Introducing Global Issues 9781685852627

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
Part 1. Conflict and Security
2 The Global Challenge of Weapons Proliferation
3 Nationalism
4 Human Rights
5 Peacekeeping and Peacemaking
Part 2 The Global Economy
6 Controversies in International Trade
7 International Capital Flows
8 Poverty in a Global Economy
Part 3 Development
9 Population and Migration
10 Women and Development
11 Children
12 Health
Part 4 The Environment
13 Protection of the Atmosphere
14 Cooperation and Conflict over Natural Resources
15 Environmental Protection and the Earth Summit: Paving the Path to Sustainable Development
Part 5 Conclusion
16 Future Prospects
Bibliography
The Contributors
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

Introducing GLOBAL ISSUES

Introducing GLOBAL ISSUES edited by

Michael T. Snarr D. Neil Snarr

LYN N E RIENNER I'UIU [SMI RS n o u i i) I i; I O N [1 O N

Published in the United States of America in 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, C o l o r a d o 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of C o n g r e s s Cataloging-in-Publication Data Introducing global issues / edited by Michael T. Snarr and D. Neil Snarr. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-587-4 (hardcover : alk. paper). — ISBN 1-55587-595-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. World p o l i t i c s — 1 9 8 9 2. International e c o n o m i c relations. 3. Social h i s t o r y — 1 9 7 0 4. Ecology. I. Snarr, Michael T. II. Snarr, Neil, 1 9 3 3 - . D860.I62 1998 909.82—dc21 98-15207 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of A m e r i c a

„ ^ i j

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z 3 9 . 4 8 - 1 9 8 4 . Printed on recycled paper. 5 4 3 2 1

For our wives, Melissa and Ruth, whose patience and support deserve more credit than can be acknowledged

Contents

Acknowledgments 1

ix

Introduction Michael T. Snarr

1

•

PART 1

2

The Global Challenge of Weapons Proliferation Jeffrey S. Lantis

11

Nationalism John K. Cox

29

Human Rights D. Neil Snarr

45

Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Carolyn M. Stephenson

61

3 4 5

CONFLICT AND SECURITY

•

PART 2

6

Controversies in International Trade Bruce E. Moon

81

International Capital Flows Gerald W. Sazama

99

7 8

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Poverty in a Global Economy Don Reeves

•

PART 3

9

Population and Migration Ellen Percy Kraly

117

DEVELOPMENT 137

Vll

viii

Contents

10

Women and Development Elise Boulding

157

Children George Kent

173

Health Marjorie

187

11 12

• 13 14 15

• 16

PART 4

E. Nelson THE ENVIRONMENT

Protection of the Atmosphere Mark Seis

209

Cooperation and Conflict over Natural Resources Karrin Scapple

225

Environmental Protection and the Earth Summit: Paving the Path to Sustainable Development Stephen Collett

241

PART 5

CONCLUSION

Future Prospects Michael T. Snarr

Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

261 269 279 283 293

Acknowledgments

We would like to express our appreciation to those who made this book possible. Jeffrey Lantis, John McLaughlin, Stephen Poe, Gerald Sazama, Amanda Dobbs, Michael Ebbert, Kimberly Hawk, Alison Johnson, Sekou Ade Mark, Christina Ralbovsky, and Kim Pavlina assisted us by reading and commenting on parts of the manuscript. Special thanks go to Margaret Degenhardt and Rena Hutton, who proofread several chapters. We are indebted to Connie Crecion for providing outstanding secretarial help and to Divya Thadani for technical assistance. We would like to thank Lynne Rienner for her support of this project and Sally Glover who promptly answered the multitude of questions we asked. Of course, we also owe a great deal of thanks to the contributors to this book, who were patient with what must have seemed like a neverending stream of requests. We are also grateful to our institutions for support. Special thanks go to Wheeling Jesuit University, which provided release time through its Scholar-in-Residence program, and to the Social Science Department at Wheeling Jesuit, which offered unwavering support. Most important, we would like to thank our families for bearing with us throughout this demanding process. Both our wives read significant portions of the manuscripts and gave valuable comments. The book would not have been possible without them. Michael T. Snarr D. Neil Snarr

IX

1 Introduction Michael T. Snarr

•

• • • •

• • • • • • •

Approximately 230,000 people are added to the world's population every day; that is the equivalent of 84 million people per year (Crossette 1996b). People in more than 130 countries have access to Cable News Network (CNN) (Barber 1996). In one region of Australia, a majority of the people over sixty-five years of age have skin cancer (Gore 1992). The number of individuals suffering from lack of food has declined over the past two decades (FAO 1996). Each year nearly 80,000 square miles of forest are depleted (with only a fraction of it being reforested). This is equal to the total territory of Maine, Massachusetts, and Virginia (Rourke 1997). Over the past two decades, the lives of 3 million children per year have been saved by immunization programs (UNDP 1996). More civilians have died this century as a result of war than in the four previous centuries combined. McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken served more customers than any other restaurants in Japan in 1992 (Barber 1996). Tens of thousands of species are becoming extinct every year, and the rate is increasing. More than 1 billion people live in absolute poverty (UNDP 1996). Global military expenditures have decreased over the past decade (UNDP 1994). At the end of the century, 90 percent of the market for CocaCola will be outside the United States (Hauchler and Kennedy 1994). 1

Introduction

2

• •

Nearly 20 million people are HIV-infected ( U N D P 1996). Smallpox has been wiped out.

Each of the items above is related to a global issue discussed in this book. But what is a global issue? The term is used in the book to refer to t w o types of p h e n o m e n a . First, there are those issues that cross political boundaries (country borders) and therefore affect individuals in more than one country. A clear example is air pollution produced by a factory in the United States and blown into Canada. Second, there are problems and issues that do not necessarily cross borders but affect a large number of individuals throughout the world. Ethnic rivalries and h u m a n rights violations, for example, may occur within a single country but have a far wider impact. Our primary goal is to introduce several of the most pressing global issues and d e m o n s t r a t e how strongly they are interconnected. We also hope to motivate the reader to learn more about global issues and in turn to be a positive force for change.

•

IS T H E W O R L D SHRINKING?

There has been a great deal of discussion in recent years about globalization, which can be d e f i n e d as "the intensification of e c o n o m i c , political, social, and cultural relations across borders" (Holm and S0rensen 1995: 1). Evidence of globalization is seen regularly in our daily lives. In the United States, grocery stores and shops at the local mall are stocked with items produced abroad. Likewise, Chicago Bulls, New York Yankees, and Dallas C o w b o y s hats and T-shirts are easily found outside of the United States. In m a n y " f o r e i g n " countries, M a d o n n a , Michael J a c k s o n , Metallica, and other U.S. music groups dominate the airways; CNN and Baywatch are on televison screens; and Arnold S c h w a r z e n e g g e r is at the m o v i e s . Are we moving toward a single global culture? In the words of Benjamin Barber, we are being influenced by "the onrush of economic and ecological forces that d e m a n d integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast f o o d — w i t h MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially h o m o g e n o u s global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communication, and c o m m e r c e " (Barber 1992: 53). Technology is perhaps the most visible aspect of globalization and in m a n y ways its driving force. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s technology has revolutionized our information systems. " C N N . . . now reaches more than 140 countries" (Iyer 1993: 86); "computer, television, cable, satellite, laser, fiberoptic, and m i c r o c h i p t e c h n o l o g i e s [are] c o m b i n i n g to create a vast interactive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and information network that can potentially

Introduction

3

give every person on earth access to every other person, and make every datum, every byte, available to every set of eyes" (Barber 1992: 58). Technology has also aided the increase in international trade and international capital f l o w s and enhanced the spread of Western, primarily U.S., culture. Of course the earth is not literally shrinking, but in light of the rate at which travel and communication speeds have increased, the world has in a sense b e c o m e smaller. T h u s , m a n y scholars assert that we are living in a qualitatively different time, in which h u m a n s are interconnected more than ever before. "There is a distinction between the contemporary experience of change and that of earlier generations: never before has change c o m e so rapidly . . . on such a global scale, and with such global visibility" ( C G G 1995: 12). This concept of globalization and a shrinking world is not without its critics. S o m e skeptics argue that while interdependence and technological advancement have increased in some parts of the world, this is not true in a vast majority of the South. (The terms the South, the developing world, the less developed countries, and the third world are used interchangeably throughout this book. They refer to the poorer countries, in contrast to the United States, C a n a d a , Western E u r o p e , Japan, Australia, and N e w Zealand, which are referred to as the North, the more developed economies, the advanced industrial economies, and the first world.) " ' G l o b a l ' is not ' u n i v e r s a l ' " (Mowlana 1995: 42). Although a small n u m ber of people in the South may have access to much of the new technology and truly live in the "global village," the large majority of the population in these countries does not. In most African countries there are fewer than four televisions for every 100 people ( U N D P 1996). There are fewer phone lines in sub-Saharan A f r i c a than there are in M a n h a t t a n (Redfern 1995), and "of the 6 0 0 million telephones in the world, 4 5 0 million of them are located in nine countries" (Toffler and Toffler 1991: 58). Even those in the South that have access to television or radio are at a disadvantage. The globalization of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in the less developed countries typically is a one-way proposition: the people do not control any of the information; they only receive it. It is also true that worldwide the ability to control or generate broadcasts rests in the hands of a tiny minority. While lack of financial resources is an important impediment to globalization, there are other obstacles. Paradoxically, B e n j a m i n Barber, w h o argues that we are experiencing global integration via " M c D o n a l d i z a t i o n , " asserts we are at the same time e x p e r i e n c i n g global disintegration. T h e breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as the great n u m b e r of other ethnic and national c o n f l i c t s (many of which are discussed in Chapter 3), are cited as evidence of forces countering globalization. M a n y subnational groups (groups within nations) desire to govern t h e m s e l v e s ; others see threats to their religious values and identity and therefore reject the secular nature of globalization. As a result, globalization

4

Introduction

h a s p r o d u c e d n o t u n i f o r m i t y , but a y e a r n i n g f o r a return t o n o n - s e c u l a r v a l u e s . T o d a y , t h e r e is a rebirth o f r e v i t a l i z e d f u n d a m e n t a l i s m in all the world's major religions, whether Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Shintoism, or C o n f u c i a n i s m . A t the s a m e t i m e the g l o b a l h o m o g e n e i t y h a s r e a c h e d the a i r w a v e s , t h e s e r e l i g i o u s t e n e t s h a v e r e e m e r g e d as d e f i n i n g i d e n t i t i e s . (Mowlana 1995)

N o n e of these criticisms mean that globalization, as we have d e f i n e d it, is not occurring to some extent; they do, however, provide an important caution against overstating or making broad generalizations about the e f fects of globalization.

•

IS GLOBALIZATION G O O D OR BAD?

There are some aspects of globalization that most will agree are good (for example, the spread of medical technology) or bad (for example, increased global trade in illegal drugs). But other aspects are more complex. The first column of Table 1.1 identifies three areas that are affected by globalization: politics, e c o n o m i c s , and culture. A key aspect of political globalization is the w e a k e n e d ability of the state to control both what crosses its borders and what goes on inside them. In other words, globalization can reduce the state's sovereignty (the state's ability to g o v e r n matters within its borders). This can be viewed as good, because u n d e m o cratic g o v e r n m e n t s are f i n d i n g it increasingly d i f f i c u l t to control the flow of information to and from prodemocracy groups. Satellite dishes and electronic mail are two examples of technology that have eroded state sovereignty. But d e c r e a s e d state sovereignty also m e a n s that the state has difficulty controlling the influx of illegal drugs, nuclear materials, unwanted immigrants, and terrorists. In the realm of economics, increased globalization has given consumers more choices. Also, multinational corporations are creating jobs in poor areas where people never before had such opportunities. Some critics reject these points, arguing that increased foreign investment and trade benefit only a

Table 1.1

Advantages a n d Disadvantages of Globalization

Realm of Globalization

Advantages

Disadvantages

Political

Weakens power of authoritarian governments Jobs, capital, more choices Offers exposure to other cultures

Unwanted external influences are difficult to control Exploitative; only benefits a few Cultural imperialism

Economic Cultural

Introduction

5

s m a l l group o f w e a l t h y individuals and that, as a result, the g a p b e t w e e n rich and p o o r g r o w s both within c o u n t r i e s and b e t w e e n c o u n t r i e s . R e l a t e d to this is the a r g u m e n t that m a n y g o o d - p a y i n g , b l u e - c o l l a r j o b s are m o v i n g f r o m the North to the p o o r c o u n t r i e s o f L a t i n A m e r i c a , A f r i c a , and A s i a . A t the cultural l e v e l , t h o s e w h o v i e w i n c r e a s e d c u l t u r a l c o n t a c t as p o s i t i v e s a y that it g i v e s p e o p l e m o r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s to l e a r n a b o u t ( a n d p u r chase goods from) other cultures. But critics o f cultural argue that the w e a l t h y c o u n t r i e s are guilty o f cultural

globalization

imperialism—that

their multibillion-dollar advertising budgets are destroying the cultures o f n o n - W e s t e r n a r e a s , as i l l u s t r a t e d b y A v o n ' s a g g r e s s i v e s a l e s s t r a t e g y in the A m a z o n region (Byrd

1994).

T h e d e g r e e to w h i c h c u l t u r a l v a l u e s c a n b e " e x p o r t e d " is the s u b j e c t o f s o m e d e b a t e . S a m u e l H u n t i n g t o n a r g u e s that " d r i n k i n g C o c a - C o l a d o e s not m a k e R u s s i a n s think like A m e r i c a n s any m o r e than eating sushi

makes

A m e r i c a n s think like J a p a n e s e . T h r o u g h o u t human history, fads and material g o o d s h a v e s p r e a d f r o m o n e s o c i e t y to a n o t h e r w i t h o u t s i g n i f i c a n t l y altering the b a s i c culture o f the r e c i p i e n t

society" (Huntington

1996:

2 8 - 2 9 ) . S i m i l a r l y , o t h e r s a r g u e that g l o b a l i z a t i o n b r i n g s o n l y s u p e r f i c i a l c h a n g e . " M c D o n a l d ' s m a y b e in n e a r l y e v e r y c o u n t r y , but in J a p a n , s u s h i is s e r v e d a l o n g s i d e h a m b u r g e r s . In m a n y c o u n t r i e s , h a m b u r g e r s a r e n o t e v e n on the m e n u " ( M o w l a n a 1 9 9 5 : 4 6 ) . It is l e f t to the r e a d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r g l o b a l i z a t i o n is h a v i n g a p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e e f f e c t on t h e i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d in t h i s b o o k . I s g l o b a l i z a t i o n e n h a n c i n g o u r c a p a b i l i t y t o d e a l w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e ? O r is it m a k i n g it m o r e d i f f i c u l t ? It is l e f t to t h e r e a d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r g l o b a l i z a t i o n is h a v i n g a p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e e f f e c t o n t h e i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d in this b o o k . Is g l o b a l i z a t i o n e n h a n c i n g o u r c a p a b i l i t y to d e a l with a p a r t i c u lar i s s u e ? O r is it m a k i n g it m o r e d i f f i c u l t ? O f c o u r s e , e a c h i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s p e c t i v e w i l l be i n f l u e n c e d b y w h e t h e r he o r s h e e v a l u a t e s t h e s e i s s u e s based on self-interest, national interest, religious v i e w s , or f r o m a g l o b a l humanitarian viewpoint.

•

INTERCONNECTEDNESS A M O N G ISSUES

A s m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , a p r i m a r y p u r p o s e o f t h i s b o o k is to e x p l o r e h o w t h e i s s u e s i n t r o d u c e d in t h e v a r i o u s c h a p t e r s are i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . T a b l e 1 . 2 is d e s i g n e d to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s n o t i o n o f l i n k e d i s s u e s . E a c h c e l l in t h e t a b l e r e p r e s e n t s t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f an i s s u e in t h e f i r s t c o l u m n w i t h an i s s u e in the top r o w . F o r e x a m p l e , C e l l 2 ( C 2 ) s h o u l d b e r e a d as f o l l o w s : c o n f l i c t ( s e e the l e f t c o l u m n ) c a n l e a d to n e g a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y ( s e e t h e t o p r o w ) as a r e s u l t o f w a r d i s r u p t i n g t h e f r e e f l o w o f g o o d s b e t w e e n t w o c o u n t r i e s o r w i t h i n an e n t i r e r e g i o n .

6

Introduction

Of course, when two global issues interact, the result is not necessarily negative. Cell 8 (C8) shows that an increase in a country's gross national product (GNP, or total of goods and services produced by a country's citizens in a given year) can mean a decline in its poverty rate. But also note that a possible linkage will not always occur: as Chapter 8 points out, an increase in GNP does not always lead to a decline in poverty. Table 1.2 does not cover all possible linkages but points out a few basic ones. Also, the table understates the multiple nature of the linkages. For instance, the fall in poverty rates suggested in C8 would affect the environment, which in turn would affect international economic issues like trade, which in turn would affect poverty, and so on. Thus, each variable in Table 1.2 not only has multiple consequences, but also creates a ripple effect.

Table 1.2 C o n n e c t i o n s Between Global Issues

Conflict CI Conflict

International Economics

Poverty

Population/ Migration

X

C6 trade disputes —> trade wars

International Economics C2 war —» disruption of trade patterns

CI X

Poverty

Environment

C3 war —• destruction of food crops

C4 conflict —» emigration

C5 nuclear war —> environmental damage

C8 increase in G N P —> decrease in poverty

C9 decrease in jobs —» emigration

CIO increase in GNP -» increased pollution

CI 3

C14 decrease in poverty - » less emigration

C15 poverty —» environmental destruction

C19

C20 increase in population —» strain on natural resources

Cll increase in poverty conflict

C12 poverty increases - » more foreign investment sought

C16 illegal immigrants - » domestic conflict

C17 migrant labor —» increase in low-wage jobs

C18 population increase —» increase in number of poor

C22 abundant natural resources —» wealth via exports

C23 unsustainable use of environment —• poverty

C21 scarce resources —» Environment conflict

Population/ Migration

X

X

C24 unsustainable development —• emigration

C25 X

Introduction

•

1

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

This book has been organized into four parts. The first, which focuses on conflict and security issues, considers some of the primary sources of conflict and some of the m a n y a p p r o a c h e s to establishing and m a i n t a i n i n g peace. Part 2 concentrates on e c o n o m i c issues ranging f r o m international trade and investment to one of the m a j o r concerns that confronts the global e c o n o m y — p o v e r t y . Part 3 deals with issues that, although not confined to, tend to plague the poorer countries. And Part 4 focuses on environmental issues and cooperative attempts to solve them. A concluding chapter discusses possible f u t u r e world orders, sources of hope and challenges that face us in the coming century, and things individuals can do to have a positive impact on global problems.

•

QUESTIONS

1.

What examples of globalization can you identify in your life?

2.

Do you think globalization will continue to increase? If so, in what areas?

3.

Do you think globalization has more positive attributes or more negative attributes?

4.

Can you think of additional examples that could be included in Table 1.2?

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

Barber, Benjamin R. (1996) Jihad vs. McWorld. N e w York: Ballantine Books. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (1995) 51, no. 4 (July-August). Hauchler, Ingomar, and Paul M. Kennedy, eds. ( 1 9 9 4 ) Global Trends: The World Almanac of Development and Peace. New York: Continuum. http :H www.monde-diplomatique .fri md! dossier stft! Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6. Iyer, Pico (1993) "The Global Village Finally Arrives," Time 21, no. 142 (special issue). King, Alexander, and Bertrand Schneider (1991) The First Global Revolution. N e w York: Pantheon Books. New Perspectives Quarterly (1995) 12, no. 4. United Nations Development Programme ( 1 9 9 6 ) Human Development Report. N e w York: Oxford University Press.

Parti Conflict and Security

2 The Global Challenge of Weapons Proliferation Jeffrey S. Lantis The proliferation of weapons is one of the most serious challenges to international security today. Arms races, regional competition, and the spread of weapons technology to other countries are all important dimensions of the proliferation challenge that could contribute to long-term global instability. Proliferation is best understood as the rapid increase in the n u m b e r and destructive capability of armaments. Evidence of the impact of proliferation on world a f f a i r s can be seen in the arms race b e t w e e n G e r m a n y and Great Britain that helped to spark World War I; the nuclear arms race between the s u p e r p o w e r s , the United States and the Soviet Union, that brought us to the brink of a World War III; and the c l a n d e s t i n e a r m s buildup in Iraq that helped it fight the Gulf War. It is important to remember, however, that proliferation is not simply a problem for politicians and military leaders. W h e n governments choose to use weapons in conflict in the twentieth century, they are exposing both soldiers and civilians to danger. In fact, the proliferation of w e a p o n s has contributed to higher civilian casualties and greater destruction this century than in the previous four centuries combined (Small and Singer 1982). When governments devote f u n d s to build up large armies and weapons of m a s s destruction, they are also c h o o s i n g to divert f u n d s f r o m other programs like education and health care. Clearly, citizens of the world experience these direct and indirect effects of proliferation every day.

•

TYPES OF PROLIFERATION

This chapter examines four different types of weapons proliferation. As illustrated in Table 2.1, there are two broad categories to consider: vertical

11

12

Conflict and

Table 2.1

Security

T h e Proliferation Matrix Vertical Proliferation

Horizontal Proliferation

Conventional Weapons

Type I

Type II

W e a p o n s of Mass Destruction

Type III

Type IV

versus horizontal proliferation; and conventional weapons versus weapons of mass destruction. Vertical proliferation is the buildup of armaments in one country. Horizontal proliferation is defined as the spread of weapons or weapons technology across country borders. Conventional weapons are those systems that make up the vast majority of all military arsenals—including most guns, tanks, planes, and ships. Weapons of mass destruction are those "special" weapons that have a devastating effect even when used in small numbers and kill more indiscriminantly than conventional weapons; they include nuclear, chemical, and biological systems. •

Type I: Vertical Proliferation of Conventional Weapons

The buildup of conventional weapons arsenals in many countries is the oldest form of proliferation in human civilization and represents the foundation of the proliferation threat. At first glance, one might view this category of proliferation as the least threatening or most benign of all forms. Vertical conventional proliferation, however, can be a threat to international stability for at least two major reasons. First, arms buildups provide more weaponry for governments and groups to engage in more conflicts. At the same time, conventional weapons have become more sophisticated—from breech-loading rifles to precision-guided munitions—and more destructive—from mortar shells to multiple-launch rocket systems. Vertical conventional proliferation in an unregulated world market may provide determined leaders with enough incentive to order aggressive action and to actually spark conflicts. A second important danger of conventional arms buildups in one country is the social cost, which often includes serious reductions in social welfare spending by governments for citizens who can ill afford such deprivations. More weapons means more violence. Government programs to build up conventional armaments ensure that there are more weapons available for countries to engage in more conflict. Some experts believe that the simple availability of weapons systems and the development of military strategy increases the chances that a country will engage in conflict. They have argued that advances in conventional weaponry and offensive military strategies were contributing factors to the outbreaks of numerous conflicts,

Weapons Proliferation

13

i n c l u d i n g b o t h w o r l d w a r s and the V i e t n a m War. In this c o n t e x t , a r m s b u i l d u p s are seen as o n e potential c a u s e of w a r in the international s y s t e m ( S a g a n 1986; Sivard 1991). In t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m s , c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m s b u i l d u p s f o c u s on w e a p o n s s y s t e m s that are c o n s i d e r e d to be m o s t e f f e c t i v e for the times. In the period l e a d i n g up to World W a r I, G e r m a n y and G r e a t Britain e n g a g e d in a r a c e to b u i l d the m o s t p o w e r f u l and a w e s o m e w a r s h i p s . In the p e r i o d l e a d i n g u p to W o r l d W a r II, A d o l f H i t l e r o r d e r e d r e s e a r c h a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of r u d i m e n t a r y s u r f a c e - t o - s u r f a c e m i s s i l e s a n d j e t a i r c r a f t as a w a y to g a i n military a d v a n t a g e . D u r i n g the C o l d War, P r e s i d e n t R o n a l d R e a g a n called f o r the c r e a t i o n of a 6 0 0 - s h i p U.S. naval f l e e t , with an e m p h a s i s on s t r o n g a i r c r a f t carrier battle g r o u p s and a d v a n c e d s u b m a r i n e s . M o r e recently, att e n t i o n h a s t u r n e d to the latest t e c h n o l o g y of w a r f a r e , i n c l u d i n g stealth planes and ships, remote-controlled surveillance aircraft, antisatellite w e a p o n s , and c o m p u t e r t e c h n o l o g y that w o u l d g i v e m o b i l i t y and a d v a n tage to the f i g h t i n g f o r c e s of the t w e n t y - f i r s t century. T h e relationship between arms buildups and the likelihood of conflict is multiplied by the fact that conventional weapons have b e c o m e more sophisticated and destructive over the years. " S m a r t " conventional b o m b s and precision-guided munitions have improved both accuracy and the capability to do the kind of d a m a g e intended by the attacker. T h e increase in destructive capacity of conventional w e a p o n s such as fuel-air explosives and the faster and more accurate M 1 A 1 tank also poses a greater threat to soldiers and civilians. Finally, it is important to r e m e m b e r that c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m s h a v e b e e n u s e d r e p e a t e d l y in c o n f l i c t o v e r the past f i f t y y e a r s . F r o m l a n d m i n e s to f i g h t e r j e t s , c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s h a v e been b l a m e d f o r r o u g h l y 5 0 m i l lion d e a t h s around the g l o b e since 1945. I n d i v i d u a l s , g r o u p s , and g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e all built and used c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s to a c h i e v e their goals. The social costs of arms buildups. In the late t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , m a n y g o v e r n m e n t s have built sizable c o n v e n t i o n a l arsenals. T h e a v e r a g e level of U.S. g o v e r n m e n t d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s has t o p p e d $ 2 5 0 billion a n n u a l l y in the p a s t t w o d e c a d e s , with the m a j o r i t y of t h e s e f u n d s g o i n g to s u p p o r t high levels of c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n r y and t r o o p s . In 1994, the C l i n t o n adm i n i s t r a t i o n sought a total d e f e n s e b u d g e t r e q u e s t of $ 2 6 3 . 7 billion, w h i c h s u p p o r t e d an a c t i v e - d u t y m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of 1 , 5 2 5 , 7 0 0 s o l d i e r s a n d a f o r c e s t r u c t u r e c o m p o s e d of ten a r m y d i v i s i o n s , t w e l v e n a v y a i r c r a f t carrier task g r o u p s , and t h i r t e e n air f o r c e c o m b a t w i n g s ( A s p i n 1994). A n other w a y to interpret d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g in 1994 is to say that the U.S. gove r n m e n t s p e n t a b o u t $ 1 , 0 0 0 on d e f e n s e f o r e v e r y c i t i z e n . O r in r e l a t i v e terms, U.S. d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s in 1994 were m o r e than f o u r times that of its n e a r e s t potential c o m p e t i t o r , R u s s i a ( U S G 1995). F i g u r e 2.1 illustrates the b r o a d e r context of c h a n g i n g levels of global d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s .

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Figure 2.1

and

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Global Defense Expeditures, 1 9 8 7 - 2 0 0 0

Source: John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage (Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing G r o u p / B r o w n and Benchmark Publishers, 1995), p. 270. Note: Expenditures are calculated in billions of 1991 U.S. dollars. Dollar amounts for all years are not shown.

While Figure 2.1 s h o w s a decline in global d e f e n s e spending, it is clear that countries continue to spend hundreds of billions of dollars every year on the military. This has led m a n y critics to charge that there are dangerous social costs in the trade-off between "guns and butter," and the end of the Cold War has drawn new attention to this difficult balance between military and social spending. In the 1990s, the United States is first in the world in terms of military spending but ranks relatively low against other countries on various social indicators. International relations experts Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf (1997) point out that the United States is only fourth in the world in terms of literacy rates, ninth in per capita public expenditures for education, thirteenth in average scores of students on science and math tests, twenty-first in infant mortality, and t w e n t y - f i f t h in percentage of population with access to sanitation. A related study found that when military expenditures rose in d e v e l o p i n g countries during the past f e w decades, the rate of economic growth declined and government debt increased (Nincic 1982). Kegley and Wittkopf conclude that it is a sad truth that many countries have become more concerned with defending their citizens f r o m foreign

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attack in the twentieth century than they are with protecting them f r o m social, educational, and health insecurities at h o m e . s?. Type II: H o r i z o n t a l Proliferation of C o n v e n t i o n a l W e a p o n s A second category of proliferation is the horizontal spread of conventional weapons and related technology across country borders. T h e main route of the spread of conventional weaponry is through legitimate arms sales. But the conventional arms trade has become quite lucrative and many experts are concerned that the imperative of the bottom dollar is driving us more rapidly toward global instability. Arms dealers. T h e conventional arms trade has b e c o m e a very big business, and the great p o w e r s — t h e United States, France, Russia, Great Britain, and C h i n a — a r e m a j o r dealers of conventional arms. In 1987, the Soviet Union was at the top of the arms trade, dominating the market with 46 percent of all sales. But as Soviet and (later) Russian sales levels plummeted, the United States quickly emerged as the new leader. In 1994, the Congressional Research Service reported that the United States had captured true d o m i n a n c e in the global arms m a r k e t with 47 percent of all sales. Seven years after the end of the Cold War, it was the United States government and d e f e n s e industries that were marketing advanced conventional w e a p o n s around the world. In the wake of the successful d e m o n stration of the effectiveness of U.S. w e a p o n s through the Gulf War, military contractors m a d e large shipments of F-15 f i g h t e r aircraft to Saudi Arabia, sold hundreds of M I A 1 tanks to Kuwait, and finalized many other similar deals. In the 1990s, conventional a r m s sales have earned U.S.based defense contractors about $8 billion annually, and in 1995 U.S. companies actually produced more fighter jets for export than for purchase by the U.S. military (Boston Globe 1996). Arms customers. The sales figures for the top arms merchants are significant in themselves, but it is also important to identify key customers. G e n erally speaking, U.S. d e f e n s e contractors have sold a great deal of hardware to allies. U.S. arms deliveries to Israel f r o m 1984 to 1993 were an estimated $9.5 billion, which included 4 5 0 armored combat vehicles, fifty used F-16s, and twenty-five new F-15s. In southern Europe, G r e e c e purchased $4 billion worth of U.S. arms from 1991 to 1994. In Asia, allies, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, have purchased large numbers of U.S. conventional weapons systems (Hartung 1995). A r m s sales are not always made to countries considered traditional allies. however. From 1984 to 1989, the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a purchased some $ 4 2 4 million in U.S. w e a p o n s , and these a r m s deals were stopped only after the T i a n a n m e n Square m a s s a c r e of p r o d e m o c r a c y

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activists in the s u m m e r of 1989. Through legitimate means, Iraqi president S a d d a m Hussein purchased a massive conventional arsenal on the international a r m s m a r k e t . In 1990, estimates of the arsenal included a total of 5,500 tanks, 4,000 heavy artillery, 7,500 armored personnel carriers, and 700 planes. Arms sales to Iraq by friends and allies came back to haunt the United States, however, in the Gulf War, and the sale of c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s raises real c o n c e r n about the potential f o r " d e a d l y r e t u r n s " on U.S. investments (Laurance 1992). 9

Type III: Vertical Proliferation of W e a p o n s of Mass D e s t r u c t i o n

T h e vertical proliferation of w e a p o n s of m a s s destruction ( W M D ) is another serious threat to international security. T h e r e are several important d i m e n s i o n s of this p r o b l e m , including the range and variety of m o d e r n W M D systems, incentives for states to build nuclear weapons, and the patterns of vertical W M D proliferation. Types of weapons of mass destruction. There are three d i f f e r e n t types of w e a p o n s of mass destruction in existence today: nuclear, biological, and chemical. These are often examined as a group, but it is important to note that their effects and their potential military applications are quite different. Nuclear fission was discovered in 1938, and scientists like Albert Einstein soon called on governments to sponsor an exploration of its potential. A t o m i c weapons were first developed by the U.S. government through the five-year, $2 billion secret research program during World War II k n o w n as the Manhattan Project. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a 12.5-kiloton atomic b o m b on Hiroshima, Japan. This weapon produced an e x p l o s i v e blast equal to that of 12,500 tons of conventional high e x p l o sives (like T N T ) and caused high-pressure waves, flying debris, e x t r e m e heat, and radioactive fallout. A second b o m b was dropped on Nagasaki on A u g u s t 9, 1945, and the J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t surrendered one day later (Schlesinger 1993). The use of atomic bombs to end World War II in 1945 was actually the beginning of a very dangerous period of spiraling arms races between the United States and the Soviet Union. T h e Soviet regime immediately stepped u p its atomic research and d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m . In 1949, they detonated their first atomic test device and joined the nuclear club. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union had a c c u m u l a t e d an estimated 2 7 , 0 0 0 nuclear w e a p o n s in its stockpile. Both superpowers also put an emphasis on diversification of their w e a p o n s systems. T h e s y m b o l i c c e n t e r p i e c e of each s i d e ' s nuclear arsenals was their land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which as their name implies can be launched f r o m one

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continent to another. But each side had also deployed nuclear weapons on s u b m a r i n e s ; in long-range b o m b e r s ; as w a r h e a d s on short-range, battlefield missile systems; and even in artillery shells and landmines. Chemical weapons and biological weapons. C h e m i c a l weapons, another class of weapons of mass destruction, work by spreading poisons that can incapacitate, injure, or kill through their toxic effects on the body. These clearly antipersonnel weapons can be lethal when vaporized and inhaled in very small a m o u n t s or when absorbed into the bloodstream through skin contact. E x a m p l e s of chemical w e a p o n s range f r o m tear gas used by riot police to disperse crowds to nerve agents such as Sarin (recently used by a radical religious cult in Japan to terrorize civilians in Tokyo). M a n y g o v e r n m e n t s and i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u p s have f u n d e d c h e m i c a l weapons research and d e v e l o p m e n t programs in the twentieth century. In fact, chemical w e a p o n s are relatively simple and c h e a p to produce c o m pared with other classes of W M D s . Any group with access to basic chemical manufacturing plants or petrochemical facilities can develop variants of c o m m o n l y used, safe c h e m i c a l s to create d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n s of mass destruction. T h e first recorded use of c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s in w a r f a r e occurred in the fifth century B.C.E. w h e n A t h e n i a n soldiers poisoned their e n e m y ' s water supply with a chemical to m a k e them sick. The last known wide-scale use occurred during the Iran-Iraq War ( 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 8 ) , where an estimated 13,000 soldiers were killed by chemical w e a p o n s ( M c N a u g h e r 1990). As dangerous as chemical agents can be, biological agents are actually much more lethal and destructive. Biological agents are basically diseasecausing microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, or fungi that can be deployed to cause massive infections that incapacitate or kill the intended target a f t e r an incubation period. A m o r e lethal derivative of biological w e a p o n s — t o x i n s — c a n cause incapacitation or death within m i n u t e s or hours. Examples include anthrax, a disease-causing bacteria that contains as many as 10 million lethal doses per gram. Like chemical agents, biological and toxic weapons are relatively easy to construct and have a high potential lethality rate. Any g o v e r n m e n t or group with access to basic pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities or biological research facilities can d e v e l o p biological w e a p o n s . A n d , like the other classes of W M D systems, information about the construction of such systems is available in the open scientific literature and on the Internet. Why build WMD systems? T h e r e are two basic reasons why countries build w e a p o n s of mass destruction: security and prestige. First, m a n y government leaders genuinely believe that their state security is at risk without such systems. The standoff between India and Pakistan is an example. After years of rivalry and border skirmishes between the countries, India

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began a secret program to construct an atomic device that might swing the balance of regional power in their favor. In 1974, the Indian government detonated what it termed a "peaceful nuclear explosion"—signaling their capabilities to the world and threatening Pakistani security. For the next twentyfive years, both Pakistan and India secretly developed nuclear weapons in a regional arms race. In May 1998, the Indian government detonated five more underground nuclear explosions and the Pakistani government responded to the perceived threat with six nuclear explosions of its own. At this writing, the two governments have acknowledged their nuclear capabilities and have warned that they may place nuclear warheads on missiles targeted against one another. Another example comes from the Middle East, where Israel is suspected of having developed dozens of nuclear devices for potential use in their own defense. There are now reports that the Israeli government threatened to use these systems against Iraq during the Gulf War if Israel came under chemical or biological weapons attack (Schlesinger 1993). Second, some governments have undertaken W M D research and development programs for reasons of prestige, national pride, or influence. It b e c a m e clear to some during the Cold War that the possession of W M D systems lent a certain level o f prestige, power, and even influence to state affairs. At a minimum, the possession o f W M D s y s t e m s — o r a spirited drive to attain them—would gain attention for a country or leader. North Korea's drive to build a nuclear device based on an advanced uranium enrichment process drew the attention of the United States and other Western powers in the early 1990s. After extensive negotiations, North Korea was offered new nuclear energy reactors in exchange for a promise not to divert nuclear material for a bomb program. Other government leaders pursue the development of W M D arsenals because they believe that it will help them gain political dominance in their region of the world. To illustrate this dynamic, Gerald Steinberg ( 1 9 9 4 ) , an expert on proliferation, relates the story o f clandestine Iraqi government efforts to develop a W M D arsenal. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ordered the creation of a secret W M D research and development program and began to acquire nuclear technology and materials from France, Germany, the United States, and other countries in the late 1970s. While research scientists in the program worked on uranium enrichment, Saddam Hussein worked to improve his political profile in the region and to improve relations with key Arab states. Meanwhile, the Israeli government tried to stop the clandestine nuclear program by carrying out a devastating air strike against Iraq's nuclear research reactor at Osiraq in 1981. But the determined Iraqi drive for regional influence was really only stopped by the efforts of the U.S.-led international coalition in the Gulf War and the dispatch of a United Nations (UN) special commission to investigate and dismantle the Iraqi W M D development program. Broadly speaking, Iraqi proliferation efforts were part of a larger scheme to gain prestige, power, and influence in the Middle East.

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Type IV: Horizontal Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The horizontal proliferation of W M D systems represents the final dimension of this challenge to international peace and stability. In fact, the spread of these weapons and vital technology across state borders is often viewed as the most serious of all proliferation threats. Nuclear arsenals. The massive buildup of nuclear arsenals by the superpowers was not the only game in town during the Cold War. In fact, while the Soviet Union and United States were stockpiling their weapons, several other states were working to join the nuclear club through both open and clandestine routes. Today the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China all openly acknowledge possessing stocks of nuclear weapons. At the height of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union supported key allies by secretly authorizing the transfer of sensitive nuclear weapons technology to other research and development programs. In 1952, Great Britain successfully tested an atomic device and eventually built a nuclear arsenal that today numbers about 2 0 0 weapons. France officially joined the nuclear club in 1960 and built a somewhat larger nuclear arsenal of an estimated 4 2 0 weapons. The People's Republic of China detonated its first atomic device in 1964 and built an arsenal of about 3 0 0 nuclear weapons during the Cold War (McGwire 1994). The controlled spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology from the superpowers to key allies was not the only route by which countries might obtain valuable information and materials. Several less developed countries began secret atomic weapons research and development projects after World War II. As noted earlier, states like India, Pakistan, and Israel have pursued clandestine W M D programs because of concerns about security and prestige. In some cases, these efforts were facilitated by covert shipments of material and technology from the great powers, but research and development of W M D systems was also aided by the availability of information in the open scientific literature (and by the resourcefulness of scientists and engineers). When the Indian government detonated its first nuclear explosion in 1974, it symbolically ended the monopoly on nuclear systems held by the great powers. India actually obtained nuclear material for their bomb by diverting it from a Canadian-supplied nuclear energy reactor that had key components originally made in the United States. Most experts believe that India now possesses a significant stockpile of about fifty unassembled nuclear weapons. The 1974 Indian detonation was, of course, a catalyst for the Pakistani government to step up its research and development program, and today most experts believe that Pakistan has an arsenal of dozens of weapons that could be quickly assembled for use. The test explosions sponsored by both governments in 1998 were further evidence of their capabilities.

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Finally, Israel may possess as m a n y as 100 nuclear w e a p o n s . T h e Israeli nuclear program was a derivative of research and d e v e l o p m e n t projects in the United States and, ironically, the Soviet Union. Like India, the Israeli g o v e r n m e n t proved to be quite resourceful in adapting existing technologies to construct their arsenal (Forsberg, Driscoll, Webb, and Dean 1995). Finally, there are f o r m e r nuclear states that have m a d e political decisions to dismantle their weapons. Included in this g r o u p are South A f r i c a and three f o r m e r Soviet republics: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. T h e South A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t recently admitted that it had c o n s t r u c t e d several nuclear devices for self-defense in the 1960s. But the g o v e r n m e n t decided to destroy these w e a p o n s at the end of the 1980s—unilaterally rem o v i n g t h e m s e l v e s f r o m the nuclear club. T h e three f o r m e r Soviet republics each had strategic nuclear w e a p o n s stationed on their territory after the b r e a k u p of the Soviet Union. S o o n a f t e r g a i n i n g their independ e n c e , h o w e v e r , the three r e p u b l i c s a g r e e d to b e c o m e n o n n u c l e a r w e a p o n s states under the Treaty on the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n of N u c l e a r Weapons (or N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty, N P T ) . In 1992, they signed on to the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic A r m s R e d u c t i o n Treaty (START), agreeing to transfer all the nuclear warheads on their territory to Russia in e x c h a n g e f o r e c o n o m i c assistance f r o m the U n i t e d States ( M c G w i r e 1994). The spread of chemical and biological weapons. Over 100 countries have the basic capability to develop chemical or biological weapons, and at least twenty countries have already done so. Figure 2.2 illustrates the range of actors involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. WMD terrorism. The horizontal proliferation of W M D systems raises another concern about international security in the late twentieth century: the possibility that nuclear, chemical, or biological w e a p o n s s y s t e m s may be used in terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, this fear was realized in 1995 when a Japanese religious cult released Sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway system, killing ten civilians and injuring more than 5,000. This attack confirmed the growing concerns about the monitoring and control of terrorist groups and their weapons capabilities. Many experts believe that the horizontal spread of nuclear w e a p o n s , material, and k n o w - h o w has dramatically increased the likelihood that a group or state will attempt an act of nuclear terrorism in the future. This is of particular concern given the chaos and instability surrounding the nuclear arsenal of the f o r m e r Soviet Union, and there have b e e n n u m e r o u s reports in the past f e w years of attempts to buy or steal nuclear warheads in that region. In a 1994 f e a t u r e story in the Atlantic Monthly, Seymour Hersh reports that in January 1991, armed Azeri rebels in A z e r b a i j a n penetrated a Soviet base on which tactical nuclear w e a p o n s were stored and gained physical access to a nuclear warhead for a short period before being

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Figure 2.2

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Countries Suspected of Having Programs to Develop Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source: Randall Forsberg, William Driscoll, Gregory Webb, and Jonathan Dean, eds., The Nonproliferation Primer: Preventing the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: Institute for D e f e n s e and D i s a r m a m e n t Studies, 1995). Used by permission of the editors. Notes: Iraqi programs reversed by UN. China is an acknowledged nuclear weapon state.

ejected by Soviet troops. Later that year, a nuclear expert f r o m Greenpeace actually arranged a secret deal to p u r c h a s e a Soviet nuclear warhead f o r $250,000 from a group of disgruntled Russian soldiers. The emergence of fifteen newly independent states in the region with very porous borders also increases the likelihood that nuclear materials and k n o w - h o w will be smuggled out of the country. In Germany, for example, more than 100 arrests have been made in connection with attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. In October 1992, two containers of radioactive material were discovered by the police in Frankfurt containing amounts of cesium and strontium misappropriated from scientific or medical establishments in the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, nuclear scientists in the former Soviet republics (who currently earn an average monthly salary of $30 in defunct research facilities) are being lured to less developed states like Iran to work in budding nuclear research programs by the promise of high wages and social status. All these factors suggest that the threat of nuclear terrorism has indeed increased in the post-Cold War era (Forsberg, Driscoll, Webb, and Dean 1995).

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GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: N O N P R O L I F E R A T I O N INITIATIVES

Proliferation is a very complex and multilayered challenge to international security. M a n y world leaders and experts have recognized this threat and have begun to address the proliferation challenge through a series of regional and global nonproliferation initiatives. The scope, number, and m o m e n t u m of these initiatives have steadily increased over the past f e w decades. •

Global R e s p o n s e s — t h e N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n Regime

In some ways, the global nuclear nonproliferation m o v e m e n t began even before the first use of atomic weapons in 1945. Politicians, military leaders, and scientists involved in the Manhattan Project recognized from the outset that such w e a p o n s were s o m e h o w special and more dangerous than other systems. President T r u m a n , w h o had ordered the use of atomic b o m b s over H i r o s h i m a and N a g a s a k i , authorized his a m b a s s a d o r to the United Nations, Bernard Baruch, to deliver a proposal to the organization calling for all nuclear m a t e r i a l s and technology to be placed under U N oversight. W h i l e the plan did not receive widespread support, it d e m o n strated a first step t o w a r d global consideration of proliferation p r o b l e m s and set the stage for later progress on the issue. Ten years later, in 1956, m e m b e r states of the UN agreed to create the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA's primary mission was to serve as a w a t c h d o g and inspection organization to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and stop adaptation for military uses. This agency soon b e c a m e an integral part of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In the 1960s, world leaders agreed to new initiatives, including the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This agreement banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, and it was originally signed by leaders f r o m the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. In 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America created the first large nuclear-free zone. Signatories to this treaty pledged to use nuclear facilities only for p e a c e f u l purposes. Most important, the treaty outlawed the testing or acquisition of nuclear weapons in the region and even p r e c l u d e d third parties f r o m bringing w e a p o n s to the region (Davis 1991).

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T h e Nuclear N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty

T h e N P T represented one of the most significant advances in the development of the global nonproliferation regime. The N P T was an agreement to

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halt the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five declared nuclear powers. Specifically, the treaty had ambitious goals for both vertical and horizontal proliferation. Article I of the treaty dictated that no nuclear weapons state (defined by the treaty as a state that detonated a nuclear e x p l o s i v e prior to 1967) would transfer "directly or indirectly" nuclear weapons, explosive devices, or control over these weapons to another party. Article II stipulated that no n o n n u c l e a r w e a p o n s state could receive, m a n u f a c t u r e , obtain assistance f o r m a n u f a c t u r i n g , or o t h e r w i s e try to acquire nuclear weaponry. Article VI obligated all nuclear states to pursue d i s a r m a m e n t , and other sections of the treaty required all nonnuclear w e a p o n s states to accept f u l l - s c o p e nuclear s a f e g u a r d s established and m o n i t o r e d by the IAEA (Roberts 1995). T h e N P T represented the c r o w n i n g achievement of global nonproliferation e f f o r t s during the Cold War. A f t e r careful and extensive negotiations, the treaty was signed by all the acknowledged nuclear states and 168 others. The N P T went into effect in 1970. In 1995, world leaders gathered at a special Review and Extension Conference to reconsider and evaluate the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the treaty. A f t e r some debate, they declared that the treaty would " c o n t i n u e in f o r c e i n d e f i n i t e l y " as a guarantor of international peace and security. Signatories also agreed to continue to pursue the ultimate goals of eliminating nuclear weapons and completing a treaty on general disarmament under strict and effective international control.

£ Related Nonproliferation Initiatives Several other significant a g r e e m e n t s have f o l l o w e d in the spirit of the NPT. T h e Biological W e a p o n s C o n v e n t i o n ( B W C ) of 1972 was the first formal effort to gain some control over the w o r l d ' s deadly biological arsenal. More than 100 signatories agreed to ban "the development, production and stockpiling of microbial or other biological agents." The convention, h o w e v e r , did not sanction nonsignatories and did not preclude research on biological weapons (Davis 1991). In the same spirit, world leaders drafted a C h e m i c a l Weapons C o n vention ( C W C ) that was opened for signature in January 1993, after years of intensive negotiations. In m a n y ways the f r a m e w o r k of the C W C was similar to the structure of the N P T and the B W C . It committed all signatories to eliminate their stockpiles of chemical weaponry and to halt all development efforts. In addition, it included a set of verification procedures somewhat more stringent than those under the NPT. These procedures supported the rights of a new C W C Inspectorate to conduct rigorous investigations and surprise " c h a l l e n g e i n s p e c t i o n s " of suspected c h e m i c a l weapons p r o g r a m s in signatory states. Ratification by the legislatures of sixty-five countries in the system was required for the C W C to come into force. A f t e r a great deal of debate about the implications of the treaty for

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U.S. national security and sovereignty, the U.S. Congress finally ratified the agreement in April 1997. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), another nonproliferation initiative, was opened for signature in 1996. A large majority of UN member states voted to support the C T B T (a treaty that would eliminate all actual nuclear testing), and world leaders began to sign the treaty in the fall of 1996. To become international law, the treaty requires the signature of all forty-four countries known to possess nuclear reactors. By early 1998, representatives of the five declared nuclear powers had all signed the CTBT, but both India and Pakistan refused to do so. India has claimed that it wants the C T B T to be stronger in order to force nuclear states' compliance with Article VI of the NPT. Meanwhile, the Pakistani government has stated that it would not sign the CTBT without Indian cooperation. Both countries' nuclear tests of May 1998 underscored their resistance to this latest initiative of the nonproliferation regime. Several other states also remain reluctant to sign the treaty, including Libya, Cuba, and Syria (Crossette 1996a).

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Controlling Weapons at the Point of Supply

There are also important concerns about the implications of the spread of W M D technology around the world. The NPT, for example, did not prevent states from exporting other types of materials that could potentially be adapted for use in the development of W M D programs. World leaders have tried to address the problem of weapons technology transfers for several decades. In 1976, major supplier states—including the Soviet Union, Japan, France, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and Canada—agreed to establish a "trigger list" of items that could be sold to other countries only under IAEA safeguards. Representatives of these states met in London, and this "London Club" established and coordinated a supply control group. In the 1980s, supplier states established the ballistic Missile Technology Control Regime ( M T C R ) , which prohibited the transfer of essential technology for this aspect of weapons programs. Like the NPT, however, supply control efforts have had only a mixed rate of success. They helped limit missile development projects under way in South America and the Middle East but allowed some twenty countries to join the ballistic missile club. These supply controls did not prevent Iraq f r o m making significant progress toward the development of nuclear weapons through the modification of civilian scientific technology that was adapted for military use. And they did not prevent Iraq from manufacturing and modifying the Scud-B missiles, which were used against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War—and which were capable of carrying chemical warheads. Meanwhile, Pakistan developed its own ballistic missile, the Hatf, and acquired about thirty nuclear-capable medium-range

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M - l l m i s s i l e s from China ( M c N a u g h e r 1 9 9 0 ) . Today the North K o r e a n g o v e r n m e n t is developing a l o n g - r a n g e T a e p o D o n g m i s s i l e that m a y someday have the potential to reach the United States.

IS The U.S. Response: Counterproliferation Strategies In the p o s t - C o l d War era, President C l i n t o n identified proliferation as a key threat to U . S . national security and argued that the government needed a c o h e r e n t policy to deal with new states that acquired nuclear, c h e m i c a l , or b i o l o g i c a l weapons. Given the dangers o f proliferation and new deterrent dynamics, President Clinton authorized a c o m p r e h e n s i v e Nuclear Posture R e v i e w in O c t o b e r 1 9 9 3 to define and adapt nuclear weapons to the changing international security e n v i r o n m e n t . E v e n b e f o r e the c o m p l e t i o n o f the review, the administration had already begun " v i g o r o u s counterproliferation and threat-reduction e f f o r t s " including ( 1 ) an improvement o f int e l l i g e n c e monitoring o f proliferation; ( 2 ) an e n h a n c e m e n t o f the United S t a t e s ' ability to destroy, seize, and disable nuclear, c h e m i c a l , or b i o l o g i cal s y s t e m s ; ( 3 ) the d e v e l o p m e n t o f b a l l i s t i c and cruise m i s s i l e d e f e n s e ; and ( 4 ) better cooperation with friendly g o v e r n m e n t s to improve e x p o r t control measures. In N o v e m b e r 1994, President Clinton took counterproliferation efforts a step further by issuing E x e c u t i v e Order No. 1 2 9 3 8 , which declared proliferation a " n a t i o n a l e m e r g e n c y . " In the f a c e o f such an e m e r g e n c y , the administration pushed for the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f arms reduction a g r e e ments like the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II, which called for a reduction o f Russian and U . S . nuclear warheads to a level o f 3 , 5 0 0 , and the Conventional F o r c e s in Europe Treaty, which would reduce military hardware levels across Europe. T h e Clinton administration also supported a bipartisan S e n a t e initiative known as the N u n n - L u g a r Plan to promote and o v e r s e e weapons dismantling programs, demilitarization, and defense diversification. Each o f these programs has contributed to a new U . S . security policy posture that recognizes the contemporary challenge o f proliferation ( R a t h j e n s 1995).

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CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE?

T h e proliferation o f weapons is truly a m a j o r challenge to global security, but there are also reasons for optimism about the prospects for solutions. One o f the most important c a t a l y s t s o f g l o b a l proliferation was the Cold W a r arms race between the superpowers. Today, many scholars and politicians are taking a new look at incentives for proliferation in the p o s t Cold War era, and some say that we may be headed toward a nuclear-free twenty-first century. Optimists argue that a global build-down in t e n s i o n s —

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a reverse p r o l i f e r a t i o n — h a s occurred with the end of Cold War tensions. They cite the completion of START I in January 1991, by which the two superpowers pledged to reduce their arsenals to between 8,000 and 9,000 w e a p o n s , as e v i d e n c e of this trend t o w a r d reverse proliferation. F u r t h e r m o m e n t u m was gained two years later when the United States and Russia agreed to sign START II, reducing nuclear arsenals to no more than 3,500 warheads each. And the Clinton administration has now begun preliminary negotiations with Russia on a START III accord that would lead to further, dramatic reductions in pursuit of a " m i n i m u m nuclear deterrent" relationship (Bundy, Crowe, and Drell 1993). Meanwhile, the indefinite extension of the N P T and the establishment of the C T B T both suggest an emerging global c o n s e n s u s to stop nuclear proliferation. On the conventional weapons front, there is growing recognition that conventional arms t r a n s f e r s — e v e n small a r m s — a l s o represent a threat to international security. U N experts and government leaders have been discussing w a y s to increase the transparency of the c o n v e n t i o n a l arms trade by making more information available on arms transfer policies and data. Efforts are under way for both general classes of w e a p o n s transfers to enforce trade regulations and closely monitor w e a p o n s transactions (Karp 1994). Solutions to the proliferation challenge must go even deeper, however. As we look toward the twenty-first century, citizens of the world must agree to build on the m o m e n t u m of recent progress by m a k i n g moral and principled stands against proliferation. For instance, Oscar Arias, the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize winner, has recently called for a global a g r e e m e n t to stop arms sales to countries that have violated human rights. This certainly would be an important step in a global effort to address ethical and moral c o n c e r n s about the d e v e l o p m e n t of certain classes of w e a p o n s such as l a n d m i n e s and c h e m i c a l and biological w e a p o n s . A m o r a l stand against proliferation in favor of economic development, health care, and education may pave the way toward real peace and justice in the twenty-first century.

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QUESTIONS

1.

In your opinion, which of the four types of proliferation represents the most serious threat to international security?

2.

Is the proliferation of conventional w e a p o n s a challenge that can ever fully be met by the global c o m m u n i t y ? Why or why not?

3.

Is it possible that w e a p o n s proliferation could actually m a k e the international system more stable in the twenty-first century? H o w might this occur?

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4.

W h a t are some of the e f f o r t s that individual countries and international organizations have m a d e to respond to the proliferation challenge? Which are most effective, and why?

5.

What are some of the implications of the trade-off between expenditures on defense and social welfare programs?

6.

Can countries afford to enjoy a "peace dividend" in the p o s t - C o l d War era by diverting large sums f r o m d e f e n s e expenditures to other needs? Can they afford not to?

7.

In your opinion, should government leaders o f f e r to pursue complete W M D disarmament? Why or why not?

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SUGGESTED READINGS

Bailey, Kathleen C. (1993) Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Karp, Aaron ( 1 9 9 4 ) "The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms," Washington Quarterly 17 (Autumn). Krause, Keith ( 1 9 9 2 ) Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moodie, Michael (1995) "Beyond Proliferation: The Challenge of Technology Diffusion," Washington Quarterly 18 (Spring). Quester, George H., and Victor A. Utgoff ( 1 9 9 4 ) "Toward an International Nuclear Security Policy," Washington Quarterly 17 (Winter). Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz (1995) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. N e w York: W.W. Norton.

3 Nationalism John K. Cox

Nationalism is a complicated and widespread p h e n o m e n o n in modern life. At its most basic level, nationalism is something felt by an individual. It is a sense of belonging. This b e l o n g i n g links the individual to a g r o u p of people on the basis of certain shared characteristics. Most important among these are a c o m m o n language, a c o m m o n history, and c o m m o n customs or cultural traditions (sometimes including religion). W h e n this individual national feeling develops into group national identity, nationalism becomes political. The term self-determination is used to describe the perceived right of every nation, or people, to rule itself. Ideally, this m e a n s that the various countries, or states, of the world would b e c o m e "nationstates" (independent countries c o m p o s e d of m e m b e r s of a single national group) if their populations have nationalist feelings. This is a very c o m plicated p r o c e d u r e , h o w e v e r , since many great e m p i r e s and countries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were, and still are, decidedly multiethnic or multinational. Thus, only a small fraction of today's countries are true nation-states.

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T H E HISTORY O F NATIONALISM

Napoleon Bonaparte, who ruled France from 1799 to 1815, is usually credited with introducing the m o d e r n concept of nationalism. It spread throughout Europe as a result of the Napoleonic Wars. This new national feeling went f a r b e y o n d s i m p l e patriotism, which is the love of o n e ' s homeland. Patriotism has been a part of human behavior since the beginning of history. Usually considered noble, it most often f o u n d expression

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in military terms. But it was a rather narrow idea compared to today's nationalism, since it was limited to the religious duty to "die a good death," was bound up with feudal localism, or was restricted to one stratum of society, usually an upper class (Teich and Porter 1993: xviii). Nationalism as we k n o w it was a product of the French Revolution. In 1789, France was seized by massive protests and revolts, while many of its intellectuals were under the influence of the Enlightenment. The ancien régime (old government and social system) of France had run the country d e e p into debt. I m p o r t a n t e c o n o m i c and d e m o g r a p h i c shifts had taken place with the growth of cities and industries and commerce. The classes that participated in such activities, such as skilled and unskilled workers, and merchants, were c l a m o r i n g for more political power. But the system was still controlled by the Bourbon family, F r a n c e ' s absolutist kings who claimed rule by divine right. T h e d i s t u r b a n c e s in France eventually brought about a democratic government. French nationalism was thus born in people's minds when their government truly became theirs for the first time. People, f o r m e r l y k n o w n as subjects, b e c a m e citizens in the new French democracy. Most scholars w h o deal with nationalism—historians, political scientists, and sociologists—believe that the growth of nationalism is a f u n d a mental aspect of m o d e r n i z a t i o n . Of course modernization involves more than self-determination; generally it involves industrialization, urbanization, increased literacy, and secularization. This was as true of European history in the nineteenth century as it is of the history of the decolonizing world—mostly Africa and Asia—in the twentieth. Therefore, the growth of nationalism involves two processes: its appearance in people's minds as a sense of loyalty and b e l o n g i n g ; and its a p p e a r a n c e as a political force, which ultimately works to create nation-states. T h e transition to an industrial society often predisposes people to bec o m e more nationalistic, since the b r e a k d o w n of traditional village and f a m i l y structures leaves e m o t i o n a l and moral gaps in individual lives. Also, the centralization of g o v e r n m e n t , which originated in the Middle A g e s in the struggle of kings against recalcitrant nobles, was to tap into nationalism as a way to m o b i l i z e the population. Napoleon was the first to m a k e use of this great p o w e r of the people by appealing to them with the symbolism and emotions of national unity and a national mission. In the nineteenth century, people began to accept nationalism only gradually. Europe continued to be the main place where nationalism grew. In the many small states that m a d e up the G e r m a n cultural realm, for instance, nationalists and a d v o c a t e s of greater d e m o c r a c y j o i n e d forces. They were at once attracted to the power of nationalism and disturbed by France's use of it against them. Philosophers, publicists, and revolutionaries portrayed drives for national unity and independence in the best possible

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light; they said, in essence, that the diversity among nations was a blessing f r o m G o d . S e p a r a t i n g people into nations was thought to be a duty that would result in the m a x i m u m use of individuals' talents in the overall service of humanity. O n e of the leading idealistic nationalists was French historian Ernest Renan, w h o claimed that a nation was not built on ethnic or religious criteria, but on a "rich legacy of m e m o r i e s " and a " c o m m o n will in the present"; in short, Renan said that a nation was a "spiritual princip l e " (Renan 1996: 52). Skeptics and detractors of the movement, however, had very strong arg u m e n t s against it. Leaders of E u r o p e ' s many multinational states (Great Britain, Russia, and the H a p s b u r g and O t t o m a n empires), the nobility, many officials of the Catholic church, and Marxists, all for different reasons, opposed nationalism. Despite this diverse and o f t e n intense opposition, the twentieth century began with what most p e o p l e regard as the t r i u m p h — o r running a m o k — o f the national idea. T h e great p o w e r s of Europe, such as Germany, France, and Russia, b e c a m e imperialistic and sought to expand their p o w e r at their n e i g h b o r s ' expense. T h e y were filled with national pride, b e c a m e a g g r e s s i v e , and organized t h e m s e l v e s into m a s s i v e alliance systems. A result was World War I, in which large n u m b e r s of troops c o m bined with the p r o p a g a n d a of national glory and the vilification of the e n e m y to create a new level of battlefield f u r y and d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s . T h e Great War, as it is s o m e t i m e s called, was the first total war involving weapons and tactics of mass destruction such as poison gas, tank assaults, and the b o m b a r d m e n t of civilian population centers. T h e r e is another important connection b e t w e e n World War I and nationalism: the realm of nation-states in Europe was greatly expanded as a result of the fighting. The old multinational empires of Europe collapsed. In their place arose a set of what diplomats endorsed at the time as nationstates, f r o m Finland in the north to Turkey in the south. T h e s e included Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Austria, as well as two small, multiethnic c o n f e d e r a t i o n s of mostly related p e o p l e s — C z e c h o s l o vakia and Yugoslavia.

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TYPES OF NATIONALISM

One way to categorize types of nationalism is by their organizing concepts. What is a "nation"? W h o belongs to it? And w h o is an outsider? In general, we may say that nationalism is broken d o w n into two types. The first, and oldest, was initially associated with Western European or North American politics and with countries e l s e w h e r e that f o l l o w e d them. It is usually called " c i v i c " or political nationalism and it is seen above all as a

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"legal-political c o n c e p t , " or as a "political c o n f i g u r a t i o n " (Bojtar 1988: 254). This type of n a t i o n a l i s m is heir to the legacy of the French and A m e r i c a n revolutions. In these revolutions, the growing middle class, or bourgeoisie, was c a r v i n g out space in the political structure f o r itself. These revolutions are thus important milestones on the path to democracy, since they resulted in breaking the stranglehold on political p o w e r of the kings and aristocrats. Still, these middle classes were not interested in giving the vote i m m e d i a t e l y to the lower classes or to w o m e n . In theory, though, civic nationalism presupposes that citizenship and nationality are identical (Liebich, Warner, and Dragovic 1995: 186). The nation is a political population, united in its ideas and habits. T h e other type of nationalism, " e t h n i c " nationalism, was originally associated with countries in Eastern and Central Europe. This nationalism is based on "ancestral association" (Bojtar 1988: 254) as compared to civic nationalism, which can e m b r a c e diverse people w h o live within shared borders. Ethnic nationalism requires a c o m m o n culture, way of life, and above all a perceived sense of genetic links (as in a greatly extended f a m ily) to the m e m b e r s of the ethnic community. The word ethnic comes f r o m the Greek word ethnos meaning a group of people united by their c o m m o n birth or descent. It should be noted that all types of nationalism are in some way exclusionary. If nothing else, this is true because of the presence of borders and frontiers. But ethnic nationalism, due to its emphasis on the "blood line" or racial connections between citizens, is far more exclusionary than civic nationalism and pays less attention to political boundaries. T h e historical differences between these types of nationalism are great and remain relevant to this day. T h e war in B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a can be better understood by r e m e m b e r i n g that m a n y Serbs and Croats adhere to the kind of exclusive nationalism of the second category (see Case Study One: Yugoslavia, p. 38). W h y ? Because the more inclusive civic nationalism of Western Europe was developing in the spirit of certain key turning points in European civilization, such as the Enlightenment and the growth of middle-class democracy. Western European nationalism arose in societies that were already modernizing, while the peoples of Eastern Europe were neither independent nor economically modern. In short, Eastern Europe became nationally conscious before it had experienced economic dev e l o p m e n t , representative g o v e r n m e n t , and political unity (or in m a n y cases even i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m f o r e i g n rule). T h e result was a desire to alter the political b o u n d a r i e s to coincide with the national or cultural boundaries (Sugar and Lederer 1994: 10; Kohn 1965: 2 9 - 3 0 ) . T h e much-heralded civic nationalism can also be exclusive. For instance, the U.S. Constitution was designed in the 1780s to deny w o m e n and slaves the right to vote. It was only after the Civil War that African American men were officially given the right to vote (the Fifteeth A m e n d m e n t ) ,

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a n d in m a n y states this right w a s not p r o t e c t e d by m e a n i n g f u l e n f o r c e m e n t of l a w s until the Civil R i g h t s A c t s of the 1960s, a l m o s t 100 y e a r s later. W o m e n w e r e d e n i e d the right to vote a l m o s t e v e r y w h e r e until the t w e n t i eth century; in the U n i t e d States, this right w a s p r o v i d e d by the N i n e t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t in 1920.

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F U N C T I O N S OF NATIONALISM

N a t i o n a l i s m f u n c t i o n s in f i v e w a y s . First, t h e r e is the m a t t e r of identification, w h e r e b y i n d i v i d u a l s c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s , e s p e c i a l l y since the advent of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and its p r o c e s s e s of u r b a n i z a t i o n and s e c u l a r i z a t i o n , to be part of a n o n t r a d i t i o n a l m a s s g r o u p , t h e " n a t i o n . " S e c o n d , g o v e r n m e n t s s i n c e the t i m e of N a p o l e o n h a v e u s e d n a t i o n a l i s m as a m e a n s to mobilize m i l i t a r y and e c o n o m i c p o w e r and to f u r t h e r their o w n l e g i t i m a c y . T h i r d , n a t i o n a l i s m c a n f u n c t i o n as a centrifugal force w h e n it b r e a k s u p b i g g e r c o u n t r i e s (or e m p i r e s ) into s m a l l e r o n e s . T h i s o c c u r r e d in m a n y E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s a f t e r W o r l d W a r I. It a l s o t o o k p l a c e in a m a s s i v e w a y in the B r i t i s h E m p i r e a f t e r W o r l d W a r II w h e n I n d i a , P a k istan, G h a n a , N i g e r i a , a n d o t h e r f o r m e r c o l o n i e s b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t . T h e n in the 1990s, it o c c u r r e d a g a i n in the b r e a k u p s of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a ( i n t o the s e p a r a t e C z e c h and S l o v a k r e p u b l i c s ) a n d Y u g o s l a v i a ( i n t o S l o v e n i a , C r o a t i a , B o s n i a , M a c e d o n i a , and S e r b i a - M o n t e n e g r o ) . C a n a d a a n d S p a i n are t w o c o u n t r i e s e x p e r i e n c i n g the c e n t r i f u g a l e f f e c t s of s e p a ratist n a t i o n a l i s m t o d a y : the F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g Q u e b e c o i s in C a n a d a a n d the C a t a l o n i a n s and B a s q u e s in S p a i n . T h e recent civil w a r in the D e m o cratic R e p u b l i c of C o n g o ( f o r m e r l y Z a i r e ) is a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e of d i f f e r e n t national g r o u p s c o m p e t i n g f o r p o w e r and g r a d u a l l y c r i p p l i n g the p o w e r of the c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t . N a t i o n a l i s m can a l s o w o r k in a f o u r t h w a y , as a centripetal force, w h e n it u n i t e s v a r i o u s p e o p l e into n e w n a t i o n - s t a t e s , such as o c c u r r e d in the l o n g and b l o o d y u n i f i c a t i o n s t r u g g l e s of the G e r m a n s a n d I t a l i a n s in the n i n e t e e n t h century, or in the V i e t n a m War of this century. F i f t h , nationalism can serve as a f o r m of resistance, especially to colonial i n t r u d e r s . In A f r i c a , the M i d d l e East, and A s i a , this h a s o f t e n b e e n a k i n d of s t a t e - r u n , t o p - d o w n n a t i o n a l i s m that a i m s at o r g a n i z i n g m o r e m e a n i n g f u l resistance to actual or potential i n v a d e r s . S o m e t i m e s this topd o w n n a t i o n a l i s m is c a l l e d " r e f o r m n a t i o n a l i s m " ( B r e u i l l y 1993:9). In T u r k e y a f t e r World War I, M u s t a f a K e m a l A t a t u r k l a u n c h e d a highly succ e s s f u l plan of e c o n o m i c and political m o d e r n i z a t i o n b a s e d on this kind of g o v e r n m e n t - l e d r e f o r m n a t i o n a l i s m . C u b a u n d e r Fidel C a s t r o fits this d e f inition as well. A n o t h e r k i n d of r e s i s t a n c e to c o l o n i a l i s m t a k e s the f o r m of wars of i n d e p e n d e n c e ( s o m e t i m e s called n a t i o n a l liberation struggles).

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Important examples of this kind of national struggle include the Vietnam War and the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962).

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NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM

We have seen that nationalism can be an individual's sense of identity, a political allegiance, and a force for military and political change. Arising from these different levels of meaning are various negative effects of nationalism. Many of the conflicts in the world today originate in national disputes. A quick glance over the headlines shows warfare, ethnic conflicts, or genocide in Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Indonesia, Canada, South Africa, Macedonia, Cyprus, and Ireland. We can discuss these negative, conflict-producing effects of nationalism in terms of the following categories: imperialism, the glorification of the state, the creation of enemies, the overlap with religion, discrimination against minorities, and competing rights.

N

Imperialism

Self-confidence and group assertiveness, integral aspects of nationalism, can lead to arrogance or aggressiveness. Imperialism, which is the projection of a country's power beyond its borders to achieve the subjugation or exploitation of another country, is as old as history itself. But it takes on greater intensity when it meets with a sense of national unity and purpose. The "scramble for A f r i c a " of the late nineteenth century, when many European states collaborated in literally carving up and occupying almost the whole continent, is a breathtaking example of arrogant imperialism imbued with a purported "civilizing mission" or "white m a n ' s burden," which justified the exploitation of other races. Carried to a much greater extreme, nationalism can end in genocide, as it did in the wildly homicidal policies of Adolf Hitler in the Third Reich, who sought to rid the world of Jews in order to make it "safe" for Germans. ®l Glorification of the State Although many early nationalists, especially in the nineteenth century, believed that the nation-state was a vehicle of progress and liberty for all human beings, not all nationalist thought is connected with individual freedom. Indeed, nationalism often encourages antidemocratic practices. When a "people" or nation feels threatened by neighbors, or when it has a history of underdevelopment or division, political leaders can make the case for an

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authoritarian (antidemocratic) g o v e r n m e n t . S o m e t i m e s , in the case of fascist g o v e r n m e n t s , which are e x t r e m e l y authoritarian and stress antii n d i v i d u a l i s m , racial or national h o m o g e n e i t y , s c a p e g o a t i n g , and militarism, the state or its leader c o m e s to be regarded as the ultimate expression of the p e o p l e ' s character and a m b i t i o n s (Payne 1995; Weber 1964). Loyalty to governments like these is extremely dangerous because of their aggressive and intolerant policies. Creation of Enemies Another negative effect of nationalism can take place at the most basic level of self-identification. When people identify with one group, they often develop mistrustful or hostile feelings about people outside that group. Even neighboring states with a great deal in c o m m o n can c o m e to mistrust each other, as in the case of the recent fishing controversies between the United States and Canada. Similarly, countries with common political interests and similar economic systems—such as the United States and J a p a n — c a n develop deep misunderstandings based largely on national feeling.

ss Overlap with Religion In some conflicts, such as those in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Bosnia, nationalism and religion cross paths in a very destructive way. In the current three-way struggle in Bosnia, between mostly Orthodox Christian Serbs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Bosnian M u s l i m s , religion is a factor. Adding a religious dimension to nationalism can intensify divisive feelings; for instance, it can sanction killing—or d y i n g — f o r a cause. Thus, it can m a k e nationalists more fanatical and c o n f l i c t s bloodier (Landres 1996). a

Discrimination Against Minorities

Other difficulties arise when states or countries are actually constructed on national principles. Such principles hold that only m e m b e r s of a given national or ethnic group have the right to live in the new national state. Often a related principle tends to hold a lot of weight also: f o r e x a m p l e , only m e m b e r s of a particular ethnic group should enjoy the full benefits of citizenship. This creates a problem for minority groups, which are quite num e r o u s in today's world. M a j o r e x a m p l e s include the H u n g a r i a n s in Romania and Slovakia, the R u s s i a n s in the f o r m e r Soviet republics (now independent states) of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and, until the creation of the Irish Republic, the Irish in the United K i n g d o m .

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Conflict and Security

Competing Rights

A n o t h e r n e g a t i v e a s p e c t of n a t i o n a l i s m lies in t h e c o m p e t i n g r i g h t s a n d c l a i m s s t a t e s m a k e a g a i n s t o n e a n o t h e r . T h r e e k i n d s are d e r i v e d f r o m o r h a v e a m a j o r i m p a c t o n e t h n i c a n d m i n o r i t y q u e s t i o n s . T h e first i n v o l v e s historic rights. T h e s e i n c l u d e c l a i m s b y o n e n a t i o n a l g r o u p to a c e r t a i n p i e c e of t e r r i t o r y b a s e d o n h i s t o r i c a l p r e c e d e n t . In o t h e r w o r d s , w h o w a s t h e r e f i r s t ? T h i s i s s u e is h o t l y d e b a t e d in T r a n s y l v a n i a , a large p o r t i o n of w e s t e r n R o m a n i a t h a t h a s a s u b s t a n t i a l H u n g a r i a n p o p u l a t i o n . In B o s n i a , t h e c o m p e t i n g p a r t i e s of S e r b s , B o s n i a n M u s l i m s , a n d C r o a t s h a v e e a c h tried to p r o v e t h a t t h e y c o n t r i b u t e d m o r e to t h e r e g i o n ' s c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e a n d , h a v i n g set t h e t o n e f o r t h e r e g i o n ' s c u l t u r e , d e s e r v e to m o l d t h e r e gion's political future now. N e x t are ethnic rights, w h i c h a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n of w h o is c u r r e n t l y in t h e m a j o r i t y in a g i v e n r e g i o n . T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y s e t t i n g — d e t e r m i n e d b y p o p u l a t i o n c o u n t s , p o l l s , a n d v o t e s of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ( s u c h as in t h e A u s t r i a n p r o v i n c e of C a r i n t h i a a n d in t h e P o l i s h - G e r m a n r e g i o n of S i l e s i a j u s t a f t e r W o r l d W a r I ) — i s the d e c i s i v e f a c t o r , n o t t h e c o m p l i c a t e d h i s t o r ical r e c o r d of s e t t l e m e n t s , a s s i m i l a t i o n , i m m i g r a t i o n , a n d e m i g r a t i o n . T h e f i n a l c l a i m c a n b e r e f e r r e d t o as strategic rights. S o m e t i m e s a state will c l a i m a p i e c e of t e r r i t o r y s i m p l y b e c a u s e it n e e d s that territory in o r d e r to be v i a b l e . T h i s u s u a l l y m e a n s t h e l a n d is n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c o u n try's defense or basic economic well-being. For example, after World War I, t h e n e w state of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a w a s g i v e n t h e S u d e t e n l a n d r e g i o n , e v e n t h o u g h it w a s h e a v i l y p o p u l a t e d w i t h G e r m a n s . T h i s w a s d o n e to p r o v i d e the fledgling republic with a m o r e mountainous, defensible border. Unfort u n a t e l y , t h e N a z i d i c t a t o r A d o l f H i t l e r w o u l d later attack C z e c h o s l o v a k i a b o t h d i p l o m a t i c a l l y a n d m i l i t a r i l y to " l i b e r a t e " the G e r m a n s of that r e g i o n , w h o he c l a i m e d w e r e b e i n g d e n i e d their r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

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CHALLENGES TO NATIONALISM

W e h a v e s e e n t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y n a t i o n a l i s m h a s b e e n o p p o s e d by m a n y f o r c e s . In a d d i t i o n to t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n in E u r o p e , E u r o p e a n imp e r i a l i s t p o w e r s in A f r i c a — e s p e c i a l l y G r e a t B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , B e l g i u m , a n d P o r t u g a l — r e s i s t e d t h e g r o w t h o f n a t i o n a l i s m in t h e i r c o l o n i e s . T h e y d i d t h i s d e s p i t e b e i n g m o r e or less n a t i o n - s t a t e s t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s is b e c a u s e n a t i o n a l i s m a m o n g c o l o n i z e d p e o p l e s p r e s e n t e d a d i r e c t c h a l l e n g e to E u ropean domination and exploitation. W e n o w e x a m i n e t h e f o u r m a i n c h a l l e n g e s to t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . O n e of t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s is i n h e r e n t in t h e i d e a l of n a t i o n a l i s m itself. T h i s is t h e p r o b l e m of c a r r y i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h to its

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logical c o n c l u s i o n s ; if o n e national g r o u p d e s e r v e s its o w n c o u n t r y and ind e p e n d e n c e , then d o not all g r o u p s d e s e r v e these things too? But c o u n t r i e s are d e s t a b i l i z e d w h e n e v e r y e t h n i c g r o u p w i t h i n t h e m a g i t a t e s f o r its ind e p e n d e n c e . A n d s o m e t i m e s so-called m i c r o s t a t e s are c r e a t e d that are t o o s m a l l to be e c o n o m i c a l l y v i a b l e a n d that s w e l l the m e m b e r s h i p of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and a f f e c t v o t i n g p a t t e r n s there. F o r i n s t a n c e , the P a c i f i c i s l a n d c o u n t r y of K i r i b a t i h a s a b o u t o n e - e i g h t h as m a n y p e o p l e as the C a n a d i a n city of T o r o n t o ; l i k e w i s e , t h e c o m b i n e d p o p u l a t i o n s of t h i r t y e i g h t m i c r o s t a t e s total o n l y a b o u t a third of that of C a l i f o r n i a ( R o u r k e 1995: 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 ) . A related issue is devolution, or the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of p o w e r in ethnically m i x e d c o u n t r i e s . T h i s usually d o e s not result in the b r e a k u p of the country. T h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m c o n t i n u e s to e x p e r i m e n t with this p r i n c i p l e by giving m o r e and m o r e a u t o n o m y to its Welsh and Scottish regions. Belg i u m h a s also a c h i e v e d a b a l a n c e , b a s e d on t h i s p r i n c i p l e , b e t w e e n its F l e m i s h and W a l l o o n p o p u l a t i o n s . R u s s i a is f a c e d with this issue today in m a n y a u t o n o m o u s r e g i o n s and districts. S e c o n d is the issue of s u p r a n a t i o n a l g r o u p i n g s of v a r i o u s kinds. At the height of the era of d e c o l o n i z a t i o n , s o m e A r a b and A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s tried to e s t a b l i s h political l e a g u e s that c o o p e r a t e d on a w i d e v a r i e t y of i s s u e s . Today there are regional political and e c o n o m i c g r o u p i n g s on e v e r y continent. But in E u r o p e , the b l o s s o m i n g of the E u r o p e a n U n i o n s e e m s to herald an a g e of e v e r g r e a t e r i n t e g r a t i o n of n a t i o n s . T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , of c o u r s e , w h i l e g e n e r a l l y r e s p e c t i n g the s o v e r e i g n t y of all c o u n t r i e s , is the best e x a m p l e of a global g r o u p i n g a b o v e the national level. O t h e r c o n t e m p o r a r y e x a m p l e s i n c l u d e the N o r t h A m e r i c a n F r e e T r a d e A g r e e m e n t ( N A F T A ) and the M e r c a d o C o m m u n de S u d - A m e r i c a ( M e r c o s u r ) ; both are regional f r e e trade g r o u p s in the Western H e m i s p h e r e . T h i r d , m o d e r n e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s are a l s o u n d e r m i n i n g the n a t i o n - s t a t e . T h e i n f l u e n c e of m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s , the o b s e s s i o n with f r e e t r a d e , and the a p p e a r a n c e of a g l o b a l , c o m p u t e r - d r i v e n , m a s s m a r k e t e c o n o m y are b r e a k i n g d o w n b a r r i e r s b e t w e e n p o p u l a t i o n s a n d e r o d i n g t h e s o v e r e i g n t y of s m a l l e r , less d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s . T h i s t r e n d is a n a l y z e d in detail in B e n j a m i n B a r b e r ' s ( 1 9 9 6 ) Jihad vi. McWorld, where a grim p i c t u r e is p a i n t e d of an i n c r e a s i n g l y s t a n d a r d i z e d , s h a l l o w w o r l d culture d o m i n a t e d by a few, nearly a l l - p o w e r f u l , m a r k e t i n g agents and prod u c e r s of c o n s u m e r g o o d s . T o d a y the c o n c e p t of n a t i o n a l identity, a n d e v e n to s o m e d e g r e e the c o n c e p t of n a t i o n - s t a t e s , is in f l u x . T h e p r e v a l e n c e of c o m p u t e r - d r i v e n c o m m u n i c a t i o n on the Internet and the World W i d e W e b a f f e c t s society in m a n y w a y s . F r o m shopping to political discussions to dating n e t w o r k s , geo g r a p h y and distance are s u d d e n l y rendered virtually i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l by computers. T h e much-heralded "global village" of travel and c o m m u n i c a t i o n

38

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has to s o m e extent arrived, a l t h o u g h its e f f e c t s will likely never be as grac i o u s l y p o s i t i v e a n d p r o g r e s s i v e as the g u r u s of t e c h n o l o g y p r e d i c t e d a f e w d e c a d e s ago. C o m p u t e r c u l t u r e h a s d e v e l o p e d rapidly along with the g e n e r a l e c o n o m i c s h i f t in the w o r l d ' s m o s t d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s (such as G e r m a n y , G r e a t Britain, the U n i t e d States, C a n a d a , and J a p a n ) into a serv i c e - b a s e d e c o n o m y (in contrast to e c o n o m i e s based on the p r o d u c t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l g o o d s ) . M a n y i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e s in t h o u g h t a n d a t t i t u d e s g o along with these t e c h n o l o g i c a l and e c o n o m i c shifts. Service e c o n o m i e s are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d i n d i v i d u a l c o n s u m p t i o n , and the Internet m e a n s that indiv i d u a l s can h a v e a m a x i m u m of " s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t " with a m i n i m u m of real c o n t a c t with o t h e r c i t i z e n s . T h i s can r e d u c e the s e n s e of g r o u p loyalty so i m p o r t a n t in n a t i o n a l i s m . Finally, the w o r l d t o d a y is a l s o w i t n e s s i n g a revival of c o n s e r v a t i v e r e l i g i o u s activity. T h i s is m o s t p r o m i n e n t in the M u s l i m w o r l d , but it is also present to s o m e e x t e n t a m o n g o t h e r religions. Politically s p e a k i n g , it is the n e w I s l a m i s m ( s o m e t i m e s c a l l e d " M u s l i m f u n d a m e n t a l i s m " ) that m o s t a f f e c t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , b e c a u s e it r e j e c t s c a p i t a l i s m and the d e c a d e n c e of W e s t e r n c u l t u r e as m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of a n e w i m p e r i a l i s m . S i n c e m u c h , a l t h o u g h by n o m e a n s all, of the M u s l i m w o r l d c o n s i s t s of states that are e t h n i c a l l y and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y A r a b , there is a d d e d p o t e n t i a l f o r c o o p e r a t i o n that t r a n s c e n d s political b o u n d a r i e s . T h e f o l l o w i n g t w o c a s e studies illustrate national c o n f l i c t s in various parts of the world today. T h e y give us an idea of h o w national issues mix with o t h e r kinds of p r o b l e m s to c r e a t e m a j o r crises.

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CASE S T U D Y O N E : YUGOSLAVIA

T h e region of s o u t h e a s t e r n E u r o p e k n o w n as the B a l k a n s p r o v i d e s n u m e r ous intriguing c a s e s t u d i e s of n a t i o n a l i s m at w o r k . O n e of the characteristics of the region is the p r e v a l e n c e of ethnic or cultural n a t i o n a l i s m rather than civic (or political) n a t i o n a l i s m . A n o t h e r is the highly d i v e r s i f i e d nature of its p o p u l a t i o n . In m a n y a r e a s , n u m e r o u s e t h n i c or national g r o u p s live c l o s e t o g e t h e r ; g r o u p s o f t e n i n t e r m i n g l e a n d s o m e t i m e s o c c u p y the a n c e s t r a l h o m e l a n d s of t h e i r n e i g h b o r s . T w o of the m o s t m i x e d of these a r e a s are B o s n i a and M a c e d o n i a , b o t h of w h i c h w e r e part of the f o r m e r Yugoslavia. A third m a j o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of B a l k a n s o c i e t i e s is a long h i s t o r y of f o r e i g n rule. Various e m p i r e s , f r o m the O t t o m a n and H a p s b u r g to the R u s s i a n and Soviet, h a v e d o m i n a t e d the r e g i o n , p r e v e n t i n g the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of its p e o p l e s . T h e t w o m a i n p e o p l e s w i t h i n the m u l t i n a t i o n a l state of Y u g o s l a v i a w e r e the S e r b s a n d C r o a t s . It w a s their c o n f l i c t i n g

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national aspirations—strengthened and m a d e poisonous, many would say, by their current leaders—that provided the impetus for the breakup of the country in 1991-1992. T h e term Yugoslavia m e a n s simply "land of the South Slavs." T h e c o u n t r y was created in 1918 as a kind of catch-all state f o r a n u m b e r of small nationalities, including several that had been part of e m p i r e s that c o l l a p s e d in World War I. T h u s , the term Yugoslav did not correspond to any genuine national or ethnic group; it was a matter of citizenship only, except f o r a small n u m b e r of idealists or people w h o were part of mixed f a m i l i e s created by m a r r i a g e s b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of d i f f e r e n t national groups. During its existence, the country—first under the authoritarian rule of the Serbian royal family and then under the firm hand of the C o m m u n i s t military leader Josip Broz (known as T i t o ) — w a s divided into provinces or " r e p u b l i c s " that reflected its chief national groups: Serbs, Croats, Bosnian M u s l i m s , Slovenes, etc. T h e r e were also large and important minority groups, especially Albanians. Rivalries a m o n g the various South Slavic national groups have been c o m m o n , as they are a m o n g almost all neighboring peoples. But the frequently used journalistic phrases "ancient ethnic hatreds" and "long-smoldering ethnic feuds" are not accurate. While the Muslim-Christian rivalry in the Balkans had been a problem since the Middle Ages in Bosnia, the difficulties between Serbs and Croats became acute only during World War II. A f t e r the Nazis and their allies carved up Yugoslavia in 1941, puppet states in both Croatia and Serbia emerged (see Figure 3.1). Both countries, but especially Croatia, sought to expand their territory and to h o m o g e n i z e their population at the expense of their neighbors and minorities. Further c o m p l i c a t i n g the situation was the nature of Yugoslav resistance to the Nazis, which was led by the C o m m u n i s t s under Tito but which included other rival political groups. T h e p o s t - W o r l d War II g o v e r n m e n t sought to stabilize the c o u n t r y ' s national groups by one-party rule and by a decentralized administration. The three wars of succession that accompanied the breakup of the country a f t e r 1991—in Slovenia, Croatia, and B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a — s h o w that Tito's policies failed. There is also continued unrest a m o n g A l b a n i a n s in M a c e d o n i a and in the K o s o v o region of Serbia. In some ways, Tito may have m a d e the national situation worse. Still, it is impossible to attribute the breakup of the country to any one cause. Nationalism played a part, as did economic problems, the ambitions of current leaders, and the failure of the C o m m u n i s t s to allow or promote a pluralistic civil society that could have taught deeper loyalties to the central g o v e r n m e n t and the Yugoslav ideal.

Nationalism

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CASE STUDY TWO: T H E ARAB-ISRAELI

41

CONFLICT

T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y t r o u b l e s b e t w e e n A r a b s and I s r a e l i s f o r m t h e m a i n , but not o n l y , c r i s i s in t h e M i d d l e E a s t . T h i s c o n f l i c t c e n t e r s o n p o s s e s s i o n o f the t e r r i t o r y k n o w n as P a l e s t i n e , w h i c h is i m p o r t a n t in b o t h a r e l i g i o u s and a h i s t o r i c a l s e n s e to b o t h A r a b s a n d J e w s . S i n c e t h e d i a s p o r a ( f o r c i b l e d i s p e r s i o n ) o f R o m a n times, most J e w s have lived outside this

ancestral

h o m e l a n d . A r a b s w e r e t h e m a j o r i t y , t h o u g h not t h e o n l y , p o p u l a t i o n g r o u p in P a l e s t i n e d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v e n i n g c e n t u r i e s . D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I, t h e B r i t i s h , w h o w e r e a l s o c o o p e r a t i n g with the A r a b s , i s s u e d t h e B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n in s u p p o r t o f a J e w i s h s t a t e t h e r e . In 1 9 4 8 , w h e n P a l e s t i n e w a s p a r t i t i o n e d a n d the s t a t e o f I s r a e l w a s c r e a t e d ( s e e F i g u r e 3 . 2 ) , h u n d r e d s o f thousands o f A r a b s were displaced. A s a result, m a n y M u s l i m states have, at l e a s t until r e c e n t l y , r e f u s e d to r e c o g n i z e I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to e x i s t . W a r s b e t w e e n I s r a e l a n d its A r a b n e i g h b o r s b r o k e out in 1 9 4 8 ,

1956,

1 9 6 7 , a n d 1 9 7 3 . A l t h o u g h I s r a e l w o n all t h e w a r s , t h e s i t u a t i o n r e m a i n e d v o l a t i l e in l a r g e part b e c a u s e o f t h e C o l d War. T h e S o v i e t U n i o n s u p p o r t e d A r a b s t a t e s , w h i l e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a i d e d the I s r a e l i s . In 1 9 6 4 , the P a l e s tine L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n ( P L O ) was f o r m e d . L e d by Y a s i r Arafat, the P L O h a s o p e r a t e d as a r e f u g e e o r g a n i z a t i o n , a g o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x i l e , a n d a t e r r o r i s t g r o u p ; t o d a y it h a s b e e n g r a n t e d partial s t a t e p o w e r in s e v e r a l r e g i o n s in a n d a r o u n d I s r a e l . In a d d i t i o n to t h e t e r r i t o r i a l , r e l i g i o u s , a n d l i n g u i s t i c d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e A r a b s a n d t h e I s r a e l i s , o t h e r f a c t o r s h a v e c o m b i n e d to m a k e t h e n a t i o n a l i s m o f t h e c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i e s m o r e i n t e n s e . S o m e J e w s b e g a n to t a k e an a c t i v e i n t e r e s t in r e t u r n i n g to t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l h o m e l a n d in t h e 1 8 9 0 s , due to i n c r e a s i n g a n t i - S e m i t i s m in E u r o p e . T h e m o v e m e n t k n o w n as Z i o n i s m p r o c l a i m e d the J e w i s h p e o p l e a n a t i o n w i t h t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m s to P a l e s t i n e a n d not j u s t a r e l i g i o n . In t h e 1 9 4 0 s , t h e t e r r o r s o f t h e H o l o c a u s t g a v e a d d e d i m p e t u s to J e w i s h e m i g r a t i o n . O n the A r a b side, the issues involve more than j u s t the fate o f the P a l e s t i n i a n A r a b s ; m a n y A r a b s v i e w I s r a e l as an o u t p o s t o f W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m . L o n g d o m i n a t e d b y f o r e i g n p o w e r s , t h e A r a b s in t h i s c e n t u r y h a v e r e v e a l e d " f r u s t r a t i o n o v e r past and present w e a k n e s s " ( v o n L a u e

1987:

3 5 0 ) . S i n c e W o r l d W a r I I , t h e A r a b c o u n t r i e s h a v e c o o p e r a t e d in v a r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o d i e s d e s i g n e d to f o s t e r unity a n d c o m m o n p u r p o s e . T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e A r a b L e a g u e ( s i n c e 1 9 4 5 ) , the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f A r a b P e t r o l e u m E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s , or O A P E C ( s i n c e 1 9 6 0 ) , and the short-lived U n i t e d A r a b R e p u b l i c , a fusion o f E g y p t and Syria. L i k e the Yugoslav case, nationalism has m i x e d with other historical and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s s u c h a s p o p u l a t i o n i s s u e s a n d C o l d W a r r i v a l r y . G i v e n the c o m p l e x i t y o f this s i t u a t i o n , it is n o w o n d e r that t h e m a i n a c t o r s , e v e n w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y , h a v e n o t b e e n a b l e to solve the Palestinian issue.

Figure 3.2

The Expansion of Israel

Extent of Israel as proposed under the U.N. partition plan for the establishment of a Jewish State — 1947

Damascus *

Occupied by Israel in 1948 and 1949 in excess of the U.N. recommended partition plan

SYRIA Heights

Territories occupied by Israel in June 1967

West Bank

Tel Aviv

•

I

Amman

M E D I T E R R A N E A N SEA

Gaza Strip Jerusalem

JORDAN

* Cairo

I I

/

'

\

"Palestine" claimed by World Zionist Organization 1919

SAUDI ARABIA

Source: Reprinted f r o m Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations, 4th ed. (Boulder, C O : Lynne Rienner, 1997). © Copyright 1997 Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Nationalism

•

43

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, nationalism has been one of the most powerful forces in the world over the past 200 years. It operates in various ways on individuals, social groups, and governments. Nationalism can build states or destroy them; it can provide individuals or organizations with identity, motivation, and justification for their actions. Although it is true that nationalism provides important links between people and can give them a common purpose (as in patriotism), nationalism also causes conflicts and can be used to justify aggression and feelings of superiority. Thus, it has a very mixed reputation in terms of its positive and negative effects. While most people regard nationalism as an inevitable companion to social modernization, there are some signs that the usefulness or relevance of nationalism may be on the wane.

•

QUESTIONS

1.

W h i c h of the f u n c t i o n s of nationalism do you think is the most important, and why?

2.

What are some of the negative aspects of nationalism? Which do you think is the most dangerous or immoral?

3.

W h y do some countries have civic nationalism and others ethnic nationalism?

4.

Which of the two types of nationalism is most prevalent in the United States?

5.

What parts of the f o r m e r Yugoslavia are most likely to break out in violence in the future?

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

Breuilly, John ( 1 9 9 3 ) Nationalism and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Coté, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. ( 1 9 9 7 ) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An International Security Reader. Cambridge: MIT Press. Eley, G e o f f , and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds. (1996) Becoming National: A Reader. N e w York: Oxford University Press. Geenfeld, Liah (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hutchinson, John, and Anthony D. Smith, eds. (1994) Nationalism. N e w York: Oxford University Press. ( 1 9 9 6 ) Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press.

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I g n a t i e f f , M i c h a e l ( 1 9 9 3 ) Blood find Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. N e w York: N o o n d a y . L i e b i c h , A n d r é , Daniel Warner, and Jasna D r a g o v i c , eds. (1995) Citizenship East and West. L o n d o n : Kegan Paul International. Sugar, Peter F., and Ivo John Lederer, eds. ( 1 9 9 4 ) Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Seattle: University of W a s h i n g t o n Press. Teich, M i k u l a s , and R o y Porter, e d s . ( 1 9 9 3 ) The National Question in Europe in Historical Context. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. Tilly, C h a r l e s , ed. ( 1 9 7 5 ) The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

4 Human Rights D. Neil Snarr

On D e c e m b e r 10, 1948, the United Nations (UN) u n a n i m o u s l y approved the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights. To date the UN has approved some 200 documents relating to h u m a n rights (such agreements are often referred to as " c o n v e n t i o n s " ) . T h e attention h u m a n rights have received since the signing of this d o c u m e n t is t r e m e n d o u s . As one m e m b e r of the U.S. House of Representatives and student of human rights has put it, " T h e d e f e n s e of internationally recognized human rights has b e c o m e the most universally accepted moral standard in the world today. Across the ideological spectrum, f r o m the far left to the far right, there is agreement that the one unifying spiritual ideal in modern society is the enhancement and e n f o r c e m e n t of h u m a n r i g h t s " (Drinan 1987: vii). This chapter looks at these rights—the controversies that surround them, the efforts to support them, and the many forces that inhibit their realization.

•

H U M A N RIGHTS A N D T H E I R O R I G I N

The idea of human rights certainly precedes the twentieth century, but the topic has received much greater attention since the founding of the U N in 1946 and the events that i m m e d i a t e l y preceded it. During the previous century, m a n y issues such as slavery and w o m e n ' s rights b e c a m e m a j o r concerns of citizens g r o u p s in E u r o p e and North A m e r i c a . T h e s e m o v e ments often produced significant results, including the abolition of slavery and the realization of many rights for women. The events that immediately preceded the establishment of the U N and the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, were World War II and the genocide

45

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of Jews and other groups in Europe. Because of these indescribable events, the world community f o u n d e d the UN in the hopes of avoiding such wars and violations of human rights in the future. What are h u m a n rights? One U N d o c u m e n t refers to them as "inalienable and inviolable rights of all m e m b e r s of the human f a m i l y " (UN 1988: 4). According to one scholar, T h e very term h u m a n rights indicates both their nature and their sources: they are the rights that o n e has s i m p l y b e c a u s e o n e is h u m a n . T h e y are held by all h u m a n beings, irrespective of any rights or duties one may (or may not) h a v e as citizens, m e m b e r s of f a m i l i e s , workers, or parts of any public or private organization or association. In the language of the 1948 declaration, they are universal rights. ( D o n n e l l y 1993: 19)

H o w do h u m a n rights c o m e into existence? Generally, discussions of human rights have started in the UN General Assembly, where they are debated, given public scrutiny, and voted on. Passage of human rights conventions in the General Assembly is the easy part; it only takes a majority vote. A f t e r the General A s s e m b l y a p p r o v e s these conventions, they are opened for signatures by m e m b e r states; and after a designated number of countries sign t h e m , they are said to " c o m e into e f f e c t . " It often takes many years for this to happen. A f t e r coming into effect, the agreeing countries are expected to pass laws, if they do not have such laws, that will ensure the observance and enforcement of the conventions. Eventually, it is hoped, all countries will approve such human rights laws and they will become international law. Some countries, however, have signed such conventions and made little progress toward institutionalizing them. Thus, at every juncture of this process is the possibility that countries will declare their commitment to these agreements and not enforce them. This graphically demonstrates the dilemma of human rights recognition and enforcement in the world community. W h y do countries sign these conventions and not enforce them? Simply because all countries of the world want to appear to other countries and persons to treat their citizens justly. As we will see later, this interest in being perceived as just and h u m a n e to o n e ' s citizens is an essential factor in the process of encouraging the observation of human rights. Most Western countries are strong s u p p o r t e r s of human rights and generally sign the c o n v e n t i o n s and establish m e c h a n i s m s whereby they will be observed. T h e United States is an e x c e p t i o n . In m a n y cases, the United States either r e f u s e s to sign the conventions or signs them after attaching many conditions. This raises serious questions about the U.S. gove r n m e n t ' s c o m m i t m e n t to universal h u m a n rights. It should be noted that the idea that international law be used to protect the rights of individuals is very recent. International law has been a

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47

b o d y of law to regulate the relationships b e t w e e n countries. Only since World War II and the f o u n d i n g of the U N has international law been understood to also give protection to individual rights (Drinan 1987). What Rights Have Been Identified as Human Rights? O n e way to understand the m a n y rights that have been approved by the UN and m e m b e r states is to divide them into three " g e n e r a t i o n s " or classes. T h e s e three generations have d i f f e r e n t origins and represent different views of human rights. T h e first generation of rights is said to be civil and political and are contained in Articles 2 through 22 of the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights. They f o c u s on the rights of the individual and to some extent emphasize the responsibility of countries to refrain f r o m unjustly interfering in the lives of their citizens. E x a m p l e s of these rights are f r e e d o m f r o m discrimination based on o n e ' s status, such as race or gender; the right to life, liberty, and security; f r e e d o m f r o m slavery and torture; equal treatment by the law, including f r e e d o m f r o m arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile; and the assumption of innocence until proven guilty. Originating in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Western ideas, these rights found expression in the revolutions of France, Britain, and the United States. In the United States, we often view these as civil rights and e q u a t e them with " h u m a n rights." Internationally this generation of rights has received the greatest emphasis. T h e second generation of h u m a n rights is referred to as social and economic rights. Contained in Articles 23 to 27 of the Universal Declaration, they have grown out of the Western socialist tradition. To some degree they have developed in response to what some consider to be the excessive individualism of the first generation of rights and the impact of Western capitalism and imperialism. Although they are elaborated in other conventions, in the Universal Declaration, they include the right to social security and work with fair remuneration; the f r e e d o m to join unions; the right to rest, leisure, and an adequate standard of living (including food, clothing, housing, and medical care) and an education; the right to the cultural life of o n e ' s c o m m u n i t y ; and the right to the moral and material interests resulting f r o m any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which one is author. M o r e than the first generation of rights these necessitate a proactive government acting on behalf of its citizens. They establish an acceptable standard of living for all—that is, a base level of equality. The third generation of rights is referred to as solidarity rights since they require the cooperation of all countries. Article 28 of the Universal Declaration states that " e v e r y o n e is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and f r e e d o m s set forth in this Declaration can be

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fully realized." These rights do not have the status of other rights and are in the process of being formulated. Burns Weston says the following about them: Three of these reflect the emergence of Third World nationalism and its demand for a global redistribution of power, wealth, and other important values: the right to political, economic, social, and cultural self-determination; the right to e c o n o m i c and social development; and the right to participate in and benefit from "the c o m m o n heritage of mankind" (shared earth-space resources; scientific, technical, and other information and progress; and cultural traditions, sites, and monuments). The other three third-generation rights—the right to peace, the right to a healthy and balanced environment, and the right to humanitarian disaster relief— suggest the impotence or inefficiency of the nation-state in certain critical respects. (Weston 1992: 1 9 - 2 0 )

These human rights grow out of the plight of the poorest two-thirds of the world, most of which were colonies of the Western countries and which generally remain poor.

•

E N F O R C I N G H U M A N RIGHTS

For the most part, the enforcement of human rights is left up to individual countries. T h e United Nations passes h u m a n rights c o n v e n t i o n s and expects them to be followed; but the UN also supports the principles of selfdetermination and nonintervention for its m e m b e r states (the principles of state sovereignty). Out of this contradictory situation has slowly emerged a worldwide discussion of human rights and some movement in the direction of serious human rights support. •

T h e U N a n d H u m a n Rights I m p l e m e n t a t i o n

T h e U N operates at f o u r levels in supporting h u m a n rights (Farer 1992). First, it formulates and defines international standards by approving c o n ventions and making declarations. This was initiated in 1948 with the approval of the Universal Declaration and later with the approval of t w o more m a j o r agreements that expand and clarify that d o c u m e n t : the International C o v e n a n t of Political and Civil Rights, which is closely related to the first generation of rights; and the International Covenant of Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, which is similar to the second generation of rights. (Both came into force in 1976, but many countries still have not signed them.) These three documents are referred to as the Universal Bill of Rights. B e y o n d these three m a j o r d o c u m e n t s are the nearly 2 0 0

Human

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49

conventions that deal with more specific issues such as genocide, torture, children, r e f u g e e s , w o m e n , and minorities. All these c o n v e n t i o n s f u r t h e r clarify the earlier d o c u m e n t s and spell out the responsibilities of countries that have signed them. Second, the U N advances h u m a n rights by promoting k n o w l e d g e and providing public support. This is accomplished through the press, training sessions, scholarships, expert committees, worldwide and regional conferences, and special research. R e c e n t regional and w o r l d w i d e c o n f e r e n c e s include those on the e n v i r o n m e n t , d e v e l o p m e n t , w o m e n , and population. Although these topics m i g h t not appear to be related to h u m a n rights, on closer examination the c o n c e r n f o r h u m a n rights p e r m e a t e s the structure and content of these c o n f e r e n c e s and the U N itself (see Farer 1992: 232-233). At the third level, the U N supports human rights by protecting or implementing them. Although the task of directly e n f o r c i n g human rights is primarily left to the states t h e m s e l v e s , the U N d o e s b e c o m e involved in various means of implementation. States that are party to conventions are to file reports on their actions. T h e H u m a n Rights C o m m i s s i o n , established in 1946, has been the central U N organization dealing with human rights and has also e m p l o y e d w o r k i n g groups and special rapporteurs. These rapporteurs pursue special human rights issues, such as disappearances of large n u m b e r s of persons; and blatant policies of unequal treatment, such as apartheid in South Africa prior to the early 1990s. Finally, the U N has taken additional steps at e n f o r c e m e n t that some consider to be "structural and e c o n o m i c aspects of h u m a n rights issues." This refers to support for the third generation of rights, such as economic development for the poorer countries of the world. This has taken a great deal of UN resources but does not receive the attention that more dramatic actions do (Farer 1992: 235). To these four categories of human rights support could be added the more recent and overt efforts in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, R w a n d a , and the f o r m e r Yugoslavia. T h e s e include boycotts of aggressor states (Serbia), military action against Iraq and the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, military support f o r the delivery of humanitarian aid (Somalia), and the protection of refugees (Rwanda). These actions may or may not set a precedent f o r f u t u r e U N actions, but they have elicited a great deal of discussion in the world community. Thus, with reference to h u m a n rights, the UN serves primarily as an oversight organ and a f o r u m where these issues are brought to public attention. In terms of action, the U N generally responds slowly and with uncertainty, subject to the interests of powerful governments. " T h e perspectives and capabilities of the United Nations are generally long term and indirect, so that direct, effective human rights protection remains an elusive goal" (Claude and Weston 1992: 220). Still, the U N has been s o m e w h a t

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successful in embarrassing violators into correcting their ways, and certainly the UN has become the setting for human rights dialogue. It must not be overlooked, however, that there may be some cracks developing in the ideology of state sovereignty that will result in serious intervention in a state's internal affairs when massive human rights are violated. At the close of the Gulf War in April 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 688, which was understood to permit the establishment of temporary havens for refugees inside Iraq. This in fact happened, and without the permission of Iraq. The rationale was that the violent treatment of Kurds (a large ethnic group living in Iraq) by the government of Iraq threatened international peace and security. A more recent example was the establishment of tribunals (or courts) to try persons responsible for crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Burundi. This is discussed later in this chapter.

II Human Rights Implementation Outside the United Nations The UN is clearly evolving with reference to issues related to human rights. This evolution must be seen in the total environmental context in which it exists. For example, the Cold War, which stretched f r o m soon after World War II to 1990, created an atmosphere in which human rights concerns were clearly secondary considerations. Competition between the West led by the United States and the East led by the Soviet Union placed perceptions of national security above violations of human rights. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the hopes for greater attention and commitment to human rights has not been realized. Added to this are the many attacks against the UN in the U.S. Senate. The United States as well as a few other countries have refused to pay assessments (dues) they have paid in the past (the United States owes over a billion dollars). The United States was also recently successful in blocking the reappointment of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and demanded the restructuring of the international body. Although some of this is possibly justified, the United States is often perceived as a bully who will cooperate only when its demands are met. Although the UN is legitimately seen as the primary forum for human rights discussions and states as the ultimate enforcers, it is expected that other domains of support will emerge. Two already have: regional human rights organizations, and private nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Three regions of the world now have human rights structures, but they are at very different levels of development. The most advanced and effective is the one in Europe that operates under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was established

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in 1950 and functions under the European C o m m i s s i o n of H u m a n Rights. T h e c o m m i s s i o n receives complaints f r o m approximately 4,000 individuals per year. A f t e r a process of analysis, this large n u m b e r has been reduced to some forty, which the commission "pursues vigorously, and a maj o r i t y end with a decision against the state" (Donnelly 1993: 82). T h u s , "individual h u m a n rights" are realized, even though they are opposed by the laws of sovereign states. A similar, but m u c h less s u c c e s s f u l structure exists in the A m e r i c a s . It includes the s e v e n - m e m b e r I n t e r - A m e r i c a n C o m m i s s i o n of H u m a n Rights and the Inter-American Court of H u m a n Rights. T h e c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n rights through these structures has been limited. "Its decisions . . . have usually been ignored, in sharp contrast to those of its European counterpart" (Donnelly 1993: 86). Countries of the Americas have resisted these institutions, and the principle of state sovereignty has predominated. The c o m m i s s i o n and court are left with the power of publicity and moral influence, which have been quite limited. Finally, in the 1980s, A f r i c a n states approved the A f r i c a n Charter on H u m a n and P e o p l e s ' Rights. It is a very interesting d o c u m e n t in that, unlike other regional documents, it includes the rights of "peoples," or what is called third-generation or solidarity rights. Article 19 states, "All peoples shall be equal; they shall e n j o y the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall j u s t i f y the domination of a people by another." T h e d o c u m e n t does not provide for a human rights court and emphasizes mediation, conciliation, and consensus. Probably the most h o p e f u l development in recent decades for defending human rights has been the activities of N G O s . Since the overwhelming majority of countries have expressed limited c o m m i t m e n t to human rights, N G O s have c o m e to serve the purpose of monitoring human rights violations t h r o u g h o u t the world. T h o u s a n d s of these organizations exist, but again they are more active and successful in areas where general support for human rights is evident. In several countries where human rights have made little headway, the very presence of N G O s is often unsupported, and s o m e t i m e s their operations are prohibited. In m a n y parts of the world, it is dangerous to work for human rights groups. For instance, a 1988 human rights publication reported that in 750 cases, human rights monitors were persecuted by governments and other armed groups (Human Rights Watch 1988). N G O s take many f o r m s and operate in many different ways. By operating outside of g o v e r n m e n t they are able to monitor the actions of g o v ernments and bring pressure on g o v e r n m e n t a l policies. L a u r i e Wiseberg lists nine areas in which N G O s provide services: (1) information gathering, evaluation, and dissemination; (2) advocacy to stop abuses and secure redress; (3) legal aid, scientific expertise, and humanitarian assistance; (4)

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national and international lobbying; (5) legislation to incorporate or develop human rights standards; (6) education, conscientization (raising the consciousness of citizens), or empowerment; (7) solidarity building; (8) delivery of services; and, (9) access to the political system (Wiseberg 1992: 7 3 - 7 7 ) . Amnesty International, International League for Human Rights, Cultural Survival, International Commission of Jurists, International Committee of the Red Cross, Physicians for Human Rights, and many other groups provide services. Although they are somewhat limited in what they can do, they represent one of the most promising avenues for human rights support. The UN has made provisions for these organizations to have an official representation at the UN and at UN-sponsored conferences.

•

CURRENT ISSUES RELATED TO H U M A N RIGHTS

The emergence of human rights as a new issue on the world's political agenda in recent decades is clearly not without controversy. At every step since the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there have been controversies, delays, and denouncements. There is no reason to believe that this will stop. In the sections that follow, we address a few of these controversies and the views that surround them. •

State Sovereignty, Cultural Relativity, and Female Genital Mutilation

The UN Charter guarantees state sovereignty or self-determination and nonintervention; it also proposes that all individuals, regardless of their citizenship and status, have human rights. Countries jealously guard their sovereignty and at the same time profess that they grant their citizens human rights, which often they do not. States sometimes explain or rationalize their human rights violations by referring to the standards and values of their particular culture and traditions. This is known as cultural relativity. Cultural relativity is viewed in a variety of ways (Donnelly 1993). "Radical relativists" see culture as virtually the sole source of values and would accept infanticide and female genital mutilation as cultural practices that should not be the concern of outside groups. At the other end of the spectrum are the "universalists," who view all human rights as universal. As the debate over what rights are universal proceeds, most decisions will fall somewhere between these two extremes. At the same time, however, there is general agreement that such acts as genocide (the killing of a people such as Jews, Gypsies, Hutus, or Tutsis), torture, and summary executions are violations of human rights.

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F e m a l e genital mutilation ( F G M ) is a highly controversial h u m a n rights issue. This procedure usually involves the complete removal o f the clitoris, and often the removal of some of the inner and outer labia. In its most extreme form—infibulation—almost all the external genitalia are cut away, the remaining flesh from the outer labia is sewn together, or infibulated, and the girl's legs are bound from ankle to waist for several w e e k s while scar tissue closes up the vagina almost completely. A small hole, typically about the diameter of a pencil, is left for urination and menstruation. (McCarthy 1996: 32)

This procedure affects some 100 million w o m e n in Muslim A f r i c a and for different reasons is d e f e n d e d as a cultural tradition. Reasons given are that it makes girls " m a r r i a g e a b l e " (because it ensures their virginity) and also diminishes the sex drives of w o m e n . F G M is viewed by its proponents as a cultural practice that is a personal matter that should not be considered a h u m a n rights violation. Others c o n s i d e r this p r o c e d u r e a violation of a w o m a n ' s human rights that should be eliminated. T h e debate as to whether this is a matter of cultural discretion or a violation of human rights has taken place f o r m a n y years, but in 1993, the World Health Organization ( W H O ) , an agency of the U N , voted to take a stand against female circumcision. " A resolution approved unanimously by its 185-nation annual a s s e m b l y asked W H O D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l Hiroshi N a k a j i m a to prepare a report that will call for tougher action on female circumcision and fasting during p r e g n a n c y " (Columbus Dispatch 1993). This has not put an end to the practices, but it is a small step taken by a UN agency to initiate what may eventually be recognized as a h u m a n right; states, in turn, will be challenged to face this reality. By making F G M an issue in the world press and among w o m e n ' s groups throughout the world, the practice has c o m e into question. This is a very good e x a m p l e of how human rights issues reach the public, receive international attention, bec o m e a topic of debate, and possibly b e c o m e codified in international law. This has already happened in several Western countries. It is clearly a very slow process. If it were not for the international discussion of F G M , it is d o u b t f u l that Fauziya Kasinga, a native of Togo, would have received asylum in the United States after a year in a U.S. prison. A f t e r c o m i n g to the United States and admitting to immigration officials that she did not have a valid passport, it took a year of intense legal effort before the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals granted political asylum to Fauziya Kasinga, recognizing FGM as a form of persecution against women. The ruling sets a binding precedent for all U . S . immigration judges. It also leaves open the possibility that w o m e n w h o have already undergone FGM may seek asylum in the future. (Burstyn 1995: 16)

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H u m a n R i g h t s : A F o r m of W e s t e r n I m p e r i a l i s m ?

D o e s the c o n t r o v e r s y s u r r o u n d i n g the i m p o s i t i o n of W e s t e r n h u m a n r i g h t s v a l u e s on a n o n - W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e a f o r m of W e s t e r n h u m a n r i g h t s i m p e r i a l i s m ? T h e r e is a n o t h e r r e g i o n of the w o r l d w h e r e the cry of W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m is h e a r d w i t h g r e a t e r f o r c e . S e v e r a l East A s i a n c o u n tries—China, Indonesia, and Singapore a m o n g t h e m — v i e w human rights as a p r o d u c t of W e s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n a n d not f u l l y a p p l i c a b l e to their s o c i eties. A l t h o u g h t h e y d o not r e f e r to w h a t are c o n s i d e r e d the m o r e s e r i o u s v i o l a t i o n s of h u m a n r i g h t s — s u c h as m u r d e r , s l a v e r y , t o r t u r e , and g e n o c i d e — a s c o n t r o v e r s i a l , t h e y d o t a k e issue w i t h f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n r i g h t s s u c h as f r e e d o m of t h e p r e s s , s p e e c h , a s s o c i a t i o n , a n d e x p r e s s i o n . T h e y a r g u e that t h e y h a d little input into t h e U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n of H u m a n R i g h t s a n d that it e x p r e s s e s v a l u e s t h e y d o not n e c e s s a r i l y s u p p o r t (Bell 1996). O n e a r g u m e n t p o o r e r A s i a n c o u n t r i e s g i v e to s u p p o r t their p o s i t i o n is that e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t n e c e s s i t a t e s at least the t e m p o r a r y s u s p e n s i o n of s o m e r i g h t s . T h e y say that s u s p e n d i n g c e r t a i n r i g h t s will r e s u l t in a g r e a t e r g o o d f o r m o r e p e r s o n s in the l o n g r u n , w h e n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h is r e a l i z e d . W e s t e r n s u p p o r t e r s of h u m a n r i g h t s r e s p o n d that t h e r e is little e v i d e n c e that h u m a n r i g h t s i n h i b i t s e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . S o m e a r g u e that q u i t e the o p p o s i t e is t r u e — t h a t social a n d p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s m a y h e l p e n s u r e s u c h economic growth.

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East Asian countries also argue that Western human rights advocates overlook the negative consequences that emphasizing individual freedom brings. They point to the many social problems that the West, especially the United States, is experiencing. Such problems as drug abuse, crime, declining commitment to the family, homelessness, racism, and general alienation feed this skepticism (Faison 1997). They feel that the focus on first-generation rights as opposed to second-generation rights is at least partially responsible for Western moral decline. Further, they argue that the United States' unjustifiable involvement in the Vietnam War and its close relationships with and support for many Asian governments that have massively violated human rights are more reasons to be skeptical of Western-based human rights or at least their sincerity (Faison 1997).

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China, the United States, Human Rights, and Trade

Countries may support human rights principles in their international dealings by passing laws that require that human rights records be considered before aid is given to countries. Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway follow this practice, as does the United States in many ways. A respected human rights scholar says the following about the growing importance of human rights issues in international dialogue: H u m a n rights has b e c o m e b r o a d l y important in c o n t e m p o r a r y international relations. In h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , the c h a n g e s o f the last f i f t y years c o n s t i t u t e an incremental r e v o l u t i o n in the nature o f international relations. Within the [extant] and resilient m o d i f i e d nation-state s y s t e m , the broadly d e f i n e d rights of persons matters as n e v e r b e f o r e . C o n c e r n for h u m a n rights is i n t e r t w i n e d with c o n c e r n f o r state security, e c o n o m i c health, and a sound e n v i r o n m e n t . H u m a n rights has arrived as o n e of the major subjects o f w o r l d affairs. ( F o r s y t h e 1991: 191)

This is certainly true with reference to economic relations between the United States and China. Since the United States is the largest consumer of goods in the world, all countries want access to its markets. For China this opening can come through most-favored-nation status and membership in the World Trade Organization. By granting most-favored-nation status to China, exports from China to the United States receive preferential tariff rates. This discussion, much of which has gone on for years, is permeated with human rights language. In 1989, the Chinese government broke up a student prodemocracy movement in Tiananmen Square with ruthless disregard for life and was broadly condemned by the West. This was added to the charges that in China, arbitrary arrests are c o m m o n and that the Chinese government disregards several other first-generation rights. These

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concerns have reached several of the international groups that consider human rights violations. For six of the past seven years, the United States has cosponsored a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva to call for an investigation of China's human rights record. On all occasions China has vetoed the resolution. In 1996, however, the United States established some conditions under which the resolution would not be reintroduced. In turn, China was asked to accept International Red Cross-supervised prison visits, release a list of certain political prisoners, sign two UN human rights conventions and have them ratified, and resume a dialogue with the United States on human rights (Tyler 1997). Recently the New York Times reported that China had reached an agreement with the Red Cross to reopen negotiations on access to prisons, something they have been unwilling to do since the establishment of the Communist regime nearly fifty years ago. The newspaper also reported that a senior Chinese prison official met with journalists and said that such visits by Red Cross officials are out of the question. The official went on to deny that there were any political prisons in China and added that China would not be subject to such regulation by a foreign entity such as the Red Cross, because such action is a violation of a state's sovereignty (Tyler 1997). However, at the conclusion of that article, the author states, "Still, human rights advocates say, the diplomatic pressure has led to the release of hundreds of prisoners and has brought China closer to incorporating human rights concepts into its laws" (Tyler 1997). After recounting the legal changes that have taken place since Tiananmen, a researcher at Harvard Law School and human rights consultant said t h e s e n e w l a w s are far f r o m p e r f e c t , and s e r i o u s h u m a n rights a b u s e s c o n t i n u e d e s p i t e t h e m . "But they are a real step toward rule o f law in C h i n a — a s o p p o s e d to arbitrary C o m m u n i s t Party r u l e — a n d they are b e i n g put in p l a c e b e c a u s e p e o p l e i n s i d e C h i n a h a v e an interest in that h a p p e n i n g . You w o u l d n e v e r k n o w that f r o m the debate here." (Friedman 1997)

Thus, according to these sources, China is making progress toward the institutionalization of human rights at the same time that they are saying that these concerns are internal matters and purely state sovereignty issues. •

Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

There have been several cases of massive killings, including genocide, since the founding of the UN, the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other human rights conventions. For various reasons,

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however, they h a v e not resulted in a significant response f r o m the international c o m m u n i t y , including the UN. To a great extent this was due to the Cold War, which seemed to turn every event into a Cold War issue and s u b o r d i n a t e d h u m a n rights c o n c e r n s to other interests. Donnelly (1993) points out that this was particularly true f r o m 1948 to 1973 and during m u c h of the period f r o m 1981 to 1988. D u r i n g these times, the United States supported m a n y g o v e r n m e n t s that were responsible f o r massive h u m a n rights violations but j u s t i f i e d them on the basis of fighting c o m m u n i s m . The U S S R also had a poor human rights record, especially with respect to first-generation rights. With the fall of the U S S R and the end of the Cold War, there has been renewed hope for h u m a n rights, but this has also fallen short for various reasons. Two very serious cases of g e n o c i d e have taken place during the 1990s, and the world c o m m u n i t y has been slow to respond. T h e r e has, however, been some m o v e m e n t , and this could prove to be significant. In early 1993 and again in late 1994, two international tribunals were established by the U N Security Council to deal with crimes against humanity in the f o r m e r Yugoslavia and in R w a n d a in central Africa. In the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, some 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e were killed in what was called " e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , " and in R w a n d a , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 were m a s s a c r e d in what appeared to be tribal violence. The establishment of these tribunals is promising because it clearly illustrates that the international c o m m u n i t y is listening, even though it is acting slowly. ( M a s s i v e killings that have occurred in A n g o l a , Haiti, Liberia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Somalia, and especially C a m b o d i a in recent years received m u c h less attention.) The establishment of the tribunals sets the cases of R w a n d a and the f o r m e r Yugoslavia off f r o m the others, especially since they were established before the end of the conflicts. This constitutes a f o r m of early intervention. Finally, and these are certainly not the only reasons to feel some hope, the establishment of these tribunals was based on international law, which supersedes state sovereignty. David Scheffer argues that since the U N Security Council established these two tribunals under the authority of Chapter VII of the U N Charter, it established an important precedent. International humanitarian law can subsequently override "domestic jurisdiction" (state sovereignty in such matters is challenged). If these tribunals succeed, they can become the tested and approved way for opening the door to judicial intervention, with the UN as the key actor. "Like human rights law in general international humanitarian law can reach deep into societies—into detention c a m p s and remote villages where systematic torture or crimes against humanity are the sordid business of the d a y " (Scheffer 1996: 3). Thus, if successful, these tribunals may serve as a message to regimes that c o m m i t massive rights violations that state sovereignty is not a facade

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behind which they can hide. On the other hand, both these tribunals have been justifiably criticized for their slow pace, which is due in part to inadequate f u n d i n g and personnel. Clearly their success will depend on greater support of the world community, especially the United States. The Clinton administration has supported the tribunals and has been considering the establishment of a permanent UN human rights court. •

Native Peoples and Human Rights

There are hundreds of millions of indigenous peoples throughout the world (for example, Navajos and Apaches in the United States, Inuits in Canada, Yanomamo in Brazil and Venezuela, and Maya in Mexico and Guatemala) whose well-being has been threatened for several centuries by Western expansion, population growth, state sovereignty, economic growth, resource exploitation, and a host of other forces. These peoples have found themselves subject to governments they do not recognize and forced into dilemmas not of their own choosing. What rights do groups of people have? Is there such a thing as group rights? Is there such a thing as "collective human rights"? This is another issue that challenges the principle of state sovereignty, since most indigenous peoples are subjects to modern states. "The focus of collective human rights . . . is on the rights of social groups, and proponents seek to create a normative framework independent of nation-states to enhance and project these rights" (Felice 1996: 18). Many modern conflicts and wars are related to the rights of indigenous and ethnic groups that live within the boundaries of countries but experience little or no self-determination. Even before the founding of the UN, there were serious efforts to address the rights of such peoples, and the effort continues—much of it within the UN structure. For several years there has been work on a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This document speaks of self-determination within the present state system. For example, Article 27 states: Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without their free and informed consent. Where this is not possible, they have the right to just and fair compensation. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and within resources equal in quality, size and legal status.

Like most human rights issues, the document is controversial and finds strong support from some and absolute rejection by others. Many governments have already incorporated many of the document's principles into law and are moving toward indigenous self-rule. Among them are

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C a n a d a , Australia, N e w Z e a l a n d , D e n m a r k , Norway, and S w e d e n . O t h e r governments have not m o v e d as far as self-rule but have adopted new laws to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.

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CONCLUSION

T h e e m e r g e n c e of h u m a n rights as a global issue f o l l o w e d World War II and the massive killings that accompanied it. T h e f o r u m f o r the discussion has been the UN, where the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights was approved in 1948; some 200 related d o c u m e n t s have also been approved. T h o u g h support for h u m a n rights principles has been strong in the General Assembly, the actions of member states often have been very weak. This is because implementation of these principles is left to the countries themselves, who jealously guard their sovereignty. T h e struggle for human rights receives some assistance through regional human rights structures, but only Europe has reached a stage of seriously defending human rights. N G O s have emerged as a serious link in monitoring human rights violations throughout m u c h of the world. T h o u g h they have limited f u n d s and p o w e r and are often opposed by and sometimes persecuted by governments, their impact is exceedingly important. By bringing violation to the p u b l i c ' s attention and w o r k i n g on behalf of victims, they have helped m a k e human rights an international issue. M a n y g o v e r n m e n t s are also strongly c o m m i t t e d to human rights and shape their economic and foreign policies to reflect this. Few m a j o r international issues reach the public sphere that do not mention first-, second-, or third-generation human rights issues. Political repression, rights in the workplace, rights to a clean environment, rights to self-determination, and numerous other issues fill the news media and call citizens and organizations to action. Progress toward a world in which human rights are recognized and enforced may be seen as a weak and nearly irrelevant issue, or as an emerging m o v e m e n t that will m a k e the world a more livable place. The o u t c o m e is very much in the hands of individuals, organizations, and governments that daily make decisions that mold our future.

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QUESTIONS

1.

Which generation of h u m a n rights do you think is most important?

2.

W h y does the UN not e n f o r c e the human rights that the General Assembly has already approved?

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S h o u l d f e m a l e g e n i t a l m u t i l a t i o n b e c o n s i d e r e d a cultural p r a c t i c e and not be c o n d e m n e d by human rights c o n v e n t i o n s ?

4. 5.

W h i c h is m o s t important: state s o v e r e i g n t y or u n i v e r s a l h u m a n rights? S h o u l d i n d i g e n o u s g r o u p s h a v e the right to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n e v e n t h o u g h t h e y are l o c a t e d w i t h i n the b o r d e r s o f a s o v e r e i g n c o u n t r y ?

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SUGGESTED READINGS

Amnesty International Report (annual e d i t i o n ) . L o n d o n : A m n e s t y International Publications. C l a u d e , R i c h a r d P i e r r e , and B u r n s H. W e s t o n , eds. ( 1 9 9 2 ) Human Rights in the World Community. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Donnelly, Jack (1993) International Human Rights. Boulder, C O : Westview Press. D o w n i n g , T h e o d o r e E., and Gilbert K u s h n e r , eds. ( 1 9 8 8 ) Human Rights and Anthropology. C a m b r i d g e , M A : Cultural Survival. Drinan, Robert F. ( 1 9 8 7 ) Cry of the Oppressed. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Felice, William F. ( 1 9 9 6 ) Taking Suffering Seriously. A l b a n y : State University of N e w York Press. F o r s y t h e , D a v i d P. ( 1 9 9 1 ) The Internationalization of Human Rights. L e x i n g t o n , M A : Lexington B o o k s . G u t m a n , Roy (1993) A Witness to Genocide. N e w York: M a c m i l l a n . Human Rights Watch World Report ( a n n u a l edition). N e w York: H u m a n Rights Watch. Staub, Ervin (1989) The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press.

5 Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Carolyn M. Stephenson

Conflict issues now routinely cross international boundaries, blurring the distinction between domestic and international conflict. In response, methods of providing for international peace and security have evolved, especially in the p o s t - C o l d War world. P e a c e k e e p i n g and p e a c e m a k i n g have taken new f o r m s , and the role of multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations (UN), has b e c o m e m u c h more significant. What was initially o p t i m i s m f o r a more p e a c e f u l world in the wake of the Cold War, however, has hardened into a recognition that we still face conflicts as intractable as the Cold War a p p e a r e d to be f r o m the late 1940s to the late 1980s. In the late 1980s, we were full of hope f o r a new, more gentle world order that would provide f o r m o r e peace and m o r e security. There were hopes f o r a renewed U N , in new f o r m s of mediation and other third-party conflict resolution, in a new relationship between the superpowers, in the signing of a r m s control and d i s a r m a m e n t treaties, and in the increasing recognition of individual human rights and needs. Nonviolent revolutions had overturned authoritarian r e g i m e s in the Philippines in 1986 and in Eastern Europe in 1989. T h e U N had received the Nobel Peace Prize f o r its peacekeeping missions in 1988. We were beginning to develop solid international agreements to protect and restore our environment. W h i l e we were less h o p e f u l and more sober by the early 1990s, we had begun to take seriously both new dimensions of conflict and new approaches to peacemaking. But there was disagreement about what constituted the grounds for successful peacemaking. For some, success consisted of the b r e a k d o w n of the Soviet Union and the r e n e w e d ability of the United Nations to function as originally intended as m a k e r and keeper of

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the peace, under the leadership of the United States. Many of these saw U.S. military, e c o n o m i c , and political p o w e r as having been responsible for the end of the Cold War. For them, the restoration of the UN capability for enforcement action, under U.S. leadership, was central. For others, what constituted success was the restoration of a different United Nations, a United Nations that would run by one-nation one-vote and counter the dominant influence of both superpowers, and that would function cooperatively to further individual and group rights, security, development, and the state of the global environment. For these people, U.S. leadership was not so central as that of decentralized political movements of individual human beings. For them, the changes had come about not so much because of U.S. military, economic, and political power as because of the committed organizing power of social movements all over the world. The two approaches, and other variants of them, rely on different conceptions of security and peace and on different conceptions of power. And because they e m p h a s i z e different m e t h o d s of and a p p r o a c h e s to peacemaking, it is important that we examine the conceptions of security, peace, and power that underlie these approaches. Otherwise, we risk shifting f r o m notions of world government to arbitration, to nuclear deterrence, to rapid deployment forces, to UN peacekeeping, to nonviolent revolution, to arms control, to mediation, and on to humanitarian intervention, with no sense of why we have shifted to emphasize one approach over another, let alone of what the strengths and weaknesses of each are in particular situations.

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CHANGES IN T H E C O N C E P T O F SECURITY

Where national security was once virtually the only way to talk about security, we have c o m e to acknowledge the relationship between national security and both international and individual security. We have moved f r o m reliance on a balance of power system, to collective security, to collective defense, and then to common security, with the present international security system some mixture of all of these. The classical balance of power system, the primary system for maintaining security in nineteenth-century Europe, was retained well into the twentieth century. With a goal of ensuring that no nation-state became so strong as to be able to overpower others, rough equality was maintained by two c a m p s of states in the system, with one or several states (usually Britain) changing alliances in order to maintain the balance. This system began to break d o w n in the twentieth century, when it failed to avert war and maintain stability in the system. Under collective security, which began with the League of Nations in 1919 and was strengthened with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, states agreed on certain rough rules of international law, including

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national sovereignty and f r e e d o m f r o m outside aggression; they also agreed that if any state violated these rules, all the others would band together against that state. Sanctions for violating the prohibition against international aggression could be either military or nonmilitary. Collective defense, which was a step back in the direction of the balance of p o w e r system, b e c a m e the d o m i n a n t security system by the late 1940s. U n d e r this system, each set of nation-states, West and East, gathered together in military alliance to defend against the other set. T h e formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 was followed by the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Each side bolstered its conventional military defenses with the nuclear umbrella of its respective superpower. While collective d e f e n s e has not entirely ended, the withdrawal of Soviet forces f r o m Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, and the end of the Warsaw Pact in 1990, left NATO with questions about its remaining purpose. Deterrence, including but not limited to nuclear deterrence, was the primary underlying power dynamic of collective defense. In contrast, the concept of common security arose, primarily within the UN framework. There are two distinct aspects of common security, one of which arose in the context of North-South conflict, one in the East-West context. T h e Report of the Independent C o m m i s s i o n on International Development Issues in 1980, better known as the Brandt Report, raised notions of economic security (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980). For the South, the failure of economic development was perceived as a much greater threat to security than nuclear war. T h e Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, or the Palme Commission, in 1982 made two more explicit linkages: first, there could be no victory in nuclear war—therefore we could only survive together; second, the costs of the military everywhere were contributing to economic insecurity—therefore the reduction of military costs could contribute to development (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). T h e C o n f e r e n c e on Security and C o o p e r a t i o n in E u r o p e ( C S C E ) , or the Helsinki Agreement, f o r m e d in 1975 by the states of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and now known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, is the best e x a m p l e of an actual c o m m o n security regime. T h e Helsinki A g r e e m e n t contains three "baskets": a security basket, which contains agreements on p o s t - W o r l d War II borders in Europe; an e c o n o m i c basket, which opens up trade between East and West; and a human rights basket, which provides for certain h u m a n rights guarantees and procedures in both East and West. Since the time of C S C E , proposals have been m a d e and other regional c o n f e r e n c e s held on security and cooperation; some g o v e r n m e n t a l and some n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l . T h e s e steps have been taken as confidence-building measures in regional conflict. T h e Brundtland C o m m i s s i o n report, Our Common Future, in 1987 added the concept of environmental security to that of c o m m o n security,

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strengthening the idea that sustainable development required sustaining the e n v i r o n m e n t that s u p p o r t e d d e v e l o p m e n t and p r o m o t i n g the notion that military expenditure and war were h a r m f u l to the environment. Environmental security encompassed both the protection of the environment for its own sake and the protection of the environment for the sake of humankind. C o m m o n security now e n c o m p a s s e s political-military aspects, e c o n o m i c aspects, and environmental aspects and seems to be recognizing their int e r d e p e n d e n c e ; but it is m o r e explicit in a c k n o w l e d g i n g the interdependence of the security of states. Security today is thus c o n c e i v e d of in a much more comprehensive way, even when that security is still for the nation-state rather than the global society. It comprises not only negative security (the ability to defend against or shut off relationships one views as h a r m f u l ) , but also positive security (the ability to maintain relationships one views as essential to o n e ' s survival, such as access to f o o d , oil, and credit). Such a reconceptualization of security to include both positive and negative security means that reliance on traditional approaches to security are less likely to be adequate. This is one of the reasons new approaches to peacemaking are increasingly being taken seriously.

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CHANGES IN T H E C O N C E P T O F PEACE

The concept of peace has also b r o a d e n e d in much the same way as security has, expanding f r o m the concept of "negative peace" alone—or peace as the absence of war or direct violence—to include "positive p e a c e " — o r peace as the absence of exploitation and the presence of social justice. While the earliest mention of positive and negative peace appears to be in the writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., the terms were expanded upon and more fully analyzed and operationalized by Johan Galtung (1969). The debate that ensued over which concept of peace was to be accepted has yet to be resolved. For some, the absence of direct violence seems more important; for others, the absence of exploitation is key. But until we are more in agreement about the kind of peace we are interested in making, there will continue to be major differences in the various approaches to peacemaking. At one end of the s p e c t r u m , those w h o believe that peace is simply order or the absence of violence may argue that peace can or should be enf o r c e d with military action. At the other end of the spectrum, those w h o believe that peace must include justice may argue that peace cannot be enf o r c e d and can only be b r o u g h t about by negotiations that take into account justice and the underlying needs of the parties. The international system has mechanisms that span the full range of these points of view. For a long time, distinctions have been m a d e in the U N between p e a c e m a k i n g , p e a c e k e e p i n g , and p e a c e - b u i l d i n g ( B o u t r o s - G h a l i 1992).

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Without getting into an argument over technical definitions, let it suffice to say that peace-building generally includes building the conditions of society so that there will be peace. In this area we might include such methods as human rights education, development and development aid, and reconciliation and the restoration of c o m m u n i t y f o l l o w i n g a violent conflict. Peacekeeping, in the broader sense, involves keeping parties f r o m fighting or otherwise doing h a r m to each other. In the narrower sense, it has been used to describe the particular multinational operations e m p l o y e d to restore and maintain peace between hostile parties. P e a c e m a k i n g is usually taken to mean helping bring hostile parties to agreement. Let us explore all three of these, with an e m p h a s i s on p e a c e k e e p i n g and p e a c e m a k i n g and with the recognition that they overlap somewhat.

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PEACEMAKING A N D T H E U N I T E D NATIONS CHARTER

T h e U N Charter includes two primary ways of providing for peacemaking and f o r international peace and security. Chapter VI of the Charter focuses on P e a c e f u l Settlement of Disputes, while C h a p t e r VII relates to Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. Article 33, the first article of Chapter VI, provides that the parties to any dispute, the continuance of w h i c h is likely to endanger the m a i n t e n a n c e of international p e a c e and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional a g e n c i e s or arrangements, or other peaceful m e a n s of their o w n choice.

W h e n parties are unable to negotiate their way through a dispute on their own, the Security Council may call upon them to settle their dispute by any of these means, and it, or other parts of the United Nations, may assist them by providing a third party w h o may help them do so. Enquiry and fact-finding are methods by which a third party attempts simply to find out the facts of the situation. In mediation and conciliation, a third party, sometimes in the form of a special representative of the Secretary-General, sometimes in the form of a commission, helps the conflicting parties communicate and come to agreement when they are unable to do so. Under arbitration, the third party makes a decision about the conflicting claims of the parties; sometimes the parties can choose whether to accept this decision, but under binding arbitration, the parties are bound to accept the decision of the arbitrator. Under judicial settlement, the Charter provides for submitting certain types of legal disputes b e t w e e n states to the International Court of Justice in T h e H a g u e , where the court will rule on the legitimacy of the case under international law.

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Mediation has become increasingly important in resolving international disputes. The "quiet diplomacy" of the UN Secretary-General or his representatives has been used in a long series of crises in the Middle East, beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through to the Iran-Iraq War, as well as in other regional areas. Mediation has also been used by international regional organizations such as the Organization for African Unity, as well as by powerful states such as the United States—for example, when it mediated the peace between Israel and Egypt during the Camp David negotiations—and by less powerful states such as Algeria, which mediated the release of the U.S. hostages held by Iran. Mediation is also practiced in the form of what is called "second-track diplomacy," where individuals such as academic specialists in conflict resolution, or representatives of the International Committee o f the Red Cross or of religious organizations such as the Mennonite Conciliation Service or the Friends World Committee for Consultation (Quakers), help to facilitate communication or to run workshops aimed at solving the problems underlying the conflict. UN enforcement action constitutes another approach to peacemaking that has become more available to the international system since the end of the Cold War. Enforcement action is covered under the collective security provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially the nonmilitary sanctions provided in Article 41 and the military sanctions provided in Article 42. While some consider that the Charter conditions for military enforcement have never been met, due to the failure to set up UN forces under a Military Staff Committee (Articles 4 3 - 4 7 ) , most would agree that UN-authorized operations in Korea in 1950 and in Iraq/Kuwait in 1991 constitute the primary examples of UN military enforcement. Enforcement action is generally considered when a state has clearly violated the terms of the Charter and carried out international aggressive action. Military enforcement actions have tended to be led and staffed by one or several of the great powers. There are clear differences of opinion as to whether military enforcement action constitutes an approach to peacemaking or is better considered simply as war. Nonmilitary sanctions are another approach to peacemaking. Article 41 of the UN Charter says that "the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions," including "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations." The old debate over whether sanctions are appropriate and effective was renewed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Peace organizations generally supported sanctions as an alternative to war, before the war, but opposed sanctions as harmful to the Iraqi people after the war. If the purpose was to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, there were early indications

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that s a n c t i o n s m i g h t h a v e w o r k e d . If the p u r p o s e , on the o t h e r h a n d , w a s to get S a d d a m H u s s e i n out of Iraq, s a n c t i o n s w e r e not likely to be e f f e c tive. T h e a m b i g u i t y b e t w e e n t h o s e t w o goals in m e s s a g e s f r o m the U n i t e d States m a y be o n e of the r e a s o n s sanctions did not s u c c e e d within the short t i m e period they w e r e g i v e n . In the 1930s, s a n c t i o n s w e r e seen as a p r i m a r y g u a r a n t o r , w i t h i n the s y s t e m of c o l l e c t i v e security, f o r p r e v e n t i n g w a r s . A f t e r the failure of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s s a n c t i o n s against Italy in 1936 with respect to E t h i o p i a , s e n t i m e n t turned against sanctions. M o s t writers t o d a y h a v e c o n c l u d e d that s a n c t i o n s are not e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l on m a j o r f o r e i g n policy goals but m a y b e u s e f u l on limited g o a l s . T h e d e f i n i t i o n of sanctions has c h a n g e d o v e r time. By the time of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , s a n c t i o n s m e a n t a c t i o n s t a k e n b y international b o d i e s to e n f o r c e international law. S i n c e then, the t e r m has c o m e to i n c l u d e unilateral acts and even the use of e c o n o m i c policies f o r ordinary d i p l o m a t i c i n f l u e n c e . E v a l u a t i o n of the s u c c e s s of s a n c t i o n s m a y be very d i f f e r e n t if o n e s e p a r a t e s out the unilateral f r o m the m o r e c o n s e n s u a l l y based actions of international o r g a n i z a t i o n s .

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PEACEKEEPING

O n O c t o b e r 10, 1988, U N S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l P é r e z de C u é l l a r accepted the N o b e l P e a c e P r i z e on b e h a l f of the 10,500 m e m b e r s of p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s . H e p a i d t r i b u t e to the half m i l l i o n y o u n g m e n a n d w o m e n f r o m f i f t y - e i g h t c o u n t r i e s w h o s e r v e d in U N p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s , and e s pecially to the 7 3 3 w h o h a d lost their lives. Both he and N o r w a y ' s p r i m e minister, G r o H a r l e m B r u n d t l a n d , e x p r e s s e d their c o n c e r n f o r the financial status of p e a c e k e e p i n g , particularly the fact that m a j o r p o w e r s are in c o n s i d e r a b l e a r r e a r s . At that t i m e , the a n n u a l cost of p e a c e k e e p i n g activities w a s a b o u t $ 3 0 0 m i l l i o n . By 1994, annual U N p e a c e k e e p i n g e x p e n d i t u r e s had r e a c h e d $ 3 . 6 b i l l i o n . P e a c e k e e p i n g h a d c o m e of a g e but w a s e n d a n gered by the m a s s i v e costs that a c c o m p a n y certain of its aspects. T h e r e is n o o f f i c i a l U N d e f i n i t i o n of peacekeeping. H o w e v e r , the d e f inition a d o p t e d by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e A c a d e m y (IPA), a n o n g o v e r n mental o r g a n i z a t i o n ( N G O ) c l o s e l y related to the U N that has u n d e r t a k e n m u c h of the training f o r U N p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s , h a s been seen as c l o s e to official. U n d e r that d e f i n i t i o n , p e a c e k e e p i n g is the prevention, c o n t a i n m e n t , m o d e r a t i o n and termination of hostilities bet w e e n or within states, through the m e d i u m o f a p e a c e f u l third party int e r v e n t i o n o r g a n i z e d and d i r e c t e d internationally, u s i n g m u l t i n a t i o n a l f o r c e s o f s o l d i e r s , p o l i c e , and c i v i l i a n s to restore and m a i n t a i n p e a c e .

(IPA 1984: 22)

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A wide range of interpretations are still possible under that definition. UN publications distinguish between two kinds of peacekeeping operations: observer missions and peacekeeping forces. Observers are not armed, while soldiers in peacekeeping forces have weapons, but generally are authorized to use them only in self-defense. By 1990 there had been eight peacekeeping forces and ten observer missions. By June 1996 there had been forty-one peacekeeping operations (see UNDPI 1990: 3; U N D P I 1996). Peacekeeping is not based on sending a fighting force to stop a violent conflict. Rather, the premise of peacekeeping is that inserting an impartial presence in the region will allow the parties to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict. There are differences in emphasis between the military and civilian role in peacekeeping operations, and different proportions in each operation, to achieve the double objective of reducing the violence and helping to move toward peaceful settlement. Peacekeeping is clearly different f r o m enforcement action or action based on collective security. The separation of peacekeeping from enforcement is critical as both peacekeeping and enforcement are made increasingly possible by the condominium of the great powers in the aftermath of the Cold War. The fact that peacekeeping missions are deployed in countries with their consent, that they are unarmed or lightly armed and use force only in self-defense, and that they are composed largely of middle-level powers whose degree of neutrality in the conflict is likely to be perceived as higher than that of the great powers, are significant factors that may well be important to their success. •

The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping

The changing world situation in the late 1980s led not only to an increase in peacekeeping, but also to the first UN Security Council summit meeting. In the concluding statement of the summit on January 31, 1992, the heads of state invited the Secretary-General to prepare "an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the f r a m e w o r k and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping" (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 117-118). Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in his resulting report, spoke of the increasing demands for peacekeeping: Thirteen p e a c e - k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n the years 1945 and 1987; 13 others since then. A n estimated 5 2 8 , 0 0 0 military, police and c i v i l i a n personnel had s e r v e d under the f l a g of the U n i t e d N a tions until January 1992. . . . T h e c o s t s of these operations h a v e aggregated s o m e $ 8 . 3 billion till 1992. . . . P e a c e - k e e p i n g operations approved at present are estimated to cost c l o s e to $3 billion in the current 12-month period. (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 5 7 - 5 8 )

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A m e c h a n i s m not originally provided in the U N Charter had evolved over time to b e c o m e the m a j o r item in the UN budget, with the exception of the specialized agencies. H o w did U N peacekeeping evolve? As definitions of peacekeeping differ, so consequently do writers differ on when U N peacekeeping began. For some analysts who include observer missions (e.g., W i s e m a n 1983), U N p e a c e k e e p i n g began with the U N Special C o m m i t t e e on the B a l k a n s ( U N S C O B ) , created by the U N General Assembly ( U N G A ) in 1947 to investigate the Greek allegations of Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslavian guerrilla infiltration ( U N G A 1947). For others (e.g., H i g g i n s 1996), including the U N itself, p e a c e k e e p i n g began with the U N Truce Supervision Organization ( U N T S O ) in Palestine, which e m a n a t e d f r o m a 1948 Security Council resolution but was to be under the authority of the O f f i c e of the M e d i a t o r created by the General A s s e m b l y ( U N G A 1948; U N S C 1948). U N T S O is one of the U N peacekeeping observer missions that still exists. Those early operations were the predecessors of later p e a c e k e e p i n g missions. T h e s e small early missions gradually developed a separation between the political mediation side and the military operations but maintained communication between them. T h e term peacekeeping was created to describe the first U N E m e r gency Force ( U N E F ) , which was established in E g y p t in 1956 to secure the c e a s e - f i r e and to provide f a c e - s a v i n g for the w i t h d r a w a l of Israeli, British, and French troops in the Suez crisis. A d e a d l o c k in the Security Council threw the conflict into the General Assembly under the 1951 Uniting for Peace Resolution. (This resolution allowed the General Assembly to take up security matters if the Security Council was unable to do so because it was blocked by a veto by one of the m a j o r powers.) T h e idea of a United N a t i o n s e m e r g e n c y f o r c e was first presented to the General Assembly in the wee hours of the night of N o v e m b e r 1 - 2 , 1956, by Lester Pearson of C a n a d a , and received the support of the United States. T h e n , under the authority of General Assembly resolutions, the Secretary-General brought together the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of C a n a d a , Norway, C o l o m b i a , and India to produce a plan for the establishment of a United Nations command under the leadership of M a j o r - G e n e r a l E. L. M. Burns, a Canadian who was U N T S O chief of staff, with personnel to be recruited f r o m states that were not p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the Security Council. Several days later the plan passed the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y by a vote of 57 to 0, with Egypt announcing acceptance of the plan the next day ( U N G A Resolutions 997, 998, 999, 1000, and 1001). Parts of the new force were on the ground within a w e e k . Although the United States was e x c l u d e d f r o m sending troops, it did contribute roughly 40 percent of total U N authorized expenditures f o r UNEF. U N E F I was to be the first of a series of larger U N military operations that eventually led to a f i n a n c i a l and constitutional crisis that threatened

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the entire UN. Lester Pearson had spoken in the Canadian House of C o m m o n s debates of discussion as early as 1953 on replacing U N T S O with a police f o r c e that would have greater authority. T h e Suez crisis b r o u g h t such a force into being, with U N E F I having a m a x i m u m force level of 6,173. T h e debate over the d e g r e e of military f o r c e the UN would control, and the method of that control, had arisen first in 1945 in San Francisco. T h e debate m o v e d t o w a r d increasing military authority f o r the U N with U N E F in 1956 and the Organisation des Nations Unies en C o n g o ( O N U C ) in 1960. It arose again at the close of the Cold War, when the c o m m o n interests of the f o r m e r s u p e r p o w e r s and m a j o r p o w e r s led to renewed consideration of both large and small peacekeeping missions, as well as military forces for e n f o r c e m e n t actions under collective security. U N E F I was f o l l o w e d by an even larger force of 19,825 in the July 1960-June 1964 O N U C operation. Congolese independence from Belgium on June 29, 1960, was followed in rapid succession by a Congolese A r m y mutiny, the return of Belgian troops, the proclamation of the independence of Katanga province, and a C o n g o l e s e request for UN military assistance. With a mandate considerably more vague than that of previous U N forces, the U N Security Council agreed on July 14, 1960, to provide military assistance, with the Secretary-General clarifying the mandate on July 18 to indicate that restoration of order was the main task, that the force was exclusively under U N c o m m a n d and would not b e c o m e a party to internal conflict, that military units would be drawn largely f r o m African states and not permanent m e m b e r s of the Security Council, and that they would use force only in self-defense. Over the course of the operation, many of these tenets were violated as the UN force was drawn into what became a civil war. In spite of Secretary-General Dag H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s mediation efforts and the creation of a Conciliation C o m m i s s i o n , the central part of the C o n g o operation became the UN use of force. Financing b e c a m e a p r o b l e m . While the Soviets originally supported the operation, they later became severe critics and refused to pay financial assessments associated with the operation. This, coupled with a French refusal to pay in the U N E F I f o r c e , led to an International Court of Justice advisory opinion and a m a j o r financial crisis f o r the UN. W h e r e peacekeeping had arisen out of the inability of the Military Staff C o m m i t t e e to function and because of the Cold War use of the veto in the Security Council, it had now received its most severe challenge by what was in effect a financial veto, and not only across Cold War lines. In the same period, h o w e v e r , the U N P e a c e k e e p i n g Force in Cyprus ( U N F I C Y P ) was launched in M a r c h 1964, achieving a m a x i m u m size of 6,411 and continuing to the present. U N F I C Y P has generally been considered a success in spite of the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the failure to

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move toward any settlement. It does, however, raise the question of whether the stability provided by a peacekeeping force can forestall the pressures necessary to bring parties to agree to negotiate. The combination of the financial and neutrality questions that arose from the Congo operation, and the withdrawal under fire of UNEF I in 1967 at the demand of Egypt, led to the first dormant period in UN peacekeeping. Also, the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, who had been so significant in the development of both peacekeeping and "quiet diplom a c y " and their effective linkage, had been killed in an airplane accident in the Congo in 1961, leaving a leadership gap in this area. A brief resurgence for peacekeeping came after the October 1973 war in the Middle East with the creation of the second UNEF from 1973 to 1979, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in 1974 at the contested Israeli-Syrian border, and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in March 1978. UNEF II was superseded by the arrangements under the Camp David agreement negotiated by the United States between Israel and Egypt. It has been widely regarded as successful during its period of operation, but it may be even more significant in terms of the criteria for successful peacekeeping that the Secretary-General laid down at the time of its creation. These will be discussed below. Of the other two operations, both continue. UNDOF is widely regarded as one of the most successful, because it has continued to reduce tensions in the Golan Heights area, and UNIFIL is viewed as one of the least successful, having been overrun by Israeli armies in June 1982. No new peacekeeping operations were launched in the decade between 1978 and 1988, but in 1988 a whole new era of peacekeeping arose for the UN.

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PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING AFTER THE COLD WAR

At the end of the Cold War, when the focus of conflict turned from the threat of nuclear war to ethnic conflict in the developing world and elsewhere, there was an enormous rise in peacekeeping operations. Figure 5.1 indicates the geographic spread of both completed and ongoing UN peacekeeping operations from 1948 to the end of 1996. Table 5.1 (pp. 7 4 - 7 5 ) shows that the sixteen current operations vary greatly in start date, size, budget, and purpose, as is revealed to some degree in the title of each mission. While a few of the current operations are almost as old as the UN itself, most began in the 1990s. M a n y described these conflicts as a new type, although in reality they were not significantly different from the hundreds of intrastate ethnic, religious, racial, tribal, and national conflicts that had been occurring with

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Figure 5.1 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Source: United Nations Department of Public Information in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacekeeping Financing Division (OPPBA), DPI/1634/Rev. 7, December 16, 1997. Used by permission of the United Nations. Notes: Peacekeeping operations 1948-December 1, 1997 total 46. Operations underway on December 1, 1997 total 15. Personnel as of November 30, 1997: Military and civilian police personnel serving total 16,849 (includes 12,694 troops, 1,128 military observers, and 3,027 civilian police); countries contributing military and civilian police personnel total 71; fatalities among personnel assigned to 46 peacekeeping operations from 1948-November 30, 1997 total 1,530 (includes 1,407 military, 50 civilian police, 42 civilian international staff, and 31 local staff). Financial aspects: Estimated total cost of operations from 1948-June 30, 1997 total about $17.3 billion; estimated cost of operations from July 1, 1997-June 30, 1998 total about $1.1 billion; outstanding contributions to peacekeeping on November 30, 1997 total about $1.6 billion.

regularity throughout the Cold War. The difference was that throughout the Cold War period the two sides had interpreted them as conflicts involving a competition between c o m m u n i s m and capitalism, while now they were seen simply as intrastate conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, because of the end of the Cold War and the pattern of Cold War v e t o e s there, also found that it could make decisions and take action it could not have taken before. This led not

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only to a t r e m e n d o u s rise in the n u m b e r of p e a c e k e e p i n g operations, but also to a blending of traditional p e a c e k e e p i n g with e n f o r c e m e n t in some cases and with elections monitoring, human rights monitoring, and education and other techniques in others. These new types of operations came to be called second-generation peacekeeping. Missions such as those in C a m b o dia, El Salvador, Haiti, and Mozambique are widely regarded as successes; they helped oversee elections and rebuild societies where there was agreement to do so. On the other hand, in places suffering a breakdown of society, rioting and looting, and a continuing struggle for power between factions—such as in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia—action by the UN, other groups, the United States alone, or NATO has not been regarded as entirely successful. It has become increasingly clear that there must be a peace to keep before peacekeeping can be useful. Following the tremendous rise in peacekeeping in the early 1990s, the U N entered a period of reassessment and began to step back f r o m its enormous investment and to draw conclusions on the lessons learned f r o m peacekeeping operations. A m o n g these was that it was essential to have the size and nature of the force fit the situation. The UN also began to realize that peace could not be enforced from the outside and that there was no substitute for political negotiations.

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T H E C O N D I T I O N S O F SUCCESS

The chief conditions of success in p e a c e k e e p i n g , whether for restraining violence or for resolving conflict, are more likely to be political than military. A clear mandate adopted with the greatest degree of consensus possible and the consent of the parties to the conflict may be a m o n g the most important conditions. But there are other conditions that have developed out of the experience of U N peacekeeping. T h e set of operating conditions that the U N S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l attached to the deployment of the second United Nations Emergency Force in 1973 has c o m e to be regarded as prerequisites for success. D e p l o y m e n t must be done only 1. with the full confidence and backing of the Security Council, and 2. with the full cooperation and consent of the host countries. The force must 3. be under UN c o m m a n d through the Secretary-General, 4. have complete f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t in the countries, 5. be international in c o m p o s i t i o n , with national contingents acceptable to the parties in conflict, 6. act impartially,

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Table 5.1

Security

Current Peacekeeping Operations

UNTSO Since June 1948 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Strength 3 : 156 Fatalities b : 38 Budget estimate for 1997: $23.7 million

UNMOGIP Since January 1949 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan Strength: 44 Fatalities: 9 Budget estimate for 1997: $6.4 million

UNF1CYP Since March 1964 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Strength: 1,267 Fatalities: 168 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $48 million (gross) UN assessment on Member States: $29 million; and voluntary contributions by Cyprus ($15.3 million) and Greece ($3.7 million)

UNDOF Since June 1974 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force Strength: 1,048 Fatalities: 39 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $33.6 million (gross)

UN1FIL Since March 1978 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon Strength on November 30, 1997: 4,475 Fatalities: 222 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $125 million (gross)

UNIKOM Since April 1991 United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission Strength: 1,049 Fatalities: 10 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $51.5 million (gross) Two-thirds of the cost ($33 million) is paid by Kuwait

MINURSO Since April 1991 United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Strength: 242 Fatalities: 7 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $30.2 million (gross) Proposed additional requirements requested due to resumption of identification process: $17.9 million (gross)

UNOMIG Since August 1993 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia Strength: 106 Fatalities: 3 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $18.6 million (gross) Indicated financial implications related to the planned expansion of UNOMIG: about $1.7 million

UNMOT Since December 1994 United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan Strength: 44 Fatalities: I Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $8.3 million (gross) Indicated financial implications related to the planned expansion of UNMOT: about $13.7 million for 6 months

UNPREDEP Since March 1995 United Nations Preventive Deployment Force Strength: 928 Fatalities: 4 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $46.5 million (gross)

UNMIBH Since December 1995 United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Incorporates International Police Task Force, IPTF) Strength: 2,047 Fatalities: 10 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $189.5 million (gross)

(continues)

Peacekeeping

Table 5.1

and Peacemaking

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continued

UNTAES Since January 1996 United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovakia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium Strength: 11,226 Fatalities: 10 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $275.4 million (gross) UNMOP Since January 1996 United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka Strength: 28 Cost included in U N M I B H (see above)

M I P O N U H Since December 1997 United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Authorized strength: 300 Estimated cost for six months: about S14 million As of October 1997, revised budget estimates for the period July 1, 1997-June 30, 1998 amounted to $20.6 million (gross) and related to maintaining M I P O N U H ' s predecessor missions, U N S M I H (ended June 1997) and U N T M I H ( A u g u s t - N o v e m b e r 1997) and to the liquidation of U N T M I H

MONUA Since July 1997 United Nations Observer Mission in Angola Strength: 2,795 Fatalities: 4 Budget appropriation July 1997-June 1998: $155 million (gross) Source: United Nations Department of Public Information in consultation with the Department of P e a c e k e e p i n g Operations and the P e a c e k e e p i n g Financing Division ( O P P B A ) , DPI/1634/Rev. 7, D e c e m b e r 1997. Used by permission of the United Nations. Note: U N T S O and U N M O G I P are f u n d e d f r o m the U N ' s regular budget. Costs to the UN of the 13 other current operations are f i n a n c e d f r o m their own separate accounts on the basis of legally binding assessments on all M e m b e r States. For these missions, the budget estimates and appropriations given a b o v e are for one year f r o m July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998, reflecting the financial periods established by the General Assembly in its resolution A / 4 9 / 2 3 3 A , unless otherwise indicated. a. Strength figures include military and/or civilian police personnal on N o v e m b e r 30, 1997. b. Fatalities figures include military, civilian police, and civilian international and local personnel as of N o v e m b e r 30, 1997.

7. use force only in self-defense, and 8. be supplied and administered under UN arrangements. (UN 1973) Perhaps the most important conditions here are the nonuse of force except in self-defense and the consent of the parties to station a force. UNIFIL (Lebanon) and O N U C (Congo) have become classic examples of missions where several of the basic conditions were not met and where success was at best questionable. It has been argued that it is not the use of force per se that is the problem, but the unsuccessful use of force where the intervention does not receive the support of the majority of the population. A guideline for success may be that force can only be effectively used to restrain a very small minority of the population (including a nonmajority-supported leadership)

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when that minority is violating agreed-upon norms, as is the case with the domestic use of police in participatory democratic societies. T h e emphasis by some analysts on containing violence rather than resolving conflict has led others to conclude that either (1) peacekeeping is simply p a c i f i c a t i o n , or (2) p e a c e k e e p i n g , by forestalling any " h u r t i n g stalemate," may r e m o v e any incentives f o r the parties to negotiate or resolve their conflict. Cyprus is often the classic case mentioned. Probably the most important factor in success, then, is not the mission on the ground but whether it is accompanied by sufficient efforts to facilitate the resolution of the u n d e r l y i n g conflict that led to the violence. W h i l e participants in the actual operation may do harm, if they are unskilled, partial, badly c o m m a n d e d , or without sufficient resources or information, they cannot resolve the underlying conflict on their own. Reducing violence and helping resolve conflict are both important criteria f o r success, but the cost f a c t o r must also be considered. C o n f l i c t is costly in terms of time, money, and opportunities forgone; and violent conflict is even more costly, because it takes lives as well. Where conflicts remain unresolved, there is the constant,potential for the resumption of violence. The cost of simply maintaining order without resolving underlying conflicts may not be worth it, either to the local or the international community. Perhaps a p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e that keeps order in a society for longer than a generation without resolving conflicts should be considered not a success but a failure. Perhaps a p e a c e k e e p i n g force, to provide real security, must always have both elements: the restraint of violence and assistance in the resolution of conflicts. Other factors, such as leadership, organization, and c o m m u n i c a t i o n , are also important. A d e q u a t e logistical support is critical. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1995) m a k e s particular note of this in An Agenda for Peace. A d e q u a t e and timely f i n a n c i n g is also crucial to the success of p e a c e k e e p i n g or any organizational mission. W h e r e p e a c e k e e p i n g forces are in considerable arrears, as many are, this constrains their effectiveness both logistically and politically. Perhaps financial pledges might be used as an additional gauge of the d e g r e e of c o n s e n s u s for an operation, with operations not being authorized unless there is clear financial support. It is not certain that military personnel are the best peacekeepers. Michael Harbottle made the point that one of the lessons of UNEF, O N U C , and U N F I C Y P was that the professional soldier was no better as a peacekeeper than a volunteer. Volunteers are more likely to want to be there, and because they c o m e f r o m all walks of life, they may be more likely to have a c o m m o n bond with those in the communities in which they are deployed (Harbottle 1971). A m o n g the factors critical to the success of an operation are the attitudes of the m e m b e r s of the force, their ability to be sensitive to cultural differences, and their ability to solve problems and to facilitate the

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resolution of conflicts. Increasingly, the composition of peacekeeping missions is more and more diverse, including not only military personnel and civilian police, but administrators, observers, and other civilian personnel. Civilians trained in the nonviolent resolution of conflict may have an increasingly important role to play in international peacekeeping, especially perhaps in the context of c o m m u n i t y - w i d e conflict. Nongovernmental nonviolent p e a c e k e e p i n g forces organized on the Gandhian shanti sena model have sent volunteers into situations of violence to monitor human rights or border crossings (see Desai 1972). Peace Brigades International is one of these, with an international board f r o m all continents. Originally the World Peace Brigade, it was f o u n d e d in Beirut, Lebanon, on January 1, 1962, and has sent transnational teams of observers to conflicts in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central A m e r i c a . T h e conflict between the goals of reconciliation through mediation (which stresses impartiality) and c o n f r o n t a t i o n in the n a m e of j u s t i c e (which tends to stress partisan support of one side of the struggle) has been a part of the strategy debate within Peace Brigades International. A similar but later group, Witness f o r Peace, has operated both as a nonviolent witness and as a tripwire and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s device to k e e p U.S. citizens a w a r e of what the U.S. and other g o v e r n m e n t s are doing or planning in Central A m e r i c a . It has sent observers as support f o r local c o m m u n i t i e s that are w o r k i n g f o r d e v e l o p m e n t and h u m a n rights in the face of r e p r e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s . As n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations bec o m e increasingly involved in d a y - t o - d a y p o l i c y m a k i n g and administration in the U n i t e d Nations, p e r h a p s there is a role that trained, u n a r m e d civilians skilled in nonviolent action and conflict resolution can play to improve the U N ' s p e a c e m a k i n g and peacekeeping capacity on the ground.

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CONCLUSION

Perhaps the d i l e m m a s the U N faces would not be so difficult if the international system were not so biased toward the utility of violent force. The efficacy of violence is a myth: at best, only some w i n — a n d at the great expense of others. Because violent force does not m a k e peace or justice, its use by the U N would not seem to be the most cost-effective use of its limited resources. It may well be that the situation the U N is in with respect to f u n d i n g and general support may, in contrast to popular thinking, be due to the overuse and m i s u s e of violent f o r c e rather than to its inability to bring about international (and subnational) peace and security. T h e Nobel Peace Prize was a w a r d e d after a period of m a n y small, less violent p e a c e k e e p ing missions. Criticism has c o m e f o l l o w i n g the U N m i s s i o n s in Somalia

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and the f o r m e r Yugoslavia. Perhaps it is time to have a more pointed debate on the merits of long- versus short-term, and more violent versus less violent, approaches to international peace, security, and justice. If the international system is really to m o v e in the direction of international peace, security, and justice, it must o v e r c o m e the myth of the efficacy of violence and take on the more difficult task of creating security cooperatively. Less violent, longer-term means for providing international peace and security, such as p e a c e m a k i n g and peace-building, may hold m u c h more promise than traditional e n f o r c e m e n t — o r even peacekeeping.

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QUESTIONS

1.

H o w have the concepts of peace and security evolved?

2.

Do you think peacekeeping and p e a c e m a k i n g will be more attainable now that the Cold War is over?

3.

Is it in the interest of the United States to cooperate with the United Nations in its peacekeeping and p e a c e m a k i n g efforts?

4.

Is the world more secure now that the Cold War is over?

5.

Should the United Nations have its own military force? How might this raise concerns over state sovereignty?

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SUGGESTED READINGS

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros ( 1 9 9 2 ) An Agenda for Peace. Second edition. New York: United Nations. Harbottle, Michael (1971) The Blue Berets. London: Leo Cooper. Higgins, Rosalyn ( 1 9 9 6 ) United Nations Peacekeeping. 4 vols. London: Oxford University Press. International Peace Academy (1984) Peacekeeper's Handbook. New York: Pergamon Press. UN Department of Public Information ( U N D P I ) ( 1 9 9 6 ) The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. Third edition. UN: UNDPI. Weiss, Thomas G., ed. ( 1 9 9 3 ) Collective Security in a Changing World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. White, N. D. ( 1 9 9 0 ) The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. N e w York: Manchester University Press. Wiseman, Henry ( 1 9 8 3 ) "United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview." In Henry Wiseman, ed. Peacekeeping, Appraisals and Proposals. N e w York: Pergamon Press.

Part 2 The Global Economy

6 Controversies in International Trade Bruce E. Moon

International trade is often treated purely as an e c o n o m i c matter that can and should be divorced f r o m politics. That is a mistake, because trade not only shapes our e c o n o m y but also determines the kind of world in which we live. The far-reaching consequences of trade pose f u n d a m e n t a l choices for all of us. Certainly citizens must understand those consequences before j u d g i n g the inherently controversial issues that arise over trade policy. More than that, we cannot even m a k e sound c o n s u m e r decisions without weighing carefully the consequences of our own behavior.

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T H E CASE FOR TRADE

The motives that generate international trade are familiar. Consumers who buy foreign products that are better or cheaper than domestic ones increase their material standard of living. Producers who sell their products for a higher price or in greater quantity abroad than at home increase their profit and wealth. Most p o l i c y m a k e r s believe that g o v e r n m e n t s should w e l c o m e trade because it provides benefits for the nation and the global e c o n o m y as well as for the individual. Exports produce jobs for workers, profits for corporations, and revenues that can be used to p u r c h a s e imports. Imports increase the welfare (well-being) of citizens because they can acquire more for their money as well as obtain products that are not available f r o m domestic sources. The stronger e c o n o m y that f o l l o w s can fuel increasing power and prestige for the nation as a whole. Further, the resultant interdependence and shared prosperity a m o n g countries can strengthen global cooperation and maintain international peace.

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Considerable evidence supports the view that trade improves p r o d u c tivity, consumption, and therefore material standard of living (Moon 1998). Trade successes have generated spurts of national growth, most notably in East Asia. The global e c o n o m y has grown most rapidly during periods of trade expansion, especially after World War II, and has slowed when trade levels have fallen, especially during the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s. Periods of international peace have also coincided with trade-induced growth, while war has followed declines in trade and prosperity. T h e private b e n e f i t s of trade have led individual consumers and producers to e m b r a c e it with zeal for the last half-century. As a result, trade has assumed a m u c h greater role in almost all nations, with exports n o w constituting about a quarter of the e c o n o m y in most countries and well over half in many. Even in the United States, which is less reliant on trade than virtually any other country in the world, the export sector is now about 10 percent of G N P (gross national product, d e f i n e d as the total of goods and services p r o d u c e d by a c o u n t r y ' s citizens in a given year). Smaller nations, especially those of the third world, must engage in more trade because they can neither supply all their o w n needs nor provide a market sizable enough f o r their own industries. G o v e r n m e n t s have not prevented this growth in trade levels; in fact, at least since World War II, most have encouraged and promoted it. All but a h a n d f u l of nations now rely so heavily on j o b s in the export sector and on f o r e i g n products to meet domestic needs that d i s c o n t i n u i n g trade is no longer an option. To attempt it would require a vast restructuring that would entail huge e c o n o m i c losses and m a s s i v e social c h a n g e . Furthermore, according to the "liberal" trade theory accepted by most economists, governments have no compelling reason to interfere with the private markets that achieve such benefits. Liberal economic theory is not to be confused with the a m b i g u o u s way that the term liberal is applied in U.S. politics. Liberalism, as used throughout this chapter, o p p o s e s g o v e r n m e n t interference with the market. From its roots in the work of Scottish political economist Adam Smith ( 1 7 2 3 - 1 7 9 0 ) and English economist David Ricardo ( 1 7 7 2 - 1 8 2 3 ) , this liberal perspective has e m p h a s i z e d that international trade can benefit all nations simultaneously, without requiring governmental involvement (Smith 1910). According to R i c a r d o ' s theory of comparative advantage (Ricardo 1981), no nation need lose in order for another to win, because trade allows total global production to rise. The key to creating these gains from trade is the efficient allocation of resources whereby each nation specializes by producing goods in which it has a comparative advantage. For example, a nation with especially fertile f a r m l a n d and a f a v o r a b l e climate could produce f o o d m u c h m o r e cheaply than a country that lacked this c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e . Similarly, a nation with efficient m a n u f a c t u r i n g

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facilities could produce clothing more cheaply than one better suited to raising crops. If countries each specialized in the goods they produced efficiently, they could trade their excess production to one another and both would be better off, because trade allows each nation to apply its resources to their most efficient use. No action by governments is required to bring about this trade, however, since profit-motivated investors will see to it that producers specialize in the goods in which they have a comparative advantage, and consumers will naturally purchase the best or cheapest products. Thus, liberal theory concludes that international trade conducted by private actors free of government control will maximize global welfare. Though trade levels have grown massively in the two centuries since Adam Smith, government regulation of trade has varied from tightly constraining to relatively permissive. However, no government has followed the advice of economic theorists to refrain from controlling trade altogether. This curious disparity between accepted economic theory and established political practice results in part from concerns about whether trade is always beneficial and in part from doubts about whether government action is required to bring about the benefits of trade. The most notable focal point of government anxiety surrounds the disruptive impact of the trade deficits that often arise in trading nations. A trade deficit exists when a nation's imports are greater than its exports, meaning that its residents buy more from other nations than it sells to them.

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T R A D E DEFICITS

Most states try to control trade in order to minimize its potentially negative consequences; at the same time, they want to capture the benefits claimed for it by liberal theory. In walking this tightrope, governments have sought trade expansion just as economic liberalism would recommend, but they also have been heavily influenced by a dissenting body of thought known as mercantilism. Mercantilism originated with the "mercantile" policy (i.e., commercial or trade policy) of European nations, especially England, from the sixteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth. While mercantilism does not oppose trade, it holds that governments must regulate it in order for trade to advance various aspects o f the national interest. The long-term aspirations of mercantilists go beyond immediate consumption gains to include national self-sufficiency, the vitality of key industries, and a powerful state in foreign policy. The immediate goal—and often the focal point of trade policy in mercantilist states—is to avoid incurring a deficit in the balance of trade. Mercantilists observe that the rosy evaluation of trade advanced by Smith and Ricardo was predicated on their expectation that any given

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nation's imports would more or less balance its exports. However, despite the e f f o r t s of nations to avoid potentially d a m a g i n g imbalances, trade deficits are now considered c o m m o n p l a c e . For example, the United States has run a substantial trade deficit for more than two decades, with imports surpassing exports by over $100 billion annually in recent years. The consequences of these deficits are complex and controversial. If a n a t i o n ' s imports are greater than its exports, it f o l l o w s that national c o n s u m p t i o n must exceed its production. One might ask how anyone could object to an arrangement that allows a nation to c o n s u m e more than it produces: after all, a trade deficit amounting to more than $500 per person annually allows U.S. citizens to e n j o y a higher standard of living than would otherwise be possible. The answer lies in recognizing that such a situation must have adverse repercussions (especially in the future), just as individuals cannot continue to spend more than they earn without eventually suffering detrimental consequences. Mercantilists fear that e x c e s s i v e imports permit f o r e i g n e r s to e n j o y e m p l o y m e n t and profits f r o m production that might otherwise benefit citizens of the h o m e country. On the face of it, a trade deficit of over $ 1 0 0 billion per year would a p p e a r to transfer millions of j o b s out of the U.S. e c o n o m y . For e x a m p l e , high levels of u n e m p l o y m e n t in Detroit and low levels of u n e m p l o y m e n t in Tokyo have been ascribed partially to the massive sales of Japanese cars in the United States. Liberals correctly note, however, that trade imbalances cannot be evaluated so easily, in part because they trigger complex flows of money that are also unbalanced. For example, the U.S. trade deficit means that more m o n e y f l o w s out of the United States e c o n o m y in the form of dollars to pay f o r imports than f l o w s back into the e c o n o m y through p a y m e n t s for U.S. goods purchased by foreigners. The consequences of the trade deficit depend in large part on what happens to the excess dollars that would appear to be piling up abroad. In practice, most of those dollars have found their way back into the U.S. economy, because foreigners have used them to purchase U.S. Treasury bonds and real estate and to f i n a n c e the takeover of U.S. businesses as well as m a k e new investments in the United States. Such capital flows can offset a trade deficit and render it harmless in the short run, but they only postpone the inevitable need to balance production and consumption. For e x a m p l e , f o r e i g n e r s now hold over $ 1 , 0 0 0 billion in U.S. Treasury debt, about 30 percent of all treasuries outstanding. S o m e d a y that debt must be repaid. In the m e a n t i m e , these investments produce i n c o m e for foreigners. For example, foreigners now receive about $70 billion in interest payments annually just f r o m the U.S. federal government, an amount that constitutes about half the current federal budget deficit and is growing rapidly (Forsyth 1996).

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Economists disagree about whether these developments ought to raise alarm. A f t e r all, the willingness of foreigners to invest in the United States surely is an indication of c o n f i d e n c e in the strength of the U.S. economy. M o r e generally, as Chapter 7 shows, capital f l o w s can be beneficial to the e c o n o m y and its future. Indeed, foreign capital is an essential ingredient to d e v e l o p m e n t in many third world countries. W h e t h e r capital inflows produce effects that are, on balance, positive or negative depends heavily on the source of the capital, the terms on which it is acquired, and especially on the uses to which it is put. International currency m a r k e t s have sent a cautionary signal that the persistent U.S. trade deficit is eroding the c o n f i d e n c e of foreign investors. Even with massive inflows of investment f r o m abroad, the demand for dollars by f o r e i g n e r s — t o p u r c h a s e products or investments f r o m the United S t a t e s — h a s been smaller than the supply of dollars created by Americans purchasing foreign products and investments. As a result, the value of the dollar, once equivalent to 360 Japanese yen (¥360), declined to under ¥ 8 0 in early 1995 ( b e f o r e recovering to ¥ 1 2 5 by early 1997). T h e s e currency f l u c t u a t i o n s a f f e c t the p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r of the dollar. For e x a m p l e , the ¥ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 cost of a J a p a n e s e a u t o m o b i l e would translate into a dollar price of about U . S . $ 2 , 8 0 0 at the e x c h a n g e rate of 360 yen per dollar, but would require more than U.S.$10,000 when the dollar fell below ¥ 1 0 0 . Balance of trade deficits tend to lead to such currency declines and to future price increases and snowballing debt. Thus, a trade deficit provides i m m e d i a t e b e n e f i t s , but also implies that f u t u r e c o n s u m p t i o n will be reduced and the standard of living for f u t u r e generations will fall. Whether this is viewed as a good thing or not is a subjective matter. Thus, nations vary greatly in their tolerance for trade deficits, but almost all try to minimize or avoid them altogether. Indeed, m a n y nations even seek to accumulate a trade surplus, in which exports exceed imports.

•

O P T I O N S IN TRADE POLICY

To achieve their desired trade balance, nations often c o m b i n e two mercantilist approaches. They may e m p h a s i z e the expansion of exports through a strategy known as industrial policy. M o r e commonly, they emphasize minimizing imports, a stance k n o w n generally as protectionism (Fallows 1993). Protectionist policies include m a n y f o r m s of import restrictions designed to limit the p u r c h a s e of g o o d s f r o m a b r o a d so that the d o m e s t i c import-competing industries can capture a larger share of the market. T h e simplest of these are quotas, g o v e r n m e n t restrictions that place a fixed limit on the quantity or value of g o o d s that can be imported. This is

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usually accomplished by requiring that importers obtain import licenses, which are strictly rationed by governments. The usual effect of a quota is to raise the d o m e s t i c price of the c o m m o d i t y by limiting the n u m b e r of lower-priced products that can be imported. This allows domestic producers to gain a larger market share but requires that consumers pay a higher price. Both d o m e s t i c and foreign p r o d u c e r s are able to maintain higher prices because of this artificial restriction of supply. T h e most traditional import barriers are tariffs (or import duties), which come in two forms. Most are ad valorem, calculated as a percentage of the value of the good imported. U.S. ad valorem tariffs average about 4 percent today, about the same as in most developed nations. Specific tariffs are applied to a particular quantity of an imported good; for example, the United States imposes a fixed tariff on every barrel of imported oil. M a n y f o r m s of protectionism have increased in the past d e c a d e as g o v e r n m e n t s have responded to the pleas of industries threatened by foreign competition. But tariffs are no longer the main form of protectionism. In fact, declining from their peak in the 1930s, tariff levels throughout the world are generally very low. In the United States, the average tariff rate reached a modern high of 59 percent in 1932 under what has been called "a remarkably irresponsible tariff law," the Smoot-Hawley Act, which has been widely credited with triggering a spiral of restrictions by other nations that helped plunge the global e c o n o m y into the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was reduced to 25 percent after World War II and declined to about 5 percent after the Tokyo R o u n d of trade negotiations concluded in 1979. In place of tariffs, a variety of nontariff barriers (NTBs) have arisen, especially voluntary export restraints (VERs). In the most f a m o u s case of V E R s , Japanese a u t o m a k e r s " v o l u n t a r i l y " agreed to limit exports to the United States in 1981. (Had Japan r e f u s e d , a quota that would have been more d a m a g i n g to Japanese a u t o m a k e r s would have been imposed.) The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has estimated that the higher prices for autos that resulted cost U.S. consumers about $1 billion per year. Not only does the restricted supply of Japanese autos cause their prices to rise because of the artificial shortage, but it also enables U.S. m a n u f a c t u r e r s to maintain higher prices in the absence of this competition. A favorable trade balance—or the elimination of an unfavorable o n e — also can be sought through an industrial policy that promotes exports. The simplest t e c h n i q u e is a direct export subsidy, in which the g o v e r n m e n t pays a domestic firm for each good exported, so that it can compete with f o r e i g n f i r m s that otherwise would h a v e a cost advantage. Such a policy has at least three motivations. First, by increasing production in the chosen industry, it reduces the u n e m p l o y m e n t rate. Second, by enabling f i r m s to gain a greater share of foreign markets, it gives them greater leverage to

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increase prices (and p r o f i t s ) in the future. Third, increasing exports will improve the balance of trade and avoid the problems of trade deficits. Liberals are by no means indifferent to the dangers of trade deficits, but they argue that most mercantilist cures are w o r s e than the disease. W h e n mercantilist policies affect prices, they automatically create winners and losers and in the process engender political controversies. For example, b e c a u s e the revenue to pay f o r that subsidy must be raised through taxes, the domestic consumer has to pay higher taxes. As noted above, protectionism also harms the c o n s u m e r by raising prices even while it benefits domestic firms that compete against imports. If mercantilist policies are controversial in the nations that enact them, they are met with even greater hostility by the nations with which they trade. For example, Japanese protectionism prevents U.S. f i r m s f r o m c o m peting for the lucrative Japanese market, while Japanese export promotion policies place U.S. f i r m s at a d i s a d v a n t a g e even in the U.S. market. T h e U.S. steel industry has been particularly outspoken in its denunciation of steel imported from foreign f i r m s that are heavily subsidized by their governments. They contend that U.S. jobs and U.S. profits are being undercut by this unfair competition. T h e United States has generally preferred to maintain a desirable volume and balance of trade by inducing other nations to lower their trade barriers rather than by erecting its own. The United States has undertaken direct bilateral negotiations to change the policies of other nations, especially Japan, and has spearheaded efforts to create and maintain global institutions that facilitate trade. T h e Bretton Woods trade and monetary regime, created under the leadership of the United States at the end of World War II, is the outstanding example of such institutions at the global level. The Bretton Woods regime, centered on the institutions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has governed international trade and f i n a n c e for nearly fifty years, though it has evolved and changed markedly in that time. The IMF has sought to expand trade by guaranteeing stability in monetary affairs and by providing mechanisms to finance imports and adjust trade imbalances. Since 1946, the G A T T has convened eight m a j o r negotiating sessions in which nations e x c h a n g e reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers, with the result that global trade has increased dramatically. T h e most recent session, the Uruguay Round completed in 1994, also created the World Trade Organization ( W T O ) to provide a setting for the G A T T ' s 123-nation m e m b e r s h i p to resolve trade disputes peacefully. The European Union (EU), which represents the most extensive and most successful e f f o r t to achieve free trade at the regional level, also inspired the North American Free Trade A g r e e m e n t (NAFTA), designed to expand trade a m o n g the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

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Economy

T H E MULTIPLE C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F TRADE

As nations c h o o s e a m o n g policy options, they must a c k n o w l e d g e liberal theory's contention that f r e e trade allows the market to efficiently allocate resources and thus to m a x i m i z e global and national consumption. Neither can the desire of individual c o n s u m e r s and producers to participate in trade be ignored. As our brief survey of the consequences of a trade deficit illustrates, however, the simplicity of individual motives conceals the c o m plexity of the effects that trade has on others. As we are about to see, the dangers of trade deficits are only a small part of why governments almost universally restrict trade. In fact, g o v e r n m e n t s seek m a n y o u t c o m e s f r o m t r a d e — f u l l e m p l o y ment, long-term growth, e c o n o m i c stability, social harmony, power, security, and friendly foreign relations—yet discover that these desirable outc o m e s are f r e q u e n t l y i n c o m p a t i b l e with one another. Because f r e e trade m a y achieve some goals but u n d e r m i n e others, g o v e r n m e n t s that fail to heed the advice of e c o n o m i c theory need not be j u d g e d ignorant or corrupt. (Instead, they recognize a g o v e r n m e n t a l responsibility to cope with all of trade's consequences, not only those addressed by liberal trade theory.) For example, while trade affects the prices of individual products, global markets also influence which individuals and nations accumulate wealth and political power. Trade determines who will be employed and at what wage. It determines what natural resources will be used and at what environmental cost. It shapes opportunities and constraints in foreign policy. Because trade affects such a broad range of social outcomes, conflict a m o n g alternative goals and values is inevitable. As a result, both individuals and governments must face d i l e m m a s that involve the multiple consequences of trade, the multiple goals of national policy, and the multiple values that compete for d o m i n a n c e in shaping our behavior (Moon 1996).

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T H E DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS O F TRADE

M a n y of these d i l e m m a s stem f r o m the sizable e f f e c t that international trade has on the distribution of i n c o m e and wealth a m o n g individuals, groups, and nations. Simply put, s o m e gain material benefits f r o m trade while others lose. Thus, to c h o o s e one trade policy and reject others is simultaneously a choice of one income distribution over another. As a result, trade is inevitably politicized: each g r o u p pressures the g o v e r n m e n t to adopt a trade policy f r o m which they expect to benefit. The most visible distributional effects occur because trade policy often protects or promotes one industry or sector of the economy at the expense of others. For example, tariffs on imported steel protect the domestic steel

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industry by making foreign-produced steel more expensive, but they also harm domestic automakers who must pay higher prices for the steel they use. As in this case—where car buyers face higher prices—most barriers to trade benefit some sector o f the economy at the expense o f consumers, a point always emphasized by proponents of free trade. Trade policy also benefits some classes and regions at the expense of others, a point more often emphasized by those who favor greater governmental control. For example, the elimination of trade barriers between the United States and M e x i c o under N A F T A terms forces some U.S. manufacturing workers into direct competition with Mexican workers, who earn a markedly lower wage. Unless U . S . wage rates decline, production may shift to M e x i c o and U . S . j o b s will be lost. However, if that labor competition drives down wage rates in the United States, the profits earned by the U . S . business owners might be maintained at the expense of the standard of living of workers in those industries. The losses from such wage competition will be greatest for workers in high-wage countries employed in industries that can move either their products or their production facilities most easily across national boundaries. Others, particularly more affluent professionals who face less direct competition from abroad (such as doctors, lawyers, and university professors), stand to gain from trade because it lowers prices on the goods they consume. Proponents of free trade tend to deemphasize distributional effects and instead focus on the impact of trade on the economy as a whole. That is partly because liberal theory contends that free trade does not decrease employment but only shifts it from an inefficient sector to one in which a nation has a comparative advantage. For example, U . S . workers losing their j o b s to M e x i c a n imports should eventually find employment in industries that export to M e x i c o . Proponents o f free trade insist that it is far better to tolerate these "transition c o s t s " — t h e short-term dislocations and distributional effects—than to protect an inefficient industry. B e c a u s e these distributional consequences have such obvious political implications, however, the state is much more attentive to them than economic theorists are. That is one reason all governments control trade to one degree or another. O f course, that does not mean that they do so wisely or fairly, in part because their decisions are shaped by patterns of representation among the constituencies whose material interests are affected by trade policy. In general, workers tend to be underrepresented, which is why trade policies so often encourage trade built on wage rates that enrich business owners but constrain the opportunities for workers. Similarly, the economic structures created by trade patterns can produce just as great a distributional inequity between genders as between classes, sectors, or regions. As Chapter 10 describes, political representation o f women at all levels o f decisionmaking is very poor. Finally, the e c o n o m i c activities

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shaped by trade policies tend to affect current generations very differently f r o m future o n e s — a n d the latter are seldom represented at all.

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T H E VALUES D I L E M M A

These distributional e f f e c t s pose challenging trade-offs among competing values. For e x a m p l e , the e f f e c t s of N A F T A were predicted to include s o m e w h a t lower prices f o r U.S. c o n s u m e r s , but also j o b loss or wage reduction f o r some unskilled U.S. workers. The positions taken on this issue by most individuals, however, did not hinge on their own material interests; few could c o n f i d e n t l y foresee any personal impact of NAFTA since the gains were estimated at well u n d e r 1 percent of GNP, and j o b losses were not expected to e x c e e d a f e w h u n d r e d thousand in a labor f o r c e of more than 100 million. However, the choice a m o n g competing values was plain: N A F T A meant gains in wealth but also greater inequality and insecurity for workers. S o m e citizens acceded to the j u d g m e n t of liberal theory that the country as a whole would be better off with freer trade, while others identified with the plight of workers, w h o were more skeptical of liberal theory simply because for them the stakes were so much higher. A f t e r all, it is far easier f o r a theorist to m o v e a column of figures than it is for a w o r k e r w h o has d e v o t e d his life to f a r m i n g to pack up and m o v e to a strange town in the hopes that he might find a j o b in an unfamiliar industry that requires skills he does not possess. In the final analysis, N A F T A b e c a m e a r e f e r e n d u m on what kind of society people wished to live in. The decision was quintessentially American: one of greater wealth but also greater inequality and insecurity. Of course, other distributional effects gave rise to other value choices as well. Since the gains f r o m NAFTA were expected to be greater for Mexico than for the United States, the conscientious citizen would also weigh whether it is better to help Mexican workers because they are poorer or to protect U.S. workers because they are U.S. citizens. As Chapter 8 implies, such issues of inequality in poor societies can translate directly into questions of life or death. As a result, the importance of trade policy, which has such a p o w e r f u l impact on the distribution of gains and losses, is heightened in poor, d e p e n d e n t nations (especially in an e c o n o m y with half of G N P related to trade). Perhaps the most challenging value trade-offs concern the trade policies that shift gains and losses f r o m one time period to another. Such "intergenerational" effects arise f r o m a variety of trade issues. For example, we have seen that the U.S. trade deficit, like any f o r m of debt, represents an immediate increase in consumption but a postponement of its costs. Interestingly, the J a p a n e s e industrial policy of export promotion fosters a

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trade surplus that r e i n f o r c e s the U.S. p r e f e r e n c e for immediate gratification, while it p r o d u c e s the o p p o s i t e e f f e c t in Japan. T h e subsidies the J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t pays to J a p a n e s e exporters m a k e their p r o d u c t s c h e a p e r abroad, so c o n s u m e r s in countries like the United States benefit. At the same time, those subsidies require J a p a n e s e citizens to pay both higher prices and higher taxes. However, the sacrifices of J a p a n ' s current generation may benefit future ones if this subsidy eventually transforms an " i n f a n t i n d u s t r y " into a p o w e r f u l enterprise that can repay the subsidies through cheaper prices or greater employment. Meanwhile, if the subsidies drive U.S. f i r m s out of business, f u t u r e generations of U.S. citizens m a y suffer losses of e m p l o y m e n t opportunities and higher prices. It is interesting to speculate as to why U.S. policies so f r e q u e n t l y d i f f e r f r o m J a p a n ese o n e s when distributional e f f e c t s pose the values d i l e m m a of w h e t h e r it is better to sacrifice now for the future or to leave future generations to solve their own problems. T h e values d i l e m m a e n c o m p a s s e s much more than just an alternative angle on distributional e f f e c t s , h o w e v e r (Polanyi 1944). T h e debate over " c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , " which began with the e f f o r t s by U.S. b u s i n e s s e s to lower their production costs in order to compete with foreign firms, illustrates how trade may imply a c o m p r o m i s e of other societal values. C o m panies o f t e n f i n d that g o v e r n m e n t policies m a k e it difficult f o r t h e m to lower their labor costs. Lower wages could be paid if the m i n i m u m wage were eliminated and collective bargaining and labor unions were outlawed. The abolition of seniority systems and age discrimination laws would enable companies to terminate workers when their efficiency declined (or at the whim of a boss). Eliminating pensions, health care, sick leave, w o r k m a n ' s compensation for accidents, workplace safety regulations, and paid vacations and holidays would also lower company labor costs. But such actions entail a compromise with very fundamental values, because most U.S. citizens believe that national policy should seek to make corporations more competitive in order to improve the lives of its citizens, not compromise citizen welfare in order to improve competitiveness. The government regulations that handicap U.S. business were designed to meet other legitimate national goals. Environmental regulations, for example, may add to production costs, but surely the pressures of international trade need not require that we abandon all other values. With respect to natural resources, trade has substantial impact on land use patterns and other aspects of the macroenvironment. Choosing between such alternative values is always difficult for a society, because reasonable people can differ in the priority they ascribe to such values. Still, agreements on such matters can usually be forged within societies, in part because values tend to be broadly, if not universally, shared. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , f r e e trade f o r c e s U.S. f i r m s b u r d e n e d by these value choices to c o m p e t e with f i r m s operating in c o u n t r i e s that may not share

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t h e m . T h i s s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e s a d i l e m m a f o r U. S. c o n s u m e r s as well as f o r t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t , b e c a u s e b o t h h a v e the c a p a c i t y t o e a s e the c o m p e t i t i v e p r e s s u r e s o n U . S . f i r m s if t h e y c h o o s e to d o so. B u t t h a t c h o i c e inv o l v e s a d i f f i c u l t b a l a n c e b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c interests and o t h e r v a l u e s . F o r e x a m p l e , c o n t i n u i n g to t r a d e with n a t i o n s that p e r m i t s h a b b y t r e a t m e n t of workers—or even outright human rights abuses—poses a difficult moral dilemma. As Chapter 4 documents, foreign governments have often dec l a r e d their o p p o s i t i o n to h u m a n r i g h t s a b u s e s but h a v e s e l d o m s u p p o r t e d t h e i r r h e t o r i c w i t h a c t i o n s t h a t e f f e c t i v e l y c u r t a i l e d t h e p r a c t i c e . In f a c t , t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e p o l i c y to p r e s s u r e f o r e i g n g o v e r n m e n t s o n beh a l f of a n o r m a t i v e s t a n c e h a s b e e n l e f t t o c o n s u m e r s , w h o h a v e u n w i t tingly answered key questions daily: Should we purchase cheap foreign goods like clothing and textiles even though they m a y have been m a d e w i t h c h i l d l a b o r — o r e v e n s l a v e l a b o r ? If w e d o , c a n w e r e a l l y b l a m e U . S . c o m p a n i e s f o r m o v i n g their p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s a b r o a d ? W h e r e v a l u e s a r e c o n c e r n e d , of c o u r s e , w e c a n n o t e x p e c t e v e r y o n e to a g r e e w i t h the c h o i c e s w e o u r s e l v e s m i g h t m a k e . A s C h a p t e r 11 d e s c r i b e s , c h i l d l a b o r r e m a i n s a key s o u r c e of c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e f o r m a n y c o u n tries in s e v e r a l i n d u s t r i e s p r o m i n e n t in i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e . We c a n n o t e x p e c t t h e m to g i v e u p e a s i l y a p r a c t i c e t h a t is a m a j o r c o m p o n e n t of t h e i r d o m e s t i c e c o n o m y a n d that is m o r e o f f e n s i v e to us t h a n to t h e m . If t r a d e c o m p e t i t o r s d o n o t s h a r e o u r v a l u e s , it m a y p r o v e d i f f i c u l t t o m a i n t a i n them o u r s e l v e s — u n l e s s we restrict trade, accept deficits, or design state p o l i c i e s to a l l e v i a t e the m o s t d i r e c o n s e q u e n c e s . A f t e r all, it is h a r d to see h o w U . S . textile p r o d u c e r s c a n c o m p e t e w i t h the s w e a t s h o p s of A s i a w i t h o u t c r e a t i n g s w e a t s h o p s in N e w York, a d i l e m m a in w h i c h e v e n m e d i a f i g u r e s such as K a t h i e L e e G i f f o r d h a v e r e c e n t l y b e c o m e i n v o l v e d . F u r t h e r , if w e restrict t r a d e b e c a u s e w e o p p o s e child l a b o r or rain f o r est d e s t r u c t i o n , h o w c a n w e o b j e c t w h e n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s b a n t h e s a l e of U . S . p r o d u c t s b e c a u s e t h e y v i o l a t e their v a l u e s — a c r i t i c i s m f r e q u e n t l y m a d e of U . S . r o c k m u s i c , H o l l y w o o d f i l m s , M c D o n a l d ' s h a m b u r g e r s , a n d o t h e r s y m b o l s of U . S . cultural i m p e r i a l i s m ? At issue is the t e n s i o n b e t w e e n m a i n t a i n i n g f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g f i r m s in d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s — w h i c h is e s s e n t i a l to s u s t a i n i n g t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d i n g s y s t e m — a n d m a i n t a i n i n g the cultural and political d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g n a t i o n s — w h i c h is central to the n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y and a u t o n o m y of t h e m o d e r n state s y s t e m .

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FAIR C O M P E T I T I O N A N D N A T I O N A L A U T O N O M Y

F a i r c o m p e t i t i o n in t r a d e r e q u i r e s at least i m p l i c i t c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t s , b e c a u s e n o n a t i o n c a n e x p o r t u n l e s s s o m e o t h e r n a t i o n imports. H o w e v e r , w h i l e n a t i o n s u s u a l l y e n c o u r a g e t h e e x p o r t s o n w h i c h they

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rely for j o b s , for profits, and for the limitation of balance of trade deficits, they are usually less enthusiastic about welcoming imports. Fortunately, almost all nations acknowledge, in principle, the obligation to permit the sale of foreign products within their borders, if only because they fear that excessive protectionism of their own market will encourage other nations to protect theirs. Still, disputes over trade barriers are common, because—in p r a c t i c e — governments have many compelling motives for enacting policies that affect trade. Often one nation defends its policy as a rightful exercise of national sovereignty, while another challenges it as an unfair barrier to trade. Ideally, such disagreements have been settled by appeal to the G A T T or, more recently, to the W T O , whose new dispute resolution panel hears trade disputes and determines whether national behavior is consistent with international rules. While the U . S . administration strongly supported the creation of the W T O to prevent trade violations by other nations, a surprising variety of U . S . groups opposed its ratification because it might encroach on national sovereignty. Environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the Sierra Club were j o i n e d not only by consumer advocates like Ralph Nader, but also by conservatives such as Ross Perot, Pat Buchanan, and Jesse Helms, who feared that a W T O panel could rule that various U . S . government policies constituted unfair trade practices, even though they were designed to pursue values utterly unrelated to trade. For example, E U automakers have challenged the U . S . law that establishes standards for auto emissions and fuel economy. Buchanan said, " W T O means putting America's trade under foreign bureaucrats who will meet in secret to demand changes in United States laws. . . . W T O tramples all over American sovereignty and states' rights" (Dodge 1994). B e cause the W T O could not force a change in U . S . law, G A T T directorgeneral Peter Sutherland called this position "errant nonsense" (Tumulty 1994), but the W T O could impose sanctions or authorize an offended nation to withdraw trade concessions as compensation for the injury. T h e most dramatic example occurred in the 1994 case known as " G A T T z i l l a versus Flipper," in which a G A T T tribunal ruled in favor of a complaint brought by the E U on behalf of European tuna processors who buy tuna from M e x i c o and other countries that use purse seine nets. T h e United States boycotts tuna caught in that way because the procedure also kills large numbers of dolphins; but this value is not universally shared by other nations. In fact, the G A T T ruled that the U . S . law was an illegal barrier to trade because it discriminates against the fishing fleets of nations that use this technique. Regional agreements cannot avoid this clash between fair competition in trade and national autonomy. T h e first trade dispute under N A F T A involved a challenge by the United States to regulations under Canada's

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Fisheries Act established to p r o m o t e conservation of herring and salmon stocks in Canada's Pacific Coast waters. Soon thereafter the Canadian government challenged U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations that require the phasing out of asbestos, a carcinogen no longer permitted as a building material in the United States (Cavanaugh et al. 1992). Similarly, critics of the EU worry that its "leveling" of the playing field for trade competition also threatens to level cultural and political differences among nations. Denmark, for example, found that free trade m a d e it impossible to maintain a sales tax rate higher than neighboring G e r m a n y ' s , because Danish citizens could simply evade the tax by purchasing goods in G e r m a n y and bringing them across the border duty free. Competitiveness pressures also m a k e it difficult f o r a nation to adopt policies that impose costs on business when low trade barriers force firms to compete with those in other countries that do not bear such burdens. For example, French firms demand a "level playing f i e l d " in competing with Spanish firms whenever the French g o v e r n m e n t m a n d a t e s e m p l o y e e benefits, health and safety rules, or environmental regulations more costly than those in Spain. In fact, free trade tends to harmonize many national policies. Thus, some trade barriers are designed to protect unique aspects of the e c o n o m i c , social, and political life of nations, especially when trade affects cultural matters of s y m b o l i c importance. For e x a m p l e , France imposes limits on the p e r c e n t a g e of television p r o g r a m m i n g that can originate abroad, allegedly in d e f e n s e of French language and c u s t o m . T h e obvious target of these restrictions, U.S. producers of movies and youthoriented music, contend that the French are simply protecting their own inefficient entertainment industry. Indeed, Hollywood sees "gangsta" rap and Baywatch as valuable export c o m m o d i t i e s that deserve the same legal protection abroad that the foreign television sets and CD players that display these images receive in the United States. Others see them as an example of cultural imperialism, a threat to moral values, or even an outright assault on national security. Can it be long before Colombia challenges U.S. drug laws as discriminating against m a r i j u a n a while f a v o r i n g Canadian whiskey?

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FOREIGN POLICY C O N S I D E R A T I O N S IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

S o m e of the most challenging value choices concern the effect of trade on the foreign policy goals pursued by states, such as power and peace as well as national autonomy. For e x a m p l e , p o l i c y m a k e r s have long been aware that trade has two deep, if contradictory, e f f e c t s on national security. On the one hand, trade c o n t r i b u t e s to national prosperity, which increases

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national p o w e r and enhances security. On the other hand, it has the same effect on a nation's trade partner, which could b e c o m e a political or even military rival. The resulting ambivalent attitude is torn between the vision of states cooperating for economic gain and the recognition that they also use trade to compete for political power. While a market perspective sees neighboring nations as potential customers, the state must also see them as potential enemies. As a result, the state must not only consider the absolute gains it receives f r o m trade, but also must weigh those gains in relative terms, perhaps even avoiding trade that w o u l d be more a d v a n t a g e o u s to its potential e n e m i e s than to itself. For this reason, states have always been attentive to the distribution of the gains f r o m trade and selective about their trade partners, f r e q u e n t l y enc o u r a g i n g trade with s o m e nations and discouraging or even banning it with others. W h i l e understandable, such policies create competitive struggles f o r markets, raw materials, and investment outlets, which sometimes can lead to open conflict. In fact, U.S. president Franklin R o o s e v e l t ' s secretary of state Cordell Hull even went so far as to contend that "bitter trade rivalries" were the chief cause of World War I and a substantial contributor to the o u t b r e a k of World War II. Both were precipitated by discriminatory trade policies in which d i f f e r e n t quotas or duties were imposed on the products of d i f f e r e n t nations. Hull, w h o believed that f r e e multilateral trade would build bridges rather than create chasms between peoples and nations, thus c h a m p i o n e d the nondiscrimination principle, which b e c a m e e m b o d i e d in Article I's m o s t - f a v o r e d - n a t i o n ( M F N ) clause of GATT. As we saw above, however, it also b e c a m e the grounds for challenging as discriminatory some of the laws that manifest national autonomy. A similar belief in the e f f i c a c y of f r e e trade as a guarantor of peace was an important motivation for the initiation of the regional integration in E u r o p e that eventually created the European Union. This process was launched in 1951 with the founding of the European Coal and Steel C o m munity (ECSC), which internationalized an industry that was key not only for the economies of the six nations involved, but also for their war-making potential. With p r o d u c t i o n facilities scattered a m o n g d i f f e r e n t countries, each became dependent on the others to provide both demand for the final p r o d u c t and part of the supply capacity. This a r r a n g e m e n t f u l f i l l e d the liberal dream of an interdependence that would prevent war by making it suicidal. In fact, the E C S C was an innovative f o r m of peace treaty, designed, in the words of Robert Schuman, to "make it plain that any war between France and G e r m a n y becomes, not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible" (Pomfret 1988: 75). N a t i o n s d i f f e r in their r e s p o n s e to this i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , however. C a n a d i a n f e a r of the e c o n o m i c d o m i n a n c e of the United States has long

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colored relations b e t w e e n the two, and Britain remains ambivalent about closer ties with E u r o p e because of f e a r that national a u t o n o m y must be sacrificed to achieve them. In the cases of the EU and Bretton Woods, however, p o l i c y m a k e r s saw several w a y s that an institutionalized liberal trading system could promote peace a m o n g nations. The growth of global institutions could weaken the hold of nationalism and mediate conflict between nations. Trade-induced contact could break down nationalistic hostility a m o n g societies. Multilateralism (nondiscrimination) would tend to prevent grievances f r o m developing a m o n g states. Interdependence could w e a k e n nationalism, constrain armed c o n f l i c t , and foster stability. T h e e c o n o m i c growth generated by trade could r e m o v e the desperation that leads nations to aggression. Such institutions are helpful in reducing the conflict potential in trade relations, but they require leadership to o v e r c o m e the inclination of most nations to retain their own trade barriers while inducing other countries to lower theirs. One dominant nation will usually have to subsidize the organizational costs and frequently offer side benefits in exchange f o r cooperation, such as the massive infusion of foreign aid provided to Europe by the United States under the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s. Maintaining the capability to handle these leadership requirements has substantial costs for the United States. For example, U.S. expenditures for d e f e n s e , which have been many times higher than those of nations with w h o m it competes since World War II, erode the competitiveness of U.S. business by requiring higher tax levels; they constrain the f u n d s available to spend on other items that could enhance competitiveness; and they divert a substantial share of U.S. scientific and technological expertise into military innovation and away f r o m commercial areas. (Ironically, much of that money has been spent directly on protecting the very nations against w h o m U.S. c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s has slipped, especially Germany, Japan, and Korea.) The trade-off between competitiveness and defense may be judged differently by different individuals, but it can be ignored by none. To give up global leadership or national security may be a wise choice, but it is not without costs of its own.

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CONCLUSION: C H O I C E S FOR NATIONS A N D INDIVIDUALS

Few would deny the contention of liberal theory that trade permits a higher level of aggregate consumption than would be possible if consumers were prevented f r o m purchasing foreign products. It is hard to imagine modern life without the benefits of trade. However, this aggregate economic effect tells only part of the story, because trade also carries with it important social and political implications. Trade shapes the distribution of income and

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wealth a m o n g individuals, affects the p o w e r of states and the relations a m o n g them, and constrains or enhances the ability of both individuals and nations to achieve goals built on other values. Thus, trade presents a d i l e m m a for nations: no policy can avoid some of trade's negative consequences without also sacrificing its aggregate economic benefits. That is why most governments have sought to encompass elements of both liberalism and mercantilism in fashioning their trade policies. The same is true for individuals, because every day each individual must—explicitly or implicitly—assume a stance on the dilemmas we have identified. In turn, it forces individuals to consider some of the following questions—questions that require normative judgments as well as a keen understanding of the empirical consequences of trade. We must always remember to ask not only what trade policy will best achieve our goals, but also what should our goals be.

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QUESTIONS

1.

Are your views closer to those of a liberal or a mercantilist?

2.

Is it patriotic to purchase domestic products? Why or why not?

3.

Do we owe greater obligations to domestic workers and corporations than to foreign ones?

4.

Should one purchase a product that is cheap even though it was made with slave labor or by workers deprived of human rights?

5.

Should one choose transportation that requires the importation of foreign oil, knowing it encourages a costly U.S. military presence in the Middle East?

6.

Should one lobby the government to restrict the sales of U.S. forestry products abroad because they c o m p r o m i s e environmental concerns?

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

Fallows, James (1993) "How the World Works," Atlantic Monthly, December. Moon, Bruce E. (1996) Dilemmas of International Trade. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. ( 1 9 9 8 ) "Exports, Outward-Oriented Development, and Economic Growth," Political Research Quarterly (March). Polanyi, Karl (1944) The Great Transformation. N e w York: Farrar & Reinhart. Ricardo, David (1981) Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo: Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Adam (1910) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: J.M. Dutton.

7 International Capital Flows Gerald W. Sazama

A s h u m a n s h a v e d e v e l o p e d t e c h n o l o g y , o u r r a c e has s i m u l t a n e o u s l y developed

economic

systems.

Primitive

economic

exchange

occurred

through the barter o f h a n d m a d e g o o d s within a c l a n or b e t w e e n n e i g h b o r ing t r i b e s . M o d e r n e c o n o m i c e x c h a n g e i n v o l v e s the t r a n s f e r o f s i m p l e products m a d e with c o m p l e x m a c h i n e r y , such as w h e a t , or o f the c o m p l e x m a c h i n e r y i t s e l f . T h e s e m o d e r n e x c h a n g e s are f i n a n c e d by m o n e y and o t h e r s o p h i s t i c a t e d f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u m e n t s . In f i n a n c e our r a c e has m o v e d f r o m s i m p l e f o r m s o f m o n e y like w a m p u m b e a d s and gold c o i n s to paper m o n e y and c h e c k s , and then to international m a r k e t s for i n v e s t m e n t funds and national c u r r e n c i e s . L i k e the growth in h u m a n s ' ability to d e v e l o p t e c h n o l o g y , the i n c r e a s ing s o p h i s t i c a t i o n o f e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s and f i n a n c i a l instruments is w o n derful. T h i s sophistication m a k e s p o s s i b l e the c o m p l e x m o v e m e n t o f products and r e s o u r c e s first within s i n g l e c o u n t r i e s and now around the g l o b e . L i k e the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t e c h n o l o g y , h o w e v e r , the growth o f international capital f l o w s can also be used in horrible w a y s : f o r e x a m p l e , f o r selfish acc u m u l a t i o n or f o r capital flight that dries up a n a t i o n ' s s a v i n g s b a s e , pushing it into a d e p r e s s i o n . T o p i c s d i s c u s s e d in this c h a p t e r are ( 1 ) i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l f l o w s — what they are and h o w they w o r k ; ( 2 ) c a p i t a l f l o w s b e t w e e n the industrialized or m o r e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s ( M D C s ) , such as the J a p a n e s e building a H o n d a plant in O h i o , and the A m e r i c a n s h a v i n g a C h a s e

Manhattan

I am indebted to J o h n P o w e l s o n o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f C o l o r a d o f o r his a s s i s t a n c e in gathering material and in writing s o m e portions o f this chapter.

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branch bank in London; and (3) capital flows between the MDCs and the less developed countries (LDCs). These capital flows occur as foreign investment, debt, or foreign aid.

•

BASICS CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

Three concepts central to international finance are capital theory, monetary theory, and exchange rates. •

Capital Theory

Economists divide capital into three types: physical, human, and financial. Physical capital is all the tools, machinery, and buildings we use to make products and services. At its core, this capital is saved labor, part of output that is not consumed but saved for future use. On its basic level, physical capital is the twelfth-century Native American not consuming all her corn crop so she has seeds to plant next spring. Even a computer is at its essence saved human labor, postponed consumption, embodied in a specific machine. Human capital is investing in ourselves. With training, creativity, discipline, and study, we gain the capacity to produce goods and services more efficiently. We then develop and combine these human abilities through institutions such as universities or private manufacturing corporations. Financial capital is the paper instruments through which society signals ownership rights over physical and organized human capital. Thus, a share of stock in General Motors gives its owner a claim on part of the physical capital and human capital organized within General Motors, and on the profits generated by this capital. As these forms of capital grow more complex, it is helpful to keep in mind the basics of capital theory. True capital, both physical and human, is nothing more than saved labor. To invest we have to save and thus not consume part of our output; rather we must hold it to increase our future output. Paper, or financial capital, has no value in itself. It is useful because it facilitates exchange and movement of the physical and human capital. Paper, or financial capital, has little or no value if it represents ownership of a broken machine or building or a dysfunctional corporate organization. •

Monetary Theory

Money and banking. Originally trade occurred by bartering one good for another. If the candlestick maker, however, did not want the butcher's meat because he was a vegetarian, it would be difficult for the village butcher to get candles. Therefore, our invention of money was very useful to the growth of exchange. An early form of money was precious metals. But as

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trade grew among regions, it b e c a m e inconvenient and dangerous to carry around these precious metals. So the gold was kept at the goldsmith's. The goldsmith then gave you a slip of paper (a note) that said you had gold on deposit with h i m — t h u s the birth of paper currency. Later, some wise person named Mr. Green wrote Mr. Black a slip of paper so that Mr. Black could go to Mr. G r e e n ' s goldsmith and claim s o m e of his precious metals—thus the birth of checks. Next, the goldsmith realized that all his c u s t o m e r s were not going to claim all their gold at the s a m e time, so he could lend it out to a guy named M a r c o Polo, earning interest in the process. Mr. Polo would return to Italy with spaghetti and gun powder, repay the loan, and earn a profit in the process—thus banks create money "out of nothing"; nothing, that is, but trust that Marco Polo will repay his loan. Banks, however, can create too much m o n e y — m o r e than there are real g o o d s and services to p u r c h a s e — c a u s i n g inflation. Inflation is bad f o r banks because their loans are repaid in money that is worth less than it was when they lent it out. S o m e banks could also put out too many loans and not be careful to w h o m they lent the money. W h e n customers came back for their money at such banks there would be no assets left. These problems of inflation and i m p r u d e n t banking practices led to the nineteenthcentury f i n a n c i a l panics and were instrumental in the U.S. savings and loan crisis in the 1980s. As a result of these financial panics, h u m a n s invented central banks to regulate commercial banks. Flexible exchange rates and arbitrage. Basic to the growth of imports and exports is the need for a market to exchange foreign currency. If a U.S. automobile agency wants to import a B M W f r o m G e r m a n y , it will need marks (the currency of G e r m a n y ) to buy the B M W in G e r m a n y . C o n versely, if a U.S. agribusiness sells wheat in Germany, it will receive German marks. As a result, a financial market for G e r m a n marks develops inside the United States. Matching this demand and supply of marks sets the exchange rate of dollars for m a r k s — t h a t is, the dollar price of a mark inside the United States. At the same time, in Germany there are firms that export to and import from the United States, and so a mark price of dollars develops inside Germany. If the t w o exchange markets get out of sync, international currency traders buy dollars or marks in one of the markets and transfer them to the other market. T h e traders will m a k e a profit until both m a r k e t s are synchronized, a process known as arbitrage. International finance involves more than just foreign exchange transfers caused by exports and imports. Currencies also flow into and out of a country b e c a u s e banks m a k e international loans, m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations and mutual f u n d s invest in foreign c o u n t r i e s , i m m i g r a n t s transfer labor earnings to relatives in their h o m e countries, nonprofit organizations

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such as Save the Children transfer donations, and governments build military bases or give foreign aid.

•

N O R T H - N O R T H CAPITAL FLOWS

While only 15 percent of the world's population live in MDCs, over 80 percent of the world's capital flows among these countries. This is due to the fact that about 80 percent of the world's production of goods and services (gross domestic product, GDP) is produced in the MDCs (World Bank 1996; Graham 1996). The history and contemporary situation of these North-North capital flows (among the MDCs) are discussed in this section. In the following sections, we examine capital flows between the MDCs and LDCs, which are much poorer and contain the vast majority of the world's population.

•

Historical Stages of the Growth of International Finance

During the nineteenth century, international finance was based on the gold standard, in which all countries agreed to exchange their national currencies for gold. The European nations sent capital to finance the development of emerging M D C s like the United States, or to their colonies to build the facilities necessary to extract mineral and agricultural products, which were then sent back to the colonizing country. Economic competition among the M D C s was an important cause of World Wars I and II. After World War I, Russia became communist. Also, England and France demanded large war reparation payments from Germany, which depressed the German economy and contributed to the rise of Hitler. In the early 1930s, countries also began to competitively devalue their currency in relation to gold. The international economy collapsed and with it the use of the gold standard. These factors contributed to the worldwide Great Depression and to World War II. The United States emerged from World War II as the world's dominant economic power. In the early 1950s, the total G D P of all the MDCs outside the United States was equal to only 40 percent of the United States' GDP. As a result of this emergence, the United States had a very strong influence over the terms of international trade and finance during the early postwar period. Other countries essentially pegged the exchange rate of their currency to the U.S. dollar. By the late 1960s, the European countries and Japan had rebuilt their economies; most of the LDCs were no longer political colonies; the newly industrializing countries (NICs) such as Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil were emerging on their own; and an economically powerful USSR was supporting the third world liberation m o v e m e n t s for its own political-economic

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reasons. All these factors challenged the economic supremacy of the dollar, and in 1973 the United States was forced to release the dollar f r o m a fixed e x c h a n g e rate, a l l o w i n g its value to f l u c t u a t e according to world markets. In response, m o s t other countries stopped f i x i n g the e x c h a n g e rate of their currency to the dollar, resulting in the present global system of flexible exchange rates. In the 1980s, national g o v e r n m e n t s accelerated the d e r e g u l a t i o n of banks and international finance. Although this deregulation led to a growth burst of international capital f l o w s , m a n y fear it also led to instability in the system (Korten 1996). •

C o n t e m p o r a r y Flows A m o n g t h e M D C s

Types of flows. Currently there are f o u r broad types of private capital flows a m o n g countries: (1) Multinational corporations carry out foreign direct investment (FDI). A multinational corporation is a business with at least one subsidiary or joint-ownership company located in a foreign country. Basically, FDI occurs w h e n a multinational o w n s part of or m a k e s a loan to its foreign affiliate. For e x a m p l e , when H o n d a builds a plant in Ohio, this is FDI. (2) International loans are money lent by c o m m e r c i a l banks or other financial institutions, like insurance c o m p a n i e s , to private c o r p o r a t i o n s or g o v e r n m e n t s in another country. For e x a m p l e , when the Chase M a n h a t t a n Bank of N e w York lends money to enable British Airways to e x p a n d its service to Russia, this is a foreign loan. (3) With foreign portfolio investment, investors buy stock in a foreign corporation on the stock exchange of that country. For example, when a French mutual investment f u n d p u r c h a s e s Volkswagen stock on the F r a n k f u r t stock exchange, this is foreign portfolio investment. (4) Finally, there are international currency flows. T h e s e f l o w s pay for exports and imports of goods and services and support the other types of capital flows. Size of flows. According to a U N estimate, the total value of FDI in 1993 was $4.2 trillion. A b o u t 80 percent of this FDI was a m o n g the M D C s . There was a phenomenal growth in FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The total accumulated book value of FDI tripled between 1985 and 1993; correcting for inflation, F D I doubled in just eight years. T h e vast majority of i n v e s t m e n t , h o w e v e r , r e m a i n s in the h o m e country; in 1993, FDI was still only 4.1 percent of total i n v e s t m e n t (Graham 1996). On the other hand, forty-seven of the top 100 economies in the world are multinational corporations, and by 1991, sales of the ten largest corporations exceeded the c o m b i n e d G D P of the w o r l d ' s 100 smallest countries (WFA 1996). Global data on foreign loans is hard to find, but according to the International M o n e t a r y Fund (1991), the total value of f o r e i g n loans outstanding in 1989 was $ 9 1 7 billion. Seventy percent of these loans were

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a m o n g the M D C s . T h e total value of foreign loans increased 460 percent between 1983 and 1989; correcting for inflation, it tripled in just six years. International currency f l o w s are estimated to be between $800 billion and $1 trillion per day. T h e s e currencies flow back and forth between countries over a year, so the annual net flows are much less than these daily figures times 365. To put the value of currency flows in perspective, the daily value of imports and exports is $20 billion to $25 billion. A substantial part of these currency f l o w s is therefore caused by currency m o v e m e n t s for arbitrage and speculation to earn financial profits (Korten 1996). T h e principal contemporary issue for international finance is regulation of FDI and other international financial markets by national governments or by international agencies. •

Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment

T h o s e arguing for the free flow of FDI (little or no regulation) state that total global output increases when multinationals are free to invest in the most profitable p r o j e c t s and countries. T h e y also believe that w h e n a multinational invests in a foreign country, it brings new technology and new m a n a g e m e n t and marketing styles, provides jobs, and increases that c o u n t r y ' s output. T h o s e arguing against f r e e f l o w of FDI state that these multinationals engage in cutthroat competition that harms or destroys nationally owned companies. They also believe that multinationals take profits m a d e in the host country and return them to the h o m e country, and that foreign multinationals have primary allegiance to their home c o u n t r y ' s government and not to the host country's. Other critics fear that multinationals do not have allegiance to, nor are they controlled by, any country. In the late 1980s, some people in the United States complained that Japan was buying their country. Indeed, there was a rapid increase in Japanese FDI in the United States during that time. Since the 1950s, however, the U.S. multinationals have been the primary source of FDI. T h e difference is that, since the 1980s, other countries have also been doing a large volume of FDI, which is now occurring within the United States as well. It is also interesting to note that Britain, not Japan, is the m a j o r foreign investor in the United States.

•

Regulation of Other International Financial Markets

All agree that the international financial system has gone through some serious shocks during the p o s t - W o r l d War II period. T h e first was in 1973, when the United States was forced to convert to flexible exchange rates. T h e second was the third world debt crisis in 1982, which is discussed below. Third, with the U.S. stock market crash in 1987, there was a flight of foreign capital f r o m the United States, which destabilized other markets.

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This destabilization was stemmed only with coordinated action by key central banks around the globe. Fourth, in 1995, Japanese land values and its stock market crashed, and the value o f the M e x i c a n peso collapsed. Both again created serious adjustment problems for the international financial system—problems that were minimized only by a series o f emergency ad hoc agreements among key national government finance ministers and by the U . S . government's willingness to provide billions of dollars to support the peso to protect the investments of U . S . corporations in M e x ico. Fifth, in 1 9 9 7 , there were dramatic sell-offs of s t o c k — f i r s t in the Thailand stock exchange and then in the Hong Kong stock exchange. Both of these led to drops in stock values in the major international financial markets. Sixth, in 1998, there have been repercussions on international financial markets from the recent slow economic growth and dramatic foreign exchange devaluations of several o f the Asian countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand. There is disagreement on how to minimize the effects o f a financial collapse in one country on the global economy. S o m e argue that increased regulation will slow the great increase in flow o f international capital that is integrating the global economy. They also argue that ad hoc agreements have solved the problems of the past and that they can do so in the future. Others argue for increasing the institutional structures for coordinating national policies. Still others say that more is needed than coordination, and that we ought to set up something like a world central bank. These are not simple theoretical questions. In the early 1980s, social democratic governments in France and Spain were pursuing a macroeconomic policy o f low unemployment with slightly higher inflation. T h e United States and Britain, however, were willing to tolerate higher unemployment rates, partly to keep wages lower, and they preferred lower inflation rates. Capital movements out o f France and Spain to the United States and Britain contributed to the failure o f the French and Spanish policies. T h o s e arguing for regulation to prevent personal abuse cite the example of the 1995 scandal surrounding a twenty-eight-year-old investor in Singapore. This young man sitting at a computer terminal made millions of dollars in profits for his bank and salary and bonuses o f several million dollars for himself. Then, over roughly a four-week period, he bet $ 2 9 billion o f the bank's money and ran up losses of $ 1 . 3 billion. As a result, the venerable 223-year-old Barings B a n k o f England went bankrupt, and the Tokyo stock e x c h a n g e index dropped (Korten 1 9 9 6 ) . T h o s e arguing for deregulation say these results are as they should be; if people, organizations, or even countries behave irresponsibly, they should pay for it. These potential problems leave us with a series o f questions that are not easily answered. Should we regulate? If so, how? Can a balance be struck between international regulation and national autonomy? If we use regulation, will it be controlled by large corporations and special interests

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for their own benefit, or can regulation be done to benefit all? Many, including this author, believe markets need to be open but responsible. To ensure responsibility some form of democratically controlled regulation is desirable. But that is not easy to achieve. For more on the debate about regulation see the suggested readings at the end of this chapter (especially G r a h a m , Korten, and WFA).

•

N O R T H - S O U T H CAPITAL FLOWS

H a v i n g e x a m i n e d N o r t h - N o r t h capital f l o w s — t h a t is, f l o w s a m o n g the M D C s — w e now turn our attention to North-South capital f l o w s between the 15 percent of the world's population in the M D C s and the 85 percent of the w o r l d ' s population in the L D C s . T h e most important areas of controversy f o r the L D C capital f l o w s are (1) f o r e i g n direct investment, (2) the third world debt problem ( L D C problems in repaying previous foreign loans), and (3) foreign aid. •

Foreign Direct Investment

F o r m e r president M o b u t u of Zaire (now D e m o c r a t i c Republic of Congo) referred to his country as " u n d e r e q u i p p e d " rather than " u n d e r d e v e l o p e d . " This casual remark reflects a long-standing debate among economists as to whether foreign direct investments f r o m M D C s to L D C s are a cause of development, simply an ingredient of it, or an element that retards development. S o m e agree with M o b u t u , w h o argues that f l o w s f r o m M D C s into L D C s are the missing element. They also believe that international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and regional development banks, are set up to provide L D C s with capital when and where private investors fail to do so. Others argue that it is the institutional deficiencies in L D C s t h e m s e l v e s that m a k e these countries less than ready to receive capital f r o m abroad. In Zaire, for example, Mobutu, by looting foreign companies to sustain his own p o w e r and wealth, caused these companies to abandon their factories in Zaire and refuse to return. T h e primary source of any c o u n t r y ' s capital is actually not foreign capital flows but domestic saving. In order for investment to promote dev e l o p m e n t , p e o p l e must save. If the savings of a given country are not e n o u g h to f i n a n c e the needed i n v e s t m e n t , it is possible to draw on other countries' savings through their foreign investment. Historically, investment has f l o w e d f r o m less to more profitable countries. European capital f l o w e d to the United States in the nineteenth century because the frontier and expanding population m a d e such investment profitable. The investment climate, however, must be receptive. If President

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M o b u t u stole the assets of foreign c o m p a n i e s or prevented them f r o m realizing profits, foreigners likely would stop investing in Zaire. In contrast, in the " f o u r d r a g o n s " of East Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), the investment climate has been m a d e attractive, helping economic development to surge in these countries in the past thirty years. M a n y in the L D C s say there is good reason they have not m a d e an attractive investment climate. Multinational c o r p o r a t i o n s ( M N C s ) extract raw materials and profits f r o m their host countries and bribe government o f f i c i a l s f o r special privileges. T h u s , they argue, f o r e i g n investment detracts f r o m economic d e v e l o p m e n t rather than p r o m o t e s it. While no one has a definitive answer, this chapter tries to shed light on the question. Size of the flows. In the early 1990s, private investment f r o m M D C s into L D C s suddenly surged. Table 7.1 shows the aggregate net long-term f l o w s of investment capital into L D C s f r o m 1989 to 1994. O f f i c i a l capital denotes capital f r o m g o v e r n m e n t s and international agencies. Note that, while official grants and loans have remained approximately the same during these six years, private investment has increased more than f o u r f o l d . This surge in private capital f l o w s has been concentrated in about twenty c o u n t r i e s , most of which are m i d d l e - i n c o m e c o u n t r i e s in East Asia and Latin A m e r i c a , and also in t w o large l o w - i n c o m e countries, C h i n a and India (World Bank 1995). T h e increase in private f l o w s has been spread a m o n g all the categories: debt (or private lending), direct investment, and p o r t f o l i o investment ( p u r c h a s e of stocks and b o n d s of various c o r p o r a tions). With the 1995 collapse of the Mexican stock market, however, portfolio investment in the L D C s was sharply curtailed. Policy issues. To understand why this surge in private flows occurred, and to guess whether it will happen again, one must look at the conditions of the less developed world two decades ago. At that time, L D C s held a sharp a n t a g o n i s m toward f o r e i g n investment. L D C g o v e r n m e n t s restricted the ability of multinationals to export, import, repatriate capital, set prices, and negotiate with labor unions. They required permission for ordinary transactions that could be f r e e l y u n d e r t a k e n in M D C s ; and bribery was often the only way to obtain such p e r m i s s i o n s . M a n y of these restrictions applied to local as well as f o r e i g n f i r m s , resulting in m u c h business being conducted under the table. T h e s e restrictions on investment, both domestic and foreign, were acc o m p a n i e d by intense a n t a g o n i s m toward multinational corporations, much of which was j u s t i f i e d . In 1954, f o r e x a m p l e , the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t gave military support to G u a t e m a l a n rightist forces who overthrew the reformist president, Jacobo Arbenz. He had planned land reform that was to confiscate and redistribute some of the land holdings of, a m o n g others, the United Fruit C o m p a n y . U n i t e d Fruit was a U . S . - o w n e d c o r p o r a t i o n that

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Table 7.1

Economy

Aggregate Net Long-Term Resource Flows to LDCs, 1989-1994 (billions of U.S.S)

Official Grants Loans (net) Total official Private Debt (net) Direct investment Portfolio securities Total private Total official and private Source:

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

19.2 23.4 42.6

28.7 29.2 57.9

32.6 29.2 61.9

29.9 20.4 50.3

30.1 23.8 53.9

30.5 24.0 54.5

12.7 25.7 3.5 41.9

15.0 26.7 3.8 45.5

18.5 36.8 7.6 62.9

42.4 47.1 14.2 102.7

45.7 66.6 46.9 159.2

55.5 77.9 39.5 172.9

84.5

103.4

124.7

153.0

213.2

227.4

World Bank, World Debt Tables (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995).

had close ties to the Dulles brothers, who were leaders in the U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As another example of justified antagonism, when Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile in 1970, U.S. multinationals feared that his government would expropriate their investments in Chile. In 1972, Allende was murdered and the new government, a military dictatorship, was quickly endorsed by the U.S. government. This dictatorship was friendly to foreign business, and it was supported by the United States for almost twenty years. Advocates for the MNCs argue that most MNCs pay their workers well, negotiate fairly with unions, do not cheat on taxes, and refrain from bribery. One investigation supporting this view is an International Labour Organization study that reported that MNCs pay wages, on average, twice as high as local businesses and offer significantly more fringe benefits: housing, education, hospitalization, and health services (ILO 1976). By the mid-1980s, the LDCs began developing a more favorable climate for FDI. Not only was the Soviet Union failing, but many LDCs were deeply in debt, corruption-ridden, and had state industries unable to face world competition. Also, international agencies were willing to assist only if the LDC governments would sell off unproductive state enterprises, free up exchange restrictions and prices, and open their doors to foreign private enterprise. These have been important causes of the recent foreign private investment increases in LDCs. Nevertheless, a problem remains: virtually all this investment is concentrated in middle-income countries, with almost none going to the very poor ones. •

The Debt Problem

Causes and size. When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised the price of oil in 1973, the impact was felt primarily

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in the then non-oil-producing less developed countries ( s o m e t i m e s known as N O P E C ) . T h e i r net p a y m e n t s f o r oil purchased f r o m O P E C i n c r e a s e d by $ 1 1 . 4 billion between 1 9 7 0 and 1 9 7 5 ( P o w e l s o n 1 9 7 7 ) . W h i l e industrialized countries increased their net oil payments by much more ( $ 6 2 . 8 billion) in the same period, they did not feel the same monetary or balance o f p a y m e n t s e f f e c t s , s i n c e O P E C m o s t l y invested their windfall p r o c e e d s b a c k into those m o r e d e v e l o p e d countries and deposited reserves in their banks. R e l a t i v e to their G D P s and b a l a n c e o f payments, the impact o f inc r e a s e d oil prices was therefore m o s t severe on the N O P E C s . T o sustain the N O P E C development programs and to finance their balance o f payments deficits, both governments and c o m m e r c i a l banks in industrialized countries and international a g e n c i e s m a d e special loans to N O P E C governments and central banks. S i n c e nothing had happened to inc r e a s e N O P E C exports or to attract increased investment, their indebtedness piled up, marking the b e g i n n i n g s o f the modern debt crisis. Strangely, the debt crisis spread to oil-producing countries as well. On the strength o f further r e v e n u e prospects f o r the indefinite future, these countries increased their b o r r o w i n g f o r " d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s . " M e x i c o , Nigeria, and Indonesia are particularly cited. W h e n oil prices tapered o f f in the 1 9 8 0 s , these c o u n t r i e s were unable to repay their debts. S i n c e no great increase in development was realized in any o f these three countries, it has been supposed that the borrowings mainly financed extravagant and wasteful projects or lined the p o c k e t s o f political and e c o n o m i c elites. B e t w e e n 1 9 8 9 and 1 9 9 4 , d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s ' outstanding f o r e i g n debt increased from $ 1 , 3 6 9 billion to $ 1 , 9 4 5 billion, equaling about 7 percent o f their gross d o m e s t i c product (World B a n k 1 9 9 5 ) . In l o w - i n c o m e areas, this constitutes an e n o r m o u s repayment burden; the interest charges alone subtract from the amounts available f o r d o m e s t i c c o n s u m p t i o n and investment. Debt

restructuring.

F o r reasons that c o m b i n e political interests, c o m p a s -

sion, and the need f o r world stability, industrialized nations, the World B a n k , the International M o n e t a r y Fund ( I M F ) , and other international a g e n c i e s have been s e e k i n g w a y s to r e s c h e d u l e and r e d u c e third world debt. In the early 1 9 8 0 s , s o m e key b a n k s , such as the B a n k o f A m e r i c a , held a substantial p e r c e n t a g e o f their loan p o r t f o l i o in loans to L D C s . W h e n m a n y countries found that they could not repay their loans, these large banks in the M D C s were f o r c e d to write o f f part o f this debt as bad loans. T h e s e write-offs created a global financial crisis that contributed to the recessions o f the early 1 9 8 0 s in both the United States and Europe. Third world debt has continued to increase over time. O n e cause c o n tributing to this increase has been the high interest rates in the M D C s , particularly in the 1 9 8 0 s . F o r a loan with a c o m p o u n d interest rate o f 10 percent, for e x a m p l e , the debt doubles in about seven years, even i f no new

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loans are taken out. The indebted countries, for their part, have been eager to borrow more to sustain their domestic consumption and investment, to alleviate balance of payments deficits, and to repay old loans. Given these p r o b l e m s , the international financial c o m m u n i t y has sought ways to restructure the e c o n o m i e s of indebted countries in order to contain increases in indebtedness. As a condition for its assistance to indebted L D C s , the I M F demanded that these countries reduce market regulations and have realistic exchange rates. As time went on, privatizing inefficient state enterprises and balancing government budgets were added to the list. Such conditions for refinancing are called conditionality. Conditionality issues. I M F conditionality, also required by the World Bank and governments of M D C s , is very controversial. Many view these conditions as necessary f o r the increased e c o n o m i c g r o w t h needed by L D C s to repay their debts. Others, however, hold that conditionality is big banks f r o m rich M D C s interfering in the internal politics of L D C s . In the L D C s , the public c o m p l a i n s that the poor s u f f e r f r o m the resulting austerity, since u n e m p l o y m e n t increases and g o v e r n m e n t services are reduced; at time same time, internal bank loans are cut and budgets are balanced to reduce inflation. Public protests, d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , and riots have resulted. The I M F argues that the suffering is inevitable due to wastef u l g o v e r n m e n t policies, and that the I M F p r o g r a m is actually diminishing s u f f e r i n g by s m o o t h i n g over the necessary a d j u s t m e n t s . More sage e c o n o m i s t s point out that elites in the d e v e l o p i n g countries have squandered the borrowed f u n d s and the poor are now suffering f r o m the austerity needed to bring order into government accounts. Despite the m a n y debt f o r g i v e n e s s plans proposed by g o v e r n m e n t s and international lending agencies, the debt of developing countries continues to increase, creating a world problem of crisis proportions. Indeed, net total private and official flows from the M D C s to the L D C s was negative f r o m 1983 to 1991 ( U N D P 1994). In other words, the poor were sending more capital to the rich than they were receiving f r o m them. Twenty countries have reached such a high debt level that they are now excluded f r o m international capital m a r k e t s (New York Times 1996). Debt is relatively most severe in A f r i c a n countries, where the standard of living and degree of economic development are a m o n g the lowest in the world.

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Foreign Aid

Seventy percent of foreign aid is bilateral (country to country); the remainder is multilateral (countries give aid via international agencies such as the World Bank and U N E S C O , the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) ( U N D P 1994). About 10 percent of foreign

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aid c o m e s as grants and does not require r e p a y m e n t ; but most c o m e s as concessionary loans, with lower interest rates and longer repayment periods than private sector loans. N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations, such as Save the Children and the International Red Cross, also give aid to LDCs. Such aid is about 10 percent as large as official d e v e l o p m e n t assistance ( O D A , bilateral plus multilateral). Finally, there is disguised f o r e i g n aid such as special permits f o r an L D C to export to an M D C . For e x a m p l e , Russia supported Cuba for years by buying sugar f r o m them at higher than world market prices. Size of foreign aid flows. Table 7.2 shows O D A by the principal d o n o r countries. T h e Development Assistance C o m m i t t e e ( D A C ) is an organization of the t w e n t y - t w o largest M D C s that give f o r e i g n aid. A m o n g the D A C countries, the United States gives the second largest total amount of O D A , but it gives the lowest p e r c e n t a g e of its gross national product (GNP). A m o n g these countries, the United States has the largest decrease in O D A as a percentage of G N P between 1965 and 1991. Total O D A in 1994 was $59.2 billion, an average of 0.30 percent of D A C countries' GNPs. In the 1970s, there was an international campaign to increase foreign aid to 1.0 percent of the G N P of the D A C countries, but from Table 7.2 we see that on average it decreased by 0.13 percent of G N P between 1965 and 1991. T h e United Nations Development P r o g r a m m e (UNDP) estimates that with about $40 billion more of O D A directed to basic human needs per year over the next ten years, the globe could provide universal access to safe drinking water, primary health care, basic education, and a basic family planning package to all willing couples ( U N D P 1994).

Table 7.2

Official D e v e l o p m e n t Assistance by Principal D o n o r C o u n t r i e s % of G N P (1994 U.S.$)

Billions of U.S.S 1994

Sweden France Canada Germany United Kingdom Japan United States

0.96 0.64 0.43 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.15

8.5 2.4 6.8 3.2 13.2 9.9

+0.71 -0.14 +0.26 +0.01 -0.15 +0.05 -0.38

22 DAC country average (total)

0.30

(59.2)

-0.13

Country

Sources: U N D P , Human Development Report 1996); World Bank, Investing in Infrastructure: York: O x f o r d University Press, 1994).

1.8

% of G N P 1991 Minus % of G N P 1965

(New York: O x f o r d University Press, World Development Report ¡994 (New

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Table 7.3 Official Development Assistance by Recipient Regions, 1994 Per Capita U.S.$

Billions of U.S.$

% of Recipient's GDP

Arab states Sub-Saharan Africa East Europe and central Asia Latin America and Caribbean South Asia Southeast Asia and Pacific

29 32 24 13 6 12

6.9 18.9 1.9 5.8 7.2 5.5

3.5 10.5 1.0 0.4 1.5 1.3

Average (Total)

12.l a

Region

(59.2)

1.3a

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Note: a. 1991 data from World Bank, Investing in Infrastructure: World Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Table 7.3 shows O D A by recipient regions. T h e sub-Saharan African countries receive the most per capita and total dollars of foreign aid, and it is the highest percentage of their G D P s . In the early 1990s, private capital f l o w s f r o m the M D C s to the L D C s were five times larger than O D A . Just twelve countries, however, receive 90 percent of these private flows, and the forty-eight poorest countries receive only 0.4 percent of private flows. In c o m p a r i s o n , while total O D A in 1991 was $49.4 billion, remittances back to the h o m e country f r o m immigrants working in M D C s was $20 billion ( U N D P 1994). Arguments for giving and receiving foreign aid. A political reason for giving aid would be so that an M D C could support a particular L D C government that has policies f a v o r a b l e to the granting M D C . A military reason would be to e c o n o m i c a l l y support military allies in a region of conflict, such as the United States giving aid to Israel. (Note that the O D A figures in the preceding section and tables do not include direct military aid.) An e c o n o m i c reason would be to open m a r k e t s in the L D C s f o r the donor country's businesses. Humanitarian reasons would be to prevent malnutrition and diseases and to provide basic needs for all. A larger humanitarian reason would be to redistribute resources f r o m the p r o s p e r o u s M D C s to the poor L D C s in order to alleviate the maldistribution of global output, thereby encouraging peace and democracy throughout the globe. Data f r o m a United Nations report helps us to understand the relative strength of these various motives for giving aid ( U N D P 1994). In 1993, recipient countries that had military spending greater than 4 percent of G D P received $83 per capita, while those with military e x p e n d i t u r e s below 2 percent of G D P received $32 per capita. Also, $280 and $176 per person in poverty went to Egypt and Israel, respectively, both of which are quite prosperous but are strategic allies of the United States; $19 per poor person

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went to Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries on the globe. Seven percent of total bilateral O D A goes directly f o r basic needs, as does 16 percent of multilateral O D A . An important e c o n o m i c justification for receiving aid is to acquire the capital n e e d e d for e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . If outside f u n d s are invested wisely, they will create jobs and output. This new income can then be used to repay the loans. Indeed, according to this view, once a country becomes sufficiently developed it b e c o m e s a capital exporter. Arguments against giving and receiving foreign aid. S o m e a r g u m e n t s against giving aid are: (1) It is inappropriate to interfere in another country's internal affairs. (2) Countries need to get their own houses in order before seeking aid, otherwise the aid is wasted or, worse, it fosters internal c o r r u p t i o n . (3) M o n e y w o u l d be better spent on the p o o r at h o m e — w h y send it abroad? If all foreign aid were spent on domestic social welfare expenditures in the M D C s , these expenditures would increase f r o m 15 percent of their G D P s to 15.3 percent ( U N D P 1994). S o m e arguments against receiving aid are: (1) Countries should have the right to choose their own style of economic d e v e l o p m e n t , and foreign aid skews these choices to the visions of the grantor. The vast majority of all of foreign aid, for example, goes for large-scale modernization projects. (2) Foreign aid creates enclaves of international mining, agribusiness, and unskilled m a n u f a c t u r i n g . T h e s e enclaves have little positive influence in helping modernize the domestic economy. Rather, they exist to export national resources to the M D C s . (3) Much foreign aid is "tied" aid, meaning that the aid has to be spent in the granting M D C . (4) Most aid is given as loans, creating future indebtedness for a country. (5) Some argue that even humanitarian aid given at times of famines results in only a temporary fix. In the long run, such aid harms the internal adjustment process necessary for a long-term solution. Some in the LDCs argue "trade not aid." They claim that protectionism in the M D C s deprives them of export markets important for their development (see Chapter 6). With 85 percent of the world's population, the L D C s had only about 24 percent of world exports in 1994. As with foreign direct investment, this trade was concentrated in the more prosperous LDCs.

•

CONCLUSION

Along with m o d e r n technology, we h u m a n s have invented our international f i n a n c i a l institutions, and like our use of technology, we can use these e c o n o m i c institutions for good or for ill. International capital f l o w s facilitate the worldwide m o v e m e n t of goods, services, and savings. These

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flows c a n facilitate global e c o n o m i c growth, integration, and justice. If, h o w e v e r , we do not stay in contact with some higher principles ( w h i c h some w o u l d call our Inner Light, or God) these flows can be used to gain e c o n o m i c p o w e r over others and to create instability and injustice in the international economy. S o m e argue that global governance is necessary to ensure a stable and just f l o w of international capital throughout the globe, while others argue that these goals will be better served by financial m a r kets free of regulation.

•

QUESTIONS

1.

D i s c u s s how the global financial system is an institution created by h u m a n s , which we can use for good or for ill.

2.

Do the a d v a n t a g e s of foreign multinational investment on U.S. soil outweigh the disadvantages?

3.

On b a l a n c e , does private f o r e i g n direct investment promote or disc o u r a g e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in the LDCs? Discuss strategies that L D C s might adopt to m a k e FDI fit their development aspirations better without severely harming incentives for FDI.

4.

W h a t is c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ? Is it necessary, or is it oppressive to the L D C s ? How would you solve the L D C debt problem, keeping in mind stability of the international financial system as one of your goals?

5.

Which do you think is more desirable: bilateral or multilateral foreign assistance?

6.

Should the United States give more or less foreign aid? If more aid, what are appropriate motives for giving aid, and where and for what should the aid go?

7.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of increasing the extent of global governance over the international economy?

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

Balaam, David, and Michael Veseth (1996) Introduction to International Political Economy. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. ( 1 9 9 6 ) Readings in International Political Economy. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Epstein, Gerald, Julie Graham, and Jessica Nembhard, eds. (1993) Creating a New World Economy: Forces of Change and Plans for Action. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

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Graham, Edward M. (1996) Global Corporations and National Governments. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. Korten, David C. (1996) When Corporations Rule the World. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. Todaro, Michael P. (1997) Economic Development. New York: Addison-Wesley. United Nations Development Programme (1994) Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press (see chapter 4: "A New Design for Development Cooperation"). WFA (World Federalist Association) (1996) The Global Economy, Part 2: TNCs and Global Governance. Washington, DC: WFA.

8 Poverty in a Global Economy Don Reeves

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Poverty is a m o t h e r ' s milk drying up for lack of f o o d , or kids too hungry to pay attention in school. Poverty is to live c r o w d e d under a piece of plastic in Calcutta, or huddled in a cardboard house during a rainstorm in Sào Paulo, or homeless in Washington, D.C. Poverty is w a t c h i n g your child die f o r lack of a vaccination that would cost a few pennies, or never having seen a doctor. Poverty is a j o b application you can't read, or a poor teacher in a run-down school, or no school at all. Poverty is hawking cigarettes one at a time on j e e p n e y s in Manila, or being locked for long hours inside a garment factory near Dhaka or in Los Angeles, or w o r k i n g long hours as needed in s o m e o n e else's field. Poverty is to feel powerless—without dignity or hope.

D I M E N S I O N S O F POVERTY

Poverty has many dimensions. Religious ascetics may choose to be poor as part of their spiritual discipline. Persons with great wealth may ignore the needs of those around them, or may miss the richness and beauty of nature or great art and remain poor in spirit. But this chapter is about poverty as

T h i s c h a p t e r is a d a p t e d f r o m an e a r l i e r w o r k by the a u t h o r in Hunger 1995: Hunger ( B F W Institute 1994) and is used with p e r m i s s i o n of B F W Institute.

117

Causes

of

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the i n v o l u n t a r y lack of s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s to p r o v i d e or e x c h a n g e for basic n e c e s s i t i e s — f o o d , shelter, health c a r e , c l o t h i n g , education, opportunities to w o r k a n d to d e v e l o p the h u m a n spirit. G l o b a l l y , p o o r p e o p l e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y live in A f r i c a . T h e largest n u m b e r live in A s i a . A s i g n i f i c a n t n u m b e r are in Latin A m e r i c a n and C a r i b b e a n countries. U p to 8 0 p e r c e n t of the p e o p l e in several sub-Saharan A f r i c a c o u n t r i e s a n d Haiti are poor, a n d nearly one-third of all p e o p l e s in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s t o g e t h e r are poor. ( T h e situation w o r l d w i d e is shown in F i g u r e 8.1.) But n o p l a c e on the g l o b e is i m m u n e to poverty. T h e U n i t e d States, s o m e E u r o p e a n countries, a n d Australia also have large blocs of p o o r people. W i t h f e w e x c e p t i o n s , the i n c i d e n c e of p o v e r t y is higher in rural than in urban areas but is s h i f t i n g t o w a r d the latter. Nearly e v e r y w h e r e , w o m e n a n d girls s u f f e r f r o m p o v e r t y m o r e t h a n d o m e n and boys; infants, young c h i l d r e n , and e l d e r l y p e o p l e are p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e . Cultural and discriminatory c a u s e s of h u n g e r are i m m e n s e ; the difficulties in changing long habits and practices s h o u l d not to be u n d e r e s t i m a t e d ( B F W Institute 1994). In this c h a p t e r , w e l o o k f i r s t at w a y s in w h i c h p o v e r t y is m e a s u r e d . T h e n w e look at a p p r o a c h e s to r e d u c i n g p o v e r t y in the context of a global e c o n o m y , e s p e c i a l l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d inequality. Finally, w e e x a m i n e a series of p o l i c y c h o i c e s d e v e l o p i n g country societies m i g h t c o n s i d e r as they a t t e m p t to r e d u c e poverty.

Figure 8.1

Number and Percentage of Poor People Worldwide, 1987-1993

1987 I Number of Poor People

Source: World Bank, World Development

1993 - Percentage of People Poor

Indicators

(New York: Oxford, 1997).

Poverty

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M E A S U R I N G P O V E R T Y AND I N E Q U A L I T Y

Poverty is not the same in the United States, or Poland, or Zimbabwe. It will often be described differently by supporters or critics o f a particular regime. Poverty does not lend itself to an exact or universal definition. Deciding who is poor depends on who is measuring, and where, and why. So, first, let us look at how poverty and inequality are measured. Poverty is usually measured by income or consumption. B y the most widely used measure, the World Bank estimates that worldwide 1.3 billion people live on incomes equivalent to less than U.S.$1 per day (World Bank 1997a). The majority of these people chronically lack some or all basic necessities. T h e rest live so close to the edge that any e m e r g e n c y — i l l n e s s , work layoff, drought—pushes them from just getting by into desperation. In the United States, poverty is defined as three times the value o f a thrifty food plan devised by the U . S . Department of Agriculture, adjusted for family s i z e — $ 1 6 , 0 3 6 for a family o f four in 1997. S o m e critics say it is higher than necessary, partly because certain government program bene f i t s — s u c h as Medicare, housing subsidies, and school m e a l s — a r e not counted. But poor people themselves feel hard pressed. T h e thrifty food plan was worked out in the early 1960s to address short-term emergencies. Although it is adjusted annually for changes in food prices, other costs, particularly housing, have grown faster than food costs since the plan's base year ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; so the threshold has represented a gradually declining standard of living. T h e selection of the poverty threshold often makes a dramatic difference in the observed poverty rate. The World Bank, based on its cutoff of $1 per person per day, estimates that in 1993, 3 5 0 million of China's total 1.2 billion people were poor. T h e Chinese government, using a lower cuto f f point, claims that only about 100 million of its people were poor (World Bank 1997b). Two other widely used income measures are per capita gross domestic product ( G D P ) and gross national product (GNP). G D P is the value o f all goods and services produced within an economy; G N P equals G D P plus or minus transfers in and out of the economy, such as profit paid to foreign investors or money sent home by citizens working abroad. Among countries with populations exceeding 1 million, the World Bank counts fifty-eight low-income economies with an annual per capita G N P from $ 8 0 to $ 7 6 5 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . At the other end are twenty-five high-income economies with per capita G N P from $ 9 , 3 8 6 to $ 4 1 , 2 1 0 . In between are sixty-seven middle-income e c o n o m i e s with per capita incomes between $ 7 6 6 and $ 9 , 3 8 5 (World Bank 1997a). G N P (or G D P ) provides a quick measure o f the capacity of an economy overall to meet people's needs. It also represents the pool from which

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savings and public e x p e n d i t u r e s can be d r a w n . But G N P is seriously flawed as a measure of poverty or well-being because it gives no information about the quality of the production or the distribution of i n c o m e within the country. First, G N P / G D P fails to distinguish among types of economic activity. M a n u f a c t u r i n g cigarettes, making b o m b s , and running prisons are scored as contributing to G N P / G D P the same as m a k i n g autos, teaching school, building h o m e s , or c o n d u c t i n g scientific research. Second, many g o o d s and services generate costs that are not reflected in their prices—polluted air f r o m m a n u f a c t u r i n g or illness f r o m o v e r c o n s u m p t i o n , for e x a m p l e . Third, m a n y nurturing and creative a c t i v i t i e s — p a r e n t i n g , h o m e m a k i n g , gardening, and h o m e f o o d preparation—are not included because they are not bought and sold. At best, G N P and G D P figures include only estimates for f o o d or other goods consumed by producers, unpaid family labor, and a wide range of other e c o n o m i c activities lumped together as the informal sector. Illegal or criminal activities, such as drug-dealing or prostitution, are generally not included in estimates but nonetheless contribute to some p e o p l e ' s livelihood.

•

Purchasing Power Parity

G N P / G D P f i g u r e s f o r various countries are usually c o m p a r e d on a currency e x c h a n g e basis. T h e per capita G N P in B a n g l a d e s h , at 8,800 taka, could be exchanged for U.S.$220. But 8,800 taka will buy more in Bangladesh than $220 will buy in the United States, primarily because wages are much lower. Thus, the World Bank and the United N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) have adopted a new measure—purchasing power parity (PPP)—which estimates the number of dollars required to purchase comparable goods in different countries. B a n g l a d e s h i P P P is estimated at $1,330, rather than $ 2 2 0 ( U N D P 1997). P P P estimates m a k e c o u n t r y - t o - c o u n t r y c o m p a r i s o n s more accurate and realistic and s o m e w h a t narrow the apparent gap between wealthy and poor countries. Even so, vast disparities remain. PPPs of $ 2 1 , 0 0 0 to $27,000 per capita—as in the United States, Switzerland, and Canada—are forty to fifty times those of Ethiopia and Tanzania, at $ 4 5 0 and $ 6 4 0 (World Bank 1997a):

•

Inequality

Estimates of poverty and well-being based on estimated G D P are at best crude measures. GNP, GDP, and P P P are all measured as country averages. But because poverty is experienced at the household and individual level, the distribution of national incomes is a crucial consideration.

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Detailed and accurate i n f o r m a t i o n is necessary f o r targeting antipoverty efforts and particularly for assessing the consequences of policy decisions in a timely fashion. But census data as comprehensive as that for the U n i t e d States are a distant d r e a m f o r most poor countries. M a n y of them do not k e e p such basic records as birth registrations and may h a v e only a guess as to the n u m b e r of their citizens, let alone details about their conditions. Representative household surveys are the only viable tool for most countries f o r the foreseeable future. H o u s e h o l d s u r v e y s , to be u s e f u l — e s p e c i a l l y for c o m p a r i s o n purp o s e s — n e e d to be c a r e f u l l y designed, accurately interpreted, and usable f o r m e a s u r i n g c o m p a r a b l e f a c t o r s in different times, places, and circumstances. Private agencies, m a n y governments, and even some international agencies are tempted to shape or interpret surveys to put themselves in the best light. Users of survey results need to be keenly aware of w h o conducted the survey and for what reasons. Globally, we have accepted gross income inequality. T h e most used m e a s u r e of inequality c o m p a r e s the income of the richest o n e - f i f t h , or quintile, of each population with that of the lowest quintile. T h e wealthiest one-fifth of the w o r l d ' s people control about 85 percent of global income. The r e m a i n i n g 80 percent of p e o p l e share 15 percent of the w o r l d ' s income. T h e poorest one-fifth, more than a billion people, receive only about 1.4 percent. The ratio between the average incomes of the top fifth and the bottom f i f t h of humanity is 60 to 1 (see Figure 8.2). Using recently revised U.S. census data, in 1980 the richest one-fifth of U.S. h o u s e h o l d s received 44.1 percent of the total income, while the poorest o n e - f i f t h had 4.2 p e r c e n t — a ratio of 10.5. By 1994, the ratio had widened; the top o n e - f i f t h had 49.1 percent, the bottom one-fifth only 3.6 percent, and the ratio had widened to 13.6. U s i n g older World Bank data, the ratio between the rich and poor quintile's incomes in the United States stood at 8.9 in 1985. A m o n g other Figure 8.2

D i s t r i b u t i o n of W o r l d I n c o m e 13 6%

14%

85 0% Source: United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e , Human York: O x f o r d University Press, 1997).

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Report

(New

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industrial nations, the ratio ranged from 4.3 in Japan up to 9.6 for Australia and the United K i n g d o m . A m o n g the low-income countries with estimates available, the ratios ranged f r o m 4.0 for Bangladesh and 5.0 for India up to 32.1 for Brazil (World Bank 1997a). Differences in income distribution make a big difference to poor people. Thailand's per capita G D P is only slightly larger than Brazil's, but the poorest 20 percent of the population in Thailand has more than three times as much purchasing power. In Indonesia, with less than 60 percent of Brazil's per capita GDP, poor people have more than twice the purchasing power. Even in Bangladesh, with per capita G D P less than one-fourth that of Brazil, poor people are estimated to have as much purchasing power as in Brazil (see Table 8.1).

•

Direct Measures of Well-Being

Other indicators m e a s u r e w e l l - b e i n g even more directly than i n c o m e or poverty rates: f o r e x a m p l e , infant or under-five mortality rates, life expectancy, educational achievement, and food intake. Hunger. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) attempts to measure and estimate shortfalls in food consumption. In their Sixth World Food Survey, released in late 1996, the FAO estimates that the absolute number of people in developing countries who consumed too little food declined slightly over the past two decades—from about 918 million in 1969-1971 to about 841 million in 1990-1992. Because population increased rapidly over the period, however, the proportion of people hungry in developing countries declined from about 35 percent to about 20 percent. T h e most dramatic gains in reducing hunger over the period were in East and Southeast Asia, where the percentage of hungry people dropped f r o m 41 to 16 percent and the n u m b e r by nearly h a l f — f r o m 4 7 6 million to 269 million. Less dramatic gains by both measures were recorded in the Middle East and North A f r i c a . T h e proportion declined, but the absolute

Table 8.1

Country Thailand Brazil Indonesia Bangladesh

Poverty I m p a c t of I n c o m e D i s t r i b u t i o n , Selected C o u n t r i e s , 1994 GNP PPP$/Capita 1994 6,970 5,400 3,600 1,330

GNP-PPPS 1994 Lowest 20% 1,951 567 1,566 625

Source: World Bank, From Plan to Market: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Highest 20%

Ratio Highest 20%/ Lowest 20%

18,366 18,225 7,326 2,520

9.4 32.1 4.7 4.0

World Development

Report

1996 (New York:

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123

n u m b e r i n c r e a s e d s l i g h t l y o v e r t h e p e r i o d in S o u t h A s i a a n d L a t i n

Amer-

ica

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In A f r i c a ,

of hungry

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creased f r o m 38 to 4 3 percent, while the n u m b e r soared f r o m

103 to

215

million (see Figure 8.3) ( F A O

F i g u r e 8.3

the

percentage

1996).

D i s t r i b u t i o n of U n d e r n o u r i s h e d People by D e v e l o p i n g Region, 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 1 a n d 1990-1992

1969-71: 9 1 8 million u n d e r n o u r i s h e d 6%

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@

Sub-Saharan Africa Q

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Southeast Asia

N e a r E a s t a n d Nor1h Africa

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South Asia

Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: F o o d and A g r i c u l t u r e O r g a n i z a t i o n of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , The Sixth Survey ( R o m e : F A O , 1996). R e p r i n t e d with p e r m i s s i o n .

World

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Human development index. The United Nations Development Programme has developed a Human Development Index (HDI), which gives equal weight to three factors: life expectancy at birth, educational attainment (based on the adult literacy rate and mean years of schooling), and per capita purchasing power (UNDP 1997). People's lives can be improved if even limited resources are focused on nutritional programs, public health, and basic education. Both China and Sri Lanka, for example, have invested relatively heavily in education and health care since independence. They rank with many industrial countries in life expectancy and educational attainment. Most of the formerly communist countries invested in education and health care. Some former colonies continued to build on the educational systems established during the colonial era: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Madagascar (colonized by France); Guyana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Burma (colonized by Britain); and the Philippines (colonized by Spain and the United States). Several Latin American countries have emphasized education more recently: Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Uruguay. In each instance, they rank higher on the HDI scale than other nations with a comparable per capita gross domestic product. But sustaining such improvements requires steady or improving economic performance. Many of these nations have suffered recent economic downturns or are in the midst of drastic political and economic change. In the short term, at least, they are hard pressed to maintain their education and health programs. Other nations rank much lower on the HDI scale than on a per capita GDP scale. The Middle Eastern oil-rich nations rank low in both longevity and educational attainment, particularly because of the status of women in their societies. Several African nations have extremely low educational attainment and longevity indicators, for varied reasons. Angola and Namibia have been engulfed in long independence struggles and civil war. Botswana and Gabon, although relatively rich in natural resource income, have not devoted proportional resources to education and health care services.

After this extensive digression to explore how poverty is measured, we turn now to the questions of why poverty is worse in some places than others and what might be done to reduce or eliminate it.

•

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN A GLOBAL, KNOWLEDGE-BASED, MARKET ECONOMY

Individual, community, and national efforts to reduce poverty must be set in the threefold revolution during the past two decades that has transformed national markets into a truly global economy:

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125

The evolution of a single worldwide system of producing and exchanging money, goods, and services The shift f r o m a resource-based economy to a knowledge-based economy The acceptance of market-based economics as conventional wisdom by most political leaders throughout the world

The nature of and possible gains and risks from this revolution are much more fully developed in Chapters 6 and 7. •

The Global Workforce: Need for 2 Billion Jobs

The route out of poverty for most people is through new economic opportunities—jobs or business ventures. As the world's population grows onethird, from approximately 6.0 billion to 8.0 billion or more by the year 2025, the global labor force will grow even faster, by about half, from 2.7 billion to more than 4 billion workers. In addition, the International Labour Organization (ILO 1996) estimates that more than a billion workers are now unemployed or underemployed. Half the new workers have already been born, and the number of unemployed is growing annually. The pressing need, therefore, is to create 2 billion new economic opportunities during the next thirty years. Most of the new j o b s or businesses will be needed in developing countries, where 95 percent of the increase in population and labor force is taking place. Virtually all the added jobs will need to be nonfarm. Governments in developing countries, or markets, may increase incentives for food production, but farmers are likely to adopt technologies that increase their productivity and reduce farm employment even faster. More and more farmers, or their children, will seek nonfarm employment. Whether such nonfarm employment is urban or rural will depend on policy choices. Improvements in education, health care, and public infrastructure can provide some public service jobs. But most new income-earning opportunities, if they come to pass, will be in the private sector. Every new opportunity, whether public or private, for employee or self-employment requires savings and investment—in human resources and in creating each job or business opportunity. The rate of savings and their allocation are crucial factors in determining whether enough decent income-earning opportunities can be created; these factors are determined in large measure by public policies. •

Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction

Economic growth is often held up as the primary goal for economic development and as the means to increased employment opportunities. Some

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analysts, bankers, and political leaders almost equate " d e v e l o p m e n t " with e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . Most of these p e o p l e expect poverty and other social p r o b l e m s to shrink as e c o n o m i e s g r o w — t h e "rising t i d e " of e c o n o m i c growth will "lift all boats." E c o n o m i c growth is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for reducing poverty. T h e distribution of the added income is also critical. Poverty has fallen rapidly in some fast-growing economies (Korea, I n d o n e s i a , C h i n a ) , while not c h a n g i n g m u c h in others (Brazil, South Africa, Oman). Because poverty is experienced in households and by individuals, detailed and accurate information at that level is critical. The World Bank recently c o m m i s s i o n e d a review of 109 household surveys, covering sixtyfour time c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n 1987 and 1993 in forty-six developing economies (Ravallion and Chen 1997). The surveys showed the following: • • • •

Poverty rates have consistently fallen as a v e r a g e i n c o m e s have risen, and risen as average incomes have fallen. Poverty rates have not declined a n y w h e r e in the a b s e n c e of economic growth. In d e v e l o p i n g countries, inequality increased as o f t e n as it decreased as average incomes rose. In transition e c o n o m i e s ( f o r m e r c o m m u n i s t states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia), during 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 9 3 , inequality consistently increased at the same time as average incomes fell (see Figures 8.4 and 8.5).

Other recent studies of eight East and Southeast Asian countries show that it is possible to have both economic growth and decreasing inequality if the right policies are in place. In South Korea, f o r e x a m p l e , w h e r e per capita income has grown rapidly, the most affluent f i f t h of the population has about six times as much income as the poorest f i f t h . The ratio has narrowed slightly over the past two decades; poor people have shared in the rapid growth. In sharp contrast, Brazil's per capita G N P was twice K o r e a ' s in 1970. Since then, its e c o n o m y has grown about half as fast; by 1990, K o r e a ' s per capita G N P was twice B r a z i l ' s . But the i n c o m e ratio b e t w e e n B r a z i l ' s poorest and richest f i f t h is m o r e than t h i r t y f o l d and has increased. Poor Brazilians have scarcely benefited f r o m growth and remain mired in deep poverty. The Asian countries reduced, or at least did not increase, e c o n o m i c inequality by giving poor p e o p l e the incentive and the m e a n s to i m p r o v e their own earning power; examples are land reform and support for small f a r m e r s in Korea and Taiwan; high school e d u c a t i o n , especially f o r women, in Singapore; and m a n u f a c t u r i n g for export that raised the d e m a n d

Poverty

Figure 8.4

127

Economic Growth and Poverty Rates, Developing and Transition Countries, 1987-1993 —

m

o Transition countries a Developing countries

40 I n 20

J

-100

-60

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-40

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Economic Growth Source: Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen, "What Can New Survey Data Tell Us About Recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty?" World Bank Economic Review (Washington, DC: World Bank 1997). Notes: Poverty rates = change in % of people poor x - 1 0 0 ; Economic growth = log of change in average household consumption x 100.

for unskilled factory workers, plus a massive a f f i r m a t i v e action p r o g r a m for the poorer ethnic groups, in Malaysia. Declining inequality and economic growth support each other in three ways: • •

•

As poor families' income increases, they invest more in "human capital"—more education and better health care for their own children. I m p r o v e d health and better education, which usually a c c o m p a n y decreased inequality, increase the productivity of poorer w o r k e r s and their c o m m u n i t i e s and nations. Greater equality contributes to political stability, which is essential for continued e c o n o m i c progress.

Recent research shows that relative equality in distribution of national incomes increases the likelihood that e c o n o m i c growth can be sustained. Widespread participation in political as well as economic activity reduces the likelihood of enacting bad policies and permits their earlier correction (Birdsall, Pinckney, and Sabot 1996).

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Figure 8.5

E c o n o m i c G r o w t h a n d Inequality, D e v e l o p i n g a n d Transition Countries, 1987-1993 20 • -100

-80

-40

-60

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——>

Economic Growth Source: Martin Ravallion and S h a o h u a C h e n , " W h a t Can New Survey Data Tell Us A b o u t Recent C h a n g e s in Distribution and P o v e r t y ? " World Bank Economic Review (Washington, D C : World Bank 1997). Notes: Inequality = Gini index x - 1 0 0 ; E c o n o m i c growth = log of change in average household c o n s u m p t i o n x 100.

•

Sustainable Development

Economic growth is necessary to achieve more fundamental human goals, at least in poor countries, but alone is not sufficient. The concept of sustainable development has emerged to incorporate other aspects of development in addition to economic growth. Advocates of international justice, environmental protection, peace, sustainable population growth, democracy, and human rights have increasingly come to see that their goals are interlinked. Several examples follow: •

There is no way to save the rain forests of Brazil without dealing with the land hunger of poor Brazilians. • There is no way to reduce rapid population growth in developing countries without improving living standards, especially for girls (see Chapters 9 and 10). • There are no durable solutions to poverty and hunger in the United States without social peace, broader democratic participation, and a shift to economic patterns that will be environmentally sustainable. Bread for the World defines sustainable development in terms of four interconnected objectives: providing economic opportunity for poor peo-

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pie, meeting basic h u m a n needs, ensuring environmental protection, and e n a b l i n g d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( B F W Institute 1995). T h e s e c o n c e p t s , a n d t h o s e f r o m o t h e r c h a p t e r s in this b o o k , are r e f l e c t e d in the f o l l o w i n g policy suggestions.

•

A N T I P O V E R T Y P O L I C I E S I N A GLOBAL E C O N O M Y

P u b l i c p o l i c i e s a i m e d at r e d u c i n g p o v e r t y fall into t w o b r o a d c a t e g o r i e s : (1) creating a p p r o p r i a t e , e f f e c t i v e g u i d e l i n e s f o r m a r k e t s ; and (2) c o l l e c t ing a n d a l l o c a t i n g p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r i n v e s t m e n t in h u m a n resources. T h e reality of a c h i e v i n g e f f e c t i v e a n t i p o v e r t y p o l i c i e s is, of c o u r s e , m u c h m o r e d i f f i c u l t than the assertion. Just as s o m e actors in the m a r k e t p l a c e can take a d v a n t a g e of their e c o n o m i c p o w e r , they and other p o w e r f u l political actors c a n s w a y p o l i c i e s to their o w n s e l f - i n t e r e s t , w h e t h e r at the local, n a t i o n a l , or i n t e r n a t i o n a l level. M e a n w h i l e , p o o r p e o p l e , w h o s e well-being is the strongest e v i d e n c e of w h e t h e r policies are e f f e c t i v e , o f t e n lack political access or clout. In addition, they and their allies are o f t e n u n c l e a r or d i v i d e d on issues of national and international e c o n o m i c policy. B u t as the global, k n o w l e d g e - b a s e d , m a r k e t e c o n o m y r e a c h e s into the f a r c o r n e r s of o u r p l a n e t , p e o p l e of g o o d w i l l h a v e only o n e o p t i o n : to h e l p d r a f t and i m p l e m e n t p o l i c i e s that will direct a sizable p o r t i o n of this e c o n omy toward creating income-earning opportunities for poor people. The m o s t i m p o r t a n t areas f o r p o l i c i e s to h e l p r e d u c e p o v e r t y i n c l u d e i n v e s t i n g in p e o p l e ; s u s t a i n i n g a g r i c u l t u r e a n d f o o d p r o d u c t i o n ; c r e a t i n g a f r a m e work for sustainable development; and targeting international financing ( B F W Institute 1997; World B a n k 1997a). HI Investing in People Health care and nutrition. I n v e s t m e n t s in basic health care a n d i m p r o v e d n u t r i t i o n yield h u g e d i v i d e n d s . H e a l t h y c h i l d r e n l e a r n better. H e a l t h y a d u l t s w o r k better. I m p r o v e d h e a l t h c a r e b e g i n s w i t h g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n to basic public health measures: nutrition education, clean water and adeq u a t e s a n i t a t i o n , v a c c i n a t i o n a g a i n s t i n f e c t i o u s d i s e a s e s , p r e v e n t i o n of A I D S , d i s t r i b u t i o n of i o d i n e a n d V i t a m i n A c a p s u l e s , and s i m p l e t e c h n i q u e s of h o m e health care. D e l i v e r y of t h e s e services c a n be relatively ine x p e n s i v e , e s p e c i a l l y in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , w h e r e village w o m e n with m i n i m a l training can be e m p l o y e d . T h e s e b a s i c s e r v i c e s s h o u l d h a v e priority o v e r urban h o s p i t a l s a n d s p e c i a l i z e d m e d i c a l training. In s o m e instances, p u b l i c health training can b e d e l i v e r e d in c o n j u n c tion with s u p p l e m e n t a l f e e d i n g p r o g r a m s such as the Special S u p p l e m e n t a l

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Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) in the United States, or the Integrated Child Development Services in India. Education. Investments in basic education complement those in health care and improved nutrition and yield huge payoffs in both developing and industrialized nations. Better education for youth, especially girls, leads to improved health awareness and practices for their families on a life-long basis. Cognitive and other skills improve productivity, enable better management of resources, and permit access to new technologies. They also enhance participation in democracy. A study of ninety-eight countries for the period f r o m 1960 to 1985 showed GDP gains up to 20 percent resulting from increases in elementary school enrollment, and up to 40 percent resulting from increases in secondary enrollment. In allocating educational resources, the highest payoff is for elementary education, because it reaches the most children (Fiske 1993). In the United States, dramatic improvement has followed investments in Head Start, which provides preschool education and meals for low-income children; and Job Corps, which provides remedial and vocational training for disadvantaged youth (see Figure 8.6). •

Agriculture and Food Production

Access to land. Widespread land ownership by small farmers usually contributes directly to food security and improved environmental practices. The more successful land reform programs, as in Korea and Taiwan, have provided at least minimum compensation to existing landlords.

Figure 8.6

Virtuous Circle

Source: Bread for the World (BFW) Institute, Hunger ¡995: Causes of Hunger (Washington, DC: BFW Institute, 1994), p. 56. Used by permission of Bread for the World.

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Equitable prices for farm produce. T h r i v i n g agriculture is basic to successful development in most of the poorest nations. Much of new savings must be accumulated within agriculture, since it is such a large share of the economy. Such savings are important f o r increasing agricultural productivity and f o r helping finance rural, n o n f a r m businesses. Also, as their incomes rise, farmers e x p a n d their purchases of c o n s u m e r goods, providing an important source of n o n f a r m e m p l o y m e n t . In many developing countries, state-run marketing boards have taxed agriculture by setting f a r m prices very low and retaining f o r the g o v e r n ment a large share of the value f r o m farm exports. Meanwhile, the United States and the European Union have supported their own farmers in ways that generate surplus crops. T h e y also subsidize exports of these crops, driving down prices around the world. D e v e l o p i n g country f a r m e r s , w h o usually are not subsidized, cannot match the low prices. Agriculture falters and with it the whole process of d e v e l o p m e n t . Both rich country export subsidies and developing country discrimination against agriculture should be phased out as quickly as possible.

•

Creating a F r a m e w o r k for Sustainable D e v e l o p m e n t

Access to credit. E q u i t a b l e access to credit f o r small f a r m e r s and small businesses is probably the highest priority f o r the allocation of domestic savings or outside investment. Training in resource and business management is often part of successful credit programs. Most informal e c o n o m i c activity results f r o m the efforts of small entrepreneurs w h o cannot find a place in the f o r m a l economy. If they have access to good roads, m a r k e t s , and credit, small f a r m e r s and small business people can create their own new i n c o m e - e a r n i n g opportunities in market economies. Adequate physical infrastructure. Creating and maintaining an adequate physical infrastructure is essential to a viable, expanding economy. Important for rural areas are farm-to-market roads and food storage, both oriented to domestic production and, if appropriate, exports. For all areas, safe water, sanitation, electricity, and communications networks are needed. Stable legal and institutional framework. S u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t requires a stable legal f r a m e w o r k . This includes assured property titles, enforceable contracts, equitable access to courts and administrative bodies, and accessible information networks. Stable currency and fiscal policies. Neither domestic nor international vestors, including small f a r m e r s and m i c r o e n t r e p r e n e u r s , are likely invest in countries in which the political or e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n m e n t unsettled. High inflation or c o n t i n u i n g trade d e f i c i t s , which o f t e n

into is go

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together, discourage needed investments and may even drive out domestic savings. T w e n t y - n i n e A f r i c a n countries undertook structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o grams during the 1980s. T h e s e reforms have often fallen heavily on poor people, as social service programs were frozen or cut back to help balance national g o v e r n m e n t budgets. Other m e a s u r e s to reduce budget or trade d e f i c i t s — m o r e progressive taxes, cuts in military spending, and curtailing luxury i m p o r t s — h a v e not always been pursued with equal vigor. E c o n o m i c r e f o r m p r o g r a m s , which will c o n t i n u e to be necessary, should be revamped to reduce the costs to, and increase benefits for, poor people. Effective, progressive tax systems. Effective progressive tax structures are key to s u s t a i n a b l e f i n a n c i n g f o r i n v e s t m e n t s in h u m a n resources and infrastructure. Taxes based on ability to pay are also key to stabilizing or reducing wide disparities in income distribution in both rich and poor countries. Such tax s y s t e m s are difficult to enact w h e r e wealth and political power are controlled by a small minority. Incentives for job-creating investments. T h e Asian countries that have g r o w n so rapidly have all placed e m p h a s i s on labor-intensive e x p o r t s — some in j o i n t ventures with overseas partners, some with investments solicited f r o m abroad, but m a n y with subsidies f r o m within their own e c o n o m i e s . This is a distinct departure f r o m their more general c o m m i t ment to f o l l o w i n g market signals. A primary target for job-intensive investments will be processing operations f o r primary p r o d u c t s — w h e t h e r for domestic consumption or for crops and minerals now being exported. •

Targeting International Financing

T h e i m p o r t a n c e of international f i n a n c i n g is well covered in C h a p t e r 7. T h e only addition here is to e m p h a s i z e the distinction between overall growth and growth that will create more and better opportunities for poor people.

•

SUMMARY A N D C O N C L U S I O N

P o v e r t y — t h e lack of resources or income to c o m m a n d basic necessities— is the condition of about one-fifth of the w o r l d ' s population, or about onethird of the people in developing countries. T h e absolute number of poor people has increased slowly in recent years, while their proportion has declined slightly, with considerable regional variation. Economic growth is essential to overcoming poverty, but it alone is not sufficient. Relatively egalitarian distribution of national income among and

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within h o u s e h o l d s also m a t t e r s greatly. C r e a t i n g 2 billion g o o d j o b s or busin e s s o p p o r t u n i t i e s is t h e b i g g e s t s i n g l e c h a l l e n g e f o r this g e n e r a t i o n . T h e e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i c y t o o l s to g e n e r a t e r e l a t i v e l y e q u i t a b l e g r o w t h h a v e b e e n s u c c e s s f u l l y d e m o n s t r a t e d in r e c e n t y e a r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in E a s t a n d S o u t h e a s t Asia. M e a n w h i l e , s o m e of the w o r s t e f f e c t s of p o v e r t y h a v e b e e n , and s h o u l d c o n t i n u e to be, o f f s e t b y p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n s — i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y and o v e r a l l h u n g e r h a v e d e c l i n e d , a n d literacy and l o n g e v i t y h a v e i n c r e a s e d in m a n y i n s t a n c e s , e v e n in t h e f a c e of c o n t i n u e d p o v e r t y . Adapting these tools and p r o g r a m s to particular circumstances, especially in A f r i c a , is of u t m o s t c o n c e r n to e v e r y o n e . In an i n c r e a s i n g l y g l o b a l e c o n o m y , t h e w e l l - b e i n g a n d s e c u r i t y of e a c h p e r s o n or c o m m u n i t y or nation is i n e s c a p a b l y l i n k e d to that of e v e r y other. T h e i n g r e d i e n t in s h o r t e s t s u p p l y to o v e r c o m e p o v e r t y a p p e a r s to be the p o l i t i c a l will t o d o so.

•

QUESTIONS

1.

A r e y o u m o r e i n c l i n e d t o m e a s u r e p o v e r t y in t e r m s of a b s o l u t e inc o m e , i n c o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n , or the c a p a c i t y to r e a c h m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l g o a l s ? If the latter, w h a t w o u l d be y o u r list of g o a l s ?

2.

W h i c h of the a n t i p o v e r t y p o l i c i e s d o y o u think a r e the m o s t b e n e f i c i a l ?

3.

What would you consider a reasonable goal for the ratio between the t o p and b o t t o m i n c o m e g r o u p s w i t h i n an e c o n o m y ? W i t h i n a b u s i n e s s f i r m ? W h a t p o l i c i e s w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y to m o v e t o w a r d this g o a l ?

4.

S h o u l d g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s e n c o u r a g e t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e ? If so, to w h a t e x t e n t ?

5.

A r e you as o p t i m i s t i c as t h e a u t h o r that p o v e r t y c a n b e o v e r c o m e ?

6.

D o you concur that the well-being linked"?

7.

D o you a g r e e w i t h t h e a u t h o r that t h e p r i n c i p a l m i s s i n g i n g r e d i e n t in o v e r c o m i n g h u n g e r is " p o l i t i c a l w i l l " ?

•

of e v e r y o n e

is

"inescapably

SUGGESTED READINGS

Birdsall, Nancy, Thomas Pinckney, and Richard Sabot (1996) "Why Low Inequality Spurs Growth: Savings and Investment by the Poor," Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series, No. 327. Washington, DC: IDB. Birdsall, Nancy, David Ross, and Richard Sabot (1995) "Inequality and Growth Reconsidered: Lessons from East Asia," World Bank Economic Review 9, no. 3.

134

The Global Economy

Bread for the World Institute (annual). Washington, DC: BFW Institute. Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen (1989) Hunger and Public Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fiske, Edward B. (1993) Basic Education: Building Block for Global Development. Washington, DC: Academy for Educational Development. United Nations Development Programme (annual) Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. World Bank (annual) World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.

Part 3 Development

9 Population and Migration Ellen Percy Kraly

C o m i n g to grips with the implications of current population trends is an e x t r e m e l y important d i m e n s i o n of global studies. T h e process is neither easy nor c o m f o r t i n g , b e c a u s e significant population increase is an inevitable characteristic of the global landscape in the first fifty years of the twenty-first century. It is critical that students interested in global studies and issues should appreciate both the causes of population growth and consequences of population change for society and the environment. Such an appreciation will serve in d e v e l o p i n g a p p r o p r i a t e and e f f e c t i v e responses to population-related problems emerging globally, regionally, and locally. This chapter seeks to contribute to the understanding of the interconnections among population change, environmental issues, and social, economic, and political c h a n g e in both developing and developed regions of the world. Because population growth has m o m e n t u m that cannot be quickly changed, it is important to begin by considering fundamental principles of population or demographic analysis and to place recent global and regional population trends in historical perspective. T h e chapter then examines the widely divergent philosophical and scientific perspectives on the relationships among population, society, and environment that have pervaded visions of the future. Debates on the implications of current growth have also influenced discussions about routes for population policy. In the next section, global effects of population redistribution, urbanization, and

Assistance with illustrations was provided by Jennifer Critchley and Patrick R o w e , Department of Geography, Colgate University.

137

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Development

international migration are discussed. The chapter concludes by considering global dimensions of population policies targeting growth and international population movements.

•

PRINCIPLES AND TRENDS

•

Population Concepts and Analysis

Demography is the study of population change and characteristics. A population can change in size and composition as a result of the interplay of three demographic processes: fertility, mortality, and migration. These components of change constitute the following population equation: A P = (+) births ( - ) deaths (+) in-migration ( - ) out-migration; where A P is population change between two points in time On the global level, the world's population grows as the result of the relative balance between births and deaths, often called natural increase. The U.S. population is currently increasing at about 0.9 percent per year; natural increase accounts for about two-thirds, and net international migration constitutes about one-third of this relatively low level of population growth. Many people seeking routes to sustainable development advocate a cessation of population growth often referred to as zero population growth (ZPG). When viewed from a short-run perspective, ZPG means simply balancing the components of the population equation to yield no (zero) change in population size during a period of time. Population scientists, however, usually consider ZPG in a long-term perspective by considering a particular form of a zero-growth population: a stationary population is one in which constant patterns of childbearing interact with constant mortality and migration to yield a population changing by zero percent per year. In such a case, fertility is considered replacement fertility because one generation of parents is just replacing itself in the next generation. In low-mortality counties, replacement-level fertility can be measured by the total fertility rate and is approximately 2.1 births per woman to achieve a stationary population over the long run. It takes a relatively long time, perhaps three generations after replacement fertility has been achieved, for a population to cease growing on a yearly basis. Large groups of persons of childbearing age, reflecting earlier eras of high fertility, result in large numbers of births even with replacement-level fertility. Hence, an excess of births over deaths occurs until these "age structure" effects work themselves out of the population. This is known as the momentum of population growth. To illustrate, it is

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and Migration

139

estimated that if the world's populations achieved replacement-level fertility immediately, an extremely unrealistic scenario, global population would continue to grow from 5.3 billion in 1990 to 7.4 billion in 2 0 5 0 , an increase of 4 0 percent (Lutz 1994). •

Historical and Contemporary Trends in Population Growth

The world's population was estimated to be 5.8 billion in 1996 and increasing at approximately 1.5 percent per year ( U S B C 1996). These data represent a cross-sectional perspective on population characteristics—a snapshot that fails to capture the varying pace of population change worldwide and regionally. Over most of human history, populations have increased insignificantly or at very low annual rates of growth, with local populations being checked by disease, war, and unstable food supplies. Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, population growth appeared to become more sustained as a result of changes in the social and economic environment: improved sanitation, more consistent food distribution, improved personal hygiene and clothing, political stability, and the like. The world's population probably did not reach its first billion until just past 1800. But accelerating population growth during the nineteenth century dramatically reduced the length of time by which the next billion was added. According to the United Nations ( U N D E S I P A 1994), world population reached: • • • • •

1 2 3 4 5

billion billion billion billion billion

in in in in in

1804 1927 1960 1974 1987

(123 years later) (33 years later) ( 1 4 years later) (13 years later)

If the current estimated annual rate of global population growth of 1.5 percent is maintained, the world's population will double to nearly 12 billion in just over forty-six years. A closer look at the pattern of population change suggests, however, that this is an unlikely scenario. Population data for years since 1950 are shown in Figure 9.1. Between 1950 and 1996, the world's total population increased from 2.6 billion to 5.8 billion. The difference in height of the bars in Figure 9.1 also reveals the momentum of population growth that results in continued additions to the world's population, albeit in decreasing numbers: between 1985 and 1990, approximately 85 million persons were added to the world's population each year; since 1990, the annual increase is estimated at 82 million. It is important to note, however, that in spite of these large additions to the world's population, the rate of population growth is decreasing. The

140

Figure 9.1

Development

World P o p u l a t i o n for D e v e l o p m e n t Categories, 1950-1996

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

1996

Year Source:

U.S. Bureau of the C e n s u s , International Data Base.

average annual rate of global population growth reached an all-time high of about 2.2 percent between 1962 and 1964. Since that time, the pace of the growth of the w o r l d ' s population has decreased to the current rate of approximately 1.5 percent per year. Patterns of population g r o w t h d i f f e r significantly between more and less developed regions of the world. Table 9.1 provides greater geographic detail and s u m m a r i z e s population size and distribution for m a j o r regions of the world for selected years since 1950. Dramatic shifts in the g e o g r a p h y of world population have occurred during the past five decades and, as discussed below, are expected to continue well into the future. In 1950, just over two-thirds of the world's population was located in less d e v e l o p e d countries; by 1996, this proportion had increased to four-fifths. Asian countries comprise over half the world's

Population

Table 9.1

and Migration

141

World Population by Geographic Region and for More and Less Developed Countries, 1950-1996 1950

1960

Region World Less developed countries More developed countries Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Latin America and Caribbean Europe North America Oceania

1980

1990

1996

Population (in millions) 2,556 1,749 807 29 185 1,411

3,039 2,129 910 283 227 1,685

3,706 2,703 1,003 360 289 2,113

4,458 3,377 1,081 470 379 2,601

5,282 4,139 1,142 624 504 3,123

5,772 4,601 1,171 732 594 3,428

166 572 166 12

218 639 199 16

285 703 226 19

362 750 252 23

443 789 277 27

489 800 295 29

Region World Less developed countries More developed countries Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Latin America and Caribbean Europe North America Oceania

1970

Percent Distribution 100.0 68.4 31.6 1.1 7.2 55.2

100.0 70.1 29.9 9.3 7.5 55.4

100.0 72.9 27.1 9.7 7.8 57.0

100.0 75.8 24.2 10.5 8.5 58.3

100.0 78.4 21.6 11.8 9.5 59.1

100.0 79.7 20.3 12.7 10.3 59.4

6.5 22.4 6.5 0.5

7.2 21.0 6.5 0.5

7.7 19.0 6.1 0.5

8.1 16.8 5.7 0.5

8.4 14.9 5.2 0.5

8.5 13.9 5.1 0.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1994, Table A - l .

population; over one-fifth, 21 percent, of the global village lives in China and another 16 percent in India (data not shown in Table 9.1). Africa's share has increased from just under one-tenth in 1950 to about 13 percent of the current population. European populations constituted 14 percent of the world's population in 1996, a decline from 22 percent in 1950. Western Hemisphere regions—North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean—include approximately 14 percent of the world's population. Population growth is fueled by levels of fertility, mortality, and net migration. The rapid population growth that occurred in the post-World War II era reflected significant declines in mortality resulting in large part from the transfer of medical technology and public health advances from more to less developed countries. The total fertility rate measures the average number of births per woman of childbearing age and is a strong indicator of overall population growth. In 1996, the total fertility rate for the world as a whole was 2.9

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Development

births per w o m a n , representing a significant decline f r o m 4.2 in 1985. Fertility in more d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s has been below replacement for s o m e time and is currently e s t i m a t e d at 1.6 births per w o m a n . In d e v e l o p i n g countries, the rate has dropped f r o m 4.7 in 1985 to 3.3 in 1996. M u c h of this decline is w e i g h t e d by the aggressive fertility control c a m p a i g n in China and significant declines in fertility throughout Southeast Asia and in Latin A m e r i c a . Total fertility in India has also declined but less dramatically, f r o m 4.3 in 1985 to 3.2 currently. Total fertility in A f r i c a , particularly sub-Saharan Africa, while declining somewhat in the past decade, remains strikingly high: 5.5 births per w o m a n in 1996. Figure 9.2 provides a cartographic view of current levels of fertility for countries of the world.

•

PERSPECTIVES O N T H E CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION CHANGE

R e f l e c t i o n s on the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n p o p u l a t i o n and society can be f o u n d in the early history of m a n y cultures. In early Greece, Plato wrote about the need f o r b a l a n c e b e t w e e n the size of the city and its resource base; C o n f u c i a n i s m e m p h a s i z e d the social and e c o n o m i c a d v a n t a g e s of large families. Concern about the implications of population growth for social progress b e c a m e a f o c u s of social theory in the nineteenth century and c o n t i n u e s in c o n t e m p o r a r y debates on global e f f e c t s of current levels of population growth.

•

Debates on P o p u l a t i o n G r o w t h

Certainly the most influential statement concerning the sources and implications of population growth was that of T h o m a s Malthus in his Essay on the Principle of Population; the first edition, published in 1798, was followed by several revisions (Malthus 1878). In his essay, Malthus was reacting to mercantilist p h i l o s o p h y that pervaded eighteenth-century European thought and emphasized the value of large and increasing populations for economic growth and prosperity. Malthus o f f e r e d a negative perspective on the c o n s e q u e n c e s of population growth, arguing that the cumulative, or "geometric," nature of population growth will outpace the increase in f o o d supply (which M a l t h u s believed increased arithmetically) and would result in starvation, poverty, and h u m a n misery. Because of the instinct of h u m a n s to r e p r o d u c e , p o p u l a t i o n growth can only be halted through the so-called positive c h e c k s — r i s i n g mortality as a result of famine, war, and epidemics. Malthus, a clergyman, opposed contraception and advocated delayed marriage and abstinence, which he called "prevent i v e " checks. N e o - M a l t h u s i a n s , in contrast, r e c o g n i z e the importance of

o O U Q

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