International Financial Management [10ed.] 9781118929322, 1118929322

Table of contents :
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Selected Currencies and Symbols
Part 1 The Global Financial Management Environment
Chapter 1 Introduction to International Financial Management
1.1 The Rise of the International Company
Evolution of the Multinational Corporation
The Process of Overseas Expansion by Multinationals
A Behavioral Definition of the Multinational Corporation
The Global Manager
1.2 The Internationalization of Business and Finance
Political and Labor Union Concerns about Global Competition
Consequences of Global Competition
1.3 International Financial Management: Theory and Practice
Criticisms of the International Corporation
Functions of Financial Management
Theme of This Text
Relationship to Domestic Financial Management
The Importance of Total Risk
The Global Financial Marketplace
The Role of the Financial Executive in an Efficient Market
1.4 Outline of the Text
The Global Financial Management Environment
Currency and Derivatives Markets
Managing Currency Risks
Financing International Operations
International Capital Budgeting
International Management of Working Capital
APPENDIX 1A The Origins and Consequences of International Trade
The Gains from Trade
Specialized Factors of Production
Monetary Prices and Exchange Rates
Tariffs
Chapter 2 Exchange Rate Determination
2.1 Setting the Equilibrium Spot Exchange Rate
Demand for a Currency
Supply of a Currency
Factors that Affect the Equilibrium Exchange Rate
Calculating Exchange Rate Changes
2.2 Expectations and the Asset Market Model of Exchange Rates
The Nature of Money and Currency Values
Central Bank Reputations and Currency Values
2.3 The Fundamentals of Central Bank Intervention
How Real Exchange Rates Affect Relative Competitiveness
Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
The Effects of Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
2.4 The Equilibrium Approach to Exchange Rates
Disequilibrium Theory and Exchange Rate Overshooting
The Equilibrium Theory of Exchange Rates and Its Implications
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 3 The International Monetary System
3.1 Alternative Exchange Rate Systems
The Trilemma and Exchange Rate Regime Choice
Free Float
Managed Float
Target-Zone Arrangement
Fixed-Rate System
3.2 A Brief History of the International Monetary System
The Classical Gold Standard
How the Classical Gold Standard Worked in Practice: 1821-1914
The Gold Exchange Standard and Its Aftermath: 1925-1944
The Bretton Woods System: 1946-1971
The Post-Bretton Woods System: 1971 to the Present
Assessment of the Floating-Rate System
3.3 The European Monetary System and Monetary Union
The Exchange-Rate Mechanism
Lessons from the European Monetary System
The Currency Crisis of September 1992
The Exchange Rate Mechanism is Abandoned in August 1993
European Monetary Union
Optimum Currency Area
Lessons from EMU and the Euro
Exchange Rate Regimes Today
3.4 Emerging Market Currency Crises
Transmission Mechanisms
Origins of Emerging Market Crises
Policy Proposals for Dealing with Emerging Market Crises
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 4 Currencies: Expectations, Parities, and Forecasting
4.1 Arbitrage and the Law of One Price
4.2 Purchasing Power Parity
The Lesson of Purchasing Power Parity
Expected Inflation and Exchange Rate Changes
The Monetary Approach
Empirical Evidence
4.3 The Fisher Effect
Empirical Evidence
4.4 The International Fisher Effect
Empirical Evidence
4.5 Interest Rate Parity Theory
Empirical Evidence
4.6 The Relationship Between the Forward Rate and the Future Spot Rate
Empirical Evidence
4.7 Currency Forecasting
Requirements for Successful Currency Forecasting
Market-Based Forecasts
Model-Based Forecasts
Model Evaluation
Forecasting Controlled Exchange Rates
4.8 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 5 The International Monetary System and the Balance of Payments
5.1 Balance-of-Payments Categories
Current Account
Capital Account
Financial Account
Balance-of-Payments Measures
The Missing Numbers
5.2 The International Flow of Goods, Services, and Capital
Domestic Saving and Investment and the Financial Account
The Link between the Current and Financial Accounts
Government Budget Deficits and Current-Account Deficits
The Current Situation
5.3 Coping with the Current-Account Deficit
Currency Depreciation
Protectionism
Ending Foreign Ownership of Domestic Assets
Boosting the Saving Rate
Adjusting Global Economic Policies
Current-Account Deficits and Unemployment
The Bottom Line on Current-Account Deficits and Surpluses
5.4 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 6 Country Risk
6.1 Measuring Political Risk
Political Stability
Economic Factors
Subjective Factors
6.2 Economic and Political Factors Underlying Country Risk
Fiscal Irresponsibility
Monetary Instability
Controlled Exchange Rate System
Wasteful Government Spending
Resource Base
Country Risk and Adjustment to External Shocks
Market-Oriented Versus Statist Policies
Key Indicators of Country Risk and Economic Health
6.3 Country Risk Analysis in International Lending
The Mathematics of Sovereign Debt Analysis
Country Risk and the Terms of Trade
The Government's Cost/Benefit Calculus
Lessons from the International Debt Crisis
6.4 Summary and Conclusions
Part 2 Currency and Derivatives Markets
Chapter 7 Currency Markets
7.1 Organization of the Foreign Exchange Market
The Participants
Size
7.2 The Spot Market
Spot Quotations
The Mechanics of Spot Transactions
7.3 The Forward Market
Forward Quotations
Forward Contract Maturities
7.4 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 8 Currency Derivatives
8.1 Futures Contracts
Forward Contract versus Futures Contract
8.2 Currency Options
Market Structure
Using Currency Options
Option Pricing and Valuation
Using Forward or Futures Contracts Versus Options Contracts
Futures Options
8.3 Reading Currency Futures and Options Prices
8.4 Summary and Conclusions
APPENDIX 8A Option Pricing Using Black-Scholes
Implied Volatilities
Shortcomings of the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model
APPENDIX 8B Put-Call Option Interest Rate Parity
Chapter 9 Interest Rate Derivatives
9.1 Interest Rate and Currency Swaps
Interest Rate Swaps
Currency Swaps
Economic Advantages of Swaps
9.2 Interest Rate Forwards and Futures
Forward Forwards
Forward Rate Agreement
Short-Term Interest Rate Futures
9.3 Structured Notes
Inverse Floaters
Callable Step-Up Note
Step-Down Coupon Note
9.4 Credit Default Swaps
9.5 Summary and Conclusions
Part 3 Managing Currency Risks
10.1 Alternative Measures of Foreign Exchange Exposure
Translation Exposure
Transaction Exposure
Operating Exposure
10.2 Alternative Currency Translation Methods
Current/Noncurrent Method
Monetary/Nonmonetary Method
Temporal Method
Current Rate Method
10.3 Transaction Exposure
10.4 Designing a Hedging Strategy
Objectives
Costs and Benefits of Standard Hedging Techniques
Centralization versus Decentralization
Managing Risk Management
Accounting for Hedging under IFRS
Empirical Evidence on Hedging
10.5 Managing Translation Exposure
Funds Adjustment
Evaluating Alternative Hedging Mechanisms
10.6 Managing Transaction Exposure
Forward Market Hedge
Money Market Hedge
Risk Shifting
Pricing Decisions
Exposure Netting
Currency Risk Sharing
Currency Collars
Cross-Hedging
Foreign Currency Options
10.7 Summary and Conclusions
APPENDIX 10A Currency Translation in Practice
Chapter 11 Economic Exposure
11.1 Foreign Exchange Risk and Economic Exposure
Real Exchange Rate Changes and Exchange Risk
Importance of the Real Exchange Rate
Inflation and Exchange Risk
Competitive Effects of Real Exchange Rate Changes
11.2 The Economic Consequences of Exchange Rate Changes
Transaction Exposure
Operating Exposure
11.3 Identifying Economic Exposure
Pla Seau Beach Resort
Petróleos Mexicanos
Toyota Motor Company
11.4 Calculating Economic Exposure
Spectrum's Accounting Exposure
Spectrum's Economic Exposure
11.5 An Operational Measure of Exchange Risk
Limitations
11.6 Managing Operating Exposure
Marketing Management of Exchange Risk
Production Management of Exchange Risk
Planning for Exchange Rate Changes
Financial Management of Exchange Risk
11.7 Summary and Conclusions
Part 4 Financing International Operations
12.1 Corporate Sources and Uses of Funds
Financial Markets versus Financial Intermediaries
Financial Systems and Corporate Governance
Globalization of Financial Markets
12.2 Domestic Capital Markets as International Financial Centers
International Financial Markets
Foreign Access to Domestic Markets
Globalization of Financial Markets Has Its Downside
12.3 Development Banks
The World Bank Group
Regional and National Development Banks
Regional Development Banks
Private Sector Alternatives
12.4 Project Finance
12.5 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 13 International Financial Markets
13.1 The Eurocurrency Market
Modern Origins
Eurodollar Creation
Eurocurrency Loans
Relationship Between Domestic and Eurocurrency Money Markets
Euromarket Trends
13.2 Eurobonds
To be confirmed Swaps
Links Between the Domestic and Eurobond Markets
Rationale for Existence of Eurobond Market
Eurobonds versus Eurocurrency Loans
13.3 Note Issuance Facilities and Euronotes
Note Issuance Facilities versus Eurobonds
Euro-Medium-Term Notes
13.4 Euro-Commercial Paper
13.5 The Asiacurrency Market
13.6 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 14 The International Cost of Capital
14.1 The Cost of Equity Capital
14.2 The Weighted Average Cost of Capital for Foreign Projects
14.3 Discount Rates for Foreign Investments
Evidence From the Stock Market
Key Issues in Estimating Foreign Project Discount Rates
Proxy Companies
The Relevant Base Portfolio
The Relevant Market Risk Premium
Recommendations
14.4 The Cost of Debt Capital
Annual Exchange Rate Change
Using Sovereign Risk Spreads
14.5 Establishing a Worldwide Capital Structure
Foreign Subsidiary Capital Structure
Joint Ventures
14.6 Valuing Low-Cost Financing Opportunities
Taxes
Government Credit and Capital Controls
Government Subsidies and Incentives
14.7 Summary and Conclusions
Part 5 International Capital Budgeting
Chapter 15 International Portfolio Investment
15.1 The Risks and Benefits of International Equity Investing
International Diversification
Investing in Emerging Markets
Barriers to International Diversification
15.2 International Bond Investing
15.3 Optimal International Asset Allocation
15.4 Measuring the Total Return from Foreign Portfolio Investing
Bonds
Stocks
15.5 Measuring Exchange Risk on Foreign Securities
Hedging Currency Risk
15.6 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 16 Strategies for Foreign Direct Investment
16.1 Theory of the Multinational Corporation
Product and Factor Market Imperfections
Financial Market Imperfections
16.2 The Strategy of Multinational Enterprise
Innovation-Based Multinationals
The Mature Multinationals
The Senescent Multinationals
Foreign Direct Investment and Survival
16.3 Designing a Global Expansion Strategy
Awareness of Profitable Investments
Selecting a Mode of Entry
Auditing the Effectiveness of Entry Modes
Using Appropriate Evaluation Criteria
Estimating the Longevity of a Competitive Advantage
16.4 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 17 International Capital Budgeting
17.1 Basics of Capital Budgeting
Net Present Value
Incremental Cash Flows
Alternative Capital-Budgeting Frameworks
17.2 Issues in Foreign Investment Analysis
Parent versus Project Cash Flows
Political and Economic Risk Analysis
Exchange Rate Changes and Inflation
17.3 Foreign Project Appraisal: The Case of International Machine Tools
Estimation of Project Cash Flows
Estimation of Parent Cash Flows
17.4 Political Risk Analysis
Expropriation
Blocked Funds
17.5 Growth Options and Project Evaluation
17.6 Summary and Conclusions
APPENDIX 17A Managing Political Risk
Pre-investment Planning
Operating Policies
Part 6 International Management of Working Capital
Chapter 18 International Trade Management
18.1 Payment Terms in International Trade
Cash in Advance
Documentary Credit
Draft
Consignment
Open Account
Banks and Trade Financing
Collecting Overdue Accounts
18.2 Documents in International Trade
Bill of Lading
Commercial Invoice
Insurance Certificate
Consular Invoice
18.3 Financing Techniques in International Trade
Bankers' Acceptances
Discounting
Factoring
Forfaiting
18.4 Government Sources of Export Financing and Credit Insurance
Export Financing
Export-Credit Insurance
Taking Advantage of Government-Subsidized Export Financing
18.5 Countertrade
18.6 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 19 Managing Working Capital
19.1 International Cash Management
Organization
Collection and Disbursement of Funds
Payments Netting in International Cash Management
Management of the Short-Term Investment Portfolio
Optimal Worldwide Cash Levels
Cash Planning and Budgeting
Bank Relations
19.2 Accounts Receivable Management
Credit Extension
19.3 Inventory Management
Production Location and Inventory Control
Advance Inventory Purchases
Inventory Stockpiling
19.4 Short-Term Financing
Key Factors in Short-Term Financing Strategy
Short-Term Financing Objectives
Short-Term Financing Options
Calculating the Costs of Alternative Financing Options
19.5 Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 20 Financial Management for the Global Enterprise
20.1 The Value of the Multinational Financial System
Mode of Transfer
Timing Flexibility
Value
20.2 Intercompany Fund-Flow Mechanisms: Costs and Benefits
Tax Factors
Transfer Pricing
Reinvoicing Centers
Fees and Royalties
Leading and Lagging
Intercompany Loans
Dividends
Equity versus Debt
20.3 Designing a Global Remittance Policy
Prerequisites
Information Requirements
Behavioral Consequences
20.4 Summary and Conclusions
Glossary
Index
EULA

Citation preview

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INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

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INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Alan C. Shapiro and

Peter Moles

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Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd All efforts have been made to trace and acknowledge ownership of copyright. The Publisher would be glad to hear from any copyright holders whom it has not been possible to contact. Registered office John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com. The rights of Alan C. Shapiro and Peter Moles to be identified as the authors of this work have been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East only and may not be exported. The content is materially different than products for other markets including the authorized U.S. counterpart of this title. Exportation of this book to another region without the Publisher’s authorization may be illegal and a violation of the Publisher’s rights. The Publisher may take legal action to enforce its rights. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley publishes in a variety of print and electronic formats and by print-on-demand. Some material included with standard print versions of this book may not be included in e-books or in print-on-demand. If this book refers to media such as a CD or DVD that is not included in the version you purchased, you may download this material at http://booksupport.wiley.com. For more information about Wiley products, visit www.wiley.com. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shapiro, Alan C. International financial management / Alan C. Shapiro, Peter Moles. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-118-92932-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. International business enterprises–Finance. 2. International finance. I. Moles, Peter. II. Title. HG4027.5.S465 2014 658.15’9–dc23 2014017816 ISBN: 9781118929322 (pbk) ISBN: 9781118935866 (ebk) ISBN: 9781118953556 (ebk) A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Typeset in 10/12pt Times by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain by Bell and Bain Ltd, Glasgow.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE xvii SELECTED CURRENCIES AND SYMBOLS SYMBOLS AND ACRONYMS xxi

xix

PART 1 THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT

1

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

3

1.1 The Rise of the International Company 5 Evolution of the Multinational Corporation 9 The Process of Overseas Expansion by Multinationals 18 A Behavioral Definition of the Multinational Corporation 21 The Global Manager 24 1.2 The Internationalization of Business and Finance 24 Political and Labor Union Concerns about Global Competition 25 Consequences of Global Competition 32 1.3 International Financial Management: Theory and Practice 36 Criticisms of the International Corporation 37 Functions of Financial Management 37 Theme of This Text 38 Relationship to Domestic Financial Management 38 The Importance of Total Risk 40 The Global Financial Marketplace 41 The Role of the Financial Executive in an Efficient Market 41 1.4 Outline of the Text 42 The Global Financial Management Environment 42 Currency and Derivatives Markets 42 Managing Currency Risks 42 Financing International Operations 43 International Capital Budgeting 43 International Management of Working Capital 43 APPENDIX 1A The Origins and Consequences of International Trade 45 The Gains from Trade 46 Specialized Factors of Production 47 Monetary Prices and Exchange Rates 48 Tariffs 49 v

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2

EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION

51

2.1 Setting the Equilibrium Spot Exchange Rate 52 Demand for a Currency 52 Supply of a Currency 52 Factors that Affect the Equilibrium Exchange Rate 53 Calculating Exchange Rate Changes 54 2.2 Expectations and the Asset Market Model of Exchange Rates 58 The Nature of Money and Currency Values 61 Central Bank Reputations and Currency Values 63 2.3 The Fundamentals of Central Bank Intervention 73 How Real Exchange Rates Affect Relative Competitiveness 73 Foreign Exchange Market Intervention 74 The Effects of Foreign Exchange Market Intervention 78 2.4 The Equilibrium Approach to Exchange Rates 80 Disequilibrium Theory and Exchange Rate Overshooting 80 The Equilibrium Theory of Exchange Rates and Its Implications 82 2.5 Summary and Conclusions 83

3

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

87

3.1 Alternative Exchange Rate Systems 88 The Trilemma and Exchange Rate Regime Choice 89 Free Float 91 Managed Float 93 Target-Zone Arrangement 94 Fixed-Rate System 94 3.2 A Brief History of the International Monetary System 97 The Classical Gold Standard 99 How the Classical Gold Standard Worked in Practice: 1821–1914 100 The Gold Exchange Standard and Its Aftermath: 1925–1944 100 The Bretton Woods System: 1946–1971 103 The Post-Bretton Woods System: 1971 to the Present 105 Assessment of the Floating-Rate System 108 3.3 The European Monetary System and Monetary Union 109 The Exchange-Rate Mechanism 109 Lessons from the European Monetary System 109 The Currency Crisis of September 1992 110 The Exchange Rate Mechanism is Abandoned in August 1993 111 European Monetary Union 112 Optimum Currency Area 118 Lessons from EMU and the Euro 128 Exchange Rate Regimes Today 129 3.4 Emerging Market Currency Crises 129 Transmission Mechanisms 129

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Origins of Emerging Market Crises 130 Policy Proposals for Dealing with Emerging Market Crises 131 3.5 Summary and Conclusions 132

4

CURRENCIES: EXPECTATIONS, PARITIES, AND FORECASTING

135

4.1 Arbitrage and the Law of One Price 135 4.2 Purchasing Power Parity 138 The Lesson of Purchasing Power Parity 142 Expected Inflation and Exchange Rate Changes 144 The Monetary Approach 145 Empirical Evidence 145 4.3 The Fisher Effect 147 Empirical Evidence 149 4.4 The International Fisher Effect 153 Empirical Evidence 155 4.5 Interest Rate Parity Theory 157 Empirical Evidence 161 4.6 The Relationship Between the Forward Rate and the Future Spot Rate 162 Empirical Evidence 164 4.7 Currency Forecasting 165 Requirements for Successful Currency Forecasting 166 Market-Based Forecasts 166 Model-Based Forecasts 168 Model Evaluation 169 Forecasting Controlled Exchange Rates 171 4.8 Summary and Conclusions 171

5

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 5.1 Balance-of-Payments Categories 179 Current Account 181 Capital Account 182 Financial Account 182 Balance-of-Payments Measures 183 The Missing Numbers 184 5.2 The International Flow of Goods, Services, and Capital 184 Domestic Saving and Investment and the Financial Account 185 The Link between the Current and Financial Accounts 186 Government Budget Deficits and Current-Account Deficits 189 The Current Situation 190 5.3 Coping with the Current-Account Deficit 193 Currency Depreciation 193 Protectionism 198

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Ending Foreign Ownership of Domestic Assets 199 Boosting the Saving Rate 199 Adjusting Global Economic Policies 201 Current-Account Deficits and Unemployment 202 The Bottom Line on Current-Account Deficits and Surpluses 202 5.4 Summary and Conclusions 203

6

COUNTRY RISK

208

6.1 Measuring Political Risk 209 Political Stability 210 Economic Factors 210 Subjective Factors 210 6.2 Economic and Political Factors Underlying Country Risk 218 Fiscal Irresponsibility 219 Monetary Instability 222 Controlled Exchange Rate System 223 Wasteful Government Spending 223 Resource Base 223 Country Risk and Adjustment to External Shocks 224 Market-Oriented Versus Statist Policies 225 Key Indicators of Country Risk and Economic Health 229 6.3 Country Risk Analysis in International Lending 236 The Mathematics of Sovereign Debt Analysis 236 Country Risk and the Terms of Trade 238 The Government’s Cost/Benefit Calculus 239 Lessons from the International Debt Crisis 242 6.4 Summary and Conclusions 243

PART 2 CURRENCY AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS

7

CURRENCY MARKETS

249

7.1 Organization of the Foreign Exchange Market 250 The Participants 251 Size 255 7.2 The Spot Market 257 Spot Quotations 257 The Mechanics of Spot Transactions 264 7.3 The Forward Market 265 Forward Quotations 266 Forward Contract Maturities 269 7.4 Summary and Conclusions 269

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CURRENCY DERIVATIVES

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8.1 Futures Contracts 272 Forward Contract versus Futures Contract 274 8.2 Currency Options 279 Market Structure 280 Using Currency Options 282 Option Pricing and Valuation 287 Using Forward or Futures Contracts Versus Options Contracts 288 Futures Options 294 8.3 Reading Currency Futures and Options Prices 295 8.4 Summary and Conclusions 297 APPENDIX 8A Option Pricing Using Black-Scholes 299 Implied Volatilities 301 Shortcomings of the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model 302 APPENDIX 8B Put-Call Option Interest Rate Parity 302

9

INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES

306

9.1 Interest Rate and Currency Swaps 306 Interest Rate Swaps 307 Currency Swaps 310 Economic Advantages of Swaps 318 9.2 Interest Rate Forwards and Futures 318 Forward Forwards 318 Forward Rate Agreement 319 Short-Term Interest Rate Futures 320 9.3 Structured Notes 322 Inverse Floaters 323 Callable Step-Up Note 324 Step-Down Coupon Note 324 9.4 Credit Default Swaps 324 9.5 Summary and Conclusions 326

PART 3 MANAGING CURRENCY RISKS

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TRANSLATION AND TRANSACTION EXPOSURE 10.1

331

Alternative Measures of Foreign Exchange Exposure 332 Translation Exposure 332 Transaction Exposure 332 Operating Exposure 333

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10.2

Alternative Currency Translation Methods 334 Current/Noncurrent Method 334 Monetary/Nonmonetary Method 334 Temporal Method 335 Current Rate Method 335 10.3 Transaction Exposure 335 10.4 Designing a Hedging Strategy 337 Objectives 338 Costs and Benefits of Standard Hedging Techniques 340 Centralization versus Decentralization 343 Managing Risk Management 344 Accounting for Hedging under IFRS 345 Empirical Evidence on Hedging 346 10.5 Managing Translation Exposure 347 Funds Adjustment 347 Evaluating Alternative Hedging Mechanisms 348 10.6 Managing Transaction Exposure 349 Forward Market Hedge 350 Money Market Hedge 351 Risk Shifting 354 Pricing Decisions 355 Exposure Netting 355 Currency Risk Sharing 356 Currency Collars 358 Cross-Hedging 360 Foreign Currency Options 361 10.7 Summary and Conclusions 364 APPENDIX 10A Currency Translation in Practice 369

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ECONOMIC EXPOSURE 11.1

11.2

11.3

373

Foreign Exchange Risk and Economic Exposure 374 Real Exchange Rate Changes and Exchange Risk 375 Importance of the Real Exchange Rate 376 Inflation and Exchange Risk 376 Competitive Effects of Real Exchange Rate Changes 377 The Economic Consequences of Exchange Rate Changes 379 Transaction Exposure 380 Operating Exposure 380 Identifying Economic Exposure 383 Pla Seau Beach Resort 383 Petróleos Mexicanos 385 Toyota Motor Company 385

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11.4

11.5 11.6

11.7

Calculating Economic Exposure 386 Spectrum’s Accounting Exposure 387 Spectrum’s Economic Exposure 387 An Operational Measure of Exchange Risk 391 Limitations 392 Managing Operating Exposure 393 Marketing Management of Exchange Risk 394 Production Management of Exchange Risk 396 Planning for Exchange Rate Changes 398 Financial Management of Exchange Risk 400 Summary and Conclusions 404

PART 4 FINANCING INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

12

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CAPITAL MARKETS 12.1

12.2

12.3

12.4 12.5

13

Corporate Sources and Uses of Funds 412 Financial Markets versus Financial Intermediaries 412 Financial Systems and Corporate Governance 413 Globalization of Financial Markets 416 Domestic Capital Markets as International Financial Centers 419 International Financial Markets 422 Foreign Access to Domestic Markets 423 Globalization of Financial Markets Has Its Downside 428 Development Banks 429 The World Bank Group 430 Regional and National Development Banks 431 Regional Development Banks 431 Private Sector Alternatives 432 Project Finance 433 Summary and Conclusions 435

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 13.1

13.2

411

438

The Eurocurrency Market 438 Modern Origins 439 Eurodollar Creation 439 Eurocurrency Loans 441 Relationship Between Domestic and Eurocurrency Money Markets 443 Euromarket Trends 444 Eurobonds 445 To be confirmed Swaps 445 Links Between the Domestic and Eurobond Markets 445

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13.3

13.4 13.5 13.6

14

Rationale for Existence of Eurobond Market 449 Eurobonds versus Eurocurrency Loans 450 Note Issuance Facilities and Euronotes 451 Note Issuance Facilities versus Eurobonds 453 Euro-Medium-Term Notes 453 Euro-Commercial Paper 455 The Asiacurrency Market 456 Summary and Conclusions 457

THE INTERNATIONAL COST OF CAPITAL 14.1 14.2 14.3

14.4

14.5

14.6

14.7

459

The Cost of Equity Capital 460 The Weighted Average Cost of Capital for Foreign Projects 461 Discount Rates for Foreign Investments 462 Evidence From the Stock Market 463 Key Issues in Estimating Foreign Project Discount Rates 464 Proxy Companies 465 The Relevant Base Portfolio 466 The Relevant Market Risk Premium 470 Recommendations 471 The Cost of Debt Capital 471 Annual Exchange Rate Change 472 Using Sovereign Risk Spreads 473 Establishing a Worldwide Capital Structure 473 Foreign Subsidiary Capital Structure 474 Joint Ventures 479 Valuing Low-Cost Financing Opportunities 479 Taxes 481 Government Credit and Capital Controls 482 Government Subsidies and Incentives 482 Summary and Conclusions 484

PART 5 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL BUDGETING

15

INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT 15.1

15.2 15.3

491

The Risks and Benefits of International Equity Investing 491 International Diversification 493 Investing in Emerging Markets 501 Barriers to International Diversification 506 International Bond Investing 509 Optimal International Asset Allocation 509

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15.4

15.5 15.6

16

STRATEGIES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 16.1

16.2

16.3

16.4

17

Measuring the Total Return from Foreign Portfolio Investing 510 Bonds 511 Stocks 511 Measuring Exchange Risk on Foreign Securities 512 Hedging Currency Risk 512 Summary and Conclusions 513

Theory of the Multinational Corporation 518 Product and Factor Market Imperfections 518 Financial Market Imperfections 519 The Strategy of Multinational Enterprise 520 Innovation-Based Multinationals 520 The Mature Multinationals 520 The Senescent Multinationals 523 Foreign Direct Investment and Survival 523 Designing a Global Expansion Strategy 527 Awareness of Profitable Investments 528 Selecting a Mode of Entry 528 Auditing the Effectiveness of Entry Modes 529 Using Appropriate Evaluation Criteria 529 Estimating the Longevity of a Competitive Advantage 530 Summary and Conclusions 530

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL BUDGETING 17.1

17.2

17.3

17.4

17.5 17.6

517

534

Basics of Capital Budgeting 535 Net Present Value 535 Incremental Cash Flows 536 Alternative Capital-Budgeting Frameworks 538 Issues in Foreign Investment Analysis 540 Parent versus Project Cash Flows 540 Political and Economic Risk Analysis 542 Exchange Rate Changes and Inflation 543 Foreign Project Appraisal: The Case of International Machine Tools 544 Estimation of Project Cash Flows 544 Estimation of Parent Cash Flows 549 Political Risk Analysis 552 Expropriation 552 Blocked Funds 553 Growth Options and Project Evaluation 554 Summary and Conclusions 556

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APPENDIX 17A Managing Political Risk 559 Pre-investment Planning 559 Operating Policies 561

PART 6 INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF WORKING CAPITAL

18

INTERNATIONAL TRADE MANAGEMENT 18.1

18.2

18.3

18.4

18.5 18.6

19

Payment Terms in International Trade 568 Cash in Advance 568 Documentary Credit 568 Draft 573 Consignment 576 Open Account 576 Banks and Trade Financing 576 Collecting Overdue Accounts 577 Documents in International Trade 577 Bill of Lading 577 Commercial Invoice 578 Insurance Certificate 578 Consular Invoice 578 Financing Techniques in International Trade 579 Bankers’ Acceptances 579 Discounting 581 Factoring 581 Forfaiting 582 Government Sources of Export Financing and Credit Insurance 582 Export Financing 583 Export-Credit Insurance 585 Taking Advantage of Government-Subsidized Export Financing 586 Countertrade 586 Summary and Conclusions 589

MANAGING WORKING CAPITAL 19.1

567

592

International Cash Management 593 Organization 593 Collection and Disbursement of Funds 594 Payments Netting in International Cash Management 596 Management of the Short-Term Investment Portfolio 600 Optimal Worldwide Cash Levels 602 Cash Planning and Budgeting 602 Bank Relations 605

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19.2 19.3

19.4

19.5

20

Accounts Receivable Management 606 Credit Extension 606 Inventory Management 607 Production Location and Inventory Control 607 Advance Inventory Purchases 608 Inventory Stockpiling 608 Short-Term Financing 608 Key Factors in Short-Term Financing Strategy 609 Short-Term Financing Objectives 610 Short-Term Financing Options 610 Calculating the Costs of Alternative Financing Options 614 Summary and Conclusions 616

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE GLOBAL ENTERPRISE 20.1

20.2

20.3

20.4

The Value of the Multinational Financial System 621 Mode of Transfer 621 Timing Flexibility 621 Value 623 Intercompany Fund-Flow Mechanisms: Costs and Benefits 624 Tax Factors 624 Transfer Pricing 625 Reinvoicing Centers 628 Fees and Royalties 629 Leading and Lagging 630 Intercompany Loans 632 Dividends 634 Equity versus Debt 637 Designing a Global Remittance Policy 640 Prerequisites 641 Information Requirements 641 Behavioral Consequences 642 Summary and Conclusions 642

GLOSSARY INDEX

620

645 679

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PREFACE

Approach The fundamental thinking behind International Financial Management (IFM) is to provide a conceptual framework within which the key financial decisions of the multinational firm can be analyzed. The approach is to treat international financial management as a natural and logical extension of the principles learned in a foundations course in financial management. Thus, it builds on and extends the valuation framework provided by domestic corporate finance to account for dimensions unique to international finance. International Financial Management presumes an understanding of basic corporate finance, economics, and algebra. However, it does not assume prior knowledge of international economics or international finance and is therefore self-contained in that respect. IFM focuses on decision-making in an international context. Analytical techniques help translate the often vague guidelines used by international financial executives into specific decision criteria. The text and its accompanying learning aids offer a variety of real-life examples, both numerical and institutional, that demonstrate the use of financial analysis and reasoning in solving international financial problems. These examples have been culled from the thousands of applications of corporate practice that we have collected over the years from business periodicals and consulting. Placing the best of these examples throughout the text allows students to see the value of examining real-world decision problems with the aid of a solid theoretical foundation. Seemingly unrelated facts and events can then be interpreted as specific manifestations of more general financial principles. All the traditional areas of corporate finance are explored, including working capital management, capital budgeting, the cost of capital, and the firm’s financial structure. However, this is done from the perspective of an international business, concentrating on those decision elements that are rarely, if ever, encountered by purely domestic firms. These elements include multiple currencies with frequent exchange rate changes and varying rates of inflation, differing tax systems, multiple money markets, exchange controls, segmented capital markets, and political risks such as nationalization or expropriation. Throughout the text, we have tried to demystify and simplify international financial management by showing that its basic principles rest on the same foundation as similar decisions in corporate finance made in a purely domestic context. The emphasis throughout this text is on taking advantage of being global. Too often companies focus on the threats and risks inherent in venturing abroad rather than on the opportunities that are available to firms operating in a global marketplace. These opportunities include the ability to obtain a greater degree of international diversification than security purchases alone can provide as well as the ability to arbitrage between imperfect capital markets, thereby obtaining funds at a lower cost than could a purely domestic firm.

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Pedagogy The text provides a complete learning system and is greatly enhanced by making available the following learning and teaching aids: Focus on Corporate Practice: Throughout the text, numerous real-world examples and vignettes provide actual applications of financial concepts and theories. They show students that the issues, tools, and techniques discussed in the text are being applied to day-to-day financial decision-making. Extensive Use of Examples and Applications: Numerous short applications and examples of specific concepts and techniques are scattered throughout the body of most chapters. Learning Objectives: Each chapter opens with a statement of its action-oriented learning objectives. These statements enhance learning by previewing and guiding the reader’s understanding of the materials that will be encountered in the chapter. Mini-Cases: Most chapters have at least one mini-case that briefly presents a situation that illustrates an important concept in that chapter and then has a series of questions to test student understanding of that concept. Problems and Discussion Questions: There are many realistic end-of-chapter questions and problems that offer practice in applying the concepts and theories being taught. Many of these questions and problems relate to actual situations and companies. Web Resources: Each chapter has sections called “Web Resources” and “Web Exercises” that contain a set of relevant websites for that chapter and several exercises that use those websites to address various issues that arise in the chapter. In addition, the longer cases that previously appeared at the end of each section are now available on the Internet. Solutions to these cases are available to adopters of the text. Glossary: The back of the text contains a glossary that defines the key terms appearing in the different sections.

Additional Resources A complete set of ancillary materials is available for adopters of International Financial Management. These resources can be found on the text’s companion site at www.wiley.com/college/shapiro: • An Instructor’s Manual containing detailed solutions to the end-of-chapter questions and problems and tips for teaching each chapter • Additional Case Studies along with teaching notes and solutions • A Test Bank containing more than 160 additional questions and problems suitable for use in multiple choice exams • PowerPoint Presentations for course lectures. In addition, electronic files for all the figures in the text are available.

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SELECTED CURRENCIES AND SYMBOLS

COUNTRY

CURRENCY

SYMBOL

Afghanistan Albania Algeria Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Barbados Belgium Belize Bermuda Bolivia Botswana Brazil∗ Cambodia Canada

Afghani lek dinar E.C. dollar

Af lek DA E.C.$

peso dollar euro dollar dinar dollar euro dollar dollar boliviano pula real riel dollar dollar

Arg$ $A € BS BD BDS$ € BZ$ Ber$ Bs P R CR $ or Can$ CS

peso yuan

Ch$ Y

peso colon euro krone peso

Col$ C € DKr RD$

Cayman Islands Chile China, People’s Republic of∗∗ Colombia Costa Rica Cyprus Denmark Dominican Republic ∗ Prior ∗∗ The

COUNTRY Ecuador Egypt El Salvador European Monetary Unit Fiji Finland France Germany Greece Guatemala Honduras Hong Kong Hungary India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Kenya Korea, Republic of Kuwait Liberia Liechtenstein Luxembourg

CURRENCY

SYMBOL

sucre pound colon euro

S /. LE C €

dollar euro euro euro euro quetzal lempira dollar forint rupee rupiah rial

F$ € € € € Q L HK$ Ft Rs Rp Rls

euro new sheqel euro dollar yen shilling won

€ NIS € J$ ¥ K Sh W

dinar dollar franc euro

KD $ SFr €

to 1994, Brazil’s currency was the cruzeiro, Cr$. currency is the renminbi, whereas the currency unit is the yuan.

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COUNTRY

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CURRENCY

Macao pataca Malawi kwacha Malaysia ringgit Malta euro Mauritius ruppe Mexico peso Morocco dirham Namibia rand (S.Afr.) Netherlands euro Netherlands guilder Antilles New Zealand dollar Nigeria naira Norway krone Oman rial Omani Pakistan rupee Panama balboa Papua New kina Guinea Paraguay guarani Peru new sol Philippines peso Portugal euro Qatar riyal Russia ruble Saudi Arabia riyal Senegal franc

SYMBOL P MK MS € Mau Rs Mex$ DH R € NA. f $NZ N NKr RO PRs B K G S/.

P

€ QR Rb SRIs CFAF

COUNTRY Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Somalia So. Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela Vietnam Western Samoa Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe

CURRENCY

SYMBOL

dollar euro euro shiling rand euro rupee krona franc dollar baht dollar

S$ € € So. Sh. R € SL Rs SKr SFr NT$ B TT$

dinar lira ruble dirham

D LT rub Dh

pound new peso vatu bolivar dong tala zaire kwacha dollar

£ or £ stg. NUr$ VT Bs D WS$ Z K Z$

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SYMBOLS AND ACRONYMS

ah af ADR APV B/L 𝛽 𝛽∗ 𝛽e C1 C C(E) d D Df et e′t E Ef ft g

Expected real return on home currency loan Expected real return on a foreign currency loan American depository receipt Adjusted present value Bill of lading Beta coefficient, a measure of an asset’s riskiness All-equity beta Levered 𝛽 Local currency cash flows in period t Cost Price of a foreign currency call option Amount of currency devalution Forward discount Amount of foreign currency debt Nominal exchange rate at time t Real exchange rate at time t (a) Exercise price on a call option or (b) Amount of equity Foreign subsidiary retained earnings t-period forward exchange rate (a) Expected dividend growth rate or (b) Expected rate of foreign currency appreciation against the dollar HC Home currency if (a) Expected rate of foreign inflation per period or (b) Before-tax cost of foreign debt ih Expected rate of home country inflation per period id Before-tax cost of domestic debt Io Initial investment IRPT Interest rate parity theory k Cost of capital k0 Weighted cost of capital ke Cost of equity capital given the firm’s degree of leverage k1 Weighted cost of capital for a project k∗ Cost of equity capital if all equity financed L Parent’s target debt ratio LC Local currency L/C Letter of credit LDC Less-developed country LIBOR London interbank offer rate xxi

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xxii MNC NPV OFDI P PIE PPP r rh rf r us rL Rf Rm s S Si SDR t ta Ti Xi

Multinational corporation Net present value Office of Foreign Direct Investment (a) Put option premium or (b) Principal amount of foreign currency loan Price-earnings ration on a share of stock Purchasing power parity Effective yield on a bond Home currency interest rate Foreign currency interest rate U.S. interest rate Local currency interest rate Risk-free rate of return Required return on the market Flotation cost, in percent, on long-term debt Current spot rate Interest subsidy in period i Special drawing right (a) Tax rate or (b) Time, when used as a subscript Foreign affiliate tax rate Tax savings in period i association with using debt financing Home currency cash flow in period i

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The Global Financial Management Environment PART 1

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Introduction to International Financial Management

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What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry employed in a way in which we have some advantage. Adam Smith (1776) LEARNING OBJECTIVES • To understand the nature and benefits of globalization • To explain why multinational corporations are the key players in international economic competition today • To understand the motivations for foreign direct investment and the evolution of international businesses • To identify the stages of corporate expansion overseas by which companies gradually become global businesses • To explain why managers of international firms need to exploit rapidly changing global economic conditions and why political policymakers must also be concerned with the same changing conditions • To identify the advantages of operating globally, including the benefits of international diversification • To describe the general importance of financial economics to international financial management and the particular importance of the concepts of arbitrage, market efficiency, capital asset pricing, and total risk • To characterize the global financial marketplace and explain why managers of international firms must be alert to capital market imperfections and asymmetries in tax regulations Today, on the roads, we may find cars made by European, Asian, or American manufacturers, such as BMW, Renault, Fiat, Nissan, Toyota, Honda, Kia, Tata Motors, Chrysler, and General Motors, 3

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to name but a few.1 Our personal electronic devices, tablets, and phones can have come from South Korea, China, Taiwan, and elsewhere. Everywhere we look we are surrounded by products and services that may originate in another country or even continent. These are just the most tangible evidence for the growth of international trade and the global nature of products and brands. We live in an interconnected world where the car we drive or the electronic device we use can be developed, produced, and sold from different points around the world. To sell in the global markets of the 21st century, firms have had to change and adapt, and adopt a truly international perspective. A key theme of this text is that firms now operate within a global marketplace and can ignore this fact only at their peril. The internationalization of finance and commerce has been brought about by the great advances in transportation, communications, and information-processing technology. This development introduces a dramatic new commercial reality—the global market for standardized consumer and industrial products on a previously unimagined scale. It places primary emphasis on the one great thing all markets have in common—the overwhelming desire for dependable, world-class products at aggressively low prices. The international integration of markets also introduces the global competitor, making firms insecure even in their home markets. The transformation of the world economy has dramatic implications for business. Managers everywhere have learned that their domestic markets can no longer be viewed as safe territory. Rather, their local market is merely one economy that is part of an extremely competitive, integrated world economic system. To succeed, firms need great flexibility; they must be able to change corporate policies quickly as the world market creates new opportunities and challenges. Companies are also finding that they must increasingly turn to foreign markets to source capital and technology and sell their products. Today’s financial reality is that money knows no national boundary. The U.S. dollar is the world’s major currency for international trade and finance, with billions switched at the flick of an electronic blip from one global corporation to another, from one central bank to another. Other currencies, such as the euro, the Chinese yuan, and the Japanese yen, are also traded internationally and offer alternatives to investors to the U.S. dollar, or provide sources of finance that can be switched immediately into another currency. The international mobility of capital has benefited firms by giving them more financial options, while at the same time complicating the job of the chief financial officer by increasing its complexity. The extent to which economies around the world have been integrated into a single global economy was vividly illustrated by the global nature of the financial crisis that began in August 2007 and was triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. Financial globalization was pivotal to the boom in the U.S. housing market that preceded the subprime mortgage crisis (by providing a ready supply of low-cost foreign capital to fund mortgages) and was also the crucial conduit whereby problems in the U.S. housing market were transmitted to the rest of the world (as foreign investors in U.S. mortgage-backed securities were stuck with their risky bets). As the financial crisis led to a deep U.S. recession, its economic effects were transmitted overseas. Slow growth overseas, in turn, led to a steep decline in the demand for U.S. exports. The swift decline in trade worsened the global recession. Because we operate in an integrated world economy, all students of finance should have an international orientation. Indeed, it is the rare company today, in any country, that does not have a supplier, competitor, or customer located abroad. Moreover, its domestic suppliers, competitors, and customers are likely to have their own foreign choices as well. Thus, a key aim of this text is to help you bring to bear a global perspective on key business decisions, manifested by questions such as: “Where in the world should we locate our plants? Which global market segments should we seek to penetrate? Where in the world should we raise our financing?” 1 According

to Brandirectory.com, the top 10 automobile brands in 2013 were: Toyota (Japan), Volkswagen (Germany), BMW (Germany), Mercedes-Benz (Germany), Ford (USA), Nissan (Japan), Honda (Japan), Porsche (Germany), Hyundai (Korea), and Renault (France).

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1.1 The Rise of the International Company

1.1 The Rise of the International Company In spite of its increasing importance today, international business activity is not new. The transfer of goods and services across national borders has been taking place for thousands of years as long-distance trade routes, such as the spice and silk routes from Asia to Europe attest. Since the end of World War II, however, international business has undergone a revolution out of which has emerged one of the most important economic phenomena of the latter half of the 20th century: the multinational corporation or global company.2 A multinational corporation (MNC) or transnational corporation (TNC) is a company engaged in producing and selling goods or services in more than one country. It ordinarily consists of a parent company located in the home country and a number of foreign subsidiaries, typically with a high degree of strategic interaction among the units. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines such a firm as: “…an enterprise comprising entities in more than one country which operate under a system of decision-making that permits coherent policies and a common strategy.”3 Some MNCs have upward of 100 foreign subsidiaries scattered around the world. The United Nations estimated in 2012 that over 82,000 parent companies around the world (with over 800,000 foreign subsidiaries employing 72 million workers) can be classified as multinational firms.4 Based in part on the development of modern communications and transportation technologies, the rise of the multinational corporation was unanticipated by the classical theory of international trade as first developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. According to this theory, which rests on the doctrine of comparative advantage, each nation should specialize in the production and export of those goods that it can produce with highest relative efficiency and import those goods that other nations can produce relatively more efficiently. Underlying this theory is the assumption that goods and services can move internationally but factors of production, such as capital, labor, and land, are relatively immobile. Furthermore, the theory deals only with trade in commodities—that is, undifferentiated products; it ignores the roles of uncertainty, economies of scale, transportation costs, and technology in international trade; and it is static rather than dynamic. For all these defects, however, it is a valuable theory, and it still provides a well-reasoned theoretical foundation for free trade arguments (see Appendix 1A). But the growth of the MNC can be understood only by relaxing the traditional assumptions of classical trade theory. Classical trade theory implicitly assumes that countries differ enough in terms of resource endowments and economic skills for those differences to be at the center of any analysis of corporate competitiveness. Differences among individual corporate strategies are considered to be of only secondary importance; a company’s citizenship is the key determinant of international success in the world of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. This theory, however, is increasingly irrelevant to the analysis of businesses in the countries currently at the core of the world economy—the United States, Japan, China, the nations of Europe,

2 There are a number of types of firms engaged in international business and they have distinct differences. For instance, international companies are engaged in exporting and importing but have no investment outside their home country. On the other hand, multinational corporations (or companies) have investments in more than one country but can be seen as focused on adapting their products and services for individual local markets. In contrast, a global corporation, like a multinational corporation, operates in many countries but will use global branding and marketing across all their markets. The final category is a transnational corporation, which gives local managers decision-making on investment decisions, R&D, and marketing. While each term is distinct, the most important category is generally either somewhat inaccurately called a multinational corporation or global corporation (or business). When referring to firms engaged in cross-border activities, we will use the terms “international business” or “international corporation (company)” and “multinational corporation” or “global corporation” interchangeably without being too specific as to the exact activities they are engaged in. 3 http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-Corporations-Statistics.aspx. 4 World Investment Report 2013, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 27, 2013.

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and, to an increasing extent, the most successful Latin American and East Asian countries, such as Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, and India. Within this advanced and highly integrated set of global economies, differences among corporations are becoming more important than aggregate differences among countries. Furthermore, the increasing capacity of even small companies to operate globally renders the old analytical framework largely obsolete. Not only are the “core nations” more integrated than before in terms of living standards, lifestyles, and economic organization, but their factors of production tend to move more rapidly in search of higher returns. Natural resources have lost much of their previous role in national specialization as advanced, knowledge-intensive societies move rapidly into the age of artificial materials and genetic engineering. Capital moves around the world in massive amounts at the click of a mouse; increasingly, corporations raise capital simultaneously in several major markets. Labor skills in these countries can no longer be considered fundamentally different; many of the students enrolled at universities are foreign, and training has become a key dimension of many joint ventures between international corporations. Technology and know-how are also rapidly becoming a global pool, with companies such as General Electric, Ericsson, Grundig, Siemens, Bayer, BASF, McKinsey & Co., and IBM shifting parts of their operations, such as production, accounting, engineering, and other skilled services, to countries such as India and China. Against this background, the ability of corporations of all sizes to use these globally available factors of production is a far bigger element in international competitiveness than broad macroeconomic differences among countries. Contrary to the postulates of Smith and Ricardo, the very existence of the multinational enterprise is based on the international mobility of certain factors of production. Capital raised in London on the international capital markets may be used by a Swiss-based pharmaceutical firm to finance the acquisition of German equipment by a subsidiary in Brazil. A single Barbie doll is made in 10 countries—designed in California; with parts and clothing from Japan, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, Italy, and Taiwan; and assembled in Mexico—and sold in 144 countries. Information technology also makes it possible for worker skills to flow with little regard to borders. In the semiconductor industry, the leading companies typically locate their design facilities in high-tech corridors in the United States, Japan, and Europe. Finished designs are transported quickly by computer networks to manufacturing plants in countries with more advantageous cost structures. In effect, the traditional world economy in which products are exported has been replaced by one in which value is added in several different countries. The value added in a particular country—product development, design, production, assembly, or marketing—depends on differences in labor costs and unique national attributes or skills. Although trade in goods, capital, and services and the ability to shift production act to limit these differences in costs and skills among nations, differences nonetheless remain based on cultural predilections, historical accidents, and government policies. Each of these factors can affect the nature of the competitive advantages enjoyed by different nations and their companies. During the 1980s and 1990s, fundamental political, technological, regulatory, and economic forces radically changed the global competitive environment. A brief listing of some of these forces includes the following: • Massive deregulation • The collapse of communism • The sale of hundreds of state-owned firms around the world in massive privatizations designed to shrink the public sector and which subsequently has transformed the way in which these businesses operate

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• The revolution in information technologies • The rise in the market for corporate control with its waves of takeovers, mergers, and leveraged buyouts • The jettisoning of statist policies and their replacement by free-market policies in emerging nations • The unprecedented number of nations submitting themselves to the exacting rigors and standards of the global marketplace These forces have combined to usher in an era of brutal price and service competition. The heightened competitiveness of the international business environment has compelled firms in Europe and elsewhere to undergo a process of restructuring and renewal in order to remain competitive and survive. Perhaps the most dramatic change in the international economy over the past three decades has been the rise of China as a global competitor. From 1978, when Deng Xiaoping launched his country’s economic reform program, to 2010, China’s gross domestic product rose by more than 3200%, an annual rate of 11%, the most rapid growth rate by far of any country in the world during this 33-year period. Since 1991, China has attracted the largest amount of foreign investment among developing countries each year, with annual foreign investment by the late 1990s exceeding US$50 billion. Since 2002, China has been the world’s number-two destination (the United States is number one) for foreign direct investment (FDI), which is the acquisition abroad of companies, property, or physical assets such as plant and equipment, attracting over US$121 billion in FDI flows in 2012. Almost all of the world’s 500 largest companies have now invested in China establishing more than 1,600 R&D centers and regional headquarters.5 The transformation of China from an insular nation to the world’s low-cost site for labor-intensive manufacturing has had enormous effects on everything from Europe’s competitiveness as an export platform to the cost of furniture and solar panels in the European Union, to the value of the U.S. dollar, and the number of manufacturing jobs in advanced nations. China’s rapid growth and resulting huge appetite for energy and raw materials have also resulted in stunning increases in the prices of oil, steel, and other basic commodities. Most important, hundreds of millions of consumers worldwide are benefiting from the low prices of China’s goods and more than a billion Chinese are escaping the dire poverty of their past. The prime transmitter of competitive forces in this global economy is the multinational corporation. In 2005, for example, 58% of China’s exports were by foreign companies manufacturing in China.6 What differentiates the multinational enterprise from other firms engaged in international business is the globally coordinated allocation of resources by a single centralized management. Multinational corporations make decisions about market-entry strategy; ownership of foreign operations; and design, production, marketing, and financial activities with an eye to what is best for the corporation as a whole. The true multinational corporation emphasizes group performance rather than the performance of its individual parts. For example, in 2003, Whirlpool Corporation launched what it billed as the world’s cheapest washing machine, with an eye on low-income consumers who never thought they could afford one. Whirlpool designed and developed the Ideale washing machine in Brazil, but it manufactures the Ideale in China and India, as well as Brazil, for sale in those and other developing countries. 5

China Daily (www.chinadaily.com) (June 23, 2012). Tripathi, “The Dragon Tamers”, The Guardian (August 11, 2006).

6 Salil

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Mini-Case

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

General Electric Globalizes Its Medical Systems Business

One of General Electric’s key growth initiatives is to globalize its business. According to its website, “Globalization no longer refers only to selling goods and services in global markets. Today’s most valuable innovations and solutions are envisioned, designed, built and offered on a global scale.”7 A critical element of General Electric’s global strategy is to be first or second in the world in a business or to exit that business. For example, in 1987, GE swapped its RCA consumer electronics division for Thomson CGR, the medical equipment business of Thomson SA of France, to strengthen its own medical unit. Together with GE Medical Systems Asia (GEMSA) in Japan, CGR makes GE number one in the world market for X-ray, CAT scan, magnetic resonance, ultrasound, and other diagnostic imaging devices, ahead of Siemens (Germany), Philips (Netherlands), and Toshiba (Japan). General Electric’s production is also globalized, with each unit exclusively responsible for equipment in which it is the volume leader. Hence, GE Medical Systems (GEMS) now makes the high end of its CAT scanners and magnetic resonance equipment near Milwaukee (its headquarters) and the low end in Japan. The middle market is supplied by GE Medical Systems SA (France). Engineering skills pass horizontally from the United States to Japan to France and back again. Each subsidiary supplies the marketing skills to its own home market. The core of GEMS’s global strategy is to “provide high-value global products and services, created by global talent, for global customers.”8 As part of this strategy, “GE Medical Systems focuses on growth through globalization by aggressively searching out and attracting talent in the 150 countries in which we do business worldwide.”9 GEMS also grows by acquiring companies overseas in order to “broaden our ability to provide product and service solutions to our customers worldwide. Through several key acquisitions, we’ve strengthened our position in our existing markets, and entered new 7 http://savelives.gecareers.com/abtus_growth.html. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

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and exciting markets.”10 For example, in April 2003, GE announced that it would acquire Instrumentarium, a Finnish medical technology company, for US$2.1 billion. According to the press release, The combination of Instrumentarium and GE offerings will further enable GE Medical Systems to support healthcare customers with a broad range of anesthesia monitoring and delivery, critical care, infant care and diagnostic imaging solutions and help ensure the highest quality of care.11 A year later, in April 2004, GE spent $11.3 billion to acquire Amersham, a British company that is a world leader in medical diagnostics and life sciences. According to the press release, the acquisition will enable GE to “become the world’s best diagnostic company, serving customers in the medical, pharmaceutical, biotech and bioresearch markets around the world.”12 The combined GEMS and Amersham is now known as GE Healthcare. In line with GE’s decision to shift its corporate center of gravity from the industrialized world to the emerging markets of Asia and Latin America,13 Medical Systems has set up joint ventures in India and China to make low-end CAT scanners and various ultrasound devices for sale in their local markets. These machines were developed in Japan with GEMS’s 75% joint venture GE Yokogawa Medical Systems, but the design work was turned over to India’s vast pool of inexpensive engineers through its joint venture WIPRO GE Medical Systems (India). At the same time, engineers in India and China were developing low-cost products to serve markets in Asia, Latin America, and the United States, where there is a demand from a cost-conscious medical community for cheaper machines. In 2010, GE Healthcare derived about $3.5 billion in sales to emerging markets, with over $1 billion in revenue from China alone. 10 Ibid. 11 http://www.gemedicalsystems.com/company/acquisitions/

index.html. 12 http://www5.amershambiosciences.com/aptrix/upp01077.nsf/ Content/about_us_press_releases_2004_080404. 13 In 2005, GE said it expected 60% of its revenue growth over the next decade to come from emerging markets, compared with 20% in the previous decade.

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Although it still pursues geographic market expansion, GE’s globalization drive now focuses on taking advantage of its global reach to find less expensive materials and intellectual capital abroad. In material procurement, GE’s global supply chain does business with over 500,000 suppliers across thousands of entities in more than 100 countries, deriving over $1 billion in savings on its foreign purchases. On the human capital side, General Electric has established global research and development (R&D) centers in Shanghai, China; Munich, Germany; Bangalore, India; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. By sourcing intellect globally, GE has three times the engineering capacity for the same cost. For Medical Systems, the ability to

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9

produce in low-cost countries has meant bringing to market a low-priced CAT scanner for $200,000 (most sell for $700,000–$1 million) and still earning a 30% operating margin. Questions 1. What advantages does General Electric seek to attain from its international business activities? 2. What actions is it taking to gain these advantages from its international activities? 3. What risks does GE face in its foreign operations? 4. What profit opportunities for GE can arise out of those risks?

Evolution of the Multinational Corporation Every year, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) publishes a list of the world’s 100 largest international companies. Firms are ranked not by size but the degree of their international activities, either using UNCTAD’s TNI index (see Figure 1.1, note b), or based on their foreign assets. Figure 1.1 lists the top ten by region. At present, the top transnational corporations are largely from Europe (59), North America (25), and Asia (14). Only one firm each from the Middle East and South America make the list, and none from Africa. The top international firms are often recognizable brands, such as car makers Toyota and Honda (Japan), Ford Motors (USA), and Volkswagen (Germany), but also include some less well-known names, like Hon Hai Precision Industries (Taiwan) and BHP Billiton Group (Australia). They operate in industries which both benefit from economies of scale and have global reach. For instance, Vodafone (UK) provides mobile telecommunications networks in Europe, the Americas and Asia. These firms represent 9.3% of foreign assets of TNCs and 21% of global sales, indicating their importance in the global economy. Volkswagen, the German car, bus and truck maker, provides an illustration of a typical multinational firm. Started as a “people’s car” manufacturer in 1937, it grew internationally in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the success of its iconic “Beetle” small car, a modernized version of which is still part of the product range. Currently, it has 12 different brands aimed at specific segments of the market as shown in Figure 1.2. Originally only a car maker, now through acquisitions its output includes buses and trucks (MAN) and luxury cars (Bentley, Porsche, Lamborghini), as well as motorbikes (Ducati). As its international activities grew in extent, production has expanded from Wolfsburg in Germany, where the original Beetle was made, to North and South America, Africa and Asia, as shown in Figure 1.3. Reflecting the importance of Asia, and China in particular, 34.9% of the group’s car sales were to this region in 2012. As a truly international corporation, only 13% of car sales were made in Germany, its country of domicile, the other big four EU countries (France, Italy, Spain, and the UK) accounted for a further 12% of output, while other European countries bought 19.7%. So Europe as a whole took a bit less than half of production (44.7%). North and South America combined contributed 20.4%. Thus Volkswagen sold more cars outside of Europe in 2012 than in Europe.

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Volkswagen Group Eni SpA

Nestlé SA

Enel SpA

E.ON AG

6 7

8

9

10

Germany

Italy

Switzerland

Germany Italy

France

Petroleum expl./ref./distr. Petroleum expl./ref./distr. Petroleum expl./ref./distr. Telecommunications Utilities (Electricity, gas and water) Motor vehicles Petroleum expl./ref./distr. Food, beverages and tobacco Electricity, gas and water Utilities (Electricity, gas and water)

Electrical & electronic equipment

Petroleum expl./ref./distr. Motor vehicles Diversified

Motor vehicles

128,310

132,231

132,686

158,046 133,445

175,057

199,003

214,507

270,247

185,601

226,878

138,212

409,257 185,493

271,607

217,031

227,107

300,193

360,325

119,213

58,419

307,938

149,422 132,244

117,144

192,366

185,798 193,406

232,982

333,795

685,328

Total

70,341 64,221

71,624

76,945

92,494 84,045

158,865

214,349

338,157

Foreign

109,098 169,764

117,973

98,468

247,624 163,566

124,711

70,224

234,287

375,580

467,153

104,507

152,256 83,680

57,967

134,252

58,986 446,950

222,580

420,714

144,796

Total

65,966

96,849

199,129 85,867

78,555

62,065

180,440

300,216

282,930

68,237

65,319 51,045

29,066

57,834

35,900 126,751

132,743

301,840

75,640

Foreign

Sales

40,535

37,588

328,816

296,000 51,034

110,308

78,599

62,123

69,853

73,000

332,213

108,000 92,418

4,837

89,000

56,841 800,000

31,508

46,361

171,000

Foreign

72,083

73,702

339,000

533,469 77,838

219,330

86,373

97,126

85,700

87,000

466,995

213,000 126,000

16,900

171,000

91,500 2,200,000

62,000

76,900

305,000

Total

Employment

65.0

56.6

97.1

58.2 63.3

59.2

90.4

78.5

83.8

76.6

61.8

46.9 61.0

46.6

45.0

57.6 36.1

59.5

65.4

52.5

TNIb (Per cent)

14

13

12

10 11

8

7

5

3

2

45

39 42

35

33

23 27

9

6

1

Rank by Foreign Assets

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FIGURE 1.1 Selected Transnational Corporations Source: UNCTAD http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-Corporations-Statistics.aspx.

5

Vodafone Group Plc GDF Suez

4

United Kingdom

France

Total SA

3

United Kingdom

United States

United States United States

United Kingdom

General Motors Co Procter & Gamble Co International Business Machines Corporation

United States

United States

United States United States

Europe 1 Royal Dutch Shell Plc 2 BP Plc

10

8 9

7

6

4 5

United States

Electrical & electronic equipment Petroleum expl./ref./distr. Petroleum expl./ref./distr. Pharmaceuticals Retail & Trade

Industry

Assets

10

3

United States

2

Exxon Mobil Corporation Chevron Corporation Pfizer Inc Wal-Mart Stores Inc Ford Motor Company ConocoPhillips

United States

North America 1 General Electric Co

Top 10 by Home

Regiona

Top Ten in Each Region out of the 100 Largest TNCs Ranked by UNCTAD, 2012

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Motor vehicles Diversified Electrical & electronic equipment Mining & quarrying

Japan

China Taiwan Province of China

Australia

8

Israel

Brazil

Malaysia

Pharmaceuticals

Mining & quarrying

Petroleum expl./ref./distr.

37,394

45,721

38,907

40,435

62,284

71,512 65,471

83,944

85,721

109,657

110,142

233,193

Total

50,609

131,478

150,435

52,230

129,273

514,847 70,448

135,994

103,715

153,044

144,811

376,841

Assets Foreign

19,696

38,326

43,228

19,454

66,908

9,923 128,650

90,789

24,222

49,052

95,792

170,486

Total

20,317

47,694

72,853

29,579

72,226

51,659 132,429

115,991

31,339

243,401

118,983

265,770

Sales Foreign

FIGURE 1.1

b TNI,

(Continued)

are categorized by the proportion of foreign assets and are not ranked by size. the Transnationality Index, is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales and foreign employment to total employment. 1 Latin America and the Middle East only have one company each in the top 100 TNC list for 2012.

a Firms

Middle East1 1 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited

Latin America1 1 Vale SA

10

Transport and storage

Diversified

Hong Kong, China

China

Wholesale trade

Japan

9

Motor vehicles

Japan

BHP Billiton Group Ltd China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company Petronas-Petroliam Nasional Bhd

Motor vehicles

Japan

Industry

Asia 1 Toyota Motor Corporation 2 Honda Motor Co Ltd 3 Mitsubishi Corporation 4 Hutchison Whampoa Limited 5 Nissan Motor Co Ltd 6 CITIC Group 7 Hon Hai Precision Industries

Top 10 by Home Regiona

Top Ten in Each Region out of the 100 Largest TNCs Ranked by UNCTAD, 2012

38,551

15,680

8,653

7,355

27,040

30,806 810,993

88,224

206,986

18,915

118,923

126,536

45,948

85,305

43,266

130,000

46,370

140,028 1,290,000

157,365

250,000

63,058

187,094

333,498

Total

Employment Foreign

84.9

44.5

35.1

49.6

66.4

18.4 84.3

65.4

80.9

40.6

73.4

54.7

TNIb (Per cent)

83

61

76

74

43

36 40

29

26

19

18

4

Rank by Foreign Assets

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FIGURE 1.2 Volkswagen’s Brands Source: Volkswagen Annual Report 2012. *of which

Germany 13 locations (17%)

Europe* 37 locations (51%)

North America 3 locations (8%)

Asia 9 locations (29%)

South America 6 locations (11%)

South Africa 3 locations (1%)

FIGURE 1.3 Location of Volkswagen’s Main Production Facilities Source: Volkswagen Annual Report 2012.

Its headquarters may still be in Wolfsburg but its operations are truly global, as shown by Figure 1.4. It ranks 10th in the UNCTAD list of TNCs by foreign assets and has a TNI index of 58.2, which puts it 64th on this measure of internationalization. Worldwide, the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), namely the amount companies based in one country invested in another country, reached an estimated US$22.8 trillion in 2012, as shown in Figure 1.5. Moreover, these investments have grown steadily over time, facilitated by a combination of factors: falling regulatory barriers to overseas investment; rapidly declining telecommunications

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Other Asia, 357,542

3.9% Asia Pacific, 3,169,593

34.9%

Europe, 4,053,038

44.7%

Other Europe, 1,790,825

19.7%

China, 2,812,051

31.0%

France, Italy, Spain, UK, 1,086,699

12.0% Germany, 1,175,514

13.0%

South America, 1,010,112

11.1%

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North America, 841,540

9.3%

FIGURE 1.4 Volkswagen Group Sales in 2012 Source: Volkswagen Annual Report 2012.

and transport costs; and freer domestic and international capital markets in which vast sums of money can be raised, companies can be bought, and currency and other risks can be hedged. These factors have made it easier for companies to invest abroad, to do so more cheaply, and to experience less risk than ever before. The list of companies investing abroad includes not just the usual suspects from Japan, the UK, Germany, France, Canada, and other developed countries but also many from developing countries, especially Brazil, Russia, India, and China, referred to collectively as the BRICs. Rapid economic growth combined with growing competitive pressure at home, the rise of home-grown MNCs, high commodity prices, and FDI liberalization in host countries have been feeding a boom in outward investment from the BRICs, which reached a peak of $147 billion in 2008—almost 9% of world outflows, compared to less than 1% 10 years before. Although their FDI outflows fell in 2009 due to the global financial and economic crisis, the four BRIC countries’ MNCs were again active outward investors subsequently. As of 2013, FDI has resumed its upward path as the global economy recovers from the financial crisis of 2008–10. A brief discussion of the various considerations that have prompted the rise of the multinational corporation follows. Search for Raw Materials. Raw materials seekers were the earliest multinationals, the villains of international business. They are the firms—the British, Dutch, and French East India Companies, the Hudson’s Bay Trading Company, and the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga—that first grew under the protective mantle of the British, Dutch, French, and Belgian colonial empires. Their aim was to exploit the raw materials that could be found overseas. The modern-day counterparts of these firms, the multinational oil and mining companies, were the first to make large foreign investments, beginning in the early years of the 20th century. Hence, large oil companies such as British Petroleum (BP) and Standard Oil, which went where the dinosaurs died, were among the first true multinationals. Hard-mineral companies such as Rio-Tinto, Anglo-American, Eramet, and Anaconda Copper were also early investors abroad. Market Seeking. The market seeker is the archetype of the modern multinational firm that goes overseas to produce and sell in foreign markets. Examples include IBM, Volkswagen, and Unilever.

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14 25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

Developing economies

Transition economies

20 12

20 10

05 20

00 20

5 19 9

0 19 9

19 85

19 80

-

Developed economies

FIGURE 1.5 The Stock of Worldwide Foreign Direct Investment: 1980–2012 Source: http://ststus.unctad.org/FDI/Table Viewer/TableView.aspx, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Similarly, branded consumer-products companies such as Nestlé, Louis Vuitton, McDonald’s, Dior, and Coca-Cola have been operating abroad for decades and maintain vast manufacturing, marketing, and distribution networks from which they derive substantial sales and income. The rationale for the market seeker is simple: foreign markets are big. For example, the top four Latin American countries by population (Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, and Argentina) have a combined total of 403 million, which is nearly three-fifths the number of people in the whole of Europe. Although there are some early examples of market-seeking MNCs (e.g., Colt Firearms, Singer, Coca-Cola, N.V. Philips, and Imperial Chemicals), the bulk of foreign direct investment took place after World War II. This investment was primarily a one-way flow—from the United States to Western Europe—until the early 1960s. At that point, the phenomenon of reverse foreign investment began, primarily with Western European firms acquiring U.S. firms or establishing subsidiaries there. More recently, Asian firms have begun investing in the United States and Europe, largely in response to perceived or actual restrictions on their exports to these markets. China in the last 20 years has received a lot of FDI, but less investment has gone to other emerging nations, although that is beginning to change.

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Although foreign markets may be attractive in and of themselves, MNCs possess certain firm-specific advantages. Such advantages may include unique products, processes, technologies, patents, specific rights, or specific knowledge and skills. MNCs find that the advantages that were successfully applied in domestic markets can also be profitably used in foreign markets. Firms such as Vodafone, Nestlé, Siemens, and Wal-Mart, take advantage of unique process technologies—largely in the form of superior information gathering, organizational, and distribution skills—to sell overseas. The exploitation of additional foreign markets may be possible at considerably lower costs. For example, after successfully developing a drug, pharmaceutical companies enter several markets, obtain relevant patents and permissions, and begin marketing the product in several countries within a short period of time. Marketing of the product in multiple countries enables the pharmaceutical company to extract revenues from multiple markets and, therefore, cover the high costs of drug development in a shorter period of time as compared to marketing within a single country. In some industries, foreign market entry may be essential for obtaining economies of scale, or the unit cost decreases that are achieved through volume production. Firms in industries characterized by high fixed costs relative to variable costs must engage in volume selling just to break even. These large volumes may be forthcoming only if the firms expand overseas. For example, companies manufacturing products such as tablets and smartphones that require huge R&D expenditures often need a larger customer base than that provided by a single market in order to recapture their investment in knowledge. Similarly, firms in capital-intensive industries with enormous production economies of scale may also be forced to sell overseas in order to spread their overhead over a larger quantity of sales. L.M. Ericsson, the Swedish manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, is an illustrative case. The manufacturer is forced to think internationally when designing new products because its domestic market is too small to absorb the enormous R&D expenditures involved and to reap the full benefit of production scale economies. Thus, when Ericsson developed its revolutionary AXE digital switching system, it geared its design to achieve global market penetration. Some companies, such as Coca-Cola, Diageo, Nestlé, Unilever, and Procter & Gamble, take advantage of enormous advertising expenditures and highly developed marketing skills to differentiate their products and keep out potential competitors that are wary of the high marketing costs of new-product introduction. Expansion into emerging markets enables these firms to enjoy the benefits of economies of scale as well as exploit the premium associated with their strong brand names. According to the chief executive officer of L’Oréal, the French firm that is the world’s largest cosmetics company, “The increase in emerging-market sales has a turbo effect on the global growth of the company.”14 Similarly, companies such as Nestlé and Procter & Gamble expect their sales of brand-name consumer goods to soar as disposable incomes rise in the developing countries in contrast to the mature markets of Europe and North America. The costs and risks of taking advantage of these profitable growth opportunities are also lower today now that their more free-market-oriented governments have reduced trade barriers and cut regulations. In response, foreign direct investment in emerging markets by multinationals has soared over the past decade (see Figure 1.6), despite the global financial crisis that began in August 2007. Cost Minimization. Cost minimizer is a fairly recent category of firms doing business internationally. These firms seek out and invest in lower cost production sites abroad (e.g., Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Ireland) to remain cost competitive both at home and abroad. Many of these firms are in the electronics industry. Examples include Texas Instruments, Intel, and Seagate Technology. Increasingly, companies are shifting services overseas, not just manufacturing work. For example, 14

Christina Passariello, “L’Oréal Net Gets New-Markets Lift”, Wall Street Journal (February 14, 2008): C7.

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16 800.0

700.0

600.0

500.0

400.0

300.0

200.0

100.0

20 10 20 12

05 20

00 20

5 19 9

0 19 9

5 19 8

0 19 8

5 19 7

19 7

0

0.0

FIGURE 1.6 Flows of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: 1970–2012 (Billions of U.S. Dollars) Source: Data from UNCTAD, at http://stats.unctad.org/fdi.

in 2012, Volkswagen employed 249,000 people in Germany and slightly more abroad. It had 68,700 in Asia and 63,000 in the Americas. In Brazil, it employed 24,000 people at four locations who together produced over 780,000 vehicles, largely for the South American market. But it is not just a production center. Its Brazil R&D unit led the development of Volkswagen’s flex fuel technology, which has subsequently been adopted in other parts of the group. The offshoring of services can be done in two ways: internally, through the establishment of wholly owned foreign affiliates, or externally, by outsourcing a service to a third-party provider. Figure 1.7 categorizes and defines different variants of offshoring and outsourcing. Over time, if competitive advantages in product lines or markets become eroded due to local and global competition, MNCs seek and enter new markets with little competition or seek out lower production cost sites through their global-scanning capability. Costs can then be minimized by combining production shifts with rationalization and integration of the firm’s manufacturing facilities worldwide. This strategy usually involves plants specializing in different stages of production—for example, in assembly or fabrication—as well as in particular components or products. One strategy that is often followed by firms for which cost is the key consideration is to develop a global-scanning capability to seek out lower-cost production sites or production technologies worldwide. In fact, firms in competitive industries have to continually seize new, nonproprietary, cost-reduction opportunities, not to earn excess returns but to make normal profits and survive.

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Internalized or Externalized Production Location of Production

Internalized

Externalized (“outsourcing”)

Home Country

Production kept in-house at home

Foreign Country (“offshoring”)

Production by foreign affiliate, e.g.,

Production outsourced to third-party service provider at home. Production outsourced to third-party provider abroad

• Infineion’s center in Dublin • DHL’s IT center in Prague • British Telecom’s call centers in Bangalore and Hyderabad “Intra-firm (captive) offshoring”

To local company e.g., • Bank of America’s outsourcing of software development to Infosys in India To Foreign affiliate of another MNC e.g., • A United States company outsourcing dataprocessing services to ACS in Ghana

FIGURE 1.7 Offshoring and Outsourcing—Some Definitions Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services, Table IV.1.

Application

Honda Builds an Asian Car Factory

Honda and other car makers attempting to break into Asia’s small but potentially fast-growing car markets face a problem: it is tough to start small. Car makers need big volumes to take full advantage of economies of scale and justify the cost of building a modern car plant. But outside of Japan and China, few Asian countries offer such scale. Companies such as General Motors and Ford are relying on an export strategy in all but the largest Asian markets to overcome this hurdle. GM exports cars throughout Asia from a large plant in Thailand. However, the success of an export strategy depends on Asian countries fully embracing free trade, something that may not happen soon. Honda has decided to follow a different strategy. It is essentially building a car factory that spans all of Asia, putting up plants for different components in small Asian markets all at once: a transmission plant in Indonesia,

engine-parts manufacturing in China, and other components operations in Malaysia. Honda assembles cars at its existing plants in the region. Its City subcompact, for example, is assembled in Thailand from parts made there and in nearby countries. By concentrating production of individual components in certain countries, Honda expects to reap economies of scale that are unattainable by setting up major factories in each of the small Asian markets. A sharp reduction in trade barriers across Asia that took effect in 2003 makes it easier for Honda to trade among its factories in Asia. Nonetheless, Asian countries are still expected to focus on balancing trade so that, in any given nation, an increase in imports is offset by an increase in exports. If so, Honda’s web of Asian manufacturing facilities could give it an advantage over its rivals in avoiding trade friction.

Knowledge Seeking. Some firms enter foreign markets in order to gain information and experience that is expected to prove useful elsewhere. Beecham, a British firm (now part of GlaxoSmithKline), deliberately set out to learn from its U.S. operations how to be more competitive, first in the area of consumer products and later in pharmaceuticals. This knowledge proved highly valuable in competing with American and other firms in its European markets. In the same way, as Americans have demanded better-built, better-handling, and more fuel-efficient small cars, Ford of Europe has become an important source of design and engineering ideas and management talent for its U.S. parent, notably with the hugely successful Taurus. In industries characterized by rapid product innovation and technical breakthroughs by foreign competitors, it is imperative to track overseas developments constantly. Japanese firms excel here,

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systematically and effectively collecting information on foreign innovation and disseminating it within their own research and development, marketing, and production groups. The analysis of new foreign products as soon as they reach the market is an especially long-lived Japanese technique. One of the jobs of Japanese researchers is to tear down a new foreign product and analyze how it works as a base on which to develop a product of their own that will outperform the original. Keeping Domestic Customers. Suppliers of goods or services to multinationals often will follow their customers abroad in order to guarantee them a continuing product flow. Otherwise, the threat of a potential disruption to an overseas supply line—for example, a dock strike or the imposition of trade barriers—can lead the customer to select a local supplier, which may be a domestic competitor with international operations. Hence, the dilemma: follow your customers abroad or face the loss of not only their foreign but also their domestic business. For instance, when Volkswagen set up its Brazilian production facilities many German component manufacturers built or bought local units to supply parts for the assembly lines. A similar threat to domestic market share has led many service firms: e.g. banks; advertising agencies; and accounting, law, and consulting firms to set up foreign practices in the wake of their multinational clients’ overseas expansion. Exploiting Financial Market Imperfections. An alternative explanation for foreign direct investment relies on the existence of financial market imperfections. The ability to reduce taxes and circumvent currency controls may lead to greater project cash flows and a lower cost of funds for the MNC than for a purely domestic firm. An even more important financial motivation for foreign direct investment is likely to be the desire to reduce risks through international diversification. This motivation may be somewhat surprising because the inherent riskiness of the multinational corporation is usually taken for granted. Exchange rate changes, currency controls, expropriation, and other forms of government intervention are some of the risks that purely domestic firms rarely, if ever, encounter. Thus, the greater a firm’s international investment, the riskier its operations should be. Yet, there is good reason to believe that being multinational may actually reduce the riskiness of a firm. Much of the systematic or general market risk affecting a company is related to the cyclical nature of the national economy in which the company is domiciled. Hence, the diversification effect resulting from operating in a number of countries whose economic cycles are not perfectly in phase should reduce the variability of MNC earnings. Several studies indicate that this result, in fact, is the case.15 Thus, because foreign cash flows generally are not perfectly correlated with those of domestic investments, the greater riskiness of individual projects overseas can well be offset by beneficial portfolio effects. Furthermore, because most of the economic and political risks specific to the multinational corporation are unsystematic, they can be eliminated through diversification.

The Process of Overseas Expansion by Multinationals Studies of corporate expansion overseas indicate that firms become multinational by degree, with foreign direct investment being a late step in a process that begins with exports. For most companies, the globalization process does not occur through conscious design, at least in the early stages. It is the unplanned result of a series of corporate responses to a variety of threats and opportunities appearing at random overseas. From a broader perspective, however, the globalization of firms is the inevitable outcome of the competitive strivings of members of oligopolistic industries. Each member

15 See, for example, Benjamin I. Cohen, Multinational Firms and Asian Exports (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975); and Alan Rugman, “Risk Reduction by International Diversification”, Journal of International Business Studies (Fall 1976): 79–80.

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Licensing

Exporting

Sales subsidiary

Service facilities

Distribution system

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Production overseas

FIGURE 1.8 Typical Foreign Expansion Sequence

tries both to create and to exploit monopolistic product and factor advantages internationally while simultaneously attempting to reduce the competitive threats posed by other industry members. To meet these challenges, companies gradually increase their commitment to international business, developing strategies that are progressively more elaborate and sophisticated. The sequence normally involves exporting, setting up a foreign sales subsidiary, securing licensing agreements, and eventually establishing foreign production. This evolutionary approach to overseas expansion is a risk-minimizing response to operating in a highly uncertain foreign environment. By internationalizing in phases, a firm can gradually move from a relatively low-risk, low-return, export-oriented strategy to a higher-risk, higher-return strategy emphasizing international production. In effect, the firm is investing in information, learning enough at each stage to improve significantly its chances for success at the next stage. Figure 1.8 depicts the usual sequence of overseas expansion. Exporting. Firms facing highly uncertain demand abroad typically will begin by exporting to a foreign market. The advantages of exporting are significant: capital requirements and start-up costs are minimal, risk is low, and profits are immediate. Furthermore, this initial step provides the opportunity to learn about present and future supply and demand conditions, competition, channels of distribution, payment conventions, financial institutions, and financial techniques. Building on prior successes, companies then expand their marketing organizations abroad, switching from using export agents and other intermediaries to dealing directly with foreign agents and distributors. As increased communication with customers reduces uncertainty, the firm might set up its own sales subsidiary and new service facilities, such as a warehouse, with these marketing activities culminating in the control of its own distribution system. Overseas Production. A major drawback to exporting is the inability to realize the full sales potential of a product. By manufacturing abroad, a company can more easily keep abreast of market developments, adapt its products and production schedules to changing local tastes and conditions, fill orders faster, and provide more comprehensive after-sales service. Many companies also set up research and development facilities along with their foreign operations; they aim to pick the best brains, wherever they are. The results help companies keep track of the competition and design new products. For example, it was local engineers at Volkswagen Brazil who developed the flex fuel technology locally in response to local requirements. It gave Volkswagen a later competitive advantage when it was subsequently adopted throughout the group to meet new environmental standards in other countries. Setting up local production facilities also shows a greater commitment to the local market, a move that typically brings added sales and provides increased assurance of supply stability. Certainty of supply is particularly important for firms that produce intermediate goods for sale to other companies. A case in point is SKF, the Swedish ball-bearing manufacturer. It was forced to manufacture in the United States to guarantee that its product, a crucial component in military equipment, would be available when needed. The Pentagon would not permit its suppliers of military hardware to be dependent on imported ball bearings because imports could be halted in wartime and are always subject to the vagaries of shipping.

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Thus, most firms selling in foreign markets eventually find themselves forced to manufacture abroad. Foreign production covers a wide spectrum of activities from repairing, packaging, and finishing to processing, assembly, and full manufacture. Firms typically begin with the simpler stages—packaging and assembly—and progressively integrate their manufacturing activities backward—to production of components and subassemblies. Because the optimal entry strategy can change over time, a firm must continually monitor and evaluate the factors that bear on the effectiveness of its current entry strategy. New information and market perceptions change the risk-return tradeoff for a given entry strategy, leading to a sequence of preferred entry modes, each adapted on the basis of prior experience to sustain and strengthen the firm’s market position over time. Associated with a firm’s decision to produce abroad is the question of whether to create its own affiliates or to acquire going concerns. A major advantage of an acquisition is the capacity to effect a speedy transfer overseas of highly developed but underutilized parent skills, such as a novel production technology. Often, the local firm also provides a ready-made marketing network. This network is especially important if the parent is a late entrant to the market. Many firms have used the acquisition approach to gain knowledge about the local market or a particular technology. The disadvantage is the cost of buying an ongoing company. In general, the larger and more experienced a firm becomes, the less frequently it uses acquisitions to expand overseas. Smaller and relatively less-experienced firms often turn to acquisitions. Regardless of its preferences, a firm interested in expanding overseas may not have the option of acquiring a local operation. Michelin, the French manufacturer of radial tires, set up its own facilities in the United States because its tires are built on specially designed equipment; taking over an existing operation would have been out of the question.16 Similarly, companies moving into developing countries often find they are forced to begin from the ground up because their line of business has no local counterpart. Licensing. An alternative, and at times a precursor, to setting up production facilities abroad is to license a local firm to manufacture the company’s products in return for royalties and other forms of payment. The principal advantages of licensing are the minimal investment required, faster market-entry time, and fewer financial and legal risks. But the corresponding cash flow is also relatively low, and there may be problems in maintaining product quality standards. The licensor may also face difficulty controlling exports by the foreign licensee, particularly when, as in Japan, the host government refuses to sanction restrictive clauses on sales to foreign markets. Thus, a licensing agreement may lead to the establishment of a competitor in third-country markets, with a consequent loss of future revenues to the licensing firm. The foreign licensee may even become such a strong competitor that the licensing firm will face difficulty entering the market when the agreement expires, leading to a further loss of potential profits. For some firms, licensing alone is the preferred method of penetrating foreign markets. Other firms with diversified innovative product lines follow a strategy of trading technology for both equity in foreign joint ventures and royalty payments. Tradeoffs Between Alternative Modes of Overseas Expansion. There are certain general circumstances under which each approach—exporting, licensing, or local production—will be the preferred alternative for exploiting foreign markets.

16 Once

that equipment became widespread in the industry, Michelin was able to expand through acquisition (which it did, in 1989, when it acquired Uniroyal Goodrich).

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Multinationals often possess intangible capital in the form of trademarks, patents, general marketing skills, and other organizational abilities.17 If this intangible capital can be embodied in the form of products without adaptation, then exporting generally would be the preferred mode of market penetration. When the firm’s knowledge takes the form of specific product or process technologies that can be written down and transmitted objectively, then foreign expansion usually would take the licensing route. Often, however, this intangible capital takes the form of organizational skills that are inseparable from the firm itself. A basic skill involves knowing how best to service a market through new-product development and adaptation, quality control, advertising, distribution, after-sales service, and the general ability to read changing market desires and translate them into salable products. Because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to unbundle these services and sell them apart from the firm, the firm would attempt to exert control directly via the establishment of foreign affiliates. However, internalizing the market for an intangible asset by setting up foreign affiliates makes economic sense if—and only if—the benefits from circumventing market imperfections outweigh the administrative and other costs of central control. A useful means to judge whether a foreign investment is desirable is to consider the type of imperfection that the investment is designed to overcome.18 Internalization, and hence FDI, is most likely to be economically viable in those settings in which the possibility of contractual difficulties makes it especially costly to coordinate economic activities via arm’s-length transactions in the marketplace. Such “market failure” imperfections lead to both vertical and horizontal direct investment. Vertical direct integration—direct investment across industries that are related to different stages of production of a particular good—enables the MNC to substitute internal production and distribution systems for inefficient markets. For instance, vertical integration might allow a firm to install specialized cost-saving equipment in two locations without the worry and risk that facilities may be idled by disagreements with unrelated enterprises. Horizontal direct investment—investment that is cross-border but within an industry—enables the MNC to utilize an advantage such as know-how or technology and avoid the contractual difficulties of dealing with unrelated parties. Examples of contractual difficulties include the MNC’s inability to price know-how or to write, monitor, and enforce use restrictions governing technology-transfer arrangements. Thus, foreign direct investment makes most sense when a firm possesses a valuable asset and is better off directly controlling use of the asset rather than selling or licensing it. Advantages of FDI also accrue to the host nation, which often receives superior technological and managerial resources that improve local worker skills and productivity.

A Behavioral Definition of the Multinational Corporation Regardless of the foreign entry or global expansion strategy pursued, the true multinational corporation is characterized more by its state of mind than by the size and worldwide dispersion of its assets. Rather than confine its search to domestic plant sites, the multinational firm asks, “Where in the world should we build that plant?” Similarly, multinational marketing management seeks global, not domestic, market segments to penetrate, and multinational financial management does not limit its search for capital or investment opportunities to any single national financial market. Hence, the essential element that distinguishes the true multinational is its commitment to seeking out, undertaking, and integrating manufacturing, marketing, R&D, and financing opportunities on a global, not domestic, basis. For example, IBM’s superconductivity project was pioneered in Switzerland by a 17

Richard E. Caves, “International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment”, Economica (February 1971): 1–27. 18 These considerations are discussed by William Kahley, “Direct Investment Activity of Foreign Firms”, Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Summer 1987): 36–51.

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FIGURE 1.9 How Dell Reduces the Order-to-Delivery Cycle

German scientist and a Swiss scientist who shared a Nobel Prize in physics for their work on the project. Similarly, the website of the Daimler Group, a German company, stated that it “is one of the biggest producers of premium cars and the world’s biggest manufacturer of commercial vehicles with a global reach…Daimler sells its vehicles and services in nearly all the countries of the world and has production facilities on five continents.”19 Necessary complements to the integration of worldwide operations include flexibility, adaptability, and speed. Indeed, speed has become one of the critical competitive weapons in the fight for world market share. The ability to develop, make, and distribute products or services quickly enables companies to capture customers who demand constant innovation and rapid, flexible response. Figure 1.9 illustrates the combination of globally integrated activities and rapid response times of Dell Inc., which keeps not more than two hours of inventory in its plants, while sourcing for components across the globe and assembling built-to-order computers for its customers within five days. Another critical aspect of competitiveness in this new world is focus. Focus means figuring out and building on what a company does best. This process typically involves divesting unrelated business activities and seeking attractive investment opportunities in the core business. For example, by shedding its quintessentially British automobile business and focusing on engines, Rolls-Royce has become a world-class global company, selling jet engines to 42 of the top 50 airlines in the world and generating 80% of its sales abroad.

19

Daimler website, 2013 (http://www.daimler.com/company).

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Siemens: “Think More Like Visionaries”20

Siemens, the German integrated technology company founded in 1847, has a turnover in 2013 of €75.9 billion and is a truly global business being active in 190 countries. It employs 362,000 people, with 220,000 in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, 78,000 in the Americas, and 64,000 in Asia. It is a multisector business involved in energy, healthcare, infrastructure, and sustainable technologies. You can make toast in an appliance made by Siemens using electricity generated by Siemens manufactured equipment, travel in a train built by the company, or pass through a Siemens supplied traffic control system on your way to hospital to have an MRI in a Siemens-made scanner. Executives at the headquarters in Munich and elsewhere across the world have to make decisions in the best interests of Siemens’ shareholders. They must decide where Siemens should locate and build facilities to service its global marketplace. Given the nature of its products, it does not make sense to design and manufacture all products in all countries. It is better to concentrate manufacturing in a small number of locations to benefit from economies of scale and specialization. To cater to its markets, it can ship products anywhere within the group. A problem from operating in so many countries with different currencies is the threat caused by exchange rate fluctuations. This means the price of products supplied from one place to another can vary simply because of currency changes: the euro can rise against the U.S. dollar or the Japanese yen, the currencies of some of its major competitors. As a result, Siemens then becomes less competitive. To address this, the company has an integrated internal risk management function. Siemens stated in their 2013 Annual Report: “We have implemented and coordinated a set of risk management and control systems which support us in the early recognition of developments jeopardizing the continuity of our business. The most important of these systems include our enterprise-wide processes for strategic planning and management reporting. Strategic planning is intended to support us in considering potential risks well in advance of major 20 Header

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in Siemens’ 2012 Annual Report (p.18).

business decisions, while management reporting is intended to enable us to monitor such risks more closely as our business progresses.” (Siemens Annual Report 2013; p. 232) A customer can buy from any supplier. But for the kinds of products that Siemens specializes in, price is not the only consideration. Siemens sells highly technical products and servicing these is a major consideration for customers. Being able to provide this globally provides a competitive advantage over other suppliers. This is a core part of Siemens’ strategy. By making use of its worldwide presence, Siemens aims to meet the needs of a global marketplace. While all business units report to the German headquarters, each separate business must meet the needs of its local market and customers, wherever they are. To do this best requires an understanding of local needs and culture. This is how the company puts it in their 2013 Annual Report: “Many of our successful products and solutions are developed in close cooperation with our customers. Proceeding from an indepth understanding of their unique requirements, our employees all around the world create tailored solutions for our customers. That’s why we invest in the ongoing training of our consultants and engineers. It’s also why we’ve set up consulting for large customers in a way that enables them to obtain everything they need from a single source – the whole range of products, solutions and services offered by our technology Company. In a nutshell: we’re enhancing our reputation as a strong local partner by providing consulting with added value and by reacting quickly and flexibly to local market requirements.” (2013 Siemens Annual Report, p. 83) In order to ensure world class products and services, Siemens has established global centers of excellence that serve the entire group, wherever located. In 2013, it had about 29,800 of its staff engaged in R&D and software development, in 30 countries across the globe. However, only 23% of these facilities are in Germany, while the Americas had 70 facilities (37%) and Asia 28 (15%) thus making up just over half of Siemens’ research activity and reflecting the global nature of its customer base. This is how Siemens sums up its “globalocal” approach to its business: “Siemens is close to its

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customers throughout the world. While maintaining our strong position in our established markets, we want to expand our position in the world’s rapidly growing emerging countries. To build strong partnerships in these new markets, it’s necessary to expand local development and production capacities and create solutions tailored to regional requirements. In the emerging as in the industrialized countries, the important factors for success are outstanding innovative services and rigorous customer orientation.” (2013 Annual Report, p. 83)

Questions 1. What is Siemens’ approach to being a global business? 2. What advantages has Siemens realized from its global operations? 3. What threats have arisen from Siemens’ globalizing efforts? What are some ways in which Siemens has responded to these threats? 4. How has globalization affected, and been affected by, the need to concentrate activities in larger and more efficient units?

In this world-oriented corporation, a person’s passport is not the criterion for promotion. Nor is a firm’s citizenship a critical determinant of its success. Success depends on a new breed of businessperson: the global manager.

The Global Manager In a world in which change is the rule and not the exception, the key to international competitiveness is the ability of management to adjust to change and volatility at an ever faster rate. In the words of transcultural leader Carlos Ghosn, Chairman and CEO of both Renault (France) and Nissan (Japan), “We are going to have a lot more of these external crises because we are living in such a volatile world—an age when everything is leveraged and technology moves fast. You can be rocked by something that originated completely outside your area.”21 The rapid pace of change means that new global managers need detailed knowledge of their operations. Global managers must know how to make the products, where the raw materials and parts come from, how they get there, the alternatives, where the funds come from, and what their changing relative values do to the bottom line. They must also understand the political and economic choices facing key nations and how those choices will affect the outcomes of their decisions. In making decisions for the global company, managers search their array of plants in various nations for the most cost-effective mix of supplies, components, transport, and funds. All this is done with the constant awareness that the options change and the choices must be made again and again. The problem of constant change disturbs some managers. It always has; nevertheless, today’s global managers have to anticipate it, understand it, deal with it, and turn it to their company’s advantage. The payoff to thinking globally is a quality of decision-making that enhances the firm’s prospects for survival, growth, and profitability in the evolving world economy.

1.2 The Internationalization of Business and Finance The existence of global competition and global markets for goods, services, and capital is a fundamental economic reality that has altered the behavior of companies and governments worldwide. For example, Tandon Corp., a major California-based supplier of disk drives for microcomputers, cut its 21 As

quoted in “Leading in the 21st Century: an Interview with Carlos Ghosn”, McKinsey & Company, http://www. mckinsey.com/insights/leading_in_the_21st_century/an_interview_with_carlos_ghosn.

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U.S. workforce by 39% and transferred production overseas in an effort to achieve “cost effectiveness in an extremely competitive marketplace”.22 As the president of Tandon put it, “We can wait for the Japanese to put us out of business or we can be cost-effective.”23 Increasingly, companies are bringing an international perspective to bear on their key production, marketing, technology, and financial decisions. This international perspective is exemplified by the following statement from the Swedish-Swiss engineering group ABB’s Annual Report, which explains how the group operates in a globalized world: One reason for ABB’s strength is our global reach matched with well-developed local capabilities. We have built a strong presence in North America through acquisitions in the last three years, complementing our leading position in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. We are now a leader in most of the largest or fastest-growing markets on every continent. The positions that we have in these markets are also deep-rooted thanks to our local R&D and product development capabilities, which enable us to match and exceed local competitors when it comes to speed of product development and deployment. (p. 4) We have also been resourceful, penetrating geographic markets as diverse as the US and Indonesia and new industrial ones such as data centers, developing attractive business models such as our new approach to service, and continuing to drive sustainable savings across the business through greater efficiency. We have invested extensively in technology, sharpening our technological leadership in power and automation. (p. 7)

The forces of globalization have reached into some unlikely places. For example, at Astro Apparels India, a clothing factory in Tirupur, India, that exports T-shirts to American brands such as Fubu, employees begin their workday with an unusual prayer: “We vow to manufacture garments with high value and low cost, and meet our delivery. Let us face the challenge of globalization and win the world market.”24 This prayer captures the rewards of globalization—and what it takes to succeed in such a world. It is also a timely one, for on January 1, 2005, a quota system that for 30 years restricted exports from poor countries to rich ones ended. With the ending of quotas, Indian companies used their low labor costs to more than double textile exports by 2010, to $24 billion. However, the Indian textile industry also faces hurdles in battling China for market share, including low productivity (which negates the advantage of Indian labor costs that are 15% lower than China’s), a lack of modern infrastructure, and small-scale plants that find it difficult to compete with China’s integrated megafactories. Yet, despite the many advantages of operating in a world economy, many powerful interest groups feel threatened by globalization and have fought it desperately.

Political and Labor Union Concerns about Global Competition Politicians and labor leaders, unlike corporate leaders, usually take a more parochial view of globalization. Many instinctively denounce local corporations that invest abroad as job “exporters,” even though most welcome foreign investors in their own countries as job creators. However, many people today view the current tide of asset sales to foreign companies as a dangerous assault on their country. They are unaware, for example, that foreign-owned companies account for more than 20% of industrial production in Germany and more than 50% in Canada, and neither of those countries appears to have experienced the slightest loss of sovereignty. Regardless of their views, however, the global rationalization of production will continue, because it is driven by global competition. The end result will be higher living standards brought about by improvements in worker productivity and private sector efficiency.

22

“Tandon to Reduce U.S. Work Force, Concentrate Abroad”, Wall Street Journal (March 1984): 22.

23 Ibid. 24

John Larkin, “The Other Textile Tiger”, Wall Street Journal (December 20, 2004): A12.

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Despite the common view that direct investment abroad comes at the expense of domestic exports and jobs, the evidence clearly shows the opposite. It is obvious that domestic companies in service businesses such as banking and retail must establish foreign affiliates in order to access foreign customers. Less obvious is the need for technology and capital-intensive businesses to invest abroad as well. These companies, making products such as hydraulic excavators, jet engines, and industrial robots, need foreign affiliates to service their complex equipment. By enabling MNCs to expand their toeholds in foreign markets, such investments tend to increase home country exports of components and services and to create more and higher-paying jobs in the home country in manufacturing, engineering, management, finance, R&D, and marketing.25 Volkswagen and Daimler, for example, would be generating less German-based employment today had they not been able earlier to invest abroad—both by outsourcing the production to lower-wage countries such as South Africa and China and by establishing assembly plants and R&D centers in the Americas and Asia. Similarly, the argument that poor countries drain jobs from rich countries and depress wages for all—a major theme of 1999’s “Battle in Seattle” over reductions in trade barriers sponsored by the World Trade Organization (WTO)—is demonstrably false. The fact is that as poor countries prosper, they buy more of the advanced goods produced by the richer countries that support higher-paying jobs. At the same time, despite claims to the contrary, globalization has not exploited and further impoverished those already living lives of desperate poverty. Indeed, the growth in trade and investment flows since the end of World War II has raised the wealth and living standards of developed countries while lifting hundreds of millions of people around the world out of abject poverty. The Asian tigers are the most obvious example of this phenomenon. According to then-President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, “Every case where a poor nation has significantly overcome poverty has been achieved while engaging in production for export and opening itself to the influx of foreign goods, investment, and technology; that is, by participating in globalization.”26 Moreover, by generating growth and introducing values like accountability, openness, and competition, globalization has been a powerful force for spreading democracy and freedom in places as diverse as Mexico, Korea, and Poland. Another concern of many antiglobalists, their preoccupation with income equality, reflects a fundamental economic fallacy, namely, that there is only so much global income to go around—so, if the United States is consuming $14 trillion worth of goods and services annually, that is $14 trillion worth of goods and services that Africa cannot consume. However, American consumption does not come at the expense of African consumption: The United States consumes $14 trillion of goods and services each year because it produces $14 trillion annually. Africa could consume even more goods and services than the United States simply by producing more. Opponents of free trade and globalization also claim that competition by Third World countries for jobs and investment by multinational corporations encourages a “race to the bottom” in environmental and labor standards. However, this concern ignores the fact that the surest way to promote higher environmental standards for a country is to raise its wealth. The economic growth stimulated by expanded trade and capital flows will help developing countries to better afford the cleaner environment their wealthier citizens will now demand. Similarly, although protestors claim that Nike and other apparel makers contract out work to foreign “sweatshops” where underpaid workers toil in unhealthful conditions, conditions in factories where Nike goods are made are, comparatively speaking, progressive for their countries. Statistics that show very low employee turnover in such factories

25

Research on this point using detailed plant-level data is summarized in Howard Lewis and J. David Richardson, Why Global Commitment Really Matters, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001. 26 Quoted in Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “A Bit of Straight Talk”, U.S. News and World Report (July 3, 2000): 60.

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indicate that workers do not have better prospects elsewhere. Moreover, although employees of foreign affiliates in developing countries are paid much less than equivalent employees at home, they are paid significantly more than the average local wage. Protectionists often disguise their opposition to free trade by promoting the concept of “fair trade”, which seeks to reduce Third World competitiveness by imposing Western labor conditions and environmental standards in trade treaties. However, although the goal of, say, eradicating child labor is a noble one, it has often had disastrous consequences. Although it would have been better if poor children in Pakistan did not spend their days stitching together soccer balls instead of going to school, closing down their factories forced many of them into far less appealing professions. The evidence is clear that the surest way to improve the lives of the many desperately poor workers in developing countries is to pursue market-opening reforms that further globalization and facilitate wealth creation. Fierce competition for workers has led to soaring private sector wages and benefits in China. For example, China’s manufacturing wage increased by 232% between 1996 and 2006.27 Conversely, as North Korea shows, economic isolation is the fast track to poverty, disease, poor working conditions, environmental degradation, and despair. As such, protectionist governments in the West victimize the Third World entrepreneurs and their employees who have begun to make a better life for themselves by selling their goods in Western markets. The economic purpose of free trade is to allocate resources to their highest valued use. This process is not painless. Like technological innovation, globalization unleashes the forces of creative destruction, a process described by economist Joseph Schumpeter more than 50 years ago. Schumpeter’s oft-repeated phrase conveys the essence of capitalism: continuous change—out with the old, in with the new. When competing for customers, companies adopt new technologies, improve production methods, open new markets, and introduce new and better products. In this constantly churning world, some industries advance, others recede, jobs are gained and lost, businesses boom and go bust, and some workers are forced to change jobs and even occupations. But the process of globalization creates more winners than losers. Consumers clearly benefit from lower prices and expanded choice. But workers and businesses overall also benefit from doing things that they are best suited for and by having new job and investment opportunities. The end result is economic progress, with economies emerging from the turmoil more efficient, more productive, and wealthier. Free trade has a moral basis as well, which was spelled out by Michael Miller of the Acton Institute in 2007: Free trade and markets have lifted more people out of poverty than all the fashionable political movements loaded with good intentions but pernicious consequences.28

The growing irrelevance of borders for corporations will force policymakers to rethink old approaches to regulation. For example, corporate mergers that once would have been barred as anticompetitive might make sense if the true measure of a company’s market share is global rather than national. International economic integration also reduces the freedom of governments to determine their own economic policy. If a government tries to raise tax rates on business, for example, it is increasingly easy for business to shift production and profits abroad. Similarly, nations that fail to invest in their physical and intellectual infrastructure—roads, bridges, R&D, education—will likely lose entrepreneurs and jobs to nations that do invest. Capital—both financial and intellectual—will go where it is wanted and stay where it is well treated. In short, economic integration is forcing governments, as well as companies, to compete. For example, after America’s 1986 tax reform that 27

Behzad Kianian and Kei-Mu Yi, “China’s Emergence as a Manufacturing Juggernaut: Is It Overstated?”, Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Q4 2009): 15. 28 “Does Fair Trade Help the Poor?”, Acton Institute Commentary, October 31, 2007.

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Application

The European Union Pays a Price to Stop Creative Destruction

Over the past quarter century, Europe has been stagnant, with slow economic growth, a declining share of world trade, waning competitiveness, and high unemployment. Many economists and businesspeople traced this “Euro-sclerosis” to the structural rigidities that grew out of the European social model, a web of labor and welfare laws designed by European governments to shelter their constituents from the forces of creative destruction. Over the past 20 years, the European Union has attempted to reverse its economic decline by dismantling the economic barriers that fragmented its economy—from Europe 1992, which created a single European market for goods, labor, and capital, to the European Monetary Union with its single currency, the euro. Despite these initiatives,

Europe’s economy remains less free than that of the United States, and this continues to have serious ramifications for its performance. As shown in Figure 1.10A, the U.S. economy has grown much more rapidly than that of the core EU-1529 nations, while Europe’s relatively inflexible labor markets have produced an unemployment rate 3 to 5 percentage points higher (see Figure 1.10B). 29 The term “EU-15” refers to the 15 nations that comprised the European Union prior to May 1, 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. On May 1, 2004, 10 new members joined the EU: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

140 130 120 110 100 1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Core EU-15

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

United States

FIGURE 1.10A Real GDP Growth United States Versus Core EU-15 1996=100 Source: European Commision: Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; U.S. Department of Labor Statistics. 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

1995

1996 EU 15

1997

1998 1999 EU 25

2000

EU

2001

2002

2003 EU 27

2004

2005

United States

FIGURE 1.10B Unemployment Rate: United States Versus EU Source: European Commission: Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; U.S. Department of Labor Statistics.

2006

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Productivity growth rate 160

4.5%

150 140

2.9%

130 120 1.5%

110 100 1995

1996

1997

1998 EU-15

1999

2000

2001

U.S. manufacturing

2002

2003

2004

2005

U.S. business overall

FIGURE 1.10C Labor Productivity Growth United States Versus EU 1995=100 Source: OECD Productivity Database, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Perhaps the clearest evidence of Europe’s loss in competitiveness shows up in productivity figures. Europe’s productivity (output per hour worked) grew by only 1.5% per year from 1995 to 2005, in contrast to U.S. productivity growth of 2.9% annually (Figure 1.10C). This may be the most telling statistic on the cause of Europe’s economic problems as it reflects most directly on the extent to which government policies promote a dynamic economy. The simple fact is that Europe continues to shelter too many workers and managers from competition by restrictive labor policies and expensive social welfare programs. The EU now stands at a crossroads as it debates further economic liberalization. A worrisome problem is that some member states are attempting to preserve

and even expand social protections by imposing uniform labor practices and social programs throughout the EU. Other members are promoting pro-growth policies, such as increasing labor market flexibility and reducing the burden of taxation and regulation on business. Depending on which of these competing visions wins out, Europe will either liberalize its economy further to compete in a globalized world or it will retreat further into its past and face persistent high unemployment, sluggish growth, and permanently lower living standards. The violence that erupted in Greece in 2010 shows that the way ahead will not be easy, with those benefiting from the European welfare state fighting to preserve the status quo.

slashed income tax rates, virtually every other nation in the world followed suit. In a world of porous borders, governments found it difficult to ignore what worked. Similarly, big mutual funds are wielding increasing clout in developing nations, particularly in Latin America and Asia. In essence, the funds are trying to do overseas what they are already doing domestically: pressure management (in this case governments) to adopt policies that will maximize returns. The carrot is more money; the stick is capital flight. Simply put, the globalization of trade and finance has created an unforgiving environment that penalizes economic mismanagement and allots capital and jobs to the nations delivering the highest risk-adjusted returns. As markets become more efficient, they are quicker to reward sound economic policy—and swifter to punish the profligate. Their judgments are harsh and cannot be appealed.

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Application

The Asian Tigers Fall Prey to World Financial Markets

For years, the nations of East Asia were held up as economic icons. Their typical blend of high savings and investment rates, autocratic political systems, export-oriented businesses, restricted domestic markets, government-directed capital allocation, and controlled financial systems were hailed as the ideal recipe for strong economic growth, particularly for developing nations. However, by summer 1997, the financial markets became disenchanted with this region, beginning with Thailand. Waves of currency selling left the Thai baht down 40% and the stock market down 50%. Thailand essentially went bankrupt. Its government fell and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put together a US$17 billion bailout package, conditioned on austerity measures. What the financial markets had seen that others had not was the rot at the core of Thailand’s economy. Thais had run up huge debts, mostly in U.S. dollars, and were depending on the stability of the baht to repay these loans. Worse, Thai banks, urged on by the country’s corrupt political leadership, were shoveling loans into money-losing ventures that were controlled by political cronies. As long as the money kept coming, Thailand’s statistics on investment and growth looked good, but the result was a financially

120

troubled economy that could not generate the income necessary to repay its loans. Investors then turned to other East Asian economies and saw similar flaws there. One by one, the dominoes fell, from Bangkok to Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta to Manila, Singapore to Taipei, Seoul to Hong Kong. The Asian tigers were humbled as previously stable currencies were crushed (see Figure 1.11A), local stock markets crashed (see Figure 1.11B), interest rates soared, banking systems tottered, economies contracted, bankruptcies spread, and governments were destabilized. The international bailout for the region grew to over $150 billion, crowned by $60 billion for South Korea, as the United States and other developed nations poured in funds for fear that the events in East Asia would spin out of control, threatening the world financial system with ruin and leading to a global recession. How to stave off such crises? The answer is financial markets that are open and transparent, leading to investment decisions that are based on sound economic principles rather than cronyism or political considerations. What is the bright side of the awesome power wielded by the global financial markets? Simply this: These

Crisis

100 Index, June 28, 1997 = 100

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80 60 40 20 0 1/4/97

Thailand Philippines Malaysia Korea Indonesia

2/22/97 4/12/97 5/31/97 7/19/97

9/6/97 10/25/97 12/13/97 1/31/98

FIGURE 1.11A Currency Devaluations Source: Southwest Economy, March/April 1998, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

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markets bring economic sanity even to nations run by corrupt elites. Global markets have no tolerance for regimes that suppress enterprise, reward cronies, or squander resources on ego-building but economically dubious,

180

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160 Thailand Philippines Malaysia Korea Indonesia

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grandiose projects. Indeed, although Asian business still has a long way to go, the forced restructuring that had already occurred resulted by summer 2000, three years later, in a dramatic recovery of the Asian economies.

Crisis

140

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FIGURE 1.11B Stock Market Drop Source: Southwest Economy, March/April 1998, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Paradoxically, however, even as people are disturbed at the thought of their government losing control of events, they have lost faith in government’s ability to solve many of their problems. One result has been the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the spread of free-market economics in developed and developing countries alike. Rejecting the statist policies of the past, they are shrinking, closing, pruning, or privatizing state-owned industries and subjecting their economies to the rigors of foreign competition. In response to these changes, developing countries in 1996, just prior to the Asian currency crisis, received more than $240 billion in new foreign investment. Five years earlier, by contrast, they were exporting savings, as they paid service costs on their large foreign debts and as local capital fled hyperinflation and confiscatory tax and regulatory regimes. These dramatic shifts in policy—and the rewards they have brought to their initiators—have further strengthened the power of markets to set prices and priorities around the world. Contrary to the claims of its opponents, the reality is that globalization, by forcing governments to compete, has promoted a race to the top by pushing countries toward policies that promote faster economic growth, lower inflation, and greater economic freedom.

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Consequences of Global Competition The stresses caused by global competition have stirred up protectionists and given rise to new concerns about the consequences of free trade. For example, the sudden entry of three billion people from low-wage countries such as China, Mexico, Brazil, Russia, and India into the global marketplace is provoking anxiety among workers in the old industrial countries about their living standards. Companies and unions are quite rational in fearing the effects of foreign competition. It disrupts established industry patterns, and it limits the wages and benefits of some workers by giving more choice to consumers while raising the wages and benefits of others. The European Union’s single market has caused major disruption to European businesses. Plants are closing, mergers are proliferating, and both domestic and multinational companies are adjusting their operations to the new integrated market. Similarly, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which created a giant free trade area from the Yukon to the Yucatán, has forced formerly sheltered companies, especially in Mexico, to cut costs and change their way of doing business. It led U.S. companies to shift production both into and out of Mexico, while confronting American and Canadian workers with a new pool of lower-priced (but also less productive) labor.

Application

Japanese Competition Affects the U.S. Car Industry

Beginning in the late 1970s, Japanese competition steadily eroded the influence of the Big Three U.S. car makers in the auto industry. During the 1980s, Japanese car companies raised their U.S. market share 8 points, to 28%, versus 65% for Detroit and 5% for Europe. The tough Japanese competition was a big factor in the sales and profit crunch that hit the Big Three. General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler responded by shutting down U.S. plants and by curbing labor costs. Thus, Japanese competition has limited the wages and benefits that United Auto Workers (UAW) union members can earn, as well as the prices that U.S. companies can charge for their cars. Both unions and companies understand that in this competitive environment, raising wages and car prices leads to fewer sales and fewer jobs and, ultimately, to bankruptcy. One solution, which allows both the Big Three and the UAW to avoid making hard choices—sales volume versus profit margin, and jobs versus wages and benefits—is political: limit Japanese competition through quotas, tariffs, and other protectionist devices, and thereby control its effects on the U.S. car industry. Unfortunately, American consumers get stuck with the tab for this apparent free lunch in the form of higher car prices and less choice.

The best argument against protectionism, however, is long-term competitiveness. It was, after all, cutthroat competition from the Japanese that forced Detroit to get its act together. The Big Three swept away layers of unneeded management, raised productivity, and dramatically increased the quality of their cars and trucks. They also shifted their focus toward the part of the business in which the Japanese did not have strong products but that just happened to be America’s hottest and fastest-growing automotive segment—light trucks, which includes pickups, minivans, and sport-utility vehicles. Combined with a strong yen and higher Japanese prices, these changes helped Detroit pick up three percentage points of market share in 1992 and 1993 alone, mostly at the expense of Japanese nameplates. By 1994, the Japanese share of the U.S. car market, which peaked at 29% in 1991, had fallen to 25%. Although the global financial crisis and the recent jump in oil prices has hurt the Big Three, and forced a further restructuring of the car industry, the inescapable fact is that Japanese automakers forced Detroit to make better cars at better prices. Handicapping the Japanese could not possibly have had the same effect.

So it is all the more encouraging that political leaders keep trying to stretch borders. The world’s long march toward a global economy has accelerated considerably over the past two decades as evidenced by the U.S.-Canada-Mexico free trade pact, the European Community’s drive to create a truly common market, China’s entrance into the WTO, and plans to create a North Atlantic free trade

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area. The greater integration of national economies is likely to continue despite the stresses it causes as politicians worldwide increasingly come to realize that they either must accept this integration or watch their respective nations fall behind.

Application

The Myth of a Deindustrializing America

The share of workers employed in manufacturing in the United States has declined steadily since 1960, from 26% then to about 11% in 2006. It is an article of faith among protectionists that these manufacturing jobs have been lost to low-cost labor in China, India, Mexico, Brazil, and the rest of the developing world. According to the critics, the answer to these job losses and the hollowing out of American industry is protectionism. The truth turns out to be more complex. In fact, manufacturing jobs are disappearing worldwide. A study of employment trends in 20 economies found that between 1995 and 2002, more than 22 million factory jobs disappeared.30 Moreover, the United States has not even been the biggest loser. As Figure 1.12 shows, that 30 Joseph

G. Carson, “U.S. Economic and Investment Perspective-Manufacturing Payrolls Declining Globally: The Untold Story (Parts 1 and 2)”, New York, AllianceBernstein Institutional Capital Management, October 10 and 24, 2003. Spain Canada Philippines Taiwan Mexico Malaysia Netherlands Australia India –0.1% –1.9% –5.6% –6.9% –11.3% –11.6% –11.7% –12.4% –15.3% –16.1% –19.9% –25.0% –20.0%

–15.0%

–10.0%

–5.0%

distinction goes to Brazil, which lost almost 20% of its manufacturing jobs during that period. China, the usual villain, saw a 15% drop. In fact, the real culprit is higher productivity. All over the world, factories are becoming more efficient. As a result of new equipment, better technology, and better manufacturing processes, factories can turn out more products with fewer workers. Indeed, between 1995 and 2002, factory production worldwide jumped 30% even as factory employment fell by 11%. In the United States, even as millions of factory jobs were lost, factory output has more than doubled in the past 30 years. Indeed, despite China being acclaimed as the new workshop of the world, the United States remains the world’s largest manufacturer. Because of its higher productivity, the United States manufactures twice as many goods as China even though China has around six times as many manufacturing workers. 24.6% 22.0% 6.9% 4.7%

1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0% Italy France Germany Sweden U.S. S. Korea Russia U.K. China Japan Brazil

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

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FIGURE 1.12 Winners and Losers: Percentage Change in Manufacturing Employment From 1995 to 2002

25.0%

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U.S. manufacturing productivity is both high and growing. The average U.S. factory worker in 2010 was responsible for more than $180,000 of annual manufacturing output, triple the $60,000 in 1972.31 In other words, manufacturing is being transformed the same way that farming was. In 1910, one out of every three American workers was a farmer. By 2010, with the advent of tractors and other technology, it was one in 70 even as U.S. food output increased dramatically. As such, postponing the expiration date of some U.S. manufacturing jobs through protectionist policies diverts resources from new, growing industries and instead directs them toward keeping dying U.S. industries alive for a little while longer. It is also important to distinguish between the outsourcing of manufacturing and the outsourcing of the value added associated with manufactured products. Consider, for example, the wireless mouse named Wanda sold by Logitech International SA, a Swiss-American company headquartered in California. The mice are made in Suzhou, China, and sold to American consumers for around $40. As Figure 1.13 shows, of this amount, Logitech takes about $8, distributors and retailers take around $15, and parts suppliers get $14. China’s take from each mouse is just $3, which must cover wages, power, transport, and other overhead costs. Indeed, Logitech’s Fremont, California, marketing staff of

450 earns far more than the 4,000 Chinese workers in Suzhou.32 32 Information

on Logitech’s Wanda mouse appears in Andrew Higgins, “As China Surges, It Also Proves a Buttress to American Strength”, Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2004, A1.

$3 $8

$14 $15

China–wages, power, transport, other overhead Logitech–design, marketing, profit Parts suppliers Distributors and retailers

31 Mark

J. Perry, “The Truth About U.S. Manufacturing”, Wall Street Journal (February 25, 2011): A 13.

FIGURE 1.13 How Logitech’s $40 Mouse is Dissected

Ultimately, the consequences of globalization are an empirical issue. If the anti-free traders were right, the United States, with one of the most liberal trading regimes in the world and facing intense competitive pressure from low-cost imports across a range of industries, would be losing jobs by the millions. Instead, as Figure 1.14 shows, the United States created more than 45 million jobs since 1980, when the competitive pressure from foreign imports intensified dramatically. The U.S. unemployment rate also fell during this period, from 7.1% in 1980 to 4.6% in 2006. Moreover, according to the foes of globalization, intensifying competition from low-cost foreign workers is driving down average worker compensation in the United States, both in absolute terms and also relative to foreign workers. Once again, the facts are inconsistent with the claims. Figure 1.15A shows that U.S. worker compensation has steadily risen—and it shows why. The answer is productivity: as output per hour (the standard measure of worker productivity) has gone up, so has real hourly worker compensation. According to Figure 1.15B, on average, 66% of productivity gains have gone to higher

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1.2 The Internationalization of Business and Finance

New job creation

Unemployment rate

FIGURE 1.14 U.S. Unemployment Rates and New Job Creation Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 160

140 Output per hour Real compensation per hour Index value (1992 = 100)

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FIGURE 1.15A Real Compensation per Hour and Output per Hour for American Nonfarm Workers: 1959–2007 Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

worker compensation. Rising labor productivity also explains the rapid growth in manufacturing wages in China, Mexico, South Korea, and many other developing countries in recent decades. The key to higher compensation, therefore, is increased productivity, not trade protectionism. In fact, increased trade leads to higher productivity and, therefore, higher average wages and benefits. These empirical facts point to a larger reality: globalization is not a zero-sum game, in which for some

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FIGURE 1.15B Real Compensation per Hour Various with Output per Hour for American Nonfarm Workers: 1959–2007 Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

to win others must lose. Instead, international trade and investment expand the total economic pie, enabling nations to get richer together.

1.3 International Financial Management: Theory and Practice Although all functional areas can benefit from a global perspective, this text concentrates on developing financial policies that are appropriate for the international firm. The main objective of international financial management is to maximize shareholder wealth as measured by the share price. This means making financing and investment decisions that add as much value as possible to the firm. It also means that companies must manage effectively the assets under their control. The focus on shareholder value stems from the fact that shareholders are the legal owners of the firm and management has a fiduciary obligation to act in their best interests. Although other stakeholders in the company do have rights, these are not coequal with the shareholders’ rights. Shareholders provide the risk capital that cushions the claims of alternative stakeholders. Allowing alternative stakeholders coequal control over capital supplied by others is equivalent to allowing one group to risk another group’s capital. This undoubtedly would impair future equity formation and produce numerous other inefficiencies. A more compelling reason for focusing on creating shareholder wealth is that those companies that do not are likely to be prime takeover targets and candidates for a forced corporate restructuring. Conversely, maximizing shareholder value provides the best defense against a hostile takeover: a high stock price. Companies that build shareholder value also find it easier to attract equity capital. Equity capital is especially critical for companies that operate in a riskier environment and for companies that are seeking to grow.

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Last, but not least, shareholders are not the only beneficiaries of corporate success. By forcing managers to evaluate business strategies based on prospective cash flows, the shareholder value approach favors strategies that enhance a company’s cash-flow generating ability—which is good for everyone, not just shareholders. Companies that create value have more money to distribute to all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Put another way, you have to create wealth before you can distribute it. Thus, there is no inherent economic conflict between shareholders and stakeholders. Indeed, most financial economists believe that maximizing shareholder value is not merely the best way, it is the only way to maximize the economic interests of all stakeholders over time. Although an institution as complex as the multinational corporation cannot be said to have a single, unambiguous will, the principle of shareholder wealth maximization provides a rational guide to financial decision-making. However, other financial goals that reflect the relative autonomy of management and external pressures also are examined here.

Criticisms of the International Corporation Critics of the international company liken its behavior to that of an octopus with tentacles extended, squeezing the nations of the world to satisfy the apparently insatiable appetite of its center. Its defenders claim that only by linking activities globally can world output be maximized. According to this view, greater profits from overseas activities are the just reward for providing the world with new products, technologies, and know-how. This text’s focus is on international financial management, so it does not directly address this controversy. It concentrates instead on the development of analytical approaches to deal with the major environmental problems and decisions involving overseas investment and financing. In carrying out these financial policies, however, conflicts between corporations and nation-states will inevitably arise. A classic case is that of General Motors-Holden’s Ltd. The General Motors wholly owned Australian affiliate was founded in 1926 with an initial equity investment of A$3.5 million. The earnings were reinvested until 1954, at which time the first dividend, for A$9.2 million, was paid to the parent company in Detroit. This amount seemed reasonable to GM management, considering the 28 years of forgoing dividends, but the Australian press and politicians denounced a dividend equal to more than 260% of GM’s original equity investment as economic exploitation and imperialism.33 More recently, Brazil, facing one of its periodic balance-of-payments crises, chose to impose stringent controls on the removal of profits by MNCs, thereby affecting the financial operations of firms such as Volkswagen and Scott Paper. In addition, companies operating in countries as diverse as Canada and Chile, Italy and India, and the United States and Uruguay have faced various political risks, including price controls and confiscation of local operations. International Financial Management examines modifying financial policies to align better with national objectives in an effort to reduce such risks and minimize the costs of the adjustments. The text also considers the links between financial management and other functional areas. After all, the analysis of investment projects is dependent on sales forecasts and cost estimates, and the dispersal of production and marketing activities affects a firm’s ability to flow funds internationally as well as its vulnerability to expropriation.

Functions of Financial Management Financial management is traditionally separated into two basic functions: the acquisition of funds and the investment of those funds. The first function, also known as the financing decision, involves generating funds from internal sources or from sources external to the firm at the lowest long-run cost 33 Reported

in, among other places, Sidney M. Robbins and Robert B. Stobaugh, Money in the Multinational Enterprise (New York: Basic Books, 1973): 59.

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possible. The investment decision is concerned with the allocation of funds over time in such a way that shareholder wealth is maximized. Many of the concerns and activities of international financial management, however, cannot be categorized so neatly. Internal corporate fund flows such as loan repayments are often undertaken to access funds that are already owned, at least in theory, by the MNC itself. Other flows, such as dividend payments, may take place to reduce taxes or currency risk. Capital structure and other financing decisions frequently are motivated by a desire to reduce investment risks as well as financing costs. Furthermore, exchange risk management involves both the financing decision and the investment decision. Throughout this text, therefore, the interaction between financing and investment decisions is stressed because the right combination of these decisions is the key to maximizing the value of the firm to its shareholders.

Theme of This Text Financial executives in multinational corporations face many factors that have no domestic counterparts. These factors include exchange and inflation risks; international differences in tax rates; multiple money markets, often with limited access; currency controls; and political risks, such as sudden or creeping expropriation. When companies consider the unique characteristics of multinational financial management, they understandably emphasize the additional political and economic risks faced when going abroad. But a broader perspective is necessary if firms are to take advantage of being international. The ability to move people, money, and material on a global basis enables the multinational corporation to be more than the sum of its parts. By having operations in different countries, an international business can access segmented capital markets to lower its overall cost of capital, shift profits to lower its taxes, and take advantage of international diversification of markets and production sites to reduce the riskiness of its earnings. Multinational companies have taken the old adage “don’t put all your eggs in one basket” to its logical conclusion. Operating globally confers other advantages as well: it increases the bargaining power of multinational firms when they negotiate investment agreements and operating conditions with foreign governments and labor unions; it gives MNCs continuous access to information on the newest process technologies available overseas and the latest research and development activities of their foreign competitors; and it helps them diversify their funding sources by giving them expanded access to the world’s capital markets. In summary, International Financial Management emphasizes the many opportunities associated with being multinational without neglecting the corresponding risks. To properly analyze and balance these international risks and rewards, we must use the lessons to be learned from domestic corporate finance.

Relationship to Domestic Financial Management In recent years, an abundance of new research has been conducted in the area of international corporate finance. The major thrust of this work has been to apply the methodology and logic of financial economics to the study of key international financial decisions. Critical problem areas, such as foreign exchange risk management and foreign investment analysis, have benefited from the insights provided by financial economics—a discipline that emphasizes the use of economic analysis to understand the basic workings of financial markets, particularly the measurement and pricing of risk and the intertemporal allocation of funds. By focusing on the behavior of financial markets and their participants rather than on how to solve specific problems, we can derive fundamental principles of valuation and develop from them superior approaches to financial management, much as a better understanding of the basic laws of physics leads to better-designed and better-functioning products. We also can better gauge the validity

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of existing approaches to financial decision-making by seeing whether their underlying assumptions are consistent with our knowledge of how financial markets function and the principles of valuation. Three concepts arising in financial economics have proved to be of particular importance in developing a theoretical foundation for international corporate finance: arbitrage, market efficiency, and capital asset pricing. Throughout the remainder of the text, we rely on these concepts, which are briefly described in the next sections. Arbitrage. Arbitrage traditionally has been defined as the purchase of assets or commodities on one market for immediate resale on another in order to profit from a price discrepancy. In recent years, however, arbitrage has been used to describe a broader range of activities. Tax arbitrage, for example, involves the shifting of gains or losses from one tax jurisdiction to another to profit from differences in tax rates. In a broader context, risk arbitrage, or speculation, describes the process that leads to equality of risk-adjusted returns on different securities, unless market imperfections that hinder this adjustment process exist. The concept of arbitrage is of particular importance in international finance because so many of the relationships between domestic and international financial markets, exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation rates depend on arbitrage for their existence. In fact, it is the process of arbitrage that ensures market efficiency. Market Efficiency. An efficient market is one in which the prices of traded securities readily incorporate new information. Numerous studies of capital markets have shown that traded securities are correctly priced in that trading rules based on past prices or publicly available information cannot consistently lead to profits (after adjusting for transaction costs) in excess of those due solely to risk taking. The predictive power of markets lies in their ability to collect in one place a mass of individual judgments from around the world. These judgments are based on current information. If the trend of future policies changes, people will revise their expectations, and prices will change to incorporate the new information. Despite numerous challenges, the notion of market efficiency has held up well to criticism.34 To say that markets are efficient, however, is not to say that they never blunder. Swept up by enthusiasm or urged on by governments, investors appear to succumb periodically to herd behavior and go to excess, culminating in a financial crisis. In the 1980s, for example, an international banking crisis developed as a result of overly optimistic lending to developing nations, and in the 1990s the Asian crisis was associated with overly optimistic lending to the rapidly growing Asian tigers. Similarly, the global financial crisis that began in August 2007 was facilitated by distortions in the price of credit associated with implicit government guarantees to depositors and other providers of capital, a credit bubble in the United States and Europe that led to dramatic increases in the price of housing, the tendency of central banks to cut interest rates at the first sign of financial distress, and a skewed set of incentives that led financial executives to engage in risky behavior and credit-rating agencies to overstate the credit quality of mortgage-backed securities. The resulting credit losses and failed financial institutions do not invalidate the notion of market efficiency. Indeed, the catastrophic fates of august financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, Royal Bank of Scotland, Bear Stearns, Dexia, UBS, and AIG are entirely consistent with market efficiency: in a competitive capital market, if you take massive risky positions financed by epic amounts of leverage (debt-to-equity ratios of on

34

In the words of Nobel laureate Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (“In Defence of the Dismal Science”, The Economist (August 8, 2009): 67), “Over the years, exceptions and ‘anomalies’ [to market efficiency] have been discovered…but for the purposes of macroeconomic analysis and forecasting these departures are too small to matter.”

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the order of 33-to-1), you are bound to fail one day, no matter how large and venerable you are.35 Put another way, in an efficient market, you cannot expect to consistently earn positive excess returns; one day you will earn a negative return sufficiently large to sink your institution. To date, these crises have been resolved, albeit with much pain. Between crisis and resolution, however, is always uncharted territory, with the ever-present potential of panic feeding on itself and spreading from one nation to another, leading to global instability and recession, such as has occurred with the 2007 global financial crisis. What we can say about markets, however, is that they are self-correcting; unlike governments, when investors spot problems, their instinct is to withdraw funds, not add more. At the same time, if a nation’s economic fundamentals are basically sound, investors will eventually recognize that and their capital will return. Capital Asset Pricing. Capital asset pricing refers to the way in which securities are valued in line with their anticipated risks and returns. Because risk is such an integral element of international financial decisions, this text briefly summarizes the results of more than five decades of study on the pricing of risk in capital markets. The outcome of this research has been to posit a specific relationship between risk (measured by return variability) and required asset returns, now formalized in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the more general arbitrage pricing theory (APT). Both the CAPM and the APT assume that the total variability of an asset’s returns can be attributed to two sources: (1) marketwide influences that affect all assets to some extent, such as the state of the economy, and (2) other risks that are specific to a given firm, such as a strike. The former type of risk is usually termed systematic, or nondiversifiable, risk, and the latter, unsystematic, or diversifiable, risk. Unsystematic risk is largely irrelevant to the highly diversified holder of securities because the effects of such disturbances cancel out, on average, in the portfolio. On the other hand, no matter how well diversified a stock portfolio is, systematic risk, by definition, cannot be eliminated, and thus the investor must be compensated for bearing this risk. This distinction between systematic risk and unsystematic risk provides the theoretical foundation for the study of risk in the multinational corporation and is referred to throughout the text.

The Importance of Total Risk Although the message of the CAPM and the APT is that only the systematic component of risk will be rewarded with a risk premium, this does not mean that total risk—the combination of systematic and unsystematic risk—is unimportant to the value of the firm. In addition to the effect of systematic risk on the appropriate discount rate, total risk may have a negative impact on the firm’s expected cash flows.36 The inverse relation between risk and expected cash flows arises because financial distress, which is most likely to occur for firms with high total risk, can impose costs on customers, suppliers, and employees and thereby affect their willingness to commit themselves to relationships with the firm. For example, potential customers will be nervous about purchasing a product they might have difficulty getting serviced if the firm goes out of business. Similarly, a firm struggling to survive is unlikely to find suppliers willing to provide it with specially developed products or services, except at a higher-than-usual price. The uncertainty created by volatile earnings and cash flows also may hinder management’s ability to take a long view of the firm’s prospects and make the most of its opportunities.

35

This point is made in Ray Ball, “The Global Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What Have We Learned”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Fall 2009): 8–16. 36 The effect of total risk is discussed in Alan C. Shapiro and Sheridan Titman, “An Integrated Approach to Corporate Risk Management”, Midland Corporate Finance Journal (Summer 1985): 41–56.

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In summary, total risk is likely to affect a firm’s value adversely by leading to lower sales and higher costs. Consequently, any action taken by a firm that decreases its total risk will improve its sales and cost outlooks, thereby increasing its expected cash flows. These considerations justify the range of corporate hedging activities that multinational firms engage in to reduce total risk. This text focuses on those risks that appear to be more international than national in nature, including inflation risk, exchange risk, and political risk. As we will see, however, appearances can be deceiving, because these risks also affect firms that do business in only one country. Moreover, international diversification may actually allow firms to reduce the total risk they face. Much of the general market risk facing a company is related to the cyclical nature of the domestic economy of the home country. Operating in several nations whose economic cycles are not perfectly in phase should reduce the variability of the firm’s earnings. Thus, even though the risk of operating in any one foreign country may be greater than the risk of operating in just one country, diversification can eliminate much of that risk. What is true for companies is also true for investors. International diversification can reduce the riskiness of an investment portfolio because national financial markets tend to move somewhat independently of one another. Investors today have options to invest internationally that did not exist in the past. They can invest in multinational firms, foreign stocks and bonds, securities of foreign firms issued domestically, and mutual funds that hold portfolios of foreign stocks and bonds.

The Global Financial Marketplace Market efficiency has been greatly facilitated by the marriage of computers and telecommunications. The resulting electronic infrastructure melds the world into one global market for ideas, data, and capital, all moving at almost the speed of light to any part of the planet. Today, there are more than 200,000 computer terminals in hundreds of trading rooms, in dozens of nations, that light up to display an unending flow of news. Only about two minutes elapse between the time a president, a prime minister, or a central banker makes a statement and the time traders buy or sell currency, stocks, and bonds according to their evaluation of that policy’s effect on the market. The result is a continuing global referendum on a nation’s economic policies, which is the final determinant of the value of its currency. Just as we learn from television the winner of a presidential election, so, too, do we learn instantly from the foreign exchange market what the world thinks of the government’s announced economic policies even before they are implemented. In a way, the financial market is a form of economic free speech. Although many politicians do not like what it is saying, the market presents judgments that are clear-eyed and hard-nosed. It knows that there are no miracle drugs that can replace sound fiscal and monetary policies. Thus, cosmetic political fixes will exacerbate, not alleviate, a falling currency.

The Role of the Financial Executive in an Efficient Market The basic insight into financial management that we can gain from recent empirical research in financial economics is the following: attempts to increase the value of a firm by purely financial measures or accounting manipulations are unlikely to succeed unless there are capital market imperfections or asymmetries in tax regulations. Rather than downgrading the role of the financial executive, the net result of these research findings has been to focus attention on those areas and circumstances in which financial decisions can have a measurable impact. The key areas are capital budgeting, working capital management, and tax management. The circumstances to be aware of include capital market imperfections, caused primarily by government regulations, and asymmetries in the tax treatment of different types and sources of revenues and costs. The value of good financial management is enhanced in the international arena because of the much greater likelihood of market imperfections and multiple tax rates. In addition, the greater

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complexity of international operations is likely to increase the payoffs from a knowledgeable and sophisticated approach to internationalizing the traditional areas of financial management.

1.4 Outline of the Text This text is divided into six parts. • Part I: The Global Financial Management Environment • Part II: Currency and Derivatives Markets • Part III: Managing Currency Risks • Part IV: Financing International Operations • Part V: International Capital Budgeting • Part VI: International Management of Working Capital The following sections briefly discuss these parts and their chapters.

The Global Financial Management Environment Part I examines the environment in which international financial decisions are made. Chapter 2 discusses the basic factors that affect currency values. It also explains the basics of central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets, including the economic and political motivations for such intervention. Chapter 3 describes the international monetary system and shows how the choice of system affects the determination of exchange rates. Chapter 4 is a crucial chapter because it introduces five key equilibrium relationships—among inflation rates, interest rates, and exchange rates—in international finance that form the basis for much of the analysis in the remainder of the text. Chapter 5 analyzes the balance of payments and the links between national economies, while Chapter 6 discusses the subject of country risk analysis, the assessment of the potential risks and rewards associated with making investments and doing business in a country—a topic of great concern these days.

Currency and Derivatives Markets Part II explores the foreign exchange and derivative markets used by multinational corporations to manage their currency and interest rate risks. Chapter 7 describes the foreign exchange market and how it functions. Foreign currency futures and options contracts are discussed in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 analyzes interest rate and currency swaps and interest rate forwards and futures and how these derivatives can be used to manage risk.

Managing Currency Risks Part III discusses foreign exchange risk management, a traditional area of concern that is receiving even more attention today. Chapter 10 discusses the likely impact that an exchange rate change will have on a firm (its exposure) from an accounting perspective and then analyzes the costs and benefits of alternative financial techniques to hedge against those exchange risks. Chapter 11 examines exposure from an economic perspective and presents marketing, logistic, and financial policies to cope with the competitive consequences of currency changes. As part of the analysis of economic exposure, the relationship between inflation and currency changes and its implications for corporate cash flows is recognized.

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Financing International Operations Part IV focuses on laying out and evaluating the medium- and long-term financing options facing the multinational firm, then on developing a financial package that is tailored to the firm’s specific operating environment. Chapter 12 describes the alternative external, medium-, and long-term debt-financing options available to the multinational corporation. Chapter 13 discusses the international capital markets—namely, the Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets. Chapter 14 seeks to determine the cost-of-capital figure(s) that firms should use in evaluating foreign investments, given the funding sources actually employed.

International Capital Budgeting Part V analyzes the foreign investment decision process. Chapter 15 begins by discussing the nature and consequences of international portfolio investing—the purchase of foreign stocks and bonds. In Chapter 16, the strategy of foreign direct investment is discussed, including an analysis of the motivations for going abroad and those factors that have contributed to business success overseas. Chapter 17 presents techniques for evaluating foreign investment proposals, emphasizing how to adjust cash flows for the various political and economic risks encountered abroad, such as inflation, currency fluctuations, and expropriations. It also discusses how companies can manage political risks by appropriately structuring the initial investment and making suitable modifications to subsequent operating decisions.

International Management of Working Capital Part VI examines working capital management in the multinational corporation. The subject of trade financing is covered in Chapter 18. Chapter 19 discusses current asset management in the MNC, including the management of cash, inventory, and receivables. It also deals with current liability management, presenting the alternative short-term financing techniques available and showing how to evaluate their relative costs. Chapter 20 describes the mechanisms available to the international firm to shift funds and profits among its various units, while considering the tax and other consequences of these maneuvers. The aim of these maneuvers is to create an integrated global financial planning system. QUESTIONS 1.

2.

3.

.(a) What are the various categories of international firms? (b) What is the motivation for international expansion of firms within each category? .(a) How does foreign competition limit the prices that domestic companies can charge and the wages and benefits that workers can demand? (b) What political solutions can help companies and unions avoid the limitations imposed by foreign competition? (c) Who pays for these political solutions? Explain. .(a) What factors appear to underlie the Asian currency crisis? (b) What lessons can we learn from the Asian currency crisis?

4.

.(a) What is an efficient market? (b) What is the role of a financial executive in an efficient market?

5.

.(a) What is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)? (b) What is the basic message of the CAPM? (c) How might a multinational firm use the CAPM?

6.

Why might total risk be relevant for a multinational corporation?

7.

A memorandum by Labor Secretary Robert Reich to President Bill Clinton suggested that the government penalize U.S. companies that invest overseas rather than at home. According to Reich, this kind of investment hurts exports and destroys well-paying jobs. Comment on this argument.

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Pattern bargaining—an age-old tradition of largely indistinguishable union contracts in an industry—is under pressure in the auto, tire and rubber, and agriculture and industrial-equipment industries. However, pattern bargaining is still alive and well in the utilities, aerospace, defense, and oil refinery industries. (a) Why is pattern bargaining so important for labor unions? What do they hope to accomplish with it?

9.

Are international firms riskier than purely domestic firms? What data would you need to address this question?

10.

Is there any reason to believe that MNCs may be less risky than purely domestic firms? Explain.

11.

In what ways do financial markets grade government economic policies?

(b) What industry characteristics account for the difference in the success of pattern bargaining across industries?

WEB RESOURCES www.wto.orghttp://www.wto.org Website of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Contains news, information, and statistics on international trade. www.worldbank.org Website of the World Bank. Contains economic and demographic data on 206 countries (organized in “Country At-A-Glance” tables), various economic forecasts, and links to a number of other data sources. www.wsj.com Website of the Wall Street Journal, the foremost business newspaper in the United States. Contains domestic and international business news. www.ft.com Website of the Financial Times, the foremost international business newspaper, published in London. Contains a wealth of international financial news and data. www.economist.com Website of The Economist. Contains stories on the economic and political situations of countries and international business developments, along with various national and international economic and financial data. www.oecd.org Website of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Contains news, analyses, and data on international finance and economics. www.cob.ohio-state.edu/dept/fin/fdf/osudata.htm Website run by the Finance Department of Ohio State University. Contains a detailed listing of and links to many different websites related to finance and economics.

www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.htmlhttp://www.census. gov/ipc/www/idb Contains the International Data Base (IDB), which is a computerized data bank with statistical tables of demographic and socioeconomic data for 227 countries and areas of the world. www.economy.com/dismal Covers more than 65 economic releases from more than 15 countries. Also contains numerous stories dealing with international finance and economics. www.annualreports.com Website that contains links to annual reports of over 2,200 companies, many of which are multinationals. www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?intItemID=2068 Website of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Contains information on international trade statistics. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090, 30070682,1090_33076576&_dad=portal&_schema= PORTAL Website of the Eurostat Database from the European Commission. Contains economic data for EU and Non-EU nations. www.ecb.org Website of the European Central Bank. Contains economic data for the Eurozone.

WEB EXERCISES 1.

Who are the major trading partners of the European Union? The Eurozone? Which countries are the top five exporters to the European Union? Which countries are the top five importers of European Union goods? Good references are the Eurostat and WTO sites.

2.

Who are the major recipients of Eurozone overseas investment? Which countries are the major sources of foreign investment in the Eurozone? A good reference is the European Central Bank site.

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Appendix 1A 3.

Go to the websites of companies such as the ones listed here and examine their international business activity. For example, what importance do these companies appear to place on international business? What percentage of sales revenues, assets, and income do these companies derive from their foreign operations? What percentage of their sales and income comes from exports? Is their foreign activity increasing or decreasing? How many countries and continents do these companies operate on? Which countries are listed as locations of the company’s foreign subsidiaries? What is the headquarters country of each company? Much of this information can be gleaned from the annual reports of the companies, which can be found at www.annualreports.com. Ford Motor Company Daimler Bayer A.G. Billiton Group

Royal-Dutch Shell

Renault

Philips Electronics Sony Coca-Cola

Unilever Nestlé Exxon Mobil

4.

Visit the Eurostat website at http://epp.eurostat.ec. europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/. What are the sectors that have added the most jobs in the last 10 year period?

5.

Visit the website of Hitachi (www.hitachi.com). From the home page, visit Hitachi’s site for three other countries. What similarities and differences do you see in the products, prices, and other details when comparing the various country sites? How would you account for these similarities and differences?

Underlying the theory of international trade is the doctrine of comparative advantage. This doctrine rests on certain assumptions: • Exporters sell undifferentiated (commodity) goods and services to unrelated importers. • Factors of production cannot move freely across countries. Instead, trade takes place in the goods and services produced by these factors of production. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the doctrine of comparative advantage also ignores the roles of uncertainty, economies of scale, and technology in international trade; and it is static rather than dynamic. Nonetheless, this theory helps explain why nations trade with one another, and it forms the basis for assessing the consequences of international trade policies. To illustrate the main features of the doctrine of comparative advantage and to distinguish this concept from that of absolute advantage, suppose the United States and the United Kingdom produce the same two products, wheat and coal, according to the following production schedules, where the units referred to are units of production (labor, capital, land, and technology). These schedules show how many units it costs to produce each ton in each country:37 Wheat

Coal

2 units/ton 3 units/ton

1 unit/ton 4 units/ton

37 The traditional theory of international trade ignores the role of technology in differentiating products, but it leaves open the possibility

of different production technologies to produce commodities.

45

Based on your review of The Economist, the Wall Street Journal, and the Financial Times, which countries appear to be giving foreign investors concerns? What are these concerns?

APPENDIX 1A The Origins and Consequences of International Trade

U.S. U.K.

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These figures show clearly that the United States has an absolute advantage in both mining coal and growing wheat. That is, in using fewer units of production per ton produced, the United States is more efficient than the United Kingdom in producing both coal and wheat. However, although the United Kingdom is at an absolute disadvantage in both products, it has a comparative advantage in producing wheat. Put another way, the United Kingdom’s absolute disadvantage is less in growing wheat than in mining coal. This lesser disadvantage can be seen by redoing the production figures above to reflect the output per unit of production for both countries:

U.S. U.K.

Wheat

Coal

0.5 tons/unit 0.33 tons/unit

1 ton/unit 0.25 tons/unit

Productivity for the United States relative to the United Kingdom in coal is 4∶1(1∕0.25), whereas it is “only” 1.5:1(0.5/0.33) in wheat. In order to induce the production of both wheat and coal prior to the introduction of trade, the profitability of producing both commodities must be identical. This condition is satisfied only when the return per unit of production is the same for both wheat and coal in each country. Hence, prior to the introduction of trade between the two countries, the exchange rate between wheat and coal in the United States and the United Kingdom must be as follows: U.S. U.K.

1 ton wheat = 2 tons coal 1 ton wheat = 0.75 tons coal

The Gains from Trade Based on the relative prices of wheat and coal in both countries, there will be obvious gains to trade. By switching production units from wheat to coal, the United States can produce coal and trade with the United Kingdom for more wheat than those same production units can produce at home. Similarly, by specializing in growing wheat and trading for coal, the United Kingdom can consume more coal than if it mined its own. This example demonstrates that trade will be beneficial even if one nation (the United States here) has an absolute advantage in everything. As long as the degree of absolute advantage varies across products, even the nation with an across-the-board absolute disadvantage will have a comparative advantage in making and exporting some goods and services. The gains from trade for each country depend on exactly where the exchange rate between wheat and coal ends up following the introduction of trade. This exchange rate, which is known as the terms of trade, depends on the relative supplies and demands for wheat and coal in each country. However, any exchange rate between 0.75 and 2.0 tons of coal per ton of wheat will still lead to trade because trading at that exchange rate will allow both countries to improve their ability to consume. By illustration, suppose the terms of trade end up at 1:1—that is, one ton of wheat equals one ton of coal. Each unit of production in the United States can now provide its owner with either one ton of coal to consume or one ton of wheat or some combination of the two. By producing coal and trading for wheat, each production unit in the United States now enables its owner to consume twice as much wheat as before. Similarly, by switching from mining coal to growing wheat and trading for coal, each production unit in the United Kingdom will enable its owner to consume 0.33 tons of coal, 33%(0.33∕0.25 = 133%) more than before.

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Appendix 1A

Specialized Factors of Production So far, we have assumed that the factors of production are unspecialized. That is, they can easily be switched between the production of wheat and coal. However, suppose that some factors such as labor and capital are specialized (i.e., relatively more efficient) in terms of producing one commodity rather than the other. In that case, the prices of the factors of production that specialize in the commodity that is exported (coal in the United States, wheat in the United Kingdom) will gain because of greater demand once trade begins, whereas those factors that specialize in the commodity that is now imported (wheat in the United States, coal in the United Kingdom) will lose because of lower demand. This conclusion is based on the economic fact that the demand for factors of production is derived from the demand for the goods those factors produce. The gains and losses to the specialized factors of production will depend on the magnitude of the price shifts after the introduction of trade. To take an extreme case, suppose the terms of trade become 1 ton of wheat equals 1.95 tons of coal. At this exchange rate, trade is still beneficial for both countries but far more so for the United Kingdom than the United States. The disparity in the gains from trade can be seen as follows: By producing coal and trading it for wheat, the United States can now consume approximately 2.5% more wheat than before per ton of coal.38 On the other hand, the United Kingdom gains enormously. Each unit of wheat traded for coal will now provide 1.95 tons of coal, a 160% (1.95∕0.75 − 1) increase relative to the earlier ratio. These gains are all to the good. However, with specialization come costs. In the United States, the labor and capital that specialized in growing wheat will be hurt. If they continue to grow wheat (which may make sense because they cannot easily be switched to mining coal), they will suffer an approximate 2.5% loss of income because the wheat they produce now will buy about 2.5% less coal than before (1.95 tons instead of 2 tons). At the same time, U.S. labor and capital that specialize in mining coal will be able to buy about 2.5% more wheat. Although gains and losses for specialized U.S. factors of production exist, they are relatively small. The same cannot be said for U.K. gains and losses. As we saw earlier, U.K. labor and capital that specialize in growing wheat will be able to buy 160% more coal than before, a dramatic boost in purchasing power. Conversely, those factors that specialize in mining coal will see their wheat purchasing power plummet, from 1.33(4/3) tons of coal before trade to 0.5128(1/1.95) tons of wheat now. These figures translate into a drop of about 62%(0.5128∕1.33 = 38%) in wheat purchasing power. This example illustrates a general principle of international trade: The greater the gains from trade for a country overall, the greater the cost of trade to those factors of production that specialize in producing the commodity that is now imported. The reason is that in order for trade to make sense, imports must be less expensive than the competing domestic products. The less expensive these imports are, the greater will be the gains from trade. By the same token, however, less expensive imports drive down the prices of competing domestic products, thereby reducing the value of those factors of production that specialize in their manufacture. It is this redistribution of income—from factors specializing in producing the competing domestic products to consumers of those products—that leads to demands for protection from imports. However, protection is a double-edged sword. These points are illustrated by the experience of the U.S. auto industry. As discussed in the chapter, the onslaught of Japanese cars in the U.S. market drove down the price and quantity of cars sold by American manufacturers, reducing their return on capital and

trade, the United States can now consume 1∕1.95 = 0.5128 tons of wheat per ton of coal, which is 2.56% more wheat than the 0.5 tons it could previously consume (0.5128∕0.50 = 1.0256).

38 With

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forcing them to be much tougher in negotiating with the unions. The end result was better and less expensive cars for Americans but lower profits for Detroit automakers, lower wages and benefits for U.S. autoworkers, and fewer jobs in the U.S. auto industry. The U.S. auto industry responded to the Japanese competition by demanding, and receiving, protection in the form of a quota on Japanese auto imports. The Japanese response to the quota—which allowed manufacturers to raise their prices (why cut prices when you can’t sell more cars anyway?) and increase their profit margins—was to focus on making and selling higher-quality cars in the U.S. market (as these carried higher profit margins) and shifting substantial production to the United States. In the end, protection did not help U.S. automakers nearly as much as improving the quality of their cars and reducing their manufacturing costs. Indeed, to the extent that protection helped delay the needed changes while boosting Japanese automaker profits (thereby giving them more capital to invest), it may well have hurt the U.S. auto industry.

Monetary Prices and Exchange Rates So far, we have talked about prices of goods in terms of each other. To introduce monetary prices into the example we have been analyzing, suppose that before the opening of trade between the two nations, each production unit costs $30 in the United States and £10 in the United Kingdom. In this case, the prices of wheat and coal in the two countries will be as follows:

U.S. U.K.

Wheat

Coal

$60∕ton £30∕ton

$30∕ton £40∕ton

These prices are determined by taking the number of required production units and multiplying them by the price per unit. Following the introduction of trade, assume the same 1:1 terms of trade as before and that the cost of a unit of production remains the same. The prices of wheat and coal in each country will settle at the following, assuming that the exported goods maintain their prices and the prices of the goods imported adjust to these prices so as to preserve the 1:1 terms of trade:

U.S. U.K.

Wheat

Coal

$30∕ton £30∕ton

$30∕ton £30∕ton

These prices present a potential problem in that there will be equilibrium at these prices only if the exchange rate is $1 = £1. Suppose, however, that before the introduction of trade, the exchange rate is £1 = $3. In this case, dollar-equivalent prices in both countries will begin as follows:

U.S. U.K.

Wheat

Coal

$60∕ton $90∕ton

$30∕ton $120∕ton

This is clearly a disequilibrium situation. Once trade begins at these initial prices, the British will demand both U.S. wheat and coal, whereas Americans will demand no British coal or wheat. Money will be flowing in one direction only (from the United Kingdom to the United States to pay for these goods), and goods will flow only in the opposite direction. The United Kingdom will run a

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Appendix 1A

massive trade deficit, matched exactly by the U.S. trade surplus. Factors of production in the United Kingdom will be idle (because there is no demand for the goods they can produce) whereas U.S. factors of production will experience an enormous increase in demand for their services. This is the nightmare scenario for those concerned with the effects of free trade: One country will sell everything to the other country and demand nothing in return (save money), leading to prosperity for the exporting nation and massive unemployment and depression in the importing country. However, such worries ignore the way markets work. Absent government interference, a set of forces will swing into play simultaneously. The British demand for dollars (to buy U.S. coal and wheat) will boost the value of the dollar, making U.S. products more expensive to the British and British goods less expensive to Americans. At the same time, the jump in demand for U.S. factors of production will raise their prices and hence the cost of producing U.S. coal and wheat. The rise in cost will force a rise in the dollar price of U.S. wheat and coal. Conversely, the lack of demand for U.K. factors of production will drive down their price and hence the pound cost of producing British coal and wheat. The net result of these adjustments in the British pound:U.S. dollar exchange rate and the cost of factors of production in both countries is to make British products more attractive to consumers and U.S. products less competitive. This process will continue until both countries can find their comparative advantage and the terms of trade between coal and wheat are equal in both countries (say, at 1:1).

Tariffs Introducing tariffs (taxes) on imported goods will distort the prices at which trade takes place and will reduce the quantity of goods traded. In effect, tariffs introduce a wedge between the prices paid by domestic customers and the prices received by the exporter, reducing the incentive of both to trade. To see this, suppose Mexican tomatoes are sold in the United States at a price of $0.30 per kilo. If the United States imposes a tariff of, say, $0.15 per kilo on Mexican tomatoes, then Mexican tomatoes will have to sell for $0.45 per kilo to provide Mexican producers with the same pre-tariff profits on their tomato exports to the United States. However, it is likely that at this price, some Americans will forgo Mexican tomatoes and either substitute U.S. tomatoes or do without tomatoes in their salads. More likely, competition will preclude Mexican tomato growers from raising their price to $0.45 per kilo. Suppose, instead, that the price of Mexican tomatoes, including the tariff, settles at $0.35 per kilo. At this price, the Mexican tomato growers will receive only $0.20 per kilo, reducing their incentive to ship tomatoes to the American market. At the same time, the higher price paid by American customers will reduce their demand for Mexican tomatoes. The result will be fewer Mexican tomatoes sold in the U.S. market. Such a result will benefit American tomato growers (who now face less competition and can thereby raise their prices) and farmworkers (who can now raise their wages without driving their employers out of business) while harming U.S. consumers of tomatoes (including purchasers of Campbell’s tomato soup, Ragu spaghetti sauce, Progresso ravioli, and Heinz ketchup). Longer term, U.S. companies making tomato-based products are likely to shift production to Mexico where they can purchase tomatoes at a much lower cost. So, instead of importing tomatoes, the United States will now import ketchup, tomato soup, tomato sauce, and other tomato-based products. Something like this happened with sugar, where U.S. sugar producers secured very restrictive import quotas by arguing that they would save sugar farming jobs. However, according to a 2006 study by the U.S. International Trade Administration, each sugar job saved by propping up domestic producers cost three jobs in manufacturing, with many companies relocating to countries such as Mexico and Canada where sugar can cost half the U.S. price. The result was that instead of importing sugar the United States imports more candy, cookies, cakes, and other sugary finished products.

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Ultimately, the effects of free trade are beneficial for an economy because it promotes increased competition among producers. This leads to lower prices for consumers, an increased variety of products, greater productivity and rising wages for workers, and higher living standards for the country overall.

QUESTIONS 1.

In a satirical petition on behalf of French candlemakers, Frederic Bastiat, a French economist, called attention to cheap competition from afar: sunlight. A law requiring the shuttering of windows during the day, he suggested, would benefit not only candlemakers but “everything connected with lighting” and the country as a whole. He explained: “As long as you exclude, as you do, iron, corn, foreign fabrics, in proportion as their prices approximate to zero, what inconsistency it would be to admit the light of the sun, the price of which is already at zero during the entire day!” (a) Is there a logical flaw in Bastiat’s satirical argument? (b) Do Japanese automakers prefer a tariff or a quota on their U.S. car exports? Why? Is there likely to be consensus among the Japanese carmakers on this point? Might there be any Japanese automakers who would prefer U.S. trade restrictions? Why? Who are they? (c) What characteristics of the U.S. car industry have helped it gain protection? Why does protectionism persist despite the obvious gains to society from free trade?

2.

Review the arguments both for and against the European Union’s “single market”. What is the empirical evidence so far?

3.

Given the resources available to them, countries A and B can produce the following combinations of steel and corn: Country A Steel (tons) 36 30 24 18 15 6 0

Country B

Corn (bushels)

Steel (tons)

Corn (bushels)

0 3 6 9 12 15 18

54 45 36 27 18 9 0

0 9 18 27 36 45 54

(a) Do you expect trade to take place between countries A and B? Why? (b) Which country will export steel? Which will export corn? Explain.

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Experience shows that neither a state nor a bank ever have had the unrestricted power of issuing paper money without abusing that power. David Ricardo (1817) LEARNING OBJECTIVES • To explain the concept of an equilibrium exchange rate • To identify the basic factors affecting exchange rates in a floating exchange rate system • To calculate the amount of currency appreciation or depreciation associated with a given exchange rate change • To describe the motives and different forms and consequences of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market • To explain how and why expectations affect exchange rates Economic activity is globally unified today to an unprecedented degree. Changes in one nation’s economy are rapidly transmitted to that nation’s trading partners. These fluctuations in economic activity are reflected, almost immediately, in fluctuations in currency values. Consequently, multinational corporations, with their integrated cross-border production and marketing operations, continually face devaluation or revaluation worries somewhere in the world. The purpose of this chapter and the next one is to provide an understanding of what an exchange rate is and why it might change. Such an understanding is basic to dealing with currency risk. This chapter first describes what an exchange rate is and how it is determined in a freely floating exchange rate regime—that is, in the absence of government intervention. The chapter next discusses the role of expectations in exchange rate determination. It also examines the different forms and consequences of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. Chapter 3 describes the political aspects of currency determination under alternative exchange rate systems and presents a brief history of the international monetary system. Before proceeding further, here are definitions of several terms commonly used to describe currency changes. Technically, a devaluation refers to a decrease in the stated par value of a pegged currency, one whose value is set by the government; an increase in par value is known as a revaluation. By contrast, a floating currency—one whose value is set primarily by market forces—is said to depreciate if it loses value and to appreciate if it gains value. However, discussions in this text will use the terms devaluation and depreciation, and revaluation and appreciation, interchangeably. 51

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2.1 Setting the Equilibrium Spot Exchange Rate An exchange rate is, simply, the price of one nation’s currency in terms of another currency, often termed the reference currency. For example, the yen/dollar exchange rate is just the number of yen that one U.S. dollar will buy. If a dollar will buy 100 yen, the exchange rate would be expressed as ¥100∕$, and the yen would be the reference currency. Equivalently, the dollar/yen exchange rate is the number of U.S. dollars one Japanese yen will buy. Continuing the previous example, the exchange rate would be $0.01∕¥ (1∕100), and the dollar would now be the reference currency. Exchange rates can be for spot or forward delivery. A spot rate is the price at which currencies are traded for immediate delivery; in settlement, actual delivery takes place two days later. A forward rate is the price at which foreign exchange is quoted for delivery at a specified future date, which is later than the spot delivery date. The foreign exchange market, where currencies are traded, is not a physical place; rather, it is an electronically linked network of banks, foreign exchange brokers, and dealers whose function is to bring together buyers and sellers of foreign exchange. To understand how exchange rates are set, it helps to recognize that they are market-clearing prices that bring into equilibrium the supply and demand in the foreign exchange market. The determinants of currency supply and demand are first discussed with the aid of a two-currency model featuring the U.S. dollar and the euro, the official currency of the 17 countries that participate in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The members of EMU are often known collectively as the Eurozone, the term used here. Later, the various currency influences in a multicurrency world will be studied more closely.

Demand for a Currency The demand for the euro in the foreign exchange market (which in this two-currency model is equivalent to the supply of U.S. dollars) derives from the demand for Eurozone goods and services and euro-denominated financial assets from the United States and other countries that use the U.S. dollar. Eurozone prices are set in euros, so in order for Americans to pay for their Eurozone purchases, they must first exchange their U.S. dollars for euros. That is, they will demand euros. An increase in the euro’s value in U.S. dollars is equivalent to an increase in the U.S. dollar price of Eurozone products. This higher dollar price normally will reduce the U.S. demand for Eurozone goods, services, and assets. Conversely, as the U.S. dollar value of the euro falls, Americans will demand more euros to buy the less-expensive Eurozone products, resulting in a downward-sloping demand curve for euros. As the dollar cost of the euro (the exchange rate) falls, Americans will tend to buy more Eurozone goods and so will demand more euros.

Supply of a Currency Similarly, the supply of euros (which for the model is equivalent to the demand for U.S. dollars) is based on Eurozone demand for U.S. goods and services and dollar-denominated financial assets. In order for Eurozone residents to pay for their U.S. purchases, they must first acquire dollars. As the dollar value of the euro increases, thereby lowering the euro cost of U.S. goods, the increased Eurozone demand for U.S. goods will cause an increase in the Eurozone demand for dollars and, hence, an increase in the amount of euros supplied.1 In Figure 2.1, e is the spot exchange rate (U.S. dollar value of one euro, that is, €1 = $e), and Q is the quantity of euros supplied and demanded. Since the euro is normally expressed in terms of

This statement holds provided the price elasticity of Eurozone demand, E, is greater than 1. In general, E = −(ΔQ∕Q)∕(ΔP∕P), where Q is the quantity of goods demanded, P is the price, and ΔQ is the change in quantity demanded for a change in price, ΔP. If E > 1, then total spending goes up when price declines. 1

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Dollar price of one euro ( 1 = $e)

2.1 Setting the Equilibrium Spot Exchange Rate

e S

e0

D Q0 Quantity of euros

FIGURE 2.1 Equilibrium Exchange Rates

U.S. dollars, the U.S. dollar is the reference currency. The euro supply (S) and demand (D) curves intersect at e0 , the equilibrium exchange rate. The foreign exchange market is said to be in equilibrium at e0 because both the demand for euros and the supply of euros at this price is Q0 . Before continuing, it should be noted that the notion of a single exchange rate is a convenient fiction. In reality, exchange rates—both spot rates and forward rates—are quoted in pairs, with a dealer (usually a bank foreign exchange trader) standing willing to buy foreign exchange at the bid rate or to sell foreign exchange at the ask rate (also called the offered rate). As might be expected, the bid rate is always less than the ask rate, enabling dealers to profit from the spread between the bid and ask rates by buying low and selling high. Chapter 7 describes the mechanics of the foreign exchange market in greater detail.

Factors that Affect the Equilibrium Exchange Rate As the supply and demand schedules for a currency change over time, the equilibrium exchange rate will also change. Some of the factors that influence currency supply and demand are inflation rates, interest rates, economic growth, and political and economic risks. Section 2.2 shows how expectations about these factors also exert a powerful influence on the demand and supply of a currency and, hence, on the exchange rate. Relative Inflation Rates. Suppose that the supply of U.S. dollars increases relative to its demand. This excess growth in the money supply will cause inflation in the United States, which means that U.S. prices will begin to rise relative to prices of goods and services in the Eurozone. Eurozone consumers are likely to buy fewer U.S. products and begin switching to Eurozone substitutes, leading to a decrease in the amount of euros supplied at every exchange rate. The result is a leftward shift in the euro supply curve to S’ as shown in Figure 2.2. Similarly, higher prices in the United States will lead American consumers to substitute Eurozone imports for U.S. products, resulting in an increase in the demand for euros as depicted by D′ . In effect, both Americans and residents of the Eurozone are searching for the best deals worldwide and will switch their purchases accordingly as the prices of U.S. goods change relative to prices of goods in the Eurozone. Hence, a higher rate of inflation in the United States than in the Eurozone will simultaneously increase Eurozone exports to the United States and reduce U.S. exports to the Eurozone. A new equilibrium rate e1 > e0 results. In other words, a higher rate of inflation in the United States than in Europe will lead to a depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the euro or, equivalently, to an appreciation of the euro relative to the U.S. dollar. In general, a nation running a relatively high rate of inflation will find its currency declining in value relative to the currencies of countries with lower inflation rates. This relationship will be formalized in Chapter 4 as purchasing power parity (PPP).

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Dollar price of one euro ( 1 = $e)

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S'

S

e1 e0

D' D Q2

Q1

Q3

Quantity of euros

FIGURE 2.2 Impact of U.S. Inflation on the Equilibrium Exchange Rate

Relative Interest Rates. Interest rate differentials will also affect the equilibrium exchange rate. A rise in U.S. interest rates relative to Eurozone rates, all else being equal, will cause investors in both nations to switch from euro- to U.S. dollar-denominated securities to take advantage of the higher U.S. dollar interest rates. The net result will be depreciation of the euro in the absence of government intervention. It should be noted that the interest rates discussed here are real interest rates. The real interest rate equals the nominal or actual interest rate minus the rate of inflation. The distinction between nominal and real interest rates is critical in international finance and will be discussed at length in Chapter 4. If the increase in U.S. interest rates relative to Eurozone rates just reflects higher U.S. inflation, the predicted result will be a weaker U.S. dollar. Only an increase in the real U.S. interest rate relative to the real Eurozone rate will result in an appreciating U.S. dollar. Relative Economic Growth Rates. Similarly, a nation with strong economic growth will attract investment capital seeking to acquire domestic assets. The demand for domestic assets, in turn, results in an increased demand for the domestic currency and a stronger currency, other things being equal. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that economic growth should lead to a stronger currency. Conversely, nations with poor growth prospects will see an exodus of capital and weaker currencies. Political and Economic Risk. Other factors that can influence exchange rates include political and economic risks. Investors prefer to hold lesser amounts of riskier assets; thus, low-risk currencies—those associated with more politically and economically stable nations—are more highly valued than high-risk currencies.

Calculating Exchange Rate Changes Depending on the current value of the euro relative to the U.S. dollar, the amount of euro appreciation or depreciation is computed as the fractional increase or decrease in the U.S. dollar value of the euro. For example, if the €∕$ exchange rate goes from €1 = $0.93 to €1 = $1.09, the euro is said to have appreciated by the change in its U.S. dollar value, which is (1.09 − 0.93)∕0.93 = 17.20%. The general formula by which we can calculate the euro’s appreciation or depreciation against the dollar is as follows: Amount of euro appreciation New dollar value of euro − Old dollar value of euro = (depreciation) Old dollar value of euro e1 − e0 = (2.1) e0

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Application

Russia’s implementing an adjustment program that stressed boosting tax revenues. When the Russian parliament balked at the tax collection measures, the IMF withheld its funds. Despite the high interest rates it was paying, the government had difficulty persuading investors to roll over their short-term government debt. The stock market sank to new lows, interest rates remained high, and investors began transferring money out of Russia. Facing accelerating capital flight and mounting domestic problems, the Russian government announced a radical policy shift on August 17, 1998. The key measures included abandonment of its currency supports, suspension of trading in treasury bills combined with a mandatory restructuring of government debt, and a 90-day moratorium on the repayment of corporate and bank debt to foreign creditors (i.e., default). In response, the Russian ruble plunged in value (see Figure 2.3A). Rather than dealing with the root causes of the financial crisis, the

5.0 Daily exchange rates: Russian rubles per U.S. dollar

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The Ruble is Rubble

From the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1991 on, the Russian government had difficulty managing its finances. By spending more than it was collecting in revenues, Russia faced persistent budget deficits financed by issuing short-term treasury bills and printing rubles. By late 1997, the combination of rapidly increasing debt issuance and falling commodity prices (a major source of Russia’s revenue and foreign exchange comes from exports of oil, timber, gold, and other commodities) increased investors’ doubts that Russia would be able to service its growing debt burden, including US$160 billion in foreign debt. Sensing a great opportunity, speculators launched a series of attacks against the Russian ruble. The Bank of Russia (Russia’s central bank) responded by repeatedly raising interest rates, which eventually reached 150% by the middle of May 1998. To help support the ruble, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put together a $23 billion financial package, contingent on

7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 27.5

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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99

FIGURE 2.3A The Ruble is Rubble Source: Pacific Exchange Rate Service, pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr/plot.html. ©2000 by Prof. Werner Antweiler, University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC, Canada. Time period shown in diagram: 1/Jan/1998–31/Dec/1999.

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government reverted to previously discarded administrative measures. It imposed extensive controls on the foreign exchange market, increasingly financed its debt by printing more rubles, and forced exporters to surrender 75% of their export earnings. The crisis and the government’s subsequent actions resulted in a steep rise in inflation and a deep recession in Russia, causing a continuing sharp decline in the ruble’s value, shown in Figure 2.3A. Ten years later, the global financial crisis put the Russian ruble in another precarious position. With a budget fattened by years of high oil and commodity prices, the Kremlin boosted spending on the bureaucracy, benefits, and the military. The global crisis greatly affected demand for commodities and oil and led to a steep fall in prices. This in turn led to massive government deficits as revenue fell even as spending continued to increase. The decline

in oil revenue and a flood of capital leaving the country put downward pressure on the ruble. Beginning in August 2008, the Kremlin engaged in a costly effort first to stop, then to slow, the ruble’s slide. By February 2009, the Bank of Russia had spent over $200 billion of its $600 billion in foreign exchange reserves to support the currency. The central bank also tried to defend the ruble by tightening monetary policy. However, it shied away from the massive interest rate increase that would be necessary for a decisive defense because such a rate hike would shake the fragile banking system and the slumping economy. Investors lost faith in Russia’s willingness to confront its economic troubles by cutting state spending and reforming its economy to end its over-reliance on oil exports. The market’s vote of no-confidence in the Kremlin’s policies is apparent in Figure 2.3B.

Daily exchange rates: Russian rubles per U.S. dollar

20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

FIGURE 2.3B The Ruble is Rubble Round Two Source: Pacific Exchange Rate Service, pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr/plot.html. ©2011 by Prof. Werner Antweiler, University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC, Canada. Time period shown in diagram: 1/Jul/2008–1/Mar/2009.

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Substituting in the numbers from the previous example (with e0 = $0.93 and e1 = $1.09) yields the 17.20% euro appreciation. Alternatively, we can calculate the change in the euro value of the U.S. dollar. We can do this by recognizing that if e equals the U.S. dollar value of a euro (dollars per euro), then the euro value of a U.S. dollar (euros per dollar) must be the reciprocal, or 1∕e. For example, if the euro is worth $0.93, then the dollar must be worth €1.08 (1∕0.93). The change in the euro value of the dollar between time 0 and time 1 equals 1∕e1 − 1∕e0 . In percentage terms, the U.S. dollar is said to have depreciated (appreciated) against the euro by the fractional decrease (increase) in the euro value of the dollar: Amount of dollar depreciation New euro value of dollar − Old euro value of dollar = (appreciation) Old euro value of dollar e − e1 1∕e1 − 1∕e0 = 0 (2.2) = 1∕e0 e1 Employing Equation 2.2, we can find the increase in the euro exchange rate from $0.93 to $1.09 to be equivalent to a U.S. dollar depreciation of 14.68% [(0.93 − 0.99)∕0.99 = −0.1468]. (Why don’t the two exchange rate changes equal each other?2 )

Application

Calculating Yen Appreciation Against the U.S. Dollar

During 2007, the yen went from $0.0108017 to $0.0123265. By how much did the yen appreciate against the U.S. dollar? Solution Using Equation 2.1, the yen has appreciated against the U.S. dollar by an amount equal to (0.0123265 − 0.0108017)∕0.0108017 = 14.12%.

Solution An exchange rate of ¥1 = $0.0108017 translates into an exchange rate of $1 = ¥92.578 (1∕0.0108017 = 92.578). Similarly, the exchange rate of ¥1 = $0.0123265 is equivalent to an exchange rate of $1 = ¥81.126. Using Equation 2.2, the U.S. dollar has depreciated against the yen by an amount equal to (81.126 − 92.578)∕92.578 = −12.37%.

By how much has the U.S. dollar depreciated against the yen?

Application

Calculating U.S. Dollar Appreciation Against the Thai Baht

On July 2, 1997, the Thai baht fell 17% against the U.S. dollar. By how much has the U.S. dollar appreciated against the baht? Solution

Equation (2.1) that (e1 − e0 )∕e0 = −17%. Solving for e1 in terms of e0 yields e0 = 0.83e0 . From Equation (2.2), we know that the U.S. dollar’s appreciation against the baht equals (e0 − e1 )∕e1 or (e0 − 0.83e0 )∕0.83e0 = 0.17∕.83 = 20.48%.

If e0 is the initial U.S. dollar value of the baht and e1 is the post-devaluation exchange rate, then we know from

2 The reason the euro appreciation is unequal to the amount of U.S. dollar depreciation depends on the fact that the value of one currency is the inverse of the value of the other one. Hence, the percentage change in currency value differs because the base from which the change is measured differs.

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Illustration: Calculating Afghani Appreciation Against the Pakistani Rupee The afghani, Afghanistan’s currency, has a perverse tendency to go up whenever sitting governments fall. So as soon as commentators labeled Osama bin Laden the prime suspect in the September 11 World Trade Center attack, currency traders figured that the Taliban would become a target of the United States, bringing prospects of a new government and, perhaps, economic development—and a rise in the afghani’s value. So it has. Under the Taliban, the exchange rate—quoted as the number of Pakistani rupees it takes to buy 100,000 afghanis—fell to around 85 rupees. September 11 galvanized the market. By mid-November 2001, military gains by the Northern Alliance opposition pushed the exchange rate up to 165. By how much had the afghani appreciated against the rupee?

Solution Applying Equation 2.1, the afghani had appreciated against the rupee by an amount equal to (165 − 85)∕85 = 94%. Similarly, between September 11 and midNovember, the U.S. dollar went from 78,000 to 34,000 afghanis. By how much did the U.S. dollar depreciate against the afghani during this two-month period? Solution According to Equation (2.2), the U.S. dollar depreciated during this period by an amount equal to (34, 000 − 78, 000)∕78, 000 = −56%. Equivalently, the afghani appreciated against the U.S. dollar by 129% [(1∕34, 000 − 1∕78, 000)∕(1∕78, 000)].

2.2 Expectations and the Asset Market Model of Exchange Rates Although currency values are affected by current events and current supply and demand flows in the foreign exchange market, they also depend on expectations—or forecasts—about future exchange rate movements. And exchange rate forecasts, as we will see in Chapter 4, are influenced by every conceivable economic, political, and social factor. The role of expectations in determining exchange rates depends on the fact that currencies are financial assets and that an exchange rate is simply the relative price of two financial assets—one country’s currency in terms of another’s. Thus, currency prices are determined in the same manner that the prices of assets such as stocks, bonds, gold, or real estate are determined. Unlike the prices of services or products with short storage lives, asset prices are influenced comparatively little by current events. Rather, they are determined by people’s willingness to hold the existing quantities of assets, which in turn depends on their expectations of the future worth of these assets. Thus, for example, poor weather in France can bump up the price of wine, but it should have little impact on the price of the vineyards producing the wine; instead, longer-term expectations of the demand and supply of wine govern the values of these vineyards. Similarly, the value today of a given currency, say, the euro, depends on whether, and how strongly, people still want the amount of euros and euro-denominated assets they held yesterday. According to this view—known as the asset market model of exchange rate determination—the exchange rate between two currencies represents the price that just balances the relative supplies of, and demands for, assets denominated in those currencies. Consequently, shifts in preferences can lead to massive shifts in currency values. Following the end of the Cold War the United States became the sole global power. Following a brief recession, the U.S. economy recovered and grew rapidly while Japan and Europe largely

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stagnated. Capital was attracted to the United States by the strength of its economy, the high after-tax real rate of return, and the favorable political climate—better conditions to those obtainable elsewhere. Foreigners found the United States to be a safer and more rewarding place in which to invest than elsewhere, so they added many more U.S. assets to their portfolios. In response, the U.S. dollar soared in value against other currencies. The desire to hold a currency today depends critically on expectations of the factors that can affect the currency’s future value; therefore, what matters is not only what is happening today but what markets expect will happen in the future. Thus, currency values are forward looking; they are set by investor expectations of their issuing countries’ future economic prospects rather than by contemporaneous events alone. Moreover, in a world of high capital mobility, the difference between having the right policies and the wrong ones has never been greater. This point is illustrated by the Asian currency crisis of 1997.

Mini-Case

Asian Currencies Sink in 1997

During the second half of 1997, and beginning in Thailand, currencies and stock markets plunged across East Asia, while hundreds of banks, builders, and manufacturers went bankrupt. The Thai baht, Indonesian rupiah, Malaysian ringgit, Philippine peso, and South Korean won depreciated by 40% to 80% apiece. All this happened despite the fact that Asia’s fundamentals looked good: low inflation; balanced budgets; well-run central banks; high domestic savings; strong export industries; a large and growing middle class; a vibrant entrepreneurial class; and industrious, well-trained, and often well-educated workforces paid relatively low wages. But investors were looking past these positives to signs of impending trouble. What they saw was that many East Asian economies were locked on a course that was unsustainable, characterized by large trade deficits, huge short-term foreign debts, overvalued currencies, and financial systems that were rotten at their core. Each of these ingredients played a role in the crisis and its spread from one country to another. Loss of Export Competitiveness. To begin, most East Asian countries depended on exports as their engines of growth and development. Along with Japan, the United States was the most important market for these exports. Partly because of this, many of these countries had tied their currencies to the U.S. dollar. This tie served them well until 1995, promoting low inflation and currency stability. It also boosted exports at the expense of Japan as the dollar fell against the yen, forcing Japanese companies to shift production to East Asia to cope with the

strong yen. Currency stability also led East Asian banks and companies to finance themselves with U.S. dollars, yen, and Deutschmarks—some $275 billion worth, much of it short term—because foreign currency loans carried lower interest rates than did those in their domestic currencies. The party ended in 1995, when the U.S. dollar began recovering against the yen and other currencies. By mid-1997, the dollar had risen by more than 50% against the yen and by 20% against the German mark. Appreciation against the U.S. dollar alone would have made East Asia’s exports less price competitive. But their competitiveness problem was greatly exacerbated by the fact that during this period, the Chinese yuan depreciated by about 25% against the dollar.3 China exported similar products, so the yuan devaluation raised China’s export competitiveness at East Asia’s expense. The loss of export competitiveness slowed down Asian growth and caused profits on huge investments in production capacity to plunge as output fell. It also gave the Asian central banks a mutual incentive to devalue their currencies. According to one theory, recognizing these altered incentives, speculators attacked the East Asian currencies almost simultaneously and forced a round of devaluations.4 3 For

a discussion of the role that the Chinese yuan devaluation played in the Asian crisis, see Kenneth Kasa, “Export Competition and Contagious Currency Crises”, Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, January 16, 1998. 4 See C. Hu and Kenneth Kasa, “A Dynamic Model of Export Competition, Policy Coordination, and Simultaneous Currency Collapse”, working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1997.

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Moral Hazard and Crony Capitalism. Another theory suggests that moral hazard—the tendency to incur risks that one is protected against—lay at the heart of Asia’s financial problems. Specifically, most Asian banks and finance companies operated with implicit or explicit government guarantees. For example, the South Korean government directed the banking system to lend massively to companies and industries that it viewed as economically strategic, with little regard for their profitability. When combined with poor regulation, these guarantees distorted investment decisions, encouraging financial institutions to fund risky projects in the expectation that the banks would enjoy any profits, while sticking the government with any losses. In Asia’s case, the moral hazard problem was compounded by the crony capitalism that was and remains pervasive throughout the region, with lending decisions often dictated more by political and family ties than by economic reality. Billions of dollars in easy-money loans were made to family and friends of the well-connected. Without market discipline or risk-based bank lending, the result was overinvestment—financed by vast quantities of debt—and inflated prices of assets in short supply, such as land.5 This financial bubble will persist as long as the government guarantee is maintained. The inevitable glut of real estate and excess production capacity leads to large amounts of nonperforming loans and widespread loan defaults. When reality strikes, and investors realize that the government does not have the resources to bail out everyone, asset values plummet and the bubble is burst. The decline in asset values triggers further loan defaults, causing a loss of the confidence on which economic activity depends. Investors also worry that the government will try to inflate its way out of its difficulty. The result is a self-reinforcing downward spiral and capital flight. As foreign investors refuse to renew loans and begin to sell off shares of overvalued local companies, capital flight accelerates and the local currency falls, increasing the cost of servicing foreign debts. Local firms and banks scramble to buy foreign exchange before the currency falls further, putting even more downward pressure on the 5 This

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explanation for the Asian crisis is set forth in Paul Krugman, “What Happened to Asia?”, MIT working paper, 1998.

exchange rate. This story explains why stock prices and currency values declined together and why Asian financial institutions were especially hard hit. Moreover, this process is likely to be contagious, as investors search for other countries with similar characteristics. When such a country is found, everyone rushes for the exit simultaneously and another bubble is burst, another currency is sunk. The standard approach of staving off currency devaluation is to raise interest rates, thereby making it more attractive to hold the local currency and increasing capital inflows. However, this approach was problematic for Asian central banks. Raising interest rates boosted the cost of funds to banks and made it more difficult for borrowers to service their debts, thereby further crippling an already sick financial sector. Higher interest rates also lowered real estate values, which served as collateral for many of these loans, and pushed even more loans into default. Thus, Asian central banks found their hands were tied and investors recognized that. The Bubble Bursts. These two stories—loss of export competitiveness and moral hazard in lending combined with crony capitalism—explain the severity of the Asian crisis. Appreciation of the U.S. dollar and depreciation of the yen and yuan slowed down Asian economic growth and hurt corporate profits. These factors turned ill-conceived and overleveraged investments in property developments and industrial complexes into financial disasters. The Asian financial crisis then was touched off when local investors began dumping their own currencies for dollars and foreign lenders refused to renew their loans. It was aggravated by politicians, such as those in Malaysia and South Korea, who preferred to blame foreigners for their problems rather than seek structural reforms of their economies. Both foreign and domestic investors, already unnerved by the currency crisis, lost yet more confidence in these nations and dumped more of their currencies and stocks, driving them to record lows. This synthesized story is consistent with the experience of Taiwan, which is a net exporter of capital and whose savings are largely invested by private capitalists without government direction or guarantees. Taiwanese

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businesses also are financed far less by debt than by equity. In contrast to its Asian competitors, Taiwan suffered minimally during 1997, with the Taiwan dollar (NT$) down by a modest 15% (to counteract its loss of export competitiveness to China and Japan) and its stock market actually up by 17% in NT$ terms. “The way out,” said Confucius, “is through the door.” The clear exit strategy for East Asian countries was to restructure their ailing financial systems by shutting down or selling off failing banks (e.g., to healthy foreign banks) and disposing of the collateral (real estate and industrial properties) underlying their bad loans. Although the restructuring has not gone as far as it needs to, the result so far is fewer but stronger and better-capitalized banks and restructured and consolidated industries and a continuation of East Asia’s strong historical growth record. However, progress has been much slower in reforming bankruptcy laws, a critical element of reform. Simply put, governments must step aside and allow those who borrow too much or lend too foolishly to fail. Ending government guarantees and politically motivated lending would

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transform Asia’s financial sector and force cleaner and more transparent financial transactions. The result would be better investment decisions—decisions driven by market forces rather than personal connections or government whim—and healthier economies that attract capital for the right reasons. Questions 1. What were the origins of the Asian currency crisis? 2. What role did expectations play in the Asian currency crisis? 3. How did the appreciation of the U.S. dollar and depreciation of the yuan affect the timing and magnitude of the Asian currency crisis? 4. What is moral hazard and how did it help cause the Asian currency crisis? 5. Why did so many East Asian companies and banks borrow foreign currencies instead of their local currencies to finance their operations? What risks were they exposing themselves to?

The Nature of Money and Currency Values To understand the factors that affect currency values, it helps to examine the special character of money. To begin, money has value because people are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services. The value of money, therefore, depends on its purchasing power. Money also provides liquidity—that is, you can readily exchange it for goods or other assets, thereby facilitating economic transactions. Thus, money represents both a store of value and a store of liquidity. The demand for money, therefore, depends on money’s ability to maintain its value and on the level of economic activity. Hence, the lower the expected inflation rate, the more money people will demand. Similarly, higher economic growth means more transactions and a greater demand for money to pay bills. The demand for money is also affected by the demand for assets denominated in that currency. The higher the expected real return and the lower the riskiness of a country’s assets, the greater is the demand for its currency to buy those assets. In addition, as people who prefer assets denominated in that currency (usually residents of the country) accumulate wealth, the value of the currency rises. Because the exchange rate reflects the relative demands for two moneys, factors that increase the demand for the home currency should also increase the price of the home currency on the foreign exchange market. In summary, the economic factors that affect a currency’s foreign exchange value include its usefulness as a store of value, determined by its expected rate of inflation; the demand for liquidity, determined by the volume of transactions in that currency; and the demand for assets denominated in that currency, determined by the risk-return pattern on investment in that nation’s economy and by the wealth of its residents. The first factor depends primarily on the country’s future

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monetary policy, whereas the latter two factors depend largely on expected economic growth and political and economic stability. All three factors ultimately depend on the soundness of the nation’s economic policies. The sounder these policies, the more valuable the nation’s currency will be; conversely, the more uncertain a nation’s future economic and political course, the riskier its assets will be, and the more depressed and volatile its currency’s value.

Application

Emerging Market Currency Turmoil Hits India

In the summer of 2013, the mere hint that the Federal Reserve, the central bank for the United States, was planning to reduce its quantitative easing program, was sufficient to send emerging market currencies into turmoil. The Indian rupee, Brazilian real, Turkish lira, South African rand, and Indonesian rupiah all significantly weakened against the U.S. dollar. Although some governments intervened in their foreign exchange markets, for instance, Indonesia and Turkey used currency reserves to stabilise their exchange rates, unlike the Asian financial crisis of 1997, none of the affected countries was defending a pegged exchange rate, so after a period of volatility, with some exceptions, the currencies were able to adjust to the changed economic conditions. With the end of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve (colloquially dubbed by the market the “Great Exit”), key interest rates in the United States were expected to rise and hence make U.S. dollar-denominated assets more attractive compared to those of emerging markets. While interest rates in the United States were kept low by the Federal Reserve’s actions, assets in other countries and in the relatively high growth emerging market countries in particular, had become relatively attractive. For instance, it was estimated that foreign portfolio investors held over US$200 billion in the Indian stock market alone. The arrival of the Great Exit after so many rounds of quantitative easing would have implications for the demand for emerging market currencies, particularly from foreign portfolio investors, as investments were switched to the relatively more attractive U.S. market. This would mean a sudden reversal of the currency flows that had sustained many emerging market currencies and the Indian rupee in particular. In the ensuing emerging market currency turmoil the Indian rupee was particularly hard hit. The exchange rate

went from a steady value of around 54 rupees to the U.S. dollar for the first five months of 2013 to peak at over 68 rupees to the dollar by September 2013. One reason was the decision by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the central bank, not to raise interest rates in response to currency depreciation, as both Brazil and Indonesia had. While India was a member of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) group of nations that represented the most promising emerging market countries at the start of the 21st century, it had particular problems of its own. In the run-up to the depreciation of the rupee in 2013, GDP growth had slowed, having fallen to 4.4% in June 2013 from 4.8% in the previous quarter. On the other hand, inflation was significant at 10% for the consumer price index, although somewhat lower at 6% for manufactured goods. So there was a case for raising interest rates to combat inflation but with a weakening economy, this would further depress growth. Another factor that mitigated against an interest rate hike was the weakness in the Indian banking system where banks held an abnormal number of bad debts. To add to India’s woes, the economy was mired in red tape, the country faced an imminent election, and hence was unlikely in the short term to put forward proposals for much needed economic reforms that would boost the economy. In September, Raghuram Rajan, a University of Chicago economics professor, who had previously worked for the International Monetary Fund and in the previous year acted as economic advisor to the government, became governor of the RBI with a mandate to address India’s economic woes. This meant addressing banks’ rotten balance sheets and the significant number of nonperforming loans they held as well as supporting the ailing rupee. He reiterated that the RBI’s main objective would be to control prices and facilitate growth and

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stability. However, the central bank would have limited success on its own, if the government did not reign in borrowing, which was running at 7% of GDP and had been responsible for stoking excess demand and hence widening the current account deficit. The central bank quickly put in place actions to make the currency more attractive for foreign investors, improve the banking system, and provide clarity as to how the RBI set interest rates. However, to provide stability to the currency required a coordinated response from both the central bank and the government.

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Consequently, as the Great Exit neared, India faced difficult policy decisions. Either let the rupee depreciate further, which was likely to import inflation and push up an already high inflation rate, or raise interest rates. But raising interest rates would further dampen an already slowing economy, adversely affect industrial output, which was already contracting, and further stress an already fragile banking system through additional bad debts. A change in foreign demand for the rupee had placed India in an unenviable position.

INR/USD INRUSD=X

22 Jan, 2014

0.0190 0.0185 0.0180 0.0175 0.0170 0.0165 0.0160 0.0155 0.0150 0.0145

Mar-13

May-13

Jul-13

Sep-13

Nov-13

Jan-14

FIGURE 2.4 The Indian Rupee Against the U.S. Dollar Source: ©Yahoo UK & Ireland.

Central Bank Reputations and Currency Values As the example of India indicates, another critical determinant of currency values is central bank behavior. A central bank is the nation’s official monetary authority; its job is to use the instruments of monetary policy, including the sole power to create money, to achieve one or more of the following objectives: price stability, low interest rates, or a target currency value. As such, the central bank affects the risk associated with holding money. This risk is inextricably linked to the nature of a fiat money, which is nonconvertible paper money. Until 1971, every major currency was linked to a commodity. Today, no major currency is linked to a commodity. With a commodity base, usually gold, there was a stable, long-term anchor to the price level. Prices varied a great deal in the short term, but they eventually returned to where they had been. With a fiat money, there is no anchor to the price level—that is, there is no standard of value that investors can use to find out what the currency’s future value might be. Instead, a currency’s value is

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largely determined by the central bank through its control of the money supply. If the central bank creates too much money, inflation will occur and the value of money will fall and this will be reflected in the exchange rate. Expectations of central bank behavior also will affect exchange rates today; a currency will decline if people think the central bank will expand the money supply in the future. Viewed this way, money becomes a brand-name product whose value is backed by the reputation of the central bank that issues it. And just as reputations among automobiles vary—from the Jaguar to the Dacian—so currencies come backed by a range of quality reputations—from the Swiss franc, Japanese yen, and U.S. dollar on the high side to the Thai baht, Russian ruble, and Turkmenistan mena on the low side. Underlying these reputations is trust in the willingness of the central bank to maintain price stability. The high-quality currencies are those expected to maintain their purchasing power because they are issued by reputable central banks. A reputable central bank is one that the markets trust to do the right thing, and not merely the politically expedient thing, when it comes to monetary policy. This trust, in turn, comes from history: reputable banks, such as the Swiss National Bank, have developed their credibility by having done hard, cruel, and painful things for years in order to fight inflation. In contrast, the low-quality currencies are those that bear little assurance that their purchasing power will be maintained. As in the car market, high-quality currencies sell at a premium, and low-quality currencies sell at a discount (relative to their values based on economic fundamentals alone). That is, investors demand a risk premium to hold a riskier currency, whereas safer currencies will be worth more than their economic fundamentals would indicate. Price Stability and Central Bank Independence. Because good reputations are slow to build and quick to disappear, many economists recommend that central banks adopt rules for price stability that are verifiable, unambiguous, and enforceable—along with the independence and accountability necessary to realize this goal.6 Focus is also important. A central bank whose responsibilities are limited to price stability is more likely to achieve this goal. For example, the Swiss National Bank—a model for many economists—managed to maintain such a low rate of inflation in Switzerland because of its commitment to price stability. Absent such rules, the natural accountability of central banks to government becomes an avenue for political influence. For example, even though the U.S. Federal Reserve is an independent central bank, its legal responsibility to pursue both full employment and price stability (aims that conflict in the short term) can hinder its effectiveness in fighting inflation. The greater scope for political influence in central banks that do not have a clear mandate to pursue price stability will in turn add to the perception of inflation risk. This perception stems from the fact that government officials and other critics routinely exhort the central bank to follow “easier” monetary policies, by which they mean boosting the money supply to lower interest rates. These exhortations arise because many people believe that (1) the central bank can trade off a higher rate of inflation for more economic growth and (2) the central bank determines the rate of interest independently of the rate of inflation and other economic conditions. Despite the questionable merits of these beliefs, central banks—particularly those that are not independent—often respond to these demands by expanding the money supply. Central banks that lack independence are also often forced to monetize the deficit, which means financing the public sector deficit by buying government debt with newly created money. Whether monetary expansion stems from economic stimulus or deficit financing, it inevitably leads to higher inflation and a devalued currency. Independent central bankers, on the other hand, are better able to avoid interference from politicians concerned by short-term economic fluctuations. With independence, a central bank can credibly 6 See,

for example, W. Lee Hoskins, “A European System of Central Banks: Observations from Abroad”, Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November 15, 1990.

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commit itself to a low-inflation monetary policy and stick to it. Absent such a credible commitment, households and businesses will rationally anticipate that monetary policy would have an inflationary bias, resulting in high inflation becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.7 The link between central bank independence and sound monetary policies is borne out by the empirical evidence.8 Figure 2.5 shows that countries whose central banks are less subject to government intervention tend to have lower and less volatile inflation rates and vice versa. The 10

Inflation rate (%)

8

Spain New Zealand

6 4

Australia United Kingdom Denmark Sweden France Canada Japan Belgium Netherlands

Italy

United States Switzerland Germany

2 0 –1.5

–1.0

–0.5

0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

Independence index (a) Central Bank Independence versus Inflation 1.5

Japan

Economic growth (%)

1.0

Canada United States

.5

–1.0 –2.0

Germany Norway

0 –0.5

Switzerland

Italy

New Zealand

–1.5

–1.0

France Netherlands Belgium Sweden Australia Denmark Spain United Kingdom –.5

0

.5

1.0

1.5

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2.0

Independence index (b) Central Bank Independence versus Economic Growth

FIGURE 2.5 Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Economic Growth* *

Inflation and economic growth rates calculated for the period 1951–1988. Source: Adapted from J. Bradford Delong and Lawrence H. Summers. “Macroeconomic Policy and Long-Run Growth,” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Fourth Quarter 1992, pp. 14–16.

7 In 2004, Edward Prescott and Finn Kydland won the Nobel Prize in economics for, among other things, their insights into the relationship between central bank credibility and a low-inflation monetary policy. 8 See, for example, Alberto Alesina, “Macroeconomics and Politics”, in NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 1988 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).

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central banks of Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, identified as the most independent in the post-World War II era, also showed the lowest inflation rates from 1951 to 1988. Least independent were the central banks of Italy, New Zealand, and Spain, countries wracked by the highest inflation rates in the industrial world. Moreover, Figure 2.5 indicates that this lower inflation rate is not achieved at the expense of economic growth; rather, central bank independence and economic growth seem to go together. The idea that central bank independence can help establish a credible monetary policy is being put into practice today, as countries that have been plagued with high inflation rates are enacting legislation to reshape their conduct of monetary policy. For example, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Canada, Chile, and Bolivia have all passed laws that mandate an explicit inflation goal or that give their central banks more independence. To ensure a credible monetary policy following European Monetary Union, in setting up the European Central Bank, Eurozone

Application

Inflation Dies Down Under

Inflation (change in Consumer Price Index)

In Germany and Switzerland, long seen as bastions of sound money, inflation rose during the early 1990s. However, Australia and New Zealand, so often afflicted by high inflation, boasted the lowest rates among the nations comprising the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which consists of all the industrialized nations in the world (see Figure 2.6). The cure was simple: restrict the supply of Australian and New Zealand dollars. To increase the likelihood that it would stick to its guns, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was made fully independent in 1990 and its governor, Donald Brash, was held accountable for cutting inflation to 0% − 2% by December 1993. Failure carried a high personal cost: he would lose his job. Figure 2.6 shows why Mr. Brash kept his job; by 1993, inflation had fallen

to 1.3%, and it has since then held at about 2%. At the same time, growth averaged a rapid 4% a year. The job of New Zealand’s central banker was made easier by the government’s decision to dismantle one of the OECD’s most taxed, regulated, protectionist, and comprehensive welfare states and transform it into one of the most free-market oriented. By slashing welfare programs and stimulating economic growth through its market reforms and tax and tariff cuts, the government converted its traditionally large budget deficit into a budget surplus and ended the need to print money to finance it. To ensure continued fiscal sobriety, in 1994 parliament passed the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which mandates budgetary balance over the business cycle.

0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12

New Zealand

0.1 Australia

0.08 0.06 0.04

OECD

0.02 0 –0.02 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FIGURE 2.6 Inflation Dies Down Under Source: International Financial Statistics and OECD, various years.

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countries made it independent and specifically made price stability its primary objective. The result of these policies and the focus on creating credible institutions by granting central banks independence and substituting rules for discretion over monetary policy has caused inflation to abate worldwide.

Application

The Bank of England Gains Independence expectations of investors.9 Figure 2.7 shows how the expected inflation rate embodied in three different index-linked gilts—maturing in 2001, 2006, and 2016—responded to the Chancellor’s announcement of independence. Over the two-week period surrounding the announcement, the expected inflation rate dropped by 0.60% for the 2016 gilt and by somewhat less for the shorter-maturity gilts. These results indicate that the market perceived that enhanced central bank independence would lead to lower future inflation rates. Consistent with our earlier discussion on the inverse relation between inflation and currency values, the British pound jumped in value against the U.S. dollar and the Deutschmark on the day of the announcement. 9 The

methodology used to compute these inflation expectations is described in detail in Mark M. Spiegel, “Central Bank Independence and Inflation Expectations: Evidence from British Index-Linked Gilts”, Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (1998, No. 1): 3–14.

4/28 5/6 5/13

On May 6, 1997, within days of the Labour Party’s landslide victory, Britain’s new Chancellor of the Exchequer announced a policy change that he described as “the most radical internal reform to the Bank of England since it was established in 1694.” The reform granted the Bank of England independence from the government in the conduct of monetary policy, meaning that it was now free to pursue its policy goals without political interference and charged it with the task of keeping inflation to 2.5%. The decision was a surprise, coming as it did from the Labour Party, a party with a strong socialist history that traditionally was unsympathetic to low-inflation policies, which it viewed as destructive of jobs. Investors responded to the news by revising downward their expectations of future British inflation. This favorable reaction can be seen by examining the performance of index-linked gilts, which are British government bonds that pay an interest rate that varies with the British inflation rate. One can use the prices of these gilts to estimate the inflation

Inflation expectations embedded in British gilt yields

0.042 Inflation expectations embedded in gilts maturing in 2001 2006 2016

0.040

0.038 Date of announcement that Bank of England would gain independence

0.036

0.034 One week before the announcement 0.032 One week after the announcement 0.030 1-Feb

1-Mar

1-Apr

1-May

1-Jun

1-Jul

FIGURE 2.7 British Inflation Expectations Fall as the Bank of England Gains Its Independence Source: Mark M. Spiegel. “British Central Bank Independence and Inflation Expectations,” FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, November 28, 1997.

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Evidence that even the announcement of greater central bank independence can boost the credibility of monetary policy comes from England. This example shows that institutional change alone can have a significant impact on future expected inflation rates. Currency Boards. Some countries, such as Argentina, Hong Kong, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Lithuania, have gone even further and established what is in effect a currency board. Under a currency board system, there is no central bank. Instead, the currency board issues notes and coins that are convertible on demand and at a fixed rate into a foreign reserve currency. As reserves, the currency board holds high-quality, interest-bearing securities denominated in the reserve currency. Its reserves are equal to 100%, or slightly more, of its notes and coins in circulation. The board has no discretionary monetary policy. Instead, market forces alone determine the money supply. Over the past 150 years, more than 70 countries (mainly former British colonies) have had currency boards. As long as they kept their boards, all of those countries had the same rate of inflation as the country issuing the reserve currency and successfully maintained convertibility at a fixed exchange rate into the reserve currency; no board has ever devalued its currency against its anchor currency. Currency boards are successfully operating today in Hong Kong and Lithuania. Argentina dropped its currency board in January 2002. Estonia adopted the euro as its currency in January 2011. In addition to promoting price stability, a currency board also compels government to follow a responsible fiscal (spending and tax) policy. If the budget is not balanced, the government must convince the private sector to lend to it; it no longer has the option of forcing the central bank to monetize the deficit. By establishing a monetary authority that is independent of the government and is committed to a conservative monetary policy, currency boards are likely to promote confidence in a country’s currency. Such confidence is especially valuable for emerging economies with a past history of profligate monetary and fiscal policies. The downside of a currency board is that a run on the currency forces a sharp contraction in the money supply and a jump in interest rates. High interest rates slow economic activity, increase bankruptcies, and batter real estate and financial markets. For example, Hong Kong’s currency board weathered the Asian storm and delivered a stable currency but at the expense of high interest rates (300% at one point in October 1997), plummeting stock and real estate markets, and deflation. Short of breaking the Hong Kong dollar’s peg to the U.S. dollar, the government can do nothing about deflation. Instead of being able to ease monetary policy and cut interest rates during a downturn, Hong Kong must allow wages and prices to decline and wait for the global economy to recover and boost demand for the city’s goods and services. Argentina, on the other hand, abandoned its currency board in an attempt to deal with its recession. One lesson from Argentina’s failed currency board experiment is that exchange rate arrangements are no substitute for good macroeconomic policy. The latter takes discipline and a willingness to say no to special interests. The peso and its currency board collapsed once domestic and foreign investors determined that Argentina’s fiscal policies were unsound, unlikely to improve, and incompatible with the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate. Another lesson is that a nation cannot be forced to maintain a currency arrangement that has outlived its usefulness. As such, no fixed exchange rate system, no matter how strong it appears, is completely sound and credible. Dollarization. The ultimate commitment to monetary credibility and a currency as good as the dollar is dollarization—the complete replacement of the local currency with the U.S. dollar. The desirability of dollarization depends on whether monetary discipline is easier to maintain by abandoning the local currency altogether than under a system in which the local currency circulates but is backed by the U.S. dollar. The experience of Panama with dollarization is instructive. Dollarization began in Panama more than 100 years ago, in 1904. Annual inflation averaged 1% from 1987 to 2007,

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lower than in the United States; there is no local currency risk; and 30-year mortgages are readily available. These are unusual conditions for a developing country, and they stem from dollarization.

Mini-Case

Argentina’s Bold Currency Experiment and Its Demise

Argentina, once the world’s seventh-largest economy, has long been considered one of Latin America’s worst basket cases. Starting with Juan Peron, who was first elected president in 1946, and for decades after, profligate government spending financed by a compliant central bank that printed money to cover the chronic budget deficits had triggered a vicious cycle of inflation and devaluation. High taxes and excessive controls compounded Argentina’s woes and led to an overregulated, arthritic economy. However, in 1991, after the country had suffered nearly 50 years of economic mismanagement, President Carlos Menem and his fourth Minister of Economy, Domingo Cavallo, launched the Convertibility Act. (The first Minister of Economy, Miguel Roig, took one look at the economy and died of a heart attack six days into the job.) This act made the austral (the Argentine currency) fully convertible at a fixed rate of 10,000 australs to the U.S. dollar, and by law the monetary supply had to be 100% backed by gold and foreign currency reserves, mostly U.S. dollars. This link to gold and the U.S. dollar imposed a straitjacket on monetary policy. If, for example, the central bank had to sell dollars to support the currency, the money supply automatically shrank. Better still, the government could no longer print money to finance a budget deficit. In January 1992, the government knocked four zeros off the austral and renamed it the peso, worth exactly $1. By effectively locking Argentina into the U.S. monetary system, the Convertibility Act had remarkable success in restoring confidence in the peso and providing an anchor for inflation expectations. Inflation fell from more than 2,300% in 1990 to 170% in 1991 and 4% in 1994 (see Figure 2.8). By 1997, the inflation rate was 0.4%, among the lowest in the world. Argentine capital transferred overseas to escape Argentina’s hyperinflation began to come home. It spurred rapid economic growth and led to a rock-solid currency. In response to the good economic news, stock prices quintupled, in U.S.dollar terms, during the first year of the plan. And the price of Argentina’s foreign debt rose from 13% of its face value in 1990 to 45% in 1992.

The likelihood that the Convertibility Act marked a permanent change in Argentina and would not be revoked at a later date—an important consideration for investors—was increased by the other economic actions the Argentine government took to reinforce its commitment to price stability and economic growth: it deregulated its economy, sold off money-losing state-owned businesses to the private sector, cut taxes and red tape, opened its capital markets, and lowered barriers to trade. In September 1994, the Argentine government announced a sweeping privatization plan designed to sell off all remaining state-owned enterprises—including the national mint, the postal service, and the country’s main airports. Since then, however, the Argentine economy suffered from a series of external shocks and internal problems. External shocks included falling prices for its agricultural commodities, the Mexican peso crisis in late 1994, the Asian currency crisis of 1997, and the Russian and Brazilian financial crises of 1998–1999. These financial shocks led investors to reassess the risk of emerging markets and to withdraw their capital from Argentina as well as the countries in crisis. The devaluation of the Brazilian real in early 1999—which increased the cost of Argentine goods in Brazil and reduced the cost of Brazilian goods to Argentines—hurt Argentina because of the strong trade ties between the two countries. Similarly, the strong appreciation of the U.S. dollar in the late 1990s made Argentina’s products less competitive, both at home and abroad, against those of its trading partners whose currencies were not tied to the dollar. Internal problems revolved around rigid labor laws that make it costly to lay off Argentine workers and excessive spending by the Argentine government. In a decade that saw GDP rise 50%, public spending rose 90%. Initially, the growth in government spending was funded by privatization proceeds. When these proceeds ran out, the government turned to tax increases and heavy borrowing. The result was massive fiscal deficits, a rising debt burden, high unemployment, economic stagnation, capital flights, and a restive population.

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3500% 3080% Consumer price inflation in Argentina

3000% 2500%

2316%

2000% 1500% 1000% 627%672% 500%

344% 101% 105% 165%

343% 90% 132%

0% –500%

172%

25% 11% 4% 3% 0% 0% 1% –1% –1% –2%

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FIGURE 2.8 Argentina Ends Hyperinflation Source: International Financial Statistics, various issues. On June 14, 2001, Domingo Cavallo, finance minister for a new Argentine president, announced a dramatic change in policy to stimulate Argentina’s slumping economy, then in its fourth year of recession. Henceforth, the peso exchange rate for exporters and importers would be an average of a U.S. dollar and a euro, that is, P1 = $0.50 + €0.50. With the euro then trading at about $0.85, exporters would now receive around 8% more pesos for the U.S. dollars they exchanged and importers would have to pay around 8% more for the dollars they bought. Financial markets panicked, fearing that this change was but a prelude to abandonment of the currency board. In response, Cavallo said that his new policy just amounted to a subsidy for exporters and a surcharge on imports and not an attempt to devalue the peso. Over the next six months, Argentina’s bold currency experiment unraveled amidst political and economic chaos brought about by the failure of Argentine politicians to rein in spending and to reform the country’s labor laws. During the two-week period ending January 1, 2002, Argentina had five different presidents and suspended payments on its $132 billion in public debt, the largest sovereign debt default in history. On January 6, 2002, President Eduardo Duhalde announced that he

would end Argentina’s decade-long currency board system. The collapse of the currency board had devastating consequences. Over the next week, the Argentine peso plunged by 50% against the U.S. dollar. By year’s end, the peso had depreciated 70%, the government had imposed a draconian banking freeze that sparked violent rioting, and a severe economic contraction took the Argentine economy back to 1993 levels. In effect, forced to choose between the economic liberalization and fiscal discipline that was necessary to save its currency board and the failed economic policies of Peronism, Argentina ultimately chose the latter and wound up with a disaster. Questions 1. What was the impetus for Argentina’s currency board system? 2. How successful was Argentina’s currency board? 3. What led to the downfall of Argentina’s currency board? 4. What lessons can we learn from the experience of Argentina’s currency board?

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Daily exchange rates: Ecuadoran sucre per U.S. dollar

2.2 Expectations and the Asset Market Model of Exchange Rates 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000 22500 25000 27500

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

FIGURE 2.9 Dollarization Stabilizes the Sucre Source: Pacific Exchange Rate Service, pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr/plot.html.©2000 by Prof. Werner Antweiler, University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC, Canada. Time period shown in diagram: Jan. 1, 1999–Sep. 9, 2000.

Of course, dollarization means that the government loses control over monetary policy with its attendant costs. One such cost is the inability of a central bank to act as a lender of last resort to banks and other institutions that cannot obtain credit elsewhere and the collapse of which would do serious harm to the economy.10 The central bank is also unable to raise or lower interest rates or change the exchange rate to adjust to economic shocks. Another downside of dollarization is the loss of seignorage, the central bank’s profit on the currency it prints. However, these costs are acceptable if the alternative is monetary chaos. That is what Ecuador decided in 2000. Ecuador’s new government—faced with a plunging currency, accelerating capital flight, a bankrupt banking system, huge budget deficits, in default to foreign creditors, and with its economy in a nosedive—unveiled an economic reform package on January 9, 2000. The centerpiece of that program was the planned replacement of the currency it had used for the past 116 years, the sucre, with the U.S. dollar. As Figure 2.9 demonstrates, the announcement of dollarization was enough, by itself, to stabilize the foreign exchange market. The next day, the sucre traded at the new official level of 25,000 per U.S. dollar. It remained there, despite nationwide strikes and two changes of government, until September 9, 2000, when Ecuador officially replaced the sucre with the U.S. dollar. During the period leading up to that date, some capital returned to Ecuador and the economy began to grow again. Dollarization by itself, of course, is no guarantee of economic success. It can provide price stability; however, like a currency board, it is not a substitute for sound economic policies. Even

10

The lender of last resort is usually the central bank, a role filled in the United States by the Federal Reserve, by the Bank of England in the UK, and in the Eurozone by the European Central Bank. Its object, as evidenced by these central banks’ actions during the recent global financial crisis, is to preserve the stability of the banking and financial system by preventing bank runs and ensuring the flow of productive credit to the economy.

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the United States, which by definition is dollarized, has its economic ups and downs. To achieve stable economic growth, what is needed are the types of political and economic reforms discussed in Chapter 6. But what dollarization can do is provide the macroeconomic stability that will enhance the impact of these reforms. Montenegro, which was part of the former Yugoslavia, uses a variant of dollarization that is more suited to its needs. It unilaterally adopted the euro, the currency of the Eurozone and the majority of its trading partners, as its currency. At some point, though, it is expected it will officially join the European Monetary Union and be part of the monetary union. Expectations and Currency Values. The importance of expectations and central bank reputations in determining currency values was dramatically illustrated on June 2, 1987, when the financial markets learned that Paul Volcker was resigning as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Within seconds after this news appeared on the ubiquitous video screens used by traders to watch the world, both the price of the U.S. dollar on foreign exchange markets and the prices of bonds began a steep decline. By day’s end, the U.S. dollar had fallen 2.6% against the Japanese yen, and the price of U.S. Treasury bonds declined by 2.3%—one of the largest one-day declines ever. The price of corporate bonds fell by a similar amount. All told, the value of U.S. bonds fell by more than $100 billion. The response by the financial markets reveals the real forces that are setting the value of the U.S. dollar and interest rates under the U.S. monetary system. On that day, there was no other economic news of note. There was no news about American competitiveness. There was no change in Federal Reserve policy or inflation statistics; nor was there any change in the size of the budget deficit, the trade deficit, or the growth rate of the U.S. economy. What actually happened on that announcement day? Foreign exchange traders and investors simply became less certain of the path U.S. monetary policy would take in the days and years ahead. Volcker was a known inflation fighter. Alan Greenspan, the incoming Federal Reserve chairman, was an unknown quantity. The possibility that he would emphasize growth over price stability raised the specter of a more expansive monetary policy. Because the natural response to risk is to hold less of the asset whose risk has risen, investors tried to reduce their holdings of U.S. dollars and U.S. dollar-denominated bonds, driving down their prices in the process. The import of what happened on June 2, 1987, is that prices of the U.S. dollar and those billions of U.S. dollars in bonds were changed by nothing more or less than investors changing their collective assessment of what actions the Federal Reserve would or would not take. A critical lesson for businesspeople and policymakers alike surfaces: a shift in the trust that people have for a currency can change its value now by changing its expected value in the future. The level of interest rates is also affected by trust in the future value of money. All else being equal, the greater the trust in the promise that money will maintain its purchasing power, the lower interest rates will be. This theory is formalized in Chapter 4 as the Fisher effect.

Application

Sudan Devalues Its Pound

In September 2013, the Sudan central bank quietly devalued the Sudanese pound against the U.S. dollar by a quarter, the second such devaluation in little over a year as the country struggled with a shortage of foreign currency. Faced with a lack of hard currency, the central bank had to act to reduce the differential between the official exchange rate and the black market rate. The black market rate was

signaling that the Sudanese pound was significantly overvalued against the U.S. dollar. Sudan’s currency problems stemmed from the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the loss of its major source of foreign exchange from oil exports. Up to the split, oil had been the major driver for the economy and the principal source of foreign currency to pay for food

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and other essential imports. The country was unable to produce enough food domestically to feed its growing population of 32 million. An underlying reason for the devaluation was the sharp fall in the price of gold, Sudan’s other foreign currency earner, on the global market. At the start of 2013, the gold price was US$54, 050 per kilo, by September it had fallen to US$41, 440 per kilo, a drop of over 23%. Consequenlty, the 2013 revenues for Sudan would be significantly less than the US$2.2 billion it had earned in 2012.

Mini-Case

73

In 2011, the officially exchange rate was about 3 Sudanese pounds to the U.S. dollar; it was devalued in 2012 to 4.4 to the dollar, and was now at 5.7 Sudanese pounds to the U.S. dollar. The reason the central bank was forced to devalue was due to the black market where the rate against the U.S. dollar was 7.8 Sudanese pounds. This unofficial rate had become the benchmark exchange rate for banks and firms due to the limited availability of U.S. dollars at the official exchange rate.

The U.S. Dollar Sells Off

On September 3, 2003, the finance ministers of the Group of Seven (G7)11 industrialized countries endorsed “flexibility” in exchange rates, a code word widely regarded as an encouragement for China and Japan to stop managing their currencies. Both countries had been actively intervening in the foreign exchange market to weaken their currencies against the dollar and thereby improve their exports. China and Japan had been seen buying billions of dollars in U.S. Treasury bonds. The G7 statement prompted massive selling of the U.S. dollar and dollar 11 The

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G7 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

assets. The dollar fell 2% against the yen, the biggest one-day drop that year, and U.S. Treasury bonds saw a steep decline in value as well. Questions 1. How did China and Japan manage to weaken their currencies against the U.S. dollar? 2. Why did the U.S. dollar and U.S. Treasury bonds fall in response to the G7 statement? 3. What is the link between currency intervention and China and Japan buying U.S. Treasury bonds? 4. What risks do China and Japan face from their currency intervention?

2.3 The Fundamentals of Central Bank Intervention The exchange rate is one of the most important prices in a country because it links the domestic economy and the rest-of-world economy. As such, it affects relative national competitiveness.

How Real Exchange Rates Affect Relative Competitiveness We have already seen the link between exchange rate changes and relative inflation rates. The important point for now is that an appreciation of the exchange rate beyond that necessary to offset the inflation differential between two countries raises the price of domestic goods relative to the price of foreign goods. This rise in the real or inflation-adjusted exchange rate—measured as the nominal (or actual) exchange rate adjusted for changes in relative price levels—proves to be a mixed blessing. For example, the rise in the value of the euro against other currencies in 2012 and 2013 translated directly into a reduction in the euro prices of imported goods and raw materials. As a result, the prices

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of imports and of products that compete with imports began to ease. This development contributed significantly to the slowing of inflation in the Eurozone over the period. However, the rising euro had some distinctly negative consequences for the economies of the Eurozone as well. Declining euro prices of imports had their counterpart in the increasing foreign currency prices of Eurozone products sold abroad. As a result, exports from the Eurozone became less competitive in world markets, and Eurozone-made import substitutes became less competitive in the Eurozone. Domestic sales of traded goods declined, generating unemployment in the traded-goods sector and inducing a shift in resources from the traded- to the non-traded-goods sector of the economy. Alternatively, home currency depreciation results in a more competitive traded-goods sector, stimulating domestic employment and inducing a shift in resources from the non-traded- to the traded-goods sector. The bad part is that currency weakness also results in higher prices for imported goods and services, eroding living standards and worsening domestic inflation. Figure 2.10 presents the various advantages and disadvantages of a strong euro and a weak euro. Figure 2.11 charts the value of the euro against the U.S. dollar from 1999 to 2013.

Foreign Exchange Market Intervention Depending on their economic goals, some governments will prefer an overvalued domestic currency, whereas others will prefer an undervalued currency. Still others just want a correctly valued currency, but economic policymakers may feel that the exchange rate set by the market is irrational; that is, they feel they can better judge the correct exchange rate than can the market. The tradeoffs faced by governments in terms of their exchange rate objectives are illustrated by the example of China’s yuan (a unit of the renminbi currency). Strong Euro Advantages

Disadvantages

Euro prices of imported goods, services, and raw materials are lower, benefiting consumers. Lower import prices help hold down prices of competing Eurozone products, which reduces domestic inflation. Cost to Eurozone firms and individuals of foreign investment is lower. Foreign capital attracted to a strong currency leads to lower Eurozone interest rates.

Eurozone exports become less competitive in foreign markets. Eurozone firms face more competition domestically from lower-priced foreign imports.

Advantages

Disadvantages

Eurozone exports become more competitive in foreign markets. Eurozone firms are more competitive domestically against higher-priced foreign imports.

Prices of imported goods, services, and raw materials in euros are higher, hurting consumers. Reduced price competition from imports leads to higher prices of competing Eurozone products, which increases inflation in the Eurozone. The cost to U.S. firms and individuals of foreign investment is higher. Foreign capital fleeing a weak currency leads to higher Eurozone interest rates.

The Eurozone loses jobs in the traded-goods sector.

Higher cost of operating in the Eurozone reduces foreign direct investment in the Eurozone, slowing job creation by foreign firms. Weak Euro

The Eurozone gains jobs in the traded-goods sector. Lower cost of operating in the Eurozone increases foreign direct investment in the Eurozone, boosting job creation by foreign firms.

FIGURE 2.10 Advantages and Disadvantages of a Strong Euro and a Weak Euro

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1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

FIGURE 2.11 The Value of the Euro Versus the U.S. Dollar: 1999–2013 Source: European Central Bank statistics.

Mini-Case

A Yen for Yuan

On April 6, 2005, the U.S. Senate voted 67 to 33 to impose a 27.5% tariff on all Chinese products entering the United States if Beijing did not agree to revalue the yuan by a like amount. Almost two years earlier, on September 2, 2003, U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow had traveled to Beijing to lobby his Chinese counterparts to revalue what was then and still is widely regarded as an undervalued yuan. In the eyes of U.S. manufacturers and labor unions, a cheap yuan gives China’s exports an unfair price advantage over competing American products in the world market and is part of a mercantilist strategy designed to favor Chinese industry at the expense of foreign competitors. A consequence of this strategy is an accelerating movement of manufacturing jobs to China. One piece of evidence of this problem was the widening U.S. trade deficit with China, which reached $162 billion in 2004 (on about $200 billion in total imports from China). Similarly, Japan, South Korea, and many European and other nations were pushing for China to abandon its fixed exchange rate because a weak U.S. dollar, which automatically lowered the yuan against other currencies, was making already inexpensive Chinese goods unfairly cheap on global markets, hurting their own exports. China rejected calls for it to revalue its currency and said it would maintain the stability of the yuan. Since 1998, China has fixed its exchange rate at 8.28 yuan to

the U.S. dollar. During 2004, the U.S. dollar depreciated significantly against the euro, giving Chinese companies a competitive advantage against European manufacturers. A massive rise in China’s foreign exchange reserves (reserves rose 47% in 2004, to reach $609.9 billion by the end of the year) is evidence that the Chinese government had been holding its currency down artificially. Politicians and businesspeople in the United States and elsewhere have been calling for the yuan to be revalued, which it almost certainly would in a free market. (Economists estimated that in 2005 the yuan was undervalued by 20% to 30% against the U.S. dollar.) The Chinese government has resisted the clamor for yuan revaluation because of the serious problems it faces. As the country becomes more market oriented, its money-losing state-owned enterprises must lay off millions of workers. Only flourishing businesses can absorb this surplus labor. The Chinese government is concerned that allowing the yuan to appreciate would stifle the competitiveness of its exports, hurt farmers by making agricultural imports cheaper, and imperil the country’s fragile banking system, resulting in millions of unemployed and disgruntled Chinese wandering the countryside and threatening the stability of its regime. It also justified a weak yuan as a means of fighting the threat of deflation.

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Nonetheless, keeping China’s currency peg is not risk free. Foreign currency inflows are rising as investors, many of whom are ordinary Chinese bringing overseas capital back home, bet that China will be forced to revalue its yuan. They are betting on the yuan by purchasing Chinese stocks, real estate, and government bonds. To maintain its fixed exchange rate, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) must sell yuan to buy up all these foreign currency inflows. This intervention boosts China’s foreign exchange reserves but at the expense of a surging yuan money supply, which rose 19.6% in 2003 and 14.6% in 2004. For a time, a rising domestic money supply seemed an appropriate response to an economy that appeared to be on the verge of deflation. More recently, however, rapid money supply growth has threatened inflation and led to roaring asset prices, leading to fears of a speculative bubble in real estate and excessive bank lending. The latter is particularly problematic as Chinese banks are estimated to already have at least US$500 billion in nonperforming loans to bankrupt state companies and unprofitable property developers. Another risk in pursuing a cheap currency policy is the possibility of stirring protectionist measures in its trading partners. For example, ailing U.S. textile makers lobbied the Bush administration for emergency quotas on Chinese textiles imports, while other manufacturers sought trade sanctions if Beijing would not allow the yuan to rise. Similarly, European government officials have spoken of retaliatory trade measures to force a revalued yuan. Since then, China has looked to gradually rebalance its economy away from depending on exports and to free up the yuan. The currency was gradually allowed to appreciate against the U.S. dollar and by 2012 the China

experienced a trade deficit, although it remained in trade surplus with the United States. Questions 1. Why is China trying to hold down the value of the yuan? What evidence suggests that China is indeed pursuing a weak currency policy? 2. What benefits does China expect to realize from a weak currency policy? 3. Other things being equal, what would a 27.5% tariff cost American consumers annually on US$200 billion in imports from China? 4. Currently, imports from China account for about 10% of total U.S. imports. A 25% appreciation of the yuan would be the equivalent of what percent dollar depreciation? How significant would such a depreciation likely be in terms of stemming America’s appetite for foreign goods? 5. What policy tool is China using to maintain the yuan at an artificially low level? Are there any potential problems with using this policy tool? What was China’s response to criticism about its currency policy? 6. Does an undervalued yuan impose any costs on the Chinese economy? If so, what are they? 7. Currently, the yuan is not a convertible currency, meaning that Chinese individuals are not permitted to exchange their yuan for foreign currency to invest abroad. Moreover, companies operating in China must convert all their foreign exchange earnings into yuan. China is looking to relax these currency controls and restraints on capital outflows. What would happen to the value of the yuan as a result? Explain.

No matter which category they fall in, most governments will be tempted to intervene in the foreign exchange market to move the exchange rate to the level consistent with their goals or beliefs. Foreign exchange market intervention refers to official purchases and sales of foreign exchange that nations undertake through their central banks to influence their currencies. For example, review section 2.1 and suppose the Eurozone and the United States decide to maintain the old exchange rate e0 in the face of the new equilibrium rate e1 . According to Figure 2.2, the result will be an excess demand for euros equal to Q3 − Q2 ; this euro shortage is the same as an excess supply of (Q3 − Q2 )e0 U.S. dollars. Either the European Central Bank (the central bank for the Eurozone), or the Federal Reserve (the United States’ central bank), or both will then have to intervene in the market to supply this additional quantity of euros (to buy up the excess supply of U.S. dollars). Absent some change, the United States will face a perpetual

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balance-of-payments deficit equal to (Q3 − Q2 )e0 U.S. dollars, which is the U.S. dollar value of the Eurozone balance-of-payments surplus of (Q3 − Q2 ) euros. Mechanics of Intervention. Although the mechanics of central bank intervention vary, the general purpose of each variant is basically the same: to increase the market demand for one currency by increasing the market supply of another. To see how this purpose can be accomplished, suppose in the previous example that the European Central Bank (ECB) wants to reduce the value of the euro from e1 to its previous equilibrium value of e0 . To do so, the ECB must sell an additional (Q3 − Q2 ) euros in the foreign exchange market, thereby eliminating the shortage of euros that would otherwise exist at e0 . This sale of euros (which involves the purchase of an equivalent amount of U.S. dollars) will also eliminate the excess supply of (Q3 − Q2 )e0 U.S. dollars that now exists at e0 . The simultaneous sale of euros and purchase of U.S. dollars will balance the supply and demand for euros (and U.S. dollars) at e0 . If the Federal Reserve also wants to raise the value of the U.S. dollar, it will buy U.S. dollars with euros. Regardless of whether the Federal Reserve or the ECB initiates this foreign exchange operation, the net result is the same: the U.S. money supply will fall, and the Eurozone’s money supply will rise.

Application

Switzerland Tries to Protect Its Economy by Capping the Value of Its Currency

In 2012, the acute problems of Eurozone countries spilled over to the Swiss franc as Switzerland became a refuge from the euro region’s worsening fiscal crisis that had seen Greece, Ireland, Spain, and latterly Italy all having to address budget deficits. The very existence of the euro was under threat. In this environment, money poured into Switzerland from the Eurozone, which threatened to push up the Swiss franc against the euro, and decimate local

businesses. To counter this, the Swiss National Bank set a cap of 1.20 Swiss francs to the euro and intervened aggressively at this level to prevent the currency appreciating and, as a consequence, damaging Swiss industrial competitiveness. Subsequently, as the Eurozone crisis abated, the pressure on the currency eased and the Swiss franc depreciated somewhat against the euro to around 1.23 francs to the euro, as shown in Figure 2.12.

Sterilized Versus Unsterilized Intervention. The two examples just discussed are instances of unsterilized intervention; that is, the monetary authorities have not insulated their domestic money supplies from the foreign exchange transactions. In both cases, the Eurozone money supply will rise and the U.S. money supply will fall. As noted earlier, an increase (decrease) in the supply of money, all other things held constant, will result in more (less) inflation. Thus, the foreign exchange market intervention will not only change the exchange rate, it will also increase Eurozone inflation, while reducing U.S. inflation. Recall that it was the jump in the U.S. money supply that caused this inflation. These money supply changes will also affect interest rates in both countries. To neutralize these effects, the ECB and/or the Federal Reserve can sterilize the impact of its foreign exchange market intervention on the domestic money supply through an open-market operation, which is just the sale or purchase of government securities. For example, the purchase of U.S. Treasury bills (T-bills) by the Federal Reserve supplies reserves to the banking system and increases the U.S. money supply. After the open-market operation, therefore, the public will hold more cash and bank deposits and fewer government securities. If the Federal Reserve buys enough T-bills, the U.S. money supply will return to its pre-intervention level. Similarly, the ECB could

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neutralize the impact of intervention on the Eurozone money supply by subtracting reserves from its banking system through sales of euro-denominated securities. For example, during a three-month period in 2003 alone, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) issued 250 billion yuan in short-term notes to commercial banks to sterilize the yuan created by its foreign exchange market intervention. The PBOC also sought to mop up excess liquidity by raising its reserve requirements for financial institutions, forcing banks to keep more money on deposit with it and make fewer loans. The net result of sterilization should be a rise or fall in the country’s foreign exchange reserves but no change in the domestic money supply.

The Effects of Foreign Exchange Market Intervention The basic problem with central bank intervention is that it is likely to be either ineffectual or irresponsible. Because sterilized intervention entails a substitution of foreign currency-denominated securities for domestic currency securities,12 the exchange rate will be permanently affected only if investors view domestic and foreign securities as being imperfect substitutes. If this is the case, then the exchange rate and relative interest rates must change to induce investors to hold the new portfolio of securities. For example, if the Bank of Japan sells yen in the foreign exchange market to drive down its value, investors would find themselves holding a larger share of yen assets than before and fewer foreign currency bonds. At prevailing exchange rates, if the public considers assets denominated in yen and in foreign currencies to be imperfect substitutes for each other, people would attempt to sell these extra yen assets to rebalance their portfolios. As a result, the value of the yen would fall below its level absent the intervention. At the same time, the interest rate on yen bonds will be higher and the foreign currencies’ interest rates will be lower than otherwise.

1.26

1.25

1.24

1.23

1.22

1.21

20 12 20 12 Au g 20 12 Se p 20 12 O ct 20 12 N ov 20 12 D ec 20 12 Ja n 20 13 Fe b 20 13 M ar 20 13 Ap r2 01 3 M ay 20 13 Ju n 20 13 Ju l2 01 3 Au g 20 13 Se p 20 13 O ct 20 13 N ov 20 13 Ju l

20 12

Ju n

20 12

ay M

20 12

Ap r

20 12

ar M

20 12

Fe b

Ja n

D

ec

20 11

1.2

FIGURE 2.12 Swiss Franc Versus the Euro Source: European Central Bank statistics.

12

Central banks typically hold their foreign exchange reserves in the form of foreign currency bonds. Sterilized intervention to support the domestic currency, therefore, involves selling off some of the central bank’s foreign currency bonds and replacing them with domestic currency ones. Following the intervention, the public will hold more foreign currency bonds and fewer domestic currency bonds. The reverse would be the case if the country, like China, is trying to suppress the value of its currency.

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If investors consider these securities to be perfect substitutes, however, then no change in the exchange rate or interest rates will be necessary to convince investors to hold this portfolio. In this case, sterilized intervention is ineffectual. This conclusion is consistent with the experiences of Japan between 1989 and 2003 when the economy was suffering from a long deflationary period. From June 2003, over a 15 month period, the Bank of Japan, the central bank, intervened to try to weaken the yen against the U.S. dollar by creating over ¥35 trillion of currency which it used to purchase US$320 billion. The dollars were in turn invested in U.S. Treasuries. The actions by the BOJ increased the supply of yen, and this should have led to a weaker yen, thus improving exports and helping to shift Japan out of a dangerous deflationary period. Figure 2.13 shows that all of the BOJ’s currency interventions failed to weaken the yen. In the 18 month period prior to intervention the yen had appreciated from ¥135 to the dollar to ¥118—a rise of 13%. Intervention had no effect since during the intervention period the yen appreciated a further 13%. It was not until after the BOJ ceased its weakening operations that there was a partial reversal in the following year with the exchange rate falling to ¥121—still some way above the rate at the start of 2001 and about where it was before intervention started. It would appear that exchange rates have been moved largely by basic market forces. Sterilized intervention could affect exchange rates by conveying information or by altering market expectations. It does this by signaling a change in monetary policy to the market, not by changing market fundamentals, so its influence is transitory. On the other hand, unsterilized intervention can have a lasting effect on exchange rates, but insidiously, by creating inflation in some nations and deflation in others. In the example presented earlier, the Eurozone would wind up with a permanent (and inflationary) increase in its money supply, and the United States would end up with a deflationary decrease in its money supply. If the resulting increase in Eurozone inflation and decrease in U.S. inflation were sufficiently large, the exchange rate would remain at e0 without the need for further government intervention. But it is the money

Yen depreciation

¥140

Period of Bank of Japan currency intervention ¥135

Yen appreciation from ¥135 to ¥118 that triggered intervention

¥130

¥125

Currency appreciates from ¥118 to ¥103 during intervention period

¥120

Partial reversion post intervention period ¥103 to ¥121

Yen appreciation

¥115

¥110

¥105

M 2 ay -0 2 Ju l-0 Se 2 pt -0 2 Ja n02 N ov -0 2 Ja n03 M ar -0 M 3 ay -0 3 Ju l-0 Se 3 pt -0 3 N ov -0 3 Ja n04 M ar -0 M 4 ay -0 4 Ju l-0 Se 4 pt -0 4 N ov -0 4 Ja n05 M ay -0 5 Ju l-0 Se 5 pt -0 5 N ov -0 5 Ja n06

-0

nJa

M ar

02

¥100

FIGURE 2.13 Bank of Japan Intervention Fails to Stem the Rise in the Yen

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supply changes, and not the intervention by itself, that affect the exchange rate. Moreover, moving the nominal exchange rate from e1 to e0 should not affect the real exchange rate because the change in inflation rates offsets the nominal exchange rate change. If forcing a currency below its equilibrium level causes inflation, it follows that devaluation cannot be much use as a means of restoring competitiveness. A devaluation improves competitiveness only to the extent that it does not cause higher inflation. If the devaluation causes domestic wages and prices to rise, any gain in competitiveness is quickly eroded. For example, Venezuela’s 32% devaluation of the bolivar in February 2013 from 4.3 to the U.S. dollar to 6.3—the fifth in nine years—had the result of increasing its already high inflation rate and reinforcing fears of a continuing cycle of inflation and devaluation.

Application

Japan Weakens its Currency

With Japan stuck in a long-run cycle of deflation that had resisted repeated attempts of fiscal stimulus, in 2013 the government of prime minister Shinzo Abe adopted a policy of monetary easing with a view to creating a weaker yen. A lower yen would have the effect of driving up domestic inflation and boosting the domestic

economy through exports. With interest rates that had been near zero in nominal terms for over a decade and significant government debt at over 200% of GDP, and no end to deflation in sight, a weaker yen represented the best attempt yet to kick Japan out of a falling price mentality.

Of course, when the world’s central banks execute a coordinated surprise attack, the impact on the market can be dramatic—for a short period. Early in the morning on February 27, 1985, for example, Western European central bankers began telephoning banks in London, Frankfurt, Milan, and other financial centers to order the sale of hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars; the action—joined a few hours later by the Federal Reserve in New York—panicked the markets and drove the U.S. dollar down by 5% that day. But keeping the market off-balance requires credible repetitions. Shortly after the February 27 blitzkrieg, the U.S. dollar was back on the rise. The Federal Reserve intervened again, but it was not until clear signs of a U.S. economic slowdown emerged that the dollar turned down in March.

2.4 The Equilibrium Approach to Exchange Rates We have seen that changes in the nominal exchange rate are largely affected by variations or expected variations in the relative money supply of the two countries. These nominal exchange rate changes are also highly correlated with changes in the real exchange rate. Indeed, many commentators believe that nominal exchange rate changes cause real exchange rate changes. As defined earlier, the real exchange rate is the price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods. Thus, changes in the nominal exchange rate, through their impact on the real exchange rate, are said to help or hurt companies and economies.

Disequilibrium Theory and Exchange Rate Overshooting One explanation for the correlation between nominal and real exchange rate changes is supplied by the disequilibrium theory of exchange rates.13 According to this view, various frictions in the 13 The

most elegant presentation of a disequilibrium theory is in Rudiger Dornbusch, “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics”, Journal of Political Economy (December 1976): 1161–1176.

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Money supply

Equilibrium price level

Prices

Domestic interest rate

Equilibrium domestic interest rate

Equilibrium nominal exchange rate Nominal exchange rate

t Time

FIGURE 2.14 Exchange Rate Overshooting According to the Disequilibrium Theory of Exchange Rates

economy cause goods prices to adjust slowly over time, whereas nominal exchange rates adjust quickly in response to new information or changes in expectations. As a direct result of the differential speeds of adjustment in the goods and currency markets, changes in nominal exchange rates caused by purely monetary disturbances are naturally translated into changes in real exchange rates and can lead to exchange rate “overshooting”, whereby the short-term change in the exchange rate exceeds, or overshoots, the long-term change in the equilibrium exchange rate (see Figure 2.14). The sequence of events associated with overshooting is as follows: • The central bank expands the domestic money supply In response, the price level will eventually rise in proportion to the money supply increase. However, because of frictions in the goods market, prices do not adjust immediately to their new equilibrium level. • This monetary expansion depresses domestic interest rates Until prices adjust fully, households and firms will find themselves holding more domestic currency than they want. Their attempts to rid themselves of excess cash balances by buying bonds will temporarily drive down domestic interest rates (bond prices and interest rates move inversely). • Capital begins flowing out of the country because of the lower domestic interest rates, causing an instantaneous and excessive depreciation of the domestic currency. In order for the new, lower domestic interest rates to be in equilibrium with foreign interest rates, investors must expect the domestic currency to appreciate to compensate for lower interest payments with capital gains. Future expected domestic currency appreciation, in turn, requires that the exchange rate temporarily overshoot its eventual equilibrium level. After initially exceeding its required depreciation, the exchange rate will gradually appreciate back to its new long-run equilibrium.

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This view underlies most popular accounts of exchange rate changes and policy discussions that appear in the media. It implies that currencies may become overvalued or undervalued relative to equilibrium, and that these disequilibria affect international competitiveness in ways that are not justified by changes in comparative advantage. However, the disequilibrium theory has been criticized by some economists, in part because one of its key predictions has not been upheld. Specifically, the theory predicts that as domestic prices rise, with a lag, so should the exchange rate. However, the empirical evidence is inconsistent with this predicted positive correlation between consumer prices and exchange rates.

The Equilibrium Theory of Exchange Rates and Its Implications In place of the disequilibrium theory, some economists have suggested an equilibrium approach to exchange rate changes.14 The basis for the equilibrium approach is that markets clear—supply and demand are equated—through price adjustments. Real disturbances to supply or demand in the goods market cause changes in relative prices, including the real exchange rate. These changes in the real exchange rate often are accomplished, in part, through changes in the nominal exchange rate. Repeated shocks in supply or demand thereby create a correlation between changes in nominal and real exchange rates. The equilibrium approach has three important implications for exchange rates. First, exchange rates do not cause changes in relative prices but are part of the process through which the changes occur in equilibrium; that is, changes in relative prices and in real exchange rates occur simultaneously, and both are related to more fundamental economic factors. Second, attempts by government to affect the real exchange rate via foreign exchange market intervention will fail. The direction of causation runs from the real exchange rate change to the nominal exchange rate change, not vice versa; changing the nominal exchange rate by altering money supplies will affect relative inflation rates in such a way as to leave the real exchange rate unchanged. Finally, there is no simple relation between changes in the exchange rate and changes in international competitiveness, employment, or the trade balance. With regard to the latter, trade deficits do not cause currency depreciation, nor does currency depreciation by itself help reduce a trade deficit. Some of the implications of the equilibrium approach may appear surprising. They conflict with many of the claims that are commonly made in the financial press and by politicians; they also seem to conflict with experience. But according to the equilibrium view of exchange rates, many of the assumptions and statements commonly made in the media are simply wrong, and experiences may be very selective. Econometric testing of these models is in its infancy, but there is some evidence that supports the equilibrium models, although it is far from conclusive. According to the disequilibrium approach, sticky prices cause changes in the nominal exchange rate to be converted into changes in the real exchange rate. But as prices eventually adjust toward their new equilibrium levels, the real exchange rate should return to its equilibrium value. Monetary disturbances, then, should create temporary movements in real exchange rates. Initial decreases in the real exchange rate stemming from a rise in the money supply should be followed by later increases as nominal prices rise to their new equilibrium level. Statistical evidence, however, indicates that changes in real exchange rates tend, on average, to be nearly permanent or to persist for very long periods of time. The evidence also indicates that changes in nominal exchange rates—even very short-term, day-to-day changes—are largely permanent. This persistence is inconsistent with the view that monetary shocks, or even temporary real shocks, cause

14 See,

for example, Alan C. Stockman, “The Equilibrium Approach to Exchange Rates”, Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (March–April 1987): 12–30. This part of the section is based on his article.

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most of the major changes in real exchange rates. On the other hand, it is consistent with the view that most changes in real exchange rates are due to real shocks with a large permanent component. Changes in real and nominal exchange rates are also highly correlated and have similar variances, supporting the view that most changes in nominal exchange rates are due to largely permanent, real disturbances. An alternative explanation is that we are seeing the effects of a sequence of monetary shocks, so that even if any given exchange rate change is temporary, the continuing shocks keep driving the exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium value. Thus, the sequence of these temporary changes is a permanent change. Moreover, if the equilibrium exchange rate is itself constantly subject to real shocks, we would not expect to see reversion in real exchange rates. The data do not allow us to distinguish between these hypotheses. Another feature of the data is that the exchange rate varies much more than the ratio of price levels. The equilibrium view attributes this “excess variability” to shifts in demand and/or supply between domestic and foreign goods; the shifts affect the exchange rate but not relative inflation rates. Supply-and-demand changes also operate indirectly to alter relative prices of foreign and domestic goods by affecting the international distribution of wealth. Although the equilibrium theory of exchange rates is consistent with selected empirical evidence, it may stretch its point too far. Implicit in the equilibrium theory is the view that money is just a unit of account—a measuring rod for value—with no intrinsic value. However, because money is an asset it is possible that monetary and other policy changes, by altering the perceived usefulness and importance of money as a store of value or liquidity, could alter real exchange rates. The evidence presented earlier that changes in anticipated monetary policy can alter real exchange rates supports this view. Moreover, the equilibrium theory fails to explain a critical fact: the variability of real exchange rates has been much greater when currencies are floating than when they are fixed. This fact is easily explained, if we view money as an asset, by the greater instability in relative monetary policies in a floating rate system. The real issue then is not whether monetary policy—including its degree of stability—has any impact at all on real exchange rates but whether that impact is of firstor second-order importance. Despite important qualifications, the equilibrium theory of exchange rates provides a useful addition to our understanding of exchange rate behavior. Its main contribution is to suggest an explanation for exchange rate behavior that is consistent with the notion that markets work reasonably well if they are permitted to work.

2.5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter studied the process of determining exchange rates under a floating exchange rate system. We saw that in the absence of government intervention, exchange rates respond to the forces of supply and demand, which in turn are dependent on relative inflation rates, interest rates, and GDP growth rates. Monetary policy is crucial here. If the central bank expands the money supply at a faster rate than the growth in money demand, the purchasing power of money declines both at home (inflation) and abroad (currency depreciation). In addition, the healthier the economy is, the stronger the currency is likely to be. Exchange rates also are crucially affected by expectations of future currency changes, which depend on forecasts of future economic and political conditions.

In order to achieve certain economic or political objectives, governments often intervene in the currency markets to affect the exchange rate. Although the mechanics of such interventions vary, the general purpose of each variant is basically the same: to increase the market demand for one currency by increasing the market supply of another. Alternatively, the government can control the exchange rate directly by setting a price for its currency and then restricting access to the foreign exchange market. A critical factor that helps explain the volatility of exchange rates is that with a fiat money, there is no anchor to a currency’s value, nothing around which beliefs can coalesce. In this situation, in which people are unsure of what to expect,

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any new piece of information can dramatically alter their beliefs. Thus, if the underlying domestic economic policies

are unstable, exchange rates will be volatile as traders react to new information.

QUESTIONS 1.

Describe how these three typical transactions should affect present and future exchange rates:

6.

(a) Diageo imports a year’s supply of French champagne. Payment in euros is due immediately. (b) MCI sells a new share issue to Alcatel, the French telecommunications company. Payment in U.S. dollars is due immediately.

(a) How do you think the French franc responded to Jospin’s remarks?

(c) Korean Airlines (KAL) buys five Boeing 747s. As part of the deal, Boeing arranges a loan to KAL for the purchase amount from the U.S. Export–Import Bank. The loan is to be paid back over the next seven years with a two-year grace period. 2.

The maintenance of money’s value is said to depend on the monetary authorities. What might the monetary authorities do to a currency that would cause its value to drop?

3.

For each of the following six scenarios, state whether the value of the euro will appreciate, depreciate, or remain the same relative to the Japanese yen. Explain each answer. Assume that exchange rates are free to vary and that other factors are held constant.

(b) In the event, Chirac won the election. What was the likely reaction of the French franc to this outcome? 7.

(a) The growth rate of national income is higher in the Eurozone than in Japan. (c) Prices in Japan and the Eurozone are rising at the same rate.

(b) Can Draghi support the value of the euro without intervening in the foreign exchange market? If so, how?

(d) Real interest rates in the Eurozone rise relative to real rates in Japan.

( f) European wages rise relative to Japanese wages, while European productivity falls behind Japanese productivity. 4.

5.

The European Central Bank adopts an easier monetary policy. How is this likely to affect the value of the euro and Eurozone interest rates? Comment on the following headline from The Financial Times: “Bank of Japan Hints at Extending Ultra-loose Monetary Policy” (November 21, 2013).

On November 7, 2013 European Central Bank president Mario Draghi announced that the Governing Council had decided to lower the interest rate by 0.25% from 0.50% stating that “inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%.” At the time Eurozone inflation was 0.7% the previous month having fallen from 1.1% in September. At the same time, Draghi did not mention foreign exchange market intervention to support the euro’s value. (a) What was the likely reaction of the foreign exchange market to Draghi’s statements? Explain.

(b) Inflation is higher in the Eurozone than in Japan.

(e) The European Commission imposes new restrictions on the ability of foreigners to buy companies and real estate in the European Union.

In the 1995 election for the French presidency, the Socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, vowed to halt all privatizations, raise taxes on business, spend heavily on job creation, and cut the workweek without a matching pay cut. At the time Jospin made this vow, he was running neck-and-neck with the conservative Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, who espoused free-market policies.

8.

Many Asian governments have attempted to promote their export competitiveness by holding down the value of their currencies through foreign exchange market intervention. (a) What is the likely impact of this policy on Asian foreign exchange reserves? On Asian inflation? On Asian export competitiveness? On Asian living standards? (b) Some Asian countries have attempted to sterilize their foreign exchange market intervention by selling bonds. What are the likely consequences of sterilization on interest rates? On exchange rates in the longer term? On export competitiveness?

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As mentioned in this chapter, Hong Kong has a currency board that fixes the exchange rate between the U.S. and H.K. dollars.

10.

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In 1994, an influx of drug money to Colombia coincided with a sharp increase in its export earnings from coffee and oil. (a) What was the likely impact of these factors on the value of the Colombian peso and the competitiveness of Colombia’s legal exports? Explain.

(a) What is the likely consequence of a large capital inflow for the rate of inflation in Hong Kong? For the competitiveness of Hong Kong business? Explain.

(b) In 1996, Colombia’s president, facing charges of involvement in his country’s drug cartel, sought to boost his domestic popularity by pursuing more expansionary monetary policies. Standing in the way was Colombia’s independent central bank—Banco de la Republica. In response, the president and his supporters discussed the possibility of returning central bank control to the executive branch. Describe the likely economic consequences of ending Banco de la Republica’s independence.

(b) Given a large capital inflow, what would happen to the value of the Hong Kong dollar if it were allowed to freely float? What would be the effect on the competitiveness of Hong Kong business? Explain. (c) Given a large capital inflow, will Hong Kong businesses be more or less competitive under a currency board or with a freely floating currency? Explain.

PROBLEMS 1.

On August 8, 2000, Zimbabwe changed the value of the Zimbabwe dollar from Z$38∕US$ to Z$50∕US$.

4.

(a) What was the original U.S. dollar value of the Zimbabwe dollar? What is the new U.S. dollar value of the Zimbabwe dollar?

(a) By what percentage did the won devalue?

(b) By what percentage has the Zimbabwe dollar devalued (revalued) relative to the U.S. dollar? (c) By what percentage has the U.S. dollar appreciated (depreciated) relative to the Zimbabwe dollar? 2.

3.

In early August 2002 (the exact date is a state secret), North Korea reduced the official value of the won from US$0.465 to US$0.0067. The black market value of the won at that time was US$0.005.

(b) Following the initial devaluation, what further percentage devaluation would be necessary for the won to equal its black market value? 5.

In 1995, one dollar bought ¥80. In 2000, it bought about ¥110.

On May 13, 2013, the South African rand was worth 11.7993 to one euro. By May 31, 2013, the exchange rate was 13.2174 rand to the euro.

(a) What was the U.S dollar value of the yen in 1995? What was the yen’s dollar value in 2000?

(a) By how much had the South African rand devalued against the euro?

(b) By what percentage has the yen fallen in value between 1995 and 2000?

(b) By how much had the euro appreciated against the South African rand?

(c) By what percentage has the U.S. dollar risen in value between 1995 and 2000?

(c) Suppose South Africa borrowed €4 billion, which it sold to prop up the rand. What were the South African Reserve Bank’s losses on this currency intervention?

On February 1, the euro is worth $0.8984. By May 1, it has moved to $0.9457.

(d) Suppose the European Central Bank spent €6 billion in an attempt to defend the South African rand. What were the ECB’s losses in euros on this currency intervention?

(a) By what percentage has the euro appreciated or depreciated against the U.S. dollar during this three-month period? (b) By what percentage has the U.S. dollar appreciated or depreciated against the euro during this period?

6.

At the time Argentina launched its new exchange rate scheme, the euro was trading at US$0.85 per euro. Exporters and importers would be able to convert between dollars and pesos at an exchange rate that was

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an average of the U.S. dollar and the euro exchange rates, that is, P1 = $0.50 + €0.50.

(b) How many U.S. dollars would an importer receive for one peso under the new system?

(a) How many pesos would an exporter receive for one U.S. dollar under the new system?

WEB RESOURCES http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr/plot.html Contains current and historical foreign exchange rate data for all currencies that can be downloaded into preformatted time series charts. www.ny.frb.org Website of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Contains information on U.S. interventions in the foreign exchange market. www.bis.org/cbanks.htm Website of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) with direct links to the various central banks of the world. www.bis.org/review/index.htm Contains a collection of articles and speeches by senior central bankers.

www2.jpmorgan.com/MarketDataInd/Forex/currIndex.html Website of J.P. Morgan that contains historical data on real and nominal foreign exchange rate indexes that go back to 1970. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html Website of the European Central Bank with links to current and historical foreign exchange rates. www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/hist Website of the Federal Reserve Bank with direct links to historical foreign exchange rate data that can be downloaded into spreadsheets.

WEB EXERCISES 1.

Plot the nominal and real values of the euro over the past 10 years using the European Central Bank data.

2.

How closely correlated are changes in the real and nominal values of the euro over this period? That is, do the real and nominal exchange rates tend to move together?

3.

By how much has the euro changed in real terms over this period?

4.

By how much has the euro changed in nominal terms over this period?

5.

Plot the following exchange rates over the past five years: euro/yen, U.S. dollar/euro, and euro/British pound. Are these exchange rates closely correlated with

one another? You can use foreign exchange data from the European Central Bank for this assignment. 6.

Based on your review of several recent currency interventions, what reasons were given by the monetary authorities for these interventions? How much money was expended during these interventions? You can find stories of these interventions by searching the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the websites of other central banks linked through the BIS website.

7.

Based on your review of The Economist, the Wall Street Journal, the South China Morning Post, and The Financial Times, which countries are currently having currency problems? What are the causes of those currency problems?

BIBLIOGRAPHY Frenkel, Jacob A., and Harry G. Johnson, eds., The Economics of Exchange Rates (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

and Peter B. Kenen, eds. (Netherlands: Elsevier B.V., 1985): 980–1040.

Levich, Richard M., “Empirical Studies of Exchange Rates: Price Behavior, Rate Determination and Market Efficiency”, in Handbook of International Economics, vol. II, Ronald W. Jones

Marrinan, Jane, “Exchange Rate Determination: Sorting Out Theory and Evidence”, New England Economic Review (November/ December 1989): 39–51.

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The monetary and economic disorders of the past fifteen years…are a reaction to a world monetary system that has no historical precedent. We have been sailing on uncharted waters and it has been taking time to learn the safest routes. Milton Friedman, Winner of Nobel Prize in Economics LEARNING OBJECTIVES • To explain the fundamental trilemma that affects the design of any exchange rate system • To distinguish between a free float, a managed float, a target-zone arrangement, and a fixed-rate system of exchange rate determination • To describe how equilibrium in the foreign exchange market is achieved under alternative exchange rate systems, including a gold standard • To identify the three categories of central bank intervention under a managed float • To describe the purposes, operation, and consequences of the European Monetary System • To describe the origins, purposes, and consequences of the European Monetary Union and the euro • To identify the four alternatives to devaluation under a system of fixed exchange rates • To explain the political realities that underlie government intervention in the foreign exchange market • To describe the history and consequences of the gold standard • To explain why the postwar international monetary system broke down • To describe the origins of and proposed mechanisms to deal with the various emerging market currency crises that have occurred during the past two decades

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Over the past six decades, increasing currency volatility has subjected the earnings and asset values of multinational corporations, banks, and cross-border investors to large and unpredictable fluctuations in value. These currency problems have been exacerbated by the breakdown of the postwar international monetary system established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. The main features of the Bretton Woods system were the relatively fixed exchange rates of individual currencies in terms of the U.S. dollar and the convertibility of the dollar into gold for foreign official institutions. These fixed exchange rates were supposed to reduce the riskiness of international transactions, thus promoting growth in world trade. However, in 1971, the Bretton Woods system fell victim to the international monetary turmoil it was designed to avoid. It was replaced by the present system of rapidly fluctuating exchange rates, resulting in major problems and opportunities for multinational corporations (MNCs). Today, nations must choose among competing exchange rate regimes that influence both exchange rate movements and their stability as well as strongly affect an MNC’s revenues and costs, its competitive position and value, and its investment, export, sourcing, and earnings repatriation decisions. The continued rise of cross-border capital flows, growing global imbalances, significant financial crises, changing trade patterns, fluctuating commodity prices, and the swift ascent of China have complicated exchange rate regime choice, and led to shifting exchange rate arrangements among many emerging economies. The purpose of this chapter is to help managers, both financial and nonfinancial, understand what the international monetary system is and how the choice of system affects currency values. It also provides a historical background of the international monetary system to enable managers to gain perspective when trying to interpret the likely consequences of new policy moves in the area of international finance, including the emergence of the euro, and the current problems in the Eurozone. After all, although the types of government foreign exchange policies may at times appear to be limitless, they are all variations on a common theme.

3.1 Alternative Exchange Rate Systems The international monetary system refers primarily to the set of policies, institutions, practices, regulations, and mechanisms that determine the rate at which one currency is exchanged for another. This section considers five market mechanisms for establishing exchange rates: free float, managed float, target-zone arrangement, fixed-rate system, and the current hybrid system. As we shall see, each of these mechanisms has costs and benefits associated with it and none has worked flawlessly in all circumstances. Nations prefer economic stability and often equate this objective with a stable exchange rate. However, fixing an exchange rate often leads to currency crises if the nation attempts to follow a monetary policy that is inconsistent with that fixed rate. At the same time, a nation may decide to fix its exchange rate in order to limit the scope of monetary policy, as in the case of currency boards described in Chapter 2. On the other hand, economic shocks (such as a jump in the price of oil, a financial crisis, or an increase in trading partner inflation) can be absorbed more easily when exchange rates are allowed to float freely, but freely floating exchange rates may exhibit excessive volatility, which hurts trade and stifles economic growth. The choice of a particular exchange rate regime depends on the relative importance that a nation places on various policy objectives (such as low inflation, external stability, credibility of monetary policy, international competitiveness), how those objectives are affected by different currency regimes, and the tradeoffs among those objectives the nation is willing to accept. As those objectives and the tradeoffs that are acceptable change over time, nations will often respond by changing their exchange rate regimes.

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Instability Prevails in the International Monetary System

Instability of exchange rate regimes has been a fact of life since the collapse of Bretton Woods. Countries today can choose their own exchange rate regime and occasionally cooperate to correct large exchange rate instabilities. In recent years, however, the rhetoric concerning cooperation has virtually ended, and exchange rate regime choice has been recast in battlefield terms. A combative tone emerged in 2010 as Brazil’s finance minister said “an international currency war” has broken out as governments around the globe compete to lower their exchange rates to boost competitiveness. He said further that Brazil was ready to retaliate against the United States, and the last time there was a series of competitive devaluations “it ended in World War Two”. The Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mark Warner, also warned, “With currency tensions rising, some fear a repeat of the competitive devaluations of the Great Depression.” The World Bank’s president further argued for a new gold standard or return of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR), due to a dysfunctional international monetary system, while U.S. policymakers demanded exchange rate adjustments for

currencies with trade surpluses. Meanwhile, the Chinese finance minister along with other finance ministers accused the United States of flooding the emerging world with too much money and debasing the dollar. A sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone led to bailouts in Greece and Ireland coupled with violent strikes in Greece, early elections in Ireland, and talk of the euro being replaced by national currencies. The German press accused the Greeks of being lazy, and the Slovenian president said no to bailing out the greedy Irish banks. The Group of 20 (G-20), an organization of large industrialized and developing economies that represents 19 countries and the European Union and accounts for about 85% of the world’s GDP, was supposed to be the coordinator of exchange rate arrangements, but diverse interests in this large group led to failed talks in late 2010. The head of the IMF stated: “There is clearly the idea beginning to circulate that currencies can be used as a policy weapon. Translated into action, such an idea would represent a very serious risk to the global recovery.”

The Trilemma and Exchange Rate Regime Choice The shape of any international monetary system is constrained by what is often called the trilemma. This “impossible trinity” of international finance stems from the fact that, in general, economic policymakers would like to achieve each of the following three goals: 1. A stable exchange rate A stable rate makes it easier and less risky for businesses and individuals to buy, sell, and invest overseas. On the other hand, a volatile exchange rate can increase domestic economic volatility, make planning for future overseas activities more difficult, and hurt a nation’s trade and economic growth. 2. An independent monetary policy With monetary independence, a nation can use its control over the money supply and interest rates to help stabilize the economy. The central bank can expand the money supply and cut interest rates during an economic slump, and reduce money supply growth and raise interest rates to curb inflation when the economy is overheating. 3. Capital market integration Opening the country’s economy to international flows of capital allows for better capital allocation, improved portfolio diversification by investing abroad, and a lower cost of capital. It also attracts foreign direct investors who bring their capital, technology, and expertise into the country. The policymaker’s trilemma is that in pursuing any two of these goals, the country must forgo the third. Figure 3.1 illustrates that if a country chooses monetary independence and allows for the free

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Complete capital controls (Bretton Woods, Argentina, Malaysia)

Monetary independence

Pure float (U.S., U.K., euro vs. world)

Exchange rate stability

Capital market integration

Credibly fixed (gold standard, Hong Kong, within Eurozone)

FIGURE 3.1 The Trilemma and Exchange Rate Regime Choice

movement of capital across its borders, it cannot have a fixed exchange rate. Instead, these economies, which sit in the lower left corner of the triangle, must allow their exchange rate to float. The Eurozone has picked this regime. The European Central Bank, unconstrained by the need to maintain exchange rate stability, uses monetary policy to fight inflation and to try to stimulate economic growth during downturns. Europeans can also easily invest abroad and foreigners are free to buy European stocks and bonds. In return, the Eurozone has had to accept a volatile exchange rate for the euro. Alternatively, if a country such as Montenegro or Hong Kong values exchange rate stability and capital market integration, it must give up monetary independence. Instead, it must have the same monetary policy as the country it pegs to, which is the Eurozone for Montenegro and the United States in the case of Hong Kong. The potential drawback is that when these countries employ expansionary monetary policy to stimulate their economies, Montenegro and Hong Kong inherit this policy and its subsequent consequences of higher inflation. Equally, those European countries that have adopted the euro, while maintaining international capital mobility, have eliminated all currency movements within the Eurozone area but can no longer use national monetary policy to address other economic problems. Last, countries such as China that favor monetary independence and exchange rate stability must impose capital controls. Chinese citizens are thus restricted in their ability to diversify their portfolios by investing abroad. Along with China, economies under the former Bretton Woods system, Argentina and Malaysia among others, lie on the top vertex of the triangle. Many emerging economies try to avoid the corners of the triangle and choose instead intermediate exchange rate regimes that limit capital mobility, exchange rate stability, and monetary independence. These countries, such as China and India, sit inside the triangle, and must carefully juggle partial variants of these policy objectives. History is full of nations, including Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Mexico, and Brazil, that ignored the principles of the trilemma and attempted to fully achieve all three policy objectives simultaneously, only to experience a currency crash. Some emerging countries use capital controls as a way of rationing and controlling their currency. Nations with overvalued currencies often ration foreign exchange, whereas countries facing appreciation may restrict or tax capital inflows.1 In effect, government controls supersede the allocative function of the foreign exchange market. The most draconian situation occurs when all foreign exchange earnings must be surrendered to the central bank, which, in turn, apportions these funds to users on the basis of government priorities. Figure 3.2 lists the most frequently used currency control measures. These controls are a major source of market imperfection, providing opportunities as well as risks for multinational corporations.

1

Historically, controls were mostly used to restrict capital outflows. Today, controls are largely aimed at curbing capital inflows.

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• Restriction or prohibition of certain remittance categories such as dividends or royalties • Ceilings on direct foreign investment outflows • Controls on overseas portfolio investments • Import restrictions • Required surrender of hard-currency export receipts to the central bank • Limitations on prepayments for imports • Requirements to deposit in interest-free accounts with the central bank, for a specified time, some percentage of the value of imports and/or remittances

• Foreign borrowings restricted to a minimum or maximum maturity • Ceilings on granting of credit to foreign firms • Imposition of taxes and limitations on foreign-owned bank deposits • Multiple exchange rates for buying and selling foreign currencies, depending on category of goods or services each transaction falls into

FIGURE 3.2 Typical Currency Control Measures

Free Float We already have seen that free-market exchange rates are determined by the interaction of currency supply and demand. The supply-and-demand schedules, in turn, are influenced by price level changes, interest differentials, and economic growth. In a free float, as these economic parameters change—for example, because of new government policies or acts of nature—market participants will adjust their current and expected future currency needs. In the two-country example of the Eurozone and the United States, the shifts in the euro supply-and-demand schedules will, in turn, lead to new equilibrium positions. Over time, the exchange rate will fluctuate randomly as market participants assess and react to new information, much as security and commodity prices in other financial markets respond to news. These shifts and oscillations are illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4A for the dollar/euro exchange rate; Dt and St are the hypothetical euro demand and supply curves,

Dollar price of one euro

St + 1

St St + 2

et + 1

et et + 2

Dt + 1 Dt + 2 Quantity of euros

FIGURE 3.3 Supply and Demand Curve Shifts

Dt

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Dollar price of one euro

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et + 1

et et + 2

t

t+1 Time

t+2

FIGURE 3.4A Fluctuating Exchange Rates

Dollar/euro exchange rate (U.S. dollars per euro)

$1.560 $1.555 $1.550 $1.545 $1.540 $1.535 $1.530 $1.525

May 1

May 2

May 5

May 6

May 7

May 8

May 9

FIGURE 3.4B Actual Changes in the Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate: May 1–9, 2008 Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank website, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.

respectively, for period t. Figure 3.4B shows how the dollar/euro exchange rate actually changed during a seven-day period in May 2008. Such a system of freely floating exchange rates is usually referred to as a clean float. The freely floating nature of the exchange rate in response to market forces allows it to act as an automatic stabilizer. A negative shock to the economy usually results in a fall in the exchange rate, which cushions the adjustment to the shock by stimulating exports and contracting imports. A freely floating exchange also helps lessen the impact on the economy of real shocks by allowing the central bank to pursue an independent monetary policy. On the downside, the exchange rate volatility a free float gives rise to increases risk and often substantially affects multinationals’ profits and production sourcing decisions.

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Managed Float Not surprisingly, few countries have been able to long resist the temptation to intervene actively in the foreign exchange market in order to reduce the economic uncertainty associated with a clean float. The fear is that too abrupt a change in the value of a nation’s currency could imperil its export industries (if the currency appreciates) or lead to a higher rate of inflation (if the currency depreciates). Moreover, the experience with floating rates has not been encouraging. Instead of reducing economic volatility, as they were supposed to do, floating exchange rates appear to have increased it. Exchange rate uncertainty also reduces economic efficiency by acting as a tax on trade and foreign investment. Therefore, most countries with floating currencies have attempted, through central bank intervention, to smooth out exchange rate fluctuations. Such a system of managed exchange rates, called a managed float, is also known as a dirty float. Managed floats fall into three distinct categories of central bank intervention. The approaches, which vary in their reliance on market forces, are as follows: 1. Smoothing out daily fluctuations. Governments following this route attempt only to preserve an orderly pattern of exchange rate changes. Rather than resisting fundamental market forces, these governments occasionally enter the market on the buy or sell side to ease the transition from one rate to another; the smoother transition tends to bring about longer-term currency appreciation or depreciation. This approach is designed to moderate or prevent abrupt short- and medium-term fluctuations brought about by random events whose effects are expected to be only temporary. For instance, if a negative shock to demand causes the British pound to depreciate by an amount that the Bank of England views as excessive, it could intervene and buy up pounds with its foreign currency reserves. One variant of this approach is the “crawling peg” system used at various times by some countries, such as Poland, Russia, Brazil, and Costa Rica. Under a crawling peg, the local currency depreciates against a reference currency or currency basket on a regular, controlled basis. For example, during the 1990s, the Polish zloty depreciated by 1% a month against a basket of currencies. The lack of commitment by the central bank to maintain the peg allows countries to pursue expansionary monetary policies without large losses in competitiveness. The crawling peg, however, is often a temporary regime choice, chosen by authorities to smooth the transition from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate (Brazil, 1990–2000), or from one fixed exchange rate to another peg rate (China, 2005–2008). Countries currently using crawling pegs include China, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, and Bolivia. 2. “Leaning against the wind.” This approach is an intermediate policy designed to moderate or prevent abrupt short- and medium-term fluctuations brought about by random events whose effects are expected to be only temporary. The rationale for this policy—which is primarily aimed at delaying, rather than resisting, fundamental exchange rate adjustments—is that government intervention can reduce for exporters and importers the uncertainty caused by disruptive exchange rate changes. It is questionable, however, whether governments are more capable than private forecasters of distinguishing between fundamental and temporary (irrational) values. 3. Unofficial pegging. This strategy evokes memories of a fixed-rate system. It involves resisting, for reasons clearly unrelated to exchange market forces, any fundamental upward or downward exchange rate movements. Thus, Japan historically has resisted revaluation of the yen for fear of its consequences for Japanese exports. Several emerging Asian nations in recent years have also adopted this exchange rate regime as a temporary measure to resist exchange rate appreciation. With unofficial pegging, however, there is no publicly announced government commitment to a given exchange rate level. A managed float typically has less daily volatility than does a freely floating rate. It can also avoid currency crises associated with balance of payments problems (discussed in Chapter 5) because the

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government is able to give up the peg quickly rather than maintain a rate that is unsustainable. Despite its advantages, however, managed floating has several fundamental problems. A lack of transparency of the central bank’s intentions in some cases introduces the very uncertainty the central bank is trying to avoid. Interventions are often short-lived unless accompanied by changes in the domestic money supply, which restricts domestic monetary objectives. Effective policy also requires that the government have sufficient reserves and better knowledge of the exchange rate than market forces; in practice, however, it is often difficult for governments to decide what exchange rate is appropriate and when to change it. Managing an exchange rate is particularly difficult for financially integrated economies such as OECD economies because daily exchange rate volumes typically dwarf a nation’s international reserves. At the same time, unofficial pegs do not have the strict discipline of a fixed peg, and do not encourage as much trade and investment as fixed exchange rates.

Target-Zone Arrangement Many economists and policymakers have argued that countries could minimize exchange rate volatility and enhance economic stability if they linked their currencies in a target-zone system. Under a target-zone arrangement, countries adjust their national economic policies to maintain their exchange rates within a specific margin around agreed-upon, fixed central exchange rates. This system existed for the major European currencies participating in the European Monetary System (or EMS, discussed later in this chapter) and was the precursor to the euro. This regime is designed to permit some changes in the nominal exchange rate to buffer shocks to fundamentals. In reality, selecting the correct target-zone or band is difficult, and realignment of the band destroys credibility by allowing for speculative attacks. The combination of indecision over how much flexibility to tolerate and the continued presence of realignments destabilized the EMS.

Fixed-Rate System Under a fixed-rate system, such as the Bretton Woods system, governments are committed to maintaining target exchange rates. Each central bank actively buys or sells its currency in the foreign exchange market whenever its exchange rate threatens to deviate from its stated par value by more than an agreed-on percentage. The resulting coordination of monetary policy ensures that all member nations have the same inflation rate. Put another way, for a fixed-rate system to work, each member must accept the group’s joint inflation rate as its own. A corollary is that monetary policy must become subordinate to exchange rate policy. In the extreme case, those who fix their exchange rate via a currency board system surrender all control of monetary policy. The money supply is determined solely by people’s willingness to hold the domestic currency. A potential problem with fixed exchange rates is that a country that pegs to, say, the U.S. dollar may have different monetary policy objectives than the United States. In 2010, the Federal Reserve’s prime monetary objectives were to lower unemployment and avoid deflation. Many emerging economies such as China that have adopted a U.S. dollar peg do not have problems with low inflation or high unemployment. Nonetheless, their common monetary policy implies they are importing the low interest rate and inflationary policies of the United States. China, for instance, in 2010–2011 reported rising prices due to excess liquidity. With or without a currency board system, there is always a rate of monetary growth (it could be negative) that will maintain an exchange rate at its target level. If it involves monetary tightening, however, maintaining the fixed exchange rate could mean a high interest rate and a resultant slowdown in economic growth and job creation. Governments can avoid devaluation by imposing austerity, a combination of reduced government expenditures and increased taxes. Frequently, the cause of the problem is the budget deficit and its tendency to lead to money creation. By reducing the budget deficit, austerity will lessen the need to monetize this deficit. Lowering the rate of money supply

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growth, in turn, will bring about a lower rate of domestic inflation (that is, disinflation). Disinflation will strengthen the currency’s value, ending the threat of devaluation. However, disinflation often leads to a short-run increase in unemployment, a cost of austerity that politicians today generally consider to be unacceptable. Besides encouraging trade and investment through stable exchange rates, a key reason emerging economies often choose fixed exchange rates is a loss in monetary autonomy. This loss of autonomy may be desirable if a nation’s central bank has pursued inflationary policies in the past. The fixed-rate regime will tie the hands of the central bank and help force a reduction in inflation. Of course, for this strategy to work, the country must credibly commit to that fixed rate and avoid pressures that lead to devaluations. Currency boards and complete adoption of another country’s currency (for example, dollarization or euroization) increase this credibility.

Mini-Case

The BRICs Solve the Trilemma with Different Exchange Rate Regimes

Since the collapse of Bretton Woods, a critical question facing governments, particularly emerging economies, is the choice of exchange rate regimes. While most OECD economies have floating rates and capital mobility or are in the Eurozone, emerging countries have generally selected different exchange rate regimes. Many emerging economies have a “fear of floating”, a resistance to allowing market forces to freely determine their exchange rate since they fear that speculation or overvaluation may lead to excessive volatility that could contribute to financial crises and discourage trade and investment. Lack of transparency, thin markets, poor policy, low institutional credibility, and sometimes distrust of perfectly free markets have fueled their reluctance to float. The BRICs (Brazil, China, India, and Russia) represent four important and rapidly growing economies. Figure 3.5 plots their exchange rates from 2000–2012. The different paths each nation’s exchange rate has taken reflects their different currency regime choices. Brazil. From 1990 to 1994, Brazil chose a crawling peg exchange rate system with daily devaluations, resulting in a depreciating exchange rate and high inflation. From 1994 to 1999, Brazil adopted the Real Plan, a system of tight monetary policy (named after its newly adopted currency, the real) that allowed a slow crawling exchange rate band in an attempt to anchor the nominal exchange rate and curb inflationary expectations. However, the tight monetary policy and high interest rates encouraged capital inflows, and inflation expectations failed to decline fast enough due to decades of very high inflation. When nominal exchange rates depreciate more slowly than the

difference in inflation rates, relative prices rise and imply a real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rate appreciation. In Brazil’s case, the real exchange rate appreciated nearly 100% and caused a substantial loss of competitiveness. As a result, in January 1999, Brazil experienced a currency crisis and was forced to allow its exchange rate to float. The government also loosened capital controls and eliminated restrictions by foreign investors in the security market. More recently, in 2009, the currency began to rapidly appreciate (in real terms, it rose 23% in 2009, and 62% since 2002). In response, the government imposed a 2% tax on foreign portfolio investments to stem the rapid rise of its exchange rate. Then, in late 2010, Brazil increased the tax on foreign purchases of domestic debt to 6% in response to rapid expansion of the money supply by the United States. Russia. Like Brazil, Russia also had a crawling peg in the 1990s that depreciated too slowly and allowed its currency to be overvalued in real terms. Both countries highlight a difficulty with fixed exchange rates; lack of monetary discipline implies higher inflation and an uncompetitive currency. This can lead to crisis. Russia experienced such a crisis in 1999 that resulted in a rapid depreciation of its currency. As Figure 3.5 shows, the rising price of oil from 2005 to 2008 resulted in currency appreciation and capital inflows; however, the central bank decided to slow this appreciation with large-scale currency interventions that increased its money supply. As a result, inflation and the real exchange rate both rose, reducing the competitiveness of Russia’s industry and hampering its efforts to diverse its production and exports.

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Comparative monthly average exchange rates: relative to U.S. dollar 140

Monthly average exchange rate relative to U.S. dollar (January 2000 = 100)

130 120 110

Russian Ruble Indian Rupee Chinese Renminbi Brazilian Real

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

FIGURE 3.5 BRIC Exchange Rates (Normalized to 2000)

The fall in oil prices in 2008, combined with large government deficits, contributed to a decline in the ruble. India. Since its currency crisis in 1991, India has pursued a managed exchange rate system with strict capital controls that have been gradually liberalized over time. Compared to most large industrialized countries, India’s exchange rate has experienced relatively low volatility and its real effective exchange rate was largely stable from 2000 to 2008, with only a small gradual appreciation. However, during 2008 the rupee fell sharply, by 27% against the U.S. dollar. Since then, the rupee again experienced relatively low volatility up to the second half of 2013, when the trilemma reasserted itself. China. China, along with other emerging economies in East Asia and the Gulf region, has resurrected

an exchange rate regime called Bretton Woods II, where these economies peg to the U.S. dollar.2 China pegged at ¥8.28∕$ (the yuan shares its currency symbol with the Japanese yen) from 1995 to 2005. Positive economic fundamentals, including rapid productivity growth, high investment, and enormous growth potential, resulted in capital inflows, massive trade surpluses, and pressure for the exchange rate to appreciate. On July 21, 2005, the People’s Bank of China announced a revaluation of the yuan (from ¥8.28 to ¥8.11 to the U.S. dollar) and a reform of the exchange

2 Dooley,

Garber, and Folkerts-Landau (2004) argue that the current exchange rate system in Asia operates much like the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates as these economies limit exchange rate fluctuations against the U.S. dollar to varying degrees.

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rate regime. Under the reform, the PBOC linked its currency to a reference basket of currencies, heavily weighted toward the U.S. dollar. Over the next three years, under this crawling peg system, the yuan gradually appreciated against the dollar. With the advent of the global economic crisis, China reestablished the yuan’s fixed peg to the U.S. dollar, at ¥6.84∕$, and maintained it for the next two years. After vocal complaints by U.S. manufacturers, union leaders, and politicians of both parties, and under pressure from the Obama Administration, China rolled out a new currency policy on June 20, 2010, that allowed the yuan to once again float upward, within limits, against the dollar; de facto, however, the Bretton Woods II regime remains intact and the currency pegged to the U.S. dollar. The Chinese central bank has managed this peg with widespread capital controls through quantitative limits on both inflows and outflows. The objectives of the controls have evolved over time, and include (i) facilitating monetary independence, (ii) helping channel external savings to desired uses; (iii) preventing firms and financial institutions from taking excessive external risks; (iv) maintaining balance of payments equilibrium and exchange rate stability; and (v) insulating the domestic economy from foreign financial crises. Recently, the government has started to gradually liberalize capital flows and globally integrate China’s capital markets in order to eventually establish Shanghai as a leading financial center. It remains unclear, however, whether China will yield more on monetary independence or

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exchange rate stability. Chinese authorities fear floating exchange rates, since they want to avoid a rapid and large appreciation of the yuan. This could have serious effects on employment and profits of multinationals in their export sector. Their hybrid fixed/managed floating regime aims to prevent yuan appreciation by buying up U.S. dollars, a strategy discussed in Chapter 2. Questions 1. What are the current exchange rate regimes of the BRIC economies? 2. Why has Brazil changed its exchange rate regime over the years? 3. What variable affects the Russian ruble? 4. By how much did the yuan appreciate against the U.S. dollar on July 21, 2005? 5. How has the yuan’s appreciation since July 21, 2005, affected the U.S. trade deficit with China? (Why this has happened is discussed in Chapter 5.) 6. How did the crawling-peg system in place from 2005 to 2008 likely affect inflows of hot money (that is, speculative money that can enter or exit the economy quickly) to China? To affect the PBOC’s ability to control the money supply and inflation? 7. What is the likely reason for the Chinese government again fixing the yuan to the U.S. dollar upon the outbreak of the global economic crisis? 8. Why has China adopted capital controls? 9. Why will China probably relax its capital controls eventually?

3.2 A Brief History of the International Monetary System Almost from the dawn of history, gold has been used as a medium of exchange because of its desirable properties. It is durable, storable, portable, easily recognized, divisible, and easily standardized. Another valuable attribute of gold is that short-run changes in its stock are limited by high production costs, making it costly for governments to manipulate. Most important, because gold is a commodity money, it ensures a long-run tendency toward price stability. The reason is that the purchasing power of an ounce of gold, or what it will buy in terms of all other goods and services, will tend toward equality with its long-run cost of production. For these reasons, most major currencies, until fairly recently, were on a gold standard, which defined their relative values or exchange rates. The gold standard essentially involved a commitment by the participating countries to fix the prices of their domestic currencies in terms of a specified

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amount of gold. The countries maintained these prices by being willing to buy or sell gold to anyone at that price. For example, from 1821 to 1914, the United Kingdom maintained a fixed price of gold at £4.2474 per ounce. The United States, from 1834 to 1933, maintained the price of gold at $20.67 per ounce (with the exception of the Greenback period from 1861 to 1878). Thus, from 1834 to 1914 (with the exception of 1861 to 1878), the U.S. dollar:British pound exchange rate, referred to as the par exchange rate, was perfectly determined at $20.67∕ounce of gold = $4.8665∕£1 £4.2474∕ounce of gold The value of gold relative to other goods and services does not change much over long periods of time, so the monetary discipline imposed by a gold standard should ensure long-run price stability for both individual countries and groups of countries. Indeed, there was remarkable long-run price stability in the period before World War I, during which most countries were on a gold standard. As Figure 3.6 shows, price levels at the start of World War I were roughly the same as they had been in the late 1700s before the Napoleonic Wars began. This record is all the more remarkable when contrasted with the post-World War II inflationary experience of the industrialized nations of Europe and North America. As shown in Figure 3.7, 1995 price levels in all these nations were several times as high as they were in 1950. Even in Germany, the value of the currency in 1995 was only one-quarter of its 1950 level, whereas the comparable magnitude was less than one-tenth for France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Although there were no episodes of extremely rapid inflation, price levels rose steadily and substantially.

Year

Belgium

Britain

France

Germany

United States

1776 1793 1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1913

NA NA NA NA 83 100 87 100

101 120 186 139 91 121 86 100

NA NA 155 126 96 111 85 100

NA 98 135 76 71 100 90 100

84 100 127 101 82 80 80 100

FIGURE 3.6 Wholesale Price Indices: Pre-World War I

Nation Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands United Kingdom United States

CPI, 1950 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

CPI, 1995 578 1,294 388 2,163 603 1,617 622

FIGURE 3.7 Consumer Price Indices (CPI): Post-World War II

Loss of Purchasing Power during Period (%) 82.7 92.3 74.2 95.4 83.4 93.8 83.9

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The Classical Gold Standard A gold standard is often considered an anachronism in our modern, high-tech world because of its needless expense; on the most basic level, it means digging up gold in one corner of the globe for burial in another corner. Nonetheless, until recently, discontent with the current monetary system, which produced more than two decades of worldwide inflation and widely fluctuating exchange rates, prompted interest in a return to some form of a gold standard. (This interest has abated somewhat with the current low inflation environment.) To put it bluntly, calls for a new gold standard reflect a fundamental distrust of governments’ willingness to maintain the integrity of fiat money. Fiat money is nonconvertible paper money backed only by faith that the monetary authorities will not cheat (by issuing more money). This faith has been tempered by hard experience; the 100% profit margin on issuing new fiat money has proved to be an irresistible temptation for most governments. By contrast, the net profit margin on issuing more money under a gold standard is zero. The government must acquire more gold before it can issue more money, and the government’s cost of acquiring the extra gold equals the value of the money it issues. Thus, expansion of the money supply is constrained by the available supply of gold. This fact is crucial in understanding how a gold standard works. Under the classical gold standard, disturbances in the price level in one country would be wholly or partly offset by an automatic balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism called the price-specie-flow mechanism. (Specie refers to gold coins.) To see how this adjustment mechanism worked to equalize prices among countries and automatically bring international payments back in balance, consider the example in Figure 3.8. Suppose a technological advance increases productivity in the non-gold-producing sector of the Eurozone. This productivity will lower the price of other goods and services relative to the price Foreign prices stay the same

U.S. prices fall

U.S. balance-of-payments surplus U.S. exports rise, imports fall

offset by

Foreign exports fall, imports rise

flow of foreign gold to United States Foreign money supply falls

U.S. money supply rises

U.S. prices rise

U.S. exports fall, imports rise

Foreign prices fall

Balance-of-payments equilibrium End of gold flow

FIGURE 3.8 The Price-Specie-Flow Mechanism

Foreign exports rise, imports fall

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of gold, and the Eurozone price level will decline. The fall in Eurozone prices will result in lower prices of Eurozone exports; export prices will decline relative to import prices (determined largely by supply and demand in the rest of the world). Consequently, there will be more international demand for Eurozone exports, and Europeans will buy fewer imports. Starting from a position of equilibrium in its international payments, the Eurozone will now run a balance-of-payments surplus. The difference will be made up by a flow of gold into the Eurozone. The gold inflow will increase the Eurozone money supply (under a gold standard, more gold means more money in circulation), reversing the initial decline in prices. At the same time, the other countries will experience gold outflows, reducing their money supplies (less gold, less money in circulation) and, thus, their price levels. In final equilibrium, price levels in all countries will be slightly lower than they were before because of the increase in the worldwide supply of other goods and services relative to the supply of gold. Exchange rates will remain fixed. Thus, the operation of the price-specie-flow mechanism tended to keep prices in line for those countries that were on the gold standard. As long as the world was on a gold standard, all adjustments were automatic; and although many undesirable things might have happened under a gold standard, lasting inflation was not one of them. Gold does have a cost, however—the opportunity cost associated with mining and storing it. By the late 1990s, with inflation on the wane worldwide, the value of gold as an inflation hedge had declined. Central banks also began selling their gold reserves and replacing them with U.S. Treasury bonds, which, unlike gold, pay interest. The reduced demand for gold lowered its price and its usefulness as a monetary asset. However, with global financial system risk on the rise, culminating in the subprime debacle of 2007–2008, a declining U.S. dollar, and inflation resurfacing, gold reemerged as a safe haven from market turmoil. From March 2002 to October 2013, the price of gold rose from about US$9, 656 per kilo to US$40, 396 in October 2013, having peaked at over US$59, 000 per kilo in July 2011.

How the Classical Gold Standard Worked in Practice: 1821–1914 In 1821, after the Napoleonic Wars and their associated inflation, the United Kingdom returned to the gold standard. From 1821 to 1880, more and more countries joined the gold standard. By 1880, most nations of the world were on some form of gold standard. The period from 1880 to 1914, during which the classical gold standard prevailed in its most pristine form, was a remarkable period in world economic history. The period was characterized by a rapid expansion of virtually free international trade, stable exchange rates and prices, a free flow of labor and capital across political borders, rapid economic growth, and, in general, world peace. Advocates of the gold standard hark back to this period as illustrating the standard’s value. Opponents of a rigid gold standard, in contrast, point to some less-than-idyllic economic conditions during this period: a major depression during the 1890s, a severe economic contraction in 1907, and repeated recessions. Whether these sharp ups and downs could have been prevented under a fiat money standard cannot be known.

The Gold Exchange Standard and Its Aftermath: 1925–1944 The gold standard broke down during World War I and was briefly reinstated from 1925 to 1931 as the Gold Exchange Standard. Under this standard, the United States and United Kingdom could hold only gold reserves, but other nations could hold both gold and U.S. dollars or British pounds as reserves. In 1931, the United Kingdom departed from the Gold Exchange Standard in the face of massive gold and capital flows, owing to an unrealistic exchange rate, and the Gold Exchange Standard was finished.

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Competitive Devaluations. After the devaluation of the British pound, 25 other nations devalued their currencies to maintain trade competitiveness. These “beggar-thy-neighbor” devaluations, in which nations cheapened their currencies to increase their exports at others’ expense and to reduce imports, led to a trade war. Many economists and policymakers believed that the protectionist exchange rate and trade policies fueled the global depression of the 1930s. Bretton Woods Conference and the Postwar Monetary System. To avoid such destructive economic policies in the future, the Allied nations agreed to a new postwar monetary system at a conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. The conference also created two new institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)—to implement the new system and to promote international financial stability. The IMF was created to promote monetary stability, whereas the World Bank was set up to lend money to countries so they could rebuild their infrastructure that had been destroyed during the war. Role of the IMF. Both agencies have seen their roles evolve over time. The IMF now oversees exchange rate policies in member countries (currently totaling 188 nations) and advises developing countries about how to turn their economies around. In the process, it has become the lender of last resort to countries that get into serious financial trouble. It explores new ways to monitor the financial health of member nations so as to prevent financial crises. Despite these efforts, the IMF was blindsided by the Asian crisis and wound up leading in a US$118 billion attempt to shore up Asian financial systems. It was also blindsided by the Russian crisis a year later and once again by the global financial crisis a decade later. In response to the latter, the G-20 now counts on the IMF to develop early warnings of asset bubbles (like the U.S. housing bubble that precipitated the global financial crisis) and other major problems. Critics argue that by bailing out careless lenders and imprudent nations, IMF rescues make it too easy for governments to persist with bad policies and for investors to ignore the risks these policies create. In the long run, by removing from governments and investors the prospect of failure—which underlies the market discipline that encourages sound policies—these rescues magnify the problem of moral hazard and so make imprudent policies more likely to recur.3 Moral hazard refers here to the perverse incentives created for international lenders and borrowers by IMF bailouts. Anticipating further IMF bailouts, investors underestimate the risks of lending to governments that persist in irresponsible policies. In theory, the IMF makes short-term loans conditional on the borrower’s implementation of policy changes that will allow it to achieve self-sustaining economic growth. This is the doctrine of conditionality. However, a review of the evidence suggests that the IMF creates long-term dependency. For example, 41 countries have been receiving IMF credit for 10 to 20 years, 32 countries have been borrowing from the IMF for between 20 and 30 years, and 11 nations have been relying on IMF loans for more than 30 years. This evidence explains why IMF conditionality has little credibility. Role of the World Bank. The World Bank is looking to expand its lending to developing countries and to provide more loan guarantees for businesses entering new developing markets. But here, too, there is controversy. Specifically, critics claim that World Bank financing allows projects and policies to avoid being subjected to the scrutiny of financial markets and permits governments to delay enacting the changes necessary to make their countries more attractive to private investors.

3 As economist Allan H. Meltzer puts it, “Capitalism without failure is like religion without sin. It doesn’t work. Bankruptcies and losses concentrate the mind on prudent behavior.”

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Moreover, critics argue that the World Bank should take the money it is now lending to countries such as China with investment-grade ratings and to poor countries that achieve little from the loans and reallocate these freed-up funds to poor countries that make credible efforts to raise their living standards. In this way, the World Bank would accomplish far more poverty reduction with its resources. Role of the Bank for International Settlements. Another key institution is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which acts as the central bank for the industrial countries’ central banks. The BIS helps central banks manage and invest their foreign exchange reserves and, in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank, helps the central banks of developing countries, mostly in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The BIS also holds deposits of central banks so that reserves are readily available.

Mini-Case

Competitive Devaluations in 2003, Return in 2010

Despite Bretton Woods, competitive devaluations have not disappeared. According to the Wall Street Journal (June 6, 2003, p. B12), “A war of competitive currency devaluations is rattling the $1.2 trillion-a-day global foreign exchange market…The aim of the devaluing governments: to steal growth and markets from others, while simultaneously exporting their problems, which in this case is the threat of deflation.” Currency analysts argue that the environment in 2003—of slow growth and the threat of deflation— encouraged countries such as Japan, China, and the United States to pursue a weak currency policy. For example, analysts believe that the Bush administration in the United States looked for a falling dollar to boost U.S. exports, lift economic growth, battle deflationary pressure, push the Europeans to cut interest rates, and force Japan to overhaul its stagnant economy. The weapons in this war included policy shifts, foreign exchange market intervention, and interest rates. For example, the foreign exchange market widely viewed the Bush administration as having abandoned the long-standing strong-dollar policy and welcoming a weaker dollar. Japan tried to keep its currency from rising against the U.S. dollar by selling a record ¥3.98 trillion ($33.4 billion) in May 2003 alone. A strong yen hurts Japanese exports and growth and aggravates deflationary tendencies. On the other hand, if Japan succeeded in pushing down the yen sufficiently, South Korea and Taiwan could try to devalue their currencies to remain competitive.

China, meanwhile, stuck with an undervalued yuan to bolster its economy. Another currency analyst attributed Canada’s growth ever since 1993 to an undervalued Canadian dollar: “They’ve been the beggar-thy-neighbor success story.”4 On June 5, 2003, the European Central Bank entered the competitive devaluation fray by cutting the euro interest rate by a half percentage point. In the year leading up to June 2003, the euro had appreciated by 27% against the U.S. dollar, making European business less profitable and less competitive and hurting European growth. The ultimate fear: an ongoing round of competitive devaluations that degenerates into the same kind of pre-Bretton Woods protectionist free-for-all that brought on the Great Depression. Fears of competitive devaluations and currency wars resurfaced in late 2010. China again was accused of an undervalued currency and the United States of a weak currency policy, reigniting trade tensions. The Financial Times (October 5, 2010) reported that “Co-operation is victim in currency market shoot-out.” Japan, Switzerland, South Korea, and Taiwan announced heavy intervention, although with mixed success, to stem appreciation of their currencies in response to the U.S. Federal Reserve’s decision to engage in its second round of quantitative easing (QE2).5 The Financial Times 4 Michael

R. Sesit, “Currency Conflict Shakes Market”, Wall Street Journal (June 6 2003): B12. 5 Quantitative easing is a form of open market operation whereby the central bank creates money, which it uses to buy government bonds and other financial assets, in order to increase the money supply and the excess reserves of the banking system.

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(November 14, 2010) reported that “the U.S. Federal Reserve’s announcement of a second round of quantitative easing (QE2) met with such a chorus of disapproval from the BRIC economies (Brazil, India, Russia and China) and other large exporters in Seoul last week, with warnings of a flood of western liquidity washing up, quite unwanted, on Asia’s shores.” The pumping into the U.S. economy by the Federal Reserve of an additional $600 billion sent the U.S. dollar to multi-year lows against several Asia-Pacific currencies, and raised tensions throughout the region as China blamed the United States’ unilateral monetary policy for potentially destabilizing capital flows into emerging markets—fueling asset bubbles, inflationary pressures, and driving up their currencies. The fear is that the extra liquidity would end up in Asian emerging markets, since by fixing to the U.S. dollar, they inherit this potentially inflationary policy. Other countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine intervened to manage currency appreciation against the U.S. dollar as well. In the words of the Brazilian finance minister, “We are not going to allow our American friends to melt the dollar.”6 Meanwhile, the consequences of competitive devaluations were spelled out in late 2010 as follows: The head of the World Trade Organization warned countries against keeping their currencies undervalued to create jobs, saying such policies could spark 6 John

Lyons, “Brazil and Chile Battle Rising Currencies”, Wall Street Journal (January 5, 2011): A10.

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a return to 1930s-style protectionism. Pascal Lamy, WTO [World Trade Organization] director general, said the fight over currency values—in a reference to the United States and China—could upset global financial stability. Generating employment “is at the heart of the strategy of some countries to keep their currencies undervalued,” Lamy said in New Delhi. “Just as it is also at the heart of other countries’ loose monetary policies.” Competitive devaluations, which have raised fears of a global currency war, could trigger “tit-for-tat protectionism,” he told a business audience. Lamy singled out “unsustainable and socially unacceptable unemployment” levels around the world as the most serious challenge facing the global economy. But “uncoordinated ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies will not result in increased employment,” he said.7

Questions 1. What are competitive currency devaluations? What triggered them in 2003? 2. What mechanisms are used to create competitive devaluations? 3. What is QE2, and how does it affect the value of the U.S. dollar? 4. What are the effects of QE2 on other economies and why are nations opposed to it? 5. What ignited the fear of a currency war in 2010? 6. What are the similarities between 2003 and 2010? 7 “WTO

Fears ‘World Currency War’”, The Financial Daily (November 20, 2010).

The Bretton Woods System: 1946–1971 Under the Bretton Woods Agreement, implemented in 1946, each government pledged to maintain a fixed, or pegged, exchange rate for its currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar or gold. As one ounce of gold was set equal to US$35, fixing a currency’s gold price was equivalent to setting its exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar. For example, the Deutschmark (DM) was set equal to 1∕140 of an ounce of gold, meaning it was worth $0.25($35∕140). The exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate only within 1% of its stated par value (usually less in practice). The fixed exchange rates were maintained by official intervention in the foreign exchange markets. The intervention took the form of purchases and sales of U.S. dollars by foreign central banks against their own currencies whenever the supply-and-demand conditions in the market caused rates to deviate from the agreed-on par values. The IMF stood ready to provide the necessary foreign exchange to

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member nations defending their currencies against pressure resulting from temporary factors.8 Any U.S. dollars acquired by the monetary authorities in the process of such intervention could then be exchanged for gold at the U.S. Treasury, at a fixed price of $35 per ounce. These technical aspects of the system had important practical implications for all trading nations participating in it. In principle, the stability of exchange rates removed a great deal of uncertainty from international trade and investment transactions, thus promoting their growth for the benefit of all the participants. Also, in theory, the functioning of the system imposed a degree of discipline on the participating nations’ economic policies. For example, a country that followed policies leading to a higher rate of inflation than that experienced by its trading partners would experience a balance-of-payments deficit as its goods became more expensive, reducing its exports and increasing its imports. The necessary consequences of the deficit would be an increase in the supply of the deficit country’s currency on the foreign exchange markets. The excess supply would depress the exchange value of that country’s currency, forcing its authorities to intervene. The country would be obligated to “buy” with its reserves the excess supply of its own currency, effectively reducing the domestic money supply. Moreover, as the country’s reserves were gradually depleted through intervention, the authorities would be forced, sooner or later, to change economic policies to eliminate the source of the reserve-draining deficit. The reduction in the money supply and the adoption of restrictive policies would reduce the country’s inflation, thus bringing it in line with the rest of the world. In practice, however, governments perceived large political costs accompanying any exchange rate changes. Most governments also were unwilling to coordinate their monetary policies, even though this coordination was necessary to maintain existing currency values. The reluctance of governments to change currency values or to make the necessary economic adjustments to ratify the current values of their currencies led to periodic foreign exchange crises. Dramatic battles between the central banks and the foreign exchange markets ensued. Those battles invariably were won by the markets. However, because devaluation or revaluation was used only as a last resort, exchange rate changes were infrequent and large. In fact, Bretton Woods was a fixed exchange rate system in name only. Of 21 major industrial countries, only the United States and Japan had no change in par value from 1946 to 1971. Of the 21 countries, 12 devalued their currencies more than 30% against the U.S. dollar, four had revaluations, and four were floating their currencies by mid-1971 when the system collapsed. The deathblow came on August 15, 1971, when President Richard Nixon, convinced that the “run” on the dollar was reaching alarming proportions, abruptly ordered U.S. authorities to terminate convertibility even for central banks. At the same time, he devalued the U.S. dollar to deal with America’s emerging trade deficit. The fixed exchange rate system collapsed along with the dissolution of the gold standard. There are two related reasons for the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. First, inflation reared its ugly head in the United States. In the mid-1960s, the Johnson administration financed the escalating war in Vietnam and its equally expensive Great Society programs by, in effect, printing money instead of raising taxes. This lack of monetary discipline made it difficult for the United States to maintain the price of gold at $35 an ounce. Second, the fixed exchange rate system collapsed because some countries—primarily West Germany, Japan, and Switzerland—refused to accept the inflation that a fixed exchange rate with the dollar would have imposed on them. Thus, the U.S. dollar depreciated sharply relative to the currencies of those three countries. 8 In 1969, the IMF supplemented its foreign exchange reserves by creating a new reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right or SDR. The SDR serves as the IMF’s unit of account. It is a currency basket whose value is the weighted average of four key international currencies (U.S. dollar, euro, yen, and pound). The weights, which are based on the relative importance of each currency in international trade and finance (as measured by the share of each currency in world exports of goods and services and international reserves), are updated periodically.

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Lessons and Red Flags from Bretton Woods. The most important lesson from the Bretton Woods experience is that fixed exchange rates are not fixed in stone but require sound macroeconomic policies and policy coordination. A recurrent theme during the Bretton Woods era that remains relevant today for nations that fix exchange rates is the importance of self-imposed monetary and fiscal discipline. Uncoordinated expansionary monetary or fiscal policies should raise red flags because they are warning signs typically of an impending devaluation or a currency crisis. Alternatively, nations may pursue austerity to maintain the peg, implying a slowdown in the economy, and a different strategy by the financial manager and the MNC.

The Post-Bretton Woods System: 1971 to the Present In December 1971, under the Smithsonian Agreement, the U.S. dollar was devalued to 1/38 of an ounce of gold, and other currencies were revalued by agreed-on amounts vis-à-vis the dollar. After months of such last-ditch efforts to set new fixed rates, the world officially turned to floating exchange rates in 1973. Figure 3.9 charts the ups and downs of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen and British pound from 1973 to early 2014. During 1977 and 1978, the value of the dollar plummeted, and U.S. balance-of-payments difficulties were exacerbated as the Carter administration pursued an expansionary monetary policy that was significantly out of line with other strong currencies. The turnaround in the dollar’s fortunes can be dated to October 6, 1979, when the Federal Reserve (under its new chairman, Paul Volcker) announced a major change in its conduct of monetary policy. From then on, 1977–1978 1980–1985 U.S. dollar Vigorous devalues as economic an expansionary expansion monetary results in policy is adopted strong U.S. dollar and low inflation

U.S dollar depreciation

$3.00

$2.50

1985–1987 U.S. economic growth slows. G5 agrees to devalue U.S. dollar

1988–2008 U.S. dollar continues to fluctuate, coinciding with the relative strength of the U.S. economy Also known as “great moderation”

2008–2009 Credit crunch flight to the U.S. dollar Devalues as an expansionary monetary policy is adopted

2008– Period of quantitative easing and ultra low interest rates

$2.00

U.S dollar appreciation

$1.50

$1.00

$0.50

$ per £

FIGURE 3.9 Value of the U.S. Dollar in Terms of Euro, Yen, and Pounds: 1973–2014 Source: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/Index.asp? first=yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-1&ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIx.

1-Jul-13

1-Aug-12

1-Oct-10

1-Sep-11

1-Nov-09

1-Jan-08

1-Dec-08

1-Feb-07

1-Apr-05

1-Mar-06

1-May-04

1-Jul-02

$ per Y100

1-Jun-03

1-Aug-01

1-Oct-99

1-Sep-00

1-Nov-98

1-Jan-97

1-Dec-97

1-Feb-96

1-Apr-94

1-Mar-95

1-May-93

1-Jul-91

$ per €

1-Jun-92

1-Aug-90

1-Oct-88

1-Sep-89

1-Nov-87

1-Jan-86

1-Dec-86

1-Feb-85

1-Apr-83

1-Mar-84

1-May-82

1-Jul-80

1-Jun-81

1-Aug-79

1-Oct-77

1-Sep-78

1-Nov-76

1-Jan-75

1-Dec-75

$0.00

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106

in order to curb inflation, it would focus its efforts on stabilizing the money supply, even if that meant more volatile interest rates. Before this date, the Federal Reserve had attempted to stabilize interest rates, indirectly causing the money supply to be highly variable. This shift had its desired effect on both the inflation rate and the value of the U.S. dollar. During President Ronald Reagan’s first term in office (1981–1984), inflation plummeted and the dollar rebounded extraordinarily. This rebound has been attributed to vigorous economic expansion in the United States and to high real interest rates (owing largely to strong U.S. economic growth) that combined to attract capital from around the world. The dollar peaked in March 1985 and then began a long downhill slide. The slide is largely attributable to changes in government policy and the slowdown in U.S. economic growth relative to growth in the rest of the world. By September 1985, the U.S. dollar had fallen about 15% from its March high, but this decline was considered inadequate to dent the growing U.S. trade deficit. In late September 1985, representatives of the Group of Five, or G-5 nations (the United States, France, Japan, United Kingdom, and West Germany), met at the Plaza Hotel in New York City. The outcome was the Plaza Agreement, a coordinated program designed to force down the U.S. dollar against other major currencies and thereby improve American competitiveness. The policy to bring down the value of the U.S. dollar worked too well. The dollar slid so fast during 1986 that the central banks of Japan, West Germany, and the United Kingdom reversed their policies and began buying dollars to stem the dollar’s decline. Believing that the dollar had declined enough and in fact showed signs of “overshooting” its equilibrium level, the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy—also known as the Group of Seven, or G-7 nations—met again in February 1987 and agreed to an ambitious plan to slow the dollar’s fall. The Louvre Accord, named for the Paris landmark where it was negotiated, called for the G-7 nations to support the falling dollar by pegging exchange rates within a narrow, undisclosed range, while they also moved to bring their economic policies into line. As always, however, it proved much easier to talk about coordinating policy than to change it. The hoped-for economic cooperation faded, and the U.S. dollar continued to fall (see Figure 3.10).

165

Feb. 22 G-7 nations sign Louvre Accord on exchange rates.

160

Dollar in yen (daily prices)

155 150 145

Apr. 15 Tres. Secy. Baker says further dollar declines could be counterproductive. June 2 Volcker says he will step down as Fed chairman.

June 23 Intervention fuels speculation that G-7 exchange rate bands exist.

Aug. 14 Unexpectedly wide U.S. trade deficit reported. Sept. 7 Fed raises discount rate to 6% from 51/2%.

140

Oct. 18 Baker says United States may allow dollar to fall further. Nov. 5 Baker says avoiding recession is more vital than aiding dollar. Dec. 22 G-7 nations say the dollar has fallen enough.

135 130 125 120 Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

FIGURE 3.10 Effects of Government Actions and Statements on the Value of the 1987 Dollar

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Beginning in early 1988, the U.S. dollar rallied somewhat and then maintained its strength against most currencies through 1989. It fell sharply in 1990 but then stayed basically flat in 1991 and 1992, while posting sharp intrayear swings. The dollar began falling again in 1993, particularly against the yen and DM, and it fell throughout most of 1994 and 1995 before rallying again in 1996. The dollar continued its upward direction through December 2001 owing to the sustained strength of the U.S. economy. Even after the U.S. economy began to slow in late 2000, it still looked strong compared to those of its major trading partners. However, in 2002, the sluggishness of the U.S. economy and

Application

Global Financial Crisis Boosts the U.S. Dollar

In 2008, the United States faced its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. However, an observer would not know that from watching the U.S. dollar. Rather than sinking under the weight of hundreds of billions of dollars in mortgage write-offs, trillions of dollars in lost wealth from plummeting stock prices and home values, a financial sector that required a $700 billion bailout, and a tanking economy, the dollar jumped in value against most other currencies (see Figure 3.11). The reason is

simple: the dollar benefitted from the global flight from risky assets, and the corresponding demand for U.S. Treasury bonds, as well as the unwinding of risky investments made with borrowed dollars, all of which increased the demand for U.S. dollars. Moreover, it was clear that economic and banking woes were not unique to the United States. Amid the financial crisis, the U.S. dollar reclaimed its status as the world’s safe haven during tumultuous times.

Trade-weighted exchange rate index: major currencies (March 1973 = 100)

90

85

80

75

70

65

08 4/2 3/0 8 5/7 /08 5/2 1/0 8 6/4 /08 6/1 8/0 8 7/2 /08 7/1 6/0 8 7/3 0/0 8 8/1 3/0 8 8/2 7/0 8 9/1 0/0 8 9/2 4/0 8 10 /8/ 08 10 /22 /08

4/9 /

2/0 8 3/2 6/0 8

7/0 8

3/1

3/0 8

2/2

/08

2/1

/08

1/3 0

1/1 6

1/2 /08

60

FIGURE 3.11 U.S. Dollar Rises on Global Financial Crisis Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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low U.S. interest rates, combined with the fear of war in Iraq (and later the actual war) and concerns over the large U.S. trade and budget deficits, resulted in a significant decline in the value of the dollar relative to the euro and other currencies. This decline continued through early 2008 despite U.S. economic recovery in the mid-2000s. The dollar then rose in mid-2008 as it became a safe haven currency during the global economic crisis. Once the crisis began to abate, the U.S. dollar’s rebound against the European currencies and the yen abated, but the crisis in the Eurozone temporarily halted this decline. However, a combination of historically low U.S. interest rates, huge government deficits, and a weak economy put further downward pressure on the U.S. dollar. The dollar’s future course is unpredictable given the absence of an anchor for its value.

Assessment of the Floating-Rate System At the time floating rates were adopted in 1973, proponents said that the new system would reduce economic volatility and facilitate free trade. In particular, floating exchange rates would offset international differences in inflation rates so that trade, wages, employment, and output would not have to adjust. High-inflation countries would see their currencies depreciate, allowing their firms to stay competitive without having to cut wages or employment. At the same time, currency appreciation would not place firms in low-inflation countries at a competitive disadvantage. Real exchange rates would stabilize, even if permitted to float in principle, because the underlying conditions affecting trade and the relative productivity of capital would change only gradually; and if countries would coordinate their monetary policies to achieve a convergence of inflation rates, then nominal exchange rates would also stabilize. Increasing Currency Volatility. The experience to date, however, is disappointing. The U.S. dollar’s ups and downs have had little to do with actual inflation and a lot to do with expectations of future government policies and economic conditions. Put another way, real exchange rate volatility has increased, not decreased, since floating began. This instability reflects, in part, nonmonetary (or real) shocks to the world economy, such as changing oil prices and shifting competitiveness among countries, but these real shocks were not obviously greater during the 1980s or 1990s than they were in earlier periods. Instead, uncertainty over future government policies has increased. The currency volatility has translated into substantial redistribution of multinational profits. In the third quarter of 2009, for instance, the euro’s rebound led to companies inside the Eurozone suffering a 27% fall in profits compared with only a 1.2% fall in profits for companies outside the Eurozone. The volatility has made it considerably more challenging to plan international investment decisions. Given this evidence of volatility and its consequences, a number of economists and others have called for a return to fixed exchange rates. To the extent that fixed exchange rates more tightly constrain the types of monetary and other policies governments can pursue, this approach should make expectations less volatile and, hence, promote exchange rate stability. Requirements for Currency Stability. Although history offers no convincing model for a system that will lead to long-term exchange rate stability among major currencies, it does point to two basic requirements. First, the system must be credible. If the market expects an exchange rate to be changed, the battle to keep it fixed is already lost. Second, the system must have price stability built into its very core. Without price stability, the system will not be credible. An increasing number of industrialized and emerging economies that either float or use a managed float for their currencies have adopted inflation targeting, where the central bank is committed to a low inflation rate. Even with tightly coordinated monetary policies, freely floating exchange rates would still exhibit some volatility because of real economic shocks. However, this volatility is not necessarily a bad thing because it could make adjustment to these shocks easier.

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Individual countries can peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar or other benchmark currency. However, the Asian and other crises demonstrate that the only credible system for such pegging is a currency board or dollarization. Every other system is too subject to political manipulation and can be too easily abandoned. Even a currency board can come unglued, as in the case of Argentina (see Chapter 2), if the government pursues sufficiently wrong-headed economic policies. An alternative system for a fixed-rate system is monetary union. Under monetary union, individual countries replace their local currencies with a common currency. An example of monetary union is the United States, with all 50 states sharing the same dollar. In a far-reaching experiment, Europe embarked on monetary union in 1999, following its experiences with the European Monetary System.

3.3 The European Monetary System and Monetary Union The European Monetary System (EMS) began operating in March 1979. Its purpose was to foster monetary stability in the European Economic Community (EEC), also known as the Common Market. As part of this system, the members established the European Currency Unit, which played a central role in the functioning of the EMS. The European Currency Unit (ECU) was a composite currency consisting of fixed amounts of the 12 European Community member currencies. The quantity of each country’s currency in the ECU reflects that country’s relative economic strength in the European Community. The ECU functioned as a unit of account, a means of settlement, and a reserve asset for the members of the EMS. In 1993, the EEC was renamed the European Community (EC). The EC became one of the three pillars of the European Union (EU), which was established in 1993. In 2009, the EC was abolished and replaced by the EU. The EU currently has 28 member states.

The Exchange-Rate Mechanism At the heart of the system was an exchange-rate mechanism (ERM), which allowed each member of the EMS to determine a mutually agreed-on central exchange rate for its currency; each rate was denominated in currency units per ECU. These central rates attempted to establish equilibrium exchange values, but members could seek adjustments to the central rates. Central rates established a grid of bilateral cross-exchange rates between the currencies. Nations participating in the ERM pledged to keep their currencies within a 15% margin on either side of these central cross-exchange rates (±2.25% for the Deutschmark/Dutch guilder cross rate). The upper and lower intervention levels for each currency pair were found by applying the appropriate margin to their central cross-exchange rate. The original intervention limits were set at 2.25% above and below the central cross rates (Spain and Britain had 6% margins) but were later changed. Despite good intentions, the ERM came unglued in a series of speculative attacks that began in 1992. By mid-1993, the EMS had slipped into a two-tiered system. One tier consisted of a core group of currencies tightly anchored by the Deutschmark. That tier included the Dutch guilder; the French, Belgian, and Luxembourg francs; and at times the Danish krone. The other tier consisted of weaker currencies such as those of Spain, Portugal, Britain, Italy, and Ireland.

Lessons from the European Monetary System A review of the European Monetary System and its history provides valuable insights into the operation of a target-zone system and illustrates the problems that such mechanisms are likely to encounter. Perhaps the most important lesson the EMS illustrates is that the exchange rate stability afforded by any target-zone arrangement requires a coordination of economic policy objectives and practices. Nations should achieve convergence of those economic variables that directly affect

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exchange rates—variables such as fiscal deficits, monetary growth rates, and real economic growth differentials. Although the system helped keep its member currencies in a remarkably narrow zone of stability between 1987 and 1992, it had a history of ups and downs. By January 12, 1987, when the last realignment before September 1992 occurred, the values of the EMS currencies had been realigned 12 times despite heavy central bank intervention. Relative to their positions in March 1979, the Deutschmark and the Dutch guilder soared, while the French franc and the Italian lira nosedived. Between 1979 and 1988, the French franc devalued relative to the Deutschmark by more than 50%. The reason for the past failure of the European Monetary System to provide the currency stability it promised is straightforward: Germany’s economic policymakers, responding to an electorate hypersensitive to inflation, put a premium on price stability; in contrast, the French pursued a more expansive monetary policy in response to high domestic unemployment. Neither country was willing to permit exchange rate considerations to override political priorities. The experience of the EMS also demonstrates once again that foreign exchange market intervention not supported by a change in a nation’s monetary policy has only a limited influence on exchange rates.

The Currency Crisis of September 1992 The same attempt to maintain increasingly misaligned exchange rates in the EMS occurred again in 1992. And once again, in September 1992, the system broke down. The Catalyst. The catalyst for the September currency crisis was the Bundesbank’s decision to tighten monetary policy and force up German interest rates both to battle inflationary pressures associated with the spiraling costs of bailing out the former East Germany and to attract the inflows of foreign capital needed to finance the resulting German budget deficit. To defend their currency parities with the Deutschmark, the other member countries had to match the high interest rates in Germany (see Figure 3.12). The deflationary effects of high interest rates were accompanied by a prolonged economic slump and even higher unemployment rates in Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and most other EMS members. As the costs of maintaining exchange rate stability rose, the markets began betting that some countries with weaker economies would devalue their currencies or withdraw them from the ERM altogether rather than maintain painfully high interest rates at a time of rising unemployment. The High Cost of Intervention. To combat speculative attacks on their currencies, nations had to raise their interest rates dramatically: 15% in the United Kingdom and Italy, 13.75% in Spain, 13% 20

Interest rates (%)

110

c03.tex

France

15

Great Britain

10 5 Germany 0 1980

82

84

United States 86

88

90

FIGURE 3.12 Defending the ERM Required High Interest Rates in Europe Source: Data from OECD and Federal Reserve, September 30, 1992.

92

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in France, and an extraordinary 500% in Sweden. They also intervened aggressively in the foreign exchange markets. British, French, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish central banks together spent the equivalent of roughly US$100 billion trying to prop up their currencies, with the Bank of England reported to have spent US$15 billion to US$20 billion in just one day to support the British pound. The Bundesbank spent another US$50 billion in Deutschmarks to support the ERM. All to no avail. On September 14, the central banks capitulated but not before losing an estimated US$4 billion to US$6 billion in their mostly futile attempt to maintain the ERM. Despite these costly efforts, the United Kingdom and Italy were forced to drop out of the ERM, and Spain, Portugal, and Ireland devalued their currencies within the ERM. In addition, Sweden, Norway, and Finland were forced to abandon their currencies’ unofficial links to the ERM.

The Exchange Rate Mechanism is Abandoned in August 1993 The final straw was the currency crisis of August 1993, which actually was touched off on July 29, 1993, when the Bundesbank left its key lending rate, the discount rate, unchanged. Traders and investors had been expecting the Bundesbank to cut the discount rate to relieve pressure on the French franc and other weak currencies within the ERM. As had happened the year before, however, the Bundesbank largely disregarded the pleas of its ERM partners and concentrated on reining in 4.3% German inflation and its fast-growing money supply. Given the way the ERM worked, and the central role played by the Deutschmark, other countries could not both lower interest rates and keep their currencies within their ERM bands unless Germany did so. The Catalyst. The French franc was the main focus of the ERM struggle. With high real interest rates, recession, and unemployment running at a post-World War II high of 11.6%, speculators doubted that France had the willpower to stay with the Bundesbank’s tight monetary policy and keep its interest rates high, much less raise them to defend the franc. Speculators reacted logically: they dumped the French franc and other European currencies and bought Deutschmarks, gambling that economic pressures, such as rising unemployment and deepening recession, would prevent these countries from keeping their interest rates well above those in Germany. In other words, speculators bet—rightly, as it turned out—that domestic priorities would ultimately win out despite governments’ pledges to the contrary. Governments Surrender to the Market. Despite heavy foreign exchange market intervention (the Bundesbank alone spent US$35 billion trying to prop up the franc), the devastating assault by speculators on the ERM forced the franc to its ERM floor. Other European central banks also intervened heavily to support the Danish krone, Spanish peseta, Portuguese escudo, and Belgian franc, which came under heavy attack as well. It was all to no avail, however. Without capital controls or a credible commitment to move to a single currency in the near future, speculators could easily take advantage of a one-sided bet. The result was massive capital flows that overwhelmed the central banks’ ability to stabilize exchange rates. Over the weekend of July 31 to August 1, the EU finance ministers agreed essentially to abandon the defense of each other’s currencies and the European Monetary System became a floating-rate system in all but name only. A Postmortem on the EMS. The currency turmoil of 1992 to 1993 showed once again that a genuinely stable European Monetary System, and eventually a single currency, requires the political will to direct fiscal and monetary policies at that European goal and not at purely national ones. In showing that they lacked that will, European governments proved once again that allowing words to run ahead of actions is a recipe for failure.

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Inflation rate (%)

20

Ireland

15

France

10

Denmark Belgium

5 0 –

Germany Holland 1979 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

20 Inflation rate (%)

112

15 10

Italy Spain

Britain

5 Germany 0 –

1979 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

FIGURE 3.13 The European Monetary System Forces Convergence Towards Germany’s Inflation Rate

On the other hand, despite its problems, the EMS did achieve some significant success. By improving monetary policy coordination among its member states, the EMS succeeded in narrowing inflation differentials in Europe. Inflation rates tended to converge toward Germany’s lower rate as other countries adjusted their monetary policies to more closely mimic Germany’s low-inflation policy (see Figure 3.13). For example, in 1980, the gap between the highest inflation rate (Italy’s 21.2%) and the lowest (West Germany’s 5.2%) was 16 percentage points. By 1990 the gap had narrowed to less than 4 percentage points. To summarize, the EMS was based on Germany’s continuing ability to deliver low inflation rates and low real interest rates. As long as Germany lived up to its end of the bargain, the benefits to other EMS members of following the Bundesbank’s policies would exceed the costs. But once the German government broke that compact by running huge and inflationary deficits, the costs to most members of following a Bundesbank monetary policy designed to counter the effects of the government’s fiscal policies exceeded the benefits. Put another way, the existing exchange rates became unrealistic given what would have been required of the various members to maintain those exchange rates. In the end, there was no real escape from market forces.

European Monetary Union Many politicians and commentators pointed to the turmoil in the EMS as increasing the need for the European Union to move toward monetary union. This view prevailed and was formalized in the Maastricht Treaty. Under this treaty, the EU nations would establish a single central bank with the sole power to issue a single European currency called the euro as of January 1, 1999. On that date, conversion rates would be locked in for member currencies, and the euro would become a currency, although euro coins and bills would not be available until 2002. All went as planned. Francs, marks, guilders, schillings, and other member currencies were phased out until, on January 1, 2002, the euro replaced them all. Maastricht Convergence Criteria. In order to join the European Monetary Union (EMU), European nations were supposed to meet tough standards on inflation, currency stability, and deficit spending. According to these standards, known as the Maastricht criteria, government debt could be no more than 60% of gross domestic product (GDP), the government budget deficit could not exceed 3% of GDP, the inflation rate could not be more than 1.5 percentage points above the average rate of Europe’s three lowest-inflation nations, and long-term interest rates could not be more than 2 percentage points higher than the average interest rate in the three lowest-inflation nations. The restrictions

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on budget deficits and debt, codified in the Stability and Growth Pact, were designed to ensure a basic convergence of fiscal policies across the Eurozone and impose fiscal discipline on imprudent governments to stop them from undermining the euro. It should be noted that most countries, including Germany, fudged some of their figures through one-time maneuvers (redefining government debt or selling off government assets) or fudged the criteria (Italy’s debt/GDP ratio was 121%) in order to qualify. Nonetheless, on May 2, 1998, the European Parliament formally approved the historic decision to launch the euro with 11 founder nations—Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Portugal, Austria, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Britain, Sweden, and Denmark opted out of the launch. On January 1, 2001, Greece became the twelfth country to adopt the euro when it was finally able to meet the economic convergence criteria. Since then, the Eurozone has expanded by six more members: Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), and Latvia (2014) bringing the total to 18. The United Kingdom is still debating whether to join EMU and retire the pound sterling. Launch of the Euro. As planned, on January 1, 1999, the 11 founding member countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) surrendered their monetary autonomy to the new European Central Bank and gave up their right to create money; only the European Central Bank (ECB) is now able to do so. Governments can issue bonds denominated in euros, just as individual states in the United States can issue bonds. However, like California or New York, member nations are unable to print the currency needed to service their debts. Instead, they can only attract investors by convincing them they have the financial ability (through taxes and other revenues) to generate the euros to repay their debts. This setup presented a clear division of labor; the ECB would provide price stability whereas each member state would be responsible for its own budgetary and borrowing needs. The conversion rates between the individual national currencies and the euro for the founder nations in 1999 are presented in Figure 3.14. EMU and the European Welfare State. The monetary union had two central goals: currency stability and economic reform. The latter entailed reining in the expensive European welfare state and its costly regulations. Because of high taxes, generous social welfare and jobless benefits, mandatory worker benefit packages, and costly labor market regulations that make it expensive to hire and difficult to fire workers, all of which reduce incentives to work, save, invest, and create jobs, and

Austrian schilling Belgian franc Dutch guilder Finnish markka French franc Greek drachma German mark Irish punt Italian lira Luxembourg franc Portuguese escudo Spanish peseta

FIGURE 3.14 Conversion Rates for the Euro

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Currency Symbol

1 euro =

ATS BEF NLG FIM FRF GRD DEM IEP ITL LUF PTE ESP

13.7603 40.3399 2.20371 5.94573 6.55957 340.75 1.95583 0.787564 1936.27 40.3399 200.482 166.386

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diminished competitiveness fostered by onerous regulations on business as well as state subsidies and government protection to ailing industries, job growth has been stagnant throughout Western Europe for three decades. (Western Europe failed to create a single net new job from 1973 to 1994, a period during which the United States generated 38 million net new jobs.) As a result, the European unemployment rate in the late 1990s was averaging about 12% (in contrast to less than 5% for the United States). However, although crucial for strong and sustained economic growth, limiting the modern welfare state is politically risky; too many people live off the state. Enter the Maastricht Treaty. European governments could blame the strict Maastricht criteria they had to meet to enter the EMU for the need to take the hard steps that most economists believe are necessary for ending economic stagnation: curbing social welfare expenditures, including overly generous pension, unemployment, and healthcare benefits and costly job creation programs; reducing costly regulations on business; increasing labor market flexibility (primarily by lowering the cost to companies of hiring and firing workers and relaxing collective-bargaining rules); cutting personal, corporate, and payroll taxes (the latter exceeding 42% of gross wages in Germany); and selling off state-owned enterprises (a process known as privatization). Thus, the greatest benefit from monetary union was expected to be the long-term economic gains that came from the fiscal discipline required for entry.

Application

Sweden Rejects the Euro

On September 14, 2003, Swedish voters soundly rejected a proposal to adopt the euro and kept the krona, despite the overwhelming support of the nation’s business and political establishment and a last-minute wave of sympathy following the stabbing to death of the country’s popular and pro-euro foreign minister, Anna Lindh. A critical reason for the defeat: fears that adhering to the budget rules necessary to become a member of EMU would force Sweden to become more competitive and cut taxes. That, in turn, would compel Sweden to slash its generous and expensive cradle-to-grave social welfare system. Moreover, when Swedish voters went to the polls, the Swedish economy

was stronger than the Eurozone economy, its budget was in surplus (in contrast to large Eurozone deficits), and unemployment was well below the Eurozone average. The European Central Bank was criticized for keeping interest rates too high for too long, stifling growth, and Eurozone cooperation on fiscal policy was in disarray (with the rules for budget deficits under the Maastricht criteria flouted by France and Germany). The perception that Sweden was conducting economic policy more intelligently than the Eurozone and with superior results made joining EMU less appealing as well.

Fortunately, Europe has begun to enact structural changes such as tax cuts and pension reforms to stimulate growth. For example, France, Germany, and Portugal have enacted cuts in personal and corporate taxes. In addition, Germany started to revamp its costly retirement, healthcare, and welfare systems and modify its rigid labor laws, while France and Italy are attempting to overhaul their expensive pension systems. Nonetheless, because of strong resistance to these necessary changes, reform has been limited. One sign of this resistance was that in March 2005, largely at the behest of France and Germany, which had violated the 3% of GDP budget deficit ceiling for three years in a row, the EU finance ministers agreed to render almost meaningless the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Another was the rejection of the European constitution in May/June 2005 by France and the Netherlands, largely because of concerns that it threatened the European welfare state. Politicians found it easier to keep spending and borrowing, while shying away from unpopular reforms such as

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liberalizing labor laws and reducing costly business regulations, than to impose hard choices on the electorate before it was absolutely necessary.9 The predictable result is that the costs of monetary union have been high because member nations are no longer able to use currency or interest rate adjustments to compensate for the pervasive labor market rigidities and expensive welfare programs that characterize the modern European economy. Ultimately, the consequences of half-hearted economic reform and of permitting the fiscal convergence rules to be regularly flouted or fudged came home to roost in 2010 when first Greece, followed by Ireland, and then Portugal were racked by debt crises (see Mini-Cases: A Greek Tragedy and A Wounded Celtic Tiger Has Its Paws Out). Consequences of EMU. Business clearly benefits from EMU through lower cross-border currency conversion costs. For example, Philips, the giant Dutch electronics company, estimates that a single European currency saves it US$300 million a year in currency transaction costs. Overall, the EU Commission estimates that prior to the euro, businesses in Europe spent US$13 billion a year converting money from one EU currency to another. Ordinary citizens also bore some substantial currency conversion costs. A tourist who left Paris with 1,000 French francs and visited the other 11 EU countries, exchanging their money for the local currency in each country but not spending any of it, would have found themselves with fewer than 500 francs when they returned to Paris. Firms selling within the Eurozone will also find corporate planning, pricing, and invoicing easier with a common currency. Adoption of a common currency benefits the European economy in other ways as well. It eliminates the risk of currency fluctuations and facilitates cross-border price comparisons. Lower risk and improved price transparency encourage the flow of trade and investments among member countries and have brought about greater integration of Europe’s capital, labor, and commodity markets and a more efficient allocation of resources within the region as a whole. Increased trade and price transparency, in turn, has intensified Europe-wide competition in goods and services and spurred a wave of corporate restructurings and mergers and acquisitions. Once the euro arrived, companies could no longer justify, or sustain, large price differentials within the Eurozone. Many companies have responded by changing their pricing policies so as to have single pan-European prices, or at least far narrower price differentials than in the past. Similarly, big retailers and manufacturers are increasingly buying from their suppliers at a single euro price, as opposed to buying locally in each country in which they operate. The evidence so far appears to show that EMU has resulted in a lower cost of capital and higher expected cash flows for the firms in countries that adopted the euro. The lower cost of capital is particularly pronounced for firms in countries with weak currencies prior to EMU. Such countries suffered from credibility problems in their monetary policies that resulted in high real interest rates before adopting the euro. The lower cost of capital and higher expected cash flows have had their predicted effect on corporate investment, with one study showing that investments for EMU firms have grown 2.5% more annually than for non-EMU firms after 1999.10 However, the Eurozone crisis 9 In a stunning man-bites-dog story, the chairman of China Investment Corporation, China’s sovereign wealth fund, explained in an interview on al-Jazeera television in November 2011 that China was unwilling to invest its money in the European Financial Stability Fund, which European leaders wanted to beef up to use for future bailouts, unless Europe changed its labor laws and adjusted its welfare system: “If you look at the troubles which happened in European countries, this is purely because of the accumulated troubles of the worn out welfare society. I think the labor laws are outdated. The labor laws induce sloth, indolence, rather than hardworking [sic]. The incentive system, is totally out of whack.” The world has turned upside down when a communist lectures the West on the importance of incentives in stimulating economic activity, the virtues of liberalizing labor markets to encourage hard work, and the need to roll back the welfare state to promote economic growth. 10 Arturo Bris, Yrjö Koskinen, and Mattias Nilsson, “The Real Effects of the Euro: Evidence from Corporate Investments”, Yale University, working paper, June 2004 (http://faculty.som.yale.edu/∼ab364/euroinv.pdf). This paper also summarizes much of the earlier evidence on the corporate effects of the euro.

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that started in 2010 reversed many of these gains, especially for firms in the most badly affected countries as local borrowing costs rose and the stock market crashed. On a macroeconomic level, monetary union—such as exists among the 50 states of the United States, where the exchange rate between states is immutably set at 1—provides the ultimate in coordination of monetary policy. Inflation rates under monetary union converges, but not in the same way as in the EMS. The common inflation rate is decided by the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. It would tend to reflect the average preferences of the people running the bank, rather than giving automatic weight to the most anti-inflationary nation as in the current system. Thus, for the European Monetary Union to be an improvement over the past state of affairs, the European Central Bank must be as averse to inflation as Europe’s previous de facto central bank—the Bundesbank. To ensure the European Monetary Union’s inflation-fighting success, the central bankers must be granted true independence along with a statutory duty to devote monetary policy to keeping the price level stable. Even now, after being in existence for more than a decade, independence of the European Central Bank is an unsettled issue. Germans, who favor a strong, fiercely independent ECB modeled on the Bundesbank, fear that other Eurozone nations will politicize it by using it to push job creation and other schemes requiring an expansionist (and, hence, inflationary) monetary policy. Many Europeans see the Germans as favoring price stability over compassion for the unemployed. This dispute points out a hard reality: the ECB will find it difficult to be tough on inflation without the benefit of a uniformly prudent fiscal policy across all its member states, a policy that is still lacking. Events since the global financial crisis in 2008 and within the Eurozone since 2010 have highlighted increasing differences between the German view and that of other ECB member states. These fundamental disagreements have limited the range and extent of the policy responses within the Eurozone compared to countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States where monetary policy responses have been far more proactive in addressing the recessionary conditions in those countries. The United States and the United Kingdom have both engaged in extensive quantitative easing to address the consequences of the 2008–2009 credit crunch. Another important issue in forming a monetary union is that of who gets the benefits of seignorage—the profit to the central bank from money creation. In other words, who gets to spend the proceeds from printing money? In the United States, the answer is the federal government. In the case of Europe, however, this issue has not been resolved. An unspoken reason for strong business support for European Monetary Union is to boost growth by breaking the grip of government and unions on European economies. As described earlier, meeting the Maastricht criteria—particularly the one dealing with the reduced budget deficit—was expected to help diminish the role of the state in Europe and its tax-financed cradle-to-grave benefits. Many economists believe that only by cutting back on government and its generous—and increasingly unaffordable—social welfare programs and costly business and labor market regulations can the stagnant economies of Western Europe start to grow again and create jobs. Indeed, in late February 2012, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi warned his member states that there is no escape from tough austerity measures coupled with labor market reforms and that the vaunted European social model—which places a premium on job security and generous safety nets—is obsolete and “already gone”.11 Performance of the Euro. The euro was born in optimism given the size and economic potential of the European Union (see Figure 3.15). However, reality set in quickly. Although many commentators believed that the euro would soon replace the U.S. dollar as the world’s de facto currency, 11 Brian

Blackstone, Matthew Karnitschnig, and Robert Thomson, “Europe’s Banker Talks Tough”, Wall Street Journal (February 24, 2012): A1.

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Population GDP Share of world GDP Exports Imports Share of World trade (% of World export)

117

Euro 18

United States

China

Japan

355 million $11.07 trillion 11% $900 billion $959 billion 4

317 million $16.0 trillion 16% $1, 564 billion $2, 299 billion 7.7

1,350 million $12.61 trillion 12% $2, 057 billion $1, 735 billion 10.1

127 million $4.70 trillion 5% $774 billion $831 billion 3.8

FIGURE 3.15 Comparative Statistics for the EMU Countries Source: CIA World Facebook, 2013 Estimate. GDP in U.S. dollars at purchasing power parity.

Figure 3.16 shows that until 2002, the euro mostly fell against the U.S. dollar. The euro’s decline during this period has been attributed to the robustness of the U.S. economy combined with the slowness of many European countries in performing the necessary restructuring of their economies that the euro was supposed to initiate. As one currency analyst said, “The U.S. economy is considered flexible, dynamic and productive; that contrasts with a view of Europe as a region burdened with high taxes, labor and product rigidities and bloated bureaucracies.”12 Beginning in 2002, however, continuing slow U.S. growth, large U.S. budget deficits, and aggressive Federal Reserve lowering of U.S. interest rates, combined with higher yields on euro-denominated securities and signs of significant structural reform in European economies, led to a dramatic rise in the value of the euro. $1.70 $1.60 $1.50 $1.40 $1.30 $1.20 $1.10 $1.00 $0.90

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

$0.80

FIGURE 3.16 The Euro Rides a Rollercoaster Data Source: U.S. Federal Reserve System. Rates are noon buying rates in New York City for cable transfers. Data for 9/11/01 are missing owing to the shutdown of financial trading in New York City following the destruction of the World Trade Center.

12

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Michael R.Sesit, “The Dollar Crash That Hasn’t Happened”, Wall Street Journal (July 6, 2001): A6.

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One explanation for the U.S. dollar’s large decline against the euro has been the large and growing U.S. trade deficit. This deficit has now reached a point where it is unsustainable (see Chapter 5) and so must be corrected. One such corrective is a large fall in the value of the U.S. dollar, which translates into a rise in the euro. Following the global financial crisis and the crisis in Greece, the euro began to fall against the dollar again. However, those who bet that this trend would continue lost. Subsequent ups and downs in the euro’s value have depended on which was worse at any point in time: the depressing fundamentals behind the dollar—sluggish U.S. economic growth, huge budget and trade deficits, and low U.S. interest rates—or the European debt crisis and all its adverse economic effects. One other point: the euro, which has risen significantly since 2002, has increased more than it otherwise would have because it must shoulder a disproportionate share of the U.S. dollar’s decline. The reason is that, as we have already seen, several U.S. trading partners, such as China and Japan, have resisted a rise in their currencies. In the interlocking world of foreign exchange, if the yuan cannot appreciate against the U.S. dollar, then other currencies, and especially the euro, have to compensate by appreciating even more to make up for the fixed yuan. Suppose, for example, that the U.S. dollar must decline by 10% to reach its appropriate trade-weighted value. If the yuan remains pegged to the U.S. dollar, then other currencies must rise by more than 10% against the dollar to achieve overall balance. On May 1, 2004, the European Union welcomed 10 new countries, bringing total EU membership to 25 nations with a combined population of 455 million. Most of the new members come from the former East Bloc, with two from the Mediterranean area: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. As part of the admissions bargain, countries joining the EU are obligated to strive toward the eventual adoption of the euro upon fulfillment of the convergence criteria. As noted earlier, six of these new EU members (Cyprus, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) have already joined EMU. Integration into the monetary union represents a key step toward full economic integration within the EU and has the potential to deliver considerable economic benefits to the new members. In particular, it helps countries reap the full benefits of the EU’s single market, as it works in parallel with the free movement of goods, labor, services, and capital, favoring an efficient allocation of resources. Moreover, the process and prospect of joining EMU may help anchor expectations and support the implementation of sound macroeconomic and structural policies.

Optimum Currency Area Most discussion of European monetary union has highlighted its benefits, such as eliminating currency uncertainty and lowering the costs of doing business. The potential costs of currency integration have been overlooked. In particular, it may sometimes pay to be able to change the value of one currency relative to another. Suppose, for example, that the worldwide demand for French goods falls sharply. To cope with such a drop in demand, France must make its goods less expensive and attract new industries to replace its shrinking old ones. The quickest way to do this is to reduce French wages, thereby making its workers more competitive. But this reduction is unlikely to be accomplished quickly. Eventually, high unemployment might persuade French workers to accept lower pay. But in the interim, the social and economic costs of reducing wages by, say, 10% will be high. In contrast, a 10% depreciation of the French franc would achieve the same thing quickly and relatively painlessly. Conversely, a worldwide surge in demand for French goods could give rise to French inflation, unless France allowed the franc to appreciate. In other words, currency changes can substitute for periodic bouts of inflation and deflation caused by various economic shocks. Once France has entered monetary union and replaces the franc with the euro, it no longer has the option of changing its exchange rate to cope with these shocks. This option would have been valuable to the ERM, which

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instead became unglued because of the huge economic shock to its fixed parities brought about by the absorption of East Germany into the German economy.

The French Say Non to a European Constitution and the Euro Responds

Application

On Sunday, May 29, 2005, French voters resoundingly rejected a proposed constitution for the European Union. The concern expressed by most of these “non” voters was that the constitution would force open their borders wider, accelerating economic competition and further endangering their treasured social welfare programs. Three days later, voters in the Netherlands rejected the constitution by an even larger margin. In response, the euro fell dramatically against the U.S. dollar (see Figure 3.17). The rejection of the European constitution underscored Europe’s political woes and the myriad challenges facing the euro and Eurozone economies. Sunday’s non by 55% of French voters led investors to reassess the prospects of Europe’s ability to manage a common currency without a unified government to back it up. Most important, currency traders worried that the French and Dutch votes were part of a broader populist protest against free trade and free

markets that would slow the pace of economic integration and reform in the Eurozone. That would make Europe a less desirable place to invest, reducing the demand for euros. The French and Dutch votes reinforced the view that Europe was unwilling and unable to make tough economic and political decisions. We saw earlier that even before the constitution problems arose, EMU countries had fudged rules to limit government spending considered key to underpinning the currency. They had also fought over a rule to remove cross-border barriers to services industries, with France and other nations seeking protection from low-cost service providers. As can be seen in Figure 3.17, the fear that Europe would reverse course on economic liberalization in response to persistently high unemployment and stagnant economic growth had already resulted in a falling euro earlier in the year.

$1.27 $1.26 $1.25 French vote $1.24 $1.23

Dutch vote

$1.22 $1.21 $1.20 $1.19

Jun e1 0

9 Jun e

8 Jun e

7 Jun e

6 Jun e

3 Jun e

2 Jun e

1 Jun e

Ma y3 1

7 Ma y2

6 Ma y2

Ma y2 5

4 Ma y2

Ma y2 3

$1.18

FIGURE 3.17 The Euro Tumbles in Response to the “No” Vote on the European Constitution in 2005

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Mini-Case

The Euro Reacts to New Information

While it might be expected that the European Central Bank might react by loosening monetary policy in response to the economic downturn in 2008, in fact this did not happen. Wim Duisenberg, the then President of the ECB, added to the markets’ expectations that the ECB was contemplating a rise in interest rates later in the year. The markets responded by pushing up the value of the euro, a factor that would not help the Eurozone economies. In Britain, the Bank of England decided to keep its official rate, the base rate, unchanged at 5.25% in order to support the British pound and to reduce imported inflation. Stopping the pound depreciating would pressure UK manufacturers into reducing costs and moderating price rises. On the other hand, raising interest rates would most likely lead to a stronger pound that would severely affect UK exporters.

Questions 1. Explain the differing initial and subsequent reactions of the euro to news about the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. 2. How does a strong British pound reduce the threat of imported inflation and work against higher interest rates? 3. Which U.K. manufacturers are likely to be pressured by a strong British pound? 4. Why might higher British pound interest rates send the currency even higher? 5. What tools are available to the European Central Bank and the Bank of England to manage their monetary policies?

Taking this logic to its extreme would imply that not only should each nation have its own currency, but so should each region within a nation. Why not a South of England pound, or indeed a London pound? The answer is that having separate currencies brings costs as well as benefits. The more currencies there are, the higher the costs of doing business and the more currency risk there is. Both factors impair the functions of money as a medium of exchange and a store of value, so maintaining more currencies acts as a barrier to international trade and investment, even as it reduces vulnerability to economic shocks. For a particular geographic region, if the benefits of having one currency outweigh the costs, then that region is part of an optimum currency area.13 The optimum currency area itself is the largest area in which having one currency instead of multiple currencies maximizes economic efficiency. Four criteria are often cited for a successful currency area: labor mobility, price and wage flexibility, a risk-sharing mechanism such as fiscal transfers, and similar business cycles. An optimal currency area needs to trade substantially to take advantage of the benefits of a single currency and must be similar enough to avoid large asymmetric shocks. These are shocks that affect regions or countries differently. Monetary policy, unlike fiscal policy, cannot be parsed into disparate regional effects. If some countries in Europe are expanding, while others are contracting, monetary policy is difficult to use, as the ECB cannot apply an optimal interest rate policy that fits all nations. In this case, adjustment would have to come via a central fiscal policy, labor mobility, or price and wage adjustments. So how large is the optimum currency area? No one knows. But some economists argue that Europe is not an optimum currency area and so might be better off with four or five regional

13 The

idea of an optimum currency area was pioneered by Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert A. Mundell in his article “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, American Economic Review (September 1961): 657–665.

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currencies than with only one.14 Nonetheless, the experience with floating exchange rates since the early 1970s will likely give pause to anyone seriously thinking of pushing this idea further. Those experiences suggest that exchange rate changes can add to economic volatility as well as absorb it. At the same time, economic flexibility—especially of labor markets—is critical to reducing the costs associated with currency union. This flexibility can be attained only through further deregulation; privatization; freer trade; labor market and social welfare reform; and a reduction in economic controls, state subsidies, and business regulations. Absent these changes, especially to reduce the rigidities of Europe’s labor market, the European Monetary Union will intensify economic shocks because their effects can no longer be mitigated by exchange rate adjustments or interest rate changes. In recognition of these problems, Poland expressed second thoughts about how quickly it adopts the euro. In 2013, the then Prime Minister Donald Tusk expressed the view that it would be a further decade before Poland was able to join the currency union given the lack of political consensus and the need for constitutional legislation to make the euro the official currency. The great hope of enthusiasts for Europe’s single currency, as for its single market, was that it would unleash pressures that would force its members to reform their sclerotic economies to make them more flexible and competitive. Such competitive pressures were unleashed but the core euro countries, especially France, Germany, and Italy, have responded by first initiating and then resisting the reforms that the euro and single market made necessary. The periphery economies, particularly those of Greece, Portugal, and Spain resisted reform from the outset. As predicted, the result has been greater vulnerability to economic shocks and difficult economic times. Such difficulty brought speculation in 2005 that EMU would break apart over its handling of monetary policy. The ECB was trying to steer the economy of a region in which the four largest nations—Germany, France, Italy, and Spain—were growing at very different rates. As a result, the ECB could not apply an optimal interest rate for any one country. For example, some economists argued that Italy, being in a recession, could use interest rates close to zero, and France and Germany with their slow growth could use interest rates of 1% to 1.5%. Booming Spain, on the other hand, might be better off with an interest rate of 3%. Instead, the ECB’s key short-term rate was 2%, too low for Spain and too high for Italy, Germany, and France. Viewing these problems, some economists claim that the United Kingdom has benefitted from staying out of the euro because the Bank of England can still set interest rates in line with its own particular facts and circumstances. Cracks in the Eurozone–the Periphery States Fracture. A common currency can falter because countries may violate the rules or a single monetary policy may not fit all economies. Such a situation arose with the euro because of uneven business and labor reform across the Eurozone and a lack of fiscal discipline. Absent exchange rate risk, convergence in interest rates across the Eurozone occurred as capital flowed from one country to another. Falling interest rates (see Figure 3.18) led to economic booms in four countries on the periphery of Europe—Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, which gained the ignominious acronym PIGS due to excessive public and private spending. The Portuguese and Greeks, for instance, increased hiring and spending on civil servants, leading to enormous budget deficits, while the Irish and Spanish went on a housing spree. In contrast, domestic demand since 1995 was weak in Germany and other Central European economies.

14

See, for example, Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, “Central Bank Flexibility and the Drawbacks to Currency Unification”, New England Economic Review (May–June 1990): 3–18; and Paul Krugman, “A Europe-Wide Currency Makes No Economic Sense”, Los Angeles Times (August 5, 1990): D2.

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122 20% 15% 10% 5%

1995M01 1995M08 1996M03 1996M10 1997M05 1997M12 1998M07 1999M02 1999M09 2000M04 2000M11 2001M06 2002M01 2002M08 2003M03 2003M10 2004M05 2004M12 2005M07 2006M02 2006M09 2007M04 2007M11 2008M06 2009M01 2009M08 2010M03 2010M10

0%

Ireland

Greece

Portugal

Spain

Germany

FIGURE 3.18 Ten-Year Government Bond Yields

The Catalyst—Divergences in Prices. Labor reform and wage constraints in Germany, combined with improved productivity, led to declines in German unit labor costs (wage costs-productivity growth) as Figure 3.19 illustrates. But the large increases in government spending along with sparse business and labor reform in the profligate periphery economies caused rapid increases in their wages and costs. For instance, Irish and Spanish unit labor costs increased more than 40%, and Greek and Portuguese costs rose more than 35%, which then resulted in divergences in competitiveness and inflation. By, in effect, demanding German wages and benefits without German levels of productivity, all four PIGS experienced inflation rates at least double Germany’s 1.5%. In turn, the higher inflation rates induced real differences in borrowing costs. While Germany’s real interest rate averaged 3% over the decade 2000–2009, real interest rates among the PIGS were too low, averaging between 1% and 2%. In effect, the PIGS all enjoyed German-level interest rates as members of the Eurozone, even though they were not as productive or disciplined as German savers and workers. Instead of using this lower cost of capital to modernize their economies and make themselves more competitive and productive, they went on real estate or consumption binges that triggered asset price bubbles in property and badly weakened their banks and economies. The consequences were dreadful. For example, the bursting of Spain’s real estate bubble led to unemployment reaching 26.6% in 2013 as hundreds of thousands lost jobs in construction and other real estate activities. In contrast, Germany’s unemployment rate during 2013 fell to 5.2% in 2013, its lowest level in 21 years. The differences in inflation rates caused changes in the relative price of goods between economies, defined as the real exchange rate. Countries with a common currency should experience similar real and nominal effective exchange rate movements; however, the higher inflation rate in the periphery economies compared to Germany led to appreciating real exchange rates in Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (PIGS). As mentioned earlier, a similar situation occurred in both Brazil and Russia before 155 135 115 95 1998

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Germany

FIGURE 3.19 Unit Labor Costs

Greece

Ireland

Portugal

Spain

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80

Ireland

Portugal

Spain

Greece

Germany

FIGURE 3.20 Competitiveness Diverges as Real Exchange Rates are Out of Sync

their exchange rate crises. While Germany’s real exchange rate (as well as those of other economies such as Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and France) changed little over the decade, the Irish and Spanish real rates rose dramatically as Figure 3.20 shows. In turn, rising real rates caused a dramatic loss of competitiveness for Ireland and Spain. In all four periphery economies, the export sector was a drag on growth, while in Germany export growth buoyed growth in 2010. The normal safety valve for the PIGS to restore their loss of competitiveness would be devaluation; however, the common currency made this impossible. Instead these economies face years of deflation, which only increases the real debt burden, making default more likely.15 In turn, the fear of default, as Figure 3.21 shows, caused interest rates in 2010 to rise substantially in the PIGS’ economies, but not in Germany. Euro Structural Flaws. The euro crisis highlights flaws with EMU. The Growth and Stability Pact’s 3% deficit rules failed to have teeth, allowing individual countries to flout their limit 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 20 08 M0 1 20 08 M0 3 20 08 M0 5 20 08 M0 7 20 08 M0 9 20 08 M1 1 20 09 M0 1 20 09 M0 3 20 09 M0 5 20 09 M0 7 20 09 M0 9 20 09 M1 1 20 10 M0 1 20 10 M0 3 20 10 M0 5 20 10 M0 7 20 10 M0 9 20 10 M1 1

0%

Ireland

Greece

Portugal

Spain

Germany

FIGURE 3.21 Interest Rates Diverge

15

Mohamed El-Erian, former IMF chief economist, wrote, “Meanwhile, new money remains sidelined by concerns about these countries’ debt overhang and their lack of competitiveness. Less investment in peripheral Europe means fewer jobs and deeper economic contractions, making it even harder to deliver austerity plans that are already contributing to social unrest, including Wednesday’s disturbance in Athens.” (Financial Times, December 15, 2010).

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routinely. From 2000–2007 (2000–2010), Greece violated the rule in all 8 (11) years, while Italy was over 3% in 5 (7) years and Portugal 4 (6) years. Banking policy was further left to national governments with little coordination and failed to require capital cushions large enough to cope with a crisis. Irish bank liabilities exceeded its GDP by seven times, and Spain’s by three times. These massive amounts of leverage meant that a systemic banking crisis could bring down a nation (see Mini-Case: A Wounded Celtic Tiger Has Its Paws Out). Additionally, the no-bailout provision failed to be credible, and reliance on individual country statistical agencies to report their own nation’s public finances proved problematic. These troubles, euro-skeptics believe, vindicated their view that the Eurozone is a clumsy hybrid with a flawed design—a region with a common monetary policy but a diverse collection of fiscal and business/labor policies. Disparate Growth Rates Heightened Tensions. During 2009–2010, the disparate growth rates of the different economies began to tear the Eurozone apart, heightening political tensions, nationalism, and fears of financial collapse in the PIGS. The Spanish were forced to issue a state of alarm, the first since democracy began more than three decades ago, due to austerity measures leading to airport strikes. This came after emergency austerity cuts as a result of pressure from other Eurozone members, the IMF, and the United States. Danilo Turk, President of Slovenia, said his country was uneasy about participating in an Irish bailout to solve problems elsewhere caused by risky bank lending, a situation they had “absolutely not” expected when they joined EMU, adding that “there is a general discomfort when one sees these things because we obviously expected the euro to be a layer of protection not a source of problems.”16 Many German voters became outraged that their taxes might finance early retirement for Greeks or Ireland’s very low corporate tax. The Greeks can obtain a full pension at 58, and under pressure from Germany were forced to increase their retirement age (leading to riots in Greece), compared to the German retirement age of 65. To attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from multinationals, the Irish had a corporate tax rate half that of France and Germany, which angered both these larger economies. The Germans were also promised that the euro would be as stable as the Deutschmark, that countries would not be able to borrow excessively, and that there would be a “no bailout clause” that would prevent the richer countries in Europe having to save the indigent. These promises appeared compromised and caused widespread populist resentment in Germany. As a result, the German government insisted on serious policy corrections from the PIGS and resisted multiple demands to stimulate domestic demand, which would act as an economic locomotive for all the Eurozone. “We don’t want no transfer union! Tight-fisted Germans resent paying for profligate Greeks, Irish and others” appeared in The Economist. Other German newspapers read, “Will we finally have to pay for all of Europe?” Despite widespread support among European leaders and the IMF for combating the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, German Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected an increase in the size of the European Union’s €440 billion rescue fund and a creation of a Europe-wide bond. Instead, she insisted on a sovereign debt resolution mechanism as a way of limiting taxpayer payouts and forcing the bondholders to take a loss. This proposal was heavily criticized by the French and others because it caused interest rates to rise due to the increased possibility of a default. Trouble within EMU was highlighted by increased political sparring between economies. In February 2010, the Spanish finance minister said: 16

Neil Buckley, Jan Ciensky, and Joshua Chaffin, “Single Currency Jitters Emerge from Irish Rescue”, Financial Times (November 24, 2010).

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“Spain is not Greece.” Later that year, in November 2010, the Irish finance minister added, “Ireland is not in ‘Greek Territory’.” The Greek finance minister fired back a week later, “Greece is not Ireland.” That same month the Spanish finance minister helpfully pointed out that “Spain is neither Ireland nor Portugal” while the Secretary-General of the OECD reiterated that “Spain is neither Ireland nor Portugal.” The failure of the bailouts of 2010 to deal with the basic problem, namely that the overall debt burdens of the PIGS and likely others (such as Italy) far exceeds their capacity to service them, particularly given their ongoing budget deficits, meant that the European debt crisis came roaring back in 2011. Rather than reducing these staggering debts (see Figure 3.22 for the government debt/GDP ratios for the PIIGS—the PIGS plus Italy—in 2011), the bailouts simply delayed repayment. And from the size of the PIIGS’ budget deficits, it was clear that the debt/GDP ratios were only going to get worse. The current crisis therefore contains many of the same elements that caused the EMS crisis: currency misalignments and differences in policy objectives between Germany and other economies, along with an asymmetric housing shock that affected only the periphery economies. Simply put, a single currency and single monetary policy cannot function effectively in 18 disparate economies with diverging labor costs, productivity trends, and fiscal policies. What the common currency does do is to prevent politicians from dreaming that they can devalue their way to prosperity.

180%

12%

Government debt/GDP

150%

159%

Government debt/GDP Budget deficit/GDP 10%

9.5%

120%

120% 110%

8% 105% 6.5%

6.7% 90%

6% 66%

60%

4.0%

30%

0%

4%

2%

Portugal

Ireland

Greece

Spain

Italy

FIGURE 3.22 Government Debt/GDP and Deficit/GDP Ratios for the PIIGS (2011) Data sources: Eurostat, February 6, 2012 ( for debt/GDP ratio) and The Economist, January 14, 2012 ( for budget deficit/GDP ratio).

0%

Government budget deficit/GDP

10.7%

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Mini-Case

A Greek Tragedy

In October 2009, Greece elected George Papandreou, who had promised to increase public spending and clean up corruption. At an EU summit during December of that year, to regain the confidence of his EU colleagues, Mr. Papandreou delivered a short, blunt speech that stunned the 26 bloc members: “Corruption, cronyism and a lack of transparency have undermined the state and have to be eliminated,” and added basically that his country was corrupt from A to Z. While it had been suspected for some time, he said that the magnitude of Greece’s budget deficit was not the 3.7% of GDP reported in April 2009, nor the feared 6%, but nearly 13%! After numerous upward revisions, it turned out to be 15.8%! Greece understated its deficits in previous years as well. From 1995–2010, Greek deficits averaged nearly 6%, and exceeded the Maastricht limit of 3% in every year. The cumulative effect of these deficits was a government debt/GDP ratio by the end of 2010 of 143%, the highest in the Eurozone. Further, in early January 2010, a European Commission report found that the Greek government had persistently and deliberately misreported the country’s public finances from before Greece joined EMU in 2001—a step that would never have been allowed if what is known now had been known then. Entry to EMU contributed to the eventual

crisis as it enabled Greece to issue huge amounts of debt at low interest rates, the implicit assumption being that the Eurozone would not allow one of its members to default. The ability to borrow at low rates enabled Greece to live well beyond its means for a decade. At the end of the decade, the bill came due. In December 2009, the credit rating agencies began cutting Greece’s debt rating, triggering large-scale sales by many private investors and pushing up yields (see Figure 3.23). Despite ambitious deficit-cutting plans, the credit rating agencies were still not convinced and continued to downgrade Greek debt, and interest rates continued to rise. Opposition to the bailout in Germany meant that market confidence had all but vanished by April 27, 2010, when S&P cut its rating of Greek government bonds to BB+, just below investment grade. S&P estimated that the likely “recovery rate” for bondholders if Greece were to restructure its debt or to default, was only 30–50% of their principal. That prompted panic in bond markets. The yield on Greece’s 10-year bonds leapt above 12% and the yield on two-year bonds soared over 16% at one point on April 29, 2010. Borrowing rates for Portugal, Ireland, and Spain jumped, too.

750

500

250

0

May

Sep

2009

May Greece

Sep

2010 Ireland

May

Sep

2011

Portugal

FIGURE 3.23 Yields on 10-Year Government Bonds for the PIGS Data source: Bloomberg.

May Spain

Sep

2012

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By April 2010, a €110 billion (US$150 billion) European bailout was announced that would save Greece for several years. One motive for this intervention was to avoid banks taking losses on loans to Greece. However, many believed it offered only a temporary respite as Greece was basically insolvent. Austerity measures imply the government needed to convert a 13% budget deficit into a surplus of 5% over the next several years to pay off interest payments as well as improve competitiveness. Analysts and the rating agencies viewed these cutbacks as unlikely in a politically charged environment coupled with poor growth and high unemployment rates. Civil servants voiced strong opposition to 12% cutbacks and took to the streets with strikes and demonstrations. Protestors also laid siege to Greece’s parliament, and extremist provocateurs torched a bank, resulting in the deaths of three employees. The alternative to the degree of austerity required to service Greece’s debts is debt restructuring—a polite term for default. The market’s expectation of default is reflected in the high yields on Greek bonds. Despite representing only 2% of the Eurozone’s GDP, the Greek financial crisis sent shockwaves throughout the Eurozone as investors speculated which country would be the next to suffer. Portugal, for instance, in 2010 saw its debt rating lowered two notches since its debt/GDP ratio approached 90%. The government was forced to adopt a series of increasingly harsh austerity measures to bring its public finances under control after a budget deficit of 9.6% the prior year. During the crisis, the euro fell 20%, from above US$1.50 in December 2009 to below $1.20 in

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June 2010. During the same six-month period, the Greek stock market declined 46%, and also precipitated contagion effects in other markets, including the Spanish stock market, which fell a third, and the Portuguese market, which declined more than 25%. The Economist reported (December 4, 2010) that “The euro is proving costly for some…as one botched rescue follows another.” The economic crisis in the PIGS has sorely tested the Eurozone. By early 2012, after the public sector unions and pensioners living off the state and the multitudes enjoying lavish welfare benefits violently resisted every serious reform, Greece faced a stark choice: take another bailout and adopt austerity or abandon the euro and accept the consequences. Despite defaulting on its privately held debt in March 2012, the ultimate end to the crisis would not come until the Greeks understood that they could not consume more than they produced and adopted pro-growth policies that would allow them to produce more.

Questions 1. What event initially precipitated the Greek crisis? 2. Why was Greece in so much trouble? 3. What problems in Greece highlighted wider problems in the Eurozone? 4. How did the Greek crisis affect the euro? 5. What pro-growth policies could the Greeks adopt that would allow them to produce more and how would adopting them help resolve their crisis?

A Wounded Celtic Tiger Has Its Paws Out

In November 2010, Ireland received a bailout equivalent to US$27,142 per capita. This bailout was all the more surprising because the rapid growth of the Irish economy since the mid-1980s had vaulted Ireland from the poorest Western European economy (save Portugal) to the richest (save Luxembourg), earning it the nickname “the

Celtic Tiger”. Low corporate tax rates encouraged foreign direct investment, and a deregulated banking system rapidly expanded credit. The Celtic Tiger roared, and the housing market skyrocketed, fueling a property bubble. In the mid-2000s, the Irish built houses six times faster than the British or Germans. The building was facilitated

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by Ireland’s three largest banks, which by 2008 extended credit equal to more than three times the size of Ireland’s GDP. The value of its housing stock quadrupled in the decade to 2006, with construction swelling to an eighth of the economy. The price of a typical Dublin house shot up more than fivefold. When the property market burst, prices fell by over a third, and the banks’ real estate loans quickly became troubled. A run started on Irish banks. In October 2008, the Irish government stepped in and guaranteed all bank debts—not just retail deposits but bonds and commercial deposits as well. The run stopped, temporarily, but the problems with Ireland’s banks turned out to be much greater than expected. In March 2010, Anglo-Irish Bank, Ireland’s third largest lender, reported a loss of €12.7 billion, the biggest in Irish corporate history. In September 2010, another bailout for Anglo-Irish Bank, Allied Irish Banks, and Irish Nationwide occurred. The final toll reached €35 billion and inflated the budget deficit to a staggering 32% of GDP. One-third of the nationalized loans were categorized as nonperforming or “under surveillance”, a shocking 100% of GDP in potentially bad debts. The Irish handling of their banking system has been heavily criticized, and hundreds of thousands have protested the government’s handling of the crisis. From the beginning of 2007 to the third quarter of 2010, Irish real GDP fell by more than 10% (by comparison, German GDP grew by 2.4% over this period). By the end of 2010, unemployment had reached nearly 14% and was over 25% for those aged 15 to 24. Ireland’s poor economy led to declining property tax revenue plus a ballooning budget deficit and debt. Ireland’s debt/GDP ratio before the crisis was 25%, one of the lowest in Europe. By 2010, sovereign debt had hit 65.5% of GDP, from 44.3% a year earlier. But then came the huge bank bailout of

Anglo-Irish, and Ireland’s debt/GDP ratio reached 105% in early 2011. The possibility of default sent interest rates higher (from April to December 2010, the yield on the 10-year bond almost doubled, from 4.5% to 8.5%) and Ireland lost its AAA bond ratings. By December 2010, Ireland’s credit rating had fallen to BBB+. Ireland’s financial crisis led to another run on its banks and sparked fears once again of contagion extending to Portugal, Spain, and even countries beyond, such as Italy and Belgium. In response, Europe and the IMF in November 2010 announced a bailout of €85 billion or US$115 billion, a staggering amount for an economy with a population of roughly 4 million people. External lenders forced it to accept austerity measures, including draconian budget cuts and tax increases. Unemployment rose to 13.4%, wages fell, and GDP contracted 14%. Although the budget cuts were necessary to restore long-term budget balance and competitiveness, they were deeply unpopular at the time and caused the coalition partner to force new elections. The wounding of the Celtic Tiger further heightened fears about a euro breakup and led the Czech Republic to question its upcoming euro entry. By 2014, Ireland had largely overcome its financial crisis, with the country stabilizing and exiting the support package it had received. The legacy of the forced austerity, however, would last a lot longer. Questions 1. Why was Ireland in trouble? 2. What happened to Irish debt? To Irish bond ratings? Interest rates? 3. How did the Irish crisis highlight problems with the Eurozone? 4. What must Ireland do to solve its problem?

Lessons from EMU and the Euro The same problems that led to the collapse of the European Monetary System haunt EMU today. The recurrent red flags that financial managers need to be prepared for are that permanently fixed exchange rates are no panacea for sound, coordinated macroeconomic policy. Countries that share a common currency must coordinate fiscal policy (and enforce fiscal discipline) and labor reform as well as experience similar economic shocks; otherwise, large differences in economic growth will emerge. Financial managers need to be aware that when substantial differences between

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economies arise in real exchange rates, trade balances, and competitiveness, there will be currency problems.

Exchange Rate Regimes Today The type of exchange rate regimes that economies choose depends on their level of development. Rich, large economies with open capital markets allow their exchange rates to float. Exchange rate movements in these economies tend to be highly volatile, responding to news quickly. Economies with low financial development, where markets are thin (poorly traded), tend to have fixed rates, but not forever. Since these economies often lack fiscal and monetary discipline, fixed exchange rates can enforce discipline. Sometimes, however, the authorities disregard the discipline required or the economy experiences an adverse real shock, such as a change in commodity prices or trade patterns, forcing them to abandon the peg. A decade ago, the IMF and academics argued that nations had to choose either floating or credibly fixed exchange rate regimes. The rise in capital mobility implied intermediate exchange rate regimes were unsustainable. However, the failure of Argentina’s currency board and difficulties in the Eurozone highlight the difficulty with permanently fixed rates. The success of the BRIC economies and other emerging economies in weathering the global financial crisis instead shows that exchange rate regimes are likely to evolve over time. Indeed, the relatively low exchange rate volatility of China and India, both of which use capital controls to dampen exchange rate movements, led the IMF in 2010 to reverse its past strong criticism of controls. The IMF suggested that developing countries consider using capital controls as a modestly successful means of curbing the effects of “hot money” (that is, speculative money that can enter or exit the economy quickly) so as to prevent asset bubbles and other potential calamities. In 2009 and 2010, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, and Brazil introduced various capital restrictions designed to handle large capital inflows. South Korea’s comprehensive currency controls, for instance, were aimed at limiting the risks arising out of sharp reversals in capital flows that occurred during the global financial crisis. Last, exchange rate regimes tend to differ among regions. Sub-Saharan African economies (particularly former French colonies) and oil exporters such as OPEC like to peg. Emerging Asian economies tend to heavily manage their exchange rates or informally peg to the U.S. dollar. Small Caribbean economies or Pacific nations like to fix their exchange rate. North American and European economies tend to float their currencies.

3.4 Emerging Market Currency Crises As we saw in the last chapter, the decade of the 1990s was punctuated by a series of currency crises in emerging markets. First was the Mexican crisis in 1994 to 1995. That was followed by the Asian crisis two years later in 1997, then the Russian crisis of 1998, and the Brazilian crisis of 1998 to 1999.

Transmission Mechanisms The problem with these currency crises is that they tend to be contagious, spreading from one nation to another. There are two principal routes of contagion: trade links and the financial system. Contagion is exacerbated by a common debt policy. Trade Links. Contagion can spread from one emerging market to another through their trade links. For example, when Argentina is in crisis, it imports less from Brazil, its principal trading partner. As Brazil’s economy begins to contract, its currency will likely weaken. Before long, the contagion will spread from Brazil to its other emerging market trade partners.

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Financial System. The second and more important transmission mechanism is through the financial system. As we saw in the case of the Asian currency crisis, trouble in one emerging market often can serve as a wakeup call to investors who seek to exit other countries with similar risky characteristics. For example, Argentina’s problems, which stem from its large budget deficit, focused investor attention on Brazil’s unresolved fiscal problems. Financial contagion can also occur because investors who are leveraged up start selling assets in other countries to make up for their initial losses. Investors may also become more risk averse and seek to rebalance their portfolios by selling off a portion of all their risky assets. Debt Policy. Crisis-prone countries tend to have one thing in common that promotes contagion: they issue too much short-term debt that is closely linked to the U.S. dollar. When times are good, confident investors gladly buy short-term emerging market bonds and roll them over when they come due. However, when the bad times come and currencies tumble, the cost of repaying U.S. dollar-linked bonds soars, savvy investors rush for the exits, and governments find their debt-raising capacity vanishes overnight. Things quickly spiral out of control.

Origins of Emerging Market Crises The sequence of currency crises has prompted policymakers to seek ways to deal with them. Many of their crisis-fighting proposals involve increasing the International Monetary Fund’s funding and giving it and possibly new international agencies the power to guide global financial markets. However, these proposals could exacerbate the two principal sources of these crises. Moral Hazard. A number of economists believe that by bailing out first Mexico and then the Asian countries, the IMF actually helped fuel these crises by creating a moral hazard in lending behavior. Specifically, economists such as Milton Friedman and Allan Meltzer have argued that the Mexican bailout encouraged investors to lend more money on less stringent terms to the Asian countries than they would have otherwise because of their belief that the IMF would bail them out if trouble hit. The US$118 billion Asian bailout by the IMF ($57 billion for South Korea alone) reinforced the view of foreign investors that they were operating with an implicit guarantee from the IMF, which led to the Russian currency crisis and then the Brazilian crisis. At the same time, the provision of an IMF safety net gives recipient governments less incentive to adopt responsible fiscal and monetary policies. In the case of the Brazilian real crisis, most observers had believed for a long time that the currency was overvalued. When speculators attacked the real in the wake of the Asian currency crisis, the IMF tried to prevent a crisis by providing US$41 billion in November 1998 to boost Brazil’s reserves in return for Brazil’s promise to reduce its budget deficit. That strategy broke down, however, when Brazil failed to deliver on promised fiscal reforms and investor confidence collapsed. On January 15, 1999, Brazil floated its currency and began implementing reforms. Arguably, without the IMF bailout package, Brazil would have been forced to act on its fiscal reforms sooner. IMF conditionality once again failed to work. Fundamental Policy Conflict. Underlying the emerging market currency crises is a fundamental conflict among policy objectives that the target nations have failed to resolve and that IMF assistance has only allowed them to drag out. These three objectives are a fixed exchange rate, independent domestic monetary policy, and free capital movement. As we saw in Chapter 2, any two of these objectives are possible; all three are not. Speculators recognized that the attempts by Mexico, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Brazil, Russia, and other countries to achieve these three objectives simultaneously were unsustainable and attacked their currencies, resulting in the inevitable breakdowns in their systems.

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Policy Proposals for Dealing with Emerging Market Crises There are three possible ways to avoid these financial crises. One is to impose currency controls; another is to permit currencies to float freely; and the third is to permanently fix the exchange rate by dollarizing, adopting a common currency as the participants in EMU have done, or establishing a currency board. Currency Controls. Some economists have advocated abandoning free capital movement, as Malaysia has done, as a means of insulating a nation’s currency from speculative attacks. However, open capital markets improve economic welfare by channeling savings to where they are most productive. Moreover, most developing nations need foreign capital and the know-how, discipline, and more efficient resource allocation that come with it. Finally, the long history of currency controls should provide no comfort to its advocates. Currency controls have inevitably led to corruption and government misallocation of foreign exchange, hardly prescriptions for healthy growth. Freely Floating Currency. With a freely floating currency, the exchange rate is set by the interplay of supply and demand. As Milton Friedman points out, with a floating exchange rate, there never has been a foreign exchange crisis. The reason is simple: the floating rate absorbs the pressures that would otherwise build up in countries that try to peg the exchange rate while simultaneously pursuing an independent monetary policy. For example, the Asian currency crisis did not spill over to Australia and New Zealand because the latter countries had floating exchange rates. Permanently Fixed Exchange Rate. Through dollarization, establishment of a currency board, or monetary union, a nation can fix its exchange rate permanently. The key to this system’s viability is the surrender of monetary independence to a single central bank: the European Central Bank for the countries using the euro, such as Montenegro, and the Federal Reserve for countries such as Ecuador and Panama that have dollarized. The Federal Reserve is also the de facto central bank for countries such as Argentina (until 2002) and Hong Kong that have dollar-based currency boards. It is this loss of monetary independence that is the fundamental difference between a truly fixed-rate and a pegged-rate system such as existed under Bretton Woods. In a truly fixed-rate system, the money supply adjusts to the balance of payments. If there is a balance-of-payments deficit, the supply of currency falls; with a surplus, it rises. With a pegged-rate system, on the other hand, governments can avoid—at least temporarily—allowing their money supply to adjust to a balance-of-payments deficit by borrowing from abroad or running down their foreign exchange reserves to maintain the pegged rate. With a persistent deficit, however, fueled by excessive growth of the money supply, an explosion is inevitable. Adherence to either a truly fixed exchange rate or a floating exchange rate will help avert foreign exchange crises. Which mechanism is superior depends on a variety of factors. For example, if a country has a major trading partner with a long history of a stable monetary policy, then tying the domestic currency to the partner’s currency would probably be a good choice. In any event, the choice of either system will eliminate the need for the IMF or other international agency to intervene in or usurp the market. Better Information. Little noticed in the discussion of emerging market crises is that financial market collapses in Argentina and Turkey in 2001 were not particularly contagious. For example, debt-rating agencies elevated Mexican bonds to investment grade right in the middle of the Argentine debacle. Similarly, Brazilian and Russian bond prices soared from investor perceptions that their economies were improving. A natural conclusion is that information about emerging markets

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is improving, allowing investors to distinguish the good ones from the bad. Taking this experience to its logical conclusion suggests that the best way to reduce financial market contagion in the future is to develop and disseminate better information about emerging market policies and their consequences. This course of action is exactly what one would expect free markets to undertake on their own, without the need for government intervention. That being said, contagion can still be a problem when a crisis in one country forces portfolio managers to sell assets in other emerging countries. For example, a sell-off of Brazilian assets in early 2002, sparked by the rise of leftist Brazilian presidential candidate Lula da Silva, meant that some money managers had to sell their holdings in other emerging markets to meet margin calls or redemptions resulting from Brazil. Similarly, contagion can result from investors demanding higher risk premiums for bearing emerging market risk.

3.5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter examined the process of exchange rate determination under five market mechanisms: free float, managed float, target-zone system, fixed-rate system, and the current hybrid system. In the last four systems, governments intervene in the currency markets in various ways to affect the exchange rate. Regardless of the form of intervention, however, fixed rates do not remain fixed for long. Neither do floating rates. The basic reason that exchange rates do not remain fixed in either a fixed- or floating-rate system is that governments subordinate exchange rate considerations to domestic political considerations. We saw that the gold standard is a specific type of fixed exchange rate system, one that requires participating countries to maintain the value of their currencies in terms of gold. Calls for a new gold standard reflect a fundamental lack of trust that monetary authorities will desist from tampering with the integrity of fiat money. Finally, we concluded that intervention to maintain a disequilibrium rate is generally ineffective or injurious when pursued over lengthy periods of time. Seldom have policymakers been able to outsmart, for any extended period, the collective judgment of currency buyers and sellers. The current volatile market environment, which is a consequence of unstable U.S. and world financial conditions, cannot be arbitrarily directed by government officials for long. Examining the world’s experience since the abandonment of fixed rates, we found that free-market forces did correctly reflect economic realities thereafter. In particular, the U.S. dollar’s value dropped sharply between 1973 and 1980 when the United States experienced high inflation and weakened economic conditions compared to other developed countries. Beginning in 1981, the U.S. dollar’s value rose when the United States’ policies dramatically changed under the leadership of the Federal Reserve and a new president but fell again when foreign economies strengthened relative to the

U.S. economy. Nonetheless, the resulting shifts in U.S. cost competitiveness have led many to question the current international monetary system. The principal alternative to the current system of floating currencies with its economic volatility is a fixed exchange rate system. History offers no entirely convincing model for how such a system should be constructed, but it does point to two requirements. To succeed in reducing economic volatility, a system of fixed exchange rates must be credible, and it must have price stability built into its very fabric. Otherwise, the market’s expectations of exchange rate changes combined with an unsatisfactory rate of inflation will lead to periodic battles among central banks and between central banks and the financial markets. The recent experiences of the European Monetary System point to the costs associated with the maintenance of exchange rates at unrealistic levels. These experiences also point out that, in the end, there is no real escape from market forces. Most European nations have responded to this reality by forming a monetary union and adopting the euro as their common currency. Some countries have gone further and abandoned their currencies altogether by dollarizing, either explicitly or implicitly through a currency board. The danger, as can be seen with the experience of the euro, is that nations that tie their fates to a currency they do not issue cannot use monetary policy or devaluation to solve their economic problems. At the same time, they must exercise fiscal discipline or they wind up trading one set of problems for another. A final lesson learned is that one must have realistic expectations of a currency system. In particular, no currency system can achieve what many politicians seem to expect of it—a way to keep all the benefits of economic policy for their own nation while passing along the costs to foreigners (who do not vote) or to future generations (who do not vote yet). The series of emerging market crises since 1994 points to the futility of this exercise.

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QUESTIONS 1.

.(a) What are the five basic mechanisms for establishing exchange rates?

7.

(b) How does each work? (c) What costs and benefits are associated with each mechanism? (d) Have exchange rate movements under the current system of managed floating been excessive? Explain. 2.

(a) What underlies the peseta’s historical weakness?

Find a recent example of a nation’s foreign exchange market intervention and note what the government’s justification was. Does this justification make economic sense?

3.

Gold has been called “the ultimate burglar alarm”. Explain what this expression means.

4.

Suppose nations attempt to pursue independent monetary and fiscal policies. How will exchange rates behave?

5.

The experiences of fixed exchange rate systems and target-zone arrangements have not been entirely satisfactory.

(b) Comment on the banker’s statement. (c) What are the likely consequences of EMS membership on the Spanish public’s willingness to save and invest? 8.

In discussing the European Monetary Union, a recent government report stressed a need to make the central bank accountable to the “democratic process”. What are the likely consequences for price stability and exchange rate stability in the EMS if the ECB becomes accountable to the “democratic process”?

9.

Comment on the following statement: “With monetary union, the era of protection for European firms and workers has come to an end.”

10.

Comment on the following statement: “The French view European Monetary Union as a way to break the Bundesbank’s dominance in setting monetary policy in Europe.”

2.

Suppose the central rates within the ERM for the French franc (FF) and Deutschmark (DM) are FF 6.90403:ECU 1 and DM 2.05853:ECU 1, respectively.

(a) What lessons can economists draw from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system? (b) What lessons can economists draw from the exchange rate experiences of the European Monetary System? 6.

Historically, Spain has had high inflation and has seen its peseta continuously depreciate. In 1989, however, Spain joined the EMS and pegged the peseta to the Deutschmark. According to a Spanish banker, EMS membership means that “the government has less capability to manage the currency but, on the other hand, the people are more trusting of the currency for that reason.”

How did the European Monetary System limit the economic ability of each member nation to set its interest rate to be different from Germany’s?

PROBLEMS 1.

During the currency crisis of September 1992, the Bank of England borrowed 33 billion Deutschmarks (DM) from the Bundesbank when a British pound was worth DM 2.78, or $1.912. It sold these DM in the foreign exchange market for pounds in a futile attempt to prevent a devaluation of the pound. It repaid these DM at the postcrisis rate of DM 2.50∶£1. By then, the U.S. dollar: British pound exchange rate was $1.782∶£1. (a) By what percentage had the British pound devalued in the interim against the Deutschmark? Against the U.S. dollar? (b) What was the cost of intervention to the Bank of England in British pounds? In U.S. dollars?

(a) What is the cross-exchange rate between the French franc and the Deutschmark? (b) Under the former 2.25% margin on either side of the central rate, what were the approximate upper and lower intervention limits for France and Germany? (c) Under the new 15% margin on either side of the central rate, what are the current approximate upper and lower intervention limits for France and Germany?

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A Dutch company exporting to France had 3 million French francs (FF) due in 90 days. Suppose that the spot exchange rate against the Dutch guilder (DFl) was FF1 = DFl 0.3291.

(d) Redo part b, assuming you know nothing about the spot cross-exchange rate. 4.

Panama adopted the U.S. dollar as its official paper money in 1904. Currently, $400 million to $500 million in U.S. dollars is circulating in Panama. If interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities are 7%, what is the value of the seignorage that Panama is forgoing by using the U.S. dollar instead of its own-issue money?

5.

By some estimates, $185 billion to $260 billion in currency is held outside the United States.

(a) Under the exchange rate mechanism, and assuming central rates of FF 6.45863/ECU and DFl 2.16979/ECU, what was the central cross-exchange rate between the two currencies? (b) Based on the answer to part a, what was the most the Dutch company could lose on its French franc receivable, assuming that France and the Netherlands stuck to the ERM with a 15% band on either side of their central cross rate?

(a) What is the value to the United States of the seignorage associated with these overseas dollars? Assume that dollar interest rates are about 6%.

(c) Redo part b, assuming the band was narrowed to 2.25%.

(b) Who in the United States realizes this seignorage?

WEB RESOURCES www.imf.org/external/fin.htm Website of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with direct links to information on the IMF, SDRs, exchange rates, position of each country in the IMF, and lending arrangements with member nations.

www.ecb.int Website of the European Central Bank (ECB). Contains press releases and publications put out by the ECB along with exchange rate data and other euro area-related economic and financial statistics.

www.imf.org/external/about.htm IMF website that discusses the role of the IMF as well as a number of other topics, including debt relief for poor countries and reforming the international monetary system to cope with financial crises.

europa.eu.int Website of the European Union (EU). Contains news, information, and statistics on the EU and its member nations and the euro.

www.ex.ac.uk/∼RDavies/arian/llyfr.html Contains a detailed history of money from ancient times to the present.

www.sysmod.com/eurofaq.htm Contains answers to frequently asked questions about the euro and EMU as well as links to related websites.

WEB EXERCISES 1.

Plot the U.S. dollar value of the euro since its inception. How has the euro fared in the past year?

2.

What explanations have been given for the decline of the euro in the first three years of its existence?

3.

What are the objectives of the ECB? What policy tradeoffs does the ECB have to consider?

4.

According to the IMF, what are its main purposes?

5.

What proposals have been made by the IMF to reduce the incidence and severity of international financial crises?

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bordo, Michael David, “The Classical Gold Standard: Some Lessons for Today”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (May 1981): 2–17.

Friedman, Milton, and Robert V. Roosa, “Free Versus Fixed Exchange Rates: A Debate”, Journal of Portfolio Management (Spring 1977): 68–73.

Coombs, Charles A., The Arena of International Finance (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976).

Mundell, Robert A., “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, American Economic Review (September 1961): 657–663.

Dooley, Michael P., David Garber, and Peter Folkerts-Landau, “The Revived Bretton Woods System”, International Journal of Finance & Economics, vol. 9, no. 4 (2004): 307–313.

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Currencies: Expectations, Parities, and Forecasting

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4

It is not for its own sake that men desire money, but for the sake of what they can purchase with it. Adam Smith (1776) LEARNING OBJECTIVES • To describe the meaning of the “law of one price” and its importance to the study of international finance • To explain how arbitrage links goods prices and asset returns internationally • To list and describe the five key theoretical relationships among spot exchange rates, forward exchange rates, inflation rates, and interest rates that result from international arbitrage activities • To differentiate between the real and nominal exchange rate and the real and nominal interest rate • To list and describe the four requirements for successful currency forecasting • To identify a five-stage procedure for forecasting exchange rates in a fixed-rate system • To describe how to forecast exchange rates in a floating-rate system using the predictions already embodied in interest and forward rates • To describe the meaning and likelihood of forecasting success in both fixed-rate and floating-rate systems On the basis of the flows of goods and capital discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter presents a simple yet elegant set of equilibrium relationships that should apply to product prices, interest rates, and spot and forward exchange rates if markets are not impeded. These relationships, or parity conditions, provide the foundation for much of the remainder of this text; they should be clearly understood before you proceed further. The final section of this chapter examines the usefulness of a number of models and methodologies in profitably forecasting currency changes under both fixed-rate and floating-rate systems.

4.1 Arbitrage and the Law of One Price Arbitrage is one of the most important concepts in all of finance. It is ordinarily defined as the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same assets or commodities on different markets to profit 135

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from price discrepancies. The concept of arbitrage is of particular importance in international finance because so many of the relationships between domestic and international financial markets, exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation rates depend on arbitrage for their existence. Indeed, by linking markets together, arbitrage underlies the globalization of markets. One of the central ideas of international finance stems from arbitrage: in competitive markets, characterized by numerous buyers and sellers having low-cost access to information, exchange-adjusted prices of identical tradable goods and financial assets must be within transaction costs of equality worldwide. This idea, referred to as the law of one price, is enforced by international arbitrageurs who follow the profit-guaranteeing dictum of “buy low, sell high” and prevent all but trivial deviations from equality. Similarly, in the absence of market imperfections, risk-adjusted expected returns on financial assets in different markets should be equal. Five key theoretical economic relationships, which are depicted in Figure 4.1, result from these arbitrage activities: • Purchasing power parity (PPP) • Fisher effect (FE) • International Fisher effect (IFE) • Interest rate parity (IRP) • Forward rates as unbiased predictors of future spot rates (UFR) The framework of Figure 4.1 emphasizes the links among prices, spot exchange rates, interest rates, and forward exchange rates. Before proceeding, some explanation of terminology is in order. Specifically, a foreign currency is said to be at a forward discount if the forward rate expressed in the reference currency is below the spot rate, whereas a forward premium exists if the forward rate is above the spot rate. The forward discount or premium is expressed in annualized percentage terms as follows: Forward premium or discount =

Forward rate − Spot rate 360 × (4.1) Spot rate Forward contract number of days

where the exchange rate is stated in domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency. Expected percentage change of spot rate of foreign currency –3% UFR Forward discount or premium on foreign currency –3%

IFE PPP

Interest rate differential +3%

IRP FE

Expected inflation rate differential +3%

FIGURE 4.1 Five Key Theoretical Relationships among Spot Rates, Forward Rates, Inflation Rates, and Interest Rates

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According to the diagram in Figure 4.1, if inflation in, say, Sweden is expected to exceed inflation in the Eurozone by 3% for the coming year, then the Swedish krona should decline in value by about 3% relative to the euro. By the same token, the one-year forward Swedish krona should sell at a 3% discount relative to the euro. Similarly, one-year interest rates in Sweden should be about 3% higher than one-year interest rates on securities of comparable risk in the Eurozone. The common denominator of these parity conditions is the adjustment of the various rates and prices to inflation. According to modern monetary theory, inflation is the logical outcome of an expansion of the money supply in excess of real output growth. Although this view of the origin of inflation is not universally subscribed to, it has a solid microeconomic foundation. In particular, it is a basic precept of price theory that as the supply of one commodity increases relative to supplies of all other commodities, the price of the first commodity must decline relative to the prices of other commodities. Thus, for example, a bumper crop of corn should cause corn’s value in exchange—its exchange rate—to decline. Similarly, as the supply of money increases relative to the supply of goods and services, the purchasing power of money—the exchange rate between money and goods—must decline. The mechanism that brings this adjustment about is simple and direct. Suppose, for example, that the supply of euros exceeds the amount that individuals desire to hold. In order to reduce their excess holdings of money, individuals increase their spending on goods, services, and securities, causing Eurozone prices to rise. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 2, this price inflation will cause the value of the euro to decline. The adverse consequences of an expansionary monetary policy and the benefits of a stable monetary policy—one that leads to stable prices and is not subject to sharp expansions or contractions—are both clear. A further link in the chain relating money-supply growth, inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates is the notion that money is neutral. That is, money should have no impact on real variables. Thus, for example, a 10% increase in the supply of money relative to the demand for money should cause prices to rise by 10%. This view has important implications for international finance. Specifically, although a change in the quantity of money will affect prices and exchange rates, this change should not affect the rate at which domestic goods are exchanged for foreign goods or the rate at which goods today are exchanged for goods in the future. These ideas are formalized as purchasing power parity and the Fisher effect, respectively. We will examine them here briefly and then in greater detail in the next two sections. The international analogue to inflation is home currency depreciation relative to foreign currencies. The analogy derives from the observation that inflation involves a change in the exchange rate between the home currency and domestic goods, whereas home currency depreciation—a decline in the foreign currency value of the home currency—results in a change in the exchange rate between the home currency and foreign goods. That inflation and currency depreciation are related is no accident. Excess money-supply growth, through its impact on the rate of aggregate spending, affects the demand for goods produced abroad as well as goods produced domestically. In turn, the domestic demand for foreign currencies changes and, consequently, the foreign exchange value of the domestic currency changes. Thus, the rate of domestic inflation and changes in the exchange rate are jointly determined by the rate of domestic money growth relative to the growth of the amount that people—domestic and foreign—want to hold. If international arbitrage enforces the law of one price, then the exchange rate between the home currency and domestic goods must equal the exchange rate between the home currency and foreign goods. In other words, a unit of home currency (HC) should have the same purchasing power worldwide. Thus, if a euro buys a half-kilo loaf of bread in the Eurozone, it should also buy the same half-kilo loaf of bread in the United Kingdom. For this to happen, the foreign exchange rate must

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change by (approximately) the difference between the domestic and foreign rates of inflation. This relationship is called purchasing power parity (PPP). Similarly, the nominal interest rate, the price quoted on lending and borrowing transactions, determines the exchange rate between current and future euros (or any other currency). For example, an interest rate of 10% on a one-year loan means that one euro today is being exchanged for 1.1 euros a year from now. But what really matters, according to the Fisher effect (FE), is the exchange rate between current and future purchasing power, as measured by the real interest rate. Simply put, the lender is concerned with how many more goods can be obtained in the future by forgoing consumption today, whereas the borrower wants to know how much future consumption must be sacrificed to obtain more goods today. This condition is the case regardless of whether the borrower and lender are located in the same or different countries. As a result, if the exchange rate between current and future goods—the real interest rate—varies from one country to the next, arbitrage between domestic and foreign capital markets, in the form of international capital flows, should occur. These flows will tend to equalize real interest rates across countries. By looking more closely at these and related parity conditions, we can see how they can be formalized and used for management purposes.

Mini-Case

Oil Levies and the Law of One Price

The combination of weakening oil prices in the mid-1980s and the failure of Congress to deal with the budget deficit by cutting spending led some to see the possibility of achieving two objectives at once: (1) protecting U.S. oil producers from “cheap” foreign competition and (2) reducing the budget deficit. The solution was an oil-import fee or tariff. A tax on imported crude oil and refined products that matches a world oil price decline, for example, would leave oil and refined-product prices in the United States unchanged. Thus, it was argued, such a tax would have little effect on U.S. economic activity. It would merely represent a transfer of funds from foreign oil producers to the U.S. Treasury. Moreover, it would provide some price relief to struggling refineries and encourage the production of U.S. oil. Finally, at the current level of imports, a US$5/barrel tariff on foreign crude oil and a separate tariff of US$10/barrel-equivalent on refined products would raise more than $11.5 billion a year in revenue for the U.S. Treasury. Questions

2.

3.

4.

5.

hurt? Who would benefit? Why? What would be the longer-term consequences? If a US$10/barrel tariff were levied on imported refined products (but no tariff were levied on crude oil), who would benefit? Who would be hurt? Why? What would be the longer-term consequences? What would be the economic consequences of the combined US$5/barrel tariff on imported crude and a US$10/barrel tariff on refined oil products? How will these tariffs affect domestic consumers, oil producers, refiners, companies competing against imports, and exporters? How would these proposed import levies affect foreign suppliers to the United States of crude oil and refined products? During the 1970s price controls on crude oil—but not on refined products—were in effect in the United States. Based on your previous analysis, what differences would you expect to see between heating oil and gasoline prices in New York and in Rotterdam (the major refining center in northwestern Europe)?

1. Suppose the tariff were levied solely on imported crude. In an integrated world economy, who would be

4.2 Purchasing Power Parity Purchasing power parity (PPP) was first stated in a rigorous manner by the Swedish economist Gustav Cassel in 1918. He used it as the basis for recommending a new set of official exchange rates at

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the end of World War I that would allow for the resumption of normal trade relations.1 Since then, PPP has been widely used by central banks as a guide to establishing new par values for their currencies when the old ones were clearly in disequilibrium. From a management standpoint, purchasing power parity is often used to forecast future exchange rates, for purposes ranging from deciding on the currency denomination of long-term debt issues to determining in which countries to build plants. In its absolute version, purchasing power parity states that price levels should be equal worldwide when expressed in a common currency. In other words, a unit of home currency should have the same purchasing power around the world. This theory is just an application of the law of one price to national price levels rather than to individual prices. (That is, it rests on the assumption that free trade will equalize the price of any good in all countries; otherwise, arbitrage opportunities would exist.) However, absolute PPP ignores the effects on free trade of transportation costs, tariffs, quotas and other restrictions, and product differentiation. The Big Mac index, a light-hearted guide to whether currencies are at their “correct” levels against the U.S. dollar, illustrates the law of one price and absolute purchasing power parity. It is calculated by comparing the prices of Big Macs worldwide (they are produced in almost 120 countries). The Big Mac PPP, put together by The Economist, is the exchange rate that would leave hamburgers costing the same overseas as in the United States. By comparing Big Mac PPPs with actual exchange rates, which is done in Figure 4.2, we can see whether a currency is over- or undervalued by this standard. For example, a Big Mac in Brazil cost R$12 in December, 2013. Dividing this price through by its U.S. price of $4.56 implies a PPP exchange rate of R$2.63∕$: R$12 = R$2.63∕$ $4.56 The actual exchange rate on that date was R$2.27. By this measure, the real was 16% overvalued in December 2013: R$2.63 − R$2.27 = 15.86% R$2.27 Alternatively, with a U.S. dollar PPP of HK 3.73∕$ (HK$17∕$4.56), the Hong Kong dollar appeared to be undervalued by 52%(HK3.73∕7.76–1 = –52%)(HK$3.92∕7.77 − 1 = −50%). The Big Mac standard is somewhat misleading because you are buying not just the hamburger but also the location. Included in the price of a Big Mac is the cost of real estate, local taxes, and local services, which differ worldwide and are not traded goods. When the items being compared contain a bundle of traded and nontraded goods and services, as in the case of a Big Mac, it should not be surprising that absolute PPP and the law of one price fail to hold. Despite its flaws, the Big Mac index has had some success. For example, in 1999, it signaled that the euro was overvalued at its launch and the euro fell, notwithstanding expectations to the contrary. In 2002, it signaled that the U.S. dollar was more overvalued than at any other time in the life of the Big Mac index; shortly thereafter, the dollar plummeted in value. Similarly, the Big Mac signal in 2007 that the euro and pound were overvalued relative to the dollar preceded steep declines in the dollar value of these currencies in mid-2008. As of 2013, the Big Mac index was signaling (see Figure 4.2) that many Asian currencies (such as the Chinese yuan and Indonesian rupiah) and the Russian ruble were significantly undervalued against the dollar, while others such as the Swiss franc and Scandinavian currencies were significantly overvalued. The relative version of purchasing power parity, which is used more commonly now, states that the exchange rate between the home currency and any foreign currency will adjust to reflect changes in the price levels of the two countries. For example, if inflation is 5% in the Eurozone and 1% in 1

Gustav Cassel, “Abnormal Deviations in International Exchanges”, Economic Journal (December 1918): 413–415.

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Big Mac prices In local currency United States1 Argentina Australia Brazil Britain Canada Chile China2 Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Euro area3 Hong Kong Hungary India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Mexico New Zealand Norway Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore South Africa South Korea Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Thailand Turkey UAE Ukraine Uruguay Venezuela

4.56 21 5.035 12 2.69 5.53 2000 16 70.45 28.5 16.75 3.62 17 860 90 27939 320 7.3 37 5.5 46 3000 10 115.21 9.2 87 10 4.7 18.33 3900 370 41.61 6.5 79 89 8.5 12 19 105 45

In U.S. dollars 4.56 3.88 4.62 5.28 4.02 5.26 3.94 2.61 3.49 4.91 2.39 4.66 2.19 3.76 1.50 2.80 3.20 2.30 2.86 4.30 7.51 3.00 3.59 2.65 2.73 2.64 2.67 3.69 1.82 3.43 2.83 6.16 6.72 2.63 2.85 4.34 3.27 2.33 4.98 7.15

Implied PPP* exchange rate

Actual LC/US$ exchange rate

4.61 1.10 2.63 0.59 1.21 438.92 3.51 15.46 6.25 3.68 0.80 3.73 188.73 19.75 6131.46 70.23 1.60 8.12 1.21 10.10 65.84 2.19 25.28 2.02 19.09 2.19 1.03 4.02 855.89 81.20 9.13 1.43 17.34 19.53 1.87 2.63 4.17 23.04 9.88

* Purchasing-power

parity: local currency price divided by dollar price in the United States. pound (euro) exchange rate is in dollars per pound (euro). *** Under/over valuation: (implied PPP rate-actual exchange rate)/actual exchange rate. 1 Average of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Atlanta prices. 2 Average of prices in five cities. 3 Average of prices in the euro area. ** British

FIGURE 4.2 The Big Mac Hamburger Standard as of July 2013 Source: McDonald’s; The Economist.

5.41 1.09 2.27 0.67 1.05 508.16 6.13 20.18 5.80 7.01 0.78 7.76 228.46 59.98 9965.00 100.11 3.18 12.94 1.28 6.13 100.04 2.78 43.44 3.37 32.94 3.75 1.27 10.05 1135.70 130.80 6.76 0.97 30.03 31.28 1.96 3.67 8.16 21.09 6.29

Under (–) Over (+) valuation against the U. S. dollar

−14.85 1.39 15.98 −11.78 15.44 −13.63 −42.76 −23.40 7.83 −47.56 2.25 −51.90 −17.39 −67.07 −38.47 −29.85 −49.63 −37.25 −5.65 64.73 −34.19 −21.14 −41.80 −40.01 −42.04 −41.48 −19.08 −59.96 −24.64 −37.92 35.12 47.46 −42.26 −37.55 −4.70 −28.30 −48.87 9.29 56.95

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Japan, then the euro value of the Japanese yen must rise by about 4% to equalize the euro price of goods in the two countries. Formally, if ih and if are the periodic price-level increases (rates of inflation) for the home country and the foreign country, respectively; e0 is the euro (home currency or HC) value of one unit of foreign currency at the beginning of the period; and et is the spot exchange rate in period t, then (1 + ih )t et = e0 (1 + if )t If Equation 4.2 holds, then et = e0 ×

(4.2)

(1 + ih )t (1 + if )t

(4.3)

The value of et appearing in Equation 4.3 is known as the PPP rate. For example, if the United States and Switzerland are running annual inflation rates of 5% and 3%, respectively, and the spot rate is SFr 1 = $0.75, then according to Equation 4.3 the PPP rate for the Swiss franc in three years should be ) ( 1.05 3 e3 = 0.75 = $0.7945 1.03 If purchasing power parity is expected to hold, then $0.7945∕SFr is the best prediction for the Swiss franc spot rate in three years. The one-period version of Equation 4.3 is commonly used. It is e1 = e0 ×

Application

1 + ih 1 + if

(4.4)

Calculating the PPP Rate for the Swiss Franc

Suppose the current U.S. price level is at 112 and the Swiss price level is at 107, relative to base price levels of 100. If the initial value of the Swiss franc was $0.98, then according to PPP, the U.S. dollar value of the franc should have risen to approximately $1.0258 [0.98 × (112∕107)],

an appreciation of 4.67%. On the other hand, if the Swiss price level now equals 119, then the Swiss franc should have depreciated by about 5.88%, to $0.9224 [0.98 × (112∕119)].

Purchasing power parity is often represented by the following approximation of Equation 4.4:2 i h − if e1 − e0 = e0 1 + if

(4.5)

That is, the exchange rate change during a period should equal the inflation differential for that same time period. In effect, PPP says that currencies with high rates of inflation should depreciate relative to currencies with lower rates of inflation.

2

Dividing both sides of Equation 4.4 by e0 and then subtracting 1 from both sides yields e1 − e0 e0

Equation 4.5 follows if if is relatively small.

=

ih − if 1 − if

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CURRENCIES: EXPECTATIONS, PARITIES, AND FORECASTING Percentage change in home currency value of foreign currency

5

Parity line

4 A

3 2 1 –5

–4

–3

–2

–1

B 1

–1 –2

2

3

4

5

Inflation differential, home country relative to foreign country (%)

–3 –4 –5

FIGURE 4.3 Purchasing Power Parity

Equation 4.5 is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The vertical axis measures the percentage currency change, and the horizontal axis shows the inflation differential. Equilibrium is reached on the parity line, which contains all those points at which these two differentials are equal. At point A, for example, the 3% inflation differential is just offset by the 3% appreciation of the foreign currency relative to the home currency. Point B, on the other hand, depicts a situation of disequilibrium, at which the inflation differential of 3% is greater than the appreciation of 1% in the HC value of the foreign currency.

The Lesson of Purchasing Power Parity Purchasing power parity bears an important message: just as the price of goods in one year cannot be meaningfully compared with the price of goods in another year without adjusting for interim inflation, so exchange rate changes may indicate nothing more than the reality that countries have different inflation rates. In fact, according to PPP, exchange rate movements should just cancel out changes in the foreign price level relative to the domestic price level. These offsetting movements should have no effects on the relative competitive positions of domestic firms and their foreign competitors. Thus, changes in the nominal exchange rate—that is, the actual exchange rate—may be of little significance in determining the true effects of currency changes on a firm and a nation. In terms of currency changes affecting relative competitiveness, therefore, the focus must be not on nominal exchange rate changes but instead on changes in the real purchasing power of one currency relative to another. Here we consider the concept of the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for changes in the relative purchasing power of each currency since some base period. In technical terms, the real exchange rate at time t (in euros, U.S. dollars or home currency per unit of foreign currency), e′t , relative to the base period (specified as time 0) is defined as Pf e′t = et (4.6) Ph where Pf is the foreign price level and Ph the home price level at time t, both indexed to 100 at time 0.

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By indexing these price levels to 100 as of the base period, their ratio reflects the change in the relative purchasing power of these currencies since time 0. Note that increases in the foreign price level and foreign currency depreciation have offsetting effects on the real exchange rate. Similarly, home price-level increases and foreign currency appreciation offset each other. An alternative—and equivalent—way to represent the real exchange rate is to directly reflect the change in relative purchasing powers of these currencies by adjusting the nominal exchange rate for inflation in both countries since time 0, as follows: e′t = et

(1 + if )t

(4.7)

(1 + ih )t

where the various parameters are the same as those defined previously. If changes in the nominal exchange rate are fully offset by changes in the relative price levels between the two countries, then the real exchange rate remains unchanged. (Note that the real exchange rate in the base period is just the nominal rate e0 .) Specifically, if PPP holds, then we can substitute the value of et from Equation 4.2 into Equation 4.6. Making this substitution yields e′t = e0 ; that is, the real exchange rate remains constant at e0 . Alternatively, a change in the real exchange rate is equivalent to a deviation from PPP.

Application

Calculating the Real Exchange Rate for the Japanese Yen

Between 1982 and 2006, the ¥∕$ exchange rate moved from ¥249.05∕$ to ¥116.34. During this same 25-year period, the consumer price index (CPI) in Japan rose from 80.75 to 97.72 and the U.S. CPI rose from 56.06 to 117.07. a. If PPP had held over this period, what would the ¥∕$ exchange rate have been in 1995? Solution According to Equation 4.2, in 1995, the ¥∕$ exchange rate should have been ¥144.32∕$: ¥∕$ PPP rate = 249.05 ×

(97.72∕80.75) = ¥144.32∕$ (117.07∕56.06)

In working this problem, note that Equation 4.3 was inverted because we are expressing the exchange rate in ¥∕$ terms rather than $∕¥ terms. Note too that the ratio of CPIs is equal to the cumulative price-level increase. Comparing the PPP rate of ¥144.32∕$ to the actual rate of ¥116.34∕$, we can see that the yen has appreciated more than PPP would suggest. b. What happened to the real value of the yen in terms of U.S. dollars during this period?

Solution To estimate the real value of the yen, we convert the exchange rate from ¥∕$ terms to $∕¥ terms and apply Equation 4.5 (using the yen quoted in ¥∕$ terms would yield us the real value of the U.S. dollar in terms of yen):3 e′t = et

Pf Ph

=

(97.72∕80.75) 1 × = $0.004981∕¥ 116.34 (117.07∕56.06)

To interpret this real exchange rate and see how it changed since 1982, we compare it to the real exchange rate in 1982, which just equals the nominal rate at that time of 1∕249.05 = $0.004015∕¥ (because the real and nominal rates are equal in the base period). This comparison reveals that during the 25-year period from 1982 to 2006, the yen appreciated in real terms by (0.004981 − 0.004015)∕0.004015 = 24%. This dramatic appreciation in the inflation-adjusted value of the Japanese yen put enormous competitive pressure on Japanese exporters as the U.S. dollar prices of their goods rose far more than the U.S. rate of inflation would justify. 3 Dividing both current price levels by their base levels effectively

indexes each to 100 as of the base period.

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Application

How Undervalued Is the Chinese Yuan?

As we saw in Chapter 2, politicians and manufacturers in the United States have complained bitterly that in 2005 China undervalued its exchange rate, by some 20% to 30% against the U.S. dollar. In response to this pressure, the Chinese have allowed the yuan to appreciate, from ¥8.2765∕$ at the start of 2005 to ¥6.6000∕$ by the end of 2010.4 These figures translate into yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar of (1∕6.6000 − 1∕8.2765)∕(1∕8.2765), or 25.40%. Despite this increase falling squarely within the estimated range of required appreciation, the clamor for more yuan appreciation continues apace. What the advocates for a higher yuan do not seem to realize is that China’s real exchange rate increased even faster than its nominal rate because prices in China rose faster during this period than in the United States. In terms of competitiveness, the relevant measure of prices is unit labor costs (the price of labor per unit produced). These costs rise when wages and benefits increase relative to the change in productivity. From 2005 to 2010, U.S. unit labor costs rose by 4%, whereas Chinese unit costs rose by 25%. The impact on the real exchange rate was 4 The

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currency symbol for the Chinese yuan is the same as that for the Japanese yen.

dramatic. Specifically, the real exchange at the end of 2010 equaled e′t = et

1 + if 1 + ih

=

1.25 1 × = $0.18211∕¥ 6.6000 1.04

To interpret this real exchange rate, we compare it to the real exchange rate in 2005, which just equals the nominal rate at that time of 1∕8.2765 = $0.12082∕¥ (given equality between the real and nominal rates in the base period). This comparison reveals that during the 6-year period from 2005 to 2010, the yuan appreciated in real terms by (0.18211 − 0.12082)∕0.12082 = 50.72%, double the yuan’s nominal appreciation against the U.S. dollar. This dramatic appreciation in the yuan’s real value has forced Chinese firms to rely less on cheap labor for a competitive advantage and more on moving up the value chain by improving their design, engineering, manufacturing, and marketing skills. Moreover, if the signal sent by the Big Mac index (see Figure 4.2) is correct, notwithstanding what has happened to the real value of the yuan until now, Chinese firms must prepare for further real yuan appreciation in the future.

The distinction between the nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate has important implications for foreign exchange risk measurement and management. As we will see in Chapter 11, if the real exchange rate remains constant (i.e., if purchasing power parity holds), currency gains or losses from nominal exchange rate changes will generally be offset over time by the effects of differences in relative rates of inflation, thereby reducing the net impact of nominal devaluations and revaluations. Deviations from purchasing power parity, however, will lead to real exchange gains and losses. In the case of Japanese exporters, the real appreciation of the yen forced them to cut costs and develop new products less subject to pricing pressures. We will discuss their responses in more detail in Chapter 11. We also find that, in the same way as Japanese firms had to learn to live with a rising yen, Chinese firms are responding to the real appreciation of the yuan by improving the design, engineering, manufacture, and marketing of their products.

Expected Inflation and Exchange Rate Changes Changes in expected, as well as actual, inflation will cause exchange rate changes. An increase in a currency’s expected rate of inflation, all other things being equal, makes that currency more expensive to hold over time (because its value is being eroded at a faster rate) and less in demand at the same price. Consequently, the value of higher-inflation currencies will tend to be depressed relative to the value of lower-inflation currencies, other things being equal.

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The Monetary Approach More recently, purchasing power parity has been reformulated into the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. It is based on the quantity theory of money: M Y = P V

(4.8)

where M is the national money supply, P is the general price level, Y is real GNP, and V is the velocity of money. We can rewrite Equation 4.8 in terms of growth rates to give the determinants of domestic inflation: ih = 𝜇h − gyh + gvh

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(4.9)

where ih = the domestic inflation rate 𝜇h = the rate of domestic money supply expansion gyh = the growth in real domestic GNP gvh = the change in the velocity of the domestic money supply For example, if the Eurozone money supply growth is forecast at 5%, real GNP is expected to grow at 2%, and the velocity of money is expected to fall by 0.5%, then Equation 4.9 predicts that the Eurozone inflation rate will be 5% − 2% + (−0.5%) = 2.5%. A similar equation will hold for the predicted foreign rate of inflation. Combining these two equations along with purchasing power parity leads to the following predicted exchange rate change: e1 − e0 = ih − if = (𝜇h − 𝜇f ) − (gyh − gyf ) + (gvh − gvf ) (4.10) e0 where the subscript f refers to the corresponding rates for the foreign country.

Empirical Evidence The strictest version of purchasing power parity—that all goods and financial assets obey the law of one price—is demonstrably false. The risks and costs of shipping goods internationally, as well as government-erected barriers to trade and capital flows, are at times high enough to cause exchange-adjusted prices to systematically differ between countries. As shown in Figure 4.4, retail prices for Coca Cola clearly vary around the world, from €0.83 in Bangkok to €3.67 in Olso. On the other hand, there is clearly a relationship between relative inflation rates and changes in exchange rates. In particular, over time, as shown in Figure 4.5, those currencies with the largest relative decline (gain) in purchasing power saw the sharpest erosion (appreciation) in their foreign exchange values. The general conclusion from empirical studies of PPP is that the theory holds up well in the long run, but not as well over shorter time periods.5 The difference between the short-run and long-run effects can be seen in Figure 4.6, which compares the actual U.S. dollar exchange rate for six countries with their PPP rates. Despite substantial short-run deviations from purchasing power parity, currencies have a distinct tendency to move toward their PPP-predicted rates. Another way to view this evidence is that, despite fluctuations, the real exchange rate tends to revert back to its predicted

5 Perhaps the best known of these studies is Henry J. Gailliot, “Purchasing Power Parity as an Explanation of Long-Term Changes in Exchange Rates”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (August 1971): 348–357.

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Retail prices for Coca Cola (2L bottle) Africa

In local currency

Nairobi Cape Town

Kenyan shilling South African rand

Americas Buenos Aires Rio de Janeiro Lima New York City

Argentinian peso Brazilian real Peruvian new sol U.S. dollar

Asia Sydney Beijing Hong Kong Delhi Jakarta Tokyo Kuala Lumpur Bangkok Istanbul Ho Chi Minh City Europe Paris Berlin Rome Oslo Warsaw Moscow Madrid Stockholm London

167 14

In Euros (€) 1.42 0.91

14 4.42 5.58 2.34

1.28 1.33 1.45 1.72

Australian dollar Chinese Yuan Hong Kong dollar Indian rupees Indonesian rupiah Japanese yen Malaysian ringgit Thai Bhat Turkish lira Vietnamese dong

3.31 8 15 65 16,874 364 4.35 37 2.76 35,000

2.12 0.97 1.42 0.76 1.01 2.61 0.96 0.83 0.88 1.22

Euro Euro Euro Norwegian krone Polish zloty Russian rubles Euro Swedish krona British Pounds

2.09 1.73 2.08 31 5.55 60 1.54 19 1.92

2.09 1.73 2.08 3.67 1.31 1.25 1.54 2.15 2.32

FIGURE 4.4 Retail Prices for Coca Cola Around the World Source: www.expatistan.com.

value of e0 . That is, if e′t > e0 , then the real exchange rate should fall over time toward e0 , whereas if e′t < e0 , the real exchange rate should rise over time toward e0 . Additional support for the existence of mean-reverting behavior of real exchange rates is provided by data spanning two centuries on the dollar-British pounds and French franc-British pounds real exchange rates.6 Mean reversion has important implications for currency risk management, which will be explored in Chapter 11. A common explanation for the failure of PPP to hold is that goods prices are “sticky”, leading to short-term violations of the law of one price. Adjustment to PPP eventually occurs, but it does so with a lag. An alternative explanation for the failure of most tests to support PPP in the short run is that these tests ignore the problems caused by the combination of differently constructed price indices, relative price changes, and non-traded goods and services. Despite these problems, most tests of relative PPP as a long-term theory of exchange rate determination seem to support its validity. In summary, despite often lengthy departures from PPP, there is a clear correspondence between relative inflation rates and changes in the nominal exchange rate. However, for reasons that have nothing necessarily to do with market disequilibrium, the correspondence is not perfect. 6 See James R. Lothian and Mark P. Taylor, “Real Exchange Rate Behavior: The Recent Float from the Perspective of the Past Two Centuries”, Journal of Political Economy (June 1996).

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147

12 Swaziland

Relative change in exchange rate (%)

10

8

6 Regression line 4

India China

Japan

2 Germany

0

Sweden United Kingdom

France Canada

New Zealand

Spain Italy Australia United States

(2)

(4) 0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5 2.0 Relative change in purchasing power (%)

2.5

3.0

FIGURE 4.5 Purchasing Power Parity Empirical Data, 1993–2006 Source: International Monetary Fund; Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

4.3 The Fisher Effect The interest rates that are quoted in the financial press are nominal rates. That is, they are expressed as the rate of exchange between current and future money. For example, a nominal interest rate of 8% on a one-year loan means that €1.08 must be repaid in one year for €1.00 loaned today. But what really matters to both parties to a loan agreement is the real interest rate, the rate at which current goods are being converted into future goods. Looked at one way, the real rate of interest is the net increase in wealth that people expect to achieve when they save and invest their current income. Alternatively, it can be viewed as the added future consumption promised by a corporate borrower to a lender in return for the latter’s deferring current consumption. From the company’s standpoint, this exchange is worthwhile as long as it can find suitably productive investments. However, because virtually all financial contracts are stated in nominal terms, the real interest rate must be adjusted to reflect expected inflation. The Fisher effect states that the nominal interest rate r is made up of two components: (1) a real required rate of return a and (2) an inflation premium equal to the expected amount of inflation i. Formally, the Fisher effect is 1 + Nominal rate = (1 + Real rate)(1 + Expected inflation rate) 1 + r = (1 + a)(1 + i)

(4.11)

3.5

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Australian $ per USD

Canadian $ per USD

2.2

1.7 1.6

2

1.5 1.8

1.4

1.6

1.3 1.2

1.4

1.1 1.2

1

1

0.9 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Actual

2005

2000

2006

2001

2002

PPP

2003

2004

2005

2006

2005

2006

2005

2006

PPP

Actual

Japanese Yen per USD

Euro (In Germany) per USD 1.2

140

1.1

130

1

120

0.9 110 0.8 100

0.7

90

0.6

80

0.5 2000

2001

2002

2003 Actual

2004

2005

2000

2006

2001

2003

2002

PPP

Actual

Swiss Franc per USD

2004 PPP

Britain Pounds per USD

1.7

0.75

1.6

0.7

1.5

0.65

1.4 1.3

0.6

1.2

0.55

1.1

0.5

1 0.45

0.9

0.4

0.8 2000

2001

2002

2003 Actual

2004

2005

2006

2000

2001

2002

2003 Actual

PPP

2004

PPP

FIGURE 4.6 Purchasing Power Party and Actual Exchange Rates Source: Actual exchange rates obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Inflation data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007.

or r = a + i + ai

(4.12)

Equation 4.11 is often approximated by the equation r = a + i. The Fisher equation says, for example, that if the required real return is 3% and expected inflation is 10%, then the nominal interest rate will be about 13% (13.3%, to be exact using Equation 4.11). The logic behind this result is that €1 next year will have the purchasing power of €0.90 in terms of today’s money. Thus, the borrower must pay the lender €0.103 to compensate for the erosion in the purchasing power of the €1.03 in principal and interest payments, in addition to the €0.03 necessary to provide a 3% real return. The generalized version of the Fisher effect asserts that real returns are equalized across countries through arbitrage—that is, ah = af , where the subscripts h and f refer to home and foreign real rates, respectively. If expected real returns were higher in one currency than another, capital would flow from the second to the first currency. This process of arbitrage would continue, in the absence of government intervention, until expected real returns were equalized.

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Application

149

Central Banks’ Low Interest Policies Lead to Negative Real Interest Rates

As the the credit crunch unfolded, the central banks of the Eurozone, the United Kingdom and the United States rapidly reduced official interest rates to historic lows. On the other hand, inflation did not fall to zero. As a consequence, savers have experienced significant negative real interest rates. For the Eurozone, inflation has averaged about 2% in the period 2008–2013, while the short-term interest rate has been about 1.2% on average. For the U.K.,

the interest rate has been 0.5% but inflation has averaged 3%. The U.S. had an official interest rate of 0.25% and inflation of about 2.2%. Clearly, savers have seen the real value of their deposits erode over this period as central banks’ policies have led to negative real interest rates. This was not unintended: people with savings were being encouraged to spend following the “Great Recession” that depressed these advanced economies post the 2008 credit crunch.

In equilibrium, then, with no government interference, it should follow that the nominal interest rate differential will approximately equal the anticipated inflation differential between the two currencies, or r h − r f = i h − if (4.13) where rh and rf are the nominal home and foreign currency interest rates, respectively. The exact form of this relationship is expressed by Equation 4.14:7 1 + rh 1 + ih = 1 + rf 1 + if

(4.14)

In effect, the generalized version of the Fisher effect says that currencies with high rates of inflation should bear higher interest rates than currencies with lower rates of inflation. For example, if inflation rates in the Eurozone and the United Kingdom are 4% and 7%, respectively, the Fisher effect says that nominal interest rates should be about 3% higher in the United Kingdom than in the Eurozone. A graph of Equation 4.13 is shown in Figure 4.7. The horizontal axis shows the expected difference in inflation rates between the home country and the foreign country, and the vertical axis shows the interest differential between the two countries for the same time period. The parity line shows all points for which rh − rf = ih − if . Point C, for example, is a position of equilibrium because the 2% higher rate of inflation in the foreign country (ih − if = −2%) is just offset by the 2% lower home country interest rate (rh − rf = −2%). At point D, however, where the real rate of return in the home country is 1% lower than in the foreign country (an inflation differential of 2% versus an interest differential of 3%), funds should flow from the home country to the foreign country to take advantage of the real differential. This flow will continue until expected real returns are again equal.

Empirical Evidence Figure 4.8 illustrates the relationship between interest rates and inflation rates for 28 countries as of December 2013. It is evident from the graph that nations with higher inflation rates generally have higher interest rates. Thus, the empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that most of the

7

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Equation 4.14 can be converted into Equation 4.13 by subtracting 1 from both sides and assuming that rf and if are relatively small.

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5

Interest differential, in favor of home country (%)

4 3 Parity line 2 1

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

1 –1

C

–2

D

–3

2

3

4

5

Inflation differential, home country relative to foreign country (%)

–4 –5

FIGURE 4.7 The Fisher Effect

25%

Turkey

Money market interest rate

20%

15%

Regression line Brazil South Africa

10%

Pakistan Russia

Mexico New Zealand Britain Australia United States Philippines 5% Sweden France Thailand Israel China Switzerland Czech Republic Canada Taiwan Japan Germany Singapore

0% 0%

2%

Argentina

Indonesia Colombia India

4%

6%

Hungary

8%

10%

Inflation rate (measured as the change in the CPI over the past 12 months)

FIGURE 4.8 Fisher Effect: Nominal Interest Rate Versus Inflation Rate for 28 Developed and Developing Countries as of November 2013 Inflation = annualised inflation in sample countries for December 2013. Nominal interest rate = Short-term money market interest rate as at December 2013. Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com.

12%

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4.3 The Fisher Effect

Sez aez

Srw

arw Dez Credit (a) Capital Market Segmentation

Drw

Real interest rate

Real interest rate

variation in nominal interest rates across countries can be attributed to differences in inflationary expectations. The proposition that expected real returns are equal between countries cannot be tested directly. However, many observers believe it unlikely that significant real interest differentials could long survive in the increasingly internationalized capital markets. Most market participants agree that arbitrage, via the huge pool of liquid capital that operates in international markets these days, is forcing pretax real interest rates to converge across all the major nations. To the extent that arbitrage is permitted to operate unhindered, capital markets are integrated worldwide. Capital market integration means that real interest rates are determined by the global supply and global demand for funds. This is in contrast to capital market segmentation, whereby real interest rates are determined by local credit conditions. The difference between capital market segmentation and capital market integration is depicted in Figure 4.9. With a segmented capital market, the real interest rate in the Eurozone, aez , is based on the national demand Dez and national supply Sus of credit. Conversely, the real rate in the rest of the world, arw , is based on the rest-of-world supply Srw and demand Drw . In this example, the Eurozone real rate is higher than the real rate outside the single currency area, or aez > arw . Once the Eurozone market opens up, the real interest rate in the euro area falls (and the rest-of-world rate rises) to the new world rate aw , which is determined by the world supply Sw (Sez + Srw ) and world demand Dw (Dez + Drw ) for credit. The mechanism whereby equilibrium is brought about is a capital inflow to the Eurozone. It is this same capital flow that drives up the real interest rate outside the Eurozone.8 As shown by Figure 4.9, in an integrated capital market, the domestic real interest rate depends on what is happening outside as well as inside the Eurozone. For example, a rise in the demand for capital by Asian companies to finance investments in the Pacific Rim will raise the real interest rate in the Eurozone as well as in Asia. Similarly, a rise in the Eurozone savings rate, other things being equal, will lower the real cost of capital both in the Eurozone and in the rest of the world. Conversely, a fall in inflation in the euro area will lower the nominal Eurozone interest rate (the Fisher effect), while leaving unchanged real interest rates worldwide. Capital market integration has integrated markets around the world, eroding much, although not all, of the real interest rate differentials between comparable domestic and offshore securities, and strengthening the link between assets that are denominated in different currencies but carry similar

Sw = Sus + Srw aus aw arw Dw = Dus + Drw Credit (b) Capital Market Integration

FIGURE 4.9 The Distinction Between Capital Market Integration and Capital Market Segmentation

8 The net gain from the transfer of capital equals the higher returns on the capital imported to the United States less the lower returns forgone in the rest of the world. Returns on capital must be higher in the United States prior to the capital inflow because the demand for capital depends on the expected return on capital. Thus, a higher real interest rate indicates a higher real return on capital.

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Real interest rate (measured as the money market interest rate— the change in the CPI over the past 12 months)

credit risks.9 To the extent that real interest differentials do exist, they must be due to either currency risk or some form of political risk. A real interest rate differential could exist without being arbitraged away if investors strongly preferred to hold domestic assets in order to avoid currency risk, even if the expected real return on foreign assets were higher. The evidence on this point is somewhat mixed. The data indicate a tendency toward convergence in real interest rates internationally, indicating that arbitrage does occur, but real rates still appear to differ from each other.10 Moreover, the estimated currency risk premium appears to be highly variable and unpredictable, leading to extended periods of apparent differences in real interest rates between nations.11 These differences are displayed in Figure 4.10, which compares real interest rates (measured as the nominal interest rate minus the past year’s inflation rate as a surrogate for the expected inflation rate) as of May 2007 versus nominal rates for the same 28 countries shown in Figure 4.8. According to this figure, countries with higher nominal interest rates (implying higher expected inflation and 12%

Turkey

10% Brazil

8%

6%

Thailand France New Zealand South Africa Australia 4% Mexico Israel Britain Russia Colombia Philippines Switzerland Canada

Regression line

2%

India Hungary Czech Republic China 0% Germany Pakistan Taiwan Sweden Singapore Japan

Argentina

–2% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 21% Nominal money market interest rate

FIGURE 4.10 Real Interest Rate Versus Nominal Interest Rate for 28 Developed and Developing Countries as of May 2007 Inflation = Change in 2007 consumer price. Nominal Rate = 3-Month Money Market Rate. Source: The Economist, May 17, 2007.

9

An offshore security is one denominated in the home currency but issued abroad. They are generally referred to as Eurosecurities. for example, Frederick S. Mishkin, “Are Real Interest Rates Equal Across Countries? An International Investigation of Parity Conditions”, Journal of Finance (December 1984): 1345–1357. He finds that, although capital markets may be integrated, real interest rates appear to differ across countries because of currency risk. His findings are consistent with those of Baghar Modjtahedi, “Dynamics of Real Interest Rate Differentials: An Empirical Investigation”, European Economic Review 32, no. 6 (1988): 1191–1211. 11 Adrian Throop, “International Financial Market Integration and Linkages of National Interest Rates”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, no. 3 (1994): 3–18, found that exchange risk caused persistent real interest rate differentials among developed nations for the years 1981 to 1993. 10 See,

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4.4 The International Fisher Effect

greater currency risk) tend to have higher real interest rates, resulting in large real rate differentials among some countries. In addition to currency and inflation risk, real interest rate differentials in a closely integrated world economy can stem from countries pursuing sharply differing tax policies or imposing regulatory barriers to the free flow of capital. In many developing countries, however, currency controls and other government policies impose political risk on foreign investors. In effect, political risk can drive a wedge between the returns available to domestic investors and those available to foreign investors. For example, if political risk in Brazil causes foreign investors to demand a 7% higher interest rate than they demand elsewhere, then foreign investors would consider a 10% expected real return in Brazil to be equivalent to a 3% expected real return in their home country. Hence, real interest rates in developing countries can exceed those in developed countries without presenting attractive arbitrage opportunities to foreign investors. The combination of a relative shortage of capital and high political risk in most developing countries is likely to cause real interest rates in these countries to exceed real interest rates in the developed countries. Indeed, the countries in Figure 4.10 with the highest real rates of interest tend to be developing countries. Investors’ tolerance of economic mismanagement in developed nations also has fallen dramatically, as financial deregulation, abolition of foreign exchange controls, and the process of global portfolio diversification have swollen the volume of international capital flows. With modern technology enabling investors to move capital from one market to another at low cost and almost instantaneously, the pressure on central banks to seem to “do the right thing” is intense. Conversely, those nations that must attract a disproportionate amount of global capital to finance their national debts and that have no credible policies to deal with their problems in a noninflationary way will be forced to pay a rising risk premium. Before we move to the next parity condition, a caveat is in order. We must keep in mind that there are numerous interest differentials just as there are many different interest rates in a market. The rate on bank deposits, for instance, will not be identical to that on Treasury bills. In computation of an interest differential, therefore, the securities on which this differential is based must be of identical risk characteristics save for currency risk. Otherwise, there is the danger of comparing apples with oranges (or at least Seville oranges with navel oranges). Adding Up Capital Markets Internationally. Central to understanding how we can add the euro, yen, British pound, U.S. dollar, and other capital markets together is to recognize that money is only a veil: all financial transactions, no matter how complex, ultimately involve exchanges of goods today for goods in the future. As we will see in Chapter 5, you supply credit (capital) when you consume less than you produce; you demand credit when you consume more than you produce. Thus, the supply of credit can be thought of as the excess supply of goods and the demand for credit as the excess demand for goods. When we add up the capital markets around the world, we are adding up the excess demands for goods and the excess supplies of goods. A car is still a car, whether it is valued in euros, yen, British pounds, or U.S. dollars, or some other currency.

4.4 The International Fisher Effect The key to understanding the impact of relative changes in nominal interest rates among countries on the foreign exchange value of a nation’s currency is to recall the implications of PPP and the generalized Fisher effect. PPP implies that exchange rates will move to offset changes in inflation rate differentials. Thus, a rise in the inflation rate in the Eurozone relative to those of other countries will be associated with a fall in the euro’s value. It will also be associated with a rise in the Eurozone

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interest rate relative to foreign interest rates. Combine these two conditions and the result is the international Fisher effect (IFE): e (1 + rh )t = t (4.15) t (1 + rf ) e0 where et is the expected exchange rate in period t. The single-period analogue to Equation 4.15 is 1 + rh e = 1 1 + rf e0

(4.16)

According to Equation 4.16, the expected return from investing at home, 1 + rh , should equal the expected home currency return from investing abroad, (1 + rf )e1 ∕e0 . As discussed in the previous section, however, despite the intuitive appeal of equal expected returns, domestic and foreign expected returns might not equilibrate if the element of currency risk restrained the process of international arbitrage.

Illustration: Using the IFE to Forecast US$ and SFr Rates In July, the one-year interest rate is 2% on Swiss francs and 7% on U.S. dollars. (a) If the current exchange rate is SFr 1 = $0.91, what is the expected future exchange rate in one year?

(b) If a change in expectations regarding future U.S. inflation causes the expected future spot rate to rise to $1.00, what should happen to the U.S. interest rate? Solution If rus is the unknown U.S. interest rate, and the Swiss

Solution

interest rate stayed at 4% (because there has been no

According to the international Fisher effect, the spot exchange rate expected in one year equals 0.91 × 1.07∕1.02 = $0.9546.

change in expectations of Swiss inflation), then according to the international Fisher effect, 1.00∕0.91 = (1 + rus )∕1.02, or rus = 11.21%.

If rf is relatively small, Equation 4.17 provides a reasonable approximation to the international Fisher effect:12 e − e0 rh − rf = 1 (4.17) e0 In effect, the IFE says that currencies with low interest rates are expected to appreciate relative to currencies with high interest rates. A graph of Equation 4.17 is shown in Figure 4.11. The vertical axis shows the expected change in the home currency value of the foreign currency, and the horizontal axis shows the interest differential between the two countries for the same time period. The parity line shows all points for which rh − rf = (e1 − e0 )∕e0 . Point E is a position of equilibrium because it lies on the parity line, with the 4% interest differential in favor of the home country just offset by the anticipated 4% appreciation in the home currency value of the foreign currency. Point F, however, illustrates a situation of disequilibrium. If the foreign currency is expected to appreciate by 3% in terms of the home currency, but the interest differential

12 Subtracting

1 from both sides of Equation 4.16 yields

(e1 −e0 ) e0

=

rh −rf 1+rf

. Equation 4.17 follows if rf is relatively small.

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4.4 The International Fisher Effect Expected change in home currency value of foreign currency (%)

5 E

4 F

3 2 1 –5

–4

–3

–2

–1

1 –1 –2

2

3

4

5

Interest differential in favor of home country (%)

–3 Parity line

–4 –5

FIGURE 4.11 International Fisher Effect

in favor of the home country is only 2%, then funds would flow from the home to the foreign country to take advantage of the higher exchange-adjusted returns there. This capital flow will continue until exchange-adjusted returns are equal in the two nations. Essentially what the IFE says is that arbitrage between financial markets—in the form of international capital flows—should ensure that the interest differential between any two countries is an unbiased predictor of the future change in the spot rate of exchange. This condition does not mean, however, that the interest differential is an especially accurate predictor; it just means that prediction errors tend to cancel out over time. Moreover, an implicit assumption that underlies IFE is that investors view foreign and domestic assets as perfect substitutes. To the extent that this condition is violated (see the discussion on the Fisher effect) and investors require a risk premium (in the form of a higher expected real return) to hold foreign assets, IFE will not hold exactly.

Empirical Evidence As predicted, there is a clear tendency for currencies with high interest rates (for example, Brazil, Egypt, and the Philippines) to depreciate and those with low interest rates (for example, Japan and Switzerland) to appreciate. The ability of interest differentials to anticipate currency changes is supported by several empirical studies that indicate the long-run tendency for these differentials to offset exchange rate changes.13 The international Fisher effect also appears to hold even in the short run in the case of nations facing very rapid rates of inflation. Thus, at any given time, currencies bearing higher nominal interest rates can be reasonably expected to depreciate relative to currencies bearing lower interest rates. Despite this apparently convincing evidence for the international Fisher effect, a large body of empirical evidence now indicates that the IFE does not hold up very well in the short run for nations

13

See, for example, Ian H. Giddy and Gunter Dufey, “The Random Behavior of Flexible Exchange Rates”, Journal of International Business Studies (Spring 1975): 1–32; and Robert A. Aliber and Clyde P. Stickney, “Accounting Measures of Foreign Exchange Exposure: The Long and Short of It”, The Accounting Review (January 1975): 44–57.

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with low to moderate rates of inflation.14 One possible explanation for this result relies on the existence of a time-varying exchange risk premium. However, this explanation for the failure of the IFE to hold in the short run has been challenged by empirical evidence indicating that the currency risk premium, to the extent it exists, is very small.15 A more plausible explanation for the IFE’s failure in the short run relies on the nature of the Fisher effect. According to the Fisher effect, changes in the nominal interest differential can result from changes in either the real interest differential or relative inflationary expectations. These two possibilities have opposite effects on currency values. For example, suppose that the nominal interest differential widens in favor of the Eurozone. If this spread is due to a rise in the real interest rate in the Eurozone relative to that of other countries, the value of the euro will rise. Alternatively, if the change in the nominal interest differential is caused by an increase in inflationary expectations for the Eurozone, the euro’s value will drop. The key to understanding short-run changes in the value of the euro or other currency, then, is to distinguish changes in nominal interest rate differentials that are caused by changes in real interest rate differentials from those caused by changes in relative inflation expectations. Historically, changes in the nominal interest differential have been dominated, at times, by changes in the real interest differential; at other times, they have been dominated by changes in relative inflation expectations. Consequently, there is no stable, predictable relationship between changes in the nominal interest differential and exchange rate changes.

Application

The Carry Trade

The carry trade involves borrowing a currency bearing a low interest rate and investing the proceeds in a currency bearing a high interest rate. In recent years, the carry trade has centered around borrowing yen in Japan at rates close to zero and selling the yen to invest in higher-yielding assets, such as U.S. Treasury notes or European bonds. By 2007, it was estimated that the yen carry trade totaled about $1 trillion. According to the international Fisher effect, carry trades should not yield a predictable profit because the interest rate differential between two currencies should (aside from currency risk considerations) equal the rate at which investors expect the low interest rate currency to appreciate against the high interest rate one. However, the existence of a large volume of carry trades may lead to an opposite result. For example, as borrowed yen are sold to buy euros or U.S. dollars, carry trades will send the yen lower and boost the euro or the U.S. dollar.

14

The danger, of course, is that the small, steady returns from the carry trade (say, borrowing at 1% in yen and investing at 4% in euros to earn a spread of 3%) is the possibility of a very large, very sudden loss when the euro sinks or the yen jumps in value. The currency effect will be exacerbated if speculators try to cut their losses by bailing out of their euro assets and repaying their yen debts. This risk is captured in the colorful description of the carry trade as “picking up nickels in front of a steamroller”. A good example of this occurred in 2007 when the Federal Reserve started slashing short-term interest rates in September. With Japan’s rates remaining unchanged, the yen jumped sharply against the U.S. dollar. In response, many carry trade speculators unwound their carry trades, helping to push the yen up further and triggering a global sell-off in assets that had been financed by the yen carry trade.

Much of this research is summarized in Kenneth A. Froot, “Short Rates and Expected Asset Returns”, NBER working paper no. 3247, January 1990. 15 See, for example, Kenneth A. Froot and Jeffrey A. Frankel, “Forward Discount Bias: Is It an Exchange Risk Premium?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1989): 139–161.

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157

It is also possible that capital movements to take advantage of interest rate differentials can be driving exchange rates in the opposite direction to that predicted by the IFE. One example of this phenomenon is the carry trade, whose existence also indicates that many investors believe that they can profitably arbitrage interest rate differentials across countries on an unhedged (or “uncovered”) basis.

Application

Iceland’s Economy Heats Up and then Freezes Over

In mid-2007, The Economist explained to its readers that Iceland was defying economic theory by borrowing abroad five times the value of its GDP with no adverse consequences. According to The Economist (July 21, 2007, p. 72), Icelandic companies and consumers were enjoying apparently risk-free currency arbitrage: High rates have made Iceland the beneficiary of the “carry trade,” where investors borrow in a low-yielding currency and invest the proceeds in a higher-yielding one. This trade offends economic theorists, who assume the juicy yields Iceland offers will be offset by an eventual plunge in the value of its currency. But so far the trade seems to have worked. Meanwhile, Icelandic consumers have taken the opportunity to borrow cheaply abroad, bypassing the punishing interest rates imposed by the central bank.

tripled, and its stock market capitalization (the value of all listed shares outstanding) increased by a factor of eight. Then financial gravity struck in the form of the global financial crisis. By October 2008, when the full force of the crisis hit, Iceland’s currency (the krona) depreciated against the euro by 85%, its stock market capitalization plummeted by over 90%, and all three of its major commercial banks went bankrupt. Relative to the size of its economy, Iceland’s banking collapse was the largest suffered by any country in economic history. Iceland had no recourse but to seek financing from the IMF. Although the full cost of the crisis is still unknown, it is estimated to exceed 75% of the country’s 2007 GDP. The Economist’s instinct that there is no such thing as a free lunch, including in international financial markets, was borne out with a vengeance. Perhaps Icelanders will better trust economic theory in the future.

The effects of Iceland’s borrowing spree were epic. In the span of three years, Iceland’s per-capita income

4.5 Interest Rate Parity Theory Spot and forward rates are closely linked to each other and to interest rates in different currencies through the medium of arbitrage. Specifically, the movement of funds between two currencies to take advantage of interest rate differentials is a major determinant of the spread between forward and spot rates. In fact, the forward discount or premium is closely related to the interest differential between the two currencies. According to interest rate parity (IRP) theory, the currency of the country with a lower interest rate should be at a forward premium in terms of the currency of the country with the higher rate. More specifically, in an efficient market with no transaction costs, the interest differential should be (approximately) equal to the forward differential. When this condition is met, the forward rate is said to be at interest rate parity, and equilibrium prevails in the money markets. Interest parity ensures that the return on a hedged (or “covered”) foreign investment will just equal the domestic interest rate on investments of identical risk, thereby eliminating the possibility of having a money machine. When this condition holds, the covered interest differential—the difference between the domestic interest rate and the hedged foreign rate—is zero. To illustrate this condition, suppose an investor with US$1, 000, 000 to invest for 90 days is trying to decide between investing in U.S. dollars at 8% per year (2% for 90 days) or in euros at 6% per year (1.5% for 90 days).

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Today

Finish: $1,020,000

Start: $1,000,000

3. Simultaneously with euro investment, sell the 751,100 forward at a rate of 0.73637/$ for delivery in 90 days, and receive $1,020,000 in 90 days.

1. Convert $1,000,000 to euros at 0.7400/$ for 740,000.

Alternative investment: Invest $1,000,000 in New York for 90 days at 2% and receive $1,020,000 in 90 days

751,100 Frankfurt: 90 days

2. Invest 740,000 at 1.5% for 90 days, yielding 751,100 in 90 days.

740,000 Frankfurt: today

FIGURE 4.12 An Example of Interest Rate Parity

The current spot rate is €0.74000∕$, and the 90-day forward rate is €0.73637∕$. Figure 4.12 shows that regardless of the investor’s currency choice, their hedged return will be identical. Specifically, $1, 000, 000 invested in U.S. dollars for 90 days will yield $1, 000, 000 × 1.02 = $1, 020, 000. Alternatively, if the investor chooses to invest in euros on a hedged basis, they will 1. Convert the $1, 000, 000 to euros at the spot rate of €0.74000∕$. This yields €740, 000 available for investment. 2. Invest the principal of €740, 000 at 1.5% for 90 days. At the end of 90 days, the investor will have €751, 100. 3. Simultaneously with the other transactions, sell the €751, 100 in principal plus interest forward at a rate of €0.73637∕$ for delivery in 90 days. This transaction will yield €751, 100∕0.73637 = $1, 020, 000 in 90 days. If the covered interest differential between two money markets is nonzero, there is an arbitrage incentive to move money from one market to the other. This movement of money to take advantage of a covered interest differential is known as covered interest arbitrage. The transactions associated with covered interest arbitrage will affect prices in both the money and foreign exchange markets. In the previous example, as British pounds are bought spot and sold forward, boosting the spot rate and lowering the forward rate, the forward discount will tend to widen. Simultaneously, as money flows from New York, interest rates there will tend to increase; at the same time, the inflow of funds to London will depress interest rates there. The process of covered interest arbitrage will continue until interest parity is achieved, unless there is government interference. If this process is interfered with, covered interest differentials between national money markets will not be arbitraged away. Interference often occurs because many governments regulate and restrict flows of capital across their borders. Moreover, just the risk of controls will be sufficient to yield prolonged deviations from interest rate parity.

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Application

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159

Covered Interest Arbitrage between London and New York

Suppose the interest rate on British pounds is 12% in London, and the interest rate on a comparable U.S. dollar investment in New York is 7%. The British pound spot rate is $1.95, and the one-year forward rate is $1.87. These rates imply a forward discount on British pounds of 4.10% [(1.87 − 1.95)∕1.95] and a covered yield on British pounds approximately equal to 8% (12% − 4%). Because there is a covered interest differential in favor of London, funds will flow from New York to London. To illustrate the profits associated with covered interest arbitrage, we will assume that the borrowing and lending rates are identical and the bid-ask spread in the spot and forward markets is zero. Here are the steps the arbitrageur can take to profit from the discrepancy in rates based on a $1, 000, 000 transaction. Specifically, as shown in Figure 4.13, the arbitrageur will

2. Immediately convert the $1, 000, 000 to British pounds at the spot rate of £1 = $1.95. This yields £512, 820.51 available for investment. 3. Invest the principal of £512, 820.51 in London at 12% for one year. At the end of the year, the arbitrageur will have £574, 358.97. 4. Simultaneously with the other transactions, sell the £574, 358.97 in principal plus interest forward at a rate of £1 = $1.87 for delivery in one year. This transaction will yield $1, 074, 051.28 next year. 5. At the end of the year, collect the £574, 358.97, deliver it to the bank’s foreign exchange department in return for $1, 074, 051.28, and use $1, 070, 000 to repay the loan. The arbitrageur will earn $4, 051.28 on this set of transactions.

1. Borrow $1, 000, 000 in New York at an interest rate of 7%. This means that at the end of one year, the arbitrageur must repay principal plus interest of $1, 070, 000. New York One year Finish: 7. Net profit equals $4,051.28. 6. Repay the loan plus interest of $1,070,000 out of the $1,074,051.28. 5. Collect the £574,358.97 and deliver it to the bank’s foreign exchange department in return for $1,074,051.28.

Today Start: 1. Borrow $1,000,000 at an interest rate of 7%, owing $1,070.00 at year end. 2. Convert the $1,000,000 to pounds at $1.95/£ for £512,820.51. 3. Invest the £512,820.51 in London at 12%, generating £574,358.97 by year end.

London: one year

London: today 4. Simultaneously, sell the £574,358.97 in principal plus interest forward at a rate of $1.87/£ for delivery in one year, yielding $1,074,051.28 at year end.

FIGURE 4.13 An Example of Covered Interest Arbitrage

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5 4

Arbitrage inflow to home country

H

3 2

G Arbitrage outflow from home country

1 –5

–4

–3

–2

–1

1 –1 –2

2

3

4

5

Forward premium (+) or discount (–) on foreign currency (%)

–3 Parity line

–4 –5

FIGURE 4.14 Interest Rate Parity Theory

The relationship between the spot and forward rates and interest rates in a free market can be shown graphically, as in Figure 4.14. Plotted on the vertical axis is the interest differential in favor of the home country. The horizontal axis plots the percentage forward premium (positive) or discount (negative) on the foreign currency relative to the home currency. The interest parity line joins those points for which the forward exchange rate is in equilibrium with the interest differential. For example, if the interest differential in favor of the foreign country is 2%, the currency of that country must be selling at a 2% forward discount for equilibrium to exist. Point G indicates a situation of disequilibrium. Here, the interest differential is 2%, whereas the forward premium on the foreign currency is 3%. The transfer of funds abroad with exchange risks covered will yield an additional 1% annually. At point H, the forward premium remains at 3%, but the interest differential increases to 4%. Now reversing the flow of funds becomes profitable. The 4% higher interest rate more than makes up for the 3% loss on the forward exchange transaction, leading to a 1% increase in the interest yield. In reality, the interest parity line is a band because transaction costs, arising from the spread on spot and forward contracts and brokerage fees on security purchases and sales, cause effective yields to be lower than nominal yields. For example, if transaction costs are 0.75%, a covered yield differential of only 0.5% will not be sufficient to induce a flow of funds. For interest arbitrage to occur, the covered differential must exceed the transaction costs involved. The covered interest arbitrage relationship can be stated formally. Let e0 be the current spot rate and f1 the end-of-period forward rate. If rh and rf are the prevailing interest rates in New York and, say, Frankfurt, respectively, then one U.S. dollar invested in New York will yield 1 + rh at the end of the period; the same dollar invested in Frankfurt will be worth (1 + rf )f1 ∕e0 U.S. dollars at maturity. This latter result can be seen as follows: one U.S. dollar will convert into 1∕e0 euros that, when invested at rf , will yield (1 + rf )∕e0 euros at the end of the period. By selling the proceeds forward today, this amount will be worth (1 + rf )f1 ∕e0 U.S. dollars when the investment matures.

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161

Funds will flow from New York to Frankfurt if and only if 1 + rh


(1 + rf )f1 e0

Interest rate parity holds when there are no covered interest arbitrage opportunities. On the basis of the previous discussion, this no-arbitrage condition can be stated as follows: 1 + rh f = 1 (4.18) 1 + rf e0 Interest rate parity is often approximated by Equation 4.19:16 f − e0 rh − rf = 1 e0

(4.19)

In effect, interest rate parity says that high interest rates on a currency are offset by forward discounts and that low interest rates are offset by forward premiums. Transaction costs in the form of bid-ask spreads make the computations more difficult, but the principle is the same: compute the covered interest differential to see whether there is an arbitrage opportunity.

Application

Using Interest Rate Parity to Calculate the $ ∕ ¥ Forward Rate

The interest rate in the United States is 10%; in Japan, the comparable rate is 7%. The spot rate for the yen is $0.003800 (¥263.16∕$). If interest rate parity holds, what is the 90-day forward rate? Solution

f90 = $0.003800 ×

1 + (0.10∕4) = $0.003828 1 + (0.07∕4)

In other words, the 90-day forward Japanese yen should be selling at an annualized premium of about 2.95% [4 × (0.003828 − 0.003800)∕0.0038].

According to IRP, the 90-day forward rate on the Japanese yen, f90 , should be $0.003828:

Empirical Evidence Interest rate parity is one of the best-documented relationships in international finance. In fact, in the Eurocurrency markets, the forward rate is calculated from the interest differential between the two currencies using the no-arbitrage condition. Deviations from interest parity do occur between national capital markets, however, owing to capital controls (or the threat of them), the imposition of taxes on interest payments to foreigners, and transaction costs. However, as we can see in Figure 4.15, these deviations tend to be small and short-lived. 16 Subtracting 1 from both sides of Equation 4.18 yields (f − e )∕e = (r − r )∕(1 + r ). Equation 4.19 follows if r is relatively 1 0 0 h f f f small.

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Application

Computing the Covered Interest Differential When Transaction Costs Exist

Suppose the annualized interest rate on 180-day U.S. dollar deposits is 6 7/16 − 5/16%, meaning that U.S. dollars can be borrowed at 6 7/16% (the ask or offered rate) and lent at 6 5/16% (the bid rate). At the same time, the annualized interest rate on 180-day Thai baht (B) deposits is 9 3/8–1/8%. Spot and 180-day forward quotes on Thai baht are B 31.5107-46∕$ and B 32.1027-87∕$, respectively. Is there an arbitrage opportunity? Compute the profit using B 10,000,000.

2.

3.

Solution The only way to determine whether an arbitrage opportunity exists is to examine the two possibilities: borrow U.S. dollars and lend Thai baht or borrow baht and lend U.S. dollars, both on a hedged basis. The key is to ensure that you are using the correct bid or ask interest and exchange rates. In this case, it turns out that there is an arbitrage opportunity from borrowing Thai baht and lending U.S. dollars. The specific steps to implement this arbitrage are as follows:

4.

5.

rate of 0.09375∕2 = 4.6875%, requiring repayment of B 10,468,750 in principal plus interest at the end of 180 days. Immediately convert the B 10,000,000 to U.S. dollars at the spot ask rate of B 31.5146∕$ (the baht cost of buying U.S. dollars spot). This yields $317, 313.25 (B 10,000,000/31.5146) available for investment. Invest the principal of $317, 313.25 at 0.063125∕2 = 3.15625% for 180 days. In six months, this investment will have grown to $327, 328.44 ($317, 313.25 × 1.0315625). Simultaneously with the other transactions, sell the $327, 328.44 in principal plus interest forward at the bid rate of B 32.1027 (the rate at which U.S. dollars can be converted into baht) for delivery in 180 days. This transaction will yield B 10,508,126.86 in 180 days. At the end of six months, collect the $327, 328.44, deliver it to the bank’s foreign exchange department in return for B 10,508.126.86, and use B 10,468,750 of the proceeds to repay the loan. The gain on this set of transactions is B 39,376.86.

1. Borrow B 10,000,000 at the ask rate of 9 3/8% for 180 days. This interest rate translates into a 180-day

4.6 The Relationship Between the Forward Rate and the Future Spot Rate Our current understanding of the workings of the foreign exchange market suggests that, in the absence of government intervention in the market, both the spot rate and the forward rate are influenced heavily by current expectations of future events. The two rates move in tandem, with the link between them based on interest differentials. New information, such as a change in interest rate differentials, is reflected almost immediately in both spot and forward rates. Suppose a depreciation of the British pound is anticipated. Recipients of British pounds will begin selling the pound forward, and British pound-area U.S. dollar earners will slow their sales of dollars in the forward market. These actions will tend to depress the price of forward British pounds. At the same time, banks will probably try to even out their long (net purchaser) positions in forward British pounds by selling pounds spot. In addition, British pound-area recipients of U.S. dollars will tend to delay converting dollars into British pounds, and earners of British pounds will speed up their collection and conversion of pounds. In this way, pressure from the forward market is transmitted to the spot market, and vice versa. Ignoring risk for the moment, equilibrium is achieved only when the forward differential equals the expected change in the exchange rate. At this point, there is no longer any incentive to buy or sell the currency forward. This condition is illustrated in Figure 4.16. The vertical axis measures the expected change in the home currency value of the foreign currency, and the horizontal axis shows the forward

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FIGURE 4.15 Uncovered and Covered Interest Rate Differentials (U.S. $ Versus Other Currencies) Source: Bhar, Buk-Joogn, Kim, Ramprasad, and Toan M., Pham, “Exchange Rate Volatility and Its Impact on the Transaction Cost of Covered Interest Rate Parity.” Japan and the World Economy, Vol. 16, 2004.

discount or premium on the foreign currency. Parity prevails at point I, where the expected foreign currency depreciation of 2% is just matched by the 2% forward discount on the foreign currency. Point J, however, is a position of disequilibrium because the expected 4% depreciation of the foreign currency exceeds the 3% forward discount on the foreign currency. We would, therefore, expect to see speculators selling the foreign currency forward for home currency, taking a 3% discount in the expectation of covering their commitment with 4% fewer units of the home currency. A formal statement of the unbiased forward rate (UFR) condition is that the forward rate should reflect the expected future spot rate on the date of settlement of the forward contract: ft = et

(4.20)

where et is the expected future exchange rate at time t (units of home currency per unit of foreign currency) and ft is the forward rate for settlement at time t.

Application

Using UFR to Forecast the Future $ ∕ € Spot Rate

If the 90-day forward rate is €1 = $0.8987, what is the expected value of the euro in 90 days?

Solution Arbitrage should ensure that the market expects the spot value of the euro in 90 days to be about $0.8987.

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Expected change in home currency value of foreign currency (%)

5 4 3 Parity line 2 1

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

1 –1 –2

2

3

4

5

Forward premium (+) or discount (–) on foreign currency (%)

I –3 J

–4 –5

FIGURE 4.16 Relationship Between the Forward Rate and the Future Spot Rate

Equation 4.20 can be transformed into the equation reflected in the parity line appearing in Figure 4.16, which is that the forward differential equals the expected change in the exchange rate, by subtracting 1(e0 ∕e0 ), from both sides, where e0 is the current spot rate (home currency per unit of foreign currency):17 f1 − e0 e − e0 = 1 (4.21) e0 e0 Market efficiency requires that people process information and form reasonable expectations; it does not require that f1 = e1 . Market efficiency allows for the possibility that risk-averse investors will demand a risk premium on forward contracts, much the same as they demand compensation for bearing the risk of investing in stocks. In this case, the forward rate will not reflect exclusively the expectation of the future spot rate. The principal argument against the existence of a risk premium is that currency risk is largely diversifiable. If foreign exchange risk can be diversified away, no risk premium need be paid for holding a forward contract; the forward rate and expected future spot rate will be approximately equal. Ultimately, therefore, the unbiased nature of forward rates is an empirical, and not a theoretical, issue.

Empirical Evidence A number of studies have examined the relation between forward rates and future spot rates.18 Of course, it would be unrealistic to expect a perfect correlation between forward and future spot rates because the future spot rate will be influenced by events, such as an oil crisis, that can be forecast only imperfectly, if at all. 17

Note that this condition can be derived through a combination of the international Fisher effect and interest parity theory. Specifically, interest rate parity says that the interest differential equals the forward differential, whereas the IFE says that the interest differential equals the expected change in the spot rate. Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, so the forward differential will equal the expected exchange rate change if both interest rate parity and the IFE hold. 18 See, for example, Giddy and Dufey, “The Random Behavior of Flexible Exchange Rates”; and Bradford Cornell, “Spot Rates, Forward Rates, and Market Efficiency”, Journal of Financial Economics (January 1977): 55–65.

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Nonetheless, the general conclusion from early studies was that forward rates are unbiased predictors of future spot rates. But later studies, using more powerful econometric techniques, argue that the forward rate is a biased predictor, probably because of a risk premium.19 However, the premium appears to change signs—being positive at some times and negative at other times—and averages near zero. This result, which casts doubt on the risk premium story, should not be surprising given that testing the unbiased nature of the forward rate is equivalent to testing the international Fisher effect (assuming covered interest parity holds). In effect, we wind up with the same conclusions: over time, currencies bearing a forward discount (higher interest rate) depreciate relative to currencies with a forward premium (lower interest rate). That is, on average, the forward rate is unbiased. On the other hand, at any point in time, the forward rate appears to be a biased predictor of the future spot rate. More specifically, the evidence indicates that one can profit on average by buying currencies selling at a forward discount (i.e., currencies whose interest rate is relatively high) and selling currencies trading at a forward premium (i.e., currencies whose interest rate is relatively low). Nonetheless, research also suggests that this evidence of forward market inefficiency may be difficult to profit from on a risk-adjusted basis. One reason is the existence of what is known as the peso problem. The peso problem refers to the possibility that during the time period studied investors anticipated significant events that did not materialize, thereby invalidating statistical inferences based on data drawn from that period. The term derives from the experience of Mexico from 1955 to 1975. During this entire period, the peso was fixed at a rate of US$0.125, yet continually sold at a forward discount because investors anticipated a large peso devaluation. This devaluation eventually occurred in 1976, thereby validating the prediction embedded in the forward rate (and relative interest rates). However, those who limited their analysis on the relation between forward and future spot rates to data drawn only from 1955 to 1975 would have falsely concluded that the forward rate was a biased predictor of the future spot rate. In their comprehensive survey of the research on bias in forward rates, Froot and Thaler conclude, Whether or not there is really money to be made based on the apparent inefficiency of foreign exchange markets, it is worth emphasizing that the risk-return trade-off for a single currency is not very attractive…Although much of the risk in these [single currency] strategies may be diversifiable in principle, more complex diversified strategies may be much more costly, unreliable, or difficult to execute.20

This evidence of bias suggests that the selective use of forward contracts—sell forward if the currency is at a forward premium and buy it forward if it is selling at a discount—may increase expected profits but at the expense of higher risk.

4.7 Currency Forecasting Forecasting exchange rates has become an occupational hazard for financial executives of multinational corporations. The potential for periodic—and unpredictable—government intervention makes currency forecasting all the more difficult. But this difficulty has not dampened the enthusiasm for currency forecasts or the willingness of economists and others to supply them. Unfortunately, however, enthusiasm and willingness are not sufficient conditions for success.

19

See, for example, Lars P. Hansen and Robert J. Hodrick, “Forward Rates as Optimal Predictions of Future Spot Rates”, Journal of Political Economy (October 1980): 829–853. 20 Kenneth A. Froot and Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: Foreign Exchange”, Journal of Economic Perspectives (Summer 1990): 179–192.

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Requirements for Successful Currency Forecasting Currency forecasting can lead to consistent profits only if the forecaster meets at least one of the following four criteria:21 • Has exclusive use of a superior forecasting model • Has consistent access to information before other investors • Exploits small, temporary deviations from equilibrium • Can predict the nature of government intervention in the foreign exchange market The first two conditions are self-correcting. Successful forecasting breeds imitators, whereas early access to information is unlikely to be sustained in the highly informed world of international finance. The third criterion is how foreign exchange traders actually earn their living, but deviations from equilibrium are not likely to last long. The fourth situation is the one worth searching out. Countries that insist on managing their exchange rates and are willing to take losses to achieve their target rates present speculators with potentially profitable opportunities. Simply put, consistently profitable predictions are possible in the long run only if it is not necessary to outguess the market to win. As a general rule, in a fixed-rate system, the forecaster must focus on a government’s decision-making structure because the decision to devalue or revalue at a given time is clearly political. Under the Bretton Woods system, for example, many speculators did quite well by “stepping into the shoes of the key decision makers” to forecast their likely behavior. The basic forecasting methodology in a fixed-rate system, therefore, involves first ascertaining the pressure on a currency to devalue or revalue and then determining how long the nation’s political leaders can, and will, persist with this particular level of disequilibrium. Figure 4.17 depicts a five-step procedure for performing this analysis. In the case of a floating-rate system, in which government intervention is sporadic or nonexistent, currency prognosticators have the choice of using either market- or model-based forecasts, neither of which guarantees success.

Market-Based Forecasts So far, we have identified several equilibrium relationships that should exist between exchange rates and interest rates. The empirical evidence on these relationships implies that, in general, the financial markets of developed countries efficiently incorporate expected currency changes in the cost of money and forward exchange. This means that currency forecasts can be obtained by extracting the predictions already embodied in interest and forward rates. Forward Rates. Market-based forecasts of exchange rate changes can be derived most simply from current forward rates. Specifically, f1 —the forward rate for one period from now—will usually suffice for an unbiased estimate of the spot rate as of that date. In other words, f1 should equal e1 , where e1 is the expected future spot rate. Interest Rates. Although forward rates provide simple and easy-to-use currency forecasts, their forecasting horizon is limited to about one year because of the general absence of longer-term forward contracts. Interest rate differentials can be used to supply exchange rate predictions beyond one year. For example, suppose five-year interest rates on U.S. dollars and euros are 6% and 5%, respectively. If the current spot rate for the euro is $0.90 and the (unknown) value of the euro in five years is e5 , then $1.00 invested today in euros will be worth (1.05)5 e5 ∕0.90 U.S. dollars at the end of five years;

21 These

criteria were suggested by Giddy and Dufey, “The Random Behavior of Flexible Exchange Rates”.

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4.7 Currency Forecasting Forecasting Indicators

Environmental Factors Internal External Inflation— Inflation rates in traded goods sector, major trading partners— nontraded goods sector traded goods sector, Interest rates— nontraded goods sector short term, long term Interest rates in other GDP growth rate money markets Foreign GDP growth rates

Growth in money supply Government deficit financing—level, trends Domestic wage levels Productivity changes 5 Effects of policy selected

Equilibrium exchange rate

1

Exchange controls Import restrictions

Environmental Indicators Balance of trade Invisibles (tourism, services, etc.) Debt-servicing requirements Capital flows—short term, long term Forward currency discount Black market or "free" market exchange rate

2

Extent of balance-of-payments deficit

Rate and change in rate of depletion of owned or borrowed reserves

Devaluation pressure coefficient

3

Political Factors Key decision makers Ideology of ruling party Additional economic goals Upcoming elections External political factors

4

External Political Factors Pressure by allies or major trading partner

Estimate of government response

Possible Government Responses Austerity (deflation) Exchange controls Induce capital inflows by a combination of monetary and fiscal policy Devaluation

FIGURE 4.17 Forecasting in a Fixed-Rate System

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if invested in the dollar security, it will be worth (1.06)5 in five years. The market’s forecast of e5 can be found by assuming that investors demand equal returns on dollar and euro securities, or (1.05)5 e5 = (1.06)5 0.90 Thus, the five-year euro spot rate implied by the relative interest rates is e5 = $0.9437 (0.90 × 1.065 ∕1.055 ).

Model-Based Forecasts The two principal model-based approaches to currency prediction are known as fundamental analysis and technical analysis. Each approach has its advocates and detractors. Fundamental Analysis. Fundamental analysis is the most common approach to generating model-based forecasts of future exchange rates. It relies on painstaking examination of the macroeconomic variables and policies that are likely to influence a currency’s prospects. The variables examined include relative inflation and interest rates, national income growth, and changes in money supplies. The interpretation of these variables and their implications for future exchange rates depend on the analyst’s model of exchange rate determination. The simplest form of fundamental analysis involves the use of PPP. We have previously seen the value of PPP in explaining exchange rate changes. Its application in currency forecasting is straightforward.22

Application

Using PPP to Forecast the South African Rand’s Future Spot Rate

The U.S. inflation rate is expected to average about 4% annually, and the South African rate of inflation is expected to average about 9% annually. If the current spot rate for the rand is R125∕$, what is the expected spot rate in two years?

Solution According to PPP (Equation 4.3), the expected spot rate for the rand in two years is R125 × (1.09∕1.04)2 = R137.31.

Most analysts use more complicated forecasting models whose analysis usually centers on how the different macroeconomic variables are likely to affect the demand and supply for a given foreign currency. The currency’s future value is then determined by estimating the exchange rate at which supply just equals demand—when any current-account imbalance is just matched by a net capital flow. Forecasting based on fundamental analysis has inherent difficulties. First, you must be able to select the right fundamentals; then you must be able to forecast them—itself a problematic task (think about forecasting interest rates); finally, your forecasts of the fundamentals must differ from those of the market. Otherwise, the exchange rate will have already discounted the anticipated change in the fundamentals. Another difficulty that forecasters face is the variability in the lag between when changes in fundamentals are forecast to occur and when they actually affect the exchange rate. 22

Some forecasters use an adjusted version of purchasing power parity to account for the tendency of price differences across countries to be positively correlated with income differences, meaning that prices of the same goods tend to be higher in high-income countries than in low-income countries. Explanations of this price-income relationship appear in some of the works listed in the Bibliography: see Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964), and Alessandria and Kaboski (2008).

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4.7 Currency Forecasting

Despite these difficulties, Robert Cumby developed a sophisticated regression model incorporating forward premiums along with real variables such as relative inflation rates and current-account balances that yielded predictable return differentials (between investing in uncovered foreign deposits and domestic deposits) on the order of 10% to 30% per year.23 Technical Analysis. Technical analysis is the antithesis of fundamental analysis in that it focuses exclusively on past price and volume movements—while totally ignoring economic and political factors—to forecast currency winners and losers. Success depends on whether technical analysts can discover price patterns that repeat themselves and are, therefore, useful for forecasting. There are two primary methods of technical analysis: charting and trend analysis. Chartists examine bar charts or use more sophisticated computer-based extrapolation techniques to find recurring price patterns. They then issue buy or sell recommendations if prices diverge from their past pattern. Trend-following systems seek to identify price trends via various mathematical computations.

Model Evaluation The possibility that either fundamental or technical analysis can be used to profitably forecast exchange rates is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis, which says that current exchange rates reflect all publicly available information. Because markets are forward-looking, exchange rates will fluctuate randomly as market participants assess and then react to new information, much as security and commodity prices in other asset markets respond to news. Thus, exchange rate movements are unpredictable; otherwise, it would be possible to earn arbitrage profits. Such profits could not persist in a market, such as the foreign exchange market, that is characterized by free entry and exit and an almost unlimited amount of money, time, and energy that participants are willing to commit in pursuit of profit opportunities. In addition to the theoretical doubts surrounding forecasting models, a variety of statistical and technical assumptions underlying these models have been called into question as well. For all practical purposes, however, the quality of a currency forecasting model must be viewed in relative terms. That is, a model can be said to be “good” if it is better than alternative means of forecasting currency values. Ultimately, a currency forecasting model is “good” only to the extent that its predictions will lead to better decisions. Certainly interest differentials and/or forward rates provide low-cost alternative forecasts of future exchange rates. At a minimum, any currency forecasting model should be able to consistently outperform the market’s estimates of currency changes. In other words, one relevant question is whether profitable decisions can be made in the forward and/or money markets by using any of these models. Currency forecasters charge for their services, so researchers periodically evaluate the performance of these services to determine whether the forecasts are worth their cost. The evaluation criteria generally fall into two categories: accuracy and correctness. The accuracy measure focuses on the deviations between the actual and the forecasted rates, and the correctness measure examines whether the forecast predicts the right direction of the change in exchange rates. An accurate forecast may not be correct in predicting the direction of change, and a correct forecast may not be very accurate. The two criteria are sometimes in conflict. Which of these two criteria should be followed in evaluation depends on how the forecasts are to be used. An analysis of forecasting errors—the difference between the forecast and actual exchange rate—will tell us little about the profit-making potential of econometric forecasts. Instead, we need to link these forecasts to actual decisions and then calculate the resulting profits or losses.

23 Robert

279–300.

Cumby, “Is It Risk? Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity”, Journal of Monetary Economics (September 1988):

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For example, if the forecasts are to be used to decide whether to hedge with forward contracts, the relative predictive abilities of the forecasting services can be evaluated by using the following decision rule: If f1 > e1 , sell forward. If f1 < e1 , buy forward. where f1 is the forward rate and e1 is the forecasted spot rate at the forward contract’s settlement date. In other words, if the forecasted rate is below the forward rate, the currency should be sold forward; if the forecasted rate is above the forward rate, the currency should be bought forward. The percentage profit (loss) realized from this strategy equals 100[(f1 − e1 )∕e1 ] when f1 > e1 and equals 100[(e1 − f1 )∕e1 ] when f1 < e1 , where e1 is the actual spot rate being forecasted. Despite the theoretical skepticism over successful currency forecasting, a study of 14 forecast advisory services by Richard Levich indicates that the profits associated with using several of these forecasts seem too good to be explained by chance.24 Of course, if the forward rate contains a risk premium, these returns will have to be adjusted for the risks borne by speculators. It is also questionable whether currency forecasters would continue selling their information rather than act on it themselves if they truly believed it could yield excess risk-adjusted returns. That being said, it is hard to attribute expected return differentials of up to 30% annually (Cumby’s results) to currency risk when the estimated global equity risk premium is only about 5% for a riskier investment.

Application

The Distinction Between an Accurate Forecast and a Profitable Forecast

Suppose that the ¥∕$ spot rate is currently ¥110∕$. A 90-day forecast puts the exchange rate at ¥102∕$; the 90-day forward rate is ¥109∕$. According to our decision rule, we should buy the Japanese yen forward. If we buy US$1 million worth of yen forward and the actual rate turns out to be ¥108∕$, then our decision will yield a profit of $9, 259 [(109, 000, 000 − 108, 000, 000)∕108]. In contrast, if the forecasted value of the yen had been ¥111∕$,

we would have sold yen forward and lost $9, 259. Thus, an accurate forecast, off by less than 3% (3/108), leads to a loss; and a less accurate forecast, off by almost 6% (6/108), leads to a profitable decision. When deciding on a new investment or planning a revised pricing strategy, however, the most critical attribute of a forecasting model is its correctness. In the latter case, the second forecast would be judged superior.

Of course, if you take a particular data sample and run every possible regression, you are likely to find some apparently profitable forecasting model. But that does not mean it is a reliable guide to the future. To control for this tendency to “data mine”, you must do out-of-sample forecasting. That is, you must see if your model forecasts well enough to be profitable in time periods not included in the original data sample. Hence, the profitable findings of Cumby and others may stem from the fact that their results are based on the in-sample performance of their regressions. That is, they used the same data sample both to estimate their model and to check its forecasting ability. Indeed, Richard Meese and Kenneth Rogoff concluded that sophisticated models of exchange rate determination make poor

24 Richard

M. Levich, “The Use and Analysis of Foreign Exchange Forecasts: Current Issues and Evidence”, paper presented at the Euromoney Treasury Consultancy Program, New York, September 4–5, 1980.

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forecasts.25 Their conclusion is similar to that of Jeffrey Frankel, who, after reviewing the research on currency forecasting, stated that the proportion of exchange rate changes that are forecastable in any manner—by the forward discount, interest rate differential, survey data, or models based on macroeconomic fundamentals—appears to be not just low, but almost zero.26

Frankel’s judgment is consistent with the existence of an efficient market in which excess risk-adjusted returns have a half-life measured in minutes, if not seconds. That being said, the finance literature supports the idea that whereas fundamental analysis fails to outperform random walk models, technical analysis is useful for predicting short-run, out-of-sample exchange rate movements.27 In particular, technical analysis makes two predictions that appear to hold up under scrutiny: (1) Downtrends (uptrends) tend to reverse course at predictable “support” (“resistance”) levels, which are often round numbers, and (2) trends tend to accelerate after rates cross such levels.28 Some research suggests that these patterns result from order clustering associated with stop-loss and take-profit orders.29 A stop-loss (take-profit) buy order instructs the currency dealer to purchase currency once the market rate rises (falls) to a certain level; sell orders instruct dealers to do the opposite. Such orders tend to cluster at round numbers, explaining the effect on trends when market rates get near those numbers. The short-term predictive success of technical analysis, however, does not mean that one can earn excess returns after accounting for the transaction costs associated with acting on these predictions.

Forecasting Controlled Exchange Rates A major problem in currency forecasting is that the widespread existence of exchange controls, as well as restrictions on imports and capital flows, often masks the true pressures on a currency to devalue. In such situations, forward markets and capital markets are invariably nonexistent or subject to such stringent controls that interest and forward differentials are of little practical use in providing market-based forecasts of exchange rate changes. An alternative forecasting approach in such a controlled environment is to use black-market exchange rates as useful indicators of devaluation pressure on the nation’s currency. The black-market rate tends to be a good indicator of where the official rate is likely to go if the monetary authorities give in to market pressure. It seems to be most accurate in forecasting the official rate one month ahead and is progressively less accurate as a forecaster of the future official rate for longer time periods.30

4.8

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we examined five relationships, or parity conditions, that should apply to spot rates, inflation rates, and 25 Richard

interest rates in different currencies: purchasing power parity (PPP), the Fisher effect (FE), the international Fisher effect

A. Meese and Kenneth Rogoff, “Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do They Fit Out of Sample?”, Journal of International Economics, 14, no. 1/2 (1983): 3–24. 26 Jeffrey Frankel, “Flexible Exchange Rates: Experience Versus Theory”, Journal of Portfolio Management (Winter 1989): 45–54. 27 Much of this literature is summarized in Carol L. Osler, “Currency Orders and Exchange Rate Dynamics: An Explanation for the Predictive Success of Technical Analysis”, Journal of Finance (October 2003): 1791–1818. 28 A support level is usually defined as a price point at which buying interest is sufficiently strong as to overcome selling pressure. A resistance level is the opposite of a support level. 29 See Osler, “Currency Orders and Exchange Rate Dynamics.” 30 See, for example, Ian Giddy, “Black Market Exchange Rates as a Forecasting Tool”, working paper, Columbia University, May 1978.

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(IFE), interest rate parity (IRP) theory, and the forward rate as an unbiased forecast of the future spot rate (UFR). These parity conditions follow from the law of one price, the notion that in the absence of market imperfections, arbitrage ensures that exchange-adjusted prices of identical traded goods and financial assets are within transaction costs worldwide. The technical description of these five equilibrium relationships is summarized as follows:

• Interest rate parity f (1 + rh )t = t (1 + rf )t e0 where ft = the forward rate for delivery of one unit of foreign currency at time t

• Purchasing power parity (1 + ih )t et = e0 (1 + if )t Where et = the home currency value of the foreign currency at time t e0 = the home currency value of the foreign currency at time 0 ih = the periodic domestic inflation rate if = the periodic foreign inflation rate

• Fisher effect 1 + r = (1 + a) (1 + i) Where r = the nominal rate of interest a = the real rate of interest i = the rate of expected inflation

• Forward rate as an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate ft = et Despite the mathematical precision with which these parity conditions are expressed, they are only approximations of reality. A variety of factors can lead to significant and prolonged deviations from parity. For example, both currency risk and inflation risk may cause real interest rates to differ across countries. Similarly, various shocks can cause the real exchange rate—defined as the nominal, or actual, exchange rate adjusted for changes in the relative purchasing power of each currency since some base period—to change over time. Moreover, the short-run relation between changes in the nominal interest differential and changes in the exchange rate is not so easily determined. The lack of precision in this relation stems from the differing effects on exchange rates of purely nominal interest rate changes and real interest rate changes. We examined the concept of the real exchange rate in more detail as well. The real exchange rate, et ′ , incorporates both the nominal exchange rate between two currencies and the inflation rates in both countries. It is defined as follows:

• Real exchange rate e′t = et

• Generalized version of Fisher effect (1 + rh )t (1 + ih )t = t (1 + rf ) (1 + if )t

Pf Ph

where Pf = the foreign price level at time t indexed to 100 at time 0

where rh = the periodic home currency interest rate rf = the periodic foreign currency interest rate

• International Fisher effect e (1 + rh )t = t t (1 + rf ) e0 where et = the expected home currency value of the foreign currency at time t

Ph = the home price level at time t indexed to 100 at time 0 We then analyzed a series of forecasting models that purport to outperform the market’s own forecasts of future exchange rates as embodied in interest and forward differentials. We concluded that the foreign exchange market is no different from any other financial market in its susceptibility to profitable predictions. Those who have inside information about events that will affect the value of a currency or a security should benefit handsomely. Those who do not have this access will have to trust either to luck or to the existence of a market

Shapiro

4.8 Summary and Conclusions imperfection, such as government intervention, to assure themselves of above-average, risk-adjusted profits. Given the widespread availability of information and the many knowledgeable participants in the foreign exchange market, only the latter situation—government manipulation of exchange

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rates—holds the promise of superior risk-adjusted returns from currency forecasting. When governments spend money to control exchange rates, this money flows into the hands of private participants who bet against the government. The trick is to predict government actions.

QUESTIONS 1.

.(a) What is purchasing power parity?

(c) What might account for Chile’s high interest rate relative to its inflation rate? What are the likely consequences of this high interest rate?

(b) What are some reasons for deviations from purchasing power parity?

(d) During this same period, Peru had a small interest differential and yet a large average exchange rate change. How would you reconcile this experience with the international Fisher effect and with your answer to Part b?

(c) Under which circumstances can purchasing power parity be applied? 2.

3.

One proposal to stabilize the international monetary system involves setting exchange rates at their purchasing power parity rates. Once exchange rates were correctly aligned (according to PPP), each nation would adjust its monetary policy so as to maintain them. What problems might arise from using the PPP rate as a guide to the equilibrium exchange rate?

8.

Suppose the rupiah-U.S. dollar exchange rate is fixed, but Indonesian prices are rising faster than U.S. prices. Is the Indonesian rupiah appreciating or depreciating in real terms?

From 1982 to 1988, a number of countries (e.g., Pakistan, Hungary, Venezuela) had a small or negative interest rate differential and a large average annual depreciation against the U.S. dollar. How would you explain these data? Can you reconcile these data with the international Fisher effect?

9.

What factors might lead to persistent covered interest arbitrage opportunities among countries?

10.

In early 1989, Japanese interest rates were about 4 percentage points below U.S. rates. The wide difference between Japanese and U.S. interest rates prompted some U.S. real estate developers to borrow in yen to finance their projects. Comment on this strategy.

11.

In 2000, Eurozone interest rates were below those of the US. By 2001, this had reversed. At the same time, the euro fell against the U.S. dollar. What might explain the divergent trends in interest rates?

12.

In late December 1990, one-year German Treasury bills yielded 9.1%, whereas one-year U.S. Treasury bills yielded 6.9%. At the same time, the inflation rate during 1990 was 6.3% in the United States, double the German rate of 3.1%.

4.

Comment on the following statement. “It makes sense to borrow during times of high inflation because you can repay the loan in cheaper money.”

5.

Which is likely to be higher, a 150% ruble return in Russia or a 15% U.S. dollar return in the United States?

6.

7.

The interest rate in the UK is 12%; in Switzerland it is 5%. What are possible reasons for this interest rate differential? What is the most likely reason? From 1982 to 1988, Peru and Chile stand out as countries whose interest rates were not consistent with their inflation experience. Specifically, Peru’s inflation and interest rates averaged about 125% and 8%, respectively, over this period, whereas Chile’s inflation and interest rates averaged about 22% and 38%, respectively.

(a) Are these inflation and interest rates consistent with the Fisher effect? Explain. (b) What might explain this difference in interest rates between the United States and Germany?

(a) How would you characterize the real interest rates of Peru and Chile (e.g., close to zero, highly positive, highly negative)?

13.

(b) What might account for Peru’s low interest rate relative to its high inflation rate? What are the likely consequences of this low interest rate?

The spot rate on the euro is $1.39, and the 180-day forward rate is $1.41. What are possible reasons for the difference between the two rates?

14.

British government bonds, or gilts, currently are paying higher interest rates than comparable U.S. Treasury

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rampant inflation in Turkey forced up domestic interest rates. At the same time, Turkey’s central bank was intervening in the foreign exchange market to maintain the value of the Turkish lira. Comment on the Turkish banks’ funding strategy.

bonds. Suppose the Bank of England eases the money supply to drive down interest rates. How is an American investor in gilts likely to fare? 15.

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PROBLEMS 1.

From base price levels of 100 in 2000, Japanese and U.S. price levels in 2003 stood at 102 and 106, respectively.

5.

(a) If the current exchange rate is $1.63 ∶ £1, what is the expected future exchange rate in one year?

(a) If the 2000 Japanese yen-U.S. dollar exchange rate was ¥130, what should the exchange rate be in 2003?

(b) Suppose a change in expectations regarding future U.S. inflation causes the expected future spot rate to decline to $1.52 ∶ £1. What should happen to the U.S. interest rate?

(b) In fact, the exchange rate in 2003 was 115. What might account for the discrepancy? (Price levels were measured using the consumer price index.) 2.

6.

Suppose that in Japan the interest rate is 8% and inflation is expected to be 3%. Meanwhile, the expected inflation rate in France is 12%, and the UK interest rate is 14%. To the nearest whole number, what is the best estimate of the one-year forward exchange premium (discount) at which the British pound will be selling relative to the euro?

7.

Chase Econometrics has just published projected inflation rates for the United States and the Eurozone for the next five years. U.S. inflation is expected to be 10% per year, and Eurozone inflation is expected to be 4% per year.

Two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, produce only one good, wheat. Suppose the price of wheat is $3.25 in the United States and is £1.35 in England. (a) According to the law of one price, what should the $ ∶ £ spot exchange rate be? (b) Suppose the price of wheat over the next year is expected to rise to $3.50 in the United States and to £1.60 in England. What should the one-year $ ∶ £ forward rate be? (c) If the U.S. government imposes a tariff of $0.50 per bushel on wheat imported from the United Kingdom, what is the maximum possible change in the spot exchange rate that could occur?

3.

If expected inflation is 100% and the real required return is 5%, what should the nominal interest rate be according to the Fisher effect?

4.

In early 1996, the short-term interest rate in France was 3.7% and forecast French inflation was 1.8%. At the same time, the short-term German interest rate was 2.6% and forecast German inflation was 1.6%.

In July, the one-year interest rate is 12% on British pounds and 9% on U.S. dollars.

(a) If the current exchange rate is $0.95∕€, forecast the exchange rates for the next five years. (b) Suppose that U.S. inflation over the next five years turns out to average 3.2%, Eurozone inflation averages 1.5%, and the exchange rate in five years is $0.99∕€. What has happened to the real value of the euro over this five-year period? 8.

During 1995, the Mexican peso exchange rate rose from Mex$5.33∕US$ to Mex $7.64∕US$. At the same time, U.S. inflation was approximately 3% in contrast to Mexican inflation of about 48.7%.

(a) Based on these figures, what were the real interest rates in France and Germany?

(a) By how much did the nominal value of the Mexican peso change during 1995?

(b) To what would you attribute any discrepancy in real rates between France and Germany?

(b) By how much did the real value of the Mexican peso change over this period?

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10.

Suppose three-year deposit rates on Eurodollars and Eurofrancs (Swiss) are 12% and 7%, respectively. If the current spot rate for the Swiss franc is SFr 2.51∕$, what is the spot rate implied by these interest rates for the franc three years from now? Assume that the interest rate is 16% on British pounds and 7% on euros. At the same time, inflation is running at an annual rate of 3% in the Eurozone and 9% in the UK.

(d) Assuming no transaction costs, what would be your arbitrage profit per U.S. dollar or dollar-equivalent borrowed? 14.

(b) Suppose now that transaction costs in the foreign exchange market equal 0.25% per transaction. Do unexploited covered arbitrage profit opportunities still exist?

(d) What are the real costs to a British firm of borrowing euros? Contrast this cost to its real cost of borrowing pounds.

Suppose the spot rates for the euro, British pound, and Swiss franc are $1.52, $2.01, and $0.98, respectively. The associated 90-day interest rates (annualized) are 8%, 16%, and 4%; the U.S. 90-day rate (annualized) is 12%. What is the 90-day forward rate on an ACU (ACU 1 = €1 + £1 + SFr 1) if interest parity holds?

13.

= $1.46 ∶ € = $1.49 ∶ € = 7% per year = 9% per year

(a) Assuming no transaction costs or taxes exist, do covered arbitrage profits exist in this situation? Describe the flows.

(c) Suppose that during the year the exchange rate changes from €1.8 ∶ £1 to €1.77 ∶ £1. What are the real costs to a Euozone company of borrowing British pounds? Contrast this cost to its real cost of borrowing euros.

12.

Here are some prices in the international money markets: Spot rate Forward rate (one year) Interest rate (€) Interest rate ($)

(b) What is the real interest rate in the Eurozone? In the UK?

Suppose the Eurosterling rate is 15% and the Eurodollar rate is 11.5%. What is the forward premium on the U.S. dollar? Explain.

175

(c) What arbitrage opportunity do these figures present?

(a) If the euro is selling at a one-year forward premium of 10% against the British pound, is there an arbitrage opportunity? Explain.

11.

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(c) Suppose no transaction costs exist. Let the capital gains tax on currency profits equal 25% and the ordinary income tax on interest income equal 50%. In this situation, do covered arbitrage profits exist? How large are they? Describe the transactions required to exploit these profits. 15.

Suppose today’s exchange rate is $1.55∕€. The six-month interest rates on U.S. dollars and euros are 6% and 3%, respectively. The six-month forward rate is $1.5478. A foreign exchange advisory service has predicted that the euro will appreciate to $1.5790 within six months.

Suppose that three-month interest rates (annualized) in Japan and the United States are 7% and 9%, respectively. If the spot rate is ¥142 ∶ $1 and the 90-day forward rate is ¥139 ∶ $1,

(a) How would you use forward contracts to profit in the above situation?

(a) Where would you invest?

(c) Which alternatives (forward contracts or money market instruments) would you prefer? Why?

(b) Where would you borrow?

(b) How would you use money market instruments (borrowing and lending) to profit?

WEB RESOURCES www.oecd.org/topicstatsportal/0,2647,en_2825_495691_1_1 _1_1_1,00.html Contains data on PPP exchange rates for

the OECD countries going back to 1970. The PPP exchange rate data are presented in a spreadsheet that can be saved.

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www.tradingeconomics.com Contains current exchange rates along with economic data, forecasts, and news. http://mwprices.ft.com/custom/ft-com/html-marketsDataTools .asp Website of the Financial Times that contains data on

short-term Eurocurrency interest rates for the U.S. dollar, euro, Swiss franc, Japanese yen, British pound, and several other currencies. This website also links to worldwide exchange rate data.

INTERNET EXERCISES 1.

Using data from the OECD, compare the most recent

4.

PPP exchange rates for the euro, British pound, and Japanese yen, with their nominal exchange rates. What

(a) Which of these currencies are forecast to appreciate and which to depreciate?

differences do you observe? What accounts for these differences? 2.

(b) Compare these forecasts to the forward rates for the same maturity. Are the predicted exchange rates greater or less than the corresponding forward rates?

Using OECD data, plot the PPP exchange rates for the British pound, Japanese yen, Australian dollar, and Korean won. Have these PPP exchange rates gone up or

(c) Compare these forecasts to the actual exchange rates. How accurate were these forecasts?

down over time? What accounts for the changes in these PPP exchange rates over time? 3.

(d) If you had followed these forecasts (by buying forward when the forecasted exchange rate exceeded the forward rate and selling forward when it was below the forward rate), would you have made or lost money?

Find the 90-day interest rates from the Financial Times website for the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, euro, Polish zloty, Russian ruble, and British pound. Are the yield differentials on these currencies consistent with the forward rates reported in the Wall Street Journal? What might account for any differences?

Examine forecasts from www.tradingeconomics.com for the British pound, Japanese yen, Russian ruble, and euro.

5.

How have forward premiums and discounts relative to the U.S. dollar changed over annual intervals during the past five years for the Japanese yen, British pound, and euro? Use beginning-of-year data.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aliber, Robert A., and Clyde P. Stickney, “Accounting Measures of Foreign Exchange Exposure: The Long and Short of It”, The Accounting Review (January 1975): 44–57.

Froot, Kenneth A., and Jeffrey A. Frankel, “Forward Discount Bias: Is It an Exchange Risk Premium?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1989): 139–161.

Allesandria, George, and Joseph Kaboski, “Why Are Goods So Cheap in Some Countries?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, Q2 (2008): 1–12.

Froot, Kenneth A., and Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: Foreign Exchange”, Journal of Economic Perspectives (Summer 1990): 179–192.

Balassa, Bela, “The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal”, Journal of Political Economy, 72 (1964): 244–267.

Gailliot, Henry J., “Purchasing Power Parity as an Explanation of Long-Term Changes in Exchange Rates”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (August 1971): 348–357.

Cornell, Bradford, “Spot Rates, Forward Rates, and Market Efficiency”, Journal of Financial Economics (January 1977): 55–65. Dufey, Gunter, and Ian H. Giddy, “Forecasting Exchange Rates in a Floating World”, Euromoney (November 1975): 28–35.

Giddy, Ian H., “An Integrated Theory of Exchange Rate Equilibrium”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (December 1976): 883–892.

______, The International Money Market (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1978).

_________, “Black Market Exchange Rates as a Forecasting Tool”, Working Paper, Columbia University, May 1978.

Frankel, Jeffrey, “Flexible Exchange Rates: Experience Versus Theory”, Journal of Portfolio Management (Winter 1989): 45–54.

Giddy, Ian H., and Gunter Dufey, “The Random Behavior of Flexible Exchange Rates”, Journal of International Business Studies (Spring 1975): 1–32.

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Hansen, Lars P., and Robert J. Hodrick, “Forward Rates as Optimal Predictions of Future Spot Rates”, Journal of Political Economy (October 1980): 829–853.

Officer, Lawrence H., “The Purchasing-Power-Parity Theory of Exchange Rates: A Review Article”, IMF Staff Papers (March 1976): 1–60.

Levich, Richard M., “Analyzing the Accuracy of Foreign Exchange Advisory Services: Theory and Evidence”, in Exchange Risk and Exposure, Richard Levich and Clas Wihlborg, eds. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1980).

Samuelson, Paul A., “Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems”, Review of Economics and Statistics (May 1964): 145–154.

Lothian, James R., and Mark P. Taylor, “Real Exchange Rate Behavior: The Recent Float from the Perspective of the Past Two Centuries”, Journal of Political Economy (June 1996). Mishkin, Frederick S., “Are Real Interest Rates Equal Across Countries? An International Investigation of Parity Conditions”, Journal of Finance (December 1984): 1345–1357. Modjtahedi, Baghar, “Dynamics of Real Interest Rate Differentials: An Empirical Investigation”, European Economic Review, 32, no. 6 (1988): 1191–1211.

Shapiro, Alan C., “What Does Purchasing Power Parity Mean?”, Journal of International Money and Finance (December 1983): 295–318. Strongin, Steve, “International Credit Market Connections”, Economic Perspectives (July/August 1990): 2–10. Throop, Adrian, “International Financial Market Integration and Linkages of National Interest Rates”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, no. 3 (1994): 3–18.

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The International Monetary System and the Balance of Payments

The value of a currency is, ultimately, what someone will give you for it – whether in food, fuel, assets, or labor. And that’s always and everywhere a subjective decision. James Surowiecki, economic commentator A common currency imposes on us a duty to cooperate more on policy. Gerhard Schroder, German Chancellor 1998–2005 The German export successes are not the result of some sort of currency manipulation, but of the increased competitiveness of companies. Wolfgang Schauble

LEARNING OBJECTIVES • To distinguish between the current account, the financial account, and the official reserves account and describe the links among these accounts • To calculate a nation’s balance-of-payments accounts from data on its international transactions • To identify the links between domestic economic behavior and the international flows of goods and capital and to describe how these links are reflected in the various balance-of-payments accounts A key theme of this text is that companies today operate within a global marketplace, and they can ignore this fact only at their peril. In line with that theme, the purpose of this chapter is to present

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5.1 Balance-of-Payments Categories

the financial and real linkages between the domestic and world economies and examine how these linkages affect business viability. The chapter identifies the basic forces underlying the flows of goods, services, and capital between countries and relates these flows to key political, economic, and cultural factors. Politicians and the business press realize the importance of these trade and capital flows. They pay attention to the balance of payments, on which these flows are recorded, and to the massive and continuing trade imbalances that currently exist. As noted in Chapter 2, government foreign exchange policies are often geared toward dealing with balance-of-payments problems. However, many people disagree on the nature of the trade deficit problem and its solution. In the process of studying the balance of payments in this chapter, we will sort out some of these issues.

5.1 Balance-of-Payments Categories The balance of payments is an accounting statement that summarizes all the economic transactions between residents of the home country and residents of all other countries. Balance-of-payments statistics are published for the Eurozone (the single currency area within the European Union), by the European Central Bank. The discussion below will focus on the Eurozone as it has a common currency and hence balance of payments. The data include transactions such as trade in goods and services, transfer payments, loans, and short- and long-term investments. The statistics are followed closely by bankers and businesspeople, economists, and foreign exchange traders; the publication affects the value of the home currency if these figures are more, or less, favorable than anticipated. Currency inflows are recorded as credits, and outflows are recorded as debits. Credits show up with a plus sign, and debits have a minus sign. There are three principal balance-of-payments categories: 1. Current account, which records imports and exports of goods, services, income, and current unilateral transfers. 2. Capital account, which includes mainly debt forgiveness and transfers of goods and financial assets by migrants as they enter or leave the Eurozone. 3. Financial account, which shows public and private investment and lending activities. The naming of this account is somewhat misleading as it, rather than the capital account, records inflows and outflows of capital. For most countries, only the current and financial accounts are significant. Exports of goods and services are credits; imports of goods and services are debits. Financial inflows appear as credits because the nation is selling (exporting) to foreigners valuable assets—buildings, land, stock, bonds, and other financial claims—and receiving cash in return. Financial outflows show up as debits because they represent purchases (imports) of foreign assets. The increase in a nation’s official reserves also shows up as a debit item because the purchase of gold and other reserve assets is equivalent to importing these assets. The balance-of-payments statement is based on double-entry bookkeeping; every economic transaction recorded as a credit brings about an equal and offsetting debit entry, and vice versa. According to accounting convention, a source of funds (either a decrease in assets or an increase in liabilities) is a credit, and a use of funds (either an increase in assets or a decrease in liabilities or net worth) is a debit. Suppose a Spanish company (and hence in the Eurozone) exports machine tools to Switzerland at a price of 4,000,000 Swiss francs (SFr). At the current exchange rate of SFr1.25 = €1 this order is worth €3,200,000. The Swiss importer pays for the order with a check drawn on its Swiss bank account. A credit is recorded for the increase in Spanish exports (a reduction in Spanish goods—a

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source of funds), and because the exporter has acquired a Swiss franc deposit (an increase in a foreign asset—a use of funds), a debit is recorded to reflect a private capital outflow: Debit Spanish exports Private foreign assets

Credit €3,200,000

€3,200,000

Suppose the Spanish company decides to sell the Swiss francs it received to the European Central Bank in exchange for euros. In this case, a private asset would have been converted into an official (government) liability. This transaction would show up as a credit to the private asset account (as it is a source of funds) and a debit to the official assets account (as it is a use of funds): Debit Private assets Official assets

Credit €3,200,000

€3,200,000

Similarly, if a British person sells a painting to a Spanish resident for €1, 000, 000 with payment made by issuing a check drawn on a Spanish bank, a debit is recorded to indicate an increase in assets (the painting) by Spanish residents, which is a use of funds, and a credit is recorded to reflect an increase in liabilities (payment for the painting) to a foreigner, which is a source of funds: Debit Private liabilities to foreigners Spanish imports

Credit €1,000,000

€1,000,000

In the case of unilateral transfers, which are gifts and grants overseas, the transfer is debited because the donor’s net worth is reduced, whereas another account must be credited: exports, if goods are donated; services, if services are donated; or capital, if the recipient receives cash or a check. Suppose the Spanish Red Cross donates €100,000 in goods for disaster relief to the Philippines. The balance-of-payments entries for this transaction would appear as follows: Debit Spanish exports Unilateral transfer

Credit €100,000

€100,000

Because double-entry bookkeeping ensures that debits equal credits, the sum of all transactions is zero. That is, the sum of the balance on the current account, the capital account, and the financial account must equal zero: Current-account balance + Capital-account balance + Financial-account balance = Balance of payments = 0

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Credits: Sources of Foreign Exchange (+)

Debits: Uses of Foreign Exchange (−)

a: Exports of goods

b: Imports of goods €161.00 d: Imports of services (fees earned, transportation receipts, foreign tourism in the Eurozone, etc.)

c: Exports of services (fees earned, transportation receipts, foreign tourism in the Eurozone, etc.) e: Income receipts g: Current transfers receipts

1,931.30 Trade balance 642.0

Services balance 512.9 Income balance 100.3 Net current transfers Current account balance

i: Capital account transactions (net)

1Annual

181

1,770.30 545.1

459.2 215.4

−€115.1 = a + c + e + g − (b + d + f + h) = Credit of €196.50

17.6

Capital account balance j: Direct investment in the −281.4 Eurozone l: Portfolio investment in −264.3 the Eurozone n: Financial derivatives 45.6 (net) o: Other investment −299.4 Finance account balance q: Errors and omissions

€96.9 f: Income payments €53.7 h: Current transfer payments

= Surplus of €17.6 k: Direct investment outside the Eurozone m: Portfolio investment outside the Eurozone

p: Other investment = i + j + l + n + o − (k + m + p) = deficit of €27.6

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163.8 399.3

208.8

33.8

data to end of September 2013; numbers may not sum exactly due to rounding.

FIGURE 5.1 Eurozone Balance of Payments for 2013 (€ Billions)1 Source: European Central Bank, data published November 18, 2013.

These features of balance-of-payments accounting are illustrated in Figure 5.1, which shows the Eurozone balance of payments for 2013 up to the end of September, and in Figure 5.2, which gives examples of entries in the Eurozone balance-of-payments accounts.

Current Account The balance on current account reflects the net flow of goods, services, income, and unilateral transfers. It includes exports and imports of merchandise (trade balance), service transactions (invisibles), and income transfers. The service account includes sales under military contracts, tourism, financial charges (banking and insurance), and transportation expenses (shipping and air travel). The income account was once part of the services account (as it represents payments for the services of capital and foreign employees), but it has become so large in recent years that it is now shown separately. It includes investment income (interest and dividends) and employee compensation (for Eurozone workers abroad and foreign workers in the Eurozone). Unilateral transfers include pensions, remittances, and other transfers overseas for which no specific services are rendered. The Eurozone current-account surplus of €197 billion in 2013 reflected the export-led nature of its largest economy, Germany, and the severely depressed nature of the economies of Southern Europe.

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182 Credits

Current Account a: Sales of motor vehicles to United Kingdom; sales of machine tools to Malaysia c: Sales of Eurofighter jet pilot initiation to Saudi Arabia e: Licensing fees earned by SAP AG; spending by Japanese tourists at Disneyland, Paris

g: Interest earnings on loans to Argentina; profits on German-owned car plants abroad Capital Account j: Purchases by the Japanese of Eurozone real estate; increases in Arab bank deposits in Netherlands banks; purchases by the French of IBM stock; investment in plant expansion in Slovakia by Hyundai l: Purchases of German Bunds by Japanese investors; increases in holdings of bank deposits by Saudi Arabian nationals in French banks Other investment

Debits

b: Purchases of oil from Saudi Arabia; purchases of Korean automobiles d: Payments to software companies in India f: Hotel bills of French tourists in Egypt h: Profits on sales by Amazon’s Luxembourg holding company i: Remittances by Turks in Germany to relatives in Turkey; payments to Spaniards living in Argentina; economic aid to Pakistan k: New investment in a Chilean chemical plant by BASF; increases in French bank loans to Lebanon; deposits in Swiss banks by Eurozone residents; purchases of Chinese stocks and bonds by Eurozone residents m: Purchases of Hong Kong stocks by Eurozone-based mutual funds n: Deposits of funds by the European Commission in British banks; purchases of Swiss-franc bonds by the European Central Bank; increases in holdings of Japanese yen by the European Central Bank

FIGURE 5.2 Examples of Entries in the Eurozone Balance-of-Payments Accounts

As a percentage of GDP, the surplus was 1.2%, but (see Figure 5.3) in the middle of the pack among industrialized nations with deficits.

Capital Account The capital account records capital transfers that offset transactions that are undertaken, without exchange, in fixed assets or in their financing (such as development aid). For example, migrants’ funds represent the shift of the migrants’ net worth to or from the Eurozone, and are classified as capital transfers. This is a minor element of the balance of payments.

Financial Account Financial-account transactions affect a nation’s wealth and net creditor position. These transactions are classified as direct investment, portfolio investment, financial derivatives, other investment, or reserve assets. Direct investments are those in which management control is exerted, defined under the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as cases where the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power in the enterprise. Portfolio investments are purchases of financial assets with a maturity greater than one year; short-term investments involve securities with a maturity of less than one year. Government borrowing and lending are included in other investments. This also includes changes in reserve assets, which are holdings of gold and foreign currencies by official monetary institutions, as well as transactions involving financial derivatives. As shown in Figure 5.1, the Eurozone financial-account balance in 2013 was a deficit of €26.7 billion.

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183

Switzerland Slovenia Netherlands Luxemburg Sweden Denmark Germany Russian Federation Korea Japan Estonia Austria Hungary Ireland Indonesia Slovak Republic OECD total Mexico Belgium Finland United Kingdom France Australia Czech Republic Canada United States Italy Spain NewZealand Poland Chile Portugal Iceland Turkey Greece –12.0

–7.0

–2.0

3.0

8.0

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13.0

FIGURE 5.3 Current-Account Balances as a Percentage of GDP (2011) Source: Data from OECD website.

Balance-of-Payments Measures There are several balance-of-payments definitions. The basic balance focuses on transactions considered to be fundamental to the economic health of a currency. Thus, it includes the balance on current account and long-term capital, but it excludes ephemeral items such as short-term capital flows, mainly bank deposits, that are heavily influenced by temporary factors—short-run monetary policy, changes in interest differentials, and anticipations of currency fluctuations. The net liquidity balance measures the change in private domestic borrowing or lending that is required to keep payments in balance without adjusting official reserves. Non-liquid, private, short-term capital flows, and errors and omissions are included in the balance; liquid assets and liabilities are excluded. The official reserve transactions balance measures the adjustment required in official reserves to achieve balance-of-payments equilibrium. The assumption here is that official transactions are different from private transactions. Each of these measures has shortcomings, primarily because of the increasing complexity of international financial transactions. For example, changes in the official reserve balance may now reflect investment flows as well as central bank intervention. Similarly, critics of the basic balance argue that the distinction between short- and long-term capital flows has become blurred. Direct investment is still determined by longer-term factors, but investment in stocks and bonds can be just as speculative as bank deposits and sold just as quickly. The astute international financial manager, therefore, must analyze the payments figures rather than rely on a single summarizing number.

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184

Application

Apple’s iPhone is Not Really Made in China

According to trade statistics, Apple’s iPhone added $1.9 billion to the U.S. trade deficit in 2009.1 However, this figure fails to reflect the complexities of global commerce, where the design, manufacturing, and assembly of products are carried out in multiple countries. To illustrate, trade statistics consider the iPhone to be a Chinese export to the United States, even though it is entirely designed (and owned) by a U.S. company and is made largely of parts produced in several Asian and European countries. Only the assembly and packaging work is done in China. Nonetheless, because assembly is the final stage, the entire US$178.96 estimated wholesale cost of the shipped phone is credited to China, even though the value of the work performed by the Chinese workers at Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. accounts for just 3.6%, or $6.50, of the total. Thus, although the iPhone is stamped “Made in China”, Figure 5.4 shows that what makes up its commercial value comes from a number of countries. If China were credited only with producing its portion of the value of the iPhone, the trade impact of Chinese iPhone exports to the United States would show a U.S. trade surplus of $48.1 million, after accounting for parts contributed

by U.S. firms. The World Trade Organization estimates that applying this same concept of having trade statistics only reflect the actual value added to a product by different countries would cut the measured U.S. trade deficit with China in half.

1 Yuqing

FIGURE 5.4 Assembled But Not Really “Made in China”

Xing and Neal Detert, “How iPhone Widens the U.S. Trade Deficits with PRC”, GRIPS Policy Research Center, November 2010.

34%

JAPAN

17%

GERMANY

13% 6% 3.6%

SOUTH KOREA U.S. CHINA

27%

OTHERS

Value of iPhone 3G $178.96 components and labor

The Missing Numbers In going over the numbers in Figure 5.1, you will note an item referred to as errors and omissions. This number reflects errors and omissions in collecting data on international transactions. In 2013, that item was €33.8 billion. (A positive figure reflects a mysterious inflow of funds; a negative amount reflects an outflow.)

5.2 The International Flow of Goods, Services, and Capital This section provides an analytical framework that links the international flows of goods and capital to domestic economic behavior. The framework consists of a set of basic macroeconomic accounting identities that link domestic spending and production to saving, consumption, and investment behavior, and thence to the financial-account and current-account balances. By manipulating these equations, we can identify the nature of the links between the Eurozone and world economies and assess the effects on the euro-area economies of international economic policies, and vice versa.

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Mini-Case

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The Bank of Korea Reassesses Its Reserve Policy

In April 2005, the Bank of Korea, South Korea’s central bank, was reviewing its investment policy. It was looking at a range of higher-yielding investment options—including corporate bonds and mortgagebacked securities—to improve returns on its large and growing reserve holdings. At the end of March 2005, South Korea’s foreign reserves were the fourth largest in the world, at US$205.5 billion. Currency traders were suspicious that the bank’s decision to invest more money in nontraditional assets was a cover for plans to diversify its reserves out of U.S. dollars and into euros, Japanese yen, and other currencies that have held their value better than the U.S. dollar that had depreciated against the South Korean won. The Bank of Korea’s governor, Park Seung, said in response to these concerns that the Bank had no plans to sell U.S. dollars because that would lead to a further appreciation of the South Korean won. The Bank has been trying to slow the won’s rise against the dollar to protect Korean exporters. Historically, the Bank of Korea, like other central banks, has focused on safe, short-term investments so that money is available on short notice to intervene in currency markets or cope with sudden shifts in capital flows. It has paid little attention to maximizing returns. However, this policy began to change as foreign exchange reserves piled up, exceeding the amount needed for policy reasons. For example, South Korea’s reserves grew 28% in 2004. One of the factors that prompted this review was the growing cost of maintaining such large reserves. This cost stems from the Bank of Korea’s policy of sterilizing its

currency market interventions. It sold government bonds to soak up the newly minted won it has been issuing to prop up the weakening U.S. dollar. The problem is that the South Korean government paid higher interest rates on these domestic bonds than it earned on the U.S. Treasury bonds and other dollar-denominated assets it bought with its U.S. dollar reserves. Moreover, the Bank of Korea also suffered valuation losses as the U.S. dollar fell against the won. The public and politicians also called for South Korea’s large reserves to be put to more productive use. Questions 1. What is the link between South Korea’s currency market interventions and its growing foreign exchange reserves? 2. What is the annualized cost to the Bank of Korea of maintaining US$205.5 billion in reserves? Assume that the government of Korea issues bonds that yield about 4% annually while buying U.S. dollar assets that yield about 3.25%. 3. Suppose that during the year, the South Korean won rose by 8% against the U.S. dollar and the Bank of Korea kept 100% of its reserves in dollars. At a current –– 011∕$, what would that do to the exchange rate of W1, won cost of maintaining reserves of $205.5 billion? 4. What are some pros and cons of the Bank of Korea diversifying its investment holdings out of U.S. dollars and into other currencies, such as euros and Japanese yen?

As we see in the next section, ignoring these links leads to political solutions to international economic problems—such as the global trade imbalances—that create greater problems. At the same time, authors of domestic policy changes are often unaware of the effect these changes can have on international economic affairs.

Domestic Saving and Investment and the Financial Account The national income and product accounts provide an accounting framework for recording the national product and showing how its components are affected by international transactions. This framework begins with the observation that national income, which is the same as national product, is either spent on consumption or saved: National income = Consumption + Saving

(5.1)

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Similarly, national expenditure, the total amount that the nation spends on goods and services, can be divided into spending on consumption and spending on domestic real investment. Real investment refers to plant and equipment, research and development, and other expenditures designed to increase the nation’s productive capacity. This equation provides the second national accounting identity: National spending = Consumption + Investment (5.2) Subtracting Equation 5.2 from Equation 5.1 yields a new identity: National income − National spending = Saving − Investment

(5.3)

This identity says that if a nation’s income exceeds its spending, saving will exceed domestic investment, yielding surplus capital. The surplus capital must be invested abroad (if it were invested domestically there would not be a capital surplus). In other words, saving equals domestic investment plus net foreign investment. Net foreign investment equals the nation’s net public and private capital outflows plus net capital transfers. The net private and public capital outflows equal the financial-account deficit if the outflow is positive (a financial-account surplus if negative); the net increase in capital transfers equals the balance in the capital account. Ignoring the minor impact of the capital account, excess saving equals the financial-account deficit. Alternatively, a national saving deficit will equal the financial-account surplus (net borrowing from abroad); this borrowing finances the excess of national spending over national income. Here is the bottom line: a nation that produces more than it spends will save more than it invests domestically and will have a net capital outflow. This capital outflow will appear as a financial-account deficit. Conversely, a nation that spends more than it produces will invest domestically more than it saves and have a net capital inflow. This capital inflow will appear as a financial-account surplus. Given its common currency area, this applies to the Eurozone in the same way as it would for a particular country with its own currency, such as Poland or Turkey.

The Link between the Current and Financial Accounts Beginning again with national product, we can subtract from it spending on domestic goods and services (including spending on the services of capital and foreign employees). The remaining goods and services must equal exports. Similarly, if we subtract spending on domestic goods and services from total expenditures, the remaining spending must be on imports. Combining these two identities leads to another national income identity: National income − National spending = Exports − Imports

(5.4)

Equation 5.4 says that a current-account surplus arises when national output exceeds domestic expenditures; similarly, a current-account deficit is due to domestic expenditures exceeding domestic output. Figure 5.5 illustrates this latter point for the United States. Moreover, when Equation 5.4 is combined with Equation 5.3, we have a new identity: Saving − Investment = Exports − Imports

(5.5)

According to Equation 5.5, if a nation’s saving exceeds its domestic investment, that nation will run a current-account surplus. This equation explains the Chinese, German, and Japanese current-account surpluses: the Chinese, Germans, and Japanese have very high saving rates, both in absolute terms and relative to their investment rates. Conversely, a nation such as the United States, which saves less than it invests, must run a current-account deficit. Noting that saving minus domestic investment equals net foreign investment, we have the following identity: Net foreign investment = Exports − Imports

(5.6)

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105%

5%

104%

4% Total spending as a share of GDP

3%

102%

2%

101%

1%

100%

0%

99%

–1%

98% 97%

Trade balance as a share of GDP

–2% –3%

96%

–4%

95%

–5%

94%

–6%

FIGURE 5.5 The Trade Balance Falls as Spending Rises Relative to GDP

Equation 5.6 says that the balance on the current account must equal the net capital outflow; that is, any foreign exchange earned by selling abroad must be either spent on imports or exchanged for claims against foreigners. The net amount of these IOUs equals the nation’s capital outflow. If the current account is in surplus, the country must be a net exporter of capital; a current-account deficit indicates that the nation is a net capital importer. This equation explains why China, with its large current-account surpluses, is a major capital exporter, whereas the United States, with its large current-account deficits, is a major capital importer. Bearing in mind that trade is goods plus services, to say that the United States has a trade deficit with China is simply to say that the United States is buying more goods and services from China than China is buying from the United States, and that China is investing more in the United States than the United States is investing in China. Between the United States and China, any deficit in the current account is exactly equal to the surplus in the financial account. Otherwise, there would be an imbalance in the foreign exchange market, and the exchange rate would change. Another interpretation of Equation 5.6 is that the excess of goods and services bought over goods and services produced domestically must be acquired through foreign trade and must be financed by an equal amount of borrowing from abroad (the financial-account surplus). Thus, the current-account balance and the financial-account and capital-account balances must exactly offset one another. That is, the sum of the current-account balance plus the capital-account balance plus the financial-account balance must be zero. These relations are shown in Figure 5.6. These identities are useful because they allow us to assess the efficacy of proposed “solutions” for improving the current-account balance. It is clear that a nation can neither reduce its current-account deficit nor increase its current-account surplus unless it meets two conditions: (1) raise national product relative to national spending and (2) increase saving relative to domestic investment. A proposal to improve the current-account balance by reducing imports (say, via higher tariffs) that does not

Net exports of goods and services/GDP

6%

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Gross domestic purchases/GDP

187

106%

103%

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188

Domestic national product (Y ) minus Domestic spending for consumption = =

−

Domestic total Spending (E) minus Domestic spending for consumption

Domestic national saving (S) − Domestic investment in in-country assets (Id ) Net foreign investment, or the net increase in claims on foreigners and official reserve assets, for example, gold (If ) Domestic national product (Y ) − Domestic total spending (E) minus Domestic spending on domestic goods minus Domestic spending on in-country and services Domestic goods and services

= Exports of goods and services (X) = Balance on current account = − (Balance on capital and financial accounts)

−

Imports of goods and services (M)

Y − E = S − Id = X − M = If Conclusion: A nation that produces more than it spends will save more than it invests, export more than it imports, and wind up with a capital outflow. A nation that spends more than it produces will invest more than it saves, import more than it exports, and wind up with a capital inflow.

FIGURE 5.6 Linking National Economic Activity with Balance-of-Payments Accounts: Basic Identities

affect national output/spending and national saving/investment leaves the trade deficit the same; and the proposal cannot achieve its objective without violating fundamental accounting identities. With regard to China, a clear implication is that chronic Chinese trade surpluses are not reflective of unfair trade practices and manipulative currency policies (which surely exist) but rather are the natural effect of differing cultures and preferences (which can be affected by economic policies) regarding saving and consumption. As long as the Chinese prefer to save and invest rather than consume, the imbalance will persist. The same goes for Germany, which has traditionally run a trade surplus both within the Eurozone and with the wider global economy. These accounting identities also suggest that a current-account surplus is not necessarily a sign of economic vigor, nor is a current-account deficit necessarily a sign of weakness or of a lack of competitiveness. Indeed, economically healthy nations that provide good investment opportunities tend to run trade deficits because this is the only way to run a financial-account surplus. The United States ran trade deficits from early colonial times to just before World War I, as Europeans sent investment capital to develop the continent. During its 300 years as a debtor nation—a net importer of capital—the United States progressed from the status of a minor colony to the world’s strongest power. Conversely, it ran surpluses while the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff helped sink the world into depression. Similarly, during the 1980s, Latin America ran current-account surpluses because the dismal economic prospects in the region made it unable to attract foreign capital. As Latin America’s prospects improved in the early 1990s, money flowed in and it began running financial-account surpluses again, matched by offsetting current-account deficits. Note, too, that nations that grow rapidly will import more goods and services at the same time that weak economies will slow down or reduce their imports, because imports are positively related to income. As a result, the faster a nation grows relative to other economies, the larger its current-account deficit (or smaller its surplus). Conversely, slower-growing nations will have smaller current-account deficits (or larger surpluses). Hence, current-account deficits may reflect strong economic growth or a low level of saving, and current-account surpluses can signify a high level of saving or a slow rate of growth. Because current-account deficits are financed by capital inflows, the cumulative effect of these deficits is to increase net foreign claims against the deficit nation and reduce that nation’s net international wealth. Similarly, nations that consistently run current-account surpluses increase their

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189

25,000

20,000

Billions of dollars

15,000

10,000

–

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

5,000

(5,000) U.S. assets abroad

Foreign assets in the United States

Net U.S. international wealth position

FIGURE 5.7 International Investment Position of the United States: 1976–2010 Source: Data are investment positions calculated on a current cost basis by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis at www.bea.gov/international/.

net international wealth, which is just the difference between a nation’s investment abroad and foreign investment domestically. Sooner or later, deficit countries such as the United States become net international debtors, and surplus countries such as China and Japan become net creditors. Figure 5.7 shows that the inevitable consequence of the continued U.S. current-account deficits was to turn U.S. net international wealth (computed on a current cost basis) negative. In 1986, the United States became a net international debtor, reverting to the position it was in at the start of the 20th century. By the end of 2010, U.S. net international wealth was −$2.5 trillion.

Government Budget Deficits and Current-Account Deficits In the previous discussion, government spending and taxation have been included in aggregate domestic spending and income figures. By differentiating between the government and private sectors, we can see the effect of a government deficit on the current-account deficit. National spending can be divided into household spending plus private investment plus government spending. Household spending, in turn, equals national income less the sum of private saving and taxes. Combining these terms yields the following identity: National spending = Household spending + Private investment + Government spending = National income − Private saving − Taxes + Private investment + Government spending

(5.7)

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Rearranging Equation 5.7 yields a new expression for excess spending: National spending − National income = Private investment − Private saving + Government budget deficit

(5.8)

where the government budget deficit equals government spending minus taxes. Equation 5.8 says that excess national spending is composed of two parts: the excess of private domestic investment over private saving and the total government (central, state, and local) deficit. Because national spending minus national product equals the net capital inflow, Equation 5.8 also says that the nation’s excess spending equals its net borrowing from abroad. Rearranging and combining Equations 5.4 and 5.8 provides a new accounting identity: Current-account balance = Private saving surplus − Government budget deficit

(5.9)

Equation 5.9 reveals that a nation’s current-account balance is identically equal to its private saving-investment balance less the government budget deficit. According to this expression, a nation running a current-account deficit is not saving enough to finance its private investment and government budget deficit. Conversely, a nation running a current-account surplus is saving more than is needed to finance its private investment and government deficit. In 2012, for example, private saving in Germany totaled €172.6 billion; private investment equaled €36.6 billion; and the government budget surplus amounted to €4.2 billion. Excess domestic saving thus equaled €140.2 billion, and Germany had a €188.2 billion current-account surplus. The €48 billion discrepancy reflects errors and omissions in the measurements of international transactions, plus other small adjustments. The purpose of this discussion is not to specify a channel of causation but simply to show a tautological relationship among private saving, private investment, the government budget deficit, and the current-account balance. Indeed, such a channel of causation does not necessarily exist, as is evidenced by the historical record. For example, the increase in the U.S. current-account deficit during the 1980s was associated with an increase in the total government budget deficit and with a narrowing in private saving relative to private investment. As saving relative to investment rose beginning in 1989, the current-account deficit narrowed, even as the government deficit continued to grow. Conversely, even as strong economic growth during the 1990s eventually turned the federal deficit into a surplus, the current-account deficit continued to grow. Moreover, the twin-deficits hypothesis—that government budget deficits cause current-account deficits—does not shed any light on why a number of major countries, including Germany and Japan, continue to run large current-account surpluses despite government budget deficits that are similar in size (as a share of GDP) to that of the United States (at least until 2009, when the U.S. budget deficit exploded to 10% of GDP). In general, a current-account deficit represents a decision to consume, both publicly and privately, and to invest more than the nation currently is producing. As such, steps taken to correct the current-account deficit can be effective only if they also change private saving, private investment, and/or the government deficit. Policies or events that fail to affect both sides of the relationship shown in Equation 5.9 will not alter the current-account deficit.

The Current Situation Global trade imbalances remain very significant at the start of the second decade of the 21st century. Figure 5.8 shows the situation for various regions and specific countries. The major sources of imbalance are the continuing trade deficit for the United States and the corresponding trade surpluses by Japan and latterly that of China. Not unsurprisingly, Latin America and emerging market economies have shown significant trade deficits, although not at the same point in time. Collectively,

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5.2 The International Flow of Goods, Services, and Capital 2000 Euro area1 European Union Major advanced economies (G7) Other advanced economies (Advanced economies excluding G7 and euro area)2 Emerging market and developing economies Commonwealth of Independent States3 Developing Asia4 Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America and the Caribbean Selected countries France* Germany* Italy* Spain* United Kingdom United States China Japan Brazil

2003

2006

2009

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191 2012

n∕a −27.8 −31.7 17.1

n∕a 10.8 −13.3 10.9

52.9 161.7 −65.4 77.5

6.4 239.4 −300.9 98.8

121.5 310.1 −347.5 149.3

−82.3 −3.7 −8.4 −27.3

−94.5 3.8 −37.0 −3.3

−104.4 −7.4 51.1 −26.5

52.4 33.2 39.0 49.9

209.6 63.5 94.7 93.5

−6.5 47.9

−10.0 −28.8

−15.8 −99.5

−5.0 −141.3

−8.2 −191.1

19.3 −32.8 19.3 −2.2 −23.1 −416.3 20.5 43.9 −24.2

13.0 45.8 13.0 −11.8 −31.1 −519.1 43.1 132.0 4.2

−13.0 181.7 −13.0 −28.1 −110.9 −800.6 231.8 65.7 13.6

−35.0 197.1 −35.0 −42.0 −70.4 −381.9 243.3 114.7 −24.3

−62.9 238.5 −62.9 −10.7 −14.5 −475.0 213.7 112.7 −54.2

* Major

economies within the Eurozone area balance of payments data not available until 2006 2 Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Israel, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, & Taiwan 3 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 4 Brunei Darussalam, Timor-Leste, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 1 Euro

FIGURE 5.8 Global Current-Account Balances: 2000 to 2012 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2013.

the G7 economies, which include the U.S., have moved from a deficit of US$31.7 billion in 2000 to $347.5 billion in 2012. What must change depends on what has brought about these trade imbalances. In this regard, it should be noted that a nation’s current-account balance depends on the behavior of its trading partners as well as its own economic policies and propensities. For example, regardless of the U.S. propensity to consume or to save and invest, it can run a current-account deficit only if other nations are willing to run offsetting current-account surpluses. Hence, to understand the recent deterioration in the U.S. current account, we must look beyond economic policies and other economic developments within the United States itself and take into account events outside the United States. One such explanation is provided by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. His explanation holds that a key factor driving recent developments in the U.S. current account has been the very substantial shift in the current accounts of developing and emerging-market nations, a shift that has transformed these countries from net borrowers on international capital markets to large net lenders and created a significant increase in the global supply of saving.2 The global saving glut, in turn, helps explain both the increase

2 Ben S. Bernanke, “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit”, March 10, 2005. Much of the discussion in this section is based on this speech, which appears at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/default.htm.

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Invasion of the Sovereign Wealth Funds

One consequence of the massive current-account surpluses—and hence foreign exchange reserves—being piled up by oil exporters and Asian exporters such as China has been a proliferation of state-controlled investment funds, more commonly termed sovereign wealth funds. As of early 2013 these funds held an estimated US$5 trillion in assets, more than all the world’s hedge funds combined.3 Moreover, with developing countries projected to run aggregate current-account surpluses in excess of $600 billion annually for the foreseeable future, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are expected to grow rapidly. One projection has them reaching $12 trillion in assets by 2015.4 The largest fund, the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, held estimated assets of $627 billion as of 2012. During the subprime financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, SWFs helped rescue U.S. and European financial institutions, including Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, and UBS, by investing more than $100 billion to purchase minority stakes and thereby replenish capital that had been lost owing to mortgage-related write-offs. SWFs have provided capital to other hard-pressed firms, such as Sony and Advanced Micro Devices, as well. Their capital infusions are all the more welcome since SWFs tend to be passive and long-term investors. These characteristics also mean that SWFs could help stabilize financial markets and provide added liquidity, particularly during periods of tight credit and high volatility. The benefits to the state sponsoring a sovereign wealth fund are apparent as well. They enable a country to diversify its investments and earn higher returns on its foreign exchange reserves than U.S. Treasury bonds, the usual default option, will pay. Despite these mutual benefits of SWF investments, recipient countries worry that SWFs may use their investments for political purposes, such as accumulating strategic assets and the power to influence political and economic decisions, not just for making money. For example, investments by Chinese 3 Citibank,

“Global Pension and Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in Hedge Funds: The Growth and Impact of Direct Investing”, June 2011, http://www.citibank.com/icg/sa/ flip_book/GrowthImpactDirectInvesting/index.html#/6/zoomed. 4 Estimate

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by Morgan Stanley cited in Nick Tiomiraos, “Will Overseas Funds Be a Juggernaut?”, Wall Street Journal (December 1–2, 2007): A11.

and Russian SWFs in certain sectors, such as telecommunications, information technology, defense, and energy, may raise national security issues. One such situation is illustrative. In September 2006, Russian state-controlled bank OAO Bank VTB revealed that it had accumulated a 5% stake in European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. (EADS), which owns Airbus. Although VTB executives claimed their investment was purely financial, senior Kremlin officials made it clear that they had broader goals in mind as well. President Vladimir Putin’s top foreign policy advisor said Russia might raise its stake in EADS to 25%—enough to block major decisions. Russia could then use this bargaining chip as leverage to push for cooperation between EADS and Russia’s own ailing aerospace industry. This prospect was especially troublesome given the fact that EADS supplies military technology, including the ballistic missiles for France’s nuclear submarines. France and Germany, another major partner in EADS, let Mr. Putin know that Russia was not welcome as a partner. At the same time, they had no objection to passive investments in EADS. In 2007, Dubai’s purchase of a 3% stake in EADS aroused no major fears. China’s SWF, China Investment Corporation (CIC), has made major investments in natural-resource companies worldwide. These investments dovetail with China’s long-term strategic interest in securing access to natural resources. The potential threat to Western interests is mitigated by the fact that CIC has only taken minority positions so far. Other examples of sovereign wealth funds abusing their power are hypothetical rather than real, for example, CIC buying Citigroup and then threatening to shut it down if America took sides in a conflict between China and Taiwan or Russia’s National Wealth Fund buying Alcoa, shutting down its aluminum smelters in the United States and moving production to Russia. To minimize the possibility of such abuse (aside from the guaranteed huge losses to the SWF from actions such as these), a number of governments and international agencies are drafting guidelines for SWF investments. At the heart of these guidelines is a demand for greater transparency, to ensure that SWF investment decisions are being made by finance professionals seeking maximum returns, rather than as a mechanism to achieve political or foreign policy goals, to acquire proprietary knowledge, or to gain other strategic advantages.

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in the U.S. current-account deficit and the relatively low level of long-term real interest rates in the world today. As Figure 5.8 shows, the U.S. current-account deficit was balanced by changes in the current-account positions of other countries. In particular a shift by developing nations (attributable to a combination of financial crises that forced many emerging-market nations to switch from being net importers of financial capital to being net exporters, foreign exchange interventions by East Asian countries—intended to promote export-led growth by preventing exchange rate appreciation—that led to them piling up reserves, and the sharp rise in oil prices that boosted the current-account surpluses of Middle East and other oil exporters) together with the high saving propensities of Germany, Japan, and some other major industrial nations, resulted in a global savings glut. This increased supply of saving boosted U.S. equity values during the period of the stock market boom; the saving glut also lowered real interest rates and helped increase U.S. housing prices after 2000, as a consequence reducing U.S. national saving and contributing to the nation’s rising current-account deficit.5 This explanation is consistent with the experience of other industrial countries besides the United States. The bursting of the housing bubble and destruction of huge amounts of household wealth beginning in 2007 has caused a change in current-account balances worldwide, including a decline in the U.S. current-account deficit, which up until that time had been on a growing trend. However, the global imbalances remain and countries such as Germany, China, and Japan continue to run significant current-account surpluses. As long as this trend continues, the U.S. and other countries and areas—such as Latin America—will continue to have current-account deficits.

5.3 Coping with the Current-Account Deficit Conventional wisdom suggests some oft-repeated solutions to unsustainable current-account deficits. The principal suggestions are currency devaluation and protectionism. There are important, though subtle, reasons, however, why neither is likely to work.

Currency Depreciation An overvalued currency acts as a tax on exports and a subsidy to imports, reducing the former and increasing the latter. The result, as we saw in Chapter 2, is that a nation maintaining an overvalued currency will run a trade deficit. Permitting the currency to return to its equilibrium level will help reduce the trade deficit. Many academics, politicians, and businesspeople also believe that devaluation can reduce a trade deficit in a floating-rate system. Key to the effectiveness of devaluation is sluggish adjustment of nominal prices, which translates changes in nominal exchange rates into changes in real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rates. This view of exchange rate changes implies a systematic relation between the exchange rate and the current-account balance. For example, it implies that the current U.S. trade deficit will be reduced eventually by a fall in the value of the dollar. By contrast, we saw in Chapter 2 that all exchange rates do is to equate currency supplies and demands; they do not determine the distribution of these currency flows between trade flows (the current-account balance) and capital flows (the financial-account balance). This view of exchange rates predicts that there is no simple relation between the exchange rate and the current-account balance. Trade deficits do not cause currency depreciation, nor does currency depreciation by itself

5 Cheap money has other harmful effects as well, including distorting the allocation of capital and labor, excessive risk-taking, debt-ridden balance sheets of both financial institutions and households, and delaying the cleaning up of bad debts from the banking system (because holding these bad loans is so inexpensive).

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Index 1980–82 = 100

1.40

50

Merchandise trade deficit ( )

1.30

45

1.20

40 The dollar* ( )

1.10

35

1.00

30

.90

25

.80

Dollars (billions)

194

20 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 1984

1985

1986

1987

FIGURE 5.9 The Dollar and the Deficit* *

The U.S. dollar’s value against 15 industrial-country currencies weighted by trade.

help reduce a trade deficit: both exchange rate changes and trade balances are determined by more fundamental economic factors. These diametrically opposed theories can be evaluated by studying evidence on trade deficits and exchange rate changes. A good place to start is with U.S. experience since the late 1970s. From 1976 to 1980, the value of the U.S. dollar declined as the current-account deficit for the United States first worsened and then improved; but from 1980 to 1985, the dollar strengthened even as the current account steadily deteriorated. Many analysts attributed the rise in the U.S. trade deficit in the early 1980s to the sharp rise in the value of the U.S. dollar over that period. As the dollar rose in value against the currencies of America’s trading partners, fewer U.S. dollars were required to buy a given amount of foreign goods, and more foreign currencies were needed to buy a fixed amount of U.S. goods. Responding to these price changes, Americans bought more foreign goods, and foreign consumers reduced their purchases of U.S.-made goods. U.S. imports increased and exports declined. After reaching its peak in early March 1985, the value of the U.S. dollar began to decline. This decline was actively encouraged by the United States and by several foreign governments in hope of reducing the U.S. trade deficit. Conventional wisdom suggested that the very same basic economic forces affecting the trade account during the U.S. dollar’s appreciation would now be working in the opposite direction, reducing the U.S. trade (current-account) deficit. As Figure 5.9 documents, however, the theory did not work. The U.S. trade deficit kept rising, reaching new record levels month after month. By 1987, it had risen to $167 billion. The 1988 trade deficit fell to $128 billion, but this figure still exceeded the $125 billion trade deficit in 1985. Even more discouraging from the standpoint of those who believe that currency devaluation should cure a trade deficit is that between 1985 and 1987 the Japanese yen more than doubled in its dollar value without reducing the U.S. trade deficit with Japan. After peaking in value in 2002, the U.S. dollar fell dramatically against currencies worldwide while the U.S. current-account deficit reached record levels in both absolute terms as well as relative to U.S. GDP. What went wrong? Lagged Effects. The simplest explanation is that time is needed for an exchange rate change to affect trade. Figure 5.11 shows that when the exchange rate is lagged two years (i.e., the current-account balance for 1987 is matched against the value of the U.S. dollar in 1985), there is a closer correspondence between the current-account balance as a percentage of GDP and the exchange rate. Despite this closer correspondence, however, in some years the U.S. dollar falls and the current-account balance worsens; and in other years the dollar strengthens and the current-account balance improves. Overall, changes in the U.S. dollar’s value explain less than 4% of the variation in the U.S. current-account balance as a percentage of GDP from 1970 to 2010.

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Chinese Exports to the United States Rise along with the Yuan

As we saw in Chapter 4, during the six-year period from 2005 to 2010, the Chinese yuan appreciated in real terms by 50.72%. Despite this dramatic appreciation in the yuan’s real value, we see in Figure 5.10 that Chinese exports to the United States continued to rise during this period, as they had over the preceding 20 years. Moreover, the Chinese surplus on its balance of trade with the United States continued to rise as well, the opposite of what advocates of yuan appreciation would have predicted. According to them, the yuan’s appreciation should have made Chinese goods more expensive in the United States and U.S. goods more affordable in China, resulting in fewer Chinese goods sold in the United States and more U.S. exports to China. An examination of the apparel industry points to some answers as to why yuan appreciation has not had the

predicted effect on China’s exports. If any industry should be exposed to yuan appreciation, it would be apparel, where yuan-denominated labor accounts for a much higher fraction of cost than it does in more highly mechanized manufacturing. Nonetheless, a closer look at the industry’s cost structure indicates that the bulk of the value of its products is not exposed to the yuan-U.S. dollar exchange rate. Consider, for example, a pair of boy’s summer shorts that a Chinese manufacturer would sell for $10 ∶ $2.50 is cotton, the price of which would not be affected by the appreciation of the yuan. About another $2.50 is profit. That leaves roughly $5 in Chinese labor and other yuan-denominated costs such as utilities. A 5% appreciation of the yuan would boost the price of these shorts by $0.25 (5% × $5); a 10% increase would boost price to $10.50. If Chinese companies are unable

400 365

350

338 321

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268 259 243

Billions of Dollars

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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Chinese exports to the United States

Chinese balance of trade with the United States

FIGURE 5.10 Chinese Exports to the United States Continue to Rise

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196

to raise prices in the fiercely competitive U.S. apparel market, such cost increases could be easily covered by improved productivity or by absorbing them in their profit margins. A 50% appreciation, on the other hand, would likely put the manufacturer out of business—except for the fact that Chinese companies no longer make their cheapest products in China. Instead, they are moving production of low-priced T-shirts and jeans to countries

like Vietnam or Bangladesh. What remains in China are higher-value-added, more profitable, less price-sensitive merchandise. An important implication of this discussion is that when China becomes too expensive, manufacturing is likely to move elsewhere in Asia, not back to the United States. In other words, yuan appreciation will not solve the U.S. trade deficit.

J-Curve Theory. Another explanation, which is consistent with the presence of lagged effects, is based on the J-curve theory, illustrated in Figure 5.12. The letter “J” describes a curve that, when viewed from left to right, goes down sharply for a short time, flattens out, and then rises steeply for an extended period. That’s how J-curve proponents have been expecting the U.S. trade deficit to behave. According to the J-curve theory, a country’s trade deficit worsens just after its currency depreciates because price effects will dominate the effect on volume of imports in the short run. That is, the higher cost of imports will more than offset the reduced volume of imports. Thus, the J-curve says that a decline in the value of the dollar should be followed by a temporary worsening in the trade deficit before its longer-term improvement. The initial worsening of the trade deficit occurred as predicted in 1985, but not until four years later, in 1989, was the trade deficit below where it had been in 1985. Moreover, the improvement that occurred between 1985 and 1989 may owe more to the $59 billion drop in the federal budget deficit over this period than to depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Similarly, between 1970 and 1995, the yen 4%

140

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100 0%

80 –2% 60 –4%

–6%

U.S. current account balance/GDP Value of U.S. dollar Value of U.S. dollar lagged two years

–8%

FIGURE 5.11 The U.S. Current-Account Balance Versus the U.S. Dollar: 1970–2010 Data Source: Economic Report of the President, February 2011 and prior reports.

40

20

0

Trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar

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2%

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5.3 Coping with the Current-Account Deficit

Trade balance eventually improves +

Currency depreciation

0

Time

– Trade balance initially deteriorates

FIGURE 5.12 The Theoretical J-Curve

rose from ¥360 to the U.S. dollar to ¥95 to the dollar. At the same time, America’s trade deficit with Japan kept rising. In other words, the upturn of the J-curve proved elusive. Part of the answer in the case of Japan is that Japanese manufacturers responded to currency appreciation by cutting costs and profit margins enough to keep their goods competitive abroad. Another confounding factor is that a strong yen makes Japanese raw material imports cheaper, offsetting some of the cost disadvantage. The Japanese experience has been similarly disappointing to advocates of using currency changes to cure current-account imbalances. Between 1991 and 1995, when the yen was rising rapidly, Japan’s current-account surplus widened. Since 1995, however, Japan’s surplus has narrowed, even as the yen has fallen in value. One explanation for this turn of events is that the Japanese government’s budget has moved into sizable deficit, reducing Japan’s total domestic saving. Other things being equal, lower domestic saving will reduce a current-account surplus. Devaluation and Inflation. Devaluing to gain trade competitiveness can also be self-defeating because a weaker currency tends to result in higher domestic inflation, offsetting the benefits of devaluation. For example, higher inflation brought about by a lower U.S. dollar will make U.S. exports more expensive abroad and imports more competitive in the U.S. market. U.S. Deficits and the Demand for U.S. Assets. Another possible reason for the failure from the devaluation of the U.S. dollar to cure the persistent U.S. trade deficit is that the earlier analysis mixed up cause and effect. The argument that the strong dollar was the main culprit of the massive U.S. trade deficit rested on the obvious fact that the U.S. dollar’s high price made importing cheaper than exporting. But that was not the complete picture. The value of the U.S. dollar was not a cause or even a symptom of the problem. It is axiomatic that price is a reflection of a fundamental value in the market. To argue that the high U.S. dollar hurt the U.S. economy does not explain how or why the price got there. One plausible explanation is that owing to an increasingly attractive investment climate in the United States and added political and economic turmoil elsewhere in the world, foreign investors in the early 1980s wanted to expand their holdings of U.S. assets. They bid up the value of the U.S. dollar to a level at which Americans were willing to exchange their assets for foreign goods and services. The result was a financial-account surplus balanced by a current-account deficit. In effect, the financial-account surplus drove the current-account deficit. The net result was excess American spending financed by borrowing from abroad. Adding fuel to the current-account deficit, particularly after 1982, was the growth of the federal government’s budget deficit. The U.S. budget deficit could be funded in only one of three ways:

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restricting investment, increasing saving, or exporting debt. The United States rejected the first alternative, was unable to accomplish the second, and thus relied heavily on the third. Accordingly, the trade deficit was the equilibrating factor that enabled the United States to satisfy its extra-large appetite for debt. The price of the U.S. dollar determined the terms on which the rest of the world was willing to finance that deficit. When foreigners wanted to hold U.S. assets, the terms were quite attractive (they were willing to pay a high price for U.S. dollars); when foreigners no longer found U.S. assets so desirable, the financing terms became more onerous (they reduced the price they were willing to pay for U.S. dollars). However, even when the budget deficit declined in the late 1990s and then turned, briefly, into a surplus, the current-account deficit continued to rise as the U.S. saving rate fell even as U.S. investment increased. This analysis suggests that the current-account deficit will disappear only if the U.S. savings rate rises significantly or its rate of investment falls. As such, currency devaluation will work only if some mechanism is in place that leads to a rise in private saving, a cut in private investment, or a government budget surplus.

Protectionism Another response to a current-account deficit is protectionism—that is, the imposition of tariffs, quotas, or other forms of restraint against foreign imports. A tariff is essentially a tax that is imposed on a foreign product sold in a country. Its purpose is to increase the price of the product, thereby discouraging purchase of that product and encouraging the purchase of a substitute, domestically produced product.6 A quota specifies the quantity of particular products that can be imported to a country, typically an amount that is much less than the amount currently being imported. By restricting the supply relative to the demand, the quota causes the price of foreign products to rise. In both cases, the results are ultimately a rise in the price of products consumers buy, an erosion of purchasing power, and a collective decline in the standard of living. These results present a powerful argument against selective trade restrictions as a way to correct a nation’s trade imbalance. An even more powerful argument is that such restrictions do not work. Either other imports rise or exports fall. This conclusion follows from the basic national income accounting identity: Saving − Investment = Exports − Imports. Unless saving or investment behavior changes, this identity says that a reduction in imports by one unit of currency will lead to a one unit decrease in exports. The mechanism that brings about this result depends on the basic market forces that shape the supply and demand for currencies in the foreign exchange market. For example, when the U.S. government imposes restrictions on steel imports, the reduction in purchases of foreign steel effectively reduces the U.S. demand for foreign exchange. Fewer U.S. dollars tendered for foreign exchange means a higher value for the dollar. The higher-valued U.S. dollar raises the price of U.S. goods sold overseas and causes proportionately lower sales of U.S. exports. A higher-valued U.S. dollar also lowers the cost in the United States of foreign goods, thereby encouraging the purchase of those imported goods on which there is no tariff. Thus, any reduction in imports from tariffs or quotas will be offset by the reduction in exports and the increase in other imports. Restrictions on importing steel will also raise the price of steel, reducing the competitiveness of U.S. users of steel, such as auto and capital goods manufacturers. Their ability to compete will be constrained both at home and abroad. Ironically, protectionism punishes the most efficient and most internationally competitive producers—those who are exporting or are able to compete against imports—whereas it shelters the inefficient producers. 6 The incidence of a tariff—that is, who pays it—depends on the relative elasticities of supply and demand. For example, the more elastic the demand, the more of the tariff that will be absorbed by the exporter. On the other hand, an elastic supply means that more of the tariff will be paid by the consumer.

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Ending Foreign Ownership of Domestic Assets One approach that would eliminate a current-account deficit is to forbid foreigners from owning domestic assets. If foreigners cannot hold claims on the nation, they will export an amount equal in value only to what they are willing to import, ending net capital inflows. The microeconomic adjustment mechanism that will balance imports and exports under this policy is as follows. The cessation of foreign capital inflows, by reducing the available supply of capital, will raise real domestic interest rates. Higher interest rates will stimulate more saving because the opportunity cost of consumption rises with the real interest rate; higher rates also will cause domestic investment to fall because fewer projects will have positive net present values. The outcome will be a balance between saving/investment and elimination of the excess domestic spending that caused the current-account deficit in the first place. Although such an approach would work, most observers would consider the resulting slower economic growth too high a price to pay to eliminate a current-account deficit. Many observers are troubled by the role of foreign investors in the domestic financial markets of deficit nations, but as long as such countries continue to spend more than they produce, there will be a continuing need for foreign capital. On the plus side, this foreign capital is helping improve the country’s industrial base, while at the same time providing capital gains to those in the country who are selling their assets to foreigners. Foreign investors often introduce improved management, better production skills, or new technology that increases the quality and variety of goods available to local consumers, who benefit from lower prices as well. Investment—even foreign investment—also makes labor more productive. And higher labor productivity leads to higher wages, whether the factory’s owners live across town or in a different country. One study indicates that foreign direct investment is an especially powerful engine for stimulating the productivity of domestic industries.7 The study demonstrates that domestic workers could achieve productivity levels on a par with leading foreign workers, and foreign investment spreads good practices as employees move from the foreign firm to local ones. For example, Japanese auto transplants have provided a close-up learning lab for U.S. automakers to grasp concepts such as lean production and just-in-time component delivery. Restrictions on foreign investment will eliminate such productivity gains and may also provoke reciprocal restrictions by foreign governments.

Boosting the Saving Rate We have seen that a low saving rate tends to lead to a current-account deficit. Thus, another way to reduce the current-account deficit would be to stimulate saving behavior. For the U.S. with its persistent current-account deficit, the data indicate that the rate of private saving has declined over time. Although the global financial crisis boosted the U.S.’s private saving rate (as falling wealth and tighter credit caused consumers to spend less), it is still very low compared to other advanced nations. Moreover, the beneficial impact of higher private saving on the U.S. current-account deficit has been more than offset by the huge federal budget deficits attributable to the crisis and its aftermath. Future U.S. wealth will be impaired if the low U.S. saving rate persists. One possible explanation for the low U.S. personal saving rate is provided by the life-cycle hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, people like to smooth consumption over their lifetimes, so during their working years they spend less than they earn and accumulate wealth to finance consumption after they retire. In the case of the United States, Social Security benefits expanded greatly during the 1970s. By attenuating the link between saving behavior and retirement income, Social Security may have reduced the incentive for Americans to save for retirement. By contrast, China and Japan—which have only rudimentary social security systems and meager social safety nets at

7

“Manufacturing Productivity”, McKinsey Global Institute, October 1993.

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best—have had extraordinarily high personal saving rates. Presumably, the inability of the Chinese and Japanese to depend on the state has affected their willingness to save for the future. Another implication of the life-cycle hypothesis—the higher the ratio of retirees to workers, the lower the saving rate—explains the sharp decline in Japanese household saving over the past 30 years, from 18% of income in 1980 to 2.4% in 2010. Specifically, the ratio of Japanese aged over 65 to those of working age rose from 14% in 1980 to about 35% in 2010 and is forecast to rise to 49% by 2020. As the population continues to age, household saving will decline further and may even turn negative as the retired live off their accumulated financial assets. If investment rates do not decline, Japan will eventually run a current-account deficit. China has a similar demographic time bomb lying in wait. The one-child policy that China introduced in 1981, while initially increasing the working-age proportion of the population and boosting the saving rate, will result in a rapidly aging population, negative growth in the work force by 2015, and reduced saving rates.8 With a rapidly aging population, Germany too is accumulating savings and running a current-account surplus, behavior that is reinforced by the economic caution borne of the ruinous wars and hyperinflation of the last century.

Mini-Case

Yin and Yang of Capital Flow Management

In its October 2013 World Economic Outlook,9 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made the point that there are two ways countries can deal with a surge in foreign capital inflows into a country; either financial adjustment involving reserve accumulation or through offsetting capital outflows, or via a current-account deficit. For emerging market economies, capital inflows led to domestic booms and a current-account deficit. When such capital inflows reversed, this led to painful economic adjustments and—in some cases—financial crisis, such as affected Asian economies in 1998. The global financial crisis has led to a break in this pattern. Some countries continued to experience the knock-on effects of capital inflows and outflows through a boom and then bust for their economies. However, many countries experienced something different. When foreign capital flows reversed, their place was 9 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Wash-

ington D.C., Chapter 4: The yin and yang of capital flow management: balancing capital inflows with capital outflows, Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/.

8 “China

taken by domestic residents who repatriated their own foreign assets. In the IMF’s view, this pattern where foreign capital flows were offset by resident flows was a key factor for those economies that experienced this to be more resilient to the inflows and outflows of foreign capital. The IMF staffers suggested that policymakers should support domestic residents’ actions to offset sudden capital outflows and to encourage such behavior in those countries where it does not currently occur. Questions 1. What was the major issue facing emerging market countries when facing an influx of foreign capital? 2. What would be the likely effect of a surge in capital inflows? In capital outflows? 3. What prompts domestic residents to dampen the effect of sudden surges by repatriating assets? 4. How can policymakers encourage domestic residents to offset the flow of foreign capital?

Facing the Challenge of Aging Population”, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry, IAA, November 28, 2006, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/06112801.html#figure1. The one-child policy also boosted the saving rate by depriving parents of children to fall back on for support in old age.

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So one way to address the global imbalances is for governments to act to either increase or decrease the savings rate. For instance, the U.S. saving rate can be boosted by creating further tax-favored saving vehicles, reducing the social net, or switching from an income tax to a consumption tax (which penalizes consumption while rewarding saving). At the same time, reducing the U.S. government’s budget deficit would be a step in the right direction as well. Surplus countries can help too. China in 2013 announced a partial rebalancing of its economy in its 5-year plan, one strand being to relax its one-child policy. Similarly, changes in tax regulations and tax rates may greatly affect saving and investment behavior and, therefore, the nation’s trade and capital flows. Thus, purely domestic policies may have dramatic—and unanticipated—consequences for a nation’s international economic transactions. The lesson is clear: in an integrated world economy, everything connects to everything else; politicians cannot tinker with one parameter without affecting the entire system. A good, though unwanted, example is the global financial crisis during 2007 and 2008 brought on by the subprime mortgage disaster in the United States, itself a direct result of federal mandates on financial institutions designed to boost home ownership among low-income families. Dealing with that crisis has required coordinated policy actions by nations worldwide to avoid the possibility that nations with, for example, better deposit or interbank lending guarantees would drain the banking systems of nations with weaker guarantees. These coordinated actions were a reaction to the severe economic effects of the credit crunch. On the other hand, countries are still reluctant to coordinate on global imbalances. Germany, for instance, is unwilling to give up its export-orientated economic model and there are no signs that China is willing to significantly reduce its investment-led growth.

Adjusting Global Economic Policies As explained earlier, some key reasons for the large U.S. current-account deficit are likely to be external to the United States, implying that purely domestic policy changes are unlikely to resolve this issue. Dr. Bernanke explains what some of these policy changes might be:10 [A] more direct approach is to help and encourage developing countries to re-enter international capital markets in their more natural role as borrowers, rather than as lenders. For example, developing countries could improve their investment climates by continuing to increase macroeconomic stability, strengthen property rights, reduce corruption, and remove barriers to the free flow of financial capital. Providing assistance to developing countries in strengthening their financial institutions—for example, by improving bank regulation and supervision and by increasing financial transparency—could lessen the risk of financial crises and thus increase both the willingness of those countries to accept capital inflows and the willingness of foreigners to invest there. Financial liberalization is a particularly attractive option, as it would help both to permit capital inflows to find the highest-return uses and, by easing borrowing constraints, to spur domestic consumption. Other changes will occur naturally over time.

Following the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the attendant economic downturn, imbalances in trade and capital flows have been, to some extent, correcting themselves, although as Figure 5.9 shows, they still remain considerable. Current-account surpluses in the Eurozone and Japan that narrowed in 2009 have since widened. China still remains a creditor nation in 2012, although its surplus has not grown since 2009. The continuing global imbalances are putting pressure on surplus countries to shift from purely export-oriented growth to growth driven more by domestic consumption, as China is starting to do. This policy shift entails fiscal stimulus such as cutting tax rates, financial 10

See Bernanke, “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit”.

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market liberalization to improve consumer access to credit, and reducing regulations that hamper the development of service industries geared toward domestic consumption.

Current-Account Deficits and Unemployment One rationale for attempting to eliminate a current-account deficit is that such a deficit leads to unemployment. Underlying this rationale is the notion that imported goods and services are substituting for domestic goods and services and costing domestic jobs. For example, some have argued that every million-dollar increase in the U.S. trade deficit costs about 33 American jobs, assuming that the average worker earns about $30, 000 a year ($1, 000, 000∕$30, 000 = 33). Hence, it is claimed, reducing imports would raise domestic production and employment. However, the view that reducing a current-account deficit promotes jobs is based on single-entry bookkeeping. If a country buys fewer foreign goods and services, it will demand less foreign exchange. As discussed earlier, this result will raise the value of the domestic currency, thereby reducing exports and encouraging the purchase of other imports. Jobs are saved in some industries, but other jobs are lost by the decline in exports and rise in other imports. Following this line of reasoning, the net impact of a trade deficit or surplus on jobs should be nil. According to the apocalyptic claims of some politicians, however, the post-1980 economic performance of the United States should have been dismal because of its huge current-account deficits. However, if the alternative story is correct—that a current-account deficit reflects excess spending and has little to do with the health of an economy—then there should be no necessary relation between economic performance and the current-account balance. The appropriate way to settle this dispute is to examine the evidence. Research that examined the economic performance of the 23 original OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries during a 38-year period found no systematic relationship between trade deficits and unemployment rates.11 This result is not surprising for those who have looked at U.S. economic performance over the past 20 years or so. During this period, the trade deficit soared, but the United States created jobs three times as fast as Japan and 20 times as fast as Germany. Also, in the same time period, America’s GDP grew 43% faster than that of Japan or Germany, even though both nations had huge trade surpluses with the United States. In general, no systematic relationship between net exports and economic growth should be expected—and none is to be found.12 The evidence shows that current-account surpluses in and of themselves are neither good nor bad. They are not correlated with jobs, growth, decline, competitiveness, or weakness. What matters is why they occur.

The Bottom Line on Current-Account Deficits and Surpluses To summarize the previous discussion of current-account deficits and surpluses, consider the following stylized facts. Suppose the United States is a country whose citizens, for one reason or another, have a low propensity to save. And suppose also that for a variety of reasons, the United States is an attractive place to invest. Finally, suppose that in the rest of the world, people have high propensities to save but their opportunities for investment are less attractive. In these circumstances, there will be a flow of capital from the rest of the world and a corresponding net inflow of goods and services to the United States. The United States would have a current-account deficit.

11

See David M. Gould, Roy J. Ruffin, and Graeme L. Woodbridge, “The Theory and Practice of Free Trade”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review (Fourth Quarter, 1993): 1–16. 12 See, for example, David M. Gould and Roy J. Ruffin, “Trade Deficits: Causes and Consequences”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review (Fourth Quarter, 1996): 10–20. After analyzing a group of 101 countries over a 30-year period, they conclude (p. 17) that “trade imbalances have little effect on rates of economic growth once we account for the fundamental determinants of economic growth”.

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In this situation, the current-account deficit would not be viewed as a problem. Rather, it would be regarded as an efficient adaptation to different saving propensities and investment opportunities in the United States and the rest of the world. From this perspective, a current-account deficit becomes a solution, not a problem. This was the situation confronting the United States early in its history, when it ran almost continual trade deficits for its first 100 years. Nobody viewed that as a problem back then, and it still is not one. The real problem, if there is one, is either too much consumption and thus too little saving or too much investment. Regardless of what one’s opinions are, the situation confronting the United States and the rest of the world is an expression of national preferences, to which trade flows have adjusted in a timely manner. An economist has no further wisdom to shed on this matter. What are the long-term consequences for the United States or for any other nation that runs a current-account deficit? Here an economist can speak with some authority. As we saw in Section 5.2, the cumulative effect of current-account deficits is to reduce that nation’s net international wealth. The consequences of a reduction in a nation’s net international wealth depend on the nature of the foreign capital inflows that cause the erosion. If the capital inflows finance productive domestic investments, then the nation is better off; the returns from these added investments will service the foreign debts with income left over to increase living standards. Conversely, capital inflows that finance current consumption will increase the nation’s well-being today at the expense of its future well-being, when the loans must be repaid. That trade-off, however, has little to do with the balance of payments per se. In the case of the United States, a good portion of the inflows seems to have been of the productive variety. But a growing share of capital inflows, particularly since the late 1990s, appears to be financing consumption and government borrowing. If they are, the erosion of net U.S. international wealth will inflict new burdens on the U.S. economy in the future.

5.4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The balance of payments is an accounting statement of the international transactions of one nation over a specific period. The statement shows the sum of economic transactions of individuals, businesses, and government agencies located in one nation with those located in the rest of the world during the period. Thus, the balance of payments for the Eurozone for a given year is an accounting of all transactions between Eurozone residents and residents of all other countries during that year. The statement is based on double-entry bookkeeping; every economic transaction recorded as a credit brings about an equal and offsetting debit entry, and vice versa. A debit entry shows a purchase of foreign goods, services, or assets or a decline in liabilities to foreigners. A credit entry shows a sale of domestic goods, services, or assets or an increase in liabilities to foreigners. For example, if a foreign company sells a computer to a resident of the Eurozone, a debit is recorded to indicate an increase in purchases made by the Eurozone (the computer); a credit is recorded to reflect an increase in liabilities to the foreigner (payment for the computer). The balance of payments is often divided into several components. Each shows a particular kind of transaction, such

as merchandise exports or foreign purchases of government securities. Transactions that represent purchases and sales of goods and services in the current period are called the current account; those that represent capital transactions are called the financial account. Changes in official reserves appear on the other investment account. Double-entry bookkeeping ensures that debits equal credits; therefore, the sum of all transactions is zero. In the absence of official reserve transactions, a financial-account surplus must offset the current-account deficit, and a financial-account deficit must offset a current-account surplus. Some countries run current account surpluses; others have deficits. At present there is a global imbalance where countries, such as the United States, have significant deficits. Other countries or, in the case of the Eurozone—a currency bloc, have surpluses. The United States is currently running a large currentaccount deficit. Much public discussion about why the United States imports more than it exports has focused on claims of unfair trading practices or on the high value of the U.S. dollar. However, economic theory indicates that the total

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size of the current-account deficit is a macroeconomic phenomenon; there is a basic accounting identity that a nation’s current-account deficit reflects excess domestic spending. Equivalently, a current-account deficit equals the excess of domestic investment over domestic saving. Explicitly taking government into account yields a new relation: the domestic spending balance equals the private saving-investment balance minus the government budget deficit. Since 2001, the U.S. trade deficit can be traced to a combination of the federal budget deficit and a low U.S. saving rate.

We saw that failure to consider the elementary economic accounting identities can mislead policymakers into relying on currency depreciation, trade restrictions, or trade subsidies in order to reduce trade deficits without doing anything about excess domestic spending. The current-account deficit can be reduced only if domestic savings rise, private investment declines, or the government deficit is reduced. Absent any of those changes, the current-account deficit will not diminish, regardless of the imposition of trade barriers or the amount of depreciation.

QUESTIONS 1.

In a freely floating exchange rate system, if the current account is running a deficit, what are the consequences for the nation’s balance on financial account and its overall balance of payments?

2.

.(a) As the value of the euro rises, what is likely to happen to the Eurozone balance on its current account? Explain.

U.S. competitiveness owing to low productivity or low-quality products and/or lower wages, superior technology, and unfair trade practices by foreign countries. Which of those factors is likely to underlie the persistent U.S. trade deficits? Explain. 7.

During the 1990s, Mexico and Argentina went from economic pariahs with huge foreign debts to countries posting strong economic growth and welcoming foreign investment. What would you expect these changes to do to their current-account balances?

8.

Suppose the trade imbalances of the second decade of the 21st century largely disappear during the next decade. What is likely to happen to the huge global capital flows that currently exist? What is the link between the trade imbalances and the global movement of capital?

9.

In the early 1990s, Japan underwent a recession that brought about a prolonged slump in consumer spending and capital investment. (Some estimate that in 1994 only 65% of Japan’s manufacturing capacity was being used.) At the same time, the U.S. economy emerged from its recession and began expanding rapidly. Under these circumstances, what would you predict would happen to the U.S. trade deficit with Japan?

10.

According to the World Competitiveness Report 1994, with freer markets, Third World nations now are able to attract capital and technology from the advanced nations. As a result, they can achieve productivity close to Western levels while paying low wages. Hence, the low-wage Third World nations will run huge trade surpluses, creating either large-scale unemployment or sharply falling wages in the advanced nations. Comment on this scenario.

(b) What is likely to happen to the value of the U.S. dollar as the U.S. current-account deficit increases? Explain. (c) A current-account surplus is not always a sign of health; a current-account deficit is not always a sign of weakness. Comment. 3.

4.

Suppose Lufthansa, the German airline, buys $400 million worth of Boeing jets in 2010 and is financed by the U.S. Eximbank with a five-year loan that has no principal or interest payments due until 2011. What is the net impact of this sale on the U.S. current account, financial account, and overall balance of payments for 2010? .(a) What happens to Argentina’s ability to repay its foreign loans if the United States restricts imports of Argentinian agricultural produce? (b) Suppose Brazil starts welcoming foreign investment with open arms. How is this policy likely to affect the value of the Brazilian real? The Brazilian current-account balance?

5.

China’s overall saving rate is now nearly 50% of GDP, the highest in the world. China’s domestic investment rate, at 43%, is also high, but not as high as its saving rate. What do these facts imply about China’s current-account balance?

6.

According to popular opinion, U.S. trade deficits indicate any or all of the following: a lack of

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PROBLEMS 1.

How would each of the following transactions show up on the Eurozone balance-of-payments accounts? (a) Payment of €100 million in welfare benefits to Eurozone citizens living in Costa Rica

in euro-denominated corporate bonds on behalf of a Cayman Islands bank. 3.

(b) A sale of a Picasso by a French owner to a Japanese resident (c) Tuition receipts of €3 billion received by universities in the Eurozone from students from the Asia-Pacific region

(a) Assuming the preceding data are measured with precision, what can you conclude about the change in Japan’s foreign exchange reserves during the year?

(d) Payment of €1 million to French business consultants CGI by a Nigerian company

(b) What is the gap between Japan’s national expenditure and its national income?

(e) Sale of a €1, 000 million Eurobond issue in London by EADS

(c) What is the gap between Japan’s saving and its domestic investment?

( f) Investment of €200 million by Peugeot to build a parts plant in Argentina

(d) What was Japan’s net foreign investment for the year?

(g) Payment of €45 million in dividends to Eurozone residents from foreign companies 2.

(e) Suppose the Japanese government’s budget ran a $22 billion surplus during the year. What can you conclude about Japan’s private saving-investment balance for the year?

Set up the double-entry accounts showing the appropriate debits and credits associated with the following transactions: (a) Bollore Group, a French agribusiness, exports €80 million of soybeans to China and receives payment in the form of a check drawn on a French bank.

During the year, Japan had a current-account surplus of $98 billion and a financial-account deficit, aside from the change in its foreign exchange reserves, of $67 billion.

4.

The following transactions (expressed in € billions) take place during a year. Calculate the Eurozone merchandise-trade, current-account, financial-account, and official reserves balances.

(b) The European Union provides refugee assistance to Somalia in the form of wheat valued at €1 million.

(a) The Eurozone exports €300 of goods and receives payment in the form of foreign demand deposits abroad.

(c) BASF invests €500 million in a chemical plant in Texas financed by issuing bonds in London.

(b) The Eurozone imports €225 of goods and pays for them by drawing down its foreign demand deposits.

(d) Volkswagen pays €5 million in dividends to foreign residents, who choose to hold the dividends in the form of bank deposits in Frankfurt. (e) The Bank of Japan buys up €1 billion in the foreign exchange market to hold down the value of the yen and uses these euros to buy Eurozone government bonds.

(c) The Eurozone pays €15 to foreigners in dividends drawn on Eurozone deposits. (d) Tourists from the Eurozone spend €30 overseas using traveler’s checks drawn on Eurozone banks. (e) Eurozone residents buy foreign stocks with €60, using foreign deposits held abroad.

( f) Cemex, a Mexican company, sells €2 million worth of cement to a Spanish company and deposits the check in a bank in Madrid.

( f) Eurozone governments sell €45 in gold for foreign deposits abroad.

(g) Colombian drug dealers receive €10 million in cash for the cocaine they ship to the Eurozone. The money is smuggled out of Europe and then invested

(g) In a currency support operation, the governments of the Eurozone use their foreign deposits to purchase €8 from private foreigners in the Eurozone.

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During the Reagan era, 1981–1988, the U.S. current account moved from a tiny surplus to a large deficit. The following table provides U.S. macroeconomic data for that period.

(b) To what extent would you attribute the changes in the U.S. current-account balance to an increase in the U.S. government budget deficit? (c) Based on these data, what was the excess of national spending over national income during this period?

(a) Based on these data, to what extent would you attribute the changes in the U.S. current-account balance to a decline in the U.S. private saving-investment balance? Year Private saving Private investment Government budget deficit Current-account balance

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

500 468 −35 2

586 558 −30 5

617 503 −109 −11

641 547 −140 −45

743 719 −109 −100

736 715 −125 −125

721 718 −147 −151

731 749 −112 −167

802 794 −98 −129

WEB RESOURCES http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018773 Website of the European Central Bank. Contains direct links to Eurozone trade and balance of payments data that can be downloaded into spreadsheets. www.oecd.org Website of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Contains data and

articles on member and other countries, international trade and capital flows. http://www.imf.org/external/research/index.aspx Website of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with data and articles on member countries, including balance-of-payment statistics.

WEB EXERCISES 1.

Which countries are the major customers for Eurozone of goods and services? Which countries are the major exporters of goods and services to the Eurozone?

2.

Examine the Eurozone of payments over the past year. (a) What is the current-account balance, the financial-account balance, the capital-account balance, and the official reserves balance? (b) How have these balances changed from the previous year? What economic factors might account for these changes?

3.

Based on historical data from the European Central Bank, what is the relationship between Eurozone trade balances and economic growth in the Eurozone?

4.

What is the historical relationship between Eurozone trade balances and the value of the euro?

5.

Select a country and analyze that country’s balance of payments for 8 to 12 years, subject to availability of data. You can find such data by using the Google search engine (at www.google.com) and typing in the country name and “Balance of Payments data”. For example, the site for Japanese balance of payments data is http://www.mof.go.jp/e1c004.htm and Canadian data can be found at http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/ Economy/Economic/econ01a.htm. The analysis must include examinations (presentation of statistical data with discussion) of the trade balance, current-account balance, financial-account balance, basic balance, and overall balance. Your report should also address the following issues: (a) What accounts for swings in these various balances over time?

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5.4 Summary and Conclusions (b) What is the relationship between shifts in the current-account balance and changes in saving and investment? Include an examination of government budget deficits and surpluses, explaining how they are related to the saving and investment and current-account balances.13 6.

13

For the country selected in exercise 5, analyze the exchange rate against the euro and/or U.S. dollar during the same period.

Project suggested by Donald T. Buck.

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(a) Is there any observable relationship between the balance-of-payments accounts and the exchange rate? (b) Provide a possible explanation for your observations in part a above.

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Country Risk

To travel is to discover that everyone is wrong about other countries. Aldous Huxley LEARNING OBJECTIVES • To define what country risk means from the standpoint of an MNC • To describe the social, cultural, political, and economic factors that affect the general level of risk in a country and identify key indicators of country risk and economic health • To describe what we can learn about economic development from the contrasting experiences of a variety of countries • To describe the economic and political factors that determine a country’s ability and willingness to repay its foreign debts Multinational firms must constantly assess the business environments of the countries they are already operating in as well as the ones they are considering investing in. Similarly, private and public investors alike are interested in determining which countries offer the best prospects for sound investments. This is the realm of country risk analysis, the assessment of the potential risks and rewards associated with making investments and doing business in a country. Ultimately, we are interested in whether sensible economic policies are likely to be pursued because countries adopting such policies will generally have good business environments in which enterprise can flourish. However, because political considerations often lead countries to pursue economic policies that are detrimental to business and to their own economic health, the focus of country risk analysis cannot be exclusively economic in nature. By necessity, it must also study the political factors that give rise to particular economic policies. This is the subject matter of political economy—the interaction of politics and economics. Such interactions occur on a continuous basis and affect not just monetary and fiscal (tax and spending) policies but also a host of other policies that affect the business environment, such as currency or trade controls, changes in labor laws, regulatory restrictions, and requirements for additional local production. By extension, the international economic environment is heavily dependent on the policies that individual nations pursue. Given the close linkage between a country’s economic policies and the degree of exchange risk, inflation risk, and interest rate risk that multinational companies and investors face, it is vital in studying and attempting to forecast those risks to understand their

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causes. Simply put, no one can intelligently assess a country’s risk profile without comprehending its economic and political policies and how those policies are likely to affect the country’s prospects for economic growth. Similarly, attempts to forecast exchange rates, inflation rates, or interest rates are helped immensely by a deeper understanding of how those economic parameters are affected by national policies. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework that can facilitate a formal assessment of country risk and its implications for corporate decision-making. Both international banks and non-bank firms analyze country risk, but from different perspectives. Non-bank firms analyze country risk in order to determine the investment climate in various countries, whereas banks are interested in the country’s ability to service its foreign debts. Country risk assessments may be used in investment analyses to screen out countries that are excessively risky or to monitor countries in which the firm is currently doing business to determine whether new policies are called for. Banks analyze country risk to determine which countries to lend to, the currencies in which to denominate their loans, and the interest rates to demand on these loans. The chapter begins with a discussion of political risk and then moves to an analysis of the economic and political factors underlying country risk. The third section focuses on country risk from the perspective of an international bank.

6.1 Measuring Political Risk Although expropriation1 is the most obvious and extreme form of political risk, there are other significant political risks, including currency or trade controls, changes in tax or labor laws, regulatory restrictions, and requirements for additional local production. The common denominator of such risks is not hard to identify: government intervention into the workings of the economy that affects, for good or ill, the value of the firm. Although the consequences usually are adverse, changes in the political environment can provide opportunities as well. The move by the European Union to impose anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels led to both a price increase for European customers and an import quota. The result is to reduce the amount of solar capacity since local firms do not have the capacity to make up any shortfall. The following application discusses the types of risks that foreign firms are subject to. It is from the 2012 annual report of Convergys Corporation, an Ohio-based company that provides services globally in customer care, billing, and human resources.

Application

Overseas Risks Faced by Convergys

Expansion of our existing international operations and entry into additional countries will require management attention and financial resources. There are certain risks inherent in conducting business internationally including: exposure to currency fluctuations, longer payment cycles, greater difficulties in accounts receivable collection, difficulties in complying with a variety of foreign

laws, changes in legal or regulatory requirements, difficulties in staffing and managing foreign operations, inflation, political instability, compliance with anti-bribery and anti-corruption legislation, and potentially adverse tax consequences. To the extent that we are adversely affected by these risks, our business could be adversely affected and our revenues and/or earnings could be reduced.

1 The terms expropriation and nationalization are used interchangeably in this text and refer specifically to the taking of foreign property, with or without compensation.

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Despite the near-universal recognition among multinational corporations, political scientists, and economists of the existence of political risk, no unanimity has yet been reached about what constitutes that risk and how to measure it. The two basic approaches to viewing political risk are from a country-specific and a firm-specific perspective. The first perspective depends on country risk analysis, whereas the second depends on a more micro approach. This chapter focuses on macro indicators. Chapter 17 will discuss political risk from the perspective of an individual firm. A number of commercial and academic political risk forecasting models are available today. Some prominent ones include Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), Political Risk Services (PRS), Control Risks’ Country Risk Forecasts, Deutsche Bank Eurasia Group Stability Index, as well as ratings provided by Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Euromoney, Institutional Investor, Standard & Poor’s Rating Group, and Moody’s Investors Services. These models normally supply country risk indices that attempt to quantify the level of political risk in each nation. Most of these indices rely on some measure(s) of the stability of the local political regime.

Political Stability Measures of political stability may include the frequency of changes of government, the level of violence in the country (e.g., violent deaths per 100,000 population), the number of armed insurrections, the extent of conflicts with other states, and so on. For example, the Deutsche Bank Eurasia Group Stability Index measures risk according to long-term conditions that affect stability (structural scores) and temporal assessment on impacts of policies, events, and developments each month.2 The basic function of these stability indicators is to determine how long the current regime will be in power and whether that regime also will be willing and able to enforce its foreign investment guarantees. Most companies believe that greater political stability means a safer investment environment. A basic problem in many Third World countries is that the local actors have all the external trappings of genuine nation-states—United Nations-endorsed borders, armies, foreign ministries, flags, currencies, national airlines—but they are nothing of the kind. They lack social cohesion, political legitimacy, and the institutional infrastructures necessary for economic growth.

Economic Factors Other frequently used indicators of political risk include economic factors such as inflation, balance-of-payments deficits or surpluses, and the growth rate of per capita GDP. The intention behind these measures is to determine whether the economy is in good shape or requires a quick fix, such as expropriation to increase government revenues or currency inconvertibility to improve the balance of payments. In general, the better a country’s economic outlook, the less likely it is to face political and social turmoil that will inevitably harm foreign companies.

Subjective Factors More subjective measures of political risk are based on a general perception of the country’s attitude toward private enterprise: whether private enterprise is considered a necessary evil to be eliminated as soon as possible or whether it is actively welcomed. The attitude toward foreign businesses is particularly relevant and may differ from the feeling regarding local private ownership. Consider, for example, the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries that actively sought products, technology, and even joint ventures with Western firms while refusing to tolerate (until

2

Ian Bremmer, “Managing Risk in an Unstable World” Harvard Business Review (June 2005): 51–60.

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the early 1990s) domestic free enterprise. In general, most countries probably view foreign direct investment in terms of a cost/benefit tradeoff and are not either for or against it in principle.

Application

Threats to the Nation-State

From Canada to the former Czechoslovakia, from India to Ireland, and from South Africa to the former Soviet Union, political movements centered on ethnicity, national identity, and religion are reemerging to contest some of the most fundamental premises of the modern nation-state. In the process, they are reintroducing ancient sources of conflict so deeply submerged by the Cold War that they seemed almost to have vanished from history’s equation. The implications of this resurgence of national, ethnic, and religious passions are profound.

• A host of modern nation-states—from Afghanistan to Belgium to Lebanon to Indonesia and Iraq—are beginning to crumble, while others—such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Somalia—have already disintegrated, because the concept of the melting pot, the idea that diverse and even historically hostile peoples could readily be assimilated under larger political umbrellas in the name of modernization and progress, has failed them. Even in the strongest nations, including the United States, the task of such assimilation has proved difficult and the prognosis is for even greater tension in the years ahead. • After 70 years on the road to nowhere, the Soviet Union finally arrived in 1991. Now, turmoil in the states making up the former Soviet Union and parts of China threaten to blow apart the last remnants of an imperial age that began more than 500 years ago. The turbulent dismantling of 19th-century European empires after World War II may be matched by new waves of disintegration within the former Soviet and Chinese Communist empires, with incalculable consequences for the rest of the world. Stretching from the Gulf of Finland to the mountains of Tibet and beyond, the sheer scale of the potential instability would tax the world’s capacity to respond. Ethnic unrest could spill into neighboring countries, old border disputes could reignite, and if the central governments tried to impose order with force, civil wars could erupt within two of the world’s largest nuclear powers. • Around the world, fundamentalist religious movements have entered the political arena in a direct challenge to

one of the basic principles of the modern age: that governments and other civic institutions should be predominantly secular and religion confined to the private lives of individuals and groups. Since the end of the Middle Ages, when religion dominated not just government but every aspect of society, the pervasive trend in the past 500 years has been to separate church and state. Now, in many parts of the world, powerful movements, reacting against the secular quality of modern public culture and the tendency of traditional values to be swept aside in periods of rapid change, are insisting on a return to God-centered government. One consequence of this trend is to make dealings between states and groups more volatile. As the United States learned with the terrorist attacks on September 11, the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda terror network in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian revolution, and the Persian Gulf war, disputes are far harder to manage when governments or groups root their positions in religious principle. The civil war in Syria and its consequences for the Middle East show, too, that countries and even regions can be split apart on religious lines. • In some countries, notably Afghanistan and Somalia, the long-term breakdown in government and the division of the country into fiefdoms with armed groups involved in complex rivalries has led to failed nation-states. Paradoxically, at the same time that many states and societies are becoming more fragmented over religion, ethnicity, and national culture, their people nourish hopes of achieving economic progress by allying themselves to one or another of the new trade blocs—Europe, North America, Pacific Rim—now taking shape. Yet, in many cases, such dreams will not materialize. Civil strife and dogmatic politics hold little allure for foreign investors; bankers lend money to people whose first priority is money, not religion or ethnic identity. The challenge for business is to create profitable opportunities in a world that is simultaneously globalizing and localizing.

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An index that tries to incorporate all these economic, social, and political factors into an overall measure of the business climate, including the political environment, is the Ease of Doing Business rankings, produced by the International Finance Corporation, part of the World Bank, shown in Figure 6.1. The ranking of countries listed is based on an aggregation of ten factors that affect the ability of business to start and operate and includes items such as the complexities of starting a new business to more prosaic considerations such as how difficult it is to obtain electricity. Political Risk and Uncertain Property Rights. Models such as those provided by the International Finance Corporation are useful insofar as they provide an indication of the general level of political risk in a country. From an economic standpoint, political risk refers to uncertainty over property rights. If the government can expropriate either legal title to property or the stream of income it generates, then political risk exists. Political risk also exists if property owners may be constrained in the way they use their property. This definition of political risk encompasses government actions ranging from outright expropriation to a change in the tax law that alters the government’s share of corporate income to laws that change the rights of private companies to

Selected ease of doing business indicators1 Economy Singapore Hong Kong SAR, China New Zealand United States Denmark Norway United Kingdom Canada Germany Japan France Spain Italy Turkey Morocco Russian Federation Vietnam Ukraine Brazil Cote D’Ivoire Angola

Ease of doing business rank 1 2 3 4 5 9 10 19 21 27 38 52 65 69 87 92 99 112 116 167 179

Starting a business 3 5 1 20 40 53 28 2 111 120 41 142 90 93 39 88 109 47 123 115 178

Getting electricity 6 5 45 7 18 17 74 145 3 26 42 62 34 49 97 117 156 172 14 153 170

Paying taxes 5 4 23 64 12 17 14 8 89 140 52 67 138 71 78 56 149 164 159 173 155

Trading across borders 1 2 21 22 8 26 16 45 14 23 36 32 56 86 37 157 65 148 124 165 169

Enforcing contracts 12 9 18 11 32 4 56 58 5 36 7 59 103 38 83 10 46 45 121 88 187

1 The

10 indicators are: starting a business; dealing with construction permits; getting electricity; registering property; getting credit; protecting investors; paying taxes; trading across borders; enforcing contracts; and resolving insolvency

FIGURE 6.1 Ease of Doing Business Rankings 2013 Source: International Finance Corporation, by permission. Updated versions of the table can be found at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings#.

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compete against state-owned companies. Each action affects corporate cash flows and hence the value of the firm.

Application

Komineft Rhymes with Theft

In early 1995, Komineft, a Russian oil company, instituted a 3-for-2 stock split but did not tell shareholders. It also decided that only those investors on the registry in May 1984 would get the new shares, thereby diluting by a third the stakes of those who had bought shares afterward, which included most foreign buyers. Komineft, although conceding there was a problem, insisted it had done nothing wrong. It was probably right. The few Russian laws that protect shareholders’ interests are often contradictory, allowing Russian companies to ignore shareholder rights and get away with it. Although Komineft later reversed its position on the stock split, episodes such as this one have taken most of the luster off investing in Russian companies.

Other investors in Russia have had similar experiences with vague and shifting property rights. For example, in February 1995, Texaco’s US$45 billion deal to drill in the Russian Arctic hit a last-minute snag when a regional production association suddenly demanded a 50% share of the profits. In addition, oil companies have suffered from arbitrary changes in tax and export laws despite the fact that when Western oil companies registered their joint ventures in 1991, the Soviet government assured them they would be able to export 100% of production tax free. However, as the government struggled over cash shortages, the oil companies’ “rights” disappeared. As a result, every foreign oil company operating in the former Soviet Union scaled back its operations there or pulled out altogether.

Companies should ask the following key questions in assessing the degree of political risk they face in a country, particularly one undergoing a political and economic transition: • Has economic reform become institutionalized, thereby minimizing the chance of abrupt policy changes that would adversely affect an investment’s value? • Are the regulatory and legal systems predictable and fair? Constant rule changes involving foreign ownership, taxes, currency controls, trade, or contract law raise investment risk. • Is the government reasonably competent, maintaining the value of its currency and preserving political stability? Capital Flight. A useful indicator of the degree of political risk is the seriousness of capital flight. Capital flight refers to the export of savings by a nation’s citizens because of fears about the safety of their capital. By its nature, capital flight is difficult to measure accurately because it is not directly observed in most cases. Nevertheless, one can usually infer the capital outflows, using balance-of-payments figures—particularly the entry labeled “errors and omissions”. The World Bank methodology estimates capital flight as “the sum of gross capital inflows and the current account deficit, less increases in foreign reserves”.3 These estimates indicate that capital flight represents an enormous outflow of funds from developing countries. 3

World Bank, World Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985): 64.

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Application

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Mr. Yampel Gets Trampled in Ukraine

In August 2000, Jacob Yampel had just won a Ukrainian court decision in his battle to regain a 50% stake in a pharmaceutical factory. This stake had been taken from him by the plant’s managers through a complicated series of transactions involving share dilution, transfer of plant assets to a new private company, doctored documents, and a bankruptcy declaration of the original joint venture. Unfortunately for Mr. Yampel, the losing side then enlisted the aid of the Ukrainian president. In a televised broadcast, President Leonid Kuchma said, “I often say…we must obey laws. But there is something higher than the law: the country’s national interest. And this means the interests of our people, not of someone else.” Twelve days later, Ukraine’s High Arbitration Court overturned Mr. Yampel’s victory on a technicality. An official at the U.S. Embassy called the timing of the unfavorable court decision “suspicious” and said it was “likely to raise questions in the minds of investors about their ability to obtain a fair hearing…particularly if they have disputes with prominent domestic producers.”4

Mr. Yampel’s plight is not that uncommon in Ukraine, a large, underdeveloped market that holds lucrative opportunities along with big risks. Although the government hopes to attract foreign investors by combining economic reforms with privatization, Ukrainian leaders have sent potential investors mixed messages about their attitude toward foreign business. In addition to Mr. Yampel’s company, a number of U.S. firms have complained to the U.S. Congress about their treatment in Ukraine. Their grievances range from commercial disputes with government agencies or companies to bureaucratic interference to improper handling by the judicial system of their disputes with Ukrainian firms. The “Orange Revolution” in December 2004, which replaced Ukraine’s corrupt government with opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko and his record of commitment to democracy and the rule of law, inspired new hope of economic reform and a less risky business environment, hopes that had not been fully realized as of 2008.

4 Tom Warner, “Lessons for Foreign Investors in Ukraine”, Wall Street Journal (August 16, 2000): A18.

Application

Political Risk in Venezuela

According to the Wall Street Journal (December 31, 1980, p. 10), when Venezuela’s oil income quadrupled in 1973, a high government official declared, “Now we have so much money that we won’t need any new foreign investment.” President Carlos Perez calculated that the country was rich enough to buy machinery from abroad and set up factories without any foreign participation. He overlooked the fact that Venezuela did not have enough skilled technicians to run and maintain sophisticated equipment. Despite an orgy of buying foreign-made machinery, economic growth stalled as companies were left with equipment they could not operate. By 1980, President Luis Herrera, who succeeded Perez, recognized the mistake and invited foreigners back. But once shunned, foreigners did not rush back, particularly because the Herrera administration sent out such

mixed signals that investors could not be certain how sincere the welcome was or how long it would last. Consider the uncertainty faced by a foreign investor trying to decipher government policy from the following statements. On the one hand, the Superintendent of Foreign Investment insisted that the government had had “a change of heart” and declared that the country needed “new capital and new technology in manufacturing, agro-industry, and construction of low-cost housing.” On the other hand, the head of the powerful Venezuelan Investment Fund, which invests much of the country’s oil income, was downright hostile to foreign investors. He said, “Foreign investment is generally unfavorable to Venezuela. Foreign investors think Venezuela is one big grab bag, where they can come and pick out whatever goodies they want.” Still another official, the president of the Foreign Trade Institute, said, “It is a grave

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error to think that foreign investment can contribute to the transfer of technology, capital formation, the development of managerial capacity, and equilibrium in the balance of payments.” The collapse of oil prices brought the return of Carlos Perez as a free-market reformer, who instituted needed economic changes in Venezuela. However, the Venezuelan government failed to pursue political reforms in tandem with economic reforms, and the economic reforms themselves worsened the existing economic inequality and undermined President Perez’s hold on power. After Perez was forced out of office on corruption charges in 1994, his successor, President Rafael Caldera, spent more than 10% of the nation’s GDP to bail out weak banks (financed by running the central bank’s printing presses overtime), stopped all privatizations, appointed the country’s best-known Marxist economist to the board of the central bank, imposed price and currency controls, and spoke out strongly against the private sector. The result was high inflation and a massive outflow of capital, prompting an 87% devaluation of the Venezuelan bolivar. In 1998, Hugo Chavez, a military officer whose rise to power began with a bloody attempted military coup in 1992, swept into power based on the promise of a “Bolivarian revolution” to attack poverty. Instead of battling poverty, however, Chavez, an open admirer of Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein, has spent much of his time fighting a growing list of political opponents. First businesses

$8,300

$8,000

$7,000 Per capita GDP

$6,200 $6,000

$6,100 $5,500 $4,800

$5,000

$4,400

$4,000 $3,000 $2,000 $1,000 $0

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

FIGURE 6.2 Venezuela’s Per Capita GDP Falls Under Hugo Chavez Source: CIA World Factbook.

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turned against him, then unions, and then the media. In 2001, without consulting Congress, Chavez issued 49 “revolutionary” decrees that gave him near-total control of the economy. A fierce foe of capitalism (“I have said it already, I am convinced that the way to build a new and better world is not capitalism. Capitalism leads us straight to hell.”) with a deep antipathy toward property rights (his administration pledged to seize about 3.4% of the area of Venezuela in 2005 to give to poor farmers), Chavez has seen his alternative path to socialism lead to further misery and poverty for the Venezuelan masses. In his first six years in office (1998–2004), Venezuela’s per capita income declined by 47% (see Figure 6.2) even as Venezuela’s oil revenues zoomed from high oil prices. Moreover, despite the imposition of exchange controls, by April 2005, the Venezuelan bolivar had declined in value by 73%. Although the bolivar has been fixed since 2005 at 2,150 per dollar, its black market rate had fallen to 4,800 per dollar by mid-2007. Chavez’s star has faded along with Venezuela’s economy. By 2011, Venezuela had the highest inflation rate in the world, a skyrocketing crime rate, and a sluggish economy. In March 2013, Chavez died, leaving behind deep economic and social problems in Venezuela. His successor, Nicolas Maduro, has continued the policies started by Chavez and increasingly used the power of the state to hunt down suspected price-gougers.

$9,000 $8,000

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Application

Is Russia Too Corrupt for Foreign Investors?

“According to Angus Roxburgh, former BBC Moscow correspondent and later a public-relations adviser to the Kremlin, there is one overriding reason why Russia is failing to achieve its economic potential and failing to attract outside investors: corruption. ‘It is something the government acknowledges but seems powerless to combat, despite a regular stream of anti-corruption decrees and initiatives,’ he says.”5 Transparency International,6 which measures corruption, placed Russia 133rd out of 176 countries on its Corruption Perception Index, putting it alongside Iran and Kazakhstan. It also did poorly in the World Bank’s Doing Business survey, coming in at 122 out of 185 countries. The much publicized story of Yukos, the Russian oil company, which was taken to court in 2004 for tax evasion, and its then chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was subsequently jailed for fraud, is just the most public of many incidents where the state or powerful individuals have used their power to their own advantage.

5 From

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a report by James Melik for the BBC (http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/business-18622833). 6 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 (http://www.transparency.org.uk/).

After the judgment, Yukos was subsequently acquired by the government at a price that many considered did not represent the business’ true value. Cases such as Yukos and the troubles for foreign firms such as BP with its joint investment in TNK-BP, which it exited in March 2013, as well as others, have made foreign investors wary. The underlying cause is corruption in the police, judiciary, and administration, where the paying of “blat”— a euphemism for bribe—to obtain services or prevent unwelcome intrusion, is a normal feature of daily life. As Roxburgh goes on to argue: “Bureaucrats in charge of state tenders routinely ask for enormous bribes from companies bidding for the contracts, which adds to the cost of the bills that the state pays. ‘A year or so ago, three seniors officials were convicted—a rare occurrence—for demanding $1m to take the Japanese company Toshiba off a fictitious blacklist, which was preventing the company bidding for a contract,’ Mr Roxburgh recalls.”7 It is no surprise that foreign firms look at Russia and the experience of inward investors and keep away. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that foreign investment is low compared to other emerging market economies. 7 As

quoted by James Melik in the BBC report (http://www. bbc.co.uk/news/business-18622833).

Capital flight occurs for several reasons, most of which have to do with inappropriate economic policies: government regulations, controls, and taxes that lower the return on domestic investments. In countries in which inflation is high and domestic inflation hedging is difficult or impossible, investors may hedge by shifting their savings to foreign currencies deemed less likely to depreciate. They may also make the shift when domestic interest rates are artificially held down by their governments or when they expect a devaluation of an overvalued currency. Yet another reason for capital flight could be increases in a country’s external debt, which may signal the likelihood of a fiscal crisis.8 India is one country in which capital flight was unusually large when the economy was still shackled by socialistic ideologies and high amounts of external debt. As the Indian economy engaged in liberalization and started attracting foreign direct investment inflows, capital flight was reversed (see Figure 6.3).9 8 Donald R. Lessard, “Comment”, In Donald R. Lessard and John Williamson, eds., Capital Flight and Third World Debt (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987): 97–100. 9 Niranjan Chipalkatti and Meenakshi Rishi, “External Debt and Capital Flight in the Indian Economy”, Oxford Development Studies, vol. 29, no. 1 (2001): 31–44.

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Capital flight ($USD billions)

$200 $150

$148

$88

$100 $50 $0 1971–1987

1988–1997

Total

–$50 $(61) –$100

FIGURE 6.3 Capital Flight from India 1971–1997 Note: In 1997 U.S. dollars. Source: Niranjan Chipalkatti and Meenakshi Rishi, “External Debt and Capital Flight in the Indian Economy”, Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 29 No. 1, 2001.

Perhaps the most powerful motive for capital flight is political risk. In unstable political regimes (and in some stable ones), wealth is not secure from government seizure, especially when changes in regime occur. Savings may be shifted overseas to protect them. For example, the citizens of Hong Kong, which returned to communist China on July 1, 1997, responded to the anticipated change in regime by sending large sums of money abroad in advance. Common sense dictates that if a nation’s own citizens do not trust the government, then investment there is unsafe. After all, residents presumably have a better feel for conditions and government intentions than do outsiders. Thus, when analyzing investment or lending opportunities, multinational firms and international banks must bear in mind the apparent unwillingness of the nation’s citizens to invest and lend in their own country. What is needed to halt capital flight are tough-minded economic policies—the kind of policies that make investors want to put their money to work instead of taking it out. As we shall see in the next section, these policies include cutting budget deficits and taxes, removing barriers to investment by foreigners, selling off state-owned enterprises, allowing for freer trade, and avoiding currency overvaluations that virtually invite people to ship their money elsewhere before the official exchange rate falls. Starting around 1990, such policies began to be employed in much of Latin America, with predictable results. As seen in Figure 6.4, beginning in 1990, capital flight was reversed, with private capital flooding back into Latin America. These capital inflows helped fuel the extraordinary performance of the Latin American stock markets during this period that is discussed in Chapter 15. Culture. Often overlooked is the role of culture, for it is culture that shapes the behavior that determines economic outcomes. As with individuals, so with nations. As Banfield pointed out, societies that are present oriented, thereby attaching “no value to work, sacrifice, [or] self-improvement”, will likely remain poor despite substantial amounts of aid.10 Conversely, cultures that adopt the values

10 Edward

C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

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218 $300

$250 Net private capital inflows

$150

$100

$50 Net private capital outflows 82 19 83 19 84 19 85 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 1 20 0 11 e 20 12 f

$0 19

Billions

$200

–$50

FIGURE 6.4 Private Capital Returns to Latin America *e= estimated; f= forecast Sources: Bank for International Settlements, Inter-American Development Bank, Institute for International Finance, and World Bank Group.

and practices of a modern industrial society, including free markets, meritocracy, pragmatism, the rule of law, an orientation toward the future, an emphasis on education, and an interest in science and technology, are more likely to succeed.11

6.2 Economic and Political Factors Underlying Country Risk We now examine in more detail some of the economic and political factors that contribute to the general level of risk in the country as a whole—termed country risk. The primary focus here is on how well the country is doing economically. As noted earlier, the better a nation’s economic performance, the lower the likelihood that its government will take actions that adversely affect the value of companies operating there. Although many of the examples used in this section involve less-developed countries (LDCs), country risk is not confined to them. The same considerations affect developed countries as well. As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, for example, Western European nations are currently confronting economic stagnation and business risk stemming from the aftermath of the 2008 credit crunch. Recovery is not helped by the fact that many countries have over-regulated economies, inflexible labor markets, and overly expansive and expensive social welfare systems. Similarly, companies operating in many countries, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, face systemic

11 For

further discussion of this point, particularly as it applies to Asian societies, see Kishore Mahbubani, “The New Asian Hemisphere”, Public Affairs (2008).

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litigation risks and arbitrary changes in employment and environmental laws. Meanwhile, Japan is stuck with a rigid and highly regulated business system that puts too much power in the hands of the state and makes it difficult to adapt to a changed environment. Moreover, until 2001, Japan had a banking system that refused to face up to a problem of almost biblical proportions—an estimated US$1.23 trillion in bad bank loans—and a government that, fearing higher unemployment and temporary economic pain if the problem were forcefully addressed, went along with this game of “let’s pretend that all is well”. The failure to put insolvent borrowers out of their misery left the Japanese economy loaded down with crippled companies too weak to do anything except pile up more bad debts. Of course, keeping ailing firms on life support protected jobs but it also fossilized industry structures, hindered the development of a more flexible labor market, restrained the growth of healthier companies, and retarded the creation of new companies, thereby harming the economy overall. The result was over a decade of recession and economic stagnation, with politicians unwilling to induce the Japanese to take the bitter medicine needed to get their economy going again. Japan’s economy began growing again following the election in 2001 of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Prime Minister Koizumi cut public spending, cleaned up the banking mess by appointing a tough new bank regulator who forced Japanese banks to write off bad loans and weakened the power of Japan’s bureaucrats. He also passed laws to privatize Japan’s huge postal savings and life insurance system (Japan Post), which had historically funneled money into bridges to nowhere and other wasteful government projects. Unfortunately, after Koizumi left office in 2006, the Japanese government began to backslide on structural reforms. In 2010, a new government scaled back plans to privatize Japan Post to keep control of the state-owned group, opening the way for it to buy more government bonds to finance Japan’s budget deficit. Recently, Japan has taken some tentative steps towards addressing its long-standing problems and, in particular, the continuing deflation that has bedeviled the economy since the bust of the 1990s. The bottom line is that no country offers a perfect business environment. Rather, countries are better or worse than average for doing business. We now examine key factors that determine the economic performance of a country and its degree of risk.

Fiscal Irresponsibility To begin, fiscal irresponsibility—excessive government spending—is one sign of a country that is likely to be risky because it will probably have an insatiable appetite for money. Thus, one country risk indicator is the government deficit as a percentage of gross domestic product. The higher this figure, the more the government is promising to its citizens relative to the resources it is extracting in payment.12 This gap lowers the possibility that the government can meet its promises without resorting to expropriations of property, raising taxes, or printing money. These actions, in turn, will adversely affect the nation’s economic health. Expropriation will cause capital flight and dry up new investment; raising taxes will adversely affect incentives to work, save, and take risks; and printing money to finance a government deficit—known as monetizing the deficit—will result in monetary instability, high inflation, high interest rates, and currency depreciation. 12

An increasingly important driver of government deficits and high taxes worldwide is state-run pension and retiree healthcare plans. Most of these plans are funded on a pay-as-you-go basis in which the payroll taxes of current workers are paid directly in benefits to current retirees; there are no savings to draw on. That leaves them vulnerable to a declining workforce and an increasing number of dependants, which is the situation in most developed nations today. And it will only get worse. As populations age and there are fewer workers to pay taxes for each person drawing pension and medical benefits, these plans will run ever-larger deficits. The political will to deal with these deficits by cutting benefits or raising taxes sharply is often lacking owing to the voting power of the elderly and the resistance of the young.

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Application

Japan as Number One in Fiscal Irresponsibility

Even apparently stable countries are not immune to fiscal irresponsibility. For example, rather than deal directly with its bank problems discussed previously, Japan attempted to kick-start its long-suffering economy by running huge budget deficits, the traditional Keynesian remedy for an economic downturn. Aside from giving

Japan the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the developed world (see Figure 6.5A), the end result was a Japanese economy mired in a seemingly endless recession—and a clear repudiation of Keynesian economics (Figure 6.5B shows that after deficit spending totaling some US$1.03 trillion from 1992 to 2001, Japan’s GDP grew

250%

Percentage of GDP

200%

150%

1992 2001 2011

100%

50%

0%

Japan

United States United Kingdom Germany

France

Italy

Canada

FIGURE 6.5A Gross Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP: 1992, 2001, and 2011

6%

6%

5.0%

4% 2%

4% 1.6%

1.5%

1.0% 0.3%

0.6%

1993

1994

1.4%

–2%

2%

0.2%

0% 1992

0.9%

1995

1996

1997

1999

1998

2000

–2.0%

0% 2001 Average –0.6% –2%

–2.5% –4% –6% –8% –10%

–4.8%

–4% –5.1% –6.4%

–5.8%

–6.9% Growth rate in real GDP Budget deficit (percentage of GDP)

–7.2% –8.5%

–6.5%

–6.1%

–8.2%

FIGURE 6.5B Japanese Economic Performance Over the Lost Decade: 1992–2001

–6% –8% –10%

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6.2 Economic and Political Factors Underlying Country Risk

an average of 0.9% annually during this period—with four recessions thrown in for good measure—in contrast to average annual growth of 4.1% during the preceding 10-year period).13 For a brief period following the election of Junichiro Koizumi, when Japan began to refocus its antirecessionary efforts away from fiscal stimulus and toward structural reforms—privatization and deregulation of its economy along with continuing to clean up its bad bank loan problem and allowing insolvent companies to go bankrupt—the Japanese economy appeared to recover from its “lost decade”. However, although Japan began growing again in 2003 and 2004, largely owing to these reforms, expanding trade with China and other Asian nations, an expansionary monetary policy by the Bank of Japan, and the start of corporate restructuring by large Japanese firms, the Japanese economy still has major structural problems and stalled once again in early 2005. From 2005 through 2011, with successor governments resistant to ongoing structural reforms, real GDP growth 13 Die-hard

Keynesians would likely argue that Japanese growth would have been even lower absent this fiscal stimulus. This hypothesis falls short since Japan ran this experiment for a second decade, 2002–2011, with the same results—a world-leading debt/GDP ratio and anemic growth. A side effect of Japan’s experience was to silence the numerous Japanologists who were urging other countries to emulate Japanese economic policies.

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averaged a minuscule 0.33% per annum. The result of this backsliding was annual growth that averaged 0.7% for the decade 2002–2011, yielding average annual growth for a full generation (1992–2011) of 0.8% (see Figure 6.5C).14 This sluggish growth, combined with ongoing deficit spending, resulted in a ratio of debt to GDP of 212% by 2011, the highest in the world. In recognition of this dubious achievement, and simultaneously emphasizing that no nation is immune from fiscal reality simply by virtue of having a large economy, in January 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Japan’s sovereign debt to AAfrom AA. Japan’s travails illustrate the point that, unlike fine wine, problems do not improve with age. Only when Japan fully embraces a competitive market system and stops trying to spend and regulate its way out of trouble will it regain its economic vitality. 14 Many

observers have pointed to Japan’s hostility toward competition in many aspects of its economic life as being a key roadblock to its recovery. In inefficient sectors such as construction and distribution, for example, losers continue to be propped up by government policy instead of being allowed to fail. Similarly, farming, healthcare, and education largely exclude private companies, thereby depriving Japan of the innovation that has driven its export-oriented industries and is hobbling its economic growth. Not surprisingly, the lack of competition in its domestic economy makes Japan one of the highest-cost nations in the world.

6%

6% 4.4%

4%

4% 2.7% 2%

1.9%

1.4%

2.0%

2.4%

2% 0.7%

0.3% 0%

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

–2%

–3.5%

–4%

–5.2%

–6% –8% –10%

2007 2008 –2.8% –1.2%

2009

2010

–8.0%

Growth rate in real GDP

0%

2011 Average –2% –0.9%

–3.3%

–4% –6.4%

–6.6% –7.9%

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–6.3% –9.3%

Budget deficit

FIGURE 6.5C Japan’s Lost Decade Turns Into a Lost Generation

–8.1%

–6% –8%

–8.8%

–10% –12%

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Monetary Instability As we saw in Chapter 4, according to modern monetary theory, inflation is the logical outcome of an expansion of the money supply in excess of real output growth. Large and unpredictable changes in the money supply lead to high and volatile inflation. Rapid expansion in the money supply is typically traceable to large government deficits that the central bank monetizes.

Mini-Case

Zimbabwe Descends into Chaos

Zimbabwe, formerly known as Rhodesia, used to be an industrial powerhouse in Africa, second only to South Africa in the region. It has roads, factories, telephones, fertile farmland, and some of the most educated people in Africa. But the country is now undergoing an industrial revolution in reverse. Its factories are grinding to a halt for want of power and spare parts; its great mineral wealth is staying underground; tourism has plummeted; and the shelves in its shops are largely bare. These tribulations can be laid at the door of President Robert Mugabe, leader of the party that liberated Zimbabwe from white rule, and his policies. To soothe disgruntled veterans of the war against white rule, he gave 50,000 of them huge bales of cash that he borrowed or printed (Zimbabwe already had a large budget deficit). To win over rural black voters, he offered them free land—not idle state-owned land, but land belonging to white commercial farmers (who tend to back the opposition party). The peasants who settled on this land did not have the skills or capital to properly farm it, so agricultural production plummeted, transforming Zimbabwe from Africa’s breadbasket into a basket case. Mugabe’s policies had their predictable results. By voiding property rights, he killed investment. By monetizing the large budget deficit (in 2000 Zimbabwe spent more than twice what it received in tax revenues), he sparked inflation (running at an annual rate of 400% in July 2003). In a vain attempt to curb this inflation, Mugabe imposed price controls on fuel and food, leading to shortages. The government also started issuing treasury bills yielding far less than the rate of inflation. Since no one would buy them voluntarily, the regime forced institutional investors to put 45% of their portfolios into government paper. The high inflation forced the Zimbabwe dollar to devalue in February 2003 from its previous official exchange rate of Z $55/US$ to Z $824/US$. Nonetheless, with a black market rate of Z $5500/US$, the Zimbabwe dollar was still greatly overvalued at its new official

exchange rate. Only the government could get U.S. dollars at the official rate, and only by forcing exporters to surrender 40% of their hard-currency earnings. Many previously honest businesspeople turned to smuggling; others went bankrupt. In response to these policies, the economy nosedived. Although it is difficult to determine with precision just how bad things had gotten because of poor-quality data, economists estimate that between 1997 and 2002, income per capita had fallen by at least 25% and possibly more than 50%. By the end of 2008, 80% of the population was unemployed, industrial output was at just 20% of capacity, inflation was estimated at 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion percent (65 followed by 107 zeros), and at least three million Zimbabweans (out of a population of about 12.3 million) had fled to South Africa and other neighboring countries. The regime was forced to print banknotes of ever-higher values to keep up with surging inflation, culminating with the 100-trillion-Zimbabwe dollar note (now a collector’s item on eBay) in early 2009. The use of foreign currencies was legalized in January 2009. In April 2009, with the economy effectively dollarized (U.S.), Zimbabwe abandoned its official currency. Questions 1. What are key elements of country risk in Zimbabwe? 2. How has increased country risk affected Zimbabwe’s economy and living standards? 3. By how much is the Zimbabwe dollar at its official rate overvalued relative to its black market rate? 4. What caused the Zimbabwe dollar to be so overvalued? What effect does an overvalued official rate have on businesses and consumers in Zimbabwe? 5. According to the Wall Street Journal (February 19, 2008, A10), “Mr. Mugabe has blamed his country’s economic crisis on Western saboteurs hoping to return the country to white rule.” Comment on this statement.

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Controlled Exchange Rate System The economic problems presented by a fiscally and monetarily irresponsible government are compounded by having a controlled exchange rate system, whereby currency controls are used to fix the exchange rate. A controlled rate system goes hand in hand with an overvalued local currency, which is the equivalent of taxing exports and subsidizing imports. The risk of tighter currency controls and the ever-present threat of devaluation encourages capital flight. Similarly, multinational firms will try to repatriate their local affiliates’ profits rather than reinvest them. A controlled rate system also leaves the economy with little flexibility to respond to changing relative prices and wealth positions, exacerbating any unfavorable trend in the nation’s terms of trade, the weighted average of the nation’s export prices relative to its import prices—that is, the exchange rate between exports and imports.

Wasteful Government Spending Another indicator of potential increased country risk is the amount of unproductive spending in the economy. To the extent that capital from abroad is used to subsidize consumption or is wasted on showcase projects, the government will have less wealth to draw on to repay the nation’s foreign debts and is more likely to resort to exchange controls, higher taxes, and the like. In addition, funds diverted to the purchase of assets abroad (capital flight) will not add to the economy’s foreign currency generating capacity unless investors feel safe in repatriating their overseas earnings.

Resource Base The resource base of a country consists of its natural, human, and financial resources. Other things being equal, a nation with substantial natural resources, such as oil or copper, is a better economic risk than one without those resources. However, typically, all is not equal. Hence, nations such as South Korea and Taiwan turn out to be better risks than resource-rich Argentina and Kazakhstan. The reason has to do with the quality of human resources and the degree to which these resources are allowed to be put to their most efficient use. A nation with highly skilled and productive workers, a large pool of scientists and engineers, and ample management talent will have many of the essential ingredients needed to pursue a course of steady growth and development. Three additional factors are necessary: (1) a stable political system that encourages hard work and risk taking by allowing entrepreneurs to reap the rewards (and bear the losses) from their activities, (2) a flexible labor market that permits workers to be allocated to those jobs in which they will be the most productive, and (3) a free-market system that ensures that the prices people respond to correctly signal the relative desirability of engaging in different activities. In this way, the nation’s human and natural resources will be put to their most efficient uses. The evidence by now is overwhelming that free markets bring wealth and that endless state meddling brings waste. The reason is simple: unlike a government-controlled economy, free markets do not tolerate and perpetuate mistakes. At the same time, free markets help unleash the human ingenuity and passion that are often stifled by government regulations. It is unimaginable that a government bureaucracy could have conceived of, much less created, the iPod, iPad, iPhone, or iTunes store. Instead, it took a driven entrepreneur like Steve Jobs to first imagine and then develop and market these products and services. The example of Steve Jobs and Apple points to a critical source of prosperity: breakthroughs that create products and services for which there is no current demand. Think of some of the fruits of entrepreneurial activity: trains, cars, light bulbs, jet planes, electric generators, televisions, telephones, and computers—all products that did not exist when the Industrial Revolution started and yet have contributed immeasurably to economic growth and the prosperity that people around the world enjoy today. Although there is scant evidence of politicians successfully promoting entrepreneurial activity through public

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investments, government can help create an environment in which innovation can flourish in several ways: fund basic research, establish clear laws and property rights, reduce regulatory burdens on start-ups, improve immigration policies (to attract and keep foreign-born scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs), build infrastructure, and keep capital gains tax rates low. Conversely, it is not logical to praise the contributions of an entrepreneur such as Steve Jobs while favoring policies—high tax rates on capital and capitalists, stringent regulations on doing business, and the redistribution of wealth—that reduce incentives for entrepreneurs and investors. Perhaps the best commentary on what it takes to nurture the entrepreneurial genius that produces great technology came from the many Chinese, who in the days after the death of Steve Jobs in October 2011, raised the question: why isn’t there a Steve Jobs in China? Their tweeted responses point to the obstacles that China faces.15 One person tweeted, “In a society with an authoritarian political system, monopolistic business environment, backward-looking culture and prevalent technology theft, talking about a master of technology? Not a chance!” Another tweet said, “If Apple is a fruit on a tree, its branches are the freedom to think and create, and its root is constitutional democracy.” To which another Chinese added, “And its trunk is a society whose legal system acknowledges the value of intellectual property.”

Country Risk and Adjustment to External Shocks Recent history shows that the impact of external shocks is likely to vary from nation to nation; some countries deal successfully with these shocks, and others succumb to them. The evidence suggests that domestic policies play a critical role in determining how effectively a particular nation will deal with external shocks. Asian nations, for example, successfully coped with falling commodity prices, rising interest rates, and rising exchange rates during the 1980s because their policies promoted timely internal and external adjustment, as is manifest in relatively low inflation rates and small current-account deficits. The opposite happened in Latin America, where most countries accepted the then-prevalent ideology that growth is best promoted by an import-substitution development strategy characterized by extensive state ownership, controls, and policies to encourage local substitution of imports. Many of these countries took over failing private businesses, nationalized the banks, protected domestic companies against imports, ran up large foreign debts, and heavily regulated the private sector. Whereas the “East Asian Tigers”—Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—tested their ability to imitate and innovate in the international marketplace, Latin American producers were content with the exploitation of the internal market, charging prices that were typically several times the international price for their goods. The lack of foreign competition has contributed to long-term inefficiency among Latin American manufacturers. In addition, by raising the cost of imported materials and products used by the export sector, the Latin American import-substitution development strategies worsened its international competitive position, leaving the share of exports in GDP far below that of other less developed countries. Moreover, state expenditures on massive capital projects diverted resources from the private sector and exports. Much of the investment went to inefficient state enterprises, leading to wasted resources and large debts. The decline in commodity prices and the simultaneous rise in real interest rates in the early 1980s should have led to reduced domestic consumption. However, fearing that spending cuts would threaten social stability, Latin American governments delayed cutting back on projects and social expenditures. The difference between consumption and production was made up by borrowing overseas, thereby enabling their societies to temporarily enjoy artificially high standards of living. 15

These tweets are quoted in “China Frets: Innovators Stymied Here”, Wall Street Journal (October 8–9, 2011): B3.

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Latin American governments also tried to stimulate their economies by increasing state spending, fueled by high rates of monetary expansion. This response exacerbated their difficulties because the resulting high rates of inflation combined with their fixed exchange rates to boost real exchange rates substantially and resulted in higher imports and lower exports. Moreover, the overvalued exchange rates, interest rate controls, and political uncertainties triggered massive capital flight from the region—estimated at up to US$100 billion during the two-year period of 1981 and 1982. The result was larger balance-of-payments deficits that necessitated more foreign borrowing and higher debt-service requirements. Moreover, in an attempt to control inflation, the Latin American governments imposed price controls and interest rate controls. These controls led to further capital flight and price rigidity. Distorted prices gave the wrong signals to the residents, sending consumption soaring and production plummeting.

Market-Oriented Versus Statist Policies The great economic lesson of the ill-fated, post-World War II experiment in communism is that markets work and command economies do not. The truly extraordinary difference in the economic results of these two systems—contrast the disparate experiences of East Germany and West Germany; North Korea and South Korea; and Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China under Mao—stems directly from their diametrically opposite means of organizing economic activity. In a market economy—also known as capitalism—economic decisions are made by individual decision makers based on prices of goods, services, capital, labor, land, and other resources. In a command economy—often termed socialism—people at the top decide what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, and where it is to be produced, and then command others to follow the central plan. Why Capitalism Works. The core distinction between a market economy and a command economy, and the one that accounts for the huge disparity in their performances, is the different ways in which they harness information and incentives. Given that resources are scarce, economic decisions—such as what to produce, how and how much to produce, where to produce, and how, where, and to whom to distribute this production—involve a series of tradeoffs. In order to make these tradeoffs successfully, command economies demand that all the fragments of knowledge existing in different minds be brought together in the mind of the central planner, an impossible informational requirement. Markets work because economic decisions are made by those who have the information necessary to determine the tradeoffs that must be made and the suitability of those tradeoffs, given their own unique skills, circumstances, and preferences combined with market prices that signal the relative values and costs placed on those activities by society. Of equal importance, in a market economy, people have the incentives to efficiently act on that information. Ultimately, capitalism is about economic freedom. The key ingredients of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange—both domestically and internationally—of goods and currencies, freedom to enter and compete in markets, and security of private property. With these basic elements in place, which enable people to work, produce, and invest with confidence, countries and their citizens prosper; absent them, they do poorly. Figures 6.6A and 6.6B document the correlation between income and economic freedom, and economic growth and economic freedom, respectively, where economic freedom is measured by a widely used index produced by The Heritage Foundation. Moreover, Richard Roll has shown empirically that these correlations imply a causal relationship as well: more economic freedom means higher incomes.16 Clearly, the payoff to economic freedom is enormous. And this payoff increases over time. Thus, unless obstacles to economic freedom are removed, the nations in the lower income quartiles will be unable to catch up to those in the highest quartile. 16 Richard

Roll, “Economic and Political Freedom: The Keys to Development”, in Mark A. Miles, ed., The Road to Prosperity (Westminster, Md.: Heritage Books, 2004).

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COUNTRY RISK GDP per Capita (Purchasing Power Parity)

226 $50,000

$44,488

40,000

$35,228

30,000 20,000

$15,822

10,000 0

Free

Mostly Free

Moderately Free

$5,475

$5,462

Mostly Unfree

Repressed

Freedom Category in the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom

FIGURE 6.6A Economic Freedom and GDP per Capita

GDP per Capita (Purchasing Power Parity)

Source: Terry Miller, Kim R. Holmes, Edwin J. Feulner, with Anthony B. Kim, Bryan Riley, and James M. Roberts, 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C., p. 11–12. $50,000 $43,140

$41,577

40,000 $35,848

$35,403

30,000

20,000 $13,723 10,000 $5,357 0

Asia-Pacific

$8,948

$7,732

Middle-East/ North Africa

Europe

Fire Freest Countries

Americas

$7,459

$5,093

Sub-Saharan Africa

Five Least Free Countries

FIGURE 6.6B Economic Freedom and Prosperity Source: Terry Miller, Kim R. Holmes, Edwin J. Feulner, with Anthony B. Kim, Bryan Riley, and James M. Roberts, 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C., p. 11–12.

Statist Policies Constrain Growth. Most countries today have a mixture of market and command economies. Pure command economies are rare nowadays—only Cuba and North Korea remain—and markets tend to predominate in the production and distribution of goods and services around the world. However, many nations follow statist policies in which markets are combined with heavy government intervention in their economies through various regulations and tax and spending policies. In addition, so-called critical industries, such as air transportation, mining, telecommunications, aerospace, oil, and power generation are typically owned or controlled by the state. As a result, economic power is often heavily centralized in the state, usually with harmful consequences for wealth creation.

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India Reforms and Reaps the Benefits

For centuries, India’s vibrant entrepreneurial culture has been evident throughout Asia and Africa, as Indian merchants tended to dominate local business. More recently, during the period 1995–2005, Indian entrepreneurs founded 15.5% of the engineering and technology firms in Silicon Valley. But for nearly 45 years after its independence in 1947, stifled by restrictive economic policies amid a futile flirtation with socialism, India suffered the “Hindu rate of growth”, a derogatory expression used to refer to its low annual GDP growth rate. Rather than unleashing the entrepreneurial spirits of its people, the government sought to close the Indian economy to the outside world. Its currency, the rupee, was nonconvertible and high tariffs and import licensing prevented foreign goods reaching the market. India also operated the infamous “license raj”, an almost unimaginably elaborate system of licenses, regulations, and accompanying red tape that were required to set up, invest in, and run businesses in India between 1947 and 1990. The labyrinthine bureaucracy often led to absurd restrictions—up to 80 agencies had to be satisfied before a firm could be granted a license to produce—and the state would decide what was produced, how much, at what price, and what sources of capital were used. The government also prevented firms from laying off workers or closing factories. The central pillar of the policy was import substitution—replacing imports with local production—and thereby relying on internal markets for development, not international trade. Planning and the state, rather than markets, would determine how much investment was needed in which sectors. Not surprisingly, the energies of investors were directed toward winning licenses, rather than capturing markets or producing superior goods, and profits tended to be guaranteed irrespective of quality or efficiency. External regulation, major controls on foreign direct investment, and a high tariff wall then protected companies from foreign competition. Restrictions on consumer goods were the tightest, thanks to the belief that precious foreign exchange should not be wasted on consumer goods. In addition to its low rate of growth, this environment provided an ideal Petri dish for the cultivation of corruption, as businesses bribed officials to get licenses or keep them from potential competitors. A bloated public sector also developed that recorded huge losses, but that could not be shut down. Between

1986 and 1991, state-owned enterprises made 39% of gross investment, but generated only 14% of GDP. Monopolies and controls also prevented the much-needed development of the country’s infrastructure—power cuts remain a serious problem for many parts of India. In 1991, in response to a financial crisis, India abandoned its Soviet-style, centrally planned economy model, embraced capitalism, opened its doors to foreign goods and foreign investment, and jump-started economic growth. From this point on, India boomed, with GDP growth of 8% or more since 2003, from 1% in 1991. In recent years growth decelerated somewhat with 2013 only achieving 5%; it touched 9.3% in 2010–11 and there are calls for further reforms to help rekindle growth. India’s success in raising its growth rate stemmed from deregulating and freeing up industries once dominated by the state, such as airlines and telecommunications, which are now are led by private-sector companies. And India’s outsourcing industry is admired worldwide for its expertise and low cost. The boom has created enormous wealth for the business elite and improved the lives of hundreds of millions of people. However, serious impediments to economic development remain. Despite a start at economic liberalization, the government still exerts tight control over large areas of the Indian economy. Regulators still try to pick winners and losers in different industries, regressive labor laws make it difficult to hire and fire workers, a budget-busting make-work scheme distorts labor markets and breeds corruption, the government still pours cash into bloated state-owned firms, such as Air India, political meddling has caused infrastructure in cities and rural areas to remain woefully inadequate, and bureaucratic delays and arbitrary regulations continue to thwart entrepreneurs. Moreover, the problem of bribes and kickbacks for public officials persists and has caused a recent wave of scandals at the very top of the political system. For example, the government was deprived of billions of U.S. dollars in potential revenue from a flawed and allegedly corrupt allocation of mobile-telephone spectrum in 2008. To realize more of its potential, India must increase accountability of its public officials, further shrink the state’s regulatory hold over the economy, actively pursue privatization, improve its legal system, and strengthen property rights. If it does not, the lower growth experienced in 2013 will become the norm.

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The centralization of economic power in much of the Third World turned the state into a huge patronage machine and spawned a swollen and corrupt bureaucracy to administer the all-encompassing rules and regulations. Avaricious elites, accountable to no one, used the labyrinthine controls and regulations to enrich themselves and further the interests of their own ethnic group or professional class at the expense of national economic health and well-being. Such statist policies come at the expense of economic freedom, thereby leading to slower economic growth. Moreover, as shown in Figures 6.6A and 6.6B, the more pervasive these statist policies, the worse the economic outcome for both today and the future.

Application

The China Express Derails

On July 24, 2011, during a lightning storm, two bullet trains collided in eastern China, killing 40 people and injuring 172 in one of the world’s worst high-speed train accidents. This tragedy on a high-speed rail line transformed what was meant to be a symbol of Beijing’s pride into an emblem of incompetence and imperious governance, dented China’s industrial ambitions, and raised questions about the Chinese model of economic development: a combination of authoritarian rule, state-directed investment, and limited capitalism. As evidence emerged that the high-speed rail project—and China’s railway system more broadly—were riddled with corruption, the train wreck focused attention on the corruption and corner-cutting behind the country’s breakneck economic growth. The accident, and the government’s bungled handling of the aftermath (evasion combined with an attempted cover-up of evidence), triggered national outrage fueled by an online media storm, and highlighted the weaknesses of China’s current leadership, whose rampant corruption and reflexive secrecy could undermine its rule in the long term. Especially troubling for the country’s ruling Communists were the serious questions that the train wreck raised, not only about the causes of the pile-up and the flaws in the government’s response to it but about whether the whole disaster was produced by a style of governance that recklessly pursues rapid economic growth above all else. The train wreck had a disproportionate impact on public opinion because it fed already intensifying cynicism among many Chinese about corruption and regulatory problems that had triggered a series of scandals in the past several years, from poisoned

baby formula to bridge collapses to embezzlement and other abuses of power by officials and their families. The tragedy also highlighted a paradox at the heart of Communist Party rule. To survive, the Party needs high-speed growth that creates jobs and keeps social tensions in check. But rapid growth has spawned regime-threatening risks—deadly accidents, many of them preventable, and an upsurge of scandals in areas like food safety and illegal land seizures. As critics have stressed, a modern economy demands transparency and accountability, two elements conspicuously absent in this tragedy. Whatever the details, the accident was seen, even by officials, as an indictment of breakneck growth. “China wants development, but it doesn’t want blood-smeared GDP,” said a front-page commentary in the People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s official mouthpiece. Development “should not come at a reckless price, nor be practiced by a handful of people as if it overrides everything,” it said. China’s leaders have talked for years about the need to emphasize the quality of growth rather than simply its speed. They have stressed the importance of narrowing a widening wealth gap and curbing widespread environmental degradation. Yet even as they have said those words, the government has poured money into massive public works projects, often built on land taken from farmers by force or with insufficient compensation. The train disaster and other scandals have eroded faith in the central government, presenting an ominous omen for China’s leadership and a caution for those enamored of the Chinese model of economic development.

Why Statist Policies Persist. Many of these countries are finally rejecting their earlier statist policies and trying to stimulate the private sector and individual initiative. The experience in countries that are reforming their economies—including the former Soviet Union, China, and India, as well as much of Latin America—illustrates that it is far easier to regulate and extend the state’s reach

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than to deregulate and retrench. When the state becomes heavily involved in the economy, many special interests from the state bureaucracy, business, labor, and consumer groups come to rely on state benefits. Of course, they actively oppose reforms that curtail their subsidies. The process of reform is greatly complicated by egalitarian ideologies that deprecate private success while justifying public privilege and by the pervasiveness of the state, which distorts the reward pattern and makes it easier to get rich by politics rather than by industry, by connections rather than by performance. These ideologies tend to take investment and the provision of productive capacity for granted (they like capital but dislike capitalists), while being generally more concerned with redistributing the benefits and mitigating the costs of economic progress than with protecting its foundations. The message is clear. In evaluating a nation’s riskiness, it is not sufficient to identify factors—such as real interest shocks or world recession—that would systematically affect the economies of all foreign countries to one extent or another. It is necessary also to determine the susceptibility of the various nations to these shocks. This determination requires a focus on the financial policies and development strategies pursued by the different nations.

Application

Lack of Growth in Hungary

In March 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its annual economic “check-up” argued that Hungary needed “a different mix of policies to jump start growth and increase employment”.17 The country had slipped into its second recession in four years and the economy had contracted by 1.7% in 2012. The IMF staffers found that while the government had acted to ameliorate the 17 International

Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/car032913a.htm).

impact of the global crisis on households, the state had also increased its interference in the economy through frequent and unpredictable policy changes. The consequence was that investment in the country had fallen to a 10-year low. The IMF argued that the government needed to put in place a more business-friendly set of policies to grow the economy. It also stated that the high level of government debt—at 80% of GDP, left the country vulnerable to changes in market conditions.

Key Indicators of Country Risk and Economic Health Based on the preceding discussion, the following are some of the common characteristics of high country risk: • A large government deficit relative to GDP • A high rate of money expansion, especially if it is combined with a relatively fixed exchange rate • Substantial government expenditures yielding low rates of return • Price controls, interest rate ceilings, trade restrictions, rigid labor laws, and other government-imposed barriers to the smooth adjustment of the economy to changing relative prices • High tax rates that destroy incentives to work, save, and invest • Vast state-owned firms run for the benefit of their managers and workers • A citizenry that demands, and a political system that accepts, government responsibility for maintaining and expanding the nation’s standard of living through public sector spending and regulations (the less stable the political system, the more important this factor will likely be)

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• Pervasive corruption that acts as a large tax on legitimate business activity, holds back development, discourages foreign investment, breeds distrust of capitalism, and weakens the basic fabric of society • The absence of basic institutions of government—a well-functioning legal system, reliable regulation of financial markets and institutions, and an honest civil service. Alternatively, positive indicators of a nation’s long-run economic health include the following: • A structure of incentives that rewards risk-taking in productive ventures: People have clearly demonstrated that they respond rationally to the incentives they face, given the information and resources available to them. This statement is true whether we are talking about shopkeepers in Nairobi, viticulturists in Nájera, or bankers in London. A necessary precondition for productive investment to take place is secure legal rights to own and sell at least some forms of property. If property is not secure, people have an incentive to consume their resources immediately or transfer them overseas, lest they be taken away. Low taxes are also important because they encourage productive efforts and promote savings and investment. Not surprisingly, permanent reductions in marginal tax rates have historically been associated with higher long-run growth. • A legal structure that stimulates the development of free markets: Wealth creation is made easier by stable rules governing society and fair and predictable application of laws administered by an independent judicial system free of corruption. Such a legal structure, which replaces official whim with the rule of law, combined with a system of property rights and properly enforceable contracts, facilitates the development of free markets. The resulting market price signals are most likely to contain the data and provide the incentives that are essential to making efficient use of the nation’s resources. Free markets, however, do more than increase economic efficiency. By quickly rewarding success and penalizing failure, they also encourage successful innovation and economic growth. Conversely, the lack of a rule of law and a well-defined commercial code, as in Russia, and the persistence of corruption, as in most emerging markets in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and parts of the former Soviet Union, hampers the development of a market economy by making it difficult to enforce contracts and forcing businesses to pay protection money to thugs, bureaucrats, or politicians. • Minimal regulations and economic distortions: Complex regulations are costly to implement and waste management time and other resources. Moreover, reduced government intervention in the economy lowers the incidence of corruption. After all, why bribe civil servants if their ability to grant economic favors is minimal? Instead, the way to succeed in an unregulated economy is to provide superior goods and services to the market. • Clear incentives to save and invest: In general, when there are such incentives—that is, the economic rules of the game are straightforward and stable, property rights are secure, taxes on investment returns are low, and there is political stability—a nation’s chances of developing are maximized. • An open economy: Free trade not only increases competition and permits the realization of comparative advantage, it also constrains government policies and makes them conform more closely to those policies conducive to increases in living standards and rapid economic growth. An open economy strengthens the rule of law as well because it must compete for investment capital by demonstrating that it protects property rights. • Stable macroeconomic policies: Macroeconomic stability, largely promoted by a stable monetary policy, reduces economic risk and leads to lower inflation and lower real interest rates. The

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resulting increase in the willingness of people to save and entrepreneurs to invest in the domestic economy stimulates economic growth. The sorry economic state of Eastern Europe under communism dramatically illustrates the consequences of pursuing policies that are the exact opposite of those recommended. Thus, the ability of the Eastern European countries to share in the prosperity of the Western world turned on their willingness to reverse the policies they followed under communist rule. Similarly, investors assessing the prospects for Western nations would also do well to recognize the benefits of markets and incentives. Government economic intervention in the form of subsidies and regulations is appealing to many, but governments make poor venture capitalists and for a simple reason: industries not yet born do not have lobbyists, whereas old and established ones have lots of them. The net result is that the bulk of subsidies go to those industries resisting change, a system that virtually guarantees that fresh capital goes to the losers of yesteryear rather than the winners of tomorrow. For example, Germany spends more on subsidies for powerful smokestack industries such as shipbuilding and coal mining than to support basic research. Until 1998, it also sheltered the state-owned telecommunications monopoly, Deutsche Telekom, and its suppliers, such as Siemens, from most foreign competition;18 government sheltering in turn dampens innovation across a range of industries. When government does invest in high-tech industries, it usually botches the job. Examples are legion, including the tens of billions spent to develop European software, semiconductor, computer, and aerospace industries. For instance, in 2013 the European Commission announced a €25 billion plan to try and reverse the decline of the EU’s share of global electronic components and systems.

Application

The 1948 West German Erhard Reforms

At the end of World War II, the German economy lay in ruins. Industrial output in 1948 was one-third its 1936 level because of a massive disruption in production and trade patterns. Aside from the devastation caused by the war, economic disruption was aggravated by wartime money creation, price controls, and uncertainty about economic policy. Each day vast, hungry crowds traveled to the countryside to barter food from farmers; an extensive black market developed; and cigarettes replaced currency in many transactions. In June 1948, Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s economic czar, announced an extensive reform package. This package created a new currency, the Deutschmark (DM), and dismantled most price controls and rationing ordinances. It also implemented a restrictive monetary policy, lowered tax rates, and provided incentives for investment. Erhard’s reforms almost immediately established sound and stable macroeconomic conditions and led to the

18 The

German “economic miracle”. Consumer prices initially rose by 20%, but inflation then subsided to an average annual rate of about 1% between 1949 and 1959. Goods that had been hoarded or sold only in the black market flooded the market. Industrial production increased 40% in the second half of 1948 and then tripled over the next 10 years. Real GDP and productivity also grew rapidly. Although unemployment rose from 3% in the first half of 1948 to more than 10% in the first half of 1950, it then disappeared over the next eight years. In 1958, the DM became convertible. Economic reform could not have produced such dramatic results if West Germany had not had key structural elements already in place. It had the legal framework necessary for a market economy, many intact businesses, and skilled workers and managers. Marshall Plan money helped, but without the reforms, any aid would have been wasted.

German telecommunications industry was deregulated in 1998. However, Deutsche Telekom is still majority-owned by the German government.

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Market-Oriented Policies Work. As the West German example illustrates, realism demands that nations—especially those in the Third World and Eastern Europe—come to terms with their need to rely more on self-help. The most successful economies, such as the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, demonstrate the importance of aligning domestic incentives with world market conditions. As a result of their market-oriented policies, Asian nations have had remarkable economic success since the early 1960s as reflected in their strong economic growth and rising standards of living. Their problems in the 1990s just reinforce the importance of such policies: when Asian nations substituted the visible hand of state intervention for the invisible hand of the market in allocating capital, they helped create the financial crisis that rocked Asia in 1997. The evidence indicates that the more distorted the prior economic policies, the more severe the crisis, with Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia being hit much harder than Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Like it or not, nations must make their way in an increasingly competitive world economy that puts a premium on self-help and has little time for the inefficiency and pretension of statism—that is, the substitution of state-owned or state-guided enterprises for the private sector—as the road to economic success. Statism destroys initiative and leads to economic stagnation. Free enterprise is the road to prosperity. This recognition—that countries cannot realize the benefits of capitalism without the institutions of capitalism—is dawning in even the most socialist countries of Europe, Asia, and Latin America. For example, in 1989, Vietnamese families were given the right to work their own land and sell their output at market prices. Within a year, rice production rose so dramatically that Vietnam went from the edge of famine to being the world’s third-largest rice exporter. Market-oriented reform of Eastern European and less developed countries’ economic policies lies at the heart of any credible undertaking to secure these nations’ economic and financial rehabilitation. The first and most critical step is to cut government spending. In practical terms, cutting government spending means reducing the bloated public sectors that permeate most emerging market countries. Market-Oriented Reform in Latin America. Reform of the public sector probably went the furthest in Latin America, where, shocked by the severe miseries of the 1980s (known in Latin America as the Lost Decade), many of these countries abandoned the statism, populism, and protectionism that had crippled their economies since colonial times. Chile and Colombia have embarked on fairly comprehensive reform programs, emphasizing free markets and sound money, and, despite some backsliding and significant problems with corruption, Mexico has made surprisingly good headway (see Figure 6.7 for a summary of the changes in Mexico’s economic policies). We saw in Chapter 2 that Argentina also undertook radical reform of its economy, highlighted by privatizing—returning

Old Mexican Model

New Mexican Model

Large budget deficits Rapid expansion of money supply Nationalization Restricted foreign direct investment High tax rates Import substitution Controlled currency Price and interest rate controls Government-dominated economy

Fiscal restraint Monetary discipline Privatizations Attraction of foreign direct investment Tax reform Trade liberalization End of currency controls Prices and interest rates set by market Reduced size and scope of government

FIGURE 6.7 Mexico’s Economic Policies: Then and Now

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to the private sector from the public sector—major activities and galvanizing the private sector by deregulation and the elimination of protectionism. Unfortunately, Latin America’s reforms of the 1990s were limited in their intent and scope and so failed to bring the promised hope and opportunity. Instead, “Countries replaced inflation with new taxes on the poor, high tariffs with regional trading blocs, and, especially, state monopolies with government-sanctioned private monopolies. Moreover,

Application

The Potential Gains from Privatization

A study by the McKinsey Global Institute points to the potential gains from privatization.19 Government-owned entities in India have about 43% of the country’s capital stock and account for about 15% of nonagricultural employment. However, according to Figure 6.8, the labor (capital) productivity of public sector entities relative to that of their private sector competitors varies 19 Amadeo M. Di Lodovico, William W. Lewis, Vincent Palmade,

and Shirish Sankhe, “India–From Emerging to Surging”, The McKinsey Quarterly, 4 (2001): 1–5.

Telecoms

Retail banking

from 11% for labor (20% for capital) to 50% (88%) and averages just 26% (63%). Two factors largely account for these stark differences: (1) public sector companies experience little pressure to perform better and (2) the government subsidies they receive mean they can survive despite their extraordinary inefficiency. Privatizing these government entities would boost productivity, save on subsidies, and give their customers better products and services at lower prices.

Not available 18%

Power transmission and distribution

20% 17%

81%

Power generation

Dairy processing

88%

33%

50%

Not available 11%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Labor and capital productivity of Indian public sector companies relative to that of private sector companies Relative labor productivity

Relative capital productivity

FIGURE 6.8 Indian Government Ownership Hurts Productivity Source: Based on data appearing in Amadeo M. Di Lodovico, William W. Lewis, Vincent Palmade, and Shirish Sankhe, “ India—From Emerging to Surging”, The McKinsey Quarterly, 4, 2001, pp. 1−5.

100%

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the courts were subjected to the whims of those in power, widening the divide between official institutions and ordinary people.”20 The resulting disappointment in free-market reform brought leftist governments to power in several countries, including Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia, with predictable results for those who pursued statist policies. After dismantling their government-favored monopolies, the next big challenge for those countries that are trying to move forward is to revamp the entire civil service, including police, regulatory agencies, judiciaries, and all the other institutions necessary for the smooth functioning of a market economy. Most important, they must end the legal favoritism so prevalent in the region’s judicial systems. Obstacles to Economic Reform. Even in the best of circumstances, structural reform meets formidable political obstacles: labor unions facing job and benefit losses, bureaucrats fearful of diminished power and influence (not to mention their jobs), and local industrialists concerned about increased competition and reduced profitability. All are well aware that the benefits of restructuring are diffuse and materialize only gradually, while they must bear the costs immediately. Many are also trapped by a culture that sanctifies the state and distrusts the market’s ability to bring about fair or wise results. This distrust reflects an ideology that equates inequality with inequity and is unwilling to accept the fact that the prospect of large rewards for some is the fuel that drives the economic engine of growth. Despite these obstacles, reducing state subsidies on consumer goods and to inefficient industries, privatizing bloated state enterprises to boost productivity and force customer responsiveness, removing trade barriers and price controls, and freeing interest rates and the exchange rate to move to market levels are probably the most straightforward and workable solutions to economic stagnation. These actions, if implemented, can increase output (by making the economy more efficient) and reduce consumption, therefore increasing the quantity of goods available for export. They will also discourage capital flight and stimulate domestic savings and investment.

Application

Strategies for Eastern European Economic Success

Eastern Europe has the basic ingredients for successful development: an educated workforce, low wages, and proximity to large markets. However, the key to creating a dynamic market economy is to mobilize the energies and savings of the populace on the broadest possible scale; without this support, any reform package is doomed to failure. Unfortunately, under communism, people had no incentive to take risks and thus took no initiative. State-owned firms were focused on the bureaucrats who gave them orders rather than the customers who bought from them, toward output rather than profit, and toward the social welfare of their employees rather than efficiency. Market signals became even more muffled because the state banking system continued to finance loss makers, no matter how hopeless, so that jobs were not jeopardized. The result was no innovation, an insatiable

20

demand for investment capital, no concern with profitability, no consumer orientation, and low-quality merchandise. Since the fall of communism, however, Eastern Europe has largely pursued a policy of economic liberalization and today is well on its way to economic success. Here is a thumbnail sketch of the lessons learned from Eastern Europe’s experience as to what economic success requires.

• Prerequisites: Privatization of bloated state enterprises to force efficiency and customer responsiveness;21 21 For

a discussion of privatization programs around the world and their performance, see William L. Megginson, Robert C. Nash, and Matthias van Randenborgh, “The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis”, working paper, University of Georgia, April 1993.

Alvaro Vargas Llosa, “The Return of Latin America’s Left”, New York Times (March 22, 2005), http://www.independent .org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1483.

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market prices to signal relative scarcity and opportunity cost; private property to provide incentives; and a complete revamping of the legal, financial, and administrative institutions that govern economic activity to permit enforceable contracts and property rights. The creation of these capitalist institutions is critical, for without them changes made today could easily be reversed tomorrow. These legal institutions would also go a long way to reducing the corruption that is rampant in these societies. • Economic reforms: Decontrolling prices; eliminating subsidies and restrictions on international trade; creating strong, convertible currencies so that people can receive something for their efforts; permitting bankruptcy so that assets and people can be redeployed; doing away with regulations of small businesses; introducing a free capital market; and demonopolizing state enterprises through privatization to introduce competition and boost productivity. Privatization and deregulation should also improve the economic infrastructure. Under socialism, Eastern Europe was plagued by dilapidated state-owned transport, power, and telecommunications systems. These are not mere details. Completing such tasks will embroil a nation in all the wrangles about wealth distribution and the size and role of the state that Western countries have spent generations trying to resolve. And there was another complicating factor for Eastern Europe. For persons born since 1945, the habits that constitute the tradition of private property, markets, and creativity had been blotted out. Two generations in Eastern Europe had never experienced private property, free contracts, markets, or inventive enterprise; the skills were gone. Fortunately, the experience of Eastern Europe suggests that these skills and habits can be resurrected, albeit not without fits and starts. Given the prerequisites and reforms outlined earlier, here are four strategies that, where tried, improved the odds of economic success. 1. Deregulating agriculture (especially farmers’ access to markets, ownership of land, and decontrol of prices) helps to quickly ease food shortages and contain food

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price increases as subsidies are eliminated. Communal ownership of land stifles initiative. Raising efficiency in agriculture is critical to successful development. Vietnam provides a good example of the potential gains from freeing up farmers. 2. Privatizing small businesses, on the broadest possible scale, is desperately needed in order to create new job opportunities for workers displaced by the inevitable restructuring of heavy industry. Small businesses have the greatest potential for harnessing individual initiative and creating new jobs quickly and are an indispensable part of the infrastructure of any dynamic market economy. Any owner is better than the state, so getting the job done is more important than how it is done. 3. Manufacturing low-technology goods plays a key role in increasing skill levels and in disseminating technology throughout the economy. The comparative advantage of a transitioning economy typically lies in low-technology manufactured goods. Such an economy cannot be expected immediately to produce cars, computers, and consumer electronics of sufficient quality to compete with the advanced market economies; moving up the ladder to more sophisticated products takes considerable time and lots of inward investment and expertise. 4. Direct investment in local production is a preferred strategy because none of the countries in the region can afford a huge influx of imports. Foreign companies should target relatively cheap, everyday products of less-than-premium quality. Living standards in transitioning economies, such as those of China, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, are too low to warrant mass purchases of anything but the most basic foreign goods. Perhaps a fifth strategy is speed. The lesson of reform so far is that fortune favors the brave. Those countries that opted for shock therapy—Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have had the smallest overall output declines and the fastest subsequent growth. In contrast, the gradualist countries—Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania—had delayed economic recovery and increased social costs. In the end, these countries spared their citizens none of the hardships that gradualism was supposed to avoid.

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The simple truth is that a nation’s success is not a function of the way its government harnesses resources, manages workers, or distributes wealth. Rather, economic success depends on the ability and willingness of a nation’s people to work hard and take risks in the hopes of a better life. From this perspective, the state’s best strategy is to provide basic stability—and little else—thereby permitting the humble to rise and the great to fall.

6.3 Country Risk Analysis in International Lending This section explores country risk from a creditor’s standpoint, the possibility that borrowers in a country will be unable or unwilling to service or repay their debts to foreign lenders in a timely manner. Countries that default will lose access, at least temporarily, to the international financial markets. For many borrowers, this penalty is severe enough that they do not voluntarily default on their loans. Thus, countries will sometimes go to extraordinary lengths to continue servicing their debts. Creditor country risk analysis, therefore, typically focuses largely on ability to repay rather than willingness to repay. Consequently, risk analysis for sovereign debts usually begins with an assessment of factors that affect the likelihood that a country, such as Greece, Argentina, or Mexico, will be able to generate sufficient foreign currency to repay foreign debts as these debts come due. These factors are both economic and political and are very similar to those we already examined in analyzing country risk from an international business perspective. Among economic factors often pointed to are the country’s resource base and its external financial position. Most important, however, are the quality and effectiveness of a country’s economic and financial management policies. The evidence from those countries that have defaulted on their international debts is that all too often the underlying causes of country risk are homegrown, with massive corruption, bloated bureaucracies, and government intervention in the economy leading to inefficient and uncompetitive industries and huge amounts of capital squandered on money-losing ventures. In addition, poor macroeconomic policies have made their own contribution to economic instability. Many of these countries have large budget deficits that they monetized, leading to high rates of inflation, overvalued currencies, and periodic devaluations. The deficits stem from too many promises that cannot be met from available resources and high tax rates that result in tax evasion, low revenue collections, and further corruption. Political factors that underlie country risk include the degree of political stability of a country and the extent to which a foreign entity is willing to implicitly stand behind the country’s external obligations. Lending to a private-sector borrower also exposes a lender to commercial risks, in addition to country risk. Because these commercial risks are generally similar to those encountered in domestic lending, they are not treated separately. A more recent phenomenon in country risk analysis has been the focus on heavily indebted developed countries. These countries, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Japan, and even the United States, have assets that exceed their sovereign debts but investors still worry about the risk of default. This belief stems in part from the nature of sovereign debt. Because governments are not subject to formal bankruptcy regulations, investors have few legal rights over borrower assets. Consequently, the likelihood of default is not determined solely by traditional measures of financial health—the ability to repay creditors—but rather by the willingness to bear the political costs associated with repayment. Indeed, even countries whose capacity to repay is in question because of large budget deficits, misallocated resources, and misguided macroeconomic policies would normally be able to service their sovereign debts if they have the willpower to reform the policies that put them in their current situation.

The Mathematics of Sovereign Debt Analysis When analysts seek to determine a country’s ability to pay its debt, not just today but in the foreseeable future, they examine a combination of four factors: the ratio of debt to gross domestic product

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(GDP), the average interest rate on its debt, the primary budget balance (the budget deficit or surplus before interest payments), and the growth rate of nominal GDP. Given these four factors, a nation is considered solvent and its economic policies sustainable if its debt/GDP ratio is projected to stay the same over time or decline; if this ratio rises, then the country’s economic policies are not sustainable (because, ultimately, interest expense will exceed GDP). Absent some—possibly dramatic—changes, it will be unable to service its debts and default will occur unless the country is rescued by an international agency or foreign government. To see how these four factors interact, consider two countries, Germany and Greece. Suppose that the German debt/GDP ratio is 50% and the average interest rate on this debt is 4%. If the budget is in primary balance (inflows equal outflows before interest expense), then the budget deficit will be 2% of GDP (the interest rate of 4% times the 50% debt/GDP ratio) and the amount of debt will grow by 4% (it will grow by 2% of GDP, which is 4% of debt outstanding given the 50% debt/GDP ratio). As long as German GDP grows at the rate of 4% per annum, the debt/GDP ratio will remain at 50%. Now suppose that Greece has a debt/GDP ratio of 100% and also pays a 4% average interest rate on its debt. With its primary budget in balance, its budget deficit will be 4% of GDP. However, as long as GDP grows by 4% a year, and interest rates stay at 4%, its debt/GDP ratio will remain at 100%, and its fiscal path is sustainable. But this equilibrium is fragile. It can be disturbed in three ways: Nominal GDP growth can decline, interest rates can rise, or the primary budget can go into deficit. When a highly indebted country like Greece combines all three, the result can be devastating. Imagine that growth falls to zero. If nothing is done, the debt/GDP ratio will rise by 2% in Germany but by 4% in Greece. Countries can keep their debt/GDP ratio from rising by running primary surpluses to compensate. That means moving to a surplus of 2% of GDP for Germany and to 4% for Greece. Moreover, investors will likely raise the interest rates they charge to compensate for the risk that a country may not tighten its budget sufficiently to run such a large primary surplus. For example, if the average interest rate rises to 6%, Greece must now run a primary surplus of 6% to offset the effects of the four percentage point decline in the growth rate and the two percentage point increase in the interest rate. More typically, if growth slows down, budget deficits rise—not fall—as government spending goes up and tax collections fall. In the case of Greece, if its primary balance becomes a deficit, the wheels come off the cart. The relationship between the four factors we have been discussing and sovereign credit risk can be expressed mathematically using the following parameters: D = the current amount of sovereign debt G = the current level of GDP r = the average interest rate on sovereign debt g = the expected growth rate in GDP B = the current year primary budget balance The amount of debt outstanding in one year will consist of the current amount of debt plus the interest expense on this debt minus the primary surplus (or plus the deficit), or D(1 + r) − B. With a growth rate of g, GDP in one year will be G(1 + g). We can now calculate the debt/GDP ratio in one year as [D(1 + r) − B]∕G(1 + g). On an ongoing basis, this set of parameters leads to a sustainable sovereign debt burden only if [D(1 + r) − B]∕G(1 + g) ≤ D∕G. Substituting d for D/G and b for B/G, and rearranging terms, this inequality becomes d(r − g) ≤ b. To illustrate this inequality, suppose that Greece’s growth rate is zero, its debt/GDP ratio is still at 100%, and its average interest rate goes to 6%. In order for its debt/GDP ratio to not rise, it must run a primary surplus of 6%. All else staying the same, if Greece’s debt/GDP ratio rises to 150%, then its primary surplus must also rise, to 9%, in order to maintain the same debt/GDP ratio. In other words, as long as r > g, the higher the debt/GDP ratio, the higher the primary surplus must be to maintain equilibrium. Of course, a country

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with a high debt/GDP ratio must have historically run large budget deficits. As such, the higher its debt/GDP ratio, the less likely it is that a country will maintain a primary budget surplus, much less a larger one. Consequently, it requires a high degree of adjustment that may not be politically feasible. Not surprisingly, research shows that many countries with periods of excessive debt accumulation have defaulted on their debt.22 These defaults include outright default, restructuring payments and payment schedules, and inflating away the real value of the debt (a reason why foreign lenders prefer to denominate their loans in hard currencies).

Application

Spain’s Hard Budget Arithmetic

In January 2012, Spain’s budget deficit was forecast at 8%, versus a target of 6%. Economic growth was also set to disappoint, at a meager 0.7%. However, its government debt was a moderate 67.8% of GDP. Assuming an average yield on Spanish government debt of 5.25% (the actual yield on 10-year government bonds at the time), then if the primary budget was in balance, the budget deficit would be 3.56% (0.0525 × 67.8%) and it would grow by 3.56% a year. As long as GDP grew by 3.56% annually, the

Application

debt/GDP ratio would remain constant. Given the actual figures, however, Spain was in big trouble. At 0.7% forecast growth, Spain would have to run a primary surplus of 2.86% in order to keep its debt/GDP ratio stable. With a forecast budget deficit of 8%, Spain was projected to run a primary deficit of 4.44% (8% − 3.56%). Spain’s choices are to slash its deficit or grow faster, much easier said than done.

France Loses Its AAA Rating

No nation that combines a high debt/GDP ratio with large budget deficits is immune from default concerns. Indeed, in January 2012, in response to the continuing crisis in the Eurozone and the failure of politicians to address ongoing structural problems in the country, Standard & Poor’s downgraded France’s debt, from AAA to AA+. In effect, S&P said that the likelihood of a French default had gone from inconceivable to remote. Factors that led to the decision were a long-term decline in France’s competitive edge, a large and growing debt that in 2012 was €1.7 trillion or 87.4% of GDP, ongoing budget deficits,

the last budget surplus being in 1974, the costs and problems of its welfare state, such as the 35-hour week legislation and employer’s social costs making up 49% of wage costs—versus, for instance, 29% in Germany. Taken in conjunction with France’s poor past growth record and future growth prospects meant that the rating agency no longer saw the country as deserving its triple-A cachet. Subsequently the other international major rating agencies, Moody’s Investor Services and Fitch, also followed suit to lower their sovereign ratings for France.

Country Risk and the Terms of Trade The preceding discussion of sovereign debt implicitly assumed that either the nation’s debt was denominated in its own currency or that foreign exchange to service any foreign currency-denominated debt was readily available. For developing countries in particular, neither of

22 For

a history of financial crises, including sovereign debt defaults, see Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time It’s Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).

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these assumptions is necessarily satisfied. In most cases, foreign lenders will only denominate their loans in foreign currencies such as the U.S. dollar, euro, or yen. This means that for most countries what ultimately determines their ability to repay foreign loans is their ability to generate U.S. dollars and other hard currencies. This ability, in turn, is based on the nation’s terms of trade. Most economists would agree that these terms of trade are largely independent of the nominal exchange rate, unless the observed exchange rate has been affected by government intervention in the foreign exchange market. In general, if its terms of trade increase, a nation will be a better credit risk. Alternatively, if its terms of trade decrease, a nation will be a poorer credit risk. This terms-of-trade risk, however, can be exacerbated by political decisions. When a nation’s terms of trade improve, foreign goods become relatively less expensive, the nation’s standard of living rises, and consumers and businesses become more dependent on imports. However, because there is a large element of unpredictability to relative price changes, shifts in the terms of trade also will be unpredictable. When the nation’s terms of trade decline, as must inevitably happen when prices fluctuate randomly, the government will face political pressure to maintain the nation’s standard of living. As we saw in Section 6.2, a typical response is for the government to fix the exchange rate at its former (and now overvalued) level—that is, to subsidize the price of foreign currencies. Loans made when the terms of trade improved are now doubly risky: first, because the terms of trade have declined and, second, because the government is maintaining an overvalued currency, further reducing the nation’s net inflow of foreign currency. The deterioration in the trade balance usually results in added government borrowing. Capital flight exacerbates this problem, as residents recognize the country’s deteriorating economic situation. To summarize, a terms-of-trade risk can be exacerbated if the government tries to avoid the necessary drop in the standard of living when the terms of trade decline by maintaining the old and now-overvalued exchange rate. In reality, of course, this element of country risk is a political risk. The government is attempting by political means to hold off the necessary economic adjustments to the country’s changed wealth position. A key issue, therefore, in assessing country risk is the speed with which a country adjusts to its new wealth position. In other words, how fast will the necessary austerity policy be implemented? The speed of adjustment will be determined in part by the government’s perception of the costs and benefits associated with austerity versus default.

The Government’s Cost/Benefit Calculus The cost of austerity is determined primarily by the nation’s external debts relative to its wealth, as measured by its gross domestic product. The lower this ratio, the lower the relative amount of consumption that must be sacrificed to meet a nation’s foreign debts. The cost of default is the likelihood of being cut off from international credit. This possibility brings with it its own form of austerity. Most nations will follow this path only as a last resort, preferring to stall for time in the hope that something will happen in the interim. That something could be a bailout by the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, or some other major central bank. The bailout decision is largely a political decision. It depends on the willingness of citizens of another nation to tax themselves on behalf of the country involved.23 This willingness is a function of two factors: (1) the nation’s geopolitical importance to the countries taking part in the bailout and (2) the probability that the necessary economic adjustments will result in unacceptable political turmoil. For instance, not being

23 See

Tamir Agmon and J.K. Dietrich, “International Lending and Income Redistribution: An Alternative View of Country Risk”, Journal of Banking and Finance (December 1983): 483–495, for a discussion of this point.

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part of the Eurozone, the United Kingdom has resisted taking part in measures designed to help those countries within the single currency affected by the financial crisis. The more a nation’s terms of trade fluctuate and the less stable its political system, the greater the odds the government will face a situation that will tempt it to hold off on the necessary adjustments. Terms-of-trade variability probably will be inversely correlated with the degree of product diversification in the nation’s trade flows. With limited diversification—for example, dependence on the export of one or two primary products or on imports heavily weighted toward a few commodities—the nation’s terms of trade are likely to be highly variable. This characterizes the situation facing many countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. It also describes, in part, the situation of those nations heavily dependent on oil imports. The history of financial crises shows that defaults on external debt frequently occur in clusters. In the case of emerging markets, their governments often treat favorable shocks to their terms of trade as permanent and increase their spending and borrowing. Since such shocks are usually tied to commodity price increases, which are highly correlated, emerging markets often go heavily into debt simultaneously. When commodity prices fall, as inevitably occurs, these countries are stuck with large debt burdens and few resources to service their debts. When lenders refuse to roll over these debts, defaults tend to occur in a wave. When it comes to developed nations, the possibility of default is a more recent phenomenon and yet it is tied to a common cause as well. That cause is the loss of competitiveness that has been attributed, in part, to the modern welfare state with its insatiable appetite for more spending and powerful public employee unions who use their monopoly over labor to demand ever richer salaries and benefits. Another factor has been the depressed growth rates that followed the credit crunch. Consequently, with higher spending combined with slowing growth rates, developed countries around the world have begun to run large budget deficits. These deficits, in turn, have led to increased debt/GDP ratios and a perceived higher risk of default.

Application

Swine Flu

Since large deficits and high debt/GDP ratios are default factors that are common to many developed nations, it is not surprising that fears of contagion have arisen. Default risk and the threat of contagion have been particularly acute among nations in the Eurozone, because their debts are denominated in a currency they cannot issue (so they cannot just inflate away their large debts). The nations singled out by investors were the weaker members, such as Greece and Portugal, who, rather than being compelled by the common currency to become more competitive, took advantage of cheap borrowing costs to finance large budget deficits and paper over their structural inefficiencies such as low productivity and high labor costs. Moreover, these deficits are structural in nature, reflecting fundamental imbalances between government receipts and expenditures that result from taxpayers being unwilling to pay for all the goodies they are receiving from the state. Concerns over European sovereign debt levels escalated in 2009 when a new Greek government disclosed that its budget deficit was much higher than previously

thought: 13.6% of GDP, more than double the initial estimate of 6.1%. This deficit raised the Greek debt/GDP ratio to 115% and put pressure on the government to implement economic reforms designed to reduce the deficit and boost economic growth. These reforms were strongly resisted by many Greeks, most notably the public employees who would bear the brunt. Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating to junk status, which worsened its already dire fiscal situation. Greece’s debt woes then spread to other heavily indebted countries with large budget deficits, particularly Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy. By year end 2009, the debt/GDP ratios of these five countries—the aptly named PIGS plus Italy (or PIIGS)—had all risen to levels higher than at any time since the formation of EMU in 1999. Their budget deficits had all widened in recent years as well and were at unsustainably high levels (see Figure 6.9). By 2011, although deficits were generally reduced, the PIIGS’s debt/GDP ratios rose further.

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160%

142.8% 140%

Deficit/GDP (2009) Deficit/GDP (2011) Debt/GDP (2009)

120%

Debt/GDP (2011)

100%

115%

96.2%

93%

80%

119.0% 115%

77% 64% 60.1%

60%

53%

40% 32.4%

20%

14.3% 9.4% 9.1%

0%

Portugal

5.3% 4.6% Ireland

Italy

13.6% 10.5%

Greece

11.2% 9.2%

Spain

FIGURE 6.9 PIIGS in Trouble

The threat of contagion among the PIIGS stemmed from their similar underlying sovereign credit risk characteristics—precarious state finances, anemic growth, and a deep reluctance among their governments to implement meaningful austerity programs—combined with fear that the Eurozone would be unwilling to support its imprudent members. Driving resistance to a rescue program was growing anger among politicians—and voters—in stronger Eurozone nations, such as Germany and the Netherlands, who felt they were being asked to subsidize the citizens of states that have been borrowing and spending beyond their means. One suggested means of financing the deficits of the PIIGS is bonds that would

be issued collectively by Eurozone nations. However, although the PIIGS would be able to borrow more cheaply using these Eurozone bonds, good credit risks like Germany would see their borrowing costs go up because they would have to take responsibility not just for their debts but for those of the PIIGS and every other Eurozone nation. More important is the element of moral hazard: if German taxpayers effectively underwrite Greece’s risk, it would reduce pressure on the Greek government to curtail deficit spending and undertake unpopular measures—such as privatization, entitlement reform, and curbing the power of labor unions—to add dynamism to its economy.

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Lessons from the International Debt Crisis During the 1970s and early 1980s, international banks lent hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars to less-developed countries and communist countries. Most of the money was squandered on all sorts of extravagant and profitless projects, from Amazon highways to highly automated steel mills in Africa. These loans made sense, however, only as long as banks and their depositors were willing to suspend their disbelief about the risks of international lending. Today, the risks are big and obvious, particularly in light of the international banking crisis of 1982. Onset of the Crisis. This crisis began in August 1982, when Mexico announced that it was unable to meet its regularly scheduled payments to international creditors. Shortly thereafter, Brazil and Argentina (the second- and third-largest debtor nations) found themselves in a similar situation. By spring 1983, about 25 less-developed countries—accounting for two-thirds of the international banks’ claims on this group of countries—were unable to meet their debt payments as scheduled and had entered into loan-rescheduling negotiations with the creditor banks. Altogether, the LDCs defaulted on several hundred billion dollars’ worth of debt. Lending to LDCs dried up, but this was the equivalent of closing the barn door after the horses had bolted. Reform Takes Hold. By late 1983, the intensity of the international debt crisis began to ease as the world’s economic activities picked up, boosting the LDCs’ export earnings, and as the orderly rescheduling of many overdue international loans was completed. However, it was not until 1991 that net international bank lending (new loans net of loans repaid) turned positive again, following on the heels of the dramatic economic reforms underway in many LDCs. The major reason for the drop in international lending activity through the 1980s was the difficulty the LDC debtor nations had in achieving sustained economic growth. The LDCs required capital formation to grow, but the banks first wanted to see economic reforms that would improve the odds that the LDCs would be able to service their debts. Debt Relief. Many of the LDCs pushed for debt relief —that is, reducing the principal or interest payments, or both, on loans. However, the middle-income debtor nations were neither very poor nor insolvent. They possessed considerable human and natural resources, reasonably well-developed infrastructures and productive capacities, and the potential for substantial growth in output and exports given sound economic policies. In addition, many of these countries possessed considerable wealth, much of it invested abroad. Although debt burdens exacerbated the economic problems faced by these countries, all too often the underlying causes were to be found in patronage-bloated bureaucracies, overvalued currencies, massive corruption, and politically motivated government investments in money-losing ventures. These countries also suffered from markets that were distorted by import protection for inefficient domestic producers and government favors for politically influential groups. For these countries, debt relief was at best an ineffectual substitute for sound macroeconomic policy and major structural reform; relief would only have weakened discipline over economic policy and undermined support for structural reform. The Crisis Ends. Ten years after it began, the decade-long Latin American debt crisis ended in July 1992 with the signing of an agreement with Brazil to restructure the US$44 billion it owed foreign banks. In the end, however, it was not negotiation that cut the Gordian knot of Latin American debt—no new money until Latin America showed economic growth, yet growth required new money—but genuine economic reforms, forced on unwilling governments by the unrelenting pressures of the debt crisis. Mexico and Chile, hopelessly mired in debt, so thoroughly reformed their economies, spurring economic growth in the process, that they were able to raise new money from the international capital markets. These economic reforms included opening their markets to

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imports, tearing down barriers to foreign investment, selling off state-owned companies, instituting tight money policies, and cutting government deficits. The examples of Mexico and Chile led other countries, such as Argentina and Venezuela, to change their policies as well. Unfortunately, it has not been happy ever after for all those countries caught up in the crisis. The settlement allowed these countries to return to the international capital markets and while Mexico has done very well, Argentina subsequently defaulted again in 2002–2005 and Venezuela in 2004 as their reforms failed to be sustained. Lessons from Successful Economic Reform. The experiences of those LDC countries that appear to have successfully implemented economic reform programs show that they all met the following criteria:24 • A head of state who demonstrates strong will and political leadership • A viable and comprehensive economic plan that is implemented in a proper sequence • A motivated and competent economic team working in harmony • Belief in the plan from the head of state, the cabinet, and other senior officials • An integrated program to sell the plan to all levels of society through the media. These criteria are applicable not only to Latin America but to all countries anywhere in the world. Some of the Eurozone’s difficulties in dealing with its problem countries like Greece and Portugal are because they are only partially adopting or being allowed to adopt the remedies that helped Latin America—and elsewhere following a debt crisis. This is because, even with the best of intentions, economic reform is painful and difficult to put in place unless all levels of society are convinced that instituting free-market policies and retrenching the state will bring the long-term benefits of sustained growth.

6.4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From the standpoint of an international business, country risk analysis is the assessment of factors that influence the likelihood that a country will have a healthy investment climate. A favorable business environment depends on the existence of a stable political and economic system in which entrepreneurship is encouraged and free markets predominate. Under such a system, resources are most likely to be allocated to their highest-valued uses, and people will have the greatest incentive to take risks in productive ventures. To fully achieve these desirable outcomes requires the institutions of a free society: limited government, rule of law fostered by an independent judiciary, protection of private property, free markets, and free speech. Several costly lessons have led to a new emphasis on country risk analysis in international banking as well. From the lender’s standpoint, country risk—the credit risk on loans to a nation—is largely determined by the real cost of repaying

24 These

the loan versus the real wealth that the country has to draw on. These parameters, in turn, depend on the variability of the nation’s terms of trade and the government’s willingness to allow the nation’s standard of living to adjust rapidly to changing economic fortunes. The experience of those countries that have made it through the international debt crisis suggests that others in a similar situation can get out only if they institute broad systemic reforms. Their problems are caused by governments spending too much money they do not have to meet promises they should not make. They create public sector jobs for people to do things they should not do and subsidize companies to produce high-priced goods and services. These countries need less government and fewer bureaucratic rules. Debt forgiveness or further capital inflows would only tempt these nations to postpone economic adjustment further.

criteria appear in William R. Rhodes, “Third World Debt: The Disaster That Didn’t Happen”, The Economist (September 12, 1992): 21–23.

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244 QUESTIONS 1.

What are some indicators of country risk? Of country health?

2.

What can we learn about economic development and political risk from the contrasting experiences of East and West Germany; North and South Korea; and China and Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore?

3.

What role do property rights and the price system play in national development and economic efficiency?

4.

What indicators would you look for in assessing the political riskiness of an investment in Eastern Europe?

5.

Figure 6.7 describes some economic changes that have been instituted by Mexico.

(b) Who are the winners and the losers from these economic changes? 6.

Many antipoverty activists believe that what keeps incomes and living standards from rising as fast in the developing world as they have in the developed world is an international conspiracy of bankers, corporations, governments, and other institutions allegedly bent on oppressing the masses in order to enrich themselves. Comment on this view.

7.

For decades, efforts to end world poverty have focused on redistributing wealth, rather than creating it. How successful has this approach been in fostering long-term economic progress?

(a) What are the likely consequences of those changes?

PROBLEMS 1.

Comment on the following statement discussing Mexico’s recent privatization: “Mexican state companies are owned in the name of the people but are run and now privatized to benefit Mexico’s ruling class.”

2.

Between 1981 and 1987, direct foreign investment in the Third World plunged by more than 50%. The World Bank was concerned about this decline and wanted to correct it by improving the investment climate in Third World countries. Its solution: create a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) that will guarantee foreign investments against expropriation at rates to be subsidized by Western governments.

at least US$20 billion of the roughly US$100 billion tab. However, Beijing informed investors that, contrary to their expectations, they would not be permitted to hold majority stakes in large power-plant or equipment-manufacturing ventures. In addition, Beijing insisted on limiting the rate of return that foreign investors can earn on power projects. Moreover, this rate of return would be in local currency without official guarantees that the local currency can be converted into foreign currency, and it would not be permitted to rise with the rate of inflation. Beijing said that if foreign investors failed to invest in these projects, it would raise the necessary capital by issuing bonds overseas. However, these bonds would not carry the “full faith and credit of the Chinese government”.

(a) Assess the likely effects of MIGA on both the volume of Western capital flows to Third World nations and the efficiency of international capital allocation.

(a) What problems do you foresee for foreign investors in China’s power industry?

(b) How will MIGA affect the probability of expropriation and respect for property rights in Third World countries?

(b) What options do potential foreign investors have to cope with these problems?

(c) Is MIGA likely to improve the investment climate in Third World nations? Explain. (d) According to economists, there is more demand for political risk coverage than can be delivered through private sources. Is this a valid economic argument for setting up MIGA? Explain. 3.

In the early 1990s, China decided that by 2000 it would boost its electricity-generating capacity by more than half. To do that, it planned on foreigners’ investing

(c) How credible is the Chinese government’s fallback position of issuing bonds overseas to raise capital in lieu of foreign direct investment? 4.

You have been asked to head up a special presidential commission on the Russian economy. Your first assignment is to assess the economic consequences of the following six policies and suggest alternative policies that may have more favorable consequences.

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(c) Russian enterprises are allocated foreign exchange to buy goods and services necessary to accomplish the state plan. Any foreign exchange earned must be turned over to the state bank. (d) In an effort to introduce a more market-oriented system, the government has allowed some Russian enterprises to set their own prices on goods and services. However, other features of the system have not been changed: Each enterprise is still held accountable for meeting a certain profit target; only one state enterprise can produce each type of good or service; and individuals are not permitted to compete against state enterprises. (e) Given the poor state of Russian agriculture, the Russian government has permitted some private plots on which anything grown can be sold at unregulated prices in open-air markets. Because of the success of these markets, the government has recently expanded

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this program, giving Russian farmers access to much more acreage. At the same time, a number of Western nations are organizing massive food shipments to Russia to cope with the current food shortages.

(a) Under the current Russian system, any profits realized by a state enterprise are turned over to the state to be used as the state sees fit. At the same time, shortfalls of money do not constrain enterprises from consuming resources. Instead, the state bank automatically advances needy enterprises credit, at a zero interest rate, to buy the inputs they need to fulfill the state plan and to make any necessary investments. (b) The Russian fiscal deficit has risen to an estimated 13.1% of GDP. This deficit has been financed almost exclusively by printing rubles. At the same time, prices are controlled for most goods and services.

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(f) Western nations are considering instituting a Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe that would involve massive loans to Russia and other Eastern European nations in order to prop up the reform governments. 5.

The president of Malawi has asked you for advice on the likely economic consequences of the following five policies designed to improve Malawi’s economic environment. Describe the consequences of each policy and evaluate the extent to which these proposed policies will achieve their intended objective. (a) Expand the money supply to drive down interest rates and stimulate economic activity. (b) Increase the minimum wage to raise the incomes of poor workers. (c) Impose import restrictions on most products to preserve the domestic market for local manufacturers and thereby increase national income. (d) Raise corporate and personal tax rates from 50% to 70% to boost tax revenues and reduce the government deficit. (e) Fix the nominal exchange rate at its current level in order to hold down the cost to Malawi consumers of imported necessities (assume that inflation is currently 100% annually in Malawi).

WEB RESOURCES www.moodys.com Website of Moody’s. Contains country risk ratings and analyses.

www.fitchratings.com Website of Fitch. Contains country risk ratings and analyses.

www.standardandpoors.com Website of Standard & Poor’s. Contains country risk ratings and analyses.

WEB EXERCISES 1.

Which country risk factors do Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s emphasize?

2.

Pick a country (e.g., Australia, South Korea). Which is the general assessment of country risk of your chosen

country? Has it increased or decreased over the past year? Which factors caused this change?

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Agmon, Tamir, and J.K. Dietrich, “International Lending and Income Redistribution: An Alternative View of Country Risk”, Journal of Banking and Finance (December 1983): 483–495. Kobrin, Stephen J., “Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration”, Journal of International Business Studies (Spring/Summer 1979): 67–80. Krueger, Anne O., “Asian Trade and Growth Lessons”, American Economic Review (May 1990): 108–112. Landes, David S., “Why Are We So Rich and They So Poor?”, American Economic Review (May 1990): 1–13. Lessard, Donald R., and John Williamson, eds. Capital Flight and Third World Debt (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987).

Plaut, Steven, “Capital Flight and LDC Debt”, FRBSF Weekly Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, January 8, 1988. Rhodes, William R., “Third World Debt: The Disaster That Didn’t Happen”, The Economist (September 12, 1992): 21–23. Roll, Richard, “Economic and Political Freedom: The Keys to Development”, in Mark A. Miles, ed., The Road to Prosperity (Westminster, Md.: Heritage Books, 2004). Shapiro, Alan C., “The Management of Political Risk”, Columbia Journal of World Business (Fall 1981): 45–56. _________, “Risk in International Banking”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (December 1982): 727–739. _________, “Currency Risk and Country Risk in International Banking”, Journal of Finance (July 1985): 881–891.

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7

The Spaniards coming into the West Indies had many commodities of the country which they needed, brought unto them by the inhabitants, to who when they offered them money, goodly pieces of gold coin, the Indians, taking the money, would put it into their mouths, and spit it out to the Spaniards again, signifying that they could not eat it, or make use of it, and therefore would not part with their commodities for money, unless they had such other commodities as would serve their use. Edward Leigh (1671) LEARNING OBJECTIVES • To describe the organization of the foreign exchange market and distinguish between the spot and forward markets • To distinguish between different methods of foreign exchange quotation and convert from one method of quotation to another • To read and explain foreign currency quotations as they appear in the financial press • To identify profitable currency arbitrage opportunities and calculate the profits associated with these arbitrage opportunities • To describe the mechanics of spot currency transactions • To explain how forward contracts can be used to reduce currency risk • To list the major users of forward contracts and describe their motives • To calculate forward premiums and discounts The volume of international transactions has grown enormously over the past 65 years. From 1980 when exports were US$2.0 trillion it grew to $18.4 trillion—a compound annual growth rate of 7.2%. Exports of goods and services by the Eurozone in 2012 was 20.2% of gross domestic product. It was 249

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9.6% for the United States, 12.9% for Japan and 23.9% for China. Imports are about the same size. Similarly, annual capital flows involving hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars occur between nations. International trade and investment of this magnitude would not be possible without the ability to buy and sell foreign currencies. Currencies must be bought and sold, because buyers expect to pay in their local currency, while sellers expect to receive their currency in exchange. Unless the two parties share a common currency, as is the case within the Eurozone, in most other countries foreign currency is not the normally acceptable means of payment. Investors, tourists, exporters, and importers must exchange their domestic currencies for foreign currencies, and vice versa. The trading of currencies takes place in foreign exchange markets whose primary function is to facilitate international trade and investment. Knowledge of the operation and mechanics of these markets, therefore, is important for any fundamental understanding of international financial management. This chapter provides this information. It discusses the organization of the most important foreign exchange market—the interbank market—including the spot market, the market in which currencies are traded for immediate delivery, and the forward market, in which currencies are traded for future delivery. Chapter 8 examines the currency futures and options markets.

7.1 Organization of the Foreign Exchange Market If there were a single international currency, there would be no need for a foreign exchange market. As it is, in any international transaction, at least one party is dealing in a foreign currency. The purpose of the foreign exchange market is to permit transfers of purchasing power denominated in one currency to another—that is, to trade one currency for another currency. For example, a Japanese exporter sells cars to a Netherlands dealer for euros, and a German manufacturer sells machine tools to a Japanese company for yen. Ultimately, however, the German company will likely be interested in receiving euros, whereas the Japanese exporter will want yen. Similarly, a Eurozone investor in Swiss-franc-denominated bonds must convert euross into francs, and Swiss purchasers of German Treasury bills require euros to complete these transactions. It would be inconvenient, to say the least, for individual buyers and sellers of foreign exchange to seek out one another, so a foreign exchange market has developed to act as an intermediary. Most currency transactions are channeled through the worldwide interbank market, the wholesale market in which major banks trade with one another. This market, which accounts for about 95% of foreign exchange transactions, is normally referred to as the foreign exchange market. It is dominated by about 20 major banks. In the spot market, currencies are traded for immediate delivery, which is actually paid or received two business days after the transaction has been entered into. In the forward market, contracts are made to buy or sell currencies for future delivery; namely dates beyond the spot settlement date. Spot transactions in 2013 accounted for about 38% of the market, with forward transactions accounting for another 13%. The remaining 49% of the market consists of swap transactions, which involve a package of a spot and a forward contract, at 44%, currency options (discussed in Chapter 8) at 6%, and currency swaps (discussed in Chapter 9) at 1%.1 The foreign exchange market is not a physical place; rather, it is an electronically linked network of banks, foreign exchange brokers, and dealers whose function is to bring together buyers and sellers of foreign exchange. The foreign exchange market is not confined to any one country but is dispersed throughout the leading financial centers of the world: London, New York, Paris, Zurich, Amsterdam, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Toronto, Frankfurt, Milan, and other cities.

1 These volume estimates appear in “Triennial Central Bank Survey: Report on Global Foreign Exchange Market Activity in 2013” (September 2013): p. 8. Missing transactions are allocated proportionately to the spot, forward, and swap transactions.

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Trading has historically been done by telephone, telex, or the SWIFT system. SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications), an international bank-communications network, electronically links all brokers and traders. The SWIFT network connects more than 7,000 banks and broker-dealers in 192 countries and processes more than five million transactions a day, representing about $5 trillion in payments. Its mission is to transmit standard forms quickly to allow its member banks to process data automatically by computer. All types of customer and bank transfers are transmitted, as well as foreign exchange deals, bank account statements, and administrative messages. To use SWIFT, the corporate client must deal with domestic banks that are subscribers and with foreign banks that are highly automated. Like many other proprietary data networks, SWIFT is facing growing competition from Internet-based systems that allow both banks and nonfinancial companies to connect to a secure payments network. Foreign exchange traders in each bank usually operate out of a separate foreign exchange trading room. Each trader has several telephones and is surrounded by terminals displaying up-to-the-minute information. It is a hectic existence, and many traders burn out at an early age. Most transactions are based on verbal communications; written confirmation occurs later. Hence, an informal code of moral conduct has evolved over time in which the foreign exchange dealers’ word is their bond. Today, however, much of the telephone-based trading has been replaced by electronic brokering. Although one might think that most foreign exchange trading is derived from export and import activities, this turns out not to be the case. In fact, trade in goods and services accounts for less than 5% of foreign exchange trading. More than 95% of foreign exchange trading relates to cross-border purchases and sales of assets, that is, to international capital flows. Currency trading takes place 24 hours a day, but the volume varies depending on the number of potential counterparties available. Figure 7.1 indicates how participation levels in the global foreign exchange market vary by tracking electronic trading conversations per hour.

The Participants

Electronic conversations per hour (Monday–Friday, 1992–93)

The major participants in the foreign exchange market are the large commercial banks; foreign exchange brokers in the interbank market; commercial customers, primarily international businesses; 45,000 40,000

Peak Avg

35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

100 300 10 A.M. Lunch in hour Tokyo in Tokyo

500 700 Europe coming in

900 Asia going out

1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 Lunch Americas London Afternoon New 6 P.M. Tokyo hour in coming going in Zealand in coming London in out America coming New York in in

FIGURE 7.1 The Circadian Rhythms of the Foreign Exchange Market Note: Time (0100–2400) hours, Greenwich Mean Time. Source: Reuters Chart appears in Sam Y. Cross. “All About…the Foreign Exchange Market in the United States”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, www.ny.frb.org/pihome/addpub.

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and central banks, which intervene in the market from time to time to smooth exchange rate fluctuations or to maintain target exchange rates. Central bank intervention involving buying or selling in the market is often indistinguishable from the foreign exchange dealings of commercial banks or of other private participants. Only the head offices or regional offices of the major commercial and investment banks are actually market makers—that is, they actively deal in foreign exchange for their own accounts. These banks stand ready to buy or sell any of the major currencies on a more or less continuous basis. Figure 7.2 lists some of the major financial institutions that are market makers and their estimated market shares. A large fraction of the interbank transactions is conducted through foreign exchange brokers, specialists in matching net supplier and demander banks. These brokers receive a small commission 1 on all trades (in the U.S. market this has traditionally been 32 of 1%, which translates into $312.50 on a $1 million trade). Some brokers tend to specialize in certain currencies, but they all handle major currencies such as the British pound, Canadian dollar, euro, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen. Brokers supply information (at which rates various banks will buy or sell a currency); they provide anonymity to the participants until a rate is agreed to (because knowing the identity of the other party may give dealers an insight into whether that party needs or has a surplus of a particular currency); and they help banks minimize their contacts with other traders (one call to a broker may substitute for half a dozen calls to traders at other banks). As in the stock market, the role of human brokers has declined as electronic brokers have significantly increased their share of the foreign exchange business. Commercial and central bank customers buy and sell foreign exchange through their banks. However, most small banks and local offices of major banks do not deal directly in the interbank market.

Barclays

10.5%

Deutsche Bank

9.8%

9.3%

Citigroup

8.2%

UBS

HSBC

7.6%

J.P. Morgan

7.5%

0%

2%

4% 6% 8% Foreign exchange trading market share

10%

FIGURE 7.2 Leading Foreign Exchange Traders in 2012 Source: 2012 Greenwich Leaders, Global Foreign Exchange Services, April 2012, Greenwich Associates, www.greenwich.com.

12%

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Rather, they will typically have a credit line with a large bank or with their home office. Thus, transactions with local banks will involve an extra step. The customer deals with a local bank that in turn deals with its head office or a major bank. The various linkages between banks and their customers are depicted in Figure 7.3. Note that the diagram includes linkages with currency futures and options markets, which we will examine in the next chapter. The major participants in the forward market can be categorized as arbitrageurs, traders, hedgers, and speculators. Arbitrageurs seek to earn risk-free profits by taking advantage of differences in interest rates among countries. They use forward contracts to eliminate the exchange risk involved in transferring their funds from one nation to another. Traders use forward contracts to eliminate or cover the risk of loss on export or import orders that are denominated in foreign currencies. More generally, a forward-covering transaction is related to a specific payment or receipt expected at a specified point in time. Hedgers, mostly multinational firms, engage in forward contracts to protect the home currency value of various foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities on their balance sheets that are not to be realized over the life of the contracts. Arbitrageurs, traders, and hedgers seek to reduce (or eliminate, if possible) their exchange risks by “locking in” the exchange rate on future trade or financial operations. In contrast to these three types of forward market participants, speculators actively expose themselves to currency risk by buying or selling currencies forward in order to profit from exchange rate Customer buys $ with

Foreign exchange broker

Local bank

Stockbroker

Major banks interbank market

IMM LIFFE PSE

Local bank

Stockbroker

Customer buys with $

FIGURE 7.3 Structure of Foreign Exchange Markets Note: The International Money Market (IMM) Chicago trades foreign exchange futures and euro futures options. The London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) trades foreign exchange futures. The Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PSE) trades foreign currency options. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, March 1984, p. 9, revised.

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fluctuations. Their degree of participation does not depend on their business transactions in other currencies; instead, it is based on prevailing forward rates and their expectations for spot exchange rates in the future. The Clearing System. Technology has standardized and sped up the international transfers of funds, which is at the heart of clearing, or settling, foreign exchange transactions. The following discusses the system as it applies to the U.S. dollar leg of transactions. Similar systems, with different acronyms, apply to other countries. For the euro, for instance, there is a pan-European payment and settlements system known as TARGET (which stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer) that falls under the responsibility of the European Central Bank. In the United States, where all foreign exchange transactions involving U.S. dollars are cleared, electronic funds transfers take place through the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). CHIPS is a computerized network developed by the New York Clearing House Association for transfer of international U.S. dollar payments, currently linking 46 major depository institutions that have offices or affiliates in New York City. Currently, CHIPS handles more than 360,000 interbank transfers daily valued at more than $2 trillion. The transfers represent more than 95% of all interbank transfers relating to international payments in U.S. dollars. The New York Fed (Federal Reserve Bank) has established a settlement account for member banks into which debit settlement payments are sent and from which credit settlement payments are disbursed. Transfers between member banks are netted out and settled at the close of each business day by sending or receiving FedWire transfers of fed funds through the settlement account. Fed funds are deposits held by member banks at Federal Reserve branches. The FedWire system is operated by the Federal Reserve and is used for domestic money transfers. FedWire allows almost instant movement of balances between institutions that have accounts at the Federal Reserve Banks. A transfer takes place when an order to pay is transmitted from an originating office to a Federal Reserve Bank. The account of the paying bank is charged, and the receiving bank’s account is credited with fed funds. To illustrate the workings of CHIPS, suppose Mizuho Corporate Bank has sold US$15 million to Citibank in return for ¥1.5 billion to be paid in Tokyo. In order for Mizuho to complete its end of the transaction, it must transfer $15 million to Citibank. To do this, Mizuho enters the transaction into its CHIPS terminal, providing the identifying codes for the sending and receiving banks. The message—the equivalent of an electronic check—is then stored in the CHIPS central computer. As soon as Mizuho approves and releases the “stored” transaction, the message is transmitted from the CHIPS computer to Citibank. The CHIPS computer also makes a permanent record of the transaction and makes appropriate debits and credits in the CHIPS accounts of Mizuho Corporate Bank and Citibank, as both banks are members of CHIPS. Immediately after the closing of the CHIPS network at 4:30 p.m. (Eastern Time (ET)), the CHIPS computer produces a settlement report showing the net debit or credit position of each member bank. Member banks with debit positions have until 5:45 p.m. (ET) to transfer their debit amounts through FedWire to the CHIPS settlement account on the books of the New York Federal Reserve. The Clearing House then transfers those fed funds via FedWire out of the settlement account to those member banks with net creditor positions. The process usually is completed by 6:00 p.m. (ET). Electronic Trading. A major structural change in the foreign exchange market occurred in April 1992 when Reuters, the news company that supplies the foreign exchange market with the screen quotations used in telephone trading, introduced a new service that added automatic execution to the process, thereby creating a genuine screen-based market. Other quote vendors, such as EBS, Telerate, and Quotron, introduced their own automatic systems. These electronic trading systems offer automated matching. Traders enter buy and sell orders directly into their terminals on an anonymous

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basis, and these prices are visible to all market participants. Another trader, anywhere in the world, can execute a trade by simply hitting two buttons. The introduction of automated trading has reduced the cost of trading, partly by eliminating foreign exchange brokers and partly by reducing the number of transactions traders had to engage in to obtain information on market prices. The new systems replicate the order matching and the anonymity that brokers offer, and they do it more cheaply. For example, small banks can now deal directly with one another instead of having to channel trades through larger ones. At the same time, automated systems threaten the oligopoly of information that has underpinned the profits of those who now do most foreign exchange business. These new systems gather and publish information on the prices and quantities of currencies as they are actually traded, thereby revealing details of currency trades that until now the traders have profitably kept to themselves. Such comparisons are facilitated by new Internet-based foreign exchange systems designed to help users reduce costs by allowing them to compare rates offered by a range of banks. The largest such system, FXall, teams some of the biggest participants in the foreign exchange market—including Barclays, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Union Bank of Switzerland, Morgan Stanley, Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, and Royal Bank of Scotland—to offer a range of foreign exchange services over the Internet. The key to the widespread use of computerized foreign currency trading systems is liquidity, as measured by the difference between the rates at which dealers can buy and sell currencies. Liquidity, in turn, requires reaching a critical mass of users. If enough dealers are putting their prices into the system, then users have greater assurance that the system will provide them with the best prices available. That critical mass has been achieved. According to the Bank for International Settlements, in 2000, 85% to 95% of interbank trading in the major currencies was conducted using electronic brokers.2

Size The foreign exchange market is by far the largest financial market in the world. A survey of the world’s central banks by the Bank for International Settlements placed the average foreign exchange trading volume in 2013 at US$5.3 trillion daily, or $1,272 trillion a year.3 This figure compares with an average daily trading volume in 2013 of about $1,200 billion on the New York Stock Exchange and is 16 times the average daily turnover of global equity markets.4 As another benchmark, the U.S. gross domestic product was about $16.6 trillion in 2013. After peaking in 1998, foreign currency trading volumes fell, largely because the replacement of 12 European currencies with the euro, combined with the rise of electronic trading, greatly reduced the number of currency transactions. This trend reversed itself after 2001 for a variety of reasons, including investors’ growing interest in foreign exchange as an asset class alternative to equity and fixed income, the more active role of asset managers, and the growing importance of hedge funds. According to data from the 2013 triennial survey by the Bank for International Settlements, London is by far the world’s largest currency trading market, with daily turnover in 2013 estimated at US$2,726 billion, more than that of the next three markets—New York, at $1,263 billion, Singapore at $383 billion, and Tokyo at $374 billion—combined.5 Figure 7.4A shows that the top three largest financial centers (London, New York, and Singapore) have seen their share of global trading volume increase at the expense of smaller centers. Their share grew as they have consolidated

2 See

BIS 71st Annual Report, p. 99. Survey results appear in Bank for International Settlements, “Triennial Central Bank Survey: Report on Global Foreign Exchange Market Activity in 2013” (September 2013): 4. Annual data are based on an estimated 20 trading days per month. 4 Data are from http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics. 5 Source: Bank for International Settlements, “Triennial Central Bank Survey”, p. 10. 3

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256

Location Global London New York Singapore Tokyo Hong Kong Zurich Paris Sydney Frankfurt Copenhagen

Amount of transactions in US$ billion

Percentage of global turnover (in pct)

Growth in trading activity since 2010 (in pct)

6,671 2,726 1,263 383 374 275 216 190 182 111 103

100 40.9 18.9 5.7 5.6 4.1 3.2 2.8 2.7 1.7 1.5

32.3 47.0 39.7 44.0 19.9 15.5 −13.3 25.0 −5.2 1.8 −14.2

FIGURE 7.4A Daily Foreign Exchange Trading Volume by Financial Center Data source: “Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2013”, Bank for International Settlements, September 2013.

their position as the global centers for foreign exchange. The survey also revealed a rise in volume of 32%, continuing the trend from the previous survey where volumes grew at 31%. The growth trend is consistent with the fact that foreign exchange trading has historically outpaced the growth of international trade and the world’s output of goods and services. The explosive growth in currency trading since 1973—daily volume was estimated at US$10 billion in 1973 (see Figure 7.4B)—has been attributed to the growing integration of the world’s economies and financial markets, as well as a growing desire among companies and financial institutions to manage their currency risk exposure more actively. Dollar/DM trades used to be the most common, but with the replacement of the DM and 11 other currencies with the euro, dollar/euro trades have the biggest market share (28%) with dollar/yen trades at 14% and dollar/sterling trades at 9%.6 $6.00 $5.34

$5.00 $3.98

$4.00 $3.21

$3.00 $1.88

$2.00 $1.50 $1.19

$1.00

$0.65

$1.20

$0.82

$0.01 $0.06 $0.26

$0.00

1973 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

FIGURE 7.4B Daily Global Foreign Exchange Trading Volume Source: Various Bank for International Settlements Triennial surveys.

6

Source: Bank for International Settlements, “Triennial Central Bank Survey”, p. 12.

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7.2 The Spot Market This section examines the spot market in foreign exchange. It covers spot quotations, transaction costs, and the mechanics of spot transactions.

Spot Quotations Almost all major newspapers print a daily list of exchange rates. For major currencies, up to four different foreign exchange quotes (prices) are displayed. One is the spot price. The others might include the 30-day, 90-day, and 180-day forward prices. These quotes are for trades among dealers in the interbank market. When interbank trades involve U.S. dollars and about 60% of such trades do, these rates will be expressed in either American terms (numbers of U.S. dollars per unit of foreign currency) or European terms (number of foreign currency units per U.S. dollar). In their dealings with nonbank customers, banks in most countries use a system of direct quotation. A direct exchange rate quote gives the home currency price of a certain quantity of the foreign currency quoted (usually 100 units for currencies that have a low value, but only one unit in the case of the euro, the U.S. dollar, or the British pound, for instance). For example, the price of foreign currency is expressed in Swiss francs (SFr) in Switzerland and in euros in Germany. Thus, in Switzerland the euro might be quoted at SFr 1.22 (a direct quote in Switzerland), whereas in Germany the franc would be quoted at €0.82 (a direct quote in Germany). Figure 7.5 lists quotes in both forms of foreign exchange quotation side by side, using data as provided by the European Central Bank. For example, at end of trading on September 16, 2013, the American quote for the euro was US$1.3592 (also expressed as $1.3592/€), and the quote in terms of the euro was $1 = €0.7357 (or €0.7357/$). Nowadays, in trades involving the euro and U.S. dollars exchange rates, their quotation is normally expressed in European terms. The exception for the U.S. dollar is British pounds, which traditionally has been expressed in American terms (number of U.S. dollars per British pound, e.g. £1 = $1.5822), and the euro. American and European terms and direct and indirect quotes are related as follows: American terms

European terms

U.S. dollar price per unit of foreign currency (for example, $0.012251/¥)

Foreign currency units per U.S. dollar (for example, ¥81.63/$)

A direct quote in the United States

A direct quote outside the United States

An indirect quote outside the United States

An indirect quote in the United States

Banks do not normally charge a commission on their currency transactions, but they profit from the spread between the rates at which they buy and sell both spot and forward transactions. Quotes are always given in pairs because a dealer usually does not know whether a prospective customer is in the market to buy or to sell a foreign currency. The first rate is the buy, or bid, price; the second is the sell, or ask, or offer, rate. Suppose the British pound is quoted at €0.8295 − 05. This quote means that banks are willing to buy pounds at €0.8295 and sell them at €0.8305. If you are a customer of the bank, you can expect to sell British pounds to the bank at the bid rate of €0.8295 and buy pounds from the bank at the ask rate of €0.8305. The dealer will profit from the spread of €0.0010 (€0.8305 − €0.8295) between the bid and ask rates. In practice, because time is money, dealers do not quote the full rate to one another; instead, they quote only the last two digits of the decimal. Thus, the British pound would be quoted at 95-05 in the previous example. Any dealer who is not sufficiently up-to-date to know the preceding numbers will not remain in business for long.

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258

ISO Currency Code

Currency per €

€ equivalent

Europe Bulgaria (lev) Croatia (kuna) Czech Republic (koruna) Denmark (krone) Hungary (forint) Latvia (lats) Lithuania (litas) Norway (krone) Poland (zloty) Romania (new leu) Russia (ruble) Sweden (krona) Switzerland Turkey (lira) United Kingdom (pound)

BGN HRK CZK DKK HUF LVL LTL NOK PLN RON RUB SEK CHF TRY GBP

1.9558 7.641 27.458 7.4594 302.49 0.7026 3.4528 8.3105 4.1983 4.4721 45.0345 8.8382 1.2268 2.7809 0.83

0.5113 0.1309 0.0364 0.1341 0.0033 1.4233 0.2896 0.1203 0.2382 0.2236 0.0222 0.1131 0.8151 0.3596 1.2048

Africa South Africa (rand)

ZAR

14.1267

0.0708

Country

Country

ISO Currency Code

Americas Brazil (real) Canada (dollar) Mexico (peso) United States (dollar)

BRL CAD MXN USD

3.2274 1.4484 17.8511 1.3592

0.3098 0.6904 0.0560 0.7357

Asia-Pacific Australia (dollar) China (yan renminbi) Hong Kong (dollar) India (rupee) Indonesia (rupiah) Japan (yen) Malaysia (ringgit) New Zealand (dollar) Philippines (peso) Singapore (dollar) South Korea (won) Thailand (bhat)

AUD CNY HKD INR IDR JPY MYR NZD PHP SGD KRW THB

1.5046 8.2789 10.5384 84.208 16174.91 139.31 4.3834 1.6585 59.665 1.7044 1442.72 43.826

0.6646 0.1208 0.0949 0.0119 0.0001 0.0072 0.2281 0.6030 0.0168 0.5867 0.0007 0.0228

Currency per €

€ equivalent

FIGURE 7.5 Foreign Exchange Rates Wednesday, December 4, 2013 Source: European Central Bank; reference rates for December 4, 2013.

Note that when American terms are converted to European terms or direct quotations are converted to indirect quotations, bid and ask quotes are reversed; that is, the reciprocal of the American (direct) bid becomes the European (indirect) ask, and the reciprocal of the American (direct) ask becomes the European (indirect) bid. So, in the previous example, the reciprocal of the bid of €0.8295 becomes the ask of €1.2055, and the reciprocal of the ask of €0.8305 equals the bid of €1.2041, resulting in a direct quote for the euro in London of €1.2041-55. Note, too, that the banks will always buy low and sell high. This is clear if we put the two quotations side-by-side and show what the bank does:

Bank will… = ask = bid

Sell €1 Buy €1

Buy £0.8305 Sell £0.8295

Quotation £/€ €/£ 0.8305 0.8295

1.2041 1.2055

Bank will… Sell €1.2041 Buy €1.2055

Buy £1 Sell £1

= bid = ask

In the £/€ quotation, for the ask, it sells €1 and receives the higher amount of £0.8305; in the bid, it buys €1 and pays £0.8295. In the reciprocal quotation, it is buying £1 for €1.2041 and selling the British pound at €1.2055. Transaction Costs. The bid-ask spread—that is, the spread between bid and ask rates for a currency—is based on the breadth and depth of the market for that currency as well as on the currency’s volatility. The spread repays traders for the costs they incur in currency dealing, including earning a profit on the capital tied up in their business, and compensates them for the risks they

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bear. It is usually stated as a percentage cost of transacting in the foreign exchange market, which is computed as follows: Ask price − Bid price Percentage spread = × 100 Ask price For example, with British pound quoted at £0.8295 − 0.5∕€, the percentage spread equals 0.049%: £0.8305 − £0.8295 × 100 = 0.12% Percentage spread = £0.8305 For widely traded currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, British pound, euro, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen, the spread used to be in the order of 0.05% to 0.08%.7 However, the advent of sophisticated electronic trading systems has pushed the spreads on trades of $1 million or more to a tiny 0.02%.8 Less heavily traded currencies, and currencies having greater volatility, have higher spreads. In response to their higher spreads and volatility (which increases the opportunity for profit when trading for the bank’s own account), the large banks have expanded their trading in emerging market currencies, such as the Czech koruna, Russian ruble, Turkish lira, and Zambian kwacha. Although these currencies currently account for less than 5% of the global foreign exchange market, the forecast is for rapid growth, in line with growing investment in emerging markets. Mean forward currency bid-ask spreads are larger than spot spreads, but they are still small in absolute terms, ranging from 0.09% to 0.15% for actively traded currencies. There is a growing forward market for emerging currencies, but because of the thinness of this market and its lack of liquidity, the bid-ask spreads are much higher. The quotes found in the financial press are not those that individuals or firms would get at a local bank. Unless otherwise specified, these quotes are for transactions in the interbank market exceeding one million. (The standard transaction amount in the interbank market is now about ten million.) But competition ensures that individual customers receive rates that reflect, even if they do not necessarily equal, interbank quotations. For example, a trader may believe that they can trade a little more favorably than the market rates indicate—that is, buy from a customer at a slightly lower rate or sell at a somewhat higher rate than the market rate. Thus, if the current spot rate for the Swiss franc against the euro is SFr 1.2267 − 72, the bank may quote a customer a rate of SFr 1.2264 − 75. On the other hand, a bank that is temporarily short in a currency may be willing to pay a slightly more favorable rate; or if the bank has overbought a currency, it may be willing to sell that currency at a somewhat lower rate. For these reasons, many corporations will shop around at several banks for quotes before committing themselves to a transaction. On large transactions, customers also may get a rate break inasmuch as it ordinarily does not take much more effort to process a large order than a small order. The market for traveler’s checks and smaller exchanges of currency, such as might be made by a traveler going abroad, is quite separate from the interbank market. The spread on these smaller exchanges is much wider than that in the interbank market, reflecting the higher average costs banks incur on such transactions. As a result, individuals and firms involved in smaller retail transactions generally pay a higher price when buying and receive a lower price when selling foreign currency than those quoted in newspapers. 7 Data on mean spot and forward bid-ask spreads appear in Hendrik Bessembinder, “Bid-Ask Spreads in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Markets”, Journal of Financial Economics (June 1994): 317–348. 8 Gregory Zuckerman, “UBS Cleans Up in Currency-Trading Corner”, Wall Street Journal (May 27, 2003): C1.

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Application

Banks Battle Pension Funds over Foreign Exchange Pricing

In early 2011, allegations surfaced that custody banks such as Bank of New York Mellon and State Street Corp. overcharged public pension funds by tens of millions of dollars in executing currency trades. Bank of New York Mellon and State Street denied wrongdoing and said they would vigorously fight legal actions against them. BNY Mellon responded by saying “Money managers transact with us at competitive FX prices and we provide reliable, low-risk service and execution.” A Wall Street Journal analysis of more than 9,400 trades the bank processed for the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association, a large L.A. pension fund, provided ammunition to its critics. According to that analysis, “BNY Mellon priced 58% of the currency trades within the 10% of each day’s interbank trading range that was least favorable to the fund.”9 As an example, on March 8, 2010, BNY Mellon exchanged €8.1 million into U.S. dollars for the pension fund at a rate of $1.3610, just above the day’s low of $1.3604. During the day, the euro traded as high as $1.3704. If the trades had occurred at the midpoint of the range that day, or $1.3654(($1.3604 + $1.3704)∕2) = $1.3654), the pension fund would have received $35,640 more than it did (8, 100, 000 × ($1.3654 − $1.3610) = $35, 640). Overall, the cost to the fund of the 9,400 trades analyzed was $4.5 million more than if the average trade 9 Carrick

Mollenkamp and Tom McGinty, “Inside a Battle Over Forex”, Wall Street Journal (May 23, 2011): A1.

had occurred at the midpoint of the trading range during each day. The bank confirmed the accuracy of the analysis but then pointed out that it acts in its own interest when pricing currency trades, not that of its customers. Indeed, banks make money in foreign exchange trading by getting the customer to buy high and sell low. BNY Mellon noted that customers are not necessarily entitled to the interbank rate and that many of the L.A. pension fund’s trades were relatively small ones, often less than $100,000. If those trades were executed in the international wire-transfer market, the bank said, the trades would cost the fund two percentage points above the interbank rate—much more expensive than trading through BNY Mellon. Left unsaid was the fact that customers could always negotiate their own foreign exchange trades, potentially getting better rates, but that would require a significant investment in staff, technology, and other infrastructure of a modern trading desk. A number of lawsuits filed against the banks also allege that bank foreign exchange desks chose exchange rates after the fact, usually near the worst possible rate for the client that day, instead of setting a price based on the time of day the trade was executed. In early October 2011, BNY Mellon’s troubles escalated when both the U.S. Department of Justice and New York’s attorney general filed lawsuits alleging that BNY Mellon defrauded or misled public pension funds and others by overcharging them for foreign exchange. By April 2012, BNY Mellon was facing lawsuits filed by six states seeking a total of over $2 billion in damages.

Cross Rates. Because most currencies are quoted against the U.S. dollar, it may be necessary to work out the cross rates for currencies other than the dollar. For example, if the euro is selling for $1.47 and the buying rate for the Swiss franc is $0.98, then the €/SFr cross rate is €1 = SFr1.5. A somewhat more complicated cross-rate calculation would be the following. Suppose that the European quotes for the Japanese yen and the South Korean won are as follows: Japanese yen: South Korean won:

¥105.62/U.S.$ –– W1040.89/U.S.$ –– W1040.89/U.S.$

In this case, the cross rate of yen per won can be calculated by dividing the rate for the yen by the rate for the won, as follows: Japanese yen∕U.S.dollar ¥105.62∕U.S.$ –– = = ¥0.10147∕W –– –– Korean won∕U.S.dollar W1040.89∕U.S.$ ––

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Canada Japan Mexico Switzerland U.K. Euro U.S.

261

U.S. Dollar

Euro

British Pound

Swiss Franc

Mexican Peso

Japanese Yen

Canadian Dollar

1.0656 102.49 13.134 0.9026 0.6107 0.7357 …

1.4484 139.31 17.851 1.2268 0.8300 … 1.3592

1.7451 167.84 21.507 1.4781 … 1.2048 1.6376

1.1806 87.7084 14.551 … 0.6766 0.8151 1.1079

12.325 7.8040 … 0.0687 0.0465 0.0560 0.0761

96.18 … 0.1281 0.0114 0.0060 0.0072 0.0098

… 0.0104 1.0000 0.8470 0.5730 0.6904 0.9384

FIGURE 7.6 Key Currency Cross Rates Wednesday, December 4, 2013 Source: European Central Bank. Note that in calculating the cross rates, you always assume that you have to sell a currency at the lower (or bid) rate and buy it at the higher (ask or offer) rate, giving you the worst possible rate. This method of quotation is how banks make money in foreign exchange.

Figure 7.6 contains cross rates for major currencies on September 16, 2011.

Application

Calculating the Direct Quote for the Brazilian Real in Bangkok

Suppose that the Brazilian real is quoted at R 𝟎.𝟗𝟗𝟓𝟓 – 𝟏.𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟔 ∕ US$ and the Thai baht is quoted at B 𝟐𝟓.𝟐𝟓𝟏𝟑 – 𝟑𝟗𝟖𝟔 ∕ US$. What is the direct quote for the real in Bangkok? Solution Analogous to the prior example, the direct bid rate for the real in Bangkok can be found by recognizing that selling Brazilian reais (plural of real) in exchange for Thai baht is equivalent to combining two transactions: (1) selling the real for U.S. dollars (which is the same as buying dollars with reais) at the ask rate of R1.0076/US$ and (2) selling those dollars for baht at the bid rate of B25.2513/US$. These transactions result in the bid cross rate for the real being the bid rate for the baht divided by the ask rate for the real: Bid rate for Thai baht∕US$ Bid cross rate = for the real Ask rate for Brazilian real∕US$ 25.2513 = B25.0608∕R = 1.0076

Similarly, the baht cost of buying the real (the ask cross rate) can be found by first buying U.S. dollars for Thai baht at the ask rate of B25.3986/US$ and then selling those dollars to buy Brazilian reais at the bid rate of R0.9955/US$. Combining these transactions yields the ask cross rate for the real being the ask rate for the baht divided by the bid rate for the real: Ask cross rate for the real

= =

Ask rate for Thai baht∕US$ Bid rate for Brazilian real∕US$ 25.3986 = B 25.5134∕R 0.9955

Thus, the direct quotes for the real in Bangkok are B 25.0608–5134.

Currency Arbitrage. Historically, the pervasive practice among bank dealers was to quote all currencies against the U.S. dollar when trading among themselves. Now, however, a growing percentage of currency trades do not involve the U.S. dollar. For example, Swiss banks may quote the euro against the Swiss franc, and German banks may quote British pounds in terms of euros. Exchange traders are continually alert to the possibility of taking advantage, through currency arbitrage transactions,

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of exchange rate inconsistencies in different money centers. These transactions involve buying a currency in one market and selling it in another. Such activities tend to keep exchange rates uniform in the various markets. Currency arbitrage transactions also explain why such profitable opportunities are fleeting. In the process of taking advantage of an arbitrage opportunity, the buying and selling of currencies tend to move rates in a manner that eliminates the profit opportunity in the future. When profitable arbitrage opportunities disappear, we say that the no-arbitrage condition holds. If this condition is violated on an ongoing basis, we would wind up with a money machine, as shown in the following example. Suppose the British pound is bid at $1.9422 in New York and the euro is offered at $1.4925 in Frankfurt. At the same time, London banks are offering the British pounds euro cross rate at €1.2998. An astute trader would sell U.S. dollars for euros in Frankfurt, use the euros to acquire British pounds in London, and sell the pounds in New York. Specifically, if the trader begins in New York with $1 million, they could acquire €670,016.75 for $1 million in Frankfurt ($1,000,000/$1.4925), sell these euros for £515,476.80 in London (€670,016.75/€1.2998), and resell the pounds in New York for $1, 001,159.05(515, 476.80 × 1.9422). Thus, a few minutes’ work would yield a profit of $1,159.05. In effect, by arbitraging through the euro, the trader would be able to acquire British pounds at $1.9400 in London ($1.4925 × 1.2998) and sell it at $1.9422 in New York. This sequence of transactions, known as triangular currency arbitrage, is depicted in Figure 7.7. In the preceding example, the arbitrage transactions would tend to cause the euro to appreciate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar in Frankfurt and to depreciate against the British pound in London; at the same time, the pound would tend to fall in New York against the dollar. Acting simultaneously, these currency changes will quickly eliminate profits from this set of transactions, thereby enforcing the no-arbitrage condition. Otherwise, a money machine would exist, opening up the prospect of unlimited risk-free profits. Such profits would quickly attract other traders, whose combined buying and selling activities would bring exchange rates back into equilibrium almost instantaneously. 4. Net profit equals $1,159.05 New York Finish $1,001,159.05

Start $1,000,000 2. Sell $1,000,000 in Frankfurt at 1 = $1.4925 for 670,016.75

Multiplied by $1.9422/£

Divided by $1.4925/

3. Resell the pounds sterling in New York at £1 = $1.9422 for $1,001,159.05

£515,476.80 London

Divided by 1.2998/£ 2. Sell these euros in London at £1 = for £515,476.80

FIGURE 7.7 An Example of Triangular Currency Arbitrage

670,016.75 Frankfurt 1.2998

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Opportunities for profitable currency arbitrage have been greatly reduced in recent years, given the extensive network of people—aided by high-speed, computerized information systems—who are continually collecting, comparing, and acting on currency quotes in all financial markets. The practice of quoting rates against the U.S. dollar or euro makes currency arbitrage even simpler. The result of this activity is that rates for a specific currency tend to be the same everywhere, with only minimal deviations resulting from transaction costs.

Mini-Case

Arbitraging Currency Cross Rates

Your friendly foreign exchange trader has given you the following currency cross rates. The quotes are expressed as units of the currency represented in the left-hand column per unit of currency shown in the top row. Consider the U.S. dollar rates to be the quotes from which the cross rates are set.

Currency SFr DKr £ ¥

Questions 1. Do any triangular arbitrage opportunities exist among these currencies? Assume that any deviations from the theoretical cross rates of 5 points or fewer are due to transaction costs. 2. How much profit could be made from a $5 million transaction associated with each arbitrage opportunity?

SFr

DKr

£

¥

– 3.3818–25 0.41227–35 78.381–496

0.29570–76 – 0.12381–90 23.178–251

2.4256–67 8.2031–41 – 190.121–390

0.01276–78 0.04315–19 0.00526–29 –

US$ 1.5780–86 5.3021–33 0.6502–10 123.569–707

Settlement Date. The value date for spot transactions, the date on which the monies must be paid to the parties involved, is set as the second working day after the date on which the transaction is concluded. Thus, a spot deal entered into on Thursday in Paris will not be settled until the following Monday (French banks are closed on Saturdays and Sundays). It is possible, although unusual, to get one-day or even same-day value, but the rates will be adjusted to reflect interest differentials on the currencies involved. Exchange Risk. Bankers also act as market makers, as well as agents, by taking positions in foreign currencies, thereby exposing themselves to exchange risk. The immediate adjustment of quotes as traders receive and interpret new political and economic information is the source of both exchange losses and gains by banks active in the foreign exchange market. For instance, suppose a trader quotes a rate of £1:$1.9712 for £500,000, and it is accepted. The bank will receive $985,600 in return for the £500,000. If the bank does not have an offsetting transaction, it may decide within a few minutes to cover its exposed position in the interbank market. If during this brief delay, news of a lower-than-expected British trade deficit reaches the market, the trader may be unable to purchase pounds at a rate lower than $1.9801. Because the bank would have to pay $990,050 to acquire £500,000 at this new rate, the result is a $4, 450 ($990, 050–$985, 600) exchange loss on a relatively small transaction within just a few minutes. Equally possible, of course, is a gain if the U.S. dollar strengthens against the pound. Clearly, as a trader becomes more and more uncertain about the rate at which they can offset a given currency contract with other dealers or customers, they will demand a greater profit to bear this

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added risk. This expectation translates into a wider bid-ask spread. For example, during a period of volatility in the exchange rate between the Swiss franc and U.S. dollar, a trader will probably quote a customer a bid for francs that is distinctly lower than the last observed bid in the interbank market; the trader will attempt to reduce the risk of buying Swiss francs at a price higher than that at which they can eventually resell them. Similarly, the trader may quote a price for the sale of Swiss francs that is above the current asking price.

The Mechanics of Spot Transactions The simplest way to explain the process of actually settling transactions in the spot market is to work through an example. Suppose a U.S. importer requires HK$1 million to pay their Hong Kong supplier. After receiving and accepting a verbal quote from the trader of a U.S. bank, the importer will be asked to specify two accounts: (1) the account in a U.S. bank that they want debited for the equivalent dollar amount at the agreed exchange rate—say, US$0.1280 per Hong Kong dollar, and (2) the Hong Kong supplier’s account that is to be credited by HK$1 million. On completion of the verbal agreement, the trader will forward to the settlement section of their bank a dealing slip containing the relevant information. That same day, a contract note—which includes the amount of the foreign currency (HK$1 million), the dollar equivalent at the agreed rate ($128, 000 = 0.1280 × 1, 000, 000), and confirmation of the payment instructions—will be sent to the importer. The settlement section will then cable the bank’s correspondent (or branch) in Hong Kong, requesting transfer of HK$1 million from its nostro account—working balances maintained with the correspondent to facilitate delivery and receipt of currencies—to the account specified by the importer. On the value date, the U.S. bank will debit the importer’s account, and the exporter will have their account credited by the Hong Kong correspondent. At the time of the initial agreement, the trader provides a clerk with the pertinent details of the transaction. The clerk, in turn, constantly updates a position sheet that shows the bank’s position by currency, as well as by maturities of forward contracts. A number of the major international banks have fully computerized this process to ensure accurate and instantaneous information on individual transactions and on the bank’s cumulative currency exposure at any time. The head trader will monitor this information for evidence of possible fraud or excessive exposure in a given currency. Because spot transactions are normally settled two working days later, a bank is never certain until one or two days after the deal is concluded whether the payment due the bank has actually been made. To keep this credit risk in bounds, most banks will transact large amounts only with prime names (other banks or corporate customers). A different type of credit risk is settlement risk, also known as Herstatt risk. Herstatt risk, named after a German bank that went bankrupt after losing a fortune speculating on foreign currencies, is the risk that a bank will deliver currency on one side of a foreign exchange deal only to find that its counterparty has not sent any money in return. This risk arises because of the way foreign currency transactions are settled. Settlement requires a cash transfer from one bank’s account to another at the central banks of the currencies involved. However, because those banks may be in different time zones, there may be a delay. In the case of Herstatt, German regulators closed the bank after it had received Deutschmarks in Frankfurt but before it had delivered dollars to its counterparty banks (because the New York market had not yet opened). Because central banks have been slow to deal with this problem, some banks have begun to pool their trades in a particular currency, canceling out offsetting ones and settling the balance at the end of the day. In early 1996, 17 of the world’s biggest banks went further and created a global clearing bank that operates 24 hours a day just to settle foreign exchange transactions. Known as the Continuous Linked Settlement Bank, this is a financial utility where banks active in foreign exchange use a payment-versus-payment service to settle their trades.

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7.3 The Forward Market Forward exchange operations carry the same credit risk as spot transactions but for longer periods of time; however, there are significant exchange risks involved. A forward contract between a bank and a customer (which could be another bank) calls for delivery, at a fixed future date, of a specified amount of one currency against another; the exchange rate is fixed at the time the contract is entered into. Although the euro is the most widely traded currency at present, active forward markets exist for the British pound, the Canadian dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc. In general, forward markets for the currencies of less-developed countries are either limited or nonexistent. In a typical forward transaction, for example, a Spanish company buys textiles from England with payment of £1 million due in 90 days. Thus, the importer is short British pounds—that is, it owes pounds for future delivery. Suppose the spot price of the pound is €1.15. During the next 90 days, however, the British pound might rise against the euro, raising the cost in euros of the textiles. The importer can guard against this exchange risk by immediately negotiating a 90-day forward contract with a bank at a price of, say, £1 = €1.16. According to the forward contract, in 90 days the bank will give the importer £1 million (which it will use to pay for its textile order), and the importer will give the bank €1.16 million, which is the euro equivalent of £1 million at the forward rate of €1.16. In technical terms, the importer is offsetting a short position in British pounds by going long in the forward market—that is, by buying pounds for future delivery. In effect, use of the forward contract enables the importer to convert a short underlying position in pounds to a zero net exposed position, with the forward contract receipt of £1 million canceling out the account payable of £1 million and leaving the importer with a net liability of €1,160,000: Forward contract receipt

£1,000,000

Account payable Forward contract payment

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£1,000,000 €1,160,000

According to this T-account, the forward contract allows the importer to convert an unknown British pound cost (1, 000, 000 × e1 , where e1 is the unknown spot exchange rate—€/£—in 90 days) into a known British pound cost (€1,160,000), thereby eliminating all exchange risk on this transaction. Figure 7.8 plots the importer’s dollar cost of the textile shipment with and without the use of a forward contract. It also shows the gain or loss on the forward contract as a function of the contracted forward price and the spot price of the pound when the contract matures. The gains and losses from long and short forward positions are related to the difference between the contracted forward price and the spot price of the underlying currency at the time the contract matures. In the case of the textile order, the importer is committed to buy British pounds at €1.16 apiece. If the spot rate in 90 days is less than €1.16, the importer will suffer an implicit loss on the forward contract because it is buying pounds for more than the prevailing value. However, if the spot rate in 90 days exceeds €1.16, the importer will enjoy an implicit profit because the contract obliges the bank to sell the pounds at a price less than current value. Three points are worth noting. First, the gain or loss on the forward contract is unrelated to the current spot rate of €1.15. Second, the forward contract gain or loss exactly offsets the change in the cost of the textile order in euros that is associated with movements in the pound’s value. For example, if the spot price of the pound in 90 days is €1.18, the importer’s cost of delivery is €1.18 million. However, the forward contract has a gain of €20,000 or 1, 000, 000 × 1.18 − 1.16. The net cost of the textile order when covered with a forward contract is €1.16 million, no matter what happens to the spot exchange rate in 90 days. (Chapter 10 elaborates on the use of forward contracts to manage exchange risk.) Third, the forward contract is not an option contract. Both parties must perform the

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1,190,000 1,180,000 Forward contract gain

1,170,000 Payment cost (€)

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1,160,000 1,150,000

Forward contract loss

Hedged cost £1 million payment

1,140,000 1,130,000 1,120,000 1,110,000

Spot rate

Forward rate

1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.22

FIGURE 7.8 Hedging a Future Payment with a Forward Contract

agreed-on behavior, unlike the situation with an option in which the buyer can choose whether to exercise the contract or allow it to expire. The bank must deliver the British pounds, and the importer must buy them at the prearranged price. Options are discussed in Chapter 8.

Forward Quotations Forward rates can be expressed in two ways. Commercial customers are usually quoted the actual price, otherwise known as the outright rate. In the interbank market, however, dealers quote the forward rate only as a discount from, or a premium on, the spot rate. This forward differential is known as the swap rate. As explained in Chapter 4, a foreign currency is at a forward discount if the forward rate expressed in euros or U.S. dollars is below the spot rate, whereas a forward premium exists if the forward rate is above the spot rate. As we see in the next section, the forward premium or discount is closely related to the difference in interest rates on the two currencies. For instance, the Japanese yen is quoted (in American terms) at a spot rate of $0.013023, whereas 180-day forward yen is priced at $0.013055. Based on these rates, the swap rate for the 180-day forward yen is quoted as a 32-point premium (0.013055 − 0.013023), where a point, or “pip”, refers to the last digit quoted. Similarly, if the 90-day British pound is quoted at $1.5773, whereas the spot pound was $1.5788, the 90-day forward British pound sold at a 15-point discount. Based on Equation 4.1, which is repeated here as Equation 7.1, the forward premium or discount on a foreign currency may also be expressed as an annualized percentage deviation from the spot rate using the following formula: Forward premium Forward rate − Spot rate 360 or discount on = × Spot rate Forward contract foreign currency number of days where the exchange rate is stated in domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency. Thus, the 180-day forward Japanese yen is selling at a 0.49% annualized premium: Forward premium 0.013055 − 0.013023 360 = × = 0.0049 annualized 0.013023 180

(7.1)

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The 90-day British pound is selling at a 0.38% annualized discount: Forward discount 1.5773 − 1.5788 360 × = −0.0038 = annualized 1.5788 90 A swap rate can be converted into an outright rate by adding the premium (in points) to, or subtracting the discount (in points) from, the spot rate. Although the swap rates do not carry plus or minus signs, you can determine whether the forward rate is at a discount or a premium using the following rule: when the forward bid in points is smaller than the ask rate in points, the forward rate is at a premium and the points should be added to the spot price to compute the outright quote. Conversely, if the bid in points exceeds the ask rate in points, the forward rate is at a discount and the points must be subtracted from the spot price to get the outright quotes.10 Suppose the following quotes are received for spot, 30-day, 90-day, and 180-day Swiss francs (SFr) and British pounds against the euro: Spot

30-day

90-day

180-day

€1.1615-30 €0.8163-68

19–17 4–6

26–22 9–14

42–35 25–38

Bearing in mind the practice of quoting only the last two digits, a dealer would quote the British pound at 15–30, 19–17, 26–22, 42–35 and Swiss francs at 63–68, 4–6, 9–14, 25–38. The outright rates are shown in the following chart. £ Maturity

Bid

Ask

Spot 30-day 90-day 180-day

1.1615 1.1596 1.1589 1.1573

1.1630 1.1613 1.1608 1.1595

SFr Spread (%) 0.13% 0.15% 0.16% 0.19%

Bid

Ask

0.8163 0.8167 0.8172 0.8188

0.8168 0.8174 0.8182 0.8206

Spread (%) 0.06% 0.09% 0.12% 0.22%

Thus, the Swiss franc is selling at a premium against the euro, and the British pound is selling at a discount. Note the slightly wider percentage spread between outright bid and ask on the Swiss franc compared with the spread on the British pound. This difference is due to the broader market in British pounds. Note, too, the widening of spreads by maturity for both currencies. This widening is caused by the greater uncertainty surrounding future exchange rates. Exchange Risk. Spreads in the forward market are a function of both the breadth of the market (volume of transactions) in a given currency and the risks associated with forward contracts. The risks, in turn, are based on the variability of future spot rates. Even if the spot market is stable, there is no guarantee that future rates will remain invariant. This uncertainty will be reflected in the forward market. Furthermore, because beliefs about distant exchange rates are typically less secure than those about nearer-term rates, uncertainty will increase with lengthening maturities of forward contracts. Dealers will quote wider spreads on longer-term forward contracts to compensate themselves for the

10

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This rule is based on two factors: (1) The buying rate, be it for spot or forward delivery, is always less than the selling price and (2) the forward bid-ask spread always exceeds the spot bid-ask spread. In other words, you can always assume that the bank will be buying low and selling high and that bid-ask spreads widen with the maturity of the contract.

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risk of being unable to reverse their positions profitably. Moreover, the greater unpredictability of future spot rates may reduce the number of market participants. This increased thinness will further widen the bid-ask spread because it magnifies the dealer’s risk in taking even a temporary position in the forward market. Cross Rates. Forward cross rates are figured in much the same way as spot cross rates. For instance, suppose a customer wants to sell 30-day forward euros against Japanese yen delivery. The market rates (expressed in European terms of foreign currency units per U.S. dollar) are as follows: €:$ spot 30-day forward ¥:$ spot 30-day forward

0.81070–0.81103 0.81170–0.81243 107.490–107.541 107.347–107.442

Based on these rates, the forward cross rate for yen in terms of euros is found as follows: forward euros are sold for U.S. dollars—that is, dollars are bought at the euro forward selling price of €0.81243 = $1—and the dollars to be received are simultaneously sold for 30-day forward Japanese yen at a rate of ¥107.347. Thus, €0.81243 = ¥107.347, or the forward buying rate for yen

Application

Arbitraging Between Currencies and Interest Rates

On checking the Reuters screen, you see the following exchange rate and interest rate quotes: Currency British pound Yen

90-day interest rates

Spot rates

90-day forward rates

7 7/16 – 5/16% 2 3/8–1/4%

¥159.9696–9912/£

¥145.5731–8692/£

a. Can you find an arbitrage opportunity? (100∕159.9912) × (1.0183) × 145.5731 Solution There are two alternatives: (1) Borrow Japanese yen at 2 3/8%/4, convert the yen into British pounds at the spot ask rate of ¥159.9912/£, invest the pounds at 7 5/16%/4, and sell the expected proceeds forward for yen at the forward bid rate of ¥145.5731/£ or (2) borrow British pounds at 7 7/16%/4, convert the pounds into Japanese yen at the spot bid rate of ¥159.9696/£, invest the yen at 2 1/4%/4, and sell the proceeds forward for pounds at the forward ask rate of ¥145.8692/£. The first alternative will yield a loss of ¥7.94 per ¥100 borrowed, indicating that this is not a profitable arbitrage opportunity:

−100 × 1.0059 = −7.94 Switching to alternative 2, the return per £100 borrowed is £8.42, indicating that this is a very profitable arbitrage opportunity: 100 × 159.9696 × 1.0056∕145.8692 −100 × 1.0186 = 8.42 b. What is the profit per £1,000,000 arbitraged? Solution Based on the answer to part a, the profit is £84, 200 (8.42 × 10, 000).

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is €0.81243∕107.347 = €0.0075683. Similarly, the forward selling rate for yen against euros (euros received per yen sold forward) is €0.81170∕107.442 = €0.0075548. The spot buying rate for yen is €0.81103∕107.490 = €0.0075452. Hence, based on its ask price, the Japanese yen is trading at an annualized 3.67% premium against the euro in the 30-day forward market: Forward premium 0.0075683 − 0.0075452 360 × = 3.67% = annualized 0.007452 30

Forward Contract Maturities Forward contracts are normally available for 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, 180-day, or 360-day delivery. Banks will also tailor forward contracts for odd maturities (e.g., 77 days) to meet their customers’ needs. Longer-term forward contracts can usually be arranged for widely traded currencies, such as the British pound, euro, or Japanese yen; however, the bid-ask spread tends to widen for longer maturities. As with spot rates, these spreads have widened for almost all currencies since the early 1970s, probably because of the greater turbulence in foreign exchange markets. For widely traded currencies, the 90-day bid-ask spread can vary from 0.1% to 1%. Currency swap transactions, discussed in the next chapter, are a means of converting long-term obligations in one currency into long-term obligations in another currency. As such, we will see that swaps act as substitutes for long-dated forward contracts.

7.4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we saw that the primary function of the foreign exchange market is to transfer purchasing power denominated in one currency to another and thereby facilitate international trade and investment. The foreign exchange market consists of two tiers: the interbank market, in which major banks trade with one another, and the retail market, in which banks deal with their commercial customers. In the spot market, currencies are traded for settlement within two business days after the transaction has bee