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Introduction To Classical Indian Philosophy
 0231133987, 9780231133982

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CLASSICAL INDIAN PHILOSOPHY



UNIVERSl'TYLIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA. RENO RENO, NV 89557

eo1umb1a untV.rs1ty Press Publishers Stnce lll'll .. New York chfhester; WeSt Sussex Copyright ,C' 2011 •,Columbia University Press '

All rights reser\ied

Librafy ofCongres• ca~-ln-Publicat!on Data · Sanna. Deepak, 1969-

Readin!l" in classic:al Irullan phil"'opby I neepak Sanna. P• cm. Include. bibliographic:al references and Index. !SB"197s4231-1H9S-2 (cloth: alk. paper) -ISBN 978-0-231-13399-9 (p) L Indian philosophy. I. Title. ll513L527

2011"

181'.4-dc22 2010016122

8 Columbia Unlverslty Press books are printed on permanent and durable add-free paper. This book is printed on paper with recycled content Printed in the United States of America c109B7654321 pl0987654321

In service ofLard KT$!UI and the Miidhva Swppmdiiya

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)rve5varobhidii caivaJaileSvarobhidii tathii IFrvabhedo mitha5 caiva jaiiefrvabhidii tathii ImtthaS caJailabhedo 'yWJ1pmpaiim bhedapancakai) Iso YWJ1 satyo. The universe has five [intrinsic] differences: There Is a difference between [each]jfva (enduring self), and Lord [V~u]. There Is a difference between Lord [V~u] andjaiJa (nonsentlent material entitles). There Is difference between the indlvidual )rvas. There Is a dlfference betweenjfvas and jru;las. There Is a difference between onejaiJa and another. The [difference . between these five] Is real. -Madhviicfilya. V~utattva(vi)nir(laya

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ·xi Introduction

l1.u7: f.

•xv

NASTIKA (HETERODOX) SCHOOLS·

1. Carvaka

.3 From Madhavacarya's SarvadarSana-saqigmha •s SaJjlkariicarya's Sarvasiddhiinta-sW/lgm}ut .10

2.

Buddhism • 14

Dhannacakmpravartana Siitm 3.

Yogacara Buddhism • 20 Vasubandhu's VlrpSatika Kiirika and Vrttf • 22

4. Madhyamaka Buddhism • 40 Nagiirjuna's Vigrahavyiivartanf 5.

• 42

Jainism • 50 From Hemacandra's YogaSiistra • 54 From Saniantabhadra's AptamfmWp.sa • Bl

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• 16 ·

FIVE ASTIKA (ORTHODOX) SCHOOLS

Nyaya • 93 From Gautama's Nyiiya Siitms • 96 From Uddyotakara's Nyiiya-viirttlka • 136

7. Valse~!ka

• 141

Kfu)ada's V~ka Siitms

• 143 From Sndhara's Nyiiya-kiindalf • 159

x Contents

s. siltpkhya • 161 ISvaralqgia's Sii!pkhya-kiirikii • 169 9. Yoga

• 178

Patafijali's Yoga Siitras • 180 10. M"lllliiipsii • 195 From Sahara's Sabam-b~a

Jl,,_.f{; (( (,

• 197

SCHOOLS OF VEDANTA

11. Advalta Vedanta • 201 From Sarµkaraciirya's Brahma Siitm-bhieya 12. V!Si~\ijdvalta Vedanta • 214 From Riimanujiiciirya's Vediirthasarpgroha

• 209

• 216

13. Miidhva Vedanta • 223 Madhviiciirya's Mijyiiviidakha(lllana • 221 Madhviiciirya's UpiidhfkhaW= • 229

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From Madhviiciirya's Vigiutattva(vi)nir(urya . •232

General Bibltogruphy •235 Index •239

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'' ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ,,

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his project originates from work that·l began on Indian philosophy as an undergraduate in 1990 at Reed College. with Professor Edwin Gerow and in Udupi with Sri Bananjee Govindacarya. I was fortunate to be able to continue my study under Professor Paul]. Grif!lths at the Divinity School at the University of Chicago. Scholars of the Piin).aprajfia Srupfodhana Mandiram (PPSM) under the auspices of the Piiil;laprajfia Vidyilpi\:ham of the Pejiivara mafha have helped tremendously in my.stlidy of Indian philosophy. Professors K; T. Pru:u;lurangi, D, Pra!iliidilcilryit, and ,. Sita Nrunbiarin India were guides to whom I run deeplylndebtetL fora5-; sistance on this book, I run grateful to Dan Arnold; francis:X. C!oone}';J. Chastity and other such (cunning) conventions have been .inyented by c;Ieyer weajdings. Gifts ofgold and' oflan~, etc.,'the enjoying of sweet dinners on invitation, are all the devices of per~ons who are poor and have stomachs that are (ever) lean with hunger. With respect to temples, houses for the distribution of drinking water to travelers, tanks, wells, pleasure-gardens, and other such devices-only travelers praise them daily, (but) not others. The ritual ofAgnihotrn, tlie three ')

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12 .NASTIKA SCHOOLS

Vedas; the (ascetic's) triple staff, the smearing of one's self with ashes are all (merely) means oflivellhood to those who are destitute of intelligence and energy: so opines Brhaspati. By adopting only those means which are seen (to.be practical), such as agriculture, the tending of cattle, trade, politics, and administration, . etc., a wise man should always (endeavor to) enjoy pleasures (here) in this world.

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NOTES

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1. For example, .jlg Veda 8,70.2, 8.71.8, 10.38.3; Brhudiinz&aka Rmniiytheiri (oD•both or neither)." To this we reply: "Jn that case·youcaµmakeassertlorinoteven to the , ''

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Jalhlsm es effect that we are not entitled to give verbal expression to the four alternatives In question. Moreover,. an entity that is all~gedly de,vold of all characteristics whatsoever Is really' a .nonentity; for such an entity . can act neither, as a qualiflcand nor as a qualifier:• · ,' 47. It Is only a really existing entltycdenoted"by-a-word thatwhen proposed to be a possessor of the root-substance, etc. (I.e., rootsubstance, place, time, form), that arenotits ow'n root-substance, etc.can be subjected to a negative assertion. On the other hand, an alleged entity that is really but a nonentity can be subjected neither to a positive assertion nor to.a negative one. 48. What is devoid of all characteristics whatsoever, let that be an indescribable nonentity (as posited by our rival). On the other hand, a real entity (as, posited by us), too, can be treated as a nonentity when the pi;ocedure (of attributing characteristics to it) is reversed (I.e., when : it is proposed that this entity possesses characteristics that are not In fact its ow'ncharacteristlcs). · 49. If all characteristics whatsoever are indescribable why is It that our clval himself goes on ·to speak of certain characteristics ·(which accordingto hlin belong to reality)? if it is replied that this kind oftalk is but a mere usage, It turns out to be but a falsity, for such a thing (i.e., what is a mere usage) is just the opposite of trutk 50. We ask whether the reality is thus (being declared to be) indescribable because our rival Is Incapable of describing It; or because it· does not exist, or because our rival has·no knowledge about it Of these the first and third alternatives should not be acceptable to our rival. Why then does he resort to camouflage.and not clearly state his position (viz. that the reality is indescribable because it does not exist)? 51, On our rival's position the mind that kills has not willed to kill, . one that has willed to kill does notckill, one that suffers bondage has neither willed to kill nor killed, one that attalits liberation (moksa) has . not suffered bondage. ' 52. Since It is our rival's position that destruction is causeless, he should,be ready to concede that· the killer iS not the cause of killing and that the (celebrated) eightfold cpath Is not the cause of liberation • (mo~) conceived (by our rival himself) In the form of a destruction of the series of mental states. 53. It might be maintained that the activity of a cause is required In order to bring Into existence a dissimilar effect (Le., an effectdissinlilar ·from the one that had occilrred·at the same place but at the immediately preceding moment). But then the relation of this cause should be 1



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the same to both the coming Into existence of the effect in question and the going out of existence of the effect of the preceding moment, · for the two processes (viz. the coming Into existence of the effect in question and the going out of existence of the effect of the preceding moment) are not different from one another; this is just as the entitles that are Internally connected do not have different causes. 54. Thus on our rival's position the series and the aggregates, being mere usages, turn out to be something nonentltative (strictly speaking, unoriglnated); of such alleged entitles there can certainly be no continuation, origination, and cessatlon,just as there can be no continuation, · etc., of the horns of a donkey. 55. The enemies of the logic of syiidviida can also not malntaln that the two (viz. "absolute permanence" and "absolute momentariness") · characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position.will be self-contradictory, And If they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon Is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. 56. A real Is something permanent, because It Is subject to recognition while the (indispensable) uninterruptedness of an object of recognition cannot be accidental; at the same time, a real ls ·something momentary because It ls·differentat different times. In the absence of these features (viz. permanence and momentariness) in a real there would arise the undesirable contingency of one state of cognition never· being replaced by another one. This Is your position. 57. An entity neither originates nor ceases so far as its universal character Is concerned, for the continuation of this universal character Is an obvious fact; on the other hand, an entity originates as well as ceases so far as Its particular characters are concerned.·This Is how on your position a real entity is characterized by the .coexistence of origination, etc. (i.e., of origination, cessation, contlnuiltion). 58. The production of an effect Is the same thing as the destruction of the cause of this effect, for the two (I.e., the production of an effect and the destruction of the cause of this effect) are Invariably found to go together even If they are mutually distinguishable through their respective definitions. And inasmuch as there Is here a continuation of the concerned universal character, etc. (i,e ... ofithe concerned universal character, the concerned numerical identity, the concerned inherent capacity, and so forth), the two are not independent of each other, an independence that would have reduced them to.the status of (a nonentity like) sky~flower. · •

JainJsm 87 59. When there occur three phenomena (viz. that of destruction [of

a jar], that of production [of potsherds], and that of continuation [of gold]); three persons (viz. one de'sirous of getting.a jar, one desirous ·of getting potsherds, and one desirous of gett!ng gold) respectively experience three feelings (viZ. that of sorrow, that of joy, and that of neutrality); and such a behavior on their part is well established. , • 60. One who ha.5 taken a vow to feed himself on nothing save milk does not partake of curd, one who has taken a vow to feed himself on nothing save curd does not partake of mJlk, while one who has taken a vow not to partake of any dairy product partakes of neither milk nor curd; hence It follows that a real entity Is possessed of three characters (viz. origination; cessation, and continuation). 1



Difference and Identity !

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61. If one maintains thatan effect ls absolutely distinctfromlts cause, a quality ls absolutely distinct from the thiri.g qualifled by this quality,. and a universal Is absolutely distinct from the particularpossessing this universal(, one would be faced With the following difficulties). · 62. An effect cannot reside in what are many, for ltis possessed of no parts; alternatively, one would be forced to concede that this effect ls. Itself ofthe form of a number'ofentities (which is an undesirable con, tingency). Or.one might concede that this effect Is possessed of parts, but then it will no more be aslrigle entl ty (which again is an undesirable contingency). These are the difficulties that a certain non-Jaina position hasto face on the question of the mode of an effect's residence in its cause. · . 63. On therival's position it should be possible for an effect to occupy a place and a time.that are differentfrom those ofits cause, just as two externally connected physicitl substances may occupy two different places and two different times. Nay, since both an effect and Its cause are corporeal entities it sh~uld never. J:>e possible for them to occupy · one and the same place . . 64. It might be pleaded that there obtains the relation of substratum-superstratum between :two entities that are related through samavaya-relatlon and ·that therefore they. cannot exist in independence from each other. To this we reply that it is not proper to posit .. a relation that is supposed to relate two entitles by existing alongside them but which is ltself not.relatedto them (a description thatflts the . : samavaya-relation posited by the rival In question).

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65. Since a particular universal as we!Lasthesamavaya-relation exist

in their entirety in some one entity (acting as their substratum), It follows that they ought to eidstnowhere else inasmumas an entity toast as their substratuin can be available nowhere else; but then what happens (to the universal in question and to the samavaya-relatlon) when an old entltyperlshes or when a new entity comes into existence? 66. On: the rival's position there obtains absolutely· no relation between a universal and the samavaya-relation, nor is the entity alleged to be the substratum of both related to either; thus all these three (viz. the universal in question, the 5amavaya-relation, and the entity in question) turn out to be nonentities like sky-flower. 67. If one maintains that an effect Is absolutely nondistlnct from atoms (that are to act as Its cause), then there arises the difficulty that these atoms should remain as much unrelated after their mutual conjunction (that Is to give rise to the effect in q~estlon) 'as they wer~ Iii . the early state of mutual disjunction; moreover, in that case the four basic elements (viz. earth, water, fire, air) .will turn out to be but illusory appearances, . 68. And when their effect:S (viz. the basic elements earth, water, fire, air) thus turn out.to be illusory appearances, these atoms themselves ' follow suit, for the nature of cause is Jnferred from that of Its effect Again, in the absence of all cause ahd all effect there also do not exist qualities, universals, etc., supposedly residingin a cause or an effect 69. If an effect and its cause are declared to be one, then either of them must be nonexistent; but then the other partner too must be nonexistent inasmuch as the two invariably go together. Moreover, in that case (I.e., If an effect and Its cause are declared to be one) the twoness of an effect and Its cause will remain unaccounted for; and If it Is said that this twoness Is a mere usage, It turns out to be but a falsity. · 70. The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the, two (viz. "absolute distinctness" and "absolute nondlstinctness") characterize one arid the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And If they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, theri even to say that a phenomenon Is indescribable becomes an Impossibility on theil' part. 71-72. A substance and Its mode are one with each other insofar as they are invariably found to go together; insofar as a substance is found to undergo transformation that is, peculiar to itself, insofar as a substance .is a possessor of such capacities as it is fotlrid to exercise. On the other hand, they are also different fyoin eacli other insofar· as they

Jainism 89

have got different designations, different numerical properties, different definitions, different utilities, and so on and so forth; however, they are not different from each other in an absolute fashion.

NOTES L Hermann Jacobi, Gaina Sutros, part II: The Uttaradhyayana 5atro, The Satnuitanga Sutm (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995);Jarl Charpentier, The UttamyayanasUtra: Being the First Millasiitm of the Svetambara]ains (Delhi: Ajay Book Service, 1980), 93-94. · 2. See Paul Dundas, The]ains, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), 107, for more on Kundakunda's dating. 3. Ibid., 132-134, for more on Haribhadra's dating. 4. The term utman, not jiVa, was used in the oldest canonical texts and by some Digambara writers.

FURTHER READING Dundas, Paul The fains. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2002. Jainl, Padmanabh S. The ]alna Path of Purification. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Malvania, Dalsukh, and Jayendra Soni. Jain Phllascphy, Part L Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2007. Matilal, Birnal K. The Centml Philosophy ofJainism (Anekanta-V-ada). Ahmedabad: L D. institute oflndology, 198L _ "The Jaina Contribution to Logic." In The Character ofLogic In India, ed. Jonardon Ganer! and Heeramann Tiwari, 127-139. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Padmarajiah, Y.J. ACompamtlve Study ofthe]ain Theorieso{Reallty and Klwwledge. Delhi: Motilal Banarsldass, 1963. shah, NaglnJ.Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth. Delhi: Motilal Banarsldass, 2000. Sharma, Chandradhar. A Critlcal Survey oflnd/Jln Phllascphy. London: Rider, 1960.

'D__ .."'/-- ( (, FIVE ASTIKA (ORTHODOX) SCHOOLS (~.................. ................................................................................................. ,

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l NY AYA

HISTORY

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The Nyiiya system holds that mo/cyr the Study ofNavya'.Nyiiya Logic. Deihl: Motilal Banarsldass, l9BB: . .. . , . .

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King, Richard.Indian Phtlm;ophy. Edinburghi Edlnbl\fgh University Press, 1999. Matllal, Birnal Krislina. Nyfya-VaUe,/kti Wiesbaden: Harrassowilz, 1~77: PWlllps, Stephen H. Classical Indian Metaphysics; Refuiations,ofRealism and the Emergence of"New Logic;" DelhlcMotllal Bai:tarsldass, 1997. Potter, Karl H. Indian Metaphysics and tpiStii11a1ogJ:iffu!ifiid/J:lon ofNyaya-Va15e;ika up to G'" tor who Imparts knowledge ls false, the person who has correct knowledge of the 5astra Is also false. All this ls to be gathered from the SUstra, which is false itself. . ;, ·' §B. others occupy a different position and hold .that Bmhman, though having all.perfections like freedom from evil, etc., is--becaus~ of the conception of identity-afflicted with some sort of adjunct, so thathe rriay be

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alternatively in bondage or in released state and Is consequently the abode of evolution, which takes the form of various Imperfections.

Brahman as the Sarfrln · §75, This Is the reason all ternis that denote pralqti and puTU$\jdvaita, 215 dreams: Yogiiciira, '22-23, 30-33; Nyaya, 136--140; ValSe>ika.158; Yoga, 183; Miidbva, 227, 232-233

j~ (nonsentient material entitles), 215,

223

Jaimlnl, 203 ' Jainism, xvi; darSana (correct belief), 53, 55;jfiiilia (cotrect knowledge), 53,' 55; cdritra(cor'rect conduct), 53, 55; argllfuents against Hinduism and 'Mcimismrtl. 62-68, 7i, 72: On women and seXiialll:y, 65-67119; dietary restrictions, 69-75; liquor, 69-70; livelihood, 76--78; argument against per-

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manence and ti'anstencairt~ 83-87; argument agalnstdlfferertce and identity in VaiS">ika, 87~89' )ayatirtha, 224 . jfva (enduring self}, xvii, 51, 52, 209, 215, 223,227"228,232-233 jfvanmuktas (ones living while Uberated}, 209 I jfulrut {knowledge}, 225

kaivalya (isolation}: siil]lkhya, 168, 169, 176; Yoga, 178, 179, 180, 185, 192-194 karma, xvii; YogiicBra, 21; Jainism, 51l-53, 62, 75;.Ny~ya, 95, 139, 140; VaiSe¢ka, 142, 143, 147, 151l-159;Siil]lkhya, 168; Yoga, 179, 184-185, 192; M"unlirpsi!, · 196, 197; Advalla; 209; VIS~dvalta, 216,217,220;Madhva,23o Karnataka, 223 Katha Upani$ad, 229 kevalaji!iina (unllm!ted and absolute knowledge}, 50, 51, 53,175 • ..

Mrm#s~ '228 ,!"

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Mim~,2oJ)"' .. '"' ' mo1¥(1lberatloh),xvll,xvtlffdrcvii,kw1 n: Jainlsfu, 75,.ai;c84, BSt Nyifya\·!!Jr Va!Se¢ka, 143, isz, 153; Vedi!nlji,204;

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Advaita, 207, 209tVilfWidvalta, 214, . 215; Mi!dhva, 224-228; 232"233·. Muv4aka Upani$ad, 231 munitmyam (the three major thinkers}, 224

nirv-self doctrine. See anatman

nondU:Bllsm, 81 normal truth. See bl-level epistemology Nyiiya,.93-141; anumana, 94, 101~104, arguments agairu;t Yogi!cBra, 136-140

0111. 182

KhaJ)~a,226.

padarthas (categories}: Va!Se¢ka, Umlting adjunct. See upiidhi lokasaqivrtfsatya (conventionaltruth}. See bi-level epistemology Miidhava-Vldy