International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance [2 ed.] 9781588266989, 2009042175

Citation preview

SECOND

EDITION

International Organizations THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

MARGARET P. KARNS

KAREN A. MlNGST

International Organizations

. I ■

SECOND EDITION

International Organizations The Politics and Processes of Global Governance Margaret P. Karns Karen A. Mingst

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LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

BOULDER LONDON

Published in the United States of America in 2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kams, Margaret P. International organizations : the politics and processes of global governance / Margaret P. Kams, Karen A. Mingst. — 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-58826-698-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. International agencies. 2. International organization. I. Mingst, Karen A., 1947- II. Title. JZ4850.K37 2010 341.2—dc22 2009042175

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

W

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

4

3

To Inis L. Claude Jr. and Harold K. Jacobson for their extensive contributions to the study of international organizations

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Contents

List of Illustrations Preface

Part 1

xi xm

Understanding Global Governance

1 The Challenges of Global Governance

3

What Is Global Governance? 3 The Pieces of Global Governance, 4 Actors in Global Governance, 14 An Increasing Need for Global Governance? 21 Processes of Global Governance: Multilateralism Matters, 25 The Politics and Effectiveness of Global Governance, 29

2

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

35

Liberalism, 35 Realism, 45 Social Constructivism, 50 Critical Theories, 52 Theories of Organizational Interactions, 55 IR Theory and Global Governance, 59

Part 2

3

Evolving Pieces of Global Governance

Foundations of the Pieces of Global Governance

63

The State System and Its Weaknesses, 64 Governance Innovations in the Nineteenth Century, 65 Multilateralism in the Twentieth Century, 68

4

The United Nations: Centerpiece of Global Governance Foundations of the United Nations, 96

VII

95

Contents The Principal Organs of the United Nations, 99 Persistent Organizational Problems and the Need for Reform, 131 The UN’s Relationship to Regional Organizations, 142

5 Regional Organizations

145

The Roots and Dynamics of Regionalism, 147 Europe’s Regional Organizations, 153 Regional Organizations in the Americas, 178 Asia’s Regional Organizations, 188 Africa’s Regional Organizations, 203 Regional Organizations in the Middle East, 210 Assessing the Consequences of Regionalism, 214 Moving Beyond Regionalism, 215

6 Nonstate Actors: NGOs, Networks, and Social Movements

219

Nonstate Actors in Action, 219 The Range of Nonstate Actors, 221 The Growth of Nonstate Actors, 230 NGOs’ Relationships to IGOs, 236 NGO Influence and Effectiveness, 245 NGOs: A Love Affair Cooling? 249

‘

State Sovereignty and Nonstate Actors’ Influence, 252

7 The Role of States in Global Governance

255

States and Global Governance: A Complex Interaction, 256 The Key Role of the United States, 258 Other Powerful States, 262 Middle-Power States, 271 Small States, Developing States, 273 State Strategies, 274 Explaining State Policies and State Strategies, 279 The Challenges of Multilateral Diplomacy, 282

Part 3

The Need for Global Governance

8 The Search for Peace and Security Case Study: Somalia as a Watershed, 289 Wars as the Genesis for Pieces of Security Governance, 291

289

Contents

IX

Mechanisms for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 303 Collective Security, Enforcement, and Sanctions, 311 Peace Operations, 323 Arms Control and Disarmament, 355 Putting Together the Pieces of Security Governance, 366 The Challenges of Human Security, 383

9 Promoting Human Development and Economic Well-Being

387

Case Study: Economic Globalization and Africa, 387 An Evolving Global Economy, 390 The Globalization of Liberal Economic Norms, 391 Pieces of Global Economic Governance, 395 The Regionalization of Economic Governance, 427 Critics of the Liberal Economic System and Its Governance, 437 Case Study: The Global Financial Crisis and the Need for Economic Reform, 441

10 Protecting Human Rights

447

Case Study: Rights of the Child and the Problem of Child Soldiers, 447 The Roots of Humanitarian and Human Rights Norms, 450 Human Rights Institutions and Mechanisms, 453 The Processes of Human Rights Governance, 463 Global Human Rights Governance in Action, 484 Expanding Human Rights in the Age of Globalization, 494

11 Protecting the Environment Case Study: Global Warming, 497 Relating Environmental Problems to Security, Economics, and Human Rights, 501 Emergence of the Environment as an Issue Area, 503 The Pieces of Global Environmental Governance, 503 Global Environmental Regimes and Institutions, 511 Global Governance in Action, 522 Regional Environmental Governance, 524 The Challenges of Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness, 532

497

Contents

X

Part 4 12

The Dilemmas of Global Governance

Innovations in Global Governance for the Twenty-First Century

537

What Makes Global Governance Different? 537 Challenges for the Future, 547 The Need for New Thinking About Global Governance, 552

List of Acronyms References Index About the Book

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555 563 595 633

Illustrations

■

Tables

4.1

Vetoes in the Security Council (1946-2008)

4.2

UN-Sponsored Global Conferences and Summits

127

4.3

UN System Expenditures (1986-2007)

139

5.1

EU Enlargements

164

6.1

Participation at Selected UN-Sponsored Global Conferences and Summits

112

233

8.1

Selected IGO Sanctions

319

8.2

Traditional UN Peacekeeping Operations

329

8.3

Complex UN Peacekeeping Operations

331

8.4

Regional Organizations and Peace Operations

350

8.5

The Global Counterterrorism Legal Regime

377

Selected UN Human Rights Conventions

466

10.1

■

Figures

1.1

Pieces of Global Governance

5

1.2

Classifying Types of IGOs

6

1.3

IGO Functions

7

1.4

Actors in Global Governance

15

3.1

Growth Patterns of IGOs and INGOs (1891-2008)

68

3.2

Functional Intergovernmental Organizations

73

3.3

International and Regional Courts

90

4.1

Key UN Charter Provisions

98

4.2

The United Nations System

100

4.3

Caucusing Groups in the United Nations

107

4.4

Growth of UN Membership (1945-2008)

108

4.5

UN Secretaries-General (1946-present)

119

4.6

Provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention

128

4.7

The Debate over Security Council Reform

134

XI

xii

Illustrations

4.8

Assessments for Major Contributors to the UN Budget (2001 -2004)

140

5.1

Nested European Institutions

154

5.2

Timeline of European Integration

166

5.3

European Union Institutions

166

5.4

Asian Regionalism

189

6.1

Types of Nonstate Actors

222

6.2

NGO Governance Functions

235

8.1

Global Trends in Violent Conflict (1946-2007)

292

8.2

Pieces of Security Governance

294

8.3

Global and Regional Security IGOs

294

8.4

Security-Related INGOs

295

8.5

Crimes Against Humanity

299

8.6

Types of Peace Operations Tasks

325

8.7

Humanitarian Crises

347

8.8

Major Governance Pieces for Weapons of Mass Destruction

361

9.1

IMF Structural Adjustment Programs

399

9.2

Decisionmaking in the IMF

404

9.3

The Millennium Development Goals

409

9.4

The World Trade Organization: Central Principles

413

10.1

UN Human Rights Organizational Structure

459

10.2

The Genocide Convention

485

11.1

Selected Global and Regional Environmental Agreements

513

■ 5.1

Maps Major Regional Organizations

146

8.1

Democratic Republic of Congo

338

8.2

Middle East

367

Preface

As we wrote in the preface to the first edition of International Organizations, when Lynne Rienner calls and invites you to write a book, the invitation is hard to resist, particularly when it comes with passion, enthusi¬ asm, and encouragement. Lynne was patient then, and she continues to be so as this second edition grew beyond our collective anticipation. We thank her for the support she has provided throughout our work on this project. The politics and processes of global governance have become increas¬ ingly complex in recent years as the pieces and actors multiplied and chal¬ lenges mounted. Many of the ideas we tried to express in the first edition had a long period of gestation. They have continued to develop since that edition appeared in 2004, and we have been astounded at the development of scholar¬ ship in several areas in the interim. Throughout, we continue to be inspired by two scholars who have contributed significantly to the study of international organizations, Inis L. Claude Jr. and the late Harold K. Jacobson. It is to them that we dedicate this book, with gratitude for their continuing inspiration. A number of people aided us in preparing this second edition. Among them are Natalie Florea Hudson, Kent Kille, Melissa Labonte, Martha Finnemore, Mark Pollack, Martin Rochester, Courtney Smith, and Alynna Lyon, who pro¬ vided feedback from their use of the book in the classroom. To all of those who participated in discussions of our ideas but are not named here, we also say thanks. Portions of Chapters 3-4 and 8-11 are drawn from Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007). Those sections are reprinted with permission of Westview Press. We have incurred a debt to our students who tested pieces of the book and ideas and gave us feedback on what worked and what did not. To several stu¬ dents we owe special acknowledgment for contributing case material and other pieces; these include Zachary Sideras, Lauren Etzkorn, Victoria Vaughn, Christine Wolcott, and Amanda Zimmerlin. No project like this is possible without the support of families, who bear the burden of long hours, weeks, and months of concentrated labor. We are grateful to our husbands, Ralph Johnston and Robert Stauffer, for all the love, support, and encouragement they provided, as well as to Ginger and Brett Stauffer and Paul and Anna Karns, who represent the next generations that must sustain efforts to strengthen the pieces of global governance.

xiii

V

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v

PARTI Understanding Global Governance

The Challenges of Global Governance

Growing evidence of climate change, along with the continuing threat of global terrorism, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, the rippling effects of higher food and oil prices, and financial markets’ meltdown in 2008, has brought home to Americans and to people around the world the complex gov¬ ernance challenges we face today. These also include the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation, large-scale humanitarian crises and intractable con¬ flicts in several parts of the world, the persistence of deep poverty, and failed states. None of these problems can be managed by sovereign states acting alone, even by the sole superpower, the United States. All require cooperation of some sort among governments and the increasing number of nonstate actors; many require the active participation of ordinary citizens; some demand the establish¬ ment of new international mechanisms for monitoring or the negotiation of new international rules; and most require the refinement of means for securing states’ and actors’ compliance. All illustrate the effects of globalization in inten¬ sifying the connections between peoples and states around the world. In short, there is a wide variety of international policy problems that re¬ quire governance. Sometimes the need is truly global in scope, as with terror¬ ism or climate change. In other cases, the governance problem is specific to a region of the world or group of countries, as with the need to manage an inter¬ national river or regional sea. But what do we mean by “governance,” and is the need for global governance increasing?

■

What Is Global Governance?

In 1995 the Commission on Global Governance, an independent group of prominent international figures, published a report on what reforms in modes of international cooperation were called for by global changes. The commission defined governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions.

3

4

Understanding Global Governance

public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and coop¬ erative action may be taken. It includes formal ... as well as informal arrange¬ ments that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their inter¬ est” (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 2). How does governance relate to government? While clearly related, they are not identical. As James Rosenau (1992: 4) put it: Both refer to purposive behavior, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenome¬ non than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also sub¬ sumes informal, nongovernmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants.

Thus, global governance is not global government; it is not a single world order; it is not a top-down, hierarchical structure of authority. It is the multi¬ level collection of governance-related activities, rules, and mechanisms, for¬ mal and informal, public and private, existing in the world today. We refer to these as the pieces of global governance. ‘ Although the idea of global governance has ancient roots, post-Cold War liberalism and globalization have heavily influenced contemporary concep¬ tions of global governance. Analyzing these pieces of global governance and the actors in the politics and processes that have shaped them is the central purpose of this book. Post-Cold War liberalism and globalization have brought clear changes in who makes collective decisions over various parts of the international community and in the authority under which those decisions are made. Although states still exercise coercive power, global, regional, and transnational governance increasingly rests on new bases of authority. Thus, Emmanuel Adler and Steven Bernstein (2005: 302) note that “the decoupling of coercive force and legitimate rule is the most striking feature of contempo¬ rary global governance.” Our task is to explain the norms, structures, rules, processes, and challenges of global governance.

■

The Pieces of Global Governance

The pieces of global governance are the cooperative problem-solving arrange¬ ments and activities that states and other actors have put into place to deal with

The Challenges of Global Governance

5

various issues and problems. They include international or transnational struc¬ tures such as formal international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); international rules or laws, norms or “soft law,” as well as international regimes in which the rules, norms, and structures are linked together in a specific issue area; ad hoc arrangements and global conferences; and private and hybrid public-private governance schemes (see Figure 1.1).

Intergovernmental Organizations IGOs are organizations that include at least three states among their member¬ ship, that have activities in several states, and that are created through a for¬ mal intergovernmental agreement such as a treaty, charter, or statute. In 2008-2009, the Yearbook of International Organizations identified about 240 IGOs. These organizations range in size from 3 members (North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]) to more than 190 members (Universal Postal Union [UPU]). Members may come from primarily one geographic re¬ gion (Organization of American States [OAS]) or from all geographic regions (World Bank). Although some IGOs are designed to achieve a single purpose (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]), others have been developed for multiple tasks (United Nations [UN]). Most IGOs are not global in membership but regional, wherein a commonality of interest motivates states to cooperate on issues directly affecting them. Among the universe of IGOs, most are small in membership and designed to address specific func¬ tions. Most have been formed since World War II, and among the different re¬ gions, Europe has the densest concentration of IGOs (see Figure 1.2). IGOs are recognized subjects of international law with separate standing from their member states. In a 1949 advisory opinion, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice

Figure 1.1

•

Pieces of Global Governance

Private and hybrid public-private governance

6

Understanding Global Governance

Figure 1.2

Classifying Types of IGOs

Geographic Scope

Examples

Global

UN WHO WTO

Regional

ASEAN AU EU

Subregional

ECOWAS GCC

Purpose

Examples

General

OAS UN

Specialized

ILO WHO WTO

(ICJ) concluded: “The Organization [the United Nations] was intended to exer¬ cise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality.” IGOs serve many diverse functions, including collecting information and monitoring trends (United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP]), deliv¬ ering services and aid (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]), providing forums for intergovernmental bargaining (European Union [EU]), and adjudicating disputes (International Court of Justice, World Trade Organization [WTO]). IGOs are instrumental in helping states form sta¬ ble habits of cooperation through regular meetings, information gathering and analysis, and dispute settlement as well as operational activities (see Figure 1.3). They enhance individual and collective welfare. They also “construct the social world in which cooperation and choice take place,” in the words of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2005: 162). And, “they help define the interests that states and other actors come to hold.” Yet how IGOs serve their various functions varies across organizations. Organizations differ in membership. They vary by the scope of the subject and rules. They differ in the amount of resources available and by level and degree of bureaucratization as well as in their effectiveness. Why do states join such organizations? Why do they choose to act and to cooperate through formal IGOs? Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998:

The Challenges of Global Governance

Figure 1.3 • • • • • •

7

IGO Functions

Informational—gathering, analyzing, and disseminating data Forum—providing place for exchange of views and decisionmaking Normative—defining standards of behavior Rule creation—drafting legally binding treaties Rule supervision—monitoring compliance with rules, adjudicating disputes, taking enforcement measures Operational—allocating resources, providing technical assistance and relief, deploying forces

4-5) answer these questions by suggesting that IGOs “allow for the centraliza¬ tion of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational struc¬ ture and a supportive administrative apparatus. These increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization’s ability to affect the un¬ derstandings, environment, and interests of states.” Thus, states join to partic¬ ipate in a stable negotiating forum, permitting rapid reactions in times of cri¬ sis. They join IGOs to negotiate and implement agreements that reflect selfand community interests. They participate to provide mechanisms for dispute resolution. They join to take advantage of centralized organization in the im¬ plementation of collective tasks. By participating, they agree to shape interna¬ tional debate on important issues and forge critical norms of behavior. Yet states still maintain their sovereignty and varying degrees of independence of action. IGOs not only create opportunities for their member states, but also exer¬ cise influence and impose constraints on their member states’ policies and processes. IGOs affect member states by setting international and hence na¬ tional agendas, and forcing governments to take positions on issues. They sub¬ ject states’ behavior to surveillance through information sharing. They encour¬ age the development of specialized decisionmaking and implementation processes to facilitate and coordinate IGO participation. They embody or fa¬ cilitate the creation of principles, norms, and rules of behavior with which states must align their policies if they wish to benefit from reciprocity. For ex¬ ample, Chapter 9 explores how China’s admission to the World Trade Organi¬ zation has affected its national policies and required extensive governmental reforms. Most countries perceive that there are benefits to participating in IGOs and international regimes even when it is costly. South Africa never withdrew from the UN over the long years when it was repeatedly condemned for its policies of apartheid. Iraq did not withdraw from the UN when it was subject to more than a decade of stringent sanctions. China spent fourteen years negotiating the terms of its entry into the international trade system and undertaking changes in laws and policies required to bring itself into compliance with WTO rules.

8

Understanding Global Governahce

Twelve countries joined the EU between 2004 and 2007, despite the extensive and costly changes required. Although the earliest IGOs were established in the nineteenth century, there was a veritable explosion of IGOs in the twentieth century, as discussed in Chapter 3. Major-power wars (especially World Wars I and II), economic de¬ velopment, technological innovation, and the growth of the state system, espe¬ cially with decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, provided impetus for creat¬ ing many IGOs. Since the 1960s, there has also been a growing phenomenon of IGOs creating other IGOs. One study noted that IGO birthrates “correlate positively with the number of states in the international system,” but found death rates of IGOs low (Cupitt, Whitlock, and Whitlock 1997: 16). Of thirtyfour IGOs functioning in 1914, eighteen were still operational at the end of the twentieth century. The Cold War’s end brought the death of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, both Sovietbloc institutions. The creation of the UN in 1945 led to the demise of the League of Nations. The authoritative source for all data on international orga¬ nizations, both IGOs and NGOs, is the Union of International Associations (UIA), located in Brussels, and its Yearbook of International Organizations.

Nongovernmental Organizations NGOs are private voluntary organizations whose members are individuals or associations that come together to achieve a common purpose. Some organi¬ zations are formed to advocate a particular cause such as human rights, peace, or environmental protection. Others are established to provide services such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid in war-torn societies, or development assis¬ tance. Some are in reality government-organized groups (dubbed GONGOs). Scholars and analysts distinguish between not-for-profit groups (the vast ma¬ jority) and for-profit corporations; it is also common to treat terrorist, crimi¬ nal, and drug-trafficking groups separately. NGOs are increasingly active today at all levels of human society and governance, from local or grassroots communities to national and inter¬ national politics. Many national-level groups, often called interest or pressure groups, are now linked to counterpart groups in other countries through net¬ works or federations. International NGOs, like IGOs, may draw their members from more than one country, and they may have very specific functions or be multifunctional. The estimates of numbers of NGOs vary enormously. The 2008-2009 Yearbook of International Organizations identifies over 7,600 nongovernmen¬ tal organizations that have an international dimension in terms of either mem¬ bership or commitment to conduct activities in several states. Exclusively na¬ tional NGOs number in the millions. Many large international NGOs (INGOs) are transnational federations involving formal, long-term links among national groups. Examples include the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

The Challenges of Global Governance

9

Crescent Societies, Oxfam, CARE, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors With¬ out Borders), the World Wildlife Fund, Transparency International (the lead¬ ing NGO fighting corruption worldwide), Fluman Rights Watch, Amnesty In¬ ternational, and Save the Children. NGOs’ governance functions parallel many functions provided by IGOs and, like IGOs, they can be analyzed as both pieces of and actors in global governance. As pieces of governance, they provide processes at many levels to pressure or persuade individuals, governments, IGOs, corporations, and other actors to improve human rights records, protect the environment, tackle corruption, create a ban on landmines, or intervene in conflicts such as that in the Darfur region of Sudan. The Geneva Conventions delegate legal responsi¬ bility for humanitarian law to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Some IGOs, such as the International Fabour Organization (IFO), World Tourism Organization, and the UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), provide for NGO roles in their governance. As a result of global trends to privatize activities previously controlled by governments, services once provided by governments or IGOs are now often contracted out to NGOs. They deliver disaster relief, run refugee camps, administer development pro¬ grams, strive to contain the international spread of disease, and work to clean up the environment. They are important pieces of global governance because of the ways they enable individuals to “act publicly” (Kaldor 2003: 585). Fikewise, their “voluntary, local, and issue-specific character ... [and the networks they create] make them a useful link between the subnational community and national and international communities and institutions” (Ku and Diehl 2006: 171). In this sense, they function as transmission belts among multiple levels of governance.

International Rules and Law The scope of what is generally known as public international law has ex¬ panded tremendously since the 1960s. Although the statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes five sources of international law (treaties or con¬ ventions, customary practice, the writings of legal scholars, judicial decisions, and general principles of law), much of the growth has been in treaty law. Be¬ tween 1951 and 1995, 3,666 new multilateral treaties were concluded (Ku 2001). They included the Vienna Convention on Treaties, conventions on ozone, climate change, and whaling, the Faw of the Sea, humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions), human rights law, trade law, arms control agreements, and intellectual property law. By far the largest number of new multilateral agreements deal with economic issues. Treaty-based law has been particularly valued because the process of negotiation now involves all affected countries. Nonetheless, customary practice persists as an important source of new law, particularly because of the long time it takes to negotiate and bring into effect agreements involving large numbers of countries.

10

Understanding Global Governance

For purposes of global governance, one major limitation of public inter¬ national law is that it applies only to states, except for war crimes and crimes against humanity. At present, except within the European Union, multilateral agreements cannot be used directly to bind individuals, multinational corpora¬ tions, nongovernmental organizations, paramilitary forces, terrorists, or inter¬ national criminals. They can, however, establish norms that states are expected to observe and, where possible, enforce against nonstate actors, such as lead¬ ers of rebel groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. Another problem in the eyes of many is the absence of international en¬ forcement mechanisms and the role of self-interest in shaping states’ decisions about whether or not to accept treaties and other forms of international rules. International law has traditionally left states to use “self-help” means to secure compliance. In reality, the United Nations Charter and European Union treaties, for example, provide enforcement mechanisms, yet the threat of sanc¬ tions is not a key motivator for compliance with international rules. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995), instead, cite efficiency, inter¬ ests, and norms as key factors, and treaty ambiguity and lack of capability as principal sources of noncompliance. States often value a reputation for lawabiding behavior and desire the benefits of reciprocity (the “golden rule” of “doing unto others as you would have them do unto you”); they are generally inclined to comply with international law. Peer pressure from other states and domestic or transnational pressures from NGOs may induce compliance. For weaker and developing states, failure to comply can be a consequence of in¬ adequate local expertise and governmental capacity jto do what is required for compliance. In short, the “force” of international law often comes from the “felt need to coordinate activities . . . and to ensure stable and predictive pat¬ terns of behavior,” and the reality is “imperfect, varied, and changing imple¬ mentation and compliance,” with many factors affecting the extent to which states meet legal commitments (Jacobson and Weiss 1995: 122).

International Norms or "Soft Law" Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of norms in interna¬ tional relations. These are shared expectations or understandings regarding standards of appropriate behavior for various actors, particularly states. They range from the norm that states are obligated to carry out treaties they ratify (pacta sunt servanda) to the expectation that combatants will not target civil¬ ians. Norms vary in strength, and determining whether one exists involves as¬ certaining whether states perceive that a certain practice is obligatory or ex¬ pected. Some norms are so internalized in states that they are difficult to recognize unless a violation occurs. Still others are weak, contested, or “emerging.” Many international legal conventions set forth nonbinding obligations for states that are in fact norms and sometimes referred to as “soft law.” Examples

The Challenges of Global Governance

11

of such soft law include human rights and labor rights norms, the concept of the global commons applied to the high seas, outer space, and polar regions, as well as the concept of sustainable development. Generally, “the degree of formalization determines the strength of a rule, especially when it is made legally binding” (Duffield 2007: 10). Soft law can take a number of forms when a formal agreement is not pos¬ sible. In 2005, for example, the final document of the UN-sponsored World Summit endorsed the emerging norm of responsibility to protect (R2P), which is seen as the soft-law basis for humanitarian interventions when states fail to protect peoples at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other major human rights violations. In environmental law, an initial framework convention often sets forth norms and principles that states agree on, such as those for ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity, and global climate change, but no concrete actions. As sci¬ entific understanding of the problem improves, the political environment changes, and technology provides new possible solutions (such as substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals, or carbon dioxide-producing energy sources), leading states, key corporations, and other interested actors may agree on spe¬ cific, binding steps to be taken. Protocols are used to supplement the initial framework convention, and they are considered to form the “hard” law deal¬ ing with the issue. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, was the first attempt to give effect to general principles in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Negotiations are currently under way to produce a successor agreement—a hard-law agreement—that establishes state obligations to take urgently needed action. Soft law has the advantages of being easier to negoti¬ ate, more flexible, and leaving open the possibility of negotiating hard law in the future.

International Regimes Scholars have developed the concept of international regimes to understand governance where principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures are linked to one another in a particular issue area. Where international regimes exist, such as for nuclear weapons proliferation, whaling, European transboundary air pollution, and food aid, participating states and other inter¬ national actors recognize the existence of certain obligations and feel com¬ pelled to honor them. Because this is “governance without government,” they comply based on an acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules and underlying norms, and the validity of the decisionmaking procedures. They expect other states and actors also to comply and to utilize dispute settlement procedures to resolve conflicts. Key characteristics of international regimes are their associ¬ ation with a specific issue area and the links among the constituent elements. International regimes encompass rules and norms, as well as the practices of actors that show both how their expectations converge and their acceptance

12

Understanding Global Governance

of and compliance with rules. IGO decisionmaking procedures, bureaucracy, budget, headquarters, and legal personality may be required (or established) within a given issue area, but individual IGOs, by themselves, do not constitute a regime. Some issues, such as nuclear accidents that trigger widespread nuclear fallout, do not need a formal organization that functions regardless of whether there is an accident. Ad hoc arrangements for decisionmaking and taking action when an accident occurs can be coupled with rules and norms. The regime for nuclear weapons proliferation, however, benefits from the inspection machinery and safeguard systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (even though it is not yet in effect), the UN Security Coun¬ cil’s enforcement powers, and the IAEA’s technical assistance programs to non-nuclear weapon countries for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Not all issue areas have resulted in regimes, as discussed in Chapter 2. But where regimes exist, they are key pieces of global governance.

Ad Hoc Groups, Arrangements, and Global Conferences As multilateralism has become the dominant practice in international affairs, other types of global governance pieces have emerged. These include various ad hoc arrangements and groupings that lack a formal legal basis, UN-sponsored global conferences, intergovernmental panels and forums, and commissions. The Group of Seven (G-7), for example, began in an ad hoc fashion in the mid-1970s, when summit meetings of governmental leaders were not yet com¬ mon practice and major changes in international economic relations suggested the value of periodic, informal gatherings. These later evolved into a regular arrangement, but not a formal IGO. In 1992, Russia was invited to join the group for noneconomic discussions, thus creating the Group of Eight (G-8), which dealt with nuclear proliferation questions after the breakup of the So¬ viet Union and efforts to curb financing of terrorism after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. For the 2007 G-7/8 summit, Germany as host invited Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa to participate in G-8+5 discussions, recognizing that the G-8 no longer reflected the realities of world politics. A number of such “G” groups now exist. Led by India, Brazil, and South Africa, for example, the Group of 20 (G-20) (comprising both de¬ veloped and developing countries) has played significant roles in WTO trade negotiations, demonstrating that the major economic powers could not have a free hand. The politics of these negotiations are discussed in Chapter 9. When Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy decided to negotiate a convention banning antipersonnel landmines in 1996, none of the existing IGO structures, such as the UN Conference on Disarmament and the UN Gen¬ eral Assembly, seemed appropriate for achieving this goal in a short period of time. Instead, Axworthy convened a special conference in Ottawa in Decern-

The Challenges of Global Governance

13

ber 1997 for the sole purpose of securing agreement on a total ban by the largest possible number of countries. A similar process was used in 2007-2008 by Norway and other countries to conclude an international treaty banning cluster munitions. Since the 1970s, the United Nations has convened many global conferences on economic, environmental, and social matters. Some have been designated “world summits” rather than “global conferences” because they have included meetings of heads of state and government. These conferences have spawned complex multilateral diplomacy, with NGOs, scientific experts, corporations, and interested individuals trying to influence outcomes. They have raised impor¬ tant issues of who gets to participate and in what ways. Often the results are dis¬ appointing to those most concerned about the issues, because they may represent the least common denominator of agreement among the large number of partic¬ ipants, of whom only states, however, actually have a formal say. Conferences like the Summit for Children (New York, 1990), the Earth Summit (Rio, 1992), the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), and the UN Climate Change Conference (Bali, 2007) have been important global political processes for addressing interdependence issues, for seeking ways to improve the lives and well-being of humans, and for strengthening other pieces of governance. They also have raised awareness of interdepen¬ dence issues; galvanized the creation, dissemination, and sharing of knowl¬ edge; created new norms and new international law; created new structures; and defined global political priorities. Cumulatively since the 1970s, the global conferences have also bolstered understanding of the linkages among issues of environmental protection, equal rights (especially for women), elim¬ ination of poverty, improved access to economic resources, sharing of knowl¬ edge and technology, and participation of local communities.

Private Governance Private governance is a growing but little-studied phenomenon. Although the meaning of the term is disputed, private governance involves authoritative de¬ cisionmaking in areas where states have not acted, or have chosen not to ex¬ ercise authority, or where states have themselves been ineffective in the exer¬ cise of authority. Examples include international accounting standards; the private bond-rating agencies, such as Moody’s Investors Service, whose rules can shape government actions through the threatened drop in a country’s rat¬ ing; International Chamber of Commerce ndes and actions; private industry governance, such as the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Manufacturing Prin¬ ciples and the Forest Stewardship Council; or labor standards within a single multinational firm such as Nike or Ford. Cyberspace is governed by hybrid institutions, and presently involves a strong dose of private authority. Private firms are attempting to establish

14

Understanding Global Governance

enforceable intellectual property rules for music, software, and published ma¬ terials available on the Internet. Visa and MasterCard have created the Secure Electronic Transaction protocol to enable bank-card transactions to be made securely via the Internet. As Debora Spar (1999: 47) notes about this electronic environment: International organizations lack the power to police cyberspace; national governments lack the authority; and the slow pace of interstate agreement is no match for the rapid-fire rate of technological change. If rules are to emerge along the Internet, private entities will have to create them . . . [in¬ cluding] University consortia and library groups . . . industry associations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Business Software Alliance.

Private authorities are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. “What is evident, though,” Spar (48) says, “is that private entities will play an everincreasing role in the development and management of electronic interaction. . . . They will assume quasi-govemmental functions in many instances, regu¬ lating activity in their particular spheres through a combination of formal and informal rules, administrative and technical means.” The mix of public and private governance required by the Internet’s growth is explored further in Chapter 12. The various pieces of global governance are not well organized. They vary in scope, effectiveness, and durability. In subsequent chapters we shall explore them in more depth and specificity. We turn now, however, to identifying the key actors in global governance.

■

Actors in Global Governance

The complexity of global governance is a function not only of many pieces, but also of many actors, some of which are linked in networks. Such networks have become increasingly dense since the 1970s, when Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971) first pointed out the importance of regular interactions of governmental and nongovernmental actors across national boundaries. Such scholars as Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004), Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995), and James Rosenau (1997) have explored the existence of these networks and their policy impact. What differentiates the concept of global governance from in¬ ternational relations is the equal importance attached to such networks as well as to NGOs, multinational corporations, scientific experts, IGOs, and other types of actors along with states (see Figure 1.4). Whereas international rela¬ tions is largely interested in politics between and among states, “the term global governance does not establish such a hierarchy. ... In essence, global governance implies a multiactor perspective on world politics” (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 191).

The Challenges of Global Governance

Figure 1.4 • • • • • • • •

15

Actors in Global Governance

States Subnational and local jurisdictions Transnational and'transgovernmental networks of actors IGOs NGOs Experts and epistemic communities Multistakeholders Multinational corporations

States States continue to be key actors in global governance, creating many of the pieces and carrying out many of the activities. States alone have sovereignty, which has historically given them authority not only over their own territory and people, but also over powers delegated to international institutions. States create IGOs and set their mandates; they create international law and norms and determine their effectiveness through their compliance or failure to com¬ ply. Because the more than 190 states in the international system vary so dra¬ matically, however, their relative importance in global governance will vary. Large, powerful states are more likely to play greater roles than are smaller, less powerful states. The United States, in particular, used its dominant posi¬ tion after World War II to shape much of the structure and rules of the postwar international system. At the time, IGOs offered a way to create structures com¬ patible with American notions of political order and through which to promote US political and economic interests. Although support for such institutions was not necessarily ensured, governmental and public commitment were gen¬ erally strong. The predominance of Americans in many secretariats and the relatively large share of operating and program funding contributed by the United States reinforced American influence over policies and programs of many IGOs. Today, however, the United States cannot shape global governance alone, as even a sole superpower cannot dominate the many pieces of and actors in global governance. In the UN, the United States faced strong opposition, from small and large states alike, to the use of force against Iraq in 2003 and was later forced to seek Security Council authority for its continued presence in the country. In international economic governance, the United States works closely with the other G-7 members (Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain, France, and Canada), yet, as noted earlier, emerging powers such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa refuse to accept US and EU dominance in interna¬ tional trade negotiations. On issues such as the International Criminal Court, the Convention to Ban Landmines, and climate change, large numbers of other countries (and NGOs) have demonstrated a willingness to act even in the face

16

Understanding Global Governance

of US opposition. We explore the fluctuations in US support for multilateral¬ ism further in Chapter 7. Middle-power states play a particularly critical role, often acting in con¬ cert in the United Nations and other IGOs. Canada, Australia, Norway, Swe¬ den, the Netherlands, Argentina, and Nigeria, for example, are known for their commitment to multilateralism, ability to forge compromises, and support for reform in the international system. The essence of middle powers’ role lies in the importance of secondary players in international politics, as both follow¬ ers and leaders. For the large number of less developed, small, and weak states, power and influence generally come only insofar as they are able to form coalitions. IGOs provide arenas for this and also for international recognition and legitimacy. Through their collective efforts, small and developing countries have endeav¬ ored to shape the agendas, priorities, and programs of many IGOs over the past fifty years, with varying degrees of success. States themselves may not all act with one voice in global governance. In¬ creasingly, subnational actors such as provinces, state, and local governments are involved in international economic negotiations, implementing environ¬ mental regulations and human rights initiatives, acting independently and oc¬ casionally at odds with their respective national governments. Chapters 10 and 11 examine some examples. Although states continue to be major actors in global governance, their governments, as Jessica Mathews (1997: 50) so aptly describes, “are sharing powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups. . . . The steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while.” Power, indeed, is less concentrated in states and has diffused to the other actors in global governance.

IGOs International relations scholars have long viewed IGOs primarily as agents of their member states and focused on their structural attributes, decisionmaking processes, and programs. After all, IGOs are formed by states, and states grant IGOs responsibilities and authority to act. Yet when we speak of IGOs as actors, we are often referring to the IGO secretariat members who, as international civil servants, play key but often in¬ visible roles in persuading states to act, coordinating the efforts of different groups, providing the diplomatic skills to secure agreements, and ensuring the effectiveness of programs (Mathiason 2007). These officials include the UN Secretary-General and his or her under- and assistant secretaries-general; the directors-general of organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization; the UN High Commissioners for

The Challenges of Global Governance

17

Refugees and Human Rights; the UN Secretary-General’s special representa¬ tives for Afghanistan, for child soldiers, and for Kosovo; the president of the World Bank; the executive director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the president of the European Commission; and the country representatives of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). These individuals “will generally possess an identity that is distinct from that of any other entity and an interest in promoting the well-being of the organization and its membership” (Duffield 2007: 13). Stories are legion about the roles secretariat officials have played in achieving international trade agreements, cease-fires in wars, governments’ agreement to revise their development strategies to meet international guide¬ lines, and organizational reforms. Uike other bureaucracies, IGO secretariats often do much more than their member states may have intended. For one thing, they must turn vague man¬ dates into procedures and actions. Because individuals are international civil servants, they tend to take their responsibilities seriously and work hard “to promote what they see as ‘good policy’ or to protect it from states that have competing interests” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 5). Frequently, they must respond to new challenges and crises, provide policy options for member states, change their own missions, and formulate new tasks and procedures. For example, the UN Secretariat created peacekeeping at the height of the Cold War, and later devised peacebuilding operations. Prior to the Cold War’s end, the UN had not helped to monitor elections in member states, except in colonial territories in transition to independence. Responding to needs for help with elections in postconflict situations and in former communist states tran¬ sitioning to democracy in the 1990s, the UN Secretariat, after some initial re¬ luctance, developed its expertise in electoral assistance. IGOs have resources, including money, food, weapons, and information. In fact, many IGOs play important roles in analyzing and interpreting infor¬ mation, giving it meaning that can prompt action. IGOs “thus help determine the kind of world that is to be governed and set the agenda for global gover¬ nance” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 7). In addition, IGOs can often claim expert authority on the basis of the specialized knowledge and expertise that inheres in their secretariats. That knowledge and expertise also shape the way some organizations behave. Contemporary scholarship is focusing on IGOs as actors. At one level, the “power” of IGOs is limited in terms of their ability to enforce decisions, ex¬ cept in specific cases such as the EU, which has supranational authority over member states in many policy domains, or the IMF, which can impose condi¬ tions on its lending. Most IGO actions are in fact recommendations. Their ef¬ fectiveness lies in other actors’ willingness to make and comply with commit¬ ments. Their suasion is largely moral, based on the broad principles and values IGOs have often been created to serve or protect, such as human rights or peace. Peer pressure can be powerful, however, in pushing states to act in ways

18

Understanding Global Governance

that others wish, and IGOs are prime arenas for exercising peer pressure and moral suasion. At another level, IGOs are not just tools of states. They are also purposive actors that have power to influence world events and, in some cases, authority and autonomy to act. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 21) argue, “The author¬ ity of [intergovernmental organizations] and bureaucracies generally, lies in their ability to present themselves as impersonal and neutral—as not exercising power but instead serving others.” The need to be seen in this way is crucial, for example, to the UN Secretariat or the EU Commission’s credibility. This inter¬ pretation of IGO agency and its implications is discussed further in Chapter 2. To be sure, not all IGOs are alike, as we shall examine in subsequent chapters. Thus their authority and autonomy as actors in global governance will vary in kind and degree. As actors, however, they can also fail to act; like domestic bureaucracies, international bureaucracies may use inaction as a way to avoid doing something they oppose. IGOs may also act against the interests and preferences of strong or weak states; they may ally with other actors such as NGOs, other IGOs, and select states to pursue or protect certain policies; and they may attempt to persuade states to change their behavior—for exam¬ ple, by reducing corruption, eliminating food subsidies, or turning over war criminals for prosecution by the International Criminal Court.

NGOs Like intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations are both pieces of governance and key actors, playing a number of roles. The growth of NGOs and NGO networks since the 1980s has been a major factor in their increasing involvement in governance at all levels, from global to local. The majority of the thousands of grassroots groups that exist in coun¬ tries around the world are not part of formal networks, but may have informal links to organizations, such as large international human rights and develop¬ ment NGOs like Human Rights Watch and CARE, from which they obtain funding for local programs or training assistance. The links between grassroots and international NGOs are key to activities such as promoting population control, empowerment of women, healthcare, and environmental protection. The Internet, e-mail, and fax have been valuable tools for NGO mobilization, along with their mobility and autonomy, enabling them to access areas that governments and IGOs may be slow to reach. NGOs have become key sources of information and technical expertise on a wide variety of international issues, from the environment to human rights and corruption. They frequently are key actors in raising awareness of and helping to frame issues. Thus, landmines came to be seen as a humanitarian rather than an arms control issue, for example (Thakur and Maley 1999). They lobby for policy changes by states, IGOs, and corporations. They contribute to international adjudication by submitting friend-of-the-court briefs to interna-

The Challenges of Global Governance

19

tional criminal tribunals such as those for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as to trade and investment tribunals (Chamovitz 2006: 353-354). They also play important roles in monitoring states’ and corporations’ implementa¬ tion of human rights norms and environmental regulations. And, they may as a result put pressure on states and other actors to change their behavior. It is the large international NGOs, along with transnational advocacy groups such as the Coalition to Ban Landmines, that bring together hundreds of NGOs that are among the most visible NGO actors in global governance. Their roles have been particularly important in expanding human rights, humanitarian, and environmental law. NGOs participate at least indirectly in UN-sponsored global conferences and international negotiations, raising issues and submitting docu¬ ments. In some instances, they have contributed treaty language such as with the Convention to Ban Landmines and the Rome Statute of the International Crim¬ inal Court (ICC). They also educate delegates, expand policy options, set agen¬ das, and influence the positions of key states (Betsill 2008: 178). We explore the legal basis of NGOs, their diversity, and their activities in Chapter 6, as well as in the issue chapters of Part 3.

Experts In a world whose problems seem to grow steadily more complex, knowledge and expertise are critical to governance efforts. There is a need to understand the science behind environmental problems such as climate change, ozone de¬ pletion, and declining fish stocks in order to consider policy options. Costeffective alternatives have to be developed for fuels that emit carbon dioxide and ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons if there is to be political support for making policy changes and new rules. Thus, experts from governmental agen¬ cies, research institutes, private industries, and universities around the world have increasingly been drawn into international efforts to deal with various is¬ sues. The technical committees of the International Organization for Standard¬ ization, for example, are entirely composed of experts. Often experts may be part of transnational networks and participate in international conferences and negotiations, laying out the state of scientific knowledge, framing issues for debate, or proposing specific solutions. Since 1988, hundreds of scientists from around the world have participated on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose policy-neutral reports have provided key inputs for global climate change negotiations. Scholars have coined the phrase “epistemic communities” to identify networks of knowledge-based experts.

Multistakeholder Actors Multistakeholder actors include experts, IGOs, corporations, professional as¬ sociations, NGOs, and governments (although the latter are not always in¬ volved). These loose alliances of a broad range of participants “join together to achieve what none can accomplish on its own” (Reincke 1999-2000: 44).

20

Understanding Global Governance

Such groups take advantage of the ability to communicate with and travel rap¬ idly among distant parts of the globe to promote collaboration, tap expertise, and disseminate new knowledge. The networks have the advantage of flexibil¬ ity, which is often lacking in traditional governmental, IGO, and corporate bu¬ reaucracies. One of the oldest global policy networks is the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, founded in 1971 to coordinate and finance sixteen agricultural research centers around the world. The UN’s leadership has begun to think more strategically about such net¬ works. The Secretary-General’s Millennium Report points out, “Mobilizing the skills and other resources of diverse global actors . . . may increasingly in¬ volve forming loose and temporary global networks that cut across national, institutional and disciplinary lines” (Annan 2000). We examine the roles of ex¬ perts and multistakeholder actors further in Chapter 6.

Multinational Corporations Multinational corporations (MNCs) are a particular form of nongovernmental actor organized to conduct for-profit business transactions and operations across the borders of three or more states. Multinational corporations can take many different forms, from licensing local industries to providing foreign sup¬ pliers, contract manufacturing, turnkey projects, manufacturing, and assembly operations. What they share in common is that they are companies based in one state with affiliated branches or subsidiaries and activities in other states. They have the ability to invest capital and thus to create jobs, influence polit¬ ical actors, offer incentives to host governments, lobby for changes in state laws, and threaten to move jobs and investment elsewhere should the condi¬ tions not be conducive to profitable business. Since the 1970s, MNCs have been increasingly recognized as significant international actors, controlling resources far greater than those of many states. The world’s largest MNCs account for four-fifths of world industrial output. In the 1990s, foreign direct investment grew rapidly, although it was still highly concentrated and distributed unevenly in Europe, the United States, Latin America (particularly Brazil and Mexico), and East and Southeast Asia (especially China). As actors in global governance, MNCs have “profoundly altered the structure and functioning of the global economy” (Gilpin 2001: 290). By choosing where to invest or not to invest, MNCs shape the economic development opportunities of individual communities, countries, and entire re¬ gions such as Africa, where little foreign investment takes place compared to East Asia. By moving production from communities such as Peoria, Illinois, or Dayton, Ohio, to Mexico or Malaysia, MNCs’ activities can benefit or hurt both developed and developing countries. Globalization of markets and production in industries such as automobiles challenges corporate leaders and managers to govern these complex struc¬ tures, and poses problems for states and local governments losing connection

The Challenges of Global Governance

21

to and control of these larger corporate networks. Corporate choices about in¬ vestment have also changed the landscape of development assistance. Far more funding for development today comes from private investment capital than from bilateral, govemment-to-government aid, or from multilateral aid through the UN and other IGOs. In short, MNCs’ activities have raised a number of governance questions: How can they best be regulated—through new forms of international rules, or through private mechanisms? How can they be mobilized for economic devel¬ opment in collaboration with international agencies and NGOs? How can less developed countries (LDCs) be assured that powerful MNCs will not interfere in their domestic affairs, challenge their sovereignty, destroy their resources and environment, and relegate them to permanent dependency? MNCs are par¬ ticularly important actors in addressing trade, labor, and environmental issues. Their participation has been critical, for example, in efforts to address ozone depletion and global warming. They are also targets of NGO activism, as dis¬ cussed further in Chapter 6. Kofi Annan, during his tenure as UN Secretary-General, was a champion of new mechanisms to regulate corporate behavior and to engage MNCs as positive contributors to global governance. In 1999, Annan broke new ground for the United Nations by convening a meeting with world business leaders and exhorting them to embrace the UN Global Compact, whose nine princi¬ ples cover human rights, labor, and the environment. Companies that partici¬ pate must submit online updates of their progress for NGOs to scrutinize, thus involving NGOs in policing MNC compliance. This innovation is discussed further in Chapter 9. The various actors in global governance cannot be analyzed in isolation from one another. Each plays key roles in efforts to deal with various issues and problems. Sometimes, they compete with each other for scarce resources, international standing, and legitimacy. At other times, their activities comple¬ ment one another. In many instances, they are linked in complex networks. Subsequent chapters will explore the relationships among various actors in global governance.

■

An Increasing Need for Global Governance?

With a growing agenda of international challenges, the simple answer to this question is yes. Globalization is playing a major role in shrinking the planet, proliferating issues,, and changing the roles of key actors. The Cold War’s end contributed also to increased needs for governance. The emergence of transna¬ tional civil society and the contested nature of state sovereignty likewise fac¬ tor into the rising need for global governance. These changes alter the roles of various actors and significantly affect the approach!! to problem solving.

22

Understanding Global Governance

Globalization In the 1970s, increasing trade and other links among states were seen as evi¬ dence of growing interdependence. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, clearly something more fundamental was happening than a mere interconnectedness among states and between states and individuals. International interdepen¬ dence has been around for centuries, but economic globalization—the “inte¬ gration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology” (Bhagwati 2004: 3)—has broadened and deepened. The contemporary form is unprecedented in the degree to which not only eco¬ nomic markets, but also cultures, peoples, and states, are being linked to¬ gether. This has spurred the proliferating networks of NGOs and financial markets, as well as the unwelcome, often illegal actors—terrorists and drug traffickers. Globalization challenges the assertion by many international relations scholars that states are still the primary actors in international politics. More specifically: It denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction, and the ex¬ ercise of power. It involves a stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across space and time such that, on the one hand, day-to-day ac¬ tivities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and, on the other, the practices and decisions of local groups of communities can have significant global reverberations. (Held 1997: 253)

Globalization encompasses two simultaneous yet contradictory patterns in world politics. One involves greater integration and interdependence be¬ tween peoples and states, between states and other states, and between states and international bodies. This has been facilitated particularly by the commu¬ nications revolution and by the preeminence of two core philosophies, eco¬ nomic liberalism and democracy. The integrative side of globalization is con¬ tradicted by its disintegrative tendencies. It has not ensured stability, as the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008-2009 energy, food, and finan¬ cial crises demonstrate. While globalization affects all spheres of human activity—economic, so¬ cial, cultural, technological, environmental, and political—not all peoples or areas of the world are equally affected. Many critics, such as World Bank chief economist and noted international economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002), charge that globalization has deepened global inequality between the haves and have-nots, especially those living on less than a dollar a day. Others charge that it has contributed to environmental degradation, child labor, and cultural homogenization.

The Challenges of Global Governance

23

Many weak states have been unable to accommodate technological changes and the challenges of more open economies that make them vulnera¬ ble to competition and exploitation. Weak states may also be unable to provide the necessary public goods. There has been a resurgence of ethnic and reli¬ gious identities and ethnic conflicts, and a weakening, if not failure, of some states. The disintegrative tendencies of globalization affect both states’ and in¬ dividuals’ perceptions of uncontrollable global processes such as global finan¬ cial markets and multinational corporations. Individuals themselves are in¬ creasingly alienated as they become further removed from political institutions that lack democratic accountability, or worry about a homogenization of cul¬ tures and declining value of labor in global markets. The need for global gov¬ ernance has never been greater. Yet one of the paradoxes of globalization is that global governance has to be accepted by states whose conceptions of in¬ terests and identity remain largely national and local. Given the detrimental and beneficial effects of globalization, the question is not will globalization be governed, but rather, how will globalization be gov¬ erned? UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2000: 6) put it more bluntly: “The central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a pos¬ itive force for all the world’s people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in squalor.” Globalization has both coincided with and contributed to the changed in¬ ternational political environment resulting from the Cold War’s end, the growth of transnational civil society, and shifts in the nature of state sovereignty.

The Cold War's End The end of the Cold War was brought about by both political changes toward democratization and economic changes toward liberalization of the economy in the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolized the end of the Cold War, and two years later the Soviet Union itself disintegrated into fif¬ teen separate, independent states. This marked the ending of one historical era and the beginning of another. The international system shifted from a bipolar structure to a post-Cold War structure that was simultaneously unipolar and a nonpolar, networked system of a globalized world. At the outset, some suggested that history itself was at an end with the tri¬ umph of liberal capitalism (Fukuyama 1989) and the end of ideological com¬ petition, but those high expectations have not been borne out. Instead, the dis¬ integration of the former Soviet Union and end of the Cold War system revived ethnic rivalries and conflicts in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa, leading some to postulate a “clash of civilizations” as the new source of enduring conflicts in international politics (Huntington 1993). The Cold War’s end also contributed to reducing barriers to trade and investment, which in turn contributed to globalization. In short, it produced a new series of gov¬ ernance challenges.

24

Understanding Global Governance

Emergent Transnational Civil Society Contributing to the Cold War’s end and benefiting from both increased democ¬ ratization and accelerating globalization is the growth of civil society within many countries and transnationally. Civil society is not just NGOs; it is a broader concept, encompassing all organizations and associations that exist outside of the state and the market (i.e., government and business). It includes not just advocacy groups but also associations of professionals such as doc¬ tors, lawyers, and scientists, along with labor unions, chambers of commerce, religious groups, ethnic associations, cultural groups, sporting associations, and political parties. The key distinction between NGOs and civil society groups is their links to citizens. Many NGOs are elite-run groups with tenuous links to citizens on whose behalf they claim to act. Especially in developing and newly democratizing countries, grassroots and national NGOs may de¬ pend on international funding. Like NGOs, civil society is neither inherently good nor inherently bad. People work together to advance both nefarious and worthy ends. The spread of democracy to many corners of the globe has bolstered the growth of civil societies in countries where restrictions on citizens’ groups have been lifted. Civil society groups communicate with each other domesti¬ cally and cross-nationally, creating new coalitions from the local to the global. These “networks of knowledge and action” (Lipschutz 1992: 390) are uncon¬ strained by geographic borders and largely beyond states’ control. Transna¬ tional civil society groups permeate numerous issue areas, including the envi¬ ronment, human rights, technology, economic development, and security. Their demands for representation in processes of global governance contribute to the increased need to reform existing international institutions and to find new ways to incorporate actors other than states in governance.

Contested Nature of Sovereignty These trends pose direct challenges to state sovereignty. The norm that states enjoy internal autonomy and cannot be subjected to external authority has been the bedrock of the Westphalian state system that has persisted from 1648 to the present. Some theorists focus on the erosion of sovereignty, suggesting that it may at one time have been absolute, but is now compromised by states’ own weaknesses, by external influences such as flow from globalization or the development of international human rights norms, or by other actors such as MNCs, NGOs, and global financial markets (Strange 1996). Others see sover¬ eignty as always having been contested—for example, from within by ethnic groups seeking autonomy or self-determination (their own sovereignty)—and hence it varies across time, place, and issues (Krasner 1999). Over time, then, the nature of sovereignty has changed with the blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign issues, contributing further to the in¬ creased need for pieces of global governance. The acceleration of globaliza-

The Challenges of Global Governance

25

tion, the rise of powerful nonstate actors, and the emergence of transnational civil society all undermine state sovereignty. Globalization is linking issues and actors together in complex new ways, where economic, humanitarian, health, and environmental problems respect no state boundaries. “Small events in one place can have catalytic effects, so that consequences later and else¬ where are vast” (Keohane and Nye 2000: 11). Viruses like those that cause se¬ vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) move around the world in a matter of hours, due to air travel. “New players, thorny problems, spillover effects, and the magnitude of cross-border flows together inflate the difficulty of coherent action at almost all levels of international affairs. ... At the same time, these offshoots of escalating interdependence strongly influence the direction in which globalization will move—either toward tighter teamwork in meeting multiple challenges or toward division. . . . [T]he stakes are rising” (Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat 2001: 8). The processes for dealing with these chal¬ lenges are predominantly multilateral in character. Therefore we turn now to a brief examination of the nature of multilateral diplomacy and practice.

■

Processes of Global Governance: Multilateralism Matters

Multilateral negotiations have become “management tools in international politics” (Hampson 1995: 6) and a key variable in global governance out¬ comes. They are “the diplomatic bargaining processes through which the in¬ ternational community confers political legitimacy or comes to accept . . . [generalized] principles” (Hampson 1995: 3). Therefore, understanding the nature of multilateral diplomacy is key to understanding how IGOs function, how NGOs have become involved in governance processes, and how different kinds of outcomes (from degrees of success to failure) come about. But what differentiates multilateral diplomacy from traditional bilateral diplomacy, other than just the numbers of participants? John Ruggie (1993: 8) has stated, “At its core, multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles.” Thus relationships are defined by agreed-upon rules and princi¬ ples, and perhaps by organizations. Participants expect that outcomes will yield “diffuse reciprocity” (Keohane 1984) or roughly equal benefits over time. For example, the principle of nondiscrimination or most-favored-nation governing the global trade system prohibits countries from discriminating against imports from other countries that produce the same product. In collec¬ tive security arrangements, participants must respond to an attack on one country as if it were an attack on all. By contrast, bilateralism is expected to provide specific reciprocity and roughly balanced (but not necessarily equal) exchanges by each party at all times.

26

Understanding Global Governance

Complex Diplomacy Prior to the twentieth century, there was very little multilateralism. As we will discuss in Chapter 3, the nineteenth century was marked by the development of a number of public international unions and river commissions. The Con¬ cert of Europe provided a series of periodic gatherings of great (European) powers. Twentieth-century diplomacy saw the accelerated trend from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy to institutions, especially formal organizations, and the growth of conference diplomacy. What makes multilateralism in the twenty-first century different from multilateralism at the end of World War II is its complexity. There are now lit¬ erally scores of participants. States alone have almost quadrupled in number since 1945. The first sessions of the UN General Assembly now look like cozy, intimate gatherings. In fact, back then, the UN overall had fewer members than its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has today! Other types of actors add to the complexity, as do various coalitions of states. As one observer notes, “Large numbers . . . introduce a qualitatively different kind of diplo¬ macy in international politics. The hallmark of this diplomacy is that it occurs between groups or coalitions of state actors” (Hampson 1995: 4). In addition, a central issue for many IGOs today is how to do a better job of incorporating nonstate actors into processes of global governing, since “securing agreement of government officials is not enough to permit the smooth running of these institutions” (O’Brien et al. 2000: 208). Greater numbers of players (and coalitions of players) mean multiple in¬ terests, multiple rules, issues, and hierarchies that are constantly in flux. These all complicate the processes of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation—of finding common ground for reaching agreements on collective action, norms, or rules. Managing complexity has become a key challenge for diplomats and other participants in multilateral settings. For example, UN-sponsored confer¬ ences have several thousand delegates from 192 countries, speaking through interpreters in English, French, Russian, Chinese, Spanish, and Arabic. There are hundreds of NGOs and numerous private citizens. As one veteran noted, “They are all interested in the subject matter under discussion, all want to be kept informed of every detail, and all have the possibility of being present at almost all of the sessions” (McDonald 1993: 249). Although the universe of multilateral diplomacy is diverse, there is actu¬ ally a high degree of similarity in the structures of most IGOs and in the types of decisionmaking processes used. Let us look at key patterns in how decisions get made in IGOs and other settings.

How Do Decisions Get Made? Historically, since IGOs have been created by states, the principle of sovereign equality has dictated one-state, one-vote decisionmaking. Indeed, until well into the twentieth century, all decisions had to be unanimous, as states would

The Challenges of Global Governance

27

not accept the concept of majority decisionmaking. This is often cited as one of the sources of failure for the League of Nations. An alternative principle accords greater weight to some states on the basis of population or wealth and results in weighted or qualified voting. In the IMF and World Bank, for example, votes are weighted according to financial con¬ tribution. In the European Union’s Council of Ministers, qualified majority voting applies to issues where the EU has supranational authority over mem¬ ber states. The number of votes for each state is based on population; the num¬ ber of votes required to pass legislation ensures that the largest states must have support of some smaller states; and neither the smaller states alone nor fewer than three large states can block action. Another form of qualified ma¬ jority voting prevails in the UN Security Council, where the five permanent members each possess a veto and all must concur (or not object) for decisions to be taken. Since the 1980s, much of the decisionmaking in the UN General Assem¬ bly, Security Council, and other bodies, as well as in global conferences, the World Trade Organization, and many other multilateral settings, has taken the form of consensus. Consensus does not require unanimity; it depends on states deciding not to block action and it often means that outcomes represent the least common denominator—that is, more general wording and fewer tough demands on states to act. “Pressure toward consensus,” Courtney Smith (1999: 173) notes, “now dominates almost all multilateral efforts at global problem solving.” The puzzle, he suggests, is “how an organization that is composed of 185 [sz'c] member states, influenced by numerous nongovernmental organiza¬ tions, lobbied by multinational corporations, and serviced by an international secretariat reconciles all of these potentially diverse interests in search of a consensus on the most pressing issues of the day.” Key variables in consensus building are leadership; small, formal negotiating groups; issue characteristics (including issue salience to different actors); various actor attributes such as economic or military power or ability to serve as brokers; the amount and quality of informal contacts among actors; and personal attributes of partici¬ pants such as intelligence, tolerance, patience, reputation, negotiating skills, creativity, and linguistic versatility. Let us look briefly at two of these: leader¬ ship and actor strategies. In Chapter 7, we also explore the role of culture and negotiating style.

Leadership Leadership in multilateral diplomacy can come from diverse sources: power¬ ful and not-so-powerful states, a coalition of states, an NGO or coalition of NGOs, a skillful individual diplomat, or an IGO bureaucrat. Leadership can involve putting together a winning coalition to secure agreement on a new in¬ ternational trade agreement; it may involve the skill of negotiating a treaty text acceptable to industry, NGOs, and key governments. It may be the efforts of a

28

Understanding Global Governance

coalition of NGOs and college students publicizing an issue such as sweat¬ shops and pressuring companies to change their behavior. It may involve a government’s (or any other actor’s) willingness to act first—to commit mone¬ tary resources to a program or military forces for enforcement, to change trade laws, or to renounce development of a new weapons system. Leadership in multilateral diplomacy can also come from the UN Secretary-General, who might prod various other actors to do something, as Ban Ki-moon is doing with respect to global climate change.

Actor Strategies The nature of the multilateral arena means that actors cannot just present their individual positions on an issue and then sit down. Delegates must actively en¬ gage in efforts to discern the flexibility or rigidity of their respective positions. They must build personal relationships in order to establish the trust that is es¬ sential to working together. Some states (and NGOs) will take a stronger in¬ terest in particular topics than others; some will come with specific proposals; some will be represented by individuals with greater familiarity or expertise on a topic than others; some will be represented by individuals with little or no experience in multilateral diplomacy while others have long experience; and some states’ positions will matter more than others because of their relative power in the international system, in a given region, or on a particular issue. The face-to-face interactions of the individuals representing participating states are what caucusing is all about. It may take place at the back of the Gen¬ eral Assembly hall, in the delegates’ dining room, in a hotel lobby bar, at re¬ ceptions hosted by particular countries, in the restrooms, or in the corridors surrounding the official meeting place. A hallmark of multilateral diplomacy is the formation of groups or coali¬ tions of states and, in many contexts, networks and coalitions of NGOs. Coali¬ tions are a way of managing large numbers of participants. States can pool their power and resources to try to obtain a better outcome than they might by going it alone. Just banding together is not enough, however. Group members must negotiate among themselves to agree on a common position; they must maintain cohesion, prevent defections to rival coalitions, and choose represen¬ tatives to bargain on their behalf. At some point, crosscutting coalitions need to be formed if agreement is to be reached with other parties. Often, it is small states or middle powers that exercise key bridging roles. For example, during the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations in the early 1990s, a group of countries called the “Cairns Group,” led by Canada, Australia, and Argentina, helped to resolve sharp disagreements between the United States and the EU over agricultural trade. Very early in the UN’s history, regional groups were formed to elect non¬ permanent representatives to the Security Council and other bodies. The Cold War produced two competing groups, under the leadership of the Soviet Union

The Challenges of Global Governance

29

and United States, as well as a group of nonaligned countries. In 1964, Latin American, African, and Asian states formed the Group of 77 (G-77), which re¬ mains an active part of UN politics today along with regional and other groups. These are discussed in Chapters 4 and 7. A further actor strategy is the creation of networks to achieve greater pol¬ icy coherence. Networks are horizontal associations of diverse actors that op¬ erate on the basis of shared normative and conceptual frameworks and the awareness that shared goals cannot be achieved by actors on their own. A net¬ work approach is a key strategy for many NGOs and has been used extensively for a variety of issues and problems, from promoting the rights of women and other groups to addressing the governance challenges of HIV/AIDS. •J

■

The Politics and Effectiveness of Global Governance

The politics of global governance reflects “struggles over wealth, power, and knowledge” in the world (Murphy 2000: 798). Thus, power relationships among states matter, but so do the resources and actions of nonstate actors. The authority and legitimacy of pieces of global governance also matter. In ad¬ dition, the accountability and transparency of multilateral institutions have be¬ come a growing concern. And, as with all types of institutions, effectiveness or the ability to deliver public goods and to make a difference matters.

Power: Who Gets What? For some, the politics of global governance is about US power and dominant coalitions. To be sure, US power and preferences shaped, and continue to shape, many pieces of global governance, especially the liberal international economic system, and they ensure that US interests (and often European as well) are accommodated in many regimes. Yet, especially since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, US power and influence in the world have declined substan¬ tially. Even before then, the unilateralist policies of the George W. Bush ad¬ ministration were leading small, middle-power, and larger states to take initia¬ tives without US participation, let alone leadership, such as with the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the convention banning antipersonnel landmines. Yet the politics of global governance is not only about who gets included in decisionmaking, but also about who gets excluded (and at what price), as well as institutional bias and privilege (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 17). South African Peter Vale (1995), for example, argues that economic liberalism and the increased influence of multilateral institutions have only intensified “mar¬ ket-driven poverty” for the vast majority of Africans, Eastern Europeans, and others whose states are failing. The widening inequality between rich and poor, the failure to address growing environmental crises, concerns about

30

Understanding Global Governance

labor conditions in many areas of the world, and other shortfalls of contempo¬ rary global governance have provoked a lively debate about the politics of global governance and, in particular, the “who gets what” and “who benefits” questions. For Vale and many others, contemporary pieces of global governance are “too geographically unbalanced, dominated by the largest economies. . . . Most small and poor developing countries are excluded, as are people’s orga¬ nizations. . . . The structures and processes for global policy-making are not representative. . . . There are no mechanisms for making ethical standards and human rights binding for corporations and individuals, not just governments” (UNDP 1999: 8). Yet power and influence in global governance do not belong only to pow¬ erful states, coalitions of states, or even rising powers such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa. MNCs exercise power in investment choices and fi¬ nancial markets. NGOs exercise soft power—the power to persuade, name, and shame. They also command resources such as money from donations, and ex¬ pertise that can be used to affect the lives of those who receive humanitarian re¬ lief or development assistance. IGOs such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have the power to shape the development and monetary policies of borrowing states, and the lives of millions of refugees. We borrow from Ronnie Lipschutz (1997: 83) a useful set of questions re¬ garding the politics of governance: “Who rules? Whose rules? What rules? What kind of rules? At what level? In what form? Who decides? On what basis?” And, who benefits? Answers to these questions will emerge in subse¬ quent chapters, but first we examine three critical challenges: legitimacy, ac¬ countability, and effectiveness.

Legitimacy Why do the powerful and not-so-powerful actors in global governance decide to cooperate? Why do actors obey rules in the absence of coercion? The deci¬ sion to comply with rules, norms, and law rests on legitimacy: “the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed,” as Ian Hurd (2007: 30) defines it. “Such a belief is necessarily normative and subjective [and] has im¬ plications for behavior, as its presence changes the strategic calculation made by actors about how to respond to the rule or institution. . . . [T]he decision whether to comply is no longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution or by a calculation of self-interest but, instead by an internal sense of rightness and obligation.” A key aspect of legitimacy in the international system is membership in the international community, whose system of multilateral, reciprocal interac¬ tions helps to validate its members, institutions, and rules. International insti¬ tutions like the United Nations, for example, are perceived as legitimate to the extent that they are created and function according to certain principles of

The Challenges of Global Governance

31

right process, such as one-state, one-vote. The UN Security Council’s legiti¬ macy as the core institution in the international system imbued with authority to authorize the use of force derives from the widespread acceptance of that role, as we will discuss in Chapter 4. As political theorists have long noted, flags and rituals are important symbols of legitimate authority. Thus, when peacekeeping forces wear UN blue helmets, they symbolize the international community’s desire to preserve a cease-fire in hostilities and, since their coer¬ cive power is severely limited, it is their token presence that induces states and other actors to comply. When the Security Council refused to approve the US military operation in Iraq in 2003, it denied the United States the symbols of legitimacy and affected how the mission was regarded by much of the world. As Thomas Franck (1990: 205) explains, “It is because states constitute a com¬ munity that legitimacy has the power to influence their conduct.” Legitimacy is also intimately tied to whether the many nonstate actors and vocal members of civil society have a voice and can participate in global gov¬ ernance. Steve Chamovitz (2006: 366) asserts, “Intergovernmental consulta¬ tion with NGOs can enhance the legitimacy of international decision-making, but it is the consultation itself that makes the contribution, not the quantity of NGO support obtained.” If IGOs’ decisionmaking processes exclude civil so¬ ciety or marginalize the voice of small, poor states, does that undermine the le¬ gitimacy and viability of these institutions? In Chapters 4 and 6, we explore the issue of NGO participation in particular.

Accountability As a result of the diffusion of domestic democratic norms into the international arena, actors in global governance, including IGOs, NGOs, MNCs, experts, and ad hoc commissions, have faced growing demands for greater accountability and transparency. Some of these demands come from NGOs and civil society groups themselves; others come from democratic governments. Even if dele¬ gates to international conferences and IGO meetings come from democratic governments and are instructed by and accountable to elected officials, the con¬ ferences and meetings may well be closed to the public and operate more like private clubs. The UN Security Council, along with the World Bank, WTO, and IMF, have all been charged with operating in secrecy. There is also an active de¬ bate over the “democratic deficit” in EU institutions, as discussed in Chapter 5. Despite the general call for accountability, there is no single, widely ac¬ cepted definition. At its core is the idea of account-giving—reporting, mea¬ suring, justifying, and explaining actions. The question is to whom and for what actors are accountable, and how to measure this accountability. Are IGOs accountable only to their member states, for example? To whom are NGOs ac¬ countable? What about expert groups or private governance arrangements? Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane (2005) have identified seven accounta¬ bility mechanisms that operate in world politics, ranging from hierarchical and

32

Understanding Global Governance

fiscal accountability to peer and public reputational accountability. They add, however, that international accountability is relatively haphazard and less likely to constrain more powerful actors. Mark Bovens (2008: 14) explains why accountability is so important: “It provides legitimacy to public officials and public organizations,” he says, and “is meant to assure public confidence in government and to bridge the gap between citizens and representatives and between governed and government.” On the other hand, he adds, “accounta¬ bility arrangements assure that public officials or public organizations remain on the virtuous path.” Central to having accountability is ensuring transparency. With respect to IGOs, Alexandru Grigorescu (2007: 626) asserts that “information about an organization’s deliberations, decisions, and actions needs to be made available to determine if government representatives and 10 officials are acting in the public’s interest. If this information is not public, officials cannot be held ac¬ countable for their actions.” And more generally, Chayes and Chayes (1995: 22) argue that transparency “is an almost universal element of management strategy . . . [that] influences strategic interactions among parties ... in the di¬ rection of compliance.” Some institutions may have established mechanisms for accountability, such as the WTO’s Appellate Body, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, and the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services. In other situations, an ad hoc body may be created to investigate a particular problem, as was the case with an independent inquiry committee (the Volcker Committee) that investigated the UN’s Oil-for-Food Programme. NGOs and member states have played key roles in pushing for such accountability and transparency. Lack of transparency may adversely affect not only legitimacy, but also the efficacy of all kinds of institutions. An ongoing challenge for global gov¬ ernance in the future, then, is how to increase transparency and accountability of various pieces of governance—IGOs, NGOs, informal groups, and private authorities—without undermining the very conditions that enable deal-making and cooperation.

Effectiveness: Measuring Success and Failure A third critical challenge involves the effectiveness of governance and the suc¬ cess or failure of different approaches to addressing needs and problems. What are the outcomes of rules and actions? How are people actually affected by the pieces of global governance? Is security increased, are health and well-being im¬ proved, is poverty reduced, is environmental degradation slowed? The task of assessing effectiveness is one of the central challenges in public policymaking, whether at local, national, regional, or global levels of politics and governance. As P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (2001: 13-14) note, “Ef¬ fectiveness goes beyond formal compliance; parties may come into compli¬ ance with agreements effortlessly for a time and without undertaking any mea-

The Challenges of Global Governance

33

sures that change behavior or contribute to solving the problem. Agreements themselves may not be ambitious enough to provide more than temporary or cosmetic relief of global problems.” The key question is: What works? “The complexity of international issues, their overlapping nature, and the turmoil of the arena in which they’ surface defy tidy theorizing about effective manage¬ ment.” There are many points of view and interests to be reconciled, shifting politics, and uncertainties about the efficacies of different policy alternatives. In assessing effectiveness, several key questions may be asked. Who does what to translate agreements into action, including incorporating norms into domestic laws? Which techniques or mechanisms work best to get targeted ac¬ tors to change their behavior, and what are the reactions to noncompliance? Who provides incentives or technical assistance to developing countries to get them to comply with environmental rules? Which actors employ diplomacy or public shaming, impose economic sanctions, or employ military force to pun¬ ish failure to comply? *

*

*

The challenges of global governance, then, include a variety of international policy problems and issues that require governance, not all of which are nec¬ essarily global in scope. Rather, what we see is a multilevel and often very dif¬ fuse system of pieces of governance with many different actors playing key roles alongside states. The need for more pieces of governance is clearly ris¬ ing with globalization and other developments; the processes are complex; the politics, even in a world with a single superpower, is an ongoing struggle to control “who gets what”; and the issues of legitimacy, accountability, and ef¬ fectiveness require constant attention.

■

Suggested Further Reading

Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall, eds. (2005) Power in Global Governance. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. (1995) The New Sovereignty: Compli¬ ance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Commission on Global Governance. (1995) Our Global Neighbourhood: Report of the Commission on Global Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Held, David, and Anthony McGrew, eds. (2002) Governing Globalization: Power, Au¬ thority, and Global Governance. Cambridge: Blackwell. Slaughter, Anne Marie. (2004) A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wilkinson, Rorden, ed. (2005) The Global Governance Reader. New York: Routledge.

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The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

Scholars use international relations (IR) theories to describe, explain, and predict various aspects of international relations. Each is based on a set of key ideas about the nature and roles of individuals, conceptions of the state, sovereignty, and interactions among states and other actors, as well as concep¬ tions about the international system. Explicitly or implicitly, IR theories are also theories of global governance, addressing questions of “who governs,” how governance occurs, and with what effects. They are also theories of how global change occurs and, hence, of how patterns of global governance have changed in the past, may be changing in the present, and might change in the future. In this chapter, we briefly discuss four major theories—liberalism, re¬ alism, social constructivism, and critical theories—with particular attention to what each has to say about global governance and international cooperation. In addition, we explore some of the most important variants of each theory. Middle-level theories derived from the major theories often link even more specifically to international law and organization, as well as to core ideas regarding global governance. These include functionalism, international regimes, and collective goods drawn from liberalism; rational choice, hege¬ monic stability, and great-power concerts drawn from realism; and depen¬ dency theory drawn from critical Marxism. Economic and sociological theo¬ ries about both interorganizational and intraorganizational processes are also useful for examining global governance. Subsequent chapters refer back to these theories as an aid to understanding and analyzing pieces and processes of global governance.

■

Liberalism

Liberal theory in the classical tradition holds that human nature is basically good, social progress is possible, and human behavior is malleable and per¬ fectible through institutions. Injustice, aggression, and war are, according to

35

36

Understanding Global Governance

liberals, products of inadequate or corrupt social institutions and of misunder¬ standing among leaders. They are not inevitable, but rather can be eliminated through collective or multilateral action and institutional reform. The expan¬ sion of human freedom is a core liberal belief that can be achieved through de¬ mocracy and market capitalism. The roots of liberalism are found in the seventeenth-century Grotian tra¬ dition, eighteenth-century Enlightenment, nineteenth-century political and economic liberalism, and twentieth-century Wilsonian idealism. The Grotian tradition developed from the writings of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), an early Dutch legal scholar. Just prior to the European states’ challenge to universal religious authority in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Grotius asserted that all international relations were subject to the rule of law—both the law of nations and the law of nature. He rejected the idea that states can do whatever they wish and that war is the supreme right of states. Grotius believed that states, like people, are basically rational and law-abiding. The Enlightenment’s contribution to liberalism rests on Greek ideas that individuals are rational human beings and have the capacity to improve their condition by creating a just society. If a just society is not attained, then the fault rests with inadequate institutions. The writings of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) reflect these core Enlightenment beliefs with their extensive treatment of the relationship between democracy and peace. Kant was among the first political thinkers to articulate this connection and the possibility of “perpetual peace” among democratic states. Then as now, the liberal theory of democratic peace did not mean that democratic states would refrain from war in their relations with nondemocratic states, but Kant did argue that in a “pa¬ cific union,” free, democratic states would retain their sovereignty while working together to avoid war. Nineteenth-century liberalism linked the rationalism of the Enlighten¬ ment, and the growing faith in modernization through the scientific and indus¬ trial revolutions, to promoting democracy and free trade. Adam Smith and Jer¬ emy Bentham believed that free trade would create interdependencies that would raise the cost of war and reward fair cooperation and competition with peace, prosperity, and greater justice. This strand of liberalism forms the basis for economic liberalism, examined in more detail in Chapter 9. To stimulate individual (and therefore collective) economic growth and to maximize eco¬ nomic welfare, free markets must be allowed to develop and mature, and gov¬ ernments must permit the free flow of trade and economic intercourse. The beliefs of US president Woodrow Wilson, captured best in the Four¬ teen Points on which the Versailles Treaty (ending World War I) and the Covenant of the League of Nations were based, formed a core of twentiethcentury liberalism. Wilson envisioned that creating a system of collective se¬ curity, promoting self-determination of peoples, and eliminating power poli¬ tics could prevent war. The League of Nations illustrated the importance that

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

37

liberals place on international institutions for collective problem solving. Early-twentieth-century liberals were also strong advocates of international law, arbitration, and courts to promote cooperation and guarantee peace. Be¬ cause of their faith in human reason and progress, they were often labeled “idealists.” With the League of Nations’ failure to prevent World War II, the Holocaust, and the Cold War, liberalism and idealism came under intense crit¬ icism from realist theorists. For liberals, while individual human beings are key actors, states are the most important collective actors, but they are pluralistic not unitary actors. That is, moral and ethical principles, elections (in the case of democratic states), power relations and bargaining among domestic and transnational groups, and changing international conditions shape states’ interests and poli¬ cies. There is no single definition of states’ national interests; rather, states vary in their goals, and their interests change. Liberals recognize the roles of nonstate actors and transnational and transgovernmental groups as well. Liberals believe that cooperation is possible and will grow over time for two reasons. First, they view the international system as a context within which multiple interactions occur and where various actors “learn” from their interactions, rather than a structure of relationships based on the distribution of power among states and a fixed concept of state sovereignty. Hedley Bull (1977) also promoted the idea that the system is a society where actors adhere to common norms, consent to common rules and institutions, and recognize common interests. Power matters, but it is exercised within this framework of rules and institutions, which also makes international cooperation possible. Second, liberals expect mutual interests to increase with greater interdepen¬ dence, knowledge, communication, and the spread of democratic values. This will promote greater cooperation and thereby peace, welfare, and justice. Liberals view international organizations as arenas where states interact and cooperate to solve common problems. International law is viewed as one of the major instruments for framing and maintaining order in the international system, although it represents horizontal rather than hierarchical authority. As Louis Henkin (1979: 22) explains: If one doubts the significance of this law, one need only imagine a world in which it were absent. . . . There would be no security of nations or stability of governments; territory and airspace would not be respected; vessels could navigate only at their constant peril; property—within or without any given territory—would be subject to arbitrary seizure; persons would have no pro¬ tection of law or diplomacy; agreements would not be made or observed; diplomatic relations would end; international trade would cease; inter¬ national organizations and arrangements would disappear.

For liberals, international organizations play a number of key roles, includ¬ ing contributing to habits of cooperation and serving as arenas for negotiating

38

Understanding Global Governance

and developing coalitions. They are a primary means for mitigating the danger of war, promoting the development of shared norms, and enhancing order. They carry out operational activities to help address substantive international prob¬ lems, and may form parts of international regimes. They can be used by states as instruments of foreign policy or to constrain the behavior of others. Andrew Moravcsik (1997), for one, uses liberal theory to show the links between do¬ mestic politics within states and intergovernmental cooperation. Core liberal beliefs in the roots of cooperation and role of international in¬ stitutions have been challenged since the 1970s by so-called neoliberal insti¬ tutionalists. Their ideas form an important variant on liberal theory.

Neoliberal Institutionalism or Neoliberalism In the 1970s, liberalism experienced a revival following the Cold War preem¬ inence of realism. Increasing international interdependence and heightened awareness, especially by Americans, of the sensitivities and vulnerabilities that characterize interdependence were major factors boosting this revival. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s book Power and Interdependence (1977), which outlined how international institutions constituted an important re¬ sponse to conditions of complex interdependence, also had a major impact. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that “even if . . . anarchy constrains the will¬ ingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions” (Grieco 1993: 117). They therefore take a more state-centric view of international relations and believe that states are rational actors in a generally anarchic world. At the same time, they recognize that states have incentives to cooperate because they seek to maximize absolute gains. As a result, cooperation is a common occurrence, not the rare exception. Through institutions, states can solve col¬ lective action problems, that is, problems that one state alone cannot solve. Some neoliberal institutionalists, such as Robert Axelrod and Robert Keo¬ hane (1986), have drawn on game theory and particularly the Prisoners’ Dilemma game to illustrate how cooperation is in the individual state’s selfinterest. The Prisoners’ Dilemma is the story of two prisoners, each being held and interrogated separately for an alleged crime. The interrogator tells each prisoner that if one of them confesses and the other does not, the one who con¬ fesses will go free and the one who keeps silent will get a long prison term. If both confess, both will get somewhat reduced prison terms. If neither con¬ fesses, both will receive short prison terms based on lack of evidence. In the first play, both prisoners will confess and each will serve a longer sentence than if they had cooperated and kept silent. The self-serving behavior of each player leads to bad outcomes for both players. If the game is repeated, however, or the environment changed—for instance, by allowing communication—the possi¬ bility of joint gains provides incentives to cooperate by remaining silent. Neo¬ liberals have drawn a number of conclusions from studying Prisoners’

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

39

Dilemma games. For example, they have shown that if states use a tit-for-tat strategy of reciprocating each other’s cooperation, they are likely to find this mutually beneficial over the long term, especially if the costs of verifying com¬ pliance and sanctioning cheaters are relatively low compared to the costs of joint action (Grieco 1993: 122). They have also shown that the applicability of the Prisoners’ Dilemma varies between economic and security issues when there are shared norms, and if issues are linked. Finally, use of the Prisoners’ Dilemma has helped neoliberals demonstrate that although states may be inde¬ pendent actors, their policy choices tend to be interdependent. The 1970s and early 1980s presented a puzzle for neoliberals. Given the major international economic dislocations resulting from rising oil prices, the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements for international monetary rela¬ tions, increasing third world debt, and the decline in US economic power rel¬ ative to Europe and Japan, why did the post-World War II institutions for eco¬ nomic cooperation (such as the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) not collapse? Keohane’s influential book After Hegemony (1984) answered this question by emphasizing the cooperation that states achieved through international institutions and the effects of institutions and practices on state behavior. Thus, according to neoliberal institutionalists, states that have continuous interactions with each other choose to cooperate, despite the anarchic interna¬ tional environment, because they realize that they will have future interactions with the same actors. Continuous interactions also provide the motivation for states to create international institutions, which in turn moderate state behav¬ ior, provide a guaranteed framework for interactions and a context for bargain¬ ing, provide mechanisms for reducing cheating by monitoring behavior and punishing defectors, and facilitate transparency of the actions of all. Interna¬ tional institutions provide focal points for coordination and serve to make state commitments more credible by specifying what is expected, thereby encour¬ aging states to establish reputations for compliance. They are an efficient so¬ lution to problems of coordination because they provide information that aids decisionmaking and reduces the transaction costs for achieving agreement among large numbers of states (Keohane and Martin 1995). States benefit be¬ cause institutions do things for members that cannot be accomplished unilat¬ erally. Thus, for neoliberals, institutions have important and independent ef¬ fects on interstate interactions, both by providing information and by framing actions, but they do not necessarily affect states’ underlying motivations. Neoliberals recognize that not all efforts to cooperate will yield good re¬ sults. Cooperation can aid the few at the expense of the many, and accentuate or mitigate injustice. Unlike many earlier liberals, some neoliberals have been more willing to address issues of power, particularly in answering the question of how cooperation emerges initially. To explain the creation, for example, of the post-World War II network of international economic institutions and

40

Understanding Global Governance

shared standards for liberalizing trade and capital flows, neoliberal institution¬ alists such as Robert Keohane (1984) and John Gerard Ruggie (1982) have fo¬ cused on the role of the United States as a hegemonic state, the particular char¬ acter of the order it created (embedded liberalism), and the joint gains it offered the Europeans and Japanese for cooperating. Liberalism and neoliberalism have spawned several middle-level theories that provide additional dimensions for explaining international cooperative be¬ havior. These include functionalism, regime theory, and collective goods theory.

Functionalism Functionalism is rooted in the belief that governance arrangements arise out of the basic, or functional, needs of people and states. Thus, it explains the origin and development of many IGOs. Functionalists, however, assert that interna¬ tional economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for political coopera¬ tion and eliminating war, whose causes (in their view) lie in ignorance, poverty, hunger, and disease. As articulated by David Mitrany in A Working Peace System (1946: 7), the task of functionalism is “not how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together.” He foresaw “a spreading web of inter¬ national activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all nations would be gradually integrated” (14). Not all functionalists share this vision, but they do share a belief that it is possible to bypass politi¬ cal rivalries of states and build habits of cooperation in nonpolitical economic and social spheres by addressing problems requiring international cooperation for solution. Increasing amounts of such cooperation will expand these coop¬ erative interactions and build a base of common values. Eventually, those habits spill over into cooperation in political and military affairs. A key aspect of this process is the role of technical experts and the assumption that these ex¬ perts will lose their close identification with their own states and develop new sets of allegiances to like-minded individuals around the globe. The form that specific functional organizations take is determined by the problem to be solved and shapes an organization’s mandate as well as the scope of its mem¬ bership. In short, form follows function. Functionalism is applicable at both regional and global levels and has been important in explaining the evolution of the European Union as a process of economic integration, gradually spilling over into limited political integra¬ tion. The “father of Europe,” Jean Monnet, believed that nationalism could be weakened and war in Europe made unthinkable in the long run by taking prac¬ tical steps toward economic integration that would ultimately advance Euro¬ pean political union. The success of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), proposed by Monnet, led to the creation of the European Atomic En¬ ergy Community (Euratom) to manage peaceful uses of atomic energy and to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), with its common

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

41

market and many facets of practical cooperation for boosting European eco¬ nomic and social development. Functional theory fell short in its prediction that such cooperation would spill over in a deterministic fashion from the eco¬ nomic area into areas of national security. Although most analysts would credit European integration with making the region a “zone of peace,” achieving common foreign and security policy has proved particularly difficult for EU members. In fact, neofunctionalists theorized that the process and dynamics of cooperation are not automatic. At key points, political decisions are needed and these may or may not be taken (Haas 1964). The evolution of European integration has borne this out (see Chapter 5 for further discussion). Functionalist theory also helps us understand the development of early IGOs such as the International Telegraph Union (ITU, later renamed the Inter¬ national Telecommunication Union), Universal Postal Union (UPU), and Commission for Navigation on the Rhine River, as well as the specialized agencies of the UN system such as the World Health Organization (WHO), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and International Labour Organization (ILO). These are discussed further in Chapter 3. Harold Jacobson, William Reisinger, and Todd Mathers (1986) tested key propositions of functionalism as an explanation for the phenomenon of IGO development and found that the overwhelming number of IGOs could be clas¬ sified as functional. That is, they have specific mandates, links to economic is¬ sues, and limited memberships, often related to geographic region. The major¬ ity of those created since 1960 have been established by other IGOs and show increasing differentiation of functions, particularly in the social field. This trend toward greater specialization characterizes trends in domestic govern¬ ment as well. Jacobson, Reisinger, and Mathers also found, however, that functionalism did not provide a complete explanation for the trends in IGO de¬ velopment. Historical currents in world politics, particularly the process of de¬ colonization, were important. Finally, they found that “the evolving web of in¬ ternational governmental organizations has modified the global political system, as functionalism argued that it would, but it has not yet radically trans¬ formed this system, as functionalism hoped would happen” (1986: 157). Functionalism fails to address a number of key questions and problem areas. If the ultimate goal is elimination of war, and war is not caused just by economic deprivation, illiteracy, hunger, and disease, then how can the other causes of war be alleviated? Another basic flaw is the assumption that political and nonpolitical issues can easily be distinguished. A further problem is the as¬ sumption that habits of economic and social cooperation will transfer to politi¬ cal areas. In fact, the European integration process since 1950 has shown the degree to which functionalists underestimated the strength of state sovereignty and national loyalties. Despite these limitations, functionalism has proven a useful theoretical approach for understanding the development of a key piece

42

Understanding Global Governance

of global governance—international intergovernmental organizations cooperation many IGOs foster in economic and social issue areas.

and the

International Regimes A second important middle-level theory within liberalism emerged from in¬

ternational law. In the 1970s, legal scholars began to use the concept of inter¬ national regimes that we introduced in Chapter 1. They recognized that inter¬ national law consisted not only of formal authoritative prohibitions, but also of more informal norms and rules of behavior that over time may become codified and sometimes institutionalized. By referring to the totality of these norms and rules of behavior as “regimes,” they emphasized the governance provided for specific issue areas. International relations scholars have found regime theory particularly useful for examining many aspects of governance. According to the most widely used definition, a regime includes “sets of im¬ plicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area” (Krasner 1982: 1). Unlike functionalism, which is based solely in the liberal tradition, regime theory has been shaped not only by liberalism and especially neoliberalism, but also by realism and neorealism (discussed later in this chapter). Some regime theorists focus on the role of power relations among states in shaping regimes, particularly the role of a hegemonic state such as the United States (or Great Britain in the nineteenth century). Others recognize how common in¬ terests aid states in enhancing transparency and reducing uncertainty in their environment. Regime theorists have also used constructivist approaches (dis¬ cussed later) to focus on social relations and the ways in which the strong pat¬ terns of interaction often found in an international regime actually affect state interests (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000). Explaining how regimes are created and maintained, and how, why, and when they change, are key tasks for regime theorists. Regime theory has shown how states create these frameworks to coordi¬ nate their actions with those of other states, if and when necessary for achiev¬ ing their national interests. Regimes can provide information to participants and reduce uncertainty. Over time, coordination may lead to a partial conver¬ gence of interests and values among the parties in a regime, as well as a grow¬ ing sense of legitimacy. Regime theorists have focused on IGO roles in the creation and mainte¬ nance of regimes, while being careful not to equate an IGO with the existence of a regime. By themselves, IGOs do not constitute a regime, but their char¬ ters may incorporate principles, norms, rules, decisionmaking processes, and functions that formalize these aspects of a regime. An IGO’s decisionmaking processes may then be used by member states for further norm and rule cre¬ ation, for rule enforcement and dispute settlement, for the provision of collec-

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

43

tive goods, and for supporting operational activities. Thus, IGOs are one way that habits of cooperation are sustained and expanded. Identifying international regimes in different issue areas enables scholars to discuss the interaction not only between states and IGOs, but also between various IGOs, between IGOs and NGOs, and among noninstitutionalized rules and procedures that have developed over time. Regimes enable scholars to ex¬ amine informal patterns and ad hoc groupings that enhance international co¬ operation. As Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger (2000: 3) succinctly summarize: Regimes are deliberately constructed, partial international orders on either a regional or a global scale, which are intended to remove specific issue areas of international politics from the sphere of self-help behaviour. By creating shared expectations about appropriate behaviour and by upgrading the level of transparency in the issue area, regimes help states (and other actors) to co¬ operate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security.

There is now a substantial body of literature explaining the formation, per¬ sistence, and decline of international regimes, as well as their specific proper¬ ties and openness to change (Rittberger 1993; Young 1989). There is also a growing examination of issue areas where regimes have not developed. In the areas of global deforestation and small arms limitations, for example, one study has noted the absence of regimes. In such cases, the lack of reliable information and the absence of recognized interdependence of issues explain the failure to develop regimes. In short, there is no perceived need for collective action (Dimitrov et al. 2007). Despite inherent ambiguities, the study of international regimes and regime theory has helped link international institutions and gover¬ nance by establishing that governance and order are embedded in norms and in¬ volve more than just organizational structures.

Collective or Public Goods Theory Still another approach within liberalism to explaining governance and cooper¬ ation has involved the application of collective or public goods theory. Biolo¬ gist Garrett Hardin (1968), in his article “The Tragedy of the Commons,” tells the story of a group of herders who share a common grazing area. Each herder finds it economically rational to increase the size of his own herd, allowing him to sell more in the market and hence return more profits. Yet if all herders follow what is individually rational behavior, then the group loses; too many animals graze the land and the quality of the pasture deteriorates, which leads to decreased output for all. As each person rationally attempts to maximize his own gain, the collectivity suffers, and eventually all individuals suffer. What Hardin describes—the common grazing area—is a collective good available to all members of the group, regardless of individual contribution.

44

Understanding Global Governance

Collective or public goods may be tangible or intangible. In the global context, they include the “natural commons” such as the high seas, atmo¬ sphere, ozone shield, and polar regions. They also include what Inge Kaul (2000: 300) calls “human-made global commons” such as universal norms and principles, knowledge, and the Internet, as well as “global conditions” ranging from peace, health, and financial stability to free trade, environmental sustain¬ ability, and freedom from poverty. The use of collective goods involves activities and choices that are inter¬ dependent. Decisions by one state have effects for other states; that is, states can suffer unanticipated negative consequences as a result of the actions of others. For example, a decision by developed countries in the 1980s to con¬ tinue the production and sale of chlorofluorocarbons would have affected all countries through further, long-term depletion of the ozone layer. With collec¬ tive goods, market mechanisms are inadequate and alternative forms of gov¬ ernance are needed. A central concern in collective or public goods theory, therefore, revolves around the question of who provides the public goods. Without some kind of collective action mechanisms, there is a risk that such goods will not be adequately provided. Once they are, however, the goods exist and all can enjoy them, which creates the problem of “free-riding.” Collective goods are easier to provide in small groups than in large groups. Mancur Olson, in The Logic of Collective Action (1968: 35), argues that “the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good.” Free-riding and defection are harder to conceal and easier to punish if the group is small. With larger groups, the fraction of the group that benefits will decline and organizational costs will increase. Smaller groups can more effectively monitor each other and exert pressure, since violations will be more easily noticed. Small groups can also mobilize collective pressure more effectively and can more easily obtain the continuous information necessary for effective allocation. Miles Kahler (1992), however, argues that voting rules, delegation, and other strategies can facilitate cooper¬ ation within large groups. Another alternative is to force nations or peoples to govern collective goods by establishing organizations with effective police powers that coerce states or individuals to act in a mutually beneficial manner. Such an organiza¬ tion could, for example, force people to limit the number of children they have in order to stop the population explosion. Elinor Ostrom (1990), however, sug¬ gests that the most effective management may be self-governance, with pri¬ vate agents acting as enforcers. Individuals or groups make binding contracts to commit themselves to cooperative strategies, and use the enforcers to mon¬ itor each other and report infractions. Finally, public goods theory suggests that those confronted with a collec¬ tive action problem could seek to restructure actors’ preferences through re¬ wards and punishments. For example, mechanisms could be established to

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

45

offer positive incentives for states to refrain from destroying the polar regions and to tax or threaten to tax those who fail to cooperate. Collective goods theory can be used to explain the role of international agreements, the United Nations, and many IGOs, as well as international regimes in producing (dr underproducing) various goods. It can also be used to investigate the gaps in international efforts to deal with policy issues. Col¬ lective goods theory is especially useful for examining those global commons areas such as the high seas or ozone layer over which no state can claim sov¬ ereignty because these have been designated as the common heritage of humankind. Thus, collective or public goods theory, along with other liberal theories, sees international organizations, international law, and international regimes playing positive roles in facilitating cooperation and managing public goods. They believe, for example, that the UN has helped to check power politics, cre¬ ate some degree of shared interests in place of national interests, provide a forum for international cooperation, and promote human progress. These views stand in opposition to those of realists, who are primarily interested in states’ exercise of power and pursuit of national interests.

■

Realism

A product of a long philosophical and historical tradition, realism in its vari¬ ous forms is based on the assumption that individuals act rationally to protect their own interests. Within the international system, realists see states as the primary actors, entities that act in a unitary way in pursuit of their national in¬ terest, which is generally defined in terms of maximizing power and security relative to other states. States coexist in an anarchic international system char¬ acterized by the absence of an authoritative hierarchy. As a result, states must rely primarily on themselves to manage their own insecurity through balance of power and deterrence. Because each state is concerned with acquiring more power relative to other states, competition between states is keen and there is little basis for cooperation. To most realists, in the absence of international authority, there are few rules or norms that restrain states, although Hans Morgenthau, generally re¬ garded as the father of modem realism, did include chapters on international morality, law, and government in his pathbreaking textbook Politics Among Nations. In his view (1967: 219-220), “The main function of these normative systems has been to keep aspirations for power within socially tolerable bounds. . . . [MJorality, mores, and law intervene in order to protect society against disruption and the individual against enslavement and extinction.” Yet Morgenthau suggested that there had been a weakening of these moral limita¬ tions from earlier times, when there was a cohesive international society

46

Understanding Global Governance

bound together through elite ties and common morality. Thus, international law and government, in his view, are largely weak and ineffective. For Morgenthau, international organizations are a tool of states to be used when de¬ sired; they can increase or decrease the power of states, but they do not affect the basic characteristics of the international system; because they reflect the distribution of power among states, they are no more than the sum of their member states. In fact, they are susceptible to great-power manipulation. Thus, international organizations have no independent effect on state behavior and will not over time change the system itself. Most realist theorists do not claim that international cooperation is impos¬ sible, only that there are few incentives for states to enter into international arrangements and that they can always exit such arrangements with little dif¬ ficulty. International organizations are viewed as epiphenomenal. Hence, since international institutions and agreements have no enforcement power, they will have little independent impact on state actions or world politics in gen¬ eral. They have no authority and hence no power (Gruber 2000). Realists do not acknowledge the importance or influence of nonstate actors such as NGOs and MNCs in international politics and governance, nor do they accept the idea of IGOs as independent actors. To most realists, deterrence and balance of power have proven more effective in maintaining peace than have interna¬ tional institutions.

Neorealism or Structural Realism

*

Among the variants of realism, the most powerful is neorealism or structural realism, which owes much to Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979). The core difference between traditional realists and neorealists lies in the emphasis placed on the structure of the international system for explaining world politics. The system’s structure is determined by the ordering principle, namely the absence of overarching authority (anarchy), and the distribution of capabilities (power) among states. What matters are states’ material capabili¬ ties; state identities and interests are largely given and fixed. Anarchy poses a severe constraint on state behavior. But how it is defined, and how much of a constraint it imposes on the possibilities for cooperation and international order, are matters of dispute and some confusion among both neorealists and neoliberals (Baldwin 1993). This has important implications for theorizing about global governance (Milner 1991), since most definitions involve ques¬ tions of government, authority, and governance in some way. Likewise, the way in which the power distribution shapes state behavior and provides order in international politics, either through the formation of balances of power or through a hierarchy of relations between states with unequal power, under¬ scores that order is a product less of state actions, much less of international institutions, than of system structure.

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

47

In neorealist theory, the possibilities for international cooperation are log¬ ically slim, though not impossible. As Waltz (1979: 105) posits: When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask'how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not “Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?” If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its dis¬ proportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities.

In contrast to this neorealist emphasis on relative gains from cooperation, neo¬ liberals stress that actors with common interests try to maximize their absolute gains (Stein 1982: 318). Charles Lipson (1984: 15-18) has pointed out that rel¬ ative gains are more important in security matters than in economic issues, making cooperation more difficult to achieve, harder to maintain, and more dependent on states’ power. Since anarchy fuels insecurity, states are wary of becoming too dependent on others, preferring greater control and increased capabilities. Many neorealists do recognize the emergence of international regimes and institutions, but believe their importance has been exaggerated. Others such as John Mearsheimer are not just skeptical about international institu¬ tions, but also outright disdainful. In his view, institutions are merely arenas for pursuing power relationships. They have “minimal influence on state be¬ havior and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world” (1994—1995: 7). In fact, Mearsheimer (49) suggests that the US reliance on such institutions is apt to lead to more failures. While not all neo¬ realists would go as far as Mearsheimer, it is clear that many believe that in¬ ternational institutions do not have independent effects worth studying. Al¬ though there are many criticisms of neorealism’s inability to explain system change and failure to incorporate variables other than the structure of the in¬ ternational system, it continues to have a strong influence on IR scholars. One middle-level theory derived from realism that has addressed issues of interna¬ tional cooperation more directly is strategic or rational choice.

Strategic or Rational Choice Theory Strategic or rational choice theory has enjoyed wide usage in other fields of political science as well as in economics. It assumes that preferences are de¬ duced from objective and material conditions of the state. Predicated on the view that markets are the most efficient mechanism of human behavior, strate¬ gic choice theorists often use the language of microeconomic theory to explain state choices. Yet they also acknowledge that market imperfections may arise.

48

Understanding Global Governance

Information may be incomplete, or transaction costs may be too high. Then, organizations and institutions can play key roles. They may also act as con¬ straints on choice. Lloyd Gmber (2000) is intrigued by the fact that states find it rational to take part in international arrangements, even though they would prefer the original, precooperation status quo. He argues that states fear being left behind; they want to join the bandwagon, even when it is not directly in their best interest. States come to believe that the status quo—not participating in such agreements—is not an option and they may be forced to conform to the rules of the game. Key to rational or strategic choice theory is the assumption that state ac¬ tions are based on rational calculations about subjective expected utility. Such calculations incorporate estimates of others’ capabilities and likely intentions. From this perspective, then, Keohane (1993: 288) suggests, “international in¬ stitutions exist largely because they facilitate self-interested cooperation by re¬ ducing uncertainty, thus stabilizing expectations.” Hence an analysis of ra¬ tional state action within Europe, for example, must take Europe’s many international institutions into account. Rational choice theorists are also interested in how states use international institutions to further their national goals and how they design institutions to reflect those goals. Thus they see institutional designs as “rational, negotiated responses to the problems international actors face” (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001: 768). For example, US, Canadian, and Mexican negotiators made certain that the North American Free Trade Agreement conformed to the rules of the global trading system under GATT. Similarly, participation in the nu¬ clear nonproliferation regime requires states to accept inspections, a deliberate strategy to reduce uncertainty and defection. In short, rational choice theory sees decisions on membership rules, scope of issues covered, rules for control¬ ling an institution, and flexibility of arrangements as products of rational de¬ sign considerations. Unlike in other variations on realist theory, power is not a central consideration. The same is not true with hegemonic stability theory.

Theories of Hegemonic Stability and Great-Power Concerts Middle-level hegemonic stability theory is rooted in the realist tradition, but draws also from neoliberal, regime, and public goods theories. It was devel¬ oped in the 1970s and 1980s to answer the question of how an open world economy is created and maintained. The theory’s answer is that these happen through the power and leadership of a dominant or hegemonic state that uses its position in particular ways. Some have questioned whether this must be a single state (Krasner 1976); all agree on the relationship between leadership or power and a liberal international economy. As Robert Gilpin (1987: 72) notes, “Hegemony without a liberal commitment to the market economy is more likely to lead to imperial systems and the imposition of political and economic restrictions on lesser powers.”

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

49

Hegemonic stability theory is based on the premise that an open market economy is a collective or public good (Kindleberger 1973) that cannot be sus¬ tained without the actions of a dominant economy. When there is a predomi¬ nant state with “control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods” (Keohane 1984: 32), it has the means to exercise leadership over other economies as well as to use its economic power for leverage over other states. If, and it is an important if, such a dominant power is committed to an open, liberal world economy based on nondiscrimination and free mar¬ kets, it can use its position to guarantee provision of the collective good—an open trading system and stable monetary system. In so doing, it must perform several roles, including the creation of norms and rules, preventing cheating and free-riding, encouraging others to share the costs of maintaining the sys¬ tem, encouraging states to remove trade barriers, managing (to some degree) the monetary system, using its own dynamism as an engine of growth for the rest of the system, transferring knowledge and technology, and responding to crises. As strategic choice theorists would argue, the hegemon may also be en¬ gaging in behavior that serves to perpetuate its power and position. There are, to date, only two examples of such hegemonic leadership. The first occurred during the nineteenth century, when Great Britain used its dom¬ inant position to create an era of free trade among major economic powers. The second occurred after World War II, when the United States established the Bretton Woods international trade and monetary systems, and promoted the reduction of trade barriers, the use of the dollar as a global reserve cur¬ rency, and the expansion of overseas investment. An important part of its role was the willingness to pay the costs to make its vision of a liberal economic order a reality. Some have questioned whether a theory based on two cases is sufficient to explain why a dominant state would undertake a leadership role or be com¬ mitted to liberal values. These depend, as Ruggie has noted (1982), on the hegemon’s “social purpose” and commitment to “embedded liberalism.” The persistence of international economic regimes in the face of the eco¬ nomic dislocations of the 1970s and 1980s led Keohane (1984), as noted ear¬ lier, to explore the consequences of declining hegemony. He found that, in a view compatible with the institutionalist position, cooperation may persist, even if the hegemon’s power declines and it is not performing a leadership role. A residue of common interests and the norms of the regime help to main¬ tain it, for “regimes are more readily maintained than established” (Kindle¬ berger 1986: 8). Such views have contributed significantly to understanding the bases of states’ choices and the role of power, especially hegemonic power, in the creation of international regimes. The role of power, particularly the economic power of preeminent states, also plays a key role in Daniel Drezner’s book All Politics Is Global (2007).

50

Understanding Global Governance

Like other realists and hegemonic stability theorists before him, Drezner posits that preeminent states (those with the largest internal markets and least vulner¬ ability to external shocks) are the dominant actors in the global economy, but unlike realists, Drezner links state preferences to the domestic economies. Similar to neoliberal institutionalists, he also argues that other actors IGOs, NGOs, global civil society actors—influence the processes of governance. States make the ultimate choices, however, among the different forums and in¬ stitutions of global governance. Drezner’s studies show that most cooperation will occur when there is a concert among the great powers, which may then be institutionalized in clublike groups of the like-minded or even in universal IGOs, but if there is no agreement, rival standards may deadlock IGOs. If in¬ terests of great powers and other states diverge, then club groups are convened or preeminent states shop for the most convenient venue. Although most realists have little to say about the pieces of global gover¬ nance, more recent work on hegemonic stability and great-power behavior ev¬ idences cross-fertilization among different theories. These approaches lead researchers to look at the role of dominant states in global governance out¬ comes, and how other actors affect governance processes. The benefits of cross-fertilization become equally as evident when we examine the contribu¬ tion of constructivism to global governance.

S

Social Constructivism

4

Although it is a newer approach to IR, social constructivism has become in¬ creasingly important for studying key pieces of global governance, particu¬ larly the role of norms and institutions. While there are many variants, all con¬ structivists agree that the behavior of individuals, states, and other actors is shaped by shared beliefs, socially constructed rules, and cultural practices. They argue that what actors do, how they interrelate, and the way that others interpret their behavior create and can change the meaning of norms. The ap¬ proach has strong roots in sociology and social theory. At the core of constructivist approaches is a concern with identity and in¬ terests and how these can change—a belief that ideas, values, norms, and shared beliefs matter, that how individuals talk about the world shapes prac¬ tices, that humans are capable of changing the world by changing ideas, and hence that it is necessary to show how identities and interests of actors are “so¬ cially constructed.” Whereas realists treat states’ interests and identity as given, constructivists believe they are socially constructed, that is, influenced by culture, norms, ideas, and domestic and international interactions. Thus, Germany after World War II reoriented its identity to multilateralism, embed¬ ding itself in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European in¬ stitutions with the encouragement of the United States. Russia, too, struggled to redefine its identity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

51

is currently further redefining it. For constructivists, then, states do not have identities or national interests prior to interactions with others. As Alexander Wendt (1995: 81) explains, “the social construction of international politics is to analyze how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures—cooperative or conflictual—that shape actors’ identities and inter¬ ests and the significance of their material contexts.” Constructivists place a great deal of importance on institutions as embod¬ ied in norms, practices, and formal organizations. The most important institu¬ tion in international society is sovereignty, since it determines the identity of states. Yet constructivists criticize those who see sovereignty as unchanging and point to various transformations in understandings of sovereignty since Westphalia, influenced by both states and nonstate actors (Reus-Smit 1999). To illustrate how sovereignty determines the identity of states, however, one need only consider how failed states such as Somalia retain their statehood and continue to be members of IGOs. Among the key norms affecting state behavior is multilateralism. In Mul¬ tilateralism Matters, Ruggie (1993) and others examine how the shared expec¬ tations surrounding this norm affect the behavior of states. Several other stud¬ ies have examined the impact of norms and principled beliefs on international outcomes, including the evolution of the international human rights regime (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), the end of apartheid in South Africa (Klotz 1995), the spread of weapons taboos (Tannenwald 2007), and humanitarian in¬ tervention (Finnemore 2003). In examining international organizations (IOs), constructivists seek to un¬ cover the social content of organizations, the dominant norms that govern be¬ havior and shape interests, and to decipher how these interests in turn influ¬ ence actors. IOs then may serve as agents of social construction, as norm entrepreneurs trying to change social understandings (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). They can be teachers as well as creators of norms, socializing states to accept new values and political goals (Finnemore 1996b). The UN Educa¬ tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), for example, “taught” developing states the relevance of establishing science bureaucracies as a necessary component of being a modem state. The International Commit¬ tee of the Red Cross taught humanitarian rules to states concerning their re¬ sponsibility for the welfare and protection of wounded soldiers, including enemy soldiers. The World Bank put the concept of poverty alleviation on in¬ ternational and national agendas in the late 1960s as it “sold” poverty allevia¬ tion to members through a mixture of persuasion and coercion, redefining in the process what states were supposed to do to ameliorate the situation. For constmctivists, then, IGOs in particular have real power. Barnett and Finnemore (2005: 162) argue that they “construct the social world in which co¬ operation and choice take place. They help define the interests that states and other actors come to hold and do so in ways compatible with liberalism and a lib¬ eral global order. These are important exercises of power.” In addition, Barnett

52

Understanding Global Governance

and Finnemore note with respect to the role of IGO bureaucracies that the author¬ ity of these organizations and their secretariats “lies in their ability to present themselves as impersonal and neutral—as not exercising power but instead serv¬ ing others” (2004: 21). Yet, as the same authors explore in case studies, the per¬ ception of IGOs as servants of their member states may be deceiving. Constructivists are also concerned with the potential of IOs to socialize in¬ dividual policymakers and states. Jeffrey Checkel (2005a) explores the differ¬ ent mechanisms, including strategic calculation, role-playing, and normative suasion, that connect organizations to socializing outcomes. When the norms of the institution become deeply rooted and thus internalized, actors’ identities can be transformed and interests changed. Most of this research focuses on the so¬ cializing effects of European Union membership on candidate members. Thus, to constructivists, international organizations are purposive actors with independent effects on international relations. They have been important to the processes of changing understandings and behavior with respect to poverty, humanitarianism, colonialism, slavery, and other problems. Although most constructivists have focused on positive outcomes such as decoloniza¬ tion, human rights norms, and poverty alleviation, others have made us mind¬ ful that IOs may also be dysfunctional and produce conflict rather than coop¬ eration, and act in ways contrary to the interests of their constituents. They may pursue particularistic goals, competing over turf, budgets, and staff. Such dysfunctional behavior may create a bureaucratic culture that tolerates ineffi¬ cient practices, lack of accountability, and mission-defeating behaviors (Bar¬ nett and Finnemore 1999). We discuss these issues further in later chapters.

■

Critical Theories

Critical theories comprise a diverse group of overarching theories of interna¬ tional relations that challenge conventional wisdom and provide alternative frameworks for understanding the world. Among the most prominent are Marx¬ ist and neo-Marxist theories, and their derivative, dependency theory. They challenge realism’s focus on the primacy of power and the existing order, and liberalism’s optimism about the benefits of expanding markets for peace and stability. Those rooted in Marxism share a historicism that drives questions of how the present international order came into being, what forces are at work to change it, and how that change may be influenced or shaped. Understanding how structural changes occur and the role of social forces is central.

Marxist and Neo-Marxist Theories Although Marxism was discredited with the demise of the Soviet Union and the triumph of capitalism, it is still an important perspective for describing the hi¬ erarchy in the international system and the role of economics in determining

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

53

that hierarchy. It still influences the thinking of many in the developing world whose colonial past, present weakness, and experience with capitalism are characterized by poverty and economic disadvantage. Marxist and neo-Marxist critical theories contribute important perspectives to understanding IR and global governance through the frameworks they provide for linking politics, economics, social forces, and structures of order. Like realism and liberalism, Marxism comprises a set of core ideas that unite its variants. These include a grounding in historical analysis, the primacy of economic forces in explaining political and social phenomena, the central role of the production process, the particular character of capitalism as a global mode of production, and the importance of social or economic class in defin¬ ing actors. The evolution of the production process also is a basis for explain¬ ing how new patterns of social relations develop between those who control production and those who execute the tasks of production, therefore explain¬ ing the relationship between production, social relations, and power. Accord¬ ing to Karl Marx, a clash would inevitably occur between the capitalist class (bourgeoisie) and workers (the proletariat). From that class struggle would come a new social order. Interpreting this in the context of international rela¬ tions, Robert Cox (1986: 220) noted, “Changes in the organization of produc¬ tion generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states and . . . [alter] the problematic of world order.” Marxist views of the structure of the global system, and hence of global governance, are rooted in these ideas about the relationships of class, the cap¬ italist mode of production, and power. The hierarchical structure is a byprod¬ uct of the spread of global capitalism that privileges some states, organiza¬ tions, groups, and individuals, and imposes significant constraints on others. Thus, developed countries have expanded economically (and in an earlier era politically, through imperialism), enabling them to sell goods and export sur¬ plus wealth that they could not absorb at home. Simultaneously, developing countries have become increasingly constrained and dependent on the actions of the developed. Variants of Marxism emphasize the techniques of domination and sup¬ pression that arise from the uneven economic development inherent in the cap¬ italist system. The influence of an Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci (1891— 1937), on critical theorists and some neoliberal institutionalists, however, has been considerable, given Gramsci’s particular interpretation of hegemony as a relationship of consent to political and ideological leadership, not domination by force. Thus Cox (1992b: 140) argued that the foundation of hegemonic order “derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social strata of the dominant state or states . . . [with] the acquiescence of the domi¬ nant social strata of other states.” These views have important implications for neo-Marxist theorizing about contemporary global governance. For example, in Craig Murphy’s view

54

Understanding Global Governance

(2000: 799), global governance is “a predictable institutional response not to the interests of a fully formed class, but to the overall logic of industrial capi¬ talism.” Cox (1986) and Stephen Gill (1994) have emphasized the importance of “globalizing elites” in the restructuring of the global political economy, and hence in global governance. These elites are found in the key economic insti¬ tutions (IMF, WTO, and World Bank), in finance ministries of G-7 countries, in the headquarters of MNCs, in private international relations councils (e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations and Trilateral Commission), and in major business schools (Harvard, Wharton, Stanford, and others). True, however, to a classical Marxist dialectical process, transnational social forces backing neo¬ liberalism are increasingly challenged by those resisting globalization, as well as by environmental, feminist, and other social movements that in Murphy’s view (2000) constitute a new locus for class analysis and a potential source of future change. Marxists and neo-Marxists view international law and organizations as products of dominant states, dominant ideas, and the interests of the capitalist class. Some view them as instruments of capitalist domination imposed on others. The Gramscian view sees international organizations as a means to get others to consent to domination through shared ideas. Murphy (1994) argues that they have been instrumental in the development of the modem capitalist state by facilitating industrial change and the development of liberal ideology. Cox (1992a: 3) also sees them as being concerned with “longer-term questions of global structural change and . . . how international organizations . . . can help shape that change in a consensually desirable direction.” These views on the links between international institutions and the inter¬ national capitalist order are reflected in many critiques of both the World Bank and the IMF. For example, Cheryl Payer (1982: 20) asserted that the bank “has deliberately and consciously used its financial power to promote the interests of private, international capital in its expansion to every comer of the ‘under¬ developed’ world.” Marxists and neo-Marxists are almost uniformly normative in their orien¬ tation. They see capitalism as “bad,” its structure and mode of production as exploitative. They have clear positions about what should be done to amelio¬ rate inequities. Thus they are proponents of major structural change in inter¬ national relations.

Dependency Theory Dependency theorists, particularly those writing in the 1950s from Latin America, such as Raul Prebisch, Enzo Faletto, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Andre Guilder Frank, sought to understand why development was benefit¬ ing rich Northern countries, rather than the poorer South, and why that gap was widening. They hypothesized that the basic terms of trade were unequal between the developing and developed world, partially as a consequence of

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

55

the history of colonialism and neocolonialism, and partly because multina¬ tional corporations and international banks based in developed countries were hamstringing dependent states. The latter organizations were seen as helping to establish and maintain dependency relations. They were also viewed as agents of penetration, not benign actors, as liberals would characterize them, nor as marginal actors, as realists would characterize them. Dependency theo¬ rists argue that public and private international organizations are able to forge transnational relationships with elites in the developing countries (the “com¬ prador class”), linking domestic elites in both exploiter and exploited countries in a symbiotic relationship. Many dependency theorists argued that the solution was to disengage na¬ tional economies from the international economy, to foster industrial growth in the South through import substitution, to protect internal markets from com¬ petition, and to seek major changes in international economic institutions. Only when countries in the South had reached a certain level of development could they participate fully in the international economy. These views had strong appeal and shaped the agenda of developing countries in the United Na¬ tions during the 1960s and 1970s. In essence, dependency theorists argued that development could not take place without fundamental changes in interna¬ tional economic relations in order to redress inequalities of power and wealth. Dependency theorists share the view of other Marxist-derived theories that international organizations are generally the tools of capitalist classes and states. Multinational corporations are, likewise, instruments of capitalist ex¬ ploitation and mechanisms of domination that perpetuate underdevelopment. Even with the demise of the Soviet Union, Marxism and its variants did not disappear. To be sure, dependency theory became less popular after devel¬ oping countries failed in the 1970s and 1980s to achieve their objectives in the proposed New International Economic Order (NIEO). Some aspects of these critical theories have resurfaced in the debates over globalization, particularly among opponents of globalization, including those who oppose corporate con¬ trol over the economy and those who are trying to rewrite the rules of the global economy to strengthen protection for workers, small farmers, poor peo¬ ple, and women. Worsening economic and social conditions in Latin America and Africa and the widening gap between rich and poor have also fueled re¬ newed interest in the perspectives that critical theories offer.

■

Theories of Organizational Interactions

Interstate relations are not the only interactions that are important for under¬ standing international cooperation and global governance. Relevant middlelevel theories that provide insights relevant to studying interactions both among the various global governance actors and within specific organizations

56

Understanding Global Governance

can also be found in sociology and economics. These theories see organiza¬ tions as making choices and interacting with their environments.

Interorganizational Processes The proliferation of actors in global governance has made it imperative to study interorganizational relations. Sociologists have long contended that for all types of organizations, the most important part of the environment is their cooperative and conflictual relations with other organizations. Organizational interdependence emerges from the shared need for resources (money, special¬ ized skills, and markets), overlapping missions, or the desire to add new spe¬ cialties at reduced cost. In response, organizations may innovate to exclude ri¬ vals or increase coordination and cooperation. Thus, interorganization theorists examine how and why organizations, often working within the same environment or on the same type of problems, may both clash and cooperate. Interorganization theorists are also interested in the dependence of one or¬ ganization on another. For example, the UN Security Council needs both re¬ sources and information to fulfill its mission, and such dependence limits its autonomy. Similarly, the regional development banks may depend on the World Bank for cofinancing large projects, for setting development priorities, and for technical expertise. Karen Mingst (1987: 291) found that the African Development Bank (AfDB) in the 1980s was in this position as “the newer or¬ ganization”: it offered fewer prestigious employment possibilities, and had fewer economic resources and thus a less visible presence in the field; as a re¬ sult, the AfDB was “‘slower’ to innovate, with the World Bank taking the lead in imposing conditionalities and suggesting policy reforms.” This dependence was reinforced by the attitude of the African countries themselves, which viewed the AfDB as one of the “last lenders” and one of the “last to be repaid.” Coordination problems between and among IGOs, such as those among economic and social agencies within the UN system, or among NGOs such as the humanitarian relief groups, form another group of interorganizational problems. Chapter 4 explores how the UN’s Economic and Social Council was intended to play a central, coordinating role for the system but has lacked the resources and clout to do so effectively. Humanitarian crises in the 1990s and the problem of too many groups trying to help led to the creation of the UN’s Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998 as the lead humanitarian agency coordinating the efforts of other UN-system agencies and NGOs in the field.

Networks Part of understanding how organizations interact is recognizing that they may interact not just with each other, but also within broader social networks. The idea of networks comes from sociology, but has been appropriated into think¬ ing about global governance. Harold Jacobson was the first to identify the rel-

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

57

evance of networks for the field, as reflected in the title of his pathbreaking textbook, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System (1984). The sociological literature on networks exam¬ ines the various links between organizations and individuals (both private and public), domestically and internationally. Often there is a linking-pin organi¬ zation in the network, an organizatiop able to mobilize coalitions on particu¬ lar issues or control the process of bargaining. Such organizations have seldom been delegated such authority, but are able to legitimize their actions with re¬ spect to the specific issue area (Jonsson 1986). Transnational advocacy networks have become increasingly important to global governance, as we discussed briefly in Chapter 1 and examine further in Chapter 6. Such networks, note Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998: 2), share “the centrality of values or principled ideas, the belief that individu¬ als can make a difference, the creative use of information, and the employment by nongovernmental actors of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns.” They are “bound together by shared values, a common dis¬ course, and dense exchanges of information and services.” These networks also try to set the terms of international and domestic debate, to influence in¬ ternational and state-level policy outcomes, and to alter the behavior of states, international organizations, and other interested parties. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is one prominent example of a transnational ad¬ vocacy network from the late 1990s. The human rights, environmental, and women’s movements further illustrate the phenomenon. Network analysis en¬ compasses both international and domestic actors and processes, and exam¬ ines how individuals and groups are linked and what strategies they use to pro¬ mote their goals.

Principal-Agent Interactions Economists’ work on the theory of the firm has been expanded by those study¬ ing US government bureaucracies and, more recently, adapted to studying IGOs and NGOs. Principal-agent theorists posit that principals (in politics, de¬ cisionmakers) delegate authority to an agent (e.g., a bureaucracy), empower¬ ing the agent to act on behalf of the principals. Principals delegate such author¬ ity for a number of reasons: to benefit from the agent’s specialized knowledge, enhance certitude, resolve disputes, or enhance their own credibility. Yet prin¬ cipals need to be careful of agent autonomy, that is, of the agents taking inde¬ pendent actions that the principals do not want taken. Much of the principalagent literature discusses ways the principals control the agents (establishing rules, monitoring and reporting, inserting checks and balances) and ways in which agents can become independent, autonomous actors. Scholars of international organizations (both IGOs and NGOs) have turned to principal-agent theory to examine how states as collective principals delegate authority and control to IGOs and the ways that the agents (both IGOs

58

Understanding Global Governance

and NGOs) can exert autonomy (Hawkins et al. 2006). The theory has been used to show how agents interpret mandates, reinterpret rules, expand perme¬ ability to third parties, and create barriers to principals’ monitoring. Much of this literature to date has focused on a few IGOs, including the IMF, World Bank, and European Union. In using principal-agent theory, some writers have found that NGOs may be crucial intermediaries between states and IGOs, but not independent actors that change preferences (Lake and McCubbins 2006: 341, 368). Other writers suggest the ways that NGOs have agency—the ability to choose among differ¬ ent courses of action, learn from experience, and effect change, which may be both independent from states and also dysfunctional (Cooley and Ron 2002). Like social constructivists, then, principal-agent theorists are concerned with examining the degree of independence and autonomy of international or¬ ganizations. Although social constructivists explain autonomy by reference to authoritative bureaucracies, principal-agent theorists find that principals limit their agents and that agents act rationally and strategically to try to expand their authority.

Intraorganizational Processes Another group of middle-level theories focuses on what happens within orga¬ nizations themselves. Two have particular relevance for the study of global governance actors: theories of organizational culture, and organizational adap¬ tation and learning. , Organizational culture. Over time, organizations tend to develop cultures of their own, independent from and different than the cultures of their individual members. During the 1970s, sociologists and anthropologists began to study these cultures rather than seeing organizations only as technical, rational, im¬ personal mechanisms. During the 1980s, it became popular to think of organi¬ zations as autonomous sites of power, with their own particular cultures, norms, and values. Thus, organizations might become agents themselves, not just structures through which actors operated. Organization theorists, there¬ fore, created typologies of organizational cultures and showed how these can change over time (Hawkins 1997). Some IR scholars have borrowed the no¬ tion of organizational culture, suggesting that bureaucracies develop cultures that influence state preferences. This counters the realist view that preferences are exogenously determined. International organization scholars, particularly constructivists, have also seized upon the notion of organizational culture, believing “the rules, rituals, and beliefs that are embedded in the organization (and its subunits) has [sic] important consequences for the way individuals who inhabit that organization make sense of the world’’ (Barnett and Linnemore 1999: 719). Lor example, the practice of UN peacekeeping includes sets of rules designed to maximize

The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

59

the probability of success. Those rules, including requirements of consent and impartiality, were embedded in the peacekeeping culture of the UN and have provided one explanation why the UN Secretariat did not support a strong re¬ sponse to the genocide in Rwanda (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The World Bank has also been shown to have a distinctive organizational culture, in part an intellectual culture, since over half of its professional staff have graduate degrees in economics or finance from US or British institutions (Weaver 2008: 77). Organizational cultures, then, explain some organizational behaviors, al¬ though those cultures are subject to slow change. Organizational adaptation and learning. Organization theorists have also been particularly interested in examining how organizations evolve. Ernst Haas (1990) delineates two such processes. In the first, organizations adapt by adding new activities to their agendas without actually examining or changing underlying bases of the organization and its values. The organization muddles through and change occurs incrementally. Such was the case when the UN took on added peacekeeping tasks in the early 1990s, including election mon¬ itoring, humanitarian aid delivery, and protection of populations threatened by ethnic cleansing and genocide. Only with the failures in Somalia and Bosnia did the secretariat and member states look seriously at the lessons to be learned from the incremental, unplanned changes. The second kind of change process is based on the premise that organiza¬ tions can, in fact, learn. With learning, members or staff question earlier be¬ liefs and develop new processes. Thus, learning involves redefinition of orga¬ nizational purposes, reconceptualization of problems, articulation of new ends, and organizational change based upon new, underlying consensual knowledge. Such has been the case with the evolution of World Bank pro¬ grams from an initial emphasis on infrastructure projects to basic human needs, structural adjustment, environmental sustainability, and, today, poverty alleviation and good governance. Other examples abound. Organizational theories from both sociology and economics enable us to probe deeper within specific institutions of global governance by helping us understand both the interorganizational and intraorganizational processes. In¬ creasingly scholars are using multiple theoretical perspectives, enhancing our knowledge in new ways.

■

IR Theory and Global Governance

One of the unanswered puzzles is that despite the fact that multilateral diplo¬ macy and institutions became dominant forms of interaction in the twentieth century, multilateralism is generally neglected in IR theory (Caporaso 1993: 51). As we have seen, neoliberals and neorealists, in particular, have attempted

60

Understanding Global Governance

to explain cooperation and the conditions under which cooperation becomes multilateral and institutionalized through international regimes. Constructivist approaches that look at processes of persuasion, discussion, and argumenta¬ tion contribute further to these understandings. Constructivists have also con¬ tributed to our knowledge about how norms, ideas, and beliefs affect out¬ comes. Critical theories provide perspectives on contemporary structures of global governance; they and neorealist theory share a concern for the role of power and powerful actors. Liberalism and its middle-level derivatives, how¬ ever, form the foundation for much global governance theorizing. Subsequent chapters utilize these various theories when appropriate. In Chapters 3 and 5, functionalism explains much of the history of specialized or¬ ganizations and the EU. In Chapters 8-11, specific international regimes are examined, along with their major principles, rules, and decisionmaking processes. In Chapter 11, collective goods theory forms a central focus for in¬ ternational efforts to address environmental problems. In Chapter 8, realist theory helps us understand the difficulties that international institutions have in addressing threats to peace and security. Chapter 9 considers how hege¬ monic stability and great-power concert theories and critical perspectives have affected efforts to address economic globalization issues. Throughout the book, middle-level interorganizational and intraorganizational theories help us understand how different organizations function and the connections among different actors and their roles.

■

Suggested Further Reading

Baldwin, David A., ed. (1993) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary De¬ bate. New York: Columbia University Press. Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Drezner, Daniel W. (2007) All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. (2006) Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge: Cam¬ bridge University Press. Rittberger, Volker, ed., with Peter Mayer. (1993) Regime Theory and International Re¬ lations. Oxford: Clarendon. Wendt, Alexander. (1995) Constructing International Politics.” International Security 20 (Summer): 71-81.

PART 2 Evolving Pieces of Global Governance

'

*

‘

Foundations of the Pieces of Global Governance

Political communities throughout history have tried to establish norms and rules for interacting with their neighbors. Many schemes dating as early as ancient Chinese and Indian civilizations were based on principles and methods designed to manage or eliminate conflict among contending parties. For example, Confucius (551^-79 B.c.E.) preached the norm of moderation in interstate relations and condemned the use of violence. The Greeks sought to establish permanent protective alliances among the city-states to address con¬ flict issues. Third-party arbitration proved effective in deflecting conflict and promoting cooperation. United by common culture, the city-states agreed to follow established rules. From these rules, confederations of various citystates grew. Yet each continued to claim sovereignty for itself, while acknowl¬ edging the sovereignty of others. None of these arrangements was in actuality either an “international” entity or an “organization,” being limited to a specific geographical area and lacking permanent institutionalized relationships. More than a millennium later, a number of European philosophers began to elaborate structured schemes for international cooperation. The Roman Catholic Church and its head, the pope, provided the impetus. For example, medieval French writer Pierre Dubois (1250-1322) proposed that Christian (at that time, Catholic) leaders should form political alliances against violators of the prevailing norms; the pope could arbitrate any ensuing disputes. Not all such proposals, however, centered on religious foundations. Some were based on common economic interests. The Hanseatic League (1200s-1400s), which comprised 100 to 160 northern European cities, was formed to facilitate trade and commerce and lasted for 200 years. It was a system of governance based on the interaction among independent city-states. Such a system of governance was also found among the Italian city-states during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The smaller cities and principali¬ ties consolidated into five major political units—the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, the Papal States, and the city-states of Florence, Venice, and Milan. Al¬ though they were a mere patchwork of towns whose borders had been frequently

63

64

Evolving Pieces of Global Governance

redrawn, they established a system of balancing power on the Italian peninsula. Diplomacy was regularized and commercial interaction routinized. Two cen¬ turies later these practices were adopted by the state system of governance.

■

The State System and Its Weaknesses

International relations theorists date the contemporary state system from 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War. Although most of the more than 100 articles of the treaty dealt with allocating the spoils of war, other provisions proved pathbreaking. Articles 64, 65, and 67 established sev¬ eral key principles of a new state system: territorial sovereignty; the right of the state (prince or ruler) to choose its religion and determine its own domes¬ tic policies; and the prohibition of interference from supranational authorities like the Catholic Church or Holy Roman Empire (Bueno de Mesquita 2000). The treaty marked the end of rule by religious authority in Europe and the emergence of secular states. With secular authority came the principle of the territorial integrity of states that were legally equal and sovereign participants in the international system. Sovereignty was the core concept in this state system. As French philoso¬ pher Jean Bodin (1530-1596) stated, sovereignty is “the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any way be subject to the commands of an¬ other, for it is he who makes law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete law” (1967: 25). Although there is no supreme arbiter among states, Bodin acknowledged that sovereignty may be limited by divine law or natural law, by the type of regime, or even by promises to the people. It was during this period that Hugo Grotius, as previously discussed, re¬ jected the concept that states have complete freedom to do whatever they wish. Thus, even in the seventeenth century, the meaning of state sovereignty was contested. Stephen Krasner (1993: 235) argues, “The actual content of sover¬ eignty, the scope of authority that states can exercise, has always been con¬ tested. The basic organizing principle of sovereignty—exclusive control over territory—has been persistently challenged by the creation of new institutional forms that better meet specific national needs.” He asserts that although breaches of sovereignty occur continuously through treaties, contracts, coer¬ cion, and imposition, there is no alternative conception of international system organization. Other contemporary scholars such as James Rosenau (1997: 217-236) see states as vulnerable to demands from below—decentralizing tendencies including domestic constituencies and nonstate actors—and from above, including globalization processes and international organizations. They have to contend with a variety of new actors and processes that confound and constrain them, limiting authority and challenging the whole notion of state sovereignty, and hence the state system based on the principle.

Foundations of the Pieces of Global Governance

65

The nature of the contemporary state system is a matter of dispute be¬ tween Westphalians, Grotians, and those who argue that a fundamental trans¬ formation has occurred. The weaknesses of the state system became increas¬ ingly apparent after the middle of the nineteenth century with increasing international trade, immigration, democratization, technological innovation, and other developments that undermined the capacity of states to govern ef¬ fectively. These changes gave rise to the earliest international organizations.

■

Governance Innovations in the Nineteenth Century

In the nineteenth century, governance innovations were stimulated by a number of key trends. The defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and the emergence of five major European powers—Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia—ushered in a new era of relative peace among those five powers. Rivalry among these five was generally played out in Africa and Asia, where they established colonies and economic dependencies. Industrialization, beginning in England, spread to all parts of the continent, resulting in expanded commerce and trade among the European countries and between European states and their colonies. State-tostate interactions became more frequent and intense. These trends provided the stimulus for a more international approach to governance. In a pioneering textbook on international organization, Swords into Plow¬ shares, Inis Claude (1964) describes three major innovations of governance that emerged in the nineteenth century: the Concert of Europe, public international unions, and the Hague Conferences.

The Concert of Europe The first innovation was a concert of major powers making systemwide deci¬ sions by negotiation and consensus, a kind of informal intergovernmentalism. States agreed to coordinate behavior based on certain rights and responsibili¬ ties with expectations of diffuse reciprocity. They still operated as separate states and societies, but within a framework of rules and consultation without creating a formal organization. The Concert of Europe was established in 1815. The concert system in¬ volved the practice of multilateral meetings rather than bilateral diplomacy among the leaders of the major European powers for the purpose of settling problems and coordinating actions. Meeting over thirty times in the century preceding World War I, the major powers constituted a club of the likeminded, dictating the conditions of entry for other would-be participants. They legitimized the independence of new European states such as Belgium and Greece in the 1820s. At the last of the concert meetings, which took place in Berlin in 1878, the European powers divided up the previously uncolonized parts of Africa, extending the reach of European imperialism.

66

Evolving Pieces of Global Governance

Although these concert meetings were not institutionalized and included no explicit mechanism for implementing collective action, they solidified im¬ portant practices that later international organizations followed. These in¬ cluded multilateral consultation, collective diplomacy, and special status for great “powers.” As Claude (1964: 22) summarizes, “The Concert system was the manifestation of a rudimentary but growing sense of interdependence and community of interest among the states of Europe.” Such a community of in¬ terest was a vital prerequisite for modem international organizations and broader global governance, even though sovereignty remained intact. The concert idea of mutual consultations, necessitated by a growing com¬ munity of interests, can be seen in management of the international gold stan¬ dard and in the contemporary Group of Seven/Eight. It is also the foundation for the UN Security Council, where the five permanent members have special privileges and responsibilities and continuously consult with each other in a highly institutionalized setting.

Public International Unions Public international unions were another important organizational innovation. Agencies were initially established among European states to deal with prob¬ lems stemming from the industrial revolution, expanding commerce, commu¬ nications, and technological innovation. These functional problems involved such concerns as health standards for travelers, shipping rules on the Rhine River, increased mail volume, and the cross-boundary usage of the newly in¬ vented telegraph. Many of these practical problems of expanding international relations among states proved amenable to resolution with intergovernmental coopera¬ tion. The International Telegraph Union was formed in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874; each was instrumental in facilitating communication, transportation, and hence commerce. With growing levels of interdependence, the European states had found it necessary to cooperate on a voluntary basis to accomplish nonpolitical tasks. The international labor movement provided an¬ other model for nonstate groups, organizing in the First International (1864— 1872), the Second International (1889-1914), and the Third International (1919-1943). The International Chamber of Commerce was established in 1920, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in 1923, and the Bank of International Settlements in 1930. The rise of public international unions and specialized organizations dedicated to defined nonpolitical tasks gave rise to functionalism and specialized IGOs helping states deal with practical problems in their international relations, as discussed in Chapter 2. The public international unions spawned several procedural innovations. International secretariats, composed of permanent bureaucrats hired from a variety of countries, were formed. The public unions also developed the prac¬ tice of involving specialists from outside ministries of foreign affairs as well

Foundations of the Pieces of Global Governance

67

as private interest groups in their work. Multilateral diplomacy was no longer the exclusive domain of traditional diplomats. In addition, the public unions began to develop techniques for multilateral conventions, that is, lawmaking or rulemaking treaties.

The Hague System The third governance innovation in the nineteenth century was the emergence of generalized conferences in which all states were invited to participate in problem solving. In 1899 and 1907, Czar Nicholas II of Russia convened two conferences in The Hague (Netherlands), involving both European and nonEuropean states, to think proactively about what techniques states should have available to prevent war and under what conditions arbitration, negotiation, and legal recourse would be appropriate (Aldrich and Chinkin 2000). Explo¬ ration of such issues in the absence of a crisis was a novelty. The Hague Conferences led to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, ad hoc international commissions of inquiry, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The institutionalization of the latter was the culmination of the widespread practice of inserting clauses into treaties call¬ ing for arbitration should disputes arise among parties. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (1899) became a permanent body composed of jurists selected by each country from which members of arbitral tribunals would be chosen. It remains in existence and has been used in recent years for handling claims arising from the 1979-1980 Iran hostage crisis. The Hague Conferences also produced several major procedural innova¬ tions. This was the first time that participants included both small and nonEuropean states. The Latin American states, China, and Japan were each ac¬ corded an equal voice, thus establishing the twin principles of universality and legal equality of states. What had been largely a European state system until the end of the nineteenth century became a truly international system at the be¬ ginning of the twentieth century. For the first time, participants utilized such techniques as electing chairs, organizing committees, and taking roll call votes, all of which became permanent features of twentieth-century organiza¬ tions. The Hague Conferences also promoted the novel ideas of common in¬ terests of humankind and the codification of international law.

The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century Nineteenth-century innovations served as a vital precursor to the development of modem international organizations and to the broader notion of global gov¬ ernance in the twenty-first century. Governments established new approaches to dealing with problems of joint concern, such as the multilateral diplomacy of the concert system, the cooperative institutions of the public international unions, and the broader legalistic institutions of the Hague system. To imple¬ ment the new approaches, innovative procedures were developed, participation

68

Evolving Pieces of Global Governance

was broadened, and international secretariats were established. Each has been extensively utilized during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Yet the institutional arrangements of the nineteenth century proved inad¬ equate for preventing war among the major European powers. The balance of power among the great powers—so vital to the concert system—broke down into two competing military alliances at the end of the nineteenth century, which in turn led to World War I. Interdependence and cooperation in other areas of interest proved insufficient to prevent war when national security was at stake. Hence the outbreak of World War I pointed vividly to the weaknesses and shortcomings of these arrangements.

■

Multilateralism in the Twentieth Century

The twentieth century was marked by the development of numerous interna¬ tional organizations, both small and large, general purpose and specialized, governmental and nongovernmental, as shown in Figure 3.1. These formal in¬ stitutions have been created to manage disparate needs. International law has

Figure 3.1

Growth Patterns of IGOs and INGOs (1891-2008)

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side of the DRC government along with troops from Namibia, Chad, Eritrea, and Sudan, the Rwandan Hutu militia, and other militias that supported govern¬ ment forces as well as their own agendas. Dubbed “Africa’s First World War,” the 1998-2002 war was incredibly complex, with the various rebel and militia groups and troops from the other African countries competing for political power and access to the Congo’s vast mineral deposits. It has also been disastrous for civilians, millions of whom were displaced and died of war-related diseases and starvation. Despite the signing of a peace agreement in late 2002, smaller-scale violence has persisted as has the massive humanitarian crisis, with large population displacements, extremely violent systematic rapes, and collapse of the health and food sys¬ tems. The death toll between 1998 and 2009 is estimated at 5.4 million peo¬ ple, making this the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II. The eco¬ nomic interests of neighboring states and various militias have been central to the conflict’s persistence and a major impediment to peacemaking efforts. Early efforts to halt the violence in the DRC were led by African coun¬ tries through the SADC as well as the OAU and the Francophonie (the orga-

The Search for Peace and Security

339

nization of former French-speaking colonies). The 1999 Lusaka Agreement, mediated by the SADC, was the basis for the UN’s initial action. But given the enormity of the tasks and recent UN failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, as well as demands for new operations at that time in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, both member states and the UN Secretariat were reluctant to take on another major -operation. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in fact, warned, “In order to be effective, any United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whatever its mandate, will have to be large and expensive. It would require the deployment of thousands of interna¬ tional troops and civilian personnel. It will face tremendous difficulties, and will be beset by risks, Deployment will be slow” (UN 1999e). Those misgiv¬ ings were echoed by the United States, which also questioned the UN’s capac¬ ity to manage such a force, its ability to conduct enforcement operations against the various groups, congressional opposition, and cost (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 250-252). The UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was authorized by the Security Council in November 1999 (Resolu¬ tion 1279) and began as a small observer force of 4,900 personnel. It took three years, however, to reach that strength, as member states were reluctant to con¬ tribute troops. In addition, the DRC government initially refused to let MONUC deploy outside the capital and there were multiple violations of the Lusaka Agreement. The situation began to improve in 2001 when the Security Council condemned Rwanda’s and Uganda’s continuing presence and demanded their withdrawal, while approving changes in MONUC’s operation (Resolution 1341). Foreign forces (except for some Ugandan troops) were withdrawn and, with SADC and OAU mediation, the DRC government and various rebel groups reached agreement in 2002 to form a transitional government, with MONUC tasked to help disarm the militias, albeit still without enforcement power. Two years later, in 2003, an upsurge of ethnic violence in Ituri province in the east led the Security Council to authorize deployment under Chapter VII of an interim emergency multinational force (Resolution 1484). The French-led EU operation, Operation Artemis, became the EU’s first military operation. Man¬ dated to reinforce MONUC and halt the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situ¬ ation in the city of Bunia, troops from five EU countries were on the ground within seven days of the EU Council’s decision. Overall, however, the operation was limited in duration (three months) and scope (securing the situation only in Bunia itself, not the Ituri region). Shortly thereafter, the Security Council strengthened MONUC’s mandate and authorized use of force to protect civilians, to assist the transitional government, to fill the security vacuum, and to disarm and repatriate former armed militias, including the Rwandan Hutu genocidaires. In short, it took four years for MONUC’s mandate to evolve from traditional peacekeeping as an observer force into a complex, multidimensional operation

340

The Need for Global Governance

involving peace enforcement and protection of civilians, despite the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis. Only in 2004 did the Security Council authorize an increase in troop strength, but only by an additional 5,900 troops when the secretary-general had requested 13,000—an action reminiscent of the council’s failure to provide UNPROFOR with sufficient troops for its mandates. Not only was MONUC understaffed for its mission, but with its more aggressive tactics the UN peacekeepers became targets themselves—-just as in Somalia. And, that same year, the press reported widespread sexual exploitation and abuse by MONUC peacekeepers—a problem that would lead to organizational changes within the UN, disciplinary proceedings, new policies, and training procedures. Following the 2002 peace agreement, some peacebuilding activities were begun. In 2006, with support of an EU rapid reaction force and EU funding, the Congo held its first multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections in forty years—a sign that despite continuing problems, the transitional govern¬ ment was making progress with MONUC’s help (EU 2006: 2). MONUC itself was deployed throughout the country during the election period. Remarkably, the elections were considered reasonably free and fair. Despite these signs of progress, violence persists in the Congo’s eastern provinces, particularly North and South Kivu, and the DRC remains highly unstable. The Hutu militias are still active, along with various Congolese mili¬ tias, the Rwandan and Ugandan government troops, and the Ugandan-based Lord’s Resistance Army. The humanitarian crises continue, with ethnic cleans¬ ing, communal violence, and the worst instances of sexual violence in the world committed by militias and Congolese government troops alike engaging in widespread rape. At the beginning of 2009, MONUC was the UN’s largest peace operation, with over 17,000 uniformed personnel, the major contributors of which are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Uruguay. Since the 2006 elections, it has been primarily deployed in the major eastern, government-controlled cities to protect civilians. Yet this has been difficult, as the Congolese army “has proven itself entirely incapable of restoring order to these provinces . . . [and] does more to compound insecurity than to bring peace.” The Congolese police are also reported to be “violent and incompetent . . . part of the problem in eastern Congo today, regularly mistreating civilians” (Gambino 2008: 15). Because the DRC is a weak state teetering on the brink of failure, whose conflict includes various warlords and their militias, it bears some resem¬ blance to Somalia. As in Bosnia, however, massive human rights violations and displacements have marked the conflict. Yet the DRC conflict is far more complex than those in either Somalia or Yugoslavia and hence the challenges it poses to international peace and security governance are enormous. Because it is in the heart of Africa, it has implications for much of the continent, but this also means that it has been of limited importance to the major powers, and especially the United States.

The Search for Peace and Security

341

The difficulties of ending the Congo’s seemingly infinite conflict and bringing peace and security to its people, who have suffered through more than a decade of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, demonstrate the problems “when there is serious deficiency in local leaders’ willingness to support the peace, marginal international political will to take risks for peace, and equally little willingness to expend the necessary resources to create it” (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 301). The Congo yase also underscores the Security Coun¬ cil’s difficulty in crafting an overall strategy for dealing with threats to peace, for coordinating diplomatic and military activities rather than just responding to events on the ground and crisis situations, and for providing the people and material necessary to accomplish a multidimensional peace operation’s goals. In short, there was little evidence that the Security Council had rectified its problems in responding to either the conflict in Bosnia or the genocide in Rwanda. It is also worth noting that the Congo’s huge size presents enormous logistical difficulties that magnify the cost of peace operations since roads and railroads are virtually unusable, requiring the use of more expensive air trans¬ port. As with every other UN operation in Africa since the mid-1990s involv¬ ing internal conflict, it has been difficult to get states to contribute to MONUC, particularly developed countries. Neither the SADC nor the AU has the re¬ sources for significant enforcement action (and some of the parties in the 1998-2002 war were SADC members), leaving the UN “with the daunting task of managing the Congo war by itself’ with little political will among the P-5 to do much (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 303). This raises the difficult question of whether it is better to undertake a weak operation or none at all when the will for a robust one is lacking. A weak operation still raises expec¬ tations that civilians will be protected and peace kept, but hundreds of thou¬ sands have died and thousands more have suffered rape and other major human rights abuses, despite the presence of UN peacekeepers. MONUC is credited with preventing the collapse of government authority in the east (Gambino 2008: 17), but the Congo experience demonstrates how “demand for peacekeeping in hostile environments with limited global strategic value poses a fundamental challenge to the Security Council” for which no satisfac¬ tory solution has been found (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 306). Although the UN’s multidimensional operation in the DRC has included peacebuilding, these activities have been dwarfed by the continuing violence and humanitarian crises. The same is not the case in two other situations— Kosovo and East Timor—where the international community responded ini¬ tially to crises, then undertook multidimensional peace operations with major peacebuilding tasks that amounted to state-making. Kosovo and East Timor: The challenges of state-making. The UN built on its experience in Namibia and Cambodia to address the situations in both Kosovo and East Timor in the late 1990s, undertaking multidimensional operations with

342

The Need for Global Governance

even more extensive peace and statebuilding responsibilities. In neither case, however, was there a prior peace agreement or an existing state; both were provinces of other countries (Yugoslavia/Serbia and Indonesia); both cases in¬ volved the initial use of force by a coalition of the willing—the United States and NATO in the case of Kosovo and a UN-authorized Australian-led force in the case of East Timor. In the case of Kosovo, international legal status was among the questions to be determined; in East Timor, as in Namibia, the out¬ come was to be independent statehood. Following NATO bombing of Serbia and intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians in 1999 from ethnic cleansing by Serbian/Yugoslav military forces that displaced more than a million people. Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) called for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to undertake wideranging civilian administrative functions, including maintaining civil law and order, aiding in return of refugees, coordinating humanitarian relief, and sup¬ porting reconstruction of key infrastructure, in conjunction with a NATO peacekeeping force (KFOR). Additionally, UNMIK was given key political tasks of promoting Kosovo’s autonomy and self-government and helping to determine Kosovo’s future legal status. The head of UNMIK, a special repre¬ sentative of the secretary-general (SRSG), was expected to coordinate the work of several non-UN organizations, among which various functions were divided, but over which he had little power. The UN was given the unprece¬ dented authority to establish and exercise civil authority as well as chief re¬ sponsibility for police and justice; the OSCE handled democratization and in¬ stitution building; the EU was responsible. for reconstruction and development; and the UNHCR was responsible for all humanitarian matters. The contact group originally formed in the early 1990s to address Yugoslavia’s breakup (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) provided a political mechanism to ensure the support of key powers for UNMIK. The Kosovo mission was pathbreaking in its nature and scope. It was also the first UN mission designed with other IGOs as full partners. There were, however, critical problems with the Kosovo mission in gen¬ eral and Resolution 1244 in particular. First, the mandate was the most ambi¬ tious ever laid out, involving security, political, economic, and civil dimen¬ sions. Yet there was no peace to be kept. When the Serbian army and civil administration withdrew, there was violence by Kosovar Albanians against local Serbs; there was also violence between the two main Albanian groups; and there were criminal groups that opposed the UN and NATO presence. Al¬ though KFOR was able to establish sufficient security to reduce its troops from 50,000 to 16,000 in 2005, it failed to protect Kosovo Serbs from wide¬ spread riots in 2004, and the problem of insecurity for the Serbs persists. Second, the interim civilian authorities encountered problems. Although local governance was encouraged, the international organizations were slow to transfer power to locals. Economic development programs, an EU responsibil-

The Search for Peace and Security

343

ity, were poorly organized and implemented, and the economy has become ex¬ tensively criminalized with little done by UNMIK to curb transnational drug and human trafficking. There was no advance mobilization of qualified per¬ sonnel (such as thousands of police to curb violence) and necessary financial resources, so UNMIK was slow to get off the ground. By May 2000, for ex¬ ample, UNMIK police had only reached 75 percent of strength (Dziedzic 2006: 348). After 2001, international priorities shifted to Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing money and manpower for Kosovo. Coordination among the partner IGOs was hampered by different organizational objectives and cultures as well as their autonomy. In addition, there were more than 380 international NGOs active in Kosovo in 2003, and there was an explosion of local NGOs from about 110 in 2000 to 2,394 in 2004 (cited in Narten 2009: 268). Third, there was no international agreement either on when the interim government would end or on Kosovo’s future status. The Albanian Kosovar majority wanted nothing less than independence from Serbia. At the same time, UNMIK was caught between mandates to exercise highly intrusive authority and to promote local ownership with no clear timetable or exit strategy (Narten 2009: 263-264). Thus, over time, UNMIK came to be perceived as an occupier. It had to identify local partners, which in effect determined who were “win¬ ners” among local groups; by its choices, UNMIK also came to institutionalize Kosovo’s ethnic divide rather than promoting the ethnic tolerance its rhetoric called for. Over time, Kosovars also complained that “the quality of the UN in¬ ternational staff has declined and is constituted primarily of nationals from countries less democratic than Kosovo” (quoted in Talentino 2007: 163). The various difficulties hampered the operation and contributed to skepti¬ cism about its long-term outcome. In 2006, the UN’s Special Envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, initiated a diplomatic process to determine Kosovo’s final status that led to a proposal for self-government under EU supervision— thus continuing indefinite international supervision and leaving Kosovo’s legal status undetermined. In February 2008, Kosovo’s Provisional Self-Government Assembly declared the country’s independence and received recognition from the United States and several European countries, but strong opposition from Russia and Serbia. Because of the latter, plans to transfer continuing interna¬ tional responsibility for policing and rule of law from UNMIK to the EU were blocked until late 2008, and Kosovo remains a ward of the international com¬ munity; its Albanian majority continues to establish the symbols, if not the legality, of statehood, and its Serbs continue to seek Serbia’s protection, if not partition; and 15,000 NATO KFOR troops remain in place. The difficulties of statebuilding in Kosovo have been reinforced by the ex¬ perience in East Timor (now Timor-Leste), where the transition to independence under UN auspices initially seemed successful, but the newly independent gov¬ ernment proved to have little capacity beyond its capital and the UN was forced to return in 2006 when riots and political instability suggested that it left too

344

The Need for Global Governance

soon. This mission was undertaken in 1999 after almost fifteen years of UNmediated efforts to resolve the status of East Timor—a former Portuguese colony seized by Indonesia in the mid-1970s—when, after a UN-organized vote endorsed independence, violence broke out, Indonesian troops failed to restore order, and almost half a million East Timorese were displaced from their homes. The Security Council initially authorized the Australian-led multinational force to restore order and then created the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) with an ambitious and wide-ranging mission ranging from exercising all judicial, legislative, and executive powers to assisting in develop¬ ment of civil and social services, providing security, ensuring the delivery of hu¬ manitarian aid, promoting sustainable development, and building the foundation for stable liberal democracy. As in Kosovo, the UN’s role involved collaboration with other international organizations—both IGOs and NGOs. As was the case in Kosovo, UNTAET was given unprecedented powers for civil administration, justice, and statebuilding, along with responsibilities for se¬ curity and humanitarian assistance. It was also given more financial resources, in part at least because there was more political support from major powers as well as from ASEAN members and Australia. It faced a far greater problem of total destruction wreaked by the Indonesia-backed militias and the departure of all civilian administrators. Unlike in Kosovo, where future status was unspeci¬ fied, UNTAET’s charge was unequivocal: to lead the territory to statehood. In this, it resembled the Namibian case, but without the advantages of South Africa’s competent administration or a clear roadmap to follow. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the SRSG in charge, noted, “We had to feel our way, somewhat blindly, towards [the two-phased strategy of devolving executive power] wast¬ ing several months in doing” (Vieira de Mello 2001). Despite Timorese complaints of delay and insufficient empowerment, in 2002, after just three years, elections were held and an independent TimorLeste was recognized (Edelstein 2009: 86). A small UN operation continued to provide support for stability, democracy, justice, law enforcement, and external security, with a clear mandate from the Security Council for ending its respon¬ sibilities. Despite Timor’s lack of economic development and still shaky polit¬ ical institutions, the Security Council terminated UNTAET in 2005, only to be forced by riots and political instability in 2006 to authorize a new mission, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor (UNMIT), with a mandate “to support the Government and relevant institutions, with a view to consolidating political sta¬ bility . . . [and ensure] the restoration and maintenance of public security,” among other things (Resolution 1704). The 2006 crisis changed the perception of Timor from “the UN’s nation-building success to a failed state in the mak¬ ing,” in the view of the International Crisis Group (2008: 1), by revealing the weakness of government institutions, including the police and military, as well as rivalries among leaders, regional differences, and a culture of violence. Like most contemporary UN missions, UNMIT operates with twelve-month re-

The Search for Peace and Security

345

newals and no specified exit conditions. Its top priority is security sector reform to strengthen the police, military, and judicial institutions. In 2008, the Inter¬ national Crisis Group (2008: ii) recommendations called for better-trained UN police and legal reform to complement security sector reform, yet it also warned that “donor fatigue” was setting in and that enhanced consultation is necessary so that the reforms are not viewed as imposed. In short, peacebuilding as statebuilding entails major challenges for the international community. The interim administrations in Kosovo and Bosnia, where internationally appointed high representatives retain authority, have been described as forms of international trusteeship, protectorates, and even neoimperialism, given that the circumstances under which international over¬ sight will be terminated are unclear. And, as the case of East Timor shows, if a statebuilding process yields a weak state, international involvement may well continue indefinitely. Utilizing lessons from Kosovo, East Timor, and elsewhere to improve support for peacebuilding. In various forms and degrees, postconflict peacebuilding activities are an integral part of all complex, multidimensional UN peace oper¬ ations today. They have also become part of the activities of many UN agencies and other organizations, both IGOs and NGOs. Given the number of non-UN actors involved in many peacebuilding efforts, however, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, appointed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2003, called for better coordination and sustained international atten¬ tion to keep fragile states from sliding toward collapse. It specifically proposed creation of a peacebuilding commission (UN 2004). That recommendation came to fruition in 2006 with the establishment of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), bringing together all the relevant actors to address the need for integrated strategies and sustained attention for postconflict peacebuilding and recovery. The PBC is composed of thirty-one UN member states, including the P-5, top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions, military personnel, and civilian police, and serves as an intergovernmental advisory body to bring together all relevant actors within and outside the UN, marshal resources, and advise on strategies for reconstruction, institution building, and sustainable de¬ velopment. The UN General Assembly also approved a multiyear standing peacebuilding fund for postconflict reconstruction, to be financed by voluntary contributions, and a small peacebuilding support office within the Secretariat. The first two countries referred to the PBC by the Security Council were Bu¬ rundi and Sierra Leone; subsequently the Central African Republic and GuineaBissau have been added. In each of the countries on its agenda, consultations between the PBC and government identify critical areas for consolidating peace, such as strengthening the rule of law, security sector reform, promoting good governance, and youth employment and specific peacebuilding projects

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The Need for Global Governance

for funding by the UN and international and national donors. The fund also sup¬ ports projects in non-PBC countries to avert the risk of relapse into conflict, help implement peace agreements, or strengthen peacebuilding efforts. Whether the PBC can truly improve the international community’s ability to build on the lessons of the complex operations in Kosovo, East Timor, the DRC, and elsewhere to create and sustain more integrated missions remains to be seen. Another set of lessons for peace operations, however, relates to the ex¬ periences dealing with conflicts involving genocide and the emerging norm of responsibility to protect.

Humanitarian Intervention: The Dilemmas of R2P Horrific as earlier twentieth-century conflicts had been, post-Cold War con¬ flicts were particularly marked by major humanitarian crises, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, with huge numbers of IDPs and refugees, mass starvation, deliberate targeting of civilians, rape, widespread abuses of human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. The UNHCR and humanitarian NGOs have been challenged as never before to cope with human tragedy on a mas¬ sive scale (see Figure 8.7). The inability of weak states to exercise effective authority over their territories and populations and the outright collapse of oth¬ ers have resulted in anarchy, chronic disorder, massive flight of refugees, and deadly civil wars waged without regard for laws of armed conflict (Rotberg 2003). Beginning with the creation of safe havens and no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq in April 1991 to protect Iraqi Kurds and Shiites, the interna¬ tional community took the first of several coercive actions, without the con¬ sent of authorities in the respective states, to halt widespread suffering or death. These were the first steps toward endorsing a norm of humanitarian in¬ tervention. Other interventions motivated at least in part by humanitarian crises included those in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, the DRC, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sudan’s Darfur region. The international responses to genocide in Rwanda and Darfur are examined further in Chapter 10. Here, it is important to note that only for the crisis in East Timor did the Security Council invoke Chapter VII in authorizing the Australian-led multinational force that preceded UNTAET. In all the other cases, the initial mandates called for either a traditional peacekeeping mission or, in the case of Kosovo, where there was no authorization for NATO’s action, a multidimensional operation following the agreement that ended NATO bombing. The cases of humanitarian intervention raise a number of issues about where to intervene and when. Selectivity has clearly been a problem. The UN intervened in Somalia but ignored the civil wars in Sudan, Liberia, and Sri Lanka that produced large-scale loss of life due to deliberate starvation, forced migrations, and massive human rights abuses, including enslavement of chil¬ dren and recruitment of child soldiers. The UN and NATO focused on the for-

The Search for Peace and Security

Figure 8.7

Humanitarian Crises

347

-

Time

Country

People at Risk

1981-1993 1991 1992-1993

Central America Northern Iraq Somalia

1955-2005

Sudan

1991-1995

Bosnia

1994

Rwanda

1995-1996

Burundi

1999 1998-

Kosovo Congo

2003-

Sudan-Darfur

1.8 million refugees 2.5 million refugees 300,000 deaths 1 million refugees 95% population malnourished 2 million deaths 4 million refugees 250,000 deaths 2.7 million displaced 1.4 million refugees 850,000 deaths 1.1 million refugees 150,000 deaths 1 million displaced 800,000 refugees 5.4 million deaths 340,000 refugees 1.4 million displaced 300,000 deaths 200,000 refugees 2.2 million displaced

mer Yugoslavia but ignored the war in Chechnya and the civil war in Afghanistan (until September 11, 2001). Selective media and NGO attention played a role, but so did varying national interests and political will. Furthermore, international action was often too little or too late to save thousands of human lives in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, the DRC, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan authorized independent examinations of what went wrong in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo. The Independent Inquiry on Rwanda reported, “The responsibility for the failings of the United Nations to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda lies with a number of different actors, in particular the Secretary-General [then Boutros Boutros-Ghali], the Secretariat [in which Annan was head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the time], the Security Council, UNAMIR [UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda] and the broader membership of the United Na¬ tions” (UN 1999d). Acknowledging the failures, Annan stated, “Of all my aims as Secretary-General, there is none to which I feel more deeply commit¬ ted than that of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter” (UN 1999c). Regardless of selectivity, egregious errors, and controversy, the very fact that debate has taken place and that the Security Council during the 1990s re¬ peatedly referred to humanitarian crises as threats to international peace and

348

The Need for Global Governance

security under Chapter VII marks a change. Not once during the Cold War had any council resolution referred to humanitarian intervention. And the reality is that the 1990s were, in the words of the International Commission on Inter¬ vention and State Sovereignty, “a revolutionary decade for humanitarian ac¬ tion. . . . The Security Council authorized more than a dozen Chapter VII op¬ erations in response to conscience-shocking human catastrophes; regional organizations were seized with these issues and responded; militaries and hu¬ manitarian agencies adopted new policies and practices. . . . [T]he lives of lit¬ erally hundreds of thousands were saved” (ICISS 2001b: 220). If a new norm of humanitarian intervention is ultimately confirmed, then there is all the more need for early warning, for preventive actions where such crises can be anticipated, and for peacebuilding once interventions have taken place, as states, IGOs, and NGOs will need to collaborate in expanding their collective intelligence-gathering and analytic capabilities. In the future, however, IGOs, including the UN, are less likely to be the interveners than are coalitions of willing states. The reasons have to do with the absence of standby UN forces, the weakness of most regional IGOs, the continuing opposition to the R2P norm among some developing countries, and the reality that “it is only states [and only a handful] that have the capabilities to fly thousands of troops halfway round the world to prevent or stop genocide or mass murder” (Wheeler 2000: 310). Although the UN remains the primary IGO for mounting all types of peace operations, regional IGOs, and particularly the AU, the EU, and NATO, have become increasingly involved as well. Their activities have raised a num¬ ber of issues regarding the authority of the Security Council, legitimacy, ca¬ pacity, coordination, and effectiveness.

Regional Organizations and Peace Operations A major impetus for regional IGOs to undertake peace operations was the sheer number of new operations (fifteen) that the UN undertook between 1989 and 1993, which taxed its capacity to organize and supervise missions. That led Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace (1992: 64) to call for greater participation by regional organizations to share the burden and “contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.” By the late 1990s, there were more regional IGO peace operations than UN operations, a trend that has reversed since 2003 (Kams 2009). ECOWAS un¬ dertook peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s and again in Liberia in 2003; the SADC sent peacekeeping troops into the DRC and Lesotho in 1998; the OAS was part of a joint UN operation in Haiti in 1993; NATO sent peacekeepers (as well as combat troops) to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, then handed over responsibility in the first two to the EU in 2004 and 2008 respectively; Russia and the Commonwealth of Indepen-

The Search for Peace and Security

349

dent States took on peacekeeping roles in three civil conflicts arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union (Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan) with UN ob¬ servers to ensure international oversight. Since 2003, the AU, the EU, and NATO have emerged as the primary regional organizations involved in peace operations, often in partnerships with the UN (and each other) ranging from se¬ quential deployments to integrated “hybrid” missions (for example, Darfur). Since the UN Charter clearly states that only the Security Council can au¬ thorize the use of force, the increased involvement of regional IGOs in peace operations has clearly raised issues of authority and legitimacy. In some cases, the UN Security Council has delegated responsibility to a regional IGO or given its approval retroactively; in other cases, regional operations have been undertaken in collaboration or partnership with the UN and, in a few cases, have subsequently transitioned to a UN operation. Table 8.4 illustrates the variations in council authorization. Often when there is a transition from a re¬ gional to a UN peacekeeping force, soldiers from NATO or the AU, in Bosnia and Darfur for example, have simply changed their hats to don the UN’s blue berets and the UN secretary-general has named a new commander. Although none of the regional organizations were designed specifically to complement the UN’s role, as discussed earlier. Chapter VIII of the charter clearly envi¬ sioned the possibility of such entities and Article 52 encourages regional ef¬ forts to settle disputes peacefully. IGOs in Africa and Europe have been most active in peace operations, in¬ cluding ECOWAS, the AU, NATO, and the EU, although they vary widely in their organizational capacities (Crocker 2007: 12). For example, although African IGOs have long asserted the preference for dealing with African prob¬ lems regionally, resource constraints afflict them all, as shown in the case of Darfur. Capacity-building efforts are currently being supported by the G-8’s Global Peace Operations Initiative and the EU’s African Peace Facility. NATO is the exception to the general rule that IGOs do not have any mil¬ itary capabilities except those that their members commit for action on an ad hoc basis, but the earlier discussion of its role in Afghanistan showed the dif¬ ficulties even it has encountered in getting members to commit troops and not limit their use. As discussed in Chapter 5, the EU’s rapid reaction force is rel¬ atively recent. Its major strategic objectives include assisting the UN in re¬ sponding to threats to international peace and security, assisting countries emerging from conflicts, and strengthening the UN’s abilities in short-term crisis management situations. The EU’s rapid deployment capability proved vital on two occasions in the DRC, as discussed earlier, and has been utilized more recently in Chad for violence spilling over from Darfur. Whether peace operations have been undertaken by the UN or regional IGOs, there are some notable successes and some striking failures, as our case studies have shown. We turn now to a more systematic evaluation of success and failure in peace operations.

350

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