Interrogation, intelligence and security: Controversial British Techniques 9780719098352

Table of contents :
Front matter
Contents
List of figures and tables
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
Introduction
The ‘five techniques’ of interrogation and the Aden Emergency, 1963–67
Aden: Results and reactions
‘The troubles’, policy-making and interrogation, 1969–71
The government’s response: Banning the ‘five techniques’
The ‘five techniques’, intelligence and security in Northern Ireland
Basra, Iraq, September 2003
The impact of the reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Interrogation, intelligence and security examines the origins and effects of the use of interrogation techniques known as the ‘five techniques’.

Focusing on the colony of Aden at a time when British rule was being challenged by nationalist insurgents (1963 – 67), on the height of ‘the troubles’ in Northern Ireland (1971) and the conflict in Iraq (2003), the book explores the use of hooding to restrict vision, white noise, stress positions, limited sleep and a limited diet. In each instance the use of these ‘five techniques’ was followed by allegations of brutality, public inquiries, and changes to interrogation guidelines, while the reasons the techniques were used differ from case to case. This book will be of particular interest to security professionals, academics and members of the public interested in the torture debate, intelligence, the military, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, foreign policy and law enforcement. Samantha Newbery is Lecturer in Contemporary Intelligence Studies at the University of Salford

Cover image: Police holding centre interview room, RUC Holywood, Co Down. Courtesy of The National Archives

Interrogation, intelligence and security

Through its in-depth analysis, the book reveals how British forces came to use such controversial methods in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and internal security contexts. There are clear parallels between the three case studies examined and the controversial interrogation techniques that continue to be used around the world today. By identifying and analysing the short- and long-term results of the use of the ‘five techniques’ in these case studies, the book leaves readers equipped to make informed judgements about whether interrogation techniques that might be described as torture can be justified.

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Controversial British techniques

Newbery

Interrogation, intelligence and security

I n t e r r o g at i o n , i ntelli g en ce and secu rity Controversial British techniques

www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

ISBN 978-0-7190-9148-3

9 780719 091483

Samantha Newbery

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Interrogation, intelligence and security

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Interrogation, intelligence and security Controversial British techniques SAMANTHA NEWBERY

Manchester University Press

Copyright © Samantha Newbery 2015

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The right of Samantha Newbery to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN

978 0 7190 9148 3 hardback

First published 2015 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire

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Contents

List of figures and tables Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

page vi vii ix

Introduction 1 The ‘five techniques’ of interrogation and the Aden Emergency, 1963–67 2 Aden: Results and reactions 3 ‘The troubles’, policy-making and interrogation, 1969–71 4 The government’s response: Banning the ‘five techniques’ 5 The ‘five techniques’, intelligence and security in Northern Ireland 6 Basra, Iraq, September 2003 7 The impact of the reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’ Conclusion

1 11 34 62 85 114 132 164 193

Bibliography Index

199 223

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Figures and tables

Figures 1.1 The location of Aden relative to the Federation and Protectorate of South Arabia 2.1 The Fort Morbut Interrogation Centre 2.2 Number of detainees in Aden State during the Emergency 3.1 The ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, Ballykelly 6.1 The Temporary Detention Facility, Basra

13 40 42 67 141

Tables 3.1 Total hours hooded and on the wall at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ 3.2 Compton Report’s hours on the wall at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ 3.3 Total hours in interrogation at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ 5.1 Compensation

69 70 72 122

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Acknowledgements

A great many people have helped with this book, whether it be through their work at the archives and libraries visited during its preparation, by commenting on papers I have presented at conferences and seminars, or giving encouragement by merely expressing an interest. I am grateful for the support of the British Academy, and for financial support from Trinity College Dublin’s Grace Lawless Lee fund and Postgraduate Research Travel Fund, the University of Salford’s Vice Chancellor’s Early Career Researcher scholarship, and research travel funds from the university’s School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences and the School of English, Sociology, Politics and Contemporary History. Particular thanks go to all those who have let me interview them. I am grateful for your time, your thoughts and your frankness. I have also benefited from the informal conversations about my research held at conferences and otherwise with academics and interested parties. Colleagues at the University of Salford, past and present, have been supportive and provided advice on this research project, especially Christopher J. Murphy, Jim Beach and Alaric Searle. I owe many thanks to Professor Eunan O’Halpin, who was my PhD supervisor in the Department of History, Trinity College Dublin. His help has already proved valuable in the work I have done since. Particular thanks are due to those who have commented on drafts of the book or portions thereof: Michael Hose and Brian Stewart. My husband, Simon Hose, deserves special thanks for consistently taking an interest in my research and acting as a sounding-board. I am profoundly grateful to my parents for having supported me in my studies over so many years. Finally, thanks are also due to Stephen Blancke, Ian Cobain, Tony Craig, Tim Dowle, Bill Duff, Guy Harrison, Kieran Hegarty, Tony Johnston, Matthew Kelleher, Jon McCourt, Paul Rice and the staff at Manchester University Press. I cannot name everybody who has shared their thoughts on my project and the topic with me, nor everyone who has encouraged me over the years. None the less, if you fall into this category, please be assured that I am grateful. Any errors are entirely my own.

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Abbreviations

1BW 1QLR ATUC BG Main BGIRO BGS(Int)DIS BMInq CDS CGS CINC CO CPA DCDC DFA DGI DIS DISC ECHR EEI FCO FLOSY FO FOI FRAGO FRL GOC HC HMG HO

First Battalion Black Watch Regiment First Battalion The Queen’s Lancashire Regiment Aden Trade Union Congress Battlegroup Main Headquarters Battlegroup Internment Review Officer Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence) of the Defence Intelligence Staff Baha Mousa Inquiry Chief of the Defence Staff Chief of the General Staff Commander-in-Chief Colonial Office Coalition Provisional Authority Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Ireland Director-General of Intelligence Defence Intelligence Staff Defence Intelligence and Security Centre European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Essential Elements of Information Foreign and Commonwealth Office Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen Foreign Office Freedom of Information Fragmentary Order Former Regime Loyalist General Officer Commanding High Commissioner, Aden Her Majesty’s Government Home Office

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x ICRC IRA JDP JFIT JIC JSIO JSIU JSIW LIC MIDEAST MND(SE) MoD NICRA NIO NLF OPTAG PDT PIRA PMNI PRONI PSP PW RHC RMP RUC SB SIB SIS SLO SOI TDF TIF TNA VCGS WMD WO

Interrogation, LIST OF intelligence abbreviations and security

International Committee of the Red Cross Irish Republican Army Joint Doctrine Publication Joint Forward Interrogation Team Joint Intelligence Committee Joint Services Interrogation Organisation Joint Services Interrogation Unit Joint Services Interrogation Wing Local Intelligence Committee, Aden Middle East Multinational Division (South East) Ministry of Defence Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association Northern Ireland Office National Liberation Front Operational Training Advisory Group (Army) Pre-deployment training Provisional Irish Republican Army Prime Minister of Northern Ireland Public Records Office of Northern Ireland People’s Socialist Party Prisoners of War Regional Holding Centre Royal Military Police Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch Special Investigation Branch Secret Intelligence Service Security Liaison Officer Standard Operating Instruction Temporary Detention Facility Theatre Internment Facility The National Archives Vice Chief of the General Staff Weapons of Mass Destruction War Office

x

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Introduction

Interrogation techniques are the subject of this book. Specifically, the book concerns techniques that have been described as torture by those who experienced them and by the European Commission of Human Rights in 1976, how these techniques came to be used by a Western state, and the reactions and results that followed.1 It is about a collection of techniques developed and used by the British military after 1945 in the frequently overlapping contexts of counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and internal security operations. They are known as the ‘five techniques’ and consist of forcing a prisoner to maintain a physical position that causes stress on the body, thus becoming uncomfortable (a ‘stress position’); of restricting sight by putting a hood over the prisoner’s head (‘hooding’); the use of loud continuous noise; restricting the amount of sleep the prisoner achieves; and limiting the amount and quality of food and drink provided. This description is deliberately broad because the exact form the techniques took varied from use to use. For example, the system that saw a tape-recorder and amplifiers used to produce noise in Brunei (1963) proved unnecessary in Aden (1963–67) because of the noise of an air conditioning system. The term ‘five techniques’ was first used in late November 1971 by members of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).2 These were techniques that the British military developed and practised in a series of conflicts predominantly connected with the end of empire between 1945 and 1971, and that were used again in Iraq a few months after the 2003 war became an Occupation. Although the military began developing them after the Second World War, they were not used all together until the 1963 interrogation operation that responded to an insurrection in Brunei. It was there that hooding to achieve sight deprivation and continuous noise were first introduced. This history of the techniques is expanded upon in the first chapter. The book focuses on the use of the techniques in Iraq (2003), Northern Ireland (1971) and the former British colony of Aden (1963–67). In Aden the ‘five techniques’ were used by the British military in an effort to collect intelligence during the State of Emergency in which nationalist forces sought to win independence from British rule. In Northern Ireland the British military

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trained local police Special Branch officers to use them. The reasons for this will be made clear in Chapter 3 and were based on an understanding that using the military in this role in Northern Ireland would be provocative. Widespread condemnation resulted from the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland, leading the British government to ban them in 1972. Despite this ban the military was to use the techniques once more, this time in Basra, Iraq, in September 2003. The ‘five techniques’ were developed in an effort to increase the amount of reliable, timely intelligence – or information – produced by interrogation. In the early 1970s the military made clear its views that the techniques had produced intelligence between 1945 and 1971. The Iraq case differed in that the use of the techniques was not a result of the same degree of forethought. There, the belief that the techniques would improve the amount of intelligence obtained through interrogation was one of many reasons why they were used. It is important to note that each of the techniques came to be used in Iraq because of a slightly different set of circumstances. These are far from the only interrogation techniques that have been described as torture and used in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and internal security contexts. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’) the involvement of the US, the UK and other states in controversial interrogation practices at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, the Guantánamo Bay detention camp in Cuba, the US’s secret prisons in other states’ territory – known as ‘black sites’ – and other places has received substantial media and scholarly attention. These techniques have included sleep deprivation, isolation, noise and waterboarding, a treatment often described as simulated drowning.3 Controversial interrogation techniques have also been used in wartime, with the Security Service (MI5) using psychological methods, at least, when interrogating prisoners at London’s Camp 020 Detention Centre during the Second World War.4 In the twentieth century intelligence organisations and secret police of authoritarian states acquired fearsome reputations due to their methods of obtaining information and (false) confessions. Police questioning for evidence, which is governed by different rules from those which aim to obtain intelligence, so that it is admissible in court, has also given rise to allegations of brutality.5 It is beyond the scope of this book to address both types of questioning. Interrogation to collect intelligence, and associated techniques, is the focus. The term ‘interrogation’ is used in the book to refer not only to the actual questioning of prisoners but to techniques used with the intention of improving the effectiveness of questioning. The ‘five techniques’ are strikingly similar to the techniques used within the ‘War on Terror’ launched by the US after 9/11. In addition, the ‘War on Terror’ and uses of the ‘five techniques’ all respond to terrorist and insurgent threats. The book’s in-depth analysis helps answer the questions of why the

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‘five techniques’ were used and with what results. In doing so it can inform media, scholarly and policy-makers’ discussions about the future of these kinds of techniques. Regardless of whether similar techniques are used today, analysis of how such controversial techniques came to be used and the nature and reach of their results is important to society. Debates about torture and interrogation have grown as a result of public knowledge about controversial interrogation practices used in the ‘War on Terror’. It has been argued elsewhere that the ‘torture debate’, as it is known, has three components: what is justifiable, what is effective, and how controversial interrogation techniques come to be used.6 These pressing questions have motivated the growth in popularity of the torture debate. Intelligence is a prerequisite for achieving and maintaining national and international security, but opinions are polarised as to whether controversial techniques that might be described as torture succeed in producing intelligence, and whether they are justifiable given their probable illegality and the harm that they cause to those who experience them. This book aims to add clarity to these discussions by identifying the results that followed the use of the ‘five techniques’ in three cases. Policy-makers and practitioners have an understandable, and commendable, interest in what is acceptable and effective. By providing accounts of the results, the book aims to help inform readers’ decisions on whether the techniques were effective, and whether their results render them justified. The book also addresses the third strand of the torture debate: how techniques that went on to cause such controversy came into use. Questions about who, if anyone, authorised the use of the techniques and the processes that resulted in the granting of authorisation are asked of the Aden, Northern Ireland and Iraq examples. Where the techniques were not authorised, the factors that facilitated their use and motivated the individuals who used them are identified. Explaining how controversial techniques come to be used is useful regardless of the stance taken on whether they should continue to be used: it provides lessons about how to reduce the chances of it happening again as well as about how authorisation should be considered and granted by decision-makers. Defining torture is not easy. A myriad of definitions – some improvised, others taken from formal documents such as the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture – are employed in the torture debate. Definitions are important because torture is almost universally considered to be not only unethical but illegal, and for many observers illegal practices are simply not justifiable. However, the book avoids describing the ‘five techniques’ as torture because the term is of limited usefulness here. The book’s main aims of identifying the origins and effects of the techniques do not require the legality of the techniques to be identified. It is more important to understand what

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the techniques entail than whether they meet a given definition of torture. Where the legality of the techniques is relevant, though, are in those instances where the legal status of the techniques prompted or encouraged particular responses or reactions. Existing literature on how controversial interrogation techniques come to be used explores both how official approval comes to be given and how individuals come to use such techniques without authorisation. In other instances there is an absence of explicit authorisation but the presence of official tolerance.7 The international human rights lawyer Philippe Sands’s research into how US President George W. Bush and his government came to authorise controversial interrogation techniques after 9/11 is unusual in respect of the level of detail it contains.8 It is one of the underlying arguments of the present book that a valuable approach to the question of how particular techniques come to be used is to look at particular cases in detail. There is considerable disagreement, even amongst interrogators who have spoken out in recent years, over whether interrogation techniques that can be described as torture help gain intelligence. Matthew Alexander, writing about his experiences as a United States Air Force interrogator in Afghanistan in 2006, argues that interrogation based on instilling ‘fear and control’ is unnecessary, and, at times at least, ineffective.9 A different view is adopted by Jose Rodriguez Jr, a retired CIA officer whose book explains how ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, including waterboarding, allowed the CIA to gain intelligence from Abu Zubaydah, allegedly a senior member of al-Qaeda.10 These statements tell us more than those that simply claim that torture does or does not work. Without specifying what is meant by ‘torture’ and whether it ‘works’, such statements tell us little: specificity is required. Examining particular interrogation techniques used in identified contexts for stated reasons allows for the most possible progress to be made towards resolving the matter of whether controversial interrogation techniques produce intelligence. The ‘five techniques’ have been addressed by many researchers. Rarely, though, are more than a few pages dedicated to them. They are most likely to appear in works on Northern Ireland, and to consist of brief accounts of their use, the two public inquiries that followed, the Republic of Ireland’s case against the UK for alleged breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and the 1972 ban.11 In 2012 the techniques received considerably more attention in the senior reporter for the Guardian Ian Cobain’s Cruel Britannia, in which their origins and results are addressed alongside comments on other methods used by Britain since the Second World War.12 As will be demonstrated here it is possible – and worthwhile – to study them with even greater depth and breadth. The book has two main aims: to identify how the ‘five techniques’ came to be used in the three cases selected; and to identify their results. Identifying

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how the techniques came to be used is not as straightforward as it might seem. With respect to Aden and Northern Ireland the military, police, politicians and civil servants were involved in discussions about how to improve the quality and quantity of intelligence produced by interrogation. It was in this context that the ‘five techniques’ came to be used. The Iraq example provides a useful contrast in this respect as the techniques were much less a result of dedicated discussions involving individuals in senior positions, and more the result of the coincidence of numerous factors and the taking of initiative by individuals working at a lower level. The Iraq case raises issues about the adequacy of annual and pre-deployment training in prisoner handling and interrogation, and the applicable regulations. The question of the appropriate level and type of supervision given to those tasked with guarding and interrogating prisoners is also raised. To what extent collecting intelligence by interrogation was the motivation behind each of the techniques in each of the three cases is also addressed in the book. Analysis of the results that followed the use of the ‘five techniques’ is not confined to whether they produced intelligence. It includes whether any intelligence gained made a difference to security in the countries concerned, adverse publicity pertaining to the techniques and the effects of that publicity on the morale of the police and the military, on policy, on international politics and on whether the techniques would be used in future. Both short- and longterm results are identified to allow for as thorough a response to the question of what results ensued as the available sources allow. Relations between the military and police in the interrogation operations in Aden and Northern Ireland are also examined. This pertains to the theme within the scholarly literature on counter-insurgency that concerns how effective police – military relations have been in counter-insurgencies.13 Co-ordination and the importance of gaining intelligence are both emphasised in this literature. There are similarities between the three cases selected: each concerns British forces exposing detainees to the ‘five techniques’, motivated – in part, in the Iraq case – by a requirement to obtain intelligence swiftly in an internal security operation. Further, each prompted outcry by members of the public and non-governmental organisations, and subsequently the British government commissioned public inquiries into the events. Each case resulted in amendments to the written rules governing interrogation. The differences between the Aden and Northern Ireland cases largely stem from the fact that one was a far-off colony, the other part of the United Kingdom. The latter case resulted in much more far-reaching repercussions for the British government. The Iraq example differs principally in how the techniques came to be used. While the three cases are similar in many respects, the differences between them will become apparent. The book’s analysis begins with Aden, the earliest of the case studies, then turns to Northern Ireland and ends with Iraq. Each

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case is addressed chronologically, beginning with what happened and how, before turning to the results, reactions and responses. Aden is now part of Yemen, an area that today is home to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.14 Britain’s presence in what came to be called Aden State began in the nineteenth century when it was seized because of its strategic location along shipping routes. In 1937 it became a Crown Colony.15 Growing trade unionism and nationalism, and an incident in which a grenade was thrown at the High Commissioner – Britain’s representative in Aden – led to the declaration of a State of Emergency in December 1963. During the four years of the Emergency, the Aden Police and the British military struggled to keep control of a burgeoning urban insurgency. A lack of intelligence was a major reason for this struggle, and led to the British military being asked to extend their involvement in the Emergency by helping with interrogation. They took the ‘five techniques’ to Aden with them. To what extent different decisions on the part of the British might have enabled them to keep hold of Aden rather than handing it over to the main nationalist group they had been fighting there is widely debated and it is beyond the scope of this book to engage with this at length. The impact of the interrogations that involved exposing detained terror suspects to the ‘five techniques’ is, however, examined. Northern Ireland’s troubles – the most recent outbreak of political violence connected with the region’s position within the United Kingdom – began in the late 1960s. By this time Britain had accumulated significant experience in conflicts connected with the end of empire. Northern Ireland was different though: it was part of the United Kingdom. A civil rights movement emerged in the 1960s in response to inequalities in the experiences of the Catholic and Protestant communities, feelings ran high and were exacerbated by police action, and the conflict known as ‘the troubles’ began. The predominantly urban insurgency and terrorism of ‘the troubles’ was to continue for many years, with some arguing that it ceased as a result of the peace process of the 1990s and others taking the view that it is not yet over. It was in 1971, at  the  peak of ‘the troubles’, that the ‘five techniques’ were used there. One of the responses to the use of these techniques within the United Kingdom continued until 1978 when Ireland’s case against the UK for alleged breaches of the ECHR concluded. That the ‘five techniques’ had been used was far from the only claim of mistreatment made against the British Army after they were deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969. Indeed, interrogation beyond that which involved the ‘five techniques’ has also featured, with recent press reports publicising claims that soldiers used waterboarding in connection with interrogation.16 As will be seen with the ‘five techniques’, such claims had the power to inflame tensions in a region where even the terms used to refer to what are commonly known as Northern Ireland and

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the Republic of Ireland can be inflammatory. The term Northern Ireland is used in this book because this is how the region is referred to in UK and Irish legislation.17 Although in many respects the book’s focus is the British perspective and both the city and county of Londonderry were referred to as such in British documents created at the time, it is acknowledged that there is a growing consensus across communities today that Derry is the preferable term.18 The use of the ‘five techniques’ at a Temporary Detention Facility (TDF) run by the British military in Basra, Iraq, in September 2003 led to the death of one of the detainees concerned. Baha Mousa’s wife and brother had already died, leaving him the primary carer for both his own and his brother’s children. His father has since spoken of his loss and the challenge of supporting his grandchildren. Now known as ‘the Baha Mousa episode’ and ‘the TDF episode’, this case has been described as the UK’s Abu Ghraib and ‘one of the most notorious episodes involving British soldiers in Iraq’.19 That the ‘five techniques’ had resurfaced and been used in the TDF episode did not become public knowledge until January 2008 when an Army-commissioned report into abuse and unlawful killings in Iraq was published.20 That report drew attention to the potential value of further investigations into the TDF episode.21 This call was answered when the Baha Mousa Inquiry was commissioned in 2008. This Inquiry was one of the principal responses to the case that the book addresses and has provided many of the written sources on which the book’s research into this case is based. By the time of the TDF episode, the war that had begun with the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 had become an Occupation in which the US-led coalition came up against insurgents. The influence that this context had on the reoccurrence of the techniques is explored herein. There is a further reason for having selected these three cases. Enough relevant source material has been put into the public domain, not least because of the public nature of the inquiries that looked into them, to enable adequately complete answers to the two main research questions to be formulated. The National Archives in London hold the surviving records of the government departments involved in the Aden and Northern Ireland cases. This includes the views of the military that can be found in the records of the Ministry of Defence in particular. The Aden High Commission’s records, available in the British Library, usefully add to the documentation kept by the London-based government departments. These repositories hold a large amount of material but it is by no means complete: some records remain classified and others, in the case of Aden, were destroyed before the colony was granted independence.22 A committee comprised of two administrators and a Special Branch officer began deciding in 1966 which of Aden’s records should be burnt and which moved to London.23 It has been suggested that ‘[t]he paucity of Aden documentation so far declassified may suggest that the committee decided

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that most files should be destroyed’, but as will be shown this does not prevent the book’s key research questions from being addressed.24 The reports of the official inquiries that resulted from the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Aden and Northern Ireland have been drawn on here. A huge amount of material relevant to the Iraq case has been made available online by the Baha Mousa Inquiry. This material falls into three categories: transcripts for each of the days the inquiry sat; witness statements collected from around four hundred witnesses, who include the surviving detainees, the soldiers involved, senior members of the Armed Forces and the then Secretary of State for Defence; and documents dating from the 1960s right up until 2011 provided to the Inquiry principally by the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office. Inconsistencies between some of the witness statements given to the Royal Military Police (RMP) in the days and weeks after the death of Baha Mousa, the witness statements provided to the Inquiry by the same individuals, and the statements made in person during the Inquiry’s hearings highlight the dangers of failing to question the reliability of sources when conducting research. But without such a collection of memories recorded at different times and in different contexts researchers would be much less able to judge where the truth lies. When the book’s notes refer to documents made available by the Inquiry, the day and week of the hearings they are linked to is provided so that readers can locate the material for themselves on the Inquiry’s website should they wish to do so. Although the material collected by the Baha Mousa Inquiry informs many of the conclusions reached here, only a minority of those conclusions appear in the Inquiry’s Report. The book and the Inquiry have overlapping, but largely separate aims. Where they overlap, the relevant parts of the Report were not consulted until conclusions had been reached on the basis of the available evidence. The book follows the Report’s example by referring to the ranks and roles held by individuals at the time of the events in question rather than those held subsequently. Using original written material has its limitations, especially when it comes to ascertaining what intelligence, if any, was gathered by these interrogations. The Northern Ireland case illustrates this very well. Understandably, the authorities’ claims about the success of the techniques are sometimes at odds with the claims of the individuals interrogated this way. Interviews have been used to contest, expand on and address gaps in the written record. Published research on Aden predominantly consists of a handful of books that address only Aden, counter-insurgency texts that consider Aden alongside other British counter-insurgencies of the Cold War period and texts that address the end of empire. Spencer Mawby, who has penned some of the most detailed and analytical work on Aden, persuasively argues that there is little literature on Aden because of a ‘lack of an appetite for discussion of a striking

introduction

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defeat’ and the lack of a comprehensive strategy for the Emergency.25 The literature on Iraq tends to focus on the reasons for the March 2003 invasion, the course of the war phase of the conflict and the US role thereafter. Andrew Williams’s book on the Court Martial that followed the use of the techniques in Iraq, A Very British Killing, is an exception.26 The literature on Northern Ireland is by far the most voluminous. Notes 1 British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR) R/20/D/22, Anthony Greenwood (Secretary of State for the Colonies) to Acting High Commissioner (HC), 12 January 1965; Interview, Northern Ireland, 4 December 2008; The Baha Mousa Inquiry (BMInq), transcript, Detainee 3, 24 September 2009, p. 8; Ireland v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (1978), Series A, No. 25, 35. 2 The National Archives (TNA), War Office (WO) 32/21776, ‘Note of a meeting held by PUS [Permanent Under-Secretary, of the MoD] on 23 November 1971 to discuss a draft historical paper on interrogation techniques for the Parker Committee’, 25 November 1971; TNA, records of the Ministry of Defence (DEFE) 23/109, C. A. Whitmore (Secretary, Headquarters Organisation Committee, Ministry of Defence (MoD)), ‘Meeting with Mr Healey’, 24 November 1971. 3 J. A. Rodriguez Jr with B. Harlow, Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions after 9/11 Saved American Lives (New York: Threshold Editions, 2012). 4 O. Hoare (ed.), Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies, The Official History of MI5’s Wartime Interrogation Centre (London: Public Record Office, 2000), pp. 17–21. 5 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland (Bennett Report), Cmnd. 7497, March 1979. 6 S. Newbery, ‘The study of interrogation: A focus on torture, but what about intelligence?’, in C. J. Murphy and C. Moran (eds), Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 222–35. 7 King’s Inns Library, Declan Costello’s Papers, Ireland v. United Kingdom, 19 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights (1976), pp. 460, 463–8. 8 P. Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and the Compromise of Law (London: Allen Lane, 2008). 9 M. Alexander with J. R. Bruning, How to Break a Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq (New York: Free Press, 2008), pp. 183–91. 10 Rodriguez, Hard Measures, p. 64. 11 For example, J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence, 1967–1992 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1993), pp. 219, 226–7, 231; T. P. Coogan, The  Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966–1995 and the Search for Peace (London: Random House, 1995), pp. 126–9; D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969–1985 (London: Methuen, 1986 (revised edition (1985)), pp. 64–7.

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12 I. Cobain, Cruel Britannia: A Secret History of Torture (London: Portobello Books, 2012). 13 See T. R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919–1960 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); D. French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 14 Critical Threats, ‘Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’, accessed 24 October 2013, www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula. 15 J. Walker, Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia 1962–67 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2005), pp. 2, 8. 16 I. Cobain, ‘British army “waterboarded” suspects in 70s’, Guardian (21 December 2009), accessed 10 December 2013, www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/21/british-army-northern-ireland-interrogations. 17 Republic of Ireland, Parliamentary Debate, Jack Lynch (Taoiseach), 27 October 1971, vol. 256, col. 282. 18 ‘What’s in a name?’, Derry Journal (2 October 2009), accessed 15 November 2013, www.derryjournal.com/news/local-news/what-s-in-a-name-1-2141016. 19 D. Benest, ‘Atrocities in Britain’s counter-insurgencies’, Royal United Services Institute, 156:3 (2011), 80; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘MoD launches inquiry into Iraqi’s death in army custody’, Guardian (14 May 2008), accessed 14 May 2008, www. guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/may/14/military.iraq. 20 The Aitken Report: An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse and Unlawful Killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, 25 January 2008. 21 Ibid. 22 I. Cobain, O. Bowcott and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Britain destroyed records of colonial crimes’, Guardian (18 April 2012), accessed 24 April 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/ uk/2012/apr/18/britain-destroyed-records-colonial-crimes. 23 I. Cobain, ‘Revealed: the bonfire of papers at the end of Empire’, Guardian (29 November 2013), accessed 29 November 2013, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ 2013/nov/29/revealed-bonfire-papers-empire. 24 Ibid. 25 S. Mawby, ‘Orientalism and the failure of British policy in the Middle East: The case of Aden’, History, 95: 319 (July 2010), 344. 26 A. T. Williams, A Very British Killing: The Death of Baha Mousa (London: Vintage Books, 2013).

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The ‘five techniques’ of interrogation and the Aden Emergency, 1963–67

The use of the ‘five techniques’ to aid interrogation during the years of the Aden Emergency is the subject of this and the following chapter. Aden is the first use of the ‘five techniques’ to be analysed in depth because it was the first that received sustained retrospective attention from the government. As a result of this, written records were created that allow sufficiently complete answers to the key questions of what happened, why, and with what results, to be composed. The division between Chapters 1 and 2 is chronological: the first addresses the run-up to and details of the interrogation operation, while the second examines the results and reactions. In order to explain how the ‘five techniques’ came to be used in Aden, this chapter examines the history and development of the techniques. Detailing who used the techniques, against whom and where, further helps explain the aims behind their use. This will be combined with an examination of the decision-making processes and the level and type of authorisation this operation received to allow the questions of what happened with respect to the ‘five techniques’ in Aden and why to be answered. The chapter begins with a brief history of Britain’s presence in what became the colony of Aden. Britain was eventually forced to withdraw by the nationalist insurgency it faced there, granting Aden State, and the Federation of South Arabia to which it belonged, independence in 1967. Debates about to what extent, if at all, Britain might have brought about a different outcome continue. While the historian R. J. Gavin argues that even before the Emergency began Britain had little to no chance of maintaining a presence in Aden, the counter-insurgency scholar Thomas Mockaitis argues that the British were unable to maintain a presence there because of their own action and inaction.1 Strong claims that there were weaknesses in the British approach to the Emergency can be made. Poor co-ordination of its intelligence activities has been highlighted, as has the encouragement the 1966 announcement that Britain would withdraw from the Federation of South Arabia and abandon the military base there gave to the nationalist insurgents.2 As will be seen, interrogation became a crucial source of intelligence at a time when other

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sources were scarce. Identification of the positive and negative contributions that interrogation and the allegations of mistreatment associated with it made to British efforts during the Aden Emergency adds to the debate about the extent to which Britain was responsible for the Emergency’s outcome.

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Declaration of a State of Emergency Aden State was a colony 73 square miles in size – only one-third of the size of the Isle of Man in the Irish Sea – with a population of approximately 220,000, more than two and a half times that of the Isle of Man.3 On 16 January 1963 Aden joined the Federation of South Arabia.4 When the Federation was created in 1959 a number of states chose to remain un-federated, and remained part of the East and West Aden Protectorates, though by the end of 1964 all bar one of the states belonging to the latter had already joined, or were soon to join, the Federation.5 These territories outside of Aden State, known as ‘the hinterland’, remained dominated by tribes and tribal politics, and the Federation never developed a cohesive political identity.6 Aden Colony became Aden State when it joined the Federation. However, Britain retained sovereignty.7 Federal rulers were obliged to accept advice from the UK on how to govern the Federation.8 The British High Commissioner took advice from Adeni Ministers but was solely responsible ‘for [Aden’s] external affairs, defence, internal security, police and the Aden Public Service’.9 Being responsible for internal security, successive High Commissioners played an influential role in the Aden Emergency. There were two reasons why Aden was a valuable possession. Firstly, its port was the busiest in the Commonwealth and ‘the premier [oil] bunkering port in the world’.10 Secondly, it was home to a large military base and the headquarters of the military’s Middle East (MIDEAST) Command. It was from this base that activities to protect the Federation and un-federated states were carried out and support given to forces operating in the Gulf.11 The military base was seen as key to protecting Kuwait, which a treaty obliged them to protect. Kuwait had 20 per cent of the world’s known oil reserves.12 Britain controlled half of these reserves, rendering any disruption to British access to this oil harmful to the economy.13 The Commander-in-Chief, MIDEAST Command, emphasised in May 1964 that ‘[t]he fulfilment of my tasks in Kuwait, the Persian Gulf, and in East and Southern Africa depend upon the free and unfettered use of our facilities in Aden’.14 A stable Aden was key to the continued functioning of the British base there. Much of the accommodation for UK service personnel was spread throughout Aden and therefore could not be given full protection.15 The base installations were also scattered around Aden and could not be protected without considerable manpower, and the base depended on the local area for provision of water, electricity

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Figure 1.1 Aden relative to the Federation and Protectorate of South Arabia Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:FederationOfSouthArabiaMap.jpg, accessed 27 May 2014

and sewerage.16 Britain therefore had an interest in maintaining a presence in Aden and keeping it stable. A State of Emergency was declared by Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, the Aden High Commissioner, on 10 December 1963. The immediate cause was the throwing of a grenade at a group of dignitaries, including Trevaskis himself, at Khormaksar civil airport earlier that day. Amongst the fifty-three people injured were the High Commissioner and his wife, both of whom were shielded from further injury by Herra Banti, an Indian woman, and the Deputy High Commissioner George Henderson, both of whom were killed.17 Two Federal Ministers were also injured.18 Trevaskis told Secretary of State for the Colonies Duncan Sandys that he intended to act firmly in response.19 The Colonial Office offered its support but was sceptical about the need to declare a State of Emergency as suggested by the High Commissioner.20 Aden had experienced political violence since 1958.21 In the months before the grenade incident Yemeni authorities had claimed that the Federation was part of Yemen, leading to a steady decline in the security situation.22 The People’s Socialist Party (PSP) had also become a cause for concern, as intelligence indicated that they were preparing to use terrorism and sabotage in their quest to overthrow the government of Aden.23 This culminated in the declaration of a State of Emergency throughout the Federation on 10 December 1963.24 In the following few days, twenty-nine PSP leaders were detained, while the Federation passed a law controlling the

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immigration of aliens and began deporting Yemenis.25 Members of the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), which was supported by the UK’s Labour Party, were also detained, taking the total number of detainees in Aden State to fifty-five by 18 December.26 Detention continued to be used until the Emergency came to an end in November 1967. Reasons for the use of detention will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter. It was ascertained that the grenade incident was ‘part of a deliberate plan for the subversion of the Federation’.27 The most prominent group amongst those posing a threat to security during the Emergency was the National Liberation Front (NLF). Formed in 1963, its weapon of choice was hand grenades.28 It also favoured explosives with time pencils, automatic weapons and mines, all of which were easy to smuggle into Aden because of its porous borders.29 Although the NLF could be described as an insurgent group later in the Emergency, at least,30 the authorities chose to describe it as terrorist so as not to recognise its grievances.31 Its revolutionary aims included removing the British base.32 The NLF caused considerable problems in the relatively small state of Aden. The other influential nationalist group active in Aden at this time was the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), created in 1966.33 It was controlled by Egypt, which had lost its hold on the NLF.34 One of its aims was to compel Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) to recognise that FLOSY was the ‘single Arab entity with which they can negotiate’.35 It was ultimately unsuccessful in this aim, as it was the NLF the British were eventually forced to negotiate with over their exit from Aden.36 Through the NLF, and later FLOSY, Egypt made the continued British presence in Aden increasingly difficult. It was Egypt’s stated intention ‘to overthrow the Federal Government and to secure the removal of the British Base in Aden’, and the Aden authorities learnt that Egypt was trying to organise terrorism and sabotage within the Federation.37 In March 1965 the Aden Local Intelligence Committee (LIC), which was similar to London’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), reported there was no longer any doubt ‘of the Egyptian direction of the N.L.F. campaign’.38 It had provided training to the NLF in Yemen and perhaps also in Cairo.39 This training included ‘instruction on how to resist interrogation’.40 It was within this context that the ‘five techniques’ of interrogation were used. The ‘five techniques’ in Aden The history and development of the ‘five techniques’ How the ‘five techniques’ of standing against a wall in a stress position, being hooded – often with a sandbag or pillow case – to restrict vision, exposure to continuous noise, limited access to food and water, and limited sleep came

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to be used in Aden cannot be explained without reference to their history. As a result of the reaction to the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s the Parker Inquiry was commissioned to look into whether, and if so how, the Directive that governed interrogation in Northern Ireland and in other internal security operations should be amended. Its remit also included consideration of whether the ‘five techniques’ should be permitted for use in future operations. To help it with these tasks the Parker Committee was provided with written histories of the ‘five techniques’, the most detailed of which were attributed to Brigadier Bremner, Inspector of the Army’s Intelligence Corps and Commandant of the Intelligence Centre.41 The Intelligence Centre was the forerunner of the present-day Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC), which delivers training in intelligence across the Armed Forces. This documentation shows how the ‘five techniques’ came to be a part of the British military’s repertoire. These histories of the techniques are based on classified documents and official records, supplemented where possible by ‘the personal recollection of officers who were involved in [the] interrogation operations’.42 This evidence was incomplete, however, as some material remained ‘the property of indigenous Police Special Branches’ to whom, ‘for varying reasons’, the authors no longer had access.43 The precise dates on which the techniques were used could not be determined in every case because they too were contained in the records which the British could no longer consult. Sir James Dunnett, who as the MoD’s Permanent Under-Secretary was its civil service head, wrote that as a result ‘we are … driven back to the question of the dates between which these overseas emergencies occurred’.44 As will be explored below, it remains difficult to determine precisely when the ‘five techniques’ were used in Aden, despite the more recent disclosure of additional details of these interrogations. The Intelligence Centre’s account of the development of the ‘five techniques’ begins in 1945 but notes that the decade up to 1955 ‘is of little significance’.45 The Parker Report states that the ‘five techniques’ were used in Palestine.46 An interrogation centre was established in 1946 during Britain’s counter-insurgency campaign there,47 but Palestine is not mentioned in the official histories examined here. The first use of some or all of the ‘five techniques’ in an internal security operation referred to in these documents concerns the Kenyan Emergency of 1952–60. It is important to note that the five techniques were not used together from the outset. Rather, each was developed over time. It is also significant that in many, if not all, of these internal security operations allegations of mistreatment of various sorts were levelled against the British. In 2009, for example, five elderly Kenyans launched a claim with the High Court for reparations in respect of abuse they allegedly suffered during the Emergency.48 Four years later, the British government agreed to award compensation.49

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Bremner and the Intelligence Centre supported their claim that the interrogation of prisoners in Kenya was successful not by stating that it produced intelligence but by writing that many were persuaded during interrogation to change allegiance and lead raids against their former comrades.50 It is significant that these histories of the ‘five techniques’ were produced by the Intelligence Centre and the Ministry of Defence with the aim of persuading the Parker Committee to support the continued use of the ‘five techniques’. They sought to do so by showing the techniques to be indispensable aids to collecting intelligence and to maintaining security. Bremner went on to report that the first time after the Second World War that interrogation was used as a source of intelligence in an internal security situation was during the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60. Though the Emergency in Malaya began before that seen in Kenya, the ‘five techniques’ did not follow the same progression, as they were used between 1953 and 1954 in Kenya, and from 1956 to 1960 in Malaya. Interrogation involving some or all of the ‘five techniques’ was also used against members of the EOKA (the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) in Cyprus from 1956 to 1960.51 More detail is available on the outcomes of those uses of the ‘five techniques’ in internal security operations that took place after 1960. When the techniques were used in 1960 and 1961 in the British Cameroons, a territory now divided between Nigeria and Cameroon, they targeted subversives from the neighbouring Cameroon Republic who were using it as a base. It was reported that of ‘20 high grade subjects 15 co-operated fully. Information included full details of rebel training camps in Morocco and other north-west African countries – even to course syllabi. The heavy involvement of Communist China in African affairs was confirmed for the first time.’52 The document that this account appears in implies that this high rate of co-operation was attributable to the ‘five techniques’. The use of the techniques in British Guiana in 1964 was also presented as a success, as it led to the ‘immediate co-operation of one hitherto resistant subject’.53 Two short ‘negative’ interrogation operations took place in the early 1960s. In Swaziland interrogation using the ‘five techniques’ showed that no subversive organisation was involved in recent unrest. The second of these negative operations took place in Aden in January and February of 1964. This was a response to the grenade incident of December 1963, and proved that those who had been arrested were not directly involved with the incident.54 This operation will be detailed further below. The techniques were also used in Brunei in 1963, where hooding and noise techniques were first introduced.55 The noise used there was produced by a tape-recorder and amplifiers.56 Denis Healey, who served as Labour Defence Secretary between 1964 and 1970, was told in preparation for his testimony to the Parker Committee that Brunei was where ‘as far as could be ascertained,

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all 5 techniques were first used together’.57 This gradual development of the techniques in circumstances where there was pressure to gather accurate and timely intelligence, and the presentation of them as successful, supports the assertion that they were developed and used with the intention of meeting intelligence requirements. A summary of the intelligence gathered this way in Brunei, based on a report by Squadron Leader E. Williams, the School of Military Intelligence member who led the team sent to assist the interrogation operation there, states that the TNKU (North Kalimantan National Army) order of battle was collected in detail, that Indonesia’s support of the insurrection was confirmed and that the future plans of the revolutionary leader were exposed.58 The techniques were also stated to have produced valuable intelligence when Indonesia adopted its policy of ‘confrontation’ with Malaya after Indonesia’s support for the Brunei insurrection failed to dissuade Britain and Malaya from setting up the Federation of Malaysia.59 In the Confrontation the ‘five techniques’, it was later stated, helped obtain detailed Order of Battle information for the regular Indonesian forces and intelligence on the activities of guerrilla forces and identified ‘subversive persons’.60 The ‘five techniques’ were in use in Aden between September 1964 and 1967, in a separate operation from the short negative one that took place earlier in 1964. More details will be given of this example later in the chapter. Completing the history of the ‘five techniques’ requires that two other operations be outlined: Oman, 1970–71 and Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland example is the focus of Chapters 3 to 5. That the techniques had been used in Oman was concealed from the Parker Inquiry because it was ‘such a special case’.61 It was simply told that the operation had taken place between September 1970 and June 1971, and that it targeted Maoist insurgents in the Persian Gulf.62 The following quotation reveals that the Intelligence Centre felt the Oman case represented the culmination of the previous eighteen years of work on the ‘five techniques’: It was essentially this careful mounting of interrogation operations which enabled complete security to be planned and obtained, for the first time during … [these] operations in the winter of 1970/71, and subsequently, when a requirement for interrogation was recognised in Northern Ireland. In all cases, small numbers of suspects were especially selected and were successfully interrogated in depth, in complete security and isolation.63

The quotation makes clear the pride felt by the Intelligence Centre. It had perfected the techniques in Oman, just months before they were used in Northern Ireland. It is clear that the Intelligence Centre sought to show that the ‘five techniques’ had been successful across the eleven operations they had been used in between 1945 and when they were taken to Northern Ireland.

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As will be explored further, this conviction played a pivotal role in the transfer of the techniques to Aden. Others have argued that inspiration for the techniques  was taken from methods used by the Soviets, and the techniques that British military personnel were exposed to by other British personnel as part of training in how to resist interrogation.64 The principles underpinning successful interrogation could certainly have been developed by examining methods used by other states and during Britain’s earlier experiences with interrogation. But the level of detail put forward in these histories of the ‘five techniques’, written by the British military’s experts on interrogation, constitutes strong evidence that this particular collection of methods was developed by the British. Given the military’s tradition of using some or all of the ‘five techniques’ in internal security operations, it is no surprise that it took the techniques to Aden after it was asked to help with interrogation there. The first interrogation operation, 1963–64 From amongst those arrested and detained shortly after the grenade incident of 10 December 1963, eleven individuals were selected by Special Branch (SB).65 It was expected that these eleven would be able to answer the questions that would be put to them during interrogation: was the PSP implicated in the bomb incident and if so how; and what connections, if any, were there between the PSP and other countries?66 They were all described by the authorities as ‘important’ members of the PSP or the nationalist ATUC, and included the leader of the PSP, Abdullah al Asnaj.67 It is worth highlighting that the authorities were focused on the PSP, the political party, rather than the NLF at this stage. It appears the NLF’s involvement in terrorism was not yet known to them. Interrogation was selected as an appropriate method for collecting the intelligence that was needed at this early stage of the Emergency. What intelligence was gained by interrogation in Aden and how that intelligence was used is the subject of the next chapter. The details of this first interrogation operation that used the ‘five techniques’ shed some light on why the techniques were used. The intention was originally to interrogate these detainees in a prison in Ahwar, 200 miles east of Aden.68 This became impossible after the Governor of the prison could no longer guarantee the detainees’ personal safety.69 Instead, they were taken to a facility near HQ MIDEAST Command which had been prepared for use as an interrogation centre in an emergency situation ‘some time ago’.70 This was Fort Morbut,71 occasionally spelt Morbat or Morbeg, or referred to as Ras Morbut, a two-storey building with six cells and three or four interrogation rooms.72 It was described by a number of detainees held there later in the Emergency as ‘famous in Aden … [for being] similar to Hitler’s detention camps’.73

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It was Trevaskis, the High Commissioner, who asked the Colonial Secretary if the War Office would send extra interrogators to Aden to help speed up the interrogation of detainees, hitherto being undertaken by Special Branch.74 Trevaskis was to be replaced by Sir Richard Turnbull in 1964 because of differences of opinion with the new Labour Colonial Secretary.75 Trevaskis’s involvement in the work of the Aden LIC, which produced intelligence reports on the Federation to be forwarded to London, can be described as interference, as he not only altered the LIC’s reports but did not inform London that he had done so.76 His request for interrogators was met. A team of five were to leave the UK by 1 January 1964, and were expected to stay in Aden for six weeks.77 The leader of the team was Major W. B. Sedgwick of the Intelligence Corps, Senior Instructor for the Interrogation Branch at the School of Military Intelligence.78 The rest of the team was comprised of three other interrogators and one technician, all of whom hailed from the Intelligence Centre.79 The Interrogation Branch remained part of the School of Military Intelligence until April 1965, when it became the Joint Services Interrogation Wing (JSIW). The JSIW was co-located with the Intelligence Centre until it became part of the Centre in 1969.80 The Metropolitan Police Special Branch and Security Service also had a degree of expertise in interrogation. It is not known whether consideration was given to sending them to Aden instead. What is clear is that the military had extensive experience in interrogation within internal security contexts. Whilst in Aden Sedgwick’s team reported to Special Branch.81 As ‘it was considered undesirable for the army to be connected with interrogation of detainees’ for ‘political reasons’, the team were given police ranks and police identity cards, and told to wear civilian clothes.82 The interrogations began on 8 January 1964.83 Sedgwick reported the results of the operation to the Head of Special Branch on 29 January, and his team left Aden on 8 February 1964.84 Further information about who knew of this interrogation operation can be found in statements about the briefing Sedgwick received before leaving London. He was briefed by the Security Service, the Colonial Office and the War Office’s Director of Military Intelligence.85 They provided Sedgwick with the general aims of the interrogation operation, and more specific aims were set and issued by the Head of Special Branch after Sedgwick’s arrival in Aden.86 Representatives of these organisations and these post-holders were therefore not only aware that this interrogation operation was being planned but actively involved in the preparations for it. The High Commissioner also had foreknowledge of the operation. The question that remains unanswered is how much knowledge, if any, they had of the ‘five techniques’. It is conceivable that when the Intelligence Centre was asked to send interrogators no information was given by them, or sought from them, as to the interrogation techniques the team would use. This, in turn, raises the question of who gave

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their authorisation for the ‘five techniques’ to be used in this operation. It is possible that there was no requirement to have Ministerial approval, and that authorisation was given by the Intelligence Centre. The selection of these eleven high-profile detainees for interrogation by the military’s interrogation experts strongly suggests that Special Branch, the High Commissioner and those in London who were also involved were eager for these interrogations to produce intelligence. Whether it was anticipated that methods like the ‘five techniques’ would be used, or known that these were in the Intelligence Centre’s repertoire, is simply not known. The Intelligence Centre’s histories of the ‘five techniques’ written some years later confirm that these eleven detainees were exposed to the ‘five techniques’. It is significant that Sedgwick noted in his report on the operation that because of the contact the detainees had with the outside world whilst at Fort Morbut – contact that included visits by MPs from the UK – ‘proper interrogation became impossible’ and was confined to ‘gentlemanly interviews’.87 Describing the ‘five techniques’ as ‘gentlemanly interviews’ would be surprising, to say the least. An explanation for Sedgwick’s choice of words may be provided by the distinction that can and should be made between the ‘five techniques’ that aim to condition and prepare an individual for interrogation, and the questioning that is conducted alongside that conditioning. The second interrogation operation, 1964–67 A longer interrogation operation involving the ‘five techniques’ spanned most of the rest of the Emergency, beginning in September 1964 and continuing until late 1967. Although it is not clear how many people were treated this way, it is possible to detail the methods used, who used them, where, and which figures in the High Commission, London government and the military were aware they were in use. Like the first, this second interrogation operation was conducted at Fort Morbut. The Fort Morbut Interrogation Centre was re-opened for this interrogation operation.88 Interrogation became the main source of intelligence during the Emergency,89 and all interrogation after September 1964 that sought intelligence was conducted at Fort Morbut.90 Detainees who were to be interrogated were held at Fort Morbut for this purpose before being transferred to the dedicated Detention Centre at alMansoura, also spelt Mansura, near Aden State’s border, which was opened in September 1965.91 Numerous allegations of mistreatment relating to the Detention Centre have been made, but as they do not relate to interrogation they are beyond the scope of this work. Detainees who were to be interrogated for a second time were returned to Fort Morbut.92 Given the evidence available it is difficult to ascertain how many of the detainees held at Fort Morbut were exposed to the ‘five techniques’. The Ministry of Defence does not hold records on whether the ‘five techniques’

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were used on all detainees held at the Interrogation Centre.93 Many descriptions of the treatment experienced there, as reported by the detainees themselves, are available.94 Far from all of these list every one of the ‘five techniques’. The ‘five techniques’ were, however, in use between September 1964 and late 1967.95 The impetus for this second interrogation operation that used the ‘five techniques’ came in September 1964 when Special Branch traced responsibility for terrorist activity to the NLF.96 HQ MIDEAST Command emphasised that there had been a sharp increase in terrorism, that the people already arrested were in a ‘different category to those in [the] previous interrogation exercise’ and that there was not at present the capability to carry out detailed interrogation.97 The Head of Special Branch was one of only a few interrogators in Aden, and military interrogators already in the area were not available.98 Special Branch needed help, and a military interrogation team led by Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Richards was sent to Aden.99 Richards was the Commanding Officer of the Joint Services Interrogation Unit (JSIU), a Corps-level unit linked to the JSIW.100 He arrived on 18 September, accompanied by Warrant Officer Class 2 F. G. Everson, also of the Intelligence Corps and the JSIU.101 They were joined ten days later by Sergeant Phillips, Royal Corps of Signals, a technician with the Interrogation Branch of the School of Military Intelligence.102 They posed as civilian police officers and worked in plain clothes until their departure on 25 October.103 They brought the ‘five techniques’ with them. Their departure did not mean the end of the military’s involvement in interrogation in Aden. During Richards’s visit his team was joined by Staff Sergeant Zellma and later by Major Gahan, sometimes spelt Gahann. They were taught the techniques that Richards’s team had been using and became the permanent Aden interrogation team.104 By December 1964 Zellma and Gahan were overstretched, ‘unable to keep pace with current demand for interrogation’.105 The High Commissioner’s Office requested that the MoD be asked to send two more interrogators to assist.106 By this time Sir Richard Turnbull had been appointed High Commissioner. Former diplomat Glen Balfour-Paul notes that although Turnbull brought with him ‘the credit of stage-managing the transfer of power in Tanzania’ he had ‘no experience of negotiating with the Arab mind’.107 The request was granted and Everson returned to Aden on 1 January 1965 accompanied by Staff Sergeant A. Miller.108 They stayed for the duration of January, after which they were returned to the UK.109 Everson’s report on this visit estimated that there was enough interrogation to be done to occupy four interrogators for the next six to twelve months.110 The High Commissioner requested that Everson and Miller be replaced, and the MoD replied that they hoped to provide replacements by mid-February.111

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Less is known about the interrogators working at Fort Morbut from early 1965 until the operation ended in September 1967. There were, however, seven military interrogators there in October 1966.112 The following month it was confirmed that the average number of interrogators at Fort Morbut was six, and that a total of twenty-two interrogators had worked there to date.113 The Interrogation Centre continued to be operated by the military throughout this operation, being staffed ‘almost entirely by Army officers and NCOs [non-commissioned officers], whose numbers varied, according to need, from one officer and one NCO to three officers and three NCOs’.114 It is known that at least one member of the Diplomatic Service worked there as an interrogator towards the end of the Emergency.115 Although operated by the military, the Interrogation Centre remained the responsibility of Special Branch.116 The involvement of the military’s experts on the ‘five techniques’ in interrogation during the Emergency consisted of conducting interrogations themselves and teaching the techniques to the permanent interrogation team at Fort Morbut. The provision of dedicated facilities and a permanent interrogation team betray a belief that interrogation was worthwhile, would continue to be so and was worth doing well. This chapter now turns to what form the ‘five techniques’ took in Aden, who knew they were being used, and what questioning techniques were used in conjunction with them. After the Emergency the Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence) of the MoD’s intelligence branch in the Defence Intelligence Staff, the BGS(Int)DIS, confirmed that all five techniques had been used in Aden.117 White hoods were used on the journey to the Interrogation Centre and whilst detainees were being moved around the building.118 This enhanced security by concealing detainees’ identities from others being transported in the same vehicle and from other detainees at the Centre. Hoods were not compulsory in individual cells.119 Detainees may have had the option of wearing hoods in their individual cells, as detainees held at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ in Northern Ireland may have chosen to do.120 No information is available on the length of time for which each prisoner wore a hood, but they were worn for much less time at Fort Morbut than at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ because the circumstances in the two places ‘were quite different’.121 Chapter 3 will provide figures on the relative length of time detainees spent hooded and in a stress position in Northern Ireland. Detainees held at Fort Morbut complained that the ‘five techniques’ were in use and that they had been beaten.122 Some allegations were no doubt of substance and describe genuine hardship. Others were false, made with the intention of ‘embarrassing the authorities’123 or in an effort to explain co-operation with their interrogators.124 Some allegations were found to be groundless,125 and others were found to have no evidence to support them.126 The latter were therefore neither proved nor disproved, and the absence of

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evidence meant no disciplinary action could be taken. A detainee’s claim that he was pushed against a wall whilst hooded led to action being taken to limit the chances of this happening again. Hooding was not banned, but ‘[f]ollowing this incident, instructions issued by the [Intelligence] Centre ordered that the practice of hooding detainees be used only in exceptional circumstances’.127 More substantial comments on changes made as a result of the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Aden will be made in the following chapter. Detainee number 299, Mugbil Abdullah Muhsin Dhalai, complained when he was released from Fort Morbut that he had been made to stand with his hands against a wall for six and a half hours. The Controller of the Interrogation Centre admitted that wall-standing might have been used for up to an hour ‘on one or two occasions … whilst other detainees are being moved around, or … [the detainee] himself was waiting his turn for interrogation’, but said it was ‘out of the question that … [the detainee] would have been kept in such a position for six and a half hours as he has alleged’.128 In contesting the amount of time wall-standing was used for, the Centre Controller admitted that wall-standing was in fact used. While wall-standing was used as an aid to interrogation along with the other four techniques, it also benefited security by making it harder for prisoners to attack Interrogation Centre personnel because their hands were visible. In the words of Brigadier J. M. H. Lewis during his time as BGS(Int)DIS, there was ‘conflicting evidence’ on noise in Aden.129 After noisy air conditioning was installed in 1965130 this was relied on to provide noise, negating the need for any other kind of noise-producing equipment.131 Lewis believed that, while a tape-recorder had been used to produce noise in Brunei, no such system was used in Aden. The white noise machine later used in Northern Ireland may have been used after it was invented in 1966.132 Related to noise is another of the ‘five techniques’, namely restricting detainees’ ability to sleep. Military sources confirm that deprivation of sleep was used when suspects were not co-operating and that sleep was disrupted by interrogation.133 In response to allegations that detainees were kept awake, the High Commissioner’s Office admitted that noise was unavoidable because ‘[t]he cell doors are of steel and naturally cannot be opened or closed without some noise. Movements within the cell block during the day and night are frequent, e.g. to the toilets and ablution blocks and to the interrogation rooms.’134 Uncooperative prisoners were, however, deprived of sleep for ‘considerable periods’.135 No records have been kept on how long.136 As well as limiting sleep, detainees’ diets were restricted when they were not co-operating.137 There is evidence that food was offered three times a day until September 1966, after which it was offered only every twenty-four hours.138 No further information on diet could be found.139

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Preparing detainees for interrogation was not the only motivation for using the techniques: there were also security-related motivations for them, and others were by-products of unavoidable noise, for example. Other techniques designed to prepare detainees for interrogation, as disclosed to the author by the Ministry of Defence in response to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act, include moving the prisoner between hot and cold rooms, which is reminiscent of methods used in Guantánamo Bay since 2001, depriving them of tobacco and getting them to perform menial cleaning tasks.140 The questioning methods used by interrogators at Fort Morbut between 1964 and 1967 included alternating between sympathetic and harsh approaches; appealing for information on ideological or religious grounds; promising to assist the detainee following release; seeking to extract information by chatting with the detainee without taking notes; and appealing to the detainee for information that would prevent acts of terrorism and protect innocent people.141 Another source states that interrogators were taught to use intensive questioning, ‘forms of trickery’ and confrontation, as well as rewards, ‘kindness and the friendly approach’.142 This usefully expands understanding of what took place at the Interrogation Centre, and serves as a reminder that interrogation did not involve just the ‘five techniques’ but involved verbal attempts to obtain intelligence too. Without asking prisoners what they know, or otherwise verbally prompting them to speak, the central component of interrogation is absent. It is clear that a number of departments and individuals based in Aden and the UK knew that the military were involved in interrogation at Fort Morbut. Special Branch was the one to request help with interrogation and it remained responsible for the Interrogation Centre, but it is not clear how much information about interrogation methods it was provided with or sought. By extension, the Interrogation Centre was the responsibility of the High Commissioner, who in turn was responsible to the Foreign Secretary.143 The third and final High Commissioner during the Emergency was Sir Humphrey Trevelyan. He replaced Turnbull in May 1967 when Turnbull fell out with Lord Shackleton, who had become the informal minister for Aden, and the Foreign Secretary George Brown.144 Trevaskis and Turnbull were both wellinformed about the value of interrogation and were ardent proponents of it. Trevelyan’s views on interrogation are not known, possibly because by the time he became High Commissioner the emphasis was on an orderly withdrawal from Aden rather than attempts to defeat the NLF and FLOSY. The frequency and insistence of the requests for extra interrogators made by the Emergency’s first two High Commissioners to successive Secretaries of State for the Colonies were instrumental to the provision of extra interrogators. The Colonial Secretaries were thus aware of the need for extra interrogators and were involved in attempts to locate suitable candidates.

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Denis Healey took ‘a close interest’ in interrogation in Aden because it involved Army personnel.145 A short note on the ‘five techniques’ was prepared for him by Gerry Reynolds, Minister of Defence for the Army, after Reynolds visited the School of Military Intelligence in October of 1966.146 HQ MIDEAST Command had been involved in the search for extra interrogators.147 As well as the Ministry of Defence, the Security Service was involved in discussions about providing additional interrogators in the context of the September 1964 search, at least.148 Despite all this evidence, the Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Cabinet Office do not hold any records on who knew the ‘five techniques’ were going to be used, who authorised their use or who was aware that they were in use.149 The question of who, if anyone, authorised the use of the techniques remains unanswered. Conclusion It is clear that collecting intelligence in order to improve the security situation was the predominant reason the ‘five techniques’ were used in Aden. This was also to be the case in Northern Ireland. No evidence has been found to support the proposition that the techniques were used with the intention of punishing or otherwise causing the suffering of the detainees held at Fort Morbut, but it cannot be ruled out that this might have motivated some of the individuals involved. The following chapter will address to what extent people were arrested and detained in order that they could be interrogated and thereby provide intelligence that would help the Aden Police and the British military to defeat, or at least control, the nationalist insurgency that was threatening their ability to maintain a military base there. When help with interrogation was requested in the wake of the 1963 grenade incident and again in 1964, it was the military who stepped in. By that time the military had already been developing and practising the ‘five techniques’ in internal security operations in other colonies for over ten years. Transferring those techniques to Aden – another internal security operation – was logical. Knowledge that the ‘five techniques’ were to be used there, and that they were being used, was not restricted to the military and the Ministry of Defence. The Aden High Commissioner, the Security Service and the Colonial Office were involved in the decision to send the military there. All were familiar with the military’s expertise in interrogation for internal security operations, expertise that was embodied in the ‘five techniques’. Descriptions of the ‘five techniques’ and other conditions at the Fort Morbut Interrogation Centre are reminiscent of much more recent interrogation operations. The ‘War on Terror’ has resulted in widely circulated photos and moving images of hooded and restrained detainees, and descriptions of

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beatings, temperature manipulation and other controversial methods used in similar contexts with similar aims. The next chapter further explores the link between the ‘five techniques’ and efforts to obtain intelligence on the one hand, and Britain’s eventual withdrawal from Aden State and its military base there on the other.

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Notes 1 R. J. Gavin, Aden under British Rule, 1839–1967 (London: Hurst, 1975); T. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 44–71. 2 C. Andrew, Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 474; J. Paget, Last Post: Aden 1964–67 (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 114, 158–9. 3 TNA, Colonial Office (CO) 968/730, no author (Aden Department, CO?), ‘Note on the value of the Base to Aden’, May 1965; TNA, Cabinet Office (CAB) 148/17, Greenwood, ‘Memo 16: Policy in Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia’, 30 December 1964; population of the Isle of Man according to the 2011 census: Isle of Man Government, ‘Island facts’, 2013, accessed 31 December 2013, www.gov. im/categories/business-and-industries/iom-key-facts-guide/island-facts/. 4 BL, IOR/R/20/D/34, ‘LIC [Local Intelligence Committee] Aden Summary No. 317 for period 16 to Noon 22 Jan. 1963’, 23 January 1963. 5 TNA, CAB 148/17, Greenwood, ‘Memo 16: Policy in Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia’, 30 December 1964. 6 Gavin, Aden under British Rule, p. 341. 7 TNA, CAB 148/17, Greenwood, ‘Memo 16: Policy in Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia’, 30 December 1964. 8 Ibid. 9 BL, IOR/R/20/D/222, Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), MoD, ‘Intelligence Briefing Memorandum: Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia (including Perim Island)’, 26 August 1965. 10 TNA, CAB 148/78, ‘Report by the South Arabia Action Group (SAAG) to subcommittee OPDO(AS)’, February 1967, p. 11. 11 TNA, CO 968/730, Aden Department CO, ‘The Aden Base’, 6 May 1965. 12 TNA, CAB 148/9, Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (Cabinet Office), ‘Draft Report – Aden (Third Revise)’, 6 October 1964, p. 2. 13 Ibid., pp. 2, 3. 14 TNA, CO 1055/194, Lt-Gen. Sir Charles Harington (Commander-in-Chief, Middle East) to Earl Mountbatten (Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)), 11 May 1964. 15 TNA, CO 968/730, Aden Department, CO, ‘The Aden Base’, 6 May 1965. 16 Ibid. 17 K. Trevaskis, Shades of Amber: A South Arabian Episode (London: Hutchinson, 1968), pp. 198, 199; BL, IOR/R/20/D/50, ‘List of injured admitted to Q.E.H.’, no

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21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28

29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

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date; BL, IOR/R/20/D/50, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis (High Commissioner) to Chief Superintendent, New Scotland Yard, 22 January 1964. BL, IOR/R/20/D/50, Trevaskis to Duncan Sandys (Secretary of State for the Colonies), 10 December 1963. Ibid. BL, IOR/R/20/D/50, Colonial Office to Trevaskis, no date (received 10 December 1963). S. Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955–67: Last Outpost of a Middle East Empire (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 115. TNA, CAB 21/5297, Foreign Office (FO) to certain of Her Majesty’s Representatives, 4 May 1964. BL, IOR/R/20/D/366, R. L. Waggitt (Head of Special Branch (SB)) to Commissioner of Police, 11 May 1963. TNA, CAB 21/5297, FO to certain of Her Majesty’s Representatives, 4 May 1964. TNA, DEFE 11/422, Trevaskis to Sandys, 13 December 1963. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, p. 56; TNA, WO 208/5572, Major W. B. (Bill) Sedgwick (Intelligence Corps and Senior Instructor, Interrogation Branch, School of Military Intelligence), ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964); TNA, CO 1055/197, Trevaskis to Sandys, 18 December 1963. TNA, DEFE 11/422, Trevaskis to Sandys, 13 December 1964. TNA, AIR 2/18891, ‘Defence and Security of Royal Air Force Stations and Role of Provost and Security Services in Aden during the Emergency, 1963–1967: The defence and security of RAF installations in Aden, 1963–1967’, no date; TNA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 8/208, ‘Background notes’, no date. TNA, CAB 191/12, LIC, ‘The National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South or The National Liberation Front (NLF)’, 25 January 1965. Insurgency has been described as the use of military means to achieve political aims, with insurgents seeking to wear down the authorities over time and resting on popular support for their strength. J. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 14, 22; R. Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (London: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 20. See French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, p. 60. BL, IOR/R/20/D/66, Arthur Wiltshire (Commissioner of Police, Aden Colony Police) to Tom Oates (High Commissioner’s Office), 8 February 1965. TNA, FCO 8/208, ‘Background notes’, no date. Ibid. BL, IOR/R/20/D/212, LIC, ‘Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 480 for period 28 Feb to noon 6 March, 1966’, 6 March 1966. Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates, p. 150. TNA, DEFE 11/497, Headquarters Middle East Command (HQMIDEAST), ‘Report on the development of operations in the Radfan area’, 10 May 1964; TNA, CO 1055/194, Trevaskis to Sandys, 16 April 1964. TNA, CO 1055/63, Sir Richard Turnbull (High Commissioner) to Sandys, 11 March 1965.

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39 TNA, CAB 191/12, LIC, ‘The National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South or The National Liberation Front (NLF)’, 25 January 1965. 40 Ibid. 41 Sir James Dunnett (Permanent Under-Secretary for Defence), Sir Dick White (Intelligence Co-ordinator) and Lieutenant General Cecil Blacker (Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS)) decided on 16 November that an historical narrative of ‘the interrogation story’ was to be produced for the Parker Inquiry by 19 November. BMInq, day 1, CAB001632, Brigadier J. M. H. Lewis (Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence) Defence Intelligence Staff (BGS(Int)DIS)) to Brigadier R. M. Bremner (Inspector of the Intelligence Corps and Commandant of the Intelligence Centre), 16 November 1971. 42 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Intelligence gained from interrogation operations since 1960’, 18 November 1971. 43 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in international security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971; TNA, DEFE 23/111, Colonel H. W. B. Hancock (on behalf of Bremner), ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, 8 December 1971. 44 TNA, Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) 15/485, Dunnett to Burke Trend (Cabinet Secretary), 15 November 1971. 45 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in international security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971. 46 Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Consider Authorised Procedures for the Interrogation of Persons Suspected of Terrorism (Parker Report), Cmnd. 4901, March 1972, Majority Report, p. 3. 47 TNA, CO 537/1838, Arthur Creech Jones (Colonial Secretary) to General Sir A. Cunningham (in Palestine), 23 October 1946. 48 See X. Rice, ‘Mau Mau veterans sue for colonial abuses’, Guardian (10 May 2009), accessed 11 May 2009, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/10/kenyacolonial-abuses. 49 I. Cobain, ‘Kenya: UK expresses regret over abuse as Mau Mau promised payout’, Guardian (6 June 2013), accessed 29 November 2013, www.theguardian.com/ world/2013/jun/05/kenyan-mau-mau-payout-uk-regret-abuse. 50 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in international security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971. 51 Ibid. 52 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Intelligence gained from interrogation operations since 1960’, 18 November 1971. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in international security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971. 56 TNA, DEFE 24/745, Whitmore to Assistant Private Secretary, Minister of State, 2 December 1971. 57 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Whitmore to Private Secretary, Permanent Under-Secretary, 24 November 1971.

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58 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Intelligence gained from interrogation operations since 1960’, 18 November 1971; TNA, WO 208/5572, Squadron Leader E. S. Williams (School of Military Intelligence), ‘Interrogation of detainees in Brunei February/March 1963’, 16 April 1963. 59 D. Easter, ‘British and Malaysian covert support for rebel movements in Indonesia during the “confrontation”, 1963–66’, Intelligence and National Security, 14:4 (1999), 195. 60 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Intelligence gained from interrogation operations since 1960’, 18 November 1971. 61 BMInq, day 1, CAB001633, no author (annexed to document by Lewis), ‘Historical narrative concerning the interrogation process as practiced by UK security forces and overseas Special Branches’, 16 November 1971. 62 TNA, DEFE 24/1834, R. J. E. Abraham (Head of DS6, MoD) to Assistant Private Secretary, Secretary of State, 9 December 1975; TNA, DEFE 23/109, no author (MoD), ‘Background note’, no date (c. November 1971); TNA, DEFE 23/111, no author (cover letter by Hancock), ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, no date (cover letter dated 8 December 1971). 63 TNA, DEFE 23/111, no author (cover letter by Hancock for Bremner), ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, 8 December 1971. 64 D. Streatfeild, Brainwash: The Secret History of Mind Control (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2006), pp. 102–40. A video made by the Army shown to soldiers in Aden in 1966 in order to train them in resistance to interrogation depicted waterboarding, beatings, stress positions and hooding. Roy Giles (on the basis of his experience in the Gloucestershire Regiment), interview, 17 June 2009. 65 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick to Head of SB, 29 January 1964. 66 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick to Brigadier, 11 January 1964. 67 Ibid.; TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick to Head of SB, 29 January 1964. 68 TNA, DEFE 23/109, no author (MoD), ‘Background note’, no date (c. November 1971). 69 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick to Brigadier, 11 January 1964. 70 Ibid. 71 No evidence has been found explicitly stating that it was Fort Morbut, but a diagram of the layout of the building provided by Sedgwick matches very closely a diagram of Fort Morbut provided at a later date. TNA, WO 208/5572, ‘Plan of interrogation centre’, annexed to Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964); TNA, CO 1035/178, ‘Interrogation Centre Fort Morbut’, annexed to Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Richards (Intelligence Corps), ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964). 72 TNA, CO 1035/178, ‘Interrogation Centre Fort Morbut’, annexed to Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964); TNA, WO 208/5572, ‘Plan of interrogation centre’, annexed to Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964, no date (c. April 1964).

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73 TNA, PREM 13/704, detainees who are senior members of trade unions to Harold Wilson (Prime Minister), Greenwood and the General Secretary, Trades Union Congress, 31 October 1965. 74 BL, IOR/R/20/D/50, Turnbull to Greenwood, 21 December 1964. 75 Trevaskis, Shades of Amber, p. 225. 76 C. Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (London: Harper Press, 2013), p. 320. 77 TNA, CO 1035/178, Major E. H. P. Berry (War Office) to J. C. Long (Colonial Office), 31 December 1963; TNA, WO 208/5572, War Office to Eastern Command, no date (December 1963). 78 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964). 79 TNA, WO 208/5572, War Office to Eastern Command, no date (December 1963); BL, IOR/R/20/D/50, Colonial Office to Trevaskis, 24 December 1963. 80 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in international security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971. 81 TNA, DEFE 23/109, no author (MoD), ‘Background note’, no date (c. November 1971). 82 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964); Military Intelligence Museum (MIM), A/ Aden Collection Box 1, ASFIC: 212, Brigadier [initials illegible] to Sedgwick,  ‘Administrative instruction to OC Interrogation Detachment under orders for Aden’, no date. 83 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick to Brigadier, 11 January 1964. 84 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964). 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in international security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971. 89 BL, IOR/R/20/D/213, LIC, ‘Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 520 for period 4 December to noon 11 December 1966’, 12 December 1966; TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Intelligence gained from interrogation operations since 1960’, 18 November 1971. 90 TNA, PREM 13/1294, Turnbull to Sir Roger Allen (FO), 28 September 1966. In addition, no evidence has been located that suggests interrogation took place anywhere other than Fort Morbut. 91 TNA, FCO 8/233, Oates to Donald McCarthy (FO), 11 April 1967; TNA, CO 1055/209, Turnbull to Greenwood, 13 November 1965; Introduction by the Foreign Secretary (George Brown), Report by Mr. Roderic Bowen, Q.C., on Procedures for the Arrest, Interrogation and Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Aden (Bowen Report), Cmnd. 3165, 14 November 1966. 92 BL, IOR/R/20/D/22, no author, no title, 22 January 1965. 93 Gary Lewitt (MoD) to the author in response to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request, 7 August 2013.

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94 For example, TNA, FCO 8/164, ‘Return of Complaints’, 31 December 1966. 95 TNA, DEFE 23/109, no author (MoD), ‘Background note’, no date (c. November 1971). 96 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in international security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971. 97 TNA, CO 1035/178, HQMIDEAST to MoD Army, no date. 98 TNA, CO 1035/178, Box 500 (the Security Service) to D. W. Russell (Colonial Office), 4 September 1964; TNA, CO 1035/178, HQMIDEAST to MoD Army, no date (received 11 September 1964). 99 TNA, CO 1035/178, Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964). 100 Ibid.; BMInq, day 3, MOD042018, no author (cover letter by MoD), ‘Interrogation in war’, no date (cover letter dated 13 August 1974). 101 TNA, CO 1035/178, Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964); TNA, CO 1035/178, Warrant Officer Class 2 F. G. Everson (Intelligence Corps), ‘Report on IS interrogation in Aden, 2 Jan–30 Jan 1965’, no date. 102 TNA, CO 1035/178, Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964). 103 Ibid.; BL, IOR/R/20/D/50, HQMIDEAST to War Office, Eastern Command and Intelligence Centre, 30 December 1963. 104 TNA, CO 1035/178, Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964). 105 TNA, CO 1035/178, Acting High Commissioner to Greenwood, 27 December 1964. 106 Ibid. 107 G. Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 82. 108 TNA, CO 1035/178, Major Miller (ASb2(B), MoD) to Eastern Command, Intelligence Centre and AIROPS Salisbury, no date. 109 TNA, CO 1035/178, J. B. Wilson (MoD) to MIDEAST, no date. 110 TNA, CO 1035/178, Everson, ‘Report on IS interrogation in Aden, 2 Jan–30 Jan 1965’, no date. 111 TNA, CO 1035/178, Turnbull to Greenwood, 28 January 1965; TNA, CO 1035/178, J. B. Wilson to MIDEAST, no date. 112 TNA, DEFE 23/110, Intelligence Centre to DI 16 (MoD), 24 October 1966. 113 Introduction by the Foreign Secretary, Bowen Report, p. 5. 114 TNA, DEFE 23/109, no author (MoD), ‘Background note’, no date (c. November 1971). 115 TNA, FCO 8/238, Turnbull to FO, 22 April 1967; TNA, FCO 8/238, Brown to Lieutenant Colonel Hurr (Philip Hurr’s father), 9 March 1967. 116 TNA, DEFE 23/109, no author (MoD), ‘Background note’, no date (c. November 1971).

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117 TNA, DEFE 13/918, ‘Note of a telephone conversation between PUS and Mr Roy Hattersley, MP’, no date (conversation took place on 22 November 1971). 118 TNA, DEFE 23/111, no author, ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, 8 December 1971. 119 TNA, FCO 8/165, ‘Report by Major TH Perkins, HQ MIDEAST Command on events of 23 July 1966 at the Interrogation Centre Fort Morbut’, 26 January 1967. 120 TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Secretary HOC (unknown), 1 December 1971. 121 TNA, DEFE 23/111, Lewis, 9 December 1971; TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Secretary HOC, 1 December 1971. 122 For examples, see TNA, FCO 8/164, High Commissioner’s Office, February 1967 return of complaints. 123 The allegations of detainee number 248, for example, were described this way. TNA, FCO 8/164, High Commissioner’s Office, February 1967 return of complaints. 124 The allegations of Detainee 281, for example, were described this way. TNA, FCO 8/164, High Commissioner’s Office, May and June 1967 return of complaints. 125 For example those of Detainee 275. TNA, FCO 8/164, High Commissioner’s Office, May and June 1967 return of complaints. 126 For example those of Detainee 279. TNA, FCO 8/164, High Commissioner’s Office, May and June 1967 return of complaints. 127 TNA, FCO 8/164, High Commissioner’s Office, February 1967 return of complaints. 128 TNA, FCO 8/164, High Commissioner’s Office, May and June 1967 return of complaints. 129 TNA, DEFE 24/745, Lewis to Air Marshal Sir Harold Maguire (Director-General of Intelligence (DGI)), 1 December 1971. 130 TNA, DEFE 23/111, no author, ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, 8 December 1971. 131 TNA, DEFE 23/111, Hancock (for Bremner), ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, 8 December 1971. 132 TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Secretary HOC, 1 December 1971. 133 Ibid.; TNA, DEFE 23/111, ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, 8 December 1971. 134 TNA, FCO 8/164, High Commissioner’s Office, February 1967 return of complaints. 135 TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Secretary HOC, 1 December 1971. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 TNA, DEFE 23/111, no author, ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, 8 December 1971. 139 TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Secretary HOC, 1 December 1971. 140 Lewitt (MoD) to the author in response to an FOI request, 7 August 2013. 141 Ibid. For more on what the harsh approach can entail, see Chapter 7. 142 TNA, DEFE 23/110, Intelligence Centre to DI 16 (MoD), 24 October 1966.

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143 TNA, DEFE 23/117, no author (MoD), ‘Origins of the Bowen Inquiry’, no date (cover letter dated 2 November 1971). 144 Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East, p. 87; Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates, p. 134. 145 TNA, DEFE 24/209, no author, ‘Labour Ministers and Interrogation in Aden’, no date. 146 Ibid. 147 TNA, CO 1035/178, DI(MI)16 (MoD) to HQ MIDEAST, no date. 148 TNA, CO 1035/178, Box 500 to Russell, 4 September 1964. 149 Lewitt (MoD) to the author in response to an FOI request, 7 August 2013; Cabinet Office FOI Team to the author, 5 September 2013; Clare Burton (FCO) to the author in response to an FOI request, 6 September 2013.

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Aden: Results and reactions

The range of results and reactions prompted by the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Aden are the subject of this chapter. There is sufficient available evidence to be able to comment on how successful the techniques were in eliciting intelligence from the people interrogated this way. This is not the only respect in which the success of controversial interrogation techniques can be assessed. If they produce intelligence but that intelligence is not used, then the argument that the techniques were justified because they contributed to an improved security situation is weakened at best. The effects of the techniques on the detainees who experienced them were addressed in the previous chapter. As well as their effects on intelligence and security, the current chapter examines the responses of the British government, the High Commission and non-governmental organisations. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International investigated the treatment of detainees. The results of these and the government’s own inquiries will be assessed. Impact of the ‘five techniques’ on intelligence and security When the histories of the ‘five techniques’ were written in the early 1970s, both of Aden’s interrogation operations were said to have been successful. The second operation, from September 1964 to September 1967, was described as the main source of intelligence during this period, while the earlier operation was deemed ‘important in that it pointed to the innocence of those arrested’.1 This chapter begins by asking to what extent these claims were accurate. The related matters of why intelligence was produced by these interrogations and what impact this intelligence had on security will also be addressed. The first operation that involved the ‘five techniques’ responded to the incident of 10 December 1963 in which a grenade was thrown at the High Commissioner. By the time the interrogation of the eleven detainees selected began on 8 January 1964, the shock of arrest that interrogators seek to exploit had passed.2 Interrogation had ceased by 29 January when Sedgwick, the leader of the interrogation team, forwarded their findings to the Head of

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Special Branch. On 20 January Sedgwick had reported to Brigadier A. W. Vickers at the Intelligence Centre that the interrogations had ‘so far produced nothing more than the original police statements taken on arrest’.3 His final report on the operation expressed his disappointment with what they had achieved as they had not produced any conclusive results.4 The aim of establishing what connections, if any, there were between the PSP and other countries went unfulfilled. Despite Sedgwick’s reservations, the other main aim of the operation was achieved. This concerned whether the PSP was linked to the plot to throw the grenade. Interrogators concluded that three detainees had pre-knowledge of the plot, one of whom was judged unlikely to have supported it, and another who might have been involved in the planning. Two of these detainees, at least, were influential in the PSP. Five of the remaining detainees were found to have had no pre-knowledge of the plot, one was not interrogated for health reasons and another was not interrogated for reasons unknown. This was a negative operation in that none of those interrogated was found to have been directly involved with the grenade incident.5 Sedgwick’s disappointment with these results may be attributable to a desire to have obtained intelligence that shed more light on the activities of the PSP. The final detainee, the leader of the PSP, provided no intelligence of any value during the first two interrogation sessions, after which ‘[i]t was decided that further interrogation would not yield any dividend, owing to the frequent visits by lawyers and Members of Parliament’.6 These visits were a thorn in the side of Sedgwick’s team. The detainees were visited by British MPs, lawyers preparing a case for their release and relatives.7 Contact with the outside world raised the detainees’ awareness that people were campaigning on their behalf, raising their morale and bolstering their resistance to interrogation.8 As the detainees were in a position to complain to the outside world, ‘albeit with no justification’ Sedgwick added, the interrogators were not able to use any of the ‘tricks and subtleties of proper interrogation’.9 It is not entirely clear what he meant, though it may refer to the questioning techniques rather than to the ‘five techniques’ or any other prisoner-handling methods designed to prepare detainees for questioning. Later in the Emergency visits to the Interrogation Centre were restricted because of the adverse effect it was feared they would have on interrogation. Special Branch’s files on the detainees were made available to the interrogation team to help them plan the interrogations.10 Writing about interrogation in Aden a member of the Intelligence Centre later emphasised the importance of being able to show you have knowledge about the person being interrogated.11 This helps interrogators make suitable choices about which questioning techniques to use. All the detainees knew sufficient English that there was no language difficulty.12 While this interrogation operation did not produce the kind of intelligence that allows action to be

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taken to improve security or political stability in Aden, it did show that the detainees interrogated were not behind the grenade incident. A police investigation into the attack, which was assisted by two Scotland Yard detectives, concluded confidently that Khalifa Hasan Khalifa was responsible.13 Questioning by police with a view to obtaining evidence for prosecutions was undertaken in accordance with different rules from those governing interrogation so as to ensure the admissibility of evidence obtained.14 This failed to secure a conviction in this case. Khalifa’s murder trial was discontinued when the main prosecution witness, who had been in the airport with Khalifa at the time of the incident, fled to Yemen.15 As far as can be ascertained, the ‘five techniques’ were in continuous use at the Fort Morbut Interrogation Centre from September 1964 until September 1967, just two months before Britain withdrew from Aden. It is unlikely that all detainees held at the Interrogation Centre were exposed to the ‘five techniques’. It was with Lieutenant Colonel Richards’s visit to Aden in late 1964 that the second operation involving the ‘five techniques’ in Aden began. Richards and his team were to stay for a little over five weeks. Six detainees were interrogated: only one produced intelligence, while another refused to co-operate, but it was ascertained from this detainee’s body language that he had participated in the bazooka incident he was questioned about.16 Zaki Lutfi Freij proved a valuable source of intelligence. Not only did Richards’s team gain intelligence about Zaki’s involvement with the NLF, but they found he was working for an Adeni government official who they were able to confirm was the most important Egyptian agent in Aden.17 It was also found that the PSP was not connected with the NLF, and they collected the first proof that the NLF existed as an organisation. Most significant, however, was what Zaki told them about the NLF. He is said to have produced ‘in considerable detail, membership lists, cell lists and the political instruction programme of the Front’.18 Special Branch and the Aden Intelligence Centre, where intelligence was collated and assessed, judged this intelligence to be ‘of great importance’, and that exploiting the intelligence provided would keep two interrogators busy for several months.19 The Security Liaison Officer (SLO), the Security Service’s representative in Aden, did not entirely agree with Richards’s assessment of how valuable Zaki’s intelligence was. After reading Richards’s report the SLO told the Security Service’s John Morton, the Security Intelligence Adviser in Aden, that the value of the information obtained was inflated, as there were still considerable gaps in the authorities’ knowledge of ‘the top executive’ of the NLF.20 His assertion that Zaki ‘by no means gave all that he could’ was confirmed when Zaki was interrogated again at a later date.21 The written histories of the ‘five techniques’ produced by the Intelligence Centre in 1971 claim that the interrogation operation that spanned 1964–67 was successful.

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Interestingly, all of the intelligence it cites in support of that statement, bar one piece, was collected during Richards’s visit. This may reflect what paperwork the author of the history had to hand, as interrogation continued to produce intelligence into 1967. Everson, who had been part of Richards’s interrogation team, returned to Aden in January 1965 supported by Miller. This team interrogated ten detainees, six of whom came to co-operate with their interrogators. The interrogation of one was discontinued on instructions from the High Commissioner’s Office, and interrogation of the other three was still in progress when Everson’s team left Aden at the end of the month. Of particular value was Abdul Razzaq, who provided organisational details of the NLF, the name of the leader of the NLF in Aden and the first concrete information on the existence of the NLF’s ‘military/terrorist’ branch.22 Interrogation at Fort Morbut was playing a key role in the authorities’ knowledge and understanding of the NLF. Everson had an interest in championing his methods of interrogation but was at least partially accurate when he stated that ‘[i]f ZAKI had not been broken then the NATIONAL FRONT would probably have developed, become more and more secure, and, inevitably, more difficult to penetrate’.23 After all, it was intelligence from Zaki that led to Razzaq’s arrest and interrogation.24 As it is difficult to know to what extent the ‘five techniques’ were used at Fort Morbut after Everson’s team departed, to some extent we must fall back on evidence about what intelligence was produced in the period during which it is known the ‘five techniques’ were in use. Knowledge that the techniques were used at the Fort Morbut Interrogation Centre, and that this was the only location where interrogation aiming to collect intelligence was carried out aids this endeavour. Once it was established that the NLF was active in Aden and was behind the current strife, interrogation was directed against members of this organisation. Sa’id Muhammad Salih Baidhani, for example, was arrested and interrogated in early 1965 after being accused of being an NLF courier.25 Of the forty-three detainees held in December 1964, thirty-six were believed to be in the NLF, seventeen of whom had been or were being interrogated.26 Interrogation continued to produce intelligence until it was discontinued. For example, in the summer of 1965 ‘[t]he interrogation of a terrorist involved in a grenade incident led to the arrest of four others and the recovery of explosives, grenades, arms and N.L.F. propaganda material’.27 In the summer of 1966 interrogation of confessed NLF members showed ‘that cell members have had to return their arms unused, with tasks of grenade throwing or assassination uncompleted after several days waiting, because of the sustained effectiveness of the security force patrols’.28 In August 1967, despite a shortage of Arabic-speaking interrogators, interrogation was ‘providing growing proof of the participation in terrorist activities of Federal Government servants and Federal Security Forces’.29

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When assessing the value of an intelligence-gathering method it is important to assess not just what intelligence was gained but what impact that intelligence made. The leaders of the military interrogation teams who used the techniques at Fort Morbut all reported that intelligence was obtained. Special Branch co-operated with them, at least in respect of giving them access to detainees’ files in the first operation. There is no evidence of tension or rivalry between Special Branch and the military in the area of interrogation. Sir Richard Turnbull, High Commissioner for the vast majority of the time Fort Morbut operated, was strongly in favour of interrogation on the basis of its stand-alone and relative usefulness. He described interrogation as ‘our major, and virtually only, equipment for forestalling terrorism and saving British lives’, described the Interrogation Centre as ‘the nerve centre of our antiterrorism organization’, and added that without it ‘we should have virtually no forewarning against terrorism or information on its development’.30 Given the strength of these views he felt the need to add: ‘[y]ou may think I exaggerate. But it is almost impossible to over-state the probable consequences of the effective neutralisation of virtually the only intelligence weapon we have.’31 This was a strong response to Foreign Office suggestions that concessions might be made to Amnesty International in light of the latter’s investigations into the treatment of detainees. The Commander-in-Chief (Middle East), who was based in Aden, put forward similarly strong views. He told the Ministry of Defence that interrogation was ‘at present virtually our only avenue of intelligence’, and that interference with the Interrogation Centre ‘would result in a very sharp deterioration of the security situation’.32 John Prendergast, an experienced colonial Special Branch officer, visited Aden in October 1965 to make recommendations on how to improve its intelligence system.33 After visiting the Interrogation Centre he said not only that it was producing valuable intelligence that had ‘been followed up with gratifying results’ but that it was valuable when compared to other sources of intelligence as well.34 Indeed, in December 1966 the LIC confirmed that interrogation had ‘been the major source of operational intelligence in internal security for eighteen months’.35 Not only is there strong evidence from various sources familiar with the intelligence yield from interrogation and the general security situation in Aden that emphasises its value and impact, but there is no evidence to suggest the contrary. This came at a time when the security situation was difficult, to say the least. Large-scale arrest operations were conducted, with 431 detained in the Crater area of Aden in one night as a result of riots and curfew-breaking.36 In 1965 additional Emergency Regulations were brought in, increasing the High Commissioner’s powers, and the NLF was proscribed.37 In this and the following year there were frequent reports of deteriorations in the security situation amongst occasional reports of lulls in terrorist activity.38 Harsh

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measures used by the British military on the streets of Aden fostered hostility towards the military.39 Any intelligence gained from interrogation therefore had the potential to make a much-needed difference. The evidence that interrogation produced intelligence is persuasive and gives rise to the question of what made interrogation successful. Once more, this discussion comes with the caveat that it is not always possible to distinguish between interrogation that involved some or all of the ‘five techniques’ and that which did not. The interrogation techniques used will, of course, influence the outcome. While Sedgwick judged that his team obtained intelligence partly because they had knowledge about the detainees, Richards attributed his team’s success to ‘the correctness of the techniques of interrogation and the methods of handling prisoners’ taught by the Intelligence Centre.40 The ‘five techniques’ might be described as techniques of interrogation or as methods of handling prisoners. They are intended to make someone more likely to co-operate with their interrogators, while the questioning technique popularly known as ‘good cop, bad cop’ proved successful at the start of Aden’s second interrogation operation at least.41 Also helpful was keeping secret the fact someone had been arrested and taken for interrogation.42 Once a terrorist’s confederates, in Turnbull’s words, know he or she has been arrested, they can take action to thwart the security forces’ (the military’s and the police’s) exploitation of the intelligence that individual possesses.43 For instance, if the detainee knows the whereabouts of arms caches, and their colleagues know they are being interrogated, those arms caches might be moved. There were times when circumstances worked against the interrogators. Some of those taken into detention had been trained by the Egyptian Intelligence Service in how to resist interrogation.44 This instruction was described by the LIC as effective.45 Another obstacle was an occasional language barrier between detainee and interrogator. Only some of the higher-grade detainees spoke English, and interrogation using interpreters was ‘inevitably slower’ and ‘always unsatisfactory’.46 A shortage of Arabicspeaking interrogators, of trustworthy local translators who could work with interrogators and of British translators47 was never resolved. Weaknesses in the facilities at Fort Morbut adversely affected interrogation in the early stages of the operation. Fort Morbut was described as ‘quite unsuitable for the purpose’ because it was not possible to isolate prisoners from one another and because the first floor veranda and part of the courtyard were visible from the road, causing a ‘major security problem’, as prisoners could be seen and identified by members of the public.48 This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. As well as separating them from each other and the public, efforts were made to stop detainees seeing their lawyers before interrogation was completed, as this could raise their morale.49 Brigadier A. W. Cowper, who was appointed to the co-ordinating role of Chief of Intelligence in January

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Figure 2.1 The Fort Morbut Interrogation Centre Source: TNA, CO 1035/178, ‘Interrogation Centre Fort Morbut’, annexed to Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964)

1965, called for Fort Morbut to be enlarged.50 The inadequacy of the facilities limited the effectiveness of interrogation.51 Rather than build a new centre plans were made to refurbish and extend the existing premises, including the addition of eight isolation cells.52 Authorisation for the expenditure of £8,000 for this extension was given in April 1965.53 The final factor adversely affecting interrogation was investigations into allegations of mistreatment. Such investigations ‘stiffened the morale of terrorists … reduced that of interrogators’, and the intelligence collected suffered as a result.54 These allegations and associated investigations will be addressed later in the chapter. The relative value of interrogation as a source of intelligence has already been highlighted. An outline of some of the other principal sources of intelligence and their value further emphasises the relative worth of interrogation. It is known, for example, that surveillance was in use, but little detail about it is available.55 At Fort Morbut, monitoring equipment was installed so that conversations between detainees in the cells could be listened to remotely. It was learned that the presence of listening devices was suspected by detainees. Staff accordingly faked their departure for the night whilst secretly remaining behind to monitor conversations. The detainees were fooled and information was gained.56 Agent coverage was said to be improving in March 1967,57 but it was difficult to recruit and keep informers from among the local population. Rewards for information were offered, but the NLF intimidated locals

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into silence.58 Sympathy for the NLF amongst Aden’s predominantly Arab population meant that they were less likely to inform on the organisation.59 Captured documents were a useful source, although there was a shortage of translators. Documents provided, for example, names of persons connected with the NLF, who could then be detained and a letter was intercepted that detailed Egypt’s involvement in what officials called terrorism in Aden.60 Intelligence was certainly gained from sources other than interrogation, but interrogation remained of vital importance relative to these sources. Yet simply possessing intelligence is not enough. It must be exploited before it can make a difference to security. Even the best intelligence acted on in a timely fashion will not allow a fight that has already been lost to be won, but it can provide for greater control over its final stages, such as the timing and nature of the withdrawal from a territory. Before moving on to the inquiries that non-governmental organisations, the High Commission and British government conducted in response to allegations that controversial interrogation techniques had been used, it is worth addressing to what extent people were arrested and detained in order that they could be interrogated. Many detainees were interrogated. In January 1965, for instance, Special Branch said that all detainees fell into two categories: there were those whose interrogations were complete and those whose interrogations were still in progress.61 Figure 2.2 below depicts how many people were in detention until July 1967, shortly before the Emergency ended. It has also been confirmed that roughly fifteen to twenty prisoners passed through Fort Morbut every month.62 The evidence goes one step further than this and confirms that some detainees, at least, were being detained in order that they could be interrogated.63 Collecting intelligence through interrogation was certainly not the only motivation for the use of detention in Aden. Witnesses were reluctant to provide evidence in court for political cases because of fear of reprisals carried out by the NLF or FLOSY.64 Without a realistic chance of conviction, detention without trial was seen as the only alternative.65 Detention provided a way of improving security by keeping those believed to be troublemakers off of the streets, as well as being punitive by depriving them of their freedom. Trevaskis explained detention to the Secretary of State for the Colonies shortly after he declared the State of Emergency in the following terms: ‘As I understand it, the purpose of detention under emergency powers is to deny liberty to persons who are a threat to security of the State, and their detention is justifiable on those grounds alone so long as a state of emergency (threat to the security of the state) persists.’66 The Chief of Police believed that detention had ‘a deterrent effect on would-be terrorists and political extremists’,67 and it is probable that this was true in some cases. It has also been claimed that some used their time at al-Mansoura Detention Centre to plan disruptive activities

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200 175 150

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125 100 75 50 25 0 11 Dec. 1963

11 June 1964

11 Dec. 1964

11 June 1965

11 Dec. 1965

11 June 1966

11 Dec. 1966

11 June 1967

Figure 2.2 Number of detainees in Aden State during the Emergency Source: TNA, CO and DEFE files; BL, IOR files

and expected to be regarded as heroes of independence after their release.68 The Chief of Police persuasively argued that powers of detention, search and arrest ultimately would not ‘stop acts of terrorism since in the final analysis the solution must be a political one’.69 Inquiries and the revision of rules on interrogation Allegations of mistreatment first arose in December 1963, shortly after the Emergency and detention without trial began. Allegations were made throughout the Emergency and concerned treatment whilst being arrested, whilst in detention and whilst being interrogated. Similar allegations were made after the introduction of internment without trial in Northern Ireland nearly eight years later. Such allegations had the potential to impact on political progress in Aden, as demonstrated by Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood’s concern that allegations of torture published in The Times ought to be refuted in case they endangered an upcoming constitutional conference.70 The remainder of this chapter focuses on responses to the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Aden. These responses included the complaints made by detainees and investigations into the truthfulness of their complaints. The form and conclusions of the inquiries and investigations undertaken

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into allegations relating to the ‘five techniques’ will be identified, as will the content of the discussions that took place about what action, if any, should be taken in response to their findings. The impact of these investigations on interrogation, intelligence and security will also be addressed. Finally the rules that governed interrogation in Aden will be identified, as will how they came to be changed as a result of the Bowen Inquiry’s investigation into procedures for the arrest, interrogation and detention of suspected terrorists in Aden. On 21 December 1963 Aden’s Legislative Council asked the High Commissioner for permission to send a delegation to the Detention Centre to check conditions there.71 Allegations made to the delegation during their visit to the Detention Centre concerning the unsatisfactory nature of food and accommodation during the detainees’ first few days there were found to be true but these conditions were the result of oversight rather than an intention to cause suffering.72 The High Commissioner’s Office continued to pay close attention to allegations of mistreatment throughout the Emergency, at least in part because of the impact that such allegations were having upon security forces already faced with a difficult task. Efforts were made to improve the food available, which might have been motivated by a desire to deter further allegations.73 Attempts were made to identify false allegations. Turnbull believed these were ‘commonplace’ in 1964 and 1965.74 Allegations were certainly made throughout the rest of the Emergency that the authorities’ investigations revealed to be false. In July 1967, for example, it is possible that numerous false allegations were motivated by a wish to overwhelm the Joint Provost and Security Organisation who investigated them.75 Making false or exaggerated claims gave detainees who had co-operated with their interrogators a way to explain away their co-operation. Such claims also damaged security forces’ morale whilst turning the population of Aden away from the authorities and towards those who opposed them instead.76 Not only were there these incentives for making false or exaggerated allegations, but it was ‘a good deal easier to invent an allegation of torture than to prove the negative’.77 Further working against the British, if accurate, was the observation made by Turnbull that ‘suspicions, rumours and false witness inevitably flourish in an Arab society in present conditions here’.78 In response to the detention of some of its leaders in December 1963 the  PSP claimed that detainees were being tortured.79 This did not concern  Fort Morbut or the ‘five techniques’ as neither of these were yet in use. It is noteworthy, though, that the High Commissioner said he had ‘a special responsibility as regards their treatment, and that it would be wrong for me to remain inactive in the face of the wild allegations of maltreatment and torture which are now being put about’.80 Accordingly, he asked the Chief

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Justice of Aden to conduct an inquiry and did so in the belief that the complaints of torture were unsubstantiated.81 The Chief Justice found there had been no torture, but some hardship that was justified in the circumstances.82 Allegations that detainees were being mistreated continued. Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross pressed for a representative of the latter to be allowed to visit Aden to see detainees.83 M.  Rochat was appointed to this role.84 By invitation, Rochat visited Fort Morbut in March 1966 during his second visit to Aden, touring the facilities, seeing all detainees and interviewing two of them, and speaking to officials.85 He was asked not to visit Fort Morbut on his third visit for fear it would disrupt interrogation.86 The authorities were also developing a dislike of Rochat. John Weakley of the High Commissioner’s Office made it clear that he thought Rochat was too keen to accept anti-British allegations, and by September 1966 Donald McCarthy, another British official familiar with Rochat, felt tempted to tell him ‘that we were one and all sick and tired of him and would be glad to see the back of him’.87 He was described privately as being ‘blindly partisan to detainees to the point of unnatural obsession’,88 and the tone of his reports supports this. In response to the interest that Rochat took in the welfare of detainees held at al-Mansoura and Fort Morbut the authorities made their precautions against mistreatment more comprehensive.89 Despite their difficulties, the High Commissioner’s Office appreciated Rochat’s visits because they ‘deny our opponents one stick to beat us with’.90 The year 1966 was to see a provocative Amnesty International investigation into the treatment of prisoners during interrogation.91 Significantly, it encouraged the British government to create the Bowen Inquiry, which will be turned to shortly. Amnesty International had been discussing the treatment of detainees in Aden since complaints first reached them in 1964.92 In 1966 they sent Dr Selahuddin Rastgeldi to Aden to investigate. His report was made public on 19 October that year.93 It was a scathing report that repeated unsubstantiated allegations of torture connected with interrogation made to Rastgeldi by ex-detainees and families of current detainees.94 The FCO described it as ‘biased and inaccurate’, and a more recent observer has called it ‘markedly incompetent’.95 Journalists were given non-attributable briefings claiming that Rastgeldi was not impartial on Middle Eastern issues because of his Kurdish extraction and that as he had stopped off in Cairo on his way to Aden he was under the influence of President Nasser of Egypt.96 Amnesty explained that Rastgeldi had been to Cairo on his way to Aden to collect evidence from Adeni exiles as part of his duties.97 The report was also condemned for the damage it was likely to cause to the work of the Interrogation Centre. Referring to Egypt’s sponsorship of terrorism in Aden, McCarthy wrote, ‘[a]s seen from here, Amnesty International have succeeded in carrying … [Egypt’s] objective of destroying our only major source of operational intelligence nearer to

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achievement than ever before’.98 Either Amnesty failed to consider the potential damage its work would do or it placed detainee welfare above the benefits of intelligence. Allegations of mistreatment and the resulting inquiries had a similarly damaging effect on the success of interrogation in Northern Ireland. Amnesty International played a principal role in the creation of the Bowen Inquiry. After Rastgeldi reported back to Amnesty International, it requested, and secured, a meeting with the Foreign Secretary. It wished to conduct a further inquiry into interrogation in Aden as Rastgeldi had been denied access to current detainees.99 The High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief (Middle East) strongly opposed this proposal.100 By the time it met with the Foreign Secretary on 29 September, Amnesty had lowered its sights. Instead it ‘pressed the Foreign Secretary to send a representative of his own choice (but in whom Amnesty would also have confidence)’, not to investigate past practices, but to examine existing procedures for arrest, interrogation and detention.101 On 14 October, five days before the Amnesty Report was published, the Foreign Office announced there would be an inquiry into procedures for arrest, interrogation and detention of persons suspected of terrorism in Aden.102 This was a fruitless attempt to persuade Amnesty not to publish its report.103 Amnesty International thus played a highly influential role in the commissioning of what was to become the Bowen Inquiry. Roderic Bowen QC, a former Liberal MP, was appointed to conduct the inquiry on behalf of HMG.104 He was given his terms of reference on 24 October 1966.105 Bowen arrived in Aden on 26 October, stayed until 8 November and submitted his report to the Foreign Secretary six days later.106 It was the Foreign Office which set up the inquiry as Fort Morbut and al-Mansoura were under the control of the High Commissioner who was answerable to it.107 None the less, Defence Ministers were consulted on the creation of the inquiry.108 Although Amnesty International’s report had an influence, the usefulness of the changes that stemmed from earlier investigations into procedures in Aden more than likely contributed to the decision to commission the Bowen Inquiry. The inquiry’s terms of reference expanded on those demanded by Amnesty International. They were: to examine the procedures current in Aden for the arrest, interrogation and detention of persons suspected of terrorist activities; and to advise me [Foreign Secretary, George Brown] whether there are any ways in which these procedures can be improved, having in mind on the one hand the rights of the individual and on the other the duties of the authorities to safeguard the community as a whole from lawless acts.109

The challenge of balancing the rights of the individual and the security of communities also appeared in the context of an official inquiry into the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland and has been prominent in the

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torture debate engaged in by officials, academics and the public since the start of the ‘War on Terror’. In accordance with his brief Bowen did not investigate specific allegations. This has prompted historian David French to describe the inquiry as a partial cover-up,110 though no evidence has been found that suggests this was the intention. Bowen benefited from the co-operation of officials, detainees, and wives and dependants of detainees, all of whom supplied him with evidence.111 The government debated whether to publish the Bowen Report in full. Brown was concerned that the content of the report would damage interrogators’ morale, which would in turn damage the productivity of the Interrogation Centre. Healey, Defence Secretary, opposed full publication of the Bowen Report as he was concerned ‘about the widespread publicity that is likely to be aroused by publication, and the impact of this on our forces in Aden, together with the windfall it will provide for … [Egyptian] propaganda’.112 Despite their reservations, and with Healey’s and Brown’s consent, the report was published in full on 19 December 1966.113 It was Brown’s hope that publication would ‘do less harm than the continuing cloud of allegations and suspicion which will hang over the present and future teams of interrogators if we decline to publish’.114 Before the impact of the Bowen Report can be evaluated its findings should be examined. A fair summary of the report has been put forward by Kirsten Sellars, a journalist who has produced work on human rights and international law. She wrote, ‘Bowen stuck scrupulously to … [his] evasive brief and produced a report that exonerated everyone bar a few officials accused of sins of omission, and “three men” (unnamed) who had worked as interrogators at … [Fort] Morbut’.115 These sins of omission related to weaknesses in how allegations of mistreatment were handled. The Report made seven formal  recommendations for change, and twelve further suggestions. Many of these recommendations related to procedures for handling allegations of ill-treatment and were motivated by a desire to make investigations  into allegations  quicker and more thorough, to make it harder for false allegations to be made and to enable disciplinary action to be taken promptly. The publication of Bowen’s report was announced on the front page of The Times on 19 December.116 The following day it received extensive coverage and parts of  the report were reproduced.117 George Brown described the report as ‘most useful’.118 He told the House of Commons on the day it was published that ‘after receiving the High Commissioner’s comments on Mr. Bowen’s recommendations, I have been able to accept them almost in their entirety and the High Commissioner is now putting them into effect’.119 Just how useful the report was can be judged by the impact of the changes it prompted. Bowen’s first two recommendations should be looked at individually, and the remaining five considered as a group. He began by recommending

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that the Interrogation Centre be closed and a new one created as an annex to the Detention Centre.120 This was rejected unequivocally on the grounds that it would involve ‘serious loss of efficiency’ in interrogation, and risks to the security of staff as the Detention Centre was in an area prone to terrorist attacks.121 The other recommendations received more consideration, beginning with the recommendation that the military interrogators at Fort Morbut be replaced with civilians. Bowen was careful to emphasise that this was ‘not intended … to suggest that military personnel are any less suitable than civilians for this work’.122 Rather, it was designed to eliminate difficulties that he believed might have arisen from divided control there. If all staff were civilian, then all staff at the Interrogation Centre would be responsible to the High Commissioner.123 The possibility of implementing this recommendation was investigated, but it was highly unlikely that they would find sufficient numbers of trained and available civilian interrogators. The remaining five recommendations were accepted. By the time the Report was published they had either been implemented or were in the process of being brought in.124 Medical care at the Interrogation Centre was to be provided by civilians. The Foreign Office opposed this recommendation because it was impractical.125 None the less it was being put into place and the necessary staff were being recruited.126 A representative from the High Commissioner’s Office was to record any allegations made by detainees at meetings of the Medical Board which took place when they were transferred from the Interrogation Centre to the Detention Centre; everyone at the Interrogation Centre was to be seen daily by a Medical Officer, asked if they had complaints and any allegations forwarded to the Director of Health Services; complaints would be referred to the High Commissioner’s representative straight away; and there was to be a monthly return of complaints detailing investigations carried out and action taken.127 The first return of complaints was for December 1966.128 Amongst the first seven monthly returns are ninety complainants. In the majority of cases it was noted that their allegations had been investigated and no evidence to support them found.129 Some of the allegations made, such as being slapped or threatened, are hard to substantiate though, making them unlikely to lead to disciplinary action, even if true. Although it is difficult to know what concrete difference, if any, producing these returns of complaints made, it is likely that they proved a useful way of keeping track of investigations and of providing a quick way to produce summaries of the outcomes of those investigations. Daily medical checks on detainees were instituted by an amendment to the Directive that governed interrogation in internal security contexts, as detailed below. Before the Bowen Inquiry concluded, there were already procedures in place for recording and responding to allegations of mistreatment. Allegations

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made to the Review Tribunal, set up to review the continued detention of detainees on an individual basis, and cases arising from the scrutiny of medical records when prisoners arrived at al-Mansoura from Fort Morbut, were investigated by looking at the available medical evidence.130 It is not known whether this procedure led to disciplinary action. A new system for dealing with allegations was put into place in November 1966, a month before the Bowen Report was published, and this itself was replaced in March 1967 ‘[i]n the light of experience’.131 No matter how allegations reached the authorities, they were recorded by the High Commissioner’s Office and included in the monthly return of complaints.132 This March 1967 procedure set out clear steps to be taken after an allegation was made, though it was a procedure that if followed through to conclusion involved many people, from medical personnel to the Senior Adviser (Security) in the High Commissioner’s Office, the Assistant Legal Adviser, the police’s CID and the appropriate prosecuting body. This procedure is more prescriptive than that Bowen called for. Indications are that without Bowen’s recommendations the procedure for investigating allegations might still have been refined as the Emergency went on, as the High Commissioner’s Office was keen to improve detainees’ conditions and reduce the occurrence of allegations of mistreatment. Philip Hurr, a member of the Diplomatic Service working as an interrogator at Fort Morbut, was tried after these procedures were followed. He was tried by the Aden Magistrate’s Court in May 1967 for assaulting a detainee during interrogation and acquitted.133 There was a reluctance to prosecute Hurr because it might further damage the morale of other interrogators, but Turnbull judged that they had to follow their own procedures.134 Bowen’s Report also prompted consideration of whether to prosecute the three unnamed interrogators against whom allegations had been made therein. The Special Investigation Branch (SIB) of the military responded on behalf of the Ministry of Defence by looking into whether there was sufficient evidence to bring them to trial under the Army Act.135 SIB eventually found that, although there was evidence against the three men, it was highly unlikely a Court Martial would convict and no disciplinary action was to be taken against them.136 Once again the willingness to respond positively to Bowen’s conclusions and to initiate investigations into allegations of mistreatment is evident. The Bowen Inquiry, Rastgeldi’s investigations on behalf of Amnesty and Rochat’s investigations on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross had the unfortunate effect of lowering interrogators’ morale.137 By mid-December 1966 the LIC was reporting ‘that for some weeks now terrorists entering Fort Morbut have exuded confidence’. They had come to see Fort Morbut as a place of comfort, creating an environment that was very challenging for interrogators.138 This continued into April 1967 when

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the Commander-in-Chief (Middle East) reported that the amount of ‘useful operational intelligence’ gained by interrogation was ‘much diminished’ compared with the time before the Amnesty and Bowen Reports, in part because those being interrogated knew that they had nothing to fear and had been trained in how to resist interrogation.139 These dangers still exist today: public disclosures concerning interrogation rules and practices educate those who know they risk being captured and interrogated this way about what to expect. The interrogation Directive in place at the time of the Bowen Inquiry was amended in light of the Inquiry’s recommendation about daily medical checks. In this way Bowen’s findings and official willingness to accept the majority of his recommendations influenced interrogation practices. The document in question was the Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas, known as JIC(65)15 for short because it was authored by the JIC in 1965. The JIC is ‘the apex of the British intelligence process’, bringing together ‘key personnel responsible for intelligence collection, intelligence assessment and policymaking in a regular weekly forum’.140 This Directive and its 1967 amendment governed the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland. It was replaced in 1972 in response to the negative reaction to the use of these techniques in Northern Ireland, and in turn the 2005 guidance was replaced with more a specific set in 2010. In Aden, Northern Ireland and Iraq the use of controversial interrogation methods prompted not only official inquiries but changes to written rules on interrogation. It was confirmed between the start of the Emergency in 1963 and when the 1965 Directive came into force that Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was being complied with at the Interrogation Centre.141 JIC(65)15 later stated that the parts of Article 3 that military personnel must follow when conducting interrogation include the prohibition of violence ‘to life and person, in particular mutilation, cruel treatment and torture’.142 Designed to apply to war situations, the Geneva Conventions applied to very few of the interrogation operations the military had worked in since the Second World War.143 Additional guidance for interrogation in war was contained in a separate pamphlet issued by the War Office in 1955.144 The 1965 Directive was created because it was realised that the Geneva Conventions did not always apply to the military’s interrogation operations, because military interrogators had provided assistance to civil authorities in internal security operations a number of times in 1964, and because the Director of Military Intelligence wanted clear rules for these personnel.145 It was signed into force by the JIC on 17 February 1965. The ‘five techniques’ were introduced to Aden before this Directive was written, but efforts had been made to comply with the Geneva Convention’s prohibition of cruel treatment and torture.

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Staff at the Ministry of Defence noted some years later that the production of JIC(65)15 represented ‘the first time as far as we knew that the general principles relating to interrogation were closely formulated’.146 The Directive states the importance of acting within the Geneva Conventions and local legislation. It details prerequisites for successful interrogation, as well as stating the potentially high value of interrogation as a source of intelligence in internal security operations. It stated that any information about the persons being interrogated should be made available to the interrogators, an edict that is supported by Everson’s partial attribution of his team’s success in early 1964 to Special Branch’s provision of background information about the people they were to interrogate. An ‘atmosphere of rigid discipline’ is given as one of the prerequisites for successful interrogation, and it is acknowledged that interrogation might need to take place ‘both by day and by night with consequent disruption of the normal routine of living’.147 The opposition to torture and inhumane treatment set out by the Geneva Conventions and the call for ‘rigid discipline’ appear to be at odds with one another until it is acknowledged that the definitions of both are open to interpretation. It should also be noted that the Directive describes what it contains as rules to be followed, but does not set out what repercussions there would be against anyone who did not comply with them. Responsibility for compliance with the Directive may have rested with the local Military Commander providing the interrogators, or Head of Special Branch to whom they were ultimately responsible. As a JIC document the Directive will have been discussed and agreed by the JIC’s members. The MoD has confirmed that the following post-holders commented on drafts of the Directive: the Director Naval Intelligence, the ACAS(I) (believed to be Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence)), Defence Intelligence (Military Intelligence) 16, the Army Department, Navy Department and Air Department.148 The Security Service was also involved in the drafting process, and there are indications that it, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Navy Department and Air Department were particularly involved.149 Neither the Cabinet Office, where the JIC was based, nor the FCO has a record of who was involved in drafting the Directive.150 Neither of these departments, or the MoD, possesses records of what was discussed whilst the Directive was being drafted.151 In 1971 the Director-General of Intelligence (DGI), who was head of the MoD’s intelligence section, the Defence Intelligence Staff, remained confident that the Directive had been submitted to Ministers for approval and pledged to look for evidence of this.152 The 1965 interrogation Directive was sent to a wide range of individuals in a variety of locations, including the Commandant of the Intelligence Centre, the Governor of Gibraltar, the General Officer Commanding (Middle East), and other British military leaders abroad.153 Aden was the first place the Directive and its 1967 amendment applied to.154 There is ample evidence that

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efforts were made to comply with it at Fort Morbut. All interrogators there read and signed the Directive.155 There is also evidence that the Directive was actively complied with, as the High Commissioner received frequent assurances from the Chief of Intelligence and Head of Special Branch that it was being ‘scrupulously observed’, and the officer in charge of the Interrogation Centre confirmed that he and the interrogation team conformed to the terms of the Directive.156 To what extent, if at all, the Directive changed the behaviour of military interrogators is not known. As will be emphasised in the context of the 1971–72 review of this Directive, it can be regarded as not being particularly restrictive. It states that only ‘permissible techniques’ can be used, but ‘permissible’, ‘humane’ and ‘torture’ are not defined. Interpretation of these terms can differ depending on the background and training received by the individual encountering them. A change had already been made to medical safeguards for detainees in July 1966, when instructions were issued requiring more detailed medical records to be made on arrival and departure of detainees from Fort Morbut and alMansoura.157 The essence of this, along with Bowen’s recommendations that there be daily checks by a Medical Officer who should also ask detainees if they have any complaints, and that detainees be weighed on admission and discharge, were contained in the February 1967 amendment to JIC(65)15. This amendment was a result of a review of the Directive that was prompted by the Bowen Report.158 The Security Service, Defence Intelligence Staff and Commonwealth Office all contributed to the drafting of what was to become the 1967 amendment.159 The amendment also stated that any allegations of cruelty or torture must be reported at once to the appropriate authority; that there should be compulsory medical examinations on admission and discharge; that medical treatment should be readily available; and that the Medical Officer ‘is to maintain a record of each person’s weight as recorded on admission and discharge’.160 This increase in medical safeguards was one of the legacies of Bowen, and after becoming part of JIC(65)15 applied not only to interrogation in Aden but to future internal security operations as well. Britain’s withdrawal from Aden The reasons behind Britain’s withdrawal from Aden, the Federation and the Protectorates are complex and disputed to the extent that it is not possible to recount them all here. None the less a brief account of Britain’s exit is warranted. The military base there remained important to Britain’s strategic interests. Yet with the Defence White Paper of February 1966 came the announcement ‘that Aden was not vital after all, the British would leave by 1968, the base itself would be abandoned, and no defence agreement would protect the post-independence government’.161 The United Nations had taken

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an interest in events in Aden, passing a Resolution that called for universal suffrage, general elections under UN supervision, the end of the Emergency and the release of all detainees.162 A UN Mission visited Aden in April 1967 to find ways of implementing past Resolutions. In the words of Julian Paget, a soldier who served in the High Commissioner’s Security Secretariat and has since written about how to succeed in counter-insurgency, their visit  was a tragi-comedy, ending when they ‘hurried off in an obvious huff … amid extraordinary scenes of farce’.163 The last straw had been the Federal government’s decision not to broadcast a TV interview they had recorded especially.164 Two months later the Crater area of Aden – so named because it rests within the crater of an extinct volcano165 – fell under nationalist control after a mutiny by elements within Aden’s police force.166 This was the  start of a particularly heated episode that ended with Crater being reoccupied in early July, in a military operation led by Lieutenant Colonel Colin Mitchell, a man who came to be known as ‘Mad Mitch’. Having originally been set for January 1968,167 the date for Britain’s withdrawal from Aden was gradually brought forward. In mid-November 1967 the date was finally set for 30 November.168 It was thought that by this date negotiations with the NLF for handing over authority would have been completed.169 Preparations were made for talks to be held in Geneva in August that were to include the UN Mission, the NLF and FLOSY. A stalemate was created when the NLF said it would attend the talks if FLOSY also attended, whilst FLOSY told the UN it would not attend if the NLF was there.170 It was the NLF who came out on top. By mid-November it was increasingly taking on the functions of government.171 That is not to say that FLOSY gave up without a fight: it was still competing for control early the following year.172 On 29 November 1967 the last British forces left Aden, and the country became independent and was handed to the NLF.173 The final detainees had been released on 16 November and the Detention Centre closed.174 Withdrawal from the base involved discharging 8,500 local employees who were given £1.5 million in end-of-service grants.175 Aden has been described as ‘decolonisation at its messiest’.176 The resulting People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, or simply ‘South Yemen’, although free from British rule faced a desperate economic situation.177 For the territory’s new leaders, a host of challenges were yet to come. Conclusion It is evident that Trevaskis, Turnbull, the military and Special Branch were convinced that interrogation was a valuable source of intelligence during the Aden Emergency. Not only did it produce intelligence that was new to the authorities but it was valuable in relation to the other available sources of

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intelligence. It provided details of the NLF’s structure, members and plans. This success likely boosted morale and gave hope to the High Commissioner’s Office, the military and Special Branch during a challenging period. However, allegations of mistreatment during interrogation, many of which cited some or all of the ‘five techniques’, damaged interrogators’ morale, thereby lessening their effectiveness, and the volume of false, exaggerated and truthful allegations created a considerable workload for those tasked with investigating them. A more comprehensive evaluation of the role of the ‘five techniques’ in the course and outcome of the Emergency in comparison to the other factors influencing its course and outcome is beyond the scope of this book. This is especially so given the disagreement that persists in scholarly debates about the reasons why the Emergency took the course that it did. There remain unanswered questions about to what extent the ‘five techniques’ can be classed as the reason why intelligence was gained from the detainees interrogated at Fort Morbut. The Intelligence Centre later claimed interrogation’s success was attributable to the ‘five techniques’ but specific evidence to support this is limited. The continued use of the techniques was attributable both to the continued presence and to the training role of members of the military who were familiar with the ‘five techniques’, and a persistent belief that interrogations at Fort Morbut, where the ‘five techniques’ were used, were producing intelligence. The use of the ‘five techniques’ and other controversial treatment of detainees such as beatings had a range of repercussions. The High Commissioner’s Office yielded to pressure to investigate allegations of mistreatment and to allow representatives from Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit Aden. These allegations and Amnesty International’s report into the treatment of prisoners during interrogation prompted the London government to commission the Bowen Inquiry into procedures for the arrest, interrogation and detention of suspected terrorists. The use of interrogation in Aden played an important role in the creation of a Directive governing interrogation in internal security operations. The 1967 amendment to that Directive was a direct result of the Bowen Report’s recommendations and increased the medical safeguards in place for detainees. Considerable parallels with these investigations and changes to rules governing interrogation will be seen in both the Northern Ireland and the Iraq examples. Notes 1 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Intelligence gained from interrogation operations since 1960’, 18 November 1971. 2 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964).

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3 MIM, A/ Aden Collection Box 1, ASFIC: 212, Sedgwick to Brigadier  Vickers (likely Inspector of Intelligence, Intelligence Centre), 20 January 1964. 4 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964). 5 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick to Head of SB, 29 January 1964. 6 Ibid. 7 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964). 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 TNA, DEFE 23/110, Intelligence Centre to DI 16 (MoD), 24 October 1966. 12 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964). 13 TNA, CAB 148/17, Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (Cabinet Office), minutes, 21 October 1964. 14 TNA, CO 1055/207, Trevaskis to Sandys, 22 December 1963; TNA, CO 1055/207, Sandys to Trevaskis, 20 December 1963. 15 TNA, DEFE 11/424, Trevaskis to Sandys, 17 March 1964; TNA, CO 1055/200, Trevaskis to Sandys, 7 April 1964; TNA, DEFE 11/422, Trevaskis to Sandys, 19 December 1963. 16 TNA, CO 1035/178, Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964). 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 TNA, CO 1035/179, Box 500 to John Morton (Security Intelligence Adviser, Aden), 25 February 1965. 21 Ibid.; TNA, CO 1035/178, Everson, ‘Report on IS interrogation in Aden, 2 Jan–30 Jan 1965’, no date. 22 TNA, CO 1035/178, Everson, ‘Report on IS interrogation in Aden, 2 Jan–30 Jan 1965’, no date. 23 Ibid. Original emphasis. 24 TNA, CO 1035/178, Everson, ‘Report on IS interrogation in Aden, 2 Jan–30 Jan 1965’, no date. 25 BL, IOR/R/20/D/22, A. W. Cowper (Chief of Intelligence) to HC, 5 April 1965. 26 BL, IOR/R/20/D/21, The High Commissioner’s Office, ‘Details of Persons subject to Detention as at 22.12.64’, no date; BL, IOR/R/20/D/21, The High Commissioner’s Office, ‘Additions to POL.35-4/85, details of persons subject to detention as at 30.12.64’, no date. 27 TNA, CO 1055/63, LIC, ‘Monthly Intelligence Summary for June 1965’, in Turnbull to Greenwood, 6 July 1965. 28 BL, IOR/R/20/D/208, LIC, ‘Monthly Intelligence Summary for May 1966’, in Turnbull to Foreign Office, 6 June 1966.

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29 TNA, FCO 8/157, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) MIDEAST, ‘Sitrep for week ending 150700C Aug.’, 15 August 1967. 30 TNA, PREM 13/1294, Turnbull to Allen, 28 September 1966. 31 Ibid. 32 TNA, DEFE 11/505, CINC MIDEAST to MoD, 29 September 1966. 33 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 321; TNA, CO 1035/180, ‘Intelligence in Aden: Report by Mr J. V. Prendergast, Director of Special Branch, Hong Kong on his visit to Aden from 17th to 30th October, 1965’, 18 November 1965. 34 TNA, CO 1035/180, ‘Intelligence in Aden: Report by Mr J. V. Prendergast, Director of Special Branch, Hong Kong on his visit to Aden from 17th to 30th October, 1965’, 18 November 1965. 35 BL, IOR/R/20/D/213, LIC, ‘Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 520 for period 4 December to noon 11 December 1966’, 12 December 1966. 36 TNA, CO 1055/221, A. C. Ashworth (HC’s Office) to Philip Noakes (CO), 3 October 1965. 37 TNA, FCO 8/217, J. V. Mullin (FO) to W. N. Hillier-Fry (FO), 17 March 1967; Walker, Aden Insurgency, p. 195. 38 TNA, PREM 13/113, Trend to H. Wilson, 23 September 1965; BL, IOR/ R/20/D/208, LIC, ‘Monthly Intelligence Summary for June 1966’, in Turnbull to Foreign Office, 12 July 1966; BL, IOR/R/20/D/213, LIC, ‘Weekly Intelligence Summaries, No. 519 for period 27 November to noon 4 December 1966’, 5  December 1966; BL, IOR/R/20/D/213, LIC, ‘Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 500 for the period 17 July to noon 24 July 1966’, 25 July 1966. 39 Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates, p. 144. 40 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964); TNA, CO 1035/178, Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964). 41 TNA, CO 1035/178, Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964). 42 TNA, DEFE 11/505, Turnbull to FO, 25 September 1966. 43 Ibid. 44 TNA, DEFE 11/505, Turnbull to FO, 5 October 1966. 45 CAB 191/12, TNA, LIC, ‘The National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South or The National Liberation Front (NLF)’, 25 January 1965. 46 TNA, CO 1035/179, Box 500 to Morton, 25 February 1965; TNA, CO 1035/178, Turnbull to Greenwood, 28 January 1965; TNA, FCO 8/155, T. F. Brenchley (Head of Aden Department, FO), ‘South Arabia: Bowen Report’, 19 January 1967. 47 TNA, CO 1035/178, Turnbull to Greenwood, 28 January 1965; TNA, CO 1035/179, Box 500 to Morton, 25 February 1965; BL, IOR/R/20/D/345, Squadron Leader  R.  Hampton (for Head of Security Secretariat) to Deputy High Commissioner,  28 October 1965; TNA, FCO 8/155, G. C. M. Heathcote (Ministry of Overseas Development, London) to Mullin, 3 January 1967.

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48 TNA, CO 1035/178, Richards, ‘Secret Report on IS Interrogation in Aden 18 Sept – 25 Oct 1964’, no date (cover letter dated 29 December 1964). 49 TNA, DEFE 11/505, Turnbull to FO, 25 September 1966. 50 TNA, CO 1035/183, Extract from report by VCGS on visit to Aden, 31 March 1965. 51 TNA, CO 1035/179, Turnbull to Greenwood, 30 March 1965. 52 Ibid. 53 TNA, DEFE 11/597, Greenwood to Turnbull, 23 April 1965. 54 BL, IOR/R/20/D/366, Turnbull to FO, 9 March 1967. 55 For example, a member of the NLF’s secretariat was under surveillance. TNA, CO 1035/178, Everson, ‘Organisation of the National Liberation Front for the Liberation of Southern Arabia’, annexed to ‘Report on IS interrogation in Aden, 2 Jan–30 Jan 1965’, no date. 56 TNA, WO 208/5572, Sedgwick, ‘Report on visit to Aden, 1 January – 8 February 1964’, no date (c. April 1964). 57 TNA, FCO 8/148, Turnbull to FO, 9 March 1967. 58 TNA, CO 1055/202, Ministry of National Guidance and Information, ‘Police HQ issue reward notice’, 10 December 1964; BL, IOR/R/20/D/165, Wiltshire to Oates, 30 November 1964. 59 TNA, CO 1035/183, Cowper, 18 March 1965; TNA, CO 968/730, no author (likely Aden Department, CO), ‘Note on the value of the Base to Aden’, no date (May 1965). 60 BL, IOR/R/20/D/165, Wiltshire to Deputy High Commissioner, 26 September 1964; TNA, CO 1055/194, Trevaskis to Sandys, 16 April 1964. 61 BL, IOR/R/20/D/22, no author, 22 January 1965. 62 TNA, DEFE 23/110, Intelligence Centre to DI 16 (MoD), 24 October 1966. 63 TNA, CO 1055/201, Trevaskis to Sandys, 4 June 1964. 64 BL, IOR/R/20/D/165, Wiltshire to Oates, 30 November 1964. 65 TNA, CAB 21/5297, Colonial Office (on behalf of the Prime Minister) to Aden Chief Minister the Hon A. Q. Mackawi, 15 July 1965. 66 BL, IOR/R/20/D/20, Trevaskis to Sandys, 23 December 1963. 67 BL, IOR/R/20/D/165, Wiltshire to Oates, 30 November 1964. 68 TNA, FCO 8/217, McCarthy to Brenchley, 13 March 1965. 69 BL, IOR/R/20/D/165, Wiltshire to Oates, 30 November 1964. 70 TNA, CO 1055/266, Greenwood to Turnbull, 21 January 1965. 71 BL, IOR/R/20/D/166, Acting Chief Minister (signature illegible) to Trevaskis, 21 December 1963. 72 BL, IOR/R/20/D/166, Trevaskis to Sandys, 26 December 1963; BL, IOR/ R/20/D/20, Trevaskis to Sandys, 27 December 1963. 73 For example, the Officer-in-Charge at al-Mansoura ‘amply increased the quantity of food supplied (he has doubled the meat rations, for example), and is closely watching the standard of cooking’, even though this meant increased costs. TNA, CO 1055/209, J. Weakley (High Commissioner’s Office), ‘Feeding arrangements – detainees’, 10 November 1965. 74 TNA, FCO 8/153, Turnbull, ‘Note on the Security situation in Aden in December, 1965’, 25 January 1967. 75 TNA, DEFE 11/530, CINC MIDEAST to MoD, 25 July 1967.

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76 It has been noted that by the end of 1966 allegations of torture had reached the local press and had begun to be used for propaganda. TNA, records of the Northern Ireland Office (CJ) 4/95, FCO, ‘Note on events leading up to the preparation of the Bowen Report on procedures for the arrest, interrogation and detention of suspected terrorists in Aden’, 29 October 1971. 77 TNA, FCO 8/153, no author (cleared with MoD), ‘Notes for supplementaries’, no date (for reply to a Parliamentary Question scheduled for 23 January 1967). 78 TNA, DEFE 11/505, Turnbull to FO, 25 September 1966. 79 BL, IOR/R/2/D/43, signature illegible (for Chief of Police, Police Headquarters (SB)), ‘Monthly Intelligence Summary, December 1963’, 9 February 1964. 80 TNA, CO 1055/197, Trevaskis to Sandys, 27 December 1963. 81 Ibid.; TNA, CO 1055/199, R. L. LeGallais (Chief Justice, Aden), ‘Inquiry into the treatment of detainees: Report by the Chief Justice’, 14 January 1964. 82 TNA, CO 1055/199, LeGallais, ‘Inquiry into the treatment of detainees: Report by the Chief Justice’, 14 January 1964. 83 TNA, CO 1055/260, Peter Benenson (Amnesty International) to Nigel Fisher (Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office), 11 May 1964; TNA, CO 1055/260, Léopold Boissier (President, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) to R. A. Butler (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), 14 July 1964. 84 Introduction by the Foreign Secretary, Bowen Report. 85 TNA, FO 371/185315, M. Rochat (ICRC), ‘Aden: Special Report (Visit of the I.C.R.C. Delegate to Al-Mansura Prison)’, 22 March 1966; TNA, FO 371/185315, Rochat, ‘Aden: General Report No. 2’, 28 May 1966. 86 TNA, FO 371/185315, A. J. Wilton (High Commissioner’s Office), ‘Visit of delegate of I.C.R.C.’, 17 July 1966. 87 TNA, FO 371/185315, Weakley, ‘Visit of M. Rochat to Al Mansura Detention Centre on 23rd May 1966’, 25 May 1966; TNA, FO 371/185315, McCarthy, ‘Conversation with M. Rochat, 22 September’, 22 September 1966. 88 BL, IOR/R/20/D/213, LIC, ‘Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 520 for period 4 December to noon 11 December 1966’, 12 December 1966. 89 TNA, FO 371/185315, McCarthy to Stuart Roberts (Arabian Department, FO), 9 August 1966. 90 Ibid. 91 TNA, DEFE 23/117, no author (MoD), ‘Origins of the Bowen Inquiry’, no date (cover letter dated 2 November 1971). 92 TNA, DEFE 24/252, Dr Selahuddin Rastgeldi (Amnesty International), ‘Aden Report’, no date. 93 ‘Amnesty discloses Aden torture allegations: “Nails torn from fingers and toes”’, The Times (19 October 1966). 94 TNA, DEFE 24/252, Rastgeldi, ‘Aden Report’, no date. 95 TNA, FCO 8/166, FO and Commonwealth Office to certain missions, 9 May 1967; Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates, p. 143. 96 K. Sellars, ‘Human rights and the colonies: Deceit, deception and discovery’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 93:377 (October 2004), 718.

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97 TNA, FO 953/2506, Benenson, ‘A report by Amnesty International: Aden 1963–1966’, 11 November 1966. 98 TNA, WO 32/20987, McCarthy to Foreign Office, 15 November 1966. 99 TNA, DEFE 11/505, F. Cooper (Assistant Under-Secretary (POL (unknown)) to Private Secretary, Secretary of State, 29 September 1966; TNA, DEFE 23/117, no author (MoD), ‘Origins of the Bowen Inquiry’, no date (cover letter dated 2 November 1971). 100 TNA, DEFE 11/505, Cooper to Private Secretary, Secretary of State, 29 September 1966. 101 TNA, DEFE 23/117, no author (MoD), ‘Origins of the Bowen Inquiry’, no date (cover letter dated 2 November 1971). 102 ‘Inquiries on suspects in Aden: Britain to examine procedure’, The Times (14 October 1966). 103 TNA, CJ 4/95, no author (FCO), ‘Note on events leading up to the preparation of the Bowen Report on procedures for the arrest, interrogation and detention of suspected terrorists in Aden’, 29 October 1971. 104 ‘Bowen Aden Report Out Today’, The Times (19 December 1966). 105 Introduction by the Foreign Secretary, Bowen Report. 106 Bowen Report; TNA, DEFE 23/117, no author (MoD), ‘Origins of the Bowen Inquiry’, no date (cover letter dated 2 November 1971). 107 TNA, DEFE 23/117, no author (MoD), ‘Origins of the Bowen Inquiry’, no date (cover letter dated 2 November 1971). 108 Ibid. 109 Bowen Report. 110 French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, p. 170. 111 Bowen Report, p. 16. 112 TNA, CAB 163/68, Brown, ‘South Arabia: Bowen Report on the Handling of Detainees in Aden’, 1 December 1966. 113 Ibid.; ‘Bowen Aden Report Out Today’, The Times (19 December 1966). 114 TNA, CAB 163/68, Brown, ‘South Arabia: Bowen Report on the Handling of Detainees in Aden’, 1 December 1966. 115 Sellars, ‘Human rights and the colonies’, 717. 116 ‘Bowen Aden Report Out Today’, The Times (19 December 1966). 117 ‘Investigation of three Aden interrogators: Mr. Brown accepts Bowen proposals’, The Times (20 December 1966); ‘Restraint of Services in Aden’, The Times (20  December 1966); ‘Bowen report urges changes in Aden interrogation of suspects: Delay in investigating accusations of ill-treatment’, The Times (20 December 1966). 118 Introduction by the Foreign Secretary, Bowen Report. 119 Hansard, Brown, 19 December 1966, vol. 738, col. 1005. 120 Bowen Report. 121 TNA, CAB 163/68, no author (annexed to document by Brown), ‘Recommendations in the Bowen Report’, no date (annexed to document dated 1 December 1966). 122 Ibid.

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123 Bowen to Brown, 1 November 1966, appended to Bowen Report; ‘Summary of recommendations by Mr Bowen and Action Taken’, appended to Bowen Report. 124 ‘Summary of recommendations by Mr Bowen and Action Taken’, appended to Bowen Report. 125 TNA, FCO 8/155, Brenchley, ‘South Arabia: Bowen Report’, 19 January 1967. 126 ‘Summary of recommendations by Mr Bowen and Action Taken’, appended to Bowen Report. 127 Bowen Report. 128 TNA, FCO 8/164, Oates to Brenchley, 17 January 1967. 129 Monthly returns have been located for December 1966 to June 1967 inclusive. See TNA, FCO 8/164. 130 Bowen Report, p. 10; TNA, CO 1055/209, Turnbull to Greenwood, 19 December 1965; TNA, CO 1055/209, Turnbull to Greenwood, 11 December 1965. 131 TNA, FCO 8/226, Oates to J. V. Prendergast (Director of Intelligence, Aden) and others, ‘Procedures for dealing with allegations from detainees’, 18 March 1967. 132 Ibid. 133 TNA, FCO 8/166, George Thomson (FO) to R. Swann (Amnesty International), 12 May 1967; TNA, FCO 8/226, McCarthy to Oates, 17 May 1967. 134 TNA, DEFE 11/527, CINC MIDEAST to Field Marshal Sir Richard Hull (CDS), 4 May 1967; TNA, FCO 8/238, Turnbull to FO, 22 April 1967. 135 TNA, FCO 8/156, Brown to H. Wilson, 8 January 1967; TNA, DEFE 24/252, Army to UK Representative in Kuala Lumpur, January 1967. An unsuccessful attempt was made by the author to contact one of these three men in November 2013. 136 TNA, FCO 8/153, G. W. Reynolds (Minister of Defence for Administration) to Thomson, 12 June 1967. 137 BL, IOR/R/20/D/213, LIC, ‘Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 520 for period 4 December to noon 11 December 1966’, 12 December 1966. 138 Ibid. 139 TNA, DEFE 11/527, CINC MIDEAST to Hull, 29 April 1967. 140 R. Cormac, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 2013), p. 16. 141 BL, IOR/R/20/D/22, no author, 22 January 1965. 142 TNA, PREM 15/485, Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas (JIC(65)15), 17 February 1965. 143 TNA, DEFE 23/111, no author, ‘The evolution of handling techniques in the interrogation environment’, 8 December 1971. 144 BMInq, day 3, MOD038251, Joint Service Pamphlet, ‘Interrogation in War’, 1955. 145 BMInq, day 1, CAB001319, J. M. C. Vivian (unknown, on behalf of JIC Secretary), covering a draft of the 1965 Directive, 3 February 1965. 146 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Private Secretary, Permanent Under-Secretary, ‘Note of Action’, 17 November 1971. 147 TNA, PREM 15/485, JIC, Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas (JIC(65)15), 17 February 1965.

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148 Lewitt (MoD) to the author in response to an FOI request, 7 August 2013. 149 BMInq, day 1, CAB001319, no author (cover letter by J. M. C. Vivian on behalf of JIC Secretary), final draft of paragraphs 1–9, JIC(65)15, no date (cover letter dated 3 February 1965). 150 Cabinet Office FOI Team to the author, 5 September 2013; Burton to the author in response to an FOI request, 6 September 2013. 151 Lewitt (MoD) to the author in response to an FOI request, 7 August 2013; Cabinet Office FOI Team to the author, 5 September 2013; Burton to the author in response to an FOI request, 6 September 2013. 152 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Private Secretary, Minister of State for Defence, 25 October 1971. 153 TNA, CAB 163/68, Director of Military Intelligence, ‘Military interrogation in internal security operations overseas: Joint Directive’, 22 February 1965. 154 TNA, CAB 163/172, Colonel P. T. I. Macdiarmid (unknown) to BGS(Int), 10 November 1971. 155 TNA, DEFE 23/110, Intelligence Centre to DI 16 (MoD), 24 October 1966. 156 TNA, FCO 8/153, Turnbull, ‘Note on the Security situation in Aden in December, 1965’, 25 January 1967; TNA, FCO 8/153, Deputy High Commissioner, ‘Allegations of maltreatment’, 30 January 1967. 157 TNA, FO 371/185315, Rochat, ‘Aden: General Report No. III – Aden, 12th to 20th July, 1966’, 18 July 1966. 158 TNA, CAB 163/68, JIC, ‘Joint Directive on military interrogation in internal security operations overseas’, 24 January 1967. 159 Ibid.; TNA, CAB 163/68, JIC, ‘Joint Directive on military interrogation in internal security operations overseas’, 1 February 1967. 160 TNA, PREM 15/485, JIC, ‘Amendment to JIC(65)15’, 10 February 1967. 161 P. Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 102. 162 Paget, Last Post, p. 166. 163 Ibid., p. 189, 195. 164 MIM, A/ Aden Collection Box 2, ASFIC: 2201, no author (MoD), ‘British military  operations 1967 et seq. ADEN until Nov 1967’, no date; BL, IOR/ R/20/D/386, signature illegible, ‘Diary of U.N. Mission, 6th and 7th April, 1967’, 7 April 1967. 165 Walker, Aden Insurgency, p. 4. 166 Mawby, ‘Orientalism and the failure of British policy in the Middle East’, 347–8. 167 TNA, CAB 148/25, Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (Cabinet Office), Minutes, 2 December 1966. 168 TNA, PREM 13/1297, signature illegible to H. Wilson, ‘Aden’, 13 November 1967. 169 Ibid. 170 TNA, DEFE 11/530, Brigadier Gribbon (DMC(SCDS), unknown) to Vice CDS, 31 July 1967; TNA, DEFE 11/530, FO to Aden, 3 August 1967. 171 TNA, PREM 13/1297, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan (High Commissioner) to FO, 12 November 1967.

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172 TNA, FCO 8/150, R. O. Miles (British Embassy, Aden) to Hillier-Fry, 19 January 1968. 173 Hansard, Brown, 29 November 1967, vol. 755, col. 435; Gavin, Aden under British Rule, p. 350. 174 TNA, FCO 8/157, CINC MIDEAST to MoD UK, 21 November 1967. 175 Paget, Last Post, p. 247 176 Cormac, Confronting the Colonies, p. 108. 177 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, p. 118.

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‘The troubles’, policy-making and interrogation, 1969–71

At the height of ‘the troubles’ in Northern Ireland, in which political violence was used by Nationalists striving for a united Ireland free from British political domination and by Loyalists seeking to maintain Northern Ireland’s union with the UK, Operation Calaba took place. In this operation fourteen detainees suspected of possessing intelligence that could help the security forces were exposed to the ‘five techniques’ and interrogated. In this, the first of three chapters on the ‘five techniques’ and Northern Ireland, the granting of approval for the use of the techniques is addressed. The type and nature of the preparations made for using these techniques in Northern Ireland shows that they were expected to produce valuable intelligence. These preparations took place at a time when the security situation was deteriorating, and lessons learnt in colonial contexts were transferred. The IRA, described as terrorists by the authorities and as insurgents since, were proving difficult to tackle, leading to the introduction of internment without trial on 9 August 1971. It was after internment was introduced that the ‘five techniques’ were used in connection with interrogation, specifically in August and October 1971. This chapter focuses on how and why the techniques were used in Northern Ireland, and the details of what happened to the fourteen detainees who experienced these techniques. Chapter 4 addresses the government’s responses to the use of the techniques, which were principally two public inquiries, a ban on the ‘five techniques’ and a new interrogation Directive. Chapter 5 then concludes the Northern Ireland example by examining the impact the use of the ‘five techniques’ had on intelligence, on security, on the fourteen detainees and on the UK’s reputation abroad. To understand the pressures faced by policy-makers and the security forces in Northern Ireland in 1971, and therefore the context within which the ‘five techniques’ were introduced to Northern Ireland, the chapter begins by outlining the outbreak and early years of ‘the troubles’.

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Origins and early years of ‘the troubles’ The ‘five techniques’ were used at a time when ‘the troubles’ were intensifying. ‘The troubles’ are widely considered to have got fully under way when the British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969. The reasons for the outbreak and escalation of ‘the troubles’ are many and complex, as are the reasons internment without trial was introduced in 1971, but it is possible to outline the key events of the late 1960s and early 1970s. A civil rights campaign had begun in the mid-1960s ‘as an attempt to draw attention to grievances felt by Catholics in Northern Ireland’.1 A civil rights march in Derry in October 1968 and another that took a route from Belfast to Derry in January 1969 variously resulted in outbreaks of violence involving Nationalists, Loyalists and Northern Ireland’s police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Footage of the violence was aired on television.2 David McKittrick and David McVea write in their history of ‘the troubles’ that ‘[t]he weeks which followed brought more and more demonstrations, with the RUC struggling to cope with so much unrest and street activity’.3 Tensions increased further when the 1969 summer marching season began.4 There were fears that Northern Ireland was on the brink of civil war.5 On 14 August the government of Northern Ireland, based at Stormont, Belfast, requested that British troops be sent in to help restore law and order. In London, Home Secretary James Callaghan approved the request. Troops arrived on the streets of Derry the same day, and Belfast the following day. ‘The troubles’ were under way and would prove extremely difficult to stop. Although the Catholic community initially welcomed the arrival of soldiers,6 this ‘honeymoon period’ did not last long. In January 1970 the Army Council of the newly formed Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) decided to prepare for the defence of the Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland in advance of the summer marching season.7 By the autumn of 1970 PIRA had outstripped the Official IRA in terms of action and was thereafter referred to simply as ‘the IRA’.8 The number of troubles-related deaths rose from eighteen in 1969 to twenty-six in 1970. In 1971 186 people died. The violence that year was much more intense after internment without trial was introduced.9 It was within this context that internment was introduced and the ‘five techniques’ used. One of the men arrested recounts his arrest as follows: The time – 4.30 a.m. on 9 August 1971 – conscious of a soldier standing in the bedroom. He hit me with the butt of a rifle to awaken me. I tried to get up and get dressed but I wasn’t in fact given time, just put on underpants and trousers – no vest or anything, and had to go barefooted … As soon as I had my trousers on I was forced at gunpoint down the stairs and on to the street. I was then forced to run about 400 yards barefoot at gunpoint. About ten others were taken from

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their homes in the same condition. We were piled into the back of an army three ton lorry, one on top of the other.10

On Monday 9 August 1971, the first day of internment, 342 men were arrested under the Special Powers Act.11 The arrests took place at around 4.30am,12 adding to the impact they had on those arrested and the family members who witnessed their arrests. Internment had previously been planned for Tuesday 10 August. General Robert Ford, the new Commander Land Forces (Northern Ireland), was sure that as ‘[q]uite a few people in Whitehall and Stormont were aware of the 4am Tuesday date’, there would be a leak, so it was moved forward a day.13 An IRA source within the RUC, the build-up of troops in Northern Ireland and the widely held belief that internment was on the cards alerted the IRA to the imminence of internment.14 As reported in the press, ‘[l]arge numbers of Provisional leaders were able to escape the mass arrests, some because they had left home some time ago anticipating internment, others because they received tip-offs minutes before the soldiers arrived’.15 Contrary to the intelligence on which the list of people to be arrested was based, far from all of the 342 men arrested that day were active in the IRA.16 The initial arrests exclusively targeted Catholics,17 and were accompanied by a ban on marches, further encouraging violent protest.18 Nationalist areas of Belfast, for instance, saw ‘barricades erected, arson, riots, shootings and bombings’.19 The UK Representative in Belfast, whose post was created in August 1969 to brief London on developments in Northern Ireland, commented eight days after internment began that ‘[t]he political and social consequences of internment have … been more serious than many people here expected’.20 Internment, and the loss of life and damage to property it caused, were deemed newsworthy around the world. Many British embassies came under threat in the following days and months.21 The deterioration in the security situation up to August 1971 was the overarching reason internment without trial was introduced. As Prime Minister of Northern Ireland (PMNI) the decision on whether to introduce internment was ultimately Brian Faulkner’s.22 In the spring of 1971, as a result of a further deterioration in security, Faulkner’s Cabinet agreed internment might become necessary.23 The deterioration in security was threatening Faulkner’s position as PMNI. It was expected that internment would allow the security forces to arrest a substantial number of known IRA members whose removal ‘could make a major contribution to lessening tension in Northern Ireland and enabl[e] Mr Faulkner to demonstrate to his supporters his determination to suppress violence’.24 His position would therefore be strengthened. The bombings of mid-July made Faulkner decide that internment was necessary.25

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The London government too had been considering the possibility of introducing internment in the future. In February 1971 it had authorised the preparation of ‘a contingency study (rather than a contingency plan) dealing with the practical problems of internment’.26 By the end of July, they had decided that they would allow internment.27 On 5 August the Prime Minister Edward Heath, Home Secretary Reginald Maudling, Defence Secretary Lord Peter Carrington and Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home met with Faulkner, a Unionist, and agreed that the time had come to introduce internment.28 This policy-making process and the extent to which the impetus came from London or from Belfast have been analysed at length elsewhere.29 None the less, the key reasons for internment can be identified, and doing so helps explain how the ‘five techniques’ came to be used in Northern Ireland. There is no evidence that collecting intelligence by using the ‘five techniques’ with interrogation, or from the numerous other interrogations of people arrested under internment, were reasons for its introduction. The collection of intelligence by interrogating people arrested under internment was, however, a foreseen benefit. Internment would see wide-scale arrests and extended detention that would allow interrogation to take place over a period of days. Lewis, BGS(Int)DIS, described being able to use the ‘five techniques’ to collect intelligence as ‘one of the major advantages of internment’.30 There was also a judicial reason for internment. As Maudling explained, ‘the normal processes of investigation, detection and trial are obstructed by a wall of silence, created either by intimidation or sympathy and information gained during the processes of detention and internment should produce information which could lead to the conviction of those who are at present escaping the courts’.31 Convictions tended to rest on members of the security forces providing evidence for the prosecution where the accused had been caught red-handed.32 While it is not known to what extent internment achieved the aim of increasing convictions, it did allow for those suspected or known to pose threats to be kept off the streets for long periods of time without first securing a criminal conviction in the courts. The 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), known simply as the Special Powers Act, provided for these arrests and subsequent detention or internment.33 Arrests could be made on the basis of suspicion ‘of acting, having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace’, Detention Orders were, in practice, used to detain people for up to twenty-eight days, and Internment Orders provided for indefinite internment without trial for anyone suspected of acting, who had acted or was believed to be about to act ‘in a manner prejudicial to peace and order’.34 Central to all of these reasons behind the introduction of internment was security: internment would provide a way of detaining suspects without needing a conviction, show that the Belfast and London governments were willing

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to take action to address the deteriorating security situation and to strengthen Faulkner’s position as PMNI. As the following chapter explains, internment was not the success it was hoped it would be.

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The ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland Fourteen detainees were to experience the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland. Twelve of them were arrested in the initial internment sweep of 9 August, with the remaining two arrested on 9 and 11 October. What follows is an account of the detainees’ time at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, including their arrival there, the form the techniques took and the amount of time they were used for, and the interrogations. Before concluding, the chapter looks in detail at the policy-making processes that led to the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland. It is now certain that the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ all fourteen detainees were taken to, exposed to the ‘five techniques’ and interrogated at was Hut 60 at Ballykelly airfield in County Derry.35 The draft Standing Orders for this ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ confirm that it was to be run in accordance with the 1965 Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas. It was under the direct command of the Head of Special Branch, with immediate command resting with the Centre Controller.36 The military’s role at the Centre differed from their role at Aden’s Interrogation Centre. While in Aden they staffed the Interrogation Centre, carrying out interrogations there, using the ‘five techniques’ and training other members of the military in those techniques, their role in Northern Ireland was advisory. The August operation saw twelve JSIW personnel provide technical support and advice on all aspects of interrogation. The JSIW was the successor to the Interrogation Branch of the School of Military Intelligence, and was part of the Intelligence Centre.37 The interrogations were carried out by twenty RUC Special Branch officers, while the RUC also carried out all internal guarding duties and escorted the detainees when they were moved around within the Centre.38 There is strong evidence that the military did not interrogate at the Ballykelly ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, though one of the detainees believes that it was indeed the military who interrogated him.39 Contingency plans for using the military as interrogators as a last resort in the face of an even more drastic downturn in the security situation were drawn up in early 1973 and acknowledged as potentially vexatious.40 The identities of the individual interrogators who worked at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ have been concealed by the authorities.41 There is more information available on the experiences of the initial group of detainees taken to the Ballykelly interrogation centre than on the two detainees taken there in October. It is likely that the experiences of the second

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Figure 3.1 The ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, Ballykelly Legend: A – reception; B – baggage; D – holding and cells; E – toilets; G – guard room; G1-6 – guard posts; H – MI [Medical] room; I1-6 [sic] – interview rooms; M – monitors; N – administration; O – operations room; T – technical section; V – rest and report writing; Y –intelligence support. The audio picked up by microphones in the interview rooms was fed into the monitors’ room. The technical section was responsible for maintaining communications, for the tape-recorders and for replacing the batteries in the noise machine. Source: TNA, CAB 163/173, ‘Standing Orders’, draft, 1971

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group were very similar, and where the evidence put forward below specifically relates to one of these two groups, this will be stated. The layout of the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ can be seen in the plan reproduced in Figure 3.1. All bar one of the initial group of detainees were taken to Ballykelly by helicopter. The flight was always made longer than necessary to disorientate its passengers.42 By 7.15am on 11 August all of the twelve detainees who would be held there that month had arrived.43 Upon arrival, searches and initial medical examinations were carried out and belongings removed.44 Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Nicholson, who had been part of the first military interrogation team sent to Aden after the outbreak of the Emergency there, led the JSIW team present at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ to advise on interrogation and the ‘five techniques’. He reported that all the detainees ‘appeared to be in a very nervous state after their helicopter flight [that was] coupled with silent handling’.45 There had been an administrative error, though, in that these detainees had not been issued with Detention Orders. They were all returned to Crumlin Road Jail in Belfast where they were issued both with Detention Orders and Removal Orders, allowing the RUC to remove them back to Ballykelly, where they arrived by 7pm on 11 August.46 Nicholson noted that this incident ‘revived the morale of the subjects’.47 After this, the ‘five techniques’ began in earnest. They did not take the same form as in Aden because ‘physical conditions, [the] mentality and background of prisoners, security considerations, and climate were all quite different’.48 At Ballykelly’s ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, each detainee was hooded with a black bag.49 Hoods were certainly in place when the detainees were moved around the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ and when in the holding room awaiting interrogation.50 Although it is possible detainees had the option of removing the hoods whilst in their individual cells, there is strong evidence that they were worn at all times other than during interrogation.51 While there can be security benefits from hooding, this is not the case when detainees are held in individual cells. The question of how long they were hooded for is a difficult one. Brigadier Lewis has stated that hoods were worn for longer periods in the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ than they were at Fort Morbut, Aden.52 Figures are not available for the total time spent hooded, but are available for time spent both hooded and in the wall-standing stress position. It is not known where the Ministry of Defence obtained these figures from.53 Even the lowest of these figures represents a considerable amount of time to spend deprived of sight. These detainees were exposed to the ‘five techniques’ over periods ranging from two and a half to almost eight days each. When this total time is compared to the time spent hooded and wall-standing, these figures still represent considerable periods of time. The stress position used at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ is known as wall-standing. Detainees were made to stand with their hands against the

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Table 3.1 Total hours hooded and on the wall at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ Detainee

Total hours hooded and on the wall

Paddy Joe McClean Patrick Shivers Michael Donnelly Michael Montgomery Kevin Hannaway James Auld Joseph Clarke Francis McGuigan Brian Turley Patrick McNally Sean McKenna Gerrard McKerr Liam Rogers William Shannon

36hrs 55mins 49hrs 50mins 30hrs 30mins 28hrs 10hrs 45hrs 15mins 38hrs 30mins 16hrs 8hrs 45mins 25hrs 30mins 28hrs 15mins 7hrs 9hrs 5mins 35hrs

wall.54 The detainees say that their hands were placed high on the wall and that they were forced with batons to maintain the posture and were lifted back into position after collapsing. The supervising staff, however, claimed that though wall-standing was used for up to six hours at a time, no excessive force was used to keep detainees in the posture, no batons were used for this purpose and that it was not a stress position as legs were not sufficiently wide apart, arms not sufficiently high and weight of the body not forward enough.55 The detainees’ testimony that it was severe enough to be a stress position is persuasive. While the draft Standing Orders for the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ instructed the guards to use minimum force, this is a term that is open to interpretation.56 As with hooding, it is not clear whether wall-standing was used when detainees were in their individual cells, but it has been claimed that this was the case.57 Once again, there is little in terms of security enhancements to justify using wall-standing in individual cells. Sir Edmund Compton, who was appointed to head an official inquiry into the allegations arising from the introduction of internment – including those connected with the ‘five techniques’ – has provided figures on the length of time wall-standing was used.58 It should be noted that for the initial group of detainees, at least, records ceased two days before they were moved out of Ballykelly because during this time a different approach to collecting intelligence from them was used, and that the figure given for Paddy Joe McClean is not accurate because he was allowed to lie on the floor for much of the stated time.59 Many of these figures are similar to those given above for the

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Table 3.2 Compton Report’s hours on the wall at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ Detainee

Compton Report’s hours on the wall

Paddy Joe McClean Patrick Shivers Michael Donnelly Michael Montgomery Kevin Hannaway James Auld Joseph Clarke Francis McGuigan Brian Turley Patrick McNally Sean McKenna Gerrard McKerr Liam Rogers William Shannon

29hrs 23hrs 9hrs 30hrs 50mins 20hrs 43hrs 30mins 40hrs 14hrs 9hrs 13hrs 30hrs 15hrs 11hrs 41mins 35hrs 15mins

time spent both hooded and standing at the wall, while others differ wildly. It is difficult to explain the discrepancies. The time not accounted for in either table includes that spent being issued with Detention and Removal Orders, and occasions when they were offered food or drink, visited the latrines or, the MoD claimed, were in their individual cells.60 Again, these figures reveal what many observers might consider to be extensive use of an uncomfortable position. White noise was broadcast so that it was audible to detainees most, if not all, of the time.61 Nicholson notes it was broadcast in the holding area and in the corridors.62 It has been described as an ‘unmerciful noise … like a jet engine multiplied 40 times, piercing noise, high-pitched noise’.63 Research into the nature and volume of the noise was conducted in response to two Parliamentary Questions dating from November 1971. In response, a team was sent to the JSIW’s base in Ashford to measure the decibels produced by the electronic sound generator used at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’.64 Lieutenant Colonel Larner, who led the team, noted differences between the Northern Ireland environment and the one at Ashford, but concluded that the results should be valid within a 10 per cent margin of error. With the output adjusted by ear to compare to that used in Northern Ireland, the average level was 85dB. A black hood ‘gave an attenuation of 2dB with the sensation of reducing the higher frequencies’ of the sound which was described as similar to a railway train letting off steam. Larner reported the level lay somewhere between the sound in a train with the windows open and the sound inside a

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tube train with the windows open.65 Arthur Hockaday commented that 90dB, even for a considerable length of time, was harmless. Hockaday was Assistant Under-Secretary, General Staff, and therefore the civil service member of the management team run by the head of the British Army, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS). He added that there was no medical record of permanent or semi-permanent damage to Army personnel who had been subjected to these levels in interrogation resistance training over the last ten years.66 Sadly Hockaday neglected to include the psychological effects that constant white noise, even at low levels, may induce. Chapter 5 will address the effects of the ‘five techniques’ upon the fourteen men exposed to them at Ballykelly. The detainees were allowed to sleep when it was deemed medically necessary ‘or when such rapport has been established that the subject is cooperating to the extent where it is to the mutual interest that he should be allowed to do so’.67 Statements collected from the fourteen detainees soon after their transfer out of Ballykelly show that they were permitted some rest, but little sleep.68 By Standing Order, plain food and water was to be offered ‘every six hours’.69 Feeding charts for 11–14 August held by the Ministry of Defence show that bread and water were indeed offered every six hours.70 Of the group subjected to the ‘five techniques’ in August, all were on a light diet above bread and water by the evening of 13 August. Patrick Shivers lost over a stone in weight as he refused to eat or drink. On medical orders he was offered food and drink more frequently than the other detainees held at the time, demonstrating that medical supervision did, in this instance, intervene for the sake of the welfare of these men.71 Medical examinations took place once a day, as required by the 1967 amendment of the interrogation Directive, and medical help was available at all times.72 The interrogation of the first group of detainees began at 7pm on 11 August, after their return from Crumlin and following clearance from the Stormont government.73 The ‘five techniques’ alone are unlikely to produce intelligence: questions must also be put to detainees. Constant questioning was permitted for up to twenty hours a day.74 The Ministry of Defence’s records show the length of time each detainee was interrogated for, as reproduced in Table 3.3.75 The detainees were taken to an interrogation room where they were unhooded and questioned according to a ‘pre-prepared plan which includes the variation of hard (shouting) [and] soft (friendly) approach[es] by one or more interrogators’. After questioning, they were either returned to the holding room to await further questioning or, if medical circumstances dictated, to an individual cell. This process was continued until it was halted on medical grounds, until they were believed to have provided all the useful information they possessed, or until they were considered to have resisted questioning to the limits of the interrogation Directive and the Geneva

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Table 3.3 Total hours in interrogation at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ Detainee

Total hours in interrogation

Paddy Joe McClean Patrick Shivers Michael Donnelly Michael Montgomery Kevin Hannaway James Auld Joseph Clarke Francis McGuigan Brian Turley Patrick McNally Sean McKenna Gerrard McKerr Liam Rogers William Shannon

10hrs 20mins 11hrs 10mins 17hrs 13hrs 10mins 13hrs 10mins 11hrs 50mins 21hrs 24hrs 45mins 8hrs 20mins 8hrs 5mins 10hrs 50mins 11hrs 42mins 32hrs 39mins 56hrs 25mins

Conventions.76 Copies of the Directive and the Geneva Conventions were to be available in the operations room at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’.77 It is worth noting that both documents forbade cruel treatment and torture, but that it was thought possible to use the ‘five techniques’ and to comply with this prohibition. The majority, at least, of the group taken to Ballykelly in August 1971 also underwent a type of interrogation known as ‘prisoner’s friend’ or ‘father figure’. The type of questioning described above ceased on the morning of 14 August. The detainees were instead each allocated an interrogator to act as a father figure, who sought to build up the detainees’ dependence upon them in order to gain their co-operation. Nicholson reported that this ‘ploy’ was extremely successful, though it has also been said that it was clear to the detainees that this approach was designed to obtain information from them.78 This continued until 16 August. On this day the first of the detainees was moved out of Ballykelly into a place of internment as a result of pressure his wife exerted upon the authorities. The other eleven detainees left the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ on the morning of 17 August, eight days after their arrest.79 The two men arrested on 9 and 11 October were transferred out of Ballykelly on 18 October, and there are indications that they too were exposed to the ‘father figure’ approach.80 Chapter 5 will address the impact this time at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ had on these detainees.

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Why the techniques were used The remainder of the chapter addresses the interrelated matters of how the ‘five techniques’ came to be used in Northern Ireland, and why they were used there. In the spring of 1971, introducing internment and the need for better intelligence were considered. Policy-makers realised that the widescale arrests of an internment operation would provide the opportunity to interrogate numerous terrorist suspects, improving the quality and quantity of intelligence available. Preparations to employ the ‘five techniques’ against a selection of those arrested under internment began to be made. Which members of government were involved in policy-making on the ‘five techniques’ will be addressed here in order to explain further how the techniques came to be used. It is possible to comment on the involvement certain individuals had in the process that led to the setting up of the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, and the type and level of authorisation that was given for the techniques. There was no clear moment at which a decision to use the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland was made. Rather, echoing what happened in Aden, it was calling on the military to help with interrogation that played the pivotal role in the ‘five techniques’ being taken to Northern Ireland. Before concluding the chapter, the conviction of key military personnel that the techniques were effective, and the basis of this conviction, will be examined. There were weaknesses in intelligence pertaining to Northern Ireland in the spring of 1971. The years 1969–70 had seen the RUC partially collapse, creating an intelligence-gathering vacuum that was rapidly filled by a number of agencies in an intelligence ‘gold rush’.81 Inter-agency rivalry followed.82 Improvements in intelligence had nevertheless been made by 1971. In January 1970 London made progress towards coming to terms with the seriousness of the situation, as the Director General of the Security Service visited Northern Ireland ‘to discuss future security and intelligence arrangements’.83 In the inflammatory Falls Road ‘cordon and search’ operation of July 1970, house-to-house searches were carried out extensively, and events escalated into a full-scale riot.84 Despite this the operation produced ‘an unquantifiable though undoubtedly large amount of general background intelligence’.85 Later that year it was noted that there was a definite improvement in Special Branch’s performance.86 While there had been some successes, the intelligence system of early 1971 left a lot to be desired. It was in this context that the potential intelligence value of interrogation began to be discussed. In February 1971, Maudling told Heath ‘I am not sure that we have a reliable picture of the efficiency of the security and intelligence network as a whole in Northern Ireland’.87 He suggested that Sir Dick White travel to Northern

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Ireland to write a report on the overall picture. White was the Intelligence Co-ordinator, a Cabinet Office post created in 1968 as part of a rethinking of intelligence co-ordination.88 He had formerly been Director General of the Security Service (1953–56) and Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS (MI6), 1956–68). White was to be heavily involved in the government’s discussions between late 1971 and early 1972 about whether the ‘five techniques’ should be used in future. White duly visited Northern Ireland in March 1971 to ‘examine the intelligence organisation … and its possible future development’.89 White’s report, drafted by the JIC Secretary,90 argued that the RUC should be given further support. It also emphasised the importance of interrogation.91 White had become ‘a firm believer in the utility of interrogation’ in general on the basis of his involvement in successful interrogation operations during the Second World War.92 At the time of White’s visit the security climate in Northern Ireland changed, making the security forces’ work harder and prompting politicians in London and Stormont to see internment as a possibility. They knew that the IRA was well armed and operated ‘in a manner that made the arrest of their leaders and the gathering of intelligence very difficult’.93 Preparations for interrogating people arrested under internment began. On 17 March 1971 interrogation training for Special Branch was requested. This was before White had completed his visit and emphasised the value of interrogation.94 On 24 March the MoD discussed the implications of setting up a dedicated Interrogation Centre with representatives of the Security Service.95 Subsequently, the MoD sent Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Nicholson from the JSIW to advise.96 He was to have a JSIW support team with him whilst the ‘five techniques’ were in use.97 It was in April 1971, at the request of the Head of Special Branch, that the JSIW taught the ‘five techniques’ to Special Branch. This training took place at the Intelligence Centre, which was the forerunner of today’s DISC that trained the military interrogators active in Iraq in 2003.98 The government’s view on the responsibility of those employing the techniques was made clear when it was announced that none of these interrogators would be prosecuted.99 Special Branch was, at first, rather sceptical of the techniques, but it was later claimed that it ‘became convinced that they were more effective, as well as less brutal, than their own “traditional” methods’.100 Differences in physique and personality of the detainees were allowed for, ‘as this was the way to get the best results’, implying that the government saw the ‘five techniques’ as skilled tools aimed at collecting intelligence.101 Witnesses preparing to give evidence to the European Commission of Human Rights in Ireland vs UK, a case in which Ireland alleged that the UK had breached the ECHR by using the ‘five techniques’, internment and other activities, were instructed not to answer questions about this training. Nor was there a military interrogation training manual because of the classified

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nature of what it would contain.102 It was when the MoD, and by extension the JSIW, was called upon to help with interrogation by delivering training and advice that the ‘five techniques’ were transferred to Northern Ireland. The military, which took the techniques to Special Branch, believed that methods developed in colonial situations would be appropriate for Northern Ireland. The ‘five techniques’ were used at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ with the knowledge and approval of a number of senior members of government. Revealing who knew what about the techniques before they were used is an important dimension of investigating how they came to be used. This question is closely related to the question of who authorised the use of the techniques. A number of high-ranking ministers and civil servants in London and Stormont were aware that the RUC were ready to use the techniques: Before interrogation in depth began on 11 August, [the] S[ecretary] of S[tate for Defence] had discussed the matter with the Home Secretary; neither Secretary of State indicated any dissatisfaction with what was proposed. Meanwhile, the Director of Intelligence in Northern Ireland had for one hour personally explained the techniques to Mr. Faulkner, and it is understood that the Director General of the Security Service had briefed Sir Philip Allen [Permanent UnderSecretary of State, Home Office].103

As well as the Home Secretary’s advance knowledge of Operation Calaba, the Home Office itself was heavily involved in the inter-departmental discussions about establishing the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’. Lewis wrote that there ‘can have been NO doubt in anybody’s mind as to the purpose for which this camp was being modified’.104 It is therefore clear that before the ‘five techniques’ were used a number of high-ranking individuals and departments were aware of the intention to use them. It is plausible that those involved in these discussions may have had the power to stop the plans from going ahead. It is less clear whether those who were told about the ‘five techniques’ shortly before they came into use could have derailed the plans had they wanted to. Although the individuals referred to above were aware the techniques were going to be used, a member of the government’s Northern Ireland Office wrote: I doubt whether the full implications of the techniques as actually practised were ever approved by British Ministers – for example, wall standing for periods of 4–6 hours, up to a total of 43½ hours in the worst case … No evidence has yet been found to indicate that British Ministers fully understood the implications of these techniques as actually practised.105

Faulkner had been provided with a description of the ‘five techniques’ before he gave his authorisation, but later wrote in his memoirs that he had been told London had already given its approval, so assumed that the

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techniques were not ‘of dubious propriety’.106 A slightly different view was taken in London, where it was claimed that it was the Northern Ireland government that authorised Operation Calaba, with London simply agreeing.107 While it is commendable that those in authority were told about the techniques before they were used, questions remain over whether enough information was given and who was ultimately responsible for the introduction of the techniques. The interrogations of the first group of detainees taken to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ ‘were not cleared individually with Ministers in Whitehall’.108 This was changed after the Compton Committee was tasked with investigating allegations of physical brutality, including those pertaining to the ‘five techniques’.109 On 24 August General Harry Tuzo, the General Officer Commanding (Northern Ireland) (GOC(NI)), was informed that the techniques should not be used again ‘except with the authority of Whitehall in respect of individual cases’.110 In preparation for the interrogation of William Shannon and Liam Rogers, the final two detainees exposed to the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland, the Defence Secretary was informed that these interrogations were planned.111 It was understood that it was not necessary to gain Ministers’ approval, but that Ministers should be informed ‘whenever interrogation was about to be used’.112 Chapter 5 will address how these individuals were selected. After the interrogation of Shannon and Rogers, procedures were changed once again. Nobody could be interrogated using the ‘five techniques’ ‘without the specific consent of United Kingdom Ministers’.113 In the event, no one else would be taken to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’. With the benefit of hindsight observers might be forgiven for thinking that the plans to use the ‘five techniques’ within the United Kingdom should have raised serious doubts. It is unclear how much knowledge, if any, of the ‘five techniques’ was possessed by the members of government who agreed to ask the MoD to help prepare the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ and to train Special Branch in interrogation. What is much clearer is that the military believed the ‘five techniques’ were valuable tools for intelligence-gathering, and that this underpinned its transfer of the ‘five techniques’ to Northern Ireland. The conviction that the techniques were effective is shown in statements they made about how the techniques worked. Discipline, for example, was one of the principles underlying the design of the ‘five techniques’. When a prisoner experiences a disciplined regime at an Interrogation Centre they are, it is said, more likely to cooperate with their interrogators. A note written for inclusion in the Compton Report and approved by the Cabinet stated that ‘[i]nformation can be obtained more rapidly if the person being interrogated is subjected to strict discipline and isolation with a restricted diet’.114 It must be remembered that a prisoner who talks is not necessarily co-operating: only a co-operative one

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speaks what they believe or know to be the truth. The Ministry of Defence argued, in defence of the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, that discipline encourages co-operation and helps break down a person’s natural defences against interrogation.115 Brigadier Bremner, Inspector of the Intelligence Corps and Commandant of the Intelligence Centre, and author of the most detailed histories of the ‘five techniques’ examined in earlier chapters, wrote that wall-standing, limited diet and limited sleep could and should be used to inculcate strict discipline in individuals selected for interrogation.116 Bremner’s views were echoed by the BGS(Int)DIS. Brigadier Lewis described how the essence of the type of interrogation planned for the Ballykelly interrogation centre ‘lies in the desire of the average person to communicate with his fellow beings’. Questioning, he continued, therefore takes place ‘in circumstances designed to heighten the subjects [sic] desire to communicate’, which is brought about by inducing a subject’s ignorance of his whereabouts and loss of sense of time; isolation; fatigue; and white sound.117 It is, as Lewis has argued, the isolation and fatigue that result from the ‘five techniques’ that encourage people to co-operate with their interrogators. To what extent they did co-operate is addressed in Chapter 5. A great deal of research into how the environment that people awaiting interrogation are held in affects those interrogations has been undertaken in fields such as psychology. This has something to add to the above understanding of the principles underlying the ‘five techniques’. Albert D. Biderman, a social scientist, researched methods used by Chinese forces against US Air Force personnel captured during the Korean War.118 He found that prisoners’ resistance could be undermined through ‘monopolisation of perception’ achieved through physical isolation, a barren environment, restricted movement or monotonous food – all of which are reminiscent of the ‘five techniques’. He also wrote about the power of semi-starvation, exposure and sleep deprivation to weaken the mental and physical ability to resist.119 A different view has been put forward by the neuroscientist Shane O’Mara, who writes of the negative effects that stress and irregular sleep have on the ability of subjects to recall information.120 There is not the scope to engage with this research any further here. Indeed, if there were convincing evidence about which techniques work in which circumstances, the torture debate about what techniques were justified might peter out. None the less, the MoD had a clearly identifiable understanding of how the ‘five techniques’ could lead prisoners to co-operate with their interrogators. Conclusion A collection of individuals across the Security Service and the governments of London and Stormont were either involved in the discussions about

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setting up the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ so that the ‘five techniques’ could be used there or were informed the techniques were to be used shortly before Operation Calaba began. It is likely that those explaining the techniques believed their audiences to have understood what they were told. Interrogation began to be looked upon as a way of improving the amount of high quality intelligence available to the security forces in April 1971, at around the same time that planning for the possible use of internment advanced. Policy-making on internment and interrogation were linked, but interrogation was not a reason for internment. The call for improvements in Special Branch’s interrogation capability led to the JSIW, the UK’s experts on interrogation, being called in. As the custodians of expertise in the ‘five techniques’, the training that took place at the Intelligence Centre saw the JSIW pass that expertise to Special Branch. Fourteen men in total were interrogated using the ‘five techniques’ at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, Ballykelly. The initial twelve were arrested on 9 August – the day internment was introduced – and not transferred into places of internment until 16 and 17 August. An additional two men were to go through a very similar experience in October. They were hooded with a black bag for much of their time at Ballykelly, were forced to maintain the wall-standing stress position, exposed to machine-generated white noise measuring an estimated 85dB at source, allowed little sleep, and offered only bread and water every six hours. For the first group of detainees, at least, this ceased two days before their release when the ‘father figure’ approach to interrogation was adopted instead with three meals offered a day. They each went through lengthy interrogations. The situation in Northern Ireland differed from that seen in Aden. Northern Ireland could not be abandoned so easily, either politically or physically. This might explain why lessons about the potential harm done by using these techniques in Aden were not transferred to Northern Ireland. Indeed, their purported success in Aden likely influenced the transfer of the techniques to Northern Ireland. The extent to which lessons were learnt and transferred between British counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the first half of the Cold War is debated, with some showing that lessons were transferred,121 and others arguing it is possible to identify common features across British campaigns of this period.122 The ‘five techniques’ were regarded as lessons learnt and were transferred between operations until Operation Calaba took place at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, Ballykelly. As the first group of detainees interrogated there were held incommunicado, it was only when they were transferred into places of internment that their stories became public. The remaining two chapters on this Northern Ireland example examine the responses that followed this publicity.

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Notes 1 Conflict Archive on the Internet, M. Melaugh, ‘The civil rights campaign – summary of the main events’, accessed 18 December 2013,  http://cain.ulster. ac.uk/events/crights/sum.htm. 2 D. McKittrick and D. McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles (London: Penguin, 2001 (revised edition (2000)), p. 48; Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Cameron Report), Cmd 532, 1964, chapter four. 3 McKittrick and McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, p. 48. 4 Ibid., p. 54. 5 E. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p. 66. 6 McKittrick and McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, p. 56. 7 T. Hennessey, The Evolution of the Troubles, 1970–72 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), p. 7. 8 B. Anderson, Joe Cahill: A Life in the IRA (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 2002), p. 215. 9 M. T. Fay, M. Morrissey and M. Smyth, Mapping Troubles-Related Deaths in Northern Ireland, 1969–1994 (Derry: INCORE, 1997), p. 36; Hennessey, Evolution of the Troubles, p. 143. 10 Statement of Francis McGuigan in D. Faul and R. Murray, The Hooded Men: British Torture in Ireland August, October 1971 (self-published, 1974), p. 36. 11 Introduction by the Home Secretary (Reginald Maudling), Report of the Enquiry into Allegations against the Security Forces of Physical Brutality in Northern Ireland Arising out of Events on the 9th August, 1971 (Compton Report), Cmnd. 4823, November 1971, p. iv. 12 Compton Report, p. 8. 13 Bloody Sunday Inquiry (BSInq), B1123, General Robert Ford (Commander Land Forces (Northern Ireland), July 1971 – April 1973), transcript of BBC footage broadcast 30 January 1972, pp. 143–4. 14 BSInq, B1123, Ford, untitled transcript, p. 119; Anderson, Joe Cahill, p. 222; B. W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 29. 15 S. Hoggart, ‘“Opponents of violence” under arrest’, Guardian (11 August 1971). 16 Coogan, The Troubles, p. 126. 17 P. Taylor, Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), p. 105; Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles, p. 216; Coogan, The Troubles, p. 126. 18 TNA, FCO 46/726, no author, ‘Northern Ireland: Internment’, 9 August 1971. 19 Hennessey, The Evolution of the Troubles, p. 132. 20 TNA, CJ 4/56, UK Representative in Belfast (unknown) to Sir Philip Allen (Permanent Under-Secretary, Home Office (HO)), 17 August 1971. 21 For example, there was a bomb threat to the British government offices in New York on 11 August: TNA, FCO 33/1471, Crowe (UK Mission, New York) to FCO, 11 August 1971; threats were issued to British posts in Australia: TNA, FCO 33/1474, W. Peters (British High Commission, Canberra) to J. C. Strong (Security Department, FCO), 18 November 1971; and a Molotov cocktail was

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23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39 40 41

Interrogation, intelligence and security used to attack the Nice consulate-general: TNA, FCO 33/1474, Soames (Paris) to FCO, 25 November 1971. University of Westminster and King’s College London, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. B. Faulkner, edited by J. Houston, Memoirs of a Statesman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), pp. 100–1, 117–18. TNA, CJ 4/57, Maudling, ‘Internment’, no date. Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, p. 119. TNA, PREM 15/475, Northern Ireland Department (HO), ‘Internment in Northern Ireland’, no date (cover letter dated 12 February 1971). Original emphasis. A. Craig, Crisis of Confidence: Anglo-Irish Relations in the Early Troubles, 1966–1974 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2010), p. 97. Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, pp. 119–20. See, for example, Craig, Crisis of Confidence, pp. 85–119; Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, pp. 114–38. TNA, DEFE 23/108, Lewis (BGS(Int)DIS) to Blacker, 9 August 1971. TNA, CJ 4/57, Maudling, ‘Internment’, no date. Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), HA (Ministry of Home Affairs) 32/2/54, Stormont Castle, ‘Notes on internment’, 11 October 1971. M. O’Boyle, ‘Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom’, American Journal of International Law, 71:4 (October 1977), 674–5. Ireland v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (1978), Series A, No. 25, 18–20. TNA, CAB 163/173, Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Nicholson (Senior Military Representative, Joint Services interrogation Wing (JSIW)), ‘Report on Operation CALABA – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. While there is no explicit statement that the two detainees exposed to the ‘five techniques’ in October were taken to Ballykelly, this is implied in many documents. For example, see TNA, WO 296/66, no author, ‘Weights of detainees interrogated in Northern Ireland’, no date. TNA, CAB 163/173, ‘Standing Orders’, draft, 1971. TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in international security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971. TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. University of Westminster and King’s College London, Paddy Joe McClean, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. TNA, DEFE 25/283, D. R. J. Stephen (Assistant Under-Secretary (General Staff)) to Blacker, 28 March 1973. John McGuffin claims to have identified two of them. See: J. McGuffin, The Guineapigs (London: Penguin Books, 1974 and 1981), Afterword, accessed 19 December 2013, www.irishresistancebooks.com/guineapigs/afterword.htm.

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42 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 43 Ibid. 44 TNA, CAB 163/173, ‘Standing Orders’, draft, 1971. 45 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 46 Ibid.; TNA, DEFE 24/1215, P. F. G. Allardyce (GSOI DI (NI), unknown) to DS6, 26 August 1971. 47 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 48 TNA, DEFE 24/745, Lewis to Maguire, 1 December 1971. 49 Faul and Murray, The Hooded Men, p. 1. 50 TNA, CAB 163/173, ‘Interrogation methods – A brief description’, attached to Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971; TNA, CAB 163/173, ‘Standing Orders’, draft, 1971. 51 TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Secretary HOC, 1 December 1971; TG4, Francis McGuigan, unbroadcast interview conducted for ‘Éalu: An Cochall & An Cléireach’ (‘The Hood and the Collar’), broadcast 2012. 52 TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Secretary HOC, 1 December 1971. 53 TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (attached to document by PS/Minister of State for Defence), untitled table, no date (attached to document dated 25 October 1971). 54 BMInq, day 1, MOD033810, Bremner to Lewis, 28 October 1971. 55 Compton Report, pp. 15–16; The minutes of a meeting chaired by Permanent Under-Secretary of State Sir James Dunnett on 26 October 1971 agree that wallstanding was used for a maximum of six hours: TNA, DEFE 23/108, 28 October 1971. 56 TNA, CAB 163/173, ‘Standing Orders’, draft, 1971. On the concept of ‘minimum force’, see Thomas R. Mockaitis, ‘The minimum force debate: Contemporary sensibilities meet imperial practice’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 23:4–5 (2012), 762–80. 57 University of Westminster and King’s College London, James (Jim) Auld, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. 58 Compton Report, p. 16; TNA, CJ 3/119, Compton, ‘Northern Ireland, interrogation in depth: The cases of Michael Joseph Montgomery and Liam David Rodgers’, 15 November 1971; BMInq, day 1, MOD020432, Compton, ‘Northern Ireland: Further investigation into arrests under the Special Powers Act’, 14 November 1971. 59 TNA, CJ 4/118, Whitmore to N. E. A. Moore (Secretary, Compton Committee), 12 January 1972; Compton Report, p. 16. 60 TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (attached to document by Private Secretary, Minister of State for Defence), untitled table, no date (attached to document dated 25 October 1971). 61 Faul and Murray, The Hooded Men, p. 1.

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62 TNA, CAB 163/171, no author, ‘Note of a meeting held by PUS to discuss interrogation procedures at 15.50 on 26 October 1971’, 28 October 1971. 63 TG4, Kevin Hannaway, unbroadcast interview conducted for ‘Éalu: An Cochall & An Cléireach’ (‘The Hood and the Collar’), broadcast 2012. 64 TNA, DEFE 13/918, Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Larner to VCGS, 25 November 1971. 65 Ibid. 66 These comments were originally made by DDGAMS (unknown). TNA, DEFE 13/918, Arthur Hockaday (Assistant Under-Secretary (General Staff)) to Private Secretary, Permanent Under-Secretary, 29 November 1971. 67 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Maguire to Private Secretary, Minister of State, 22 October 1971. 68 Faul and Murray, The Hooded Men, p. 1. 69 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Maguire to Private Secretary, Minister of State, 22 October 1971. 70 TNA, WO 296/66, no author (cover letter by Major D. M. Thompson (SO/ BGS(Int)DIS), unknown), feeding charts, and visits and feeding charts, no date (cover letter dated 19 June 1974). 71 TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author, ‘Note of a meeting held by PUS to discuss interrogation procedures at 15.50 on 26 October 1971’, 28 October 1971. 72 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Maguire to Private Secretary, Minister of State, 22 October 1971. 73 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 74 TNA, CAB 163/173, ‘Interrogation methods – A brief description’, attached to Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 75 TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (attached to document by Private Secretary, Minister of State for Defence), untitled table, no date (attached to document dated 25 October 1971). 76 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Maguire to Private Secretary, Minister of State, 22 October 1971. 77 TNA, CAB 163/173, ‘Standing Orders’, draft, 1971. 78 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971; Interview, Northern Ireland, 8 August 2012; Interview, Northern Ireland, 9 August 2012. 79 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 80 Liam Rogers, statement taken by James Fitzpatrick (solicitor) in Faul and Murray, The Hooded Men, pp. 73–5; William Shannon, statement taken by Paschal J. O’Hare (solicitor) on 18 October 1971 in Faul and Murray, The Hooded Men, pp. 76–8. 81 K. Jeffery, ‘Intelligence and counter-insurgency operations: Some reflections on the British experience’, Intelligence and National Security, 2:1 (January 1987), 126. 82 TNA, CAB 130/444, ‘Security intelligence organisation in Northern Ireland: Memorandum by the Security Service’, 4 May 1970; BSInq, KD2, ‘David’

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84 85 86 87 88

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101

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(formerly Director of Intelligence, Northern Ireland), witness statement, 17 February 2000, p. 1. E. O’Halpin, ‘The British Joint Intelligence Committee and Ireland, 1965–1972’, Institute for International Integration Studies discussion paper 211 (March 2007), accessed 19 December 2013, www.tcd.ie/iiis/pages/publications/discpaperseries. php, p. 17. C. Tuck, ‘Northern Ireland and the British approach to counter-insurgency’, Defence and Security Analysis, 23:2 (2007), 173; G. Warner, ‘The Falls Road Curfew revisited’, Irish Studies Review, 14:3 (2006), 326–7. Jeffery, ‘Intelligence and counter-insurgency operations’, 132. TNA, CAB 185/4, ‘Northern Ireland’, confidential annex to JIC meeting minutes for 2 July 1970. TNA, PREM 15/475, Maudling to Edward Heath (Prime Minister), 26 February 1971. O’Halpin, ‘The British Joint Intelligence Committee and Ireland’, pp. 5–6. See also J. W. Young, ‘The Wilson government’s reform of intelligence coordination, 1967–68’, Intelligence and National Security, 16:2 (Summer 2001), 133–51. TNA, DEFE 23/109, no author (MoD), ‘Background Note’, no date (c. November 1971). Brian Stewart (JIC Secretary, 1968–72), Interview, 12 December 2013. TNA, CJ 4/97, Hockaday to Private Secretary, Secretary of State, 9 November 1971. Cobain, Cruel Britannia, p. 6. TNA, CAB 134/3011, Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland (Cabinet Office), Minutes for 10 March 1971. TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Maguire, 27 August 1971. TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author, ‘Summary of events leading up to interrogation of August 12 and the results of the subsequent interrogation operation: Note on interrogation in Northern Ireland’, no date. TNA, CAB 163/171, no author, ‘Summary of events leading up to interrogation of August 12 and the results of the subsequent interrogation operation: Note on interrogation in Northern Ireland’, no date. TNA, DEFE 70/214, Macdiarmid to Blacker, 11 October 1971. Parker Report (Minority Report), p. 12; TNA, CJ 4/583, J. T. Williams (Northern Ireland Office (NIO)) to Sir William Nield (NIO), 15 February 1973; Aitken Report, p. 11. TNA, CJ 4/2107, Roy Mason (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) to Dr Shirley Summerskill MP (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, HO), 21 or 24 April 1978. TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (cover letter by Hockaday), ‘Northern Ireland – Interrogation in Depth’, no date (cover letter dated 13 October 1971). TNA, DEFE 13/958, Peter Gregson (Private Secretary to the Prime Minister) to Graham Angel (HO), no date (recounts meeting on 18 November 1972 between Heath and Lord Parker).

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102 BMInq, day 1, MOD033809, Bremner to Lewis, 28 October 1971. 103 TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (cover letter by Hockaday), ‘Northern Ireland – Interrogation in Depth’, no date (cover letter dated 13 October 1971). Further evidence that the Director General briefed Allen can be found in TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Maguire, 27 August 1971. 104 TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Lewis to Maguire, 27 August 1971. Original emphasis. 105 TNA, CJ 4/583, Williams to Nield, 15 February 1973. 106 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971; Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, p. 124. 107 Hansard, Balniel, 9 December 1971, vol. 827, col. 1680. 108 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Whitmore to Private Secretary, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 17 November 1971. 109 TNA, DEFE 24/968, Blacker to Lord Balniel (Minister of State for Defence), 25 August 1971. 110 Ibid. 111 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Whitmore to Private Secretary, Permanent Under-Secretary (MoD), 17 November 1971. 112 Ibid. 113 TNA, DEFE 13/958, Gregson to Angel, no date (recounts meeting on 18 November 1972 between Heath and Lord Parker). 114 TNA, PREM 15/485, no author (Cabinet), ‘Note on interrogation’, no date (October 1971). 115 TNA, DEFE 23/111, no author (MoD), ‘The interrogation environment’, 1 December 1971. 116 TNA, DEFE 23/109, Bremner, ‘Interrogation in internal security situations since 1945’, 18 November 1971. 117 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Lewis to Blacker, 9 August 1971. 118 A. D. Biderman, ‘Communist attempts to elicit false confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War’, Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, 33:9 (September 1957), 616–25. 119 Ibid., 619. 120 S. O’Mara, ‘Torturing the brain: On the folk psychology and folk neurobiology motivating “enhanced and coercive interrogation techniques” ’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13:12 (2009), 497–500. 121 A. Edwards, ‘Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 21:2 (2010), 312. 122 C. Kennedy-Pipe and C. McInnes, ‘The British army in Northern Ireland 1969–1972: From policing to counter-terror’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 20:2 (1997), 3–4.

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The government’s response: Banning the ‘five techniques’

The use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland in August and October 1971 was met with a variety of responses and reactions. These are the subject of this and the following chapter. The present chapter focuses on the government’s responses to the use of the techniques and, more specifically, its responses to the criticisms the techniques were met with. Its starting point is the violent reaction to internment and to the revelation that the ‘five techniques’ had been used in Northern Ireland. The commissioning, conduct and report of the Compton Inquiry into allegations of mistreatment made by those arrested on the first day of internment, which included the ‘five techniques’, will be examined. To many, including those who made these allegations, this Inquiry was a disappointment. It was closely followed by the Parker Inquiry, which focused on interrogation. The resulting Parker Report was to feed into the government’s March 1972 decision to ban the ‘five techniques’ from all future use by British personnel. Parallel to the Parker Committee’s investigations, discussions involving the Ministry of Defence, Intelligence Co-ordinator and Secretary of the JIC took place. Their focus was whether each of the techniques should continue to be used. These processes resulted in a decision to ban all of the ‘five techniques’. This ban was encapsulated in a new interrogation Directive that replaced that signed into force by the JIC in 1965 and amended in response to the Bowen Report into arrests, interrogation and detention in Aden. By 2003, when the techniques were used in Iraq, this ban and the new Directive that contained it had been forgotten. The introduction of internment on 9 August 1971 was accompanied by allegations against the security forces. Complaints of mistreatment in connection with interrogation were made, as were allegations connected with the manner of arrest and treatment during transport to places of detention and whilst in detention. Liam Cummings and Elisha Anderson alleged they were hooded with empty sandbags on arrest, and Anderson also claimed he was dragged out of the house over broken glass.1 Michael Brady said he had been trailed through dirt and barbed wire at the Albert Street collection point where arrested persons were taken before being transported to Girdwood

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Park Regional Holding Centre (RHC) in Belfast.2 Brady also alleged he was hit on the foot and toes with a rifle butt whilst in transit, Cummings said he was beaten and urinated on in a jeep, and James Boyle claimed he was beaten in a jeep en route to the Magilligan RHC in County Derry. Complainants taken to Girdwood Park described what has become known as the ‘helicopter incident’, in which prisoners were forced to run over broken glass and rough stones to a helicopter: [sic] that they were menaced by police dogs, kicked into a helicopter and pushed or forced to jump out after 15 seconds or so in it; that in one case when the helicopter had taken off a complainant whose hands were bound was threatened with being thrown out above ground; and that they were forced to crawl back to the building … being kicked, struck and called abusive names.3

Other arrested men described how they were compelled to engage in ‘special exercises’ at Ballykinlar RHC in County Down. These consisted of a series of floor exercises which were physically taxing and of long duration. These exercises included sitting with arms stretched upwards for 10–15 minutes, sitting with the arms clasped behind the head, lying on the floor with legs stiffly pressed on the floor and fingers touching the wall, and bending forward in the kneeling position, with the hands clasped behind the back at waist level until the head touched the floor. If anyone refused or failed to carry out an exercise he was kicked, punched or struck with a baton.4

As well as surprise and disgust at these claims, members of the wider community in Northern Ireland and beyond expressed similar feelings towards the fact internment itself had been brought in. On 31 August the British government responded by commissioning the Compton Inquiry to investigate the truthfulness of allegations made by those arrested on 9 August. It is of course important to distinguish between substantiated and unsubstantiated claims, as there are incentives for terrorist suspects to exaggerate or fabricate accounts of mistreatment. Such incentives include the hope that their claims may aid the political fight for a united Ireland, or that it would justify to their communities having provided their interrogators with information. The press reported some of the allegations considered by the Compton Committee on 11 August.5 The allegations the Committee investigated continued to be reported on an almost daily basis until 20 August.6 Amongst claims made in the weeks after internment began were details of the use of the ‘five techniques’. A written account of their experiences was delivered to Cardinal Conway, archbishop of Armagh, who often spoke out against the violence of ‘the troubles’, after the detainees were moved out of Ballykelly.7 He told Heath of his concerns.8 When these allegations reached The Irish Times, the paper gave them considerable publicity.9

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The Sunday Times’ Insight Team reported on the techniques on 17 October, substantially increasing the publicity the techniques received.10 By voicing his hopes that they would be covered by the Compton Inquiry, Cardinal Conway contributed to their inclusion in the Inquiry’s remit.11 The ‘five techniques’ stand out from the other allegations of mistreatment made after internment was introduced because they were authorised methods designed to aid the collection of intelligence during interrogation. The Compton Inquiry into allegations of ‘physical brutality’ The shock that these allegations of controversial treatment provoked in Britain, Ireland and further afield prompted the British government to commission an inquiry to investigate the facts. The resulting Compton Inquiry disappointed almost everyone from the outset: its composition, remit, procedures and conclusions were criticised. The British government’s attitudes towards the allegations directed at the security forces can be seen in the details of the creation of this Inquiry and its reactions to its findings. The Irish government made a formal request for an investigation of allegations of ill-treatment when the Irish Ambassador, Donal O’Sullivan, met Sir Thomas Brimelow, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, in London on 25 August 1971.12 Sullivan told Brimelow that Ireland was considering taking action on possible breaches of the ECHR in Northern Ireland.13 The British government was taken aback by this. It had already decided to commission an inquiry into allegations of brutality.14 Although it thought the allegations justified setting up an inquiry, it ‘expressed the view that [Ireland] would be “backing a loser” if [they] thought the allegations … were well founded’.15 It appears that Heath’s government commissioned the inquiry in the hope that it would disprove some or all of the allegations. One of the earliest criticisms of the Compton Inquiry concerned its composition. Ireland had specified that to guarantee impartiality the inquiry should be international.16 Amnesty International requested that the British government permit an observer to attend the inquiry.17 Neither body was to get its wish. On 31 August the Home Office appointed Sir Edmund Compton as Chair.18 After more than thirty years in the Treasury, Sir Edmund had in 1967 been appointed Ombudsman for Great Britain, a post which he held simultaneously with the post of Ombudsman for Northern Ireland from 1969. Sir Edmund’s committee comprised Dr Ronald Gibson, who had been Chair of the British Medical Association since 1966, and Edgar Fay QC.19 The Irish government was critical of the choice of Sir Edmund as Chair, as the reports he had written as Ombudsman found no fault with the administration in Northern Ireland and saw no ‘culpable action in the organs of central government’ there.20 Sir Edmund used a press conference on 2 September to

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defend the Home Secretary’s decision to hold the inquiry in private, stating that the decision was made ‘on the ground that it was necessary to guard the safety and security of complainants and witnesses alike’.21 Details of the inquiry’s remit also attracted strong criticism. Its terms of reference were ‘[t]o investigate allegations by those arrested on 9th August under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 of physical brutality while in the custody of the security forces prior to either their subsequent release, the preferring of a criminal charge or their being lodged in a place specified in a detention order’.22 Cardinal Conway wrote to Sir Edmund to express his concern that the psychological effects of the ‘five techniques’ would not fall under the committee’s remit. He asked for reassurance that these effects would be investigated alongside the physical effects.23 The committee did no such thing, examining only physical brutality as dictated by their terms of reference. The use of the ‘five techniques’ on eleven of the twelve men arrested on 9 August was to be part of the Inquiry’s investigations. No reason has been given for neglecting to consider one of these detainees in this report. The Committee’s terms of reference were limited to allegations made by those arrested on 9 August, yet other allegations continued to be made. Violence persisted while the Committee carried out its work and was so severe in the two months after the introduction of internment that Belfastbased civil servants predicted that a breakdown of the Stormont government could occur in a matter of weeks.24 Sir Edmund and his committee were, however, asked to write separate reports into two further groups of allegations. An article published in The Sunday Times on 17 October recounted claims made by Patrick Shivers and William Shannon who were exposed to the ‘five techniques’, amongst others.25 The following day, Heath met the opposition leader and former Prime Minister Harold Wilson, at the latter’s request, to discuss these allegations.26 Wilson and James Callaghan, both of whom were to become Labour prime ministers in later years, told Heath they believed The Sunday’s Times allegations should be met with a dedicated committee of investigation. Downing Street agreed that the public must be reassured that these new allegations were being addressed, but argued that they fell under the remit of the Compton Committee.27 Maudling asked Sir Edmund to look separately at the allegations of Bernard McGeary, Anthony Rosato and Shannon reported in The Sunday Times.28 Sir Edmund was also asked to produce a second additional report, this time into allegations made by Liam Rogers and Michael Montgomery. These two men also experienced the ‘five techniques’, and by examining their allegations Sir Edmund covered those made by all fourteen detainees who spent time at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’.29 These additional reports received little media attention, and allegations continued to be published by the British and Irish press. It was unlikely

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that anything other than a new inquiry would have quietened the critics of the Compton Inquiry. This Inquiry might have provided a means through which the grievances of arrested persons, the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland and the Irish government could be addressed and progress made towards rebuilding good relations. But detainees refused to co-operate with the inquiry because it ‘would not be in public; would not have full judicial powers to summon witnesses and examine records; … people giving evidence would not be legally represented; and … there would be no cross-examination of witnesses’.30 One of the fourteen detainees taken to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ stated he did not co-operate because he believed the Inquiry was created to justify the security forces’ actions and that co-operation would not achieve anything.31 The Times reported on 2 September that the inquiry would be boycotted ‘by most, if not all, of the 240 men still in detention’.32 Their refusal to co-operate led to a half-hearted concession five days later. Complainants and ‘those complained of’ were to be allowed to have a legal representative when giving evidence. But these representatives could question only their own clients. The Irish government’s Department of Foreign Affairs reported that ‘[t]his modification did not, apparently, impress the detainees’, and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) declared that it still intended to organise a boycott.33 Each of those arrested on 9 August was given the opportunity ‘to come forward to … [the Compton Committee], if they wished to substantiate an allegation’.34 From the 115 men held in Crumlin Jail the Committee received a written statement ‘to the effect that they had complaints but would not make them to us’ and the same reply was given by seventy-seven detainees being held on HMS Maidstone.35 Only one of those arrested on 9 August ‘availed himself of the opportunity to substantiate his complaint by appearing before’ the Committee.36 Sir Edmund ‘admitted that the inquiry was bound to be less effective if boycotted, but insisted that it would not be frustrated’.37 It was instead forced to draw on allegations published in the press and transmitted to them from other sources, and on the evidence of officials ‘against whom the allegations were made’.38 The Committee visited the RHCs, Crumlin Road Jail and the Maidstone, and collected documentary evidence such as arrest files for each person admitted to an RHC and doctors’ reports.39 In total, the Compton Committee commented on allegations made by forty complainants in their Report of 16 November 1971.40 They concluded that the ‘five techniques’ constituted physical ill-treatment.41 It was found that the allegations considered in Sir Edmund’s two additional reports were unsubstantiated other than those pertaining to the ‘five techniques’.42 The Compton Report concluded that the physical experiences of the men forced to take part in the helicopter incident constituted ‘a measure of ill-treatment’ and that the

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special exercises at Ballykinlar ‘must have caused some hardship’ but were not ‘thought of and carried out with a view to hurting or degrading the men who had to do them’.43 On the individual cases put before the committee it was found that there had been a measure of ill-treatment in two, and hardship and ‘avoidable neglect in getting medical attention’ in a third.44 A headline that appeared in the Guardian accurately summarised these findings as ‘[s] ome ill-treatment – but no “brutality”’.45 Given the criticisms voiced about the composition, remit and collection of evidence it is not surprising that the Compton Inquiry’s conclusions were also criticised. A newspaper article stated that the main objections to the report were that ‘it defined “brutality” too narrowly, and … misjudged the degree of mental pressure implicit in interrogation’.46 Its definition of brutality as ‘an inhuman or savage form of cruelty, … that … implies a disposition to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in, the victim’s pain’ does appear narrow.47 George Cunningham, Labour MP for Islington South-West and one of the most vocal critics of the ‘five techniques’ amongst MPs in the early 1970s, described the construction of Sir Edmund’s definition as ‘semantic gymnastics’.48 Despite describing the ‘five techniques’ as physical ill-treatment the Inquiry neglected to define ill-treatment. Yet that the Inquiry did find there had been ill-treatment should not be overlooked: it did find fault with the way arrested men had been treated. As the Committee had seen only one complainant, it had a limited ability to make findings in instances where there was a conflict of evidence.49 Instead of merely reporting a conflict of evidence in every case, the committee went so far as to adopt conclusions in cases where there was internal inaccuracy in the complainant’s statement; where there was contemporary documentation; where they had collected information on the topography, accommodation and physical features of the places where the events complained of took place; and where there was oral evidence from doctors or medical officers.50 Their conclusions were therefore based on incomplete evidence. In addition, the MoD was concerned that the Chair had ‘incorrectly understood or incorrectly recorded evidence presented to him’.51 Heath was sorely disappointed by the Compton Report. He told the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend ‘[i]t seems to me to be one of the most unbalanced, ill-judged reports I have ever read’.52 On interrogation he said, ‘here they seem to have gone to endless lengths to show that anyone not given 3–star hotel facilities suffered hardship and ill-treatment. Again, no where [sic] is this set in the context of war against the I.R.A.’53 What Heath objected to most of all was that the committee had put ‘unfounded’ allegations on a par with ‘tested evidence’ from the RUC and the Army. This supports the contention that the government hoped the Inquiry would dispel the allegations of physical brutality made by those arrested on the first day of internment.

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Of the criticisms that met the Compton Report, Heath’s private comments were some of the strongest. The faults perceived in the inquiry’s composition, remit and methods gave rise to ‘the widespread view that the whole exercise … [was] a “whitewashing” operation intended to clear the security forces’.54 When presenting the report to the House of Commons and in the subsequent debates of 16 and 17 November 1971, Maudling cast it in a rather different light. He said the Compton Report was ‘a genuine operation designed to ascertain and make clear the facts’.55 Maudling, like Heath, believed that the allegations should be placed in the context of the much wider scale of the arrests.56 During the House of Commons debates that followed publication of the Report, the issue of balancing the collection of intelligence designed to save lives through controversial interrogation techniques against the rights of those being interrogated arose. Callaghan argued that an ‘important and fundamental question’ was ‘how far … a democratic assembly [is] entitled to sanction the ill-treatment of those committed to the custody of soldiers or police in order to save the lives of others’.57 In reply, Maudling stated that ‘[t]orture is not acceptable, but merely asking people if they would be good enough to help in the investigation is equally not acceptable’.58 In other words, in dealing with ‘the troubles’ the British government, in the belief that controversial interrogation techniques produced intelligence, was faced with the challenge of finding a balance between respect for the human rights of prisoners and the need to collect intelligence. This remains a question that policy-makers grapple with today, and one that the media and scholarly research continue to show an interest in. To calm claims that the Compton Inquiry was inadequate because it did not address whether the ‘five techniques’ complied with written guidance on interrogation and whether this guidance was appropriate for the 1970s, the day the Compton Report was published Maudling announced there was to be a follow-up inquiry.59 Headed by the Privy Counsellor Lord Parker of Waddington, the new inquiry would look into the interrogation Directive that applied in Northern Ireland. Where to draw the line, in Maudling’s words, between torturing for information and politely asking for information was to be the subject of the Parker Inquiry.60 Had this announcement been made before the Compton Committee finished its deliberations, it would have undermined what confidence there still was in its work. The Parker Inquiry into interrogation procedures While the Compton Inquiry was an immediate response to allegations of mistreatment looking backwards to ascertain what had happened, the Parker Inquiry looked forwards as part of a wider examination of what British

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interrogation methods might be used in internal security operations in the future. The government’s reasons for commissioning this new inquiry and the way the terms of reference were designed give an insight into its thinking on the ‘five techniques’ and on the public’s reaction to their use. In turn, the Parker Committee’s findings fed into the government’s own debates about the future of the ‘five techniques’ and the decision it reached on this question in February 1972. The government considered the course of action it might take after the Compton Committee’s report had been published before the fact.61 It rightly assumed that the Compton Report would find there had been ill-treatment in respect of the ‘five techniques’, and recommended that an independent review be carried out into interrogation procedures.62 On 3 November Trend noted that no firm decision should be made on whether to commission such an inquiry until the final text of the Compton Report was available.63 Maudling chose the day that the Report was published to inform the House of Commons that the Parker Inquiry was being set up. This choice of date was designed to allay criticisms of the Compton Inquiry’s limited remit and findings. Maudling explained the rationale for the creation of the follow-up inquiry in the following terms: The principles applied in the interrogation of suspects in Northern Ireland and the methods employed are the same as those which have been used in other struggles against armed terrorists in which Britain has been involved in recent years. Her Majesty’s Government consider, however, that it would be right now to review them.64

The similarity between the task given to this committee and to Roderic Bowen QC in 1966 is striking. In both instances allegations of ill-treatment and associated publicity led to inquiries into whether changes to interrogation practices should be made. Lord Parker of Waddington, a retired lord chief justice, was to act as Chair. Lord Gardiner, who later chaired the committee behind the 1975 report into the balance between preserving civil liberties and tackling terrorism and subversion in Northern Ireland, and active back-bencher John Boyd-Carpenter, completed the committee.65 They were considered ideal for this task because as Privy Councillors they had taken an oath to protect any information put before them.66 Their terms of reference were to consider ‘whether, and if so in what respects, the procedures currently authorised for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism and for their custody while subject to interrogation require amendment’.67 The Inquiry accepted written submissions from members of the public and representative organisations.68 The MoD submitted written materials that included the histories of the ‘five techniques’ examined in earlier chapters, as

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well as its view on whether the techniques should be retained for future use, which will be explored below. In addition, it heard thirty-three witnesses, many of whom belonged to representative organisations, the civil service and the military.69 The Parker Committee was unable to reach a unanimous agreement as to its conclusions. Instead, Lord Parker and Boyd-Carpenter published a majority report and Lord Gardiner a minority report, collectively known as the ‘Parker Report’. The Report was delivered on 31 January 1972, published on 2 March, and made recommendations about the rules governing interrogation. Both parts of the Report focused on the ‘five techniques’, as the committee’s terms of reference were to look at ‘authorised’ techniques, ruling out the more improvised type of controversial treatment that was sometimes used in conjunction with interrogation in Northern Ireland. The majority and minority reports differed in their conclusions on morality and legality. The majority report’s conclusion on the morality of the ‘five techniques’ was accurately paraphrased in the record of a Cabinet meeting held on 9 February 1972 to discuss the Parker Report. It read, ‘subject to safeguards, there was no reason to rule out on moral grounds the techniques which the Committee had been asked to examine and that it was possible to operate them in a manner consistent with the highest standards of our society’.70 For Lord Parker and Boyd-Carpenter the morality of the ‘five techniques’ hinged on the intensity of their application and safeguards against excessive use. On risks to physical and mental health, the Committee had ‘heard evidence concerning army personnel who had been subjected to these techniques in order to train them in resistance’.71 This encouraged Lord Parker and Boyd-Carpenter to conclude that the ‘five techniques’ could be used without real risk of injury to detainees and that the techniques could conform with JIC(65)15, the Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas amended in 1967. It is likely that they were also persuaded by the MoD’s claims – examined in the following chapter – that the ‘five techniques’ helped elicit intelligence in Northern Ireland that was used to save lives. Reference to training members of the Armed Forces to resist interrogation led a Cabinet committee and MoD personnel to discuss the future of this training. Air Marshal Sir Harold Maguire, DGI, thought it relevant that their use ‘has on several occasions been checked by Service psychiatric consultants to make sure that no participant would suffer any damage’.72 The argument that no harm was suffered may be questioned given that the techniques are designed to achieve a feeling of isolation. Amnesty International raised objections to this training in 1974 on the basis that it indirectly taught the Armed Forces how to torture.73 As will be seen in Chapter 6, exposing personnel to banned techniques without making it clear they are not to be used runs a risk of inadvertently encouraging them to use these methods themselves.

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There is an important difference between using the techniques in interrogation resistance training and in an interrogation operation. Those exposed to the techniques as part of a training course are there voluntarily, though there can be career repercussions for someone who does not complete the course. The Treasury Solicitor confirmed that using the techniques in interrogation resistance training was not unlawful provided it was voluntary and the participant could drop out at any time.74 A Cabinet committee decided that for the benefit of security the training would have to continue, and continue to use methods unlawful in the UK.75 Lord Gardiner disagreed with the other members of the Committee on whether ‘it is feasible in practice to devise safeguards’ for the use of the ‘five techniques’.76 He argued that it was impracticable to attempt to fix limits to techniques which were unlawful and not morally justifiable.77 This conclusion was based on the belief that the techniques were likely to result in minor physical injuries and lasting mental distress, and that the initial benefit of saving lives by gaining intelligence was outweighed by damage to relations between the forces of law and order and the people of Northern Ireland, and the damage done to the reputation of the United Kingdom. Further, Lord Gardiner was not convinced that the intelligence the ‘five techniques’ helped produce was unobtainable any other way.78 The majority and minority reports adopted different stances on the legality of the ‘five techniques’. The majority report made no judgement on this matter because the applicability of international law was the subject of Ireland vs UK, which was in progress.79 Lord Gardiner mentioned the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment contained in the ECHR, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. But he did not express an opinion on whether the techniques violated these prohibitions, not only because it was difficult to determine whether these Conventions applied to Northern Ireland, but also because of the difficulty in defining torture and other key terms, and because Ireland vs UK rendered the matter sub judice.80 He did, however, conclude that the techniques were illegal under the laws of Aden, England and Northern Ireland, and argued that it appeared that by using these techniques the UK was not complying with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.81 Lord Gardiner ended his minority report with this comment on responsibility: The blame for this sorry story, if blame there be, must lie with those who, many years ago, decided that in emergency conditions in Colonial-type situations we should abandon our legal, well-tried and highly successful wartime interrogation methods and replace them by procedures which were secret, illegal, not morally justifiable and alien to the traditions of what I believe still to be the greatest democracy in the world.82

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The Second World War interrogation methods Lord Gardiner refers to appear to be those mentioned earlier in the report, which comprise treating prisoners kindly, and using microphones and stool-pigeons – ‘agents or traitors’ placed among the prisoners.83 Although the minority and majority reports acknowledge that the wartime context differs from that seen in Northern Ireland, they accept too readily the supposition that techniques that were successful in the Second World War could have been successful in Northern Ireland. Not only are there differences in the rules provided by governments and legal statutes but it has been argued that there are much stronger incentives for collaborating with one’s interrogators in wartime, including the offer of ‘a comfortable new life’ in exchange for co-operation, or execution in exchange for intransigence.84 In his closing statement Lord Gardiner attributed minimal responsibility for the ‘five techniques’ to the incumbent administration or its predecessors. The government had concerns about publishing the Parker Report. Even before the terms of reference had been set and the Committee appointed it was feared that publishing details of intelligence-gathering practices risked reducing their effectiveness by aiding future suspects’ ability to train in resistance techniques and by damaging the psychological advantage that interrogators possess when subjects do not know what to expect.85 Yet at a Cabinet meeting of 9 February 1972 it was decided that the report would be published.86 The reasons why were not recorded. When considering whether to accept the majority or the minority report the government had to formulate and refine its views on the legality of the ‘five techniques’ and whether they would be retained for further use in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. The content of the Parker Report fed into this decision. Extensive debates involving the Intelligence Co-ordinator, JIC Secretary and MoD took place alongside the Parker Committee’s investigations. The Intelligence Co-ordinator, Sir Dick White, was the main point of contact between the government and the Parker Committee.87 These debates, like the Parker Report’s conclusions, influenced the government’s eventual decision about whether the ‘five techniques’ would be used in future. As a result, it is right to explore the views expressed in these debates before turning to the government’s response to the Parker Report and its decision on the ‘five techniques’. Intra-governmental debates Though the Parker Inquiry was designed to inform decisions on whether the ‘five techniques’ would be used in future, considerable thought was given to this issue by senior members of the MoD, the Intelligence Co-ordinator and JIC Secretary before the Inquiry reported. This attention was prompted

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by the negative reaction to the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland and a need to agree on how to present these techniques to the Parker Committee in a way that would encourage it to recommend they could continue to be used. The opinions found in this intra-governmental debate about the utility and future use of the techniques are heavily influenced by the participants’ wish  to retain the techniques for future use despite the public backlash against their use in Northern Ireland. This perceived need to retain the techniques was based on the belief that they were valuable aids to intelligence-gathering. As will be seen, the MoD, Intelligence Co-ordinator and JIC Secretary were already drawing conclusions before the Parker Committee presented its findings. Building on the previous chapter’s examination of the principles underlying the ‘five techniques’, the discussions examined here reveal its participants’ views on how the techniques might lead to the collection of intelligence and enhance security at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’. The earliest insight into the MoD’s views on the effects and purposes of the ‘five techniques’ is a note of a meeting chaired by Sir James Dunnett in October 1971.88 This meeting was held to discuss what evidence on interrogation procedures would be given to the Compton Committee. During discussion those attending, who included the Intelligence Co-ordinator and the DGI, raised a number of points about how each of the ‘five techniques’ was used at the Ballykelly interrogation centre. They commented that the most important time to use hooding was before the first interrogation, ‘to maintain total isolation so that … [the detainee] would not know where he was or indeed in whose hands’. But the primary reason for hooding, it was stated, was to prevent the detainee’s identification by other prisoners, and, significantly, for this reason most detainees voluntarily kept their hoods on when in their cells. If the security forces carried out an operation that was successful, this could suggest to the IRA that intelligence had recently been gained. If it was known that a particular member of the IRA possessing intelligence who could have facilitated that operation had recently been interrogated, other members of the organisation might suspect that the individual had co-operated with their interrogators, thus endangering their own safety. By claiming that detainees voluntarily kept their hoods on when in their cells, the MoD is suggesting that detainees were keen to protect their identity from other detainees who might, the detainee could reasonably suppose, be able to see into their cell when being moved around the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’. It is important to note that this statement about detainees being in favour of hooding may have been influenced by the speaker’s pre-existing desire to retain the techniques for future use. While it was therefore claimed that security was the main reason for hooding, the disorientating effect was a result to be exploited and was enhanced by the

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restriction on any staff other than interrogators and medical personnel from speaking to the detainees.89 Security was also noted to be an advantage of using white noise. The noise prevents the detainees from knowing where they are by eliminating extraneous sounds they may recognise, prevents them from communicating with other detainees and protects them from recognition by voice.90 Colonel Nicholson added in respect of white noise that ‘the sensory deprivation aspect was … a spin-off which helped … [the breaking down] process’.91 Already, security and aiding interrogation emerge as reasons these policy-makers supported hooding and white noise. It is also possible that deterrence of further IRA activity and punishment of IRA suspects were motivations behind the ‘five techniques’. While no evidence has been found that these motivations existed among policy-makers, punishment could have been in the minds of those employing the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland as it was in Iraq thirty-two years later. On 23 November 1971 Dunnett held another meeting, this time to discuss preparation of the written histories of the ‘five techniques’ for the Parker Inquiry. The question of ‘how far the five techniques described by the Compton Committee were in fact essential parts of the interrogation process’ was raised, and after considerable discussion it was agreed that the deprivation of sleep during the interrogation process itself, and the hard rations were all part of the interrogation process as such. It was suggested that the other techniques viz hooding, wall standing, and noise, were essentially security measures although they did undoubtedly have the advantages that their use brought the prisoner under control and increased his sense of isolation.92

Limited sleep and limited diet were thus separated from the other three techniques by their primary intended effect. They could not be described as ways to achieve security. The argument that the remaining three techniques could be explained as methods of improving security was to recur in these intragovernmental debates about future use of the ‘five techniques’. Those attending the November meeting addressed intentionality in the context of deciding how to present wall-standing, hooding and white noise to the Parker Committee. ‘The point at issue’, the record of the meeting reads, ‘was whether we should go as far as to say that these essentially security techniques were also used to some extent with the aim of bringing prisoners under control and increasing their isolation; or rather took the line that they were used essentially for security reasons but as a by-product had this effect’.93 If the Parker Committee asked, it was to be told that such intensive use of these three techniques at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ resulted from the inadequacy of its facilities for the interrogation of up to twelve people at once.94

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There were not as many individual cells as was desirable.95 Wall-standing, for instance, ensures that when detainees are held in the holding room rather than an individual cell, ‘hands are visible to the guard and thus incapable of offensive action’.96 This explanation of the relationship between the ‘five techniques’ and the interrogation process was judged by the MoD to be the best chance of being permitted to continue to use techniques it considered to be successful. There is a difference between the planning for the use of the ‘five techniques’ detailed in the previous chapter, which showed the motivation to be the collection of intelligence, and these retrospective explanations for the use of the techniques that emphasise security instead. The explanation for this difference lies in the desire of those involved in these retrospective discussions to maximise their chances of persuading the Parker Committee and the rest of government to allow British forces to continue to have the ‘five techniques’ in their repertoire. In January 1972 the MoD remained convinced that the ‘five techniques’ should be retained as tools for future interrogation operations, and told the Parker Committee this.97 By this time Ireland vs UK, which included the allegations that the ‘five techniques’ breached the ECHR, was under way yet the MoD’s support for these methods continued unaffected. It did, however, consider limits for each of the techniques, something the Intelligence Co-ordinator avoided when redrafting the report on prisoner handling in Interrogation Centres in Northern Ireland that he was asked to write in October 1971. It had already been suggested that future limits on the techniques should not be set by ministers.98 The MoD argued that, with adequate planning, hooding and wall-standing should be required only for two hours at a time, but there might be circumstances in which longer durations were required. It was difficult to set a time limit on white noise because it might be required all the time for security. The level of noise was checked by the Medical Officer, and staff who were also subject to it were instructed to complain if it was too loud.99 The MoD told the Parker Committee it saw no reason to change current practice on the amount of sleep. A co-operative and non-violent subject could be left alone in his cell when not being questioned and could sleep then: ‘He is roused only when he is required for interrogation, and there is no question of systematically depriving him of sleep’.100 The MoD’s Northern Ireland Policy Group wanted this sentence to be looked at again, as it seemed in fact that at the Ballykelly interrogation centre ‘deprivation of sleep had been used as part of the softening-up process’.101 The MoD paper proposed no change in diet, claiming there was no evidence that being kept on a sparse diet for a short time causes harm.102 Sir Dick White and the Secretary of the JIC covered similar ground as the Ministry of Defence but with different emphases. Documents attributed to

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White and drafted by the JIC Secretary show their support for the techniques. These documents combined with the histories of the techniques authored by Bremner and Nicholson’s report on Operation Calaba comprise the available indications of the intelligence world’s attitude towards the future use of the ‘five techniques’ in the early 1970s. On 18 October 1971, before the Parker Committee became a fully formed idea and once it was known what the Compton Committee’s conclusions were likely to be, a Northern Ireland Ministerial Committee requested that White, in consultation with officials from the Home Office, MoD and the intelligence services, ‘make an immediate assessment of methods of interrogation suitable for use in Northern Ireland’.103 In parallel, the Inspector of the Intelligence Corps and Commandant of the Intelligence Centre, Brigadier Bremner, produced his own report after being invited to do so. While his support for the ‘five techniques’ on the basis that they could produce intelligence has already been identified here, in this report Bremner added that information ‘extracted under duress’ is not reliable.104 Interestingly, this suggests he believed the ‘five techniques’ did not constitute duress. Amongst White’s recommendations was that the handling of detainees and their interrogation in Northern Ireland continue to be governed by the general principles laid down in the 1965 Directive; that handling and interrogation techniques be subject at all times to ‘medical scrutiny and advice’; and that records should continue to be maintained throughout a detainee’s stay at the centre noting ‘the exact times during which he has been hooded or been ordered to wall-stand or been subjected to “white sound”’. The report also recommended there be immediate investigation into the possibilities of securing improvements in the facilities, layout and construction of the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ in order that the need for hooding, wall-standing and white noise be reduced. As already seen, those attending one of Dunnett’s meetings agreed that the Parker Committee could be told the ‘five techniques’ were used to mitigate inadequacies in the facilities at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’. Additional support for this link between facilities and the techniques is provided by the point made at a Northern Ireland Policy Group meeting that if interrogation was to be carried out in Northern Ireland without the techniques it would be necessary to improve the buildings available.105 White did not want hooding, wall-standing or white noise to be presented to the committee as ‘an essential part of the softening up process’ because ‘the use of the three techniques for this primary purpose does lay us open to possible charges of physical assault’.106 One of the few differences between three versions of his report available is that the most recent is the only one to acknowledge the techniques’ softening up effect, stating that ‘the three special techniques … should be employed for the purposes of control, discipline and security. Inevitably these methods would have some effect on the detainee’s

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will to resist; they should not be used for this purpose.’107 It must be acknowledged that there can be more than one intention behind an action. What is difficult to ascertain is which reason predominated, and how to distinguish between intentional outcomes and those that were foreseen but unintended. White took the view that the use of the techniques at the Ballykelly interrogation centre could best be defended by explaining their security and safety benefits.108 As of 13 December his report had ‘neither been agreed nor discussed in detail’ because it had been overtaken by the appointment of the Parker Committee.109 The report’s specific recommendations on the purposes for which each of the three techniques could be used are as follows: hooding should be permitted during transport to protect the secrecy of the interrogation centre’s location; hooding can be used ‘to protect the identities of those selected for protracted interrogation’; compulsory wall-standing should be permitted in the holding area ‘to protect guards and interrogators from sudden violent demonstrations’; and white sound should be used to ‘prevent inter-communication between detainees and to prevent detainees overhearing the interrogation of their associates or any other activity in the centre’.110 He acknowledged that, if adopted, these recommendations would weaken the softening up process.111 He went on to argue that, even if the Parker Committee decided to limit these techniques ‘to the security and safety context’, they would still soften up subjects as a unintentional by-product.112 White expected the Parker Committee to support the techniques. Although the JIC was never consulted on whether the ‘five techniques’ should be used in future after the techniques gained media attention in the autumn of 1971, its secretary produced his own report on hooding, wallstanding and white noise. Here, the JIC Secretary argued that these techniques should be permitted but only for security purposes. He wrote that while all the defensive attributes of wall-standing, hooding and white noise could be provided for ‘at considerable expense in manpower and money for specially constructed buildings in the longer term’ they provide ‘when urgency is paramount, an essential ingredient in the process’ of interrogation. Therefore, he argued, these three techniques should be retained for use in an ‘urgent operational situation’ but in more strictly defined limits and with full records so it could be shown, if challenged, that they were used defensively.113 Like White and the MoD, the JIC Secretary argued that improvements in interrogation facilities would reduce the need for these three techniques. There is a consensus among these military and civilian discussants that hooding, wall-standing and white noise should be used primarily for their effects upon the security of the guards, the detainees and the location of the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’. They were to be retained because they could not be replaced, in the short term, with better facilities, but also, significantly,

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because of the impact they would have upon interrogation. That their impact on interrogation was to no longer be an intentional purpose behind the ‘five techniques’ is a significant change in official thought brought about as a result of the backlash against the use of the techniques in Northern Ireland. These intra-governmental debates on the techniques drew heavily upon the distinction between intended effects and foreseen but unintended ones. What must be remembered, though, is that what policy says the intention is does not necessarily match the intentions of the people using the techniques, and that the detainee may misunderstand the intention behind their treatment. It is clear that the impetus for the ban of the ‘five techniques’ did not come from the Ministry of Defence, the Inspector of the Intelligence Corps and Commandant of the Intelligence Centre, the Intelligence Co-ordinator or JIC Secretary. By mid-February 1972 the Parker Report had been made available to government, and the Cabinet had expressed the intention that the ‘five techniques’ would not be used in any foreseeable operation and ‘certainly not’ in Northern Ireland. Thoughts instead turned to how best to conduct interrogation without them.114 A new interrogation directive The Prime Minister Edward Heath announced in the House of Commons that the ‘five techniques’ were to be banned. This took place on 2 March 1972, the same day that the Parker Report was published. The ban and a replacement for the 1965 Directive on interrogation in internal security operations were two of the principal outcomes of the attention that was given to the ‘five techniques’ after it became public knowledge that they had been used in Northern Ireland. The origins and form of the ban and replacement Directive, as well as their scope and impact, are the foci of the rest of the chapter. As early as 9 February 1972 Lord Gardiner’s argument that the ‘five techniques’ were illegal was pushing the government towards banning the techniques. At a meeting between the Treasury Solicitor, the Legal Adviser to the Home Office and the Attorney General, for example, it was accepted that the methods ‘were and are illegal’.115 The government had to decide whether to accept the Majority or Minority Parker Report in advance of its publication. The Ministry of Defence felt that, as Ministers had previously said that the techniques were justified in the Northern Ireland context because of the results they achieved, it would be most appropriate to accept the Majority Report.116 They remained eager to retain the techniques for future use.117 At a meeting attended by the Prime Minister, Home Secretary, Defence Secretary and others, it was acknowledged that, if they accepted the techniques were illegal, this would have implications for whether they could use them again.118

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It was not until the end of February that a decision was reached. By 24 February the decision had been made to ban the techniques, but the government was still planning to accept the majority report.119 In the end, the Minority Report was adopted. A biography of Lord Gardiner describes the government’s acceptance of his report as ‘a remarkable tribute to his legal and moral authority’.120 Ministers accepted that the ‘five techniques’ could not realistically be legalised by passing a law through Parliament.121 On 1 March, with Heath’s agreement, an instruction was sent from the Chief of the General Staff to the GOC(NI) informing the latter that the ‘five techniques’ ‘will not be used again as an aid to interrogation’. Wall-standing, almost certainly when used in a form that was not a stress position, was to be permitted for short periods when the Army was searching civilians, and on no account would hoods be used on people in Army custody.122 The ban was disseminated widely. Dennis Trevelyan of the Home Office wrote that ‘it was agreed by JIC that similar instructions should be issued inside MI5, MI6, and through Foreign Office channels to any colonies or dependencies where the army or the local police might of their own initiative employ them (though it is hardly likely that anyone now would)’.123 The decision was also taken not to accept the Majority Report’s recommendation that interrogation always be carried out by service personnel.124 Some years earlier, the Bowen Report into interrogation procedures in Aden had recommended that interrogators be civilian.125 The Bowen and Parker Reports’ recommendations were therefore at odds with one another, but the rejection of the latter’s suggestion meant the UK government adopted a position closer to Bowen’s 1967 recommendation. Heath announced in the House of Commons on 2 March 1972 that the ‘five techniques’ were being banned. After summarising the Parker Report, Heath said: ‘The Government, having reviewed the whole matter with great care and with particular reference to any future operations, have decided that the techniques which the [Parker] Committee examined will not be used in future as an aid to interrogation’.126 Disagreement over the scope of the ban of the ‘five techniques’ remains. Some confusion was caused by Heath’s statement that the ‘five techniques’ were banned but that interrogation-in-depth would continue, as the latter term had become synonymous with the ‘five techniques’ in the public mind since the Compton Report was published.127 Yet the term ‘interrogation-in-depth’ was used by government to refer to secondary or detailed interrogation for intelligence, which was certainly to continue. Despite banning the techniques Heath attempted to justify their use in Northern Ireland by repeating the Parker Report’s assertion that they had provided information that helped protect innocent civilians.128 The Foreign

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Secretary’s telegram relaying the ban to HMG’s representatives in over thirty countries also exposes a belief that they had been right to use them in Northern Ireland. The telegram continued, ‘nevertheless, in the British way, HMG have thought it right to err on the side of caution and not to permit the [five] techniques to be used in future as an aid to interrogation’.129 The Minority Report’s findings that the techniques were illegal according to the laws of Northern Ireland and Aden played a role in the decision to ban them. It is difficult to judge whether different findings would have led to a different outcome. While the Ministry of Defence, Intelligence Co-ordinator and JIC Secretary remained convinced of the need for the techniques, it is likely that other parts of government had other priorities. The day the techniques were banned a message was passed from Heath to Jack Lynch, who as Taoiseach was Head of the Irish government, via the British Ambassador in Dublin.130 The Taoiseach was reminded that the Majority Report noted that the ‘five techniques’ helped obtain information from the fourteen detainees that directly and indirectly led to innocent lives being saved, and that ‘the lives saved were Irish’.131 It is possible that a hope that it would persuade the Irish government to drop its case before the European Commission of Human Rights was a factor in the decision to ban the techniques. Even though guidance is difficult to draw up because ‘the distinction between what treatment was lawful and what constituted an assault depend[s] so much on the attendant circumstances’, Ministers agreed that consideration ought to be given to replacing the current guidance on interrogation.132 A new Directive for interrogation in internal security operations approved in June 1972 replaced JIC(65)15 and its 1967 amendment, and included the ban on the ‘five techniques’. The replacement of the previous Directive was, like the formation of the Compton Inquiry and discussions about the future of the ‘five techniques’, driven by public and media protest at the experiences of the fourteen detainees interrogated at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’. A note of a meeting held on 18 November, two days after Sir Edmund reported and the Parker Inquiry was announced, discloses that ‘[i]n the light of the investigations of the Compton Committee, some revised rules about interrogation procedures had been drawn up’.133 How closely these rules resembled the final Directive is unknown, but the point remains that before Lord Parker’s team had begun investigating the question there was a belief in Whitehall that it was best to introduce a new version. That new version was to be much more detailed than the last. JIC(72)21, the ‘Directive on Interrogation by the Armed Forces in Internal Security Operations’, was divided into two parts. Part I was approved by the JIC subject to certain amendments on 11 May 1972, while Part II was the responsibility of the MoD.134 The Directive was adopted on 29 June 1972, replacing the 1965 version and its amendment. One of the two significant

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differences between the new and the old is that the 1972 Directive explicitly prohibits each of the ‘five techniques’. It states:

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Techniques such as the following are prohibited – a any form of blindfold or hood; b the forcing of a subject to stand or to adopt any position of stress for long periods to induce physical exhaustion; c the use of noise producing equipment; d deliberate deprivation of sleep; e the use of a restricted diet to weaken a subject’s resistance.135

The 1965 Directive had not specifically authorised the techniques but read ‘[t]o obtain successful results from interrogation, the actual and instinctive resistance of the person concerned to interrogation must be overcome by permissible techniques’.136 Although the ban of the ‘five techniques’ had already been announced, its inclusion in this Directive reinforced it. The second major difference between the 1965 and 1972 Directives is the latter’s division into more than one document. Part I of JIC(72)21 states that in dealing with detainees Service personnel must comply with the requirements of international law and the country’s domestic law, likely as a consequence of the Republic of Ireland’s action against the UK at the European Commission of Human Rights and mistreatment cases before the courts in Northern Ireland. The ban was also contained in Part I of the Directive, as were details of medical safeguards for detainees, along with principles for the command and control of the interrogation system and Interrogation Centre. In a new initiative, the more security-sensitive matters, principally details of the object of interrogation, the principles underpinning successful interrogation, and administrative requirements such as the keeping of records, were to be issued as a separate Instruction. Written by the MoD, this was Part II of JIC(72)21. Public scrutiny of the government’s interrogation methods had opened its eyes to the possibility that they might be forced to make the new interrogation Directive public at some point. It was thus divided into two Parts. Not only this but Part I was written in a way that it would not raise suspicion that another Part existed. In the event, this forethought paid off, as paragraphs from Part I alone were disclosed to the European Commission of Human Rights. Although the Commission sat in camera so this disclosure did not constitute publication, it was possible that after providing the Commission with the document it might be leaked. Paragraphs seven to nine of Part I were given to the European Commission. Notably, the ban on the ‘five techniques’ fell amongst these paragraphs. The decision to release this extract came only after opinions were sought from across government. Its disclosure was designed to persuade the Commission there was no administrative practice or official tolerance of torture, inhu-

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man or degrading treatment or punishment, and thus to get this allegation dismissed. As a JIC document, its release required Cabinet approval.137 Peter Rawlinson, the UK’s Attorney General, argued that paragraphs five to nine provided ‘substantial evidence of practical steps taken by the United Kingdom administration to prevent ill-treatment, which would rebut the allegation of official toleration’, and that paragraphs seven to nine were more specific than any other instruction issued to the security forces.138 J. F. Halliday of the Home Office reported there was no objection to releasing the paragraphs from the intelligence point of view.139 The Foreign and Defence Secretaries supported the proposal to release these paragraphs.140 The argument that releasing the Directive to the Commission would ‘substantiate the argument that, once H.M.G. knew what was going on, every possible step was taken to stop it and prevent it recurring’141 triumphed, and paragraphs seven to nine of JIC(72)21 were released to the Commission and the Irish delegation to the Commission in March 1973.142 These paragraphs addressed the treatment of prisoners, banned the ‘five techniques’ and coercion during interrogation, provided for medical safeguards and required the maintenance of comprehensive records of each subject’s progress from admittance to departure from the interrogation centre. Part II of the new Directive stated that a theatre-specific Instruction should be prepared for each interrogation operation. This emerged out of the MoD’s concerns that because of the differences between individual interrogation operations, which included the quantity and quality of information already known about the detainees, their level of political commitment, suitability of buildings in use and number of guards available, they did not want ‘precise and invariable limits’ put on interrogation techniques. They noted that ‘care must be taken not … to make … [the interrogation procedures] so rigid that the officer in charge of the operation has little or no discretion to vary them according to the immediate needs of the situation’.143 For each operation to which the Directive applied, commanding officers would receive a list of what was permitted for that individual case in an instruction.144 A draft of Part II added that this instruction would be prepared by the MoD and submitted for approval by ministers.145 The Instruction specific to Northern Ireland, which bears the same date as the 1972 Directive, states the aim of interrogation and clarifies the division of responsibilities between the RUC and the Army.146 As a whole, the 1972 interrogation Directive was much more specific than the version it replaced, instituting more safeguards for detainees, and therefore personnel, and providing for increased effectiveness in interrogation operations by clarifying roles and procedures. The Directive and its accompanying theatre-specific instruction were disseminated to the Army and to the RUC.147 The RUC were to operate under the Directive when questioning detainees for intelligence purposes.148 The Home Secretary and

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Foreign Secretary confirmed that the Security Service, SIS ‘and officers in the dependent territories will in future act in accordance with it’.149 In addition, the Cabinet Office confirmed that the Security Service would ‘pay full regard to the terms of the Directive insofar as interrogations are conducted by them or on their behalf – which is not likely to happen very often’.150 A few months after the new Directive came into force, it was reported that the RUC were finding it very restrictive. The BGS(Int) reported that ‘[i]t seems to be having the effect of making RUC staff at … [Police Offices] too nervous to do anything. Nevertheless, Interrogation Reports do show that some subjects talk, but not the important ones.’151 More will be said about the intelligence gained from interrogation using the ‘five techniques’ and during the remaining years of internment in the following chapter. The Directive was also applied in Oman, where, in support of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, British personnel were involved in the interrogation of subversives.152 In accordance with JIC(72)21, an Instruction specific to this interrogation operation was drawn up.153 A potential criticism of the Directive is that it applied only to internal security operations. In the context of the reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’ in Iraq in 2003, Sir William Gage, Chair of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, drew attention to the lack of clarity over whether the ban was intended to apply only to internal security operations.154 He reported that ‘while there were reasonable contemporaneous rationales for limiting the 1972 Directive to internal security operations and splitting it into two parts, this can be seen now to have contributed over time to the loss of MoD corporate knowledge about the prohibition and its extent’.155 The relationship between the ban and new Directive and events in Iraq will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7. Conclusion Given that the Compton Inquiry was commissioned in response to allegations of ill-treatment that shocked people around the world, critics can be forgiven for expecting the Compton Inquiry to be wider and more thorough. The limitations in its design might be attributable to a failure of its designers to see the positive outcomes that commissioning an inquiry in late August 1971 might have had. But what was also needed was a quick response to allegations of mistreatment, and the government was not yet ready to expose the rules pertaining to interrogation to the scrutiny of an inquiry. None the less, the Compton Inquiry was a disappointment to observers, whether they were hoping for findings of brutality or for vindication. The Parker Inquiry provided the opportunity to calm some of the criticisms of the earlier Compton Inquiry. It both prompted and contributed to

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the intra-governmental debates about the future use of the ‘five techniques’ that culminated in what has become known as the Heath statement of March 1972 announcing the ban on the techniques. The MoD’s discussions about what form the ‘five techniques’ should take in future were greatly influenced by the claimed successes of these methods in past internal security operations. The basis of the MoD’s view that the ‘five techniques’ produced valuable intelligence in Northern Ireland will be contested in the following chapter. What is clear, however, is that the views of other government departments outweighed those of the MoD. The ban was the culmination of the government’s responses to the Northern Ireland episode. It was included in a new set of rules for interrogation in internal security operations. These rules were contained in the Directive that replaced the one drawn up during the Aden Emergency and amended in response to the Bowen Report’s recommendations on interrogation procedures. This new Directive was more detailed than its predecessor. But this did not stop it from being critiqued afresh after 2003 when it became apparent that the ban had been forgotten. The Directive was none the less an improvement on the previous version, as it increased safeguards for detainees, interrogation centre staff and, by extension, those higher up the hierarchy of authority. Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Compton Report, pp. 37, 47. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., pp. 23–4. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., pp. 51, 66. Ibid. TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (cover letter by Hockaday), ‘Northern Ireland – Interrogation in Depth’, no date (cover letter dated 13 October 1971). McGuffin, The Guineapigs, chapter four. TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (cover letter by Hockaday), ‘Northern Ireland – Interrogation in Depth’, no date (cover letter dated 13 October 1971). ‘How Ulster internees are made to talk’, Sunday Times (17 October 1971). TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (cover letter by Hockaday), ‘Northern Ireland – Interrogation in Depth’, no date (cover letter dated 13 October 1971). National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 2002/19/438, no author, ‘British Committee of Inquiry into Allegations of Brutality’, no date (c. 22 September – 16 November 1971). Ibid. NAI, DFA 2007/58/21, Donal O’Sullivan (Irish Ambassador to Britain) to Sean  Ronan (Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs), 25 August 1971.

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15 NAI, DFA 2002/19/438, no author, ‘British Committee of Inquiry into Allegations of Brutality’, no date (c.22 September – 16 November 1971). 16 Ibid. 17 NAI, Taoiseach’s Office (TAOIS) 2002/8/493, Emergency Resolution on Northern Ireland adopted by The International Council of Amnesty International at Luxembourg, 26 September 1971. 18 Introduction by the Home Secretary, Compton Report, p. iii. 19 G. Clark, ‘Mr Heath authorizes Britain’s reply’, The Times (1 September 1971). 20 NAI, DFA 2002/19/438, no author, ‘British Committee of Inquiry into Allegations of Brutality’, no date (c. 22 September – 16 November 1971). 21 J. Clare, ‘Ulster Ombudsman may rely on press statements for inquiry on alleged brutality’, The Times (3 September 1971). 22 Introduction by the Home Secretary, Compton Report, p. iii. 23 TNA, CJ 4/109, Cardinal Conway (Archbishop of Armagh) to Sir Edmund Compton, 14 September 1971. 24 McKittrick and McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, p. 74. 25 TNA, DEFE 13/917, ‘How Ulster internees are made to talk’, The Sunday Times (17 October 1971). 26 TNA, PREM 15/485, Robert Armstrong (Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister), ‘Note for the record’, 18 October 1971. 27 Ibid. 28 TNA, CJ 4/99, Compton to Graham Shillington (Inspector-General, Royal Ulster Constabulary), 15 November 1971. 29 TNA, CJ 3/119, Compton, ‘Northern Ireland, Interrogation in depth: The cases of Michael Joseph Montgomery and Liam David Rodgers’, 15 November 1971. 30 NAI, DFA 2002/19/438, no author, ‘British Committee of Inquiry into Allegations of Brutality’, no date (c. 22 September – 16 November 1971). 31 University of Westminster and King’s College London, Kevin Hannaway, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. 32 J. Clare, ‘Detained men to boycott inquiry’, The Times (2 September 1971). 33 NAI, DFA 2002/19/438, no author, ‘British Committee of Inquiry into Allegations of Brutality’, no date (c. 22 September – 16 November 1971). 34 Compton Report, p. 2. 35 Ibid., p. 2. 36 Ibid., p. 3. 37 J. Clare, ‘Ulster Ombudsman may rely on press statements for inquiry on alleged brutality’, The Times (3 September 1971). 38 Compton Report, p. 3; NAI, TAOIS 2002/8/494, Hugh McCann (Secretary, DFA) to Jack Lynch (Taoiseach), 22 November 1971. 39 Compton Report, pp. 4–5. 40 Ibid., p. 3. 41 Ibid., p. 71; TNA, CJ 3/119, Compton, ‘Northern Ireland, Interrogation in depth: The cases of Michael Joseph Montgomery and Liam David Rodgers’, 15 November 1971; BMInq, day 1, MOD020432, Compton, ‘Northern Ireland: Further investigation into arrests under the Special Powers Act’, 14 November 1971.

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42 TNA, CJ 3/119, Compton, ‘Northern Ireland, Interrogation in depth: The cases  of Michael Joseph Montgomery and Liam David Rodgers’, 15 November  1971; BMInq, day 1, MOD020432, Compton, ‘Northern Ireland: Further investigation into arrests under the Special Powers Act’, 14 November 1971. 43 Compton Report, pp. 26, 36. 44 Ibid., p. 72. 45 NAI, DFA 2005/145/1980, H. Jackson, the Guardian, 17 November 1971. 46 NAI, DFA 2005/145/1980, ‘Interrogation: What is allowed?’, the Guardian, 29 November 1971. 47 Compton Report, p. 23. 48 Hansard, George Cunningham (MP for Islington South-West), 9 December 1971, vol. 827, col. 1672. 49 Compton Report, pp. 3, 6. 50 Ibid., pp. 6–7. 51 TNA, DEFE 24/968, Hockaday to Dunnett, 19 October 1971. 52 TNA, PREM 15/485, Heath to Trend, 8 November 1971. 53 Ibid. 54 NAI, DFA 2007/58/36, no author (Irish government), ‘Material for Chequers II’, no date (September 1971). 55 Hansard, Maudling, 17 November 1971, vol. 826, col. 439. 56 Hansard, Maudling, 16 November 1971, vol. 826, col. 216. 57 Hansard, James Callaghan (MP for Cardiff, South-East), 16 November 1971, vol. 826, col. 218. 58 Hansard, Maudling, 17 November 1971, vol. 826, col. 444. 59 Hansard, Maudling, 16 November 1971, vol. 826, col. 217. 60 Hansard, Maudling, 17 November 1971, vol. 826, col. 444. 61 TNA, DEFE 23/117, no author, ‘Interrogation: The follow up to the report of the Compton Committee’, no date. 62 Ibid. 63 TNA, PREM 15/485, Trend to Heath, 3 November 1971. 64 Hansard, Maudling, 16 November 1971, vol. 826, col. 216. 65 Report of a Committee to Consider, in the Context of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Measures to Deal with Terrorism in Northern Ireland (Gardiner Report), Cmnd. 5847, January 1975. 66 BMInq, day 1, MOD034200, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with Lord Parker’, no date. 67 Parker Report, p. v. 68 Ibid., p. v. 69 Ibid., p. v. 70 TNA, CAB 130/558, Cabinet Committee GEN 77, minutes of a meeting held on 9 February 1972. 71 Parker Report (Majority Report), p. 4. 72 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Maguire to Private Secretary, Minister of State, 20 October 1971.

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73 TNA, DEFE 13/838, David Ive (Chair, Campaign for the Abolition of Torture and Member of Executive Committee British Section Amnesty International) to William Rodgers (Minister of State for Defence), 9 December 1974. 74 TNA, WO 296/25, J. M. Parkin (Head of C2(AD), MoD, unknown) to Maguire, 3 March 1972. 75 TNA, CAB 130/558, Cabinet Committee GEN 77, minutes of a meeting held on 9 February 1972. 76 TNA, DEFE 13/958, Anthony Stephens (Head of DS10, MoD) to Private Secretary, Permanent Under-Secretary, 1 February 1972. 77 Parker Report (Minority Report), pp. 19–21. 78 Ibid., p. 19. 79 Parker Report (Majority Report), p. 1. 80 Parker Report (Minority Report), pp. 14–15. 81 Ibid., pp. 14, 22. 82 Ibid., p. 22. 83 This definition of stool-pigeon can be found in C. Cunningham, No Mercy, No Leniency: Communist Mistreatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), p. 145. 84 B. Stewart, ‘The interrogation dilemma’, in S. Newbery et al., ‘Interrogation, intelligence and the issue of human rights’, Intelligence and National Security, 24:5 (2009), 642. 85 TNA, DEFE 23/117, no author, ‘Interrogation: The follow up to the Report of the Compton Committee’, 1 November 1971. 86 TNA, CAB 130/558, Cabinet Committee GEN 77, minutes of a meeting held on 9 February 1972. 87 BMInq, day 1, MOD034202, no author, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with Lord Parker’, no date. 88 TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author, ‘Note of a meeting held by PUS to discuss interrogation procedures at 15.50 on 26 October 1971’, 28 October 1971. 89 Ibid. 90 TNA, CJ 4/97, I. R. Campbell (Director of Management and Support of Intelligence) to Stewart, 18 October 1971. 91 TNA, DEFE 23/108, ‘Note of a meeting held by PUS to discuss interrogation procedures at 15.50 on 26 October 1971’, 28 October 1971. 92 TNA, WO 32/21776, ‘Note of a meeting held by PUS on 23 November 1971 to discuss a draft historical paper on interrogation techniques for the Parker Committee’, 25 November 1971. Those attending included White, Blacker, Maguire, Hockaday, Lewis and Stewart. 93 TNA, WO 32/21776, ‘Note of a meeting held by PUS on 23 November 1971 to discuss a draft historical paper on interrogation techniques for the Parker Committee’, 25 November 1971. 94 BMInq, day 1, CAB001592, Permanent Under-Secretary to Lord Peter Carrington (Secretary of State for Defence), 18 November 1971. 95 Ibid. 96 TNA, CJ 4/97, Campbell to Stewart, 18 October 1971.

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97 TNA, CJ 4/118, no author (MoD), ‘Possible further safeguards on the use of interrogation in depth’, no date (discussed at MoD’s Northern Ireland Policy Group Meeting on 7 January 1972). 98 TNA, DEFE 13/918, signature illegible (MoD) to Carrington, 6 December 1971. 99 TNA, CJ 4/118, no author (MoD), ‘Possible further safeguards on the use of interrogation in depth’, no date (discussed at MoD’s Northern Ireland Policy Group Meeting on 7 January 1972). 100 Ibid. 101 TNA, WO 296/25, Northern Ireland Policy Group (MoD), minutes of meeting held on 7 January 1972. 102 TNA, CJ 4/118, no author (MoD), ‘Possible further safeguards on the use of interrogation in depth’, no date (discussed at MoD’s Northern Ireland Policy Group Meeting on 7 January 1972). 103 TNA, DEFE 23/109, quote from Cabinet Committee GEN 47 meeting minutes for 18 October 1971, in ‘Prisoner handling in Interrogation Centres in Northern Ireland: Report by the Intelligence Coordinator’, no date. An earlier version of the report can be found in TNA, PREM 15/485, and a later version in TNA, WO 32/21776. 104 BMInq, day 1, MOD033808, Bremner to Lewis, 28 October 1971. 105 TNA, WO 296/25, Northern Ireland Policy Group (MoD), minutes of a meeting held on 7 December 1971. 106 This was also the view of T. C. Hetherington of the Law Officers Department, Royal Courts of Justice. BMInq, day 1, MOD031469, Hetherington, ‘Interrogation of Detainees in Northern Ireland – Lord Parker’s Enquiry’, 26 November 1971. 107 TNA, WO 32/21776, ‘Prisoner handling in Interrogation Centres in Northern Ireland: Report by the Intelligence Coordinator’, 2 December 1971. 108 TNA, DEFE 13/918, ‘Privy Councillor’s enquiry: Note by the Intelligence Coordinator’, no date. 109 TNA, DEFE 24/210, Northern Ireland Policy Group (MoD), Minutes of a meeting held on 13 December 1971. 110 TNA, WO 32/21776, ‘Prisoner handling in Interrogation Centres in Northern Ireland: Report by the Intelligence Coordinator’, 2 December 1971. 111 TNA, DEFE 13/918, ‘Privy Councillor’s Enquiry: Note by the Intelligence Coordinator’, no date. 112 Ibid. 113 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Stewart to White, draft, no date. 114 TNA, DEFE 24/209, no author, ‘Note for the record: Future interrogation policy’, 18 February 1972. 115 BMInq, day 2, MOD032662, no author (prepared on behalf of the Treasury Solicitor) to Deputy Under-Secretary (Army), 14 February 1972. 116 TNA, DEFE 25/339, Stephen to Private Secretary, Secretary of State, 9 February 1972. 117 Ibid. 118 TNA, CAB 130/558, Cabinet Committee GEN 77, minutes of a meeting held on 9 February 1972.

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119 BMInq, day 2, MOD033736, no author (cover letter by Dunnett), ‘Draft Ministerial Statement on the Parker Report’, no date (cover letter dated 24 February 1972). 120 N. S. Marsh, ‘Gerald Austin Gardiner’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 121 BSInq, KR3, Cabinet meeting, minute 3, annexed to CM(72) 7th Conclusions, 17 February 1972, p. 38. 122 BMInq, day 2, MOD032994, CGS to GOC(NI), 1 March 1972; BMInq, day 2, MOD032755, Prime Minister’s Office, 1 March 1972. 123 TNA, CJ 3/97, Dennis Trevelyan (HO) to Philip Woodfield (HO), 10 March 1972. 124 TNA, CAB 130/558, Cabinet Committee GEN 77, minutes of a meeting held on 9 February 1972. 125 Bowen Report, p. 19. 126 Hansard, Heath, 2 March 1972, vol. 823, col. 744. 127 TNA, DEFE 13/1118, Cunningham to Heath, 7 March 1972. 128 Hansard, Heath, 2 March 1972, vol. 823, col. 743. 129 TNA, FCO 87/157, Alec Douglas-Home (Foreign Secretary) to certain missions and posts, 2 March 1972. 130 TNA, FCO 87/157, Heath to Lynch, in Douglas-Home to Dublin, 1 March 1972. 131 Ibid. 132 TNA, CAB 130/558, Cabinet Committee GEN 77, minutes of a meeting held on 9 February 1972. 133 TNA, DEFE 13/958, Gregson to Angel, 18 November 1972. 134 BMInq, day 3, MOD033039, BGS(Int) to CGS, no date; BMInq, day 3, MOD035344, R. C. Kent (Deputy Under-Secretary (Army)) to Private Secretary to Under-Secretary of State (Army), 25 July 1972. 135 TNA, CAB 164/1329, JIC, JIC(72)21, Part I, 29 June 1972. 136 TNA, PREM 15/485, JIC, JIC(65)15, 17 Feb. 1965. Emphasis added. 137 TNA, PREM 15/1709, R. A. Custis (MoD) to Christopher Roberts (Private Secretary, 10 Downing Street), 1 March 1973. 138 TNA, CJ 4/655, Peter Rawlinson (Attorney General) to Heath, 23 February 1973. 139 TNA, CJ 4/655, J. F. Halliday (HO) to Trevelyan, 2 March 1973. 140 TNA, CAB 164/1329, Trend to Heath, 2 March 1973. 141 Advice given by A. H. Hammond (Legal Adviser’s Branch, HO). TNA, CJ 4/655, Halliday to Trevelyan, 2 March 1973. 142 NAI, DFA/2004/7/2585, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights; Application No. 5310/71; (Merits); Counter Memorial of the United Kingdom Government’, Appendix 7, ‘Extracts of Security Forces’ Instructions and Orders’, March 1973. 143 TNA, CJ 4/118, no author (MoD), ‘Possible further safeguards on the use of interrogation in depth’, no date (January 1972). 144 TNA, WO 32/21726, MoD, JIC(72)21, Part II, 29 June 1972. 145 TNA, WO 32/21726, MoD, ‘Part II, Directive on interrogation by the armed forces in internal security operations: Instructions for individual operations’, draft, no date (c. June 1972).

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146 TNA, FCO 87/158, no author, ‘Interrogation by the Security Forces in Northern Ireland’, accompanying JIC(72)21, no date (June 1972). 147 Ibid. 148 TNA, PREM 15/1709, Brian Norbury (Cabinet Office) to Angel, 5 June 1972. 149 BMInq, day 3, CAB000361, Trend to Heath, 6 June 1972. 150 TNA, PREM 15/1709, Norbury to Angel, 5 June 1972. 151 TNA, DEFE 13/919, Brigaider M. S. Bayley (BGS(Int)DIS) to MA/CGS (unknown), September 1972. 152 BMInq, day 3, MOD041842, Bayley to Blacker, 7 September 1973. 153 TNA, DEFE 11/759, no author, ‘Special instructions covering the arrangements for interrogation in Operation Jason in Oman – 1973’, no date. 154 The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry (BMInq Report), HC 1452-I, September 2011, Part IV, p. 434. 155 BMInq Report, Part IV, p. 444.

5

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The ‘five techniques’, intelligence and security in Northern Ireland

It is possible, though challenging, to comment on what intelligence, if any, was collected from the fourteen detainees interrogated using the ‘five techniques’ at the Ballykelly ‘Special Interrogation Centre’. Comments on the intelligence yield will be put in context by identifying the basis on which these individuals were selected and what intelligence it was hoped would be gained from them. As intelligence itself has no impact on security unless it is acted upon, the military and government’s views on the security gains achieved as a result of this interrogation operation will be examined. The impact of the ‘five techniques’ on these fourteen detainees will also be identified, as this too was an outcome of this interrogation operation and should not be overlooked when assessing it. The relative value of Operation Calaba as a source of intelligence will be judged by comparing it, as far as is possible, to other sources of intelligence available in late 1971. These other sources included a wider-scale interrogation operation that did not employ the ‘five techniques’. Finally, the remaining identifiable effects of the use of the techniques will be assessed, namely: the decline in the effectiveness of interrogation from 1972  until internment was ended in 1975; the radicalisation of the Nationalist  community; and its impact on the UK internationally. Following on from the previous chapter’s attention to the government’s responses to the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland, this chapter completes the book’s examination of the impact of this operation. The ‘five techniques’ and intelligence The Northern Ireland government was ultimately responsible for deciding which individuals should be selected for exposure to the ‘five techniques’.1 In practice, it was Special Branch who selected them, on the grounds that they were ‘known (or strongly suspected) of being officers or officials of the IRA’, and were ‘thought to possess considerable knowledge of the IRA but … were considered unlikely to respond to normal police questioning’.2 The accuracy of these claims will be contested below. After the initial group of

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twelve detainees were released from Ballykelly and it became apparent that the  Compton Inquiry would investigate their allegations, Special Branch became unwilling to conduct any further interrogations using the ‘five techniques’.3 Philip Woodfield of the Home Office visited the Chief Constable and the Head of Special Branch, telling them that approved interrogation methods did not fall within the Compton Committee’s remit. This visit was successful in that Special Branch then withdrew its objection to further use of the ‘five techniques’.4 Only two more men were considered suitable subjects for this type of interrogation.5 Of those final two detainees, both of whom were arrested in October 1971, one was thought to be ‘a middle piece operational [IRA] commander, who will have the tactical and operational knowledge of current and projected operations to produce the information and intelligence the Security Forces require’.6 A different view has been put forward by John McGuffin in The Guineapigs, a book that is respected by former internees. He notes that, of the initial twelve detainees, four came from each of the three RHCs that those arrested on 9 August 1971 were taken to.7 McGuffin goes on to argue that this was part of an experiment in sensory deprivation, and that by releasing them from internment William Whitelaw, the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, a post created in March 1972, and Faulkner admitted they were not selected on the grounds that they were thought to be senior figures in the IRA.8 Given the weaknesses in intelligence before 9 August 1971 it would not be surprising that errors were made in selecting detainees for interrogation at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, and those errors may have become  evident after their interrogation, affecting subsequent decisions on whether to release them. The history of the ‘five techniques’ and the Commandant of the Intelligence Centre’s belief that they had perfected the techniques in Oman in 1970 and early 1971, is somewhat at odds with the description of the Northern Ireland case as an experiment. Geography did, however, play a role in the selection of the first twelve men in that they were chosen on the basis of four per IRA Brigade area.9 It is possible to be more specific than simply to state that the security forces hoped to gain intelligence from the fourteen detainees by conducting interrogations in conjunction with the ‘five techniques’. Special Branch was responsible for providing the list of aims for these interrogations, known as the ‘Essential Elements of Information’ (EEI). But at 9pm on 11 August, two hours after the interrogations began, Special Branch had still not produced these. Instead, Nicholson of the JSIW and the Officer Commanding Special Branch drew up the following EEI: (1) 1st PRIORITY – Imminent enemy operations. (2) 2nd PRIORITY – Location of people, arms and explosives. (3) 3rd PRIORITY – Future enemy intentions.10

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In other words, these interrogations aimed to protect life and property by collecting intelligence on imminent enemy operations, and to get intelligence that would allow the authorities to carry out searches for weapons, to inform surveillance operations and to arrest suspects. They also sought intelligence on the IRA’s plans and direction. These priorities are in line with the stated aims of the wider interrogation operation conducted under internment, which were ‘to obtain information concerning the personnel, plans, and weaponry of the IRA’.11 James (Jim) Auld, one of the first group of detainees taken to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’, confirms that he was asked who was in the IRA, who was behind certain killings and where the guns were kept.12 Kevin Hannaway, another member of this group, says his interrogators accused him of being responsible for a wide range of events.13 This could have been a fishing trip by interrogators who had little background information on the man they were interrogating or an approach designed to persuade or trick him into admitting to something he might have done. The priorities for the ‘five techniques’ were changed on 13 August when Special Branch Headquarters began to issue its own.14 It was later noted that priorities were to be kept up to date to reflect the security forces’ progress and changes to the IRA threat.15 The interrogations of the first twelve detainees taken to the Ballykelly interrogation centre, at least, were recorded and copies stored at the JSIW’s base in Ashford, Kent. In the same vein as the Intelligence Centre’s reports on the intelligence gained in the interrogation operations in Aden, Nicholson wrote a report on the intelligence gained from the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland.16 This was then combined with a summary of the intelligence gained in October 1971, and annexed to an MoD document given to the Parker Committee with the aim of persuading them to recommend that the ‘five techniques’ continue to be available to interrogators.17 A slightly condensed version of the summary was published in the Parker Report. Nicholson wrote that although two of the twelve detainees taken to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ in August 1971 ‘revealed virtually nothing of a subversive nature’ it was a successful interrogation operation that produced considerable information.18 He reported that these interrogations resulted in the collection of six daily Intelligence Summaries containing ‘detail of possible IRA operations, arms caches, safe houses, communications, supply routes for arms and explosives and wanted persons’. In addition, ‘[o]ver 40 sheets of IRA Orbat [Order of Battle] were produced’, ‘[a]pproximately 500 personalities were recorded for future SB use’, and ‘[o]ver 40 major incidents which have been outstanding on Police records’, Nicholson wrote, ‘can probably be cleared’.19 A later MoD document claimed the interrogations of the thirteenth and fourteenth detainees taken to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ yielded information of a similar nature:

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(1) Identification of over 180 members of both Wings of the IRA and their position in the Order of Battle. (2) Allocation and descriptions of approximately 80 weapons. (3) Details of morale, operational directives, propaganda techniques, relationships with other organisations, and future plans. (4) Clearance of a further 45 major incidents outstanding on Police Records.20

Brigadier Lewis, Inspector of the Intelligence Corps and Commandant of the Intelligence Centre, added that Shannon, who along with Rogers was held at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ in October 1971, ‘gave a mass of information when he did finally break’.21 Another MoD document admits that not all of the intelligence gained was new: it confirmed much of what was already known about the IRA Order of Battle, whilst also filling some gaps and revealing the existence of units previously unknown to the authorities.22 The impression is given that a large amount of intelligence was gained, and that it was intelligence that could be acted upon to improve the security situation in Northern Ireland. The information obtained from interrogation was collated and evaluated by the intelligence support staff based at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’.23 Conspicuous by its absence is comment on whether this intelligence was obtainable any other, less intrusive or less ethically questionable, way. There is also no information on whether these detainees were offered any incentives for co-operation such as money or immunity from prosecution. The authorities’ claims about the intelligence collected are contested by the surviving detainees. The statement that safe houses and arms caches were detailed is misleading, as many of the safe houses would also have been arms caches. Revealing the location of a safe house would in many instances also have meant revealing the location of an arms cache.24 There was no Order of Battle, at least in written form. Much of the IRA’s activity was spontaneous.25 The summary of the operation prepared by the MoD for the Parker Inquiry added that as a result of improvements in intelligence attributable to the introduction of internment in general, 115 rifles were seized between the introduction of internment and 17 November 1971. It has been argued, however, that there simply were not this many weapons in IRA hands at this time.26 Finally, it has been said that the detainees possessed intelligence about the location of arms dumps, but that these went untouched by the security forces.27 Some of the fourteen detainees were involved with the IRA.28 This placed them in a position where they were likely to possess intelligence that the authorities would have found useful. The two who the authorities admitted gave no intelligence were identified as Patrick Shivers and Paddy Joe McClean.29 Shivers had never been in the IRA, a point that McGuffin adds ‘even the local SB men in Toome, his hometown, recognized’.30 Yet records had showed that he was ‘deeply involved in the higher echelons of the IRA

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and was politically implicated’.31 McClean was suspected of having been taught how to react to interrogation on a course in the Republic of Ireland because he ‘to some extent defeated the system by becoming physically limp’.32 He was not a member of the IRA but was involved in the civil rights campaign.33 Going limp was simply an expression of non-cooperation.34 Despite the poor selection of these two men the DGI judged that the intelligence dividends from the other twelve confirmed the basis for selection.35 The only available statement on the impact intelligence gained at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ had on security is a brief account of three of the detainees leading their interrogators to arms caches in the early hours of 15 August.36 It is difficult to reconcile claims that are so at odds with one another. Given the MoD’s incentives for claiming the operation was a success, and the doubt cast on some of their claims, it is likely that the case was overstated. It is also likely that some intelligence, at least, was gained this way. To further assess Operation Calaba and the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland it should be placed relative to the other sources of intelligence available at the time. Interrogation was particularly valuable from the introduction of internment in August 1971 until the end of that year. The detainees taken to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ were far from the only people arrested under internment who were interrogated for intelligence. After arrest initial police questioning, also known as screening, tactical interrogation or primary interrogation took place. The aim of this type of interrogation was to confirm whether the right person had been arrested, whether they should be questioned with a view to preferring a charge, interrogated for intelligence or released.37 Suspects against whom there was the slightest suggestion that criminal charges could be brought were automatically interviewed at police stations in accordance with the Judges’ Rules so that evidence obtained would be admissible in court.38 Interrogation that aimed to collect intelligence – secondary interrogation – took place at the RHCs before these were replaced by Police Holding Centres in September and October 1971.39 Secondary interrogation aimed to collect intelligence to inform arrest operations and searches for weapons.40 More information was gained this way than anticipated. In November 1971 the RUC’s interrogators wanted to suspend interrogation until they had analysed the intelligence already collected.41 Intelligence ought to be assessed for reliability before it is disseminated to those who can act on it, and this must be done before the associates of the person interrogated take precautionary action such as relocating arms caches. Weaknesses were present in secondary interrogation, in part because of a lack of manpower.42 None the less intelligence from secondary interrogation, including that which involved the ‘five techniques’, facilitated ‘the bulk of successful search

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and arrest operations’ carried out before November 1971 and resulted in the unearthing of arms caches.43 One such find located in Ballymena on 13 November included twenty-eight shotguns, nineteen rifles and 9,840 rounds of ammunition.44 The usefulness of intelligence gained through interrogation beyond that which involved the ‘five techniques’ raises questions about the necessity of those techniques. The MoD, seeking to persuade the Parker Committee that continued secondary interrogation was imperative, told them that after 9 August interrogation became ‘the principal source of intelligence, the volume of which rapidly increased’.45 Secondary interrogation was therefore valued not only in itself but in relation to other sources of intelligence. This was not to last though, as will be explained later in the chapter. Little is known about other sources of intelligence available at this time. It is likely that informers were active, with the IRA severely beating Gerald McAllister in September 1971 for having dealings with Special Branch.46 Informers were used increasingly by the British during the 1970s.47 In 1971, the Military Reconnaissance Force was set up to provide intelligence by conducting plain-clothes patrols and recruiting informers, but was disbanded in 1973 after its operations, some of which resulted in loss of life, caused ‘more trouble than they solved’.48 The British Army’s report on Operation Banner, the codename for their near-forty-year presence in Northern Ireland, describes how observation posts, including one on top of the Divis Flats in Belfast, facilitated surveillance activities that provided intelligence.49 Coordination between the Army, Special Branch and other agencies involved in collecting intelligence proved problematic both in terms of avoiding overlap and in sharing intelligence.50 Co-ordination, and therefore the intelligence available to all, had improved by January 1972.51 International co-operation can also be valuable, and Special Branch worked with its counterparts over the border, the Garda Special Branch.52 In the early months of internment without trial, a number of sources of intelligence were therefore available. Interrogation was the most valued of these sources. The ‘five techniques’ and the detainees Francis McGuigan, who was taken to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ in August 1971, described his time there as ‘pure and absolute hell’.53 Kevin Hannaway, who was taken there at the same time, has said there are no words in any language to describe what he went through.54 Yet the Defence Secretary was absolutely satisfied that no mental injury resulted from the ‘five techniques’.55 The impact of exposure to the ‘five techniques’ on the detainees themselves should not be forgotten in assessments of this interrogation operation. Their families also suffered as they were not told where their loved

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ones were being held or even whether they were still alive.56 HMG later agreed to award the detainees compensation. Dr G. B. Plunkett, a psychiatrist who interviewed six of the fourteen detainees, expressed the professional opinion that they ‘have undergone a very severe psychological trauma and … I would have fears that some of these men would never completely recover from the experience’.57 Professor Robert Daly, a member of the Royal College of Psychiatrists based in the Republic of Ireland,58 interviewed all bar one of the detainees. He found they were much more likely to suffer from nightmares than the other men interrogated during internment.59 Whilst in the wall-standing position, they experienced ‘various illusions, delusions and hallucinations’ including hearing music.60 Although it is not possible to compare this with the incidence of such conditions in the wider population, it is perhaps notable that at least three of them subsequently developed physical diseases, two of which were of a cancerous nature.61 Sean McKenna died in June 1975 from heart disease which Daly told the Royal Courts of Justice in London had been made worse by his experiences.62 Research has shown that stress positions can result in long-lasting or even permanent physical effects ‘such as nerve, joint and circulatory damage’.63 A physical effect upon these particular detainees was weight loss. The Compton Report noted that all detainees lost weight during their stay at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’.64 Figures claiming to show detainees’ weight on admission and discharge from the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ show that weight loss varied between three and sixteen pounds each, and that one man gained one pound. Noted at the bottom of this list of figures, however, is the point that the weights given for the first twelve men on admission to the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ were only estimates made by the Medical Officer. No weighing scales were available at that time.65 The reliability of the figures for this first group is therefore considerably undermined. While there is no evidence to prove weight loss was experienced by all, it was experienced by some of the detainees at least,66 and given the regime they were exposed to it would not be surprising if they all lost weight. By the end of 1976 all fourteen men had accepted financial compensation in respect of their experiences. The offer of compensation was all but inevitable given that the government did not deny the ‘five techniques’ had been used and could be said to have admitted the wrongfulness of them with the ban of 2 March 1972. A majority decision was taken by the detainees who had been exposed to the ‘five techniques’ to pursue compensation.67 The British government was advised that complainants were guaranteed to win their civil cases alleging ‘wrongful arrest and detention, and assault and trespass to the person combined with allegations of brutality and torture’ and that damages were likely to be awarded.68 It was realised that the Parker Committee’s

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findings on the legality and morality of the ‘five techniques’ would increase the amount of damages awarded.69 Additionally, in civil actions the government has a duty to disclose the existence of all relevant documents, and to produce them for inspection. Major Wakerley of the Army’s Legal Services wrote that producing the documents could be avoided, but announcing their existence could not,70 meaning that these court cases could publicise confidential information. The UK had been reluctant to settle in the case of McGuigan, who escaped from internment in Long Kesh prison in 1972, as it was thought that he had been active in the Provisional IRA since then.71 Montgomery had settled an earlier claim for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment and signed a form discharging the Crown from liability for other action concerning the time in question. There was uncertainty over whether the courts would re-open civil proceedings when he then submitted a claim arising from the ‘five techniques’, but they did so.72 Counsel acting for Rogers made clear that he wished to maximise publicity of any settlement, but one year later it was noted that the settlements had caused little public interest in Britain.73 The Northern Ireland Office requested that Hannaway’s case and others in hand not be settled until after the elections to the Constitutional Convention on Northern Ireland on 1 May 1975 so as to avoid the possibility of political repercussions.74 Shannon’s claim was the last to be agreed. This 1976 settlement was also the largest at £25,000. It had been estimated that had the claim gone to court the amount would have been nearly twice that as he alleged that the mental and physical after-effects of the ‘five techniques’ were so severe that he was unfit to work.75 The settlements and corresponding dates are as in Table 5.1.76 HMG’s legal advisers told it there was no defence in law against these cases.77 If they had gone to court, information the government would rather have kept classified would have been made public, and members of the RUC and Army involved would have been named.78 As a result, HMG settled these cases out of court. Interrogation, security and international politics, 1972–78 The final ways in which the ‘five techniques’ should be assessed is their impact on intelligence and security until internment ended in 1975, and their role in Ireland vs UK, which was to continue until 1978. Secondary interrogation for intelligence became less valuable on its own and in relative terms at the end of 1971. This situation continued until the end of internment. The use of the ‘five techniques’ was a significant reason for this. By January 1972 the flow of intelligence from interrogation was ‘already becoming less’.79 This was not a result of the ‘five techniques’ or responses

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Table 5.1 Compensation Detainee

Settlement amount

Date

Patrick Shivers Gerrard McKerr Joseph Clarke Patrick McNally James Auld Michael Donnelly Paddy Joe McClean Kevin Hannaway Michael Montgomery Brian Turley Sean McKenna (deceased) Liam Rogers Francis McGuigan William Shannon

£15,000 £10,000 £12,500 £11,250 £16,000 £11,250 £14,000 £12,000 £11,000 £15,000 £12,000 £11,500 £11,750 £25,000

Feb. 1974 July 1974 Dec. 1974 Dec. 1974 Jan. 1975 Jan. 1975 Jan. 1975 May 1975 Oct. 1975 Dec. 1975 Dec. 1975 Mar. 1976 Sept. 1976 c. Oct. 1976

to them, but because detainees ‘had become alive to the limitations of the present procedures, particularly the limit of 48 hours which they could spend at Police Holding Centres’.80 It was agreed within the Ministry of Defence that the answer lay in providing Special Branch with eight to twelve more skilled interrogators, just as extra military interrogators had been provided to improve the intelligence yield from interrogation during the Aden Emergency.81 Finding available, skilled interrogators is easier said than done, especially in an environment where the military cannot conduct interrogations itself. The Compton and Parker Inquiries, the new 1972 Directive on interrogation in internal security operations and Ireland vs UK negatively affected the success of interrogation. The origins of all these proceedings can be traced to the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland. In 1974 it was noted that although ‘[t]he command structure of the IRA in Belfast has been captured, replaced and captured again three times … practically no intelligence’ was gained by interrogating them. This was attributed to the 1972 Directive.82 At around the same time the GOC(NI), General Sir Frank King, the Vice Chief of the General Staff and Defence Secretary Roy Mason agreed that there was scope to interrogate more fully within the rules contained in the current Directive.83 Mason believed the RUC had adopted a cautious interpretation of the rules because its ‘confidence was shaken by the Compton and Parker inquiries and is probably still affected by [Ireland vs UK]’.84 General Peter Hunt, who became Chief of the General Staff and therefore head of the British Army in 1973, agreed that the RUC Special Branch was suffering from a lack

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of confidence and wholeheartedness as a result of the Compton and Parker inquiries and Ireland vs UK.85 Its members’ lives were in danger already, without running the risk of breaking the rules on interrogation. It is also possible that the ban on the ‘five techniques’ gave reassurance to those undergoing interrogation. When examining the effects of the ‘five techniques’ on intelligence, it is important to include the impact of the public inquiries, Ireland vs UK and the new interrogation Directive, all of which responded to the use of the techniques and the reactions that use provoked. Internment’s potential for providing intelligence by allowing for the prolonged interrogation of prisoners was severely curtailed from 1972 onwards. It is difficult to identify the effects that publicity of the ‘five techniques’ had upon communities in Northern Ireland as it is difficult to disentangle these from the effects of the introduction of internment and the other allegations of mistreatment that accompanied it. Persuasive statements have been made, however, to the effect that the allegations of abuse that accompanied the introduction of internment increased the number of recruits and amount of support for the IRA.86 Father Denis Faul, ‘a critic of the administration of justice in Northern Ireland … [and] a resolute opponent of terrorism’,87 described the news that the ‘five techniques’ had been used as ‘[j]ust like a bombshell to the Catholic community’.88 Although the peace process of the 1990s saw significant progress towards a stable Northern Ireland, the early 1970s continued to be particularly troublesome. Five days after internment began, the UK’s Representative in Belfast reported that eighty-three IRA officers and 144 volunteers had been detained.89 On 26 January 1972, there were 741 being held in detention or internment.90 It is difficult to dispute that internment and detention succeeded in taking many suspects off the streets. Yet 1972 saw 496 troubles-related deaths, more than any other year.91 A NICRA-organised march against internment held in Derry on 30 January 1972 turned violent and shots fired by the Parachute Regiment resulted in the deaths of thirteen people in a day that became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’. It has since been found that none of those casualties ‘was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury’.92 Violence and instability persisted, leading to the suspension of the Stormont government and imposition of direct rule from London in March 1972. Direct rule damaged support for the IRA and brought the unity of command that theorists of counter-insurgency attribute so much importance to by giving the GOC(NI) overall control of security, though, as has been noted, co-operation between the Army and Special Branch remained flawed.93 Direct rule also encouraged a Protestant backlash.94 Operation Motorman began on 31 July 1972 and saw the removal of the no-go areas and barricades that had been erected in Derry and Belfast since the start of ‘the troubles’. A warning issued in advance of the operation ensured it was met with little resistance.95 Lord Diplock’s

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report into normalising legal procedures in Northern Ireland resulted in the establishment of jury-less Diplock Courts in 1973. This was followed by a 1975 report by Lord Gardiner, who had previously served on the Parker Committee, into balancing counter-terrorism with civil liberties and human rights. Lord Gardiner concluded that internment could not be used longterm. Internment was duly phased out, with the last of those interned without trial released in December 1975.96 Without the wide-scale arrests that internment permitted, it would not have been possible to carry out interrogation on such a wide scale, reducing its value in comparison to other sources of intelligence. As well as having an impact on intelligence, security and the fourteen detainees, the impact of the ‘five techniques’ was felt on international politics. The techniques played a prominent role in the Republic of Ireland’s decision to initiate Ireland vs UK. On 15 December 1971 the Irish government filed an application with the European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg alleging that since 9 August the UK had breached certain articles of the ECHR in Northern Ireland. These were Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Articles 5 and 6 (right to liberty and security, and right to a fair trial), Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 1 (an obligation to respect human rights).97 In March 1972 it further alleged that Article 7 (no punishment without law) had been violated.98 The case was to continue until the European Court of Human Rights passed its judgement in 1978. It was alleged that the ‘five techniques’ and other controversial treatment connected with interrogation breached Article 3. The Irish government’s reasons for taking the case were numerous. Prominent among them were that it believed the Compton Report had failed to address the allegations satisfactorily, and the pressure it faced at home and in Northern Ireland to take action.99 The British government was embarrassed that this international action had been taken against it in respect of their conduct in Northern Ireland. The impact of the case itself on Anglo-Irish relations was most evident in its first two years, during which time the two governments were making written and oral statements to the Commission, and dialogue between them was fraught with misunderstanding and miscommunication. The case concluded in 1978 when the European Court of Human Rights passed its judgement. It found that the UK had breached Article 3’s prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment with the ‘five techniques’ and certain other actions connected with interrogation and detention.100 The Court’s decision that the ‘five techniques’ did not constitute torture has been the subject of much critique since.101 Ireland’s case under the ECHR, itself resulting in part from the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland, caused headaches for the UK, especially

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until December 1973 when the case moved into the evidence collection phase. It remains to be seen whether efforts made by a human rights organisation in 2013 to persuade Ireland to re-open the case in the light of evidence now available in the National Archives in London will succeed.102 Ireland vs UK was arguably the most far-reaching international political repercussion of the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland. Conclusion Public knowledge that the ‘five techniques’ had been used in Northern Ireland, combined with allegations of other forms of what can be called mistreatment connected with the introduction of internment, contributed to the Irish government’s decision to take a case against the UK for alleged breaches of the ECHR, to an increase in support for the IRA, to official investigations and to new rules on interrogation that themselves, inadvertently, damaged Special Branch’s ability to collect intelligence through interrogation. Although internment was designed to improve the security situation, the way it was carried out, if not also internment itself, heightened the difficulties faced by the security forces and the London and Stormont governments. After more than two years, compensation began to be awarded to the fourteen detainees exposed to the techniques. Whether this was sufficient given the physical and psychological effects the techniques had upon them is perhaps for them alone to judge. It is unlikely that there will ever be certainty over the amount and value of the intelligence these interrogations produced. Asking what intelligence was produced is crucial when arguments that controversial interrogation techniques, even those found to amount to torture, were justified because they produced intelligence persist today. None the less, for many observers techniques found to be in breach of the ECHR can never be justified. There are also challenges involved in assessing this use of the ‘five techniques’ on the basis of the outcomes of the operation, whether that be simply how any intelligence gained was used, its importance relative to other sources of intelligence or its unanticipated impact on IRA recruitment and international politics. With hindsight and on the basis of the negative results it brought about, the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland can be described as a miscalculation, even though it appears likely that it resulted in the collection of intelligence on the threat the security forces and the government were faced with. A better understanding of the nature of ‘the troubles’, the strength of feeling among the Nationalist community and the Republic of Ireland’s interest in the welfare of this community, might have led to a greater inclination to question plans to use a collection of techniques within the United Kingdom that had, after all, provoked protest in the distant colony of Aden. Yet given the

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decisions that led to the techniques being used in Northern Ireland, it is easy to see how this happened. The military was called upon to provide its expertise in interrogation, and policy-makers knew little of what the techniques entailed. That changed after it became public knowledge that the techniques had been used in Northern Ireland. A host of repercussions ensued. Lessons were learnt: the ‘five techniques’ were banned and a more detailed Directive governing interrogation in internal security operations came into force. As the Iraq case examined in the remainder of the book demonstrates, lessons were perhaps not learnt well enough, as the ‘five techniques’ were used once more, this time with fatal consequences. The Iraq case, even more so than the Northern Ireland example, shows just how easily such techniques can come into use. Notes 1 TNA, DEFE 13/957, no author (cover letter by Whitmore), ‘Supplementary questions and answers’, briefing for House of Commons debate on Compton, no date (cover letter dated 15 November 1971). 2 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Maguire to Private Secretary, Minister of State, 22 October 1971; TNA, DEFE 23/119, no author (MoD), ‘Interrogation in Northern Ireland: An assessment of local factors affecting its operation, and a record of its value in security force activities’, no date (c. November 1971). 3 TNA, DEFE 23/108, no author (cover letter by Hockaday), ‘Northern Ireland – Interrogation in Depth’, no date (cover letter dated 13 October 1971). 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 TNA, DEFE 70/214, Macdiarmid to Blacker, 11 October 1971. 7 McGuffin, The Guineapigs, chapter three. 8 Ibid., chapter four, chapter six. 9 TNA, DEFE 24/1215, Allardyce to DS6 (MoD), 26 August 1971. 10 TNA, DEFE 23/108, annex to JIC Secretary to Intelligence Co-ordinator, ‘Report on interrogation methods used in Northern Ireland’, draft, no date. 11 TNA, DEFE 23/119, no author (MoD), ‘Interrogation in Northern Ireland: An assessment of local factors affecting its operation, and a record of its value in security force activities’, no date (c. November 1971). 12 University of Westminster and King’s College London, Jim Auld, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. 13 University of Westminster and King’s College London, Kevin Hannaway, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. 14 TNA, DEFE 23/108, annex to JIC Secretary to Intelligence Co-ordinator, ‘Report on interrogation methods used in Northern Ireland’, draft, no date. 15 TNA, WO 32/21726, no author, ‘Part II, Directive on interrogation by the armed forces in internal security operations: Instructions for individual operations’, JIC(72)21, 29 June 1972.

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16 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 17 TNA, DEFE 13/958, no author (MoD), ‘Intelligence gained from interrogations in Northern Ireland’, no date (c. November 1971). This document is reproduced in Newbery (ed.), ‘Interrogation, intelligence and the issue of Human Rights’. 18 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 19 Ibid. 20 TNA, DEFE 13/958, no author (MoD), ‘Intelligence gained from interrogations in Northern Ireland’, no date (c. November 1971). 21 BMInq, day 2, MOD031487, Lewis to Blacker, 1 December 1971. 22 TNA, DEFE 23/119, no author (MoD), ‘Interrogation in Northern Ireland: An assessment of local factors affecting its operation, and a record of its value in security force activities’, no date (c.November 1971). 23 TNA, CAB 163/173, no author, ‘Standing Orders’, draft, 1971. 24 Interview, Northern Ireland, 9 August 2012. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Two interviews, Northern Ireland, 9 August 2012. 28 University of Westminster and King’s College London, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011; McGuffin, The Guineapigs, chapter four; Cobain, Cruel Britannia, p. 147; Interview, Northern Ireland, 4 December 2008. 29 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Maguire to Private Secretary, Minister of State, 22 October 1971. 30 McGuffin, The Guineapigs, chapter four. 31 TNA, DEFE 23/117, C. H. Henn (DS10, MoD) to Secretary HOC, 8 November 1971. 32 TNA, CJ 4/97, ‘Note of a meeting held at the Home Office on 21st October 1971’, no date. 33 University of Westminster and King’s College London, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. 34 McGuffin, The Guineapigs, chapter four. 35 TNA, DEFE 23/108, Maguire to Private Secretary, Minister of State, 22 October 1971. 36 TNA, CAB 163/173, Nicholson, ‘Report on Operation Calaba – August 1971’, 26 August 1971. 37 TNA, FCO 87/158, ‘Interrogation by the Security Forces in Northern Ireland’, accompanying JIC(72)21, no date (June 1972). 38 TNA, CJ 4/1744, I. M. Burns (NIO), ‘Note of a meeting’, no date. 39 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 19 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights (1976). 40 TNA, DEFE 23/119, no author (MoD), ‘Interrogation in Northern Ireland: An assessment of local factors affecting its operation, and a record of its value in security force activities’, no date (c. November 1971).

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41 TNA, DEFE 13/917, Anthony W. Stephens (Assistant Private Secretary to Defence Secretary) to Carrington, 16 August 1971. 42 BMInq, day 2, MOD031881, no author (cover letter by Colonel P. E. B. Madsen for General Officer Commanding (GOC)), ‘Requirement for military interrogators Northern Ireland’, no date (cover letter dated 23 December 1971). 43 TNA, DEFE 23/119, no author (MoD), ‘Interrogation in Northern Ireland: An assessment of local factors affecting its operation, and a record of its value in security force activities’, no date (c. November 1971). 44 TNA, DEFE 23/119, untitled annex to no author (MoD), ‘Interrogation in Northern Ireland: An assessment of local factors affecting its operation, and a record of its value in security force activities’, no date (c. November 1971). 45 TNA, DEFE 23/119, no author (MoD), ‘Interrogation in Northern Ireland: An assessment of local factors affecting its operation, and a record of its value in security force activities’, no date (c. November 1971). 46 TNA, DEFE 13/958, ‘The IRA doctrine of counter intelligence and intelligence’, no date (cover letter dated 29 November 1971). 47 J. Moran, From Northern Ireland to Afghanistan: British Military Intelligence Operations, Ethics and Human Rights (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), p. 43. 48 Ibid., pp. 37–8; Tuck, ‘Northern Ireland and the British approach to counterinsurgency’, p. 175. 49 Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, prepared under the direction of General Sir Mike Jackson (Chief of the General Staff), July 2006, pp. 5–7. 50 PRONI, HA 32/2/51, ‘Assessment of operations in Northern Ireland – 1 May – 1 Nov 1971’, no date. 51 BSInq, KS3, ‘Visit of CDS on 24 Jan 1972’, no date, p. 202. 52 G. Clarke, Border Crossing: True Stories of the RUC Special Branch, the Garda Special Branch and the IRA Moles (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2009), p. 123. 53 University of Westminster and King’s College London, Francis McGuigan, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. 54 BBC Radio Ulster, ‘Inside the torture chamber’, first broadcast 7 October 2012, accessed 11 October 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01n3vby. 55 BMInq, day 1, MOD031432, ‘The Compton Report: Note of unattributable briefing of defence correspondents by the Secretary of State for Defence at the MOD on 16 November 1971’, no date. 56 University of Westminster and King’s College London, Francis McGuigan and James Auld, ‘Witness seminar – Internment in Northern Ireland: Forty years on’, 25 July 2011. 57 NAI, DFA 2003/17/429, Dr G. B. Plunkett (Consultant Psychiatrist, Northern Ireland Hospitals Authority, St Luke’s Hospital, Armagh), ‘Some psychiatric considerations of the effect of interrogation by the Security Forces in NI’, July 1972. 58 NAI, DFA 2007/111/1899, Séan Donlon (Assistant Secretary) to P. J. G. Keating (Irish Ambassador in London), 4 April 1977; Interview, Northern Ireland, 4 December 2008.

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59 TNA, FCO 87/983, Robert J. Daly (Royal College of Psychiatrists), ‘Psychiatric effects of counter-insurgency operations’, May 1976. 60 Ibid.; TNA, CJ 4/967, Dr Denis Leigh to S. Noel Rea (Crown Solicitor’s Office, Royal Courts of Justice, Belfast), 18 June 1975. 61 TNA, DEFE 24/1612, B. B. Hall (Treasury Solicitor’s Office) to R. J. Meadway (10 Downing Street), 8 December 1976. 62 TNA, CJ 4/967, Leigh, ‘Sean McKenna’, 20 June 1975; TNA, FCO 87/983, Daly, ‘Psychiatric effects of counter-insurgency operations’, May 1976. 63 Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights First, Leave No Marks: Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the Risk of Criminality, August 2007, p. 11. 64 Compton Report, p. 17. 65 WO 296/66, ‘Weights of detainees interrogated in Northern Ireland’, no date. 66 Interview, Northern Ireland, 9 August 2012. 67 Interview, Northern Ireland, 4 December 2008. 68 TNA, PREM 16/966, N. H. Nicholls (MoD) to The Lord Bridges, 31 May 1974. 69 TNA, WO 296/63, Ronald Kent (Deputy Under-Secretary of State (Army)) to N. F. Cairncross (NIO), 13 April 1972. 70 TNA, WO 296/63, Major J. C. Wakerley (Deputy Assistant Director of Army Legal Services), 18 August 1972. 71 ‘Internees declare Strasbourg Court findings wrong’, Irish Times (26 January 1978); TNA, PREM 16/966, no author (cover letter by P. A. Rotheram (MoD)), ‘The Deep interrogation cases’, no date (cover letter dated 8 December 1976). 72 TNA, CJ 4/1259, ‘Extracts from a report on a conference held at the Ministry of Defence on 17 and 18 April 1975’, no date. 73 Ibid.; TNA, PREM 16/966, Roy Mason (Defence Secretary) to Prime Minister, 1 April 1976. 74 TNA, CJ 4/1259, ‘Extracts from a report on a conference held at the Ministry of Defence on 17 and 18 April 1975’, no date. 75 TNA, DEFE 24/1612, Mason to Airey Neave (Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) 15 December 1976; TNA, DEFE 24/1612, M. J. D. Fuller (C2(AD)) to APS/Secretary of State (unknown), 2 December 1976. 76 TNA, DEFE 24/1612, M. J. D. Fuller to DPO(Army) (unknown), 10 December 1976; TNA, DEFE 24/1612, Mason to Neave, 15 December 1976. 77 TNA, PREM 16/966, N. H. Nicholls (MoD) to Lord Bridges, 31 May 1974. 78 TNA, WO 296/63, Wakerley, 18 August 1972; TNA, PREM 16/966, no author (cover letter by P. A. Rotheram (MoD)), ‘The Deep interrogation cases’, no date (cover letter dated 8 December 1976). 79 TNA, DEFE 23/119, no author, ‘Note of a meeting held by Sir James Dunnett (Permanent Under-Secretary, MoD) on 4 January 1972’, 5 January 72. 80 BSInq, KH9, MoD Northern Ireland Policy Group, ‘Note of a meeting held in the Secretary of State’s Office Friday 7 January 1972 at 10.00 AM’, 10 January 1972, p. 43. 81 TNA, DEFE 23/119, no author, ‘Note of a meeting held by Sir James Dunnett (Permanent Under-Secretary, MoD) on 4 January 1972’, 5 January 72.

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82 BMInq, day 3, MOD041881, no author (cover letter by Stephens), untitled, no date (cover letter dated 4 July 1974). 83 TNA, DEFE 13/838, Mason to Merlyn Rees (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland), draft, no date (c. May 1974). 84 Ibid. 85 TNA, DEFE 13/838, General Sir Peter Hunt (CGS) to Roy Jenkins (Home Secretary), 14 May 1974. 86 J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, revised 3rd edition 1997) (1970), p. 383; Mobley, Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence, p. 27; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, p. 103. 87 ‘Monsignor Denis Faul’, Telegraph (22 June 2006), accessed 26 November 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1521906/Monsignor-Denis-Faul.html. 88 D. Streatfeild, transcript of interview with Monsignor Denis Faul of 9 November 2004, accessed 9 October 2013, www.dominicstreatfeild.com/2011/03/21/interview-with-monsignor-denis-faul/. 89 TNA, CJ 4/56, UK Representative in Belfast to Jack Howard-Drake (HO), 14 August 1971. 90 BSInq, CD1, BGS(Int)DIS, ‘Northern Ireland: Weekly Intelligence Report’, 28 January 1972, p. 45. 91 Fay, Morrissey and Smyth, Mapping Troubles-Related Deaths in Northern Ireland, p. 36. 92 Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Saville Report), HC 29-I – HC 29-X, 2010, volume 1, chapter 5. 93 Jeffery, ‘Intelligence and counter-insurgency operations’, p. 126; R. Thornton, ‘Getting it wrong: The crucial mistakes made in the early stages of the British Army’s deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 30:1 (February 2007), 102. 94 TNA, CAB 164/1330, Shillington’s evidence to the European Commission of Human Rights, no date. 95 M. L. R. Smith and P. R. Neumann, ‘Motorman’s long journey: Changing the strategic setting in Northern Ireland’, Contemporary British History, 19:4 (December 2005), 413–35. 96 K. Boyle, T. Hadden and P. Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland (London: The Cobden Trust, 1980), p. 24. 97 NAI, DFA 2002/19/513, Application of the Government of Ireland, 15 December 1971. 98 NAI, DFA 2002/19/513, Ireland’s supplementary application to the Commission, 3 March 1972. 99 Republic of Ireland, Parliamentary Debate, Erskine Childers (An Tánaiste, Deputy Head of the Irish government), 23 November 1971, vol. 257, cols 1–2; NAI, TAOIS 2002/8/495, signature illegible to Minister, 18 November 1971. 100 Ireland v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (1978), Series A, No. 25. 101 For example, N. S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 92.

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102 See V. Kearney, ‘Former internees claim “new evidence” of Army torture’, BBC News (28 November 2013), accessed 28 November 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/ uk-northern-ireland-25137411; ‘Secret Ballykelly interrogation centre unveiled’, BBC News (6 August 2013), accessed 28 November 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/ uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-23586361.

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Basra, Iraq, September 2003

Of the three addressed in this book, the Iraq case is the best known because of the recent press coverage it has received. Reports of the commissioning, hearings and conclusion of the Baha Mousa Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of one of the detainees interrogated in this episode were accompanied by a photograph of Baha Mousa with his family, the post-mortem photograph of his bruised face and a shocking video of the treatment Mousa and the other detainees experienced in the Temporary Detention Facility. These bring home the nature of these detainees’ experiences and increase the impact of publicity given to allegations of similar treatment. The episode examined here involves only a small fraction of the people taken into detention in Iraq since the war began in 2003 and a small fraction of the military personnel involved with arresting, detaining, guarding and interrogating detainees there. Ten detainees were exposed to the ‘five techniques’ at the TDF in Basra between Sunday 14 and Tuesday 16 September 2003. The ‘five techniques’ were used in a markedly different way here than in Aden and Northern Ireland: they were used for a different combination of reasons and were not the result of efforts to transfer expertise gained in interrogation in similar environments. None the less, the use of the techniques at the TDF had repercussions for the detainees and their families, for the soldiers involved, and for training and written guidance on interrogation and prisoner handling. Although the UK was not the only country involved in the Occupation of Iraq that began when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) formally took charge in May 2003 and continued until Iraq became sovereign in June 2004,1 it alone was involved in arresting these detainees and was responsible for them. The law professor Peter Rowe has described the treatment that resulted in Baha Mousa’s death as military misconduct on the grounds that it was a breach of military discipline that had an effect on individuals or property not belonging to the armed forces of the perpetrating state.2 The extent to which it was the result of a breach of military discipline will be examined. As the respected military historian Huw Bennett explains,

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‘[t]he experience of Baha Mousa permits the first detailed insight into the British Army’s treatment of prisoners and detainees in the wars following 9/11’.3 The following chapter examines the results and responses to what has become known as ‘the TDF episode’. The present chapter focuses on the experiences of the detainees exposed to the ‘five techniques’ at the TDF, and the facilitating and motivating factors it is attributable to. It is not always easy to identify with confidence the motivations behind the actions of the soldiers concerned. None the less, conclusions can be reached. Differences, as well as the similarities, between this case and the Aden and Northern Ireland cases will be made clear and explained. September 2001 – September 2003 It has often been said that the events of 11 September 2001 ‘changed everything’. Whether or not that is true, al-Qaeda’s attacks on United States soil that day led to changes in the way many Western countries regarded the threat from terrorism, how they guarded against it and how they responded to it. Before the month was over, President Bush described al-Qaeda as having committed an act of war against the US, adding that the US would respond with a ‘war on terror’.4 On 7 October the US-led war in Afghanistan began, with the aim of overthrowing the Taliban because of their links with al-Qaeda.5 The ‘War on Terror’ has seen Western states employ a variety of controversial intelligence practices and pieces of legislation. Responses to disclosures about these intelligence activities that include the use of interrogation techniques that have been described as torture, and methods of surveillance that raise issues of privacy, have included vibrant media and scholarly debates about the tension between improving security and protecting civil and human rights. Indeed, this book itself contributes to this debate by examining the relationship between security, intelligence and the experiences of people held for interrogation. In January 2002 Bush labelled Iraq, Iran and North Korea an ‘axis of evil’ because of their purported pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities.6 He went on to state that the aim of the war in Iraq was to remove its WMD, free its people and ‘defend the world from grave danger’.7 It has been argued that another of the US’s goals was to stop Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime from forming an alliance with al-Qaeda and providing it with WMD, though the likelihood of the two becoming allies has rightly been questioned.8 Control of the oil trade has also been cited as a reason for the intervention in Iraq, as has building a more democratic and a more stable Middle East.9 Like the US, the UK’s stated reason for its involvement in the invasion was regime change and the removal of WMD.10 The reliability of

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intelligence on Iraqi WMD and the use of that intelligence to garner public support for the UK’s involvement in the war in Iraq remains a popular topic but one that is beyond the scope of this book. It did not take long to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Known as Operation Iraqi Freedom in the US and Operation Telic in the UK, preliminary operations for the US-led coalition’s invasion formally began on 20  March, after preliminary operations had taken place the previous day. On 14 April the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair told the House of Commons that Saddam Hussein’s regime had fallen, and on 1 May Bush announced that major combat operations had ceased. The disbandment of the UK’s National Component Command Headquarters, from where the UK element of the war phase was fought, on 8 May has been described by Brian Burridge, the National Contingent Commander at the time, as the end of the war-fighting phase of the conflict.11 Mockaitis has observed that the shift from conventional to unconventional war ‘rarely occurs at a specific point in time. And yet, iconic events sometimes symbolise profound change. Such an event occurred in Iraq on April 8, 2003’ when a US flag was hoisted over the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.12 The following day the statue was famously toppled.13 At around the same time, the UK’s military forces captured Basra.14 The retired British Army officer turned academic James K. Wither has described the capture of Basra as ‘a notable achievement’. He continues, however, by pointing out that much less impressive was the unfortunate fact that the British Army was no more prepared for widespread disorder and criminality than the Americans in Baghdad. Widespread looting began immediately after the British occupation of Basra and continued for several weeks. The British lacked sufficient troops to provide security and even encouraged some looting as a ‘cathartic’ reaction to the fall of Saddam’s regime.15

In the words of a Professor at the Swedish National Defence College, ‘[t]he Iraq War went well for the United States and its British ally, but the sequel did not’.16 Around a year later Bush stated that the US had not intended to stay in Iraq as an occupying power.17 But the war phase of the conflict was followed by an Occupation, during which time the US, UK and other members of the coalition were involved in peacekeeping, stabilisation, reconstruction and,  increasingly, counter-insurgency. The CPA was tasked with  overseeing the reconstruction of Iraq and governing it until power could be handed to  the Iraqis. This was a difficult task. It sought to distribute resources for school building, for example, in the face of widespread corruption, and to develop trust between rival tribes with a view to preparing them to sit alongside each other in a new government.18 In addition, what began

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as a lawless celebration of the demise of Saddam’s regime grew into three weeks of uncontrolled looting and violence. To Baghdad’s residents, coalition forces appeared unable or unwilling to curtail the violence that swept across the city. The growing perception among Iraqis that US troops were not in full control of the situation helped turn criminal violence into an organised and politically motivated insurgency.19

Wither reveals that ‘Al-Qaeda style terrorist attacks against coalition forces were expected, but neither British nor American planners foresaw the development of a full-scale insurgency’.20 In the summer of 2003 insurgents began targeting oil pipelines and water mains, and people working on reconstruction projects, aiming to turn the Iraqi people against the Occupation of Iraq.21 The insurgency that emerged in Basra and the other provinces of southern Iraq was motivated by ‘a mixture of power-seeking, religion, and criminality rather than nationalism or sectarianism’.22 General Sir Peter Wall was in command of 1 (UK) Armoured Division from mid-May until mid-July, making him ‘effectively the UK lead for the role of “occupying power” in Iraq in the provinces of Basra and Maysan’.23 He described the way this role was carried out as ‘a botched job at the best’.24 He went on to explain, ‘[a]ll the time we were acutely conscious that we were failing to meet the expectations of 4 million or so Iraqi people and, the longer that that pertained, the greater was going to be their resentment and the sort of extremity of the actions they took to punish us for it. Those were the sort of things we were dealing with.’25 It was in this environment that First Battalion The Queen’s Lancashire Regiment (1QLR) deployed to Basra. It arrived in June 2003 in preparation for Operation Telic 2. Telic 2 began the following month, and continued until November 2003, at which time 1QLR left the country.26 In the words of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Mendonça, later awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his service in Iraq,27 it found that in Basra ‘the infrastructure had disintegrated, there was no effective police or judicial system, looting and general criminality was rife and there was a constant danger of insurgent activity’.28 Although as an institution the British military was experienced in counter-insurgency, it was certainly not presented with a clear or straightforward problem in Basra in 2003. ‘Broad-reaching indefinite detention’ has been common in many countries since the attacks of September 2001, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, the island of Diego Garcia and on international waters.29 Suspected terrorists have also been arrested and detained in a number of Western states. Since the invasion of Iraq detention has been used in a number of ways there. In the war phase of the conflict there were Prisoners of War (PW). By the time Operation Telic 2 began there was only one PW remaining.30 Thereafter, the term ‘detention’ was used in two ways. It was

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used in a broad sense, referring to every individual who had been taken into custody of any sort.31 But there were also distinct categories amongst those who had been taken into custody. Upon arrest an individual was held in pre-internment custody.32 Persons suspected of being a threat to coalition forces or to the new Iraq could then be interned without trial.33 In July 2003, for instance, the US was holding seventy-one internees on the UK’s behalf ‘on the basis of intelligence or acts against UK forces since the end of major hostilities’.34 In addition, those who were suspected or convicted of criminal offences could be held in detention, in the specific sense of the term.35 ‘Detention’ thus referred to the status of everyone in custody, as well as just those who were being held in connection with criminal offences. The detainees held at the TDF in September 2003 were detainees in the broad sense of the term. They had been arrested on the basis of being suspected insurgents and were in pre-internment custody awaiting a decision on whether they would be interned or released. The process through which it was decided what would happen to people held in pre-internment custody will be explained, as will what happened to the detainees after their time in the TDF. Arrests and the Temporary Detention Facility, 14–16 September 2003 The ten detainees who went on to be exposed to hooding, stress positions, noise, limited sleep and a limited diet at the TDF between Sunday 14 and Tuesday 16 September 2003 were arrested at three locations. Once a short account of their arrests has been given, attention can turn to their subsequent experiences and the motivations of those who used the ‘five techniques’. Operation Salerno led to the arrests of all bar one of the detainees. The FRAGO – a written Fragmentary Order – that outlined Operation Salerno explained that it was to consist of searches of certain locations within four districts of Basra. Various hotels, including the Hotel Ibn al-Haitham with which nine of the ten detainees were connected, were to be searched by A Company of 1QLR in order to ‘disrupt criminal activity and gain intelligence’.36 Intelligence had already revealed that before Coalition Forces entered Basra ‘[s]ecurity and Intelligence agents hid in this Hotel and kept important files and instruments there’.37 On this basis the hotel was identified as ‘a centre of FRL [Former Regime Loyalist] activity’.38 The search was to be a ‘soft knock’ operation, meaning that permission would be sought from the occupants to search the premises.39 A hard knock operation, by contrast, involves a search where entry is forced and is used when it is thought there is a threat inside the building.40 When the soldiers arrived at the Hotel Ibn al-Haitham at around 6am on Sunday 14 September,41 six men who were later to be arrested were present. All were hotel employees. Twenty-six-year-old Baha Mousa worked

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as a receptionist at the hotel in the evenings and was a car trader by day.42 Detainee 1, or D001 to use the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s cipher, was a cleaner and guard at the hotel.43 Detainee 2 was a night guard; Detainee 3 was manager of the hotel restaurant; Detainee 4 was the hotel’s generator operator; and Kifah Matairi, who was not given a cipher because he died of an unrelated accident before the Inquiry began, was an electrician.44 A seventh individual, Ahmad Matairi, was also arrested at the hotel after Kifah, his brother, telephoned and asked him to attend because the soldiers had requested the key to the safe.45 Ahmad Matairi co-owned the hotel with Detainee 6, who was arrested elsewhere later that day, and Civilian 1.46 The soldiers from 1QLR found three Kalashnikovs in hotel reception.47 Detainees 1, 2, 3 and 4 all stated the weapons were there to help protect the hotel.48 It was, Detainee 4 added, normal practice for hotels in Basra to own weapons for this purpose.49 Further weapons and other suspicious items including two sub-machine guns, two pistols and a satellite phone were found elsewhere in the hotel, chiefly in the safe and in a locked toilet.50 When these latter discoveries were made the soldiers, in the words of one of the detainees, ‘became very angry’.51 This was more weapons than a business was permitted to own and the find created suspicions about what was going on in the hotel.52 When it was also discovered that Civilian 1, who had been in the hotel when the search began, had fled the scene, the soldiers treated the remaining men differently.53 Varying accounts of the treatment meted out from that point until the detainees were taken from the hotel have been put forward by the detainees and the soldiers. Humiliating treatment is one of the most prominent claims made by the detainees.54 At around 10am these six men had been arrested and all bar Detainee 3 were taken from the hotel and moved to the TDF. This was located at the Main Headquarters of the Battlegroup 1QLR belonged to (BG Main), formerly the Ba’ath Party headquarters.55 Detainee 3 agreed to take soldiers to the home of Civilian 1 because he was told this might lead to his own release.56 Upon arrival, the soldiers found that Civilian 1 was not at the house, but his father, who was to become Detainee 6, and Civilian 1’s eighteen-year-old brother, who was to become Detainee 5, were present. Detainee 6 was a co-owner of the hotel and Detainee 5 worked in the communications centre attached to the hotel where customers could make phone calls.57 Soldiers executed a hard knock operation at the house,58 most likely because of what had been found at the hotel and because of Civilian 1’s decision to go on the run. Detainee 3, who had taken soldiers to the house, rather than being released as had been suggested to him, was taken to the TDF at around noon.59 The two men found at the house were also detained and were taken to the TDF at about 2pm.60 The final detainee held at the TDF from Sunday 14 September was unconnected with the hotel. Stephen Wilding, commander of a multiple – a group

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of around eight soldiers – in B Company 1QLR, saw a white Nissan pick-up truck with a red stripe on the streets of Basra. It matched the description of a stolen vehicle he had been briefed about, so he and his multiple approached it.61 Guns were found in the car. The driver has since claimed that men with guns had forcibly got into the car. After he caused a crash in the hope it would allow him to escape, the men left, leaving their weapons behind.62 Regardless of how the guns came to be in the car, they caused him to be arrested and taken to the TDF.63 He was Ahmad Maitham, originally known as Detainee 7. A change in personal circumstances led him to invite the Baha Mousa Inquiry to lift the anonymity order he had originally been granted.64 It is likely that he arrived at the TDF soon after 10pm that day.65 What happened to these ten detainees at the TDF was to result in Baha Mousa’s death and a variety of other far-reaching repercussions. Motivations for using the ‘five techniques’ It is not easy to reach conclusions about what happened to these detainees at the TDF and why. There are conflicting claims about the form the ‘five techniques’ took, most notably between detainees and soldiers, and in the soldiers’ explanations of how each technique came to be used. Nevertheless it is possible to provide descriptions of the experiences of these ten detainees between their arrival at the TDF on Sunday 14 September, and, for the surviving detainees, until Tuesday 16 September 2003 when they were transferred out of the TDF. The explanations for their experiences fall into two categories: facilitating and motivating factors. This categorisation distinguishes between circumstances that allowed the events to happen, and those that caused them to happen. The facilitating factors will be turned to later in the chapter, and include the loss of the 1972 ban on the ‘five techniques’ from the MoD’s corporate memory by 2003 that meant the ban was not adequately contained in written guidance materials and training. These factors facilitated the events of 14–16 September in that had they been different – had the ban not been forgotten, for instance – these detainees might have had a different experience. The present task, though, is to identify what happened at the TDF, and the motivations of the soldiers involved. As well as the nature and intentions behind each of the five techniques, the use of plasticuffs and beatings will be discussed, as will the circumstances of Baha Mousa’s death and the aims and outcomes of the interrogations conducted during this time. Ahmad Matairi described his time at the TDF in the following understandably emotive terms: ‘It was the worst day in my life. I wouldn’t have imagined to see people who were inhuman and who lacked conscience to this degree. I wouldn’t have imagined. They had no mercy whatsoever, regrettably. A man is distinguished with their mercy, sympathy, values and life conscience. They had none of that.’66 Detainee 3 said that the mistreatment began as soon as

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they arrived at the TDF.67 Each of the ‘five techniques’ was used there during these three days in September 2003. Many of them took a different form from those seen in Aden and Northern Ireland. Hooding, however, bore striking similarities in the sense that it was used for sight deprivation and in that it was used to prepare the detainees for questioning. A chronology of the detainees’ time at the TDF was hastily put together by Major Edward Fenton, chief of staff to Brigadier Moore of 19 Mechanised Brigade, in response to Baha Mousa’s death. It states that hooding began as soon as the detainees arrived at BG Main.68 Fenton himself disputes the reliability of this document on the basis that much of the information was provided by 1QLR, who may have wished to mislead people about their treatment of the detainees.69 However, the admission that hooding began straight away still stands. Hoods were either lifted or removed when food or water was provided.70 They were taken off during Tactical Questioning,71 a form of interrogation, which took place in the Tactical Questioning room located in Headquarters Building. The other main type of interrogation conducted by the British military in Iraq was known as Interrogation, and consisted of a more protracted effort to obtain intelligence from prisoners. The distance between the Headquarters Building and the TDF is roughly equal to the length of the two large accommodation blocks between them.72 Information obtained from the Battlegroup Operations Officer, whose responsibility was planning and co-ordination,73 showed Baha Mousa to have been hooded for twenty-three hours and forty minutes of his thirty-six hours in detention.74 It is not clear where this information came from, but the officer was later judged to be honest by Sir William Gage, Chair of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, who heard evidence from him during the Inquiry’s hearings.75 Others were hooded until the morning of Tuesday 16 September, shortly before being transferred out of the TDF.76 Another key feature was that according to the eight detainees still alive in 2009 they were hooded with two, and in some cases three, sandbags at a time.77 Private Garry Reader admits that two sandbags were used during his guard shift.78 Because of the nature of the material they were made out of, one sandbag was not enough to prevent sight altogether. Application of the sandbags also restricted breathing in a building with no air conditioning at a time when the temperature was often over 58 degrees Celsius.79 An effort was made to stop hoods from being applied to these detainees. On the Sunday evening, the detainees’ first night at the TDF, Paul Smith, who as Battalion Provost Sergeant was responsible for ensuring soldiers ‘kept in line and conducted themselves appropriately’, ordered that the hoods be removed.80 Smith believed that the reason for hooding was to condition or prepare detainees for Tactical Questioning, the kind of interrogation they were to undergo during their time at the TDF. At that point he believed that interrogation had been completed and as a result there was no longer any

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justification for hooding.81 But shortly after hoods were removed an order was given to replace them.82 Colour Sergeant Robert Livesey, a member of the intelligence cell that collated and analysed information, and who has admitted to striking a detainee, confirms that it was him who gave the order to replace the hoods, and that he gave this order because he thought it was the wishes of Tactical Questioner Sergeant Ray Smulski.83 Smulski has no recollection of communicating this to Livesey.84 None the less, hoods were replaced for all detainees, though Detainee 6’s hood was removed on the morning of the second day as a result of pre-existing poor health and a medic’s examination.85 After the ‘five techniques’ were used at Northern Ireland’s ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ governmental discussions about whether the techniques should be used in future centred on their benefits to intelligence and to the security of the detainees, the Interrogation Centre and its staff. Preparing detainees for interrogation so as to increase the intelligence produced, also known as conditioning, was a motivation for using hoods in the TDF episode. To what extent security concerns had a role is much less certain. Although many soldiers witnessed these techniques being used at the TDF and might have taken action that led to orders to stop them, the impetus for the techniques, and therefore the most direct form of responsibility for them, lies with a much smaller group of individuals. The individuals who could be regarded as directly responsible for the detainees were the two Tactical Questioners who interrogated them, Corporal Donald Payne of the Regimental Provost Staff, and Major Michael Peebles, the Battlegroup Internment Review Officer (BGIRO). The creation of the BGIRO role in June 2003 caused considerable confusion over who was responsible for the detainees whilst they were at the TDF. Although creating the role was an effort to avoid sending detainees to the Theatre Internment Facility (TIF) unnecessarily by improving the system through which it was assessed whether they should be interned, released or passed to the RMP in connection with criminal activities,86 there were contrasting views amongst the RMP and the BGIROs about who was responsible for any detainees held at the TDF.87 There was also confusion over whether the Tactical Questioners were responsible for the detainees whilst they were in the TDF or were responsible for them only whilst they were being questioned. After Baha Mousa’s death efforts were made to clarify the chain of command for prisoner handling, and the BGIRO’s involvement in the running of the TDF was increased.88 Payne’s evidence is questionable. Even though he disclosed more to the Baha Mousa Inquiry than to the Court Martial that he and six other soldiers were put before as a result of the TDF episode, doubt has still been cast on his testimony to the Inquiry.89 He claims that he ordered hooding to be used because one of the Tactical Questioners told him to.90 But there is no evidence to suggest that either Tactical Questioner gave such an order. Regardless of

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who provided the impetus for using hoods, there is consistency in Payne’s evidence to the effect that he gave the order because he thought hooding was a part of conditioning, which had to be done before Tactical Questioning. Given that hooding was still banned by the 1972 interrogation Directive it is significant that the Ministry of Defence has admitted hooding was intended as an aid to interrogation in this case.91 There was a general understanding among many of the soldiers who guarded the detainees at the TDF that hooding benefited security.92 As depicted in Figure 6.1, the TDF comprised three rooms: one to either side with an interconnecting corridor and a room containing a floor-level toilet in between.93 Without cells it was not possible to keep the detainees separate. But most of the detainees were arrested together so there was little need to conceal their identities from one another. Hoods would have prevented the detainees from identifying the soldiers and interpreters present, but this advantage was reduced by removing hoods when food was provided. The windows of the TDF were blacked out,94 so even without hoods prisoners would not be able to see the layout of the base. In sum, there was little security justification for sight deprivation in the TDF, but this does not mean security did not motivate the use of hoods as soldiers may have believed that hooding prisoners within BG Main was standard practice for security reasons. Before moving on, it should be made clear that there is a difference between hooding and sight deprivation in that blindfolds or blacked-out goggles can achieve the latter without restricting a detainee’s ability to breathe. More will be said about this in the context of changes made after the TDF episode.

Figure 6.1 The Temporary Detention Facility, Basra Source: BMInq, week 1, day 11, BMI00923, September 2006. Prepared by the Metropolitan Police’s Computer Aided Modelling Bureau and commissioned by the Royal Military Police. Crown Copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v2.0, accessed 29 May 2014, www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/2/

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The predominant form of stress position used in the TDF episode was the ski position.95 In this, detainees were made to sit with their backs against the wall without a chair or stool for support. A video that was probably shot by a soldier wanting to create a souvenir for himself shows six of the detainees in the right-hand room of the TDF and clearly depicts Payne enforcing this stress position with rough handling and by shouting abuse.96 A standing form of stress position was also used on occasion.97 Payne was not the only one to use physical force to get detainees to maintain stress positions.98 Three other soldiers, at least, have confessed to shouting at detainees with the same aim.99 These efforts suggest these positions were enforced long after they became uncomfortable. As with hooding there is conflicting evidence on whose idea it was to use stress positions.100 Many of the soldiers who enforced them likely did so in the belief that it was expected of them. Corporal John Douglas, who visited the TDF without any need to do so, helped maintain stress positions in the belief that it helped condition detainees in preparation for interrogation.101 Reader has explained that he helped maintain stress positions because it was Payne’s wishes.102 Many soldiers have reported that Payne was popular and had a fearsome reputation, both of which discouraged them from telling the truth to the RMP’s SIB who investigated the circumstances of Baha Mousa’s death.103 The degree of influence Payne might have exerted over others is highlighted by an American Colonel who notes that, for junior and mid-grade soldiers, ‘leadership is the most significant factor in ethical military behaviour’.104 Noise was used in two ways. Detainee 5 was put next to a loud, hot generator overlooked by the Tactical Questioning room.105 Generators were common in Iraq and were in operation all the time.106 Davies ordered that this detainee be kept next to the generator before he questioned him a second time. This was not, he has stated, intended to aid interrogation.107 Davies instead explains that he wanted the detainee back at short notice, and as there was no individual cell close to the Tactical Questioning room the noise of the generator would stop him from hearing other detainees being questioned.108 In the event, Detainee 5 was left there for nearly two hours.109 The MoD expressed no opinion, leaving it up to the Inquiry to determine whether noise was intended to aid interrogation in this instance.110 Sir William concluded that one of the motives for placing this detainee by the generator was ‘to make him more amenable to answering questions’.111 Other forms of noise were used inside the TDF itself. These chiefly took the form of shouting and, for a period, banging a metal bar on the floor. Keeping the detainees from sleeping, rather than aiding interrogation, was the aim of both.112 Stress positions are also relevant here as there is an indication that they were enforced in order to prevent detainees from sleeping.113 It appears that some of the detainees were allowed to sleep after Mousa’s death on the

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second night,114 while others were not able to sleep at all during their time at the TDF.115 In general the treatment of the detainees improved after his death.116 This raises the question of the aim of depriving the detainees of sleep. Unfortunately there is little evidence to go on here. One of the soldiers who performed guard duty reported that he kept them awake because it was what Payne wanted.117 As already noted, Payne thought the detainees ought to be conditioned. It is possible he saw deprivation of sleep as a part of this process. Helpfully, the MoD admits that the detainees were deprived of sleep in order to condition them in preparation for interrogation.118 It is unlikely it would state this without being confident of its accuracy. The surviving detainees remember being offered breakfast on both mornings of their detention at the TDF.119 Sir William concluded that the detainees were indeed offered breakfast on both mornings but no other meals.120 The chronology of their time at the TDF that Fenton hastily composed noted that water was offered every thirty minutes during their time there.121 But Fenton himself admits 1QLR claimed some things had happened that with retrospect clearly did not.122 Water was given on occasion but not in sufficient quantities.123 In addition, sometimes it was poured over detainees’ heads, making it difficult or impossible to drink.124 Limited access to toilet facilities,125 and injuries sustained from beatings experienced at the TDF, may have deterred detainees from consuming what they were offered. Unlike the restricted diet that was given to detainees in Aden and Northern Ireland, there was no apparent intention to aid conditioning by providing only a limited diet in this case. Sir William concluded that the failure to feed the detainees properly was instead likely ‘caused by a lack of proper attention to the Detainees’ needs’.126 Although it is not one of the ‘five techniques’, it is clear from the above that the detainees were beaten. Photos of the severe bruising sustained by the detainees were published in the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s Report.127 The sum of the beatings was that, in the words of Detainee 6, ‘I felt I was dying’.128 Two detainees were hospitalised as a result of their treatment at the TDF.129 Medical checks were carried out on the detainees during their time at the TDF,130 but controversy surrounds the involvement of medical personnel in this episode, most notably in respect of whether Captain Derek Keilloh, a 1QLR Regimental Medical Officer, had fulfilled his duties. The investigations into his conduct and their repercussions are examined in the next chapter. The MoD admits that this brutality, to use its term, was motivated by misplaced revenge, thuggery, sadism and loss of control.131 Revenge was certainly a motivation. On 24 June 2003 six members of the RMP were killed. This was followed by the death of Captain Dai Jones, a medic with 1QLR, on 14 August and the deaths of three more RMP on 23 August.132 A rumour that the detainees arrested at the hotel were connected with this series of deaths was known to some of those who visited the TDF whilst the detainees were

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there.133 A rumour was all that it was. The only intelligence report that might support such a view was not produced until the day after the arrests. It stated that ‘a vehicle similar to the one used in [the] attack on [the] RMP on 23 Aug 03, was seen outside this hotel. A separate report stated that armed men were seen at the hotel around the time of the attack.’134 This does not constitute proof that the hotel staff were responsible for the attack. The fact that this possible connection, and purported connections with other soldiers’ deaths, motivated one soldier to kick a prisoner in revenge for the deaths of the six RMPs in June,135 and another to punch detainees because of anger and frustration over Jones’s death,136 reveals the mood of some of the soldiers involved in the detainees’ mistreatment. While it does not justify their actions, it helps explain them. Sir William Gage concluded that nineteen soldiers used physical force such as punches, pushes, kicks and slaps against these detainees.137 The video taken in the TDF shows the detainees with their hands plasticuffed together in front of them at the wrists. Plasticuffs provide a way of restraining prisoners without using metal handcuffs. The MoD maintains that plasticuffs were used mainly for security.138 However, for one detainee at least they were applied tightly enough to cause injury.139 There is undoubtedly a tension between the security and safety of the soldiers guarding detainees, and detainee welfare. Striking a balance acceptable to all is extremely difficult. The MoD and Payne have stated that hooding the detainees was intended to aid interrogation. Conditioning and security may have both played a part in exposing Detainee 5 to the noise of the generator. Conditioning also motivated the use of stress positions and keeping the detainees awake. The only of the ‘five techniques’ that it can be confidently asserted was not intended to aid interrogation in this case was limited provision of food. It may be the case that some of the soldiers involved held personal motivations that they have not revealed, meaning that there may be other motivations for which there is no accessible evidence. When the techniques were used in Aden and Northern Ireland, the reason for this was, first and foremost, conditioning. The security benefits of the techniques were highlighted in 1971–72 in the context of discussions about whether, after the reaction to their use in Northern Ireland, they should be retained for possible future use. There were no deaths in custody in the Northern Ireland case, and while no deaths in custody in Aden are known to have taken place, given the level of interest in the treatment of prisoners there at the time it is highly likely that any deaths would be public knowledge. Only the Iraq case was to see a detainee lose their life in custody. Some of the details of the final minutes of Baha Mousa’s life are contested by the soldiers who were present. Yet the following can be confidently asserted. On the evening of Monday 15 September, the day after the detainees were arrested, Mousa was involved in a struggle with soldiers in the room of the TDF that contained the toilet. He had removed his hood and possibly

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his plasticuffs,140 and resisted efforts to restrain him. After considering the evidence Sir William found that Payne assaulted Mousa at this time.141 The post-mortem finding that he had sustained ninety-three separate injuries is oft-cited. In fact, this figure includes only external injuries.142 Ascertaining the cause of death was challenging. Sir William concluded that there were two causes: Firstly, Baha Mousa had been made vulnerable by a range of factors, namely: lack of food and water, the heat, rhabdomyolysis [the breakdown of muscle tissue releasing toxic substances into the circulatory system], acute renal failure, exertion, exhaustion, fear and multiple injuries. Both stress positions, which are a form of exertion, and hooding, which obviously must have increased Baha Mousa’s body temperature, contributed to these factors. Secondly, against the background of this vulnerability, the trigger for his death was a violent assault, consisting of punches, being thrown across the room and possibly also of kicks. It also involved an unsafe method of restraint, in particular being held to the ground in an attempt to reapply plasticuffs. The combination of both causes was necessary to cause his death; neither was alone sufficient to kill him.143

In short, three of the ‘five techniques’, including hooding and stress positions used with the intention of aiding interrogation, contributed to Mousa’s death. It may be some small consolation to his friends and family that Payne has expressed regret for his involvement.144 The MoD, too, has apologised for the ‘appalling treatment’ the detainees experienced.145 The final aspect of the detainees’ time at the TDF to be considered was interrogation. They were taken, one at a time, to a building near to the TDF where they went through Tactical Questioning, a form of interrogation. As with the term ‘detention’, ‘interrogation’ is used in connection with Iraq in a broad sense, referring in general to the types of interrogation carried out by the Armed Forces, and to one of these two types. Tactical Questioning aimed ‘to extract time sensitive information from a … [detainee] or to establish if a … [detainee] requires interrogation in the Theatre … [Internment] Facility (TIF). During TQ [Tactical Questioning] the questioner aims to exploit the shock of capture and disorientation felt by the suspect in order to gain intelligence that will lead to subsequent operations.’146 It is therefore distinguished from the Interrogations carried out at the TIF on the basis of what kind of intelligence was sought. Given that many of the ‘five techniques’ were used with the intention of preparing the detainees for Tactical Questioning it is important to examine the details of this interrogation and whether it produced intelligence. Two Tactical Questioners interrogated these detainees: Smulski and Staff Sergeant Mark Davies. Neither were full-time Tactical Questioners, primarily fulfilling other duties whilst on tour in Iraq.147 Smulski was qualified for

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this role on the basis of having completed a Prisoner Handling and Tactical Questioning training course in 1999, and Davies on the basis that he had completed the Interrogation training course earlier in 2003.148 Both these courses were delivered or managed by the Joint Services Interrogation Organisation (JSIO), the successor to the JSIW. The JSIO became part of the DISC in 1997.149 The DISC is where all intelligence training, including interrogation training, for the Armed Forces takes place,150 and replaced the Intelligence Centre where in 1971 the ‘five techniques’ were taught to RUC Special Branch. The longest Tactical Questioning sessions that the detainees arrested on 14 September went through appear to have lasted an hour, the estimate Detainee 5 attached to the session he went through before his time by the generator.151 Many of the detainees were interrogated only once, though Detainee 5 was interrogated three times.152 The aim behind the Tactical Questioning of these detainees was to obtain information that would allow the military to find Civilian 1, the co-owner of the hotel who had fled from the site.153 The surviving detainees’ accounts of what they were asked is in line with Davies’s and Smulski’s accounts. Questions about Civilian 1 focused on who he was and where he was.154 They were asked basic questions about themselves such as what family they had and what they did for a living.155 Detainee 5 recalls being asked to identify individuals in photos he was shown.156 A 15 September report by Davies on his interrogation of three of the detainees gives a valuable insight into what intelligence he gained from them.157 He recorded that all three detainees responded to the questions posed, and that Detainee 5 was the most forthcoming.158 On Monday 15 September Peebles, the BGIRO, expressed the view that Tactical Questioning suggested the detainees connected with the hotel comprised two-thirds of a Former Regime Loyalist (FRL) cell.159 The focus of the Tactical Questioning, from that point onwards, at least, was ‘the retrieval of information leading to follow up operations to capture the remaining members of the … [cell], gather additional intelligence and compile evidence for further prosecution’.160 Davies drew the conclusion that Civilian 1 was the dominant person in the group.161 Of the information that he states supports the albeit tentative conclusion that Civilian 1 was running an FRL cell at the hotel, none obviously stems from interrogation, though interrogation may have helped interpret information gained from other sources. The evidence consists of the forged ID cards, photos, and weaponry and related material found at the hotel, combined with intelligence that hotels provided ‘perfect cover for FRL operations’.162 Davies recommended additional Tactical Questioning and subsequent interrogation in order that their involvement in FRL activity be explored further.163 Detainee 6’s Interment Record – a form that was completed when he was interned on suspicion of being a terrorist – lists the evidence that led to his internment. Again, this comprises the weapons and other items seized at the

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hotel and intelligence reports that another cell sent members to the hotel to collect weapons on the day the detainees were arrested.164 The intelligence provided during Tactical Questioning therefore played no significant role in his internment. There are dangers involved in extrapolating from the details of the Tactical Questioning of these three detainees to the questioning of the remaining seven. The limited, tactical, aims of this form of questioning must also be remembered when evaluating the intelligence it produced and the impact that intelligence went on to have. Although after reviewing all the evidence Sir William concluded it was ‘highly unlikely that the Detainees were involved in any insurgent or terrorist activity’,165 at the time there was evidence to suggest the contrary. This might have justified some of the conditioning techniques used at the TDF, but there is no doubt that limits on what was acceptable for these techniques were exceeded. The official responses to this treatment included modifications to training and written guidance on interrogation and prisoner handling and are the subject of the next chapter. Completing this account of the surviving detainees’ time at the TDF demands an account of their transfer to the TIF at Um Qasr. The TIF was run by the US, and was home to the UK’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT) which interrogated the UK’s internees. The surviving nine detainees were transferred to the TIF on the morning of Tuesday 16 September, the day after Mousa’s death.166 Medical staff at the TIF judged that Detainee 3 and Kifah Matairi required hospitalisation. Matairi was kept in hospital for around two months with acute kidney failure.167 The detainees were interned for periods ranging from around two to six months before being released.168 The ‘five techniques’: facilitators The above account of the detainees’ experiences identifies the factors that motivated the use of each of the ‘five techniques’, plasticuffs and beatings. Yet this does not fully explain the events of 14–16 September 2003. To remedy this, the remainder of the chapter highlights the relevant facilitating factors that paved the way for the use of the ‘five techniques’. Had any of these been different, it is possible that the use of the ‘five techniques’ might have been curtailed or even not taken place. These factors consist of keeping the detainees at the TDF well beyond the fourteen-hour time limit within which they should have been transferred to the TIF; the loss of the 1972 ban on the ‘five techniques’; the ineffectiveness of an April 2003 ban on hooding in Iraq; the difficulties of conducting an effective handover of orders from First Battalion Black Watch Regiment (1BW) to 1QLR in June 2003; the belief that hooding and stress positions were authorised; and deficiencies in 1QLR’s training. The even broader underlying matters of the responsibilities of the Commanding Officer, the

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maintenance of military discipline and instilling in soldiers the confidence to question orders are also addressed. The following chapter will examine the steps that the Ministry of Defence has since taken to ensure these facilitators are eliminated, or, at least, moderated. The length of time the detainees were held at the TDF was itself a facilitating factor. As of 26 June 2003 prisoners were to be delivered to the TIF within fourteen hours of capture.169 This was made somewhat less clear in early September 2003 when the order became to transfer prisoners to the TIF within fourteen hours ‘or as soon as possible thereafter’.170 This fourteen-hour limit was breached spectacularly in respect of the ten detainees arrested on 14 September. It is possible that the fact 1QLR had no Tactical Questioners of its own and the general shortage of Tactical Questioners in the brigade delayed Tactical Questioning in this instance.171 There is no convincing evidence that this was the case. Tactical Questioning was delayed, however, while the ID cards found at the hotel were investigated. They appeared to be issued by the US Titan corporation, and allowed the holders to pass though Coalition checkpoints and to carry weapons.172 British military intelligence and the CIA eventually confirmed that the ID cards were false, allowing interrogation to commence.173 While Tactical Questioning ended between noon and mid-afternoon on Monday 15 September, the prisoners were not moved the 70km to the TIF that day because of a lack of the necessary manpower and resources.174 The detainees’ transfer to the TIF was also delayed by a mistaken belief that detainees could not be admitted to the TIF overnight.175 In the event, the surviving detainees were held at the TDF for approaching fortyeight hours. While their extended detention at the TDF was not a reason for their experiences, had the fourteen-hour limit been complied with this treatment would have ended sooner. The first of the remaining facilitating factors to arise was the loss of the ban on the ‘five techniques’. As detailed in a previous chapter this ban was included in the June 1972 interrogation Directive that was produced in response to the re-examination of the subject prompted by the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland. By 2003 the 1972 Directive had ‘very largely fallen from the corporate memory’.176 Key people planning Operations Telic 1 and Telic 2 did not see Part One of the 1972 Directive, the part that contained the ban.177 A potential explanation for this is that the British Army is more likely to forget those lessons that clash with its belief that it conducts counterinsurgency well and humanely.178 Another rests with policy. Jon Moran, who has written about British military intelligence, describes the reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’ in Iraq as a failure of intelligence policy, as well as a failure of training and implementation of intelligence.179 In 1997 a new ‘Policy for interrogation and related activities’ was issued and applied not only to internal security operations but to all military operations.180 Part One of the

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1972 Directive remained extant, but the directive specific to Operation Telic produced in accordance with the 1997 policy’s requirement to do so did not refer to it.181 This was a missed opportunity to refer to the ban in new documentation. The 1997 policy on interrogation might itself have reiterated the ban on the techniques. Even with sufficient and appropriate training, written materials and discipline, it is not possible to prevent illegal and unauthorised methods from ever being used. None the less, the loss of the ban from the MoD’s corporate memory facilitated the use of the techniques in Iraq by removing a safeguard that might have prevented the techniques from being used. Whether the soldiers who used the ‘five techniques’ in Iraq came to know of them because of the Northern Ireland episode should also be considered. It has already been noted that the techniques used in the TDF episode bore only some similarities to the form they took in Northern Ireland, with a different stress position used and no white noise machine. The MoD makes the very reasonable observation that the episodes were also different in that ‘the clinical and deliberate application of the combination of techniques in Northern Ireland … is in clear contrast to the shambolic, amateur and brutal use of hooding, sleep deprivation and noise in the TDF’.182 The chances that the techniques were transferred by individuals familiar with the Northern Ireland episode are slim to none, as many of the soldiers involved in guarding the detainees at the TDF were too young to have served in Northern Ireland before the techniques were banned.183 Whether knowledge of the techniques reached the soldiers involved though Conduct after Capture training, also known as interrogation resistance training, should also be considered. Level 1 Conduct after Capture training was classroom-based rather than practical and was delivered to all soldiers annually.184 Efforts made since to make clearer which of the methods it mentioned were prohibited indicate an awareness of this weakness in the training.185 It cannot be ruled out that knowledge of the techniques may have reached the soldiers guarding the detainees through this training. Whilst in Northern Ireland and Aden the techniques were used as a result of an intentional transfer to these locations, in Iraq the techniques came to be used as a result of a much more complex set of factors. In early 2003 hooding had been banned. This ban was ineffectual, as the TDF episode demonstrates. As General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 1  Armoured Division in early 2003 Major General Robin Brims was the most senior member of the UK’s armed forces in Iraq. He issued an order banning the use of hoods for any purpose in Iraq.186 This was in April, after the International Committee of the Red Cross raised the issue in respect of PW, after Brims saw PW hooded in British custody at the TIF and thought it was inhumane and ‘sent the wrong message to the Iraqi people’, and after

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discussions within the Army about the legality of hooding.187 Brims’s order was an oral one. This was normal for the fast-moving environment of the war phase of the conflict, and, as GOC, Brims would rarely have written anything himself.188 The Chief of Staff was responsible for disseminating the order.189 The ban failed to stop hoods being used later in the year because the order got through to some people and not others, for which Brims himself accepts responsibility.190 This can be explained by pointing out that although prisoner handling was to become of the utmost importance to the Army, it was just one issue of many that came across the desks of their legal advisers and senior personnel. The failure to establish this ban marked another lost opportunity to stop hoods from being used. A written order from earlier in the year that might have stopped hoods from being used in Iraq was FRAGO 152, a divisional-level order that stated that detainees’ faces should not be covered in any circumstances as this might impair breathing. It also stated that detainees should be treated with humanity and dignity and not be assaulted.191 This order was reissued at brigade level, as was common practice.192 These orders ought to have been handed over when 1QLR formally took over from 1BW on 27 June 2003.193 Prisoner handling was a relatively low priority at this handover though,194 as it was just one of many issues the Army was involved with at the time. A number of members of 1QLR involved with the handover do not recall seeing either order.195 It appears this was an oversight, yet it must be remembered that ‘despite the structured handover process, there is still limited time and a lot to cover’ during a handover.196 The possibility of losing orders at handover has since been addressed by the creation of a Standard Operating Instruction that is distributed when pre-deployment training is begun.197 One of the aims of this book is to examine what authorisation there was for the use of the ‘five techniques’. It has become clear that in the Iraq example there was little in the way of orders to use the ‘five techniques’, especially in respect of limited diet, which resulted from a lack of proper attention to the detainees’ needs. But there is evidence of a belief that hooding and stress positions had been authorised as conditioning methods. Major Antony Royce, Peebles’s predecessor as BGIRO, saw 1BW using hoods and queried this with two colleagues, one of whom had an intelligence role and the other a legal role. He gained the impression that hooding and stress positions were permitted and that through these conversations he had been given authorisation to use these techniques.198 This may have led to a standard operating procedure in which hooding and stress positions were used for conditioning. Those who regularly witness practices such as hooding may understandably come to the conclusion that they are authorised. No evidence has been found to suggest that hooding or any other technique examined here was learnt by observing the American military use them. A common defence against alleged misconduct is

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that the soldiers came to understand that the treatment in question was what their commanders wanted.199 This raises the difficult question of to what extent those in command are responsible for actively seeking to find out what is happening under their command, and to take action to address any shortcomings. This is particularly difficult when standard operating procedures vary between groups as small as multiples.200 The belief that hooding and stress positions were permitted may have given rise to a standard operating procedure that was not in keeping with what was legal but that was allowed to continue. This contrasts sharply with the Aden and Northern Ireland cases in which senior members of government, the security forces and the civilian intelligence community gave their consent for the techniques to be used. A further facilitating factor behind the use of the ‘five techniques’ lies with training. Annual training for all troops covers the Law of Armed Conflict, which governs the treatment of PW and civilian detainees. The lawyer Mark Osiel notes there is a debate over how much influence law can have over whether military atrocities take place.201 But it is difficult to believe that law has no role to play. Questions posed to tens, if not more, of the military witnesses to the Baha Mousa Inquiry reveal a widespread understanding gained from training that prisoners were to be treated humanely. Understanding of what is meant by ‘humane’ will indisputably vary, even if the content and teaching methods used in this training were the same for everyone. Misunderstandings as to what treatment is permitted in a war or an Occupation may then arise. In respect of soldiers active in 2003 the MoD accepts ‘that there was a lack of detailed prisoner handling training’.202 There were also deficiencies in the pre-deployment training (PDT) delivered to 1QLR. Formal warning that it was to deploy to Iraq was delayed, preventing it, in Lieutenant Colonel Mendonça’s words, from ‘conducting properly resourced training’.203 The Warning Order informing it that it would be deployed on Operation Telic 2 and that it would be relieving 1BW in Basra was issued on 3 May, five weeks before its deployment.204 One month earlier Mendonça anticipated such an order and began making preparations for predeployment training.205 1QLR’s ability to engage in PDT was then limited by its involvement in Operation Fresco, which saw it cover a fire-fighters’ strike that lasted into April 2003.206 As a result PDT did not include sufficient attention to prisoner handling. Nor was it known at the time that they would be handling civilian detainees in such numbers.207 Since 2003 steps have been taken to avoid this deficiency and decrease the chances of prisoners receiving improper treatment. A forty-minute briefing on detention, which states, among other things, that the ‘five techniques’ are prohibited is now part of the training given to military personnel when they arrive in theatre.208 This examination of the factors that paved the way for the events and  actions detailed earlier in the chapter has touched on the underlying

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issue of military  conduct. The final observations on this topic concern command, discipline and moral courage. There were soldiers who visited the TDF and saw the detainees and the state they were in, yet did not report what  they had seen.209 Reasons why they kept quiet include loyalty to the soldiers  involved, whom they knew they would have to work with in future.210 Others did speak out, but for a variety of reasons this failed to stop the treatment they witnessed from continuing.211 As Rowe has noted in a particularly analytical article on military misconduct, ‘[f]urther work  … needs to be done by armed forces on the issue of why failing to report misconduct occurs as frequently as it appears to do’.212 This is another area in which the MoD has said it will make improvements: while soldiers should continue to exhibit loyalty and discipline, increased efforts will be made to train soldiers to display moral courage by reporting behaviour they are concerned about.213 Bennett notes that soldiers’ reluctance to stop the ‘five techniques’ from being used when they believed their use had been ordered may show that regimental discipline was too strong. He contrasts this with the MoD’s view that discipline in the Queen’s Lancashire Regiment collapsed.214 Mendonça has expressed the view that discipline was lacking among the soldiers guarding the detainees.215 All these views may be correct as military discipline should exhibit itself in a variety of ways in a set of circumstances as complex as those seen at the TDF. The frequency with which those soldiers questioned by the Baha Mousa Inquiry blame Payne but do not blame Mendonça, their Commanding Officer, is noteworthy. Yet as Rowe points out, ‘[a] very significant factor [in preventing misconduct] will be the attitude of the commander, whether a corporal or a general, towards the maintenance of discipline’.216 Rowe adds that it is difficult to convict commanders at courts martial when they ‘did not order nor were at the scene of the crimes committed by those under their command’.217 This is illustrated by the 2006–7 Court Martial held in connection with the TDF episode. Mendonça was charged with negligently performing a duty by failing to ensure the men at the TDF were not ill-treated and he was acquitted following a ruling of ‘no case to answer’.218 In response to this ruling ‘certain sectors of the right-wing press were vociferous in their indignation’.219 The difficulties encountered during the Court Martial and the charges and rulings against the other six soldiers, who included Payne, Peebles and Davies, will be examined in the following chapter. Conclusion A great many factors allowed the events at the TDF to take place. It is possible the treatment experienced by the detainees held there between Sunday 14 and Tuesday 16 September 2003 might have been stopped or avoided altogether

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had the acts been reported and those reports acted on with sufficient vigour; had there been more extensive annual or pre-deployment training in the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’ and how detainees should be treated; had the impression not been gained that hooding and stress positions were authorised; had Brims’s ban on hooding been more thoroughly disseminated and recorded, and orders extant at the time of the handover to 1QLR been better flagged up and disseminated amongst 1QLR; had the 1972 ban on the ‘five techniques’ not been lost; and had the detainees spent only the maximum allowance of fourteen hours at the TDF. More influential though were the direct reasons for their experiences, the factors that actively motivated the soldiers involved to treat the detainees in the ways described here. Deficiencies in the provision of food and water are attributable to neglect. The beatings experienced by the detainees are attributable primarily to a misplaced and inexcusable desire for revenge. Security was a more significant factor, motivating exposing Detainee 5 to the noise of the generator and possibly motivating the use of hoods to achieve sight deprivation. Preparing the detainees for interrogation was the most significant cause in that it motivated hooding, stress positions, the lack of sleep achieved through the use of noise and possibly the placing of Detainee 5 next to the generator. Tactical Questioning – the form of interrogation used at the TDF – was carried out in order to ascertain the location of Civilian 1. He was believed to be the leader of an FRL cell to which, it was also believed, the detainees arrested in connection with Hotel Ibn al-Haitham belonged. Intelligence was obtained from the brief Tactical Questioning sessions conducted. Opinions will inevitably differ on whether the treatment of the detainees in preparation for interrogation was proportionate to the aim of arresting Civilian 1 and thus neutralising a potentially deadly FRL cell. The accounts of the detainees’ experiences, the video taken inside the TDF, the photos of bruising sustained and the account of Baha Mousa’s death and its effects on his family have an impact on observers that a report of the termination of an FRL cell would not. But the security forces are responsible for establishing and maintaining security, and achieving security may entail some encroachment on rights and other controversial activities. This question of proportionality – of whether the ends justify the means – appears throughout the ‘torture debate’ prompted by the ‘War on Terror’ and in connection with debates about Western states’ monitoring of citizens’ private communications. The debate about proportionality aside, the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Iraq can be criticised on the grounds that they were prohibited by the 1972 Directive governing interrogation in internal security operations. This explanation of how the ‘five techniques’ came to be used in Basra in September of 2003 demonstrates how easily such treatment can arise. A vast number of facilitating and motivating factors converged. As a result of

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the causes being so diffuse, responsibility for this reoccurrence of the techniques is similarly diffuse. This contrasts with the Aden and Northern Ireland cases in which responsibility was restricted to fewer individuals. There are known examples where similar interrogation techniques that were expressly approved have been used since 2001, whilst there are many others in which, as in the TDF episode, there was little or no explicit approval from above. Alternatively, it may be argued that one or more of the soldiers involved ought to have chosen to take responsibility for establishing what treatment was legal and for ensuring that only legal methods were used. The following chapter addresses the efforts made since 2003 to prevent or at least limit the likelihood of similar events reoccurring. While the current chapter has identified some changes made, such as an increase in the BGIRO’s involvement in the running of the TDF, the remaining chapter covers the more substantial changes made, as well as the other principal results of this episode. Notes 1 R. Kerr, The Military on Trial: The British Army in Iraq (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), p. 7. 2 P. Rowe, ‘Military misconduct during international armed operations: “Bad apples” or systemic failure?’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 13:2 (2008), 166. 3 H. Bennett, ‘The Baha Mousa tragedy: British Army detention and interrogation from Iraq to Afghanistan’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2012, online first, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2012.00539.x, 2. 4 G. W. Bush (President of the United States of America), address to a joint session of Congress and the American people, 21 September 2001, accessed 5 December 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13. 5 J. Hallenberg, ‘What were the Bush administration’s goals in invading Iraq?’, in J. Hallenberg and H. Karlsson (eds), The Iraq War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy and Operations (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 20. 6 Bush, State of the Union address, 29 January 2002, accessed 16 December 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm. 7 Bush, TV address, 20 March 2003, accessed 27 November 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/20/iraq.georgebush; Bush, speech at the Pentagon, 25 March 2003, accessed 27 November 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2003/ mar/25/iraq.usa. 8 Hallenberg, ‘What were the Bush administration’s goals in invading Iraq?’, p. 22. 9 Ibid., pp. 21–2. 10 Tony Blair (Prime Minister), TV address, 21 March 2003, accessed 27 November 2013, www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/21/uk.iraq. 11 BMInq, transcript, Brian Burridge (Air Marshal, Iraq, February – May 2003), 3 June 2010, p. 7. 12 T. R. Mockaitis, Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency (Westfort: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 95.

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13 This was widely reported. For example, see BBC News, ‘Arab TV captures “moment of history”’ (9 April 2003), accessed 6 August 2013, http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2933437.stm. 14 W. Murray and R. H. Scales Jr, The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 129–30, 152. 15 J. K. Wither, ‘Basra’s not Belfast: The British Army, “small wars” and Iraq’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 20:3 (2009), 620. 16 B. Huldt, ‘The Iraq War and the transatlantic relationship’, in J. Hallenberg and H. Karlsson (eds), The Iraq War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy and Operations (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 52. 17 Bush, speech, 25 May 2004, accessed 16 December 2013, www.theguardian.com/ world/2004/may/25/usa.iraq4. 18 R. Stewart, Occupational Hazards: My Time Governing in Iraq (London: Picador, 2006). 19 T. Dodge, Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p. 9. 20 Wither, ‘Basra’s not Belfast’, 619. 21 A. S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (London: Hurst, 2006), pp. 32–3. 22 Wither, ‘Basra’s not Belfast’, 619. 23 BMInq, witness statement, Peter Wall (General Officer Commanding (GOC), 1 Armoured Division, May–July 2003), 22 September 2009, p. 3. 24 BMInq, transcript, Peter Wall, 2 June 2010, p. 131. 25 Ibid., p. 132. 26 BMInq, transcript, Gerard Elias (Counsel to the Baha Mousa Inquiry), 16 July 2009, p. 32; Lancashire Infantry Museum, ‘Queen’s Lancashire Regiment’, no date, accessed 14 August 2013, www.lancashireinfantrymuseum.org.uk/theregiments/. 27 BMInq Report, Summary of Findings, p. 1322. 28 BMInq, witness statement, Jorge Mendonça (Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, Queen’s Lancashire Regiment, December 2001 – June 2004), 10 June 2009, p. 18. 29 H. Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 355, 333. 30 BMInq, transcript, Richard West (Royal Military Police, in Iraq September 2003), 26 April 2010, p. 159. 31 For example see BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV002414-16, Geoff Hoon (Defence Secretary), ‘Ministry of Defence Strategic Detention Policy: A Policy Statement by the Secretary of State’, March 2010. 32 BMInq, week 13, day 57, MOD020042, Main HQ 1(UK) Armoured Division, ‘FRAGO 29 to OPO 005/03 – Internment procedures’, 26 June 2003. 33 BMInq, day 7, MOD019686, PowerPoint delivered by Charles Barnett (Army Legal Services) as part of Operational Training Advisory Group, Army (OPTAG), training, ‘Op Telic – Legal Powers and Issues’, 3 September 2003; BMInq, week 13, day 57, MOD020042, Main HQ 1(UK) Armoured Division, ‘FRAGO 29 to OPO 005/03 – Internment procedures’, 26 June 2003.

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34 BMInq, week 25, day 103, MOD054914, Hoon, ‘Internment of Iraqi nationals in Iraq’, 15 July 2003. 35 BMInq, day 7, MOD019686, PowerPoint delivered by Barnett as part of OPTAG training, ‘Op Telic – Legal Powers and Issues’, 3 September 2003. 36 BMInq, week 18, day 76, MOD030882, ‘1 QLR FRAGO – OP SALERNO’, 12 September 2003. 37 BMInq, week 18, day 76, MOD030886, ‘Anzio Coy Target Pack’, annexed to ‘1 QLR FRAGO – OP SALERNO’, 12 September 2003. 38 Ibid. 39 BMInq, week 6, day 30, MOD000188, Service police interview statement with Adrian Redfearn (First Battalion The Queen’s Lancashire Regiment (1QLR)), no date. 40 BMInq, week 5, day 27, witness statement, Peter Strong (Territorial Army, involved with Operation Salerno), 18 April 2009, p. 3. 41 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 56. 42 BMInq, week 1, day 10, witness statement, Daoud Mousa (father of Baha Mousa), 5 June 2009, pp. 1, 3. 43 BMInq, transcript, D001 (Detainee 1), 28 September 2009, p. 4. 44 BMInq, transcript, Detainee 2, 30 September 2009, p. 4; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 3, 23 September 2009, p. 61; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 4, 7 October 2009, p. 7; BMInq, transcript, Singh (representing the detainees), 21 September 2009, p. 5. 45 BMInq, transcript, Ahmad Matairi, 28 September 2009, p. 56. 46 Ibid., p. 49. 47 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 57. 48 BMInq, transcript, Detainee 1, 28 September 2009, p. 5; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 2, 30 September 2009, p. 5; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 3, 23 September 2009, p. 63; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 4, 7 October 2009, p. 8. 49 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 2. 50 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 57. 51 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 3. 52 BMInq, transcript, Douglas Ingram (Queen’s Own Yeomanry, part of Operation Salerno), 6 October 2009, pp. 152–3. 53 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 61. 54 For example see BMInq, transcript, Detainee 4, 7 October 2009, pp. 14–15. 55 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 69. There is news footage of some of the arrested persons being taken from the hotel. BMInq, weeks 27/28, NCP001258, Associated Press Television News, 14 September 2003. 56 BMInq, transcript, Detainee 3, 23 September 2009, p. 77. 57 BMInq, transcript, Detainee 5, 6 October 2009, pp. 3–4. 58 BMInq, transcript, Michael Crosbie (Territorial Army, searched Civilian 1’s house), 8 October 2009, p. 182. 59 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 72. 60 Ibid., p. 73. 61 BMInq, transcript, Stephen Wilding, 12 October 2009, p. 22.

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62 BMInq, transcript, Ahmad Maitham, 29 September 2009, pp. 6–9. 63 Ibid., p. 13; BMInq, transcript, Wilding, 12 October 2009, p. 24. 64 BMInq, transcript, Patrick Moss (Counsel to the Baha Mousa Inquiry), 13 October 2009, p. 1. 65 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 78. 66 BMInq, transcript, Ahmad Matairi, 28 September 2009, p. 70. 67 BMInq, transcript, Detainee 3, 23 September 2009, p. 86. 68 BMInq, week 19, day 80, MOD031229, Edward Fenton (Chief of Staff, 19  Mechanised Brigade, August – November 2003), ‘Death in detention’, 18 September 2003. 69 BMInq, transcript, Fenton, 8 June 2010, pp. 128–30. 70 For example: BMInq, transcript, Detainee 4, 7 October 2009, pp. 20–1; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 1, 28 September 2009, p. 17. 71 For example, BMInq, transcript, Detainee 4, 7 October 2009, p. 25. 72 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 237, 80. 73 BMInq, witness statement, Gareth Seeds (Operations Officer, Battlegroup Main), 7 September 2009, p. 10. 74 BMInq, week 19, day 79, MOD016121, Major B. L. Richards (attached to 1QLR) to Fenton, ‘Follow up to incidents 15 Sep’, 16 September 2003. Charles Burbridge (19 Mechanised Brigade) wrote this document and believes this information would have come from the battlegroup operations officer. BMInq, transcript, Burbridge, 19 April 2010, p. 38. 75 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 282. 76 For example, BMInq, transcript, Detainee 1, 28 September 2009, p. 16. 77 For example: BMInq, transcript, Detainee 6, 29 September 2009, p. 65; BMInq, transcript, Ahmad Maitham, 29 September 2009, p. 28. 78 BMInq, transcript, Gary Reader (1QLR), 9 November 2009, p. 136. 79 BMInq, transcript, Detainee 2, 12 October 2009, p. 7; BMInq, week 14, day 59, MOD014588, Mendonça to Robert Aitken, 10 March 2005; BMInq Report, Part II, p. 83. 80 BMInq, transcript, Paul Smith (Provost Sergeant, Iraq), 14 December 2009, p. 109; BMInq, witness statement, Smith, 26 September 2009, pp. 2, 17–18. 81 BMInq, transcript, Smith, 14 December 2009, p. 109. 82 BMInq Report, Part II, pp. 248–9. 83 BMInq, witness statement, Robert Livesey (Intelligence cell, Battlegroup Main), 3 May 2009, p. 6; BMInq, transcript, Livesey, 26 November 2009, pp. 2–3, 49–50. 84 BMInq, witness statement, Ray Smulski (Tactical Questioner, Territorial Army), 9 June 2009, p. 38. 85 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 55, 181. 86 BMInq, transcript, Soldier 2 (British Army, managed human intelligence collection, Iraq, January – August 2003), 22 April 2010, p. 130; BMInq, week 13, day 57, MOD020043, Main HQ 1(UK) Armoured Division, ‘FRAGO 29 to OPO 005/03 – Internment procedures’, 26 June 2003. 87 George Briscoe, the Regimental Sergeant Major in September 2003, believed that once the BGIRO role was created he was no longer responsible for the detainees

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Interrogation, intelligence and security (BMInq, transcript, George Briscoe, 11 December 2009, p. 139) and Michael Peebles (BGIRO, 1QLR, September 2003) did not consider himself responsible for the detainees’ welfare (BMInq, supplementary witness statement, Peebles, 6 June 2011, p. 2). BMInq, witness statement, Peebles, 8 July 2009, pp. 27–8; BMInq, transcript, Peebles, 7 December 2009, p. 193. BMInq, witness statement, Donald Payne (Regimental Provost Staff), 15 November 2009, p. 1; BMInq Report, Summary of Findings, p. 1293. BMInq, transcript, Payne, 16 November 2009, p. 36. BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, p. 82. For example, BMInq, transcript, Stuart Mackenzie (1QLR), 10 November 2009, p. 139. BMInq Report, Part II, p. 79. Ibid., p. 79. BMInq Report, Summary of Findings, p. 1316. BMInq, day 26, week 5, TDF video. BMInq Report, Part II, p. 88. BMInq Report, Summary of Findings, p. 1297. Wayne Crowcroft (1QLR), Darren Fallon (1QLR) (BMInq, transcript, Crowcroft, 14 October 2009, p. 51) and Thomas Appleby (1QLR) (BMInq, transcript, Appleby, 20 October 2009, p. 46). For example, Aaron Cooper (1QLR) believes it was Payne or Craig Rodgers (1QLR) who told them to maintain stress positions (BMInq, transcript, Cooper, 10 November 2009, p. 37), and John Seaman (1QLR) has said that he believed Tactical Questioners wanted stress positions to be used (BMInq, transcript, Seaman, 8 February 2010, p. 71). BMInq, week 6, day 31, MOD000187, Service police witness statement of John Douglas, no date. BMInq, transcript, Reader, 9 November 2009, p. 160. For example, BMInq, transcript, Gareth Aspinall (1QLR), 9 November 2009, p. 18. M. A. Strong, ‘Maintaining discipline in detainee operations: A study in small unit leadership and ethical behavior’, Journal of Military Ethics, 11:4 (2012), 363. BMInq Report, Part II, p. 237. Interview, Army lawyer (2003), 29 October 2013. BMInq, witness statement, Mark Davies (Tactical questioner, Military Intelligence Section, 19 Mechanised Brigade), 14 September 2009, p. 18. BMInq, transcript, Davies, 9 December 2009, pp. 76–7. Ibid., p. 82. Peebles estimates the time as 40 minutes. Sir William accepts Davies’s estimate of one and three-quarter hours because this was recorded in Davies’s statement to the SIB of 27 September 2003. See BMInq Report, Part II, p. 238. BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, pp. 93–4.

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111 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 242. 112 BMInq, transcript, Reader, 9 November 2009, p. 159; BMInq, witness statement, Benjamin Briggs (attached to 1QLR), 28 September 2009, p. 7; BMInq, week 5, day 26, MOD000152, Service police witness statement of Lee Graham (1QLR), 12 October 2003; BMInq, transcript, Jonathan Hunt (1QLR), 22 October 2009, p. 56. 113 BMInq, transcript, Hunt, 22 October 2009, p. 17. 114 BMInq Report, Part II, pp. 87–8, 288–9. 115 BMInq, transcript, Detainee 3, 23 September 2009, pp. 89–90; BMInq, witness statement, Maitham, 3 June 2009, pp. 13, 18. 116 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 296. 117 BMInq, transcript, Appleby, 20 October 2009, p. 53. 118 BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, p. 93. 119 For example, Ahmad Matairi says they were given breakfast on the third day (BMInq, transcript, Ahmad Matairi, 28 September 2009, p. 66) and Maitham says he was offered breakfast on the second day (BMInq, transcript, Maitham, 29 September 2009, p. 38). 120 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 336. 121 BMInq, week 19, day 80, MOD031229, Fenton, ‘Death in detention’, 18 September 2003. 122 BMInq, transcript, Fenton, 8 June 2010, p. 143. 123 For example, BMInq, transcript, Detainee 2, 12 October 2009, p. 5; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 5, 6 October 2009, p. 13. 124 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 336. 125 For example, Maitham says he was offered the toilet only once. BMInq, transcript, 29 September 2009, p. 36. 126 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 336. 127 Ibid., pp. 115–19. 128 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 6, 5 June 2009, p. 9. 129 BMInq, witness statement, David Vassallo (British Military Hospital, Shiabah), 2 May 2009, p. 8; BMInq, witness statement, Ahmad Matairi, 5 June 2009, p. 22. 130 For example, see BMInq, week 20, day 83, MOD049727, ‘Outline of RMP investigation (CCRIO64695/03): Sudden death (whilst in detention)’, no date. 131 BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, p. 80. 132 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 50. 133 For example, Kenneth Simmons (Territorial Army) went to the TDF out of curiosity to see the detainees who might have been involved in Dai Jones’s death or the RMPs’ deaths. BMInq, transcript, Simmons, 19 October 2009, p. 18. 134 BMInq, week 18, day 76, MOD048540, Roderick Paterson (Military Intelligence Section, 19 Mechanised Brigade), ‘INTSUM NO. 197, for 1600 on 14 September 2003 to 1600 on 15 September 2003’, no date (15 September 2003). 135 BMInq, transcript, Craig Slicker (1QLR), 13 October 2009, p. 85. 136 BMInq, transcript, Cooper, 10 November 2009, p. 25. 137 BMInq Report, Part II, pp. 323–6.

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138 BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the BahaMousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, p. 81. 139 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 88. 140 Ibid., p. 258. 141 Ibid., p. 269. 142 Ibid., p. 262. 143 Ibid., p. 270. 144 BMInq, transcript, Payne, 16 November 2009, p. 186. 145 BMInq, transcript, Barr (representing the MoD), 21 September 2009, p. 16. 146 BMInq, week 13, day 58, MOD030416, Intelligence Officer, ‘Tactical Questioning, TAC note no.2010’, 29 September 2003. 147 BMInq, witness statement, Smulski, 9 June 2009, p. 2; BMInq, witness statement, Davies, 14 September 2009, p. 1. 148 BMInq, witness statement, Smulski, 9 June 2009, p. 4; BMInq, witness statement, Davies, 14 September 2009, p. 2. 149 BMInq, week 16, day 67, MOD028335, Soldier 40 (Officer Commanding, Joint Forward Interrogation Team, Um Qasr, March – June 2003), ‘Interrogation requirements study – Preliminary results’, 30 November 1999. 150 The British Army, ‘Defence Intelligence and Security Centre’, no date, accessed 4 January 2014, www.army.mod.uk/intelligence/32259.aspx; BMInq, transcript, Peter Adams (director of training, Defence Intelligence and Security Centre), 8 October 2010, p. 4. 151 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 5, 4 June 2009, p. 24. 152 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 1, 4 June 2009, p. 12; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 2, 4 June 2009, p. 12–13; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 3, 4 June 2009, pp. 19–20; BMInq, witness statement, Maitham, 3 June 2009, pp. 15–16; BMInq Report, Part IX, p. 890. 153 BMInq, transcript, Davies, 9 December 2009, pp. 47–8; BMInq, week 9, day 41, MOD006042, Service police witness statement of Smulski, 26 June 2004. 154 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 2, 4 June 2009, p. 13; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 11; BMInq, transcript, Ahmad Matairi, 28 September 2009, p. 74. 155 BMInq, transcript, Detainee 1, 28 September 2009, p. 28; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 11; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 5, 6 October 2009, p. 31. 156 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 5, 4 June 2009, p. 23. 157 BMInq, week 18, day 76, MOD030816, Davies, file note, 15 September 2003; BMInq, week 18, day 77, MOD030813-5, Davies, file note, 15 September 2003. 158 BMInq, week 18, day 76, MOD030816, Davies, file note, 15 September 2003; BMInq, week 18, day 77, MOD030813-5, Davies, file note, 15 September 2003; BMInq, witness statement, Davies, 14 September 2009, p. 15. 159 BMInq, week 18, day 77, MOD030811, Peebles, ‘Op Salerno – IBN Hotel FRL Group’, 15 September 2003. 160 Ibid. 161 BMInq, week 18, day 76, MOD030816, Davies, file note, 15 September 2003.

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162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 BMInq, week 8, day 38, MOD016653, Peebles, ‘Op Telic internment record of D006’, 16 September 2003. 165 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 65. 166 Ibid., p. 282. 167 BMInq, transcript, Singh, 21 September 2009, p. 5; BMInq, witness statement, Matairi, 5 June 2009, p. 22. 168 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 1, 4 June 2009, p. 19; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 23; BMInq, transcript, Moss, 15 October 2009, p. 110; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 3, 4 June 2009, p. 31; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 2, 4 June 2009, p. 21; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 5, 4 June 2009, p. 39; BMInq, witness statement, Ahmad Matairi, 5 June 2009, p. 25; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 6, 5 June 2009, p. 17. No corresponding information for Maitham has been found. 169 BMInq, week 9, day 43, MOD016189, Main HQ 1(UK) Armoured Division, ‘FRAGO 29 to OPO 005/03 – Internment procedures’, 26 June 2003. 170 BMInq Report, Part II, pp. 329–30. 171 BMInq, transcript, John McLaughlin (1QLR), 26 January 2010, p. 46; BMInq, transcript, Paterson, 30 March 2010, p. 97. 172 BMInq, week 19, day 80, MOD031229, Fenton, ‘Death in detention’, 18 September 2003. 173 Ibid. 174 BMInq, witness statement, Peebles, 8 July 2009, pp. 11, 23; BMInq Report, Summary of Findings, p. 1317; BMInq, supplementary witness statement, Peebles, 6 June 2011, p. 2. 175 BMInq Report, Summary of Findings, p. 1317. 176 BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, p. 87, ft. 127. 177 Ibid., p.112. 178 H. Bennett, ‘Baha Mousa and the British Army in Iraq’, in Paul Dixon (ed.), The British Way of Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), p. 177. 179 Moran, From Northern Ireland to Afghanistan, p. 112. 180 BMInq, transcript, Elias, 24 February 2010, pp. 134–5; BMInq Report, Summary of Findings, p. 1328. 181 BMInq, transcript, Elias, 24 February 2010, pp. 134–5. 182 BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, p. 94. 183 For example, see BMInq Report, Part II, pp. 51–2. 184 BMInq, transcript, Soldier 59 (4 Conduct after Capture Company, Joint Services Interrogation Organisation (JSIO), 2000–3), 13 May 2010, p. 175. 185 BMInq, weeks 27/28, witness statement, David Pledger (Commanding Officer, Defence ‘Survive, Evade, Resist, Extract Training’ Organisation), 23 September 2010, pp. 1–3.

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186 BMInq, transcript, Robin Brims (GOC, 1 Armoured Division), 10 June 2010, pp. 31–2. 187 BMInq, week 15, day 66, MOD041855, ‘LD/LSL – Post Operation tour report – Land Command component Joint Forward Interrogation Team’, draft, no date; BMInq, witness statement, Brims, 5 March 2010, p. 13; BMInq, transcript, Nicholas Mercer (Command Legal Adviser for 1 Armoured Division), 16 March 2010, p. 52. 188 BMInq, transcript, Brims, 10 June 2010, p. 13; BMInq, transcript, Patrick Marriott (Brims’ Chief of Staff), 3 June 2010, p. 142; BMInq, witness statement, Brims, 5 March 10, p. 9. 189 BMInq, transcript, Brims, 10 June 2010, p. 32; BMInq, transcript, Marriott, 3 June 2010, p. 141. 190 BMInq, transcript, Brims, 10 June 2010, p. 38. 191 BMInq, week 16, day 68, MOD017062-3, Mercer, ‘Detention of civilians’, enclosure to FRAGO 152, 20 May 2003. 192 BMInq, week 24, day 98, MOD031016-7, Mercer, ‘Detention of civilians’, annex to FRAGO 63, 21 May 2003. 193 BMInq Report, Part X, p. 908. 194 Ibid., p. 928. 195 For example, Hugh Eaton (1QLR), BMInq Report, Part XII, p. 1006. For others see BMInq Report, Part XII. 196 BMInq, transcript, Eaton, 3 June 2010, p. 78. 197 BMInq, transcript, Rufus McNeil (Permanent Joint Headquarters), 26 October 2010, p. 109; BMInq, witness statement, McNeil, 4  August 2010, p.  17. 198 BMInq Report, Part XIII, p. 1034, 1052. 199 P. Rowe, ‘Military misconduct during international armed operations’, 175–6. 200 BMInq, transcript, William Riley (1QLR), 20 January 2010, p. 14; BMInq, transcript, Liam Felton (attached to the Company Quarter Master Sergeant’s Department, Battlegroup Main), 6 October 2009, pp. 71–2. 201 M. J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of War (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002 (1999)), p. 161. 202 BMInq, MoD’s closing written submission on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s module 4, 22 July 2010, p. 157. 203 BMInq, transcript, Richard Barrons (Chief of Staff, Multinational Division (South East) (MND(SE)), 2003), 4 June 2010, p. 94; BMInq, week 14, day 59, MOD014587, Mendonça to Aitken, 10 March 2005. 204 BMInq, week 13, day 55, MOD016766, Mendonça, ‘Operation Telic 2 – WNG O 01/03’, 13 May 2003; BMInq, week 14, day 59, MOD014587, Mendonça to Aitken, 10 March 2005. 205 BMInq, week 13, day 55, MOD022124, Mendonça, ‘Pre-Op TELIC training 28 Apr – 30 Jun 2003’, 6 April 2003. 206 BMInq, transcript, Dingemans (on behalf of witnesses and core participants represented by Kingsley Napley), 21 September 2009, p. 39; BMInq, transcript, Barrons, 4 June 2010, pp. 93–4. 207 BMInq, transcript, Mendonça, 15 February 2010, p. 22.

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208 BMInq, transcript, Richard Langley (leader of the Force Protection Operations team at Permanent Joint Headquarters, 2010), 6 October 2010, pp. 73–4. 209 Crosbie saw kneeling detainees being made to form ‘the choir’ by being kicked or tapped to make them cry out, but did not report this. BMInq Report, Part II, p. 149. 210 For example, BMInq, transcript, Payne, 16 November 2009, pp. 72–3. 211 For example, BMInq, transcript, David Schofield (Territorial Army), 7 October 2009, pp. 193–5. 212 Rowe, ‘Military misconduct during international armed operations’, 187. 213 BMInq Report, Part XVII, p. 1282; Liam Fox (Defence Secretary), ‘Statement on the Report into the death of Mr Baha Mousa in Iraq in 2003’, 8 September 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/ Speeches/SofS/20110908StatementOnTheReportIntoTheDeathOfMrBahaMous aInIraqIn2003.htm. 214 Bennett, ‘Baha Mousa and the British Army in Iraq’, p. 199. 215 BMInq, transcript, Mendonça, 12 February 2010, p. 79. 216 Rowe, ‘Military misconduct during international armed operations’, p. 185. 217 Ibid., p. 179. 218 Kerr, The Military on Trial, pp. 24–25; BMInq, transcript, Mendonça, 12 February 2010, p. 5. 219 R. Kerr, ‘A force for good? War, crime and legitimacy: The British Army in Iraq’, Defence and Security Analysis, 24:2 (December 2008), 408.

7

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The impact of the reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’

The reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’ in 2003 had an impact on security and on the detainees who experienced them. Beyond this, its impact consisted of a series of changes to training and written guidance governing interrogation and prisoner handling across the British military. The Baha Mousa Inquiry is examined here, not only because it was itself a response to the TDF episode but because it fed into the tightening up of training and rules relating to prisoner handling. This chapter covers the efforts made by the military, the government and the Inquiry to identify and address weaknesses that contributed to the reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’. For reasons of source availability some of the changes made can be tracked only up to 2011. By this time substantial changes had already been made, though making sufficient and appropriate changes to training and written rules was still a work in progress. This chapter assesses the changes made and to what extent further changes are desirable and feasible. The ‘five techniques’ and security in Iraq It is both possible and worthwhile to examine the impact of the use of the ‘five techniques’ and the other experiences of the detainees held at the TDF in September 2003 on security and intelligence. After the surviving detainees were transferred to the TIF at Um Qasr, little effort was made to get further intelligence from them. Two of the detainees confirm that they were not interrogated at all at the TIF.1 Detainee 2 remembers being interrogated for one night, during which time he was asked about Civilian 1 and the person who rented the restaurant at the hotel.2 Detainee 6 was also interrogated at the TIF, as the report on his hour-long interrogation confirms.3 This report reveals that he provided intelligence on the ID cards and weapons found at the hotel.4 ‘It was assessed that he was telling the truth’ and the interrogator drew the conclusion – with which the Officer in Command of the Joint Forward Interrogation Team agreed – that there was no evidence to show involvement with anti-coalition forces or FRL activities and that there was no

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reason to detain him further.5 Efforts to collect intelligence from the surviving detainees after their transfer to the TIF appear to have been less than thorough, though we can only speculate on whether this was due to a belief they did not have intelligence, a lack of interrogators or other reasons. Tentative conclusions that some, but little, intelligence was gained during the Tactical Questioning and Interrogation of these detainees can be reached. Civilian 1 was not arrested, as the discovery of the weapons at the hotel caused him to leave the country.6 There is no evidence that the intelligence gained was used to improve security in Iraq, but intelligence that shows an absence of a threat where one was suspected can be helpful. Examining the broader strengths and weaknesses of intelligence in Iraq at the time helps place the decision to arrest, detain, intern and interrogate these detainees in context. A naval reservist who was part of the JFIT that operated at the TIF during Operation Telic 2 describes how ‘[i]t was not uncommon for prisoners to talk as soon as they were interrogated and we normally gathered a fair amount of intelligence from the prisoner at this time’.7 Yet in September of 2003 it was noted that interrogation was ‘already limited and so having little effective use on the battlefield’.8 It is not clear, then, how important interrogation was as a source of intelligence and therefore how much of a contribution it made to security at this time. Imagery intelligence was also available from the start of Operation Telic 2 in July 2003. Various aircraft were engaged in aerial photography, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, though some were out of operation for half of the year because of the heat.9 The Army noted that many reports authored between July 2003 and April 2005 identified a shortage of individuals collecting intelligence from people, whether by running agents or informers or by interrogating detainees.10 Intelligence was gained from other locals when, as was not uncommon in Basra in the autumn of 2003, individuals walked in off the streets, offered to provide intelligence to the Army and were interviewed.11 The 1QLR Intelligence Officer commented that most of the intelligence he dealt with was of unknown quality and uncorroborated.12 Exacerbating this, Iraq’s own intelligence and security structures had been dismantled and needed to be rebuilt.13 Intelligence in Iraq was a mixed bag of strengths and weaknesses. It was far from perfect, which may have made interrogators and Tactical Questioners, and others who prepared detainees for interrogation, feel under pressure to produce results. This limited availability of intelligence in the autumn of 2003 does not excuse the use of hooding, noise, stress positions and lack of sleep to aid Tactical Questioning, but it may help explain it. Iraq was a dangerous place in mid- to late 2003, with the insurgency posing a real threat to coalition forces and to efforts to rebuild the country. None the less, in September of that year there were still plenty of residents of Basra who opposed Saddam Hussein and supported British soldiers. The

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majority of the detainees shared this view until they were arrested on 14 September.14 Speaking about Britain’s involvement in Iraq in more general terms, in May 2004 the Defence Minister Adam Ingram drew the House of Commons’s attention to the thousands of military personnel who had served in Iraq to date and stated that they had done ‘an exceptional job in testing circumstances, and in turn have secured the support of the majority of Iraqis’.15 Having the support, and therefore the co-operation, of the local population is a major advantage when trying to improve security in a given area. A supportive population can volunteer to provide intelligence. The Aden Emergency serves as a reminder of the dangers of not having this kind of support, as the authorities struggled to access the intelligence they needed. The British military’s reputation amongst the people of Iraq was tarnished by allegations of mistreatment. As of May 2004 thirty-three cases of Iraqi civilian ‘deaths, injuries and ill treatment … have been or are under investigation’.16 In the words of one of the men arrested on 14 September 2003, ‘the raid at the Ibn Al Haitham hotel and the subsequent death of Baha Mousa shocked the people of Basra. Everyone knew about the incident and was talking about it.’17 It would not be surprising if this increased resistance to the British Army’s presence in Basra. Before moving on, the impact of the TDF episode on the detainees themselves must be considered. There is no doubt that it had a substantial impact on all of the detainees. Physical and psychological effects, some of them long-lasting, were induced. These may have been exacerbated by the conditions experienced during their time in internment. The detainees’ accounts make for particularly unpleasant reading. They recount the long-term effects of their detention, including a series of suicide attempts and nightmares.18 Many of the detainees recount how their arrest and detention damaged their reputation in their communities, who are inclined to believe that they must have been arrested for good reason.19 Families’ reputations were damaged by association,20 and family members have been affected by the suffering of their detained relatives.21 The impact of this and earlier uses of the ‘five techniques’ on the detainees concerned and their families should not be forgotten. Changes to prisoner handling, 2003–11 Changes to policy, doctrine and training in prisoner handling, including Tactical Questioning and Interrogation, have been made since 2003. This part of the chapter asks to what extent these changes were responses to the TDF episode. It begins with changes to prisoner handling brought in soon after Baha Mousa’s death. These responses were to be part of a longer-term process of identifying what had gone wrong and efforts to stop similar circumstances from occurring.

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Medical care for detainees was changed promptly. A more rigorous system for assessing detainees was developed on Tuesday 16 September, including that the Regimental Medical Officer was to see all of them on entry and exit from BG Main, and therefore on entry and exit from the TDF.22 Confusion over responsibility for detainees was addressed in a brief composed by Peebles, the BGIRO, on 18 September. This briefing was to be delivered to the guard force when any detainees were taken to the TDF. Guards were to be told they were responsible for the safety and needs of the detainees, for example by offering food three times a day.23 Major Fenton had already written that Tactical Questioning procedures also needed to be reviewed.24 He added, ‘[m]ake no mistake, we may consider ourselves at the “front line of a war on terror”, but I guarantee UK will not see it that way, and we cannot get away with treating people in this manner. So: let’s tighten up what we do.’25 Safeguards for detainees going through Tactical Questioning were increased before September ended. The Tactical Questioning process was to last no more than twelve hours, and the questioning itself no more than an hour and a maximum of two sessions.26 Notes attached to a Tactical Questioning report form tell its readers that ‘NO STRESS POSITIONS, CONDITIONING, PHYSICAL ABUSE, HOODS, OR WHITE NOISE [are] TO BE USED’, and that adequate food, water and medical attention are to be provided.27 Efforts were clearly being made to ensure a certain level of treatment for detainees and to reduce the chances of further damage to the British military’s reputation. Hooding was banned once more. A Standard Operating Instruction was issued on 30 September 2003 to ensure a common approach to internee and detainee handling across the four Southern Iraqi Provinces that Britain was responsible for.28 One of its annexes concerned the handling and Tactical Questioning of prisoners. This banned hoods as well as stress positions.29 It echoed earlier statements that there must be a medical examination before Tactical Questioning commences and that there should be no more than two Tactical Questioning sessions.30 The document added that Tactical Questioning must only be conducted by personnel who had passed a Tactical Questioning or Interrogation course run or sanctioned by the Joint Services Intelligence Organisation.31 A message based on this document was sent to SIS operatives abroad and to Security Service staff. These institutions too admit to having forgotten about the 1972 ban, but claim that they believed the 1998 Human Rights Act forbade the ‘five techniques’ anyway.32 The Standard Operating Instruction of 30 September 2003 had succeeded in stopping hoods from being used by the time that Lieutenant General John Reith, the Chief of Joint Operations, who had operational command of UK forces in Iraq, also ordered that hooding ‘is to stop and you are to direct all under your command to immediately cease the hooding of persons detained’. Sight deprivation was still allowed, but it could not be achieved by hooding.33

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The MoD has since added via its submissions to the Baha Mousa Inquiry that hooding can be lawful in certain circumstances, including if it is a military necessity.34 The efforts made to clarify prisoner handling and Tactical Questioning procedures in September and October 2003, and to impose greater safeguards and limits to them, were the first stages of a much wider process that saw revisions of policies and training. Responses to the TDF episode also included the Court Martial of seven soldiers, the awarding of compensation to the surviving detainees, the commissioning of the Baha Mousa Inquiry and the implementation of the Inquiry’s recommendations. Before turning to these responses the chapter continues with the subject of changes to prisoner handling, asking to what extent these changes were a direct result of the TDF episode. The Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth issued a ‘strategic detention policy’ in March 2010. Policy has appropriately been described as being at the top of a hierarchy, with lower-level, more detailed documents below it.35 The strategic detention policy used the term ‘detention’ in a broad sense, referring to PW, detainees and internees.36 It applies when detained persons are going through Interrogation or Tactical Questioning, and applies across the UK’s Armed Forces and the MoD.37 Before this there was no strategic-level detention policy.38 According to Ainsworth the standards set out in the policy are important because the UK has international obligations, because its operations must be legitimate in the eyes of the international and British public, and because they must maximise support within the country they are operating in.39 The link between detainees’ experiences and the UK’s reputation and success in their operations is thereby acknowledged. The policy goes on to list nine principles to be complied with, including acting in accordance with all applicable laws, providing a safe and secure environment for detainees, having procedures in place to investigate allegations of abuse promptly and effectively, and not transferring detainees to another state if this risks their exposure to torture, serious mistreatment or unlawful rendition.40 It goes on to clarify responsibility for complying with the policy, and a post was to be established for the inspection and monitoring of detention facilities in order to ensure the policy’s standards were upheld.41 This policy demonstrates a commitment to meeting minimum standards of care for detainees. Given the factors that led to the TDF episode, the existence and content of this policy is a positive step towards avoiding similar events happening in future. But policy is only at the very top of the ladder: doctrine is the next level down and also has an impact on the way detention is managed. Doctrine explains how policy is to be carried out.42 Doctrine for the handling of captured persons, including guidance for the strategic level and the fundamental rules and principles for the operational level, is set out in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1–10 of October 2011.43 At 351 pages in length it

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is a detailed document. It contains chapters on standards of treatment, medical support, responsibilities, training, planning, the procedures to be followed from point of capture to transfer or release, and how to respond to adverse incidents and allegations of abuse. The chapter on standards of treatment includes the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’. A comparison with a draft of JDP 1–10 reveals that the wording of this passage had been tightened up. The following list contains each of the prohibitions as it appears in the final version, with comments on how it differs from that found in the draft. a. Stress Positions. Any physical posture which a CPERS [Captured Person] is deliberately required to maintain will be a stress position if it becomes painful, extremely uncomfortable or exhausting to maintain.44

The previous version gave a more limited definition by stating that a stress position was something that was ‘intended to cause physical pain and exhaustion’.45 The wording adopted in the final version was that suggested by Sir William Gage, Chair of the Baha Mousa Inquiry.46 b. Hooding. Placing a cover over a CPERS’ head and face.47

As hooding is never permitted, this straightforward statement was adopted instead of a draft version that stated it was prohibited to put a hood on and keep it there.48 c. Subjection to Noise. Holding a CPERS in an area where there is unnecessary excessive noise.49

An earlier reference to ‘continuous’ noise was removed and a footnote added to help define ‘excessive’.50 d. Deprivation of Sleep and Rest. Depriving a CPERS of the minimum requirement of sleep and rest. e. Deprivation of Food and Water. Depriving a CPERS of the minimum requirement of food and water.51

The reference to ‘minimum requirements’ further clarified the prohibitions and did not appear in the draft version of JDP 1–10. The reasons for tightening up these definitions included the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s scrutiny of the draft of this JDP.52 Given its familiarity with the dangers of loose language in written guidance, it is not surprising that in pursuit of its goal of considering ‘what has happened since 2003 in relation to “conditioning techniques” and to examine any appropriate recommendations for the future’,53 the Inquiry paid close attention to the wording of the document’s prohibition of the ‘five techniques’. When Barry Burton, Principal Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary, appeared before the Inquiry he was questioned at some length as to why the draft of JDP 1–10 prohibited

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‘continuous’ noise. He explained that this was an acknowledgement that on military operations there are often loud noises and the intention was to distinguish between this and exposure to noise over a long, or continuous, period of time.54 When Rupert Hollins, leader of the legal section of the MoD’s Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, attended the Inquiry he volunteered the view that the inclusion of ‘continuous’ in the prohibition of noise needed to be revisited.55 The Chair of the Inquiry pointed out to him that the draft wording on stress positions opened the door for individuals to claim it was acceptable to use stress positions because the pain and discomfort caused was not intentional.56 Before Sir William had even written his report, the Inquiry had already influenced the specifics of this JDP on prisoner handling. JDP 1–10 goes further in its efforts to emphasise the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’. It details the minimum standards referred to in the list above, stating, for example, that there must be food in sufficient quantity, quality and variety to keep detainees in good health, that there must be three meals per twenty-four-hour period, sufficient drinking water, and at least eight hours of rest per twenty-four-hour period, including the ability to sleep uninterrupted for at least four hours.57 Advice is also given on the situations in which restraint positions that fall short of being stress positions, ‘temporary disruption of sleep, exposure to noise and limited food and water’ are unavoidable, detailing what is acceptable in these circumstances.58 Not only is the ban on the ‘five techniques’ now detailed in written doctrine but guidance on interpreting this ban is provided. It is encouraging that this level of attention has been paid to ensuring the nature of the ban is understood. Evidence of a commitment to the ban is convincing. The detention policy and doctrine for handling captured persons applied to Interrogation and Tactical Questioning. Separate policies for these activities were also drawn up as written doctrine was not the place to provide sufficient detail on these practices.59 In 1999 it was found that little interrogation documentation existed.60 By December 2002 there was still no authoritative written guidance or policy on interrogation: an interrogation instructor referred to his training materials as a substitute.61 Little is known about a November 2005 guidance note on interrogation.62 Bringing in the October 2010 Interrogation and Tactical Questioning policies was a huge improvement on the lack of written guidance available ten years earlier. At over thirty pages each the level of detail and breadth in the 2010 policies is impressive, though it remains to be seen whether this is sufficient. These two types of interrogation were given separate policies because there are differences in the ‘governance structures’ for Interrogation and Tactical Questioning.63 Unsurprisingly, both policies reiterate the ban on the ‘five techniques’.64 The techniques are described in the same language as the draft version of JDP 1–10, as they came into force before the final version of

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JDP 1–10 was produced. Given that the policies are to be reviewed annually, the current versions may reproduce the description of the ‘five techniques’ contained in the final version of JDP 1–10.65 The Interrogation and Tactical Questioning policies reiterate much of JDP 1–10’s content. Although it is marked as classified, Annex B to the Tactical Questioning policy was released to the Baha Mousa Inquiry and subsequently made public. Notably, it states that the ‘five techniques’ are not only illegal but ‘counterproductive to the aim of developing a willing subject’.66 This is a significant change in the MoD’s thinking. In the 1960s and early 1970s it was believed that the ‘five techniques’ were effective tools for collecting intelligence; in 2010 the view was that the ‘five techniques’ were detrimental to this. This change in view is difficult to explain without access to the reasons behind them. Tactical questioning is noted in the policy to be most effective when carried out as soon as possible after capture, before the detainee has regained their composure.67 Further guidance is also given on exploiting the pressures put on detainees by the conditions of their detention, such as the repetitive and bland nature of a prison diet.68 The Interrogation policy lists authorised questioning methods, including the neutral approach, the approach best known as ‘good cop, bad cop’ and the harsh technique.69 More will be said about the harsh technique below. At Sir William’s suggestion, the policies were to give greater guidance on the approaches they describe.70 Releasing current interrogation guidelines like this can endanger security. In 2006 Ingram referred to the 2005 interrogation policy as a Confidential UK Eyes Only document that could not be made public. Neither, he added, could the training documentation be released.71 Despite this, only a few years later current policies were made public. Not only were the Interrogation and Tactical Questioning policies discussed above made public via the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s website but in 2010 the Prime Minister David Cameron released the policy that governed the questioning of prisoners overseas and paid particular attention to occasions when another country’s intelligence or security agencies are involved in the detention or questioning.72 It is noteworthy that this policy was written for publication, and its drafting involved ministers to an unprecedented degree.73 The danger with releasing current interrogation guidelines is that members of terrorist and insurgent groups can use them to inform their own training in how to resist the interrogation they may experience should they be captured. Although the policy released by Cameron bears no discernible relationship to the TDF episode, it is worth noting that it too includes the ban on the ‘five techniques’. It does, however, permit hooding where it is ‘necessary for security reasons during arrest or transit’. This provision has since been found to be unlawful by the High Court, a judgement welcomed by Phil Shiner. Working for Public Interest Lawyers, Shiner has been prominent in efforts to use the legal process to hold

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the government to account in domestic courts for the conduct of war,74 and has said the High Court’s judgement ‘slams the door shut forever on hooding involving UK personnel anywhere in the world’.75 The Inquiry recommended that one of the questioning techniques used during the Tactical Questioning of the detainees arrested on 14 September 2003 be discontinued.76 This was the ‘harsh technique’, a short, sharp shock used to bring a difficult detainee ‘back into the realisation of their situation’.77 Sir William judged it could continue to be used in Interrogation, rather than Tactical Questioning, provided safeguards such as clear guidance and training on the proper limits were provided and that Ministerial approval was granted in advance.78 By this time the MoD had already reviewed the harsh approach as part of a legal audit of interrogation policies and training.79 It had concluded in March 2011, six months before the Inquiry’s Report and recommendations were published, that there was a requirement for retaining the harsh approach ‘in both Interrogation and Tactical Questioning’.80 Despite Sir William’s recommendation, and despite agreeing to accept the other seventy-two recommendations made in his report, the Ministry of Defence decided to continue to use the harsh technique in Tactical Questioning. Liam Fox, Defence Secretary, explained in the House of Commons that ‘[i]t is vital that we retain the techniques necessary to secure swiftly in appropriate circumstances the intelligence that can save lives’.81 The need to collect intelligence was therefore deemed more important than protecting people going through Tactical Questioning from this unpleasant technique. This tension between the rights of the prisoner and efforts to collect intelligence is at the centre of the widespread debates about interrogation and looks set to continue to divide opinion. Before moving on to changes to training in prisoner handling and interrogation since September 2003 the matter of medical ethics must be addressed. This subject has proved particularly thorny in respect of the medical profession’s involvement in interrogation in the ‘War on Terror’.82 The changes outlined here were not a direct result of the TDF episode, but rather a part of wider reviews of the treatment of detainees which the TDF episode contributed to. In January 2005 the Surgeon General, the head of the UK’s Defence Medical Services, issued a Policy Letter stating that health personnel cannot ‘engage, actively or passively, in acts which constitute participation in, complicity in, incitement to or attempts to commit torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment’.83 This letter had its origins in the summer of 2004 when Major General Louis Lillywhite, then the Director General Army Medical Services, became aware of a lack of guidance on medical support for people detained by the Armed Forces. When he visited detention facilities in Iraq later that year he found that, although medical care for detainees was generally good, Medical Officers were not conducting medical

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exams on entry and exit from detention as required by the 1967 amendment to the then current JIC Directive on interrogation and as repeated in the 1972 Directive.84 In respect of detainees other than PW, Lillywhite found that there had probably not been a clear policy on medical care since some time after 1981, hence the January 2005 Letter.85 This letter was reissued in 2008 and 2009,86 by which time Lillywhite himself had become Surgeon General. The 2009 issue made clear that health personnel were not to certify detainees fit for interrogation as this entails applying their skills to assist interrogation in a way that might then adversely affect detainees’ health.87 The Standard Operating Instruction that had been issued days after Baha Mousa’s death had, conversely, required a Medical Officer to certify that a detainee was fit for detention and questioning.88 Written guidance on medical care, prisoner handling and interrogation were not the only areas improved after September 2003. Changes have also been made to training in these areas. Training now explicitly and prominently includes the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’. Given the military’s efforts to find out what went wrong during the TDF episode and to take corrective action, and given that these changes began soon after the TDF episode, it is likely that they resulted from this. The previous chapter noted that soldiers in Iraq in 2003 had not been given sufficiently detailed prisoner-handling training, and that this has since been addressed by way of an amendment to pre-deployment training. Prisoner handling and the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’ also receive attention in annual training for the Army,89 the prohibition appears in annual RAF and Royal Marines training in the Laws of Armed Conflict,90 and as of October 2010 the prohibition was soon to be incorporated into compulsory training for everyone in the Royal Navy.91 Sir William’s recommendation that there should be both theoretical and practical training on what can and should be done when handling prisoners was accepted by the Ministry of Defence.92 In addition, the MoD agreed to review prisoner handling training materials to ensure they were consistent and clear.93 From testimony proffered by personnel involved in delivering training in interrogation prior to 2003 it is evident that a clear statement on what techniques were not permissible was lacking.94 Some instructors stated that, although they did not include the ban on hooding in the training they delivered, it would have been implied.95 Early September 2003 saw the appointment of the first in-house legal adviser for the Intelligence Corps.96 The first appointment holder provided a briefing to everyone attending the Tactical Questioning and Interrogation courses. This briefing contained explicit coverage of the ban on the ‘five techniques’, thereby ensuring that everyone on these courses was told about the ban.97 An undated but later copy of the legal briefing used on the Tactical Questioning course, for example, includes a

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PowerPoint presentation with numerous slides on why the briefing is important, including photos of Baha Mousa’s father and a summary of the verdict of the 2006–7 Court Martial.98 The prohibited five techniques are also clearly listed on a poster displayed in the premises used for interrogation training.99 Without further details about the dates on which these briefings and posters were introduced it is difficult to do more than suggest that these changes may have resulted from the TDF episode. An intention to ensure ‘instruction … is updated to provide clearer guidance for specialist TQ [Tactical Questioners] and Interrogators’ was expressed by the individual responsible for this training as early as November 2003.100 This was a response to media coverage of unspecified allegations concerning prisoner handling in Iraq that may have included the TDF episode.101 Further changes were made as a result of recommendations made by the Baha Mousa Inquiry after it had consulted all documentation pertaining to current teaching in this area.102 In September 2010 the MoD announced that it would adopt an enhanced annual legal audit of its training, and later agreed to a threeyearly audit and that they would ensure out-of-date teaching materials could easily be distinguished from current ones.103 The incorporation of the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’ into Tactical Questioning and Interrogation courses via the legal briefing is set to continue because of the checks provided by the annual and three-yearly reviews of training materials. In November 2010 the Ministry of Defence stated that there had ‘been very considerable improvements in relation to issues concerning CPERS since 2003’.104 This is easy to accept. From the creation of a detention policy, implementation of that policy through its translation into doctrine, into Interrogation and Tactical Questioning policies, and into training, considerable changes have been made in respect of the treatment of detainees. It would be an exaggeration to describe this as a sea change, with the harsh technique, Tactical Questioning and Interrogation continuing. Yet compared to the public inquiries and amendments to the interrogation Directives that responded to the Aden and Northern Ireland episodes, changes made since 2003 have been much more substantial. The reasons for these most recent changes are varied and not always readily identifiable. The media’s publication of allegations concerning the mistreatment of prisoners abroad has combined with the government’s desire to remove cause for further allegations to play a role, as has the death in custody at the TDF on 15 September 2003. Official responses to the TDF episode, 2003–13 The remaining direct results of the events at the TDF are the focus of the rest of this chapter. The Baha Mousa Inquiry was itself a response to the TDF episode. The reasons the Inquiry was commissioned, how it was conducted

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and the impact it made via its recommendations will be examined here. Before that, earlier responses will be addressed, specifically the Court Martial of seven soldiers involved in the episode, the striking off of GP and then Regimental Medical Officer Dr Keilloh, and the awarding of compensation to the detainees and their families. By Wednesday 17 September 2003, two days after Baha Mousa’s death, the SIB had begun investigating the circumstances of his death.105 This was to lead to a Court Martial that saw no parallel in Northern Ireland or Aden. Seven servicemen were charged in July 2005.106 Mendonça, who had been promoted to Colonel, was by far the most senior individual amongst them and was charged with negligently performing a duty with respect to failures to ensure the welfare of the detainees. The Army Prosecuting Authority’s decision to charge him was influenced by pressure to charge a senior officer.107 Davies, one of the two Tactical Questioners involved with the detainees, was charged with negligently performing a duty by not ensuring personnel under his control were not ill-treating the detainees. Peebles faced the same charge in respect of his duties as BGIRO. Sergeant Kelvin Stacey was charged with assault and battery in connection with his time at the TDF between the detainees’ arrival and the first guard duty. It was in this time that hoods were put on and stress positions first enforced.108 Lance Corporal Wayne Crowcroft and Kingsman Darren Fallon faced charges of inhuman treatment in connection with their time on guard duty.109 Finally, Payne was charged with manslaughter in respect of Baha Mousa, the war crime of inhuman treatment in respect of Baha Mousa and the other detainees, and perverting the course of justice.110 Consideration was given to charging another four soldiers, three of whom later appeared on Sir William’s list of those who assaulted the detainees, but there was insufficient evidence to warrant prosecution.111 Davies was the only Tactical Questioner charged as Smulski was no longer subject to military law for the period of Service during which the alleged offence took place.112 The Court Martial began in late 2006.113 It collected one thousand pages of witness statements and the transcript of the hearings amounted to around eight thousand pages.114 It had its weaknesses, however. Military witnesses have since confessed to not telling the truth at the Court Martial. Some have since said their motivations were: because the battalion was a close-knit unit and the witness feared alienating himself;115 a desire to protect Payne;116 and being angry with the way the Army treated the witness after his discharge as a reservist.117 The detainees, who gave evidence at the Court Martial, are united in their dissatisfaction with it. They felt it was a farce,118 that the Court Martial was not interested in finding the truth,119 and that they – not the soldiers – were the accused.120 In the words of Detainee 5, he was left feeling ‘very badly let down by the British justice system’.121

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Bringing charges against Mendonça rendered him the highest-ranking soldier to face a Court Martial in recent history.122 He was acquitted on 14 February 2007.123 Rulings of ‘no case to answer’ followed in the cases of Crowcroft, Fallon and Stacey.124 The cases against Peebles and Davies continued, concluding the following month with findings of ‘not guilty’.125 Payne’s case was a different matter. He admitted the charge of inhuman treatment and was therefore found guilty, making him the first British convicted war criminal.126 He was sentenced to a year in a civilian jail and was discharged from the Army.127 Rulings of ‘no case to answer’ were issued in respect of the remaining charges against him.128 The Court Martial cost a reported £20 million.129 But it discovered little about how Baha Mousa died.130 Mr Justice McKinnon, the Court Martial’s Judge Advocate, said that more was not discovered because of a ‘closing of ranks’ amongst the military witnesses.131 The submissions of ‘no case to answer’ were accepted because one of the prosecution witnesses was ‘incapable of belief’, because it could not be shown that the charge could be proved and because of an inability to find sufficient evidence that two of the defendants were the assailants.132 A legal examination of whether the Court Martial fulfilled the obligation placed upon the UK by the ECHR to conduct an adequate and effective investigation into this death in custody is required by the ruling that the ECHR applied to these detainees.133 Dr Derek Keilloh, the Regimental Medical Officer at the time of Baha Mousa’s death, was also the subject of a career-changing investigation. In December 2012 he was struck off the medical register, preventing him from continuing his work as a GP.134 He had tried to resuscitate Baha Mousa in the TDF.135 The Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service – the part of the General Medical Council that reviewed his actions – found he knew of the injuries to Baha Mousa but failed to carry out an adequate examination of the body and failed to assess the other detainees or to report suspected foul play to senior officers.136 The tribunal further found that he lied to Army investigators about the injuries and continued to lie on this matter before the Court Martial and the Baha Mousa Inquiry.137 Whilst he is not the only individual to have misled or withheld the truth from the RMP in the wake of the events at the TDF, others did later confess to having lied.138 After the Court Martial, civil proceedings were brought on behalf of the surviving detainees and the families of Baha Mousa and Kifah Matairi.139 Compensation was asked for and, in 2008, was awarded.140 The British government had also awarded compensation to the fourteen men interrogated using the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland after admitting the techniques had been used. By late 2012 the Ministry of Defence had awarded a total of £14 million in compensation to Iraqis in respect of illegal detention and torture.141 The year 2012 alone saw £8.3 million paid in compensation to a total

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of 162 Iraqis.142 As reported in the Guardian many of these cases were linked to the practices of the JFIT ‘who operated an interrogation centre throughout the five-year occupation’.143 In another similarity with the TDF episode, videos were shot at the JFIT’s interrogation centre. These videos, shot by interrogators, showed interrogations taking place and prompted consideration of whether to issue war crimes charges and take disciplinary action.144 The former was considered disproportionate to the actions concerned and the latter unlikely to lead to convictions. The Service Prosecuting Authority concluded that, although one soldier had committed offences, his actions were in accordance with his training so no charges were filed.145 It is important to place the events of 14–16 September 2003 in context in this way. It was far from the only contentious episode concerning the UK’s military personnel in Iraq, highlighting the challenges of reducing the likelihood of further similar actions taking place. The Baha Mousa Inquiry In his opening statement to the Baha Mousa Inquiry, Donald Payne’s lawyer issued an apology to the detainees and to Baha Mousa’s family on his client’s behalf.146 Payne felt, his lawyer also said, that for too long he had been the only soldier to have taken responsibility for what occurred.147 Like the Judge Advocate, Payne felt the Court Martial had not exposed the truth about what happened.148 In an effort to prompt further investigations after the Court Martial, the post-mortem photo of Baha Mousa’s badly injured face, along with others, was released by Phil Shiner.149 The Baha Mousa Inquiry turned out to be sizeable in terms of the amount of evidence it collected and the amount of time and money it consumed. Its features and performance are evaluated here. In the 2004 case of Al Skeini and Others v the Secretary of State for Defence, the European Court of Human Rights found that the ECHR applied to civilian detainees arrested and held by British forces.150 The Law Lords later confirmed the Court’s decision.151 The MoD went on to admit that Baha Mousa’s death was a breach of Article 2 of the ECHR and that the treatment of all of the detainees was in breach of Article 3’s prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment.152 The Court also ruled that the government must launch an inquiry into his death.153 A further incentive arose in January 2008 with the publication of the Aitken Report into ‘cases of deliberate abuse and unlawful killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004’.154 This Report revealed in public for the first time that the ‘five techniques’ had been used at the TDF in September 2003 and that the 1972 ban on the techniques ‘appeared to have been forgotten’.155 The same day, the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Richard Dannatt, promised there would be a new inquiry.156 On 14 May 2008 Bob Ainsworth, the Armed Forces Minister, confirmed

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in a written statement to Parliament that there would be an inquiry into Baha Mousa’s death.157 The Rt Hon. Lord Justice Gage was appointed Chair. The Inquiry’s hearings began in July 2009 with an opening statement from Counsel to the Inquiry that took eight days to deliver. The Inquiry enjoyed the co-operation of the military and, more widely, the MoD. The impetus for the inquiry is likely to have come from the courts and from the lawyers representing the families of Baha Mousa and others who had died as a result of controversial British actions witnessed in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. Sir William Gage was asked to investigate and report on the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa and the treatment of those detained with him, taking account of the investigations which have already taken place, in particular where responsibility lay for approving the practice of conditioning detainees by any members of the 1st Battalion, The Queen’s Lancashire Regiment in Iraq in 2003, and to make recommendations.158

Sir William hoped he would be able to avoid the ‘closing of ranks’ seen at the Court Martial.159 He obtained an undertaking from the Attorney General that ‘evidence given by an individual witness could not be used against that same witness in any subsequent prosecution’.160 He also received undertakings from the Permanent Under Secretary of State at the MoD, the Commander in Chief Fleet, the Army’s Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff that administrative action would not be taken against witnesses who came forward to the Inquiry with relevant information, in respect of any previous failure to provide that information, or for previously providing false information.161

While some told the Inquiry they had forgotten events described in written witness statements collected by the Inquiry earlier in the year,162 others were encouraged to speak out at the hearings and admitted to having lied in their witness statements.163 Therefore, the Inquiry had some success in encouraging witnesses to tell the truth. While the undertakings regarding prosecution and administrative action appear to have gone some distance towards helping the Inquiry achieve its aims, the logical next step is to take action against those shown by the evidence to be responsible. The assurances Sir William received did not mean that no further prosecutions or disciplinary action was possible. The Inquiry team set about collecting material relevant to its tasks. The largest body of material was the documents disclosed to the Inquiry. While the Cabinet Office provided a lot of material, most of the documentary evidence was to come from the MoD. A total of nearly eleven thousand

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documents were disclosed to the Inquiry, with many more having been assessed for relevance and cast aside.164 All the documents referred to in the Inquiry’s hearings have been made available to the public on the Inquiry’s website. These alone ran to nearly nine thousand pages not including the documents released in connection with the final stage of the Inquiry, which examined changes made since 2003.165 Written witness statements were collected from nearly four hundred witnesses, 277 of whom were called to give oral evidence.166 Transcripts for each of the 115 days the Inquiry sat are available. There can be no doubt that the Inquiry collected a great deal of evidence. Although the MoD had the ability to redact material put before the Inquiry by blacking-out text it wanted to keep secret, its first set of redactions ‘went too far’ and the Inquiry team renegotiated the amount of redactions.167 This level of co-operation between the Inquiry and the MoD no doubt led to material being released that otherwise would have been kept back. It is unavoidable, though, that witnesses’ evidence can be influenced by a desire to give a particular portrayal of themselves. While some witnesses were perceived as being uncooperative,168 the vast majority appeared to be co-operating fully. By putting the vast majority of the witnesses in the witness box and subjecting them to cross-questioning by lawyers representing core participants and questions about historical documents they authored, due effort was made to assess the reliability and accuracy of the evidence collected. Their collection of documents on the Northern Ireland case was not as thorough as it might have been, but is explained by the absence of a need to examine the origins of the ban on the ‘five techniques’ in detail. The Inquiry’s conclusions and the impact they have had on policy, doctrine and training in prisoner handling and interrogation have already been discussed. When the Report was released in September 2011 Sir William described the events at the heart of the Inquiry as ‘an appalling episode of serious, gratuitous violence on civilians’.169 The Report ends by making seventy-three recommendations. All bar the recommendation that Tactical Questioning should cease to use the harsh technique were accepted by the government.170 The recommendations can be divided into those that concern written materials – specifically doctrine, Standard Operating Instructions for handling captured personnel, interrogation and medical policies – and those that concern practice and training in detention and interrogation, and Conduct after Capture training. The Chair succeeded in his aim ‘to take into account improvements that had already been made’,171 as not all of the recommendations required changes. Recommendation One illustrates the point, stating ‘[t]he MoD should retain its current absolute prohibition on the use of hoods on Captured Personnel’.172 Sir William stated that by the time the report was published ‘the prohibition on the five techniques [had been] … firmly re-established in military doctrine’.173

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The Report’s recommendations can usefully be compared with the discussions of interrogation rules and practices, and the subsequent changes, dating from the 1960s and 1970s. Both the government’s 1971–72 discussions and the military’s post-2003 discussions led to the ban on the ‘five techniques’ being disseminated to those who could implement it. The key difference was that in 1972 this ban was new, whilst after 2003 it was simply reinstituted. Medical checks put into place in the 1960s were also put back into place after 2003. Further, as was the case within government in the 1970s, Sir William considered whether Conduct after Capture training should persist, and should continue to use the ‘five techniques’. On both counts his conclusion was ‘yes’.174 The same conclusion had been reached in the 1970s. Sir William added a safeguard though, as it was to be made clear in this training that methods participants would be exposed to that were not compliant with the Geneva Conventions could not be used by UK forces.175 The allegations of mistreatment in Aden investigated by Roderic Bowen led to the 1967 amendment of the JIC’s interrogation Directive. The furore over the treatment of people interrogated in the first few months of internment in Northern Ireland led to a replacement Directive being issued in June 1972. Similarly, new Interrogation and Tactical Questioning policies were issued in 2010. By the time of the TDF episode, work had already begun on filling the gap in interrogation doctrine and guidance, and the TDF episode had a limited impact on the 2010 policies, an impact predominantly consisting of that had by the Baha Mousa Inquiry. Comparing the impact of each use of the five techniques on written rules on interrogation also draws attention to the existence of different standards. As of 1972 and as a result of the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s Report there were to be theatre-specific Instructions or standard orders. The June 1972 Northern Ireland-specific Instruction on interrogation does not include the ban on the ‘five techniques’ because it was appended to the Directive that did include the ban. Sir William, by contrast, recommended that standard orders for each detention operation include the ban on the ‘five techniques’.176 It is plausible that it was as a result of this recommendation that the standing order for operations in Afghanistan was modified by improving the description of the ‘five techniques’, showing how the Inquiry has made a difference to current military operations.177 A lesson learnt as a result of the loss of the 1972 ban was that a reminder about the ban ought to be included in every possible document. In the 1970s the MoD, the Intelligence Co-ordinator and Secretary of the JIC argued that hooding, white noise and stress positions should continue to be used when the intention behind them was to improve security. The techniques were, however, banned. Sir William sought to clarify the circumstances in which the techniques were forbidden. As a result, JDP 1–10 was

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amended to read ‘[t]he 5 techniques … must never be used as an aid to tactical questioning or interrogation, as a form of punishment, discriminatory conduct, intimidation, coercion or as deliberate mistreatment’.178 It is not known whether this wording was crafted this way in order to leave the door open for the techniques to be used in certain circumstances, or whether it leaves the door open for retrospective excuses to be made should the techniques be used. A mechanism is in place to check how detainees are being treated by examining prisoner handling processes ‘in the round’,179 increasing the chances of impermissible activities being identified and corrective action being taken before it can escalate or spread. Overall, by prompting the MoD to make much more far-reaching changes to prisoner handling practice and written materials than was attempted in the early 1970s, the Inquiry has given the ban a strong chance of being remembered and complied with. Upon publication of the Inquiry’s Report, the Defence Secretary Liam Fox described it as fair and balanced, whilst also expressing disgust ‘that individuals [involved in the TDF episode] could have acted in this brutal way’.180 The head of the Army, Sir Peter Wall, accepted some institutional responsibility when he stated that had all soldiers deployed been fully trained in their legal responsibilities and the need to treat detainees humanely and with respect, Baha Mousa would not have died in British custody.181 As a result of the Report, Fox told the House of Commons, ‘military and civilian prosecuting authorities will be looking closely at the evidence to see whether it is possible to bring more of those involved to justice’.182 An undisclosed number of soldiers were immediately suspended in light of the Report’s findings and the Army was to look into whether anyone should be disciplined in light of the evidence unearthed by the inquiry.183 This included Peebles, the BGIRO.184 Recent changes to ‘the so-called double jeopardy law allowing people to be prosecuted a second time after an acquittal’ apply to the military justice system and may be exploited in this case.185 In addition, the Iraq Historic Allegations Team is looking into ‘new lines of inquiry’ connected with the death, building on earlier inquiries carried out by other bodies.186 These investigations, coupled with the Inquiry, may make good the Court Martial’s weaknesses, albeit more than a decade after the TDF episode took place. The absence of press criticism of the Inquiry’s characteristics or report is noteworthy. Shiner and Public Interest Lawyers, who are largely funded by legal aid,187 supported Sir William’s recommendation that the harsh technique be banned for use in Tactical Questioning, announcing that they would launch a legal challenge to the MoD’s decision to dismiss this recommendation.188 Support for the Inquiry can also be found in scholarly work, with Andrew Williams judging that it comes as close to the truth as possible ‘given the imperfection of memory and the complexity of individual motives’.189 It is difficult to fully evaluate the impact of the Inquiry so soon after it closed. The

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surviving detainees hope the Inquiry will stop what happened to them from being repeated.190 It is possible that as the years pass weaknesses will become apparent in the system the Inquiry has helped put into place. But observers must be careful not to impose unrealistic expectations retrospectively on a process as complicated as that prompted by the reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’ in Iraq. At a cost of around £13 million,191 the Inquiry was certainly better value for money than the £20 million Court Martial. Conclusion Since the UK government set up the Baha Mousa Inquiry, another has been established to look into allegations of ill-treatment and unlawful killing in Iraq. The Al-Sweady Inquiry heard its opening submissions in March 2013.192 This further supports the finding that government believes inquiries are worthwhile and are willing to initiate these retrospective investigations into controversial events that took place in Iraq. Not all inquiries set up in recent years have been as successful as the Baha Mousa Inquiry. In 2010 the Gibson Inquiry was commissioned to investigate ‘whether Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees held by other countries that may have occurred in the aftermath of 9/11’.193 Sir Peter Gibson explained in his 2013 report that the inquiry only carried out preliminary investigations before being abandoned because of ongoing criminal cases relating to the UK’s alleged involvement in rendition.194 The government and the military’s revisions of written materials and training courses that make clearer what is permitted will benefit members of the military as well as future detainees. Guidance that is consistent, complete and written in clear language will benefit those who rely on it. The efforts made to repeat the ban of the ‘five techniques’ in the written rules on prisoner handling and interrogation indicate that the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces are committed to complying with the ban. It is possible that these efforts to protect detainees, and, by extension, those who come into contact with them, will restrict the ability to collect intelligence. Whether right or wrong, the Ministry of Defence’s decision that the harsh technique continue to be used in Tactical Questioning shows it has not forgotten the potential value of interrogation as a method of obtaining intelligence. Whilst conducting its investigations, the Baha Mousa Inquiry enjoyed an impressive level of co-operation from the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and individual witnesses. It is unlikely that the governments of the 1960s or 1970s would have agreed to an investigation so extensive in terms of the practices it reviewed, the amount of its evidence that was made public and the resources it required. Prompted by the TDF episode, immediate efforts were made to ban hooding. The discovery that the ban on the ‘five techniques’ had been lost enabled

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it to be reinstituted. Those who oppose the techniques will be grateful that the discovery was made no later than it was. The gaps in written guidance and in training on prisoner handling and interrogation that existed in 2003 have been closed up, hopefully in a thorough fashion. No longer should there be conflicting advice in this written material and delivered through these training courses. But this examination of the events at the TDF in Basra on 14–16 September 2003 has shown just how easily undesirable or unauthorised acts can occur. Efforts to place responsibility among the soldiers present at the TDF, and to hold them to account, continue. Notes 1 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 3, 4 June 2009, p. 31; BMInq, witness statement, Maitham, 3 June 2009, p. 22. 2 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 2, 4 June 2009, p. 21. 3 BMInq, week 9, day 43, MOD047982-3 and MOD047985, Joint Forward Interrogation Team, ‘TQ/Interrogation Report in respect of Detainee 6’, no date. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 65. The Inquiry was unable to contact him. BMInq Report, Part II, pp. 53–4. 7 BMInq, witness statement, Soldier 18 (Joint Forward Operating Team), 23 October 2009, p. 13. 8 BMInq, week 20, day 86, MOD022183, E. R. D. (PJHQ-J2-DACOS-PLANS-S) to Nick Clapham (Army Legal Services), ‘Hooding of persons detained’, 17 September 2003. 9 British Army, Stability Operations in Iraq (Op Telic 2-5): An Analysis From a Land Perspective, prepared under the direction of the Chief of General Staff, July 2006, pp. 54–5. 10 Ibid., p. 56. 11 BMInq, transcript, Seaman, 8 February 2010, p. 46. 12 Ibid., p. 49. 13 BMInq, written opening statement on behalf of the family of Baha Mousa and the surviving detainees, 7 September 2009, p. 133. 14 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 56; BMInq, transcript, Ahmad Matairi, 28 September 2009, p. 49; BMInq, transcript, Maitham, 29 September 2009, pp. 43–4; BMInq, transcript, Detainee 6, 29 September 2009, p. 60. 15 Hansard, Adam Ingram (Minister of State, Ministry of Defence), 4 May 2004, vol. 420, col. 1211. 16 Hansard, Hoon, 10 May 2004, vol. 421, cols. 21–2. 17 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 30. 18 Ibid., p. 31–3; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 3, 4 June 2009, p. 35; BMInq, witness statement, Ahmad Matairi, 5 June 2009, p. 29; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 1, 4 June 2009, p. 23; BMInq, witness statement, Maitham,

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20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Interrogation, intelligence and security 3 June 2009, p. 29; BMInq, witness statement, Ahmad Matairi, 5  June  2009, p. 28. BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 3, 4 June 2009, p. 37; BMInq, witness statement, Ahmad Matairi, 5 June 2009, p. 29; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 1, 4 June 2009, p. 25; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 6, 5 June 2009, p. 21; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 2, 4 June 2009, p. 27; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 5, 4 June 2009, p. 47. BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 1, 4 June 2009, p. 25; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 5, 4 June 2009, p. 47. For example, see BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 2, 4 June 2009, pp. 26–7. BMInq, transcript, Derek Keilloh (Regimental Medical Officer), 23 November 2009, p. 144. BMInq, week 9, day 42, MOD016210, Peebles, ‘Detainee handling brief’, 18 September 2003. BMInq, week 19, day 79, MOD016114, Fenton to Mark Robinson (Intelligence Officer), 16 September 2003. Ibid. BMInq, week 13, day 58, MOD030416, Intelligence Officer, ‘Tactical Questioning, TAC note no. 2010’, 29 September 2003, annexed to HQ MND(SE), Standard Operating Instruction (SOI) 390, ‘Policy for apprehending, handling and processing of detainees and internees’, 30 September 2003; BMInq, week 18, day 78, MOD031244 and MOD031238, ‘Tactical Questioning Report’, annexed to HQ19 Mechanised Brigade, ‘Prisoner Handling and Tactical Questioning Procedures’, 27 September 2003; BMInq, week 19, day 79, MOD022299, Burbridge, ‘TQ timeline’, 18 September 2003. BMInq, week 18, day 78, MOD031242-4, ‘Tactical Questioning Report’, annexed to HQ19 Mechanised Brigade, ‘Prisoner Handling and Tactical Questioning Procedures’, 27 September 2003. Original emphasis. BMInq, week 20, day 83, MOD023104, MND(SE), SOI 390, ‘Policy for apprehending, handling and processing of detainees and internees’, 30 September 2003. BMInq, week 20, day 83, MOD023125, ‘Instruction for the handling and tactical questioning of internees’, annexed to HQ MND(SE) SOI 390, ‘Policy for apprehending, handling and processing of detainees and internees’, 30 September 2003. Ibid., MOD023123-4. Ibid., MOD023123. The Report of the Detainee Inquiry (Gibson Report), December 2013, pp. 56–7, 61–2, 45–6. BMInq, week 23, day 94, MOD020274, John Reith (Chief of Joint Operations, Permanent Joint Headquarters) to Major General Lamb (Commander, MND(SE)), October 2003; BMInq Report, Summary of Findings, p. 1365. BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, pp. 67–9. BMInq, transcript, Barry Burton (Principal Private Secretary, Defence Secretary from 2010, previously Head of Legal Policy within the Operations Directorate in the MoD), 5 October 2010, p. 35.

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36 BMInq, week 27, day 108, MIV002414-16, Bob Ainsworth (Defence Secretary), ‘Ministry of Defence Strategic Detention Policy: A Policy Statement by the Secretary of State’, March 2010, p. 2, ft. 2. 37 Ibid., pp. 3, 1. 38 BMInq, transcript, McNeil, 6 October 2010, p. 39. 39 BMInq, week 27, day 108, MIV002414-16, Ainsworth, ‘Ministry of Defence Strategic Detention Policy: A Policy Statement by the Secretary of State’, March 2010, p. 1. 40 Ibid., pp. 1–2. 41 Ibid., p. 3. This post was given to Edward Forster-Knight (Provost Marshal (Army)) who had a representative in theatre. BMInq, transcript, Forster-Knight, 6 October 2010, pp. 131, 135. 42 BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV002567, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), MoD, ‘Joint Doctrine Development Handbook’ (third edition), April 2007. 43 DCDC, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Captured Persons (CPERS)’ (second edition), October 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, www.gov.uk/government/ publications/jdp-1-10-second-edition-captured-persons-cpers, p. iii. 44 Ibid., p. 2–9. Original emphasis. 45 BMInq, week 27, day 108, MIV004173, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees’ (second edition), draft, June 2010. 46 BMInq Report, Part XVI, p. 1174. 47 DCDC, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Captured Persons (CPERS)’ (second edition), October 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, www.gov.uk/government/ publications/jdp-1-10-second-edition-captured-persons-cpers, p. 2–9. Original emphasis. 48 BMInq, week 27, day 108, MIV004173, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees’ (second edition), draft, June 2010. 49 DCDC, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Captured Persons (CPERS)’ (second edition), October 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, www.gov.uk/government/ publications/jdp-1-10-second-edition-captured-persons-cpers, p. 2–9. Original emphasis. 50 BMInq, week 27, day 108, MIV004173, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees’, (second edition), draft, June 2010. 51 DCDC, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Captured Persons (CPERS)’ (second edition), October 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, www.gov.uk/government/ publications/jdp-1-10-second-edition-captured-persons-cpers, p. 2–9. Original emphasis. 52 Ibid., p. 2–9. 53 This was the aim of the fourth of the Inquiry’s four modules. Elias, Moss and Patrick Halliday (Counsel to the Baha Mousa Inquiry), ‘The Baha Mousa  Public  Inquiry: Issues list’, 17 November 2008, accessed 22 August 2013, www.bahamousainquiry.org/linkedfiles/baha_mousa/key_documents/ issues_list.pdf. 54 BMInq, transcript, Burton, 5 October 2010, p. 65.

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55 BMInq, transcript, Rupert Hollins (Assistant Head Legal at Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, MoD), 5 October 2010, p. 84. 56 BMInq, transcript, Sir William Gage, 5 October 2010, pp. 85–6. 57 DCDC, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Captured Persons (CPERS)’ (second edition), October 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, www.gov.uk/government/ publications/jdp-1-10-second-edition-captured-persons-cpers, pp. 2-4 – 2-5. 58 Ibid., see pp. 2-10 – 2-13. 59 BMInq, transcript, Robert Kett (Assistant Director Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Defence Intelligence Staff, MoD, c. 2002–3), 2 June 2010, pp. 197–8. 60 BMInq, week 21, day 88, MOD028335, Commanding Officer, JSIO, ‘Interrogation requirements study – preliminary results’, 30 November 1999. 61 BMInq, week 21, day 88, MOD042058-9, Kett, ‘Tactical Questioning/ Interrogation Situation’, 11 December 2002; BMInq, transcript, Soldier 49, 6 May 2010, p. 20. 62 ‘Guidance on Interrogation and Tactical Questioning – Support to Operations’, November 2005. This document is described in ‘Memorandum from Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence further to oral evidence session of 27 March 2006’, no date, Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), Nineteenth report of session 2005–06, The UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), HL Paper 185-II, HC 701-II, 18 May 2006, volume two, Ev 104–5. 63 BMInq, transcript, Soldier 67 (author of the 2010 Tactical Questioning and Interrogation policies, MoD), 5 October 2010, pp. 100–1. 64 BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012545-76, ‘MOD Policy on Tactical Questioning’, 4 October 2010; BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012577-614, ‘MOD Policy on Interrogation’, 4 October 2010. 65 BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012547, ‘MOD Policy on Tactical Questioning’, 4 October 2010; BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012579, ‘MOD Policy on Interrogation’, 4 October 2010. 66 BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012571, ‘Classified annex to MOD policy on tactical questioning’, ‘MOD Policy on Tactical Questioning’, 4 October 2010. 67 BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012549, ‘MOD Policy on Tactical Questioning’, 4 October 2010. 68 BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012572, ‘Classified annex to MOD policy on tactical questioning’, ‘MOD Policy on Tactical Questioning’, 4 October 2010. 69 BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012604-5, ‘Classified Annex to MOD policy on interrogation’, ‘MOD Policy on Interrogation’, 4 October 2010. 70 BMInq Report, Part XVI, p. 1197. 71 ‘Memorandum from Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence further to oral evidence session of 27 March 2006’, no date, JCHR, Nineteenth report of session 2005–06, Ev 104–5. 72 HM Government, ‘Consolidated guidance to intelligence officers and service personnel on the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas, and on the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees’, July 2010, accessed

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82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

91 92 93 94

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23  August 2013, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62632/Consolidated_Guidance_November_2011.pdf. Gibson Report, p. 70. A. Forster, ‘British judicial engagement and the juridification of the armed forces’, International Affairs, 88:2 (2012), 291. I. Cobain and O. Bowcott, ‘High court rules it unlawful to put hood over suspect’s head’, Guardian (4 October 2011), accessed 3 August 2012, www.guardian. co.uk/uk/2011/oct/03/iraqi-citizen-wins-legal-hooding. BMInq Report, Part XVII, p. 1273. BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV012604, ‘Classified Annex to MOD policy on interrogation’, ‘MOD Policy on Interrogation’, 4 October 2010. BMInq Report, Part XVII, p. 1273. BMInq, MIV012736-9, Natalie Wirth (Directorate of Judicial Engagement Policy, MoD) to Sophie Eloquin (Baha Mousa Inquiry), 7 March 2011. BMInq, MIV012736-9, Wirth to Eloquin, 7 March 2011. These ‘strict parameters’ are included in this document. Fox, ‘Statement on the Report into the death of Mr Baha Mousa in Iraq in 2003’, 8 September 2011, accessed 31 May 2012, www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/ AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20110908StatementOnTheReportIntoTh eDeathOfMrBahaMousaInIraqIn2003.htm. See for example S. H. Miles, ‘Medical ethics and the interrogation of Guantanamo 063’, American Journal of Bioethics, 7:4 (2007), 5–11. BMInq, transcript, quoted by Elias, 18 May 2010, p. 154. BMInq, transcript, Louis Lillywhite (Surgeon General, British military, 2006–c. 2009), 18 May 2010, pp. 144–7. Ibid., p. 142. BMInq, transcript, Lillywhite, 18 May 2010, p. 151. BMInq, week 27, day 100, MIV002685, Lillywhite, ‘Surgeon General’s Operational Policy Letter’, 18 December 2009. BMInq, week 20, day 83, MOD023123, ‘Instruction for the handling and tactical questioning of internees’, annex to HQ MND(SE) SOI 390, ‘Policy for apprehending, handling and processing of detainees and internees’, 30 September 2003. BMInq, transcript, Mark Edkins (responsible for the development and co-ordination of pan-Army individual training policy, 2008–c. 2010), 11 October 2010, p. 5. BMInq, transcript, Wing Commander Andrew McKendrick (delivered prisoner handling training, 2010), 11 October 2010, p. 67; BMInq, transcript, Michael Bestwick (responsible for Royal Marines’ individual and collective training, and some pan-Royal Navy training), 11 October 2010, p. 90. BMInq, transcript, Andrew Murdoch (Directorate of Naval Legal Services), 11 October 2010, p. 98. BMInq Report, Part XVII, p. 1279. Ibid., p. 1280. BMInq, transcript, Soldier 11 (Instructor, Field human intelligence branch, JSIO), 8 June 2010, p. 16.

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95 For example, BMInq, transcript, Neil MacKinnon (Instructor, Field human intelligence branch, JSIO), 17 May 2010, p. 171. 96 BMInq, witness statement, David Yates (Legal Adviser to Director Intelligence Corps, 2003–5), 20 April 2010, p. 4. 97 BMInq, witness statement, Yates, 20 April 2010, p. 5. 98 BMInq, week 27, day 111, MIV003488-554, no author, PowerPoint presentation, ‘Tactical Questioning. Detainee Questioning: Legal Issues’, no date. 99 BMInq, transcript, Soldier 4 (Officer Commanding, Interrogation Branch, Defence School of Intelligence, 2008–c. 2009), 8 October 2010, p. 32; BMInq, weeks 27/28, MIV006140, ‘Prohibited Techniques’, poster, no date. 100 BMInq, week 25, day 100, MOD030341-2, Andrew Ridgway (Chief of Defence Intelligence, 2003–6) to Reith, 27 November 2003. 101 Ibid., MOD030341. Ridgway does not know to what extent this was prompted by Baha Mousa’s death. BMInq, transcript, Ridgway, 7 June 2010, p. 15. 102 BMInq, transcript, Sir William Gage, 5 October 2010, p. 2. 103 BMInq, Report, Part XVI, pp. 1247–8; BMInq Report, Part XVII, p. 1283. 104 BMInq, MIV012645, MoD’s closing written submission on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s module 4, 3 November 2010. 105 BMInq, week 9, day 43, MOD016095, Major C. M. Suss-Francksen (Second in Command of 1QLR) for Chief of Staff of Headquarters 19 Mechanised Brigade, ‘Allegations by JFIT commander’, 17 September 2003; Williams, A Very British Killing, p. 24. 106 Williams, A Very British Killing, p. 189. 107 Ibid., pp. 185–9. 108 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 136. 109 Kerr, The Military on Trial, p. 24. 110 Ibid., p. 68. 111 Williams, A Very British Killing, p. 183. 112 BMInq, week 8, day 36, MOD013220, K. J. Eble, ‘Request for disclosure dated 31st October 2006’, 8 November 2006. 113 BMInq Report, Part I, p. 1. 114 BMInq, transcript, second directions hearing, Elias, 19 January 2009, pp. 4–5. 115 BMInq, transcript, Reader, 9 November 2009, pp. 125–6. 116 BMInq, transcript, Cooper, 10 November 2009, p. 69. 117 BMInq, transcript, Aspinall, 9 November 2009, p. 111. 118 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 1, 4 June 2009, p. 20; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 2, 4 June 2009, p. 22. 119 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 6, 5 June 2009, p. 17; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 24. 120 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 3, 4 June 2009, p. 32; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 6, 5 June 2009, p. 17. 121 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 5, 4 June 2009, p. 41. 122 M. Oliver and agencies, ‘Cleared Mendonca quits army’, Guardian (1 June 2007), accessed 1 August 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/01/iraq.military. 123 BMInq, transcript, Mendonça, 15 February 2010, p. 5.

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124 Kerr, The Military on Trial, p. 26. 125 S. Morris and A. Gillan, ‘Soldiers cleared over ill-treatment of Iraqi prisoners’, Guardian (14 March 2007), accessed 1 August 2013, www.theguardian.com/ uk/2007/mar/14/military.topstories3. 126 M. Oliver and agencies, ‘Cleared Mendonca quits army’, Guardian (1 June 2007), accessed 1 August 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/01/iraq. military; S. Morris and A. Gillan, ‘Soldiers cleared over ill-treatment of Iraqi prisoners’, Guardian (14 March 2007), accessed 1 August 2013, www.theguardian. com/uk/2007/mar/14/military.topstories3; Kerr, The Military on Trial, p. 25. 127 M. Oliver and agencies, ‘Cleared Mendonca quits army’, Guardian (1 June 2007), accessed 1 August 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/01/iraq.military; Kerr, The Military on Trial, p. 25. 128 Kerr, The Military on Trial, p. 25. 129 A. Gillan, ‘Investigations into civilian abuse in Basra’, Guardian (14 May 2008), accessed 14 May 2008, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/14/iraq.military. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Rowe, ‘Military misconduct during international armed operations’, p. 168, ft. 7. 133 D. Whetham, ‘Killing within the rules’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18:4 (2007), 724. 134 ‘Baha Mousa death: Army doctor Derek Keilloh struck off’, BBC News (21 December 2012), accessed 11 January 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukengland-20809692. 135 BMInq, transcript, Keilloh, 23 November 2009, pp. 121–3. 136 J. Meikle, ‘Baha Mousa army doctor found guilty of dishonest conduct’, Guardian (16 December 2012), accessed 17 December 2012, www.guardian. co.uk/world/2012/dec/16/baha-mousa-army-doctor-conduct. 137 ‘Baha Mousa death: Army doctor Derek Keilloh struck off’, BBC News (21 December 2012), accessed 11 January 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukengland-20809692. 138 Private Aaron Cooper, for example, admitted hitting some of the detainees and admits that he lied about important issues up until his testimony before the Baha Mousa Inquiry. BMInq, transcript, Cooper, 10 November 2009, p. 89. 139 BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 3, 4 June 2009, p. 32; BMInq, witness statement, Ahmad Matairi, 5 June 2009, p. 26; BMInq, witness statement, Maitham, 3 June 2009, p. 25; BMInq, Detainee 2, witness statement, 4 June 2009, p. 22; BMInq, witness statement, Daoud Mousa, 5 June 2009, p. 16; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 1, 4 June 2009, p. 20; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 25; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 5, 4 June 2009, p. 41; BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 6, 5 June 2009, p. 18. 140 BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, p. 6. 141 I. Cobain, ‘MoD pays out millions to Iraqi torture victims’, Guardian (20 December 2012), accessed 11 January 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/ dec/20/mod-iraqi-torture-victims.

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142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 One of the videos is available here: I. Cobain, ‘Interrogation techniques at “Britain’s Abu Ghraib” revealed’, Guardian (5 November 2010), accessed 28 August 2013, www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/05/interrogationtechniques-iraq-inmates. 145 I. Cobain, ‘MoD pays out millions to Iraqi torture victims’, Guardian (20 December 2012), accessed 11 January 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/ dec/20/mod-iraqi-torture-victims. 146 BMInq, transcript, Topolski (representing Donald Payne), 21 September 2009, p. 55. 147 Ibid., p. 51. 148 Ibid., p. 54. 149 A. Gillan, ‘Father describes horror of seeing son’s body’, Guardian (17 April 2007), accessed 1 August 2013, www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/apr/17/iraq.world. 150 Kerr, The Military on Trial, p. 17. 151 Whetham, ‘Killing within the rules’, 724. 152 BMInq, week 26, MoD’s closing written submissions on the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, p. 6. 153 Kerr, ‘A force for good?’, 404. 154 Aitken Report. 155 M. Evans, ‘Poorly trained and ill prepared: British troops who mistreated Iraqi prisoners’, The Times (26 January 2008). 156 Ibid. 157 R. Norton-Taylor, ‘MoD launches inquiry into Iraqi’s death in army custody’, Guardian (14 May 2008), accessed 6 December 2013, www.theguardian.com/ uk/2008/may/14/military.iraq. 158 The Baha Mousa Inquiry, ‘Terms of reference’, accessed 17 December 2013, www.bahamousainquiry.org. 159 BMInq Report, Part II, p. 48. 160 Ibid., p. 47. 161 Ibid., p. 48. 162 For example, BMInq, transcript, Hunt, 22 October 2009, p. 77; BMInq, transcript, Lee Graham, 21 October 2009. 163 For example, BMInq, transcript, Payne, 16 November 2009, pp. 2–3. 164 BMInq, transcript, Gage’s statement accompanying publication of the Report, 8 September 2011, p. 20. 165 BMInq, transcript, Gage, 10 June 2010, p. 239. 166 BMInq, transcript, Gage’s statement accompanying publication of the Report, 8 September 2011, p. 20. 167 BMInq, transcript, third directions hearing, Elias, 8 June 2009, pp. 9–10. 168 Private Lee Graham, for example, was told by the Chair to reflect on the need to be co-operative over the lunch break on the day of his hearing. After lunch he was asked if his ‘faded memory restored itself’, to which he answered, ‘Not that I know of, no.’ BMInq, transcript, Graham, 21 October 2009, p. 72.

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169 BMInq, transcript, Gage’s statement accompanying publication of the Report, 8 September 2011, p. 23. 170 Fox, ‘Statement on the Report into the death of Mr Baha Mousa in Iraq in 2003’, 8 September 2011, accessed 31 May 2012, www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/ AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20110908StatementOnTheReportIntoThe DeathOfMrBahaMousaInIraqIn2003.htm. 171 BMInq Report, Part XVI, p. 1157. 172 BMInq Report, Part XVII, p. 1267. 173 BMInq Report, Part XVI, p. 1210. 174 Ibid., pp. 1256–7. 175 BMInq Report, p. 1284. 176 BMInq Report, Part XVII, p. 1267. 177 BMInq Report, Part XVI, p. 1210. 178 DCDC, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 1–10: Captured Persons (CPERS)’ (second edition), October 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, www.gov.uk/government/ publications/jdp-1-10-second-edition-captured-persons-cpers, p. 2–6. 179 BMInq, transcript, McNeil, 6 October 2010, pp. 65–6. 180 Hansard, Fox, 8 September 2011, vol. 532, col. 571; Fox, ‘There can be no excuses for Baha Mousa’s death’, Guardian (8 September 2011), accessed 3 August 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/08/baha-mousa-death-sirwilliam-gage. 181 R. Norton-Taylor and O. Bowcott, ‘Army’s “lack of moral courage” led to killing and abuse of Iraqi civilians’, Guardian (9 September 2011). 182 Hansard, Fox, 8 September 2011, vol. 532, col. 575. 183 R. Norton-Taylor and O. Bowcott, ‘Army suspends Baha Mousa soldiers as more prosecutions are considered’, Guardian (9 September 2011), accessed 3 August 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/08/army-suspends-baha-mousasoldiers. 184 Williams, A Very British Killing, p. 294. 185 I. Cobain, ‘Police reinvestigate Baha Mousa death’, Guardian (10 September 2013), accessed 8 November 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/10/ police-reinvestigate-baha-mousa-death. 186 E. Branagh and M. Davis, ‘New clues in Baha Mousa custody death inquiry’, Independent (10 September 2013), accessed 8 November 2013, www. independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/new-clues-in-baha-mousa-custody-deathinquiry-8806399.html. 187 Williams, A Very British Killing, p. 168. 188 I. Cobain and O. Bowcott, ‘High court rules it unlawful to put hood over suspect’s head’, Guardian (4 October 2011), accessed 3 August 2012, www.guardian. co.uk/uk/2011/oct/03/iraqi-citizen-wins-legal-hooding. 189 Williams, A Very British Killing, p. 275. 190 For example, Detainee 4. BMInq, witness statement, Detainee 4, 4 June 2009, p. 37. 191 These are the costs as of 31 January 2012. The Baha Mousa Inquiry, ‘Inquiry expenditure’, accessed 2 September 2013, www.bahamousainquiry.org/costs/ index.htm.

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192 Al-Sweady Public Inquiry, Sir Thayne Forbes (Chair, Al Sweady Inquiry), ‘Ruling RE: Postponement of Starting Date for Hearing Military Evidence’, 31 July 2013, p. 1. 193 R. Norton-Taylor and I. Cobain, ‘Government to compensate torture victims as official inquiry launched’, Guardian (7 July 2010). 194 Gibson Report, p. 3.

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Conclusion

The importance of intelligence in counter-insurgency has long been recognised and is not disputed.1 In Aden, in Northern Ireland, and in Western counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations carried out since 9/11, the expected and proclaimed value of interrogation as a source of intelligence has been emphasised by the military, civilian intelligence personnel and policy-makers. These first two examples illustrate how controversial interrogation techniques can come into use as a result of a belief that they are appropriate and effective methods for internal security operations. The military’s expertise in interrogation and belief in the ‘five techniques’ led it to take these techniques to Aden and Northern Ireland. The impetus for using the military and its interrogation techniques came not from the military itself but from governments eager to improve the intelligence on which the security forces’ actions and policies were based. The individuals using the ‘five techniques’ were trained, ordered and authorised to use these methods. Whether they also had any personal motivations for using the techniques, such as revenge, cannot easily be ascertained. In light of the repercussions that followed their use in Northern Ireland it is particularly surprising that such controversial interrogation techniques were used in this case. The use of controversial interrogation techniques is not always the direct result of policy. The UK’s use of JFIT in Iraq demonstrates that interrogation was valued at the time that each of the ‘five techniques’ were used at the TDF in Basra. No evidence has been found to suggest that this or the US’ emphasis on the value of interrogation in the ‘War on Terror’ encouraged military personnel at the TDF to use these techniques in conjunction with Tactical Questioning, but the possibility cannot be ruled out. One of the most valuable lessons of the TDF episode is that it demonstrates how a coincidence of factors can lead individuals to use interrogation techniques that were not permitted. There was a mistaken belief that hooding and stress positions had been authorised, and some soldiers employed the techniques after being ordered to do so by Corporal Donald Payne of the Provost Staff, who himself believed they were a necessary part of preparing the detainees for interrogation. Similarities can

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be seen between this case and the US government’s arguments that the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were not authorised other than possibly at low levels and were attributable to a few ‘bad apples’.2 Facilitating factors were also key in the TDF episode, especially the loss of the 1972 ban on the ‘five techniques’ and the limited dissemination of the April 2003 ban on hooding. These factors, along with deficiencies in training, proved missed opportunities to have considerably decreased the likelihood of these events taking place. The complexity of the set of conditions that allowed the TDF episode to occur might suggest that similar conditions are unlikely to occur again. Progress has been made towards reinstituting the ban on the ‘five techniques’ and improving training, policy and doctrine. However, many of the conditions that facilitated and motivated the events at the TDF in September 2003 were of a type that it is difficult to categorically prevent from reoccurring. As the Northern Ireland example in particular has shown, the reasons why the ‘five techniques’ were used are not always the same as the reasons given after the fact. The British government sought to justify the use of the techniques in Northern Ireland retrospectively, just as the Special Branch officers involved there and in Aden, and the soldiers involved in the TDF episode, may have sought to retrospectively justify their actions to themselves and others. In respect of Northern Ireland this meant emphasising the value of the techniques for the security of the detainees, for the security of the staff at the ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ and for the Centre’s location with a view to persuading the Parker Inquiry to conclude that the techniques ought to continue to be available in the future. The government’s discussions about how to present these techniques to this Inquiry, and why it sought to emphasise their value for security rather than for intelligence, were not meant to become public. With respect to Aden, there is no evidence that either the British government or the High Commission intended to give a particular explanation for the use of the techniques because they were not called upon to explain them either within government or before an official inquiry. The High Commissioner Sir Richard Turnbull did, however, emphasise the relative value of interrogation when asking the London government for more interrogators. There has been an absence of retrospective efforts to justify the TDF episode, with the exception that the Ministry of Defence has pointed out that hooding can be lawful in certain circumstances. Instead, the MoD and Liam Fox, Defence Secretary at the time the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s report was published, have sought merely to explain what happened. A partial explanation given variously by the military and MoD for the use of the ‘five techniques’ in each case is that facilities at the interrogation centres were inadequate. Without an individual cell to hold each detainee between interrogations, it was argued, the need for sight deprivation was increased. Hooding was the

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chosen method of sight deprivation in each case. In Northern Ireland, where the ‘five techniques’ were authorised aids to interrogation, the government sought to justify their use publicly after the fact by stating that the techniques produced intelligence. Similar claims have been made by the US in the context of its post-9/11 ‘enhanced interrogation programme’. The 1972 Parker Report made public a summary of intelligence gained from the detainees interrogated using the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland. This book has cast doubt on the strength of the claims made in this summary. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the ‘five techniques’ in these cases. Any effort to do so is exacerbated by the difficulty of agreeing upon a definition of ‘effective’. By assembling and analysing the available evidence on the identifiable results of particular uses of the ‘five techniques’, this book equips readers with the tools to make their own judgements on the techniques’ effectiveness and justifiability. When such judgements are based solely on what intelligence was produced, the quality, quantity and timeliness of that intelligence ought to be taken into account. Each case gave rise to claims that intelligence was produced but questions have been raised about its quality and quantity. To what extent particular interrogation methods achieve their aims depends upon the skill of those who implement them. Some or all of the results of the use of these interrogation techniques can also be included in judgements of their effectiveness and justifiability. It is evident that the damage done by the three interrogation operations analysed here has reached far beyond the harm done to the detainees and their families. This can be employed as a counter-argument to claims that as the ‘five techniques’ produced intelligence they were justified. Particularly relevant is the negative impact that criticisms of the use of the techniques in Northern Ireland had upon Special Branch’s subsequent ability to collect intelligence during interrogation. In addition to weighing up results, the aims of an interrogation operation might be assessed, specifically whether they were worthwhile and achievable. The legality of the techniques can also be taken into consideration, as can the speculative question of whether any intelligence produced could have been obtained in a timely fashion any other, less controversial, way. Judgements on justifiability are liable to differ depending on the background of the individual making the judgement and the decade in which their judgement is made. Despite the differences between the Aden, Northern Ireland and Iraq cases and the responses to them, they reveal a progression in respect of the regulation of interrogation. The 1965 Directive on interrogation in internal security operations was the first of its kind, and the first interrogation operation it applied to was Aden. Its 1972 replacement responded to the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Northern Ireland, contained the ban on the techniques and was more detailed than its predecessor. The 2010 Interrogation and Tactical

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Questioning policies are considerably more detailed than even the 1972 Directive. This is a sign of increasing efforts to make clear what is and is not allowed. If the ‘five techniques’ do not reoccur it will be difficult to ascertain to what extent this is attributable to the post-2003 doctrine on prisoner handling, to the new policies on Interrogation and Tactical Questioning, and to how these have been translated into training. Regardless, the level of detail in these policies and doctrinal documents and the care taken in writing their descriptions of the ‘five techniques’ can be seen as positive steps. Lessons about the need for specificity in written rules are being learnt and implemented to the benefit of the government, its institutions, its personnel and the people it holds in custody. Efforts to identify a lesson to learn and to implement it do not always succeed. David Benest, a retired Colonel, persuasively argues in the context of atrocities committed in the course of British counter-insurgencies that ‘insufficient attention has been granted to the terrible mistakes of the past’. As Benest points out, learning lessons is not the only way that actions that might be considered regrettable can be avoided, as the ‘sophisticated discourse on human rights’ and media coverage of conflict reduce the chances of atrocities taking place today.3 International human rights law ‘expanded and developed in the second half of the twentieth century’, providing increased guidance on what actions are permissible in pursuit of security.4 Considerably more information on current interrogation techniques is publicly available than has been the case in the past. Not only has this material been made available online by the Baha Mousa Inquiry, but the Freedom of Information Act 2000 allows individuals to request that government departments disclose material pertaining to specified matters. Similar legislation has been brought in by a myriad of other countries. The 2010 Interrogation and Tactical Questioning policies were released to the Baha Mousa Inquiry the same month that they were finalised and were subsequently made available on the Inquiry’s website. As recently as 2006 an MoD representative stated that the 2005 version of these policies could not be made public because of its sensitivity. It cannot be denied that disclosing and disseminating details of these practices and their limits risks damaging the effectiveness of interrogation. It helps members of insurgent and terrorist organisations to train in resistance to interrogation, and removes their fear of the unknown. None the less, it is important to analyse and assess these and similarly controversial techniques simply because they have been, and continue to be, used. This book has addressed two of the most important questions raised in the torture debate: how do controversial interrogation techniques that might be described as torture come to be used, and with what results? These are important questions not only because such techniques have been used, and continue to be used, but because there is a willingness to believe that they produce intelligence and enhance security.5 Evidence-based analysis and discussion

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of these issues is essential. These two key questions are not new. The Home Secretary Reginald Maudling’s 1971 House of Commons statement that judgements needed to be made about what methods of interrogation were permissible in pursuit of potentially life-saving intelligence was re-articulated in Sir William Gage’s 2011 report into the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa.6 Aden and Northern Ireland were not the only cases of the Cold War period in which British security forces used controversial interrogation techniques. Northern Ireland itself saw a ‘second wave’ of allegations of mistreatment arise in the late 1970s. These allegations were made in connection with interrogation carried out at police stations in response to criminal acts rather than in pursuit of intelligence.7 The ‘five techniques’ themselves were developed and used across eleven post-war Emergencies, not including Northern Ireland, as detailed in Chapter 1. They are not the only controversial forms of treatment to have been used in the colonies, as the British government’s award of compensation to survivors of the Kenyan Emergency’s prison camps,8 and efforts to hold the British government responsible for the deaths of twenty-four plantation workers allegedly murdered by British soldiers during the Malayan Emergency, demonstrate.9 The torture debate also draws attention to other divisive and under-explored matters. These include the legal and moral issues raised by international intelligence liaison arrangements such as alleged collusion in practices that can be described as torture; the involvement of the medical profession in torture; and the question of the admissibility in court of evidence obtained using torture. It should be remembered that treatment that can be described as torture is not only used in connection with interrogation, as revenge, punishment and deterrence continue to motivate individuals and states. In addition, interrogation is not the only controversial practice employed by Western states in the name of security in recent years: disclosures about the monitoring of citizens’ communications, for example, has itself raised legal and moral questions. It is possible that other allegations concerning interrogation techniques that might be described as torture and other questionable actions connected with the pursuit of intelligence and security may surface in the coming years. Then, too, it will be important to analyse their origins, effects and the responses of whichever government was ultimately responsible. Notes 1 B. Grob-Fitzgibbon, ‘Intelligence and counter-insurgency: Case studies from Ireland, Malaya and the Empire’, Royal United Services Institute, 156:1 (2011), 72. 2 G. B. Adams, D. L. Balfour and G. E. Reed, ‘Abu Ghraib, administrative evil, and moral inversion: The value of “putting cruelty first”’, Public Administration Review, 66:5 (September/October 2006), 681.

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3 D. Benest, ‘A liberal democratic state and COIN: The case of Britain, or why atrocities can still happen’, Civil Wars, 14:1 (2012), 45. 4 Kerr, The Military on Trial, p. 3. 5 This phenomenon has been identified in the context of the supposed Iraqi WMD capability. S. Lewandowsky, W. G. K. Stritzke, K. Oberauer and M. Morales, ‘Misinformation and the “War on Terror”: When memory turns fiction into fact’, in W. G. K. Stritzke, S. Lewandowsky, D. Denemark, J. Clare and F. Morgan (eds), Terrorism and Torture: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 179–203. 6 Hansard, Maudling, 16 November 1971, vol. 826, cols 216-17; BMInq Report, Part XVI, p. 1197. 7 See Bennett Report. 8 I. Cobain, ‘Kenya: UK expresses regret over abuse as Mau Mau promised payout’, Guardian (6 June 2013), accessed 29 November 2013, www.theguardian.com/ world/2013/jun/05/kenyan-mau-mau-payout-uk-regret-abuse. 9 C. Milmo, ‘Revealed: How British Empire’s dirty secrets went up in smoke in the colonies’, Independent (29 November 2013), accessed 29 November 2013, www. independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/revealed-how-british-empires-dirtysecrets-went-up-in-smoke-in-the-colonies-8971217.html.

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Index

‘n.’ after a page reference indicates the number of a note on that page 9/11 2, 4, 133, 182, 193, 195 Abu Ghraib 2, 7, 194 Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC) 14, 18 Afghanistan 4, 133, 135, 180 Ainsworth, Bob 168, 177–8 al-Mansoura Detention Centre 20, 41–5, 47, 48, 51, 52 al-Qaeda 4, 6, 133, 135 Amnesty International 34, 38, 44–5, 53, 87, 93 Attorney General 101, 105, 178 Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, The 7, 8, 106, 132, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 151, 152, 164, 168, 169–70, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177–82, 194, 196, 197 Battlegroup Internment Review Officer (BGIRO) 140, 146, 150, 154, 157n.87, 167, 175, 181 Belfast 63, 64, 68, 86, 119, 122, 123 ‘black sites’ 2 Black Watch Regiment, The 147, 150, 151 Bowen Inquiry 43, 44–9, 51, 53, 85, 92, 102, 107, 180 Bremner, Brigadier R. M. 15, 16, 77, 99 Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence) of the Defence Intelligence Staff (BGS(Int) DIS) 22, 23, 65, 77, 106 Brims, Major General Robin 149–50, 153 British Cameroons 16 British Guiana 16 Brown, George 24, 45, 46 Brunei 1, 16–17, 23 Bush, George W. 4, 133, 134

Cabinet Office 8, 25, 50, 74, 106, 178 see also Intelligence Co-ordinator; Joint Intelligence Committee; Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee Cameron, David 171 Callaghan, James 63, 88, 91 Carrington, Lord Peter 65 Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 115 Chief of Intelligence (Aden) 39–40, 51 Chief Justice (Aden) 43–4 Chief of Police (Aden) 41–2 CIA 4, 148 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 132, 134 Colonial Office 13, 19, 25 Commander-in-Chief (Middle East) 12, 38, 45, 49 Commander Land Forces (Northern Ireland) 64 compensation 15, 120–1, 122, 125, 168, 175, 176–7, 197 Compton Inquiry 69, 70, 76, 85, 86–91, 92, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103, 106, 115, 120, 122–3, 124 Conway, Cardinal 86–7, 88 Court Martial 9, 48, 140, 152, 168, 174, 175–6, 177, 178, 181, 182 Crowcroft, Lance Corporal Wayne 175–6 Cunningham, George 90 Cyprus 16 Davies, Staff Sergeant Mark 142, 145–6, 152, 175–6 Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) 15, 74, 146

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Derry 7, 63, 66, 86, 123 Diplomatic Service 22, 48 Directive on Interrogation by the Armed Forces in Internal Security Operations (JIC(72)21) 62, 85, 103–6, 107, 122, 123, 126, 141, 148–9, 153, 173, 174, 180, 195–6 Director-General of Intelligence 50, 93, 96, 118 Director of Military Intelligence 19, 49 Douglas-Home, Sir Alec 65 Dunnett, Sir James 15, 96, 97, 99 Egypt 14, 36, 39, 41, 44, 46 European Commission of Human Rights 1, 74, 103, 104–5, 124 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 4, 6, 74, 87, 94, 98, 124–5, 176, 177 European Court of Human Rights 124–5, 177 Everson, Warrant Officer Class 2 F. G. 21, 37, 50 Fallon, Kingsman Darren 175–6 Faulkner, Brian 64, 65, 66, 75, 115 Federation of South Arabia 11, 12, 13–14, 19, 37, 51–2 Ford, General Robert see Commander Land Forces (Northern Ireland) Foreign and Commonwealth Office 25, 44, 50 Foreign Office 38, 45, 47, 102 Foreign Secretary 24, 45, 65, 106 see also Brown, George; Douglas-Home, Sir Alec Fort Morbut Interrogation Centre 18, 20–4, 25, 29n.71, 30n.90, 35, 36, 37, 38–41, 43, 44, 45, 46–9, 51, 53, 66, 68 Fox, Liam 172, 181, 194 Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) 14, 24, 41, 52 Gage, Sir William 106, 139, 142–5, 147, 158n.109, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 178, 179–81, 197 see also Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, The General Officer Commanding (Northern Ireland) (GOC(NI)) 76, 102, 122, 123 Geneva Conventions 49, 50, 71–2, 94, 180 Greenwood, Anthony 42

Guantánamo Bay 2, 24, 135 Guardian, the 4, 90, 177 Headquarters, Middle East (MIDEAST) Command 12, 18, 21, 25 Healey, Denis 16–17, 25, 46 Heath, Edward 65, 73–4, 86, 87, 88, 90–1, 101, 102–3, 107 High Commissioner (Aden) 6, 12, 13, 19–20, 21, 24, 25, 34, 38, 43, 45, 46, 47, 51, 194 see also Trevaskis, Sir Kennedy; Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey; Turnbull, Sir Richard High Commissioner’s Office (Aden) 7, 20, 21, 23, 34, 37, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 53, 194 High Court 15, 171–2 Hockaday, Arthur 71 Home Office 75, 87, 99, 101 Home Secretary 63, 65, 75, 88, 101, 105–6, 197 see also Callaghan, James; Maudling, Reginald House of Commons 46, 91, 92, 101, 102, 134, 166, 172, 181, 197 Ingram, Adam 166, 171 Intelligence Co-ordinator 73–4, 85, 95–6, 98–100, 103, 180 Intelligence Corps 15, 19, 21, 77, 99, 101, 117, 173 International Committee of the Red Cross, The 34, 44, 48, 53, 149 interpreters 39, 141 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 62, 63, 64, 74, 96, 97, 114–18, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125 Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas (JIC(65)15) 15, 47, 49–51, 53, 66, 71–2, 85, 91, 93, 99, 101, 103–4, 107, 180, 195 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1–10 168–71, 180–1 Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT) 147, 164–5, 177, 193 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 14, 49–50, 85, 100, 102, 105, 173, 180 Joint Services Interrogation Unit (JSIU) 21

index Joint Services Interrogation Wing (JSIW) 19, 21, 66, 68, 70, 74–5, 78, 115, 116, 146 Jones, Captain Dai 143–4, 159n.133

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Keilloh, Captain Derek 143, 175, 176 Kenya 15–16, 197 Lewis, Brigadier J. M. H. see Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence) of the Defence Intelligence Staff Local Intelligence Committee (Aden) 14, 19, 38, 39, 48 Maguire, Air Marshal Harold see DirectorGeneral of Intelligence Malaya 16, 17, 197 Mason, Roy 122 Maudling, Reginald 65, 73–4, 88, 91, 92, 197 Medical Officers 47, 49, 51, 90, 98, 120, 143, 167, 172–3, 175, 176 Mendonça, Lieutenant Colonel Jorge 135, 151, 152, 175–6 Miller, Staff Sergeant A. 21, 37 Ministry of Defence (MoD) 1, 7, 8, 15, 16, 20–1, 22, 24, 25, 38, 48, 50, 68, 70, 71, 74–5, 76–7, 85, 90, 92–3, 95–6, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 116–19, 122, 138, 141, 142–5, 148, 149, 151, 152, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177–9, 180–1, 182, 194, 196 Morton, John 36 Mousa, Baha 7–8, 132–3, 136–7, 138, 139, 140, 142–3, 144–5, 153, 166, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177–8, 181, 197 National Liberation Front (NLF) 14, 18, 21, 24, 36–7, 38, 40–1, 52, 53 Nicholson, Lieutenant Colonel J. R. 68, 70, 72, 74, 97, 99, 115, 116–17 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) 89, 123 Northern Ireland Office 75, 121 Oman 17, 106, 115 Palestine 15 Parker Inquiry 15–17, 85, 91–101, 102, 103, 106, 116, 117, 119, 120–3, 124, 194, 195

225

Payne, Corporal Donald 140–1, 142, 143, 144, 145, 152, 175–6, 177, 193 Peebles, Major Michael 140, 146, 150, 152, 167, 175–6, 181 see also Battlegroup Internment Review Officer People’s Socialist Party (PSP) 13, 18, 35, 36, 43 police 2, 5, 6, 12, 19, 21, 25, 35, 36, 48, 52, 86, 91, 102, 114, 116–17, 118, 135, 197 see also Chief of Police (Aden); Police Holding Centres; Royal Military Police; Royal Ulster Constabulary; Special Branch; Special Investigation Branch Police Holding Centres 118, 122 Prendergast, John 38 Prime Minister 65, 88, 101, 134, 171 see also Cameron, David; Heath, Edward Prime Minister of Northern Ireland see Faulkner, Brian Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) see Irish Republican Army Queen’s Lancashire Regiment, The 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 143, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 165, 178 Rastgeldi, Dr Selahuddin 44–5, 48 Rawlinson, Peter 105 Regional Holding Centres (RHCs) 85–6, 89–90, 115, 118 Republic of Ireland 4, 7, 87, 89, 103, 104, 105, 118, 120, 124, 125 Richards, Lieutenant Colonel R. M. 21, 36–7, 39 Rochat, M. 44, 48 see also International Committee of the Red Cross, The Royal Military Police (RMP) 8, 140, 142, 143–4, 176 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 63, 64, 66, 68, 73, 74, 75, 90, 105, 106, 118, 121, 122–3, 146 see also Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary Sandys, Duncan 13 School of Military Intelligence 17, 19, 21, 25, 66 Second World War 1, 2, 4, 16, 49, 74, 95

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226

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Secret Intelligence Service (SIS (MI6)) 74, 102, 106, 167 Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee 74, 85, 95, 96, 98–9, 100, 101, 103 Secretary of State for the Colonies 13, 19, 24, 41, 42 Secretary of State for Defence 8, 16–17, 65, 76, 101, 105, 119, 122, 168, 172, 177, 181, 194 see also Ainsworth, Bob; Carrington, Lord Peter; Fox, Liam; Healey, Denis; Mason, Roy Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 115 see also Greenwood, Anthony; Sandys, Duncan Security Intelligence Adviser (Aden) see Morton, John Security Liaison Officer (SLO) 36 Security Service (MI5) 2, 19, 25, 36, 50, 51, 73, 74, 75, 77, 102, 106, 167 Sedgwick, Major W. B. 19–20, 34–5, 39 Shiner, Phil 171–2, 177, 181 Smulski, Sergeant Ray 140, 145–6, 175 Soviet Union 18 Special Branch 2, 7, 15, 18, 19–20, 21, 22, 24, 34–5, 36, 38, 41, 50, 51, 52–3, 66, 73, 74–5, 76, 78, 114–16, 119, 122–3, 125, 146, 194, 195 ‘Special Interrogation Centre’ 22, 66–72, 73, 75, 76–8, 80n.35, 86, 88–9, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 114, 115, 116–18, 119, 120, 140, 194 Special Investigation Branch (SIB) 48, 142, 175

Stacey, Sergeant Kelvin 175–6 Standard Operating Instruction 390 167, 173, 179 Sunday Times, The 87, 88 Swaziland 16 Temporary Detention Facility (TDF) 7, 132, 133, 136, 137–45, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 154, 164, 166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 180, 181, 182, 183, 193–5 Theatre Internment Facility (TIF) 140, 145, 147, 148, 149, 164–5 translators 39, 41 Trend, Burke 90, 92 Trevaskis, Sir Kennedy 13, 19, 24, 41, 52 Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey 24 Turnbull, Sir Richard 19, 21, 24, 38, 39, 43, 48, 52, 194 Tuzo, General Harry see General Officer Commanding (Northern Ireland) War Office 19, 49 ‘War on Terror’ 2–3, 25, 46, 133, 153, 167, 172, 193 waterboarding 2, 4, 6, 29n.64 White, Sir Dick see Intelligence Coordinator Whitelaw, William see Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Williams, Squadron Leader E. 17 Wilson, Harold 88 Yemen 6, 13–14, 36, 52