International environmental law, policy and ethics [Second edition] 9780198713456, 0198713452, 9780191781896, 0191781894

Table of contents :
Cover......Page 1
International Environmental Law, Policy, and Ethics......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Dedication......Page 6
Contents......Page 8
List of Abbreviations......Page 14
Table of Legislation......Page 16
Table of Instruments......Page 18
I Introduction......Page 24
2 The anthropocentric worldview......Page 27
3 Reflection in law and policy......Page 33
4 Conclusion......Page 36
2 Protecting the environment due to self interest......Page 37
3 Recognition in law and policy......Page 42
4 Limits of the approach of self interest......Page 44
5 Conclusion......Page 47
2 The idea......Page 48
3 The economics of conservation......Page 51
4 The economics of pollution......Page 56
5 Recognition of the argument......Page 60
A Irreconcilable worldviews......Page 63
B No economic value and/or lack of ecological knowledge......Page 67
C Higher economic values......Page 68
D Market problems......Page 71
E Political problems......Page 72
7 Conclusion......Page 73
2 The influence of religion......Page 74
3 Reflection in international environmental law......Page 75
4 Religion as a catalyst for environmental concern......Page 76
5 The Christian stewardship ethic......Page 79
6 Difficulties with the stewardship ethic......Page 82
7 Conclusion......Page 89
1 Introduction......Page 91
2 The argument of aesthetic value......Page 92
3 Recognition in law and policy......Page 95
4 Difficulties with aesthetics......Page 99
5 Conclusion......Page 103
2 The values of culture as a catalyst for environmental protection......Page 105
3 Reflection in law and policy......Page 108
4 Difficulties with cultural-based arguments......Page 111
5 Conclusion......Page 117
2 Environmental damage and future generations......Page 118
3 The moral consideration of other generations......Page 121
4 Adoption of the argument in law and policy......Page 124
5 Problems when considering future generations......Page 128
6 Conclusion......Page 132
2 Moral consideration for animals......Page 134
3 Animals in international law and policy......Page 138
A Near equal to humanity......Page 139
B Utilization, no pain, and the welfare approach......Page 142
C Lethal scientific experiments using animals......Page 145
4 Inherent value in all individual living entities......Page 149
5 Inherent value in international law and policy......Page 150
6 Conclusion......Page 151
1 Introduction......Page 153
2 Extinction and endangered species......Page 154
3 Endangered species in law and policy......Page 156
4 Ecosystems......Page 159
5 Ecosystems in international law......Page 161
6 Difficulties of thinking holistically......Page 163
7 Conclusion......Page 166
XI Conclusion......Page 168
Bibliography......Page 174
Index......Page 214

Citation preview

I N T E R N AT I O N A L E N V I RO N M E N TA L L AW, P O L I C Y, A N D E T H I C S

International Environmental Law, Policy, and Ethics Second Edition ALEXANDER GILLESPIE

1

1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,

United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Alexander Gillespie 2014 The moral rights of the author‌have been asserted First Edition published in 1997 Second Edition published in 2014 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Crown copyright material is reproduced under Class Licence Number C01P0000148 with the permission of OPSI and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2014938494 ISBN 978–0–19–871345–6 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

This book is dedicated to the memory of Patricia Birnie (1926–2013) : exemplar

Contents List of Abbreviations Table of Cases Table of Legislation Table of Instruments

xiii xv xv xvii I. INTRODUCTION II. ANTHROPOCENTRICISM

1.   Introduction 2.   The anthropocentric worldview 3.   Reflection in law and policy 4.   Conclusion

4 4 10 13

III.  SELF INTEREST 1.   Introduction 2.   Protecting the environment due to self interest 3.   Recognition in law and policy 4.   Limits of the approach of self interest 5.   Conclusion

14 14 19 21 24

IV. ECONOMICS 1.   Introduction 2.   The idea 3.   The economics of conservation 4.   The economics of pollution 5.   Recognition of the argument 6.   Difficulties with the argument A. Irreconcilable worldviews B. No economic value and/or lack of ecological knowledge C. Higher economic values D. Market problems E. Political problems 7.   Conclusion

25 25 28 33 37 40 40 44 45 48 49 50

V. RELIGION 1.   Introduction 2.   The influence of religion

51 51

viii

Contents

3.   Reflection in international environmental law 4.   Religion as a catalyst for environmental concern 5.   The Christian stewardship ethic 6.   Difficulties with the stewardship ethic 7.   Conclusion

52 53 56 59 66

VI. AESTHETICS 1.   Introduction 2.   The argument of aesthetic value 3.   Recognition in law and policy 4.   Difficulties with aesthetics 5.   Conclusion

68 69 72 76 80

VII. CULTURE 1.   Introduction 2.   The values of culture as a catalyst for environmental protection 3.   Reflection in law and policy 4.   Difficulties with cultural-based arguments 5.   Conclusion

82 82 85 88 94

VIII.  FUTURE GENERATIONS 1.   Introduction 2.   Environmental damage and future generations 3.   The moral consideration of other generations 4.   Adoption of the argument in law and policy 5.   Problems when considering future generations 6.   Conclusion

95 95 98 101 105 109

IX.  ANIMALS AND OTHER LIVING ENTITIES 1.   Introduction 2.   Moral consideration for animals 3.   Animals in international law and policy A. Near equal to humanity B. Utilization, no pain, and the welfare approach C. Lethal scientific experiments using animals 4.   Inherent value in all individual living entities 5.   Inherent value in international law and policy 6.   Conclusion

111 111 115 116 119 122 126 127 128

Contents

ix

X.  SPECIES AND ECOSYSTEMS 1.   Introduction 2.   Extinction and endangered species 3.   Endangered species in law and policy 4.   Ecosystems 5.   Ecosystems in international law 6.   Difficulties of thinking holistically 7.   Conclusion

130 131 133 136 138 140 143

XI. CONCLUSION Bibliography Index

151 191

In the relations of man with the animals, with the flowers, with the objects of creation, there is a great ethic, scarcely perceived as yet, which will at length break forth into the light and which will be the corollary and compliment to human ethics. Victor Hugo (1802–1885) En voyage, Alpes et Pyrénées, 1867

List of Abbreviations ACCOBAMS Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea and Mediterranean ASCOBANS Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas CAFF Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna CBD Convention on Biological Diversity CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna CMS Convention on Migratory Species FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature IWC International Whaling Commission OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OIE World Organisation for Animal Health UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNPF United Nations Population Fund WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development WWF World Wildlife Fund

Table of Cases U N I T E D S TAT E S TVA v Hill 437 US 153, 187 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Ness v Albert 665 S.W.2d 1 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Table of Legislation U N I T E D S TAT E S S TAT U T E S Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 16 USC § 668-668d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-551. . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 USC § 1531(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 National Parks Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 USC § 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 USC § 1331–40. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 USC § 1131–6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 U N I T E D K I NGD OM S TAT U T E S Cruelties to Animals Act 1876, s 3(1). . . . . . 123 N E W Z E A L A N D S TAT U T E S Conservation Act 1987. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Environment Act 1986. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Resource Management Act 1991 . . . . . . . . . 127

EU ROPE A N DI R E C T I V E S Council Directive 83/129/EEC of 28 March 1983 concerning the importation into Member States of skins of certain seal pups and products derived therefrom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Council Directive 86/609/EEC on the protection of animals used for experimental purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Council Directive 89/370/EEC of 8 June 1989 amending Directive 83/129/EEC concerning the importation into Member States of skins of certain seal pups and products derived therefrom . . . . . . . . . . 71 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Table of Instruments African Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 2003 Art 9(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Art XII (1)(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Annex III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Agenda 21 (1992) s 4.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 8.28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 8.31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 8.37. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 11.14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 s 11.20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 11.21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 11.23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 12.22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 14.54. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 s 14.55. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 s 30.9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 s 31.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 s 31.8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 s 31.9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Ch 26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Ch 5, para 5.50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Ch 19, para 19.21(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd 1987 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Agreement Concerning the Creation of a Marine Mammal Sanctuary in the Mediterranean Art 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears 1973 Art II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Agreement on Humane Trapping Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Agreement on Migratory Birds Between Australia and China 1986 Art II(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Agreement on Migratory Birds Between Australia and Japan 1974 Art II(1)(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Agreement on Migratory Birds Between Australia and the Republic of Korea 2007 Art 2(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds 1995. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Preamble, para 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 73 Art II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Annex 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Action Plan 2.1.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 points 4.1.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 4.1.8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Agreement on the Conservation of Albatross and Petrels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Art II.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art III.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Art III.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121–2 Action Plan 1.4.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121–2 Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Art II.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art II.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitat 2007 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 para 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 para 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Art II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears 1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea 1990 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Art III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art VI.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121, 125 Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art 2.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 ‘Action Plan’, Pt 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 (2003) Resolution 4.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program 1998 Art 5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Annex VIII 3.d. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

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Table of Instruments

Agreement Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1995 Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art 5(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Alpine Convention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Antarctic Protocol on Environmental Protection 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Apia Convention 1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development 1990 point 6(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Bern Convention see Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats Bilateral Agreement Between the United States and Russia for Polar Bears of the Chukchi Sea Population 2001. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Biosafety Protocol Art 3(h). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Bonn Convention see Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species Charter for African Unity 1963. . . . . . . . . . 102 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974 Art 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States 1916 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art II(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Art II(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Art IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Convention Between the United States, United Kingdom and Russia for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals 1911 Art IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Convention Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and their Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 73, 75, 85, 139 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Article 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Art 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85, 102 Convention Designed to Ensure the Conservation of Various Species of Wild Animals in Africa 1900. . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Art 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Annex VI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Convention for Co-operation in the Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Regions Art 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Art 3.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Annex, s 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Convention for the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals 1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa 1900 Schedule I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture 1902 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and the Environment of the South Pacific Region 1986 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 86 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South East Pacific 1981 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1931 Art 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29,53, 87, 103, 120 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 para 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 para 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Art 8(j). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Art 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 (1998) Decision III/18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 (2000) Decision V/3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 V/5, para 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 V/15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 (2002) Decision IV/10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 (2004) Decision VII/9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 (2008) Decision IX/6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 IX/7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140–1 Principle 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Table of Instruments Principle 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 Principle 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Principle 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 IX/11, para 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 (2009) Decision IX/1, para 1. . . . . . . . . . . 20 (2010) Decision X/2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 39 X/2, Target 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 X/44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Decisions I/8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 II/9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 II/10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 III/12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 IV/4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 IV/5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 IV/6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 IV/7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 IV/1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 VI/5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 VI/7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 IV/10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 IV/10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 VI/8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 VI/9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 VI/10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 VI/23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 VI/25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Convention on Birds Useful to Agriculture 1902 Art VII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific 1976. . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73, 134 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 1958 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora 1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 71, 73 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 85, 102 para 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art III 2.c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 4.b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 5.c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 Art IV 2.c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 5.b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20

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6.b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 Art VIII 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 Resolution 3:16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 4:21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 5:18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 9:23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 10:20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 10:21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 Decision 12:85. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 13:88. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 14:58. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 14:59. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20 Convention on Migratory Birds Between the United States and Japan 1972 Art III(1)(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Convention on Migratory Birds Between the United States and USSR 1976 Art II(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere 1940. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73, 86 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habits 1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73, 139 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 73, 127, 133 Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Art 3(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 73, 125, 139 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 86, 102, 127 paras 1–3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Convention on the Conservation of Wildlife in Africa 1900 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Convention on the Elimination of All Kinds of Discrimination Against Women 1979 Art 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Art 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Art 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Art 2(6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83, 85 Art 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

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Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 1971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 39, 86, 139 (1980) Resolution 1.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (1984) Resolution 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (1996) Resolution 6.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (1999) Resolution 7.15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (1999) Resolution 7.16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (2002) Resolution 8.23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (2002) Resolution 8.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (2002) Resolution 8.34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (2002) Resolution 8.40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State (in Africa) 1933. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Convention Respecting Measures for the Preservation and Protection of the Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean 1911. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development 1995 para 26(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Declaration for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture 1875. . . . . . . . . . 121 Declaration of Fontainbleau 1986 . . . . . . . . 128 Declaration of the Council of European Communities on the Program of Action of the European Community on the Environment 1973 Pt 1, Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Ch 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Annex, Pt II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 85 Ch 1, para 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Recommendation 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Declaration of the World National Parks Congress 1983 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Declaration on Future Generations 1997. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Draft Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island States, 1994 Preamble, para 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 para 56. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

European Charter on Hunting and Biodiversity Principle 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 European Convention for the Protection of Animals During International Transport Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals 1987 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 European Landscape Convention 2004 Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Global Strategy for the Survival of Great Apes and their Habitat 2005 Para 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Annex, para 10-12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 para 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground Level Ozone 1999 Art 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Art 8(k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Art 6(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Great Bustard Memorandum of Understanding point 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles 1996 Art IV(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Art IV2h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals 1957 . . . . . . 121 Art V(2)(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Art VII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Art IX (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 International Conference on Population and Development 1994, Action Plan, Principle 8 para 7.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 para 7.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 para 7.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 para 7.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 para 8.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna Art 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 International Convention for the Protection of Birds 1950 Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Table of Instruments International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 47 para 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 para 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Art V(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976 Art 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Long-line Fisheries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 International Tropical Timber Agreement 1983 Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development 2002 para 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 para 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 1997 Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Art 11(vi),(vii). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Kinshasa Declaration on Great Apes 2005 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Madrid Protocol see Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctica Treaty Memorandum of Understanding on the Slender Billed Curlew Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 s 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation Measures for the Aquatic Warbler Point 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Memorandum of Understanding on Marine Turtles of the Atlantic Coast of Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Memorandum of Understanding on the Siberian Crane Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Memorandum of Understanding on West African Elephants para 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Mercury Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

xxi

Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies 1982. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Migratory Bird Convention see Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States 1916 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer Art 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33–34 Nairobi Declaration 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Nordic Convention 1974 Art 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Pact of Arab States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Peace of Westphalia 1648. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African Region Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty Annex II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Art 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73, 124, 139 Art 3(2)(b)(vi) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Art 3(2)(b)(v). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art 3(5),(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art 5(9). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 ‘Amended Version of Annex II to the Environmental Protocol’(2009) Measure 16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Protocol on Further Reductions of Sulphur Emissions 1994 Art 6(f ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Protocol on Volatile Organic Compounds Art 2(7)(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Ramsar Convention see Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Principle 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Principle 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Seoul Declaration on Environmental Ethics 1997. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55–6

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Seville Strategy Objective 1.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Seville + 5 Recommendations, Recommendation No. 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Art 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Principle 8(f ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Principle 12(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Principle 16(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Statute for the Council of Europe 1949 (Treaty of London). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Statute of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972 Principle 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Principle 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Principle 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Recommendation 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Article 61(2), (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art 118 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Art 119 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development 1986 Art 4, para 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 Preamble, para 17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138–9 Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138–9 Art 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Art 3(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103–4 Art 3(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 United Nations Millennium Declaration para 21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 104 para 23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Universal Declaration of the Rights of Animals 1977. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Vienna Declaration from the World Conference on Human Rights 1993 Art 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Art 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Art 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 World Charter for Nature 1982 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 103, 138 General Principle 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 General Principle 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 General Principle 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11–12 Annex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 2.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72–3 World Conservation Strategy 1980 Preface to Chapter 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127–8 para 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 para 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Ch 18, para 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127–8 World Heritage Convention see Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage World Summit on Sustainable Development ‘Plan of Implementation’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 para 44(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

I Introduction We must spare no effort to free all of humanity, and above all our children and grandchildren, from the threat of living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs. . . . We resolve therefore to adopt in all our environmental actions a new ethic of conservation and stewardship . . . 1

The above quote from The Millennium Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly came at the end of the twentieth century, by which point, terms like ‘ozone hole’, ‘climate change’, ‘biodiversity loss’, ‘deforestation’, ‘population growth’, ‘hazardous waste’, and ‘chemical pollution’ had become universal currency. By 2014, the response to these issues has been 50 years’ environmental activism, a dizzying amount of laws at the domestic, regional, and international levels, and the agreement that, at the political level, ‘sustainable development’ is the answer to all of the problems.2 However, while the broad agreement has been reached that sustainable development is the political answer (although there remains a world of difference about how to implement this), there is much less certainty about what the ethical basis of the response to the environmental situation should be. It is this question— about what is the most suitable ethical basis for dealing with environmental problems of an international magnitude—that is the focus of this book. This focus on the ethical component of international environmental law is coming of age. This has happened as debates about the ethical values which are utilized in this area have moved from the journals of philosophy in the 1970s to the international levels in 1990s when calls went out from the global decision makers for ‘a new mode of civic conduct . . . man . . . must learn to love his world. . . ;3 ‘a paradigm shift in values’;4 and the formation of new ‘global ethics’.5 From   The Millennium Declaration, UNGA/Res/55/2, paras 21 and 23.   Hawken, P. (2007) Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming (Viking, New York). 3   Boutros-Ghalli, Boutros (1992) ‘Text of closing UNCED statements’ in Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc.A/CONF.151.26, 66. 4  This quote is from Elizabeth Dowdeswell, then Director of UNEP, in her speech at the ‘Symposium on Values for a Sustainable Future’, 2 June 1994: UNEP Speech 1994/10. Note also UNEP/N.J. Brown (1994) Ethics and Agenda 21: Moral Implications of a Global Consensus (United Nations, New York). 5  Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 47. See also International Commission on Peace and Food (1994) Uncommon Opportunities: An Agenda for Peace and Equitable Development (Zed, London) 177, 180. 1 2

2

Introduction

this basis, the United Nations could, as noted above, call for ‘a new ethic of conservation and stewardship’. This book is about the new ethics—and the old ones. In both instances, it is about the way the ethics have evolved, where they exist in international law and policy, and what their limitations are. This book is not about the formation of new documents such as the Earth Charter (a collection of principles, which are already found in many other areas),6 that do not have any standing in the international setting. Rather, this book seeks to work with what ethical arguments already exist in law and policy. The majority of the arguments in this book are anthropocentric. Anthro­ pocentricism is the belief that humanity is at the centre of existence. This belief, built up and reinforced over thousands of years of scholarship, is predicated on the idea that humanity is fundamentally different to the rest of the natural world, of which we are rational, and it, isolated and valueless, has been provided as an instrument for our benefit. This intellectual mindset has been largely incorporated into international environmental law and policy, from which attempts to justify the protection of the environment have been built.7 There are six different arguments within this anthropocentric framework. These are direct self interest, economics, religion, aesthetics, culture, and future generations. Each one of these arguments has one chapter in this book. However, as this work hopes to show, each of these six anthropocentric justifications, although powerful in some settings, is limited to how far, and how much, it can achieve. Many of them are either contradictory, limited in scope, or plainly indefensible in part. To many people, such anthropocentric justifications are shallow, and ‘deeper’ ethical thinking is required. The deeper ethical thinking is non-anthropocentric, whereby the justifications for environmental protection are not directly related to the interests of humanity. These non-anthropocentric views are based around the interests of other sentient beings (animals), the importance of all individuals which are alive, endangered species, or, finally, the views that suggest that the ecosystem as a whole should be the focus of ethical thinking in all environmental matters. In all four of these non-anthropocentric justifications, the environment, or aspects within it, is protected for its own intrinsic (or inherent) value.8 However, as with the anthropocentric arguments, many of the non-anthropocentric arguments are

6   For the debates on the Earth Charter, see Ruiz, J. (2010) ‘Dangers Facing the Earth Charter’ Journal of Education for Sustainable Development 4(2):  181; Attfield, R. (2007) ‘Beyond the Earth Charter: Taking Possible People Seriously’ Environmental Ethics 29(4): 359; Bosselmann, K. (2004) ‘In Search of Global Law: The Significance of the Earth Charter’ World Views: Global Religions, Culture and Ecology 8(1): 62; McCloskey, D. (2003) ‘The Earth Charter: A Reply’ Eastern Economic Journal 29(3): 473; Taylor, P. (1999) ‘The Earth Charter’ New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 3: 193. 7   Rolston, H. (2011) ‘The Future of Environmental Ethics’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68(Oct): 1; Kortenkamp, K. (2001) ‘Ecocentrism and Anthropocentrism: Moral Reasoning About Ecological Commons Dilemmas’ Journal of Environmental Psychology 21(3): 261. 8   Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach (UCL Press, London) 54; Naess, A. (1973) ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement’ Inquiry 16: 95.

Introduction

3

also not only impossible to reconcile with each other, but are also either limited in scope or plainly indefensible when taken to the full extent of their logic.9 The end result is that there are ten different arguments for why the environment should be protected. While sometimes a few of the arguments can safely overlap and complement each other, more often than not they cannot be reconciled. Both within their anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric brackets, and between the brackets, the arguments are rarely complimentary, and they will often clash if the goal is to build a single salient moral theory through which to filter all ethical problems involving the environment. This is a particularly difficult problem for those who want one ethical theory—a single philosophical touchstone—by which to answer all of the problems at hand.10 I spent four years of my life searching for that touchstone, and at the end of the journey I had more questions than when I began. While I hope that other scholars will continue this search, I am now more of the opinion that it is necessary to adopt a type of moral pluralism when thinking about ethical matters and the environment. I  believe that this is important because of the diversity of the problems, the amount of work that is required to be done, and the time limits before us. In my experience, to achieve conservation, it has been necessary to utilize each of these justifications, anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric, like separate tools. Each tool can fix something. No single tool can fix everything. Sometimes, the wrong tool makes the problem worse. In this new edition of International Environmental Law, Policy, and Ethics, the hope is not that the reader will become disillusioned with any of the particular arguments, but rather, to understand what its limits are, but still to apply any argument (but knowing its limits) where positive environmental benefits can be achieved. As such, this edition is much more pragmatic than the first. It is no longer sufficient to try to understand environmental problems of an international dimension in terms of philosophical paradigms. It is necessary to work directly towards solving the problems. There is much to be done.

9  Hargrove, E. (1992) ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’ The Monist 75(2):  183; Fox, W. (1990) Towards a Transpersonal Ecology:  Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Shambhala, Boston); Devall, B. (1990) Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology (Green Print, Surrey) 3–38; Hargrove, E. (1992) (ed) The Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective (Sunny, New York) xvii–xviii. 10  Peterson, K. (2011) ‘Bringing Values Down to Earth’ Appraisal 8(4):  3; Attfield, R. (2011) ‘Beyond Anthropocentrism’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69:  29; Carter, A. (2011) ‘Towards a Multidimensional Environmentalist Ethic’ Environmental Values 20(3):  347; Sterba, J.P. (1995) ‘From Biocentric Individualism to Biocentric Pluralism’ Environmental Ethics 17:  191, 204–5; Sterba, J. (1994) ‘Reconciling Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Values 3(3): 229; Wenz, P. (1993) ‘Minimal, Moderate and Extreme Pluralism’ Environmental Ethics 15: 61, 66–8, 70, 72, 74; Johnson, L. (1991) A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 236–8; Callicott, J.B. (1990) ‘What’s Wrong With Moral Pluralism’ Environmental Ethics 12: 32; Stone, C. (1988) ‘Moral Pluralism and the Course of Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 10: 147, 149.

II Anthropocentricism 1. Introduction Anthropocentricism is basically human chauvinism, with a narrowness of sympathy that is comparable to sexual, racial, or national chauvinism. The paradigm in this context involves the core of beliefs that underpin the human relationship with the natural world. The philosopher Mary Midgely (1919–) explained the anthropocentric paradigm in the following terms: People have seen themselves as placed, not just at the relative centre of a particular life, but at the absolute, objective centre of everything. The centrality of MAN (sic) has been pretty steadily conceived, both in the West and in many other traditions, not as an illusion of perspective, imposed on us by our starting-point, but as an objective fact, and indeed an essential fact, about the whole universe.1

2.  The anthropocentric worldview The anthropocentric position did not arrive without justification. The foundations for the position have a number of inter-linked arguments. The first strand derives from the early rationalists. Against a background that dates back millions of years, in which humanity had to struggle against both species and ecosystems to survive, philosophy and social practice slowly began to develop reasons for why humanity

1  Midgley, M. (1994) ‘The End of Anthropocentricism?’, in R. Attfield (ed), Philosophy and the Natural Environment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 17. See also McShane, K. (2007) ‘Anthropocentrism vs Nonanthropocentrism:  Why Should We Care?’ Environmental Values 16(2): 169; Chiarelli, B. (2007) ‘Ethical Anthropocentricism: Humanistic Ethics and the Need for a New Global Bioethics’ Mankind Quarterly 47(4): 105; Schmidt, S. (2006) ‘The Anthropocentric Principle’ Analog 126(1):  17; O’Neil, O. (1997) ‘Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism’ Environmental Values 6(2): 127; Midgley, M. (1992) ‘Is the Biosphere a Luxury?’ Hastings Centre Report 222: 7, 9; Norton, B. (1984) ‘Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentricism’ Environmental Ethics 6: 141; Murdy, W.H. (1983). ‘Anthropocentricism: A Modern Version’, in D. Scherer (ed), Ethics and the Environment (Prentice Hall, New Jersey) 12, 13–15, 19–20; Sessions, G. (1974) ‘Anthropocentricism and the Environmental Crisis’ Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 2 (1974) 73.

The anthropocentric worldview

5

was not only different from, but better than, the rest of the natural world. For example, Protagoras (570–495 bce) proclaimed that ‘man is the measure of all things’.2 Sophocles (497–406 bce), in his tragedy Antigone, asserted: Wonders are many on earth, and the greatest of these is man. . . He is master of ageless Earth, to his own will bending. . . He is lord of all things living; birds of the air, Beasts of the field, all creatures of sea and land.3

From such a view, it was easy to assert, as Hesiod had earlier, that ‘human beings have no compact of justice with irrational animals’.4 Pythagoras (570–495 bce) and Plato (428–347 bce) helped support the intellectual division of humanity from nature via two belief systems. First, both of these philosophers believed in the separation of the (immortal) soul from the (mortal) body. Following from this belief, the physical world was considered as ultimately a trap for the soul. Second, both were both distrustful of sensation and empirical observation as a source of knowledge. Rather, they both preferred to rely on the use of abstract reason to gain knowledge.5 Pythagoras, despite his own strong ethics in this area, also inadvertently assisted the downgrading of the natural world by his development of conceptual individualism, whereby everything was considered to be isolated, individual units, rather than interconnected wholes. Democritus (460–370 bce) expanded upon this theory, and together they presented a thesis in which there was no creator, and nature worked through blind physical cause.6 Aristotle (384–322 bce) added to these debates, with his assertions that humanity was fundamentally different to the rest of nature due to our rationality.7 He added: ‘nature. . . has made all animals for the sake of man’.8 Lucretius Carus (99–55 bce) ‘longed to smash the constraining locks of nature’s door’,9 while Cicero (106–43 bce) suggested that: 2   Protagoras, quoted in Rodman, J. (1974) ‘The Dolphin Papers’ North American Review (12, 16. The original quote was recorded in Plato, Theaetetis (trans J. Sachs, Pullman Publishing, 2004) section. 152a. 3   Sophocles, ‘Antigone’, in Theban Plays (trans R. Fagle, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1947) 123. 4  Hesiod, Works and Days (trans D. Wender, Penguin, London, 1973) 277. 5   Carone, G. (1998) ‘Plato and the Environment’ Environmental Ethics 20(2): 115; Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach (UCL Press, London) 47–55; Oelschlaeger, M. (1991) The Idea of Wilderness:  From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (Yale University Press, New  York) 57–60; Hargrove, E. (1989) The Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Prentice Hall, New Jersey) 22–3, 35–7; Callicott, J.B. (1983) ‘Traditional American Indians and Traditional Western European Attitudes Towards Nature:  An Overview’, in R. Elliot and A. Gare (eds), Environmental Philosophy (Queensland University Press, Queensland) 231, 236–7; Cottingham, J. (1984) Rationalism (Paladin, London) 18, 27–8, 98; Rodman, J. (1976) ‘The Other Side of Ecology in Ancient Greece’ Inquiry 19, 111. 6   Hughes, J. (1994) Pan’s Travail: Environmental Problems of the Ancient Greeks and Romans (John Hopkins University Press, London) 60–1; Scott, W. (1970) The Conflict Between Atomism and the Conservation Theory (MacDonald, London) 3–10; Russell, B. (1946) A History of Western Philosophy (Allen and Unwin, Woking) 224–240; Whitehead, A.N. (1925) Science and the Modern World (MacMillan, New York) 65, 93, 167. 7  Aristotle, Ethics (trans J.  Tredennick, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 2003) 83; Foster, S. (2002) ‘Aristotle and the Environment’ Environmental Ethics 24(4): 409. 8  Aristotle, Politics (trans R.  Ellis, Everyman, New  York, 1972) 10. Epictetus held very similar views. See Epictetus, Discourses (trans G. Oldfather, Everyman, London, 1910) Ch 10. 9  Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe (trans G. Long, G. Penguin, London, 1951) 229.

6

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The produce of the Earth was designed for those who make use of it, and though some beasts may rob us of a small part, it does not follow that the earth produced it also for them.10

By the time the Middle Ages dawned, much of this thinking was reinvigorated. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), while drawing out the principle that only humanity possessed rationality, reiterated the division between the intellectual and physical worlds, and then denied intrinsic value outside of humanity. He added: ‘dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life and reason whereby to set themselves in motion, they are moved, as it were, by another, by a kind of natural impulse’.11 Marsilio Ficino (1433–1439) built on these thoughts, emphasizing the differences between humanity and the rest of nature due to the human possession of reason.12 Soon after, Giannozzo Manetti (1396–1459) stated, ‘Nothing in the world can be found that is worthy of more admiration than man’.13 Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), added, ‘Man not only makes use of the elements, but also adorns them . . . man who provides generally for all things, both living and lifeless, is a kind of God’.14 From such assertions, it became possible for other great minds of the period, such as Francis Bacon (1561–1626), to push the anthropocentric position as far as possible. Bacon became known for portraying the arts and sciences as encouraging invention so that nature could be changed and made more adaptable to human purposes. He placed an emphasis upon ‘new and useful knowledge’. This, in turn, would ‘stretch the deplorably narrow limits of man’s dominion over the universe to their promised bound’. This was what Bacon called knowledge ‘for the benefit of man, for the relief of man’s estate’. Thus, he argued: ‘Our main object is to make nature serve the business and conveniences of man’. Nature must be ‘bound into service’. He also became known for his focus upon science and his argument that ‘scientific knowledge is technological power over nature’. Ultimately, he hoped humanity would subdue ‘nature with all her children, to bind her to service, and to make her a slave’.15 10  Cicero, as quoted in Passmore, J. (1980) Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Duckworth, London) 14. 11   Aquinas, T. (1922) Summa Theologica (Burns and Oats, London) Vol 2, Q64, 1; LeBlanc, J. (1999) ‘Eco-Thomism’ Environmental Ethics 21(3):  293; Jenkins, W. (2003) ‘Thomistic Roots for Environmental Ethics’ The Journal of Religion 83(3) 401; Halligan, P. (1984) ‘The Environmental Policy Of Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Environmental Law 19:  789–99; Aquinas, Basic Writings (trans A. Pegus, Pullman, New York, 1945) Vol 2: 220. 12   Ficino, M. (1948) ‘Letters’, in E. Casserirer (ed), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago University Press, Chicago) Book 2:1. 13   Manetti, G. (1901) The Dignity and Excellence of Man (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 54. 14  Ficino, M. (1977) ‘The Soul of Man’, in J. Ross (ed), The Portable Renaissance Reader (Harmonsdworth, Penguin, Harmonsdworth) 387. 15  Bacon, F., Novum Organum (trans Purbach and J.  Gibson, Open Court, Chicago, 1995) Book 1, XV. See also: ‘The New Atlantis’, in J. Spedding (ed), The Works of Francis Bacon (Noble, London, 1857) Book 4, 517; Bacon, F. (1977) Essays; The Wisdom of the Ancients and the New Atlantis (Oldham Press, London) 134, 166; Vickers, B. (2008) ‘Francis Bacon, Feminist Historiography and the Dominion of Nature’ Journal of the History of Ideas 69(1): 117; Merchant, C. (2008) ‘Secrets of Nature: The Bacon Debates Revisited’ Journal of the History of Ideas 69(1): 147; Farrington, G. (1970) The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool University Press, Liverpool) 62, 83, 92, 93, 129, 130.

The anthropocentric worldview

7

The dichotomy between the mental and the physical world was cemented with Rene Descartes (1596–1650) and his philosophical method of radical doubt. With this theory he could only establish his own identity by his ability to think (‘I think, therefore I am’). Everything outside of his own identity had a questionable existence. He added to this belief that ‘outside’ surroundings were not important to his material dependence. He built this up from his philosophical cogito. This provided rational verification for his own existence as a separate entity. Everything existed outside of him, and he believed himself to be truly insular. As a result, Descartes divided the world into two metaphysically different and hierarchical orders: mind and matter, of which only humanity had mind/reason. Additionally, like Plato, Descartes came to believe that anything that could not be validated scientifically, in the wider sense, did not exist. Consequently, when the question arose, ‘what is nature made of?’, he suggested that nature consisted of only tangible qualities, like size and weight. Intrinsic or inherent values and other non-quantifiable considerations were denied importance. This lack of value led Descartes to suggest that the material world operate like any machine according to fixed and unvarying rules, with laws that have been built into the machine from the start. It has no sentience (if an animal), creativity, or spontaneity of its own. With particular regards to animals, he suggested that movements and actions of animals can be attributed to ‘nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, [like] . . . a clock’.16 As a consequence of this metaphor, nature, at all levels, was seen as unconnected and possessive of no value, except that which humanity attributed to it. This conclusion was very helpful to Descartes, as it supported his quest to ‘find a practical philosophy to . . . render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature’.17 In the domain of post-Reformation science, atomism was at the heart of the understandings of physics conceived in the seventeenth century, founded upon the achievements of the German astronomer Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), and Isaac Newton (1643–1727). While Kepler put forward the analogy that nature was a machine,18 Galileo insisted that nature should only be thought of mathematically, in terms of shapes, numbers, and 16  Descartes, see section 84 of Meditation Six. See also Soper, K. (2001) ‘Humans, Animals, Machines’ Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 12(3): 85. 17  This quote is from Descartes, Discourses (trans D.  Cress, Hackett, New  York) 78. See also Descartes, Philosophical Writings (trans J. Cottingham, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975) Meditations One, Two, Five (especially sections 71 and 74)  and Six; Miller, M. (2013) ‘Descartes on Animals’ Journal of Philosophical Research 38:  89; Thomas, J. (2006) ‘Does Descartes Deny Consciousness to Animals?’ Ratio 19(3): 336; Hassan, M. (2005) ‘Silencing the Animals: Montaigne, Descartes and the Hyperbole of Reason’ Symploke 13(1): 263; Steiner, G. (1998) ‘Descartes on the Moral Status of Animals’ Archiv Für Geschichte der Philosophie 80(3):  268; Damasio, A. (1994) Descartes’ Error:  Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (Putnam, New  York); Harrison, P. (1992) ‘Descartes on Animals’ Philosophical Quarterly 42(167): 219; Thomas, K. (1984) Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 (Penguin, London) 32–4; Cottingham, R.G. (1978) ‘A Brute to the Brutes? Descartes Treatment of Animals’ Philosophy 53: 551; Smith, S. (1949) ‘The Messes Animals Make in Metaphysics’ Journal of Philosophy 46: 833, 851; Descartes (1966) ‘Letter to Henry Moore’, in N. Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics (Harper and Rowe, New York) 6; Dubus, A. (1993) Man and Nature in the Renaissance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 54–72. 18  Kepler, J.  (1691) ‘Harmonise Mundi’, quoted in Pepper, D. (1990) The Roots of Modern Environmentalism (Routledge, London) 47.

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movements which could be measured and quantified as ‘irreducible and stubborn facts’.19 Newton added to this area, being able to explain the motion of the planets, moons, and comets down to the smallest details, as well as the flow of tides and various other phenomena related to gravity, explainable by equation. Properties which were considered subjective, like beauty or more intangible qualities like life itself, were seen as non-objective elements and were moved to the side of scientific inquiry.20 Newton’s mathematical system, based upon solid, isolated, objective individual units, captured the intellectual world. Many disciplines from this point onwards, from economics to half of the political worldview with liberalism at its root, have drawn directly from his atomistic approach. The importance of abstracted individualism become a central feature of both the Enlightenment, in France, Britain, Germany, and the United States. The philosophies of, inter alia, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778)21 and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716), also proclaimed that the progress of humanity consisted in gaining control over nature and improving on the Earth’s design.22 John Locke (1632–1704) was also part of this thinking, but more influential than most in this area, due to his assertions that humanity was fundamentally different to the rest of nature due to our rationality, but also (as Adam Smith (1723–1790) concurred),23 any nature in a state unaltered by humanity was worthless. Locke added: There can not be subordination among us . . . as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures were made for ours. . . . God who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to best advantage of life and convenience.24

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), with his strong focus upon the distinguishing feature of human rationality, suggested that ‘Man . . . is the ultimate purpose of creation here on Earth . . . [Nature is] . . . merely a means to an end. That end is man’.25 19   Gallileo Gallilei (1621) The Assayer, as reprinted in Clarke, J.J. (ed) (1993) Nature in Question: An Anthology of Ideas and Arguments (Earthscan, London) 85–8. 20   Marshall, P. (1992) Nature’s Web:  An Exploration of Ecological Thinking (Simon and Schuster, London) 69–71; Capra, F. (1982) The Turning Point, Science, Society and the Rising Culture (Simon and Schuster, London) 54–5; Skolimowski, H. (1992) Living Philosophy: Eco-Philosophy as a Tree of Life (Arkana, London) 223–5; Sheldrake, R. (1990) The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God (Rider, London) 44–50; Merchant, C. (1982) The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Period (Wildwood, London) 275–80. 21  Smith, J. (2012) ‘Leibniz on Natural History’ History of Science 50(169):  377; Duffin, S. (2004) ‘The Environmental Views of John Locke’ Environmental Ethics 26: 381; Friedman, J. (2002) ‘Rousseau’s Dream: Nature and Artifice’ Critical Horizons 3(2): 165; Rousseau, H., The Social Contract and Discourses (trans G. Cole, Dent, London, 1954) 184–6. 22   Leibniz, G.W. (1714) Monadology (Lowe, London) 259–71. 23   Smith, A. (1904) An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Methuen, London) I: 32. 24   Locke, J. (1936) Two Treatises of Civil Government (Dent, London) Sections 37, 42–3, 118, 119, 126, 129, 131, 304, 305, 314, 316, 308; Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (trans J. Woolhouse, Penguin, London, 1998) Book II, 88–91. 25  Kant, I. (1963) Lectures on Ethics:  Duties Towards Animals and Spirits (Harper and Rowe, Oxford) 239; Kant, I. Fundamental Principles of Metaphysics and Morals (trans F.  Munzel, Bobbs

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Following through, Georg Hegel (1770–1831)26 and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788– 1860)27 reiterated the fundamental division of reason between humanity and all other nature, while the German idealist, Johan Fitche (1762–1814), argued: I will be the Lord of Nature, and she shall be my servant. I will influence her according to the measure of my capacity, but she will have no influence on me.28

Scholarship for the nineteenth century on this question, despite diverging political philosophies, continued to agree. John Stewart Mill (1806–1873) proposed that ‘it is the duty of man to co-operate with the beneficent powers [of nature], not by imitating but by perpetually striving to amend the course of nature’.29 The social Darwinist, William Sumner (1840–1910), suggested in 1896: It is legitimate to think of Nature as a hard mistress against whom we are maintaining a struggle for existence. All our science and art are victories over her, but when we quarrel amongst ourselves we lose the fruits of our victory just as certainly as we would if she was a human opponent.30

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) suggested that the right way to control human aggression was to direct it away from other people, and direct it towards the rest of the biosphere, ‘combining with the rest of the human community and taking up the attack on nature, thus forcing it to obey human will, under the guidance of science’.31 John Dewey (1859–1952) added that ‘nature is just raw materials to be used by us for the application of ideas’.32 Frederick Nietzsche (1844–1900), with his strong emphasis upon the defining influence of human rationality, and each individual existing within a very atomized existence, was not far behind when he philosophized that humanity was near ‘perfect’ and that the position of humanity with regard to other animals had to be reconsidered. He went so far as to suggest that ‘man’ would progress ‘into a God’.33 Indeed, as the hold of religion on the Western mind weakened, the position of the rational human became even more

Merill, London, 1973) 70, 76, 96, 345; Kant, I. Critique of Judgement (trans C. Meredith, MacMillan, London, 1914) 148. See also Breitenbach, A. (2009) ‘Environmental Ethics According to Kant’ Zeitschrift fur Philosophie 57(3): 377. 26   Hegel, G. Lecture on the Philosophy of World History (trans H.  Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) 48–51. 27   Schopenhaur, A. The World as Will and Representation (trans T. Jones, Kegan Paul, New York, 1969) 228–30. See also Varner, E. (2002) ‘The Schopenhauerian Challenge in Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 7(3): 209. 28   Fichte, J.G. The Vocation of Man (trans P. Preuss, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1987) 29. 29   Mill, J.S. (1858) Nature, The Utility of Religion and Theism (Baker, London) 9–10. See also Clayre, A. (1977) Nature and Industrialisation (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 311–12. 30   Sumner, quoted in Jung, D. (1974) ‘The Splendour of the World’ Atlantic Naturalist 29: 9. 31   Freud, quoted in Midgley, M. (1994) ‘The End of Anthropocentricism?’, in R. Attfield (ed), Philosophy and the Natural Environment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 17, 21. 32   Dewey, as noted in McDonald, H. (2002) ‘Dewey’s Naturalism’ Environmental Ethics 24(2): 189. 33   Nietzsche, F. (1994) Human, All Too Human (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 11. See also Nietzsche, F. (1910) The Joyful Wisdom (Foulis, London) 296–300; Nietzsche, F. (1975) The Gay Science (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 115, 285; Parkes, G. (2005) ‘Nietzsche’s Environmental Philosophy’ Environmental Ethics 27(1): 77.

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elevated, leading Nietzsche to proclaim that ‘the age of human will as the centre of reality’.34 Similar conclusions were arrived at, albeit via diametrically opposite political ideologies, by Karl Marx (1818–1893) and Frederick Engels (1820–1895). Marx suggested that humanity was unique because of the rationality of the species and because it had the ability to produce goods beyond physical need. Moreover, ‘the purely natural material in which no human labour is objectivised . . . has no [intrinsic] value’.35 After asserting that the natural world could only ever have instrumental value, Marx added: ‘the whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labour’.36 From such thinking, Engels hoped that the communist future would be one where: The idea of solidarity could finally . . . grow to a point where it will embrace all mankind and oppose it, as a society of brothers living in solidarity, the rest of the world—the world of minerals, animals and plants.37

Mao Zedong (1893–1906) added that ‘of all the things in the world, people are most precious’,38 while the former Socialist Communist Party suggested that ‘Communism elevates man to a tremendous level of supremacy over nature and makes possible a greater and fuller use of its inherent forces’.39

3.  Reflection in law and policy By the beginning of the twentieth century, many of the above ideas that had culminated in anthropocentric outlooks became implicitly or explicitly accepted by most of the world’s dominant cultures. From there, it was a small step for them to be entered into the legal and policy setting, both nationally and internationally. 34  Nietzsche, F. (1886) Daybreak (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 23. See also McGinn, T. (1974) ‘Ecology and Ethics’ International Philosophical Quarterly 14:154; Ponting, C. (1991) A Green History of the World (Sinclair Stevenson, London) 159–60; Horkheimer, M. (1947) The Eclipse of Reason (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 20–21, 93, 97. 35   Marx, K. (1981) Capital (Foreign Languages Publishing, Moscow) Vol 1, 206–7, Vol 3, 745. See also Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1989) Collected Works (Lawrence and Wishart, Oxford) 48, 404–5; Marx, K. (1956) Economic and Social Manuscripts (Bolton, London) Vol 3. 275–7, 329; McLean, D. (ed) (1978) Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 82, 104, 160, 443, 581; Barber, W.J. (1967) A History of Economic Thought (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 129; Schmidt, A. (1971) The Concept of Nature in Marx (New Left, London) 152, 163, 178. 36   As noted in Parson, H. (1977) Marx and Engels on Ecology (Greenwood Press, Connecticut) 10. See also Burkett, P. (1999) Marx and Nature:  a Red and Green Perspective (St Martin’s Press, New York); Daly, H.E. and Cobb, J. (1989) For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Towards the Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future (Beacon Press, Boston) 111–13. 37   Marx, K. and Engels F. (1989) Collected Works (Lawrence and Wishart, Oxford) XV, 330–1. See also Parson, H. (1977) Marx and Engels on Ecology (Greenwood Press, Connecticut) 55. 38   Mao Tsetung (1954) ‘The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception on History’, in Mao Tsetung, Selected Works (International, New  York) 451, 454. See also Shapiro, J. (2001) Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 39   Noted in Singleton, J. (1986) ‘Do the Greens Threaten the Reds?’ World Today 46: 160. See also Webb, B. and Webb, S. (1941) Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation (Longman, London) Vol 2: 928–9.

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That is, all environmentally related actions, either in terms of conservation and/or the prevention of pollution, were to be done, primarily, for the good of humanity. The environment was to be protected because of instrumental value to humanity. For example, the preamble to the 1900 Convention on the Conservation of Wildlife in Africa noted: Being desirous of saving from indiscriminate slaughter, and of insuring the preservation throughout their possessions in Africa of the various forms of animal life existing in a wild state which are either useful to man or are harmless, have resolved. . .

Such views became common in the decades that followed. Consider Article II, entitled ‘The Fundamental Principle’, of the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, which stated that the parties: .  .  . shall undertake to adopt the measures necessary to ensure conservation, utilisation and development of the soil, water, flora and faunal resources in accordance with scientific principles and with due regard to the best interests of the people.40

The 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment reflected its anthropocentric basis in its very title. This was strengthened further with the emphasis upon protecting the environment for present and future [human] generations. Additionally, the Declaration emphasized (as Mao had done earlier) that ‘of all things in the world, people are the most precious’.41 In 1973 the Council of Europe declared that ‘as befits the genius of Europe, particular attention will be given to . . . protecting the environment so that progress may really be put at the service of mankind’.42 The 1980 World Conservation Strategy, which advocated sustainable development, defined development as ‘the application of human, financial, living and non-living resources to satisfy human needs and to improve the quality of human life’.43 The Strategy also stated that conservation in the modern sense meant: The management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations.44

In 1980 the first Brandt report, North-South: A Program for Survival, defined development as leading to the ‘self fulfilment’ of ‘full human potential’.45 The 1982 World Charter for Nature recognized that:   African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Art 22.   Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972, UN Doc.A/ CONF.48/14, Ch 1, para 7. Maurice Strong continued this theme in his opening address at Stockholm with the suggestion that the international community must ‘put man and his plight at the centre of our concerns’. 42   Declaration of the Council of the European Communities on the Program of Action of the European Community on the Environment 1973, Pt 1, Introduction. 43   See IUCN (1980) World Conservation Strategy, paras 4 and 5: ‘conservation, like development is for people’. Reprinted in Ruster, B. and Simma, B. (eds) (1983) International Protection of the Environment (Oceana, New York) Vol XIII, 427. 44   Paragraph 4. 45   Brandt Commission (1980) North–South: A Program for Survival (Pan Books, London) 223. 40 41

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Ecosystems and organisms, as well as the land, marine and atmospheric resources that are utilised by man, shall be managed to achieve and maintain optimum sustainable productivity.46

In 1986, the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development recognized that: The human person is the central subject of the development process and that development policy should therefore make the human being the main participant and beneficiary of development.47

The following year, the World Commission on Environment and Development stated that ‘sustainable development . . . is a process . . . that is designed to enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations’.48 Likewise, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development stated that ‘human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development’.49 This was reiterated at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development,50 the Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States,51 and the World Summit for Social Development in 1995.52 Such perspectives implicitly continue to accept the proposition suggested in the 1994 Report of the International Commission on Peace and Food, namely that ‘human beings are the most creative, productive and precious resource’.53 Anthropocentric terminology also appears in a number of international environmental documents and texts in the designation of nature as resources, rather than attributing it an intrinsic value of its own accord. This type of classification can be found in the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment54 and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.55 It is also common within a number of specific international agreements, such as the 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement,56 the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,57   General Principle 4.  United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA/Res/41/18, Art 4, para 13. 48  The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 23, 46. 49   Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1, 13, Principle 1. For discussion, see Sands, P. (1993) Greening International Law (Earthscan, London) 1, 12–13; Campiglio, L. (1994) The Environment After Rio (Graham & Trotman, London) 33, 41. 50   Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, A/CONF.171/13, 18 October 1994, Principle 2. 51   Draft Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island States, A/CONF.167/9, 18 March 1994, para 56. 52   Report of the World Summit for Social Development, A/CONF.166/9, 19 April 1995, paras 8, 24, 26(a). 53   Report of the International Commission on Peace and Food (1994), Uncommon Opportunities: An Agenda for Peace and Equitable Development (Zed, London) 27. See also point 14 of the executive summary, with the demands for a ‘human centred theory of development’. 54   UN Doc.A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1. 55   UN Doc.A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1. 56   Cmnd 9240, Misc. 11 (1984), Art 2. 57   As portrayed in its very title. 46 47

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and a number of fishery conservation agreements,58 including the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.59

4. Conclusion Anthropocentricism is the belief that humanity is at the centre of existence. This belief, built up and reinforced over thousands of years of scholarship, is predicated on the idea that humanity is fundamentally different to the rest of the natural world. We are rational, and non-human nature is isolated and valueless. It has been provided as an instrument for our benefit. This anthropocentric foundation has not only provided the basis for most of the justifications for when the natural world is exploited, but, ironically, also for when it is conserved. Accordingly, as the above examples showed, anthropocentricism is also at the core of environmental policy. Historically, this has meant that the natural world will only be conserved on account of the instrumental values attributed to it by humans, rather than being protected because of its own intrinsic value. There are seven common forms of arguments that exemplify this central precept. These are direct self interest economic proposals, religious, aesthetic, cultural, and recreational justifications, and finally arguments that work on the idea of preserving the environment for future generations. These intellectual mindsets lead to discourse and judgements that initiate actions, create preferences, and cement attitudes over why the environment should be protected. The overall problem, as the following chapters on anthropocentric justifications will attempt to show, is that each of these justifications, although good in part, is limited.

58   For example, Art 8 of the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna. Preamble to the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. 59   International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, Preamble, para 1.

III Self Interest 1. Introduction Although it is axiomatic, it is useful to point out the obvious—that humanity exists because of the Earth, its ecosystems, and the species upon it—not the other way around. Very simply, the well-being of every human on the Earth is fundamentally dependent upon non-human species and surrounding ecosystems in local, regional, and global contexts. This has always been the way, and it is more than likely to continue to be the basis of our existence for thousands of years to come. From the food we eat to the purified air we breathe, biodiversity and ecosystems contribute both directly and indirectly to the success, if not the very existence, of humanity. The problem is we often fail to practise adequate conservation and/or control the pollution that threatens to undermine the very physical basis upon which our existence is built.1 To prevent this from happening, it is suggested that we should protect the environment, because it is in our own self interest.

2.  Protecting the environment due to self interest The self interest argument has long and complicated roots. Although traceable to antiquity,2 the argument is more commonly recognized with Adam Smith (1723– 1790), who famously hypothesized that it was possible to achieve the best economic benefit for all, even when all individuals were tending to act in their own self interest within a regulated (as in a basic set of laws to ensure that everyone plays by the same rules) environment.3 1   Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) Ecosystems and Human Well Being:  The Biodiversity Synthesis (World Resources Institute, Washington) 6–8. 2   Plato in the Republic argued that the good of society coincided with the good of the individual. In effect this meant that the individual’s pursuit of self interest was beneficial not only to the individual, but also to society. See Plato, The Republic (trans F. Conford, Oxford University Press, 1974) 2–7, 9–40, 42–66, 102–5, 119–43. 3  Barbalet, J. (2012) ‘Self Interest and the Theory of Action’ The British Journal of Sociology 63(3): 412; Griswold, C. (1989) ‘Adam Smith on Virtue and Self Interest’ The Journal of Philosophy 86(11): 681; Hollander, S. (1977) ‘Adam Smith and the Self Interest Axiom’ The Journal of Law and Economics 20(1): 133.

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This axiom of self interest, highly persuasive in the field of economics, spread to multiple other disciplines over subsequent centuries. Within environmental thinking, the idea that the pursuit of self interest will bring conservation benefits for all is common. Most justifications for environmental protection are derived from some form of self interest, with some of the most commonly recognized ones being built on this idea thousands of years ago. For example, in the Old Testament when God commanded Noah to take all the available species onto the ark, God made it clear that the species were saved, inter alia, so that the chosen ones would inherit a ‘land in which they would lack nothing’. Moreover: [U]‌pon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands are they delivered . . . Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things.4

That is, God commanded that the species be conserved for the benefit of humanity, not because they were valuable in themselves. This idea has continued through the ages. In modernity, self interest is restricted to the more specific idea that the survival and prospering of humanity is linked to the survival and prospering of the biosphere and its interdependent ecosystems. This is a commonly articulated argument, by which conservation and the ethics surrounding it is justified by reference to direct human interests. That is, something within the environment is protected, and law is created, purely because of its direct and self-interested benefit to humans.5 In this setting, the justification to protect the environment is not because of its inherent values or holistic ecological values whereby conservation benefits all species and ecosystems equally, or metaphysical values linking the individual with the ecosystem. This thinking is a much shallower type of anthropocentric self interest.6 Perhaps the foremost example of where acting in self interest to achieve a conservation goal is with climatic change. In this area, ‘humanity is conducting an   Genesis 7: 8–9; 9:1–3; Deuteronomy 8:7–9.  Beardsley, T. (2007) ‘Enlightening Self Interest’ BioScience 57(7):  547; Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and Political Theory:  Towards an Ecocentric Approach (UCL Press, London) 37; Lewis, M.W. (1992) Green Delusions:  An Environmentalist’s Critique of Radical Environmentalism (Duke University Press, London) 176–9; Porritt, J. (1984) Seeing Green (Blackwell, Oxford) 117; Ehrenfeld, D. (1978) The Arrogance of Humanism (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 184; Cooper, D.E. (1992) The Environment in Question: Ethics and Global Issues (Routledge, London) 147, 152, 165, 178–9; Katz, E. (1979) ‘Utilitarianism and Preservation’ Environmental Ethics 1: 362; Passmore, J. (1974) ‘Removing the Rubbish: Reflections on the Ecological Craze’ Encounter 23: 19. 6   For the wider, most holistic view of self interest, see Fox, W. (1990) Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations For Environmentalism (Boston, Shambhala) 225–43; Devall, B. (1990) Simple in Means, Rich in Ends; Practising Deep Ecology (Green Print, Surrey) 35–72; Naess, A. (1989) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 8–9, 85–6, 170–81; Mathews, F. (1988) ‘Conservation and Self Realisation: A Deep Ecology Perspective’ Environmental Ethics 10:  351; Callicott, J. (1986) ‘The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology’ Environmental Ethics 8:  301, 313; Fabel, A. (1994) ‘Environmental Ethics and the Question of Cosmic Purpose’ Environmental Ethics 16: 303, 312–14; Curtin, D. (1994) ‘Dogen, Deep Ecology and the Ecological Self ’ Environmental Ethics 16: 195, 197, 203–5, 212–13. Cf. Plumwood, V. (1991) ‘Nature, Self and Gender’ Hypatia 6: 1, 3–7, 10–22; O’Neil, J. (1993) Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (Routledge, London) 24–5, 149–51. 4 5

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unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war’.7 This position is held due to the physical impacts that have already begun to occur, and are expected to accelerate, upon the weather, cryosphere, oceans (in terms of acidification, oxygen depletion, sea level rise, and temperature increases), terrestrial biological systems (from endangered species to entire ecosystems), fresh water, and human intrastructure and needs (from health, agriculture, migration through to concerns over potential armed conflict).8 In some instances, such as with small-island states, their very survival may be threatened. Less extreme but also convincing self-interest justifications for conservation can be found in the reasons to protect biodiversity, and agricultural biodiversity in particular. This category includes the variety and variability of animals, plants, and micro-organisms in addition to the species and ecosystems which are necessary to sustain key functions of the agro-ecosystem. This cornerstone of human existence is often cemented by the raw material that is taken from the wild, from which entirely new or improved food types are developed and output is expanded. For example, when disaster (such as a blight on coffee plantations), large-scale crops like coffee plantations, plant breeders return to Ethiopia, the home of wild (Arabica) coffee plants. From these areas come new, unadulterated, raw germplasm, which is often used to find solutions to ever-evolving problems or develop new strains of coffee. This approach applies to most types of agricultural biodiversity, in which direct self interest fuels a perpetual search for new strains.9 A similar self-interest justification can be adduced for the conservation of species with medical value to humanity. This value has been known for thousands of years because the history and contemporary practice of many aspects of medicine (including ‘natural’ remedies) and narcotics have been directly linked to the natural world. In contemporary times, it is estimated that between 50,000 and 70,000 plant species are used as medicines. Approximately half of synthetic drugs have a natural origin, including 10 of the 25 highest selling drugs in the United States. Of all the anti-cancer drugs available, 42 per cent are natural and 34 per cent are semi-natural.10 Similarly, the non-plant world also offers medical benefits 7  UNEP (1988) Proceedings of the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) vii. 8   For the study of these impacts, see the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Reports. In particular, IPCC (1996) Climate Change 1995:  Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigations of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) iii–x; IPCC (2001) Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge); and IPCC (2007) Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). See also Gillespie, A. (2006) Climate Change, Ozone Depletion and Air Pollution in International Law (Nijoff, The Netherlands) Ch 5. 9   See Maxted, N. (ed) (2008) Crop Wild Relative Conservation and Use (Cabi Publishing, New York); Anon (2008) ‘Conserving Crop Wild Relatives’ SPECIES 49: 32; Anon (2004) ‘Botanical Treasure Haul’ New Scientist (28 August) 4; Anon (2000) ‘Fading Aroma’ New Scientist (24 June) 14. 10   Anon (2009) ‘Plant Cells Harnessed to Build New Drugs’ New Scientist (24 January) 19; Holmes, B. (2005) ‘African Herb Yields its Anti Addiction Secret’ New Scientist (22 January) 11; Anon (2005) ‘Migraine Herb’s Cancer Promise’ New Scientist (12 March) 17; Ross, I. (2003) Medicinal Plants of the World (New Jersey, Humana Press); Emboden, W. (2003) Narcotic Plants (London, Studio Vista);

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for humanity, ranging from the medicinal leech to cancer-fighting sea sponges, to small animals like some frogs (and their ability to be fully frozen and then revived), through to bears (and the study of osteoporosis, diabetes, and renal disease), primates (and understanding infectious diseases and the development of vaccines), and sharks (for anti-microbial, anti-ageing, and hunger-suppression studies).11 Closely akin to the areas where it can be shown that it is necessary to protect species for our own self interest is the area of ‘radical uncertainties’ that surround exactly what the environment can and cannot do, or which species are, or are not, important to the functioning of ecosystems. The ‘radical uncertainty argument’ (as a self-interested justification to protect the environment) appears especially pertinent with theoretical discussions relating to large-scale, multi-connected problems such as the entire ecosystem of the Earth, as seen through the Gaia thesis, through to more global specific environmental problems. This argument is also recognized with regard to biodiversity and is commonly manifested in the concept of the ‘web of life’, in which all species, as part of a tightly interconnected ecology, play an interdependent part. This type of view is commonly articulated in the twenty-first century, with a number of studies suggesting that no species can survive in isolation. Instead, all species depend on one another, directly or indirectly, for their survival.12 It is from such interdependence that many argue, from a self-interest perspective, against the loss of any species. As Aldo Leopold (1887–1948) suggested: If the [living world], in the course of eons, has built something we like but do not understand, then who but a fool would discard seemingly useless parts? To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering.13

Good examples of this idea of species interrelationships, and the need to keep all of the pieces, involve what are known as ‘keystone’ species. A change in the abundance of a keystone species may lead to unexpected changes in the abundance of another species. A useful example of a keystone species can be seen in the island of Mauritius, where the last few aged survivors of a tree called Calvaria major are failing to produce any more saplings because the seeds which the old trees still drop in abundance must pass through the gizzard of a dodo before they can germinate. Unfortunately, the dodo was made extinct in 1681. Other examples exist of where

Nicolaou, K. (1996) ‘Taxoids: New Weapons Against Cancer’ Scientific American (June) 84; Joyce, C. (1994) Earthly Goods: Medicine Hunting in the Rainforest (Boston, Little Brown) 226–34, 251–68. 11   Stern, V. (2009) ‘Coral Fights Antibiotic Resistance’ Scientific American Earth 19(2): 6; Holmes, B.  (2005) ‘Lowly Sea Animals Boast Genetic Armory’ New Scientist (5 December) 10. Fullick, A. (2002) ‘The Spice of Life’ New Scientist (7 December) 2; Swedlow, J. (2000) ‘Nature’s Remedies’ National Geographic 197(4): 98. 12   Brown, N. (ed) (1994) Ethics and Agenda 21: Moral Implications of a Global Consensus (United Nations, New York) 61, 64–7, 70–1, 77–81; Lovelock, J. (1979) Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford University Press, Oxford); Joseph, L.E. (1990) Gaia: The Growth of an Idea (Arkana, London) 207;Wilson, E.O. (1985) ‘The Little Things that Run the World’, in C. Pierce (ed), People, Penguins and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics (Wadworth, London) 139–42; Weizsacker, C. (1993) ‘Competing Notions of Biodiversity’, in W. Sachs (ed), Global Ecology: A New Area of Political Conflict (Zed, London) 117–27. 13   Leopold, A. (1953) Round River (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 146–7.

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species, assumed to be isolated from the ecosystem, have been removed at great cost. For example, when Mao Zedong (1893–1976) declared a three-day war on songbirds and sparrows in 1958, claiming that they consumed too much grain, so many were killed that the remnant populations could not control the proliferation of insects and plagues of locusts the following year. Elsewhere, sea otters play a major role in the survival of giant kelp forests along the coasts of California and Alaska by consuming the sea urchins which may otherwise plague the kelp forests. Seagrass beds are also kept healthy by the recycling of nutrients through green turtles, while Caribbean reef sharks keep the species that graze on reef vegetation in check. Another example comes from England where the Large Blue butterfly became extinct in 1979. This occurred when the local rabbits were wiped out by disease. With the rabbits gone, long grass grew, and the short grass preferred by wood ants, and the Large Blue butterfly for laying eggs, disappeared. A different species of ant came to dominate the area, which ate the eggs of the Large Blue butterfly.14 From such thinking, even highly undesirable species such as deadly pathogens like smallpox or polio are conserved and not made extinct because often their roles are not completely clear and there may be future benefits in having the choice to utilize them.15 Another self-interested benefit that species may possess is their ‘indicator status’, whereby they can reflect detrimental impacts of environmental change before they impact upon humanity. Excellent biological indicators include bryophytes (mosses, liverworts, and hornworts) and dragonflies, as both are very sensitive to water and air quality. Birds can also be excellent biological indicators, for example canaries used in coal mines.16 A final example of self interest can be seen in the recreational value of the protection of wilderness. In this context, as the 1964 Wilderness Act of the United States suggested: A wilderness, in contrast to those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognised as an area where the earth and its community are untrammelled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.17

14  Marshall, M.  (2013) ‘Kill All the Big Beasts:  Impoverish an Ecosystem’ New Scientist (17 August) 13; Nicol, S.  (2011) ‘Givers of Life’ New Scientist (9 July) 36; Anon (2011) ‘If Birds Go Extinct, Plants Could Follow’ New Scientist (12 February) 18; Crawford, D. (2008) Shark (Reaktion, London) 15; Fullick, A. (2002) ‘The Spice of Life’ New Scientist (7 December) 2; Spotila, J. (2007) Sea Turtles: A Complete Guide to Their Biology, Behaviour and Conservation (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore) 177; Russell, S. (2003) An Obsession with Butterflies (Basic, New York) 36–7; Doak, D. (1993) ‘The Keystone-Species Concept in Ecology and Conservation’ Bioscience 43: 219. 15  MacKenzie, D.  (1999) ‘Good ol’ Milkweed’ New Scientist (16 October) 24; Editor (2002) ‘One Good Reasons to Let Smallpox Live’ New Scientist (26 January) 3; Nowak, D.  (2002) ‘Stay of Execution’ New Scientist (26 January) 12; Anon (2002) ‘Reprieve for Smallpox’ New Scientist (19 January) 13. 16   Hallingback, T. (2000) Mosses, Liverworts and Hornworts (Gland, IUCN) 8; IUCN (2001) Dragonflies: Status Survey and Conservation Action Plan (Gland, IUCN); IUCN (2001) Grebes: Status Survey and Conservation Action Plan (Gland, IUCN) 10. 17   Wilderness Act 1964 16 USC 1131–6.

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It is in these wilderness areas, roped off from humanity for anything but visitation, that it is believed that individuals can obtain great satisfaction of their deepest psychological needs, through which they reconcile and reconnect themselves to wider environments. This idea, with strong connections to the early centuries of Christianity, whereby the first theologians sought isolated shelter from worldly distractions in the wilderness, would continue to grow in popularity throughout the Middle Ages, before reappearing in the nineteenth century.18 At this point, the argument was presented as one whereby wilderness was viewed as essential, and to protect the wilderness is to protect the values that are important to society. Indeed, parts of the environment are believed to play a unique role in providing leisure settings where social bonds are created and enhanced. On the larger view, wilderness has inspired many activities, from the logging camps of the 1930s Depression to modern day summer camps and Outward Bound courses. What is valued here is the challenge of physical and mental endurance, in teamwork or alone, with reflection on skills acquired and values learnt. This approach mirrors the oft-quoted dictum of Henry Thoreau (1816–1862) that ‘in wilderness is the preservation of the world’.19

3.  Recognition in law and policy One of the first, generic, recognitions of the self-interest argument in the international arena occurred in 1968 when the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution expressing concern about the deterioration of the environment—and clearly linked it to the effect it was having on humanity.20 Four years later, at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, it was recognized that ‘Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat. . .’.21 The reasons for conservation were strictly in terms of human interest, of which careful planning to safeguard the natural resources of the Earth for present and future generations was deemed essential.22 It was added that ‘particular attention should be paid to those species of wildlife that may serve as indicators for future wide environmental disturbances, and an ultimate   Aberth, J. (2013) An Environmental History of the Middle Ages (Routledge, London) 127–9.   Thoreau, H.J. (1906) Excursions and Poems (Houghton, Boston, 1978) 224. See also Lupp, G. (2011) ‘ Wilderness:  A  Designation for European Landscapes?’ Land Use Policy 28(3):  594; Lutz, A. (1999) ‘Wilderness’ Environment and Behavior 31(2):  259; Hill, T.E. (1994) ‘Ideals of Human Excellence and the Preservation of the Natural Environment’, in L. Guren and D. Jamieson (eds), Reflecting on Nature: Readings in Environmental Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 98, 106– 9; Oelschlaeger, M. (1991) The Idea of Wilderness (Yale University Press, New York) 1, 164–8, 281–2, 317, 320–1, 352–3; Burch, B. (1979) ‘The Social Meaning of Forests’ Humanist 39: 39; Hammitt, W. (1982) ‘Cognitive Dimensions of Wilderness Solitude’ Environment and Behaviour 14(4): 478; Merton, T. (1971) ‘The Wild Places’, in R. Disch (ed), The Ecological Conscience: Values for Survival (Prentice Hall, New Jersey) 37, 41; Woodell, S. (1969) ‘Wilderness and the American Mind’ Biological Conservation 1(4): 350. 20   Problems of the Environment, UNGA/Res/2398 (XXIII) 1968. 21   Stockholm Declaration, UN Doc.A/CONF.48/14 (1972), Principle 4. 22   Stockholm Declaration, Principle 2. 18 19

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impact upon human populations’.23 From such goals, of which the United Nations Environment Programme was formed, the foundation objective was recognized as one to ‘anticipate and prevent threats to human health’.24 The importance of self interest to survival was a theme that dominated the 1980s as the Cold War threatened nuclear Armageddon, and was repeated in numerous international commissions.25 These self-interested ideals quickly followed into environmental thinking of an international dimension. For example, in 1982 the World Charter for Nature enunciated that ‘Lasting benefits from nature depend upon the maintenance of essential ecological processes and life support systems, and upon the diversity of life forms’.26 Five years later in 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development suggested that: There are environmental trends that threaten to radically alter the planet, that threaten the lives of many species upon it, including the human species . . . we must be ever mindful of the risk of endangering the survival of life on Earth . . . mutual self-interest . . . is essential to human progress .  .  . Human survival and well-being could depend on the success of elevating sustainable development to a global ethic.27

Similar conclusions were echoed in the 1990 report Challenge of the South28 and the 1995 report Our Global Neighbourhood, which suggested that it was essential to seriously address the international environmental problems because ‘they pose a danger to the very survival, not just the well-being, of whole societies. In this sense, together with nuclear war, they constitute the ultimate security risk’.29 The importance of self-interested actions as a basis for conservation was also clear at the 1992 Earth Summit. For example, in the area of global warming, the international community agreed with the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 that ‘the parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects’.30 Similar approaches were found in the Convention on Biological Diversity, also of 1992. With particular regard to the example cited above—agricultural biodiversity—unlike most other forms of biodiversity, was directly linked to international initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals31 and tied into the 2020   See Recommendation 29.   UNEP (1975) ‘Policy Objectives’, in B. Ruster and B. Simma (eds), International Protection of the Environment (Oceana, New York) Vol 1, 184. 25   Palme Commission (1980) Disarmament and Security Issues (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 52; Brandt Commission (1983) North-South: Common Crisis (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 9; Brandt Commission (1980) North-South: A Program for Survival (Pan, London) 47. 77. 26   World Charter for Nature 1982, Preamble. 27   World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 32–3, 90, 148, 308. 28   South Commission (1990) The Challenge of the South (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 212. 29  Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 83. 30   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992, Art 3. 31   Note the Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity on Agriculture on this point, namely (2009) Decision IX/1, para 1, and (2000) Decision V/5, para 5. 23 24

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conservation targets for the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity.32 Similarly, the idea of protecting species with an indicator value went on to be found in international wildlife law with arrangements covering, inter alia, Great Apes, bats, seals, and even the Great Bustard. All claim that these respective species are ‘key indicators’ for the health of their surrounding habitats.33 Similarly, the importance of wilderness, as directly linked to human self interest through the recreational value of such places (and/or species), came to be found in multiple international treaties dealing with, inter alia, endangered species,34 wetlands,35 migratory species,36 as well as regional conservation treaties covering areas as diverse as Europe37 and the South Pacific.38 In Antarctica, the protection of its ‘wilderness significance’ was a particularly highlighted obligation to the signatories of the 1991 Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection;39 while in 2012 the importance of the recreational value of biodiversity was reaffirmed at Rio+20.40

4.  Limits of the approach of self interest The limit with the self-interest argument, with particular regards to wilderness, is threefold. First, not only do many people not believe that wilderness is necessary for their psychological well-being, they may actually dislike it, preferring urban environments. Second, the idea of wilderness as an essentially static piece of the environment without human intervention is at odds with most studies in science, which reflect an ecological nature that is constantly in flux. Even if the idea is accepted, it can only act as a justification to protect some areas, as few places remain true wilderness, and, even if they do, only a sample would be required to satisfy this need. Finally, the cultural context of the wilderness idea, whereby people are only allowed to visit, and not live in, the highly protected environment is sometimes the direct antithesis of the views of many developing countries, which view this type of wilderness idea as a type of conservation unsuitable to their needs, as their people exist within, not outside of, the protected areas.41   (2010) ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020’ Decision X/2. See target 13.   Global Strategy for the Survival of Great Apes and their Habitat, Annex, para 13; Great Bustard Memorandum of Understanding, point 10; Wadden Sea Seals Agreement, Preamble. For bats, see (2010) ‘Bats as Indicators for Biodiversity’ Resolution 6.14. 34   Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, Preamble. 35   Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 1971, Preamble. 36   Convention on the Conservation of Species of Migratory Animals 1979, Preamble. 37   Berne Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife, Preamble. 38   Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific 1976, Art 1. See Kiss, A. (ed) (1982) Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment (UNEP, Kenya) 463. 39   Madrid Protocol, Art 3(2)(b)(vi). 40   Earth Summit 2012, The Future We Want, A/CONF.216/XX, para 197. 41  DeLancey, C. (2012) ‘An Ecological Concept of Wilderness’ Ethics and the Environment 17(1): 25; Grumbine, R. (1994) ‘Wilderness, Wise Use and Sustainable Development’ Environmental Ethics 16: 227, 230–1; Gomez, A. (1992) ‘Taming the Wilderness Myth’ Bioscience 42(4): 271; Engels, J.R. (1990) The Ethics of Environment and Sustainable Development: Global Challenge, International Response (Belhaven, London) 145. Birch, T. (1990) ‘The Incarceration of Wilderness: Wilderness Areas 32 33

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The difficulties with the self-interested argument for the conservation of species is that if conservation justifications are only applied to species with direct self-interest benefit to humanity, many will be without protection. This is because many, perhaps most, species are of little present or potential self interest from the perspective of the ecological needs of humanity, either individually or as components of an ecosystem. Even if it has got a self-interested value, this may only last until it can be replaced by a better alternative.42 A  good example of this is agricultural biodiversity, where, despite 7,000 and 10,000 species having been cultivated and/or collected for food since agriculture began about 12,000 years ago, in current times the core collection of key crops is remarkably small and highly vulnerable upon the, albeit very economically valuable, monocultures of only a few species. That is, in the twenty-first century, 90 per cent of the world’s calories come from only 30 crops, and 50 per cent from just rice, maize, wheat, and potato. Only 12 plant species provide 75 per cent of the total human food supply and only 14 mammal and bird species make up more than 90 per cent of global domestic livestock production. Accordingly, while diversity from outside the few main crops is important, this argument can easily be overstated.43 The third, and final, difficulty of the self-interest argument is that it—self interest—does not always coincide when needed. Besides philosophical difficulties of adopting ethics which are purely egotistical, the greater problem is that in practice, despite the assertion that a common goal to the benefit of all can be achieved if everyone pulls together at the same time, in many instances different actors pull at different speeds, different weights, and/or in different directions—ultimately to the detriment of all. This is because self interests are not always the same.44 The point is, especially in environmental problems, that self-interests need to be regulated, not amalgamated, so that an equality of effort and output is achieved. Otherwise, the conservation goal will not be achieved. In environmental thinking, Garrett Hardin (1915–2003) forcefully demonstrated this with his famous article, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, whereby the unregulated pursuit of self interest as Prisons’ Environmental Ethics 12:  3, 23; Guha, R. (1989) ‘Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique’ Environmental Ethics 11: 71, 75; Callicott, J. (1991) ‘The Wilderness Idea Revisited: The Sustainable Development Alternative’ The Environmental Professional 13: 236; Pearce, F. (1991) Green Warriors: The People and Politics Behind the Environmental Revolution (Bodley, London) 77. 42   Doremus, H. (1991) ‘Patching the Ark:  Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity’ Ecology Law Quarterly 18: 265, 277; Scherer, D. (1983) Ethics and the Environment (Prentice Hall, New Jersey) 12, 15, 82–3; Livingston, J. (1981) The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation (Toronto University Press, Toronto) 22, 42. 43  Editor (2000) ‘Let Them Eat Caju’ New Scientist (2 September) 3; Anon (2000) ‘Ripe for Revival’ (2000) New Scientist (2 September) 42; Edwards, R. (1996) ‘Tomorrow’s Bitter Harvest’ New Scientist (17 August) 14; Fowler, C. (1990) The Threatened Gene: Food, Politics and the Loss of Genetic Diversity (Lutterworth, Cambridge) 44–7; Kloppenberg, J. (1988) First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology: 1492–2000 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 50–65. 44  Singer, P. (1993) Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press) 322–7; Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations (Clarendon, Cambridge) 403–11, 507–15; Gauthier, D. (1970) Morality and Rational Self Interest (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey) 56, 72–80, 113–14; Kant, I. (1981) Critique of Practical Reason (Routledge, London) Book II, Chapter ii, § 5; Kant, I. (1948) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Hutchinson, London) 61–2, 64–7, 74, 80–92, 95–107.

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by everyone leads directly to conservation failure.45 Specifically, as has been shown in many instances, failure to regulate many situations of environmental concern may actually lead to those with different self interests adopting actions which are the antithesis of environmental goals. This is because their self interests are more advanced by non-cooperation since their self interests are different to those of others, and individual interests are bettered by unrestrained competition, rather than cooperation. Simply, conservation may not be in their best interests.46 This problem is not only recognized in the theory of environmental problems; it is also well recognized in international affairs, in which the theory of states pursuing self interest to the detriment of other states is identified within the theories of realism, as reflected in the works of Thucydides (460–395 bce),47 Machiavelli (1469–1527),48 and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1689).49 In this world, competition is the norm between all self-interested state actors, but this does not lead to the satisfaction of shared goals. Rather, conflict—not cooperation—is the norm, as the self interests are all different and, more often than not, opposing. This paradigm of international relations remains convincing to many scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, particularly in the area of international environmental law.50 Climate change is a good example, where the pursuit of self interest does not necessarily lead to conservation success. Here, if the goal is to keep climatic change within boundaries of which ecosystems can successfully adapt, reductions of emissions of greenhouse gases in the order of 60 per cent may be required. However, despite the international community accepting the broad goal of keeping climate change within safe ecological levels, over 20 years of negotiations have failed to reach any meaningful agreements. The high tide mark in this area, the Kyoto Protocol, only ever achieved a five per cent reduction, and that was only for industrialized countries. The reasons for this failure are multiple, but relate, primarily, to debates   Hardin, G. (1968) ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ Science 162: 1244.   Schneider, F. (2013) ‘Satisfaction with Democracy and Collective Action Problems: The Case of the Environment’ Public Choice 155(2): 109; Ya-Po, Y. (2012) ‘Gresham’s Law in Environmental Protection’ Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 14(2): 103; Holley, C. (2010) ‘Subverting Self Interest and Limiting Discretion’ Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 35(1): 127; IIg, M. (2004) ‘Environmental Harm and Dilemmas of Self Interest’ Tulane Environmental Law Journal 18(1): 59; Lyons, M. (1999) ‘Political Self Interest and U.S Environmental Policy’ Natural Resources Journal 39(2):  271; Oye, K. (1994) ‘Self Interest and Environmental Management’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 6(4): 593; Miller, B. (1992) ‘Collective Action and Rational Choice: Place, Community and the Limits to Individual Self Interest’ Economic Geography 68(1): 22; Holmes, T. (1990) ‘Self Interest, Altruism and Health Risk’ Land Economics 66(2): 140. 47  Thucydides (1954) History of the Pelopennesian War (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 80–1, 199, 214–15, 402–3. 48   Machiavelli (1992) The Prince (Quality Paperbooks, London) 37–9, 50–6, 82–3. 49   Hobbes, T. (1976) Leviathan (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 151, 160–1, 186, 189, 224. 50   Kegley, C.W. (1995) The Global Agenda:  Issues and Perspective’s (McGraw, New  York) 35–44, 119–231; Little, R. and Smith, M. (1993), Perspectives on World Politics (Routledge, London) 1–139, 405–69; Panjabi, R. (1992) ‘Idealism and Self-Interest in International Law:  The Rio Dilemma’ Californian Western International Law Journal 23:  189, 194–6; Boyle, F.A. (1985) World Politics and International Law (Duke University Press, Durham) 3–16, 159–70, 171–6; Schwarzenberger, G. (1964) Power Politics (Stevens, London) 57–94; Ophuls, W. (1977) Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (Freeman, San Francisco) 208–10; Morgenthau, H. (1940) ‘Positivism, Functionalism and International Law’ American Journal of International Law 34: 261. 45 46

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about who is responsible for what, and which countries should be expected to incur greater economic costs in reducing greenhouse gas emissions than others. Differences in causation historically, and in the future, and differences between per capita and sovereign emissions, make this a difficult area to navigate. The fact that not all countries will be impacted upon by the physical changes caused by climate change to the same extent accentuates the difficulties in this area. This is especially so because, in ecological terms (and depending on the scale of the increase in temperature), there will be both winners and losers in climate change.51 The end result is that because not all countries will share the same costs and/or benefits, they each have very different self interests, from the ecological to the economic. It is the pursuit of these that has made the acceptance of any meaningful targets in this area elusive.52

5. Conclusion The pursuit of self interest as a justification to protect the environment underlies all anthropocentric thinking for conservation. In the context of this chapter, the self interest is more in terms of direct benefits, such as those related to mental and/ or physical well-being. For example, wilderness is conserved because it is good for the human spirit, biodiversity is protected because of its value as food or medicine, while the climate is kept stable because catastrophic impacts upon humanity may otherwise result. Accordingly, species or ecosystems are protected, or pollution is avoided, because the actions directly benefit humanity. The difficulties with this approach is that it is very selective and, in many areas, debatable. The wilderness justification is contended by many individuals, let alone countries, which see the idea of human-free areas as a cultural imposition. The food and medicine argument, along with the idea of keystone species, is weakened by the fact that the vast majority of species have no direct benefit to humanity. Even in the key areas of food and medicine, the argument, at best, conserves only a few high values types. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the self-interest argument assumes that both the costs and impacts will be shared equally by those who should cooperate to share the same conservation outcome. In many areas, especially the high risk areas such as climate change, where cooperation is needed more than anywhere else, this is not the case. Political, philosophical, historical, and economic differences all point to very different interpretations of how, or why, countries choose to respond to this problem. In short, the pursuit of direct self interest in this sphere does not necessarily lead to successful cooperative conservation outcomes. 51   Dutkiewics, S. (2013) ‘Winners and Losers:  Ecological and Biogeochemical Changes’ Global Biogeochemical Cycles 27(2):  463; Dutkiewicz, S. (2013) ‘Winners and Losers:  Ecological and Biogeochemical Changes in a Warming Ocean’ Global Biochemical Cycles 27(2):  463; Hamer, K. (2010) ‘The Search for Winners and Losers in a Sea of Climate Change’ Ibis 151(1): 3; Obrien, K. (2003) ‘Winners and Losers in the Context of Global Change’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 93(1): 89. 52   Gillespie, A. (2006) Climate Change, Ozone Depletion and Air Pollution in International Law (Brill, The Netherlands) Ch V.

IV Economics 1. Introduction Economic justifications for the protection of the environment are probably the most popular protection rationales in environmental debates. As the thinking evolved out of the 1960s, environmental economics came to represent the mainstream view regarding the explanation of the causes of many environmental problems and their solutions.1 In time, a supplementary steam of thinking on free market ideas (such as the importance of private property) has grown to occupy a prominent part in the dialogue in this area. However, for the purpose of this book, the focus is only upon environmental economics, and the core idea that the environment can be given an economic value that justifies its conservation. The other questions on supporting free market ideas only supplement and help enforce these economic values. The difficulty, as this chapter will attempt to show, is that although the economic arguments are strong, they remain limited by considerations of ethics, politics, markets, and even economic theory itself, with the theories of discounting.

2.  The idea Sophisticated methods have been evolving over the last four decades which attempt to maximize, and display, the net economic value of the environment. It is believed that in high economic valuations lies the justification for conserving the environment. This is not a new idea. For example, in 1910, Gifford Pinchot (1865–1946), the Chief Forester of the United States, argued that if it could be shown that the net benefits to society from conservation were higher than any other form of land use, then there was a clear case for conservation. The weighing of these benefits, he concluded, must be through economic considerations. Thus, if the net economic

1  Slavikova, L. (2013) ‘From Cost Benefit to Institutional Analysis in the Economics of the Environment’ Contemporary Economics 7(2): 65.

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benefits of conservation were higher than those of alternative uses of investment, a convincing case for conservation could be established.2 Despite the persuasive simplicity of this argument, and the overwhelming adopting of the use of cost-benefit thinking in regulatory structures all over the world (including in environmental regulatory settings)3 for the following century, it struggled because of one large obstacle: the economic value of conservation was often invisible or very small. The base problem is that a large number of debates about multiple forms of development and/or policy choice are, when looking at the economic side of the ledger, biased towards the economic figures which are easiest to quantify. Consequently, the costs and benefits that are more difficult to measure, and harder to attribute economic data to, tends to be ignored or undervalued. This is a particular problem in the environmental context of which, as Elizabeth Dowdeswell, the former Executive Director for the United Nations Environment Program explained, ‘until recently, the language of mainstream economics has defined the economy in market terms, without giving much attention to non-market elements such as subsidies provided by eco-system services . . . this must change’.4 The later successor to Dowdeswell, Achim Steiner, suggested in 2012 that ‘the environmental community has been scared of the economy for too long . . . green economics is the key to. . . . sustainability’.5 The key, in the words of the World Bank, is that ‘markets and governments [need] to price the environment appropriately’.6 Thereafter, as the foundation economist of the environment, David Pearce (1941–2005), suggested, ‘environmental concerns must be properly integrated into economic policy from the highest level to the most detailed level’.7 If this is done correctly, it is assumed, as the World Commission on Environment and Development suggested in 1987, that more (economically) rational choices can be made, and one of the primary justifications for a lack of conservation— that there is little or no economic cost in destroying parts of the ecology—can be avoided.8 To many, this ability to put robust economic evaluations against options 2  Pinchot, G. (1910) The Fight for Conservation (Harcout Brace, New  York) 38–41. See also Pinchot, G. (1947) Breaking New Ground (Harcourt, New York) 263, 325–6. 3   See generally Addler, M. (2006) New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis. (Oxford University Press, Oxford); Mishan, E. (2006) Cost Benefit Analysis (Routledge, London); Boardman, A. (2006) Cost Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice (Pearson, London). 4   Dowdeswell, E. (1995) Speech at the World Summit for Social Development, UNEP/1995/3. 5   Steiner, as noted in Pearce, F. (2012) ‘Earth Summit: Give Nature a Cash Value’ New Scientist (30 June) 10. 6   World Bank (1992) World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 71. 7   Pearce, D. et al. (1989) Blueprint for a Green Economy (Earthscan, London) xiv. 8   World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 220. See also Munasinghe, M. (1993) Environmental Economics and Sustainable Development (World Bank, Washington) 4–5; Barbier, E. (1992) ‘Economic Policy and Sustainable Natural Resource Management’, in J. Holmberg (ed), Policies for a Small Planet (Earthscan, London) 65, 66; Pearce, D. (1990) The Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment (Harvester, London) 41; Cairncross, F. (1991) Costing the Earth (Economist Books, London) 91; Barbier, E. (1990) ‘The Economic Framework for Natural Resource Management’, in N. Polunin, (ed), Maintenance of the Biosphere. Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Environmental Future (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh) 199.

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for conservation opposed to options for destruction, so that decision-makers can then compare like with like, is seen as highly desirable. This is particularly so because it allows previously difficult-to-quantify values in this area to be estimated in economic terms, which then allows debates to proceed, and decisions to be made, in a neutral, non-subjective language. That is, difficult decisions can be made because everything can be reduced to a common medium which all humans understand—economic value.9 To achieve such an objective, it became necessary to develop a method whereby the economic value of parts of the natural world could be clearly, and robustly, adduced and displayed. This task has been accomplished by a new form of economic equation that seeks to establish the ‘Total Economic Value’. Total Economic Value consists of a total economic aggregate of three separate economic factors:  consumptive or direct use values, non-consumptive or indirect use values, and existence and option values. Consumptive use values can be assigned prices through such mechanisms as estimating market value if the product is sold on the market, instead of being consumed. An exemplar of such non-consumptive values is eco-tourism. Indirect use values correspond to the economic value of ecological functions (such as how much it would cost to clean the air if forests were not doing the work for free). Option values relate to the amount an individual would be willing to pay to conserve something for possible future use, and existence values relate to how much people are willing to pay for the existence of parts of the environment, irrespective of its other uses or values. When all three of these economic values are subsumed into the Total Economic Value, economic logic should provide a strong justification for the conservation of the natural environment, in terms of either entire ecosystems or individual species.10 9  Livermore, M. (2011) ‘Can Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Policy Go Global?’ New  York University Environmental Law Journal 19(1):  146; O’Neil, J. (1993) Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (Routledge, London) 62–4, 83, 102–3, 115–18; Jacobs, M. (1991) The Green Economy: Environment, Sustainable Development and the Politics of the Future (Pluto, London) 203; Pearce, D. (1990) Sustainable Development: Economics and Environment in the Third World (Earthscan, London) 57–60; Daly, H.E. (1989) For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Towards the Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future (Beacon Press, Boston) 92–3; Dawson, R. (1988) ‘Environmental Policy in the Real World’ Environmental Forum 5: 21, 23; Edwards, S. (1987) ‘In Defence of Environmental Economics’ Environmental Ethics 9: 73, 74, 76, 82–5; Commoner, B. (1985) ‘Economic Growth and Environmental Quality: How to Have Both’ Social Policy 16(18): 5. 10   Hanley, N. (2009) Pricing Nature: Cost Benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy (Edward Elgar, London); Atkinson, G. (2008) ‘Environmental Cost Benefit Analysis’ Annual Review of Environment and Resources 33(1):  317; Weesie, P. (2008) ‘An Integrated Framework for the Instrumental Value of Nature’ Restoration Ecology 16(1):  1; Plottu, B. (2007) ‘The Concept of Total Economic Value of the Environment’ Ecological Economics 61(1):  52; Pearce, D. et  al. (2006) Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment: Recent Developments (OECD, Paris); Miller, D. (2005) ‘Beyond Benefit Cost Analysis:  Accounting for Non-Market Values in Planning Evaluation’ Urban Planning and the Environment 340; Puttaswamaiah, K. (2002) Cost Benefit Analysis:  Environmental and Ecological Perspectives (Transaction Publishers, New  York); Crowards, T. (1997) ‘Nonuse Values and the Environment’ Environmental Values 6(2):  143; Mazzotta, M. (1995) ‘Environmental Philosophy and the Concept of Nonuse Value’ Land Economics 71(2):  244; Pearce, D. (1993) World Without End: Economics, Environment and Sustainable Development (World Bank, Washington) 102–5; Global Environmental Facility (1993) Economics and the Conservation of Biodiversity (GEF, Washington)

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3.  The economics of conservation In terms of the biggest picture possible, it has been estimated that the biodiversity and ecosystems that deliver crucial services to humankind—from food security to keeping waters clean, buffering against extreme weather, providing medicines, and providing recreational opportunities—are worth between US$21 and 72 trillion every year. This is broadly comparable to the World Gross National Income.11 Conversely, in terms of the smallest picture possible, as found tiny insects, if these are involved in functions such as dung burial, pest control, pollination, and wildlife nutrition, they can be worth billions of dollars to national economies.12 In between the macro and micro, three good examples of tropical forests, wetland, and coral reefs can be adduced in this area. Similar instances can be found with protected areas in general, and species which people will pay to watch.13 The first example involves tropical deforestation. All too often it is assumed that the conversion of forests into other uses, such as for pasture or biofuel, is without economic cost. Conversely, the timber that could be extracted, in addition to the produce that could later be extracted from the land, is economically valuable. However, a more accurate view would suggest that the total economic value of a forest is not just the value of its extracted timber, but rather its value as selectively and sustainably extracted timber in addition to the economic values of non-timber forest products, biodiversity, genetic information, forest land conversion, watershed protection, carbon sequestration, tourism and recreational values, amenity, option, and existence values. The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations followed the logic of this type of thinking in its 2009 State of the World’s Forests Report in that the value of forests is now explicitly taken to include not just its timber values, but also those of non-wood forest products and the environmental services provided by forests. With such thinking, one of the most comprehensive studies to date, which examined the market and non-market economic values associated with eight Mediterranean countries, found that timber and fuel-wood generally accounted for less than a third of the total economic value of forests in each country. Values associated with non-wood forest products, recreation, hunting, watershed protection, carbon sequestration, and passive uses accounted for between 25 per cent and 96 per cent of the Total Economic Value. Further studies in 2010 suggested that annual losses as a result of deforestation and forest degradation alone may equate to losses of US$2 trillion to over US$4.5 trillion alone. These could be secured by an annual investment of just US$45 billion: a 100 to 1 return.14 13, 16–19, 47–50; Quiggin, J. (1993) ‘Existence Value and Benefit Cost Analysis’ Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 12(1): 195. 11   Engler, M. (2008) ‘The Value of International Wildlife Trade’ TRAFFIC Bulletin 22(1): 4. 12   Boyles, J. (2011) ‘The Economic Importance of Bats in Agriculture’ Science 332(6025):  41; Losey, J. (2006) ‘The Economic Value of Ecological Services Provided by Insects’ Bioscience 56(4): 311. 13   Salles, J.-M. (2011) ‘Valuing biodiversity and ecosystem services: Why put economic values on Nature?’ Comptes-rendus-biologies 334(5): 469. 14   UNEP (2010) Biodiversity Outlook 3 (Nairobi, UNEP) 3–4; UNEP (2010) Dead Planet, Living Planet (Nairobi, UNEP) 5–8; FAO (2009) State of the World’s Forests (FAO, Rome) 3–21; Millennium

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The second example involves wetlands. Studies in this area suggest that the monetary value of wetlands (floodplains, swamps/marshes, and peatlands), depending on where they are and what they contain, ranged from US$981 per hectare per year to UD$44,597 per hectare per year. Accordingly, in nearly all instances, the costs of the conservation measures to protect wetlands are a small fraction (often around one-seventh) of the economic benefits that they return. The benefits include, inter alia, the habitat for valuable aquatic (fish) and overlapping (birds, mammals) species, fresh water, flood control, tourism, and sporting activities (hunting). These economic benefits are often considerably greater than alternative opportunity costs, such as draining and removing such areas.15 A third example is coral reefs, which provide a wide range of ecological services to around 500 million people each year. Some 9 to 12 per cent of the world’s fisheries are based directly on coral reefs, while a large number of offshore fisheries also rely on them as breeding, nursery, or feeding grounds. They also provide services in terms of coastal protection and, most obviously, tourism. Of the latter, reef recreation has been estimated at US$184 per visitor globally, or, depending where they are and what they contain, between US$14 dollars and US$1,195,478 per hectare per year. Cumulatively, the total economic value of such places is probably between $30 billion and $170 billion per year.16 A variation on this theme is with marine protected areas and the ‘spillover benefits’ they create. Marine protected areas are an exemplar of such spillover benefits or, as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and other notable international bodies such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Scientific Consensus Statement on Marine Reserves concluded, ‘marine protected areas often provide striking examples of the potential synergies between conservation and sustainable use’.17 This type of conclusion is justified, but treated with caution by the FAO on Ecosystem Assessment (2005) Ecosystems and Human Well-Being (Island Press, Washington) 401; Pye-Smith, C. (2003) ‘Fruits of the Forest’ New Scientist (19 July) 36–40; CBD Secretariat (2001) The Value of Forest Ecosystems CBD Technical Series No 4 (Montreal); Torras, M. (2000) ‘The Total Economic Value of Amazonian Deforestation: 1978–1993’ Ecological Economics 33(2): 283; Pearce, D. (1992) ‘An Economic Approach to Saving the Tropical Forests’, in D. Helm (ed), Economic Policy Towards the Environment (Blackwell, Oxford) 239; Ruitenbeek, H.J. (1992) The Economic Analysis of Tropical Forest Conservation Initiatives (World Bank, Washington) 241, 251. 15   Convention on Biological Diversity, Report on the Study of Ecosystems and Biodiversity:  Water and Wetlands UNEP/CBD/COP11/INF/22 (2012); Kakuru, W. (2013) ‘The Total Economic Value of Wetland Products and Services’ The Scientific World Journal 192; Wattage, P. (2008) ‘The Total Economic Value of Wetland Conservation in Sri Lanka’ Wetlands Ecology and Management 16(5): 359; European Communities (2008) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Berlin, Welzel) 35–8; Woodward, R. (2001) ‘The Economic Value of Wetland Services:  A  Meta-Analysis’ Ecological Economics 37(2): 257. 16   Madani, S. (2012) ‘Estimating the Total Economic Value of Coral Reefs’ International Journal of Environmental Research 6(1): 51; CBD (2012) Report on the Study of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Water and Wetlands, UNEP/CBD/COP11/INF/22; Anon (2009) ‘Reef ’s Riches’ New Scientist (24 October) 7; European Communities (2008) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Berlin, Welzel) 35–8; Spalding, M. (2001) The World Atlas of Coral Reefs (UNEP/WCMC) 47–56; Cesar, H. (2004) The Economics of Worldwide Coral Reef Degradation (Netherlands, WWF) 4–5. 17   FAO (2012) The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture (FAO, Rome) 164–9; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) Ecosystems and Human Well Being:  The Biodiversity Synthesis (World Resources Institute, Washington) 11; ‘Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity’, Decision VII/5,

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two grounds.18 First, well-placed and well-policed marine protected areas which have a no-catch approach considerably help the recovery of endangered species, threatened habitats, and the overall functioning of local and, depending on size, regional ecosystems of the surrounding areas when carefully linked to overall stock management initiatives. Second, marine protected areas when designed and managed appropriately can also produce spectacular increases in abundance, biomass, and average size of exploited species in adjacent zones while also helping to sustain biological diversity, ecosystem functioning, and health in these zones. For example, within three years of Saint Lucia’s fishing grounds being listed as no catch in 1995, commercially important stocks doubled in adjacent waters generating valuable exports for the country and a source of protein for its people. Likewise, the network of marine protected areas established off the west coast of Hawaii in 1999 are believed to have led to record catch levels for the two most commercially important species that have been recorded for over 40 years. On a larger scale it has been estimated that, if a global marine protected area system accounting for the closure of 20 per cent of the total existing fishing areas was created, although initial financial costs of US$270 to US$280 million per year would be incurred, in the longer term it would help sustain fisheries worth US$70 to US$80 billion per year.19 As many of the above examples suggest, a particularly influential non-consumptive, but very direct, economic benefit is tourism. Of this flow of nearly one billion people per year, up to 40 per cent have an express interest in some form of nature-related activity. At the macro level, this involves visiting protected areas, of which the exemplars, such as the World Heritage sites, are very valuable. The top World Heritage sites draw over one million visitors and generate over US$1 billion in direct and visit-related revenue per year. Australia’s top eight national parks were estimated to be bringing in AU$2 billion per year, with about a quarter of this sum coming from the Great Barrier Reef. Even less spectacular sites which attract only tens of thousands of people each year can still be worth hundreds of millions of dollars for not turning them into other uses.20 sections 12 and 19. The full statement of the Scientific Consensus can be found at . 18   FAO Committee on Fisheries (2005) Marine Protected Areas and Fisheries, COFI/2005/8. 19   IUCN (2009) ‘Protecting the Oceans Makes Economic Sense’, Press Release (22 May); European Communities (2008) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Berlin, Welzel) 39; Toepfer, K. (2004) ‘Protected Areas’ Our Planet 14(2): 1; CBD (2004) Technical Advice on the Establishment and Management of a National System of Marine and Coastal Protected Areas, CBD Technical Series No 13, 10–11; Anon (2008) ‘Coral Reefs’ Lifeline’ New Scientist (26 July) 6; MacKenzie, D. (2006) ‘Glimmer of Hope for Doomed Fish’ New Scientist (11 November) 10; Roberts, C. (1998) Fully Protected Marine Reserves (Gland, WWF) 88–9. 20   Hazen, H. (2009) ‘Valuing Natural Heritage: Park Visitors’ Values Related to World Heritage Sites’ Current Issues in Tourism 12(2): 165; Maldonado, P. (2008) ‘Rumble in the Jungle’ Economist (12 April) 50; Yungkun, C. (2008) ‘Evaluation of the Economic Value of World Heritage’ Journal of American Academy of Business 13(2): 160; Zografos, C. (2007) ‘The Environmental Values of Potential Ecotourists’ Journal of Sustainable Tourism 15(1):  44; Subade, R. (2007) ‘Mechanisms to Capture Economic Values of Marine Biodiversity: The Case of World Heritage Sites’ Marine Policy 31(2): 135; Kim, S. (2007) ‘Assessing the Economic Value of a World Heritage Site’ Tourism Management 28(1): 317; Convention on Migratory Species (2006) Wildlife Watching and Tourism (Bonn, CMS) 12–14; IUCN (2003) ‘Protected Areas as Engines for Development’ Parks 13(3): 1; Conservation of

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In addition to the economic value of protected areas with species in them, some species, on a stand-alone basis, can generate staggering amounts of money while also generating good practices that generate long-term interest in the survival of the species. These practices may be either consumptive or non-consumptive. With regard to some consumptive uses of species, such as trophy-hunting, when carefully regulated, economic benefits can generate strong conservation incentives, especially against alternative development/policy options. In this area, hunters, killing from carefully monitored stock, have been known to pay US$30,000 to kill a single lion or a single elephant.21 On the micro level, examples of economic benefit can be given of less spectacular animals and insects. In the first instance, it has been noted that a single colony of Mexican free-tailed bats eats more than 9,000 kg of insects per night, targeting predators on corn crops in particular. Likewise, a single brood of woodpeckers can eat 8,000 to 12,000 insects per day, helping maintain the health of forests and fruit plantations. With regards to insects, it has been estimated that the economic value of the services offered by four insects in the United States in terms of dung burial, pest control, wildlife control, and pollination is worth over US$157 billion each year. In this last service alone, bees are of particular interest. Albert Einstein (1879–1955) once said that if the bee disappeared, humanity would only have a few years to live due to the loss of pollination; that is, without this service, many interconnected species and processes would collapse. With well over 200,000 flowering plant species dependent on pollination, the critical nature of the process is obvious. Although Einstein overestimated the importance of bees, their making up only one-fifth of all the species that visit flowers, approximately one-third of the average diet, or, to put it another way, one in three mouthfuls eaten by the average person, is nevertheless pollinated by bees. Although pollination could be done by humans, it would be remarkably expensive: To employ people to pollinate by hand the 3.5 million acres of crops normally fertilized by honeybees in the United States alone would cost an estimated US$90 billion per year. Globally, this figure would be well over hundreds of billions per year.22 Other economic benefits can often be shown that if a species has medical benefits, the economic rewards may be great. The turnover for drugs derived from genetic resources of biological resources was estimated to be between US$75 million and US$150 billion at the turn of the twenty-first century. In South Africa, Arctic Flora and Fauna (2002) Protected Areas of the Arctic: Conserving a Full Range of Values (Canada, CAFF Secretariat, Department of Foreign Affairs) 10–11, 28. 21   Anon (2008) ‘A Trophy for Conservation’ SPECIES 49: 35; Barnett, R. (2005) Sport Hunting in the Southern African Development Community Region (Cambridge, TRAFFIC) 3; Mackay, R. (2005) The Atlas of Endangered Species (Earthscan, London) 52; Quammen, D. (2000) Monster of God (Norton, New York) 290–4; Wilkie, D. (1999) ‘The Potential Role of Safari Hunting as a Source of Revenue’ Oryx 33(4): 339. 22  McNeely, J. (2009) ‘The Contribution of Species to Ecosystem Services’ SPECIES 50:  12; Aizen, M. (2009) ‘The Truth About Honey Bees’ New Scientist (24 October) 26; FAO (2008) Rapid Assessment of Pollinators’ Status (FAO, Rome) 7, 47; Anon (2010) ‘Pollen Crisis’ New Scientist (11 September) 6; Benjamin, A. (2008) A World Without Bees (Guardian Books, London) 3, 240; Losey, J. (2006) ‘The Economic Value of Ecological Services Provided by Insects’ 56(4) Bioscience 311.

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medicinal plant species generate an income of US$2.43  million per year, while the trade in the bark of the rare Punus Africana tree (used to treat the swelling of the prostate gland) is alone estimated to be worth US$220 million each year. The American trade in wild ginseng is worth an estimated US$18 million to several rural communities, while the overall global market for herbal medicines has reached over US$43 billion per year, with annual growth rates of between 5 and 15 per cent, according to one estimate. For China, the leading country in this area, traditional medicine generates over US$14 billion per year.23 Non-consumptive utilization can also generate remarkably large sums. This is especially so with mega-fauna, or the most spectacular of species.24 Gorilla-watching operations generate over US$1 million per year in tourist income per enterprise. In some countries, such as Rwanda, gorilla tourism is the country’s top earner for foreign currency within the tourism sector.25 Each lion in Kenya is thought to be worth US$27,000 per year in tourism revenues. Bird-watching continues to be the fastest-growing outdoor recreational activity in a number of countries. In addition to the indirect values that birds bring—from controlling pests to performing key roles in ecosystems—they often have a direct economic value related to tourism.26 On average, a bird-watching day tripper in the United States will spend somewhere between US$32 and $142 in a local community. However, this figure may be higher depending on the type of bird, its conservation status, and the time of year.27 Sea turtles and their nesting grounds are also strong magnets for tourists. Each Hawksbill turtle is estimated to be worth US$30,000 to the local resort economy.28 23   Vie, J. (2009) Wildlife in a Changing World (Gland, IUCN) 37; European Communities (2008) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Berlin, Welzel) 18; Robbins, C. (2003) ‘American Ginseng’ TRAFFIC Bulletin 19(3):  153; Correa, C. (2003) Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property (Geneva, Quaker United Nations Office) 3; Brace, M. (2001) ‘Power Plants’ Geographical (March) 14; Dold, T. (2001) ‘The Trade in Medicinal Plants in the Eastern South Africa’ TRAFFIC Bulletin 19(1): 11. 24   Richardson, L. (2009) ‘The Total Economic Value of Threatened, Endangered and Rare Species’ Ecological Economics 68(5): 1535. 25   Maekawa, M. (2013) ‘Mountain Gorilla Tourism Generating Wealth and Peace’ Natural Resources Forum 37(2):  127; Speceley, A. (2010) ‘Benefits to the Poor from Gorilla Tourism’ Development Southern Africa 27(5): 647; Pain, S. (2009) ‘You’ll Miss Me When I’m Gone’ New Scientist (25 July) 34, 36–7. 26   Dolesh, R. (2011) ‘Assessing the Value of Feathered Workers:  Birds Perform a Multitude of Services that Contribute to Our Well-Being’ Birder’s World 25(4): 12. 27   Edwards, P. (2011) ‘The Economic Value of Viewing Migratory Shorebirds’ Human Dimensions of Wildlife 16:435; Lee, C.K. et al. (2009) ‘Assessing the Economic Value of a Public Birdwatching Interpretive Service Using a Contingent Valuation Method’ International Journal of Tourism Research 11: 583; Glowinski, S.L. (2008) ‘Bird-Watching, Ecotourism, and Economic Development: A Review of the Evidence’ Applied Research in Economic Development 5(3): 65; Eubanks, T. (2004) ‘Understanding the Diversity of Eight Birder Sub-Populations’ Journal of Ecotourism 3: 151; MacMillan, D. (2004) ‘Costs and Benefits of Wild Goose Conservation in Scotland’ Biological Conservation 119:  475; Baicich, R. (2003) ‘Parks and Birders: A Natural Pair’ Parks & Recreation 38(2): 48. 28   Newsome, D. (2007) Wildlife Tourism (Thomson, Boston) 122–7; Anon (2004) ‘If You Go Down to the Woods Today, You’ll Be Helping the Bears’ New Scientist (21 August) 17; Russell, S. (2003) An Obsession With Butterflies: Our Long Love Affair With A Singular Insect (Basic, New York) 180–7; IUCN (2002) Sustainable Tourism in Protected Areas: Guidelines for Planning and Management (Gland, IUCN) 25; Spotila, J. (2007) Sea Turtles: A Complete Guide to Their Biology, Behaviour and Conservation (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore) 113.

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Some 590,000 shark-watchers expend US$314  million per year, supporting 10,000 jobs. For a country like Palau, this industry can generate US$18 million per year.29 In the 23 countries in which manta ray-watching operations occur, some US$140  million are generated annually.30 By the twenty-first century, the whale-watching industry was active in over in 65 countries and attracting more than nine million participants per year. In some small countries such as Tonga, whale-watching has become the single most important tourist attraction. In Australia, more than 1.6 million visits were made to watch whales, while in Latin America the figure was just under 900,000—but they still generated US$79.4 million in ticket prices and US$278.1 million in total expenditure. Overall, in the same year (2008) the whale-watching industry was reaping US$2.1 billion per year. As such, it had more than doubled in less than eight years.31

4.  The economics of pollution Although initial work in the 1980s suggested that there would be an economic cost (dependent on the depth and speed of the restrictions) in phasing out ozone-depleting substances, there was relative uncertainty over what the economic costs and benefits would be.32 This was especially so after the Interior Secretary of the United States, Donald Hodel (1935–), claimed that skin cancer was a ‘self-inflicted disease’ attributable to personal life style preference, and therefore protection against excessive radiation was the responsibility of the individual, not the government. Thus, concerns about depletion of the ozone layer should be met by people wearing sunglasses and suntan lotion, not by regulating the chemicals industry. Through ‘personal protection and lifestyle changes’ it was stated that to actually allow the destruction of the ozone layer would be economically beneficial since, if each American had to buy two bottles of sunscreen per year and a pair of sunglasses, that would amount to US$40 per person, and US$8 billion in national expenditure.33 Such unique views of economic benefits, irrespective of the costs of damage, were, in part, responsible for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 29   Andres, M. (2013) ‘Global Economic Value of Shark Ecotourism: Implications for Conservation’ Oryx 47(3): 381; Vianna, G. (2012) ‘Socio-Economic Value and Community Benefits from Shark Diving’ Biological Conservation 145(1): 267. 30   O’Mally, M. (2013) ‘The Global Economic Impact of Manta Ray Watching’ PLoS One 8(5): 17. 31   Anon (2009) ‘Preservation Pays’ New Scientist (4 July) 4; Parsons, E. (2009) ‘A reason not to support whaling’ Current Issues in Tourism 12(4): 397; Hoyt, E. (2008) The State of Whalewatching in Latin America (Washington, IFAW) 3. 32  UNEP Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1981) A Look at Some Issues: A Contribution by the UNEP Secretariat, UNEP/WG.69/5, 31 December,. para 42. 33  Benedict, R. (1991) Ozone Diplomacy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge) 60; Roan, S. (1991) Ozone Crisis (Wiley, New York) 202; Anon (1989) ‘The Economics of Preserving the Ozone Layer’, The Futurist 23(1): 40; Joyce, C. (1987) ‘Hot Air Threatens Ozone in Montreal’ New Scientist (17 September) 30.

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the Ozone Layer, through which, inter alia, the necessity for the ‘costs and benefits of relevant control strategies’ are being fully researched and debated.34 Thereafter, review panels were created under the auspice of the Montreal Protocol to consider, among other topics, the economics of the issue, from impacts, to adaptation and mitigation.35 These panels consistently showed that the economic benefits in terms of reduced health impacts from a depleted ozone layer greatly exceeded the economic costs placed upon industry to make the necessary reductions (154 million cases of skin cancer and 3.2 million deaths without the restrictions under the Montreal Protocol, as opposed to 9.5  million cases of skin cancer and 142,000 deaths with the restrictions).36 The basic conclusion was that, although there would undoubtedly be an economic cost to phase out ozone-depleting chemicals: [N]‌otwithstanding the problems of quantifying the benefits,. . . the monetary value of the benefits is undoubtedly much greater than the costs of CFC and halon reductions. . . the monetary value of the benefits of safeguarding the ozone layer is undoubtedly much greater than the costs of CFC and halon reductions.37

The importance of looking at the economic costs and benefits of regulation has also been clearly replicated with the international and regional laws dealing with air pollution.38 For example, following a series of similar requirements on the laws dealing with different air pollutants, Article 8 of the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground Level Ozone obliged the parties to research into ‘the quantification and, where possible, economic evaluation of benefits for the environment and human health resulting from the reduction of emissions of sulphur, nitrogen oxides, ammonia and Volatile Organic Compounds’.39 The call for such studies has a history of over two decades of studies that have demonstrated that the economic costs created by reducing air pollutants (such as via the imposition of new technologies or fuel-switching) have consistently been smaller than the economic benefits that have been created, in terms of reduced   Montreal Protocol, Art 9.   UNEP (1989) First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Helsinki, 2–5 May, UNEP/ OzL.Pro.1/5 (6 May), Decision II, p 14. The terms of references for the panels were contained in Report of the COP of the Vienna Convention on the Work of its First Meeting, UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5 (28 April 1989), Decision 4, Annex VI, p 8. 36   Skjaerseth, J. (1992) ‘The Successful Ozone Layer Negotiations’ Global Environmental Change (December) 292; Roan, S. (1991) Ozone Crisis (Wiley, New York) 227; Benedict, R. (1991) Ozone Diplomacy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge) 21. 37   UNEP (1989) Synthesis Report on the Ozone Layer (UNEP, Nairobi) 12, 13, 141. See also Final Report: Second Session of the First Meeting of the Open Ended Working Group of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4, p 21; Selin, N. (2009) ‘Global Health and Economic Impacts of Future Ozone Pollution’ Environmental Research Letters 4: 44014. 38   For an early notation in this area, see the Preamble to the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions. Note the earlier Europeans obligation of the necessity for authorities to ‘make accurate assessments. . . of the economic aspects of anti-pollution measures’. See Ch 9, Annex, Pt II of the Declaration of the Council of European Communities on the Program of Action of the European Community on the Environment. 1973. 39  Gothenburg Protocol, Art 8(k). See also Art 6(g). For the Protocol on Volatile Organic Compounds, see Art 2(7)(d); for the 1994 Protocol on Further Reductions of Sulphur Emissions, see Art 6(f ). 34 35

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human health costs, environmental pollution (including, inter alia, agricultural, forestry, and fresh water) and damage to cultural property, and associated economic losses. As time has progressed (the first significant studies were done in the 1960s), it has become apparent, as medical science has evolved and understandings have expanded, that the economic costs of health impacts of air pollution alone have consistently been underestimated by more than a third, as they typically did not take into account the long-term, compounding effects of health costs or the true extent of the impact. Recent studies in this area suggest that significant reductions in air pollution could, globally, save 1.3 million premature deaths. Each of these deaths has associated health costs, as well as lost economic potential of each individual.40 Against the background of the use of economics to achieve pollution control in the case of both the ozone layer and air pollution, it was no surprise that the idea drifted easily into the negotiations on climate change. Specifically, the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change noted that it was necessary to take ‘into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible costs’.41 In addition, ‘various actions to address climate change can be justified economically in their own right and can also help in solving other environmental problems’.42 Despite such recognition, since the late 1980s when the topic first appeared for serious discussion there has been intense debate around the economic costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions as opposed to the potential economic benefits that may result. This debate was especially apparent in the early 1990s when successful efforts were made to scare off the United States from making any significant reductions in this area, for fear of immediate damage that could be done to the American (if not global) economy for minimal economic benefit, at least in the short term.43 This debate, which continued throughout the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, recognized that much of the argument turned on the availability to make easy reductions (at minimal cost, like energy efficiency) and 40   Kortelainen, M. (2013) ‘Estimating Mortality and Economic Costs of Particulate Air Pollution in Developing Countries’ Environmental and Resource Economics 54(3):  361; Marshall, M.  (2013) ‘Green Energy Bill Balances By Lives Saved By Smog’ New Scientist (28 September) 11; Vlachokostas, C. (2010) ‘Economic Damages of Ozone Air Pollution’ Atmospheric Environment 44(28): 3352; Hall, J. (2010) ‘Air Pollution, Health and Economic Benefits: Lessons Learnt from 20 years of Analysis’ Ecological Economics 69(12):  2590; Hayes, J. (2009) ‘Clearing the Air:  The Health and Economic Damages of Air Pollution in China’ Public Affairs 82(3): 508; ApSimon, H. et al. (1997) Acid Rain in Europe:  Counting the Cost (Earthscan, London); Boehmer-Christiansen, S. and Skea, J. (1991) Acid Politics (Belhaven, London) 6, 51–5, 127, 133; Stanners, D. (1995) Europe’s Environment: The Dorbris Assessment (European Environment Agency, Copenhagen) 278–80; Segerson, K. (1987) ‘The Economic Impacts of Ozone and Acid Rain’ American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69(5): 970; OECD (1981) The Costs and Benefits of Sulphur Oxide Control (OECD, Paris); Mishan, E. (1969) ‘The Economic Costs of Air Pollution’ Economica 141: 110. 41   Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art 3(3). 42   Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble, para 17. 43  Tobey, J.  (1992) ‘Economic Issues in Global Climate Change’ Global Environmental Change 215; Bush, G. (1990) ‘Two World Leaders on Global Environmental Policy’ Environment (April) 12.

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the point at which the economic costs of making no reductions were examined. That is, the economic costs of an increase of temperature at an ecologically unsustainable six degrees are much higher than at an ecologically sustainable one-degree change. This equation only became more difficult when it was realized that some countries (such as small island states) were likely to have to carry a much greater economic cost than others.44 Meanwhile, as the scholars were musing such difficulties, Hurricane Katrina, possibly linked to anthropogenic climatic change, ripped through the United States in 2005, causing an estimated at US$81 billion in damages, thus creating the largest economic costs ever linked to an environmental disaster. By comparison the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 caused about US$21 billion worth of damage.45 It was against this background that the 2006 report by Nicolas Stern (1946–) on the economics of climate change was undertaken. The report concluded: The evidence gathered by the Review leads to a simple conclusion: the benefits of strong, early action considerably outweigh the costs. The evidence shows that ignoring climate change will eventually damage economic growth. Our actions over the coming few decades could create risks of major disruption to economic and social activity, later in this century and in the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the 20th century. And it will be difficult or impossible to reverse these changes. Tackling climate change is the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries. The earlier effective action is taken, the less costly it will be. At the same time, given that climate change is happening, measures to help people adapt to it are essential. And the less mitigation we do now, the greater the difficulty of continuing to adapt in future.46

In simple terms, depending on the level of impact of climate change, the economic costs could be 20 times higher than the costs of solving the problem. In particular, the report estimated that one per cent of global GDP investing in combating climate change over the next 50 years (to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations) would be considerably less than the estimated potential cost of US$4 trillion to the global economy of doing nothing.47 In subsequent years, Stern suggested that the report (as with much environmental economics which cannot model the impacts

44   Anon (2009) ‘Grim Prospects for Asia’ New Scientist (2 May) 5; IPCC (2007) Climate Change 2007:  Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 6; IPCC (2007) Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 15; Anon (2007) ‘Price of Action’ New Scientist (12 May) 4; IPCC (2001) Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 7; IPCC (1996) Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 14; Fankhauser, S. (1994) ‘The Economic Costs of Global Warming: A Survey’ Global Environmental Change 4(4): 301; Pearce, F. (2002) ‘Miserly Attitude to Climate Rubbished’ New Scientist (15 June) 7. 45   Goldenberg, S. (2012) ‘BP adds $847m to Deepwater Horizon Costs’ Guardian, 31 July, A6; Goldenberg, S. (2012) ‘Deepwater Horizon Aftermath: How Much is a Dolphin Worth?’ Guardian 12 April, A7, 5. Thanks to SGB for this fact. 46   Stern, N. (2008) ‘The Economics of Climate Change’ The Journal of Corporate Citizenship 29: 17. 47   See Anon (2006) ‘Low Carbon Now’ New Scientist (4 November) 7.

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of truly catastrophic events)48 had underestimated the potential damage that could be caused by climatic change, and due to the rapidly escalating nature of the problem, the cost to reduce carbon would be even higher, at about two per cent of GDP instead of the one per cent in the original report.49

5.  Recognition of the argument Although the argument and valuations of the economic importance of nature have become much more refined in the last three decades, the recognition of the idea that economic values are important in environmental agreements is very long standing. For example, in 1902 an international treaty for the protection of birds was justified on the grounds that certain birds provided economic benefits for agriculture.50 Over the following decades, especially post-1970s, this rationale has become mainstream within environmental law in many countries.51 At the same time, the idea grew into international environmental law. For example, recommendation 30 of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment requested: [T]‌hat the Secretary-General ensure the establishment of a programme to expand present data-gathering processes so as to assess the total economic value of wildlife resources. Such data would . . . demonstrate to questioning nations the value of their resources.

Other regions reiterated the importance of economics in environmental matters.52 All recognized the value of their focus to include an economic angle. In the following decade in 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development was explicit in its recognition of the role that economics should play, specifically calling for ‘conservation pricing’ that ‘requires that governments take a long term

48  Dietz, S. (2011) ‘High Impact, Low Probability:  An Empirical Analysis of Risk in the Economics of Climate Change’ Climate Change 108(3): 519; Ng, Y. (2011) ‘Consumption Trade off vs Catastrophes Avoidance’ Climatic Change 105(1): 109; Weitzman, M. (2009) ‘On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change’ The Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1):  1; Heal, G. (2009) ‘The Economics of Climate Change:  A  Post Stern Perspective’ Climate Change 96(3):  275; Pielke, R. (2007) ‘Mistreatment of the Economic Impacts of Extreme Events in the Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change’ Global Environmental Change 17(3): 302. 49   Stewart, S. (2013) ‘Nicholas Stern: I Got It Wrong on Climate Change—Its Far, Far Worse’ Guardian 27 January, 4; Anon (2012) ‘Climate Harms Today’s Economy’ New Scientist 29 September 5; Adam, D.  (2008) ‘I Underestimated the Threat Says Stern’ Guardian 18 April; Giles, J.  (2008) ‘Catastrophe Comes to Those Who Wait’ New Scientist (1 March) 14; Giles, J. (2007) ‘Spend New, Reap the Rewards Later’ New Scientist (1 December) 14. 50   See the Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture 1902. Discussed in Lyster, S. (1985) International Wildlife Law (Grotius, Cambridge) 63–4. 51   See Navrud, S. (1992) Pricing the European Environment (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 9–37. 52   Convention for the Protection of the Natural Environment of the South Pacific 1986, Preamble; in Rummel-Bulsks, I. (ed) (1991) Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment (Grotius, Cambridge) Vol 2, 372; Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, Preamble; in Rummel-Bulsks, I. (ed) (1991) Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment (Grotius, Cambridge) Vol 2, 324.

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view in weighing the costs and benefits of the various measures’.53 Similar high level support for change in this area, such as by the Group of Seven, occurred, leading up to the 1992 Earth Summit, in its calls for ‘price signals, reflecting where possible, the full value of natural resources’.54 At the 1992 Earth Summit, the importance of drawing out economic values for the environment was repeatedly made. The Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of Forests emphasized in Principle 13(c) that: Incorporation of environmental costs and benefits into market forces and mechanisms, in order to achieve forest conservation and sustainable development, should be encouraged both domestically and internationally.55

The Statement of Principles went on to suggest that economic values, other than that provided by timber, should be taken into account when seeking to achieve the sustainable development of forests.56 Section 11.21 and 11.22 of Agenda 21 went on to advocate that to achieve the sustainable development of forest ecosystems it is necessary: To improve recognition of the social, economic and ecological values of trees, forests and forest lands, including the consequences of the damage caused by the lack of forests. . . to promote methodologies with a view to incorporating social, economic and ecological values of trees, forests and forest lands into the national economic accounting systems.57

Agenda 21 also asserted that it was necessary to develop, adopt, and strengthen national programmes for accounting for the economic and non-economic value of forests.58 Agenda 21 also contained a number of other provisions calling for a reassessment of economic pricing in other areas. For example, section 30.9 calls on governments and industries to: Work towards the development and implementation of concepts and methodologies for the internationalisation of environmental costs into accounting and pricing mechanisms.59

53   World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 15. See also 13, 155–7. 54   G-7 Economic Summit, Paris, 16 July 1989, para 37. Note also Bergen Conference: Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Principle 6(B). 55   Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Use of all Types of Forests (1992) UNCED Doc.A/CONF.151/6/Rev. 1. 56  See Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Use of all Types of Forests, Principles 12(a) and 16(e). 57   Agenda 21 (1992) UNCED Doc.A/CONF.151/4, section 11.20. 58   Agenda 21 (1992) UNCED Doc.A/CONF.151/4, para 11.23. 59   Agenda 21 (1992) UNCED Doc.A/CONF.151/4, section 8.28 also suggests that it is necessary ‘to incorporate environmental costs in the decisions of producers and consumers, to reverse the tendency to treat the environment as a free good, and pass these costs onto other parts of society, other countries and future generations’. See also sections 8.31 and 8.37. Such actions are also deemed necessary because, as section 4.4 states, ‘without the stimulus of price and market signals that make clear. . . the environmental costs of the consumption of energy, materials and natural resources and the generation of wastes, significant changes. . . seem unlikely to occur in the near future’.

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Of this 1992 gathering, the greatest of all the documents that was to go on to influence thinking in this area was the Convention on Biological Diversity. Under this regime, it is an obligation that each contracting party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, adopt economically and socially sound measures that act as incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of components of biological diversity.60 Accordingly, the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity have undertaken a number of studies on the economic valuation of biodiversity and have encouraged each other to ensure adequate incorporation of market and non-market values of biological diversity into plans, policies, and programmes at local, regional, and international levels, where appropriate.61 Internalization of the economic costs of environmental considerations, so that markets are not distorted, is a foremost consideration in this area. Therefore, the parties to the Convention have agreed, inter alia, to identify, study, and voluntarily confront such perverse incentives. They have also agreed to put more emphasis on the assessment of the values of biodiversity and associated ecosystem services.62 Whilst the parties to the CBD have been studying this topic at the higher lever, a number of other regimes have attempted to implement the policies in practice. These attempts include the Convention on Migratory Species, the International Whaling Commission, the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna, and the World Heritage Convention. With the 1995 Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, the signatories were aware, inter alia, of the ‘economic value of [the] waterbirds’,63 while the 2007 Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitat recognized that ‘great ape populations in a favourable conservation status can constitute a considerable asset for countries and areas that hold them’.64 All of these regimes have sought to encourage safe and sustainable eco-tourism as a viable way to show solid economic returns for projects that are not consumptive.65 Similar, the Man and the Biosphere regime under the auspice of UNESCO has attempted to take a broader view of economic value of the sites under its influence.66 The regime which has advanced furthest in this area is the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance.67 Under Ramsar, wetlands are recognized as possessing multiple values including, inter-alia, water supply, defences against natural extremes, food security, and poverty alleviation. Accordingly, the Ramsar parties have consistently recommended that in cases of large-scale wetland   See Convention on Biological Diversity, Art 11.   CBD (2004) Decisions VII/9; (2002) Decision IV/10; (2000) Decision V/15; (2000) Decision V/3; and (1998) Decision III/18. 62  See (2010) ‘Incentive Measures’ Decision X/44. Note the earlier Decision on the same topic:  (2008) Decision IX/6. See also (2008) ‘Review of Implementation of Articles 20 and 21’ Decision IX/11, para 2. 63   Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Preamble, para 4. 64   The Gorilla Agreement, Preamble, para 9. 65   See Gillespie, A. (2012) Conservation, Biodiversity and International Law (Edward Elgar, London) Ch 12. 66   Seville Strategy, Objective 1.1; Seville + 5 Recommendations, Recommendation No. 6. 67   Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Preamble. 60 61

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transformation, decisions are not taken until an assessment of all the values involved has been made. The question of ‘all values’ was furthered in 1984 and 1996. At the first point in 1984 it was suggested that when making decisions on wetlands, ‘quantifications of both direct (monetary) and indirect (non-monetary) values of wetlands and formation of criteria to enable all values to be taken into account in the planning of conservation projects’ should be taken into account.68 Since that time, the Ramsar parties have sought to take these values into account in the planning and conservation of wetlands.69

6.  Difficulties with the argument Despite the prevalence of economic values in most areas of national and international environmental law, it would be a mistake to assume that this is an approach without criticism. As it stands, there are five substantive challenges to the argument that placing an economic value on the environment is a solid way to achieve its protection.

A.  Irreconcilable worldviews The first problem in this area concerns ‘economism’, which is a belief in the primacy of economic forces and values in human affairs. This is a foundation of many modern societies. However, economic rationality postulates a theory of human behaviour that owes little to science and much to a deductive logic that interprets events on the basis of philosophical assumptions regarding human motivation and rationality. The difficulty is that many of the proponents of the economic position suggest that the theory of economic considerations should not just underlie economics but all aspects of human relations, including, in this instance, the human relationship with the environment. The difficulty, as the father of modern economics, Adam Smith (1723–1790) recognized, on the first page of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, was that not everything could be reduced to economic value.70 Simply put, economic value and responding choices based upon maximizing economic self interest do not provide all the justifications for human activity. Many things that people cherish, admire, or respect cannot be valued in monetary terms. Consequently, it is fair to say that often the worth of things is sometimes better measured by an unwillingness to pay for them. Consider love, or something that has to be worked for, such as a university degree. A degree that can be bought   Recommendation 2.2 of Art 5 of the Recommended Amendment.   For the reflection of this principle in Ramsar Resolutions, see: (2002) Resolution 8.4; (2002) Resolution 8.34; (2002) Resolution 8.23; (2002) Resolution 8.25; (2002) Resolution 8.40; (1999) Resolution 7.15; (1999) Resolution 7.16; (1996) Resolution 6.10; (1984) Resolution 2.3; and (1980) ‘Assessment of Wetland Values’ Resolution 1.6. 70   Smith, A. (1759) The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Methuen, London) 1; Otteson, J. (2002) Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 23–35; Lux, K. (1990) Adam Smith’s Mistake (Century, London) 202–3. 68 69

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is not worth buying. However, the fact that these things are not for sale does not make them worthless. They have a dignity rather than a price. Economic values do not recognize integrative values like honour, respect, or reverence that refer not to personal desires that can be gauged in monetary terms, but to feelings orientated in other spheres of commitment. This leads to the problem that some people would be disgusted at the thought of receiving money for certain events such as in exchange for someone’s life or betraying their own family, community, or country. The reason for this is that value and price are not always commensurate.71 This problem is obvious when attempts are made to take cost-benefit analysis into other cultures that are not predicated upon the paradigm of the economically focused, self-interested individual and associated values. In such settings, many matters of principle cannot be understood in economic terms.72 Similarly, even within conventional Western societies, the idea that people make all of their decisions on purely economic grounds is often mistaken, as many people still opt for communal outcomes that are at loggerheads with direct self interest. For example, individuals might argue for overall restrictions in private transport, despite owning a car. In such situations, their own self interest as a consumer is voluntarily trumped by wider goals as a citizen within a society with underlying shared values such as a viable transport system.73 Similar concerns arise within the political context of such mechanisms, whereby it is argued that such decisions are best resolved within robust democratic debate in which all voices are equal, rather than within economic analysis in which, although all dollars may be equal, some people have many more than others. For example, when recognition of the economic options of parts of the tropical Amazon are compared between the indigenous groups of the area and those interested in types of development (agriculture, forestry, biofuels, etc) of the same place, the economic values ascribed by the developers will often be much larger than what the indigenous group (even with all the tools for total economic value) can produce. This type of problem became magnified at the end of the twentieth century when the economics of the impact of climate change were calculated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. As part of the exercise, the economists placed values on human lives that ranged from US$1.5 million for people from the richest countries, down to $100,000 for people from the poorest. These 71   Sagoff, M. (2004) Price, Principle and the Environment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 134–56; O’Neil, J. (1993) Ecology, Policy and Politics:  Human Well-Being and the Natural World (Routledge, London) 118–22; Sagoff, M. (1982) ‘We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us, or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law’ Environmental Law 12: 283, 306; Baker, C. (1975) ‘The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 5(3): 35; Robinson, J. (1968) ‘Value and Price’ Social Science Information 7(6): 62. 72   Norgaard, R. (1994) Development Betrayed (Routledge, London) 122–35; Redclift, M. (1993) ‘Environmental Economics, Policy Consensus and Political Empowerment’, in R.K. Turner (ed), Sustainable Environmental Economics: Management, Principles and Practice (Belhaven, London) 106, 110; Ecologist (1992) ‘Whose Common Future?’ Ecologist 22: 174. 73   Peterson, J. (1993) ‘A Rhetorical Critique of Non-Market Economic Valuations for Natural Resources’ Environmental Values 2: 47, 58–9; Jacobs, M. (1991) The Green Economy: Environment, Sustainable Development and the Politics of the Future (Pluto, London) 65–70, 215, 220; Pearce, D. and Turner, K. (1990) The Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment (Harvester, Hempstead) 11–12; Cooper, D. (1992) The Environment in Question (Routledge, London) 195, 198–201.

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valuations were based on assessments of average earnings, and a community’s willingness to pay to avoid risks of death. These figures subsequently caused an international stir, and were attacked as ‘absurd and discriminatory’ by the then Indian Environment Minister, Kamal Nath (1946–).74 This resulted in the IPCC having to issue the disclaimer that ‘monetary valuation should not obscure the human consequences of anthropogenic climate change damages, because the value of life has meaning beyond monetary considerations’.75 The basis of the IPCC disclaimer was that, ethically and politically it was not at all clear why a person with more economic wealth should have more weight in the debate on environmental matters than an economically poorer person. While this may make sense within self-justifying economic theories, it often does not make sense in political debate, which rejects the idea of unequal influence between the rich and poor, and issues of equity are believed to trump issues of efficiency.76 The recognition of trumping philosophical, political, cultural, and ethical interests over economic factors has also been recognized in some early American environmental cases which stated that cost benefit analysis and subsequent economic valuation could not be used to make a decision concerning endangered species. This is because the American Endangered Species Act, like those of many similar countries, calls for the preservation of endangered species on account of their aesthetic, ecological, and educational values. The noteworthy point is that Congress did not initially include economic values as one of the reasons for preserving species. This was not because of their lack of economic value (in fact, endangered species can become highly valuable in economic terms), but because their preservation was not an economic issue, as the risk of extinction cannot be given a price.77 It is a similar logic that many of the most pressing difficulties of humanity, especially those applied to social issues from abortion to child labour, cannot be made solely on economic grounds. The exact same deduction should include environmental debates, where the real issues are about ethical and/or social principles, not economic prices.78 Oscar Wilde (1854–1900), summed up this type of 74   Noted in Pearce, F. (1995) ‘Price of Life Sends Temperatures Flying’ New Scientist (1 April) 5; Pearce, F. (1995) ‘Global Row Over Value of Human Life’ New Scientist (19 August) 7; Anon (1995) ‘A Lunatic Way to Count the Cost’ New Scientist (8 April) 5. 75   IPCC (1996) Climate Change 1995:  Economic and Social Dimensions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 10. 76   Blumm, M. (1992) ‘The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism’ Harvard Journal of Law and Public and Policy 15: 371, 376; Commoner, B. (1990) Making Peace With the Planet (Gollancz, London) 46; Daly, H.E. (1989) For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy towards the Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future (Beacon Press, Boston, London) 58–60. 77   The (American) Endangered Species Act 16 USC § 1531(b) (1988). The initial view was that the value of endangered species was ‘incalculable’. See TVA v Hill 437 US 153, 187 (1978). For useful discussions on the initial and subsequent approaches, see Loureiro, M. (2008) ‘Valuing Local Endangered Species’ Ecological Economics 68(1): 362; Sinden, A. (2004) ‘The Economics of Endangered Species’ Harvard Environmental Law Review 28: 128; Brown, G. (1998) ‘The Economics of the Endangered Species Act’ The Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(3): 3; Sagoff, M. (1980) ‘On the Preservation of Species’ Colombia Journal Of Environmental Law 7: 33, 52, 53. 78   Gore, A. (1992) Earth in Balance: Forging a New Common Purpose (Earthscan, London) 190–1; Naess, A. (1989) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 106, 111–123; Rolston, H. (1985) ‘Valuing Wetlands’ Environmental Ethics 7: 38; Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985) Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Utah, Gibbs Smith) 136; Leopold, A. (1979)

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thinking over 120 years ago, with his renowned quote: ‘Nowadays, people know the price of everything and the value of nothing’.79 Exactly 100 years after Wilde penned his line, the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development recognized that: Efforts to supplement accounting systems to reflect the importance of natural resources are laudable, but that should be tempered by an awareness that it is not possible to translate all environmental values into monetary terms.80

An important problem here is the use of monetary values to measure political, ideological, and moral convictions. This is known in philosophical terms as a category mistake because an attempt is made to describe an object in terms that do not apply to it. Hence, the idea that moral or ideological convictions should be downgraded unless they can be backed up with hard cash is problematic as it is trying to test the worth of an ideal by asking people what they are willing to pay for it. In a very similar (yet ignored) sense, nobody asks economists how much they are willing to pay for their ideological view that cost-benefit analysis and the idea that (in this instance) nature should be ascribed an economic value, and these values should form the basis of a privileged regulatory policy.81 When ethical considerations like those above are recognized, people may choose not to participate within the ambits of the economic debate. For example, if an individual is asked to place a price on what he or she would be willing to accept as payment for the use or destruction of an environment, that individual may reply: ‘it’s priceless’, ‘I won’t sell’, or ‘infinity’. This type of position can be attributed to the argument that such development options are simply intolerable regardless of any amount of financial compensation. Yet the economic approach is working on a presumption that a median or midway point can be achieved, and to argue that something is priceless is irrational. The problem with this approach is that to refuse to accept monetary payment as an exchange for a principle should not be seen as an irrational response. Rather, it may be seen as entirely rational as it recognizes the illegitimacy of the debate.82 ‘Conservation as a Moral Issue’ Environmental Ethics 1: 131; Coarse, R. (1960) ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ Journal of Law and Economics 3: 213. 79   Wilde, O. (2009) The Picture of Dorian Grey (Penguin, London) 79. 80   Bergen Conference: Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, point 6(c). 81   Ackerman, F. (2002) ‘Pricing the Priceless: Cost Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150(5): 1553; Pearce, D. (1998) ‘Cost Benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14(4): 84; Norton, B.G. (1994) ‘Economists’ Preferences and the Preferences of Economists’ Environmental Values 3:  311, 318–19, 329–30; Redclift, M. (1993) ‘Sustainable Development: Needs, Values, Rights’ Environmental Values 2: 1, 13; Ekins, P. (1992) Real Life Economics:  Understanding Wealth Creation (Routledge, London) 10, 17; Gillis, M. (1991) ‘Economics, Ecology and Ethics: Mending the Broken Circle for Tropical Forests’, in F.H. Bormann, Ecology, Economics, Ethics: The Broken Circle (Yale University Press, New York) 155, 156; Goodin, R.E. (1992) Green Political Theory (Polity, Cambridge) 20–2. 82  Ackerman, F. (2005) Priceless:  On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (New Press, New York); Heinzerling, L. (2003) ‘Pricing the Priceless: Inside the Strange World of Cost-Benefit Analysis’ Dollars and Sense 246: 41; Foster, J. (1997) Valuing Nature? Ethics, Economics and the Environment (Routledge, London) 23–35, 67–71, 143–56; Sagoff, M. (1994) ‘Four Dogmas of Environmental Economics’ Environmental Values 3: 285, 300–3; Sagoff, M. (1990) The Economy of

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The illegitimacy of this debate has already been recognized in other areas where the ethical considerations are the highest, such as human rights. Similarly, when viewing other matters of high ethical importance, such as the human relationship with the environment, many scholars suggest that this same recognition of illegitimacy should also be carried over to this area. It is argued that the environment has more value than instrumental human values, such as those captured in economic valuation. Rather, the environment has value in and of itself. Yet monetary valuation through either conventional cost-benefit analysis or the enhanced methodology of the Total Economic Value does not recognize this, and continues to try to constrain the debate into a particular type of (economic) value, within a purely anthropocentric paradigm. In this setting, therefore, ecology and economics are irreconcilable disciplines in philosophical terms.83

B.  No economic value and/or lack of ecological knowledge The second major area that is problematic with the economic valuation of the environment is that economic values cannot always be established and, even if they are, they may change. Dealing with the first problem, it can be asserted that if the environment is valued as an economic resource, then harmful species, or things which humanity has no value for in an economic context, can be considered to be worthless, with a clear conscience. On a wider scale this is a frightening precedent because, as Aldo Leopold (1887–1948) noted, most members of the ecological community ‘have no economic value’.84 That is, while certain species and ecosystems can be attributed an economic value, most cannot. While this may make sense in economic terms, it is often based on a lack of understanding of what is valuable in ecological terms, which in turn undermines attempts to put an economic value on natural things. For example, as was noted in the official preparations to the 1992 Earth Summit, with regards to the classification of economic values with forests and biodiversity: Unfortunately, in most cases there are vast gaps in our understanding of these physical/ biological relationships, e.g, in the case of the forest’s role in the carbon cycle and how to specify what contribution a specific area of forest makes as a sink for greenhouse gases. Without such information, the economist cannot proceed to develop value measures. . . in the case of biodiversity . . . the economist faces almost complete uncertainty. It simply cannot be known what the future holds, when another medicinal plant of interest to the the Earth (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 81–8; Helm, D. (1991) Economic Policy Towards the Environment (Blackwell, Oxford) 3. 83  Ackerman, F (2005) Priceless:  On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (New Press, New York) 1–13, 205–35; Prior, M. (1998) ‘Economic Valuation and Environmental Values’ Environmental Values 7(4):  4; Fox, W. (1990) Towards A  Transpersonal Ecology:  Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Shambhala, Boston) 152–3; Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985) Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Gibbs Smith, Utah) 117; Norton, B. (1991) ‘Why Environmentalists Hate Mainstream Economists’ Environmental Ethics 13: 235, 248–51; Parker, K. (1990) ‘The Values of a Habitat’ Environmental Ethics 12: 353, 357; McBurney, S. (1990) Ecology into Economics Won’t Go (Green Print, Devon) 168–75. 84   Leopold, A. (1949) A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 210–12, 214.

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chemical industry . . . will emerge and what its value will be in terms of the contribution of the forest. Thus, useful economic values cannot be attached to such potential outputs from the forest.85

This lack of understanding and consequential nonsensical commodification of a completely holistic environment is often due to incomplete scientific knowledge, and/or the distance between economic value to humans and what the species or ecosystem does for value to itself—rather than humanity. This leads to two mistakes, in that not only is the economist misunderstanding ecology, he or she is often then basing his or her incomplete evaluations on the mistakes and/or lack of knowledge.86

C.  Higher economic values As all preferences are assumed to be neutral, with the determining factor being economic value, the risk develops in this region that the economic values of conservation for a particular species can be outbid (and thus lose its conservation justification), without recourse to other considerations. This problem can be seen at multiple levels. For example, the economic value of sport-fish is often much greater with those that are the best fighters, and/or best eating. The difficulty is that these are often non-indigenous fish, which may attract much greater conservation concerns. Accordingly, if choices are to be made about the best way to stock or replenish a stream, based on economics, endangered local species which taste bad are not at the forefront.87 This problem of alternative uses (or different species) having a potentially greater economic attraction than Total Economic Value based on conservation considerations is a particular difficulty in two scenarios. The first is that the basis for the Total Economic Value changes. This has been evident in some areas such as ‘alternative products’, which could be derived from rainforests and which have had a roller-coaster of consumer demand and subsequent economic value. Similar difficulties have been encountered with eco-tourism, in that when   Third Session, Working Group 1, A/CONF.151/PC/64 (1991), paras 84, 85.   Admiraal, J. (2013) ‘More than Total Economic Value: How to Combine Economic Valuation of Biodiversity with Ecological Resilience’ Ecological Economics 89: 115; Small, E. (2012) ‘The New Noah’s Ark: Beautiful and Useful Species Only’ Biodiversity 13(1): 37; Gomez, E. (2011) ‘Economic Valuation and the Commodification of Ecosystem Services’ Progress in Physical Geography 35(5): 613; Nunes, P. (2001) ‘Economic Valuation of Biodiversity:  Sense or Nonsense’ Ecological Economics 39(2):  203–22; Brown, N. (1994) Ethics and Agenda 21:  Moral Implications of a Global Consensus (United Nations, New York) 61, 64–7, 70–1, 77–81; Sachs, W. (1993) Global Ecology: A New Area of Political Conflict (Zed, London) 117, 126–7; Johnson, L. (1991) A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 168–70; Wilson, E.O. (1988) Biodiversity (National Academy Press, Washington) 200, 202–5; Ehrenfeld, D. (1978) The Arrogance of Humanism (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 190, 193, 199, 210, 212, 215, 217–20. 87   Serafy, S. (1991) ‘The Environment as Capital’, in R. Costanza (ed), Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of Sustainability (Colombia University Press, New York) 168, 175; Holland, A. (1994) ‘Natural Capital’, in R. Attfield (ed), Philosophy and the Natural Environment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 28–37. 85 86

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consumer/tourist demand has fallen, the justifications for conservation are threatened. Even if the demand does not fall, if an alternative becomes available which can reach a higher economic value (say, trading a wetland for a potentially popular resort), then what was once protected soon falls out of the protection bracket. Or, as happened in the case of Oman, the World Heritage area which protected the Oryx was delisted after it was discovered that valuable oil reserves were beneath it.88 An intertwined part of this problem is that the over-exploited environment, or aspects of it, can reach very high prices. The illegal trade (or take) is that which is not authorized by an appropriate authority. The legal trade in wildlife was estimated in 2010 to be around US$160 billion per year. The illegal trade is estimated at being somewhere between US$10 and 20 billion. This illegal trade in species is believed to be worth less than the illegal trade in narcotics, but is possibly equal to or greater than the illegal trade in weapons. From ivory, to rhino horns, whale-meat to illegally taken fish, the amount of money that can be made from the illegal sale of endangered species is vast. In some instances, these sums may be larger than all the other economic values that have been created to justify environmental conservation of these creatures, while the economic costs of conservation may make them even less fiscally attractive to preserve. In some of these situations, the economically smart option may be to kill the species, sell the animals at a profit, and reinvest proceeds in operations which return greater rates of return than was originally offered by non-consumptive alternatives such as eco-tourism.89 A similar consideration arises from debates around the ‘sustainable use’ of species, whereby decisions are made on a basis of economics and stability of species, rather than any other considerations. Once long-term productivity is assured, this idea of sustainable use is linked to the goal of utmost utilization and economic maximization, with minimum inefficiency or waste. The overall objective, in economic terms, is that resources be optimally allocated to their best use. This ‘wise use’ ethic, common in many areas of conservation policy, can be found in multiple domestic and international levels.90 The difficulty is that while this approach may 88   Buckley, R.  (2012) ‘The Tourist Trap’ New Scientist (13 October) 28; Gillespie, A. (2008) Protected Areas and International Law (Nijoff, The Netherlands) Ch 8; Ashford, J. (1993) ‘Brazil Nuts Crumble’ BBC Wildlife 11(2): 59; Funk, C. (1992) ‘Free Market Environmentalism: Wonder Drug or Snake Oil?’ Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 15: 511, 514; Lohmann, L. (1991) ‘Dismal Green Science’ Ecologist 2: 194; Caldwell, L. (1990) Between Two Worlds: Science, the Environmental Movement and Policy Choice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 76. 89  Mason, C. (2012) ‘Banking on Extinction’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28(1):  180; Duffy, R. (2010) ‘Your Role in Wildlife Crime’ New Scientist (11 September) 28; Chivian, E. (2008) Sustaining Life: How Human Health Depends on Biodiversity (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 42; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) Ecosystems and Human Well Being: The Biodiversity Synthesis (Washington, World Resources Institute) 7–10; Pearce, F. (1991) Green Warriors:  The People and Politics Behind the Green Revolution (Bodley, London) 91. 90   Pearce, D. and Barbier, E.B. (1990) Sustainable Development: Economics and the Environment in the Third World (Earthscan, London) 206; Oelschlaeger, M. (1991) The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (Yale University Press, New  York) 286–9; World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 331;

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be suitable for some species and ecosystems, it is not necessarily suitable—of which very different and contending worldviews exist—for what should be sustainably harvested, or not. Thus, for many countries, the question about sustainable use is only related to the safety of the level of the biological take. Many pro-whaling countries have argued this, and have asserted that this view is in accordance with the objectives of the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, which the signatories committed themselves to ‘conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whale industry’. Thus, the Convention aimed to achieve the ‘conservation, development, and sustainable utilisation of the whale resource’.91 Conversely, for other countries, since the 1980s, it has not been a question about whether a safe biological level for harvesting whales can be reached and associated economic objectives, but whether it is suitable to harvest such species at all. These countries have objected on ethical grounds, which, in substance, consider these animals to be special and not the subject of commercial harvesting.92 Further difficulties arise when such issues concerning sustainable use and economic value are based upon long-term harvesting—but reproduction takes longer to mature than set interest rates. This is because the populations of most species increase at much slower rates than money invested in the bank. For example, in relation to the sustainable harvest of whales, it has been estimated that while whales reproduce between one and four per cent of the total population annually, the income from a dead whale would be likely to reap, say, 10 per cent interest in the bank. Economically speaking, it makes much more sense for the whaling industry to kill as many whales as possible, as quickly as possible, and reinvest the proceeds and thereby maximize profit. Sustainable harvesting, if it were possible, could not compete. The same logic can be applied to old growth forests, which, compared to fast-growing monocultures, make little economic sense. This is because young forests add wood at a comparatively high annual rate, unlike their older counterparts. Therefore, to maximize the amount of economic return when given a choice between the two, from an economic standpoint, old-growth forests should be harvested and converted to managed, even-aged forests that are harvested every 60 to 100 years, as opposed to every 1,000 years.93

Norton, B. (1986) ‘Conservation and Preservation:  A  Conceptual Rehabilitation’ Environmental Ethics 8: 195, 210, 211. 91   International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling 1946, Preamble and Art V(2). 92   Gillespie, A. (2005) Whaling Diplomacy (Edgar Ellen, London) Ch 5; See also Gillespie, A. (1996) ‘The Ethical Question in the Whaling Debate’ Gergetown International Environmental Law Review 9: 17–37. 93   Booth, D. (1992) ‘The Economics of Old-Growth Forests’ Environmental Ethics 14:  43, 60; Holmberg, J. (1992) Policies for a Small Planet (Earthscan, London) 295, 306; McGonigle, M. (1980) ‘The Economising of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die’ Ecology Law Quarterly 12: 120, 122–3; Clark, A. (1977) ‘The Economics of Over-exploitation’, in G. Hardin (ed), Managing the Commons (Freeman, San Francisco) 121–34; Ehrlich, P. (1989) ‘Will Economists Learn to Respect Mother Nature?’ Business and Society Review 60; Hardin, G. (1975) ‘Why Plant A Redwood’, in G. Miller (ed), Living in the Environment (Wadsworth, Belmont) 154.

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D.  Market problems A further area in which environmental justifications for the conservation of the environment run into difficulty is discounting. Environmental economics are difficult to deal with when there is a large geographic gap between regions and citizens do not share the same interests in a resource and its associated economic costs and benefits. Environmental economics are even more difficult to deal with when the gap is between generations. This is especially so because economics already has a method—discounting—for dealing with considerations in the future. The discount rate is the interest rate you need to earn on a given amount of money today to end up with a given amount of money in the future. The discount rate accounts for the time value of money, which is the idea that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow given that the dollar today has the capacity to earn interest. Put simply, the weight attached to the future gets increasingly smaller the further into the future the analyser goes. Impatience causes what is known as a time preference. Consequently, as we prefer to focus on the present, the future gets discounted, and the further into the future one looks, often, the less value it is accorded. In other words, discounting contains a built-in bias against future generations, as their interests are considered to be less pressing than those of the current generation. Discount rates arise because people prefer to have their benefits now as opposed to later.94 Exactly to what level future costs get discounted is the source of large debate. Sometimes these figures shrink into the future, sometimes they are considered constant.95 The differences are due to the factors that modellers will include in or exclude from their considerations. These include growth models, utility functions, the opportunity cost of capital, estimates of technological change, future wealth, ethical concerns, and interest rates. The last concern alone can be monumental, as the higher the interest rates, the greater the value of $100 today compared with the same sum in a decade’s time. As Frances Cairncross (1944–) explained: On this arithmetic, on-term interest rates of 10% a year mean that it is not worth paying more than $73 now to avoid an ecological loss of a million dollars expected to happen in a hundred years time. Even if interest rates fell to 2%, costs incurred 35 years into the future are only half as important as those suffered now. Using such logic, governments argue that it is more important to use up oil today than to keep it in the ground for future generations; and more important to sell teak forests than to leave them standing.96 94  Tribe, L. (1971) ‘Trial by Mathematics:  Precision and Ritual in Legal Process’ Harvard Law Review 84: 1361. 95  Arrow, K. (2013) ‘Determining Benefits and Costs for Future Generations’ Science 341(6144):  349; Szekeres, S. (2011) ‘Discounting in Cost Benefit Analysis’ Society and Economy 33(2):  361; Dietz, S. (2009) ‘New Frontiers in the Economics of Climate Change’ Environmental Resource Economics 43:  295; Meral, P. (1998) ‘Future Generations and Economic Activities:  The Case for the Social Discount Rate’ Forum for Social Economics 27(2): 1; Heesterman, A. (2004) ‘The Discount Rate in Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis’ Economics Issues 9(1): 39; Toman, M. (1998) ‘Research Frontiers in the Economics of Climate Change’ Environmental and Research Economics 11(3): 603. 96   Cairncross, F. (1991) Costing the Earth (Economist Books, London) 32.

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Standard discounting gives long-term damages a very low present value. Hence, the perceived environmental costs of future damages are considerably less than they would be if they existed in the present. Higher discount rates imply more sacrifices for present generations. Lower discount rates imply more sacrifices for future generations. This is a particular issue for some environmental problems which are particularly long term in view, such as climate change, in which those causing the difficulty, and those dealing with it, are in different generations. Accordingly, whether the benefits of climate policies, which can last for centuries, outweigh the costs, is especially sensitive to the rate at which future benefits are discounted.97 This difficulty became particular apparent with the Stern Review on climate change. The Review’s unambiguous conclusions about the need for immediate and meaningful action (at economic cost to the present) were directly challenged by the argument that the same economic justifications for action were underestimating the economic costs that would really be placed upon the current generation to deal with the problem and would not survive the substitution of assumptions that were consistent with current marketplace real interest rates and savings rates.98 This conclusion suggests that it would cost substantially more to make larger, meaningful cuts in the emission of greenhouse gases than is proposed. Moreover, given the lesser costs for future generations to deal with this problem, it makes economic sense to carry out only the most cost-effective measures, rather than pay ‘disproportionate’ economic costs to avert it.99

E.  Political problems The fifth problem in this area is that environmental economics are dependent upon two factors. The first assumption is that the free market works perfectly and that alternative uses are not subsidized to the point that they become less attractive options in economic terms As the World Commission on Environment and Development 97  Arrow, K. (2013) ‘Determining Benefits and Costs for Future Generations’ Science 341(6144):  349; Pearce, D (1993) World Without End:  Economics, Environment and Sustainable Development (World Bank, Washington) 65–80; Splash, C. (1993) ‘Economics, Ethics and Long Term Environmental Damage’ Environmental Ethics 15:  117; Gowdy, J. (1994) ‘Further Problems with Neo-Classical Economics’ Environmental Ethics 16: 161, 167; Revesz, R. (2011) ‘Climate Change and Future Generations’ Southern California Law Review 84(5): 1097. 98   Carlin, A. (2011) ‘A Multidisciplinary, Science-Based Approach to the Economics of Climate Change’ International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 8(4): 985; Tol, R. (2010) ‘The Economic Impact of Climate Change’ Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 11(1):  13; Godard, O. (2009) ‘Time Discounting and Long Run Issues:  The Economics of Climate Change’ OPEC Energy Review 33(1):  1; Nordhaus, W. (2007) ‘A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change’ Journal of Economic Literature 45(3):  686; Toman, M. (2006) ‘Values in the Economics of Climate Change’ Environmental Values 15(3): 365; Kenny, C. (2007) ‘A Note on the Ethical Implications of the Stern Review’ The Journal of Environment and Development 16(4): 432; Philibert, C. (1999) ‘The Economics of Climate Change and the Theory of Discounting’ Energy Policy 27(15): 913. 99  Nordhaus, W. (1991) ‘To Slow, or Not to Slow:  The Economics of the Greenhouse Effect’ Economic Journal 101:  921; Bate, R. (1994) Global Warming:  Apocalypse of Hot Air? (Institute of Economic Affairs, London) 28–9, 41–2, 49; Hayes, P. and Smith, K.R. (1993) The Global Greenhouse Regime: Who Pays? (Earthscan, London) Chs 8–13.

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noted, such economic subsidies ‘dilute the pressure to conserve resources’.100 The example of tax credits being given to develop/destroy natural resources, which made it economically beneficial to clear virgin areas, illustrates the point well, where economic values for the environment are out-trumped. A variation on this problem is with the economic value of carbon absorption services provided by tropical forests. These forests, more often than not, are located in other countries, and although the economic theory is strong that the forests are providing economically valuable services, politically very few governments are willing to pay the correct economic amounts of the value of these carbon-absorption services to these countries.101 These examples illustrate how the market has been distorted so that uneconomic choices have gained precedence over true economic costs that should lean towards environmental protection. Such distortions often represent distinct political choices, and to attempt to change them to incorporate correct economic pricing would invoke what the 1995 Commission on Global Governance classified as ‘considerable political difficulties’.102

7. Conclusion Economic tools that create a high value for the environment are currently, in practice, the most popular justification for conservation. Although the idea is over 100 years old, it is only in the last 30 years that the tools that can demonstrate the economic values of the conservation of biodiversity, and/or the prevention of pollution, have come into full strength. Without doubt, in both settings they are formidable and have been widely adopted throughout international environmental law and policy. The difficulties with the economic approach are fivefold. First, ethically, it is clear that it is possible to know the price of everything and the value of nothing. Second, ecologically, assuming that the ecology is accurately understood, often it is found that parts of it have no particularly important ecological role that can justify an economic valuation. Third, even if an economic price is found, these may be trumped by higher economic values based upon consumption and/or destruction. Fourth, economically, the theories are limited by the market contexts within which they exist and, via discounting, a built-in bias against actions which impose medium to large economic costs on the present. Finally, politically, many countries, both internally and externally, simply refuse to accept the logic of such economic values—especially if this means that they have to pay others for the services they traditionally took to be free. 100   World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 222. 101  Taylor, A. (1992) Choosing Our Future:  A  Practical Politics of the Environment (Routledge, London) 53; Vidal, J. (1992) ‘Earth Soundings’ Guardian 3 April; Watkins, K. (1992) ‘Trade Route of Almost All Evils’ Guardian 6 March, 29. 102  Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 212; World Bank (1992) Malaysia: Forestry Subsector Report (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 13.

V Religion 1. Introduction The role of religion in contemporary society cannot be underestimated. Although no longer at the forefront of international debates, its influence remains vast and persuasive. Within this mix, the influence of religion, as a catalyst for environmental concern, is now becoming obvious. The ethic of Christian stewardship is an exemplar of this type of approach. However, due to the fact that this (and other) religious texts can often be interpreted in opposing ways, in as much as positive values can be advanced for environmental protection, conversely, so too can negative ones.

2.  The influence of religion At the individual, national, and global levels, religion has a remarkable influence upon human society. At the micro level, recent statistics show increasing numbers of adherents, especially of Christianity, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, while numbers of believers in North America have stabilized at high levels of between 80 and 85 per cent of the adult population. North-west Europe is exceptional in its steadily declining pattern of church membership. At present over 80 per cent of the world population (some five billion people) adhere to some sort of religion, with Christianity (2.1 billion) and Islam (1.2 billion) being the two major faiths.1 The religious influence of such numbers upon domestic law is evident in a number of countries, and in some, the politicization of theology or the ‘theologization of politics’ is not an uncommon phenomenon. In these situations there may be little separation between politics (and subsequently law) and religion. This can be seen with some Islamic societies and even some Western societies such as Israel and the United States. In these settings it can be suggested that religious ideas are still an

  Boersema, J. (2008) ‘The Religion- Environment Connection’ Environmental Sciences 5(4): 217.

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active part in influencing the culture—legal and otherwise—of a surprisingly large number of countries.2 At the global level, religion has long been recognized as having a fundamental influence on the development and practice of international law. This overt influence only began to wane (in the West) after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and the ideal of the Holy Roman Empire was finally extinguished with a Europe made of sovereigns, independent of higher powers, claiming primacy based upon religious authority. This move was cemented into position with the Enlightenment. Outside of Western-based countries, the process waned in the twentieth century, but in part has become reinvigorated in the twenty-first century. The end result is that although the right to practise religion is a recognized human right in international law,3 religion itself is believed to be a largely historical influence in the global context, although its influence continues to be felt.4 For example, the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development was careful to point out that it’s Action Plan was to be implemented ‘with full respect for the various religious values’ of the countries at the Conference.5 Similar words were reiterated in the Plan of Implementation following the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, in which the plan for health was caveated with the words that the ‘strengthen[ing of ] the capacity of health-care systems to deliver basic health services to all. . . [would be] . . . consistent with national laws and cultural and religious values’.6

3.  Reflection in international environmental law The recognition of religious considerations within international environmental documents can be traced to the World Conference on National Parks in 1962. This suggested that national parks should be created because ‘the beauty and character of landscapes and sites are necessary to the life of man, providing a powerful physical, moral and regenerative spiritual influence’.7 Similar objectives were 2   DÁntonio, W. (2013) Religion, Politics and Polarization: How Religiopolitical Conflict is Changing Congress and American Democracy (Rowman, Maryland); Tuch, S. (2013) Shariá Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World (Indiana University Press, Indiana); Turner, B. (2011) Religion and Modern Society:  Citizenship, Secularisation and the State (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge); Diamond, S. (1989) Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right (South End, Boston) 62–5. 3   Green, C. (2011) Religion and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford). 4  Gillespie, A. (2013) The Causes of War (Hart Publishing, Oxford) Ch 5; Johnson, J. (2013) ‘Religion, Violence and Human Rights’ Journal of Religious Ethics 41(1): 1; Sheik, M. (2011) ‘How Does Religion Matter? Pathways to Religion in International Relations’ Review of International Studies 38(2): 1; Janis, M.W. (1991) The Influence of Religion on the Development of International Law (Nijhoff, Netherlands) 85, 137–9, 148, 152, 195, 198, 201; Arsanjaki, M.H. (1989) ‘Religion and International Law’ American Bar Association Journal of International Law 195, 206–8; Habermas, J. (2006) ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’ European Journal of Philosophy 14(1): 1. 5   Report of the International Conference on Population and Development (1994), A/CONF.171/13, Preamble, Ch II. 6  WSSD, Plan of Implementation, para 47. 7   IUCN First World Conference on National Parks 1962; reprinted in Ruster, B. and Simma, B. (1976) (eds) International Protection of the Environment (Oceana, New York) Vol5, 2383.

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restated in the 1983 Declaration of the World National Parks Congress.8 Religious justifications for environmental protection were also notable at the 1992 Earth Summit. For example, Principle 8(f ) of the Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forest stated: Conservation and sustainable development of forests should include the protection of ecologically viable representatives of spiritual. . . religious and other unique and valued forests of national importance.9

Section 11.14 of Agenda 21 (which also dealt with deforestation) reiterated similar objectives.10 It was also suggested in the negotiations that led to the Convention on Biological Diversity that ‘common religious concepts could be used to get a large number of countries united in this effort’.11 Simultaneously, the foremost international bodies in this area, such as the United Nations Environmental Programme, receive periodic input from all major world religions, as do many of the major international environmental non-governmental organizations.12 Similarly, at major international gatherings, due to historical reasons, certain religions, such as the Holy See, continue to have both standing and speaking rights. From such platforms, the idea that ‘we . . . are only stewards of the common patrimony of the planet’ was clearly iterated at the 1992 Earth Summit.13

4.  Religion as a catalyst for environmental concern It is important at the beginning of this section to make the distinction between protecting the environment because of values derived from established (and somewhat conventional) religious traditions, and those derived from philosophical, political, and ecological values—irrespective of the influence of traditions. This latter approach, where a religious type of inspiration is derived from the environment, irrespective of conventional religious paradigms, is a form of pantheism. Pantheism, which is associated with philosophers like Baruch Spinoza (1632– 1677), works on identifying a religious meaning via the identification of something deeply mystical in nature, but often without the assistance of conventional theological frameworks. The following discussion is not related to this type of   Declaration of the World’s National Park Congress, Preamble.  UNCED. Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forest, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/6/Dev.1. 10   Agenda 21 (1992) UNCED Doc.A/CONF.151/4. Also reprinted in Johnson, S.P. (ed) (1993) The Earth Summit (Graham and Trotman, London). 11  Bilderbeck, S. (1992) Biodiversity and International Law:  The Effectiveness of International Environmental Law (IOU, Amsterdam) 134. 12   Angell, D. (1990) Sustaining Earth: Response to the Environmental Threats (Macmillan, London) 97; Engel, J. (1990) The Ethics of Environment and Development:  Global Challenge, International Response (Belhaven, London) 1, 12–13; Daly, H. (1989) For the Common Good:  Redirecting the Economy Towards the Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future (Beacon, Boston) 376. 13   See the Statement by Cardinal Angelo Sodano in Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1, Vol 3, 196, 197. 8 9

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religious catalyst, but is more about religions that are derived from established and supporting theological positions.14 The importance of religion as a positive action for social change in contemporary debates is well known. This influence is now being recognized in environmental matters. Environmental protection is identified in most of the world’s major religions. From such identification, theological views have been brought to focus, and galvanize attention and action on a number of environmental concerns worldwide.15 That is, the discovery of religious values in the natural environment has gone from being purely for mystical contemplation, to becoming a tool through which conservation actions are undertaken to improve the situation, as the objectives of conservation intertwine perfectly with the pursuit of religious virtue.16 The contemporary academic discussion of religion and the environment, with roots going back to the early 1960s, accelerated rapidly in the early 1990s when Harvard University Press began producing its ten-volume Religions of the World and Ecology, divided by theological types (such as Buddhism, Islam, Christianity). However, owing to limitations of space, it is prudent to illustrate only one—the Christian stewardship ethic. I have chosen to focus on the Christian stewardship ethic because, aside from it being the dominant religion in the West, it has also become very influential in the last two decades after being taken up by a number of prominent individuals,17 as well as politically powerful evangelical groups, which have adopted matters of the environment as a matter of protecting God’s Earth, covering all concerns from endangered species to climate change.18 Similar approaches of an ethic of 14   Kober, G. (2013) ‘Spinoza and Deep Ecology’ Ethics and the Environment 18(1): 43; Forrest, P. (2010) ‘Spinozistic Pantheism, the Environment and Christianity’ Sophia 49(4): 463; Levine, M. (1994) ‘Pantheism, Ethics and Ecology’ Environmental Values 3(2): 121; Clarke, J.J. (1993) Nature in Question: An Anthology of Ideas and Arguments (Earthscan, London) 112; Marshall, P. (1992) Nature’s Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking (Simon and Schuster, London) 194–213; Macy, J. (1990) ‘Faith and Ecology’, in J. Button (ed), The Green Fuse (Quartet, London) 97, 105; Wood, H. (1985) ‘Modern Pantheism as an Approach to Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 7: 159. 15  Levasseur, T. (2012) ‘Navigating Ideology, Religion and Views of the Environment’ Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 11(3):  62; Jenkins, W. (2011) ‘Religion and Environment’ Annual Review of Environment and Resources 36: 420; Gottlieb R. (2009) A Greener Faith: Religious Environmentalism and Our Planet’s Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford); Boersema, J. (2008) ‘The Religion- Environment Connection’ Environmental Sciences 5(4):  217; Witham, L. (2008) ‘The Greening of Theology:  Religious Thinkers Weigh in on the Ecological Crisis’ Science and Spirit 19(2): 24; Palmer, M. (ed) (2003) Faith in Conservation, New Approaches to Religions and the Environment (The World Bank, Washington); Shaiko, R. (1987) ‘Religion, Politics and Environmental Concern: A Powerful Mix of Passions’ Social Sciences Quarterly 68: 244. 16  Hall, M. et  al. (2009) ‘The Need for Religions to Promote Values of Conservation’ Nature 462(7274):  720; Gottlieb, R. (2006) ‘Religious Environmentalism in Action’, in R. Gottlieb (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Ecology (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 467–510; Devall, B. (1990) Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practising Deep Ecology (Green Print, Devon) 45–51. 17   Such as Al Gore, in Gore, A. (1992) Earth in Balance: Forging A New Common Purpose (Earthscan, London) 238–669, 260–2; Fritz Schumacher, in Schumacher, F. (1973) Small is Beautiful (Abacus, London) 93–4; Rudolph Bahro, in Bahro, R. (1984) From Red to Green (Heretic, London) 221; Petra Kelly, in Spretnak, C. and Capra, F. (1986), Green Politics (Bear, New Mexico) 55; and Jonathan Porrit in Porritt, J. (1988) The Coming of the Greens (Fontana, London) 233–53. 18  Veldman, R. (2013) How the World’s Religions are Responding to Climate Change (Routledge, London); Wilson, E. (2012) ‘Religion and Climate Change:  The Politics of Hope and Fear’ Local-Global:  Identity, Security, Community 10:  20; Simmons, J. (2009) ‘Evangelical

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stewardship have been clearly articulated by both the Anglican and Catholic faiths. Of the latter, Pope Benedict XVI (1927–) proclaimed his Ten Commandments for the Environment. Specifically: Nothing that exists in this world is outside the Divine plan of Creation and Redemption . . . We should not reduce nature to a mere instrument to be manipulated and exploited . . . Our responsibility towards ecology extends to future generations . . . A spiritual response must be given to environmental questions, inspired by the conviction that Creation is a gift that God has placed in the hands of Mankind to be used responsibly with loving care.19

Extrapolating from such positions it has been suggested by certain theologians that ‘the eleventh commandment is that the Earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof, thou shall not despoil the Earth, nor the life thereon’.20 Although only the Christian religious interpretation will be examined, the two core underlying justifications for why a religious vision should be invoked carry for most, if not all, religious thinking in this area. The first rationale used to justify the need for a religious environmental ethic is that a solution to the environmental crisis is not believed to be possible without a theistic basis, as for many people, when religion lost its prominence in modern society, society lost the ability to deal with fundamental issues. Only with the placement, or identification, of religion in this world is it believed to be possible to tackle the most pressing issues, as this allows the ‘deeper’ metaphysical questions to be answered, whereby the relationship between cosmology, spirituality, and morality is aligned, thus filling a void in humanity. Filling this void is believed by many to be the foundation necessary for achieving all sorts of actions in the temporal realm.21 This view was clearly articulated in the Seoul Declaration on Environmental Ethics, which was forwarded by the South Korean government to the 1997 United Nations Conference on the Review and Implementation of Agenda 21. It stated: The scale and magnitude of environmental problems are such that they must be recognised as having a religious as well as a scientific dimension. Efforts to safeguard the environment Environmentalism:  Oxymoron or Opportunity?’ World Views:  Global Religions, Culture and Ecology 13(1):  1; Kearns, L. (1997) ‘Noah’s Ark Goes to Washington:  A  Profile of Evangelical Environmentalism’ Social Compass 44(3):  349; Anon (2007) ‘A Cross of Green:  Religion and the Environment’ The Economist, 1 December, 59. 19   Koenig-Bricker, W. (2009) Ten Commandments for the Environment: Pope Benedict Speaks Out (Maria Press, New York) 27, 41, 51, 135. See also Bendict XVI (2012) The Environment (Huntington Press, Indiana). 20   Reinhart, P. (1985) ‘To be Christian is to be Ecologist’ Epiphany 6: 84. 21   Hessel, D. (2000) Christianity and Ecology (Harvard University Press, London) xxxvii; Gottlieb, R. (1996) This Sacred Earth:  Religion, Nature, Environment (Routledge, London) 110; Fabel, A.J. (1994) ‘Environmental Ethics and the Question of Cosmic Purpose’ Environmental Ethics 16: 303, 304–7; Skolimowski, H. (1992) Living Philosophy (Akrana, London) 123–5; Skolimowski, H. (1988) ‘Eco-Philosophy and Deep Ecology’ Ecologist 18:  124–6; Schwartz, W. and Schwartz, D. (1987) Breaking Through (Green Books, Devon) 235, 237–8, 245–6; Haught, J.F. (1986) ‘The Emergent Environment and the Problem of Cosmic Purpose’ Environmental Ethics 8:  139; Spretnak, C. (1986) The Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics (Bear, New Mexico) 46; Nasr, S.H. (1968) Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man (London, Unwin) 20; Bryce-Smith, C. (1977) ‘Ecology, Theology and Humanism’ Zygon 12: 225.

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need to be infused with a vision of the sacred. Religious and spiritual leaders must accept a responsibility to make known the full dimensions of this challenge. The cause of environmental integrity and justice must occupy a position of utmost priority for people of faith.22

The second vindication for a religious environmental ethic is in the strength that is supposedly found with the identification of God, for to pollute the Earth is to defile God, or to destroy species, is to destroy the property of the Almighty. This idea of God and nature being defiled in the same act is not new. John Calvin (1509–1564), for example, came close to equating God with nature, and insults to nature were, for him, offensive to God, as the creator and sustainer of nature.23 In a similar sense, many contemporary eco-theologians propose that not only may God be seen in the beauty of the natural world, but also that God actually calls upon believers to protect and improve the environment, as to do so is not only defending what belongs to God, but is actually a form of respect and praise.24

5.  The Christian stewardship ethic There can be no disputing that the Bible states that humanity is the centre of God’s creation.25 However, the concept of dominion referred to in the passages of Genesis 1:26 and 1:28 can lead to an approach which is beneficial from an environmental perspective. For example, after creating the Earth, God saw that ‘it was very good’.26 God blessed creation and creation praises or glorifies God.27 Additionally, God’s covenant is made not only with humanity, but also with ‘all living creatures’.28 In the New Testament, Romans 8:19–23 adds: 22   Seoul Declaration on Environmental Ethics, UNGA Special Session on the Review and Appraisal of Agenda 21, A/S-19/21, 17 June 1997, para 11. 23   Santmire, P. (2006) ‘The World of Nature According to the Protestant Tradition’, in R. Gottlieb (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Ecology (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 115–47. 24   Eggemeier, M. (2013) ‘A Sacramental Vision:  Environmental Degradation and the Aesthetics of Creation’ Modern Theology 29(3): 338; Carroll, M. (2008) ‘On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History’, in A. Carlson (ed), Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism:  From Beauty to Duty (Columbia University Press, New  York) 169–85; Gill, R. (1999) ‘Religion and the Environment’ Theology 102: 408; Wallace, M. (2000) ‘The Wounded Spirit as the Basis for Hope in an Age of Radical Ecology’, in D. Hessel, Christianity and Ecology (Harvard University Press, London) 51–69; Cooper, T. (1990) Green Christianity:  Caring for the Whole Creation (Spire, Suffolk) 53–7; Caldicott, J. (1991) ‘A Christian Cosmology’, in J. Button (ed), The Best of Resurgence (Green Books, Devon) 200, 201; Sherrard, P. (1987) The Rape of Man and Nature (Golgonooza, Suffolk) 15, 18, 20, 24–5, 29–30, 33, 39, 101–3; Jantzen, G. (1984) God’s World: God’s Body (Westminster, Philadelphia) 156–7; Barbour, I. (1972) Earth Might Be Fair: Reflections on Ethics, Relgion and Ecology (Prentice Hall, New York) 105–10; Barbour, I. (ed) (1973) Western Man and Environmental Ethics (Addison, London) 116, 120–4; Scharlemann, R. (1972) ‘A Theological Model of Nature’ Bucknell Review 20: 104. 25   Genesis 1:26, 1:28. 26   Genesis 1:21, 1:25, and 1:31. For a discussion of this, see Cohen, J. (1985) ‘The Bible and Nature in Western Thought’ Journal of Religion 65: 55–72; Bratton, S. (1984) ‘Christian Ecotheology and the Old Testament’ Environmental Ethics 6: 200; Dubos, R. (1973) ‘Saint Francis Versus Saint Benedict’ Psychology Today 54; Cobb, J.B. (1972) Is It Too Late: A Theology of Ecology (Bruce, Beverley Hills) 4–10. 27  See Psalm 104:1–3, 148:3–10; and Isaiah 55:12. 28  See Genesis, paras 2–5.

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For the earnest expectation of the creature wait for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope, Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groan and travel in pain together until now.29

Such statements can be taken to suggest that God has a continuing concern for creation. Thus, it is often noted that God saw all of creation as good, not just the human species. The blessing given to go forth and multiply was given to all living things and not just people; thus, it could be argued that God’s other creatures were meant to exist, whether or not they were useful to humans. Additional references point to the beauty of the natural world, for example Matthew 6:28–29, which proclaims ‘Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: And yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these’. The importance of the natural world can also be seen in other sections such as Luke 12:6, which emphasizes that not a single sparrow is forgotten, and that sparrows are precious to God.30 The worth of the natural environment can also be grasped from a number of examples where God reveals himself through nature.31 Additionally, holistic instructions can be grasped from passages like Job 12:8, which advises, ‘Speak to the earth, and it shall teach thee’. Furthermore, although dominion was given over nature, people are also instructed to behave with compassion and justice.32 Recognition of worth can also be shown in how God instructed that the traditional practices of animal sacrifices were to end.33 The recognition of the concept of the Sabbath as the day of rest may also be interpreted to have positive environmental implications. This is because with the Sabbath the ideal is to rest and enjoy rather than strive and exploit. These instructions indicate that the Earth needs to replenish, and be cared for. The implication is that although the human stay may be brief, preservation of the natural world is still required. This view coincides with Genesis 2:15 where ‘the Lord took the man and put him in the garden to keep it and till it’. Perhaps the best evidence of such conservation requirements was the story of Noah’s Ark, which goes beyond caring for simple human needs, and the survival of all species was sought.34 Associated with this is the fact that the world belongs to God and not to anyone or anything else. Accordingly, human dominion over Earth is always limited by a higher authority.35

29   For comment, see Cheryl, H. (2008) ‘An Environmental Mantra? Ecological Interest in Romans 8: 19–23’ The Journal of Theological Studies 59(2): 546. 30   Luke 12:6; but see also Luke 12:7 and Matthew 10:31. 31   Acts 14, 17; Romans 1:20; Psalm 8:1, 42:4, 104:24–25, 147:15–18. 32   Matthew 12:11; Luke 14:5; Revelation 7:3; Deuteronomy 8:7–9. 33   Isiah 66:1–3; Amos 5:25; Jeremiah 7:21–23. 34   Genesis 6:13–7:24. 35   Psalm 24:1, 19:11; Leviticus 25:23, 1; Chron. 29:11. See also Kay, J. (1988) ‘Concepts of Nature in the Hebrew Bible’ Environmental Ethics 10: 315; Heirs, R. (1984) ‘Ecology, Theology and Methodology’ Zygon 19: 43.

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Having recognized all of these considerations, a religious ethic of environmental stewardship for the Earth is suggested. This position is encompassed by the warning in Corinthians 4:1, which advises believers to be ready to be held to account as ‘stewards of the mysteries of God’.36 Additionally, in Luke 16:2 God said to the unfaithful steward, ‘[G]‌ive an account of thy stewardship, for thou mayest no longer be steward’.37 The recognition and application of a stewardship ethic towards nature, as extracted from the above readings, is not new. The first post-New Testament Christians to adopt the ‘reverential attitude’ towards the environment and all of the creatures within were some of the early fathers of the Church, as well as the early monks who entered into the wilderness.38 Augustine of Hippo (354–450), who recognized the holistic nature of Creation, proclaimed that all ‘created things’ reflected the ‘goodness of the Creator’.39 Preaching 500 years before he was to be ordained as the patron Saint of Ecology, Francis of Assisi (1181–1226) was more forthright in his vision of stewardship. He tried to depose the human position of monarchy and saw all of God’s creatures as equals. Consequently, he preached of an equality of all living creatures and that it was important not to hurt them. His views of nature and humanity rested on the premise that all things, animate and inanimate, were designed for the glorification of the Creator.40 Soon after, while trying to provide some more anthropocentric frameworks for the non-monastic side of the Christian faith, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) still recognized restraints on human action in the natural world. He suggested, using metaphors of harmony and equilibrium, that nature honours God and that, consequently, studying the world is better than consuming it. Further, he rejected an earlier perspective that any non-human creature could be essentially evil. Finally, Aquinas also recognized the interests of future human beings, which currently forms the basis of a common argument (‘the rights of future generations’) for environmental conservation.41   Corinthians 4:1.   Luke 16:2.   Hiebert, T. (2000) ‘The Human Vocation: Origins and Transformations in Christian Traditions’, in D. Hessel (ed), Christianity and Ecology (Harvard University Press, London) 135–51; Ponting, C. (1991) A Green History of the World (Sinclair-Stevenson, London) 144–8; Bratton, S. (1988) ‘The Original Desert Solitaire’ Environmental Ethics 10:  31, 34; Dubos, R.  (1973) ‘Saint Francis Versus Saint Benedict’ Psychology Today 544, 559; Waddel, H. (1949) Beasts and Saints (Constable, London) 17–23; Attfield, R. (1983) ‘Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics’, in R. Elliot (ed), Environmental Philosophy (Queensland University Press, Queensland) 201, 211; Dubos, R.  (1972) ‘Conservation, Stewardship and the Human Heart’ Audubon Magazine 21, 24. 39  Saint Augustine (1877) ‘Enchiridion’, in M. Dodds (ed), Works of Saint Augustine (Clarke, Edinburgh) Vol 9, 286–7, 289–90. 40   Hughes, J. (1996) ‘Francis of Assisi and the Diversity of Creation’ Environmental Ethics 18: 311; Caldicott, J. (1990) ‘The Patron Saint of Ecology’, in J. Button (ed), The Green Fuse (Quartet, London) 316; Borchi, A. (1989) The Writings of Saint Francis (Casa Editrice, Assisi) 21–5. 41   Saint Thomas Aquinas (1947) Summa Theologica (Oxford University Press, Oxford) Vol 1, Q45, arts 1, 3. See also Benzoni, F. (2005) ‘Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics: A Reconsideration of Providence and Salvation’ The Journal of Religion 85(3): 446; LeBlanc, J. (1999) ‘Eco-Thomism’ Environmental Ethics 21(3):  293; Jenkins, W. (2003) ‘Biodiversity and Salvation:  Thomistic Roots 36 37 38

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From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, Christian theology provided a solid basis for the early attempts at protecting the natural world.42 This trend drew from a number of areas. For example, in 1691 John Ray (1627–1705), in his work The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation, preached that all nature had the primary purpose of exhibiting evidence of God’s glory, and all of it had inherent value. In doing so, he attacked the then prevailing assumption that there was no other end for any creature, other than in some way to be serviceable to humanity.43 Alexander Pope (1688–1704) wrote that ‘the more entirely the inferior creature is submitted to our power, the more answerable we should seem for our mismanagement of it’,44 while William Blake (1757–1827) added, ‘everything that lives is Holy’.45

6.  Difficulties with the stewardship ethic The first difficulty of the Christian stewardship ethic is that it only makes sense for those who believe in Christianity, and this type of interpretation in particular. It has no resonance for people who do not share this theological worldview, let alone those who demand that organizing society and responding to collective problems should be based on decisions of reason and science. Such decisions on how to protect the environment, like multiple other social issues, should be determined by rationality, not religious faith or interpretation from theological documents that hold little scientific merit.46 The second difficulty of the Christian stewardship ethic is that as with most—if not all—works of theological importance, they are often ambiguous and can be interpreted in different ways. In the context of this discussion, the difficulty is for Environmental Ethics’ The Journal of Religion 83(3) 401; Halligan, P. (1984) ‘The Environmental Policy of Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Environmental Law 19: 789. 42   See Thomas, K. (1984) Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 154–8; Glacken, C.J. (1965) ‘The Origins of Conservation Philosophy’, in I. Burton and R.W. Kates (eds), Readings in Resource Management and Conservation (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 158. 43   Ray, J. (1691) The Wisdom God Manifested in the Works of Creation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1954). 44   Pope, A., ‘Cruelty to Animals’, in A. Vallance (ed) (1950), A Hundred English Essays (MacMillan, London) 159. 45   Keynes, G. (ed) (1957) The Complete Writings of William Blake (Brown, London) 160. 46   Morito, B. (1995) ‘Value, Metaphysics and Anthropocentricism’ Environmental Values 4:  31, 33–5; Caldwell, L. (1990) Between Two Worlds: Science, the Environmental Movement and Policy Choice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 108; Bookchin, M. (1987) ‘Deep Ecology Versus Social Ecology:  A  Challenge for the Ecology Movement’ The Raven 1:  219; Goodin, R.E. (1992) Green Political Theory (Policy, Cambridge) 40; Naess, A. (1988) ‘Deep Ecology and the Ultimate Premises’ Ecologist 18: 128, 129; Rawls, J. (1985) ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 14: 223, 225; Mitchell, B. (1970) Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular Society (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 90–100; Watson, R. (1985) ‘Challenging The Underlying Dogmas Of Environmentalism’ Whole Earth Review 45: 9; Brennan, A. (1988) Thinking About Nature (Routledge, London) 31–5, 192–5, 197; Scherer, D. (1983) Ethics and the Environment (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey) 82, 85.

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that in as much as positive views can be ascertained for this particular social goal, alternative views can also be ascertained. This, of course, is not a problem particular to environmental concerns. Debates covering everything from slavery to same-sex relationships have being fired by interpretations of scripture which are not conducive to social change.47 In the context of the environmental debate, from the beginning, God is seen as completely transcendent from the creation. The initial downfall of ‘man’ was attributed to a woman and an animal, and elsewhere, animals and landscape are often seen, or used, to dominate humanity. God goes on to declare that the Earth and all upon it are corrupt,48 and the Bible condemns the worship of anything but a biblical God.49 Additional references suggest that nature is to be subservient to human kind. This absolute stamp of dominion over a ‘land in which they would lack nothing’ came when God blessed Noah.50 Explicitly: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands are they delivered . . . Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things.51

Psalm 8:5–8 adds: What is Adam’s breed that it should claim care? Thou has placed him a little below the angels, crowning him with glory and honour, and bidding him rule over the works of thy hands. Thou has put them all under his dominion, the sheep and the cattle, and the wild beasts besides; the birds in the sky, and the fish in the sea.

Finally, the transitory nature of this world, with the promise of a better place to come, of which this place can be abandoned, is a theme which echoes strongly in both the Old and New Testaments. The escatology of this approach does not necessitate care for the environment because the believers are only here for a short time and these pastures are not to accompany the believers on their departure. The believers are human and the vast majority of the work should therefore be spent on the most important task at hand—obtaining more souls. Accordingly, as base, there is a dualism between humanity as the most valued species, and everything else on the planet, which, at best, has only instrumental value for what it can give to humanity. Humanity remains the be all and end all of the theological equation.52 Benedict XVI picked up on this theme in his work on the topic, when he 47   Jones, S. (2008) ‘Appeals to the Bible in Ecotheology and Environmental Ethics: A Typology of Hermeneutical Stances’ Studies in Christian Ethics 21(2): 219; Fortin, E. (1995) ‘The Bible Made Me Do It: Christianity, Science and the Environment’ The Review of Politics 57(2): 197. 48   Genesis 3:14–15, 6:7, 6:11–12; Jeremiah 15:14; Hos 13:8; Joel 1:4; Isaiah 10:13–19, 13:17–22; Amos 4:6–9; 2 Samuel 1:21; Matthew 21:19. 49   Deuteronomy 4:16–19; Ezekiel 8:16. 50   Deuteronomy 8:7–9. See also Joel 1:12; Amos 1:2; Jonah 3:7–9; Isa 14:7–8. 51   Genesis 9:1–3. 52   See 2 Peter 3:10, 12–13; Corinthians 5:7; Hebrews 11:1–6, 13:14. For comment, see Whitney, B. (2007) ‘The Problem of a Transcendent God for the Well-Being of Continuous Creation’ Dialog 46(2) 120; Peterson, A. (2000) ‘In and Of the World? Christian Theological Anthropology and Environmental Ethics’ Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 12(3): 237; Rossing, B. (2000)

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underlined the belief that ‘the human person, made in God’s image, is superior to all other Earthly creatures . . . nor should we make nature an absolute value’.53 From such thinking, while some theologians (such as Benedict) adopted a stewardship approach, others have come to argue the exact opposite, against any meaningful forms of stewardship of either other creatures or the land in general. Augustine, despite his soft notes above, was very clear that there was no moral tie of any kind between humanity and animals and that the ‘thou shall not kill’ command did not apply to anything but humans. He added that God was unconcerned about the human treatment of nature, and was only concerned with issues involving the Church and humanity—with the latter being the absolute pinnacle of focus. This was because, as multiple other theologians would add, only humanity was made in the image of the divine.54 Aquinas largely reiterated these views, suggesting that the only reason concern could be generated for non-human nature was if the damage to anything which was not human impacted upon humanity. Fundamentally, nature and all of its creatures were to be governed, in accordance with the will of God, by the human species, who were gifted dominion over all other species. Thus, ‘it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to man’s power’.55 Moreover, it is ‘proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior’.56 Fundamentally, only humanity had an immortal soul. All other species, therefore, were only cable of holding instrumental value. Thereafter, successive Jewish and/or Christian commentators joined the chorus. Among others, Calvin suggested in his commentary upon Genesis that ‘the end for which all things were created [was] that none of the conveniences and necessities of life might be wanting to men’.57 Cornelius Aggripa (1486–1535) opined that ‘man is the most beautiful and finished work . . . [in] . . . the image of God’. Consequently, ‘He has a supreme destiny beyond the common range of other creatures’.58 Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) added that ‘everything that drives us to become ‘An Escatological Vision for Earth’s Future’, in D. Hessel (ed), Christianity and Ecology (Harvard University Press, London) 205–24; Phan, P. (1996) ‘Eschatology and Ecology:  The Environment in the End Time’ Irish Theological Quarterly 62(1) 3; Bronislaw, S. (1993) ‘The Metaphysics of Environmental Concern:  A  Critique of Ecotheological Antidualism’ Studies in Christian Ethics 6(2):  67; Oelschlaeger, M. (1991) The Idea of Wilderness (Yale University Press, New  York) 64–7; Fox, W. (1990) Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Shambhala, Boston) 180–1. 53   Koenig-Bricker, W. (2009) Ten Commandments for the Environment: Pope Benedict Speaks Out (Maria Press, New York) 27, 41. 54  Augustine, The City of God (Clark, Edinburgh, 1877) 30–2; Augustine, Confessions (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1961) 13:30–1, 343–4; McGowan, R. (2010) ‘To Use and to Enjoy: Augustine and Ecology’ Saint Marks Review 212: 90; Passmore, J. (1974) Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Duckworth, London) 111, 143, 199. 55  Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1947) Vol 1, questions 64.1 and 65.3. 56  Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1947) Vol 1, question 96, Vol 2, question 77, art 3. See also questions 62, 64, and 72 in Vol 2. 57   Calvin, J. (1847) Commentaries on the First book of Moses (Brown, London) Book 1, 96. 58   Cornelius Agrippa, ‘On the Occult Philosophy’, in G. Hersey (ed) (1976), Pythagorean Palaces (Cornell University Press, Ithica) 90–4.

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attached to creatures is bad, since it prevents us from serving God’.59 Karl Barth (1886–1968) would later add that the whole of creation was simply ‘a theatre of the covenant [between God and man], radically incapable of serving any other purpose’.60 In turn, these views were taken up by generations of Christians, and in the space between the Reformation and the twentieth century, when science, technology, globalization, and worldview coincided with what many believed was a divinely ordained objective, a very destructive anthropocentric worldview prospered in large parts of the Western world.61 In the light of such considerations, the famous thesis of Lynn White (1907–1987), ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis’, concluded: Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has ever seen . . . Christianity not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends . . . Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects.62

The only difficulty with this thesis is that it is not just historical. In a contemporary setting, many people of the Christian and Hebrew faiths explicitly reject the new environmental approach shown by some of their brethren. Rather, these people stick closely to their strongly anthropocentric worldviews, calling for dominance, exploitation, and lack of restraint in human dealings with the natural world.63 In the contemporary world, this problem can be seen at multiple levels. For example, on the one hand, some religious practices require the inhumane killing of animals in ways in which the reduction of pain in the animal prior to death is

  Pascal, B. (1658) Pensees (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1958) 158.   As noted in Clarke, J. (ed) (1993) Nature in Question:  An Anthology of Ideas and Arguments (Earthscan, London) 180–2. 61  Cooke, B. (2003) ‘Religion’s Anthropocentric Conceit’ Free Inquiry 24(1):  35; Carter, D. (2001) ‘Unholy Alliances: Religion, Science and Environment’ Zygon 36(2) 357; James, B. (2007) ‘Environment and Religion:  God and the Natural World in Nineteenth Century New Zealand’ Environment and History 13(4):  413; Gatta, J. (2004) Making Nature Sacred:  Literature, Religion and the Environment in America from the Puritans to the Present (Oxford University Press, Oxford); Short, J. (1991) Imagined Country:  Society, Culture, Environment (Routledge, London) 13, 92–3; Thomas, K. (1984) Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 138–42. 62   White, L. (1967) ‘The Historical Roots of the Environmental Crisis’ Science 155: 1205, 1207; White, L. (1973) ‘Continuing the Conversation’, in I. Barbour (ed), Western Man and Environmental Ethics (Addison, London) 55–64. 63   Sherkat, D. (2007) ‘Structuring the Religion Environment Connection: Identifying Religious Influences on Environmental Concern and Activitism’ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 46(1):  71; Greeley, A. (1993) ‘Religion and Attitudes Toward the Environment’ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 32(1): 19; Merchant, C. (1992) Radical Ecology: The Search for a Liveable World (Routledge, London) 66, 126; Angell, D. (1991) Sustaining Earth: Responses to Environmental Threats (MacMillan, London) 97, 103, 110; Cooper, T. (1990) Green Christianity: Caring for the Whole of Creation (Spire, Suffolk) 65–6; Schwartzchild, S. (1984) ‘The Unnatural Jew’ Environmental Ethics 6:  347; Crownfield, D. (1973) ‘The Curse of Abel:  An Essay in Biblical Ecology’ North American Review 258: 59. 59 60

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not the foremost consideration.64 For example, the 1999 Protocol annexed to the European Community Treaty stated: In formulating and implementing its policies, the Community and the Member States shall pay full regards to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the. . . customs of Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.65

On the macro level, entire policies can be developed to exploit regions because of justifying theologies. A recent example of the application of this type of this thinking was found with the former American Interior Secretary in the early 1980s, James Watt (1938–), who justified his desire to open up nearly 800 million acres of federally owned land for immediate exploitation because his ‘responsibility is to follow the Scriptures which call upon us to occupy the land until Jesus returns’.66 With such a perspective, Watt represented a very literal interpretation that the Earth was only a temporary way station on the road to eternal life. It was thus an unimportant place, except as a testing ground to get into heaven. This view was not so different from his boss, former President Ronald Reagan (1911–2004), who suggested: ‘we want, as men on earth, to use our resources for the reason that God gave them to us—for the betterment of man’.67 In other instances, the influence, although very forceful, does not manifest itself as directly as the above instances. The foremost example of this is with the debate on contraception and family planning. This debate covers methods from abortion through to condoms. Of this, certain aspects, when linked to religious values, have had large implications. For example, Reagan barred any American money related to family planning to be given to the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) if it provided counselling on abortion, or assistance for such practices. This was only ended when Bill Clinton (1946–) lifted the gag rule on the UNPF, before George Bush Jnr (1946–) re-imposed it. This was flipped again in 2009, when President Barack Obama (1961–), in one of his first acts as President, reinstated funding for the UNPF.68 The background to the debates surrounding the policies of the UNPF is the overlap between fertility control and religion. This is a highly charged area. While abortion is an obvious tinderbox in this area, an equally contentious area is the use 64  Szucs, E. (2012) ‘Animal Welfare in Different Human Cultures and Religious Faiths’ Asian-Australian Journal of Animal Sciences 25(11): 1499; Silver, J. (2011) ‘Understanding Freedom of Religion in A  Religious Industry:  Kosher Slaughter and Animal Welfare’ Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 42(4): 671; David, S. (2007) ‘Cruelty of the Worst Kind: Religious Slaughter’ Central European History 40(1):  89; Lerner, P. (2006) ‘The Prohibition of Ritual Slaughtering and Freedom of Religion of Minorities’ Journal of Law and Religion 22(1): 1. 65   See Camm, T. (2000) ‘Animal Welfare and the Treaty of Rome’ Journal of Environmental Law 12(2): 197. 66   Brown, D.  (1981) ‘James Watt’s Land Rush’ Newsweek 29 June 29, 24. See also Bratton, S. (1983) ‘The Ecotheology of James Watt’ Environmental Ethics 5: 202. 67  Reagan, R. (1984) ‘Presidential Address on Environmental Issues’ Environmental Protection Agency Journal 10: 35. 68   Editor (2009) ‘Reversing Bush’s Assault on the UN Population Fund’ Herald Tribune 26 January, A6.

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of contraception. Contraception is a very powerful tool to promote equity between sexes. It improves the status of women and allows increases in education, training, and employment for women who are not taken out of the workforce by unplanned pregnancies. It is at the forefront of preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. It also helps directly reduce the need for induced abortion. Recent estimates suggest that if the demand for contraception was met globally, around 150,000 maternal deaths per year would be avoided. Few social policy objectives are as cost-effective and effective as the provision of family planning.69 In addition to the strong social benefits, family planning is also the foremost method by which one of the largest environmental base problems—population growth—can be confronted. In particular, the world population of 7.2 billion in mid-2013 is projected, as a best guess, to increase by almost one billion people within the next 12 years, reaching 8.1 billion in 2025, and to further increase to 9.6 billion by 2050 and 10.9 billion by 2100. Almost all of the additional 3.7 billion people from now to 2100 will enlarge the population of developing countries, which is projected to rise from 5.9 billion in 2013 to 8.2 billion by 2050 and to 9.6 billion by 2100. Growth is expected to be particularly dramatic in the least-developed countries of the world, which are projected to double in size from 898 million inhabitants in 2013 to 1.8 billion in 2050 and to 2.9 billion in 2100.70 In an attempt to address these multiple overlapping problems, the international community has repeatedly recognized the need, and right, of individuals and couples to birth control. As it stands, globally, although modern contraceptive use has increased from about 47 per cent of women of reproductive age in 1990 to 56 per cent in 2007, large groups of women are without adequate access to contraception. The unmet need for any form of family planning is around 15 per cent of the global total population of females of reproductive ages, although in some countries more than 40 per cent of women who have a desire to delay or avoid pregnancy cannot access the contraception they want. In least-developed countries, on average 23 per cent of women of reproductive age who are married or in a partnership have an unmet need for family planning.71 These figures are despite the fact that this issue has been on the international agenda for over 30 years. The first clear time (as opposed to being inferred through other human rights, like health and privacy) the right to family planning occurred was with the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Kinds of Discrimination Against Women, Article 12 of which stipulates that ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning’.72 Despite the 69   Giuseppe, B. (2007) ‘Contraception: A Social Revolution’ The European Journal of Contraception and Reproductive Health Care 12(1): 3. 70  Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013) World Population Prospects:  The 2012 Revision, Highlights and Advance Tables (UN, New York) 3–4. 71  Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2010) Speeding Progress on the Millennium Development Goals (UN, New York) 2; United Nations Population Fund (2010) Looking Back, Moving Forward (UNFPA, New York) 17–19. 72   See also Arts 10 and 14.

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clarity of this provision and its reiteration in a series of Commissions over the following decade (the Brandt Commission in 1980, the Bruntland Commission in 1987, and the South Commission in 1990) the right could not be repeated in global contexts due to overt pressure from a number of religious groups. The most spectacular example of this was at the 1992 Earth Summit, where, despite the pleas from numerous Northern and Southern governments and official organizations, the issue of population growth was largely sidelined. Indeed, the only recognition of population came in Chapter 5 of Agenda 21 where any suggestion that population growth should be limited was conspicuously absent, as was the suggestion that direct and effective methods of family planning be implemented, whereas the importance of ‘ethical and cultural considerations’ was enhanced.73 This reticence only changed in 1994 with the International Conference on Population and Development, which recognized that ‘All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so’.74 Moreover, it is ‘the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law’.75 The Action Plan emphasized the importance of contraception as a method of population control and abortion where the emphasis is on the protection of women’s health, and not as a method of birth control.76 Finally, in the year 2000, it was agreed in the Millennium Development Goals, in Goal 5 on improving maternal health, to ‘achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health’. Despite its clarity, and necessity, there has been relatively strong objection to Goal 5 from religious quarters. The Vatican has taken the words of the Bible—‘and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth.’77—as the basis for its theological position (the 1968 encyclical Humanae Vitae (‘of Human Life’)). This states that ‘direct interruption of the generative process. . . [is] absolutely excluded as illicit means of birth control’. This belief places a near absolute ban on the ‘artificial’ interference with the reproduction process. This position was justified at the 1992 Earth Summit by Cardinal Angelo Sodano (1927–), Secretary of State for the Holy See, who stated that: The church is aware of the complexity of the problem [of rising population levels . . . but . . . ] the urgency of the situation must not lead into error in proposing ways of intervening. To apply methods which are not in accord with the true nature of man actually ends up causing tragic harm.78

  UNCED Doc.A/CONF.151/4, para 5.50.   Action Plan, Principle 8. 75   Action Plan, paras 7.2, 7.3. 76   Action Plan, paras 7.6, 7.9, and 8.25. 77   Genesis 1:26–28. 78   Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1, Vol 3, 197. 73 74

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Following through, in the run-up to the 1994 Cairo Conference on population, the Vatican reissued the Veritatis Splendour and re-emphasized its position against contraception. The encyclical went on to condemn the uses of contraception as ‘intrinsically evil’ and ‘irremediably evil acts, per-se’. However, this entrenchment could not stall the momentum which had built after the UNCED of the absolute necessity to address exponential population growth. Nevertheless, the Vatican continually tried to stall the eventual document, classifying it as lacking a clear ethical vision, the social abdication of responsibility, and the encouragement of irresponsible actions of young people. Similarly, although the international momentum is now clearly in favour of family planning, the Catholic Church (and some Islamic groups) has not changed its position, and continued to have a negative impact in this area by facilitating the stopping of contraception to many individuals and communities.79

7. Conclusion The role of religion in contemporary society cannot be underestimated. Although no longer at the forefront of international debates, its influence remains vast and persuasive. Within this mix, the influence of religion, as a catalyst for environmental concern, is now becoming obvious, with the links between conservation and religious obligation being joined by many theologians. The ethic of Christian stewardship is an exemplar of this type of thinking, and, clearly, many good conservation goals are being set and reached by religiously minded individuals. In some instances, the power of the pursuit of these conservation goals can be remarkable, because those who subscribe to these beliefs can equate protecting the environment with protecting the works of God. Although clearly a powerful ethic for those with an associated theological worldview by which conservation can be achieved, the ethic remains limited by two fundamental concerns. First, many people do not subscribe to religious worldviews, for which such approaches are meaningless. The reaction against religious worldviews is often due to the fact that there is no objective certainty in religion. It is for this reason that so many religious questions have differing answers. This is a particular problem in environmental matters, for as much as religious texts and interpretations can be used to support green goals, they can also be interpreted to act directly against them. This action against ranges from differences which are

79  The Statement of the Holy See was made in Prepcom III, 5 April 1994. For commentary, see Benagiano, G. (2011) ‘Condoms, HIV and the Roman Catholic Church’ Reproductive BioMedicine 22(7): 701; Gyimhan, S. (2012) ‘Religion, Contraception, and Method Choice’ Journal of Religion and Health 51(4): 1359; McQuillan, K. (2004) ‘When Does Religion Influence Fertility?’ Population and Development Review 30(1): 25; Rearden, M. (2003) ‘Grave Matter: Humane Vitae, Thirty Five Years Later’ Irish Theological Quarterly 68(2): 155; Boore, E (2003) ‘Overpopulation: Ecological and Biblical Principles Involving Limitation’ Worldviews 7(1): 154.

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purely theological (but lead to very anthropocentric paradigms) to actions which are highly political (such as with contraception) in international environmental law, which cut directly against making action in some of the most pressing concerns of the twenty-first century. This is not to suggest that there is no value in the quest for religious values in environmental thinking, but, rather, that caution needs to be exercised, for this is a sword that can cut both ways.

VI Aesthetics 1. Introduction The aesthetic appreciation of nature, in terms of both species and areas, is one of the foremost justifications for protecting the environment. Its success is due to a widely held belief that beautiful things should be conserved, not destroyed. This belief has been continually built into legislation, domestically and internationally, for over 100 years. It is likely, that the importance of the ethical values of the aesthetics of the natural world will increase in time to come, as the technically driven globalized world of the twenty-first century propagates aesthetic images to greater levels than could have been envisaged in earlier times.1 Where the debate about the value of the aesthetics of nature is different to contemporary debates about the power of aesthetics in a globalized world in general, is that the debate about the aesthetics of nature already has a legacy and a largely successful track-record in the conservation of spectacular areas, which stretches back hundreds of years.2

1   LeMenager, S. (2012) ‘The Aesthetics of Petroleum, After Oil’ American Literary History 24(1): 59; Imre, S. (2012) ‘Crude Aesthetics:  The Politics of Oil Documentaries’ Journal of American Studies 46(2): 423; Mayer, A. (2008) ‘The Aesthetics of Catastrophe’ Public Culture 20(2): 177; Aristarkhova, I. (2007) ‘News Media and Aesthetics’ Theory, Culture and Society 24(7): 317. 2   Hoe, L. (2011) ‘Environmental Aesthetics:  Must Moral Issues Always Override Aesthetic Considerations?’ Philosophia:  The International Journal of Philosophy 40(2):  133; Hargrove, E. (2008) ‘The Historical Foundations of American Environmental Attitudes’, in A. Carlson A (ed), Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty (Columbia University Press, New York) 29–49; Thompson, J. (1995) ‘Aesthetics and the Value of Nature’ Environmental Ethics 17: 291, 294–6; Paehlke, R. (1989) Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics (Yale University Press, New Haven) 145, 172; Hargrove, E. (1989) The Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Prentice Hall, New Jersey) 132–5; Passmore, J. (1974) Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Duckworth, London) 55–6; Austin, R.C. (1985) ‘Beauty:  A  Foundation For Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 7:  197; Sadler, B. (1982) Environmental Aesthetics:  Essays in Interpretation (Carlson, Toronto) 1–3.

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2.  The argument of aesthetic value The aesthetic appreciation of nature has remarkably deep roots. There can be no doubt that the Greeks and Romans delighted in the wild and cultivated beauty of Mediterranean landscapes. Cicero (106–43 bce) observed: ‘If we dwelt some time amid mountains and forests we take delight in them’.3 Pliny the Younger (61–112) mused that ‘There is nothing that gives either you or me as much pleasure as the works of nature’,4 while Plotinus (205–270) added that ‘Without beauty, what would become of being’.5 In the following centuries, Michel de Montaigne (1533– 1592) would add that human art could never improve on nature, who ‘makes our vaine and frivolous enterprises wonderfully ashamed’.6 Antony Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury (1621–1683), added, ‘I sing of Nature’s order in created beings, and celebrate the beauties which resolve in thee, the source and principle of all beauty and perfection’.7 Such aesthetic appreciation of nature grew in both popularity and rhetoric with the onset of the Romantics, and their reaction against the Industrial Revolution from the nineteenth century onwards, of which writers and artists like Coleridge, Johnson, Wordsworth, Keats, Byron, Shelley, and Ruskin would all advocate the values that could be derived from the beauty of the natural world.8 Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)9 and Frederick Nietzsche (1844–1900)10 would concur. Some scholars of key importance to the environmental movement, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862), and John Muir (1838–1914), went even further in exploring the importance of aesthetics and environmental conservation. Emerson linked the beauty of nature to an almost ontological level, suggesting that nature, which was always perfect and beautiful, ‘exist[s]‌to the soul to satisfy the desire for beauty’.11 Thoreau argued that the most (popularly perceived) ugly places of nature were always superior

3   Cicero, ‘On Friendship’, in Cicero, On the Good Life (trans M.  Grant, Penguin, London, 1971) 172. 4   Pliny, Epinomis; as reprinted in Hughes, J. (1994) Pan’s Travels: Environmental Problems of the Ancient Greeks and Romans (John Hopkins University Press, London) 57. 5  Plotinus, Enneads (trans J. Dillon, Penguin, London, 1981) 5.8.9. 6   Florio, A. (ed) (1892) Montaigne’s Essays (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) I: 219. 7   Cooper, noted in ‘The Moralists’, in G. Stanley (ed), Characteristics (Bobbs Merril, New York, 1964) 64–7, 97–9. 8  Paden, R. (2013) ‘Philosophical Histories of the Aesthetics of Nature’ Environmental Ethics 35: 58; Nicolson, M. (1997) Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite (University of Washington Press, Seattle); Clayre, A. Nature and Industrialisation (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 30–45, 59–63, 205–21, 313–21; Clarke, J.J. (ed) (1993) Nature in Question: An Anthology of Ideas and Arguments (Earthscan, London) 142–4; Marshall, P. (1992) Nature’s Web:  An Exploration of Ecological Thinking (Simon and Schuster, London) 267–80; Short, J.R. (1991) Imagined Country:  Society, Culture and Environment (Routledge, London) 15–18; Thomas, K. (1984) Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 68–9, 257–8. 9   Kant, I. (1952) Critique of Judgement (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 51; Arendt, L. (1982) Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (University Of Chicago Press, Chicago) 30. 10   Nietzsche. F. (1977) A Nietzsche Reader (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 125–48. 11   Emerson, R. (1849) ‘The Nature of Beauty’, as reprinted in Carlson, A. (ed) (2008) Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty (Columbia University Press, New York) 49–53.

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to the most cultivated places of humanity, as ‘wild places are the most beautiful, captivating and meaningful’.12 Muir added that with a full understanding of how the environment worked, a very deep aesthetical appreciation of its values was possible.13 Such views would end up permeating as far as some of the most powerful conservation organizations on the planet. For example, the 1948 Statute of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources came to recognize that: Natural beauty is one of the sources of inspiration of spiritual life, and the necessary framework for the needs of recreation, intensified now by man’s increasingly mechanised existence.14

Such recognitions of the aesthetic value of nature have been buttressed by philosophical experiments which have sought to establish the weight of such considerations. For example, George Edward Moore (1873–1958) suggested that the reader compare the most ugly world they could imagine (without humans on it) and the most beautiful (again, without humans). On the assumption that the reader would agree that the beautiful world is better than the ugly, it is asserted that an inherent value in beauty exists.15 Such values can lead to direct environmental protection arguments. As Holmes Rolston (1930–) suggested, ‘people are learning to respect natural things. . . . because we find a beauty we are unwilling to destroy’.16 This unwillingness to destroy beautiful parts of nature is on par with why great works of art—especially those which can never be recreated—should also be protected either in their natural state or rehabilitated to their full potential, as full aesthetic beauty requires the full health of the natural object in question17 In practice, aesthetic considerations are often at the forefront of play with the appreciation of particular areas. In this space, there is often what Emile Durkheim

12   Thoreau, H. (1862) ‘Walking’, as reprinted in Carlson A. (ed) (2008) Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty (Columbia University Press, New York) 54–63. The quote is from the introduction, at 25. 13   Wattles, J. (2013) ‘John Muir as a Guide to Education in Environmental Aesthetics’ Journal of Aesthetic Education 47(3): 56. 14   Statute of the International union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources; reproduced in Ruster, B. and Simma, B. (eds) (1976) International Protection of the Environment (Oceana, New York) Vol 1, 8. 15  Moore, G.E. (1903) Principa Ethica (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965) 83–4, 194–5. 16   Rolston, H. (1974) ‘Is There an Ecological Ethic?’ Ethics 85: 103; Rolston, H. (2008) ‘From Beauty to Duty’, in A. Carlson (ed), Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism:  From Beauty to Duty (Columbia University Press, New York) 325–37. See also Eaton, M. (2008) ‘The Beauty that Requires Health’, in Carslon, Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism, 339–59; Rolston, H. (1988) Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Temple University Press, Texas) 342; Lane, J. (1991) ‘The Language of the Soul’, in J. Button (ed), The Best of Resurgence (Green Print, Devon) 145. 17   Wynne-Tyson, J. (ed) (1990) The Extended Circle: An Anthology of Humane Thought (Cardinal, Sussex) 121–2; Goldsworthy, A. (1991) ‘Art in Nature’, in J. Button (ed), The Best of Resurgence (Green Print, Devon) 16; Sears, P.B. (1965) ‘Ethics, Aesthetics and the Balance of Nature’, in I. Burton (ed), Readings in Resource Management and Conservation (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 272, 273.

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(1858–1917) argued was a common collective conscience—‘common to the average citizens of the same society’—and in this context, over what allows aesthetic beauty to be recognized in certain geographical areas.18 This is particularly evident in discussions about landscapes, of which many people drift towards appreciating similar types (with a rural or coastal focus) in terms of everything from planning their vacations in these areas, to paying a premium for a location with a more pleasing view. The defence of these aesthetic values, especially when held in private ownership, is long recognized in the multiple domestic legal practices. Even when dealing with public spaces, when the aesthetics of beautiful areas are spoilt—from the macro level, such as oil spills onto coastal zones, right down to the micro, with items as small as litter found in a natural environment—the public can get very disconcerted.19 In terms of biodiversity, flagship species are often chosen by environmental groups because of their aesthetic value. In some instances, conservation results have been spectacular. The foremost example of this involved the campaigns against the clubbing to death of baby seals in the 1980s. Despite seal hunts being lawful in the countries in which the practice took place and not prohibited under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (due to being sustainable in terms of population numbers), in 1983 the European Economic Community introduced its first directive banning the importation of skins of whitecoat pups of harp seals and pups of hooded seals, for commercial sale, into the European Community.20 This move followed an extremely successful campaign to protect the seals, which began in the late 1950s. The difference was that the original campaign was concerned primarily with levels of sustainable harvests and the humaneness of the killing procedures. However, by the mid-1960s the campaign changed focus, with an emphasis upon questions of ‘morality’, ‘compassion’, ‘cruelty’, ‘baby seals’, ‘innocence’, and ‘luxury fur’. Central to this very media and image orientated campaign was the fact that ‘the seals were very young and very attractive; the killing took place in the open on the ice; and the killing was bloody and looked brutal’.21 The question of the sustainability of the take, despite being noted in the Preamble to the Directive, could not be seriously questioned as the populations of seals were actually increasing, and had been doing so since the early 1970s. Thus, the campaign was fought and won largely on the grounds of   Durkheim, E. (1933) The Division of Labour Within Society (Allen and Unwin, London) 79–80.   Howley, P. (2011) ‘Landscape Aesthetics:  Assessing the General Public’s Preferences Towards Rural Landscapes’ Ecological Economics 72:  161; Carlson, A. (2010) ‘Environmental Aesthetics’ Environmental Values 19(3): 289; Parson, R. (2002) ‘Good Looking: in Defense of Scenic Landscape Aesthetics’ Landscape and Urban Planning 60: 43; Kapper, T. (2004) ‘Bringing Beauty to Account in the Environmental Impact Statement’ Environmental Practice 6(4):  296; Karp, J.P. (1990) ‘The Evolving Meaning of Aesthetics in Land Use Regulation’ Colombia Journal of Environmental Law 15:  307; Woodbury, S. (1987) ‘Aesthetic Nuisance’ Natural Resources Journal 27:  877, 878, 882; Broughton, R. (1972) ‘Aesthetics and Environmental Law’ Land and Water Law Review 7: 451, 472. 20   Council Directive 83/129/EEC of 28 March 1983 concerning the importation into Member States of skins of certain seal pups and products derived therefrom. This ban was extended indefinitely in 1989 under Council Directive 89/370/EEC of 8 June 1989. 21  Canadian Royal Commission (1986) Seals and Sealing in Canada (Government Printer, Montreal) Vol 1, 25–8 and Vol 2, Ch 9. 18 19

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considerations that had little to do with sustainability in a strict sense. Rather, it had everything to do with aesthetic appeal and response. As Brian Davies (1935–), the man largely credited with stopping the seal hunts in the 1980s, said: ‘The seals are beautiful, so they struck a special chord. If they had been ugly little monsters, they’d probably still be out there killing them’.22 If a larger animal, considered a ‘higher form of life’, has some similarity to humans, its marketing value can grow even higher. If an animal holds these characteristics and is identified as being under threat of extinction, its perception of beauty can increase even further. This was particularly obvious with some species such as marine mammals. With such a collection of benefits, conservation groups were, and are, often quick to select species which will lead direct to public buy-in, in terms of everything from donations to the conservation cause, to eco-tourism choices where the charismatic megafauna reside. Even biodiversity that does not have similarities to humans, let alone mammals, is often inadvertently ranked over how it appears physically. This practice reigns all the way down to insects, where butterflies trump beetles.23

3.  Recognition in law and policy The most recent appreciation of high level support for aesthetic values in this area came at the 2012 Earth Summit where the participants reaffirmed, inter alia, ‘the aesthetic values of biological diversity’.24 This reaffirmation of high level political support can be traced to the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development, which also recognized that aesthetic considerations can justify environmental preservation,25 and the World Charter for Nature, which suggested in 22   Sykes, T. (1992) ‘Interview: Brian Davies’ Green Magazine (31 March) 32. For the build-up to the eventual European ban, see Holt, S. (1982) ‘Seal Slaughtered: Science Abused’ New Scientist (11 March) 636–8; Anon (1982) ‘Europe to Ban Imports of Skins from Baby Seals’ New Scientist (1 July); Anon (1982) ‘Minister to Try Again for Seal Ban’ New Scientist (9 December) 627; Anon (1983) ‘Canada Denies Arm Twisting Over Seal Trade’ New Scientist (6 January) 7. 23   Skibins, J. (2013) ‘Charisma and Conservation: Charismatic Megafauna’s Influence on Safari and Zoo Tourists’ Pro-Conservation Behaviors’ Biodiversity and Conservation 23(2):  17; Maresova, J. (2008) ‘Noah’s Ark is Full of Common Species Attractive to Humans’ Ecological Economics 6(4): 554; Home, R. (2009) ‘Selection Criteria for Flagship Species by Conservation Organizations’ Environmental Conservation 36(2): 139; Goedeke, T. (2004) ‘In the Eye of the Beholder: Changing Social Perceptions of the Manatee’ Society and Animals 12(2):  99; Walpole, W. (2002) ‘Tourism and Flagship species in conservation’ Biodiversity and Conservation 11(3):  543; Gunnthorsdottir, A. (2001) ‘Physical Attractiveness of an Animal Species as a Decision Factor for its Preservation’ Anthrozoos 14(4):  204; Metrick, A. (1998) ‘Conflicts and Choices in Biodiversity Preservations’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(3): 21; Metrick, A. (1996) ‘Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation’ Land Economics 72(1): 1; Pearce, F. (1991) Green Warriors: The People and Politics Behind the Environmental Revolution (London, Bodley Head) 37; Gunn, A. (1982) ‘Preserving Rare Species’, in T. Regan (ed), Earthbound:  New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics (Random House, New York) 298. 24   Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), A/CONF.216/16, para 197. 25   World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 155.

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1982 that in ‘the allocation of areas of the Earth to various uses . . . due account shall be taken of . . . the natural beauty of the area concerned’.26 Collectively, these three examples show that for over 30 years, at the highest, generic, global levels, the international community has recognized the value of aesthetic considerations for the conservation of areas and the biodiversity within them. The idea of conserving species (as opposed to areas) because of their aesthetic value appeared at the international level in the early 1970s, when the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna noted in its Preamble that the signatories were ‘Conscious of the ever growing value of wild fauna and flora from aesthetic [and other] points of view.’ The Preamble to the Convention Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and their Environment followed suit, recognizing the importance of birds from a number of considerations, including aesthetic ones. Comparable acknowledgments are reflected in the Preambles to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, and the subsidiary agreements made under the Convention, such as the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds.27 The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity also records this value.28 An early example of support for the aesthetic value of nature as a pretext to conservation of areas can be found in the 1933 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State (in Africa). This suggested that the signatories set up national parks ‘for the propagation, protection and preservation of. . . objects of aesthetic importance’.29 Soon after, aesthetic considerations were further reflected in Articles I and VII of the 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere. Over the following decades, the same point was repeated in regional conservation treaties designed to protect areas, in Africa (in 1968 and 2003),30 the South Pacific in 1976,31 and Europe in 1979 in the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, and the related European Diploma of Protected Areas.32 It later gained recognition in the 1991 Antarctic Protocol on Environmental Protection.33 In terms of truly global conservation treaties that protect areas based on their aesthetic value, the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage is at the fore. This Convention was in part based on the earlier recognition by UNESCO in 1962 that damaging landscapes of aesthetic value was an unfortunate harm that impoverished heritage, because aesthetic value in nature was:

  World Charter for Nature, UN Doc.A/35/141/1980, Annex 2.2.   Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Preamble, para 4. 28   The aesthetic value of biodiversity is noted in the Preamble to the CBD. 29   Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, Art 2. 30   African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 1968. For the 2003 Convention, see Art XII (1)(c). 31   Convention on Conservation in the South Pacific, Preamble and Art 2. 32   See Preamble to the European Convention on the Preservation of Wildlife and Natural Habitats. See also European Diploma, Art 1. 33   Protocol on Environmental Protection, Art 3. 26 27

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[N]‌ecessary to the life of men for whom they represent a powerful physical, moral and spiritual regenerating influence, while at the same time contributing to the artistic and cultural life of peoples, as innumerable and universally known examples.34

Ten years later, in part to rectify this problem, the Convention recognized that ‘aesthetic’ factors and ‘beauty’ were considerations that could go towards recognizing cultural and natural heritage that may possess ‘Outstanding Universal Value’, thus meriting its conservation as an international concern. The launching point into this discussion came from the appreciation within the Convention of: [N]‌atural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic . . . point of view and/or natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of . . . natural beauty.35

This section of the Convention has gone on to be interpreted to allow for the inscription of sites that ‘contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance’.36 In practice, despite the apparent simplicity of these words, the ideal has been controversial to apply as it is difficult to measure. That is, whereas superlative natural phenomena can be objectively measured and assessed, as with the tallest mountain, the deepest canyon, the largest cave, and so on, ‘exceptional natural beauty’ is harder to assess, although the Committee of the World Heritage Convention does attempt to do so. For example, with the 2009 inscription of the Dolomites in Italy, it was recorded that they were widely regarded as being among the most attractive mountain landscapes in the world. This was because their beauty was derived from spectacular vertical forms of pinnacles, spires, and towers. A great diversity of colours, as provided by the contrasts between the bare, pale-coloured rock surfaces and the forests and meadows below, was also noted.37 Similar superlative language was repeatedly utilized in 2010 as landscapes, seascapes, and megafauna were all recognized for their aesthetic qualities.38 Despite such recognitions, the Committee has continually expressed caution in trying to recognize aesthetic value in World Heritage deliberations. The broad principles are that the aesthetics criterion is applied only to areas (not species) and that natural aesthetics should not have a human influence. Accordingly, site nominations under the aesthetic category are often knocked back if human influence in the vista is excessive (from telecommunications towers to walking tracks).39 In 34   UNESCO (1962) Recommendation Concerning the Safeguarding of the Beauty and Character of Landscapes and Sites; reprinted in Ruster, B. and Simma, B. (eds) (1976) International Protection of the Environment (Oceana, New York) Vol 5, 2398. 35   See World Heritage Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Art 2. 36   World Heritage Committee, Operational Guidelines (2002 edn) para 44(iii). 37   (2009) ‘Dolomites’ Decision 33 COM 8B.5. 38   From 2010, see Decisions 34 COM 8B.1; 8B.2; 8B.4; 8B.4; 8B5 and 8B.7. 39   Pressouyre, L. (1992) The World Heritage Convention, Twenty Years Later (UNESCO, Paris) 24. For recent decisions on this, see (2008) Decision 32 COM 7B.31 and (2008) Decision 32 COM 7B.44.

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addition, the Committee prefers not to allow sites to be nominated on aesthetic value alone—but rather, that the aesthetic criterion should only be used in conjunction with other criteria and, singularly, only in exceptional circumstances. This approach has been consistently applied, and more often than not the aesthetic considerations of a site are listed in conjunction with other criteria. Nevertheless, a number of sites have been listed after fulfilling only the aesthetic criteria.40 Apart from these few instances of listing a site only on its aesthetic value, the more common approach is to list sites with spectacular aesthetic qualities in conjunction with other considerations. This approach, whereby aesthetic concerns are linked with other criteria, has involved listings from all over the world and dozens of different cultures, strengthening the view that aesthetic considerations, in practice at the highest international level, are much more cosmopolitan and cross-cultural than once assumed.41 The one area where the World Heritage Convention has felt more comfortable in expanding its considerations of aesthetics has been in relation to cultural landscapes. Cultural landscapes, as first defined in 1925, are ‘fashioned from a natural landscape by a cultural group. Culture is an agent, the natural the medium, the cultural landscape the result’.42 Despite this early recognition, the idea of cultural landscapes as an inscription option took a long time to evolve. In addition, this evolution has been primarily in Europe. For example, the 2004 European Landscapes Convention, the Alpine Convention, and the European Diploma all recognize the value of landscapes, which, according to the 2004 European Landscape Convention, are areas ‘as perceived by people, the character of which is the result of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors’.43 The European Diploma of Protected Areas has gone on to identify such areas as: Sites or landscapes of outstanding aesthetic or cultural value or of a spectacular nature; complexes conserved as evidence of the history of the countryside or woodlands in Europe; or country or wooded areas which are cultivated using extensive methods and constitute typical examples of European landscapes.44

The World Heritage interest in this area began in early 1980 when a ‘mixed’ category of nominations began to appear, which blurred the traditional dualism of the natural and cultural heritage. The mixed inscriptions, whereby a site was noted for its natural and its cultural values, have come to encompass notable areas such as Mounts Wuyi and Emei in China, the Laponian area of Sweden, the Ibiza Park in Spain, the Pyrenees, the Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical Landscape in South 40   UNESCO (1996) Expert Review on Evaluation of General Principles and Criteria for Nominations of Natural World Heritage Sites WHC-96/CONF.202/INF.9 (15 April) 3. 41   For a full list of sites which are recognized for their aesthetic values, in conjunction with their other values, see Gillespie, A. (2007) Protected Areas and International Law (The Netherlands, Brill) Ch 4. 42   This is the definition of Carl Sauer. See UNESCO (2002) Cultural Landscapes: The Challenge of Conservation (UNESCO World Heritage Papers No 7) 17. 43   European Landscape Convention 2004, Art 1, ‘Definitions’. 44   European Diploma, Annex I, ‘Criteria’. The new criteria were adopted in 2008: see Resolution CM/ResDip (2008) 1 on the Revised Regulations for the European Diploma of Protected Areas.

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Africa, and Tongariro National Park in New Zealand.45 Soon after, the Committee revised its interpretation of cultural criteria to justify inscription of cultural landscapes to ensure that ‘the combined works of nature and man of outstanding universal value’ were duly appreciated.46 The key point, in each instance, is that aesthetic value is interpreted, if not verified, by a strong connection to human culture. It is not about the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, without a discernable human influence.47

4.  Difficulties with aesthetics Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762) introduced the term ‘aesthetics’ to name his ‘science of perception’ in 1735.48 However, as many people will contend, aesthetics is not a science, as the interpretation of aesthetics is relative, or, as more commonly noted, beauty is in the eyes of the beholder, not within inherent properties in the item being admired (or disliked). Thus, as Protagoras (570–495 bce) noted, ‘Beauty is relative and subjective’.49 Luminaries, such as John Locke (1632–1704),50 David Hume (1711–1776),51 and George Santayana (1863– 1952)52 would subsequently reiterate this position, and argue against the possibility of objective aesthetics. In turn, this argument would be repeated in a number of domestic legal jurisdictions that ‘aesthetic considerations are fraught with subjectivity. One man’s pleasure may be another man’s perturbation . . . Judicial forage into such a nebulous area would be chaotic’.53 The related problem to this is not only that aesthetics are subjective, but the aesthetics of nature, if invoked, may be negative. Early theorists in this area, such as Aristotle (384–322 bce), Augustine (354–430), and Edmund Burke (1729– 1797) restricted discussions of beauty to mathematical considerations, consistency,

45   UNESCO (1998) Report of the World Heritage Strategy Natural and Cultural Heritage Expert Meeting (Amsterdam, UNESCO) 3, 4, 9, 11–13. 46  UNESCO (2000) Synthesis Report of the Meeting on Cultural Landscapes:  Concept and Implementation WHC-2000/CONF.204/WEB.3 (13 October) Annex III. 47  Operational Guidelines (2002 edn) para 57; UNESCO (2002) Cultural Landscapes:  The Challenge of Conservation (UNESCO, World Heritage Papers No 7). 48   Collinson, D. (1992) ‘Aesthetic Experience’, in O. Hanfling (ed), Philosophical Aesthetics:  An Introduction (Blackwell, Oxford) 110, 111. See also Sibley, F. (1964) ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, in W.E. Kennick (ed), Art and Philosophy—Readings in Aethetics (St Martin’s Press, London) 351; Solomon, R.C. (1993) Introducing Philosophy (Harcourt, Florida) 876–914. 49   Protagoras, in Sullivan, M. (1982) The Four Seasons of Greek Philosophy (Efstathiadis, Cyprus) 84. 50   Locke, J. (1690) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Thomas Tegg, London, 1972) Vol III. 3, 6, 11. 51   Lenz, J.W. (ed) (1965) Hume’s Essays (Bobbs-Merril, Cambridge) 6, 124–5. 52   Santayana, G. (1955) The Sense of Beauty (Ascott, Dover) 28–9. 53   Ness v Albert 665 S.W.2d 1 (1983). See also O’Neil, J. (1993) Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (Routledge, London) 166–7; Costonis, J.L. (1982) ‘Law and Aesthetics’ Michigan Law Review 80: 355, 367–8; Williams, D. (1977) ‘Subjectivity, Expression and Privacy: The Problems of Aesthetic Regulation’ Minnesota Law Review 62: 1.

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proportionality, and limited size.54 Following through, and infused with religious interpretations of beauty, a number of important scholars, such as Francis Bacon (1561–1626), took an actual dislike to the natural world and argued that no beauty could reside within it because it was ‘the entrance of prevarication and corruption’.55 English poet Andrew Marvell (1621–1678) added that mountains were ‘ill-defined excrescences that deform the Earth and frighten heaven’. In a similar sense, Thomas Burnett (1635–1715) argued in 1681 that mountains were not part of God’s creating but a product of human sinfulness.56 While such cultural interpretations of the value of mountains are no longer fashionable, it remains impossible not to recognize the cultural (including the economic and demographic) influence on aesthetics, in both historical and contemporary contexts. At base, this presents the foremost argument against using aesthetics as a pretext for conservation—that what may be attractive to one group of people (say, sharks swimming freely in the ocean) may be different to another (say, the fins of the same sharks being removed and sold to provide money to the fisherman to feed his family). Such problems, often related directly to where someone is on the economic ladder, also mean that for poor people without jobs, pollution-belching factories which offer employment are places of beauty, while for those without such pressing economic needs, they are places of ugliness.57 This problem becomes even more complicated when environmental problems are seen at different levels by opposing groups, and both use aesthetic arguments for their position. A  good example of this is with the advent of modern wind turbines, which, as they have become commercially viable, have come to occupy vast swathes of both the land and ocean. In so doing, they are providing one of the most promising technologies that will challenge the build-up of greenhouse gases, and thus help confront what is probably the foremost environmental challenge of 54  Plato, Phaedo (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969) 184.d; Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, in Basic Works of Aristotle (Random House, London, 1976) 1078.b; Burke, E. (1757) A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (Routledge, London, 1956) 94. 55  Bacon, as noted in Thomas, K. (1984) Man and the Natural World:  Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 32, 33, 200. See also Tuan, Y. (1974) A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values (Prentice Hall, New Jersey) 72–3. 56   Nicolson, M. (1997) Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite (University of Washington Press, Seattle); Short, J.R. (1991) Imagined Country: Society, Culture and Environment (Routledge, London) 15; Thomas, K. (1984) Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 200. 57  Todd, A. (2010) ‘Anthropocentric Distance in National Geographic’s Environmental Aesthetic’ Environmental Communication:  A  Journal of Nature and Culture 4(2):  206; Elands, B. (2009) ‘No Wilderness for Immigrants:  Cultural Differences in Images of Nature and Landscape Preferences’ Landscape and Urban Planning 91(3): 113; Stamps, A. (1999) ‘Demographic Effects in Environmental Aesthetics: A Meta-Analysis’ Journal of Planning Literature 14: 155; Morito, B. (1995) ‘Value, Metaphysics and Anthropocentricism’ Environmental Values 4: 31, 33; Mitchell, W.J.T. (1994) Landscape and Power (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 6–12, 14–15, 20–1, 118, 128–9, 132; Sobevilla, D. (1991) ‘Aesthetics and Ethnocentricism’, in M. Dascal (ed), Cultural Relativism and Philosophy (Brill, New  York) 215–21; Rowe, J.S. (1986) ‘In Praise of Beauty’, in P. Hanson (ed), Environmental Ethics:  Philosophical and Policy Perspectives (Simon Fraser University Press, Toronto) 45, 46–7, 177; Haldane, J. (1994) ‘Admiring the High Mountains: The Aesthetics of Environment’ Environmental Values 3: 97, 99, 101–2; Binder, R. (1994) ‘Ngugi Wa Thiong’o and the Search for a Populist Landscape Aesthetic’ Environmental Values 3: 47, 49–50, 57–8.

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the twenty-first century. To many people, such technology is seen as aesthetically beautiful, for all that it comes to represent. However, despite being part of an answer to one of the foremost environmental problems, they often dramatically alter land or seascapes. Accordingly, wind farms are often strongly objected to by local communities for their aesthetic damage at the local level. The base difficulty is that what is, or is not, of aesthetic value depends entirely on where an individual or community is sitting in the debate and what is important to them. Quite simply, within the prism of aesthetics, there is no way to weigh the respective merits of the competing interpretations of what is beautiful, as the equation is looked at from two completely different angles. The difficulty of such subjective values is that if aesthetics are the defining characteristic for why something is of value, even assuming that there is no active aesthetic that would value it destroyed, that which is ugly, or unattractive, still has no value. When such limitations are realized, it becomes obvious that aesthetic considerations lose something of their importance as a basis for environmental protection, as species or areas which are not attractive lose their value for conservation. The problem is particularly acute for either landscapes or species which are not megafauna—lacking the ‘wow’ factor or, worse still, are associated with the ‘ick’ factor. For these less-than-beautiful examples—the overwhelming majority of the natural world—the future would be far from secure.58 Worse still, if shallow ideas of beauty are used as the yardstick for focus, deeper thinking on more serious issues may be avoided. For example, air pollution can make spectacular colours that can enhance scenery (especially at sunset). Similarly, climate change can kill off corals by bleaching them, which also, when bone white, look stunning in a blue ocean, but to only see the stark images is to completely miss the massive ecological catastrophe that is causing this type of beauty—of a dying ecosystem.59 This problem, as first recognized by foundation thinkers such as John Muir, was that if landscape was only valued for spectacular scenery, only a few areas would ever be of interest, with most other places being ‘sadly disappointing’ to 58  Brady, E. (2011) ‘The Ugly Truth:  Negative Aesthetics and Environment’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69(Oct):  83; Knight, A. (2008) ‘Bats, Snakes and Spiders:  How Aesthetic and Negativistic Attitudes, and Other Concepts Predict Support for Species Protection’ Journal of Environmental Psychology 28: 94; Brady, E. (2006) ‘Aesthetics in Practice: Valuing the Natural World’ Environmental Values 15:  277; Nash, S. (2004) ‘Desperately Seeking Charisma:  Improving the Status of Invertebrates’ Bioscience 54(6): 487; Daniel, T. (2000) ‘Whither Scenic Beauty?’ Landscape and Urban Planning 54: 267; Yuriko, S. (1998) ‘The Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature’ The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56(2):  101; Saito, Y. (1998) ‘The Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature’ The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56(2): 101; Lothian, A. (1999) ‘Landscape and the Philosophy of Aesthetics: Is Landscape Quality Inherent in the Landscape or in the Eye of the Beholder?’ Landscape and Urban Planning 44: 177; Foster, C. (1992) ‘Aesthetic Disillusionment: Environment, Ethics, Art’ Environmental Values 1(3): 205; Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach (UCL Press, London) 40; Cobb, J. (1978) ‘Beyond Anthropocentricism in Ethics and Religion’, in R. Morris (ed), On The Fifth Day: Animal Rights and Human Ethics (Acropolis, Washington) 139–40; Passmore, J. (1974) Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Duckworth, London) 109–10. 59   Smith, T. (2000) ‘Surviving Great Smokey’ New Scientist (1 July) 14.

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observers who did not possess a deeper appreciation of the environment.60 Aldo Leopold (1887–1948) echoed Muir’s complaint that if the focus was on ‘show pieces’ of ‘grand mountains and waterfalls, cliffs and lakes’ the vast majority of other landscapes would be considered ‘tedious’ and ‘boring’. Against this trend, Leopold suggested that ‘in country, as in people, a plain exterior often conceals hidden riches’, but for this to be reached, a deeper understanding of the landscape, and the inter-linking ecological processes, had to be reached. He explained: The taste for country displays the same diversity in aesthetic competence among individuals as the taste for opera, or oils. There are those who are willing to be herded in droves through ‘scenic’ places; who find mountains with waterfalls, cliffs and lakes. . . In country, as in people, a plain exterior often conceals hidden riches, to perceive these requires much living in and with.61

For Leopold, a healthy environment was beautiful and deserved consideration for its beauty, whatever its contribution to human utility. Accordingly, even the areas or acts typically viewed with disdain, such as smelly bogs or a rotten carcass of an elk full of maggots—should be reconsidered as being a type of beauty, due to their representing healthy natural processes. For Leopold, and many scholars after him, it was such regenerative processes within nature that were the subject of beauty. The key to unlocking such a vision was, more often than not, scientific understanding of the way nature works, as only then does the viewer fully understand what he or she is seeing. Such knowledge also helps takes the appreciation of aesthetics from the subjective to the objective.62 In some regards, Leopold has obtained his wish, as enhanced understandings of nature and a deeper study of aesthetics have evolved in the area of conservation in the last 20  years. Specifically, many people and policy makers have come to understand ecological context, as well as modernist forms of beauty in nature. At the ecosystem level, the most obvious example was when bogs—considered to be ugly and with no value—became wetlands—considered to be beautiful with high value. At the species level, considerations of the physical attraction of a species came to be trumped, if it was aggressively invasive or over populated. Similarly, within managed protected areas, the pursuit of ‘facade management’ made up of frozen and manicured images is often frowned upon, with much more emphasis 60  John Muir (1894) ‘The Mountains of California’; reprinted in Conron, J. (ed) (1973) The American Landscape: A Critical Anthology of Prose and Poetry (Oxford University Press, New York) 255. 61   Leopold, A. (1966) A Sand County Almanac:  With Essays on Conservation from Round River (Ballantine Books, New York) 96. 62   Leopold, A. (1966) A Sand County Almanac:  With Essays on Conservation from Round River (Ballantine Books, New York) 39, 179, 180, 193. Note also Carlson, A. (2008) ‘Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural Environment’, in A. Carlson (ed), Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism:  From Beauty to Duty (Columbia University Press, New  York) 119–29; Saito, Y.  (2008) ‘Appreciating Nature on Its Own Terms’, in Carlson, Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism, 151–67. See also Matthews, P.  (2008) ‘Scientific Knowledge and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature’, in Carlson, Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism, 188–203; Callicott, J.B. (1987) ‘The Land Aesthetic’, in J.B. Callicott, Companion to a Sand County Almanac: Interpretative Essays (University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin) 157, 158, 160–1, 165–6; Gussow, A. (1995) ‘Beauty in the Landscape: An Ecological Viewpoint’, in G. Thompson (ed), Landscape in America (University of Texas Press, Texas) 230–1.

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moving to allowing ecosystems to evolve in accordance with their own directions. The same pattern has occurred with ecosystem restorations.63 While the expansion of the aesthetic value of the natural world is clearly an advance in many respects, when this approach is taken to environmental philosophy, by moving aesthetics into a worldview (supplemented by the objectivity of scientific understanding) where everything that is natural is aesthetically valuable, a type of mass-sameness occurs, whereby all of the natural world can be seen as valuable because of its aesthetic value. The difficulty that this presents is that this type of worldview does not provide any mechanism by which decisions can be made, as everything natural is, prima-facie, of equal aesthetic value. In this world, there are no better types of beauty, only different interpretations. As such, unless some kind of moral values (be they anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric) is introduced to add factors to decision making processes, the system ends up at a place where no distinctions can be made, because everything is aesthetically equal.

5. Conclusion The importance of aesthetics to environmental matters, from philosophy to law, cannot be understated. The idea and recognition of the beauty of the natural world, from individual species to complete areas, as a catalyst to conservation is very powerful. This approach, with roots back to the nineteenth century, has gone from strength to strength, with some of the most successful environmental campaigns of the twentieth century being built purely around aesthetic values. The difficulties with the aesthetic approach of the environment, as with all debates about aesthetics, is that it is often perceived to be either individually and/or culturally subjective. While this is undoubtedly true, combinations of both rising standards of living and scientific education have advanced the understanding and appreciation of nature, which is considered aesthetically beautiful. However, in becoming a little more standardized and objective, the ability of aesthetics to be a tool to help make difficult decisions in environmental thinking has been blunted, as everything natural can be seen to be beautiful and deserving of protection because of its aesthetic value. Accordingly, although being a very powerful environmental ethic, it always works better when supplemented with other ethical values of either anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric

63  Carlson, A. (2011) ‘Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature and Environmentalism’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69(Oct): 137; Jorgensen, A. (2011) ‘Beyond the View: Future Directions in Landscape Aesthetics Research’ Landscape and Urban Planning 100: 353; Sayre, N. (2010) ‘The Science and Aesthetics of Ecological Restoration’ Ecological Restoration 28(1): 23; Junker, B. (2008) ‘Aesthetic Preferences Versus Ecological Objectives in River Restorations’ Landscape and Urban Planning 85(3): 141; Callicott, J.B. (1991) The Wilderness Idea Revisited (Beacon, Boston) 69; Sellers, W. (1989) ‘Science or Scenery? A Conflict in Values in National Parks’ Wilderness 52: 29, 30, 35–8.

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perspectives. Alternately, when left in its more subjective and culturally relative state, whereby aesthetics works towards the ‘spectacular’ and ‘superlative’, large parts of the natural world are excluded from moral consideration, as most of the natural world is not spectacular or superlative in the normal sense of the word. However, for those species or areas which are, this ethic provides a foremost route for their conservation.

VII Culture 1. Introduction Culture, according to the 1982 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, is: [T]‌he whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.1

For the purposes of this chapter, the value systems under examination do not include those related to religion. These are dealt with, separately, in Chapter V. For the purposes of this chapter, the focus is on the other cultural values, as they relate to environmental thinking. The positive application of these values, especially with exemplars like indigenous peoples and how they are reflected in international environmental law, is set out. These positive values are then juxtaposed against the problem that cultural values in the area of the environment are highly relative, with a number of cultural practices leading to endangerment, extinction, and/or cruelty to species.

2.  The values of culture as a catalyst for environmental protection From ancient times to modern day, cultural attitudes that link to the natural environment have been recognized as important. Consequently, it is suggested that to preserve the environment is to preserve the natural expressions of the values of culture, history, and identity.2 As the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions explained:

1  Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies (Mexico City, World Conference on Cultural Policies, 26 July to 6 August 1982); available from UNESCO, Paris. See also Cultural Diversity Convention 2005, Art 4. 2   Claudia, M. (2011) ‘Sustainability and Place Identity’ Procedia Engineering 21: 1104; Mariel, P. (2009) ‘The Influence of Cultural Identity on the Willingness to Pay to Protect Natural Resources’ Ecological Economics 68(8):  2372; Moore, N. (2007) Heritage, Memory and the Politics of Identity

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Cultural diversity is a rich asset for individuals and society. The protection, promotion and maintenance of cultural diversity are an essential requirement for sustainable development for the benefit of present and future generations.3

This argument, that the environment should be valued because of its cultural importance, is very long standing. Both Greek and Roman cultures had a strong sense of locality. The presence of gods was felt in places of natural attractiveness and traditional associations. Wild, beautiful locations such as springs, caves, groves, and places with panoramic views were highly valued, and often linked to particular sanctuaries. Such ideas became even more apparent thousands of years later, as the cultural identities came to be increasingly linked to the environment.4 For example, within the United States, the ‘Wild West’ tradition, from Daniel Boone to Huckleberry Finn, all help in the assemblage of a powerful imagery in contemporary American culture. Associated and interwoven ideals of power, freedom, and integrity, as reflected in the landscape or individual species, from bald eagles to freely roaming horses, are part of this mix. For example, while the Bald Eagle Act of 1940 was created as a direct recognition of the need to preserve the animal as a symbol of the nation. Likewise the Wild Horses and Burros Act stipulates: Congress finds and declares that wild free roaming horses and burros are living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West . . . they enrich the lives of the American people . . . they shall be protected from capture, branding, harassment, or death . . . 5

In a similar sense, the British, with a particular linkage to the Romantic influence, also have a very close cultural relationship with nature and parts of their landscape when viewed through a particular cultural prism which forms a core part of their natural identity. Here, music (composers like Elgar, Delius, and Holst), artists (like Constable and Turner), and visionaries (like William Blake) have combined to idealize ‘England’s green and pleasant land’ in the national psyche.6 Protecting the (Routledge, London) 23–45; Clayton, S. (2003) Identity and the Natural Environment (MIT Press, Cambridge) 24–35, 72–81; Simmons, I. (1993) Interpreting Nature:  Cultural Constructions of the Environment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 1–10, 45–64; Short, J.R. (1991) Imagined Country:  Society, Culture and Environment (Routledge, London) 28–34, 30–5, 57–90, 179–96; Wilson, A. (1992) The Culture of Nature (Blackwell, London) 11–14; Mitchell, W. (1994) Landscape and Power (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 5, 6–9, 12, 14, 17, 20–3, 30–5, 127–9, 136, 138; Norton, B.G. (1989) ‘The Cultural Approach to Conservation Biology’, in D. Western (ed), Conservation for the Twenty-first Century (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 241–6; McNeely, J.A. (1989) ‘Protected Areas and Human Ecology’, in Western, Conservation for the Twenty-first Century, 150, 152–3; Binder, R. (1994) ‘Ngugi Wa Thiong’o and the Search for a Populist Landscape Aesthetic’ Environmental Values 3: 47, 50, 57–8; Tuan, Y. (1974) A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values (Prentice Hall, New Jersey) 100–102. 3   Convention on Cultural Expressions 2005, Art 2(6). 4   Hughes, J. (1994) Pan’s Travail: Environmental Problems of the Ancient Greeks and Romans (John Hopkins University Press, London) 49–50. 5   Wild Horses and Burros Act, 16 USC ss 1331–40. See also Gross, J. (1995) The Protection and Management of Our Natural Resources and Wildlife Habitats (Oceana, New York) 289–90, 303–6. 6   Strang, V. (2006) ‘Substantial Connections: Identity in an English Cultural Landscape’ World Views:  Global Religions, Culture and Ecology 10(2):  155; Marshall, P. (1992) Nature’s Web:  An Exploration of Ecological Thinking (Simon and Schuster, London) 274–7; Oelschlaeger, M. (1991) The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (Yale University Press, New York) 110–21; Clarke, J.J. (1993) Nature in Question:  An Anthology of Ideas and Arguments (Earthscan, London)

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key parts of such imagery, or acting in positive ways for environmental benefit due to the associated cultural identity, follows easily in many countries.7 Perhaps the most common example of a positive link between the conservation of culture and environmental protection is indigenous/aborigines. The word ‘aborigine’ derives from the Latin meaning ‘from’ (ab) and ‘beginning/creation of the world’ (origine). As its roots suggest, it has been used to mean ‘original inhabitants’ of a place, commonly before the arrival of ‘others’(who are usually viewed as Europeans). The word ‘aborigine’ is often used as a synonym for the word ‘indigenous’. This word, of Latin and French origin (indigene/indigena), has a slightly larger ambit by having the term ‘native’ at its core. ‘Indigenous’ is therefore a more comprehensive category than ‘aboriginal’. Further, the word ‘native’ represents something or someone ‘born or produced in a particular land or region, or belonging naturally to a region, soil etc, as in it is not introduced’.8 Although these terms mean slightly different things, they are often used interchangeably. This is especially true in the context of changing political connotations attached to certain phrases. In the area of international conservation law, the term ‘indigenous’ is more commonly used than the term ‘native’ or ‘aborigine’. The idea that indigenous peoples have a strong connection with the environment began with the Enlightenment and the development of interest in non-Western, indigenous cultures and the idealization of the ‘noble savage’ (as the antithesis of the industrialization ideological paradigms in the Western world). In recent decades this interest has been revived and the focus has shifted to examine traditional management systems used by indigenous peoples as it has become apparent that these disappearing societies have a knowledge that is valuable to modern society in the search for viable models of sustainable development. These views are sought because indigenous populations often adopt strategies that work towards long-term horizons and consequently adopt sustainable efficient uses of the environment. Thus, as a generalization, indigenous communities may offer good examples of harmony with the ecological world.9

142–4; Thomas, K. (1984) Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 64–8; Clayre, A. (1982) Nature and Industrialisation (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 30–45, 59–63, 205–21, 313–21. 7   Katja, S. (2012) ‘How National Cultural Values Affect Pro-Environmental Consumer Behaviour’ International Marketing Review 29(6): 623; Hargrove, E. (1989) The Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey) 177–87; Udall, S. (1988) The Quiet Crisis and the Next Generation (Gibbs Smith, Utah) 25–38; Sagoff, M. (1974) ‘On Preserving the Natural Environment’ Yale Law Journal 84:  245, 2647; Leopold, A. (1949) A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 177–87; Disch, R. (1970) The Ecological Conscience (Spectrum, New Jersey) 37, 38–40. 8   The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) Vol 1, 1350. 9   Heizer, R. (1980) The Natural World of the Californian Indians (University of California Press, Los Angeles) 209–20; Burger, J. (1990) The Gaia Atlas of First Peoples (Gaia Books, London) 36–50; Redclift, M. (1987) Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions (Routledge, London) 155; Callicott, J. (1982) ‘Traditional American Indian and Western European Attitudes Toward Nature: An Overview’ Environmental Ethics 4: 293, 312–18; Booth, A.L. (1990) ‘Native American Beliefs as a Foundation for Environmental Consciousness’ Environmental Ethics 12: 27.

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3.  Reflection in law and policy The protection of different cultural practices has been an indirect feature of multiple treaties among European powers since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Since the Second World War, the enhancement and promotion of specific cultural values within the rubric of human rights have been a driving concern of the international community. For example, Article 27 of the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirmed the rights of persons belonging to ‘ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities . . . to enjoy their own culture’. By the end of the twentieth century, the focus was moving to the protection of cultural integrity and the desire to pursue tolerant pluralistic societies, whereby culture and its various manifestations were protected.10 The 1972 World Heritage Convention suggested that ‘the deterioration or disappearance of any item of cultural or natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment to all nations of the world’.11 Consequently, the signatories recognised the importance of preserving ‘exceptional combinations of natural and cultural elements’.12 The protection of tangible cultural manifestations under the World Heritage Convention was supplemented in 2003 by the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. This Convention recognized ‘the importance of the intangible cultural heritage as a mainspring of cultural diversity and a guarantee of sustainable development’ as practised by all communities, and indigenous communities in particular. Finally, in 2005 the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was agreed. The objectives of the 2005 Convention are: [T]‌o protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions [and] to create the conditions for cultures to flourish and to freely interact in a mutually beneficial manner . . . the protection, promotion and maintenance of cultural diversity are an essential requirement for sustainable development for the benefit of present and future generations.13

In addition to the World Heritage Convention, the link between cultural value and environmental conservation is obvious in a number of fora. For example, in 1972 the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment recognized that the preservation of the environment through cultural considerations was important.14 The Preamble to the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora recognized ‘the ever growing value of wild fauna and flora from . . . cultural points of view’. This idea is also reflected 10   Vienna Declaration from the World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc.A/49/688 (25 June 1993), Arts 20, 28, 32. 11   Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972, Preamble. 12   See Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Listing Criteria, Art 4. 13   Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005, Arts 1, 2(6). 14   See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972, UN Doc.A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, recommendation 95; in Ruster, B. and Simma, B. (eds) (1976) International Protection of the Environment (Oceana, New York) 125.

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in the Preamble to the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, the Preamble to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere,15 and the 1975 South Pacific Conference on National Parks and Reserves.16 The 1976 European Ministerial Conference on the Environment recommended the conservation of natural and cultural values of the countryside as they ‘satisfy the essential needs of mankind’.17 The 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development reiterated similar types of views,18 while 30 years later, in 2007, the Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats noted the ‘exceptional significance of great apes for the natural and cultural heritage of humankind’.19 The importance of culture and environmental protection has also been a consistent theme through the various Earth Summits, although this has typically been narrowed down to focus upon the cultural value of indigenous peoples’. For example, at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, those attending acknowledged ‘the natural and cultural diversity of the world and recognize[d]‌that all cultures and civilizations can contribute to sustainable development’.20 They added: We recognize that the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous peoples and local communities make an important contribution to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and their wider application can support social well-being and sustainable livelihoods. We further recognize that indigenous peoples and local communities are often the most directly dependent on biodiversity and ecosystems and thus are often the most immediately affected by their loss and degradation.21

Further: We stress the importance of the participation of indigenous peoples in the achievement of sustainable development. We also recognize the importance of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the context of global, regional, national and subnational implementation of sustainable development strategies.22   The Preamble to the Convention recognizes the ‘historic’ value of natural objects.   See Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South East Pacific 1981, Preamble, in Rummel-Bulska, I. (ed) (1991) Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment (Grotius, Cambridge) 130. See also the Preamble to the Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and the Environment of the South Pacific Region 1986, in Rummel-Bulska, Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment 386. See also South Pacific Conference on National Parks and Reserves 1975, recommendation 4, in Rusta, B. and Simma, B. (eds) (1976) International Protection of the Environment (Doubelday, New York) V: 22538. 17   European Ministerial Conference on the Environment 1976, resolution 1, in Rusta, B. and Simma, B. (eds) International Protection of the Environment. (Doubleday, New York) I: 1174. 18   World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 155. 19   Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitat, Preamble, para 3. 20   Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), A/CONF.216/16, Annex, para 39. 21   Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), A/CONF.216/16, Annex, para 39. 22   Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), A/CONF.216/16, Annex, para 49. 15 16

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The particular recognition of the ‘knowledge systems of indigenous peoples, and its positive contribution to sustainable development’ was earlier recognized in the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.23 Two years later in 2007 the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples emphasized that to achieve the desired goals for indigenous peoples, it was necessary to ensure that their distinctive spiritual relationships with traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas, and other resources were upheld.24 Although such linkages between indigenous peoples’ environmental resources and sustainable practices existed prior to the twenty-first century,25 the linking of sustainable practices and the rights of indigenous peoples only really escalated in the new century. These recognitions are because of, in part, what the countries at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development recognized as the ‘vital role of indigenous peoples’ to sustainable development. Accordingly, the countries at the World Summit concluded that it was necessary to: Develop policies and ways and means to improve access by indigenous people and their communities to economic activities . . . [and] . . . Recognize that traditional and direct dependence on renewable resources and ecosystems, including sustainable harvesting, continues to be essential to the cultural, economic and physical well-being of indigenous people and their communities.26

Ten years later at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, those attending recognized: [T]‌hat the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous peoples and local communities make an important contribution to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and their wider application can support social well-being and sustainable livelihoods. We further recognize that indigenous peoples and local communities are often the most directly dependent on biodiversity and ecosystems and thus are often the most immediately affected by their loss and degradation.27

Twenty years before this at the 1992 Earth Summit, similar positive affirmations of the relationship between indigenous people and the environment were noted in the Convention on Biological Diversity,28 and the Forest Principles.29 Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development added:   Cultural Expressions Convention 2005, Preamble, para 9.   United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Arts 24, 25. 25   Apia Convention 1976, Art VI. From such considerations, it has become common, as the IUCN first suggested in 1975, to call upon governments to ‘maintain and encourage traditional methods of living and customs which enable communities both rural and urban, to live in harmony with their environment’: IUCN (1975) ‘Protection of Traditional Ways of Life’, Resolution 12.5. Similar themes were reiterated at the IUCN conferences in 1981, 1990, 1996, and 2000. 26   World Summit on Sustainable Development ‘Plan of Implementation’, paras 6(e), 25. 27   Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), A/CONF.216/16, Annex, para 39. 28   Convention on Biological Diversity, Arts 8(j), 15. For discussion, see IUCN (1994) A Guide to the Convention on Biodiversity (Gland, IUCN) 84–91. 29   Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, Principles 2(a), 5(a). 23 24

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Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communities have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognise and duly support their identity, culture and interest and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development.15

That indigenous/traditional peoples are deserving of special rights in international conservation law, primarily in terms of being able to harvest endangered and/or protected species as part of their cultural practices—but not to the point of extinction—is a reflection of a very long-standing recognition. An early manifestation of this type of exception to conservation policy because of the needs of indigenous communities can be traced to the 1911 Convention Between the United States, United Kingdom and Russia for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals.30 Thereafter, similar exceptions were repeated in treaties for, inter alia, birds,31 seals,32 turtles,33 caribou,34 and polar bears.35 The same rule can also been seen with regard to the management of large cetaceans, of which the aboriginal subsistence guidelines stipulated that ‘highest priority shall be accorded to the objective of ensuring that the risk[s]‌of extinction to individual stocks are not seriously increased by subsistence whaling’.36

4.  Difficulties with cultural-based arguments The main problem with the cultural argument is that as much as cultural practices can lead to good results for environmental goals, they can also lead to bad results. Quite simply, cultural practices can be good or bad. Just because they are cultural, does not make them defensible if conservation is the goal. Indeed, the mass consumerism of much of the modern world, solidly based in culture, is far

15  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNCED Doc.A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1. Similar pronouncements can be found in Ch 26 of Agenda 21 (1992), A/CONF.151/26. 30   See Art IV. 31   Convention Between Canada and the United States on Migratory Birds 1916, Art II(1), II(3); Convention on Migratory Birds Between the United States and Japan 1972, Art III(1)(e); Agreement on Migratory Birds Between Australia and Japan 1974, Art II(1)(d); Convention on Migratory Birds Between the United States and USSR 1976, Art II(c); Agreement on Migratory Birds Between Australia and China 1986, Art II(1); Agreement on Migratory Birds Between Australia and the Republic of Korea 2007, Art 2(d); Agreement on the Conservation of Albatross and Petrels, Art III(2); Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds 1995. 32   Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals 1957, Arts V(2)(d), VII. 33   Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, Art IV(3). See IUCN (1995) A Global Strategy for the Conservation of Marine Turtles (IUCN, Geneva) 3. 34   Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd 1987, Preamble. 35   Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears 1973; Bilateral Agreement Between the United States and Russia for Polar Bears of the Chukchi Sea Population 2001. 36  International Whaling Commission, ‘A Review of Aboriginal Management Procedures’, Resolution 1994-4, Appendix 4; IWC (1995) ‘Resolution Concerning Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling’, 45th Report, 42–3.

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from representing a sustainable practice.37 Even when pointing towards the same direction of environmental sustainability, very different approaches to very similar questions (such as those that support sustainable use, or those that support no-take preservation) are apparent.38 Accordingly, decisions often have to be made over which cultural practices (and/ or interpretations) to support and which should be avoided. This is a particularly and innately political area as many countries draw strong lines around whether or not they will accept and support certain cultural practices over others. For example, some countries refuse to accept the idea of indigenous peoples—within their own borders—due to concerns about, inter alia, collective rights, self-determination, national unity, or undue preference.39 This political interpretation is often bolstered by the arbitrary nature of many claims in this area. For example, while whaling by traditional communities is supported by the International Whaling Commission, exactly who these communities are is the matter of endless debate and often arbitrary divisions. Thus, while Norwegian and Japanese whalers claim that they can trace a cultural tradition of whaling back hundreds of years, they are denied their requests to practise whaling because they use modern methods. This situation, according to the Norwegians, is intolerable. Specifically, as their ambassador to the International Whaling Commission explained: Norway no longer accepts what she perceives as cultural imperialism imposed by the majority of the members of the International Whaling Commission on the local communities of the nations and peoples who want to exercise their sovereign cultural right to be different.40

However, although modern countries with a whaling tradition have been denied the option of whaling, other groups, with an indigenous basis, have been allowed to do so, even when the basis of their claims has been somewhat weak. For example, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have made claims for aboriginal subsistence whaling on behalf of people who are not pre-colonial inhabitants, but the descendants of slaves introduced into the Caribbean in the early stages of colonization. In particular, their claim has a history of only about 150 years and the hunt derives from ‘the Yankee whaling technique’ when local seamen enlisted (in 1860) aboard whalers. When questioned about how this claim, based on a relatively recent

37   Paterson, M. (2000) ‘Car Culture and Global Environmental Politics’ Review of International Studies 26(2): 253; Wilson, A. (1992) The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez (Blackwell, London) 23–7. 38   Hardin, R. (2011) ‘Competing Cultures of Conservation’ Conservation Biology 25(6):  1098; Norton, B. (1986) ‘Conservation and Preservation:  A  Conceptual Rehabilitation’ Environmental Ethics 8(3): 195. 39   Meyer, W. (2012) ‘Indigenous Rights, Global Governance and State Sovereignty’ Human Rights Quarterly 13(3): 327; Howitt, R. (1990) Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 27–45. 40  IWC (2004) Chairman’s Report of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting (IWC, Cambridge) 16; Gillespie, A. (2005) Whaling Diplomacy (Edward Elgar, London) Ch 7; Birnie, P. (1985) The International Regulation of Whaling (Oceana, New York) 707–24; Lynge, F. (1992) Arctic Wars: Animal Rights and Endangered Peoples (Dartmouth, Hanover) 37, 40, 42–3, 45–65.

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tradition, reflected traditional indigenous practices, the retort was effectively that the question was out-of-bounds, and that reminding Caribbean countries of their history of slavery and colonialism should be cautioned against.41 In other instances, perceptions of cultural relationships with the environment are romanticized. A good example of this is the human (including indigenous) relationship with species. The difficulty is that humanity has been effectively extinguishing species since the later half of the Cenozoic era. No other predator has come close to matching the human capacity to catch and kill, ignoring habitat boundaries and geographic barriers. Known as the ‘overkill’ thesis, the fossil evidence shows the detrimental impacts on other species due to arrivals and conquests by humans as early as 11,000  years ago. Among genera of large mammals, about 73 per cent, 80 per cent, and 68 per cent respectively became extinct (often in conjunction with other non-human factors) in North America, South America, and Australia at the time of, or soon after, human arrival. The ‘overkill’ thesis has been bolstered by the recent (within the last 1,200 years) extinction waves which have also followed the arrival of humans in otherwise unpopulated areas and the rapid extinguishment of other species which followed. For example, it has been suggested that within the space of 1,000 years Polynesians may have had a direct hand in the extinguishment of 2,000 species of birds. Within New Zealand alone, between the arrival of the Maori in approximately ad800 and Captain Cook in 1769, 36 species of birds disappeared. This averages out to around one species every 20 years. Since 1769, the extinction rate for birds has averaged at one every 27 years. Such percentages do little to bolster the idea that non-industrialized humanity lived in harmony with nature.42 This is not to suggest that indigenous communities should never be regarded as exemplars of environmental sustainability. Rather, the point is that no generic claims should be made which suggest that all indigenous cultures are the same in all areas, especially on questions that relate to the environment. While some indigenous cultures have particularly strong relationships with the environment and/or the species within it, others do not.43 This division has become particularly   IWC (2002) Bequian Whaling: A Statement of Need, 54th Report, IWC/54/AS7, 19.   Anon (2005) ‘People Killed Off Mammoths’ New Scientist (16 April) 18; Anon (2005) ‘Why Big Beasts Vanished When the First Australians Arrived’ New Scientist (16 July) 18; Anon (2004) ‘Early Americans Spoiled Their Lake’ New Scientist (11 September) 14; Mason, B. (2003) ‘Fires Destroyed the Only Food Source of Giant Flightless Birds’ New Scientist (9 August) 17; Wong, K.  (2001) ‘Mammoth Kill’ Scientific American (15 February) 22; Cohen, P. (2001) ‘Whodunnit’ New Scientist (16 June) 7; Krech, S. (1999) ‘Playing With Fire’ New Scientist (23 October) 54; Steadman, D. (1995) ‘Prehistoric Extinctions of Pacific Island Birds: Biodiversity Meets Zooarchaeology’ Science 267: 1123; Jones, T. (1989) ‘Moas, Mammals and Climate in the Ecological History of New Zealand’ Supplement to the New Zealand Journal of Ecology 12; Martin, P.S. (1967) ‘Prehistoric Overkill’, in P.S. Martin (ed), Pleistocene Extinctions: The Search for a Cause (Yale University Press, New Haven) 77–120; Martin, C. (1978) Keepers of the Game: Indian Animal Relations (University of California Press, Los Angeles) 71, 116, 186–7; Diamond, J. (1991) The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee (Radius, London) 285– 303; Lewis, M. (1992) Green Delusions: An Environmentalist’s Critique of Radical Environmentalism (Duke University Press, London) 43–73. 43   Dove, R. (2012) ‘Indigenous People and Environmental Politics’ Progress in Human Geography 36(6): 810; Waldron, D. (2012) ‘Rethinking Appropriation of the Indigenous’ Nova Relio 16(2): 64; Pearce, A. (2012) ‘Environmentalism, Culture, Ethnography’ Oceania 82(3):  217; Gillespie, A. (1998) ‘Environmental Politics in New Zealand/Aotearoa:  Clashes and Commonality Between 41 42

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apparent in some international debates. For example, at the Fifty-second Meeting of the International Whaling Commission in 2000, Sandra Lee (1952–), the then leader of the New Zealand delegation, explained: I stand here today, as the Minister of Conservation of the Government of New Zealand, and the Associate Minister of Maori Affairs, and also as an indigenous person of the South Pacific, a Maori from Aotearoa New Zealand. . . Maori people had benign contact with whales for more than a thousand years of coastal and ocean-going travel before European colonisation. All whales, but especially sperm whales were regarded as chiefly figures of the ocean realm. High ranking Maori were often praised and revered by being likened to whales and indeed, some Iwi tribes acknowledge that their descent comes down from ancestor whales. Whales also served as guardians during my peoples’ long voyages of discovery throughout Polynesia. My own tribe, from the great canoe Takitimu, hold that a guardian whale accompanied my ancestors to our new homeland in Aotearoa.  .  . The Guardian remained with us and became the revered ancestor of my people.44

With such considerations in mind, it is not surprising that cetaceans were, and remain, commonly recognized as taonga (treasure). Moreover, given such importance and perhaps reverence of cetaceans, it appears that prior to contact with Europeans, Maori did not hunt large whales.45 As Lee continued to explain at the Commission: I have observed with interest the comments made by a number of delegations of historical traditional relationships many indigenous peoples have with whales. I  would point out however, that many traditional relationships for my people are not simply based on the linear argument of harvesting whales.46

Although there is ambiguity in some of the cultural traditions of some indigenous peoples with the environment, in other places there is no uncertainty, as practices are adopted which are at loggerheads with ethical considerations. Practices which involve cruelty, or the infliction of unnecessary pain, such as bull-fighting or bear-baiting, are good instances of this.47 Other good examples include traditional hunting methods, in which the welfare considerations for the animal are placed well below the desire to maintain certain cultural practices. For example, within the International Whaling Commission, decades of work has gone into reducing the time to death for a whale killed in Maoridom and Environmentalists’ New Zealand Geographer 54(1): 19; Kessell, J.L. (1973) ‘Spaniards, Environment and the Pepsi Generation: An Historian’s View’ Historian 36: 82. 44   Lee, S. (2000) ‘Conservation Minister’s Speech on South Pacific Whale Sanctuary Proposal to the International Whaling Commission Annual Meeting in Adelaide’, Press Notes. In the possession of the author. 45   For a full discussion of this, see Gillespie, A. (2002) ‘The Evolving Bicultural Relationships with the Management of Cetaceans in New Zealand’ Journal of Asia Pacific Environmental Law 6(1): 107. 46   Gillespie, A. (2002) ‘The Evolving Bicultural Relationships with the Management of Cetaceans in New Zealand’ Journal of Asia Pacific Environmental Law 6(1): 107. See also CMS (2008) Western African Talks on Cetaceans and their Habitats (CMS, Bonn) 4. 47  Behrens, K. (2009) ‘Animal Anti-Cruelty vs. Culture’ South African Journal of Philosophy 28(3): 17; Randolph, M. (2009) ‘Naturalising Cruelty’ Biology and Philosophy 24(1): 21; Wenz, P. (2007) ‘Against Cruelty to Animals’ Social Theory and Practice 33(1): 127.

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a commercial hunt. Work in this area began after the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea in 1958, which suggested that the killing of all marine life should be done with the intention of sparing them suffering ‘to the greatest extent possible’.48 While the work in this area has yielded impressive results (reducing the time to death down to minutes when involving commercial hunts), the same is not the case with traditional/indigenous and/or small-scale cultural hunts. For example, in relation to indigenous hunting, due to a desire to maintain traditional practices, attempts at reducing pain and time until death are often negated, despite good intentions, with relatively long deaths resulting of on average of between 30 and 60 minutes (although it can be less or more), depending on the subsistence hunt in question. For example, with the indigenous take off Greenland in 2003, the average time for a minke whale to die was 14 minutes and the average time for a fin whale was 114 minutes. The worst case was 720 minutes.49 Similar concerns have arisen in relation to primary killing methods of small cetaceans. The foremost example of this overlap was the pilot whale hunt in the Faeroe Islands, which evoked strong international concern because of the use of the gaff and spear before these were (domestically) outlawed in the mid-1990s. However, exactly how effective the alternative—a new type of knife inserted into the blowhole—is in reducing time to death remains a matter of debate. Similar debates arose in 2013 with the introduction in Japan of the use of a thin rod to insert behind the blowhole of surrounded dolphins.50 Other examples where cultural justifications are linked to negative impacts in the environmental sphere involve species that are taken to the point of extinction as a result of their use in traditional medicine. An example of this has been the catastrophic decline in species of seahorses (an estimated loss of 25 million individuals per year), rhinoceros, bears, and tigers.54 Poaching—for the purposes of traditional medicine—has been identified as a primary threat to the Iberian lynx, the clouded leopard, all subspecies of leopard within its Asian range, and the Asiatic and African lions.51 However, it is with the tiger that this problem is most pronounced. At least one tiger reserve (Sariska) has lost its entire tiger population to poaching. In 2009, tigers were even being poached from zoos in Indonesia. From the period between 2000 and 2010, genetic   See UN Doc.A/CONF.13/L.56 (1958).   In Denmark, the average time to death for minke whales is 16 minutes and for fin whales 28 minutes. Only 15 per cent of minke whales and 17 per cent of fin whales die instantly: IWC/53/WKM & AWI, Agenda Item 3.1; Greenland Home Rule Government (2004) Note Regarding Information Encompassed in the IWC Resolution 1999, IWC/56/7; Report of the Workshop on Whale Killing Methods and Associated Welfare Issues, IWC/55/Rep 5. 50   Anon (2013) ‘Blowhole Method for Killing Dolphins is Inhumane’ New Scientist (20 April) 16; Humane Society (2003) Hunted: Dead or Still Alive (Washington, HSUS) 13. 51   CITES. ‘Conservation of and Trade in Tigers and Other Appendix I  Asian Big Cat Species’, Resolution 12.5 (2002); ‘The Pardel Lynx in the Iberian Peninsula’, Berne Recommendation No 19 (1991); Theile, S. (2003) ‘Snow Leopard’ 19(3): TRAFFIC Bulletin 120; Patterson, C. (2006) ‘African Lion Workshops’ 21(1): TRAFFIC Bulletin 4; Anon (2005) ‘A Continental Conservation Strategy for the African Lion’ 44: SPECIES 29. 48 49

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work undertaken following seizures of illegally taken tiger parts suggests that at least 1,069 tigers were killed in this period (of which a total population in the wild is only around 3,200). Such losses are because the costs of poaching a tiger are relatively less (about US$100 to US$200) than the potential retail value (a dead adult male is worth between US$10,000 and $70,000). A single tiger pelt may sell for as much as US$15,000 and powdered tiger bone may be worth up to US$1,450 per pound. This high economic value is due to a long-standing demand by those who utilize various traditional medicines. Tiger bone and pelt continues to be found in dozens of countries, from the United States to China.52 Many parts of the bear, from the fat to the brain and the spinal cord, have been used for centuries by traditional medical practitioners. The most coveted medicinal part of the bear is the bile within the gall bladder, which, gram for gram, can exceed the cost of narcotics. Bear bile is used to treat a number of ailments including, inter alia, inflammation, cancer, burns, pain, and asthma. The only bear that does not produce bile is the giant panda. In the mid-1990s it was estimated that China, Japan, and South Korea consumed nearly 100 tons of synthesized bear bile annually. Bear farms in China (where bile is routinely drained from live bears through devices implanted surgically in their gall bladders) currently produce about 6,000 kg of bear bile annually, which is more than the entire country consumes each year, all for cultural purposes.53 The primary threat to rhinoceros is being killed for their horns. In mid-2011, poachers in Africa and Asia were believed to be killing between two and three rhinoceros per week in some areas, with a minimum of 470 rhinoceros poached in seven range states between 2006 and 2009. Rhinoceros horns are used in traditional medicines or to make handles for daggers. One Yemeni trader claimed that he had imported a total of 36,700 kg of horn over the period 1970 to 1986, taken from at least 12,759 individual rhinoceros. With regard to traditional medicine, the preference is for Asian rhinoceros horn, which has long been used for a wide range of illnesses and conditions. By the end of the century, despite international bans on this product, over 10,000 kg were registered with the Chinese authorities (excluding retail, private holdings, and museums). Over 9,000 kg were also held in Taiwan. The demand for dagger handles, especially from Yemen, was particularly problematic during the 1970s with about 40 per cent of rhinoceros horn entering the world market ending up there.54 52   Anon (2009) ‘Tiger Hit’ New Scientist (29 August) 7; Damania, R. et al. (2008) A Future for Wild Tigers (Washington, World Bank) 18–19; Anon (2008) ‘Tigers Tailing Off’ New Scientist (16 February) 7; Nowell, K. (2007) Taming the Tiger Trade (TRAFFIC, Cambridge) 3–4; Anon (2005) ‘Wildlife Crime Arrests’ New Scientist (15 October) 5; Sheperd, D. (2004) Nowhere to Hide: The Trade in the Sumatran Tiger (TRAFFIC, Cambridge) 3–4; Kang, S. (2003) A Question of Attitude: South Korea’s Medicine Practitioners and Wildlife Conservation (TRAFFIC, Cambridge); TRAFFIC (2000) Far from a Cure: The Tiger Trade Revisited (TRAFFIC, Cambridge). 53   Lee, S. (2000) ‘The Third International Symposium on Trade in Bear Parts’ 18(2): TRAFFIC Bulletin 57; Mills, J. (1997) ‘New Information on East Asia’s Market for Bear Gall Bladders’ 16(3): TRAFFIC Bulletin 107. 54   Prins, J. (2013) ‘Rhino Poaching: Unique Challenges’ Science 340(6137): 1167; IUCN (2009) ‘Africa and Asian Rhinoceroses: Status, Conservation and Trade’, COP 15 Doc 45.1, Annex; Anon (2008) ‘Rhino Poaching Increases’ 22(1): TRAFFIC Bulletin 6.

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5. Conclusion The identity of different societies, through the manifestations of their culture, is very important in multiple aspects of modern society, to both the group and the individuals within them. In the case of environmental thinking, the relationship between the protection of culture and the protection of the environment is commonly believed to be positive. The exemplar of this type of thinking is with indigenous peoples who are often believed to possess, via their cultural practices, deep and meaningful relationships with the natural environment that lead to positive conservation outcomes. Such recognitions, and the goal to perform them, are found in many areas of international environmental law and policy. The difficulty with this type of approach is that while some instances of cultural practices produce positive environmental results, in many instances they do not. This problem is doubly complicated by the fact that every culture is different, and even within commonly bracketed cultures, such as with indigenous peoples, the variations between them and their practices can be massive. This is particularly so when other factors, such as economic needs, are placed into the equation. In other instances, cultural practices, buttressed by their obviously strong anthropocentric thinking, often lead to over-consumption, the taking of species to extinction (historically), and/or the poaching of species to extinction (contemporarily). They can also produce practices which can be linked to cruelty. This is not to deny that, in some instances, the relationship between culture and conservation is positive, but rather, to recognize that as an overall ethic to protect the environment, it is limited, and generalizations should not be made lightly as, often, cultural practices are not positive, let alone benign.

VIII Future Generations 1. Introduction We have all benefited from the efforts of the generations before us. This is especially obvious in terms of economics, technology, culture, and politics. For the majority of people today, their lives are richer because of the work of the generations that passed earlier, the work they did, the sacrifices they made, and the achievements they secured. From such an inherited legacy, it is easy to assume that this generation will leave beneficial results from which the generations after those currently alive will reap the rewards. The risk is that this generation may do acts that actually make the situation worse, to the detriment of future generations. The possibilities with regards to the challenges of the future are multiple. As the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations explained: Humanity is at a crossroads. This could be our best century ever, or our worst. [the risk is our] . . . increasing short-termism of modern politics and our collective inability to break the gridlock which undermines attempts to address the biggest challenges that will shape our future.1

2.  Environmental damage and future generations While some challenges threaten to retard the progress of humanity on economic, social, or political grounds (with possible cycles of violence and/or economic depression following), other challenges threaten the core physical basis upon which future generations are required to prosper, at the most basic biological level. This consideration of basic biological needs is important, for although we do not know specifically which social aspects of society will bring future generations happiness, we can be confident that their needs for a safe and stable ecological environment will be the same as ours are today. The situation is additionally weighted, as we now have the knowledge that the choices that this generation may take can leave a substantial legacy. This is unique, as not only do we have the capacity to damage

1   Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations (2013) Now for the Long Term (University of Oxford, Oxford) 6.

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the environment to the detriment of those who will come after us, we also know this to be the case. We cannot claim ignorance.2 There are many examples of this type of problem, whereby the current generation can bequest an environmental problem to a future generation. Although the most commonly recognized one is probably climatic change,3 it is with another example, the disposal of high-level nuclear waste, that casts an even greater shadow onto posterity.4 Nuclear waste is radioactive material in gaseous, liquid, or solid form for which no further use is foreseen, and which is controlled as radioactive waste, by a regulatory body.5 Of the three classes of nuclear waste (low, medium, and high), it is the last which is of the greatest concern to future generations. High level waste arises from the ‘burning’ of uranium fuel in a nuclear reactor and the solidified liquid wastes from reprocessing such fuel to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. This waste has both long-lived and short-lived components, with half-lives ranging from seconds to millennia. At the lower end of the spectrum, strontium-90 has a half-life of 29 years and caesium 137 has a half-life 30  years. At the higher end, plutonium 239 has a half-life of 24,400  years. Technetium-99 has a half life of 220,000 years. The half life of neptunium 237 is two million years, while iodine-129 possesses a half-life of 17 million years. While the half-lives required for the radioactivity of high-level waste to decay completely may be millions of years, it typically takes at least 10,000 years for the radioactivity of such waste to decay to the level which would have been generated by the original ore from which the nuclear fuel was produced, if this ore had never been mined. Currently, about 10,000 square meters of high-level waste are produced each year worldwide. This figure is expected to increase rapidly as nuclear power production

2   Elliot, R. (1983) Environmental Philosophy (Queensland University Press, Queensland) 1, 24; Kavka, G. (1982) ‘The Paradox of Future Individuals’ Philosophy And Public Affairs 11:  103, 105; Regan, T. (1982) Earthbound:  New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics (Random House, New York) 56; Sterba, J.P (1981) ‘The Welfare Rights of Distant People and Future Generations: Moral Side-Constraints on Social Policy’ Social Theory And Practice 7: 110; Seiger H. (1981) ‘The Obligation to the Future’, in E. Partridge (ed), The Rights of Future Generations (Prometheus, New York) 43; Baier, A. (1981) ‘The Rights of Past and Future Persons’, in Partridge, The Rights of Future Generations, 43, 178–81; Callahan, D (1981) ‘What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations’, in Partridge, The Rights of Future Generations, 77; Barry, M. (1977) ‘Justice Between Generations’, in P. Hacker, Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour or H.L.A. Hart (Clarendon, Oxford) 274–5; Passmore, J. (1974) Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Duckworth, London) 75–8; Bayles, M. (1968) Contemporary Utilitarianism (Doubleday, New York) 263. 3   Myers, B. (2013) Time and the Land: Four Approaches to Environmental Ethics, Climate Change, and Future Generations (Northwest Passage, New York); Davidson, M. (2008) ‘Wrongful Harm to Future Generations: the Case of Climate Change’ Environmental Values 17(4): 471; Page, N. (2007) Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations (Edgar Elgar, London). 4  Peterson, P. (2006) ‘Nuclear Waste and the Distant Future’ Issues in Science and Technology 22(4):  47; Riddel, M. (2003) ‘The Value of Protecting Future Generations from the Health Risks of Nuclear Waste Storage’ Land Economics 79(4):  537; Shrader, K. (2000) ‘Duties to Future Generations: The Case of Nuclear Waste’ Risk Analysis 20(6): 771. 5   Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 1997, Art 2(h). Note also IAEA (2013) Nuclear Waste (IAEA, Vienna) 2.

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grows by about one third over the following 20 years, existing power stations have to be retired, and the current stocks of high-level nuclear waste are reconciled to permanent, as opposed to temporary, storage.6 Given that nuclear waste can no longer be disposed of into the oceans, and that the options for recycling are limited, this means that the most examined practice for dealing with the problem of waste disposal is to place it into the land. After four decades of examining this problem, and broad agreement that the interests of future generations must be taken into account in this equation, the international community finally agreed the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.7 This Convention seeks to achieve and maintain a high level of safety worldwide in radioactive waste management. Fundamentally, it aims to ensure that, during all stages of radioactive waste management, there are effective defences against potential hazards so that individuals, society, and the environment are protected. In doing so, in theory, the needs and aspirations of the present generation are meant to be met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs and aspirations.8 To achieve this goal, the Joint Convention has set down some standards for the facility in terms of both management and design. Specifically, the design and operation of each site dealing with nuclear waste must: [S]‌trive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation [and] aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.9

In practice, what this has meant is that a number of countries have attempted to reconcile this obligation with the development of what is known as permanent deep geological disposal. The aim of this method is to place the waste in an environment where there will be no need for custodial care of the site after emplacement and closure of the access portals. This is not to suggest that this will be a perfect method for disposal of such waste; only that it is considered better than any of the alternatives (such as dumping solid waste into space or drilling cores five kilometres into the core of the Earth, and filling them with liquid waste). The basis of this thinking is that the placement of the high-level nuclear waste, deep underground and within robust geological formations should be relatively safe. These deep sites are usually characterized by chemically reducing conditions—that 6  IAEA (2013) Nuclear Waste (IAEA, Vienna) 2; Anon (2013) ‘Nuclear Waste’ New Scientist (1 June) iv; Schaffer, M. (2011) ‘Toward a Viable Nuclear Waste Disposal Program’ Energy Policy 39: 1382; Anon (2008) ‘Nuclear Power’s Great Expectation’ Power Engineering International 16(9): 34, 36; Vandenbosch, R. (2007) Nuclear Waste Stalemate (Utah University Press, Salt Lake) 20–1; Anon (1997) ‘High-Level Nuclear Wastes’ Environment 39(3): 8. 7  For the agreed importance on future generations, see Nuclear Energy Agency (1995) The Environmental and Ethical Basis of Geological Disposal (NEA, Paris) 8, 12–13, 16–17. See also IAEA (1995) Safety Fundamentals:  The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management. Safety Series (IAEA, Vienna) No III.F. 8   Joint Convention, Art 1. 9   Joint Convention, Art 11(vi) and (vii).

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is, the absence of oxidants like dissolved oxygen, which could encourage barrier corrosion or radionuclide dissolution. Collectively, these sites are meant to ensure the inviolability of the waste—in perpetuity (or at least one million years).10 It is the problem of perpetuity that has caused many scholars and policy makers to question this method of disposal. The basis of the questioning is whether it is reasonable to assume that the method is safe when projected out over thousands of years. In this time, everything from technological failure, to risks from human action (accidents, war, mistake), slow processes (from climate change to tectonic movements), and fast natural movements (such as earthquakes, volcanism, and/or groundwater change) could directly impact upon the safety of the disposal method. It was due, in part, to such problems that countries such as Britain and Germany wrestled with, and changed their positions back and forth over, the suitability of deep geological disposal. In 2012 the United States cancelled its project of deep geological disposal of high-level waste in the Yucca Mountain complex. However, such risks have not been considered paramount in other parts of the world, such as Finland, France, and Sweden, where deep geological disposal facilities have been approved, and are expected to start operating after 2025.11

3.  The moral consideration of other generations It is due to such situations, whereby the current generation can act in a way which results in detriments to future generations, that a number of scholars have argued for restraint. One of the first in this context, Gifford Pinchot (1865–1946), proclaimed: No generation can be allowed needlessly to damage or reduce the future general wealth and welfare by the way it uses or misuses any natural resource.12

10  Alley, W. (2011) Too Hot to Touch:  The Problem of High Level Nuclear Waste (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 10, 23–7; Laverov, N. (2010) ‘Crystalline Rocks as a Medium for Nuclear Waste Disposal’ Russian Journal of General Chemistry 81(9):  1980; Johnson, O. (2010) ‘High-Level Radioactive Waste Management’ Water Environment Research 82(10): 1748; Anon (1997) ‘A History of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal Efforts’ Environment 39(3):10. 11   North, A. (2013) ‘Getting U.S. High-Level Nuclear Waste into a Geological Repository’ Risk Analysis 33(1): 1; Naslund, J. (2013) ‘Climate Considerations in Long-Term Safety Assessments for Nuclear Waste Repositories’ AMBIO 42: 393; Birkholzer, J. (2012) ‘Geologic Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste: Status, Key Issues, and Trends’ Annual Review of Environment and Resources 37: 79; Alley, W. (2011) Too Hot to Touch: The Problem of High Level Nuclear Waste (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 19–20; Schaffer, M. (2011) ‘Toward a Viable Nuclear Waste Disposal Program’ Energy Policy 39: 1382; Beken, T. (2010) ‘Security Risks in Nuclear Waste Management’ Journal of Environmental Management 91: 940; Rutqvist, J. (2009) ‘A Multiple-Code Simulation Study of the Geological Nuclear Waste Repositories’ Environment and Geology 57: 1313; Anon (2010) ‘Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste in Europe’ Energy & Ecology (March) 72; Strom, A. (2008) ‘Geological Repository for Nuclear Waste in Sweden’ Applied Geochemistry 23: 1747; Vandenbosch, R. (2007) Nuclear Waste Stalemate (Utah University Press, Salt Lake) 215–50. 12   Pinchot, G. (1965) ‘What it all Means’, in I. Burton (ed), Readings in Resource Management and Conservation (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 255.

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In a contemporary sense, Edith Brown Weiss (1942–), in combination with a number of other influential scholars, has argued well that the concept of a planetary trust is founded on the ‘nearly universal recognition and acceptance among peoples of an obligation to protect the natural and cultural heritage for future generations’. Specifically, at any given time, each generation is both a ‘custodian or trustee of the planet for future generations and a beneficiary of its fruits’.13 She believes that to protect the welfare of future generations there are three things that this generation is required to do, namely: To sustain the life support systems of the planet; to sustain the ecological processes and environmental conditions necessary for the survival of the human species; and to sustain a healthy and decent environment.14

The idea that other human generations are worthy of moral consideration is far from new. The idea appears within a number of religious (especially Islamic15 and Judeao-Christian)16 and indigenous17 cultural traditions. A number of philosophers within the Western lineage, including Marcus Cicero (106–43 bce)18 and John Locke (1632–1704),19 also noted this idea. Edmund Burke (1729– 1797) developed the view of human society as a type of partnership through which all generations formed part of a larger whole and in which the present builds on the sacrifices and achievements of the past, just as much as the future would reap the benefits of the achievements of the present generation. Burke suggested: People will not look forward to posterity who never look back towards their a­ ncestors. . . and nuclear weapons, which generate, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are yet to be born.20

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)21 added that people live in societies that are far from ideal but still strive for a better society in the future, of which they may well not be

13   Weiss, E. (1990) In Fairness to Future Generation: International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity (Transnational, New York) 7–8, 17. 14   Weiss, E. (1984) ‘The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity’ Ecology Law Quarterly 11: 511. 15   Khadduri, A. (1984) The Islamic Conception of Justice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 137–9, 219–20, 233–9. 16   See, for example, Genesis 1: 1–31, 17: 7–8; Muers, R. (2003) ‘Pushing the Limit: Theology and Responsibility to Future Generations’ Studies in Christian Ethics 16(2): 36. 17   Burger, J. (1990) The Gaia Atlas of First Peoples (Gaia Books, London) 11–13, 20–1, 88–9, 112–23, 140–3, 162–3, 172–7. 18  Cicero, De Finibus (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971) 3, 64. 19   Locke, J. (1971) An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government (Oxford University Press, London) paras 25, 31, 33, 37. 20   Burke, E. (1961) Reflections on the Revolution in France (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 45. For more on this cross-temporal argument, see O’Neil, J. (1993) Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (Routledge, London) 32–4. 21   Kant, I. (1970) ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, in Nisbet, F. (ed), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), 50.

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part. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1842)22 and Karl Marx (1818–1883) also recognized the idea of future generations as a legitimate concern, with Marx particularly recognizing its merit in helping with the formation of class identity, and as a method to defeat the risks of alienation.23 Subsequent authors in the twentieth century have built on the idea that both individuals and communities are much healthier if they are able to locate themselves beyond an alienated, isolated, and atomistic existence, within a much greater continuum, in which the past, present, and future generations are linked together in a type of ‘stream of humanity’.24 At base, with this type of vision, both people and the processes they exist within learn to identify with more than a short-term vision and pre-occupation of the present to the exclusion of generations ahead of them. A second approach used to justify the moral consideration of future generations was developed by the philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002). Briefly, Rawls endeavoured to locate the principles of justice on the basis of an elaborate thought experiment. This idea entails a volunteer to be asked what principles would be adopted by subjects who are rational and self-interested and situated behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. Behind such a veil, the subjects would be ignorant of their own social, sexual, and ethnic life and not be informed of any talents they may possess. Therefore, the ideal observer theory should check all emotional sympathies and self-favouritism that the person behind the veil of ignorance may have had before being so situated. Consequently, strict impartiality would be guaranteed. The ideal observer would only be acquainted with all the non-moral facts, while conscious that he or she could be located anywhere within the human spectrum. Therefore, the ideal observer would also be disinterested, dispassionate, and consistent in his or her approach. Accordingly, it would be irrational in Rawl’s view to endorse principles that could possibly disadvantage the person behind the veil—as he or she could be that person. Accordingly, the ideal observer would tend to adopt policies that would cover the least advantaged in society as there is a possibility that it could be him or her.25 In the context of future generations, Rawls proposed that the ideal observer ‘must choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live with

22   Bentham, noted in Narveson, J. (1967) ‘Utilitarianism and Future Generations’ Mind 76: 64. Cf. Carr, I. (1992) ‘Saving the Environment: Does Utilitarianism Provide a Justification’ Legal Studies 12: 92, 98–9. 23  Marx, K., Early Writings and Economics, 515–17, both in McLean, D. (ed) (1978) Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 77 and 515 respectively; Marx, K., Capital (Wishart, London, 1972) III: 776; Tolman, C. (1981) ‘Karl Marx, Alienation and the Mastery of Nature’ Environmental Ethics 3: 63, 64–9. 24  Inayatullah, S. (1997) ‘Future Generations Thinking’ Futures 29(8):  701; Goodin, R.E. (1992) Green Political Theory (Polity, Cambridge) 39–40; Fox, W. (1990) Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Shambhala, London) 289–99; Dooley, K. (1986) ‘The Ambiguity of Environmental Ethics: Duty or Heroism’ Philosophy Today 30: 54; Westra, A. (1985) ‘Let It Be: Heideggger and Future Generations’ Environmental Ethics 7: 348, 349; Polak, F.L. (1961) The Image of the Future (Oceana, New York). 25   Rawls, J. (1972) A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 136–42, 164, 177–8, 289–93, 511; Rawls, J. (1963) ‘The Sense of Justice’ Philosophical Review 72: 284.

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whatever generation they turn out to belong to’.26 Here, Rawls extended the veil of ignorance to cover the aspect of time. This meant that the individual behind the veil would not know where he or she would fit in on a time scale, ie whether it was the first, middle, or last generation. Rawls believed that the compromise which a rational person behind the veil would choose would be one whereby he or she could inherit the world in the same condition as the generation before he or she existed had enjoyed. The ideal person would not opt for a situation in which one generation inherited a world damaged by the acts of a previous generation, as he or she could be in the generation that suffered. Rawls classified this realization as the ‘just savings’ principle. This can be regarded as an understanding between generations that each generation will carry its fair share of the burden of realizing a just society. In this instance, the ‘just savings’ principle would seek to improve the welfare of the least-advantaged group extending over future generations. Each generation could then be read as a trustee for the planet, with an obligation to care for it, and as a beneficiary, with rights to use it—but only to a limited degree.27 The theories of both the cross-temporal and the ideal observer have been bolstered by the rapidly changing context in which this generation, above all others, operates. That context is the multitude of environmental problems that have been created, which have legacies and impacts that will far outlive the current generation. This changing context, especially in terms of cause and effect, is believed by many to place a special responsibility on this generation not to act to the detriment of those in the future.28

4.  Adoption of the argument in law and policy In the environmental context, the idea of conservation for the benefit of future generations has been evident for around a century. For example, the United States Congress in 1916 passed their National Parks Service Act for the protection and 26  Singer, B. (1988) ‘An Extension of Rawls’ Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 10: 219. 27   Rawls, J. (1972) A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 284–93. For commentary, see Welburn, D. (2013) ‘Rawls, the Well Ordered Society and Intergenerational Justice’ Politics 33(1):  56. Macclellan, J. (2013) ‘How Not to Defend a Rawlsian Approach to Intergenerational Ethics’ Ethics and the Environment 18(1):  67; Norton, B. (1989) ‘Intergenerational Equity and Environmental Decisions: A Model Using Rawl’s Veil of Ignorance’ Ecological Economics 1(2): 137; Kunnas, J. (2012) ‘The Theory of Justice in a Warming Climate:  John Rawl’s Theory Applied’ Electronic Green Journal 34: 1. 28   Beekman, V. (2004) ‘Sustainable Development and Future Generations’ Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17(1): 3; Gower, B. (1992) ‘What Do We Owe Future Generations?’, in D. Cooper and J. Palmer (eds), The Environment in Question:  Ethics and Global Issues (Routledge, London) 1; Chowdhury, S.R. (1992) The Right to Development in International Law (Graham and Trotman, London) 233, 244–6; Gundling, L. (1990) ‘Our Responsibility for Future Generations’ American Journal of International Law 84: 207, 208; Passmore, J. (1974) Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Duckworth, London) 73–100; Attfield, R. (1983) The Ethics of Environmental Concern (Blackwell, Oxford) 92–108; Hubin, D. (1976) ‘Justice and Future Generations’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 6(1): 70.

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creation of national parks. The Act stated that it was necessary to ‘conserve the scenery. . . and the wildlife. . . in such a manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations’.29 In an international context, the idea of recording the interests of future generations became apparent with the conclusion of the Second World War. At this point, the opening paragraph of the United Nations Charter stated ‘We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.  .  .’.30 Similar recognitions of the interests of future generations quickly spread into other international documents. This was particularly the case in the area of international environmental law. For example, the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (unlike its 1931, 1937, and 1938 predecessors) recognized ‘the interests of the Nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by whales’.31 This recognition of the idea of future generations as some kind of moral touchstone in international treaties grew over the following decades before becoming popularized in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference of the Human Environment, which recognized in Principle 1 that ‘man, . . . bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations’.32 The idea was then taken and applied in the same decade to World Heritage,33 and the trade in endangered species. Specifically, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora sets out to preserve species that are endangered as ‘they are irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come’.34 Similar considerations were noted with the justifications to protect migratory species.35 Even the United Nations 1974 Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States recognized that ‘the protection, preservation and the enhancement of the environment for the present and future generations is the responsibility of all states’.36

29   16 USC ss 1 (1994). For context, see Pinchot, G. (1910) The Fight for Conservation (Doubleday, New York) 79–81. See also Winks, R. (1997) ‘The National Park Service Act of 1916’ Denver University Law Review 575; Udall, S. (1988) The Quiet Crisis and the Next Generation (Gibbs Smith, Utah) 124. 30   UN Charter, 26 June 1945. 31   International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Preamble, para 2. 32  Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UNDoc.A/CONF./48/14 (1972), Principle 1. 33   Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Art 4. 34   Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Preamble. 35   Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, Preamble. 36   See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974, UNGA Res/3281 (XXIX), Art 30; Statute for the Council of Europe 1949, 87 UNTS, 104; Nordic Convention 1974, Art 4.For similar recognitions in more general political contexts, see Charter for African Unity 1963, 479 UNTS, 39; Pact of Arab States, 70 UNTS, 237, 248. For a number of individual constitutions on this question, see Weiss, E.B. (1989) In Fairness to Future Generations (United Nations University, Japan), Appendix B. Certain countries have gone so far as to create an ombudsman to represent future generations: see Weiss, E. (1984) ‘The Planetary Trust:  Consequences and Intergenerational Equity’ Ecology Law Quarterly 11: 453, 564–72; Susskind, L. (1994) Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Environmental Agreements (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 53–8.

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In 1980, ‘the historical responsibility of states for the preservation of Nature for Present and Future Generations’ was declared by the General Assembly of the United Nations.37 This idea became more specific as the ‘Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Humankind’38 became an annual concern. The year 1980 also saw the first Brandt Commission suggest that ‘the rights of future generations’ should be considered as a reason to protect the environment.39 The 1982 World Charter for Nature40 and the 1982 Nairobi Declaration also emphasized the importance of environmental protection for future generations.41 In 1987 the World Commission for Environment and Development famously defined the concept of sustainable development as the present generation meeting its own needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs.42 The leader of this Commission, Gro Bruntland (1939–), went on to argue that consideration of future generations should form a ‘new global ethic’, that is needed to find an answer to the current international environmental problem.43 The importance of future generations was then noted repeatedly in the run-up to the 1992 Earth Summit,44 and then at the event itself. Foremost, Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development explained that ‘the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet development and environmental needs of present and future generations’. While the importance of the future unborn was being commonly reiterated by the dignitaries at this event,45 it went on to be recognized in the main agreements to evolve from that gathering. Namely, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, of which the signatories were ‘determined to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations’,46 and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, under which the parties were ‘Determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations’. They then added, 37   Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature for Present and Future Generations, UN.Doc.A./RES/35/8 (1980), Principles 1, 2. 38   UNGA Resolution 67/210, 21 December 2012. 39   The Brandt Commission (1980) North-South: A Programme for Survival (Pan, London) 115. 40   World Charter for Nature 1982, Preamble. 41   Nairobi Declaration, UN Doc.A/37/25 (1982). 42   World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 8, 40. 43   Gro Bruntland 1988; recorded in Starke, L. (ed) (1990) Signs of Hope: Working Towards Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 28; Bruntland, G.H. (1990) ‘Our Common Future: A Call for Action’, in N. Polunin (ed), Maintenance of the Biosphere. Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Environmental Future (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh) 186, 192. 44   The South Commission (1990), The Challenge to the South (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 23, 280. See ‘Decision of the Interparliamentary Conference on the Global Environment’ (1990) Environmental Policy and the Law 20: 112. Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the EEC Region, Preamble; reprinted in (1990) Environmental Policy and the Law 20: 104. 45   See the individual speeches in the Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992), A/CONF.151/26, Vol 3 (see John Major on this point, at pp 25 and 28, and George Bush (Snr) at p 79). Note also Gore, A. (1992) Earth in Balance: Forging a New Common Purpose (Earthscan, London) 170. 46   Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble.

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as an overriding principle (ie in the actual text of the Convention, and not just in the Preamble), that ‘the Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind’.47 The idea was utilized again through a series of official reports of an international nature in 1994 and 1995,48 before being recognized at the International Conference on Population and Development49 and the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, the Preamble to which recorded: That further international action to prevent, reduce and where practicable eliminate pollution of the sea caused by dumping can and must be taken without delay to protect and preserve the marine environment . . . to sustain the legitimate uses of the sea and will continue to meet the needs of present and future generations.

The Millennium Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly agreed: We must spare no effort to free all of humanity, and above all our children and grandchildren, from the threat of living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs.50

Four years later, at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, those present declared: At the beginning of this Summit, the children of the world spoke to us in a simple yet clear voice that the future belongs to them, and accordingly challenged all of us to ensure that through our actions they will inherit a world free of the indignity and indecency occasioned by poverty, environmental degradation and patterns of unsustainable development. As part of our response to these children, who represent our collective future, all of us, coming from every corner of the world, informed by different life experiences, are united and moved by a deeply-felt sense that we urgently need to create a new and brighter world of hope.51

In 2007, UNESCO adopted its Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations. In so doing, it agreed that: The present generations have the responsibility of ensuring that the needs and interests of present and future generations are fully safeguarded . . . The present generations have the responsibility to bequeath to future generations an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human activity. In order to ensure that future generations benefit from the richness of the Earth’s ecosystems, the present generations should strive for   Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art 3(1).  International Commission on Peace and Food (1994) Uncommon Opportunities:  An Agenda for Peace and Equitable Development (Zed, London) 6–9; Draft Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, A/CONF.167/9 (1994), Preamble, para 1; Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development, A/ CONF.166/L.3/Add.1 (1995), para 26(b); Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 47. 49   Report of the International Conference on Population and Development (1994), A/CONF.171/13, Principle 3. 50   UNGA/Res/55/2, paras 21. 51   Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development 2002, paras 3 and 4. 47 48

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sustainable development and preserve living conditions, particularly the quality and integrity of the environment.52

Five years later, in 2012, the Parties to the Mercury Convention were aware of ‘the health concerns . . . resulting from exposure to mercury of vulnerable populations, especially women, children, and, through them, future generations’. In the same year, at the 20-year anniversary of the Rio Earth Summit, the following was agreed: We, the Heads of State and Government and high-level representatives . . . renew our commitment to sustainable development and to ensuring the promotion of an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for present and future generations . . . We will also consider the need for promoting intergenerational solidarity for the achievement of sustainable development, taking into account the needs of future generations.53

While the international community has been considering new methods of ‘intergenerational solidarity’, a large number of countries have already attempted to incorporate the needs of the future into their own constitutions. As of 2013, at least 29 governments directly refer to future generations in their foundation documents. Moreover, considerable judicial attention has been, and is being, focused on what intergenerational justice may entail, with some countries possessing an actual Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations.54

5.  Problems when considering future generations Despite the strong support for the recognition of the interests of future generations in environmental matters, it is important to recognize that there is considerable scepticism of the idea that this generation should show any restraint to consider the interests of the next. This is not a new reflection, being particularly noticeable in times of radical change (often when those who wish to preserve the status quo invoke images of the past and future as a justification for no change). Accordingly, those in the business of making change can argue the opposite way—that each generation should be completely free to determine its own destiny. Moreover, although short-term vision may have its limits, it is better than being constrained by a longer-term vision with unknown needs, or flow-back of benefits to the current decision-makers.55 For example, John Trumbull (1756–1843) asked the

52   Declaration on Future Generations, 12 November 1997, made by the General Conference of UNESCO at its twenty-ninth session. 53   Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), A/CONF.216/16, Annex, paras 1, 86. See also paras 13, 39, 50, 108, 158, 191, 197. 54   Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations (2013) Now for the Long Term (University of Oxford, Oxford) 6, 46–7; Wolfe, M. (2008) The Shadows of Future Generations Duke Law Journal 57: 1897; Gosseries, A. (2008) ‘On Future Generations’ Future Rights’ The Journal of Political Philosophy 16(4): 446. 55   Thompson, D. (2010) ‘Representing Future Generations’ Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13(1):  17; Gosseries, A. (2008) ‘Constitutions and Future Generations’ The Good Society 17(2): 32; Posner, E. (2007) ‘Agencies Should Ignore Distant Future Generations’

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question, ‘what has posterity ever done for us?’.56 Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) articulated a somewhat larger view: The earth belongs to the living, not to the dead . . . Each generation has the usufruct of the earth during the period of its continuance. When it ceases to exist, the usufruct passes on to the succeeding generation, free and unencumbered, and so on . . . We may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation, more than the inhabitants of another country.57

In a more contemporary context, Robert Heilbroner (1919–2005) added: Why should we make sacrifices now to ease the lot of generations whom we will never live to see . . . it is the absence of . . . a bond with the future that casts doubt on the ability . . . to take now the measures needed to mitigate the problems of the future.58

The first reason that a bond with the future (beyond a generation or two in front) cannot be seriously entertained is that the issue of distance involves considerations of both identification and what can, practically, be done to help their potential interests. As John Passmore (1914–2004) observed: Anything we can do would, over millions of years, be infinitesimal in its effects; not even by reducing our consumption of petrol to a thimbleful apiece could we ensure the availability of a similar quantity to our remotest descendants.59

In addition, the self interest of existing individuals can only weaken as their genetic material dilutes with each successive wave and the distance between now and the endless future continues to expand. Accordingly, while it may make sense to protect the ecology to hand it on to our children, grandchildren, and perhaps even great-grandchildren, after that the individuals’ specific identity into the future fades. At this point, the individuals’ specific concern with the distant future must be tempered, unless they can extend their concern to being for generations to come, without recognition of the particular individuals that may be contained within them and any chance of a strong genetic lineage. At this point, the concern is much more for the future of our species, than the individuals that make it up.60 University of Chicago Law Review 74(1): 139; Parfit, D. (1982) ‘Future Generations: Further Problems’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 11(2): 113. 56   Bowden, D. (ed) (1962) The Satirical Poems of John Trumbull (Texas University Press, Austin) 129. 57   Jefferson, in S. Padover (ed), Thomas Jefferson on Democracy (New American Library, New York, 1946) 15–16. 58   Heilbroner, R.L. (1974) An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect (Norton, New York) 135; note also pp 114–15, 131, 132, 136. See also Gower, B. (1992) ‘What Do We Owe Future Generations?’, in D. Cooper (ed), The Environment in Questions: Ethics and Global Issues (Routledge, London) 1, 3; Care, N. (1982) ‘Future Generations, Public Policy, and the Motivation Problem’ Environmental Ethics 4:  207, 210; Golding, M. (1972) ‘Obligations to Future Generations’ Monist 56:  97; Hardin, G. (1981) ‘Who Cares for Posterity?’, in E. Partridge (ed), The Rights of Future Generations (Prometheus, New York) 222–6; Sieger Derr, H. (1981) ‘The Obligation to the Future’, in Partridge, The Rights of Future Generations, 39. 59   Passmore, J. (1974) Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Duckworth, London) 78–9. 60  Carr, I. (1992) ‘Saving the Environment:  Does Utilitarianism Provide a Justification’ Legal Studies 12:  92, 99; Daly, H. (1989) For the Common Good:  Redirecting the Economy Towards the

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This focus upon the species, as contained in future generations, makes more sense because, as has been pointed out by Derek Parfit (1942–), any focus on individuals is counter-intuitive. Simply, if any future individuals exist at all, then they cannot bemoan the fact that an earlier generation wronged them. If an earlier generation acted differently, then, via countless multipliers, the specific persons of the generation that are complaining would not exist at all. Thus, given that any (in the vast majority of cases) existence is better than no existence, they have no right to complain—for if things had been different, they would not exist. This problem presents a fundamental dilemma, because this consideration suggests that, short of creating no future at all, we, in effect, cannot harm future generations if our loci of concern are the fate of individuals in the future.61 The only way out of this paradox is to focus on the future generation as a whole, as that stream of our own species, as opposed to individuals within it—but to do so, skips the core of the thought experiment of the ideal observer.62 The difficulty with focusing the future generation argument upon a wider group, as represented by the continued longevity of our own species, is that many people simply do not accept this line of thinking. At the most obvious level, large numbers of people remain alienated from the present generation, let alone future ones. In the best of times, many people cannot relate to those with needs in their own communities, let alone those in other countries. For example, although millions of people can see through the media that thousands of people are starving, only a small number of those who witness these tragedies will actually do anything to help alleviate the starvation. That is, if all of the extremes of social human existence and ingrained alienation cannot move people to act to help current generations in jeopardy, there is little hope that they will feel empathy towards, let alone take action to protect the interests of future generations.63 This chasm of distance between concern for the present and that of the future only increases when those in the current generation, in the worst of times, have overtly pressing interests which make it impossible to see beyond tomorrow. In these situations, ‘the tyranny of the immediate’64 takes precedence over any Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future (Beacon, Boston) 39; De George, R. (1971) ‘The Rights of Future Generations?’, in J. Dias (ed), Law and the Ecological Challenge (Random House, New York) 27–39. 61   Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 351, 355–65, 372, 378, 382, 387–8, 434–5, 451. 62   Vanderheiden, S. (2006) ‘Conservation, Foresight and the Future Generations Problem’ Inquiry 49(4): 337; Johnson, L. (2003) ‘Future Generations and Contemporary Ethics’ Environmental Values 12(4):  471; Carter, A. (2001) ‘Can We Harm Future People?’ Environmental Values 10(4):  429; O’Neil, J. (1993) ‘Future Generations: Present Harms’ Philosophy 68(263): 35. 63   Partridge, E. (1981) ‘Why Care About the Future?’, in E. Partridge (ed), The Rights of Future Generations (Prometheus, New York) 215. See also O’Neil, J. (1993) Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (Routledge, London) 38–43; Fromm, E. (1955) The Sane Society (Routledge, New York) 111; Lasch, C. (1978) The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Discriminatory Expectation (Abacus, London) 39–40; Keniston, K. (1965) The Uncommitted (Brace and World, New York) 441. 64   Starke, L. (1990) Signs of Hope: Working Towards Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 28.

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long-term planning. Garrett Hardin (1915–2003) summed up this problem simply by pointing out that ‘people will sacrifice every promise of tomorrow for the merest scrap of food today (if they are hungry enough)’.65 That is, all of the extremes of physical human existence, from lack of sustenance to lack of security as they currently stand, suggest to many that it is more pertinent to spend time and energy working on problems of the present, rather than those of the future. Therefore, any theory of future generations must be limited by the requirement that the important needs of present generations are considered and met first, or, as Gifford Pinchot suggested after recognizing the interests of the future generations, ‘the welfare of this generation first, and afterward the welfare of future generations to follow’.66 This is not to suggest that the future generations’ argument has no validity. Rather, it is has to be balanced by other considerations and a caveat placed upon it: namely, inter-generational equity cannot exist without intra-generational equity.67 Assuming that the intergenerational argument can be reconciled, and those who advocate in this area are content to recognize the broader focus on the species, rather than any particular individuals, the next hurdle is whether it even makes sense to give moral consideration to something, even if it as wide as the human species of the future, which does not yet exist. This idea about the need for existence is a powerful one. Thus, even in controversial debates, such as abortion, the basis begins when at least something already exists, not when it has the potential to exist.68 The answer to this type of conundrum is that we know our actions in the present have the strong potential to impact upon the interests of those who will make up the future. Arguably, this recognition that the future has interests creates a moral catapult, as these interests—the basic biological needs that we know of, and we know we can impact upon—should not undercut. The difficulty with this argument (and this is a large problem) is that we also know that all other species have the same interests. That is, unless we intend to draw a very arbitrary line, our concern for the future generations should not be confined only to our own species, but also every species having basic biological needs that should not be undercut.69 65  Hardin, G. (1981) ‘Who Cares for Posterity?’, in E. Partridge (ed), The Rights of Future Generations (Prometheus, New York) 227. This did not mean that Hardin disagreed with the idea; in fact, it was the opposite. He asserted that ‘every life saved this year in a poor country diminishes the quality of life for subsequent generations’: Hardin, G. (1978) Stalking the Wild Taboo (Kaufman, California) 234, 256–9. 66   Pinchot, G. (1910) The Fight for Conservation (DoubleDay, New York) 35. 67   Baier, A. (1981) ‘The Rights of Past and Future Persons’, in E. Partridge (ed), The Rights of Future Generations (Prometheus, New York) 172–4; Callahan, D. (1981) ‘What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations?’, in Partridge, The Rights of Future Generations, 81; Weiss, E. (1988) In Fairness to Future Generations (United Nations University, Japan) 55; Attfield, R. (1983) The Ethics of Environmental Concern (Blackwell, Oxford) 92. 68   Macklin, R. (1981) ‘Can Future Generations Correctly Be Said to Have Rights?’, in E. Partridge (ed), The Rights of Future Generations (Prometheus, New York) 152. See also Warren, K. (1981) ‘Do Potential Persons Have Rights?’, in Partridge, The Rights of Future Generations, 261; De George, R.T. (1976) ‘The Environment, Rights and Future Generations’, in T. Regan (ed), Ethics And Problems of the Twenty-first Century (Random House, New York) 52, 95. 69   Feinberg, J. (1974) ‘The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations’, in W.T. Blackstone (ed), Philosophy and the Environmental Crisis (University of Georgia Press, Athens) 65; Norton, B. (1982) ‘Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations’ Environmental Ethics 4: 322.

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The base problem here is that most, if not all, of the arguments for the moral consideration of future generations are hopelessly anthropocentric. The consideration of anything non-human is currently outside the sphere of the debate, and this exclusion may be somewhat hard to justify. Even with the famous thought experiment from Rawls’ Theory of Justice, a truly objective view for the future would have the ideal participant not only not knowing which generation he or she was in, but also which species. This is necessary when playing this game for the human species because there is the possibility that the participant could be a non-rational human (say, an infant or the mentally infirm) who would have to adopt policies which are not to the detriment of these groups of people, based on their basic biological needs (and not just their rationality). The problem with this is that when the debate moves away from shared rationality (necessary to encompass all non-rational humans) and encompasses all humans because of their shared basic biological needs, the same line can also encompass all other species with similar basic biological needs. If this were the case, the ideal observer behind the veil of ignorance would be unlikely to opt for actions which could harm future generations—of any species, not just human.70

6. Conclusion The idea that all of humanity is connected via a type of inter-temporal stream, in which past, present, and future generations are connected, has been recognized throughout history. Towards the end of the twentieth century, this idea was expanded when it became apparent that the current generation had an unprecedented ability to detrimentally alter the environment to the loss of future generations. There are many exemplars in this area, but the most obvious is the difficulty of the creation of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, which generates a waste that has to be carefully contained for tens of thousands of years to come. With such considerations in mind, numerous theorists have argued that the interests, if not rights, of future generations should be taken into account. This argument, perhaps more than all others, has become the most widely cited justification for moral action found in international environmental law. Indeed, it is the moral core of all thinking about sustainable development.

70  Fox, W. (1990) Towards a Transpersonal Ecology:  Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Shambhala, London) 202–3; Naess, A. (1989) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 165–6; Taliaferro, C. (1988) ‘The Environmental Ethics of an Ideal Observer’ Environmental Ethics 10: 233; Singer, B. (1988) ‘An Extension of Rawls’ Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 10: 219, 226–7; Regan, T. (1988) The Case for Animal Rights (Routledge, London) 179–182; Gundling, L. (1990) ‘Our Responsibility to Future Generations’ American Journal of International Law 84: 207, 208–9; Elliot, R. (1984) ‘Rawlsian Justice and Non-Human Animals’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 1: 95, 99–103; Elliot, R. (1984) ‘Rawlsian Justice and Non-Human Animals’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 1: 95, 99–103; Manning, S. (1981) ‘Environmental Ethics and Rawls’ Theory of Justice’ Environmental Ethics 3: 17.

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Despite its widespread acceptance, the argument is plagued by four faults. First, some scholars absolutely reject the idea of any bonds between the past, present, and future, as at a minimum, existence—not the potential for existence—is seen as the bottom line for moral concern. Second, the reality of alienation within the current generation to those already existing, let alone those in future generations, is recognized as a serious limitation. Although not going to the core of the theoretical idea, the practical considerations—that intra-generational equity should be accompanied by inter-generational equity—are important, as they provide a stark reminder of the way the world actually is, as opposed to how it should be. Third, there is the paradox that any existence in the future cannot readily be bemoaned, as any existence, no matter how poor, is better than no existence. The only way to bypass this paradox is to think in terms of future generations as a collective (not individuals) in which their overall interests in the future (which we can be reasonably certain they will possess) could be damaged by actions undertaken in the present. The difficulty with this collective approach to the future is that it cannot logically be kept to encompass only the human species. That is, the same interests that generations of future humans have are the same that generations of similar (non-human) species also possess. This does not suggest that the principle of protecting the rights of future generations is wrong, but rather that it is unduly restricted in the way that it is currently focused.

IX Animals and Other Living Entities 1. Introduction Unsatisfied with all of the limitations involved in anthropocentric environmental ethics, a number of theorists have argued that non-anthropocentric approaches should be adopted. At the forefront have been efforts to extend moral consideration to animals and, separately, all living individual entities. Enhanced moral considerability of animals is based on arguments of either utilitarian interpretations or inherent/intrinsic value.1 The argument for the moral consideration of all other living individual entities comes from an extension of similar arguments around inherent/intrinsic value. In both instances, inroads have been made into international law. Although there is no moral equivalence for non-human animals akin to humanity, clear restraints related to utilitarian thinking on reducing pain (as a welfare-based argument), and utilization if the benefits exceed the costs (with scientific testing) are evident in international environmental law. Greater progress has been made in the idea that all species have a moral—intrinsic—value independent of humanity. This idea is now clearly recognized in multiple regimes.

2.  Moral consideration for animals Peter Singer (1946–) is often credited with laying the intellectual foundations for the contemporary basis for the moral respect for animals. Singer’s commitment is to the utilitarian doctrine, according to which moral agents are expected to do those acts which, directly or indirectly, can reasonably be expected to yield the best consequences or lead to the greatest happiness. Conversely, moral agents should seek to minimize the occurrence of badness in the world.2 These considerations

1   Aaltola, E. (2010) ‘The Anthropocentric Paradigm and the Possibility of Animal Ethics’ Ethics and the Environment 15(1): 27; Benthall, J. (2007) ‘Animal Liberation and Rights’ Anthropology Today 23(2): 1. 2   Singer, P. (1979) ‘Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 9: 327; Singer, P. (1976) Animal Liberation: Towards an End to Man’s Inhumanity to Animals (Cape, London) 21–44; Singer, P. (1993) Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 1–15, 57–9, 110–35,

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are determined by the extent to which satisfaction of preferences is maximized and dissatisfaction minimized for the moral individuals whose interests are to be taken into account. The goal is to achieve the best balance of good over bad. To achieve this, all interests, no matter which entity they relate to, are meant to be taken into account. This is because every interest is just what it is, and counts for its own weight. Accordingly, as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) suggested, ‘the questions is not can they reason? Nor can they talk? The question is can they suffer?’3 The central point that can be extracted from Bentham’s and Singer’s argument is that animal interests should (prima facie) be considered in the course of moral deliberations as animal interests in avoiding pain are very similar to those of humans.4 Drawing the line at interests in terms of pain and pleasure is seen as the only possible line of demarcation as all other supposedly unique human qualities, such as rationality or cognition, are not in fact shared by all humanity, ie infants or the mentally disabled. This is not a modern discovery; as Plutarch (46–120) noted in his dialogue Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer, as a group, human beings have reason only to a degree and ‘not every man may be said to exercise it’.5 The follow-on point is that despite all humanity not sharing the ‘higher’ capacities like intelligence (which animals are not supposed to possess), all humans, from infants and imbeciles to ‘normal’ functioning people, have an interest in the avoidance of physical suffering. However, this is a characteristic of all sentient creatures and not just humans. Therefore, membership of the human species cannot justify a difference in moral treatment, as the relevant consideration—the avoidance of pain—is also applicable to non-human beings that are sentient.6 Throughout the ages, especially during the Enlightenment, this was noted by Michel de Montaigne (1532–1593),7 Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1788),8 David Hume (1711–1776),9 and John Stewart

274–6, 283–4; Singer, P. (1977) Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals (Paladin, Sydney) 8; Singer, P. (1976) ‘Not for Humans Only:  The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental Issues’, in T. Regan (ed), Ethics and the Twenty-first Century (Random House, New York) 194; Singer, P. (1974) ‘All Animals are Equal’ Philosophic Exchange 1: 103. 3   Bentham, J. (1789) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Russell, London, 1962) I, 328. 4   Rollin, B. (2011) ‘Animal Pain: What it is and Why it Matters’ The Journal of Ethics 15(4): 425; Carter, A. (2005) ‘Animals, Pain and Morality’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 22(1): 17; Allen, C. (2004) ‘Animal Pain’ Nous 38(4): 617; Harrison, P. (1991) ‘Do Animals Feel Pain?’ Philosophy 66(255): 25. 5   Plutarch, as noted in Hughes, J. (1994) Pan’s Travails:  Environmental Problems of the Ancient Greeks and Romans (John Hopkins University Press, London) 110–11. 6  Balcombe, J. (2009) ‘Animal Pleasure and its Moral Significance’ Applied Animal Behaviour Science 118(3): 208. 7   Montaigne, M.E. (1576) ‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’, in E.J. Trechman, Essays of Montaigne (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1927) 451–2, 460. See also, Melehe, H. (2006) ‘Silencing the Animals: Montaigne, Descartes, and the Hyperbole of Reason’ Symploke 31(1): 263. 8   Wolloch, N. (2008) ‘Rousseau and the Love of Animals’ Philosophy and Literature 32(2): 293. Specifically, Rousseau, J.J. (1772) The Social Contract (Dent, London, 1973) 41–2, 178–80, 184–6. 9   Pitson, T. (2003) ‘Hume on Morals and Animals’ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11(4): 639. Specifically, Hume, D. (1751) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (La Salle, Open Court, 1946) section 3, pt 1.

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Mill (1806–1873).10 However, it was Henry Salt (1851–1939), at the turn of the twentieth century, who turned this into strong ethical argument: If rights exist at all, they cannot be consistently awarded to men and denied to animals, since the same sense of justice and compassion apply in both cases. Pain is pain, whether it be inflicted on man or on beast; and the creature that suffers it, whether man or beast, being sensitive of the misery of it while it lasts, suffers evil . . . if man, as a sentient and intelligent being, should be exempt from all avoidable suffering, it follows that other beings who are also sentient and intelligent, though in a lower degree, should have, in lower degree, the same exemption.11

This benchmark has subsequently become established with the arguments for the moral consideration of animals. Sentience is seen as necessary for having a good of one’s own. Anything that cannot suffer cannot therefore be an object of moral concern. Thus, in so far as animals (including potentially fish, and even some invertebrates like crustaceans)12 can suffer equally with humans, they have an equal claim to relief, as pain is pain. It is the suffering of pain and not the type of sufferer of pain that is morally significant. The claim here is not that sentience leads to equal consideration in all matters, such as an animal’s right to vote. Rather, such a capacity leads to the necessity of weighing like interests equally. Animals, unlike humans, clearly have no interest in voting but they do have an interest in avoiding pain, as humans do. At a minimum, this view commits the utilitarian to, in the vast majority of instances, a vegetarian diet.13 The second route by which it is suggested that animals deserve a much greater moral consideration relates to the inherent/intrinsic value that each individual possesses. George Edward Moore (1873–1958) defined inherent value in 1922 in such a way that the value which a thing possesses, and the degree to which it possesses it, depend solely on the inherent nature of the thing in question. This means that an object of moral concern is not ‘good as a means’ but rather is ‘good as an end’ and valuable for its own sake, aside from any instrumental value it may also possess in the eyes of others.14 In the context of the moral value of animals, it has been suggested that inherent/intrinsic value means: 10   Mill, J.S. ‘Three Essays on Religion’, in Robinson, J.M. (ed), John Stuart Mill: Essays on Ethics, Religions and Society (Routledge, London, 1969) 1847; Mill, J.S. ‘Whewell on Moral Philosophy’, in T. Priestly (ed), Collected Works of J.S. Mill (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1986) Book 3, 952; Book 10, 167–89, 209–14, 398–9; Book 24, 925, 952–4; Book 25, 1172–3. 11   Salt, H. (1892), in Animal Rights Connected in Relation to Social Progress (George Bell, London, 1987) 50–1, 77; Salt, H. (1899) ‘The Rights of Animals’ International Journal of Ethics 10:  206. For the historical development of this argument, see Thomas, K. (1984) Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 (Penguin, Harmondsworth) 159, 176–81; Wolloch, N. (2012) ‘Animals in Enlightenment Historiography’ Huntington Library Quarterly 75(1): 53. 12  Barras, C.  (2007) ‘Crustacean Pain Responses Gives Food for Thought’ New Scientist (10 November) 14; Randerson, J. (2003) ‘Does a Hook Hurt a Fish?’ New Scientist (3 May) 15. 13  Kaufman, F. (1994) ‘Machines, Sentience and the Scope of Morality’ Environmental Ethics 16:  57, 66–8; Hare, R.M. (1987) ‘Moral Reasoning About the Environment’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 4: 3, 10. 14  Moore, G.E. (1922) ‘The Concept of Intrinsic Value’, in G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (Routledge, London) 260. This type of definition is also attributed to Kant: see (1797) The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Bobbs-Merril, London, 1965) 96. See also Sorenson, J. (2008) ‘Moore’s

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... that its good is deserving of the concern and consideration of all moral agents, and that the realisation of that good has intrinsic value, to be pursued as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is.15

This is not an unfamiliar argument. It is commonly believed that all humans have an equal inherent dignity. This is despite the fact that certain humans are more intelligent than others, certain lives are more fulfilling than others, and that certain lives are more valuable to society. Nevertheless, modern legal systems emphasize that people must be treated equally. The respect and protection of humans do not depend upon their individual qualities and/or abilities, but on their inherent value as humans. Thus, people who are not of average mental ability (such as the very young, those who have accidents or suffer from genetic variability, or those who have degenerated with age) gain their respect and protection because of their possession of inherent value. They have this inherent value because of what they are, ie humans, not what they possess, ie intellectual capabilities. They are not disenfranchised for what they do not possess, but are granted protection because of the inherent value that is attached to every human person.16 The philosophical quandary that this position creates is that inherent value is generally taken to reside exclusively, or at least pre-eminently, in humans. This distinction allows for humans, because of our unique lives, to be classified above all other forms of nature as we are believed to be the only species to possess inherent value. Conversely, every other species is seen as only being in possession of instrumental value. The difficulty is that this is an arbitrary judgment. Indeed, the fact that Homo sapiens’ capacities may be different to other natural entities should not give them alone inherent worth, any more than it should be given to sharks for having the capacity to be superb underwater predators. Indeed, it may be asserted that the idea that there is a pinnacle of evolution as occupied by humanity is an absolute myth. Our species has no greater claim in evolutionary terms than a tree, a termite, or an octopus.17 To argue that human capacities create inherent value overlooks what it is that gives all living things inherent worth. The thing that gives all living creatures, Ethics: Good as Intrinsic Value’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 5(1): 155; Darwall, S. (2003) ‘Moore, Normativity and Intrinsic Value’ Ethics 113(3): 468. 15   Taylor, P. (1981) ‘The Ethics of a Respect for Nature’ Environmental Ethics 3: 201. 16   Dworkin, R. (1977) Taking Rights Seriously (Oxford University Press, Oxford) Ch 4; Lukes, T. (1973) Individualism (Harper and Row, New York) 49; MacPherson, C.B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 220; Sapontzis, S.F. (1982) ‘The Moral Significance of Interests’ Environmental Ethics 4: 347; McCloskey, H.J. (1965) ‘Rights’ Philosophical Quarterly 15:  115; Blackstone, W.T. (1974) Philosophy and the Environmental Crisis (University of Georgia Press, Athens) 52; Frey, R.G. (1980) Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals (Clarendon, Oxford) 87–8. 17   Morgan, E. (1990) The Scars of Evolution (Penguin, London) 2–3; Taylor, P. (1984) ‘Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants?’ Environmental Ethics 157; Goodpaster, K.E. (1978) ‘On Being Morally Considerable’ Journal of Philosophy 75: 317; Taylor, P. (1981) ‘Frankena on Environmental Ethics’ Monist 64:  375; Lombardi, L.G. (1983) ‘Inherent Worth, Respect and Animals Rights’ Environmental Ethics 5:  260; Whitehead, A.N. (1925) Science and the Modern World (MacMillan, London) 129; Marcuse, H. (1964) One Dimensional Man (Routledge, London) 146–8.

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including humanity, an inherent worth is that they have an independent ‘good of their own’ that they seek to realize, as much as humans who do not possess considerations like rationality, also seek to realize. Tom Regan (1938–) came to stipulate that the conditions for being the subject of a life are: Having beliefs and desires, perception, memory, a sense of future and self, an emotional life including feelings of pleasure and pain, the ability to initiate action, a psychophysical identity over time, interests and welfare.18

This is especially the case with species that have survived through their own evolutionary path and appear to share many of the same key considerations that were once believed to be in the exclusive domain of humans, such as consciousness, emotions, empathy, and a sense of self.19 Exactly what having inherent value results in is a matter of debate. While some philosophers suggest that all entities with inherent value should be treated exactly the same (ie no killing), others suggest that it should be used in a more positive sense. That is, if the entity in possession of inherent value has been harmed, it should be helped, or restored, back to a position where it can again pursue its own good.20

3.  Animals in international law and policy The reflection of the moral consideration of animals in law can be divided into three parts. The first concerns the advocacy for the position that animals, or at least the animals most like humanity, are deserving of equal moral consideration. The second deals with variations linked to utilitarian thinking, namely scientific tests

18   Regan, T. (1975) ‘The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5: 181. See also Regan, T. (2004) The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press, California) 178–93; Regan, T. (1982) All that Dwell Within: Essays on Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics (University of California Press, Berkeley) 56; Naess, A. (1989) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 11. 19   As Darwin said, ‘there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties’:  Darwin, C. (1871) The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (Collier, New  York) 94–171. See generally Williams, C.  (2012) ‘The Consciousness Connection’ New Scientist (21 July) 33; Steeves, P. (2011) ‘Animal, Animal, Animal, Animal’ The New Centennial Review 11(2): 193; Phillips, H. (2006) ‘Known Unknowns’ New Scientist (16 December) 28; Brown, C. (2004) ‘Animal Minds’ New Scientist (12 June) 41; Mameli, M. (2006) ‘Animal Rights, Animal Minds and Human Misreading’ Journal of Medical Ethics 32(2):  84; Hauser, M. (2000) Mind Games:  What Animals Really Think (London, Penguin); Haldane, J. (1997) ‘Rational and Other Animals’ Philosophy 17; Diamond, J. (1991) The Rise and the Fall of the Third Chimpanzee (Radius, London) 125–73; Gardiner, G. (1990) ‘Between Two Worlds:  Humans in Nature and Culture’ Environmental Ethics 12:  339, 347; Midgley, M. (1980) The Beast and Man:  The Roots of Human Nature (Harvester, London) 25–6, 205; Rachels, J. (1987) ‘Darwin, Species and Morality’ Monist 70: 102; Pierce, C. (1994) People, Penguins and Plastic Trees: Basic Readings in Environmental Ethics (Wadsworth, London) 63–4, 70–1. 20   Taylor, P. (1986) Respect for Life: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton University Press, Princeton) 172–3, 273, 283, 292.

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upon sentient species, as well as welfare considerations. The third considers the application of intrinsic/inherent value.

A.  Near equal to humanity There has been a growing body of law in many countries which has attempted to change the moral and legal status of animals.21 In some instances, these attempts have been taken to the regional level. For example, the 1987 European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals recognized ‘that man has a moral obligation to respect all living creatures’ and also noted that pet animals have ‘a special relationship to man’.22 Despite such recognitions, and the developments in restraints in areas such as transport, culling, and scientific experimentation (as discussed below), there are currently no generic international legal documents which contain provisions consistent with the proposed Universal Declaration of the Rights of Animals.23 Rather, what exists in the international sphere has been a movement to provide an enhanced moral status for particular animals. The flagships in this area whales and great apes—are probably the most charismatic of all species, and which humanity tends to favour. Whales are a favoured speices, which many people believe are 'special', and therefore deserve a heightened status of moral concern. This argument can be traced back to Aristotle (384–322bc), who made some of the earliest recorded notations on the topic of whales and dolphins. These creatures, which were deemed possibly ‘the fastest of all animals both on sea and on land’, were somewhat of an enigma to Aristotle. The problem was that they seemed to exist in two different ecologies; that is, they lived in the water, but they breathed like land animals. They had a unique vocal ability and displayed mating and social patterns that were remarkably similar to humans. The relationship between mother and her offspring demonstrated to Aristotle ‘evidence of mildness and gentleness’ akin to that displayed by humans.24 With such considerations in mind, other Greeks, such as the second-century AD poet Opian of Cicilia, suggested that ‘the hunting of dolphins

21   For domestic applications, see Favre, D. (2011) Animal Law: Welfare Interests and Rights (Kluwer, The Netherlands). See also Wagman, B. (2009) Animal Law: Cases and Materials (Carolina Academic Press, Carolina). 22  European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, Preamble, reproduced in Rummel-Bulsks, I. (ed) (1992) Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment (Grotius, Cambridge) Vol 2, 404. 23   The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Animals begins with the principle that ‘All animals are born with an equal claim on life and the same rights to existence’. The Declaration was adopted by the International League of the Rights of Animals on 21 September 1977. London. It is reprinted in Magel, C.R. (1989) Animal Rights (Mansell, London) Appendix B. See generally Bowman, M. (1989) ‘The Protection of Animals Under International Law’ Connecticut Journal of International Law 2: 487. 24  Aristotle, Historia Animalium (‘HA’) (trans A.L. Peck and D.M. Balme, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, 1965) 504B, 17-26; 506B, 2-5; 566B, 10-15; 521B, 20-27; 535B, 32; 536A, 1-5; 540B, 20-24; 566B, 10, 15-24; 631A, 15, 17-20; 631A, 25-35.

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is immoral . . . for equally with human slaughter the gods abhor the death doom of the monarchs of the deep’.25 By the end of the twentieth century this idea had become common currency in a number of countries as environmental issues mushroomed, and whales often became a symbol of humanity’s wider mismanagement of nature. Because of this broader debate and changing views about the utilization of nature, arguments developed which suggested that whales should be treated differently to other animals because, as Victor Scheffer (1906–2004), the former chairperson of the United States Marine Mammal Commission, wrote: ‘whales are different’.26 This idea has appeared in a number of documents. For example, in 1993 a Resolution from the European Parliament expressing opposition to all commercial utilization of marine mammals stated that ‘whales are sentient mammals with a high level of intelligence and complex social and cultural activities’.27 This question of intelligence (or awareness and consciousness) has become a foremost consideration for many and has even been argued at the International Whaling Committee (IWC). In 1979 Panama suggested that the ‘high intelligence potential in the sperm whale’ should be an additional consideration for deliberation on the [then] proposed sanctuary.28 This suggestion coincided with an IWC co-sponsored conference on Cetacean Behaviour and Intelligence.29 The conference could not come to a conclusion on the question of whale intelligence because of ‘widely differing views’.30 The differing views break down into two camps: those who think that whales are intelligent (often linked to whales’ communication abilities and social networks—which lead some to believe that whales may even be trying to communicate with humans in some instances);31 and those who dismiss these claims, especially at the generic level.32 25   Noted in Scarff, J. (1977) ‘The International Management of Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment’ Ecology Law Quarterly 6: 343. 26   Scheffer, V. (1976) ‘The Status of Whales’ 29 Pacific Discovery 2, 8. See also D’Amato, A. and Chopra, S. (1991) ‘Whales:  Their Emerging Right to Life’ American Journal of International Law 85: 25. 27   Joint Motion for a Resolution (26 May 1993) DOC.EN/RE/228/228125, para B. 28   IWC (1980) 30th Report of the International Whaling Commission (IWC, Cambridge) 27. 29   ‘Proposal for Meeting on Cetacean Behaviour and Intelligence’, App 5; IWC (1980) 30th Report of the International Whaling Commission (IWC, Cambridge) 35. 30   IWC (1981) 31st Report of the International Whaling Commission (IWC, Cambridge) 24. 31   Anon (2013) ‘Remember My Whistle’ New Scientist (10 August) 7; Anon (2012) ‘Take That, Nemo. I Speak Human and I’m Real’ New Scientist (27 October) 14; Hooper, R. (2011) ‘Do Dolphins Have a Concept of Death?’ New Scientist (3 September) 10; Marshall, M. (2011) ‘Dolphins Call Each Other By Name’ New Scientist (10 September) 15; Campbell, M. (2011) ‘Learning to Speak Dolphin’ New Scientist (7 May) 23; Brakes, P. (2011) Whales and Dolphins: Cognition, Culture, Conservation and Human Perceptions (Arnold, London) 1–18, 23–34, 49–65; Young, E. (2007) ‘Dolphins Have a Word for It’ New Scientist (29 December) 10; Marino, L. (2007) ‘Cetacean Brains: How Aquatic are They?’ Anatomical Record 290(6): 694; Whitehead, H. (2004) ‘A Way with Whales’ New Scientist (15 May) 43; Morton, A. (2002) ‘Call of the Wild’ New Scientist (21 September) 46; Janik, V. (2001) ‘Cetacean Culture: Humans of the Sea?’ Behavioural and Brain Science 24(2): 337; Hecht, J. (2000) ‘Blind to the Big Blue’ European Journal of Neuroscience 13:  1520; Copley, J.  (2000) ‘Speaking in Whistles’ New Scientist (2 September) 7. See also the classic in this area: McIntyre, J. (1974) Mind in the Water (New York, Scribner) 69–70. 32   Skåre, M. (1994) ‘Whaling:  Sustainable Use of Natural Resources or a Violation of Animal Rights’ 36 Environment 31; Kallard, A. (1994) ‘Super Whale:  The Use of Myths and Symbols in

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Even some conservation-focused intergovernmental organizations, such as with the Parties operating under the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea and Mediterranean (ACCOBAMS), have come to the conclusion that cetacean interaction programmes should be viewed with great suspicion, as claims that the proponents make about cetaceans and humans having a special relationship that can benefit the human health often lack scientific foundations.33 The extremes of these dismissive views have come from the members of governments who wish to hunt whales. For example, in 1993 the Norwegian commissioner to the IWC called minke whales ‘rats of the sea’.34 Seven years later, a senior Japanese whaling official suggested that minke whales were the ‘cockroaches of the ocean’.35 The second international setting where debates about ‘heightened’ ethical standards for humanity and certain animal species have been evident concerns great apes. Efforts in this area have been largely driven by the similarities between humanities and many of seven species of great apes, which all share very similar brains. Some of the seven living species of great ape have complex and advanced intelligences which may, in some instances, trump that of humans. Great apes share similarities with humans in terms of empathy, embarrassment, love, forms of deception, the use of tools, and the ability to communicate with some humans, as well as genetic similarities. Such similarities have led many people to argue that these creatures deserve ‘special’ ethical treatment.36 The best example of an attempt to treat great apes ethically is the Great Ape Project, launched in 1994.37 This project, which had high-level support from a number of prominent scientists and philosophers, aims for the United Nations to endorse a Declaration on Great Apes, to fundamentally extend the long-standing recommendations not to use apes for non-essential scientific research, and to provide apes with three fundamental human liberties, namely the right to life, the right to protection of individual liberty, and the right to be protected from torture. However, despite the movement away from using great apes in scientific research, the Declaration failed to materialize. Moreover, the international instruments Environmentalism’, in High North Alliance; 11 Essays on Whale and Man (High North Alliance, Norway) 5, 7; Lynge, F. (1992) Arctic Wars: Animal Rights and Endangered Peoples (Dartmouth, New England) 24. 33   See ‘Dolphin Interaction Programmes’ Resolution 2006, 3.13. 34   MacKenzie, D. (1993) ‘Norway Declares War on the Minke Whale’ New Scientist (13 February) 9. 35   See Browne, A. (2001) ‘Global Ban on Whaling Faces its Severest Test’ Guardian Weekly 26 July; and Editorial, ‘Bloody Whaling’, in the same edition. 36   Bekoff, J. (2007) ‘Empathy’ New Scientist (26 May) 43; Anon (2007) ‘One Word’ New Scientist (4 August) 16; Hooper, R. (2007) ‘Chimps Beat People at Game’ New Scientist (8 December) 10; Anon (2007) ‘Handy With a Hammer’ New Scientist (17 February) 15; Anon (2007) ‘The Most Refined Ape?’ New Scientist (21 April) 17; Spinney, L. (2006) ‘A Chimp Knows’ New Scientist (10 June) 48; Anon (2005) ‘Gorilla Tool’ New Scientist (8 October) 20; Anon (2004) ‘Primate Brains’ New Scientist (13 March) 17; Ananthawamy, A. (2003) ‘Talking Chimp?’ New Scientist (4 January) 12; Beck, B. (2002) Great Apes and Humans (Smithsonian, Washington). 37  See . See also Bekoff, M. (1997) ‘The Great Ape Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals’ Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10(3): 269; Cavalieri, P. (1993) The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity (Fourth Estate, London).

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which have evolved in relation to great apes have consistently down-played any of the earlier ethical concerns in this area and have conservation as the primary focus. For example, originally two texts of international significance recognized the moral value of great apes. The 2005 Global Strategy for the Survival of the Great Apes and Their Habitat made great play (in the Annexes, not the text) of the genetic similarities and social and intellectual abilities of great apes.38 In addition, the Kinshasa Declaration on Great Apes recognized that these animals are a ‘flagship species’, which have an ‘intrinsic value . . . as part of the world’s natural heritage which we have a moral duty to conserve and share with future generations’.39 However, when the Gorilla Agreement was concluded in 2007, besides the central goal of preventing the extinction of gorillas, their only moral recognition was the note in the Preamble of the parties’ awareness ‘of the exceptional significance of great apes for the natural and cultural heritage of humankind’.40

B.  Utilization, no pain, and the welfare approach Within utilitarian thinking, the use of animals may be acceptable if no pain is involved and a greater overall benefit is achieved. In theoretical situations, killing animals may be acceptable if animals, in exemplary free-range settings (as opposed to factory farming, in which the costs to the animals will always exceed the benefits) have a full life and are then killed painlessly, fully utilized, and instantly replaced with at least the same number. The key to this equation is minimization of pain. Although in practice the utilitarian approach would most likely require people to become vegans, as opposed to just vegetarians, in many ways the basis of this argument—to reduce pain to the highest level possible (a welfare/humane-based focus) has become a cornerstone for much thinking about the moral considerability of animals. This approach is evident in many areas of international policy.41 Humane values are those that seek to reduce unnecessary pain inflicted upon animals. Humane considerations do not necessarily seek to prohibit the killing of animals, but rather to mitigate the cruelty that occurs with the killing and holding of animals. In this view, minimizing the pain is seen as the bottom line for the continued exploitation of animals.42 Within international law and policy, humane values may be divided into transportation, indiscriminate capture, and a series of species-specific examples. First, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna

  Global Strategy for the Survival of Great Apes and their Habitat, Annex, para 10-12.   Kinshasa Declaration on Great Apes 2005, Preamble. 40   Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats 2007, Preamble. 41   Steiner, G. (2011) ‘Justice Towards Animals Demands Veganism’ Australia Humanities Review 11: 51; Garner, R. (2008) ‘The Politics of Animal Rights’ British Politics 3(1): 110; Johnson, L.E. (1991) A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 47–9, 53; Cave, G.P. (1982) ‘Animals and the Right to Life’ Environmental Ethics 4: 249. 42   Francione, G. (2010) ‘Animal Welfare and the Moral Value of Nonhuman Animals’ Law, Culture and Humanities 6(1): 24. 38 39

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(CITES) has called for ‘humane care’ in a number of resolutions. The parties have been rigorous with regard to enforcing regulation on the cross-border transport of CITES-listed species because the language of the Convention obliges all the parties to ‘minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment’.43 From the outset, this obligation has been a concern among many Convention parties, and guidelines for transport have been generated to help monitor ‘undue stress’ placed upon animals during transit. Similar guidelines have been developed regionally (such as within Europe)44 and internationally by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). The OIE Guidelines state that the amount of time animals spend in transit should be as minimal as possible and that each part of the journey should be buttressed by detailed management considerations to ensure that the welfare of the animals are met.45 The necessity to minimize avoidable suffering by animals when killing them is also a common goal of hunters. This goal is clearly reflected in documents such as the European Charter on Hunting and Biodiversity.46 It was also emphasized at the 2004 Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, when the Addis Ababa Principles were adopted. The Principles specifically recognized that, when optimizing benefits from biodiversity, ‘more efficient ethical and humane use of wild fauna and flora within local and national contexts’ should be promoted.47 This followed the IUCN Sustainable Use Principles, which specify that any sustainable use should, inter alia, provide for the protection of wild animals from avoidable cruelty and suffering.48 With regards to international instruments of note, the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty states that ‘all taking of native mammals and birds shall be done in the manner which involves the least degree of pain and suffering practicable’.49 The importance of causing minimal pain, when releasing animals which have been unintentionally caught in nets, can be found in regimes dealing with turtles50 and dolphins.51 Large-scale terrestrial management regimes restricting hunting methods which are both indiscriminate and inhumane date back to the 1900 Convention Designed to Ensure the Conservation of Various Species of Wild Animals in Africa. Similar prohibitions were repeated, and expanded, for 43   CITES, Art III.4.b. See also Arts III.5.c, III.2.c, IV.2.c, IV.5.b, IV.6.b, VIII.3. See also Resolutions 3:16, 4:21, 5:18, 9:23, 10:20, 10:21; and Decisions 12:85, 13:88, 14:58, and 14:59. 44   See, for example, the Preamble to and Art 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals During International Transport. 45  The OIE Guidelines can be found in the Report of the Fourth Meeting of the OIE Working Group on Animal Welfare (2005). For discussion, see Anon (2004) ‘Welfare Worry’ New Scientist (28 February) 2. 46   See European Charter on Hunting and Biodiversity, Principle 10. Available from the Berne Convention, T-PVS (2007) 7. 47   ‘Sustainable Use’, UNEP/CBD/COP/7/L17. 48   IUCN (1990) ‘Conservation of Wildlife Through Wise Use as a Natural Resource’, Resolution 24. 49   Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991, Art 3(5), (6). 50   Inter-American Convention for the Protection of Sea Turtles 1996, Art IV2h. 51   Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program 1998, Art 5(b), Annex VIII 3.d.

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subsequent regional conservation agreements in Africa, Asia, and Europe.52 A good example of the overlap between indiscriminate methods of capture and humane considerations is steel-jaw leg-hold traps. At the end of the twentieth century, following clear intentions of the European Community to prohibit the importation of animals caught in such traps, two agreements with Canada and Russia, and the United States were established. The agreements with Canada and the Russian Federation were very specific in their prescriptions of trap standards with which the parties had to comply. The Agreement on Humane Trapping Standards begins by recalling the parties’ ‘deep commitment to the development of international humane trapping standards’.53 The parties to the 1957 Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals agreed to: [S]‌eek to ensure the utilization of those methods for the capture and killing and marking of fur seals on land or at sea which will spare the fur seals pain and suffering to the greatest extent practicable.54

Similar goals for the humane killing of seals can be found in regional Conventions in 1972,55 1976,56 1990,57 and especially within Europe, which has insisted upon high standards in this area for the importation of seal pelts.58 The prohibition of both indiscriminate and inhumane killing of birds began in a bilateral sense with the 1875 Declaration for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, which outlawed the use of poison and narcotics to catch birds. Similar restrictions were reiterated in 1902, before the 1950 International Convention for the Protection of Birds stipulated that certain methods were prohibited which would cause mass killing of birds ‘or cause them unnecessary suffering’. With such considerations in mind, the Convention listed a series of prohibited methods, including the particularly cruel use of ‘blinded decoy birds’.59 Similar principles and restrictions on hunting methods were followed by the regional Conventions in Europe and Africa,60 as well as by the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatross and Petrels, which stipulated that, when dealing with albatrosses or petrels which could not be rescued, ‘humane killing, by duly authorized persons, to end the suffering of seriously injured or moribund albatrosses or petrels’ would be permissible. The accompanying Action Plan suggested that, when removing or eradicating 52   See Convention Designed to Ensure the Conservation of Various Species of Wild Animals in Africa 1900, Art 16 and Annex VI. See also Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. 53  (1988) International Legal Materials 37: 532. 54   Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Seals 1957, Art IX (3). 55   Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, Art 3.1 and Annex, section 7. 56   Convention for the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals 1976. 57   Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea 1990, Art VI.2. 58   Anon (2010) ‘Ban on Imports of Seal Products Reinstated in EU’ Traffic Bulletin 23(1) 10; Wilkins, D. (1997) Animal Welfare in Europe: European Legislation and Concerns (The Netherlands, Kluwer) 68–74. 59   International Convention for the Protection of Birds 1950, Art 5. 60  Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds 1995, Annex 3, Action Plan 2.1.1, points 4.1.5, 4.1.8. Note also the African Convention 2003, Art 9(3) and Annex III.

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non-native species, measures taken ‘should satisfy to the extent feasible, humane and environmental considerations’.61 Similar humane considerations can also be found in the FAO’s International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Long-line Fisheries. The final example of humane killing objectives in international environmental law is the International Whaling Commission. In this forum, the objective to reduce both pain and time to death for hunted cetaceans goes back to the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea, which suggested that the killing of all marine life should be done with the intention of sparing them suffering ‘to the greatest extent possible’.62 Most of the countries within the International Whaling Commission have attempted to find ways to reduce the time to death for whales caught in either commercial or subsistence whaling, continually moving towards more modern primary and secondary killing techniques (primarily for large, but also sometimes small whales) which reduce the time to death. The exception is the indigenous hunting of cetaceans, to which modern humane standards do not apply; traditional hunting methods can result in deaths closer to an average of about 45 minutes, as opposed to approximately 90 seconds for commercial hunting.63

C.  Lethal scientific experiments using animals The utilitarian goal intends to maximize benefit over loss. Thus, an optimal policy for a utilitarian could be one which allows some suffering or pain to animals provided the best overall result is achieved with the least possible suffering. With regards to the use of animals for scientific experiments, this means that if there are no alternatives to the use of animals, the benefit is clear, and the amount of animals used and associated pain in testing must be kept to a minimum; and, fundamentally, if the greatest good for the greatest number is reached, then experimentation may not be morally wrong.64 In practice, the necessity of experimentation upon animals to achieve scientific benefits remains controversial in the twenty-first century. At one end of the spectrum are those who claim that nearly all experimentation is beneficial and has resulted in great achievements for humanity, including the eradication of many infectious diseases and increased lifespan for humans through scientific advancements. This view suggests that most scientific breakthroughs in this area would not have occurred without research upon animals. Those who are opposed to animal experimentation are quick to point out that there are often large gaps in the knowledge derived from these experiments which may render the results near worthless.   Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels, Art III.5, Action Plan 1.4.2.   See UN Doc.A/CONF.13/L.56 (1958).   See Gillespie, A. (2005) Whaling Diplomacy (Edward Elgar, London) Ch 8. 64   Clune, C. (1996) ‘Biomedical Testing on Non-Human Animals: An Attempt at a Reproachment Between Utilitarianism and Theories of Inherent Value’ Monist 79(2): 230; Regan, T. (1988) The Case for Animal Rights (Routledge, London) 210, 229, 392–3; Singer, P. (1993) Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 66–8. 61 62 63

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The specific problems that supposedly make many of the experiments invalid include the artificial induction of diseases, confusion of background variables, and the fundamental biological differences between species. Most notably, thalidomide was marketed as a sedative after extensive animal trials, only to be subsequently found to have teratogenic effects upon pregnant women—although interestingly the compound in mice that protected them from thalidomide has proved to be a powerful anti-cancer agent.65 The truth is probably somewhere in between the rhetoric of the two extremes. What appears compelling is the list of claimed achievements linked to animal experimentation from which many people (and other species) have benefited. These include immunization with vaccines, antiseptic surgery, anaesthetics, insulin for diabetes, antibiotics, transplantation, and a vast array of medicines for illnesses from asthma to ulcers. Animal experimentation may also be essential for future breakthroughs in research into cancer, heart disease, AIDS, and a large number of genetic, neurological, and mental disorders. Given these considerations, few people are willing to forgo such benefits to humanity, despite the unpleasant consequences for laboratory animals. This realization can be traced to the 1875 British Royal Commission which was responsible for the first animal experimentation legislation in the world. The Commission argued for the necessity ‘to reconcile the needs of science with the just claims of humanity’.66 Under the UK’s Cruelties to Animals Act 1876, experiments on animals were only permitted if they were likely to engender: The advancement by new discovery of physiological knowledge or of knowledge which will be useful for saving or prolonging life, or alleviating suffering, or the acquisition of such knowledge by persons attending lectures in medical schools, hospitals and elsewhere.67

Whether animal experimentation produces sufficient contributions to society remains the common ethical yardstick in legislation all over the world in the twenty-first century. Similarly, the ability of countries to undertake scientific research on species protected under international law is recognized in a number of treaties. From such a basis, many modern societies require careful scrutiny (and the creation of associated processes, such as external review and avoidance of conflicts of interest) of the purported benefits of animal experiments, and the allowance of such science. Even then, such research is permitted only if it is ‘essential’ and produces a direct benefit to humanity. Exactly what is essential, and not trivial, depends on each society. Thus, some prohibit lethal scientific research for the purposes of cosmetics. Even if testing is deemed important for social needs, the debate continues into how the animals used in such experimentation can be reconciled with pushes for efficiency. The efficiencies in this area are known as the ‘Three R’s’, namely to

  Anon (2008) ‘Why Thalidomide Spared Mouse Pups’ New Scientist (15 November) 16.   Stated in Hampson, J. (1989) ‘Animal Experimentation:  Practical Dilemmas and Solutions’, in D. Patterson and M. Palmer (eds), The Status of Animals:  Ethics, Education and Welfare (CAB International, Oxford) 100. 67   Cruelties to Animals Act 1876, s 3(1). 65 66

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reduce (move to the absolute minimum of number of animals involved), refine (to reduce unnecessary pain and utilization of animals), and replace (move towards non-lethal scientific research). The ‘Three R’s’ have been incorporated into legislation and policy guidance all over the world.68 For example, Agenda 21 from the 1992 Earth Summit, while calling for the establishment of ‘principles, codes of practice and guidelines’69 in this area, added that it was necessary to promote ‘research on, and validation of, methods constituting a replacement for those testing [upon] animals’.70 International conservation law contains a number of examples where unfettered scientific exceptions, on species of conservation concern, have been curtailed. This practice can be traced to the 1902 Convention on Birds Useful to Agriculture which, although containing exceptions for scientific research, only allowed scientific utilization for ‘single instances and after taking all measures of precaution necessary to prevent any abuse of the same’.71 After this point and continually through the twentieth century, when wildlife conservation treaties were concluded it was common to list the exceptions to scientific experimentation on animals, which experimentation could not be carried out if it threatened the conservation status of the particular species. This principle became evident with migratory birds, turtles, bats, and seals.72 When the (Madrid) Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctica Treaty came into force, the parties went even further by stipulating that a permit to take a specially protected species could only be granted if it was for a compelling scientific purpose. In addition, it had to be shown that the research would not jeopardize the survival or recovery of that species or local population and that ‘the use of lethal techniques on specially protected species’ would only be permitted where there was ‘no suitable alternative technique’.73 It is in large part due to the adoption of such restraints in other areas, such as with the Japanese take of more than 8,000 whales over a 30-year programme under the label of scientific research, that led to Australia and New Zealand taking Japan to the International Court of Justice in 2013. The basis of their concern was that the research was 68   See Gillespie, A. (2011) Conservation, Biodiversity and International Law (Edward Elgar, London) Ch 11; Fano, A. (1997) Lethal Laws: Animal Testing, Human Health and Environmental Policy (Books, London) 50–68; ICSU (1996) ICSU Statement of Principles for the Use of Animals in Research and Education (Geneva, ICSU); Webster, J. (1994) Animal Welfare: A Cool Eye Towards Eden (London, Blackwell) 229–234; Balls, M. (1994) ‘Replacement of Animal Procedures: Alternatives in Research, Education and Testing’ Laboratory Animals 28: 193–211; Sharpe, R. (1988) Cruel Deception: The Use of Animals in Medical Research (Thorsons, London) 72–3, 86–92, 105–7; Russell, W.M.S. and Burch, R.L. (1959) The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique (Allen & Unwin, London). 69   Agenda 21, ss 31.1, 31.9. 70   ‘Environmentally Sound Management of Toxic Chemicals’, Ch 19, Agenda 21, para 19.21(b). For the European context, see Council Directive 86/609/EEC on the protection of animals used for experimental purpose. 71   Convention on Birds Useful to Agriculture 1902, Art VII. 72   Gillespie, A. (2011) Conservation, Biodiversity and International Law (Edward Elgar, London) Ch 11. 73  Madrid Protocol, Annex II, Arts 3, 5(9). See (2009) ‘Amended Version of Annex II to the Environmental Protocol’, Measure 16.

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neither important nor necessary, and what was required could be obtained through non-lethal means.74 This point of alternative techniques is particularly important, as this is the lead-in to development and promotion of non-lethal scientific techniques over lethal techniques. This approach is evident within international agreements pertaining to the Convention on Migratory Species Agreement which relates to seals75 and cetaceans. The Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea and Mediterranean (ACCOBAMS) only allows for scientific research which utilizes ‘non-lethal in-situ research aimed at maintaining a favorable conservation status for cetaceans’.76 The Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas (ASCOBANS) also places a premium on non-lethal research and emphasizes that, although scientific research is very important, ‘the studies should exclude the killing of animals and include the release in good health of animals captured for research’.77 The same premium on non-lethal research was followed in the Agreement Concerning the Creation of a Marine Mammal Sanctuary in the Mediterranean.78 A final point to note here is the restrictions on the use of certain animals based on their similarities to humanity, namely great apes. Developments in this area are traceable to the early 1970s, since which time a number of countries have introduced restrictions on the types of scientific research, if any, that can be carried out on great apes, which have subsequently become the foremost species of concern in this area. For example, in New Zealand, testing or teaching involving great apes now requires specific government approval and must demonstrate that any likely benefits are not outweighed by harm to the individual animal. The United States took a similar step with its Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance and Protection Act of 2000. This law prohibits the routine euthanasia of chimpanzees that are no longer needed for medical research and commits the federal government to funding their lifetime care in sanctuaries. In Europe, the British government banned the use of great apes in biomedical research in 1997. Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands have all followed suit. In 2007, the European Parliament declared that all experimentation on non-human primates in Europe should stop, while in 2012, a bill in the United States Senate called for a general ban on all scientific research on great apes which had negative health implications, unless it was necessary in individual cases for research into a new or re-emerging disease. The following year, the National Institute of Health of the United States announced it

74   For a full discussion of the merits in this debate, including both the science and the politics within the International Whaling Commission, see Gillespie, A. (2005) Whaling Diplomacy (Edward Elgar, London) Ch 6. 75   Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea 1990, Art VI.2. 76   ACCOBAMS Treaty, Art 2(2). 77   ASCOBANS ‘Action Plan’, Pt 2; (2003) ‘Further Implementation of ASCOBANS’ Resolution 4.8. 78   Agreement Concerning the Creation of a Marine Mammal Sanctuary in the Mediterranean, Art 7.

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was likely to slash medical research on chimpanzees—following a 2011 report that such research was unnecessary.79

4.  Inherent value in all individual living entities The alternate route to the enhanced moral considerability of animals is through their recognition as having an inherent value equal to humans. The basis of this suggestion—that both are the ‘subject of a life’—as the threshold of moral concern is that anything which is not an animal has only instrumental value. The difficulty that this extension of ethical concern to all animals produces is that in as much as limiting inherent value only to humans is arbitrary, so too is restricting the recognition of inherent value only to species which share similar characteristics, such as sentience or cognition. A non-arbitrary, ethically consistent position is to recognize inherent value in all living species, including insects and plants, and seek to further their own good via pursuit of their own existence. This is especially so because sentience, cognition, or possession of qualities that allow entities to experience existence are ancillary to life—and are not the end in themselves.80 This suggests that it is the goal of life, rather than the capacity to experience pleasure and pain, that should be the criterion of moral considerability. Accordingly, the ethical focus should be located in natural (as opposed to self-recreating machines), autonomous, regenerating individuals (as opposed to wholes, like ecosystems) which are alive, even if they are not conscious or cognizant of why they seek to exist. Thus, all living individuals have an inherent value, independent of their instrumental value to humans.81 Accordingly, as Holmes Rolston (1932–) suggested: 79   Anon (2013) ‘US Chimps Retire’ New Scientist (2 February) 4; Anon (2012) ‘Bill to Ban Ape Research’ New Scientist (4 August) 5; Anon (2007) ‘Spare the Apes’ New Scientist (15 September) 4; Douglas, K.  (2007) ‘Just Like Us’ New Scientist (2 June) 46; Anon (2003) ‘Fury Over Primate Decision’ New Scientist (29 November) 5; Coghlan, A. (2002) ‘Animal Experiments on Trial’ New Scientist (23 November) 5, 16–17; Blum, D (1994) The Monkey Wars (Oxford University Press, Oxford); Nowak, R. (1999) ‘Almost Human’ New Scientist (13 February) 20. 80  McCrone, J.  (2006) ‘Smarter than the Average Bug’ New Scientist (27 May) 37; Philips, H. (2002). ‘Plants: Not Just A Pretty Face’. New Scientist. July 27. 39–42; Vines, G. (2001) ‘Other Minds’ New Scientist (30 June) 45. 81   The modern thought experiment used to justify this position poses the question whether or not the last person on the planet should destroy the last tree before they die. The decision, for most, to let the tree live, suggests a recognition of value independent of the human. See Elliot, R. (1996) ‘Facts about Natural Values’ Environmental Values 5(3): 221; Yorek, N. (2009) ‘Are Animals More Alive than Plants? Animistic Anthropocentric Construction of Life Concepts’ Journal of Mathematics, Science and Technology Education 5(4):  369; Elliot, R. (1996) ‘Facts about Natural Values’ Environmental Values 5(3): 221; Kaufman, F. (1994) ‘Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality’ Environmental Ethics 16: 57; Rolston, H. (1993) ‘Rights and Responsibilities on the Home Planet’ Yale Journal of International Law 18: 251, 263–5; O’Neill, J. (1993) Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (Routledge, London) 8–13; Johnson, L.E. (1991) A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 138–45; Bormann, F.H. (1991) Ecology, Economics Ethics: The Broken Circle (Yale University Press, New York) 73–80; Fox, W. (1990) Towards a Transpersonal Ecology:  Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Shambhala, London) 164–5; Cahen, H. (1988) ‘Against the Moral Considerability of Ecosystems’ Environmental Ethics 10: 208; Scherer, D. (1988) ‘A Disenthropic Ethic’ Monist 71: 6; Scherer, D. (1983) Ethics and the Environment (Random House, New York) 82–9; Taylor, P. (1986) Respect for Nature: A Theory of

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So the oak grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds and resists death. The physical state that the organism seeks, idealised in its programmatic form, is a valued state. Value is present in this achievement. A life is defended for what it is in itself. . . [thus] a really vital ethic respects all life, not just animal pains and pleasures, much less just human preferences.82

Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965) is usually credited with the initial advocacy of this life-oriented approach. His basic rule was that ‘it is good to maintain and promote life; it is bad to destroy life or obstruct it’.83 He added: A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life, which he is able to assist, and shrinks from injuring anything that lives. He does not ask how far this or that life deserves one’s sympathy as being valuable, nor beyond that, whether and to what degree it is capable of feeling. Life as such is sacred to him. [An ethical person would rip] no leaf, pluck no flower and crush no insect.84

5.  Inherent value in international law and policy The language of inherent/intrinsic value for all living things, not just animals, is an argument which became convincing for many legislators, domestically and internationally, from the late 1970s. For example, following the excellent guidance of Sir Geoffrey Palmer (1942–) the idea of the importance of the intrinsic value of nature as a key part of understanding sustainable development was written into all three pieces of key environmental legislation in New Zealand, for pursuing conservation, protection of the environment, and resource management.85 Such domestic recognition was in broad accordance with the international developments at this time, such as the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, recognizing in its Preamble that wild fauna and flora has intrinsic value. In 1980 the World Conservation Strategy, in its preface to Chapter 18, pronounced that: Environmental Ethics (Princeton University Press, Oxford) 100, 119–25; Attfield, R. (1983) The Ethics of Environmental Concern (Blackwell, Oxford) 51–3, 142–7; Rolston, H. (1983) ‘Values Gone Wild’ Inquiry 26: 191; Lehmann, S. (1981) ‘Do Wildernesses Have Rights?’ Environmental Ethics 3: 137; Attfield, R. (1981) ‘The Good of Trees’ Journal of Value Inquiry 15: 45; Taylor, P. (1981) ‘The Ethics of a Respect for Nature’ Environmental Ethics 3: 197, 206; Goodpaster, K.E. (1978) ‘On Being Morally Considerable’ Journal of Philosophy 75: 310. 82   Rolston, H. (1992) ‘Challenges in Environmental Ethics’, in D. Cooper (ed), The Environment in Questions: Ethics and Global Issues. (Routledge, London) 135, 137–8. See also Rolston, H. (1994) ‘Value in Nature and the Nature of Value’, in R. Attfield (ed), Philosophy and the Natural Environment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 70–90; Rolston, H. (1991) ‘Values and Duties to the Natural World’, in F.H. Bormann and S.R. Keller (eds), Ecology, Economics, Ethics: The Broken Circle (Yale University Press, New York) 73, 93. 83   Schweitzer, A. (1929) Civilisation and Ethics (Black, London) 246. 84   Schweitzer, A. (1961) Out of My Life and Thought (Henry Holt, New  York) 225, 230, 247. See also Goodin, D. (2007) ‘Schweitzer Reconsidered:  The Applicability of Reverence for Life as Environmental Philosophy’ Environmental Ethics 30(4): 401. 85   See New Zealand Environment Act 1986; New Zealand Conservation Act 1987; and Resource Management Act 1991. See Palmer, G. (1990) Environmental Politics: A Greenprint for New Zealand (McIndoe, Dunedin) 100–4.

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A new ethic, embracing plants and animals as well as people, is required from human societies to live in harmony with the natural world on which they depend for survival and well-being. The long term task of environmental education is to foster or reinforce attitudes compatible with this new ethic.86

Two years later, the World Charter for Nature added: Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and to accord other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action.87

In 1986 the Declaration of Fontainbleau, adopted at the fortieth anniversary of the IUCN, emphasized the importance of a new moral code that reflects ‘a respect for life in all its forms’.92 The following year, the World Commission on Environment and Development recognized that ‘the case for the conservation of nature should rest not only with development goals. It is part of our moral obligation to other living beings. . . ’.88 This view, that all parts of living nature have an ethical value independent of their value to humanity, and are not worthless if they have no instrumental value, was recognized at the 1992 Earth Summit when Agenda 21 noted: Increased ethical awareness in environmental and developmental decision-making should help to place appropriate priorities for the maintenance and enhancement of life-support systems for their own sake.89

In addition, the Preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity recognised the ‘intrinsic value of biological diversity’.90 In 2012, those present at the Earth Summit+20 reaffirmed the intrinsic value of biological diversity.91

6. Conclusion A number of theorists have argued that non-anthropocentric approaches should be adopted. At the forefront of this effort have been the efforts to extend moral consideration to animals and, separately, all living individual entities. Enhanced moral considerability of animals derives from arguments based around either utilitarian interpretations or inherent/intrinsic value. Both of these arguments produce a framework that draws on thinking which builds around ideas common within inter-human activities. The argument for the moral consideration of all other living individual entities comes from an extension of similar arguments around inherent/intrinsic value.   World Conservation Strategy, Ch 18, para 1.   World Charter for Nature, Annex. 88   World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 57. 89   Agenda 21, UNCED Doc.A/CONF. 151/4, section 31.8. Also reprinted in Johnson, S.P. (ed) The Earth Summit (Graham and Trotman, London, 1993). 90   Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble, para 1. 91  Rio+20, The Future We Want, A/CONF.216/XX, para 197. 86 87

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In both instances, inroads have been made into international law. However, the largest adoption has been the recognition that all species have a moral—intrinsic—value independent of humanity. This idea is now clearly recognized in multiple regimes. This is not the case with attempts to extend the moral considerability of animals. Here, despite attempts to focus only upon the most charismatic of species with the greatest emotional relationships with humanity—great apes and cetaceans—there is no recognized moral equivalence to humans. Although moral equivalence for animals cannot be found in international law, it is possible to highlight areas where restraints in the way animals may be used have been imposed. The two areas where this is evident are with welfare/humane considerations and the use of animals in scientific experiments (and the need to replace, reduce, and refine). These two areas clearly reflect a growing ethic in which, in both cases, it is permissible to use animals, but this should not be done without basic restraints coming into play, as the animals are a subject of moral, although not fundamental, concern.

X Species and Ecosystems 1. Introduction Although the arguments for the enhanced moral consideration of animals and/ or all individual living things are clear advances in terms of trying to expand the circle of ethical considerations outside of anthropocentric considerations, in other areas, these non-anthropocentric approaches also raise two difficult questions that need attention. These questions relate to where this type of ethical thinking ends up because of what it includes; and where it ends up because of what it excludes. In terms of inclusion, as was shown with the increasingly common recognition that all living things have intrinsic value, the question has to be asked that, besides the philosophical niceties of a new label that it is seen as valuable, what has really changed? The answer is nothing because the recognition of everything having an equal intrinsic value does not provide any guidance on how to act. If everything is of equal value it becomes impossible to weigh the needs of one entity with inherent value against those of another with equal inherent value because, in theory, if inherent value is equal, there is no difference between that of a fly and that of a human. In such a moral context, if everything is equal and everything should be respected, human existence could gridlock as people should not harm anything that is living. Humans would end up living like the early Pythagorean disciples, waiting for fruit to fall from a tree before eating it. In this way all life is respected and basic needs are met. This is an impractical suggestion in a world of seven, soon to be nine, billion people. To avoid this impractical situation, the more likely outcome is that an arbitrary preference is given to the needs of humans over all other species with inherent value. In such a situation, the primacy of humanity remains.1 In terms of exclusion, the theoretical difficulty with ethics that only focus upon animals and/or individual living entities is that they fail to provide direct ethical guidance on things which are not alive, but are obviously important, such as the 1  Aaltola, E. (2010) ‘Animal Ethics and the Argument from Absurdity’ Environmental Values 19(1): 79; Attfield, R. (1993) ‘Sylvan, Fox and Deep Ecology: A View from the Continental Shelf ’ Environmental Values 2: 21, 24–5; Regan, T. (1988) The Case for Animal Rights (Routledge, London) 243; Birch, C. and Cobb, J. (1985) The Liberation of Life (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 149. Hughes, J. (1980) ‘The Environmental Ethics of the Pythagoreans’ Environmental Ethics 2: 195.

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species and/or ecosystems in which individual living entities exist. In this worldview, while species have no direct value (as they are not alive or self aware, nor can they feel pleasure or pain), ecosystems have a higher instrumental value because, without them, individuals fail to exist. To many theorists, approaches based on individual entities are absurd, as ecosystems are the basis of existence on Earth. Keeping other species from extinction is therefore the obvious goal given the current extinction spasm of other species, in as much as we strive to keep our own species in existence. It is these considerations—the protection of endangered species and ecosystems—that are now most common in international environmental law. However, neither system is perfect, and in both instances humanity remains at the centre of the moral equation.

2.  Extinction and endangered species According to the Biosafety Protocol, as long as an organism is ‘capable of transferring or replicating genetic material’ it is alive.2 When an individual organism is no longer so capable, it is considered dead. When this incapacity covers all of the individuals within a species, that species is considered extinct. Extinction is the failure of a species to maintain itself through reproduction. Aside from some scientific curiosities such as cloning or rebuilding extinct species via stored DNA, extinction is the end point for the existence of a species—as in the totality of the individuals. Extinction is complete when the last individual of that particular species has died. Humanity, as Charles Darwin (1809–1882) noted, liked to ‘invent laws on the duration of the forms of life’.3 The problem is that there are no such laws. The evidence suggests that extinction is not rare, slow, or of minimal implications for surrounding species. As it stands, approximately 99.9 per cent of all species that have ever existed on Earth are now extinct. Extinction is very much a process which is part of nature, with extinction processes dating back some 650 million years when the first skeletonized creatures left their bodies as fossilized evidence. Since then, there have been at least a further 14 major extinction spasms. These have been divided into first (greater) and second (lower) order extinctions. The first order of extinctions is classified as greater extinctions because they completely reorganized the ecosystems in the sea and on the land by extinguishing as much as 50 per cent of all then available species. The average lifetime of a species is somewhere between 1 and 15 million years. Marine species tend to persist for longer than terrestrial species. The last mass extinction terminated 50 per cent of all species on the planet, including 15 per cent of all marine families, and the dinosaurs, who had ruled as undisputed evolutionary monarchs for 120 million years. This leads to the important point that in terms of the evolution of the total number of species on Earth, although each extinction is catastrophic for the species concerned, for the genetic   Biosafety Protocol, Art 3(h).   Darwin (1859) The Origins of Species (Hall, London) 53.

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pool of total species on the planet as a whole it can be a vital ingredient in the future evolution of other species. This is because a greater number of species appear to come back after each extinction than existed before it, although this process is typically very slow.4 Nevertheless, the current rates of extinction are a very large concern. The 2002 statement from the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity to the preparatory committees for the World Summit on Sustainable Development stated that ‘the rate of biodiversity loss is increasing at an unprecedented rate, threatening the very existence of life as it is currently understood’.5 Following on from the previous five mass extinctions in the Earth’s history, the current extirpation process is known to many scholars as ‘the sixth extinction’. It is suggested that the sixth extinction may be the greatest yet, eradicating more individual species than the first and second events combined, with up to one in ten species disappearing by the year 2100.6 The current extinction process is different to earlier ones because of the speed with which it is occurring, the breadth of coverage, and the uniqueness of the agent of change (humanity). In terms of speed, the current extinction spasm is happening at a rate much faster than previously: That is, the first major extinction spasm took ten million years to complete, the second took thousands of years, and the current one a couple of hundred years. In terms of breadth, current rates of extinctions are higher than the non-anthropogenic extinction rates within recent geological time (that is, without incorporating previous mass extinctions). The background rate is meant to be one mammal species every 400 years and one bird species every 200 years. When mass extinctions are factored in, it appears that the rate of extinction is roughly one species every one and one-ninth years. Conversely, the current rate of extinction may be somewhere between 50 and 10,000 times in excess of the earlier extinction spasms. Estimates in 2010 suggested that the extinction rate was more than 100 extinctions per million species per year, and rising. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment put the current extinction rate at 1,000 times higher than was previously typical over Earth’s history.7 4   Le Page, M. (2010) ‘After the Fall’ New Scientist (24 April) 38; Pringle, H. (2007) ‘Firestorm from Space Wiped Out Prehistoric Americans’ New Scientist (26 May) 8; Ravilious, K.  (2004) ‘Chromosome Clock Ticks Out Our Fate’ New Scientist (10 April) 9; Anon (2003) ‘Impact Caused Mass Wipeout’ New Scientist (29 November) 15; Jablonski, D. (1991) ‘Extinctions:  A  Paleontolo gist’s Perspective’ Science 253:  754; Frankel, O.H (1981) Conservation and Evolution (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 11–14; Gould, S. (1985) The Flamingo’s Smile:  Reflections in Natural History (Norton, New York) 231. 5  Convention on Biological Diversity (2002) ‘Annex to the Hague Ministerial Declaration’, Decision 6.21. 6   Leakey, R. (1995) The Sixth Extinction: Biodiversity and its Survival (Phoenix, New York) 240– 3; Anon (2011) ‘And Goodbye Species’ New Scientist (16 July) 5; Nitecki, H. (1984) Extinctions (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 21–68. 7   WWF (2008) Living Planet Index (WWF, London); Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) Ecosystems and Human Well Being: The Biodiversity Synthesis (World Resources Institute, Washington) 3–4. The 2010 figure is from Pearce, F. (2010) ‘Earth’s Nine Lives’ New Scientist (27 February) 33; World Conservation Monitoring Centre (1992) Global Biodiversity (Chapman & Hall, New York) 196–7; Raup, D. (1986) ‘Biological Extinction in Earth History’ Science 231: 35; Jablonski, D. (1986) ‘Background Rates and Mass Extinctions’ Science 231: 129.

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Each of these species going (or recently gone) extinct shares similar traits to humanity, in that they have struggled to evolve and exist over millions of years, on the same planet as us. In this way we have much in common, and this commonality can spark a type of empathy in some people. For others, moral concern arises from the fact that humanity is responsible for the current situation, in that the current extinction spasm is different (in terms of agent, speed, and breadth). Changes from the other extinction patterns means that humanity—as the only species capable of a moral reaction—necessitates a different response. In particular, because of our own involvement in the current spasm, it is not possible to attempt to excuse it as a ‘natural’ process, for which we have no ethical responsibilities. Accordingly, the ethical goal should be to ensure that all species with which humanity shares the planet should continue to exist, even if they are very dangerous to humanity (including diseases). The goal is to keep all species in existence, and prevent them falling into levels of endangerment. It is this goal which is the most identifiable non-anthropocentric conservation aim in international environmental law.8

3.  Endangered species in law and policy The recognition in international environmental law of the need to protect endangered species dates back to the turn of the twentieth century. For example, the 1900 Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa had five Schedules. Schedule I  listed animals whose preservation was desired to ensure their usefulness or ‘on account of their rarity and threatened extermination’. Such regional obligations continued to proliferate during the twentieth century. For example, the 1979 (Berne) Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habits Convention begins with the recognition that numerous species of wild flora and fauna are being seriously depleted and that some are threatened with extinction. In an attempt to stop this problem, the parties to the Convention have the objective of promoting national policies for the conservation of wild flora and fauna, with particular attention being given to endangered and vulnerable species, especially those that are endemic.9 Similar regional conservation agreements 8   MacKenzie, D.  (2011) ‘Flaw Detected in Extinction Rates’ New Scientist (21 May) 8; Mann, C. (1996) Noah’s Choice: The Future of Endangered Species (Knopf, New York) 53–81; Callicott, J.B. (1989) In Defence of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Random House, New York) 57; Callicott, J.B. (1987) Companion to a Sand County Almanac: Interpretative Essays (University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin) 186–200; Norton, B.G. (1986) The Preservation of Species (Princeton University Press, New  York) 173, 179–84; Elliot, D.K (1986) Dynamics of Extinction (Wiley, New  York) 165–80; Cuaron, A. (1993) ‘Extinction Rate Estimates’ Nature 366:  118; Smith, F.D. (1993) ‘Estimating Extinction Rates’ Nature 364:  494; Edwards, S.R. (1995) ‘Conserving Biodiversity:  Resources for Our Future’, in R. Bailey (ed), The True State of the Planet (Free Press, New York) 211–22; Raup, D. (1995) ‘Here Are Only Numbers Ratified’ Nature 375: 126; Varner, G. E. (1987) ‘Do Species Have Standing’ Environmental Ethics 9: 71; Simon, J. (1986) ‘Disappearing Species, Deforestation and Data’ New Scientist (15 May) 60, 61–3; Simon, J. (1996) The Ultimate Resource 2 (Princeton University Press, New Jersey) 439–55. 9   Berne Convention, Preamble, Arts 2, 3(1).

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to prevent endangered status exist for, inter alia, the South Pacific,10 South East Asia,11 Antarctica,12 and West, Central,13 and East Africa.14 Specific treaties dedicated to keeping one particular species from becoming extinct also evolved throughout the twentieth century, beginning with, among others, seals in 1911,15 birds in 1916,16 whales in 1931,17 fish (in general) in 1958,18 polar bears in 1973,19 turtles in the 1990s,20 and great apes, in the mid-1990s.21 Such species-specific conventions have been supplemented by two treaties which deal with endangered species in the particular settings of being either in trade or migratory. First, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES) was based upon the realization that ‘wild fauna and flora. . . are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the Earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come. . . ’. Accordingly, it seeks to limit trade in any species which may ‘endanger their survival’.22 Second, the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) recognized that ‘wild animals are an irreplaceable part of the earth’s natural system which must be conserved for the good of mankind’. The fundamental principle of this Convention is to conserve migratory species which have an unfavourable conservation status, with the parties to the Convention being specifically required to take action to avoid any of them becoming endangered.23 The importance of taking cooperative actions under the CMS is to maintain a favourable conservation status, especially for those species   Convention on Conservation in the South Pacific, Art 2.   ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Art 5.   Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, Art 3(2)(b)(v). See also Art 5 and Annex A of the Agreed Measures 1964. 13   Convention for Co-operation in the Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Regions, Art 11. 14   Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African Region, Arts 2, 12. 15   Convention Respecting Measures for the Preservation and Protection of the Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean 1911. 16   Migratory Bird Convention Between Canada and the United States 1916, Preamble, Art IV. For the following treaties, international and bilateral, in 1936, 1950, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1986, and 2007, see Gillespie, A. (2011) Conservation, Biodiversity and International Law (Edward Elgar, London) Ch IV. 17   Regulation of Whaling Convention 1931, Art 4. For a full discussion of all of the instruments in this area, see Gillespie, A. (2005) Whaling Diplomacy (Edward Elgar, London) Chs 1, 2. 18  Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 1958, Preamble, Art 1. Even clearer rules were later expressed in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Articles 61(2) and (4), 118, and 119. See also Agreement Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1995, Art 2; World Summit for Sustainable Development 2002, Plan of Implementation, para 31; CBD (2010) Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, Decision X/2, Target 6. 19   Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears 1973, Art II. 20   See Gillespie, A. (2006) ‘The Slow Swim from Extinction: Saving Turtles’ International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 21: 57. All the regional sea turtle agreements are set out in (2002) Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 5(1). 21   Global strategy for the Survival of Great Apes and their Habitat, para 2. See also Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats 2007, Art II. 22   Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Preamble, para 1 Art II. 23   CMS, Preamble, paras 1–3, Art II. 10 11 12

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which are recognized as being of a particular conservation concern (such as some cetaceans,24 waterbirds,25 seals,26 albatross, and petrels)27 and have become covered by stand-alone conservation agreements. A very similar approach is evident with lesser legal arrangements designed to prevent the extinction of, inter alia, the slender-billed curlew, the Siberian crane, the aquatic warbler, West African elephants28 and sea turtles.29 The above examples are focused around species coming from or occurring in particular places, or being of particular types, such as endangered or migratory. The first convention that aimed to cover the conservation of all species was the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The objectives of the CBD—to preserve all species of biodiversity both nationally and to cooperate internationally for the same goal30—were largely reflected in the foundational work of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),31 the 1980 World Conservation Strategy, and the 1982 World Charter for Nature.32 All of this earlier work was solidified in 1992 when the CBD was signed and it was agreed that the ‘conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind’. Accordingly, all parties agreed to work towards its conservation, sustainable use, and equitable sharing.33 However, soon after the CBD was signed it became apparent that, to be meaningful, it had to be tied to specific targets, which were in vogue as the century came to an end. The most notable international targets in this area were those developed by the United Nations and its Millennium Development Goals. Of note, the seventh Millennium Goal sought to ensure environmental sustainability by 2015.34 As a stepping stone towards the 2015 target, it was proposed that the CBD develop an interim 2010 target. Accordingly, in 2002 the parties to the Convention committed themselves to a more effective and coherent implementation of the three objectives of the Convention: ‘to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level. . . to the benefit of all life on Earth’.35 24   Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas (ASCOBANS), Preamble, Art 2.1; Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea and Mediterranean (ACCOBAMS), Art II.1. 25   Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Arts II, III. 26   Wadden Sea Seals Agreement, Art III. 27   Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels, Art II.1. 28   Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Slender Billed Curlew, Preamble and section 1; MOU on the Siberian Crane, Preamble; MoU Concerning Conservation Measures for the Aquatic Warbler, Point 1; MoU on West African Elephants, para 3. 29  See MoU on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia; MoU on Marine Turtles of the Atlantic Coast of Africa; and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional environment Programme (2005) Regional Marine Turtle Conservation Plan. 30   See CBD, Arts 4, 5. 31  UNEP (1974) ‘Decisions of the First Governing Council’ Decision 5(c), in Ruster, B. and Simma, B. (eds) (1976) International Protection of the Environment (Oceana, New York) Vol 1, 259. 32   World Charter for Nature 1982, Principle 2. 33   CBD, Preamble, para 3, Art 1. 34   Program of Work and the Millennium Development Goals, UNEP/CBD/COP/7/L9. 35   (2002) ‘The 2010 Target’, Decision VI/26.

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The 2010 target was subsequently endorsed at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) through which those present pledged themselves to ‘promote concrete international support and partnership for the. . . the protection of endangered species’.36 Although the 2010 target was not met, a new target was later set in the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, with its associated ‘Aichi Targets’.37 The vision of this Strategic Plan: . . . is a world living in harmony with nature where by 2050, biodiversity is valued, conserved, restored and wisely used, maintaining ecosystem services, sustaining a healthy planet and delivering benefits essential for all people.

The mission of the Strategic Plan is to: [T]‌ake effective and urgent action to halt the loss of biodiversity in order to ensure that by 2020 ecosystems are resilient and continue to provide essential services, thereby securing the planet’s variety of life . . .

To achieve these goals, the parties committed themselves to achieving a series of targets with regards to species, various ecosystems, and protected areas. With regards to species, it was agreed that the extinction of known threatened species must be prevented and their conservation status, particularly of those most in decline, be improved and sustained. Similarly, the genetic erosion of domesticated species of plants and animals must be minimized and these species ‘safeguarded’, while all fish, invertebrate stocks, and aquatic plants are all to be managed and harvested sustainably, so that overfishing is avoided and recovery plans and measures are in place for all depleted species. The only species which are to be targeted (but not to the point of extinction) are alien species.38 These goals were subsequently reaffirmed at the 2012 Earth Summit, when those present reiterated their commitment to ‘effectively reduce the rate of, halt and reverse the loss of biodiversity’.39

4. Ecosystems The most obvious difficulty for the position that ascribes moral value to only animals and/or individual entities, or even focuses on trying to keep species in existence, is that everything else is excluded from the moral calculus. This results in an inability to deal with many critical issues such as how to value non-living aspects (such as landscapes) and how to distinguish between alien and indigenous species. Fundamentally, it is also a nonsense in the real world whereby all the components within a species, and the species itself, only exist by grace of the ecosystem in which they live:  it is not the other way round. This reality has caused many to suggest that the focus of philosophical value should, therefore, be upon the  WSSD, Plan of Implementation, section 44(f ).  CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, Decision X/2. 38   Targets 6, 9, 12, and 13. 39   Rio+20 (2012) The Future We Want, A/CONF.216/XX, para 198. 36 37

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whole—not the individuals within it. This view was buttressed by a raft of scientific advances throughout the twentieth century, including, inter alia, evolution, physics, the Gaia thesis (as advanced by James Lovelock, 1919–), and (especially) ecology, which all show that the paradigm of a human species (like any individual species) as independent, isolated, autonomous, discrete, and above the surrounding world, is wrong. This paradigm, whereby the moral focus moves from the individual entity/species to the ecological whole, has been replaced by a world view of dynamic inter-relationships and interconnections, which inform a myriad of ethical and physical (if not metaphysical) reorientations.40 Such reorientations help cross the philosophical chasm between the objective world (the ‘is’) and the values world (the ‘ought’). This crossing is necessary because, in theory, the basis of human existence, seen in such a holistic setting, should provide a foundation for how people should respond. (They should adopt values that directly further their own existence in relation to their placement within a much greater whole.)41 To many theorists, this larger type of focus is where moral considerations should reside, in which the good of the whole, not the good of individuals, is the emphasis. Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), commonly recognised as the founder of this ‘land ethic’, explained: The effect on ecological systems is the decisive factor in the determination of the ethical quality of actions . . . A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.42

Associated with this view is the position that everything involved in a natural process has an inherent value, whether it be found in the individual or in the whole. However, it should be noted that the emphasis remains upon the whole, and the possession of inherent value does not mean that it should be protected against, or above, all other entities in possession of the same inherent values. This is because in the broader holistic picture individuals of all species (including humans) are no more than small dots within a huge matrix. Given that the ultimate goal of the holistic land ethic is to achieve the values of ecological diversity, stability, 40  Tyrrell, T. (2013) On Gaia:  A  Critical Examination (Princeton University Press, London); Sheldrake, R. (2009) Morphic Resonance:  The Nature of Formative Causation (Routledge, London); Laszlo, E. (2006) Science and the Reenchantment of the Cosmos (Park Street Press, Vermont); Lovelock, J. (2001) Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 9–11, 92, 148–9, 152; Goldsmith, E. (1992) The Way: Towards an Ecological World View (Rider, London) 122–3; Diamond, J. (1991) The Rise and the Fall of the Third Chimpanzee (Rider, London) 15–21; Sheldrake, R. (1990) The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God (Rider, London) 68; Naess, A. (1989) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 35–40; Capra, F. (1982) The Turning Point: Science, Society and the Rising Culture (Flamingo, New York); Heinsenberg, W. (1958) The Physicist’s Conception of Nature (Penguin, Harmondsworth); Whitehead, A. (1925) Science and the Modern World (MacMillan, London), 29, 167, 175. 41  Cooper, D. (1992) The Environment in Question:  Ethics and Global Issues (Routledge, London) 135–45; Fox, W. (1990) Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Shambhala, London) 188–93; Callicott, J. (1982) ‘Hume’s Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation to the Land Ethic’ Environmental Ethics 4: 163. 42   Leopold, A. (1949) A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 224–5.

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complexity, and harmony of individual ecosystems and the overall ecosphere, none of these dots, especially as individuals, and often even as species, are of heightened moral value if they do not compliment the whole.43 As Baird Callicott (1941–) stated: The idea of the good of the biotic community is the ultimate measure of moral value. . . in every case the effect upon the ecological systems is the decisive factor in the determination of the ethical quality of actions. . . 44

5.  Ecosystems in international law International environmental law and policy is increasingly thinking in terms of ecosystems. Strong advocacy of this approach was evident at the 2012 Earth Summit, when those assembled called for: [H]‌olistic and integrated approaches to sustainable development that will guide humanity to live in harmony with nature and lead to efforts to restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem.45

This call was easy to make, as recognition of ecosystem types of approaches had been evident for over four decades at this point, before the World Conservation Strategy of 1980 worked around the central precept of the maintenance of ‘essential ecological processes and life support systems’.46 A dozen years after this, the Preamble to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development noted ‘the integral and interdependent nature of Earth, our home’ and Principle 7 recognized the necessity to ‘conserve, protect and restore the integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem’.47 At the largest level, the Conventions on protection of the ozone layer and climate change are exemplars of this. Of the latter, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change focuses on the adverse effects on ‘the Earth’s

43   Callicott, J.B. (1987) Companion to a Sand County Almanac:  Interpretative Essays (University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin) 186, 196, 205. See also Welchman, J. (2012) ‘A Defence of Environmental Stewardship’ Environmental Values 21(3): 297; Holmes, R. (2000) ‘The Land Ethic at the Turn of the Millennium’ Biodiversity and Conservation 9(8): 104558; Merchant, C. (1992) Radical Ecology: The Search for a Liveable World (Routledge, London) 76–8; Atkinson, A. (1991) Principles of Political Ecology (Belhaven, London) 182–3; Naess, A. (1988) ‘Deep Ecology and the Ultimate Premises’ Ecologist 18: 128, 130. 44   Callicott, J.B. (1980) ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair’ Environmental Ethics 2: 311, 324–5; Rodman, J. (1977) ‘The Liberation of Nature’ Inquiry 20: 94; Scherer D. (1982) ‘Anthropocentricism, Atomism and Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 4: 115, 116. 45   2012 Earth Summit, The Future We Want, A/CONF.216/XX, para 40. 46   World Charter for Nature, Preamble, General Principle 1. Note, however, that the Charter was never intended to be anything more than a philosophical and political framework to ‘guide and judge’ worldwide efforts at conservation. See Wood, H.W. (1985) ‘The United Nations Charter for Nature’ Ecology Law Quarterly 12: 977, 990. The early notation, in 1972, was Recommendation 38 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. 47   Rio Declaration, UNCED Doc.A/CONF.151/5 (1992).

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climate’. The climate system, which the Convention signatories pledged to protect via stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference, was defined to mean ‘the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their interaction’.48 Such need to focus on the totality of ecosystems is also recognized with particular types of ecosystems, such as forests (with their ‘complex and unique ecological processes’49), wetlands,50 particular geographical areas, such as Antarctica,51 and Conventions which set out to conserve areas—such as the World Heritage Convention (through which ecosystems of outstanding universal value are preserved). Conventions which focus on endangered species nearly always oblige the parties to also protect the habitat of the species in question. The Convention on Migratory Species and the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats are good examples of this approach.52 Similar obligations to conserve related habitats have arisen in the context of international law, of which those related to fish,53 and the practice of bottom trawling, are particularly notable.54 At a somewhat wider level, the parties to the CBD recognized that all species and all protected areas must be seen within the ecosystem in which they occur, and not in isolation, or, as the Preamble to the CBD noted, ‘the fundamental requirement for the conservation of biological diversity is the in-situ conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats’.55 Given the importance of ecosystems in this equation, the parties to the CBD have developed, as a thematic and cross-cutting topic, the ‘ecosystem approach’.56 This approach, which was endorsed by the international community at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development,57 suggested that:   Framework Convention on Climate Change, Arts 1, 2.  Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests 1992, Preamble and Art 3. 50   See Preamble to the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. See also Gillespie, A. (2011) Conservation, Biodiversity and International Law (Edward Elgar, London) Ch 7. 51  The Madrid Protocol was built around the need to protect the ‘Antarctic environment and dependent associated ecosystems’, in relation to which the signatories promised ‘comprehensive protection’: Madrid Protocol, Art 3. 52   Gillespie, A. (2011) Conservation, Biodiversity and International Law (Edward Elgar, London) Ch 7. 53   With the Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks of Fish 1995, the signatories agreed, inter alia, to ‘assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental factors on target stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target stocks’. See Art 5(d). Note also FAO (2007) Technical Guidelines on Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (FAO, Rome). 54   See FAO (2011) Guidelines for Deep Sea Species and Habitats (FAO, Rome). 55   See also Agenda 21, sections 14.54, 14.55. 56  For inland water ecosystems (Decisions IV/4; VI/5); marine and coastal biological diversity (Decisions II/10; IV/5); forest biodiversity (Decisions I/8; II/9; III/12; IV/7); monitoring and indicators of biological diversity (Decisions IV/1; VI/7); incentive measures (Decision IV/10); and environmental impact assessment (Decision IV/10). In addition it has also been linked to agricultural biodiversity (Decision IV/6); the Global Taxonomy Initiative (Decision VI/8); the Global Plant Strategy (Decision VI/9); Art 8(j) and related provisions (Decision VI/10); alien species (Decision VI/23); and National Reports (Decision VI/25). 57   World Summit on Sustainable Development, ‘Plan of Implementation’, para 44(e). 48 49

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[C]‌onservation of ecosystem structure and functioning, in order to maintain ecosystem services, must be a priority.  .  . ecosystems must be managed within the limits of their functioning.58

A further influence within the CBD of the need to focus particularly upon ecosystems was introduced with the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and its associated ‘Aichi Targets’.59 Specifically, in terms of ecosystems, it was agreed that by 2015 the threats to coral reefs and other vulnerable ecosystems impacted by climate change or ocean acidification be minimized so as to maintain their integrity and functioning. With other ecosystems, the timeline was moved to 2020. It was agreed that the rate of loss of all natural habitats, including forests, be at least halved and, where feasible, brought close to zero. Degradation and fragmentation must be significantly reduced. At least 15 per cent of degraded ecosystems are intended to be restored, thereby contributing to climate change mitigation and adaptation and to combating desertification. Ecosystems that provide essential services, including services related to water, and contribute to health, livelihoods, and well-being, are to be restored and safeguarded. Agriculture, aquaculture, and forestry are to be managed sustainably, ensuring conservation of biodiversity, while pollution, including from excess nutrients, will be brought to levels that are not detrimental to ecosystem function and biodiversity.60

6.  Difficulties of thinking holistically The first problem of the ecosystem approach, especially when taken at the philosophical level, is that, as with many areas where theorists attempt to make moral suggestions based upon scientific understandings, the understandings are flawed. This is noticeable with the approach of putting a moral value on the healthy functioning of the ecosystem, at both the macro level (such as with the scientifically disputed Gaia thesis), and all other ecosystems beneath this level.61 The difficulty with all of the other levels is that there is great uncertainty in the scientific study of ecosystem stability. While it is generally accepted that sufficiently large or complex ecological networks have a probability of persisting in perpuity close to zero, debates continue about the relationships of diversity, complexity, and stability within all ecosystems. Change, rather than continual, regular, or harmonious equilibrium/balance/stability is generally recognized as a common quality of ecosystems. Consequently, it has been asserted that an absolute balance of nature does not exist, as evolution and change are the pattern, not otherwise.62 This point was actually acknowledged in the CBD Principles on the approach to   CBD Decision IX/7 (2008) ‘Ecosystem Approach’, Principles 5, 6.  CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, Decision X/2.   Targets 5, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15. 61   Tyrell, T. (2013) ‘Gaia: The Verdict Is. . . ’ New Scientist (26 October) 30. 62   Allesina, S. (2012) ‘Stability Criteria for Complex Ecosystems’ Nature 483(7388): 205; Grman, E. (2010) ‘Mechanisms Contributing to Stability in Ecosystem Function Depend on Environmental Context’ Ecology Letters 13(11): 1400; Ives, A. (2007) ‘Stability and Diversity of Ecosystems’ Science 58 59 60

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the ecosystem, which recognized, despite the merit of long-term planning, that ‘change is inevitable, and because ecosystems are beset by a complex of uncertainties, potential “surprises” are possible’.63 The end result is that this ethical system, based upon the stability of the whole ecosystem and alleged interpretations of ecology, may have little scientific merit. The second difficulty in this area is largely in the chasm that has developed between the philosophical theory and its application in law. In particular, the theory, which suggests the moral judgement should be on the good of the ecosystem, should not give preference to human goals unless they further the whole. In all other instances, there should be no trumping and no inalienable rights for any individual species or particular parts of the ecosystem. This is because the focus is on the functioning and stability of the whole. The goal is one of appropriate treatment of all parts of the ecosystem, not equality of everything within it. In practice, this would mean that the restoration of the depleted or damaged ecosystems should be given preference over the needs of humanity. This is especially so if the interests of humanity are not vital, and the interests of the other parts of the ecosystem are essential to the whole. Consequently, the human licence to interfere detrimentally with the natural world would be greatly restricted from what it is now..64 The difficulty with this approach is that, in practice, the conservation of ecosystems has been, and is, undertaken with humanity at the centre of the equation or as Principle 1 of the CBD Principles on ecosystem approach recognized, ‘the objectives of management of land, water, and living resources are a matter of societal choices’. It was recommended that ‘a balance between and the integration of, conservation and use of biological diversity should be sought’.65 While these are,

317(5834):  58; Azaele, S. (2006) ‘Dynamical Evolution of Ecosystems’ Nature 444(7121):  926; Michaelian, K. (2005) ‘Thermodynamic Stability of Ecosystems’ Journal of Theoretical Biology 237(3): 323; Dambacher, J. (2003) ‘Qualitative Stability and Ambiguity in Model Ecosystems’ The American Naturalist 161(6):  876; Tilman, D. (1996) ‘Biodiversity:  Population Versus Ecosystem Stability’ Ecology 77(2):  350; Voris, V. (1980) ‘Functional Complexity and Ecosytem Stabilility’ Ecology 61(6): 1352; Clements, B. (1975) ‘Stasis–The Unnatural Value’ Ethics 86: 130. 63   CBD Decision IX/7 (2008) ‘Ecosystem Approach’, Principle 9. 64   Bjerket, T. (1999) ‘The Relationship of Ecocentric and Anthropocentric Motives to Attitudes Towards Large Carnivores’ Journal of Environmental Psychology 19(4): 415; Sterba, J.P. (1995) ‘From Biocentric Individualism to Biocentric Pluralism’ Environmental Ethics 17:  191, 199; Johnson, L.E. (1991) A Morally Deep World:  An Essay on Moral Significance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 200, 224–7; Fox, W. (1990) Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Shambhala, London) 114–18, 188–93; Foley, G. (1988) ‘Deep Ecology and Subjectivity’ Ecologist 18: 119; Golley, F.B. (1987) ‘Deep Ecology from the Perspective of Ecological Science’ Environmental Ethics 9: 51; Naess, A. (1986) ‘The Deep Ecology Movement: Some Aspects’ Philosophical Inquiry 8: 14, 20, 22; Moline, J.N. (1986) ‘Aldo Leopold and the Moral Community’ Environmental Ethics 6:  113; Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985) Deep Ecology:  Living as if Nature Mattered (Gibbs Smith, Utah) 67–9; Naess, A. (1984) ‘A Defence of the Deep Ecology Movement’ Environmental Ethics 6:  265, 267; Zimmerman, M.E. (1983) ‘Towards a Heideggerean Ethics for Radical Environmentalism’ Environmental Ethics 5:  123; Heffernan, J.D. (1982) ‘The Land Ethic: A Critical Appraisal’ Environmental Ethics 4: 243. 65   CBD Decision IX/7 (2008) ‘Ecosystem Approach’, Principle 10.

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from an anthropocentric point of view, admirable goals, the basic point is that the interests of the entire ecosystem are secondary to the goals of humanity. In practice, humanity assumes its place as master of the ecosystems whereby they are sustained for the benefit of humanity, not citizens within them provided for the benefit of all of the other components. Nevertheless in a number of instances, such as with the protection of habitat/ecosystems for endangered species, non-anthropocentric leanings are clearly obvious.66 This anthropocentric epicentre, while still taking the health of the ecosystem as the overall focus, may not necessarily be a bad thing. This is because if the primary focus upon the whole ecosystem was applied, individuals, or indeed anything not essential to furthering the goals of the whole, are at best secondary, and, at worst, redundant and of no ethical value. In an environmental context, the problem is that many species are of direct value to an ecosystem. This problem can be magnified to the macro level, with something like the Gaia thesis, where, apart from a few particular concerns (such as climate change), many other environmental issues are of limited impact. Thus, apart from protecting Gaia’s vital organs (the wetlands, the continental shelves, and the rain forests) little else needs to be of moral concern, and an indifference to many issues may develop as no direct duties to individual animals or species exist, except in the rare instance in which they are important to the functioning of a larger community. In this world, killing, pain, and instrumental use of all individuals and species are the rule, not the exception. Accordingly, associated human ethics like compassion, justice, and equality, let alone concern for individual species, are invisible, if not absurd when looking at the way the (non-human) natural world interacts, without the philosophical musings of humans.67 66   Ekebom, J. (2013) ‘The Long and Winding Road of the Ecosystem Approach’ Aquatic Conservation 23(1):  1; Ressurreicao, A. (2012) ‘Resident and Expert Opinions on the Ecosystem Approach’ Ocean and Coastal Management 69:  243; Bolshakov, V. (2009) ‘Biodiversity Conservation:  From the Ecosystem to the Ecosystem Approach’ Russian Journal of Ecology 40(2): 72; Young, A. (2008) ‘Safeguarding the Environment: The Ecosystem Approach’ Biologist 55(4): 198; Joji, M. (2008) ‘What is the Ecosystem Approach for Fisheries Management?’ Marine Policy 32(1): 19; Corkeron, P. (2006) ‘Opposing Views of the Ecosystem Approach’ Conservation Biology 20(3): 617; Clark, J. (1999) ‘The Ecosystem Approach from a Practical Point of View’ Conservation Biology 13(3): 679; Bell, A. (1994) ‘Non-Human Nature and the Ecosystem Approach: The Limits of Anthropocentricism’ Alternatives 20(3):  20; Kay, J. (1994) ‘Embracing Complexity:  The Challenge of the Ecosystem Approach’ Alternatives 20(3): 32. 67  Donahue, T. (2010) ‘Anthropocentricism and the Argument from Gaia Theory’ Ethics and the Environment 15(2):  51; Hird, M. (2010) ‘Indifferent Globality:  Gaia, Symbiosis and Other Worldliness’ Theory, Culture and Society 27(2):  54; Midgley, M. (2000) ‘Individualism and the Concept of Gaia’ Review of International Studies 26(5): 29; Lynch, T. (1998) ‘Non-Anthropocentrism? A Killing Objection’ Environmental Values 7(2): 151; Sober, E. (1994) ‘Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism’, in L. Gruen and D. Jamieson, Reflecting on Nature: Readings in Environmental Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 345, 352–4; Hettinger, N. (1994) ‘Valuing Predation in Rolston’s Environmental Ethics: Bambi Lovers Versus the Tree Huggers’ Environmental Ethics 16: 2, 6–9; Nelson, M.P. (1993) ‘A Defence of Environmental Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 15: 245, 256–7; Rolston, H. (1993) ‘Rights and Responsibilities on the Home Planet’ Yale Journal of International Law 18: 251, 153–9; Nash, J.A. (1993) ‘The Case for Biotic Rights’ Yale Journal of International Law 18: 235, 237–8; Marshall, P. (1992) Nature’s Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking (Simon and Schuster, London) 436–7; Joseph, L.E. (1990) Gaia: The Growth of an Idea (Arkana, London) 153–72, 192, 204, 217; Wenz, P. (1988) Environmental Justice (State of New York University Press, Albany) 82–9;

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While an indifference to other animals or species is one concern, when something does threaten the whole, the need to further the whole over all other considerations introduces a more sinister possibility. Specifically, in the obvious case of humanity, which threatens many ecosystems and/or biotic communities, misanthropic tendencies can develop, by which justifications to either kill, or at least not help those in need, can come into play. The possibilities for action against individuals for the good of the whole had terrifying consequences in a number of political ideologies in the twentieth century. Although many of the current generation advocating the land ethic do not associate themselves with such positions, the risk remains too pertinent to ignore.68

7. Conclusion The attempts to extend moral considerations to either animals or to all living entities has limitations, in both theory and practice. While international law has moved to accept considerations of welfare and humaneness with regards to other animals, it stopped short of any kind of moral equivalency. However, it did come to accept a type of moral equivalency in the sense that it is now widely accepted that all living things have their own inherent value. The difficulty that this moral position created was that while it was progress to recognize that everything is valuable in its own right; by all living things having the same value, nothing really changed. In this paradigm no decisions can be made as everything is equal and nothing took precedence. The larger concern is that all animals and/or living things do not exist in isolation. Rather, they exist as species, and the species exist within ecosystems. The focus on preventing species becoming extinct has become the most identifiable, moral, non-anthropocentric goal in international environmental law. This is due in large part to a responsibility that humanity has incurred because the current extinction spasm is largely the fault of humanity.

Rolston, H. (1988) Environmental Ethics: Duties and Values in the Natural World (Temple University Press, Philadelphia) 48, 225; Sagoff, M. (1988) The Economy of the Earth (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 157, 162–7; Weston, A. (1987) ‘Forms of Gaian Ethics’ Environmental Ethics 9: 220; Katz, E. (1985) ‘Organism, Community, and the Substitution Problem’ Environmental Ethics 7: 243; Gunn, A. (1984) ‘Preserving Rare Species’, in T. Regan (ed), Earthbound: New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics (Random, New York) 312; Norton, B. (1982) ‘Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights’ Environmental Ethics 4: 36; Hunt, W.M. (1980) ‘Are Mere Things Morally Considerable?’ Environmental Ethics 2:  61; Callicott, J.B. (1980) ‘Animal Liberation:  A  Triangular Affair’ Environmental Ethics 2: 311, 326–8. 68   Amerigo, M. (2007) ‘Underlying Dimensions of Ecocentric and Anthropocentric Environmental Beliefs’ The Spanish Journal of Psychology 19(1):  97; French, W.C. (1995) ‘Against Biospherical Egalitarianism’ Environmental Ethics 17:  38, 40; Morris, B. (1993) Deep Ecology and Anarchism (Freedom Press, London) 37, 40, 46; Bramwell, A. (1989) Ecology in the 20th Century:  A  History (Yale University Press, New  York) 161–205; Dominick, R. (1987) ‘The Nazis and the Nature Conservationists’ Historian 49: 522.

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The difficulty with this focus is that it too is reductionist, and it examines only one part of the ecological equation, namely that species, like animals and all living entities at the individual level, do not exist without the ecosystems around them. This basic fact has suggested to many that the object of moral concern should, therefore, be the health and stability of ecosystems. This idea, that ecosystems should be the basis of concern and management, has also, of late, made large headway in international environmental law. From the conservation of the habitat of endangered species, to the protection of the ozone layer or the atmosphere, international law increasingly recognizes that conservation cannot be achieved without focusing on the ecological context. However, although international law and policy increasingly recognize this reality, it is important to note that this type of ecosystem ethic is not one where humanity is an equal part of the ecosystem, of comparable worth to everything else. Rather, it places the ecosystem squarely at the service of humanity, where the whole is managed for us. Although this may be a strong diversion from the philosophical theory, it has helped avoid the risk of misanthropic tendencies which can otherwise develop in such holistic settings. It has not, however, helped avoid the fiction that ecosystems, like species, are meant to remain stable and go on forever.

XI Conclusion Anthropocentricism is the belief that humanity is at the centre of existence. This belief, built up and reinforced over thousands of years of scholarship, is predicated on the idea that humanity is fundamentally different to the rest of the natural world. We are rational, and it, isolated and valueless, has been provided as an instrument for our benefit. This paradigm leads to discourse and judgements that initiate actions, create preferences, and cement attitudes over why the environment should be protected, all of which have resulted in international law and policy, whereby justifications have been adduced to protect the natural world on account of the instrumental values to humans. There are six different arguments within this anthropocentric framework via self interest, economics, religion, aesthetics, culture, and future generations. However, as this book has hoped to show, each of these anthropocentric justifications, although powerful in some settings, is limited in how far it can progress, in as much as it is contradictory, limited in scope, or plainly indefensible. The pursuit of self interest as a justification to protect the environment underlies all anthropocentric thinking for conservation. In the context of chapter III, the self interest was more in terms of direct benefits, such as those related to mental and/ or physical well-being. The difficulties with this approach is that it is very selective and, in many areas, debatable. The wilderness justification is disputed by many individuals, let alone countries, which see the idea of human-free areas as a cultural imposition. The food and medicine argument, along with the idea of keystone species, is weakened by the fact that the vast majority of species have no direct benefit to humanity. Even in the key areas of food and medicine, the argument, at best, conserves only a few high value types. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the self-interest argument assumes that both the costs and impacts will be shared equally by those who should cooperate to share the same conservation outcome. In many areas, this is not the case. Political, philosophical, historical, and economic differences all point to very different interpretations of how, or why, countries choose to respond to this problem. Unfortunately, because of the multiple factors which make nations different in the global sphere, in some instances it may be in the self interest of states if not to directly destroy the environment, then certainly not to hurry to preserve it. In short, the pursuit of direct self interest based upon biological need does not lead to successful cooperative conservation outcomes, as all needs are not the same.

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The second vindication for environmental protection is through economics. This position has received a greatly enhanced status in light of new economic methods, which vastly inflate the economic value of the environment. In practice, these new methods have made economics, currently, the most popular justification for the conservation of biodiversity and/or the prevention of pollution. Without doubt, in both settings they are formidable and have been widely adopted throughout international environmental law and policy. The economic justifications for environmental protection are limited by five considerations. First, ethically, it is clear that it is possible to know the price of everything and the value of nothing. Second, ecologically, assuming that the ecology is accurately understood, parts of it have no particular importance that can justify an economic valuation. Third, even if an economic price is found, this may be trumped by higher economic values based upon consumption and/or destruction. Fourth, economically, the theories are limited by the market contexts within which they exist and, via discounting, a built-in bias against actions which impose medium-to-large economic costs on the present. Finally, politically, many countries, both internally and externally, simply refuse to accept the logic of such economic values—especially if this means that they have to pay others for the services they traditionally took to be free. The third argument based upon the anthropocentric position is religious justification. The role of religion in contemporary society cannot be underestimated, and when used as a catalyst for environmental concern it is arguable if a more meaningful justification could be found for a religiously motivated individual. The ethic of Christian stewardship is an exemplar of this type of thinking and, clearly, many good conservation goals are being set and reached by religiously minded individuals. In some instances, the power of the pursuit of these conservation goals can be remarkable in that those who subscribe to these beliefs equate protecting the environment with protecting the works of God. Despite the power of this position, the justification for conservation remains limited by two concerns. First, for many people who do not subscribe to religious worldviews such approaches are meaningless. The reaction against religious worldviews is often due to the fact that there is no objective certainty in religion. It is for this reason that so many religious questions have differing answers. This is a particular problem in environmental matters, for as much as religious texts can be interpreted to support green goals they can also be interpreted to act directly against them. Such interpretations range from differences that are purely theological (but lead to very anthropocentric paradigms), to actions that are highly political (such as contraception) in international environmental law, which cut directly against taking action in relation to some of the most pressing environmental and social concerns of the twenty-first century. In this area, clearly, sustainable development and theology are travelling in opposite directions. This is not to suggest that there is no value in the quest for religious values in environmental thinking, but rather, caution needs to be exercised, for this is a sword that can cut both ways. The fourth anthropocentric justification for the conservation of the environment is aesthetics. The idea that recognition of the beauty of the natural world,

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from individual species through to complete areas, is a catalyst to conservation is very powerful. This approach, with roots back to the nineteenth century, has gone from strength to strength, with some of the most successful environmental campaigns of the twentieth century, built around super-cute species like seal-pups, being based purely on their aesthetic value. For species or areas which are superlative or spectacular, this ethic provides a foremost route for their conservation. The difficulties with the aesthetic approach to the environment, as with all debates about aesthetics, is that it is often perceived to be either individually and/or culturally subjective. When left in this subjective and culturally relative state, large parts of the natural world are excluded from moral consideration because most of the natural world is not spectacular or superlative in the normal sense of the word. The fifth argument is the cultural justifications for environmental protection. The identity of different societies, through the manifestations of their culture, is very important in multiple aspects of modern society, to both the group and the individuals within them. In the case of environmental thinking, the relationship between the protection of culture and the protection of the environment is commonly believed to be positive. The exemplar of this type of thinking is indigenous peoples, who are often believed to possess, via their cultural practices, deep and meaningful relationships with the natural environment, which lead to positive conservation outcomes. Such recognitions, and the goal to perform them, are found in many areas of international environmental law and policy. The difficulty with this type of approach is that while some cultural practices produce positive environmental results, in many instances they do not, because what one culture may want to protect, another may destroy—even if not intentionally. This is particularly true when factors such as economic needs are placed into the equation. Human cultures have taken species to extinction in both historical and contemporary settings. They can also carry out, and attempt to justify, practices which are cruel. This is not to deny that in some instances the relationship between culture and conservation is positive, but rather to recognize that, as an overall ethic to protect the environment, it is limited and generalizations should not be made lightly because cultural practices are often not positive, let alone benign. The sixth position, which adopted a slightly more enhanced view of environmental protection, is the rights of future generations; in that it is still anthropocentric, it aims to look beyond the immediate realm. This idea is that all of humanity is connected via a type of inter-temporal stream, in which the past, present, and future generations are connected, was recognized before the twentieth century. However, as the environmental condition became prominent towards the end of the twentieth century, the idea was expanded when it became apparent that the current generation had an unprecedented ability detrimentally to alter the environment to the loss of future generations. There are many exemplars in this area, but the most obvious is the difficulty of the creation of nuclear waste by this generation, which has to be carefully contained for tens of thousands of years to come. With such considerations in mind, numerous theorists have argued that the interests, if not rights, of future generations should be taken into account. This

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argument, perhaps more than all others, has become the most widely cited justification for moral action, and is the moral core of all thinking about sustainable development, in international environmental law. Despites its widespread acceptance, the argument is plagued by four faults. First, some scholars reject the idea of any bonds between the past, present, and future. At a minimum, existence—not the potential for existence—is seen as the bottom line for moral concern. Second, the reality of alienation within the current generation to those already existing, let  alone future generations, is recognized as a serious limitation, in that intra-generational equity must accompany inter-generational equity. Third, there is the paradox that any existence in the future cannot readily be bemoaned, as any existence, no matter how poor, is better than no existence. The only way to bypass this paradox is to think in terms of future generations as a collective (not individuals) in which their overall interests in the future which we can be reasonably certain they will possess could be damaged by actions undertaken in the present. The difficulty with this collective approach to the future is that it cannot logically encompass only the human species. That is, the theoretical justifications for considering the rights of future generations are unnecessarily restricted within narrow, anthropocentric viewpoints. Following on from all of the above objections, four, somewhat newer, non-anthropocentric developments within international environmental law and policy were examined. These justifications covered animals, individual living entities, endangered species, and ecosystems. The idea of the moral considerability of animals can be approached from two angles. The routes to the enhanced moral considerability of animals come from arguments based around either utilitarian interpretations or inherent/intrinsic value. Both of these arguments produce a framework drawing on thinking that builds around ideas that are common within inter-human activities. The argument for the moral consideration of all other living individual entities comes from an extension of similar arguments around inherent/intrinsic value. In both instances, inroads have been made into international law. However, the greatest recognition has been the assertion that all species have a moral—intrinsic—value independent of humanity. This idea is now recognized in multiple regimes. This is not the case with attempts to extend the moral considerability to animals. Here, despite attempts to focus only upon the most charismatic of species with the greatest emotional relationships with humanity—great Apes and cetaceans—there is no recognized moral equivalence to humans. Although moral equivalence for animals cannot be found in international law, it is possible to display areas where restraints in the way animals may be used have been imposed. The two areas where this is evident are welfare/humane considerations and the use of animals in scientific experiments. Although international law and policy has not accepted any type of moral equivalency of other species compared to humans, it has changed in the way that it is now widely accepted that all living things have their own inherent value. Thus, every living thing is assumed to have a moral value beyond its instrumental value to humanity. The difficulty with this moral and legal position is that

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although everything is now considered valuable in its own right, by all living things having the same value, nothing has really changed and no decisions can be made because on this basis, everything is equal and nothing takes precedence. That is, despite the philosophical niceties, this position is held back by the failure to provide workable goals to pursue in an infinitely complex and crowded world. More than this, it fails to have any meaningful relationship to the wider ecological contexts within which all individuals exist—their species, and then within the wider ecosystems. It is these two considerations—the protection of species and of ecosystems— which formed the last chapter of this book. The focus on preventing species becoming extinct has become the most identifiable, moral, non-anthropocentric goal in international environmental law. This is due in large part to a responsibility that humanity has incurred because the current extinction spasm is largely the fault of humanity. Despite its popularity, this position is limited by the fact that it is too reductionist, and it examines only one part of the ecological equation, namely that species, like animals and all living entities at the individual level, do not exist without the ecosystems around them. This basic fact has suggested to many that the object of moral concern should, therefore, be the health and stability of ecosystems. This has proven to be a highly attractive doctrine to many environmental philosophers. Of late, it has also been making good headway in international environmental law. From the conservation of the habitat of endangered species to the protection of the ozone layer or the atmosphere, international law increasingly recognizes that conservation cannot be achieved without focusing on the ecological context. However, although international law and policy increasingly recognize this reality, it is important to note that this type of ecosystem ethic is not one where humanity is an equal part of the ecosystem of comparable worth to everything else. Rather, it places the ecosystem squarely at the service of humanity, where the whole is managed for us. Although this may be a strong diversion from the philosophical theory, it has helped avoid the risk of misanthropic tendencies which can otherwise develop in such holistic settings. It has not, however, helped avoid the fiction that ecosystems, like species, are meant to remain stable and go on forever. Overall, it can be seen that attempts to protect the environment in international environmental law and policy are a mixture of anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric options. Each justification has its own benefits, and each, its own limits. It is possible to spend years trying to interpret and reconcile each of these philosophical ideas—trying, as it were, to invent the perfect philosophical tool to fix all of the environmental difficulties at hand. I spent years of my life searching for philosophical purity in the way to protect the environment. I  am different now. I have spent the last 20 years in environmental debates at all levels of international, regional, and domestic law and policy. While I would still like to discover the ultimate philosophical tool by which all justifications could be convincingly argued, I am no longer sure that this is possible in light of the amount of

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work that is required to be done and the time limits before us. In my experience, to achieve conservation, it has been necessary to utilize each of these justifications, like separate tools. Some work best in some settings, and some in others. Sometimes, more than one can be used. It really does not matter which tool is used, for all of these tools, as I have tried to show, already exist. So too does the problem of an environment in need.

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Index abortion  42, 63, 65, 108 ACCOBAMS  118, 125, 135 aesthetic beauty  70–1 aesthetic value  69–76, 78, 80, 147 nature  70, 73 aesthetics  2, 56, 68–81, 145–7 aesthetic value, see aesthetic value conservation  68–70, 76–7, 79, 146–7 international environmental law  2 nature  68–70, 73, 75–6, 79–80 objectivity  76, 80 problems 76–80 recognition in law and policy  72–6 subjectivity 76 UNESCO 76 Africa  11, 51, 73, 76, 93, 120–1 agreements, see Table of Instruments agricultural biodiversity  16, 20, 22, 139 agriculture  16, 20, 22, 37, 121, 124 Agrippa 61 air pollution  16, 24, 34–5, 78 albatrosses  88, 121–2, 135 alienation  100, 107, 110, 148 Amazon 41 animals  5–10, 59–63, 108–9, 111–30, 142–4, 148–9; see also endangered species cruelty  59, 91, 119–20 ecosystems, see ecosystems equality 118 ethics  8, 108–9, 111–15, 119, 122–3, 130 experimentation 122–3 farming 119 hunting  17, 117, 120, 122 inherent value  113, 115–16, 122, 130, 143, 148 in all individual living entities  126–7 in international law and policy  127–8 international law and policy  115–26 laboratory 123–4 land ethic  143 lethal scientific experiments  122–6 mentally disabled  112 moral consideration  111–15, 119, 129, 148 nature  113–14, 117, 127–8 near equal to humanity  116–19 plants  6, 10, 16, 126, 128, 136 predators 31 rationality  5–6, 112, 115 rights  108, 113–16, 119, 122 sentience  7, 113 slaughter 117 suffering  112–13, 120, 122 utilitarianism  111, 122

utilization, no pain and welfare approach 119–22 value  111, 113–16, 119, 122, 126–30, 148 wild  73, 86, 120–1, 133–4 anthropocentric worldview  4–10, 62 anthropocentricism  2, 4–13, 59, 62, 77–8, 142 anthropocentric worldview  4–10, 62 Atomism 138 conservation  13, 142 environmental policy  13 humanity  2, 4, 13, 145 intrinsic value  13 nature  5–10, 12 reflection in law and policy  10–13 religion  9, 78 value  59, 77 Aquinas, St Thomas  6, 58–9, 61 Aristotle  5, 76–7, 116 Atomism  5, 138 Augustine  58, 61, 76 Australia  33, 88, 90 Bacon, Sir Francis  6, 77 bats  21, 28, 31, 78, 124 Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb  76 beauty  52, 56–7, 68–72, 74, 76–80, 137 natural  70, 73–4 beliefs  2, 4–5, 7, 13, 68, 145–6 Bentham, Jeremy  100, 112 Bible  56–7, 60, 65 biodiversity  20–2, 27–30, 44–6, 71–3, 132–6, 138–42 agricultural  16, 20, 22, 139 Convention  20–1, 29–30, 39, 73, 134–5, 139–40 endangered species  21, 72–3, 136 international environmental law  50, 53, 146 religion 58 value  21–2, 24, 28–30, 44–5, 73, 136 biological diversity, see biodiversity biosphere  4, 9, 11, 15, 26, 39 biotic communities  137–8, 143 birds  18, 32, 37, 90, 120–1, 133–4 birth control, see contraception Blake, William  59, 83 Brandt Commission  11, 20, 65, 103 Bruntland, Gro  103 Calvin, John  56, 61 Canada  31, 88, 121, 134 capital  48, 100 cetaceans, see whales chauvinism 4

192 chimpanzees 125–6 China  32, 35, 88, 93 Christianity  19, 51, 54–62 God 62 religion  51, 55–6, 62 Cicero  5–6, 69, 99 climate change  15–16, 23–4, 35–7, 48–9, 96, 138–40 economics  25, 35–7, 41, 48–9, 96 emissions 23–4 self-interest 24 United Nations  1, 20, 103, 138 cognition  112, 117, 126 commercial hunting  122 Commission on Global Governance  1, 20, 50, 104 Communism 10 community  9–11, 31–4, 41–2, 63–4, 137–9, 141–3 competition 23 conservation  11–16, 18–33, 68–81, 83–9, 117–22, 132–6 aesthetics  68–70, 76–7, 79, 146–7 anthropocentricism  13, 142 biodiversity  27, 50, 140, 142, 146 ethics  2, 15, 22, 43, 47, 127 future generations  11, 19, 58, 85, 101–2, 107–8 goals  15, 22, 66, 146 outcomes  24, 94, 145, 147 recreation  32, 70 religion  54, 66 status  32, 39, 124–5, 134, 136 value  25–7, 29, 33, 45–6, 73–4, 127–8 contraception  63–7, 146 conventions, see Table of Instruments Cooper, Antony  69 coral reefs  28–9, 140 cost-benefit analysis  26–7, 41, 43–4, 48 value  27, 41, 43–4 costs, economic  24, 26, 28, 33–6, 46, 48–50 Council of Europe  11, 102 cultural diversity  83, 85–6 cultural heritage  75, 85–6, 99, 119 cultural landscapes  75–6, 83 cultural practices  82, 85, 88–9, 91, 94, 147 culture  2, 68–9, 75–7, 82–94, 117, 147 cruelty  82, 91, 94 difficulties 88–93 environmental protection  82–4, 86, 147 ethics  2, 115, 119, 142 extinction  82, 94 future generations  2, 83, 107, 145 indigenous peoples  86, 94, 147 nature  83, 89–90 reflection in law and policy  85–8 sustainable development  2, 83, 87–8 values as catalyst for environmental protection 82–4 whaling 89

Index Darwin, Charles  115, 131 Descartes, René  7, 112 Dewey, John  9 Diamond, Cora  52, 90, 115, 137 direct self interest  2, 24, 41, 145 discounting  25, 48–50, 146 dolphins  116–17, 120 dominion  6, 56–7, 60 Dowdeswell, Elizabeth  1, 26 Durkheim, Emile  70–1 Earth Charter  2 Earth Summit  20–1, 38, 53, 65, 128, 138 eco-tourism  27, 39, 45–6 ecological knowledge, lack of  44–5 ecological processes  20, 79, 99, 138–9 ecology  15, 41–7, 54–9, 61–2, 137–8, 140–3 land ethic  137–8, 141 radical  56, 62, 138, 141 social  55, 59 economic benefits  14, 29–31, 33–5, 37 economic costs  24, 26, 28, 33–6, 46, 48–50 economic prices/pricing  38, 42, 50, 146 economic self-interest  40 economic valuation  39, 42, 44–5, 50, 146 economic value  25–8, 30–2, 37–47, 50, 93, 146 absence of  44–5 higher 45–7 Total Economic Value  27, 29, 32, 44–5 economics  23, 25–50, 71–2, 95–6, 100–1, 145–6 background 35–6 capital  45, 100 climate change  24, 35–7, 41, 48–9, 96 community  23, 26–7, 42 conservation 28–33 cost-benefit analysis  43–4, 48 difficulties with economic argument  40–50 discounting 48–9 emissions 34 environmental  25, 36, 41, 48–9 environmental policy  27, 35 environmental protection  15, 23, 43, 83, 146 exploitation 47 forestry 35 higher economic values  45–7 idea 25–7 individualism 8 irreconcilable worldviews  40–4 lack of economic value and/or ecological knowledge 44–5 market problems  48–9 natural resources  26, 32, 38, 41, 50, 82 nature  30–1, 37, 43 political problems  49–50 pollution 33–7 recognition of economic argument  37–40 sustainable development  26–7, 41, 43, 46, 49, 101

Index Total Economic Value  27, 29, 32, 44–5 United States  8 whaling 47 ecosystem stability  140–1, 144, 149 ecosystems  14–18, 22–4, 27–30, 44–7, 131, 136–8, 141–4, 148–9 forest 38 in international law  138–40 educational value  42 Emerson, Ralph Waldo  69 emissions  23–4, 34–5, 49 endangered species  21, 30–1, 42, 71–3, 102, 148–9 biodiversity  21, 72–3, 136 convention  21, 39, 73, 102, 133–4, 139 extinction  42, 131–3 in law and policy  133–6 value  39, 42, 46, 73, 131, 139 whaling  39, 102 Engels, Friedrich  10, 21 environmental damage, and future generations 95–8 environmental economics  25, 36, 41, 48–9 environmental policy  6, 13, 23, 27, 35, 103 anthropocentricism 13 economics  27, 36 religion  6, 59 value  13, 27 environmental protection  21, 50–1, 53–4, 73, 120, 146–7 culture  82–4, 86, 147 economics  15, 23, 43, 82, 146 religion  51, 53–4 self-interest 21 environmental sustainability  89–90, 135 environmental thinking  15, 20, 22, 80, 82, 146–7 equity intergenerational  99, 102, 108, 110, 148 intra-generational  108, 110, 148 ethics  1–6, 52–63, 106–9, 111–15, 126–7, 141–3 animals  8, 108–9, 111–15, 119, 123, 130 basis 2 conservation  15, 22, 43, 47, 89, 127 culture  2, 115, 119, 142 future generations  49, 96, 99–101, 106–10 international environmental law  3, 47, 53, 143 land ethic  137, 141 new global  1, 20, 103 religion  6, 9, 52, 54–6, 58–9, 62 respect for life  115 stewardship 56–66 value  43, 113–14, 119, 122, 127, 130 evolution  75, 114, 131–2, 137, 140–1 exploitation  47, 62–3, 119 economics 47 extinction  88, 90, 94, 131–6, 143, 149 endangered species  42, 131–3

193 rates  90, 132 spasms 131–2

family planning  63–6 farming 119 Ficino, Marsilio  6 fin whales  92 fish  15, 29, 60, 133–4, 136, 139 flagship species  71–2, 119 food  12, 14, 22, 24, 28, 145 forestry  35, 41, 50, 140 economics 35 value 41 forests  27–8, 38, 44–5, 50, 53, 139–40 tropical  28–9, 43, 50 Francis of Assisi  58 fresh water  16, 29, 35 Freud, Sigmund  9 future generations  11, 13, 48–9, 83, 95–110, 147–8 adoption of argument in law and policy 101–5 alienation  100, 107, 110, 148 community  97, 105, 107 conservation  11, 19, 58, 85, 101–2, 107–8 cost 48–9 culture  2, 83, 107, 145 distance 107 and environmental damage  95–8 environmental protection  83, 103, 147 ethics  49, 96, 99–101, 106–9 existence  100, 107–8, 110, 148 Ideal Observer  109 interest  2, 13, 19, 48–9, 145 international law  101, 109, 145 justice  96, 99–101, 105, 109 knowledge 95 moral consideration  98–101 motivation 106 natural heritage  119 natural resources  11, 19, 38, 102 nature 104 nuclear waste  96–8 ombudsman 102 problems  49, 105–9 Rawls  100–1, 109 religion  2, 145 sustainable development  49, 83, 85, 101, 103–5, 109 United Nations  11, 19, 85, 102–5, 108 United States  101 whaling 102 Gaia  17, 84, 99, 137, 140, 142 Galileo Galilei  7 Genesis  15, 56–7, 60–1, 65, 99 global ethics, new  1, 20, 103 global warming, see climate change God  6, 8–9, 15, 54–63, 65–6, 137 Christianity 62

194

Index

great apes  21, 116, 118–19, 125, 129, 134 Grotius, Hugo  37, 86, 116

irreconcilable worldviews, and economic argument 40–4

habitats  19, 21, 39, 44, 119, 139 Hardin, Garrett  22–3, 47, 89, 106, 108 harmony  84, 87, 90, 128, 136, 138 health  30–1, 64, 66, 70, 138, 140 human  20, 34, 46, 118 Hobbes, Thomas  23 holistic thinking, difficulties of  140–3 Holy, see  53, 65–6 human health  20, 34, 46, 118 human rights  44, 52, 64, 85 humaneness  71, 121, 143 humanity  4–11, 13–19, 58–61, 114–18, 128–33, 141–5 anthropocentricism  2, 4, 13, 145 religion 9 self-interest  16, 22, 145 Hume, David  76, 112, 137 hunting  17, 28–9, 31, 91–2, 117, 120–2 indigenous  92, 122 traditional methods  91, 122

Japan  88, 92–3, 102, 108, 124 Jefferson, Thomas  106 justice  56–7, 59, 96, 99–101, 109, 142 future generations  96, 99–102, 105, 109–10

ideal observer  100–1, 107, 109 indigenous hunting  92, 122 indigenous people  41, 82, 84–91, 94, 147 culture  84, 88, 90 individualism  3, 5, 8, 114, 141–2 economics 8 inherent value  111, 113–16, 130, 137, 141, 148 in all individual living entities  126–7 definition 113 in international law and policy  127–8 inhumane killing  62, 121 insects  18, 28, 31, 72, 126–7 instrumental value  10–11, 13, 113–14, 126, 128, 131 interest rates  47–9 intergenerational equity  99, 102, 108, 110, 148 International Conference on Population and Development  12, 52, 65, 104 international environmental law  1–3, 50, 52–3, 133, 143–4, 146–9 aesthetics 2 animals  111, 133, 143, 148 biodiversity  50, 53, 146 conservation  3, 40, 50, 144, 146–7, 149 ecosystems  23, 131, 138, 143–4, 148–9 ethics  3, 47, 53, 143 future generations  2, 102, 109, 148 natural resources  102 and religion  52–3 values  1, 40, 50, 52, 67, 82 International Whaling Commission  39, 88–9, 91, 117, 122, 125 intra-generational equity  108, 110, 148 intrinsic value, see inherent value

Kant, Immanuel  8–9, 22, 69, 99, 113 Kepler, Johann  7 keystone species  17, 24, 145 killing  31, 71–2, 92–3, 115, 119–22, 142 humane 121 inhumane  62, 121 laboratory animals  123–4 land ethic  133, 137–8, 141, 143 liberalism 8 liberties 118 Locke, John  8, 76, 99 Lovelock, James  17, 137 Lucretius 5 Luke 57–8 Machiavelli, Nicolo  23 markets  25–7, 39, 50 market problems  48–9 Marx, Karl  10, 100 mass extinctions  131–2 Matthew  57, 60 medicines  16, 24, 28, 123, 145 traditional  32, 92–3 mentally disabled  112 migratory species  21, 39, 73, 86, 102, 134 Mill, John Stuart  9, 113 Millennium Declaration  1, 104 Millennium Development Goals  20, 64–5, 135 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment  14, 29, 46, 132 minke whales  92, 118 Montaigne, Michel de  7, 69, 112 Moore, George Edward  70, 82, 113–14 moral consideration  81, 108–9, 128, 137, 143, 147–8 animals  111–15, 119, 129, 148 future generations  98–101 moral value  113, 119, 136, 138, 140, 148 morality, see ethics Muir, John  69–70, 78–9 national parks  30, 52–3, 73, 80, 86, 101–2 natural beauty  70, 73–4 natural heritage  30, 73–4, 85, 102, 119 natural resources  11, 38, 41, 43, 70–1, 82–3 economics  26, 32, 38, 41, 50, 82 future generations  11, 19, 38, 102 nature aesthetics  68–70, 73, 75–6, 79–80

Index animals  113–14, 117, 127–8 anthropocentricism  5–10, 12 culture  83, 89–90 economics  30–1, 37, 43 extinction 131 future generations  104 harmony with  136, 138 religion  53, 55–62, 65 self interest  20–1 necessity  34, 65–6, 113, 120, 122–3, 138 Newton, Isaac  7–8 Nietzsche, Friedrich  9–10, 69 non-anthropocentric approaches  2–3, 80, 111, 128, 130 non-lethal research  124–5 Norway  89, 118 Nozick, Robert  22 nuclear waste  96–8 objectivity 80 observers, ideal  100–1, 107, 109 ozone layer  33–5, 138, 144, 149 pain  91, 93, 112–13, 115, 119–20, 122 Pantheism 53–4 Parfit, David  106–7 Pearce, David  26–7, 29, 41, 43, 46, 49 petrels  88, 121–2, 135 philosophy  1, 4, 6–9, 76, 112, 114 Pinchot, Gifford  25, 98, 108 plants  16, 18, 31–2, 126, 128, 136 Plato  5, 7, 14, 77 Pliny the Younger  69 Plotinus 69 Plutarch 112 poaching  46, 92–4 political problems  49–50 pollution air  16, 24, 34–5, 78 chemical 1 economics 33–7 prevention  11, 50, 146 population  12, 47, 51–2, 63–6, 92–3, 104 family planning  63–5 International Conference  12, 52, 65, 104 International Conference on Population and Development  12, 52, 65, 104 poverty  39, 104 power  59, 61, 66, 68, 83, 146 predators  31, 90, 114 prices  26, 38, 41–4, 50, 146 economic  38, 42, 50, 146 Protagoras  5, 76 protected areas  21, 28–32, 73, 75, 136, 139 public policy  46, 106 Puritans 62 Pythagoras 5 radical ecology  56, 62, 138 radioactive waste management  96–8

195

rationality  5–6, 8–10, 40, 109, 112, 115 animals  5–6, 112, 115 value 6 Rawls, John  59, 100–1, 109 Ray, John  33, 59 recreation  28–9, 32, 70 recreational value  18, 21, 28 reef recreation  29 Regan, Tom  72, 108–9, 112, 115, 122, 130 religion  2, 9, 51–67, 78, 82, 145–6 anthropocentricism  9, 78 Bible 56 biodiversity 58 as catalyst for environmental concern  53–6 Christian stewardship ethic  56–66 Christianity  51, 55–6, 62 conservation  54, 66 cruelty 63 environmental policy  6, 59 environmental protection  51, 53–4 ethics  6, 9, 52, 54–6, 58–9, 78 future generations  2, 145 God  9, 62 humanity 9 influence  51–2, 66 and international environmental law  52–3 nature  53, 55–62, 65 Pantheism 54 population  51–2, 66 Puritans 62 slaughter 63 stewardship  51, 54–5, 58 religious environmental ethic  55–6 religious values  52, 54, 63, 67, 146 respect for life  115, 128 ethics 115 trees 115 reverence  41, 91, 127 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development  12, 87–8, 103, 138 risks  36–7, 42, 45, 95, 98, 100 Sabbath 57 sacrifices  49, 57, 95, 99, 106 Salt, Henry  113 Schweitzer, Albert  127 seals  21, 71–2, 88, 121, 124–5, 134–5 self interest  16–17, 19–23, 145 climate change  24 direct  2, 24, 41, 145 economic 40 environmental protection  21 humanity  16, 22, 145 limits of approach  21–4 nature 20–1 protecting environment due to  14–19 recognition in law and policy  19–21 United Nations  19 value  16, 21 sentience  7, 112–13, 126

196

Index

Singer, Peter  22, 101, 109, 111–12, 122 skin cancer  33–4 slaughter  11, 63, 117 Smith, Adam  8, 14, 40 souls  5, 60–1, 69–70 South Pacific  21, 37, 73, 91, 134 sperm whales  91, 117 Spinoza, Benedict  53–4 stability, ecosystem  140–1, 144, 149 Steiner, Achim  26 stewardship  1–2, 51, 54–5, 138, 146 ethic 56–66 problems 59–66 Stockholm Declaration  19, 102 subsistence whaling  88–9, 122 suffering  92, 112–13, 120–3 Sumner, John  9 sustainability, environmental  89–90, 135 sustainable development  11–12, 20–2, 26–7, 38, 83–8, 103–5 conservation  11, 38, 53, 85–8, 134, 139 culture  2, 83, 88 economics  26–7, 41, 43, 46, 49, 101 value  2, 27, 38, 43, 85–6, 127 sustainable use  29, 38–9, 46–7, 86–7, 89, 120 theologians  55–6, 61, 66 Thoreau, Henry David  19, 69–70 thought experiments  100, 107, 109, 126 Thucydides 23 tourism  27–30, 32–3, 39, 45–6, 72; see also eco-tourism trade  32, 39, 92–3, 102, 134 treaties, see Table of Instruments tropical forests  28–9, 43, 50 United Nations  1–2, 11–12, 19–20, 85–7, 102–5, 134–5 future generations  11, 19, 85, 102–5, 108 self interest  19 UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme)  16, 20–1, 28, 34, 53, 135 UNESCO  39, 73–6, 82, 104–5 UNPF (United Nations Population Fund) 63–4 value  12, 28, 32, 85–6 United States  16, 18, 31–3, 35–6, 88, 125 economics 8 future generations  101 utilitarianism  96, 100, 111, 115, 119, 122 animals  111, 122 valuation, economic  39, 42, 44–5, 50, 146 value  24–34, 37–50, 67–80, 113–16, 126–31, 136–43 aesthetic, see aesthetic value anthropocentricism  59, 77 biodiversity  21–2, 24, 28–30, 44–5, 73, 136 conservation  25–7, 39, 45–6, 73–4, 127–8, 146–7

cost-benefit analysis  27, 41, 43–4 economic  25–8, 30–2, 37–47, 50, 93, 146 endangered species  39, 42, 46, 131, 139, 148 environmental policy  13, 27 ethics  43, 113–14, 119, 122, 127, 130 forestry 41 inherent/intrinsic  111, 113, 127–8, 148 instrumental  10–11, 13, 113–14, 126, 128, 131 international environmental law  37, 40, 50, 67, 138, 146 intrinsic  2–3, 12–13, 111, 113–14, 127– 30, 148 moral  113, 119, 136, 138, 140, 148 problem  40–1, 44–5, 50, 74, 78, 142 rationality 6 recreational  18, 21, 28 right to life  119 self interest  16, 21 sustainable development  2, 27, 38, 43, 85–6, 127 Total Economic Value  27–9, 32, 44–5 whaling 122 World Commission on Environment and Development  26, 37, 128 waste  38, 46, 96–8, 104, 109, 147 radioactive waste management  96–8 water  11, 18, 28–9, 87, 116–17, 140–1 Weiss, Edith  99, 102, 108 welfare  98–9, 101, 108, 115, 120, 123 welfare/humane considerations  119, 129, 148 wetlands  21, 28–9, 39–40, 46, 139, 142 whales  47, 91–2, 116–18, 122, 124–5, 134–5 fin 92 minke  92, 118 sperm  91, 117 whaling  47, 88–91, 117–18, 122, 125, 134 culture 89 economics 47 endangered species  39, 102 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling  13, 47 International Whaling Commission  39, 88–9, 91, 117, 122, 125 Norway  89, 118 right to life  117 subsistence  88–9, 122 value 122 wilderness  18–19, 21–2, 24, 58, 61, 80 women  64–5, 105 World Charter for Nature  20, 72–3, 103, 128, 135, 138 World Commission on Environment and Development  12, 20, 26, 37–8, 49–50, 72 World Conservation Strategy  11, 127–8, 135, 138