International Talent Management in Times of Crisis: China and International Comparisons [1 ed.] 1803921552, 1803921560, 9781803921556, 9781803921563

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EDITED BY Shahamak Rezagi

International Talent Management in Times of Crisis CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

CHINESE MANAGEMENT AND GLOBAL BUSINESS

© The Editor and Contributing Authors Severally 2025

With the exception of any material published open access under a Creative Commons license (see www.elgaronline.com), all rights are reserved and no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Chapter 2 is available for free as Open Access from the individual product page at www.elgaronline.com under a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercialNoDerivatives 4.0 International (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) license.

Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL30 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2024948212

This book is available electronically in the Elgaronline Business subject collection https://dot.org/10,.4337/978 1803921563

ISBN 978 1 80392 155 6 (cased) ISBN 978 1 80392 156 3 (eBook)

To Monica, Zoey and Ivy, true Global Talents and sources of my inspiration

Contents List of figures List of tables List of contributors Foreword:

The winner takes it all ... or not

Marco Goli

l

Contribution to the study of international talent management Shahamak Rezaei and Mikkel Ronnow Mouritzen

Thousand Talents, revisited: research funding as a talent recruitment tool from Europe to China Andrea Braun Strelcova Intra-company transfers: a European perspective

36

Axel Fredholm, Annika Elwert and Johan Sandberg

Talent waste: when immigration fails to enhance immigrant enclave economy formation

50

Osa-Godwin Osaghae and Thomas Cooney

Unexpected talent flows in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine: missed opportunities in Georgia and Turkey (2022-2023) Karina Goulordava and Martin Geiger Sweden in the quest for global talent Johan Sandberg and Axel Fredholm

69 86

Global science networks in times of crisis Maj Grasten, Stine Haakonsson and Duncan Wigan

100

China’s overseas investment impact and the rise of ESG practices

119

Wen Xiang

vil

Vill

9

Index

fnternational talent management in times of crisis

Synthesizing key insights in international talent management: expatalent as a new promising path of research Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Shahamak Rezaei

136

143

Figures 3:1

Processing time in weeks and cooling off period in months

40

4.1

Linking immigration to enclave economy formation

6]

6.1

Number of work-permits according to country issued in 2022

92

6.2

Most common occupational groups of labor migrants in Sweden, 2018-2022

92

Total number of work-permits in professions requiring tertiary education in Sweden, 2018-2022

95

6.3 71

Scientific journal articles

102

eh

Spending on R&D

11]

tia

Triadic patents filed by Chinese residents

112

O31

The triple-win expatalent strategy model

138

Tables 2.1

Overview of research participants

2A.1

List of reviewed documents

2A.2

List of reviewed documents

2A.3

List of reviewed documents

2A.4

List of reviewed documents

2A.5

List of reviewed documents

3.1

Regulations of ICTs by country

4.1

International migrants 1970-2020

Contributors Thomas Ireland

Cooney,

College

of Business,

Technological

University

Dublin,

Annika Elwert, Department of Sociology, Lund University, Sweden Axel Fredholm, Department of Sociology, Lund University, Sweden

Martin Geiger, Faculty of Public and Global Affairs, Carleton University, Canada Karina Goulordava, Kog University, Turkey Maj Grasten, Copenhagen Business School, Center for Research and Education (SDC)

Denmark

and

Sino

Danish

Stine Haakonsson, Department of Organization, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark and Sino Danish Center for Research and Education (SDC) Mikkel

Rennow

Mouritzen,

Roskilde University, Education (SDC)

Department

Denmark

and

Sino

of Social

Danish

Sciences

Center

&

Business,

for Research

and

Osa-Godwin Osaghae, College of Business & Law, School of Strategy & Leadership, Coventry University, UK Shahamak

Rezaei,

Department

of Social

Sciences

&

Business,

Roskilde

University, Denmark and Sino Danish Center for Research and Education (SDC) and Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Center for Migration & Development (CMD), USA

Johan Sandberg, Department of Sociology, Lund University, Sweden and Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Center for Migration & Development (CMD), USA Andrea Braun Stielcova, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science,

Germany and Tampere University, Finland Duncan Wigan, Department of Organization, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark and Sino Danish Center for Research and Education (SDC)

XI

xi

Wen

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

Xiang, Faculty of Law, Copenhagen University, Denmark

and Sino

Danish Center for Research and Education (SDC)

Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration at the Department of Political and Social Sciences at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (GRITIM-UPF), Barcelona, Spain

Foreword: The winner takes it all ... or not Marco Goli International Talent Management in Times of Crisis: China and International Comparisons 1s a groundbreaking exploration into a realm of global significance that intersects business studies and migration research. Edited by esteemed scholar Shahamak Rezaei, this book endeavors to delve deep into the complexities and dynamics of talent management amid unprecedented global challenges and transformative shifts in the talent landscape. In an era marked by unparalleled globalization, the movement of talent across borders defies conventional understanding. The introduction to this volume sets the stage by elucidating the intricate pathways through which highly skilled individuals navigate, driven by diverse motivations ranging from economic opportunities to geopolitical crises. It 1s afterward rather obvious that as talent people traverse continents, they intersect with policy landscapes and political, social and cultural environments that shape their trajectories, presenting both opportunities and challenges for governments, civic society institutions and organizations, as well as individuals. Throughout this book, contributors explore certain facets of international talent management, each shedding light on critical aspects of this multifaceted phenomenon. From examination of research funding as a talent recruitment tool to analysis of intra-company transfers as catalysts for economic growth, each chapter offers valuable insights into some of the complexities and nuances of talent dynamics in times of crisis. As the concluding reflections articulate, this volume presents a paradigm shift by introducing the concept of “expatalent” — skilled individuals strategically navigating mobility journeys to enhance their careers and simultaneously generating still to be utilized potentials of greater coherence and interconnectedness, even interdependence, not only at governmental and organizational level, but also at the very heart of the civic societies and families, it happens gradually through binding both strong and loose ties within and across societies. Expatalent bridges the gap between talent-centric expatriation and expatriation-focused talent management, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding the intricate interplay between talent, mobility, and economic development. XIE

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

Moreover, the conclusion underscores the need for closer alignment between business and migration studies, highlighting the potential for further research to advance our understanding of expatalent as a strategic talent management process. By integrating expatriation and talent management, scholars and practitioners can unlock new avenues for innovation, diversity, and global competitiveness. In synthesizing the collective wisdom presented within these pages, it becomes evident, and apparent, that international talent management is not merely an organizational endeavor but a global imperative. To fully utilize the potential it requires collaborative efforts between governments, industries, and academia to harness the full potential of human capital and navigate the complexities of talent flows in times of crisis for the benefit of all countries who pursue economic growth, well-being and welfare of their citizens. The implicit point of departure and the very framework of understanding that has facilitated as Well as motivated the collaboration around this volume is that global talent mobility, no matter intentions and policies of countries involved, in the end does not represent a zero-sum game, but rather a positive-sum one, where not competition but coopetition increasingly becomes the key word. This awareness of the dynamic of the current development will, we believe, increase constructive and long-term planning at national and international level. We hope that this book inspires innovative approaches, informs policies, and fosters a renewed commitment to nurturing and harnessing talents that transcend borders — may it serve as a catalyst for further research, dialogue, and action in the vital field of international talent. We will in the following briefly address some of the core conceptualization efforts that are included in this volume, and even more briefly address some core questions and challenges to be dealt with in the near future. One of the core efforts needed in the field of migration and global talent mobility is conceptualization, by time; also operationalization of the very potential of global talents, the extent of utilization of the potential, and identification of things that hinder and facilitate this utilization. During this process, we believe the need for identification of talent waste will inevitably emerge, both at the company level, regional and national level, and the aggregate international level. Putting on the glasses of a positive-sum game, we believe that the fundamental premise of economy (i.e., being the study of efficiency of utilization of scarce resources), will be challenged, at least within this area of study. Actors at different levels of conceptual development, development of management policy and planning divisions at governmental and international level, will be called upon to rather deal with the plentifulness of talents as resources focusing on sufficiency and reproduction rather than insufficiency, on coopetition rather than on competition, on the common benefits rather than on maximization of personal benefit at the cost of other actors involved. No

Foreword

XV

doubt we are at the very beginning of a new way of framing the field of global talent. Furthermore, and inspired by the insight brought about by the empirically based conceptualization in this volume, we would be able to reconsider our perspectives on international conflicts, and the very understanding of the relationship between “winners” and “losers.” It will in the long run become more and more apparent that the winner does not take it all, after all. Nations will acknowledge that exclusionary gains or victories on one front or field will be hugely outweighed by long-run losses and damages to the welfare and well-being of the citizens. To understand this and make the development conceivable for actors involved in the management of global talent, we clearly need more in-depth empirical research of the changing patterns of global and regional migration and namely global talent. Probably the very first step on this path is to make a clear distinction between the traditional understanding of migration, on the one hand, and the phenomenon of expatalent, on the other, the latter being the very core axiom of this volume. What does a company or country need in order to become able to act proactive in the field of talent mobility management? What practices at different level of operation are to be considered sustainable? Are there new facets of the very concept “sustainability” that have to be taken into account in order to grasp the newly emerged circumstances of sustainability? We are dealing with circumstances that both produce and are themselves reproduced by a global imperative and a new global narrative that manifest themselves in a variety of ways To grasp this global imperative and the new global narrative with regard to the identification, the development, and the utilization of talent we need new concepts and perspectives, among which the crucial ones comprise the management of global talent, the complexities of talent flows, the factors that drive or trigger individual talents, the policies of governments and companies to attract talents as well as policies to avoid development of demotivational factors, the nature of the race for talents at different levels, the budgetary policies of resource allocation and efficiency of the very resources when it comes to the improving the position of the country or the company in the race, including, for example, how to make immigration regimes of the country more competitive. Many of the presented themes are not completely new. Neither is the awareness of some of the highlighted challenges: The OECD publication The Global Competition for Talent: Mobility of the Highly Skilled (QECD, 2008) highlights that the international mobility of highly skilled workers is increasing in scale and complexity as more economies participate in R&D and innovation activity. Mobile talent diffuses knowledge both directly and indirectly across

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borders. This can boost global innovation performance, with benefits accruing to both sending and receiving countries: It is clear that mobility is leading to an increasing level of labour-market internationalisation and integration, and competition for talent is now influencing innovation policy initiatives across the globe. Most countries offer a range of policies focused on assisting and encouraging mobility, although few have a specific and coherent mobility strategy. Many nations aim to attract the same pool of highly skilled talent; thus, relying on international flows to fill existing or future gaps in supply

may entail risks. Addressing shortcomings in national policies that may limit the domestic supply of skilled workers, and ensuring that the wider environment for innovation and scientific endeavour is sound, are key policy challenges for coun-

tries. (OECD, 2008) The majority of contemporary research on the international competition for talent between nations, though, focuses on highly skilled individuals within STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) and NBIC (nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science). In our view, STEM and NBIC only represent a subcategory of a more significant population of global talents, whose distinguised character is being “achievers.” These global talents comprise all individual empaths and potential empaths with one common denominator: Due to their resources, competencies, and skills (within any field; scientific, financial, cultural, sport or other) they are attractive to nations participating in the global competition for economic prosperity now and in the future. To understand the nature of this growing competition, we propose using “competitiveness,” “comparative advantages,” “attraction,” and certainly “global talents” as core concepts or building blocks of comprehensive analyses. These core concepts need to be clarified, operationalized, and adjusted to future research projects, as the prime general question to be answered would be: What is the status quo with regard to numbers and types of global talents residing in specific countries? And how we can explain the likely causes of the existing pattern in order to prepare for and facilitate future development? Starting with the concept “comparative advantage,” we should redefine/free it from the economic theoretical context to which the concept traditionally has belonged since David Ricardo first coined it. In the original, purely economic terminology, “comparative advantage” referred to a law of principle that holds that under free trade, an agent will produce more and consume less of a good for which they have a comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is the economic reality describing the work gains from trade for individuals, firms, or nations, which arise from differences in their factor endowments or technological progress. In an economic model, agents have a comparative advantage over others in producing

a particular good if they can produce that good at a lower relative opportunity cost

Foreword

XVII

or autarky price, 1.¢. at a lower relative marginal cost prior to trade. (Watson, 2017, p. 257)

Put simply, an opportunity cost is a potential benefit that someone loses when selecting a particular option over another. In the case of comparative advantage, the opportunity cost (that is to say, the potential benefit which is forfeited) for one company is lower than that of another company. Putting the concept of comparative advantage in the context of international competition for the global talents we should approach the concept from a psychological, sociological and cultural perspective, although the result is economic (see https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/opportunitycost.asp). Similarly, the concept of competitiveness is closely linked to economic theory, referring to the “ability of a firm or a nation to offer products and services that meet the quality standards of the local and world markets at prices that are competitive and provide adequate returns on the resources employed or consumed in producing them,” “Competitiveness” in this terminology is

defined further in various ways highlighting certain, not exclusively economic, dimensions of the concept, for instance, the cost/market share view of

competitiveness. It can be used to motivate policies that lower costs and thus raise exports but in doing so entrench zero-sum competition among locations

and lower prosperity. The productivity-based view of competitiveness, as the second definition looks at competitiveness as a location’s productivity level, driving the standard of living the individuals in that location can sustain (Delgado et al., 2013). This definition is motivated by a concern for a location’s inherent ability to create value based on the production factors it has at its disposal. ECB president Mario Draghi, for example, defined a competitive economy as one in which “institutional and macroeconomic conditions allow productive firms to thrive and in turn, the development of these firms supports the expansion of employment, investment and trade” (quoted in Altomonte & Bekes, 2016). Individual behavior and interactions between individuals are a core aspect of economic activity, and ultimately have a strong impact on the level of productivity and prosperity a location can reach. No doubt culture, broadly defined, is one important influence on these dynamics, with Max Weber, one of the early contributors, linking the value systems of different religions to economic success in his work, with specific arguments as to whether different cultures are more prone to support risk-taking, entrepreneurship, and other types of behavior that drive long term-prosperity. Cultures might also differ in the value that they put on economic prosperity overall, or on specific value capabilities like education. Institutions, both in government and in the private sector, are an important influence on competitiveness. Their quality and their capacity in implementing policies or

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

management techniques arguably are of high importance for the quality of business environments and the sophistication of companies that can be observed; some have even argued that economic development should at its core be understood as increasing institutional capacity. (Feldman, 2013)

Individuals and institutions interact and it is this ability to interact effectively and efficiently that is seen to be positively associated with higher levels of economic performance (Bronisz & Heijman, 2009); besides, measures of social capital have been designed to capture this quality of a location. They tend to be significantly associated with economic performance, but the indicators used are often dominated by relatively traditional indicators of human capital presence. Concepts like innovation systems and entrepreneurial ecosystems look at the strengths of linkages as social connections (Ketels et al., 2012).

GLOBAL TALENTS ARE GLOBAL ACHIEVERS In order to understand the concept of global talent, it is necessary to unpack the concept “talents” or achievers. What exactly characterizes a talent or an achiever? Talents as a “personality type” are goal-oriented, energetic, self-assured, and are driven by a focus on meeting goals and hitting targets. They seek recognition of accomplishment, they pursue the “right” image, the right place to grow, and they fear being worthless, wasted, and limited. They are

motivated by a basic desire toward being/making themselves valuable. They are not necessarily altruistic, but the results of their efforts and industry benefits large groups of people. They are optimistic, hardworking, competitive, sociable, practical, charismatic, and competent; they are good providers and motivators. At the same time, talents are preoccupied with the question of image and status as they chase validation and recognition from others; some are workaholics, guided by accomplishments and success. Their identities are attached to their achievements. They achieve in order to receive external validation, which feeds their need to feel worthy. G/obal talents, to be found in

many branches of business including, but certainly not only, STEM branches and NBIC branches, are those talents who seek sources, channels, and envi-

ronments to fulfill their psychological needs, which Maslow classified into two categories: (i) esteem needs, i.e., esteem for oneself (dignity, achievement, mastery, independence) and (ii) the desire for reputation or respect from others

(e.g., status, prestige). Moreover, the talents have se/f-actualization needs — realizing personal potential, achieving self-fulfillment, and seeking personal growth and peak experiences: a desire “to become everything one is capable of becoming” (Maslow, 1987, p. 64). Global talents are those individuals who

Foreword

XIX

are both capable and (might) wish to further the process of self-actualization beyond national borders. Contemporary evidence indicates that the number of global talents has been growing tremendously during recent decades: The share of STEM (as a sub-category of Global Talents) has been proliferating in some, but not all, countries, in some business branches but not in all. Looking

at the USA, their share of employment has risen modestly from 4.2% in 1960 to 11.6% in 2010-12 in education, law, and social service occupations, while jumping from 6.6% to 28.1% over the same period in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM).” (Hanson et al., 2017)

Due to the opportunity structure available in different countries and policy priorities, “The presence of highly educated foreign-born workers varies markedly by occupation. Human capital and skill acquisition investment are accepted to be fundamental variables for productivity growth (Lucas, 1988; see also Jones, 1995; Jones, 2002). In a context of international labor mobility, the stock of human capital in an economy does not only depend on investment in skill acquisition by natives, but it also depends on by the skill embodied in the human resource of STEM and NBIC from abroad (Bongersy et al., 2018). Looking at the U.S.A. again, as one of the best examples of “attractors of STEM” the foreign-born accounted for only 7.1 percent of prime-age males with a college education in 1980. By 2012, this share had reached 17.1 percent. According to Bauman, The opposition between the tourists and the vagabonds is the major, principal division of the postmodern society. We are all plotted on a continuum stretched between the poles of the ‘perfect tourist” and the

‘vagabond

beyond

remedy’,

and our

respective places between the poles are plotted according to the degree of freedom we possess in choosing our life itineraries. Freedom of choice is in the postmodern society by far the most seminal among the stratifying factors. The more freedom

of choice one has, the higher is his or her rank in the postmodern social hierarchy. (Bauman, 1996)

Global talents might be the number one agents of globalization, although we miss empirical evidence for Bauman’s argument (1996) on the “rootless character” of “the perfect tourists”/global Talents and their lack of loyalty, trust and solidarity with the home or host country contexts. It is possible that we will find that the global talents or Bauman’s “perfect tourists” precisely chase that sense of belonging, loyalty, and emotional attachment on both sides of national borders, which would be contrary to Bauman’s theoretical ideas. At least this is the core of the very insight that has been brought about by applying theoretical perspectives on social capital and specifically “dual habitus,” which could indicate that “the perfect tourists” or as we call it “global talents” are privileged

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

to have the sense of emotional more than one national context.

and substantial attachment and affiliation to

COUNTRY IMAGE AND ATTRACTION Elaborating on the causes of this attraction, Freeman (2005) argues that the United States today can meet the need for a more technologically sophisticated labor force either by growing its talent through the education and training of native-born workers or by importing talent from abroad. On the other hand, the policy priorities and discourses in the U.S.A., also toward STEM and NBIC migrants, have changed to a restrictive stance during recent years. Despite these changes, the country is still among the most attractive ones for STEM and NBIC migrants, who are chasing opportunities to improve their career and lives. Why? As we obviously are dealing with pool factors here (1.c., what makes country A more attractive than country B), the causes have to be found in the concept of “comparative advantages” or rather “competitiveness” with regard to attracting the global talents. Neither competitiveness nor “comparative advantage,” on the other hand, have been operationalized beyond the strictly economic sense of the concepts, especially not regarding their character, contents, scope, dimensions, and implications concerning global competition for attracting global talents. Similarly, there is a lack of knowledge and systematically elaborated and articulated reflections on how to design strategies and how to implement those strategies in order to get a more significant share of the intellectual and innovational resources that global STEM, NBIC and other talents represent. Among obvious contributory factors to the attraction of a country towards global talents, including STEM and NBIC migrants, is the acknowledgement, the quality, and the attractiveness of a country’s universities. However, attractive universities are far from the only comparative advantage a country can have with regard to attracting global talents (including STEM and NBIC migrants) and despite the lack of the empirical knowledge on how global talents actually are distributed among different nations, the records and experiences of Scandinavian countries would support a hypothesis on the positive impact of the international image of the country, and how the balance between work and life (work-life balance) is designed, facilitated, and organized. The case of Scandinavian countries demonstrates that very few universities in the top 10 or even top 50 level are not necessarily a barrier on the path of attractiveness. However, as we are limited by the lack of empirical evidence and proper theoretical perspectives on the subject matter of “the international competition for the global talents” these ideas will so far only stand as qualified guesses (i.e., hypotheses). There is a tremendous lack of knowledge on

Foreword

XXI

how many talents enter different countries, with what skills and competencies, with what contribution and whether they, based on their residence experiences, choose to make those host countries their “home” countries (1.e., countries in which they plan to stay on (an almost) permanent basis).

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL

FRAMEWORK

There exists only limited research on the causes of why global talents (incl. STEM and NBIC) or those who at a later stage of skill development and certain circumstance in the home country or abroad might become global talents, choose to move to certain countries. Moreover, there has been almost

no research on why they decide to reside in those countries on a more or less permanent basis. Among the entrance corridors, student visas have received much attention. On the other hand, few if any studies have comprehensively addressed the question of to what extent those students stay after finishing their studies, and where they go with all possibilities open for them, and why. When we are here dealing with the attractiveness of different countries, there is certain international ranking systems that most probably influence the complicated process of individual decision-making relating to where to go. There have not yet been any efforts to develop a comprehensive empirically based theory development in the field of “country attraction and the global talents.” One indisputably substantial contribution to such theory development would, in our view, be Hofstede’s work and the Hofstede institute’s measurement of country culture alongside six dimensions, namely Power Distance Index (high versus low), Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance Index (high versus low), Long- versus Short-term Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint. Despite the valuable insights of Hofstede’s measurement of countries’ cultural context, there has been no study connecting these dimensions and the country profile based on these dimensions, on the one hand, and the attraction of the respective countries, on the other, on global talents. Still another ranking is produced by the World Economic Forum, based on systematic assessment of “the competitiveness of 137 economies, identifying drivers of their productivity and prosperity.” The ranking is based on systematic studies of the economies in relation to the following 12 dimensional “pillars.” 1.

Institutions: Security, property rights, social capital, checks and _balances, transparency and ethics, public-sector performance and corporate

governance. 2.

Infrastructure: The quality and extension of transport infrastructure (road, rail, water, and air) and utility infrastructure.

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

ICT adoption: The degree of diffusion of specific information and communication technologies. Macroeconomic stability: The level of inflation and the sustainability of fiscal policy. Health: Health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE) — the average number of years a newborn can expect to live in good health. Skills: The general level of skills of the workforce and the quantity and quality of education. While the concept of educational quality is, constantly evolving, important quality factors today include developing digital literacy, interpersonal skills, and the ability to think critically and creatively. Product market: The extent to which a country provides an even playing field for companies to participate in its markets. It is measured in terms of extent of market power, openness to foreign firms, and the degree of market distortions. Labor market: It encompasses “flexibility,” namely, the extent to which human resources can be re-organized and “talent management,” namely, the extent to which human resources are leveraged. Financial system: The depth, namely the availability of credit, equity, debt, insurance, and other financial products, and the stability, namely,

10. ll.

the mitigation of excessive risk-taking and opportunistic behavior of the financial system. Market size: The size of the domestic and foreign markets to which a country’s firms have access. Business dynamism: The private sector’s capacity to generate and adopt new technologies and new ways to organize work, through a culture that embraces change, risk, new business models, and administrative rules that

be.

allow firms to enter and exit Innovation capability: The development; the extent to collaboration, connectivity, different visions and angles; and services.

the market easily. quantity and quality of formal research and which a country’s environment encourages creativity, diversity, and confrontation across and the capacity to turn ideas into new goods

THE MISSING LINK — COOPETITION These are interesting and crucial insights, as well as conceptual operationalizations, but the missing link between the insights and the global talent management remains: There has been no effort toward theoretical and empirical comprehensive understanding of coherence and consistency, that is, investigation of whether there is any correlation between the performances of the specific countries alongside these pillars/dimensions, on the one hand, and the

Foreword

XXIII

complicated and often very subjective processes of elaboration in which global talents are involved when deciding on which specific country to go to. We are in other words at the very beginning of a road not taken. The volume at hand provides deeper empirical insights into some of the many and very complex dynamics of the both the nature and the function of global talent management by putting the concept of expatalent at the center of elaborations developed within a new paradigm. New concepts introduced in this volume, together with specific empirical studies, will hopefully open up a different view and a more comprehensive empirical study as well as policy-oriented conceptualization and theorization.

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Paper 30, https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/898/1/pw_30.pdf. Bongersy,

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Social Behaviour, 32(3), 344-365, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00191. Ketels C., Delgado, M., Porter, M.E., & Stern, S. (2012). “The determinants of national

competitiveness,” https://doi.org/10.3386/w18249. Lucas, R. (1988). “On the mechanics of economic development,” Journal of Monetary

Economies, 22(1), 3-42, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(88)90168-7. Maslow, A.H. (1987). Motivation and Personality (3rd edn.). Harper & Row.

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(2008). “The global competition

for talent, mobility of the highly skilled.”

https://dot.org/10.1787/9789264047754-en, Watson, M, (2017). “Historicising Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory, challenging the normative foundations of liberal International Political Economy,” New Political Economy, 22(3), https://www.tandfonline.com/‘doi/full/10.1080/13563467 .2016.1216535#d1e128.

1.

Contribution to the study of international talent management Shahamak Mouritzen

Rezaei and Mikkel Rennow

In an era marked by unprecedented global challenges and transformative shifts in the talent landscape, /nternational Talent Management in Times of Crisis is a collaborative endeavor guided by the esteemed chapter contributors. As we embark on this journey through the world of international talent management, it is essential to understand the backdrop against which these chapters are framed, enabling us to have more profound knowledge on the significance of international talent management. Talent, often considered to be the lifeblood of innovation and economic growth, flows across borders in ways that defy conventional understanding (Kerr, 2018). In this book, we traverse the intricate pathways that highly skilled individuals carve on their journeys, both compelled and driven by diverse motivations — from seeking new opportunities and escape from conflicts to contributing to their host nations’ economic vitality. As talent flows traverse continents, they intersect with policy landscapes that either facilitate or hinder their progress. Governments, organizations, and individuals alike face unprecedented challenges in navigating the complexities of talent management during times of crisis (Appadurai, 1990; Rezaei & Mouritzen, 2021). The chapters that follow in this volume serve as portals into this dynamic realm helping us to understand the complexities of talent flows.

THE GLOBAL RACE FOR TALENT Chapter 2 by Andrea Braun Stfelcova initiates our journey with an examination of research funding as a talent recruitment tool from Europe to China. As we delve into the competitive landscape of talent acquisition, we begin to discuss the intricate relationships between science, technology, and the global race for talent. Furthermore, the Chinese case illustrates that talent acquisition is rapidly becoming a more political issue. Research funding plays a pivotal role in attracting and retaining international talent. In this chapter, we explore how China strategically allocates i

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

resources to lure talent from different parts of the world. It provides valuable insights into the intricate web of international collaboration, highlighting the evolving nature of talent acquisition in a globalized world. Andrea particularly engages with China’s Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) through document analysis and interviews conducted amongst European researchers in China. She bases her analysis on Aylet Sachar’s competitive immigration regime (Shachar, 2006; Shachar & Hirschl, 2013) and uses this perspective to explore China’s migration governance. In conclusion Andrea finds that the Chinese talent programs are people-based rather than project-based as seen elsewhere. Moreover, she finds that talent funding exists at national, provincial, city, district, and university level and she concludes that

Chinese funding programs are highly flexible and able to morph into new and different talent schemes. This means that even if the TTP is no longer publicly active the same funding, principles, and engagement still exists elsewhere.

INTRA-COMPANY TRANSFERS: A CATALYST FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH Moving forward, Chapter 3 by Axel Fredholm, Annika Elwert, and Johan Sandberg provides a European perspective on intra-company transfers. This chapter sheds light on the increasing importance of highly educated migrants within transnational corporations, offering valuable insights into economic development within destination countries (Bailey & Mulder, 2017). Intra-company transfers have emerged as a driving force behind economic development in destination countries. This chapter delves into the complexities of these transfers, their definitions, their impact on the global talent landscape, and their implications for economic growth (Allan & Sophie, 2015; Weinar & Klekowski Von Koppenfels, 2020).

UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF IMMIGRANT TALENT In Chapter 4, Osa-Godwin Osaghae and Thomas Cooney challenge conventional narratives surrounding immigration by delving into the concept of talent waste. Their exploration highlights the invaluable contributions immigrants make to host countries and the potential for immigrant enclave economy formation. Talent waste is a critical issue that needs to be addressed. This chapter underscores the significant contributions immigrants make to host countries, dispelling myths about the drain on resources and emphasizing the potential for fostering immigrant enclave economies.

Contribution to the study of international talent management

3

GEOPOLITICAL CRISES AND TALENT FLOWS Chapter 5 by Karina Goulordava and Martin Geiger unravels the unexpected talent flows resulting from Russia’s war on Ukraine. Georgia and Turkey emerge as central players in this narrative, grappling with the opportunities and obstacles presented by an influx of IT specialists. The geopolitical landscape has a profound impact on talent flows. This chapter explores how the Russia—Ukraine conflict has reshaped the movement of highly skilled individuals. It sheds light on the roles of Georgia and Turkey as both destinations and transit points for these talent flows.

SWEDEN’S TALENT ATTRACTION STRATEGIES Our exploration continues with Chapter 6, where Johan Sandberg and Axel Fredholm examine Sweden’s quest for global talent. This chapter unveils Sweden’s strategies and policies for attracting and retaining highly skilled migrants, illustrating the vital role such professionals play in economic growth and innovation. Sweden’s proactive approach to talent management offers valuable lessons. This chapter provides insights into the country’s policies and practices for attracting and retaining global talent, emphasizing their significance for fostering economic growth and innovation.

THE ACADEMIC DIMENSION OF TALENT In Chapter 7, Maj Grasten, Stine Haakonsson, and Duncan Wigan examine the challenges international scientific networks confront from geopolitical headwinds and how scientific networks adapt in face of these challenges. Focusing on neuroscientists at the Sino Danish Centre, the authors explore how international scientific networks came under strain as Denmark’s view of China began to change from partner to threat and competitor. Despite the institutional and political space for collaboration shrinking, micro level processes of network maintenance and exchange continued. The chapter shows that micro level action amongst global scientists can provide international network stability when formal institutional backing and political support are in retreat.

SUSTAINABLE PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS Chapter 8 by Wen Xiang delves into the necessity of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) skills in managing China’s overseas investments,

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

particularly in Africa. This chapter highlights the importance of sustainable practices and regulatory frameworks in shaping the future of international investments. The chapter emphasizes the growing significance of ESG skills in managing international investments, especially in the context of China’s ventures in Africa. It sheds light on the role of responsible business practices in shaping the global economy.

SYNTHESIZING KEY INSIGHTS Finally, Chapter 9 by Ricard Zapata Barrero and Shahamak Rezaei serves as a capstone, drawing together the threads of international talent management presented in this book. It provides an analytical framework for synthesizing the key takeaways from the preceding chapters, allowing readers to reach a higher level of understanding and conclusion. Chapter 9 serves as the linchpin, weaving together the diverse perspectives and insights shared in this book. It offers readers a comprehensive framework for understanding international talent management in times of crisis, culminating in meaningful conclusions. In this book, we have embarked on a multifaceted journey through the realm of international talent management in times of crisis. The chapters presented herein shed light on the complexities and nuances that define the global talent landscape. As we conclude this journey, it is imperative to reflect on the insights gained and the broader implications for talent management, policy, and practice.

EMBRACING COMPLEXITY IN TALENT MANAGEMENT The interconnectedness of talent flows and their impact on economies and societies has never been more evident. From the competitive immigration regimes driving talent acquisition to the unanticipated talent inflows resulting from geopolitical crises, our exploration has unveiled a world in flux (Shachar,

2006, 2011, 2018; Shachar & Hirschl, 2013, 2015). At the heart of this book lies the recognition that talent is a critical driver of innovation, economic growth, and societal progress. Highly skilled individuals, whether they are scientists contributing to research, IT specialists fueling digital transformation, or professionals enhancing global mobility within corporations, play pivotal roles in shaping the future (Kerr, 2018). However, the book also opens up on the increasingly politicized nature of talent attraction. Where talent politics was hitherto relatively uncontroversial

Contribution to the study of international talent management

5

at a political level, especially when compared to other types of migration, skilled migration now seems to be more of a geopolitical battleground.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN TALENT MANAGEMENT Consequently, talent management in the twenty-first century is far from straightforward. The chapters in this book illuminate the challenges and opportunities faced by nations, organizations, and individuals during times of crisis. The need for adaptable policies, sustainable practices, and a deeper understanding of the dynamics of global talent flows has never been more pressing. As we navigate through each chapter, we witness the diverse dimensions of international talent management. From talent recruitment strategies to the economic impacts of highly skilled migrants, from the challenges of talent waste to the intricacies of ESG skills in international investments, our exploration is rich and insightful.

A GLOBAL IMPERATIVE In synthesizing the collective wisdom presented within this book, we recognize that talent management is not solely an organizational endeavor but a global imperative. It requires collaborative efforts between governments, industries, and academia to harness the full potential of human capital. International Talent Management in Times of Crisis serves as a testament to the complexity and dynamism of the global talent landscape. We hope that the insights shared within these pages inspire innovative approaches, informed policies, and a renewed commitment to nurturing and harnessing the talents that transcend borders.!

NOTE 1.

The authors owe a deep debt of gratitude to the Sino Danish Center for Education and Research (SDC) for their generous financial support for this study.

REFERENCES Allan,

F., &

Sophie,

C.

(2015).

What’s

in a research

agenda?

An

evaluation

of

research developments in the arena of skilled international migration. /nternational Development Planning Review, 37(1), 17-31. https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2015.3. Appadurai, A. (1990). Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. Theory, Culture & Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/026327690007002017.

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Bailey, A., & Mulder, C. H. (2017). Highly skilled migration between the global North and South: gender, life courses, and institutions. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(16), 2689-2703. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2017.1314594. Kerr, W. R. (2018). The Gift of Global Talent: How Migration Shapes Business, Economy & Society. Stanford University Press. http://www.sup.org/books/title/7id aor 10. Rezaei, $., & Mouritzen, M. R. (2021). Talent flowscapes and circular mobility in a Belt and Road (BRI) perspective — global talent flows revisited. Asian Journal of

Social Science, 49(4), 188-197. https://do1.org/https://dot.org/10,1016/).ajss.2021 09.005. Shachar, A. (2006). The race for talent: highly skilled migrants and competitive immigration regimes. New York University Law Review, 81(1). https:// nyulawreview -org/ issues/ volume-81 -number-1/the-race -for-talent-highly -skilled -migrants -and -competitive-immigration-regimes’. Shachar, A. (2011). Picking winners: Olympic citizenship and the global race for talent. Fale Law Journal, https://www_.yalelawjournal.org/feature/picking-winners -olympic-citizenship-and-the-global-race-for-talent. Shachar, A. (2018). The marketization of citizenship in an age of restrictionism. Ethics

& International Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1017/s08926794 1 8000059. Shachar, A., & Hirschl, R. (2013). Recruiting super talent: the new world of selective migration regimes. /ndiana Journal of Global Legal Studies. https://doi.,org/10.2979/ indjglolegstu.20.1.71. Shachar, A., & Hirschl, R. (2015). On citizenship, states, and markets. In R. E. Goodin & J. 8. Fishkin (eds.), Political Theory without Borders, Philosophy, Politics and Society vol, 9, Wiley. https://do1.org/10,1002/9781119110132.ch9.

Weinar,

A., & Klekowski Von Koppentels, A. (2020). Highly Skilled Migration:

Concept

and

Definitions

(pp.9-35).

IMISCOE

Research

International. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42204-22.

Series.

Springer

2.

Thousand Talents, revisited: research

funding as a talent recruitment tool from Europe to China Andrea Braun

ly

Stfrelcova

INTRODUCTION

The People’s Republic of China, long known as a migrant-sending country, was a latecomer to the the ‘global race for talent’ (Shachar 2006). The Chinese government began to introduce targeted migration schemes for ‘talents’ in the mid 1990s (Wang, Zweig, and Lin 2011; Zweig and Wang 2013). Of those, the Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) became the most internationally visible (Lewis 2023). Formerly a prestigious funding instrument (e.g. Royal Society of Chemistry 2018), the TTP found itself at the centre of growing US-China geopolitical tensions and was discontinued around 2019 (Cao and Simon 2021). However, the TTP was just one of many programmes under the ‘talent funding umbrella’ (Allen and Allen 2022). The talent funding plans were designed to entice highly qualified professionals—mostly researchers and entrepreneurs based in the USA and other countries of the global West—to work in (or with) China’s universities, research institutions, disciplines, innovation programmes, and companies. The talent funding plans exemplify the human dimension of China’s expanding immigration regime and its tight link to science and technology (S&T). Previous literature has highlighted the shortcomings and accomplishments of the policy in attracting Chinese returnees (Zweig, Kang, and Wang 2020; Zweig and Wang 2013; Cao and Simon 2021), examined the awardees’ careers (Shi, Liu, and Wang 2023; Yang and Marini 2019; Fedasiuk and Feldgoise 2020) and placed the TTP within US-China rivalry (Sharma 2020; Mattis 2023; Mervis 2020). Existing research also connects ‘talents’ with ‘foreign experts’ and foreign skilled migration into China (Huang and Kim 2022; Mouritzen 2022; Farrer 2014). However, the US—China geopolitical conflict and China’s increased separation from the global West has shed new light also on the TTP, and talent funding at large, and its role as a skilled migration

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

instrument. The ‘story of the TTP’ challenged the widely accepted notion that skilled migration is relatively apolitical, unlike temporary or undocumented migration of refugees (Kerr 2020; Shachar 2009). At the same time, China has learned from other Western countries in the immigration approach to cherry-pick the “best and the brightest’, suggesting the talent funding is a case of the country emulating practices that first emerged in other countries. Yet, this development has been scantly covered in academic research. The TTP, and talent funding at large, has been largely underresearched in migration literature. Therefore, this chapter aims at closing a part of this gap by asking how talent funding has evolved as a competitive immigration tool by examining in detail academic migration of European ‘talents’ to China. Sourcing both quantitative and qualitative data on the topic is challenging because from c.2019 information on the TTP disappeared from official sources. The controversy around the TTP resulted in increased sensitivity around the plan, making the field hard to reach for researchers (Zweig and Kang 2020; Chamberlain and Hodgetts 2018). However, the talent-attracting discourse is prominent in China (e.g. CCG 2023), perhaps even more than ever, rendering talent funding an important theme for research. In this text, empirical material was generated through 20 semi-structured research interviews with 15 research participants generated in two previous projects (in 2018 and 2022). To gain a more in-depth understanding of the subject, I also reviewed 56 Chinese official regulations and other applicable documents, such as Chinese funding calls and universities’ hiring offers. To increase the validity of this qualitative research, I also relied on my long-term presence in the field as an expert to triangulate the findings (Welch and Piekkari 2017; Bogner, Littig, and Menz 2018). This chapter uses the competitive immigration regime (Shachar 2006, 152-153; 2013) as a conceptual framework to investigate talent funding. The perspective describes the interjurisdictional multi-layer competition driven by policymakers in a country that puts forward selective immigration procedures designed to attract ‘talents’ with a goal of emulating and exceeding similar efforts of their international counterparts. I argue that talent funding, of which the TTP was the tip of the iceberg, is a case of China’s competitive immigration regime. It exposes the ongoing drive of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to rival talent-recruitment efforts of other knowledge economies, by offering generous ‘incentives packages’ to a selected few (Shachar 2006), among whom scientists play a prominent role. The CCP strives to attract highly skilled Chinese returnees and foreigners to work in higher education and S&T sectors, and showers them with lucrative offers (both financial and non-financial), promising either a full-time or part-time residency. China has moved on from the TTP and introduced new talent attraction programmes (such as Qiming) which continue to support

Thousand Talents, revisited

9

‘high-end’ scientific talents (Zhu et al. 2023). These plans enabled the hiring of scientists and experts from around the world even during the harsh entry restrictions enforced by the Covid-19 pandemic. China’s leadership, both in the CCP and across various branches of the government, continues to view talent recruitment as a valid way to boost China’s scientific, economic, political, and military prowess. The approach of cherry-picking academic talents based on their potential of contributing to China’s development is firmly incorporated in the country’s immigration regime. Talent funding focuses on people, incentivizing them through lucrative individualized packages, including generous research funding, job salary, tax-free personal allowances, housing benefits, relocation and residency support, administrative support, children’s schooling, and medical and legal assistance. Unlike other competitive immigration regimes, China has refined its approach to allow researchers to split their time between China and abroad, facilitating knowledge transfer without mandating permanent settlement as a prerequisite (Shachar and Hirsch! 2013, p. 85). What’s more, the selective research-migration tool runs not just at the national, but also at the provincial, municipal, and district level. Besides immigration, the tool also assists the Chinese government’s top-down drive to become a more self-reliant, internationally competitive scientific powerhouse with world-class universities and research institutions. However, the findings based on interviews with European scientists funded by talent programmes show that their experience is mixed, as they balance between appreciation for their career progression and frustration in navigating the Chinese environment. The TTP is just one programme in the large family of talent funding, and to understand its role in attracting European researchers in China we first must turn to its context and how it is used both for research funding and migration policy.

2.

COMPETITIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME AND CHINA’S TALENT FUNDING

The intense competition among countries to attract highly skilled immigrants is commonly known as the ‘race for talent’ (Shachar 2006). National authorities have developed selective immigration programmes to entice and compete for talented migrants, emulating and trying to outbid each other (Shachar 2006). The competitive immigration regime describes the multiplayer, multilevel game in the competitive landscape, in which all jurisdictions are striving to outdo each other to lure in highly skilled migrants (Shachar and Hirsch! 2013, p. 79). This concept underscores the significance of offering enticing incentive packages, expedited paths to permanent residency or citizenship, contingent upon the potential contributions of those skilled migrants to the host country’s growth, knowledge economy, and international reputation.

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

The contemporary relationship between talent and migration began to take shape in the 1960s, with the United States pioneering these efforts in 1962, followed by the United Kingdom. Canada introduced a points-based immigration system in 1967, and Australia (later joined by New Zealand) joined this endeavour in 1973. However, as the twentieth century progressed, the dominance of the United States as the primary talent destination began to wane (Solimano 2008) at the expense of emerging destinations, notably the European Union and its member states, such as Germany. Additionally, nations such as Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea adopted strategies to attract their nationals back through enticing resettlement programmes. Around the turn of the twenty-first century, major talent-exporting countries like China and India also joined the pursuit. Countries engaged in the global talent race are continuously striving to enhance their relative advantages and position themselves as hubs of innovation excellence. This global competitive landscape is marked by dynamic policy emulation and competition among jurisdictions, resulting in non-cooperation among countries rather than the coordinated global harmonization of migration (Shachar and Hirschl 2013, p. 79). A notable characteristic is the interplay between talent and citizenship, and the emergence of strategic policies which expedite permanent residency or even citizenship as a fast-track ‘membership benefit’ in the host country. Examples of initiatives with both international and domestic dimensions, such as the UK Global Talent Visa, the US EB-1 visa, or the EU Blue Card, illustrate a strategic approach to attracting highly skilled individuals with the aim of fostering domestic economic growth and outpacing other countries (Shachar and Hirschl 2013, p. 74).

3.

METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, | work with three principal tools of qualitative case study research — document, fieldwork, and interviews (Creswell 2014; Flick 2017). The multiple ways of finding available sources on talent funding was done to achieve a representation consistent with the experience of the research participants (Arnould 1998). The documents I worked with consisted of government files, records, reports, regulations, legal notices, media news, and university postings (Roulston and Choi 2018; Coffey and Atkinson 2017). I have analysed 56 documents from various official bodies and university job advertisements. Their full list is provided in the Appendix. Secondly, I drew on my experiences as a ‘skilled migrant’ working full-time in China as a project manager between 2011 and 2017, and an expert consultant for EU-funded projects in China between 2018 and 2023. Throughout more than a decade in the field, I interacted with scientists navigating their careers between Europe and China (of all nationalities), funding managers, university administrators, and science policy officials. My long-term engagement in the field, including

Thousand Talents, revisited

11

the observations and countless informal conversations, have all contributed to my understanding of the topic, which added value to the analysis (Eakin and Gladstone 2020). As a qualitative researcher, | considered my proximity to the field a source of insight, rather than bias

(Welch and Piekkari 2017), which is

essential since the TTP and its offsprings ‘went underground’ amidst heated US-China conflict, and information on the TTP, its features, recipients and evalutors was removed from the internet (Zweig and Kang 2020). My previous experience endowed me with access to the field, which can be an issue in authoritarian regimes such as China (Gentile 2013; Glasius et al. 2018). | am reusing data from 20 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 15 research participants (RPs) conducted for two previous research projects. Namely, | work with eight interviews | conducted in 2022, two in 2018 (before the TTP controversy erupted). Five people were interviewed twice, both in 2018 and in 2022. Among the RPs, ten were scientists in STEM fields and five were social scientists and experts. Of the STEM researchers, five RPs were funded by the national-level TTP, four by provincial talent plans, six held National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) grants, and one was a ‘100 Talent’ of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). RPs’ funding sometimes overlapped as they were awarded recognition from two different institutions at the same time. Five RPs were female; all were either based in

China or had recently left at the time of interview (in 2022 during the Covid-19 pandemic). The interview questions focused on their experience as a participant of the TTP or other talent funding application, administration, evaluation, and management, and how these intersected with visa and residency applications. Interviews were transcribed and analysed in Atlas.T1, utilizing thematic analyses and coding based on the analytical framework. Their information is summarized in Table 2.1.

4.

THOUSAND TALENTS PLAN: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONTROVERSIES

The talent policies must be understood in the overall context of the quickly evolving Chinese S&T system. The growth of quantity and quality of scientific infrastructure, and a more attractive job market, has enabled Chinese returnees as well as some foreign academics, to move (back) to China (Li et al. 2021). Whereas in 1997, China’s R&D investment was at 3 per cent of the USA’s, in 2015, it was 45 per cent (Zweig, Kang, and Wang 2020). In 2022, China spent 3 trillion RMB (459 billion USD), or 2.55 per cent of its GDP on R&D (Cao 2023). The country became the world’s biggest producer of scientific articles (Tollefson 2018). Such rapid expansion profoundly transformed the institutional environment and the research culture. China’s transition to the knowledge economy, including the pursuit for greater self-reliance and

University

University

CAS

CAS

University

University

University

University

University

University

University

CAS

University

University

University

RPI

RP2

RP3

RP4

RP5

RP6

RP7

RP8

RP9

RP1O

RP11

RP12

RP13

RP14

RP15

Source: Author.

Organization

Czech

Dutch

Finnish

French

British

Italian

Chinese

Belgian

Spanish

German

British

German

Spanish

French

German

Nationality

Overview of research participants

Research participant

Table 2.1

Shanghai

Beijing

Shanghai

Shanghai

Hunan

Shanghai

Shanghai

Beijing

Beijing

Shanghai

Zhejiang

Yunnan

Guangdong

fhejiang

Jilin

Location

Local university funding

Changjiang scholar applicant, NSFC erantee

Provincial TTP

100 Talents, TTP, local TTP

Provincial TTP

TTP applicant

Expert. local funding holder

NSFC grantee

Young TTP, NSFC grantee

NSFC grantee

Expert, local funding holder

National and provincial TTP

National and provincial TTP

Local university funding

Local university funding

Funding source

2022

2018

2018, 2022

2018

2018, 2022

2018, 2022

2022

2018, 2022

2018, 2022

2022

2022

2022

2022

2022

2022

Date of interview

12 /nternational talent management in times of crisis

Thousand Talents, revisited

13

domestic breakthroughs in key technologies, comprising high-tech industries and innovative businesses, was to be accomplished by attracting overseas Chinese talents who were ‘high-level, elite, top-notch, and urgently-needed’ (e.g. MOHRSS 2020). TTP was launched in 2008 with high-level political support from both the CCP and the Chinese government. Such joint endorsement was “remarkably unusual’ (Kim and Allen 2018). The TTP mainly attracted overseas Chinese faculty staff from the global West, active in the fields of chemistry, materials science, physics, and engineering (Allen and Allen 2022). Prospective TTP awardees were evaluated in front of a scientific panel who investigated the applicants’ publication track record and their position in the field. However, at its outset, the TTP failed to attract the people it was primarily designed for: leading senior Chinese scholars abroad. The most high-performing individuals already had settled into a permanent position in the global West (Zweig and Wang 2013). The TTP packages attracted mainly those without a stable job (Shi, Liu, and Wang 2023). In one cohort, 89 per cent of those who were rejected had a position at the time of recruitment (Yang and Marini 2019). As a response, the TTP expanded into new, more flexible sub-programmes, notably the “Young TTP’ for talents under 40, and (since many overseas Chinese had a foreign passport) a “Foreign TTP’. Also, a new ‘part-time TTP’ option allowed grantees to keep their job abroad while occasionally visiting China. The award consisted of two main budget lines: First, research funding of 1—1.5 million RMB (135,000—205,000 EUR) per year, for three to five years, and second, a personal allowance (“pocket money’) which totalled 1 million RMB (c.135,000 EUR), occasionally up to 3 million RMB (420,000 EUR). In addition, the award included many individual performance-based bonuses, customized relocation services, administration support, research assistance, housing, insurance, job arrangements for spouses, childcare, medical care, and other perks. The flexibility demonstrated the policymakers’ willingness to accommodate the talents’ needs (Shachar and Hirschl 2019, p. 85). It also encouraged scientists to keep positions in more than one institution, double dipping in funding pools of two or more countries. This was, back then, neither illegal nor controversial, since scientific collaboration with China was broadly encouraged in the global West (and vice versa). However, it created space to cheat, allowing scientists or their employers to avoid disclosing full funding amounts, or to commit tax fraud or intellectual property theft (Zweig and Kang 2020). The vast majority of awardees were returning Chinese, along with a few hundred foreigners without any Chinese background. Although the exact numbers

are

not

known,

the

national-level

TTP

between

2008

and

2018

attracted around 7,000 people. From this pool of talent, 53-55 per cent com-

14

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

pleted their PhD in the USA, and 68.7 per cent were working in the USA before accepting the TTP. Around 10 per cent (9.4-10.6 per cent) did their PhDs in Europe, 8.4—-8.6 per cent in the UK (Zweig and Kang 2020). The Young TTP funded 3,535 returnees under 40 (Cao et al. 2020). The TTP ran smoothly until 2019; its problematic nature was epitomized by the arrest of Professor Charles M. Lieber, a TTP awardee with a part-time affiliation at the Wuhan University of Technology. Lieber was found guilty of hiding his participation in the TTP, tax evasion, and false statements to US federal authorities in 2021] (Mervis 2021; DoJ 2023). In November 2019, the US Senate called the TTP a threat to national security (US Congress 2019). Following the introduction of the China Initiative by the US Department of Justice, looking into Chinese interference in US research, the TTP went ‘underground’ (Zweig and Kang 2020). The China Initiative was later abandoned but the TTP’s reputation was destroyed (Schiavenza 2022). Prior to the controversy, universities proudly displayed TTP grantees on their websites. Afterwards, any reference to the TTP disappeared from official documents and online sources. Recipients were also asked to delete it from their CVs and personal websites (RP2, 7): Previously, information about awardees was public, also the awarding committee names were public. But since the TTP got all the attention from the US, China changed the name. They run the same thing, but under different names, and it is not public anymore. (RP7) As RP7 indicates, new recruits, however, continued to submit their applications to talent plans in confidentiality (also RP3). The Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) established the “High-end Foreign Experts Introduction Programme’ which combined several programmes like the TTP (Weinstein 2020). A 2020 document on permanent residency for foreigners dealt with the same top-level overseas talents as targeted by the TTP (MoST 2020). Chinese universities and research institutes regularly advertise open calls to recruit talents with conditions similar to the TTP, with rolling deadlines (e.g. UCAS 2022; JNU 2022; see Appendix). Recruitment relied also on networks of ambassadors, ‘recruitment stations’, and targeted events

(Wu and Qiu 2021;

Zhang 2021; Joske 2020). China’s development blueprint, the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021—2025) lists the recruitment of ‘overseas high-end talents’ as a strategic goal (Xinhua 2021), echoed also by President Xi Jinping, such as in his 20th Party Congress speech (Xinhua 2022).

Thousand Talents, revisited

ae

15

TALENT FUNDING: IMMIGRATION TOOL TO ATTRACT SCIENTISTS FROM EUROPE TO CHINA

These developments went hand in hand with the overhaul of the immigration system which enabled the talent funding to become a selective migration tool. To tackle the brain drain, China began emulating other developed nations as early as the 1990s (Zweig and Wang 2013). Although not offering ‘talent-for-citizenship’ like other competitive immigration regimes (Shachar 2006), the authorities allowed foreigners’ long-term settlement in 2004 (MFA

2004), offering a ‘permanent’ residency (renewable every ten years). The Exit and Entry Law in 2012 further clarified the rules for foreigners’ residency (NIA 2023). Within a few years, a new points-based system for immigration categorized migrants into three groupings: A (high-level talents), B (other foreign professionals), C (low-end workforce), with the policy to ‘encourage A, control B, and restrict C’ (MoST 2020, 2018; Richter 2020). A new

type of ‘R’ visa (R for rencai = talent) was introduced to allow a residency of the highly skilled (SAFEA, MFA, and MPS 2017). The Green Card, previously notoriously difficult to get, was revamped, some ‘A talents’ extended privileges to avoid otherwise lengthy

flexible Chinese granting visa and

residency renewals (SAFEA, MFA, and MPS 2017; Zhou 2017). The National

Immigration Agency (NIA) opened to streamline the system in 2018. Talents could get a fast-track ‘green’ visa access, even during the Covid-19 pandemic which otherwise saw China’s borders closed for almost three years (MoST 2020). The TTP remains doubtlessly the best-known ‘talent funding’ outside China, but it is by no means the only one. Although the exact number of individuals was never publicly available, it is estimated that the TTP alone attracted around 7,000 people (with at least 16,000 more returning on various other national programmes), while the local talent awards supported approximately 60,000 individuals (Jia 2018; Cao et al. 2020; Joske 2020). This may

seem like a small number against the four million Chinese returnees since the start of the Reform and Opening in 1978 (Cao 2023), yet, it demonstrates China’s determination to groom a pool of ‘super talent’ (Shachar and Hirschl 2013), people capable of leading their respective fields. The national-level policies incentivized local actors to launch their own talent attraction programmes. An official document on the permit system from 2017 lists close to 200 talent programmes (SAFEA, MFA, and MPS 2017). The catalogue includes small-scale local plans as well as famous national plans which date back to the 1990s, such as the ‘Changjiang Scholar Programme’ of the Ministry of Education and the ‘CAS 100 Talents Project’ (MoE 2018;

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CAS 2017). The National Science Foundation of China’s Research Fund for International Scientists (NSFC-RFIS) began to target foreigners residing in China. Finally, the Chinese Academy of Sciences ‘Presidential Initiative Fellowship’ (CAS PIFI) offers a high degree of flexibility for those who visit China part-time, like the TTP used to (50,000 RMB or approx. 6,600 EUR for ‘Category A’ leading scientists to undertake a week-long lecture tour). In other words, the more highly skilled the ‘talent’ is, the less time he or she is required to spend in China. Local programmes administer a sizeable proportion of the talent funds. It is estimated that more than 80 per cent of talent recruitment was funded at the subnational level (Bekkers 2017). In affluent provinces such as Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, local talent awards are generous and less competitive than the national-level grants (Development Solutions and Petino 2020). They can be awarded on their own, or added on top of a national talent funding (RP3, 4,5, 9, 11). In 2022, in Guangdong, the annual salary for an “outstanding talent’ was around 400,000 RMB (approx. 55,000 EUR) with research funding of amounts up to 5 million RMB (700,000 EUR) for three years. The province could top up national funding by adding 200,000 RMB in subsidies, and 2 million RMB in research funds, plus provide support for housing, healthcare, administration, and children’s schooling (RP). In addition to this, the highly skilled worker could get a personal allowance (pocket money) which made it easier to settle: This money is for you, it is a package to a certain citizenship, so you can rent an apartment and send your children to schools, to set up lives and make it durable. (RP11) However, this funding structure was not universally applicable. In other cases, the 500,000 RMB allowance was paid in yearly installments (RP9), or, at the end of the funding period ‘to make sure you wouldn’t get the money and run’ (RP7). Universities and research institutions created individualized offers and encouraged the researchers to apply for additional funds, helped with translations to Chinese, polishing research proposals and arranging mock interviews (RP7, 9). Cities such as Shanghai, Wenzhou, and Tianjin have also “glocalized’ their talents funding (Kim and Allen 2018). What’s more, talent funding could even be granted by districts, such as Zhongguancun in Beijing or Xishuangbanna Tropical Garden in Yunnan province (CAS Xishuangbanna 2017). Every university or a research institute that employed a recipient played a role in the implementation, “willing to pay large salaries and bonuses to major international researchers who accept the remuneration for what is essentially transferring their knowledge to China’ (Zweig and Kang 2020, p. 9). In its talent recruitment, China has learned from — and exceeded

Thousand Talents, revisited

17

— talent-attracting policies of other countries to provide lucrative settlement incentives. However, unlike the UK or Canada, the ‘talent for citizenship’ in China exists only in exceptional cases. Instead, flexibility emerged as the core feature of the talent plans, in exchange for knowledge transfer. China has always placed emphasis on ‘learning from the West’, which, on top of North America, includes supporting cooperation with OECD and developed, mostly Western European countries — the UK, Germany, France, or the Netherlands (Braun Stfelcova, Christmann-Budian, and Ahlers 2022). Similarly, talent policies prioritised researchers from the West because of their education, professional background, international networks, or Caucasian ethnicity (Lan 2021; Farrer 2014). Due to the deterioration of the US—China relationship, China has begun to place more emphasis on scientific cooperation with Europe which is less controversial (Mervis 2019). This includes talent attraction, although primarily and originally targeting the returnees, it extends to foreigners, including those from the UK and other European countries. In line with the talent philosophy, European academics in China could be split in two groups: short-term visitors and long-term residents. The first batch includes several high-profile, leading academics with part-time engagements in China. These are, for example, Professor Bernard Lucas Feringa (University of Groningen), winner of the 2016 Nobel Prize in Chemistry (molecular nanotechnology), a guest professor at East China Normal University in Shanghai, and a Green Card holder (China Daily 2018). Similarly, Professor Jules Hoffmann, a Luxembourg-based Nobel Prize winner in Physiology and Medicine, was a regular visitor to China (EURAXESS China 2014). He opened a Sino-French Hoffmann Institute at the Guangzhou Medical University (USIAS 2023), and considered starting a company with traditional Chinese medicine (PR Newswire 2017). And finally, Professor Nigos Logothetis, former director of the Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, caused a stir in German academic circles when he decided to move to Shanghai to co-lead a neuroscientific institute there, after he faced accusations of violating animal rights in Germany (SWRWissen 2020). Beyond the high-profile cases featured in the media, many other European academics recruited by talent funding moved to China full-time. Their motivation to relocate frequently stemmed from a lack of suitable academic jobs in Europe (or North America) (RP3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15). A research participant admitted: In my experience, (China) is much more relaxed compared to the University of Cambridge where | was before. | was happy to leave behind the stress of job insecurity, poor pay, and no recognition. (RP3)

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The rapid expansion of Chinese science enabled quick career growth for researchers and gave them the freedom to pursue their research (Chen and Zhu 2020; Xu et al. 2022). While in China, they described having difficulties with visa and residency document renewals, the glass ceiling, a lack of integration in the workplace, cultural and language challenges, and the authoritarian political regime, paired with general feelings of unease over what was perceived as growing nationalist sentiments in Chinese society. They often felt like cultural ‘misfits’ (Chen and Zhu 2020), ‘golden guests’ (Xu and Marini 2021), caught forever in a liminal position (Mouritzen 2022), unable to integrate. A research participant explained that a ‘permanent residency’ in China was, in fact, rarely permanent: China wants your skills, and once they’ve used your skills, they will kick you out.

(RP13)

This fragility became even more apparent during China’s strict entry restrictions during the Covid-19 pandemic (Nehring and Hu 2022) which caused the foreign population in China to drop from about one million foreigners to around 500,000 (Klein 2022). Also, in the European academic community, the number of people plummeted (EURAXESS China 2022; Mouritzen, Rezaei, and Liu 2020), which shows that China’s appeal as a talent migration destination remains limited (Braun Stfelcova, Cai, and Shen 2022; Mouritzen 2022).

6.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have offered an exploration of the Chinese talent funding landscape, focusing on the Thousand Talents Plan (TTP), as a case of China’s competitive immigration regime. This concept (Shachar 2006, 2013) encompasses a multi-tiered international competition among different jurisdictions, operating through emergence of policies designed to entice talents with compelling incentive packages, streamlined pathways to residency and/or citizenship; and other new legal mechanisms to ease skilled migration. The TTP was primarily aimed to encourage leading Chinese STEM researchers from US universities to return to China but later became more flexible. Between 2008 and 2018, the TTP attracted at least 7,000 people (an additional c.16,000 and 60,000, respectively, were hired by other national or provincial talent plans), mostly returning Chinese. This created a pool of “super talent’ (Shachar and Hirsch] 2013), who could lead their respective fields, mainly in chemistry, physics, materials, and engineering, as well as in other natural sciences and emerging technologies. As a research policy instrument, talent funding runs at national, provincial, city, district, and university level. It is the flexibility which allowed

Thousand Talents, revisited

19

the discredited TTP to seamlessly morph into other talent schemes, which continue to recruit the highly skilled. Unlike most research funding which is project-based, talent funding is purely people-centred. The incentive packages combine research funding with a personal award and other lucrative perks to ‘make life easy’. Other benefits include housing, legal, tax, insurance and/ or medical benefits, relocation assistance, access to schooling for children, administrative help, and additional local top-up funding. The talent-hunting approach is firmly embedded in Chinese immigration policy. The Green Card, the R visa policy and points-based work permit system all allow talents a flexible ‘part-time’ visitor status as well as long-term residency. However, ‘talent-for-citizenship’ exchange which defines the traditional talent attraction destinations such as Canada (Shachar 2006) is notably missing in China. Its immigration regime is marked by a different equation: ‘flexibility for knowledge transfer’. The flexibility incentivizes the scientists to contribute to, while simultaneously reaping benefits from, expanding Chinese research and innovation. However, this approach rests upon the intermediaries — funders, universities, and research institutions, which administer the funding on behalf of the researcher. Using 20 interviews with experts and talent funding recipients from Europe, the findings show that this creates a dependency, and misunderstandings and frustrations, for the researcher who is being funded. This was particularly visible during the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the controversy surrounding the TTP against the backdrop of the US-China conflict made the decision to accept talent funding more fragile, as follow-up programmes operate in secrecy. This study is exploratory and has limitations due to the unavailability of data on Chinese talent funding, especially the TTP. The splintering of talent funding into numerous local varieties presented another methodological difficulty. Other restrictions included the absence of consistently compiled data on scientific mobility and migration between Europe and China and the overall quality and scope of the data generated. The number of interviews was limited given the small size of the sample and the sensitive nature of the subject; this research does not aim at representativeness, and more research is needed to corroborate the findings. Recent geopolitical events have strained China’s relations with the global West, exemplified by US—China rivalry and the deterioration of China’s relationship with EU countries. Furthermore, China’s support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has added to tensions, contributing to a growing distance between China and the Western world. Simultaneously, due to China’s long-term investments in cultivating its pool of scientific talents, many researchers have returned or launched their careers there, integrating China further into global scientific networks. The ongoing significance of talent funding shows that many research questions remain unanswered, and new developments should be continuously studied.!

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NOTE 1.

Research leading to this book chapter was supported by the EU Delegation to China and Mongolia, the EU-—China Project Facility (ECPF) and Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR, project ‘Immigrant China’, code ANR-14-ORAR-0004). The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of Mei-Huey Chen, Mikkel R. Mouritzen, and Gaoming Zheng.

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Zhou, Laura. 2017. “China Launches Revamped ‘Green Cards’ for Foreigners.” South China Morning Post. https://www .scmp.com/news/ china/ policies -politics/ article/ 2088410/china-launches-revamped-green-cards-foreigners. Zhu, Julie, Fanny Potkin, Eduardo Baptista, and Michael Martina. 2023. “Insight:

China Quietly Recruits Overseas Chip Talent as US Tightens Curbs.” Reuters, August 24, sec. Technology. https:// www .reuters .com/ technology/ china -quietly -recruits-overseas-chip-talent-us-tightens-curbs-2023-08-24/. Zweig, David, and Sigin Kang. 2020. “America Challenges China’s National Talent

Programs.” Vol. 4. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Zweig, David, Sigin Kang, and Hutyao Wang. 2020. “*The Best Are yet to Come’: State Programs, Domestic Resistance and Reverse Migration of High-Level Talent

to China.” Journal of .2019.1705003. Zweig,

David,

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Huiyao

Wang.

2013.

“Can

China

Bring

Back

the Best?

The

Communist Party Organizes China’s Search for Talent.” The China Quarterly 215: 590-615. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0305741013000751.

Source: Author.

Government document

Government document

Government document

Government document

Government document

Government document

TE SB a A Tee Pe BL

EE

FT Oe] +E ER”

EC EER

i+] Deepening the central

(2014) 645 BARRA

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(Measures for

Talents), Nr. 218

the Implementation of Visa System for Foreign

Ab DEL AA Sik

financial S&T plan management reform program notice [2014] No. 64

rH Jel

Fl

Tat

FAR BE GK Fighting the battle

against the bottleneck

2017

2014

2013

2013

CH PR) 2 1 5] ED AL he BB A ABE

fj (Guide for Chinese Provinces and Cities to Introduce Overseas Innovative Technology Talents)

2012

2004

Exit and Entry Administration Law

Permanent Residence of Aliens in China)

(Regulations on Examination and Approval of

Sb FBLA

1980

P.R.C. Nationality Law

Government

document

Year

Name of document

List of reviewed documents

Type of document

Table 2A.

APPENDIX

SAFEA, MFA, MPS

State Council

MoE

MoST

NIA

MFA

NIA

Source

http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/ content_5296556.htm

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/ content/2015-01/12/content_9383.htm

http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/ moe 2082/zl_ 2019n/2019_7196/201912/ 120191226 413551.html

https://bbs.pinggu.org/thread-10863203-1-1. html

https://en.nia.gov.cn/n1 62/n222/index.html

https://en.nia.gov.cn/n] 62/n222/c398/content. html

https://en.nia.gov.cn/n1 62/n222/index.html

Link

26 /nternational talent management in times of crisis

MoST

2018

ot SS pa HE BAT)

Sh

in China (for Trial Implementation)

Classification Standards for Foreigners to Work

LARA

Chinese Green Card: Who got it and how to get it

Government document

Government document

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/20/ WS85b29e3e7a3 103349141 dd4cf 4.html Daily

2018

“Thousand Talents Plan” Entrepreneurial Talents and Young Talents

document

China

cbnews/20181005/1007568.html

CCP

2018

Qualification List of the Twelfth Batch of

Government

https://fuwu.most.gov.cn/lhgzweb/attached/file/ 20180731/20180731103648 983.pdf

https://www.bannedbook.org/bnews/

Le

https:/www.bannedbook.org/bnews/ cbnews/20181007/1007604.html

http://www.moe.gov.cn/sresite/A04/ 349638. html $8 132/201809/t20180921_

62/n222/index.html

2018

MoE

https://en.nia.gov.cn/n1

Qualification List of the Tenth Batch of “Thousand Talents Plan” Entrepreneurial Talents and Young Talents

2018

MOHRSS

https://dwjl.hait.edu.cn/content.jsp?urltype=

SAFEA, MOHRSS, MFA, MPS news. NewsContentUrl& whtreeid= 1037&wbnewsid=1093

Link

Source

Document from a service provider (visa agency)

Program”

FE Management eR ath ey es i Measures of the “Changjiang Scholar Award

Funding agency document

document

Rules for the Administration of Employment of Foreigners in China Nr. 32

Government

Security. Document No. 40, 2017

Resources and Social Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Public

Foreign Experts Affairs, Ministry of Human

2017

2017

Notification on the full implementation of permit system for foreigners to work in China,

Government document

Jointly issued by State Administration of

Year

Name of document

List of reviewed documents

Type of document

Table 2A.2

Thousand Talents, revisited

27

experts introduction programme

VOT: BEB IT SSF FB F201 OF fey my 9b Bl ee S| ETP A A (14 FYP:

website

News

Source: Author.

Government document

HBR a

(Guidelines for the application of national foreign expert projects in 2020)

2020 4F RZ Eel 2g Sb Eeae

Foreign High-End Talents)

General Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology on the Delegation of the Authority to Review and Issue Confirmation Letters for

ea i A A

SEAN (Notice of the

Sb

PF

document

PA AT ACSC

PER AIR AIT

A

Government

Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology on Declaring the 2019 High-end Foreign Experts Introduction Plan)

2019

frying 7h PS 3c 9] BETTY High-end foreign

Government

2020

2020

2019

Year

Name of document

Type of document

SAFEA

MoST

Council

State

MoST

Source

http:/lawinfochina.com/display. aspx ?id=27053 &lib=law

https://www.shhk.gov.cn/qyfwy/030002/030 002001/030002001001/03000200100 1003/20 20072 1/91 Jeafc2-9667-4ef9-b933-0b7a8e lel 6be. html

https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/

https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/

Link

28 /nternational talent management in times of crisis

AERA

(2020) 965 Ministry of Human

Source: Author.

Archive

Archive

(National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China: Outline of the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan and Vision

document

PU th: 2 hc ES

Ste A HE AP 7K (202 1

) 2021 Revision of Law of the

TTP to attract overseas high-end talents?

CE P| ES EE BT Oe | TE Sb rea sig ACP PAE /2.0? Will China launch a second round of

People’s Republic of China on Scientific and Technological Progress

‘£41

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2035)

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rH AB A BG1 Bl El B25

Resources and Social Security on Further Strengthening the Career Development of Highly Skilled Personnel and Implementation Opinions of Professional and Technical Talents’ Career Development Integration

Central government

document

EM BARA A A eS

2021

2021

2021

2020

2 Dn ai ea BE

ATURE SS PRERRB SE FE HEA AS

Central

government

Year

Naine of document

List of reviewed documents

Type of document

Table 2A.3

Radio Free Asia

MosT

NDRC

MOHRSS

Source

https://www.trta.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/ kejiaowen/bx-03112021113226.html

https://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/ xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/feze/flfg/202201/ 120220118 179043 html

https://www.ndre.gov.cn/xxgk/zctb/ ghwb/'202103/t20210323_ 1270124.html

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/ zhengceku/2021-01/07/content_ 5577864. htm

Link

Thousand Talents, revisited

29

Natural National Science Foundation:

Programme Guide 2021

bet eT BE BEE S|

Funding agency

document

Central

5 | HE 100%

News

FEE BR Se

ol A

a

eH XG

Programme Guide

National Science Foudantion of China

Jinping: Strive to Become the World’s Primary Centre for Science and High Ground for Innovation

BT) A

2022

2021

2021

Xi Jinping visiting Tsinghua University

News

News

2021

Xi Jinping speech to CAE

2021

2021

2021

Year

Local government document

global ambassadors)

(Shandong Talent Group selects and hires 100

a) ES

LL a AA Se A

document

Funding agency document

ES

AA FRIES BGA (The elites from all walks of life gather to hire “talent attraction ambassadors”: The Highlights of Qingtian Overseas Talent Science and Technology Summit is full of highlights)

government

Ea

Name of document

List of reviewed documents

Type of document

Table 24.4

NSFC

Qiushi

Xinhua

Xinhua

Government

Shangdong Municipal

Zhejiang Municipal Government

NSFC

Source

https://www.nsfc.gov.cn/publish/portal0/ tabl 143/

http:www.gstheory.cn/dukan/ qs/2021-03/15/c_1127209130.htm

http.www_.xinhuanet.com/politics/202 1-04 /19/e_ 112734892 1.htm

http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-05 /28/c_1127505377.htm

http://124.133.228.83/ articleContent/1176 926076.html

https://z).zjol.com.cn/news. html ?id=1754595

Programs202 1 .pdf

National NaturalScienceFundGuideto

https://www.nsfc.gov.cn/english/site_1/pdf/

Link

30 /nternational talent management in times of crisis

a ee

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427)

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EHF ATA A ARIEL HAE

it Fy Overseas high-level

Work Permit Category A Talent Awards (Updated | January 2023)

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international influence on education is

CH 8c FF Fl Bs 2 oi Jy 4s Tg GiB (China’s

from near and far)

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Funding agency document

AEE 1000 Think Tank

for Proposals 2023

Research Fund for International Scientists: Call

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talent introduction programme

government document

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government

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Implementation Rules of “Xi'an Young Talent Station”

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document

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NSFC

2023

Government

Municipal

Shenzhen

Consulting Company

Management

Shanghai Meixi

MoE

Shanghai Municipal Government

Municipal Government

Xian

Source

2023

2023

2023

2022

2022

2022

Year

LOO0Othinktank.com/apply

https://www.nstc.gov.cn/english/site_1/ international/D5/202 1/04-02/23 | .html

www.

http:/www.shenhus.com.cn/html/shnews/ rencaiyinjiniuohw/

http:'www.visainchina.com/ work _permit_A_list_cn.htm#l

http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwtb/ moe 2082/2022/2022 z108/202209/ t20220923 663987.html

http:www-.wrsa.net/content_42094701.htm

hzgfxwyj/63 16e9c6f8fdlc4c2116516d.html

http://xahrss.xa.gov.cn/xxgk/zewy/

Link

Thousand Talents, revisited

3]

“Talent Recruitment at UCAS”

“ECN Seeking Global Talents

Job advertisement

Job advertisement

Source: Author,

Name of document

Type of document

EL!

https://www.nature.com/naturecareers/job/

ecnu-seeking-global-talents-east-china-nor mal-university-eenu-/63427

East China Normal

University

2022

https://www.nature.com/naturecareers/ job/talent-recruitment-at-university-ofchinese-academy-of-sciences-ucas-b eijing-china-university-of-chinese -academy-of-sciences-ucas-765125

University of Chinese Academy of Sciences

2022

Link

Source

Year

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

2023

2022

2022

“A Global Search for Talented Scholars”

“Changscha Overseas Innovation and Enterpreneurship Project”

Job advertisement

Local government document

Talents Programme” global recruitment notice)

439Ja 4 (CAS leading the “Hundred

APae BR

BP ER Le Bic 38 56 (Ta

Job advertisement

a

2021

“"Recruiting for the Young Thousand Talents Programme”

Job advertisement

Suzhou Medical

Changsha

Nanjing University of Science & Technology

CAS

Jinan University

College

2022

“Suzhou Medical College seeking talents

Source

Year

Job advertisement

bh]

Name of document

List of reviewed documents

Type of document

Table 2A.5

https://cotiec.cast.org.cn/home

ckeditor/attachments/8714/nanjing university -_a_global_search.pdf

s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/ _

http://s3-service-broker-live- 1 9ea8b9 8-4d41-4cb4-bede-d68 4963 b7dd.

http://cas.9 1 boshi.net/

58 9 TES ASMA TMES MAD MA 6% E44 BAMBA%E6%89% 8D E68 BIBER 8 | M98 MES 90% APME4 “BA%8B.pdf

https://www.chinauniversityjobs.com/ wp-content/uploads/202 1/09/talen t-recruitment-jinan-u E69 A ASME

https://www.nature.com/naturecareers/ job/faculty-positions-at-suzhou-medi cal-college-soochow-university-suzho u-medical-college-of-soochow-univers ity-763419

Link

Thousand Talents, revisited

33

2022

2022

“Southern Medical University Seeks Top-level Talent”

Faculty Positions available for “Global Talents at UESTC”

“Seeking Faculty Members and Postdocs’

Job advertisement

Job advertisement

Job advertisement

Job advertisement

*

2022

“Multiple Faculty Positions at ShanghaiTech”

Job advertisement

Zhejiang University

2022

2023

“Faculty Search for Zhejiang University: New 100 Talents”

"CAS PIFI: Presidential Fellowship

Initiative"

Funding agency

document

of Sciences

Chinese Academy

Wuhan University

2022

China

& Technology

Electronic Science

University of

Southern Medical University in Guangzhou

Shanghai Tech

Institute for Energy Conversion

Guangzhou

2022

“Talent Search at GIEC”

Job advertisement

Source

Year

Name of document

Type of document

Fellowship Initiative (PIFI) — Aerospace Information research Institute Chinese Academy of Sciences (aircas.cn)

CAS President's International

http://talent.zju.edu.en/ talentenlish’2019/0723/ ¢32149a1322302/page.htm

N/A

Global Talent Recruitment — Faculty Positions at the UESTC - China Foreigner Jobs (isacjobs.com)

https://media.nature.com/full/ nature-cms/uploads/ckeditor/ attachments/8720/Southern_Medical_ University print_ready.pdf

pdf

university - multiple faculty positions.

attachments/8699/shanghai tech_

s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/ckeditor/

http://s3-service-broker-live-19ea8b9 8-4d41-4cb4-be4c-d68 £4963 b7dd.

Join Us — Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion,Chinese Academy of Sciences (cas.cn)

Link

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

2022

2022

2022

“100 Top Talents Programme of SYSU”

Faculty Positions for Talents at Westlake University

Faculty Positions for Talents at Nanjing Tech

Job advertisement

Job advertisement

Job advertisement

Source: Author.

Year

Name of document

Type of document

State Key Laboratory of Materials-Oriented Chemical Engineering at Nanjing Tech University

(Hangzhou)

Westlake University

Sun Yatsen University (Guangzhou)

Source

(NanjingTech) | 781247 (nature.com)

Join the State Key Laboratory of Materials-Oriented Chemical Engineering of Nanjing Tech University job with Nanjing Tech University

https://www.nature.com/naturecareers/ job/faculty-positions-in-westlak e-university-westlake-university-764278

n-memorial-hospital-sun-yatsen -university-2022-sun-yatsen-mem orial-hospital-sysu-762778

job/faculty-positions-at-sun-yatse

https://www.nature.com/naturecareers/

Link

Thousand Talents, revisited

35

3.

Intra-company transfers:

a European

perspective Axel Fredholm, Annika Elwert and Johan

Sandberg INTRODUCTION Since the early 2000s, the proportion of highly educated migrants, especially from China and India, has consistently risen and their role in transnational corporations is increasingly important (OECD, [LO, and World Bank 2015). Consequently, the recruitment of global talent has become a prominent focus in migration research and attention is increasingly given to the mobility of skilled professionals through staff transfers from one country to another within the same corporation (cf. Salt and Brewster 2022). While these “brain exchanges” (Findlay and Cranston 2015) are believed to have a positive impact on growth and economic development in destination countries, staff transfers are also influenced by country-specific immigration policies regarding minimum wages, entry requirements, and the definition of skilled professionals as outlined in policy directives (Bailey and Mulder 2017). In the European Union (EU), most countries have implemented policies to attract skilled migrants based on domestic labor needs or business-driven demands. However, the impact of EU directives on recruitment has been heterogeneous due to shifting immigration laws among member countries (Cerna and Czaika 2016). This chapter aims to address the pursuit of global talent within the European context by analyzing immigration policies pertaining to intra-company transfers (ICTs) of overseas and third-country nationals. We will initially discuss the policy context of ICTs and EU’s approach to recruitment of skilled third-country nationals. Subsequently, we will examine the implementation of ICT policies in three specific cases: the United Kingdom (U.K.), Sweden, and Germany. The U.K. has played a significant role in facilitating high-skilled migration, characterized by a long-standing history of ICTs. Presently, the U.K. operates an autonomous ICT policy framework following its departure from the EU. Being the largest economy within the EU, Germany attracts a considerable number of highly skilled migrants. In contrast, Sweden adopted 36

/ntra-company transfers

37

the EU’s directive on ICTs relatively late and maintains a cautious stance toward common European migration policies (Parusel 2020). Analyzing these cases provides insights into [CTs across diverse contexts, shedding light on how European countries approach the contemporary necessity of facilitating the international mobility of skilled staff.

ICTs: POLICY CONTEXT AND THE EUROPEAN APPROACH Countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have recently gained recognition as successful contenders in the global talent competition. One key factor contributing to their success is the presence of favorable visa regulations and policies that facilitate the entry and growth of entrepreneurial ventures (OECD 2023). In the field of government and enterprise interaction, research often focuses on how institutions, including laws and regulations, can effectively meet the recruitment and cross-border mobility requirements of businesses. Drawing from institutional theory (e.g., North 1990) and concepts like ‘co-evolution’ (Cantwell et al. 2010), scholars emphasize the potential for synergistic relationships to develop between governments and businesses when their objectives align in recognizing the significance of global talent. A notable example of such alignment is the prominence of ICTs which, in certain countries, represent a distinct visa category enabling skilled professionals to move within the internal job markets of multinational enterprises. The United Kingdom serves as an illustrative case where such arrangements significantly have shaped the organization of labor migration while also reflecting the recruitment needs of globally oriented businesses (Salt and Brewster 2022; further elaborated below). In comparison, labor migration within the EU has historically been intertwined with the movement of workers across internal borders, driven by the establishment of an internal market. Following the Amsterdam Treaty, which paved the way for a broader approach to migration, labor migration gained recognition as a potential solution to the emerging challenges of demographic change and sustained economic development (Gsir 2013; Farcy 2020). Responding to these ideas, the Blue Card Directive (2009) was introduced with the aim of facilitating the acquisition of residence permits by skilled workers from third countries, contingent upon documented qualifications and job offers with adequate salary levels (Gsir 2013). Subsequent strategies have pursued similar objectives, notably through complementary policies like the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive (2014) and the Student & Researcher Directive (2016). However, due to hesitancy and divergent priorities among member states, the initial implementation of the 2009 Blue Card Directive proved largely ineffective, with only a few countries adopting it. Consequently,

38

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

arevised and harmonized directive was agreed upon in 2021, aiming to address the shortcomings of the previous approach. Positioned within the framework of complementary directives, the revised Blue Card is expected to position the EU as a premier destination for global talent, mitigating the obstacles encountered previously (de Lange and Vankova 2022). Therefore, the ICT directive serves as an integral component of the broader aspiration to increase the influx of talented and skilled professionals to the EU (cf. Bie and Ghimis 2017). The ICT directive provides a mechanism for managers, specialists, or trainees from third countries to obtain a temporary work permit, contingent upon fulfilling certain criteria, such as applying in their country of origin and being transferred within the same company based on the original employment contract (Minderhoud and de Lange 2018). The duration of the permit varies depending on the category of staff, with trainees typically receiving the shortest duration (Lommers and Oehlers 2018). The heterogeneous implementation of the ICT directive across European countries has resulted in several unresolved issues. From its inception, the directive has encountered challenges similar to those faced by the Blue Card, primarily stemming from divergent legislation and varying levels of commitment among member states. For example, the provision of social security benefits to seconded staff varies across member countries, despite the EU's objective of treating foreign and domestic workers equally (Verschueren 2021). Furthermore, the principle of EU-wide recognition of work permits is hindered by its voluntary nature, leading to inconsistent application and the lack of validity of work permits issued in one country in another (Farcy 2020). The length of the ‘cooling-off period,’ during which workers must leave the country before a new permit can be issued, also varies, and some countries have implemented quotas to limit the total number of granted work permits. While countries like France exhibit relatively rapid processing times of approximately three weeks, others, like Sweden, have significantly longer processing times of nearly twelve weeks (Lommers and Oehlers 2018). These discrepancies indicate significant barriers to achieving a cohesive and uniform framework. A comprehensive comparison, as depicted in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, highlights notable disparities also in salary or income thresholds, the allowance to work with subcontractors or clients, and the availability of work permits for family dependents.

Intra-company

Table 3.1 Country

transfers

39

Regulations of [CTs by country Quotas

Income requirements

Intra-EU mobility

Dependents’ right to work

Work — at

client site Austria

No

Collective agreement

Full mobility

Yes

Yes

Bulgaria

No

Labour market

Full mobility

No

Yes

standard Croatia

Yes

Labour market standard

Full mobility

No

Yes

Cyprus

Yes

Sufficient funds

Full mobility

Yes

Yes

Czech Republic

No

Sufficient funds

Full mobility

Yes

No

Estonia

Yes

Specific threshold

Full mobility

Yes

Yes

France

No

Labour market standard

Full mobility

Yes

No

Germany

No

Labour market standard

Full mobility

Yes

Yes

Hungary

Yes

Labour market standard

Full mobility

No

Yes

Italy

No

Specific threshold

Full mobility

Yes

No

Latvia

No

Specitic threshold

Full mobility

Yes

Yes

Lithuania

No

Sufficient funds

Limited

Yes

Yes

mobility

Luxembourg

No

Sufficient funds

Full mobility

No

Yes

Netherlands

No

Specific threshold

Full mobility

Yes

Yes

Poland

No

Specific threshold

Full mobility

Yes

Yes

Portugal

No

Sufficient funds

Limited mobility

Yes

No

Romania

Yes

Specific threshold

Full mobility

No

No

Slovakia

Yes

Labour market standard

Limited mobility

Yes

Yes

Spain

No

Collective agreement

Limited mobility

Yes

Yes

Sweden

No

Collective agreement

Full mobility

No

No

Source: Lommers and Ochlers (2018).

40)

Jaternational talent management in times of crisis

Cooling off period in months

*

w

he

&

o

(Czech Republic

= &

i

||"

e

Processing time in weeks

Source: Lommers and Ochlers (2018).

Figure 3.1

Processing time in weeks and cooling off period in months

ICTs IN THE U.K. Labor migration to the U.K. has been regarded as a strategy for addressing labor shortages since the 1920s. Over the years, various types of work permits have been employed to ensure access to labor, with ICTs emerging as a significant visa route. While low-skilled workers were the primary focus in the post-war era, there has been a growing emphasis on attracting skilled professionals. This shift is largely attributed to the decline of domestic manufacturing, the increasing economic importance of multinational enterprises, and the global competition for skilled labor. In this context, [CTs have facilitated staff transfers through a distinct visa category, which operates independently of the labor market matching requirements typically associated with work permits under the points-based system introduced in 2009. Aligned with business-driven recruitment needs, ICTs have played a crucial role in U.K.’s approach to the globalized economy. This is evident from the annual visa numbers, which have risen from around 5,000 in 1985 to over 40,000 in 2019. The majority of ICT permit holders currently come from India, serving in professions related to information and communication technology (Salt and Brewster 2022).

Intra-company transfers

4]

In light of U.K.’s withdrawal from the European Union, the government announced that national immigration laws would apply to citizens from EU countries, effectively bringing an end to the previous phase of unrestricted labor migration from these countries. However, due to the close ties between the U.K. and Ireland, Irish citizens were granted an exemption from these changes (Salt and Bauer 2020). It was further emphasized that high-skilled labor would continue to be prioritized under the points-based system, and the ICT system would remain unaffected (Salt and Brewster 2022). Nevertheless, the implementation of the Global Business Mobility scheme in April 2022 introduced five new visas, which led to partial modifications of the previous [ICT regulations. The ICT category, as it previously existed, has been officially replaced by the ‘Senior or Specialist Worker’ route and the “Graduate Trainee’ route. Notably, the key difference compared to the previous ICT rules lies in the higher income requirements currently in place (Ellisons Solicitors 2022; Richmond Chambers 2021). The Senior or Specialist Worker visas enable specialists and senior executives in multinational companies to work within their U.K. branch, while Graduate Trainee visas allow graduate staff in such companies to gain experience and prepare for managerial or specialist positions through temporary work in the U.K. (U.K. Government 2023). In addition to these routes, the other options within the Global Business

Mobility scheme are geared towards contractual service provisions by overseas providers, staff transfers to companies without a U.K. branch under high-value contracts, or transfers intended for establishing new branches of overseas companies in the U.K. (NA Law Solicitors 2023). To be eligible for the Senior or Specialist Worker route, the U.K. government (2023) specifies that applicants must have a minimum of one year of employment with the transferring company and an annual income of £45,800 (EUR 53,259).' However, high-income applicants earning £73,900 (EUR 85,936) or above are exempt from the requirement of previous employment. Similar criteria apply to the Graduate Trainee route, but in this case, the previous work with the company must span at least three months, and the annual salary threshold is set at £24,220 (EUR 28,175). Additionally, the application fee for the Graduate Trainee route is significantly lower, amounting to less than half the cost of a Senior or Specialist Worker visa. Applicants must also be sponsored by their employer, who must be authorized by the Home Office, and the job should correspond to a specific list of eligible occupations for the visa. If the employer cannot cover the costs of application fees, annual healthcare surcharges, and initial living expenses, these costs must be borne by the applicant. Language requirements are not applicable, and dependents can join as long as they meet the eligibility criteria, can pay the application fee, provide proof of identity, and demonstrate the ability to support themselves individually or through the sponsoring spouse’s employer.

42

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

High-income earners who meet the criteria can stay in the U.K. for up to nine years within a ten-year period. Senior or Specialist Workers with salaries below the high-earner threshold can remain in the U.K. for a total of five years within a six-year period. The U.K. government further states that extensions or transitions from another visa type within the Global Business Mobility scheme are possible during this period, but applicants must spend at least one year abroad before reapplying. Graduate Trainees are eligible to stay for up to 12 months or for the duration of their sponsorship, with a maximum limit of five years within a six-year period if other visas within the Global Business Mobility scheme have been utilized. However, it is not possible to switch from another visa type to a Graduate Trainee visa within the U.K., and applications for new traineeships must be made from abroad. While visas in both routes are processed relatively quickly, with a turnaround time of approximately three weeks, neither of them grants access to state pension or benefits from public funds, and they cannot be used for permanent settlement in the U.K. For Senior or Specialist Workers, changes to secondary or subsequent jobs require visa updates, unless they previously held Long-Term Staff or [CT visas, while the Graduate Trainee route does not allow for additional or new jobs.

ICTs INSWEDEN Labor immigration to Sweden has historically played a pivotal role in facilitating economic development, and the nation has gradually recognized the growing significance of skilled workers to meet the demands of the global knowledge economy. Sectors such as IT and engineering have particularly witnessed a gradual surge in the presence of these skilled professionals. The EU ICT Directive was implemented on March 1, 2018, albeit with a delay of approximately 15 months from the original deadline of November 2016. Similarly, the Blue Card Directive came into effect in August 2013. These delays could possibly be attributed to the Swedish government’s somewhat cautious stance toward implementation of EU migration policy, coupled with the existing immigration laws that have been relatively accommodating in granting work permits. The Blue Card Directive, for instance, does not offer significant advantages for labor migrants, as it imposes requirements regarding salary thresholds, university degrees, and work experience that do not apply to the regular rules governing residence and work permits. In a similar vein, the ICT directive coexisted alongside the Swedish regulations governing international personnel exchanges. However, according to the current regulations, ICT permits take precedence and should be issued instead of the previous permits. Since their implementation, there has been an increase in the number of ICT permits, with the majority of third-country nationals coming to Sweden for work purposes being granted this type of permit (Parusel 2020).

Intra-company transfers

43

ICT permits in Sweden are primarily intended for individuals in managerial positions and specialists with knowledge deemed essential by the company in areas such as business, technology, or administration (Lommers and Oehlers 2018; Swedish Migration Board 2023). These permits can also be used by trainees holding university degrees who are relocated internally for training purposes and receive a salary during their relocation. To be eligible, applicants must provide a contract or trainee agreement from an employer outside the EU. They are required to serve a minimum of 90 days at the Swedish branch of the company and demonstrate appropriate qualifications, experience, or education for their positions. Additionally, applicants must have been employed for at least three months prior to the relocation to Sweden and demonstrate that they will be reassigned within the same corporation outside the EU upon the contract’s expiration. If the profession is regulated by Swedish law, validation of necessary qualifications to practice the profession in Sweden is also required. Employers must offer salaries that align with Swedish collective agreements and ensure that the terms of employment are comparable to similar professions in Sweden. Comprehensive health insurance valid in Sweden is a mandatory requirement, covering the entire relocation period for stays shorter than one year, and a minimum of three months for relocations beyond one year (Swedish Migration Board 2023). Any changes to the conditions of the ICT permit must be reported to the Swedish Migration Board, and extensions are permitted for up to three years for managers and specialists, and one year for trainees. New applications for ICT permits can be made from abroad without restrictions on a cooling-off period. If the requirements for extensions are fulfilled, permit holders can also apply for a permanent residence permit. Applicants must then have been employed through a work or [CT permit in Sweden for a total of four years within the past seven years, maintained an orderly life, and have the financial means to support themselves. Permits issued in other EU countries are valid as long as the stay in Sweden does not exceed three months within a 180-day period and pertains to work within the same company. For stays beyond this limit, an application for an extended-stay mobility ICT permit is necessary (Swedish Migration Board 2023). Professionals posted in Sweden are also required to report to the Swedish Work Environment Authority for any work exceeding five consecutive days (Lommers and Oehlers 2018). Dependents and family members of ICT permit holders can obtain residence permits for the same duration as the primary applicant. However, this is subject to the condition that the applicant can financially support their dependents and provide valid documentation such as marriage certificates or birth certificates for children. Accompanying partners or family members are not permitted to work in Sweden unless they change their immigration status accordingly

44

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

(Lommers and Oehlers 2018). As mentioned previously, the processing time for ICT permits in Sweden is relatively long, typically taking around 90 days.

ICTs INGERMANY Germany provides an interesting case for studying the ICT framework since it developed the prototype of the so-called guest-worker migration but had, until 1998, been reluctant to accept its status as an immigration country (Janda 2017). During the postwar economic boom and until the recruitment stop in 1973, Germany had recruited 2.6 million foreign workers through bilateral agreements with several European and North African countries (Bade 2002; Currle and European Forum for Migration Studies 2004). By implementing a recruitment stop, the government intended to reduce the number of foreign workers and encourage the return of guest workers to their home countries, which unintendedly led many workers to opt for a longer-term stay and relocation, initiating a phase of family reunification migration. The immigration of family members and ceasing return migration limited the option of ‘exporting unemployment’ (Bade 2002) to the foreign workers’ countries of origin during weaker economic periods. Hereby, the typically high employment rate of foreign workers decreased and the situation of the foreign population in the German labor market was increasingly marked by high unemployment. Germany’s experience with guest-worker migration had a long-term impact on Germany’s immigration policy, which was largely characterized by limiting third-country nationals’ immigration and encouraging return migration (Dickel 2002). It was only with the change of government in 1998 that Germany was recognized as an immigration country by the newly elected federal government, and far-reaching changes in legislation were initiated (Mukazhanov 2004), including the possibility for intra-corporate transfers (Hefi 2009). The idea of a general points-based system for labor immigration did not, however, find support and the regulatory framework remained rather restrictive. First initiatives to open up its labor market to highly skilled third nationals were made in 2000 with the introduction of the Green Card, which largely failed to attract foreign specialists on a broader level (Gereke 2013). The implementation of the EU Blue Card in 2012 turned out to be an attractive instrument for Germany’s recruitment of high-skilled labor, unlike in other member states. By 2017, about 90 percent of all Blue Cards had been issued in Germany. The ICT permit was implemented in Germany in 2017 by adding several provisions to the German Residence Act (Mavers 2018). Germany decided to introduce the permits alongside its existing international staff exchange program for intra-corporate transferees, in contrast to most other member states, which mainly abolished their pre-existing schemes (Bie and Ghimis

Intra-company transfers

45

2017). In 2021, almost 1,400 persons immigrated to Germany on ICT visas. The most frequent countries of origin of the transferees were India, China, the United States, Japan, and Mexico. About 23 percent of transferees were women. The proportion of [CT permits among the total number of employment visas granted is relatively small. In 2021, only 3 percent of all foreign workers immigrating to Germany did so under the EU ICT directive, and holders of ICT permits accounted for just 6 percent of all qualified immigration cases (Bundesministerium des Innern und fiir Heimat & Bundesamt ftir Migration und Fliichtlinge 2023). The ICT permit in Germany is designed for intra-corporate transfers with a minimum duration of 90 days, although regulations for short-term stays also exist (Mavers 2018). The permit is initially valid for the intended period of stay or up to one year, with the possibility of extension. Managers and specialists can request extensions for a maximum of three years, while trainees can extend their permits for up to one year. To qualify as a manager or specialist, individuals must demonstrate a minimum of six months of consecutive employment within the current company group. However, trainees are exempt from employment requirements (European Commission 2023; Lommers and Oehlers 2018). During the application process, it is essential for the contract or letter of secondment to explicitly state that the transferee intends to return to a company branch outside the EU after the transfer period concludes. Germany has implemented a cooling-off period of six months, meaning that a new ICT permit cannot be issued until at least six months after the transferee has left the country (Mavers 2018). It is worth noting that there are no restrictions on the number of permits that can be granted, and the processing time is relatively short, typically around 20 days (Stadt Leipzig 2023; Lommers and Oehlers 2018). ICT permits in Germany are not limited to work exclusively within the same company; they also allow transferees to collaborate with clients and subcontractors associated with the main employer. However, it is necessary to ensure that salaries paid during the secondment period align with local job market standards. Accompanying family members of [CT permit holders have similar entry rights as EU Blue Card holders. Consequently, they are generally permitted to work in Germany, and knowledge of the German language is not required. However, it is important to note that the right to work under the [CT directive applies only to married spouses (Lommers and Oehlers 2018). Regarding EU mobility, each member state has the authority to decide whether an ICT permit issued by another EU country is sufficient for working and residing within its territory. For short-term stays in Germany (up to 90 days within a 180-day period), only a notification to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is required. However, for longer stays, Germany has chosen not to solely recognize another member state’s ICT card. Instead, the

46

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

option of obtaining a separate residence permit, known as the mobile ICT card, has been established (Mavers 2018). Third-country nationals who already possess an ICT card from another member state and intend to stay in Germany for an extended period (more than 90 days) can apply for this separate residence permit either in the member state that initially issued the [CT card or directly to German authorities, provided that the original ICT card is still valid.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION Research on global mobility of skilled professionals has encountered inherent obstacles due to their relatively inconspicuous role within prevailing frameworks of growth and economic development. Consequently, compared to other migrant categories, they have not been perceived as a disruptive factor in sending or receiving countries, but rather as a group that is challenging to identify. This presents significant challenges for conceptualization and analysis in research (Findlay and Cranston 2015). Furthermore, the study of global professional circulation has been hindered by the scarcity of comparable data across nations (Koser and Salt 1997). This scarcity is still evident in the available statistics on ICTs. For instance, current data from the OECD only encompasses major destination countries, omitting information on visa extensions (Salt and Brewster 2022). Given the heterogeneous and intricate nature of country-specific visa regulations discussed in this chapter, comparing and estimating the overall scope and processes of ICTs becomes a challenging task. Despite these complexities, a main conclusion is that significant disparities exist in the regulation of ICTs among the cases we have compared. The U.K. stands out as having a rich history of ICT policies and a more detailed regulation of skilled labor, with ICT permits that can span up to nearly 10 years for certain groups. However, it is worth noting that the U.K. imposes rather stringent income requirements and maintains a specific list of eligible occupations to determine access to ICT permits. While Germany and Sweden appear to be more lenient in this respect, these countries simultaneously exhibit differences in aspects such as cooling-off periods, processing time, and the availability of opportunities to work with clients or subcontractors. These variations highlight the intricacy of establishing common rules across the EU as member countries assert their need for autonomy in local regulations. Consequently, certain EU countries may possess more favorable legislation, which enhances their competitive ability to attract global talent. On a broader level, this underscores the necessity of harmonizing EU regulations in order to enhance the region’s prospects of competitiveness in the global knowledge economy through the influx of talented and skilled professionals. The examined cases also demonstrate shared characteristics in their fundamental aspects of ICT regulation, specifically in their focus on facilitating

Intra-company transfers

47

streamlined staff transfers for a specific group of professionals. This implies that similar efforts have been undertaken to align immigration laws with the interests of businesses in addressing the demand for international recruitment. However, the presence of persistent obstacles, such as challenges in meeting eligibility criteria for ICT permits, raises questions about the extent to which the studied policies truly draw on synergies that cater to the needs of both parties. Delays in visa processing, limited opportunities for dependents to work, and inadequate recognition of work permits in neighboring countries further cast doubt on the efficacy in this respect. Research by Ageberg and Wiberg (2022) as well as the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC 2021) also highlights contrasting employer expectations and concerns regarding immigration routes for skilled workers in Sweden and the U.K., revealing divergent views on the impact of existing regulations. Thus, it remains uncertain whether the current outline of ICTs effectively facilitate seamless staff transfers while keeping pace with the opportunities for growth and economic development offered by transnational corporations. In addition to need for more data on ICTs, this topic warrants further attention in future research on ICT policies within the European context.

NOTE 1.

The monetary conversions provided are based on exchange rates at the time of the chapter revision and may vary.

REFERENCES Ageberg, E., & Wiberg, D. (2022). Starkt Svensk Talangattraktion: Konkurrenskraft och kompetens genom arbetskrafisinvandring. ISBN: 978-91-89752-00-9. Orebro: Entreprenérskapsforum.

Bade, K.J. (2002). Ewropa in Bewegung: Migration vom spdten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Brosch., durchges. Sonderausg). Europa bauen. Miinchen: Beck. Bailey, A., & Mulder, C.H. (2017). Highly skilled migration between the global North and South: gender, life courses and institutions. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43:16, 2689-2703. Bie, A. de, & Ghimis, A. (2017). The intra-corporate transferees directive: a revolutionary scheme or a burden for multi-national companies? ERA Forum, 18(2), 199-211.

Bundesministerium des Innern und fiir Heimat & Bundesamt fiir Migration und Fliichtlinge (2023). Migrationsbericht der Bundesregierung: Migrationsbericht 2021, Retrieved from https:// www .bamf.de/SharedDocs/ Anlagen/ DE/ Forschung/

Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-202 1 .html?nn=283568. Cantwell, J, Dunning, J.H., & Lundan, 5.M. (2010). An evolutionary approach to understanding international business activity: the co-evolution of MNEs and the institutional environment. Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 567-586.

Cerna, L., & Czaika, M. (2016). European policies to attract talent: the crisis and highly skilled migration policy changes. In Triandafyllidou, A., & Isaakyan, 1.

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(eds), Migh-Skill Migration and Recession: Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Currle, E., & European Forum for Migration Studies (2004). Migration in Europa Daten und Hintergriinde. Forum Migration. Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius. de Lange, T., & Vankova, Z (2022). The recast EU Blue Card directive: towards a level playing field to attract highly qualified migrant talent to work in the EU? European

Journal of Migration and Law, 24, 489-515. Dickel, D. (2002), Einwanderungs- und Asylpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Frankreichs und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine vergleichende Studie der 1980er und 1990er Jahre. Forschung Politikwissenschaft: v.168. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fiir Sozialwissenschaften. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/

lib/kxp/detail.action?docID=6286496. Ellisons Solicitors (2022), The new UK Global Business Mobility Visa — good news or bad? Retrieved from https://www.ellisonssolicitors.com/news/the-new-uk-global -business-mobility-visa-good-news-or-bad/. European Commission (2023). Germany — intra-corporate transferee (ICT). Retrieved from https:// immigration -portal .ec .curopa .cu/ germany -intra -corporate -transferee -Ict_en.

Farcy, J.B, (2020), Labour immigration policy in the European Union; how to overcome the tension between further Europeanisation and the protection of national interests? European Journal of Migration and Law, 22, 198-223. Findlay, A.M., & Cranston, 8. (2015). What’s in a research agenda? An evaluation of

research developments in the arena of skilled international migration. DPR, 37(1),

17-31. Gereke, J. (2013), Highly-skilled Indian Migrants in Germany (CARIM-India Research Report No. RR2013/32). Retrieved from https://cadmus .eui .ew/ bitstream/handle/ 1814/29494/CARIM-India-2013%20-%%2032.pdf?sequence=1.

Gsir, 8. (2013).

EU

labour immigration

policy: discourses and mobility. Refugee

Survey Quarterly, 32(4), 90-111. Heb, B. (2009). Zuwanderung von Hochqualifizierten aus Drittstaaten nach Deutschland: Ergebnisse einer schrifilichen Befragung (Working Paper der

Forschungsgruppe des Bundesamtes). Janda, C. (2017). We asked for workers: legal rules on temporary labor migration in

the European Union and in Germany, Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 39(1), 143-164. Koser, K., & Salt, J. (1997). The geography of highly skilled international migration. /nternational Journal of Population Geography, 3, 285-303.

Lommers, M., & Ochlers, 5 (eds) (2018). ICT permit study: facilitating EU mobility for third-country nationals. Deloitte. Retrieved from https:/ www2 .deloitte .com/ content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-ict-permit-study.pdf.

MAC

(2021).

Intra-company

transfers.

Migration

Advisory

Committee,

October.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-the-intra-company-transfer -ict-route-202 | /intra-company-transfer-report-october-202 | -accessible-version. Mavers, G. (2018). Intra-corporate Transfer (ICT) Directive — the German perspective.

In P. Minderhoud & T. de Lange (eds), The Intra Corporate Transferee Directive: Central

Themes,

Problem

Issues and Implementation

in Selected Member

States.

Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers. Minderhoud, P., & de Lange, T. (2018). Introduction. In P. Minderhoud & T. de Lange (eds), The Intra Corporate Transferee Directive: Central Themes, Problem Issues and Implementation in Selected Member States. Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers.

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Mukazhanov, T. (2004). Ein “weltoffenes” Land? Deutschlands langer Weg zu einer neuen Politik der Zuwanderung (Neue Ans&tze in deutscher Migrationspolitik und

Einstellung der Bevolkerung), Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg, Freiburg 1.Br. NA

Retrieved from https://d-nb.info/97 1647100/34. Law Solicitors (2023). Changes under the Global Business Mobility Routes. Retrieved from https:// www .nalawsolicitors .co .uk/ changes -under -the -global

-business-mobility-routes/. North, D.C, (1990), Jnstitutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. OECD (2023). What is the best country for global talents in the OECD? Migration Policy Debates, No. 29, March. OECD, ILO, & the World Bank (2015). The contribution of labour mobility to economic growth. Joint paper for G20 Labour and Employment Ministers’ Meeting, Ankara, Turkey, 3—4 September 2015. Parusel, B. (2020). Legal migration for work and training: mobility options to Sweden for those not in need of protection, Official Reports of the Swedish Government. Delmi Report 2020:2. Richmond Chambers (2021). A first look at the global business mobility route. Retrieved from https://immigrationbarrister.co.uk/a-first-look-at-the-global-business-mobility

-route/?utm_source=mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_term=Immigration &utm_ content=articleoriginal&utm_ campaign=article. Salt, J., & Bauer, V. (2020). Managing foreign labour immigration to the UK: government policy and outcomes since 1945, UCL Department of Geography, Migration Research Unit. Salt, J., & Brewster, C. (2022). Intra-company transfers: the government corporate interface in the United Kingdom. Global Networks, 23, 375-390. Stadt Leipzig (2023). [CT-Karte und Mobiler-ICT-Karte beantragen (Unternehmensinterner Transfer von drittstaatsangehérigen Arbeitnehmern).

Retrieved from https:// www

leipzig .de/ buergerservice -und -verwaltung/ aemter

-und -behoerdengaenge/ behoerden -und -dienstleistungen/ dienstleistung/ ict -karte -und-mobiler-ict-karte-beantragen-unternehmensinterner-transfer-von -drittstaatsan gehoerigen-arbeitnehmern-5f3a7c3fl 5b14.

Swedish

Migration

Board

(2023).

ICT

permits.

Retrieved

from

https:// www

-migrationsverket .se/ English/ Private -individuals/ Working -in-Sweden/ Employed/

Special-rules-for-certain-occupations-and -citizens-of-certain-countries/ICT-permit -html. U.K. Government (2023). Work in the UK: skilled worker visa, graduate visa, other work visas, right to work. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/browse/ visas

-Immigration/work-visas. Verschueren, H. (2021). The labyrinth of employment and social rights in the EU Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive. European Labour Law Journal, 12(3), 280-300.

4.

Talent waste: when immigration fails to enhance immigrant enclave economy formation Osa-Godwin Osaghae and Thomas Cooney

INTRODUCTION International migration is now an essential, inevitable and potentially beneficial component of the political, economic and social life of every country and region (IOM, 2004). This claim supports current views on immigration which indicate that the immigrant’s contribution to both the COR and COO is enormous, thus contradicting some of the early theoretical perception on immigration as being a result of world economic imbalance (e.g. Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976; Thieme, 2006). Current views suggest that people migrate for various reasons, ranging from war to unemployment, the chance of a better life, family reunification and, most often, for transnational entrepreneurship (Hammar et al., 1997; Kingma, 2007; Portes and Fernandez-Kelly, 2015; Osaghae and Cooney, 2021). Since the early 2010s, international immigration has been on the rise, and the number of migrants worldwide has continued to grow, rapidly reaching 272 million in 2019 and 244 million in 2015, from 222 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000 (IOM, 2004, 2015, 2022). This situation has rendered migration one of the most contentious issues of the twenty-first century and the focus of governments around the world. With that said, it is estimated that the COVID-19 pandemic may have reduced growth in the stock of international migrants by around two million. Thus, had the pandemic not arisen, the number of international migrants in 2020 would have likely been around 283 million (see Table 4.1 for an estimated number of international migrants from 1970 to 2020). This rise has led to scholars such as Schiller et al. (1995) describing immigration as a process of cultural diffusion, “the spread of the beliefs and social activities of one culture to the different ethnicities in a COR”. Cultural diffusion often creates an immigrant environment that facilitates the integration of their skills and talents within the immigrant community and, over time, into ali)

Talent waste

Table 4.1

International migrants

5]

1970-2020

Year

Number of international migrants

Migrants as a “o of global population

1970

84 460 125

2.3

1975

90 368 010

oun

1980

101 983 149

20

1985

113 206 691

2.3

1990

152 986 157

2.9

1995

161 289 976

2.8

2000

173 230 585

2.8

2005

19] 446 828

2.9

2010

220 983 187

3.2

2015

247 958 644

3.4

2020

280 598 105

3.6

Source: IOM (2022),

the broader mainstream society (Portes, 1981; Schiller et al., 1995; Neuman, 2016; Osaghae and Cooney, 2021). Some studies (e.g. Portes, 1981; Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990; Watson, Keasey and Baker 2000; Berry et al., 2006; Aguilera, 2009; Engelen, Lackhoff and Schmidt, 2013; Osaghae and Cooney, 2021) have suggested that an enclave is a community of immigrants whereby ethnic culture (trust, ethical beliefs and environment) provides the entrepreneur with relational reciprocity, trust and talent utilisation in a COR. Other studies (e.g. Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976; Thieme, 2006; Djaji¢, 2013) have described immigration as a money remittance, a process of bridging the economic imbalance in sending countries, and less a focus on economic advantages (e.g. becoming an entrepreneurs, practitioners) that immigration provides to a country of residency. Hence the opportunity for the present study is to explore the possible consequences when immigration fails to support enclave economic formation; the talent that comes with immigration; and to suggest that ceasing international immigration will decrease enclave economic activity and immigrants’ talent ina COR. Immigration has been described as the movement of people from one place to another, while international immigration symbolises the crossing from one country to another (Hammar et al., 1997; Kingma, 2007; IOM, 2016). The understanding is that the cultural attributes that come through immigration allow people of the same ethnic or migratory background to form a community that provides them with the essential cultural predisposition that helps in enclave economic formation. Hence, this chapter explores how the constant inflow of people of the same ethnic background and immigration experience

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

supports immigrant enclave economy formation in a COR. The study contributes to the knowledge gaps through its suggestion that immigration brings together the immigrant’s COO cultural disposition and reduces talent waste in a COR. Conversely, that the coming together of the COO cultural elements in a COR aids enclave economy formation in the following ways: (1) by driving the enclave’s demographic characteristics; (2) the enclave creates an environment that allows for the cultural predisposition and talent that immigrants have brought with them to grow; and (3) that immigrants’ entrepreneurship activity will cease when there is decrease in immigration into a COR. To explain the influence of immigration on the immigrant enclave economy formation, the chapter explores immigration and immigrant enclave theories and creates an understanding of how immigration affects enclave economic formation in the COR. Although there are several theories that could have been used to explain immigration, the theories used in this chapter explain concepts that best describe some immigration and immigrant enclave concepts and help us understand how enclaves and economic activities within enclaves are formed. An enclave, in the present study, has been defined as “a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of enhancing their economic, social and/or cultural development” (Marcuse, 1997, p. 242). What this suggests is that immigrant enclaves (IEs) are environments that create bonding and an atmosphere that allows the immigrant to embrace his/her own country’s ethnic culture, exchanging things with others for mutual benefit and to practise religious and cultural beliefs in the COR (Light et al., 1994).

THEORIES EXPLAINING IMMIGRATION Some modern views on immigration argue that immigration creates a social field whereby the immigrant’s COO cultural predisposition (e.g. languages, culture ethnicity, human capital, resources, environment) come together in the COR (Djajic, 2013; Osaghae, 2020). Schiller et al. (1995) argued that immigration is the interconnection of economic processes, people, ideas and the diffusion of culture. Piore (1979) sees immigration as the increase in the demand for ethnic markets and goods (not wages). Tilly (1978, p. 62) sees the following three factors as decisive in the course of long-distance migration: (1) the changing geographic distribution of employment opportunities, (2) demographic imbalances, alterations of regional differentials in natural increases, and (3) actions and policies of nation states; 1.c. making war, expelling or relocating specific ethnic groups, controlling migration, as some of the driving forces in modern day immigration. The work by Thieme (2006) suggests that migration is an integral part of life for many people, a continuing social process embedded in societal rules and norms, and describes the movement of

Talent waste

53

people across international borders. However, there are variations in views on the reasons for international immigration. Portes and Fernandez-Kelly (2015) claim people immigrate for economic, cultural, social and political reasons and see immigration as the creator of interaction between nations. This interaction occurs as a result of the migration of talents from one country to another. To define immigration, this chapter uses the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2016) definition: “The movement of people across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes of the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.” Early theorists of immigration argued that immigration was simply a money remittance and income maximisation process (as propagated in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s); but it has been suggested more recently that immigration is a bridge between nations in areas such as economic, social and political relationships. Despite these differential views, there are still some commonalities between the earliest and modern views on immigration. Hence, the next section explores some of the theories on immigration. Early and Modern Views on Immigration Some scholars’ views were used to suggest that the earliest forms of immigration were the result of the equalities in the developed and developing countries, rather than the talent transfer between a COO and COR. According to scholars such as Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961), Harris and Todaro (1970) and Todaro (1976), the movement of people from one country to another is a result of the difference in wages. Using the actions of nation states such as Germany (Gastarbeiter programme) and the United States of America (United States Bracero Program) as a point of argument, Djaji¢ (2013) claimed that early waves of immigration were a result of income maximisation. The consumption theory suggests that human movement is a result of several factors of globalisation that include proximity to family members and the unequal distribution of wealth (Wallace, 1979; Liebig, 2003). This view in some way aligned with the classical view on immigration but suggests that people move for political reasons, safety, war, economic imbalance, or family unification and income maximisation (Wallace, 1979; Liebig, 2003). However, some of the early theorists also suggested that immigration 1s an income-motivated process — people move to improve their economic position. However, Portes and Fernandez-Kelly (2015) have a different view on immigration, suggesting that globalisation has allowed immigrants to travel for entrepreneurship, and development of COR and COO in the areas of political, social and economic relationships, a perspective that follows current trends

54

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

of immigration as the diffusing of cultures and creation of immigrant’s economic activity (Schiller et al., 1995). What this suggests 1s that immigration, once a dividing factor, now helps in the bridging of countries. Neo-capitalist theorists suggest that immigration is one of the major contributors to the growth and intensification of the global interconnection of economic processes, people and ideas (Schiller et al., 1995; Portes and Fernandez-Kelly, 2015). This theory suggests that human movement has loosened constraints associated with a variety of market failures, and that immigration has become a process of filling the structural vacuum created by the expansion of industrialisation and mass production (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark, 1984; Katz and Stark, 1986; Lauby and Stark, 1988; Taylor, 1986;

Stark, 1991). The modern view of describing immigration as the creator of a mobile population, global interconnectedness and a new era of international trade, contradicts some of the early immigration theorists (Petras, 1981; Castells and Laserna, 1989). As found in the work on immigrant transnational organisation in four continents, Portes and Fernandez-Kelly (2015), point out that immigrant entrepreneurs are fast becoming the major factor in the eroding of the national border and the creation of a mobile market place in COR and COO. The understanding is that immigration has become the facilitator of modern economic growth and the transfer of talents. Thus, it could be argued that immigration now serves as an element of linkage between the migrant’s ancestral home and their COR, the channel for cultural integration and an opportunity for immigrants’ economy formation (Lemann, 1991; Stack, 1996; Wilkerson, 2010). From the discussion above, immigration could be argued as a process involving the inflow of immigrant’s infrastructures, talent waste, capital, demographic characteristics, and cultural predisposition from COO into COR. More so, immigration allows for the embeddedness of an immigrant’s cultural resources in a specific geographical area and the formation of an economy in the immigrant’s COR. Thus, an immigrant’s economy formation is made possible by the present of the COO cultural predisposition that immigrants bring with them on arrival in a COR (Waldinger, 1986; Aldrich and Waldinger,

1990; Portes and Sensenbrenner,

1993). As found in the work by

Ugba (2006), increases in the inflow of immigrants into the Republic of Ireland adds to the immigrants’ cultural predisposition in the country and suggests that any increase in the immigrant enclave population will create resources, market niches, and human, financial and social capital needed for enclave activity. Hence, enclave economy is referred to in this chapter as all the social, human, fascial capital, resources, talent waste, cultural predisposition and immigrant environment

that allows

for enclave

Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993).

activity (Aldrich

and Waldinger,

1990;

Talent waste

55

UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRANT ENCLAVES The concentration theory explains the adaptation and strategy that immigrants adopt to cope with a lack of social networks, language and skills deficiencies, and discrimination in COR (Lieberson, 1981; Portes and Manning, 1986, Waldinger, 1996; Zeltzer-Zubida, 2005). Furthermore, it explains how

immigrants are found in some sectors of political, cultural and economic life and why immigrants maintain their ethnic identity (Gold, 1997), and how immigrants are overrepresented in a particular area and in the same industry. The theory suggests that the presence of immigrant COO culture and resources in a specific geographical area creates an environment whereby an immigrant acts in COR as if in COO (Waldinger, 1986; Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990). As found in the work by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) on the Cuban American

community

in Miami,

concentration

brings together COO

culture, demo-

graphic characteristics, resources, behaviour, and attitudes, and creates market

niche and human and financial capital in a specific geographical area. When this happens, it creates the opportunity for an immigrant enclave economy to be formed. Furthermore, the theory argued that immigrant concentration helps in overcoming language and skills deficits upon arrival. According to Osaghae and Cooney (2021), the presence of the Nigerian enclave in Blanchardstown Dublin Ireland helped newly arrived Nigerians to integrate and avoid the adversity that immigrants usually encounter on their arrival in a COR. This perspective suggests that cultural bonding and immigrant talent are an essential element in enclave economy formation in COR. Cultural theory explains a situation in which immigrant businesses differ from those of native-born entrepreneurs, and the nature of the products and services that each set provides (Portes and Zhou, 1992; Brenner et al., 2010).

Following the suggestion by scholars such as Bonacich (1993), Rath (2000) and Rueda-Armengot and Peris-Ortiz (2012), enclave culture helps our under-

standing of how immigrant entrepreneurs gain access to resources and infrastructures within the enclave. Ram and Smallbone (2002) and Kloosterman and

Rath (2010) suggest that immigrants’ culture allows for some understanding of the immigrant entrepreneur’s ability and flexibility in the management of economic exchanges and the use of incomplete contracts in their entrepreneurial activity. As found in the work by Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath (1999) on Islamic butchers in the Netherlands, the Islamic culture of the slaughter of meat (Halal) in a specific area was essential to economic formation. What this

means is that, when present, the immigrant’s talent can create an opportunity for people of the same cultural background to engage in cultural and economic activity.

56

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

Ecological succession theory suggests that when the native entrepreneurs in an area no longer replace themselves and seek businesses outside the local area, it creates an opportunity for immigrant entrepreneurs to move into the space vacated (Waldinger, 1986; Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990). This relocation creates entrepreneurial opportunities and subsequently leads to overpopulation and settlement of immigrants in the area (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). In a study of black America in four US business sites and their study of 571 small shops in Britain using interviews, population and observation, Aldrich and Reiss (1976) showed that when the black population increases in one area, there was a shift from the traditional local (white) business ownerships to black ethnic businesses. Aldrich and Reiss, argue that these large-scale areas and high residential concentrations of new immigrants favour the growth of immigrant enclaves. This theory helps our understanding that enclave 1s the result of the moving out of an area by native entrepreneurs (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990). In Ireland for example, Africans have been present since the eighteenth century (Ugba, 2006), but it was not until early 2000 that a high rate of localisation of immigrant ventures in Moore Street Dublin 1 became visible. The reason for this high rate of immigrant ventures in Moore Street Dublin 1 was the result of the infrastructures left behind by the relocation of the native-born population, creating market economies for the new occupants of the area, who in most cases are immigrants. According to Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) ecological succession occurs when the native inhabitant of an area moves out, the facilities left behind creating an opportunity for new inhabitants to engage in entrepreneurship. The disadvantages theory claims that discrimination in the labour market, unrecognised certificates and language barriers faced by immigrants with mainstream society push immigrants to an area in which their culture is predominant (Wilson and Portes, 1980; Burstein et al., 1994; Light and Rosenstein, 1995). This disadvantage leads to ethnic cohesion and visible distinctiveness of an immigrant group from the native population (Reitz, 1980). The disadvantage theorist argues that segregation from mainstream society leads to the formation of a closely knit community whereby immigrants trade exclusively with one another (Waldinger, 1986; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993), thus enabling a shift towards an enclave that provides a refuge and talent that allows for the embeddedness and creation of COO culture and identity that facilitates economic survival in COR (Waldinger et al., 1986; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Alici, 2003). The acculturation framework, however, has been highlighted as a problem and as an opportunity for individuals and societies (Baubéck, Heller and Zolberg, 1996), but the economic contribution of immigrants to personal and societal development makes acculturation a positive, rather than a negative process (Berry et al., 2006). The framework explains how individual

Talent waste

57

groups find a way to live together and adopt strategies for a reasonably successful adaptation to living inter-culturally. The acculturation framework helps provide an understanding of why immigrants are drawn to their own enclave community (Waldinger, 1986; Berry et al., 2006) and defines how an individual is in a better position to understand the structural resources, COR entrepreneurial culture and available support structure (Berry et al., 2010). The framework helps our understanding of why immigrants, upon arrival, lacking cultural understanding of the COR, seek refuge within their own ethnic group that provides the much-needed resources for initial settlkement (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Berry, 2010). Applying theories to enclave formation helps in our understanding of how individual mentality, being discriminated against, availability of cultural habits, and an immigrant’s ethnic identity and national identity in a specific geographical area create a bonding and bridging capital that leads to the formation of a close-knit community (Berry et al., 2006; Chrysostome, 2010). While other theories could have been a good option for this research, the ones described above best fit the objective of this research. Furthermore, bonding or bridging of the immigrant creates a high level of interaction, group identity, trust and sharing of the available resources (Berry et al., 2006). From this perspective, it could be argued that immigrant enclave theories create an understanding that COO culture, ethnic beliefs, talent and religions found in a specific geographical area, create an environment, resources and infrastructure of human and financial capital. The elements that immigrants bring with them from their COO are considered crucial factors that contribute to the economic formation of immigrants in their COR. Without immigration, these elements would potentially go to waste, as they play a significant role in harnessing immigrant talent and facilitating their economic integration (Phinney et al., 2001; Reitz and Sklar, 1997; Benish-Weisman and Horenczyk, 2010).

IMMIGRANT ENCLAVE ECONOMIC FORMATION The resilience of ethnic culture and attitudes towards the host community by immigrants have been suggested as the main factors that creates an immigrant enclave economy (Phinney et al., 2001; Reitz and Sklar, 199; Benish-Weisman

and Horenezyk, 2010). However, culturalist views point to the persistence in the differences in work values and norms across groups as factors for enclave economy formation (Ogbu, 1978; Wilson and Portes, 1980; Barrett et al., 1996; Ram and Jones, 1998; Knocke, 2000). An alternative to the cultural determinist perspective, proposed by the emerging ‘stratification economics’ suggests that enclave economies emerge because of resources rather than cultural practices and moral values. Darity (2005) and Bogan and Darity (2008) argue that enclave resources are the result of the cultural interaction found

58

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

within the enclave. Portes and Jensen (1989) and Portes and Shafer (2007) identify two conditions for the emergence of economic enclaves as follows: (1) access to sufficient start-up capital, networks and connections to COO culture, and (ii) a steady arrival of a new labour force within the enclaves. Arguably, immigration (steady arrival of an immigrant in COR) increase the demographic characteristics of immigrants in COR — this increase in immigrant population create resources and a culture that are essential to enclave economic formation in COR (Neuman, 2016). What this suggests is that as the number of international migration of a people into any country increases, the entrepreneurship culture, talents, immigrant capital and cultural predisposition that immigrants bring with them increases the number of immigrant activities in a COR. Increases in this cultural element have been found to enhance enclave economic formation, and influence the individual decision to exploit and identify entrepreneurial opportunity (Portes and Jensen, 1989; Portes and Shafer, 2007). In the validation of the work by scholars such as Kirzner (1985) and Ardagna and Lusardi (2008), human capital, ethnic resources and structural infrastructures that favour immigrant settlement enhance the formation of enclave economies. As Kloosterman (2003) and Aldrich and Reiss (1976) found in the study of Islamic butchers in the Netherlands and in the study of ethnic businesses in the United States and the UK, a steady arrival of immigrants was found to have aided the growth of immigrant businesses. Despite the negativity surrounding immigration, theories presented in this chapter suggest that immigration provides immigrants’ COO cultural resources (e.g. multiple ethnic resources, ethnic group, cultural network, support agencies, infrastructure cultural predisposition), elements that have been suggested as immigrant economies in COR. Following the suggestion by Kloosterman et al. (1999), common culture allows immigrant embeddedness in the socioeconomic and politico-institutional environment of the COR, and provides social networks and interaction needed for economic economy formation. Neuman (2016) states that group relationships create a concentration of people with similar cultural/immigration backgrounds in a specific geographical location, and that localisation creates ethnic resources that aid the formation of enclave economies. Hence, the suggestion is that the formation of enclave economies is the result of the resources, infra-

structures and cultural predisposition that comes through immigration (Light and Bonacich, 1988; Carbonell et al., 2011; Newman, 2016). Therefore, the current study asserts that a decrease in immigration will impede the economic formation of immigrants in a country of residence and lead to an increase in the waste of talent.

Talent waste

59

DISCUSSION Industrialisation, globalisation, communication and improvements in transportation have created cultural diffusion, connectedness and the concentration of

immigrants in specific geographical areas in most host countries. Concentration and the diffusion of cultures have led to the claim that international migration is now an essential, inevitable and potentially beneficial component of the economic and social life of every country and region (IOM, 2004). Statistical evidence from cross-border movement shows that immigration enhances the demographic characteristics and talents of immigrants in the COR (North, 1990; Riddle et al., 2010). Immigration brings the country of origin culture together, helps to overcome many

the COR

and the COO

structural challenges and travels between

for investment

and entrepreneurial

opportunities

(Khanna and Palepu, 2010).

Tilly (1978, p. 62) claims that three factors are decisive for the engagement in international migration, namely: (1) the changing geographic distribution of employment opportunities, (2) demographic imbalances and alteration of regional differentials in natural increases, along with (3) the actions and policies of nation states (i.e. making war, expelling or relocating specific ethnic groups and controlling migration, which are some of the driving forces of modern-day immigration), while Portes and Fernandez-Kelly (2015) argue that immigration bridges the cultural, social, economic and political relationship between countries. What this suggests is that immigration is no longer a process of fleeing economic imbalance; rather, it is a process of creating economic, social and political values between nations, bridging the talent waste gap between countries. As per immigrant entrepreneurship economy formation, immigration is fast becoming a phenomenal process that provides entrepreneurs with the COO cultural predisposition in a COR. This study argues that the presence of the immigrants’ COO cultural predisposition (demographic characteristics, resources, human, social and financial capitals, network) supports enclave economy formation. Additionally, it can be argued that immigration reduces talent waste by bringing together the cultural predispositions of immigrants in a COR, which facilitates the formation of entrepreneurship opportunities. As evidenced from work in some OECD countries, for example in Canada and the UK, it is suggested that the immigrant cultural predisposition, when found in the COR, creates a market opportunity for immigrants (Hou and Wang,

2011;

OECD,

2012).

This

aligns

with

theoretical

views

that

the

coming together of cultures in a specific geographical area in a COR creates an immigrant culture that aids enclave economy formation (Lieberson, 1981; Portes and Manning,

1986; Waldinger,

1996; Zeltzer-Zubida, 2005). It also

follows the suggestion in the immigrant literature that immigrants, on arrival,

60

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

when faced with adversity, seek refuge in their own enclave (Alici, 2003; Osaghae, 2020). The refuge allows immigrants to use their cultural predisposition to create resources that help them to settle and later support essential enclave

economy

formation

(Waldinger,

1986;

Portes

and

Sensenbrenner,

1993; Osaghae and Cooney, 2019). As found in the studies of black America involving four US businesses, 571 shops in Britain and Nigerian business in Blanchardstown Dublin Ireland, by scholars such as Aldrich and Reiss (1976), Carter and Jones-Evans (2012) and Osaghae and Cooney (2021), immigration and immigrant settlement in COR was also found to have increased the number of ethnic businesses and talent waste in the three countries. In Ireland, for example, Africans have been being present since the eighteenth century (Ugba, 2006), but there was no known enclave economy until the early 2000s, when there was mass immigration of Nigerians into Ireland and, eventually, a high rate of localisation of Nigerian immigrant ventures in Moore Street Dublin. This increase in the number of African businesses around the early 2000s was the result of the Irish immigration law that granted residency for children and parents of children born in the Republic of Ireland. This inflow of Nigerian immigrants into Dublin created immigrant enclave resources and infrastructure, in addition to human and financial capital elements set out as factors influencing the emergence of enclave economies (Portes and Guarnizo, 1991; Brouthers and Nakos, 2004; Peromi et al., 2016). Thus, an immigrant’s resources are all the socio-cultural factors or elements that come through the immigration of people into a country, and these help in creating a market economy within the enclave (Light and Bonaich, 1988; Neuman, 2016). Hence, this study argues that immigration increases the concentration of immigrants, and provides immigrants with a cultural predisposition that aids enclave economic formation and talent waste in the various ways. For example, immigrants, on arrival in the COR, bring with them COO resources, infrastructures, social interactions, demographics, culture and capital. When immigrants are faced with discrimination, a lack of gainful employment and unrecognised degrees or certificates earned in the COO, they move towards an area associated with the COO culture regarded as an immigrant enclave. An enclave is defined as the concentration of immigrants in a specific geographical area. The moving to a specific geographical area creates culture, environment and infrastructures, human, financial and social capital regarded as enclave economy. These resources create a market economy and enclave entrepreneurship opportunity that would otherwise not have been possible without the immigration of people into the COR. Thus, immigration has become a process that facilitates immigrant culture, providing the COO environment in the COR, along with resources that make enclave economic formation possible. As international immigration continues to rise, immigrant

Talent waste

6]

and immigration issues should be regarded as the bridging of nations and an element of cultural diffusion, not as an element of the divide that is currently associated with immigration in most CORs. Framework Linking Immigration to Enclave Economy Formation According to the new model proposed in Figure 4.1, immigrants, on arrival, faced with discrimination and a lack of recognition for their degrees or certificates find more peaceful lives in an environment involving people with the same ethnic beliefs (the enclave). When this happen it creates an immigrant COO environment, culture and capital (human and financial) in a specific geographical area in a COR, elements that aid enclave economic formation and allow immigrants to act in their COR as if in their COO. As immigration is the main process of transportation of immigrant cultural predispositions, the model suggests that that ceasing immigration will decrease immigrants’ economic formation in a COR and that the increase in immigration supports immigrants economic formation and talent waste in a country of residency. ooo

r-!

Cultural Predisposition

[4y--------------------

Resources Immigration

Enclave

Infrastructure

Environment

Social

Formation

Rmernctionis Demographics Culture

Immigrants’ ’

Enclave

Economy

a Country of Residency Environment Source: Authors.

Figure 4.1

Linking immigration to enclave economy formation

As shown in Figure 4.1, the cultural interaction that happens within the enclave creates an economy and an opportunity for the utilisation of the cultural predisposition that the immigrants have brought with them into the COR. Such cultural predispositions are together regarded as the immigrants’ enclave economy. Thus, this chapter has argued that immigrants’ economic formation

62

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

and elements that aid enclave entrepreneurship are those that come through the immigration of people of the same culture into the COR, and it suggests that the continuous inflow of immigrants into the COR can lead to (a) the formation and development of the immigrant enclave in the COR, (b) the provision of the immigrants’ cultural predisposition and market niches and (c) the formation of an enclave economy in the COR. This proposed model contributes to the existing literature by explaining how immigration is linked to enclave economy formation in the COR. The chapter also suggests that (1) good communication of the importance of immigration into the COR is key to the development of the enclave sector, (2) that the presence of positive immigrant demographic conditions is vital for enclave economy formation, (3) that environmental factors, resources and infrastructures are important to enclave economy formation and (4) that immigrant culture, along with the other three mentioned, encourages immigrant enclave economy formation in the COR. As suggested by scholars such as Aldrich and Waldinger (1990) and Riddle et al. (2010), the immigrant culture promotes enclave economic activity, as such highlighting that immigration is an element that aids the national economy and talent waste, will reduce the negative associations around immigration and enhance immigrants’ economic activities in a COR.

CONCLUSION Immigration is fast becoming an important factor in the erosion of traditional boundaries, languages, cultures, ethnic groups and nation states (Schiller et al., 1995). Currently, views on immigration suggest immigration as the coming together of the place of origin and the destination. Meanwhile, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines an immigrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence. However, immigration is fast becoming a topic associated with division, stereotypes and disunity in most CORs; for example, the British European Union Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as the US president. Whatever the issues that are associated with immigration, immigrants’ contribution to COR economy far exceeds any issues surrounding immigration and human settlement in a country other than their country of birth (Osaghae, 2018). Thus, attention should be directed at highlighting immigration as the new source of capital (financial, social, experiential, knowledge-related and human) accumulation for both COR and COO. As observed in countries such as Canada, Ireland, the UK and the USA, the coming together of immigrants in these countries has enhanced immigrants’ economy and entrepreneurship. Thus, international immigration is no longer

Talent waste

63

a one-way process (moving from developing to developed countries), as it was once described. Recent developments have shown that immigrants aim to use the experience and knowledge gained in the COR to travel between the COR and the COO, a process that has increased the prevalence of international immigration (IOM, 2004; Portes and Fernandez-Kelly, 2015). This shows that migration creates opportunities for societies and increases the desire of people to move to other places for a better life, made possible by advances in technology, industrialisation, communication and transportation. In 2015, for example, the number of international immigrants reached an estimated 244 million, from 222 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000 (IOM, 2015). This makes immigration one of the main contributors to technology, industrialisation, communication and transportation to date. Hence, this chapter concludes that the cultural predispositions that come through immigration are essential prerequisites for the development of immigrant environments, infrastructures, cultures, resources and capital, which are pivotal for immigrant enclave economy formation in the COR. It also concludes that there should be a constant inflow of immigration to both developed and developing countries, as this will increase the enclave cultural predisposition, environment, resources and infrastructures that are regarded as essential elements that enhance immigrant enclave economy formation COR. As evidenced in the literature, the advancement of immigrant enclave activity in the OECD regions shows that immigration into the COR has improved enclave economy, talent waste and enclave opportunity formation. This view is a diversion from the classical theoretical view that immigration is a means of bridging the economic imbalance between developed and developing countries, including those where people are fleeing from wars or natural disasters in the quest for a better life (Lewis,

1954; Ranis and Fei,

1961; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976; Dyjajic, 2013). Thus, modern immigration theorists suggest that immigration has become the new source of foreign and direct investment, filling the structural vacuum resulting from industrialisation and mass production, and enhancing COR and COO in areas such as entrepreneurship, politics, economics, and networking (Tilly, 1978; Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999; Portes and Fernandez-Kelly, 2015). This claim by modern immigration theorists is aligned with the new way of viewing immigration, and it suggests that the future of international immigration is not concerned with issues such as immigration being a source of money remittance and economic adaptation for immigrants, but as a process that aids the development of both the COR and the COO and the integration of cultures. Therefore, future research should seek to identify ways of reducing the negativity surrounding immigration, talent waste and immigrant activity within the national and international contexts.

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

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5.

Unexpected talent flows in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine: missed

opportunities in Georgia and Turkey (2022-2023) Karina Goulordava and Martin Geiger

INTRODUCTION Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, continues to cause large-scale displacement, and the fate of Ukrainians and their forced war-induced movements are rightly the focus of public and academic interest (e.g., Duszezyk & Kaczmarezyk, 2022; Diivell & Lapshyna, 2022).' However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also triggered other migratory movements, including a mass exodus of tens of thousands of Russian and Belarusian specialists with training and work experience in the IT (information technology) sector. In 2022, Georgia and Turkey — alongside other countries like Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan — were among the main destinations for this talent flow (After 24, 2022; Kostenko et al., 2023). The continued mass influx of Russian and Belarusian IT talents presents Georgia and Turkey with a unique opportunity to increase the innovativeness and competitiveness of their IT industries (section 1). In the following, we are (1) interested in how Russian and Belarusian IT specialists were received in Georgia and Turkey. Our main interest lies (2) in exploring if and to what extent Russian and Belarusian IT specialists have become involved in the Georgian or Turkish IT sector. Section | situates both countries and their IT development in broader discussions on labor mobility, innovation, and the so-called race for talent. Our study is based on an extensive review of over 100 local and international media reports in English, Belarusian, Georgian, Russian, and Turkish published since February 2022 and containing information on the arrival and social, economic,

and political reception, and

inclusion of Russian and Belarusian IT specialists in Georgia and Turkey. Moreover, we draw on 15 in-depth interviews* with Russian and Belarusian IT specialists in both countries’ and 16 interviews with stakeholders from the 69

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Georgian and Turkish IT sectors.* Our study’s main findings are discussed in section 2; the chapter concludes with a summary.

l.

SITUATING GEORGIA AND TURKEY IN RELEVANT DISCUSSIONS ON LABOR MOBILITY AND INNOVATION

Georgia and Turkey are difficult to compare: While geographically located in the same region, Turkey dwarfs Georgia in area, population, economy, resources, and political influence. This uneven comparison extends to the size and prosperity of the countries’ IT sectors. In 2022, the Turkish IT economy was home to three [T unicorns — privately financed startups valued at over US$1 billion (Peak Games, Dream Games, and delivery service Getir) — and even a decacorn (over US$10 billion in investment): Trendyol, an e-commerce platform (Mahfoud & Tecimer, 2022). Meanwhile, Georgia — comparably much smaller in population and economy” — has not yet been able to generate unicorn startups. Both Georgia and Turkey are active and adamant about growing their IT sectors. Similar to most other countries, they perceive their [IT development as an essential activity for securing growth, employment, and welfare for their citizens (e.g., Bradshaw, 2021; Business Media Georgia, 2022; Daily Sabah, 2022; ETF, 2012; Omur, 2013). This approach matches scholarly and expert recommendations that prioritize education and training in IT and other areas in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) field, entrepreneurship, and increased female participation in IT and STEM, as well as relevant administrative and policy reforms as key measures to foster innovation and development (Abesadze, 2021; Bessant & Howells, 2012; EBRD

&

EIB, 2021; EU4Digital, 2022; Haslam et al, 2009; OSAA, 2022). Since the early 2010s, the Georgian IT sector has massively expanded from a tiny niche of less than 500 IT employees in 2014 to a sector with more than 20,000 specialists working in FinTech (I[T-based consumer and business financing solutions), marketing, data analytics, virtual reality, [T-based food production, and other fields in 2020. Recent efforts to limit corruption, reduce taxation, and facilitate company registrations are said to have motivated more than 50 leading foreign IT companies (e.g., Viber, IBA Group, EPAM, Exadel, and SoftSwiss) to acquire and establish Georgian subsidiaries; ‘500 Global’, the world’s largest accelerator program, has launched a “500 Georgia’ subsidiary to support the scale-up of local companies (SO00Georgia, 2022), and, aside from foreign corporate investments, Georgia regularly receives significant funding from the United States of America (U.S.A.), the European Union (EU) and its member

states, the World

Bank,

and other international donors

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(Business Media Georgia, 2022; GEC Consulting, 2021; Gurbanov, 2021: 155; Sovetnikova, 2019: 172-179; UNECE, 2021; World Bank, 2016, 2019). By contrast, Turkey’s IT sector, while attracting foreign investment, has robust national funding programs in place. National organizations such as TUBITAK, the Scientific Technological Research Council, the Technology Development Foundation, and various Turkish government departments provide funding support as part of Turkey’s overall strategic efforts to promote IT adoption and innovation in a diverse range of sectors ranging from agriculture and banking to national defense. However, the country’s IT sector has also continuously attracted significant international investments, which have supported growth in its important cryptocurrency, e-delivery, e-commerce, FinTech, and mobile gaming fields, and other areas (Bradshaw, 2021; Chandni, 2022; Mahfoud & Tecimer, 2022; Omur, 2013; Startups Watch & Invest in Turkiye, 2022; TuBiSAD & Deloitte, 2018). At the end of 2020, it was estimated that over 158,000 professionals worked in Turkey’s IT sector (International Trade Administration, 2022). In the case of Georgia, the influx of Russians and Belarusians, which unfolded in the aftermath of Russia’s February 2022 attack and invasion of Ukraine, occurred at a time when the country’s overall migration situation had already started to change. For most of its history, Georgia had predominantly been a source country of emigrants. However, before the COVID-19 pandemic, Georgia had already started to resemble other countries that had experienced a transition of their migration situation and growing immigration levels following decades of persistent emigration (e.g., Spain: Arango, 2000). Emigration, particularly of young and well-educated populations, from Georgia continued; however, the country also started to experience increasing return flows, which grew stronger during the pandemic, while it simultaneously recorded a rise in international immigration, including of students, e.g., from India and Pakistan, predominantly interested in studying medicine in Georgia (Berulava, 2017: 396; Khomeriki, 2022: 11, 14; Koroutchey & lashvili, 2018: 12-13; OECD, 2017: 50; SCMI, 2020, 2021). As of mid-2020, Georgia already counted 79,000 immigrants (equaling 2 percent of its population); most of them were Russians (37,267), Armenians (12,789), Ukrainians (12,203), and citizens of Azerbaijan (6,023), Kazakhstan (1,718) and Belarus (1,101) (IOM, 2022). Stronger economic development often subsequently attracts more return flows and stronger immigration (de Haas, 2010), and above all, the unexpected, war-related influx of Russians and Belarusians could further shift Georgia’s migration situation and seriously position it as a new immigration country in Europe’s southeastern periphery. By comparison, Turkey’s migration situation had changed much earlier. Following decades of substantial emigration, Turkey already recorded increasing inflows of transit and immigration flows of predominantly lower and

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unskilled labor migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, students, and also European retirees during the 2000s (igduygu & Karacay, 2012; Ieduygu, 2014; Diivell, 2018, 2020; Kilic & Biffl, 2021). However, Turkey’s overall migration situation is particularly different from Georgia in terms of the number of refugees it continues to receive, which predominantly shapes its character as a significant arrival as well as a destination and factual immigration country. In 2023, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Turkey was the world’s most important host country for refugees for the ninth consecutive year, with close to four million refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR, 2023), most of them Syrians (3.65 million) ahead

of 136,000 Afghans.°® Whereas Georgia and Turkey show differences in their IT sector development and overall migration situation, both countries share certain analogies concerning the migration pattern in the focus of our study. Much different in population size and many other, including particularly political, aspects, Georgia and Turkey have received comparable numbers of Russian and Belarusian IT specialists. As media reports and our empirical evidence indicate, numbers are clearly in flux, and some ‘relocants’ have already moved back or to another country while others also frequently relocate back and forth between their country of origin, Georgia/Turkey, and perhaps even other countries (Kostenko et al., 2023). At the end of 2022, in Georgia, official statistics pointed to close to 113,000 Russian nationals — a third or fourth of the 300,000—400,000 Russians that arrived in Georgia following Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine — remained in the country (Deutsche Welle, 2022; Kakachia & Kandelaki, 2022). More recent data indicates that while the vast majority remain in Georgia, around 30,000 may have departed throughout 2023 (Kucera, 2024). Turkey has seen similar fluctuation. In Turkey, the number of Russian nationals residing in the country more than doubled from 2021 (65,982) (thus, before Russia’s 2022 launch of attacks on Ukraine) and a peak of around 153,000 at the end of 2023. However, primarily due to rising rates of residence permit refusals by the Turkish Presidency of Migration Management, Russians are now the second — down from the first throughout much of 2022 — largest foreign citizen group in possession of a residence permit (87,831), after Turkmenistan (105,586), but

ahead of Iraq (76,208), Syria (74,995), and Iran (73,353) (Turkish Presidency of Migration Management, 2024). However, it is important to note that most foreign citizens residing in Turkey do not hold residence permits but carry other forms of legal documentation. Turkey’s strongest group of foreign nationals by far is Syrians, the majority of whom hold Temporary Protection Status. Both in the Georgian and the Turkish case, publicly available immigration statistics provide information only on the top ten foreign citizen groups. It is, therefore, unknown to the authors how many Belarusians were residing

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in Georgia and Turkey before February 2022 and how many Belarusians have moved to Georgia or Turkey following February 2022. The number of Belarusians living in Georgia and Turkey probably sits at 15,000—20,000 (e.g., IDFI, 2022). Among the Russian and Belarusian nationals that arrived in Georgia and Turkey in 2022, at least a third were IT workers, according to various reports and our empirical research (Reg Info, 2022; Interpress News, 2022; Knews, 2022; Kostenko et al., 2023). In both Georgia and Turkey, IT specialists arriving from Belarus and Russia have primarily settled in major cities (Tbilisi and Istanbul), as well as popular seaside towns and regions such as (around) Batumi (Georgia) or Antalya (Turkey). In the case of Georgia, Russian and Belarusian IT specialists started to arrive just at a time when the local talent demand of Georgia’s IT sector was showing growing signs of exceeding local talent supplies and rising demand for foreign IT specialists (GEC Consulting, 2021: 6). In Georgia, the continued emigration of young Georgian professionals, including IT specialists and students with IT skills, has been highlighted as a major hurdle for the country’s continued growth in IT (ETF, 2020: 7, 11; GEC Consulting, 2021; WIPO, 2022: 51). By contrast, Turkey’s IT sector can rely on a huge and, by international comparison, young Turkish population, in addition to its established position as a leading destination for international students, including those with an interest in IT (Council of Higher Education, 2021; Kondakci, 2011; Sert et al., 2014; UNESCO, 2023). Turkey’s efforts in developing and maintaining a high-skilled workforce remain predominantly concentrated on efforts to motivate the return of specialists of Turkish nationality and background and, to a far lesser extent, on recruiting foreign, i.e., non-Turkish background specialists (Colakoglu et al., 2018; Kilic & Biffl, 2021). Georgia is lagging behind Turkey, having no strategies yet to facilitate the returns of skilled specialists, including those of Georgian background, nor to attract and retain foreign talents long-term. Neither Georgia nor Turkey had received significant inflows of foreign IT specialists before 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the exodus of Russian and Belarusian IT specialists that started to unfold in the months following February 2022 have significantly changed this situation and both countries’ position in the postulated and often hyped so-called ‘global race for talent’ (Docquier & Machado, 2016; Kapur & McHale, 2005).

2.

GEORGIA AND TURKEY, 2022-2023: ARRIVAL AND RECEPTION OF RUSSIAN AND BELARUSIAN IT SPECIALISTS

Most of our Russian and Belarusian interviewees chose to leave their countries in opposition to the war, to search for a better life abroad, or (in the case of male respondents) to avoid military conscription. One of the IT specialists

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we interviewed in Turkey left Russia one day after the start of Russia’s invasion and was strongly determined to no longer pay taxes to the Russian state (RUSTUR6). For another IT specialist in Georgia, it was important to leave and relocate to a freer and more democratic country (BELGEO4). Our interviews indicated that Georgia and Turkey, aside from political considerations, were chosen as migration destinations for five general reasons: First, both countries continued to allow Russian and Belarusian citizens entry after February 2022, while entry to and visa obtainment for most EU and other Western states became more restricted. Flights from Russia and Belarus to Turkey and from Belarus to Georgia continued. Russian citizens could access Georgia via the land border or connecting flights from other countries as flights between Russia and Georgia were suspended from 2019 until May 2023. Second, Georgia and Turkey were perceived as comparatively more developed countries with higher living standards than some of the Central Asian republics. Third, Georgia and Turkey were preferred by Russians and Belarusians due to their openness in terms of visa and migration regulations. Georgia allows citizens of 98 countries, including Russians and Belarusians, to enter, reside, work, and study in Georgia for up to 360 days without a visa, residence, or work permit (Georgia MFA, 2022). Turkey allows for a 60-day stay for Russian citizens and 30 days for Belarusian citizens before a residency application is necessary (Tiirkiye MFA, 2022). Fourth, despite significantly increasing living costs in Georgia and Turkey since February 2022, IT specialists perceived both countries as more affordable than other accessible countries, e.g., the United Arab Emirates. Finally, geographical proximity and historical ties made both countries attractive destinations; additionally, in the case of Georgia, many IT specialists were strategically relocated from Russia or Belarus by their Russian, Belarusian, or foreign/multinational employers who opened offices in Georgia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. |

Socio-political Climate and Conditions of Arrival and Reception

Despite the similarities in choosing Georgia or Turkey as destinations for relocation, Russians and Belarusians encountered different climates of reception depending on the country of arrival. At the social level, three out of ten IT specialists interviewed in Georgia shared that they had witnessed or experienced direct resentment. One IT specialist detailed that social interaction with Georgians was marked by tension but that they found this justifiable, stating, “Georgian youth are against Russian people in Georgia, and unfortunately, their arguments are true” (RUSGEO2). At the socioeconomic level, the influx of Russian and Belarusian citizens, primarily to Tbilisi and Batumi, has led to competition for housing and rising rent prices, exacerbating tensions with the local population (Eurasianet, 2022; Guriismoambe, 2022; OC Media,

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2022). Meanwhile, at the political level, Georgian and international media outlets reported growing resentment among Georgians toward Russian (and sometimes even Belarusian) arrivals. About both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s ongoing support of and military presence in the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, local politicians and journalists have referred to Russians, as well as Belarusians, as “citizens of the occupier country and its satellite country, [coming to Georgia] not in opposition [to their governments, but to] escape personal discomfort and sanctions” (Jam News, 2022), and as threats of further Russian intervention in Georgia. In Georgia’s divided political climate, the ruling Georgian Dream Party (in power since 2012) has been accused by opposition parties and many citizens of being more oriented toward Russia rather than the EU and the West (EUAA, 2022: 3). The prime minister, a member of the ruling party, has repeatedly spoken in favor of Georgia’s decision not to impose sanctions on Russia, citing the immense economic damage this would inflict on Georgia (Al Jazeera, 2023). In 2022, 120,000 Georgians marched in favor of joining the EU after Moldova and Ukraine were granted EU candidate status while the decision on Georgia was postponed but later granted in November 2023 (EUAA, 2022: 8). In May 2023, smaller protests were held outside the airport in Tbilisi in opposition to the resumption of direct flights between Georgia and Russia, which were halted in 2019 (Demytrie, 2023). In Turkey, the overall climate of arrival and reception of Russian and Belarusian migrants has been more neutral. Unlike in Georgia, there have been no local or international media reports of resentment toward the arrival of Russian and Belarusian citizens either at the public or political levels. In interviews for this research, none of the respondents in Turkey had experienced hostility due to their nationality. Despite this comparatively more neutral reaction, the influxes of tens of thousands of Russian citizens and a smaller number of Belarusians took place when Turkey already hosted the largest number of refugees in the world. Coupled with an economic crisis and high inflation, public and political backlash against the presence of millions of refugees has led to rising social and political tensions. Migration to Turkey has become highly contentious and a popular rallying cry of multiple political parties (Michaelson

& Narli, 2023). Whether at the political or social level,

most vocal anti-migrant sentiments are projected toward refugee populations (especially Syrians and Afghans) and racialized migrants, particularly from African countries (Bandur, 2020; Orakg1, 2020). Despite no reports of social hostility toward Russian and Belarusian citizens in media reviews or interviews, rates of residency permit refusals for Russian citizens have risen since 2023 compared to 2022 (Haber, 2023); however, refusals have increased for other foreign nationals as well. As in Georgia, major urban areas hosting newly arrived Russian and Belarusian citizens, e.g., Istanbul and Antalya, have expe-

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rienced increased rent competition and rising housing prices. However, direct linkages to the arrival of Russians and Belarusians require a more nuanced analysis, as Turkey’s housing market witnessed significant price increases before February 2022. Zor

Engagement between Local IT Sectors and Russian and Belarusian IT Specialists

There is a comparably strong variation among local IT stakeholders and their attitudes toward Russian and Belarusian IT specialists. In Georgia, vocal resistance against Russian and sometimes Belarusian IT specialists was widespread among most IT stakeholders interviewed. A representative of a co-working space shared that any Russian citizen who does not sign a statement condemning Russian president Vladimir Putin and acknowledging that Russia has invaded Ukraine and occupies 20 percent of Georgia would not be able to access and use the co-working space. The same interviewee stated, “] cannot say that we, in any way, benefit from Russians coming to Georgia. No way. None of the industries can benefit” (GEO12). Another interviewee explained that hiring Russian IT specialists was “very sensitive, especially for us Georgians, because Russia has occupied two of our regions, we are in a war with Russia, and you will see a lot of support for Ukraine when you come here” (GEQOS5). Viewpoints on Belarusian IT specialists were more mixed, with some Georgian IT stakeholders expressing strong hesitation toward hiring and working with them due to their government’s support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In contrast, other stakeholders said they would welcome them and that they perceive Belarusians as “activists” who oppose their government and “are fighting for their rights” (GEO12). Other stakeholders hoped for the arrival of Ukrainian IT specialists, although the number of Ukrainian IT specialists present in Georgia is likely very limited. One respondent stated, “We are waiting for those [IT specialist] Ukrainians with open arms. We are here to give them everything we can so that they feel at home, and they have all the tools and the environment to leverage their expertise” (GEO2), Only two of the Georgian IT stakeholders interviewed were generally open to accepting Russian and Belarusian specialists into Georgia’s IT sector: “We are incredibly glad that Georgia is one of the first countries that companies and individuals from Russia and Belarus are considering. [...] If [they move] for a long time [to Georgia], then this is an additional qualified resource that will help in creating a digital economy” (GEO8). A second stakeholder representative agreed and stated that “it is possible to use the knowledge Russians bring with them regard to their profession, it will be beneficial for local people. There is no reason they cannot be part of the local community and increase the level of expertise” (GEO4).

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In Turkey, IT stakeholders do not seem to share the political concerns of their Georgian counterparts. They expressed more neutral views toward the arrival of Russian IT specialists; none of the stakeholders interviewed had interacted with Belarusian IT specialists, and thereby their comments referred exclusively to Russian IT specialists. Stakeholder representatives, e.g., from technology parks, stated that Russian nationals had contacted them to gain information on establishing a company in the park’s free economic zone and that 20 to 30 percent of the interest they had received in recent months came from Russian entrepreneurs. However, none of the stakeholders interviewed had collaborated directly with Russian entrepreneurs due to the apparent difficulties foreign nationals face in establishing companies. One Russian IT entrepreneur shared that they were considering establishing their company in one of the free economic zones but were struggling to navigate the highly bureaucratic processes required to implement their plan. Another IT stakeholder interviewed indicated that Turkish stakeholders might be hesitant to engage with the newly arrived IT entrepreneurs and specialists because of uncertainties regarding whether Russian specialists and entrepreneurs will even stay in the country long term: “The major question is, if the war ends, will they go back? You need to figure this out first. That is one question that everybody here [in Turkey] asks” (TUR1). As Turkey follows a more endogenous strategy for the growth and expansion of its IT sector, investment in international specialists, whether in capital or non-material means, appears to face careful calculation by Turkish stakeholders. When discussing aspects of international talent attraction and retention, most IT stakeholders in Georgia stated that their nascent IT sector would benefit from an influx of foreign IT talent, a statement absent from interviews with Turkish IT stakeholders who appear to still focus exclusively on local, i.¢e., Turkish talent. One interviewee from the Georgian IT sector stated: “It will be good for our country to try to innovate and develop the [T community by using a large number of skilled international IT workers with IT experience and knowledge” (GEO14). Indeed, the policies of the Georgian government, such as low taxes, ease of business registration, and independent entrepreneur registration, accompanied by a liberal arrival and settlement policy, favor the attraction of foreign professionals. In contrast, Turkey has yet to develop such policy incentives. The lack of integration of Russian and Belarusian IT specialists in the Georgian and Turkish IT sectors results from hesitancy and lack of engagement from local stakeholders and is also linked to the perceptions of Russian and Belarusian IT stakeholders and their professional aspirations and outlooks. The nascent state of Georgia’s IT sector is a key reason Russian, and Belarusian IT specialists do not seek local opportunities and integration. The IT specialists interviewed in our study held the same opinion that the Georgian

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tech sector is comparatively underdeveloped. One respondent stated, “There are not really advantages [to being in Georgia]. | would not consider it as a country for IT by itself’ (RUSGEO8). Another IT specialist shared this perspective by stating they “do not think that Georgian IT is developed. If we are talking about IT, America, Europe, and Russia are developed” (BELGEOS). Based on our interviews, Georgia’s ease of business registration, independent entrepreneur registration, and low taxes initially influenced the decision to choose Georgia as a migration destination. However, these policies are likely not enough to retain the talents that arrived from Russia and Belarus. One respondent explained, “I did not consider anything [anywhere] except Georgia. I understood that this was the transit point” (BELGEOS). Another specialist stated that they “believe even a low tax will not be able to attract freelance workers to Georgia” and keep them long-term (BELGEO6). Another warned that foreign companies might simply take advantage of Georgia’s business and immigration-friendly policies but would be uninterested in genuinely supporting and contributing to the local IT sector, underscoring that “the work is still outsourced to other countries. In fact, these companies do not have the aim to develop the Georgian IT sector; they just want to legalize their business in Georgia” (BELGEO7). Despite offering a larger IT labor market than Georgia, the Turkish IT sector is rife with barriers that result in littke motivation among the newly arrived IT specialists to integrate into the local industry, such as language barriers, comparatively low salaries, rigid bureaucratic and regulatory frameworks (especially in company registration, certain aspects of the tax code, and interest rate borrowing; Bradshaw, 2021; Cotarcea, 2022), not to mention the country’s economic instability and rocketing inflation. One of the IT specialists interviewed strongly lamented Turkey’s lack of an independent entrepreneur or freelance registration system and that, as a result, they would continue to work remotely without business registration and tax-free in Turkey due to the sheer inability to pay taxes. Some IT specialists held independent entrepreneur registration and paid taxes in Georgia while residing in Turkey. One specialist stated that their colleagues were offered employment at Turkish IT companies but ultimately declined due to the comparatively much lower salary these companies were to provide compared to wages offered by international companies (abroad). Corresponding with a global talent recruitment firm working with Russian and Belarusian IT specialists, the interviewee reported that they had neither Turkish clients interested in recruiting Russian or Belarusian IT talent nor were Russian or Belarusian customers seeking placement at Turkish IT companies, primarily due to the mentioned salary gap. Discussions with local IT stakeholders and a review of related media reports indicate that the Turkish government has only paid scant attention to the recent arrival of IT and other highly skilled talents from Belarus and Russia (or any other country) and has

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yet to put forward any policies to actively attract, recruit, and retain them into the Turkish economy.

CONCLUSIONS The arrival of Russian and Belarusian IT specialists presented an unexpected talent inflow and potential ‘talent dividend’ for Georgia and Turkey — a unique chance for both countries to expand their innovativeness and competitiveness in IT and improve their position in the global race for talent. At the outset, we sought to answer (1) how Russian and Belarusian IT specialists were received in both countries and (2) if and to what extent Russian and Belarusian IT specialists have become involved in the Georgian and Turkish IT sectors. Regarding the former, the reception of the newly arrived IT specialists differed greatly between the two countries: In Georgia, IT stakeholders were nearly unanimous in their opposition to accepting Russian IT specialists, while their position toward Belarusian IT specialists was mixed. Meanwhile, in Turkey, Russian and Belarusian IT specialists were met with a high degree of neutrality. Yet, no local IT stakeholders appear to have actively recruited from the pool of newly arrived Russian and Belarusian IT specialists. Considering the second research question, at the time of writing (late 2024), there is little indication of widespread integration of Russian and Belarusian IT specialists in a way that would allow Georgia and Turkey to benefit from these unexpected talent flows, boost their IT sectors, and increase their globally competitive advantage. There are probably tens of thousands of newly arrived specialists in both countries. However, despite this significant number, neither of the countries appears to benefit from their presence. Instead, the specialists’ output flows toward their international clients and employers or the Russian and Belarusian companies and clients some continue to work with. There is also little evidence to suggest that the companies that relocated and newly registered in Georgia are interested in contributing to the development of the local IT sector. Both countries rely primarily on local IT talent but face challenges as they continue to experience brain and skill drain, including local IT specialists. Georgia does not yet educate enough IT talent to meet local demand, unlike Turkey, which has developed internationally attractive [T-focused educational capabilities for its large and comparatively young population. While other countries have benefited from coordinated or unplanned arrivals of international IT workers, this requires developing and implementing a focused policy framework, active engagement and competitive offerings from the local IT sector, and willingness from international migrants. Georgia shows promise thus far, mainly concerning the first criteria, while in Turkey, all three factors are lacking. At the same time, foreign, including newly arrived IT specialists from Russia and Belarus, seemingly do not feel attracted by the Georgian or Turkish IT sectors

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due to their comparatively lower stages of development and salary levels. Considering these conclusions, the arrival of Russian and Belarusian IT talent in Georgia and Turkey, at present, remains a missed opportunity.

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, Ukraine counts more than five million internally displaced persons; as of early 2023, more than eight million Ukrainians are registered as refugees in European countries alone; hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians also left their homeland for non-European countries, including Canada and the United States of America (USA) (UNHCR, 2023). We thank Vera Syrakvash for her work in conducting part of our interviews in Georgia, and all the interviewees who provided valuable insights. Our research received institutional ethics approval by Carleton University’s Research Ethics Board. For this study, we interviewed five Russian IT specialists in Georgia and six in Turkey (abbreviated in the following as “RUSGEO’ or ‘“RUSTUR’); additionally, five Belarusian IT specialists were interviewed in Georgia, and one in Turkey (abbreviated ‘BELGEO’ or ‘BELTUR’). Interviews took place between May 2022 and May 2023, online and in person. Abbreviated in the following as ‘GEO’/‘TUR’ and numbered 1-16. Interviews took place between May 2022 and May 2023, online and in person. At the end of 2021, Georgia had a population of 3.7 million and its GDP (gross domestic product) stood at US$5,023 per capita. At the same time, Turkey’s had a population of close to 85 million, while its GPD per capita value amounted to US$9,661 (World Bank, 2023). At the end of February 2023, 7,131 Ukrainian nationals had applied for international protection in Turkey (UNHCR, 2023).

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6.

Sweden in the quest for global talent Johan Sandberg and Axel Fredholm

INTRODUCTION Highly skilled workers are central in today’s global knowledge economy, and their mobility across borders becomes critical in countries’ quests for increased productivity, economic growth, cutting-edge innovations, and scientific discoveries (Pekkala et al. 2016). Furthermore, the OECD (2019) finds that high-skilled individuals play a central role in countries’ future welfare, and countries are therefore increasingly working actively to attract highly qualified labor migrants. Partly neutralizing trends toward restrictions in OECD countries, there is a continued expansion of policies facilitating and attracting entry of highly skilled migrants — a phenomenon often referred to as the ‘global race for talent’ (De Haas et al. 2016). Recent studies find that industrial countries worldwide are increasingly competing for highly skilled migrants in order to ensure competitiveness in the global knowledge economy (e.g., Cerna 2014). Parsons et al. (2020) similarly refer to the last two decades as ‘an era of high-skilled migration’, pointing to the remarkable rise in the number of highly educated migrants in the world. There is an emerging pattern as high-skilled migrants originate from a broader range of countries while heading overwhelmingly to a set of few destinations, namely the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, and the U.K.

Estimates put their absorption to nearly 70 percent of high-skilled migrants (Pekkala et al. 2016). Thus, competing for high-skilled migrants becomes important for a country like Sweden — a post-industrial country at the very forefront of technological and digital innovations in the global knowledge economy, requiring highly skilled labor. In spite of its advanced position in global value chains, Sweden faces a formidable challenge in enhancing its competitiveness: decreasing productivity, lowest forecasted GDP growth in the EU, and severe shortage of competency as required by firms (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). Sweden furthermore constitutes a deviating case in terms of labor migration policies. In this chapter, we first map out policies and systems utilized internationally, and subsequently provide an overview of the Swedish economy and migraa6

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tion transformations. High-skilled labor migration and structural matching problems are analyzed in the third section, followed by a review of recent and ongoing policy changes. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

POLICY AND SYSTEMS CONCEPTUALIZATION Most countries facilitate immigrants’ entry either by passing particular tests, or by having secured employment, essentially employing two major types of migration policies to attract and select highly skilled migrants (Parsons et al. 2020). Supply-side systems use points-based policies to screen skilled individual migrants at the state level, while demand-side systems are employer-driven that delegate selection of migrants to firms (Pekkala et al. 2016). Points-based systems have primarily been used in Australia and Canada, while countries like the U.S.A., Germany, and Sweden adhere predominantly to demand-driven systems. Clarke et al. (2019) observe that a number of European countries, including Germany, have pushed recently for the use of points systems in order to better capitalize on high-skilled migrants’ contributions to economic growth, innovations and trade. Points-based systems were introduced in the U.K. in 2002, 2003

in the Czech

Republic,

in 2007

in Denmark,

and in 2008

in the

Netherlands. This major type of system has subsequently also spread to Asia, primarily to China in 2006, South Korea in 2010, and Japan in 2012 (De Haas et al. 2016). The U.S.A. employs an employer-driven program, dominated by the so-called H-1B visas that enable U.S. companies to temporarily employ skilled migrants in professions that require special skills or knowledge, and subsequently to file for permanent residency on behalf of the visa-holder. Estimates put approximately 70 percent of approved H-1B visas in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) occupations, predominantly issued to high-skilled migrants from India (Pekkala et al. 2016). In contrast to the cases of Canada and Australia, the U.S. employer-driven program has remained largely the same since 1990. The main difference remains that migrants holding H-1B visas are not required to conduct job searches upon arrival, like those entering Canada or Australia through points systems (Clarke et al. 2019). However, most countries actually run hybrids of these two broader conceptual categories, dynamically changing over time (Parsons et al. 2020). For instance, Canada shifted toward increased emphasis on human capital in the early 1990s, followed up by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 2002, where changes were made to focus increasingly on professional experience and language abilities. Similarly, at the end of the 1990s, Australia moved to a two-step system by putting increased emphasis on prearranged employment, while also introducing mandatory checks on

BR

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

English-language capabilities and assessment of skills acceptable to Australian standards (Clarke et al. 2019).

OVERVIEW OF SWEDISH ECONOMY AND MIGRATION SHIFTS Since the peak of industrialization in the 1960s, Sweden has experienced a drastic transformation from industrial to post-industrial service economy, currently well-established at the very forefront of the global knowledge economy. For instance, Eurostat’s “Digital Economy and Society Index’ (DESI), ranks Sweden and Finland as the most digitalized countries in Europe (Frohm and Ingves 2020). Increasingly dependent on foreign trade, already in 2009, approximately some 70 percent of Swedish exports pertained to global value chains. Booming IT, telecom, and pharmaceutical sectors drove rapid productivity growth while industrial sectors decreased in the face of global competition and outsourcing. The great economic transformation fueled an intense labor market bifurcation, with ever higher job requirements for high-skilled, ‘new and technologically advanced’ sectors coupled with automatization and digitalization of routine tasks (Calmfors et al. 2019). Thus, Sweden’s transformed economy offers numerous opportunities for upward mobility among the highly qualified, particularly in competitive sectors in the global knowledge economy. Yet, at the same time, low-skilled workers find themselves increasingly redundant, often stuck in precarious employment while competing for the roughly 5 percent of all jobs in the Swedish economy that require little or no education (Sandberg 2018). Of particular interest here, the bifurcation according to skill levels is evident also among labor migrants — only well-educated migrants work in high-skilled sectors, whereas those with low-education work exclusively in low-skilled jobs requiring minimum education (Emilsson et al. 2014). Simultaneously, Sweden has gone through a historic demographic transformation to become a major immigration country (Fredholm et al. 2022). Formerly a land of emigrants with roughly 7 percent immigrants in total population in 1970 (Andersson 2013), in 2021, Sweden’s total population included roughly 20 percent born in another country, and over 25 percent when including second-generation immigrants born in Sweden with both parents born overseas (Statistics Sweden 2020). This rapid increase in immigration has furthermore entailed a significant shift in recent decades from Nordic and European labor-force immigration during industrial expansion to a regime overwhelmingly made up of non-European refugees and family dependents (Sandberg 2023). For instance, more than 50 percent of the total of 814,293 granted residence permits between 2010 and 2016 pertain to family reunifications and asylum-seekers, dominated by migrants from Iraq and Syria, and

Sweden in the quest for global talent

89

increasingly from Somalia and Eritrea. In comparison, labor migrants made up roughly 20 percent (Swedish Migration Board 2021). Finally, migration to Sweden during recent decades has been predominantly from low- and middle-income countries.

SWEDISH DEMAND-DRIVEN LABOR MIGRATION

POLICY AND RECENT

In retrospect, the Swedish approach to labor migration has varied. Following agreements with Nordic and European countries, the rules of the 1950s were rather lenient whereas the 1960s saw increasing demands for control and job market compatibility from unions aiming to secure jobs within Sweden. Around the mid-1960s, therefore, stricter regulation of work permits and labor-market matching emerged. In broad terms, this approach remained intact until the 2000s (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). While other OECD countries tend to increasingly limit the inflow of labor migrants into low-skilled occupations while competing through various forms of supply-driven migration policies and programs to attract highly educated, and STEM migrants, Sweden’s approach deviates significantly from such global trends. In essence selecting a path of general liberalization, the country shifted to a non-selective demand-driven labor market migration model in December of 2008. In contrast to other European countries, Sweden offers temporary visas to all migrants having secured employment with stipulated salary level (two-year visas with the opportunity to renew for another two years), and all recruitment is completed before the visa process (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). The aim of the 2008 reform was to ease labor shortages in particular sectors while meeting the demographic challenges of an aging population (Government of Sweden 2008). Labor market tests were abolished and individual employers have the power to select migrant workers and the new law does not distinguish between labor migration to high-skilled or low-skilled occupations nor does it prioritize particular sectors (Emilsson et al. 2014). Hence, although coinciding with the U.S.A. in the form ofan employer-driven model, Sweden constitutes a significant outlier as the country’s labor migration policy carries neither numerical caps nor limits, occupational restrictions, and arguably most importantly, human capital skills and qualifications. Furthermore, the Swedish system is unique, at least until proposed changes in 2022, in that it offers no preferential or different track for high-skilled labor migrants — highly skilled migrants enter the same overall visa system as other types of migrants, such as refugees and family dependents (De Haas et al. 2016). The only exception has been the opportunity for employers to bypass processing turnaround time for work permits by gaining authorization from the Migration Board. Such authorization enables employers to rapidly apply

90)

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

for permits during the recruitment process but the scheme is strictly reserved for firms that fulfill certain standards and have made several applications over a longer time period. Smaller firms rarely fulfill these criteria and cannot benefit in the same way (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). Recent and Ongoing Policy Changes On June 1, 2022, amendments to the regulation of work permits were launched. The overarching aim was to counteract the misuse of permits and the exploitation of workers that emerged after 2008, particularly in low-skilled professions. The quest for highly educated workers on the Swedish labor market was also addressed, albeit in a limited way (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). With the new regulation, applicants of work permits must have a valid passport and a binding employment contract signed by the employer (the previous rules only required a job offer). Besides existing requirements on health insurance, ability to cover living expenses in Sweden and the cost of a return ticket, applicants must also certify that accompanying family members can be supported financially. To avoid penalty fees, employers are also requested to report to the Swedish Migration Board if any form of deterioration occurs in the conditions of employment contracts (Swedish Migration Board 2023a). In order to attract talent and educated workers, a new residence permit currently enables people with advanced university degrees to stay in Sweden over a period of nine months to look for jobs or start businesses. However, since demands on counter-performance are lacking, the permit allegedly constitutes a long-term tourist visa which leaves the door open for misuse and violation of the intentions (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). The addition in terms of talent on the labor market is therefore unclear. With the new rules, the prolongation of work permits is also more generous and applicants waiting for a renewal now have the possibility to conduct business traveling abroad (Swedish Migration Board 2023a). This could possibly match the need for global mobility within high-skilled professions. Besides efforts to attract talent, the recent amendments are mainly intertwined with problems that have emerged due exploitation of workers in low-skilled professions in the wake of the 2008 regulation. To address these challenges, a major reshuffling of the rules on labor migration has recently been initiated (Government of Sweden 2022). A key objective is to counteract wage-dumping in low-skilled professions due to misuse of work permits and to prevent migrants from seeking work permits when their applications for asylum have been rejected (so-called sparbyte). A further objective is to secure that labor migration reflects competencies that are demanded on the labor market, and to recruit competency from third countries only if there is a need for it. The conservative government that took office

Sweden in the quest for global talent

9]

in 2022 has a stricter approach to low-skilled labor from third countries and has recently proposed that the minimum wage during employment in Sweden must correspond to the median salary (in 2021 — 33,200 SEK or EUR 2,973). Compared to the current requirement of 13,000 SEK (EUR 1,163) per month, this would effectively block low-skilled labor from entering Sweden. Due to the fact that salaries in low-skilled professions are often lower than the median wage, this would also guarantee that such jobs are reserved for people within Sweden, whereas labor migrants can be steered toward jobs with higher wages. On these grounds, the new government has declared a supportive attitude to high-skilled labor that goes hand in hand with the need for talent and skills in the Swedish economy (Naringslivet 2023). The current approach to labor migration thus indicates a break with the practices of 2008 and a different attitude to high-skilled migrants. At the same time, the political zeitgeist implies a return to the system that existed prior to the millennium in terms of job market compatibility and employment of low-skilled labor within Sweden. Recent Labor Migration Between 2010 and 2018, the largest groups of labor migrants have come from India, Thailand, China, Ukraine, and Turkey, following different paths in the

increasingly dualized labor market with clear linkages between countries of origin and certain jobs in Sweden (Sandberg 2023). As depicted in Figure 6.1, labor migrants from these countries comprised the largest groups also in 2022. The largest group of high-skilled, non-EU labor migrants is [T architects, systems analysts, predominantly from India. Berry pickers and planters are overwhelmingly from Thailand, while engineering professionals come mainly from India and China. Cooks and cold-buffet managers come from China, Vietnam, and Thailand, whereas fast food workers, food preparation assistants, and cleaners come from Turkey, Iraq, Mongolia, Egypt, and Bangladesh (Parusel 2020). Figure 6.2 presents an overview of granted work permits during 2018-2022 according to most common professions. Evident in Figure 6.2, the largest occupational group consists of berry pickers and plantation workers followed by IT professionals and civil engineers. In terms of global talent, workers with tertiary education are predominantly found in the latter categories but also in the category of engineers and technicians. Together with operating and network technicians and related support functions with similar demands on training, these categories are larger than the category of berry pickers and plantation workers. During 2018-2022, the number of granted work permits to this group reached 30,073 whereas 26,614 permits were granted to berry pickers and plantation workers. It is important to emphasize that other categories of non-EU labor with tertiary education are excluded from these figures. If these groups are added, the

92

Jaternational talent management in times of crisis

8000,00 7000,00 6000,00 5000,00 4000,00 3000,00 2000,00 1000,00

ie

Peaeneheeeseaes ra

&

2

Ps

ro

&

a

re

se

+

Source: Swedish Migration Board (2023b).

Figure 6.1

Number of work-permits according to country issued in 2022

7000.00 6000.00 5000.00 4000.00

ONumber

of work

permits 2018

@ Number of work permits 2021

Number

of work

permits 2019

@ Number

of work

permits 2020

QO Number of work permits 2022

Source: Swedish Migration Board (2023b).

Figure 6.2

Most common occupational groups of labor migrants in Sweden, 2018—2022

Sweden in the quest for global talent

93

number of permits to high-skilled workers since 2018 is considerably higher (for a comparison, see Figure 6.3 below).

STRUCTURAL MATCHING PROBLEMS? Sweden has a structural matching problem comprised of too many individuals lacking high skills and lack of competency demanded by the corporate sector. Nationwide surveys covering both public and private corporations point to a significant lack of competencies inhibiting recruitment and growth (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). For instance, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (2020) reports that seven out of ten corporations have difficulties in finding required competency when recruiting, and this difficulty is most pronounced in the knowledge and high-skill sectors. The problem becomes more acute considering that corporations in innovation, energy, and IT and telecom were the ones recruiting the most in 2019. The Swedish Public Employment Services (2022) warns that the lack of competency not only hinders economic growth and productivity increases, but also Sweden’s transition toward a green economy and welfare services. In a recent report by Swedish IT & Telecom Industries (2020), unsolved, the current tech competence shortage is found to potentially undermine Swedish innovation capacity and growth. Lack of cutting-edge expertise in IT, telecom and other forms of digitalization has been found to constitute the greatest obstacle to continued growth of the tech sector in Sweden, with an estimated deficit of 70,000 people in IT, telecom, and other digitalization-related professions by the year 2024, if no drastic measures are taken. This is all the more problematic since approximately half of economic growth between 2001 and 2010 has been attributed to more employees with higher education (Braunerhjelm and Eklund 2014). The need for high-skilled migrants is further evidenced by the fact that Sweden ranks 14 out of 36 on OECD’s list of countries based on percentage of total populations with higher education and competency. The same goes for skills as measured by the population rate with STEM education (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). A potential solution, high-skilled labor migration is often argued to be undermined by Sweden’s comparatively high labor taxation rates, relatively low premium on higher education, and compressed wage structure (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022). Furthermore, a well-functioning labor market immigration system has been addressed as essential for Sweden’s competitiveness and for Swedish companies, which most often operate on the global market, since high-skilled labor migrants have shown to have positive effects on company growth and growth in resources (Joyce 2019), and education alone is insufficient in meeting corporations’ needs for competency. Unfortunately, a major effect of Sweden’s migration transformations discussed above pertains to an ever-worsening labor participation among

Od

/nternational talent management in times of crisis

migrants. In 1970, migrants recorded higher labor participation rates than native Swedes — in 2021, Sweden recorded the greatest gap among OECD countries in employment rates between native-born and immigrants (Statistics Sweden 2021). One major factor behind the labor participation gap is tied to the recent dominance of refugee and family dependent immigration, and their insufficient labor market integration. Data from Statistics Sweden (2021) show that in 2019, labor participation among refugees aged between 20 and 64 was 59.9 percent, compared to 77.3 percent among other immigrants, and 86.2 percent among native Swedes. Swedish labor market integration of refugees is particularly slow. Registry data for refugees aged 20-64 who arrived in 2000 shows that it took eight years before 50 percent of the refugees were working. After fifteen years in Sweden, refugee working rates of 64 percent among men and 59 percent among women are still lagging well behind working rates of native Swedes, where 83 percent of men and 82 percent of women work (Sandberg et al. 2022). However, potentially mitigating the negative effects discussed above, the most important break in recent migration trends occurred in 2019 and 2020 when labor migrants constituted the largest category of immigrants for the first time since the end of the 1960s (Swedish Migration Board 2021). Furthermore, there has been a notable increase in STEM migration since 2020. While 17,000 IT-specialist and over 3,000 civil engineers (mainly from India, China, Iran, and the U.S.A.) received work permits in 2009-2014, the 43,250 labor migrants who arrived in 2019 are clearly dominated by STEM migrants (Sandberg 2023). The increase in high-skilled migration has continued despite declining overall figures during the COVID-19 pandemic. As depicted in Figure 6.3, nearly 11,000 work permits were granted to labor migrants in professions that require tertiary education in 2022 (during 2018-2022 a total of 39,885 permits were granted in this job category). The figure includes all categories of such professions, including STEM jobs, suggesting a rising trend in the presence of global talent. In 2016, more than 50 percent of all migrants obtaining work permits came to Stockholm and this concentration is even more pronounced in terms of migrants entering professions with demands for university education, where over 77 percent came to the country’s capital (Celikaksoy and Wadensj6 2017). Similarly, four out of five labor migrants in the IT sector in 2019-2021 came from India, who overwhelmingly settled in Stockholm. As a global city, Stockholm constitutes one of the premiere centers in the new global knowledge economy, ranked number one ahead of London in the EU Regional Competitiveness Index, third on the European Regional Economic Growth Index and the world’s Top Ten Startup Hubs. Planned in 1986, Kista Science Village in Stockholm is today the largest corporate area in Sweden and a technical and innovation hub at the very forefront in the global high-tech and

Sweden in the quest for global talent

93

12000

10000

2000

6000

4000

2000

it]

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Source: Swedish Migration Board (2023b).

Figure 6.3

Total number of work-permits in professions requiring tertiary education in

Sweden, 2018-2022

digital knowledge economy. It is Europe’s largest and the world’s third largest ICT cluster and home to more than 970 companies, including some of the world’s largest ICT companies, as well as a myriad of start-ups, test centers, and incubators, as well as leading departments of Stockholm University, and several key Swedish national research initiatives (Sandberg 2023). On the other hand, unlike low-skilled migrants who most often elect to stay in Sweden, high-skilled labor migrants rarely remain in Sweden for more than a year (Emilsson et al. 2014). Among the STEM migrants from India mentioned above, less than 10 percent actually stay in the country. Rather, STEM migration has so far been the result of internationalization where large [T-consulting firms provide services in Sweden but have outsourced production, mainly to India. This in turn results in temporary work by teams of Indian professionals in Sweden, arguably reflecting competitiveness of multinational corporations more than it does recruitment efforts of global talent (Sandberg 2023). Hence, Sweden may simply be following a global trend where economic globalization and increased interconnectedness have led to a rise in temporary and circular migration patterns for high-skilled migrants (Pekkala et al. 2016). Finally, before any verdict could be passed on Sweden’s potential matching problems, it is imperative to keep in mind the fact that a potentially significant pool of high-skilled migrants, i.c. EU citizens and intra-company transfers from non-EU countries, are by default not included in official data since their recruiting requires neither work permits nor reporting to authorities. One implication of this shortcoming is the fact that official reporting fails

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/nternational talent management in times of crisis

to account for a potentially significant percentage of high-skilled migrants recruited by multinational corporations either through other EU countries, or intra-company transfers from non-EU countries. As a consequence, current accounts of Sweden’s high-skilled and STEM migration are incomplete, thereby hindering accurate assessments of Sweden’s international competitiveness in attracting these migrants. Yet, arguably with real consequences for the country’s quest for global talent, and in contrast to other OECD countries, Sweden lacks an overarching strategy to attract international talent and competency. As discussed above, labor migration visa applications are processed in the same general track as those seeking asylum or family dependent visas, by the Swedish Migration Board. In contrast, Germany employs a system with clear divisions between labor migration and other types of migration, where visa processing 1s carried out by different government authorities. Labor migration to Sweden involves confusing and time-consuming bureaucracy, and remarkably long case-processing times. Recent reports show that 75 percent of recently processed cases for migrants seeking to start a business in Sweden surpassed 29 months of case processing, and in the budget proposition for 2023, the Swedish government recognizes that the long case processing times for labor permits has indeed had a negative effect on the country’s attractiveness for highly skilled labor migrants (Ageberg and Wiberg 2022).

CONCLUSION In an international perspective, Sweden represents a rather unique policy regime in the quest for global talent. The most striking example is the 2008 reform which largely pursued an employer-driven, generalist policy whereby anyone with a job offer has been granted a work permit. In contrast to other countries using point-based systems, and even to the demand-driven policy in the U.S.A., this reform entailed no numerical caps or priorities that would meet the demands for high-skilled labor in the global knowledge economy, but was rather mainly an attempt to ease labor shortages in response to demographic challenges of an aging population. In retrospect, the approach also differed from previous policies which essentially paid more attention to labor market needs. In view of existing demands on cutting-edge expertise in high-tech industries and due to lack of strategy for attracting high-skilled labor, the reform rather created a skewed balance in the pool of non-EU workers where comparatively large groups have been engaged in low-skilled professions despite the existence of more pertinent needs for labor in other sectors of the economy. All the while, Sweden faces a matching problem pertaining to its leading position in the global knowledge economy, where high-skilled and high-tech

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competencies represent a shortage. A significant obstacle for public and private enterprises, unsolved for instance through increased high-skilled labor migration, this matching problem threatens to undermine innovations, productivity, and economic growth. Unfortunately, policy changes in 2008 did little to increase high-skilled competencies in the Swedish population. The changes that took place in 2008 are possibly also intertwined with matching problems in low-skilled professions. During recent decades, migration to Sweden has overwhelmingly been made up of refugees and family dependents who have had significant problems integrating on the labor market. As mentioned above, differences in employment rates between native-born and immigrants in Sweden are vast in comparison with other OECD countries and refugees are increasingly lagging behind in terms of labor market access. Whether labor migration exacerbates this situation is a highly politicized question today, particularly among conservative politicians. A moratorium on the inflow of low-skilled labor is therefore often claimed to be necessary for the provision of jobs to immigrants. A case in point is the proposed reshuffling of the wage threshold for labor migrants that recently was announced by the new government. In line with the critique that has been raised against the impact of previous migration policies on the shortage of skilled labor and unemployment levels among refugees, this proposal could essentially be seen as an attempt to simultaneously address immigrant unemployment and the need for high skilled workers and global talent. In comparison with previous policies, these changes may point to a new direction in the governance of labor migration and a new awareness of the significance of global talent. Of further interest is the new visa for migrants holding a university degree. Despite worries over misuse and lax control mechanisms, this could possibly increase the prevalence of global educated labor within Swedish borders. Together with the recent upsurge in STEM migrants and increasing inflows of highly educated labor, a restructuring of the configuration of labor migration may therefore be underway.

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Celikaksoy, A., and Wadensjé, E. (2017). Nyanlanda pa vag mot etablering 1 Stockholm. Underlagsrapport,Kommissionen for ett social hallbart Stockholm. Stockholm: Stockholm Stad. Cerna, L. (2014). Attracting high-skilled immigrants: policies in a comparative per-

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Review, 52(2): 1-44. Emilsson, H., Magnusson, K., Torngren, $., and Bevelander, P. (2014). The world’s most open country: labour migration to Sweden after the 2008 law. Current Themes in IMER Research, 15. Malmo University.

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7.

Global science networks in times of CriSIS Maj Grasten, Stine Haakonsson and Duncan

Wigan INTRODUCTION Collaboration

between

scientists

working

in China,

on the

one

hand,

and

Europe and the United States, on the other, confronts political pressure to decouple, disengage, withhold, and withdraw. As geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions grow, the value of scientific networks that touch down in China has been placed under scrutiny and called into question. At the same time cross-border collaboration is integral to the production of scientific and technological innovation and is valued by scientists on both sides of what is an emergent divide. This chapter seeks to respond to the question of what happens within global scientific networks when politics comes to the fore and the net value of cooperation is marked down. It does this by tracking the ways in which scientific networks are sustained when formal bases of collaboration are constrained. The contribution draws on the case of the Sino-Danish Centre for Education and Research (SDC) and the field of neuroscience — a field of strategic relevance in Denmark and China. SDC was established at behest of the Danish and Chinese governments in 2008 and is a partnership between the eight Danish universities and the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (UCAS). It hosts eight Masters programs — six in the natural sciences and two in the social sciences — funds and trains Chinese and Danish doctoral students, and provides a platform for research collaboration between established scholars in Denmark and China.

NETWORKS

IN QUESTION

Formal research network ties between Danish and Chinese scientists and research environments have come under pressure from the Danish government. In its 2019 annual report, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service 100

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(Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET) identified China, Russia, and Iran as the most significant espionage threats, particularly in relation to Danish companies and research institutions leading in the development and production of new knowledge and technology (PET 2020). In PET’s 2021 risk assessment, foreign states, including China, were noted as engaged in espionage “against Danish universities [...] to obtain the latest technology and knowledge” and nominated a “significant threat’ to Denmark’s “leading position [...] in technology, innovation, and research” (PET 2022: 12). Also in 2021, the Center for Cyber Security raised the threat assessment for cyberattacks against Danish universities from “high” (in 2018) to “very high” (2021). Responding to this perceived threat, the Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science published a report in 2022, which provided a set of guidelines to reduce risk in cross-border research collaboration, and called for a “paradigm shift” in the Danish approach to international research networks (Politiken 2022). While the 2022 report and its recommendations were formally country-neutral, China was mentioned no less than 54 times, followed by Russia (14) and Iran (2) (URIS 2022). In 2023, Danish universities suspended the intake of Chinese doctoral students supported by the state-funded Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) due to concerns regarding censorship and political influence; 270 Chinese Ph.D. students were enrolled in Danish universities through the program at the time of its suspension, predominantly in the natural sciences (Drivsholm, 2023). Pressure on research collaboration stems from changing international alliances, policy concerns related to national competitiveness, geopolitical tension and geoeconomic rivalry. The rapid securitization of scientific collaboration reflects a two-fold shift in the geopolitical environment; first, fragmentation and increasingly multi-polarity in the international system, and second, new geographies in global science that mark the transcendence of bi-polarity around a U.S.-Western Europe axis. One pronounced feature of these shifts is that the center of gravity in the global production of science, technology, and innovation is gradually moving east, with China at the helm of this development (Zhou and Leydesdorff 2006; Veugelers 2010; Gui et al. 2019). Nature reported in 2020 that Beijing had become the leading global science hotspot, followed by New York, Boston, San Francisco, and Shanghai (Nature 2020). Beijing took this position in 2016, ten years after the launch of a strategic Chinese 15-year plan for the development of science and technology (the 2006-2020 Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology, MLP). The MLP envisioned Chinese scientific leadership by 2020, China as a technology exporting nation, and, ultimately, that China would become a “global science and technology superpower” by 2050. By 2016, China had surpassed the U.S.A. in terms of scientific output measured

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Scientific and technical journal articles

1996 1997 1998 1999 27000 27001 2007 2000 2004 2006 26 ——Ching

+++

POO? OOS

EuropeanUnien

==

OOS -India

AIO =

F011 AOI? 21S = Lnied

PO

POU 2016 PTF A018 2019 A

States

Source: World Bank Data 1996-2020.

Figure 7.1

Scientific journal

articles

by number of publications (Figure 7.1; see also Grasten and Haakonsson 2023). China’s ambition to become a global leader in science and technology by 2050 has been met by national policy initiatives to deter Chinese intrusions into foreign research environments. In 2018 and under the Trump presidency, the U.S. Department of Justice launched the China Initiative, a national security program targeting Chinese scientists based at American universities. In the same year, the U.S. National Security Strategy nominated China a “strategic competitor” (Mattis 2018: 1), and the White House’s Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy published, “How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and [ntellectual Property of the United States and

the

World”

(White

House

2018).

Accusations

that

Chinese

scientists

were working for the Chinese central government and military, and stealing intellectual property from U.S. universities, arose as the trade war between the U.S.A. and China gathered momentum. The Chinese telecom company Huawei was targeted through the U.S. export control system. American businesses were banned from selling parts and components to Huawei without U.S. government approval. The trade war “rapidly changed the political economy of global knowledge sharing” (Daniels and Kringe 2022: 300), with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs issuing a report that explicitly identified scientific collaboration as a national security

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threat: “For the Chinese government, international scientific collaboration is not about advancing science, it is to advance China’s national security interests” (United States Senate 2019: 2).! In a 2018 hearing at the House of Representatives on “Scholars or Spies: Foreign Plots Targeting America’s Research and Development’, the Chair noted that “China has publicly proven itself to be the most aggressive in the targeting of U.S. research over the past decade [...] Essentially, China steals our fundamental research and quickly capitalizes by commercializing the technology” (House of Representatives 2018: 6). Similarly, rising tensions have been notable in Europe. In 2021 the European Commission proposed a new approach to international scientific cooperation, “Europe’s Strategy for International Cooperation in a Changing World.” This pointed to a new conjuncture where “EU efforts to promote reciprocal openness at global level can be jeopardised by geopolitical tensions at a time of economic transformation” (European Commission 2021: 5). National guidelines for international research cooperation proliferated. A collective of 142 universities across the United Kingdom issued “Managing Risks in Internationalisation: Security Related Issues” in 2020. The German Association of Public Universities issued “Guiding Questions on University Cooperation with the People’s Republic of China” and “Standards in International University Cooperation.” The Dutch “Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions” and the Australian Department of Education’s “Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector” were published in 2021. Some of these guidelines are country-neutral, some specifically target scientific cooperation with Chinese universities and researchers. Together, they indicate the rapid securitization of global scientific production and, more specifically, China’s role in global knowledge production and innovation. In China, President Xi Jinping has pursued a national agenda of self-reliance and “indigenous innovation.” A number of Chinese public policy initiatives have, since the early 2000s, focused on reversing shortcomings in China’s innovation system, including insufficient funding, brain drain, and an ineffective science infrastructure characterized by inadequate facilities and equipment. These initiatives comprise large-scale funding for key state laboratories and a rapid increase in domestic research and development (R&D) expenditure. Some of these initiatives have been met with criticism. The Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) was originally designed to reverse the brain drain of top Chinese scientists to the U.S.A. and other Western countries. Launched in 2008, the program connected Chinese scientists overseas with government agencies in Beijing. The program offers part-time affiliations with Chinese universities and came under the scrutiny of several states in 2013 when the Chinese central government decided to stop publishing the names of affiliated

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Chinese scientists. Chinese authorities halted the TTP in 2018. Recently, China launched another recruitment initiative — Qiming — targeting overseas scientists and engineers and led by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Amidst the ongoing U.S.—China chip war, the program aims to attract foreign talent to advance China’s semiconductor industry. Geoeconomic rivalry and geopolitical tension have raised the costs of scientific collaboration with China. Previously robust and largely unquestioned scientific networks have come under scrutiny for security risks, and the opportunity space for collaboration has narrowed. In this context, the expectation of network atrophy is strong and formal institutional channels that previously nurtured collaboration have weakened. The specter of scientific decoupling 1s real, but the global scientific community persists and the benefits of collaboration remain significant. Despite persistent efforts by the U.S. government to curb international scientific cooperation, U.S. scientists collaborated with China-based scientists more than with nationals of any other country in 2022-2023 (Nature 2023). “We have not noticed any political problems related to research collaboration [with China]. It is more ‘free play’ here”, one of our interviewees — a Danish neuroscientist collaborating with Chinese scientists in China — noted, citing communication technology as the only and minor obstacle to cross-border research collaboration: “It may sometimes be easier to collaborate with the US and Europe, as you can just jump on zoom and email. In China, there 1s another system and one must sometimes use other [communication] providers” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). Perhaps we as scientists feel ourselves “being a bit superior” to these trends of decoupling, stated another interviewee (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). Within this context and environment, the question arises of how scientific collaboration networks might be sustained when under pressure and the formal space for cooperation shrinks. The chapter responds to this question with a micro case study that provides insight in a specific and limited context. We argue that networks are maintained by a range of mechanisms that take on varying relative importance over time and in response to changes in the environment. While formal modes of network maintenance may be in ebb, less formal, more personal forms of network maintenance are stepping into the breach to sustain established networks and network ties. We first establish our contribution in relation to extant scholarship on social networks and science collaboration with an emphasis, following Weber, on formal institutional, customary, and charismatic modes of network cohesion and maintenance. Drawing on interviews with Danish neuroscientists based at Danish universities and collaborating with Chinese neuroscientists in China within the SDC, we suggest that as formal modes of network maintenance recede, customs and charisma at a micro level step into the breach.

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NETWORK MAINTENANCE This section develops a framework that assists in identifying variation in modes of network maintenance over time and according to changes in the environment. Science and technology studies (STS) have identified the cumulative development and dynamics of networks as the outcome of the continuous enrolments of new actors (Callon

1984). We focus on how extant actors and

preexisting resources and capabilities sustain existing yet atrophying formal networks. Networks consist of micro processes steered by interpersonal relationships and the macro level formal institutional ties. This reflects the distinction in social network theory between relational and structural embeddedness (Granovetter

1985,

1992; Moran

2005; Uzzi

1996); i.e., between

how

one’s

network is (impersonally) configured and the nature and quality of its social relationships (see also Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Relational embeddedness

includes “interpersonal trust and trustworthiness, overlapping identities, and feelings of closeness or interpersonal solidarity” (Moran 2005: 1132). We deploy this distinction in terms of micro processes driven by interpersonal relationships and macro structures embedded in formal institutional arrangements. We argue that the customary and charismatic compensate for formal institutional modes of network maintenance when existing organizational forms of collaboration are under pressure. Interpersonal ties and existing actors’ social capital are key drivers of network governance and maintenance when formal network ties are under pressure.

We draw on Max Weber’s three (ideal) types of legitimate authority in making the distinction between formal institutional, customary, and charismatic modes

of network cohesion and maintenance to show that custom,

charisma, and interpersonal ties are key drivers of network resilience and maintenance. This becomes apparent when the formal is relegated and constrained. Custom and charisma operate through interpersonal relationships across the network, which differ from what Granovetter (1973) terms “weak

ties,” meaning indirect or more casual social relations between individuals or groups. In Weber’s triadic typology, authority is understood as /egitimate domination, recognized and justified by ruler and ruled (Weber 1978). Authority is established through ordered social interaction where a significant number of actors recognize and follow the same norms (Spencer 1970: 124). Formal institutional ties — or “legal-rational authority” in Weber’s typology — are based on rules, laws, and formal regulations. These ties are rooted in the legal basis and structure of an organization rather than in the personal qualities of individuals. According to Weber (1978), legal-rational authority operates through established rules within bureaucratic organizations characterized by

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hierarchy, procedures that govern the behavior of individuals in the organization, and impersonality. The institutional logics guiding the formal layers of network governance circumscribe decision-making and behavior within the organization. The organization adheres to and polices established rules and procedures to ensure consistency and predictability, eschewing personal biases or preferences. Individuals are expected to act according to established rules and in their official capacity and not allow personal relationships to impinge on the fulfillment of their duties. Customs and charisma refer to the relational embeddedness and quality of social ties within the network. In Weber’s typology, customary authority is rooted in tradition, long-established practices, and the belief in the sanctity of custom and ritual. Legitimacy is derived from historical continuity and the collective acceptance of traditional norms and values. Customary authority often involves leadership that is passed down from generation to generation within a family or a particular social group. Hereditary leadership is seen as a reflection of the enduring customs and norms of the community. It relies on unwritten traditions and the collective conscience of the community. Customary authority tends to be stable and resistant to change, as it is deeply ingrained in the culture and history of a group or society. It provides a sense of continuity and security for individuals within a community. Examples of customary authority can be found in traditional monarchies, tribal leadership, and certain religious institutions. In these cases, leaders or rulers are recognized and respected on the basis of their lineage and adherence to customary practice. Charisma is an important vehicle for banking social capital within the network. We reconstruct how network properties are activated and relationships maintained through micro-processes of charisma at work. Analytically, the distinction between orderly organized institutional life and “the destructive or the innovative and constructive potentials of charismatic activities” is not determinate (Eisenstadt 1968: xxi). In stressing the charismatic group, as opposed to the charismatic leader, Weber suggested that a charismatic predisposition is marked by a concern “to assure the succession of its leadership and the continuity of its organization” (ibid.). For instance, in Weber’s work on the bureaucratic life of public administration he often addressed how charismatic personalities would frequently appear to dominate or create disruption in formal organizations (Shils 1965: 199), Importantly, the distinction between the charismatic and the formal institutional is for Weber not a distinction between disruption and infrequency, and routine and frequency; or between actions generated by creative, “great” personalities and passive organizational practices following adherence to customs (ibid.). It is rather “a distinction between an intense and immediate contact with what the actors involved believe to be ultimate values or events and a more attenuated, more mediated

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contact with such values or events through the functioning of established institutions” (ibid.: 199-200).

MAINTAINING SINO-DANISH NEUROSCIENCE COLLABORATIONS The field of neuroscience has made significant advances over the last three decades, with significant developments in our understanding of the brain and nervous system (see Liu et al. 2020). One key area of progress is imaging technologies. In this chapter, we engage with the subfield of neuroimaging, a noninvasive technique to produce images of the structure and activity of the brain and nervous system with devices such as magnetic resonance (MR) scanners. Neuroimaging techniques like functional magnetic resonance imaging (f{MRI), positron emission tomography, and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) have allowed researchers to visualize and study the brain’s structure and function in unprecedented detail. Research in neuroscience is characterized by being organized through networks, across disciplines, and internationally through large-scale publicly funded projects. Indeed, “it is the large-scale mega-projects and very expensive machines that partly drive internationalization” in neuroscience (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). Major national and regional initiatives include the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) project launched by the U.S. government in 2013 with an initial budget of US$100 million. The European Human Brain Project, largely funded by the European Commission, ran from 2013 to 2023 and involved more than 500 researchers and 155 institutions across Europe. The International Brain [Initiative was launched in 2017 as a joint collaboration between the world’s largest brain research projects. Mandated to coordinate brain research internationally, its partner projects include the U.S. BRAIN Initiative, the Human Brain Project in Europe, the China Brain Project, the Australian Brain Alliance, the Korean Brain Initiative in the Republic of Korea, and the Canadian Brain Research Strategy. China has been investing heavily in neuroscience research in recent years. The Medium to Long-Term Plan (MLP) already listed neuroscience in 2006 as one of eight major frontier projects in basic science and technology to be supported with substantial state funding. As part of its 13th Five-Year Plan, China launched the China Brain Project (CBP) in 2016 backed by a US$746 million budget. A 15-year initiative, CBP focuses on promoting both basic and applied neuroscience. A chief architecht of the CBP and head of the Institute of Neuroscience at the Chinese Academcy of Sciences (CAS), Mu-ming Poo moved in 2009 back to China after 40 years studying and working in the U.S.A.

(Normile 2022).

CAS

is a research partner institution of Danish

universities within the SDC. And, as noted by a leading Danish neuroscientist,

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“all research collaboration in China related to CAS is really good. And as SDC is connected to CAS, we [his laboratory] only collaborate with CAS” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). The CBP is particularly focused on strengthening research in imaging, a “Chinese strength” (ibid.). Compared to other brain projects internationally, the Chinese project follows explicitly a strategy of “one body, two wings.” It targets the development of treatments for brain disorders and AI technologies at the same time. “CBP puts the research on brain disorders and brain-inspired artificial intelligence [AI] as immediate high-priority areas, rather than as remote goals after we understand the brain more completely” (interview with Mu-ming Poo, cited in Wang 2017: 258). Chinese state-of-the-art research facilities and institutions dedicated to neuroscience include the Institute of Brain Science at Fudan University, the Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (CEBSIT), the CAS Institute of Neuroscience, and the Center for Brain-Inspired Computing Research at Tsinghua University. In Denmark, neuroscience grew in the second part of the twentieth century and gradually moved from research linked to clinical practice to basic (preclinical) science (Paulson et al. 2023). A comparison of neuroscience research in Denmark, the U.S.A., Canada, the Netherlands, the U.K., Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden concluded that Denmark had the highest growth in research output measured in numbers of publications over the period 2004-2015 (Andersen et al. 2018: 199). This is largely due to an increase in international co-authorships (ibid.). Neuroscience research has mainly been funded by the Danish Research Council and private foundations, notably the Lundbeck Foundation. There is a strong Danish research tradition in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Already in 1985, the first MR department, the Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance, was established at Hvidovre Hospital in the Copenhagen region. It became the home of the first MR scanner at a time when very few scanners existed worldwide and a hub for international collaboration, attracting researchers from abroad (ibid.: 2907). Since then, functional brain imaging has been an important — and internationalized — research field in Denmark. Lundbeck is the largest foundation supporting neuroscience in Denmark. At graduate level, MRI training is provided by the Danish Technical University (DTU), Aarhus University, and SDC

(M.Sc.

in

Neuroscience and Neuroimaging) in collaboration with UCAS and CAS in Beijing. “The research setting that SDC provides [for neuroscientists] is really good with CAS. It simply means that there is a guarantee that they [CAS] pick the scientists with whom we collaborate from the top shelf. And they have tons of money” (Newroscientist, interview, 2022). Established in 2008 when Denmark entered into a formal strategic partnership with China (the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’), the SDC has been an important contributor to the development of Danish—Chinese neuro-

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science research collaboration. One interviewee made this clear: “If it wasn’t for SDC and the opportunities it provided, | wouldn’t have gone to China” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). The partnership and SDC paved the way for a series of bilateral initiatives and the establishment of direct communication channels between Denmark and China. Another of our interviewees, a leading neuroscientist based at a Danish university, collaborates on a permanent basis with six to seven Chinese professors in Beijing and Shanghai. This network is a direct outcome of the SDC partnership (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). However, with Danish intelligence services highlighting the espionage risks posed by foreign states, including China, to Danish research environments, formal modes of network maintenance in Danish—Chinese neuroscience research collaboration are under pressure. In May 2021, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Research and the Danish Business Authority, released a report titled “Is Your Research at Risk?” (PET 202 1a). “The threat to Danish research is real,” the report noted, particularly for a country like Denmark, which traditionally has had an open and internationally oriented research tradition, a high level of research, and a strategically significant geopolitical position (as an Arctic nation due to Greenland) (ibid.). Researchers were encouraged to exercise caution during their travels, and home universities to establish an internal culture of awareness across their organizations. The report followed a series of threat and security assessments by Danish intelligence services over a short period of time. PET’s 2019 annual risk assessment identified for the first time Russia, China, and Iran as the most important espionage threats for Danish research environments: “Denmark is leading in several areas in developing and producing new knowledge and technology. Foreign states [...] attempt to acquire high-technology knowledge and research results from Danish companies and research institutions” (PET 2020: 21). In its 2020 risk assessment, PET emphasized that illegal acquisition activities could occur, for example, when “researchers in good faith transfer knowledge from research institutions in Denmark to research environments that contribute to other countries’ weapons programs” (PET 2021b) and it was pointed out that PET in consequence had “strengthened the effort targeted at the Danish research sector” (ibid.). This included the establishment of a dialogue group for the research area, briefings and courses, and a guidance program for relevant actors. The following year, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s (FE) annual risk assessment noted that “due to China’s political system, Chinese actors’ own interests and the state’s strategic goals are in some cases closely integrated” leading to “growing concerns in a number of Western countries regarding Chinese espionage and unintended knowledge and technology transfer in relation to, for example, Chinese investments and

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research collaboration with China” (FE 2021: 44). The report highlighted specific security threats, including the recruitment of Western researchers and research collaborations in general, and the risk of civil science and technology developed in Western countries being used for military purposes in China. Research collaborations, China’s talent programs within the research sector, and investments in high-tech companies were listed as means by which China seeks to “map and transfer foreign technology” (FE 2022: 57). The FE assessed as “very likely” that China would attempt to acquire knowledge from Danish research institutions: “Although Danish actors can greatly benefit from research collaboration with Chinese companies and institutions, there is a risk associated with certain research collaborations, especially in the natural and technical sciences” (ibid.). As a response, the Ministry of Higher Education and Science established in the fall of 2020 a committee, the Committee on Guidelines for International Research and Innovation Cooperation (URIS), with representatives from Denmark’s eight universities, university colleges, and public research funding foundations. Its mandate included identifying the risk of Danish-developed technology being used for military purposes or in violation of human rights, the risk of foreign students and staff at Danish universities engaging in illegal activities, and the risk of “contributing to the strengthening and development of research and innovation capacity in sensitive areas in non-like-minded countries” (URIS 2023). In this context of political pressure on formal institutional and international collaboration, organizational and individual resources nested in existing networks have become key to customary and charismatic modes of network maintenance. In regard to custom, continuity is sustained through access to organizational resources, including funding, laboratories, technology, talent, and data. In positioning China as a “world science superpower” attractive to foreign talents and international research networks, state funding for research and development has increased rapidly over the last two decades (Figure 7.2; see also Grasten and Haakonsson 2023). Chinese national R&D investment as share of GDP surpassed the EU27 average in 2019. “One of the things that is very certain about China is that the budgets they work with are vast compared to what we have in Europe. A co-supervisor for two of my PhD students is based in Shanghai, and he explained it very well, I think. He said, if I go to my Head of Department and ask for money for some new equipment, | always get it. And that means that it’s never money that stands in the way of scientific excellence [...] if there is something China js really good at, then it’s investing an incredible amount of money in research” (Neuwroscientist, interview, 2022). “China is the country in the world which invests the most in research. So, if one excludes oneself from that, one is going to miss some very very important

Global science networks in times of crisis

11]

trends and currents, and methods, and everything” (Newroscientist, interview, 2022). Research and development investment has paid off with an accelerating number of patents, and China fast approaching the U.S.A. and the EU on this metric. The number of triadic patents registered by Chinese residents more than tripled between 2010 to 2020, from a total of 1,425 to 5,897 (Figure 7.3).

Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

1086 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2004 2005 2006 D007 200B8 2009 2000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 —Ching

=

— European Union

——

-indin

===

United States

Source: World Bank Data 1996-2021.

Figure 7.2

Spending on R&D

The costs of science infrastructures have increased with the development of more advanced technologies. Funding agencies can often not provide the requisite facilities to all researchers working in a field. Consequently, resources need to be pooled regionally or internationally, which can result in close cross-border research collaboration and the pooling of resources (Katz and Martin 1997: 8). “Novo and Lundbeck, as some of these large foundations from whom we apply for funding, sort of imply that research has to be transnational. That is, there must be some kind of bridging element in the projects when we are actually doing them to move some basic research [abroad]” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). In this context, China has become attractive to foreign scientists. As noted by another interviewee: “Machines are important for where we locate our collaboration” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). In recent five-year plans, China has committed to considerably upgrade its national innovation system: “With our sights set on the world’s cutting edge of science and technology, we will be guided by China’s national objectives and strategic needs in developing top-quality national laboratories [...] and

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Triadic patent families (total number)

—

1987 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 a=

China (People's Republic of)

Ce

=

oo

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 United States.

=

2017 2018 2019 2020

= European Union (27 countries, 2020)

Note: A patent family is a collection of patent applications covering the same or similar technical content. Triadic patent families are simultaneously registered in the EU, the U.S.A. and Japan (i.e., the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the European Patent Office (EPO), and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO)).

Source: OECD Statistics 1997-2020.

Figure 7.3

Triadic patents filed by Chinese residents

internationally influential centers of scientific and technological innovation” (13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), Section 3: Infrastructure for Innovation). The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2026) emphasizes the importance of advancing innovation in science and technology, including an annual increase in R&D investment of more than 7 percent, further investment in basic science, and a commitment to develop China’s national laboratory system. “Amid fierce international competition, unilateralism and protectionism, we must work out our own way to upgrade, become more innovative and make more breakthroughs from scratch,” declared Xi Jinping in a speech on the role of science and technology in the 14th Five-Year Plan period.? Universities, colleges, and research institutes have been pushed to take on a more significant role in strengthening the country’s innovation base. This has led to an increase in funding to build new and larger cross-disciplinary research centers and major national laboratories to promote “big science.” These national laboratories will be managed by the central government, rather than being placed under individual universities and research institutes. A key example is the Huairou Science City located north of Being and adjacent to the UCAS campus and the SDC. It is one element of the 2016 national strategy to build National Comprehensive Innovation Centers. Huairou Science City will cover an area of over 100 square kilometers, accom-

Global science networks in times of crisis

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modate 16 large-scale science facilities, such as a High Energy Photon Source, host nearly 50,000 researchers, and incorporate the main campus of UCAS. It will cover five main scientific fields, one of which is neuroscience. As noted by one of our interviewees: “well, now one cannot generalize about China, but the researchers | have been in contact with there, have a strong fascination with technology. So, it’s all about having the newest and the biggest, because then one can probably do something groundbreaking” (Newroscientist, interview, 2022). “In China, they love big machines. So, they have a lot of big machines which are unfortunately very expensive to use. But once you are ‘buddies’, then there are deals which means that you can use the machines for free or very cheap” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022).

A further customary mode of network maintenance is access to data, including samples and animal experiments. “I have a Chinese PhD student in Beijing; and a research partner in Shanghai. In Denmark, it takes months — 2—3 months — to apply for an animal experiment. The first time | met my Chinese research partner, he had in one day got hold of seven mice for an experiment” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). “The other person I collaborate with, he is super good at creating transgenic mice because he draws on a wealth of Chinese clinical databases. And then he studies a thousand Chinese ALS patients — and they can damn well get so many patients very quickly, right? — and then he looks at which genes are primarily involved in these patients, and he transfers that into mice. We get access to these mice relatively early, often even before they are published. That’s what you call a happy marriage!” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). One interviewee, a neuroscientist working in the area of neurological disabilities, cites the demography of China as a major advantage in research partnerships: “You can do a sample of 10,000 [non-treated cases of depression | in no time. Quickly and boom you got it! The problem for us running such a study in Denmark is that if we go out and recruit part of the population, who probably are not even aware of the phenomenon [1.e., the disease] and who are not sick and therefore has not been in the system [to be treated], then it’s really really difficult. For me, it was attractive to say, “OK, Beijing, there we got a city with 20 million people’” (Neuwroscientist, interview, 2022). According to Mu-ming Poo, head of the Institute of Neuroscience at CAS in an interview in National Science Review: “China has the largest patient populations in the world for all brain disorders, making research on the prevention, early diagnosis and early intervention particularly urgent and, in the meantime, offering the largest database for researchers to work on” (interview with Mu-Ming Po, cited in Wang 2017: 258). He further explains: “... the current international neuroscience community mostly uses rodents (mice and rats) as animal models for studying the neural mechanisms |...]. Yet, it has become increasingly clear that to understand both human cognition and pathogenesis of brain diseases,

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especially psychiatric disorders, non-human primates are likely to be more appropriate [...] China has large macaque monkey resources, and research on developing human disease models using macaque monkeys is advancing at a rapid rate. This provides the opportunity for China to play a leading role in studying higher cognitive functions ...” (interview with Mu-ming Poo, cited in Wang 2017: 258). Access to a pool of talent is an important customary source of network resilience. Danish scientists are frequently motivated by this access in a context where the talent pool in Denmark is limited. “The top 10% of students in China, they constitute a very, very large pool of people, so their elite students, those are the kind we might have maybe three of in Denmark” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). Charismatic modes of network maintenance include trust and personality. Sociologists of science have emphasized the importance of close social contact between scientists for building up mutual trust and passing on tacit knowledge (Collins 2001). Tacit knowledge is “knowledge or abilities that can be passed between scientists by personal contact but cannot be, or have not been, set out or passed on in formulae, diagrams, or verbal descriptions and instructions for action” (ibid.: 72). Network embeddedness and tie strength rely on trust and commitment that fosters knowledge exchange over time and in times of political pressure. “It is clearly an advantage to be friends with people, then you get more access to data and methods” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). In turn, long-standing relationships and a scientist’s social capital play a crucial role. One interviewee said: “I’ve met a lot of people who publish in Nature and Science, especially from China. But [ don’t necessarily want to collaborate with them. | have met the people with whom I collaborate in cafés and so on” (Neurescientist, interview, 2022). “You know there are two types of scientists: There are the introverts who love working with data and not people. They are nerds. And then people with personality like me. It’s very much about personality, some labs are open, some labs are closed. Mine is open” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). “It depends on your personality [whether a laboratory is open or closed to other scientists]. I like to be surrounded by a lot of people. | come from a large family” (Newroscientist, interview, 2022). Trust-building also implies having an open laboratory, including mentoring and providing access to laboratories and machines to the Ph.D. fellows and post-docs of research peers. “My former supervisor was a very famous scientist, extremely talented, and totally nuts. He wanted the laboratory to be as open as possible. He was always travelling. He also organized all these courses during which many of the things we invented here were openly shared with other laboratories. And that means that you both get a lot of people from abroad who want to come and visit you and learn from your methods, and you get more citations’ (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). International research col-

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laboration is an important vehicle of scientific knowledge diffusion with internationally co-authored papers cited significantly more than papers co-authored in a national context (Narin et al. 1991; Vieira 2023). Mentoring is another important factor in sustaining research networks. “These are the courses that I have typically held for PhDs [the interviewee points at a map]. It’s difficult to see, but there is one in Aarhus, then there is one in Sandbyjerg, then there is one in Bern in Switzerland, Boston in the USA, Samsun in Turkey, and then there are Beiing, Vietnam, Indonesia, and New Zealand. [These courses] have provided me with a lot of networks and taught me how to navigate different cultures. And this is extremely important when you collaborate with the Chinese. It is a bit like getting a friend for life” (Neuroscientist, interview,

2022). Ties established through doctoral supervision and hosting foreign doctoral students persist. “My first Chinese PhD student is from sometime in the 1990s — Yong. He became a post-doc in the US for several years. And then he became a professor in Chongqing. And we are in contact a lot” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). According to one of our interviewees, “if you want to gain access to their [China’s] top researchers, then you need a CV that compares with theirs. Danish—Chinese formal partnership in itself is not enough” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022). “I am not networking for the fun of it. | can see China has

something that I can use. In the 1990s and 2000s, China did something very very smart. They sent their best young people abroad to the best laboratories in the world. They lived on next to nothing. And most of them have returned to China [...] That means that all of the Chinese with whom I collaborate, they know more about my culture than I know about theirs. They have all been at some super good places, they are exceptionally skilled and can do some other things that I cannot. And I can offer something they cannot do. That’s why we collaborate” (Neuroscientist, interview, 2022).

CONCLUSION Drawing on Max Weber’s three (ideal) types of legitimate authority this contribution has distinguished formal institutional, customary and charismatic modes of network cohesion and maintenance. We have argued that the relative significance of these modes of cohesion and maintenance changes over time according to shifts in the environment. In our case, these shifts in the environment took the form of a dramatic reevaluation of networks in science and technology between China and Denmark. China moved from being perceived as a strategic partner in science and technology to being perceived as a strategic competitor that might steal a lead in key technologies through poaching and espionage. In consequence formal institutional ties between scientists and

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scientific environments in China and Denmark were degraded and began to atrophy. In face of this degradation and atrophy, network ties did not disappear but were maintained through existing customary and charismatic modes of network cohesion. Customary and charismatic modes of network cohesion play out at the micro level. Individual scientists sustain interpersonal ties on the basis of bilateral exchanges of resources, including laboratory access, technology, talent, and data. These customary bases to network maintenance worked in tandem with the charismatic. Long-term friendships that generate high levels of trust and rest on mutually recognized status and expertise compensate when formal institutional collaborative mechanisms are in retreat. These conclusions are preliminary, and, as yet, we do not know if they are idiosyncratic. The chapter is therefore a first shot and one, if our conclusions are considered plausible, that calls for a broader and deeper exploration of the modes via which scientific networks form and are maintained over time and under changing geopolitical, geoeconomic, and global scientific conditions.

NOTES 1.

2.

The report notes that “American taxpayer funded research has contributed to China’s global rise over the last 20 years. During that time, China openly recruited U.S.-based researchers, scientists, and experts in the public and private sector to provide China with knowledge and intellectual capital in exchange for monetary gain and other benefits” (United States Senate 2019: 1). Quoted in Liu Zhen, “Xi Jinping Calls on Science to Solve the Big Problems Choking China”, South China Morning Post, September 13, 2020: see https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3 101376/xi-jinping-calls -science-solve-big-problems-choking-china.

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8.

China’s overseas investment impact and the rise of ESG practices Wen Xiang

INTRODUCTION At the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, the concept of sustainable development gained recognition in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, as part of the resolve by the global community to protect the environment and bring an end to poverty for the benefit of the present and future generations. Principle 4 affirms that “environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”. Since its recognition, the concept has been incorporated into hundreds of international economic, environment, and development-related treaties and instruments (Jodoin and Cordonier Segger 2013). As a follow up on this Summit, at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, “States adopted a non-binding programme for policy change and implementation, focusing on effectuating a transition toward a green economy and confirming institutional reforms to make sustainable development more achievable” (Jodoin and Cordonier Segger 2013). Sustainable development goes beyond mere economic growth; rather, it is a development that takes into consideration other factors that affect and influence the lives of the present generation while also not forgetting future generations in the developing countries. This is in line with the definition given by the “Our Common Future” report of the World Commission on Environment and Development published in 1987 as a development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. It stressed the need to balance economic growth with environmental conservation and the protection of the rights of the people. To further appreciate the importance of sustainable development, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that expressed the global agenda priorities until 2030 are framed under the concept. All these steps been taken for global sustainability are geared towards addressing the

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social, economic, and environmental challenges presently facing the world in the wake of globalization. Energy and the environment are not mutually exclusive but are interconnected. Energy is a leading contributor to climate change, accounting for around 60 per cent of total global greenhouse gas emissions (UN 2015), and so critical to achieving sustainable development: from its role in combating climate change, to the eradication of poverty, ensuring growth and development in health, education, water supply and industrialization (Descalzi 2019). With regard to environmental sustainability, multinational corporations (MNCs) are deeply involved in the exploitation of natural resources, particularly in the oil and gas mining sectors. Major environmental, social, and cultural problems, both local and global, have been associated with the way and manner these MNCs have operated. Whilst the combustion, transport, and disposal of energy sources as they go through different conversion processes results in harmful emissions, these emissions in turn cause local, regional, and global environmental problems, including serious, even fatal, human health hazards and even dislocation of people (Davidson 2006). Unfortunately, most nations and MNCs still regard sustainable development as extraneous to their core responsibilities in the host countries in which they operate. The chapter considers the current efforts of China investments in Africa in the energy sector and the negative environmental consequences of this effort. It examines how integration of sustainability strategies and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices into Chinese investments in the energy sector can help to contribute towards solving the economic, social, and environmental challenges currently facing the country.

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND AFRICA The relationship between China and the African continent dates back to 1956 when China established diplomatic relations with Egypt. The relationship with this continent which encompassed political, economic, scientific, and cultural issues was intensified and institutionalized in 2000 with the creation of FOCAC (Forum on China Africa Cooperation) to serve as an institutional framework for China’s relations with Africa. In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China n.d.). OBOR, a China’s “opening up” and “going global” strategy is envisioned to focus on infrastructure and consisted of an economic belt reaching from China through Central Asia to Europe as well as of a maritime Silk Road, connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa (Breuer 2017; Ehizuelen and Abdi 2018) in trade, development, and culture. It further aims at increas-

ing cooperation and exchange in the area of technology, resources, tourism,

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12]

environmental protection, NGOs, and so on. It is important to stress that while the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) has potential economies in China’s partner countries, there is the fear that it could tip the world into catastrophic climate change if not done in a sustainable manner. President Xi, in his address to Uzbek Parliament on 22 June 2016 called for the building of a “green, healthy, intelligent, and peaceful” BRI and urged partner countries to “deepen cooperation in environmental protection, intensify ecological preservation and build a green Silk Road” (Hilton 2019). On his 2017 visit to four West-African countries — Mauritania, Cape Verde, Mali, and Ivory Coast — the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi confirmed that the BRI would be open to all interested African countries (notwithstanding their geographical location) (Powanga and Giner-Reichl 2019). Africa is faced with a lot of challenges hampering the continent’s growth and development prospects, thus making it more vulnerable. Some of the daunting challenges include, for example, poverty, unemployment, food and energy insecurity, conflicts, high mortality rate, environmental degradation, and migration. The question then is: how can OBOR assist Africa in overcoming some of these challenges and achieving the SDGs through its energy sector? Suffice to say that there are some promising developments in Africa which, if well harnessed, would help in reaping the benefits that OBOR has to offer the continent. The first is the African Union’s (AU’s) Agenda 2063, which is an integrated agenda directed at focusing on the themes of inclusive growth and sustainable development; political and economic integration; good governance, democracy and human rights; peace and security; and building global partnerships (le Pere 2017). The AU launched Agenda 2063 in 2015 to accelerate the modernization and industrialization progress of African countries. How then can OBOR assist in complementing Agenda 2063 to create the “Africa we want’? As pointed out by Ehizuelen and Abdi (2018): The synergies and complementarities between OBOR and Agenda 2063 are based on the fact that both highlight the need for inclusive and people-centered development with an emphasis on sustainable industrialization and industrial diversification, creating high-value added and decent employment for all. Additionally, strategic coordination between the OBOR initiative and Agenda 2063 offers several cooperation possibilities for Chinese and African investors. Africa could overcome some of its endemic development challenges through the building of synergies between Agenda 2063 and the BRI. In the sub-Saharan African countries, a sub-continent hobbled by an infrastructure gap, there are 38 countries that have keyed into the BRI as at March 2020. Other sub-Saharan African countries can take advantage of the strong initial BRI project focus on energy, transport, industry and trade, water and urban infrastructure, and agriculture, in which much of the investment will come from Chinese

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state-owned enterprises with which African countries have had considerable negotiating experience and operational interaction. The BRI therefore “presents the African Union and the African inter-state system with an ‘ecosystem’ of opportunities and a different set of institutional options that could vastly facilitate and support Agenda 2063°s integration agenda” (le Pere 2017). Infrastructure, which is a vision of Africa’s Agenda 2063, plays a major role in Chinese—African Union relations; and since OBOR or the silk road initiative largely concerns infrastructure network initiative, the local populations in Africa stand to benefit more from China’s infrastructure projects in Africa, particularly infrastructure investment in the energy sector. Further, building infrastructure can help a great deal in protecting the nature. As noted by Breuer, “the construction of cargo train networks shifts the transport of goods from trucks to railways and thus reduces pollution and CO2 emissions” (Breuer 2017). Happily, the Silk Road Fund that was established in 2015 to support investment in countries within the BRI provides, in its investment principles, that it attempts to promote environmentally friendly and sustainable development, and further that it “respects international standards and norms, and follows the laws and regulations of China and the host countries” (IDI 2017). Thus, adequate measures must be put in place concerning social and environmental impact assessments, prevention, and mitigation of the investment projects. African countries that participate in the BRI may have the opportunity to engage in the programmatic agenda and strategic goals of the BRI with an emphasis on infrastructure development, intra-regional trade facilitation, financing for development, environmental protection and energy security (le Pere 2017). More importantly, a Global Governance Report emphasizing the nexus between the OBOR initiative and the SDGs was recently jointly published by the China Center for International Economic Exchange and the UNDP. This is a welcome development since many African countries would be among those who would benefit the most from reaching the SDGs (Breuer 2017). It is hoped that decisions arrived at in the report would be implemented for the benefit of all. Several African counties including Nigeria joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018 at a Summit in Beijing. The participation of Nigeria in the OBOR initiative will further cement the historical, economic, and political ties

between her and China; and more importantly, “it also means that the areas of cooperation that are being promoted under the initiative and FOCAC, such as industrialization and infrastructure, will receive even stronger political backing from China, which may assist in fast-tracking the execution of key projects in those areas”. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous nation and so offers economic advantages if it participates in the OBOR initiative. For instance, it possesses economic significance relating to the Lekki Deep Sea port, the construction of which (as part of China’s Belt and Road [nitiative) is being financed under

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a $629 million facility agreement that Lekki Port LFTZ Enterprise Limited (LPLEL) signed with the China Development Bank, and at which operations are expected to begin in 2022 (Willkie Farr and Gallagher 2020). This port may function as a trading hub, thereby expanding the Maritime Silk Road further to the west on the continent of Africa (Ehizuelen and Abdi 2018). The BRI initiative is therefore an important platform through which Nigeria can achieve the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Therefore, the AU has a great role to play in coordinating and promoting inter-governmental collaboration, through Chinese—African forums, to ensure that Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) do not go ‘shopping’ or relocating to countries, including some in Africa with low environmental standards/lax laws or less severely enforced regulations. African governments, the AU, and civil society must work together to establish constructive policy framework that could ensure that foreign direct investment (FDI) helps to make a net positive contribution to their economies and societies (Gu 2009). Through the collective mechanism of the AU, African leaders must also constantly engage with the Chinese government on the need for Chinese NOCs to always abide by international best practices in their investments in the energy sector, pointing out the disjuncture between their activities and the norms expected and promoted by African initiatives such as Agenda 2063 (Taylor 2006). It is only by doing this that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources by MNCs (including Chinese NOCs) will be done in a sustainable manner for the betterment of resource-rich counties in Africa and its people.

INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE STRATEGIES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR Notwithstanding several efforts by the African governments to tackle environmental concerns, most countries continue to rank very low in terms of their environmental performance rating. For instance, in 2018, Nigeria’s Environmental Performance Index (EPI) was 54.76, ranking it as number 100 out of 180 countries surveyed in the world. The low EPI figure puts the country behind many other African countries like Egypt (61.21), Equatorial Guinea (60.40), Tunisia (62.35) and Morocco (63.47) (Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy 2018). A value of 54.76 indicates that while Nigeria has shown some improvement over that of 2014 where it ranked 134 out of 180 countries with a low value of 39.20, it still has limited capacity to handle environmental problems and it has not been able to significantly reduce its high rate of air, land, and water pollution (Nigerian National Policy on the Environment 2016). Low scores on the EPI are indicative of the need for more efforts in the area of environmental sustainability in Nigeria.

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In addition, a look at the negative consequences of climate change and the illegal and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources in global communities, particularly poor indigenous peoples on whose territory these natural resources are located, makes the call for the integration of sustainable development strategies to Chinese investment in Nigeria’s energy sector a necessity. The negative impacts of natural resources extraction are well captured by the report of the assessment by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) with respect to oil pollution in Ogoniland in Nigeria. It was revealed in the report that: (a) (b) (c)

(d) (e)

(f) (g) (h)

(i)

(j)

pollution of soil by petroleum hydrocarbons in Ogoniland is extensive in land areas, sediments and swampland. that oil contamination in Ogoniland is widespread and severely impacting many components of the environment. the hydrocarbon pollution has reached the groundwater at levels in excess of the Nigerian standards as per the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industries in Nigeria (EGASPIN) legislation. the surface water throughout the creeks contains hydrocarbons. the fisheries sector is suffering due to the destruction of fish habitat in the mangroves and highly persistent contamination of many of the creeks, making them unsuitable for fishing. the wetlands around Ogoniland are highly degraded and_ facing disintegration. the Ogoni community is exposed to petroleum hydrocarbons in outdoor air and drinking water, sometimes at elevated concentrations. community members at Nisisioken Ogale are drinking water from wells that is contaminated with benzene, a known carcinogen, at levels over 900 times above the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline. at Ejama-Ebubu in Eleme Local Government Area (LGA), there is presence of heavy contamination 40 years after an oil spill occurred, despite repeated clean-up attempts. the environmental restoration of Ogoniland is possible but may take 25 to 30 years (UNEP 2011).

The above is one out of several examples of communities in the oil producing areas in Nigeria negatively impacted as a result of the activities of the MNCs. The problem, however, is that it is not the case that there must always be a trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection since an effective balance can be structured (Fagbohun 2017). This has been further heightened by the inadequate responses by governments, individually and collectively, to global warming and climate change, which are radically and

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rapidly altering the basis of world ecology, because of the activities of some states and MNCs that are the worst contributors to the problem (White 2013). Sadly, where the environment is denied, destroyed, and degraded, the process leading to the very existence of human beings is diminished. China’s increasing investment in the energy sector presents to Africa indeed both an opportunity and a risk for sustainable development. This sector is environmentally sensitive and can limit or even undermine development progress if not managed well, particularly where it is carried out in a manner that doesn’t promote environmental sustainability or protect the key ecosystems on which the livelihoods of the rural poor depend or if the benefits are not fairly distributed (WWF 2011). China’s engagement in overseas natural resources and the oil sector in Africa are characterized by huge challenges, hence the need for sustainable strategies in the energy sector. More importantly, China is seen as the largest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century and greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon dioxide and methane from human activities is a major driver of climate change. China has had the world’s largest carbon footprint since 2004 and was responsible for about 26 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions and about 30 per cent of global CO2 emissions in 2018 (Olivier and Peters 2020). In addition to facing serious criticism from the international community on the environmental implications of the nation being the largest emitter of greenhouse gas, there is the fear that there is high risk of China exporting its domestic environmental record to other parts of the world, particularly developing countries, through its foreign investment strategy. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change defines climate change as being attributed directly or indirectly to human activities that alter the composition of the global atmosphere and which in turn exhibit variability in natural climate observed over comparable time periods (Owusu and Asumadu-Sarkodie 2016). The need for integration of sustainable development strategies is imperative in view of climate change, which affects all aspects of human and planetary health. Climate change poses a serious risk to all countries and individuals. Some of its expected impacts particularly to the world’s poorest, including African countries, are “reductions in crop yields, particularly at low latitudes (where most developing countries are); changed precipitation patterns and reduced water availability in some regions such as the dry tropics; increased land degradation and desertification; negative impacts on human health; sea-level rise, likely to pose an existential threat to some small island developing States and communities in countries with large coastal areas; and new risks from extreme weather” (UN High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability 2012). In order to enhance environmental cooperation with Africa, China’s Africa Policy 2006 provides that “China will actively promote China—Africa cooperation in climate change, water

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resources conservation, anti-desertification, bio-diversity and other areas of environmental protection by facilitating technological exchange.” In view of these negative impacts of climate change and based on its pledge to reduce its emissions intensity by 60 to 65 percent as part of the Paris Agreement (China Power Team 2020), in addition to its promise in the China’s Africa Policy, urgent steps must be taken by China in its investment in Africa by ensuring that sustainable development strategies are integrated in its investments in the energy sector. Exploitation of natural resources in a sustainable manner and changes in the behaviour patterns of Chinese companies will help to “reduce greenhouse gases which mitigates climate change, reduce environmental and health complications associated with pollutants from fossil fuel sources of energy” (Owusu and Asumadu-Sarkodie 2016). SDG Goal 13 calls on countries to take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; and Goal 2 stresses the need to integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning. With its participation in the non-binding 2009 Copenhagen Accord and following its ratification of the 2016 Paris Agreement, China is now showing greater commitment in tackling climate change. In March 2018, China stated that it had achieved its Copenhagen emission reduction targets for 2020, which included reducing carbon intensity by 40 to 45 per cent and raising the share of non-fossil fuel energy sources to 15 per cent (China Power Team 2020). These measures will not only contribute to Goal 13 but also to the achievement of other SDGs. Generally, Chinese investment has been criticized as either lacking or being poor on ‘responsibility’ and ‘sustainability’ in Africa (Zhang and Kangombe 2016). There have been general negative perceptions by Western as well as many of Africa’s environmental organizations about the environmental impacts of Chinese investments in Africa. This fact was also stressed in 2007 by Ian Taylor, who has written extensively on China—Africa relations, that there are several examples of Chinese companies having been caught violating environmental laws and collaborating with criminals in the exploitation of Africa’s natural resources (Shinn 2009). It is the failure to set high benchmarks, particularly regarding non-integration of sustainable strategies such as transparency, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), modern technology, and human rights standards, among others, that China’s investment in the energy sector in Africa stands accused, hence the discussion in this chapter. While observing instances of where Chinese companies have been cited for poor sustainable development strategies in their operations, Alon, Leung and Simpson (2015), noted that Chinese companies are widely perceived as not fully respecting international norms of good governance, whether in terms of political conditionality or environmental

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sustainability, and thus harm the development of resource-rich countries. By investing in Sudan, Myanmar, and Iran, it appears that Chinese NOCs are ignoring the international standards and regulations set up by the U.N. and other international bodies [...] In countries with strong institutions that have strict laws and regulations,

Chinese NOCs have complied with the local standards. In countries with weak institutions with weak laws and regulation, Chinese NOCs have complied with the local standards.

Similarly, Bosshard (2008) also cited instances of non-compliance by major Chinese investors, financiers, and equipment suppliers with the environmental guidelines and standards adopted by international financial institutions since the 1990s to address the environmental impacts of their projects abroad or the development by Chinese investors of policies that are necessarily not in line with international standards. This unwholesome behaviour by Chinese firms overseas has tarnished not only corporate reputations but has also been harmful to the Chinese government’s political campaign of branding China as a responsible power (Maurin and Yeophantong 2013). Responsible investment is a pre-requisite to building sustainable impact for a host country. Thus, risks of environmental and social

issues ought to be factored into investments. Chinese government, institutional investors,

enterprises,

banks,

and other stakeholders

must

be proactive

in

preventing and responding to such kind of risks in China—Africa investment cooperation (Zhang and Kangombe 2016).

CHINA TO ADDRESS CONCERNS ABOUT ITS OVERSEAS CORPORATE INVESTMENTS It is good to note that China has been compelled to be more sensitive to the criticisms of the environmental practices of Chinese companies in Africa and other countries and has taken measures to promote environmentally friendly ‘going abroad’ measures and enhance responsible and sustainable investment by its companies investing overseas. Indeed, it was anti-Chinese sentiments that precipitated President Hu Jintao in 2007, when meeting with Chinese businesses in Nigeria, to stress the importance of corporate responsibility and respect for local laws and customs in dealings at the local level (Maurin and Yeophantong 2013). President Xi Jinping made the declaration to stop building new coal-fired power projects abroad during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), This announcement was made in

September 2021, highlighting China’s commitment to support the global transition towards green and low-carbon energy and contribute in the fight against climate change. The statement marked a significant shift in China’s approach to overseas investments, especially considering its role as a major financier of coal projects in developing countries.

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As part of China’s ‘go global’ strategy, China’s financial sector has been contributing immensely towards implementing China’s Africa strategy. The Export Import Bank of China (EXIM) — the world’s largest export credit agency, plays a strategic role in strengthening economic relations between China and Africa and, to date, has largely funded the infrastructure required for the extraction and transport of energy and mineral resources often in return for those natural resources (WWF 2011). Asaresult of the global concerns of negative environmental impacts of the activities of the Chinese companies operating abroad, the Chinese government and financial institutions have begun to develop guidelines for overseas lending and investments. For instance, EXIM adopted in 2004 voluntary environmental guidelines which became public in 2007. The guidelines, among others, provide that the bank will not fund projects that are harmful to the environment or do not obtain environmental approval; and that if there are unacceptable environmental impacts during project implementation, EXIM requires immediate remedial action, or it will discontinue financial support (Shinn 2009). These are to ensure that companies follow better environmental practices abroad. Also in 2013, China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection issued voluntary guidelines that encouraged companies investing overseas to respect local environmental laws and regulations, conduct the environmental risks of their projects, minimize the impact on local heritage, communicate with local communities and their organizations, respect local cultures and their beliefs, manage waste, comply with international standards, and draft plans for handling emergencies. The guidelines are intended to guide companies to apply environmental protection practices in their foreign investment, fulfil their social responsibilities, and promote sustainable development (MOFCOM and MEP 2013). Also, in 2014, the Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments was published by the Chinese Mining Industry for investment in overseas mining projects. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) again issued the Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment of Enterprises in 2017. These Guidelines/Measures enjoin Chinese enterprises and their overseas investments to ensure respect for law and human rights, environmental protection, labour rights, undertake corporate social responsibilities, comply with all applicable laws and regulations, promote transparency, and respect stakeholders, among others (Shinn 2015). It is also heartwarming that as of 2015, 272 Chinese private and state-owned businesses, non-governmental organizations, and business associations have become signatories to the UN Global Compact. The UN Global Compact — a voluntary corporate responsibility initiative — commits businesses to align their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption. For instance,

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Principle 7 urges businesses to support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; Principle & urges signatories to undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility such as self-regulation, fostering dialogue with employees and the public, and adopting appropriate codes of conduct; and Principle 9 enjoins businesses to encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies such as those that use materials more efficiently and cleanly (Shinn 2015). This is a good development, as it is hoped that these companies would be committed to the Global Compact by implementing its guidelines. In view of the difficulties in enforcing voluntary guidelines (even if ignored with no penalty attached), there have been suggestions for these guidelines to be made mandatory with penalties attaching to violators, to bring about a change of behaviour that would promote sound environmental practices and sustainable development. Mandatory measures should be taken by the Chinese government to ensure compliance and social responsibility by Chinese NOCs. For example, as part of its approval requirement for overseas investment projects, the Ministry of Commerce can consider including a complete environmental impact assessment (Zhu and Song 2018). The integration of sustainable development strategies will contribute towards achieving the UN’s SDGs agreed in New York in September 2015, and the implementation of the global climate change deal reached at the UN summit (COP 21) in Paris in December 2015. The Sustainable Energy for ALL and SDG7 goals are closely connected to addressing social and environmental issues such as climate change. Thus, integrating sustainable strategies to Chinese investment in the energy sector will help in promoting a more sustainable development in Africa. This will directly contribute to the effort towards ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, modern energy for all (SDG 7); ending poverty in all forms (SDG 1); combating climate change and its impact (SDG 13); and improving health and well-being (SDG 3); and generally aid social, economic and environment sustainability on the African continent.

RISE OF CHINA’S ESG PRACTICES China’s international investments, especially through the OBOR initiative, have significantly impacted the energy sectors within Africa. These ventures offer prospects for stimulating economic development and enhancing energy availability, yet they also prompt important discussions around environmental preservation, social fairness, and governance — fundamental aspects of the ESG criteria. Analysing recent advancements in China’s ESG strategies, including policy guidelines and practices, and comparing them with global benchmarks, is crucial to understanding the nuances of responsible investment in the energy domain.

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In its pursuit to better align with international ESG norms and address internal sustainability challenges, China has been diligently broadening its ESG regulatory scope. The incorporation of ESG standards is not only pivotal to China’s domestic agenda but also plays a significant role in its external policies and investment strategies, potentially influencing the country’s global stature and diplomatic influence (China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd and International Capital Market Association 2023). Projects under the OBOR initiative and other investments in Africa underscore China’s commitment to weaving ESG considerations into its international projects (Rhodium Group 2023). However, navigating the complexities of implementing ESG principles effectively, especially in the initial phases of environmental planning and social development initiatives, highlights the intricate balance required between upholding ESG values and achieving economic and strategic goals. In 2016, the People’s Bank of China along with various government agencies launched the “Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System” to motivate financial bodies to back projects that are environmentally friendly. This initiative encompasses support for green loans, green bonds, and carrying out environmental risk evaluations for different projects. Since 2019, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment has been developing rules to ensure that all significant polluters disclose their environmental impact, aiming to boost the level of transparency and responsibility in how companies manage environmental concerns. From 2020 onwards, there has been a movement at both the central and local government levels, with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) alongside the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen mandating that publicly traded companies report information related to their ESG practices (Hui and Junbo 2022). This mandate covers a range of areas from environmental safeguarding actions, social duty fulfillment, to the execution of corporate governance. The objective behind these regulations is to promote greater organizational transparency and sustainability, thereby guiding investment choices more effectively. Additionally, as a component of its strategy to foster green finance, China has been actively endorsing green bonds and similar financial instruments, introducing specific criteria and standards for green bonds that support projects with beneficial environmental outcomes, including those focused on renewable energy, pollution mitigation, and conservation efforts. Numerous Chinese investment projects in Africa present both challenges and opportunities for the adoption of ESG standards. For example, the Garissa Solar Power Plant in Kenya, which started operations in 2018 and was financed and constructed by Chinese firms, serves as a commendable instance of ESG compliance. This project has made a significant addition to Kenya’s renewable energy resources, demonstrating the viability of sustainable energy initiatives (Mbugua and Langat 2023). On the other hand, China’s engagement

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in coal-powered projects like the Lamu Coal Power Station in Kenya, initiated in 2015, has been met with criticism for not adhering to global ESG principles, attracting protests from environmental organizations and local communities over air quality and carbon emission concerns (DeCOALonize 2018). Similarly, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, receiving Chinese financial backing since 2011, illustrates the intricate challenges associated with major renewable energy undertakings (Springer et al. 2023). Despite its contribution to power production, the dam has incited disputes over water rights and ecological consequences among neighbouring countries, emphasizing the importance of thorough ESG evaluations that consider the broader environmental and societal implications. The evolution of ESG standards in China and their extension from China to global operations, particularly in investments related to the OBOR, represents a significant shift in the country’s approach to sustainable development and international cooperation (Ehizuelen and Abdi 2018). This evolution reflects China’s growing recognition of the importance of sustainability in securing long-term economic growth, enhancing its international reputation, and contributing positively to global environmental and social outcomes. The landscape of ESG in China is undergoing rapid changes, with the nation poised to become a global leader in ESG disclosure. The significant increase in ESG regulations globally has seen China step up, moving from voluntary to mandatory disclosure requirements for its listed companies. This shift, initiated by the CSRC and the Ministry of Environmental Protection, mandates comprehensive ESG risk disclosures, marking a pivotal move towards transparency and accountability in corporate China. As China’s investments abroad, particularly through the OBOR, grew in scale and scope, the need to apply ESG principles internationally became apparent. As a global infrastructure development project, OBOR has the potential to significantly impact the environment and local communities in participating countries. China has begun to integrate international ESG standards into its overseas investment practices, albeit unevenly. This includes conducting environmental impact assessments and engaging with local communities to ensure that projects are developed responsibly. In addition, China’s alignment with the SDGs in its overseas projects reflects an attempt to balance economic development with environmental sustainability and social inclusion (Springer et al. 2023). China’s focus on ESG standards reflects a strategic alignment with its global manufacturing dominance and its aim to attract and retain foreign investment. This is evident in its efforts to link the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda with national development strategies, underscoring a deep commitment to sustainability. However, challenges remain, particularly in addressing environmental data disclosures, labour conditions, and corporate governance

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issues, Which are critical for maintaining investor confidence and meeting the expectations of international stakeholders. The main challenges may include variability in the enforcement of ESG standards, limited transparency in project selection and execution, and the often-minimal involvement of local communities in decision-making processes. These challenges are compounded by the lack of uniform global ESG standards, making it difficult to hold investors accountable to a consistent set of criteria (Hilton 2019).

CONCLUSION When viewed through the lens of sustainability and ESG practices, China’s overseas investment presents a multifaceted landscape of opportunities and challenges. As China continues to expand its economic footprint across the African continent, primarily under the auspices of the OBOR, the integration of ESG criteria into these investments has become increasingly critical. This focus not only aligns with global sustainability goals but also addresses growing concerns over the environmental and social impacts of such expansive infrastructural and development projects. The commitment to incorporating ESG standards in Chinese investments in Africa signifies a proactive step towards ensuring that these ventures contribute positively to the sustainable development of host countries. Projects like the Garissa Solar Power Plant in Kenya exemplify the potential for mutual benefits, providing clean energy resources while adhering to environmental and social governance standards. However, the journey is not without its hurdles. Investments in sectors such as coal power highlight the complexities and contradictions that can arise in balancing economic development objectives with sustainability and ethical governance. Looking ahead, the success of China’s overseas investments in Africa, in terms of sustainability and ESG compliance, will largely depend on continuous dialogue and cooperation between Chinese investors, African nations, and international stakeholders. This includes refining regulatory frameworks, enhancing transparency and accountability, and fostering community engagement to ensure that projects meet both developmental and environmental benchmarks. In conclusion, China’s overseas investment strategy in Africa, underpinned by a genuine commitment to ESG principles, has the potential to serve as a model for sustainable development. By addressing existing challenges and prioritizing the welfare of local communities and ecosystems, China can solidify its role as a key contributor to Africa’s sustainable future. This approach not only benefits host countries but also aligns with China’s global image and long-term interests — promoting a harmonious balance between economic expansion and environmental stewardship.

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China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd, and International Capital Market Association (2023). White Paper on ESG Practices in China. Accessed 30 August 2024 at https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/ Whitepaper-on-ESG-practices-in-China -ENG-January-2023.pdf. China Power Team (2020). How is China Managing its Greenhouse Gas Emissions? China Power. Updated 25 August 2020. Accessed 4 June 2024 at https://chinapower .csis.org/china-greenhouse-gas-emissions/. Davidson, O. (2006). Energy for Sustainable Development: An Introduction. In H. Winkler (ed.), Energy Policies for Sustainable Development in South Africa: Options for the Future, Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town, April 2006, DeCOALonize (2018). The Impacts on the Community of the Proposed Coal Plant in Lamu:

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30 August 2024 at https://www.unep.org/resources/perspective-series/issue-no-3 | -Impacts-community-proposed-coal-plant-lamu-who-if-anyone. Descalzi, C. (2019). Eni for Human Rights Report. Retrieved from https://www_.eni .com/assets/documents/eni-report-human-rights. pdf. Ehizuelen, M. M. O., & Abdi, H. O. (2018). Sustaining China-Africa Relations: Slotting Africa into China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative Makes Economic Sense.

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 3(4): 285-310. Fagbohun, O. A. (2017). Environmental Sustainability, International Investment and Economic Development: Issues for Nigeria. In A. Adekunle & E. Okon (eds), Law of International Investment: Essays in Honour of Professor Michael Ayo Ajomo. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. Gu, J. (2009), China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development. European Journal of Development Research, 21: 570-587. Hilton, I. (2019). How China’s Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress. Yale Environment360. Retrieved from https://e360.yale.edu/features/how -chinas-big-overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress. Hui, J., & Junbo, S. (2022). China Section of the International Comparative Legal Guide: Pragmatic Cross-border Insights into ESG Law. In David M. Silk & Carmen X.W.

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9.

Synthesizing key insights in international talent management: expatalent as a new promising path of research Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Shahamak Rezaei

This book aims to explore a topic that has been traditionally researched in business studies but has received less attention in migration studies. The latter has predominantly focused on labor migration, refugees, and forced human mobility rather than middle-class and highly educated skilled migrants. There is an assumption in migration studies that migration research needs to be linked with assistance and solidarity, including solidary researchers. However, this book shows that this assumption is wrong, especially in the case of talent movers or expatriates who do not need or require solidarity and human assistance. This edited book focuses on Chinese talent movers comprising mostly business scholars and clearly demonstrates that talent management is a massive research field. Talent expatriates, or “expatalent” as these concluding reflections suggest calling this specific human mobility to highlight its distinctive features, represent a particular profile of international population movements. Their exploration necessitates social, cultural, political, and economic discussions. Expatalent is a novel concept aiming to amalgamate two trends in migration and business studies by capitalizing on highly skilled migrants with specific profiles, who strategically migrate to enhance their capabilities and subsequently return to their native countries. The concept bridges a talent-centric approach to expatriation and an expatriation-focused approach to talent management. This volume directly contributes to a promising avenue that bridges continents, particularly with Asia and China poised for generative potential. The book surpasses the brain-drain/brain-gain dichotomy, instead incorporating global companies as actors and analyzing the alliances and tensions between the global market and national policies that were previously framed by Hollifield (1992) over three decades ago. It also focuses on the relation between the political sphere and individuals possessing the same level of talent. Additionally, it highlights the need for support to increase opportunities for economic development and building of diversity 136

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137

advantage (Zachary, 2003) through practical means. This is particularly essential at a time in which diversity is highly politicized and polarized, and in which diversity-negationists are gaining traction in Western and non-Western countries. The core arguments of this study are illustrated in Figure 9.1. At the core of the argumentation stands the novel concept of expatalent with which we amalgamate two trends in migration and business studies by capitalizing on highly-skilled migrants with specific profiles, who strategically migrate to enhance their capabilities and subsequently return to their native countries. An awareness of the very characteristics, drives, and mind-set of expatalent as well as supporting environments generates new perspectives on three interrelated levels: On the definitional level, where we operate with the very perception of the core problems or challenges, we need to establish new overall perspectives. Subsequently and on the empirical research level, the model suggests a focus on inclusionary and exclusionary practices and policies. At the practical level, the figure suggests focus on channels of mutual influence between inclusionary and exclusionary practices at the market level, state level, and civic society level (see below.) The key concept that shapes the perspectives as well as the selection of empirical fields to be studied, is management both as discursive practices, a dynamic of institutionalization, and the farmwork in and by which status and privileges are explicitly and implicitly negotiated between and among actors involved. The most important subfields of study include recruitment (of the most, current and future, needed competencies), maintainers and development of competencies through attractive career planning, and substantial ties to the surroundings at company and local society level through attractive work-life interactions. This volume presents new ideas in the developing discourse on international talent management that could be integrated into an expatalent research area. First of all, this book highlights that migratory movements are frequently tied to crisis narratives, characterized by instability and uncertainty. The book clearly demonstrates that such crises impact often overlooked or underrepresented individuals, particularly those with talent, who represent a vital asset for a country’s economic development. Secondly, this volume demonstrates that the distribution of knowledge, science, and IT is not solely achieved through virtual or digital means, but through individuals who hold a central role in the global economy. This publication presents a noteworthy occasion to emphasize that a global economy cannot flourish without skilled individuals and that it is not solely focused on companies, but on the people driving these corporations. As Keim (2014) asserts, exchanges and circulation have always been essential to knowledge production, serving as both a factual reality and a facilitating condition for intellectual work. However, the use of the terminology regarding circulation is

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Cognitive Level A comprehensive Perception of Expatalent

Migrants

¥

¥

Expatalents

Excluding Regulations

Expats

Management

Including Regulations

Conceptual/Research Level

N

Policy/Practice Level State: Services

|

Market:

Civic Society:

Career Development

Belonging

Substantial Relations

Ky

Co-Creation

Brain Drain

‘

Brain Circulation/Mobility Source: Authors.

Figure 9.1

The triple-win expatalent strategy model

Brain Gain

Svathesizing key insights in international talent management

139

a relatively recent development, specifically in its references to South—North knowledge exchange. This is further supported by the literature on mobility turn or mobility paradigm (Sheller and Urry, 2006), which is now shaping migration

research

(Baubéck,

2022).

According

to this literature,

mobility

influences societies, people, and political structures. This also aligns with the diaspora transnational literature, which highlights the emerging global social trend (Zapata-Barrero and Rezaei, 2020). Overall, this supports the emphasis most authors give to the significance of sustainable practices and regulatory frameworks in molding the future of international investments for talent management. There is a growing body of literature linking talent and expatriates in the field of business studies, emphasizing the benefits of integrating talent management with expatriation. This literature puts forward arguments that encourage organizations to strategically manage expatriation from a talent management perspective (Cerdin and Brewster, 2014; Przytuta, 2018). But this discussion is currently focused on assessing the effectiveness of this relationship, without delving too deeply or creating strong hypotheses for the advancement of this specific area. Although the concept of expatriate is not fully addressed, the notion is apparent through the overall contributions, which focus on a specific profile of individuals who temporarily relocate to another country, often sent by their own companies, and later return. This book offers a unique perspective for better framing this area of research. As a result, this volume provides a foundation for discussing expatalent. By considering this notion, we can effectively bridge two trends that have likely been studied in separate research literatures. Despite this, practical terms exist empirically to facilitate such a convergence of research fields. Therefore, the innovation is not just rhetoric but also adds substantive value. The central tenet of expatalent is that expatriation can function as a career development mechanism, fostering talent. Expatriation is more than just international employment; it adds strategic value for the benefit of countries, companies, and individuals, creating a triple-win strategy. Notably, all contributions provide case studies demonstrating how human mobility serves as a mechanism for talent formation and skill improvement through specialization, complementary training, and diversified tasks. Thirdly, this volume presents a well-defined multiscale method for understanding expatalent. This means that management of challenges and solutions is done by taking into account the particularities of governance and territorial scale, ranging from cities to regions, states, and even international organizations. It also considers the involvement of multiple actors at different levels ~— from states and nations to individual analyses of different private and public organizations, as Well as at the level of individuals and their families.

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Assuming that the three innovative features of this book can catalyze the better shaping of the expatalent concept, these conclusions can go a step further and provide two essential arguments to frame a future agenda on expatalent. This is achieved by bridging business and migration studies and can be settled as the outcome of a co-production of knowledge between two key fields of research, which is crucial. Expatalent refers to skilled individuals who strategically embark on a mobility journey to enhance their careers and have the intention of repatriating (Kraimer et al., 2009). Without entering too deeply into the concept formation debate, we can identify a phenomenon known as “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970), in which a concept lacks a clear referent and becomes vague and amorphous. This occurs alongside a hierarchical organization of concepts, with migrants at the lower end and expats at the top. Both express mobility and have meanings within the market domain. However, they are situated at opposite ends: “migrants” are in economic need, whereas “expats” are global market actors. It is uncertain whether this pattern is a paradox, but it 1s clear that the same patterns of human mobility have completely opposite meanings. There is a trend to control and prevent certain profiles of migrants, while other profiles are promoted and encouraged. The dichotomy arises from the interplay between the market and politics within the global economic system. Hollifield was among the first scholars to conceptualize this relationship, which sees markets favoring open borders while politics tend to control, limit, or regulate mobility through legal and political filters. Although both entities have policies, they differ significantly. Control policies tend to prevail for migrants. National states filter admissions based on contractual potential. This device, with varying degrees of implementation, generally unwelcomes migrants who lack potential for immediate market incorporation. This book focuses on the needs of expatriates and the imperative to delve deep into state—market alliances in order to promote expat talent. Without disregarding the reality of the situation, this literature brings attention to the importance of talent management as a political strategy, rather than solely relying on global companies for mobility dynamics. It highlights the necessity of including this topic in the political agenda of countries seeking to attract individuals with such profiles, as well as market and firms which can greatly profit from these movements. Ultimately, there is a question as to why states do not function as international organizations and establish an expat talent policy that encompasses preparation, staying in the sending country, and returning for the mutual benefits of both nations, as well as their respective populations. Some argue in favor of this approach. Further research is needed to determine if countries may participate in the selection process for expatriates in addition to companies, as suggested by Franke and Nicholson (2002) and Anderson (2005).

Svathesizing key insights in international talent management

14]

Last, but not least, this book provides a framework for expatalent, a strategic talent management process that targets talented individuals from around the world. Expatalent aims to attract, develop, and retain individuals with the necessary skills, knowledge, and experience to contribute to the success of global organizations in an international context. The process involves identifying and nurturing talented individuals to meet the requirements of the organizations. Expatriate, shortened as expat, typically refers to individuals who reside and work outside their home country for a limited time. In the realm of international talent management, expatalents specifically denote expats who are assigned by their organizations to work in a different country or region to enhance their skills. Expatriates are typically selected for their specialized skills, expertise, or leadership potential. The practice of assigning these individuals to work in various countries brings numerous benefits to the organization, the national country, and the individuals involved. Some of the conceptual advantages include topics discussed in this volume like access to specialized skills, knowledge transfer, and global leadership development. This can enhance organizations’ competitiveness, foster innovation, and build a diverse and inclusive workforce. There are several critical challenges that affect expatriates differently, such as adapting to new cultures, personal and family issues (including healthcare, housing, and education for children), and

returning home. It is essential to consider these issues from the start of the planning. Further research is needed to combine expatriation and talent management, and this volume serves as a foundation for further discussions that require closer alignment between business and migration studies.!

NOTE 1.

The authors owe a deep debt of gratitude to the Education and Research (SDC) for their generous study. Special thanks are also extended to Thomas for all his kind and valuable graphic and technical with this chapter.

Sino-Danish Centre for financial support for this Lykke Pedersen at SDC assistance in connection

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B.

(2005).

Expatriate

selection:

Good

management

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or

good

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16(4): 567-583.

Baubéck, R. (2022). Migration and mobility: physical, contextual and perspectival interpretations. In R. Zapata-Barrero, D. Jacobs,

& R. Kastoryano (eds.), Contested

Concepts in Migration Studies, pp. 167-181. London: Routledge. Cerdin, J. L., & Brewster, C. (2014). Talent management and expatriation: bridging two streams of research and practice. Journal of World Business, 49(2):. 245-252.

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Franke, J., & Nicholson, N. (2002). Who shall we send? Cultural and other influences on the rating of selection criteria for expatriate assignments. /nternational Journal of

Cross Cultural Management, 2(1): 21-36. Hollifield, J. F. (1992). /mmigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Keim, W. (2014). Conceptualizing circulation of knowledge in the social sciences. In

Wiebke Keim, Erctiment Celik, Christian Ersche & Veronika Wohrer (eds.), Global Knowledge in the Social Sciences: Made in Circulation, pp. 87-113, Farnham: Ashgate. Kraimer, M. L., Shaffer, M. A., & Bolino, M. C. (2009). The influence of expatriate and repatriate experiences on career advancement and repatriate retention. Human Resource Management, 48(1): 27-47. Przytuta, S. (2018). Global talent management in the context of expatriation. Human Resource Management/Zarzadzanie Zasobami Ludzkimi, 123(6). https:// zz] .ipiss .com.pl/resources/html/article/details?id=220875 &language=en. Sartori, G. (1970). Concept misformation in comparative politics. American Political Science Review, 64(4):

1033-1053.

Sheller, M., & Urry, J. (2006). The new mobilities paradigm. Planning A, 38(2): 207-226. Zachary, G. P. (2003).

The Diversity Advantage:

Environment and

Multicultural Identity in the New

World Economy, Boulder, CO; Westview Press. Zapata-Barrero, R., & Rezaei, S$. (2020). Diaspora governance and transnational entrepreneurship; the rise of an emerging social global pattern in migration studies. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (Special Issue), 46(10): 1959-1973.

Index Abdi, H. O. 121 academic perspectives 3 acculturation framework 56—7

CCP see Chinese Communist Party charisma 105—6 charismatic modes, network maintenance 114 China 119-35, 136 Africa relations 120-23, 125-6, 128-9

achievers, characteristics xvii Africa—China relations 120-23, 125-6,

128-9 Ageberg, E. 47 Aldrich, H. 56, 58, 60, 62 Alon, I. 126-7

Belt and Road initiative 120—23,

129-30

Anderson, B. 140 Ardagna, 5. 58

innovation system

asylum-seekers 88—9, 90, 96 attraction xv, xix—xx see also talent attraction Australia 87-8

Thousand Talents Plan 2, 7—35,

103-4 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 89, 13 circular migration patterns 95 circulation 137-8 citizenship-for-talent 10, 17, 19

authoritarian regimes 11 authority 105 Barrero, Ricard Zapata 4 Bauman, 7. xviil

Clarke, A. 87

climate change 124—6 comparative advantage xv—xvi, xix competitive immigration regime 8, 9-10, 18 competitiveness xv, xvi, xix productivity-based view xvi concentration theory 55 ‘conceptual stretching’ 140 consumption theory 53 COO see country of origin

Belarusian talent flaws 69-85 Belt and Road initiative (BRI) 120-23, 129, 130 Blue Card Directive, EU 37-8, 42, 44-5

Bogan, V. 57 Bonacich, E, 55

bonding capital 57 Bosshard, P, 127 ‘brain drain’

103, 111—12

MLP project 101, 107 overseas investments 3—4, 119-35 science networks 100-104, 107-13

15, 103

‘brain exchanges’ 36 brain research projects 107-8 BRI see Belt and Road initiative bridging capital 57 bridging element, research funding 111 budget lines, TTP award 13 bureaucratic organizations 105—6 business dynamism xxi

Cooney, T. 2, 55, 60

coopetition xxiii Copenhagen Accord 126 COR see country of residence corporate investments 127—9, 131-2 country attraction xix country of origin (COO) economy formation 50-52, 54—6, 38, 61 country of residence (COR) economy

Canada 87 Carter, 5. 60 case study research 10

formation 50, 52, 54—6, 58, 61-2 Covid-19 pandemic 15, 18, 50, 94

crisis narratives 137 143

144

International talent management in times of crisis

cultural determinist perspective 57 cultural diffusion 50-51, 52, 54 cultural theory 55, 57 culture xvi custom 105—6, 110, 113-14 customary authority 106

customary modes, network maintenance 113-14 cyberattacks 101 Darity, W. 57

definitional-level perspective 137 demand-driven policies 89-93 demand-side systems 87

Denmark 3, 100-101, 104, 107-10, 113 diaspora trends 139 disadvantages theory 56

diversity-negationists 137 Djajic, S. 53 ecological succession theory 56 economic development

labor migration 42 migration shifts 88-9 economic growth

environmental trade-offs 124 immigration as 54 intra-company transfers 2 economy formation, immigrant enclaves

50-68 educational quality xx/ educational requirements, work permits

90, 94—5 Ehizuelen, M. M, O, 121

environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices 3-4, 119-35 EPI see Environmental Performance Index ESG practices see environmental social, and governance practices espionage threats 101, 109

esteem needs xvii ethnic culture 51, 57

EU see European Union Europe—China talent funding 10-11,

15-18 European Union (EU) intra-company transfers 36-49 science networks 100, 103-4 EXIM see Export Import Bank of China expatalent xii, 136-42

conceptualization 140 migration distinction xiv

triple-win strategy 138 expatriates 136 conceptualization 140 migrants distinction 140 talent link 139 see also expatalent

expatriation 139 Export Import Bank of China (EXIM)

128 family dependent immigration 43—5,

88-90, 94, 96 family reunification migration 44, 88-9 FDI see foreign direct investment Fei, J. C. 53

Elwert, Annika 2

Feringa, Bernard Lucas 17

emigration 71

Fernandez-Kelly, P. 53-4, 59 financial system xxi

empirical research-level perspective 137 employer-driven systems 87, 89 employer sponsorship 41

employment terms, work permits 43 enclave, definition 52

enclave economies 50-68

FinTech 70 flexibility

Chinese residency scheme 19 for knowledge transfer 19 labor market xxi

talent attraction plans 15, 17

energy—environment interconnection 120 energy sector 123-7 entrepreneurship 56—7 environment—energy interconnection 120

foreign direct investment (FDI) 123 ‘foreign experts’ 7 formal institutional arrangements 110

Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 123

Franke, J. 140

formal institutional ties 105—6 Fredholm, Axel 2, 3

145

Index

Geiger, Martin 3

geopolitical conflict, US-China 7, 19 geopolitical crises 3, 101, 104 Georgia 3, 69-85 Germany 36, 44-6, 96

Global Business Mobility scheme 41—2 Global Governance Report 122

ICTs see intra-company transfers IEs see immigrant enclaves

imaging technologies 107-8 immigrant enclaves (IEs) 50-68 immigrant talent, potential of 2 immigration definition 53

‘global race for talent’ 1—2, 7, 86

early views 53-4

global science networks 100-118

enclave economy link 61—2

global talent xv as achievers xvii—xix conceptual framework xx—xxi theoretical framework xx—xxi global warming 124-5 globalization 53—4 Goulordava, Karina 3 Graduate Trainee visas 41-2 Granovetter, M. 105

modern views 53-4

Grasten, Maj 3 green finance 130

‘green’ visa access 15 greenhouse gas emissions 125 guest-worker migration 44

as monetary remittance 51]

theories 52-5 see also labor migration immigration laws, EU 41

immigration regime, China 7-35 immigration tools 15-18 incentive packages 8, 9

income motivations 53 industrialization 88 information and communication technologies (ICT) xxi information technology (IT) sector 69-79: see also information and

communication technologies H-1B visas, US 87 Haakonsson, Stine 3

HALE see health-adjusted life expectancy

Harris, J. R. 53

health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE) XXI

health insurance 43 hereditary leadership 106 High-end Foreign Experts Introduction Programme 14 high-skilled migration 36, 41, 44

central role of 86 labor market bifurcation 88 retention issues 95

structural matching problem 93 visa regulations 89 Hoffmann, Jules 17 Hofstede, Geert xx

Hollifield,J. F. 136, 140 Hu Jintao 127 human capital xviii ICT see information and communication

(ICT) infrastructure xx, 122 innovation 70—73 innovation capability xxi innovation system, China 103, 111-12 institutional ties 105—6 Institutions xvi-xvii, xx

internally displaced persons 80 international immigration

numbers 1970-2020 51 symbolic description $1 international investments 3-4 international migration, factors in 59 international mobility 36—49

international system 101 international talent management

new research paths 136—42 study contributions 1—6 synthesizing insights in 4, 136-42 interpersonal ties 105 intra-company transfers (ICTs) 2, 36-49, 95-6 IT sector see information technology sector

technologies Jensen, L. 58

146

International talent management in times of crisis

Jones-Evans, D. 60

mobility schemes, EU 36-49 monetary remittances 51

Keim, W, 137 Kirzner, I. M, 58 Kloosterman, R, 55, 58 knowledge economy 11, 13

multinational corporations (MNCs) 120, 125 multiscale research method 139

knowledge production 137 knowledge transfer 19

nanotechnology, biotechnology,

labor labor labor labor

nation states 52—3

information technology, and cognitive science (NBIC) xv, xix

market xxi market bifurcation 88 migration 36—49, 70—73, 89-93, 96 participation gap 94

language requirements, visas 87-8 legal-rational authority 105—6

legitimacy 106 legitimate authority 105 Lewis, J. R. 53 Lieber, Charles M. 14 Logothetis, Nigos 17

national oil companies (NOCs), China 123 NBIC see nanotechnology,

biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science neo-capitalist theories 54 network atrophy 104

network embeddedness 114 network maintenance 104, 105—7,

long-term residency, China 17

113-14 network ties 100-101, 104, 114—15

low-skilled workers 40, 88, 90-91

networks, characteristics 104

Lusardi, A. 58

Neuman, E. 58

macroeconomic stability xxi management studies 137 market economy 56 market—politics relationship 140 market size xxi Maslow, A. H. xvii

media coverage, Russia 75

Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (MLP)

101, 107

mentoring 114—15 migrants—expatriates distinction 140 migration expatalent distinction xiv growth of 50

IT specialists 69-71, 73—9 talent relationship 10 see also labor migration

neuroscience 100, 107-15 Nicholson, N. 140

Nigeria 122-4 NOCs see national oil companies OBOR

initiative see One Belt, One Road initiative occupational groups, labor migration

91-2 OECD see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development oil pollution 124 One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative

120-123, 129-30 opportunity costs xvi

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 86, 94 Osaghae, Osa-Godwin 2, 55, 60

migration policies 36-49, 88—9

Paris Agreement 126, 129

migration studies 136-7

Parsons, C. R. 86

MLP see Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and

patent registration 111—12

Technology MNCs see multinational corporations

Peris-Ortiz, M. 54

mobility paradigm 139

personality types xvii, 114

people-centred talent funding 9, 19 ‘permanent’ residency, China 15, 18

147

Index

Piore, M. J. 52

Sandberg, Johan 2, 3

points-based systems 15, 87-8

Scandinavian countries xix see also Sweden

policy conceptualization 87-8 politicization 4—5

Schiller, N. G. 50, 52

politics—market relationship 140

science networks 100-18

pollution disclosure 124, 130 Poo, Mu-ming 107—8, 113 pool factors xix Portes, A. 53—6, 58-9 practical-level perspective 137 product market xxi

science, technology, engineering, and

productivity-based perspectives xvi project-based talent funding 19

scientists, talent attraction 15-18

psychological needs xvii Putin, Vladimir 76

R&D see research and development ‘race for talent’ 7, 9, 86 Ram, M, 55 Ranis, G. 53

Rath, J. 55 refugees Sweden 89, 94

SDC see Sino-Danish Centre for Education and Research Goals security threats 109-10 self-actualization needs xvii—xvili

Senior or Specialist Worker visas 41—2 Sensenbrenner, J. 55, 56 service economy 88 Shafer, 8. 58 short-term visitors, China 17 Sino-Danish Centre for Education and

Research (SDC) 100, 107-15, 141

Turkey 75 Ukraine 80 Reiss, Jr, A. J. 56, 58, 60 relational embeddedness 103—6 ‘relocants’ 72

research and development (R&D) 11, 103, 110, 112 research funding 7-35, 110-11

research-migration tool 9 research participants (RPs) 11—12 15, 17-18, 43—4, 46

resource-rich countries, Africa 123, 127 responsible investment

127, 129

Rezaei, Shahamak 4 Ricardo, David xv

Riddle, L. 62

Rio Earth Summit 119 RPs see research participants Rueda-Armengot, C, 55 Russia, talent flows 69-85 Russia—Ukraine conflict 3, 19, 69, 73, 76

S&T sector see science and technology sector

scientific collaboration, research 13

SDGs see Sustainable Development

qualitative research tools 10

residency schemes

mathematics (STEM) xv, xviii,

xix, 70, 87, 93-4, 93-6 science and technology (S&T) sector 7-8, 11

skill acquisition xviii skilled migration 7—8, 36, 40-41, 73, 77,

140 see also expatalent; high-skilled migration skills xxi Smallbone, D. 55 social capital 105—6 social network theory 105

social responsibility 128—9 social security benefits 38 social ties 106

socio-political climate 74—6 sponsorship 41 state—market alliances 140

STEM see science, technology, engineering, and mathematics Staclcova, Andrea Braun

1—2

strategic partnerships 108-9 ‘stratification economics’ 57 structural embeddedness 105

structural matching problem 93-6 ‘super talent’ pool 15, 18 supply-side systems 87 sustainability strategies 3-4, 123—7, 130

148

International talent management in times of crisis

sustainable development 119-27, 129 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 119, 121—2, 126, 131 Sweden

Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) 2, 7-35,

global talent 86-99 intra-company transfers 36-7, 42-4 talent attraction strategies 3 work permit processing time 38 Syrakvash, Vera 80 Syrian immigrants 72

triadic patents 111—12 Trump, Donald 102

systems conceptualization &7—8

UK see United Kingdom

tacit knowledge 114 talent academic dimension 3 characteristics xvii citizenship for 10, 17, 19

expatriates link 139 global race for 1-2, 7, 86

migration relationship 10 race for 1-2, 7, 9, 86 talent attraction xv Chinese regime 8—9 country image xix“

Europe-China 15-18 flexibility 15, 17 incentive packages 8 IT specialists 77 politicization 4—5 Swedish strategies 3, 90 talent expatriates see expatalent talent flows 1, 3, 69-85

talent funding 7-35 talent management

challenges 5 complexity 4—5

opportunities 5 talent pool 114 talent recruitment tool 7-35 talent waste 2, 50-68

taxation impacts 78 Taylor, lan 126

technological breakthroughs 13 tertiary education 94—5 third-country nationals 46

103-4 Tilly, C. 59 Todaro, M. P. 53

trust 114

TTP see Thousand Talents Plan

Turkey/Tiirkiye 3, 69-85

Ukrainian war 3, 19, 69, 73, 76 UN Global Compact 128-9 United Kingdom (UK) 36, 37, 40-42 United States (US) China conflict 7, 11, 17, 19

H-1B

visas 87

migration-talent relationship 10 science networks 100, 102 university collaboration 14, 16 US see United States visa routes employer-driven system 87, 89

‘green’ visa access 15

labor migration 40-42, 96 points-based system 87 wage-dumping 90 wage requirements 91 Waldinger, R. 62

‘weak ties’ 105 Weber, Max xvi, 104, 105—6, 115 Wiberg, D. 47

Wigan, Duncan 3 work permits 38, 40, 42—5 ‘cooling-off period’ 38, 40, 45

educational requirements 90, 94—5 occupational groups 91—2

policy changes 90-91 processing times 38, 40, 44 Xi Jinping 14, 103, 112, 120-21, 127 Xiang, Wen 3-4