Acknowledgments
Arabic Transliteration System and Citation Guidelines
1 Introduction
Preliminary
Islamic diversity
The emergence of a non-Islamic cultural challenge
Setting of the research problem and relevance
Aspects of the problem
Methods
Study scheme and sub-questions
2 The Dilemma of a Diachronic Language
Language and religion
Reading sources between narration and re-interpretation
3 Classical Sources and Interpretations about Development: Between Tradition and Renovation
The value of development
Islam and the pre-Islamic Arab tradition
“This day have I perfected your religion for you”: Revivalism or renovation?
Reform in a Muslim context
4 On Pluralism
The scriptural background: Humanity as unity
Islam and the “Other”
Religious–cultural identity and pluralism
The status quo: Muslims in a multicultural context
5 On Democracy
Islam and the state
The prototype of rā‘ī and ra‘iyya: ‘adl-kratia vis-à-vis dēmo-kratia?
Between freedom and submission: the challenge of liberal democracy
Shū-ra and democracy: Islamizing democracy or democratizing Islam?
6 Summary and Conclusions
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy aspires to clarify the tensions and congruences between the revelational and the rational, the text and the context, the limits and the horizons of contextualization in Islam, as these emanate from the Islamic interpretive tradition. This book examines classical and modern Muslim interpretations with regard to the concepts of diachronic development, pluralism and democracy based on Arabic–Islamic sources and literature. Focusing on the parameters of semantic changes, methods of interpretation and cultural variables, it shows how this interpretive tradition offers a diversity of ideas and approaches that can be utilized in contemporary debates concerning the socio-political contextualization of Islamic genuine thought. However, within this diversity, Islam presents generic principles and core values as “moral paradigms” that can deal with such modern challenges. Based on the analysis of core Islamic texts and key terms related to the discussed issues, mainly from the Quran and the Sunnah, and the broader Arabic-Islamic literature, it explores the boundaries of the mutable and constant in the Islamic worldview. Presenting classical Muslim interpretations and scholars as possible interlocutors in debates over the compatibility of Islam with challenges of modernity, this book is essential reading for researchers and postgraduates interested in Islamic Studies, Philosophy of Religion and Political Science. Yaser Ellethy is Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Theology – VU University Amsterdam. He holds PhDs in Islamic Theology and in Philology. He has published articles and books in English, Greek, Dutch and Arabic.

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy Classical and Modern Interpretations

Yaser Ellethy

Routledge

Routledge

Routledge

Routledge Routledge

First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Yaser Ellethy The right of Yaser Ellethy to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978–1–138–80030–4 (hbk) ISBN: 978–1–315–75553–3 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books

To my parents: your fit.ra was my greatest teacher ever; I miss you so much. To Mohammad: speechless, you could inspire all this love! Rest in peace, brother. To Ghada: for your patience and altruism; I owe you a lot.

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Contents

List of figures Acknowledgments Arabic Transliteration System and Citation Guidelines 1

Introduction Preliminary 1 Islamic diversity 2 The emergence of a non-Islamic cultural challenge Setting of the research problem and relevance 6 Aspects of the problem 7 Methods 15 Study scheme and sub-questions 16

1

4

2

The Dilemma of a Diachronic Language Language and religion 21 Reading sources between narration and re-interpretation 28

3

Classical Sources and Interpretations about Development: Between Tradition and Renovation The value of development 47 Islam and the pre-Islamic Arab tradition 54 “This day have I perfected your religion for you”: Revivalism or renovation? 65 Reform in a Muslim context 78

4

xi xiii xiv

On Pluralism The scriptural background: Humanity as unity 102 Islam and the “Other” 113 Religious–cultural identity and pluralism 130 The status quo: Muslims in a multicultural context 163

20

46

101

x

Contents

5

On Democracy Islam and the state 192 The prototype of ra-‘ı- and ra‘iyya: ‘adl-kratia vis-à-vis de-mo-kratia? 208 Between freedom and submission: The challenge of liberal democracy 228 Shu-ra and democracy: Islamizing democracy or democratizing Islam? 245

190

6

Summary and Conclusions

289

Bibliography Index

306 325

List of Figures

2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19 4.20 4.21 4.22 4.23 4.24 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

Tafsir and Arabic Islamic culture and Arabic Language groups of the Muslim world The structure of Islam One God and multi-creation The Quran in the daily life of Muslims Quranic verses displayed at home The belief in God and Muhammad The universality of the belief in God and Muhammad The belief in angels (1) The belief in angels (2) The belief in fate The belief in Heaven and Hell Daily prayers Mosque attendance Fasting during Ramadan (1) Fasting during Ramadan (2) Giving alms (1) Giving alms (2) Pilgrimage to Mecca The belief in afterlife The belief in eternal reward The belief in eternal punishment “Muslimness” (1) “Muslimness” (2) Interpreting Islam’s teachings The sectarian affiliations of Muslims Ethnicities and cultures of the Muslim world Should the Quran hold sway over constitutional laws? The role of Islam in politics (1) The role of Islam in politics (2) The role of Islam in politics: good or bad?

34 36 36 82 107 134 135 136 137 139 140 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 147 148 149 150 152 153 156 157 158 195 198 199 199

xii 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9

List of Figures Percentage for democracy What is important in democracy? Strong economy as a good democracy? The Arab Spring and democracy Islamic democratic core values

228 244 245 264 265

Acknowledgments

Throughout my journey toward attaining this work, many people have contributed to its completion with their kind and generous support. First of all, my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation go to Professors Muhammad Abu Laylah and the late Hendrik Vroom who dedicated a lot of time and expertise helping me to achieve this work. Through their thorough reading and shrewd comments, I could improve and revise the text of this book many times. Our discussions have been always a source of inspiration for me. I am deeply indebted to their assistance, motivation, guidance and synergy; to both of them I say humbly: shukran-dank! I also wish to express my gratitude to the late Professor Abdul-Mo‘ti Bayoumi, ex-dean of the faculty of us.u-l al-dı-n at Al-Azhar University, and Professor Muhammad Imara, member of the Higher Council of Islamic Research in Egypt. Many thanks are due to my friends and colleagues in Salonica, especially Fotini Tsimpiridou and Efi Voutira, who shared with me the birth of the very first ideas of this project. I would like to extend my gratitude to my colleagues and students at the Faculty of Theology and the Centre for Islamic Theology at the VU University Amsterdam who always inspired me with their friendship, collegiality and academic spirit. I am especially grateful to Dr. Mohsen Hermes and Dr. Zaynab Hermes for the precious help they both offered. I am also thankful to Mariam Rasem, Azza Askar, Harriet O’Donovan, Willie van der Merwe, Peter Versteeg, Jan Krans and Arie Zwiep. I feel also great debt to all my teachers and colleagues along my multidisciplinary academic career. Their names are too many to fit here, but my appreciation of their knowledge and wisdom is great and cannot be described in a few words. Many thanks also to the Routledge team, especially J. Whiting, K. Rylance, G. Martin, A. Service, all the editorial personnel and the anonymous external referees. Finally, yet importantly, I would like to thank, from the bottom of my heart, my family members. I owe a lot to my beloved wife, friend and journey partner, Ghada. Without her lifelong support, sacrifice and altruism I would have never been able to stand where I am. Thanks go also to my daughter Manar, whose smile, tenderness and multilingual stimulus accompanied me over the authorship of an MA in Arabic, a first PhD in Greek and a second PhD in English. Thanks, of course, to my son Omar who is finally happy that my long “essay” is coming to an end, so we can share more time together playing and watching football. No words can express my gratitude to my late parents, sisters and brothers; they already know how much I owe them.

Arabic Transliteration System and Citation Guidelines

This study draws upon a considerable number of Arabic sources and literature. The following transliteration system is used to cite the Arabic terms. The citation does not include the case law in Arabic, or the assimilation of the la-m of the definition article with the following letter (al-tafsı-r, not at-tafsı-r). Special symbols and fonts have been used to render some special Arabic letters. For example: an apostrophe (‘) for hamza ‫ﺀ‬, a reverse apostrophe (‘) for ‘ayn ‫ﻉ‬, and a t. with a subscript dot for the letter t.a-’ ‫ﻁ‬:

Arabic letter/-s ‫ ﺀ‬/ ‫ ﺃ‬/ ‫ ﺁ‬/‫ﻯ‬ ‫ﺏ‬ ‫ﺕ‬/‫ﺓ‬ ‫ﺙ‬ ‫ﺝ‬ ‫ﺡ‬ ‫ﺥ‬ ‫ﺩ‬ ‫ﺫ‬ ‫ﺭ‬ ‫ﺯ‬ ‫ﺱ‬ ‫ﺵ‬ ‫ﺹ‬

Transliteration

Arabic letter/-s

Transliteration

’/a/ā b t / a (not ah) th j ḥ kh d dh r z s sh ṣ

‫ﺽ‬ ‫ﻁ‬ ‫ﻅ‬ ‫ﻉ‬ ‫ﻍ‬ ‫ﻑ‬ ‫ﻕ‬ ‫ﻙ‬ ‫ﻝ‬ ‫ﻡ‬ ‫ﻥ‬ ‫ﻫـ‬ ‫ﻭ‬ ‫ ﻱ‬- ‫ﻳﺔ‬

ḍ ṭ ẓ ῾ gh f q k l m n h u/ū/w i/y/ī - iyya

Proper names and nouns are mostly excluded from this system, except some cases where the use of a special symbol would eliminate confusion between names or render the identification of a name or noun to the greatest extent possible. Excluded from this system as well are some Islamic terms already known in English (e.g., Quran, Sunnah, hadith, Sharia, ummah). Authors’ names beginning with Al-(Al-Ghazali; thus cited in the notes) are classified alphabetically in the bibliography list according to the first letter following the article Al-(Ghazali Al-). The superscript number above the year of publication refers to the number of the edition (e.g. 20098).

1

Introduction

Preliminary Islam has often been presented or perceived, in the West and even by some Muslims, as a fixed template religion which can hardly keep pace with a developing and changing worldly context. Despite the great deal of Arabic and Islamic literature on the topic of Islam in changing contexts, the problem of the conflict between certain Islamic principles and some modern global notions still persists. My aim in this book is to examine and analyze the concept of diachronic development and variability of time and place within the Islamic tradition and the relevant Muslim views which can frame the debates on pluralism and democracy in a modern Islamic context. Specifically, these views will be approached in light of their respective classical and modern Muslim interpretations of the source texts. Moreover, I try to give a clear idea about the changeable and the unchangeable in Islam through an explanation of the parameters of the tradition of exegesis (tafsı-r) and how these are utilized in the field of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). The main themes discussed in this book – diachronic development, pluralism and democracy – follow a sequence which helps to structure my critical approach from the generic to the more specific. I have chosen to focus on the concepts of pluralism and democracy as they comprise the most salient challenges that emerge in the modern and contemporary discourse concerning the conformity of Islam with the developing and changing socio-political human context. Speaking about interpretation in Islam, the Arabic language and its diachronic adaptability to both text and context form an essential access to all the issues examined here. Therefore, the study begins with a discussion of the linguistic intricacies related to the process of interpretation in Islam and the impact of the variability of the Arabic language on the conceptualization of classical notions in modern contexts. Concepts evolve, change and are constantly conceived in a certain linguistic and cultural sphere which determines the way we approach them. This is a crucial starting point in order to conclude a certain Islamic view which emanates from a plethora of texts and theological approaches and permeates the contemporary Islamic discourse on the boundaries of adapting to a developing world where pluralism and democracy are

2

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy

principal values. It should be clear that it is not my intention here to approach Arabic per se as a language but rather as a tafsı-r-tool. What follows in this introduction is an attempt to survey the object, content, approaches and methods of this book. I touch briefly and not deeply on the topics discussed because these will be handled in more depth throughout the following chapters. Furthermore, the reader of this work is expected at the end to have a deeper idea about how far Islamic thought can find ways to cope with different challenges, such as modernity, pluralism and democracy, in their updated contexts. Of course, to cope with these challenges does not imply that we have to put some aspects of Islam in a moratorium. The question is more about whether Islam has the dynamics and mechanisms to do this or not. It is beyond the scope of this book to relativize or even ignore the authority of the Islamic main sources, the Quran and the Sunnah. It aspires rather to clarify the tensions and congruences between the revelational and the rational, the text and the context, the limits and the horizons of contextualization in Islam, as these emanate from the Islamic interpretive tradition.

Islamic diversity To address any question in Islamic tradition without taking into consideration the diversity that characterizes almost all its aspects is not reasonable. Throughout its long history, Islam always produced a great diversity, not only in the domain of its epistemological and theological tradition, but also in the fields of its socio-political and cultural manifestations. Epistemologically, Islam has developed a great number of religious sciences (‘ulu-m shar‘iyya) which aimed mainly at the understanding and then the implementation of God’s Word and the Islamic sacra scriptura, embodied in the Quran and the Sunnah. The starting point already took place during the time of the revelation itself. The Prophet explained what seemed ambiguous or what could have been misinterpreted to his companions through words and actions. After his death, the companions (s.ah.a-ba) and then their followers (ta-bi‘u-n)1 took the burden of conveying God’s Word and the tradition of His Messenger to the new generations of Muslims. By the second and third Islamic centuries (eighth/ninth CE) the methodological grounds for the most important science of Quranic exegesis and the Hadith methodology already developed into a registered literature. Tafsı-r rapidly developed and produced a variety of methods and schools with different readings and interpretations of the Quran, ranging from the authority of the Prophet and the first generations, to the human tendency to reinterpret the holy texts by personal opinion. To implement the divine code – as embedded in the Quran and the Sunnah – another science was needed, namely Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), which reached its zenith as a methodology under the name us.u-l al-fiqh in the eighth century. The objective of fiqh is to deduce the legal rulings from the sources of Sharia and to regulate the exercise of human reasoning (ijtiha-d), especially in cases where the Quran and the Sunnah are silent. This resulted in

Introduction

3

the classification of the sources of Sharia into revealed (basic scriptural evidence and indication from which detailed rules may be derived) and non-revealed (methodology and procedural guidelines to ensure the correct utilization of the source evidence).2 As a field mainly concerned with hermeneutic and deductive principles, the practitioners of fiqh (fuqaha-’) produced different views on the interpretation of the scriptural evidences. Consequently, another diversity of the jurisprudential schools (madha-hib) emerged, with a variety of opinions (a-ra-’, sing. ra’y) even within the same school, whereas fiqh remained a variable human understanding of the invariable divine text. Similarly, Islam knew another great diversity in cultural, social and political aspects. The first state in Medina, founded by the Prophet, was actually established on a political constitution which aimed to unite people from different social and religious backgrounds. The Medina state remained the utopia par excellence in Islamic history as an exemplary model of the implementation of God’s revelation on Earth through the person of the Prophet. After the death of the Prophet, a Rightly Guided Caliphate (khila-fa ra-shida) was established as a human attempt to follow the legislation of the Quran and the Prophet’s legacy. During this period (632–61), Islam reached new lands, peoples and cultures. The geopolitical expansion inevitably exposed both the Arabic language and the culture of Islam to a wide array of external influences. Nonetheless, Mecca and Medina remained the religious and political centers of the Islamic Empire. From the year 661, a long-term dynastic system of government was initiated for the first time outside the realm of the central Islamic sacred cities. Both Damascus and Baghdad became respectively the capitals of the Umayyad (661–750) and the Abbasid (750–1258) dynasties. The Arab-Islamic culture became a mixing pot of various and different civilizations and cultures. Moreover, the most recent chapter in the history of the Islamic Caliphate contributed significantly to this diversity. The Ottoman Empire (1299–1923) represented not only the last emergence of an Islamic Caliphate, but also the last pan-Islamic political experience with the challenge of multiculturalism. Today the term Islamic World is a label which covers a great mosaic of different and independent political entities, with populations who may or may not be entirely Muslim, who fully or only partially apply Sharia, who adhere to one or another jurisprudential school (madhhab), who are Sunni or Shiite, and who are secular or religious. Thus, Islam, as a tradition, reached its status quo throughout more than 14 centuries of diachronic changes in different epistemological, cultural and socio-political contexts. The challenge was always to struggle for a balanced consistency between the new worldly contexts and the preservation of the divine guidance, between this life and the Hereafter. If we look for a common factor in this long history, it would be only “Islam,” while the above mentioned political variants can be identified as manifestations of an “Islamic project” inspired in a way or another by the belief in the last divine revelation which ordains all the fields of human life, spiritually and materially.

4

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy

The contemporary era is a crucial historical moment in Islamic history, not only because of the civilizational recession of the majority of Muslim countries, but also due to the enormity of the cultural challenge imposed on the Muslim world and the lack of a consensus with regard to a certain concept of the needed reform. Any socio-political Islamic project today is basically faced with two main challenges: secularism and contextualization. Both of these challenges are related to the controversial theme of the role of religion in modern societies, a theme which should lead us inevitably to the broader and much discussed issue of Islam and the West. A developed, secular, liberal and democratic West is challenging a developing, conservative and non-democratic Muslim world. This notion is matched by a question about the impact of Islam, or a certain perception of the religion of Islam, with regards to the status quo in this Muslim world. It is also matched, most certainly, by a question about an already available non-Islamic “superior” ad hoc model.

The emergence of a non-Islamic cultural challenge The role of religion in the public domain in modern societies has tremendously changed. The rise to power of different non-religious philosophical isms, each claiming to provide a certain utopian system for human life, has contributed to the retraction of religion, gradually and vehemently, to the sphere of individual spiritual and ritual practices. It is a fact that this phenomenon characterizes most of what we call “the West,” even without distinguishing the regional differences and the diversities within this general term. Nonetheless, the Muslim world has also witnessed significant shifts concerning the involvement of religion in the formation of the socio-political character of its modern states. Many factors influenced the tensions between tradition and religious restrictions, on the one hand, and development and modernity, on the other, in modern and contemporary Muslim societies. But the most significant factors are related to the relationship between Islam and the West. Through European colonialism and orientalism, the Muslim world was not only militarily invaded, but also culturally challenged. Ever since the European naval explorations of Muslim territories in the fifteenth century, followed by the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire and the submission of its heritage to European imperialism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the indoor Islamic culture was closely exposed to the culture of the European colonizer. The interaction became as direct and influential as never before.3 This Western–European influence had already begun to gain its momentum by the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Modernist movements in the political arena, like the Young Turks (Jön Türkler, 1889–1918), were in fact the fruits of Western education. Their liberal ideology intensified the role of Western science and technology at the expense of religion, opposed authoritarian Ottoman rule, favored a constitutional parliamentary government, called for the secularization of society, enhanced freedom of religion for minorities, fostered European-like school systems, and

Introduction

5

encouraged Western clothing for women. Their Turkish nationalist tendencies conflicted with the religious pan-Islamic identity of the Caliphate Empire regime. One of their most striking figures, Ali Suavi (d. 1878), emphasizes the “meaninglessness of the search of politics method in Kuran [sic] and Hadith, and of making conclusion from Arabic expressions.” He also concludes: We accept Koran and Hadith for the service of religion, but not for the matters of temporal world because the science of politics relies upon geography, economics and ethics.4 By means of this interaction between Islam and the West, a new era of cultural antagonism was initiated in totally different terms from the era of imperialism. From the second half of the twentieth century, most of the colonialists had departed and the colonized countries had restored their new geopolitical borders, but the socio-cultural borders with the West have now overlapped once and for all. A new cultural enterprise of a “superior” developed world, based on a separation between the Church and the State, is now present side by side with the traditional Islamic worldview, which is originally based on a constitutional role of the divine revelation in all aspects of human life. The question of reform and modernization of Muslim societies arose intensively in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, together with the waves of national independence. The exposition to the “Other’s” superiority created a challenge of self-confidence, if not of identity. As J. Esposito puts it: By the nineteenth century much of the Muslim World found itself subjugated to European imperial powers, demonstrating its political, economic, and military impotence and challenging the veracity of Islam itself. Why had Europe (that is, Christendom) proved triumphant? Was it the superiority of its science and technology or of its religion and culture? Many Muslims had long believed that their historical success and florescence were due to the truth of their faith and mission, but with the political, economic, and military success of European imperial powers at hand, what were Muslims now to conclude?5 Nevertheless, Islamic traditionalism remained a dominant component of the cultural mosaic in Muslim communities inside and outside the borders of the Muslim world. During this very transformational historical moment, the concepts of reform, revival, modernism and renovation were, in the mainstream of the Muslim intellectual movements, remarkably connected to Islamic tradition and Islam’s scriptural sources, the Quran and the Sunnah. The conceptualization about the place of religion in this modern world was still different from Western and European notions. As a result, this cultural antagonism was not routed into a total conformity, but rather developed into theories about a clash of civilizations and Islamophobia on the one side and, on the other, resistance to the Western cultural paradigm to the extent of justifying the use of violence against it.

6

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy

Setting of the research problem and relevance The current study focuses on the central question of the diachronic development of Islamic thought between textualism and intellectualism, and the challenge of coping with modern and contemporary global challenges represented in the concepts of democracy and pluralism. In the West, the Muslim world is predominantly criticized for the lack of pluralistic and democratic values on different levels. The majority of Muslim countries are under monarchical, emirate-dynastic, plutocratic, dictatorial or corrupted regimes, and the world’s most unsettled areas of armed conflicts and civil wars are hosted in Muslim countries. The high average of social inequities, violation of human rights, lack of freedom of opinion, promotion of monocultural values, oppression of women and persecution of religious minorities comprise most of the Western critique against the Muslim world. The mere characterization of this geopolitical entity as “Muslim” leaves no doubt that Islam, as a belief and a culture, is involved in this critique. On the Muslim side, it is widely claimed that Islam, on the contrary, offers solutions for all these problems. The last divine revelation had already proven its veracity. From its very beginnings and throughout centuries of civilizational superiority, Islam presented a paradigmatic model of guidance toward human prosperity, justice, tolerance and peaceful coexistence. The adherents of this perspective can claim that it is the deviation from the true path of Islam and the lack of commitment to Islam that are behind all these problems. The Quran puts it clearly and utterly: And verily this is My straight path, so follow it. Follow not other ways, lest you be parted from His way. This has He ordained for you, that you may ward off [evil]. (Al-An’aa-m, 6:153) According to the latter view, Islam stands clearly against all these problems and its teachings are meant to solve and not to enhance them. Consequently, the crisis of the Muslim world can be attributed to the fact that it is less substantially “Muslim” than it should be. Nevertheless, the Quran, the Sunnah and the classical Islamic interpretive and jurisprudential legacy did not address pluralism and democracy directly as human norms. In other words, the divine revelation gives general principles in this respect to be elaborated in different times and places. What Islamic political jurisprudence, for example, has achieved in a particular period of time is the product of applying those principles to its contemporary reality. Some of the classical scholars have contributed very positively to keep the hermeneutical process in consistency with their own time. The role of Muslim scholars of our time, then, is to do the same through the tools of ijtiha-d (human reasoning), taking into consideration the changing and developing nature of human life, without a contradiction with the Islamic core legislative rules.

Introduction

7

If Islam offers the “solution” for the aforementioned problems, while the West can claim to have largely overcome them through non-Islamic solutions, where do both the Islamic and the Western solutions agree and where do they differ? And how does a developing Islamic thought respond to modern global challenges represented in pluralism and democracy? In an attempt to elaborate an answer to these questions, this book explores some aspects of the adaptability of Islamic thought to modernity. It also examines classical-traditional and modern interpretations with regard to the concepts of pluralism and democracy. In doing so, it explores the diversity that exists in the Islamic tradition in quest of an Islamic model which endorses congruence between the unchangeable holy text and the evolvable human life. A considerable part of the contribution this book can claim is that it seeks to add to Western literature, and maybe even to the Muslim one, more knowledge about the Islamic conception of development and modernity, and the discourses on reform within Muslim traditional and modern intellectualism. It also aspires to show how the concepts of traditionalism and modernism can sometimes overlap in the Islamic context. The reader of this book will see how some views in classical and traditional Islamic scholarship can be utilized in the contemporary debates concerning the so-called contextualization of Islam. This is the reason why I give more attention to Arabic-Islamic literature and bibliography on the issues discussed. Admittedly, Western literature and many non-Muslim scholars have contributed to the knowledge about the Islamic tradition; this book owes also a lot to some of these studies. However, my aim is to investigate mostly Arabic-Islamic classical sources and to involve the reader in some intra-Arabic-Islamic discussions on the approached themes with authors who take theological stances and account for them as Muslims.

Aspects of the problem Having already described the general research problem, I will now survey and explain its main aspects as they will be discussed separately in this book. These are: the dilemma of a diachronic language, its relativity vis-à-vis the immutability of the divine revelation, and the tension between textualism and intellectualism in the Muslim interpretive tradition; the relation between tradition, development and modernity, and the boundaries of renovation and reform in an Islamic context; and, finally, how this Muslim interpretive tradition can be utilized in discussions related to the concepts of pluralism and democracy, as the most salient socio-political challenges that face Islamic reform today. Language, diachrony and interpretation The issue of Islam and development is directly related to the diachrony of the Arabic language and the interpretations of the Islamic sources in a historical sequence of changing linguistic and socio-cultural aspects. As the term

8

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy

“diachrony” is used identically to label so-called historical linguistics,6 the study is based on the historical role of the Arabic language and the impact of semantic shifts on the interpretations of the Islamic sources. While almost all classical Islamic literature is written in classical High Arabic fos.h.a, this language has gone through many variations during centuries of diachronic development reaching its status quo of colloquial Arabic with its local vernaculars. Fos.h.a remains the language of religious rituals for Muslims, even non Arabic-speakers, all over the world. But the reflection on many Islamic notions is predominantly affected by the linguistic system of the present and the distance from the “High” language of the source texts. Add to this the fact that the present Islamic world comprises a huge mosaic of different languages, cultures and traditions. As the interpretive attempts of the source cognitive heritage of Islam make use of the Arabic language, diachronically, to bring this miraculous God-sent Word closer to the grasp of Muslim people, the tool used (i.e., the Arabic language) always stands as a variable measure. Moreover, both classical and modern interpretations represent some contextual reflections on the holy text of the Quran. These reflections are predefined by a certain methodology to approach the holy text in an attempt to understand it. In this process, language is both the tool and the goal at the same time. It is a tool because God revealed His Word in a certain language to people who understand it, and it is a goal because the human understanding of this “Holy” language is an attempt to preserve this Word in the form of a “text,” to re-reveal and reconstruct it on the levels of interpretation and proclamation. The sub-theme of language and interpretation concerns the problematic of how the development of the interpretive tradition in Islam, along with the central role of the Arabic language in its tremendous variety of literature, can affect Muslim approaches to many modern and contemporary notions. If religious texts are representing the unchangeable Holy Word, while language is a variable for humans, how far can the interpretation of the changeless religious texts stand with the diachronic variability of language throughout time? In other words, many religious notions that were easily accessible by early Muslims, as the language of the Quran and the Sunnah was closer to the classical language they use, have come to semantic changes today. How much is this process responsible for the different versions of contemporary Islamic thought? Is the tradition of interpretation open to the continuous human attempts of ijtiha-d? What are the limitations of interpreting those sources? All these questions put us in confrontation with the hypothesis of lending the sacredness of the interpreted text to the interpretation itself and the eligibility of re-interpretations. Simply put: with the exception of the few authentic Prophetic traditions related to tafsı-r, is there a “holy” interpretation of a “Holy” text? The fact that the difference between human understanding and the divinely intended meaning already played a role in the period of the revelation itself sheds light on the primary construction of Islamic interpretive tradition. This is taken as the starting point of this study simply because there is no unified

Introduction

9

approach to the Islamic position concerning the notions of development, pluralism and democracy. Each interpretation – adopted by a certain school, group or sect – is grounded on a claim of understanding the intended meaning of God’s Word in the proper way. The vital role of the Arabic language in Islam is not only limited to the fact that it is the language of the Quran, but also because almost each word in Arabic can be interpreted and understood in various ways according to the context in which it is used. Hence, the diversity of interpretations can always justify the role of Muslim intellect in the development of Islam, which could constantly move between tradition and renovation. Development, tradition and renovation The theme of change and development in Islam is crucially relevant to the main research problem of this book. This is necessary to promote a certain Islamic view about contextualization and adaptability to spatiotemporal changes, prior to the discussion of an Islamic position concerning pluralism and democracy. Hence, the whole issue of renovation and production of new contextual conscientiousness in the fields of fiqh, that meets the challenges of every human variation, emerges. One of God’s attributes in Islam is the Ever Enduring and Immutable (Al-Ba-qı-); all His creatures are subject to change, mutability and development. Religion itself is based on the idea of a variable humankind which needs to be reminded constantly of the invariable Divine Truth. Both the Quran and the Hadiths, the scriptural sources of Islamic Sharia and jurisprudence, touch upon the principles of development and change of the human status. He Who created man knows His creation: Should He not know what He created? And He is the Subtile, the All-Aware. (Al-Mulk, 67:14) Human progress and change should be seen as a gift of the divine wisdom which grants a margin of validity to the authority of the human intellect in the realization of God’s Word on Earth. This margin stands on the limits of the principal sources of Islamic law, represented in the Quran and the Sunnah, and extends to cover the realm of the recipient intellect, represented in the other two sources-criteria of Islamic law: consensus (ijma-‘) and analogy/reasoning (qiya-s/ijtiha-d) of the authorized scholars (‘ulama-’), as a valid means of knowledge. The great diversity in Islamic jurisprudence is actually a reflection of the human variety of reasoning in its attempt to cover different contexts and circumstances of the human status. This diversity is exactly what makes the balance between tradition and renovation an Islamic virtue. From its very beginning, Islam did not build its newborn world of ideas on the ruins of the pre-Islamic Arabian era. Those who were enemies of Muhammad became his companions and all the inherent aspects of the moral code of the pre-Islamic Arab culture were developed and refined by the spirituality of

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divine guidance. Imitation of the tradition of the forefathers is no more a blind criterion of the tribal character. Through the detribalization of preIslamic Arab society, on the one hand, and the adoption of everything good even in this “antagonistic” culture, on the other, Islam set a new paradigm of inclusiveness, pluralism and openness to the “Other.” Islamic generic norms deal with all sub-issues in the course of human progress on the basis of a God-made pattern of humankind as a whole. Thus, Islam, the religion which addresses Allah’s handiwork according to the pattern on which He has made humankind (fit.ra),7 could refine and enhance every human aspect outside its sphere as long as it responds to this divine pattern. This is exactly what happened with the very pagan society Islam came to teach pure monotheism. Similarly, the question about the power of the same divine revelation with regard to the adaptability of such an attitude in modern contexts and the openness to certain Western civilizational and cultural aspects may also become a legitimate one. In contrast, another dilemmatic, and equally Islamic, approach to the issue of development adds more inputs to this debate. A counter-argument might be grounded in the idea of the “perfection” of this last divine message to humankind. A sound justification for that may be: since it is God’s chosen religion for humanity, Islamic legislation should be valid for every temporal and geographical context.8 Consequently, the question arises concerning whether we should revive a certain historical model or renovate according to the contemporary context. And if we are to renovate, what are the limits of this renovation? But this same argument should be analyzed carefully as it might lead to totally different results concerning the ideas of development, modernization and renovation. Islam is perfected as it has the latent ability to be valid for every new context. The flexibility and relaxations shown in the core of the ritual code (‘iba-dat) of Islam, the room left for the changeability of the human “believer” and the diversity of the contexts he/she might be facing, leaves no doubt that this is a norm valid as well in the behavioral code (mu‘a-mala-t). In this respect, the concept of reform in Islam and the tension between revivalism and renovation are expressed in ways which are sometimes unfamiliar to Western culture. The “Islamic solution” varies from the reproduction of the classical golden eras of Islamic history, and those are many, to the innovative trend which utilizes the role of ijtiha-d in coping with modern and contemporary challenges. Here, the conceptualization about renovation and adoption of modernized extra-Islamic ideas might also lead to a conflict with the Islamic concept of bid‘a (novelty/heterodoxy), unless we carefully analyze this controversial term within its religious framework. The exhortations and limits of reform in Islam are marked by the ability of an eventually contemporary Muslim reformism which can re-establish a consistency between the holy texts and the developing contexts – something that already happened throughout the long historical path of Islam, on the hands of other reformists in their own times.

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Pluralism A discussion of the Islamic view of state and democracy in modern contexts should also include a discussion of the Islamic perspective on pluralism. I use the term “pluralism” here, as it is often expressed in Islamic literature, in a broader sense than “religious pluralism,” as it is usually reconstructed in theology and the (Western) philosophy of religion.9 The term ta‘addudiyya (pluralism), as I use it, denotes the inclusive interaction between Islam and all the diversity that exists outside it,10 including a wide array of religious, socio-cultural and political aspects. This is inevitably related to the idea of universality (‘a-lamiyya) within Islam, as God’s last message for all humankind and not for a particular nation or ethnic group. This can have connotations to the concepts of inclusivism, pluralism and even exclusivism, because the universality of Islam deals also with the “otherness” within humanity, in its religious and ethno-cultural manifestations. Part of the problematic of this theme is the divergence in views about it, something which feeds it increasingly with more discussion. Both the proponents and opponents of the idea of a pluralistic Islam could, whether prejudiced or not, find justifications for their claims in the scriptural tradition of Islam. Again, we are faced with diverse interpretations of the texts, historical contexts and hermeneutics of practical-political theology. The current study contributes to this argumentation by focusing on four main sub-themes: Islamic universality, Islam and “otherness,” Muslim identity, and the present Muslim stance vis-à-vis pluralism inside and outside an Islamic context. The first sub-theme on Islamic universality involves the Islamic Weltanschauung of human existence and its perspective on humanity as one unity. This view is intrinsically related to the reflection on and formation of the Islamic concept of pluralism, inclusivism and exclusivism. On the one hand, viewing matters from the angle of the One and Unique God who created Adam as the one father of humankind would justify all the inclusive views in Muslim scholarship. The perception of this universe as a unity and its differences and diversity as part of God’s will enhances the idea of an Islam which can reconcile with this plurality in inclusivistic terms. On the other hand, this same universality can be claimed exclusively on soteriological grounds, underlining the veracity of Islam as valid to all humankind, and thus can view the world as a House of Islam (da-r Islam) and a House of War (or Disbelief: da-r h.arb or da-r kofr). The consequence is to establish the relation between the Muslim and the non-Muslim only on “missiological” and antagonistic terms and to understand Islamic universality only as pan-Islamism. The second sub-theme concerns the concept of the “Other” in Islam and how this can affect the Muslim attitude, as a majority or a minority, with respect to pluralism. Terms such as dhimmitude (status of a religious minority under Islamic rule), jizya (poll tax paid by a dhimmi) and ka-fir (unbeliever) should become relevant to our discussion here. Those controversial terms are used in totally exclusivistic context, not only in polemic literature against

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Islam but also in some Muslim contemporary discourses. Here, it is necessary to reconstruct our knowledge in this field through both theological and historical approaches to the issue. This is also important in order to reach a present-day model for Islam-and-the-“Other.” Because of the tangled relation between Sharia and fiqh in Islam, some classical and traditional views in the field of mu‘amala-t (as issues related to worldly matters) are perceived today as belonging to ‘iba-dat (rituals and practices of worship). This creates cognitive problems concerning the concept of pluralism and the very idea of the compatibility between Islam and democracy. The third sub-theme reflects on the question of identity and the tensions between ethno-cultural and religious elements in forming the identity of a Muslim, rendering it monocultural or multicultural. Whether a Muslim identifies himself more as a “Muslim,” or a citizen of a particular country, or an adherent of a certain culture is a classical question that has often been present in questionnaires of anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. The way in which Islam structures the identity of its adherents is crucial here because it pertains to their own reflection on the world outside the realm of Islam, especially in the context of a globalized world. Furthermore, the collective identification of a state as Islamic is constantly a debatable issue with regard to the way it would interact with the prerequisites of a modern “civil” state, which is founded basically on pluralistic values. The fourth sub-theme tackles the status quo, the challenges of a supposed Muslim project of revivalism which can promote pluralistic values. It also explores the Muslim existence in a multicultural Western context. Today, in a globalized world marked so far by Western hegemony, seen in the Muslim collective awareness as one entity, Muslims are often challenged either to compromise or to clash with some Western ideals. Historically, Islam has managed in its historical path to globalize many civilizations and develop an inclusive culture from its very beginning. How, then, can the fears about a re-emergence of an Islamic model for the state be justified? Practically, the Muslim world is not yet able to present a model par excellence for a modern Islamic state. Moreover, the Muslim presence in the West, with its multicultural identity, has fed the discussions on the consistency of Islam with pluralism. Surely, it is beyond the scope of the discussions in these four sub-themes to solve all complicated questions of religious pluralism. Rather, it is my aim to elucidate some crucial points of the general context in which an Islamic theory of religious diversity can be developed, and give way to a pluralistic society taking Islamic principles seriously. Democracy In this chapter, I am mainly concerned with the Islamic intellectual debates on Islamic politics and democracy. Almost all the modern and contemporary discussions on “political” Islam and the relationship between Islam and the State focus on the compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with democracy.

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The classical Islamic so-called Sharia-oriented politics (siya-sa shar‘iyya), endorsed in the works of prominent scholars such as Ibn Taymiya (1263–1328)11 and his pupil Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya (1292–1350),12 is mainly concerned with applying Islamic Law to government matters. Additionally, the modern and contemporary Islamic political discourse is more aligned to the Western models of government and state. This directs the whole debate to an attempt to conclude jurisprudential terms between Islam and democracy, the greatest achievement of Western political thought, and to investigate whether both are compatible or not. To approach this topic, we need to examine the broader issue of Islam and the State in its historical context. This will lead us, inevitably, to refer to the margins of human freedom within the realm of religion in Islam. It is a fact that the concept “religion” in Islam is different from the same concept in early Christianity and Judaism as far as its involvement in politics is concerned. From its very beginnings, Islam struggled to turn its universal message into a geopolitical entity, and the Prophet acted both as a Messenger and a statesman. Nonetheless, the political involvement of Islam is denied, not only by liberal and secular streams, but also by some modern Muslim scholars. This Islam– State relation creates fears about two main hypothetical consequences of the establishment of a so-called religious-Islamic state. The first concerns the transnationalization of Islam and the ambitions of some Muslim movements to revive the period of the Caliphate and unify the Muslim ummah, as a community of all believers, under one political power. The second concerns the establishment of a theocratic state where no room is allowed for personal freedoms, human rights, and democratic apparatuses to guarantee the free choice of the people in the selection and evaluation of their political authorities. As part of these discussions, a core question is related to the history of Islamic political thought, and the interpretive tradition concerning the concepts of the ummah, God’s sovereignty and theocracy. The term ummah is ambiguous even for many Muslims today who do not have access to the relevant Quranic sciences of interpretation. On the one hand, the link between this concept and its transnational implications in the context of the Quran and the Sunnah can hardly be observed in a particular political sense. On the other hand, after the death of the Prophet in 632, the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphate and the following dynastic empires, with all that they can present as a political model, remain human experiences inspired by different historical contexts. Therefore, it is important to understand the transnational dimension of the concept ummah today more as a spiritual bond which unifies Muslims all over the world. However, this same spiritual dimension of the ummah can still feed Muslim political thought with ideas about a pan-Islamic state, and mobilize some Muslim movements to struggle for it. The fact that Islam has no clerical hierarchy made it difficult, at least in the Sunni doctrine, to promote theocratic regimes. The question about who is qualified to rule in Islam today has to do more with modern political skills and expertise, even if religious piety is desirable. The contemporary Muslim

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apologetic discourse regarding the issue of an Islamic state rebuts all allegations of a theocratic political system using historical arguments. From this perspective, both the state of Medina and the following Rightly Guided Caliphate represent the anti-theocratic paradigm of an Islamic state. The accountability of the Muslim ruler before God hinges upon his accountability before his people. This being the case, the question about the compatibility of such an Islamic state with democracy becomes legitimate, especially when Islam has the scriptural and historical basis for democracy in the form of the shu-ra (the Quranic term for consultation) system. Nonetheless, to approach this issue in terms of comparing Islam with democracy would be misleading. Politics as a whole in Islam is part of a universal Ius Dei whose aim is to ordain the different aspects of human life to guarantee success in this world and the Hereafter. Democracy, on the other hand, is an ius positum which regulates the relationship between the individual, society and the state. The Quran and the Sunnah, as primary sources of the Sharia, have nothing to say, namely and particularly, on democracy. Rather, they present general principles which can be utilized to reach an Islamic form of democracy. The link between Sharia and all human achievements and innovations throughout history and up until the present day is fiqh, which, based on the general principles of the divine guidance, seeks for the deduction of rules that meet the new historical contexts. This is why the opinions of the Muslim scholars on the compatibility of Islam and democracy are varied and often diverge. Furthermore, democracy has developed in the Western context into something more than a political term. It can be better described as a culture which encompasses a series of values and principles for a system of human life. Paragraph 8 of the Vienna Declaration of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights affirms that: Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. In the context of the above, the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels should be universal and conducted without conditions attached. The international community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world.13 This relation between democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms has become a global culture. In addition to this, both secularism and modernism have almost become constitutional correlatives of Western democracy. Thus, the compatibility of Islam with democracy is questioned regarding whether it can cope with not only the so-called procedural democracy,14 but also the global democratic culture of human rights, and the margins of human freedom in

Introduction

15

legislation away from the authority of a God-sent law. Thus, if democracy, as a socio-political culture, is to glorify the value of man as an individual, what are the margins of this freedom within an eventual democratized Islamic society? Modern Muslim political discourse tends to present shu-ra as an Islamic alternative of Western democracy. This can be justified, partly, on the procedural level of managing common affairs based on collective or representative consultation. Nevertheless, the religious restrictions on such “consultation” raise more questions about the relevance of a shu-ra Islamic political system to a Western democratic system. I will attempt to show how Islamic principles, based on classical and modern interpretations, promote the expertise of all citizens and their collective right as a source of political authority. At the same time, a mere majoritarian democracy should not be Islamically welcomed if it does not achieve basic values such as justice, equality, freedom and minority rights.

Methods The methods of this study ground heavily on interdisciplinarity. In many parts, the reader who is not familiar with Arabic might get the impression that linguistics is considerably used, but this is a sine qua non to Islamic classical scholarship. Every single term in Islamic theological epistemology is to be defined and analyzed on two correlative levels: linguistically (lughatan) and technically/terminologically (is.t.ila-h.an). Linguistics and semasiology are crucial in order to shed light on misinterpretations and shortcomings in some contemporary approaches to the issues discussed. Moreover, a study concerned with interpretation of religious texts and hermeneutics of contextualization should be based on language and its parameters. This is a study in Islamic Studies (in the Western context: Islamic Theology) and not in Islamology. The frequent usage and quotation of texts from the Holy Quran, the Sunnah and the Islamic traditional scholarship of tafsı-r and fiqh is in the core of this book. Reading the texts in the framework of tafa-sı-r (pl. of tafsı-r) is a starting point, and the comparative method is used to reflect on traditional-classical and modern interpretations. Comparative exploration of classical, modern and contemporary Islamic literature serves to evaluate the theoretical background of many Muslim currents of today. To apprehend the impact of some “readings” upon modern Muslim societies and the modulation of popular religious manifestations, I might penetrate the terminological world of anthropology and sociology to describe and analyze questions such as identity and religiosity. Finally, though the term “hermeneutics” has bad fame in Islamic studies, I use this method many times in concordance with the Islamic science of us.u-l al-tafsı-r to move from theory to practice. As I mentioned before, the focus on Arabic-Islamic literature is part of the methods as well as the contribution of this work. The knowledge about the intra-Arabic-Islamic discourses on issues related to modernism and reform in the West in general is still poor. The Arabic bibliography is given a particular importance, as it is mainly involved in the process of interpretation, exegesis

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and jurisprudential development. I will search for the ways in which some Muslim authors have accounted for their stances in the fields of Islamic political thought. Most of the discussed authors, either classical or modern/contemporary, have been chosen for their great influence in the field of Islamic theology with relevance to the debated issues. Sometimes, it will be shown that even strict traditionalism or so-called radicalism – represented by classical authors such as Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, or modern authors such as Al-Maududi and Qutb, present other moderate and contextual aspects of their thought with regard to the approached issues. Thus, in my argumentation, I will refer to such “orthodox” authors seeking a “middle way” that can be followed without contradiction with established Islamic theological views. A discussion of concepts such as pluralism and democracy, from an Islamic theological view, should be based on the us.u-l ((methodological) fundaments/ principles) within the interpretive tradition which feeds Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). These concepts belong primarily to the jurisprudential field of siya-sa shar‘iyya (shari‘a-oriented politics). Somehow, as in the case of the Christian contextual theology, though with methodological differences, the source texts are (re-) interpreted in a contextual reading. Strikingly, we will see how even some classical scholars who represent Muslim traditionalism suggest interpretive views that can be useful in our very contemporary context. Surely, there are many interesting descriptive studies about development, pluralism and democracy in both the Muslim and the non-Muslim contexts. However, in this book, as mentioned above, I focus on some authors with great influence in the field of ‘ulu-m shar‘iyya (sciences of the Shari‘a) and the theological debates on the examined issues. Therefore, the main interlocutors in the present book are orthodox Muslim scholars and theologians who are established in the field of Islamic studies, and enjoy authority in the Arabic-Muslim public consciousness and political activism.15 Tafsı-r works, among others, such as those of Al-Tabari (d. 923), Ibn Kathir (d. 1373) and Al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), are often quoted and utilized in the argumentation of the discussed themes because they form the most accessible and famous Quran commentaries among the majority of Muslims. For the translation of the meanings of the Quranic quotations, I use mainly The Holy Quran: English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary by A. Yusuf Ali.16 Sometimes I also use The Meaning of the Glorious Koran by M. Pickthall17 and The Noble Qur’an by M. Al-Hilali and M. Khan,18 especially where the translation is closer to the original meaning in Arabic. Minor modifications occur, of course, where necessary. For the quotations from the Prophetic tradition (hadith, pl. hadiths), I give the name of the collection where it appears, hadith’s number and eventually the volume and page number.

Study scheme and sub-questions As mentioned before, the aim of this book is to examine and analyze the concept of diachronic development and variability of time and place within

Introduction

17

the Islamic tradition, and the relevant classical and modern Muslim interpretations which can frame the debates on pluralism and democracy in a modern Islamic context. Therefore, the book is divided into 6 chapters. Apart from the present introduction, the second chapter, The Dilemma of a Diachronic Language, addresses the problem of the Arabic language diachronic development and the parameters of Islamic interpretive tradition. The question here is: what is the impact of the centrality of Arabic language and its diachronic mutability upon the Islamic tradition of interpretation of the immutable texts? The third chapter, Classical Sources and Interpretations about Development: Between Tradition and Renovation, is devoted entirely to approach the problematic of development and renovation in Islam. The question to be answered is: what is the Islamic standpoint to development and renovation and what are the finalities and limits of an Islamic project of reform? The fourth chapter, On Pluralism, assesses the Islamic view of pluralism as this takes form within the source texts. In this chapter, I am in quest of an answer to the following question: in what forms is Islam a pluralistic religion and how far can this Islamic pluralistic view play a role in the modern cultural and socio-political contexts? The fifth chapter, On Democracy, explores the Islamic attitude toward the notion of democracy between tradition and modernism, and the problematic of the margins of freedom within the context of religious commitments. In this chapter, I explore this problem of how far are religion and politics interwoven in Islam and try to respond the following questions. Are there specific core Islamic fundamentals for a Democratic society? In addition, what are the points of intersection between the “Islamic” and the “Western” in the issue of Democracy? The sixth chapter is devoted to the summary and the conclusions of the study. Finally, at the end of this book, the reader should be able to reconstruct an idea about Islam within the framework of diversity. It is a fact that Islam is constantly presented or comprehended in the West as computer “hardware”, to borrow a term from modern technology, which is not updatable or upgradable. My intention is not to try to propose or market the “software,” but rather to show that in this Islam (with capital i) there is a great deal of traditional diversity which can still be utilized for a continuum of a modern Islamic model. Ironically, the “traditional” interpretations and jurisprudential ijtiha-d (human reasoning) of some classical Muslim scholars are sometimes more modernistic, reformative and innovative than many of the contemporary ones. The diversity that characterizes both classical Islamic jurisprudence fiqh and traditional interpretations can be taken as a starting point for a contemporary modern Islamic “civilizational project”, which sees no contradictions between the new contextual developments, human interests and Islamic principles.

Notes 1 A s.ah.a-bı- (sing. of s.ah.a-ba), a companion of the Prophet, is whoever encountered the Prophet believing in him and died as a Muslim. Their generation extends

18

2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13

14

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy until 110 H. (728 CE). A ta-bi‘ı- (sing. of ta-bi‘u-n), companion of a s.ah.a-bi, is whoever encountered a s.ah.a-bı- and died as a Muslim. Their generation ends in 181 H. (797 CE). See Al-Asqalani (2008), Nozhat al-Naz.ar fi Sharh. Nokhbat al-Fikar fi Mus.t.alah. Ahl al-Athar (Joy of the Eyes on the Explanation of the Chosen Thoughts on the Terminology of the Hadith Methodologists), Maktabat Nizar Mostafa Albaz, Mecca-Riyadh-Cairo, p. 291 ff, who adds to the definition: “even if [his Islam] was interrupted by apostasy according to the strongest opinion”; Cf. Ibn Al-S.ala-h. (2006), An Introduction to the Science of the Hadith, trans. Dickinson E., Garnet Publishing Ltd, Reading, p. 211 ff; Abu Shahba M. (2006), al-Wası-t. fi ‘Ulu-m wa Mus.t.alah al-H . adıth (The Concise on the Hadith Sciences and Methodology), Maktabat Al-Sunnah, Cairo, p. 504 ff. Kamali M. (2003), Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, The Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, p. 1. It is a fact that the interaction between Islam and Europe took place centuries before in the Iberian Peninsula between 711 and 1492, but in totally different terms of power and under Muslim hegemony. Saygin T. & Önal M. (Summer 2008), “‘Secularism’ from the Last Years of the Ottoman Empire to the Early Turkish Republic,” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 7, 20, p. 30. Esposito J., “Contemporary Islam: Reformation or Revolution?” in: The Oxford History of Islam, ed. Esposito J., Oxford Islamic Studies Online, retrieved from: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/book/islam-9780195107999/islam-978 0195107999-chapter-15 (accessed 27 May 2012). I do not agree with the identification of Europe as Christendom in the context of a Muslim perception of “impotence.” Even during the Crusades (1096–1291) the Arab-Muslims used to call the Crusaders as Frinja (Franks). For a thorough study of the crusades from an Arabic perspective, see Maalouf A. (1983), Les Croisades vues par les Arabes, Jean-Claude Lattès, Paris. In the context of the modern Muslim awareness of European superiority, this identification with Christendom is baseless. Its main concern is to trace the historical changes of the meanings of words in the development of language. See the Holy Quran, Al-Ru-m, 30:30. See Al-Ma-’ida, 5:3. For a discussion of the development of the notion of pluralism in the field of Western philosophy of religion see Vroom H. (2006), A Spectrum of Worldviews, Rodopi, Amsterdam, NY, p. 2 ff., and passim. Cf., for example, the definition of “pluralism” in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (2003, Oxford University Press), which also restricts the term ta‘addudiyya to religious pluralism; Cf. also Yitik A. (2004), “Islam and Pluralism: Does Quran Approve Religious Pluralism,” Journal of Religious Culture, n. 68, p. 2, who argues: “The problem of pluralism emerges not at socio-cultural level, but at religious sphere.” His work is titled: al-Siya-sa al-Shar’iyya fi Is.la-h. al-Ra-‘i wa al-Ra‘iyya (The Sharia-oriented Politics for the Guidance of the Ruler and His Subjects). His work is titled: al-T.uruq al-H . ukmiyya fi al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya (The Ways of Government in the Sharia-oriented Politics). Retrieved from: http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a. conf.157.23.en (accessed 10 October 2011). It was adopted in 25 June 1993; see also Gallagher A. (20083), “The United Nations, Democracy and Human Rights” in: Manual on Human Rights Monitoring: An Introduction for Human Rights Field Officers, Norwegian Center for Human Rights, University of Oslo, Oslo, pp. 1–3. As mere competition of parties/individuals in an electoral system to choose the people’s representatives.

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15 I am aware that similar studies and scholarly debates are present also in large Islamic countries such as Turkey and Indonesia. However, I have chosen to concentrate on Arabic literature, which is hardly translated in Western languages, where terms, concepts and interpretations are elaborated in the original language of the source texts. It will be noted that most of this literature belongs to Egyptian authors. The reason is that their works, influence or socio-political involvements are closely related to the debated issues. In addition, Al-Azhar University and its ‘ulama-’ enjoy great theological authority in both the Arabic and the Islamic world. 16 (1410 H.), King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an, Madinah. 17 (1996), Amana Publications, Maryland. 18 (1417 H.), King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an, Madinah.

2

The Dilemma of a Diachronic Language

This introductory chapter is intended to clarify the main issues directly related and fundamental to the subject of this study. The primordial and central position of the Quran in Islam is inextricably connected to the directness of its revelation to the Prophet as the unaltered literal Word of God revealed in the highest form of Arabic. This created an eternal link between the holy unchangeable text of the Quran and Arabic with its linguistic parameters. The role of the Arabic language, its diachronic development, reaching its status quo with the deep diglossia, which characterizes the modern Arabic-speaking world, are all factors significantly involved in the interpretation (tafsı-r) tradition, in both its classical and modern methods. Therefore, the analysis of the intricate connection between the “linguistic” and the “religious” in the development of the tafsı-r methodology, and the role of human intellect in forming this connection, will constitute a necessary threshold to delve into the Muslim views on pluralism and democracy. In the first section, I will analyze the relationship between religion and language in general and between Islam and Arabic language in particular. This is meant primarily to clarify the variety of linguistic levels with regard to approaching the holy texts. More specifically, the particularities of Arabic in its written and spoken forms, the degree of acquaintance with its classical eloquence vastly present in the Quranic text and in the Prophetic sayings, and the high linguistic level of the classical Islamic literature compared to the contemporary lingual situation are all essential to understand the interpretive process in Islam. As already mentioned in the Introduction, I will focus on Arabic as a tafsı-r-tool and not per se as a language. While attempting to analyze the implications of language in the interpretive tradition in Islam, we need also to explore the boundaries of the role of human Muslim intellect in the tafsı-r process between narration and (re-)interpretation. This will be the subject of the second section. Examples from early Muslim history, where companions of the Prophet reflected upon the Quranic text from the ostensible (z.a-hir) meaning, and other examples where the most eminent among them dared not to interpret the Quran based on personal opinion, show the tension between the Divine Word and the human intellect.

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As we will see in all the following chapters, the discussion of the tensions between the divine text and the human understanding, the linguistic and the technical meaning, the religious and the cultural will be based on our discussion here. The interpretations of the concept of development in relation to tradition, the Muslim conceptualization of the notion of pluralism with all its components related to “otherness,” and the reflection on the idea of a democratic state from an Islamic perspective are all issues dependent on how far texts, terms and words are religiously, linguistically or culturally perceived.

Language and religion What follows is an analytical approach of the general relation between religion and language. This is important to set the theoretical framework of the problem of this chapter of the study which focuses on the role of the Arabic language and its parameters in the Islamic tradition of interpretation. I base my discussion of the relation between religion and language on a hypothesis that a religious text has to do with three phases of linguistic evolution. The first is the “pre-existent,” which is already established and acts as the code in which the Divine Word is revealed, simply because every revelation needs a certain linguistic sphere.1 The second is the “communicative,” which needs the mediation of a conveyor, a Messenger, and here a new spectrum of language emerges and dominates through the holiness of the divine text. The third is the “diachronic,” which involves the semantic changes in language and its adaptability to the historical and cultural parameters, and here a methodological tradition of interpretation emerges with parallel levels of readings and understandings. I begin with an analysis of the relation between religion and language, in general, and then move to the particular relation between Islam and the Arabic language. The Message and the code The relation between religion and language should not be viewed only as one between a God-sent message and a certain code through which this message is humanly revealed and delivered. A God-sent Word, per se, could be identified – again, inevitably in a certain human language – as absolute, perfect, unchanged, most eloquent, eternal and non-circumstantial.2 Language, however, is relative, evolvable, variable, limited and spatiotemporal. In this context, on the one hand, one would be reminded of the ancient Greek philosophical motto of Heraclitus “τα πάντα ρεί,” which indicates that in this worldly life “everything flows,” and how much this is representative in the case of language. On the other hand, all that can be attributed to God should consequently contradict Heraclitus’ principle (i.e., everything that is all-absolute, all-perfect, all-eternal, etc. belongs only to God). If this is the case, men are right to designate religious messages as Holy Books – on the basis that they represent the Divine Logos compared to the

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human. Nevertheless, the Divine and the human converge and interact once this God’s Message is revealed, where the word “revelation” here means nothing but decryption into a certain code/language to humankind. Only then, the human becomes responsible toward God, and is held accountable by Him, because now he/she knows and understands God’s will.3 This holy text, now in human hands, might be subject to linguistic relativism (i.e., what one understands is what God intends, and thence the Divine Message needs messengers/prophets, whose principal role is to convey and explain this Message). To put it clearly, messengers and prophets act as mediators between the Divine Logos and a human language, through two correspondent processes – namely, revelation and proclamation.4 That is why a language is a precondition for what we like to name “religion”: a word which can be etymologically analyzed in the Latin root re-ligo (-lego), as recurrence of a previous process of fastening/connecting – recovering the tie between the Divine and the human as conformity of the human to the Divine Will.5 This repetitive procedure required diachronic revelations, or in the case of the three so-called Abrahamic religions: the Torah (Tawra-h), the Gospel (Injı-l) and the Qur’a-n.6 The diachrony of these revelations was correspondent to the diachrony of the human status, and consequently to the language premises of each phase. Therefore, language, in the worldly temporal sense, anticipates religion, simply because a religious text requires a language to be revealed in. Because language is a pre-established normative human tool which encompasses the holy text, it becomes adapted, redefined and rediscovered through a systematic process of semantic and semiotic changes – for example, an ancient Greek word such as εκκλησία, which in democratic Athens of the fifth century BC meant “People’s Assembly” (εκκλησία του δήμου). This word later underwent a semantic Christianization to mean “Church.” The new meaning still denotes partially something within the semantic sphere of the ancient word – that is, to “congregate” or to “assemble”; but in the new religious context, it becomes a “Believers’ Assembly.” Thus, through religious vocabulary, the human mind faces two levels of semantic knowledge: the linguistic/superficial (human) knowledge, and the quintessential/religious (Divine) knowledge. Through this cognitional process and the relation between its two levels, a religious culture and tradition evolves, develops and divaricates. Religious and irreligious, believers and disbelievers, traditionalists, modernists and reformists rationalize their own argumentative logos on various tensions between those two major levels. As religion employs language, language employs religion, something that becomes evident when we reflect on the fact that we actually learn a new “extra-language” in order to confess and proclaim our religious faith, to pray, to supplicate to God, etc. Furthermore, this extra-language often becomes a sacred language: Hebrew, Sanskrit and Arabic in Judaism, Hinduism and Islam, respectively, are all examples of this. A religious extra-language is actually a new code, different in vocabulary, syntax, semantics and even in grammatical structure. Through this difference,

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men are easily distinguished based on their adherence to religious textuality, the way in which they express themselves, judge things, explain a phenomenon or even answer simple questions like “How are you?” by replying with “thank God!” In this new religious code, words and expressions are substituted. A good example can be given from Islam, where even the greeting of the Arabs before Islam: ‘imta s.aba-h.an/masa-’an (have a nice morning/evening) ought to be substituted by a Muslim one: assala-mu ‘alaykum wa rah.matu ’Lla-hi wa baraka-tuh (peace, God’s mercy and blessings be upon you). A Prophetic tradition (hadith) narrates that the Prophet was greeted by a man called Omayr Ibn Wahb who said “an‘em s.aba-h.an o Mohammad” (good morning Mohammad), then the Prophet replied: “God has substituted it with a better greeting for us, the greeting of the people of paradise, assala-mu … .”7 This religious quid pro human quo has almost put an end to the substituted expression. The prominent Muslim scholar Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 1111) shows how the terms used for the ritual pillars of Islam, like s.ala-, h.ajj, s.awm and zaka-, received their Islamic semantic development while their original linguistic meaning remains. Linguistically s.ala- is supplication/prayer, h.ajj is to orient-direct oneself, s.awm is forbearance and zaka- is increase/outgrowth. Islam broadened the linguistic meaning adding some religious preconditions to each term. Thus, besides the spiritual experience, to the Islamic s.ala-, some kinetic activities such as kneeling and prostrating are performed, and by an Islamic h.ajj the activities of circling around the Ka‘ba and standing on the mount of Arafa, etc. are implied. The same applies in the case of s.awm and zaka-.8 To further advance this point, the Italian adage “traduttore traditore” (translator (is) a traitor) is not only representative in the case of translation (i.e., from one language to another). Frequently, a religious term in its extra-linguistic (textual) form is unintelligible within the realm of the same language, during the process of transference of the religious term to the most reliable human conceptualization. Then, different transferential-hermeneutic attempts are brought forth, and a consensus over one or more religious concepts is missed. After a certain period of time, which in the history of religions and languages is measured by centuries, language shifts become more and more visible, effective and important. The impact of these linguistic changes can be clearly identified in the popular religious practices, which take the present linguistic status as a measure of conceptualizing the historically remote extralinguistic religious texts. This last case forms what is known as “religious culture” or “popular religion,” which grounds somewhat on the sophistic principle “man is the measure of everything.”9 Concepts such as religious companionship, the community of believers and religious brotherhood become more and more theoretical. This is because, essentially, each religious group, sect or heresy reinvents its own religious version, a different reading, which bases upon the aforementioned two cognitional levels: the superficial/ linguistic and the quintessential/religious. At the same time, it adds a third level, the contextual level, a sort of vertical reading, where man does not only read religious texts, but rather tries to reconstruct them.

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In fact, people here act, again unintentionally, as interpreters; but the question is whether they interpret the same holy text or not. What they do substantially interpret here is a new “virtual” text, adapted to, among other factors, the linguistic particularities of the new era under the unease they face with the extra-language of the classical remote text. In the same context, although in different vocabulary, E. Gellner had remarkably identified this “Low Islamic culture” in Muslim societies, as compared to another “High Islamic culture,” where the latter is representing nothing but “scriptural” Islam with its source texts.10 Each aspect of the different popular religious attitudes is another feature of the unintentional tendency to control religion, to go beyond the high eloquence of the holy text and to act as sporadic communities of believers instead of one body of readers. On a more substantial level, language is a crucial and key tool to explore a religion, a religious tradition or, more broadly, the world of ideas within a religion. The remoteness of a holy text, in both its extra-linguistic and spatiotemporal context, together with the diachrony and development of the language which encompassed this text comprise the essential means to understand the different aspects of this religion. Islam and the Arabic language With regards to Islam and the Arabic language, the aforementioned aspects can be recognized, in general terms, in this relationship, and the following discussion will further clarify the particularities of this specific case. Firstly, if we try to trace the history of the linguistics of Arabic, we find that the theoretical knowledge about the Arabic language dates back to the text of the Quran, which is the Word of God (kala-m Allah), but also considered to be the oldest complete and most perfect text in Arabic. Before the Quran our knowledge about Arabic is, at best, fragmentary and poor. The Quran, revealed in the same tongue of the tribe of the Prophet, precisely homogenized the pre-Islamic dialects/vernaculars and granted accreditation to the most eloquent fos.h.a dialect of the Arabian peninsula: the dialect of Quraish. Not only that: for the first time speaking the Arabic language became a reason for identifying a speaker as an Arab. A Prophetic tradition narrates that the Prophet said: “Arabic for any of you is not a father nor a mother, but a tongue. He who speaks Arabic is an Arab.” The Prophet here was reacting on Qays Ibn Matatiyya, who characterized three companions – namely, Suhayb the Greek, Salman the Persian and Bilal the Abyssinian – as non-Arabs.11 By this declaration, the Arabic language is now ethno-decentralized, or rather Islamized, once and forever. In fact, the bond between Islam and the Arabic language was enhanced through the Quran. A myriad of Islamic sciences in different fields emerged from the study of the Quran, especially in fields related to the Arabic linguistics and literature. The words of Fazlur Rahman are very representative here to get an idea about the value of the Quran in Arab-Islamic civilization and culture:12

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Indeed, it is claimed by Muslim scholars with a good deal of justice that all the sciences in Islam which are not absolutely secular owe their origin to the Qur’a-n. The Qur’a-n has also exerted an incalculable influence on the growth of Arabic literature and literary style, and continues to exert it up to this day. The doctrine of the ‘inimitability’ [i‘jaz]13 of the Qur’a-n, not only in content but even in literary form, is common to almost all Muslim schools, and has attained a cardinal status and found expression in various treatises specially devoted to this topic. Muslim orthodoxy had strenuously resisted any attempt to produce a translation of the Book in any language without the Arabic text. Moreover, J. Penrice seems to be much more inspired about the miraculous nature of the language of the Quran as a standard of the Arabic language and its literature: That a competent knowledge of the K . or-ân [sic] is indispensable as an introduction to the study of Arabic literature will be admitted by all who have advanced beyond the rudiments of the language. From the purity of its style and elegance of its diction it has come to be considered as the standard of Arabic even by those who have no belief in its pretensions to a divine origin [ … ] It is not to be expected that all the transcendent excellencies and miraculous beauties discovered in the K . or-ân by its commentators and others should immediately unveil themselves to our cold and unsympathizing gaze; beauties they are, many and great; ideas highly poetical are clothed in rich and appropriate language, which not unfrequently rises to a sublimity far beyond the reach of any translation.14 Arabic linguistics has totally originated from the Quran and for the sake of the Quran. Even the so-called pre-Islamic poetry is claimed to have been compiled during the first two centuries of the Islamic chronology.15 The first reliable book of Arabic grammar, by Sibawwayh (d. 797), appeared by the end of the second century of Hijra. Before the appearance of Islam and the need for preservation of the Quranic text, the Sunnah and the whole Islamic memorabilia, Arabic tradition could be characterized as mainly oral. The writing tradition in Arabic began with the Quran, a revelation which began by an imperative: Read in the name of your Lord, who created. Created man out of a mere leech, read and your Lord is the most Bountiful, He who taught by the Pen, taught man that which he knew not. (Al-‘Alaq, 96:1–5)16 This written tradition was inspired to serve primarily the religious challenges of the new era, the era of pen and book.

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Interestingly, however, and despite the failings and shortcomings of the preIslamic Arabs to document their oral tradition, it is through the Islamic written recovery of this oral tradition that we can appreciate the linguistic supremacy of the Arabs before Islam. It may not be exaggerated to claim that the ancient Arabs exalted and celebrated their language to the utmost, as a cultural apparatus of creativity and a genuine source of uniqueness. There are many narratives related to this fact;17 but our main concern here is to show how the Quran came to challenge the geniality of this language. In many Quranic verses, this fact is clearly underlined.18 For the first generation of Muslims – namely, the Prophet’s companions (s.ah.a-ba) – the text of the Quran had been, in general, easily accessible as its language addressed the linguistic status of their era. For their followers/ disciples (ta-bi‘u-n) and, to some extent, the followers of the followers (ta-bi‘ual-ta-bi‘ı-n), it was somehow also easily accessible. On the one hand, linguistically it was not too remote for them, and on the other hand, the exegetic knowledge of the companions was still among hands. But still, the extralanguage of the Quran could challenge the linguistic shrewdness of the first Muslim generations. Ibn Khaldoun (d. 1406) seems to be generalizing when he says in his Prolegomena: The Quran was revealed in the language of the Arabs, on their rhetoric styles, so they could all understand it and know its meanings both in vocabulary and in syntax.19 Many are the narrations where the Prophet gives an exegesis of a verse or word of the Quran which was not clear enough for the companions or had an allegorical meaning which was out of their grasp. One of the characteristic cases of literal interpretation is that of the s.ah.a-bı- Adiy Ibn Hatim, who told the Prophet that he used to have two colored threads, one white and another black, under his pillow, and whenever he can distinguish by eye the one from the other he begins the fast of the day of Ramadan, as he so comprehended the following part of the Quranic verse: And eat and drink until the white thread appears to you distinct from the black thread. (Al-Baqara, 2:187) The Prophet smiled and explained to him that the intended meaning is the light of dawn and the darkness of night.20 Ibn Abbas, the cousin and companion of the Prophet, acknowledged as the most knowledgeable of the interpretation of the Quran in Islamic tradition, is reported to have said: I didn’t know the meaning of ‘the fa-t.ir of Heavens and Earth’ until I heard a Bedouin woman saying: I fat.artuh, that is began it (originated, created it from nothing).21

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The word belonged to a logha,22 dialect or idiom, of the Arabs, so for Ibn Abbas it was a gharı-b (unusual) word.23 He made use mostly of the pre-Islamic poetry to justify his exegesis of many Quranic verses as an indication and testimony to the authenticity of his interpretation, because the Arab poets were familiar with the same meaning. Other narrations draw our attention to another orthographic particularity of Arabic at the early Islamic period, which resulted in a crucial development in the writing system of Arabic. The narration relates to the following part of verse 3 from Sura 9 (Al-Tawba): [ … ] that Allah and His Messenger repudiate the Pagans. One of the nomads heard a man reading it by alienating the short vowel o (of the nominative case of the noun rasu-loho ‫ َﺭ ُﺳﻮﻟُ ُﻪ‬into i – i.e., rasu-lihi ‫) َﺭ ُﺳﻮﻟِﻪ‬. The result is a serious distortion of the meaning as follows: “[ … ] that Allah repudiates the Pagans and His Messenger!” According to Al-Qurtubi in his tafsı-r, the nomad man actually reacted by saying: “if Allah repudiates His Messenger, I will do so too” in the presence of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, the second Caliph (634–644), who rebuffed the man and ordered that a reader of the Quran should be of a good knowledge of Arabic. At that time, the short vowel symbols system was not yet developed in writing the Quran. Other narrations state that, as a result of this misreading, Abu Al-Aswad Al-Du’ali developed this system to help any reader of the text of the Quran to recognize the grammatical cases.24 Thus, the Arabic language should be seen as part of the dı-n (religion) of Islam, and learning classical Arabic is not merely an educational goal, but also the most essential means for an access to the understanding and deep knowledge of Islamic sources. Almost all the classical scholars and intelligentsia of Muslim history recognized the importance of Arabic as part of Islam. Omar Ibn Al-Khattab is narrated to have said “learn Arabic, for it is part of your religion … .”25 Ibn Al-Jawzi writes that “[Arabic] Grammar and language are part of Islamic sciences, through them the meaning of the holy Quran is known, I swear this is something undeniable.”26 Ibn Jinni sees the weak knowledge of Arabic as the major reason for the deviation of many Muslim sects from the true path of the Islamic Sharia.27 Ibn Taymiya makes the knowledge of Arabic language, of course in the classical level, a fard., an obligatory deed. He says: The Arabic language itself is part of the religion; its knowledge is a religious obligatory must [fard. wa-jib], because the understanding of the Quran and the Sunnah is fard., and this is not possible without the knowledge of Arabic; and what is a sine qua non to perform a must is also a must.28 These were examples of the particularities and importance of Arabic within the sphere of its Quranic level during the early years of Islam. When Islam gradually and strenuously expanded, and many non-Arabs embraced it as

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their new faith, the dangers of misreading, misunderstanding or misinterpreting the Arabic text of the Quran began to stress heavily. Ibn Khaldoun dedicated a separate chapter of his Prolegomena to the peripheral dialects in the Muslim world of his time (lugha-t ahl al-ams.a-r)29 and the importance of Arabic to Islam. He touches on the mixing of the pure Arabic language with ‘ajam (non-Arabic-speaking) tongues as a result of the foreign invasions. Al-Zarkashi, a leading figure in the field of Quranic sciences, states: Know that it is not possible for him who is ignorant of the facts of the language and its subjects to interpret anything of God’s words. It is not sufficient for him to know few of them, because the word might be of combined meaning and he knows only the one meaning while the other meaning is the one intended.30 The need to develop some Quranic Sciences, ‘ulu-m Al-Qur’a-n, has vigorously arisen, and the first tafsı-r-schools were established in Mecca, Medina and Iraq, already during the first century of the Hijra. It did not take long until the compilation and authorship of separate tafsı-r-books appeared after a short period when they were primarily included in the hadith-books under a “chapter on interpretation” (kita-b al-tafsı-r). Presumably, all the aforementioned aspects justify an adage that Arabic language and its literature could be classified into Poetry, Prose and Quran. The prompt emergence of a tafsı-r methodology in Islam was meant to safeguard the invariable Divine Word from the hyperbolic variability of human language. Nevertheless, the diachrony of the Arabic language remained the most significant factor in the human interaction with the Quranic text.

Reading sources between narration and re-interpretation In this section, I discuss the modalities of the Islamic tafsı-r methodology in relation to the diachrony of the Arabic language and the parameter of human intellect in interaction with the texts. The authority of the classical tafsı-r methodology is based on the transmission of the interpretive traditions from the period of the revelation and the nearby generations. The credibility of such a methodology is not only related to the undisputable authority of the Sunnah and the pious traditional tendency to favor the early generations of faith, but also to a genuine mastery of the linguistic and socio-cultural context of the revelation. On another level, human reasoning and personal interpretations challenged the traditional methods of tafsı-r already during the early development of Islamic intellectualism. The tendency to control the authority of human intellect in the interpretation of the Divine Word resulted in the standardization of the methods of tafsı-r as the most fundamental Islamic science. However, this standardization itself involved a significant room for human intellect, but within the boundaries of linguistic and canonic norms. Discussing this issue, I will firstly shed light on the diachronic adaptability of the Arabic language and its

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relation to the tafsı-r tradition. Secondly, I will investigate the impact of the linguistic and cultural parameters upon the interpretation process throughout the development of the Islamic tradition. Finally, I will examine the boundaries of Islamic textualism and the role of Muslim intellect and ijtiha-d in forming the mutable and the immutable in the Muslim worldview. Tafsı-r tradition and language adaptability The Arabic word tafsı-r derives etymologically from the stem fasara (i.e., to “uncover, reveal”). In the Islamic technical meaning, particularly related to words and verses of the Quran, it denotes clarifying, expounding and explaining what is ambiguous or unclear.31 A sine qua non condition is the knowledge of the extra-language of the Quran and the classical Arabic of the period of the revelation, as Mujahid, a pupil of Ibn Abbas, puts it: It is not permissible for anyone who believes in God and the Hereafter to speak in the Book of Allah unless he has got deep knowledge of the languages [idioms, dialects] of the Arabs.32 A very rigorous, intricate and interdisciplinary science of tafsı-r-principles (us.u-l al-tafsı-r) was developed. For this reason, there is almost a consensus in Muslim scholarship upon the scale of credibility in the tafsı-r methodology based on traditional narrations (riwa-ya/athar). The scale shows that the exegesis of the Quran can be achieved as follows: (a) By the Quran: meaning that many verses/words which may seem ambiguous or difficult to be understood in the Quran can be simply clarified, explained and interpreted by other verses/words again in the Quran, because the latter is more direct, clear or detailed. (b) By the Sunnah: although the narrated exegetic hadiths of the Prophet are few, still nobody else could have a deeper and more sententious understanding of the Quran than the Messenger, who was its first receptor and teacher. (c) By the Companions (s.ah.a-ba): who had the direct contact with the Prophet, and Ibn Abbas was the most reliable source among them.33 (d) By the Followers (ta-bi‘u-n): who inherited this knowledge from the s.ah.a-ba.34 Both the s.ah.a-ba and the ta-bi‘u-n, here act as transmitters of the “first reception” or narrated interpretation of the Quranic text to the following generations. Consequently, every tafsı-r approach based on those traditional/transmissional sources is known as tafsı-r by narration (riwa-ya) or by tradition (athar/ma’thu-r), and is considered most reliable, authentic and trustful. The role of a compiler of such a tafsı-r-book is mainly to reproduce the narrative tradition of these interpretive sources. However, he, as a mufassir (exegete), still plays an

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important role, by his own reasoning (ijtiha-d), in the argumented preference of the one narration to the other. Here, we should also be reminded that language is not the only factor responsible for an authentic or inauthentic interpretation. Even those who bring forth a tafsı-r based on personal opinion can somehow, albeit paraphrastically and metaphorically in most cases, justify their allegations in linguistic terms. In fact, the authority of classical interpretations in Islam has more credibility when relying on a number of methodological techniques which approach the Quranic text more within its divine nature and less within a relative intellectual law. The most important criterion of tafsı-r in this school is to give the chance for the holy text to speak for and interpret itself.35 This involves the basic rule of asba-b al-nuzu-l or the “occasions/reasons of revelation,” which clarifies the temporal and topical contexts of the revelation. This process is also connected to the specificity (khus.u-s.) of the occasion/reason or its generality (‘umu-m) – that is, the limitation of the text to a certain occasion, at a certain time, within a certain context, or its openness to other occasions, at different times and within variant contexts. Classical scholars established a relevant rule: “the consideration is to be given to the generality of the word, not to the specificity of the reason.” Similarly, the limited (muqayyad) and the unlimited (mut.laq), the general (‘aa-m) and the specific (kha-s.), the totalized (mujmal) and the detailed (mubayyan), the abrogating (na-sikh) and the abrogated (mansu-kh), the explicit/ clear (muh.kam) and the implicit/unclear (mutasha-bih) are crucial words in the terminology of the tafsı-r tradition, and consequently in the jurisprudential sciences. All these terms are directly connected to the deep knowledge of language and the semantics of Arabic words, which enable the mufassir or the jurist to deduce the proper interpretation or legislative rule. As time passed, a new approach of tafsı-r appeared and was mainly meant to deviate from the traditional school/methodology which grounded on the narrative tradition received from the predecessors. The variation in different aspects of the Muslim society was becoming more and more a major factor. Differences on the socio-political level and also in beliefs and cultural backgrounds began to gain more ground, and the normative value of the individual Muslim found a fertile soil, the soil of Diversity. The diversity in Islam, which characterized positively the first classical period, is now a diversity about Islam; the proper interpretation of some issues related to the tenets of faith is renegotiated.36 The diachronic variation of Arabic, our main interest here, was one of the core factors which influenced the tafsı-r tradition in Islam. Whenever a tafsı-r grounds mainly on the author’s personal opinion, known as tafsı-r bi al-ra’y or dira-ya (human opinion/reasoning) it is seen as less trustful and sometimes baseless, because it trespasses the limitations of the holy text of the Quran, and loads it with meanings and hermeneutical connotations which the first receivers of the text did not recognize or narrate. This trend can be traced most distinctly in the literature of the Mu‘tazila, who marked the history of Islamic thought with a serious hermeneutic and philosophical

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movement. Differentiating themselves mainly with regard to interpretive questions, they based their tafsı-r of many Quranic verses upon a pre-established idea. Ibn Taymiya, in a chapter on tafsı-r,37 disproves their interpretations on linguistic grounds, because they first establish the idea and then load it on the Quranic meaning (h.aml al-alfa-z. ‘ala al-ma‘a-nı-). Examining the historical-cultural period that witnessed the appearance of such revolutionary movements, we can observe an important curve point in the development of Arabic-Islamic thought, and also of the Arabic language. By the end of the Umayyad period (661–750), the conquest of a new cultural world, especially in the Mesopotamian and the Hellenized Christian areas, has largely subjected the traditional foundations of Islamic religiosity to stormy philosophical speculations. These areas were, for centuries before Islam, a battleground of different civilizations, cults and religions from many directions. In fact, the new cultural environment offered a new linguistic context, which was developed to meet the challenges of the new philosophical questions. A new trend of “breaking off” (i‘tiza-l) from the traditional narrations of the first generations, a call for more “rationalism” in the relationship between the Divine and the human, and more openness to allegorical interpretations is now present. The rise of the new science of Kala-m, or dialectical scholastic theology – strongly connected to language by its very name – is added to the interpretive schools.38 Consequently, the Arabic language is called again to adopt and develop the proper vocabulary and terminology for the sake of the new religious-philosophical debates. Commenting authoritatively on the Quran by giving one’s own opinion or interpretation without having the proper knowledge is one of the severest wrongdoings in Islam. The Prophet is narrated to have said: “He, who speaks on the Quran by his own personal opinion, let him occupy his place in hell.”39 Ibn Taymiya comments saying that anyone who interprets the Quran by personal opinion (ra’y) actually has involved himself in a field outside his scope of knowledge, and even if he reaches the right meaning, he is still committing a grave act, because he did not reach it through the right process.40 The word ra’y could mean a lot, but in respect to a religious text, the mufassir or interpreter in such a case adopts a certain reading of the Quran, a more hermeneutic if not structural one, either by applying modern conceptions or meanings to the linguistically remote text, or by alienating the traditionally narrated-intended meaning. This approach is, more or less, a sort of “what I understand is what God intends,” and the unchanged Word of God becomes an open-ended text. But is this the last word to be said regarding the tafsı-r by ra’y or dira-ya? To explore the problematic of such a question we need to consult another opinion (ra’y) of one of the greatest Usulists. Our example is Abu Ish.aq Al-Shatibi (d. 1388), a major figure in the science of maqa-s.id al-sharı-‘a (the objectives of the Divine Legislation), a scholar who comes from Granada, at that time, a new geographical, social and cultural context where Islam would flourish for nearly eight centuries. He says:

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy Dispraising the practice of ra’y in the Quran is narrated, but the demand to practice it is also narrated. [ … ] We can say that ra’y is of two kinds: the first occurs in accordance with Arabic, the Book and the Sunnah. Such [ra’y] cannot be ignored by anyone who is knowledgeable of these things, for some reasons: firstly, it is necessary to practice reasoning in the Quran, whether to clarify a meaning, deduce a rule, interpret a word or understand an indication. These things were not entirely reported by the earlier generations. Suspending it [exegesis] at that point would result in the suspension of all or most rulings and this is impossible. That is why the practice of proper reasoning [in the Quran] is inevitable. Secondly, if it was so, the Prophet (pbuh) should have clarified all this exclusively [tawqı-f], so that no one would have an opinion or a view, and it is known that he (pbuh) did not do this, denoting that it was not assigned to him to act in such a way. He rather explained what cannot be known without him, and left many issues open to interpretation so that they can be interpreted through reasoning by the people of ijtiha-d. Thus, he [the Prophet] did not limit the interpretation of the Quran as a whole to tawqı-f [exclusively to God or His Messenger]. The third reason is that the s.ah.a-ba would have been much more aware of this precaution than others, but it is known that they interpreted the Quran according to their understanding. The interpretation of its meanings reached us through them. Exclusiveness contradicts this. Therefore, claiming it in general and prohibition of reasoning is not right. In the fourth place, this hypothesis is also impossible because the Quran is approached from two perspectives: from the legislative issues, where exclusiveness could be acceptable and ra’y is to be abandoned, argumentatively; and from the issues of Arabic, where exclusiveness is not possible. [ … ] Concerning the ra’y which occurs in discordance with Arabic or the legislative evidences, it is the dispraised one without any discussion, [ … ] because it is an attribution to God’s Word without a testimony, considered as lying about Almighty God.41

The words of Al-Shatibi would be a reference point on the role of ra’y and the parameter of language in the interpretation of the Quran. The role of human reasoning and intellect in the interpretation of the Quran is praised whenever it does not trespass the limits of the semantic sphere of Arabic or disagree with the legislative norms. However, the diachronic development of Arabic and its semantic shifts, which occur away from the principles of interpretation (us.u-l al-tafsı-r), adds more dimensions to the relation between the holy text and the human reader. The boundaries between “interpreting” and “understanding” in this relation become marked according to another kind of us.u-l: the linguo-cultural norms. The scriptural and the linguo-cultural Another tafsı-r is involved in this last category of ra’y, the one which belongs to the popular version of religion, that which usually controls the public

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domain, or in Gellner’s terminology,42 the Low culture. To understand this process in a better context, we have to examine it from a socio-linguistic perspective. In accordance to the anthropological theory of Gellner about High and Low islams, C. Ferguson was the first to introduce to the academic circles the neologism of Arabic diglossia, and to name two variations of the same language: also a High (fus.h.a: formal language) and a Low (‘a-mmiyya: informal) Arabic. He defines diglossia as: A relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation.43 This definition is specifically representative in the case of Arabic: In all the defining languages the speakers regard H as superior to L in a number of respects. Sometimes the feeling is so strong that H[igh] alone is regarded as real an L[ow] is reported ‘not to exist’. Speakers of Arabic, for example, may say (in L) that so-and-so doesn’t know Arabic. This normally means he doesn’t know H, although he may be a fluent, effective speaker of L.44 If we project these definitions on the modern Arab world, the “High” language is used for writing, formal occasions, religious prayers, sermons, political speeches, literature, etc. The “Low” is the medium of oral communication.45 But there is always a higher language than the H Arabic in the theory of Ferguson, the one we encounter in the classical dicta of Islamic sources. Thus, in fact, we have three levels of Arabic: 1 the E (-xtra) language of the Quran or the “Quranic Arabic”, which would include the “Classical Arabic”; 2 the H, which can be identified as the MSA (Modern Standard Arabic); and 3 the L, the spoken or the “Colloquial Arabic”. If we are to compare this classification to the aforementioned tafsı-r scale, the pyramidal scheme (overleaf) can be representative. Many factors have contributed to the reduction of the role/value of classical Quranic Arabic (E) and even MSA in modern societies: missionary schools, colonialism, the new higher-paying labor markets that demand knowledge of European languages and the mediocre state of public education.46 To give an example in the field of education from the late decades, the recession of the

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Quran by Quran By the Prophet (p. b. u. h.)

E language

E&H language

By the Companions

By the followers and their Followers

H&L language

By personal opinion

In popular religion

L Language

Figure 2.1 Tafsir and Arabic

kutta-b system,47 which was widespread in North African countries, was one of the crucial factors. The kutta-b is a traditional mini Quran school, where usually an aged sheikh teaches a number of pupils, often in the preschool phase, the reading, the memorization and the recitation of the Quran. It existed as an important support to the classical language in many Muslim societies. French colonial authorities, on the one hand, attempted to eradicate this system in North Africa, while the British authorities, on the other, converted them to quasi-state schools with nonreligious curricula. There is no doubt that colonialism has undermined the propagation of Classical Arabic in a way that even the very posing of the problem of the “difficulty” of Classical Arabic is a consequence of colonial rule.48 The kutta-b system was also very much useful in challenging illiteracy among low social groups. Many people who belong to the poor classes in Muslim societies, who had no chance to complete basic levels of state education, were familiar with Classical Arabic thanks to early attendance in a kutta-b. All of these elements have formulated different conditions regarding the popular religious mass of many Muslim societies, which comprises the majority compared to the elite highly educated group. When we observe the incapability that characterizes most of the highly educated Muslims, with the exception of those specialized in Islamic studies, to deal not only with many Quranic verses, but also with many classical Islamic works, we can imagine the case of the mass majority of the low-educated or illiterate Arab Muslims.49 Although the H Arabic owes some of its preservation among the mass illiterate speakers of Arabic in the Arab world mainly to the religious discourse within the mosques – as it is explicitly the case in the Friday khut.ba – the E religious language of the Quran and the Classical Islamic literature remains, de facto, a privilege of the rank of the ‘ulama-’ and scholars of Islamic studies. During the last decades, thanks to the widespread diffusion of Internet and satellite digital audiovisual media, a new phenomenon appeared on the scene

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of Muslim da‘wa (preaching/proselytizing). A large number of fully Islamicoriented Arabic satellite-channels have appeared and became very popular, especially among Muslim youth. The new means contests the classical role of lessons in the Mosque, with a variety of eminent (but not only) scholars, interesting collective debates and, sometimes, free from governmental control. The language here varies from L to H to E Arabic, as the usage of code switching is very frequent and familiar. The outcome is very tangible in many Muslim societies both inside and outside the Arab world, and the most popular “new ‘ulama-’” are those mostly displayed on Islamic channels. In linguistic terms, the contribution of these channels to reduce the gap between the three lingual levels of Arabic is important and practically very effective. Through many of the presented items, they function as a medium between scriptural and popular religion. The popular form of religion is too influential in the Islamic interpretive tradition. Although it is less interested in the Quranic sciences, the Prophetic tradition and the enormous classical Islamic literature, it is more active and distinguishable with regard to an interpretation of Islam as a whole. The folk reconstruction of a religion is mainly concerned with borrowing and embodying elements which fit to its daily cultural details. Through this process, the culture, unintentionally, popularizes religion in a shortened version or a summarized interpretation, adopting only those aspects of religion which can be admitted within its realm, free of the complexities of the scriptural tradition with its extra-linguistic requirements. Now, if we place the anthropological theory of Gellner, about High and Low islams, side by side with the Arabic linguistic variations E, H and L, the outcome will be a High Islamic culture which has access to E and H, and a Low Islamic culture which can only have access to L. While in its Fos.h.a form (officialese, puristic), the Arabic language presents two levels, E and H (MSA), the ‘Ammiyya (colloquial, vernacular), or L Arabic, presents much more regional variations, or “dialect continua.” Almost each Arab region/ country has a characteristic dialect. Furthermore, within each country, there may be many local vernaculars. This is the case inside the Arabic-speaking world, with a population of almost 300 million of native speakers. The rest of the Muslim world, of which the Arab countries comprise roughly 20 percent, shapes a huge mosaic of languages and cultures, with more than 1 billion people who know Arabic varyingly as a foreign language. Figure 2.3 overleaf may give an idea about the linguistic diversity of the Muslim world. The authority of language in the different aspects of Islam, as a religion and a way of life, can provide us with more explanation of the diversities within the Muslim world. Each linguistic level corresponds to a certain cognitional category, and determines a tendency to prefer one reading, understanding and interpretation to another. Even when the text is silent about an issue, and human reasoning has permission to intervene and exert its best effort to find analogies to the text or conduct an in-depth investigation

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy E Arabic

High Islamic culture

H Arabic Low Islamic culture

L Arabic

Regional/national dialects

Local ver

Figure 2.2 Islamic culture and Arabic

Arabl * Arablc * Amharic & ngrlnya * Berber

Arabl

Arabl

Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl

ArablArabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl

ArablArabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl Arabl

Arabl Arabl ArablArabl Arabl ArablArabl Arabl Arabl

Figure 2.3

of the whole tradition to extract rules, language is, again and again, the major tool and measure in every process. The tradition of tafsı-r, and its rigorous methodology, which was earlier developed in the field of Quranic sciences, left less room for the role of personal understanding in the interpretation of the text of the Quran. However, the diachronic variations of the Arabic language, which resulted in the restriction of the privilege of this High tafsı-r-knowledge to a certain category, provided and still provide Muslim culture with more and more hermeneutic readings, of even the most established interpretations. Muslim intellect and Islamic textualism Combining all the aforementioned variations to tafsı-r in the Muslim public domain today, how far is it legitimate to wonder about the validity of the very name “Islamic world”50 and who is representing Islam in our present world? Consequently, should this result in a great dilemma in dealing with Muslims, understanding clearly the Quranic and Prophetic texts, and evaluating both apologetic and polemic approaches to Islam, simply because the “elusiveness” of the whole issue is unchallengeable? In fact, the problem with such claims is not the output but the input, to use mathematical terminology. In other words, whenever the access to Islam is any of the variables of the historical Islam, such as socio-political, economic, cultural and ethnic aspects, the outcome is

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linked to this variable and remains always comparable to other cases within this Islamic history. This includes the variety of interpretations, fatwas, fiqh schools and Quranic exegesis works throughout the long history of Islam. Each of these variants should be approached in a certain context. Nonetheless, concerning Islamic classical epistemology, Muslim scholars distinguished two kinds of diversity: variety (tanawo‘) and contradiction (tada-d). In the field of classical tafsı-r methodology, the school of narration (riwa-ya), the first kind (tanawo‘) is the dominant character among the early mufassiru-n. They usually give an “exegesis” of the same meaning by different expressions/interpretations. Ibn Taymiya gives the example of the 99 Attributes of God, which all denote to Allah. So they are variant Attributes (e.g., the Almighty, the Merciful, the Compassionate) to the One God, and praying to God by one of these Attributes does not contradict praying to Him by another.51 The various jurisprudential schools should be approached in this framework of a diversity of tanawo‘. Even the known sources of Islamic Sharia, ranked in referential order – Quran, Sunnah, ijma-‘ (consensus) and qiya-s/ijtiha-d (analogy/ human reasoning and assiduity) – do not, in fact, suggest different or independent methods to deduce Islamic rulings, as the Quran is the norm and reference to the rest and none of them may ever contradict the Quranic text.52 In this context, we can say that the Quran remains the primary source for Islamic law and the highest authoritative criterion (furqa-n) between any contradictive or different notions. Its text and, in second order, the texts of the authentic Sunnah comprise the infinite source,53 while the way in which these texts are approached is finite. The very term of tafsı-r, in the definition of some us.u-l scholars, denotes technically “a science in which the holy Quran is examined, with regard to its indication to the intended meaning of God’s Word, within the boundaries of the human capacity.”54 Because human capacity is a “variant” normative standardization, the variety of tafa-sı-r is a natural product. This is the reason why we usually encounter the “standard” words w’ Allahu a’lam (and Allah knows best), as an epilogue of the Muslim interpretive discourse. To better understand the role of human intellect and reasoning in this issue we should recall the semantics of the Arabic word fiqh. Linguistically, the word denotes knowledge gained by deep understanding. Terminologically, it concerns reaching practical Islamic rules based on detailed evidences, where evidences here are mainly to be found in the Quran and the Sunnah.55 This is another reason that a faqı-h (jurist) is a precondition to a mujtahid (assiduous, practitioner of ijtiha-d), an eminent scholar who strives, always equipped with deep understanding of the sources, to extract rules/evidences from the immutable texts to the mutable spatiotemporal reality.56 Thus, one should be careful about the way this classification of the sources of Islamic law is approached as separate or independent from each other. To put it clearly, Sharia is invariable in its textuality, while fiqh is variable in its intellectuality. While the invariability of the Sharia grounds on the immutability of both the Quran and the Sunnah, the variability of fiqh grounds on the mutability of human reasoning or ijtiha-d.

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It is necessary here to present some definitions of the meaning and preconditions of ijtiha-d and, consequently, of the mujtahid.57 Ijtiha-d means, linguistically, to spend the utmost effort and do one’s best in order to achieve something that cannot be achieved unless by exertion and tenaciousness. So, it is only to be used for what needs great effort and struggle.58 Technically, according to the usulists of fiqh, it denotes that a faqı-h exerts his utmost effort in seeking the rules of Sharia by detailed testimonies, and to do his best until he feels the inability to do more.59 In the field of tafsı-r, Al-Dhahabi classifies ijtiha-d as the third source of tafsı-r among the s.ah.a-ba, after the Quran itself and the exegesis given by the Prophet.60 Whenever they could neither find an exegesis in the Quran itself, nor take it from the Prophet, they used their human conscientiousness to understand the meaning only where it was needed. As regards to what is understandable by the knowledge of Arabic, there was no need to put it into more investigation, or better sophistication. The first tool of the s.ah.a-ba was the perfect knowledge of Arabic and its peculiarities.61 Al-Shatibi distinguishes two sorts of ijtiha-d: one is everlasting and continues until the end of time as long as religious commitment is still valid for humankind, while the other is temporary and can come to an end in this worldly life.62 The author gives examples to the first sort, in which we are interested here. For example, in familial cases concerning divorce and reconciliation, the Quranic text in Sura 65, Al-T.ala-q, verse 2, cites that the testimony of two upright (dhawaı‘adl) witnesses should be coupled with any of the procedures in regard.63 The presence of the two upright witnesses here is a clear legislative rule (h.okm) cited by a clear text as a principle (as.l); but, at the same time, there is a sub-issue (far‘) which is represented in the identification of the concept of uprightness (‘ada-la). In other words, men do understand the “totality” (kolliyya) of the ruling but they lack the secondary “detail” concerning the prerequisites and criteria for identifying upright people in different periods of time and different societies. Here, ijtiha-d does not touch the totality or the principle, but investigates the details necessary to implement it. The most important role of the mujtahidı-n in such cases is to reach the utmost human capacity to deduce the details of the rules of Islamic Sharia, where the sources in the Quran and the Sunnah suggest or leave secondary details to human endeavor. Sometimes, former generations of Muslim jurists have already reached the best possible conditions of ijtiha-d on a certain matter, especially when the issue does not deal with humans, as for example the ruling of killing animals during the period of pilgrimage, where the kind of animal required for atonement is not as problematic of a question as that of the uprightness of a witness.64 Here, later generations of mujtahidı-n may choose to become muqallidu-n (imitators, traditionalists) when they judge that their predecessors have already done their best on a matter so that it became one of diachronic consensus (ijma-‘). However, even this kind of taqlı-d (imitation/ traditionalism) should be seen as grounding somehow on ijtiha-d, simply because the very human choice to “prefer” imitation of a traditional interpretation is in itself a sort of ijtiha-d, not to mention the preference of the opinion of one traditional

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school to the other, and justifying it sometimes by a testimony from the Quran and the Sunnah. Taqlı-d itself can be rated referentially in accordance with the authority of the source/reference. The Quranic text is a divine revelation which must be made the sole director of human life and the source of law,65 because its source is the All-knowing God. The Sunnah refers to the personal sayings, actions, verbal and tacit confirmations, and physical and moral characteristics of the Prophet. At the same time, when his wife Aisha was asked about his character she said briefly that it was the Quran,66 a notion to the faithful commitment of the Prophet to the rules of the Quran, as he was, in the words of Fazlur Rahman, its “most authoritative factual exponent.”67 According to the Quran itself, Muslims are ordered to emulate the Prophet and take him seriously to be their good pattern: You have indeed in the Messenger of Allah a beautiful pattern (of conduct) for any one whose hope is in Allah and the Final Day, and who engages much in the praise of Allah. (Al-Ah.za-b, 33:21) Another important philosophical debate was developed as regards to the boundaries of human reflection on religious revelation. The authority of human intellect (‘aql) with regard to the imparted/revealed words of God and His messenger (naql) is one of the most discussed issues among classical scholars of us.u-l and Muslim philosophers. Al-Shatibi concludes the rule that ‘aql (intellect) does not contradict the legislative evidences (adilla shar‘iyya) originated by naql (text/revelation) because they are originally established to be received by human intellects. However, the final dictum is given to naql, which should be followed and human intellect to be its follower, as in the case of qiya-s/ijtiha-d where human reasoning bases on the revealed texts to deduce jurisprudential rulings.68 The jurist Ibn Abi Al-‘Izz Al-Hanafi (d. 1390) also says that if ‘aql and naql contradict, naql should be given priority.69 This does not mean that the role of human intellect is nihilistic in front of the sources of Islam. Actually, the usulists were still under the influence of mu‘tazilism and the superior role given to human intellect over the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah in their school of thought. But Ibn Rushd clarifies the situation simply by giving a logical explanation of the importance given by the revelation itself to the deductive usage of human intellect and wisdom (h.ikma).70 He argues that if ‘aql is a tool to know the Creator through contemplation of His creation, no contradiction should be expected between it and what is revealed by the Creator. A contradiction between human intellect and what is mentioned in the Quran or the Sunnah is consequently a misconception in this intellect itself. Thus, the usulists have claimed that a sound human intellect never contradicts with an authentic revealed/imparted source. In fact, both ‘aql and naql are in the same path in Islam, the first needs the latter and the inverse is right as well. ‘Aql may lead to a Transcendent Power behind this universe, but

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naql reveals/imparts the Name, the Attributes and the Law of this Power. Man would have never known the name “Allah,” His Attributes and Law without naql. In historical terms, if we turn to the diachrony of Islam, the companions of the Prophet, the s.ah.a-ba, and the following generations of ta-bi‘u-n, and their successors throughout time up until our days, the tradition of imitation always finds roots in a reliable undisputed authority. While the methodology of taqlı-d kept the transmissional, impartitive and reproductive tradition in Islam, ijtiha-d remained the elixir of revival and concordance of the Islamic law with every spatiotemporal incident. In this context, the concept of diversity in Islam and Muslim scholarship gives Muslims the opportunity to live under a rich tradition which acknowledged the idea of difference and variety, and appreciated the wisdom behind development and change, as long as there is no contradiction to the principles of Islamic belief and law. To sum up, as it is concluded by the consensus of the scholars of us.u-l, the general principles, guidelines and rules of Islam are clear. In the terminology of the tafsı-r scholars, such verses of the Quran are muh.kama-t (i.e., of such a clear and explicit meaning that they do not need more clarification and could not cause any confusion). Similarly, the authentic Prophetic tradition concerning the belief and the legislation is established, and its authority is indisputable. Nonetheless, the fact that the “totalities” (kolliyya-t) of Islam are far beyond human intervention is one side of the issue, because the gate of ijtiha-d remains open until the end of time, always in the field of furu-‘, the subsidiary issues where there is no clear text or no text at all in the scriptural sources of Islam. The principle of the ‘ulama-’: “there is no ijtiha-d with a [clear] text (nas.s.)”71 does not actually deny or reject the existence and the continuity of the ijtiha-d tradition, but rather intensifies the perpetual necessity to practice it in light, but also absence, of such a “clear text.”

Notes 1 Cf. The Holy Quran, Ibra-hı-m, 14:4: “And We did not send any messenger but with the language of his people, so that he might explain to them clearly.” 2 In Islamic theology, the Quran is defined technically by Muslim scholars as: Allah’s Word (kala-m Allah), the inimitable (al-mu‘jiz), sent down/revealed to the Prophet (pbuh) (al-munazzal ‘ala al-Nabiy), written/recorded in the Codices (al-maktu-b fi al-mas.a-h.if), imparted/delivered from him consecutively through great numbers of people (al-manqu-l ‘anhu bi al-tawa-tur), through its recitation the acts of worshipping are performed (al-muta‘bbad bi tila-watih). See Al-Zurqani A.(2006), Mana-hil al-‘Irfa-n fi ‘Ulu-m Al-Qur’a-n (The Fountains of Knowledge on the Quranic Sciences), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, vol. I, pp. 14–18; Al-Salih S. (200727), Maba-h.ith fi ‘Ulu-m Al-Qur’a-n (Studies in the Quranic Sciences), Dar AlIlm li Al-Malayyin, Beirut, p. 21. 3 Cf. Al-Isra-’, 17:15 “Nor do We chastise until We raise a messenger.” 4 We mean here the Arabic-Islamic terms wah.i and bala-gh, respectively. The word wah.i linguistically means, among other meanings, “informing secretly” and technically “God’s inspiration/notification of what He wills from knowledge and

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9 10 11

12 13 14 15

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guidance to a chosen human through a secret and humanly unusual way”; see Shehata A. (2002), ‘Ulu-m Al-Qur’a-n (The Quranic Sciences), Dar Gharib, Cairo, p. 11. The word bala-gh means “announcement, notification” and it is cited in the Quran many times in the context of “conveyance, intimation” of the message of Islam through the Prophet to the whole humanity; see, suggestively, Al-Nu-r, 24:54; Al-‘Ankabu-t, 29:18; Ya-sı-n, 36:17; and Al-Shu-ra 42:48 where we read that the duty of the Messenger is but to convey and preach the Message of God: “If then they turn away, We have not sent you as a guard over them. Your duty is but to convey (the Message).” Cf. re-ligo/lego in the Oxford Latin Dictionary (1980), the Clarendon Press, Oxford; cf. also Saler B. (August 1987), “Religio and the Definition of Religion,” Cultural Anthropology, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 395–399. For the etymology of the word among Roman writers, see Hoyt S. (1912), “The Etymology of Religion,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 126–129. The names of these sacred Books are also representative here as connected to some linguistic abilities: Tawra-h: “instruction/teaching,” Injı-l: “good announcement/news” and Qur’a-n: “to be read/recited.” See the full text with different narrations in Al-Haythami (2001), Majma‘ al-Zawa-’id wa Manba‘ al-Fawa-’id (The Complex of Supplements and Source of Benefits), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, vol. 8, Kita-b ‘Ala-ma-t al-Nubuwa, hadith 14063, pp. 362–365; Al-Tabarani (1983), Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabı-r (The Major Lexicon), Maktabat Ibn Taymiya, Cairo, vol. 17, hadiths 117, 118, 119. Ghazali Al-(Abu Hamid) (2010), Al-Mustas.fa min ‘Ilm al-Us.u-l (The Gist on the Fundamentals [of Jurisprudence]), Dar Sadir, Beirut, vol. I, p. 274; see also AlAmidi (2003), Al-Ih.ka-m fi Us.u-l al-Ah.ka-m (The Precision on the Fundamentals of Rulings), Dar Al-Semi‘i, Riyadh, vol. I, pp. 60–63. On religious language, in general, and the relation between religious practices and linguistic resources, see Keane W. (1997), “Religious Language,” Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 26, pp. 47–71. Attributed to the sophist Greek philosopher Protagoras (d. ca. 420 BC), apud Diogenes Laertius (1925), Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. Hicks R., The Loeb Classical Library, London, NY, vol. II, IX–51. pp. 462–463. See his works: Gellner E. (1983), Nations and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 74 ff.; (1996) Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, pp. 60–61. Ibn Taymiya (2003), Iqtid.a-’ al-S.ira-t. al-Mustaqı-m Mukha-lafat As.h.a-b al-Jah.-ım (The Prerequisite of The Straight Path is to Contradict the People of Hell), Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, pp. 158–159. He comments that the hadith is d.a‘ı-f (weak), but its meaning is authentic in concordance with other narrations. Rahman F. (20022), Islam, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 40. Cf. p. 41 where he uses the term “unsurpassability” of the Quran. Penrice J. (2004), A Dictionary and Glossary of the Koran, Dover Publications, Mineola, New York, pvii (first ed. 1873). See Al-Fakhouri H. (2000), Al-Ja-mi‘ fi Ta-rı-kh al-Adab al-‘Arabi (The Sententious in the History of the Arabic Literature), Dar Al-Jil, Beirut, pp. 48 ff; Ellethy, Y. (2006), Η AραΒική Γλώσσα για τους Έλληνες (The Arabic Language for Greeks), Zήτρος, Θεσσαλονίκη, pp. 17 ff. The issue of the authenticity of this poetry and its eligibility as a criterion of Arabic language before Islam comprised one of the most controversial debates in modern Egyptian academia. The protagonist is Taha Hussein with his book (1926) Fi al-Shi‘r al-Ja-hilı- (On Pre-Islamic Poetry), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Misriyya, Cairo, where he doubts the authenticity of this poetry and its authority concerning the status of the Arabic language and society before Islam. A critique of his approach can be found in many later works; see, e.g., Othman A. (1997) Fi al-Shi‘r al-Ja-hilı- wa al-Logha al-‘Arabiyya (On Pre-

42

16

17

18 19

20

21 22 23 24

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy Islamic Poetry and the Arabic Language), Al-Shorouq, Cairo. For a discussion of the pre-Islamic poetry related to the history of the Arabic language, see Ziadeh F. (1986), “Prosody and the initial formation of classical Arabic,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 106, no. 2, pp. 333–338. Al-Qurtubi, in his tafsı-r, (2006), Al-Ja-mi‘ li Ah.ka-m Al-Qur’a-n (The Compiler of the Rulings of the Quran), Mu’assassat Al-Risala, Beirut, vol. 22, pp. 377–379, interprets verse 4 (He who taught by the Pen (Qalam)) as follows: “Firstly: it means writing, that He taught man to write using a pen. Sa‘id narrated on the authority of Qata-da: ‘Pen is a great grace from God, without it, religion would have not been established, nor would living have been possible’ [ … ] Thirdly: our ‘ulama-’ said: the Arabs were the most ignorant of writing among all peoples.” Only suggestively we refer to the myriad vocabulary in the field of synonyms (mutara-difa-t), where many classical books have been dedicated to the enormous number of names attributed to the same thing: Al-Fairouz Aba-di (d. 1414), the famous lexicographer, wrote a book titled al-Rawd. al-Maslu-f fi ma lahu Isma-n ila Ulu-f (The Cultivated Meadow on What Has Two to Thousand Names); Ibn Khalawayh (d. 980) wrote a work on Asma-’ al-Asad (The Names of the Lion) where he compiles more than 500 names. See Al-Shafi‘i (n.d.), Al-Risa-la (The Epistle), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, vol. 1, p. 52; Ibn Al-Jawzi (19852), Al-Mudhish (The Amazing), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, pp. 42 ff. See, e.g., Al-Baqara, 2:23; Yunus, 10:38; Hud, 11:13; Yusuf, 12:2; Al-Ra‘d, 13:37; Al-Nah.l, 16:103; Ta-ha, 20:113; Al-Shu‘ara-’, 26:195; Al-Zumar, 39:23, 28; Fus.s.ilat, 41:3, 44; Al-Shu-ra, 42:7, Al-Zukhruf, 43:3. (undated), Ta-rı-kh Ibn Khaldu-n (The History of Ibn Khaldoun [its first introductory book known as Muqaddimma (Prolegomena)]), Bayt Al-Afkar Al-Duwaliyya, Amman, ch. 6/5, p. 223. See also Al-Dhahabi H. (20007), Al-Tafsı-r wa al-Mufassiru-n (Exegesis and Exegetes), Maktabat Wahba, vol. I, pp. 29–30, who writes: “I don’t think Ibn Khaldoun was right in (saying) this.” Other companions are narrated to have fastened the two colored threads around their feet. The hadith is authentic and narrated by Al-Bukhari (20072), S.ah.-ıh. (The Authentic [collection of hadiths] of Al-Bukhari), Dar Al-Marefah, Beirut, Kita-b al-S.awm, hadith 1916, 1917; Moslim (20072), S.ah.-ıh. Moslim (The Authentic [collection of hadiths] of Moslim), Dar Al-Marefah, Beirut, Kita-b al-S.iya-m, hadith 1090, 1091. Al-Amidi, op. cit., vol. 1. p. 73; The verse is in Al-An‘aa-m, 6:14. “Say: Shall I take a guardian besides Allah, the Originator of the heavens and the earth.” Today, in the so-called MSA (Modern Standard Arabic), the word logha means “language,” while the Quran uses only the word lisa-n (tongue, language). Supplementary tafsı-r books titled Gharı-b Al-Qur’a-n (unusual words of the Quran) or Ghara-’ib (plural of Gharib) Al-Qur’a-n have been developed in Islamic literature. See Al-Qurtubi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 43, who narrates that this situation happened with Omar. Cf. Al-Nadim (2009), Al-Fihrest (The Index), Mu’assasat Al-Furqan li Al-Turath Al-Islami ( = Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation), London, vol. I, part II, second essay, pp. 104–105, who reports that it happened in the presence of Abu Al-Aswad Al-Dou’ali (d. ca. 688). Cf. Al-Zarkashi (2005), Al-Burha-n fi ‘Ulu-m Al-Qur’a-n (The Testimony on the Quranic Sciences), Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, vol. I, p. 459. Cf. also Haeri N., “Form and Ideology: Arabic Sociolinguistics and Beyond,” Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 29, 2000, p. 72, who comments on the modern Arabic written language: “Arabic orthography was thought to present special problems for the reader: It does not indicate short vowels (it does indicate all long vowels), and for every letter there are four possible shapes depending on where occurs in the word. Several solutions were offered, ranging from adding to

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25

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35

36

37 38 39

40

43

and modifying the existing orthography, to switching completely to the Latin alphabet.” Ibn Taymiya, Iqtid.a-’ … , op. cit., p. 191. He cites the narration on Omar in the context of his discussion of the (im-) permissibility of the usage of foreign languages, like Persian, instead of Arabic in prayers, months’ names, or even in general issues. Ibid. (1952) Al-Khas.a-’is. (The Properties), Al-Maktaba Al-Ilmiyya, Cairo, vol. 3, p. 245. Iqtid.a-’ … , op. cit. Op. cit., ch. 4/22. pp. 191–192. Al-Burha-n … , op. cit., vol. I, pp. 370–371. See Al-Dhahabi, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 12 ff. Al-Zarkashi, op. cit., vol. I., p. 369; Al-Suyuti (2008), Al-Itqa-n fi ‘Ulu-m Al-Qur’a-n (The Perfection in the Quranic Sciences), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, vol. II, p. 973. He was known as “the dragoman of the Quran.” It is narrated that the Prophet himself prayed to God, upon Ibn Abbas’s birth, to grant him deep understanding in the religion and teach him the art of interpretation. He is narrated in the tafsı-r of Al-Tabari (2008) Ja-mi‘ al-Baya-n ‘an Ta’wı-l Ayy Al-Qur’a-n (The Eloquent Sententious on the Interpretation of the Quranic Verses), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, vol. I, p. 91 to have said “tafsı-r includes four kinds: one that the Arabs know from their language, one that nobody can be excused if he ignores, one known by the ‘ulama-’, and a tafsı-r known only by Almighty God”; see also Al-Zarkashi, op. cit., vol. II, p. 181; Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 42. This is the most agreed upon classification among scholars of us.u-l; see Al-Zarkashi, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 173 ff, 192; Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 112 ff. This method of interpretation was largely accepted from the time of the Alexandrian philologists with their famous scholia or commentaries on the classical Greek works through the hermeneutic rule Όμηρον ἐξ Όμήρου σαφηνίζειν (explaining Homer by Homer) even prior to the protestant maxim Sacra Scriptura sui ipsius interpres; see Siegert F. (1996), “Early Jewish Interpretation in a Hellenistic Style,” in Sæbø M., Hebrew Bible, Old Testament, the History of its Interpretation, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, p. 137. For example, the scholastic theological debates on the status of the perpetrator of a major sin (kabı-ra: homicide, adultery … etc.) with regards to his/her characterization as a believer or disbeliever, the nature of the Quranic address and whether the Quran is created (makhlu-q) or not, and the allegorical reinterpretation of some Quranic verses related to Divine attributes (s.ifa-t) to avoid anthropomorphic conceptions. See Al-Tayyar M. (1426 H.), Sharh. Muqaddima fi Us.u-l al-Tafsı-r li Ibn Taymiya (Explanation of the Prolegomena on Us.u-l al-Tafsı-r of Ibn Taymiya), Dar Ibn Al-Gawzy, Al-Dammam, pp. 47 ff. See Fazlur Rahman, op. cit., p. 87. Al-Tirmidhi (19782), Al-Ja-mi‘ al-S.ah.-ıh. (The Sententious Authentic ( = Sunan ([Prophetic] Traditions)), Maktabat Mustafa Al-Halabi, Cairo, Kita-b Tafsı-r Al-Qur’a-n, vol. V, hadith 2951; cf. hadith 2950, where the narration substitutes “own personal opinion” by “without knowledge.” In another narration (hadith 2952) we read: “He who speaks in the Quran by his own personal opinion and says the right thing has still gone wrong.” The hadiths are cited as weak (d.a‘ı-fa) in Al-Albani (2000), D . a‘ıf Sunan Al-Tirmidhi (The Weak [narrations] of the Sunan of Al-Tirmidhi), Maktabat Al-Maarif, Riyadh, pp. 313–314. (2005) Majmu-‘ al-Fata-wa (The Collection of Fatwa’s), Dar Al-Wafaa, Al-Mansura, par. 13/371, p. 199.

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41 (20052) Al-Mwa-faqa-t fi Us.u-l al-Sharı-‘a (The Congruences on the Principles of Sharia), Maktabat Nazar Mustafa Al-Baz, Mecca-Riyadh, vol. III, pp. 860–861. For the needed fields of knowledge for an accepted tafsı-r by ra’y, see Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 189 ff. 42 See “The Message and the code” above. 43 Ferguson C. (1959), “Diglossia,” Word, vol. 15, p. 336. 44 Ibid, p. 332. 45 Haeri, op. cit. p. 65. She adds: “there is generally some literature in this variety [L] in the genres of epic and poetry. The superposed variety has more ‘prestige’ then the ‘primary dialect’.” 46 Haeri, op. cit., p. 69. 47 The term is somehow corresponding to the madrasa, known in other Muslim societies of Asian countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan … etc. Albert Hourani (2002), A History of the Arab Peoples, Harvard University Press, p. 163, attributes its foundation, at least, to Nizam Al-Mulk (1018–1092) the vizier of the first Seljuk ruler of Baghdad. However, the establishment of the madrasa system can be traced back in the tafsı-r-schools found already from the seventh century in Mecca, Medina, Kufa, Basra, Syria and Egypt by prominent companions. See also Μακρής Γ. (2004), Ισλάμ, Πεποιθήσεις, Πρακτικές και Τάσεις (Islam: Beliefs, Practices and Trends), Eλληνικά Γράμματα, Aθήνα, pp. 196–200. 48 Haeri, op. cit., pp. 70–71, with a reference to Abu-Lughod L. (January–June 1975), “Arab Cultural Consolidation: A Response to European Colonialism?,” The Islamic Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 30–41. 49 See Ellethy Y. (2007), “Al-Lugha al-‘Arabiyya wa Dirasa-t al-Istishra-q al-Isla-miyya” (“Arabic Language and Orientalist-Islamic Studies”), Al-Tasamoh, vol. 17, p. 258. 50 For this reason the term “Muslim world” is preferably used here. 51 See Al-Tayyar, op. cit., p. 21 ff. 52 Cf. Fazlur Rahman, op. cit., p. 68: “The mutual relationship of these four principles is highly confusing and it is not at all easy to make it fully clear. Perhaps, as a rough parallel, the famous Aristotelian scheme of analysis will be helpful. Pursuing this analogy, the Qur’a-n and the Sunna are the material principles (or the “sources”), the activity of analogical reasoning (qiya-s) the efficient cause, and the Ijma-‘ the formal principle (or the functional power). To complete the picture of the Aristotelian scheme, the purpose of the structure is to enable man to live under the sovereignty of God and in accordance with His will.” 53 Al-Nisa-’, 4, 59: “O you who believe! obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you do believe in Allah and the Last Day: that is best, and most suitable for final determination.” 54 See Al-Zurqani, op. cit., vol. II, p. 381. 55 See Al-Khudari M. (1969), Us.u-l al-Fiqh (The Fundamentals of Jurisprudence), Al-Maktaba Al-Tujareya Al-Kubra, Cairo, p. 14. 56 The Shiite scholarship uses also the name marji‘ (reference, authority), while the Ja‘afari school of Shiitism adds a source of ‘aql (human intellect) to the sources of Islamic Sharia, where the Sunni fiqh uses the method of qiya-s (deductive analogy) or ijtiha-d (deductive reasoning). 57 It should be reminded that what is mentioned here about ijtiha-d does not necessarily define qiya-s, as they are, technically, considered to be two names of the same meaning by some usulists, see Al-Shafi‘i, Al-Risala, op. cit., p. 477. However, the accurate and detailed clarification of Al-Ghazali, in Al-Mustas.fa … , op. cit., vol. II, p. 107, makes ijtiha-d more general than qiya-s. 58 Shehata, op. cit, p. 385; Al-Khudari, op. cit., p. 366. 59 Al-Khudari, op. cit., p. 367. 60 Op. cit., p. 45.

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61 Ibid. Al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 943 ff, states that, to qualify for the degree of ijtiha-d, a scholar should reach the highest level of knowledge in the field of Arabic linguistics as a tool-science. 62 Op. cit., vol. IV, p. 929 ff. 63 “ … and take for witness two persons from among you, endued with justice.” 64 See Al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 931. 65 Fazlur Rahman, op. cit., p. 68–69. 66 Part of a long narration in Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b S.ala-t al-Musafirı-n, hadith 746. Al-Bukhari narrated it in his al-Adab al-Mufrad (The Unique Manners), see Al-Albani (1997), S.ah.-ıh. al-Adab al-Mufrad li al-Ima-m Al-Bukhari (The Authentic [narrations] of Al-Adab al-Mufrad of Imam Al-Bukhari) Al-Dalil, Al-Jebeil, hadith 234, p. 129. He cites the hadith as s.ah.-ıh. li ghayrih (authentic through other narration/-s), a term in Hadith methodology which means that the hadith is not per se s.ah.-ıh. but is strengthened through other factors such as multiplicity of similar narrations. 67 Op. cit., p. 69. 68 Op. cit., vol. III, pp. 612–621 ff. Ibn Taymiya has also written a sizable work where he refutes the philosophical allegations of a supposed contradiction between ‘aql and naql; see his (2006), Dar’ Ta‘a-rud. al-‘Aql wa al-Naql (Refuting the Contradiction between Intellect and Revelation), Dar Al-Hadith, Cairo, esp. vol. I, p. 107 ff. 69 (undated) Sharh. al-T.ah.awiyya (Explanation of the [Creed-work] of Al-Tahawi), Dar Al-Turath, Cairo, p. 137. In Mu‘tazilism, for example, the priority is given to ‘aql on naql. 70 See Ibn Rushd (1999), Fas.l al-Maqa-l fi ma bayna al-H . ikma wa al-Shari‘a min Ittis.a-l (The Final Word on the Nexus between Wisdom and Sharia), Dar Al-Ma‘aref, Cairo, pp. 31–32; Idem (1998), Al-Kashf ‘an Mana-hij al-Adilla fi ‘Aqa-id al-Milla (Revealing the Methods of Evidences on the Religious Creeds), Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabiyya, Beirut, pp. 188 ff, 152–153. 71 The word nas.s. itself denotes in Arabic something that is “raised/elevated” so that it becomes apparent, evident and obvious. This is why the word for a “podium, rostrum, platform” in Arabic is “minas.s.a,” because it is always apparent and visible being in a high place to be distinguished by everyone; see Ibn Manzour (1983), Lisa-n al-‘Arab (The Language of the Arabs), Dar Al-Ma‘aref, Cairo, vol. VI., p. 4441. The dictum “la- ijtiha-d ma’a nas.s.” is used enthusiastically in Muslim literature without reference to the source of this rule. However, we can trace it, for example, in Al-Ghazali, in a discussion of the permissibility of ijtiha-d in the time of the Prophet, in his absence and presence. He prefers the opinion that it was possible in both cases; see Al-Mustas.fa … , op. cit., p. 204. In another occasion, the Egyptian Shafi‘ite jurist Sulayman Al-Bijirmi (or Al-Bujayrami; d. 1806) refers to the same rule in the context of his discussion of the second coming of Jesus, in the Muslim eschatology, and how the different doctrines madha-hib will be suspended during this period, because he will be like a nas.s., wherewith there is no ijtiha-d; see Al-Bujayrami S. (1280 H.), H . ashiyat Al-Bujayrami ’ala Sharh. Manhaj al-T.ulla-b [of Zakaria Al-Ansari] (The Annotation of Al-Bujayrami on the Explanation of Manhaj al-T.ulla-b), Matbaat Muhammad Shahin, Cairo, p. 661.

3

Classical Sources and Interpretations about Development Between Tradition and Renovation

This chapter examines the theme of change and development in Islam, and the limits of renovation, contextualization and reform. It is crucial to discuss this theme before turning to the discussion of the concepts of pluralism and democracy in the Islamic view, because of the alleged incompatibility between this view and the very idea of socio-political modernization and reform. Both the concepts of pluralism and democracy have substantially developed to reach their status quo in a global perspective. The tense relation between tradition and renovation in both the classical and modern Islamic thought resulted in a variety of interpretive and jurisprudential views, which are crucial to the understanding of any modern Muslim reformism. The pious devotion to the immutable texts, along with the developing and changing human status, put the Muslim intellect in a perpetual process of confronting contemporary and variable queries about the position of religion concerning the new issues. Hence, the tension between traditionalism, revivalism and renovation emerges. The traditional school of taqlı-d (imitation/traditionalism) tends to reproduce the conclusions of early Muslim readings, and, usually, sees in Islam a totality which overcomes the spatiotemporal limits of every human development. Nevertheless, the school of ijtiha-d – with the assiduous attempt of the ‘uluma-’ to deduce rules from the unchangeable texts to the changeable historical circumstances – finds justifications for renovation in this same Islamic tradition. In this latter view, the notions of tradition and renovation in Islam may be in juxtaposition and intrinsically interwoven. This is because of the diversity that permeates the Islamic interpretive and jurisprudential tradition, and makes the balance between tradition and renovation an Islamic virtue. Based on the scriptural sources and the early Islamic experiences, there is always a place for religion wherever human interest lies. Our discussion of this theme is divided into four sections. The first focuses on the concept of development as a religious value in Islam. I expound this value as an element of Islamic faith, and analyze the scriptural and jurisprudential fundamentals for the nature and meaning of development in the Islamic view. The second section explains how Islam utilized, refined and developed even its most hostile pre-Islamic Arabic tradition, in all aspects that could be perfected by the spirituality of the divine guidance. In the third section, I discuss

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the concept of “perfection” of religion in Islam and its correlations to the notions of revivalism and renovation. Some examples, from the views of classical and modern scholars, are given and analyzed. Finally, in the fourth section, I tackle the concept of reform in a Muslim context, showing the peculiarities of this concept in the Muslim view and proposing a reading of the philosophy and fiqh of an Islamic reform.

The value of development Development, in its broad sense, is in the core of religion. The All-Knowing, the Omniscient, the All-Aware and Timeless God, who honored humankind with the grace of intellect, has bestowed upon it His guidance in a diachrony of revelations and a series of messages. The succession of religious God-sent messages and the enormity of the number of prophets and messengers, during the long history of humankind on Earth, leaves no room for doubt that development and evolution of the human status are part of God’s will. One of the greatest signs of the “Incomparability” of God with the human status, and His “Transcendence,” lies in the idea of development, change and progress, which characterizes all His creation. God’s Transcendence is partly comprehended in the human imperfection: an imperfection embodied in a perpetual quest for the better. The Islamic view of the notion of development is crucial to our discussion about Islam and the concepts of pluralism and democracy in the modern global context. Through this view, we can promote a generic Islamic theorization about contextualization, adaptability to changing circumstances and reform. Therefore, in the first sub-section, I survey the concept of development as it emerges from the Islamic faith, which describes the human status in general. In the second sub-section, I discuss the scriptural and jurisprudential hermeneutics of the notion of development in Islam. Development as a norm The notion of development has its origins in the Islamic worldview as a postulate norm for the human status. Although the Quran is the last “God-sent perfected Book” and no more revelation is expected,1 and Prophet Muhammad is the “seal” (kha-tam) of the messengers of God, the door of guidance will always remain open until the end of time, so that those who do not believe can witness incessant signs in the universe and in themselves: We shall show them Our portents on the horizons and within themselves until it will be manifest unto them that it is the Truth. (Fus.s.ilat, 41.53) The last Book of Divine Revelation is fulfilled and preserved, but the Book of Nature,2 with its developments and wonders discovered every now and then, corroborates, clarifies and explicates the Quran. The role of human intellect

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(‘aql) is to support and lead harmoniously to the facts cited in revelations of/ about God (naql). A Quranic verse with a command of perpetual speculation and investigation underlines the need of human progress to discover the secrets of God’s creation: Say: Travel through the Earth and see how Allah did originate creation; so will Allah produce a later creation; for Allah has power over all things. (Al-‘Ankabu-t, 29:20) There is no doubt that all kinds of sciences and fields of knowledge developed through the long journey of human epistemology: biology, chemistry, physics, medicine, astronomy, geology, etc., together with history, anthropology, philosophy, logic and any other humanly achieved knowledge should be included in this command. Again, the idea of development is not only God’s Will, but also a way to apprehend that He is truly God. The diachrony of God’s revelations from the beginning has given an important consideration to the idea of the development of the human status and the dominant circumstances. Every prophet has received and delivered a message “in the tongue of his people”: We sent not a messenger except (to teach) in the language of his (own) people, in order to make (things) clear to them. (Ibra-hı-m, 14:4) A deeper understanding of the word “language” extends its meaning here to the cultural and civilizational context, and the spatiotemporal particularities of each era and people, young or old, urban or Bedouin, literate or illiterate. The consistency between both the religious and the cultural/civilizational projects is a crucial point in the Islamic perspective of development. A hadith makes it clear that considering the changing context is an Islamic virtue. It narrates that Ali Ibn Abi Talib said: Address the people according to what they know. Would you like that (the words of) Allah and His messengers be refuted.3 The Quran is full of narrations that show the progress and evolution of humanity. The Quran moves from one status to the other, beginning with the story of Adam and Eve, the creation of the first man and woman, and all the circumstances concerning the first human existence on Earth, then the deviation of humankind from the path of God and the successive revelations and messengers up until “the seal of the prophets,” reaching the Hereafter and the after-death eternal life. The very process of entrustment (taklı-f) of the Divine Legislation is in itself a paradigm of taking the idea of gradual development into consideration. The Quran was revealed gradually in a period of 23 years, the rules of the Sharia were considering the human nature of dependence on a former habit and the need to shift it gradually into an established divine rule.

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This is what an authentic Prophetic tradition implies; the Prophet tells his wife ‘Aicha: O ‘Aicha, had not your people been still close to the pre-Islamic period [of ignorance/infidelity], I would have dismantled the Ka‘ba and would have made two doors in it; one for entrance and the other for exit.4 This hadith gives an example of how the norm of progression and gradual development is considered, even in issues linked to the most sacred place of Islam. Similarly, Omar Ibn Abdulaziz, the Umayyad Caliph (717–720), often referred to as the fifth of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, reacted on the enthusiasm of his son Abdulmalik in such a context showing him the wisdom behind a developing divine assignment vis-à-vis a developing human nature. The son said: O father, why don’t you put things into action? I swear by Allah, I do not care if we both get burned in boiling pots for the sake of the truth. Omar replied: Do not hasten my son; God dispraised wine twice in the Quran before He forbade it in the third time. I fear to enforce truth on the people once and for all lest they refuse it, and a tumult would result.5 It is a fact that every new rule was grounded on a previous one which was already settled in the Muslim community. The consistency between revelation and circumstances is already a Quranic science known as “occasions/reasons of revelation” (asba-b al-nuzu-l). This is also crucial to the understanding of the much-discussed theory of “abrogation” (naskh) in the Quranic sciences, where much of the focused verses are subject to the development/gradation of legislation (tadarruj al-tashrı-‘) than to abrogation of an earlier ruling by a later one. The Quranic guidance, the Islamic Sharia and the example of the Prophet are the guidelines for the Muslims of every era to come, but the role of development and change is never neglected. The equilibrium between tradition and renovation is an Islamic virtue; Sharia is unchangeable but fiqh is developing and adaptable to every new context. Ijtiha-d is always preferable and advisable whenever and wherever it seeks the good and the common interest of Muslims and Islam, and of course does not contradict with an established and known rule in the principles of religion. Islam left the door open for issues to come and problems to appear throughout the human course in history, and provided guidelines for confronting them and handling them with the appropriate method. The scriptural-jurisprudential fundament The Quran provides us with many examples about development as a principle and a human de facto. Thus, the Muslims of early Islamic history could

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promote the different socio-political, economic and cultural aspects of the Muslim state within the framework of this “unchangeable” text which narrates so much about a “changing” world. The Quran calls on Muslims to always promote their thinking in order to judge what is right and what is wrong. We read in many verses that the problem of the unbelievers of the earlier nations, and even of the Arabs of the era of the Prophet, lied in the fact that they blindly followed the steps of their forefathers concerning the way they worshipped God(s). The following are some examples: When it is said to them: ‘Follow what Allah has revealed’ they say: ‘Nay! We shall follow the ways of our fathers.’ What! even though their fathers were void of wisdom and guidance? (Al-Baqara, 2:170) When it is said to them: ‘Come to what Allah has revealed; come to the Messenger’ they say: ‘Enough for us are the ways we found our fathers following.’ What! even though their fathers were void of knowledge and guidance? (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:104) If Allah had wished (to send messengers), He could have sent down angels: never did we hear such a thing (as he says), among our ancestors of old. (Al-Mu’ominu-n 23:24) When Moses came to them with Our Clear Signs, they said: ‘This is nothing but sorcery faked up: never did we hear the like among our fathers of old!’ (Al-Qas.as., 28:36) They said: ‘Nay, but we found our fathers doing thus (what we do).’ (Al-Shu‘ara-’, 26:74) Then the Quran makes it for the Prophet clear that this was the case of all previous nations with their messengers. The address is general and also goes for those who follow blindly the tradition of their forefathers without judging right from wrong: Just in the same way, whenever We sent a Warner before you to any people, the wealthy ones among them said: ‘We found our fathers following a certain religion, and we will certainly follow in their footsteps’. He said: ‘What! even if I brought you better guidance than that which you found your fathers following?’ They said: ‘For us, we deny that you (prophets) are sent (on a mission at all).’ (Al-Zukhruf, 43:23)

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Al-Qurtubi, in his tafsı-r, comments saying: Qata-da said: having them as example and following their footsteps. Here, there is an annulment of imitation, as He dispraises them for following their fathers and neglecting what the Prophet has called them to.6 The kind of imitation meant here is of course that which contradicts what God has prescribed for humankind as guidance for their worldly life and right path to the hereafter. It is clear enough that following the Prophet as an example and, consequently, his companions and the upright predecessors (al-salaf al-s.a-lih.) is the most preferable model for imitation in Islam. Nonetheless, within the very margins of this divine prescription, human reasoning is guaranteed for every case where the benefit of the individual and the society exists. The Egyptian reformist Muhammad Abdu (1849–1905) put it clearly: It (the Quran) directs (us) to enjoin rational procedure and intellectual enquiry into the manifestations of the universe, and, as far as may be, into its particulars, so as to come by certainty in respect of the things to which it guides. It forbids us imitation by narrating the attitude of the previous nations who simply imitated/followed their forefathers showing this in a hideous way and how they were finally involved in an utter collapse of their beliefs and their own disappearance as a community. Well it is said that imitation/traditionalism can be in evil as well as good and may occasion harm as well as conduce to benefit. It is a deceptive thing that may be pardoned in an animal but is never seemly in man.7 The famous adage “wherever lies the interest, thereat lies the Sharia” is vehemently corrected by many Muslim scholars to be “wherever lies the Sharia, thereat lies the interest”. The interest of humankind can always be found in the Divine Law and its principles. According to this approach, the first phrase puts this Divine Law under the guidance of the human interest, something that dismisses the very essence of religion. The fiqh principle “different circumstances result in different judgments” already exists, but the problem lies in extending this legislative adaptability to the extreme, that it becomes no more religious (i.e., secularizing worldly life to the extent that humankind sees no afterworld life). Al-Shatibi sharply refers to this problematic tension between a “developing world” and a “perpetual divine legislation,” saying: Know that what has been mentioned here – about the difference in rules according to the difference in circumstances – is not, in fact, a variation in the origin of the [divine] address, because the Law is set to be everlasting. Suppose that the world is endless, and the divine entrustment [taklı-f] is so as well, nothing more would be needed in this Law. The meaning of difference here is that whenever circumstances vary each of them should be attributed to a Sharia principle whereupon it can be judged.8

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As far as the term mas.lah.a (interest) is concerned, Al-Ghazali defines it as follows: Concerning mas.lah.a, it is – originally – either bringing benefit or rebutting harm. But we do not mean this here, because bringing benefit and rebutting harm are both human purposes, and the good of humankind lies in achieving their purpose. We rather mean by mas.lah.a: ‘to sustain the purpose of the shar‘ [God’s legislation]’. The purpose of the shar’ for humans is to preserve their: religion, life, intellect, lineage and property. Everything that includes the preservation of these five fundamentals is to be a mas.lah.a. Anything that misses these five fundamentals is a mafsada [harm/disadvantage] and rebutting it is a mas.lah.a.9 Another important kind of imitation could bring more debate into this discussion – namely, imitating the “Other,” either the religious or the cultural “Other.” To put it in a form of a question: is it permissible for Muslims to “imitate” or, better, to adopt ideas, habits or some aspects of renovations not present in their doors? A hadith denotes a general virtue in this respect. The Prophet says: The word of Wisdom (h.ikma) is the object of the Muslim, wherever he finds it, he should be the most worthy of it.10 The term h.ikma denotes a generic totality (i.e., everything that can be good and useful to Muslims and their society, and, of course, does not contradict the established Islamic rules). Another important keyword in the hadith is the adverb “wherever,” which is general and open and does not exclude a certain nation, ethnicity, religion or culture. Both the virtue and the role of development are significant in Islam. In another hadith, albeit a mawqu-f one,11 narrated by Ibn Mas‘ud, we read: If something is seen by the Muslims as good, then it is good for Allah, and if it is seen as bad, then it is also so for Allah.12 The occasion of this narration would help us to understand the circumstances of this analogy between the human and the divine judgment. Ibn Mas‘ud was commenting on the consensus (ijma-‘) of the companions concerning the election of Abu Bakr as his first Caliph. Neither a clear Quranic text nor a Prophetic declaration was there to guide the Muslim community about the successor (khalı-fa) of the Prophet. The procedure to select Abu Bakr and entrust him with the leadership of the Muslim state was based on the ijtiha-d of the companions which lead to a certain status of consensus ijma-‘ among them. The narration is used to show how the consensus ijma-‘ of Muslims on a matter in a certain period cannot be a source of contradiction to God’s law.13 Al-Shatibi intensifies the fact that this hadith may possibly be used as evidence by those

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who deviate from the path of Sharia by the creation of bida‘ (sing. bid‘a: religious novelty/heterodoxy). He comments that the ijma-‘ here is the task of the Muslim ‘ulama-’, who belong to the category of mujtahidı-n (those who can practice ijtiha-d). Whenever they reach this consensus on issues open to human reasoning, then what they see as good concerning these issues is also good for God, as it is in consistency with His Law. He concludes that this hadith does not imply a permission to prefer or refuse something without a dalı-l shar‘ı(evidence from the Sharia).14 This is also linked to the practice of istih.sa-n (finding something good/better, appropriateness), which is a jurisprudential tool that can work in cases where a certain tradition or custom (‘urf) in a community meets the consensus of the Muslims. Istih.sa-n, in short, is “to consider a partial interest at the expense of total evidence”15 (i.e., the exceptional cases for the interest of the Muslims are taken into consideration though a religious evidence to prohibit or permit exists). Actually, the ‘ulama-’, here, do not only focus on the rule/evidence itself, but rather on the surrounding conditions and the objectives behind it. Istih.sa-n, as a jurisprudential tool, is a very big chapter in the discipline known as fiqh al-maqa-s.id (objectives/purposes).16 What interests us here is the classification of this tool into two kinds according to the reason behind it. Abu Bakr Ibn Al-Arabi (d. 1148), the Malikite jurist, classifies the authoritative reasons which can justify istih.sa-n into custom/tradtion (‘urf) and interest/benefit (mas.lah.a).17 Another Prophetic tradition tackles the issue of the permissibility of practicing human reasoning in matters connected to the worldly affairs. Although the Prophetic narration in hand generated much discussion about the limits and permissibility of human action and reasoning in such matters away from, or under the umbrella of, the Sharia, it points out, strikingly, the role of such human ijtiha-d in the field of furu-‘ (subsidiary issues), as long as inconsistency with the principles of Islamic rules is avoided. The hadith is narrated by Talha Ibn Ubaydillah, who was accompanying the Prophet when they passed by some people climbing their palm trees. The Prophet asked Talha: “what are they doing?” He replied: “they pollinate them, making the male in the female so that it gets fecundated.” The Prophet said: “I don’t think this would have a sense.” The people were told about the comment of the Prophet and ceased what they were doing believing that he was speaking of a religious rule; then he said: “if this is useful let them do it, I was just making a supposition. Do not take my supposition, but whenever I speak to you in the name of God, take it [as a rule] because I never lie about God.”18 The same classifier of the hadith, Moslim, mentions another narration by Anas Ibn Malik, where we read that the Prophet commented: “you are better knowledgeable of your worldly affairs.”19 The worldly affairs mentioned in the hadith could include those related to agriculture, medicine, technology, economy, politics and any other field of knowledge linked to human development and necessary to facilitate and ameliorate the existence of humankind on Earth. Those fields of knowledge

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are subject to continuous development and empirical improvement. Again, the issue of maqa-s.id is very relevant here, because all these terrestrial methods are sine qua non for the realization of the celestial Will. In fact, Islamic civilization has always coupled religiosity with practical worldly epistemology. Muslims were those who appreciated the role of ancient Greek achievements in the fields of philosophy, medicine, astronomy, astrology, mathematics, etc. A long-term process of translation and elaboration of Greek works into Arabic continued throughout two centuries, beginning from the last years of the Umayyad dynasty until the tenth century during the rule of the Abbasid dynasty. This scientific movement produced a new era of human civilization to which the European Renaissance owed a lot.20 The correlation between religious belief and scientific/epistemological innovation in Islam was the main characteristic of this period. Many of the Muslims today may know about the historical contribution of one of the most renowned Muslim scientist, Al-Khwarizmi (d. 850), the inventor of the science of Algebra. Very few of them, however, might know that the motive behind the authorship of his relevant work al-Jabr wa al-Moqa-bala (Completion and Reduction) was mainly to solve mathematical calculation problems related to inheritance rules and other issues in Islamic jurisprudence, and that a great part of this work was dedicated to this religious sake.21 The conclusion is clear: whenever Muslims could realize and establish the nexus between religion and the worldly evolution and development, they could achieve success in both fields.

Islam and the pre-Islamic Arab tradition In this section, I tackle Islam’s position toward the society where it initially appeared. The pre-Islamic society, known as al-mujtama‘ al-ja-hilı- (the ignorant society) or the Ja-hiliyya (the status of ignorance), is so characterized mainly in antithesis with the Guidance that Islam brought forth.22 A pagan, materialistic, violent, chaotic, vicious and uncivilized society is often the postulated description of this pre-Islamic era, not only in the consciousness of the average Muslim, but also in most Muslim literature and intelligentsia. I will question the credibility of such a generalization from within the Islamic tradition itself, aiming to shed light on Islam’s openness, or lack thereof, to adopting and promoting ideas and virtues that belong to even the most “alien” context, and embodying them within its religious sphere, as long as there is an Islamic legislative ground for them. I discuss this issue in two parts with some examples of the Islamic modalities of ethical detribalization of the ja-hilı- society, and the methods followed to utilize every good human value or virtue, even if it emanates from the most antagonist religious/cultural context. Refinement and ethical detribalization Islam, as a universal message, originally appeared in a small spot on Earth which, given the geopolitical criteria of that era, had not remarkably attracted

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the attention of the great powers of the time. The small society of Mecca, and the smaller tribe of Quraish, witnessed the emergence of the religion which became the greatest power within a few decades. The construction of a Muslim state, which can guarantee the fulfilment of the divine entrustment (taklı-f) and vicegerency (istikhla-f) on Earth, had to be anticipated by a construction of a Muslim character. This might be the main reason behind the quick inversion from a “tribal” to a “Muslim” society, which happened in a historically short period of time and in an exemplary manner. Most of the very severe enemies of the newborn Message became its most faithful defenders, and those whose utmost goal was to win the head of Mohammad amazingly turned into obedient companions who are eager to sacrifice their own life for a single hair of his head. The most proud knights of the desert, the arrogant chieftains of the Arab tribes, and the fearless youth of the Nomads suddenly became humble and devout believers whose vespers, weeping and God-fearing supplications echoed a new version of their recently abandoned nightlife. How was that ever possible? Islam, from its very beginnings, was open to promote every element that proved to be beneficial to humankind in both their worldly and after-death life, as long as it was very strict and clear in establishing the totalities of a God-sent Message. In the field of sub-issues (furu-’), Islam remained the “Divine Norm” for all things that would develop in the future and until the end of time. All the good habits and moral elements of the pre-Islamic Arabs were promoted and routed, or better, revised, in the path of a religious guidance. Such “openness” to every good human aspect outside the Islamic religious realm is actually, and should better be understood as, a “consistency” with the divine innate pattern from the part of the religious law, and an inherent “compliance” to God’s Wisdom from the part of the human. Dı-n al-fit.ra, the religion of the divinely inherent human nature and the pattern of the Divine handiwork according to which God created humankind, is, at the same time, al-dı-n al-qayyim, the standard religion, as the Quran cites clearly: So set your face steadily and truly to the Faith: (establish) Allah’s handiwork according to the pattern on which He has made humankind: no change (let there be) in the work (wrought) by Allah: that is the standard Religion: but most among humankind understand not. (Al-Ru-m 30.30) Pride, generosity, chivalry, commitment to one’s word and pledge, strong ties of kinship, eagerness to help the wronged, trustiness and sincerity were all virtues that Islam – throughout the Quran and the Sunnah and as much as they adhere to the inherent human nature – cultivated, elevated, redirected in a virtuous ethical way and, rather, “Islamized.”23 Personal and familial pride and honor were held in great esteem among the Arabs before Islam. Extant pre-Islamic poetry is full of poems dedicated to such an exaggerated form of ostentation. That is why, in such a tribal society, a good reason for celebration and feasting was found whenever a tribe

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acquired a poet, a defender of its honor and good repute. Ibn Rashiq Al-Qayrawani (d. 1064) says: Whenever a poet emerged in an Arab tribe, the other tribes would come and congratulate it. Feasts would be prepared, and the women would gather together playing on lutes, as people do at weddings; men and boys alike would exchange the good news. For the poet was a defence [sic] to their honour, a protection for their good repute, he immortalised their deeds of glory, and published their eternal fame. On three things they congratulated one another: the birth of a boy, the emergence of a poet in their midst, or the foaling of a mare.24 Extant examples from the pre-Islamic poetry comprise a main source of knowledge about the social code of the Ja-hiliyya period. Actually, the seven Mu’allaqa-t, literally the seven “Hanged Odes,” which used to be suspended on the Ka’ba in Mecca before Islam, represent a good source of knowledge about the characteristics of the pre-Islamic society of Ja-hiliyya. In this respect, a few verses from the Ode, or mu’allaqa, of the pre-Islamic poet Amr Ibn Kulthoum may give an example: We are heirs to the glory of Alkama Ibn Saif he mastered for us the castles of glory. I am the heir to Muhalhil and his better, Zuhair, a fine treasure indeed to treasure, heir to Attáb, and Kulthúm, the whole of them, by whom we attained the heirdom of the noblest, heir to Dhul Bura, of whom you’ve heard tell, our defence, through whom we defend the shelterers, and, before him, Kulaib the Striver was one of us: so what glory is there we are not possessed of ?25 The following quotation by the same poet is also very representative, especially when we note the excessive and consecutive usage of the personal pronoun “we”: Short-haired are our steeds on the morn of terror, known to us, our weanlings, won from the enemy; them we inherited from the truest fathers, them we shall bequeath dying to our sons. All the tribes of M’aad have known right well when tents were built in their valley-bottoms that in every scant year we are the protectors, we the bountiful givers to them that beg of us, we the defenders of those near to us whenever the white swords leave their scabbards, we the benefactors when we are able,

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we the destroyers when we are set upon, we the drinkers of the purest water that others perforce drink sullies and muddy. In another mu’allaqa, the other great Arab poet Labid boasts about his own tribe with the following verses: So be satisfied with what the Sovereign has allotted; He has divided the qualities among us, knowing them well, and when trustworthiness came to be apportioned among a tribe the Apportioner bestowed on us an exceeding share. They are the strivers, whenever the tribe is visited by distress; they are the tribe’s knights and high arbiters; to those who seek their protection they are as the bounteous Spring as also to widows in their long year of widowhood. Such a tribe they are, that no envier succeeds to hold back nor any reviler assists the enemy’s reviling tongue.26 On the one hand, this narrow loyalty to the tribe, extreme pride in one’s clan and despise for other people became strictly disrepute in Islam to the extent that it reached the boundaries of the impermissible (h.ara-m). Derision of others is utterly prohibited according to the Quran: O you who believe! Let not some men among you laugh at others: It may be that the (latter) are better than the (former): Nor let some women laugh at others: It may be that the (latter) are better than the (former): Nor defame nor be sarcastic to each other, nor call each other by (offensive) nicknames: Ill-seeming is a name connoting wickedness, (to be used of one) after he has believed: And those who do not desist are (indeed) doing wrong. (Al-H . ujurat, 49:11) The new divine norm and criterion of preference and honor among people is righteousness (taqwa): Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. (Al-H . ujurat, 49:13) The Prophetic tradition is not short of narrations concerning the matter. The Prophet missed no chance to remind Muslims of the new code of pride and honor in Islam and the related disrepute ethics of the Ja-hiliyya that are difficult to abandon. He said: Four things in my Ummah belong to the Jahiliyya that people abandon them not: Ostentation of kin, defamation of lineage, ascribing/asking rain to/from the stars, and wailing the dead.27

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In his last sermon during the pilgrimage season, he said: O people, your Lord is one, and your father is one. Let there be no preference of an Arab to a non-Arab, nor of a non-Arab to an Arab, nor of a white man to a black man nor of a black man to a white man, unless by righteousness. The most honored among you to God is the most righteous. Do you bear witness that I have delivered God’s word? They replied “Yes you did, O messenger of Allah.” He said: “let him who is present inform him who is absent.”28 In another authentic narration by Al-Tirmidhi, the Prophet says: God has taken away from you the arrogance of the Ja-hiliyya and its ostentation of the forefathers. (Now it is) a righteous believer or a lecher evildoer. People are all sons of Adam and Adam is (created) out of clay.29 The utmost manifestation of this new Islamic criterion of preference and honor, symbolized in the concept of righteousness (taqwa), is the command given in the Quran to the Prophet to admonish his closest kinsfolk: And admonish thy nearest kinsmen.

(Al-Shu’ara-’, 26:214)

Both Al-Tabari and Ibn Kathir comment on this verse and narrate that, upon its revelation, the Prophet summoned his own family members saying: O Fatima daughter of Mohammad, O Safiyya daughter of Abdel-Mauttalib, O sons of Abdel-Muttalib, I have no privilege to prefer you before God, you can ask me whatever you want of my wealth.30 Al-Tabari adds another relevant hadith where the Prophet, addressing his own clan Banu Hashim in general, said: O Banu Hashim, may I not meet you (in the Day of Judgment) coming only with a harvest from worldly life while the others come with a harvest for the Hereafter. My friends among you are only those who are righteous. So save yourselves from Hellfire even with a half date (given in alms).31 On the other hand, while the extreme pride in one’s lineage is prohibited, this pre-Islamic habit was restricted and redirected in the right path. Knowing one’s own lineage and following one’s blood-kin is a desired virtue as long as it leads to kinship ties (s.ilat al-rah.im). Abu Hurayra narrates that the Prophet said: Learn from your lineage that which enables you to keep ties with your kinship.32

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Many pagan Arabs were turning away from embracing Islam out of fear of losing their high rank in society. Nonetheless, the Prophet, addressing those who were asking about the noblest among men, said: [ … ] People are (like) metals, the best among them in the Ja-hiliyya will be the best in Islam, if they perceive (religion).33 With this new norm of “faith,” Bilal, the Ethiopian slave, acquires a high rank in the new “society of believers” together with the Quraishite nobles who embraced Islam, and Salman the Persian is one of the closest companion to the Prophet, while Abu Lahab, the Prophet’s uncle, becomes a symbol of the people of Hell.34 Strong ties of kinship are a characteristic of the pre-Islamic society, but mostly in the negative direction of fanaticism to one’s kinsfolk and supporting it in all cases, being just or wrong. Many are the wars that were waged for the slightest injury of the tribal code established on the solidarity among all members of the clan. The system which one may call “the tribe-state” in analogy to the city-state of ancient Athens urged its members simply to help friends and harm enemies.35 Islam, coming with new bonds established on faith and common origin of humankind, purified the tribal code from its blind loyalty to blood ties. On the one hand, Islam intensified kinship-tie (s.ilat al-rah.im) to the extent that in a qudsi hadith God Almighty says: I am the Rahman (Merciful), I created the rah.im (kinship) and gave it a name linked to Mine, he who maintains link with it will I maintain link with him, and he who cuts link with it will I cut link with him.36 On the other hand, this blood link is no more the determinant to distinguish justice from wrongdoing. The Quran orders Muslims to stand out firmly for justice, not only against their kin or parents but even against themselves. The determinant to distinguish the just from the unjust is no more “my kin,” but rather “my God”: O you who believe! stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. Follow not the lusts (of your hearts), lest you swerve, and if you distort (justice) or decline to do justice, verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that you do. (Al-Nisa-’, 4:135)

Integration, rationalization and centrism (wasat.iyya) The Islamic refinement of the Arab tradition, as a reference point of criticism which represents the human case as a whole, exceeded the limits of the tribal

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blood bonds to the moral code of this ja-hilı- society. The Islamic approach toward the pre-Islamic moral code took different forms. In the case of moral virtues, like generosity, commitment to one’s word and pledge, eagerness to help others, etc., Islam integrated every good practice inspired by these virtues. At the same time, hyperbole and excessiveness even in the practice of virtues become severely criticized, rationalized and consolidated in a balanced mode. A virtue, in the new Islamic context, lies, in accordance with the Platonic ethics, between two vices. For example, the Arabs before Islam were famous for their hospitality and generosity. Hatim Al-Tai’y, a pre-Islamic poet, remains a prototype of these virtues in the Arab-Islamic culture until our days. Islam extended these values and ranked them highly in the scale of a religious code for the “ethics of faith.” The Quran, establishing the concept of ’ı-tha-r (altruism), praises those who favor others over themselves even if they are in need: And (they) prefer (others) above themselves though poverty become their lot. And whoso is saved from his avarice – such are they who are successful. (Al-H . ashr, 59:9) Al-Tabari, Ibn Kathir and Al-Qurtubi cite the following story as the occasion for the revelation (sabab al-nuzu-l) of this verse. A man arrived in Medina and asked the Prophet for hospitality. The Prophet had nothing at his home to offer him so he asked the present companions if any of them could do so, and a poor man from the Ans.a-r named Abu Talha said: “I do, Messenger of God.” He accompanied the man to his house; but his wife told him that the food is enough only for their kids. They planned to put the hungry kids to sleep, serve the food, the wife would pretend to fix the lamp but in fact she will turn it off, and in darkness, they will pretend to eat with the man so that he might not be embarrassed.37 The Prophet says: Let him who believes in Allah and the Hereafter be generous to his guest.38 Moreover, “giving” and combating poverty became not only an Islamic virtue, but also a ritual. The Islamic pillar of almsgiving (zaka-/s.adaqa) urges Muslim to spend in all routes of good and welfare and makes it an essential part of their faith. The following verses are only a few examples of what we read in the Quran: And they feed, for the love of Allah, the indigent, the orphan, and the captive. (Al-Insa-n 76.8) Those who patiently persevere, seeking the countenance of their Lord; establish regular prayers; spend, out of (the gifts) We have bestowed for their sustenance, secretly and openly; and turn off Evil with good: for such there is the final attainment of the (Eternal) Home. (Al-Ra’d 13.22)

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Speak to My servants who have believed, that they may establish regular prayers, and spend (in charity) out of the Sustenance We have given them, secretly and openly, before the coming of a Day in which there will be neither mutual bargaining nor befriending. (Ibra-hı-m, 14:31) Those who rehearse the Book of Allah, establish regular Prayer, and spend (in Charity) out of what We have provided for them, secretly and openly, hope for a Commerce that will never fail. (Fa-t.ir, 35:29) Equally, avarice is seen as a vice, dispraised to the utmost degree both in the Quran and the Sunnah. We find many relevant verses in the Quran; for example: And let not those who covetously withhold of the gifts which Allah has given them of His Grace, think that it is good for them: nay, it will be the worse for them; soon shall the things which they covetously withheld be tied to their necks like a twisted collar, on the Day of Judgment. (Al ’Imra-n, 3:180) So fear Allah as much as you can; listen and obey and spend in charity for the benefit of your own soul and those saved from the covetousness of their own souls, they are the ones that achieve prosperity. (Al-Tagha-bun, 64:16) The Sunnah has also many telling examples. A Prophetic supplication teaches Muslims to ask God’s help to be saved from avarice.39 Another hadith puts it clearly: Two characteristics never meet in a believer: avarice and bad manners.40 From the above texts, it is clear that expenditure in the path of welfare is intensified as an essential characteristic and pillar of Islamic faith. Even on the personal level, a Muslim is not barred from enjoying the graces of this world; rather, he is asked to do so in a balanced way without transgression of limits. Islam redirected generosity and consumption, rationalized expenditure as regards to its negative aspects and distinguished it from luxury so that it would not turn into a sort of prodigality and dissipation. While the door is kept open for every kind of expenditure to help the poor and support all kinds of common societal welfare, every kind of wealth overuse and improvidence is totally dispraised. The via media or wasat.iyya (centrism) is a crucial concept here: O Children of Adam! Wear your beautiful apparel at every time and place of prayer: eat and drink: but waste not by excess, for Allah loves not the wasters. (Al-A’ra-f, 7:31)

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy But waste not by excess: for Allah loves not the wasters. (Al-An’aa-m, 6:141) Make not your hand tied (like a niggard’s) to your neck, nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach, so that you become blameworthy and destitute. (Al-Isra-’, 17:29)

This was also the case concerning keeping one’s pledge, word and oath, which was a characteristic of the Arab society observed very early in ancient historical works. The ancient Greek historian Herodotus, known as the father of history, gives a detailed description of a case where the Ancient Arabs keep their pledges more than any other people: Cambyses took the advice of his Halicarnassian guest, and sent messengers to the Arabian to beg a safe-conduct through the region. The Arabian granted his prayer, and each pledged faith to the other. The Arabs keep such pledges more religiously than almost any other people. They plight faith with the forms following. When two men would swear a friendship, they stand on each side of a third: he with a sharp stone makes a cut on the inside of the hand of each near the middle finger, and, taking a piece from their dress, dips it in the blood of each, and moistens therewith seven stones lying in the midst, calling the while on Bacchus and Urania. After this, the man who makes the pledge commends the stranger (or the citizen, if citizen he be) to all his friends, and they deem themselves bound to stand to the engagement.41 In the same context, the pre-Islamic poet Amr Ibn Kulthoum says: We shall be found the firmest men in duty and the truest of men to the oath once taken.42 This commitment to one’s word and pledge is underlined repeatedly in the Islamic sacra scriptura. The Quran orders Muslims to be committed to their covenants, pledges, oaths, words, contracts, treaties and every kind of obligation: O you who believe! Fulfill (all) obligations.

(Al-Ma-’ida, 5:1)

To fulfill pledges is one of the characteristics of righteousness. It is mentioned in a direct Quranic context in relation to the pillars of Islam and belief: It is not righteousness that you turn your faces towards East or West; but it is righteousness to believe in Allah and the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Book, and the Messengers; to spend of your substance, out of love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer,

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for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayer, and practice regular charity, to fulfill the covenants which you have made; and to be firm and patient, in pain (or suffering) and adversity, and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth, the God-fearing. (Al-Baqara, 2:177) Even if the pledge is given to the polytheists and the pagans, it should be kept. The verse pertaining to this comes from a Medinaean Sura and in a context about engaging in fighting with the polytheists: (But the treaties are) not dissolved with those Pagans with whom you have entered into alliance and who have not subsequently failed you in aught, nor aided anyone against you. So fulfill your engagements with them to the end of their term: for Allah loves the righteous. (Al-Tawba, 9:4) Fulfill the Covenant of Allah when you have entered into it, and break not your oaths after you have confirmed them: indeed you have made Allah your surety; for Allah knows all that you do. (Al-Nah.l, 16:91) There are still more examples of the openness of Islam to incorporating virtuous practices or moral codes, even if they come from the most alien contexts. The Prophet did not hesitate to express his readiness to adopt a pre-Islamic practice which he himself witnessed. The Prophetic tradition approves and maintains the pre-Islamic alliance and coalition called h.ilf al-fud.u-l (the alliance of the Virtuous/fud.u-l), which took the responsibility of helping and supporting the weak against the strong and the wronged against the wrong-doer. The Prophet said: I have witnessed with my uncles, in the house of Abdullah Ibn Jud’aan, an alliance to which I would not prefer the most precious wealth (the Red Camels h.umr al-ni‘am),43 and if I were called to it in Islam I would have joined it.44 Furthermore, such pre-Islamic virtue is even more cultivated in Islam. A religion which claims to address the human inherent nature (fit.ra) always promotes and sublimates every human moral, behavior or practice regardless of its socio-historical particularities. The Prophet acknowledges this moral privilege to the very people who considered him and his message as their greatest enemy. On the one hand, another hadith states: Support your brother either wronged or wrong-doing. A man said: “O messenger of Allah, I would support him if he is wronged, but if he is wrong-doing how could I support him?” He said: “You hinder him, or forbid him, from being wrongful. This is how you support him.”45

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On the other hand, the Quranic revelation commands justice and support of the wronged in general terms: Allah does command you to render back your trusts to those to whom they are due; and when you judge between people, that you judge with justice: verily how excellent is the teaching which He gives you! for Allah is He Who hears and sees all things. (Al-Nisa-’, 4:58) Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and liberality to kith and kin, and He forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion: He instructs you, that you may receive admonition. (Al-Nah.l, 19:90) Then, more specification is given to situations in which human temper and emotional tendencies may lead to transgressions of the rule of justice. The Quran presents the instance of two parties of believers who are in quarrel and how the third party should act: If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make you peace between them: but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight you (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies with the Command of Allah; but if it complies, then make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair (and just). (Al-H . ujurat, 49:9) Nothing should make a believer depart from justice; the motive should only be the total commitment to justice even if the receiver of the benefit is full of hatred toward us: O you who believe! stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to Piety: and fear Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that you do. (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:8) This specification extends even further to situations in which human nature may intervene to prefer one party over another, and in situations where the subject of witness is rich or poor, weak or privileged, and in situations where one should witness the truth against his own kin, and if the victim of commitment to justice is his own father or even the individual himself.46 As we have seen, Islam neither completely destructed even the pagan society which existed as its first target of criticism, nor approached it as totally alien and opponent. The examples we have given show that the excessive adoption of a habit, custom, tradition or even an idea can sometimes be rerouted, other

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times cultivated, promoted or refined, but in all cases can be, somehow, Islamized, and put on a path that guarantees the harmony and the consistency between some religious norms and the human inherent nature. Islam has endorsed several social and ethical codes from the Ja-hiliyya period as long as they respond to human fit.ra. Islam did not come to eradicate contemporary systems, but rather to dismantle corruption and give way for the righteous.47 No other words can express what we have discussed in this concern better than the hadith of the Prophet: I have been sent to perfect the best of ethics.48 The Prophet uses the verb “perfect” as a clear reference to the fact that ethics were there, and that he comes with the message that will perfect them by the Divine revelation. If this was the case with the society which Islam originally took as a starting-point of its message, and was its first enemy and line of resistance, how much is someone justified to question the adaptability of such an attitude in the diachronic development of the Muslim societies and the new spatiotemporal contexts, where the Divine immutable Word can be “lived” and “practiced” in a vital and consistent way. To put it more relatively, how much room exists for such a contextualization, though now in reverse order of “Islamic and post-Islamic,” in the relationship between this scriptural Islam and the cultural West? The way in which Islam dealt with its very first antagonistic context shows an impartial and objective attitude toward the values it cherished. The determinant criterion is not the source of the value, but its response to the objectives of the Divine Guidance and appropriateness to the balance between a “perfected” God-sent Message and a developing human status. Thus, the perfection of Islam is to be conceived as perfection through Islam and its ability of amelioration and reform in interaction with different worldly developments. But how does Muslim intellectualism approach this issue of “perfection”? This is what I analyze in the following section.

“This day have I perfected your religion for you”: Revivalism or renovation? In this section, we discuss the boundaries of the celebrated motto among Muslim scholars: “Islam is valid for every time and place.” The critics of such an Islamic theoretical claim – both Muslim and non-Muslim – can easily introduce several modern and contemporary “life systems” and worldviews which guarantee, from their own perspective, practical “solutions” for many urgent and difficult problems and questions in human life. Some of them may also introduce many traumatic “islamic” experiences from the ancient, modern and contemporary history of Islam, where certain dynasties, states, groups or individuals adopted the same motto and had their own conceptualization about the way it should be realized.49 Here we will try to understand the main streams of this Islamic trend which diagnoses most of the modern socio-political diseases of the

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Muslim societies, and even the West, in the scope of an Islamic “solution.” We will do this, focusing on two theoretical approaches which seem to be opposite to one another with regards to their attitude to what is immutable or developable in Islam. We need not forget that this is, overall, an “issue of belief” for many Muslims, simply because Islam is the last Divine Message revealed to humankind, and this last revelation came as guidance to all humankind being the “seal” of religions. In this last revelation, the Divine Law combined and covered the spiritual and the material, the ritual and the behavioral needs of humankind. This should be the starting point of tackling this issue; otherwise, one runs the risk of understanding Islam as a totalitarian system which seeks only to control the life of its believers. Therefore, I will analyze, first, the hermeneutics of the validity of Islam for every time and place, and its implications in the Muslim view of renovation and reform. Secondly, I discuss the example of the modern scholar S. Qutb, and his concept of the perfection of Islam, as a socio-political theorist with great influence on modern Muslim traditionalism. Finally, I survey briefly the veracity of the identification of renovation as bringing alien novelties to a purely perfected Islam. The s.a-lih. and the mus.lih. dialectic Part of the challenges put on the shoulders of the promoters of the motto “Islam is valid for every time and place” can be formulated in the question: which “islam” in which “time and place”? In other words, Islam as a tradition has witnessed several forms of socio-political contexts from its very beginning reaching its status quo with a great mosaic of cultures, societies, political systems and even forms of religiosity. This diverse variety of so-called “islams” lays down a lot of ambiguities about the constitutional structures and practical implications of such a generalized and indeterminate slogan. Both modern and contemporary Islamic discourses on reform, the limits or the incentives imposed on the process of modernization of Muslim societies – with regard to every new implication and context of life – are all linked to a series of jurisprudential approaches marked by some classical and modern Muslim “archetype” scholars. Each of those approaches finds its legitimacy in certain readings and interpretations of the primary sources of the Islamic law. In order to investigate the tensions between the different approaches it is very important to explore the ideological backgrounds that feed them. Here, we will discuss some examples of the evolution of Islamic thought concerning the concepts of innovation and revivalism and the very compatibility of Islam with such socio-cultural and political theoretical notions. A central issue in this discussion was always, and still is, the boundaries between a (bad/heterodox) novelty (bid‘a) and an unrestricted benefit (mas.lah.a mursala) in light of the objectives of the Islamic law (maqa-s.id al-shari‘a). In other words, the point of conflict is represented in two sets of philosophical/ hermeneutical approaches to the core Islamic texts on the matter of the consistency of Islam to the diachronic changeable spatiotemporal contexts. One

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focuses on the indisputable “perfection” of the last divine message of Islam, which God bestowed upon humankind to be “valid” (s.a-lih.) in the time of its revelation as well as in every time to come until the last day. The other approach argues that an essential part of the very “perfection” of this last divine message is the fact that it possesses the ability to “reform/mend” (mus.lih.) every spatiotemporal context. These two rhetorical/linguistic discourses which, in a different way, link “perfection” to “reform,” through the usage of the intransitive participle s.a-lih. or the transitive mus.lih., portray the main streams in Islamic thought concerning the issue of Islam and modernization. The semantics of the two terms are sometimes ignored or vague, with disregard to the mechanisms through which this theoretical adage is to be brought into practice. S.a-lih. is a present active participle derived from the intransitive verb s.alah.a/s.aloh.a which, according to the Arabic classical dictionaries, is the opposite of “decay/be decayed/be corrupted” (i.e., “to be valid/to be good for”). Mus.lih. is the present active participle from the transitive form of the same stem as.lah.a (< s._l_h.) “to mend/repair/fix/improve/make something valid/to grant validity or improvement to something.”50 Thus, on the one hand, the s.a-lih. notion presumably sees in Islam, as a religion and a system for life, an “unchangeable entity” in itself, which proved its validity to the first generations (salaf) and, as it was valid for them, it should be valid for us, as long as we follow the way it was applied then.51 The other adage used in this case, attributed to imam Malik Ibn Anas (d. 796), is “The last of this ummah will not be mended, except by that which mended its beginning.”52 On the other hand, the mus.lih. notion denotes more of the “dynamic” nature of Islam as a system of life. Thus it proposes a more “interactive” dimension to the relationship between Islam and the different spatiotemporal contexts. Moreover, the difference, from an ideological perspective, is clearly to be distinguished in two trends, respectively. The first, the s.a-lih., approaches Islam’s integrity as a per se self-sufficient divine system that was perfected, accomplished and guaranteed by the Transcendent All-Knowing God to humankind before the death of the Prophet. This perfection remains a transtemporal orthodox constitution in the form of the Quran and the Sunnah practiced by the last Messenger of God and followed by his companions, their followers and the generation after the followers: the good/righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-s.a-lih.). The following verse from the Quran, believed by some scholars to be the last verse on rulings revealed to the Prophet,53 can be seen as the best evidence for this approach: This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion. (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:3) The central view of the door to any

question related to this issue is whether this perfection, in the s.a-lih. approach, as mentioned in the previous verse, closes the renovative and reformative initiatives in the diachrony of Islam.

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Is there any room at all for concepts like “renovation,” as seen from the perspective of those who perceive themselves as revivers of the true religion of Islam? And does their concept of “revivalism” respond to the everlasting development and evolution of the human status? To find a reasonable answer for this question, we need to look at some classical and modern interpretations of the aforementioned verse, which can shed some light on the contradictions and juxtapositions between this view and the mus.lih. view. Such interpretations, on a theoretical level, would be a starting point for the discussions about the implementation of those views and their socio-political implications on a tangible and concrete level. In his commentary, Al-Tabari (d. 923), known as the father of tafsı-r, cites the various interpretations of the meaning of “perfection” in the verse. He mentions the view of some interpreters that it is a perfection of the rulings, penalties, commandments, prohibitions, permissible and impermissible things, revelation of the Quran and clarifications through the Prophet; evidences that are given for anything people might need as regards to their religion, so that no more addition is needed after this day. He argues that the most accurate interpretation among the different opinions should see in this perfection of the religion how God has put an end to polytheism in Mecca and around the H . aram (Sacred Place), where now only Muslim pilgrims have access and no single idolater is permitted to join them. He does not agree with the opinion that rulings and laws were completed and finished at that very day because the revelation lasted until the death of the Prophet. According to Al-Tabari, the completion of favor in this verse is a reference to the prevalence of Islam, the defeat of polytheism and the end of the danger that Muslims could be forced to abandon their faith. He interprets the segment “and have chosen Islam as your religion” as God having chosen for humankind the submission to His Will and the obedience of His Law. Here, he uses the linguistic meaning of the terms Islam and Dı-n rather than the technical one, as “submission” and “conformance/obedience,” respectively.54 Al-Qurtubi (d. 1273) sees in the perfection of the religion in this verse a reference to the completion of the religious rituals of Islam. Before the migration from Mecca, only the ritual prayer was prescribed for the Muslims. After the migration to Medina and the establishment of an independent Muslim society, the circle of the permissible and the impermissible was expanded. Now that the pilgrimage to Mecca is also accomplished by the Prophet himself with thousands of Muslims, no more polytheists circumambulate the Ka‘ba and Islam has prevailed; in this sense religion is completed. He links the phrase “completed My favour upon you” to this interpretation as an emphasis on the completion of the rituals, rulings and the prevalence God guaranteed to the believers by bringing them back home safely and victoriously.55 Similarly other classical and modern mufassiru-n, such as Ibn Atiyya (d. 1146), Al-Shawkani (d. 1834) and Rashid Reda (d.1935), relate the meaning of perfection and completion here to the rulings of the permissible (h.ala-l), the impermissible (h.ara-m) and the prevalence of Islam.56

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The modern exegete M. Al-Shaarawi (d. 1998) expands the interpretation of the verse to the crucial issue of whether Islam is valid for every period in time. He argues that if the perfection of this religion is the work of God, then it is unacceptable from any human to redress anything of God’s Legislation. Nevertheless, Al-Shaarawi anticipates the reader’s comprehension by referring to the exceptional relaxations God legislated for Muslims, being The Creator who knows best the changeability and instability of His creatures and of humans in particular. He does so based on the interpretation of the last part of the same verse (“But if any is forced by hunger, with no inclination to transgression, Allah is indeed Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful”). He says: The Creator is the most knowledgeable of His creatures. He knows that human creatures are changeable. Circumstances may intervene so to make the literal implementation of the divine law difficult or impossible. God does not leave it to them to find ways out, He legislates for them the concessive permission. Let no one then say ‘I am not capable of doing this’, because when God knew that this is out of the capacity of the Muslim, He eased him from the beginning.57 The perfection and completion of religion declared in this verse are coupled with this sense of mitigation and ease. This “ease” – made in the core of Islamic legislation, even on the level of the ritual acts of worshipping – is underlined in many verses of the Quran. The compatibility and consistency with human nature are both translated in the very label of Islam, again, as dı-n al-fit.ra. Many of the verses linked to legislative rulings are formulated in the Quran with proper consideration to the human status, so that the continuity and commitment to God’s Law are guaranteed under all circumstances, and in different places and times. In the context of giving a relaxing alternative in a legislative ruling connected to the ritual ablution for the prayer, we read in the following verses of the same Sura: O you who believe! when you prepare for prayer, wash your faces, and your hands (and arms) to the elbows; rub your heads (with water); and (wash) your feet to the ankles. If you are in a state of ceremonial impurity, bath your whole body. But if you are ill, or on a journey, or one of you comes from offices of nature, or you have been in contact with women, and you find no water, betake yourselves to pure earth and wipe your faces and your hands therewith. Allah does not wish to place you in a difficulty, but to make you clean, and to complete His favour to you, that you may be grateful. (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:6) In another context about the fasting of the month of Ramadan, this same concept is repeatedly expressed: Ramadan is the month in which the Qur’an was sent down, as a guide to mankind, and clear signs for guidance and a Criterion (between right and

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy wrong). So whosoever of you is present, let him fast the month, and whosoever of you is sick or on a journey, (let him fast the same) number of other days. Allah desires for you ease; He desires not hardship for you; and (He desires) that you should complete the period, and that you should magnify Allah for having guided you, and that peradventure you may be thankful. (Al-Baqara, 2:185)

And in a context about jiha-d in another Sura, we read: And strive in the cause of Allah as you ought to strive. He has chosen you and has not laid upon you a hardship in religion; it is the cult of your father Abraham. (Al-H . ajj, 22:78) The word “hardship” (h.araj) comes in the indefinite form in the context of negation (nakira fi siya-q al-nafiy), which, in the tafsı-r methodology, implies “generalization” (‘umu-m). The same word is preceded by the preposition “from/ anything of” (min) which implies partition (ta-b‘ı-d.) to intensify that God did not lay upon the believers any kind of hardship. Even in the context of righteousness and piety (taqwa), the variety and instability of the human condition is expressed: So keep your piety to Allah as much as you can.

(Al-Tagha-bun, 64:16)

Relaxations and taking the extent of the human ability into consideration are also widely expressed in the Quran in many other contexts, which all stress God’s All-Encompassing Knowledge as a Creator of the fragility, changeability and diversity of the human status as His creation. He, the All-Knowing, even teaches His creatures how to supplicate to Him for the forgiveness of everything beyond their human strength and beyond the load they can carry: The messenger believes in what has been revealed to him from his Lord, and (so do) the believers; they all believe in Allah and His angels and His books and His messengers; We make no difference between any of His messengers; and they say: We hear and obey, our Lord! Thy forgiveness (do we crave), and to Thee is the eventual course. Allah does not impose upon any soul a duty but to the extent of its ability; for it is (the benefit of) what it has earned and upon it (the evil of) what it has wrought: Our Lord! do not punish us if we forget or make a mistake; Our Lord! do not lay on us a burden as Thou did lay on those before us, Our Lord do not impose upon us that which we have not the strength to bear; and pardon us and grant us protection and have mercy on us, Thou art our Patron, so help us against the unbelieving people. (Al-Baqara, 2:285–86)

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Being the religion of human fit.ra, Islam could consequently claim to be the religion of ease (dı-n al-yosr). In an authentic hadith on the authority of Abu Hurayra the Prophet says: Religion is ease, and whoever goes to extremes in religion overburdens himself (and will not be able to continue in that way). So do not go to extremes, but strive to be near to perfection and receive the good tidings that you will be rewarded; and gain strength by worshipping in the early morning and late night.58 Acknowledging the “imperfection” and changeability of the human status, Islam, as a “perfected” religion, guaranteed mitigation and ease for its believers, even in issues of worshipping (‘iba-dat). It is rather logic to conclude that in worldly issues (mu‘a-mala-t) the room left for the changing spatiotemporal contexts is also guaranteed. Being such a religion, Islam is always valid for different circumstances, times and places. This is why ijtiha-d is considered a valid source of Sharia rulings after the Quran, the Sunnah and the consensus (ijma-‘); and it is the basis and elixir of both the renovation and “transition” of Islam throughout human history. The sphere of this human reasoning is all those rules and rulings that are not proven through definite evidence (dalı-l qat.‘ı-). In this sense, the subjects of ijtiha-d are those rules and rulings which touch on dynamic and variable issues through the course of time. That is why one of the principles of ijtiha-d says: “the change of rules with the change of time and place is not to be denied.”59 Qutb and the idea of perfection One can hardly speak about concepts such as the perfection of Islam, or the “sovereignty of God” (h.a-kimiyya) as a correlative notion, without making reference to Sayyid Qutb. His name and legacy have been largely connected to the revival movement of Islam, on the one hand, and the severe and harsh criticism and opposition to the “non-Islamic” manifestations of modern Muslim societies on the other. Moreover, Qutb has been accused of being one of the major theorists whose work inspired the militant groups that appeared on the political arena of the Middle East and other parts of the world from the second half of the twentieth century. We will give more attention to his approach because of the particularity of his case, as a modern socio-political theorist of the renowned Muslim Brothers movement. He spent two years in the United States, which contributed to his comparative perspective of Muslim and Western societies. He has been, and still is, linked to concepts such as radicalism and fundamentalism, and his influence as a Muslim intellectual stamped his proponents by the term “Qutbists.” Furthermore, Qutb paid his own life for the way he introduced his views of Islamic revivalism.60 Qutb accepts in his tafsı-r work the opinion that the verse in discussion (“This day have I perfected your religion for you … ”) is the last revealed

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verse of the Quran, to announce the perfection of the message and the fulfillment of God’s favor upon humankind.61 Commenting on the beginning of the same Sura, Qutb leaves no obscurity about his statement. His interpretation targets a certain conceptualization about the holistic nature of the opening verse of the same Sura: O you who believe! fulfill the obligations [‘uqu-d].

(Al-Ma-’ida, 5:1)

These ‘uqu-d (linguistically: contracts) denote the covenants/obligations that include every single rule given by the divine revelation to humankind:62 Islam establishes these regulations in the life of humankind, defines them accurately and clearly, links them all to God the Almighty, ensures their due respect so that they should neither be violated nor mocked at, nor be taken by means of whims and capricious desires, nor according to casual interests considered by an individual, a group, a nation, or even a generation of people, something that would lead them to break up those regulations. Because these regulations, established and defined by God, form the ‘interest’ [mas.lah.a], as long as God is He who established them for humankind. They form the interest even if an individual, a group, a nation or a generation finds interest elsewhere! For Allah knows and people know not! What He determined for them is better than what they determine for themselves.63 Although his interpretation of the word ‘uqu-d does not deviate a lot from the classical interpretations, Qutb’s statement tends to go beyond the interpretation of the verse. His magnum opus in tafsı-r, titled fi Z.ila-l Al-Qur’a-n (In the Shade of the Quran) has been classified according to the exegetic genre as a social interpretation. In this work, there is a clear tendency to diagnose all the social problems of the era as symptoms of the antireligious currents and the internal Islamic apostasy, not from Islam, but within Islam. It is quite clear from the beginning of his approach that he differentiates the Muslims of today from those of his own concept. He introduces his interpretation of this Sura reminding the readers of the utmost goal of the revelation of the Quran as a whole. While he defines this goal in totally socio-political terms, he emphasizes that this is the true “religion” of Islam, as Muslims had known it when they were truly “Muslim”: This Quran was revealed upon the heart of the Messenger of God – peace be upon him – to build an Ummah, establish a state, organize a society, refine consciences, morals and minds, and itemize the bonds of this society, within itself, and the bonds between this state and the other states, and the relation between this Ummah and the other nations [ummahs] … and to bind all this together with one strong bond, which gathers its scattered portions, compiles its parts and pulls them all to one source, one

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authority and one orientation.This is the true religion, as it is for God, as the Muslims had known it, when they were “Muslim”!64 When he comes to the part of the verse in question, he draws the attention of the reader to the fact that the reference to the “perfection of religion” is mentioned in the context of a verse about the permissibility and impermissibility of some animal meats;65 then, he poses this rhetorical question: what is the significance of this? The answer comes directly to intensify his theorization of the Sharia as an “indivisible whole” which comprises in its different details the dı-n, “religion”: A part of the significance of this is that the Sharia of Allah is an indivisible integral whole, either with regard to what is related to conception and belief, or to rituals and actions of devotion, or to h.ala-l [permissible] and h.ara-m [impermissible], or to social and international regulations. This, as a whole, is dı-n ‘religion’, about which God says in this verse that He has perfected. It is the ‘favor’, which God addresses the believers about, that He has completed upon them. Also that there is no difference in this religion between what is related to personal conception and belief or to rituals and actions of devotion, or to h.ala-l permissible and h.ara-m impermissible, or to social and international regulations … because these comprise as a whole the Divine Path which God has chosen for those who believe. To step out of this path in a part is equal to step away from it as a whole, [that is] to step away from this dı-n, and, consequently, to step out of this dı-n.66 On the one hand, through a parity between Sharia and religion, he sets, in clear terms, a standardization of the notion of dı-n, “religion,” as a maximal and inclusive system for all the features and aspects of human life. On the other hand, he gives a perception of the practical application of this dı-n as a predominant normative process of accreditation for all the details of human life. No margins exist between “religion” and “life” in Qutb’s view. In other words, one can easily conclude from his reading of the verse that this “last religion” is perfected in order to perfect the “lasting life”. He goes beyond the holistic nature of the Sharia-dı-n notion to reproduce his main theory about the doctrine of h.a-kimiyya, “sovereignty of God”: The issue here is to be attributed to what we have defined previously: that a refusal of anything of this path, which God has chosen for the believers, and to substitute it with something else of a human source, means clearly a refusal of Allah’s Godship – glory be to Him; ascribing the qualities of Godship to some humans; a violation of God’s sovereignty on Earth and claiming Godship in its higher quality: the h.a-kimiyya. This means clearly stepping away from this dı-n and consequently stepping out of this dı-n.67

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For Qutb, rejecting any of God’s legislations means a rejection of His authority for the sake of human authority, and as a corollary, this involves deifying humans. Ascribing sovereignty h.a-kimiyya to humans instead of God is, in his view, a contemporary ja-hiliyya which is “based on an attack against God’s authority on Earth and against the most distinctive characteristic of divinity (ulu-hiyya), sovereignty (h.a-kimiyya), ascribing sovereignty to humans and making some people lords over others.”68 He calls us to contemplate about the status of the divine messages before Islam, and how each of them addressed a certain group of people, in a certain period of time and a certain context. When God wanted to accomplish His message to humankind, He sent this last message to address humankind in every time, place and circumstance, because it addresses the human fit.ra (i.e., the inherent God-made pattern of all humankind). Accordingly, Qutb quotes Sura Al-Ru-m 30.30: So set your face steadily towards the religion (Islam) worshipping none but Allah Alone. Allah’s handiwork according to the pattern on which He has made mankind; no change (let there be) in the work (wrought) by Allah; that is the standard Religion, but most among mankind understand not.69 When he returns to his comments on the verse, “This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion,” he writes: He announced to them the perfection of both creed and Sharia together … this is the dı-n … it is no more possible for the believer to imagine that this religion – in this sense – has any defect that requires completion, nor an insufficiency that requires supplement, nor a topicality or a temporality that require development or alteration … otherwise he is no more a believer and does not confesses the trueness of God, or accepts what God accepts for the believers! The Sharia of the time of the revelation of the Quran is the Sharia of every time, because it is – according to God’s testimony – the Sharia of the religion which came to ‘humankind’ in every time and place, not to a certain group of humankind, in a certain generation, in a certain place, as it is the case of the former messages and messengers. The detailed rulings came to remain as they are. The general principles came to be the framework within which human life would develop until the end of time, without stepping out of it, unless stepping out of faith! God, who created ‘man’ and knows who He did create, is He Who had chosen for him this religion which includes this Sharia. Thus, no one could say: ‘the Sharia of the past is not valid for today’, unless he is someone who claims to himself the knowledge about human needs and human evolution better than God!70 Here, Qutb seems to leave no doubt about his maximal view of Islam, a belief and a law, as an immutable and non-evolutional code which was valid in the

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time of its revelation and cannot be subject to any human alteration, development or reinterpretation, otherwise, this would be a sign of disagreement with God’s choice for humankind. He states that authority is only to be given to what God revealed “without any modification, distortion or alteration”.71 The perfection of the dı-n, in this theorization, indicates necessarily its validity for human life in every time and place. The reader gets a strong impression that no difference is to be made between the detailed rulings and the general principles; both are to be followed literally, and applied despite the change in time and place. The greatest part of the severe criticism made against Qutb’s theory is largely based on this generalization.72 This may not actually be the case when Qutb’s statements in this same tafsı-r are read with more careful attention. He seems to be fully aware of these differences and distinctions between the total principles (kolliyya-t) and the detailed rulings (ah.ka-m tafs.-ıliyya). He writes: He [God] set in this Message a Sharia which deals with the ‘human’ life from all its sides and activities. It establishes for this life the total principles and basic fundamentals with regards to everything which develops and evolves due to the change of time and place. It establishes also the detailed rulings and partial laws with regards to everything which does not develop or evolve due to the change of time and place. Thus, this Sharia, with both its total principles and detailed rulings, embodies everything ‘human’ life needs since the time of this Message until the end of time, including regulations, instructions, legislations and systems so that this life keeps going, develops, evolves and can be renewed around this axis and within this framework.73 This clear view of the difference between the general principles and the detailed rulings can be seen in the context of the distinction between the immutable Sharia and the developable fiqh. This position becomes clearer when we read the words of Qutb in one of his other works where he adopts a more intelligible perspective about a diachronic Islamic Image. Here, we find a rebuttal of the idea of one matrix/model of an “islam,” and acceptance of several potential images of Islam which can correspond to the different spatiotemporal contexts. Qutb theorizes upon the flexibility of many “renewed” images that can all be described as “Islamic,” as long as they all reflect the total Islamic view as their starting point. From the start, he already feels the need to underline two great facts: We have to clarify in advance two great facts: the first is that Islamic Sharia is something and Islamic fiqh is something else. They are not equal, neither in source nor in authority, and our position with regards to the revivalism of the constituents of the Islamic society and its organization toward them is not the same. The second is that the historical image/images of the Islamic society is/are not the final one/ones for this

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The way in which Qutb expresses the distinction between Sharia and fiqh, his awareness of the fact that the historical Islamic experiences cannot be seen as the “final” patterns of an Islamic revivalism today, and his recognition of any society which is inspired by the total Islamic idea and lives in its general framework as Islamic, are all clear evidence that Qutb realized and promoted the need to combine revivalism and renovation in any Islamic modern sociopolitical project. The “perfection” of Islam in his view lies also in the ability of this last divine revelation to develop and renovate itself, and respond to the new challenges and needs that emerge in human life. Renovation and bid‘a Another central issue related to the discussion about revivalism and renovation is the concept of bid‘a. Bid‘a, as an Islamic term, is often freely translated as an “innovation,” “heterodoxy” or a “novelty”. The concept emerges basically from a Prophetic hadith where we read: The best speech is the Book of Allah, and the best guidance is the guidance of Muhammad. The worst of matters are those innovated, and each innovated matter is a bid‘a, and every bid‘a is misguidance.75 Linguistically, the term can be defined as: “what is invented without a precedent example”. Technically, bid‘a is “an invented way in religion after its perfection,”76 or “an action without evidence in religion,”77 or, according to another definition, “an invented way in religion which emulates the original religious legislation and its aim is the exaggeration in worshipping God.”78 Al-Shatibi, in his work titled al-I‘tis.a-m – which is entirely dedicated to the disclosure of and admonition against bid‘a – states that the technical definition of this “innovation” or “novelty” is restricted to “religion” because it occurs within it and the attempt is made to add it to this religion. He emphasizes the fact that if it is an invention, especially in the worldly life, it cannot be called bid‘a, like the invention of different workmanships and cities which were not usual in the past.79 He rejects any justification of any inventor/innovator (mubtadi‘) in religion simply because the Sharia came perfected and needs neither increase nor decrease. He does so using, as evidence, the same verse (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:3: “This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion”).80 However, Al-Izz Ibn Abdelsalam (d. 1261) opened a new chapter in the definition and classification of the concept of bid‘a. He defines it technically as “an act which was not usual in the period of the Prophet.” He classifies it

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into the same five categories of the Sharia rulings – al-ah.ka-m al-taklı-fiyya: obligatory (wa-jib/fard.); prohibited (h.ara-m); recommended (mandu-b/Sunnah); detestable (makru-h); and neutral/permissible (muba-h.). His method for classifying a bid‘a into one of these categories is to examine it by the respective ruling of the Sharia.81 In one of his treatises,82 he cites three types of bid‘a: the neutral/permissible (muba-h.), the good (h.asan) and that which contradicts the Sharia (mukha-lif). Here, he distinguishes between a good and a bad bid‘a. In the good bid‘a, he includes some worldly deeds such as building schools and shops etc. However, this leads some other scholars to disprove the classification of Al-Izz, and to generalize the negative meaning of bid‘a in the aforementioned Prophetic hadith. Thus, there is only a bad bid‘a.83 In all the above-mentioned cases, the concept of bid‘a is unanimously restricted to an innovation or invention in something related to the legislative corpus of religion, especially in the field of creed ‘aqida and ritual actions of devotion (‘iba-dat). Both Al-Shatibi and Al-Izz Ibn Abdelsalam mention some achievements of the civilization and culture of their own time as examples of those innovations outside the Islamic concept of bid‘a. The outcome of this exploration of some representative examples and relative issues to the two approaches of the s.a-lih. and the mus.lih. Islam might lead to reconciliation between both streams on the theoretical level. Both sides claim a certain authority of Islam, a “scriptural” and “pure” Islam, in the systematization, amelioration and prosperity of Muslim societies today. The difference is to be distinguished in the solidity or flexibility of this “Islamization,” and the ability or inability of the proposed pattern to be responsive to the changeability of time and place. Neither of those approaches denies the fact that in order to make Islam valid (s.a-lih.) for every time and place, it should be able to reform/mend (mus.lih.) the very context of that specific time and place. Those who tend to introduce Islam in a rigid, immutable and literally repeatable experience perceive it, unintentionally, as a template form for life, and not as a religion, a way of life and a last divine message with a method (manhaj) which prognosticates the mutability and development of the human status. In this perspective, acts that involve interaction with the mundane context (mu‘a-mala-t) are to be viewed as much fixed as rituals of worship (‘iba-dat), while Islam has guaranteed ease and flexibility even in the case of the latter. The first generations of Muslims (the salaf) – who are regarded to have understood and implemented the Islam we opt for today – managed to be righteous and pious Muslims as much as they succeeded to be prosperous and civilized humans. The reason was that they did not only adhere fully to God’s Law, but that they tried also to deduce practical rulings for their worldly life based on detailed evidences from the divine revelation. The perpetual consistency between this adherence to God’s Law and that attempt to open the way for this Law in practical life is nothing more than the nexus between Sharia and fiqh. At exactly this point, both promoters of the s.a-lih. and the mus.lih. Islam can meet.

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Reform in a Muslim context A debate on the concept of reform is surely part of the discussion about development, the tensions between tradition and renovation, and the limits of contextualization. The term “reform,” as it is used in Western theological contexts, is mainly related to radical religious corrective/ameliorative movements as is the case of Protestantism: from the Roman-Catholic Magesterium to the Sola Scriptura, or Vatican II; from the Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus (third century) to its Nostra Aetate (1965). As Islam has no such institutional clerical organization, as is the case with Christianity, it is expected that the concept of reform in Islam would assume different forms and occur through different processes.84 Other historical and cultural factors determine the difference between an Islamic reform and the religious “reform” as it was experienced in certain Christian contexts. The reasons and motivations requiring this reform are totally different. In the case of Islam, the concept of reform is clearly connected to revivalism. In the view of most Muslims, the classical Islamic tradition had presented “models” of civilizational and cultural superiority without discrepancies or conflict with science, human intellectuality and development. In this view, the Islamic “Middle Ages” stand for the Islamic “Golden Age” and represent the zenith of Islamic civilization. Perhaps the modern and contemporary calls for revivalism and reform, which began intensively in the nineteenth century, are signalizing the fact that Islam is going through its own epoch of stagnation. Nevertheless, the authority of religion in the Muslim world can still survive the impact of both modernity and post-modernity. All these factors should be taken seriously and carefully into consideration in any discussion of an Islamic reform. Consequently, we have to begin with the particularities of this notion within an Islamic perspective. Afterwards, in the second sub-section, I analyze the philosophy of the Muslim notion of renovation tajdı-d, and then, in the third sub-section, the conceptualization of the fiqh of reform in some classical and modern Muslim views. Islamic reform and “reform” In the beginning, we have to pose the question: What is Islamic reform? This is the question we need to answer in advance before we explore the modalities of a supposed Islamic reform. Firstly, an “Islamic” reform is/should be per definitionem based on Islam and its scriptural sources. Claiming reform in the name of Islam, while its core fundamentals are abandoned, altered or substituted, disadvantages the very process of reform and its acceptability in a “Muslim” context. It creates and generalizes an idea that every initiative to achieve reform in Muslim societies is actually an attempt to eliminate the role of religion, and control its involvement in society or in politics for the sake of non-Islamic secular ideologies. In the middle of the twentieth century, A. Amin defined the term “tajdı-d” (renewal, renovation), psychologically, as:

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The flexibility of the mind to substitute the old status by a new one, or modify the old to be in consistency with the new. Consequently, tajdı-d takes two forms: putting an end to the old by revolutionary means, or taking part of the old and anther of the new and mixing them proportionally by a peaceful uneventful way.85 This definition of tajdı-d, with its two forms, is irrelevant to the Islamic perspective of reform. It contributed to undermining the credibility of the very concept of reform among Muslims, and having them view it as a call to abandon religion. Presumably, Amin had in mind the Western model of Enlightenment, and especially Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78).86 Paradoxically, Amin seems indifferent about the fact that even in the eighteenth century Europe of Enlightenment, in the name of social coherence, contradictions and a pro-theocratic mentality were so pervading. Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote in 1762 in his Du Contrat Social that in the future ideal state, one who did not believe in the religious truths decreed by the legislature should be banished from the state, or even, one who, after having recognized them, would cease to believe, should be punished by death.87 The rejection, by some Muslims, of the applicability of the concept of reform in Islam can be attributed to several factors. One is the notion of perfection of Islam, which makes out of every “reform” a political invention essentially alien to true Islam. In this perspective, “reform” is seen as “deform,” and reformed Islam is no longer Islam at all.88 According to T. Ramadan, Muslims oppose the word “reform” because it represents a threefold danger concerning their faithfulness to Islamic tradition. The first is that reforming Islam means changing and distorting Islam to adapt it to current times. The second criticism sees reform as an approach imported from Christianity. The third bases on the universality and timelessness of Islamic teachings that can be implemented in all times and places.89 Thus, an Islamic reform is/should be a procedure from within, and for Islam, but not of Islam. What I mean is that Islam has its inherent capacity to offer reform and renewal of its socio-political mechanisms, as long as the tenets of faith are not altered or renovated. Terms such as is.la-h. (reform), tajdı-d (renewal, renovation), ih.ya-’ (revival) and nahd.a/s.ah.wa (renaissance, revival) are all representative and present in classical, modern and contemporary Muslim history.90 These terms, in the Islamic context, have always emanated from within coherent genuine Islamic thought, and mostly for the sake of the re-emergence of Islamic ideals and modalities of life. I would define an “Islamic reform” of today as a theory and procedure which proposes a redefinition of a certain Islamic approach to the challenges of modernity within the framework of Islamic legislative regulations. This happens not apart from the traditional contributions of Islamic thought, and not in contradiction with the fundamentals of Islam as delineated in the Quran and the Sunnah.91 From an Islamic perspective, religion and divine revelation as an infallible source of knowledge are in the heart of every reform. Even in the Islamic

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eschatology, the coming of Al-Mahdi Al-Muntaz.ar (the Expected Rightly Guided One), in the Sunni tradition, or the Hidden Imam Al-Mahdi, in the Shiite tradition, is supposed to be a sort of reform and renewal which will restore “true Islam.”92 The contemporary trend to compete with literalists by disqualifying some authentic Prophetic traditions or re-interpreting some Quranic verses, limiting them exclusively to the historical context of their revelation, do less favor to an “Islamic” project of reform. Both the Hadith methodology and the Quranic science of asba-b al-nuzu-l (reasons/occasions of revelation) have anticipated such allegations by setting norms to the issue of authenticity and methods to the idea of contextual limitedness. The criteria for determining the authenticity of a Prophetic tradition follow a strict critical historical methodology on both external and internal levels: the chain of narrators (sanad/isna-d) and the veracity of the text (matn). Also, the Quranic science of asba-b al-nuzu-l which links some Quranic verses to the reason or occasion of their revelation teaches a well-known rule that consideration should be given to the generality of the wording and not the specificity of the reason/occasion (al-‘ibra bi ‘umu-m al-lafz. la- bi khus.u-s. al-sabab).93 Not to mention the problem of authenticity as far as some related narrations about asba-b al-nuzu-l are concerned.94 Such a doctrine of “reform,” based on the disqualification of authentic hadiths or the contextual limitedness of Quranic verses, misses the right way to approach the problematic of literality and “anachronistic” interpretations. Instead of “re-reading” and understanding the texts in light of a great Islamic diversity of interpretations, it tends to “re-construct” the sources of Islamic faith, with the hope that this may bring the desired change. However, this is not only untrue to the grasp of most Muslims, but also works in favor of the literalist school which finds an easily labeled antagonist, not of itself but of Islam, to manipulate. The true challenge of an Islamic reform is how to remain faithful to the creed as such, and how to remain coherent as to the confrontations of modern scientific, cultural and societal evolution.95 Tajdı-d al-dı-n and the philosophy of renovation A reference point in the theme of reform and renovation in Islam is a Prophetic tradition which clearly affirms the notion of tajdı-d. Abu Hurayra narrates that the Prophet said: God sends for this Ummah [at the head (end/beginning) of] every hundred years someone/some people who renew(s) its religion.96 Apart from the intended meaning by the “head” of the 100 years, there is a good reason to believe that the relative pronoun man (who) used in the hadith indicates either singular or plural.97 The classical interpretation of the intended tajdı-d focuses on the theological aspects of the concept of renewal and regeneration of the purity of the tenets and principles of Islam as they

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were established by the Prophet and the first generations. Most explanations see that the role of the “mujaddid” (renovator), whether one or more, is to purify Islam from bad innovations (bida‘), revive the true teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah and to overcome the distorted forms of religious practices.98 Actually, the concept of tajdı-d from this perspective is less relevant to the reform we discuss here. The term dı-n (religion) mentioned in the hadith may denote two things. It may mean the divine guidance which God revealed to His Messenger to regulate the relation between humans and God and between humans and each other. This is the immutable aspect of “religion” which cannot be renewed, as it represents an extra-human truth. The second meaning indicates the human status in interaction with that God-sent truth, spiritually and practically. In this second aspect, “religion” is mutable and dynamic because it is related to the human understanding and commitment to the teachings of the divine revelation. This last aspect of religion is mutable and renewable. This is why the word “religion” in the hadith is added to the ummah (yujaddidu laha- dı-naha-) and not to God, because the object of tajdı-d is the religion of the Muslims and not the religion of Islam.99 Here exactly lies the nature and domain of reform. Firstly, in the area of the no-text, which God left to the humans in order to practice the fourth Islamic source of Sharia, human reasoning ijtiha-d. Secondly, ijtiha-d is also active in the area of the speculative texts (nus.u-s. z.anniyya),100 which bear no conclusive meaning and are open to interpretation, and these are many. Above these two areas, there is the area of assertive and decisive texts (nus.u-s. qat.‘iyya) which covers the corpus of the principles of Islamic Sharia.101 This means that an Islamic reform, while not reaching the immutable fields of religion, includes an attempt to seek divine guidance in aspects of life beyond the realm of religious knowledge. It covers the civilizational terrain of scientific progress, socio-political development and all new comings in human life having no direct or clear textual reference, in whatever time or place.102 This field of reform, based on ijtiha-d, enables Muslims to renew properly their understanding of the scriptural tradition in the context of the here and now. In this view, there is no revolutionary cut-off attitude as regards to the tradition, but rather, a re-activation of the dynamic aspects of this tradition, in consistency with the prerequisites of development and modernity. That the result would be different from the “Western” model(s) of modernity is certain, not to mention the diverse notions about modernity. But here we need to pose a question about the presupposition of the uniqueness of the Western path to modernity, the tension between tradition and modernity and the role of religion in this tension. A. Salvatore brilliantly puts it as follows: Tradition should not be understood as non-reflexive, primordial culture but, more dynamically as the ensemble of practices and arguments that secure the social bond and provide cohesiveness to human communities

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy of varying scale [ … ]. In this sense, tradition is not the opposite of modernity intended as the manifestation of human autonomy and creativity [ … ]. Such a negative notion of tradition has often been identified with ‘religion’, which then happens to be viewed in the most archaic forms [ … ]. In contrast to this approach, I propose an understanding of tradition and modernity neither as antithetical modes of social being, nor as typologically distinct social formations, but as forms of the social bond that are different but can become organically connected in various ways. It is the combination of certain types of tradition with given processes of transformation that produces distinctive societies that we call “modern.”103

What makes Islam, as a tradition, capable of producing dynamics for reform and modernity lies in the very structure of Islam, which combines unequivocally the spiritual with the material. Any project of reform which aims to restore the Islamic golden ages only by focusing on the spiritualities of Islam without a scientific-civilizational dimension cannot be characterized as fully Islamic. Such a project would certainly achieve spiritual goals, but is spirituality what Islam is all about? Islam is constructed, symbolically, in a pyramidal form which bases on spirituality and moves toward the world of reality. At the foundation and core of this pyramid stands a creed of pure monotheism (Tawh.-ıd), and through rituals (‘iba-dat), which are strictly linked to a complete system of morals and ethics (akhla-q), it reaches its top in the form of a behavioral system of interaction with all the mundane context (mu‘amala-t). The final goal is, again, the amelioration (is.la-h.) of the human for happiness in this world and the Hereafter. The five pillars of Islam (arka-n al-Isla-m al-khamsa) begin with a declaration of the testimony of faith (shaha-da) and proceed toward the ritual manifestations of this faith (s.ala-, zaka-, s.awm, and

Mu ‘ämalät (behavior & dealings)

Akhhiq (ethics) ‘Ibiilh lt (rituals o f devotion)

*Aqida Figure 3.1 The structure of Islam

(c re e d : T a vvljld )

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h.ajj). Each of these rituals is strictly linked to a certain moral and behavioral code. S.ala- (prayers) should restrain a believer from obscenity and evil: Recite what is sent of the Book by inspiration to you, and establish regular Prayer: for Prayer restrains from shameful and unjust deeds. (Al-‘Ankabu-t, 29:45) Zaka- (obligatory alms) has been legislated to “purify” and cleanse people. It is supposed to purify the heart of the needy from envy and hatred, keep his dignity and integrity and push him to work and struggle for better social status. At the same time, it is supposed to discharge the rich person from egoism, teach him altruism and push him for more work to make up his alms’ contribution. Take alms out of their property, you would cleanse them and purify them thereby. (Al-Tawba, 9:103) S.iya-m/S.awm (fast) is not only to “give up” food, drink and sexual intercourse, but is also prescribed as a means of self-restraint.104 O you who believe! Fasting is prescribed to you as it was prescribed to those before you, that you may (learn) self-restraint. (Al-Baqara, 2:183) Fasting without keeping with the behavioral and moral code behind this ritual becomes mere hunger and thirst. The s.ah.-ıh. hadiths narrated by Abu Hurayra state that the Prophet said: Fasting is a shield (screen/shelter). So, the person observing fasting should avoid sexual relation with his wife and should not behave foolishly and impudently, and if somebody fights with him or abuses him, he should tell him twice, “I am fasting.”105 Whoever does not forsake false speech and evil deeds, God is not in need of his forsaking food and drink.106 H . ajj (pilgrimage) is also conditioned by strict moral and behavioral restrictions: The pilgrimage is (in) the well-known months. If anyone undertakes that duty therein, Let there be no obscenity, nor wickedness, nor wrangling in the Hajj. And whatsoever good you do, (be sure) Allah knows it. And take a provision (with you) for the journey, but the best of provisions is right conduct. So fear Me, O you that are wise. (Al-Baqara, 2:197)

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Many of the Muslim societies have reduced Islam and its teachings to the realm of theological issues, rituals and religious formalities, which indeed comprise an important part of Islam, but are also strictly connected to a very rich ethical code. The ethical and moral impact of the Quran is summarized in the answer of the Prophet’s wife Aisha when she was asked about his character. She replied that it was the Quran.107 The amalgamation of the ritual with the behavioral and the heavenly with the earthly should irrefutably lead Muslims to an awareness of the uttermost of the message of Islam and its civilizational impetus. Islam reached its civilizational and cultural zenith when Muslims of the golden ages, for which most Muslims today are nostalgic, coupled their assiduity for the Hereafter with their desire for epoch-making achievements in this world. As we previously pointed out, the term dı-n (religion), mentioned in the hadith on tajdı-d, also denotes the divine guidance which God revealed to His Messenger. This guidance is based on a cognitive system which creates a balance between human intellect and spirituality. This is important for understanding the intended “renewal of religion” in this hadith, and for understanding the way reform in the Islamic World of today should be directed and implemented. To conceive the renewal of “religion” as a re-emergence of the Divine Truth and utilize it only as a spiritual defensive process against the invasion of a “Western material positivism” has contributed to the civilizational stagnation of the Muslim world. It is a crisis that results from misunderstanding the core of Islam. The fear of the extreme dominance of materialism, rationalism and positivism should not be confronted by another extreme dominance of spiritualism, mysticism at the expense of the role of intellect and science in Islam. This cognitive crisis was recognized by the great Muslim reformist of the modern era, the Egyptian sheikh Muhammad Abdu. In his tafsı-r of verse 6 of the first Sura of the Quran, Al-Fa-tih.a, he gives a detailed survey of the hermeneutics of the verb ihdina- (guide us).108 According to Abdu’s theory of the “four guidances” (al-hida-ya-t al-arba’), the Islamic cognitive system combines four levels of guidance and knowledge. The first is the guidance of the natural inspiration and inherent intuition (ilha-m-wijda-n), as in the case of a newborn child who cries for food and once he reaches his mother’s breast, he knows intuitively how to take his food. The second is the guidance of senses (h.awa-s), which fulfills the first. Humans share this organic level of knowledge with animals. The third is intellect (‘aql), which corrects and refines the inputs of the senses. The fourth is the guidance of religion and revelation (dı-n/naql), which censors and corrects the intellect. Human intellect might err too as regards to its awareness of good and evil. Humans may misuse intellect and the utilization of the senses in their path toward individual and social happiness. This is why they need the divine guidance which gives another cognitive dimension to control human passion and desire.109 This is what the Quran expresses in terms of human knowledge compared to God’s knowledge:

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and it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and Allah knows, while you do not know. (Al-Baqara, 2:216) A similar approach to the limitations of human knowledge exists also in the fundamentals of Western and European philosophical heritage. Heraclitus, the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher (ca. 535–475 BC), considered by some scholars to be the founder of ancient Greek epistemological heritage,110 believed in the deceitfulness of human senses unless these are guided by the proper knowledge of Psyche.111 He was the first to underestimate human intelligence as a source of knowledge, and urged man to contemplate in quest of the Logos which is the common truth between all entities.112 This is the same logic in the religious perception of the divine revelation as source of the Truth. The problem of a Muslim worldview with an extreme secular approach, which glorifies human intellect as the “source of knowledge,” lies in a simple question: which and whose intellect? A counterargument may reciprocally address the same question about the plethora of Muslim interpretations of Islam, as they represent also the production of different human intellects. Nevertheless, this is why Islam recognizes what is known as hida-yat al-tawfı-q (God-oriented knowledge/guidance). Abdu tackles this issue in his commentary on the word “ihdina-” (guide us, Al-Fa-tih.a, 1:6). He argues that by supplicating ihdina ’s.s.ira-t.a ’l-mustaqı-m (guide us to the straight way), we ask God to shower us with His divine guidance that protects us from our human fallibility and imperfection, so that we can be steadfast to the truth.113 This Islamic worldview of the balance between human intellect and divine revelation should be at the core of the understanding of the concept of renewal of religion (tajdı-d al-dı-n). Reform without the guidance of God is subject to human error and fallibility through the limitations of this human knowledge. At the same time, reform without giving the proper consideration to the role of intellect in scientific and civilizational development is more likely to be a sort of deform. There is a clear Islamic Via Media between those two extremes. The Quran designates the Muslim community and nation as a middle and balanced ummah: Thus, have We made of you an Ummah justly balanced, that you might be witnesses over the nations, and the Messenger a witness over yourselves. (Al-Baqara, 2:143) Although the classical tafa-sı-r (sing. tafsı-r) focused on the idea of “justice” with regard to the witness of the Prophet and Muslims on others,114 Abdu tackles the Islamic concept of wasat.iyya (centrism/balanced moderateness) as one of the most specific characteristics of an Islamic reform. This balanced moderateness between two extremes, between two wrongs, represents the Islamic universal view. In the context of reform from a secularized Western

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philosophical perspective, a distinction has been made between materialism, rationalism and science, on the one side, and idealism and religion on the other. Abdu sees in Islamic centrism the solution for a reform which finds its way between theological solidity and modernistic dynamism. Islam is known as dı-n al-fit.ra (religion of human inherent nature) for its golden equilibrium between materialism and spirituality, the Hereafter and this world,115 as the Quran says: But seek, with the (wealth) which Allah has bestowed on you, the Home of the Hereafter, nor forget your portion in this world, and do good (to others) as Allah has done good to you, and do not seek to make mischief in the land, surely Allah does not love the mischief-makers. (Al-Qas.as., 28:77) From this perspective, any renewal of religion (tajdı-d dı-n) should be a means to achieve reform and renovation of this worldly life (tajdı-d dunia) as well. This is what we discuss in the following section. The fiqh of reform The rise of modernist rationalism in the Muslim world has played a significant role in determining and defining of the concept and form of an “Islamic reform.” The “extreme” glorification of human intellect, a main characteristic in European Enlightenment in reaction to certain historical circumstances, found supporting voices within the Muslim world. Mottos such as “no authority above intellect except that of intellect,” already present within cultural elite circles in the Muslim world, intensively represented a model of reform based on the total Westernization of the Muslim world. This approach sees in religion and its texts a restraint on the human intellect, and therefore, an impediment to progress, science and modernism. The influence of the Western-European experience is steering the reformist discourses of this approach.116 On the other extreme, the so-called Muslim “textualists” and “literalists” adhere to some interpretive texts of Islamic tradition and grant them almost the same level of sanctity as the Revelation itself, ignoring the divine law of progress and change.117 Between these two extremes, where should we seek a model, which is “Islamic,” and “reformist”? Actually, the room for coping with the changing and an evolvable world in Islam exists not only in modern trends, but also in classical pioneer writings in the field of jurisprudence of objectives (fiqh al-maqa-s.id). The major figure in this field is Imam Abu Ish.aq Al-Shatibi (d. 1388). He sees that “habits” (‘awa-’id), or what can be better translated as “cultural norms,” are of two categories in the Islamic law. The first belong to the Islamic legislation (shar‘iyya), being established by Sharia, and these are immutable and cannot be reconsidered as for their goodness or badness according to changing factors of time and place. He gives examples such as the rules for cloth prudery

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(‘awra)118 and forbidding circumambulation around the Ka‘ba naked. The second are evolving things among people which are not forbidden nor affirmed by a source evidence which emanates from religious texts (dalı-l shar‘ı-). After enumerating different aspects of the second category, he concludes that “rules differ by differing habits and circumstances.” This does not mean a variation in the original rule, because Sharia is established to be everlasting. If this world were endless, the divine legislation would never need any addition. Rather, it means that if these habits and circumstances change and differ, each should be attributed to a legislative principle that fits in its particular case (e.g., the case of a child who is not required to commit to the Law, but once he reaches the prescribed age, he is required to do so, and is held accountable to the same Law). He links this theory to the fact that the divine legislation came to consider the interests (mas.a-lih.), a reason to assert that consideration should be given to the changing habits and circumstances.119 This Islamic classical conceptualization of the relation between text and context, coming from the fourteenth century, is still relevant to our discussions on Islamic reform today. The mechanism of changing rules with the changing habits (taghayyur al-ah.ka-m bi taghayyur al-‘a-da-t) in the field of Islamic jurisprudence, known as custom and habit (al-‘urf wa al-‘a-da), means that rules change with the changeability of people, places and times. Furthermore, another important jurisprudential principle in this respect is what is known as istis.la-h. (to deem something good for public interest/appropriation) which is active in the field of establishing new rulings in accordance with common unrestricted interests (mas.a-lih. mursala). This latter principle is concerned with bringing about an interest or preventing a harm or corruption but in keeping with the objective of the divine legislation.120 In all the aforementioned legislative jurisprudential mechanisms, the scriptural texts do not cover explicitly issues which emerge, evolve or develop with the progress of the human status. The space for such contextualization of new developments of life is also based on the great diversity in Islamic fiqh. Sheikh Al-Maraghi (1881–1945), a jurist and grand Imam of Al-Azhar, found in the ampleness and diversity within Islamic jurisprudence the solution for contextualization. As chairperson of the committee concerned with personal status, he addressed the members and said: Put those articles which seem to you in consistency with the time and the place. I do not need, then, to bring you a text from the Islamic schools [madha-hib] in consistency with what you put. The Islamic Sharia has such a tolerance and ampleness that enables us to find in its ramifications and rulings, in civil and penal issues, everything which benefits us in every time and comes in compatibility with our wishes, needs and progress in every period. In all this, we are still in adherence to our Sharia. But a group of the late scholars saw that all that exists in the books of fiqh – including the texts, the explanations, the right and the wrong opinions – belong to

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While the Hanafi School of fiqh was the official state doctrine, Al-Maraghi was stimulating selectivity as regards to the legislative opinions of the different Islamic schools to achieve compatibility with the contemporary contexts. The Islamic fiqh presents such a great mosaic of opinions and diverse human reasonings ijtiha-da-t. This diversity guarantees, on the one hand, an interpretive opulence to a Muslim interpreter of the Sharia (a muftı-), and, on the other, a wide array of consecutive legislative traditions which serve the Muslim society in different spatiotemporal contexts. We should not deal with the words of Al-Maraghi as a license to reconstruct the Islamic Sharia or to contradict with an established Muslim rule. He speaks clearly about fiqh issues which are not definite. He adds: Fiqh should be studied freely and away from doctrinal fanaticism. Its rules should be studied in association with its source evidences. The aim of this study should not be to impinge the established rules in the Quran and the Sunnah and those which met consensus. Reviewing the ijtiha-doriented rulings makes it compatible with the times, places, customs and nature of the different nations, as the jurists of the predecessors used to do.122 The same man brought one of the greatest reforms in the history of Islam and its da‘wa (preaching Islam). In the year 1936, being in authority as the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, he issued the famous fatwa concerning the permissibility of the translation of the meanings of the Quran from Arabic to foreign languages.123 We are reminded of the term bid‘a h.asana (good novelty), which, even in a different context, characterized the decision of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, to compile the text of the Quran. At the beginning, Abu Bakr reacted negatively to the proposal of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, being reluctant to do something which the Prophet did not do.124 The roots of ijtiha-d are to be found in the Prophetic period. Two famous Prophetic traditions comprise the traditional basis for the permissibility of human reasoning in the absence of relevant scriptural texts, the endorsement

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of differences, and the diversity in the literalist and the inductive interpretations. The first hadith is in the highest degree of authenticity (s.ah.-ıh.) as it is narrated by both Al-Bukhari and Moslim. The Prophet ordered the companions, upon their return from the battle of Al-Ah.za-b, saying: None should pray the ‘As.r [afternoon] prayer but in Banu Qurayz.a.125 During the journey, some of them decided to pray on time, out of fear that they might miss the prayer. Another group of the companions refused to pray before arriving at Banu Qurayz.a as an adherence to what the Prophet literally said. When the Prophet was told about this, he approved both acts. In the second narration, which carries a lesser degree of authenticity, the Prophet asks Mu‘a-dh Ibn Jabal, whom he sends to Yemen, about the method to use if he would judge among people: What would you use to judge [among people] if it so happens that you must judge? Mu‘a-dh replied that he would judge by “Allah’s Book.” The Prophet asked him again: What if you don’t find [a relevant legal ruling in a Quranic text]? Mu‘a-dh replied that he would judge then according to “the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah.” However, the Prophet repeated his question again: What if you don’t find [a ruling to deduce from the Sunnah]? Mu‘a-dh then replied: Then I will use my independent judgment and I would not spare any effort. The Prophet reacted contentedly and said: All praise is for Allah who guided the messenger of the Messenger of Allah to that which pleases Allah and His Messenger.126 The task of ijtiha-d is surely not open for every Muslim, but strictly entrusted to the qualified scholars who reached this level of knowledge. Moreover, in the context of modern ijtiha-d, scholars have set some regulations as far as its technicalities are concerned, such as the avoidance of the area of conclusive and definite rulings, to be independent from the fear of those in authority and to be open to the culture of difference in opinions.127 Thus, the gate of ijtiha-d will never be closed, as the evolvable issues of life will only come to end when the world comes to end. Every time these issues are renewed, an Islamic

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ijtiha-d approach is, simultaneously, renewed. This includes the demanding reformist procedure which takes into consideration the socio-political and scientific progress of the Western world. Surprisingly, this notion has hardly escaped the notice of many modern reformists, including even some who were characterized of radicalism. Although S. Qutb adopted an interpretation of the objectives of Sharia in a way that seems literalist, he declared that he does not call for an ideological or social isolation from the progressing procession of humanity. He sees Muslims as partners in this human civilization to which they had already contributed. In his criticism of the application of foreign European laws, he supports the idea that legislations should express the common spirit and nature of the society.128 This leads us to the historical contexts where Muslim intellectuals such as Qutb developed their approaches. It is a fact that any reform project is a product of society, with its religious, cultural, political and economic particularities. Both the literalist and the rationalist approaches to reform are products of modern Muslim societies and represent two different reflections on the same crisis of civilizational stagnation. The impact of the political systems in most modern and contemporary Muslim societies was significant. These have formed, for decades, the inputs and outputs of these reflections by determining the mechanisms of public culture in terms that can secure the monopoly of power. The fake Westernization of Muslim societies targeted more power interests than reform and modernization. The result is the great polarization in the spectra of Muslim reform. In the aftermath of the enormous political changes in leading Muslim Arab countries, and the rise of Muslim movements to power, the challenge of an Islamic project is now taking form. If the evolution of fiqh in accordance with the evolution of life and a fiqh-oriented reform both need an “Islamic society,”129 the task of Muslim jurists should become easier. The true challenge is how to activate what can be termed as “selective ijtiha-d,” which means the selection of the most preferable and reliable opinion from the plethora of Islamic jurisprudential traditions.130 This process of selectiveness should happen in the framework of the maqa-s.id (objectives) of the Sharia and the common interests of the people in the here and now. One of the most important aspects of this fiqh of reform should be linked, again, to the civilizational message of Islam and its balanced equity between the two notions of s.ala-h. (betterness) of the self and is.la-h. (betterment) of the Earth. This is an everlasting onus on Muslims, as the following authentic hadith denotes: If the Hour [Day of Judgment] is established upon you, with small palm-tree in your hand, if you are able, do not stand until you have planted it into the ground.131

Notes 1 Al-Ma-’ida 5.3: “This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion.”

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2 Ibn Kathir, in his (2003), Tafsı-r Al-Qur’a-n al-‘Az.-ım (Interpretation of the Glorious Quran), Dar Al-Hadith, Cairo, vol. IV, p. 124, interprets “horizons” with the Islamic conquests and the prevalence of Islam. However, when it comes to “themselves,” he speaks about anatomy and the scientific miracles in the creation of man. See Al-Jazairi (1994), Aysar al-Tafa-sı-r li Kala-m Al-‘Aliyy Al-Kabı-r (The Simplest Interpretation of the Word of the Almighty), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, vol. IV, p. 591, who agrees on the scientific “portents” that “shall be shown” in both the “horizons” of the natural world and the creation of the human beings. Cf. Al-Tabari, Ja-mi‘ … , op. cit., vol. 9, p. 7215, who, though adopting this approach, supports the exclusiveness of the “signs” to the Prophetic period so that the polytheists might embrace Islam. 3 Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-‘Ilm, hadith 127. 4 Ibid, hadith 126. 5 Ibn Abdrabbih (1983), Al-‘Iqd al-Farı-d (The Unique Necklace), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, vol. I, p. 39; Cf. Ibn Abdelhakam (19846), Sı-rat Omar Ibn Abdulaziz (The Biography of Omar Ibn Abdulaziz), ‘Alam Al-Kutub, Beirut, p. 57. 6 Op. cit., vol. 19, p. 25. 7 (1986), Risa-lat al-Tawh.-ıd (The Treatise on Unification), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, pp. 13–14; Cf. Musa‘ad I. & Cragg K. (trans.) (2004), Muhammad ‘Abduh: The Theology of Unity, Islamic Book Trust, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 39–40. 8 al-Mwafaqa-t … , op. cit., vol. II, p. 490. 9 al-Mustas.fa, op. cit, vol. II, p. 258. Cf. Al-Bouti M., D . awabit. al-Mas.lah.a fi al-Shari‘a al-Isla-miyya (The Regulations of Mas.lah.a [interest] in Islamic Sharia), Mu’assasat Al-Risala, Beirut, 1973, p. 23. 10 Al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, op. cit., Kita-b al-‘Ilm, vol. V, hadith 2687. The hadith is characterized by Al-Tirmidhi as gharı-b “singular” (i.e., unknown except from this chain of narration). See also Al-Albani N. (2000), D . a‘ıf Sunan Al-Tirmidhi (Weak [narrations] of the Sunan of Al-Tirmidhi), Maktabat Al-Maarif, Riyadh, p. 276, who classifies this narration as very weak (d.a‘ı-f jiddan). 11 Characterizing a hadith by the term mawqu-f (suspended) means that the final authority in its chain of narrators (sanad/isna-d) is one of the companions of the Prophet s.ah.a-bi. Rather a marfu-‘ (exalted) hadith is attributed to the Prophet himself. 12 Ibn Hanbal (1995), Al-Musnad (The Attributed), Dar Al-Hadith, Cairo, vol. III, hadith 3600. The editor Ahmad Shaker comments on the isna-d (chain of narration) of this hadith and describes it as s.ah.-ıh. (authentic). 13 Al-Haythami, in his Majma‘ … , op. cit., vol. I., Kita-b al-‘Ilm, hadith 832, classifies the hadith under a chapter on ijma-‘ (consensus). 14 (1992), Al-I‘tis.a-m (The Maintenance), Dar Ibn Affan, Al-Khubar, vol. II, pp. 635–638. 15 Al-Shatibi, Al-Mwafaqa-t, op. cit. vol. IV, p. 997. He gives many examples of istih.sa-n, such as loaning, which might be linked to usury; but it can be permitted in exceptional cases for needy people, or to uncover those parts of the body considered ‘awra (parts of the body not permitted to uncover) for the sake of medication. This definition of istih.sa-n (al-akhdh bi mas.lah.a juz’iyya fi muqa-balat dalı-l kolli) is the one attributed to the Maliki School. Ibn Rushd (1988), Al-Baya-n wa al-Tah.s.-ıl (Clarification and Conclusion), Dar Al-Gharb Al-Islami, Beirut, vol. IV, p. 156, states that “the most used istih.sa-n, so that it becomes even more common than qiya-s, is when the avoidance of qiya-s (analogy) leads to hyperbole and exaggeration in (applying) the rule; then it becomes bypassed in some cases, for a significance that effects the rule in this particular case.” See also Al-Shatibi, Al-I‘tis.a-m, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 607 ff., who dedicated a long chapter in this work for the difference between bid‘a (novelty/heterodoxy), mas.lah.a mursala (unrestricted interest) and istih.sa-n. 16 For more details, see Al-Shatibi, Al-Mwafaqa-t, op. cit., vol. IV; Idem, Al-I‘tis.a-m, op. cit.

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17 In his definition istih.sa-n is “to prefer to abandon the requisite of the evidence by means of exception or permissiveness.” See Al-Shatibi, Al-Mwafaqa-t, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 998. 18 Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Fad.a-’il, hadith 2361. 19 Ibid, 2363. 20 For a detailed study of the subject see Gutas D. (1998), Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, Routledge, London and New York. See also Saliba G. (2007), Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, and London; Lewis D. (2009), God’s Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, 570–1215, W.W. Norton & Co, New York. 21 We read in the preface to his work: “That fondness for science, by which God has distinguished the Imam Al Mamun, the Commander of the Faithful (besides the caliphat which He has vouchsafed unto him by lawful succession, in the robe of which He has invested him, and with the honours of which He has adorned him), that affability and condescension which he shows to the learned, that promptitude with which he protects and supports them in the elucidation of obscurities and in the removal of difficulties, has encouraged me to compose a short work on Calculating by (the rules of) Completion and Reduction, confining it to what is easiest and most useful in arithmetic, such as men constantly require in cases of inheritance, legacies, partition, law-suits, and trade, and in all their dealings with one another, or where the measuring of lands, the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other objects of various sorts and kinds are concerned … .” See Al-Khwarizmi (1831), The Algebra of Mohammed ben Musa, ed. and trans. Rosen F., Τhe Oriental Translation Fund, London, p. 3. 22 See “Dja-hilliya,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, ed. Bearman P., Bianquis Th., Bosworth C., van Donzel E. & Heinrichs W. (2010), Brill, Brill Online, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 18 June 2010, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/ encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/djahiliyya-SIM_1933. “A term used, in almost all its occurrences, as the opposite of the word isla-m, and which refers to the state of affairs in Arabia before the mission of the Prophet, to paganism (sometimes even that of non-Arab lands), the pre-Islamic period and the men of that time. From the morphological point of view, ḏ j̱ a-hiliyya seems to be formed by the addition of the suffix-iyya, denoting an abstract, to the active participle ḏ j̱ a-hil, the exact sense of which is difficult to determine. I. Goldziher (Muh. St., i, 219 ff.; analysis in Arabica, vii/3 (1960), 246–49), remarking that ḏ j̱ a-hil is opposed to h.alı-m ‘administered’ [see h.ilm], gives it the sense of ‘barbarous’, and renders ḏ j̱ a-hiliyya as ‘the time of barbarism’, but he has not been followed to the letter by translators of the K . ur’an who render ḏ j̱ ahil as ‘not knowing God, the Prophet and the Law’, or ‘lawless’, and ḏ j̱ a-hiliyya as ‘time of ignorance’, ‘heathendom’.” Cf. “Jahiliyyah,” The Oxford Dictionary of Islam: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies. com/article/opr/t125/e1157# (accessed June 18, 2010), where the definition is linked more to modern and current use among the so-called radical Islamists: “Pre-Islamic period, or ‘ignorance’ of monotheism and divine law. In current use, refers to secular modernity, for example in the work of Abu al-Ala Maududi, who viewed modernity as the ‘new jahiliyyah.’ Sayyid Qutb interpreted jahiliyyah as the domination of humans over humans, rather than submission of humans to God. The term denotes any government system, ideology, or institution based on values other than those referring to God. To correct this situation, such thinkers propose the implementation of Islamic law, values, and principles. Radical groups justify militant actions against secular regimes in terms of jihad against jahiliyyah.” 23 For a detailed and thorough study of the pre-Islamic Arabic history, the traditions, norms and values of the Arabs, see Ali J. (1993), Al-Mufas.s.al fi Ta-rı-kh al-‘Arab qabla Al-Islam (The Elaborate [Book] on the History of the Arabs before Islam),

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25 26 27 28

29 30

31 32 33

34

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Baghdad University, Baghdad, esp. vol. IV, p. 271 and passim, where he discusses the Arab society before Islam. Al-Qayrawani (19815), Al-‘Omda fi Mah.a-sin al-Shi‘r wa Ada-bih wa Naqdih (The Reference on the Merits of Poetry, its Ethics and Criticism), Dar Al-Jil, Beirut, vol. I, p. 65. The translation is quoted from Arberry A. (1957), The Seven Odes, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, p. 14. Arberry, op. cit., p. 207. Arberry, op. cit., p. 147. Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Jana-’iz, hadith 934. Al-Bayhaqi (2003), Al-Ja-mi‘ li Shu‘ab al-Ima-n (The Sententious on the Ramifications of Faith), Al-Rushd, Riyadh, vol. VII, hadith 4774; Al-Albani N. (1995), Silsilat al-Ah.adı-th al-S.ah.-ıh.a (The Series of Authentic Hadiths), Maktabat Al-Maarif, Riyadh, vol. VI (published 1996), hadith 2700, pp. 449–452; Idem (2000), S.ah.-ıh. al-Targhı-b wa al-Tarhı-b (The Authentic [Narrations] of Al-Targhı-b wa al-Tarhı-b [Inspiriting and Disheartening (of Al-Mundhiri)]), Dar Al-Maarif, Riyadh, vol. III, hadith 2964, pp. 135–136. Sunan, op. cit., Kita-b Tafsı-r Al-Qur’a-n, vol. V, hadith 3270; Al-Albani N. (2000), S.ah.-ıh. Sunan Al-Tirmidhi (The Authentic [Narrations] of the Sunan of Al-Tirmidhi), Maktabat Al-Maarif, Riyadh, vol. III, p. 334. Al-Tabari, Ja-mi‘ … , op. cit., vol. VIII, p. 6246. Ibn Kathir, Tafsı-r … , op. cit., vol. III, p. 429 ff. The hadith is in Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Ima-n, hadith 205; cf. Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-Was.a-ya, hadith 2753, 4771; Al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, op. cit., Kita-b al-Zuhd, vol. IV, hadith 2310. Op. cit., vol. VIII, p. 6251. See Al-Bukhari (20002), Al-Adab al-Mufrad (The Unique Manners), Dar Al-Siddiq, Al-Jebil, hadith 897, p. 313; Al-Albani, Silsilat al-S.ah.-ıh.a, op. cit., vol. II, hadith 765, pp. 391–392. Al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, op. cit., Kita-b al-Birr wa al-S.ila, vol. IV, hadith 1979; the hadith is cited as authentic in Al-Albani, S.ah.-ıh. Sunan Al-Tirmidhi, op. cit., vol. II., p. 370. Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b Ah.adith al-Anbiya-’, hadiths 3353, 3374, 3383, Kita-b al-Mana-qib, hadiths, 3493, 3496, 3588, Kita-b al-Tafsı-r, hadith 4689; Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b Fad.a-’il al-S.ah.a-ba, hadith 2526, Kita-b al-Adab, hadith 2638, Kita-b al-Fad.a-’il, hadith 2378. The following poetic verses are attributed to Ali Ibn Abi Talib (my translation): By your life, man’s value is only his faith Abandon piety not for the sake of noble race By Islam Salman of Persia is raised And polytheism truly humbled Abu Lahab the dispraised ِ ‫ﻟَ َﻌ ْﻤ ُﺮ َﻙ ﻣﺎ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎ ُﻥ ﺇﻻ ﺑ ِﺪﻳﻨ ِﻪ ﻓﻼ ﺗَ ْﺘ ُﺮ ِﻙ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻮﻯ ﺍ ّﺗﻜﺎ ًﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﺐ‬ َ ُ ‫ﺿ َﻊ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻙ ﺍﻟ ّﺸ ِﻘ َّﻲ ﺃﺑﺎ ﻟﻬﺐ‬ َ ‫ﺱ ﻭﻗﺪ َﻭ‬ ٍ ‫ﻓﻘﺪ َﺭ َﻓ َﻊ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻡ ﺳﻠﻤﺎ َﻥ ﻓﺎﺭ‬

35 Few exceptions existed, as in the case of h.ilf al-fud.u-l (the Alliance of the Virtuous/ fud.u-l), which will be discussed later. 36 Al-Bukhari, Al-Adab … , op. cit., Bab 27: Fad.l S.ilat al-Rah.im, hadith 53. See also Al-Sayyid M. (1993), al-Ah.a-dı-th al-Qudsiyya (The Sacred [Attributed to God] Hadiths), Dar Al-Sahaba, Tanta, pp. 112–13. A qudsi hadith belongs to the Sunnah; the meaning is inspired by God and the wording belongs to the Prophet. 37 The hadith is also narrated by Abu Hurayra in Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b Mana-qib al-Ans.a-r, hadiths 3798, Kita-b al-Tafsı-r, hadith 4889; Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Ashriba, hadiths 5327, 5328, 5329. 38 Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-Adab, hadiths 6135, 6136, 6138; Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Ima-n, hadiths 172, 173, 175.

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39 See Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-Da’awa-t, hadiths 6363, 6365, 6369, 6370, 6371, 6374, 6390, Kita-b al-Tafsı-r, hadith 4707; Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Da’awa-t, hadith 2706. 40 Al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, op. cit., vol. IV, Kita-b al-Birr wa al-S.ila, hadith 1962. 41 Herodotus, The Histories, Book III, trans. G. Rawlinson, retrieved from: The Internet Classics Archive: http://classics.mit.edu/Herodotus/history.3.iii.html (accessed August 19, 2008). The occasion is about giving an account of the Persian king Cambyses who asked the Arabs to grant him water supplies and a safe passage to Egypt through their regions. 42 Arberry, op. cit., p. 207. 43 h.umr al-ni‘am or the Red Camels were the symbol of great wealth for the Arabs. They used this metaphor to express the high value and preciousness of something. 44 Ibn Hisham (1990), Al-Sı-ra al-Nabawiyya (The Biography of the Prophet), Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi, Beirut, vol. I, pp. 153–155; Ibn Kathir (2004), Al-Bida-ya wa al-Niha-ya (The Beginning and the End), Bayt Al-Afkar Al-Duwaliyya, Amman, vol. II, p. 336; Al-Ghazali M. (1965), Fiqh Al-Sı-ra (The Jurisprudence of the [Prophetic] Biography), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Haditha, Cairo, p. 75, where the editor, Al-Albani, cites the sanad as s.ah.-ıh.. 45 Al-Bukahri, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-Ikra-h, hadith 6952; Kita-b fi al-Maz.a-lim wa al-Ghad.ab, hadith 2444. 46 See Al-Nisa-’, 4:135; see also the sub-section on “Refinement and ethical detribalization” above. Cf. Al-An‘aa-m 6.152. 47 Al-Shaarawi M. (1991), Tafsı-r Al-Sha‘ara-wi, Dar Akhbar Al-Youm, Cairo, vol. V, p. 2885. 48 Al-Bukhari, Al-Adab … , op. cit., Bab H . usn al-Khuluq, hadith 273; Al-Albani, S.ah.-ıh. al-Adab … , op. cit., p. 118; Idem, Silsilat al-S.ah.-ıh.a, op. cit., vol. I, hadith 45, p. 112; Al-Bayhaqi (20033), Al-Sunan al-Kubra (The Major Sunan), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, vol. X (10/192), Kita-b al-Shaha-da-t, hadith 20782. 49 The usage of the small and capital letter “I” in the word Islam is meant to distinguish the “scriptural” and “archetype” Islam from the “cultural” and “sectarian” manifestations of the tradition of Islam throughout its historical evolution. 50 See Ibn Manzour, op. cit., vol. IV., p. 2479; Ibn Fares (1986), Mujmal al-Lugha (The Summation of Language), Mu’assasat Al-Risala, Beirut, vol. II, p. 539; Al-Kafawi A. (19982), Al-Kulliyya-t: Mu‘jam fi al-Mus.t.alah.a-t wa al-Furu-q al-Lughawiyya (The Totalities: A Dictionary on Terminology and Linguistic Differences), Mu’assasat Al-Risala, Beirut, pp. 560–561. 51 Part of this analysis is believed to be linked to the terms salafi, salafism and Salafi School. The major notion linked to these groups finds its foundation in an authentic hadith which reads: “the best people are those of my century, then those who follow them, then those who follow them,” Al-Bukhari, Sah.ih., op. cit., Kita-b Fad.a-’il As.h.a-b Al-Nabi, hadith 3651, Kita-b al-Shaha-da-t, hadith 2652; Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b Fad.a-’il al-S.ah.a-ba, hadiths 2533, 2534. 2535. Those first three generations of Islam, namely the companions (s.ah.a-ba), the followers (ta-bi‘u-n) and the followers of the followers (ta-bi‘u- al-ta-bi‘ı-n), are characterized as the “righteous predecessors” (salaf s.a-lih.). The term means, linguistically, “the past, all that belongs to it and preceded the time being.” Technically, the term symbolizes the Islamic Golden Age, which represents the pure understanding of Islam and the implementation of the Islamic religious and ideological theory, excluding different sects and intellectual schools which appeared on the sociopolitical arena and inserted “alien/heterodox” elements in the Muslim creed. As far as salafism (salafiyya) is concerned, it is clear that its reference point and preaching are based on this very first Islamic experience, and aspire to revive it in the current reality. This school claims the “texts” of the Quran and the Sunnah as the main sources to understand Islam, something that no Muslim can deny.

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However, the general tendency to a “literalist” interpretation of these texts comprises the main characteristic of this school in the view of its opponents in modern Muslim intellectualism. In fact, within salafism, one can encounter a considerable variety of attitudes, ideas and approaches to Islam, Muslims, society, politics, etc. They vary between an excessive imitation (taqlı-d) of all the details of the salaf, and a reasonable balance between ijtiha-d and taqlı-d. The leader figure in this school is Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780–855), while its great revivalism is attributed to other figures such as Ibn Taymiya (1263–1328), his pupil Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya (1292–1350) and other prominent Muslim scholars. For more information about these terms, see Imara M. (20085), Al-Wası-t. fi al-Madha-hib wa al-Mus.t.alah.a-t al-Isla-miyya (The Concise on the Islamic Schools and Terms), Nahdet Misr, Cairo, pp. 19–31. Apud Al-Qadi ‘Iyad. (1984), Al-Shifa- bi Ta‘rı-f Huqu-q Al-Mus.t.afa (The Healing by Reporting the Rights of the Prophet), Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi, Beirut, vol. II, p. 676. In fact, Imam Malik was commenting here on a question about the permissibility of standing before the tomb of the Prophet and greeting him for the people of Medina. He stated that it is only legitimate for strangers to do so, but not for the inhabitants of Medina, because, as far as he knows, the “first” generations of this ummah did not act similarly. The context is, thus, more related to the concept of bid‘a (innovation/novelty in religion/heterodoxy). The supporters of this view adopt a narration that the Prophet lived only 81 days after this revelation and that the meant perfection here is related to the rulings of Islam. See Al-Tabari, Ja-mi‘ … , op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 2697–2698. Al-Tabari, Ja-mi‘ … , op. cit., vol. IV, 2697 ff. Al-Qurtubi, op. cit., vol. VII, pp. 272–296. See Ibn Atiyya (2001), Al-Muh.arrar al-Wajı-z fi Tafsı-r al-Kitab al-‘Azı-z (The Edited Concise on the Exegesis of the Glorious Book), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, vol. II, pp. 154–155; Al-Shawkani (20074), Fath. Al-Qadı-r (The Inspiration of the Almighty), Dar Al-Marefah, Beirut, pp. 353–354; Abdu M. & Reda R. (1947), Tafsı-r Al-Qur’a-n al-H . akım (The Interpretation of the Holy Quran (known as Tafsır al-Mana-r)), Dar Al-Manar, Cairo, vol.VI, p. 155 ff. Al-Shaarawi, Tafsı-r … , op. cit., vol. V, p. 2926. Al-Bukhari, Sah.ih., op. cit., Kita-b Al-’Ima-n, hadith 39. Al-Dosouqi M. (undated), Tajdı-d Fahm al-Dı-n (Renovating the Understanding of Religion), Silsilat Fikr Al-Muwajaha 19, Rabitat Al-Jami‘aat Al-Isla-miyya, Cairo, pp. 5–6. For a full biography of Qutb, among the many works about his life and career, see Qutb S. (2004), A Child from the Village, ed. and trans. Calvert J. & Sheppard W., Syracuse University Press, New York; Zirwaq N. (2009), Maqa-s.id al-Sharı-‘a fi Fikr al-Ima-m Sayyid Qutb (The Objectives of the Sharia in the Thought of Imam Sayyid Qutb), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, pp. 27–43. Fi Z.ila-l Al-Qur’a-n (In the Shade of the Quran), Dar Al-Shorouq, Cairo, 2003, vol. II, pp. 832, 841. Cf. Al-Tabari, Ja-mi‘ … , op. cit., 4/2661–2664; Ibn Kathir, Tafsı-r … , op. cit., 2/6–7. Both give the same meaning to the term ‘uqu-d. Qutb, Fi Z.ila-l … , op. cit., vol. II, p. 835. Ibid, vol. II, p. 825. The full verse (Al-Ma-’ida, 5.3.) reads as follows: “Forbidden to you (for food) are: dead meat, blood, the flesh of swine, and that on which hath been invoked the name of other than Allah; that which hath been killed by strangling, or by a violent blow, or by a headlong fall, or by being gored to death; that which hath been (partly) eaten by a wild animal; unless you are able to slaughter it (in due form); that which is sacrificed on stone (altars); (forbidden) also is the division (of meat) by raffling with arrows: that is impiety. This day have those who reject

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy Faith given up all hope of your religion: yet fear them not but fear Me. This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion. But if any is forced by hunger, with no inclination to transgression, Allah is indeed Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.” Qutb, Fi Z.ila-l … , op. cit., vol. II, p. 841. Ibid. Qutb S. (1979), Ma‘a-lim fi al-T.arı-q (Milestones), Dar Al-Shorouq, Cairo, pp. 8–9; Shepard W. (November 2003), “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of ‘Ja-hiliyya’,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, p. 524. In his Fi Z.ila-l … , op. cit., p. 844, Qutb redefines the term ja-hiliyya in a broader sense than the per-Islamic period. He argues that only those who knew the reality and tasted the evils of ja-hiliyya, in belief and life, can realize the grace God bestowed upon humanity by this religion. This ja-hiliyya, in every time and place, is a system of life, a “condition,” which contradicts God’s legislation. It is rather debatable whether he meant by this “condition” a ja-hiliya of unbelief (kofr) or conduct (sulu-k). The Prophet is reported in an authentic hadith to have characterized one of his close companions, Abu Dharr Al-Ghifa-ri, as a man who has “ja-hiliya within him.” The reason was that he insulted a servant by his non-Arab mother (See Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-Adab, hadith 6050; Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Ayma-n, hadith 1661). However, this remains as a characterization of the conduct and not of the faith of a Muslim. Nonetheless, Qutb’s words, especially in his tafsı-r, leave less doubt that he links the refusal of the notion of h.a-kimiyya, whether by the rulers or their people, as kofr. See for example his introduction to Sura Al-Ma-’ida 5 in Fi Z.ila-l … , op. cit., vol. II, pp. 827–829. Qutb, Fi Z.ila-l … , op. cit., vol. II, p. 842. Qutb, Fi Z.ila-l … , op. cit., vol. II, p. 843. Ibid, vol. II, p. 829. We have to be aware that the differences and shifts in some of his views are marked by different phases of his personal experience. Probably, he should be read in different chronological contexts. Especially the late phase of his authorship – with works like his tafsı-r (the first unrevised volume was published in 1952 and the revised in 1960) and his last and controversial work Milestones (1964) – during his imprisonment and persecution until his execution in 1966, is remarkably different from the earlier writings like al-‘Ada-la al-Ijtima-‘iyya fi Al-Islam (Social Justice in Islam) (first published in 1949). See March A. (2010), “Taking People as They Are: Islam as a ‘Realistic Utopia’ in the Political Theory of Sayyid Qutb,” American Political Science Review, vol. 104, no. 1, February pp. 191–192. Qutb, Fi Z.ila-l … , op. cit., vol. II, pp. 842–843. Qutb S. (199310), Nah.wa Mujtama‘ Isla-mi (Toward an Islamic Society), Al-Shorouq, Cairo, pp. 46–47. Qutb’s doctrine will be also discussed in the following chapter as one of the modern Muslim reformists. Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Jumo‘a, hadith 867. Cf. Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-I‘tis.a-m bi Al-Kitab wa al-Sunna, hadith 7277; Al-Albani N. (1988), S.ah.-ıh. al-Ja-mi‘ al-Saghı-r (The Authentic [narrations] of al-Ja-mi‘ al-Saghı-r (the Small Sententious) [of Al-Suyuti]), Al-Maktab Al-Islami, Beirut, vol. I, hadith 1353, p. 287 (with the authentic addition of Al-Nasa’i: “[ … ], and every misguidance is in the Hellfire”). Another hadith, in the highest degree of authenticity (agreed upon in both Al-Bukhari, Kita-b al-S.ulh., hadith 2697, and Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b alAqd.iya, hadith 1718) is also linked to this concept: the Prophet said: “He who invents in this religion anything which does not belong to it, is, then, void.” Al-Razi (20083), Mukhta-r al-S.ih.a-h. (The Anthology of the Accurate [Meanings]), Dar Al-Marefah, Beirut, p. 56, b_d_‘. Al-Shatibi, Al-I‘tis.a-m, op. cit., p. 92. This book is the last work of Al-Shatibi and is considered the best classical source on the concept and varieties of the term bid‘a.

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78 Ibid, p. 50; Aal Salman A. & Al-Shakwakani A. (2007), Qamu-s al-Bida‘ (The Dictionary of Bida‘), Dar Al-Imam Al-Bukhari, Duha, pp. 30–31. This work is a compilation of bida‘, as identified in the works of Al-Alabani. 79 Al-Sahatibi, Al-I‘tis.a-m, op. cit., p. 51. He excludes every invented science in Islamic scholarship like Arabic grammar, us.u-l, kala-m … , etc., because it has an “origin” in the Sharia. 80 Ibid, pp. 63–64. 81 (2000), Al-Qawa-‘id al-Kubra (The Major Rules (known as Qawa-‘id al-Ah.ka-m)), Dar Al-Qalam, Damascus, pp. 337–339. 82 It concerns a message he wrote to rebut a fatwa by his contemporary Ibn Al-Salah, concerning a voluntary prayer which he saw as a bid‘a. For the whole written debate between the two scholars See Al-Albani N. & Al-Shawish M. (1405 H.), Musa-jala ‘Ilmiyya (A Scientific Debate), Al-Maktab Al-Islami, Beirut-Damascus, pp. 3–5. 83 This is the opinion of scholars such as Al-Albani. See Aal Salman A. & Al-Shakwakani A., op. cit., pp. 32 ff, 120 ff. 84 Cf. Küng H. (2007), Islam: Past, Present & Future, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, p. 396: “there could be no universal reformation but only regional reform movements.” 85 (19582), Fayd. al-Kha-t.ir (The Abundance of Thoughts), Al-Nahda Al-Misriyya, Cairo, p. 124. 86 Directly after his definition of the term tajdı-d, he cites Rousseau’s description of the most important aspects of tajdı-d as “adopting the principles of humanism, rationalism and philosophical tolerance. This should substitute the old status with the sanctification of authorities and narrow-minded fanaticism,” ibid. For a critique of this view see Al-Dosouqi, op. cit., pp. 21–22. 87 Rousseau J. (1923), The Social Contract and Discourses, translated with an introduction by Cole G., J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London and Toronto, p. 121: “There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which the Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject. While it can compel no one to believe them, it can banish from the State whoever does not believe them – it can banish him, not for impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty. If anyone, after publicly recognising these dogmas, behaves as if he does not believe them, let him be punished by death: he has committed the worst of all crimes, that of lying before the law”; Hillar M., “Sebastian Castellio and the Struggle for Freedom of Conscience,” Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism, vol. 10, 2002, p. 31; See also Vroom H. (2006), “The Critique of the Critique of Enlightenment,” in: Boeve L. & Schrijvers J. & Stoker W. & Vroom H. (eds.), Faith in the Enlightenment? The Critique of the Enlightenment Revisited, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York, p. 340 ff; Besten L. den (2011), Illusie of Verlichting, Kritiek op en Betekenis van Religie, Skandalon, Vught, p. 290. 88 Jacobs A. (2006), “Reformist Islam. Protagonists, Methods, and Themes of Progressive Thinking in Contemporary Islam,” Working Paper/Documentation, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, no. 155, p. 5. 89 Ramadan T. (2009), Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, p. 11. 90 Cf. Ibid, p. 10, “We are in a sort of terminological haze in which the meaning of words is so variable that one no longer knows exactly what the discourse about ‘reform’ refers to.” See also p. 12 ff. I think that this is due to the lack of unanimous approach within the Islamic jurisprudential thought about the definition, the task and the process of reform, on the one side, and the tension between some Westernized liberal projects and traditional Islamic revivalism. We can

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy add to this the fact that Islam has neither cleric–church institutionalism nor such a geopolitical and cultural uniformity which can permit a global concept of reform today. Cf. the definition of Al-Dosouqi, op. cit., p. 23: “Substantially tajdı-d is not a pure human action. It is an aware and rational effort as far as it goes in the framework of religious limits and rules.” See Ramadan, Radical … , op. cit., pp. 12–13: “scriptural sources (the Quran and Sunnah) remain the primary references and the fundamentals of faith and practice are left as they are, but our reading and our understanding of the texts will be ‘renewed’ by the contribution of those scholars and thinkers who will point to new perspectives by reviving timeless faith in our hearts while stimulating our minds so as to enable us to face the challenges of our respective times.” See Küng, op. cit. p. 293. For a thorough study of the Hadith methodology, the authenticity and authority of Sunnah, see Al-Azami M. (19903), Manhaj al-Naqd ‘inda al-Muh.addithı-n (Critical Methodology of the Hadith-Scholars), Maktabat Al-Kawthar, Al-Marba‘; Idem (1992), Studies in Early Hadith Literature, America Trust Publications, Burr Ridge; Idem (1992), Dirasa-t fi Al-Hadı-th Al-Nabawi (Studies in the Prophetic Hadith), Al-Maktab Al-Islami, Beirut; see also Al-Idlibi S. (1983), Manhaj Naqd Al-Matn (Critical Methodology of the Hadith-Text), Dar Al-Afaq Al-Jadida, Beirut. For asba-b al-nuzu-l see Al-Suyuti, Al-Itqa-n … , op. cit., vol. I, pp. 85 ff.; Shehata, op. cit., pp. 73 ff., esp. 81–83; Al-Salih, op. cit., p. 127 ff.; Al-Qattan M. (20003), Maba-h.ith fi ‘Ulu-m Al-Qur’a-n (Studies in the Quran Sciences), Maktabat Al-Maarif, Riyadh, p. 75 ff. See, for example, the criticism of Al-Wahidi, and his key work on asba-b al-nuzu-l, by Al-Suyuti in the introduction of his book (2008), Luba-b al-Nuqu-l fi Asba-b al-Nuzu-l (The Essence of Traditions on the Reasons of Revelation), Al-Maktaba Al-Qaiyyma, Cairo, pp. 11–12; Cf. Al-Wahidi (1991), Asba-b Nuzu-l Al-Qur’a-n (The Reasons of the Revelation of the Quran), Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, Beirut. See Ramadan, Radical … , op. cit., pp. 16–17. Abu Dawoud (1417 H.2), Sunan ([Prophetic] Traditions), Dar Al-Maarif, Riyadh, Kita-b al-Mala-h.im, hadith 4291; Al-Hakim (1997), Mustadrak (Appendix), Dar Al-Haramayn, Cairo, vol. IV, Kita-b al-Fitan wa al-Mala-h.im, hadith 8657. The authenticity of the hadith is supported by the majority of scholars. For a discussion of the sanad see Al-Qaradawi Y. (20052), Min ajl Sah.wa Ra-shida (In Quest of a Reasonable Revival), Dar Al-Shorouq, Cairo, pp. 11–12. Al-Albani cites the hadith in his S.ah.-ıh. collection of Abu Dawoud; Al-Albani N. (1998), S.ah.-ıh. Sunan Abi Dauwu-d (The Authentic [Narrations] of the Sunan of Abu Dawoud), Maktabat Al-Maarif, Riyadh, vol. III, hadith 4291, p. 23; Idem, Silsilat al-S.ah.-ıh.a, op. cit., vol. II, hadith 599, p. 148. The classical scholars who understood the singular from the pronoun man struggled to define and name the Muslim scholar of each century. For a detailed discussion of the meanings of the words ra’s (head) and man (who), see Abadi A. (2005), ‘Awn Al-Ma‘abu-d ‘ala Sharh. Sunan Abi Dawu-d (God’s Assistance in the Explanation of Abu Dawoud), Dar Ibn Hazm, Beirut, vol. I, hadith 4291, pp. 1959 ff.; Al-Qaradawi, Min ajl … , op. cit., pp. 13–25, prefers the plural. See, for the classical explanation of the hadith, Abadi, op. cit., esp. pp. 1961–1962; Amama A. (2003), Al-Tajdı-d fi al-Fikr al-Isla-mi (Renovation in the Islamic Thought), Dar Ibn Al-Jawzi, Riyadh, pp. 16–18. For a modern salafi view, see Al-Fawzan S., Min Masha-hı-r al-Mujaddidı-n fi Al-Islam (Some Renowned Renovators in Islam), retrieved from http://www.islamhouse.com/p/117072 (accessed April 17, 2008), pp. 8–9, who focuses on Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab as great reformers against bida‘. Al-Dosouqi, op. cit., p. 24.

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100 This term is divided into two categories: z.annı- al-thubu-t (of probabilistic authenticity) as in the case of the most Prophetic traditions, or z.annı- al-dala-la (of speculative connotation) as in the case of the majority of the Quranic verses. 101 Al-Qaradawi, Min ajl … , op. cit., pp. 44–45. Cf. Amama, op. cit., p. 19, who defines tajdı-d of religion as “revival and renovation of its extinct elements, purifying it from novelties and applying it to the realities of life and its developments.” 102 See Al-Dosouqi, op. cit., p. 26. 103 “Tradition and Modernity within Islamic Civilization and the West,” in Masud M. & Salvatore A. & van Bruinissen M. (ed.), Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, pp. 5–6. 104 See the tafsı-r of Al-Tabari, Ja-mi‘ … , op. cit., vol. II, pp. 889–890, for the meaning of s.a-ma (to fast); For the interpretation of the verb tattaqu-n as, in general, self-restraint from evil deeds see the tafsı-r of Al-Qurtubi, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 126–127. 105 Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-S.awm, hadith 1894. Moslim narrates the same hadith in different wording. See his S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., hadith 1151: “If any of you begins his day fasting he should avoid sexual relation with his wife and should not behave foolishly and impudently, and if somebody fights with him or abuses him, he should tell him, ‘I am fasting, I am fasting.’” 106 Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-S.awm, hadith 1903. 107 See the sub-section on “Muslim intellect and Islamic textualism” above, note 66. Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b S.ala-t al-Musa-firı-n, hadith 746; Al-Albani, S.ah.-ıh. al-Adab … , op. cit., hadith 234, p. 129. For the ethical code of the Quran See Daraz A. (1996), Dostu-r al-Akhla-q fi Al-Qur’a-n (The Ethical Constitution of the Quran), Dar Al-Da‘awa, Alexandria; See also Abu Laylah, Al-Islam: Manhaj wa T.at.bı-q (Islam: Method and Practice), Dar Al-Hilal, Cairo, 2010, p. 50 ff. 108 Abdu & Reda, Tafsı-r … , vol. I, p. 62 ff. 109 Al-Shatibi, Al-Mwafaqa-t … , op. cit., vol. II, p. 395, says: “the legislative objective behind the establishment of Sharia is to protect the entrusted human from his whim, in order to be servant of God voluntarily, as he is servant of God forcibly.” See Imara M. (2009), Al-Manhaj al-Is.lah.i li al-Ima-m Muhammad ‘Abdu (The Reformative Approach of Imam Muhammad Abdu), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, p. 50 ff. 110 Barnes J. (1986), The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 146. 111 Heraclitus, fragment 107: “κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχἀς ἐχὀντων” (“Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, if they have souls that understand not their language”). 112 Guthrie W., The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle, Methuen, London, 1950, pp. 43–44; Ellethy Y. (1996), Ma‘rifat al-Dha-t fi Masrah. Sophocles (Selfknowledge ‘Γνώθι σαυτόν’ in Sophocles), (MA thesis), Ain Shams University, Cairo, pp. 7–8. 113 See Abdu & Reda, Tafsı-r … , op. cit., pp. 64–65; Imara, Al-Manhaj al-Is.lah.i … , op. cit., pp. 52–53. 114 See, for example, the tafa-sı-r of Al-Tabari, Ibn Kathir, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Atiyya. Al-Zamakhshari (1998), Al-Kashsha-f (The Revealer), Al-Ubaykan, Riyadh, vol. 1, pp. 337–338, adds the linguistic meaning of the word as “good.” See also the relevant hadiths in almost similar wording in the S.ah.-ıh. of Al-Bukhari, Kita-b Ah.a-dı-th al-Anbiya-’, hadith 3339, Kita-b al-Tafsı-r, hadith 4487, Kita-b al-I‘tis.a-m bi al-Kitab wa al-Sunna, hadiths 7349. 115 See Imara, Al-Manhaj al-Is.lah.i … , op. cit., p. 36 ff. For more on the Islamic concept of wasat.iyya see Ellethy Y. (2011), “Quran and Islamic Tradition Connected to Religion and Violence: the Absent Texts,” in Eynikel E. & Ziaka A., Religion and Conflict: Essays on the Origins of Religious Conflicts and Resolution Approaches, Harptree Publishing, London, pp. 44–45; Cf. Ramadan, Radical … ,

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117 118 119 120

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127 128 129 130 131

Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy op. cit., pp. 37–38, who argues that “transformation” and not just defensive “adaptation” is what Muslims need today. He argues that Muslims need a new more coherent balance and stimulating energy to be able to propose their own answers in today’s and tomorrow’s world. See Hamza M. (2007), Islam al-Mujaddidı-n (Islam of the Renovators), Dar Al-Tali‘a, Beirut, pp. 19–20. His book is a good survey of the so-called “Arab rationalists,” and their concept of a “New Islam”; Imara M. (1993), Fikr al-Tanwı-r bayna al-‘Alma-niyyı-n wa al-Isla-miyyı-n (Enlightenment Thought between Secularists and Islamists), Jam‘iyyat Al-Markaz Al-‘Alami li Al-Tawthiq wa Al-Tarbiyya Al-Isla-miyya, Cairo, pp. 16–17. Imara M. (2000), Al-H . iwar bayna al-Islamiyyın wa al-‘Almaniyyın (Dialogue between Islamists and Secularists), Nahdat Mirs, Cairo, p. 19. The part of a person’s body that must be covered before everybody with exceptions that vary from a spouse to a parent, etc. Al-Mwafaqa-t, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 488–492. Al-Asaadi M. (1998), Al-Mu-jaz fi Us.u-l al-Fiqh ma‘a Mu‘jam Us.u-l al-Fiqh (The Concise on the Fundamentals of Jurisprudence with a Lexicon of Us.u-l al-Fiqh), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, pp. 260–261. On the authority of ‘urf (custom) see Ben Ibrahim M. (2009), Al-Ijtiha-d wa al-‘Urf (Ijtihad and Custom), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, p. 141 ff. For a detailed study of mas.a-lih. mursala see Hasan M. (1995), Al-Mas.a-lih. al-Mursala (The Unrestricted Interests), Dar Al-Nahda Al-Isla-miyya, Beirut. Imara M. (2007), Al-Is.la-h. al-Dı-nı- fi al-Qarn al-‘Ishrı-n (Religious Reform in the 20th Century), Dirasat Isla-miyya 148, Cairo, pp.20–21; Idem (2011), Al-Sheikh Al-Mara-ghi wa al-Is.la-h. al-Dı-nı- fi al-Qarn al-‘Ishrı-n (Sheikh Al-Marahghi and Religious Reform in the 20th Century), Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, pp. 25–26. Ibid, p. 22. Abu Laylah M. (2002), Al-Qur’a-n al-Karı-m min al-Manz.u-r al-Istishra-qi (The Holy Quran from the Orientalisitc Perspective), Dar al-Nashr li Al-Jami‘aat, Cairo, p. 372. See Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b Fad.a-’il al-Qur’a-n, hadith 4986, Kita-b al-Ah.ka-m, 7191; Al-Zarkashi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 295. Al-Bukhari, S.ah.-ıh., op. cit., Kita-b al-Khawf, hadith 946, Kita-b al-Magha-zi, hadith 4119; Moslim, op. cit., Kita-b al-Jiha-d, hadith 1770. Banu Qurayz.ah is the name of a Jewish tribe and its homonymous fort near Madina. Abu Dawud, Sunan, op. cit., hadith 3592. The hadith is cited as weak (d.a‘ı-f); Al-Qaradawi, Min ajl … , op. cit., p. 39, argues that the isna-d (chain of narrators) of the hadith is strengthened through some scholars like Ibn Taymiya, Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, Al-Dhahabi and Ibn Kathir. Al-Qaradawi, Min ajl … , op. cit., p. 48. See the recent analytic work on his view of the objectives of Sharia by Zirwaq, op. cit., esp. p. 402. Qutb S. (199211), Al-Islam wa Mushkila-t al-H . ad.ara (Islam and the Problems of Civilization), Dar Al-Shorouq, Cairo, p. 188. Al-Qaradawi, Min ajl … , op. cit., p. 49. Al-Bukhari, Al-Adab … , op. cit., Kita-b Is.t.ina-‘ al-‘Umma-l, hadith 479, Al-Albani, Silsilat al-S.ah.-ıh.a, op. cit., hadith 9, p. 38.

4

On Pluralism

Having explored in the previous chapters aspects of the diachrony of the interpretive tradition of Islam, the notion of development and its manifestations in the concepts of renovation and reform, I tried to clarify the boundaries of mutability, development and human reasoning vis-à-vis immutability, traditionalism and divine revelation. No understanding of the Muslim worldview and code of behavior is possible without profound knowledge of the scriptural fundamentals and their diverse human conceptualizations that give form to the collective Muslim identity. The Quranic text, God’s immutable word, inspires various interpretations and meanings (h.amma-l awjuh),1 and intrinsically influences the different tafsı-r-schools and trends. It is revealed in the most perfected form of Arabic; a language and a source of creativity for the Arabs, which diachronically produced diglossic variations with many dialects and vernaculars, hence levels of reading, understanding and contextualization of the divine text. The Islamic Sharia remained always the fixed “center” surrounded by diverse fiqh schools and deduction methods (ijtiha-ds), which reflect the human endeavor to understand the divine revelation. The great diversity that characterizes this Islamic diachrony functioned as a historical mechanism of production of many intraIslamic epistemological, theological, socio-political and cultural spectra. It was always the generating factor of a plethora of ideas, approaches, practices and reform projects of the modern and contemporary Muslim world. Thus, the notions of development, progress, revival, renovation and reform remain inherent to the Islamic worldview, and the door of ijtiha-d remains always open to meet all new mundane developments. In modern times, especially from the nineteenth century onwards, Islamic reformism emerged as a religion-based precondition for the revival of the Muslim ummah. This did, and does not, happen in a historical vacuum or a geopolitical and cultural independence. The Islamic “alternative,” generated in a historical crisis of deterioration on different levels and fields, raised many questions about the validity of a religion-centered civilizational project versus a non-religious but “superior” project, which presents itself in terms of rationalism, secularism, epistemic revolutionism and pluralistic multiculturalism. In this respect, a revival of an Islamic alternative is viewed as an anachronistic

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reproduction of an obsolete historical stasis already surpassed by Western modernity. Being religion-based, any Islamic socio-political reformative project, seen a priori as inherently pre-modern,2 could be criticized as being exclusive, mono-cultural and non-democratic. To put all this into a hermeneutical context we need to broaden our investigation to include the Islamic view of a non-Islamic diversity. This brings us to a wider discussion of the Islamic diachrony and development concerning the encounter between Islam and all that exists outside its realm of belief, modalities of life and civilizational project. Therefore, in this chapter, I will discuss the dynamics of an Islamic reaction to, and interaction with, the challenge of diversity outside the realm of Islam. I do this aiming at a reconstruction of the cognitive model based on some Islamic pluralistic values which constitute some Muslim and non-Muslim approaches to the subject. Tackling the issue of pluralism from an Islamic perspective would broaden the focus of this study on the contentious critique on any modern Islamic reformative approach: its inability to encompass any form of “otherness” as it claims to be the self-sufficient representative of the divine truth. Based on the previous chapters, I will try to show, in the four sections of this chapter, how the concepts of Islamic universality and diversity affect and permeate the Muslim perspective on the worldly diversity and plurality. This is also a question that we need to bring forth before we discuss, in the following chapter, the Islamic Sharia-oriented political thought, and its view of democracy where pluralism is a prerequisite. I will begin with the scriptural foundation of the Islamic concept of universality. Afterwards, I will try to reconstruct the relation of Islam and the “Other” by defining the relevant terminology in linguistic, theological and historical contexts. Thirdly, I will expand the discussion on the Muslim religious and cultural identities as an attempt to understand the intricacies of the Muslim world of ideas in terms of self-knowledge. Finally, I will approach the Muslim status quo within a globalized and a multicultural context. I need to emphasize that it is not my aim here to handle all critical problems of religious pluralism, but rather to review some crucial and general points related to an Islamic theory of religious diversity, which can help to enhance a pluralistic society with the Islamic principles taken seriously.

The scriptural background: Humanity as unity What follows is an exploration of the global Islamic standpoint on humanity as this emerges from the Islamic scriptural sources. I begin with this general Islamic conceptualization of humanity as a whole to establish the broader framework of the Islamic concept of pluralism. On the one hand, this is important for the understanding of the peculiarities of the term pluralism, explained by the Islamic view, and for understanding its otherness in relation to the conventional typology of inclusivism–exclusivism–pluralism. On the other hand, this will be utilized as a guiding concept in the discussion of

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many of the issues approached in this chapter. I will begin with the conceptual basis of the term pluralism and its connotations in the Arabic language and Islamic literature. Thereafter, I will approach human diversity in relation to the concept of tawh.-ıd (unification/unity of God) to show how this makes part of the Muslim perspective of pluralism as a divine will. I then focus on the peculiarities of the Islamic concept of inclusivism concerning other forms of faith. Finally, I will discuss the universal connotations of the word Islam and its implications on the Muslim concept of pluralism. The conceptual framework To speak about pluralism in the Islamic worldview one finds himself primarily faced with a global approach to this concept within the scriptural sources of Islam. Therefore, this sub-section focuses on the scriptural framing of the theme of the unity of humankind and its influence on the Islamic perspective of pluralism. Before we do this, we need to examine the linguistic connotations of the term “pluralism” in Arabic. The Arabic word for pluralism is ta‘addudiyya, a derivation from the stem ’adada (in the duplicated form: ‘adda), which originally means to enumerate or to count. The intransitive reflexive form of this verb ta‘addada denotes the state of being plural, numerous, various, diverse and growing more.3 Today in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), the passive participle of this verb (muta’addid) is used in the place of the English prefix multi-. The term ta‘addudiyya then is a modern derivative of this last form which is the Arabic equivalent of “plurality–pluralism.” Terminologically, it is difficult to approach the definition of the term within a certain Islamic discipline or field. This is probably to be attributed to the fact that the threefold typology of exclusivism–inclusivism–pluralism of Western philosophers of religion is less known and not commonly used in Islamic pluralist literature. The Muslim literature on pluralism is scarce and can be considered marginal when compared to Christian literature.4 However, a contemporary Muslim scholar defines the Arabic term ta‘addudiyya in general terms as a “diversity based on uniqueness and particularity.”5 Thus, evident in this definition is the need to underline the particularities of the components of such diversity. Diversity, as we will see, constitutes the key word in the Muslim view of pluralism. This view is not confined to the religious sense. Surely, religious pluralism comprises a considerable part of the discussions about pluralism in Islam, but not the only part. Nonetheless, in Western Islamology the definition of the term is predominantly restricted to its religious aspect. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Islamic pluralism is defined as: Inclusiveness that acknowledges the legitimacy of other faiths. In general, Muslim pluralists stress that the Quran recognizes salvific value in other religions, particularly Judaism and Christianity, with whom it is linked through shared prophets. Some Muslims accept other faiths as not merely

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy inferior manifestations of religiosity, but variant forms of individual and communal responses to the presence of the transcendent in human life. Proponents of this view find support in the Islamic teaching that all persons are created by God with a disposition that potentially leads to knowledge of God (fitrah). The mainstream Islamic viewpoint, however, is that Islam is superior to other religions; while protecting individuals’ rights to practice the religion of their choice privately, Islam sees itself as the final revelation, perfect and complete, which corrects the errors of earlier religious communities. Its law must therefore remain dominant and may not be challenged by other legal systems.6

Moreover, the Muslim view of pluralism is at odds with some approaches in the philosophy of religion. The pluralistic hypothesis of J. Hick is a telling example. His famous hypothesis on religious pluralism, against Christian exclusivism, has been widely debated in Western academia since the publication of his relevant works.7 His name had been synonymous with religious pluralism since the 1980s. He made an interesting attempt, as a Christian, to reflect on other traditions and understand his own faith through other faiths in a way that can contribute to religious and cultural pluralism. Yet, the way in which he approaches pluralism pertains primarily to a Kantian-Sophistic skepticism. In his view, theistic religions should be seen as various manifestations of human reflections on “God.” It is all about the difference between the truth of the “noumenal” God and a human perception of a “phenomenal” God. The outcome is a theorization of religious pluralism as a sort of religious relativism about what he calls “the One Real.” On the one hand, this might serve in the discussions of scholastic theology as rationalist evidence of the generic human perception of “a” certain Real beyond this creation. On the other, it still works in one direction from the human toward the Divine.8 In other words, it overlooks the role of “the” Real and His scriptural message in the revelation of His name, attributes and law. As we mentioned before,9 human intellect has always tried to answer the question pertaining to the existence and identity of a high authority behind this universe, but has always come short without the aid of revelation. Knowing God (ma‘rifat Allah) by God, the difference between monotheism of Lordship (tawh.-ıd al-rubu-biyya) and of Divinity (tawh.-ıd al-ulu-hiyya) are crucial issues of the Islamic creed (‘aqı-da). An Islamic tradition reports that when a Muslim mystic was asked: “How did you know your Lord?” he replied: I knew my Lord by my Lord and without my Lord I would have never known my Lord.10 In this respect, it will not be my concern here to give an account of how a Muslim thinks about other creeds and religions, but to elucidate some general Islamic aspects that might help organize religious diversity. Thus, the way in which I discuss the notion of pluralism is from an Islamic perspective, rather

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than a Western philosophical perspective. Overlapping, despite this, may occur as the Christian philosophy of religion has developed the theoretical framework of this theme. In the following three sub-sections, I will focus on different aspects of the concept of pluralism, including inclusivism and exclusivism, as these might be induced from the Islamic sacra scriptura. One God and multi-creation: Religious Tawh.-ıd and human ikhtila-f The term ta‘addudiyya is neither to be encountered in the Islamic sources nor even in the classical Muslim literature. The term known in the Islamic tradition is ikhtila-f (dissimilarity, difference, variation, diversity).11 The notion of ikhtila-f constitutes the background for the Muslim concept of pluralism as it can be deduced from the Quran. This notion is based on the fact that diversity is a divine norm which characterizes God’s creation as a whole. Many verses address the issue of ikhtila-f as a divine will and wisdom. Humankind belongs to a one single nation which later became diverse: Mankind was one single nation, and Allah sent Messengers with glad tidings and warnings; and with them He sent down the Book in truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed. (Al-Baqara, 2:213) Mankind was but one nation, but differed (later). Had it not been for a word that went forth before from your Lord, their differences would have been settled between them. (Yunus, 10: 19) The classical interpretations of this one nation (ummah) almost agree that it indicates one “religion.” According to Al-Tabari, God informs His servants that humankind was one nation with one religion, the religion of their first father Adam. When they deviated from the right path and differed in this religion God sent His messengers beginning with Noah.12 The period of this religious uniformity amongst humankind and the people (na-s) mentioned in the verses is subject of disagreement in the tafsı-r tradition. One of the opinions maintains that it was the era between Adam and Noah, while another narration, attributed to Ubay Ibn Ka‘b and Ibn Zayd, times it at the moment of creation itself.13 This latter opinion can be corroborated by the following verses: When your Lord drew forth from the Children of Adam from their loins, their descendants, and made them bear witness against themselves, (saying): “Am I not your Lord (Who cherishes and sustains you)?” They said: “Yea! we do testify!,” lest you should say on the Day of Judgment: “Of this we were never mindful.” (Al-A‘ra-f, 7:172)

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy So set your face steadily and truly to the Faith: Allah’s handiwork according to the pattern on which He has made mankind: no change (let there be) in the work (wrought) by Allah: that is the standard Religion: but most among mankind understand not. (Al-Ru-m, 30:30)14

Actually, the Muslim approach to the concept of pluralism basically emerges from this Islamic concept of pure monotheism (Tawh.-ıd). The oneness and immutability of the Creator involves the plurality and variation of His creation. In Islamic scholastic theology (Kala-m) this has been the common denominator for all arguments against anthropomorphic attributes of God. The criterion verse in this theological argumentation is always quoted by Muslim theologians by its last words (i.e., “There is nothing whatever like unto Him, and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing”), neglecting the beginning of the verse that speaks of the oneness of God in comparison to the plurality and multitude of His creatures: (He is) The Creator of the heavens and the earth. He has made for you pairs from among yourselves, and pairs among cattle: by this means does He multiply you. There is nothing whatever like unto Him, and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing. (Al-Shu-ra, 42:11)15 Humankind is seen from this perspective as originally belonging to one multifarious nation, offspring of one father (having the fit.ra – inherent god-made pattern of humankind – to believe in the One and Only Creator). While this Islamic view restricts “oneness” to God and extends “plurality” and variety to all that exists in His creation, it promotes the principle of pluralism as a divine norm. In this variation, those who know (al-‘a-limı-n) should recognize the Signs (aya-t) of God: And among His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the variations in your languages and your colours: verily in that are Signs for those who know. (Al-Ru-m, 30:22)16 The variation of languages and colors, then, is part of the signs of God’s Might, and surely Will, in His creation. Such signs should not escape the notice of those who know and are not content with the superficial aspect of things but delve into them to reach the truth.17 The Quran sets the idea of pluralism in the framework of a divine norm which includes all things in this universe and then asks humans to reflect on this as Divine Signs. The Quranic structure of this idea begins from the One and Only God, to the creation of one father and mother of humankind, to the extension of humankind into one nation on fit.ra, to the variation and plurality of all aspects of this

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One Father and Mother

ity Un

Di ve rs ity

One God

One Nation with one Fitra

Different nations, religions, languages and cultures

Figure 4.1 One God and multi-creation

creation including humans. The oneness of God is at the top of all of existence as a common reference. The more we are inspired by the higher unity of our existence the more we are aware of our diversity in pluralistic terms. The diachrony of the divine revelations has always been a perpetual guidance toward the One and Unique Originator. That is why “revelation” constitutes an essential part of Islamic pluralism, which fosters tolerance between diverse humans, but still recognizes their doctrinal and ritual particularities. According to this rooting of the concept of pluralism, all humans are linked by the bond of a broader brotherhood than that of religion, the bond of brotherhood in humanity. The collective identity of humankind is utterly prescribed in the so-called Farewell Sermon (khut.bat al-wada-‘) of the Prophet during his last pilgrimage. He addressed his words to the masses of Muslims from different ethno-cultural and societal backgrounds saying: O people, verily your Lord is One and your father is one. You are all (coming) from Adam, and Adam is from clay.18 This most often and enthusiastically quoted part of the sermon by Muslims echoes honestly what the Quran expresses as follows: O mankind! Reverence your Guardian-Lord, who created you from a single person, created, of like nature, His mate, and from them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men and women. (Al-Nisa-’, 4:1)

Diversity in faith and inclusivism Ikhtila-f, especially in the field of belief, is a result of human deviation from the divine inherent and common fit.ra. The task of all messengers is to remind

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people of the true faith and guidance and clarify those things in which they differed.19 However, the return to the Originator of this creation, and the accountability of all people before Him, constitutes one of the pillars of Islamic faith. After this return, He will judge between them: Verily thy Lord will judge between them on the Day of Judgment, in the matters wherein they differ (among themselves). (Al-Sajda, 32:25) Allah will judge between you on the Day of Judgment concerning the matters in which you differ. (Al-H . ajj, 22:69) The Quranic argument, even with the polytheists of Quraish, defers the final word on certain disputed matters of faith to the Hereafter: Say: “Shall I seek a Lord other than Allah, when He is the Lord of all things? And no soul earns (evil) but against itself no bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another. Then to your Lord is your return, so He will inform you of that in which you differed.” (Al-An‘aa-m 6:164) In his commentary on this verse, Al-Tabari says: God, all praise be to Him, says to His Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him: say to those who equalize idols with their Lord: each doer amongst us and you shall have the reward or the burden of his (/her) deeds, so do what you want to do. (To your Lord) o people is (your return), that is to say: to Him is your final destination and end (He will inform you of that in which) in the worldly life (you differed) in religions and beliefs. Some of you believed in Judaism, others in Christianity, others Magianism, others in idolatry and ascribing partners to God. He will recompense all of you according to what he did in the worldly life, good or evil, and then you know who is the beneficent and the wrongdoer among us.20 This does not mean that Islam is totally inclusive as far as all other forms of faith are concerned. In other words, Islamic pluralism does not involve religious relativism, as maintained by the aforementioned view of Hick. This would be theologically impossible simply because it contradicts the tenets of proper faith and deconstructs the very concept of “religion,” as it is in Islam. The major issue of Islamic faith is unequivocally that of pure monotheism and unification (tawh.-ıd) of God; every deviation from this core belief is, from an Islamic view, nonnegotiable.21 At the same time, Islam is not totally exclusive toward other forms of faith in the practical sense of peaceful

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coexistence, mutual respect and cooperation for the common good. Islam rather acknowledges and recognizes the Divine Will behind the existence of “otherness” in this world including that of other worldviews and religions. The Quranic statement in this respect expresses clearly that religious diversity is not only part of God’s Will, but it is also a manifestation of the human freedom of choice whether to accept or to refuse His guidance. The accountability for such a choice is a divine acknowledged and mandated reality, expressing itself in the revealed Word: If your Lord had so willed, He could have made mankind one single nation (of the same faith) and they shall continue to differ. Save him on whom your Lord has mercy; and for that He did create them. (Hu-d, 11:118–19) The idea of naja- (salvation) has occupied a great deal of the discussions in the Islamic scholastic theology (Kala-m). It involves even Islamic erratic sectarianism. A well-known hadith reports that while the Muslim ummah will split into seventy three sects, only one, which preserves the proper creed and faith, will survive the Hell.22 Religious pluralism as it is expressed in Hick’s approach does not actually come into agreement with the Islamic perspective, not to mention Christianity and Judaism. To neutralize the particularities and differences between worldviews and religions, especially those related to issues of creed, in the name of pluralism belongs more to a fanciful philosophical idealism than practical reality.23 The question that should be posed in the matter of inclusivism-exclusivism is whether we should involve the particularities of the tenets of creed, or rather focus on the commonalities of our human brotherhood? The Islamic view of pluralism is more linked to the acknowledgement of a “human diversity in unity,” not only in the field of religious beliefs, but also in all facets of life. “Islam” and universal Islam:24 One God, one Message Although the Quran is full of references concerning the encounter of Islam with other religions, many verses in Sura 3 (Al ‘Imra-n) are representative of the description and analysis of the encounter of Islam with followers of other religions, especially the People of the Book, Christians and Jews. The occasion of the beginning of the revelation of this Sura is reported to have been a debate on pure monotheism between the Prophet and a delegation of Christians from Najra-n.25 To begin with, a verse in this Sura can be taken literally as evidence for Islamic exclusivism if it is not properly interpreted in light of other verses in the same Sura. In this particular verse we read that “the” religion for God is Islam: The Religion before Allah is Islam (submission to His Will). (Al ‘Imra-n, 3:19)26

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The definite article (al-) before the word “dı-n” is significant here.27 It indicates that there is only one “religion,” as there is only One God. The sequence of all messengers and revealed books from the beginning of creation until the end of time belongs to the same source. The word “Islam” in this context, as many classical and modern commentaries interpret it, denotes the global meaning of “submission and surrender to the One and Only God.”28 Al-Tabari draws on the meaning of the word “dı-n” in this same context as “obedience and prostration.” Thus, the true obedience of God is through subjugation and submission to God without reluctance. The interpretation, then, is: Obedience, as it is for Him, means: obedience to Him, the avowal of subjection and surrender to Him with both tongues and the hearts, their submission to Him in all that He orders and forbids, and their prostration to Him without neither arrogance against Him nor deviation from Him, and without joining other partners of His creation to Him in worshipping or as deity.29 This is the way the Quran expresses the essence of “obedience” (dı-n) of God as “submission” (Islam) to God, as the universal Message of all messengers, the common and universal Islam in all divine revelations. Al-Shaarawi puts it clearly by saying: Thus, Islam in the previous nations was a description, but for the message of the Messenger of God (pbuh) it became a proper name, because no other religion was revealed after it. Its Islam, thus, is a universal Islam. This is why we, by this religion, say: ‘we are Muslims’, while the people of other religions are also Muslims but only by description.30 The universality of this Islam has its linguistic implications. The name Islam implies a “status” of the relationship between the human and the Divine, and is not derived from the name of the founder, as in the case of Christianity, or a certain ethnonym, as in the case of Judaism. Even the dispute with those who do not believe in the “Islam” of Muhammad and his message is put in terms of the commonality of faith between him and that of the previous messengers and prophets, which is the “submission” (Islam) of oneself to God: So if they dispute with you, say: “I have submitted My whole self to Allah and so have those who follow me” And say to the People of the Book and to those who are unlearned: “Do you (also) submit yourselves?” If they do, they are in right guidance, but if they turn back, Your duty is to convey the Message; and in Allah’s sight are (all) His servants. (Al ‘Imra-n, 3:20)

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The Prophet is addressed to call the People of the Book to come to common terms with Muslims. These common terms are again represented in pure monotheism and the identity of submitting oneself to this One and Only God: Say: “O People of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: That we worship none but Allah; that we associate no partners with Him; that we erect not, from among ourselves, Lords and patrons other than Allah.” If then they turn back, say you: “Bear witness that we (at least) are Muslims (bowing to Allah’s Will).” (Al ‘Imra-n, 3:64) The universality of Islam as the Message of all messengers and prophets is emphasized as a continuum of belief in all divine revelations from the Abrahamic line of prophethood. An authentic Prophetic tradition reports that all prophets are sons of the same father from different mothers (abna-’ ‘alla-t) and have all the same religion.31 Ibn Taymiya comments on the hadith and writes: Thus, their religion is one; that is the worshipping of Allah the One with no partner. He is to be worshipped in each time by that which he orders at that time. This is the religion of Islam at that time.32 In another authentic hadith the Prophet says: My similitude in comparison with the Prophets before me is that of a man who has built a house nicely and beautifully, except for a place of one brick in a corner. The people go around about it and wonder at its beauty, but say: ‘Would that this brick be put in its place!’ So I am that brick, and I came as a seal (end) of the Prophets.33 Thus, a pluralistic term like the “Abrahamic religions,” from this Islamic view, would be also seen as Islam: Say: “We believe in Allah, and in what has been revealed to us and what was revealed to Abraham, Isma’il, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and in (the Books) given to Moses, Jesus, and the Prophets, from their Lord: We make no distinction between one and another among them, and to Allah do we bow our will (in Islam).” (Al ‘Imra-n, 3:84)34 The (same) religion has He established for you as that which He enjoined on Noah, and that which We have revealed to you, and that which We enjoined upon Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. Namely, that you should remain steadfast in religion, and make no divisions therein. (Al-Shu-ra, 42:13)

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The commonality in this same religion (al-dı-n), as Ibn Kathir comments,35 is to worship One God without enjoining any partners to Him. When it comes to the diversity in “laws” (shara-’i‘, sing. sharı-‘a and shir‘a)36 within this commonality of “religion,” these are due to the contextual and spatiotemporal interests of the former different nations according to their circumstances.37 The variation, then, is in the law, and if God has so willed he would have made all humans one nation, with no difference in the rules of law, or, in the terms of Ibn Abbas, the “Way” (shir‘a and minha-j: sabı-l and sunna): To each among you have we prescribed a law and an open way. If Allah had so willed, He would have made you a single people, but (His plan is) to test you in what He has given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to Allah; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which you dispute. (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:48)38 The word minha-j (way) has its connotations also to the social and cultural differences between people. Being different, humans should strive jointly in all virtues and good deeds. The human unity is recognized in its diverse aspects as a premise for a common good. The Islam of the fit.ra of all humankind, with its diversity of laws and rules can be a factor of rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims. But what about the truth of the matters in which people dispute? Al-Tabari anticipated the question and pointed out that while God’s messengers have already clarified this truth in this world, the difference is that everyone is tested in this life but both punishment and reward are not directly witnessed. In the Hereafter, we all face this truth and the consequences of believing in it or not.39 Furthermore, the word Islam is mentioned again in another verse of Sura Al ‘Imra-n, as the only accepted religion for God. In this context, we should be always reminded of the concept of fit.ra and the pure Oneness (Tawh.-ıd) of the Creator: If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter He will be in the ranks of those who have lost. (Al ‘Imra-n 3:85) The judgment on the authenticity of this universal faith is not exclusively connected to the era and the call of the Prophet, but overarches all of human history. Islam presents itself as the timeless religion of the One and Only God who revealed His message to humankind, indeed with various and diachronic details of law, but with the same core. This is why the Quran draws our attention, again, in the same Sura, to the fact that Ibra-hı-m (Abraham) was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but a “submitter” to God (a Muslim) who chose for truth and turned away from falsehood (h.anı-f):

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Abraham was not a Jew nor yet a Christian; but he was true in Faith, and bowed his will to Allah’s (as a muslim), and he joined not gods with Allah. (Al ’Imra-n, 3:67) To conclude, through this Islamic universality the notion of pluralism in Islam is neither inclusive nor exclusive, as these terms came to be formulated and established in the context of the Western philosophy of religion. This is because Islam does not conditionally involve the ideas of “salvation” and “truth” about the Divine in the conceptualization of a pluralistic worldview. In this respect, we have to distinguish between religious relativism and a universal pluralistic position.40 The first focuses on the question: what to do about our belief ? The latter asks a more practical question about what to do beyond our belief ? Islamic pluralism, thus, crosses the threshold of creed to find a place of religion in a civilizational context. Islamic pluralism does not mean that Islam has a neutral stand against other forms of creed, which, for example, deny the prophethood of Muhammad or the divine origin of the Quran. At the same time it does not mean that Islam sees itself as the sole valid civilizational project in this world, in a way that it eliminates the civilizational other. The diversity in nations, colors, cultures, languages, religions and their laws is apprehended as a divine norm and a natural principle.41 We need to learn how to develop solidarity and commonality as urgent needs of our world today, but we have to take differences of worldviews and cultures with utter seriousness and handle them well.42 We do not need, for example, to Christianize Islam or to Islamize Christianity in order to speak about pluralism. I claim, for this reason, that the Islamic terms ta‘addudiyya and ikhtila-f have more relevance to the concept of diversity than that of religious pluralism. The Islamic worldview recognizes diversity and differences and seeks to find ways to reconcile with them; this is what I discuss in the next section.

Islam and the “Other” In the previous section, I have shown how the notion of pluralism is perceived within the Islamic scriptural sources as a human diversity within one universal unity. But what is the impact of such a scriptural background on the ethicalbehavioral code of the Muslims and how is it interpreted in the theological and socio-political contexts? To explore this issue we need to re-examine the Islamic interpretive traditions and its correlation to the practical pluralistic experience as it emerges in the Islamic tradition. Therefore, I will discuss, in this section, the Islamic attitudes towards the “Other” in general. Of course, the focus will be on the religious “Other,” as this comprises primarily the “non-Muslim Other” in an Islamic perception of what exists outside its realm of faith. I will do this in the framework of some historical, exegetic and jurisprudential contexts which build up the discourse on Islamic pluralism.

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Firstly, I will discuss the relation between Islam, Christians, and Jews and, of course, the Pagans as those comprised the “Other” main groups in the first Islamic period. Secondly, I will investigate the claim of abrogation (naskh) of the pro-tolerance Quranic verses by other anti-tolerance verses. Finally, in the third and fourth sub-sections, respectively, I will tackle two much discussed key terms in this respect, dhimmi (a non-Muslim, especially Christian or Jew, under Muslim authority) and ka-fir (unbeliever), and their eventual exclusivistic connotations. The beginning of an Islam–“Other” encounter The encounter between Islam, Christianity and Judaism took place actually at the very beginning of the Islamic history. In the case of Christianity, the Muslim classical literature celebrates the names of Christian monks who predicted the prophethood of Muhammad before and after the first revelation. The most famous narrations report that the monk Bah.-ıra (Sergius) met the young Muhammad (10 to 12 years old at that time) together with his uncle Abu Talib at Bosra-Syria during a trade caravan. In his abode, this monk, a well-versed authority in Christian scriptures, foretold of the Prophetic career of Muhammad to his uncle and asked him to take his responsibilities in the protection of the future prophet.43 The second incident is even more symbolic of the role of a Christian hermit in authenticating the divine revelation given to the Prophet and the sincerity of his universal message. Waraqa Ibn Nawfal, a cousin of the Prophet’s wife Khadija, was the first to be consulted on the miraculous appearance of the Angel to the 40-year-old Muhammad in a cave on mountain Al-Nu-r. Waraqa, by means of his biblical knowledge, affirmed the sincerity of Muhammad’s experience of revelation.44 The third incident is characteristically present in the Muslim discourse on the relationship with early Christians. When the persecution of the new Muslims in Mecca reached an unbearable height, the Prophet advised his companions to immigrate to the Christian Abyssinia. This choice was made with confidence of Abyssinia being ruled by a just king named Al-Naja-shi (As.h.ama Ibn Abjar or king Negus of Aksum, d. ca. 632). Quraish sent a delegation asking the Christian king not to grant asylum to the Muslim immigrants. In a debate on the new religion of Muhammad, the apologetic argument of the Muslims ended with some verses from Sura 19 (Mariam), and a statement on the Quranic Jesus. As a result, both the king and the present priests shed tears as they were touched by the Quranic narrative about the Virgin Mary and Jesus. This relationship between Al-Najashi and the Prophet remained close, even before his conversion to Islam, as some narrations report, and until his death. After his death, he was the only one we know in the Prophetic tradition who received the honorary funeral prayer for those who died in a distant place (s.ala-t al-gha-’ib).45 All these reports in the early Islamic period hint to a juxtaposition and self-recognition of Islam as a continuum in the circle of the biblical tradition. This may have served in the Muslim tradition as a

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historical testimony for the coming and credibility of the “Seal of the Prophets,” as seen by some People of the Book, but it worked also as a nexus between Islam and the religious other. Such historical reports are often used in Muslim discourse on the early amicable encounter between Islam and Christianity. Furthermore, the intimacy and preference given to the Christians, as People of the Book, compared to the pagan Persians constituted the reason of the revelation of the opening verses of Sura 30, titled Al-Ru-m (the Byzantines): The Byzantines have been defeated. In a land close by; but they, (even) after (this) defeat of theirs, will be victorious. Within a few [three to nine] years. With Allah is the Decision, in the past and in the Future: on that Day shall the Believers rejoice. With the help of Allah. He helps whom He will, and He is exalted in might, most Merciful. (It is) the promise of Allah. Never does Allah depart from His promise: but most men understand not. (30: 1–6) The verses perpetuate the remarkable defeats of the Roman Empire under Heraclius (ca. 575–641) by the Persians. The defeat “in a land close by” refers to Syria and Palestine. Jerusalem was lost in 614–615 AD, shortly before this Sura was revealed. The pagans of Quraish cheered up when their counterpart pro-pagan Persians defeated the Christian Byzantines, seen as counterparts of the Muslims because both are People of the Book.46 The revelation came to assure the victory of the Byzantine-Christians within a period of no more than nine years (bid.‘ sinı-n). A narration cited in most classical commentaries reports that Abu Bakr wagered the Quraishites, before wager was forbidden, for some young she-camels (qala-’is., sing. qa-lu-s.) on the victory of the Christians. He said to the Pagans of Quraish: You are in cheer for the victory of your brothers over our brothers? You should not! May God fulfill your wish not. By Allah! The Byzantines will overcome the Persians. Our Prophet (pbuh) told us so. The victory of the Byzantines took place decisively at the battle of Nineveh in 627. The Muslims celebrated this victory and became more hopeful of a decisive defeat of the pagans of Quraish by their own hands, as it was the case of the Persians and their brothers of the People of the Book.47 As far as the Jews are concerned, we note that their involvement in this early Islamic period, compared to the Christians,48 was very vital and active. This can be attributed to the fact that they were demographically and economically more present in the Arabian peninsula, especially in Medina where the first Islamic state was founded. Moreover, this may be the reason that the relation with the Jews witnessed tensions and frictions from the very beginning, such as it was with the Pagans. Historical sources show that earlier conflicts

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between the Jewish inhabitants of Yathrib (Medina) and the newcomers from Yemen, the tribes of Al-Aws and Al-Khazraj, were mainly caused by socioeconomic and political rivalry.49 Religious, cultural and economic-political antagonisms were present in the encounter with a new “Abrahamic” faith and, at the same time, a promising political power.50 Religiously, Islam presented itself as the last divine revelation with a universal reformative message which assesses and witnesses over (muhaymin) the previous Biblical traditions through its revealed Book, the Quran: And to you have We sent down the Book (this Quran) with the truth, confirming whatever Scripture was before it, and a witness (guardian, safeguard) over it. So judge between them by that which Allah has revealed, and follow not their desires away from the truth which has come to you. (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:48)51 The relation between Muslims and the Jews in the Arab Peninsula took different forms and strategies. This was determined by the socio-political conditions, especially the tensions between a newborn state with a religious background and another religious group which had its own worries and discomfort with the rise of a promising political power led by an “Abrahamic Prophet.” We have to consider seriously the economic, political, social and tribal implications of the period. The balance of powers upon the appearance of a new religious “alternative,” within a tribal pagan society in terms of alliance with a minority of adherents of a Biblical tradition, should have been inevitably full of intricacies. Paganism played a significant role in the socioeconomic and political structure of the pre-Islamic society. With hundreds of idols around the Ka‘ba responding to the spiritual needs of the Arab tribes from all over the Peninsula, Mecca became both the spiritual and economic center of the Arabs. A calling to a single transcendent God, with a new revolutionary social code based on the detribalization of this society, was more than a challenge. In the same way, it was to be expected that the Jews in Medina, already a cohesive social group with a literate scriptural tradition, who had come to ensure for themselves a stabilized status of certain privilege, would feel threatened by the new socio-religious rival partner. Especially when this newcomer, on the one hand, preaches a universal faith within the Abrahamic line, but, on the other, criticizes and revises the tenets of this tradition, it would have felt like the outsider who claimed to be an insider. As the Quran describes it, this was almost the case with every new divine message and messenger in the history of humankind.52 The historical context, topicality and geopolitical particularity of the Arabian Peninsula are all core factors in this discussion of the first encounter between an arising Islamic “alternative” and all the surrounding cohesive religious, social and economicpolitical “otherness.” Was the Islamic norm in dealing with this “otherness” always conflictive and challenging? This is a question we need to discuss.

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The tolerance abrogated! Although many verses in the Quran might refer to an antagonistic relation with the People of the Book, whether theologically or politically, this relation is not established as a reference code for the behavioral encounter with any religious “Other.” This includes even the Pagans whose animosity to Islam was undoubtedly the common factor in all the warfare incidents during the first decades of Islamic history. Many other verses prompt tolerance, patience and kindness. The controversy on the validity of these last verses arises in the interpretive tradition from a claim of abrogation (naskh) by other verses. This had, of course, influenced the Muslim approach to the “Other” and the code of behavior applied when dealing with every non-Muslim and to some extent with certain Muslims. How far are these abrogation claims reasonable? And in case they are, should those other numerous Quranic verses on tolerance remain “deactivated”? To respond to these questions, I will explore the problem of the pro-tolerance verses abrogated by the anti-tolerance verses. Of course, this does not mean that I will cover all the relevant verses in the Quran, but I will present the most discussed representative examples. The Quranic vocabulary is full of terms such as pardon/forgiveness (s.afh.), amnesty (‘afw), remission (ghufra-n), patience (s.abr), beneficence/kindness (ih.sa-n) and many others. These moral values represent some referential ethical codes for dealing with the “Other” in the early Islamic context. A reference example in this respect can emerge from the following verses: Allah forbids you not with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loves those who are just. Allah only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for (your) faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support (others) in driving you out, from turning to them (for friendship and protection). It is such as turn to them (in these circumstances), that do wrong. (Al-Mumtah.ana, 60:8–9) Despite the opinions that support that such pro-tolerance verses are all abrogated, Al-Tabari, the father of the tafsı-r literature, disagrees lucidly and utterly with this approach. He begins with a discussion of the different traditions concerning “those” meant in verse 8. Some views argue that the verse refers to the people from or outside Mecca who accepted Islam but did not immigrate to Medina. Others say that those are the polytheists of Mecca who did not fight the Muslims or drive them out of their homes, and that this verse is abrogated by the famous verse 5 in Sura 9 (Al-Tawba), known in the exegetic tradition as “the Sword Verse” (a-yat al-sayf),53 which orders the Muslims to fight and slay the polytheists when the sacred months have passed. At the end of his discussion of the different traditions, Al-Tabari puts it in clear words saying: And the most right among these opinions is that which says: “With this, it is meant that Allah does not forbid you, with regards to those who

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In fact, Al-Tabari disconnects himself, here, form a long tradition within the Islamic exegetic literature which, in the name of the naskh (abrogation) notion, made extreme, if not fatal, exaggerations in the field of the rapport between Islam and the “Other.” It might be enough here to mention that a scholar like Ibn Khuzayma (d. after 1097), a leading classical author in the field of naskh, dedicates a separate ba-b (chapter, part) of his work to what he calls “baya-n al-mansu-kh fi al-Qur’a-n bi a-yat al-sayf” (a statement of the abrogated [verses] in the Quran by the Sword Verse). He cites 116 Quranic verses which are all abrogated by this Sword Verse. The verses he cites are all related to tolerance, benevolence, self-restriction, patience, freedom of faith, forgiveness and other Islamic virtues opposite to enmity and the use of violence with non-Muslims.55 Ibn Al-Arabi (d. 1148) said: All that refers in the Quran to forgiveness of the unbelievers, forbearing them, leaving them off and turning aside from them is abrogated by the Sword Verse [ … ] this verse abrogates 114 verses.56 Another early classical exegete, Muqatil Ibn Suleyman Al-Balkhi (d. 767), claims that 16 Quranic verses, which proclaim merciful attitudes and peaceful relations with non-Muslims, are all abrogated by that “Sword Verse” (9:5).57 Surprisingly, another major scholar of naskh, Hibatulla-h Ibn Sala-ma (d. 1020), argues that the aforementioned verse in Sura Al-Mumtah.ana (60:8) is abrogated by the following one and that both verses are abrogated by the Sword Verse.58 In this perception, the latter verse would even abrogate the verse used enthusiastically by all Muslims to assure the merciful and tolerant nature of the Message of Muhammad: “We sent you not but as a Mercy for all mankind” (Al-Anbiya-’, 21:77).59 The same Sword Verse has been frequently used in polemics characterizing this attitude as the general and factual Islamic behavioral code towards the “Other.” All these classical traditions were

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reproduced in Muslim literature for centuries, echoing a single fixed ruling of fighting which abrogates numerous rulings of peaceful and tolerant treatment. Other representative examples are to be found in two of these allegedly abrogated verses, in the claim of some classical Muslim scholars. The first verse is one of many Quranic verses which addresses the Prophet – and in his person all Muslims – to give priority to pardon, tolerance and forgiveness in dealing with the “Other,” when the normal reaction requires cruelty: And because of their breaking their covenant, We have cursed them and made hard their hearts. They change words from their context and forget a part of that whereof they were admonished. You will not cease to find them – barring a few – ever bent on (new) deceits. But bear with them and pardon them. For Allah loves those who are kind (to others). (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:13)60 The reason of the revelation of this verse refers, in a certain historical context, to a group of the Jews in Medina – namely, the Banu Al-Nad.-ır who planned to assassinate the Prophet and his companions. Both Al-Tabari and Ibn Kathir refuse the claim of abrogation. Al-Tabari dismisses the claims that the verse is abrogated by verse 9:29,61 and says that this is an order to the Prophet to pardon and forgive those Jews because God loves the kind and the doers of the good (muh.sı-nı-n).62 Ibn Kathir seems to ignore the naskh claim and comments: “ … bear with them and pardon them”; this is the real victory and triumph, as some predecessors said: “You never treat him who disobeys God with you [by doing you wrong] in a better way than obeying God with him.”63 The claim of abrogation by the verses on fighting is baseless, as each of these verses is applicable in its own context. This is what we read in the aforementioned verses of Al-Mumtah.ana (60:8–9). The first verse sets the general basis for the encounter between Muslims and non-Muslims (“Allah forbids you not with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loves those who are just”), while the second defines the exceptional group (“Allah only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for (your) faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support (others) in driving you out, from turning to them for friendship and protection”). The second example is another verse revealed after the battle of Uh.ud (625), when the Muslims in Medina were defeated by the army of the pagans of Quraish. The loss of tens of the outnumbered Muslim army, including the uncle of the Prophet, Hamza, and the mutilation of his body, led the Muslims to express their outrage and desire for revenge. Some of them decided that,

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were they to fight the Quraish yet again, they would slay and mutilate more numbers of them. Then this verse was revealed: And if you punish, then punish them with the like of that with which you were afflicted. But if you show patience, that is indeed the best (course) for those who are patient. (Al-Nah.l, 16:126) According to another narration on asba-b al-nuzu-l (the reasons/occasions of revelation), the same verse was revealed again upon the conquest of Mecca in the year 630. The Prophet commented: “We show patience, and we will not punish.”64 He then asked the Quraishites: What do you think I would do to you? They replied: “Good! (You are) a gracious and kind brother and cousin.” Then he replied: I would tell you nothing but what Joseph said to his brothers: this day let no reproach be (cast) on you, may Allah forgive you, and He is the most Merciful of those who show mercy.65 Mustapha Zayd, in his modern detailed study on the question of naskh in the Quran,66 examined thoroughly the credibility of the claims about the prevailing abrogative authority of verse 9:5. He draws the attention to the previous and next verses that define the certain group of the Pagans meant in this verse.67 He concludes that it concerns a “group” among the Pagans and that it does not imply their compulsion to accept Islam. This is clear from verse 6 (“And if anyone of the idolaters seeks protection from you (O Muhammad), then protect him so that he may hear the Word of Allah, and afterward convey him to his place of safety. That is because they are a folk who know not”); and the unequivocal verse in Al-Baqara (2:256: “There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error”); and the verse in Yunus (10:99: “And if your Lord willed, all who are in the Earth would have believed together. Would you (Muhammad) compel men until they are believers?”).68 Zayd explains how fighting (qita-l) was permitted in Islam as a final means to secure the proclamation of faith and the freedom of belief.69 This is what the Arabic-Islamic term for “conquest/victory” is all about. The term fath., derived from verb fatah.a (to open), indicates “opening” the way to the Word of God, not necessarily by power. Reading the first verses of Sura 48 of the Quran, named Al-Fath., would surely give the impression that they cover the conquest of Mecca with an army of 10,000 Muslim soldiers. Nevertheless, the occasion of the revelation of these verses, on a “manifest victory” (fath. mubı-n), dates two years before, when a pact of ten years truce, known as S.ulh. Al-H . udaybiya (628), was signed between the Prophet and the pagans of Quraish. As the chance was given for the peaceful and safe preaching of the new faith, this was considered a great conquest. The Prophet, asked by one of his companions if this is a conquest, replied firmly: “Yes it is.”70 Therefore,

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we can argue with a good portion of reason that the verses 8–9 in Sura 60 Al-Mumtah.ana are unequivocal and not abrogated (muh.kama). The same is true for many other Quranic verses that regulate the relation between Islam and the “Other” in terms of tolerance and rapprochement. For example: Repel evil with that which is best: We are well acquainted with the things they say. (Al-Mu’ominu-n 23:96) Nor can goodness and Evil be equal. Repel (Evil) with what is best: Then will he between whom and you was hatred become as he were your friend and intimate. (Fus.s.ilat 41:34) The last example shows how the Prophet reacted to the malignity of the head of the hypocrites in Medina, Abullah Ibn Saloul. A man who missed no chance by all means to cause damage to both the Prophet and his message, either using obloquy and scandalous defamation, or by retreating from the battle field with one third of the Muslim army as he did in the crucial battle of Uh.ud (625). Though his own son Abdullah, a companion of the Prophet, expressed his utmost outrage that he might even kill his own father, the Prophet replied: “No! Be good to your father and pay him the best companionship.”71 The Quran dedicates many verses to the malice and divine punishment of the Hypocrites; a whole homonymous Sura on them (AlMuna-fiqu-n, 63), and condemns them as being in the lowest depths of Hell.72 Nevertheless, the Prophet visited Ibn Saloul while he was dying and granted him his own garment as a shroud. He even went further when he prayed on his dead body while a Quranic verse was already revealed about asking forgiveness for the hypocrites: Ask forgiveness for them or do not ask forgiveness for them; even if you ask forgiveness for them seventy times, Allah will not forgive them; because they have rejected Allah and His Messenger: and Allah guides not those who are perversely rebellious. (Al-Tawba, 9:80) An authentic hadith reports how Omar Ibn Al-Khattab grabbed the Prophet’s cloth and asked the Prophet astonishingly: “you pray for him while he is a hypocrite and God has forbidden you from asking forgiveness for them!,” then the Prophet replied: “Allah has given me the choice; [ … ] I will ask (forgiveness) more than seventy times.”73 Whether the Golden Rule teaches: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” or “it is good to benefit others and evil to harm them,” this is what pluralism really implies, and it may probably constitute a better and more comprehensive understanding of religious diversity and “otherness.”74

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As long as there is no severe danger, and in spite of the claims of abrogation, the Islamic Rule is to repel (daf‘) evil not by the good, but by the best (ah.san). Ibn Kathir, in his commentary on the order given to the Prophet concerning the Pagans in verse 23:96, relates it to verse 41:34. He says: God Almighty guides him to the useful antidote [tirya-q] in the treatment of people: beneficence [ih.s.a-n] to whomever does him wrong.75

The “Other” as dhimmi? One of the most problematic notions and terms for non-Muslims with regard to the issue of Islam and the “Other” is that of the dhimmi. Referring to the term has always been linked to polemics and biased generalizations. It might be a fact that misuse and distortions of the notion of dhimmi have taken place throughout the long historical-political course of Islam. I intend to discuss the term and some of its jurisprudential implications, not in the context of apologetics versus polemics, but as it emerges linguistically and theologically in Islam. To do this, I will analyze its semantics and, thereafter, its hermeneutic implementations in the Islamic theological and jurisprudential domains. Some examples will shed light on the political manifestations of, as I think, the proper meaning of this term. Linguistically, the word dhimmi is a substantive of dhimma, a noun which means pact/covenant (‘ahd), warranty/guaranty (kafa-la) and security (ama-n). The word is linked to other correlative derivatives such as dhima-m/dhima-ma and madhamma, which all mean “right” (h.aqq) and “sanctity, inviolability” (h.urma), especially dhima-m, which indicates “every sanctity to which one should be committed” and to which if you fell short you become worthy of disparagement (madhamma). Saying “so and so has dhimma” means that “he has right or covenant.”76 Thus, the word dhimma indicates semantically a pact of protective care, guardianship and looking after someone (or something), who has an inviolable right. Terminologically and religiously, the term dhimma is to be encountered only twice in the Quran in the following two verses: How (can it be)! While if they prevail against you, they would not pay regard in your case to ties of relationship, nor those of covenant [dhimma]. (Al-Tawba, 9:8) They do not pay regard to ties of relationship nor those of covenant [dhimma] in the case of a believer; and these are they who go beyond the limits. (Al-Tawba, 9:10) Both verses follow the aforementioned and much discussed verse of 9:5. The verses here warn Muslims about the group of pagans who broke the ten-year

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pact (Al-H . udaybiya), shortly before the conquest of Mecca, and supported aggressions against other allies of the Muslims. What interests us here is the use of the term dhimma as a pact and a covenant to safeguard something entrusted.77 This term has some connotations also with self-conscious commitment to fulfill voluntarily this entrustment even without a written warranty.78 Dhimma is more frequently used in the Prophetic tradition (the Sunnah). We find many hadiths that can help us to investigate the proper linguisticreligious semantics of the term. The term is mentioned in a hadith, cited by the lexicographers Ibn Manzour and Ibn Fares, as explained by Abu Ubayd Ibn Sallam.79 In the narration, the Prophet says that if one Muslim gives his dhimma (pact of safety) to a non-Muslim, it becomes, then, the obligation of all Muslims to safeguard him (yas‘aa bi dhimmatihim adna-hum).80 Consequently, the dhimmis (or ahl al-dhimma; people of dhimma) are those non-Muslims, especially Christians and Jews,81 who by a pact of God, His Messenger and the Muslims should be protected and enjoy security within the realm of any Islamic authority. In that context, it was a sort of a status of citizenship. This status involved rights of protection and security but also obligations towards the Muslim state.82 This is actually what remains in almost all the modern Muslim discourses on the issue of dhimmis. Both the rights and the human values related to the status of dhimmi in a Muslim society should not be neglected in the discussion of this notion. They constitute a common approach in almost all the debates of modern and contemporary Muslim intelligentsia and jurists. This happens in the framework of a contextual remoteness from the historicity of the whole issue. Many of these Islamic values are to be traced in many Prophetic traditions, all of which address directly the issue of the “Other” and, particularly, the status of the people of the Book within a Muslim society. These reports show the Muslim commitment to a pro-civil-state political system which, in its historical medieval context, formed an exceptional case for conflict resolution and pluralistic coexistence. A founding text in this respect is the constitutional agreement in Medina which established the first Muslim state (622). After decades of tribal conflicts, this agreement aimed at the establishment of a political entity built on the principle of citizenship and city-state confederation strategies.83 The agreement included the Muslims, the pagans and the Jews inhabitants of Yathrib (later Medina). In the so-called S.ah.-ıfat Al-Madı-na we read, among other things: (1) This is a document from Muhammad the Prophet [the Messenger of Allah] [agreed upon] between the believers and Muslims of Quraish and [the people of] Yathrib, and those who followed them and joined them and labored with them. (2) They are one community (ummah) to the exclusion of all people. [ … ] (16) To the Jews who join us belong help and equality, they shall not be wronged nor shall their enemies be aided. [ … ] (25) The Jews of the Banu Awf are one community (ummah) with the believers, the Jews have their religion and the Muslims have theirs,

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Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy their freedmen and their persons except those who behave unjustly and sinfully, for they hurt but themselves and their families. (26–35) The same applies to the Jews of Banu Al-Najjar, Banu Al-Harith, Banu Sai‘ida, Banu Jusham, Banu Al-Aus, Banu Tha‘laba except those who behave unjustly and sinfully, for they hurt but themselves and their families, and the Jafna, a clan of the Tha‘laba and the Banu Al-Shutayba. (Between them is) loyalty and not treachery. The freedmen of Tha‘laba are as themselves. The close friends of the Jews are as themselves. [ … ] (37–37b) The Jews must bear their expenses and the Muslims their expenses. Each must help the other against anyone who attacks the people of this document. Between them are mutual advice and consultation, loyalty and not treachery. A man is not liable for his ally’s misdeeds. The wronged must be helped. [ … ] (38) The Jews must pay with the believers so long as war lasts. (39) Yathrib shall be a sanctuary for the people of this document. (40) A stranger under protection shall be as his host doing no harm and committing no crime. [ … ] (46) The Jews of Al-Aus, their freedmen and themselves have the same standing with the people of this document, in pure loyalty from the people of this document. (Between them is) loyalty and not treachery. Whoever commits wrong commits it against himself. God approves the very veracity and loyalty of this document. (47) This document will not protect the unjust and the sinner. Whoever goes out is safe and whoever stays at home in the city is safe unless he has been unjust or sinned. God is the protector of the good and the God-fearing, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.84

This document is enthusiastically celebrated by all Muslims as a par excellence paradigmatic constitution of pluralistic coexistence. The realignment of the ethno-religious, cultural and social “otherness” is practiced with a significant consideration to the individual and collective particularities. Both the moral detribalization of the society and the agreement with the Jews of Medina did not take the form of total Islamization. It rather acknowledged the particularities of its participants as partner-citizens, all dedicated to some interdependent and interactive goals. The tendency to the principle of equal citizenship at the expense of differences is clear.85 In Muslim eyes, this document constituted a Social Contract, more than 1,000 years before Hobbes (1588–1679), Locke (1632–1704) and Rousseau (1712–1778). The political utilization of the Muslim enthusiasm for such pluralistic approaches can always serve as a religious impetus toward pluralistic values, inspired and embodied in modern civil constitutions. In the same context, other Prophetic traditions underline the sanctity and inviolability of the rights and integrity of the “dhimmi-Other.” The Prophet said: Whoever wrongs a mu‘a-hid [or mu‘a-had: a non-Muslim who has the pact of safety, a dhimmi], deprives him his rights, overburdens him, or takes

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anything from him involuntarily, I will be his adversary in the Day of Judgment (The messenger of Allah pointed out to his chest with his hand).86 We read also in S.ah.-ıh. Al-Bukhari: Whoever kills a man who has the dhimma of Allah and His messenger will never smell the fragrance of paradise, and its (the paradise’s) fragrance is to be found from the march of forty years.87 In the same authentic collection of hadiths, we find that these dhimmis, who have the pact of Allah and His Messenger, are also the Muslims themselves: Whoever prays our prayers and heads towards our qibla (direction towards the Ka‘ba during the ritual prayers), and eats our sacrificed meat that is the Muslim, who has the dhimma of Allah and His messenger. So do not break Allah’s pact.88 In another hadith in S.ah.-ıh. Moslim we read: Whoever prays the morning prayers is in the dhimma of Allah [in His pact and protection and should be secured].89 The second Caliph Omar Ibn Al-Khattab – who died after a dhimmi, Abu Lu’lu’a Al-Maju-si (the Magian), stabbed him in the mosque and killed a number of Muslims during the prayer – describes in his last breath the following will to his successor Caliph and says: I entrust him (the rights of the people of) the dhimma of Allah and His Messenger (pbuh), to fulfill their pact to them, to fight for their protection and abstain from overburdening them.90 Omar is the same Caliph who summoned the great companion Amr Ibn Al-‘Aas, governor (wa-li) of Egypt, to Medina upon a complaint of a Christian Copt against the son of Amr. The son of Amr had earlier whipped the Copt who won him in a horse racing and said to him “I am the son of noble parents!” Omar, having gathered Amr, his son Muhammad and the Copt who came to complain, gives the latter his own stick and orders him to hit the son of the governor of Egypt saying: “Hit the son of the noble parents.” He even orders him to hit Amr’s head saying: “Now on Amr’s head, I swear by Allah he (the son) has hit you only for the authority of his father.” Omar addresses his governor on Egypt and says: “O Amr! Since when have you enslaved people while their mothers have begotten them as free men?” He sends the Copt back to Egypt with the following words: “Go in peace, if you have any other troubles, write to me.”91 Omar should have had in his mind a relevant

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authentic Prophetic tradition. Under the title “the advice of the Prophet (pbuh) concerning the people of Egypt,” Moslim narrates the following hadith: You will open (conquest) Egypt, a land in which the qı-ra-t. (a coin) is mentioned. When you conquest it do beneficence to its people, because they are entitled to dhimma and kinship.92 Though the Egyptian Maliki jurist Al-Qarafi (1228–1285) differentiated in his famous work Al-Furu-q (The Differences) between muwa-la- (adherence) and ih.sa-n (beneficence and good treatment) to the dhimmis, he says: The covenant of dhimma entitles us to give them certain rights. [This is] because they are in our protection and guardianship, the pact [dhimma] of the Almighty Allah and his Messenger (pbuh). Whoever commits any aggression against them even with a word of defamation or gossip concerning their honor, or any kind of harm, or helped in doing this, has surely broken the pact [dhimma] of the Almighty Allah, His Messenger (pbuh) and Islam. Ibn Hazm [994–1064] reported, in his Mara-tib al-Ijma-‘, that if someone is in our dhimma and he is threatened by an external enemy we should go out with our weapons and horses to fight them and die for the sake of that single man, safeguarding whoever is in the dhimma of the Almighty Allah and His Messenger (pbuh). Surrendering him otherwise is an omission of the pact of dhimma, and he [Ibn Hazm] reported the consensus of the Muslims on this. A covenant for which souls and wealth are sacrificed to keep unbroken is really great!93 In accordance with this covenant, during the catastrophic invasions of the Tatars, which put an end to the Abbasid Empire by the fall of Baghdad in 1258, Ibn Taymiya (1263–1328) wrote the following: The Christians know already that when I negotiated with the Tatars to free the captives [ … ], he [the Tatar’s leader] said to me: “But we have Christians whom we captured in Jerusalem. These will not be freed.” I said to him: “Nay! But all the Jews and the Christians in your disposition, who are the people of our dhimma. We set them free and we will never leave a single captive, neither from ahl-al milla (the people of our religion; Muslims) nor from ahl al-dhimma.”94 These were some examples, among many others, to clarify the connotations of the terms dhimmi, dhimma and ahl al-dhimma in Islam, as these are encountered in the Quran, the Sunnah and some historical and legislative contexts. These terms, as many other Islamic terms, have been shifted from their linguistic realm to their religious usage. In turn, this religious term in its historical course became charged with social, political and cultural elements.

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It is thus very important to consider the linguistic semantics of Islamic terms and their diachrony when we approach them in modern contexts. In the present context, when modern and contemporary Muslim scholars, in their majority, discuss the rights of the so-called ahl al-dhimma, they agree on some basic rights.95 They use the term mostly in its historical fiqh domain and not as belonging to a certain status quo. They tend to utilize it in the here and the now more as a conflict resolving socio-political mechanism. Actually, in their interpretations and ijtiha-d they tackle issues which their predecessor classical scholars did not determine simply because they did not face them. The modern “Islamic” states are based more on the principle of Muslim majority and not on a Muslim conquest. These states fought wars, resisted colonists, struggled for independence, and in all these fields both Muslims and non-Muslims fought side by side and sacrificed their lives together.96 Add to this the fact that modern social contracts are mostly expressed in democratic legal forms and constitutions, where all people are represented on the principle of citizenship.97 In an Islamic modern state, this covenant of dhimma might be shifted again from the pact concept to the constitutional principles of law. Judicially, the non-Muslim rights will be manifested in constitutional laws and religiously these will be rendered to and supported by the pact of dhimma. Finally, we have to stress again that the term dhimmi has already gone through linguistic shifts and almost does not exist in the socio-political or cultural vocabulary of the contemporary Muslim debates. What has remained is the religious pact and covenant (dhimma-‘ahd/‘aqd) which puts on Muslims the onus of protecting non-Muslims living in a Muslim society, their sacred places, properties and rights, and dealing with them justly. Unfortunately, the pact has been, and is still sometimes, violated for different reasons, mostly sectarian and political. It is a fact that the modern and contemporary secular legal standardizations are utilized in the struggle to protect human rights and religious freedoms in many Muslim countries today. Legal modifications are quested, new constitutions are compiled, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and dialogue groups try to enhance pluralistic values. Nevertheless, Islamic religious values and ethics of difference and “otherness” (ikhtila-f), when inspired in their proper spirit and objectives, can contribute effectively and significantly in this respect. In this respect, a recall of the term dhimmi might imply a classification but not discrimination.98 Dhimma is a covenant, pact and duty on Muslims and is not a status of religious discrimination for Muslims against non-Muslims. The “Other” as ka-fir? One more term should be briefly discussed in the issue of Islam and the “Other,” the term ka-fir. I will restrict myself to the semantics of the term and how it is shifted in the religious Islamic context. The word, as it is used in the debates on Islam and the “Other,” has been charged with notions of nonpluralistic discrimination. It is certain that it refers to an “unbeliever,” but

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the analysis of its linguistic origin and usage in different Quranic contexts would clarify more its semantic shifts. Therefore, we need to reconstruct the cognitive model concerning this religious term and its connotations, which sometimes, escape the notice even of some Muslims. Linguistically, the word is a derivative of the verb kafara, which means to “cover.” The first derivative noun kafr means “covering” and its present active participle ka-fir is someone or something who/which “covers.” Thus, ka-fir is a name used for the night, which covers the world with its darkness; and for the sea, which covers what is in it. It is also used for someone going to fight as being covered with panoply. Hence, an interpretation of the hadith of the Prophet sees koffa-r (pl. of ka-fir) as armed people: “don’t turn after my death into koffa-r beating the necks of (killing) each other.”99 A farmer/ tiller is a ka-fir, “coverer,” because he puts seeds in the earth and covers them with soil.100 In the Quran, we read this meaning of the plural koffa-r as farmers/tillers: Know you (all), that the life of this world is but play and amusement, pomp and mutual boasting and multiplying, (in rivalry) among yourselves, riches and children. Here is a similitude: How rain and the growth which it brings forth, delight (the hearts of) the tillers [koffa-r]; soon it withers; you see it grow yellow; then it becomes dry and crumbles away. (Al-H . adıd 57:20) The second derivative noun is kofr, which contains the reference to religion. Firstly, kofr is the corollary opposite of -ıma-n (faith, belief). In order to believe in something one has to disbelieve in another, this is clear from the following Quranic verse, which compare the words kofr and -ıma-n as interdependent: There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error. And he who disbelieves (yakfor) in false deities and believes (yu’min) in Allah has grasped a firm handhold which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower. (Al-Baqara, 2:256) The two verbs yakfor and yu’min are used in a correlative and interactive context, which shows that to believe in the truth is to disbelieve in falsehood at the same time. Al-Shaarawi notes how disbelief precedes belief in the verse. This is because cleaning (takhliya) the heart from the impurities of falsehoods precedes its ornamentation (tah.liya) with the purity of the truth.101 In another verse, we also read that believing in Allah necessitates disbelieving in any other associates or partner in His divinity: When they saw Our doom, they said: We believe (a-manna) in Allah only and disbelieve (kafarna) in all that we used to associate (with Him). (Gha-fir, 40:84)

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Thus, we see that even a Muslim should disbelieve (yakfor) in other forms and tenets of faith in order to be a believer (mu’min). This is also the case for a non-Muslim who disbelieves in Islam and believes in his own faith as true. Hence, a ka-fir, in the semantics of a religious term, is anyone who covers the truth sent by God or any part of it and acts as if it does not exist. Another opinion is that he is a ka-fir because his heart is covered from the God-sent truth.102 Denying God’s grace (ni‘ma) and favors and being thankless to them is also called kofr ni‘ma. Again here, through the denial of God’s favors and graces, one “covers” them as if they do not exist. The Quran addresses this aspect of the human nature. For example: If We give man a taste of Mercy from Ourselves, and then withdraw it from him, behold! he is in despair and blasphemous (kafu-r). (Hu-d, 11:9) And He gives you of all that you ask Him; and if you count Allah’s favors, you will not be able to number them; most surely man is very unjust, very ungrateful (kaffa-r). (Ibra-hı-m, 14:34) Allah sets forth a parable: a city enjoying security and quiet, abundantly supplied with sustenance from every place: Yet was it ungrateful (kafarat) for the favors of Allah. (Al-Nah.l, 16:112) After this brief explication of the term ka-fir, it can be clear that when a nonMuslim is called a ka-fir, this has to do with the proper faith and belief in the Quran as God’s Word and Muhammad as His last messenger. From this same perspective a non-Muslim sees similarly in a Muslim a ka-fir, as he “covers” all or part of the truth he adheres to. This classification is related to the soteriological and theological tenets of every religion.103 What is more important is whether these classifications form a hindrance from being just, fair and humane before the “Other.” Justice is the norm, not only in the case of otherness, but also in the case of animosity and hatred. In this respect, the Quranic statement is clear: And let not the hatred of some people in (once) shutting you out of the Sacred Mosque lead you to transgression (and hostility on your part). Help you one another in righteousness and piety, but help you not one another in sin and rancor: fear Allah: for Allah is strict in punishment. (Al-Ma-’ida, 5:2)104 Those to whom the Muslims were ordered to be just and not to react with transgressions were the pagans of Quraish who hindered them from entering the Ka‘ba for pilgrimage in the occasion of Al-H . udaybiya (628).

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When the term koffa-r is used in the general, indefinite or historical sense, it refers to these pagans. To conclude, as we have seen in our analysis of the notion of dhimma, the classification of the Muslims and non-Muslims under Islamic authority contains two main terms: ahl milla (the people of religion/Islam) and ahl dhimma (the people of dhimma). On the basis of faith, Islam strictly regards the “covering” of the God-sent truth, partially or wholly, as kofr, and in this regard people are “believers” or “unbelievers.” On the basis of humanity, people are all equal humans and their differences do not justify wronging them. This is what the fourth Caliph (656–661) Ali Ibn Abi Talib expressed in his message to his governor on Egypt, Malik Al-Ashtar. He writes to him that he should treat his citizens kindly and tenderly because people, as Muslims should see them, are of two kinds “a brother in religion or a counterpart in humanity.”105

Religious–cultural identity and pluralism In the previous section, we tackled the issue of otherness in Islam and how Muslims perceive the other in theological and historical contexts. Now we need to investigate how Muslims themselves experience their own identity within the worldly diversity and differences. We do this as an attempt to explain, on the one hand, the role of religion in the formation of a Muslim identity. On the other hand, we will also examine the impact of this role, and the eventual tensions it might create, upon ethno-cultural parameters which also constitute important elements in the identity of a Muslim. This is important for the analysis of whether an Islamic “sameness” can be monocultural or multicultural in a context of “otherness.” Furthermore, the question of religious identity, especially within Islam, is strictly linked to the issue of affiliation and loyalty. Whether a Muslim is more loyal to his own spatiotemporal context or to his transnational and trans-temporal identity, as a member of an ummah, and the consequences of this self-consciousness on his cultural and socio-political involvements, is another core problematic dimension in the issue of pluralism. Therefore, in this section, I will discuss two main aspects of the Muslim identity, the religious and the cultural, and their pluralistic implications. I will do this beginning from the particular and the individual ending with the general and the collective. Firstly, I will present a survey of a certain image of Muslim religious identity and its major components. Secondly, and finally, I will show the cultural diversity and parameters within this one identity and the varieties of manifestations it might produce. Recent statistics of the Pew Research Center are used indicatively to shed light on the discussed elements of religious and cultural identity based on empirical data. Religious identity Especially in the case of religious affiliation, the question about “who is a ‘ … ’?” does not only relate to the descriptive aspect of an identity. It goes far beyond

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this aspect to determine the way in which an adherent of a certain religious tradition perceives the world and acts in his private and social life.106 In the case of Islam, this question has a significant relation to the notion of pluralism. This is because Islamic traditionalism, as a cultural impetus, is constantly and dynamically active in various aspects and levels of Muslim societies and communities all over the world. The way in which a Muslim conceives his own identity emerges partially from a number of cognitive elements about Islam as a faith and a tradition, and partially from the surrounding sociocultural and political circumstances. Speaking about identity, I use the term “Muslimness” anthropologically to refer to the individual and collective identity of Muslims as a product of the adherence to Islam and the different socio-cultural and political contexts. As a result, this identification of “Muslimness” has its crucial effect on the ways in which Muslims see themselves in a broader context. In this sub-section, I focus on some features of the identity of a Muslim as these might emerge from the Quran, the Sunnah and Islamic tradition. This may help to construct a foundational commonality between the majority of Muslims and the identification of an Islamic religious identity. Consequently, a better understanding of the Muslim identity with its variations would enable us to assess the pluralistic nature of Muslims in a multicultural and globalized society.107 It goes without saying that the Quran, as the divine address to humans as implemented by the Prophet, constitutes how a Muslim should know God, the essence of his existence, his position in this world and relation to others (family, neighbors, society, state, ummah, world, etc.). The Quranic formation of a Muslim identity can be deduced from a plethora of verses. Moreover, it is difficult to restrict the definition of Muslim to certain verses, as the Quran as a whole is meant to frame the character of a Muslim. Nevertheless, we can use some examples that handle some features of how a Muslim should be, as these comprise the major characteristics of a Muslim religious identity. As we had previously shown, the term Muslim means someone who submits and surrenders wholly to Almighty Allah the One and Unique God. The Quran expresses this utterly in many verses, such as: Nay! whoever submits his whole self to Allah and is a doer of good, He will get his reward with his Lord; on such shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. (Al-Baqara, 2:112) Who can be better in religion than one who submits his whole self to Allah, does good, and follows the way of Abraham the true in Faith? (Al-Nisa-’, 4:1215) This “Islam,” as it is depicted in these verses, requires subsequently a wholehearted and maximal commitment to the divine guidance in a quest for success in this world and the Hereafter. The Quran calls upon a Muslim

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to realize that true acceptance is the acceptance of the entirety of Allah’s guidance: O you who believe! Enter into Islam perfectly and wholly; and follow not the footsteps of the Satan; for he is to you an avowed enemy. (Al-Baqara, 2: 208) In this verse, we see that the addressed are those who have already believed. Nevertheless, they are asked to enter into Islam. This perfect and whole (ka-ffa) entrance in (fi) Islam implies the likeliness of Islam as a structure in which a Muslim should enter and benefit of all its parts. It also implies that a Muslim should not take a portion of Islam and leave another, but rather accept and obey all the rules and regulations as they are inextricable part of the divine guidance.108 This is a difference between -ıma-n (belief/faith), Islam (submission) and “Islam” as label,109 which the following verse touches: The Nomads (wandering Arabs) say: We believe. Say: You do not believe but say, We submit; and faith has not yet entered into your hearts; and if you obey Allah and His Messenger, He will not diminish aught of your deeds; surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. (Al-H . ujurat, 49:14) The verse refers to a group of Bedouins (Banu Asad) who claimed Islam outwardly and not inwardly. To speak the shaha-da out of the tongue is “Islam,” but -ıma-n is to speak it out of the heart and to confirm this with deeds; to submit really to God’s guidance.110 Whoever follows this guidance, which God promised to send to Adam and all his progeny, will never go astray nor fall into distress and misery. Adversely, whoever turns away from this guidance will have a straitened life, full of hardship, and will be raised up in blindness, as he could not see God’s signs and revelations in his mundane life: He (Allah) said: Go down hence, both of you, one of you a foe unto the other. But when there come unto you from Me a guidance, then whoso follows My guidance, he will not go astray nor come to grief. But he who turns away from My Remembrance, his will be a narrow life, and I shall bring him blind to the assembly on the Day of Resurrection. He will say: My Lord! Wherefore have You gathered me (hither) blind, when I was wont to see? He will say: So (it must be). Our revelations came unto you but you did forget them. In like manner you are forgotten this Day. (T.a-ha, 20:123–26) Another verse shows this full submission and compliance of a Muslim with the guidance he received from God. The verse is frequently used by Muslim

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133

scholars and preachers to promote a Muslim’s maximal devotion to the divine guidance embodied in His last message to humankind: Say: Verily, my Lord has guided me to a way that is straight,-a right religion, the religion of Abraham the true monotheism, and he (certainly) joined not gods with Allah. Say: Truly, my prayer and my service of sacrifice, my life and my death, are (all) for Allah, the Lord of the worlds. No partner has He: this am I commanded, and I am the first of Muslims. (Al-An‘aa-m, 6:161–63) These indicative Quranic examples, among many other verses, stamp the identity of a Muslim with features related to his self-consciousness, as a holder and follower of a divine message and a revealed system that differentiates him from other adherents of mundane worldviews. Moreover, the authority of the Quran in the life of Muslims is not only legislative and constitutional. The Quran has a tremendous formative pedagogic and educational role in the life of Muslims. H . ifz. (memorization) and tajwıd (professional recitation) of the whole Quranic text are two honorable diplomas that many Muslim families strive to obtain for their children at a very early age. Quranic schools and private charitable institutes are exclusively devoted to the memorization and recitation of the Quran. Worldwide competitions are held and generous prizes are awarded for the h.uffa-z.. Most of the famed Muslim scholars worldwide ornament their biographies with the privilege of having memorized the Quran at an early age in one of the private Quranic schools (kutta-b/madrasa). The pedagogic aspect of the Quran in the life of Muslims comprises a significant factor in the formation of both their individual and collective identities.111 If we turn to the second primary source of Islam, the Sunnah, the paradigm of the Prophet will emerge as the archetype of “Muslimness.” The Prophet as an example to be followed (uswa, qudwa)112 represents, in the life of Muslims, the embodiment and personification of this divine address in all aspects of human life. Hence, “Sunnah” is linguistically a Way and technically every spoken word, done act, a tacit or expressed confirmation (taqrı-r) of the Prophet, and even his physical and moral characteristics. These aspects of the Prophetic tradition form for Muslims, after the Quran, not only the second primary source of Islam but also a substantial par excellence human pattern of their identity. In sociological terms, Muhammad represents the sociometric star of all Muslims, as his charismatic personality is repeatedly and vehemently inspired in different religious, social and political situations. It is a fact that Muslims know intricate details about the Prophet’s life as with no other historical figure. These details include his prenatal period, genealogical line, prophetic and political career and personal life, and extend to elaborated information about the very particular features of his physical, ethical, familial and behavioral attributes.113 His tradition, embodied in the

■ Read Q u ra n e v e ry d a■y Read Q u ra n e v e ry■ dRead a y Q u ra n e v e ry d a y ■ Read Q u ra n e v e ry d a y

% who ... ■ Read Q u ra n e v e ry d a y ■ Read Q u ra n , b u t less th a n once a d ay I N e v e r read Q u ra n S o u th e rn -E a s te rn E u ro p e

58 Bosnia-Herz. 58 Malaysia 58 Malaysia 58

23 58

58

Russia

58

58 58 58

58 58

C e n tra l Asia

Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkey Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Kazakhstan

58 58 58 58 58 58

58

1 5 58

58 58

2 3 58 258 3

58

58 58 58

258 4 2 3 58

S o u th e a s t Asia

58

58

Thailand7'

58 58

Indonesia ■ Malaysia

58 58

58 58 58

S o u th Asia

Pakistan Bangladesh

58

58 58

Afghanistan

58

58 58

58 14 58 5 58

M idd le E a s t-N o rth A frica

Jordan Palestinian terr. ^ Tunisia Egypt Iraq Morocco Lebanon

58 58 58 58 58 58 58

58 58 58 58 58 58 58

58 58 58

58 58

N ot all categories sho w n. ^ In te rv ie w s conducted w ith M uslim s in five southern province s on ly.

PEW RESEARCH CEN TER Q6S.

Figure 4.2 The Quran in the daily life of Muslims Source: Pew Research Center (2012), The World’s Muslims: Unity in Diversity, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Pew Research Center, Washington, August 9 2012, p. 50, retrieved from: http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_ Affiliation/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf

Quranic Verses % who say they have verses from Islam's holy book displayed in their home SOlithern~Eastern

Europe

Bosnia-Herz.

77

Russia

55

Kosovo Albania

34

18 Central Asia

EgyptEgypt

72 72

Turkey Tajikistan Azerbaijan

63

Kyrgyzstan

49

Kazakhstan

42 Southeast Asia

Egypt Egypt

Thailand/\. Malaysia Indonesia

:::::::::::::~97 95

88

South Asia

Egypt Egypt Afghanistan Pakistan

Bangladesh

::::::::::~~~

90

7S

71

Middle East-North Africa

96 96

Morocco

Iraq Tunisia Lebanon EgyptE gyptE gypt Egypt Jordan

95 93

91 85

77

"Interviews conducted with Muslims in five southern provinces only.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q64d. Figure 4.3 Quranic verses displayed at home Source: Pew Research Center, The World’s Muslims…, op. cit., p. 79

Belief in God and Muhammad % who say they believe in one God and the

Prophet Muhammad Southern-Eastern Europe Bosnla-Herz. Russia Albania. Albania.

94 94 94 94

central Asia Tajikistan Azerbaijan Turkey Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan KaJ:CIkhstan

96 94 94 96 96 94 96 9' 94 96 96 94 Southeast Asia

Thailand" Indonesia Malaysia

100 96 96 South Asia

96 96

Pakistan Bangladesh Sub-Saha.aSub-Saha.a Sub-Saha.a

100 100 100 100 96 96 96 96 96

"'" Iraq Jordan TuniSia Palestinian terr. lebanon Morocco Sub-Saha.a Africa·

Cameroon Senegal Niger Tanzania Niger Chad Ethiopia Mali Ghana Nigeria Uberla DR Congo Djibouti Mozambique Uganda Guinea Bissau

96 96 96 96 97 96 96 96 9S 93 90 90 89 87 87 85

'Data f",- all countries except Noger from "Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christ",nity in $tJb·Sahar"n Africa." Alnterviews conducted with Muslims in ~\ie southern p