Is God the Best Explanation of Things? A Dialogue [1st ed.] 9783030237523, 3030237524

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Is God the Best Explanation of Things? A Dialogue Joshua Rasmussen · Felipe Leon

Is God the Best Explanation of Things? “This is a terrific book. It is bold in its approach, and interesting in its details. Rasmussen and Leon are to be congratulated both for the spirit in which their investigation is conducted and for the contributions that they make to advancing discussion.” —Graham Oppy, Professor of Philosophy, Monash University, Australia “The authors of this clear and absorbing volume are intent on saying the best that can presently be said on behalf of theism and naturalism. Energetically, they produce clever arguments for their respective views, many of them new or interestingly refashioned, grounded in the latest relevant results from a wide range of areas. But Leon and Rasmussen have also adopted a more deliberately collaborative and constructive approach than is visible in any similar work. And by this means they succeed in exposing how much more flexible and variously construable are the concepts of theism and naturalism themselves than the history of their discussion would have led one to expect. One almost dares to think that a future agreement on the God question is possible!” —J. L. Schellenberg, Professor of Philosophy, Mount Saint Vincent University, Canada “Felipe Leon and Joshua Rasmussen bravely tackle the most profound ontological question we can ask: what is the foundation of existence? Exploring this question in dialogue, they offer a fascinating exchange of ideas regarding such philosophical issues as causation, morality, evolution, the fine-tuning of the universe, consciousness, and the existence of God. I found this to be one of the most engaging, informative, and thought-provoking philosophical dialogues I have ever read.” —Yujin Nagasawa, H. G. Wood Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, University of Birmingham, UK “Is God the Best Explanation of Things? is an exemplar of the virtues a philosophical dialogue should display. It is about fundamental issues, is engagingly written, and offers original arguments. Moreover, it is a genuinely open-minded series of exchanges that exhibit the philosophical progress that can be achieved when the interlocutors are eager to learn from one another and see themselves as partners in their search for the truth of the matter.” —Evan Fales, Professor of Philosophy (emeritus), University of Iowa, USA

“This book brings together the formidable talents of two philosophers to bear on one of the most intractable problems in philosophy: the question of whether or not we have good reason to accept the existence of God. The prose is clear and accessible, and the arguments are well-developed and rigorous. It should be of interest and value to a wide range of readers and would make an excellent text for courses in the philosophy of religion, in particular.” —Andrei Buckareff, Associate Professor of Philosophy; Co-Director of the Cognitive Science Program, Marist College, USA

Joshua Rasmussen · Felipe Leon

Is God the Best Explanation of Things? A Dialogue

Joshua Rasmussen Azusa Pacific University Azusa, CA, USA

Felipe Leon El Camino College Torrance, CA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-23751-6 ISBN 978-3-030-23752-3  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Photo by Rubén Chase Carbó/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Introduction 1 Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon Part I  Is There a Foundation for the Universe? 2

For a Foundation 7 Joshua Rasmussen

3

Modal Skepticism and Material Causation 23 Felipe Leon

4

The Geometric Argument 39 Joshua Rasmussen

5

On Finitude, Topology, and Arbitrariness 53 Felipe Leon

6

Argument from Arbitrary Limits 71 Joshua Rasmussen

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Varieties of Naturalism 85 Felipe Leon v

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Contents

Part II  Is the Foundation Personal? 8

For a Personal Foundation 101 Joshua Rasmussen

9

How Naturalism Could Explain Morality, Rationality, and Intentionality 117 Felipe Leon

10 Foundational Mind Theory Extended 139 Joshua Rasmussen 11 Filling Out a Naturalistic Picture via Spinoza and Russell 153 Felipe Leon 12 How the Best of Naturalism Fits Inside a Foundational Mind 171 Joshua Rasmussen 13 Reflection 185 Felipe Leon Part III  Is the Foundation Good? 14 A Perfectly Good Personal Foundation: Some Reasons for Doubt 193 Felipe Leon 15 The Great Story Theodicy 223 Joshua Rasmussen 16 Questioning the Story 243 Felipe Leon

Contents   

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17 How to See the Good in the Foundation 253 Joshua Rasmussen 18 Epilogue 273 Felipe Leon and Joshua Rasmussen Index 279

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon

1   Purpose In recent years, philosophers have made remarkable progress on the development and analysis of arguments relevant to the existence/ nonexistence of a supreme being. A problem, however, is that many of these developments become lost in the smoke of polarizing debates. We want to explore this topic afresh, by bringing the latest ideas into a new, collaborative investigation of the ultimate explanation of things. We explore the topic in a friendly, constructive manner. Rather than seek to win an argument, we aim to build upon each other’s ideas in an effort to see more truth. We do not hold up flags for a team or tribe. Nor do we seek victory in a debate. Instead, we seek to learn from each other, as we seek new paths into new lands. We find that debates often become entrenched in the defense of previous packages. Progress stalls. Time and effort go into the defense of prior positions, leaving unexplored territories unexplored. We seek another path. We want to see if we can promote significant progress on a universal question through a depolarized style. We want to break new ground, if we can. Our aim, then, is to see if we can bring into view a clearer vision of the foundation of existence. In view of the wide interest in the question of God’s existence, we also want this book to be widely accessible. While the book is a resource © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_1

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2  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON

for professional philosophers, we write in a style that is accessible to a broad thoughtful audience. We want everyone who is interested in the question of God’s existence to be able to follow along.

2   What to Expect For the sake of focus, we concentrate on the following question: What is the best, ultimate explanation of the general features of our world? We do not attempt to tackle all the major themes related to the question of God’s existence. Instead, we narrow our scope to the question of explanation. We use inference to the best explanation as a tool to probe the foundation of things. Together, we seek the best ultimate explanation of everything. We divide our discussion into three sections. First, we ask whether there is a foundation for universe (along with the related question of what it might mean for the universe to have a foundation). Second, we ask whether, if the universe has a foundation, this foundation is ­personal. Third, we ask whether the foundation could be a perfectly good, supreme being. Each section divides into a back and forth exchange across several chapters. By dividing the book into these sections, we are able to organize our path. In the first section, we lay groundwork for later sections. We begin by discussing whether there is a necessarily existent foundation of things. In this way, we separate questions about God’s nature from arguments relevant to particular features of a foundational reality. For example, rather than assume that God would have necessary existence, or that a necessary foundation would be God, we lay down an initial plank in the larger inquiry, as we probe the nature and existence of both God and the foundation. This separation facilitates a progressive inquiry, where each section builds upon planks we put down in the previous sections. This exchange displays a real-life conversation as friends. We originally began the conversation via e-mail correspondence. We were curious to draw out each other’s views. Rasmussen enters the dialogue as a theist, while Leon enters as a non-theist. We both understand what it is like to see things from the other side, as we have both been on the other side. We also have concentrated much of our professional research on seeking a deeper understanding of the foundation of things, and so we have been curious to see what might come out of a sustained correspondence.

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The conversation has indeed reaped special fruits. We followed pathways beyond first and second rounds of debates, and we found ourselves stepping into new lands. At the end of each section, we share some of the things we learned from the dialogue up to that point and give final reflections on the whole dialogue in the Epilogue. On several occasions, we develop new terms to describe our respective views, as we uncover some striking similarities in our vision the foundation. While questions remain and new paths open, one theme that emerges is that a broad naturalism and broad theism can overlap in profoundly substantial ways. There are many other fruits and discoveries, which readers must simply follow in the journey to see.

PART I

Is There a Foundation for the Universe?

CHAPTER 2

For a Foundation Joshua Rasmussen

1   Introduction In order to investigate a subject as deep as the existence of God, it will help to start at the foundation of existence. A classic thought is that the best ultimate explanation of existence—i.e., why anything exists at all—will include reference to a necessary, supreme foundation. In this statement, I will focus on necessity. I will offer three reasons in support of the thesis that there is a necessarily existent foundation. The reasons are (i) from explanation, (ii) from contingency, and (iii) from possible causes. In the final section, I will respond to what may be the most common objection to the necessary foundation theory. My case for a necessary foundation is a first plank in a larger argument (to be unpacked in subsequent chapters) for a foundation of the material world.

© The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_2

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2  Reason One: Inference to the Best Explanation We can wonder what explains the existence things. Why are there any things at all? Why not none? These “why” questions are not about the purpose of existence; rather, they are about the explanation of existence: What, if anything, accounts for the existence of concrete things?1 One classic answer is that there is an ultimate foundation of contingent concrete things, where this foundation exists of necessity. On this foundation theory, reality divides into two sections. There is the “bottom” (ultimate) section, which is fundamental, uncaused, and selfexistent. The foundation cannot fail to exist. Its necessity accounts—in some sense—for why it exists at all; or, its necessity accounts for why it has no deeper explanation. The “upper” section of reality, by contrast, is dependent, caused, and ultimately explained by a prior or more fundamental state of reality. On the foundation theory, all concreta—big or small, individual or plural—may have an explanation, either in terms of explanatorily prior states or in terms of a necessary nature. Before we consider alternative explanations of existence (of why there are any concrete things), I will say more about the meaning of the term “necessity.” In this context, I take “necessity” to denote what must actually be in the most basic sense. We can grasp the concept via examples: It is necessary that red is a color; it is necessary that no prime number is a prime minister; it is necessary that a cube has more volume than any of its proper parts; it is necessary that justice is a virtue; and so on. These examples illustrate metaphysical necessities. Metaphysical necessities differ from epistemic necessities. Something can be necessary even if no one knows it. For example, it might turn out to be necessary that matter is infinitely divisible, but I am not rationally required to think this. The “necessity” in view concerns the way things in reality must be independent of what anyone thinks. For this reason, something could be necessary even if it is not deducible from some set of logical rules humans beings happen to consider

1 I

wish to be neutral about the meaning of “concrete existence.” But for sake of precision, it is consistent with our purposes to narrow our scope to things that can be part of a causal or explanatory chain. Thus, we can follow Alexander’s Dictum: to be [concrete] is to have causal [else, explanatory] power.

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“canonical.” The necessity is about the world, not our current methods of demonstration.2 We can gain a more precise grasp of the relevant concept of necessity by considering its logical properties. I will understand “necessity” in terms of the standard system, S53: M: □p → p (where “□” abbreviates “it is necessary that”) K: □(p → q) → (□p → □q) 4: □p → □□p 5: ◊p → □◊p (where “◊” abbreviates “~□~”). For general readership, here is a translation. I shall speak of necessary, possible, and actual states of affairs—for example, the state of affairs of Bertrand Russell never studying philosophy. (We could also translate everything in terms of propositions.) On this interpretation, axiom M says that if a state of affairs must obtain, then it actually does obtain. From this axiom, we may deduce that any state of affairs that actually obtains also possibly obtains.4 M thus shows a relationship between actuality and modality. Axiom K shows a relationship between modality and logical consequence: A logical consequence of a necessary state of affairs is itself a necessary state of affairs. Finally, axioms 4 and 5 tell us that modality is itself necessary. Thus, for example, if a state of affairs is metaphysically necessary, then it is necessary that it is necessary. And, if a state of affairs is possible (i.e., consistent with whatever is necessary), then it is 2 To be clear, the so-called strict logical truths (truths deducible from canonical laws) may be epistemically stronger, in the sense that they are easier to demonstrate. Still, strict logical truths are not thereby “metaphysically” stronger. As Swinburne (2012) and others have suggested, we may treat logical necessities as a species of metaphysical necessities. 3 I do not include N (the necessitation rule) because it, together with standard logic, implies that the theorem, ∃x (x = x), is necessary, and thus that there must be something. I wish to avoid building into the meaning of “necessity” anything that strictly implies the controversial metaphysical hypothesis that there must be something. Moreover, the axioms I give sufficiently characterize an important conception of metaphysical necessity. 4 The deduction goes as follows. Suppose p does not possibly obtain. We defined “possible” as “not necessarily not.” So it follows that it is necessary that p doesn’t obtain (applying double negation). So, by M, p doesn’t actually obtain. The contrapositive is this: If p actually obtains, then p possibly obtains.

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necessary that it is possible. These axioms record the idea that absolute, metaphysical necessity is rooted in the basic, unalterable nature of reality. That is to say, modal truths are bedrock principles of reality: They cannot be otherwise. Although philosophers may debate the axioms, I intend to use them here to convey one important interpretation of “metaphysical necessity.” Thus, the S5 axioms implicitly define “□.” The axioms limit the scope of “possible” states of affairs to those for which the accessibility relation is symmetric and transitive. We then define “necessity” in terms of “possible”: Any state of affairs that does not possibly obtain is necessary. In view of the above account of “□,” we may state the foundation theory as follows: Necessary foundation: ∃x □ x is the foundation of all else. In other words, there is something, such that necessarily, it is the ultimate foundation of whatever else exists. I will now provide a few initial thoughts about three alternative explanations of existence on the market. First, there is Peter van Inwagen’s earlier proposal that we can explain why there is anything by the fact that it is highly improbable that there is nothing (1996, p. 95–120). This proposal may explain existence on one level, but a puzzle remains. What accounts for the likelihood itself? Suppose planets are likely to exist. Why are they likely? Isn’t the answer that some planets were likely to have been produced (eventually)? Suppose there was never anything capable of producing, or forming into, a planet. Would planets then be likely? You might think that the very likelihood of planets is explicable in terms of the likelihood of planet producers (i.e., materials that can form into a planet). Without planet producers, planets would not be likely because they would not even be possible. To further draw out this deeper layer of explanation, suppose for a moment that there are only dependent things: Each dependent thing depends upon another. Now we have a problem: Nothing within the nature of dependent things makes those dependent things, in total, independent. To illustrate, suppose some clay is dependent in nature. Then packing together more and more dependent clay would not thereby produce some clay that is independent in nature. The size of the clay makes no difference: An infinite bunch of purely dependent clay bits would equally fail to include anything within it that could account for how the total bunch could be independent in nature. This result leads to a puzzle: How can an independent reality arise from purely dependent

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realities? My point here is not that this puzzle leads to a decisive argument for an independent foundation (although I think the argument implicit here is very strong). Rather, my point is that we cannot solve this puzzle of dependence merely by the saying that it is likely that there are dependent things. Dependent things may be likely (for some reason), but their likelihood doesn’t explain how they are even possible. Necessary foundation, by contrast, has an explanatory advantage here. If we have a necessary foundation, then we have an account for how there can be a total stack of dependent things. The dependent things come from an independent foundation, while the necessary nature of the foundation accounts for its very independence. Probability has nothing to do with it. Let us turn to another candidate explanation of existence: Things exist because there simply cannot be nothing. In other words, there is something because there must be. This theory, like the probability theory we just considered, still leaves open a deeper puzzle. The puzzle is in the reason there cannot be nothing. Why can’t there be nothing? Here’s a reason: The foundation is necessary. In other words, there cannot be nothing precisely because there is a necessary foundation. We see here that the necessary foundation theory doesn’t compete with the “there is something because there must be” theory. On the contrary, a necessary foundation anchors the theory. Now to be clear, I realize that the inference from “necessarily, there is something” to “something is necessary” is not a strict, formal entailment. Still, the inference is plausible. Suppose that each thing can fail to be. Then plausibly, each thing could be subtracted from reality, one by one, until there are none.5 In other words, if nothing is necessary, then it is false that necessarily, there is something. Besides this argument from subtraction, we also have the argument from explanation: A necessary foundation explains why there must be something. I see no better explanation. A third and final idea: There is no “deep” answer to the question of existence. Maitzen (2013), for example, suggests that there is something rather than nothing because there are penguins. The idea here is that

5 For

representative discussions of this subtraction argument, see Baldwin (1996), Lowe (2002), Paseau (2002), Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997, 2000, 2002), Cameron (2006, 2007), Efird et al. (2005, 2006, 2009), and Hoffman (2011).

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each thing provides an explanation for why there is anything. After all, the existence of each thing guarantees the existence of something rather than nothing. Therefore, the effort to find a deeper answer to the question, “why is there anything?” is misguided. I think Maitzen does successfully solve something, but I suspect Maitzen will agree that penguins don’t remove every puzzle in this neighborhood.6 Consider iPhones. Why are there any iPhones? On one level, perhaps we could say there are iPhones because there is an iPhone in your pocket, whose existence entails that there are iPhones. Yet, pointing to the iPhone in your pocket is not a complete answer; one could still wonder why or how there are any iPhones in the first place. I think the same is so for existence: pointing to particular existing things, like Penguins, leaves open a question about why or how anything ever existed. After all, penguins themselves cannot even exist unless something already exists.7 Compare: iPhones cannot exist unless something already exists. So it seems to me it is perfectly sensible to continue to wonder, how did existence manage to be instantiated in the first place (prior to penguins)? A puzzle remains.8 As I suggested above, necessary foundation provides a deeper answer: (concrete) existence is instantiated because it cannot not be instantiated. Moreover, the reason (concrete) existence cannot not be instantiated

6 Maitzen’s full argument merits more attention than I can give here. What follows is a path that I think goes between the relevant aspects of his argument, without going into all the details. 7 Although I use the language of “properties,” I do not mean to imply a commitment to abstract objects. Readers may translate what I say in terms of pieces of language, like predicates. Also, in case any readers have the Kantian worry that “existence” is not a predicate, replace “existence” with “concrete [causally-capable] thing.” 8 Here is a proposal as to what else may be driving the puzzle. It is that without a further explanation, we end up with a circular explanation. Here is why. For any predicate F, a full, non-circular explanation of F’s instantiation cannot be solely in terms of the existence of Fs. To be clear, as Maitzen points out, if F is not a basic kind, we could perhaps explain F’s instantiation in terms of the instantiation of some more fundamental property G that every instance of F has. For example, we could say there are chairs or tables because there are chairs. However, notice the full explanation of the instantiation of chairs or tables is not solely in terms of chairs or tables. A chair-maker—which is neither a chair nor a table—is part of the explanation sequence. In general, to avoid circularity, the full explanation of the instantiation of an F (for any F) is ultimately in terms of non-Fs (or else the necessity of F). For more on the problem of circularity, see Pruss and Rasmussen (2018, 3.4.3.).

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is that there is a foundational (concrete) layer whose nature entails the impossibility of its non-existence. This survey is brief, and I have only begun to set a stage for our discussion of possible explanations of existence. At this initial step, I think we can agree on at least this much: the necessary foundation theory has some things going for it, e.g., simplicity, explanatory power, and internal coherence. These theoretical goods constitute some reason—even if modest— to prefer (or raise the epistemic probability of) necessary foundation over its salient competitors, other things being equal. That is a start.

3  Reason Two: An Argument from Contingency A second consideration comes from an updated version of a classic contingency-based cosmological argument. Although this argument has taken many forms in its long history, all versions aim to reveal a causal or explanatory link between contingent existence and necessary existence.9 This argument typically begins with the mundane premise that something or other exists. Next, the argument purports to provide a rationale for inferring that contingent realities ultimately require a necessary foundation of some sort. I shall put on the table a contemporary version of the argument that uses plural reference.10 I call it “the Argument from Contingent Existence”—or “ACE.” Here it is: P1. Something exists. P2. For any contingent (non-necessary) things, there is a causal foundation of their existence. P3.  Without a necessary foundation, there is no causal foundation of the existence of all the contingent things. C. Therefore, there is a necessary foundation.11 9 For a notable contemporary articulation and defense of an argument from contingency, see O’Connor (2008). 10 I develop this argument in detail in Pruss and Rasmussen (2018). 11 In arguing for a necessary causal foundation of contingent things, I am leaving open here whether there may be a deeper non-causal explanation of the entire causal chain. We shall have an opportunity to return to the question of non-causal explanations when we consider the natural vs. theistic account of a necessary foundation in the next section. For a recent and highly penetrating discussion of the role of non-causal explanations in an argument from contingency against naturalism, see Pearce (2017).

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Let us consider possible supports for the premises. The first premise, that something exists, is justified by your awareness of your own existence. You exist. Therefore, something exists. I take that to be relatively uncontroversial. Besides, if there is not anything, then there is not anything here for us to debate, not even these very statements! The more controversial premise is the causal principle, P2: For any contingent (non-necessary) things, there is a causal foundation of their existence.12 Why think that is true? I will summarize three candidate reasons: (i) the principle is a simple inductive generalization from apparent instances of explanation; (ii) the principle is supported by a priori intuition; and (iii) the principle makes sense of the fact that there is not a chaotic mess of random contingent things coming into existence. Consider, first, the proposal that the causal principle is an inductive generalization from many apparent instances of explanation. Explanations are part of our ordinary experience. Steve discovers a puddle of milk on the floor, and he wonders where it came from. He assumes there is an answer. Moreover, he assumes the answer explains, to some extent, the presence of the puddle of milk. By contrast, Steve does not even entertain the idea that the milk may have popped into place without any explanation at all. What is true for the milk is equally true for countless other contingent configurations of matter. Therefore, we might generalize: For any xs that just happen to exist (i.e., they do not exist of necessity), there is some causal explanation(s) of their existence.13 In other words, contingent things, be they few or many, related or unrelated, do not exist without any causal explanation at all. The above extrapolation is not ad hoc since the causal principle is relatively simple. It is expressible with just a few conceptually basic terms:

12 I am assuming for sake of argument that somethings are contingent (i.e., can fail to exist). If instead all things are necessary, then trivially, something concrete is necessary, which is what I’m arguing for. Also, even if everything were necessary, we could recast the argument in terms of those necessary things that are internally changeable vs. those that are internally unchangeable. Simply replace occurrences of “contingent” with “internally changeable.” The conclusion is then that the foundation is internally unchangeable. I leave it to interested readers to investigate the argument on this translation. 13 The principle leaves open whether or not necessary things may also have an explanation, such as an explanation in terms of a self-existent nature or the impossibility of their non-existence.

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“cause,” “things,” “the existence of.” As far as I see, no simpler, competing principle can account for the wide range of apparent instances of explanation (putting aside causal principles that imply the causal principle in question). Therefore, in view of the simplicity and explanatory power of the causal principle, it seems to have some inductive support. Of course, if there are evident counterexamples to the causal principle, then the inductive argument fails. I will consider the prospect of counterexamples in the discussion of objections below. A second candidate support arises from an a priori seeming associated with explaining stuff. To illustrate, pick an arbitrary state of existence E, which consists of things existing. Now suppose E is not necessary: It is metaphysically possible that E never obtains. Suppose also that E in fact obtains. We may wonder why E obtains, considering that E might have been completely absent from reality. Notice that this wonderment remains whether E consists of small things or big things. Similarly, differences in the shape of the things in E do not seem relevant: A square object is no more or less likely to snap into being without a cause than a triangular one (for instance). Even if we imagine that E is composed of non-spatial contingent things, it seems an explanation of their existence is equally pressing. What is relevant, it seems, is that E doesn’t have to exist. Its E’s contingency that inspires a common conviction that there must have been some explanation of its existence. On the other hand, a priori expectations are notoriously debatable. For this reason, I propose an inclusive approach. If you are someone who has a sense that contingent existence “calls out” for an explanation, then that sense provides you with some positive epistemic support. This support, like any other, is defeasible and so you may weight it in the balance of your total evidence. Only you are in a position to estimate its strength, if any, for you. I am assuming here a broadly phenomenal conservativism, which I take to be foundational to both scientific and mathematical reasoning: If it seems to one that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, one has some degree of justification for accepting p.14 Here is a third potential support. The causal principle explains why there isn’t a chaotic mess of objects snapping in and out of existence. Chaos results if arbitrarily large chunks of matter regularly come into

14 See

Huemer (2001).

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existence uncaused everywhere all the time, without constraint, for no reason at all. We don’t we observe that happening, of course. But why not? Here is a simple answer: It can’t. For suppose that unexplained contingent chunks of reality are in fact impossible. Then macroscopic objects cannot come into being unless there are prior states from which they may arise. Given a certain law-like connection between states (whether deterministic or indeterministic), the threat of large-scale chaos diminishes; there is then less expectation that arbitrary chunks of matter would randomly appear, without constraint. Now suppose instead that unexplained contingent chunks of reality are possible. So, for instance, it is possible, let us say, for there to be a particle-antiparticle pair that has no cause or explanation (not even in terms of an indeterministic law or prior states of energy). Then it would seem that any number of unexplained contingent things would possible. It would be quite strange (i.e., contrary to reason) if instead there were some precise finite number of states of existence that could obtain without an explanation: It seems that if two protons, say, can appear without a cause, then so could three, and four, and five, and so on for any number. So, suppose there are infinitely many possible contingent chunks of matter, of any size and shape, that can obtain at any given time with no explanation. Then it is puzzling why a random chaos of popping and dropping of existence is not a common phenomenon at every scale. After all, at any moment any number of countless arbitrary mixes of possible objects might snap into being for no reason at all. The root of the problem is with explaining the difference between the caused and the uncaused. What difference is relevant? Jonathan Edwards expressed the puzzle as follows: “If there be no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a Cause; then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions” (Edwards 1830, p. 53). Arthur Prior builds upon Edwards: “If it is possible for objects to start existing without a cause, then it is incredible that they should all turn out to be objects of the same sort” (Prior 1968, p. 65). Even if they are not all of exactly the same sort, it is still incredible that they fall into a small number of sorts. The number of sorts of elementary particles appears to be in the double or at most triple digits, whereas the number of particles in the observable universe is of the order of 1088 (Kofman 1997, p. 133).

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These observations make perfect sense if there is a universal causal order grounded in a necessary foundation. I have just provided an initial sketch of three lines of support for the causal premise in ACE. Let us now turn to the next premise, P3: Without a necessary foundation, there cannot be a cause of the existence of all contingent things. Why think about that? Here is why. This premise is about all the contingent things there actually are. I shall refer to the state of affairs of the actual contingent things existing as “the Big Contingent State.” P3 records the thought that the Big Contingent State cannot be completely accounted for apart from the causal activity of one or more non-contingent things. This thought is rooted in a general principle: No facts about contingent instances of F can, by themselves, causally account for why there exist those very Fs.15 Thus, no facts about contingent instances of being contingent can, by themselves, account for the existence of those very contingent things.16 There is a famous Humean objection (developed later by Russell and Paul Edwards) that arises from the following question: Why think there should be an explanation of a whole that goes beyond the explanations provided by the individual parts (Hume 1779, pp. 58–59)? Perhaps an explanation of the contingent things can simply consist of the conjunction of the explanations of each c? Then there would be no need for a non-contingent cause.

15 In case the reader wonders if Fs that exist now could be explained by Fs that did exist, let us clarify that “the Fs” includes any and all Fs that have ever existed (whether temporally or sans time). So, we cannot explain the existence of the Fs merely by citing the activities of past Fs. (We are assuming here that it makes sense to talk about past Fs. If that assumption is false—perhaps because presentism is true—then a fortiori we cannot explain the existence of the Fs by citing the activities of past Fs.) 16 Notice that we are not asking for an explanation of the fact that there are any contingent things at all. Thus, we avoid many of the issues that arise in discussions over the question of why there is anything. For instance, there is no need to assess Maitzen’s recent proposal (Maitzen 2013, pp. 252–271) that the fact that there is anything is trivially explained by the fact that there are penguins.

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However, my formulation completely sidesteps these worries. That is because I articulated the argument in terms of plural reference, not in terms of wholes. This difference is crucial. For even if the explanation of a whole is entirely in terms of explanations of its parts, the parts themselves cannot be explained by those same parts—not without circularity. To avoid circularity, an explanation of the existence of some items (whether finite or infinite) must go beyond those same items. To illustrate this point, suppose you encounter a snake and learn somehow that it has grown by undergoing an infinite number of stages of development. The growth process has occurred as follows: The front half of the snake was caused by events within an adjacent quarter section of it, which in turn was caused by events within an adjacent eighth section, which in turn was caused by events within the preceding sixteenth section, and so on, so that each section was produced by events within an adjacent section half its size. In this scenario, each part of the snake was caused by events within another part, ad infinitum. If there were such a snake, the mere causal connections between the snake’s parts would not constitute an explanation of the existence of the snake’s infinite parts. Merely causally connecting its parts does nothing to explain why, or how, there are those infinitely many parts in the first place. Inner-causal connections do nothing to remove the need for an explanation of the connected parts. We can imagine a contingent blob consisting of infinitely many smaller blobs in an infinite, internal causal series. It is no easier for this fictional blob to appear uncaused than for any other contingent blob. Crucially, the three lines of evidence I gave for the causal principle are insensitive to inner-causal connectivity and size. All three lines independently indicate that contingent blobs cannot exist uncaused, no matter their internal structure (finite or infinite). For this reason, the Humean objection does not undermine my specific version of the argument.17 To conclude, the premises, each enjoying independent support, jointly entail that there is a necessary foundation.

17 I say more about the Humean worry and its variants (including Russell’s worry expressed in the Russell-Copleston debate) in Rasmussen (2010). My main response is that while the worries effectively disarm certain defenses of certain versions of the argument from contingency, they do not squarely target the particular supports I give for my plural formulation of the causal premise.

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4  Reason Three: An Argument from Possible Causes A more recent type of cosmological argument seeks to display a connection between a premise about possible causes (or explanations) and necessary foundation. Here is one form of the argument: P1. Whatever can happen can be caused to happen. (By “happen,” I mean “begin to be.”) P2. A Beginning of Contingency (i.e., a beginning of the exemplification of ­having non-necessary existence) can happen. C1. Therefore, there can be a cause of a Beginning of Contingency. P3. The only possible cause of a Beginning of Contingency is a non-­contingent (necessary) thing that can cause a Beginning of Contingency. C2. Therefore, there can be a necessary foundation: A necessary thing that can cause a Beginning of Contingency. P4. If there can be a necessary foundation, then there is one. C3. Therefore, there is a necessary foundation.

Briefly, here is why I find the premises plausible. P1 seems to me to be the simplest causal principle that explains (i) our experience with events (happenings) having causes, (ii) our lack of experience with uncaused events, and (iii) the apparent causal irrelevance of any differences in size or shape or contents of an event. I see no way to generate counterexample to P1 without dubious assumptions about causation or events—for example, that tiny or large events are uncausable. Without a counterexample in hand, one can extrapolate from the many known instances of causation to the simplest principle that accounts for them. I point very briefly to two supports of P2. First, imagination is a defeasible guide to possibility: I can imagine a beginning of an explosion that contains all non-necessary concrete materials. Second, there is the apparent independence of non-necessary things: You can subtract non-necessary things in your minds’ eye, one by one, until none are left. Reverse the subtraction, and you have a Beginning of Contingency. P3 falls out of a “no circularity” condition on causation: A thing cannot cause its own existence, since it would already exist. If anyone resists that condition, just replace “cause” in the argument with “external cause,” and P3 is then true by definition. My reasons for P1 remain the same in this translation.

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We complete the argument in two steps. First, we deduce necessary existence from possible necessary existence using standard logic in a familiar way.18 Thus, from the premises above, we may infer that there is a necessary reality that can (in some possible world) cause a Beginning of Contingency. From here, it is plausible to conclude that this necessary reality explains our contingent reality, since only it can. The principle here is what I call the Sherlock Holmes Principle: If X can explain Y, and nothing else can explain Y, then X (probably) explains Y. The main part of my argument is designed to support the antecedent—that there is a necessary reality that can explain contingent reality. We now have the steps in another pathway to necessary foundation.19 Professor Leon, I am curious what you think of this argument.

5  Hume’s Objection from Conceivability The most persistent objection to the foundation theory is Hume’s objection from conceivability (cf. Swinburne 2012). Hume objects that the concept of “necessary existence” cannot apply to anything in reality because anything that can be conceived of as existing can be conceived of as not existing (Hume 1779, p. 58–59).

18 We may display the deduction as follows: D1: Let ‘~’ abbreviate ‘it is not the case that’. D2: Let ‘◊’ abbreviate ‘it is possible that’. D3: Let ‘□’ abbreviate ‘it is necessary that’ (or ‘~◊~’). D4: Let ‘N’ abbreviate ‘there is an x, such that □ x exists’. 1. Assume ◊N. 2. Then: ◊□N. (□(N → □N), by axioms 4 and 5) 3. Now suppose (for the sake of argument) that ◊~N. 4. Then: □◊~N. (by axiom 5) 5. Then: ~◊~◊~N. (by substituting ‘~◊~’ for ‘□’) 6. Then: ~◊~~□~~N. (by substituting ‘~□~’ for the second ‘◊’) 7. Then: ~◊□N. (because ‘~~X’ is equivalent to ‘X’) 8. But (7) contradicts (2). 9. So: (3) is not true. ((3) → (7)) 10. So: ~◊~N. 11. So: □N. (by substituting ‘□’ for ‘~◊~’) 12. So: N. (□X → X, by axiom M) 13. So: if ◊N, then N. 19 To explore additional pathways via interactive survey, see www.necessarybeing.com. See also Pruss and Rasmussen (2018).

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I offer here a challenge that emerges from post-Humean developments in modal logic. Suppose Hume is right that whatever can be conceived of as existing can be conceived of as not existing. And suppose that a necessary concrete thing N can be conceived of in the relevant sense. Then either conceivability implies (or gives evidence for) possibility, or it does not. If conceivability does not provide evidence for possibility, then Hume’s objection fails at the start: For then we cannot use conceivability to infer that N’s non-existence is possible. So, suppose instead that conceivability provides evidence for possibility. Then since N’s existence is itself conceivable (per hypothesis), we have evidence that N’s existence is possible. From all this, it follows (by the modal axioms in play) that N exists. In other words, the very assumptions behind Hume’s objection, together with the contemporary logic of modality, actually give evidence for a necessary concrete thing. Therefore, the objection fails.20,21

References Baldwin, Thomas. 1996. “There Might Be Nothing.” Analysis 56 (4): 231–238. Cameron, Ross. 2006. “Much Ado About Nothing: A Study of Metaphysical Nihilism.” Erkenntnis 64 (2): 193–222. ———. 2007. “Subtractability and Concreteness.” Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227): 273–279. Efird, David, and Tom Stoneham. 2005. “The Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism.” Journal of Philosophy 102 (6): 303–325. ———. 2006. “Combinatorialism and the Possibility of Nothing.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2): 269–280. ———. 2009. “Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron.” Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234): 132–137. Hoffmann, Aviv. 2011. “It’s Not the End of the World: When a Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism Fails.” Analysis 71 (1): 44–53. Edwards, Jonathan. 1830. The Works of Jonathan Edwards in 10 Volumes. New York: G. & C. & H. Carvill. Huemer, Michael. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Hume, David. 1779. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cambridge University Press. 20 I

address contemporary versions of the conceivability objection in Rasmussen (2016). to Robert Koons and Kenny Pearce for comments an earlier draft.

21 Thanks

22  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON Kofman, L. A. 1997. “The Origin of Matter in the Universe.” In Relativistic Astrophysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133–149. Lowe, E. J. 2002. “Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument.” Analysis 62 (273): 62–73. Maitzen, Stephen. 2013. “Questioning the Question.” In The Puzzle of Existence, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. O’Connor, Timothy. 2008. Theism and Ultimate Explanation. Malden: Blackwell. Paseau, Alexander. 2002. “Why the Subtraction Argument Does Not Add Up.” Analysis 62 (1): 73–75. Pearce, Kenneth L. 2017. “Foundational Grounding and the Argument from Contingency.” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8. Prior, Arthur. 1968. “Limited Indeterminism.” In Papers on Time and Tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pruss, Alex, and Joshua Rasmussen. 2018. Necessary Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rasmussen, Joshua. 2010. “From States of Affairs to a Necessary Being.” Philosophical Studies 148: 183–200. ———. 2016. “Could God Fail to Exist?” European Journal of Philosophy 8: 159–177. Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 1997. “There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved.” Analysis 57 (3): 159–8211. ———. 2000. “Lowe’s Argument Against Nihilism.” Analysis 60 (4) (October 1): 335–340. ———. 2002. “Metaphysical Nihilism Defended: Reply to Lowe and Paseau.” Analysis 62 (2): 172–180. Swinburne, R. 2012. “What Kind of Necessary Being Could God Be?” In Ontological Proofs Today, edited by Miroslaw Szatkowski. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1996. “Why Is There Anything?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 95–120.

CHAPTER 3

Modal Skepticism and Material Causation Felipe Leon

1   Introduction As we explain in the Introduction, our inquiry into whether reality has a theistic explanation proceeds along with three steps: Step 1: Does physical or material reality have a cause or ground? Step 2: Assuming it does, is the cause or ground personal? Step 3: Assuming it is, is it omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good? In his opening statement, Rasmussen offers three interesting and powerful arguments for the existence of a metaphysically necessary cause or foundation or ground for (at least) the realm of contingent concrete objects. If his arguments should turn out to be cogent, then he will have successfully completed a core part of the first step. In this chapter, I will raise three main concerns for his arguments for step 1. First, there are general worries about our ability to reliability form judgments about possibilities and necessities far removed from our ordinary experiences. Second, the hypothesis that there is a metaphysically contingent, yet “factually” necessary foundation of dependent beings remains a live option. Finally, our evidence that things have “material” causes calls into question the possibility of a caused beginning of contingent concrete beings. I will discuss each of these concerns in turn below, applying them to Rasmussen’s arguments where relevant.

© The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_3

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2  The Scope of Our Modal Knowledge My first concern pertains to the scope of our modal knowledge—i.e., our knowledge of metaphysical possibility and necessity. The arguments in play seem to assume that the scope of our modal knowledge is sufficiently vast to justify modal claims significantly remote from ordinary experience, such as that it is possible that there could have been no material objects at all. However, while there is a long tradition of such an assumption in the history of philosophy, contemporary philosophers have become increasingly leery of it. Perhaps the most well-known difficulty with justifying modal claims about the universe as whole is that some metaphysical necessities are only knowable through experience.1 We cannot simply access these modal facts from our favorite armchair via imagination or conception. There are additional difficulties, and I’ll briefly mention three here. First, as I (and others) have argued elsewhere, many (if not most) imagined scenarios that are at least modestly remote from human experience are such that, when we try to flesh out the details about what they would involve, we quickly find that it is no longer clear that the envisioned scenario is metaphysically possible.2 To be clear, these sorts of cases do not clearly show that what we imagine is metaphysically impossible. However, they do seem to shift the burden of proof back onto the person who claims that they know, or justifiedly believe, that such things are possible. So, for example, it seems that I can imagine a bar of iron floating on the surface of a body of water. At first, I feel confident that the floating bar is at least metaphysically possible. But that confidence quickly deflates once I start to consider some of the details about what this would involve. For example, changing the properties of a bar of iron so as to make it float requires changing its gravitational properties, which in turn requires changing its specific density, which in turn requires changing either the size of its unit cells or the number and kinds of atoms within them. In either case, these molecular changes are sufficient to render the bar no longer iron. Therefore, changing the properties of iron so as to make it float results in non-iron. In fact, iron is a transition metal, lying between manganese and cobalt on the periodic table. 1 Kripke

(1980). (1972), Van Inwagen (1977, 1979, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2008), and Fischer and Leon (2016a). 2 Seddon

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Thus, the range of possible densities for iron is highly restricted by these neighboring transition elements. But such leeway for changes in density isn’t anywhere near what’s required to make iron float. It is therefore no longer clear that floating iron bars are metaphysically possible.3 In the example above, we came to realize certain details about the case that were relevant to whether floating bars of iron are metaphysically possible. We also came to realize that it is not at all clear whether the details of the case could be worked out in a way that is compatible with that possibility claim. Because of these facts, the case above provides an undercutting defeater4 for the original seeming that floating bars of iron are metaphysically possible. But the problem generalizes to very many possibility claims that are remote from ordinary experience. For there are many possibility claims where the details about physical, biological, or psychological facts will be relevant to whether they are true, and yet our basis for thinking they are true conceivings, imaginings, or bare modal seemings.5 Second, some argue that a permissible, freewheeling approach to modal judgments about possibilities admits of too many false positives. So, for example, we cannot rule it out as impossible that Goldbach’s Conjecture (GC) is false, even after reflection. If that were enough to make it reasonable to believe that GC is possibly false, then given that GC is necessarily true if true at all, it would thereby reasonable to infer that GC is actually false. Despite this result, I am hesitant to submit my findings to the Annals of Mathematics.6 That is bad enough, but it gets 3 This example is from Seddon (1972). For a host of other examples that make the same point, see Van Inwagen (1977, 1979, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2008). 4 Here I am employing the common notion of a defeater in epistemology, as well as the related standard distinction between a rebutting defeater and an undercutting defeater. According to this distinction, and very roughly, a rebutting defeater is a reason or ground for thinking that a belief is false, and an undercutting defeater is reason or ground that deflates or removes the basis for thinking that a belief is true. So, for example, suppose I believe on the basis of a visiting person’s testimony that there is a package on my doorstep. Then if I open the door and look to find that there is no such package on my doorstep, then this constitutes a rebutting defeater for my original belief. By contrast, if instead I come to learn that the person whose testimony I’m here trusting tells everyone they visit that they have a package on their doorstep (whether there is one there or not), then this fact constitutes an undercutting defeater for my original belief. 5 For a fuller exposition and defense of this point, see Fischer and Leon (2016a). 6 This criticism is raised by, e.g., van Cleve (1983) and Yablo (1993).

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worse. I not only fail to see any incoherence in the possible falsity of GC, I also fail to see an incoherence in its possible truth. Therefore, by the above reasoning, it now seems we have good evidence for both the possible truth and the possible falsehood of GC, in which case GC is a contingent truth. But again, GC is necessarily true if true at all; therefore, there is reason to worry that our unfettered, freewheeling approach to modalization is unworthy of our confidence. The problems for an unfettered approach to modalizing aren’t restricted to our judgments about unproven mathematical conjectures. Thus, consider Alvin Plantinga’s modal ontological argument.7 The key premise is that, roughly, there is a possible world at which a necessarily existent God exists. But given the modal system S5—which entails that whatever is possibly necessary is necessary simpliciter—the truth of the key premise entails that Plantinga’s necessary God exists. Now even on reflection, I fail to find any incoherence in the concept of God as described by Plantinga. So if mere epistemic possibility (i.e., possibility for all I can tell) justifies claims about metaphysical possibility, I should conclude that Plantinga’s God exists. But, so far as I have been able to tell, there have been few takers on Plantinga’s ontological argument. A problem here is that the same reasoning applies to a maximally excellent being’s possible non-existence. Thus, consider Peter van Inwagen’s “knownos.”8 A knowno is a being that knows there are no necessary beings. Now I fail to see any incoherence in the notion of a knowno. Alternatively, I see no incoherence in a purely physical, contingent, yet metaphysically independent or “free-standing” universe: There are the fundamental particles, and all else logically supervenes on that. So if epistemic possibility is a guide to possibility, it’s also reasonable for me to believe that there are no necessary beings. Thus, the unfettered approach to modalizing once again leads us into trouble. There are other problematic cases (e.g., “I fail to see that my disembodied existence is impossible…”), but perhaps we have enough to conclude that an unfettered, freewheeling approach to modalizing, such as that found in the use of epistemic possibility, is too unrestricted. Third, some argue that our account of modal knowledge should mesh nicely with what we have reason to believe in other areas such as

7 Plantinga 8 Van

(1974). Inwagen (2002).

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modal psychology and evolutionary explanations of the etiology of modal knowledge. Thus, Timothy Williamson and Shaun Nichols have independently argued that the ability to reason about nearby (but not remote) possibilities is conducive to survival, in virtue of giving us the ability to evaluate risks and opportunities (perhaps by mentally simulating counterfactual scenarios).9 But while it’s sensible enough to think that such an evolved ability would enable us to have knowledge of unactualized possibilities similar to ordinary experience, it is not at all clear that such an ability would allow us to have knowledge of “far out” possibilities that are remote from ordinary experience. In view of the sorts of reasons above, among others, there is a growing trend in the epistemology of modality to construct an account of our knowledge of possibility that draws a principled line between justified and unjustified modal claims, where this line coincides with a principled line between “nearby” and “remote” possibility claims. Most of these trace our knowledge to possibility back to our empirical knowledge of the actual world (at least in part). A number of plausible accounts have already been given.10 Perhaps, the most well known is Williamson’s (2007) counterfactual-based account, but there are many others. Examples include similarity-based accounts,11 abduction-based accounts,12 and folk theory-based accounts.13 Such accounts can nicely explain the epistemic force of paradigm-case thought experiments (e.g., Gettier cases) while leaving more exotic modal claims unjustified (e.g., possibly, an Anselmian Being exists; possibly, I exist apart from my body; etc.). Although there is more to be said on the problems with justifying modal claims, it suffices for my purposes here to call into question possibility claims that are remote from ordinary experience. In particular, modal skepticism about remote claims weakens Rasmussen’s contingency arguments for a metaphysically necessary being. One way to see this is by applying some of the points above to the Subtraction Argument in play in support of the claim that the universe (or totality of contingent

9 Williamson

(2007) and Nichols (2006). a representative sampling, see Fischer and Leon (2016b). 11 Leon (2009, 2016), Hawke (2011), and Roca-Royes (2016). 12 Hanrahan (2007), Biggs (2011), and Fischer (2015, 2016, 2017). 13 Leon (2009, 2016). 10 For

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things) is contingent. Now I agree that we can imagine fewer things in the universe—say, a universe with one less car on the road, or one less cat, or one less anything. Furthermore, I agree that we can repeat this exercise as many times as you please. However, I am not sure how much weight we should give such imagined scenarios—at least in a way that lends support to Rasmussen’s argument. For in our actual experience, when a particular car or cat goes out of existence, it is not as though the parcels of matter that constitute them go out of existence with them. Rather, when cars and cats go out of existence, they merely decompose into their elements, and these continue to remain with us in the world. Thus, while we have observed things made from matter subtracted from the world, we have yet to see matter (or matter/energy) subtracted from the world. If that is right, then what the Subtraction Argument invites me to imagine is contrary to all experience. A similar worry applies to Rasmussen’s appeal to modal seemings regarding the possible beginning of the existence of contingent concrete particulars. For such a possibility does not trace back to our experience of the actual world in the ways mentioned above. Thus, it is not clear how the evolutionary pressures that gave rise to our competence with counterfactual reasoning in daily life (e.g., reliable reasoning about what would happen if one tried to cross a busy intersection) would make us competent to determine something so remote from ordinary experience as the possibility of an absolute beginning to all contingent concrete particulars. Nor can it be justified by means of our folk theory of how the actual world works. Nor yet is such a beginning sufficiently similar to our experience and knowledge of the actual world so as to ground a solid inductive, abductive, or analogical/similarity-based inference from the (actuality, and thus) possibility of the latter to the former. In this regard, one might find the claim about the beginning of the existence of all concrete particulars to be on a par with the controversial modal premise of (say) Plantinga’s modal ontological argument (possibly, an Anselmian Being exists), or of conceivability arguments for dualism (possibly, I exist apart from my body). Perhaps, though, someone will dig in their heels and say that the relevant modal claims in play are justified. In reply, I worry that all the criticisms raised against an unfettered, freewheeling approach to modalizing will rear their ugly heads here. For then one can likewise say that it seems that I can imagine a world at which no concrete objects exist at

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all, whether contingent or necessary.14 But if that’s right, then if we stick with an unqualified or unrestricted version of the imaginability-possibility principle, then it seems that we should conclude that there is at least one metaphysically possible world at which no concrete objects exist at all, in which case necessary concrete objects are impossible. Thus, for these and related reasons, I am skeptical of putting much weight on imagined scenarios involving the possible non-existence of material objects. To sum up my first concern: There are reasons to doubt that our modal knowledge extends to possibilities remote from ordinary experience. Therefore, Rasmussen’s arguments from contingency that depend on knowledge of remote possibilities are likewise called into doubt.

3  Foundations: Metaphysical vs. Factual Necessity My next concern pertains to the notion of the necessary being in play. In particular, it appears that the arguments for a metaphysically necessary being assume a twofold categorization of beings: contingent beings and necessary beings. We may summarize Rasmussen’s account as follows. Contingent beings exist at the actual world, but not at some others. By contrast, necessary beings exist not only at the actual world, but at all possible worlds. Furthermore, contingent beings cannot account for themselves somehow. For example, if we imagine that they begin to exist, this beginning cries out for an explanation in terms of an independent being that is metaphysically necessary. According to the above categorization of types of beings, then, there are only two possible sorts of concrete beings: I. Contingent dependent beings II. Necessary independent beings Now suppose we were to grant that this twofold categorization of types of beings is exclusive and jointly exhaustive, and the relevant causal or explanatory principle in play is correct. Then perhaps we could properly conclude that all contingent beings are causally or explanatorily dependent upon a necessarily existent, independent being. 14 So, for example, one might continue the Subtraction Argument and subtract God from the universe after one subtracts the last physical particle, thereby erasing in thought all concrete objects from the world.

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However, there at least two concerns for thinking this categorization of types of beings is adequate. For it seems that at least two other sorts of beings are epistemically possible as well. First, necessary dependent beings seem epistemically possible. So, for example, some Christian philosophers take the second person of the trinity to be just such a being. On the sort of account I have in mind, God the Father is a necessary being, and he necessarily and eternally wills the existence of the second person of the trinity—God the Son—as an act of essence. On this account, then, God the Son exists in all possible worlds and is thus a necessary being. However, despite this, his existence is dependent on the causal activity of at least one other being, viz., God the Father. Therefore, on this account, God the Son of Christian theology is a necessary dependent being. Second, contingent independent beings seem epistemically possible as well. So, for example, some Christian philosophers think that the first person of the trinity of Christian theology is just such a being.15 According to such philosophers, there are possible worlds in which God the father doesn’t exist. However, he is an existentially independent, freestanding being who is uncaused, uncreated, eternal, and indestructible at all the worlds in which he does exist. Typically, philosophers of religion who accept such a view of God also take all the other existing concrete beings to be contingent beings that depend for their existence upon him. It is therefore common for such philosophers to speak of God’s existence as “necessary” in the relative sense of it being necessary for the existence of other beings—viz., contingent dependent beings—as the latter depend upon him for their existence. Let us therefore follow such philosophers in referring to contingent independent beings as factually necessary beings.16 In light of the preceding, the worry is that the twofold categorization of types of concrete beings is inadequate, as it seems to unduly restrict the range of candidate types of beings. The preceding considerations reveal a more neutral and inclusive way of carving up epistemically possible space that expands the types of concrete beings from two to four: I. Contingent dependent beings; II. Contingent independent beings; 15 See,

for example, Swinburne (1994). the account of God as factually necessary, see, for example, Hick (1961), Rowe (1998), and Swinburne (1994). 16 On

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III. Necessary dependent beings; IV. Necessary independent beings. However, given the epistemic possibility of this broader categorization of possible types of beings, one cannot automatically infer “dependent being” from “contingent being.” For then, it is epistemically possible that all contingent dependent beings are ultimately composed of contingent independent beings, i.e., factually necessary beings. So, for example, perhaps matter-energy (or whatever matter-energy is ultimately composed) is a factually necessary being. According to such a scenario, the contingent dependent beings (e.g., rocks, trees, planets, you and I, etc.) come into being when two or more contingent independent beings (i.e., factually necessary beings) are combined, and the contingent dependent beings cease to exist when they decompose into their elements. Meanwhile, the fundamental elements of which contingent dependent beings are composed (i.e., the contingent independent beings/factually necessary beings) cannot pass away, for they are at least de facto indestructible—i.e., nothing in the actual world has what it takes to knock them out of existence. Nor can they be created, for they are eternal, existentially independent, and (assuming origin essentialism and their being uncaused at the actual world) essentially uncaused. In this scenario, then, we have an explanation for all contingent dependent beings in terms of contingent independent beings. Furthermore, we have an explanation of contingent independent beings—partly in terms of the factual necessity of their own nature (i.e., in terms of their being uncreated, eternal, and existentially independent) and partly in terms of the character of the world at which they exist. (They are indestructible at least partly in virtue of there being nothing around in the world that can knock them out of existence.) Here is my concern: Why should we reject the above explanatory model for why there is anything at all in favor of the one Rasmussen proposes in his arguments? In keeping with the appeal to an inference to the best explanation, for example, I agree that the standard theoretical virtues should guide us here, including simplicity and scope. However, it is not at all clear to me that the hypothesis of one or more metaphysically necessary beings (MNB) embodies the theoretical virtues more fully than the hypothesis of one or more contingent independent, factually necessary, beings (FNB).

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First, one might argue that FNB matches MNB in terms of explanatory scope. For both hypotheses provide an explanatory terminus for the existence of contingent dependent beings in terms of independent beings. Furthermore, both versions provide an explanation of the existence of independent beings in terms of their own nature. One might reply that MNB has wider explanatory scope, as it can also explain the existence of contingent independent beings (i.e., factually necessary beings), if any such beings exist. However, widely shared intuitions about origin essentialism (that a thing cannot have a different origin than what it in fact has) provide prima facie reason to think the latter sorts of beings are beginningless, uncaused, and existentially independent essentially—in which case their existence can have no such explanation. Second, one might argue that FNB is more conservative than MNB— that is, FNB does not conflict, but fits well with, other things we have reason to believe about the world. For consider that we have decent independent reasons for thinking all concrete objects are contingent. Thus, one might reason inductively that since all of the huge quantity and wide variety of concrete objects we’ve observed are contingent, probably all concrete objects whatsoever are contingent. So, probably, there are no metaphysically necessary beings. We may also construct an abductive version of the argument: Our uniform experience of the huge variety of concrete objects we have observed is such that we find them to be contingent beings. What explains this? One might think the simplest, most conservative explanation of the data with the widest explanatory scope is the hypothesis that all concrete objects are contingent beings. One might reply that FNB has narrower scope than MNB on the grounds that the latter, but not the former, can account for the fact that there are contingent beings at all, rather than just nothing. However, the reasons we have for thinking that such an account is needed at all ultimately rely upon the principle of sufficient reason (i.e., the principle that every contingent fact has a sufficient explanation), which (arguably) is itself in need of inductive or abductive support from our uniform experience. If so, then even if such evidence is likewise universal, we have a mutual canceling-out of the epistemic force of both FNB and the principle of sufficient reason, in which case the PSR doesn’t favor the MNB over FNB. Finally, one might argue that FNB is a simpler hypothesis than MNB. In particular, one might argue that FNB provides a more quantitatively and qualitatively parsimonious explanation of the existence of contingent

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dependent beings than MNB. For the former explains the existence of all contingent dependent beings in terms of the fundamental constituents of contingent matter, while MNB expands our ontology by explaining contingent dependent beings in terms of at least one more being—one that belongs to a more metaphysically and modally extravagant ontological category (viz., that of metaphysically necessary beings). What shall we make of these considerations? For my own part, I find them to roughly counterbalance one another. Thus, I find myself unable to decide between the two hypotheses of MNB and FNB. Pending grounds to rule out this epistemically possible hypothesis, then, I worry that the case in play for a metaphysically necessary being is undercut.

4   Possible Beginnings, Possible Causes, and Material Causes My third and final concern pertains to some key premises in the argument from possible causes. The first premise states that whatever can happen can be caused to happen. I am wondering, however, what type of cause is in play here. Perhaps it will prove helpful to appeal to Aristotle’s four causes as a way to clarify the type of cause you have in mind. Thus, consider a shiny new penny that just came out of the press. The penny originated as an idea in the minds of its architects (its formal cause), which they wanted to make for a purpose, viz., to be used as currency (its final cause). Furthermore, the penny was ultimately made from a parcel of copper (its material cause). Finally, by means of persons and machines (its efficient cause), the parcel of copper was transformed into a shiny new penny. Now I imagine that at least the notion of an efficient cause is in play, but does the premise require more than that? Rasmussen nicely and plausibly appeals to experience and imagination in support of his causal premise (expressed with P1). Yet, it seems to me that our evidence would equally support a causal principle according to which all things that have a beginning have a material cause as well. Call this causal principle the principle of material causality (or “PMC” for short). If so, then it would seem that all things that are caused to begin to exist have a material cause as well—very roughly, new stuff always comes from old stuff. And if that’s right, then at least on the face of it, there cannot be a cause of the beginning to all concrete physical reality, even if it can be shown that

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there can be a beginning to all contingency within the realm of concrete reality. For then, the only way for a new physical thing to be caused to begin to exist would be if it were made from prior things or stuff. To further draw out this point, consider the following principle, which I’ll call the Impossibility of Uncaused Concrete Objects (IUC): (IUC) It is metaphysically impossible for a concrete object to come into existence out of nothing, without any cause whatsoever.

IUC is just an instance of the more general principle, ex nihilo nihil fit. And, as far as widely accepted metaphysical principles go, the latter is about as good as it gets. Not only have many considered it to be selfevident, all of nature appears to conform to it without exception. However, some philosophers remain skeptical. Philosophers in this camp tend to sympathize with Hume that anything that can be imagined or conceived without contradiction is prima facie metaphysically possible (or, more weakly, such imaginings defeat conflicting modal claims). And since one can imagine, say, a quark—or even the whole universe— popping into existence uncaused out of nothing, and can do so without a contradiction in one’s conception, that’s enough to call the principle into question. On the basis of this line of reasoning, philosophers of this stripe take it to be a live possibility that ex nihilo nihil fit is false, and thus that it is at least a live possibility that the universe popped into existence uncaused, out of nothing. Now consider the following version of PMC: (PMC’) It is metaphysically impossible for a concrete object to come into existence by an efficient cause if it lacks a material cause.

The thing to see is that PMC’ looks to be on an epistemic par with IUC. Both are self-evident (if either is), and both enjoy the support of universal experience. Moreover, neither principle is a strict logical truth (entailed by logical axioms), and so one can deploy the Humean gambit above to resist them both if one is so inclined. Given that IUC and PMC are in the same epistemological boat, therefore, it seems unprincipled and arbitrarily selective to accept one while rejecting the other. It therefore looks as though one should treat them similarly: either accept both, or use the Humean gambit to reject both.

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Here is the rub. Either option poses a problem for Rasmussen’s framework. For consider the first option: accept both principles. If you do that, then you accept PMC, in which case you accept something that entails that the necessary being cannot create concrete objects ex nihilo, in which case you accept something that entails that the classical theistic account of the foundation is false. Moreover, even if Rasmussen opts for a non-classical view of God, there is the more fundamental problem of seeing how a “material” cause of physical reality could be anything other than physical. On the other hand, suppose you reject both principles. Then you reject IUC, in which case you accept that it is at least a live option that there is a metaphysically possible world at which concrete objects pop into existence out of nothing without a cause. In other words, you fail to secure a reason to think that contingent things ultimately depend on a necessary foundation. Therefore, either way, you accept something that poses a problem for the sort of foundation theory for which Rasmussen proposes to argue. The previous points about the argument from possible causes give rise to a third point, which has to do with the inference from a necessary being to a necessary ground of being. For suppose the questions raised above can be adequately addressed, and it turns out that (i) contingent concrete reality can have a beginning (ii) such reality can have a cause, and (iii) concrete reality has a necessary being as its causal ground in those cases. My worry is that, based on the sorts of reasons sketched above, there may well be possible worlds in which the realm of concrete objects (at least those distinct from the sort of Necessary Being you have in mind) cannot have a beginning. But if so, then it’s not clear why such objects require a necessary ground of being. And the worry is that the actual world might be such a world. If that is right, then even if there is a necessary being, and this being is distinct from the world of concrete material objects, it might not play the role of ground or foundation in the actual world. Therefore, it is not clear that we have found the best answer to our original question: Why does anything at all exist, instead of just nothing?

5   Conclusion To recap, my worries about the case for a metaphysically necessary foundation of contingent concrete reality largely reduce to three main concerns. First, our modal evidence seems to fall short of supporting the

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view that the physical universe is contingent. Second, the hypothesis of a factually necessary being as the ground of contingent dependent beings seems to remain a live epistemic possibility. Finally, our evidence that things need material causes calls into question the possibility of the caused beginning of contingent concrete beings.

References Biggs, S. 2011. “Abduction and Modality.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 83 (2): 283–326. Fischer, Bob. 2015. “Theory Selection in Modal Epistemology.” American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4): 381–395. ———. 2016. “A Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2): 228–247. Fischer, R. 2017. Modal Justification via Theories. Dordrecht: Springer. Fischer, R., and F. Leon (eds.). 2016a. “The Modal-Knowno Problem.” Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1): 225–231. ———. 2016b. Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Dordrecht: Synthese Library. Hanrahan, R. 2007. “Imagination and Posssibility.” Philosophical Forum 38 (2): 125–146. Hawke, P. 2011. “Van Inwagen’s Modal Skepticism.” Philosophical Studies 153 (3): 351–364. Hick, John. 1961. “Necessary Being.” Scottish Journal of Theology 14 (4): 353–369. Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. Leon, F. 2009. “Armchair Knowledge and Modal Skepticism: A Rapprochement,” diss., University of California-Riverside. ———. 2016. “From Modal Skepticism to Modal Empiricism.” In Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, edited by R. Fischer and F. Leon. Dordrecht: Synthese Library. Nichols, Shaun. 2006. “Imaginative Blocks and Impossibility: An Essay in Modal Psychology.” In The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, edited by Shaun Nichols, 237–256. Oxford: Clarendon; New York: Oxford University Press. Plantinga, A. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roca-Royes, S. 2016. “Similarity and Possibility: An Epistemology of de re Possibility for Concrete Entities.” In Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, edited by R. Fischer and F. Leon. Dordrecht: Synthese Library. Rowe, William L. 1998. The Cosmological Argument. New York: Fordham University Press.

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Seddon, J. 1972. “Logical Possibility.” Mind 81: 481–494. Stich, S. 2008. “Imaginative Blocks and Impossibility: An Essay in Modal Psychology.” In The Architecture of the Imagination, edited by S. Nichols. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Swinburne, Richard. 1994. The Christian God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Van Cleve, James. 1983. “Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 35–45. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1977. “Ontological Arguments.” Nous 11(4): 375–395. ———. 1979. “Review of Richard Swinburne’s The Coherence of Theism.” The Philosophical Review 88: 668–672. ———. 1991. “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence.” Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Religion 5: 135–165. ———. 1997. “Materialism and the Psychological Continuity Account of Personal Identity.” Philosophical Perspectives 11: 309–317. ———. 1998. “Modal Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 92: 67–84. ———. 2002. Metaphysics. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press. ———. 2008. Metaphysics. 3rd ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Williamson, T. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yablo, S. 1993. “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 53: 1–42.

CHAPTER 4

The Geometric Argument Joshua Rasmussen

1   Introduction Leon offers valuable considerations about the theories of modality and causation at work in my arguments. He places orange cones warning all travelers of potential pitfalls in the journey to an ultimate foundation, and he helps us probe the conceptual framework of any argument for a foundation of material reality. In this piece, I will add a few more planks in a larger argument relevant to the nature of an ultimate foundation. Rather than walk into the weeds of a purely defensive dialectic, I wish to celebrate Leon’s orange cones as helpful warnings. In fact, I am excited about his points because they do indeed protect us from pathways that go into darkness. I will seek to mark a path that moves between the cones. Here is my plan. I will begin by giving a new “Geometric” Argument in support of the thesis that material stuff, as normally conceived, would not be explanatorily fundamental. This argument is part of what William Rowe calls “Stage 2” of cosmological arguments. It builds upon arguments for a necessary foundation by revealing some reason to think the nature of the foundation transcends materiality. I will then review the entire two-stage bridge of arguments in light of Leon’s considerations about (i) modality, (ii) factual necessity, and (iii) material causation.

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2  The Geometric Argument In my opening statement, I focused on arguments for a necessarily existent causal foundation for contingent things. These arguments leave open an important question, however, about the nature of that foundation: Could it be material or physical? This question is relevant to Leon’s observation that although macroscopic material objects can fail to exist, we never witness their basic material parts snap out of existence. One type of response involves giving reasons to think material stuff has an ultimate beginning in an original Big Bang event. Necessary stuff (whether metaphysically necessary or merely factually necessary) would have no beginning. On this picture, a beginning of material stuff would imply that the material world lacks necessary existence (in any sense).1 The standard reasons to think material stuff have a beginning appeal to current cosmology or to philosophical arguments for a causally finite history. Each of these reasons invites critical assessment, since they are part of an important case against a material foundation.2 Rather than enter the fine details of the debate over a finite past, however, I will take a step back and consider the conceptual constraints of “materiality.” For even if our universe has a finite history, there is still a question about what kind of stuff could precede our universe.3 Could it be “material” in some sense? To address that question, I will give a Geometric Argument in support of the theory that the ultimate foundation of reality, whether everlasting or not, is not fundamentally geometric (or topological) in nature. For the sake of focus, I will conceive of “materiality” in terms ultimately of functions of geometric properties (such as mappings from one topology to another).4 The Geometric Argument challenges this strictly materialist conception of the foundation. 1 If you are Williamson and think all is necessary, then I invite you to translate my talk of “necessary” into talk of “necessarily concrete.” In Williamson’s theory, an original Big Bang event would mark a beginning of the concretization of physical stuff. 2 For a couple classic arguments against the possibility of an infinite causal regress, see Craig (1991). For replies and counter-replies, see Oppy (1991, 2006), Craig (1993), and Morriston (1999, 2003). 3 For example, Smith (2001) argues that the ultimate cause could be a timeless point. 4 If we define “physical” as whatever is material or dependent on the material, then the Geometric Argument also targets the broader thesis that the foundation is fully physical (in that sense).

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Before I present the argument, it will help to clarify what is at stake at this stage. So far, we are considering whether there is a transcendent foundation of material reality. Later in this book, we will go further and consider whether this foundation may have other attributes associated with something as special as a Supreme Being. At this stage, however, there is ample room for a broad-minded naturalist to allow for a causal foundation that is not strictly material. In fact, some physicists theorize that the material world bottoms out in energy fields rather than in geometrically defined strings or point particles.5 The “fields” theory may, as far as I can tell, describe aspects or effects of an ultimate foundation that transcends the geometric landscape.6 Let us now move on to the Geometric Argument. The engine behind the argument is a principle about irrelevant differences between geometries. The basic idea is that mere differences in shape, size, and geometric structure cannot be relevant to the stark categorical differences with respect to either necessity or fundamentality. Take, for example, a particular chair shape. The instantiation of that shape depends upon prior conditions. Chair shapes never instantiate on their own, without any prior conditions. Instead, chair-instantiations depend on something. To illustrate further, consider an imaginary (uninstantiated) shape of an iPhone. Could this shape be instantiated without any cause or explanation? Here is a reason to think not. This iPhone shape differs from the shape of a chair, but this difference in shape is plainly irrelevant to the ability to be uncaused or unexplained. In other words, if the shape of a chair cannot be instantiated without prior conditions (i.e., uncaused and unexplained), neither can the shape of an iPhone. This thought generalizes: If some shape depends on something for its instantiation, then so does every other shape. We can build upon this thought. The underlying principle is a principle of irrelevant differences: Differences in shape are irrelevant to a

5 See,

for example, Hooft (2000). is one way in which fields themselves may transcend a purely materialistic description. Our physical descriptions (via mathematical models) may be about the effects of a deeper layer. Even if “fields” are the fundamental layer, that still leaves open a question about the ultimate nature of fields themselves. That nature may not be material (in the ordinary sense). As far as science has revealed, a foundation of fields could transcend the material world while also being visible in its effects throughout the world. 6 Here

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difference with respect to independent (uncaused or unexplained) existence. From this principle, we can construct an argument for a foundation whose fundamental nature precedes (in the order of causation or explanation) the instantiation of shapes. That is, from irrelevant differences, we can deduce that the foundation—whatever it is—is relevantly different from non-foundational things. Let us make the argument precise. Begin with a definition: Let “Geometry” designate a specification of the complete spatiotemporal geometry of the entire cosmos or multiverse. Geometry is simply the biggest “shape”—i.e., a state of the form such and such geometric properties being instantiated at such and such spatial-temporal positions.7 Here, then, is the Geometric Argument for a geometry-less concrete foundation: 1. Geometry is a geometric state. 2. Every geometric state is dependent. 3. Therefore, Geometry is dependent (1, 2). 4. Geometry cannot depend on any state featuring only things that have a geometry. 5. Geometry cannot depend on any state featuring only nonconcrete (non-causal) things. 6. Therefore, Geometry depends on a state featuring at least one geometry-less concrete thing (3–5). Let us consider each premise in turn. Premise (1) says that Geometry is a geometric state. This premise falls out of the definition of a “geometric state”: A geometric state is any state according to which such and such geometric properties are instantiated at such and such spatial-­temporal positions. Geometry is such a state because Geometry specifies the geometrical properties of all objects at all times and places. Therefore, Geometry counts as a geometrical state. (As before, Geometry need not consist of a single fusion of geometries; it may be a state of many geometries jointly.) 7 A complexity arises if presentism is true. On presentism, “Geometry” never obtains simpliciter because it includes geometries that are not presently instantiated. To iron out the definition of “Geometry” for presentists, let “these shapes at these locations at these times” pick out past-tense “geometric” properties of presently existing objects. So, for example, present things have the past-tense property of being preceded by a geometrical state g at time t.

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Turn to premise 2: Every geometric state alike is dependent. One way one might support this premise is by developing a track record argument. Two sorts of observations are relevant here: (i) the regular observation of new geometries arising from prior states and (ii) the lack of observation of new, previously uninstantiated geometries appearing completely disconnected from any relevant prior states. Recently, Wahlberg (2017) shows how these observations can support a general principle about the causal order with respect to physical states. He appeals to a track record argument that David Papineau develops in support of there being a ­physical causal order. Wahlberg then argues that a general principle applied uniformly to all physical states enjoys greater explanatory scope (by, e.g., underwriting the scientific inference to the best explanation over no explanation), while retaining the virtue of theoretical simplicity. To be sure, the principle is defeasible (in principle). I appreciate Leon’s points with respect to claims that reach far beyond ordinary experience. As he explains, there are many principles that may account for our experiences, and it is not a simple matter to determine which, if any, best accounts for them. More on this later. For now, the thing I wish to highlight is that a principle of irrelevant differences can itself help us proceed with greater confidence. In general, it is possible to see at least some truths that apply far beyond ordinary experience. For example, we can see that gravity works throughout the universe, including in galaxies far beyond our reach. In fact, by the light of irrelevant differences, we can see some things with perfect clarity. Try this principle: Differences between prime numbers are irrelevant to the number’s inability to give birth to a kitten. This principle is clearly true (you might think undeniable), even though it certainly reaches far beyond ordinary experience; after all, it applies to infinitely many distinct numbers and infinitely many distinct ways to give birth to kittens. Our insight into irrelevant differences makes the prime number principle eminently plausible. Suppose one begins to one wonder whether some unusual prime numbers might be able to give birth to some unusual kittens. There is a cure for doubt: See the irrelevance of the differences. See that the differences in the size of number make no a categorical difference with respect to the ability to give birth to kittens. The light of reason can make this irrelevance crystal clear. In precisely the same way, the light of reason can, I believe, make crystal clear the irrelevance of differences between shapes vis-à-vis independence. Just as all prime numbers alike are unable to give birth to

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kittens, all shapes alike are unable to have independent instantiation. If instead some geometric states fail to depend on anything, then we have a puzzle: How can mere differences in geometric state make a categorical difference with respect to being dependent? To draw out the worry, let us stipulate that a triangle cannot be instantiated without relevant prior conditions (at least in worlds relevantly like ours), while an octagon can. What, then, could account for this difference? These shapes may differ in complexity, such as number of vertices. Yet a mere difference in complexity does not seem to account for a difference with respect to whether the geometry in question is dependent in nature. A difference with respect to dependence is deep and categorical, whereas a difference in number of vertices is not. To be clear, I do not claim that categorical differences cannot in principle turn on differences in complexity. My proposal here is that without any independent reason to carve a categorical distinction between geometries, one has reason to treat all possible geometries as categorically uniform with respect to dependence and contingency. Elsewhere, I motivate a principle of uniformity with respect to modality.8 The basic idea is that there are contexts where we would expect a mere difference in degree not to make any categorical difference with respect necessity or contingency. Applied here, a mere difference in complexity of geometry appears irrelevant to a difference with respect to either dependence or modality. For the sake of modesty, we may treat the principle as defeasible: If you have good reason to break uniformity, then that reason may reasonably cause you to posit a break in categorical uniformity. Without that reason, however, you may reasonably infer categorical uniformity. At this point, you might worry that the principle of irrelevant differences leads to other costs. One standard objection to traditional cosmological arguments is that they invoke a causal or explanatory principle that results in a “costly” ontology—by requiring, for example, more basic kinds of things, such as gods, necessary beings, and the like.9 Skeptics of this ontology can then cite the cost of (say) multiplying complexity. This cost motivates a more restricted causal/explanatory principle that is consistent with a more affordable ontology. This objection

8 Rasmussen 9 See,

(2013, 2017). for example, Oppy (2009, 2013).

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is relevant to the Geometric Argument: Those of us who are antecedently skeptical of geometric-less concreta may favor a weaker principle of dependence, such as that every non-foundational geometric state is dependent. We may prefer to keep our ontology free from geometric-less concreta. However, the problem of irrelevant differences goes beyond swapping theoretical costs. The problem is rooted in the basic nature of geometry. Our mathematics of geometry has progressed far precisely because we have positive insight into axiomatic, self-evident geometric principles that apply to the real world. The principle of irrelevant differences (i.e., that a difference in possible shape makes no difference with respect to fundamentality) is no less evident to my mind than any other geometric axiom.10 If things strike you differently, that is okay; still, to whatever extent it seems to you that uniformity of explanations should not be broken arbitrarily and inexplicably, to that extent you have a reason you may weigh in support of a uniform-dependence principle. One more point about multiplying categories. Later in this dialogue, I will say why I think the simplest and least arbitrary ultimate theory independently predicts non-geometric, foundational features. If I’m right, then rather than multiply complexity at the root of reality, the Geometry Argument delivers a result that is to be expected from the simplest root. (See especially, Chapter 8, Sect. 6 and Chapter 17, Sect. 2.) The next premise is (4): Geometry cannot depend on any state featuring only geometric things. The reason to think (4) is true is to avoid circular explanations. Suppose that contra (4) that there are some things, the os, that have a size, and that their states or activities alone figure into the explanation of Geometry. Then, since the os are themselves geometric objects, the facts about their positions in space are part of Geometry. That is to say, the spatiotemporal profile of the os is among the very facts that the os are supposed to explain. The difficulty here is that in order for the os to explain their own spatiotemporal profile, they must “already” have a spatiotemporal profile. The most straightforward way for things to explain a spatiotemporal profile is for them to cause it to obtain. 10 The parallel postulate is a special case, given its history of controversy. In my judgment, that controversy is over application, not truth. More specifically, the controversy has been over whether space is curved, not over whether parallel lines in non-curved space would ever meet.

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But things cannot cause their own spatiotemporal profile if they already have a spatiotemporal profile. Even in an infinite regress of causes, we lack an explanation as to how the specific total spatiotemporal geometry obtains.11 To avoid circularity, the total explanation cannot be purely in terms of that same geometric profile. Compare: Copying geometry books from other geometry books cannot explain why there are all the geometry books in the first place.12 The final premise is (5): Geometry cannot depend on any state featuring only non-concrete (non-causal) things. My argument for this premise is that states of abstract things—such as properties, propositions, relations, sets—are inadequate to be the ground for the existence of Geometry. Geometry is a state of spatiotemporal positions of concrete, material objects. Abstract things, as I am thinking of them, lack the power to bring about the massy objects that instantiate Geometry. Therefore, Geometry would not itself obtain without some causal foundation that transcends geometric form. (If instead abstracta do have causal powers, then we can include them in the foundation of existence, and the result is the same!) So, where does this leave us? The proposal that the ground level of reality transcends geometric form may sound bold, but let me suggest a way in which this result actually fits very well with contemporary physics. Consider the following scenario. Suppose the ns are necessarily existing fields that at least can lack a definite geometry. So, for instance, imagine that explanatorily prior to the Big Bang, the ns are in a size-less (formless) state of pure “energy.” This “energy” has a disposition to change into (else: produce) a scattered array of particles. Suppose that is exactly what happens. The Big Bang follows. In this scenario, measurable time itself results from the initial transition from un-located “energy” into located particles. The geometry of our universe then unfolds as things causally interact in accordance with indeterministic, probabilistic laws.

11 There is the famous Humean objection that the whole is automatically explained if each part is sufficiently explained (Hume 1779, 58–59). But in the context of explaining geometric states, Hume’s proposal only works in cases where the total explanation is in terms of geometric states that are not already included in the geometric state to be explained. Otherwise, you have circularity. 12 The geometry book example is from Leibniz in “On the Ultimate Origin of Things.”

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In this way, certain facts about formless energy could conceivably provide an ultimate explanation of Geometry.13 (We will have a closer look at the ultimate nature of, or foundation for, “formless energy” as we proceed; but let us not get ahead of ourselves.)

3   Questions and Answers Leon brings to light valuable questions relevant to the two-stage bridge beneath our feet. I shall address them here. Question 1. Do the arguments for a necessary foundation require unjustified modal assumptions? Reply. Leon rightly invites caution with respect to modal judgments about far-reaching philosophical matters. Let us consider how this caution relates to my case for a necessary foundation. In my opening statement, I gave three arguments for a necessary foundation: (i) from explaining why there is something rather than nothing, (ii) from explaining contingent reality, and (iii) from the possibility of a cause of contingent reality. Arguments (i) and (ii) are fully compatible with modal caution, since their supports don’t depend upon any modal judgments (i.e., judgments about what is possible). Therefore, modal skepticism about remote claims does not even touch my contingency arguments for a metaphysically necessary being. Regarding (i), the argument is that the necessary foundation theory provides the simplest ultimate explanation for why there is not merely nothing. There isn’t nothing because there couldn’t have been, which in turn is because there is something that cannot not be. Nothing in this reasoning includes a modal judgment about which universes are possible. As for (ii), someone might worry about the fallacy of composition: Why infer that the totality composed of all contingent things is itself contingent? My answer is that my formulation of the argument does not actually depend on any inference from contingent individuals to contingent wholes. Rather, I appeal to empirical data and reason in support

13 I have been assuming that non-spatial things can exist in time. If that is not possible, then the conclusion of the argument is all the more intriguing: It implies that at least one concrete thing is either trans-spatial or non-temporal.

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of a causal principle linking contingent existence with dependence. These data include our lack of awareness of contingent things appearing from nowhere. From these data, we use inference to the best explanation, not a fallacy of composition. Besides this, even if the totality of contingent things were not contingent, that would not undermine the arguments’ conclusion; it would only entail the conclusion that something is necessary. The necessary something would then overlap all things, just as some imagine God’s omnipresence to imply. In any case, whether this necessary something overlaps all things or exists within all things, the result is the same: Something has necessary existence. Now to be clear, Leon raises a very good challenge to my inference here in his appeal to factual necessity, and I shall consider that challenge shortly. My point so far is just that modal intuitions are not in play in my first two arguments. My third argument, however, is indeed vulnerable to Leon’s critique, since that argument relies on a modal judgment. I claimed that there could be an ultimate beginning of contingent reality. So, yes, theories of modality do indeed invite us to be cautious. Thanks for the orange cone! In fact, I think Leon’s objection successfully stalemates, or at least calls into question, this third argument if modal intuition is all we have to go on. I agree. Time for progress. I see a couple of ways to gain light, while still keeping an eye on the orange cone. First, in view of the Geometric Argument, we have the “categorical uniformity” tool. Just as one may expect differences in geometry to be irrelevant to whether that geometry could have had a beginning, one may expect differences in shape or size of contingent reality to be equally irrelevant to whether that reality could have had a beginning (other things being equal). This inference is supported by the “modal continuity” tool I develop in Rasmussen 2013. This tool need not be decisive for it to unearth some additional support. Second, instead of relying on a raw intuition about the possibility of an ultimate beginning of contingent reality, we may instead consider what best explains infinite age. Suppose we deny that there can be a beginning of contingency. Then, a beginningless past is necessary. Suppose, for example, the basic stuff of matter (say) persists for infinite time in every possible world in which it exists. We may then wonder how and why it should last so long. The simplest and most obvious answer to

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me is that the basic stuff of matter persists because it cannot fail to exist; that would explain why it cannot cease. An alternative, more complex hypothesis is that there is some necessary rule of reality that entails the following: if the basic stuff exists, then it cannot begin or stop existing. But this rule of persistence leaves unanswered a deeper question: What is it about this basic stuff that makes it unable to begin or stop? Related: Why does this law itself hold? These questions are especially puzzling if we suppose that the basic stuff has a nature that is actually compatible with non-existence. Why must the foundation persist if it can fail to exist? The greater simplicity and explanatory scope of the first answer is surely some reason—even if modest—to prefer it. Moreover, the first answer provides a deeper explanation of the necessary rule itself. The point, in summary, is that even if one denies that there can be a beginning of contingency, one is then committed to the necessity of no beginning, which is precisely what a metaphysically necessary causal foundation successfully predicts and explains. Question 2. Why couldn’t the foundation be merely factually necessary? Reply. I begin with a concession: A merely factually necessary, independent foundation is consistent with all empirical data. Still, here are four reasons I think a metaphysically necessary foundation provides a deeper and more complete explanation of the data: 1.  Explains eternal existence. To say that X is factually necessary is to say that it cannot come to be or cease to be.14 As suggested above, the simplest account of how something can be unable to start or cease is that it has necessary existence—i.e., it has a nature that cannot fail to be instantiated. By contrast, suppose its nature can fail to be instantiated. Then, apart from any explanation, it is deeply perplexing why it cannot fail at any time once it happens to exist. An explanation in terms of necessary existence is simpler and less ad hoc.

14 We can state this result in terms of different theories of time. In static theories (e.g., eternalism), a foundation that exists at all worlds and all times explains why there continue to be things at all times in our world. On dynamic theories (e.g., presentism), a foundation that necessarily exists simpliciter explains why there continue to be things simpliciter.

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2. Explains lack of chaos. I am inclined to agree that empirically equivalent competing principles undercut unqualified inductive support for my dependence principle (that every contingent thing is dependent). I celebrate this point of agreement and progress. Fortunately, we can build upon it. In particular, we can consider what explains why there are not random chunks of reality, whether material or immaterial, that appear from nowhere. Leon’s principle of material causality (that new stuff can only be formed out of prior stuff) explains the data. The thing to see here is that his principle does not itself compete with the principle of dependence. It merely adds a specific condition on how new stuff would have to be caused. So both may be true. (I will say more about the principle of material causation in my answer to the final question.) 3. Explains irrelevant differences. The Geometric Argument is about the uniformity of geometric reality. By parallel reasoning, we have an argument for the uniformity of contingent reality. Contingent realities alike are dependent, because their mere differences in shape, size, spatiotemporal location, density, inner-causal structure, etc. don’t appear to make a difference with respect to dependence. By contrast, necessary existence (or, supreme value, which entails necessary existence) could certainly be relevant to dependence.15 4. Explains more. Recall the argument from possible causes. This argument, if sound, entails that there is a necessarily existing thing capable of causally explaining a contingent reality. Note, in addition, that the simplest, least arbitrary account of its explanatory power entails that the foundation can be at the explanatory root of simply any possible contingent realities. In other words, on the simplest theory, a necessary foundation can be the root of all contingencies.

15 Building on Leon’s points about a classic Trinitarian conception of God, a Trinitarian could theorize that necessary elements within God depend ultimately on God as a whole, which alone instantiates axiological perfection. The point here is that axiological perfection intuitively precludes dependence. Another option is that we work with a stronger notion of dependence, where x depends on y only if y can exist without x. In that case, we still have an argument from uniformity for the dependence of all contingent things, while no necessary things could be dependent in that same sense.

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Leon asks why necessary concreta would be an actual cause of anything. My answer is this: Other things being equal, we have reason to infer the best explanation available. A necessary foundation is available. Moreover, even if we put all the above considerations aside, we still have a significant result if the foundation is at least factually necessary. In fact, most of the arguments we shall consider as we further probe the foundation are insensitive to whether its necessity is factual or metaphysical. Therefore, although I think a metaphysically necessary foundation provides the best ultimate explanation of existence, the Geometry Argument (and others we shall get to) give me a reason to think that any ultimate foundation would transcend material reality, as ordinarily conceived. Question 3. Why think a necessary being would produce its effects ex nihilo rather than out of preexisting materials? Reply. I intend to be as neutral as possible about the nature and conditions of efficient causation. Thus, I leave open several important questions about causation. First, I leave open whether causation can be indeterministic (such as when Sam’s smoking causes his lung cancer but didn’t have to). Second, I leave open whether causation is reducible to laws, tendencies, powers, or something else. Third, for purposes of the argument, I allow “causation” to be treated as a generic grounding or dependence relation. Furthermore, I leave open whether causes may require, as Leon suggests, a “material” cause, in Aristotle’s sense of being made out of prior things. Theism, as we have defined it (an ultimate cause that is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good), is compatible with both creation ex nihilo and creation ex Deus—where the material forms are manifestations, aspects, or effects of the intrinsically formless supreme substance. Perhaps we will have occasion to return to this distinction, if necessary, as we examine arguments from consciousness and axiology in later chapters. At this stage, however, I am content to concede (and celebrate) that my arguments for an ultimate ground are consistent with (and can even underwrite) Leon’s preferred principle of causation.16

16 Thanks

to Cameron Bertuzzi and Evan Fales for helpful notes on a previous draft.

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References Craig, W. L. 1991. “The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe.” Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3: 85–96. ———. 1993. “Graham Oppy on the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Sophia 32: 1–11. Hooft, Gerard’t. 2000. In Search of the Ultimate Building Blocks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hume, David. 1779. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cambridge University Press. Morriston, Wesley. 1999. “Must the Past Have a Beginning?” Philo 2: 5–19. ———. 2003. “Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?” Faith and Philosophy 20: 288–306. Oppy, Graham. 1991. “Craig, Mackie, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Religious Studies 27: 189–197. ———. 2006. Perspectives on Infinity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2009. “Cosmological Arguments.” Nous 43: 31–48. ———. 2013. “Ultimate Naturalistic Causal Explanations.” In The Puzzle of Existence, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt. New York and London: Routledge. Rasmussen, Joshua. 2013. “Continuity as a Guide to Possibility.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 214: 525–538. ———. 2017. “Extending Modal Knowledge.” In Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, edited by R. Fischer and F. Leon. Dordrecht: Synthese Library. Smith, Quentin. 2001. “An Atheist Explanation of Spacetime.” In God and Time, edited by G. Gegansall and D. Woodruff. New York: Oxford University Press. Wahlberg, Mats. 2017. “A Cosmological Argument Against Physicalism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9: 165–188.

CHAPTER 5

On Finitude, Topology, and Arbitrariness Felipe Leon

1   Introduction In the previous chapter, Rasmussen raises a number of valuable and constructive points regarding the topic of the present section, viz., whether the universe has a cause or foundation or ground. In addition, he offers a novel and powerful argument against candidate causes or grounds of the universe that have geometric or topological properties. Along the way, Rasmussen addresses my questions and concerns about the arguments he presented in Chapter 2. The aim of the present chapter is to address these concerns and to raise questions for Rasmussen’s intriguing Geometry Argument.

2  On PMC and Matter’s Necessity I am delighted to see we agree that matter (or whatever matter is made of) is at least part of the cause or ground or foundation of contingent concrete reality. I think this is an extremely important point of progress, as much past discussion led to a stalemate with classical theists, who hold to a view of the ground of contingent concrete reality wholly in terms of pure immaterial spirit, and who make an absolute distinction between creation and creator. Moving beyond such a conception of the divine leaves open many other conceptions worth exploring. It is also © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_5

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refreshing to see our discussion join the growing chorus of analytic philosophers of religion who are unmooring from the research agenda of classical theism,1 as they move on to research programs involving alternative conceptions of the divine, such as pantheism, panentheism, ordinal polytheism, demiurgism, and Spinozism.2 Indeed, with some reservations (more on this below), I am inclined to accept Rasmussen’s proposal that the nature of this (at least partial) material ground is some kind of field-like entity.

3   Clarifying PMC Rasmussen points out an important objection to my proposal that the material foundation is factually necessary. The core of the worry is that there are philosophical and scientific grounds for thinking that 1. The universe had a beginning. And then it’s natural to suppose that 2. Whatever has a beginning is not factually or metaphysically necessary. And then from (1) and (2), it follows that 3. The universe is not factually or metaphysically necessary. However, it’s not clear to me that (2) is true. So, for example, it seems epistemically possible that ontologically prior to the first moment of time, the universe (or some portion of it) exists eternally in a timeless state, and that the stuff of the universe (or some portion of it) is factually or metaphysically necessary.3 Here is another way to draw out the point. In Chapter 3, I offered a rough-and-ready formulation of principle of material causality (PMC), according to which all things that begin to exist have a material cause. 1 See,

for example, Oppy (2014) and Draper and Schellenberg (2017). a recent sampling, see, e.g., Buckareff and Alter (2016). 3 It also seems epistemically possible that the finite, temporal portion of the universe in our scenario above is a necessary consequence of the timeless portion of the universe, in which case it would be a necessary dependent being, as defined in Chapter 3. 2 For

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However, one might think that Rasmussen’s reply above provides pressure to give a more careful formulation of PMC. In what follows, therefore, I will provide such a formulation of PMC, which in turn will enable me to address Rasmussen’s concern in a way that (I hope) will be illuminating. In simplest terms, PMC says that all made things are made from other things or stuff. According to a more careful and accurate formulation of PMC, all concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining efficient cause have an originating or sustaining material cause, respectively. Given this more technical formulation, further clarifications about PMC’s terminology are in order. First, “concrete object” denotes at least the sorts of entities classically individuated by the ontological category of Substance, and to distinguish the entities at issue from those of other ontological categories (e.g., property, relation, event, and trope). Examples of concrete objects thus include atoms, stars, rocks, planets, trees, animals, angels, Cartesian souls, and gods. They are thus to be distinguished from concrete entities in other ontological categories (shapes, surfaces, events, and the like) and abstract objects (propositions, numbers, sets, and the like). The next two key terms in PMC are those of originating cause and sustaining cause. By the former, I mean an efficient cause of the temporal beginning of a thing’s existence4 (if it should have such), and by the latter, I mean an efficient cause of a thing’s continued existence. So, for example, matches and lighter fluid are at least partial originating causes of the existence of a flame, and the oxygen that surrounds it is at least a partial sustaining cause of the flame’s existence. Finally, material cause aims to capture (roughly) Aristotle’s notion of the term and to individuate the type of cause in play from the other three sorts of causes distinguished by Aristotle, viz. formal, efficient, and final causes. By “material cause”, then, I mean “the things or stuff from which a new thing is made.” So, for example, the material cause of a shiny new penny is the parcel of copper from which it was made, and the material causes of a new water molecule are the hydrogen and oxygen atoms from which it was made. Given these clarifications, we see that PMC is compatible with the possibility of concrete objects that lack a material cause, namely those 4 Consider any arbitrary carving up of the stretch of time of a given object’s existence into equal intervals of finite, nonzero duration, and ordered according to the “earlier than” relation. As I’m using the expression, an object has a temporal beginning of its existence just in case any such carving up includes an earliest temporal interval.

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that lack an originating or sustaining cause. So, for example, PMC allows that the universe may lack a material cause of its existence if it is both beginningless and also lacks a sustaining cause. It also allows that a universe with a temporal beginning may lack a material cause, if it also lacks an originating and sustaining cause. An example of the latter sort of case might be a temporally finite, four-dimensional “block” universe. As such, PMC is neutral as to whether all concrete objects begin to exist, and to whether all concrete objects that begin to exist have a material cause. PMC only rules out concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining cause, but lack a material cause. I worry, though, that such a reply will seem unsatisfactory for some, as they might have further, related worries about naturalistic hypotheses involving a universe with a finite past. It might therefore be worth responding to the Rasmussen’s point about arguments for a finite past at some length, not only because it provides an opportunity to further clarify PMC, but also to address a number of issues regarding both problems and options for theistic and naturalistic hypotheses. Let us therefore have a closer look at the scientific and philosophical evidence for a finite past, and consider what bearing it might have for both naturalism and theism.5

4  Finite Pasts, Theism, and Naturalism For our purposes, the scientific evidence for a finite past can be dealt with quickly. This is because the current evidence does not show that our universe had an absolute beginning. Rather, the evidence allows us to trace the antecedents of the current phase of our universe to back to around 13.7 billion years ago, when the universe was very hot and very small. Beyond that, we can currently only speculate, as our laws of physics break down at that point, and thus our ability to say what probably happened prior to that state likewise breaks down. In any case, at best, such evidence only points to the beginning of our universe, not to all physical reality. However, some philosophers have argued on a priori grounds that the past is necessarily temporally finite, in which case there are grounds for a finite past that are independent of scientific evidence.6 Arguments 5 I’ve

addressed these issues in much more detail in Leon (2019). a recent exposition and defense of both a priori and scientific arguments for a finite past, see Craig and Sinclair (2009). For a systematic critique of both, see, e.g., Leon (2019). 6 For

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of this sort are of two main types: (i) those that argue that actually infinite sets or collections of concrete entities are metaphysically impossible (in which case an actually infinite set of past events can’t exist, in which case the past must be finite) and (ii) those that argue that while actually infinite sets of concrete entities may or may not be metaphysically possible, they cannot be successively traversed one at a time (in which case the past must be finite, as it has been traversed—after all, here we are). Space does not permit me to address all of the arguments for a finite past.7 Instead, I will address arguments of both types that I take to be representative. Let’s begin with arguments of type (i). Perhaps the most popular argument of this sort among philosophers is based on the famous Hilbert’s Hotel thought experiment (named after its author, the mathematician David Hilbert). Thus, imagine a hotel with an infinite number of rooms and an infinite number of guests. Such a hotel would have some surprising features. So, for example, suppose all the guests in the even-numbered rooms check out. Then the hotel would still have infinitely many occupied rooms, viz., the odd-numbered rooms. On the other hand, suppose all the guests in rooms 4, 5, 6, … check out of the hotel. Then the hotel will no longer have infinitely many occupied rooms—it will have three. But how can this be? Just as many guests checked out in the first scenario as in the second scenario. This is because (i) the infinite set of even-numbered rooms (2, 4, 6, …) can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of rooms numbered 4 and higher (4, 5, 6, …) and (ii) any two sets that can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with one another are the same “size”—each set has just as many members as the other. But this is absurd: subtracting the same amount cannot yield different amounts. Therefore, an infinite hotel is metaphysically impossible. The absurdity here isn’t particular to just infinite hotels. Rather, they generalize to every denumerably infinite set of concrete entities whatsoever. Therefore, concrete actual infinites are metaphysically impossible.

7 For a recent exposition and defense of both a priori and scientific arguments for a finite past, see Craig and Sinclair (2009). For representative criticisms, see, e.g., Morriston (1999, 2002a, b, 2003, 2010, 2013), Oppy (2006), Craig and Smith (1993), Draper (2008), and Leon (2019).

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We can express the argument illustrated above as follows: 1. If concrete actual infinites are possible, then a hotel with infinitely many rooms and infinitely many guests is possible. 2. If a hotel with infinitely many rooms and infinitely many guests is possible, then it’s possible to remove just as many guests from the hotel and get different amounts of remaining guests. 3. It’s impossible to remove just as many guests from the hotel and get different amounts of remaining guests. 4. Therefore, concrete actual infinites are impossible. What to make of this argument?8 A number of objections have been raised against it, but here I will raise just one: There is an equivocation on the locution “just as many” in (2) and (3). On the one hand, it might mean that “just as many” guests were removed in the two scenarios in the sense that the two sets of rooms can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with each other. Then while (2) is true, it’s not obvious that (3) is true. For while the two sets of rooms can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with each other, one set has all the members of the other set and then some, viz. the odd-numbered rooms. Referring to the coarsegrained similarity of the two sets (viz. being able to be put into a one-toone correspondence with each other) conceals this crucial difference. Yet, once one shifts one’s focus from the correspondence of their members to the finer-grained difference in the particular members of the two sets, the intuitiveness of premise (3) disappears. For then one would expect different results when the sets removed in the two scenarios are different in this crucial way. On the other hand, one might mean that “just as many” guests were removed in the two scenarios in the sense that neither set of guests has members besides the ones they share in common. Then while (3) is true on that reading, (2) is not. For of course the set of guests removed in the second scenario has all the guests that were removed in the first scenario and others besides. The upshot is that the argument gets its intuitive appeal by equivocating on the notion of “just as many.” Thus, once the different readings of the expression are disambiguated, the argument loses its force. 8 Cf. Morriston (2002a) and Draper (2008). For related worries regarding the Hilbert’s Hotel argument, see Morriston (2003) and Oppy (2006).

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Suppose one finds the problems with arguments against the existence of actual infinites persuasive. Still, as I mentioned earlier, some who argue against the possibility of an infinite past grant, at least for the sake of argument, that actual infinites exist in reality, but go on to deny that they can be traversed or crossed one at a time. If arguments of the latter sort succeed, then an infinite past is still ruled out (at least if it was formed one event at a time, contrary to those who think of the universe as a timeless four-dimensional block), even if arguments of the sorts sketched above fail. Let us therefore briefly consider a representative argument against the traversability of actual infinites. William Lane Craig offers the following argument for the finitude of the past: Suppose we meet a man who claims to have been counting down from infinity and who is now finishing: …, -3, -2, -1, 0. We could ask, why didn’t he finish counting yesterday or the day before or the year before? By then an infinite time had already elapsed, so that he should already have finished. Thus, at no point in the infinite past could we ever find the man finishing his countdown, for by that point he should already be done! In fact, no matter how far back into the past we go, we can never find the man counting at all, for at any point we reach he will already have finished. But if at no point in the past do we find him counting, this contradicts the hypothesis that he has been counting from eternity. This shows again that the formation of an actual infinite by never beginning but reaching an end is as impossible as beginning at a point and trying to reach infinity.9

Call this the immortal counter argument. The immortal counter argument can be expressed as a reductio, with (1) below as the premise set up for reduction: 1. The past is beginningless (conceived as a set of events with the cardinality aleph-null, and the order-type w*). 2. If the past is beginningless, then there could have been an immortal counter who counts down from such a past at the rate of one negative integer per day. 3. The immortal counter will finish counting if and only if he has an infinite number of days in which to count them. 9 Craig

and Sinclair (2009, 121–122).

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4. If the past is beginningless, then there are an infinite number of days before every day. 5. Therefore, the immortal counter will have finished counting before every day. 6. If the immortal counter will have finished counting before every day, then he has never counted. 7. Therefore, the immortal counter has both never counted and has been counting down from a beginningless past (contradiction). 8. Therefore, the past is not beginningless (from 1 to 7, reductio). An undercutting defeater for the argument can be brought out by a careful look at (3). Grant the “only if.” Still, why think the immortal counter will finish his count if he has had an infinite number of days to count them? For it’s epistemically possible that he’s counted down an infinite number of negative integers from a beginningless past, and yet has not counted them all. So, for example, he could now be counting “−3,” so that he has just finished counting an infinite number of negative integers, viz. {…−5, −4, −3}, and yet he has not counted down all the negative integers. Given this epistemic possibility, (3) is undercut. Craig has a reply to this sort of objection: I do not think the argument makes this alleged equivocation [from ‘infinite’ to ‘all’. –F.L.], and this can be made clear by examining the reason why our eternal counter is supposedly able to complete a count of the negative numbers, ending at zero. In order to justify this intuitively impossible feat, the argument’s opponent appeals to the so-called Principle of Correspondence…On the basis of the principle the objector argues that since the set of past years can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of negative numbers, it follows that by counting one number a year an eternal counter could complete a countdown of the negative numbers by the present year. If we were to ask why the counter would not finish next year or in a hundred years, the objector would respond that prior to the present year an infinite number of years will have elapsed, so that by the Principle of Correspondence, all the numbers should have been counted by now. But this reasoning backfires on the objector: for on this account the counter should at any point in the past have already finished counting all the numbers, since a one-to-one correspondence exists between the years of the past and the negative numbers.10 10 Craig

(1985).

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Thus, Craig thinks the objector is committed to the claim that the counter will finish his count if and only if the days he’s counted can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of natural numbers. And since this can be done at any day of a beginningless past, the counter should always be done. But that contradicts the hypothesis that he’s been counting down from a beginningless past. But why, exactly, must the objector presuppose that the counter will finish his count if and only the set of days he counts can be put into oneto-one correspondence with the set of natural numbers? Craig says that it’s because otherwise the objector can’t account for the possibility of an immortal counter who finishes the task on a particular day, as opposed to any other day. Now granted, counting a set of days that can be put into such a correspondence is a necessary condition for counting down a beginningless set of negative integers. But why are we supposed to think it is also sufficient? Call the bi-conditional above ‘Craig’s Claim’ (‘CC’): (CC) The counter will have finished counting all of the negative integers if and only if the years of the past can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with them.

Now consider the following epistemically possible scenario as an undercutting defeater for CC. Suppose God timelessly numbers the years to come about in a beginningless universe. Suppose further that He assigns the negative integers to the set of events prior to the birth of Christ, and then the positive integers begin at this point. Then the timeline, with its corresponding integer assignment, can be illustrated as follows: …−3 −2 −1 Birth of Christ 1 2 3…

Suppose yet further that God assigned Dave, an immortal creature, the task of counting down the negative integers assigned to the years BCE, and stopping at the birth of Christ. Call this task “T.” With this in mind, suppose now that Dave has been counting down from eternity past and is now counting the day assigned (by God) the integer −3. In such a case, Dave has counted a set of years that could be put into a one-to-one

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correspondence with the set of negative integers, yet he has not finished all the negative integers.11 The case above shows that while it is a necessary condition for counting all of the events that one is able to put them into a one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers, we have reason to doubt that it’s sufficient. For if the events that are to be counted have independently “fixed,” or, “designated” integer assignments set out for one to traverse, one must count through these such that, for each event, the number one is counting is the same as the one independently assigned to the event. In the scenario mentioned above, God assigned an integer to each year that will come to pass. In such a case, Dave must satisfy at least two conditions if he is to accomplish T: (i) count a set of years that can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers, and (ii) for each year that elapses, count the particular negative integer that God has independently assigned to it. According to CC, however, Dave is supposed to be able to accomplish T by satisfying (i) alone. But we have just seen that he must accomplish (ii) as well. Therefore, being able to place the events of the past into a one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers does not guarantee that the counter has finished the task of counting all the negative integers. And given that this scenario is epistemically possible CC is undercut. But recall that CC is Craig’s rationale for (3). Thus, (3) is undercut.12 Suppose, though, that the objections above can be answered, and that the past should turn out to be finite, in that there is a first, finite interval of time. Would that show that the universe, in the sense of all material reality, began to exist in the relevant sense? No. For standard arguments for a finite past are compatible with an eternal universe. For as mentioned earlier, there are models of the universe according to which it is a timeless, temporally finite, four-dimensional “block.” But on such models, the universe has no temporal beginning (in the sense of genuine temporal becoming), although it may have a first, finite temporal interval. And as even Craig has granted, such models of the universe don’t require an efficient cause of their origination.13 11 This

counterexample is Tony Roy’s (personal communication). related criticism, see Morriston (1999, 2002b). For other criticisms of this argument and other arguments against the possibility of traversing actual infinites, see, e.g., the references in fn. 6, as well as Leon (2011) and Cohen (2015). 13 Craig and Sinclair (2009, 124). 12 For

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In any case, the existence of a first moment of time does not entail the origination of the universe ex nihilo. For as I pointed out above, a first moment of time is compatible with a timeless material “stuff” from which the temporal universe arose. Granted, we may not be acquainted with timeless material “stuff,” but by the same token, neither are we acquainted with a timeless personal efficient cause.14 Therefore, even if the arguments for a finite past should turn out to succeed, the preceding points, when combined with the evidence for PMC, would provide pressure to accept the origination of a temporal beginning from a timeless material cause. Furthermore, there are conceptual concerns with the rival theistic hypothesis of a timeless personal cause of a universe with a beginning. For if an omnipotent God’s willing of the universe is sufficient for bringing about its existence (which, on orthodox views of the theistic god, it is), then the universe should be as old as God’s willing it. But if we suppose that God is timeless sans creation, then given his omniscience, there was no change in God in this state. But if not, then it appears that his willing of the universe must be eternal, in which case the universe should also be eternal, which contradicts the arguments for a finite past.15 What might a theist say in reply to the previous argument? One thing one might say is that God’s willing the universe is sufficient to bring it about. Thus, one might distinguish between God’s deciding to create a universe and his carrying out that decision. This distinction has a good deal of plausibility, as it appears to apply to at least some actions of human persons. Such a distinction arises in three main types of case: When you do not yet know what you will decide to do; when a decision the time for carrying out your decision has not yet arrived; and when you have weakness of will that (at least temporarily) prevents you from carrying out your decision. The problem, however, is that the analogy breaks down, for none of these conditions apply to the type of God in play. God is supposed to be omniscient, and thus, presumably, always knew what he would do; God is in a timeless state “when” he both intends and undertakes to create, and thus, there is no room for a temporal delay in creating; and God is omnipotent and morally perfect, and thus can’t succumb to weakness of will. If that’s right, then appeal to

14 Cf.

Morriston (2000, 2002b, c, d).

15 Ibid.

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the distinction between deciding and carrying out one’s decision won’t block the problem raised above.16 Perhaps some theists will reply that God is a necessary, but not a sufficient, cause of the origination of the universe. But then it’s not clear what sense can be made of his omnipotence. It’s also not clear why a similar account can’t apply to non-personal causes of the universe’s origin. Relatedly, perhaps some theists will reply that God is a probabilistic cause. But then, again, it’s not clear why similar accounts can’t apply to non-personal causes of the universe’s origin.17,18 Let me wrap up this section by stepping back and panning out a bit on our perspective of the issues at hand. Thus, let’s consider the competing naturalistic and theistic hypotheses about the origin of the universe (assuming for the sake of argument that the past is finite) in terms of causes. Leaving aside formal and final causes, there appear to be four possible types of scenario: i. Both an efficient cause and a material cause. ii. An efficient cause without a material cause. iii. A material cause without an efficient cause. iv. Neither an efficient nor a material cause. Prima facie, (i) is the most natural to assume as a starting point, as it comports well with, and does the least violence to, what we already have reason to believe. By contrast, one might think that (iv) does the most violence to what we already have reason to believe about how the world works, and so is the position of last resort. However, it should be remembered that (iv) is unobjectionable if the universe is a four-dimensional block of some sort, and of course, many scientists and philosophers think that ours is such a universe. It should also be remembered (from our discussion in Chapter 3) that the epistemic credentials for both PMC and the more general principle, ex nihilo nihil fit, stand or fall together, in which case rejecting PMC would commit one to allowing for universes popping into existence without any cause whatsoever.

16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 For other arguments to the conclusion that naturalistic accounts of the origin of the universe fare at least as well as theistic accounts, see Oppy (2009, 2010, 2013a, b).

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What about (ii)? We’ve seen that some philosophers have argued that (ii) is the most plausible, on the grounds that there are good a priori and scientific arguments for a finite past. However, as I’ve tried to indicate, it’s not at all clear that such arguments show this to be the case. I’ve also tried to indicate that such arguments, even if successful, fail to show that a finite past entails (or even makes probable) the hypothesis that the universe had an origination ex nihilo. Now to the previous point, one might reply that a purely naturalistic quiescent universe can be ruled out on the grounds that it would be in a state of absolute rest, from which no event could arise (barring supernatural intervention). However, we’ve seen above that a similar worry arises for the hypothesis of the creation of the universe by a God who is quiescent prior to the creation of the universe. We’ve also seen that hypotheses involving probabilistic causes of the universe, as well as ­necessary-but-not-sufficient causes, are equally available to the theist and the naturalist. If so, then neither the theistic hypothesis nor the quiescent naturalistic universe hypothesis has a clear epistemic advantage over the other. Therefore, (iii) seems to be at least on an epistemic par with (ii). However, if (ii) and (iii) were the two most plausible candidates, it would seem that (iii) has an epistemic advantage over (ii). For as I argued in Chapter 3, we have strong a priori and a posteriori reasons for thinking that a version of the PMC is true, and thus that creation ex nihilo is metaphysically impossible. Indeed, it looks as though PMC provides roughly equal grounds for preferring just about any of the other candidates over (ii). However, given the prima facie oddity of a universe arising from an absolutely quiescent state, candidate (i) (i.e., matter/ energy, or its ultimate constituents, are eternal, and thus that our universe arose from prior materials) and candidate (iv) (in particular, an eternal 4D block universe) appear to have an epistemic advantage over both (ii) and (iii). A lot of ground has been covered in my assessment of the “finite age” objection to a factually or metaphysically necessary material foundation of contingent concrete reality. I had seven main things to say in reply: (i) the scientific and philosophical arguments for a beginning of the universe are unpersuasive; (ii) even if they were, they wouldn’t entail the origination of the universe ex nihilo; (iii) there are serious worries about how a universe with a finite past could arise from a timeless personal cause; (iv) relatedly, even if the arguments for a finite past and timeless cause succeed, they seem to entail a 4D block universe; (v) even if these issues can

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be resolved, similar solutions are available for naturalistic universes with a finite past arising from a timeless non-personal cause; (vi) our four case argument supports (on the basis of an analysis of theoretical costs and benefits) a temporally beginningless universe and a 4D block universe over a universe created ex nihilo; and in any case, (vii) a universe’s temporal finitude is perfectly compatible with both (factual and metaphysical) necessity and (when carefully articulated) PMC.

5  Regarding the Geometry Argument Rasmussen offers the following argument for a cause or ground or foundation of contingent concrete reality that lacks geometrical or topological properties: 1. Geometry is a geometric state. 2. Every geometric state is dependent. 3. Therefore, Geometry is dependent (1, 2). 4. Geometry cannot depend on any state featuring only things that have a geometry. 5. Geometry cannot depend on any state featuring only non-concrete (non-causal) things. 6. Therefore, Geometry depends on a state featuring at least one geometry-less concrete thing (3–5). Before raising concerns about the argument, let me start by making two preliminary remarks. First, this is an intriguing argument for a number of reasons, not least of which is the fact that if it’s sound, then it provides independent philosophical support for scientific hypotheses that posit a non-geometric or non-topological ground or foundation for physical particles. It would thereby put a restraint on what can even count as an acceptable scientific theory of the physical foundations of contingent concrete reality. The argument may ultimately succeed, but the implications of the argument mentioned above make me at least initially skeptical. Second, having said that, I should say that I’m already inclined to accept the plausibility of its conclusion prior to considering the argument’s merits. This is because such a view is already popular among the relevant community of scientists, as Rasmussen indicates in the previous chapter. There are, therefore, independent grounds for epistemic deference to a conclusion in at least the same vicinity as

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Rasmussen’s.19 However, we are here concerned with what must be the case with respect to the foundation of contingent concrete reality tout court, and not merely with what, as a matter of contingent fact, happens to be the case about physical reality. Therefore, since Rasmussen’s argument aims to address the former matter, let us turn to consider its merits. My first worry applies to premise (2). To get at the worry, suppose the most basic entities with geometry (if such there be) have their geometries of factual or metaphysical necessity. Then it’s not true that every geometric state is dependent. Now in support of (2), Rasmussen rightly points out that there is quite a bit of inductive support for the dependence of geometric states upon prior states. But unless we have consensus-supported scientific theories that rule out the epistemic possibility just sketched, worries will remain about the representativeness of our inductive sample in support of (2). Aside from particular quibbles with premise (2) of the Geometry Argument, however, perhaps my main worry is a general one, applying to just about any argument that moves from facts about apparent contingent particularity and an explicability principle to conclusions about the nature of foundational reality. So, for example, might one not say that the hypothesis of a foundational field-like entity is subject to an argument similar to the Geometry Argument? Thus, why does it have the particular nature it has, which in turn gives rise to our universe’s geometry? Indeed, the worry above seems to generalize to just about any account of ultimate reality. So, for example, won’t explicability arguments saddle Christian theism with the same concern, viz. why the deep structure of God’s nature should necessitate exactly three persons in the Godhead? In general, won’t explicability arguments equally support a required explanation for why a particular God exists rather than others, or rather than, say, an infinite hierarchy of gods? The heart of

19 It should also be mentioned that a significant number of naturalist philosophers of physics are inclined toward wave function realism, according to which the three-dimensional world of our experience is ultimately grounded in a massively higher-dimensional configuration space, where these dimensions aren’t “spatial” in any familiar sense of the word. Indeed, I myself am inclined toward such a view. On this sort of view, see, e.g., Albert (1996), Ismael and Schaffer (2016), Lewis (2004), Loewer (1996), Ney (2012, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019), and North (2013).

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the criticism is that it seems any theory must stop somewhere and say that the fundamental character is either brute or necessary, and that if it’s necessary, then the explanation of why it’s necessary (despite appearing contingent) is beyond our ability to grasp.

6   Conclusion In this chapter, I did two things. First, I provided a closer assessment of the important “finite past” objection to a factually necessary or metaphysically necessary material foundation. Recall that the core of that objection is that there is decent evidence the universe had a beginning, and that this implies that it is neither factually nor metaphysically necessary. My reply, in brief, was that the evidence for a beginning of the universe is less than persuasive, and that in any case a temporally finite universe is problematic for naturalism just in case it is problematic for theism. Second, I took a close look at Rasmussen’s intriguing Geometry Argument, which aims to show that contingent concrete reality has a non-geometric ground. I concluded that while a modally weaker version of the conclusion is persuasive on scientific grounds, it’s not clear that the argument succeeds in demonstrating that the ground of reality must be non-geometric. I then raised the worry that the same kind of reasoning involved in the Geometry Argument seems to raise problems for just about any account of the foundation of reality.

References Albert, David. 1996. “Elementary Quantum Metaphysics.” In Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, edited by J. T. Cushing, A. Stock and S. Goldstein, 277–284. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Buckareff, Andrei, and Tornin Alter, eds. 2016. Alternative Concepts of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, Yishai. 2015. “Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Philosophical Papers 44 (2): 165–187. Craig, William Lane. 1985. “Review of Time, Creation and the Continuum.” International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (3): 319–326. ———, and Quentin Smith. 1993. Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———, and William Sinclair. 2009. “The Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, 101–201. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

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Draper, Paul. 2008. “A Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, edited by Louis Pojman and Michael Rea, 5th ed., 45–50. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. ———, and J. L. Schellenberg, eds. 2017. Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ismael, Jenann, and Jonathan Schaffer. 2016. “Quantum Holism: Nonseparability as Common Ground.” Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11229-016-1201-2. Leon, Felipe. 2011. “Moreland on the Impossibility of Traversing the Infinite: A Critique.” Philo 14 (1): 32–42. ———. 2019. “Causation and Sufficient Reason: Atheism.” In Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy, edited by Joseph W. Koterski and Graham Oppy, 281–300. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference. Lewis, Peter. 2004. “Life in Configuration Space.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 713–729. Loewer, Barry. 1996. “Humean Supervenience.” Philosophical Topics 24: 101–127. Morriston, Wes. 1999. “Must the Past Have a Beginning?” Philo 2 (1): 5–19. ———. 2000. “Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?” Faith & Philosophy 17 (2): 149–169. ———. 2002a. “Craig on the Actual Infinite.” Religious Studies 38 (2): 147–166. ———. 2002b. “A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In God Matters, edited by Martin and Christopher Bernard, 95–108. New York: Longman. ———. 2002c. “Creation Ex Nihilo and the Big Bang.” Philo 5 (1): 23–33. ———. 2002d. “Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument: Reply to Craig.” Faith & Philosophy 19 (2): 233–244. ———. 2003. “Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?” Faith & Philosophy 20 (3): 288–306. ———. 2010. “Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and the Actual Infinite.” Faith & Philosophy 27 (4): 439–450. ———. 2013. “Doubts About the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In Debating Christian Theism, edited by J. P. Moreland, Chad V. Meister, and Khaldoun A. Sweis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ney, Alyssa. 2012. “The Status of Our Ordinary Three Dimensions in a Quantum Universe.” Noûs 46 (3): 525–560. ———. 2013. “Ontological Reduction and the Wave Function Ontology.” In The Wave Function: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, edited by Alyssa Ney and David Z. Albert, 168–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2015. “Fundamental Physical Ontologies and the Constraint of Empirical Coherence: A Defense of Wave Function Realism.” Synthese 192 (10): 3105–3124.

70  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON ———. 2017. “Finding the World in the Wave Function: Some Strategies for Solving the Macro-object Problem.” Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11229-017-1349-4. ———. 2019. “Locality and Wave Function Realism.” In Quantum Worlds: Perspectives on the Ontology of Quantum Mechanics, edited by Olimpia Lombardi, Sebastian Fortin, and Federico Holik. Cambridge University Press. North, Jill. 2013. “The Structure of a Quantum World.” In The Wave Function: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, edited by Alyssa Ney and David Albert, 184–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oppy, Graham. 2006. Arguing About Gods. New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2009. “Cosmological Arguments.” Noûs 43 (1): 31–48. ———. 2010. “Uncaused Beginnings.” Faith & Philosophy 27: 61–71. ———. 2013a. The Best Argument Against God. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2013b. “Ultimate Naturalistic Causal Explanations.” In The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt. Abingdon: Routledge. ———. 2014. Reinventing Philosophy of Religion: An Opinionated Introduction. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 6

Argument from Arbitrary Limits Joshua Rasmussen

1   Introduction Leon has brought to light several additional considerations that help us go deeper in our quest to comprehend the ground layer of reality. In this piece, I will build upon our conversation in four ways. First, I will clarify what I see is at stake at this stage in our inquiry. Second, I will further support why I think the foundational explanation of existence transcends material reality in view of Leon’s latest considerations. Third, I will introduce a general problem of arbitrary limits that sets a stage for additional inquiry into the nature of a supreme foundation. Finally, I will review the progress we have made together and note advances in my own thinking thanks to my interaction with Leon.

2   Clarifying the Options Given the depth of our inquiry, it will help to clarify the theories at stake with greater precision. We can divide theories of the foundation of reality into two broad categories: (i) theories on which the ultimate layer is axiologically supreme (has supreme value) and (ii) theories on which

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that layer is less than supreme.1 Supreme foundation theories are compatible with a variety of forms of theism (broadly construed), as Leon notes. Examples include classical theism, pantheism, panentheism, axiarchism, demiurgism, and Spinozism. What interests me here is the core notion of supreme value (i.e., maximal axiological height), from which other core attributes of the divine flow. The attributes I aim to tease out in our exchange are these: (i) fundamentality, (ii) self-existence (i.e., necessary existence), (iii) explanatory or causal priority over material forms, (iv) personhood, and (v) perfect goodness. So far, we have focused on (i)–(iii), leaving (iv) and (v) to be discussed in the next two sections, respectively. My observation here, which Leon has helped to bring into focus, is that (i)–(iv) are compatible with a wide range of theisms, each united by the core concept of supreme value. In this book, my central aim is to put light on the core aspects of an ultimate foundation. For this reason, I seek to separate the core theory of a supreme nature from more specific paradigms associated with divinity. This separation can help us break new ground together, rather than becoming entrenched in particular problems plaguing particular paradigms. Let me illustrate how I think the separation of ideas can lead to progress. Every theory of the foundation faces the problem of accounting for how the foundation connects to everything else. For example, some philosophers in the tradition of priority monism have suggested that fundamental reality is related to dependent reality via overlap: The fundamental layer is the whole of all things and ipso facto overlaps its dependent parts.2 That’s one idea. Here’s another, which proceeds from the opposite direction: The fundamental layer is the stuff out of which all things are ultimately made. This idea fits with Leon’s PMC because the relation of dependence is mediated via constitution (or parthood): The fundamental stuff is in dependent things. The third idea is that a basic, efficient causal relation mediates dependence. A classical depiction of this idea involves a transcendent Being that creates dependent things ex 1 There is also the option that there is no foundation—i.e., no ultimate explanation or ground of things. However, even in the case where each layer of reality is grounded in a more fundamental layer, ad infinitum, still, the entire bottomless ground would itself be ultimate and fundamental (without a transcendent explanation). Note that the total ground has no external explanation whether we treat it as an individual layer or as a plural of dependent layers. 2 Schaffer (2018).

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nihilo. We could also mix options. For example, I have recently wondered whether the propositions, and , may be made true by the same basic facts of reality. All these options are complicated by the fact that our theories of parthood, dependence, and causation open additional questions, and philosophers have not reached consensus about how to analyze any of these relations (or even if they are relations). Yet, for our purposes, we can set these complexities aside. We can separate questions about the foundation’s connection to things from questions about the nature of the foundation itself. For this reason, and for the sake of focus, I leave wide open the range of options for how fundamental reality may cause, explain, or ground dependent things. I want to be clear that in leaving open the prospect of “material” causation, I do not mean to suggest that God must be purely material in the physicists’ sense. A material cause, in Aristotle’s sense (being caused out of), is not the same as a material cause in the physicists’ sense. In fact, I will later share why I think the foundational layer has a fundamentally and irreducibly mind-like quality. On this “mind-first” theory, mentality is not a form of materiality (understood in terms of geometry). This framework still leaves open the “material causal” theory, where material forms are themselves made out of or from aspects of the underlying mental substance. In leaving that open, I do not thereby mean to imply that God might be decomposable into protons. It is also worth clarifying the relationship between naturalism and supreme foundation theories. As indicated previously, I have not said anything so far to rule out a broadly naturalistic account of the foundation (if “naturalism” is broad enough to allow for fundamentally mental objects). In fact, I consider it an advantage of supreme foundation theories that they are compatible with a naturalism construed broadly enough to allow for fundamental mentality.3 Naturalism (construed broadly) is attractive for two principled reasons: First, we have a track record of finding purely natural causes, and second, naturalism doesn’t multiply categories or causes beyond necessity. For these reasons, therefore, I favor (consider more probable) theories that maintain a broadly natural framework, other things being equal, so long as “natural” allows for fundamental mentality. 3 For

example, there is the proto-panpsychist naturalism articulated by Chalmers (1996).

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To draw out how a natural framework could work on a supreme foundation framework, suppose the ultimate layer of reality is a basic substance that has fundamental mentality. Its basic structure includes all rules of reason, which exist explanatorily prior to motions of matter. This ultimate layer may ground the visible patterns and forms by its intentional acts, which guide things along lines of order. On this picture, visible lines of order are not accidental. Instead, they flow from (or are constrained by) the invisible lines of law, which include (i) the necessary rules of reason, and (ii) contingent, intended laws (some of which are describable by “field” equations). Each event then is “natural” in the following sense: Each event alike flows within, and from, a single type of concrete substance, which grounds orderly, rational principles. Importantly, there is no need to posit a spooky, wholly “other” kind of reality beyond all that we know in ordinary experience. All is rooted (ultimately) in a rational foundation. Of course, there are other ways to conceive of a supreme foundation. Here let me just add that I see an advantage of a certain classical theistic theory that combines transcendence and immanence. God is both transcendent (in a certain sense) and immanent (in a certain sense). The foundation then transcends dependent, limited realities by being non-identical to such realities. Meanwhile, there is a wide space of conceptual possibilities for how that foundation may also be immanent in, or among, all things. This wide space of options concerning the foundation’s immanence could provide a platform for theists and atheists to work together in developing a surprisingly unified understanding of the core aspects of the foundation, even while they might tend to approach some of those aspects through different conceptual lenses.

3  The Geometry Argument Revisited Let us consider again the Geometric Argument. The purpose of the argument is to reveal a reason to think that geometric reality is not fundamental. The engine behind the argument, recall, is a principle of irrelevant differences: Differences in the details of geometry are irrelevant to the categorical difference with respect to dependence. From this principle, I infer that all geometries alike, big and small, complex and simple, are dependent. Therefore, the foundational, non-dependent layer is not geometric.

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Interestingly, Leon is sympathetic with this result. His basis is recent empirical science, which suggests that the basic nature of energy fields is explanatorily prior to geometrically situated elements, such as particles. Still, he raises some valuable concerns about the strength of my argument and its conclusion. One concern, in particular, is that without consensus-supported scientific theories that rule out the epistemic possibility of a geometric foundation in some world, one could worry that our observations of dependent geometries are not representative of all possible geometries. In other words, a ground layer may, as a matter of epistemic possibility, be geometric in nature even if the geometries we observe are not foundational. A related concern is that the Geometric Argument gives us a metaphysically necessary result that goes beyond the empirical data. The concern is reasonable: After all, we have no scientific consensus that a geometric foundation is metaphysically impossible. How could we? These concerns are valuable and instructive. I have four considerations to offer in the spirit of further construction. First, I wish to emphasize our degree of alignment in favoring a non-geometric ground. Even if alternative theories remain epistemically or metaphysically possible, it is still a significant result if the causal foundation of the actual world transcends geometric form. Although I endorse the metaphysical necessity of our shared vision (since I think that is the sober truth), even the mere actuality of a non-geometric ground is significant. In fact, my main motivation for supporting the stronger result was to reach the more modest result. My particular reason for the metaphysically stronger result is a clear reason in my mind to think the ground is actually non-geometric. Second, we may distinguish between epistemic possibility from plausibility relative to various data. It is epistemically possible that Peter van Inwagen is not climbing a tree right now, given my data. You might have different data, though. Maybe you see a van Inwagenesque figure hiking up a tree right now. In that case, given your data, it may not even be epistemically possible, let alone plausible, to think that he is not climbing a tree. Your epistemic situation depends on the data you have. Similarly, the epistemic possibility or plausibility of a nongeometric foundation may differ for those of us who have entertained the Geometric Argument, or the principle of irrelevant differences, than for the many scientists who have not. Moreover, even if a geometric foundation remains an epistemically possibility for someone, it does not thereby follow that a geometric foundation is the most plausible theory

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on the data available, including the data from both science and the Geometric Argument (both observation and reason). Third, in addition to empirical data, there is also the principle of irrelevant differences—i.e., that dependence does not turn on differences in geometric detail. It is possible that you could find this principle plausible a priori. Full disclosure: I consider the principle of irrelevant differences as having approximately the same range of a priori plausibility as any other axiom of geometry.4 To be even bolder, frankly, after much reflection on possible dependence conditions, I find myself sure that the principle is true. In any case, you do not have to share my confidence to experience at least some epistemic tug in direction of this principle of uniformity. If you do, then reason itself gives you additional support over and above what scientists generally appeal to in their theorizing about the basic elements. Fourth, there is more to say about the possibility of extrapolation via inductive inference. Consider the following data. You have not observed triangles or squares, or any other geometry, suddenly and inexplicably appear before you. Meanwhile, you regularly observe new geometries form in the context of prior conditions. Call these data, “your geometric observations.” As with any data, there are infinitely many ways to explain them. As a result, there are famous worries about how to justify any inductive inference.5 Why select one explanation over the infinitely many? Fortunately, developments in the theories of epistemic probability provide resources for progress.6 Here I will suggest how we can mark a way forward using the instrument of distinction. We can carve a distinction between competing explanations and complementary ones. To see what I mean, suppose someone hypothesizes that gravity holds in all visible galaxies. This hypothesis suffices to explain all our observations in the visible galaxies. Notice that this gravity hypothesis does not compete with the more general hypothesis that gravity also applies in all galaxies, whether detectable by us or not. In fact, the more general hypothesis predicts the

4 As

before, I am assuming the parallel postulate is implicitly about non-curved space. include Hume’s riddle of induction and Goodman’s new riddle. See Vickers (2014). 6 Ward (2012), for example, provides a Bayesian solution to Goodman’s new riddle of induction. 5 Examples

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data explained by the more specific one. For that very reason, all the data in support of the specific one also support the general one (assuming its negation doesn’t more strongly predict the data). By the same reasoning, the data in support of Leon’s PMC also support general principles that predict the same data, including the principle that geometric states cannot exist without a prior explanation or condition. In other words, evidence for PMC is also evidence for a geometric-less foundation. To be clear, there may be independent reasons to doubt a general principle. My point here is just that in the absence of counter-reasons, the evidence for the more complex, local principle is also evidence for the simpler, more general principle. And, I don’t see that we have any evidence against the uniformity principle in play. Since these waters are deep, I want to say more about the connection between local principles and the deeper, universal principle in play. Suppose, for sake of argument, that geometries can lack a prior condition. For example, suppose that the ground of reality instantiates an unexplained and ungrounded spatial-temporal geometry G. A question then arises: What explains the persistent truth of the more specific or local principles? Take, for example, this principle: No duplicates or remote neighbors of G instantiate themselves on their own in front of anyone. Although the principle of irrelevant difference may be one way to secure the inference from the local principles to the broader one, there is another, independent path via extrapolation. Specifically: Any data that support a local principle also support simpler, more general principles that predict all the data predicted by the local principle. There is no competition. What about cases where the proposed principles compete? For example, take the hypothesis that gravity applies only in the past and present. This “only” hypothesis competes with the more general hypothesis that gravity will also continue to hold in the future. Since these hypotheses are empirically equivalent (no one has observed what has yet to be), do we then have a stalemate? We do not. The reason is that the historical data is itself evidence against a component of the “only” hypothesis. To hammer down why, notice that we can break apart the “only” hypothesis into component parts: (i) that gravity holds up to now, and (ii) that gravity doesn’t hold in the future. The problem is that any evidence for (i) is also evidence against (ii), for the evidence for (i) also supports the more general principle that gravity always holds. The root of the problem with

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the “only” hypothesis is that there is evidential tension between its component parts.7,8 In precisely the same way, the geometric observations are evidence for all theories that predict those same observations, including (and especially) the simple theory that all geometric states alike are dependent. Therefore, in addition to the contemporary scientific theory of fields, we have two more witnesses who testify to a non-geometric foundation: (i) the principle of irrelevant differences and (ii) undefeated extrapolation. Having said all that, there remains the worry (possibly Leon’s main worry) that the Geometric Argument generalizes in an untoward way. Leon asks, “Might one not say that the hypothesis of a foundational field-like entity is subject to an argument similar to the Geometry Argument?” He goes on to suggest that any theory of the foundation may be susceptible to a similar argument from irrelevant differences. This suggestion is extremely important and astute, and therefore I shall devote the next section to introducing a response that will set the stage for upcoming stages of our investigation.

4  The General Problem of Arbitrary Limits The Geometric Argument inspires a wider inquiry into a family of ­explanation-based arguments, including certain of the more recent arguments on grounding.9 To see how the Geometric Argument fits into this wider range of arguments, consider the following schema: 1. There is a “maximal” T-type state M, which consists of all other T-type states. 2. Every state of T-type state is dependent. 3. Therefore, M is dependent (1, 2). 7 Thanks to Dustin Crummett for helping me weed out infelicities from a previous iteration of this section. Any remaining infelicities are my fault. 8 Similar remarks may apply to Goodman’s riddle of induction involving “grue” and “bleen” on the assumption that propositions are divisible into more basic parts or constituents. For a defense of this assumption, see Rasmussen (2013, pp. 85–119). 9 On the grounding side, I have in mind, for example, Schaffer’s arguments for an explanatory foundation (in terms of grounding) that mereologically overlaps every concrete thing. See Schaffer (2018).

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4. M cannot depend on any state featuring only T-type things. 5. M cannot depend on any state featuring only non-concrete (noncausal) things. 6. Therefore, M depends on a state featuring at least one T-less, concrete thing (3–5). The Geometric Argument is an instance of this schema, where T = geometric state. In view of the general structure of the Geometric Argument, one may worry that this general style of reasoning is overly far-reaching. After all, there are many instances of the above schema—infinitely many! Moreover, we can demonstrate that at least one instance is unsound. Here is how. Let T be the general type, being something.10 Then the conclusion is that there is a state featuring something that is not something—a contradiction. Therefore, there is at least one unsound instance of the general schema. But then how can we be sure which, if any, instances are sound? To echo Leon’s concern, every theory of the foundation is committed to inexplicable primitives. So, why prefer to locate bruteness one place rather than another? I have two answers to offer. First, even if we have no general answer about where to locate bruteness, still, we can see that certain principles of dependence are plausible by the evidence we do have. Take, for example, this principle: coffee mugs, and groups of them, depend on prior conditions. If we plug that principle into the general argument schema above, we get an argument for an intriguing conclusion: The ultimate foundation of coffee mugs is not itself a coffee mug (at least, not essentially). This coffee mug argument is sound! The point here is that even if some instances of the general argument schema are unsound, it does not follow that none are plausibly sound. The principles do not stand or fall together, and neither do the arguments. In particular, the principles of dependence at work in the Geometric Argument could be true (and clearly so) even if other principles are not. After all, we could remain confident that a coffee mug, for example, is dependent, even if we know that something else (e.g., totality of reality) depends on nothing. To be sure, if we had independent

10 As before, nominalists may give a nominalist translation from type talk to talk of extensions of predicates.

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evidence against a candidate principle, that evidence may indeed defeat that principle. But we don’t have any evidence on the table against the dependence principle applied to geometric states. In fact, a salient advantage of the principle is that it evades the most troublesome candidate exceptions posed against certain other principles of explanation.11 My second response to the generalization worry is more enterprising: I propose a principled account of where to locate bruteness. My account grows out of what I call the problem of arbitrary limits. To illustrate the problem, suppose the spatiotemporal foundation of reality happens to instantiate the spatiotemporal geometry of a large alligator across time. Although this scenario is logically consistent, it exhibits features that are arbitrary in a way that call out for a deeper explanation. Arbitrariness of the foundation is problematic because no deeper explanation for the most foundational attributes is possible in principle. The principle of irrelevant differences exacerbates this problem because it generalizes to apply to any difference in limit of any kind. For example, if the foundational layer can produce up to 10^80 + 49 particles and no more, then this particular upper-limit is plainly irrelevant to any account of how such a state could be non-dependent. Again, there cannot be a deeper explanation of the fundamental attributes of the foundation, for they are fundamental. Suppose, by contrast, that the foundation, in its most basic nature, is supreme in value. Then its fundamental nature lacks arbitrary limits. It is edgeless: without limits, boundaries, or borders. Instead, it is unbounded or non-degreed, along all its basic aspects. On this picture, we have an account of how something could fail to be dependent in nature: The ultimate foundation lacks arbitrary limits that would otherwise be relevantly similar to the sorts of things known to be dependent.12 There are of course many considerations to weigh at this level of inquiry. My presentation so far is just an introduction to a method for probing the foundation. I propose we shave off arbitrary limits wherever we can. To my mind, the basic picture that reality bottoms out in a foundation that lacks arbitrary limits is philosophically fruitful. It solves the

11 I am thinking in particular of the cases that threaten us with explanatory loops or modal collapse. See, for example, Van Inwagen (1983), Rowe (1998), and Ross (1969). 12 Weaver and I develop this argument in “Why is there anything?” (forthcoming).

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problem of arbitrary limits. And, as I hope to develop later, minimizing arbitrariness empowers a simple and unified explanation of many general phenomenon “above” the foundation (such as minds, morals, and matter itself). Besides all this, a non-arbitrary foundation removes less intrinsically probable theories that imply arbitrary, unexplained limits.13 I think these results could be a gift to atheists who are rightly skeptical of the existence of arbitrary, ad hoc deities. Shave off the deities. Then, by the same light, shave off other arbitrary, ad hoc complexities in the foundation. If we must have bruteness, locate bruteness in the least arbitrary foundation. My main concern at this stage has been to address the generalization worry. My proposal, then, is this: We may generalize the Geometry Argument as far as differences in details are irrelevant to a difference in dependence. If that is correct, then generalization does not damage the Geometric Argument. Rather, it extends its light.

5  Review of Progress I will close this section by listing some significant results that have emerged in the course of our exchange thus far. While there remain significant questions and points of difference between Leon and me to explore, here are five apparent points of general alignment: 1. Some arguments face the problem of modal skepticism. To reach a necessary foundation, then, we must be careful to step along paths that do not move through dark modal landscapes. 2. It seems we agree that there is a causal or explanatory foundation, of some sort. 3. The foundation is “necessary” in at least some sense (leaving open whether it is factually or metaphysically necessary).

13 Thus, for example, if a Trinitarian theory of the divine realm implies inexplicable arbitrariness with respect to the number of divine persons (as Leon hints), then a more monistic theory should be preferred. Alternatively, as noted in my previous chapter, a Trinitarian could seek to have an explanation of the divine persons in terms of more basic features of totality of the ground. Cf. Swinburne (1994) (on an explanation in terms of the requirements of maximal love).

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4. One who seeks a path to a finitely old universe must find a way through various obstacles (which I shall set aside for sake of focus).14 5. There is at least some reason (e.g., scientific) to think the foundation transcends geometric form. I hope that the considerations I have offered in this chapter further illuminate the last result. I would like to close by noting a point of progress. My conversations with Professor Leon have helped bring to light how arguments for a specific account of creation ex nihilo have a certain disadvantage compared with arguments that leave this account open. In particular, the empirical evidence that supports the causal principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause also supports a principle of material causation on which creation ex nihilo is impossible! This result accords with my observation that a significant objection to theism grows out of a conception of God as a separate (“super-natural”?) type of entity wholly beyond from the natural order. Although I do think there is a sense of the term “natural” (as fundamentally mindless) on which God transcends the natural, I appreciate the general track-record argument on behalf of a causal-order on which ontological categories are not multiplied beyond necessity.15 This exchange makes clearer the value of developing a causal-explanatory foundation that is as “natural,” inclusive, and parsimonious as reason and empirical science will allow.

References Chalmers, David. 1996. “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 4: 3–46. Oppy, Graham. 2009. “Cosmological Arguments.” Nous 43: 31–48. Rasmussen, Joshua. 2013. Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

14 I

do not claim that the obstacles are unavoidable, or that there is not more to say. There is certainly more to explore on that path. Rather than work in those weeds, however, my hope in this exchange is to highlight another path, which appears to me to be more ontologically inclusive. 15 See,

for example, Oppy (2009).

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Ross, James. 1969. Philosophical Theology. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Rowe, William L. 1998. The Cosmological Argument. New York: Fordham University Press. Schaffer, Jonathan. 2018. “Monism.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/. Swinburne, Richard. 1994. The Christian God. Clarendon: Oxford University Press. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vickers, John. 2014. “The Problem of Induction.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/. Ward, Barry. 2012. “Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction.” The Philosophical Quarterly 62: 365–385.

CHAPTER 7

Varieties of Naturalism Felipe Leon

1   Introduction In the previous chapter, Rasmussen provides helpful clarifications of his Geometry Argument. He also further fleshes out a version of theism that serves as the explanatory hypothesis for the arguments he has defended so far. In this chapter, I will further assess Rasmussen’s Geometry Argument. I will then sketch an account of the varieties of naturalism. This account will serve three main purposes as we transition from the first section of the book to the remaining two: (i) clarifying the largescale hypotheses open to the naturalist; (ii) illuminating the potential for widespread agreement between theists and naturalists; and (iii) providing a framework by which to better evaluate the evidence for theism and for naturalism. Finally, I will summarize the points of agreement and difference between us.

2  The Geometry Argument Again In the previous chapter, Rasmussen made many valuable points in further clarifying his Geometry Argument for a non-geometric ground of contingent concrete reality. Let me here re-affirm my inclination to agree with his conclusion, at least when restricted to the actual world. Given the aim of our discussion, our agreement about this point is what is © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_7

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crucial. However, in the interest of evaluating the merits of Rasmussen’s argument for the modally stronger conclusion about what our foundation must be like, let me push my questions and concerns for his Geometry Argument a bit further. My first concern pertains to the metaphysical (and religious) significance of the Geometry Argument’s conclusion. I’ll get at this concern by means of sketching the following epistemically possible scenario. Thus, consider a very small space-time manifold—say, three meters in diameter— where this manifold comprises one homogenous, indivisible object with the geometry of a sphere. Suppose further that the stuff composing this object—suppose, say, that it’s a relativistic quantum field or set of quantum fields—has its nature of metaphysical necessity, which in turn necessitates the total geometry of the space-time manifold. Finally, suppose this constitutive stuff is eternal and metaphysically necessary. Then the geometry of space-time is also eternal and metaphysically necessary. In the scenario above, then, the geometry of space-time is dependent upon something distinct from it—viz., the stuff of which it’s composed. However, that something is yet wholly immanent and internal to the object making up the geometry of space-time. My worry, then, is that the epistemically possible scenario depicted above gives us a reason to curb our enthusiasm about the “geometry-less concrete object” of Rasmussen’s Geometry Argument. In particular, it gives us reason to question whether this object must a transcendent, “external” ground. To be clear, I make no claim about the plausibility of the scenario sketched above.1 Rather, my worry is just that to the extent that the Geometry Argument is meant to provide, as it were, armchair evidence for the ultimate nature and structure of foundational reality, then to the extent that the present scenario can’t be ruled out from the armchair, it poses a challenge to the conclusion’s significance (at least for the purposes of our discussion). My main worry about the Geometry Argument, as Rasmussen rightly surmises, is that the general style of reasoning involved in the argument threatens to generalize to just about any account of the nature of foundational reality, including theistic accounts. In reply, Rasmussen 1 For a non-fanciful, scientifically informed argument that foundational material reality has tightly circumscribed, non-arbitrary, metaphysically necessary constraints, see McKenzie (2017).

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argues for a principled distinction between acceptable and unacceptable accounts of foundational reality by means of a defeasible principle regarding arbitrary limits. According to this principle, theories that involve limits at the foundations—in particular, limits that are arbitrary in a way that cries out for further explanation—are less plausible than those that are not. Call this the no arbitrary limits principle. Given the no-arbitrary-limits principle, theories that entail that the foundation of concrete reality lacks limits or boundaries are more plausible than those that have them. In reply, let me start out with a conciliatory point by saying that while I’m not as confident about the suggested means of reaching the proposed picture of fundamental concrete reality, perhaps my conclusions aren’t so far off from Rasmussen’s, although I’ve reached them by a different route. For in some moods, I’m likewise inclined to think that ultimate reality might well be “maximal” or “unlimited” in some sense (more on this in subsequent sections of the book). But in the spirit of inquiry, I’ll raise some concerns about Rasmussen’s reply. My first concern here has to do with the no arbitrary limits principle. At least three questions arise when evaluating it: (i) What makes a limit arbitrary in a way that cries out for further explanation? (ii) Given an answer to (i), what grounds might there be for accepting the no arbitrary limits principle? (iii) Given answers to (i) and (ii), does the no arbitrary limits principle provide a good reason to think the ultimate foundation of reality is without limits or boundaries? Let’s begin with (i) and (ii). Rasmussen aims to go some way toward addressing these by means of a thought experiment, according to which the universe’s geometry resembles that of a large alligator across time. He concludes that such a universe has spatial limits that are unusual in a way that cries out for explanation. What to make of Rasmussen’s thought experiment? Surely he is right to think that a universe having the geometry of a giant alligator is arbitrary in a way that cries out for explanation. However, one might worry that what’s driving the intuition about the need for an explanation in this case is not merely that such a universe has boundaries or limits, but rather that its particular shape bears the marks of contrivance.

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For suppose instead we consider a universe having a geometry that doesn’t bear the marks of contrivance—it just looks, to all the world, like an amorphous blob, its shape drawn at random, as it were, from the platonic space of possible geometries. Then my intuition that its shape cries out for explanation evaporates. The preceding discussion provides an answer to questions (i) and (ii) above. The thought experiment provides an initial reason for thinking that objects have limits that are arbitrary in a way that cries out for an explanation if they bear the marks of contrivance. However, given these answers to (i) and (ii), we fail to get an affirmative answer to (iii) unless we have grounds for thinking our universe has limits that bear the marks of contrivance. So far, however, we have not seen grounds for thinking so. Now it’s of course doubtful that Rasmussen had in mind a “contrivance” gloss on his no arbitrary limits principle; the idea is supposed to be that any hypothesis that involves limits or boundaries is thereby arbitrary (pending a good reason to think otherwise). But we’ve seen that the alligator-shaped universe thought experiment does not support that hypothesis.2 Another worry I have about the problem of arbitrary limits is that it seems to assume that if foundational reality has seemingly arbitrary limits (finite particularity), then this is a contingent fact about it. My worry here stems from my skepticism about modal claims remote from ordinary experience. For it seems to me that given moderate modal skepticism, we have no reason to think it improbable that foundational reality has its finite particularity of metaphysical necessity. But if it should turn out to be so, then its limits aren’t arbitrary or inexplicable—although the necessity of its own finite particularity would only be knowable, if knowable at all, a posteriori. But might it not turn out, for all we know, that the latter is the case? It seems we can push the point further. For one could argue that in our experience, all of the seemingly endless quantity and variety of entities we’ve observed are explained in terms of entities with finite particularity; therefore, probably all entities whatsoever have finite particularity—including foundational reality. Perhaps that’s a satisfactory stopping point for many. But if one is also inclined to think all finite 2 For an important case for something in the neighborhood of Rasmussen’s no arbitrary limits principle, see Swinburne (2004). For important criticisms of it, see Gwiazda (2009a, b, 2010).

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particularity must have an explanation, then one could go further and reason that (on the hypothesis that the finite particularity in the case at hand is foundational) the explanation can’t be external to the object. And if so, then the explanation must be internal to it and (perhaps) metaphysically necessary. Another worry is that the no arbitrary limits principle would seem to screen out many theistic hypotheses, no less than many naturalistic ones. Thus, recall the trinity problem raised in Chapter 5. If Trinitarian accounts of ultimate reality are acceptable, then they threaten to undermine the grounds against finite particularity that is contingent and brute. They also threaten to undermine the grounds against foundational finite particularity that has its nature of necessity, despite appearing contingent. Now in the previous chapter, Rasmussen gestured to Swinburne’s (1994) a priori argument for trinity monotheism as an illustration of how one might accept a principle against arbitrary limits while granting limits or particularity at the metaphysical ground floor (viz., in God’s nature). I have a few things to say in reply. First, many Trinitarians—perhaps most—reject Swinburne’s argument as unpersuasive,3 and if history is any guide, the prospects aren’t promising for a future a priori argument for Trinitarianism that persuades many. Second, many Trinitarians argue that Swinburne’s social Trinitarianism is heretical.4 Although this historical fact may not make a difference philosophically, it should be noted that many theists who are interested in volumes of this sort are orthodox Christians, and they might therefore find theological grounds for rejecting the argument. Third, Swinburne’s argument crucially involves creation of the other two members of the trinity ex nihilo, but as I have argued (and as Rasmussen has granted arguendo), creation ex nihilo is metaphysically impossible. But if these things are so, then absent other explanations for an exception to the no arbitrary limits principle, they provide non-trivial grounds for Trinitarian theists to reject it. Given that most theistic analytic philosophers of religion are Trinitarians, this might be a significant drawback from a dialectical point of view. 3 Cf. Leftow (1999), Clark (1996), Alston (1997), Howard-Snyder (2003), and Davidson (2016). 4 See, e.g., Howard-Snyder (2016) for a powerful argument that Swinburne’s trinitarianism is heretical, and indeed a version of polytheism, and thereby fundamentally incompatible with Christianity.

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Finally, the problem of arbitrary limits and finite particularity for theism doesn’t end with Trinitarianism; similar concerns apply to God’s nature, preference structure, character, and choices. Thus, suppose we were to conclude that the God of theism is the ultimate foundation of contingent concrete reality. Why this particular God, with his particular attributes and preference structure, rather than some other? Furthermore, why a person? The hypothesis of a personal ground of being exhibits particularity and would thus seem to fall prey to the gloss on the no arbitrary limits principle. We can keep going: Why did God create this particular universe, with these particular laws, entities, and evolutionary history, rather than some other? If we say it’s because of a radically free choice, then his choice is contingent, and yet lacking a deeper, complete explanation. On the other hand, if we say that it’s because God’s choice for our universe follows from his preference structure, then this latter feature of him is either contingent or necessary. If we say the former, then, again, it’s contingent, and yet lacking a deeper explanation, thereby falling prey to the no arbitrary limits principle. But if we say the latter, then a similar explanation is open to the naturalist: it’s metaphysically necessary, but knowable only a posteriori (if knowable at all). In light of these considerations, there are at least some grounds for pause regarding the no arbitrary limits principle.

3  The Varieties of Naturalism In Chapter 6, Rasmussen provided a nice sketch of an account of theism that is compatible with a requirement that things have material causes. In doing so, he reminds us that there are varieties of theism outside of those narrowly prescribed boundaries assumed in other discussions about the existence and nature of God. And because of this, we see that from the fact (if it is a fact) that a particular argument or line of evidence rules out a particular form of theism, it doesn’t follow that theism simpliciter is ruled out. For the purposes of our discussion, it will prove worthwhile to indicate that the same is true of naturalism: A set of arguments might rule out a particular version of naturalism, while other versions remain viable. Many theistic critiques of naturalism share a common basic strategy: point to a piece of data (e.g., abstract objects, morality, consciousness, the apparent fine-tuning of the universe, the apparent contingency of the

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universe, etc.), propose that it doesn’t fit within the naturalist’s sparse ontology, and then argue that the data is better explained on the hypothesis of theism. Call this form of argumentation The Common Strategy. What to make of arguments that instantiate the Common Strategy? Instead of evaluating particular instances of this strategy (i.e., evaluating this or that theistic argument from morality, or consciousness, or cosmic fine-tuning, etc.), I’d like to raise a worry about the general line of reasoning such arguments take, as outlined above. In order to do so, I’ll need to spend some time making some basic distinctions. This in turn will provide a framework for evaluating such arguments as our discussion develops in later chapters. There are several versions of naturalism. Naturalists share in common the view that the natural world is all there is. However, naturalists differ in how they define “the natural world.” Now there are at least three broad ways of characterizing the natural world, and thus, there are at least three kinds of naturalists. Let’s call them conservatives, moderates, and liberals. Conservative naturalists are straight physicalists—nothing exists but the physical, and the physical is characterized by all and only the properties of a completed physics (and perhaps chemistry, if chemistry cannot be reduced to physics). By contrast, moderate naturalists differ from conservative naturalists in that they expand their conception of the natural world so as to include abstract objects (e.g., propositions, properties, possible worlds, etc.). Finally, liberal naturalists differ from moderates and conservatives in that they not only admit into their ontology of the natural world the abstracta of the moderates, but they also allow for concreta that have more properties and powers than the conservatives and moderates allow. Examples of liberal naturalism include Spinozism and Russellian monism (also known as panprotopsychism).5 Since liberal forms of naturalism are no doubt the least familiar, perhaps it will help to sketch one such account. David Chalmers’ version of contemporary liberal naturalism is representative, so I’ll sketch his version (call it “CLN”):

5 Perhaps the most famous past Liberal naturalist was Spinoza, but more recent Liberal Naturalists include Torin Alter (2016), David Chalmers (1996), Philip Goff (2017), Yujin Nagasawa (cf. Nagasawa and Wager (2017)), Derk Pereboom (2011), Bertrand Russell (1927), Galen Strawson (2006, 2008), and Daniel Stoljar (2001, 2006). For a recent collection of papers defending liberal naturalism, see, e.g., Alter and Nagasawa (2015).

92  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON (CLN) the world of concrete objects is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenal or protophenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes.6

The preceding threefold categorization of naturalism makes room for at least two basic approaches a naturalist can take to explaining the relevant data. According to the first, one keeps one’s ontology sparse by adopting (say) conservative naturalism and then tries to explain all the data in terms of the types of entities in that limited ontology. Furthermore, if something doesn’t fall within the basic or foundational elements within that ontology, then one either reduces it to entities already posited in that ontology or eliminates it—i.e., one says that such entities aren’t real. Call this approach, The Shoehorn Approach. Now if naturalism were limited to conservative naturalism, the Shoehorn Approach would be the naturalist’s only option. But as we have seen above, naturalists are not so limited—moderate and liberal forms of naturalism are live possibilities as well. This fact about the varieties of naturalism leaves room for a second approach to explanation, which I will call The Base-Expanding Approach. The Base-Expanding Approach starts out in the same way as the Shoehorn Approach: begin with a sparse ontology, and then try to explain all the data in terms of it. However, the Base-Expanding Approach diverges from the Shoehorn Approach when it comes to entities that don’t seem to fit one’s ontology: If the data to be explained don’t fit well within a sparse naturalistic ontology, then one need not reduce or eliminate them. Rather, one can expand one’s ontology. So, for example, a naturalist might start out tentatively adopting conservative naturalism as a working hypothesis, and then find that she can’t reduce abstract objects to such a sparse ontology; nor can she plausibly eliminate them. She may then broaden her ontology by allowing for abstract objects, thereby moving from conservative to moderate naturalism. And if she can’t reduce or eliminate the mental, she may then broaden her ontology further, from moderate to liberal naturalism. In light of the preceding, we can now provide a broad characterization of the ontologies and explanatory strategies available to naturalists. 6 An alternative version of CLN: The one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but the physical and mental are composed of it.

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Thus, naturalists have available to them at least three basic ontologies: conservative, moderate, and liberal. Conservatives are straight physicalists; moderates go further by adding abstract objects to the ontology of conservative naturalism; and liberals go further than both conservatives and moderates by positing a richer nature to concrete objects by allowing representational or proto-representational properties to be part of the essence of matter. Furthermore, given that naturalists aren’t limited to conservative naturalism, they have two basic explanatory approaches available to them: the Shoehorning Approach and the Base-Expanding Approach. Shoehorners aim to reduce all phenomena they can to the fundamental elements of the naturalistic ontology they’ve adopted, and eliminate all else that they cannot so reduce. Base-Expanders, by contrast, add more elements to their fundamental ontology when they cannot reduce or plausibly eliminate a given phenomenon to their fundamental ontology. In light of our framework, we are in a better position to evaluate the Common Strategy outlined at the beginning of our discussion. First of all, we see that those who adopt it fail to appreciate that naturalists need not adopt conservative naturalism. And second, because of this, they fail to appreciate that naturalists need not adopt the Shoehorning Approach to explanation. Therefore, pending good arguments against other versions of naturalism and against the Base-Expanding Approach, arguments that adopt the Common Strategy are bound to fail. Perhaps it’s helpful to see the framework applied. At least two contemporary naturalists exemplify the success of the Base-Expanding Approach in their work, thereby showing the inadequacy of the Common Strategy: David Chalmers and Eric Wielenberg. Case 1: Erik Wielenberg, Moderate Naturalism, and the Theistic Argument from Morality Erik Wielenberg’s version of moderate naturalism7 exposes a weakness in a number of contemporary moral arguments for theism, the latter of which exemplify the Common Strategy. The argument states that the naturalist is limited to the ontology of conservative naturalism, and that the data of moral facts cannot be shoehorned into such a sparse

7 Cf.

Wielenberg (2009, 2014).

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ontology; nor can it be plausibly eliminated. By contrast, theism can, with God as the ground of moral facts. Therefore, the data of moral facts is best explained in terms of theism and not naturalism.8 Wielenberg agrees that moral facts cannot be adequately reduced to the ontology of conservative naturalism; he also agrees that they cannot be plausibly eliminated. However, he also thinks there are good reasons to reject theism. He therefore feels pressure to expand the base of his ontology and move from conservative to moderate naturalism. Thus, he posits abstract objects such as properties and states of affairs. These abstract objects ground the necessity of basic moral truths, such as that it’s wrong to cause a person or animal significant pain without a sufficient reason for doing so. And given that this view is epistemically possible, standard theistic arguments from morality are thereby undercut.9 Case 2: David Chalmers, Liberal Naturalism, and Theistic Arguments from Consciousness David Chalmers’ version of liberal naturalism10 exposes a weakness in a number of contemporary arguments from consciousness to theism, the latter of which also exemplify the Common Strategy. Arguments of this sort assert that the naturalist is limited to the ontology of conservative naturalism, and that the data of phenomenal consciousness cannot be shoehorned into such a sparse ontology; nor can it be plausibly eliminated. By contrast, theism can accommodate them via its substance dualist ontology. Therefore, the data of phenomenal consciousness is best explained in terms of theism and not naturalism.11 Chalmers agrees that the data of phenomenal consciousness cannot be adequately reduced by means of the sparse ontology of conservative naturalism. He also rejects the strategy of eliminating the data, as the Churchlands do. However, he also finds theism implausible. He therefore opts for the Base-Expanding Approach, thus moving from 8 For a recent argument in this vicinity, see, e.g., Baggett and Walls (2016). For an overview of moral arguments for theism, see Evans (2018). 9 Either (i) Wielenberg (2009, 2014), or (since these were just cited on the previous page) (ii) Wielenberg op. cit. 10 Cf. Chalmers (1996). 11 For a recent argument in this vicinity, see, e.g., Moreland (2008).

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conservative to liberal naturalism. Thus, he grants that consciousness cannot be squeezed out of the properties of objects listed in physics and chemistry textbooks, and thus posits that they must therefore have more properties as a part of their essences—proto-phenomenal or protorepresentational properties.12 This account allows that simpler concrete objects aren’t conscious, but it also entails that when a complex collection of such objects exists and is suitably arranged, it necessarily exemplifies consciousness. But if this account of the origin of phenomenal consciousness is epistemically possible, then the theistic argument from consciousness to theism is undercut. What went wrong with the theistic arguments above? In both cases, the flaw was not with something particular to either argument. Rather, the problem was with the Common Strategy exemplified by both arguments. Thus, both arguments assumed that the naturalist was limited to conservative naturalism, and thus that the naturalist was stuck with the Shoehorn Approach to explaining the relevant data (moral facts in the first case, phenomenal consciousness in the second). But we saw that both assumptions were false: Moderate and liberal versions of naturalism are prima facie epistemically possible, in which case Wielenberg and Chalmers were free to opt for the Base-Expanding Approach to explanation: Wielenberg broadened his ontology to adopt moderate naturalism, thereby allowing him to account for necessary truths about morality within a naturalist framework, and Chalmers broadened his ontology to adopt liberal naturalism, thereby allowing him to account for phenomenal consciousness within a naturalist framework.

4   Potential Points of Agreement In light of both the previous section and Rasmussen’s previous chapters, we see that there is tremendous potential for much overlap between theistic and naturalistic worldviews. Both are compatible with a factually or metaphysically necessary foundation of contingent concrete reality. Both are compatible with abstract objects. Both are compatible with irreducible moral values. Both are compatible with irreducibly mental (or proto-mental) phenomena. And both are compatible with objective human purpose and meaning.

12 Op.

cit.

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The tremendous potential for striking places of agreement between theism and naturalism is both encouraging and frustrating. From a psychological and sociological point of view, it’s encouraging, as it helps the theist and the naturalist appreciate each other by seeing how much they have in common. But from an epistemological point of view it’s frustrating, as it suggests that finding evidence to decidedly support one of the two theories over the other may be difficult indeed. Of course, it’s one thing to say that the data is compatible with competing theories, but quite another to say that the competing theories explain the data equally well. In the next two sections, we will see how far the extent of our agreement can go and to what extent the relevant data is better explained by one of our two hypotheses: theism and naturalism.

References Alston, W. 1997. “Swinburne and Christian Theology.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41: 35–57. Alter, Torin. 2016. “The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism.” Noûs 50 (4): 794–815. Alter, Torin, and Yujin Nagasawa. 2015. In Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism, edited Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baggett, David, and Jerry L. Walls. 2016. God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning. New York: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, Kelly James. 1996. “Trinity or Tritheism?” Religious Studies 32 (4): 463–476. Davidson, Matthew. 2016. “The Logical Space of Social Trinitarianism.” Faith & Philosophy 33 (3): 333–357. Evans, C. Stephen. 2018. “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2018 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moralarguments-god/. Goff, Philip. 2017. Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. New York: Oxford University Press. Gwiazda, Jeremy. 2009a. “Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, and Principle P.” Sophia 48: 393–398. ———. 2009b. “Richard Swinburne’s Argument to the Simplicity of God via the Infinite.” Religious Studies 45 (4): 487–493.

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———. 2010. “Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, and Exact Numerical Values.” Philosophia 38 (2): 357–363. Howard-Snyder, Daniel. 2003. “Trinity Monotheism.” Philosophia Christi 5 (2): 375–404. ———. 2016. “Two Peas in a Single Polytheistic Pod: John Hick and Richard Swinburne.” In Journal of Philosophical Research, Special Supplement: Selected Papers in Honor of William P. Alston, edited by Thomas Senor and Michael DePaul, 17–32. Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center. Leftow, Brian. 1999. “Anti-Social Trinitarianism.” In Trinity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McKenzie, Kerry. 2017. “Against Brute Fundamentalism.” Dialectica 71 (2): 231–261. Moreland, J. P. 2008. Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument. New York and London: Routledge. Nagasawa, Yujin, and Khai Wager. 2017. “Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism” (with Khai Wager). In Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, 113–129. New York: Oxford University Press. Pereboom, Derk. 2011. Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Russell, Bertrand. 1927. The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul. Stoljar, Daniel. 2001. “Two Conceptions of the Physical.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 253–281. ———. 2006. Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen. 2006. “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10–11): 3–31. ———. 2008. Real Materialism: And Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Swinburne, Richard. 1994. The Christian God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 2004. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wielenberg, Erik. 2009. “In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism.” Faith & Philosophy 26 (1): 23–41. ———. 2014. Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.

PART II

Is the Foundation Personal?

CHAPTER 8

For a Personal Foundation Joshua Rasmussen

1   Introduction Despite our differences, we appear to have discovered a significant common ground: We agree that there is some ultimate ground or foundational layer of things. This foundation, whether it is metaphysically necessary or only factually necessary, is the foundation of all non-­ foundational, dependent things. It is also a foundation for the next stage of our dialogue. We are ready to proceed to one of the most thought-provoking questions anyone can ask: Is the foundation personal? We can divide all the accounts of the foundation into two classic alternatives. Either the foundation is personal (i.e., has a mind), or it is impersonal. On the personhood account, the basic rules of reality—such as physical laws, moral principles, and even axioms of reason—are unified by their relation to a fundamental mind. This fundamental mind, then, underlies everything. The other option is that the foundation is purely impersonal. It has no mind. On this account, the basic rules either hang free, or they flow from more basic non-personal forces or entities. The mind vs. non-mind distinction is so fundamental, so far-reaching, and so divergent, that it can be difficult to imagine the world from both vantage points. It is like the old-woman/young-woman picture. Anyone who sees the world as having a basic mind at the root will naturally interpret much of the world, its laws and events, in terms of that mind. It can © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_8

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be difficult, therefore, to reimagine the entire world with a completely mindless root. Same for the other direction. I appreciate the challenge of seeing the world in another way. If one sees the world as having a purely impersonal root, it can seem like crazy talk to suppose that a mind literally underlies everything. It may sound absurdly anthropomorphic. Before the rise of science, maybe it was hard to resist projecting our own minds onto the world of unknown causes. From a modern lens, however, science has given us a long and growing track record of perfectly natural, non-personal explanations of things. On this perspective, the most natural inference is that non-personal explanations go all the way down. I get it. Yet, in this chapter, I will explain why I think the mind-first hypothesis provides a vastly better explanation of things. My reasons do not spring from prior hopes, superstition, or challenges to science. On the contrary, they come from my analysis of the best science and the inner light of reason. I aim to explore with Leon some of the advantages I see with the personhood framework. These advantages have in fact shifted me away from agnosticism about a personal foundation. I am especially curious to see how this conversation will go. Here is how I shall proceed. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to the presentation of what I call “clues.” These clues are data-points anchored within persons. The clues I will focus on are these: (i) organized complexity, (ii) consciousness, (iii) morality, and (iv) reason itself. Then, I will provide an independent argument from arbitrary limits for the conclusion that the foundation of the world is/has a maximal mind. Finally, I will sum up why I think a foundational mind allows us to have the simplest, least ad hoc, and most intrinsically probable account of the foundation. Each section is an introduction that sets the stage for a longer discussion.

2  Fine-Tuning Matter has taken some interesting forms. Right now in front of me, I see the form of a desk with movable drawers. The desk holds a lamp, a stapler, some pens, and scattered pieces of paper. Above the papers is a ledge, which provides a platform for a coffee mug. Next to the mug is something special: a drawing of a princess by my daughter. These forms of matter have some striking features in common: they display (i) organized complexity, (ii) information, and (iii) beauty.

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Why has matter taken any such forms? Here is part of the answer: p­ eople. People manufactured the desk, the stapler, and the pens. Students wrote the words on the papers. My daughter Lana made the princess drawing. However, the “people” answer is incomplete. All the people I just mentioned display these same features to an even greater degree. For example, Lana’s hand, which she used to draw the princess, is immeasurably more complex than her drawing. And her face is way more beautiful! So if people explain the forms, then what explains the people? In due course, I will propose how to end the regress in terms of a simple theory. More on that later. For the sake of focus, I will narrow in on organized complexity. The highest forms of organized complexity exist within organisms. A person’s face, for example, can do something I wish my laptop could do: It can self-repair. Moreover, organisms can grow and reproduce their hardware. Even the simplest cells are capable of self-replicating. No current technology on earth is able to do these things. Why does such technology exist? On one level, we might explain biological complexity by the mechanisms of Darwinian evolution. The explanation, in brief, goes like this. First, a relatively simple self-replicator emerges somewhere by natural processes. Then natural selection takes over, whereby the stronger replicators survive and replicate. The result is an inevitable increase in complexity over time. With enough time, it is not too surprising, then, that something like a human face should arise by blind forces. The “evolution” explanation, however, is still incomplete. I say this for two reasons. First, contrary to popular impression, natural selection in a randomized environment does not automatically select for increases in complexity. In fact, recent computer simulations of evolution suggest an opposite tendency.1 I tested this myself. A few years ago, I wrote a grant-funded computer program that simulated randomized evolution (for the Randomness and Divine Providence group), and I observed that randomized natural selection in my randomized environments tended to select simpler organisms, not more complex ones. I was able to generate some moderately complex structures, but that was only after I coded a very specific environment in which the evolution would “aim” for complex structures. In my randomized environments, by contrast, any initial 1 For more on this subject, see, for example, Wagner’s Arrival of the Fittest: Solving Evolution’s Greatest Puzzle.

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organized complexity dwindled over time. As far as I am aware, all the computer-based simulations of evolution support (or at least, are consistent with) my findings (see, e.g., the complexity research at the Santa Fe Research Institute; cf. Wagner 2014). The result is this: The very existence of an evolution in which turtles, giraffes, and humans can emerge depends on a precisely fine-tuned environment. A second and more fundamental problem is that evolution of life-forms cannot even get started without the right background conditions. We can see this immediately by reason. We can see, for example, that a universe with nothing but empty space has no ingredients for life. Similarly, we can see that a million motionless particles will never produce an amoeba. We can see, moreover, that a universe with only particles that constantly repel each other will produce an endless scatter, with no complex unities, anywhere, ever. Similarly, we can see that a universe with things that only attract each other will only form a blob, forever. And so on. None of these scenarios allows even for the possibility of any evolution, anywhere, ever. Recent physics is a another witness to the fine-tuning requirement. Physicists tell us that many parameters appear to be set on a razor’s edge. For example, if you adjust the universe’s rate of expansion in one direction, then matter and anti-matter completely annihilate each other, and the universe collapses into nothing. If you adjust it in the other direction, the universe expands too quickly to form anything but scattering hydrogen and helium atoms. Physicist Alan Lightman concludes: “[I]f these fundamental parameters were much different from what they are, it is not only human beings who would not exist. No life of any kind would exist.”2 Philosopher and physicist Robin Collins offers an illustration to indicate the degree of precision. It is like hitting a one-inch target, he estimates, by launching a dart across the entire Milky Way.3 Such a launch would need to be extremely calculated and precisely executed to succeed in hitting the target. Collins calculates that the dials that define the basic features of our universe need to be at least as precise for any life-forms exhibiting organized complexity to come on the scene, anywhere, ever. Why, then, does the world happen to be suited for complex creatures? Here is a simple ultimate explanation: Fundamental reality has

2 Lightman 3 Collins

(2011), p. 3. (2003).

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intentional powers, which themselves do not depend upon fine-tuned material conditions. Intentional powers allow the foundation to aim for interesting ends, such as an evolution leading to a complex creature who can make a princess drawing. With intentional powers at the foundation, we have a mechanism to explain why the world unfolds toward something beyond merely dots of dust. This mechanism provides a probability pump, which renders organized complexity far more probable/expected. Of course, a mind that itself depends on material complexity would only relocate the problem; its existence would then be just as surprising (i.e., improbable) as the material complexity we are seeking to explain. For this reason, a foundational mind would, by hypothesis, be a mind that exists prior to material complexity. The foundational mind does not depend on organized complexity; rather, it provides the ultimate explanation of all organized forms. Let us slow down this argument a bit. We can make the argument more precise using a standard Bayesian formula: 1. P(C/M) is not low, where (i) C = “there are complex creatures,” (ii) M = “there is a fundamental mind,” and (iii) the probability is epistemic (i.e., reasonable degree of expectation). 2. P(C/~M) is (very) low. 3. Therefore, C supports M. Why accept the premises? One reason to accept premise 1 is that organized complexity, like a face, is just the sort of thing that minds, as we know them, have interest in producing. Moreover, we can appeal to a principle of indifference. Suppose one has no reasons to think a foundational mind would not create complexity. Given neutrality, that by itself is enough to give one a non-low epistemic probability, on M. (The next premise is about the expectation without M.) Premise 2 is inspired by the “fine-tuning” data—i.e., from reason, computer-based simulations, and physics. Each datum is an independent voice that testifies to the razor edge conditions for material complexity. Meeting all those conditions just by chance—i.e., without any aim—is like this book assembling itself by chance. Without intentional powers, nothing of the sort is expected. One might wonder how anything could exist prior to organized forms. Interestingly, the hypothesis that a foundational mind exists prior to material complexity fits well with a vision of the foundation that Leon

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and I appear to share. In particular, Leon expressed sympathy for the recent scientific evidence for a layer of reality that precedes geometric form (even putting aside my Geometric Argument for this same result). On this view, the foundation doesn’t itself depend on any complex geometry. Instead, the geometric complexity is explained in terms of the foundation’s more basic, non-geometric attributes. My proposal takes us a step further by suggesting how, ultimately, the foundation’s nongeometric attributes could explain geometric complexity (and without pushing the question of “fine-tuning” back a step). The solution is this: The foundation can explain complexity via its non-geometric, intentional powers, which underlie the basic patterns and properties of energy fields. We may test this argument with the instrument of objections. The most promising responses I’ve seen involve showing that something other than intentional powers provides an equally good—if not better— ultimate explanation of the data. Some common proposals include these: (i) there are so many universes that some will probably be suited for life by chance, (ii) there are basic physical laws that determine the “fine-tuned” parameters, or (iii) fine-tuning is explained by an observer selection-effect. I will leave it to Leon to develop the response he thinks is best. Here, I will simply report a pattern I have noticed from my study of the proposals I have seen. I observe that, on scrutiny, the purely non-intentional explanations either depend on fine-tuned parameters themselves—effectively, pushing the problem of fine-tuning back a step—or fail to make all the relevant data nearly as probable as the fundamental mind explanation. The challenge, then, is to find an explanation that avoids this pattern. Of course, even if intentional powers raise the probability of complex creatures, it does not follow that the foundation definitely, or even probably, has intentional powers. What follows, rather, is that the complexity of creatures is a clue that contributes to the weight of evidence for the fundamental mind hypothesis. This clue can adjust the scale.

3   Consciousness In addition to technologically complex bodies, we also enjoy consciousness. But why? How? We can easily imagine a world without any consciousness. Imagine an evolution of robots. Imagine these robots smashing other robots without ever feeling excited or scared. In general, we can

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imagine any shape and motion without positing a single sensation or emotion. Why then does our world include consciousness in addition to complexity? Consciousness is especially perplexing if the world is fundamentally mindless. One problem is in seeing how it is even possible—in principle— to construct first-person “sense” aspects of a consciousness (e.g., qualia) from purely third-person material forms. How do you build actual sense from pure non-sense? Imagine a cloud of dust. The motions of dust bits don’t feel anything. It’s not as if the dust that shifts quickly away from other dust is feeling scared. Mere motion is insufficient for emotion. So how could senseless stuff make sense? By the light of reason, the location of dust makes no difference: Dust could have any location on earth without feeling anything. Similarly, the amount, orientation, and speed of dust are equally irrelevant. We could make dust move in the same pattern as the particles of a human brain, but motion is insufficient for emotion. How, then, can emotion emerge? The problem of consciousness runs underneath the discoveries of science. Science discovers correlations, like the correlation between an itch and a neural network. To see a correlation, however, is not yet to have insight into what makes the correlation possible. A lamp glows after a flip of a switch, but this correlation doesn’t reveal how the light switch makes the lamp glow. Similarly, to glow with happiness after some chemicals interact leaves a deep question: how do chemicals make the happy sensation? The root of the problem, as I see it, is that mere molecules in motion appear to be the wrong materials to build the conscious aspects of a mind. Molecules have third-person, public features, like shape, motion, and mass, which are categorically different from private sense features. Building sadness out of shifts in shapes, for example, is like building a prime minister by counting prime numbers: The building materials are wrong. Some philosophers have responded to the problem of consciousness by eliminating consciousness altogether. We have no thoughts or feelings, they say. Hence, the mystery is gone. I do not recommend eliminativism. First, eliminativism is itself a thought (or the content of a thought). So it is self-defeating. Second, and more fundamentally, you can be immediately aware of thoughts and feelings within your own mind. Speaking for myself, I am aware of my thought that eliminativism is implausible, for example.

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Another response to the problem of consciousness is to reduce “sense” aspects to third-person non-sense aspects of matter. However, I agree with philosopher of mind, John Searle, that reduction of sense to nonsense (whether material motions or functions from input motions to output motions) is only disguised elimination. To say “sense” is nothing but patterns of non-sensing particles is like saying a “car” is nothing but a carburetor, a “giraffe” is nothing but a telephone pole, or “understanding Chinese” is nothing but a Chinese grammar book. These reductions are no more plausible to me than eliminations. In response, some people have suggested that differences in perspective create an illusion of distinction. A feeling of happiness may seem different from chemical reactions, just as Clark Kent may seem different from Superman. Yet, the sober truth, they say, is that the brain and the mind are the same thing viewed from different perspectives. There is at least something right about this proposal. We can indeed view a single thing from different perspectives. For example, we can look at a coin from its tails side or from its heads side. Similarly, Lois can view Clark Kent as a news reporter or as a superhero. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to infer that one thing thereby lacks multiple properties. The one coin has two different sides, after all. Similarly, Clark Kent’s superhero properties differ from his news reporter properties. In fact, the different perspectives are themselves windows into the different properties. You can see a coin, for example, from different sides precisely because the coin actually has different sides. Similarly, we can describe different states of a person precisely because a person has different states. For example, a neuroscientist can view a women’s brain activity while she sleeps without also viewing her dream of a fish. That’s precisely to be expected if a person has different sides—the conscious side (e.g., thoughts, feelings, emotions, mental images) and (ii) the nonconscious side (e.g., neural patterns, quantities, and motions). The perspectives objection doesn’t undermine this result; it points to it. Moreover, even if consciousness were somehow reducible to, or grounded in, complex patterns of non-sense, that still wouldn’t explain why “conscious” patterns exist. Why do the particular patterns ever occur? We can perfectly well imagine a robot world in which the robots lack consciousness. So, even if consciousness from non-consciousness is somehow possible (itself dubious), it is not thereby probable. As you will expect, I think the foundational mind hypothesis provides the best solution to the problems of consciousness. A foundational mind

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has the right resources. It has “mental” materials, such as sensations, thoughts, and intentions. With these materials at the foundation, it is possible to construct the first-person, private properties of other minds. Sense materials can then be the ultimate building materials for all sensations. Whether we call the foundational mind “proto-conscious” (a la Chalmers) or just “conscious,” the point is the same: A mental foundation provides the materials to construct the other mental aspects of reality. Without a foundational mind, on the other hand, it is unexpected— if not impossible—for consciousness to emerge. No non-mental mechanism predicts, or makes probable, that consciousness will ever result. Consider, again, my computer-based simulation. It never produced actual thoughts or feelings. How do you get thought from non-thought, sense from non-sense, or reason from non-reason? Mindless motions predict none of these things. These considerations provide an initial statement of an argument from consciousness. We can summarize the argument with a standard Bayesian formulation: 1. P(m/M) is high, where (i) m = “there are minds” and (ii) M = “there is a fundamental mind,” 2. P(m/~M) is not high (if not impossible), 3. Therefore, m supports M. This argument provides a second clue pointing to a foundational mind.

4  Moral Landscape Among our conscious experiences are the specific sensations of something being good, bad, right, wrong, better, worse, positive or negative. These sensations are axiological. Why does the world contain axiological sensations? It is easy to take for granted the existence of axiological sensations. Feelings of good and bad are as familiar as air. Yet, they are far from trivial. Just as we can imagine a world without consciousness, we can easily imagine a world without any axiological sensations. We can imagine, for example, organisms that can feel cold but that cannot feel bad. Purely non-axiological states could be the sole drivers of adaption. Yet, our world, interestingly enough, includes the feeling of good.

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The feeling of good is part of the axiological landscape. We may debate the nature of the axiological landscape. Some will say that the axiological landscape is entirely reducible to patterns of subjective experiences, while others will say that the axiological landscape also includes objective principles of value, justice, and goodness. For now, I wish to focus on the clearest and least controversial dimension of the axiological landscape. In particular, I wish to focus on the observation that we have moral sensations, like the sensation that something has gone wrong. Why are there beings with moral sensations? Unguided evolution is not a complete explanation. None of the computer-based simulations of evolution have ever produced creatures with any sense of right and wrong—not even close. That is not surprising: Without a moral foundation and a design plan, there is no reason to expect the existence of morally sensitive beings to emerge ever. On the contrary, we may expect non-moral states to continue producing non-moral states indefinitely. With a foundational mind, by contrast, we have a clear mechanism to explain the aspects of an axiological landscape. A foundational mind has intentional powers that can aim for valuable things, including morally sensitive beings. Moreover, the simplest theory of this mind’s nature is that it is perfect (without particular limitations), and thus contains the perfect rules of living and thinking. On this account, the foundational mind anchors abstract moral principles into its perfect (i.e., supreme) nature. Moreover, unlike a purely unanchored Platonic realm, a moral foundation with intentional powers would have the power to produce a world in which beings like us can apprehend the moral principles. Notice here that I am not giving a traditional moral argument for the conclusion that a moral standard requires a foundational mind. My argument, rather, is about conditional expectations governed by the usual Bayesian formula. Here, explicitly is the argument: 1. P(A/M) is high, where (i) A = “there is an axiological landscape that includes minimally axiological sensations,” and (ii) M = “there is a fundamental mind,” 2. P(A/~M) is low (or not high), 3. Therefore, A supports M. This argument represents a third clue.

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5  Reason The existence of reason may be the most powerful, yet least considered clue relevant to our inquiry. Consider these observations about reason: 1. Principles of reason (like the law of non-contradiction) are permanent—i.e., they cannot fail to hold. 2. Principles of reason are principles of correct thinking. 3.  Principles of reason have the characteristic mental property of aboutness. 4. Actual beings can apprehend principles of reason. These things are precisely what we may expect given the fundamental mind hypothesis. A fundamental mind predicts the existence of principles of reason, since a fundamental mind would be capable of reasoning. Moreover, by anchoring reason into the nature of a foundational, necessary mind, we have the deepest conceivable explanation of the constancy of reason itself. Principles of reason are constant because they exist in the nature of an eternal foundation. There is more: A fundamental mind would have intentional powers, which provide a probability pump for the existence of other beings who can apprehend principles of reason. A foundational mind would also explain how there can be thought-like laws of physics, leading to beings who can think.4 Imagine, by contrast, the foundation is mindless. Then, we have no mechanism to account for why any principles tell any minds how to think rationally. Why would a mindless foundation “care” to have principles about proper thinking? Why do any necessary truths exist in the first place? Note that the metaphysical necessity of the principles does not get to the root explanation. Compare: If it were metaphysically necessary that the front edge of the universe had the form of a female face, we still have reason to expect a deeper explanation of the necessity of the face itself. The reasoning here is about epistemic expectation: The prior epistemic expectation of any principles of reason having any metaphysically necessary existence is high if the foundation is a necessary mind; otherwise, not so much. 4 For

reasons why the laws themselves are immaterial, see Jaworski (2016).

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Moreover, there is the challenge of explaining why any minds apprehend principles of reason. Why such fortune? If rules of reason fill Plato’s heaven, why can any beings visit this realm of reason? Natural selection is not an answer: For even if evolution produces robots that can simulate thought, nothing in natural selection itself predicts the specific power (let alone the possibility), of first-person awareness of abstract principles; not even close.5 Therefore, without intentional powers at the root of reality, we have no clear mechanism to pump the probability of actual minds coming to apprehend the principles of reasoning. Finally, without a foundational mind, there is the rationality problem: Rational thinking from non-rational patterns of motion is less expected than rational thinking from a rational foundation. As usual, we can gather these data points into a Bayesian analysis, to produce this argument from reason: 1. P(R/M) is high, where (i) R = “principles of reason exists and are apprehended,” and (ii) M = “there is a fundamental mind,” 2. P(R/~M) is not high, 3. Therefore, R supports M. This argument represents a fourth clue.

6  From Arbitrary Limits I’d like to add one more reason to the balance. Rather than another Bayesian argument, this argument takes a deductive form. I shall build upon my previous remarks about arbitrary, unexplained limits, while taking into account Leon’s excellent questions about the no-arbitrary-limits principle. My goal is to show how to transform the problem of arbitrary limits into an argument for a foundational mind. Here is the argument, which I call “The Maximal Mind Argument”: 1. The foundation lacks arbitrary, unexplained limits (e.g., a limit in size, number of vertices, causal power, etc.). 5 One argument against the very possibility of awareness from non-awareness comes from the indeterminacy problem, with material configurations being unable to determine which particular thing one is thinking. See Ross (2008), Chapter 6. See also a version of my counting argument for this same problem (Rasmussen 2018).

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2.  A foundation with less than maximal conceivable power has an arbitrary, unexplained limit. 3. Therefore, the foundation has maximal conceivable power. 4. Maximal conceivable power includes maximal cognitive power. 5. Therefore, the foundation has maximal cognitive power. 6. Only a mind can have cognitive power. 7. Therefore, the foundation is (or has) a mind. This argument makes use of the no-arbitrary-limits principle. It says that the foundation lacks arbitrary, unexplained limits. Why think this principle is true? I have three reasons. First, any theory that razors off arbitrary limits is simpler and therefore intrinsically more probable, other things being equal. Second, we may extrapolate from known cases: Vastly many limits are known to have an explanation, and no limits are known to lack any explanation. This extrapolation, like any, is defeasible (in principle). That is to say, we have a presumption with respect to any given limit to treat it like the others, unless we have some good reason to think the limit in question is relevantly different from the others. I’ve never seen any reason to make an exception. Hence, I have an undefeated reason to treat the limits uniformly. Third, the no-arbitrary-limits principle is supported by a more general principle of explanation: (PE) For any data (state of affairs or fact) D, where (i) there is some conceivable explanation of D (ii) one has no reason to think that D is relevantly different from explained data, it is reasonable to infer (else: it is likely) that D has an explanation.

PE makes good sense of all cases of explanation I have ever considered. That’s why I find it plausible. Amazingly, PE independently supports the no-arbitrary-limits principle: for any limit the foundation has, that limit is probably not basic (unexplained), assuming a conceivable explanation is available. Let us now consider Leon’s questions about the no-arbitrary-limits principle. He first asks what makes a limit “arbitrary” in a way that calls out for an explanation. What I want to say, more precisely, is that a limit is arbitrary in this sense: The limit could conceivably have been slightly greater or slightly lesser. For example, if the foundation was the shape of

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an octagon, then its shape is arbitrary because it could conceivably have had nine vertices instead of eight. Why eight? That number is arbitrary in view of the conceivable alternatives. Notice here that I am not presupposing that conceivable alternatives would be genuinely possible. The theory that the foundation is necessarily octagonal, for example, is still “arbitrary” in my sense. Metaphysical necessity doesn’t by itself remove arbitrariness. For example, while a blob with radius of 101 trillion meters may have greater intrinsic probability than my alligator theory of the foundation, still, both have arbitrary limits. If someone simply announces that the limits of a big blob are somehow necessary, this announcement does nothing to remove the conceivable neighbors. Leon then asks why we might accept the no-arbitrary-limits principle. My answer is the three reasons I just mentioned: (i) from intrinsic probability, (ii) extrapolation, and (iii) a general, undefeated principle of explanation. In short, the more limits we razor off our theory of the foundation, the greater its intrinsic probability and predictive success. Leon’s final concern is that many theistic theories fall into the same problem of arbitrary limits. First, I offer a conciliatory note. If he is right, then I will have reason to doubt those theories. My purpose is not to stick to any particular tradition. Rather, I aim to follow reason wherever it may lead. Second, I think theism, in its broad form, is uniquely suited to minimize, if not entirely excise, unexplained limits. Consider the following theistic hypothesis. The foundation’s basic attributes are not arbitrarily limited. Instead, they jointly imply maximality with respect to any basic magnitudes, such as power, knowledge, and goodness. These magnitudes flow from its most basic attribute of maximal value (i.e., perfection). On this picture, we can explain any particularities that may exist within God’s nature. For example, we could speculate that supreme value entails the highest category of cooperative love, which in turn entails a triune relationship. This idea illustrates how one could, at least in principle, conceive of a limit, like 3, as having an explanation in terms of more fundamental principles. If you find this example problematic, put it aside. The main point is that whatever particularities may exist in the foundation, they should have a deeper explanation, if one is available. Rather than stumble over specific theories of God, the lack-of-limits principle is a tool, which anyone can use to probe the nature of the foundation by their own light.

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Consider, moreover, that we might also explain particularities within abstracta in terms of God’s supreme nature. Maybe abstracta comprise the nature of a supreme foundation. For example, maybe the number pi is a crevice in the mathematical landscape, itself grounded in more basic principles, where these basic principles are essential elements of a perfect mind. The theory fits. There is more. A supreme (non-arbitrarily unlimited) foundation could also explain the finite features in the created order. Here is how the explanation might work. The total explanation makes reference to causal chains, including indeterministic chains, that ultimately trace back to the foundation’s basic, uncaused love for an interesting, advancing world (on a minimalist understanding of “explanation” as compatible with indeterminism). Return to the main argument at hand. I have been suggesting that we should prefer to minimize arbitrary limits as far as we can. Say we encounter some limit L. If we have some independent reason to think L is necessarily inexplicable, then that reason might indeed defeat the principle of explanation. But without that, the principle is not defeated. Instead, we have reason to remove arbitrary limits, as far as we can. The next step is to draw out the implication of removing arbitrary limits. Here is how to complete this argument for a foundational mind. Power, let’s say, is ability to bring about some effect. We have no reason to think the foundation’s power is arbitrarily limited. So, by the no-arbitrary-limits principle, we can expect the foundational power to be explanatorily prior to limits. The foundational power cannot itself be explained in terms of power (else circularity). Therefore, the foundation must have a basic power, i.e., a power prior to all its effects. To avoid arbitrary, unexplained limits, then, we can infer that the basic power of the foundation is the maximal conceivable (i.e., without limit). One more step. The maximal conceivable power includes cognitive power (by conceptual analysis), since we can conceive of a foundation with cognitive power in addition to its other powers. It follows that the foundation has maximal cognitive power—i.e., the power of a mind.

7  Recap We covered a lot of territory. Let us review the highlights. I introduced four Bayesian arguments about four clues we find within ourselves: biological complexity, consciousness, moral sense, and rules of reason. Each

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clue is perplexing (i.e., unexpected) on a purely mindless foundation. Consider what mindlessness implies. If the foundation is mindless, then the ultimate basis of reasoning is reasonless motions. The basis of sense is nonsense. The basis of axiological states is value-less states. The basis of the most advanced, self-repairing, self-reproducing technologies on earth is randomness or mindless motions. On top of these consequences, we have the problem of arbitrary limits. A purely non-mental foundation predicts unnecessary, ad hoc complexity. In particular, it requires that we posit some arbitrary limit with respect to the total power (and more fundamentally, total value). A supreme foundation, by contrast, shaves off this unnecessary ad-on, while also makes good sense of the basic attributes we witness in other minds.6

References Collins, Robin. 2003. “God, Design, and Fine-Tuning.” In God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by R. M. Bernard, 54–65. London: Longman. Jaworski, William. 2016. “Why Materialism Is False, and Why It Has Nothing to Do with the Mind.” Philosophy 91 (2): 183–213. Lightman, Alan. 2011. “The Accidental Universe.” Harper’s. https://harpers. org/archive/2011/12/the-accidental-universe/. Rasmussen, Joshua. 2018. “Against Non-reductive Physicalism.” In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland, 328–339. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Ross, James. 2008. Thought and World: The Hidden Necessities. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Wagner, A. 2014. Arrival of the Fittest: Solving Evolution’s Greatest Puzzle. New York: Penguin.

6 Thanks

to Robin Collins and Ben Bavar for comments on previous drafts.

CHAPTER 9

How Naturalism Could Explain Morality, Rationality, and Intentionality Felipe Leon

1   Introduction In Part I, Rasmussen and I agreed arguendo that there is a foundational level of reality that is either factually or metaphysically necessary, and that it is at least partly physical or material in nature (or at least: it’s what the physical or material is ultimately made up of). In the present section, our aim is to determine whether this foundational level of reality also has a personal element. Rasmussen began our inquiry regarding this second question by offering several important lines of argument in support of an affirmative answer. In particular, he argued that considerations of order, mind, value, reason, and arbitrary limits suggest that the foundational level of reality is personal. In this chapter, I offer several questions and considerations concerning these lines of support, with the aim of collaboratively seeking to shed light on this important topic.

2  Fine-Tuning and Final Causes For Rasmussen’s first line of support for the claim that the foundation of reality is a person, he offered a Bayesian version of the argument from cosmic fine-tuning. The core idea is that the numerical values of many of © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_9

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the fundamental constants of nature must fall within an extremely narrow range in order for life to be possible. But while we’d expect such data on the hypothesis of theism, we wouldn’t on the hypothesis of naturalism. And if so, then all else being equal, the data of cosmic fine-tuning provide at least some support for the former vis-à-vis the latter. I have five things to say in reply. First, some general remarks about naturalism and final causes, or teleology. There is a long tradition in theistic philosophy of religion of appealing to God as the ultimate ground or architect of final causes— of purpose, plan, and function—found in nature. A key rationale behind this appeal is that final causes have an intelligent source as part of their nature or essence. Because of this, many think final causes are incompatible with atheism and with naturalism. This rationale appears to be at work in a wide range of arguments for God. Examples include design arguments, arguments from reason, arguments from intentionality, and arguments from life-meaning and purpose. The issue is commonly traced back to Aquinas, who is widely thought to have argued that final causes require an agent acting for the sake of some end. However, it’s not at all clear that naturalism is incompatible with final causes that are more fundamental than those produced by human persons. To see this, let us distinguish between four notions of a final cause that seem to be suggested in the writings of Aquinas: (a) the tendency to produce one type of effect rather than another; (b) the tendency toward some end point or terminus; (c) the tendency toward some end point or terminus that is good in some important sense; and (d) acting for the sake of some end (Hoffman 2009). Now if there are ground-floor-level final causes in sense (d), then this seems incompatible with naturalism, if the latter involves conscious deliberation. However, it’s not at all clear that any of the other three senses of a final cause are incompatible with, or otherwise especially problematic for, naturalism. For (a) only requires regularity in nature, which is prima facie compatible with naturalism. On this point, it’s also worth noting that this seems to be the only sense of a final cause that Aquinas thought was strictly required for efficient causes (ibid.). Furthermore, (b) and (c) seem no more problematic for naturalism than for theism. For consider the God of theism: prima facie, God has at least an intellect and a will, and these reliably work together in such a way as to have a tendency toward a number of ends (e.g., to design and create things). Furthermore, these ends appear to be good in some

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important sense—at a minimum, they are good for God’s well-being or flourishing or proper function. Prima facie, then, final causes in senses (a), (b), and (c) are built into God’s nature without a prior cause, and, a fortiori, without an intelligent cause. But if that’s right, then classical theism entails the existence of such final causes at the metaphysical ground floor that God cannot, and thus did not, create. And if that’s right, then theism entails that non-conscious teleology in senses (a), (b), and (c) are more fundamental features of reality than final causes produced by intelligence. And finally, if that’s right, then at the very least, it’s not at all clear why naturalism would be any worse off than theism in this regard if it should likewise turn out that there are such final causes at the metaphysical ground floor that have no prior cause. Second, given that theism entails—and thus predicts—final causes not produced by intelligence at the metaphysical ground floor, this seems to undercut the claim that cosmic fine-tuning isn’t expected unless produced by intelligence. To the contrary, theism seems to entail that we should expect base-level teleology in the universe of types (a)–(c) that are not caused by God’s intentions—or anything else, for that matter. But if that’s right, then it’s not clear that fine-tuning confirms theism vis-à-vis naturalism. Third, there are further, independent reasons that might lead one to doubt that cosmic fine-tuning should be chalked up to one or more intelligent fine-tuners. Here, I will mention one. Other features of the universe aren’t what one would expect on the hypothesis. For one thing, it appears that the vast majority of the observable universe is quite hostile to life. For another, most of the relatively meager number of living things that we know to exist in the universe appear to languish for a significant portion of their lives. For yet another, the members of very many species are hostile to the existence of those of the others. In short, even if the more general phenomena of cosmic fine-tuning might seem surprising on naturalism, but not on theism, the more specific aspects of the life that seems fine-tuned are surprising on theism, but not on naturalism. Accordingly, while the former sort of phenomena might raise the probability of an intelligent foundation, the latter sorts of phenomena appear to deflate it.1

1 Draper

(2010).

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Fourth, a number of people have argued that the hypothesis of a multiverse explains the data of fine-tuning at least as well as theism, if not better.2 Such a hypothesis fits nicely with what we’ve concluded about the nature of the foundation in Part I, viz., that it is a necessary being of some kind, and it is at least partly material in nature. Such a hypothesis is more qualitatively parsimonious3 than those that posit other kinds of entities to explain the data, as it posits just more of the same sort of stuff (viz., material stuff), which we already know to exist, to explain what we observe. Furthermore, while I myself am not persuaded by Rasmussen’s

2 For the canonical defense of this position, see Leslie (1989). For an important criticism, see White (2000). For an important rejoinder, see Oppy (2006). 3 At least two worries about simplicity and complexity are worthy of brief comment here. First, it is sometimes argued that theism is a much simpler explanation of fine-tuning than a multiverse: therefore, theism is a better explanation. But this seems to assume that there is only one relevant kind of theoretical parsimony, viz. quantitative parsimony (i.e., the explanation postulates fewer entities). However, as David Lewis (1973) has taught us, another type is qualitative parsimony (i.e., the explanation postulates fewer kinds of entities). And while the theistic hypothesis is a much more quantitatively parsimonious explanation of the data (it explains all of the data in terms of just one entity, viz. a God), the multiverse hypothesis is a more qualitatively parsimonious explanation of the data (since it explains all of the data solely in terms of one kind of entity, viz. matter-energy). And it’s not at all clear which type of theoretical parsimony is more important here. Second, theists sometimes object that the multiverse hypothesis is implausible, on the grounds that the mechanism that would be required to produce the universes on that hypothesis is complex and functional and thus would itself require a designer. However, when the same point is applied to the theistic hypothesis (God is complex and functional and thus would require a designer), some theists reply that a theoretical posit y can be an adequate explanation of some phenomenon x, even if y is itself complex-yet-unexplained. Call the latter principle ‘(*)’. Then the worry is this. Either one accepts (*) or rejects it. Suppose the former. Then one thereby loses the ground for the present objection to the multiverse hypothesis, and with it any explanatory upper hand the theistic hypothesis may have had with respect to the data of fine-tuning. On the other hand, suppose one rejects (*). Then, one rejects the theistic hypothesis as a legitimate explanation of cosmic finetuning. Of course, one could reply that God is absolutely simple—e.g., one could hold to the Thomistic conception of God as a being whose existence is identical with his essence, and that all of his attributes are identical. But many contemporary theistic philosophers of religion are reluctant to do so, due to deep conceptual problems with such a view (see, e.g., Plantinga 1980; Craig 2016). In any case, the multiverse proponent could play the same game, viz. positing that the most fundamental level of natural reality is absolutely simple. Given that both naturalistic and theistic accounts of absolutely simple reality are prima facie deeply mysterious at best, and incoherent at worst, neither seems promising as an explanatory posit for cosmic fine-tuning.

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no arbitrary limits principle (NALP) (at least not yet), it seems to me that those who do accept it have an extra reason to think that the material portion of foundational reality is without limits, and therefore infinite in extent. But if so, then the hypothesis of many universes seems quite plausible. Finally, as I argued in Section I, there are significant concerns about the possibility of a personal cause that is a timeless entity. For these reasons, then (along with others: see below), I worry that the foundation of reality isn’t personal in quite the robust sense that Rasmussen is arguing for. However, we’ve also seen that foundational teleology or final causes are something about which theists and naturalists can agree in principle (if it should turn out that there are sufficient grounds for thinking such exist).

3  Naturalism and Mind Rasmussen’s second piece of data for a personal foundation is consciousness. Rasmussen raises several considerations in this regard to argue that consciousness is real, and is not reducible to the physical, in which case we have reason to think that consciousness requires a cause in terms of something that is not physical, in which case there is reason to think its cause is likewise non-physical—and indeed, mental—itself. But if so, then there are grounds for thinking that the foundation of reality includes not only a physical component, but a mental one as well. Rasmussen’s argument brings us into the deep and murky waters of the philosophy of mind, where there is a dizzying array of stances about the nature of consciousness and its relation to the body. There are thus many things one can say (and have been said) in reply. A number of philosophers are convinced that the mental can be eliminated entirely. A good many others are convinced that while the mental cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced to the physical or to a set of functional states. A good many yet others think that while it can’t be shown to be reduced or eliminated, some form of non-reductive materialism about the mind is the best account. For our purposes, however, I will leave such views to the side, as I’m inclined to agree with Rasmussen that the mental—in particular, phenomenal states—cannot be so reduced or eliminated. Recall my discussion of the varieties of naturalism and the common strategy in Chapter 7. There, I pointed out that naturalism admits of a variety of views,

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including the liberal naturalist view that proto-representational or protophenomenal states are part of foundational reality. One popular version of this among philosophers is Russellian monism.4 Therefore, naturalism is compatible with Rasmussen’s core claim that consciousness isn’t reducible to the physical, and that consciousness is part of foundational reality. Indeed, I myself am strongly inclined toward such a view. Therefore, let us proceed under the assumption that Rasmussen’s core point here is correct. This will bring one more point of agreement between us. First, a preliminary point. As with many philosophical puzzles, at the core of the puzzle of consciousness is an inconsistent set of propositions, each of which enjoys strong intuitive or empirical evidence (compare: the problem of radical skepticism and the problem of freedom and determinism). And since this is so, at least one item of common sense must be thrown out in order to solve it. This brings me to my first main point: While it may be true that Rasmussen’s proposed answer to the problem of consciousness relieves a tension, it also comes at the cost of rejecting something extremely plausible and intuitive. As Eric Schwitzgebel has argued,5 since all views about the mind are “crazy” (in the sense that something that seems a core element of common sense must be rejected in order to accept it), it follows that the truth about the nature of the mind must be “crazy.” But if that’s right, then it’s not at all clear that any view has an epistemic advantage over any other.6 Beyond this, I’d like to offer four considerations for thinking we can go further in specifying the way in which the phenomenal or representational states of humans, animals, and other creatures are related to the foundational layer(s) of reality. First, given the truth of PMC, we have grounds for thinking that if minds are substances, individuals, and/or concrete objects, then they cannot be created ex nihilo, in which case they must be uncreated and eternal, or otherwise created from prior materials. Substance dualism about the mind therefore seems to require two types of objects at the foundation of reality. This is less parsimonious

4 See, e.g., Russell (1927), Chalmers (1996), Stoljar (2006), Strawson (2006, 2008), Pereboom (2011), Alter (2016), Alter and Nagasawa (2015), and Goff (2017). 5 Schwitzgebel (2014). 6 For other forceful cases for this point, see Strawson (2008), Chalmers (Forthcoming), and Draper (Forthcoming).

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than the Russellian monist thesis that the minds or phenomenal or representational states of humans, non-human animals, insects, and no doubt “lower” forms of life are made out of a fundamental (proto)phenomenal or (proto)representational layer of reality. Second, David Chalmers (1996) has offered a powerful argument from continuity for thinking that phenomenal or proto-phenomenal states are a part of the fundamental stuff of reality. The basic idea is that, as with humans, we have extremely strong grounds for thinking nonhuman animals have an inner life. The same thing goes for organisms lower down the Great Chain of Being, as it were. In fact, it seems to be completely arbitrary to say that there is a hard-and-fast cutoff point in the Great Chain of Being where the entity above the line has phenomenal or representational states, and the entity below it does not. A natural way to avoid this arbitrariness problem is to say that there is no such cutoff point, and that (proto)phenomenal or (proto)representational states are a property of the fundamental stuff of reality. But if so, then we have non-trivial grounds for thinking that something like Russellian monism is true.7 But even if one is not persuaded that phenomenal states go all the way down the Great Chain of being, it’s hard to deny that they go further down the chain than what is predicted or expected on the hypothesis of substance dualism (viz., to humans, and perhaps to some nonhuman animals). At some point, the substance dualist is going to have to say that consciousness stops at some arbitrary point (crows have it, but ravens do not, say).8 This implausible implication is a theoretical cost, and one that afflicts substance dualism, but not Russellian monism. Third, there is strong evidence that the mental is dependent on the existence and functioning of the physical. For example, brain damage of various sorts can prevent one from ordinary sorts of cognition and can even change one’s personality entirely. It is also possible to split one’s consciousness by severing the corpus callosum in the brain. And of course, very many different sorts of trauma to the body or brain can lead to death. This is at least initially surprising on theism, but not on naturalism, including Russellian monism.

7 Chalmers

(1996). (2014).

8 Schwitzgebel

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Finally, many philosophers9 have argued that materialism—and, I now point out, classical theism—has an explanatory gap problem of another sort. For science only tells us about the structure and dynamics of matter (its extrinsic, relational properties). Further progress in science only seems to exacerbate this problem (Ladyman and Ross 2007). Many thus now argue for ontic structural realism, according to which reality consists of relations without relata, and it is only “relations all the way down.” Unfortunately, to date, even the most strident defenders of ontic structuralism have failed to give a coherent account of the view, and many of its sympathizers admit that the current evidence fails to support its most plausible construals (McKenzie 2017). Incoherence threatens. This is the explanatory gap problem for both theism and materialism: Both views give us a universe with a hollow core. There is thus pressure to say that there must be some stock of intrinsic properties to physical reality. However, the only intrinsic properties we know of are phenomenal properties. What is a naturalist or a theist to do? Recall that on Russellian monism, matter has both physical and phenomenal (or proto-phenomenal) properties as fundamental properties. Russellian monism appears to solve both the hard problem of consciousness and the intrinsic properties of matter problem in one stroke.10 Let me end this section on a conciliatory note: While Rasmussen and I disagree on matters of detail about the nature of the mind, it is exciting to see that both the theist and the naturalist can agree that the foundation has features that are characteristically mental, such as (proto)representational or (proto)phenomenal properties.

4  Morality Theists standardly take morality to be objective—i.e., independent of human belief and opinion—and many naturalists agree. A number of theistic philosophers have argued that objective morality is better explained on theism than on atheism. The most popular accounts of this sort rely on some version or other of divine command theory in meta-ethics, and so determining whether theism provides the best explanation of moral knowledge largely depends 9 See, for example, Russell (1927), Strawson (2006, 2008), Chalmers (1996), Stoljar (2006), Pereboom (2011), Alter (2016), Alter and Nagasawa (2015), and Goff (2017). 10 cf. Alter and Nagasawa (2015, pp. 444–445).

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on the plausibility of divine command theory. A brief overview of divine command theory, as well as standard criticisms, is therefore given below. The simplest form of divine command theory is one that accounts for all moral values and duties in terms of God’s commands. However, it is widely thought that the simplest form of divine command theory has been defeated by the Euthyphro dilemma. According to the dilemma, either something is morally right or good because God commands or decrees it, or God commands or decrees it because it is already morally right or good. But if something is morally right or good merely because God commands or decrees it, then moral rightness and goodness are arbitrary, which is implausible: Prima facie, harming people or animals merely for fun would still be wrong even if God commanded it. On the other hand, if God commands or decrees something because it’s already morally right or good, then moral rightness or goodness is independent of God’s commands and decrees, in which case divine command theory is false. Therefore, either moral rightness and goodness are arbitrary, which is implausible, or they are independent of God’s commands and decrees, in which case divine command theory is false. Robert Adams (1999) and William Alston (1989) have developed and defended a modified version of divine command theory with the aim of (among other things) answering the Euthyphro dilemma. According to Adams’ modified divine command theory, (i) the infinite good is God himself, and finite goodness is analyzed in terms of resemblance to God or the divine nature, and (ii) an act is morally obligatory just in case a good God commands it. Given these alterations, it looks as though modified divine command theory can go between the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma: Morality is neither arbitrary nor independent of God. However, Wes Morriston (2001) has argued that even if modified divine command theory escapes the Euthyphro dilemma for moral duties, it yet falls prey to a Euthyphro dilemma for moral values: Either God is good because he has the properties that constitute moral goodness (lovingness, kindness, justice, honesty, etc.), or the properties are good because God has them. If the latter, then moral goodness is arbitrary: If what makes a set of moral properties good is the fact that God has them, then if God were, say, a greedy, murderous coward, then it would’ve been good to be a greedy, murderous coward, which is absurd. But if the former, then moral goodness is independent of God: Moral goodness consists in having those properties, and God (and anyone else, for that matter) qualifies as good in virtue of exemplifying those

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properties. Therefore, either moral goodness is arbitrary or the standard of moral goodness is independent of God. One response to the new Euthyphro dilemma is to identify God himself, and not his properties, with the ultimate standard of goodness (Alston 1989; Adams 1999). On this sort of view, when it comes to goodness, God functions in a way analogous to the standard meter stick in Paris. Thus, while the length of the standard meter stick is not analyzed in terms of a standard of goodness beyond itself, the stick serves as the standard by which all other lengths have the property of being a meter in length: An object is a meter in length just in case its length exactly resembles the length of that stick. Similarly, while God (qua the Good) is not analyzed in terms of any other standard beyond himself, he serves as the standard by which all other entities have the property of goodness: An object is good just to the extent that it resembles that being (viz., God qua the Good). On this sort of view, then, goodness supervenes directly on God’s being and confers goodness on his loving, kind, honest, just, nature, etc. Two main criticisms have been raised against the latter sort of view. First, the view entails that it gets the relevant counterpossibles wrong: If God didn’t exist, then kind, honest, loving, just humans wouldn’t be good, which is implausible (Morriston 2001). Second, since God is not good in virtue of being kind, loving, honest, just, etc., the view makes it unintelligible what God’s goodness consists in (Morriston 2001; Koons 2012). The lesson of the new Euthyphro dilemma seems to be that what matters for moral goodness is having the relevant properties, in which case goodness does not depend on whether God exists and has those properties. But if the properties alone are what determine moral goodness, then explaining the latter by positing a God that has them complicates our view of the world without adding to our understanding of it. But the latter sort of view is compatible with moderate and liberal naturalism. Other problems have been raised against both versions of modified divine command theory. One is that it seems that at least some actions are intrinsically wrong—i.e., wrong in themselves (Wielenberg 2014). But modified divine command theory denies this: It entails that if God doesn’t exist, or if he does but never commanded against (e.g.,) harming a person or animal merely for entertainment, then doing such things wouldn’t be morally wrong. In short, even if divine command theory could account for the data that some things seem objectively right or

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wrong, it can’t account for the data that some things seem intrinsically right or wrong. Another problem is that divine command theory leaves some moral facts ungrounded or otherwise unaccounted for (Wielenberg 2014). For example, it fails to explain why, if God commands one to do something, one is morally obligated to do it. But if divine command theory entails that at least some things are morally obligatory without being commanded by God, divine command theory looks unmotivated: If at least some things don’t require the command of a good God to make them morally right or wrong, then it’s not clear why one should think anything does. (For further criticisms, see Murphy [1998, 2012].) However, a theist might yet argue that even if divine command theory is false, and so God isn’t strictly needed to ground morality, God is needed to communicate the objective truths of morality. The most natural view of this sort states that the objective standards of morality are a set of necessarily true propositions, construed as abstract objects. Since the topic of God and abstract objects is taken up in the present chapter and later chapters, worries of that sort are deffered to those sections. Is moral knowledge a problem for atheism? Some argue that evolutionary debunking arguments (e.g., Street 2006), when combined with a naturalistic view of the world (which some atheists accept), defeat the atheist’s epistemic grounds for moral realism (Bogardus 2016). The basic line of reasoning in evolutionary debunking arguments starts with the plausible claim that our evaluative moral judgments are extensively shaped by evolutionary factors. But if so, then our evaluative moral judgments line up with those that help us, individually and collectively, to survive and reproduce. But if morality is objective, then moral truths are true independently of the evolutionary factors that shaped our evaluative moral judgments. Therefore, it would be an extraordinary coincidence if our evaluative moral judgments lined up with moral truths. And if that’s right, then our justification for our moral beliefs is defeated, in which case we should embrace moral skepticism. A number of criticisms have been leveled against evolutionary debunking arguments. First, a number of accounts of moral realism have been articulated and defended that allow—and sometimes insist— that evolution has reliably shaped our system of evaluative judgments. Perhaps the most relevant is neo-Aristotelian virtue theory, most notably developed and defended by Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), Philippa Foot (2001), and (most recently) Micah Lott (2018). According to this

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version of virtue theory, moral goodness is analyzed in terms of what is good for members of a given species, which in turn is defined in terms of what allows its members to carry out their characteristic life cycle, which in turn has been shaped by evolutionary factors. On this sort of account, moral knowledge is a kind of practical knowledge of how to achieve one’s species-specific goods. Given this sort of account, it is guaranteed that evolution will shape our evaluative judgments in a way that is truth tracking. For those individuals whose evaluative judgments fail to reliably track the truth about what’s good for them are thereby selected out. Second, some non-natural moral realists (Huemer 2006, 2016) argue that moral truths are necessary truths, known via reason. Therefore, the way we know moral truths is the same way we know other necessary truths (e.g., those of mathematics and philosophy). And while there is as of yet no complete account of the mechanics of a priori knowledge (but see BonJour 1998; Bengson 2015a, b; Chudnoff 2014; Huemer 2016 for recent defenses), this fact hasn’t led many to deny that we have such knowledge. But if not, then by the same token, it shouldn’t lead one to reject moral knowledge. Other (natural and) non-natural moral realists resist evolutionary debunking arguments in other ways. For example, Erik Wielenberg (2014, 2016) argues that while evolution didn’t select for knowledge of moral truths, it selected for something else that is adaptive and which correlates with moral truths. In particular, he argues that creatures with cognitive capacities like ours thereby have rights. But evolution didn’t select for this knowledge. Rather, it selected for our cognitive capacities, which in turn help us survive and reproduce. But creatures with such capacities are thereby able to grasp the concept of a right, and to come to believe that they have them. Yet others point out that evolutionary arguments don’t apply to constructivist accounts of morality. Versions include those articulated by Kant (2012), Korsgaard (1996a, b), Rawls (1999), and Scanlon (1998). According to at least some of these versions, there are constitutive features of rational, autonomous agents from which a set of moral principles is necessarily constructed (by means of, e.g., a deliberative procedure, the essential features of practical reason, etc.). Furthermore, knowledge of such principles is knowable a priori. Finally, some take evolutionary debunking arguments to be successful. Those that do can take any number of views about morality, such as moral relativism (Harman 1975; Prinz 2007), moral fictionalism

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(Nolan et al. 2004), or some version of non-cognitivism (e.g., Gibbard 2003). On virtually any such view, the atheist need not embrace a set of moral guidelines or attitudes that conflict with commonsense morality. And when this fact is combined with the fact that it’s not at all clear that theism can account for the existence and knowledge of objective moral facts, then at the very least, it’s not at all clear that naturalism is any worse off than theism in this respect.

5  Reason Rasmussen’s fourth consideration in favor of a personal foundation concerns reason, where these are construed as the basic principles of rational thought. The core argument is another Bayesian argument, according to which the existence and nature of the rules of reason are better explained on the hypothesis that there is a foundational mind than on the hypothesis of its negation. I think this is an intriguing argument. Here, I offer nine questions and concerns one might raise. First, it’s not clear that propositions are intrinsically representational or intentional. There is a wide variety of accounts on the nature of propositions, and on only some of these do they have such properties. So, for example, some accounts of propositions construe them as properties. Others construe them as sets of possible worlds, and many other analyses have been offered. Given that this is so, it’s not clear why we should accept this claim.11 Second, even if propositions are essentially or intrinsically representational, it’s not clear why such data are more to be expected on the hypothesis that they are anchored in a foundational mind. For example, on Fregean accounts of propositions, they are intentional, and yet they aren’t grounded in a foundational mind. In fact, on such accounts, the intentionality of thought is derivative of the intentionality of propositions, and not the other way around.12 Third, even if propositions are intrinsically intentional or representational, then by definition, their having this feature does not depend on whatever else happens to exist. But if so, then their having intentionality does not depend on a foundational mind. 11 For a powerful critique of arguments from the nature and intentionality of propositions to theism, see Ruloff (2014a, b, 2016). 12 Ruloff (2014a).

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Fourth, Russellian monism—the view toward which I’m most inclined (more on this in later chapters)—is a naturalistic view of reality, and it entails that there are inherent intentional or representational properties at the metaphysical ground floor that don’t depend on a foundational mind in the robust sense of Rasmussen’s use of that term. But if so, then irreducible intentional or representational properties are not more to be expected on one of these two theories over the other. Fifth, one might worry that taking the rules of reason to be anchored in a foundational mind is subject to a Euthyphro dilemma of sorts. For either the rules of reason are correct because God decrees them, or God decrees them because they are the correct ones. If the former, then the rules of reason are arbitrary. But if the latter, then their correctness is independent of God’s decree. Either option is prima facie problematic for the foundational mind explanation of the rules of reason, at least without further clarification. Sixth, if the rules of reason are necessary truths, and the validity or correctness of the logical relations are intrinsic to them, then it’s not clear why they need a further explanation. Seventh, there are worries about the counterpossible conditionals coming out in a way not predicted on the foundational mind hypothesis. For example, consider the following two counterpossible conditionals13: 1. If a foundational mind didn’t exist, modus ponens wouldn’t have been a valid argument form. 2. If a foundational mind didn’t exist, modus ponens would still have been a valid argument form. Prima facie, (1) is false and (2) is true. But this is the wrong result if the rules of reason are dependent upon a foundational mind.14 By contrast, it’s the correct result on the hypothesis that they don’t depend upon a

13 For exposition and defense of the legitimacy and indispensability of counterpossibles, and proposed accounts of their semantics, see, e.g., Zagzebski (1990), Nolan (1997, 2014), Brogaard and Salerno (2007), Jago (2013), and Krakauer (2013). For a case for the indispensability of counterpossible reasoning in the sciences, see Tan (2019). 14 As Ruloff (2014b) argues, a similar counterpossible analysis worry arises for the foundational mind hypothesis when the focus is placed back on theistic arguments from intentionality. Consider, for example, the counterpossible, “If there were no beings capable of mental states, ‘There are no beings capable of mental states’ would’ve still been true.”

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foundational mind. It’s therefore not at all clear to me that the rules of reason confirm theism vis-à-vis naturalism. Eighth, a clarification question: Does the argument presuppose or otherwise require the existence of universals and/or other sorts of abstract objects, and their being related to a foundational mind? If so, then one might worry that a number of significant concerns have been raised about every such account. And to the extent that this is so, it threatens the plausibility of the explanatory power and scope of the foundational mind hypothesis with respect to abstract objects. Finally, as with the fine-tuning argument, even if the general datum of reason inflates the probability of theism, other more specific data related to these rules seem to deflate it. Here are ten examples. First, there are apparent counterexamples to modus tollens, in which case it holds only with qualifications (Yalcin 2012); problems have also been raised for modus ponens (Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010). Second, we still don’t have an uncontroversial account of the nature of conditionals—whether indicative, subjunctive, strict, etc.—that captures all of our intuitions about their truth conditions. Third, there are nontrivial problems with other systems of theoretical and practical rationality, including Bayesianism and decision theory. Fourth, the foundations of set theory are currently up for grabs, and there are grounds for thinking that choosing among the alternative accounts of the foundations is a matter of pragmatic considerations. Fifth, Mercier and Sperber (2017) and Kahneman (2011) have raised serious concerns about the utility of deductive logic for daily life vis-à-vis various sorts of inductive and heuristic reasoning. Sixth, there are problems with abductive inference, including how to rank the theoretical virtues so as to determine which theory is the best explanation of a given set of data. Seventh, it’s controversial whether PEM, PNC, and other basic logical principles really are correct and/or exceptionless rules of reason (Priest 2006a, b). Eighth, even assuming there are correct and uncontroversial principles of reason, most people seem unable to avail themselves of them, at least on a consistent basis. Ninth, according to a robust range of empirical studies, the human mind is riddled with cognitive biases that regularly prevent humans from reasoning reliably (Kahneman 2011). Finally, even if most people can avail themselves of them, it’s not at all clear that most people do so avail themselves of them so as to reliably avoid error. In short, even if the general data about reason Rasmussen discusses are expected on theism, other specific data about reason—e.g., their limited

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practical utility, our cognitive biases that routinely subvert them, the fact that most are unable to avail themselves of these principles, and the modest utility of such principles over unconscious, heuristic reasoning, etc.,— are such that it’s not at all clear that they would be expected on a theistic account of a foundational mind. By contrast, if there is no such mind in Rasmussen’s robust sense of the term, then they don’t seem surprising at all. It’s therefore not at all clear to me that Rasmussen’s hypothesis is the best explanation of the relevant data at issue.

6  Arbitrary Limits Again In my previous chapter, I raised a number of questions and concerns for Rasmussen’s NALP. Here, I offer several more. First, as Jeremy Gwiazda has pointed out, the history of science indicates that positing infinite numerical values is a sign that something is wrong with our current theories (e.g., the positing of infinite density at the singularity in early versions of big bang theory; similarly for black holes).15 Relatedly, one might worry that a track-record argument can be run that everything we’ve observed that has an explanation has one in terms of something that itself has finite limits, so we have reason to think that every explanans has finite, seemingly arbitrary limits. Second, it seems that, by the very nature of the case, everything has limits. For example, the infinite set containing all the natural numbers has limits, with an endless series of larger infinite ordinals and cardinals above them. Third, every number in the set of reals lacks an immediate predecessor and successor. Therefore, NALP seems to imply that if properties are modeled on the reals, then no number represents an arbitrary limit. Fourth, even if NALP is true, it’s not at all clear that it would prefer theism over other hypotheses. For it’s notoriously difficult to make sense of God’s attributes when taken as unlimited. For example, essential omnipotence seems incompatible with essential moral perfection, as the former attribute seems to entail the possibility of doing what is morally wrong, and the latter seems to entail the impossibility of doing what is morally wrong. A similar problem seems to arise for the combination of perfect freedom and essential moral perfection.16 15 On

this point and related worries, see Gwiazda (2009a, b, 2010). literature on incompatibility of the divine attributes is extensive. For a recent overview, see Everitt (2010). 16 The

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A recent prominent response is to take God’s maximality as the maximal consistent set of properties, where this cashes out as the greatest degree of divine attributes that are compossible (Nagasawa 2008, 2017). However, the worry is then that there is no unique best combination of compossible properties (Kvanvig 2018; Bailey 2019). This is problematic for theism in itself, for then it’s not at all clear that there must be a single best being. For example, consider two beings, A and B. A might be greater than B in terms of knowledge, while B may be greater in terms of power. In such a case, both A and B might tie in terms of greatness. Furthermore, many non-theistic competing hypotheses seem to also satisfy NALP, especially if we allow that maximality is cashed out in terms of maximal compossibility of attributes. Examples include: Steinhart’s ordinal polytheism, according to which there is an infinite hierarchy of gods, starting with a being with the smallest possible combination of knowledge, power, and goodness, and continuing on successively to ever greater gods along these three metrics. Other examples include panpsychism, cosmopsychism, Spinozism, and the Russellian monist version of liberal naturalism I defend in this book. Rasmussen asks what I would offer in place of NALP in guiding my evaluation of and choice among competing comprehensive hypothesis. I answer: the standard and much more widely accepted theoretical virtues associated with abductive inference. And when our faculties associated with judgments about what is metaphysically possible are applied in contexts beyond ordinary ones, I think the case for mitigated modal skepticism undercuts our grounds for trusting them. I conclude this section on a constructive, conciliatory point gleaned from my discussion above: If we accept NALP, we have a tool that’s friendly to both theism and naturalism.

References Adams, Robert. 1999. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alston, William P. 1989. “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.” In Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by William P. Alston. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Alter, Torin. 2016. “The Structure and Dynamics Argument Against Materialism.” Noûs 50 (4): 794–815.

134  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON ———, and Yujin Nagasawa. 2015. “Introduction.” In Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism, edited Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bailey, Andrew. 2019. “Review of Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism, by Yujin Nagasawa.” Faith and Philosophy 36 (2): 275–279. Bengson, John. 2015a. “Grasping the Third Realm.” In Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 5, edited by Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne, 1–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2015b. “The Intellectual Given.” Mind 124 (495): 707–760. Bogardus, Tomas. 2016. “Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument.” Ethics 126 (3): 636–661. BonJour, Lawrence. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press. Brogaard, Berit, and Joe Salerno. 2007. “Why Counterpossibles Are Nontrivial.” The Reasoner 1 (1): 5–6. Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. Forthcoming. “Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem.” In The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, edited by William Seager. New York: Routledge. Chudnoff, Elijah. 2014. Intuition. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Craig, William Lane. 2016. God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Draper, Paul. 2010. “Cumulative Cases.” In Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2019. “Panpsychotheism.” In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Paul Draper, 160–177. New York: Routledge. Everitt, Nicholas. 2010. “The Divine Attributes.” Philosophy Compass 5 (1): 78–90. Foot, Philippa. 2001. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gibbard, Alan. 2003. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Goff, Phillip. 2017. Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. New York: Oxford University Press. Gwiazda, Jeremy. 2009a. “Richard Swinburne’s Argument to the Simplicity of God Via the Infinite.” Religious Studies 45(4): 487–493. ———. 2009b. “Richard Swinburne, the Existence of God, and Principle P.” Sophia 48 (4): 393–398. ———. 2010. “Richard Swinburne, the Existence of God, and Exact Numerical Values.” Philosophia 38 (2): 357–363.

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Harman, Gilbert. 1975. “Moral Relativism Defended.” The Philosophical Review 84 (1): 3–22. Hoffman, Paul. 2009. “Does Efficient Causation Presuppose Final Causation? Aquinas vs. Early Modern Mechanism.” In Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, edited by Samuel Newlands and Larry M. Jorgensen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huemer, Michael. 2006. Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2016. “A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skepticism: The Empirical Case for Realism.” Philosophical Studies 173 (7): 1983–2010. Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Jago, Marc. 2013. “Impossible Worlds.” Nous 47 (3): 713–728. Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Macmillan. Kant, Immanuel. 2012. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [1785]. Rev. ed. edited and translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kolodny, Niko, and John MacFarlane. 2010. “Ifs and Oughts.” Journal of Philosophy 107 (3): 115–143. Koons, Jeremy. 2012. “Can God’s Goodness Save Divine Command Theory from the Euthyphro?” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1): 177–195. Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996a. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1996b. The Sources of Normativity. Edited by Onora O’Neill. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press. Krakauer, Barak. 2013. “What Are Impossible Worlds?” Philosophical Studies 165 (3): 989–1007. Kvanvig, Jonathan. 2018. “Nagasawa’s Maximal God: A New Defense of Perfect Being Theism.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Ladyman, James, and Don Ross. 2007. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leslie, John. 1989. Universes. New York: Routledge. Lewis, David. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lott, Micah. 2018. “Must Realists Be Skeptics? An Aristotelian Reply to a Darwinian Dilemma.” Philosophical Studies 42 (3): 761–777. McKenzie, Kerry. 2017. “Ontic Structural Realism.” Philosophy Compass. https:// doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12399. Mercier, Hugo, and Dan Sperber. 2017. The Enigma of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Morriston, Wes. 2001. “Must There Be a Standard of Moral Goodness Apart from God?” Philosophia Christi (Series 2) 3 (1): 127–138. Murphy, Mark C. 1998. “Divine Commands, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation.” Faith and Philosophy 15 (1): 3–27.

136  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON ———. 2012. “Restricted Theological Voluntarism.” Philosophy Compass 7 (10): 679–690. Nagasawa, Yujin. 2008. “A New Defence of Anselmian Theism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233): 577–596. ———. 2017. Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nolan, Daniel. 1997. “Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.” Notre Dame Journal for Formal Logic 38 (4): 535–572. ———. 2014. “Hyperintensional Metaphysics.” Philosophical Studies 17 (1): 149–160. ———, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. 2004. “Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3): 307–330. Oppy, Graham. 2006. Arguing About Gods. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pereboom, Derk. 2011. Consciousness and the Prospects for Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Plantinga, Alvin. 1980. Does God Have a Nature? Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Priest, Graham. 2006a. In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2006b. Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. New York: Oxford University Press. Prinz, Jesse J. 2007. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ruloff, Colin. 2014a. “Divine Thoughts and Fregean Propositional Realism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (1): 41–51. ———. 2014b. “Against Mind-Dependence.” Philo 17 (1): 92–98. ———. 2016. “On Propositional Platonism, Representation, and Divine Conceptualism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (4): 195–212. Russell, Bertrand. 1927. The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul. Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2014. “The Craziest Metaphysics of Mind.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92: 665–682. Stoljar, Daniel. 2006. Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen. 2006. “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10–11): 3–31. ———. 2008. Real Materialism: And Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Street, Sharon. 2006. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies 127 (1): 109–166.

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Tan, Peter. 2019. “Counterpossible Non-vacuity in Scientific Practice.” Journal of Philosophy 116 (1): 32–60. White, Roger. 2000. “Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes.” Noûs 34 (2): 260–276. Wielenberg, Erik. 2014. Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2016. “Ethics and Evolutionary Theory.” Analysis 76 (4): 502–515. Yalcin, Seth. 2012. “A Counterexample to Modus Tollens.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6): 1001–1024. Zagzebski, Linda. 1990. “What If the Impossible Had Been Actual?” In Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, edited by M. Beaty, 165–183. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

CHAPTER 10

Foundational Mind Theory Extended Joshua Rasmussen

1   Introduction This exchange with Professor Leon has been one of the most fun and far-reaching exchanges I have ever had. I am excited to see how it will continue to unfold. In this chapter, I want to fill out the mind-first (fundamental mind) hypothesis in more detail. Leon raises several important considerations and questions that serve to tighten our understanding of the foundation’s resources for making beings like us. I believe that by filling in more details, the advantages of the fundamental mentality account will shine ever more brightly. So let us have a closer look. I begin by highlighting an advantage of having a unified explanation of diverse things. Explanations illuminate the nature of the things they explain. For example, biologists seek an explanation of the common DNA found across biological organisms. This explanation, in terms of a common biological root, gives us deeper insight into the biological world. Similarly, physicists seek an explanation of physical laws in terms of simpler and more fundamental laws. The simpler, more fundamental laws explain—and thereby illuminate—all the other laws. In the same way, Leon and I are interested in an account of the foundation that provides the best ultimate explanation of everything else. We can take a scientific approach. Just as scientists search for the simplest, © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_10

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least ad hoc explanation of a set of observations, we may search for the simplest, least ad hoc explanation of the set of all dependent things (or of all observations of all dependent things). What unifies them? What explains them? To my mind, the simplest and most plausible account of the ultimate foundation is also the least arbitrary. It is the least ad hoc. Rather than positing arbitrary, unexplained complexities, the simplest theory is that the foundation has no arbitrary, unexplained complexities. Instead, it is simply maximal or complete in all its basic attributes. For the sake of hypothesis, suppose the foundation is maximal (i.e., lacking arbitrary limits). Let us call this hypothesis, M, for maximal. In what follows, I will unpack how M can make sense of all the diverse features we have considered so far, including order (organized complexity), mind, value, reason, and arbitrary limits. Along the way, I will address Leon’s considerations and show how I think they serve to sharpen the M hypothesis.

2  A Maximal Foundation Let us begin by getting clearer on the meaning of “maximality.” How could a foundation be maximal? What does that mean exactly? A maximal foundation, as I am thinking of it, is a foundation that is complete with respect to its fundamental (basic, uncaused) features. Here is what I mean. The fundamental features of a maximal foundation lack arbitrary boundaries. Limited features, like being six feet tall, mark a boundary between the actual and the potential. For example, a tree has a certain size and number of leaves. Its size and number of leaves mark the trees boundaries, its limits, which separate this particular tree from other potential trees. A maximal foundation, then, cannot be a tree, with arbitrary numbers of leaves. The fundamental features of a maximal foundation include no arbitrary boundaries in the most basic level of its nature. Now to be clear, I am using the term “potential” to cover any feature that is consistent with the principles of reason (i.e., a priori necessary truths). Later (in the Sect. 6, Explaining Reason), I will say why I think principles of reason are included in the foundation’s nature (thereby unifying metaphysical and a priori necessity). For now, I will stipulate—for the sake of neutrality—that “potential” covers the conceivable. In other words, as long as a feature is consistent with the principles of reason, I will call it “potential” (i.e., conceivable). My proposal so far, then, is

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that a maximal foundation would have no fundamental feature along a continuum of potentially (i.e., conceivably) surpassed magnitudes. I should also clarify that maximal features are not the same as infinite magnitudes. I agree with Leon that even infinite magnitudes are conceivably surpassed. The fundamental features, then, would be nonquantitative features, like being independent, being foundational, having supreme power, and so on. (Note: having supreme power is not a quantity of power, but a quality or kind of power; or, if we want to call it a “quantity,” it a special, unsurpassable quantity.) Another clarification: Since we are interested in the nature of a concrete foundation, we may, for the sake of modesty, narrow our scope to limits within concreta. For example, for any size of tree, there could— consistent with a priori principles of reason—be a taller tree with more leaves. Related: When I talk of “limits,” I am thinking of pure limits, which don’t contain non-limits relevant to value-conferring features. That is not to say that the surpassibility of limits only applies to concreta. After all, even limited abstract things, like numbers, are surpassable: e.g., for any number, there is (else: can be) a higher number. By the twin testimonies of reason and universal experience, one might think no pure limit is maximal conceivable. A final clarification springs out of Leon’s very nice point about the reals having no immediate neighbors. Arbitrary limits can be like a real number, with no immediate neighbor. Good point. So what makes the limit arbitrary? I say this: There is a conceivable (consistent with reason) neighbor in the vicinity. So, for example, if the foundation of existence were shaped like a six-fingered hand, its having six fingers rather than five or seven would be arbitrary. Let us now return to the implications of the no arbitrary limits principle. By shaving off arbitrary limits, we can further illuminate the nature of a maximal foundation. Last time, I suggested that the simplest account of foundational mind is in terms of a supreme nature. Here I wish to add that a supreme nature would also predict—and explain—the maximality of the foundation. Here is why: Whatever has limits (in its basic nature) is less than supreme. A fully supreme foundation, by contrast, would have supreme value and ipso facto lack fundamental limits. What about Leon’s worry about the risk that a supreme nature entails incompatible properties? He mentions, for example, the potential conflict between omnipotence and essential moral perfection. It is a valuable consideration. In fact, I recommend all readers reflect

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carefully on the implications of a supreme nature, especially when considering the potential predictive value or disvalue of the supreme mind hypothesis. For my part, I see good news even in this risk. First, it brings the supreme mind hypothesis out of a black box onto the table for real testing, where the light of reason could potentially falsify the hypothesis. Second, the arguments for incompatibility serve to separate different analyses of the divine attributes. To see just one analysis that attempts to show how divine power could be internally coherent and consistent with essential perfection, see Flint and Fredossa (1983). This analysis is only a beginning, with further critiques and analyses occupying an ongoing inquiry. For my part, I’ve not seen any successful deduction from the core concept of supreme value to any incoherence, or to no conceivable maximum. Instead, the arguments seem to me to sharpen the concepts in play, while shaving off problematic analyses or deductions. Third, beyond these fruits, I think Leon’s point about the open-ended consequences of a non-arbitrarily limited foundation invites us into further inquiry. Another good thing! In any case, I will seek to sharpen the concept of a maximal foundation as I consider its explanatory power. Here I wish to draw attention to an immediate theoretical advantage of the maximal mind hypothesis M: M is not arbitrary or ad hoc. In fact, viewed through the lens of a supreme nature, it is the simplest and least arbitrary hypothesis of the foundation anyone has conceived. Every other hypothesis, by contrast, posits arbitrary, unexplained limits at the ground layer. The simplicity of a supreme nature contributes to its intrinsic probability, which in turn contributes to the prior probability of M.

3  Explaining Order (Organized Complexity) Let us now consider the explanatory power of M. The fundamental layer of reality is the foundation of organized complexity. How? Why? The M hypothesis predicts good answers. For suppose the fundamental features flow from a supreme nature (the most intrinsically probable option). Then it follows that the foundation has intentional powers— since there is more value in having intentional powers than in their absence. With intentional powers, the foundation has the resources to aim toward a target, such as one in which complex creatures emerge.

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Before I address Leon’s questions, I would like to draw attention to the predictive success and depth of the foundational mind hypothesis. A foundational mind with intentional powers (rooted in its supreme, maximal nature) has resources to explain why any geometric forms exist at all. Leon agrees with me that the fundamental layer precedes particular geometric forms. Together we can ask, how so? Consider this account. The fundamental layer can produce geometric forms the same way we form pictures in our own minds: by direct intention. Just as you can form the geometry of a horse, say, in your mind, the foundation can form the geometry of superstrings by forming them in its own mind. While your “images” (i.e., geometric forms within your immediate awareness) are private to your mind, maybe the “images” the foundation produces could be public to all minds (and in that sense, “objective”). That’s one idea. In any case, a foundational mind could also explain the law-like, orderly motions of material forms. Laws reflect thoughts. For example, the law that “dense” material forms attract in a certain way reflects the thought that they attract in that way. The law has the same structure as the thought: Both “say” that things of a certain type do certain things under certain conditions. We can explain why: Laws have the structure of a thought because laws are thoughts acted upon. This theory explains why matter never vanishes like vapor. A rational foundation, then, provides a foundation for order throughout the universe. It provides a foundation for science. Notice that this account still leaves open Leon’s Principle of Material Causation (PMC). So far, I have granted Leon (for sake of argument) PMC. I want to separate that principle from other questions at hand. In particular, we saw that PMC leaves open questions about the necessity of the foundation: The foundation could have a necessary nature even if contingent things are “made from” necessary stuff (like cookies made from dough). Furthermore, we can separate PMC from this question: Does the fundamental layer have a mental nature? Let me clear: I am not proposing that the foundational layer is itself fundamentally material stuff (whatever that even means). Rather, the proposal is that the foundation is fundamentally subjective (a subjective substance with intentional powers). This vision is consistent with PMC: If the ground layer is subjective, then “material” forms could be like mental images stamped onto the canvass of God’s imagination.

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That’s one option. Here is another: A foundational mind produces a world ex nihilo and then sustains an order in which PMC holds. There are many options open for further inquiry, and we need not let them distract us from the more fundamental question at hand. Here is another fruit, one that is easy to miss. A foundational mind simplifies our ontology. It is ironic to me that purely mind-independent stuff beyond all that we know would be associated with simplicity. The opposite is so. There is no need for the extra posit of mindlessness. A foundational mind, by contrast, is like everything else we know in experience: We know thoughts, feelings, geometric images, laws, ideas, and ourselves. All these things are elements of a mind. With a fundamental mind, the root of all subjective things is itself subjective. There is no need to posit additional sorts of things. Here, then, are three favorable results so far: The foundational mind hypothesis (i) springs from an intrinsically probable hypothesis, (ii) has great explanatory power, and (iii) unifies our ontology. Now for Leon’s points. I think they actually serve to help us see some additional fruits of the M hypothesis. Leon points out that a purely “natural” foundation could still have a tendency toward some good endpoint. Yes! Still, why does it have that tendency? To see the value of a deeper explanation, imagine a team of scientists land on Jupiter and discover an arrow marked in sand. They walk in the direction the arrow is pointing until they arrive at a large cube with a door. They open the door and go inside. Inside the cube, they see an animated contraption that displays of the planets of our solar system revolving around the sun. As the scientists study the contraption, they discover that its materials are composed of micro-machines that allow the planets to self-repair if something damages them. What might these scientists think about the arrow they saw outside? Would they say it was a “natural” phenomenon, with no mind behind it? Technically, it could be. But why does the arrow happen to be pointed toward the sort of thing we’d expect from minds? Return to the foundational mind hypothesis. It gives a deeper explanation of the teleological arrow. Keep in mind that the mind hypothesis is rooted in an intrinsically probably (simple, non-ad hoc, non-arbitrary) M hypothesis. To be clear, the M hypothesis doesn’t cause the intentions of the foundation. Rather, it explains them, or at least predicts them. This explanation reduces mystery: It is not at all surprising that the foundation would “happen” to be non-arbitrary (again, given the simplicity of

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the hypothesis). A mental foundation, rooted in supreme value, explains teleology. Without M, by contrast, it is completely surprising—and vanishingly unlikely—that the “teleological” arrow at the foundation of things would happen to point toward anything but a mess of sand. It is so unlikely, in fact, that to my mind, it is completely absurd to think the arrow has no deeper explanation. It would be like finding a love note with your name on it, but no mind behind it. Unlikely. What about the multiverse? Could that explain teleology? Not by itself. A multiverse is like an infinite desert. If we discover an arrow on an infinite desert pointing toward a planetary timepiece, the size of the desert does not itself explain the pattern we see. After all, infinite deserts might have no arrows and no timepieces. Similarly, multiverse hypotheses might have no organized complexity in any universe. (In case someone wonders whether a multiverse could simply include all possibilities, notice a contradiction: The possibility that all reality is empty precludes the possibility that some parts of reality are not empty.) Ironically, the best multiverse hypothesis is going to follow from the simplest, least arbitrary theory of the foundation, which is M! If instead we give a multiverse hypothesis without M, then we have only pushed the “arrow” back a step. We’ve relocated the puzzle. To my mind, therefore, reflection on the multiverse only points to the value of having a non-arbitrary, simple explanation of the teleological arrow. The M hypothesis provides this deeper explanation. Maybe Professor Leon could celebrate this result! That said, Leon is certainly right to ask whether there may be other, more specific observations that disconfirm the mind hypothesis. For my part, I cannot see how the mere existence of uninhabitable places calls into question the least arbitrary account of the foundation. Of course, I acknowledge that specific observations about death and destruction can indeed raise questions about the nature and goals of a foundational mind. Is it bad mind? We will look closely at some of these questions in Part III, when we discuss the problem of evil. Here, I observe merely that places without organized complexity do nothing to mitigate the value of explaining places with organized complexity. To illustrate, imagine again the scientists who find an arrow on Jupiter pointing to sophisticated, self-repairing technologies. Suppose they also find that Jupiter is largely empty—and uninhabitable. Should they then chalk up the arrow to blind causes? Certainly not. Just because

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there are places where complex technologies do not exist, it does not follow that mental activity is not ultimately behind the technologies that do exist. For now, we can see that the M hypothesis has some strikingly valuable features: (i) It is non-arbitrary and non-ad hoc, (ii) has resources to explain the existence of geometric forms, (iii) has resources to explain the orderly motion of things, (iv) simplifies and unifies our ontology (by razoring off unnecessary mindless stuff), (v) and solves the fine-tuning problem by explaining the teleological “arrow.”

4  Explaining Mind To my great interest, Leon joins me in taking minds seriously. He doesn’t eliminate minds; nor is he inclined to analyze them purely in terms of non-minds. He recognizes, moreover, the advantage of having something like (proto) representational or (proto) phenomenal states in the foundation of things. The advantage is this: Unless we have mind-like resources at the ground layer, we have a construction problem. Some constructions are impossible. Just as you cannot construct prime ministers from prime numbers or black steel from white marble, it seems you cannot construct sensations from sand. In general, you cannot construct sense from non-sense, thought from non-thought, and mind from mindless motions. Or, if such constructions are somehow possible, they are not thereby probable without a foundational mind. Mental (or proto-mental) resources at the foundation solve both the construction problem and the probability problem. Leon and I agree. Our overlap in understanding of the foundation of minds is significant and worth celebrating. At the risk of being overly optimistic, I anticipate that we may achieve an even greater unity of understanding by seeing how the M hypothesis further illuminates many things. We have already seen how a supreme nature predicts a non-arbitrary foundation with intentional powers. This same account also predicts our solution to the construction problem: Instead of constructing sense from pure non-sense, we now have the right resources and powers at the ground layer. Still, Leon suggests that my theory, like every other theory of mind requires rejecting something plausible. While he is right that many theories do indeed reject plausible principles, M is not like every other theory. First, M flows from the least arbitrary theory of the foundation

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(as supreme), which counts in favor of its intrinsic probability. Second, M illuminates (and successfully predicts) a wide range of data, perhaps the widest possible. In particular, through the lens of supreme value (the simplest account), we not only have the least arbitrary foundation, we also have the least arbitrary mind (since a supremely valuable mind lacks arbitrary limits). Hence, M gives us the right materials: Dependent minds spring from the foundational, supreme mind. Leon suggests that Russell’s monism is at least as good as my account. I have intriguing news: The features Leon proposes don’t compete with my account. Leon proposes that the foundation has (proto) representational or (proto) phenomenal states. That’s built into my account. I have more intriguing news: We can explain the foundation’s (proto) representational or (proto) phenomenal states. We need not treat (proto) intentional states as an uncaused “arrow”; they flow from a root feature of the foundation. Rather than positing arbitrary complexity, we can explain the arrow in terms of the least arbitrary theory of the foundation. The root of the foundation’s mental nature is its supreme value. From this single root, we can explain—and thus illuminate—why the foundation has any representational or phenomenal states in the first place. What about the correlations between mental and physical states? Are these correlations a problem for a foundational mind? They are not. On the contrary, a foundational mind makes excellent sense of them. Recall the “thoughts” account of laws we considered earlier. This account explains the psychophysical laws that hold between our mental episodes and chemical reactions. For example, healthy thinking affects the health of a brain because there is a law that certain axons in your brain fire in a certain way when you have certain thoughts. This law is the (acted upon) thought that certain axions fire in a certain way when you have certain thoughts. So far so good. Without a fundamental mind, by contrast, it is perplexing how shifts in shape could have anything to do with shifts in sensation. A foundational mind with intentional powers has the resources to provide a deeper explanation. I have even more intriguing news: A foundational mind has the resources to solve the so-called binding problem. The binding problem is the problem of explaining how different experiences are unified into a single perspective. What binds them together? Here is the simplest, least ad hoc answer I can think of: a single subject unifies the diverse elements. This account fills out our theory of the foundation. The simplest, least ad

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hoc account of the foundation is that its (proto) representational states are themselves unified by a single subject. The foundation is not a scatter of disparate sensations and thoughts. The deepest and simplest account, rather, is that there is a single root of all its sensations and thoughts. A single subject unifies them all. Rather than positing a scatter of “dots” that differ in nature from every subjective element we know via immediate experience, we can shave off unnecessary complexities. We can unify our account everything. All things spring from the simplest, least arbitrary, most unified foundation of all minds, just as M predicts.

5  Explaining Value If the many advantages we have seen were not enough, there are still more. A supreme nature within a foundational mind illuminates the axiological dimension of reality. From this single root of value springs both (i) abstract moral principles and (ii) the intentional resources to produce people capable of apprehending those principles. No other meta-ethical theory explains so much with so little. Leon’s survey of the relevant literature is beautiful and helpful. I only wish to add how I think a foundational mind fits with contemporary moral theory. Two clarifications are in order. First, M still leaves open the wide range of secular moral theories. M underwrites—rather than competes with all the normative theories Leon mentions, including contractarianism, consequentialism, various forms of constructivism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and among many others. We can think of these normative theories as compasses. A moral compass helps us navigate the moral landscape. Different moral theories are different compasses. My purpose is not to tell you what compass is best. Take any that looks right to you. What I want to understand, more fundamentally, is why any moral compass exists at all. Examples illustrate why the particular moral compasses do not themselves explain morality. Suppose contractarians have it right: Moral principles are grounded in principles of rationality. Still, why are there these principles of rationality? Or suppose moral principles are rooted in principles of welfare (per consequentialists or virtue ethicists). Then why are there any principles of welfare? The principle that (say) if people exist, they should not harm each other just for the fun of it is real, whether you

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happen to be thinking about that principle or not. So, why are there any principles like that? Particular theories may reduce or explain moral principles in terms of other principles. But what explains the other principles? Why do any principles give rise to axiology? M explains why any moral compass exists. Here is why. The deepest and simplest ultimate explanation of axiology is in terms of an axiological foundation. The least arbitrary axiological foundation would lack arbitrary boundaries and limits. It would have a supreme—and hence morally perfect—nature. Such a nature would—by virtue of its perfection—include the perfect rules of personal engagement. Again, this account doesn’t compete with secular moral theories; it gives them a home. A secular moral theory describes the moral lines within this home; the principles of goodness and justice are the basic principles contained within the home of a perfect nature. By this light, if you are accountable to purely secular moral principles, you are ipso facto accountable to principles in the nature of a supreme foundation. A second clarification: I do not claim that any nature makes values, like justice and mercy, good. Leon mentions the modified Euthyphro Dilemma. Right! In fact, that very dilemma has persuaded me to think it is a mistake to suppose that God’s nature grounds all morality, including the principles that comprise God’s own nature. I join Swinburne on this point: Morality is bedrock in its own right. So we agree: Some things are intrinsically wrong, independently of what anyone says, thinks, or is. God’s nature, then, doesn’t make the principles of right and wrong. To be clear, then, I say that the perfect nature contains—not makes— the principles of value. To be precise, all value—and all principles of value—flows from a single simple feature, perfection. Here, perfection itself is valuable in a basic way. Perfection is not valuable because it is part of God’s nature. Rather, perfection is part of the foundation’s nature because the foundation is supreme. Moreover, I want to emphasize that my argument for a moral foundation is about epistemic probability, not grounding. A supreme foundation predicts (makes probable) the existence of abstract moral principles. It also predicts that the foundation has the resources to aim to produce moral agents who can apprehend those principles. These twin predictions display additional theoretical fruit of the least arbitrary account of the foundation.

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6  Explaining Reason Of the theoretical fruits of the least arbitrary account, there appears to be no end in sight. I draw attention to yet another fruit: A supreme nature in a foundational mind would not only include principles of supreme living (ethics), it would also include principles of supreme thinking (logic). Why should reality care to include principles about how people should think? Why care about people? Here is why: The foundation of reality has a supreme nature, which—by virtue of its supremacy—contains the principles of perfect thinking. To be clear, just as one’s nature does not make anything intrinsically right or intrinsically wrong, a supreme foundation doesn’t make propositions representational. My thought, rather, is that a supreme foundation provides a context for propositions; it predicts their existence. This distinction between making and predicting alleviates a host of Leon’s Euthyphro-style concerns. God doesn’t decree logic. God’s nature contains it: Lines of logic characterize the foundation’s supreme nature. Similarly, logic doesn’t hold because some nature contains it (per the Modified Euthyphro Dilemma). Rather, the foundation’s nature contains the principles of supreme reasoning because the foundation is supreme. To answer Leon’s clarification question about whether abstracta must be related to a foundational mind, I say that my argument does not require that the relation be one of grounding. Instead, it is one of prediction: A perfect mind predicts perfect principles of reason (and whatever they entail). Notice that I have left open what the principles are. I have not said which system of logic is correct, or even whether or not propositions are intrinsically representational. For our purposes, we can leave these things open. Just as I leave open which moral compass is best, I leave open which logic compass is best. We still have much to explore in the logical landscape. My interest here has been to account for why any logical landscape exists at all. What about the problems Leon mentions? Leon rightly points out that even if the raw existence of principles of reason provides some evidence for a foundational mind, still, that leaves open specific challenges. Leon offers us ten to consider. Ten! What are we to do? This: see that all ten are fully consistent with the hypothesis that true logic is part of the nature of a mental foundation. In fact, we can expect

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there to be many unexplored and perplexing places in the logical landscape precisely if logic is part of a supreme nature. After all, we can expect a supreme nature to include lines that move out of our current, limited sight. Perfect sight is not required for some sight. I think it will be helpful to see Leon’s challenges as pressing against the goodness of the foundation. Then, we can separate questions about the details of the logical landscape from questions relevant to the goodness of the foundation (e.g., would a good foundation cause there to be beings capable of making logical mistakes?). We will have the opportunity to examine challenges to goodness in depth in Part III. We can bracket them for now.

7  Explaining Limits So far, we have seen that M bears many fruits. First, it is simple, which contributes to its intrinsically probability. Second, through the single, simple root of supreme value, M is highly fruitful, by explaining or predicting such diverse things as, (i) the power to produce geometric forms, (ii) the existence of orderly motions, (iii) fine-tuning (the arrow) pointing toward complex creatures, (iv) intentional powers and consciousness, (v) axiological principles, (vi) moral agents, (vii) principles of reason, and (viii) agents capable of apprehending (at least some) principles of reason. Third, a mental foundation (predicted by supreme value) simplifies and unifies our ontology. Here, I add yet one more advantage to the list: The least arbitrary theory allows us to have an ultimate explanation of all limits. Rather than have brute, unexplained limits in our ontology, the least arbitrary theory allows us to shave off arbitrary, unexplained limits everywhere. By universal experience, all limits alike have an explanation. Even limits of abstract things, like the number pie, are explained by more fundamental principles of reason, rooted in a supreme nature. What about Leon’s point that science has a track record of explaining limits in terms of other things that also have limits? It is a good point. Fortunately, it is also consistent with the advantage of having an ultimate explanation of limits. Compare: Trees come from other trees, but we do not expect the ultimate explanation of all trees to be a tree. Moreover, there is empirical evidence pointing to a decrease in limits as we move backward in time and/or deeper into the foundation. We observe that previous states tend to be simpler, with the initial singularity

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being the simplest, least limited of all geometric states. By extrapolation, then, we can expect the ultimate foundation to be the least arbitrary and hence least limited of all. So, rather than posing a problem for the least arbitrary account, the track record of experience exposes yet another advantage of the least arbitrary account. In view of all these advantages of the least arbitrary account, I have a question for Professor Leon: Why not think the least arbitrary account is true?

Reference Flint, T. P., and A. J. Freddoso. 1983. “Maximal Power.” In The Existence and Nature of God, edited by Alfred J. Freddoso, 81–113. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

CHAPTER 11

Filling Out a Naturalistic Picture via Spinoza and Russell Felipe Leon 1   Introduction In the previous chapter, Rasmussen raised some helpful comments and criticisms of some lines of reasoning in my initial case against a personal foundation. He also provided helpful further clarification of his own position. In the present chapter, I aim to address Rasmussen’s comments. Along the way, I will further clarify my own positive position about the nature of foundational reality. The plan of the chapter is as follows. First, I will briefly discuss some methodological preliminaries for determining the fine-grained character of foundational reality. Second, I will further explicate the space of epistemic possibilities with respect to views about this finer-grained character. Finally, I will apply the methodology to a (hopefully representative sampling of) the relevant data to select a view (or range of views) among the space of epistemic possibilities. Along the way, I will address Rasmussen’s comments and criticisms.

2   Preliminaries: Methodology Perhaps it’s most helpful to address Rasmussen’s questions and concerns by reviewing and further clarifying my own preferred approach to evaluating accounts of foundational reality and offering some (extremely tentative) conclusions about the sort of view toward which (I think) the relevant data seem to point. © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_11

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Start with methodology. Rasmussen asks what I would use in place of the principle of non-arbitrary limits. In response, I recommend following standard philosophical practice of evaluating large-scale metaphysical theories by means of inference to the best explanation. On this approach, theories are evaluated and ranked in terms of the extent to which they embody the standard theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, scope, conservatism, and predictive and retrodictive success. In addition, since such large-scale metaphysical theories go beyond Moorean facts, commonsense truths, and scientific knowledge, it makes sense to begin with a stance of agnosticism when evaluating them and letting the data lead us to the theory that best embodies these virtues.

3  The Spectrum of Relevant Hypotheses With our primary methodology of inference to the best explanation, our stance of initial neutrality, and our openness to follow the evidence where it leads in place, we turn to consider the range of candidate hypothesis for explaining the relevant data. In a previous chapter, I mentioned the old, coarse-grained debate between theism and atheism, where these views were construed as classical theism and conservative naturalism, respectively. I also indicated that such a characterization of the debate artificially limits the space of epistemic possibilities, since there is a spectrum of epistemically possible hypotheses regarding the nature of foundational reality. To bring this out, I focused on the naturalistic side of the spectrum, with a brief look at conservative, moderate, and liberal forms of naturalism. Presently, however, I think it is important to sketch a much wider range of epistemically possible candidate hypotheses regarding foundational reality. Such a spectrum includes not only readily recognizable versions of theism and naturalism, but a wide spectrum of hypotheses in between, including those that blend features of both extremes. So, for example, there is pantheism, which is the view that the universe is divine in some important sense. There is also panentheism, which is the view that the universe is a proper part of the divine. There is also ordinal polytheism, according to which there is an infinite hierarchy of gods, each one greater than its predecessor on the scale in terms of its knowledge, power, and virtue (Steinhart 2013). There are also views that take the divine to be non-personal, such as those associated with various non-Western religious traditions.

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Other views lie ambiguously on the divide between naturalism and supernaturalism. Perhaps the most familiar of these is Spinozism. Spinoza famously held that God is the only substance, of which all else are modes. Furthermore (and like a version of liberal naturalism), the one substance is metaphysically necessary and has both physical and mental attributes. It also, arguably, comprises a multiverse, as all possibilities inevitably flow from its essence. Another hypothesis in the vicinity is priority cosmopsychism, according to which foundational reality is both physical and mental, and the global-scale mentality is ontologically prior to or more fundamental than any “smaller” phenomenal states in nature there may be.1 Yet another line-blurring family of hypotheses is idealism, according to which only the mental exists. Idealism is currently making a comeback, and as a result, a variety of versions of idealism have proliferated. Some of these are of course theistic (cf. Berkeley’s version); others are not.2 We can also imagine variations on and between the list of views mentioned here, and no doubt many that we have yet to even conceive.3 The challenge, of course, is to find data that are sufficiently fine-grained to push one to one of the hypotheses over the others, rather than pushing one toward a family or disjunction of views over a family or disjunction of others, at best. Given the smooth, continuous spectrum of views about ultimate foundations, we see that the standard “theism vs. naturalism” dichotomy is simplistic and unhelpful. We also see that it’s much more challenging to find data that are fine-grained enough to support one view on the spectrum over another, esp. when (a) the neighboring views tend to blend into one another in their features and (b) some blended views aren’t clearly naturalistic or supernaturalistic. On a more positive and conciliatory note, though, we see that the potential to find commonality, agreement, and congeniality between theist and non-theist is high. So far, we have a methodology and (hopefully) a representative spectrum of epistemically possible hypotheses. The final component of our search for the truth about foundational reality is of course the relevant data to be explained. Here, I will further expand upon my assessment of the data raised by Rasmussen, answering objections along the way. 1 Nagasawa 2 See,

and Wager (2017) and Nagasawa (Forthcoming). for example, Chalmers (Forthcoming); several papers in Goldschmidt and Pearce

(2018). 3 Cf. Schellenberg (2009, 2013).

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4  Material Causes and a Partly Material Foundation Again As I argued in Part I, the data of contingency when conjoined with PMC push me to start with at least a partly material foundation that is either factually or metaphysically necessary. Professor Rasmussen says he can accept PMC, at least for sake of argument. I am grateful for his insights, which have pushed me to further my thinking on this issue. Before leaving the topic, however, I will argue presently that we can generate the same problem for Anselmian theism from an even weaker version of PMC: Weak PMC: Possibly, every concrete object (and aggregate of such) that has an originating or sustaining efficient cause has an originating or sustaining material cause, respectively.

In simple terms, Weak PMC says that it is possible that all made things are made from or out of other things. A bit more carefully, it says that there is at least one possible world in which all concrete individuals and stuffs that are made are made from or out of other concrete individuals or stuffs. Now my own view is of course that a much stronger version of PMC is true—viz. that it holds of metaphysical necessity. But we’ve also seen that there are strong grounds for thinking PMC holds in at least the actual world: It’s intuitive, it has no uncontroversial exceptions, and it’s encoded in the well-confirmed conservation laws of physics. A fortiori, then, there is intuitive evidence to warrant the claim that there is at least one possible world W in which such a principle is non-vacuously true. But if so, then in W, some concrete objects are made, and all concrete objects that are made are made from other things or stuff. And if so, then no concrete objects in W that are made are made ex nihilo, in which case no god or gods made them ex nihilo in W. But on classical Anselmian theism, for any world that contains concrete objects or stuffs distinct from God, at least some of those objects or stuffs were made ex nihilo. It follows that the God of classical Anselmian theism doesn’t exist in W. But if so, then by (i) the fact that classical Anselmian theism entails that God is a metaphysically necessary being, and (ii) Axiom S5 of S5 modal logic, it follows that such a God doesn’t exist in any world, and therefore, a fortiori, such a God doesn’t exist in the actual world. Therefore, the same conclusion can be gotten from even a very weak version of PMC.

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5  Final Causes and Fine-Tuning Again Given that the foundation is prima facie at least partly material (or whatever matter is ultimately made of—whatever it is, it can’t be something that violates conserved quantities laws, so it would require God [if God exists] to transfer conserved quantities of physical energy when creating the universe, which seems to imply that either God is a physical being, or that God created the universe out of preexisting physical stuff4), there are grounds to think the explanation is in terms of more individuals or stuffs that are at least partly material. This backdrop provides the basis for assessing the data of final causes and fine-tuning. When we combine this with (a) theism’s bootstrapping problem with respect to accounting for functional complexity in terms of brute uncaused functional complexity (mentioned in Chapter 9, and discussed further below), (b) considerations of qualitative parsimony, and (c) PMC (given PMC, the posterior probability of cosmic fine-tuning on the hypothesis that the God of classical theism created it ex nihilo and designed it is zero), the data push me toward a naturalistic, many-universes hypothesis. In the previous chapter, Professor Rasmussen raised worries about ground-floor final causes in a naturalistic universe. His reply provides an opportunity to clarify my point that he was there addressing: My point was not that naturalism requires uncaused final causes at the foundation; nor was it that the sort of naturalism toward which I’m inclined includes base-level final causes (I’m agnostic about the matter). Rather, my point was that theistic hypotheses seem to require it (in God’s being), and that since this is so, this deflates the surprisingness of fine-tuning. To clarify my point, perhaps it’s helpful to start with Hume’s “Who designed the designer?” dilemma: Either all organized complexity requires an intelligent designer, or at least some doesn’t. If the former, then since God exhibits organized complexity, then God requires an intelligent designer. If the latter, then we lose our reason for thinking the physical universe needs one. Both hypotheses might then allow for the possibility of brute uncaused organized complexity at the ground floor. But this works to the advantage of the non-theistic hypothesis.

4 Fales

(2009).

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By contrast, my point is the slightly different one that, given that God exhibits organized complexity at the metaphysical ground floor (in his nature) that he did not and cannot create, he is like a giant uncaused watch at the foundation of reality that causes other watches (albeit an immaterial one). And given that this is so, theism makes watch complexity uncaused by intelligence unsurprising (since God is such a “watch”). This point highlights theism’s bootstrapping problem with respect to final causes/functional complexity: It demands an intelligent cause of all functional complexity and posits God as its ultimate cause. But since God himself exhibits functional complexity, this would require him to exist prior to himself in order to cause his own functional complexity/ the final causes within his very nature, which is absurd. If, therefore, theism is to avoid this kind of bootstrapping problem, it must allow that some final causes/functional complexity can exist without an intelligent cause. Professor Rasmussen recorded his incredulity at the thought of final causes not produced by intelligence. Is such incredulity justified? Aristotle didn’t think so. Furthermore, Hume famously argued that the theist’s appeal to a double-barreled a priori principle that functional complexity only comes from intelligence, and never from non-personal causes, is not supported by either a priori or empirical evidence. I take no stance one way or the other. I only assert that if such incredulity is justified, then this is a problem for theism, not naturalism.

6  Mind Again In Chapter 9, I offered initial reasons for why the data of phenomenal consciousness push me toward a foundation that is at least partly phenomenal. Here I will expand on this further. First, recall the explanatory gap argument I discussed in Chapter 9: Both non-liberal naturalisms and classical theism have an “explanatory gap” problem, since science only tells us about the structure and dynamics of matter (i.e., its extrinsic, relational properties). As D. M. Armstrong put it: [I]f we look at properties of physical objects that physicists are prepared to allow them, such as mass, electric charge, or momentum, these show a distressing tendency to dissolve into relations one object has to another. What, then, are the things that have these relations to each other? Must

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they not have a non-relational nature if they are to sustain relations? But what is this nature? Physics does not tell us.5,6

There is thus pressure to say that there must be some stock of intrinsic properties to physical reality, and yet physical reality seems to lack such properties. The only intrinsic properties we know of are phenomenal properties of subjective experience. The Russellian monist thus posits that phenomenal properties ground the relational properties of physics, thereby solving both the mind-body problem and the intrinsic properties problem at once. In reply, Professor Rasmussen rightly points out that the most formidable problem for Russellian monism is the combination problem: How can combinations of bits of phenomenal states be built up into wholes that constitute the apparently “smooth” and coherent experiences of ordinary conscious experience? Many proposed solutions have been given.7 My favorite is priority cosmopsychism, which offers a top-down solution.8 According to this solution, the phenomenal state of the whole universe is ontologically prior to the phenomenal states of its parts. But if so, then phenomenal states of humans and other sentient beings aren’t built up out of smaller phenomenal “atoms,” in which case the combination problem does not arise. (Note, though, that global phenomenality doesn’t entail global selfconsciousness or rationality, and the global phenomenal state may well be a “mess.” Cf. Goff [2017].) Why not substance dualism? Four considerations lead me to think it less plausible than Russellian monism. First, as I argued in the previous chapter, substance dualism—at least of the sort associated with classical theism—violates PMC. Second, substance dualism violates conservation laws. Third, substance dualism is a bad fit with the Great Chain of Being. Finally, it’s prima facie odd to say that neurons would behave differently than they actually do if souls didn’t interact with them (Schwitzgebel 2014). 5 Armstrong

(1968, p. 282). (1986) argued that shape is an intrinsic property of material objects, but Davidson (2013) has argued persuasively that shape is relative to a given inertial reference frame. 7 For a sampling, see Bruntrup and Jaskolla (2016), Alter and Nagasawa (2015). For other interesting responses, see (e.g.) Goff (2017) and Bohn (2018). 8 Nagasawa and Wager (2017) and Nagasawa (Forthcoming). 6 Lewis

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For our purposes, it’s also worth noting that, given its incompatibility with PMC, substance dualism entails the falsity of classical theism. For according to substance dualism, minds or souls are immaterial substances, which are concrete objects or substances as I have defined them. But if they have an originating or sustaining efficient cause, then by PMC, immaterial souls or minds require an originating or sustaining material cause, respectively. But then either immaterial souls are eternal and uncaused—like the God of classical theism—or new souls are ultimately created from one or more other uncreated soul or soul-stuff. The former view is incompatible with classical theism, according to which God is the ultimate, uncaused cause of contingent concrete reality that happens to exist in any given possible world. And while the latter view might be strictly compatible with classical theism, it requires that we are ultimately made from God’s soul—literal chips off the old block. If so, then it may well be hard to find data to differentiate classical theism from neighboring views, such as pantheism and other views mentioned earlier. Given the preceding points, therefore, the data, when evaluated by means of the standard theoretical virtues of simplicity, scope, and conservatism, push me toward foundational phenomenal or proto-phenomenal states, and to something like Russellian monism or priority cosmopsychism.

7  Morality Again As per Chapter 9, the data of morality push me toward the objective principles of right and wrong and good and bad, and the problems with theistic ethics push me toward a secular account: For example, either they’re necessary truths in a Platonic realm of abstracta, along with the principles of mathematics, or they’re constructivist truths, or they’re truths about what’s good for us as members of our species. Professor Rasmussen replied that his foundation of a supreme theistic foundation provides a better explanation of such data, since (a) the latter hypothesis explains them in terms of a foundation that has unlimited axiological properties, which flow from a single property of perfection, and (b) naturalistic accounts can’t explain why any basic moral principles exist at all. Start with (a). As I argued in Chapter 9, the hypothesis of a supreme foundation that flows from a property of perfection seems problematic to me, and for the reasons mentioned there: (i) There are notoriously difficult problems with the divine attributes, both when taken singly and when taken jointly, and (b) if the account of divine perfection or supremacy is revised so as to handle these concerns by defining it in terms of

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having the greatest maximal consistent set of such properties, then it’s no longer clear that any being will uniquely satisfy these desiderata. Given these problems, it’s not clear to me that the hypothesis of a supreme foundation outranks my preferred liberal naturalist hypothesis in terms of explaining the relevant data. What about (b)? On the Platonistic account of moral truths, the moral principles are necessary truths, on a par with the truths of mathematics. Furthermore, these truths are grounded in intrinsic relations between certain sorts of states of affairs and normative moral properties. Finally, these states of affairs and moral properties are abstract objects that exist necessarily and a se, in the same way God is supposed to exist. As such, they need no further explanation for why they exist, any more than a necessarily existent God would need a further explanation for why it exists.9 On (at least some interpretations of) Kantian constructivist accounts, moral principles inevitably flow from constitutive features of rational agents. These constitutive features ground facts about what rational agents will take as basic reasons for action. On such versions of Kantian constructivism, then, we have an explanation of the existence of basic moral principles in terms of the existence of rational agents. Finally, on neo-Aristotelian accounts, moral principles are grounded in facts about what are good for us as members of a species. Furthermore, facts about what is good for us are in turn grounded in facts about our biological purposes or functions. Finally, biological functions are explained in terms of what biological traits, organs, or systems helped members of a species survive and reproduce in their natural habitats under normal conditions.10

9 For

a careful defense of a view of this sort, see Wielenberg (2014). Graham (2011). Alvin Plantinga (1993) argues that the notion of proper function and cognate notions—purpose, plan, design, malfunction, etc.—are essentially connected to the notion of intelligent design. Furthermore, Plantinga argues that attempts to give naturalistic accounts of function in terms of natural selection and evolutionary history have failed miserably, further shoring up this claim. But, argues Plantinga, the best candidate for the intelligent designer of our cognitive faculties is the god of theism. However, adequate naturalistic evolutionary accounts of function have since be given that avoid Plantinga’s criticisms. See, for example, Bardon (2006), Wunder (2008), Graham (2011). Such accounts also provide an adequate response to Rasmussen’s concerns about how teleology or final causes can arise in a naturalistic universe. 10 Cf.

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8  Abstract Objects It’s now time to consider the data of abstract objects. Suppose we are persuaded by (say) one-over-many arguments, indispensability arguments, and/or theoretical utility arguments that abstract objects such as universals exist. Do they support theism over naturalism? It doesn’t seem so to me. In fact, I think abstract objects are problematic for theism. I have argued for this claim at length elsewhere,11 so here I will briefly summarize a sampling of reasons in favor of a non-theistic version of platonism about abstract objects over standard theistic accounts. First, abstract objects pose a number of serious problems for theism on straight platonism. For one thing, they conflict with the aseitysovereignty doctrine, according to which God depends on nothing distinct from himself for his existence, and everything distinct from God depends upon God for their existence.12 For on straight platonism, abstract objects don’t depend on anything outside themselves for their existence; they are uncreated, necessarily existent beings that exist a se. For another thing, abstracta are more fundamental than God, for they are God’s “metaphysical parts” on which he depends, and/or out of which he is composed.13 Relatedly, on straight platonism, God’s existence is a function of the structure of platonic or modal space. This is nicely illustrated by the way in which Plantinga’s modal ontological argument works.14 Plantinga’s modal ontological argument aims to demonstrate the existence of a modally ultimate being, upon which all else depends for its existence. But the argument seems to require an ontologically prior Platonic modal space, of which God’s existence is a function (of its existence and structure).15 On such a picture, abstract objects are fundamental, and God is an intermediary, derivative layer of reality—sandwiched between the

11 Leon

(2019). (1980), Morris and Menzel (1986), Davidson (1999, 2013), Gould (2014), and Craig (2016). 13 Plantinga (1980), Davidson (2015), and Craig (2016). 14 Plantinga (1974, 1977). 15 Rather like a modal analogue of the way in which (some argue that) our universe is a function of the nature and structure of relativistic quantum fields. 12 Plantinga

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layers of necessary abstracta and contingent concreta—contrary to the aims of the argument (and to the aseity-sovereignty doctrine). Such a being would be what I earlier called a necessary dependent being, and the platonic modal space on which it depends would be what I earlier called a necessary independent being. For yet another thing, abstracta threaten God’s supremacy in terms of his mode of existence. For then God is just one necessary being within a vast sea of infinitely many other necessary beings (viz. the abstract objects).16 Finally, straight platonism raises the specter of the Benacerraf problem,17 which threatens God’s omniscience: Prima facie, knowledge requires causal contact with the thing known. But causal contact is impossible with respect to abstract objects. Therefore, if abstract objects exist, then we cannot have knowledge of them. The same problem seems to arise for God’s knowledge of abstract objects. For if abstract objects are mind-independent and acausal, then God cannot interact with them in the way required for knowledge any more than we can. Platonism about abstract objects therefore poses a serious problem for God’s omniscience (Plantinga 2007; Baras 2017). Despite these problems and others that abstracta pose for theism, many theists accept their existence, and even aim to use them as evidence for God’s existence. For example, theistic activists argue that all abstract objects depend on God’s causal activity. However, straight theistic activism succumbs to a number of problems that have led even many theists to abandon it. Here I’ll mention two. First, the view gets the relevant counterpossibles wrong. For example: 1. If God didn’t exist, the sum of 1 and 1 would still equal 2. 2. If God didn’t exist, abstract objects would still exist. The theistic activist says both (1) and (2) are false (or at least vacuous). But this seems wrong; both seem clearly to be true. Perhaps, the main criticism that even many theists find compelling is the bootstrapping problem: In order for God to create or cause abstract

16 Plantinga (1980), Morris and Menzel (1986), Davidson (1999, 2013), Gould (2014), and Craig (2016). 17 Benacerraf (1973).

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objects, he must already have or exemplify some (e.g., the property of being able to create properties). But this requires God to be causally prior to himself to create his own properties, which is impossible. Now the theistic activist could modify their view and say that God creates all abstract objects “outside” himself, as it were, but then theistic activism looks unmotivated: If some abstract objects can exist without God’s help, why think any require his help? Another major theistic stance with respect to abstract objects is theistic conceptualism. According to this view, abstract objects are identified with items in the mind of God. On standard accounts, properties are divine concepts, propositions are divine thoughts, possible worlds are maximal consistent sets of divine thoughts, and sets are divine collections (Plantinga 1980, 1993, 2007; Welty 2014). In this way, theistic conceptualists aim to account for God as the creator or cause or ground of abstract objects. Despite its historical and contemporary popularity among theists, several criticisms have been leveled against it. First, if God causes his thoughts, then the bootstrapping problem we saw in our discussion of theistic activism arises all over again for theistic conceptualism. For on the latter view, properties are divine thoughts. But if so, then for God to have the property being able to create, he must first produce the corresponding concept. But before he can produce the corresponding concept, he must first have the property being able to create. Therefore, in order for God to create properties, he must already have some (Davidson 1999; Craig 2016). As with the theistic activist, it is up to the conceptualist to respond to the bootstrapping problem with a modified version of their view, according to which God’s nature is given a Platonistic or nominalistic construal. But then the same sorts of worries that arose for that view would seem to arise with the present view (Craig 2016). Second, theistic conceptualism seems to unduly restrict God’s freedom. For in order to explain the objectivity, necessity, and infinity of abstract objects, theistic conceptualism entails that God must think all of his thoughts (and just those thoughts) and must think them constantly (Oppy 2014; Craig 2016). Third, God’s thoughts are mental states and, as such, are concrete particular objects, not universals. But if so, then they can’t be repeatable or multiply-exemplifiable entities. But many abstract objects, such as properties and propositions, are repeatable entities. But if so, then prima

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facie, God’s mental states are unsuited to play the role assigned to them by theistic conceptualism (Gould and Davis 2014; Craig 2016). Fourth, theistic conceptualism seems to imply that God has ungodly thoughts. For if all propositions are divine thoughts, and there are propositions about things that are prima facie beneath the greatness and moral perfection of God—silly things, evil things, trivial things, naughty things, etc.—it follows that God has thoughts about things that are beneath him. Indeed, he must think about them, constantly (Oppy 2014). This seems problematic, given God’s greatness and moral perfection. Finally, there are worries about the content and granularity of God’s thoughts. For if God’s thoughts are inherently intentional or representational, as the theistic conceptualist insists, it’s not clear what his thoughts could be about with respect to merely possible entities. Some theistic conceptualists (Welty 2006; Leftow 2012) say that his thoughts are about his power to create. However, as has been pointed out (Adams 2013; Oppy 2014), it’s not clear that thoughts about God’s power alone are sufficiently fine-grained to individuate the objects of thought and to account for enough propositional content to account for omniscience. My own tentative hypothesis is something like straight platonism about abstract objects. This moves me from conservative to moderate naturalism, and when this is combined with my priority cosmopsychist version of Russellian monism, I am pushed from moderate to liberal naturalism. So far, we have a picture of foundational reality according to which there is one kind of stuff, it contains both physical and mental attributes, and it is a necessary being of some kind. This theory has very wide explanatory scope (see above, and my previous chapters). It also simplifies and unifies our experience of the world a great deal. However, some complexity remains: Even though we’ve reduced the two categories of mental and physical to one type of stuff, there remain two fundamental realms of abstracta and concreta. Furthermore, among the concrete, there are a huge variety of objects. That leaves us with two planks in our foundation, as it were, and with one that contains dubious heterogeneity. Can the liberal naturalist simplify their hypothesis further? Yes, and on both fronts. First, they can reduce the heterogeneity in their ontology of concrete objects in a number of ways. For example, they might adopt the popular neo-Carnapian approach to

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metametaphysics, according to which the multiplicity in the world is largely, if not purely, a function of the way we happen to carve it up conceptually.18 Alternatively, a liberal naturalist can adopt a realist metametaphysics and a “gunky” approach to substance. The latter approach fits nicely with the widely popular Everettian, many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.19 On this picture, there is only one kind of stuff—wave function stuff, as it were—out of which all else is composed. The liberal naturalist can also point out that particles are eliminated or reduced in contemporary physics, as these are subsumed under relativistic quantum field theory, according to which particles reduce to field excitations. The wave function stuff also obeys a single, simple, deterministic law—the Schrödinger equation.20 Second, they can reduce their ontology to a one-category ontology of properties (cf. Paul 2012, 2013, 2017). On at least one gloss of such a view, properties are fundamental, are the ultimate constituents of everything else, and exist necessarily and a se. Concrete objects are mereological bundles of properties that are joined by a relation of fusion. As an added explanatory bonus, such a view holds some promise of explaining logical truths and logical facts mentioned previously by Rasmussen. For example, Michael Jubien (2009) and Tony Roy (ms.) have argued that real, relevance-logic conditionals are best accounted for in terms of a more fundamental kind of entailment, viz. property entailment, where a property P entails another property Q just in case Q is a subcomplex of P. Similarly, they argue, all of the other standard valid inferences involving disjunctions, conjunctions, etc. can be accounted for in terms of intrinsic relations among properties. A liberal naturalist can therefore adopt a hypothesis of foundational reality that is very simple indeed.

9  Summing Up A lot of ground has been covered, so let me wrap up with a recap. The data of modal intuitions and related phenomena push me toward modal empiricism and mitigated modal skepticism; the data of contingent 18 For an important account of this sort, see Thomasson (2015). For an important collection of papers on metametaphysics, see Chalmers et al. (2009). 19 For an overview of different interpretations of quantum mechanics and their metaphysical implications, see. Lewis (2016), Maudlin (2019). 20 Or its relativistic cousin, the Dirac equation.

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concrete reality push me toward a factually or metaphysically necessary foundation; the data of material causality push me toward a necessary foundation that is at least partly material; the data of phenomenal consciousness push me toward a foundation that is at least partly phenomenal; the data of the spectrum of cognitive capacity, the principle of material causality, the dependence of the mental on the body, and the structure-and-dynamics argument push me away from substance dualism and toward Russellian monism; the data of the combination problem push me toward priority cosmopsychism; the data of morality point me toward moral facts that are objective, necessary, and independent of gods and humans; the data of organized complexity point me away from divine intelligence and toward either brute teleology or, more likely in my view, a simpler root in something like an evolutionary trial, error, and selection-of-variants picture of its foundation; the data of abstract objects push me away from nominalism, theistic conceptualism, and theistic activism, and toward some form of platonism; the data of counterpossible analysis point me toward the intrinsic intentionality of propositions; and the data of cosmic fine-tuning, when combined with the data regarding the principle of material causality and a factually or metaphysically necessary foundation that’s at least partly material, push me toward a multiverse. The picture that emerges is therefore something like a version of liberal naturalism—to a closer approximation, priority cosmopsychism. It seems to me that this hypothesis embodies the theoretical virtues (simplicity, scope, conservatism, etc.) at least as well as the theistic hypotheis, if not better. But if so, then at the very least, the relevant data discussed so far don’t favor theism over naturalism.

References Adams, Robert M. 2013. “Necessary by Nature? Possibility and the Mind of God.” On Brian Leftow’s God and Necessity. Marginalia Review of Books, December 20. https://marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/necessary-by-naturepossibility-and-the-mind-of-god/. Alter, Torin, and Yujin Nagasawa. 2015. In Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism, edited Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of Mind. London: Routledge. Baras, Dan. 2017. “A Reliability Challenge to Theistic Platonism.” Analysis 77 (3): 479–487.

168  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON Bardon, Adrian. 2006. “Reliabilism, Proper Function, and Serendipitous Malfunction.” Philosophical Investigations 30 (1): 47–64. Benacerraf, Paul. 1973. “Mathematical Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 70 (19): 661–679. Bohn, Einar Duenger. 2018. “Panpsychism, the Combination Problem, and Plural Collective Properties.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2): 383–394. Bruntrup, Godehard, and Ludwig Jaskolla, eds. 2016. Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, David. Forthcoming. “Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem.” In The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, edited by William Seager. New York: Routledge. ———, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, eds. 2009. Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Craig, William Lane. 2016. God over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Matthew. 1999. “A Demonstration Against Theistic Activism.” Religious Studies 35 (3): 277–290. ———. 2013. “Special Relativity and the Intrinsicality of Shape.” Analysis 74 (1): 57–58. ———. 2015. “God and Other Necessary Beings.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring ed. https://plato.stanford. edu/entries/god-necessary-being/. Fales, Evan. 2009. Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles. London: Routledge. Goff, Phillip. 2017. Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. New York: Oxford University Press. Goldschmidt, Tyron, and Kenneth Pearce. 2018. Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gould, Paul, ed. 2014. Beyond the Control of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects. London and New York: Bloomsbury. ———, and Richard Brian Davis. 2014. “Modified Theistic Activism.” In Beyond the Control of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects, edited by Paul Gould, 51–79. London and New York: Bloomsbury. Graham, Peter J. 2011. “Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan.” In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3, edited by Jonathan Kvanvig, 67–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jubien, Michael. 2009. Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leftow, Brian. 2012. God and Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leon, Felipe. 2019. “A Priori: Atheism.” In Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy, edited by Joseph W. Koterski and Graham Oppy, 301–312. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference. Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.

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Lewis, Peter J. 2016. Quantum Ontology: A Guide to the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics. New York: Oxford University Press. Maudlin, Tim. 2019. Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McKenzie, Kerry. 2017. “Ontic Structural Realism.” Philosophy Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12399. Morris, Thomas V., and Christopher Menzel. 1986. “Absolute Creation.” American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4): 353–362. Nagasawa, Yujin. Forthcoming. “Panpsychism versus Pantheism, Polytheism, and Cosmopsychism.” In Routledge Companion of Panpsychism, edited by William Seager. London: Routledge. ———, and Khai Wager. 2017. “Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism” (with Khai Wager). In Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, 113–129. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oppy, Graham. 2014. “Abstract Objects? Who Cares!” In Beyond the Control of God?: Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects, edited by Paul Gould, 169–181. London and New York: Bloomsbury. Paul, L. A. 2012. “Building the World from Its Fundamental Constituents.” Philosophical Studies 158: 221–256. ———. 2013. “Mereological Bundle Theory.” In The Handbook of Mereology, edited by H. Burkhardt, J. Seibt, and G. Imaguire. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. ———. 2017. “A One Category Ontology.” In Freedom, Metaphysics, and Method: Themes from van Inwagen, edited by J. A. Keller, 32–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Plantinga, Alvin. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1977. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. ———. 1980. Does God Have a Nature? Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. ———. 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007. “Two Dozen (or So) Theistic Arguments.” In Alvin Plantinga, edited by Deane-Peter Baker. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press. Roy, Tony. Making Sense of Relevant Semantics (ms.). Schellenberg, J. L. 2009. The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ———. 2013. Evolutionary Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2014. “The Craziest Metaphysics of Mind.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92: 665–682. Steinhart, Eric. 2013. “On the Plurality of Gods.” Religious Studies 49 (3): 289–312.

170  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON Thomasson, Amie. 2015. Ontology Made Easy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Welty, Greg. 2006. Theistic Conceptual Realism: The Case for Interpreting Abstract Objects as Divine Ideas. PhD diss., University of Oxford. ———. 2014. “Theistic Conceptual Realism.” In Beyond the Control of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects, edited by Paul Gould, 81–96. London and New York: Bloomsbury. Wielenberg, Erik. 2014. Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. Wunder, Tyler. 2008. “Anti-naturalism and Proper Function.” Religious Studies 44 (2): 209–224.

CHAPTER 12

How the Best of Naturalism Fits Inside a Foundational Mind Joshua Rasmussen

1   Introduction Leon’s piece is instructive, and I am excited to see if I can build upon it. Leon displays several options for a theory of the foundation, and he helps us see the resourcefulness of a natural foundation. In this piece, I want to say more about the resourcefulness of a personal foundation. The picture that is emerging between our views displays a surprising unity. These shared points stand out: i. Reality has some ultimate, foundational layer. ii. The foundation transcends, at least partially, geometric forms. iii. The foundation has (proto) conscious-like features. We also have similar methodology, as we are both using inference to best explanation as a tool to help us probe the foundation. There are additional similarities that I want to draw out. While Leon uses naturalistic vocabulary to describe his view, his fundamental ontology is remarkably congenial to a mind-like foundation. In fact, the basic elements of his ontology look to me like the very elements I’d expect in the nature of a personal foundation. More on that later. © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_12

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In this chapter, I aim to do three things. First, I will provide a final summary and analysis of arguments on the table for a personal foundation. Second, I will address Leon’s concerns relevant to the general resourcefulness of a personal foundation. Third, I will share some things I have learned from this portion of our dialogue.

2  Reflection and Summary In my effort to express a view of the world through the instrument of arguments, I want to be clear about what I take these arguments to accomplish. I will first say some general things about the role of arguments, and then I will give a summary assessment of the arguments on the table. First, I think arguments do the most good when they are tools that promote an inquiry, rather than as instruments to assess someone’s rationality. I do not intend the arguments, then, as means to judge anyone’s rationality. On the contrary, there is always more to see. Second, related, the plausibility of an argument is relative to each person. For any argument under the sun (whether in math, science, or philosophy), someone can have reasons for doubt. Each person has their own history of background thoughts and experiences, which provide a unique lens and conceptual angles from which to view a premise. Third, on my view, the arguments on the table only shine brighter under scrutiny. I am not alone. Arguments like these move many people, including (maybe especially) professional philosophers.1 While many arguments crumble under critical analysis, these arguments display resilience under pressure. Inferior forms fall to the side, while inner gold comes into view. In the interest of friendly inquiry, I wish to express personally how the arguments look to me at this moment, taking into account Leon’s latest points. I’ll review the five argument types briefly.

1 Non-theist philosopher Brad Monton was moved to become less sure of his atheism after studying design arguments in more depth (Monton 2009). Antony Flew, the longtime atheist philosopher, was moved out of atheism entirely (Flew 2007). I have many philosopher friends who share a similar journey via their study of the arguments. In fact, I’ve never encountered any philosopher who has studied these arguments who doesn’t think they have at least some weight.

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First, there is the general argument from organized complexity, which calls for a mental explanation. Here I want to add a new point (beyond my previous ones) about why I don’t think that the multiverse provides a complete explanation. It is because the existence of many universes doesn’t predict, for any particular place, that organized complexity is more likely to occur at that place by some mind than without any mind. To illustrate, suppose we found a self-repairing computer on Jupiter. This discovery would surely be evidence of a mind behind the Jupiter technology, whether or not there are many universes. There are two reasons: First, the simplest (and most intrinsically probable) many universe hypotheses do not predict the existence of any self-repairing technologies in any universe, and second (the new point), the multiverse doesn’t increase the probability, for any particular place, that self-repairing technology will exist there.2 In the same way, a self-repairing body—which is functionally more complex than any of our technologies—is, for the same reason, evidence of a mind with access to its place. Note that it will not help to explain self-repairing bodies by the natural causes that precede them. Natural causes only push back the question: Why was there any chain of events leading to such functional complexity? Computer simulations verify that natural selection doesn’t automatically lead to increases in complexity in complex adaptive systems; we observed the opposite tendency in randomized environments. Besides, without the right initial conditions, no evolution could even get started. The fine-tuning, then, is like an arrow inscribed into the foundation of material forms. This arrow is unsurprising if the foundation of things has the mental resources to aim at a target. What about Leon’s point about the problem of pushing complexity back into God’s mind (or nature)? Does a foundational mind relocate fine-tuning? A valuable question! If we explain complexity by a foundational mind, have we not merely relocated the complexity to the mind itself, like a giant watch at the foundation? My answer is that the deepest explanation of complexity is going to be in terms of a simple theory, whose intrinsic probability is not itself comparably low. To illustrate, suppose the foundation’s nature flows from supreme value (perfection). Supreme value is then a root feature within the nature of the foundation. This root feature is conceptually simple:

2 Michael

Rota develops this argument in Rota (2016, Chapter 8).

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It does not have many epistemically independent components. Even if the total nature of the foundation is complex (e.g., it includes abstract mathematical and moral landscapes), this root attribute is not. The simple root allows an ultimate explanation of complexity in theory-simple terms. Consider, by contrast, more complex properties, such as these: (i) being a giant watch at the foundation of existence; (ii) having the causal power to produce precisely 10^88 + 16 particles; (iii) being an arrow pointing to a house; or (iv) the Schrodinger equation. Each of these properties is more complex. Each has more component parts—i.e., more epistemically independent bits of information. The many component parts reflect a low intrinsic probability. The more parts, the lower the intrinsic probability the hypothesis that the property in question is instantiated. Thus, if we posit a complex property at the root of things, our theory of the foundation will have a lower intrinsic probability. This result matches our intuition that a giant watch at the foundation is intrinsically unlikely. It also follows the scientific method of seeking the simplest explanation that accounts for the data. My thought, then, is that a supreme mind shaves off unnecessary complexity. The mind theory itself is predicted by the theory that the foundation has a supreme nature, which is describable in a simple way (i.e., few primitive terms; few epistemically independent components). This theory gives us a simple root for both any intentional powers and any natural Aristotelian teleology. Above all this, the supreme mind explains fine-tuning, by making it unsurprising that the arrow of physics would happen to point to beings like us. The Schrodinger equation, by contrast, doesn’t point specifically to any complex, conscious beings; not even close! In the absence of a theory-simple root, by contrast, the ultimate explanation of fine-tuning of reality for life-forms is more complex—and so less probable. It’s like finding a watch at the foundation of existence. That’s bizarre, without any deeper explanation. So rather than undermine the fine-tuning argument, it seems to me that Leon’s points help us extend its light. They shine light on the value of seeking the simplest, ultimate explanation of fine-tuning. Brute teleology pushes back the puzzle. A perfect mind solves it. Second, there is the argument from consciousness. While I gave a Bayesian formulation of the argument, it also seems to me to be impossible for non-sensing materials to ground sensing materials.

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If I throw up sand, for example, the sand cannot become sad. Sand is the wrong category. As surely as I can see that prime numbers cannot add up to a prime minister, it seems to me that I can also see that sand can add up to a sad sensation. Now I do not claim that everyone must share my intuition here. I am merely reporting what many people, including many non-theists, have reported when thinking about the hard problem of consciousness. For example, Michael Huemer writes, “[The Hard Problem] is in my view a major, perhaps the major, challenge to our fundamental world-view [naturalism], and it would require a major world-view-revision to resolve the difficulty. As far as I can tell, no philosophical theory has come anywhere near to solving this problem in any coherent and vaguely plausible way.”3 Leading philosopher of mind, Jaegwon Kim similarly remarks, “What is becoming increasingly clear from the continuing debate over the mindbody problem is that currently popular [positions] are not easily tolerated by robust physicalism.”4 The deep problem is that the shift from pure non-sense to sense looks impossible in principle. Interestingly, Leon also seems to share the sense that something categorically like consciousness (perhaps a proto-consciousness) is at the ground level. Here I just want to note again the significance of this point of overlap. While further questions remain (about specific theories of persons), we have a common category laying at the foundational layer of reality. This category explains how the foundation could produce conscious minds like ours. My third and fourth arguments were from morality and reason, respectively. Just as with consciousness, we have a construction problem explaining how these things could ever begin to exist. A supreme mental foundation solves the problem because its nature would include the principles of reason and intrinsic value, thereby making other reasoning, valuable beings expected. There is also the value problem. How can valuable beings come from purely valueless states of matter? It looks to me that the materials are wrong. Getting valuable beings from pure non-value is like making fire out of water, neutrons out of numbers, or qualitative colors out of equations. These things cannot happen, in principle, it seems to me.

3 “What 4 Kim

Is the Mind/Body Problem?”, http://www.owl232.net/papers/mind.htm. (1998, p. 120).

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Good reasoning cannot come from non-reasoning; sense cannot come from non-sense; and value cannot come from non-value. If that is correct, then the existence of reasoning, sense, and value within us are additional clues—powerful clues—that independently point to a foundational realm containing a form of these same elements. Note again that we need not decide which normative theory is correct. The mind-first theory can underwrite a range of theories of the moral compass. Leon mentions a few theories. For example, there is the constructivist theory on which morality is grounded in principles of rationality, and there is the Aristotelian accounts on which morality is grounded in facts about goods for members of a species. The thing to see here is that these very grounds are themselves precisely what one would expect to see in the nature of a foundational, supreme mind; for one would expect the nature of a perfect mind to include principles of rationality and goodness. Here is an example where Leon’s account includes the very elements one might expect in the nature of God. Consider, finally, the argument from arbitrary limits. While I initially presented a deductive version of this argument, we can also give a more modest, probabilistic version. The basic idea here is that the simplest, most intrinsically probable account of the foundation’s nature is that it is just perfect. From perfection, we derive the classic positive properties, including knowledge, power, and goodness. The property relevant to this stage of our inquiry is knowledge. Given the perfection theory, then, it follows that the foundation has knowledge, and thus has a mental nature. This argument is an independent route to a foundational mind. Personally, this argument from arbitrary limits (in both its probabilistic and deductive forms) gives my mind additional pressure to shave off arbitrary unexplained limits. Rather than posit arbitrary limits at the foundation of things, it seems I should treat all limits uniformly with respect to their dependence (unless I have some reason to make special exceptions). While Leon has raised excellent questions about this argument, on my analysis, his questions serve to separate gold from grains, as we bring the argument into brighter light. All these reflections independently point to the same result: Mental resources in the foundation are predictively successful. The mental resources allow the foundation to provide a unified explanation of many diverse pieces of reality, including complexity (e.g., self-repairing technologies), consciousness, reasoning, valuable beings. A foundational, supreme mind would have conscious capacities, perfect rules of

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reasoning, intrinsic value, and the intentional power to fine-tune a universe for complex, conscious, reasoning, and valuable beings. The predictive success is profound. Of course, all these considerations are still only an introduction to a longer conversation. I’d like to end this section with a bold prediction. My prediction is that the more anyone examines the elements within oneself (consciousness, value, reason, complexity), the more one will see, from many angles, deep problems with a purely mindless explanation. Unlike some philosophical puzzles that seem to resolve on analysis, these problems don’t go away on inspection. Sure, we can push the problems into deeper levels of reality, but they only take new forms and shapes at those levels. By the history of my own thinking, I predict that as one looks into these issues, the more the problems with a purely mindless foundation magnify and multiply. Of course, it is up to each individual to test this prediction out for him or herself.

3   Questions and Answers Leon’s last piece provides many helpful ideas about how one might construct a theory of ultimate reality. In this section, I want to probe the foundation further by the light of several questions, which spring from Leon’s considerations. My thesis is congenial: I think Leon’s theory has the very elements we would find given a personal foundation. Question 1. Do abstract objects cause trouble for a personal foundation? My answer. In the early twentieth century, Bertrand Russell discovered a paradox of propositions,5 and reflection on this paradox leads me to doubt that abstracta could exist apart from a personal foundation. Allow me to explain. I begin with a problem for unanchored Platonism. The problem emerges from recent work on plural logic (and builds upon Russell’s proposition’s paradox).6 Suppose that for any plural, the xx, there is a proposition of those xx existing. Then there is this proposition Q: The propositions that are not about themselves exist. But there cannot be any such proposition as Q. To see why, suppose first that Q is a proposition

5 Russell 6 See

(1903). Pruss and Rasmussen (2015).

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about Q. But Q cannot be about Q because Q, by definition, is only about the propositions that are not about themselves. So suppose instead Q is not about itself. Then Q qualifies as being among the propositions it is about—since it is about the propositions that are not of themselves. The result is that Q is about itself, which contradicts the assumption that it is not. Either way, then, we have a contradiction. How shall we escape the contradiction? The clear way out is to deny the starting assumption. We can deny that for any plural, there is a proposition about that plural. Then we avoid the contradiction. Yet, if there are plurals without propositions about them, we have another puzzle. What explains why some plurals have a proposition about them and not others? How can there be a proposition about certain propositions but not about others? It is completely arbitrary and ad hoc for only certain propositions to have a proposition about them. What could explain the difference? The problem here is that if all propositions exist independently and automatically in Plato’s heaven, then there is no explanation of the existence of propositions. Then there cannot be any explanation of why only certain existential propositions exist but not others. Chris Menzel (2018) develops a similar problem in terms of sets. His solution is instructive. He appeals to an explanation in terms of God’s conceptualizing activity. This solution entails that abstracta (at least some of them) depend on God. My solution is like Menzel’s. I propose that basic abstracta exist within God’s perfect nature (all the abstracta required for perfection). To solve the paradox, I say that non-basic abstracta exist by virtue of God’s conceptualizing activity (such as by God’s conceiving of God’s most basic aspects). On this account, contra Platonism, not all abstracta exist unexplained and unanchored, and the paradox is resolved.7 Note that this account has ramifications for the nature of a perfect mind. In particular, a perfect mind doesn’t automatically (without decision) include self-reflective knowledge of all of its own knowledge. Knowledge of knowledge is open, since it isn’t bedrock. This result completely sidesteps the omniscience paradoxes because those paradoxes depend upon the premise that God has unrestricted self-reflective knowledge. That’s progress. 7 On this account, we could say God’s omniscience consists in maximal cognitive power, while leaving open questions about God’s use of that power.

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It looks to me that Leon’s concerns are with certain specific theistic theories. I have good news. Those theories are not essential to the general theory that the foundation is personal. The theory that the foundation is personal does not force into the puzzles. In fact, it frees up a solution to the puzzle of propositions. To illustrate one example of the additional fruit of this account, consider Leon’s point about God’s supremacy dwarfing in the sea of abstracta. On this account, abstracta do not compete with God’s supremacy; rather, the basic abstracta fill out God’s nature. They are the essential ingredients of a truly supreme mind. Question 2. What are God’s thoughts about? My answer. The personal foundation theory sketched above provides a fruitful answer. First, the basic propositions are part of God’s nature (again, because a perfect mind requires the principles of perfect reasoning). Other propositions can then be about these more basic propositions. This result solves the content and granularity problems by allowing all subsequent thoughts to have contents as fine-grained as the basic principles (whatever they are). To illustrate, perhaps principles of logic are part of God’s nature. Later on, other propositions about these basic logical propositions can form. Thus, when we think of logic, our minds can have the same logical contents, which are elements in the nature of the foundational mind. This account solves the problem of the unity of content, while retaining the Platonist insight that logic is necessary. This account delivers a bonus result: God is not forced to have ungodly thoughts! Instead, God’s thinking can be free. There is no requirement on my account that God thinks about everything that can be thought about, and there are no ungodly thoughts built into God’s nature. Question 3. Why can’t moral principles occupy the ultimate ground layer in some Platonic realm? My answer. They can! A supreme mind does not remove Plato’s heaven. It locates it: Plato’s heaven exists in the nature of a supreme mind. By locating (basic) abstracta in the foundation’s nature, we get two fruits. First, we get an independent and simple theory that successfully predicts the existence of Plato’s heaven; if the foundation is supreme,

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then we can expect supreme principles of reason, just as we find in Plato’s heaven. Second, we get probabilistic resources to explain why there are beings who can visit Plato’s heaven in their mind’s eye. Why do any beings become aware of abstracta? A supreme foundation entails the existence of a supreme mind, and this mind would then have reasons to aim for the existence of other minds who can visit Plato’s heaven in their mind’s eye. Mysteries reduced. Notice that these fruits have nothing to do with grounding moral principles in God (or vice versa). Leave them ungrounded, if you must. Moral principles in God are like pillars in a castle. We need not ground the pillars in the castle. The pillars are pillars in their own right. Similarly, the principles are principles in their own right. Put away grounding worries. Keep the predictive success: Just as a supreme castle would have supreme pillars, a supreme foundation would have supreme principles. The theory fits. Question 4. Does theism generate an explanatory gap? My answer. It depends. It looks like certain theisms generate an explanatory gap on certain theories of the physical world. But is there an explanatory gap on the general theory that the foundation is personal? I don’t see it. Consider that the general theory is fully compatible with Leon’s Russellian monism. On both theories, there is a most fundamental concrete substance. This substance has the resources for constructing (or grounding) all the things we see, including sensations, thoughts, and patterns of particles. All of these features are consistent with this substance being personal. In fact, a personal foundation would have precisely the features Leon identifies. It would have the resources for constructing sensations, thoughts, and orderly environments. Not only this, to solve the binding problem, Leon has proposed that the foundation may be prior to its (proto) conscious elements. Beautiful! That is precisely what I would expect if the foundation has a subjective center. In fact, I am tempted to say this view—on which the foundation has (proto) subjective elements united into a prior whole—is what I mean by “personal foundation.” It seems we are approaching the same ontology, only from different conceptual angles.

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Question 5. Does theism remove souls? My answer. I begin with a question: Does Russellian monism remove minds? If not, then a personal foundation does not remove souls. It grounds them. How does an ultimate soul ground other souls? I’ll be honest: I have no idea. Maybe we are chips off the old block. Or, maybe some other method is possible. For purposes of focus and intellectual honesty, I leave the matter open. Whatever the answer, it looks again that Leon’s preferred theory of things makes good sense in the context of a personal foundation (broadly construed). Consider what his theory includes. It includes principles of reason, proto-consciousness, moral principles, and the powers to produce us (somehow). Those are special things, and amazingly, they are precisely the elements one could expect to find within a personal foundation. Question 6. Does theism lead to incoherence? My answer. Leon helps us separate different theories of ultimate reality. In the same spirit, we can separate different theisms. Leon says there are difficult problems with the divine attributes. I agree there are problems with certain specific analyses. But, on my review of the literature, none of the alleged problems reveal any actual problem with the general theory of supreme foundational mind, as far as I see. I wish to be clear that in developing a general theory, I am not seeking to “revise” the root theory. Rather, I’m seeking a clearer vision of the actual implications of a supreme foundation. From supreme value, I deduce supreme resources, including principles of reason, proto-consciousness, moral principles, and the powers to produce us. These deductions match the data! Can we deduce inconsistencies? I’ve seen attempts; I’ve never seen success. What about Leon’s argument against Anselmian theism from weak PMC? It is ingenious! The only thing I wish to add is that we can separate questions about God’s nature from questions about God’s connection to material forms. For my part, I do not feel I have clear sight of the ways beings could, or must, connect to one another. Questions remain. Is PMC a contingent law of our world (or of the material forms of our world)? Or it a necessary principle in the nature of God? What I do see clearly is this: if PMC is indeed true in any possible world w, then the

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connections between beings must be consistent with that principle in w. Rather than remove a supreme foundation, this conditional principle extends my understanding of the potential implications. Let us not lose sight of the bigger picture. The theory that the foundation is personal has great predictive success, as we have seen. It predicts the very elements that Leon identifies in the foundation itself: logic, morality, proto-consciousness, the power to organize the world, etc. It is also theory-simple. Is there another theory that is as simple and that enjoys the same predictive success? I know of none.

4   What I Learned The lesson that stands out the most for me is that a theory of a perfect mind plays an inextricable role in arguments for an ultimate mind. Many design arguments aim for the modest, minimal result that there is some mind behind material forms. Yet, I am seeing more clearly the difficulty of separating arguments for an ultimate mind from theories of the nature of the ultimate mind. For the nature of the mind is relevant to the general problem of pushing back the mystery of complexity or fine-tuning into the ultimate explanation. To solve this mystery, I turn to least arbitrary account of the foundation for minds. Anchoring things to a perfect mind has both benefits and risks. I begin with three benefits. First, the mere minimal mind hypothesis seems to relocate many of the questions that were supposed to point to an ultimate mind. For example, if we need a mind to explain the complexity of our minds, then what explains the complexity of the foundational mind? Or, to echo Leon’s point about a natural teleology, why think a minimal mind is any more probable than a purely natural teleological arrow? The best answers to these questions, I think, are going to be in terms of a simple and non-arbitrary theory of a mental foundation, for the simplest, least arbitrary theory is the most intrinsically possible. Enter the perfect mind: It looks to me that the simplest, least arbitrary conceivable theory is the perfect mind theory. For the simplest description of any mind’s nature is that it is perfect. If we say the foundation is itself perfect (i.e., supreme in value), then we shave off arbitrary complexity from our theory of the mind’s basic nature. A second benefit of a perfect mind hypothesis is about predictive success. A perfect mind would include the requirements for perfect thinking

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(logic) and perfect being (moral principles). Thus, the perfect mind hypothesis successfully predicts the existence of logic, moral principles, and the instantiation of goodness. The minimal mind hypothesis doesn’t by itself have these same predictions. Third, the perfect mind hypothesis provides a solution to the problem of arbitrary limits, while the minimal mind hypothesis does not. If the foundational mind is perfect, then it lacks arbitrary limits in its basic nature, for its basic nature is simply supreme. By contrast, if the foundational mind lacks a supreme nature, then it includes some limit in value. This limit in value calls for a deeper explanation. One might even wonder whether specific degrees of limited value are as unexpected as organized complexity, that is, in the absence of a deeper explanation. Despite all these benefits, there is potential risk in appealing to a perfect mind. While the perfect mind hypothesis has impressive explanatory power, this very explanatory power gives the theory a longer neck. The theory extends into more things, including the jungles of evil and suffering. Can a perfect foundation allow for imperfections? There is a risk it cannot. Rather than speculate about the risk, however, let us go into the jungles to have a closer look. Who knows what we might find? In the next section, Leon and I will explore the jungles of evil and imperfection. I am curious to see how this journey will go.

References Flew, Antony. 2007. There Is a God. New York: HarperOne. Kim, Jaegwon. 1998. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Menzel, Chris. 2018. “The Argument from Collections.” In Two Dozen (Or So) Arguments for God, edited by Jerry Walls and Trent Dougherty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Monton, Bradley. 2009. Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Pruss, Alexander, and Joshua Rasmussen. 2015. “Problems with Plurals.” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9: 42–57. Rota, Michael. 2016. Taking Pascal’s Wager: Faith, Evidence, and the Abundant Life. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. Russell, Bertrand. 1903. Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 13

Reflection Felipe Leon

1   Introduction In the previous chapter, Rasmussen offered some excellent points to our finer-grained exploration of foundational reality of the present section, and I am excited to see that we continue to converge on our assessment of the nature of this reality. However, as is no doubt expected, some disagreement remains. The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Sects. 2–5, I will briefly revisit the data of reason and abstracta, consciousness, fine-tuning, and morality. In Sect. 6, I will offer several remarks about the appeal to perfection in Rasmussen’s defense of a personal foundation. Finally, in Sect. 7, I will gesture toward a new range of data we will explore in the final section of the book, and the prospects of reaching a finer grain of resolution with respect to our picture of reality’s foundation.

2  Reason and Abstracta Once More Start with the data of logical principles and abstract objects. Rasmussen offered an ingenious and intriguing solution to the problem of plurals, which in turn provides some relief regarding certain problems for theistic conceptualist accounts of abstract objects (e.g., the problem of God having ungodly thoughts I mentioned in a previous chapter). He also © The Author(s) 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_13

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argued that a theistic conceptualist account of propositions can explain the data of why some propositions are about propositions while some are not. This is great progress if it proves to be a successful solution to the problem of plurals, and perhaps it might even offer one piece of data in support of theistic conceptualism. Unfortunately, it still seems that other problems remain, thereby reducing the explanatory power of theism. For example, it still seems to get the counterpossibles wrong: It still seems that the rules of correct deductive inference would still be correct if a foundational mind didn’t exist, and it still seems that abstracta would still exist and the intentionality properties of propositions would be as they are even if a foundational mind did not exist. Furthermore, as I mentioned briefly in my previous chapter, there is promise of explaining the correct principles of deduction in terms of intrinsic relations among properties, which, according to my theory, constitute the most foundational layer of reality. By contrast, my suggestion of logical truths being grounded in intrinsic relations among properties reduces it to something simpler and more plausibly foundational. Second, the other problems I mentioned previously seem to remain for theistic activism and theistic conceptualism: Conceptualism makes god’s thoughts non-repeatable, and thus unsuitable to play the role of abstracta that are universals; God is built from abstracta, so he’s not foundational (recall again how Plantinga’s ontological argument seems to require that God supervenes upon or is grounded in an ontologically prior/more fundamental modal space of platonic properties). Finally, it still seems to me that God isn’t as good an explanation of reason and logic, for the reasons I gave in previous chapters regarding problems with our systems of deductive logic, inductive logic, and decision theory; the varieties of set-theoretic axioms and the seemingly pragmatic choice among them; our inability to reliably avail ourselves of such systems in the course of ordinary life; our primary reliance on pragmatically useful but inaccurate cognitive heuristics; and the very large set of cognitive biases that fill the cognitive architecture of all human beings. All of these things are surprising on the perfect mind hypothesis, but unsurprising on the liberal naturalist hypothesis.

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3   Consciousness Once More I am encouraged to see that Rasmussen and I agree that consciousness (or at least proto-phenomenal states and/or properties) is fundamental, and that he seems to be moving toward something close to priority cosmopsychism—or at least to allow it as among the family of foundational mind hypotheses. If that is so, then we have encouraging concrete evidence that the theist and the naturalist can have much in common to celebrate, and to encourage less partisan, and more collaborative, joint inquiry into foundational reality. Rasmussen also grants that there are, at least currently, explanatory problems or mysteries for versions of the foundational mind hypothesis that include the hypothesis of substance dualism. However, again, Rasmussen deems priority cosmopsychism to be a view that is at least a theoretical cousin of the foundational mind hypothesis. But again, this is something I am happy with as well, as of course I am inclined toward something like a priority cosmopsychist version of liberal naturalism.

4  Morality and Value Once More Turn next to the data of morality and value. Recall from my discussion in a previous chapter that God cannot confer goodness on the foundation; rather, it’s the reverse. It’s therefore not clear what work God is doing grounding or otherwise explaining such properties. Now we saw in the previous chapter that Rasmussen agrees that God doesn’t ground moral principles; they are part of the foundation. It’s encouraging to find another point of potential agreement! However, recall from my previous chapter that my account allows for deeper explanation of these principles (at least for constructivist and neo-Aristotelian accounts). But if so, then we have another piece of data that widens the explanatory scope of liberal naturalism vis-à-vis theism. Finally, Rasmussen stated that value cannot be got from non-value. However, as I argued in my previous chapter, this isn’t obviously the case. For recall that in that chapter, I briefly explained how, on neoAristotelian virtue theory, moral principles are grounded in facts about what are good for us as members of a species. Furthermore, facts about what is good for us are in turn grounded in facts about our biological

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purposes or functions. Finally, biological functions are explained in terms of what biological traits, organs, or systems helped members of a species survive and reproduce in their natural habitats under normal conditions. Here again, then, priority cosmopsychist liberal naturalism gains a point in terms of explanatory scope.

5  Fine-Tuning and Final Causes Once More Rasmussen raises several further helpful remarks regarding fine-tuning and teleology. I take his central one to be a variation of (what is known in the fine-tuning argument literature as) the “this universe” objection.1 Applying the objection to the present context, the objection is that the foundational mind hypothesis can explain why this universe in particular is fine-tuned for life, while the multiverse hypothesis cannot—it can only explain why some universe or other is so fine-tuned. Unfortunately, space constraints prevent me from doing justice to this difficult issue here, which often gets tied up in technical issues regarding probability theory and likelihoods.2 Instead, I will make one simple point that I find decisive: the objection illicitly places requirements on explaining fine-tuning that don’t apply to relevantly similar cases.3 Compare: We explain the fitness of the Earth for life in terms of the abundance of other galaxies in the universe, each with a multitude of stars and planets. We reason that, given trillions of similar planets orbiting similar stars within this abundance, there is bound to be some planet or other that’s fit for life.4 We find this explanation satisfactory—i.e., we find that there is no residual question about why this planet is fit for life that cries out for explanation—since there is nothing special about the Earth beyond the features that make it fit for life that would motivate further inquiry.5 Similarly, as with the existence of many solar systems, the existence of many universes, each with different values for their fundamental constants, makes it virtually inevitable that some universe or other will have

1 The

canonical formulation of the objection is White (2005). detailed discussion, see, e.g., Manson (2009), Oppy (2006), and Sober (2019). 3 Cf. Manson (2009). 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid, p. 277. 2 For

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the right combination of conditions required for the existence of life within it. Therefore, by similar reasoning, there is nothing special about our universe beyond having these conditions that would motivate an answer to the “why this universe?” question.6

6  The Appeal to Perfection Once More Finally, let us turn briefly to consider Rasmussen’s appeal to perfection to maximize the simplicity of the foundational theistic mind hypothesis. As I alluded to in previous chapters, appeal to perfection seems simple, but hides ambiguity and problems. For we’ve seen that there appear to be tensions among the divine attributes when taken as maximal. We also saw that a leading solution is to reconstrue God’s maximal greatness or perfection in terms of the maximal consistent combination of degreed properties. But (as mentioned in a previous chapter) as Kvanvig (2018) and Bailey (2019) have pointed out, it’s not at all clear that there is one unique combination of properties that will count as best: A tie among several candidates for best seems antecedently much more likely. I’m inclined to agree with Kvanvig and Bailey: It’s antecedently likely that there is no uniquely best combination, and thus no uniquely best being. This threatens the coherence, or at least the lowers the prior probability, of Rasmussen’s perfect foundation hypothesis. Finally, appeal to perfection seems simple, but conceals complexity. For the hypothesis of a perfect mind containing infinitely many structured thoughts, irreducible final causes, intentionality, and will exhibits incredible complexity.

7  Recap and Closing Thoughts In summary, we have taken a final look at the data relevant to determining whether foundational reality is personal. We saw that despite what one might have initially thought, theists and naturalists can agree about a great deal on this matter, including the existence of foundational abstracta, intentionality, and objective moral principles. We also saw that they can agree that the foundation is at least partly material, and even

6 Ibid.

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that it includes irreducibly phenomenal properties. However, I have offered reasons to think that with respect to the relevant data discussed in this section, some differences remain. It appears that we have made significant progress. We began our inquiry in the first section with a very blurry picture of foundational reality—one so blurry that we couldn’t make out whether reality included a foundation at all—and ended the second by increasing the pixilation of its image by a few orders of magnitude. Can we increase the resolution of its image further? In the third and final section, we bring to bear many more lines of data to achieve just this aim.

References Bailey, Andrew. 2019. “Review of Maximal God: A New Defense of Perfect Being Theism, by Yujin Nagasawa.” Faith and Philosophy 36 (2): 275–279. Kvanvig, Jonathan. 2018. “Nagasawa’s Maximal God: A New Defense of Perfect Being Theism.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 1. Manson, Neil. 2009. “The Fine-Tuning Argument.” Philosophy Compass 4 (1): 271–286. Oppy, Graham. 2006. Arguing About Gods. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sober, Elliott. 2019. The Design Argument. Cambridge Elements: Philosophy of Religion Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White, Roger. 2005. “Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes.” Nous 34 (2): 260–276.

PART III

Is the Foundation Good?

CHAPTER 14

A Perfectly Good Personal Foundation: Some Reasons for Doubt Felipe Leon

1   Introduction In this chapter, I will do three things. First, I will sketch a standard deductive formulation of the argument from evil against theism. Second, I will sketch a set of inductive arguments against theism. Each of these will appeal to a piece of data that is prima facie surprising on the hypothesis of a perfectly good personal foundation of contingent concrete reality, but not on the hypothesis of liberal naturalism. Finally, I will exploit these arguments to sketch a cumulative case argument that seems to me to provide an undercutting defeater for the view that a perfectly good personal foundation exists. To put it another way: the cumulative case sketched below seems to me to provide at least enough evidence to think that the data don’t favor the hypothesis of a perfectly good personal foundation over liberal naturalism (as well as the inclusive disjunction of hypotheses distinct from that of a good personal foundation). As before, I follow my proposed methodology of starting from an epistemic stance of agnosticism with respect to large-scale hypotheses.

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2  A Deductive Argument from Evil A standard argument against theism appeals to evil, or suffering. Evil or suffering is standardly divided into two main categories: moral and natural evil. Moral evil is suffering caused by persons. Examples range from the so-called sins of commission, such as lying, theft, murder, rape, and genocide to the so-called sins of omission, such as failure to act to prevent the sorts of evils mentioned above. By contrast, natural evil is suffering caused by nature. Examples include mental and physical illnesses, disease, natural disasters, and predation. It should be noted that a third irreducible category of evil has recently been defended, viz., social evil,1 but here I will focus on the former two. The basic idea is then that the world is full of moral and natural evil, but a God who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good wouldn’t allow2 such evil; therefore, there is no God—or at least, no God like that. The argument can be stated more carefully as follows: 1. If an all-knowing, all-powerful, perfectly good God exists, then evil does not exist. 2. Evil exists. 3. Therefore, an all-knowing, all-powerful, perfectly good God does not exist (from 1 and 2, Modus Tollens). The argument is an instance of Modus Tollens (1. If P, then Q; ~Q; therefore, ~P), and so it’s deductively valid; therefore, the conclusion must be true if the premises are. So, the only way to rationally resist the conclusion is to provide an undercutting or rebutting defeater for at least one of its premises. What, then, can be said on behalf of the premises?

1 Poston, Ted. 2014. “Social Evil,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Vol. 5) (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 209–233. 2 It is sometimes thought that God is only responsible for evil he causes, rather than merely allows. However, a moment’s reflection reveals that this can’t be right. Compare: An able-bodied father, with a sober, present mind that’s in good working order, watches his child walk into the street to fetch a stray toy ball. He then notices that a car has turned the corner and is racing toward the child. The father has plenty of time to get the child out of the street. However, rather than doing so, or even calling out to the child to alert them, the father sits back in his lawn chair, takes a sip of his beer, and says to himself, “this should be interesting.” The child is seriously injured. Most would say the parent in this scenario is less than perfectly good, despite the fact that the parent didn’t cause, but merely allowed, the child to get hit by the car.

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The standard line of support for (1) goes back to at least Epicurus (Hume quotes Epicurus in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion): “Is he [God] willing but unable to prevent evil? Then, he is impotent. Is he willing but unable? Then, he is malevolent. Is he both willing and able? Whence, then, is evil?” The logic of the reasoning here can be unpacked and stated a bit more carefully: 1. If God is all-knowing and all-powerful, then God is able to prevent evil. 2. If God is perfectly good, then God is willing to prevent evil. 3. If God is both able and willing to prevent evil, then evil does not exist. 4. Therefore, if God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good, then evil does not exist. Premise 2 is supported by observation of and testimony about suffering in the world: we observe, and hear news of, the moral evils of genocide, slavery, torture, murder, rape, kidnappings, etc., and of the natural evils of hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, famine, drought, diseases, depression, etc. There would thus seem to be at least some initial grounds for thinking the standard deductive argument from evil is not only valid but sound, in which case there seem to be at least some initial grounds for thinking no such God exists. Virtually everyone accepts premise 2 is true—viz., that evil or suffering exists. Only the most radical sort of skeptic would deny it. It all comes down, then, to premise 1. Prima facie, defeating the premise would require showing that the moral and natural evil in the world is necessary to achieve a greater good. Now here, we must be careful. Humans are excused for allowing evil because of ignorance and limitations of power. However, God is not limited by ignorance, due to his omniscience. Nor is he constrained by human limitations on power, or, indeed, the laws of nature (since he is supposed to have created them—and (many theists think) sustains them in being moment by moment—and can suspend them to perform miracles if he so wishes). The standards are therefore much higher for God than for humans: For God to allow evil, it must be absolutely impossible for any being—even an omnipotent, omnipotent God—to get the outweighing goods he wants without also allowing for the possibility of evil. Prima facie, then, answering the standard deductive argument from evil requires showing that for every evil in the world, there is a greater

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good, such that (i) the good outweighs the evil and (ii) it’s metaphysically impossible to get the good without allowing for the evil. In other words, answering the problem of evil would require showing that every evil is outweighed by a greater good, and no matter how God could’ve created a world (different creatures, different laws of nature, different evolutionary history, etc.), he couldn’t have gotten the good or goods without allowing the evils. A standard response to the argument is the free will defense, which takes aim at premise (1) of the standard deductive argument from evil: God takes no delight in robots; he wants a community of persons who have the ability to freely enter into a relationship with himself and others. Furthermore, he wants a world that contains not just aesthetic beauty, but also moral goodness that’s grounded in the free actions of his creatures. But the latter is a great good that can only be gotten by creating free creatures. But once you do that, you must allow for the possibility that they’ll abuse that freedom and freely choose to do wrong. And it’s logically impossible for God to force his creatures to freely do right. Therefore, since it’s no limit on omnipotence to be unable to do the logically impossible, premise (1) is false, and the argument is unsound. But then along came J. L. Mackie. He pointed out that if a person is free (in the libertarian sense) to do wrong with respect to some action, then it follows that it’s possible for such a person to freely do right with respect to the same action. But if it’s possible to freely do right with respect to some of their moral actions, then on the basis of the same sort of reasoning, it’s possible for free creatures to freely do right for all of their moral actions. (If it’s impossible for free creatures to freely do right for all of their moral actions, then it’s prima facie impossible for them to be morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for all of their moral actions, according to the standard libertarian account of free will commonly assumed in the free will defense.) But if so, then there are metaphysically possible worlds in which free creatures always freely choose to do right.3 Many people miss Mackie’s reasoning here, so it’s worth taking a moment to unpack it a bit. The person who uses the standard free will defense is committed to saying that we have the ability to always freely do the right thing our whole lives. This is why we’re blameworthy for each

3 Mackie

(1955).

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of the wrong things we do, and why we’re morally praiseworthy each of the right things we do. But if so, then this means that it is possible to always freely do the right thing. And this, in turn, means that there is a possible world—i.e., a way the world could be or could have been—where everyone always freely chooses to do what is right or good. But since God is all-powerful, then he can do anything that’s possible—i.e., he can actualize any possible world—including one of the possible worlds where every free creature always freely chooses to do what is right or good. How can God actualize such a world? One standard account is that since God is all-knowing, then he knows not only what every possible person can do and will do, but also what they would freely do in every possible circumstance. Given this knowledge, God can providentially order history so that people are always in situations where they would freely choose what is right of their own accord.4 Putting these ideas together, we can reason as follows: We have the kind of free will that makes us responsible for each of the moral actions within our lives. But if so, then it’s possible for us to always freely choose to do the morally right thing of our own accord. But this is just to say that there is a metaphysically possible world—a way the world could be or could have been—where we always freely do the right thing of our own accord. Now if God is all-powerful, then he can actualize any possible world. Therefore, God can actualize a possible world where we always freely do the right thing of our own accord. In short, since omnipotence entails the ability to actualize any metaphysically possible world, then since there are possible worlds where finite persons always freely do what is right of their own accord, it follows that God can actualize a world where (as a matter of contingent fact) everyone always freely chooses to do right of their own accord. But if so, then contrary to the free will defense, it’s not beyond God’s ability to create a world in which free creatures always do right, in which case premise (1) of the deductive argument from evil remains unscathed, leaving the deductive argument from evil undefeated. But then along came Alvin Plantinga. In God and Other Minds (1967), The Nature of Necessity (1974), and God, Freedom, and Evil (1978), Plantinga argued that Mackie assumes that God can actualize any possible world. But this claim is false—there are possible worlds that

4 For

an important defense of this view of divine foreknowledge, see Flint (1998).

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not even an omnipotent God can actualize. So, for example, suppose that in some possible world W, some person—call him “Steve”—freely chooses to do something morally wrong. Then, it’s not possible for God to actualize W—i.e., that very world—and yet prevent Steve from doing the wrong action. Plantinga took the insight above and used it to develop his notion of “transworld depravity” (“TWD” for short). In a nutshell, and very roughly, a person suffers from transworld depravity in a given possible world W just in case they would perform at least one morally wrong action in both W and all “nearby” worlds—i.e., worlds similar to W in all the relevant respects.5 Notice that transworld depravity grants that there are possible worlds where the transworld depraved person freely does right all the time; it’s just that none of those worlds is “nearby”—i.e., not relevantly similar to—W. To answer Mackie’s critique, Plantinga argued that for all we know, there is a possible world where everyone suffers from transworld depravity. That is, for all we know, there is a metaphysically possible world W in which every single one of the (non-denumerably?) infinitely many libertarianly free creaturely essences he could create in W would do wrong at least once. Plantinga’s claim here is one about the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. In particular, his claim is that the (would-) counterfactuals of each creaturely essence are “messed up” in W, so that although there may be metaphysically possible worlds W*1-W*n where each such creature always freely does right, none of those worlds is “nearby” (in roughly the Lewis-Stalnaker sense of relevant similarity) to W. As such, those are metaphysically possible-yet-infeasible worlds. Call this thesis “Possible Universal Transworld Depravity” (◊UTWD). But if we can’t rule out ◊UTWD, then this undercuts Mackie’s claim that, necessarily, God can actualize a world containing free creatures that always freely do right of their own accord. Plantinga’s updated free will defense was widely taken to be a successful reply to the standard problem of evil for nearly fifty years. However, a recent wave of articles indicates that the tides have changed. First,

5 Plantinga’s key insight turns on the semantics of counterfactuals, i.e., statements of the form, “If x were the case then y would have been the case.” For canonical accounts of the semantics of counterfactuals, see Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1968).

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Richard Otte (2009) demonstrated (and Plantinga has conceded6) that ◊UTWD, which is the heart of Plantinga’s free will defense, is necessarily false. Now in that paper, Otte offered a repair that gets around the problem. However, Alexander Pruss (2012) and Michael Almeida (2012) have independently argued that Plantinga’s ◊UTWD thesis is necessarily false, and that Otte’s repair can’t avoid the problem. Second, and relatedly, a number of philosophers have called into question ◊UTWD. Here is my own version of the worry.7 It seems that a minimal requirement for the success of Plantinga’s FWD is for ◊UTWD to be a live epistemic possibility. But it’s not at all clear that it’s successful in even this weak sense. For it seems not implausible to me that at every possible world at which God exists, there are at least some free creatures God could’ve created that aren’t transworld depraved (or, more weakly: such a thesis seems to be at least slightly more plausible than Plantinga’s ◊UTWD). So, for example, it’s not implausible that at any possible world W God could’ve created, God can create tokens of a type of creature that has libertarian free will but also has a nature or preference structure that makes it “grossed out” by the thought of doing wrong (on a par with, say, eating a feces sandwich) and that makes them delight in what is right and good. Such creatures have the power to do wrong; it’s just that their inclinations are strongly against it. As such, the possible worlds at which they freely do wrong aren’t “close” (in the Lewis-Stalnaker sense) to W, in which case God can’t actualize them—i.e., they aren’t “feasible” worlds. I take it that this proposal is plausible to religious theists of an orthodox stripe (Isn’t God supposed to be free in this sense? Aren’t the redeemed in Christian heaven supposed to be free in this sense?). Furthermore, it’s not implausible to me that at every possible world in which God exists, there are creaturely essences of the sort mentioned above that God could’ve actualized. But if that’s right, then ◊UTWD isn’t a live epistemic possibility. But if it isn’t a live epistemic possibility, then Plantinga’s FWD isn’t a successful reply to the logical problem of evil in any interesting sense. Or so it seems to me. The main point

6 Plantinga 7 For

(2004).

(2009). a similar worry that’s much more carefully and forcefully argued, see Rasmussen

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I’m putting on the table is that while it may be true that at every metaphysically possible world, a subset of the infinite number of possible free creatures God can create at that world is transworld depraved, it’s not implausible to think that at every metaphysically possible world, another subset of the infinite number of possible libertarianly free creatures God can create is not, in which case ◊UTWD seems undercut. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013) makes a much more careful case for a similar point. He argues that ◊UTWD depends on a controversial picture of the distribution of the counterfactuals of freedom to creaturely essences. In particular, it depends on the thesis Howard-Snyder calls Interworld Plenitude, which is (very roughly) the view that while there are an infinite number of creaturely essences and an infinite number of differing bundles of counterfactuals of freedom for each creaturely essence to have, and while each possible bundle is had by one or more essences, the plenitude of essence/bundle pairs is diffused across a large stretch of the space of possible worlds. To be more specific: while each bundle is had by some essences at some possible world or other, not every bundle is had by some essence or other at every possible world. Given Interworld Plenitude, then, (i) there are possible worlds at which every creaturely essence suffers from transworld sanctity, (ii) there are possible worlds at which every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity, and (iii) in between these two extremes, each other combination and quantity of essence/bundle pair exists at some possible world or other. If Interworld Plenitude holds, then TWD is possible, as there will be a possible world at which every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity. However, there is another basic account of the distribution of counterfactuals of freedom, which Howard-Snyder calls Intraworld Plenitude. Very roughly, this account states that a token of each such bundle is had by at least one (and, indeed, perhaps infinitely many) creaturely essence(s) at every possible world. But if so, then even if infinitely many creaturely essences suffer from transworld depravity at any given possible world, it’s also true that at least one (and, indeed, perhaps infinitely many) creaturely essence(s) enjoy(s) transworld sanctity at every possible world (⎕TWS). And if that’s right, then at no possible world are God’s hands tied: at every possible world, there are creaturely essences God can instantiate that never freely go wrong. And if so, then ◊UTWD is false, in which case Plantinga’s FWD fails to establish the compatibility of God and evil.

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Now here’s the rub. As Howard-Snyder puts it: which picture (if either) accurately represents the distribution of counterfactuals of freedom to essences? Each picture is internally consistent; and each is consistent with everything we know or reasonably believe. So which is it? I submit that none of us is in a position to answer that question. We are in no position to tell which picture (if either) is accurate. But in that case, we are in no position to tell whether S [ i.e., ⎕TWS] or D [i.e., ◊UTWD] is true. And if we are in no position to tell whether S or D is true, then it is no more reasonable for us to believe D than S and, therefore, it is reasonable for us to refrain from believing D, in which case Plantinga’s FWD fails.8

Now, those who follow the literature on the logical problem of evil know that Howard-Snyder has made this point before (with John Hawthorne).9 This paper furthers the discussion in at least two important ways: (i) by fleshing out and motivating both Interworld Plenitude and Intraworld Plenitude (and by distinguishing weak and strong versions of both; see the paper for the details) and (ii) by responding (in my view, decisively) to the most important replies to the argument, viz. those from Plantinga (2009) and Rowe (1998). Howard-Snyder points out that the core of their replies is the same, and that both replies beg the question by assuming that Interworld Plenitude is true and Intraworld Plenitude is false. As such, it seems to me that HowardSnyder’s (and Hawthorne’s) defeater for Plantinga’s FWD is undefeated by their replies. In short, FWD succeeds in showing the compossibility of God and evil only if ◊UTWD is true. But ◊UTWD is true only if Interworld Plenitude is true and Intraworld Plenitude is false. But we have no reason to prefer one of these two pictures of the distribution of the counterfactuals of freedom to creaturely essences over the other, in which case we have no reason to think ◊UTWD is true. And if that’s right, Plantinga’s FWD fails to show the compossibility of God and evil.

8 Howard-Snyder 9 Howard-Snyder

(2013, p. 27). and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998).

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A third sort of objection to Plantinga’s free will defense takes aim at the notion of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs, as they are commonly called in the debate).10 According to this objection, the notion of a CCF is incoherent. For the relevant counterfactuals are would-counterfactuals of the form: (WCCF) If person S were in circumstances C, then S would freely do A.

But the sort of possible-worlds semantics for WCCFs in play in Plantinga’s free will defense requires that their consequents are true in all the nearest (i.e., relevantly similar) worlds where their antecedents are true. But this in turn entails that S never does other than A in all the nearby worlds in which S is in C. But this is incompatible with Plantinga’s notion of significant freedom at play in his free will defense, which requires that there are some nearby worlds in which S is in C and S does not perform A. The fourth and fifth main objections I will mention call into question not ◊UTWD, but rather the outweighing good of free will. The fourth comes from Wes Morriston, which focuses on God’s agency. Morriston (2000) argues that God lacks the ability to do wrong in the modal sense Plantinga takes to apply to free creatures. For if God is essentially morally perfect, then there is no metaphysically possible world in which God freely does wrong. But if so, then God is not significantly free. And if not, then it’s not at all clear why significant freedom is an intrinsic, outweighing good for created finite persons. The fifth and final objection comes from J. L. Schellenberg (2004, 2007). Schellenberg points out that there are many ways in which God can create finite persons that are intrinsically good, yet which stop short of endowing them with libertarian-grade free will. For example, God can create finite persons with the kind of free will God has, or with some sort of standard compatibilist freedom, and such persons can, for example, continually grow into ever deeper healthy and fulfilling relationships with God and finite persons. But if so, then since it would have been much better for God to create finite persons like this than to have created finite persons with libertarian freedom that do lots and lots of evil, it follows

10 Anders

et al. (2014).

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that finite persons who possess libertarian free will, if there are any, constitute strong grounds for thinking that no such God exists.11 I therefore conclude that it’s not looking good for Plantinga’s free will defense. Perhaps it’s time to stop calling his response to the logical problem of evil a clear success. A lot of material has been covered. It’s therefore worth summarizing the key moves of the above (along with a few others). I will do so in the form of the following fictitious dialogue: A: There is at least one metaphysically possible world at which every single person God could’ve created suffers from transworld depravity (TWD). B: How could that be? A: We can support the thesis as follows: (1) Each creaturely essence is transworld depraved at some possible world or other. Therefore, (2) there’s bound to be one possible world at which every creaturely essence is transworld depraved. B: Why think that? First, the notion of transworld depravity relies on the notion of counterfactuals of creaturely (libertarian) freedom (CCFs). But there are powerful reasons to think that the notion of a CCF is incoherent.

Second, (1) entails that no possible creature is essentially morally perfect. But if you allow that a god can be essentially morally perfect, then there is pressure on the proponent of the free will defense to give a principled basis for why a created being cannot be essentially morally perfect as well. Finally, the inference from (1) to (2) commits a modal operator shift fallacy: 1. (∀x)(CEx → ◊TWDx) Therefore, 2. ◊(∀x)(CEx → TWDx)

Such is the same illicit pattern of inference involved in reasoning that if each book in the library is such that it’s possible to read it in a single day, then it’s possible to read each book in the library in a single day.

11 I should also note that J. L. Schellenberg has recently developed and defended a new version of the deductive argument from evil—one that is designed to be immune to the free will defense; see, e.g., Schellenberg (2013).

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In fact, the inference from (1) to (2) relies on the unargued assumption of the truth of Interworld Plenitude. But if Intraworld Plenitude better captures the distribution of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then not only is the inference from (1) to (2) demonstrably false, but (2) is false as well. And as it turns out, Plantinga and others have (to date) failed to show that the former is more plausible than the latter. Therefore, not only is the inference from (1) to (2) undercut, but (2) is undercut as well. Third, there are burden-shifting grounds against (2). For what grounds the counterfactuals of freedom here? Presumably, it’s the character or nature of a given being. This seems to be the most plausible explanation for why it’s supposed to be that the redeemed in heaven never do wrong. So, for example, the Christian tradition speaks of the renovation of the “heart” of the Christian into one that, like God’s, finds sin repulsive—or at least uninteresting—and which delights in what is right and good. But if so, then all that’s required to create a free being that wouldn’t sin is to endow them with such a “heart,” and with a sanctified and glorified nature or character. (This needn’t obviously require that there is no possible world at which such creatures freely do wrong, but only that, relative to the possible world in question, there is no “close” world (in the Lewis/Stalnaker sense) at which they do wrong.) But, prima facie, it’s possible for an omnipotent being to create beings and endow them with such a nature or character at every possible world at which the former exists—indeed, it’s a standardly held view among Christians that God will perform such a transformation on the saints when they reach the afterlife. But if so, then there is no metaphysically possible world at which every creaturely essence God could create suffers from transworld depravity. And if that’s right, then Plantinga’s free will defense is unsuccessful. A: I’m not sure you’re right about that. For suppose God creates creatures with a “heavenly” character from the get-go. Then since they didn’t form their character through their free choices, they’re not free at all. But whether or not we say such beings are free, perhaps we should say that it’s better to be able to shape one’s character through free choices than to come “ready-made” as it were with a morally perfect character. B: If you’re right, then it would seem to follow that since God is supposed to be morally perfect essentially, he’s had his morally perfect character or nature from the get-go, in which case he’s not free. Furthermore, the same assumptions seem to imply that God’s essentially morally perfect

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character is inferior to those whose character was shaped by their free choices. A: Nevertheless, I still think there’s a crucial difference here between a perfect-from-the-get-go God and a perfect-from-the-get-go created person. For unlike the created person, God is the ultimate source of his actions. That is, he acts on his own reasons, and nothing external to God determines his actions. Because of this, God is free and morally responsible. By contrast, if God created persons with a morally perfect nature, they could not be the ultimate source of their actions. Rather, God would be the ultimate source, as he would be an external cause of their nature, which in turn would ensure that their actions are always good. The only way for God to create free creatures, then, is to create them with the ability to choose between good and evil. Therefore, while the freedom of created beings requires the ability to do evil, God’s freedom does not.12 B: That’s an ingenious and elegant proposal, but I’m not persuaded. Here’s why. Consider two finite persons, Alpha and Beta.13 Alpha and Beta are both morally perfect and thus unable to do what is morally wrong. They differ, however, in their origins: while Alpha was made to be morally perfect by external causes (e.g., heredity and environment, God, etc.), Beta was not. Rather, Beta just popped into existence. Now if the account of freedom and responsibility you propose is correct, then we should say that while Beta is a free and morally responsible agent, Alpha is not. For while Alpha’s nature was caused by an external source, no external source caused Beta’s nature. And because of this, we should evaluate the following subjunctive conditionals differently:

1. If Alpha existed, she’d be free and morally responsible. (F) 2. If Beta existed, she’d be free and morally responsible. (T) But this doesn’t seem right: whether their natures had an external cause doesn’t seem to make a difference to the issue of whether they’re free or responsible. What matters here is that the actions of both are due to natures they did not create and for which they are not responsible. Thus, either being is free and morally responsible just in case the other one is. The proposal is therefore an unsuccessful reply to the criticism of the free will defense at issue.

12 Cf. 13 Cf.

Morriston (2000) and Timpe (2016). Morriston (2000).

206  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON A: That’s an equally ingenious and elegant rejoinder, but I’m not persuaded. For the scenario depicted in your thought experiment seems metaphysically impossible. For it seems metaphysically impossible for a being to just pop into existence. And if it’s not metaphysically possible, it can’t undermine my account.14 B: Whether the scenario is metaphysically possible or not is irrelevant. For per impossible arguments clearly have epistemic force and have proper use in the evaluation of counterpossible conditionals. Therefore, even if the thought experiment should turn out to depict a metaphysically impossible scenario, we can construe the subjunctive conditionals above as counterpossible conditionals, and we can use the thought experiment to evaluate them. The rejoinder is therefore unsuccessful.15

I therefore conclude that it’s not at all clear that (arguably) the most important and powerful objection to the standard deductive argument from evil—Plantinga’s free will defense—is successful. For an agnostic like myself, the argument provides significant grounds for pause regarding the hypothesis of a personal foundation that is perfectly good.

3  Horrors Let us now turn aside from deductive arguments, and consider an abductive, cumulative case style of argument for the same conclusion.16 The first piece of data I will mention for it that is at least prima facie surprising on theism (but not on liberal naturalism and a range of other hypotheses) is horrors. Here, I follow Adams (1999) in defining the

14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 The lines of data here are only meant to be a representative sampling. For other lines of data that might be raised against the perfectly good foundation hypothesis (and some data that bear indirectly on this hypothesis by means of data against classical theism more broadly), see, e.g., Aikin (2010), Aikin and Jones (2015), Cordry (2006), Craig (2016), Crummett (2017), Davidson (1999, 2015), Draper (1989, 2002, 2012, 2017), Everitt (2003), Feldman (2007), Hassoun (2014), Kahane (2011), Kodaj (2014), Leon (2019a, b), Lewis (2007), Lovering (2010, 2013), Maring (2012), Maitzen (2004, 2005, 2006), Megill and Linford (2016), Mizrahi (2014), Oppy (2013), Poston (2012), Rowe (1979, 2006), Schellenberg (2004, 2006, 2013), Sider (2002), Thornhill-Miller and Millican (2015), and Wielenberg (2018).

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category of horrors as “that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his life is not worth living.”17 A powerful deductive version of the argument from horrors can be found in Schellenberg (2007). Here, I sketch a probabilistic variation of it: 1. If God exists, we wouldn’t expect God to allow a person to suffer horrifically unless doing so is required for their deepest good (viz., endless intimate fellowship, ever-increasing knowledge of God). 2.  But on the face of it, God’s allowing horrific suffering isn’t required for their deepest good. 3. By contrast, we would expect horrific suffering if naturalism is true. For on such a view, the universe is indifferent to our welfare. 4. Therefore, horrors provide non-trivial evidence against a perfectly good personal foundation.

4  Hiddenness The second piece of data I will mention is that of divine hiddenness. Here, I follow Schellenberg in equating divine hiddenness with (more or less) nonresistant non-belief. As with the argument from horrors, here is a probabilistic variation on Schellenberg’s (2006, 2007, 2017) deductive argument from divine hiddenness: 1. If a perfectly good God exists, then we’d expect that God would meet all the prerequisites for all those who would want a voluntary relationship with him. 2.  One of the prerequisites is to let others know (or reasonably believe), if they wish, that he exists. 3. But this condition hasn’t been met: there are nonresistant nonbelievers. By contrast, we would expect the data of nonresistant non-belief if naturalism were true. For on that hypothesis, there is no God that is seeking a relationship with us. 4. Therefore, horrors provide some evidence against a perfectly good personal foundation.

17 Schellenberg, J. L. (2007, pp. 243–244). This is Schellenberg’s nice paraphrase of Marilyn McCord Adams’ (1999) definition of ‘horrorendous evils’.

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5  Revulsion The third piece of data I will discuss is revulsion. To be clear, the kind of revulsion in play is not primarily moral, but aesthetic. The argument therefore seems distinct from arguments from evil. Examples of repulsive things are easy to find—think, for example, of most insects and parasites. Here is a randomly chosen example: The crustacean Cymothoa exigua has the dubious and unsettling honor of being the only parasite known to replace an organ. It enters through the gills of the spotted rose snapper, attaching to the base of the fish’s tongue, where it drinks its blood. The bloodsucking causes the tongue to eventually wither away, at which point the crustacean attaches itself to the tongue stub, acting as the fish’s tongue from then on. (Choi 2011)

Other examples include the Venezuelan giant centipede, the hagfish, the Jerusalem cricket, the star-nosed mole, and the guinea worm. The argument can be expressed as follows: 1. I’m rightly repulsed by many aspects of the natural world. 2. Being rightly repulsed by many aspects of the natural world is surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on the hypothesis of naturalism. 3. Therefore, being rightly repulsed by many aspects of the world provides at least some disconfirming evidence against theism vis-à-vis naturalism. The key premise is (2). Why should we accept it? The basic line of reasoning in support of the premise is that if theism is true, then we’d expect our cognitive and affective faculties to be reliable and thus to track the truth about aesthetic properties of the world. And if theism is true, then God made the world, and it is good. Furthermore, given epistemic reliability, my aesthetic judgments about the repulsiveness of parts of the natural world are prima facie justified, in which case parts of the creation are prima facie repulsive. But this conflicts with the hypothesis that it is perfectly good (at least aesthetically). By contrast, repulsive features of the world aren’t at all surprising on naturalism, since we wouldn’t expect it to aim at aesthetic goodness. Therefore, revulsion provides some evidence against a perfectly good foundation.

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6   Inhospitable Environment The fourth piece of data pertains to the inhospitable environment of Earth for sentient beings. In simplest terms, the world is lying in wait to kill us. In particular, the Earth is filled with harmful and lethal flora and fauna. Such flora and fauna are often either undetectable (e.g., deadly microbes) or look harmless upon first inspection (e.g., poisonous berries)—wolves in sheep’s clothing, as it were. Theism makes this surprising, as the Earth is supposed to be our home, and not a Hunger Games scenario. By contrast, such a human-inhospitable environment is expected if naturalism is true and life’s history is governed by evolutionary factors. Therefore, the data of inhospitable environment provide some evidence against a perfectly good foundation. We can put the argument a tad more formally as follows: 1. Our planet is an inhospitable environment for human beings. 2. Our planet being an inhospitable environment for human beings is surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on the hypothesis of naturalism. 3.  Therefore, our planet being an inhospitable environment for humans provides at least some disconfirming evidence against theism vis-à-vis naturalism.

7  Teleological Evil The fifth piece of data is teleological evil. As a first approximation, let’s call something an instance of teleological evil just in case it’s an instance of suffering that occurs in virtue of the natural purpose or design plan of a thing, i.e., it’s part of a thing’s design plan or one of its natural purposes to cause other beings to suffer. A given instance of teleological evil might ultimately trace back to one or more creaturely agents (e.g., a human or a devil), but unless it does, let’s say that it falls under the more general category of natural evil. It’s important not to confuse the problem of teleological evil with the problem of dysteleology. The latter problem traces back to Darwin’s discussions of the imperfect design found in biological organisms and their parts. Commonly discussed examples include the panda’s thumb, the inverted retina, and the convolution of the sexual organs and the digestive organs in humans. The problem of teleological evil differs from the

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problem of dysteleology in that while the latter appeals to poor design as evidence against a supremely intelligent designer, the former appeals to good design (in particular, design that’s well-suited for causing suffering) as evidence against a supremely benevolent designer. To put it crudely, the problem of dysteleology is the problem of stupid design; the problem of teleological evil is the problem of malevolent design. Perhaps the most obvious example of teleological evil is the evil of predation. Such evil occurs when one or more organisms are “built” to cause suffering to one or more other organisms by virtue of acting in accordance with their design plans and/or natural purposes, such that it’s part of their design plan to cause organisms to suffer in some way. And it is well known that the suffering caused by the teleological evil of predation is immense. Very, very many types of organisms are such that they aren’t able to get enough nourishment unless they cause other organisms to suffer immensely (e.g., by ripping them to shreds and eating them alive). Here is a short list of vivid examples of teleological evil, culled from a quick Google Search: The North American short-tailed shrew: The North American short-tailed shrew, Blarina brevicauda, secretes venom from salivary glands in its lower jaw to paralyze prey. But the point of the paralysis is not to kill the prey, but to keep it alive for an extended period of time to allow for prolonged feeding. A tiny shrew can infect a mouse, for example, and then graze on it for days and days until it eventually succumbs to its physical injuries. (Dvorsky 2013)

The margay: Imagine being a pied tamarin monkey living in the Brazilian rainforest and suddenly a baby’s voice cries out in distress; the urge to go out and help would be overwhelming. But in reality it’s a lure set by a margay, a jungledwelling wild cat with remarkable mimicry skills. (Ibid.)

The praying mantis: The mantis is famous because the female often eats the male during intercourse, the latter being easily overpowered by his mate, but hardwired to proceed with the mating process. The sadistic part is that mantises do not bother to kill their prey before eating them: as soon as the insect embraces the hapless lover, it begins to consume it alive. (Evans 2013)

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The sea lamprey: Leeches are disgusting creatures, no one’s arguing that. Now, imagine a three-foot-long leech that feeds on the blood of larger prey. Congratulations, you’ve imagined the sea lamprey, a primitive vertebrate that resembles an enormous leech. The sea lamprey is considered a pest in the Great Lakes of North America, because it often kills the fish it attaches itself to. The reason the lamprey is so nightmarish a killer is that its victims have no limbs to fight it off and must wait for their attacker to gorge itself with their blood. (Ibid.)

The lancet fluke: Dicrocoelium dendriticum is a tiny fluke that, in one stage of its life cycle, can be found in the bodies of certain species of ant. The infected ants are controlled by the parasite and during the night, they leave the anthill, climb up grass straws, and simply wait. This leads to them getting eaten accidentally by sheep and other herbivores, inside which the parasite can continue its life cycle. Strangely enough, the ant returns to the colony during the day and proceeds with its usual activities. (Ibid.)

The parasitic wasp: Parasitic wasps are so horrifying and terrible that Charles Darwin used them as an argument against the existence of a benevolent God. To any of those amongst you that have seen Ridley Scott’s Alien movies, the wasps use a variety of host organisms, such as spiders, caterpillars, or the larvae of other insects. The prey is stung by the wasp, which lays its eggs in it. After the eggs hatch, the wasp larvae slowly consume the victim from inside out, leading to a slow, painful death. (Gayomali 2013)

Not all natural teleological evil is predatory evil, however. A ready example can be found in the parasitic wasp just mentioned: Once inside, those eggs “clone” themselves until the still-alive caterpillar is teeming with hundreds of larvae. Strangely, about 50 of the females emerge with large jaws and no reproductive organs. Their sole purpose for living? To devour as many of their brothers as they can, since only a few males are needed to fertilize their sisters. (Ibid.)

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Another example is the fungus Ophiocordyceps unilateralis (aka the zombie fungus), which is consumed by jungle ants, and takes control of their minds and bodies. Once infected, the fungus guides the ant to a high point, so that when their stem erupts and sprouts from out of its head, they may shoot out spores far and wide among the ant colony of its victim (Lu 2019). Teleological evil appears to be a much more formidable problem for theism than mere moral evil or non-teleological natural evil. Perhaps the most obvious reason is that unlike teleological evil, moral and (nonteleological) natural evil involve no clear or otherwise natural presumption that such evil was intended by God. For when it comes to moral evil and other categories of natural evil, there is always the possibility, and in some cases the plausibility, that while God intended nature and autonomous agents to be good, such agents misused their free will to cause evil, whether directly (in cases of moral evil) or indirectly, by repurposing nature for evil ends (in cases of natural evil). By contrast, with teleological evil, it is part of the very design plan and natural purpose or function of an entity that it causes evil. In such cases, it is natural to infer that if there is a God, then it is part of the very intention of God to ensure horrific suffering, where this suffering isn’t justified in virtue of being necessary to achieve some outweighing good. For example, on the face of it, it seems that God could’ve created a world containing only herbivores. Furthermore, such evil cannot obviously be accounted for by the misuse of free will (whether human or demonic). For free will defenses assume that nature is good in itself, and that this good is subverted by being used for evil ends by humans or devils. But while a free will defense might have at least a hint of plausibility with respect to moral evil, the same cannot be said with respect to an explanation of teleological evil. For the simplest hypothesis is that such design and purpose was part of the original design plan of predatory organisms. We can state the argument a bit more formally as follows: 1. The world contains a lot of teleological evil. 2. The world containing a lot of teleological evil is surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on the hypothesis of naturalism. 3.  Therefore, the world containing a lot of teleological evil provides at least some disconfirming evidence against theism vis-à-vis naturalism.

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8  Religious Diversity The sixth category is that of religious diversity and ambiguity.18 Historically, the world has contained thousands of different religious beliefs, and many of these are incompatible with one another. These incompatibilities cover a range of beliefs, including the existence, nature, and number of divine beings; the path to salvation; the nature of the cosmos, etc. This is surprising on the hypothesis of a perfectly good personal foundation. For such diversity has brought great confusion about the nature of this personal foundation, and how to properly relate to it. But prima facie, one would expect a good personal foundation of the sort discussed in this book to prevent such obstacles to properly relating to it. By contrast, religious diversity and ambiguity are not surprising on naturalism. For on the latter view, there is no such person aiming to have a loving relation with us. We can express the argument here a bit more formally: 1. The world is a radically religiously diverse and ambiguous place. 2. The world being a radically religiously diverse and ambiguous place is surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on the hypothesis of naturalism. 3.  Therefore, the world being a radically religiously diverse and ambiguous place provides at least some disconfirming evidence against theism vis-à-vis naturalism.

9  Evolution The seventh category is that of the evolution of fauna.19 If theism is true, then prima facie, God has very many ways to create and design living creatures, including humans and animals. But evolution is a slow and (one should add) extremely cruel way to bring about living creatures, and prima facie, one wouldn’t antecedently expect a theistic God to use an extremely slow and cruel means of producing living creatures if it had other ways of creating them. By contrast, if naturalism is true, then prima facie, evolution is the only plausible way for humans and other living creatures to come about.20 18 Rowe

(2007). (2002).

19 Draper 20 Ibid.

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A bit more formally: 1. Sentient creatures came to be via evolutionary processes. 2. Sentient creatures coming to be via evolutionary processes is surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on the hypothesis of naturalism. 3. Therefore, sentient creatures coming to be via evolutionary processes provides at least some disconfirming evidence against theism vis-à-vis naturalism.

10  Languishing The eighth category is that of human and animal languishing.21 It appears that by far, most sentient beings (and other living beings) never achieve flourishing. Furthermore, most beings who flourish do not do so for very long. Finally, most sentient beings (and other living beings) languish in their later years. This is prima facie surprising on the hypothesis of a perfectly good personal foundation of reality. For one would antecedently expect such a being (given their unlimited goodness) to aim at the flourishing of living beings, and (given their ultimate power and knowledge) to succeed in bringing about this aim. By contrast, such languishing is not surprising on naturalism, since there is no such being who seeks our welfare. Furthermore, such data are easily explainable in terms of naturalistic Darwinian terms. As Draper puts it: If populations increase geometrically and this leads to competition for resources necessary to survive, then inevitably a large percentage of all living things will not survive long enough to thrive, many more will barely survive and thus languish for all or almost all of their lives, and even those organisms that do flourish for much of their lives will, if they live long enough, ultimately languish in old age. A Darwinian world is inevitably cruel, especially to the young, the old, and the genetically less fortunate.22

21 Draper 22 Ibid.,

(2012). p. 61.

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We can put the argument a bit more carefully as follows: 1. Most living beings (including most sentient beings) never flourish; among the few who flourish, very few flourish for long; and most such beings languish in their later years. 2. Such facts about flourishing and languishing are surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on the hypothesis of naturalism. 3. Therefore, such facts about flourishing and languishing provide at least some disconfirming evidence against theism vis-à-vis naturalism.

11   Pain and Pleasure The ninth category is that of the distribution and mechanisms of pain and pleasure.23 Most sentient beings experience pain and pleasure. However, very many sentient beings experience pain—even excruciating pain—when it serves no clear purpose. For example, humans and animals continue to feel excruciating pain often through their last dying moments, for long periods of time after being burned in a fire. On the face of it, such pain serves no purpose if theism is true. It is therefore surprising on that hypothesis. By contrast, such biologically useless suffering is readily explainable on the hypothesis of naturalism. For on that hypothesis, there is no providential personal force who overlooks our lives to ensure that there is no useless pain. Furthermore, pleasure and pain serve obvious purposes for encouraging our survival and reproduction.24 A bit more carefully, the argument is: 1. Pain frequently occurs when it serves no useful purpose. 2. Pain frequently occurring when it serves no useful purpose is surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on the hypothesis of naturalism. 3. Therefore, pain frequently occurring when it serves no useful purpose provides at least some disconfirming evidence against theism vis-à-vis naturalism.

23 Draper 24 Ibid.

(1989).

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12   Ineffectiveness of Prayer The tenth category is that of the apparent ineffectiveness of prayer. Many controlled, double-blind experiments have been performed to test the effectiveness of prayer. For example, one such study tested for whether intercessory prayer results in more effective heart surgery recoveries than for those who receive no such prayer.25 The results showed that this is not the case. Many other experiments have been done with similar results. This is antecedently surprising on the hypothesis of a perfectly good personal foundation, as then one would expect such a being to respond to such prayer for the benefit of the patients. By contrast, such results are expected on naturalism, for on such a hypothesis, there is no such personal being who cares for our welfare. The argument can be stated a bit more carefully as follows: 1.  Prayer is no more effective than not praying when scientifically tested. 2. Prayer being no more effective than not praying when scientifically tested is surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on the hypothesis of naturalism. 3. Therefore, prayer being no more effective than not praying when scientifically tested provides at least some disconfirming evidence against theism vis-à-vis naturalism.

13   Idolatry The eleventh and final category of data I will mention that is prima facie puzzling on theism is the widespread tendency toward, and practice of, idolatry. To be more specific, there is significant evidence from the scientific study of religion that, due to their cognitive architecture and other factors, people have a strong natural tendency to believe in and worship

25 Aviles, J.M., S.E. Whelan, D.A. Hernke, B.A. Williams, K.E. Kenny, W.M. O’Fallon, S.L. Kopecky. 2001. “Intercessory Prayer and Cardiovascular Disease Progression in a Coronary Care Unit Population: A Randomized Controlled Trial.” Mayo Clinic Proceedings 76 (12):1192–1198.

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anthropomorphic deities (Hume 1757; Linford and Megill n.d.). But if the God of theism exists, then he does not want us to be idolatrous. It’s therefore surprising on theism that we have such an inclination. By contrast, such phenomena is not at all surprising on the hypothesis that there is no such being, for then one would expect no such inclination. Therefore, the strong inclination of humans toward idolatry provides some evidence against theism.

14  The Argument from (1)–(11) So far, I’ve sketched 11 lines of data—horrors, hiddenness, revulsion, inhospitable environment, teleological evil, religious diversity, evolution, languishing, the distribution of pain and pleasure, the ineffectiveness of prayer, and idolatry—that are prima facie surprising on the hypothesis of theism, but not on liberal naturalism. Perhaps each of these pieces of data taken alone provides decent evidence that favors a personal foundation of reality that is not perfectly good over one that is. But suppose, as I’m inclined to think, not. Still, one might well think—as I’m inclined to think—that these 11 lines of evidence, when taken together, favor a picture of the general character of the world according to which there is no personal foundation of the world that is perfectly good. For the purposes of our inquiry, however, it suffices if, when taken together and from the starting point of agnosticism about large-scale metaphysical hypotheses, the considerations above counterbalance the considerations for thinking that the foundation of reality is perfectly good. For then we would lack evidence that favors a perfectly good foundation over one that is not.

15  Recap In the present chapter, I’ve argued that a wide and representative range of data are surprising and puzzling on the hypothesis that there is a morally perfect, personal foundation of reality. I’ve also argued that such phenomena are not surprising on the hypothesis of liberal naturalism. This cumulative case therefore provides significant probabilistic support for liberal naturalism (as well as the inclusive disjunction of liberal naturalism and the other non-theistic hypotheses mentioned in Chapters 9 and 11) vis-à-vis the perfect personal foundation hypothesis.

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References Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1999. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Aikin, Scott. 2010. “The Problem of Worship.” Think 9 (25): 101–113. ———, and Nicholaos Jones. 2015. “An Atheistic Argument from Ugliness.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1): 209–217. Almeda, Michael. 2012. “The Logical Problem of Evil Regained.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (1): 173–176. Anders, Paul C., Joshua C. Thurow, and Kenneth Hochstetter. 2014. “On Counterfactuals of Libertarian Freedom: Is There Anything I Would Have Done If I Could Have Done Otherwise?” American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1): 85–94. Choi, C. Q. 2011. “The 10 Most Diabolical and Disgusting Parasites.” March 2. Retrieved from LiveScience: https://www.livescience.com/13040-10-disgusting-parasites-zombie-antstoxoplasma.html. Cordry, Benjamin S. 2006. “Theism and the Philosophy of Nature.” Religious Studies 42 (3): 273–290. Craig, William Lane. 2016. God over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crummett, Dustin. 2017. “The Problem of Evil and the Suffering of Creeping Things.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82 (1): 71–88. Davidson, Matthew. 1999. “A Demonstration Against Theistic Activism.” Religious Studies 35 (3): 277–290. ———. 2015. “God and Other Necessary Beings.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford. edu/entries/god-necessary-being/. Draper, Paul. 1989. “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists.” Noûs 23 (3): 331–350. ———. 2002. “Seeking but Not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic.” In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel HowardSnyder and Paul K. Moser, 197–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2012. “Darwin’s Argument from Evil.” In Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Yujin Nagasawa, 49–70. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2017. “Atheism and Agnosticism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2017 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/atheism-agnosticism/. Dvorsky, G. 2013. “9 Predators with the Most Brutal Hunting Techniques.” May 28. Retrieved from IO9: https://io9.gizmodo.com/9-predatorswith-the-most-brutal-hunting-techniques-510100768. Evans, V. 2013. “10 Sadistic Killers of the Natural World.” June 25. Retrieved from Listverse: https://listverse.com/2013/06/25/10-sadistic-killers-ofthe-natural-world/.

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Everitt, Nicholas. 2003. The Nonexistence of God. London: Routledge. Feldman, Richard. 2007. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” In Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, edited by Louise M. Antony, 194–214. New York: Oxford University Press. Flint, Thomas. 1998. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gayomali, C. 2013. “7 Animals That Eat Their Own Kind.” May 1. Retrieved from The Week: https://theweek.com/articles/464891/7-animals-that-eat-kind. Hassoun, Nicole. 2014. “Eternally Separated Lovers: The Argument from Love.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4): 633–543. Howard-Snyder, Daniel. 2013. “The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga.” In The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, edited by Justin McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. ———, and John O’Leary-Hawthorne. 1998. “Transworld Sanctity and the Free Will Defense.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1): 1–21. Hume, David. 1757. “The Natural History of Religion.” In Dialogues and Natural History of Religion, edited by J. A. C. Gaskin. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Kahane, Guy. 2011. “Should We Want God to Exist?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 696–774. Kodaj, Daniel. 2014. “The Problem of Religious Evil.” Religious Studies 50 (4): 425–443. Leon, Felipe. 2019a. “Causation and Sufficient Reason: Atheism.” In Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy, edited by Joseph W. Koterski and Graham Oppy, 281–300. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference. ———. 2019b. “A Priori: Atheism.” In Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy, edited by Joseph W. Koterski and Graham Oppy, 301–312. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference. Lewis, David. 2007. “Divine Evil.” In Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, edited by Louise Anthony, 231–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell. Linford, Dan, and Jason Megill. n.d. “Idolatry, Indifference, and the Scientific Study of Religion: Two New Humean Arguments.” Religious Studies: 1–21. Published online 17 October 2018. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0034412518000653. Lovering, Rob. 2010. “The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philosophers.” Philo 13 (2): 185–200. ———. 2013. God and Evidence: Problems for Theistic Philosophers. London: Bloomsbury. Lu, J. 2019. “How a Parasitic Fungus Turns Ants into ‘Zombies’.” April 18. Retrieved from National Geographic: https://www.nationalgeographic.com/ animals/2019/04/cordyceps-zombie-fungus-takes-over-ants/.

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———. 2006. Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ———. 2007. The Wisdom to Doubt: The Justification of Skeptical Religion. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kindle Edition. ———. 2013. “A New Logical Problem of Evil.” In A Companion to the Problem of Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Justin McBrayer. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ———. 2017. The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sider, Ted. 2002. “Hell and Vagueness.” Faith and Philosophy 19: 58–68. Stalnaker, Robert. 1968. “A Theory of Conditionals.” In Studies in Logical Theory, edited by Nicholas Rescher, 98–110. American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series: Volume 2. Oxford: Blackwell. Thornhill-Miller, Branden, and Peter Millican. 2015. “The Common-Core/ Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1): 1–49. Timpe, Kevin. 2016. “God’s Freedom, God’s Character.” In Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns, edited by Kevin Timpe and Dan Speak. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wielenberg, Erik. 2018. “The Absurdity of Life in a Christian Universe as a Reason to Prefer That God Not Exist.” In Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism, edited by Klaas Kraay, 147–163. New York: Routledge.

CHAPTER 15

The Great Story Theodicy Joshua Rasmussen

1  Setting the Stage This exchange with Professor Leon has been one of the most interesting conversations I have ever had. We have examined the deepest questions people ask, and it seems we have been productive in clarifying at least some significant guiderails and signposts. The stakes are high: Is the foundation of the world for us, or is it indifferent to our existence, or worse? I am excited—and curious—to see how the rest of our dialogue will unfold. The ultimate meaning of everything hangs in the balance. The very significance of our inquiry presents a special challenge to dialogues like these. Ideas about the meaning of life touch the deepest part of a person. For this reason, many conversations at this depth take a defensive or tribal form, where teams compete with each other. Explorers get lost in the currents of tribal warfare. Fortunately, this conversation with Leon has followed a peaceful path. Leon’s careful and charitable style has contributed to a highly productive conversation, as we enter the weeds of evil and suffering. I am thankful to Leon for this opportunity to explore the territory in such depth. I have some specific things I want to share. I want to share these things without suggesting that other perspectives are impossible or unreasonable. Rather than holding up an argument that judges anyone’s reasonableness, my goal is to offer a tool that I hope can serve people in their analysis of evil and suffering.

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Here is my vision for this chapter. I will describe a “story” tool, which we can use to investigate the kind of world that may plausibly emerge from a perfectly good foundation. First, I will explain why I think a supreme foundation predicts a great, true story. Second, I will point out several plot elements of a great story, elements that appear to match our world well. Third, I will show how these elements make good sense even in light of Leon’s objections to the free will defense. Fourth, I will consider Leon’s cumulative case from evil, and I will show how the story tool can shed light on many perplexing events. I will then suggest why even the most perplexing events could actually make the most sense in light of a great, unfolding story.

2  A Foundation for a Great Story Let us step back and consider the big picture. This book is about the ultimate explanation—the foundation—of all things. What kind of foundation could explain all things? So far, we have considered how a foundation might explain various elements of reality, like reason, morality, and existence itself. In previous chapters, I shared why I expect the best ultimate explanation to be in terms of a supreme (i.e., maximally valuable) foundation. My reason, in outline, is that the supreme foundation hypothesis provides the least arbitrary account of the ground layer of reality while also having the greatest predictive success. Specifically, I argued that a supreme foundation provides the following resources: It (i) anchors the mathematical and moral landscapes within a supreme nature (giving the foundation the power of supreme thinking and character), (ii) provides the raw materials for producing conscious, moral agents, and (iii) includes the probabilistic resources to explain the teleological arrow aimed at arenas suitable for mind-body beings like us. While each of these ideas invites further inquiry (beyond the contents of any single book), they play a powerful role in my thinking about the nature of the foundation. Leon’s own vision of the foundation can help us illuminate this vision. To illustrate, imagine the foundation is like a castle. It includes pillars of reason, arches of wisdom, and a golden floor of goodness. Imagine you walk into the castle and lean upon a pillar. As you feel the pillar, you feel a part of the castle. In a similar way, Leon sees many valuable things in the foundation. He leans upon pillars of reason and walks on a golden

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floor of goodness. As he sees these things, he is seeing the pieces that would occupy a supreme foundation. In Leon’s closing reflections in Sect. 2, he raised some specific concerns with specific theisms. I have good news: Those concerns do not block this larger vision of a supreme foundation. Instead, they help us separate areas of darkness from areas of light. I’ll share three examples. First, Leon worries about getting wrong counterpossibles, since the abstract layer of reality would still exist were there no minds. A valuable consideration! We can incorporate it here. The supreme foundation is like a supreme castle. Its parts can come apart counterpossibly. Just as the golden floor of the castle would still exist were the rest of the castle gone, so too, the golden floor of goodness within God’s nature would still exist were—somehow—the rest of God gone. An advance. Second, Leon worries about the concealed complexity of a perfect mind. Another source of sight. See this: The simple seed is in the hypothesis of a supreme mind, not in its total constitution. The supreme nature hypothesis successfully predicts the pillars of reason and the golden floor of goodness, which comprise the architecture of God’s nature. Here, the complexity is in the predictive success, not in the seed hypothesis. Third, Leon worries about there being no best being. His worry here is that any consistent set of divine attributes (omniscience, omnipotence, moral perfection) fails to determine a unique best. Again, an important worry. Here is my suggestion: look past these particular attributes. See a simpler root. Graham Oppy (2014, 62–68) points to an attribute that would determine a best being: absolute perfection.1 This property is not a product of other properties. It is the ground of others, and it successfully predicts the architecture of the foundation we do see. These results are good. Now, after all this predictive success, we come to our present inquiry about evil and suffering. The best ultimate explanation should fit with all the data. Leon’s latest piece draws our attention to the data of bad events, which are puzzling on any theory of the foundation. Can we make sense of them? How? What explanation is truly best? Seeing bad events in the world is like seeing a messy closet. If you already have an idea—an anticipation—of who owns the closet, that idea will affect your interpretation of the mess. On the other hand, the sight 1 I

say more about this root property and its implications in Rasmussen (2019).

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of the mess could cause you to reevaluate your idea of who owns the closet. In what follows, I will share why bad events are part of a great story that is probable if the foundation is supreme. From this perspective, bad events don’t automatically tip the scale away from the supreme foundation hypothesis. They could even do the opposite, as I will explain. To help us investigate the implications of bad events, I am going to tell a story—more exactly, a story outline. I will first draw the contours of the story. Then, I will fill in various details. As I proceed, I will show where the lessons from the story may shed light on Leon’s arguments. My hope is that the story will be a tool that anyone can use to probe the implications of bad events. The value of a story is that it can help organize one’s thinking about lots of data. A story provides a context. It provides meaning to the events within a larger adventure. Let me get to the crux of my proposal. I propose that all bad events are part of an unfathomably great story that unfolds, layer by layer, plot by plot, within valuable arenas designed for unending growth and discovery. Bad events—of many kinds and intensities—contribute to the great purposes of every character. Suppose, for sake of argument, that our world includes a story that emerges from a supreme foundation. What would this story be like? Here are some things I’d expect. Sitting in my armchair (with a cup of coffee), I would expect this ultimate story to fit the pattern of truly great story. As I reflect on the meaning of “great story,” several contours of the story emerge in my mind. Like any great story, I would expect to see these three universal story elements: 1. Characters—lots of them. 2. Conflict. 3. Conflict Resolution(s). I would also expect stories to be nested. There would be plots inside plots. The most addicting shows have episodes that contribute to larger plots. Just as great organisms are made of smaller organs, great stories are made of smaller stories. In the same way, then, I would expect the greatest sort of story to include plots that build upon each other. I would also expect a supreme foundation to play three roles in the story. First, the foundation would provide the ultimate setting for every

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character in the story. Second, the foundation would be the ultimate author of the contours of the story. (I will later explain why I’d expect creaturely co-authors, too.) Third, I would expect the supreme foundation to be a supreme character in the story. Here are some additional elements I would expect from any great story: adventure, exploration, progress, heroism, comic relief, courage in the face of uncertainty, layers of discovery, sacrifice, cleverness, good and evil, danger, victory, sub-plots, consistent rules that cannot be broken at the characters’ whims, unpredictable surprises, a variety of dynamic characters, episodes that contribute to a larger plot, romance, hints of the future, tension, and release. These are familiar elements in the best stories. I would expect them to exist in our world, therefore, if our world unfolds from a supreme foundation. A great story would also have mysteries. The noblest characters in a good story would face trials, through which characters experience the development and display of virtues. They may not always understand how everything in their story could fit together. On the contrary, I would expect many discoveries to unfold over time. In times of uncertainty, the stories are not over. Future scenes bring light to previous scenes. A great story includes layers of mystery to be uncovered and discovered. Now to be clear, I am not proposing that bad events exist for entertainment purposes. Nothing like that. The value of the story reflects vastly deeper values that occur inside the characters. Evidence indicates that we learn best in the context of stories.2 My proposal so far, then, is that, if the foundation were supreme, the Real Story would have the elements of a great story. Interestingly, many events in the actual world have these very elements. There are characters, like you and me. The characters have purposes and projects. There are plots inside plots. There are tensions and triumphs, dramas and discoveries, pains and purposes, and so on. All these are elements of any great story, and incredibly, all these are elements of our world. In view of these observations, I expect many unfortunate events to occur given the supreme foundation theory. Bad events, in their general form, are part of great stories because great stories include suspense and

2 See

Prestopnik (2016).

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tragedies of various kinds. For that reason, by my lights, bad events per se are not prima facie surprising if God exists. Instead, their existence fits the theory. (Later, I will say why I find these elements vastly more surprising on liberal naturalism.)

3  Scenes of a Great Story Let us sharpen our focus. I will begin to fill in some details in a more specific story. I call this story, “the Great Story.” The Great Story is a story that I think would unfold from a supreme foundation. I will display three big-picture scenes. The purpose of these scenes is to help us see how various actual events might fit into a greater story. In this section, I will focus on general categories of actual events, while in the next section, I will look at the more specific sorts of events Leon identifies. A disclaimer: I do not claim that this story is certainly true. Rather, I claim something more modest and more personal. I claim that this story—in its contours—is what I’d personally anticipate from a supreme foundation in light of everything I currently know (artistic license aside). Here goes the story: Scene 1: Creation Once upon a time, there was a great sound. It was the greatest sound in the history of all reality. As the sound went forth, lines in the foundation’s own substance vibrated like strings. These lines twisted into shapes, which moved outward as if they were riding the edge of the great sound. This sound was not a random noise. It had rhythm and purpose, as if it were guiding the shapes. This rhythm formed within the mind-substance of the great foundation. The sounds and shapes danced for ages. Meanwhile, things were building upon each other, leading somewhere. Everything was evolving along lines of order, note by note. Like a dramatic song that begins with a single instrument, the song of the universe began with the instrument of shapes. Then, when the song was ready, masses of shapes combined to form shining stars. The stars twinkled in anticipation of what was coming next. Scene 2: Kingly Creatures In the fullness of time, something greater than any shape began to emerge. This thing had a power that no shape had. It had the power to generate its own vibrations, its own sounds. By the rules of its own nature, it could act—top-down—on its shapes. By its motions, it added its own special rhythm to the universe.

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Inside this creature were three seeds for suspense. First, the creature included the power to grow along unpredictable lines. Second, it could act for its own purposes. Third, it could multiply into more things like itself. And it did multiply. Out of this thing, sprang forth a choir of tiny creatures. Each added its own rhythm to the great Sound. The choir grew and grew, as the creatures spread across the surface of a sphere.

I wish to remind the reader that an evolution of creatures from simple to complex is no easy feat. My own experiments with evolution simulation deliver the same lesson as every other evolutionary computer simulation of which I am aware. The lesson is that an upward evolution doesn’t happen easily (or ever) by accident. It takes forethought and intentionality. Sure, perhaps God could make creatures fully formed,3 without following any pre-established lines of order, but to my mind, that would be far less impressive. Back to the story: The foundational substance enjoyed this system of creatures more than every shape in every universe. Their motions were interesting. Their development was special. As their shapes transformed, they prepared the way for something even greater. They set the stage for the greatest characters in the greatest story ever told. When the setting was ready, kingly creatures were born into the Great Story. Each kingly creature had a role to play. Each had a purpose. These creatures were co-authors of a true story. The kingly creatures reflected a certain aspect of the supreme foundation. Kingly creatures, like the foundation, had the power to ponder, feel, and to rule. They could invent their own songs. They could design their own lives within the rules of their realms. These creatures were not puppets of the perfect principles that precede them. Instead, they were free to design their own principles, purposes, and play. At this time, the foundation of all things vibrated a new emotion: ­anticipation. What will the kingly creatures do?

3 But note: if Leon’s principle of material causation is true, then not even God could create beings from nothing.

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Before I continue the story, I want to share why I would expect kingly creatures to emerge from a good and personal foundation.4 The seed of my reason is that without kingly creatures, the world would be missing a certain special type of character from which springs many valuable types of experiences. Kingly creatures imply a certain freedom in the story of the world. From this freedom springs unpredictable adventures,5 joyful surprises,6 unforced relationships,7 and a diversity of intensely good experiences that would not otherwise be possible. (More on this last item in a moment.) Notice that these potential values are about the kind of world people experience, not the greatness of beings. This distinction is significant because it cuts through a certain worry about the value of moral freedom. Leon follows Morriston in wondering how moral freedom could be valuable for creatures but not God. I share this concern. In fact, elsewhere I endorse Morriston’s argument for the conclusion that moral freedom isn’t a great-making feature of any being, human or divine. However, I went on to argue that even if moral freedom doesn’t contribute to the greatness of a being, moral freedom could contribute to the value of the experiences in a world that touches everyone.8 On this view, then, the value of freedom is not just for creatures. God experiences its value, too. For example, God experiences indeterministic adventures and relationships.9 Having said that, creating kingly creatures may be risky.10 The risk is that creatures will break the harmony of the world by ruling badly.

4 I

develop these reasons in How Reason Can Lead to God (forthcoming). more on reasons for randomness, see Rasmussen and Wessling (2015). 6 Evidence indicates that variable (unpredictable) rewards are more interesting than determined rewards. See, for example, Brunner et al. (1994). 7 See Rasmussen “On the Value of the Freedom to Do Evil” (2013) as a response to Morriston’s “What’s So Good About Moral Freedom” (2000). 8 Rasmussen (2013). 9 For more on the value of indeterminism for God, see Rasmussen and Wessling (2015). 10 I will assume for sake of argument that there is a real risk. But note that if God could use middle knowledge to ensure that everyone freely does right all the time, per Leon’s suggestion (and my argument in Rasmussen 2004), then it looks like there’s no risk. In that case, God has all the more reason to create kingly creatures (or less reason not to), since God takes no risk in doing so. (I will discuss the implications of this middle knowledge account for the free will defense in the main text below.) 5 For

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Could the risk be worth it? That depends. It seems to me that the risk of kingly creatures could only be worth it if something like the following hypothesis is true: Upside: God aims to work everything—including every unfortunate event—together for long-term good that far outweighs the bad for each creature, where such good is unachievable in any other way.

This hypothesis predicts a potential Upside for every bad. Out of trouble, people can rise up to experience great courage, compassion, and sacrificial love. Some of the most profound and special ties of love spring in the toughest soil. Given Upside, one might hypothesize that all unfortunate by-products of a natural order are temporary, while its results reap value in everlasting souls. Perhaps every affliction, including every affliction caused by natural events, has the power to produce everlasting jewels of character, insight, and specially knitted connections.11 Temporary pains could reap unique and everlasting value. Note that, if Upside is true, certain negative histories can be essential to certain goods. For example, my current appreciation for my wife has a quality to it that essentially depends in part on a series of uncertainties and heartaches that preceded our relationship. As far as I see, this specific value couldn’t be forged in any other way. Now to be clear, I am not suggesting that the value that emerges is God’s reason to aim for evil. I am not saying God causes tears in order to build a kingdom. Rather, my thought is that God aims at good things, including valuable arenas in which a diversity of valuable beings can have a diversity of valuable experiences. In these arenas, there is the good of rewards and risky adventures. All unfortunate events that occur in these arenas also work together for incomparably greater goods. By this vision, this world is an arena for heroes, problem-solvers, and kingly creatures. When the innocent suffer in this arena, their suffering is tragic, but their very sorrows have an inextricable link to everlasting value that vastly outweighs it. I anticipate, then, many goods that could spring in a world with kingly creatures. These goods include unending opportunities for unforced growth, certain adventures, knowledge of reconciliation, 11 For

more on this connection-building theodicy, see Collins (2011).

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relationships knitted by forgiveness, the many fruits of perseverance, unforced love, the experience of getting up again to discover the treasures you had hoped for, conflict resolutions that lead to new beginnings, and a greater diversity of everlasting souls, to name a few. At this point, I’d like to offer a few clarifications that illustrate why I think Leon’s points about the free will defense are fully consistent with my particular proposal about the value of kingly creatures. Leon wonders why, if moral freedom is valuable, God wouldn’t create a world containing moral freedom but no moral evil. I offer three considerations in response. First, it is far from clear to me how God could ensure that everyone freely performs only right actions. Leon cites one of my own articles in which I argue that if God has middle knowledge, then God could probably ensure that everyone freely performs only right actions. Right. That very article has made me question whether God has middle knowledge, or whether God is required to consider all potential knowledge when creating an adventure. In fact, Leon himself challenges the middle knowledge view. If God doesn’t have middle knowledge, then obviously God cannot use middle knowledge to ensure that everyone freely does right. Second, even if God has middle knowledge, it doesn’t follow that God could ensure that everyone does right in the kind of world God would want to make. What if God wants to actualize every creaturely essence? While at Notre Dame in the Malloy hallway, Plantinga suggested to me an idea that I’ve never seen in print: Perhaps God intends to create new creatures without end, such that for every creaturely essence, there is a time at which that essence will be instantiated. On this hypothesis, the world (time-inclusive) enjoys maximally many characters by including all possible creatures. Then, it is enormously unlikely that everyone would freely do right. Is the all-possible-creatures hypothesis true? Who knows?12 Third, and more fundamentally, the logical argument from evil has a modal premise—about what God could achieve—that I frankly don’t see the truth of. Leon’s own modally careful sensibilities seem apropos here. Even if Plantinga hasn’t shown that God couldn’t achieve the relevant

12 Another idea is that God has middle knowledge but, for the sake of risk and adventure, God is able to bracket that knowledge in the creation of the world.

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goods in any other way, still, has anyone shown that God could? I confess that, from where I stand, I don’t see that God could achieve all the great goods in another way.13 Instead of stepping along lines out of my sight, I seek lines within sight. Let us now return to the story: Scene 3: Hidden Treasures Many ages later, some shapes came together to form a special pattern. This pattern was new, but it displayed a thought that came before all shapes. To perceive this thought, look at these shapes: it is the glory of God to conceal a matter; to search out a matter is the glory of kings (Proverbs 25:2, NIV). This thought points to treasure in three places: (i) hearts of creatures, (ii) layers of creation, and (iii) the nature of the creator. As the Great Story continued, many of these treasures began to be revealed, layer by layer, plot by plot. Like a flower that unfolds from a seed, the glories of the world unfolded from humble beginnings. As their stories continued, more treasures were discovered in every creature. Some treasures emerged early, while others emerged much later. The greater the time, the greater the treasure. The greatest treasures have yet to be revealed. In the history of the kingly creatures, some shapes hinted at an unusual treasure. This treasure is one that no time can fully contain. See the shapes below: ‫ׁשים וְ שָ ׁב ֞ ִֻעים‬ ּׁ ִ ֣ ‫ּוש ַ֗ניִ ם ִש‬ ׁ ְ ֙‫שיחַ עַד־ יְ ֽרּושָ ׁ֙לִ ַם֙ וְ לִ בְ נ֤ ֹות לְ הָ ִשׁיב֙ ְר ֣חֹוב וְ נִ בְ נְ תָ ה֙ תָ ּׁשּוב‬ ׁ ִ ֣ ָ‫שָ ׁב ִ ֻ֖עים נ ִָ֔גיד מ‬ ‫שׁבְ עָ ֑ה הָ עִ ֽ ִ ּתים׃‬. ִ Translation: “From the time the word goes out to restore and rebuild Jerusalem until the Anointed One, the ruler, comes, there will be seven ‘sevens,’ and sixty-two ‘sevens.’” (NIV). In the Great Story, not every secret is understood by everyone right away. Not every treasure is discovered at the start. Yet, some kingly creatures discovered that the above message matches actual events. After the message appeared, a decree went out to rebuild Jerusalem, and seven sevens

13 Besides all these points, even if God could make an evil-free world with moral freedom, it doesn’t follow that such a world would be better. An evil-free world would be missing all the valuable experiences I mentioned in my discussion of Upside. If anything, one may expect the greatest type of story to include moral dramas that unfold into incomparably greater goods.

234  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON (49) and sixty-two sevens (434) of years after that decree, the most famous Character in the history of creatures rode into Jerusalem with the authority of a king.14

This last part of the story illustrates the Great Story’s potential link with very specific events in our world. By linking the Great Story to the actual world, we put the story to real testing. The story tool helps us consider what to expect from a great story. We can then test whether the actual world meets these expectations. Personally, I would expect the greatest sort of story to include the greatest display of love by the greatest character. This display need not be evident to everyone at once. After all, there is value in discovery, and there is even greater value in greater discoveries that emerge over times. But I would expect to find at least hints pointing to God’s work in the story. For example, the ultimate Character—the author of authors— might well enter the Great Story in some form (or various forms at various times) to provide hope, love, and revelation. I’d expect something like that. Does our world fit the pattern of a great story? Many things match exceedingly well, e.g., many characters, plots inside plots, growth and discovery, and so on. These matches are prima facie unsurprising on the great story hypothesis. Nevertheless, some events may seem decidedly out of place. Could all the horrors of history really fit into greater purposes? One’s answer to that question is as personal as one’s unique experiences. In the next section, I will offer some personal reflections on some of the specific data points Leon raises.

4  Leon’s 11 Plot Elements: Could They Fit into the Great Story? Leon draws attention to eleven troubling elements: horror, revulsion, God’s hiddenness, inhospitable environment, teleological evil, religious diversity, evolution, languishing, pointless pain, unanswered prayers, and idolatry. Together these elements comprise what I’ll call “the terrible terrain.” Leon proposes that all these elements are prima facie surprising if 14 For a recent assessment of the prophetic data relevant to this most famous character in human history, see Scott (2018).

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God exists, but less surprising on liberal naturalism. If the foundation is so good, why is there this terrible terrain? My method of analysis will be to use the story tool to separate the clear from the unclear. I will begin by sharing three general implications of a great story that may shed some light on some crevices of the terrible terrain. Then, I will offer some more specific ideas. First, when I reflect on the greatness of a story, I find that I expect that a truly great story would have plots that unfold along many lines and levels. Some plots would take place on an individual character level. But other plots would be much larger and stimulate growth of families, cities, nations, and perhaps entire species. Thus, while some aspects of the Great Story may not make much sense on the level of any individual character, some things may make more sense from wider scope. Similarly, I would expect some problems to be fine-tuned for the growth of individuals, while other problems would be fine-tuned for the growth of cities or nations. When I say the problems are “fine-tuned,” I mean they fall along optimal edges that serve valuable ends in the Great Story. Problems are the engines for growth. In view of the value of growth and development, I would expect black holes won’t annihilate all creatures as soon as they begin to breathe; that’s too harsh for development. Instead, I would expect growth to follow edges of danger that fall within specific ranges. These ranges will tend to optimize the experience of growth for many beings, on many scales, and along many lines. One effect of growth along many lines is that certain bad events may serve other good events. For example, while the elderly diminish in physical strength, they may increase in virtue or wisdom (and even happiness15), or their loss may contribute to development on larger scales (family, society, etc.), as beings work together to solve big problems. (That is not to say these events are caused or allowed merely for the sake of these ends; as suggested above, the risks and dangers of our world may also be part of the arenas for kingly creatures.) Second, I would expect most values to be initially out of sight for most creatures. That is because the best stories include the experience of mysteries that are unveiled over time. Plus, there is always more to discover. As creatures grow and plots unfold, new things come into view;

15 Contrary to popular impression, studies show that despite diminishment along physical lines, people actually tend to increase in happiness as they age, see Rauch (2018).

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even God could vicariously enjoy our discovery of new things. These reasons lead me to expect puzzling events if God exists. Third, in a large, complicated world, I would expect some data to be at the edge of what God would allow. To illustrate, let’s say a perfectly good God wouldn’t allow some event e, and suppose that we have data e-, which is very much like e. It might then be tempting to think e- is evidence against God because e- is so similar to an event that God in fact wouldn’t allow. We should be careful, though. In a large, complex story, we should expect that some events will come to the edge of what God would allow. (For development of this point in relation to our best scientific theories, see Dougherty and Pruss [2014].) This third idea might shed some, if even minimal, light on some strange sights in the animal kingdom. Many good things ride the edges of bad things. For example, humor is often generated at the edge of the inappropriate, danger, or something negative.16 More significantly, growth follows the edge of danger. Fun exists at the edge of fear. And so on. Maybe some sights, like the Jerusalem grasshopper, are at the edge of the inappropriate, or they are parts of larger systems that are at the edge of danger. The greatest value tends to spring out of the edges. I now turn to some specific issues. Leon points to problems in the process of creating animals via evolution. For example, why design predators who eat other animals alive? Why use slow, painful processes to create the biological world? I offer a few modest thoughts. First, by the story tool, one might expect creatures to be involved in great plots that involve suspense, danger, and growth along many lines. One might also expect these events to unfold in arenas that have organizing rules and laws, which provide coherence to the drama of life. In view of these expectations, one might expect at least some amount of suspense, danger, and growth on many scales throughout the animal kingdom, especially if God could (for all one knows) forge outweighing long-term (even everlasting) goods out of every negative experience. Second, it is unclear to me how much predation would happen under ideal circumstances. The data of which I am aware suggest that, in the absence of scarcity, meat eaters prefer to eat dead carcasses. They are what scientists call “scavengers.” Maybe under perfect harmony, there 16 For more on the nature of humor, see Morreall (2016). (Ironically, as I type this note, my wife is in the other room laughing because my kids are crying so intensely in her ear.)

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would only be scavenging. In a world with indeterministic creatures, perfection is not enforced, and perhaps nature could get out of balance in various ways for various reasons (some seen, others not). Consider, moreover, that meat eaters are part of a self-cleaning ecosystem. When animal bodies fall to the ground, they are quickly eaten up by many means. That itself is remarkable. Complex adaptive systems don’t easily produce self-cleaning systems.17 Personally, I would expect self-cleaning systems in the setting of a great story whose foundation is personal and good. Something else to consider is that we tend to look through the lens of negativity bias. For example, while the civilizations have been improving in almost every respect (life expectancy, infant mortality, equality, education, crime rates, wars, etc.),18 most people imagine the opposite. Perhaps developing the discipline to overcome negativity bias by looking for the positive is another avenue for human growth. As it is, negative events are so interesting that we easily exaggerate their reality—it’s like wishful-thinking in reverse. We should keep this bias in mind when we think about the terrible terrain. Does terribleness fill most of the soil, or does it follow striking lines that lead to greater goods? A final thought is about unique values that can emerge via evolutionary processes in indeterministic contexts. Robin Collins (2011) identifies values in terms of special creaturely connection to all beings. Wessling and I (2015 & 2017) build upon Collins’ connection theodicy by identifying goods essentially tied to indeterminism, including a type of autonomous creation and aesthetically valuable development, which gives way everlasting goods for all sentient beings (of all shapes and sizes). Whatever the case, we should be careful to separate the clear from the unclear. What is clear? Is it clear that the dangers of life do not contribute to any greater purposes? From where I stand, that is not clear. While it is clear to me that a supreme foundation predicts a great story, it is not clear to me that pain and predation wouldn’t fit into that story. Having said that, I do not want to minimize the seriousness or perplexing nature of the many things. Many things are perplexing indeed. At the end of this section, I will consider whether perplexing events may actually make the most sense in the context of a supreme foundation. 17 My own evolution simulation never generated anything so sophisticated, and in fact, sophistication of the organisms and their interactions decreased over time. 18 See Easterbrook’s, It’s Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear (2018).

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I turn next to elements of confusion, leading to idolatry, divine hiddenness, and vast religious diversity. How might these elements fit into the Great Story? Here is a passage that inspires in me a possible answer: [T]he King will say to those on his right, ‘Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me.’ Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?’ The King will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me’. (Matt 25:34–40, emphasis added)

In this story, the King—who represents God—is interested in how we love people. By loving people, we love the King, whether we recognize the King or not. The idea here is that God is more inclusive and more accessible than we might perceive through the narrow lens of religion. God is closer to us than we might imagine. Even our most profound religious disagreements provide opportunities for the most profound acts of love—love for those who disagree with our deepest convictions. Maybe God puts up with our disagreements in part so that we will learn to love in the most profound ways. Maybe God is waiting for us to work through our deepest disagreements, as kingly creatures. Consider, also, that the Great Story predicts the existence of unclear things, since it predicts discoveries and growth along many lines. There are many valuable fruits of delaying knowledge of good things. Here are some examples: 1.  There is value in discovering good things over a stage of time (longer stages for greater discoveries). 2. There is value in seeking treasures in the face of uncertainty. 3.  There is value in maintaining a natural order to the universe, despite certain temporary lacks that can sometimes result, including a lack of reasons to believe in a perfect foundation.

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4.  A disagreement about God’s reality, even if for a stage, creates opportunities for some of the most interesting and most beautiful expressions of respect for people who see the world differently. It is beautiful when people who have very different views of reality are nonetheless kind to each other, learn from each other, and genuinely love each other. 5.  The comprehension of God’s love has infinitely many layers of depth displayed in infinitely many forms. In view of God’s infinite depth, our discovery of the depths and forms of God—of the ultimate Foundation—may have no end. Number 5 indicates that on some level, we are all necessarily skeptics of good things in God; no one can immediately see every treasure waiting for discovery. In that sense, every one of us is, by necessity of growth, a non-resistant, non-believer in the fullness of God’s love. There is always more depth to grasp. Moreover, perhaps the most important things to know are indeed the most universally accessible. As far as I can tell, the cultures of the world are fine-tuned in ways that lead people into lessons of love. Perhaps these lessons are what are most important for us, and perhaps they even prepare us for a greater comprehension of God’s love. Again, we can separate sight from non-sight. What do we see? Do we see that God should push along more good truths to more people more quickly? That is not in view for me. It is not even prima facie surprising to me that many good things, including good things about God, would come into view across multiple episodes of life. What about unanswered prayer? Why doesn’t God answer prayers in detectable ways? The Great Story has a section on prayer. Here is a snippet: When a kingly being forms a thought, that thought has power. Thoughts are behind all inventions, all motions, and all shapes. Thoughts are the architects of the Great Story. Some kingly creatures imagine that their thoughts can make the Kingly Foundation move at their command. Their imagination reaches too far. The Kingly Foundation moves along lines of pre-established order— rules of engagement with other sentient beings. The purpose of the rules is to maintain orderly arenas. Natural causes are the normal causes of a rational Mind acting throughout the universe.

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This “natural” Foundation sheds light on the scientific studies on prayer. Amazingly, some studies indicate a statistically significant effect from prayer.19 Not only that, some studies indicate a positive effect of mental behavior on biological function.20 The most common objection to all these studies is that they do not rule out “natural” causes. Fine. That’s my point: natural causes are the ordinary way to answer prayer in an orderly, rational universe. These ideas are only a beginning. I would like to close this section with a comment about the big picture. Here is how things seem to me, honestly, given all my experiences and reflections. A good foundation shines light on bad events. Yes, many events are deeply perplexing. Yet, I would expect perplexing elements in any great story. I would also expect great stories to emerge from a supremely great foundation. Given these expectations, I expect to find perplexing elements in the world if the foundation is supremely great. My expectations are radically different, by contrast, on the hypothesis that the foundation is mindless or arbitrarily limited (i.e., less than supreme), per liberal naturalism. Without a personal, supreme foundation, the very existence of perplexing elements is itself perplexing to me. Why does any character ever come to ask a question? Why does the world specifically produce people who ask the questions we are asking now? Why wonder whether we are part of a great story, unless we are? I confess it strikes my mind and heart as deeply, deeply strange that indifference would produce any such drama. The problem, as I see it, is that liberal naturalism doesn’t by itself predict any great story or even any characters in a not-so-great story. Without the specific positive intention that I’d expect from a supreme foundation, I’d expect no story—and so no suspense, no confusion, no wonder, no trials, no conflicts, no oddities to investigate, no humor, no discoveries, no hidden treasures, and no characters, ever. This very dialogue would not exist. On my expectations, then, perplexing events don’t point to liberal naturalism. While perplexing events are perplexing, their general existence seems to me vastly more perplexing—more surprising—if they are ultimately pointless; they make vastly more sense if they are tensions in the Great Story. 19 See

this meta-analysis by Masters and Spielmans (2007). and Begley (2002).

20 Schwartz

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I realize we have only scratched the surface. I have offered some ideas, but there is more to discuss. I hope the story tool can help in the organization of some of the data. I look forward to seeing where our inquiry will take us next.

5  Epilogue The story continued: At the edge of history, two explorers discovered each other in the land of shapes. They began to dialogue about the ultimate explanation of things— as they strained to see more than they had ever seen before. As they sought to unlock new insights into the foundation, they unlocked treasures inside each other, and their stories continued along lines that have no end.

What happens next, Professor Leon?

References Brunner, D., J. Gibbon, and S. Fairhurst. (1994). “Choice Between Fixed and Variable Delays with Different Reward Amounts.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 20 (4): 331–346. Collins, Robin. 2011. “Divine Action and Evolution.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, edited by Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea, 241– 261. New York: Oxford University. Dougherty, Trent, and Alexander R. Pruss. (2014). “Evil and the Problem of Anomaly.” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5: 49–87. Easterbrook, Gregg. 2018. It’s Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear. New York: Hachette Book Group. Masters, K. M., and G. Spielmans. 2007. “Prayer and Health: Review, MetaAnalysis, and Research Agenda.” Journal of Behavioral Medicine 30: 329–338. Morreall, John. 2016. “The Philosophy of Humor.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/humor. Morriston, Wesley. 2000. “What Is so Good About Moral Freedom.” Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 344–358. Oppy, Graham. 2014. Describing Gods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Prestopnik, N. 2016. “Games, Stories and Language: Motivating Second Language Acquisition with Play.” International Journal of Designs for Learning 7 (3). Rasmussen, Joshua. 2004. “On Creating Worlds Without Evil: Given Divine Counterfactual Knowledge.” Religious Studies 40 (4):457–470.

242  J. RASMUSSEN AND F. LEON Rasmussen, Joshua. 2013. “On the Value of the Freedom to Do Evil.” Faith and Philosophy 30: 418–428. Rasmussen, Joshua. 2019. How Reason Can Lead to God. Westmont, IL: Intervarsity Press. Rauch, Jonathan. 2018. The Happiness Curve: Why Life Gets Better After 50. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Schwartz, J. M., and S. Begley. 2002. The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force. New York: HarperCollins. Scott, Douglas. 2018. Is Jesus of Nazareth the Predicted Messiah? A HistoricalEvidential Approach to Specific Old Testament Messianic Prophecies and Their New Testament Fulfillments. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock. Wessling, Jordan, and Joshua Rasmussen. 2015. “Reasons for Randomness: A Solution to the Axiological Problem for Theists.” Theology and Science 13 (3): 288–304. Wessling, Jordan, and Joshua Rasmussen. 2017. “A Randomness‐based Theodicy for Evolutionary Evils.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 52 (4): 984–1004.

CHAPTER 16

Questioning the Story Felipe Leon

1   Introduction In the previous chapter, Rasmussen offered many thoughtful and penetrating replies to my questions and concerns for a perfectly good foundation of reality. He also provided helpful further clarification of his own position. In the present chapter, I aim to address Rasmussen’s comments, with the hope of furthering our inquiry into the nature of foundational reality.

2  On What We’d Expect God to Do Let me begin with some general points about Professor Rasmussen’s creative and ingenious Great Story theodicy. First, it strikes me as too anthropomorphic. For it’s not at all clear to me that a supreme, unlimited intelligence would have similar standards for a great story as finite persons such as ourselves. Indeed, it’s not at all clear to me that such a being would prefer a world that unfolds in accordance with a great story to one that does not (let alone to one with the elements in Professor Rasmussen’s story). The infinite chasm between such a being’s knowledge, power, and virtue and ours strongly suggests that any such analogy between their standards of a great story and ours will be very

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weak indeed. I’m therefore not tempted to guess anything about what such a foundation would create. But if I were, I would guess that creating autonomous agents1 would be better, ones that need not follow someone else’s script.2 Second, the theodicy sits in uneasy tension with the lives of members of the trinity in Rasmussen’s supreme foundation hypothesis. This is because few if any of the elements of the story applies to their own lives. For by hypothesis, no one placed them in a story. Are their lives therefore meaningless, or otherwise less valuable? There are no plot twists, or experiences of suffering or evil, or character development, or the capacity for choosing what is evil, etc. There is therefore pressure to think that a story is not what one would expect on the hypothesis of such a foundation. But even if it were, then since the elements of Rasmussen’s great story are missing in the lives of the members of the trinity, it’s not clear why we would expect them in worlds in which they do create. Finally, while I applaud Professor Rasmussen’s moderate modal skepticism, I worry that it will spread to other things he finds worrisome. My core worry here is that moderate modal skepticism seems to lead to agnosticism about large-scale theories in general.3

3  On the Creation Stage I found Professor Rasmussen’s creation stage of his narrative interesting and suggestive. Since I’ve voiced my core concerns about it in previous chapters, here I will only very briefly mention a few of my worries about a personal cause of the universe discussed in Part 1 of the book.4 First, I worry about the coherence of the idea of a temporal event arising from a timeless cause. For the willing of the universe was either included in his timeless state or it wasn’t. If it wasn’t, then it seems that no creation

1 Though not necessarily agents with libertarian moral freedom. More on this in my previous chapter and below. 2 For concerns about the compatibility of theism with healthy human autonomy, see Kahane (2011). See also the papers in Kraay (2017) for more on this and related concerns. 3 In a way akin to how my own mitigated modal skepticism leads me to agnosticism about intrinsic limits/boundaries to an ultimate foundation that can’t be known a priori. 4 For an extended discussion of this and related problems, see, e.g., Morriston (2000, 2002) and Leon (2019).

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event could’ve ever occurred. But if it was, then it seems that it must’ve always occurred, in which case the effect (the universe) must be just as eternal as the cause (God’s willing it). Of course, if it instead involves an event from a beginningless past, then this seems less problematic or otherwise worrisome. Still, even on that hypothesis, the prior probability of theism seems to diminish in this scenario: What was God doing from eternity past? Given his omnipotence and omniscience, there is at least prima facie reason to think he must’ve always known what he was going to do, in which case it would seem that he must’ve willed this event before every point in a beginningless past.

4  On the Finite Free Persons Stage I found Professor Rasmussen’s section on the finite free persons stage suggestive, expanding the discussion on evil, free will, and related matters in important ways. Here I will raise some questions and concerns for future inquiry and development. First, it doesn’t seem to fit well with other parts of theism. For consider worlds where God—construed, as suggested by Professor Rasmussen, as a trinity of persons—creates nothing outside themselves. Why wouldn’t this be best? For it seems that there is a limitless hierarchy of worlds God could’ve created, each better than its predecessor in the hierarchy. If so, then for any world God might choose to create, God will be faced with the realization that he could have done better. Better, then, one might think, not to create at all, enjoying instead a life of perfect loving communion among the supremely great members of the trinity.5 On the other hand, if worlds with finite persons are better, then since God lacks moral freedom—i.e., either he only has compatibilist free will, causally determined always, in accordance with a preference structure within his constitution beyond his making, to choose morally right actions, or the range of his libertarian free will is restricted to choosing between different morally good or right actions—then it would seem that a world with finite persons that have libertarian free will to choose what is bad or wrong are worse than those that lack them. For if worlds

5 For

a rigorous development and defense of this line of reasoning, see Rowe (2004).

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containing persons with moral freedom are better, then there’s pressure to say that God’s freedom is inferior to theirs. Second, it seems that all the best and deepest goods—e.g., everincreasing personal growth, ever-deepening loving personal ­relationships with God and finite persons, ever-growing knowledge of the world, etc.—can be attained without libertarian freedom, including libertarian freedom in the moral sphere.6 Third, it’s not at all clear how this part of the story explains the suffering of animals (Rowe 1979) and the quintillions of insects (Crummett 2017). Will there be an afterlife for them? If so, then this strikes me as prima facie less plausible than the liberal naturalist hypothesis. For example, it seems to require adding a new hypothesis to the original personal foundation hypothesis to explain the data at issue, which lowers the prior probability of the latter. Fourth, it’s not clear that there is sufficient evidence that humans have libertarian free will. For most philosophers who have studied the matter are inclined to think that humans lack this kind of free will. Fifth, as mentioned earlier, it seems that theism predicts that any finite persons God creates will lack moral freedom. For God lacks this kind of freedom, and yet it does not diminish God’s agency, his moral praiseworthiness, or the value of his life. Would creating them without this ability render them robots? If lacking the ability to do wrong thereby makes a person a robot, then the God of classical theism is thereby a robot. But if the lack of ability to do wrong does not thereby make a person a robot, then finite creaturely agents who lack such an ability are not thereby rendered robots. Finally, I’m not sure I see how finite persons with libertarian free will fit within the story framework. For if humans are truly unpredictable, then it’s not clear how God can be sure that the story will end in anything like their intended plot. Are they somehow corralled back in line with the plot if they stray too far? If the latter is acceptable, then why not other constraints on freedom that allow much less evil—or none at all? One might think that middle knowledge solves the problem here, but I argued in my previous chapter that there is pressure to think that middle knowledge is metaphysically impossible.

6 For

an important development and defense of this point, see Schellenberg (2007).

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5  On the Discovery/Soul-Making Stage and Upside What about the Soul-Making/Upside portion of Professor Rasmussen’s story? Here I will mention three main concerns. First, as with the previous stage, it’s not clear to me that it fits with other parts of the theistic hypothesis. For by hypothesis, God was perfect from the get-go and thus didn’t have to traverse the Terrible Terrain in order to have a worthwhile life and a virtuous, praiseworthy character. But if that’s right, then it’s not clear why it wouldn’t be best for God to create finite persons in his image in these respects, rather than having them endure the Terrible Terrain. In light of this point, having them endure the Terrible Terrain seems especially gratuitous. On the other hand, if enduring such a terrain is required to achieve praiseworthy virtue and a worthwhile life, then since God was never subject to the Terrible Terrain for the purpose of soul-making, etc., then it seems that God’s life isn’t optimal. Second, as pointed out in my discussion of the previous stage, it seems that all the deepest goods (ever-increasing personal growth, ever-­deepening loving personal relationships with God and finite persons, ever-growing knowledge of the world, etc.) can be achieved without the worst elements of the Terrible Terrain. Third, I think it’s clear (to me, anyway) that the data do not support the claim that the good outweighs the bad. Here I invite the reader to review my previous chapter and consider whether they agree. If it does when conjoined with an afterlife hypothesis, then this adds complexity that lowers its prior probability. Finally, regarding Professor Rasmussen’s animal soul-making theodicy, it seems to me that this will not cover very many cases (e.g., the margay cry mimicking case, the parasitic wasp case, etc.), in which case this hypothesis lacks the explanatory scope enjoyed by liberal naturalism. Furthermore, it is not hard to see that those suited to eat carcasses will survive and reproduce more frequently than those who do not in a world with scarce resources like ours. Evolutionary mechanisms will therefore have a tendency to select for at least some species with such traits.

6  On the Hick-Rasmussen Free Will Defense Is the libertarian freedom to enter into, sustain, and nurture personal relationships an outweighing good? It’s not at all clear to me that it is. For consider, say, parental relationships with children. The latter enter

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into relationships with their parents without their consent from birth, and those relationships are sustained quite independently of their consent for many years afterward. And yet it seems that the best of these are among the very best sorts of relationships one can have. So if God is our supreme Parent, it seems that we would expect a similar arrangement with him. But this is not what we find. Furthermore, even if such relationships are an outweighing good, then this is compatible with libertarian freedom within limits, as it is for the god of classical theism: God is free, but not free to do evil. His preference structure (which, again, is part of his essential nature, and to which he is subject) is such that he is overwhelmingly repulsed by the thought of doing evil, and so he can only freely choose among good or right actions. Because of this, and as Wes Morriston (2000) has argued, there is a tension between saying that significant freedom is a great good (in virtue of being a prerequisite for moral goodness) while denying that God himself is significantly free (which seems required to rule out possible worlds in which God freely does wrong). However, some (Hick 1978; Rasmussen 2013, present volume) argue that significant freedom is valuable for another reason, viz., that it’s a prerequisite for the best sorts of personal relationships. In particular, love has more value if it’s freely chosen, where this involves the possibility of the beloved rejecting the offer of love. Could Morriston’s objection thus be sidestepped by rejecting Plantinga’s account of the value of significant freedom while accepting a Hick-Rasmussen account? It seems to me that the answer is “no,” and for the same sorts of reasons raised by Morriston. So, for example, consider the relationships the members of the trinity are supposed to have with one another. These are loving relationships among persons that are morally perfect and perfectly loving essentially. Prima facie, then, there is no possible world in which one member of the trinity spurns the relationship of any other member. Therefore, it looks as though the members of the trinity lack significant freedom with respect to the loving relationships between them. Therefore, the Hick-Rasmussen account seems to entail that the members of the trinity love each other in a way that’s inferior to the best kind of love. A similar worry arises for love between God and human beings. For if God is morally perfect and perfectly loving essentially, then even if we have significant freedom with respect to choosing to love God, God does not have significant freedom with respect to choosing to love us. But if that’s right, then there is a significant sense in which the kind of love God can offer us is inferior to the kind of love we can offer him.

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In short, there’s a prima facie case to be made that a Hick-Rasmussen account of the value of freedom fares no better than the Plantingian account. Or so it seems to me.

7  On Ambiguity Data In response to the data of various sorts of religious ambiguity—hiddenness, religious diversity, idolatry, etc.—Professor Rasmussen offers a pluralist (or at least inclusivist) reply, combined with a soul-making theodicy. I think it’s clear that many of the sorts of concerns I raised above and in my previous chapters apply here as well. Therefore, I will only mention several of them briefly here. First, it’s not clear that the present elements fit well with the theistic hypothesis. For on the latter hypothesis, few if any of the listed goods apply to God. It’s therefore not clear why such elements are required for the best sort of human life. Second, it seems to me that all of the best goods can be attained without being deprived of the basic goods mentioned above. Third, if they can’t be so attained, then it seems to me that these sorts of values are outweighed by the severe badness of the listed goods delayed or missed. One wouldn’t, for example, deny basic goods required for human flourishing for these other goods. Finally, it seems to me and many others that there are also many outweighing bad states of affairs on the other side of the ledger: holy wars, persecutions, hating and persecution of people groups, etc.

8  On Theism, Liberal Naturalism, and Teleology It seems to me that Rasmussen’s inference to an intelligent source of teleology is based on a false dichotomy between forethought and intention on the one hand, and accident or chance on the other. To see this, we need look no further than God’s own nature. It exhibits functional complexity and purpose, and yet, by hypothesis, it was not caused by forethought or intention. As per my discussion in previous chapters, this strikes me as most plausibly a hypothesis involving ground-floor uncaused teleology producing more teleology. It therefore seems to me to be problematic for every view if it is so for any view, and unproblematic for any view if unproblematic for theism.

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On a more overtly conciliatory note, it’s encouraging to see that the liberal naturalist and the theist can agree on many points here: the epistemic possibility of a mind-like foundation with uncaused, foundational teleology that ultimately produces all else.

9  Remaining Odds and Ends 9.1   On Evolution Professor Rasmussen refers in the previous chapter (and in earlier chapters) to his research on computer models of biological evolution as strong evidence that the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism and evolution is a seriously inadequate account of the origin and diversity of life. That is of course an exciting discovery if true, and the scientific community will no doubt be eager to learn of his revolutionary findings if this should turn out to be so. I’m guessing, though, that most will share my antecedent skepticism about the matter. Unfortunately, as a nonexpert, I must defer to expert consensus about the truth of evolutionary theory,7 and that the evidence doesn’t require intelligent guidance, until Professor Rasmussen’s conclusions reflect the consensus among the relevant experts. For to defer to an outlier in the face of expert consensus is contrary to reason. 9.2   On Liberal Naturalism and Arbitrary Limits Again Professor Rasmussen suggested that on liberal naturalism, the foundation of reality has arbitrary limits. I’ve addressed this in previous chapters, but the fact that the issue has resurfaced suggests that I haven’t been as clear as I should’ve been. Let me therefore say that liberal naturalism as such, in itself, entails nothing one way or the other regarding the issue of whether the foundation of reality has finite or arbitrary limits. In fact, on the account I’ve fleshed out in the present book, the foundation is unlimited in at least two respects: (i) There is an unlimited number of properties, construed as platonic abstracta, in the foundation, where these are metaphysically necessary beings that exist a se; and (ii) the

7 It’s

important to note that many of these experts are theists.

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concrete aspect of foundational reality comprises an infinite multiverse. It’s therefore no part of liberal naturalism that foundational reality has finite or arbitrary limits. Furthermore, as I mentioned in my previous chapters in this section, there are other versions of liberal naturalism (e.g., Spinozism) which overtly deny all limits to foundational reality, and hold that the unlimited or maximal extent of the foundation obtains of metaphysical necessity— and even that this fact can be known a priori. Finally, as I argued in Part I, it’s epistemically possible that foundational reality has finite boundaries or limits that obtain of metaphysical necessity.8 This is a natural implication of my mitigated modal skepticism, according to which our modal knowledge does not extend to matters remote from ordinary experience or scientific investigation. But if so, then it’s epistemically possible that foundational reality has limits or boundaries that obtain of metaphysical necessity, but due to limitations on our modal knowledge, this fact is only knowable (if at all) a posteriori. Indeed, as I’ve mentioned in a previous chapter, on theism there are limits to God’s attributes that obtain of metaphysical necessity (e.g., his moral character limits what is possible or him to do). 9.3   Expecting Mystery on the Theistic Hypothesis Rasmussen stated that we should expect at least some mystery on his theistic hypothesis. This seems sensible to me as well. However, I worry that this comes at the cost of undercutting some explanatory lines of the theistic hypothesis. One example that’s relevant to the present discussion is the fine-tuning argument. For then one worries that it may well be inscrutable what sort of world God might want to create or design. And if that’s right, then this looks to deflate the posterior probability of cosmic fine-tuning for life on the theistic hypothesis.9 9.4   Theism, Liberal Naturalism, and Puzzling Phenomena Near the end of the previous chapter, Rasmussen argued that he would expect the data of perplexity about the Terrible Terrain—or even the

8 Again, 9 Cf.

see McKenzie (2017) for a scientifically informed defense of this claim. Manson (2018).

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existence of finite persons, but that he wouldn’t on the hypothesis of liberal naturalism. I offered reasons in my previous chapter and the present one why we wouldn’t expect such data on theism, so here I will focus on the second half of the conjunction: Why wouldn’t we expect perplexity on liberal naturalism? I confess that I don’t find it hard to explain such phenomena on liberal naturalism, and I have sketched my reasons why in previous chapters. I therefore suspect that I’m not quite following Professor Rasmussen’s argument. So rather than trying to address concerns that may well be misguided, I here ask Rasmussen for further clarification of the core concern and line of argument on its behalf.

References Crummett, Dustin. 2017. “The Problem of Evil and the Suffering of Creeping Things.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82 (1): 71–88. Hick, John. 1978. Evil and the God of Love. Rev. ed. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Kahane, Guy. 2011. “Should We Want God to Exist?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 674–696. Kraay, Klaas. 2017. Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. Leon, Felipe. 2019. “Causation and Sufficient Reason: Atheism.” In Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy, edited by Joseph W. Koterski and Graham Oppy, 281–300. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference. Manson, Neil. 2018. “How Not to Be Generous to Fine-Tuning Skeptics.” Religious Studies. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412518000586. McKenzie, Kerry. 2017. “Against Brute Fundamentalism.” Dialectica 71 (2): 231–261. Morriston, Wes. 2000. “Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?” Faith & Philosophy 17 (2): 149–169. ———. 2002. “A Critical Examination of the Kalām Cosmological Argument.” In God Matters, edited by Martin and Christopher Bernard, 95–108. New York: Longman. Rasmussen, Joshua. 2013. “On the Value of Freedom to do Evil.” Faith and Philosophy 30 (4): 418–428. Rowe, William L. 1979. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4): 335–341. ———. 2004. Can God Be Free? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schellenberg, J. L. 2007. The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

CHAPTER 17

How to See the Good in the Foundation Joshua Rasmussen

1   IntroduCtion I can hardly overemphasize how much I am enjoying this exchange with Professor Leon. Leon’s latest piece is especially valuable because it takes us past a midst of many contemporary philosophical ideas about evil and suffering. We are now stepping into new and special territory. In this territory, we can see some things that few people ever see. My goal in this chapter is to show how Leon’s questions help point the way to some good ideas that have been almost entirely out of sight. Many ideas in the tradition of ideas are problematic, and they stand in the way of a clearer vision of ultimate reality. Leon’s arguments help us see where not to step, and they help expose thin lines that are tough to see in the midst of many debates. My goal in this chapter is to highlight a series of steps that can lead to a clearer vision of a good foundation. I will attempt to show how Leon’s objections help shed light on these steps, while also protecting us from straying into thorny weeds. I must say, I am excited about what I am about to share.

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Fig. 1  The Foundation is bad to some degree, neutral, or good to some degree

2   steP One: see the simPliCity of goodness The first step helps frame our whole inquiry. I want to draw attention to a basic question about the foundation’s degree of value. How much value is in the foundation of existence? To help us think about the options, consider the Fig. 1. Figure 1 displays the foundation’s value-arrow, which points to its degree of value. We have three salient options. The ultimate foundation (i.e., the ground layer of existence) is either good, bad, or neither. We can also identify a gradient of options between these: e.g., extremely bad, sort of good, completely good, and so on. Each option marks a degree of value along a continuum of conceivable degrees, from negative to supreme. Our inquiry into the foundation is, at a basic level, an inquiry into the direction of the value-arrow. If the value-arrow points in a negative or neutral direction, that has certain consequences for all theories of the foundation. If, instead, the arrow points in a positive direction, that has dramatically different consequences. We can use the value-arrow, then, as a tool to shine light on different theories of the foundation. On this first step, I want to show how the value-arrow can bring to light a certain virtue of the good foundation hypothesis. I begin by highlighting a point we have seen before: The theory that the foundation is supreme (i.e., has highest value) enjoys a simplicity. This theory does not contain the complexity of an arbitrary pattern of particles shaped like a watch, a flying spaghetti monster, or an arrow pointed to a movie theater. Instead, the supreme foundation theory shaves off unnecessary limits, boundaries, and unexplained patterns of particles. Schaffer (2015) argues convincingly that we shouldn’t multiply fundamental entities beyond necessity. We can understand why in terms of intrinsic probability. Complex hypotheses have more epistemic parts (ways of being false). The more parts, the greater the chance that at least one part is false. Therefore, adding parts diminishes the intrinsic probability, absent independent insight into the truth of the parts. Going in

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the other direction, the simplest theory of the foundation has the fewest epistemic parts, which counts in favor of its intrinsic probability. This observation is relevant to the supreme foundation theory. On the supreme foundation theory, we have a simple description of the foundation’s basic nature: supreme. Unlike a tumbleweed with disparate twigs, a supreme foundation unites the deepest things into a single seed. The foundation’s nature is simply and purely positive.1 The simplicity of the supreme foundation theory is relevant to the prior probability that the foundation is good. Consider the connection between a supreme nature and a good nature. A supreme nature includes supreme value. Goodness has value. Therefore, a supreme foundation includes supreme goodness. Notice here that the hypothesis that the foundation is good is not an arbitrary add-on. The goodness hypothesis does not decrease the prior probability of the supreme foundation theory. Rather, it is a consequence of the theory. Compare: The hypothesis that my body, if it exists, has DNA is not an add-on that decreases the probability that all organisms on earth have DNA; rather, it is a consequence of the theory. This point is crucial: the consequence of a theory does not decrease the prior probability of that theory.2 (I will come back to this point when considering some consequences relevant to evil and suffering.) My first observation, then, is that the good foundation hypothesis flows from a relatively simple account of ultimate reality (i.e., that the foundation is supreme). Do other options enjoy a similar virtue? Let us look first at the hypothesis that the foundation is bad. A supremely bad foundation might explain why many things we see are bad. Moreover, the bad foundation hypothesis is as simple as the good foundation hypothesis. So is the bad foundation hypothesis as good? My answer is that, even prior to empirical observation, there is a key difference between the good foundation hypothesis and the bad foundation hypothesis. The difference is in an asymmetry between good and bad: Bad presupposes good, but not vice versa. All forms of bad are departures from or damages to something good.3 For example, damage 1 For more on perfection, see Oppy (2014, 62–86). See also, Rasmussen (2019, Chapter 11). 2 Every hypothesis trivially has infinitely many consequences (e.g., that it is true or P, for any P), yet obviously not every hypothesis has zero prior probability. 3 To be clear, the proposal here is not that bad is a mere privation of good. Rather, even if bad is a positive reality in its own right, bad cannot exist outside an axiological framework in which something of value precedes it.

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to Sally’s face is bad because Sally’s face is special—her face has value, as does Sally. If instead nothing had value, there would be nothing to harm or destroy. The reverse doesn’t hold: Someone could experience good, like peace and love, without thereby experiencing pain, suffering, damage, or anything bad. Goodness does not depend upon bad, whereas bad depends on the goodness of a moral standard and the value of beings to whom the standard applies. Therefore, the bad foundation hypothesis is not nearly as good as the good foundation hypothesis.4 (Note: The foundation could be perfectly good without thereby experiencing all possible good. I will say more about that on step five.) Let us consider, next, the hypothesis that the foundation is purely ­neutral (neither bad nor good). How does this hypothesis compare? Well, we have already identified some good things in the foundation of reality, including principles of reason, principles of morality, and ultimate power. The purely neutral hypothesis contradicts these independent discoveries. Moreover, I want to draw attention to another, deeper problem that is easy to miss: The neutral hypothesis builds in an extra, arbitrary bit of complexity. Allow me to explain. In theorizing about the foundation, we may wonder what sort of resources the foundation has. Leon and I agree that foundation has at least some resources to produce its effects. Together we ask, what is the magnitude of its resources? Here is a conceptually simple hypothesis: The resources are supreme. This hypothesis also has high predictive success. From supreme resources, we can deduce the features Leon and I already agree the foundation has. In particular, a supreme foundation enjoys (i) powers of various kinds (because supreme resources would include supreme powers), (ii) teleological properties of some sort (because supreme resources would include supreme teleological powers), (iii) co-existence with abstract moral properties (because supreme resources would include a supreme moral nature), (iv) co-existent with necessary principles of reason (because supreme resources would include the supreme thinking of a supreme mind), (v) sense or proto-sense (because supreme resources would include the resources for all consciousness), and (vi) factual or metaphysically necessary existence (because supreme resources would enjoy supremely robust existence). Supreme resources, then, are explanatorily powerful. 4 These asymmetries answer Laws’ “evil-god” challenge (in Law 2010). For additional asymmetries, see Weaver (2015).

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Now suppose we say instead that the foundation is less than supreme. Then we lose two things. First, we lose predictive power—i.e., the theory by itself explains less (vastly less). Furthermore, we lose a bit of simplicity because we now have an extra, ad hoc bit of information in the root of our theory. The extra information is required to specify that the foundation has some limit with respect to value (i.e., is not supreme). This complexity may not seem like much, but the complexity multiplies as we try to restore predictive success. We could add features, like (i)–(vi), into the root of the theory, but then we add complexity to the root theory. Here is another way to see the virtue of a simple root. Our world contains some power, knowledge, and goodness. Why? Why is there any power, knowledge, or goodness, ever? Here is a clue: The simplest degrees of power, knowledge, and goodness all flow from the simplest degree of value: supreme value. If the foundation has this degree of value, it is unsurprising a priori that there is power, knowledge, and goodness in our world. By contrast, the hypothesis that the foundation has some arbitrary cut in its degree of value is a hypothesis that by itself fails to make any such prediction. This limited-value hypothesis shaves predictive power. Worse, it precludes the simplest, least ad hoc description of the foundation’s nature. So, the good foundation hypothesis has certain virtues over its alternatives. Let me be clear: I am not saying that these virtues are everything. There is more to consider (obviously). So far, my point has been to highlight easy-to-miss features of the good foundation hypothesis: its (i) simplicity and (ii) clear points of predictive success. Seeing these features helps us see the goodness of the good foundation hypothesis.

3   steP TWo: see a Natural Foundation Leon has helped bring to light a secret idea that can unlock a new vision of ultimate reality. The secret is this: A supreme foundation can be fully natural. Allow me to explain. The term “natural” is a term of art. Yet, whatever it means, it supposedly applies to beings like you and I. What are we? Whatever we are, we include elements of reason, thought, and moral character. So, if we are natural, as the naturalist supposes, then natural things can include reason, thought, and moral character.

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The thing to see next is that a supreme foundation is in the same ­category: A supreme foundation is a supreme version of something that includes reason, thought, and moral character. In fact, in my theory, reason infuses the foundation’s basic structure. Hence, if beings like me count as natural, so could a supreme foundation. Nothing in the meaning of the term “natural” (broadly interpreted) rules that out. To clarify, let us separate two versions of naturalism. Let us call the theory that the natural foundation is supreme, “supreme naturalism.” Then let us call the theory that the natural foundation is (arbitrarily) limited in value, “limited naturalism.” These versions are orthogonal to what Leon calls “liberal naturalism.” The liberal naturalist has both versions available: Either the natural foundation is supreme, or it is less than supreme. This observation can remove a certain scary barrier to the supreme foundation hypothesis. The barrier is in thinking that a supreme foundation multiplies complexity. The opposite is so: A supreme foundation shaves off the complexities of arbitrary (i.e., conceptually unnecessary) cuts in value, and it allows us to simplify our theory of the foundation’s basic nature. By seeing a natural foundation, we also walk past a confusing cloud of debates over the prospect of a “supernatural” realm. Put away the supernatural (if you wish). The simpler view is that all realms are categorically uniform. All are natural, if any are. By taking this road, we can now remove one of the biggest obstacles to a rational (reason-infused) foundation. The obstacle is the threat of breaking uniformity. That threat is not on this road. Instead of supposing that all thinking comes ultimately from mindless, non-sense, we can put away mindless, non-sense. The simpler view is that all realms are categorically uniform. All are rationally situated (i.e., founded upon reason). This result may alleviate some of Leon’s worries about God’s relation to time. Leon already thinks the foundation relates to time somehow. For my part, while I acknowledge the challenges, I remain sympathetic with the hypothesis that God grounds a beginning of the temporal order (see Pruss and Rasmussen 2014). If that is wrong, then take the other option: Time has no beginning. Either way, the foundation exists whenever time exists. Leon asks what God was doing from eternity past. Who knows? Maybe creating the multiverse Leon likes! Whatever the case, by describing the foundation in broadly naturalistic vocabulary, maybe we can remove an obstacle to the supreme foundation hypothesis.

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We get another bonus: Instead of brute teleology, supreme naturalism provides the least arbitrary explanation of teleology. For a fully supreme nature would thereby include supreme powers, including the teleological powers to aim at a rationally organized, law-like world. In any case, my point is that you don’t need to choose between naturalism and a supreme foundation. You can have both. You can have supreme naturalism. Seeing this clearly can bring dialectical opponents together as allies, as new wisdom gushes out of a central geyser.

4   steP Three: seParate Theory from ConseQuenCes Next, I want to share why I think evil could actually be vastly more probable on supreme naturalism than on limited naturalism (see my use of the term “naturalism”!). My goal here is to bring into sharper focus why I said (in my previous chapter) that perplexing questions actually make more sense if the foundation is good. The gist of my reason is that a supremely good foundation raises the expectation of the existence of valuable, soul-developing adventures. In such adventures, one may expect there to be soul-suited problems, including uncertainties, pains, and trials of many kinds.5 Leon worries that the account is too anthropomorphic: Why think God’s standards for a great story would be anything like ours? Indeed, there is an infinite chasm between God ways and ours—hence mysteries! Still, we need not be completely in the dark about everything goodness might imply. In fact, the entire argument of evil presupposes that we can have at least some idea what God might be likely to do. Besides, even if one doesn’t have a positive expectation of particular story elements, one’s expectation could still be higher than it would otherwise be. To illustrate, suppose the foundation is not good. Then our root theory loses this predictive element: Nothing good in the fabric of the foundation specifically predicts any teleological arrow pointing toward any glorious adventures, hero-development, or problem

5 Note that even if you don’t have a positive expectation of soul-developing adventures, it does not follow that your expectation must be low on the good foundation hypothesis. A non-low expectation is enough for my main point.

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solving. That is why I said I would not expect any perplexing questions to emerge, anywhere, ever. By my expectation, the adventure of this very dialogue would certainly not exist, if God did not exist. Of course, we could add hypotheses at to the root of a limited (naturalist) theory to pick up predictive power. For example, we could suppose that the foundation happens to have a teleological arrow aimed at producing heroes and problem-solvers. But the thing to see is that this addition is itself intrinsically unlikely in the absence of any deeper explanation (such as in terms of a simple hypothesis about the direction of the foundation’s value-arrow). To see the good foundation hypothesis under the best light, it is vitally important that we distinguish between the elements included within the theory and the elements predicted by the theory. Inclusion and prediction are poles apart. The supreme foundation hypothesis does not include any teleological arrow as part of the theory; instead, an arrow pointing to soul-developing plots is a probable (or non-improbable) consequence of it. Leon’s questions help me clarify this point. He asks why I think we wouldn’t we expect perplexity on liberal naturalism. I was thinking specifically about limited naturalism (i.e., the foundation is not supreme), because that’s the version of naturalism that does not itself entail the existence of God. My thought, then, is that on limited naturalism, we don’t have the same predictive resources. To make predictions, we need to add extra (intrinsically unlikely) ad-ons to the root hypothesis, thereby diminishing the prior probability. I am trying to highlight a thin line that is easy to miss. To help us see this line clearly, let us consider an ordinary example that illustrates the value of a simpler root. Imagine you see a clock on the wall that happens to display the same time as your watch. What explains the match? Here is one theory: The clock and the watch are set to keep track of time in the same time zone. But suppose, to avoid the risk of error, we leave open this explanation. Instead, we speculate that certain gears inside could explain why a completely non-functioning clock points to the right time at this moment just by chance. This reasoning, however, masks the advantage of the working-clock hypothesis. The working-clock hypothesis has predictive success in a simpler way. Notice that predictive success does not require precise predictions. Maybe you don’t have any positive expectation that a working clock will match your watch to the precise minute; that prediction is too specific.

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Still, if the clock does match your watch to the minute, this match is vastly more likely if the clock is working than if not. So, even without a specific prediction, the specific match is evidence for the simplest hypothesis that explains it. The same reasoning applies to our inquiry into the foundation. Just as the non-functioning clock hypothesis does not itself predict that the gears cause a match in time, so too, the limited (non-supreme) value hypothesis does not itself predict the existence of any valuable beings. Sure, we can add a teleological arrow to our hypothesis (like gears in a non-functioning clock), but these additions only diminish the prior probability of the explanation. They add complexity to the root. By seeing clearly the difference between the things inside a theory and the things predicted by the theory, we can separate the complexity of a theory from the complexity of its predictions. Every theory has infinitely complex predictions (trivially). A good theory has accurate predictions. Seeing this distinction may also help us use the problem of evil as a prediction tool. Instead of adding complexity to the root of the good foundation hypothesis, the problem of evil helps us tease out the implications of a good foundation. To illustrate the tool, suppose you think that a good foundation would not allow any gratuitous suffering (a premise in the argument from evil). Then, you have reason to think that if the foundation is supremely good, then no suffering is ultimately gratuitous. Similarly, if you think the only way no suffering could be gratuitous is if souls live on, then you have reason to think that if the foundation is supremely good, souls will live on. The problem of evil helps us tease out these interesting consequences of the supreme foundation theory. Another example. Maybe you think that a supreme foundation that foreknew all the evil would prevent certain categories of evil. Then, if those categories of evil exist, you have reason to think that a supreme foundation does not foreknow all the evil (and the future is open). If not, then not. Leon asks why we should think the good outweighs the bad. Here’s why: That is what the good foundation hypothesis predicts. Take Upside, the hypothesis that the foundation is working all things together for good. This hypothesis is not an ad hoc, add-on. It does not diminish the prior probability of the theory. Rather, Upside is a probable consequence of a good foundation.

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I will add an even bolder hypothesis. It looks to me, given all the data I have considered, that (probably) every sentient being, big or small, mammal or reptilian, human or angelic, is in development along positive and (potentially) everlasting lines, whose net value infinitely outweighs every pain.6 There is no pointless evil in the universal order. Why do I think this? Life experience gives me hints. But there is a deeper reason: This principle is a plausible consequence of the simple supreme foundation hypothesis (which independently enjoys predictive success). Again, the consequences of a theory are not the same as the internal complexity of the theory itself. Leon’s points help draw out the value of this distinction. He suggests that my hypotheses reduce the probability of my theory. That is true, if my hypotheses are part of my theory. So let me be clear: My hypotheses are not part of my theory. Instead, they are plausible consequences of it. Plausible consequences of a theory don’t decrease the prior probability of that theory. Every theory has infinitely many consequences, yet not every theory has zero prior probability. In fact, if the plausible consequences match elements we see in reality, then these successful predictions only increase the posterior probability of the theory above its prior probability. In this light, we can see something good and right about liberal naturalism—something I did not previously appreciate. If liberal naturalism is compatible with supreme naturalism, then liberal naturalism per se does not suffer from the probability problem I am drawing attention to here. This looks like Leon’s point: Liberal naturalism has the resources to account for our perplexity about evil because it has the resources to account for a teleological arrow pointed at moral communities. Wonderful! I only wish to add one more thing: The best form of liberal naturalism (i.e., the simplest and most successfully predictive form) is supreme naturalism.

5   steP Four: seParate Leaves from seeds On this next step, I want to make sure it is clear that evil and suffering are not by themselves even prima facie indicators that the valuearrow points negative or neutral; if anything, the opposite is so.

6 For

a case for animal soul resurrection implicit in this principle, see Dougherty (2014).

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(That is not to say that no particular bit of evil or suffering can be evidence for a limited-value hypothesis. Please hear me: If it looks to you that certain events make less sense if God exists, that is totally understandable, and those events will appropriately weigh in the balance of your assessment.) Let us watch out for Bob’s bias. Enter Bob. Bob suspects the world is fundamentally indifferent. By inference, Bob suspects that the many bad events he sees probably have pointless ends. This expectation makes sense, given his suspicion of indifference. Now what follows? It does not follow that the foundation is thereby probably indifferent on account of its failure to prevent the bad events. It would be a mistake to read a probable consequence of a hypothesis back into an argument for the probability of that hypothesis. Consider, again, that if the foundation is instead supremely good, then probably no events are pointless; instead, all events probably work together for good. By seeing how the data could be interpreted under the light of different hypotheses, we protect ourselves from tilting in the winds of confirmation bias. To illustrate the bigger picture, imagine we see a large tree with a shriveled leaf. We wonder: Why is this leaf shriveled? We could then wonder about the quality of the seed that gave birth to this tree with this leaf. Was the seed good? Or, was the seed defective in some way? We might reason as follows. A good seed may produce a large tree with many branches and many leaves. There are many reasons leaves can shrivel that have nothing at all to do with the quality of the original seed. In view of these many reasons, it is actually unsurprising that some of the leaves might shrivel (for some unidentified reason). By contrast, if the seed is not good, it is deeply surprising that any leaves sprouted at all. By this reasoning, the sight of the shriveled leaf is not itself evidence against the good seed hypothesis; if anything, the opposite is so. Now to be clear, I am not suggesting that a shriveled leaf couldn’t (in principle) be evidence of a bad seed. If you saw a tiny, shriveled shrub with nearly every leaf in ruins, these observations may indeed give you a different assessment about the quality of the seed. My only point is that a shriveled leaf is not by itself evidence of a non-good seed. Notice that the quantity of shriveled leaves is less relevant than the proportion of shriveled leaves. In a large orchard, we might expect thousands of shriveled leaves. That expectation is plausible even if all the seeds are good.

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It remains for me to state the obvious lesson: Just as shriveled leaves are not automatically evidence of non-good seeds, broken lives are not automatically evidence of a non-good foundation. The lesson, to be clear, is not that the terrible terrain cannot inspire any legitimate questions or bring to light evidence that weighs in one’s mind. My point, rather, is that bad events (whether few or many, subtle or intense) are not automatically evidence of a bad foundation. I think bad events can actually make the most sense in the context of a large orchard. More on that next.

6   steP Five: seParate the Value of a Being from the Value of a Life Leon offers a valuable critique of my story theodicy, and it serves to shine light on some key distinctions. These distinctions will help us to separate a problematic account of God from an account that I think is closer to the truth. I begin with Leon’s theme objection. According to my story theodicy, bad events are part of soul-building stories. Yet, as Leon points out, God’s soul is already perfect without development. God’s love is perfect. God’s character is perfect. These perfections don’t require any soul-building story. What value, then, is there in soul-development? Good question. It draws our sight to a thin line, which carves a critically important distinction between the value of a being and the value of a being’s life experiences. The value of a being is not the same as the value of a life. This distinction will allow me to answer all of Leon’s questions about the value of our lives viz a viz God’s. First, I must make clear why the value of a being could differ from the value of its life. To illustrate the distinction, imagine a world that contains exactly one sentient being who experiences nothing but intense suffering for its entire life. This life is tragic. This world is tragic. Yet, notice that the being itself is not thereby tragic. In fact, part of why suffering is bad is that it harms someone who has something good inside—i.e., some value. In this case, the value of the being is immeasurably greater than the value of its life experience. In view of the distinction at hand, we can see that beings could have more value than their world. It follows that it is theoretically possible that, while a supreme foundation has the highest value, the value of the world does not (and cannot). In fact, this very proposal follows from the following axiological theory of the foundation:

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1. Supreme value hypothesis: The foundation of the world instantiates supreme value (the highest degree of intrinsic value consistent with reason). 2. Greater life hypothesis: For any conceivable life, there is a better life consistent with reason (e.g., one involving more relationships with more types of beings). 3. Expanding value hypothesis: At each moment, the teleological powers of the foundation aim toward maximizing the value of life for all beings to the highest point consistent with all prior conditions (which include, e.g., psychological, spiritual, and physical rules—or pre-established contracts—that constitute the order of the arenas in which lives unfold).7 This theory highlights why a supreme foundation might want to create a diversity of growing beings. The reason is to improve the value of the world by adding valuable beings who can grow along many valuable lines. Without diverse beings, by contrast, God’s own life, whether Triune or not, is missing many valuable experiences, such as the experience of our discoveries, our development, our play, our inventions, our love, and so forth. Our projects and purposes add to the life of God. Moreover, without a diversity of beings, the value of our lives for us is absent from the world. Without us, the world is vastly less interesting. By the light of this theory, we can see why the enhancement of the world does not preclude a supreme foundation. The reason is simple: God’s inner value could be supreme (maximal), even while God’s life experiences could never be. The value of all lives can increase forever. Let me be clear. I am not saying that all the goods are explained in terms of the goods of a grand story. The story theodicy is merely one way of drawing attention to certain salient goods. There are many others, including the value of many valuable types of experiences. We are now ready to consider Leon’s other questions in better light. Leon asks whether our love could be greater than God’s. I answer that all love, including God’s, can increase in its meaning and value, through life experiences. Of the increase in the treasures within love, there is no end. 7 An auxiliary hypothesis is that the best (and/or only possible) world begins infinitesimally small (in size and number of story elements), like a story that begins with a single character.

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Even negative experiences can add value to love. For example, forgiveness etches into love a special type of appreciation (for both the one forgiven and the one who forgives). Consider, moreover, that working through problems together creates valuable experiences and memories that bring meaning into the chords of love. Even the worst pains may open up the development of unique and everlasting cords of connection. Leon follows Morriston in asking why our freedom to do evil would have value if God lacks the freedom to do evil. I answer that our freedom improves both God’s life and ours in a number of ways (see, e.g. my response to Morriston in Rasmussen 2013).8 Without any indeterministic autonomy, many good experiences are missing from the world (unforced love, unpredictable play, certain good surprises, risk and its rewards, etc.). Leon himself says he values autonomy. The thing I wish to emphasize here is that, without some autonomy from the Creator’s nature, the experience of these goods are missing in the lives of everyone, creature and Creator alike, since every life affects the experiences in every other life. Let me also be clear that the stories of our lives are not mere play acts. I do not mean to suggest that God comes up with a script and forces us to play pre-assigned roles without any choice. Leon expresses dislike toward the idea of needing to follow someone’s script. Me too! On my account, we enjoy real freedom; the scripts are partially up to us. We are story-makers. We can contribute to the progress of the world along many lines. And many exciting lines are available to each of us. That is what I mean when I say we are kingly creatures. Leon asks whether the suffering that springs from bad choices would be worth whatever value comes with freedom. I answer that the good foundation only gives beings choices if, and to the extent, it sees that doing so is worth the risk (in the long, everlasting view). Remember, we must distinguish between theory and consequences. The freedom hypothesis is not part of my theory of the foundation. Instead, it is a plausible consequence of the good foundation theory, which I think we can tease out by the light of moral insight.

8 Incidentally, Morriston himself expressed interest in my response via e-mail 2008 and said he’d need to give it some thought before commenting. Of course, that is not to say that upon further thought, he would not still have any objections!

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If a reader thinks moral insight reveals a different line, then follow that line. The point is that if the foundation is good, our degree of autonomy will be consistent with its lines of goodness, whatever those lines are. Follow the lines where they lead. Leon asks why we should accept a libertarian account of free will. I answer with liberating news: we need not. The libertarian account is not essential to the value of indeterminism. The value is not in the choice itself, but rather in the type of unique experiences (for everyone) that can flow from indeterminism. Keep in mind that even if choice is fully compatible with determinism, extra value could still emerge in a world with some indeterministic spontaneity, suspence, and surprise. Indeterminism is a soil for many unique types of value and meaning (in love, courage, and adventure), regardless of whether some form of deterministic freedom could exist without those things. Again, it is not that this freedom is superior to God’s freedom. It’s that it opens up springs of additional value (for everyone). Let me add that I would be more impressed by philosophers’ skepticism of a libertarian account of free will if those same philosophers were not typically also skeptical of God. Without God, getting libertarian agency out of mindless non-agents is independently puzzling.9 To my mind, this puzzle is just another a problem for a purely mindless naturalism, not for libertarian agency. In any case, the story theodicy leaves wide open which particular elements are essential. It seems obvious to me that indeterministic freedom adds special value to our lives, and to God’s. If so, then indeterministic freedom is included. If not, then not. Either way, we can expect many good things to flow from soul-developing experiences, and these good things can touch every sentient being, whether created or uncreated. In light of these distinctions, it seems to me that Leon’s questions actually help us bring the story theodicy into brighter light. They help us see a problem with a certain account of God. The problematic account says that God enjoys supreme life all alone. Step away from that account. See this one instead: Every sentient being adds to the life of God, and of the increase in value in the world, there shall be no end.

9 Indeed, I’ve met two different philosophers in the flesh who, because of their ontology consisting of a mindless foundation, expressed skepticism of the existence of all personal agents altogether.

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7   steP six: seParate sight from Non-sight As travelers come along this journey, many ideas create a midst that can block clear sight. Is there a way to see through the midst? I think there is. The way is to separate the clear from the unclear. In the midst of unclear lines, seek the clear lines. Each person sees some things clearly, while other things are less clear. What you see depends upon your position on the epistemic landscape. Your position is unique; no one else stands precisely where you do. At each peak, different sights are visible. As we near the close of our conversation, I want to summarize some of the things I think I see from my current location on the epistemic landscape (a location Leon himself has helped me step to). At this place in the land of shapes, some things seem clear to me, while others are out of my sight. I begin with the clear. Here are some of the things I think I see (most clearly): 1. I see that the supreme value hypothesis is relatively simple (nonad hoc, non-arbitrary, and easy to grasp). 2. I see that the supreme value hypothesis successfully predicts all the features of the foundation we have independently uncovered: e.g., (i) causal power, (ii) teleological powers, (iii) co-existence with moral principles, (iv) co-existence with principles of reason, (v) sense or proto-sense, and (vi) factual or metaphysically necessary existence. 3. I see that simplicity and predictive success are the marks of our best (most probable) scientific theories. 4. I see that the limited-value hypothesis doesn’t itself enjoy (i) the same intrinsic simplicity or (ii) as much predictive success (not even close). 5. I see that the supreme value hypothesis is compatible with the natural foundation hypothesis (an obstacle removed!). 6. I see that the supreme-value hypothesis solves many philosophical problems, including: The problem of generating mind from mindless, non-sense: a.  because supreme value entails that the foundation is a reasoninfused, mental reality. b. The problem of generating rational thinking from non-rational causes: because supreme value entails that the foundation is rational.

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c.  The problem of generating responsible agents from forcedriven dust: because supreme value entails the resources for making first-movers. d. The problem of arbitrary, unexplained limits (like the vertices of a flying spaghetti monster at the foundation of existence): because a supreme foundation shaves them off. 7. I see that the limited-value hypothesis doesn’t itself entail solutions to any of those problems (unless we add extra hypotheses to the root, thereby diminishing its prior probability). 8. I see that evolution-simulations tend to reduce complexity without fine-tuning (and relevant experts agree).10 9. I see that the supreme-value hypothesis unifies reality: Every realm is ultimately thought-originated (no exception required). 10. I see that limits in value are categorically uniform: Differences in limit make no difference with respect to being foundational and uncaused. (This principle of uniformity runs underneath Leon’s proposal that some limits might be metaphysically necessary, whether in the nature of a particle or in God. For even if some limit were somehow necessary, it would not follow that the limit is foundational. Compare: a purple unicorn is not necessary, but if it were somehow necessary, then its purple color and unicorn shape would—like every other color and shape—probably have a deeper explanation [i.e., would not be foundational].) 11. I see that supreme value, by contrast, does make a difference: Supreme value accounts for foundational existence. 12. I see that by the above two sights, a foundation cannot be anything but supreme.11 10 Experts on these programs observe consistent results at the Sante Fe Institute. I am not aware of any relevant expert on these simulations who disputes a fine-tuning requirement or who has observed anything inconsistent with the results of my experiments. 11 Besides these, in Rasmussen Forthcoming, I develop another, related path, which only requires that limits in value logically can—i.e., consistent with a priori principles—depend upon something prior. Notice that the premise does not require that a cause is metaphysically possible. The premise is more modest. It merely says that there is no a priori contradiction in a cause. To see the inference, go to a world in which something causes (or is a foundation for) the instantiation of being limited in value, L. The only thing that could be prior to L is something supreme (i.e., not limited in value). Supreme existence entails (i) existence in all worlds and (ii) essentially supreme existence. By these inferences, together with the symmetry of accessibility of logically possible worlds, it follows that a supreme foundation spans all the logically possible worlds, including ours.

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When it comes to the argument from evil, by contrast, I find myself trying to look through a midst. All that I see is that I don’t see much. I see evil. But I do not see its complete explanation. Here are some of the things I do not see about evil: 1.  I do not see the edges of the orchard of potential purposes, whereby bad events could reap greater goods in later episodes. 2. I do not see even the proportion of bad to good; nor do I see enough to tell that the actual proportion, whatever it is, is not ideal for the development of persons along many good lines. 3. I do not see that that I would see all the reasons for evil if they were there. (In fact, I see that I wouldn’t!) 4. I do not see that God’s life is worsened by the experience of adventures with diverse beings who can grow and advance along many lines. (On the contrary!) 5.  I join Leon in not seeing that our lives must be part of grand soul-developing adventures. 6. Yet, I also do not see that our lives are not part of grand souldeveloping adventures (achieving jewels of goodness that are, for all I see, otherwise impossible). 7. I join Leon in not seeing (directly) that every crevice in the terrible terrain serves a worthwhile purpose. 8. Yet, I also do not see (not even close) that some crevice in the terrible terrain fails to serve a worthwhile purpose. 9. Most significantly, I do not see that skepticism of these particular things that are out of my sight should make me in the slightest skeptical of anything in my sight. The last item on the list is relevant to Leon’s worry about modal skepticism leading to agnosticism about large-scale theories. Here is how things look to me. Even if one is completely in the dark about what a rational foundation would produce, it does not follow that one is in the dark about what would happen without a rational foundation. Recall the clock case. One could be in the dark about whether a working clock will match one’s

Bonus: A foundation that spans all the logically possible words fits perfectly with the theory that the principles of logic are themselves part of the nature of the ultimate foundation, since they span the same worlds.

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watch to the precise minute. Yet, one is not thereby in the dark about what would happen if the clock were not working. You know what would happen: no match. And you know why: The non-working clock is vanishingly less likely to give the correct time than the working clock. (Of course, different people can be in the dark about different things and in the light about different things—hence, the value of dialogue!) In summary, my reasons for thinking that the foundation is supreme come from what I think I see. I see principles of reason, goodness, and power. All these match the nature of a supreme foundation. By contrast, I do not see anything that doesn’t match. No lines in my sight flow from bad events to pointless ends. So, where does this leave us? It depends on one’s location on the epistemic terrain. If you see what I think I see, then you can—from your location on the epistemic landscape—see something special about the foundation of the world. You can see its value-arrow. Where does it point? From this sight, you can trace its direction: The foundation’s value-arrow points toward something good, something very good, indeed. And, you can see this goodness without thinking that everyone else must—from their current location on the epistemic landscape—see it, too. Wherever you stand on the epistemic landscape, there are still many lines to explore. If I’m right, of the discovery of good things, there will be no end.

ReferenCes Dougherty, Trent. 2014. The Problem of Animal Pain: A Theodicy for All Creatures Great and Small. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Law, Stephen. 2010. “The Evil-God Challenge.” Religious Studies 46: 353–373. Oppy, Graham. 2014. Describing Gods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pruss, Alexander, and Joshua Rasmussen. 2014. “Time Without Creation.” Faith and Philosophy 31: 401–411. Rasmussen, Joshua. 2013. “On the Value of the Freedom to Do Evil.” Faith and Philosophy 30: 418–428. Rasmussen, Joshua. 2019. How Reason Can Lead to God. Westmont, IL: Intervarsity Press. Schaffer, Jonathan. 2015. “What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93: 644–664. Weaver, Gregory. 2015. “Evilism, Moral Rationalism, and Reasons Internalism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77: 3–24.

CHAPTER 18

Epilogue Felipe Leon and Joshua Rasmussen

1  Thank You (Leon) We’ve reached the end of a fruitful, stimulating, and (I want to emphasize) fun inquiry into the nature of foundational reality. And for this journey, I couldn’t have asked for a better traveling companion than Professor Rasmussen. His creativity and insight enabled me to see new vistas and hidden depths that I would’ve overlooked on my own. And his kindness, generosity, and charitable spirit made it easy to focus on the search for truth, and not on a battle of defending a corner of epistemic space. I have learned a great deal from Professor Rasmussen on the topic of foundational reality, and for that, I am very grateful. I consider Professor Rasmussen not only a fellow interlocutor, but also a good friend. So thank you, Josh, for traveling alongside me on this journey. Thanks also to our readers for joining us.

2   What I’ve Learned (Leon) It would take us too far afield to list all of the things I’ve learned from my investigation with Rasmussen. However, I’d like to highlight three that strike me as most important. First, I’ve learned concretely that the joint pursuit of truth can shed light on issues that one wouldn’t have

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otherwise been seen, and that the joint pursuit of truth from very diverse perspectives can yield significant progress on a topic. Second, I’ve learned that just as there are a variety of forms of naturalism, there are a variety of plausible forms of theism that avoid many of the weakness of standard versions. Most significantly (at least for me), I’ve learned that plausible versions of theism can be developed that are compatible with PMC. Finally, I’ve come to see much more clearly that some versions of theism and of naturalism have more similarities than differences. David Chalmers recently offered what he called a “Hegelian” argument for panpsychism, so named because it follows the dialectical pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.1 In my discussion with Rasmussen, I’ve seen concretely that this pattern of inquiry can be used with significant profit to successively revise theistic and naturalistic hypotheses, ultimately resulting in a view that combines the most plausible elements of both naturalism and theism.

3  Joining the Revolution (Leon) I’ve mentioned that contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is currently experiencing the beginnings of a new revolution away from the well-worn debate between classical theism and (what I’ve called) conservative naturalism. Toward this end, new hypotheses about the divine are being explored, developed, and evaluated. Many strong efforts have already come to fruition, and many more are in the pipeline. It is our intention that the present volume will be taken as a contribution to this exciting revolution.

4  Thank You (Rasmussen) I begin with thanks to you, Professor Leon, for this special conversation. Together, we have had an opportunity to pursue one of the biggest questions people ask at an unusual level of depth. Your grasp of the relevant literature and ideas is far beyond normal, even for professional philosophers. In addition, you combined your depth of analysis with a clear

1 Chalmers

(2016).

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and commonsense presentation. This combination of depth and clarity helped us follow paths into distant terrains. Often conversations about big questions turn into critiques of people, with an aim to expose intellectual vices. Such arguments create clouds of smoke, which cover thin lines to truth. This conversation, by contrast, was peaceful and productive. I’m grateful for your contribution to this approach. Thank you, also, simply for exploring these paths with me. It has been very interesting and deeply gratifying. I learned many things. I believe my soul will carry the fruits of our exchange forever. I also wish to thank the reader. We covered a lot of tough ground in this conversation. Thank you for joining us on the journey. I hope it has served you well.

5   What I Learned (Rasmussen) There is a stereotype that people cannot change their mind about anything through a debate. Well, maybe in a dialogue, more change is possible. In this exchange, many things have come into greater clarity for me. I’d like to share a few highlights. Here are five things that stand out: 1. I have gained a greater appreciation for the role naturalism can play in a broad theism. Naturalism (broadly construed) doesn’t compete with a supreme foundation. This dialogue has brought to light more lines of integration. 2. Related to the above point about integrating naturalism, I have gained a clearer vision of specific ways God’s nature can illuminate the naturalists’ resources. These resources include such things as principles of reason, principles of morality, and the powers to produce people. Why do these things exist? God’s nature illuminates why: Reason, morality, and the power to produce people are the elements of a supreme person. 3. I’ve gained a new appreciation for the value of an inclusive inquiry into the nature of the foundation. Leon raised specific objections to specific theisms. Rather than stumble over those objections, we walked past them, with our sights on the foundation. By exploring the nature of the foundation, we investigated both the nature and existence of God at once.

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4.  I’ve gained a deeper appreciation for God’s connection to all things (reason, morals, consciousness, math, etc.). In fact, if Leon’s PMC is correct, then perhaps the Apostle Paul was literally correct when he said, “In Him we live and move and have our being.” 5. On some level, we are all skeptics of some good things in the foundation of existence. The foundation has many treasures, and no one sees them all. There is always more good to see. These lessons all point to a single, unifying outcome. This outcome is the most significant lesson for me. It is about the way different people, from different perspectives, can see treasures within the foundation of existence. The foundation includes many treasures. When you see principles of reason, you see something good. You see treasure. These are many good things to see at the depths of reality. Instead of competing with dialectical opponents, perhaps we can come together to celebrate this common sight of good things. In the midst of the celebration of good things, other good things can come into view. By highlighting the good, one can see more of the good. Who knows, one might even come to see that the greatest treasures in the foundation—e.g., its principles of reason, roots of virtue, and powers to produce people—have their supreme home in the nature of a supreme being.

6  A Note About Truth-Seeking (Rasmussen) Questions about ultimate reality can leave people feeling lost. Can we really find any truth at this depth? I want to end this book with an idea about how to get the most out of truth-seeking. I begin with a general observation: what you seek, you tend to find. If you seek more truth, you tend to find more truth. If you seek treasure, you tend to find treasure. Wherever your eyes turn, you tend to see what’s there, if there’s anything. While we may not have much choice over our current position in life, everyone has a choice of what to seek. You can seek truth, beauty, goodness, pleasure, fame, prosperity, a friendship, a scholarship, a new place to live, or anything else you set your mind to. What you seek is up to you. However, this very principle of seeking and finding can inspire doubts for truth-seekers. If you find what you look for, how do you know you

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are not deceiving yourself? How do you know you have not crawled under a blanket of confirmation bias? In this exchange with Leon, I wondered about our respective assignments. My assignment was to represent the theistic position, whereas Leon’s assignment was to represent the skeptical or non-theist position. These assignments make a difference to where we look, and then what we see. I noticed that I would tend to discover lines, including new lines, relevant to my assignment. I pondered how the difference in where one is looking might affect the lines one comes to see most clearly. If one seeks skeptical lines, one is more likely to find skeptical lines. Meanwhile, if one seeks lines to a treasure, one is more likely to find those lines, too. How can anyone be sure one’s sights are leading along the path to truth? Despite the reasons for caution, I think success is possible. Part of the reason is that people do tend to find more truth when they seek more truth. People who seek truth in an area tend to find more truths in that area. Moreover, even in the midst of deep disagreements, one can make personal discoveries. Disagreements often distract attention from the sights people have in common. The tension of the disagreement is a fire that attracts our attention away from a beautiful meadow in the background. Those who look at the meadow may find more sights on common: In the midst of disagreements, one can still see many things. In my exchange with Leon, we uncovered many sights relevant to the question of God’s existence. There are many truths here to see. Leon identified truths about things that exist necessarily, including principles of reason and morality, while I think I personally uncovered truths about God’s connection to those very necessary things. We could both be right about many things. Consider also that sight is personal. No one sees what a community sees. A community is made of individual eyes. Only your eyes see what you see. No one else sees everything you see. The problem is not that truth is impossible to see. The biggest barriers to truth, I think, are the many other things we can seek instead of truth. There are many things to seek. In a debate, we can seek being right, being seen as reasonable, or winning the debate. We can even seek good things instead: when we seek noble ends, like justice, peace, or good news, seeking these ends is not the same as seeking truth. Sure, we can seek truth while also seeking other good things. But if we seek other things instead of truth, then we are less likely to find truth.

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Seek truth, and you will more likely find more truth on any subject you look into. If you look for more mathematical truths, you will find more mathematical truths. If you seek truths about managing money, you will discover more truths about managing money. If you seek more truths about how to build relationships, you will discover more truths about how to build relationships. Seek truths about any pathway to God or away from God, and you will discover more truths relevant to that pathway. I share these things about the prospect of sight because I want to encourage you on your journey as a truth-seeker. Whether you are student or a seasoned philosopher, we all need encouragement sometimes. We need to know that our search for truth is not in vain. Your search is not in vain, because you tend to find truths in whatever domain you humbly seek them. I offer a final thought. It is about which truths to seek. There are many truths under sun, and many more in Plato’s heaven. Why seek some truths and not others? In my experience as a philosopher, I have found that the more I seek to understand the foundation of existence, the more treasures I find within the foundation. The foundation is greater than I had imagined. It is more inclusive. It is wiser. It is more just. No religion can contain its grandeur. These truths are inspiring. Everyone sees some good and inspiring truths. I think truths about the foundation of things are among the most exciting and potentially transforming. So I seek them. If there are treasures in the foundation, I want to find them. So, here is my idea about how to get the most out of truth-seeking: Seek the most valuable and most exciting truths you can. Seek truths. Seek treasures. Seek their intersection. What you seek, you will tend to find. I hope this dialogue serves you on your journey. Wherever you are on the epistemic landscape, may you find the truths that serve you most.

Reference Chalmers, David. 2016. “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism.” In Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Index

A Abduction, 27, 28, 32, 206 and theoretical virtues, 131, 133 Abstracta, 46, 91, 115, 150, 160, 162, 163, 165, 177–179, 185, 186, 189, 250 basic, 115, 178, 179 non-basic, 178 Abstract objects, 12, 46, 55, 90–95, 127, 131, 161–165, 167, 177, 185 Arbitrary limits, 80, 87, 89, 114, 115, 117, 132, 140, 141, 183, 250, 251 as brute, 80, 81, 89, 151 problem of, 71, 80, 81, 88, 90, 112, 114, 116, 183, 269 Argument from arbitrary limits, 102, 176 deductive form, 176, 195–197, 203, 206, 207 probabilistic form, 176 Argument from contingency, 7, 13, 18

Argument from organized complexity, 173 Argument from possible causes, 7, 19, 33, 35, 50 Argument from reason, 112 Arguments, 1, 2, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, 39, 40, 44, 47, 48, 51, 53, 56, 57, 59, 62–65, 67, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85, 90, 93, 118, 142, 162, 172, 208, 275 as instruments to promote inquiry, 172 Aristotelian teleology, 174 Axiological sensations, 109–110 B Bad foundation, 255, 256, 264 Basic physical laws, 106 Bayesian form, 105, 109, 110, 112 Beginningless, 32 Beings contingent dependent, 29–33, 36

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 J. Rasmussen and F. Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3

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280  Index contingent independent, 30–32. See also Necessary being, factually necessary being (FNB) necessary dependent, 30, 31 necessary independent, 29, 31 Biological functions, 161, 188, 240 Block universe, 65, 66 Bootstrapping, 157, 158, 163, 164 Brute teleology, 167, 174, 259 C Categorical uniformity, 44, 48 Causal foundation, 13, 14, 40, 41, 46, 49, 75 Causal Irrelevance, 19 Causal principle, 14, 15, 18, 19, 33, 48, 82 Causation as dependence, 51 as grounding, 51 indeterministic, 46, 51 material cause, 51 reducible to; laws, 51; powers, 51; tendencies, 51 Cause(s), 15–17, 19, 20 efficient, 33, 34, 51, 55, 62–64, 118, 156, 160 material, 54–56, 63, 64 originating, 55, 56, 156, 160 personal, 63, 65, 121, 244 sustaining, 55, 56, 156, 160 Combination problem, 159, 167 The Common Strategy, 91, 93, 94, 121 and the Base-Expanding Approach, 92–95 and the Shoehorn Approach, 92, 95 Complex adaptive systems, 173, 237 Complexity, 42, 44, 45, 73, 81, 103–107, 116, 120, 140, 148, 157, 158, 173, 174, 176, 177, 182, 189, 225, 247, 249, 254, 256–258, 261, 262

Connection theodicy, 237 Consciousness elimination of, 108, 121 problem of, 107–108, 116, 122 qualia, 107 reduction of, 108 sense (first-person), 107–109 Construction problem, 146, 175 Constructivism, Kantian, 161 Cosmological argument, 13, 19, 44 geometric argument, 45 stage 2, 39 Cosmopsychism, 133 Counterpossibles, 126, 130, 163, 167, 186, 206, 225 Creation ex Deus, 51 Creation ex nihilo, 51, 65, 82, 89 Cumulative case, 193, 206, 217 Cumulative case from evil, 224 D Darwinian evolution, 103 Defeasible principle, 43, 44, 87 Defeater, 15, 201 rebutting, 25, 194 undercutting, 25, 60, 61, 193, 194 Dependent thing, 10, 11, 101, 140 Deterministic, 16 Dialogue, 3, 45, 101, 172, 203, 223, 240, 241, 260, 271, 275, 278 scope of, 3 value of, 2 Divine attributes, 181 as maximal consistent set, 133, 189, 225 and perfection, 160, 189 Divine command theory, 124–127 Divine hiddenness, problem of, 207 E Eliminativism, 107

Index

Empirical data, 47, 49, 75, 76 Epistemically independent bits of information, 174 Epistemically independent components, 174. See also Epistemically independent bits of information Epistemic possibility, 75 Epistemic probability, 76 Epistemic probability vs. grounding, 149 Epistemic terrain, 271 Eternal existence, 49 Euthyphro dilemma, 125, 126, 130, 149, 150 Evolution, 103–106, 110, 112, 127, 128, 173, 217, 229, 234, 236, 237, 250 Evolutionary debunking argument, 127, 128 Evolution, problem of, 213 Ex nihilo, 34, 35, 51, 63–66, 72, 89, 144, 156 Expanding value hypothesis, 265 Explaining limits, 151 Explaining reason, 140 Explanations, 77, 80, 81 competing vs commentary, 76, 96 Explanatory gap, 124, 158, 180 Explanatory power, 13, 15, 50, 131, 142, 144, 183, 186 Explanatory principle, 29, 44 Explanatory resources, 176 Expressivism, 124 F Factually necessary, 30, 40, 49, 51, 101 Fallacy of composition, 47, 48 Final causes, 33, 55, 64, 118, 119, 121, 157, 158, 161, 189 as compatible with naturalism, 118, 122, 126

  281

as a problem for theism, 118, 127, 133, 158 Fine-tuned problems, 235 Fine-tuning, 90, 91, 104–106, 117– 120, 131, 146, 151, 157, 167, 173, 182, 185, 188, 251, 269 Foundational mind, 102, 105, 108–112, 115, 129–132, 141, 143–148, 150, 173, 176, 179, 181–183, 186–188 as minimal, 182 as supreme, 150, 173–176, 179– 183. See also Perfect mind as ultimate, 171, 177, 182 Foundational power, 115 Foundation theory, 8, 10, 20 Framework, 35, 39, 73, 74, 85, 91, 93, 95, 102, 246 The free will defense, 196–199, 202–206, 212, 224, 230, 232 and feasible worlds, 198, 199 and interworld plenitude, 200 and intraworld plenitude, 200 and transworld depravity, 198, 200, 203, 204 Fundamental mind, 101, 106, 111, 139, 144, 147 G General principle of explanation, 113 The Geometric Argument, 39–42, 48, 50, 74–76, 78, 79, 81 Geometric foundation, 75 actually non-geometric, 75 impossibility of, 75 Geometric observations, 78 Geometry argument, 45, 51, 53, 66–68, 78, 81, 85, 86 God as immanent, 74 as transcendent, 72, 74 God’s hiddenness, 234

282  Index God’s imagination, 143 God’s life, 247, 265, 266, 270 Good foundation hypothesis, 206, 254–257, 259–261 Greater life hypothesis, 265 The Great Story of creation, 233 of hidden treasures, 240 of kingly creatures, 229–233, 238, 266 Growth of cities, 235 of families, 235 of individuals, 235 of nations, 235 of species, 235 Gunk, 166 H Hard problem of consciousness, 124, 175 Hegelian argument, 274 Hilbert’s Hotel, 57, 58 Horrors, problem of, 206, 207 Humean objection from conceivability, 17, 18, 20 I Idolatry, problem of, 216, 217 Immortal Counter Argument, 59 Independent thing, 8, 10, 11, 115, 149 Indeterministic, 16 Indeterministic relationships, 115, 230 Inductive support, 14, 15, 50, 67 Ineffectiveness of prayer, problem of, 216, 217 Inference to the best explanation, 2, 8, 31, 43, 48, 154

Inhospitable environment, problem of, 209 Intentionality, 118, 129, 130, 186, 189, 229 Intentional powers, 105, 106, 110–112, 142, 143, 146, 147, 151, 174, 177 Intentional resources, 148 Interworld plenitude, 200, 201 Intraworld plenitude, 201, 204 Intrinsically probable, 81, 102, 113, 142, 144, 173, 176 Intrinsic probability, 114, 142, 147, 151, 173, 174, 254, 255 K Kingly foundation, 239 L Languishing, problem of, 214 Laws as thoughts, 143 Least arbitrary foundation, 81, 147, 152 Least arbitrary theory, 145–147, 151 Liberal naturalism, 91, 92, 94, 95, 122, 133, 155, 161, 165–167, 186–188, 193, 206, 217, 228, 235, 240, 246, 247, 250–252, 258, 260, 262 Limited naturalism, 258–260 Limited-value hypothesis, 257, 263, 268, 269 M Many universes, 106, 121, 173, 188 Material causation, 39, 50, 82 Material forms, 51, 72, 73, 107, 143, 173, 181, 182

Index

Material reality, 23, 39, 41, 51, 62, 71, 86 Maximal conceivable, 113, 115, 141 Maximal mind hypothesis, 142 Meaning of everything, 223 Meta-ethical theories, 148 aristotelian virtue ethics, 148 consequentialism, 148 constructivism, 148 contractarianism, 148 Metametaphysics, 166 neo-Carnapian, 165 realist, 166 Metaphysically necessary, 9, 23, 29, 40, 47, 49, 51, 75, 81, 86, 89, 90, 101, 117, 155, 156, 269 Mind-first hypothesis, 102, 139 Minimal mind hypothesis, 182, 183 Modal judgement, 25, 47, 48 Modal knowledge, 24, 27, 29, 251 accounts of, 26 conceivability and possibility, 28 Modal logic, 21, 156 and system S5, 26, 156 Morality, 90, 91, 94, 95, 102, 124, 125, 127–129, 148, 149, 160, 167, 175, 176, 182, 185, 187, 224, 275, 277 Moral landscape, 109, 148, 174, 224 Moral principles, 101, 110, 128, 148, 149, 161, 180, 181, 183, 187, 189 like pillars, 180 as supreme, 160, 180, 181 as ungrounded, 180 Moral realism, 127, 128 Moral skepticism, 127 Multiverse, 42, 120, 145, 167, 173, 188, 251, 258

  283

N Natural, 54, 61, 62, 64, 73, 74, 82, 85, 144, 173, 188, 251, 257, 258 as fundamentally mindless vs. not supernatural, 82 natural causes, 73, 173, 239 Natural foundation, 39, 40, 42, 47, 82, 120, 124, 140, 141, 144, 149, 150, 171, 173, 174, 176, 179, 224, 257, 258, 268, 275 Naturalism conservative, 91–95, 154, 165, 274 liberal, 92, 93, 95, 154 moderate, 91–95, 126, 154, 165 naturalists’ resources, 275 Natural selection, 103, 112, 161 Necessary being, 26, 29, 30, 35, 44, 51, 120, 163, 165 factually necessary being (FNB), 30–33, 36, 54, 65, 68 metaphysically necessary being (MNB), 27, 29, 32, 33, 54, 65, 68, 156, 250 Necessary existence, 2, 13, 19, 20, 40, 48–50, 72, 111, 256, 268 Necessary foundation, 2, 7, 10–13, 17–20, 23, 35, 39, 47, 50, 51, 81, 95, 167 Necessary nature, 8, 11, 143 Necessity epistemic, 8, 9 factual, 31, 39, 48, 51, 66, 67 metaphysical, 8–10, 24, 51, 66, 67, 75, 86, 88, 111, 114, 140, 156, 251 modal logic, 9, 10, 21 S5 axioms, 10 Neutral foundation, 256 No Arbitrary Limits Principle (NALP), 87–90, 112–115, 120, 132, 133, 141

284  Index Non-arbitrary theory, 182 Non-contingent cause, 17, 19 O Object abstract, 46, 55, 90–95, 127, 131, 161–165, 167, 177, 185 concrete, 23, 28, 29, 32, 34, 35, 55, 56, 92, 93, 95, 122, 156, 160, 165, 166 Observer selection-effect, 106 Organized complexity, 102–105, 142, 144, 147, 159, 160, 169, 175, 185 Origin essentialism, 31, 32 P Panprotopsychism, 91 Panpsychism, 133, 274 Paradox of propositions, 177 plurals version, 178 Russell’s paradox, 177 Past beginningless, 48, 56, 59–61, 245 finite, 40, 56, 57, 62–66, 68 infinite, 57, 59, 60. See also Beginningless Perfect mind, 115, 150, 174, 178, 179, 182, 183, 189, 225 Perfect mind hypothesis, 182, 183, 186 Perplexing elements, 240 Personal foundation, 102, 121, 129, 153, 171, 172, 177, 179–181, 185, 193, 206, 213, 214, 216, 217, 230, 246 Phenomenal conservativism, 15 Phenomenal states, 121, 123, 146, 147, 159 Platonism, 162, 163, 165, 167, 178, 179 abstract moral principles, 110 as unanchored, 110, 177

Possibility, 23 epistemic, 26, 30, 31, 33, 36, 54, 60–62, 67, 75, 86, 94, 95, 153–155, 199, 250, 251 metaphysical, 15, 24–26, 29, 34, 35, 57, 133, 196–198, 200, 202–204, 206, 269 Prayer natural causes, 240 positive effect, 240 scientific studies of, 240 unanswered, 234, 239 Predictive success, 114, 143, 177, 180, 182, 224, 225, 256, 257, 260, 262, 268 Principle of irrelevant differences, 41, 43–45, 74–78, 80 Principle of material causality (PMC), 33–35, 50, 54–56, 63–66, 167 Principle of non-arbitrary limits, 154 Principle of sufficient reason (PSR), 32 Priori intuition, 14 Priority cosmopsychism, 155, 159, 160, 165, 167, 187, 188 Priority monism, 72 Prior probability, 142, 189, 245–247, 255, 260–262, 269 Probabilistic resources, 180, 224 Problem of evil, 145, 196, 198, 199, 201, 203, 261 as a prediction tool, 261 Propositions, 9, 46, 55, 73, 78, 91, 122, 129, 150, 164, 165, 177–179, 186 and intrinsic intentionality, 129, 167 theories of, 127 Q Quantum fields, 86, 162 Quantum mechanics, Everettian interpretation of, 166

Index

R Randomized evolution dwindling complexity, 104 Santa Fe Research Institute, 104 simulation of, 103 Rational disagreement, 172 Rational foundation, 112, 143, 270 Relativism, moral, 128 Religious diversity, 234, 238 Religious diversity, problem of evolution, 213 Revulsion, problem of, 208 Russellian monism, 91, 122–124, 130, 133, 159, 160, 165, 167, 180, 181 S Scavengers, 236 Schrodinger equation, 174 as an explanation of fine-tuning, 174 as a simple theory, 173, 179 Self-repair, 103, 144 Self-replicating, 103 Separation of ideas, 72 Sherlock Holmes Principle, 20 Simplicity, 13, 15, 31, 43, 49, 120, 142, 144, 154, 160, 189, 254, 255, 257, 268 Skepticism, 27, 47, 81, 88, 122, 133, 166, 244, 250, 251, 267, 270 Soul-building, 264 Soul-making theodicy, 247, 249 Souls, 159, 160, 181, 231, 232, 261, 262, 275 Spatiotemporal geometry, 42, 46, 80 Spinozism, 54, 72, 91, 133, 155, 251 Story theodicy, 223, 243, 264, 265, 267 Structuralism, ontic, 124 Structure and dynamics argument, 124, 158

  285

Substance dualism, 94, 122, 123, 159, 160, 167, 187 Supreme foundation, 7, 71, 74, 115, 116, 141, 149, 150, 160, 161, 180–182, 224–229, 237, 240, 244, 255–262, 264, 265, 269, 271, 275 Supreme foundation theory, 72, 73, 227, 254, 255, 261 Supreme naturalism, 258, 259, 262 Supreme nature, 72, 115, 141, 142, 146, 148, 150, 151, 174, 224, 225, 255, 259 Supreme resources, 256 Supreme value, 50, 71, 72, 114, 141, 142, 145, 147, 151, 173, 255, 257, 265, 268, 269 Supreme value hypothesis, 265, 268 T Teleological arrow, 144, 145, 182, 224, 259–262 Teleological evil, problem of, 209, 210 The terrible terrain, 234, 235, 237, 247, 251, 264, 270 Theistic activism, 163, 164, 167, 186 Theistic conceptualism, 164, 165, 167, 185, 186 Theoretical virtues, 31, 43, 154, 160, 167 Theory, 11, 28, 40, 41, 45, 50, 66, 68, 72–74, 78, 79, 81, 113–115, 131, 132, 143, 146, 147, 149, 154, 165, 166, 174–176, 179–183, 186, 188, 254, 255, 257–262, 265, 270 consequences of, 254, 255, 261, 262, 266 internal complexity, 262 Theory-simple, 78, 103, 110, 140, 174, 182, 255

286  Index Third-person features, 107 Track-record argument, 43, 82, 132 Treasure-seeking, 238, 276–278 Truth-seeking, 276–278

Value of life, 265 The value problem, 175 Variable rewards, 231 Virtue ethics, 125, 126, 148

U Ungodly thoughts, 165, 179, 185 Uniform-dependence principle, 45, 50

W Wave function realism, 67, 166 Weak PMC, 156, 181

V Value-arrow, 254, 260, 262, 271 Value of being, 256